


BORDERWORK IN TIMES OF CRISIS?
CONTROL, CARE AND THE RESOURCE OF EMOTION

Lewis John Dowle

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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
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Borderwork in Times of Crisis?
Control, Care and the Resource of Emotion

Lewis John Dowle



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of

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at the University of St Andrews

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Abstract

This thesis explores an internal EU border in Northern Europe during a 'crisis' scenario. In the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War, during 2015 Sweden received 160,000 applications for asylum, the third highest total number in Europe. Consequently, Sweden introduced three forms of border controls to restrict numbers, marking a significant shift in Swedish asylum policy. This thesis engages with the notion of 'political moments' concerning how occasions of heightened visibilities could be appropriated and brought into the political milieu in Sweden and Denmark during 2015-2016 and subsequently used in the operations of borderwork by state and non-state actors. Borderwork is understood in this thesis in a Rumfordian manner, where state and non-state actors can contribute to actions of bordering and debordering. The thesis analyses Sweden's border controls, grounded in particular contextualities and operating within a specific EU legal framework. This thesis draws on semi-structured interviews with 53 individuals primarily from the state and civil society in both countries. Complexities within and between civil society and the state concerning borderwork are shown as being interpenetrating, and the state's pervasive extension is explored through 'the Snake' and Posthusplatsen. Emotion as a political resource (which can be appealed to, framed and (re)produced to shape discourses) is analysed and seen vis-à-vis the political left and right as a mobilising force in both bordering and debordering. Finally, and as part of this, the notion of mourning is explored concerning the evocative question: Is this Sweden?

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Declarations

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I, Lewis John Dowle, do hereby certify that this thesis, submitted for the degree of PhD, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. I confirm that any appendices included in my thesis contain only material permitted by the 'Assessment of Postgraduate Research Students' policy.

I was admitted as a research student at the University of St Andrews in September 2018.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

“Under circumstances in which the highly familiar grows more and more unfamiliar, the resulting amalgam of insecurity and dis-ease [sic] of confusion and festering frustration, the resulting desire for remooring [sic], is readily reworked by many into a reassertion of national (regional, local) symbols/meanings/values/idea-logics, by way of a reassertion of difference, is readily reworked into discourses and practices apt to focus on those who culturally and physically embody the newly unfamiliar, apt to victimise those ‘less advanced’, ‘unmodern’ migrants, refugees, or minorities who most readily serve as scapegoats for *all* that is newly unfamiliar, for *every thing* [sic] and *every relation* that is newly different, newly understood, or newly unappreciated”
(Pred, 2000, pp. 30–31, emphasis in original).

This thesis explores a simple but profound question for the contemporary border scholar: how is borderwork deployed, negotiated and navigated by the state and civil society in a crisis scenario? Within the pages of this thesis, this question is explored in a particular context, namely the Swedish and Danish border during Europe’s turbulent migratory events of 2015-2016. This context allows for the studying of a border and the sites of tension within and between Sweden and Denmark that were emblematic of the political struggle present at the time across much of the West with rising right-leaning populist parties and the deployment of civil society at a large-scale in contesting and negotiating the borderwork being undertaken.

Following the earlier challenges within Europe financially in 2008 and the Arab Spring in 2011 (Bialasiewicz, 2011; Moisiu et al., 2013), unrest in much of the Middle East and beyond resulted in Europe receiving more than one million new applications for asylum in 2015 from which “[t]here is no such precedent for such a large and abrupt flow of war refugees from the Middle East to Europe” (EuroStat, 2016; Heisbourg, 2015, p. 8). The “*unresolved political problem*” of Europe (with para-sovereignties navigating the complex political and juridical terrain of the

Schengen Agreement and Dublin Regulation) was facing one of its gravest threats, centred around the issue of borders and “Europe’s *self*-imagination as a guarantor and conveyor of certain rights and values” (Balibar, 2002, p. 72, emphasis in original; Bialasiewicz, 2008, p. 76, emphasis in original; Johnson, 2017). Though geographically situated in northern Europe and distant from the key entry points to the continent for those seeking asylum (namely Greece and Italy), this did not exempt Denmark and Sweden from playing influential roles in the imagination and ramifications of a European ‘migration’ or ‘refugee crisis’ (cf. Carrera et al., 2018b, Gilbert, 2015; Kreichauf, 2021).

Following the turn of the millennium, within the Nordic countries, Denmark’s immigration policies stand out as the most severe, contrasted with Sweden’s (previously) more generous asylum policies (Pyrhönen et al., 2017). Despite Sweden’s self-image and international reputation, a plethora of discrimination, xenophobia and racism has been present – *even in Sweden* (Pred, 2000). During 2015, Sweden received approximately 160,000 new arrivals¹ bringing with it political challenges and a “refugee crisis... [as] part of a larger European (and global) phenomenon” (Dahlgren, 2016, p. 384). Denmark, though receiving considerably fewer total applications for asylum than Sweden (approximately 21,000) in 2015, still received per capita a higher value than the EU average and over three times that of France (EuroStat, 2016; Pew Research Centre, 2016).

¹ Figures for the total number of new arrivals varies between data sources. For example, according to Sweden’s Migration Agency (*Migrationsverket*), Sweden received 162,877 first-time asylum seekers (Migrationsverket, 2020a). According to EuroStat (2016), the figure is 156,110. A similar situation is present in Danish figures. From Statistics Denmark (2020c), Denmark’s gross figure of asylum was 21,315 whereas according to EuroStat (2016), first-time asylum applications was 20,825. Though the figures are different, the margins are relatively minimal.

Across the world, Sweden had been perceived as a pioneering receiving country for those in conflict, yet one author in popular media branded the events of 2015 in Sweden as ‘The Death of the Most Generous Country on Earth’ (Traub, 2016) with many across the world seeing the country as one in crisis (see Åberg, 2019). Such a political milieu did not emerge only out of the events of 2015-2016 but goes back several decades (Pred, 2000). The increase in new arrivals in the decades building up to 2015 from a starkly different cultural background presented opportunities and challenges, including the navigation of a taut political climate and the responsibilities that asylum entails (Hagelund, 2020).

Within both countries, a strong presence of right-wing political parties (Danish People’s Party and the Sweden Democrats) is present, though these are not to be conflated as important nuances distinguish these parties, as discussed in Chapter 4 (see Bialasiewicz, 2020). In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) received the second highest percentage of votes (21.2%) in the Danish general election just months before the beginning of the key events of 2015 (Statistics Denmark, 2020a). The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) are Sweden’s leading right-wing populist party and though not receiving as high a vote in the 2014 election prior to the focus of this thesis (12.9%), their political support increased up to 17.5% in the election four years later (SCB, nd). Both parties campaign on anti-immigration rhetoric and their popularity and political presence is an important backdrop to the events of 2015.

The timeline in which this thesis concentrates spans approximately 11 months, beginning in August 2015 and concluding in July 2016. It is important to note that August 2015 was not the ‘origin’ of the crisis, nor indeed was July 2016 (the introduction of the ‘temporary’ law) the

‘end’ of such challenges (see Pred (2000) for a longer history in the Swedish context). Nevertheless, it is between these two bookmarks that this thesis focuses its attention concerning the nature of borderwork over this short period time. These dates reflect that in Sweden and Denmark in 2015, though receiving steadily increasing numbers in the years prior, both reached their highest levels of new arrivals. In addition to this, it was the first time Sweden and Denmark had activated the ‘temporary’ re-introduction of the border since the origin of their participation in the Schengen Agreement, a trend that has been growing across the continent (Salomon & Rijpma, 2021)². Finally, the legacy of the border controls remains several years after these key events with ‘temporary’ border checks still in place (as of July 2022) and the ‘temporary’ law moving asylum policies to the EU minimum now being permanent as of July 2021. This thesis focuses on Sweden to understand the events and borderwork undertaken in Sweden during these key months. To more fully understand Sweden’s borderwork, considering Denmark is important concerning their geographical, political and cultural proximity with Sweden, therefore discussions are presented throughout the thesis with comparisons and juxtapositions between the two.

In August 2015, an increasing number of new arrivals entered Sweden, primarily via the city of Malmö and the smaller city of Trelleborg further down the southern coast. Civil society provided large amounts of care both in line with the state and in opposition. For reasons explored within this thesis, in response to the unprecedented migratory events, the Swedish state introduced three forms of border control: border checks, identity control and a

² The one exception was a ten-hour temporary re-introduction of the Swedish border following the Oslo shooting in 2011 (European Commission, 2022).

‘temporary’ law. These three forms of border controls – occurring in November 2015, January 2016 and July 2016 respectively – serve as three foundations to this thesis’ case study.

The Swedish state recognised the need to introduce some form of border controls in November 2015 to mitigate the numbers of new arrivals in line with the EU legal framework in which they were operating. This was initially made by introducing border checks centred at the first train station in Sweden en route from Denmark, Hyllie. Here, Sweden’s police force would engage with every passenger on the train ascertaining whether they were eligible to enter Sweden, need to be turned back to Denmark or directed to the Swedish Migration Agency to open a process for asylum. This initial measure made by the Swedish state ensured that the new arrivals would be required to seek asylum in Sweden and that they would not remain in Sweden illegally or pass through to Norway or Finland.

Two months later, Sweden introduced a complementary border control, namely the identity control (ID control). From 4th January 2016, individuals taking any form of public transport into Sweden were required to show some form of identification prior to boarding, a policy directed at the new arrivals (particularly unaccompanied minors, see Chapter 5), of whom many had no form of identification. Accordingly, such individuals were not as easily able to enter Swedish soil and therefore were less able to seek asylum there. In July 2016, Sweden’s third form of border control came into effect. The ‘temporary’ law (which was extended in 2019 and became permanent law in July 2021) marked a significant moment in Sweden’s change in asylum policies down to the European Union’s (EU) minimum (Emilsson, 2018; Regeringskansliet, 2015a). The ‘exception’ of the ‘temporary’ law had become the ‘new normal’, symbolically as well as legislatively (Agamben, 1998). Each of these three measures of border controls in

Sweden operated within a specific EU context and legal framework and are explored in more detail in Chapter 5. The legalities associated with the Schengen Border Code and the Dublin Regulation were present and important concerning the juridical framework in which Sweden was operating.

This thesis explores a series of 'moments' of heightened visibilities in the build-up to and deployment of the three forms of border controls. Such moments served as political resources that were framed and appropriated by actors within narratives, representations and discourses to achieve political aims. This understanding eschews such moments as direct causalities and rather perceives moments as a resource which form a 'constellation' attesting to the contextual complexity of borderwork (cf. Cresswell, 2008). These moments did not have intrinsic meanings in and of themselves but were rather awarded such meanings through the discourse in which it was operative and brought into the political. Accordingly, the same moment (as will be seen in Chapter 5) may be inscribed with significantly different meanings by different participants. This thesis will explore in particular six moments which were (among others) influential as political resources: the image of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian boy found dead on a Turkish beach; large numbers of new arrivals walking on the Danish highway; the image of a Danish man spitting on new arrivals from a bridge above the highway; large concentrations of new arrivals at Malmö's Central Station; 2,000 unaccompanied minors going missing from Trelleborg; and the Swedish Migration Agency being unable to accommodate all the new arrivals. These moments were brought into the political and functioned as an important component to borderwork as agents could draw on heightened visibilities to frame a particular narrative or discourse.

The term borderwork is central to this thesis, understood as state and non-state agents that are bound up in the process of the “construction, dismantling, or shifting of borders” (Rumford, 2006, 2008, 2012, p. 897, 2014). Individuals, organisations and states can, by their actions, rhetoric and decisions, strengthen existing borders (bordering) or strive to bring them down (debordering) in processes of borderwork (Rumford, 2008). This borderwork was demonstrated not only in the state’s deployment of the border via the aforementioned forms of border controls but also present via ‘ordinary people’ that made up civil society (see Chapter 6), where multiple actors could draw on moments in their (re)production of the border (Rumford, 2012). The efforts of civil society were concentrated at Malmö Central train station, the key hub for new arrivals entering Sweden, where borderwork was undertaken in co-operation with and confrontation to the Swedish state.

To understand this borderwork more fully, I will explore how emotion was used as a resource in the operations of borderwork (Chapter 7). Within this thesis, I adopt a nuanced lens by which to study emotion, namely to study the role and discursive construction of emotion as a resource rather than conducting an analysis of emotion itself. My analysis pertains to the agent’s (re)framing of emotion as a resource as it is brought into the political milieu. Within this thesis, I explore anger and fear as two prominent emotions which were influential in the mobilisation of care and control (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Walters, 2011). In addition to this, the importance of nostalgia and ‘mourning’ are explored as potent emotional frames by which to appeal to emotions and representations of the nation, carrying significant political repercussions (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011).

In total then, and in dialogue with the literature explored in Chapter 2, three research questions are explored in this thesis:

1. Concerning the Swedish-Danish border, how did the Swedish state react to the events of the large number of new arrivals into the respective countries, particularly regarding their governance?
2. How did Swedish civil society contribute to actions of borderwork and what was the nature of such interactions with regards to state and civil society actors?
3. To what extent is emotion as a resource important in the operations of borderwork?

Each of these three questions reflect and draw on different aspects of borderwork, contributing to the wider aim mentioned earlier concerning the deployment, negotiation and navigation of borderwork. The layout of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, a broad array of literature is presented and critically discussed, focusing particularly on four broad themes in the context of borders: the situating of the border; the prospect of a general theory of the border; the nature of citizenship and civil society; the role of imagination and emotion.

The subsequent chapter (Chapter 3) explores the methodological foundations for the thesis. A total of 53 individuals were interviewed remotely using semi-structured interviews which formed the empirical foundation for this qualitative study. Participants included individuals from state and non-state roles ranging from politicians (including the former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden) and anarchists, to municipal staff and clergy. Chapter 3 presents the methodological procedure adopted and engages with literature pertaining to interviews as a qualitative method, particularly when used remotely. To contextualise a case study is

paramount for scholarship and Chapter 4 addresses this. Wider events (notably the Syrian Civil War) are brought to attention and gradually zoomed in from the European scale down to the nation-state level of Sweden and Denmark. The particular EU legal framework in which Sweden and Denmark operated in during this timeframe is explored as well as the recent political climate in the two Nordic countries. Following this, a timeline of the major events and dates is shown concerning contextualities, moments and the deployment of border controls.

In Chapter 5, the deployment of Sweden's three forms of border controls (border checks, identity control and the 'temporary' law) are critically analysed. The six moments are firstly presented and analysed concerning how research participants brought these occasions of heightened visibilities into the political. In order to analyse sequentially the unprecedented deployment of the border controls in Sweden, the specific legal framework (such as the Schengen Border Code) is presented throughout, forming and shaping the juridical possibilities that were available to Sweden.

Within Chapter 6, focus is directed to the ambiguous collective of 'civil society' and complements the discussions in the preceding chapter. Following Rumford's understanding of borderwork, civil society and their operations of borderwork are explored. The examples of 'the Snake' and Posthusplatsen are critically reflected upon concerning a biopolitical governance and extension of the state in their interactions with civil society, as well as the dynamics within and between civil society (Sciascia, 2013; Topak, 2014).

In this thesis' penultimate chapter (Chapter 7), the role of emotion as a political resource is explored. The emotions of anger and fear are explored in relation to how participants (ranging

from anarchists to the Sweden Democrats) drew on these emotions as resources to shape the political milieu and operations of borderwork. Following this, the role of nostalgia and mourning are critically reflected upon in light of a poignant question from a participant: Is this Sweden?

Finally, in Chapter 8, a series of conclusions are drawn based on the discussions prior. Present throughout this thesis are scholarly contributions (for further contributions, see Section 8.3) that build upon the other and form valuable contributions within the academy and beyond. Firstly, the case study of Sweden and Denmark during the turbulent times in Europe of 2015-2016 serves as an important frame by which to understand migration, border controls and legal architecture concerning borders. Whereas much literature concerning 2015-2016 centres on Europe's external borders (particular its southern border) or the Balkans (for example, see Artero, 2019; Bernát et al., 2016; Bocskor, 2018; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Dessewffy & Nagy, 2016; Egres, 2018; Kersch & Mishtal, 2016; Panebianco, 2016; Perkowski, 2016; Sunata & Yıldız, 2018; Wodak, 2019; Zaviršek, 2017), the emphasis in this thesis is on a northern European and internal border³. The example of Sweden and Denmark provides a valuable insight into the wider crisis which unfolded across the continent during this time, illuminating politics of dissension, a reactionary move to the political right, the complex dynamism between state and civil society, the negotiation and navigation of a particular EU legal framework and the deployment of borderwork, all within the context of Northern (and a Nordic) Europe. Further, the events within Afghanistan and Ukraine in recent months serve to underscore the importance of such discussions concerning present or potential future migrations into Europe.

³ For Nordic studies in relation to this time frame that may be of interest, see Emilsson (2018), Kaun and Uldam (2018), Krzyżanowski (2018), Peterson (2017) and Stokes-Dupass (2017).

Secondly, the thesis engages with Rumford's notion of 'borderwork' concerning both the state and civil society in the processes of bordering and debordering. An important component to this is the use of 'moments' as instances of heightened visibilities which can be utilised and drawn upon as political resources in the operations of borderwork. The 'crisis' contextuality explored in this thesis presents opportunities for such theoretical reflections that may be applicable in other space-times. Thirdly, the analysis of the role of emotion as a political resource in borderwork is a valuable contribution to borderwork in a crisis scenario. The exploration of emotion as a resource unlocks an additional layer of insight to the case study concerning how emotions such as anger and fear could be drawn upon in both the mobilisation of care as well as in the rhetoric of populist parties. Prior to these important contributions and findings, however, a critical discussion on accompanying literature is present and it is to this that I first turn.

Chapter 2 – Review of Literature

“Bordering practices do more than disrupt flows: they also produce the spaces that borders separate. It is thus at the border that the everyday construction of political space comes into sharp relief. It is at international borders that we are reminded of the enduring power of the nation-state, as it is at the border that we often see the visions of supranational connection falter. At the same time, the very efforts of states to control borders illuminate the limits of state power and the increasingly transnational character of actual political practice” (Kuus, 2020, p. 1188).

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines academic literature concerning borders, civil society and emotion to correspond to the aforementioned research questions. Broadly, this chapter will explore four debates in the literature pertaining to these fields: the location of the border; generalising a theory of the border; the complexity of civil society; and the role of imagination and emotion. Literature will be engaged with and critically reflected upon, with the contributions of this thesis (Section 8.3) building upon these discussions. The first section (Section 2.2) will explore the task of ‘placing’ and situating the border, a dynamic that is essential to understand pertaining to the operations of borderwork. From approximately the turn of the millennium, the processual border emerged as a dominant academic trend and paved the way for a Rumfordian understanding of borderwork which is central to this thesis (Rumford, 2006, 2008). As part of the discussion, I will argue that Coleman and Stuesse's (2014) focus on both topographical and topological readings of the border is helpful for understanding what a border is and where it may be found. Correlatively, biopolitics, understood in an Agambenian and Foucauldian manner, will be critically reflected upon concerning what Walters (2002) termed the ‘biopolitical border’. Tied to the discussion of the situating of the border

(topographically and/or topologically) is the notion of securitisation bound up within sovereignty and the quotidian.

The second section (Section 2.3) of this chapter will explore the academic debates concerning the possibility of a generalisable theory of the border. The central authors who proposed the paradigmatic shift to processual understandings of the border (Newman and Paasi) were also the ones who cautioned against the generalisability of the border (though precisely what a 'general theory of the border' means is perhaps less clear). Their thoughts were highly influential in this debate yet have been challenged, for example, in the work of Brunet-Jailly and Ferdoush. In my paper entitled, '*Toward a (Co)Relational Border: Order, Care and Chaos at Nordic Borders*' published in *Political Geography* (2021), I engaged with this debate in part by exploring the relational dimension to borders spatially and chrono-politically, arguing that borders are to be engaged within this (co)relational understanding to better understand the processual border. Within this thesis, I continue to critically reflect on this topic and complement these discussions with the literature within borderscapes. I will explore and build upon these debates in light of the analytical chapters contained within this thesis.

Thirdly, this chapter will explore in its complexity the topic of 'citizenship' and 'civil society' (Section 2.4). The term 'civil society' is critically analysed and its ambiguous nature pertaining to the border, its deployment and operations is acknowledged. Far from being readily contained and controlled, the effervescent nature of the term results, in many respects similarly to 'borders', in a plethora of definitions and understandings. Recognising the volatility, ambiguity and polysemic nature of the concept of 'civil society' will serve as important discussion points.

Finally, in Section 2.5, imagination and emotion are explored, including the resourceful use of emotion in politics (particularly concerning anger and fear) and literature pertaining to 'emotional language'. The way in which populist parties engaged with and appealed to emotion in their political discourse has formed a prominent part of this understanding of emotion and emotional language, and this is extended further in Chapter 7 of this thesis. In addition to this, literature concerning nostalgia and mourning is presented as important analytical frames by which to engage with the wider topic of emotions as resources.

2.2 Situating the Border

2.2.1 Introducing the debate

In recent decades of scholarship pertaining to borders, it has not been uncommon for borders to be understood in one of two ways: concentrated at the territory's edge or in fact 'everywhere'. Agnew's (1994) caution of a 'territorial trap' paved the way for debates and reflections existing (and operating) beyond a territory's edge, breaking conceptually free from container-based theorising of the state (and the border). Borders were understood to be diffused, multiple and, in effect, to be found 'everywhere' (Balibar, 2002; Kesby, 2005). As part of this insight, the border has been studied accordingly, not just as walls or barriers at a territory's edge, but something to be explored at the corporeal level (Popescu, 2015) as well as being contained in our pockets (Häkli, 2015).

However, as will be discussed in the subsequent pages, territorial edges remain pertinent and hugely influential in contemporary borders. To frame borders as operating exclusively in their multiplicities (socially, politically, culturally and otherwise) carries the potential for neglect at

the territorial edges and consequently may hamper the border scholar. Coleman and Stuesse (2014) understood the gravity of this dichotomy and/or trend towards a diffused border most clearly in their discussion on topographical and topological understandings of the border, arguing against their mutual exclusion and instead positing an inherently enmeshed and complementary understanding. In this section, then, I provide a discussion of the evolution of the situating of the border (processual, reified, biopolitical and quotidian) which encompasses the debate in which the scholar asks the simple yet highly layered question: what is a border and where is it to be found?

2.2.2 The Processual Border

Within the discipline of geography, two articles by Anssi Paasi and David Newman in 1998 provided important, nuanced and insightful conceptualisations of the border, sparking a 'processual shift' in subsequent scholarship. Paasi (1998) sought to understand the border as a *process*. Without neglecting the importance of borders as a territorial limit, Paasi (1998, p. 75) invited scholars to broaden their vision of the 'border' to include its "manifestations of social practice and discourse". This change in approach carried significant ramifications. The processual border focused on representation, what Paasi referred to as 'ontological narratives' of identity and division. Consequently, he implored the reader to understand borders across a multitude of scales and appearing in manifold guises, including fences and fables.

Newman and Paasi (1998) co-authored an article which similarly sought to (re)conceptualise the border. The authors stressed the geographical significance of the border in its

‘multidimensional nature’, attributing a dynamism to borders (and the state), arguing that they exist contingently but also contextually, rooted in historical dimensions and human cognition. This processual school of thought regarding borders champions the importance of institutions and practices across all scales, intimately related to issues of sovereignty, power and identity. Newman and Paasi (1998, p. 194, emphasis added) succinctly wrote, “[b]oundaries are therefore both symbols and manifestations of power relations and social institutions, and they become part of daily life in diverging institutional practices”.

In the same year as the above two papers, the philosopher Étienne Balibar proposed new thoughts on borders which many took to be instrumental in a new wave of scholarship. Balibar (1998) understood borders to be liberated from a line at the edge of a territory (cf. Agnew (1994)), to be now seen (or experienced) as ‘dispersed’ *throughout* a society. Geographically, this entailed a transition from a ‘line’ to a ‘space’ (Laine, 2016). Instead of a world with ‘no’ borders as proposed by scholars in the previous post-Cold War years, Balibar (1998, p. 220) emphatically noted in reply that “borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localisation and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled”, making the claim that modern borders “are dispersed a little everywhere” (Balibar, 2002, p. 71). Balibar (1998, pp. 220, 217) argued succinctly “that [borders] are no longer at the border”.

What these three scholars each observed was the contingent and contextual nature of borders. “We may not necessarily see the lines,” Newman (2006, p. 143) later wrote, “but they order our daily life practices [...] perpetuating and reperpetuating notions of difference and othering”. Newman and Paasi’s theorising, though helpful, risks neglecting the physical due to

its focus on the discursive and cognitive. Such a concern carries academic ramifications as seen in the work of Amilhat Szary and Giraut (2015, p. 9) who provocatively write that “[t]he border, as a line, has not only long been dead, but it may never have even existed”. Their words are likely a reaction to overly state-dominant understandings of the border (cf. Sassen, 2015).

There is merit to the processual understanding which aligns well with the borderwork (Section 2.2.3) position that I adopt in this thesis, recognising the combinations of both bordering *and* debordering undertaken by multiple actors at multiple sites (Amilhat Szary and Giraut, 2015). Nevertheless, the intention of disposing with the border as a line is not required nor is it necessary. It is essential to understand borders in a processual manner, as will be explored within the pages of this thesis, however it is dangerous to declare a territory’s edge to be ‘dead’ or ‘non-existent’ (Amilhat Szary & Giraut, 2015; Cuttitta, 2015). Instead, the multiple guises of the border (both spatially and temporally) should be studied together alongside each other, recognising a complex and entwined, (co)relational dynamic (Cuttitta, 2015; Dowle, 2021).

2.2.3 Borderwork

One particularly important development for this thesis that came out of the processual turn with border studies is Chris Rumford’s work on what he terms ‘borderwork’. Rumford (2008, p. 3) understood borderwork to be “very much the business of citizens, of ordinary people [...] constructing and contesting borders”. The role of these various individuals may vary from “facilitat[ing] mobility for some while creating barriers to mobility for others” (Rumford, 2008, p. 3). Rather though than limiting borderwork to just ‘ordinary people’, however, in this thesis I will follow Rumford's (2007) adaptation to include all individuals, state and non-state alike. In

the same way as Conduit (2020, p. 9) argued that there are “co-constitutive relationships that extend beyond borders” and “a dynamic process between actors”, this thesis draws out the dynamism at play between the state and civil society (these containers will not be treated as a given, see Section 2.4.4), recognising the importance it plays in the deployment of borderwork.

The “plurality of actors” (Toyota, 2007, p. 109) undertaking such borderwork, from government officials and politicians to charities and asylum seekers, each interact, shape, transform and challenge borders collectively at a variety of scales from the ‘geopolitical’ to the ‘local’ (Rumford, 2008). The same individual can lobby to their government to impose stricter immigration controls or engage in activism for the rights of asylum seekers, both completed under a rubric of borderwork that entails both bordering and debordering (cf. Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012). These complex aspects of borderwork “accompany each other”, as proposed by Rumford (2006, p. 157), in the co-operation, co-production and co-functioning of the border.

Building on the work of Balibar, Rumford (2012) proposed what he termed a ‘multiperspectival’ approach to borders (an epistemology adopted by the borderscape scholars, see Section 2.3.3) and ‘seeing like a border’. In opposition to solely state-centric discussions on the border, Rumford invited scholars to acknowledge the mutually co-constitutive dynamic between the ‘social’ and the ‘political’ in the formation of the border, recognising that individuals are intimately involved in the shaping of the border and not solely the state. Though this academic move is important (by recognising multiple actors and meanings attached to the border), one must not diminish the importance the state plays in contemporary borders, particularly via Sweden’s three forms of border controls.

2.2.4 The (Un)Reified Border

Harold Bauder (2011, p. 1132) argued for collaboration between ‘meaning’ and ‘material practices’ in order to prevent “the mystification and abstraction of the border concept” which accompanies scholarship that disposes of a territory’s edge. Whilst there are some lines that we cannot see, there are certainly others that we can, and a focus on the former without a grounding in the latter can tend towards this ‘mystification’. This ‘mystification’ is intensified in part due to Balibar’s scholarly reflection of a multivalent nature to a border (Balibar, 2002). Following Wittgenstein, such an understanding recognises the border to be engaged with via ‘aspect-seeing’, where one object can be perceived in multiple ways (Bauder, 2011; see also Kesby, 2005). What the Swedish/Danish border may mean for a commuter may mean something very different for an asylum seeker (Bauder, 2011; Kesby, 2005).

Jones (2010, p. 266) implored the academy to not limit bordering processes to its physical elements alone but rather to open scholarship to include this notion of aspect-seeing, the “boundary-making narratives and practices that reify, naturalize, and fetishize the category as a thing-in-the-world”. For Jones (2009a), to clearly understand the categories and differences on display in the world, it is fruitful then to observe the construction of categories that are made and who is behind the bounding processes. The metaphorical as well as the physical workings of the border are argued to be important in creating and maintaining difference. By engaging with the material *and* the immaterial, Jones (2010) thereby proposes the border to not be a given, but something that is made through both narrative and material practices. Such an approach (rather than falling into either camp of the border only as a territorial edge or the border being everywhere) argued for a more foundational and transcending understanding of

the border, where ontologically the border is not pre-given and therefore should be studied epistemologically in a consistent manner.

Despite Balibar's (2002, p. 71) claim of the border being “dispersed a little everywhere”, such an approach risks watering down the saliency and significance of particular borders (Topak, 2014; see also BurrIDGE et al., 2017; Coleman & Stuesse, 2014). Certain ‘flashpoints’ (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012) can be materially important as physical sites where the border is clearly manifested, such as at Hyllie and Copenhagen Airport train station within this thesis. Coleman and Stuesse (2014, p. 53, emphases added) phrased this dynamic clearly concerning the edge of the US/Mexico border, stating that the border “is *very much not everywhere* in the sense that it is exceptionally locationally robust and, we would add, *lethal in its territorial rootedness*”. To remain only at the cognitive level concerning processual and discursive understandings of the border carries with it the challenge of being disconnected from the grave reality that millions of individuals face each year concerning the deadly borders of the world.

It is important to note, however, that topological borders can similarly pose “very serious challenges to resident undocumented immigrant communities” (Coleman & Stuesse, 2014, p. 54). My intention here then is not to flag one form of border (topological or topographical) as being more important than the other, rather to highlight the complexity of the borders more broadly, cautioning against dispensing with territorial borders which comes as a risk when scholars argue that ‘borders are everywhere’.

Despite Coleman and Stuesse's pensive quote concerning the 'lethal' dimension of a territory's edge, it is important to reflect on the fact that these authors did not propose that the border should remain to be studied *only* at a territory's edge (pre-Agnew (1994)); rather, they proposed a symbiosis between the two, and here I am in agreement. The authors perceived two means by which to discuss the locality of borders: topographically (geopolitically) and topologically (biopolitically), with the former being a concretisation of borders in the physical landscape (particularly a territory's edge), and the latter being a diffused "management of populations" (p. 37) within a space.

Rather than maintaining an artificial division between topographical and the topological, I argue for the same framing as Coleman and Steusse, namely that "geopolitics and biopolitics", the topographical and topological, "need to be understood as deeply intertwined as opposed to distinct technologies of government" (p. 37). Only in such an understanding is borderwork, a central theme of this thesis' reflections, able to be fully developed: focusing on the territory's edge would dismiss the proceedings at Malmö Central Station as tangential; similarly, by focusing exclusively on the Central Station may result in an overlooking of the importance the territorial edge plays in contemporary borders. Thus, it is important to recognise the hybridity of both the topological and topographical when studying borderwork.

2.2.5 Biopolitics and the Topological Border

The influence of biopolitics and biopower in recent decades of academic scholarship stems primarily from the work of two authors: Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. In order to understand the topological dimension to borderwork as discussed above, determining the

origins of biopolitics (and its practicalities) is important. Biopolitics, for Foucault, was a lens centred on the body which required careful regulation and 'management of life'. His focus was centred on regulating the population on a species level (biopolitics) and the disciplining of the body (anatomy-politics), working in symbiotic fashion. Various disciplines emerged (economic, political, militaristic) serving the rising aim of "the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations", culminating in what Foucault perceived as "the beginning of an era of 'bio-power'" (1978, p. 140). Foucault provocatively stated that during the 18th century, for "the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence" (1978, p. 142).

Foucault's understandings were critiqued in Agamben's work, particularly in relation to biological and political existence. Agamben (1998) begins his book 'Homo Sacer' with a discussion between *zōē* (the essence of life in the natural world) and *bios* (the political dimension influencing social life). Agamben (1998, p. 9, emphasis added) stated that, in contrast to Foucault, "the inclusion of *zōē* in the *polis*... [is] absolutely ancient". This disjuncture was paramount to Agamben's work. Agamben (1998, p. 6, emphasis in original) highlighted "that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power" and that "biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception". Agamben rooted his understanding of biopolitics in relation to the *exception* of sovereignty, stemming thousands of years, and culminating in 'homo sacer'.

Homo sacer, or sacred man, referred to Ancient Roman times and customs in relation to sacrificial rituals. At its core, homo sacer is one who can be killed without juridical

repercussions but not sacrificed. Agamben referred to such existence as 'bare life'⁴. Agamben argued that this 'bare life' is found in the *polis* only in relation to the state of exception and thereby its exclusion. Following Schmitt's (2005) definition of the sovereign as the one who can *decide* upon the exception, Agamben (1998, p. 26) ultimately understood "the exception [to be] the originary form of law", and through this the establishment of rules *in relation to the exception*. For Agamben (1998, p. 142), and following Schmitt, within "modern biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or the nonvalue of life as such".

For Agamben, the modern state produces this moment where "all politics become the exception" (Agamben, 1998, p. 148). For Agamben, the camp is the archetypal example of a biopolitical space where "power confronts nothing but pure life [zōē], without any mediation" (Agamben, 1998, p. 171). In the camp, innocent lives could be taken without juridical repercussions, because of the stripping of the individual from all *bios*, leaving only the zōē of bare life to remain. In a similar manner, if the bios (the politics of social life) can be stripped at borders via juridical borderwork, then the individual is reduced to the bare life of zōē and may receive no 'political life' from the state.

Following Foucault's theorisations, William Walters (2002) developed the term 'biopolitical border'. In such an understanding, the border serves as a particular space through which the state can collect 'biopolitical knowledge' about the bodies crossing the border, helping to regulate the population and assist in its governing. The micro-management of the bordered body (cf. Popescu, 2015) in this topological approach breaks from territorial rigidity and allows

⁴ Bare life may also be translated as 'naked life', see Tangseefa (2007) as an example.

for enquiry into the precarity of bodies and how they are governed. At any moment, an individual may be asked to prove or perform their entitlement to be in that space (be it through skin colour, language or documents), with borderwork being deployed at any moment or place. Spatially then, a biopolitical (topological) understanding of the border is “defined as an abandonment of spatial or territorial control per se due to its focus on the ‘everywhere’ management of populations” (Coleman & Stuesse, 2014, p. 37). The governing of the body changes the focus from a spatial delimitation of a line or space (such as a physical wall, see Rosière and Jones, 2012), to the body that moves.

In similar fashion to Walters, Amoore (2006) drew connections between Foucault’s biopower and the present day, in this instance directing attention towards immigration control in a post-9/11 world through the ‘biometric border’. Amoore (2006, p. 338) maintained that “the biometric border undeniably draws species life into the exercise of power” through the appropriating and controlling of knowledge about the body before them. The border, via various forms of technology, becomes etched and written into the daily life of the individuals concerned, “bring[ing] territory into existence” through technological means (İşleyen, 2021, p. 1089; Popescu, 2015). Ultimately, such ‘biometrification’ (Scheel, 2013) is an alteration from controlling a physical border to determining the bodies that cross such borders, rupturing, Scheel would argue, the topographical dominance to border scholarship. It would then result in, for Popescu (2015, p. 103), a move towards “border bodyscapes” which are far from static and linear but are instead mobile and living.

Such understandings rhyme with Balibar’s theorising of the border, however, as I will argue in this thesis, a topological understanding of the border alone is not sufficient to capture the

Swedish/Danish border observed in this thesis. Infrastructure, press conferences, discourse, activism and documentation each and all play considerable roles in the totality of what can be understood as borderwork and focusing only on the biopolitical risks missing out on other instrumental components to the border. Only in recognising the diversity of the border (both topographically *and* topologically) can a more complete picture of a contextual border be painted. Foucault's call for a move away from a sovereign controlling a territory towards the topological (via a government controlling a population) redefines the spatial rubric of understanding borders (Coleman & Stuesse, 2014; Joseph & Rothfuss, 2014). However, my thoughts align with Coleman and Steusse (2014) who rightly argued for a 'hybrid' of the two, acknowledging the importance of the topographical *and* the topological in relation to the border. Within the context of this thesis, the hybridity between the two are seen in relation to Sweden's border controls where both the body and the territory are guarded, managed and governed.

2.2.6 Securitisation, Sovereignty and the Citizen

Following on from this discussion of the location of the border (as something not to be studied solely at a territory's edge or only diffused across a society), the issue of securitisation emerges in its connection to sovereignty and the border. Securitisation and borders have been a prominent political issue for millennia (Popescu, 2015), however the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks proved important moments in contemporary understandings of securitisation explored above concerning biometrification and the biopolitical border (Muller, 2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Vollmer, 2017). Depending on how the border is perceived will dramatically change the course of actions for those undertaking

borderwork. This is precisely why the *situating* of the border (topologically, topographically or as a hybrid) is of such importance, not solely concerning ontological and epistemological abstractions: the different perceptions to the border's location will translate readily and radically to different deployments of borderwork and securitisation.

Topographically, such securitisation may emerge through the deployment of a wall serving as a deterrent not just physically but extending and overflowing into the imaginative via separation and normalisation (Alatout, 2006; Kreichauf, 2021; Rosière & Jones, 2012). Topologically, if Jones (2009b) is correct in asserting that the modern enemy to the West is no longer bound to geography but carries corporeal and ideological threats to the state, then a barbed wire fence at a territory's edge may not be a chosen form of borderwork to be deployed, rather requiring a biometric and biopolitical border control. These examples then demonstrate that perceptions of borders carry hugely significant repercussions, not just at an abstract level, but in their concretisation spatially.

Concomitant to the reflection on the changing location of the border spatially, so too have temporal dimensions been brought to the fore in discussions of borders and their securitisation, particularly through the notion of pre-emption and "policing at a distance" (Bigo, Vaughan-Williams, 2010). States can make the case for a securitisation in which a border politics is adopted within the aim of "kill[ing] them before they can kill us" (Jones, 2009b, p. 297). The amalgamation of borders temporally (and how they are perceived and constructed) shape and serve securitisation (Dowle, 2021; Von Löwis, 2015). Within the European context of this thesis (both spatially and temporally), terrorism culminated in a renewed urgency and justification for securitisation within Europe, internally and externally, with a combination of

past, present and future imaginations culminating in the border controls (C. Johnson, 2017; Vaughan-Williams in McConnell et al., 2017; cf. Dowle, 2020, 2021). If we return, then, to the question of where is the border, perhaps one means by which to answer this question is with a second question: where are the border security measures?

In order for the European project to work effectively, a symbiosis between the topological and topographical is essential to achieve this securitisation (Topak, 2014). To ensure the freedom of movement within Schengen, at once the topographical external borders need to be secured alongside the topological governing of the bodies within those borders. Topologically, this is assisted by the Dublin Regulation (for a more detailed legal framing of the contextuality, see Chapter 4) which states that individuals must apply for asylum in the first safe country in which they set foot, enhanced by the 'EURODAC' fingerprint database since 2003. Topographically, if Europe's external borders 'fail' in their objective (that is, in keeping out the Other), the nation-state may within a particular EU framework seek to 'temporarily' suspend the freedom of movement across its internal borders due to the 'security deficit' (see Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012).

Within the European context of this thesis, Corey Johnson's (2017, p. 773) theorising on 'para-sovereignities' is pertinent, arguing that "we may be witnessing the emergence of competing para-sovereignities acting within the same spaces, with neither traditional states nor the incipient state-like EU fulfilling what were traditionally viewed as the exclusive roles of modern, sovereign, territorial states". Such dynamics concerning states and the EU's 'internal deepening' of 'authority' raise important questions of sovereignty and territory, moments that

are exacerbated by crisis events such as 2015-2016 (Jabko & Luhman, 2019; Lavenex, 2016). Whereas past European states were preoccupied primarily with their external borders, this has now changed significantly in the EUropean [sic] context whereby both internal (the nation-state's territorial borders) and external (the edge of the Schengen area) borders both play pivotal roles within the para-sovereignty dynamic of the nation-state and supra-national state dynamic. In addition to this, the understanding of 'safe third countries' associated with the Dublin Convention (discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3) "reduces the burden of control" for states "at their immediate borders and increases the chances of curtailing unwanted flows before they reach the common territory" (Lavenex, 2006, p. 367). This is captured by Casella Columbeau (2017, p. 490) who noted that "[c]ontrols at national borders inside the Schengen Area have not disappeared; the modality of state control over individual's mobility has been redefined" spatially, temporally and geopolitically.

One particularly significant manifestation of this modality and para-sovereignty dynamic in the modern context is via documentation (once more, in an EU context, through the 'joint maintenance between the state and the EU (Longo, 2017)) such as the passport, what Häkli (2015) refers to as a border in a pocket. The passport is a testament to the submitting of the individual to the sovereign's rule and a prominent part of normalised contemporary migration (respected by over sovereignties) and yet may be revoked by the nation-state at any moment (Häkli, 2015; Salter, 2012). As Salter (2012, p. 743) noted, "[t]he passport is nothing but a reinscription [sic] of the absolute power of the sovereign to decide on the right to have rights, and the mutual construction of that power between sovereigns". The movement of individuals without the appropriate papers or passports creates 'anxieties' for states in which they may respond via a "*politics of migration management*" and upholding a 'paper border' (Scheel &

Ratfisch, 2014, p. 938, emphasis in original; Soguk, 2007; Sur & Van Meeteren, 2018; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020). In so doing, the joint maintenance of the nation-state and the supra-national has direct and tangible effects on the lives of individuals on the everyday level.

2.2.7 The Everyday Border(work)

Due to the dynamic extension of the state's reach biopolitically across a population in addition to the territory, the border can easily be located and experienced not just anywhere (spatially) but indeed on any day (temporally), from the classroom to the taxi rank. According to Parker and Adler-Nissen (2012), the border may be etched into the territory of a state, yet it is evidently experienced and made manifest in the lives of individuals. For Vammen (2021, p. 3, emphasis added), "borders have no clearly defined limits; *they come into being when borderwork is practised*". This follows the discussion above concerning the transition from the border as a line to a process and then specifically to borderwork, liberating the border solely from a territory's edge (yet not discounting it entirely) to something that is experienced, engaged with and even challenged in everyday spaces and practices (Johnson & Jones, 2014). What this means in a pragmatic sense is to recognise the importance of the everyday, where banal borders and borderwork seep into (and out of) the lives of the individuals in their specific contextualities. The processes of borderwork then, entailing bordering and debordering by a variety of actors, thereby takes on different spatial and temporal understandings.

Johnson and Jones (2014) referred to a 'devolution of borderwork' from the nation-state scale down to the individual level in the form of local authorities as well as everyday citizens. This 'vernacularization' of borderwork encapsulates the quotidian where individuals engage with

border(work) in their own manner (in the vernacular) and within the everyday milieu, transpiring to a polysemic production and performance of borderwork perceived via the multiplicity of agents (and scholars) concerned (Cooper et al., 2014; Sohn, 2015). Such readings and engagements with the border(work) is premised on numerous factors including the social and cultural dimensions, where Madsen (2014, p. 95, emphasis added) states that to “more fully and accurately conceptualise bordering, it is incumbent to recognise the ways in which *borders influence the daily lives of residents*”. Accordingly, far from the state retreating, a state can extend its reach in multiple dimensions through the diffusion of everyday experiences of life (Johnson, 2014).

Wemyss et al. (2018), for example, discussed the role of clergy in the undertaking of borderwork on behalf of the state. During interviews with church leaders, many spoke of the tension in relation to their vocation and the state’s imposition to prevent ‘sham marriages’. Such ministers therefore reluctantly performed the border (on behalf of the state) in something as normalised as marriage preparation. The border becomes diffused into the everyday, the mundane and the normal in a “*dialogue of actions*” between state and non-state actors (Dean, 2007; Scheel, 2013, p. 282, emphasis in original). This opens new theoretical horizons concerning not only the state’s extensions of the border or the agents themselves undertaking such borderwork but additionally the *dynamic* between the two. This debate will be reflected upon at length in Section 2.4 and Chapter 6 concerning civil society. Before this however, there is a debate in the literature that is parallel to that of situating the border, and it is to this that I first turn.

2.3 A General Theory of Borders?

2.3.1 Introducing the Debate

For all the theoretical contributions that Paasi (2005) and Newman (2006) made to critical border studies, a caveat both authors agreed upon was the seemingly fruitless exercise of seeking a 'generalisable' theory of borders. The main reason for such a caution was the profoundly contextual and complex nature of the many factors that contribute and co-constitutively form the 'border', including the state, individuals and territory, with each one feeding into and shaping the other (Paasi in Johnson et al., 2011; Paasi, 2005). As a result, Newman and Paasi would argue that applying a general theory to borders was not only not possible, but also not desirable.

The propositions of Newman and Paasi were not accepted by all and Brunet-Jailly's (2005) paper typifies the theoretical dimensions to border scholarship however others since then have seen merits in such theorisations. Frédéric Durand (2015, p. 322), writing in the *Journal of Borderland Studies*, proposed a theoretical model that "offers a comprehensive and feasible method, regardless of the contexts" to theorising cross-border sites. More recently, Azmeary Ferdoush (2018) proposed a more 'middle ground' approach in seeking theorisations that may be contextually re-applied. Newman and Paasi argued against a generalisable theory of the border, and Brunet-Jailly, Durand (and to a degree Ferdoush) perceived merits in wider scale theorisations, therefore this section will explore the debate in greater detail.

2.3.2 Theorising borders

In Section 2,2, I presented Bauder's (2011) thoughts and reflections on borders, including Bauder's engagement with Wittgenstein's notion of 'aspect-seeing'. Whether or not the border is to be understood in this manner carries great significance in relation to theorisations. Bauder (2011, p. 1130) reasons that there is an "impossibility of uncovering an overarching ordering principle that unifies various aspects of the border". In even blunter words, he later continues by arguing that the aim of achieving "a universal and fixed meaning of the border concept [...] is neither attainable nor desirable" (p. 1131). The words 'attainable nor desirable' are almost verbatim to Paasi's (2011, p. 27) concluding thoughts on the possibility of a general theory of the border in which he writes that such a theory "would seem in many ways unattainable, and perhaps even undesirable".

These two authors are not alone, with concerns also alluded to by Kolossov and Scott (2013, p. 1) who claim that "there can be no hegemonic dominance of any specific social theory" and by Adrian Little (2015, p. 436) who writes that "it is difficult to make abstract, generalisable normative comments about any individual border let alone [to] do so about borders and borderlands en masse". More recently, Peña (2021, p. 6) proposed that in reply to the question of a general theory the "answer provided is a loud 'no' because border studies are diverse and encompass a wide scope of issues, topics, and problems" and that the seeking of a unifying theory of the border "will do more harm than good in advancing our knowledge of borders". In its place, Peña proposed that perceiving the border from multiple directions can unlock and unpick nuances of the border for which a general theory would not discern.

If the border is perceived differently due to a Wittgensteinian notion of aspect-seeing, can generalisations be helpful in any manner? Or are there consistencies in which any of these aspects, though perceiving the border differently, recognise common characteristics? And is rejecting a 'hegemonic' social theory, as some of the authors above propose, the same thing as rejecting a general theory of the border? To answer these questions, in relation to the authors cited above, it is important to determine what the authors precisely meant when they wrote 'against' a general theory.

Despite his opposition to a general theory, Newman (2011, p. 44) writes that there are "a number of common themes which would appear to be applicable to most, if not all, understandings of borders, especially when the focus is shifted from the physical dimension or location of the border to an analysis of the dynamics and functionality of the bordering process". Similarly, Paasi (2005, p. 668) posited that "[a] general theory of borders would seem a very problematic matter" and yet at the same time recognised what he terms 'conceptual invariances', namely, "conceptual elements that are general enough but not totally fixed and can be further employed to theorise upon boundary-producing practices and discourses in different contexts". Similarly, despite his concerns about border theory, Little (2015, p. 444) recognised the need for "normative theories [...] to be applicable to existent and future borders". In effect, Newman, Paasi and Little, though on the surface shying away from a general theory of the border, nonetheless seek some form of generalisation. What Newman, Paasi and Little recognise, and here I am similarly in agreement, is the importance of stressing the contextuality of the border(work) in question with a sympathy to the commonalities within and between borders (see also Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014; Sohn, 2014).

On the other side of the debate, Brunet-Jailly (2005) laid out the rubric of what was termed a 'Theory of Borders'. At its core, Brunet-Jailly sought to address the academic discussion pertaining to agency and structure, this time specifically in relation to borders, following Anthony Giddens' (1995) 'structuration theory' and the duality of the two rather than a dualism. Brunet-Jailly (2005, p. 644, emphasis added) thereby sought to bring together the structural and agential into theorisations in his work, proposing that "[t]his, then, is the core of the theory of border studies: the implicit recognition that *agency and structure are mutually influential and interrelated* in the shaping of emerging and integrated borderlands".

Inspired by Brunet-Jailly's paper (2005), Ferdoush similarly sought to bring Giddens' theorisations into border studies. In his application, Ferdoush (2018, p. 188) contended that "borders are the vantage point from which the 'structure' and 'agency' divide is confronted", and individual 'borderlanders' are ascribed reflexive agency in the process of borderwork in vis-à-vis the state. Following Giddens, Ferdoush highlighted the reciprocal 'negotiations' of interactions between the agent and the structure in the reproduction of the border or the state. He writes that both "the border and borderlanders influence one another *continuously* based on how rules and resources at the border are allocated" (Ferdoush, 2018, p. 188, emphasis added).

In a paper for *Political Geography*, I proposed a '(co)relational' understanding of the border (Dowle, 2021). I argued that borders operate and function in relationship concerning state- and non-state actors across a plurality of scales. By bringing temporal (chrono-political (co)relationality) and spatial (vertical and horizontal (co)relationality) dimensions to border studies under the rubric of relationality, I sought to provide theoretical tools that, like Ferdoush

(2018), could be adapted and utilised in a variety of contexts. Far from being a 'general theory of the border', this approach permits the border to be situated within spatio-temporal relationalities and thus allows for other case studies (and indeed other theoretical lenses) to draw out particular dynamics (indeed from different Wittgensteinian 'aspects') which result in a more complete understanding of borderwork, a process that proposes commonalities that Newman, Paasi and Little would consider as valuable.

Rather than providing a 'hegemonic social theory' lens to understanding borders (the fear of authors who oppose a general theorisation of the border), (co)relationality and indeed many of the reflections contained here within this thesis are not complete nor are they generalisable to every border. Instead, they provide opportunities for reflection which may be applicable, amenable and contextually sensitive to borders outside of the Swedish/Danish context and time frame. A caveat is however needed as this sub-section is concluded. Christophe Sohn (2015) acknowledged that for all the theorisations (whether general or specific) tied up with border scholarship, it remains important that the border's complexity is not watered down. Bordering is a highly complex process that escapes direct causalities and overly simplified theorisations, operating within specific legal, cultural and historical contextualities. Despite the merits of the multiple theorisations which are adopted, adapted and built upon in this thesis, the complexity of the border(work) should not be overlooked lest the scholarship concerning border becomes domesticised and tame.

2.3.3 Borderscapes

One particularly influential 'lens' through which to engage with borderwork is that of 'borderscapes'. In 2007, Perera proposed the term 'borderscape' which served as the title of the volume 'Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory's Edge' edited by Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (2007). Since then, the term has been widely adopted, most notably through the 'EU Borderscapes Project', a €6.9 million European Commission funded project consisting of scholars across multiple countries (EU Borderscapes, nd). For Chiara Brambilla (2015, p. 18), a leading proponent of borderscapes, the merit of such a perspective is that it highlights "the complexity of borders to embrace ethical and normative issues of in/exclusion", something which had previously served as "a core epistemological blind spot at the heart of border studies". At its core, the borderscapes literature emerges up out of the processual turn and adopts Chris Rumford's (2012) 'multiperspectival' approach as its epistemological lens (Brambilla et al., 2015). Before unpacking it further, Dina Krichker's (2021, p. 1224) phrase concerning borderscapes is an enlightening one, namely that it, "seems to owe its appeal [due] to its vagueness".

Due to such theoretical fuzziness, understandings of borderscapes can vary. Elena Dell'Agnese and Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary (2015, p. 5) for example noted that there "is no unequivocal definition of the term" but that the words 'landscape' and 'border' carry "all the unresolved ambiguities of the two separate notions and multiplies them [together]". They argue that borderscapes entail an 'area', breaking free from the presupposition of a territorial edge (see Section 2.2). Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2007, p. x, emphasis added) similarly imply a rigidity to the border by stating that "[t]he border is a *zone* in between states where the territorial

resolutions of being and the laws that prop them up collapse". Rather than limiting borderscapes to an area or zone, Suvendrini Perera (2007) sought in her understanding of borderscapes to entail a spatial and temporal dimension via the 'mobile', "shifting and conflictual space", paving "the way for theorising emergent formations and practices". This understanding aligns more neatly with the borderscape perspective of Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones (2020, p. 298) who understand "such borders as mobile, relational and contested sites no longer confined to political margins but embedded throughout everyday life" as opposed to solely being an 'area' or a 'zone'.

Developing Balibar's move towards an 'everywhere' border, as has been critically discussed in Section 2.2 above, the borderscapes literature as presented by Brambilla and Jones (2020, p. 298) posits that "the border" is to be understood "not as a line but as a set of ideas and relationships across space and time". In this way, Brambilla and Jones (2020, p. 292) urge a "rethinking [of] the border 'beyond the line'". At the same time, the situating of the border (beyond the line) is to be read alongside "the way in which the very location of borders is constantly dis-placed, negotiated and represented as well as the plurality of processes that cause its multiplication at different points within a society" (Brambilla, 2015, p. 19, emphasis added). The aim of the borderscapes scholarship is therefore the "bridging [of] the metaphorical-material border gap" of the processual borderwork (Brambilla et al., 2015, p. 3).

What the borderscapes literature highlights in a helpful way, particularly as framed by Brambilla and Jones, is the importance of the 'relationships across space and time' quoted above. What this understanding translates to is a recognition (and in many respects a unifying concept) that bridges the debate of situating the border at a territorial edge or being 'diffused'

through a spatiality. At the same time, it is important to consider the variety of actors who engage in such borderwork throughout a borderscape, with a prominent component to this being civil society, which I now explore in greater detail.

2.4 Citizenship and Civil Society

2.4.1 Introducing the Debate

In most circumstances, and not just in academic literature, when borders are spoken about, there is the implicit assumption that sovereignty and citizenship exist, function and dominate the border climate. The tautological dependency of state, territory and borders remains preeminent in the contemporary world and bound up within each these three components is the enigmatical term of citizenship (Amilaht Szary and Giraut, 2015). There is much literature scrutinising the nature of citizenship in relation to its enactment, dynamics and attainment. The actions of citizens and others carry the potential of disrupting and de-stabilising categories and containers, playing an important role in the actions of borderwork (Rumford, 2008, 2012). Certain collectives may be referred to as 'civil society', a highly debated, ambiguous and contested term. Within the literature concerning civil society, authors including Kopecký and Mudde (2003), Laine (2014) and White (1994) each in nuanced ways, propose what I understand to be the most accurate understanding of civil society, namely the 'intermediary realm' between sectors, not neatly organised into containers but fluid and diverse in nature and action.

2.4.2 Citizenship and 'Acts of Citizenship'

Divisions can emerge between citizens who are deemed eligible to migratory freedoms and the “right to have rights”, and irregular migrants who are consequently denied such privileges and deemed ‘burdensome’ to a state (B. Anderson, 2015; Arendt, 1973, p. 297; Nyers, 2011; Zill et al., 2021). Due to such ‘burdening’ stigmatisation, states can make conscious efforts to dissuade, discourage or prevent individuals from seeking a new life in a different country (Zill et al., 2021). The fostering of a hostile climate towards individuals can utilise the *fear* of deportation to prevent future cases of illegalities, what Nicolas De Genova (2002) terms ‘deportability’.

This deportability can trickle from the state down into the lives of the everyday individuals. The state may pass on responsibility to its citizens to regulate illegal immigration such as via landowners assuming legal responsibilities for the legitimacy (or not) of their tenants (Crawford et al., 2016; Leahy et al., 2018). These measures aimed at individuals deemed ‘irregular’ by the state force such individuals to exist in phantasmic fashion, inhabiting “the elusive borderzone between inclusion and exclusion” (De Genova, 2015a; Mezzadra, 2011, p. 131). One option by which to escape such hauntings is via documentation such as residence permits or even passports, however such papers implicitly recognise and acknowledge the sovereignty of the state.

This approach has been challenged vivaciously by Engin Isin and Greg Nielsen (2008) who established the term ‘acts of citizenship’ seeking to break free from previous scholarship on citizenship, which the authors perceived as too regimented, determined and dichotomising (cf.

Wonders & Jones, 2019). Acts of citizenship carry seeds of “transformative power” bound up within the socio-political milieu, connected spatially to physical (and social) environments across multiple scales (Müller, 2016, p. 63). The transition of focus from the *subject* of the migrant to the *act* of the individual in question elevates “collective or individual deeds that rupture social-historical patterns” within contemporary scholarship on ‘citizens’, including individuals acknowledged and marginalised by the state (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 2).

The move towards an acts of citizenship lens is a significant one. The tripartite collective of state, territory and border in scholarship had long depended upon each other tautologically, where in removing one of the three results in the system’s break down (Amilhat Szary and Giraut, 2015). The radicality then of an undocumented individual crossing a border or acting *already* as a citizen (paying little regards to papers for example) thereby disrupts the dynamic and rhythm of citizenship. For Walters (2008a, p. 191, emphasis in original), the focus should be not on whether the individual is a citizen or not, nor should it focus on the very ‘actor’ in question; rather, the acts of citizenship perspective enables the scholar to read the actors or ‘moments’ of heightened visibilities through which “those subjects lacking formal rights or recognition constitute themselves [...] as capable of acting *like* citizens, and meriting treatment *as* citizens” (cf. Hansen, 2019).

Out of such a rupture, the status quo of the ‘citizen’ is challenged as the individual begins to exercise and narrate their agency through actions both mundane and ‘exceptional’, in dialogical and dialectical fashion (Barbero, 2012; Darling, 2014). Pellander and Horsti (2018) provide an extreme example of this by exploring the media attention towards the actions of two Afghan asylum seekers in Finland staging a hunger strike for 72 days outside the Finnish

Parliament. The *subject* of the individual had previously been denied asylum by the Finnish state, however, due to the extremity (and widespread media coverage) of the *act* of the two men not eating for such a time eventually resulted in citizenship being awarded. The individuals exemplified a “resilience and determination” beyond the state’s structural impositions, in effect disrupting the state’s control over citizenship (Minca & Collins, 2021, p. 9).

Lundberg and Dahlquist (2018) similarly engaged with ‘acts of citizenship’, this time in relation to the role of libraries in Scandinavia. In Malmö, Sweden, to safeguard the undocumented, the process for receiving the library card had been altered for those without addresses, requiring only the signature and address of the librarian as a patron in their place, thus assisting irregular migrants. The undocumented individual would *act* as a citizen through the frequenting of the library yet remains in political ambiguity regarding formal recognition by the state, fitting neatly in neither category (Wonders & Jones, 2019). The library thereby becomes a contested space, one which is inherently public but also a refuge for human rights in opposition to the “deportation machinery” present in much of the Nordic region (Lundberg & Dahlquist, 2018, p. 154).

It is important to highlight here though the act of the *citizen*, namely the librarian who serves as a proxy for the undocumented individual. Wonders and Jones (2019, p. 145) recognised this dynamic when they noted that “[t]hose who enjoy the privileges of citizenship also play a valuable role in blurring the boundaries between citizenship and irregularity” (p. 145). The status that an individual may wield can be used to disrupt (or comply with) the routinisation (spatially and temporally) of citizenship as will be seen in Chapter 6. Indeed, many of those

who act *as* citizens on behalf of those without formal citizenship operate under the umbrella term of 'civil society', however the term is far from easy to decipher or determine.

2.4.3 The Role of Civil Society

The term 'civil society' can be 'eclectic' and not easily defined (Dennis, 2007; White, 1994), with Petras (1999, p. 431) perceiving the term as "analytically useless and obfuscating". For Laine (2014, p. 59), the concept is "much used, perhaps overused, certainly misused if not abused", in addition to recognising that defining it is indeed a "political project in itself". Nevertheless, the concept serves many an important position in scholarship and everyday life, even being proposed by Fleischmann (2019, p. 65, emphasis in original) to be "the *backbone of society*". The "ecology of organisations" that makes up civil society, particularly present during the years of 2015-2016, brought to the surface a developing trend within Northern Europe where civil society would serve as essential components in the provision of welfare, ranging from care to political reform (Larruina et al., 2019, p. 53; Pries, 2019; Sandberg & Andersen, 2020). The term was used frequently by my research participants and therefore it is important to ask the question of what precisely is civil society?

In 1994, Larry Diamond (1994) in a widely cited paper proposed that civil society is "autonomous from the state" and yet at the same time serves as "an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state". What Diamond is correct in proposing is the term 'intermediary' (this ties well with White (1994)). I am more critical, however, of Diamond's use of the words 'autonomous' and 'entity'. Concerning the former, how much a civil society organisation can be 'autonomous' from the state is difficult to determine (see

Chapter 6). In relation to the latter, the term 'entity' alludes to an orderliness and container like image which is perhaps less accurate in reality. I prefer the conceptualising of Gordon White (1994) who refers to civil society as the 'intermediary realm' as oppose to Diamond's 'intermediary entity', with realm connoting a fluidity which translates better in relation to Jussi Laine's (2014) reflections below.

According to Laine (2014), civil society cannot be defined on its own terms, rather, it operates and exists as a result of the relationship it serves with others. Oftentimes civil society will thereby be understood as the privation of the state (which is similarly complex in operations, cf. Rogers et al., 2013; Sciascia, 2013) or the economy (cf. Chambers & Kopstein, 2009). In much literature, civil society may be referred to as the third, non-profit or non-governmental sector (Lewis, 2005, p. 239). Increasingly, in the past century civil society has been caught up in the political (Scholte, 1999). Though many of the activities of civil society are benevolent in nature, this is not always the case and Scholte's (1999, p. 29) caveat should be ever present in the reader's mind throughout this thesis: "it must never be forgotten that civil society is not intrinsically virtuous" and may even entail forms of 'caring racism' (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2011; see also Fox, 2001). Despite the 'heroic' label often awarded to civil society being perceived to operate in the spaces neglected by a neoliberal state, Pries (2019, pp. 5–6) cautions that, "civil society also consisted [...] [of] xenophobic collective actions and of violent and aggressive tactics against refugee reception centres and settlements" (Cantat & Feischmidt, 2019). Acts of volunteering of the civil society may lead to power differentials where the recipient is left as 'bare life' (Steen & Kirchner, 2020; cf. Vandevordt, 2019). Indeed, the provision of care made by civil society "does not happen in a social space detached from structures of dominance" with Posthusplatsen and Central Station Malmö (Chapter 6)

providing in this thesis an opportunity to explore these tensions in more detail (Scheibelhofer, 2019, p. 198).

I will adopt in this thesis then an understanding of civil society that is proposed by White (1994) and Laine (2014). Laine places civil society in a new category, a 'fourth sector' which sees the enmeshing between the state, the economy and the family. In a similar way to the 'vagueness' of the borderscape concept, such an understanding of civil society brings to light the multiple complexities present within its functionalities. This dynamic is, in many respects, a fourth sector which is premised on "a relationship among the sectors" and the eschewing of "overdrawn boundaries between civil society and other spheres" (Kopecký & Mudde, 2003, p. 7; Salamon & Anheier, 1997, p. 65). The merit to this understanding is the blurring between what is commonly referred to as 'the state' or 'civil society', recognising the messiness and overlap between the two (Kopecký & Mudde, 2003; Sciascia, 2013). Such an understanding complements White's notion of the 'intermediary realm' between the state and the family as a fluid space which recognises the complexity and reach beyond just containers. Laine (2014, p. 60) stresses then that the focus should be less on "civil society's organisational form" and more on "what is actually being done".

The activities of civil society may then be formal or informal, both in a religious and secular context, as well as activist or non-activist in nature (Carabain & Bekkers, 2011; Mesch et al., 2006; Qvist, 2018; Steen & Kirchner, 2020; J. Wilson & Musick, 1997). Why an individual may volunteer is for a multitude of reasons including for socio-economic benefits, career opportunities, social pressure, solidarity and resistance to xenophobia, religious convictions, desiring to belong, self-edification, the establishment of friendships, the seeking of social

capital and the development of social ties (Behnia, 2012; Carlton, 2015; Carpenter & Myers, 2010; Greenspan et al., 2011; Guribye & Mydland, 2018; Hamann & Karakayali, 2016; Mesch et al., 2006; Portes, 1998; Sivesind et al., 2018; Tang et al., 2012; Wilson-Forsberg & Sethi, 2015; Yap et al., 2011). Civil society serves then as a mediating capacity to “achieve various instrumental ends”, in a blurring co-operation and/or conflict with the state, operating as White’s ‘intermediary realm’ and Laine’s ‘fourth sector’ (Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018; Herbert, 2013, p. 28; Jańczak, 2015; J. Laine, 2014; Pries, 2019; Skinner & Fleuret, 2011; Tonkiss, 2018; White, 1994).

Civil society may exist due to negligence and marginalisation by the state in the provision of support for new arrivals (Kersch & Mishtal, 2016; Mayblin & James, 2019; Norman, 2019). As states have rolled back regarding fiscal provisions, civil society has been required to expand to make amends, becoming increasingly formalised in “an undeniable correlation between the advent of neoliberalism and the explosion in the number of NGOs” (Bendaña, 2006, p. 22; Nickel & Eikenberry, 2016; Pope et al., 2018; Weisbrod, 1997). This may also be present in response to policies where civil society “serve[s] as an important corrective to restrictive immigration policies” (Koefoed et al., 2021, p. 445) but also in response to political issues and tensions relating to society (Siim & Meret, 2019).

In reply to the situation of the events of 2015-2016, individuals often felt compelled to fill in the gap and “humanitarian vacuum” left by the reticent state and support the asylum seekers in the provision of care and integration (Bernát et al., 2016; Chtouris & Miller, 2017; Pries, 2019; Simsa et al., 2019, p. 1045). Despite the high levels of trust within Nordic societies more broadly, co-operation is, however, not a given (Guribye, 2018). Governments may seek to co-

operate with, utilise and fund the skilled labour of civil society to achieve a particular aim (occasionally premised on the fulfilment of certain demands by the “help-us state”) which may invite civil society to compromise and even serve as an extension of the state (Mason & Fiocco, 2017; Sciascia, 2013 Selle et al., 2018, p. 131; cf. Burchell, 1991). White, Laine and Diamond’s understanding of the ‘intermediary’ is thereby exemplified here. In part then, the “mobilisation for humanitarian causes [becomes] politicised” as states at once seek to allocate responsibility but also retain control of the situation, questioning the ‘independence’ of civil society actors altogether (Von Essen, 2019, p. 37). What this literature demonstrates, as will be teased out in Chapter 6, is the tension present the interactions between the state and civil society (recognising the blurred ‘intermediary realm’ between the two) in the provisions of borderwork.

Such tension and conflict may be manifested as well *within* civil society as demonstrated by Frykman and Mäkelä (2019) and Martin and Nolte (2020) in their studies on civil society in relation to the events 2015-2016 in Sweden and Serbia, Greece and Macedonia respectively (Guribye & Mydland, 2018; Reinhard, 2016; see also Siim & Meret, 2020). Larger ‘INGOs’ (international non-governmental organisations) expressed concern over the susceptibility to more spontaneous volunteers due to a “potential for abuse” with antipathy being shared in the reverse, as “a majority of volunteers is [sic] critical towards the adequacy of service provision on behalf of INGOs during the crisis” (Martin & Nolte, 2020, pp. 419, 422).

One particular conflict that is present within civil society is the dynamic between ‘old’ and ‘new’ humanitarianism (Fox, 2001). Historically, (old) humanitarianism recognised the need for ‘neutrality’ in order to provide the necessary charity to those most in need, on either side of

warzone or political spectrum (Adami, 2021). Principles such as 'neutrality' that are esteemed highly by 'old' humanitarian organisations such as the Red Cross are, however, deemed 'undesirable' by organisations who instead would perceive such an institution as a platform through which to engage in the political issue (Fox, 2001). Whereas old humanitarianism has as its focus, "neutrality and short-term, relief-based assistance", the 'new' humanitarianism prioritises "advocacy and development" (Adami, 2021, p. 419). The latter form of humanitarianism transpires to what Cantat and Feischmidt (2019) term the aforementioned 'vernacular humanitarianism'. By this, the authors understood the term to encapsulate the role individuals played in situations beyond formal structures to support those in need. Due to the gravity of the situation in Malmö, many civil society organisations were present, from anarchist and established civil society organisations to religious organisations and political parties; accordingly, different visions, approaches, methods and agendas resulted in conflict amidst the co-operation (see Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019).

According to Vandevordt (2019, p. 247), "[i]n a sense, all humanitarian actions are subversive", challenging the political and social milieu which surrounds the actions of civil society. Civil society by their actions may pose challenges to the state, sometimes for humanitarian aims, other times for political gains (Ambrosini & Van der Leun, 2015; Bigo, 2015; Geiger & Péroud, 2014; Wintour, 2017). Fleischmann and Steinhilper (2017, p. 24, emphasis in original) understood therefore "'apolitical' volunteering for refugees as a powerful *myth*" (cf. Bendaña, 2006). Such understandings do, however, imply a conflict relationship between two separate entities of 'the state' and the 'civil society', with this division, as I have argued thus far, being less ordered and far more entwined than neatly arranged containers

2.5 Imagination and Emotion

2.5.1 Introducing the Debate

Continuing with the debates discussed above, this section explores the complex role imagination and emotion play in contemporary political geography concerning the border. As part of the processual turn in critical border scholarship, there came to the fore the role of the cognitive in constructing borders, of which imagination plays an important role. Determining how and in what way imagination transpires to the construction of borders (and migrants) will prove valuable in this thesis. Emotion is analysed in this thesis as a (political) resource that is (re)produced and (re)presented into a specific political milieu. How emotion is brought into the political will be explored and critically reflected upon below, particularly concerning its role within populism. At the same time, the frame of nostalgia and mourning and how they can be influential in appealing to the populace is analysed.

2.5.2 Imaginative Geographies

Within geography, “the place and status of imagination is shaped by the position and pressure of an array of contrapuntal concepts such as reason, experience, reality, objectivity, morality and materiality; the imagination has conventionally taken up a location somewhere between the domains of the *factual* and the *fictional*, the *subjective* and *objective*, the *real* and the *representational*” (Daniels, 2011, p. 182, emphasis added). As the location between the ‘factual and the fictional’, Edward Said's (1978) notion of ‘imaginative geographies’ serve as a “process of fabrication and poesis” in the shaping of the geopolitical milieu (Gregory, 1995, p. 456; Mamadouh & Bialasiewicz, 2016). These productions need not remain only in the cognitive

sphere but may “have tangible and geopolitics impacts” upon the material world (Mamadouh & Bialasiewicz, 2016, p. 119). Such imagination may not then necessarily be accurate or correct, yet can be deployed as a “subjective device” for political gains (Marcus, 2009; Norton, 1989). Moments of heightened visibilities can thereby serve as a host unto which imaginations and ‘subjective devices’ are then impressed. Therefore, not as a dichotomy but rather as something intimately connected, ‘geography’ and ‘imagination’ depend on and feed into one other (Regan in Kearns et al., 2015).

Imagination played an important role in scholarship concerning migration, both in the imaginings *of* migrants and imaginings *towards* migrants (Brekke & Brochmann, 2015; Higgins, 2018; Koikkalainen et al., 2020; Marcus, 2009; Robins, 2019). Within political geography, the use of imagination is similarly pertinent. Ganesh and Froio (2020), for example, examined the role of ‘far-right imaginative geographies’ concerning the construction of crises within Western Europe, particularly culture, economy, representation, and defence, with culture being the dominant crisis in question. “[F]or the far right”, the authors argued, “events and processes that pertain to representation, economy and security are framed through the prism of *maintaining an imagined representation of authentic Europeanness that roots ethnicity to territory*” (Ganesh & Froio, 2020, p. 723, emphasis added). To maintain this ‘representation’, not just for right-leaning individuals, an individual must undertake what Bialasiewicz et al. (2007, pp. 411) termed “performative imaginative geographies”. By tying the imaginative with the performative, identities can be formed, (re)presented and negotiated in multiple ways.

Indeed, the role of imagination is similarly imprinted onto the asylum seekers and refugees themselves (see Doboš, 2018, 2020; Johnson, 2011). Such constructions, representations and

imaginings towards new arrivals are powerful and can result in significant real-world effects: “they belong to Others, while I belong to the Same, and I react to their essential difference, keeping myself in the Sameness and keeping them in the Otherness” (Doboš, 2020, p. 9). If this is present in a society’s understanding (consciously or otherwise (cf. Pred, 2000)), it is likely to result in a desire to secure the ‘Same’ and curtail the ‘Other’.

2.5.3 The Role of Emotion

Barbalet (2006, p. 55) proposed that “[n]o aspect of the social and political world is free of emotional involvement and any explanation of those things that ignore emotions is to that extent of limited utility” (see also Hoggett, 2006). The logic behind such a statement is that emotions and emotional spatialities are quintessential to humanity, and they should therefore, not be overlooked in human geographical scholarship for “our first and foremost, most immediate and intimately *felt* geography is the body, the site of emotional experience” (Anderson, 2009; Bondi, 2005; Davidson & Milligan, 2004, p. 523, emphasis in original; Jones, 2017). This visceral and embodied analysis proposed by the authors, though different to how emotion is studied in this thesis, has become prominent in geography more broadly. Bondi et al. (2017) proposed that the study of emotions (an ‘emotional geography’) must consider not only the interior dispositions of emotion but open up scholarship to the wider spatial and social milieu. In this way, the “unavoidable aspects” of emotion may be appealed to, manipulated, elicited and deployed as political resources, as was seen in the events of 2015-2016 in Sweden and Denmark (Clarke et al., 2006a, p. 3; Heaney, 2019).

For Koefoed and Simonsen (2022, p. 119), emotions are to be understood as 'relational', found "between the subject and the world" (see also Ahmed, 2014; Bondi, 2005; Laurier & Parr, 2000). Rather than placing emotion as something emerging solely from an individual (without influence from exterior realities), emotion is seen as the fusion between the two, where the relationship between the self and the outside world (re)shape, (re)form and (re)produce what we understand to be emotion. A spatiality is thereby present pertaining to the emotional, operating as a "space in which we are emotionally in touch – open to the world and to the different ways it is affecting us" (Simonsen, 2010, p. 227). Accordingly, the 'affective space' impresses on the body, influencing emotion beyond just its biological components (Simonsen et al., 2019). This relational understanding means that emotions are not to be reduced to "just active bodily actions" but should also include how the individual is "swept into [the] grasp" of emotions as a result of encounters, experiences and elicitations (Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021, pp. 576–577). This dynamic of emotion, as an "intersubjective encounter" (Laurier & Parr, 2000, p. 98), transpires into border studies in which Simonsen (2007, p. 179) perceives "border construction" to be "a relational conduct, presupposing an alien exteriority and constituting complex relationships of contradiction and connectivity". This 'border construction' can be taken as a starting point from which to explore how emotion may be used pertaining to borderwork in light of discourses, narratives and (re)presentations as political resources.

For Sara Ahmed (2014, p. 171), emotions are understood to be "mediated rather than immediate". Such reasoning implies that instead of perceiving emotion to be a 'blank canvas' (see Pain, 2009) and as something pure and untouched, it is rather (re)produced and emerging up from relations between the self and the world. In this way, rather than existing in an 'immediate' and only visceral manner, emotions can be manipulated, mediated and brought

into the political as a resource. Within scholarship, such an understanding has significant ramifications, for “[w]hen emotions are seen as only personal [...] then the systematic nature of their effects is concealed” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 198). By recognising emotion and borders in a discursively constructed fashion as a resource, scholars can thereby analyse the role emotion plays in the political dimension.

Political and state actors can thereby utilise emotion as a resource to bring forth agendas and policies, particularly within “left and right [wing] populism” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008; Heaney, 2019, p. 224). As part of an ‘emotional politics’, Heaney (2019) perceives the ‘emotional state’ to be “directly and indirectly involved in the construction and deconstruction of the emotional life of the polity” through the deployment of ‘emotional capital’. Drawing on Bourdieu, ‘emotional capital’ can be understood as a “*rigid and dynamic* resource that individuals *possess and use* as they engage in emotion practice” (Cottingham, 2016, p. 452, emphasis in original). In this way, emotional politics and their resourceful nature can thus be operative in the mundane, as well as at the highest form of government, in addition to operating within civil society (Heaney, 2019).

Rather than perceiving emotion as superfluous or tangential to activism, for example, emotion is, as Woods et al. (2012, p. 570) assert, thereby “implicit in the mobilization, framing and organization of social movements”. More than being just implicit, however, I would argue that the ‘explicit’, what may be understood as the discursive construction of emotion being brought into the political milieu as a resource, is also important to consider. To study social movements, activism and borders without recognising the important role that emotion plays as a political resource, risks neglecting an essential component to borderwork. It is also essential to

recognise, as Ost (2004, p. 242) does, that “elite politics need [...] emotions every bit as much as social movements do”. Therefore, in this thesis, recognising the use of emotion as a political resource for multiple (and diverse) actors is essential, understanding that emotion can be drawn upon by social movements in addition to political actors.

Two particularly recurring emotions that are evidenced in the literature regarding the political are anger and fear. Within populism, these two emotions have been seen to be hugely influential and effective in appealing to swathes of disillusioned voters. In a comprehensive study across 40 elections across the world during 2016-2017, Nai (2018) quantitatively found that populist politicians addressed the issue of fear 8% more than their non-populist counterparts. Though the difference is not wildly different between the two groups, across the globe it shows a consistency of the theme of fear within populism. Fear has, within populist narratives and discourses, been widely associated with a ‘fear of the Other’ (Gale, 2004). The ‘disrupting force’ of a populist party, therefore, could seek through emotional language to foment and foster a fear of the Other in the circulation and (re)production of particular narratives and discourses (Nai, 2018). This demographic fear of ethnicity ‘under threat’ within a country can thereby lead to the conflation of the Other with fear, terror and danger (Dowle, 2020; Hamid, 2017).

This notwithstanding, Rico et al. (2017) argue that despite anxiety and fear often being seen as predominant within populism, it is *anger* that is the central mobilising emotion by which populists are most successful in appealing to due to a greater receptivity to those experiencing anger than fear. In an American context, Wahl-Jorgensen (2018) explored this dynamic concerning President Trump and ‘angry populism’. Though anger is often perceived as a

negative, if the emotion can be successfully framed and elicited, then “the role of anger as a mobilising emotion” could be then used in the political clout, rhetoric and progress of populist politicians (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018, p. 775).

Within social movements, anger and fear can similarly play an important mobilising role (Jasper, 1998). For example, Kleres and Wettergren (2017, p. 508, emphasis in original), writing in relation to climate activism assert that “*fear can motivate* (rather than, as often argued, inhibit) action”, a finding supported by Feldman and Hart (2017). More common than fear, however, is the way that anger could be used as a mobilising resource (Rodgers, 2010). Concerning student protests in Spain, Sabucedo and Vilas (2014, p. 835) noted that anger not only had a mobilising effect in the movement, but this anger also was experienced collectively, where individuals felt “part of a larger group sharing the same objectives and in believing that their action may be effective”. By engaging with emotion as a resource in these dynamics, for both state and non-state actors in populism and civil society, an insight can then be awarded concerning the processual dimension of borderwork, particularly through the use of ‘emotional language’.

Within the political realm, emotional language is a valuable tool by which “leaders [may] motivate their followers to action [...] by *strategically expressing emotions* and emotion-related concepts *in their language*” (Matsumoto et al., 2013, p. 252, emphasis in original). Through narratives, stories and representations, discursive constructions of emotion can be formed and utilised with a particular end in mind (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2021). Such an approach is often premised on the assumption that politicians may use emotion to reach out to their populace, particularly concerning populist messages (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2021; Widmann, 2021).

Such emotional communication may be embodied and shown through gestures or facial expressions, however it is also present within the 'direct expression' of texts and media, both spoken and read, and appeal to rationality (Matsumoto et al., 2013, p. 252, emphasis in original).

For Richards (2004, p. 340), an "emotional engagement" via 'direct expressions' in emotional language "facilitate[s] rational discourse" rather than "banish[ing] it" (cf. Engesser et al., 2017). As a result of post-Enlightenment thinking, rationality has been championed at the expense of the emotional. Anderson and Smith (2001, p. 7) flagged this concerning the association of emotion with the feminine and reason with the masculine by writing that "detachment, objectivity and rationality have been valued, and implicitly masculinized, while engagement, subjectivity, passion and desire have been devalued, and frequently feminized" (see also Ahmed, 2014). In the same way, Koefoed and Simonsen (2022), note that "women are represented as 'closer' to nature, ruled by their emotions, and less able to transcend the body through thought". Reason, rationality and thought are, in such though patterns, framed as a way to 'escape' the emotional and demonstrate a superiority in the binary distinctions, where showing emotions are seen to be a display of weakness (cf. Ost, 2004).

Such theorisation is helpful considering the 'common sense' and 'plain talk' of self-perceived 'rational' populist parties such as the Sweden Democrats as explored in Chapter 7 (Antoci et al., 2020; Staerklé et al., 2022; Tomson, 2020). How such populist parties appeal to the rational may be through emotional language, with 'common sense' rhetoric reaching the 'ordinary person' as opposed to the established elite (cf. Staerklé et al., 2022; Dowle, 2020). If populist parties, through a discursive construction of emotional language, can utilise this 'plain talk' in

their rhetoric to reach out to the 'ordinary person', then their message may be more readily spread (Staerklé et al., 2022; Tomson, 2020). This way of framing the approach to populist parties could differ however with Engesser et al. (2017) and Fischer et al.'s (2019) approach, who stress the importance of emotion in populism. Fischer et al. (2019, p. np) propose that populist parties "persuade people not on the basis of rational arguments, but on the basis of fear, anger [and] resentment". This dynamic between emotion and rationality concerning emotion may not necessarily be mutually exclusive though, as through "discursive strategies of populist political emotionalization", Richards' (2004) aforementioned understanding of the espousal between the rational and emotional in discursive constructions of emotions, particularly for populist parties, is likely to be pertinent and influential (Salmela & Von Scheve, 2017, p. 588).

Though a resourceful understanding of emotion has been widely studied pertaining to populism and populist communicators, it is less common in literature concerning activism and civil society. There are exceptions to this such as Edouard Romanos' (2014, p. 561, emphasis in original) study on anarchism vis-à-vis Franco during the Spanish Civil War, where he writes that the leaders of the Spanish anarchist movement tried to *induce and generate certain emotions among potential supporters*". Another example is Saiffudin Ahmed et al.'s (2017, p. 461) study of offline and online protests in India concerning a gang-rape crime, where "individual expressions of anger" from the protesters "were mobilized into collective action". In much the same way as in populism then, emotions have been utilised as political tools, elicited and mobilised for purposeful ends in civil society. Within this, certain frames may recur frequently such as welfare chauvinism, xenophobia or injustice (Kende and Kreko, 2020; Norocel, 2016; cf. Atzeni, 2009).

One particularly significant framing for the resourceful use of emotion that may be adopted by state and non-state actors is concerning 'nostalgia'. "Nostalgia", according to Kenny (2017, p. 261), is the "recollection of past times or forgotten or enchanted places" which as part of such reminiscing is evocative of emotions "ranging across the melancholic, the disorientated, the disgruntful [sic] and the wistful". In other words, appealing to nostalgia can carry with it the potential to elicit a number of emotions, both positive and negative, across a political spectrum (Prooiken et al., 2022). Through discursive constructions of the 'golden age', a politician may, for example, use such rhetoric and emotional language to appeal to collectives within the populace and political sphere, typified most clearly perhaps by President Trump's 'Make America Great Again' slogan (Dowle, 2020; Lammers & Baldwin, 2020; Prooijen et al., 2022; Schruers, 2021; Smeeke et al., 2020).

For this nostalgia to function, however, it is tied to the issue of identity, what Smeeke et al. (2020, p. 97) understand in a populist context⁵ as seeking to "unite the 'pure people' of a native background against 'dangerous others'", namely between 'natives' and 'immigrants', fostering a 'cultural resentment' (cf. Lubbers, 2019; Rico et al., 2017). Such political rhetoric has been understood to tap into a 'societal pessimism' (Steenvoorden & Hartevald, 2018) for which in "using emotional language [...] a comparison [can be made] between a currently corrupt political system with a much better, glorious past" (Prooijen et al., 2022, p. 2). In this way (and through this emotional rhetoric), nationalist sentiments are awarded a political direction (Lubbers, 2019). Through a 'back to the future'⁶ discursive construction, a utopian future is

⁵ Nostalgia in an activist sense is explored in Chapter 7.

⁶ Kenny's (2017) article is entitled, "Back to the populist future? Understanding nostalgia in contemporary ideological discourse".

seen in light of the golden past, prior to high levels of immigration, achieved only with a rupturing of the establishment (Dowle, 2020; Kenny, 2017).

Within the context of this thesis, Tobias Hübinette and Catrin Lundström's (2011) notion of nostalgia and mourning in Sweden is helpful. Rather than awarding nostalgia only within populism, the authors make a similar appeal to what they term the 'good Sweden'. Premised on a national identity of 'colour blindness', those who mourn the loss of the 'good Sweden' do so vis-à-vis the Swedish population that mourn the 'old' Sweden. Concerning this nostalgia for an 'old' Sweden, Hübinette and Lundström connect this to the ethnicity of Whiteness and homogeneity being threatened by non-White immigration into Sweden since 1990s (cf. Pred, 2000). Accordingly, and their work centres on the Sweden Democrats, the passing of the 'dominant' White ethnicity in Sweden is connected to a "melancholic state [that] make[s] them feel hat[rid] towards migrants" (p. 46). This emotion can thereby be appealed to within the frame of 'mourning' and 'melancholy' (see also Valluvan & Kalra (2019) concerning 'melancholic populism'), where both 'old' and 'good' Sweden are "racked by melancholia and nostalgia for no longer being the whitest of all white countries in the world" (p. 50).

Though Hübinette and Lundström make the case for a polarity between the 'old' and 'good' Sweden, in reality this phenomenon is likely to be far more complex than the approach awarded by the authors. Nonetheless, it provides a helpful frame by which to read the discursive construction of emotional language by my participants concerning the events of 2015-2016. Therefore, in this thesis I will contribute to existing literature and extend it further by engaging with the how emotion is utilised and deployed by a variety of actors, state and

non-state, and analysing how emotions were used to achieve political aims and (re)produce borderwork concerning the events of 2015-2016 in Sweden and Denmark.

2.6 Conclusions

This chapter has provided a critical and analytical reading into several threads of literature which are paramount for this thesis. The four topics of literature addressed above (situating the border; generalising a theory of the border; citizenship and civil society; imagination and emotion) each and in different ways inform the theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis more broadly. Out of these fields of literature, my research questions concerning borderwork, civil society and the role of emotion are informed (Chapter 1).

Firstly, the debate concerning where the border is to be recognised was explored at length. In recognising the border as both a territorial edge as well as being present in a pervasive and multiple manner allows for a fuller examination and analysis into how Sweden's deployment of border controls and borderwork was negotiated and navigated by those concerned. In such a way, neither emphasis nor exclusion is directed to either the state or non-state actors (recognising the constellation and entwining of them both). Secondly, the discussion above pertaining to whether a general theory of the border is desirable or not raises significant academic questions concerning the generalisability of findings in this thesis and indeed the framework of the theorising itself. Whilst a 'catch-all' general theory of the border may not be possible, this does not diminish the contribution of theorisation. For example, in this thesis (Chapter 5) I utilise the term 'moments' to refer to occasions of heightened visibilities that may be appropriated and inscribed with meaning as part of the borderwork being undertaken. Such

a theorisation is not limited to just the Swedish/Danish border during this timeframe but posits the transferability and contextual applicability of moments in borderwork being completed at different locales and times.

Thirdly, citizenship has long been tied to the notion of the state. The acts of citizenship literature sought to disrupt this dynamic by arguing that the actions of those concerned was more important than the papers that they possessed. In this way, the state's authority is challenged both by the new arrivals' themselves as well as those seeking to support them, what has collectively been referred to as 'civil society'. Determining what civil society precisely is (and is not) is debated in the literature and in this thesis, particularly present in Chapter 6, I adopt in the pages that follow a combination of understandings, particularly from White and Laine, understanding civil society to be the 'intermediary realm', a dimension so blurred that it may even be considered a 'fourth sector'.

Finally, recent scholarship has recognised the important role that emotion plays in the political sphere. This thesis directs its focuses on emotion as a resource and how it is brought into the political for populist actors as well as for civil society. Through discursive constructions and 'emotional talk', particular narratives and discourses could be drawn upon in appealing to emotion to achieve particular political ends. The frame of 'nostalgia' has played an important role in populism and this will continue to be critically reflected upon in Chapter 7. Within each of the four strands of literature explored in this chapter are theoretical foundations which will be expounded upon, particularly in the three analyses chapters (Chapters 5–7). Before this, however, time will be devoted to understanding the methodological and contextual dimensions to this thesis.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

“Thus, there is no neutral vantage point. The migration researcher is a part of the field of struggle and a participant therein. A part of the conflict, a party to the dispute, one way or the other, s/he is therefore a partisan, a ‘militant’. At the risk of perhaps rendering things overly simple, the question is, simply put, ‘Which side are you on?’”
(De Genova, 2013, p. 252).

3.1 Introduction

Scholarship, by its very nature, can never be entirely neutral and border studies are no exception (Desmond, 2004; Law & Urry, 2004). How one approaches various questions of theory and method are to be framed within, and examined under, the rubrics of ‘Methodology’ as discussed here (Bowden & Galindo-Gonzalez, 2015; Duberly et al., 2012). During my Masters, I studied the four Nordic countries during the timeframe of 2015-2016 in relation to the crisis, from which I identified that the Swedish/Danish border as the most prominent of the Nordic borders. For this PhD, I thereby sought to unpack this important border during the key time frame in a deeper way. As presented in Chapter 1, this thesis explores three research questions pertaining to the migratory events in Sweden and Denmark during 2015-2016 and the foundations to these research questions stemmed from a combination of previous research, literature and the data collection process itself. Qualitative methods were adopted to capture the governance of borders, civil society’s engagement with borderwork and the discursive construction and role of emotion as a resource from multiple voices and authorities. This chapter will firstly present and discuss the methodological foundations to this thesis alongside explaining the method process I adopted. The interview medium will be reflected

upon alongside the notion of reflexivity and rapport before coding is explored alongside a discussion of critical discourse analysis.

3.2 Discussion of Methods

3.2.1 Interview Methods and Practice

Questions of *why* certain methods are used or not underpin methodological discussions, acknowledging that no single method is without fault (Aitkin, 1997; Smith, 2008). Interviews were chosen as this thesis' method and are explored in more detail in Section 3.2.3. Ethical approval was granted from the University of St Andrews (Appendix A). A total of 53 participants were interviewed across two fieldwork sessions⁷ (August–November 2019 and June–August 2020) via remote interviews. The first fieldwork session (26 interviews) allowed for a significant amount of analysis to be undertaken (a research question changed as a result of this first fieldwork session) ahead of planned in-person fieldwork at a later date. Fieldwork to Denmark and Sweden was approved and allocated funding by the Scottish Graduate School of Social Sciences (SGSSS) for June 2020, however, due to the Covid-19 global pandemic this was not possible. Nevertheless, rich data was gathered in both fieldwork sessions, not least in the second session in securing an interview with the Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden during 2014-2016.

Interviews (audio and video) were usually one hour in duration and were conducted one-to-one except for two interviews with pairs. The selection of participants is presented in Appendix B. Where agreed to by the respondents, audio recordings were made during the interview and

⁷ A single interview was also undertaken in June 2021.

subsequently transcribed. Most of the participants (save for certain public figures such as the Former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden) were given a pseudonym to protect identities and to allow myself as a researcher be more critical. As part of this research process, participants were provided with a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix C) about the project and process; a Topic Guide (Appendices D, E, F) listing potential questions for discussion tailored to the sector of the individual; and a Participant Consent Form as required (Appendix G). A Debrief (Appendix H) was later e-mailed to participants.

3.2.2 Recruitment and Sampling

From early in the research process, I was interested in a collective understanding of the various actors involved in the events of 2015-2016 in both Sweden and Denmark. Rather than focusing exclusively on one sector or organisation, I sought voices from multiple dimensions to most fully capture the complexities of the borderwork being undertaken in this significant timeframe. Consequently, I sought interviews with individuals from both Sweden and Denmark, ranging from politicians and anarchists, to clergy and a private security company. In the previous chapter, I explored the literature of borderwork and civil society, and as part of such understandings, the recognition of multiple agents contributing to borderwork is key, with the selection of interview participants in this thesis reflecting this.

Rather than seeking “to choose a representative sample” for interviews, Valentine (1997, p. 112) notes that the focus is “to select an illustrative [sample]”. In total, 17 of the participants were from Denmark, and the remaining 36 participants were from Sweden. Such a split between Denmark and Sweden is a balanced one, as my research explored Sweden’s three forms of border control and the response of civil society particularly at Malmö’s Central

Station. Nevertheless, to understand the happenings in Sweden, it is important to have voices from Denmark to compare, contrast and juxtapose participants with.

Interviewees served then as Valentine's (1997) 'illustrative sample', covering primarily state actors and politicians (31) and individuals from civil society (21)⁸. In this project, no rigid quota was utilised concerning the numbers of which sector the participants needed to be from. This allowed for the organic process of snowball sampling and for a new research idea to emerge. Most interviews were undertaken with one participant from an organisation (such as 'Refugees Welcome to Sweden') which raises a question: to what degree is this individual speaking on behalf of themselves or are they representative of the organisation to which they belong? One participant in the Red Cross in Denmark recognised this and during the interview wore different 'hats' concerning her organisation's views and her private views. Interviewing multiple individuals from the same organisations could help in mitigating this via corroboration, however this would have resulted in a trade-off as fewer organisations would likely have been covered. Within this thesis I have sought voices from multiple individuals rather than focusing exclusively on, for example, one political party or a particular anarchist organisation, therefore the breadth of voices is a strength providing multiple insights ('multiperspectively') from various angles of borderwork at the time (Rumford, 2012, 2014). At the same time, many of the interviews undertaken were with senior individuals within their respective organisations and roles, thereby providing greater knowledge and insight of the situation.

⁸ Three interviews were completed with individuals from the private sector. Two individuals were categorised as both state and civil society.

To find participants for my project, internet research was pivotal in finding key organisations, groups and participants in addition to e-mailing and 'cold calling' (Crump, 2020; Longhurst, 2010). E-mails were sent to prospective interview participants containing basic information about who I was and the research project I was exploring, requesting their assistance. If participants responded with interest, e-mail correspondence was shared back and forth. A time was arranged for our call, often scheduled for one hour, however the participant was often willing to speak longer.

Telephone calls, as with the e-mails, often met 'gatekeepers' such as receptionists, secretaries and personal assistants to potential participants (Crump, 2020). Liaising with such gatekeepers was an important aspect of the recruitment process, particularly for e-mail correspondence with parliamentary officials. Another key process through which participants were recruited was through 'snowball sampling' in supplementary fashion (Noy, 2008). During the interviews and via e-mails, snowball sampling occurred where participants (and gatekeepers) shared potential future interviewees from their network of contacts (Crump, 2020; Meho, 2006; Noy, 2008; Valentine, 1997). The final approach through which to find participants was based on previous connections following fieldwork for my Masters (see Dowle, 2021).

Early interviews were formative to my ideas and shaped and steered the research project, with subsequent interviews being more centred on specific people and events. For example, it was because of my first set of interviews that I learned of the conflict that emerged within civil society during this time, leading me to change my second research question. Accordingly, as the interview process went on, I was able to focus and direct questions more specifically to what was emerging from the data. For this research project, the aim for the total number of

interviews was between 30-50 interviews, subject to a sufficient saturation of data and exhaustion of key informants (Baxter & Eyles, 1997; Yin, 2018; cf. Charmaz, 2008). In total 53 interviews are presented in this research with sufficient data that provides rich and varied insights into the events of 2015-2016.

3.2.3 Interviews and Topic Guides

Across the social sciences, interviews are a predominant, important and “even canonical qualitative method” regarding data collection (Cook, 2009, p. 176; Dowling et al., 2016; Lechuga, 2012). At its core, an interview is an exchange of questions and answers between a researcher and a participant(s) in a contextually situated interactional format (Goldie & Pritchard, 1981; Wiles et al., 2005). Such semi-structured interviews allow for the participant to elaborate and tell a story, not being confined to tick boxes in questionnaires (Valentine, 1997; Wiles et al., 2005). As a method, semi-structured interviews thereby allowed me to frame questions based on reflection, experience and academic literature, whilst at the same time allowing for new themes and ideas to emerge from the data in the interview encounter.

Prior to the interviews, a ‘Topic Guide’ (see Appendices C, D, E) was given to the participant underscoring approximately ten broad questions pertaining to the events of 2015-2016 and their respective sectors. As highlighted by Alvesson and Ashcraft (2012), it is important to leave sufficiently broad questions in the Topic Guide to not limit or confine the answers of the participants. During the start of the interviews, I sought to put the interviewee at ease, often by speaking about the weather or some general conversation. When I determined that it was the appropriate time to begin the interview, I would thank them for being willing to help and

then begin with a broad question, often asking them to tell me about themselves and how long they had been involved in their respective organisation/role. This allowed me to learn quickly of the respondent's background. Throughout the interview, I would then broadly follow a similar pattern where I sought the participant's voices on several topics broadly aligned with the topic guide. If a certain participant shared something interesting or raised a particular point, I would seek to learn more about this rather than limiting myself only to questions associated with the topic guide, finding the balance between the structured and the organic, an important benefit to semi-structured interviews (Longhurst, 2010; Richards, 1996; Stephens, 2007; Valentine, 1997).

Some participants asked for the questions in advance before agreeing to the interview (Sabot, 1999), and others, upon seeing the questions, declined the invitation, primarily due to themselves not feeling able, as an organisation or individual, to sufficiently answer the questions. Many of the questions in the topic guide refer to 'borders', yet very few participants were involved in the formal border control measures and immigration procedures. Some participants (and this is extenuated due to the language difference) associated borders exclusively with the territory's edge, therefore requiring my reassurance to the participant about their organisation's role within the wider understanding of borders. This served as an important lesson for me, recognising the importance of how questions are framed within fieldwork.

It is worth here making an important methodological note, particularly in relation to the third research question. Whereas some scholars undertake emotional analysis in their explorations of the visceral and embodied dimension to emotion, in this thesis I explore the role of emotion

and how it was deployed as a political resource. I analyse how emotion was discursively constructed and used as a resource by state and non-state actors, and thus brought into the political milieu. My methodological engagement with emotion is similar to Derek Edwards' (1999, p. 279, emphasis added) understanding where he writes that “[e]motion categories are not graspable merely as individual feelings or expressions, and nor is their discursive deployment reducible to a detached, cognitive sense-making. They are *discursive phenomena and can be studied as such*, as part of how talk performs social actions”. Edwards’ insight into emotion as a ‘discursive phenomenon’ is valuable and in Chapter 7 I focus on the discursive construction of emotion alongside its use as a resource. This nuanced understanding of emotion is thereby accessed with different questions when compared to a scholar engaging in analysis of emotion itself.

Within the interview process, I asked participants to share whether emotion was important for them during the events of 2015-2016 which allowed for two benefits. Firstly, the phrasing of such a question opened the topic of conversation to how the participant understood and engaged with emotion. For example, in my interview with two anarchists from Kontrapunkt, I asked: “*one of the things I’m looking at in my research is the role of emotion, so the way emotion can be important in people’s decisions*”. Through such a framing, it allowed individuals to reflect on the *role* of emotion and how it related to the events at the time. In the analysis, I could then seek to unpack how it was deployed in the political milieu. This is a different approach to the likes of Ahmed and Pain who in their research seek to study the pervasive dimension of emotion throughout the political implicitly.

Secondly, by referring to emotion in the framing of the question above in a general form, how the individual would respond to the question was highly indicative. In continuing with the Kontrapunkt example (and explored further in Chapter 7), one participant replied with, *“I think I was angry a lot of the time [...] and I think I work better when I’m angry than when I’m sad”* (Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden). The framing of the question regarding the ‘role’ of emotion was answered with anger and a connection with the deployment of anger as a political resource in Amelia’s work. In reply to their answers, I was then able to follow and probe deeper into their framing of emotion as a resource and thereby tease out the role emotion played in the borderwork.

3.2.4 Remote Interviews

Despite the predominance of face-to-face interviews, alternatives (audio and video calls) are becoming a more frequent component of the social sciences, particularly in a post-Covid world. As part of my research, 20 of the interviews were conducted via audio calls and the remaining interviews were video calls. The two different interview mediums provided benefits and negatives that served to complement each other. Many of the benefits of audio and video calls are in contrast to in-person interviews, such as financial savings (Bonnell & Nir, 1998; Carr & Worth, 2001; Goldie & Pritchard, 1981; Rogers, 1976); the concealing of the researcher’s ethnicity⁹, particularly with audio calls providing additional privacy and anonymity (Holt, 2010; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004); flexibility for the participant and researcher (Carr & Worth, 2001; Drabble et al., 2016; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004); reduced power differentials and greater

⁹ As Holt (2010) notes, this is both a benefit and disadvantage, as sharing certain ethnicities can result in richer data collected.

empowerment for interviewees (Vogl, 2013); and for audio calls, fewer visual distractions (Vogl, 2013).

In this thesis, the data generated by audio calls were incredibly rich and allowed for the calls with a Danish MEP and Danish MP as part of their morning routine. Not having a visual of the interview respondent meant that greater attention could be placed on the words and discourses that the respondent was constructing. Despite the many advantages of telephone interviews that I experienced in the fieldwork though, they are not without fault. These included a dependence on 'verbal cues', with both the researcher and participant being unable to follow gesticulations and visual guides in the unfolding of the interview (Goldie & Pritchard, 1981; Holt, 2010; Stephens, 2007; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Vogl, 2013). Knowing when a participant had finished replying to a question or were just pensively pausing is more difficult to determine on an audio call than via a video call or face-to-face interview. Moreover, certain individuals may be excluded from a telephonic research project due to: a lack of access (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004); difficulty in speaking in a second language without visual cues (Carr & Worth, 2001); or if the individual suffers from mental or physical difficulties or disabilities (Carr & Worth, 2001; Glogowska et al., 2011). Each of these challenges affected my research and instated a bias concerning who was present and who was absent in the list of participants that I was able to interview. Whilst in a video call the participant would see me smiling and seeking to put them at ease; though this was not possible in audio calls, I was able to help mitigate this by asking friendly and warm questions to make the respondent feel more relaxed.

With the exponential growth of technology in recent years, communication technologies and screens are becoming increasingly (financially) accessible and part of everyday life, paving the

way for video calling software such as Skype¹⁰ that allows for audio and video calls free of charge¹¹ across the world, subject to internet coverage being sufficiently strong (Crump, 2020; Deakin & Wakefield, 2014; Lo Iacono et al., 2016; Longhurst, 2019; Mirick & Wladkowski, 2019; Oates, 2015; Sedgwick & Spiers, 2009; Seitz, 2016; Sipes et al., 2019; Sullivan, 2012; Weinmann et al., 2012; Weller, 2015). The benefits of video calls are numerous, where, in similar fashion to audio calls, they can: save money and reduce the need for overseas travel and unnecessary carbon emissions (Deakin & Wakefield, 2014; Hanna, 2012; Mirick & Wladkowski, 2019; Sedgwick & Spiers, 2009); provide an air of safety and privacy where participants (and researchers) can meet in safe personal spaces and hang up at any moment without any justification (Janghorban et al., 2014; Oates, 2015); and enable the researcher to reach a wider array of participants geographically, as well as those unable to travel (including those with disabilities) and those with busy schedules (Janghorban et al., 2014; Mirick & Wladkowski, 2019; Oates, 2015; Sedgwick & Spiers, 2009; Seitz, 2016).

These positives would, however, be challenged by some who maintain that 'pixelated partnerships' lack simple corporeal encounters such as a sharing of a cup of tea due to being inhibited by a screen (Adams-Hutcheson & Longhurst, 2017; Lo Iacono et al., 2016; Longhurst, 2010; Seitz, 2016). I would argue, however, that much of the 'putting at ease' and building of rapport between participants rests less so in the experience of sharing a cup of tea and more in warm and friendly conversation which can be achieved in a similar manner via audio and, in particular, video calls. A further challenge associated with video calls is the technical issues that may emerge from internet coverage dropping or 'frozen' screens (Adams-Hutcheson &

¹⁰ During my first set of remote fieldwork, due to it occurring prior to Covid, the 'Zoom phenomenon' had not yet occurred therefore Skype was chosen as the official tool.

¹¹ Audio calls from a Skype account to a telephone landline or mobile requires a fee.

Longhurst, 2017; AlKhateeb, 2018; Hay-Gibson, 2010; Seitz, 2016; Sipes et al., 2019; Sullivan, 2012; Weller, 2015). Though each of these technical issues were encountered during my fieldwork for this thesis, moments of disconnection could also lead to bonding as both interlocutors share their sympathy for technical issues and may even laugh and smile about it.

The more pressing concern that I found in relation to my research was less the call ending prematurely and more the times when the call continued with little coverage. In such instances, the participant may for example be sharing something important whilst being unaware that for me the coverage may be less clear. As a result, I would either need to retrace the question, ask them to clarify what they said or continue in the interview piecing together what I had ascertained from the lagging call. Nevertheless, the internet coverage was greatly effective and the merits of audio and video calls are seen in the large amount of valuable and insightful data generated. With all things considered then, I am of the same position as Sullivan (2012, p. 59) who acknowledged that Skype and video calls provide “almost unlimited potential for further research”.

3.2.5 Reflexivity, Positionality and Rapport

For any interview, it is important to recognise that though a participant is telling ‘their’ story, such narratives are inevitably partial and ‘co-constructed’ between the scholar and the interviewee in a ‘research alliance’ (Maitlis, 2012; Pile, 1991). In many respects, the researcher is involved in producing the very discourse that they seek to analyse (Fairclough, 2010). For as Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 8) note, “the subject is not external to [the] discourses on which s/he reflects”. To therefore most accurately access, engage with and (re)present to the

academy the construction of the Swedish and Danish border during the events, it is essential to let the text breathe and for it to speak more authentically (Cope, 2010). These understandings are important in relation to the use of semi-structured interviews as opposed to, for example, media analysis. Though media analysis can provide valuable research data (for examples concerning this case study, see Abdelhady (2020) and De Cock et al. (2018, 2019)), interviews as a research method allowed me to interact with participants in a 'research alliance', allowing the data to 'breathe' as well as presenting opportunities for me to engage, probe and follow up with further questions, assisting in the pursuit of how the situation was perceived and how the individual was involved in it.

As noted by Valentine (1997, p. 113), "your own identity will shape the interactions that you have with others" and my 'foreigner advantage' identity opened research opportunities and challenges (Glogowska et al., 2011; see also Hitchings & Latham, 2020; Sabot, 1999; Welch & Piekkari, 2006). All interviews were undertaken in English and the recruitment process of e-mails and telephone calls in English would discourage those not confident enough to complete an interview in English, immediately introducing a sampling bias. Similarly, the difference in language may result in an imbalance of power, re-enforcing an inequality between myself as a researcher and the participant. These issues are nonetheless mitigated as, according to Education First (2020a, 2020b), approximately two-thirds of Swedes and Danes have proficient mastery of the English language, recording the second and fourth highest scores in the world for such competencies in countries which do not have English as their national language (Marschan-Piekkari & Reis, 2004; Welch & Piekkari, 2006). At the same time, the data produced, albeit in a different language, is not subject to an interpreter and the challenges of

being 'lost in translation' and is thus likely to be more raw, less filtered and richer data (Welch & Piekkari, 2006).

The timings of the two sets of digital fieldwork are also worthy of note. The first stage of fieldwork was conducted during the late summer and autumn of 2019, a pivotal time regarding the Brexit negotiations of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. The second stage of fieldwork in the summer of 2020 was following the global Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic and worldwide lockdowns of which national borders played an important role. Both Brexit and Covid-19 emerged in discussions and could have shaped the participant's construction and reflection of the border and the events of 2015-2016 in Sweden and Denmark.

It is important to also reflect upon the importance of rapport in the interview encounter. As alluded to above, though it is not possible to share a coffee as part of a remote interview, the researcher still possesses opportunities and skills to put the participant at ease and invite more free-flowing conversation. Simple things such as finding common interests (for example having visited Scotland) and humour can quickly establish a relaxed atmosphere between the researcher and the respondent before the topic of borderwork is unpacked, allowing for richer data (Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012; Bowden & Galindo-Gonzalez, 2015; Carr & Worth, 2001; Drabble et al., 2016; Glogowska et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2014; Longhurst, 2010; Valentine, 1997).

Whereas, and tied to the notion of rapport, the 'power' often rests with the researcher, there are exceptions to this due to a number of reasons (Winchester, 1996; for examples, see Elwood

& Martin, 2000). Once such exception would be interviews with elites, namely 'researching up', which was present in my interviews with the likes of the CEO of Securitas Denmark, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden and the Chief Border Police for South Sweden (Desmond, 2004; Smith, 2006). Richards (1996, p. 201) notes that within "elite interviews, it is the interviewee who has the power" and not the researcher (see also Harvey, 2011). Nevertheless, the interviews with these individuals were conducted in a similar manner as with other participants, by developing a positive rapport and ensuring that the interview was professionally undertaken.

3.2.6 Analysis and Coding

Following the transcriptions of each of the interviews, the initial process of coding that I undertook was in a 'constructed grounded theory' manner (Charmaz, 2005) alongside a more traditional qualitative approach. Rather than entering scholarship with pre-formulated theorisations, grounded theory stresses the processual and interactive nature of theorising and *data qua data* (Charmaz, 2012; Glaser & Strauss, 2017; Reed & Runquist, 2007). This approach, Glaser (2014) claims, enables the scholar to see the data and social world more clearly, not as how one may expect or hope to perceive it. However, whether one can truly enter fieldwork with no pre-conceptions is a critique made of grounded theory, mitigated in part by the work of Kathy Charmaz (2005).

For Charmaz (2012, p. 4), approaching coding "as a *tabula rasa*, encase[d] in theoretical innocence and substantive ignorance" is neither viable nor possible. In its place, Charmaz proposes a constructed grounded theory that provides a sensitivity to the unfoldings of the

social world in an emergent manner, concomitant with an awareness of one's position *within* the research process (Charmaz, 2008, 2017). In effect, such “[e]mergent methods permit pursuing what researchers *could not* have anticipated” (Charmaz, 2017, p. 158, emphasis in original). During my research project, the interviews led me to change my second research question to pursue a dynamic within civil society during the time frame. I therefore recognise the merit of a construct grounded theory method whilst also acknowledging the importance of reflection and literature prior to the field in a ‘traditional’ manner, allowing for a hybrid form of the two approaches when encountering the data in analysis and coding (see Appendices I, J, K).

In my research, the discourse analysis adopted aligns well with Wodak and Meyer's (2016, p. 12) understanding by which I analyse “hidden, opaque and visible structures of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language”, in effect the iceberg as well as its contents below the surface (Van Dijk, 2009). These relationships may reflect conscious efforts made by agents (state and non-state) to “promote ideas and ideologies” in what can be understood as the “conceptual nature of discourse” (Krzyżanowski, 2016, p. 309, 2020, p. 523). In my analysis then, I am not to read what the participant has spoken of only at a surface-level, but to recognise the ‘(re)presenting’ and deeper meanings behind descriptions and constructions made by the respondent, conscious that such words may even be exterior to the individual, shaped by society and its Foucauldian archaeology (Garrity, 2010). The question of who is really speaking (and in what performative role) is thereby important and present in my analysis. At the same time, however, it is essential to recognise the subjectivity of myself as a researcher throughout the discourse analysis process (Baker et al., 2008).

Within the critical discourse analysis, Wodak and Meyer assert that (2016, p. 4, emphasis added), “ideologies and power [are deconstructed] through the *systematic* and retroductable [sic] investigation of semiotic data” which for this thesis consists of spoken text which was coded and analysed in a process that is co-constitutive (cf. Fairclough, 2010). Coding was conducted with an early understanding of the data based on my knowledge of the interviews undertaken and the transcription phase, allowing ‘initial themes’ to be developed before more ‘formal’ analysis began (Cope, 2010). These initial codes evolved and developed as the analysis process continued (Cope, 2010).

To complete the analysis phase, I used *ATLAS.ti*, a Computer Aided Qualitative Discourse Analysis Software (CAQDAS), that allows for systematic, rigorous and clear organisation for existing and emerging codes (Cope, 2010; Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). Each of the interview transcripts were imported into the software and coded accordingly. In total, there were approximately 250 codes ranging from specific ones (such as ‘Kontrapunkt’) to more open-ended codes (such as ‘Malmö’), allowing for individual sentences to be coded in multiple ways. An individual quote may be coded into several categories. For example, the sentence below was spoken by Frederik from Techfugees:

*“And a lot of people were condemning Denmark and saying, ‘you should do like Sweden, you should be more open, you should take in more refugees’”
(Frederik, Techfugees, Denmark).*

This quote was coded on Atlas.Ti with the following codes (in alphabetical order): (Co)Relationality; Denmark; DK; Friction (Denmark & Sweden); M[ale]; Negative; PR [Performative Role]; Techfugees; Refugees; Sweden; TS [Third Sector]. By coding in a systematic manner, an analysis becomes possible, strengthened via contextualisation and the

collating of quotes under these various themes allowing for critical reflection, comparisons and juxtapositions (Crump, 2020). If a researcher then, for example, was interested in exploring the code of 'Refugees', any statement that refers to refugees would be coded systematically (alongside whether the statement is framed in a positive or negative light), allowing for deeper analysis. However, Burnard (1991) presents a caveat: once a text is divided into distinct parts, the context is lost and the possibility of misunderstanding a text can become even more pronounced. To combat this, analysing a quote in context (and the participant's performative role) can ensure that its meaning is consistent with what the participant had been saying prior to this.

Contained in a 'text' is a series of relations: the subject with an object; the subject with another subject; the subject with the researcher and more (Fairclough, 2010; Van Leeuwen, 2009). "Discourse is" then, according to Kobayashi (2001, p. 67), "the social act of creating meaning, simultaneously transforming (however minutely) the world and ourselves, and infusing the relationship with power". Rather than focusing on the text, the critical discourse scholar seeks to unfurl the "dialectical *relations between* discourse and other objects" (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4, emphasis in original). Engaging with these manifestations of power concerning borders requires, according to Van Dijk's analogy (2009), utilising the explicit (the visible part of an iceberg) to uncover the implicit (most of the ice beneath the water). Rather than assuming the words to be the 'full picture' when studying responses from participants, I instead sought to question the deeper underlying meanings of what was spoken.

For example, within Chapter 5 of this thesis I consider the role of 'Reality' for politicians pertaining to the events of 2015-2016. Throughout the interviews I conducted, the theme of

'Reality/Surreality' was coded a total of 27 times. By collating each of phrases together, trends and themes could emerge, a practice that is woven throughout the thesis in ten tables (Tables 5.1–5.3, 5.7, 6.2–6.4, 7.1–7.3), giving an indication of 'breadth' across the topics, before then analysing in 'depth' specific quotations that may encapsulate such sentiments. Within these tables a column for 'prevalence' is also shown, premised on the frequency of sub-themes within the code that would collate and then rank such sub-themes pertaining to four categories: Very Common, Common, Less Common, Rare but Distinct. Through these tables, prevalence columns and displays of codes among different participants, a wider indication of the behind-the-scenes work of critical discourse analysis is shown.

In placing the phrase or quote in context (heeding Burnard's (1991) warning), one of two things then happens (cyclically and concurrently): theory is applied to the discourse; the discourse informs the theory (cf. Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Through applications of theoretical reflections consisting of processual borders, borderwork, humanitarian borders and more, a lens can then be applied to the discourse. At the same time though, the discourse can shape and mould the theory by raising new questions, aspects and insight in dialogue with the research questions. Thus, in adopting these approaches to the text, this thesis is thereby made more systematically and rigorously effective.

3.2 Conclusions

This chapter has explored methodological considerations and foundations to this thesis. The use of interviews as the primary method was discussed, including the process of recruitment and its illustrative sample. The medium of the interviews undertaken (remotely via audio and

video calls) were expounded upon concerning the strengths and challenges that they present for a researcher. The importance of reflexivity and positionality, of how the scholar enters and fits in with the research was then analysed before notions of rapport and power during the interview process were examined. Finally, the role of coding and critical discourse analysis was developed concerning its role in assisting one's scholarship and analysis. Indeed, to understand the borderwork undertaken during this time frame most appropriately, a discussion of their contextuality is essential and will now be addressed.

Chapter 4 – Contextualising 2015-2016

“[Concerning Sweden] I have borne the intense discomfort of bearing witness to an immense tragedy, of observing good intentions coming completely apart, of seeing what was once arguably the world’s most generous refugee policy, what was once a remarkably humane and altruistic response to cruelties committed abroad, become translated at home into the cruelties of pronounced housing segregation, extreme labour-market discrimination, almost total (de facto) social apartheid, and frequently encountered bureaucratic paternalism” (Pred, 2000, p. xii).

4.1 Introduction

The events of the European migration crisis were a result of numerous contextualities ranging from the national to the supra-national. This chapter provides foundations and backgrounds essential for the developing of analysis and understanding the nature of the border in question. Its structure is as follows. Firstly, the events of the Syrian Civil War are presented as a contributing factor to the mass migration into Europe before zooming in to the European Union more broadly before focusing on Sweden and Denmark. As part of this contextualisation, the EU legal architecture is expounded upon. Within this framework, a detailed look will then be given to both Sweden and Denmark in turn alongside introducing the three forms of border control introduced by Sweden in 2015-2016.

Before progressing further, it is important to explore here why the timeframe of August 2015 to July 2016 was chosen as the beginning and end of this thesis’ research focus. Firstly, though the number of applications for asylum had been growing in both Sweden and Denmark in the years prior to 2015 it was only in the year of 2015 that both countries reached their highest levels, culminating for Sweden¹² in a series of measures to mitigate the migratory pressures

¹² Denmark had already made several changes to their asylum policy to make it stricter.

that were growing through border checks and the announcement of the identity control and ‘temporary’ law. Two of these three forms of border controls (border checks and the ‘temporary’ law) are still in operation in July 2022, demonstrating the lasting significance of this time frame. Secondly, the number of new arrivals seeking asylum in Sweden (and Denmark) dropped dramatically in 2016, reversing the trend of several years of increasing numbers of new arrivals. Thirdly, and following the previous two points, it was only during 2015 that Sweden, for example, demonstrated an inability to cope, including turning away new arrivals from accommodation for a night and reporting 2,000 unaccompanied minors as missing, marking a ‘crisis’ scenario. The six ‘moments’ explored in this thesis (developed in detail in Chapter 5) began in August 2015, with Sweden’s third form of border controls (the ‘temporary’ law) taking effect in July 2016, thus serving as the two bookend dates for the timeframe of this thesis.

4.2 Syria’s Civil War and Migration into Europe

The Syrian Civil War, beginning in March 2011 with political demonstrations in opposition to Bashar al-Assad’s government, has been one of complex ethnic and sectarian tensions (Carpenter, 2013; Conduit, 2020; Corstange & York, 2018; Doboš, 2018). The deadly conflict raised critical alarm bells and humanitarian issues on a regional and global scale (Leenders & Mansour, 2018). As of July 2022, over five and a half million Syrians fled to different parts of the world to be registered as refugees (Operational Data Portal UNHCR, 2022). The events in Syria, alongside the Arab Spring, the rise of the Islamic State and general instabilities in the

Middle East, drove out refugees to adjacent countries¹³ and into Europe (Dimitriadi, 2016; Eimhjellen et al., 2018; Hodes et al., 2018).




Figure 4.1: Asylum Seekers into EU-27 Countries from extra-EU-27 Countries across time. Adapted from EuroStat (2020).

During the year 2015 (Figure 4.1), Europe received over 1.2 million first-time asylum applications, with over half stemming from a combination of Syria (378,000), Afghanistan (193,000) and Iraq (127,000) (EuroStat, 2020; Pew Research Centre, 2016). The response across Europe varied significantly ranging from Angela Merkel’s plea to European colleagues to welcome the new arrivals through her “*Wir Schaffen Das*” [‘We can do this’] narrative (Greenhill, 2016, p. 326), to Hungary’s persistent anti-immigration discourses coinciding with the construction of a barbed-wire fence at their border with Serbia (Bocskor, 2018). Spatially, the first-time asylum applications occurred unevenly across the continent (Figure 4.2). Sweden received the second highest per capita value of new asylum seekers (1,600), second only to

¹³ Neighbouring countries including Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have each played important roles in hosting more than five million Syrian refugees (Operational Data Portal UNHCR, 2022; Pew Research Centre, 2018).

Hungary (1,770) and almost three times higher than Germany (540) (Pew Research Centre, 2016). During the same year, Denmark received approximately 21,000 applications but a relatively high per capita value (370) above the EU average¹⁴ (250) and significantly larger than France (110) and the United Kingdom (60) (EuroStat, 2016; Pew Research Centre, 2016).




Figure 4.2: First time asylum applications from non-EU-27 Countries during 2015. Adapted from EuroStat (2016).

The large majority of the new arrivals entering Europe during 2015-2016 stemmed from Muslim majority countries (Khallouk, 2018). Refugees were becoming synonymous with Muslims alongside a conflation with terror, functioning as political and cultural ‘scapegoats’ (Pickel, 2018; Wodak, 2019; cf. Dowle, 2020). Within Denmark and Sweden, the population of Muslims had been steadily growing. Across Europe, according to the Pew Research Centre (2017b), in 2017 Sweden had the third highest percentage of Muslims in its population (8.1%), behind only France (8.8%) and Bulgaria (11.1%). Denmark’s percentage of its population

¹⁴ Consisting of the Norway, Switzerland the EU-28 (Pew Research Centre, 2016).

identifying as Muslim was 5.4%, outside of Europe's top ten (Pew Research Centre, 2017b). Based on a medium projection of migration between 2016 and 2050, the Pew Research Centre (2017a) projected that one in five individuals in Sweden will be Muslim (the highest in Europe) and one in nine for Denmark.

4.3 The EU and the Dublin Regulation

The presence of over 1.2 million new applications for asylum within Europe during 2015 was a process that occurred within a very specific legal and geopolitical context concerning the European Commission and the European Union. The origins (Figure 4.3) of these stem back to 1957 and the 'Treaty of Rome', where the European Community (EC) was formed with ideals and visions premised on free flowing movement between participating states of goods, services, people and capital (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 1997). In 1985, the participating states of Germany, Belgium, France and Luxembourg signed a new agreement in the small town of Schengen in 1985, outside of the EC, with the eventual aim of ending borders between signatory states, what would in 1990 become the 'Schengen Convention' (Casella Colombeau, 2019; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 1997). In order for the Schengen Convention to operate, emphasis was placed on securing participating states' external borders in order to bring down internal borders between these states (Salomon & Rijpma, 2021).

A foundational aspect to Schengen was the Dublin Regulation¹⁵ to avert "refugee ping-pong" or "asylum shopping" between the participating states (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2015, p. 1; Gilbert,

¹⁵ This would later become a 'regulation' in 2003 and hence change its name to become the 'Dublin Regulation' (Byrne et al., 2020). In this thesis I use 'Dublin Regulation' and 'Dublin Convention' interchangeably.




Figure 4.3: Timeline of the European Union/Commission up to 2015. Adapted from European Commission (n.d.-c, 2015b).

2015, p. 531). The Dublin Regulation is seen as foundational to the Europe project, for “without Dublin, there is no worthwhile Schengen” (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2015, p.3). In operation since 1997, the Dublin Convention sought “to identify which Member State has responsibility for examining an asylum application and to ensure that only one State determines the application” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 1997,§4; Hurwitz, 1999). Dublin did not work as efficiently as intended, with ‘Dublin II’ (the ‘Dublin Regulation’) becoming active in 2003 and ‘Dublin III’ coming into effect in 2013, as seen in Figure 4.4 (Byrne et al., 2020; European Commission, 2016b; European Council, 2022; Refugee Council, 2002). According to this third rendition of the Dublin Regulation, in Article 13 it states that if “an applicant has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for international protection” (European Union, 2013, Article 13). This results spatially in a concentration for countries on Europe’s southern borders bearing the greater responsibilities for receiving asylees due to the Mediterranean serving as an important channel for crossing (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2015).

In practical terms, Garcés-Mascreñas (2015) and Guild (2016) assert that the Dublin Regulation accounts for three key things: firstly, the asylee may only apply for asylum within participating countries once; secondly, the applicant’s preferred choice for which country to apply for asylum is not recognised in the Dublin criteria; thirdly, the asylee may be sent back to the country in which they were first registered according to the Dublin Regulation. It has thus been argued to be a system that benefits the state more than the asylee (Mitsilegas, 2014).




Figure 4.4: Timeline of the evolution of the European Union’s Common Borders and Asylum System. Sources: European Commission (n.d., 2004); European Council (2022); European Union (n.d.); UN General Assembly (2016).

Registration for the Dublin Regulation is achieved via the use of EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy) since 2003, in which the European-wide database can share fingerprint data for asylees to determine if they had entered Europe by a certain way and whether they had applied for asylum elsewhere (Garcés-Masareñas, 2015). Though the Dublin Convention affirms the right of Member States to send asylees back to a 'safe' country which they had travelled through prior, Bartel et al. (2020, p. 41) note that "Dublin States de facto rarely transfer asylum seekers back to the responsible State" (Refugee Council, 2002). Even though Dublin is expensive in its operations, it is deemed essential to the functioning of the freedom of movement within Schengen (Garcés-Masareñas, 2015).

The functioning of the Dublin Regulation is in dialogue with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees' (UNHCR) definition of the refugee¹⁶. The 1951 Convention established the notion of 'non-refoulement', the preventing of forced deportation of individuals back to their country of origin if there was an immediate and grave danger to their life if they were to return home (McAdam, 2017). The definition in the original Convention limited refugees to only those affected by events prior to the year of 1951; this was subsequently addressed in the UNHCR's 1967 Protocol which extended the Convention to make it universal in its applications (see UNHCR, 2011). Further, and still prevalent today, individuals are required to cross a national border in order to claim asylum under the UNHCR's

¹⁶ According to the UNHCR in 1951 [2011] (p. A2), a refugee is an individual who:

"As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".

criteria, meaning that individuals internally displaced would not qualify (Hathaway, 2007; Ribas-Mateos, 2016). The total number of ‘recognised’ refugees across the world for 2021 was 21.3 million with 53.2 million individuals being considered ‘internally displaced’ and therefore not deemed a ‘refugee’ (UNHCR, 2022).

Ultimately, though the legislation concerning refugees is global in reach, it remains the responsibility of the nation state (or supranational organisation such as the European Union) to enact (and interpret) the law (Puumala et al., 2018; Ribas-Mateos, 2016). Within the EU context, the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol are fundamental and present in the EU’s (2012) Charter of Fundamental Rights. In Article 18 of the Charter, it states:

“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (European Union, 2012, Article 18).

The ‘Europeanisation of refugee policy’ and the EU’s understanding concerning asylum stems back to the Convention and Protocol of the UNHCR but at the same time can also shape interpretations of the Convention and Protocol via its Court of Justice (Bank, 2015; Lavenex, 2001). Bank (2015, p. 214) writes, “it would seem likely that the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol strongly shape and delimit European asylum policies” however, concomitant to this, “the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) also have the potential for impacting on international refugee law far beyond the EU itself, not least by constituting a strong strand of international practice in the application of the 1951 Convention”. This implies that the decisions and actions of the CJEU pursuant to the Convention and Protocol can have wide reaching implications concerning how they are to be applied.

In 1999 (see Figure 4.4 above), the EU formed the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) seeking to establish “a minimum level of international protection in all Member States” in which irrespective of where the new arrival would seek asylum they would (at least in theory) be ‘treated equally’ (European Commission, n.d.-a; Guild & Moreno-Lax, 2022, p. 2). Despite the aim of CEAS though, acceptance rates fluctuate significantly for successful asylum bids between European Union countries as seen in Table 4.1 (Guild, 2016). For individuals from Afghanistan, the percentage likelihood of them receiving refugee status could vary from as low as 9% for Italy and be as high as 47% for Belgium (UNHCR, 2017).

Table 4.1: Total number of asylum claims from Afghanistan and percentage of refugee status in 2015 for selected EU and Schengen countries (adapted from UNHCR (2017)).

| Country | Total number of decisions for applications made in 2015 for asylum from Afghanistan | Percentage rate of <u>refugee status</u> awarded for new applicants from Afghanistan issued during 2015 | Percentage rate of <u>all asylum recognition</u> awarded for new applicants from Afghanistan issued during 2015 |
|---------|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 1,249 | 47% | 80% |
| Denmark | 177 | 11% | 38% |
| France | 689 | 30% | 80% |
| Germany | 5,492 | 46% | 76% |
| Greece | 1,308 | 29% | 57% |
| Italy | 3,444 | 9% | 96% |
| Sweden | 2,938 | 24% | 75% |

According to Byrne et al. (2020, p. 877), “CEAS was the world’s most developed regional legal framework for refugee protection, and in the 2015 refugee crisis it came close to collapse”. This did not just transpire to a failure of protecting the individual asylee in question, but also the “failure of [M]ember [S]tates to respect obligations *owed to each other* that precipitated the erosion of the regional asylum system”, with Swedish/Danish relations being a part of this (Byrne et al., 2020, p. 877, emphasis in original). Countries such as Greece and Hungary that had “violated the law” concerning asylum “were rewarded for their behaviour with a shifting of their share of the protection burden elsewhere” (Byrne et al., 2020, p. 887).

The legal context in which Sweden was operating concerning its deployment of border controls is therefore important. There is, for example, a tension between the EU and the UNHCR in relation to the enacting of the law concerning the protection of refugees in international law. Guild and Moreno-Lax (2022) flag this with a particular light on the principle of non-refoulement. They write, “Member States consider that the nonrefoulement [sic] obligation applies only to those persons who fulfil two criteria: (a) they have arrived at the border of the state where they seek protection (or are inside it); (b) there is no safe third country to which they can be sent” (p. 7). Written into the Dublin III Regulation is the following: “Any Member State shall retain the right to send an applicant to a safe third country, subject to the rules and safe guards laid down in Directive 2013/32/EU” (European Union, 2013, Article 2 Paragraph 2). Determining neighbouring countries as ‘safe third countries’ is thereby in the EU’s interest, even if the country in question (Turkey is a particularly poignant example, see Dimitriadi (2016)) is not necessarily a ‘safe’ third country (Guild & Moreno-Lax, 2022; Lavenex, 2006). Accordingly, Carrera and Lannoo (2018, p. 7) argue that “[r]elying on third countries for solving internal EU dilemmas is not a panacea” due to the human rights issues at play, and this was

particularly apparent in Turkey and the EU's interactions with them (see also Carrera et al., 2018a).

An important moment within the European political climate at this time was the ongoing negotiations and dialogues between the EU and Turkey (see Bialasiewicz & Maessen, 2018). The EU had received 750,000 individuals via Turkey in 2015 of which a further two million individuals were staying in Turkey following their open border policy for Syrians since the start of the war in 2011 (European Commission, 2015g; Heck & Hess, 2017). In October 2015, the EU and Turkey sought to develop a strategy to address the situation which would later come into effect on 29th November known as the 'Joint Action Plan' (European Commission, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g). As part of these discussions, the EU affirmed the provision of financial support (€3 billion) to Turkey in handling the situation and "agree[ing] to re-energise Turkey's accession process to the European Union" (European Commission, 2015f, p. np)¹⁷.

On 18th March 2016, the 'EU-Turkey Statement'¹⁸ was made proposing nine points for action, two being particularly important for the wider context at that moment (European Council, 2016). Firstly, the two parties agreed to preventing additional irregular migration from Turkey to Greek islands from 20th March 2016 through the returning of individuals to Turkey. Secondly, "[f]or every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria" (European Council, 2016, p. np). However, in order to make this 'off-shore' scheme possible, according to EU law, Turkey had to be deemed a 'safe country', with the deal thereby being considered to be an

¹⁷ As of June 2018, the European Commission 'froze' Turkey's potential accession to the Union due to "backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights" (European Commission, 2020, p. np).

¹⁸ Also known as the EU-Turkey Deal, see Heck and Hess (2017).

“outsourcing of responsibility” and even a “humanitarian failure” (Carrera & Guild, 2017; Carrera et al., 2015; Collett, 2016; Dimitriadi, 2016, p. 3; McEwen, 2017, p. 22; Ulusoy, 2015). According to the European Commission's (2017) reflection one year after the Statement, the EU-Turkey deal brought about a drop in the number of new arrivals of 97%.

4.4 Overview of Denmark and Sweden

Denmark and Sweden share no physical borders but are rather connected by the Öresund Strait, and the Öresund Bridge, a ‘bridge-border’ (cf. Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2010) in operation since 2000. The bridge (consisting of road and train lines) sought to bring about an extended common labour market between Copenhagen and Malmö with approximately 90% of such daily commuters living on the Swedish side and travelling to Denmark for higher paid work (Øresundbron Konsortiet, 2018). At its peak in 2008, there was a daily total of 17,000 commuters using the bridge, a significant increase compared to the 1,500 commuters which exist.

Following the Second World War, the Nordic countries of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland (and to a degree Iceland) have experienced an era of co-operation locally and internationally. During the 1950s, the Nordic countries moved towards a closer union signing initially a ‘Common Nordic Labour Market’ in 1954 (Nordic Co-operation, 2019a) followed by a ‘Nordic Passport Control Agreement’ (later enveloped by Schengen) between Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland three years later which was further established with the Helsinki Treaty in 1962 (Brekke & Staver, 2018; Nordic Co-operation, 2014, 2019b).

Denmark's history with the European Union has been a turbulent one, with the EU being a "sensitive issue among Danes" (Christensen, 2010, p. 18). Friis (2002, p. 394) recognised Denmark's 'bumpy' relationship with the European Union since its joining not as only a Danish situation but emblematic of an issue for each of the Nordic countries as they struggle to find "a credible fit between national identity and the EU project". In 1973 Denmark joined the European Economic Community (EEC) which would later become the European Union in 1993 (European Union, 2016a). In 1993, Denmark voted to join the Maastricht Treaty (which set up the birth of the European Union) only the second time through after four 'opt-outs' were negotiated at the Edinburgh Agreement (Council of the European Communities & Commission of the European Communities, 1992; Folketinget, 2020a, 2020b). These opt-outs for Denmark were a resistance to: the Economic and Monetary Union; a common army; ceding juridical autonomy on Danish affairs; and a European citizenship replacing a Danish one (Folketinget, 2020a). In June 2022, Denmark voted to no longer opt-out of the EU defence clause, marking a step closer to further union (The Local, 2022).

It would take until 1995 before Sweden would join the now European Union and one year later each of the five Nordic countries¹⁹ signed the Schengen Agreement which brought down internal borders for participating states in 2001 (European Commission, 2015b; European Union, 2016a). In 2000 and 2003, Denmark and Sweden respectively voted against joining the Euro currency (Folketinget, 2020b; Valmyndigheten, 2020). Though Denmark have an opt-out concerning the Euro currency, the same is not true for Sweden which is 'bound' to join the

¹⁹ Norway and Iceland are not members of the European Union but are signatories of the Schengen Agreement.

currency when “it meets the necessary conditions”²⁰ (European Central Bank, 2021; European Commission, n.d.-b, p. np).

Both Sweden and Denmark hold to a ‘dualist’ understanding of law vis-à-vis the European Union, the principle “where international legal norms are only regarded as valid and as effective in domestic law once they have been incorporated into national legislation” (Nergelius, 2019; Tvarnø and Ølykke, 2018; Wiklund, 2008, p. 165). Such a dualism can arguably be emblematic of a reluctance towards the ‘ever closer Union’ at the heart of the European project in the ‘solemn declaration’ of 1983, alongside both Sweden and Denmark’s opt-outs to various clauses of Union (European Union, 1983, Objective 1.1; Granmer, 2008). Accordingly, for Granmar (2016, p. 1), the “Swedish Courts have been slow if not downright reluctant to recognise the consequences of being [...] a Member State of the European Union” (cf. Cameron, 1999). In this way, Sweden and Denmark’s engagement with borderwork during the events of 2015-2016 emerge up out of this Nordic juridical contextuality.

Scandinavia internationally has become synonymous with a strong universal welfare state however a ‘civic selection’, namely the process concerning who is (deemed) entitled to the welfare provisions and who is not, is present and varied between the countries (Bech et al., 2017; Borevi et al., 2017; Cox, 2004). ‘Welfare chauvinism’ raises questions of the “criteria regarding who is entitled to *what* [...] [with] a strong emphasis on citizens’ duties and obligations”, conflated with discourses of ‘strains’ on a welfare state (Jørgensen & Thomsen, 2016, p. 333, emphasis in original; Keskinen, 2016; Whyte et al., 2019; Worth, 2018). In

²⁰ Though Sweden is obliged to join the Euro, they have intentionally avoided fulfilling the final condition for joining the Euro, with no means by which the EU can enforce a Member State to join (BBC News, 2019; *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, 2012, Article 140).

moments such as during 2015-2016 when large numbers of new arrivals from culturally different backgrounds entered Denmark and Sweden, welfare chauvinism rose to the fore.

Despite the strength of the welfare states that make up Scandinavia, civil society has nonetheless been prevalent in the region serving as a “key function as intermediate institutions between the citizens and the state” (Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018, p. 3; Henriksen et al., 2012; Henriksen & Bundesen, 2004; Klausen & Selle, 1996). Civil society historically played important roles in the provision of welfare, only for the state to incrementally take “responsibility [for it] in parallel with the development of the welfare state” (Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018, p. 2). The co-productive, symbiotic and hybrid nature of the welfare state and civil society for Klausen and Selle (1996, p. 118) is ‘perfectly natural’, with civil society “not working in opposition to the state...[but defining] much of what is specifically Scandinavian” (see also Frederiksen, 2015; Rantamäki, 2017).

The relationship between civil society and the Swedish and Danish state stems back over a century, with citizens long thinking highly of the state and carrying mutual levels of respect and trust, resulting in high levels of volunteerism, emerging from 19th Century Christian principles and philanthropy (Henriksen et al., 2012; Ibsen & Seippel, 2010; Lundström & Svedberg, 2003; Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Thøgersen, 2015). In recent years though, volunteers in Sweden and Denmark have received a mixed reception by their respective societies more generally and during 2015-2016 Sweden and Denmark faced a ‘criminalisation of solidarity’ (Dadusc & Mudu, 2020; Frederiksen, 2015).

4.4.1 Denmark

Due to high unemployment levels following the Second World War, Denmark was characterised as a country of emigration, particularly to Australia and Canada (Nannestad, 2004). What in-migration there was stemmed primarily from their Nordic neighbours and Western Europe (Nannestad, 2004). During the 1960s, Denmark's economy was strong and additional labour was required to fill the employment needs; as a result, 'guest workers' were sought from 1967 by employers from countries such as Yugoslavia and Turkey (Bjørklund & Goul Andersen, 2002; Wium Olsen et al., 2019). When the oil crisis of 1973 struck, guest workers were no longer sought but efforts were made to assimilate them and their immediate family into Denmark (Bjørklund & Goul Andersen, 2002; Nannestad, 2004; Wium Olsen et al., 2019).

Towards the end the 1970s, the term 'parallel society' emerged in various Danish cities and towns in relation to foreigners (Wium Olsen et al., 2019). In 1983, a re-drafting of the Danish Aliens Act was passed in the Folketinget [Danish Parliament] making it "the most liberal in Europe" beyond the United Nations' obligations concerning immigration (Wium Olsen et al., 2019, p. np). Asylum seekers increased in the subsequent years and many received permanent residency, however a political polarisation soon emerged in the mid-1980s and the Aliens Act was consequently made more restrictive in 1986 (Wium Olsen et al., 2019).

In the year 1995, the Eurosceptic Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) split from the Progress Party becoming an increasingly important player in Danish politics and, for Rydgren (2004), the birth of Denmark's first 'radical right-wing party' (Borevi et al., 2017). The Danish

People's Party, unlike their Swedish counterparts the Sweden Democrats, did not develop out of "right-wing extremist groups", but rather emerged out of populist roots, with "several of the established parties legitimis[ing] the party by co-operating with [them]" due to the multi-party political system (Damgaard & Svensson, 1989; Rydgren, 2004, p. 497, 2010). In 2015, the Danish People's Party received 21.2% of the vote in a general election to become Denmark's second largest party and serve as a support to the centre-right government headed by Lars Løkke Rasmussen and the centre-right 'Venstre' (Statistics Denmark, 2020a).

Across the Nordic countries (and adopted by the Danish People's Party) there had been "an invisible (and sometimes more visible, see The Local (2015d)) slide towards Orientalist discourses and stereotypes" particularly for those who practice Islam (Koefoed et al., 2021, p. 454). In 2014, Denmark had its first 'public' and "purpose-built mosque" which served to move "Islam from the private to the public sphere and rendering it visible in urban space" seeking to rupture the 'invisible' borders present in such an urban space (Simonsen, 2008; Simonsen et al., 2019, p. 650). The move exemplified a significant cultural step in Denmark from a predominantly "rather homogenous society"²¹ to a more multicultural one (Simonsen, 2008, p. 149; see also Rytter & Pedersen, 2014). The spatiality of the mosque impressed on the Danish landscape a series of emotions tied to imaginations of the (Muslim) Other, challenging "Islamophobia" and its "strong hold on the public consciousness in Denmark" (Simonsen et al., 2019, p. 663). The presence of the Other in Denmark poses, according to Kirsten Simonsen (2008, p. 149), both cultural and economic issues, where these individuals are, by some in Denmark, "construed as a threat to Danish society, not only because they are supposed to

²¹ This may be more based on perception than reality, see Green-Pedersen and Odmalm (2008).

‘pollute’ Danish culture, but also because they allegedly intend to ‘exploit’ the Danish welfare system”.

In Figure 4.5 below, the total number of applications for asylum per year within Denmark is presented from 1995 to 2019. The transition between the centre-right leaning governments and centre-left leaning governments demonstrates a trend in lower and higher levels of asylum applications respectively. Two months after the 9/11 terror attacks, Denmark had its general election in November 2001 where “the focus was on what was dubbed the ‘immigration crisis’” (Qvortrup, 2002, p. 205; Rytter & Pedersen, 2014). In the following year, the Danish Government, consisting of a Venstre-Conservative coalition (with support from the Danish People’s Party), introduced “radical restrictions” to immigration and family reunification to address the ‘issue’ of immigration in Denmark (Goul Andersen, 2006, p. 4, 2007).




Figure 4.5: Total Asylum Applications within Denmark (1995-2019). Adapted from Statistics Denmark (2020b).

A series of anti-immigrant legislation (particularly directed at Muslims) emerged in Denmark that had “an overall political strategy of social engineering” (Rytter & Pedersen, 2014, p. 2311). Of particular note was the transition to more temporary permits and a permanent residency conditioned on the passing of a language test and integration course for non-EU citizens (Goul Andersen, 2007). In 2011, the Social Democrats regained power, only to lose it once again in the 2015 general election where Venstre once more regained power (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2016). And it was under this Venstre Government of Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen that the events of thesis occurred.

4.4.2 Sweden

Sweden historically been “by many regarded as *the* welfare state” offering generous asylum policies and paths to citizenship for new arrivals (Dingu-Kyrklund, 1999; Svallfors, 1991, p. 610, emphasis in original). During the 1930s, the Social Democrats rose in the ascendancy in Sweden and the welfare system began to develop (Spektorowski & Mizrachi, 2004). At a similar time, widescale eugenics (‘welfare eugenics’) and sterilization occurred within the Swedish context, in which only Nazi Germany “sterilised a greater number of ‘biologically inferior’ citizens than Sweden” (Pred, 2000, p. 115; Spektorowski & Mizrachi, 2004).

During the 1950s and 60s, Sweden’s economic growth resulted in growing numbers of immigrants and (similar to Denmark) ‘guest workers’ to feed the growing economic demands stemming from countries such as Yugoslavia, Turkey, Germany and Italy (Bonfanti, 2014; Stokes-Dupass, 2017). In the decades that followed, demands for labour migration were halted and Sweden began to receive growing numbers of asylum seekers (and subsequently their

families) from countries such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chile, Turkey and the post-Soviet countries, transitioning to a supposed era of “colour blindness and generous migration policies” as a country (Bonfanti, 2014; Lundström, 2017, p. 80; Sager & Öberg, 2017; Stokes-Dupass, 2017; Rydgren, 2002; cf. Mulinari & Neergaard, 2010; Borevi, 2012). For many, Sweden was portrayed as “a paradise for human rights” and a “post-racial utopia, where colour-blindness is the norm” (Hübinette & Tigervall, 2009, p. 335). This narrative, however, was far from the wider picture (Hällgren, 2005; Hübinette & Tigervall, 2009; Pred, 2000).

Deeply rooted racial discrimination permeate(d) the country, serving as an important precursor to the rise in popularity (and mainstreaming) of the Sweden Democrats (Hällgren, 2005; Pred, 2000). This form of racism can stem all the way down to ‘playground racism’ where children in Sweden may experience discrimination from both other children as well as adults (Hübinette & Tigervall, 2009). Segregation has been prominent across the country (what Pred (2000) explores as the dynamics between the ‘racial’ and the ‘spatial’, see also Hübinette and Tigervall (2009)), being linked to urban unrest and typified by the burning of cars growing each year between 2003 and 2009 (Malmberg et al., 2013).

Writing a decade and a half before the events of this thesis, Allan Pred (2000, p. 54) noted that “Sweden had retreated a long way from having what once was arguably the world’s most generous refugee policy”. In the 1980s, Sweden began to redefine legislatively their immigration laws in response to the increasing number of new arrivals from outside Europe (Pred, 2000). Despite the reputation of Sweden (Pred’s book is provocatively entitled ‘Even in Sweden’), Pred (2000) demonstrates with countless examples the discrimination, racism, hostilities and violence that non-Europeans in Sweden experienced on an everyday level. An

awareness of this is therefore paramount for this thesis as the rise of the Sweden Democrats and the deployment of Sweden's border controls did not emerge out of nowhere, rather they are the product and agents "of a set of interfused economic, political, and social crises" in which "racisms keep flourishing throughout Europe, *even* in Sweden" (Pred, 2000, p. 268, emphasis in original).

Despite this, until relatively recently Sweden had seen little formal success regarding right-wing parties in power, however this changed with the rise of the Sweden Democrats (Rydgren, 2002). The party sought to recover Sweden's 'golden age' (particularly the 1950s welfare state and an ethnically uniform society) of an 'old Sweden' and "teeters on the edge of what is acceptable in the public debate" in regards to resistance and multiculturalism (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019; Hellström et al., 2012, p. 203; Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). In the nascency of the Sweden Democrats during the 1990s, due to the Bosnian War, Sweden received tens of thousands of individuals of which 'collective asylum' was offered to a large percentage of those that arrived (Cutts, 1999; Eastmond, 1998; Porobić, 2020). Since 1995, the number of asylum seekers in Sweden had ebbed and flowed, reaching a peak of approximately 163,000 in 2015 and then a dramatic decrease following the introduction of border controls (Figure 4.6). Amidst this backdrop, the Sweden Democrats sought to distance themselves from a neo-Nazi history which coincided with them growing in popularity as a party (for a discussion, see Hellström and Nilsson (2010) and Pred (2000)).




Figure 4.6: Applications for Asylum in Sweden (1995-2019). Adapted from Migrationsverket (2020b).

The Sweden Democrats’ political breakthrough came in 2010 when they received 5.7% of the vote in the general election (SCB, nd). In the two elections that followed (2014 and 2018), the Sweden Democrats continued to gain in popularity receiving 12.9% and 17.5% of the vote respectively (SCB, nd). Unlike in Denmark with the Danish People’s Party, due to their historical connections to neo-Nazi groups, the Sweden Democrats have (until more recently) faced a ‘cordon sanitaire’ with the majority of parties shunning them at all cost (Hirvonen, 2013; Rydgren, 2004, 2010). In the autumn and winter of 2015 (see Table 5.5 in Chapter 5) and the January of 2020 (prior to the Covid-19 pandemic), the Sweden Democrats were polling as the most popular party in the country (for examples, see Aftonbladet (2020) and SKOP Väljarbarometer (2020)). Their rhetoric of welfare chauvinism, nationalism and Islamophobia was potent and exacerbated by the large number of new arrivals in 2015 from Islamic countries (Norocel, 2016).

4.5 Timeline

As already seen, both Sweden and Denmark had growing numbers of new arrivals in the build-up to the events of 2015-2016. In Figure 4.7, this is shown most clearly in the dramatic rise and fall of the number of asylum applications into both Sweden and Denmark during the time frame of this thesis.




Figure 4.7: Gross asylum applications by quarter in Denmark and Sweden (2015-2016). Adapted from Statistics Denmark (2020c); Migrationsverket (2020a, 2020c).

This thesis focuses particularly on Sweden's three forms of border controls (Sections 4.6–4.8) during the events of 2015-2016, as well as the response of civil society. In Figure 4.8 below, key sites are shown on the map, including Malmö and Hyllie Train Stations, Posthusplatsen, Malmömässan, St John's Church, the Swedish Migration Agency and Kontrapunkt's warehouses.

Malmö - Important Sites 2015-2016




Figure 4.8: Map of Malmö, demonstrating important sites of 2015-2016. Created using Google Maps.

In focusing on the key events of 2015-2016, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provides a sketch in words and schematically of the key events during this time, with events in bold being of particular importance for this thesis. In Figure 4.10, particular boxes are highlighted in yellow as 'moments'. This thesis explores six moments that will be explored at greater length in the following chapter, however, for the present, it is important to flag that these moments served as political resources that could be utilised and wielded in the political milieu by various actors and organisations. Such moments could be imbued with meaning and framed within particular discourses, narratives and representations, appropriated differently by various actors and organisations.

Figure 4.9: Timeline of key events in Sweden and Denmark between August 2015 and July 2016.

- **August 2015** – Large numbers begin arriving in Sweden and Denmark.
- **2nd September 2015** – Image of Alan Kurdi released globally.
- **6th September 2015** – Prime Minister Löfven makes speech at a demonstration in Stockholm saying, “[m]y Europe does not build walls” (Regeringskansliet, 2015b, p. np, Google Translated).
- **7th September 2015** – A group of approximately fifty asylum seekers walk on a Danish highway towards Sweden. Kontrapunkt (anarchist organisation) open shelter in Malmö, receiving ten thousand stayovers in approximately a month.
- **9th September 2015** – Denmark closed rail link to Germany and a motorway. 300 people started walking on the motorway (Reuters, 2015a).
- **10th September 2015** – The Swedish Migration Agency (SMA) are present at Malmö Central Station (Sjöberg, 2018).
- **8th October 2015** – The City of Malmö open official reception place (Posthusplatsen) in Malmö Central Station (According to Kontrapunkt; cf. Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019).
- **15th October 2015** – The EU-Turkey Action Joint Action Plan is discussed (European Commission, 2015d). Trelleborg announce 1,000 unaccompanied minors have gone missing (The Local, 2015b).

- **12th November 2015** – Sweden announces internal border controls with a focus at Hyllie train station and use Malmömässan as a ‘detention centre’.
- **19th November 2015** – “[T]he Migration Agency announced that it could no longer offer all asylum seekers accommodation” (European Migration Network, 2016, p. 29). Three hundred individuals had nowhere to sleep.
- **24th November 2015** – Press conference of Åsa Romson and Stefan Löfven proposing new measures including identity control and the temporary law.
- **29th November 2015** – EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan is adopted (European Commission, 2015d, 2016a).
- **4th January 2016** – Identity Control comes into effect, particularly important at Copenhagen Airport Train Station. Denmark introduces border checks at southern border with Germany.
- **9th March 2016** – Prime Minister Löfven speech at EU Parliament.
- **18th March 2016** – EU-Turkey Joint Statement (EU-Turkey Deal) (European Council, 2016).
- **21st March 2016** – EU-Turkey Deal comes into effect (European Commission, 2018).
- **22nd June 2016** – Temporary Law in Sweden passed (Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016).
- **20th July 2016** – Temporary Law in Sweden comes into effect for three years (Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016).
- **4th May 2017** – End of ID Control (Joormann, 2017).

4.6 Border Checks in Sweden

Two entry points into Sweden were particularly important for this thesis during the time frame of 2015-2016: Malmö and Trelleborg. Both locales are part of the Skåne Region, the region which makes up the south-west of Sweden and has a strong presence of Sweden Democrats (Sydsvenskan, 2018). Whereas Malmö had a population in 2015 of 320,000 inhabitants (Statistics Sweden, 2020a), making it the third largest city in the country, Trelleborg is a small harbour town with ferries connecting to Germany and Denmark, hosting a population of less




Figure 4.10: Visualisation of key events timeline in Malmö, Sweden, during 2015-2016. For sources, see Figure 4.9.

than 45,000 inhabitants (Statistics Sweden, 2020b). Due to the Öresund Bridge connecting to Denmark’s capital, Malmö can be considered as “the key point of entry” into Sweden and the “gateway to and from Europe” (Kleres, 2018, p. 214; Nordling et al., 2017; Persdotter, 2020, p. 36). Trelleborg throughout the crisis time was associated with one sub-group of the population: unaccompanied minors.




Figure 4.11: Total daily number of new unaccompanied minors received by Trelleborg Municipality from 23rd September 2015 to 31st January 2016. Adapted from data provided from personal communication with Trelleborg Municipality.

As shown in Figure 4.11 above, during the month of September 2015 alone, Trelleborg received 2,699 unaccompanied minors, approximately one unaccompanied minor per seventeen residents of Trelleborg (personal communication with Trelleborg Municipality). For the adults and families that arrived at Trelleborg, buses were arranged to take the new arrivals directly to the nearest Swedish Migration Agency (SMA) office in Malmö, a process which took about two weeks when the numbers started to increase. On 12th November when Sweden’s border control was first re-introduced²², a specific imperative was given to ferries that required

²² Following the precedence of Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Hungary (European Commission, 2021).

a form of identification *prior* to getting on ferry boats going to Sweden²³. As a result, any unaccompanied minors which did not have an ID and sought out Sweden were required to try a different route, most likely travelling to Denmark via Copenhagen and the Öresund Bridge towards Malmö. This route consisted of either border checks completed at the Öresund Bridge itself or the first train station en route from Copenhagen to Malmö, the station of Hyllie. Here, the police would await the trains arriving at Hyllie and if an individual had no papers and sought to stay in Sweden, they would pass responsibility to the SMA as part of the registration process.

Such controls (border checks and ferry identity control) were deemed to be in place for just ten days, with the reasoning for such an unprecedented decision being due to “the present situation pos[ing] *acute challenges* to vital functions in society” (Regeringskansliet, 2015c, p. np, emphasis added). Prior to these measures on 12th November, an individual could have been able to travel on to Stockholm, Norway or Finland without a definitive check done by the police; after this date, border checks undertaken at Hyllie for trains and at the Öresund Bridge for cars ensured that asylum had to be sought immediately upon entry onto Swedish soil.

4.7 Identity Control

Twelve days after Sweden introduced border checks, during a press conference the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister announced the incoming identity control and ‘temporary’ law that were soon to follow (Regeringskansliet, 2015c). The identity control (ID Control) bill (Prop. 2015/16: 67) was further announced on 9th December 2015, proposing a new law “that

²³ It is important to note here that this was an early form of ID control which primarily affected Trelleborg due to the ferry links. In January, ID control became compulsory on trains and buses too.

entail[ed] a power for the government to in certain cases take special measures in order to maintain law and order or protect national security” and was voted through on 17th December before coming into effect on 4th January 2016 (Regeringskansliet, 2015c, 2015d, p. np, Google Translated; Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2015). The intended duration of the bill was for three years however the use of identification ended on 4th May 2017.

The law resulted in travel into Sweden via buses, trains and ferries from foreign countries (particularly Germany and Denmark), requiring identity checks to be undertaken in those countries prior to boarding the respective vehicle (Regeringskansliet, 2015d, Section One, Articles 2, 3§). These checks did not require ‘valid’ identification (such as a visa), rather only that the individual’s identification was legitimate and, if required, could be used in Sweden’s asylum application. The identity controls were, therefore, targeting those without any identification to restrict them from entering Sweden and thereby preventing applications for asylum there. Copenhagen Airport train station was the last stop within Denmark before passing through the Öresund Bridge to Sweden. Accordingly, it was the chosen site to set up the required infrastructure to bring about the identity control by Dansk Statsbaner (DSB Trains) the Danish state-owned rail company. DSB used the multi-billion Euro Swedish private security company Securitas (contracted by ISS) to undertake the checks, part of part of a wider movement across the Global North in privatising security in co-operation with the state (Bloom, 2015; Button & Stiernstedt, 2017; Davitti, 2019; Menz, 2013; Sciascia, 2013; Sørensen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013; Van Steden & Sarre, 2007).

On the same day as the introduction of the ID Control (4th January 2016), Denmark introduced their own border checks regarding its land and sea borders, particularly with Germany

(European Commission, 2021). According to the Danish Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing (2016), in the same manner as Sweden, the first border checks were supposedly to only last for ten days. Rather than ten days, however, the border checks still operated in both countries up to and during the Covid-19 pandemic (European Commission, 2022).

4.8 Temporary Law

The move made by the Swedish state as part of the ‘temporary law’ towards time-limited permits, though somewhat novel in a Swedish context, was not uncommon to its neighbouring countries of Norway and Denmark where temporary permits are common (Hagelund, 2020). What was significant, however, was that such a decision advanced “Sweden’s let[ting] go of its image as a humanitarian frontrunner and international exception on immigration policy [...] (temporarily at least)” (Hagelund, 2020, p. 8; Traub, 2016; cf. Pred, 2000).

In the article from the Prime Minister’s Office on 24th November 2015 proposing “measures to create respite for Swedish refugee reception”, the transition from permanent residence permits to temporary ones was announced alongside a summary of the intended law including the connection between income and permanent permits, family reunification and the suspension of the category of those ‘otherwise in need of protection’ (Regeringskansliet, 2015a, p. np).

The earliest form of the temporary law was present on the 11th February 2016 where the Swedish Government sought consultation from various organisations and institutions which was met with objection from state and non-state organisations (Bondelid, 2016;

Regeringskansliet, 2016). The law then later appeared before the Riksdag on 22nd June 2016, *Lag (2016:752) om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige* [Act on Temporary Restrictions on the Possibility of Obtaining a Residence Permit in Sweden] and was voted through with 240 out of a possible 349 MPs voting in favour of the bill (Stern, 2019). The bill was in dialogue with the Swedish Aliens Act of 2005, superseding ('temporarily') the Aliens Act to account for the new temporary provisions from 20th July 2016 to last until 19th July 2019, later extended (with some adjustments) until 2021 before becoming permanent that year (Fratzke, 2017; Hofverberg, 2016; Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016; Salmonsson & Hedlund, 2018; Stern, 2019). According to Stern (2019, p. 93), the aim of the Swedish state by introducing the law was to "make Sweden less attractive as a country of asylum" by moving Sweden's asylum laws down to the EU-minimum, as well as to "apply pressure on other EU member states to show more solidarity".

Due to the temporary law, previously permanent residence permits²⁴ became limited in time for refugees (three years) and others in need of protection (thirteen months)²⁵ (Hofverberg, 2016; Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016, Section 4, §5; Swedish Government, 2005, Chapter 5, Section 1). For a refugee to move from a temporary to a permanent residency, a sufficient level of income and registered employment (alongside other exemptions) were required (see Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016, §17-18). Family reunification was similarly restricted (limited almost entirely for those on subsidiary protection) unless the individual demonstrated that

²⁴ Quota refugees were exempt from the temporary law (Regeringskansliet, 2015a; Salmonsson & Hedlund, 2018).

²⁵ These are both general rules of law and exceptions within the act are made on grounds such as national security (see for example Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016, Section 4, §5). The number thirteen was chosen as opposed to twelve in order to allow "for access to certain social services" (Tucker, 2017, p. 18).

they were likely to be given permanent residency themselves (Fratzke, 2017; Hofverberg, 2016; Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016, §6, §9; Swedish Red Cross, 2018).

4.9 Conclusions

This contextual chapter has provided background information pertaining to the migratory events of 2015-2016 and its implications in Sweden and Denmark. The Syrian Civil War beginning in 2011 was presented as part of the build-up of displaced persons stemming from the Middle East, with 2015 being the year of critical importance. Following this, the legal architecture of the European Union and the Dublin Regulation were expounded upon and will be engaged with further in the subsequent chapter. Sweden and Denmark were then reflected upon concerning their recent history vis-à-vis co-operation, political memberships, migration, and their respective right-wing parties²⁶. A timeline of the key events that this thesis is exploring was then shown before introducing Sweden's three forms of border controls (border checks, identity checks and the 'temporary' law) which will be critically analysed and developed further in the next chapter, to which I now turn.

²⁶ It is important to note, however, that though these right-wing parties may share similarities, they are spatially situated and contextualised within each country, and thereby must not be conflated (Bialasiewicz, 2020).

Chapter 5 – Moments and Political Resources: Border Controls in Sweden

“[T]he problem was the signal, the signal that it was possible to come to Sweden and for the Government at that time, it was desperate, and they wanted to have the signal of not coming”

(Åsa Romson, Deputy Prime Minister 2014-2016, Sweden).

5.1 Introduction

This thesis' first discussion chapter seeks to address the governance of the border during the events of 2015-2016 in Sweden and Denmark. The chapter is structured in two halves. The first half, serving as an extension to the context chapter prior, examines the contextually emerging situation through the lens of 'political moments' and 'political resources'. The second part of the chapter then explores Sweden's three forms of border controls deployed during this time.

The term 'political moments' has been used in academic literature¹³¹ in different contexts and disciplines (Beardsworth, 2018; Caiani et al., 2012; Della Porta, 2020; Yerbury, 2011). Political moments can be understood within the processual dimension of a “mechanism of *appropriation of opportunities*” (Della Porta, 2020, p. 381, emphasis in original). These 'political opportunities' may occur in various space-times with each being grounded in specific localities and contextualities (Caiani et al., 2012; Yerbury, 2011). In this thesis, I utilise the term 'political moments' as an event, situation, image, circumstance or narrative that may be appropriated and (re)framed towards a particular political end, thus being utilised as a 'resource' or 'tool' in the operations of borderwork (cf. Della Porta, 2020). In other words, I explore how a state, individual or organisation may bring events, texts and images into the political as a tool to assist in borderwork.

Across the political landscape, moments permeate the social milieu from everyday experiences of workplace discrimination to terror attacks in a global city. Whilst moments may happen frequently (and perhaps (in)significantly), not each of these moments is appropriated; they may, in effect, pass under the surface because of numerous reasons such as being superseded by moments deemed more 'pressing' or striking (for example in a media outlet publishing one story in place of another). The 'constellation' (Cresswell, 2008) of moments may be made use of in a multiplicity of ways, being referred to as what I term 'political resources'. By using this term, I understand political resources to be a means and a conduit by which a state (or others) could achieve a desired end. These resources serve as 'tools' in how borderwork may be deployed within a society by both the state and beyond.

The process of moments and resources is bound up within the realm of representation: how the moment is presented, ascribed meaning and (re)produced may vary significantly for different individuals. A contributing reason to this may be because of the notion of political resources implying a (possible) political end. Actors and organisations have various (political) agendas and when a moment occurs that may assist in the (re)production of their discourse, narrative or specific agenda, this moment may be appropriated as a political resource towards a different end, such as in the operations of borderwork. In Section 5.3, for example, the image of the new arrivals walking on a Danish highway towards Sweden was framed as both an 'invasion' as well as a reason to mobilise care. The same moment could be ascribed different meanings (emerging out of different contextualities) and thus be used as a resource for different (political) ends.

Within this thesis I will explore six moments associated with the case study of the Swedish-Danish border during 2015-2016 and how they were utilised as political resources by both state and non-state organisations in the operations of borderwork. The six moments presented in this thesis are: the image of Alan Kurdi's body found on a Turkish beach; new arrivals walking on a Danish highway en route to Sweden; the 'spitting man'; the concentration of new arrivals into Central Station Malmö; the disappearing of 2,000 unaccompanied minors from Trelleborg; and the struggle for accommodation for the Swedish authorities. It is important to flag here that these six moments are not exhaustive but rather indicative, arising from the data and scholarly reflection. Certain other moments are not included and yet were deployed as political resources, such as the arson attacks on asylum centres in Sweden (Morell, 2019; SVT Nyheter, 2017). Nevertheless, the moments presented in detail below provide an insightful and helpful foundation for the analysis pertaining to Sweden's deployment of border controls in the second half of this chapter.

As a result of growing numbers of new arrivals entering Sweden, the Swedish Government began a three-part border control process consisting of border checks (12th November 2015), identity controls (4th January 2016) and a 'temporary' law (20th July 2016). Each of these three forms of border control are critically analysed considering their legal architecture in which Sweden was operating, in line with the research question: Concerning the Swedish-Danish border, how did the Swedish state react to the events of the large number of new arrivals into the respective countries, particularly regarding their governance? The Swedish Government, seeking to reduce the number of new arrivals, utilised moments to produce the effect of what the Deputy Prime Minister at the time referred to as 'signal politics' (as seen in the epigraph above). By this term, the Deputy Prime Minister sought to convey the process by which

moments such as the introduction of border checks could be used to (re)produce a narrative of control and securitisation.

To address this research question most fully, this chapter will investigate the various ways in which moments were utilised as political resources (by state and non-state actors) in Sweden (and in part, Denmark) concerning the operation of borderwork in response to the presence of the new arrivals in the countries. According to Peterson (2017, p. 13), “the situation placed the Swedish state in a state of emergency” and in order to do study this, attention is directed towards the governance of the new arrivals associated with border controls and the logics of care and control (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Walters, 2011). For Liza Griffin (2012, pp. 210–213) “the term ‘governance’ conveys power through steering as against commanding [...] [including] through the hegemony of particular discourses using all practices, relations and intentions in political arrangements”. Accordingly, power circulates in docile bodies within governance, with such a logic permeating a ‘control society’ premised on “know[ing] that which was to be governed and to govern in the light of that knowledge” (Rose, 2000; Rose et al., 2006, p. 87; Rose & Miller, 1992). These understandings of governance and the (re)production of discourses within a ‘control society’ are pertinent and present in the series of political moments that are now explored.

5.2 Alan Kurdi, Danish Highways and the Spitting Man (Moments One, Two and Three)

On the 2nd September 2015, the image of Alan Kurdi, a three-year old boy from Syria who was found dead on a Turkish beach, sent shockwaves throughout the world. The image

“represented a clear moment when public, journalistic, and political attention suddenly converged on a global scale”, serving as an important moment of heightened visibility in the mobilisation of care throughout Europe (Brekke & Staver, 2018; Kleres, 2018; Lafaut & Coene, 2019; Mortensen et al., 2017, p. 72; Olesen, 2018; Prøitz, 2018; Schiff & Clavé-Mercier, 2019).

Deacon Maryam and Reverend David from the Church of Sweden in separate interviews both spoke about the impact the image of Alan had on the situation in Sweden:

“[T]he turning point was the image of Alan [Kurdi] on the beach, it touched the heart of I think most of the people all over the world, also those leaders of [the] Church of Sweden in Malmö”
(Reverend David, Church of Sweden, Sweden).

“When this picture came out in the newspaper, it was like, you know, everything stopped, it was like, you know, I don’t know what happened, it was like a waterfall, it was coming, and suddenly I heard about many people who are coming to Malmö also with the trains from Denmark and so on” (Deacon Maryam, Church of Sweden, Sweden).

For Reverend David and Deacon Maryam, the image was a “*turning point*” and “*everything stopped*”, becoming a decisive political moment that was important in the mobilisation of the voluntary sector. Petra Kauraisa was the founder of the Vi Gör Vad Vi Kan (‘We Do What We Can’), a Swedish non-profit organisation that sought to provide care to asylum seekers on the island of Lesbos in Greece. In the space of ten days, the start-up received over one million pounds and 12 tonnes of clothing following a Facebook post from Petra at a similar time²⁷:

²⁷ Vi Gör Vad Vi Kan’s first post concerning fundraising was on 1st September 2015, one day before the image of Allan Kurdi was released.

“I think people were starting to understand the situation and then that picture of Alan Kurdi, the boy on the beach [...] that just resonated with so many people across Europe, and Sweden included, because it was such a horrifying picture” (Petra Kauraisa, Vi Gör Vad Vi Kan, Sweden).

According to Vi Gör Vad Vi Kan’s Facebook page, on the day of the 2nd September, over 8,000 people had donated to the organisation. Elliott from Allt Åt Alla, an anarchist organisation, similarly saw the picture of Alan as a driving factor, but in addition saw the image as a wider symptom of the situation at hand sharing that *“we took that picture and we did everything that we could within our power to criticise the system that allowed it to happen”* (Elliott, Allt Åt Alla, Sweden). This appropriation by Elliott, at the start of this chapter, provides a clear example of how moments are to be understood in the pages that follow. *“We took that picture”* says Elliott, exemplifying the appropriation of a moment as a political resource and tool that could then be used for particular means, drawing on a specific discourse and utilising the moment *“to criticise the system that allowed it to happen”*. The moment could be appropriated to mobilise care and for approximately one month after the image surfaced, policies promoting the support of refugees were seen more positively in Sweden, however by December 2015, support for such policies were lower than when they were in May 2015 (Sohlberg et al., 2019).

During the escalating crisis period, a second moment occurred when the press released images of asylum seekers walking on a Danish highway in early September 2015 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The ‘hypervisibility’ of the new arrivals as bodies out-of-place caused it not only to become a significant news story as they transgressed Danish and European space, but also as images which could be appropriated and framed within particular narratives, such as individuals in need compared to a contrary narrative of an impending invasion as discussed further below (Simonsen et al., 2019).

[Owing to copyright restrictions, this thesis does not contain this image]

Figure 5.1: Image of asylum seekers walking on Danish highway. Source: Reuters (2015a).

[Owing to copyright restrictions, this thesis does not contain this image]

Figure 5.2: Media coverage of event of new arrivals walking on Danish highway from British, Swedish, Danish and international news sources. Sources: Aftonbladet (2015); BBC News (2015); Berlingske (2015); B.T. (2015); Dagens Nyheter (2015); Daily Mail (2015); Expressen (2015); New York Times (2015); Politiken (2015); The Guardian (2015).

According to Andreas (a professional photographer from Denmark asked to capture the events) small numbers of new arrivals initially arrived in Denmark from Germany and “*were taken out of the trains by police and checked and most of them were sent back to Germany*” in line with the Dublin Regulation and the ‘safe’ third country of Germany. (Andreas, Professional Photographer, Denmark). On 7th September, Andreas recalled the increased number of new arrivals:

“This incident happened on my third day there, when we arrived to the harbour [of Rødby], the people had already arrived to Denmark, and that day there was a lot of them, and somehow they managed to get away from the police and just jump on the motorway and started walking toward Sweden and the police didn’t know what to do”
(Andreas, Professional Photographer, Denmark).

Frederik from ‘Techfugees’ (Denmark, emphasis added), reflected on the walking event and shared how there were “*some very crazy pictures in the media*²⁸ *that were shared*” of “*refugees being funnelled and protected by the police, not protected but rather protecting Denmark against free runners or whatever you’d call it*”. The discourse of ‘protecting Denmark’ raises

²⁸ Frederik was an acquaintance with Andreas the professional photographer, resulting in the connection that led to my interview with Andreas. This could also factor into Frederik’s impression from the media due to his more personal connections.

questions as to what the nation needed protection from, a discussion that is expanded upon concerning Sweden in Chapter 7 (Section 7.4). Strüver's (2004) understanding of three forms of representation and borders is helpful here, particularly the third. Following the text's conception and the text itself (in this instance the images of those walking on the highway are the 'text') what remains is the *encounter* of the individual with the images. This transpires in part to not only the encounter, but also with how the image, event or circumstance is ascribed a particular narrative or discourse in response to the moment, being framed differently by others and deployed as a political resource to achieve different ends.

For example, as CEO of Securitas Denmark, Mikael portrayed the police in a positive light, sharing that *"I have the picture in front of me of the refugees walking on the highway and so on and they handled it very well"*. Rather than focusing the lens on the asylum seekers, Mikael celebrates the law and order instigated by the police concerning the 'handling' of the new arrivals. The image 'in front' of Mikael was brought into a specific discourse of control. For Frederik and Maria (Head of Social Services for the City of Malmö), the moment of the new arrivals on the Danish highway was utilised in mutual blame where Frederik noted that *"Sweden took in so many refugees that they actually had to send them back, which is, to me is stupid"* and Maria highlighted that if Denmark had *"had done what we [Sweden] did [...] it would have been another story"*. The same moment was thereby being perceived multiperspectively and appropriated differently by my research participants (Bauder, 2011; Rumford, 2012, 2014). The event itself did not carry any intrinsic narrative but rather it was imbued with meaning by the various actors and organisations, infused with political discourses. Both Frederik and Maria used the moment to appeal to narratives of geopolitical dimensions where the images were emblematic of wider political issues and blame.

For Klara, a Member of Parliament for the Danish People's Party, the situation was a crisis for Denmark "*because we got invaded by these people*" (emphasis added). Though no other participant referred to 'invasion' explicitly, Klara's rare but distinct quotation is worth exploring. By using the word 'invaded', Klara draws on a powerful discourse with imageries of war, danger and fear, echoing of Frederik's notion of 'protecting Denmark'. Other participants painted images and constructed narratives about the new arrivals in a negative light (coded a total of 29 times) as economically exploitative, present in overabundance and framed as a security threat and danger to life (Table 5.1). One-third of the participants working within politics framed the new arrivals negatively, contrasted with about one-in-five for civil society and among state actors²⁹. Two sub-themes of the 'quantity' and 'undeservingness' of the new arrivals were present within the negative constructions of the asylees and allude to the 'invasion' discourse more widely.

By Klara's appeal to an 'invasion' narrative, she draws on a deeper and more fundamental discourse of an "imaginary threat of an invasion by refugees", with the mediated moment being used and framed accordingly, thus seeking to reshape "the global political imaginary" (Papastergiadis, 2006, p. 429). By drawing on these moments, agents such as Klara are able to (re)produce real world effects and "structures of imagination [...] that involve the border and make it meaningful" (Giudice & Giubilaro, 2015, p. 83). Within the borderscapes literature, Brambilla (2015) argued that the border is to be understood through a processual ontology. By this, she maintained that the reality of the border (and each of these moments) is "actively constructed" (p. 26). Through this active process, the ambiguous nature of the political

²⁹ As is noted throughout the thesis, the categories of 'state' and 'civil society' are blurred and interpenetrating (Sciascia, 2013), however, for ease of analysis, they are placed into groupings to grasp more fully the wider picture.

moment and resource, for Brambilla, is then part of the ‘active construction’ of the borderscape.

Table 5.1: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding of negative constructions of new arrivals (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the selected quotations, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|--|--|--------------------------------|
| Tobin, MEP, Denmark | <i>“people coming in with <u>no rights</u> to be here”.</i> | Underserving – Common. |
| Alfred, MP for Danish People’s Party, Denmark | <i>“They were not that poor, they were not, they bought their own food, they could have money for a taxi, and it was, I think it was strange because I started in a way feeling a bit [of] pity because these people, ‘they didn’t have anything’, but actually they didn’t want or they didn’t need, <u>they could manage for themselves</u>”.</i> | Undeserving – Common. |
| Emile, Öresunddirekt, Sweden | <i>“the Central Station [...] it was <u>flooded</u> with people”.</i> | Quantity – Common. |
| Axel, MP for Sweden Democrats, Sweden | <i>“[T]his mass immigration, you know, the <u>flocks of people</u> just wandering through Europe, most of them with their <u>eyes set on Sweden</u>”.</i> <i>“you remember the <u>hordes</u> of people just <u>strolling</u> through Europe across borders, it was <u>frightening</u>, I thought”.</i> <i>“the overall sense of almost <u>horror</u> seeing these tens of thousands of people just <u>casually wandering</u> through Europe, that was the overwhelming sense of where is this going to end”.</i> | Quantity – Common. |

As part of the appropriation of moments being framed within certain narratives and discourses, Glăveanu and De Saint Laurent (2015, p. 559) understood the pursuit of “achieving political aims” via the cyclical form of building representations (imaginings) and then using “these representations to influence (limit or enhance) the possibility of others achieving their

(imagined) aims” (p. 560). Certain moments could serve as heightened visibilities, be appropriated and deployed in the political functioning towards particular ends. If, as Klara does, Denmark is portrayed as being invaded, the moment is framed within a narrative and representation that is *built* and then subsequently *utilised* to realise political aims (such as stricter immigration policies) and steer the public imagination by ascribing meaning to the situation in a particular way. If a moment could be sufficiently framed as a crisis for Sweden and Denmark, it could then be utilised to push through laws, practices and discourses of governance which in other circumstances would not have been possible or justifiable (Davitti, 2018).

Among civil society, the moment of those walking on the highways was used as a political resource to respond and mobilise in a humanitarian manner. Frida from Save the Children, for example, shared how *“people started walking to the Swedish border and then you had all the Danes from Refugees Welcome and all sorts of people who came with their cars and took refugees to the Swedish border”*. Frida actively makes the connection between the people walking to the Swedish border and the mobilisation of some of Danish civil society. This is not a direct causality but rather indicative of the constellate and mediated moment (the individuals walking towards Sweden) being actively constructed and framed within a particular narrative and discourse that would transpire to the mobilisation of care and borderwork.

During the days of the asylum seekers walking on the Danish highway, one particularly important moment that came into the popular imagination of the time became known as the ‘spitting man’, what can be perceived as a third moment (see Figure 5.3). Frida, in relation to

her time in the Rødby detention centre, referred to the Danish maxim: *“the insects come crawling out from under the stones”*, sharing that its meaning entails the *“hidden racism or concerns about having [...] people with other backgrounds or ethnicities in our society that just came crawling out at the time”* (Frida, Save the Children, Denmark). One such instance was the ‘spitting man’. Andreas shared how when he was on a bridge taking photos looking down onto the asylum seekers, there was a man who was *“standing next to me spitting at them and shouting, ‘go home, go home”* (Professional Photographer, Denmark). Andreas shared how his colleague captured this important moment and stated that it became *“a big story in Denmark”*.

[Owing to copyright restrictions, this thesis does not contain this image]

Figure 5.3: A man from Denmark spitting from a bridge onto new arrivals walking on a highway in Denmark. Source: The Local (2016).

In my interview with Lars (the spokesperson on Migration and Integration for Venstre, Denmark’s centre-right party and minority government during the events of 2015-2016), he referred to the ‘spitting man’ and the situation that was brewing within Denmark:

“there was one day that you had a Dane who stood on the bridge and spat on the asylum seekers walking on the freeway below him which was a very sad moment to see a Dane react like that and at the same time, a very prominent TV personality in Denmark were [sic] smuggling asylum seekers through Denmark which sort of, those two instances were in complete opposite directions, but sort of underlined the problems we were going to face” (Lars, MP Venstre, Denmark).

Lars flagged the polarity that was emerging within Denmark about various responses from different Danes in relation to the new arrivals within the country revealing the “socially constructed mindscapes” within Denmark towards the new arrivals (Van Houtum, 2005, p.

673). In Lars' narrative, the 'spitting man' is framed in contradistinction with the 'smuggling' TV personality, summarising the two as examples that "*underlined the problems we were going to face*". By framing the two individuals thus, they are portrayed as juxtapositions, where spitting on new arrivals from the bridge is in some part the equivalent to driving asylum seekers into Sweden, presumably asserting a middle ground between the two being the best option in Lars' political narrative.

Augusto, a founding member of Refugees Welcome Sweden had seen the images of the walking and the 'spitting man' and reflected upon how that had inspired his organisation:

"there were images of people walking through the, like highways in Denmark and people on the overway [sic], I don't know what they're called, they were spitting down on the people walking through Denmark and it was really terrible to see, how can you treat people this way and, well, we thought that you have to feel welcome, if you come to Sweden you have to feel welcome, and we will be the first person you will meet"
(Augusto, Refugees Welcome Sweden, Sweden).

The mediated images were, for Augusto, utilised as a motivation for humanitarian mobilisation. Similar responses to either of the two moments were shared by Elliott from Allt Åt Alla, Monica from the Danish Red Cross and Hilma from Kontrapunkt who through such images utilised them as a rallying cry to mobilisation. For each of the individuals above, the same images were perceived and framed from different 'aspects' in a multiperspectival manner, with participants (re)producing discourses in different ways ranging from using the moment to attach blame to Sweden or Denmark (Frederik, Klara and Maria), to using the images as a motivation and invitation to assistance collectively and individually (Augusto, Elliott, Monica, Hilma, Frederik and Monica) (Bauder, 2011; Brambilla et al., 2015; Rumford, 2012, 2014; Strüver, 2004).

5.3 Central Station Malmö, Trelleborg and Accommodation Capacity (Moments Four, Five and Six)

The growing numbers present at the Central Station³⁰ in Malmö beginning in September 2015 were initially cared for primarily by civil society, as alluded to by a Swedish Cabinet Member sharing that *“we had a very welcoming and very open and very warm and a fantastic mobilization of the civil society”* (Robin, Swedish Cabinet Member 2014-2016, Sweden). In the aftermath of the previously mediated moments, Ebbe shared that *“with your own eyes you can see them at the railway station and around the railway station”* (Lecturer/Swedish Police Authority, Sweden). Rather than through anyone else’s gaze (particularly the media), the presence of the new arrivals could be seen with one’s *“own eyes”* according to Ebbe. The spatial and contingent reality of the new arrivals in the space of Sweden was demonstrating, as observed by Peña (2021) in the borderscapes literature, that space is not a-territorial, and neither is it everywhere to the degree that one can assert the death of geography. Rather, as seen in Ebbe’s encounter, the border(work) is experienced and (re)produced in a particular place and a particular time (Peña, 2021). Concurrent to this, such space-times of borderwork are ‘unstable’ and amenable (Brambilla, 2015). This moment then, as a political resource, existed in a particular contextuality and its appropriation, (re)framing and narrative within borderwork is inseparable from the spatial and temporal dimension in which Ebbe encounters it.

Although Ebbe was aware of former mass migrations into Sweden from former Yugoslavia, the reality was striking for Ebbe: *“I never experienced this kind of, now I see them went off [sic] the*

³⁰ Air travel into Sweden was securitised at this time, therefore trains into Sweden were the most viable form of transport for new arrivals (Peterson, 2017).

train and just sit there and just ask for help [from] me". Whereas before Ebbe had seen "about immigration walls and people running for their lives" this event was different for him as previously "that's just in the news, you can just see it in the telly". The presence of the new arrivals in Sweden's spatiality prompted Ebbe to say, "suddenly they were in front of you".

The confrontation with reality was not only felt by Ebbe. Many of the participants whose performative role was within politics, perceived the situation as 'real', even as they saw the moments through the media (Table 5.2). Five in twelve of the political actors' transcriptions contained 'Reality/Surreality' as a code (appearing in 27 quotations across all participants), a higher ratio than among state actors (one-in-three) and civil society (approximately one-in-five) with common sub-themes being of the 'gravity of the situation and 'realisation'. The 'imaginative geographies' (Said, 1978) of certain spaces (including the mediatised) being transgressed by the new arrivals (whether this is the highway in Denmark or the Central Station in Malmö) were moments by which the bodies could be framed as 'out of place' and thus utilised as a political resource to shift the milieu (Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021).

Table 5.2: Illustrative quotations from political participants concerning coding of 'Reality/Surreality' (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the selected quotations, shown in order from common to less common.

| Name/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Prevalence and Sub- Theme |
|---|---|---------------------------------|
| Axel, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden | <i>"I think [it] really more affected the other parties, really having to, [...] come to the <u>realisation</u> that, 'oops, the Sweden Democrats have been right for years'"</i> . | Realisation – Common. |
| Lars, MP Venstre, Denmark | <i>"there was this <u>realisation</u> that we had to do something". <i>"whatever we had debated became <u>very real</u> just after the election".</i></i> | Realisation – Common. |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | <p><i>“and then they arrived in huge numbers which sort of made it <u>very real</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“the EU solution is a desk solution, it is working on paper but not in <u>reality</u>”.</i></p> | |
| Alfred, MP Danish People’s Party, Denmark | <p><i>“it was <u>just too realistic</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“[...] this surely made it <u>very, very, very real</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“this was something <u>very real</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“it got to be, you know, <u>more real</u>”.</i></p> | Gravity of situation – Common; Realisation – Common. |
| Åsa, Deputy Prime Minister 2014-2016, Sweden | <i>“Swedish municipalities which had <u>real</u> and visible problems of course”.</i> | Gravity of situation – Common. |
| Klara, MP Danish People’s Party, Denmark | <i>“to make sure that they were there for <u>real</u> [...] ‘are you really here for <u>real</u> because you need our help or”.</i> | Questioning new arrivals – Rare but distinct. |

The quotations from Ebbe and the table above attest to the prominence of space in the moment and how they were utilised by various actors and organisations. Lars for example highlighted that the debate became “*very real*” when the new arrivals “*arrived in huge numbers*” into Denmark. Former Deputy Prime Minister Åsa highlighted (emphasis added) the “*real and visible problems*” that Swedish municipalities were witnessing, spatially grounded in Swedish territory. There appears to be a ruptured distance, then, between the Swedish and Danish political imaginations constructed of new arrivals and their presence “*here*” in the two countries, with the reality of the situation (and borderwork) emerging out of this spatial presence.

Ebbe’s reflections were regarding Malmo’s Central Station, a ‘humanitarian zone’ that was essential in the provision of care (initially by civil society) during the autumn of 2015 (Walters,

2011). It would take until early October before the Swedish authorities would set up 'Posthusplatsen' as a place to care for ('humanitarianism') and control ('policing') the new arrivals (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Walters, 2011). By this time hundreds of volunteers had already taken to the Central Station to provide care on behalf of organisations or as individuals (Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019; Peterson, 2017). Augusto from Refugees Welcome Sweden described the situation thus:

"at the Central Station in Malmö, when you arrive you were down underground and you come up to like a big hall, like a transit hall, and it was in this hall that we gather[ed] all the people, we had some food corners, we had some like children corners with toys and they can sit down and relax and be children for a second, and yeah, we had some food and stuff, and there were so many people, you can't say it was one or, I don't know how many organisations, or if there even were organisations working as an organisation, it was just people, everywhere, volunteers"
(Augusto, Refugees Welcome Sweden, Sweden, emphases added).

Augusto's words in relation to this moment draw out the small details by acknowledging the "food corners" and the "children[s] corners with toys". These words paint the image of an unthreatening collective of new arrivals, concurrent with constructing the volunteers as "everywhere". Augusto's frame is therefore an inversion to the 'invasion' discourse of Klara, portraying mobilisation and care of civil society in a positive light. On behalf of the City of Malmö, Rashid was asked by his boss to go to the Central Station due to his ability to speak Arabic. The situation was somewhat scarring for Rashid who constructed the situation:

"a lot of misery and chaos, noises, children laying on the floor, babies laying on the floor. Ah, I don't like it"
(Rashid, City of Malmö Employee, Sweden).

Rashid, once more in contrast to a threatening invasion narrative, uses the moment of the chaos at the Central Station to flag the humanity and fleshiness of the lives of the individuals

there. The affectual atmosphere of ‘misery’, ‘chaos’ and ‘noises’ alongside the vulnerability of ‘children’ and ‘babies’ portrays an image far from one of ‘invasion’ and war, but rather appeals to compassion and care. The situation, for Elise (a curator at the ‘Kulturen’ museum in Lund) “*would have been even more chaotic if those groups hadn’t been there [...] because the Swedish Government really got caught with its pants down this time, definitely*” (Kulturen Curator, Sweden). In this instance, Elise draws on the moment of chaos to frame the important role that civil society was playing as a result of an unprepared Swedish state (for a deeper discussion see Chapter 6; see also Kersch & Mishtal, 2016; Mayblin & James, 2019; Norman, 2019). The narrative of ‘unpreparedness’ and ‘surprise’ of the situation more broadly was present in multiple interviews with participants as seen in Table 5.3 (coded a total of 60 times), particularly concerning the wider dynamic (and shown as a sub-theme) of governance in light of the new arrivals. This was present for one-third of the political actors but much higher for the state (14 in 18 participants) and civil society (three-quarters). By drawing on the discourse of unpreparedness, the participants could tease out the vulnerability of the state and society. At the same time, the narrative implies an urgency and opportunity to justify the border control measures or decisions made by organisations during this time.

Table 5.3: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding of ‘Surprise/Unpreparedness’ (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the selected quotations, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Robin, Cabinet Member, Sweden | <i>“there was [sic] signals sent to [the] Government that, <u>we cannot cope with this, this is too much, we don’t have people, you know, etc., we don’t have place</u>”.</i> | Governance – Common; Scale – Common. |
| Frida, Senior Child Protection | <i>“The Danish public and the politicians reacted as though this was a huge emergency so I think, but I think I’ve said that to you before, that this is, the reaction was</i> | Governance – Common; Scale – Common. |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Advisor Save the Children, Denmark | <i>disproportioned in terms of the size of the population that came but I think it was much more that <u>we were all surprised</u> and we were <u>surprised</u> at our own reactions and the politicians did not have a standard operational procedure for this”.</i> | |
| Anna, Head of Administration for Labour Market Trelleborg Municipality, Sweden | <i>“So we had to prepare for everything and we have [had] no time [for] preparation, <u>no time at all [for] preparation</u>, and we were very, I would say, we were very lonely in this as a municipality, we had, there were no way[s] to get help, it was, we, it was Trelleborg and we had to make it”.</i> | Governance – Common. |
| Elliott, Allt åt Alla, Sweden | <i>“I remember [that when] we started [...] we were <u>absolutely clueless of the magnitude</u>”.</i> | Scale – Common. |
| Elise, Kulturen, Sweden | <i>“it sort of showed how <u>poorly prepared the society</u> was for this kind of situation”.</i> <i>“I think for many people [it] is a sort of a <u>wake-up call</u>”.</i> | Scale – Common; Society – Less common. |

The town of Trelleborg, in a similar manner to Malmö, was also struggling to deal with the large number of new arrivals, particularly the nearly 2,700 unaccompanied minors (see Chapter 4). In addition to the large number of unaccompanied minors that were received by Trelleborg, that autumn 45,000 new arrivals passed through the town, primarily via the ferry from Germany and upon reaching Trelleborg would be bused to *Migrationsverket*, the Swedish Migration Agency (SMA), to be registered³¹ (Sally, SMA Employee, Sweden).

Anna, the Head of Administration for the Labour Market Department in Trelleborg bore the responsibility for accommodating the unaccompanied minors. *“It was all new”*, she shared, *“we became a[n] arrival community which meant that we had to make housing for them*

³¹ Registration would entail the provision of basic information, photo and fingerprint connections and a brief outline of why they were seeking asylum before being moved to state-run temporary and then semi-permanent accommodation in anticipation of the formal asylum interview (Migrationsverket, 2020b, 2020c; Morell, 2019).

immediately" (Labour Market Department Trelleborg, Sweden). By referring to the situation as 'new' and needing to respond 'immediately', Anna frames the moment as one of urgency. To prepare for the between seven and twelve ferries a day arriving at Trelleborg throughout the week, a "*special centre*" was opened to run all hours of the day, with no way of knowing for Anna how many unaccompanied minors would be present on the ferry.

Trelleborg alone struggled to cope, having approximately 2,000 beds for unaccompanied minors and in total receiving 4,000 of such minors across the key months. Maximilian's work for the Skåne Administrative Board during this time included the bringing together of the municipalities in Skåne to assist in the provision of accommodation, a situation which he likened to the trading of stocks. The smaller municipalities were more eager to assist with accommodation and thus "*helped to take responsibility and they say [said], 'ok, I can take five hundred [new arrivals]', so it was like actions like selling stocks on the market*" (Maximilian, Skåne Administrative Board, Sweden). The dehumanising language of "*selling stocks on the market*" as a metaphor portrayed the new arrivals as capital to be traded. However, whereas assets on a stock market are seen as positive, the reception of the individuals was seen as an act of compassion (one can also read this as burdensome) for municipality where according to Maximilian they "*helped to take responsibility*".

Accommodation was sought in sport centres that continued to remain open (the unaccompanied minors would sleep in the hallways) and an old factory where office spaces were used for sleeping. Anna struggled to process the injustice that because of the SMA getting "*there first, they had the finance, the muscles, the infrastructure, they had the whole country to make some logistics and to get some good housing*", where adults and families would "*be*

sleeping in hotels with a lot of security and safety around them, and unaccompanied minors [would] be sleeping in [a] sports hall, with not so much safety around them” (Labour Market Department Trelleborg, Sweden). Indeed, Maximilian from the County Administrative Board (Sweden) flagged how municipalities and the SMA *“were in competition because they was [sic] in the same market”*. These two quotations demonstrate the complexity of ‘the state’, not existing as a singular and united whole, but seen in this moment operating in competition. The dynamic between the SMA and the local municipality was therefore not one of unison but a manifestation of an internal incoherency (Godin et al., 2021). This example is emblematic of a wider multiplicity of the (Swedish) state in which the borderwork that is (re)produced is not as harmonious as may be assumed and instead demonstrates a discordant process of borderwork where different components of ‘the state’ would compete against itself in sourcing accommodation for the new arrivals.

A fifth moment that was made use of as a political resource was the disappearing of 2,000 unaccompanied minors from Trelleborg. The minors would sleep *“for one night, have a breakfast and then they disappeared [...] which meant that 2,000 kids were disappearing”* (Anna, Labour Market Department Trelleborg, Sweden). Anna stated that this *“was a fact that we were very clear with and very loudly [sic] with”*, resulting, in her eyes, with the introduction of border controls: *“so the fact that we closed the border was probably a consequence of the kids disappearing in Trelleborg”*. These words from Anna illustrates the way in which a moment can be taken, framed and placed into a particular discourse and used as a resource, shaping borderwork in concrete ways. Anna ties the border controls to the disappearance of 2,000 unaccompanied minors. This was as a result, in Anna’s logic, because *“we”* (in this instance presumably the Trelleborg Municipality) were *“very clear”* and spoke *“very loudly”* about the

moment. The unacceptable situation (*“In Sweden [...] it doesn’t happen, it’s not okay”*) of children disappearing was utilised as a resource by Anna in seeking assistance from the Government to support and secure Trelleborg concerning the presence of the new arrivals, primarily the unaccompanied minors.

The wider challenges and pressures on the Swedish state concerning accommodation and shelter for the new arrivals served as a sixth political moment. At the start of the crisis, it was optional for a municipality to accept asylum seekers however this changed due to the situation. Jacob, the State Secretary for the Minister of Education shared that *“we actually launched legislation so that all the municipalities had to receive refugees so it was mandatory [...] otherwise we wouldn’t have been able to do this”*. In his performative role, Jacob speaks of the situation with an authority in which *“we”* put forward legislation which without it they would not have been able to manage (see Table 5.3 above).

In Malmö, emergency accommodation was sought in closed hotels, old hospitals and schools for minors and adults. Maria and Isabella, both workers at Malmö Social Services (those responsible for the care and accommodation of unaccompanied minors), spoke of the possibility of using their office or even cruise ships³³ to host the unaccompanied minors as *“had it continued, we would have had problems finding these big housings”* (Maria, Malmö Social Services, Sweden). As a result of the urgency, less rigorous investigations by authorities into such accommodation occurred because the state *“had to, you know, look through their fingers”* (Isabella, Malmö Social Services, Sweden). By Isabella framing the moment as one in which the

³³ See also The Local (2015a).

state officials had to “*look through their fingers*” and Maria noting that the SMA “*collapsed more or less*”, their words connote once more the unpreparedness of the state (alongside the neglecting of standard protocols and norms that in non-crisis situations would be considered essential) in addition to a dramatic imagery of ‘collapse’. This grave metaphor of ‘collapse’ packaged and framed by Maria is an important part in the constructing, shaping and steering of borderwork. By implying that the state is unable to cope, this not only reinforced a ‘crisis’ narrative surrounding the events, but similarly could be used as justificatory grounds by which border controls and ‘exceptional’ measures could be established and accepted.

The situation was exemplified symbolically with the unfoldings at Sankt Johannes Kyrka (St John’s Church) in Malmö. Reverend David, the one who would be responsible for opening the church for people to sleep in for the evenings, shared how “*rumours*” were spreading around the beginning of November that it was no longer going to be possible for the SMA to accommodate all the new arrivals. Recalling a conversation with the SMA, Reverend David stated:

“I think it was Thursday, on Thursday afternoon they went to the rooms where there were single men above eighteen years old and told them, ‘you can’t stay in the camp any longer, you have to go out and find your own place to stay’”
(Reverend David, Church of Sweden, Sweden).

On Saturday 21st November 2015, the SMA took up the Church of Sweden’s offer to accommodate the surplus new arrivals, with approximately 80-90 individuals (all men except for one woman) being brought by bus to Sankt Johannes Kyrka. This moment was just three days before the first announcement of both the identity control and the temporary law. The new arrivals were presented with a “*welcome kit*” from the SMA containing items such as a

toothbrush and pillow, then were to sleep on either the pews or the church floor. When the morning came, the SMA arrived and collected the group of new arrivals and took them to a large tent to spend the day as services continued in the church, a routine lasting for approximately five days.

Reverend David recognised the symbolic significance of the widely, evenly internationally reported story in the media (Reuters, 2015b) because *“for them it was a shame to take the help of a church for something that really was a state and a government duty”* (Church of Sweden, Sweden). The ‘shame’ attributed to the Swedish state, for Reverend David, was connected to the fallibility of the government (echoing the aforementioned narrative from Elise of the Government being caught *“with its pants down”*) in not being able to provide accommodation for those arriving in Sweden, having to rely on not just the Church of Sweden, but civil society more broadly. Nevertheless, there is also the possibility as Norman (2019, p. 43, emphasis added) somewhat cynically noted, that a state may be *“aware of the presence of migrant or refugee groups but chooses not to expend resources for engaging with [them], necessitating that other actors [...] step in to provide services”*.

Thus far in this chapter, I have highlighted the growing gravity of the situation in Denmark and Sweden that was building during the months of August to November 2015. The six moments presented above to varying degrees provided opportunities to be framed and appropriated as they were brought into the political milieu in the operations of borderwork. These political resources were utilised differently by various actors and organisations, including individuals from the civil society as well as the state (recognising the interpenetration of and internal incoherency of both (cf. Godin et al., 2021)). As part of Sweden’s deployment of border

controls, such political moments were utilised as resources in the enacting of border checks, identity control and the ‘temporary’ law, the three signposts for the critical analysis that follows in the remaining part of this chapter.

5.4 Border Control Phase 1: Border Checks

On the 12th November 2015, the Swedish Government announced ‘temporary’ border checks, serving as Sweden’s first of three phases of border controls³⁵ to curb the developing crisis: “The Government decided today to reintroduce internal border controls. These controls will begin at 12.00 on Thursday 12 November and will initially be in force for ten days, up to and including 21 November” (Regeringskansliet, 2015a, p. np). This initial decision by the Swedish state was in line with Articles 25 and 28³⁶ *et seq.* of the Schengen Border Code (SBC)³⁷ (Gülzau, 2021; Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code), 2016; Salomon & Rijpma, 2021). Sweden suspended ‘temporarily’ Article 22 of the SBC that reads, “[i]nternal borders may be crossed at any point without a border check on persons, irrespective of their nationality, being carried out” (Regulation (EU) 2016/399, 2016b, Article 22). Prior to this, individuals were able to pass through Denmark and Sweden (as both are Contracting States to the Schengen Agreement) with no forms of checks to their identification (see also Salomon & Rijpma, 2021).

Sweden was operating within a specific set of possibilities concerning the legal dimension and framework of border controls, hence in the public announcement they stated that it was to

³⁵ The framing of the border controls of border checks, identity control and a ‘temporary’ law emerged from the data itself (two participants referred to it as such) and has been used in this thesis accordingly.

³⁶ Triggering Article 28 of the Schengen Border Code is for ‘immediate action’ contrasted with Articles 25 and 26 that are for ‘foreseeable cases’ (see European Commission, 2022; Gülzau, 2021; Salomon & Rijpma, 2021).

³⁷ The Schengen Border Code was updated in 2016 and the numbering to the Articles used in this thesis corresponds with this version (see also Salomon and Rijpma, 2021).

last only for ten days³⁸. This was in line with Schengen Border Code Article 28 that accounts for unforeseen circumstances:

“Where a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State requires immediate action to be taken, the Member State concerned may, on an exceptional basis, immediately reintroduce border control at internal borders, for a limited period of up to ten days”
(Regulation (EU) 2016/399, 2016, Article 28, Paragraph 1).

For this to happen, however, it would have to satisfy the criteria listed above, namely, to be a ‘serious threat’, require ‘immediate action’ and occur on ‘an exceptional basis’. Accordingly, the use of moments could serve as powerful political resources brought into narratives (such as that of a ‘crisis’ and ‘urgency’) to justify and implement borderwork. Sweden at this point followed the precedent set by Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Hungary by re-introducing border checks in ‘domino’ fashion (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018; Table 5.4). In contrast to these four countries each citing ‘big influxes’ of new arrivals, Sweden’s turn of phrase to use the word ‘unprecedented’ appealed more so to a narrative of crisis and urgency.

Table 5.4: Temporary re-introduction of border controls from the beginning of the migration crisis up until Sweden’s first introduction of border checks. Source: European Commission, (2022, p. 20).

| Country | Date of Border Closure | Reason for Temporary Re-Introduction of the Border |
|---------|--|--|
| Germany | 13/09 – 22/09/2015; 23/09 – 12/10/2015; 13/10 – 1/11/2015; 2/11 – 13/11/2015. | “Big influx of persons seeking international protection, all borders with focus on Austrian land borders”. |
| Austria | 16/09 – 25/09/2015; 26/09 – 15/10/2015; 16/10 – 4/11/2015; 5/11 – 15/11/2015. | “Big influx of persons seeking international protection, all borders, focus on land borders with Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia”. |

³⁸ This ten-day period was not, however, recorded thus in the EU’s official document that lists Member States’ temporary re-introductions. Present there is Sweden’s border controls lasting from 12th November 2015 to 9th January 2016 (and then on until at least November 2022 at the point of submission for this thesis in July 2022) (European Commission, 2022).

| | | |
|----------|--|---|
| Slovenia | 17/09 – 26/09/2015; 27/09 – 16/10/2015. | “Big influx of persons seeking international protection, land borders with Hungary”. |
| Hungary | 17/10 – 26/10/2015. | “Big influx of persons seeking international protection, land borders with Slovenia”. |
| Sweden | 12/11 – 09/01/2016. | “Unprecedented influx of persons[.] All borders, with special focus on harbours in Police Region South and Police Region West as well as on the Öresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden”. |

During my interview with Jacob, the State Secretary for the Minister of Education in Sweden, he stated that, by “*October of 2015, it became very, a very acute situation*”. Representing the situation thus opened a realm of political and juridical possibilities within the legal framework that Sweden was operating. What was present in Jacob’s narrative was the framing of the situation as an urgent decision; when asked if the decision concerning the border control was sudden, Jacob replied:

“It was a sudden decision. [...] one of the things that was discussed immediately was border controls, of course, because, I mean, it was, something needed to be done to handle the acute situation with more than ten thousand people coming for a week [...] it was discussed and it was properly prepared [for] within in the ministries or within the Government, but it was in the very, very fast track. I think that the decisions were, it was, well we just reached the level when it was legal to handle cases in the way that we did because it was so fast”

(Jacob, State Secretary for Minister of Education, Sweden, emphases added).

For Jacob, urgency is present in his construction of the events using the words “*sudden decision*”, “*immediately*” and “*very, very fast track*”, all the while equating the sending of “*some*

kind of signal” with the necessary responses of the Government, including border controls. The “*really, really serious*” situation was a precursor and narrative for (re)producing a crisis discourse that “demand[ed] immediate action” (Davitti, 2018, p. 1185). To frame the situation which transpired as a “*sudden decision*” promotes the ‘suspension’ that Agamben (1998) refers to in the operations of a state of exception whereby via the constructing, framing and appropriating of political moments, such occasions can serve as resources that could be deployed as part of the wider rubric of the state of exception. These political resources could thus be drawn into and built upon to provide the possibilities for a suspension and state of exception where there is the “shift from such ‘crisis’ framing to the state of exception” (Davitti, 2018, p. 1176). This consequence of the suspension is much longer lasting however, what Agamben (1998, p. 20) predicts to be a new “fundamental political structure” that “ultimately begins to become the rule” in the everyday life of individuals, demonstrated by the ongoing ‘temporary’ border checks (Minca, 2007).

As part of the border controls, the importance of drawing on the narrative of a ‘signal’ was paramount, deployed and presented to influence the political milieu. Åsa Romson (co-leader of the Green Party between 2011-2016) described the decisions made by the Swedish Social Democrats (the larger share of the coalition government) as “*signal politics*”. Åsa stated:

“But of course, when it came to the crossing of the bridge and especially with concern of the borders and the, definitely the reforms made on the transition between Malmö and Copenhagen, that was also, it was also argued as an argument for this push factor of refugees, I mean, to be a signal to refugees not to come to Sweden, and that was of course what was totally opposite with the Green Party approach and that the Social Democratic Party wanting to take that approach with the push factor, with the signal politics, and of course, in a way, also wanted in practice to held [hold] back some of the refugee flow”
(Deputy Prime Minister 2014-2016, Sweden, emphases added).

Åsa noted in the epigraph of this chapter that the border control was not “*thought through at all*” and stressed the role of the decisions being made at the time in her perception as a “*signal*”. By appealing to narratives and representations of ‘crisis’ and urgency, the Swedish state could undertake ‘spectacularised performances’ of signal politics *alongside* the ‘factual implementation’ (“*also wanted in practice*”) of legislative and juridical change within the EU legal framework in which they were operating (Bialasiewicz & Stallone, 2020). Indeed, State Secretary Jacob for the Social Democrats maintained how Sweden “*needed to send some kind of signal because we knew that the refugees had sort of found a way through Germany and up to Sweden*” (State Secretary for Minister of Education, Sweden). The ‘signals’ that Sweden could send, however, were limited by the legal landscape in which they found themselves; nevertheless, the border checks worked effectively and the number of asylum seekers decreased at a steady rate (Figure 5.4)




Figure 5.4: Total Asylum Seekers per week into Malmö, 2015. Source: Personal Communication with the Swedish Migration Agency.

The ‘signal’ would function as one of numerous parts of a constellation of political resources shaping, being shaped by, producing and being produced in the political milieu (Cresswell, 2008). Contextually, such ‘signal politics’ were also important concerning their dynamic with the Swedish electorate which were increasingly supportive of the Sweden Democrats, and according to the Sensio polls, even became Sweden’s largest political party that autumn (Table 5.5). These opinion polls are not causative to the ‘signal politics’ but are rather a contextual indication of a turbulent political time in which the Social Democrats were facing increased pressure from the Sweden Democrats. As well as the internal pressures that Sweden were experiencing, external shifts were likely to have been significant in Sweden’s decision-making process (Dowle, 2021). Two particularly stark examples are fellow EU Member State Hungary investing in a 4-metre-high barbed wire fence in July 2015, and in the following month on 25th August Germany announcing a suspension of the Dublin Regulation for individuals from Syria (Associated Press, 2015; Ayoub, 2019; Euractive, 2015).

Table 5.5: Sensio opinion polls between May 2015 and June 2016 for the three largest parties in Sweden: Social Democrats (centre-left), Moderaterna (centre-right) and the Sweden Democrats (right). The largest party in the poll is presented in bold. Sources: Nyheter Idag (2015a, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016e, 2016f).

| Opinion Poll | Social Democrats | Moderaterna | Sweden Democrats |
|---|------------------|-------------|------------------|
| 11 th – 17 th June 2015 | 23.9% | 23.8% | 22.1% |
| 16 th – 22 nd July 2015 | 24.1% | 20.8% | 23.3% |
| 13 th – 19 th August 2015 | 23.5% | 21.1% | 23.4% |
| 3 rd – 9 th September 2015 | 24.1% | 19.8% | 26.5% |
| 1 st – 8 th October 2015 | 23.1% | 20.5% | 25.0% |
| 5 th – 10 th November 2015 | 22.0% | 19.3% | 26.8% |
| 10 th – 16 th December 2015 | 23.5% | 17.8% | 26.6% |
| 7 th – 13 th January 2016 | 23.0% | 20.1% | 25.5% |
| 3 rd – 9 th February 2016 | 21.1% | 21.8% | 25.5% |
| 3 rd – 9 th March 2016 | 22.1% | 22.7% | 24.0% |
| 6 th – 13 th April 2016 | 24.1% | 21.1% | 22.3% |
| 12 th – 18 th May 2016 | 24.8% | 22.1% | 23.7% |
| 2 nd – 6 th June 2016 | 22.9% | 21.0% | 24.5% |

As part of Sweden's announcement on 12th November, it was stated that any passengers on the ferries coming into Southern Sweden were required to show some form of identification prior to boarding, preventing many new arrivals from boarding such ferries³⁹ (Regeringskansliet, 2015a). When Anna in Trelleborg was asked about the change in November and the border re-introduction, she stated:

“So in practice it [migration into Trelleborg via the ferries] stopped, from one day to another. It began from one day to another and it stopped from one day to another”
(Anna, Labour Market Department Trelleborg, Sweden).

This strategic imposition of border checks coming into Sweden (as well as identity control for the ferries) targeted the new arrivals through a 'life disruption' (Tazzioli, 2021) as the rhythm of the new arrivals was thwarted due to the actions of the state. However, the crisis did not end for Sweden following the 'temporary' border introduction. Rather, as Anna stated, *“the identity control on the ferry made the refugees turn around and go towards Denmark”*. The introduction of the temporary border resulted in a concentration of the new arrivals into Malmö, rather than across both Trelleborg and Malmö.

The border checks for Sweden were centred at Hyllie train station, a 'strategic location', serving as the first Swedish station on the train line from Denmark (Mountz in Johnson et al., 2011). Infrastructure was set up at the station to ensure that no new arrivals could pass by without police knowledge (Peterson, 2017). Carl, the Chief of the Border Police Region South, shared

³⁹ This would be extended to include trains and buses on 4th January 2016.

that discussions were held between the Swedish Police and the Swedish Government prior to the imposition of the border checks:

“I didn’t know about it at that time, but now I know that the police and the Swedish Government, of course, discussed the whole situation very thoroughly and they asked how, or maybe wondered, how we would do this. The police authority said that the one possibility to stop the migrations, or the refugees, or to at least slow the numbers down a bit, is border con-, border checks, of course, so when the Government knew that that was a possibility, they decided to have the border checks and then they just tell [sic] the police authority, ‘fix it’. So we did, we did that, [in] a couple of days and then we started the border checks”

(Carl, Chief of Border Police Region South, Sweden).

Those who were not alighting at Hyllie would stay on the train whilst either police officers or border civilians (civilians *“with just some extra education and training”*) would inspect the carriages operating in pairs as border agents. The checks would result in three outcomes: firstly, there are those who would be entering Sweden with a valid documentation or reason; secondly, if individuals under scrutiny from the border agents did not provide the appropriate documentation and answers, *“we turn them and put them [...] on the next train to Denmark”*; thirdly, if an individual expressed their desire to seek asylum, *“our work stops right there”*, shared Carl.

The instant the new arrival sought to claim asylum on Swedish soil (via a train at Hyllie or from a car on the Öresund Bridge), the Swedish Police relinquished responsibility of the asylum seeker to the SMA and provided transport to the SMA office in Malmö who would then oversee the asylum procedure. At the SMA office, the new arrivals were required to present their fingerprints as part of the Dublin Regulation procedure in making their claim for asylum where if they had registered elsewhere previously, they would subsequently be returned (see European Union, 2013, Article 3(1), 21; see also Stern, 2019). Sweden was bound to the

European Union's (2013) legal framework of Regulation (EU) 603/2013 Article 9, Paragraph 1 which states that, "Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers of every applicant for international protection of at least 14 years of age and shall, as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the lodging of his or her application for international protection".

The use of fingerprinting at the 'border' of the SMA was therefore not a new occurrence for Sweden during this time frame, however it had grown significantly since 2003 to nearly 4.1 million fingerprints on the EURODAC database by the end of 2015 (European Agency for the Operational Management of Large Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice., 2016). What was significant in this was the effort Sweden was making to register (and hence fingerprint) as many individuals as possible: through the infrastructure put in place at Hyllie, the bodies that were entering Sweden were thus able to be registered and thereby became more governable. The state learned via "calculations and tactics" information of the new arrivals "that allow[ed] the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power" (Foucault (1979, p. 20)⁴⁰ quoted in Rose et al., 2006, p. 86). Through this, the state not only restricted illegal immigration into Sweden, but they also gained knowledge about the bodies passing through which could then subsequently be more efficiently managed, governed, disciplined and, in line with Dublin Regulation, be returned (or deported) as required.

Prior to the deployment of border checks at Hyllie, the new arrivals were likely able to arrive into Sweden without state knowledge and either remain in the country (legally or illegally) or

⁴⁰ The original source of this article by Foucault ('On Governmentality' published in *Ideology and Consciousness*, 6: 5-22) could not be found.

pass through into other countries. By instating the border checks, the Swedish state could gain biometric information, contributing (though not uniquely) to a 'biopolitical' or 'biometric' border (Amoore, 2006; Walters, 2002). The action of fingerprinting demonstrated bordering at the corporeal scale as well as the supranational scale concerning the Dublin Regulation, Member States and geopolitical relations. The bios and the zōē alongside the supra-national and the corporeal, became fused in an instant where the flesh of the new arrival was scanned and bound within the legal framework, determining whether the individual was permitted to seek refuge in Sweden⁴¹. This action was an extension of the state down to the individual police officers and state officials who administered the borderwork via directing, fingerprinting and 'caring' for the bodies of those seeking international protection.

Due to the relocation of the key site now from Malmö to Hyllie, it coincided with the opening of Malmömassan (Malmö Exhibition Centre) just outside Hyllie on 15th November (Sjöberg, 2018). Rashid, who had been working at Central Station Malmö and Posthusplatsen (see Chapter 6) noted that when the border checks were announced, "*the focus changed to Hyllie train station*". Carl explained the situation thus:

"[W]e have a huge building [Malmömassan] here at Hyllie which is normally used for fayres and big music convents [concerts] so on, it's huge. It's, phew. And when it's not organised for music convents [concerts] and so on, it's mainly a big concrete building, with [a] concrete floor. It's dry and it's fairly hot inside, but, yeah, it's like a big warehouse. That turned into a refugee camp for a couple of weeks when it was so very many refugees that came, we couldn't handle it, or maybe Malmö community couldn't handle it really, so they had to put these peoples away from rain and cold and darkness outside into something, and the only thing they could come up with that could hold so many peoples were this big building. So we had a

⁴¹ Written into the Dublin Regulation (Article 17, Paragraph 1) is the possibility for a state, at their discretion, to choose to accept an asylee's claim even if they are located on the EURODAC database (European Union, 2013b).

refugee camp in Malmö, Sweden and the people slept on cardboard”
(Carl, Chief of Border Police Region South, Sweden, emphases added).

The final line from Carl is a particularly poignant one. By using the word ‘refugee camp’, Carl draws on a powerful imaginative geography associated with suffering and hardship in conflict-ridden countries. Rather than this existing spatially far away however, it was present even in “Malmö, Sweden” (cf. Pred, 2000), with individuals not framed by the Police Chief as threats or ‘invaders’ but rather only able to sleep on cardboard, connoting a narrative of poverty, lack and a need for compassion. Malmömassan hosted approximately 1,000 new arrivals and was perceived as an “*emergency solution*” (Deacon Maryam, Church of Sweden, Sweden) and a “*detention centre*” (Hanna, Swedish Red Cross, Sweden) dealing with the backlog of many new arrivals in a short space of time and displaying “*carceral geographies of migration control*” (Figure 5.5; Martin, 2021, p. 740). The asylum seekers were “*locked*” in the building and unable to leave with Reverend David saying, “*this is a prison*” and that it “*was like a camp in any of the developing country [sic] really*” (Church of Sweden, Sweden).

[Owing to copyright restrictions, this thesis does not contain this image]

Figure 5.5: Inside Malmömassan where “[a]sylum sleepers sleep on cardboard” (Sveriges Radio, 2015, p. np). Source: Sveriges Radio [Anna Bubenko] (2015).

Police would be guarding the perimeters of the complex and no one was able to leave until they had registered with the SMA, where individuals may stay for five days and see no natural light (Sveriges Radio, 2015). Reverend David recalled how the exhibition hall continued to function as normal. A large curtain was hung within the exhibition hall with hundreds of locked in and temporarily detained new arrivals on one side and the other side featuring an “*exhibition*

about high schools and universities” (Reverend David, Church of Sweden, Sweden). The stark division of the space shared unevenly between the two groups was symbolic as well as material: one side with hopes of further education, the others awaiting the process of asylum; a border thread throughout the conference centre. Within this space, and behind the curtain, the Swedish state sought to transform the new arrivals from unknown to known, unruly to ruled, risky to docile bodies, and in order to bolster Sweden’s defences, an announcement twelve days later secured this further (Hall, 2010, p. 890).

5.5 Border Control Phase 2: Identity Controls

On the 24th November 2015, Sweden announced the immanent introduction of identity controls (identity checks) that would come into effect on 4th January 2016⁴². During an interview with Jacob (State Secretary to the Minister for Education) concerning the identity controls, he asserted that *“we had to use some kind of break in the system because it was collapsing”*. That Sweden was ‘collapsing’ (the same trope as adopted by Maria) is portrayed here by the Swedish state actor as a justifying reason in the deployment of the identity control. The moments that were happening in Sweden (and beyond) served as contributing factors and powerful political resources that could be brought into a narrative and representation of ‘crisis’ and ‘collapse’ by the state and in so doing bring about juridical change within the legal framework in which they were operating.

⁴² On the very day Sweden introduced their identity control, Denmark introduced their own form of border control regarding its land and sea borders, particularly with Germany (European Commission, 2022).

The aim of the identity control legislation was to push the Swedish border outward from its territory, particularly to Copenhagen Airport train station, “*transporting the actual borders beyond the borderline*” (Balibar, 2009, p. 203, emphasis in original). Melina recognised such an insight:

“if they’re not allowed into the country, that’s like [what] the entire point of the ID control was, then they can’t actually seek [asylum in Sweden], so they had ID controls on the Danish airport at Copenhagen airport [...] you knew that they wouldn’t be able to show an ID and then you weren’t [sic] be able to go into Sweden”
(Melina, Labour and Social Services City of Malmö, Sweden).

Melina draws attention to the legislative aim of the identity control, namely, to prevent new arrivals from reaching Swedish soil and thus preventing them from being legally entitled to seek asylum. In December 2015, the Swedish Parliament proposed an act and ordinance that paved the way for the legal foundations for the identity control. The ‘Act (2015: 1073) on Special Measures in the Event of a Serious Danger to Public Order or Internal Security in this Country’ awarded specific ‘powers’ to the Government in § 2 which states:

“If there has been a serious danger to public order or internal security in the country, the government may, in order to maintain law and order or protect national security, take such measures as referred to in §§ 3 and 4”
(*Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2015, § 2*).

Not only the Government, but any ‘authority determined by the Government’ were awarded the ‘powers’ to undertake identity checks on foreign soil for public transport (Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2015b, § 3). The subsequent ‘Ordinance (2015: 1074) on Certain Identity Checks in the Event of a Serious Danger to Public Order or Internal Security in the Country’ thereby expanded the law. This was with particular reference to the practicalities of the identity card check itself – stating in Section 3 that “[a] carrier shall check that the

passengers that the carrier transports by bus or train to Sweden from Denmark hold a valid identity document with a photograph” (Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2015a, Section 3) – and the imposition of a fee of 50,000 SEK paid to the respective state if the law was not followed (Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2015a, Sections 6 and 8). The identity checks were therefore a legislative exercise in which the Swedish state framed the situation as ‘exceptional’ not in this situation to suspend the law, but rather in utilising the law to award unto themselves privileges that otherwise would be less readily accepted in a society.

By spatially preventing those without identity reaching Swedish territory, Sweden not only relayed border responsibilities onto a different state, but also ‘filtered’, to use Walters' (2006) term, those who were allowed into ‘our’ territory and those that were not, functioning within the legal framework that Sweden found themselves in. At the same time, Sweden navigated their international obligation to the UNHCR Convention and Protocol (see Article 31) by preventing through (extra)ordinary legal measures the new arrivals (without identification) from entering Swedish territory and thus from making a claim for asylum.

The identity checks for a Swedish citizen served only as a nuisance and delay; for the individual without a form of identification, it was something more severe and the Swedish state were aware of this. Jacob, speaking in the performative role as the State Secretary for the Minister for Education, noted this:

“But ID controls demanded a long kind of legislation, it’s longer, yeah. And we knew that many of the unaccompanied children did not have ID when they come to Sweden, so we had during this period we had, in 2015, 35,000 unaccompanied children to Sweden, most in, the highest number in the EU. And of course, unaccompanied children demand more care than grown-up asylum seekers and I think they required special housing, special services by

the municipality and social care and everything, so it was really a strain on the Swedish society to have that demand of unaccompanied children.
That's one reason also why we took the ID controls
(Jacob, State Secretary for Minister for Education, Sweden, emphases added).

Concerning the identity control, Jacob explains in clear terms the importance of instating such measures to target unaccompanied minors (among other reasons). Due to a recognition that such minors were unlikely to have some form of identification, the Swedish state, within the legal possibilities in which they were operating, was framed by Jacob to be addressing in a particular way this sub-group. Rather than recognising the vulnerability of a child under eighteen with no parent or guardian seeking refuge in a country potentially thousands of miles away, Jacob presents the unaccompanied minors as “*demand[ing] more care*” and serving as “*a strain on the Swedish society*”. Jacob paints the burdensome picture of financially expensive minors (when compared to “*grown-up asylum seekers*”) which would burden the municipalities and social services. This narrative, alongside the assertion that Sweden had “*the highest number in the EU*” were justificatory measures being made by Jacob vis-à-vis the introduction of the identity checks.

Christian, an employee of DSB (Denmark’s state-owned rail company), was the one charged with overseeing the introduction of the identity checks at Copenhagen Airport train station.

Christian described the set-up as thus:

“it worked something like, you know, the strips you see normally in [an] airport when you usually go through the security checks, so it was very important for us to signal to our customers that this is not like, we didn’t want big fences that you can’t cross or, we didn’t want it to look like a refugee camp out there [chuckles], we wanted it to look like something very civilised” (Christian, DSB Trains, Denmark, emphasis added).

The words from Christian, “*we wanted it to look like something very civilised*” juxtaposed with “*look[ing] like a refugee camp*” draw upon a discourse which may be akin to Said's (1978) notion of ‘Orientalism’. Said writes, “this universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ [as] a way of making geographical distinctions” (Said, 1978, p. 54, emphasis in original). The transgression of the bodies onto the spatial territory of Copenhagen Airport train station was sought to be mitigated by a civilising process, a space which is ‘ours’ via a geographical (re)production. At the same time however, the ‘geographical distinction’ is present with the identity card itself. The contradistinction between the valid identity card which is ‘ours’ and those without such a card being ‘theirs’ extends the border beyond the reach of the spatial proximity of the identity checks to something more fundamental. The ‘formal performance’ of the individual passing through the identity checks demonstrated a border apartheid, a legislative ‘ban’ on those without valid identity from entering Swedish territory and thus not able to seek asylum in Sweden (Agamben, 1998; Bigo, 2007; Salter in Johnson et al., 2011; Van Houtum, 2010).

Securitas were employed by the Danish-state owned DSB, acting on behalf of the Swedish state and their legislation (who in turn were operating within a distinct Schengen Border Code, EU and UNCHR legal framework for asylum). Securitas were instructed to “*look at the photo, look at when it runs out [...] [and] sometimes you can see whether it is a false passport or not*” (Christian, DSB Trains, Denmark). The decision lay in the action of the Securitas guard concerning whether the identification was deemed valid as per Sweden’s Ordinance (2016: 1074), based not on the use of machines but only by the guards looking at the document, paving a way for ambiguity, inconsistency and personal judgment. If the Securitas guards were not sufficiently content with the identification shown during the subjective security ‘ritual’

(Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012), the individual would not be allowed to board the train, not able to reach Sweden (except if seeking alternative routes, see below), and therefore not be able to seek asylum there. The performative role undertaken by the private security guards of Securitas then served as an extension of the states for both Sweden and Denmark, with state and non-state actors 'blurring' into one another (Sciascia, 2013).

In Christian's reading of the situation for Securitas, he saw there to be a potential for "*a market for more guarding*" which he tied to Securitas doing the 'job' 'well' and the news of this spreading resulting in "*more tasks around Europe*". Here, a 'good job' (namely a 'civilised' undertaking of identity checks) would be rewarded with further financial opportunities. The transition towards a privatisation of security brings with it not only a normalisation (no participant expressed surprise that Securitas were undertaking the identity checks) but with it also a growing dependency upon such organisations as "expertise in this area move away from the public sector" (Bloom, 2015, p. 154; Davitti, 2019). Private security companies such as Securitas then become enmeshed in a complex manner in the constellation of borderwork exemplified in identity checks and borderwork across Europe (Davitti, 2019).

Due to the identity control, the new arrival would be required to seek other means (such as a different form of transport⁴³) or to contact the police within the station. Ebbe (University Lecturer/Swedish Police Authority, Sweden) captured this dynamic concerning an occasion when he was returning home to Malmö and crossing the Swedish-Danish border but had forgotten his identification. A "*security organisation*" (Securitas) stopped Ebbe and would not

⁴³ One possible option would be the via cars (private or taxi). Within Denmark, between September 2015 and March 2016, 279 individuals had been fined for 'smuggling' within Denmark (The Independent, 2016).

allow him to board the train from the airport towards Malmö as, in Ebbe's eyes, *"they are more frightened to do something wrong"*. After a discussion, the security guard suggested that *"it's easier to take a cab"⁴⁴*. The space at the train station then, as well as the spatiality in which the scene Ebbe recalls takes place, is a fruition of a biopolitical governance, functioning as a biopolitical space concentrated at the borderzone via a 'technology of securitisation' (Ajana, 2007; Topak, 2014). As Ebbe went to take a taxi over the bridge, *"there was a man standing in the queue waiting for a cab"* with him who asked, *"can I come with you?"* Ebbe shared that *"I saw him, maybe he was from Syria, or I don't know, Middle East, and I, I didn't answer him because the driver [of the taxi] immediately said, 'no, you can't go with me'"*. The taxi driver functioned as Vaughan-Williams' (2008) 'citizen-detective' with the border being (re)produced outside of formal infrastructure of checks and barriers and served as an extension to the state. The borderwork witnessed by Ebbe and undertaken by the taxi driver was being experienced in the everyday borderscape where the border is "no longer confined to political margins but embedded throughout everyday life" (Brambilla, 2015; Brambilla & Jones, 2020, p. 298; Madsen, 2014).

For Ebbe, it was the combination of his skin colour, hair, property, language and performance that assisted him in entering the country more easily via the taxi, demonstrating once more the ambiguity present in the subjective decision of the guard (Salter in Johnson et al., 2011). This is in juxtaposition to the man from the Middle East who was read by the taxi driver in light of narratives, discourses and representations concerning his ethnicity. At the same time, the taxi driver could implicitly appeal to the law that maintained that the transporting of 'aliens'

⁴⁴ Travelling across the bridge in a private car (or taxi) was a route which did not require identification control but was subject only to (sporadic) border checks on the Swedish side – and importantly on Swedish territory, therefore allowing for an individual to seek asylum.

within Denmark or to another country is illegal (see Danish Aliens Act, Part 9, Section 59, Paragraph 8), producing a particular borderscape in which the taxi driver could deny the taxi ride for the Middle Eastern man. The “biopolitical governance” undertaken by the taxi driver attested to the “maximum of effects [that] should be obtained with a minimum [amount] of political energy” (Deleixhe, 2019, p. 656). In other words, the state’s extension (and this was not an accident (cf. Davitti, 2018)) was present all the way down to the scale of a Danish cab, demonstrating the multiplicity of the border and the pervasiveness of particular narratives and discourses (Brambilla et al., 2015).

The legalities thereby shaped the governance of the borderwork, restricting possibilities to a degree, but more symbolically allowing individuals to appeal to the law (as the taxi driver implicitly did) to undertake borderwork. By Sweden extending its operations as a state (using individuals who would not be considered formal ‘state’ actors), the messiness and interpenetration of the ‘state’, ‘private sector’ and ‘civil society’ as containers is exemplified. From the Securitas border guard to Ebbe’s taxi driver, the state’s extension of borderwork was present and active, with this being supported by a third form of border controls: the ‘temporary’ law.

5.6 Border Control Phase 3: The ‘Temporary’ Law

The ‘temporary’⁴⁵ law, announced in November 2015, voted on in June 2016 and then taking effect on 20th July 2016, served as a third form of border controls and is shown in Table 5.6.

⁴⁵ The law, whilst claiming to be ‘temporary’ at the beginning would later become permanent in Swedish law in July 2021.

Table 5.6: Border Control and Border Hotspots from November to July.

| Dates ⁴⁶ | Border Control Phase | Border Concentration |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| Prior to 12 th November 2015 | Pre-Border Control | Central Station Malmö and Trelleborg |
| 12 th November 2015 – 4 th January 2016 | Border Checks (on Swedish soil) | Hyllie train station |
| 4 th January 2016 – 19 th July 2016 | Identity Checks (on Danish/German soil) | Copenhagen Airport train station |
| 20 th July 2016 to 19 th July 2019 (and then to present) | 'Temporary' Law | All of Sweden |

At the core of the 'temporary' law which, as will be returned to, was far from temporary, was the transition from permanence to precarity, passed with 'need for speed' urgency (Stern, 2019). The earliest mention of the law was 24th November 2015 when the Swedish Government also made their proposal for identity control. The 'temporary' law occurred within a particular legal context in which Sweden's migration and asylum laws were moved to the European Union's minimum (Emilsson, 2018; Regeringskansliet, 2015a).

Against the contextual backdrop of the EU-Turkey Deal signed on 18th March 2016 in a supranational move to secure the EU's external borders, Sweden's 'temporary' law was soon coming to pass (Bialasiewicz & Maessen, 2018; Rygiel et al., 2016). The 'Act (2016: 752) on Temporary Restrictions on the Possibility of Obtaining a Residence Permit in Sweden' made several provisions, including the superseding (where relevant) of the Swedish Aliens Act: "this Act shall be applied before the Aliens Act to the extent that the provisions of the Act deviate from the Aliens Act" (Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016, Section 1). Perhaps the most significant change to the Aliens Act proposed by the then 'temporary' law was to move away from

⁴⁶ These dates are to highlight where the border hotspots were in different periods and not the duration of the various forms of control. For example, the identity control ended on 4th May 2017 and not when the temporary law was introduced.

permanent residencies to more transitory phases. As a result of the temporary law, convention refugees and those receiving subsidiary protection were moved to time-limited permits (three years and thirteen months respectively), with others “no longer be[ing] granted, except in exceptional circumstances or in cases that would violate Swedish obligations under international law” (Fratzke, 2017, p. 9; Riksdagsförvaltningen, 2016, Sections 4 and 5).

The legal framework that Sweden was operating within had as its foundational level the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council ‘Laying Down Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection (Recast)’. Below this legal framework, the Swedish ‘temporary’ law could not go, thus limiting their juridical possibilities. Accordingly, the ‘temporary’ law passed in Sweden, as announced by their Government in the press release on 24th November 2015, stated explicitly: “The Government therefore wants to temporarily adjust the asylum regulations to *the minimum level in the EU so that more people choose to seek asylum in other EU countries*” (Regeringskansliet, 2015a, p. np, emphasis added).

Across Europe, other countries were changing their laws and Sweden would have been acutely aware of this. Germany, for example, in October 2015, passed an ‘Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act’ that sought to speed up the asylum process, in addition to expanding its list of ‘safe’ third countries to include Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro (Ayoub, 2019). In Denmark, across the September, November and January of 2015-2016, a series of amendments were made to Danish asylum law that included: the ‘Jewellery Tax’ of appropriating belongings of asylum seekers if the value surpassed a certain figure; lower levels of financial benefits; pathways to easier deportations for rejected asylees; and less stringent requirements for asylum accommodation (Kvist, 2016). Two particularly notable changes

occurred in the January of 2016 where family reunification would now not be considered in Denmark until the refugee had been present for three years instead of one, in addition to “[t]emporary residence permits [...] generally [being] shortened” (Kvist, 2016, pp. 1–2). The legal decisions happening in Europe would likely be used as political resources in Sweden in a ‘race to the bottom’ of asylum laws (Benedek, 2016; Dowle, 2021).

The ‘temporary’ law was a prime example of Agamben’s notion of the suspension of the law concerning the Swedish Aliens Act. Agamben’s (2004, p. 609) observation that “the state of exception [...] has become a paradigm of government today” is resonant concerning a law that was deemed ‘temporary’, only to later become permanent law. Drawing on Schmitt, Agamben (1998, p. 15) writes, “the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law”. What occurred with Sweden’s temporary law was not the suspension of the law in sum, but rather the suspension of a particular part of a particular law, namely the Swedish Aliens Act. By the Swedish state stepping ‘outside’ of the law and through the framing of a narrative and discourse of ‘crisis’ at home and across Europe (alongside the legal framework and precedents elsewhere in the continent), Sweden was able to supersede the Aliens Act by appealing to (and operating within) the EU legal framework.

To achieve this however, the narrative of ‘(ab)normality’ was a potent one that the state could adopt as part of the broader ‘crisis’ discourse. Across participants in my research, the gravity of the situation and the discourse of normality – and such normality being threatened – demonstrates the political resource that the Swedish (and Danish) state could utilise (Table 5.7). Within the coding for ‘normality/Abnormality’ (which was coded 32 times across my participants), sub-themes were present, particularly the notion of a ‘new normal’ and the

‘returning to normality’ following the event. The code was present for one-third of the political participants and state actors, and approximately one-half of civil society. If the situation was deemed to be ‘not-normal’ via a discourse, then the border checks, the identity control and the ‘temporary’ law could each be more readily implemented (and better received politically). The discourse of abnormality could then be utilised and (re)produced, with emotion playing an important role as a resource in the (re)production of borderwork, as shown in Chapter 7.

Table 5.7: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding of ‘Normality/Abnormality’ (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the quotations shown, ranked in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|--|--|--|
| Johan, Volunteer for Danish NGO, Denmark | <i>“I’m afraid that it’s going to <u>be the new normal</u>, that Denmark is going to be more anti-migrants, anti-refugees, I think we are going to be, I don’t think it’s going to get less in the next couple of years”.</i> | New normal – Common. |
| Emile, Öresunddirekt, Sweden | <i>“I mean, the politicians, the Government in Sweden says the border control is to, you know, to preserve the, to protect Sweden and our inhabitants and citizens and so forth and those who have the right to be in Sweden. And that’s the argument, and I mean, they could say that for ever and ever, of course. <u>It kind of feels like the new normal</u>, it does, but, I would hope that someday that the borders will, you know, be free again”.</i> | New normal – Common. |
| Axel, MP for Sweden Democrats, Sweden | <i>“We are upsetting the <u>normal political climate</u> in Sweden, the <u>normal order of things</u>, and I think that’s frightening for many”.</i> | New normal – Common. |
| Alfred, MP Danish People’s Party, Denmark | <i>“it didn’t take long then we we’re <u>back to normal</u>, I would say”.</i> | Returning to normality – Common. |

| | | |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|
| Märta, Kompisbyrån Örebro, Sweden | <i>"Now things have silenced down and you don't read about it much and we have to, so I think the first year was more, people were more on their toes to do something".</i> | Returning to normality – Common. |
| Isabella, Employee Malmö Social Services, Sweden | <i>"All the sort of <u>normal stuff just had to disappear</u> and some of the things got done anyway, and some of the things we just couldn't do".</i> <i>"of course the rules that apply in a normal situation, like we have inspections from the authority that's above us who inspect our work, some of the rules that apply in <u>a normal situation</u>, they had to, you know, look through their fingers, they couldn't really, they couldn't be, <u>it wasn't a normal situation</u>".</i> | Exception – Rare but distinct. |
| Deacon Maryam, Church of Sweden, Sweden | <i>"<u>it was not affected, the normal life of a Swedish person</u>, they still have the same life, you know, and some of [the] people who didn't meet the refugees at the Central Station or worked with them in some way, they couldn't understand [sic] what was going on I think because they didn't confront the situation".</i> | Not affected – Rare but distinct. |

The Red Cross were asked to contribute to the February 2016 consultations of the 'temporary' law and when Hanna was asked about what the Red Cross were not happy about concerning the law, she reflected:

"It is the temporary residence permit because [...] you can't treat traumas without you feeling safe. If you have [a] thirteen months residence permit in Sweden, you are not safe, you are just taking a break from life"
(Hanna, Migration Advisor Swedish Red Cross, Sweden).

Hanna's words echo of a precarious situation for the asylum seeker, perhaps having experienced trauma before, during or after their journey, imposed by the 'temporary' law. This 'border' introduced by the 'temporary' law forms a space of "legal exclusion [...] by means of ordinary law and politics and space and borders" (Basaran, 2008, p. 340). Through the passing of such a 'temporary' law, the banality of its effects permeate a spatial dimension far beyond

solely the territorial edge, where borderwork becomes etched and inscribed throughout Sweden rather than being concentrated in particular spatial sites such as train stations (Basaran, 2008). The ‘temporary’ law was thereby not in competition with the early border controls but once more a complementary form of securing the border(work).

Using as a justification in the Government’s rhetoric the move towards the EU minimum, rather than operating ‘above’ the EU law with additional benefits and more ‘generous’ asylum policies, Sweden matched their Member State colleagues, demonstrating a further move away from the ‘Swedish exceptionalism’ (Emilsson, 2018). Though the law was spoken of in a ‘temporary’ manner, it was perceived to be part of a wider consolidation of securitisation:

“[T]hey changed the laws and they call it temporary, and we knew that this was going to be permanent but we were like fighting for, ‘ok, but keep it temporary, don’t go further, go back when this is, when you have solved the issue” (Augusto, Refugees Welcome Sweden, Sweden).

Augusto feared that the three-year plan of the temporary law would extend beyond it and even become permanent, and indeed it did. Despite the work undertaken by the likes of Hanna and Augusto, the decision made by the Swedish state to implement the ‘temporary’ law demonstrated the “framing [of] migration as an issue of sovereignty, not rights”, securing the familiar space of ‘ours’ to the demise of the Other (Barbulescu & Grugel, 2016, p. 167; Said, 1978).

Reflecting further of his fear of the ‘temporary’ law being extended, Augusto shared:

“It’s going to be a terrible situation because right now [...] people staying in Sweden without any permit, undocumented, and it’s hell for them to stay for four years. It’s going to be, I don’t know how you can stay, trying to do

this in ten years, it's, because there's no other option for them, really, as, I mean, you're just making it worse because the situation from where they come or where they're going to be sent back to, it's the same"
(Augusto, Refugees Welcome Sweden, Sweden).

These individuals that Augusto refers to would be living in the blurred area “between inclusion and exclusion”, at once living within Sweden’s borders (perhaps working in the underground economy) yet not being recognised officially by the state (Mezzadra, 2011, p. 131). Their illegality is an inevitability of Sweden’s structure as a nation-state concerning citizenship (Anderson & Ruhs, 2010). These individuals are less ‘illegal’ and rather more ‘illegalised’, with such illegality stemming from the state’s juridical actions (Bigo, 2002; De Genova, 2015b). Situations and circumstances which prior to the ‘temporary’ law were considered ‘legal’ would become ‘illegal’ through the institution of the legislation. Whilst the individual and their actions may not change, through the framing of the ‘temporary’ act these individuals are moved by a juridical sleight of hand into a new encounter with the manifestations and concretisations of borderwork and may become illegalised in the process. Augusto’s fears were realised with a two-year extension voted on in 2019 with a large majority in the Swedish Parliament lasting into July 2021 before then becoming permanent in Swedish law that summer (see Section 8.5).

5.7 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the question of governance and how the Swedish-Danish border was deployed vis-à-vis the unprecedented numbers of new arrivals coming into the two countries. In the pages above, this chapter has focused primarily on the Swedish state’s deployment of three forms of border control that were connected with, among others, six key moments and resources in Denmark, Sweden and beyond. These moments of heightened visibilities served

as political resources that were framed within particular narratives (ranging from ‘invasion’ to compassion discourses) that could be used to achieve political ends in borderwork. Far from direct causalities and linear processes, this chapter has shown that the borderwork process is intrinsically complex, “created, experienced and contested by human beings” (Brambilla & Jones, 2020, p. 289). Each of the three forms of border controls did not operate in isolation or competition but supported and complemented each other to secure the border(work) of the state and its extensions more fully. Further, the border controls were deployed within specific Swedish, EU and international legal architectures where the possibilities of borderwork would meet juridical boundaries.

With the border checks, Sweden followed the precedents of four other Member State countries in appealing to the exception clauses of the Schengen Border Code. The checks were centred at Hyllie train station and resulted in the registering of thousands of new arrivals at the Swedish Migration Agency. This process was in part biopolitical (and in a Foucauldian manner managing populations), gathering biometric data about the new arrivals and thus preventing their onward travel in addition to creating the opportunities for Sweden, in line with the Dublin Regulation, to return individuals who had their fingerprints previously stored on the EURODAC database.

In complementary fashion, the identity control (completed outside of Sweden) supported the border checks (undertaken inside of Sweden) two months prior, demonstrating the topological and topographical dimension to borderwork (Coleman & Stuesse, 2014). Through this second form of border control (identity control), the borderwork was being governed and undertaken beyond Sweden’s spatial territory, demonstrating a ‘defence-in-depth’ logic and the territorial

dispersal of the border (Christiansen & Jørgensen, 2000; Longo, 2017; Mountz, 2011). Sweden passed a law in its Parliament to award itself (and those they deemed appropriate) new ‘powers’ to legally enact the identity checks, a ‘technique of power’ that was directed at those without identification, particularly unaccompanied minors (Belcher et al., 2008).

Following these two forms of border control, Sweden passed a ‘temporary’ law. This law occurred within a particular EU legal framework to which Sweden appealed to in their justification of bringing asylum laws in Sweden down to the EU minimum. The “transitional rules” of the ‘temporary’ law would soon “become normalised and transformed” into a ‘new normal’ five years later in permanent law (Davitti, 2018, p. 1190). By drawing on moments and political resources (as well as following the precedents of Denmark, Germany and others), Sweden could use such resources in justifying the end of the ‘Swedish exceptionalism’ concerning generous asylum policies (Emilsson, 2018).

The motif of exception was present in each of the three forms of border controls and such measures were “only the tip of the iceberg”, an indication of a deeper and more fundamental ‘ban’ towards those who did not possess the correct skin passport, accent and culture of the Nordic (and European) lands as demonstrated through Ebbe’s poignant anecdote of the taxi driver (Bigo, 2007, p. 13; cf. Pred, 2000). Despite Sweden’s international reputation as being welcoming and ‘colour-blind’, hostilities and animosities towards the ‘Other’ have been longstanding and this is developed in more detail in Chapter 7 (Pred, 2000). At the same time as Sweden as a state was reacting to the presence of new arrivals into the country, so too were civil society (in their complexity and diversity) reacting in operations of borderwork and care. The dynamics of the civil society’s prevalence in a centralised country such as Sweden

transpired to moments of conflict and co-operation between the state and civil society in the governance of the border. It is to these important concerns that this thesis now turns.

Chapter 6 – Borderwork: Conflict, Co-Operation and Care

“[H]adn’t it been for Allt åt Alla, Kontrapunkt, Asylgruppen, [the] Turkish Mosque and all the donors donating and all the volunteers in those organisations, and Refugees Welcome, this organisation too, it would be a humanitarian catastrophe I think”
(Elliott, Allt åt Alla, Sweden, emphasis added).

6.1 Introduction

Thus far, this thesis has explored the events of 2015-2016 within Sweden and Denmark, directing particular attention to the three forms of border control introduced by the Swedish state. These three forms of border control drew on a series of moments of heightened visibilities which were used as resources in shaping the political milieu and in the operations of borderwork. One particularly important moment of the events in Sweden during 2015 was the unfolding at Central Station Malmö and it is to this that I return. Civil society and the City of Malmö (Malmö Stad) played an important role in the provision of care administered to the thousands of new arrivals arriving at the station, serving as a key site of borderwork. Its complexities and operations are explored in the pages that follow.

At the Central Station, hundreds of individuals volunteered for organisations (and as independents) to provide for and assist in the welcoming of the new arrivals passing through the station (Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019). To frame this chapter, the second research question is addressed that seeks to explicate such an event: How did Swedish civil society contribute to actions of borderwork and what was the nature of such interactions with regards to state and civil society actors? The case study of Central Station Malmö will be explored in depth with a tangential discussion on Danish civil society during a similar time to compare and contrast.

Within Scandinavia, there exists a close connection between volunteers and the state, a phenomenon that is different to civil society elsewhere (Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018). As quoted in Chapter 2, civil society is, according to Laine (2014, p. 74), that “arena that occupies the space where the other arenas of society – namely the family, the state, and the market – interact and overlap” and in so doing it “is not part of the formal political decision-making process, controlled directly by state institutions, or dependent on the state interests”. The constellation of civil society functions as the “*intermediate associational realm between state and family*”, being intrinsically messy and blurred (White, 1994, p. 379, emphasis in original). Defining precisely what civil society (and the state) is and where it ends is a far from rudimentary task and the relationships (and complexities) within them are critically analysed in this chapter (Sciascia, 2013). Civil society is not to be understood as singularly ‘good’ or “intrinsically virtuous” and may be associated with violence and xenophobia (Cantat & Feischmidt, 2019; Scholte, 1999, p. 29, emphasis in original). What may be celebrated by one side of the political aisle may be abhorred by the other, particularly concerning contentious issues such as asylum (Karakayali, 2019).

To understand borderwork, this chapter continues with Rumford's (2006, 2008, 2012, p. 897, 2014) theorisations on borderwork, recognising “the efforts of ordinary people” as well as the state in the “construction, dismantling and shifting of borders”. In this chapter, I analyse the mobilisations and actions concerning the border and the complexity of state and civil societal interactions providing an extension as well as challenge to the state. What ensued were complex dynamics of co-operation in biopolitical governance and confrontation via a ‘criminalisation of solidarity’ (Dadusc & Mudu, 2020; Topak, 2014).

Building on these theorisations, operations of borderwork as care are adapted from William Walters (2011) and his theorisation on the humanitarian border (see also Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a). According to Walters (2011, pp. 153–154), the humanitarian border “presents us with a domain where it is especially clear that governmental practices emanate not from a given centre of official authority but in contexts of contestation and politicisation”. In effect, the humanitarian border seeks to negotiate and dialogue between ‘control’ and ‘care’, recognising that this “dichotomy [is present] in the history of both humanitarianism and policing” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a, p. 55). It is out of this ‘context of contestation and politicisation’ that borderwork and the prerogative of care is explored.

Throughout this chapter, various questions, themes and threads will be present, unpacking notions of co-operation and confrontation between civil society and the state. Such interactions carried with them particular spatialities such as at Posthusplatsen and ‘the Snake’. Alongside this, the analysis of agendas in addition to the ‘new’ and ‘old’ humanitarianism is explored. The structure of this chapter is as follows. The list of the main actors at the Central Station in Malmö will firstly be presented followed by an exploration of the mobilisation of civil society and events, particularly in relation to Kontrapunkt, the City of Malmö and the Church of Sweden, and raising the question of the subjects involved in the provision of care. In the following section, I then examine the relational dynamic between the authorities and civil society, with particular reference to the biopolitical management of the bodies undertaken by the state with ‘the Snake’ and Posthusplatsen. In the final section, the co-operation and division that took place within and between civil society during the key months is analysed pertaining to notions of agenda and ‘material necessities’.

6.2 Actors at Central Station Malmö

Within my research project, as explored in Chapter 3, a breadth of participants was sought as opposed to a 'depth' approach that would prioritise multiple interviews with specific organisations. Whilst there are merits to both approaches, the 'breadth' of organisations and individuals in this thesis enabled a grasping of the situation more fully from various vantage points multiperspectively (Rumford, 2012), ranging from the highest level of government (the Deputy Prime Minister and the cabinet) to anarchists (Kontrapunkt and Allt åt Alla), religious organisations (the Church of Sweden and the Salvation Army) and international humanitarian organisations (the Red Cross and Save the Children). Though there is the question of how representative an individual's voice is of themselves individually or as their organisation, by interviewing senior members within many of the organisations, this allowed for a valuable insight into the respective organisation.

By interviewing a broad array of voices, the situation was more fully encapsulated in a Wittgensteinian manner of 'aspect-seeing' (Bauder, 2011). This enabled a cross-cutting insight across civil society and the state into borderwork. Though a 'depth' approach has benefits (such as exemplifying the disorientation of singularity in state and non-state actors by hearing from multiple and perhaps competing voices within the same organisations), it also has negatives such as potentially missing the diversity of voices, actors and insights across the socio-political milieu during the timeframe. Further, if civil society and the state are understood not singularly but rather as different 'arenas' or 'realms' (Laine, 2014; White, 1994), then hearing from multiple voices allows a clearer insight into a constellation of messy and overlapping dynamics that are explored below.

As seen in Table 6.1, many state and civil society actors were present and important in the events at Central Station Malmö, particularly between September 2015 and January 2016⁴⁷. The various and diverse actors associated with the events at Central Station Malmö are split broadly into five different categories: International Humanitarian Organisations (IHOs), Anarchist, Grassroots, Religious and State. The first category, International Humanitarian Organisations, consisted primarily during this time of the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (ICRC) Swedish branch (Röda Korset) and *Save the Children* (Rädda Barnen). These organisations are based in countries across the world and have been established since 1863 and 1919 respectively. Their experience and large number of volunteers meant that together these two IHOs carried an influential presence at the Central Station. Secondly, Anarchist organisations were prominent during the events of 2015-2016. *Kontrapunkt* (Counter Point), *Allt åt Alla* (Everything for Everyone) and *Asylgruppen* (the Asylum Group) share similar views concerning far-left political leanings and were the quickest to mobilise in September 2015.

Table 6.1: List of Important Actors at Central Station Malmö.

| International Humanitarian Organization (IHOs) | Anarchist | Grassroots | Religious | State |
|--|--------------|---------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|
| Red Cross | Allt Åt Alla | Refugees Welcome Sweden | Church of Sweden | City of Malmö |
| Save the Children | Kontrapunkt | Refugees Welcome to Malmö | Salvation Army | Swedish Migration Agency (SMA) |
| | Asylgruppen | | Malmö Mosque | Swedish Police |

⁴⁷ The list of actors provided is not exhaustive but rather representative of key contributors.

Thirdly, Grassroot organisations consisted of groups including *Refugees Welcome Sweden* and *Refugees Welcome to Malmö*. These organisations did not exist formally prior to the crisis of 2015, therefore enthusiasm was met with inexperience and “common interests [...] with low degrees of formality” (Guribye & Mydland, 2018, p. 348). Fourthly, Religious organisations played an important role, including (but not limited to) the *Church of Sweden* (Svenska Kyrkan), the *Salvation Army* (Frälsningsarmén) and the *Malmö Mosque* (Malmö Moské).

Finally, State actors in this case study entailed primarily the work of both the *Swedish Migration Agency* (SMA) and the *City of Malmö* (Malmö Stad) alongside the *Swedish Police* (Polisen). These authorities form part of the many branches of ‘the state’ and does not result in them being without conflict (Godin et al., 2021; Mitchell, 1991). It is therefore essential to highlight that the state is diverse and multiplicative in nature and actions, thus it cannot be treated as a coherent, singular whole but rather complex, intertwined and diverse (Godin et al., 2021). Before exploring these complexities further though, uncovering the role of civil society in the borderwork completed at this time requires an insight into *why* individuals sought to be involved.

6.3 Mobilisation to Care

Exploring why individuals served and helped in the provision of care during this time is likely to reveal White and Laine’s ‘intermediary realm’ and associational ‘arenas’ within a society. A selection of quotations across my research participants concerning the code ‘Reason for Helping’ (coded 49 times) is shown in Table 6.2 below. For political actors, only one-sixth of respondents were coded as such and less than one-fifth of state actors, whereas for civil

society actors it was over one-half. For some individuals, the conviction and compulsion that the situation stirred up within and around them was flagged. Oscar, for example, helped form ‘Sport Open’ which provided guidance for sport clubs in assisting and welcoming new arrivals. For Oscar, his voluntary work behind Sport Open “*was [his] way of, to contribute to the crisis*” (Sport Open, Sweden). Oscar recognised the urgency of the situation: “*We have to do something right now; we can’t wait for tomorrow*”. The agency that Oscar draws on immediately brings the dynamic between the state and civil society into play. He refers to how “*[w]e have to do something*” (emphasis added), as part of his reasoning for why he became involved in Sport Open, seeing such a service not to be ascribed necessarily only to the state but also to the laity.

Table 6.2: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding as ‘Reason for Helping’ (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the code, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| Oscar, Lecturer/Founder of ‘Sport Open’, Sweden | “ <i>So I think, for me, Sport Open was, I would say, that was <u>my way of, to contribute in the crisis</u></i> ”. | Contribution – Common. |
| Ebbe, Lecturer/Educator at Police Academy, Sweden | “ <i>[there is] still a kind of a Swedish culture that we help people. <u>It’s necessary and we just do it</u></i> ” ⁴⁸ . | Contribution – Common. |
| Isabella, City of Malmö Social Services, Sweden | “ <i>it was a more of an emotional thing because everyone was helping out and trying to do their best and trying to welcome people who came as refugees [...] which changed in Sweden, as in other countries, you know, there was a very good sense of, ‘ok we can do this, we can help because we are a strong [chuckles] country that can help and we won’t go</i> ” | Contribution – Common. |

⁴⁸ It is important to note here that despite Ebbe’s words, he did not contribute to volunteering concerning the events of 2015-2016.

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | <i>under, you know, because people are coming here”</i> . | |
| Sara, Left Party Employee, Sweden | <i>“It’s also a city that has a lot of mixed, people come from all over the world, I think we have like 150 different nationalities in Malmö and it’s a large part of the population in Malmö [that] have come from other countries, so I think that also affects, like people know this is, this has happened to me, <u>I need to do something to help in the way I can, in a way”</u></i> . | Contribution – Common. |
| Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden | <i>“And there was always something to be done, cleaning, doing laundry, driving someone, and <u>to appeal to that need was very important, like to be needed, to feel like you were doing something that was contributing, to be there for a person, to be a human being when someone would need it, and like making a difference”</u></i> . | Contribution – Common; Humanity – Common; Making a difference – Less common. |
| Therese, Danish Red Cross Safety Zone, Denmark | <i>“humanity which is basically our most important principle of our seven principles, so that is <u>treating other people as you wish to be treated</u>. And then of course, it’s a sense of wanting to help because it’s, you could see the need, that <u>there is a need and that you sort of, you just help as a citizen</u> and also as a Red Cross worker of course, but mainly, I would say, as a citizen”</i> . | Humanity – Common, |
| Markus, Executive Director Trampoline House, Denmark | <i>“you know this woman and her children, that is a super emotionally charged memory because, you know, it still makes me cry [said emotionally] when I think about it and I think that you cannot be in this business without having emotions about it and <u>if you lose those then maybe it’s time to stop, because it’s real people we are talking about and it’s real catastrophes, it’s real children”</u></i> . | Humanity – Common. |
| Therese, Danish Red Cross, Denmark | <i>“So I was part of a team of both volunteers and Red Cross employees that sort of had to set that safety zone, that centre up, really, really quickly, which was of course, I mean there was lots of adrenaline and there was, you know, a really, that sense of, what do you call it, that <u>you can really make a difference”</u></i> . | Making a difference – Less common. |

Outside of Malmö in the city of Örebro in Central Sweden, Märta became involved with *Kompisbyrån*, an online app that helped match new arrivals with native Swedes with the aim of integration. In similar fashion to Oscar, Märta perceived the individual obligation to respond: *“I have to do something’. I felt it so strong it was almost that I left work and just, ‘I need to do something, I can’t just sit here’”* (Kompisbyrån Örebro, Sweden). Unlike Wilson (2000, p. 216) who understood volunteering to be “typically proactive rather than reactive”, what is seen in Oscar and Märta’s response is a compulsion and conviction to respond to the heightened visibilities and moments of politics, drawing on these as resources to mobilise. The actions of them both would be considered ‘deeds’ by Isin and Nielsen (2008) in their conceptualisation of ‘acts of citizenship’. These ‘deeds’ rupture the “neutral repetition of practices structured by the expectation of passive reception” and rather create something new through such deeds (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 3).

For Rumford (2006, p. 164), “borderwork is no longer the exclusive preserve of the nation-state” and the mobilisation of civil society that was unfolding in Sweden during this time demonstrated this. The rapid and mass mobilisation of hundreds of individuals in the provision of care alludes to how encounters with moments of politics were used as resources within civil society in the operations of borderwork. By partaking in this particular political milieu, the dynamic between the state and civil society in the processes of borderwork is heightened, with some contradicting and others complementing the borderwork undertaken by the Swedish state (Peterson, 2017). This is though not binary in nature: the relations between the state and civil society were enmeshed and intertwined as will be continued to be explored below.

At Copenhagen Central Station, Therese from the Danish Red Cross, commenting on the newly formed 'Central Station Volunteers' regarding this time (see also Section 6.6.2), shared how many of these individuals were Middle Eastern in origin and their willingness to provide care was greater for those with whom they shared social capital, contrasted to a Polish person for example in the same need: *"they would not be as inclined to help as if it was one of their own, if I can put it that way"* (Therese, Danish Red Cross, Denmark). By these words, Therese brings to light what would be an important source of division concerning the mobilisation, namely the differences between 'old' and 'new' humanitarianism as presented in Chapter 2 (Adami, 2021; Fox, 2001). In brief, the 'old' humanitarianism would champion neutrality and providing physical assistance, whereas the 'new' humanitarianism would focus more on political engagement (Adami, 2021; Fox, 2001).

Within the different conceptualisations of humanitarianism from the participants, in contrast to the ordered and established patterns present in international humanitarian organisations such as the Red Cross, the 'new humanitarianism' that Therese constructs ties neatly with Cantat and Feischmidt's (2019) notion of 'vernacular humanitarianism'. Writing in relation to the humanitarian responses in Europe in 2015, Cantat and Feischmidt (2019, p. 381) observed that "the new constellations of actors [...] [are] often operating outside or in tangential relations with [the] official structures as provided by states and international organisations". This trend results in the "(re)shap[ing] or (de/re)-stabilis[ing] of traditional refugee protection" and may provide opportunities in addition to challenges (Cantat & Feischmidt, 2019, p. 382). In effect, the authors argue that the 'care' that is provided is done so outside of formal channels.

Therese shared that “as a Red Cross worker [...] ‘we’re impartial, we help people in need’”, referring to one of the Red Cross principles of ‘Impartiality’⁴⁹. Writing in the International Review of the Red Cross, Warner (1999, p. 110) writes that “[i]f we assume that war and violence are extensions of the political, then we understand the traditional description of understanding of humanitarian space as an area separate from the political [...] [and is] something that is fundamental to organisations like the International Committee of the Red Cross”. If such a statement holds, the humanitarian and the political are seen to be mutually exclusive; instead, Warner, 1999 (p. 117, emphasis added) argues that “humanitarianism must be reinvigorated, politically. And this reinvigoration paradoxically includes the implosion of the political/humanitarian divide” with a need to recognise “the politics *behind* the political/humanitarian divide”. This political/humanitarian divide may be much more complex than simply functioning as an either/or dynamic. The presence of the diverse and complex array of civil society organisations present at Central Station Malmö in many respects ruptured the divide and demonstrated instead the intertwining and complex nature of borderwork with the fusion of the old and the new humanitarianism.

Within Sweden, Hanna attested to the neutrality of the Red Cross regarding their view of the ‘temporary’ law by noting:

“Then it is added value to work for [a] voluntary organisation because we don’t make the decisions. We explain the decisions and we help people and we can always explain the laws, we can explain the decisions, we can also say that we might have another opinion, but we are not making the decisions, we are [a] humanitarian organisation”
(Hanna, Migration Advisor Swedish Red Cross, Sweden, emphases added).

⁴⁹ The other principles are Humanity, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality (British Red Cross, 2022).

Not only does Hanna see it as “*added value*” to be neutral politically and to be separate from the decision-making process, she ties this precisely to the nature of the work by saying that “*we are not making decisions, we are [a] humanitarian organisation*”. In this way, Hanna sets up a disjunction between more politically oriented actors and organisations, and humanitarianism more broadly. Indeed, across my research, humanitarianism (coded alongside rights a total of 74 times) was perceived differently by different actors and is shown in Table 6.3. Of the twelve political actors interviewed, half of them were coded as such, however the code did not appear in the interviews with the Danish People’s Party, Venstre and the Sweden Democrats. Within state actors and civil society, approximately one-half of the interviews contained quotations coded as ‘Humanitarianism/Rights’. Particularly common themes were tied to co-operation (Hanna, Augusto, Elliott and Frida), humanity (Hanna, Deacon Maryam, Markus, Emil-Anton, Frida) and rights (Augusto, Melina and Emil-Anton). Among the quotations in the table below, Amelia’s words captured the sentiments most succinctly regarding mobilising volunteers.

Table 6.3: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding as ‘Humanitarian/Rights’ (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the code, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|---|---|--|
| Hanna, Migration Advisor Swedish Red Cross, Sweden | “ <i>What is always our aim is to provide humanitarian assistance to the one who is most in need, and the need at the railway station, it was <u>very much first-aid related</u> [...] So we had first-aid trained staff, we also had educated doctors and nurses that was not under the Red Cross <u>but were together with us, they came from the authorities who could see, mainly treat smaller wounds, but also make sure that those who were severely ill got to the hospital</u>”.</i> | Co- operation – Common; Humanity – Common. |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| <p>Augusto, Refugees Welcome Sweden, Sweden</p> | <p><i>“we also need to have a greater view so we, to work with the Red Cross and Save the Children, it’s very important for us because, yeah, <u>we need each other</u> and we have a, <u>they see us as a part of the humanitarian work</u> that is needed because we have the volunteers, we have the name at least”.</i></p> <p><i>“Because like you said, we all wanted to help, so <u>the helping bit and the like the solidarity and human rights and all that, that was the same</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“we have a view of migration policy and <u>how you help people and human rights</u> and the migration, <u>asylum rights</u> and all of that, we stand by that and, yeah, that’s our goal”.</i></p> | <p>Co-operation – Common; Rights – Common.</p> |
| <p>Elliott, Allt åt Alla, Sweden</p> | <p><i>“I would say that it was absolutely, when you had, yeah, and you could say, hadn’t it been for <u>Allt åt Alla, Kontrapunkt, Asylgruppen, [the] Turkish Mosque and all the donors donating and all the volunteers in those organisations, and Refugees Welcome, this organisation too,</u> it would be a humanitarian catastrophe I think”.</i></p> | <p>Co-operation – Common.</p> |
| <p>Deacon Maryam, Church of Sweden, Sweden</p> | <p><i>“you know our values, the Christian values? [...] it could be me who came like a refugee, ‘we’re all the same. <u>The values of the people are the same. We are all humans</u>”.</i></p> | <p>Humanity – Common.</p> |
| <p>Markus, Trampoline House Executive Director, Denmark</p> | <p><i>“It’s like, [the] same thing as when you <u>drag people out of the Mediterranean Ocean</u>, it’s an act of charity and it’s ok because you can make sure that <u>this person doesn’t drown</u>, but it can’t, it would be evil to <u>disallow this person to step into a life</u> where he could actually contribute and stop being a victim. So it’s all about the devictimizing, or allowing people to stop with victimisation”.</i></p> | <p>Humanity – Common.</p> |
| <p>Emil-Anton, Employee Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Office, Denmark</p> | <p><i>“<u>I was just doing my job</u> saying these people have to be treated in <u>accordance with human rights</u> and as it turned out, they were taken care of in an acceptable manner considering the number which entered into Denmark. If it was a normal situation, I think we would have, the ombudsman would have criticised the conditions”.</i></p> | <p>Humanity – Common; Rights – Common.</p> |
| <p>Melina, City of Malmö Labour and Social Services, Sweden</p> | <p><i>“I think that’s kind of a very important part of the social workers, like, they have that with them all the time, like, ‘I’m not supposed to treat you differently or do things differently because I have empathy for you or I feel sorry for you; <u>you have this right and I am going to make sure that you get it</u>”.</i></p> | <p>Rights – Common.</p> |

Concerning the anarchist organisation of Kontrapunkt, originating in 2009 in Malmö, Amelia shared an insight into the humanitarianism and volunteering that occurred during 2015:

“to appeal to that need was very important, like to be needed, to feel like you were doing something that was contributing, to be there for a person, to be a human being when someone would need it, and like making a difference [...] we are actually managing what the state at this time and at that point cannot do” (Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden, emphases added).

Amelia’s construction of the actions of civil society are set up as a juxtaposition to the state’s inability to provide during the situation. As an anarchist organisation, politics is infused into the fabric of Kontrapunkt’s operations in which appealing to the individuals and making them ‘feel like they were contributing’ draws in individuals. The political moment is appropriated by Amelia and Kontrapunkt, drawing on similar sentiments to what Guribye and Mydland (2018) understood in Greece during 2015 where volunteers had a “lack of trust” in relation “particularly [to] top-down agendas”, resulting in a mobilisation of groups more akin to the new humanitarianism as demonstrated by Kontrapunkt (Guribye & Mydland, 2018, p. 360; see also Simsa et al., 2019).

Hilma perceived Kontrapunkt’s work as “*empowering*” for themselves precisely vis-à-vis the state: “*seeing [the] Migration Board’s officers speak on television saying everything was under control, and knowing it wasn’t, we were keeping things up and everyone around us would say the same thing*” (cf. Fröhlich, 2012; Mitlin, 2008). The empowering sentiment shared by Kontrapunkt ties with White’s (1994, p. 381, emphasis added) understanding that “civil society itself embodies *a specific source of social power* based on a (differential) capacity for association which is a key path to social empowerment”. As part of this social power, civil society can then “play a *disciplinary role in relation to the state*” by holding the state to account,

bridging the ‘intermediate realm’ between the two and even challenging the state’s actions (Fleischmann, 2019; White, 1994, p. 383, emphasis in original). In White’s understanding of the ‘disciplinary role’ of civil society however, a binary image is painted between the state and the non-state, which in reality is much more complex than this, with the state and civil society in practice merging and overflowing into the other. Indeed, concerning where and to whom the care of civil society (and the state) is directed is important to consider in its effects on borderwork and this dynamic.

6.4 The Subject of Care

Many of those who responded to the events in Central Station Malmö from 7th September 2015 (Sjöberg, 2018) would be considered partaking in new and vernacular humanitarianism, operating with (relatively) little experience but great vivacity. These individuals helped form the “welcoming border” in Malmö, serving as key initial actors (Peterson, 2017, p. 3). According to Allt åt Alla, it was themselves and their activist allies of Kontrapunkt and Asylgruppen that were the first to respond⁵⁰. Kontrapunkt were among the most important organisations regarding the events at this time and were seeking to expand from the previously more cultural and social activities that they had been running in the years prior.

“By 2015”, Hilma from Kontrapunkt reflected, “when this migrant crisis or whatever happened, we were at a point where we were actually consciously wanting to take more steps towards more cultural and political activities and then this happened and became the catalyst” (emphasis added). Kontrapunkt did not shy away from their activist identity and the “practical

⁵⁰ The SMA did, however, begin to be present at the Central Station from 10th September 2015 (Sjöberg, 2018).

and visionary idea of how that [societal change] could happen and also building our own alternative” (Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden; cf. Worth, 2018). On the night of 7th September 2015 and the images of the new arrivals walking to Sweden, Kontrapunkt and Allt åt Alla recognised and appropriated these moments of heightened visibilities and mobilised accordingly, activating a wide network of support. Amelia acknowledges the pre-meditated desire for Kontrapunkt to become more involved in the political and the occasion of the mediatised images of new arrivals walking on a highway in Denmark served as the ‘catalyst’, moment and resource that could be appropriated (alongside a constellation of other resources) for a political end and their ‘alternative’ milieu. Whilst this was happening, however, Kontrapunkt were already engaged in a parallel situation concerning the local Roma community in Malmö who were facing eviction from the ‘Sorgenfri Camp’.

Kontrapunkt had *“promised”* to help the Roma community should they have to leave the camp, with the eviction taking place on 3rd November 2015 (Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden; Persdotter, 2018)⁵¹. As part of Kontrapunkt’s support given to the Roma people, a two-week protest and 150-person *“occupation”* took place outside of Malmö’s City Hall. Due to the *“system put in place in Kontrapunkt, we could serve that occupation with food and all kinds of material, sleeping bags and what was needed day and night for two weeks, during that, as long as that occupation lasted”* (Hilma; cf. Persdotter, 2020).

The support by Kontrapunkt of accommodating the Roma people in addition to the sheltering of thousands of new arrivals in their warehouses (alongside the rumours of trafficking that will

⁵¹ The eviction had, according to Hilma (e-mail correspondence) no correlation with the event of the new arrivals coming into Malmö but had been brewing in the build-up to November 2015.

be returned to) likely increased the tension between the City of Malmö and Kontrapunkt. This culminated in a fine of approximately £50,000 in the Spring of 2016 made to Kontrapunkt by the City of Malmö if they continued to host individuals in their warehouses due to a lack of permits and fire safety (Persdotter, 2020; SVT Nyheter, 2016).

Kontrapunkt were indeed acting ‘independently’ from the state but they were not separate entirely from them: their actions inevitably created a dialogue, ‘link’ and ‘tension’ between them and the state via a messy and complex constellation (Pries, 2019). The existence of an informal Roma community and the actions of Kontrapunkt were in many respects evidence of the double meaning of ‘acts of citizenship’ in which the Roma *as well as* the Swedish citizens of Kontrapunkt through their actions both sought to challenge the state’s notion of ‘citizenship’ (Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Walters, 2008; Wonders & Jones, 2019; cf. Smith, 2019). Hilma’s reflection on the “*two struggles*” that Kontrapunkt were working with at the same moment (the Roma and the new arrivals) is pertinent then on multiple levels:

“[W]e could really feel the difference of how these two groups were treated at that time; people were very welcoming to the refugees, that is very different now of course, the discourse has changed completely, but at that time they were donating money and all kinds of things. But towards the Roma community, the attitude was not at all so positive”
(Hilma, Kontrapunkt, Sweden).

Hilma flags a change in discourse concerning the “*refugees*” by the wider society, a transition which I will return to. What is important to dwell on for the moment is the *subject* in question. To whom the various levels of humanitarian help and care is directed, is raised as a juxtaposition in Hilma’s account above. What is deemed appropriate (donating money) to one sub-group was considered ‘inappropriate’ in relation to another (the Roma). Reverend David

who oversaw the welcoming of new arrivals into Sankt Johannes Kyrka (St John's Church) in Malmö⁵², similarly reflected on this division:

“[B]etween Christmas and New Year we didn't have any refugees, any asylum seekers any longer in the church coming from the Migration Office [SMA]. But still we had lots of people in the church, so [the] church [...] decided that the church will be open until Easter, and now it was mostly what we call, EU-migrants, Roma people from Romania and Bulgaria, but also of course houseless Swedish people. So the night before the last night, I think we had more than two hundred people in the church, that night”
(Reverend David, Church of Sweden, Sweden).

The decreased number of new arrivals staying at St John's did not prevent the church from providing the *same care* to the Roma people and the homeless who may be subjected to “selective withdrawal of services and protection” (Cantat & Feischmidt, 2019, p. 396). Reverend David and his team had decided to close the church as a place of overnight refuge for such individuals at Easter. Following this decision (but prior to its enactment), the church (in a similar manner to Kontrapunkt) received instruction from the City of Malmö to close the church or pay a fine of 50,000 SEK (c. £4,300⁵³):

“[W]e never have [had] to pay because we closed, you know, we had already taken that decision, but if we had continued, we had to pay at least 50,000 [SEK]. So in November, they asked us to host people in the church, but in, and then we had maybe one hundred, but in March, they fined⁵⁴ us 50,000 [SEK] because we had people in the church, because they said, ‘in [inaudible] national crisis, then we can use the church in this way, but now is not a national crisis, even though we have two hundred people on the streets, so because [of] that we forbid you to do, to have the church open at night”
(Reverend David, Church of Sweden, Sweden, emphasis added).

⁵² Since the separation of the Swedish state from the Church of Sweden at the millennium, the Church of Sweden now serves as a component of the civil society (Ideström & Linde, 2019).

⁵³ On 1st March 2016 (Reverend David does not specify which day in March), 50,000 SEK was the equivalent to £4,317.64 (Exchange Rates, 2021)

⁵⁴ This is a threat to be fined 50,000 SEK.

Why did the City of Malmö instruct the church to close when five months prior it had turned to the church as a means by which to cope with the large number of new arrivals (cf. Lewis, 2013)? According to Reverend David, the end of the crisis stopped the requirement for exceptional care. Curiously, care was allowed (and considered appropriate) for those seeking asylum during the 'crisis' whereas once this narrative of crisis was deemed over, despite more people staying in the church than on day one, the state deemed (or appealed to as a political resource) such overnight provisions to be illegal in nature. The humanitarian state of exception was deemed over (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005). If, as Lafaut and Coene (2019, p. 188) observe, "[t]he use of a crisis discourse allowed the political and humanitarian actors to focus on problem solving and urgent exceptional measures", then the passing of the 'crisis' would dramatically change the constellation of the borderwork processes, including (or even perhaps especially) the borderwork of care.

It appears that where care for (predominantly Middle Eastern and African) new arrivals was tolerated during crisis times (large numbers in a short-term), equivalent care for Roma individuals was not (smaller numbers in a longer-term) (cf. Kóczé and Rövid, 2017). This may be connected to the moments of heightened visibilities such as those explored in Chapter 5, in which the new arrivals are to be considered more 'deserving' than the Roma (Hassan & Börklund, 2016; Maestri & Monforte, 2020; Weir & Amin, 2018). Such efforts from civil society that were permitted (or even encouraged) at the beginning may later be understood by the state through an active criminalisation of care and solidarity (Dadusc & Mudu, 2020; Peterson, 2017).

For Dadusc and Mudu (2020), a distinction is made between what they term 'charity' and 'autonomous migrant solidarity'. The former is not perceived as a threat to the state, but rather "aim[s] at filling the gaps of the state" while the latter, in contrast, "desires creating cracks in the operation of the border" (p. 21). Accordingly, the actions of those associated with the latter are those who "refuse to cooperate in violent and racist bordering policies" and are criminalised accordingly (p. 21). Dadusc and Mudu would see the reaction of the Swedish state as one that "violently erase[s] any autonomous and *ungovernable form of solidarity*" (p. 20, emphasis added). The phrase 'ungovernable form of solidarity' is particularly applicable here. If solidarity is exercised outside of a state's remit, it remains in the realm of 'ungovernable', a space that is susceptible to resistance. The Church of Sweden, however, were requested by the state to provide temporary accommodation for new arrivals in November 2015 and then later threatened a fine in the spring of 2016.

At the end of my interview with Hilma and Amelia from Kontrapunkt, they flagged that a key reason why they accept such interviews is because of an active erasure taking place on behalf of the municipality towards their organisation:

"we do take part of [sic] these kind of interviews because we think it is important that we are part of the history, that we are part of the story about what happened because our municipality has actively chosen to not include us in their writing of the story of what happened, they are talking about what they did and the work at Central Station where there was a newly formed network called 'Refugees Welcome to Malmö', and they worked together and they didn't work with us, so they are actively erasing us from the story, from the history, so I think 't's very important"
(Hilma, Kontrapunkt, Sweden, emphasis added).

The efforts of the City of Malmö to "actively erase" Kontrapunkt from the story correlates with Dadusc and Mudu's (2020) earlier conceptualisations. In many respects the collective work of

Kontrapunkt challenged the City of Malmö (both with the Roma and the new arrivals), with their actions of a borderwork of care being an affront to the work undertaken by the state and being an example of ‘ungovernable’ acts of solidarity. The contrast between Kontrapunkt’s approach and the organisations of civil society that worked more ‘neatly’ with the state demonstrates what Isin (2008) marks as the distinction between ‘activist citizens’ and ‘active citizens’. The former, Isin (2008, p. 38) remarks, “engage in writing scripts and creating the scene” in contradistinction to the latter that “follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created”. In Amelia’s construction of the situation, Kontrapunkt were willing and keen to reach out to the municipality, however this “*communication abruptly ended*”⁵⁵ which Amelia presumed was because of the rumours that “*Kontrapunkt was hiding people and children were disappearing and all kinds of things that was [sic] projected to us, on us*”. The division and conflict between Kontrapunkt (as activist citizens) and the state meant that there was no common script for them to follow.

6.5 Civil Society and the State

6.5.1 Co-operation, Posthusplatsen and ‘the Snake’

During an interview with Robin, a Swedish cabinet member during the events of 2015, they shared that concerning the various sectors, “[W]hat it takes is co-operation. Co-operation and flexibility and if you’re not flexible enough, it doesn’t work”. As a leading figure representing the Swedish state during the events, Robin’s quote draws out not only the importance of authorities working together with civil society but highlights the success which can follow such

⁵⁵ It is important to note here that Augusto’s (Refugees Welcome Sweden) reflection on Kontrapunkt labelled them as “*standoffish*” towards the Government.

co-operation (Geuijen et al., 2017). Co-operation from the state however is a specific form of assistance and care, a process under the rubric of governability in which the state retains the control in humanitarian borderwork (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a, 2017).

Melina shared that at the City of Malmö, the willingness of organisations to help the municipality was overwhelming with the provision of food and clothes, and how *“it took a lot from our staff just to be able to handle all of [...] the people who wanted to help”* (Labour Market and Social Services City of Malmö, Sweden). In Melina’s narrative, the City is framed as the centralising force in which civil society gravitated towards, with their responsibility being the management and governance of the situation, in her words, *“to handle all of [it]”*. This discourse upon which Melina is drawing affirms the City of Malmö (the state) as the central figure with civil society, in effect, working on behalf of the state as an extension.

Within civil society, however, the relationship was perceived differently. For Augusto, the relationship with his organisation (Refugees Welcome Sweden) and the City of Malmö worked in his perception cyclically. *“[S]ometimes”,* Augusto recalled, the City of Malmö *“pointed out us to translate or giving [sic] the information, and then we did the information bit and then we pointed back to the officers of the Migration Board [SMA] to, yeah, do their stuff”*. This dynamic is shaped by Augusto positively concerning their relationship with the state, situating Refugees Welcome Sweden *within* the unfoldings and actions of the new arrivals coming into Central Station Malmö, writing themselves into the heart of the story. It can be argued, however, that the state had drawn Refugees Welcome Sweden into the operations of borderwork.

For Foucault, Rye (2014, p. 156) notes that “beneath the surface of sovereign power lies a dense network of strategic relations in which power is immanent”. Accordingly, through ‘discipline’, the “strategy, or technology, of power [...] organises and manages agents” such as Augusto and Refugees Welcome Sweden “in relation to time, space and tasks” in order to “obtain as efficient a machine as possible” (Rye, 2014, p. 156). Such a power would be seen by Foucault as *productive*⁵⁶, where individuals such as Augusto are “disciplined, effective and ‘empowered’” as a consequence of the ‘strategy of control’ employed by the state (Rye, 2014, p. 162). The docility of the bodies at work in Refugees Welcome Sweden could be inscribed upon and imprinted with the insignia of the state (Foucault, 1977). This is not done, according to Foucault, as an imposition of the state from the ‘top-down’, but such power “circulates everywhere down to the tiniest capillaries of the social body” (Fraser, 1981, p. 280). Through ‘micro-practices’ and ‘capillaries’, Foucauldian scholars would argue that power would be present in the apparatus of the everyday with Augusto (and others) engaging with a productive nature of power (Fraser, 1981). By Refugees Welcome Sweden directing the individuals to officers from the SMA, the consequence of this is registering (and most importantly fingerprinting) the new individuals to subsequently govern and/or deport them appropriately. Such complicit care is thereby under the gaze of the state, “seen, known, surveilled [sic] and thus controlled” (Fraser, 1981, p. 277).

One particularly insightful example of this dynamic was concerning Rashid’s account of Posthusplatsen (‘The Post Office Place’) and ‘the Snake’, with the biopolitical control of the new arrivals complementing the disciplinary power. Some weeks after the City of Malmö

⁵⁶ That power is productive is not assumed to be a given and is challenged with great force by Fraser (1981).

partook in the events at the Central Station, a few hundred metres away Posthusplatsen was established to co-ordinate the efforts of registering and directing the new arrivals, opening on 8th October 2015 (Peterson, 2017; Sjöberg, 2018). Posthusplatsen was created as part of the City of Malmö's efforts to manage the situation, an example of Walters' (2011, p. 139) theorising of the humanitarian border in which "the exercise of humanitarian power is connected to the actualisation of new spaces". Ten modules were set up in collaboration via "creative partnering" and co-production with the Swedish Migration Agency, Malmö's Labour Market and Social Administration (those responsible for unaccompanied minors), the Swedish Red Cross, the Salvation Army and Refugees Welcome to Malmö (Malmö Stad, 2019; cf. Guribye, 2018; Martin & Nolte, 2020, p. 428; Mitlin, 2008). Food and drink were offered, with heating and blankets to settle the new arrivals as they awaited buses to the SMA's office to register (Malmö Stad, 2019).

As part of Rashid's work, he would help direct the new arrivals who alighted from the trains in Central Station Malmö to Posthusplatsen along what he termed, 'the Snake'. This conceptualisation by Rashid captures the state's spatial practices of control and the 'biopolitical machine' (Wiertz, 2021):

"[W]e always meet the people where they land and then they, I used to call it 'the Snake'. [...] [W]e walked them to, we didn't go out of the Central Station, we stayed underground, and then we went to a place where there weren't a lot of people and then we went off to the Posthusplatsen, so [to] make sure there wasn't a lot of connection with other people. I used to [chuckles] call it 'the Snake' 'cos it could, at a train we could have like three, four hundred people, at the same train"

(Rashid, City of Malmö Employee, Sweden, emphases added).

'The Snake', as Rashid refers to it, operated as a somewhat 'paradox', drawing on the conceptualisation of the humanitarian border by Pallister-Wilkins (2015a, p. 66, emphasis added), where "the concomitant spectres [sic] of rescue and 'push-back'" unfolded "*within the same space*". In effect, 'the Snake' demonstrated the co-penetration between 'care' and 'control' (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a). Rashid shares on behalf of the City of Malmö how when the individual would alight from the train, they sought to restrict interaction with the immediate surroundings, seeking instead to 'stay underground' en route to Posthusplatsen. Spatially, 'the Snake' was "governing the provision of these three very elements: care, custody and control", operating as a technology of governance (Minca & Ong, 2016, p. 42; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b). These three words of 'care', 'custody' and 'control' collapsed into one another with a tautological dependency.

By arranging the space accordingly, the City could manage the new arrivals' mobility as due to 'the Snake' "their movement is not denied outright but facilitated and managed", steering and directing the bodies to Posthusplatsen where they would then register as part of this biopolitical machine (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b, p. 455). The 'care' provided at Posthusplatsen as new arrivals awaited buses to the SMA was inseparable from the 'control' and 'custody' of the bodies which were not 'denied outright' the freedom of movement but were nudged and steered towards Posthusplatsen and registration. The humanitarian border was in operation alongside the biopolitical management of spatialities of control via 'the Snake' and Posthusplatsen (Walters, 2011).

The spatial arrangements of 'the Snake' was purposeful as highlighted by Rashid, where "*there wasn't a lot of connection with other people*". Aradau and Tazzioli (2020) conceptualised this

biopolitical process through what they term 'subtraction'. They write, "through subtractive mechanisms that make their presence [such as the new arrivals into Malmö] invisible to citizens", these measures hamper "the formation of collective subjects that could build spaces of life" (p. 220). The logic was likely that by arranging the physical spatiality of 'the Snake' to avoid such crowds (in effect to make the new arrivals 'invisible'), the authorities were more readily able to biopolitically manage the individuals through such an 'urban disconnection' (cf. Oliver-Didier, 2015). The 'space of transit' provided by 'the Snake' and leading to Posthusplatsen demonstrated a humanitarian borderwork in which "border policing and humanitarian practitioners [would] attempt to govern mobile lives according to rationalities of security and wellbeing" (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017, p. 99).

The separation (symbolically and spatially, as well as biopolitically) between the new arrivals and the space beyond 'the Snake' ensured that the state would be able to govern and manage the population, reducing interference from civil society, and yet co-operate with them so as to assist in the securing of 'care' at Posthusplatsen. In the weeks building up to Posthusplatsen and 'the Snake', there were alarms of missing unaccompanied minors at the Central Station from the police and social services (Sjöberg, 2018). Such trafficking was a present and a grave reality for many vulnerable individuals; this notwithstanding, the discourse surrounding the fear and gravity attached to the trafficking could also serve as a moment of politics that could be appropriated and utilised as resources to assist the state in its management of bodies (see Table 6.4 below). Whereas only one political actor's interview contained this code (and less than one-in-four of the state actors), the theme was more prevalent among civil society, where nine-in-twenty-one were coded accordingly. When trafficking was mentioned by participants (being coded alongside smuggling for a total of 23 times), it was common to draw attention to

minors alongside incorporating blame towards smaller organisations (of the new humanitarianism). Through such means, the state could justify its actions under the logic of ‘care’ and thus ‘control’ (Minca & Ong, 2016). Consequently, only at Posthusplatsen would civil society now be able to engage with the new arrivals, and this only under ‘*le regard*’ or ‘the gaze’ of the state (Fraser, 1981).

Table 6.4: Illustrative quotations on trafficking by participants (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the code, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|--|--|--|
| Melina, Senior Officer in City of Malmö (Labour and Social Services), Sweden | <p><i>“we had a bit of an incidents [sic] in the beginning, where like, early on, before the municipality and the Migration Board [SMA] kind of caught up, where persons would come and they would like take kids in their cars and drive them and those are kind of situations that [we] try to avoid because [...] everyone do[es] not have the best intention [sic] when it comes to kids and <u>we know that that they are subjects to trafficking etc., so we want, the authorities have to be the ones, the first ones, to take them in to make sure that they don’t get in with the wrong people, because, we know that these, I mean there’s so many kids missing since that period of time”</u>.</i></p> <p><i>“even though they [Refugees Welcome⁵⁷] were really, really valuable, it could also be situations like, for example, <u>bringing kids into your car that neither we nor the Red Cross would approve of”</u>.</i></p> | Minors – Common; Blame – Common; Disappearing/Missing – Less common. |
| Hanna, Swedish Red Cross Migration Advisor, Sweden | <p><i>“there were cases, where <u>there is a risk for human trafficking, for example, there were children who came and ran to our volunteers and asked for protection because they have been taken by adults that were not connected to them. And there was [sic] a lot of private cars coming looking for people saying they will drive them to, for example, Kontrapunkt, but Kontrapunkt were [sic]</u></i></p> | Minors – Common; Blame – Common. |

⁵⁷ It is unknown if this refers to ‘Refugees Welcome Sweden’ or ‘Refugees Welcome to Malmö’.

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| | <i>not the place they should be driven to, they should be driven to the Swedish Migration Agency to be able to apply for asylum”.</i> | |
| Hilma, Kontrapunkt, Sweden | <i>“We heard a lot of rumours that like, Kontrapunkt was [sic] hiding people and <u>children were disappearing</u> and all kinds of things that was projected to us, on us”.</i> | Minors – Common; Blame – Common; Disappearing/Missing – Less Common. |
| Sara, Left Party Employee, Sweden | <i>“I mean I remember like headlines in the newspapers of <u>children going missing</u>”.</i> | Minors – Common; Disappearing/Missing – Less Common. |

The state, embodied in the police, oversaw the ‘care’ that was being provided by civil society (Refugees Welcome to Malmö, the Salvation Army and the Red Cross). The provision of care by the civil society (as an extension of the state) at the space of Posthusplatsen was under the watchful gaze of the state, “underpinned by surveillance, in which actors, believing they are visible all the time, discipline *themselves*” (Fraser, 1981; Rye, 2014, p. 162, emphasis in original). Where these organisations end though and the state begins is a complicated process. One could argue that these organisations, rather than operating independently of the state, in this space were in fact extensions of the state’s biopolitical reach and the process of borderwork, managing the proceedings and the bodies at Posthusplatsen. Laine’s (2014) reflections then on civil society as the ‘fourth sector’ are prevalent, where the various arenas of state, the family and market are all fused together in an inter-penetrating and co-productive manner.

The Swedish state was drawing on civil society for a particular purpose. The constellation between the state and civil society blurred into one another, fusing together the “supple and rigid modes of power”, supple in the sense that the civil society were freely complicit with the state and were permitted to undertake such care (in a specific spatiality and manner) and yet

rigid precisely because of the state's imposition concerning the infrastructure (underground during 'the Snake' and the modules at Posthusplatsen) and governance under the watchful eye of the state (Fraser, 1981; Wiertz, 2021, p. 1385).

Through the biopolitical spatial infrastructure of 'the Snake', the new arrivals were already deemed irregular, out-of-place and Other (Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021; Tazzioli, 2016). These new arrivals were brought into the biopolitical machine in which "the mobilisation of spatial claims and strategies of existence [...] starts from, and plays on, the condition of being governed by certain policies and of being produced as irregular conducts" (Tazzioli, 2016, p. 116). The governance and management of these bodies addresses the collectives (*omnes*) through the process of 'the Snake' leading to individual bodies (*singulatim*) being registered and fingerprinted as part of the cross-scalar and wider EU supra-national legal framework of EURODAC and the Dublin Regulation (Tazzioli, 2016). 'The Snake' and Posthusplatsen therefore captured the biopolitical governance of the border in a spatially and symbolic manner.

Rashid's words provide further clarity to this situation at Posthusplatsen and the roles different actors played as an extension of the state:

"Everybody knew what they were supposed to do. Our job was to make sure that they got to Posthusplatsen; when they arrived at Posthusplatsen, civil society made sure that they had something to eat and drink, provided from the municipality [the City of Malmö], the migration board [the SMA] were also sitting there as, like giving them information, they couldn't start the asylum process, they had to go to the main office"

(Rashid, City of Malmö Employee, Sweden, emphasis added).

Rashid's account gives an indication of the dynamic in details such as civil society providing food and drink for the new arrivals "*provided from the municipality*". This small detail speaks

volumes of the overarching shadow of the state and their control of the situation. The biopolitical machine that the Swedish state were operating at Posthusplatsen is in stark contrast to the chaos at the Central Station which preceded their intervention as discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4). By the state even controlling the food and drink given to the new arrivals, the state's authority was imprinted and (re)enforced in which the civil society serve as its extension symbolically and physically as they passed on this food to the new arrivals.

6.5.2 Conflicting with the State

By providing information for the new arrivals at Central Station, a backlash was experienced by Rashid whilst in his performative role as an employee of the City of Malmö:

“we were there trying to inform people what we believe was and is the truth about the asylum process, but at the same time you got other people working against you, there weren't a lot, but there were some people working against you [...] they were working for a certain organisation, sorry, those people that were telling us they were working for a certain organisation, that was just a lie, and when that organisation really started, we saw a lot of differences. We saw better organisation, other people that were working in a certain way that matched our jobs”
(Rashid, City of Malmö Employee, Sweden).

A friction is recalled by Rashid where combative individuals were “*working against*” the state in the disguise of a certain organisation. Here it is worth noting that Elliott from Allt åt Alla shared that “*Allt åt Alla and Kontrapunkt and Asylgruppen, we are socialists, or communists or anarchists*”, therefore frictions between them and the state are probable as part of their anarchist vision and may be connected with the combative individuals that Rashid refers to here (cf. Rogers et al., 2013a). Frykman and Mäkelä (2019, p. 304; see also Hansen, 2019; Peterson, 2017) in their interviews with volunteers from Refugees Welcome to Malmö

observed that “[t]here needs to be some civil disobedience [laughs] as long as no one is hurt”. What precisely such ‘civil disobedience’ could mean may vary enormously and yet serve as an essential component to acts of citizenship undertaken by the different components of the constellation of civil society (Isin, 2008). This dynamic of civil disobedience could have been tied to the incremental criminalisation of solidarity as seen in the fines threatened to the Church of Sweden and Kontrapunkt (Dadusc & Mudu, 2020; Peterson, 2017).

When I asked Rashid if anarchy or trafficking concerns were reasons for their opposition to the City of Malmö, he replied:

“Actually, I have no idea, it could be either way. But a lot of comments from them were like, ‘don’t listen to them, they’re, yeah, from the municipality, they’re this and they’re that’, yeah. But because of that, I have no idea. Of course, in a chaotic way everything is possible”
(Rashid, City of Malmö Employee, Sweden).

Accusatory and doubtful claims addressed towards the City were, according to Rashid’s words above, in some ways connected to the “*chaotic*” situation at hand. Via the order, regulations and bureaucracy present in the labour of the authorities, the City of Malmö stood athwart the chaotic and anarchistic situations at the Central Station. The establishment of Posthusplatsen and ‘the Snake’ thereby sought to stamp the state’s authority in a space that had been so chaotic. The opposition that the state faced was similarly shared by Melina from the City of Malmö who joked that “*everyone disagreed with the municipality and the Migration Board [chuckles] because that’s kind of their role*” (Labour Market and Social Services City of Malmö, Sweden). As seen in Table 6.4 above, the fear of trafficking was a reason for such division according to Melina, which accordingly resulted in the perception that “*the authorities have to be the ones, the first ones, to take them [unaccompanied minors] in to make sure that they*

don't get in with the wrong people [...] I mean there's so many kids missing since that period of time".

Through this political moment of trafficking, the state conflates 'care' (the best interests for the new arrivals) with 'border enforcement' (the state reaching the new arrivals first), with this resource being used to justify the state's intervention (cf. Williams, 2015). In order to achieve this, Williams (2015) conceptualises this in relation to the transition from 'humanitarian exceptionalism' to 'contingent care'. In such a way, the state's "care now functions as a technology of border enforcement – extending the reach of border enforcing state agents to govern more bodies [...] and more places" (Williams, 2015, p. 18). Where more 'spontaneous' care may be tolerated in the short-term, the state would seek order through the contingent care diffused spatially and temporally as part of wider political objectives, managing the bodies biopolitically (Williams, 2015). For this to operate, however, the care that is administered needs to be in a specific manner or else resistance may ensue. The heckling that Rashid recalled from the anarchists ("*don't listen to [...] the municipality*") was prior to Posthusplatsen; the sleight of hand by the state to establish 'the Snake' and Posthusplatsen in effect severed (future) ties between the new arrivals and the 'humanitarian exceptionalism' being provided at the station and instead demonstrated a more 'contingent care', spatially distinct and selective in whom the state would co-operate with.

The provision of care by the state at Posthusplatsen, for example, enabled care to function "as a technology of enforcement" through which "minimalist humanitarian interventions complement and uphold the enforcement regime" (Williams, 2015, p. 18). The provision of basic necessities such as food and drink (provided by the municipality), alongside the presence

of the Red Cross to address minor injuries meant that the bodies of the new arrivals could be cared for *in order to then process them* as part of the biopolitical system and humanitarian border as the site where care and control coalesce (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Walters, 2011).

Melina (City of Malmö) highlighted that the experience possessed by the Red Cross was the reason why they were *“the organisation that was most easy for us [the City of Malmö] and for the Migration Board [SMA] to talk to [...] they’re quite used to organising these kinds of things, they know how to do it”*. Melina flags the somewhat counter relationship on display in the grassroots organisations where enthusiasm is inversely related to experience: *“A lot of people, you know, they really, really want to help but sometime[s] if you help someone, [if] you do it in the wrong way, you can actually more cause a problem for the person”*. Such a concern was flagged in Martin and Nolte's (2020, p. 419) study on non-governmental organisations in relation to the wider European migration crisis, where, based on their empirical data, “[p]rofessionals were concerned that volunteers, even with the best intentions, may do harm, albeit unknowingly, or create potential for abuse”. However, if individuals did not have the ‘best intentions’, such care could also manifest itself in a strikingly different manner.

In analysing the Sweden Democrats, Mulinari and Neergaard (2012) proposed what they termed ‘caring racism’. The authors interviewed women who were part of the Sweden Democrats and used ‘care’ as a motivation to justify their participation in the party, in which “[m]igrants [...] have forced them to stop being innocent and naïve; they have forced them to care” (p. 17). Such ‘care’ may be for the nation as well as “others (even migrants)”, where “a special caring rhetoric in arguing against migration, integration, and multiculturalism” is present “in continuing to view migrants as a distinct Other” (p. 17). These discourses and

narratives can thereby seep (consciously and sub-consciously) into the psyche of those present as the provision of care is questioned. Within Denmark, Klara encapsulated this notion of ‘caring racism’:

“we have a lot of stories in Denmark this refugee, so-called refugee, has stayed in Denmark for so long and he speaks perfectly [sic] Danish and has integrated and everything and people are crying when they decide to send him back home again because it’s peaceful in their country. So there is this debate, is it the wisest thing to integrate them or should we just keep them in a refugee centre keeping them out of society because our job is to basically keep them alive until it’s safe to go back to their country”
(Klara, MP for Danish People’s Party, Denmark, emphases added).

There is much to unpack in Klara’s words. Firstly, and beyond the focus of this chapter, is the challenging of whether the refugee is indeed legitimate. Secondly, and here is where our attention is more aligned at present, is the latter part of the quotation. The connection between care and integration is an important one. In Mulinari and Neergaard’s (2012) notion of caring racism, they flag the narrative of individuals going back home ‘for their own good’. Klara is drawing on this discourse here and at this point reveals the poignant lines: *“our job is to basically keep them alive until it’s safe to go back to their country”*.

This quote encapsulates much of the anti-immigration imagination and rhetoric of the time and though being applied in this instance to Denmark, can be applied to Posthusplatsen. The biopolitical framing of the bodies that were to be managed by the state were bodies stripped of all political life (bios) and left only with the biological life of *zōē* (Agamben, 1998). They would be managed under the perennial gaze of the state until conditions allowed for them to return home, in effect, indefinitely (Fraser, 1981). What is most striking though is the ‘caring’ narrative that Klara frames in the build-up to it by raising the question between integrating the new

arrivals or having the individuals separate from society, in ‘their’ interest. In Klara’s construction of the situation, the aim of the state was simply to keep the biological body alive. Markus as the Executive Director at Trampoline House (Denmark) recognised this, using the image and narrative of ‘drag[ging]’ someone out of the Mediterranean:

“it’s an act of charity and it’s ok because you can make sure that this person doesn’t drown, but it can’t, it would be evil to disallow this person to step into a life where he could actually contribute and stop being a victim. So it’s all about the devictimizing, or allowing people to stop with victimisation”
(Markus, Trampoline House, Denmark).

Through this construction (and Markus explicitly referred to Agamben and his work during our interview), Markus understood that care would not end with the immediate act but needed to be something longer term. To resist the state’s ‘victimisation’ of, in Markus’ quotation, the effect of the camp, he challenges the ‘humanitarian border’ where bodies are cared to be controlled. Here, the ‘agendas’ of organisations such as Trampoline House and the Danish Member of Parliament for the Danish People’s Party may differ dramatically concerning the perception of care and its manifestations. Indeed, this is confirmed in their online presence. For example, Trampoline House⁵⁸ (2022, p. np) state explicitly on their website the need to resist Denmark’s asylum policies: “Refugees in Denmark more than ever before need spaces from where to protest the continuous parliamentary and societal encroachment on their rights!”. This is in dialogue and stark contrast with the policies and agenda advocated by the Danish People’s Party (2002, p. np, nd, p. np, Google Translated) who in their ‘Foreigner’s Policy’ assert that “[b]order controls must be made permanent and asylum seekers must be

⁵⁸ Since my interview with Markus from Trampoline House, due to financial difficulties, they now function only on a weekend and are now called ‘Weekend Trampoline House’ to reflect this.

rejected at the border”, and in their ‘Party Programme’ assert the ethno-nationalist claim that “Denmark belongs to the Danes”.

Hanna from the Red Cross in Sweden recognised this tension concerning agendas:

“There was a lot of communication chaired by the municipality, and they choose which organisation[s] they want because it’s also a matter, some of the organisation[s] might have their own political agenda that might not necessarily be in the best interests for asylum seekers”

(Hanna, Migration Advisor Swedish Red Cross, Sweden, emphasis added).

By coming into the picture with a different “*political agenda*”, co-ordination was more difficult, with the ultimate decision regarding co-operation resting in the hands of the state (cf. Guribye & Mydland, 2018). By Hanna drawing attention to such a ‘political agenda’, the ‘myth’ of apolitical volunteers associated with refugees that Fleischmann and Steinhilper (2017) discussed then emerges. What Hanna refers to is something larger however than just one or two individual organisations, instead, it is important to recognise that *all* organisations have an agenda of some form, including the Red Cross and the City of Malmö. Such agendas may vary significantly from cultural and political influence, to the provision of care or for financial gain. Through moments of heightened visibilities, such as the chaos at the Central Station, agendas which may have been previously out of sight are brought to the fore through the narrative and discourses that are drawn upon. What may be considered ‘care’ for the new arrivals may differ significantly between the Sweden Democrat, the Kontrapunkt anarchist and the Swedish Red Cross worker. These agendas may spill over into the dynamics within and between civil society organisations as explored in greater length now.

6.6 Civil Society Interactions

6.6.1 Competing Agendas

When Augusto from Refugees Welcome Sweden was asked about the conflicts between civil society organisations, his reply was one tied to conflicts between the state and civil society and continues the discussion from the previous section:

“Yeah, I think [...] how you see the government, how do you see, how you perceive the Government[‘s] help or the Government’s part in your work, like Kontrapunkt, for example, they were very like standoffish to the, ‘don’t work with the Government, not because we’re against the Government in any way but we can handle this, we can handle this and do this as a good a job as possible, and then, then when the people are safe and secure, then the Government can do whatever they do’, so yeah, I think one of the reasons of the separation between groups is how we perceive the aid and the help from the Government, and yeah, the police and the Migration Office [SMA] and stuff like that, I think that was a main issue. Because like you said, we all wanted to help, so the helping bit and the solidarity and human rights and all that, that was the same, but it was how you perceived the government that was, yeah”

(Augusto, Refugees Welcome Sweden, Sweden, emphases added).

In the quote, Augusto shares how the various civil society organisations shared the same vision, “*we all wanted to help*”, but how the perception towards the state (in its many branches) was a dividing issue. In Augusto’s reading of the situation, he sets up Kontrapunkt as an example and speaks on their behalf about not deeming themselves in opposition to the Government but claiming an assurance that they could “*handle this*”. Drawing on Isin and Nielsen's (2008, p. 10) reflections on ‘acts of citizenship’, the ‘deeds’ of Kontrapunkt, “disrupt habitus, create new possibilities, claim rights, and impose obligations in emotionally charged tones” thus “shift[ing] established practices, status and order”. Through these acts, Kontrapunkt disrupted the state’s order and control pertaining to more ‘formal’ understandings of citizenship, an important component to Kontrapunkt’s political vision.

The anarchistic language Augusto uses when speaking for Kontrapunkt of how the state is not needed is emblematic of a deeper level of autonomy and self-sufficiency outside of the remit of political order, justified up until *“the people are safe and secure”*, in effect, potentially indefinitely. Just as a state can use a crisis situation in order to adopt certain policies (Boin et al., 2009), so too did Kontrapunkt as an anarchist organisation utilise the situation (the ‘catalyst’), to promote their agenda in *“creat[ing] a more solidary Malmö where everyone gets their basic needs”* (Kontrapunkt, nd, p. np, Google Translated; Worth, 2018). Though opposition to the state is not vocalised in their ‘official’ rhetoric (for example on their website), their actions confirm their anarchist identity. Therefore, in the disruption of the ‘norm’ of citizenship, Kontrapunkt’s acts of citizenship were not solely ‘on behalf’ of the new arrivals, but rather an *“experiencing [of] and acting in solidarity”* with them, in which a ‘transformative power’ of resistance was present (Lewicki, 2017, p. 287; Müller, 2016).

As part of this, however, *“for acts of citizenship to be acts at all they must call the law into question and, sometimes, break it”* (Isin, 2008, p. 39). This returns then to how, as Augusto mentioned, the civil society perceived the Government and the Government’s role in shaping the co-operation (or conflict) present within civil society: the contrast between activist citizens and active citizens (Isin, 2008). Augusto, in a similar manner to Kontrapunkt, recognised the political dimension of their work by asserting that, *“we’re political [...] we have a view of migration policy and how you help people and human rights and the migration, asylum rights and all of that, we stand by that and, yeah, that’s our goal”*. When this comes up against civil society organisations such as Refugees Welcome to Malmö, of whom one participant *“thought it was a pity that their humanitarian work should be perceived as political”* (Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019, p. 310, emphasis in original), then a friction could emerge. Augusto shared how the

relationship between Refugees Welcome Sweden and Refugees Welcome to Malmö were not particularly positive: *“there were some groups and we didn’t get along always, but yeah [...] it is what it is”*. Pries' (2019, p. 15) question in relation to the events of 2015-2016 is pertinent then: *“Could ORRP [Organisations Related to Refugee Protection] with quite different political, religious, moral norms and values cooperate with each other?”*

During 2014, the autonomous far-left movement of Allt åt Alla (2014) would have their meetings at Kontrapunkt’s warehouse until, according to Elliott, they *“went separate ways”* due to having *“different view[s] on decision making”*, with Kontrapunkt *“decid[ing] what their members should and should not do”* contrasted with the individualistic nature of Allt åt Alla where each individual *“can speak for Allt åt Alla as an organisation”*. Nevertheless, according to Elliott (emphasis added), *“material necessities drove us into co-operation”* and Allt åt Alla *“had very close co-operation during those weeks [of] 2015”* with both Kontrapunkt and Asylgruppen. Elliott’s flagging of ‘material necessities’ is a pivotal one and raises the notion of the superseding of prior divisions and agendas for a common good, and a more captivating vision which Elliott saw as *“quite good, I think”*. In addition to working alongside their two anarchist counterparts and the non-anarchistic Turkish mosque, Elliott noted that *“it’s fun to see how solidarity works when you are not dogmatic”*.

Political differences were overcome due to the various organisations not being *“dogmatic”* and insistent upon their way of approaching the situation but rather keeping sight of the overarching reasoning (‘material necessities’) for which to mobilise. In the provision of care, though being ‘non-dogmatic’ may provide greater liberty initially, if foundations are not in

place across a longer-time frame, autonomy can prevent efficacy (see Roberts, 2012). According to Olivier-Mensah (2019, p. 369) then, “[v]olunteers should abandon their fear of losing their autonomy” to the state (and also other organisations within civil society) and rather “see the cooperation as extending the scope of their action”. In this phrasing, the state is then seen as an extension of civil society, rather than the reverse. Such an aim, however, strikes discordantly with fundamental issues and agendas present within anarchist organisations (Allt åt Alla and Kontrapunkt for instance) which may through acts of citizenship challenge dimensions of the state. This notwithstanding, by appealing to an exterior objectivity via Elliott’s ‘material necessities’, such divisions within civil society (and in their relationships with the state) are more readily overcome.

6.6.2 Conflicts and Co-Operation of Care

Therese, as part of her work at the Central Station in Copenhagen, was involved in what was called the ‘Safety Zone’. This area, according to Therese, “*was a physical space that the Red Cross secured in co-operation with the police in Copenhagen and the [...] Central Station*”, agreed on 11th December 2015 and running up until 31st March 2016⁵⁹. The old (and at that point empty) post office was chosen to become a site to help in the assistance of “*those people in transit*”⁶⁰ for Therese and served as what can be referred to as a ‘temporary shelter’ (Sandberg & Andersen, 2020).

⁵⁹ The Red Cross were present at the Central Station in Copenhagen prior to the official opening of the Safety Zone.

⁶⁰ That Therese uses the word “*transit*” here hints at the underlying intentions and temporariness of the individuals arriving at the Central Station in Copenhagen en route to Sweden and beyond.

As part of the work of the Safety Zone, the Danish Red Cross worked closely with the aforementioned group of 'Central Station Volunteers' (Hovedbanegårdens frivillige). These *"very, very energetic and [...] mainly young people of second-generation immigrants [...] could speak the language of the various refugees that were coming in and they were actually the first on the spot to help these people"* (Therese). The volunteers made a big impression on Therese who shared how the (mainly) young individuals *"quickly came into action, organised in groups and in teams, set up a whole network with their Snapchat and their telephone and train schedules and found out who can speak what language and who can interpret"* and even postponed or quit their studies and part-time jobs in order to help. Martin and Nolte (2020, p. 425) in their work on the voluntary sector during the migration crisis in Europe during 2015 similarly experienced international humanitarian organisation *"224perce224iv[ing] volunteers as energetic, flexible and responsive to the needs on the ground"*, assets which, if tamed (and *"negative perceptions could be overcome"*, (p.425)) would benefit all those concerned.

Such collaboration between the IHOs and the grassroots organisations was an important dynamic where *"although we sort of had our differences, and also very different ways of dealing with an emergency situation like that, we also quickly realised that we could help each other"* (Therese, Danish Red Cross, Denmark). This collective of care for both the Red Cross and these young volunteers was the (re)production of *"subject[s] and a production of disciplinary forces"* where power can be argued to operate in a productive manner as part of the 'efficient machine' (Rye, 2014, p. 181). In a capillary-like manner, power did not rest on or with specific individuals but would be reproduced through the apparatus at the Central Station in Copenhagen via productive power (Fraser, 1981).

Though the *means* through which the different groups approached the situation was different, in this instance their vision was united, perceiving an exterior objectivity much like Elliott's 'material necessities'. Therese acknowledged the benefits ("*[a] very valuable co-operation*") and difficulties ("*it was also challenging*") that came from the different skills the two disparate groups possessed. Concerning the linguistic abilities of the young volunteers, the Red Cross, according to Therese, "*were actually very much dependent on that relationship and that help from the volunteers so [that] they could translate*". The young volunteers contributed importantly then to the borderwork of care through this "linguistic mediation" which was seen as a resource to the Red Cross (Artero, 2019, p. 148).

At the station, the Red Cross took on a stewarding responsibility as "*there were all these different, you know, people and groups at all kinds of levels that just wanted to help and [...] because we are a large organisation and that's what we're good at is organising, we were trying to sort of keep it a little bit organised*". Therese concluded how "*it was a learning process on both sides*" and how "*we learned something from them, and they learned something from us*". What Therese's account brings to the surface is the tension that emerges within the borderwork of care being undertaken, and in the case of the Safety Zone, was broadly overcome due to the focus on the transcending vision and appeal to objectivity. Such ideals concerning this rallying of civil society more widely was, however, not ubiquitous.

For Melina (Labour Market and Social Services City of Malmö, Sweden), when asked if the Red Cross were the main charity (concerning the events), she replied that "*[y]eah, kind of, but there was also like Refugees Welcome and there was a bit of a disagreement between them, old organisations and new ones*", witnessing to the friction between the old and new

humanitarianism (Adami, 2021; Fox, 2001). To exemplify most clearly the conflict that arose between the IHO of the Red Cross and the smaller more grassroots oriented group of Refugees Welcome⁶¹, Hanna's reflection is worth exploring in detail:

"I remember the first week I was there, it was some[one] from, I call them the pop-up organisations [chuckles], newly formed like Refugees Welcome, they came to me as the group leader and said that 'the Red Cross had to leave the railway station', and I said, 'why should we leave?' 'Because you scare the refugees' they said, 'with your, you carry the logo of the Red Cross on you', and I said, 'no', and she was quite upset. And then a week later the same person came and asked me, 'can I ask you something?', 'yes', and she said, 'we see that you never have to explain to anyone who you are, everyone who comes with the train, they just go straight to you, why?' and I said, 'it's the logo, they already know the Red Cross, they know the Red Cross or the Red Crescent from their country of origin, they have seen it along the migration routes, they know what we do and that we stand for assistance, that's why we don't have to explain like Refugees Welcome, yeah 'Refugees Welcome' is fine, it's a very lovely sentence but it doesn't say what you are doing or what you can do"

(Hanna, Migration Advisor Swedish Red Cross, Sweden).

Firstly, Hanna refers to the nascent civil society organisations as 'pop-up organisations', a term that is unlikely to come with endearing sentiments⁶² and demonstrates a friction between the more established (old humanitarianism) and more novel organisations (new humanitarianism) (cf. Adami, 2021; Fox, 2001; Olivier-Mensah, 2019). Within Denmark, Frida from Save the Children shared similar sentiments to the *"organisations mushrooming but they disappear quite quickly because they don't have the technical knowledge and competencies"*. Hanna's words give an insight into the power struggle not only at the Central Station but the ethos and 'humanitarian machine' underlying it (Sandri, 2018). What the account highlights in particular

⁶¹ Hanna shared in an e-mail subsequent to the interview that "since they were established kind of in the spur of the moment – [they] didn't wear any kind of identification. However, it is correct that those present at Malmö Central station at the time was 'Refugees Welcome to Malmö' and 'Refugees Welcome Sverige' – but I do not know which branch the person represented".

⁶² In the same e-mail as the previous footnote, Hanna described her framing of such organisations as 'pop-up organisations' as "carelessly" done.

is a humanitarian space and the struggle concerning its control (Warner, 1999). Geographically, Hanna and this lady (and the organisations that they both represent) are jostling and sparring over a specific *space*. The lady asked Hanna to leave the Central Station, not the situation more broadly, for example. Drawing on Gupta and Ferguson (1992), Artero (2019) writes that immigration serves as a conjoining of a “politics of space” and a “politics of otherness”. We can then understand the Central Station in Malmö not only as a site/sight of tension, but also as a *political space*, where actions undertaken thus carry political ramifications. Rather than separating the humanitarian from the political at the Central Station, the borderwork carried out, due to its tensive and inter-penetrating nature, consequently connects the provisions of care *provided in particular spaces* to wider political issues. The competing and conflicting agendas of the multivalent organisations within civil society attest to a diversity and division that fundamentally sheds light on what unfolded at the Central Station. Each of the actors and organisations blurred into the melting pot of ‘care’, with even ‘care’ remaining ambiguously aloof. Far from direct causalities and linear sequences, what emerged in the context of Malmö and Copenhagen during 2015 was a complexity and inter-penetration of actors and organisations which culminated in a (re)production of borderwork that was similarly enigmatic.

6.7 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the role of both the state and civil society in the provision of care as borderwork during the events of 2015-2016, particularly at Malmö Central Station. The occasion of thousands of new arrivals passing through Malmö Central Station provided a significant challenge to the City of Malmö as well as to civil society. Such conditions forged and formed co-operations and conflicts emerging in both the dynamics between the civil society

and the state, as well as within civil society itself. These categories are far from singular and in practice bleed into one another as has been analytically demonstrated in this chapter, alongside the fusion between ‘care’ and ‘control’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Sciascia, 2013; Walters, 2011).

A complication can arise when the state co-operates with civil society to achieve a particular end, such as what happened at Posthusplatsen and the Central Station in Malmö: at what point does the civil society become so enveloped within the pursuit of the state’s overarching agenda that it no longer exists in and of itself (Barbulescu & Grugel, 2016)? What is evident is Pries’ (2019) ‘link’ – an ‘intermediate associational realm’ and ‘fourth sector’ (Laine, 2014; White, 1994) – that civil society provided in this context between the new arrivals and the state. Civil society operated in part as “a political technology of government” where even if the state is not ‘actively’ involved, they can still utilise civil society to achieve particular ends (Burchell, 1991, p. 141).

This was explored concerning Posthusplatsen and ‘the Snake’. In juxtaposition to the ‘chaos’ present at Malmö Central Station with the hundreds of new arrivals coming each day during the peak of the crisis, the City of Malmö established Posthusplatsen as a place to concentrate their care (and control) (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a). To get to Posthusplatsen, Rashid recalled what he termed ‘the Snake’, the underground train of people moving from the station to the modules set up a few hundred meters away. ‘The Snake’ sought to distance the new arrivals from exterior influences through a particular spatial regime as part of the ‘biopolitical machine’ (Fraser, 1981; Wiertz, 2021). In such a way, the state could extend its reach operating within

and through the actions of civil society. To achieve this, narratives and discourses pertaining to trafficking could be used and appropriated as moments of politics and resources.

At Posthusplatsen, the Swedish state oversaw the provision of care and co-operated with selective organisations of civil society. A disciplinary power was present “operat[ing] in the quotidian relations” between the state and civil society in which organisations from both old and new humanitarianism assisted in the provision of care and in the biopolitical governance of the state (Rye, 2014, p. 171). These organisations thus became part of the biopolitical machine and extensions of the state, providing care to the bodies in order to register, govern and manage them more effectively (Wiertz, 2021). A striking example of the biopolitical discourse was also present in Klara’s account in which she understood the Danish state’s only responsibility to be to keep the refugees alive until it would be safe for them to return home. This rhetoric was similar to Mulinari and Neergaard’s (2012) conceptualisation of ‘caring racism’ in the context of the Sweden Democrats, raising questions of what precisely may be understood to be ‘care’.

Despite the collaboration and co-operation that unfolded during this time, the “humanitarian machine and neoliberal governmentality” of the state were being challenged by the civil society in Malmö (Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019; Sandri, 2018, p. 77). Via a vernacular humanitarianism, civil society provided deontological care which often transcended statist parameters and served as an important role in keeping the state accountable (Cantat & Feischmidt, 2019; cf. White, 1994). Concomitant to this, however, were conflicting ‘agendas’ between organisations. In order to overcome these competing agendas and divisions within

civil society, focusing on 'material necessities' allowed for the focus to be on the provision of care for the new arrivals (cf. Dynes, 1990).

Amidst this tense nature of borderwork undertaken during the events of 2015-2016 and the constellation of actors bound up in the proceedings, an indispensable component was the role of emotion and its deployment as a political resource. Such occasions of heightened visibilities could be appropriated by individuals from the state and beyond, framed into particular discourses and narratives to achieve specific ends. The complex apparatus of borderwork could then be (re)produced by drawing on the political resource of emotion, and it is to this important dynamic that I now turn.

Chapter 7 – Emotion as a Political Resource: Anger, Fear and ‘Is this Sweden?’

*“I felt it so strong it was almost that I left work and just,
I need to do something, I can’t just sit here”
(Märta, Kompisbyrån, Sweden).*

7.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters of this thesis, borders have been explored in two different but complementary perspectives. Firstly, six moments of heightened visibilities were explored as resources that could be brought into the political through the (re)production of narratives, discourses and representations. Such moments were important resources connected with the introduction of three forms of border controls (border checks, identity control and the ‘temporary’ law). Secondly, this thesis shone light on the important role civil society played in borderwork, concerning both collaboration and confrontation with the state. Through ‘the Snake’, the Swedish state biopolitically managed the spatiality that separated the new arrivals from the wider society, focusing its efforts on Posthusplatsen as a place where the state worked with (and utilised) civil society, demonstrating a dynamic of both care and control.

This chapter will draw on the previous two, exploring one further aspect of the events of 2015-2016, namely the role of emotion as a political resource during this time. This chapter will argue that emotion as a resource can be an important tool in the (re)production of borderwork. Two particular emotions are explored in detail, namely anger and fear, emerging from the data as prominent resources in emotional language. Alongside this, the poignant question of ‘Is this Sweden?’ from a participant is expounded upon concerning emotion, mourning and nostalgia.

This chapter's engagement with the use of emotion as a resource in borderwork is present in many aspects of the events that this thesis has explored thus far, including the border controls and mobilisation of civil society, and in this chapter, I tease out this dynamic to explore its importance in the operations of borderwork.

Academic literature has flagged the connection between the emotional and the political (Anderson & Smith, 2001; Barbalet, 2006; Hall, 2010; Heaney, 2019; Henderson, 2008; Shapiro, 2001). Within both state and non-state actors, emotions can be drawn upon as resources, where the embodied and visceral dimension to emotion is brought into words. Concerning a 'discursive' understanding of emotion as a resource, the "social and political relations between participants in their everyday participation are configured" differently by different individuals, actors and organisations (Persson, 2017, p. 9). The attaching, imploring and appealing to emotion within particular narratives, discourses and frames is not rigid but operates via a plasticity (Klein & Amis, 2021). Through such engagements (and the utilisation of them as a resource), emotions can be prominent in the "mobilisation" of borderwork "as they [inform] the political decision to engage in solidarity actions" as well as in the deployment of border controls (Milan, 2018, p. 204). Framings of particular narratives and discourses may not be true and yet "be as real to those seemingly affected as any real dangers even if discursive representations do not reflect actually what is going on" (Özer & Kaçar Aşçı, 2021, p. 186). This chapter thereby explores the discursive constructions of emotion, particularly concerning anger and fear, and how this is connected within a Swedish context to the question: Is this Sweden?

This chapter will therefore explore the research question: To what extent is emotion as a resource important in the operations of borderwork? Rather than studying the embodied dimension of emotion, my analysis within this chapter concerns how emotion can be brought into, manipulated, elicited and utilised to shape the political via discourse, narratives and representations, and accordingly used to contribute to the operations of borderwork (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3).

To analyse these emotional resources, this thesis has used semi-structured interviews to capture emotions as they are discursively constructed. Within the interviews, participants were asked of the role and importance emotion played in their (border)work associated with the events of 2015-2016. By speaking of emotion explicitly, how the participant engaged with and understood emotion is brought to the surface and can be analysed concerning its deployment in the political realm. Nevertheless, it is important to flag the caveat that emotion may mean different things to different people, particularly for interviews undertaken in a different language. Tables are used in each of the three sub-sections below to demonstrate analysis of discourse across participants in their discursive constructions of emotion (for more detail, see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6).

This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, anger and suspicion as political resources will be critically analysed concerning how they were discursively constructed by participants and drawn upon by different individuals in the operations of borderwork. The discussion then turns to fear and how it was deployed, particularly concerning the Sweden Democrats. Building on these two sections, I then explore a question raised by a participant: 'Is this Sweden?' Here, I analyse through the lenses of nostalgia and mourning the way emotion was used as a resource

concerning the nation of Sweden. Finally, conclusions are drawn pertaining to the overarching theme of this chapter, namely whether emotion is important as a political resource in the (re)production of borderwork.

7.2 Anger, Suspicion and the Resource of Emotion

According to González-Hidalgo (2021, p. 1305), “emotions can be useful resources for [...] political subjectivation and mobilisation”, with one particularly pertinent emotion emerging from my data being that of anger⁶³ and its role within borderwork. Anger was referred to in multiple ways cutting across research participants (present in 18 interviews) as shown in Table 7.1 and was coded a total of 30 times. Of the 12 individuals working within politics, one-third brought up anger, with three of the four Members of Parliament for the right-wing parties of the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party, being coded accordingly. Among state actors this was lower (4 in 18 participants), and for civil society, approximately one-third of participants had quotations coded as anger within them. During the interviews with Amelia from Kontrapunkt and Sara from the Left Party, anger featured prominently, with the code of ‘anger’ appearing four and five times respectively in the interviews (only Alexander from the Sweden Democrats was coded as often (four times)). Two common themes associated with anger emerged from the data as an ‘anger at the system’ as well as an ‘anger associated with mobilisation’. Tied to these two sub-themes, accounts from Alexander and Axel (Sweden Democrats), Amelia (Kontrapunkt) and Sara (Left Party) encapsulate the sentiments seen in the table below.

⁶³ According to Shapiro (2001), emotions are not always easily compartmentalizable.

Table 7.1: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding as ‘anger’ (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the code, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|--|--|--|
| Alexander, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden | <p><i>“I’ve been, mad, obviously, and had very strong feelings and thoughts about <u>the policies which has [sic] been released here in Sweden and <u>mainly consequences of the open border policies</u>”.</u></i></p> <p><i>“the fact that <u>we’ve let people who have been denied asylum stay in the country then being charged with rape, assault, murders and everything, that really makes me emotionally like mad”.</u></i></p> <p><i>“I’m <u>most definitely mad regarding the policies that has [sic] been in charge of this country which has led it to this [as] a situation”</u></i></p> | Anger at system – Very common. |
| Johan, Volunteer for Danish NGO, Denmark | <p><i>“there’s also the other type of emotion which is a lot of frustration and a lot of sadness because of the Government and how the Government dealt with this crisis, yeah, <u>so there was this frustration, sadness, anger was a big part of this whole thing and something that we as volunteers also talked about”.</u></i></p> | Anger at system – Very common. |
| Catarina, Social Work for Salvation Army, Sweden | <p><i>“if, for example, if Afghani boys walk in the street and they maybe rape girls and these things, and the politicians are afraid to speak about it, then the people become angry, and they are not racist, but they become angry instead with the politicians [...] <u>So people try in Sweden to avoid speaking about difficult things and then there is [sic] other people then who become angry and vote for parties that doesn’t [sic] want any refugees in Sweden”.</u></i></p> | Anger at system – Very common. |
| Sara, Employee for Left Party, Sweden | <p><i>“we had a situation where we had a Prime Minister that were [sic] talking about, ‘in my Europe there is no walls, in my Europe everyone is welcome’ and it took maybe two months and then he closed the border. So we were really upset about that, it was, <u>a lot of people were very angry about the, it was such a dramatic shift in how you spoke about it even”.</u></i></p> <p><i>“I’d say emotions are always important in some aspec-, or for me, for me as a politician at least, it’s one of my, I mean it’s kind of [sic] drives me in many aspects, you know, <u>I see</u></i></p> | Anger at system – Very common; Mobilisation – Common. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | <i><u>something, I get angry, I want to change it, and I try to change it</u></i> . | |
| Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden | <p><i><u>"I think I work better when I'm angry than when I am sad [chuckling] and it was of course, like, very saddening to hear and to know everything that was happening, but yeah, so I was angry a lot but then to motivate the people who were maybe, you know, volunteering for the first time"</u></i>.</p> <p><i><u>"I was of course angry at the Swedish Government giving out information that they were not planning on living up to"</u></i>.</p> <p><i><u>"I was of course also angry with the system that was creating this migration because it is our actions in Western Europe that is creating the reasons why these people need to leave"</u></i>.</p> | Anger at system – Very Common; Mobilisation – Common. |
| Alfred, MP for Danish People's Party, Denmark | <i><u>"They were not that poor, they were not, they bought their own food, they could have money for a taxi, and it was, I think it was strange because I started in a way feeling a bit pity because these people, 'they didn't have anything', but actually they didn't want or they didn't need, they could manage for themselves. And I think that changed from [for] me and I think for a lot of Danes [...] they turned their heads down and then that makes people a bit angry in a way"</u></i> . | Anger at new arrivals – Less common. |

When asked about his emotional experiences in relation to the events, Alexander, as an MP for the Sweden Democrats, defined himself as “*not one of the most emotional people in the party*” but acknowledged that, “*yeah I've been, mad, obviously, and had very strong feelings and thoughts about the policies which has [sic] been released here in Sweden and mainly [the] consequences of the open border policies*”. Alexander makes the connection with the anger that he experienced to an ‘emotional attachment’:

"the fact that we've let people who have been denied asylum stay in the country then being charged with rape, assault, murders and everything, that really makes me emotionally like mad and emotionally attached to politics because I can't imagine the feeling you would have if you know that the system has failed you and that the reason to the fact [is] that the guy who raped you is still in the country"

(Alexander, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphases added).

The Sweden Democrat politician begins with the rational (“*the fact*”) consequences of weak immigration policies⁶⁴, asserting that he “*can’t imagine the feeling*” that the individual who had “*raped you is still in the country*”. Through the rhetorical construction by Alexander and a virtuous anger (Schrock et al., 2017), the individual is invited with him to ‘imagine the feeling’, and so evoke within the interlocutor images of “*rape, assault, murders and everything*” in constructing a particular political discourse connected with the Other. The discursive construction from Alexander appropriates (mediated) experiences to narrate a representation of anger and its association with the political. In such a narrative from Alexander, anger is not framed in a negative light but a noble one which “if seen as authentic and credible” then “emotionally oriented audiences” will be more likely to support Alexander and the Sweden Democrat’s cause (Schrock et al., 2017, p. 18). The resourceful use of this emotion is achieved and brought into the political in a narrative and framing of anger which serves to not only assert Alexander’s political opinions, but equally to appeal through the evocation of emotion a specific discourse of anger and fear within the advancement of politics for the Sweden Democrats. When further questioned as to whom such anger was addressed, Alexander qualified:

“Well, I can’t say that I’m mad at the migrants in general, but if anyone would commit an act of, you know, sexual harassment, rape and so on, I would be mad no matter the colour of their skin or their origin. But I’m most definitely mad regarding the policies that has [sic] been in charge of this country which has led it to this situation”
(Alexander, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphasis added).

⁶⁴ The most notable example, and likely one in the forefront of Alexander’s mind, was the 2017 Stockholm terror attack by a rejected asylum seeker from Uzbekistan (aligned with the Islamic State (ISIS)), murdering five people (BBC News, 2018).

The two-fold dimension of Alexander's reflection captures how anger is being used by the MP for the Sweden Democrats; anger is addressed not only to the criminal but for Alexander even more importantly his anger is discursively directed to the policies. At the same time, Alexander's rhetoric eschews racial claims ("*no matter the colour of their skin or their origin*") in what Balibar (2002, p. 21) has understood to be a neo-racism, namely "racism without races". Such a phrasing from Alexander is an essential move for his political party more broadly as they try to distance themselves from overtly racist actions, expressions and histories within the party (Pred, 2000). If the 'racial' claims directed to the Sweden Democrats (including by Prime Minister Löfven, see Hellström and Nilsson (2010)) are in some way 'mitigated' and anger is directed towards the policies, then the social 'cost' to the populace in voting for the Sweden Democrats decreases⁶⁵ (Facchini & Jaeck, 2021). Through the rhetoric of anger, Alexander appeals to the gravity of the situation which if sufficiently normalised reduces the social cost of individuals supporting their party, and with this, the policies that ensue.

By drawing out anger (directed at the act and the policy) as Alexander does in a resourceful manner, emotion could become a valuable tool that would bolster the message of the Sweden Democrats through the directing of the emotion towards a particular end, in this case a changing of policies. Via such "plain talk", the Sweden Democrats would seek to connect with large swathes of the Swedish population (Tomson, 2020, p. np). If Alexander's appeal to emotion strikes a chord with the populace, then their emotion can be directed towards what Alexander is referring to here (the policies and the Government), and thus use this emotion for a specific form of borderwork. In the 'plain talk' from Alexander concerning him being

⁶⁵ Facchini and Jaeck draw this from the rational choice model of Riker and Odershook (1968).

‘mad’, the emotion is named and this “labelling of perception” is not just tacitly undertaken but is operable in the manner in which it impresses upon and utilises emotion on docile bodies within the political milieu (Foucault, 1977; Hochschild, 2003, p. 233; Tomson, 2020).

In this way, by addressing the situations via a ‘plain talk’, Catarina (Social Worker, Salvation Army, Sweden) recognised connections between an absence/presence by the political parties:

“people here in Sweden are afraid to talk about the difficulties with a lot of foreign people in your country. So if, for example, if Afghani boys walk in the street and they maybe rape girls and these things, and the politicians are afraid to speak about it, then the people become angry, and they are not racist, but they become angry instead with the politicians [...] So people try in Sweden to avoid speaking about difficult things and then there is [sic] other people then who become angry and vote for parties that doesn’t [sic] want any refugees in Sweden”

(Catarina, Social Worker for Salvation Army, Sweden, emphases added).

The crime of rape is used in Catarina’s reflection alongside (as will be discussed shortly below), the notion of Afghani (or ‘immigrant’ in Axel’s words) boys being on the ‘street’. Catarina highlights an absence of the politicians in addressing the situation of girls who had been raped which as a result would lead “*the people [to] become angry*” because “*the politicians are afraid to speak about it*”. Accordingly, for Catarina, this anger would transpire to voting for parties who are against refugees. Here, two aspects are worth drawing out. Firstly, there is the silence from the politicians in Catarina’s account. The impression given in Catarina’s words is that politicians, afraid of speaking out against the refugees, would remain silent in the face of a crime which in Catarina’s perception leads to people becoming angry. Secondly, this anger, if appropriated effectively by the likes of the Sweden Democrats as a political resource, could then lead to political support by their ‘plain talk’. Catarina in this instance is thereby using emotion (and the political moment of a rape) to convey a particular meaning. She recognises

a connection between ‘silent’ politicians and an angry populace susceptible to the discourse and rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats. In such a way, the Sweden Democrats could utilise emotional language to (re)produce borderwork.

Rather than attributing the word ‘anger’ to this phenomenon, Klara as an MP for the Danish People’s Party uses the word ‘frustration’:

“[W]hat happens in Sweden is, when you don’t listen to the people, when you don’t listen to their frustration, and calling the Swedish Democrats racist, people get even more frustrated and say, ‘ok, then I’ll vote for them’ [...] this has nothing to do with racism it has something to do with taking care of our country”

(Klara, MP for Danish People’s Party, Denmark, emphasis added).

Klara, in a similar manner to Catarina then, speaks of the political gain that the Sweden Democrats could accrue by tapping into the resource of frustration and the ‘forgotten’ voter (cf. Dowle, 2020; Magni, 2017). Frustration and anger are constructed by Catarina and Klara in this instance as a resource. In mobilising particular discourses that draw on emotions such as anger, frustration and fear, the Sweden Democrats could push forward political agendas. Through the Sweden Democrats calling out these emotions (such as Axel in Chapter 5 describing the new arrivals walking on the highway as “*frightening*”), the political moments of heightened visibilities are impressed with further discursive construction drawing out the emotion to assist in the political end. By Alexander addressing his anger towards the policies and the Government (those “*in charge of this country*”), emotion functions as a productive resource in the discourse that he is constructing and drawing upon. Through this, borderwork can ensue, as the resourceful use of emotion paves the way for not only sympathies towards more hostile immigration policies but, at its extreme, outright support in the normalisation of their party and their rhetoric (Ericson, 2018). This normalisation would transpire to, if the

discourse is sufficiently prominent, a warping in which the Sweden Democrats would self-identify as the ‘caring’ party and consequently solidarity may become criminalised (see Chapter 5) as border policies become stricter (Dadusc & Mudu, 2020; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012).

To strengthen Alexander’s appeal (and to complement his resourceful use of emotion), he speaks of rationality:

“[B]ut it’s not like I’m, my political work isn’t really based on me being mad, that’s just once we’re talking emotions, yeah for sure, I can get mad about certain things, but I try to act and behave rational[ly]”
(Alexander, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphases added).

Alexander in this phrasing appeals discursively to the rational by emphasising that he tries to “*behave rational[ly]*”, asserting that his politics are not emotionally based. In this way, Alexander follows a ‘rational populism’ in which his appeal to emotion is complemented by a masculine rationality moderating his (and his party’s) policies, actions and decisions (cf. Prato & Wolton, 2018). Through the phrase “*trying to act*”, Alexander gives light to an action that is seen positively through his volition, namely constructing himself (and his party) as being able to suppress emotion and focus instead on (rational) political actions (cf. Hochschild, 2003). Through this, the widely held Enlightenment belief among society of emotion being associated with the ‘feminine’ and therefore a sign of ‘weakness’ contrasts with an individual (man) acting in a ‘rational’ manner (cf. Degerman, 2019). The gravity of the situation that Alexander is drawing on through his construction is utilised to frame the Sweden Democrats as the only viable option to address the supposed emotions of the populace. Axel, as Alexander’s fellow party member, similarly spoke of emotion as something to be quelled, whilst at the same time appealing to it through a discourse of anger (and fear):

“going emotionally crazy like, ‘I hate all immigrants’, that never fell into place, I think it happened maybe among the voters to some extent, you know, have a little bit of a suspicious eye when you see three immigrant boys walking down the street, you probably choose the other side of the street, the emotions seem to be apparent more so [in] day-to-day life than, you know, out on the streets, than actually for us as a party. We knew it, we knew this, we’ve seen it, we figured, you know, we told them [chuckles] this is going to happen. And we’re seeing everything [that] has happened, everything we’ve said for the past ten to twenty years has come true and that’s a tough pill to swallow for them, so I think emotion was probably less for us because we already had that emotion, we’d already seen it, identified it, staring us in the face, and then fighting all other parties in to them calling us crazy, having to reverse their initial views”

(Axel, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphases added).

What transpires in Axel’s narrative is an earlier experience of emotion (“we already had that emotion”) in contrast to the present where emotion is now more important for the people “out on the streets” than for the Sweden Democrats who had transcended (or rather apprehended) the emotional to construct a discourse and narrative of fear (see Section 7.3). Axel is crafting a discourse associated with the ‘post-emotional’, situating himself, as Alexander similarly did, as superior to the emotional climate. The ‘enlightened’ self-portrayals of the Sweden Democrats claim to supersede emotion and yet draw on it within the political milieu to (re)produce borderwork by seeking to appeal to a populace through whom their votes could award political power and the ability to put forward anti-immigration agendas. Axel in a similar manner to Alexander seeks to distance his party from the emotions “out on the streets” and utilise the emotion of the populace to appeal to a strongman and a ‘man on the streets’ politics (Hellström et al., 2012).

At the same time, Axel gives the impression that the Sweden Democrats had foreseen “everything [that] had happened”, framing themselves as the party to address ‘what has happened’ (cf. Pred, 2000). The anti-immigration discourse that Axel is appealing to in the

quotation above is not novel and neither did it begin with the events of 2015-2016 but is rooted in a specific socio-historical context in which such narratives and actions had been present and growing within Sweden. Swathes of xenophobic hostilities permeated aspects of Swedish life, (re)producing itself via the discourse, process of Othering and conflation of 'Whiteness' with the nation (Hellström et al., 2012; Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). By utilising the past to raise an urgency to the present, Axel is appealing to an 'Old Sweden' that is under threat which will be explored in more detail in Section 7.4 (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011).

Axel, like Alexander, constructs his argument 'rationally', asserting how the Sweden Democrats "*knew this*" and "*we figured*" concerning the immigration challenges within Sweden; at the same time, Axel proposes how emotion was "*staring us in the face*". In the same manner, fear was attached by Axel to the literal staring faces of "*three immigrant boys*" which are discursively constructed as fearsome bodies that are 'out of place' and to be met with distrust and suspicion by crossing to the other side of the road (Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021). For Balibar (2002, p. 21) the use of the word 'immigrant' here would serve as an indication of a "racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability [sic] of cultural differences". When Axel thereby shares (as seen below) of the ways in which decades of new arrivals had brought about 'parallel societies', Balibar would perceive this as neo-racism in action.

In Axel's constructions, emotion is utilised with the racializing of the mobilised bodies in a particular Swedish space (see Schuermans & De Maesschalck, 2010). The extrapolation that Axel is appealing to in his image of three 'immigrant' boys being on the street utilises emotion as a particular resource that could then be extended indefinitely across the neighbourhood,

city and country. For the street that Axel uses in his discursive construction is importantly a *Swedish* street transgressed by the bodies of the three migrant boys, bodies that “have no right to be in ‘their’ territory” and “constitut[ing] a threat to ‘their’ nation/culture” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012, p. 14).

Through the suspicious discursive construction from Axel, “every racialised body [is] magically transformed into a (frequently unemployable) no-body”, demonstrating an active and operative borderwork down to the banal and mundane practice of walking on the (Swedish) street (Pred, 2000, p. 155). In this way, the emotional language of a Member of Parliament (re)produces a discourse of suspicion, where the “normalisation of societal discourses opens the door for, and legitimises the ideas behind, acts of violence” (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2012, p. 15). In normalising the discourse, anti-immigration policies become more readily accessible, and Axel by drawing upon emotion within his narrative framing, is able to more effectively normalise a discourse of fear towards the Other and the ‘care’ for Sweden instead (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012).

Alexander noted that “*there’s no doubt that people tend to vote based on emotion instead of, you know, possible facts and so on*”. In this way, he recognised that the populace to whom the Sweden Democrats are appealing are indeed susceptible and docile to emotions, creating a foundation for their emotion to be given a political direction if the likes of he and Axel can discursively construct and utilise the emotional in a political way. If the Sweden Democrats could tap into these emotional susceptibilities, they could push forward their political agendas. Alexander shared a story about business owners who felt that regulation and taxation were

not the priority for the Government at the time so long as insecurity was present. Speaking in hypothetical reply to the business owners, Alexander noted:

“yeah, the reason for that is the fact that as long as people feel unsafe in the streets, they don't really care about the taxes. As long as you as a business owner are unsure if your daughter will get home safe or not in the evening, you don't really mind the price you pay for logistics’, because, you know, if you would look at like the desires [...] safety is one of the first ones, so I think yeah, it's very emotional because it's so close to people and it will put other topics aside until it's solved”

(Alexander, MP for Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphases added).

In this quote, the feminine is used as part of the discussion and the necessity to protect her (the (White) Swedish daughter) above all else, an approach that was present in the rhetoric of the extremist ‘Soldiers of Odin’ vigilante group operating in Sweden during 2015-2016 (Ekman, 2018). Alexander utilises the discursively constructed, vulnerable female body to (re)produce an anti-immigration rhetoric, casting the Sweden Democrats as a masculine, strongman party able to resolve the situation (cf. Ekman, 2018; Jaskulowski, 2019). As Ahmed (2014, p. 144) highlights, the (Swedish) family “is idealizable through the narrative of threat and insecurity; the family is presented as vulnerable, and as needing to be defended”. If this sentiment can be sufficiently appropriated by the Sweden Democrats as a political resource, then certain politics – through the ‘caring racism’ – can be more readily adopted, culminating in the naturalisation of anti-immigrant sentiments and policies (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012).

For Axel, he claimed that Sweden were “*second in the world after Lesotho*” for rape crime, with “[s]exual crimes [being directed] towards native Swedish women” (emphasis added) (cf. World Population Review, 2022). The Sweden Democrat MP similarly utilises the female body to make a case for a Sweden in crisis; Axel refers to ‘Swedish women’, and more specifically again, ‘*native*

Swedish women'. That the rape crime was directed towards a native Swedish woman is constructed as particularly shocking, when one of 'Us' is raped by potentially 'Them'. Such a discourse fuels nativist ethno-nationalism where the 'pure' and 'old' Sweden is under threat (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019; Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). Accordingly, and returning to Alexander, the Sweden Democrats are framed to be the political answer to this imagined or perceived threat to the daughter, the home, the family and, as will be discussed further in Section 7.4, the nation. Alexander's use of emotion as a political resource thereby seeks to promote, foster and celebrate his party's politics of austere anti-immigration measures and rhetoric.

In this way, Alexander 'normalises' and situates the wider context of immigration and asylum in the personal space of the home as part of a populist agenda (cf. Bialasiewicz, 2020). Through the personal anecdote that Alexander recalls, he utilises the emotion of fear (explored further in the subsequent section) to a powerful end: "*[a]s long as you as a business owner are unsure if your daughter will get home safe or not in the evening*". Alexander appeals to the emotional attachments one would have with their daughter to push through the 'rational' solutions of strict immigration policies. The safety of the 'home' is contrasted with a dangerous outside space (frequented by non-White bodies) that "*will put other topics aside until it's solved*". This indefinite nature echoes of a perennial state of exception, with all political focus to be directed at 'solving this situation'. In constructing the narrative in this way, the exception can be paved for the Sweden Democrats to assert particular immigration policies which are more severe or longer in operation than required (Ingimundarson & Jóhannesson, 2020).

Alexander and Axel's accounts can be contrasted with Amelia's reflections as a female activist at Kontrapunkt. Anger and fear play important roles concerning right-wing populism (Dowle, 2020; Jost, 2019; cf. Vasilopoulos et al., 2019), however, anger is also present and managed within the political left (Kleres & Wettergren, 2017; Sitrin, 2013). In relation to emotion, Amelia shared that, *"I think I was angry a lot of the time [chuckles]"* continuing and saying, *"I think I work better when I'm angry than when I am sad [chuckles]"*. Here, in Amelia's construction, her emotions are channelled, 'managed' and utilised in a 'positive way' to *"work better"* because of her anger (Hochschild, 2003; Jasper, 1998). Amelia, by referring to anger in such way, demonstrates a resourceful use of anger to be brought into her political action. This anger (contrasted in her account with sadness) is drawn upon by Amelia as a resource to drive her forward in her borderwork of care as explored in Chapter 6. She later continued by reflecting that *"so I was angry a lot but then to motivate the people who were maybe, you know, volunteering for the first time"*.

A similar sentiment was shared by Sara from the Left Party who equally 'used' emotion in her (border)work. *"I'd say emotions are always important [...] for me as a politician at least"*, Sara noted, as such emotions *"drive me in many aspects, you know, I see something, I get angry, I want to change it and I try to change it"* (emphasis added). As with Amelia and the motivation of volunteers, anger is used resourcefully and brought into Sara's political work. This resource of anger is tied to the mobilisation of motivation ("emotions into actions") in which Sara and Amelia draw specifically on anger (rather than sadness in Amelia's case) to engage in this borderwork (Miller, 2011, p. 594). Their use of anger as a political resource was thereby utilised differently to, for example, Alexander and his 'anger' at policies and the Government. The former's appropriation of anger resulted in a mobilisation of a borderwork (of care) whilst

Alexander's utilisation of being 'mad' is, among other reasons, to push forward anti-immigration policies.

When asked in the interview where her anger was directed, Amelia answered:

“Of course, to the Swedish state because I think something that a lot of these, especially young people coming, they were saying but, ‘Sweden is telling us that we can come and then it has been this difficult’ so I was of course angry at the Swedish Government giving out information that they were not planning on living up to [...] I was of course also angry with the system that was creating this migration because it is our actions in Western Europe that is creating the reasons why these people need to leave. We are creating these wars here, and the only thing I was able to do was to taken [sic] care of the people that were affected by it, so that was extremely frustrating”
(Amelia, Kontrapunkt, Sweden, emphases added).

Amelia harbours an anger towards a perceived injustice, focusing on the “*Swedish state*” and Western Europe’s “*system*” causing the wider situation in her opinion (Henderson, 2008; Thompson, 2006). As seen in Table 7.1, anger at the system was the most common theme among participants in the coding of anger for those on the political left and right. Jasper (1998, p. 409, emphasis added) noted that, “[a]ctivists work hard to create moral outrage and anger, and to provide a *target* against which these can be vented”. In constructing such a target, as Amelia does in her discursive construction, the activist can thereby rally collectively. By drawing on political resources discursively associated with specific ‘targets’ (such as the Swedish state or Western Europe more broadly), then a mobilisation and (re)production of the borderwork becomes more readily achievable in contradistinction to these ‘targets’.

7.3 Fear as a Resource

Connected to the ‘suspicion’ that Alexander flagged above is the important role that fear could play as a resource within the politics of borderwork. Table 7.2 in a similar way to the resource of anger demonstrates how fear (appearing as a code in my data 57 times) was discursively constructed and used in the narrative of research participants. Among those within politics, fear (like anger) was coded by a majority of participants (seven of the twelve interviews). Within state and civil society actors, approximately half the of interviews contained quotations coded as fear. Bound up within the fear narrative was a fear associated with the protection of the Self (spectrally across the scale from the individual to (supra)national) and a fear associated with the Other. These two sub-themes are certainly not mutually exclusive and will critically analysed below.

Table 7.2: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding as ‘fear’ (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the code, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quote | Sub-Theme and Prevalence |
|--|--|--|
| Tobin, Danish MEP, Denmark | <i>“<u>normal</u> for people to protect themselves <u>when they feel threatened</u>”.</i> | Protection of Self – <i>Common</i> |
| Isak, Örebro Council for Gymnasium Schools (Liberals), Sweden | <i>“And that is something that the <u>parties now use to frighten people</u>, you know, we have all those people going down to Syria to fight for ISIS and we have lots of people that coming [sic] here are Muslims [...] But nowadays, <u>lots of people are frightened about the Muslims</u> and what they stand for and for Sharia laws and things like that [...] But as we are a democracy, you can get in a position where you have power and if you do that you can change the community and <u>that is [what] many Swedes [are] afraid of</u>”.</i> | Protection of Self – <i>Common</i> ; Fear of Other – <i>Common</i> |
| Elise, Employee | <i>“I think <u>people got scared actually</u>, and I think [the] <u>media played a really important role</u> in that because it was on the</i> | Protection of Self – |

| | | |
|--|--|---|
| Kulturen Lund, Sweden | <p><i>news every night, in the papers all the time, in social media all the time”.</i></p> <p><i>“politicians started talking about ‘this was gonna cost us so much money as a society’ [...] and <u>I think people got scared”.</u></i></p> <p><i>“And <u>when people get scared they sort of look inwards and want to take care of what’s closest to them: their family, their kids, their parents, their own jobs, everything and that was very well played by especially by the Swedish Democratic Party [Sweden Democrats], I’m afraid. They really gained by this, they really did, and they all, they even now say, ‘oh, just look at what we’ve said for ages, this is exactly what happened’.</u></i></p> | Common; Media – Less common. |
| Axel, MP for Sweden Democrats, Sweden | <p><i>“you remember the <u>hordes of people just strolling through Europe across borders, it was frightening, I thought”.</u></i></p> <p><i>“We are <u>upsetting the normal political climate in Sweden, the normal order of things, and I think that’s frightening for many”.</u></i></p> <p><i>“the <u>overall sense of almost horror seeing these tens of thousands of people just casually wandering through Europe, that was the overwhelming sense of where is this going to end”.</u></i></p> | Fear of Other – Common |
| Klara, MP for Danish People’s Party, Denmark | <p><i>“for the immigrants, I think if you’re really escaping, if you’re <u>really in fear</u>, the moment you feel safe, the moment that you’re in a safe country, that you feel safe, <u>you don’t just walk through seven or eight different countries”.</u></i></p> | (Questioning) New arrivals’ fear – Less Common |
| Rashid, City of Malmö, Sweden | <p><i>“Some people [new arrivals] would just, ‘cos they saw the police officers immediately, they were <u>like trying to just run away, not talk to anyone</u>, and other peoples were just welcoming, chit-chatting and talking”.</i></p> | New arrivals’ fear – Less Common |

Tobin, a Danish Member of the European Parliament⁶⁶, observed (emphasis added) that it is *“normal for people to protect themselves when they feel threatened”*. This normalising

⁶⁶ The participant requested anonymity therefore Tobin’s political alignments are not disclosed.

discourse from Tobin is premised on fear and threats. Tobin draws on any threat individuals may experience (at the same time alluding to an abnormality for someone who would not be afraid) and directs this to a normalising protection of the Self in contrast to the Other. The fear of the Self that the European citizen may face is considered 'normal' by Tobin, and the response to the ideological challenges posed by the Other is to look inwards. By drawing on the resource and discourse of fearful threats of the 'Other', the very 'ontological security' of Europe, Sweden or Denmark, for example, is thrown into question (Kaunert et al., 2020). If it is 'normal' to feel threatened in such a way, political parties such as the Sweden Democrats could then draw upon the emotion of fear as a resource to push forward their political aims. Borderworkers could thereby appropriate the fear associated with the Other, raising the example of a parallel society (see Table 7.2) to contrast the Self with. In this manner, and through this political resource, the (re)production of anti-immigration borderwork could then ensue.

A prominent feature to the spreading of fear during this time was via the media, also seen in Table 7.2. In Chapter 5, six moments of heightened visibilities were explored of which the media played an important role in these. Media outlets may host (and (re)produce) the dominant discourses within a society and can utilise emotion to convey a message, in this case study particularly via "the moving images on television and relayed on social media [...] evok[ing] emotional response[s]" (Dahlgren, 2016, p. 389). At the same time, the Sweden Democrats circulated potent discourses via social media focusing on the negative and even shared publicly addresses for reception centres (Söderlund and Olsson⁶⁷ (2016) cited in

⁶⁷ This source is not available in English.

Dahlgren, 2016). The (social) media played an important role in inculcating emotional responses and this “soon turned to practical activities and included a dimension of critical public spheres” (Dahlgren, 2016, p. 391; cf. Yantseva, 2020). Axel from the Sweden Democrats for example stated (emphasis added) that, “*you remember the hordes of people just strolling through Europe across borders, it was frightening, I thought*”. The mediated construction of the new arrivals travelling across Europe utilised, in Axel’s construction, the resource of fear to support a discourse against immigration. The images and discourse circulated via the media could be appropriated and directed towards particular political ends via a “*politicisation through the public sphere*” (Krzyżanowski, 2018, p. 98, emphasis in original).

Elise from the museum project of Kulturen in Sweden stated that “*I think people got scared actually, and I think [the] media played a really important role in that because it was on the news every night, in the papers all the time, in social media all the time*”. As a result of this fear being nourished and mobilised by the (social) media, according to Elise people then “*look inwards*”. Fear was directed towards the Other, particularly Middle Eastern bodies, that are homogenised, categorised, conflated, contained and governed (Ahmed, 2014; Sengul, 2020).

The ‘Whiteness’ of the individual as well as the Swedish nation is seen to be under threat, with the securing of the household and the immediate surroundings becoming pertinent (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). Ahmed (2014, pp. 211, 215, emphases in original) wrote the poignant reflections that “[t]here can be nothing more dangerous to a body than the social agreement that *that* body is dangerous” and how “[t]he blurrier the figure of the stranger *the more bodies can be caught by it*”. The blurry bodies of the new arrivals became associated with fear, a sentiment and resource that could then be utilised politically and appropriated as a resource

to push for stricter immigration policies and securitisation (cf. Dowle, 2020; Sanchez Salgado, 2022).

As analysed in Chapter 5 concerning the moments of heightened visibilities, Elliott shared the aforementioned quotation concerning the image of Alan Kurdi:

“And we took that picture and we did everything that we could within our power to criticise the system that allowed it to happen”
(Elliott, Allt åt Alla, Sweden, emphasis added).

The phrasing from Elliott is pertinent in my discussion here of emotion and its resourceful use. The image of Alan Kurdi, even if momentarily, challenged stereotypes associated with ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’, portraying their human dignity and vulnerability (Sajir & Aouragh, 2019). According to Dahlgren (2016, p. 392) “images are powerful, they evoke immediate affective response[s]” and this principle was likely known to Elliott and his fellow anarchists at Allt åt Alla. An emotionally powerful image could be utilised as a political resource to (re)produce a particular discourse due to the affective and emotional elicitations connected with the image. As discussed in Section 7.2, anger towards the ‘system’ was a common sub-theme in my data, therefore Elliott could utilise the image of Alan Kurdi to ‘evoke affectual responses’ and then direct these responses towards the ‘system’ that allowed this to happen.

Indeed, the directing of these emotional evocations was present in Märta’s encounter with an image (see also Chapter 6). Märta’s mobilisation was tied to a specific mediated moment:

“It was actually one picture in one magazine, I was sitting here and I remember it so clearly, I know exactly where I was sitting and it was one of the magazines that showed a picture of a man [...] And he was standing on the beach and his face was all, it was, I could read so much in his face, it was sorrow, it was grief, it was relief, it was all kinds of things in that face

and he had one child on his arm and one child was standing beside him and he was just crying and when I saw that picture, I just sat here at work I just started crying and I just said to my friend, 'I have to do something'. I felt it so strong it was almost that I left work and just, I need to do something, I can't just sit here, I'm a web designer and I just felt so, you know, 'what am I doing, this is not like doing any good', it's just, I don't know, it felt stupid, so I wrote an emotional post on Facebook and I said, 'we need to do something, I don't know what yet, but I will find out and as soon as I find out I will let you know, who are with me?' pretty much. And I got hundreds of messages that said that, 'just let me know what you want me to do and I'll do it'. So, that picture changed, that was like the turning point for me then I felt that I can't just sit here and read about all these people, I need to do something, and I can't wait for someone else to do it, I have to do it myself. So that was the picture"

(Märta, Kompisbyrån Örebro, Sweden, emphases added).

In a similar manner to Dahlgren's words on images and emotional reactions, Märta was moved to tears upon encountering the image a father and two children arriving in Greece. From and through this affectual experience, Märta then takes to social media imploring her friends to do "I don't know what yet". Berezin (2002, p. 45) writes of "the channelling [of] emotional energy in a new direction", not dissimilar to Amelia's resourceful approach of working with anger rather than sadness. Elliott sought to take a picture and utilise it for a specific political end (criticising the system) and in many respects Märta going to social media implies a searching on her part for direction following her affectual experience. This phenomenon should be pursued in future scholarship further connected to the events of 2015-2016 to explore the intricacies of how affectual and emotional experiences are awarded political direction, however it is sufficient to acknowledge for this thesis here the importance of emotion and the ability of awarding political direction to it.

In Örebro in Central Sweden, Isak served as a councilman for the city pertaining to upper-high schools (*Gymnasiums*). Isak shared that "nowadays, lots of people are frightened about the Muslims and what they stand for and for Sharia laws and things like that". When the majority

of those seeking asylum in Sweden were coming from predominantly Islamic countries, this fear is likely to have been amplified, bound up within “newly virulent expressions of ethnonationalism targeting Muslims” (Koch and Vora, 2020, p. 1). As shown in Table 7.2, Isak’s construction of Swedish society carries a prominent discourse of not just a fear directed aimlessly, but specifically at an Other, the reified religious, cultural and ethnic group of Muslims. Our conversation continued:

Lewis: [...] *And when you mentioned about society maybe being frightened of Muslims and the future, like, has that grown since 2015 to 2016?*

Isak: *Yes, yes.*

Lewis: *Quite significantly?*

Isak: *I think so, yes. Because the Sweden Democrats has gone up to now maybe 20% [in opinion polls], so it’s, and they live on this, of course, so it’s in their interest to make, to frighten people.*

(Interview excerpt with Isak, Council Member for Gymnasium, Örebro, Sweden).

In Isak’s account, when questioned about society’s fear of Muslims, he connects it to voting for the Sweden Democrats, sharing how it is “*in their interest [...] to frighten people*”. According to Isak, fear could be used by the Sweden Democrats (even manipulated, cf. Shirlow and Pain (2003)) to serve their political interests. The leap made by Isak above is a revealing one, supported by the interviews with Alexander and Axel from the Sweden Democrats. Emotion, particularly fear, is used to strengthen the prospects of their political party. Something similar occurred with Donald Trump who used fear (tied to the terror attacks in the West during the events of 2015-2016) to garner support during the Republican Primaries (Dowle, 2020). By highlighting and homing in on issues such as immigration and terrorism (establishing a connection between them), if fear can be manipulated and deployed accordingly (particularly

via a conflation with the Middle Eastern body), then new possibilities and horizons for mobilisation and borderwork are opened, present for state and non-state actors.

Within my critical discourse analysis, the common sub-theme codes of 'Fear of Other' and 'Protection of Self' are not mutually exclusive but can blur into the other. By fostering and utilising fear as a resource within their political party (and then proposing rational and concrete solutions out from this fear), the Sweden Democrats could cognitively shape the populace, giving direction to emotional encounters as part of the complex process of borderwork. This process is, however, incredibly complex and not one of direct causalities. The (re)production of borderwork is underlined within the deployment of emotion as a resource that is negotiated and navigated by individuals in multiple directions.

Axel demonstrated a 'Fear of the Other' grounded in a (fearsome) construction of the Muslim within a wider historical context in Sweden, building up over a series of decades:

“And now we have twenty years of these, you know, we can look back [at] twenty years of statistics and they are very dependent on social welfare, still low education, still ridden with crime these areas, some people refer to no go zones, the cops don't even really go in there, patrolling Sharia police in their neighbourhoods, you know, telling ladies to wear their longer whatever outfits and it's scary, they're absolutely in a pure sense a parallel society that's grown up, they've increased in number and magnitude for these twenty-thirty years”
(Axel, MP Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphases added).

Axel constructs an image of a frightening “*parallel society*” where even the police are afraid to enter certain neighbourhoods (cf. The Local, 2017). Once more, the female and her body (specifically in this instance her clothing), are used as a means to support the argument, with

Western clothing being associated with liberation, and headscarves or burkas being signs of female oppression (Fluri, 2011). Mulinari and Neergaard (2012) read the Sweden Democrats under what they conceptualise to be 'exclusionary racism' and 'winners' racism'. Whilst the former portrays the Other as "uncivilized [...] and [a] threat to the reproduction of the nation", the latter "constructs the female other as different, exotic, eroticised and infantilised, *but usable*" (p. 17, emphasis in original). Through such a reading, Axel is simultaneously appealing to the discourse in which the vulnerable female body needs emancipating from the grip of Islam, concomitant to mourning of the 'old Sweden' (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). Fear is reproduced in these various discourses not in a causative way but in a manner of co-production where a myriad of narratives and discourses coalesce.

Axel gives the impression that if Sweden were to not take appropriate action, the frightening portrayal he paints may result in a similarly parallel society for neighbourhoods all over Sweden. Accordingly, the 'caring racism' as theorised by Mulinari and Neergaard (2012) can be seen in co-production with the fear that Axel is constructing. Due to the narrative and discourse of fear (in addition to suspicion), Axel implicitly implores the listener to do the 'caring' thing and vote for the Sweden Democrats to protect (White) Sweden. The female bodies within Axel's narrative are thereby "emotionally apprais[ed] [as] political objects" towards a particular end (Miller, 2011, p. 594). Emotion can be used in borderwork within the rubric of 'caring racism' (see Chapter 6), where it may be appropriated by individuals and organisations, as demonstrated by Axel. Through the everyday blurring of spaces, streets and neighbourhoods filled with bodies that are deemed Other and dangerous, the resourceful emotional discursive

constructions of fear become concretised, inviting individuals to be “fearful for their country and their neglected place in it” (Ahmed, 2014; Schrock et al., 2017, p. 18).

7.4 ‘Is this Sweden?’

As Pred's (2000) work on ‘Even in Sweden’ demonstrated, the ‘Sweden’ that had been imagined by many (domestically and internationally) was often far from reality. The presence of anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiments have been pervasive in Sweden decades before the crisis events of 2015-2016. In 1994, the Sweden Democrats questioned the identity of ‘Sweden’ as a nation through a campaign poster (Pred, 2000). According to Pred (2000, p. 233), this poster (placed in an ethnically diverse part of Malmö) carried (in Swedish) the words “WHICH SWEDEN DO YOU CHOOSE?”⁶⁹, beneath which were two images, one “a doctored black-and-white photograph [of] Muslims facing Mecca and praying on their knees in the middle of a typical Swedish city market square” and the other as “a green landscape dotted with summer cottages [...] and blue and yellow Swedish flags fluttering beside each other”. When this campaign poster was put up, the Sweden Democrats were still several years from gaining their first seat in the Swedish Parliament. Nevertheless, just a few years later Jens Rydgren (2002, p. 48) had, following Pred, acknowledged the presence of “widespread popular xenophobia” within Sweden in addition to asserting that “[a]lthough the immigration issue is of low salience for the moment, it may be made more manifest by political actors or by unforeseen events in the near future”. A prominent way in which to make manifest the ‘issue’

⁶⁹ This same question (*Viklet Sverige väljer du?*) was raised as part of the 2018 election campaign (posted on 6th September 2018) by the Sweden Democrats via their Facebook page (Sweden Democrats, 2018).

of immigration (and borderwork) could be through the resourceful use of emotions such as anger, suspicion and fear.

Shown within Table 7.3 below is a cross-cutting among participants for quotations that relate to Sweden as a nation and an identity that is changing (within the wider code of ‘Sweden’ that occurred over 500 times in my data). Present within these quotations are the sub-themes of an ‘Old Sweden’ and a ‘Changing Sweden’, alongside the sub-theme of ‘Contra Sweden’ in which Sweden’s ‘exceptionalism’ was criticised. Tied to these sub-themes, this section will use as an interpretative frame Hübinette and Lundström's (2011) notion of ‘mourning’ the loss of an ‘old’ and a ‘good’ Sweden.

Table 7.3: Illustrative quotations from participants concerning coding as ‘Sweden’, and specifically a *changing* Sweden (emphases added); this is then shown as sub-themes and their prevalence within the code, shown in order from common to less common.

| Participant/ Performative Role | Interview Quotation | Sub- Theme and Prevalence |
|--|---|---|
| Oscar, Lecturer/Founder of Sport Open, Sweden | <p><i>“We were so proud in Sweden once about <u>the Nordic way or the Swedish way</u>. We were talking about this politics of compromise, this pragmatism, and that <u>Sweden was the least corrupted country in the world</u>. We had the high rates of votes at the elections, everybody went out voting. <u>All these problems with populism, we were not part of that. We were some kind of exception in the North of Europe. But nowadays we’re no different from other countries. We have the same problems. We have our share of fake news and distrust of the political system. We have changed in that way”</u>.</i></p> <p><i>“So from that perspective there are connections to the crisis in Sweden today but <u>we were on that road anyway, to become just like all other countries</u>. We have our own populist parties nowadays, and a debate about borders and how to keep people out”</i>.</p> | Old Sweden – Common; Changing Sweden – Common. |

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| <p>Elise, Kulturen, Sweden</p> | <p><i>“there hasn’t been all that big a difference between the Social Democrats and the more right-wing parties <u>until the Swedish Democrats arrived in Sweden or [...] actually came into place in parliament</u>”.</i></p> | <p>Old Sweden – Common; Changing Sweden – Common.</p> |
| <p>Isak, Örebro Councillor for Gymnasium (Liberals), Sweden</p> | <p><i>“[W]e have one area in Örebro, it’s called Vivalla and that area is one of the areas in Sweden with [the] most people going to ISIS in Syria. So it’s very frustrating for us that that’s happening and the school in that area there are very big problems but <u>there has [sic] been problems even before 2015 because it’s an area with many people from other countries coming, moving in</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“I think if you look at Sweden in <u>about [the past] decade or something like that, maybe you can see a breaking point where the country did change, the soul of the country did change a bit, I think</u>”.</i></p> | <p>Old Sweden – Common; Changing Sweden – Common.</p> |
| <p>Axel, MP for Sweden Democrats, Sweden</p> | <p><i>“Well certainly, you know, we pushed the issue, <u>nothing started in 2015, it just came to a head then. Sweden had already for a decade or two taken on asylum seekers and migrants [...] and it was already just completely out of hand and this thing just made it, this mass immigration, you know, the flocks of people just wandering through Europe, most of them with their eyes set on Sweden</u>”.</i></p> | <p>Old Sweden – Common; Changing Sweden – Common.</p> |
| <p>Alfred, MP for Danish People’s Party, Denmark</p> | <p><i>“I think it was a crisis because I think all over Europe people found out that this was something very real, that we had to attend and I think <u>even, you know, in Sweden, before this, or at the beginning of this, they said just to everybody, ‘come here’ and that [sic] did, they locked the border</u>”.</i></p> <p><i>“And I think, we are happy, if we compare to Sweden, then we often, if you see the number of migrants coming to Sweden, coming to Denmark, then there are twice as many in Sweden as there are in Denmark. <u>And that’s because we all, we from 2001 tried to stop the number of migrants and it’s had an effect, you can see it today</u>”.</i></p> | <p>Contra Sweden – Less Common.</p> |
| <p>Frederik, Techfugees, Denmark</p> | <p><i>“Today I can tell you in 2019, there has been some shootings recently in Denmark, and it’s based, it’s Sweden gangs from Southern Sweden that are coming to Denmark and doing shootings and bombings, it’s not Danish immigrants or Danish gangs. <u>So Sweden has definitely seen some repercussions and I think in Denmark a lot of us are, sort of, you know, nodding silently to each other saying,</u></i></p> | <p>Contra Sweden – Less Common.</p> |

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| | <i><u>'see it was good that we didn't do a Sweden, you know, that we took up to our limit which was sustainable'.</u></i> | |
|--|---|--|

One particularly significant recollection from Ebbe concerning these framings (and to be read in light of the cross-cutting of participants demonstrated in the table above) occurred in the summer of “[m]aybe ’16 or ’17?” in the aftermath of the key events examined in this thesis. Ebbe and his partner had travelled by car via the ferry between Helsingborg in Sweden and Helsingør in Denmark. Ebbe shared:

“[W]hen we go back to Sweden, there was, I don’t know if it was a policeman, I think it was from the army, and he was standing there with his rifle, or I don’t know what’s it called, you know, you can ‘do-do-do-do-do-do’ [noise of an assault rifle] like this. Like [a] man from the Army Force and it frightened me a lot and I thought: ‘Is this Sweden? Is this a Swedish border? Is this the first man you will meet if you come to Sweden?’ This is crazy. And I, of course I understood this is about closing the borders and it’s about this situation with the immigrants from Syria and all this.. But this is not the Sweden I was grow[ing] up in and this is not the Sweden I want to live in, where the first man you meet when you get to the border is this man from the army with his guns and rifles and all this and look[s] like it’s a war going on. And I think it’s something about [...] a symbolical or kind of Swedish frightenedness [sic]. The whole society seems to be very frightened. We have to put the army at the border to protect ourselves. From what? I don’t know, from people running for their lives, I don’t know, but it’s, that was frightening me, and I felt very uncomfortable”
 (Ebbe, Lecturer/Police Academy, Sweden, emphases added).

Ebbe’s account recalls a fear made present after the peak moments of the crisis, with the country seeking to protect itself from “I don’t know” what. Ebbe juxtaposes Sweden’s past from their present, bringing to the life the war-like nature of contemporary Sweden. The passport free passage between the Nordic countries since the 1950s (see Chapter 4) had evolved into a scenario where an armed official greeted Ebbe at the border to which Ebbe recounts: “Is this Sweden? Is this a Swedish border?” Within this, Ebbe (re)produces a

justificatory discourse by acknowledging that *“of course I understood this is about closing the borders and it’s about this situation with the immigrants from Syria and all this”*. The wider narrative tied to the events prior meant that though Ebbe was frightened by the armed guard, he contextualised the event concerning the ‘closing of borders’. The ‘Sweden’ in which Ebbe grew up is juxtaposed with the militarised border that he encounters.

It is important to note here that Ebbe was far from a sympathiser to the Sweden Democrats. Ebbe’s reminiscences allude to the mourning of the passing of the ‘good’ Sweden in which an armed guard is constructed negatively and in contrast to *“the Sweden I was grow[ing] up in”* (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). For Hübinette and Lundström (2011, p. 50), the *“humiliating loss of Sweden as the most [...] humanitarian and anti-racist country”* coexists with a *“mourning of the passing of the Swedish population as being the most homogenous and whitest of all white peoples”*. When for Ebbe *“the first man you will meet when you come to Sweden”* is an armed guard at the border, the Sweden of his childhood is framed in contradistinction with it, where an Other is then susceptible to constructions and scapegoats as contributing factors of the passing of (White) Sweden.

In similar fashion to Ebbe, Sara (Left Party Employee, Sweden) explicitly drew on nostalgia later in her reply when she was asked about emotion:

“it was also very sad to realise that the shift that was so quickly in the debate and the shift that was so quick in the policy making from the open borders to like very closed off, very strict policies in many aspects, and it was very, it was hard in many ways and you got sad about how the shift happened, and you got very sad that the Social Democrats that, I mean, I know you shouldn’t be nostalgic but, I mean Olof Palme, his way of talking about solidarity and his way of talking of people and the shift from that in just thirty years to something that is more closely to like the right-wing”

policy makers is very, it's sad in many aspects"
(Sara, Left Party Employee, Sweden, emphases added).

Sara perceives the “*quick*” change in policies and rhetoric concerning borders and migration and laments the change in the Social Democrats from the days of Olof Palme (Prime Minister of Sweden during 1969-1976, 1982-1986) moving towards the more “*right-wing policy makers*”. Olof Palme oversaw the “official adoption of a policy of multiculturalism in Sweden”, resisting opposition from within his party to instead follow his personal “positive disposition” to the matter (Tawat, 2019, p. 481). Sara thereby draws on this narrative and representation of multiculturalism, embodied in Palme, vis-à-vis the border controls and ‘debate’ pertaining to immigration. Accordingly, Sara elicits the nostalgia alongside sadness concerning the change in solidarity in the country. She is, as I will discuss in more detail below, mourning the loss of the ‘good’ Sweden that she perceives is under threat by the likes of the Sweden Democrats (Hübinette and Lundström, 2011).

Ebbe and Sara’s reminisces are contrasted with Axel’s nostalgia of returning to Sweden after some years to find himself in the ‘Middle East’:

“Really, I mean, truly, when I came home, and I moved home after 28 years abroad, I just took my dad’s old bike and start riding around in my old neighbourhood in Malmö and things like that, and I mean half the town is no longer Sweden. I was just biking ten minutes and all of a sudden I am in the middle of the Middle East. It didn’t say ‘Bakery’ or ‘Grocery Store’ or ‘Library’ on the signs, it was all in Arabic and there were people in burkas walking around. It was absolutely a parallel society and that really, really hit it home. I didn’t have this gradual adjustment to that as most Swedes have, to me it was just an enormous wake-up call, whoever thought this would be a good idea, kind a. So it was very central in my decision to join the Sweden Democrats, absolutely”

(Axel, MP for Sweden Democrats, Sweden, emphases added).

Axel's vivid description portrays and appeals to a fear within the everyday, where previously innocent spatialities such as bakeries and libraries became appropriated and foreign, transgressed by bodies in burkas "*walking around*" Swedish territory. The presence of the Other is constructed as a threat "that might jeopardize the perceived bond between the national demos and the national territory" (Hellström et al., 2012, p. 190). Indeed, for Axel, "*half the town is no longer Sweden*" due to the Arabic signs and burkas. This construction from Axel can be framed within Pred's 'Even in Sweden' contextualisation and explored in light of "a context in which racism is an *integral part of Scandinavian society*" (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012, p. 18, emphasis added). Such fear is then not a single occurrence but a co-production (and (re)production) of a discourse, narrative and legitimisation of hostilities (Shirlow & Pain, 2003). This co-production within the narrative framing is connected to a particular contextuality and plays an important role in the re-perpetuation and circulation of the discourse. In both Axel and Ebbe's accounts then, the question 'Is this Sweden?' is a pertinent one associated with emotion and the frames of mourning and nostalgia. For both Ebbe and Axel, the Sweden that they had known had disappeared.

Populist parties in recent decades have drawn heavily on national nostalgia, serving to be for Smeekes et al. (2021, p. 99) "a master-frame for increasing their appeal among voters". The question, for Axel, would play and draw upon a reactionary and idealised homogeneity and ethno-nationalism under threat by the Other who were to be appropriating Swedish territory in a "*parallel society*". By drawing on a discourse of a 'parallel society', Axel (re)affirms a division between an 'Us' and a 'Them', whereby the Sweden Democrats perform as "emotional organisers" that may "capture and channel" an anger, suspicion and fear that is pervasive

across a society and direct it towards an “‘enemy’ they identify as the source of the problem” (Ost, 2004, p. 230). Axel closes his quote above with the statement: “*it was central to my decision to join[ing] the Sweden Democrats*”. The ‘capturing and channelling’ of these emotions could be used resourcefully to not only normalise and legitimise a discourse and narrative associated with anti-immigration sentiments and policies, but may also result in others, like himself, joining the Sweden Democrats.

Connected to the Sweden Democrats, Tobias Hübinette and Catrin Lundström (2011) developed their frames of the ‘old’ and the ‘good’ Sweden:

“the double-binding power of Swedish whiteness, whereby ‘the old Sweden’, that is Sweden as a homogeneous society, and ‘the good Sweden’, that is Sweden as an anti-racist and feminist country—two images of Sweden which on the surface and at first glance may sound incompatible—are both perceived to be threatened and even under siege by the recent influx and contemporary presence of non-white and non-Western migrants” (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011, p. 43, emphasis added).

The mourning of a passing Sweden ‘under siege’ from an Other is present in the discourse for both Ebbe (“*the whole society seems to be very frightened*”) and Axel (“*all of a sudden I am in the middle of the Middle East*”). The narratives do more than ‘describe’ contemporary Sweden, but rather inculcate and (re)produce an image of a particular ‘Sweden’. Accordingly, the ‘siege’ discourse that Hübinette and Lundström proposed is potent, connoting a fortress surrounded by foes. Axel noted that “*I didn’t have this gradual adjustment to that as most Swedes have*”, in effect, arriving to the ‘siege’ sometime after it had begun with a Platonic enlightenment upon escaping the ‘cave’. The discourse from Ebbe, Sara and Axel is thereby a powerful one in which a nation is constructed as being ‘threatened’ by a specific Other in using emotional

attachments associated with such nostalgia and “used to gain legitimacy for securitisation, nationalistic protectionism, and normalisation of xenophobia” (Ericson, 2018, p. 96). In the same way that Donald Trump drew on the nostalgic discourse of an era of American dominance, so too has the use of nostalgia be drawn upon within Swedish populist politics, aiming to ‘Make Sweden great again’, as used by a local politician for the Sweden Democrats (Schreurs, 2021; The Local, 2018). Axel’s (emphasis added) claim that “*half the town is no longer Sweden*” are words that both spatially and temporally hearken to the gradual-yet-sudden change of a Sweden White and pure to a ‘siege’ narrative of a frightening Other discursively constructed.

Sara Ahmed (2003) makes the connection of a ‘politics of fear’ with ‘a border anxiety’. Fear is utilised as a resource which is spoken about, narrated, drawn upon and discursively constructed in both Ebbe and Axel’s account, appealing to “the *ontology of insecurity* within the constitution of the political” where “it *must be* presumed that things are not secure, in and of themselves, in order to justify the imperative to *make things secure*” (Ahmed, 2003, p. 393, emphasis in original). In many respects, the Swedish state, embodied in the army officers, were utilising fear as a resource at the Swedish border. The presence of police ‘frightened’ Ebbe, a Swedish citizen (a citizenship closely associated with Whiteness, see Hübinette and Lundström (2011)), therefore its effects on non-white and non-Swedish citizens are likely to be intensified.

By using fear in a resourceful manner, Sweden could create possibilities to allow for practices of border controls and more to be present, in their operations and (re)productions. Ebbe asks the searching question, “[w]e have to put the army at the border to protect ourselves. From what? I don’t know, from people running for their lives, I don’t know”. The situation for Ebbe

“was frightening”, making him feel “very uncomfortable”; if the underlying threat to the Swedish people required an armed soldier to stand guard when one crosses the border, implicitly the scenario would evoke a fear (even subconsciously) as it did for Ebbe, in which the Other is deemed out of place and Sweden is in need of protection (cf. Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021). The discourse not only demonstrated an exception but at the same time (re)produced the possibilities for this by utilising fear as a political resource by which border controls and anti-immigration policies could be normalised and legitimised.

The nation itself is perceived as being under threat in which such discursive constructions “reify and naturalise the nation as something natural and commonsensical [sic]” (Hellström & Nilsson, 2010, p. 192). The two sub-themes emerging from my data coalesce by which a ‘Fear of the Other’ and a ‘Protection of the Self’ bleed into and inform one another. Such borderwork then serves “as a technology of control of diversity” amidst an “autochthonic populist politics of belonging” in which the ‘nation’ is to be protected at all cost (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018, p. 241). As explored in Chapter 5 in Ebbe’s account, this (re)production of borderwork associated with fear and the nation can be as tangible being denied entry into a taxi. Concerning that occasion, Ebbe reflected:

“Ok, it’s easy for me because I look, well I’m not that blonde, but I’m enough blonde and my dialect and, or perfect Swedish and all this so I can cross ‘cos of my skin, colour of my skin. And you know, getting this, it’s good for me in this situation but it’s, this feeling, I’m not feeling that good at that time. This is, this is not fair”

(Ebbe, Lecturer/Police Academy, Sweden, emphases added).

Ebbe makes the connection with him being “*enough blonde*” to finally cross the border due to the “*colour of my skin*”. Sweden’s longer-term contextualities of eugenics, sterilisations and

race biology, re-emerging in a period of 'White melancholy' and the 'mourning' of the passing of an 'old' and a 'good' Sweden, coalesce and culminate in the borderwork in which, as Ebbe perceives it, the colour of his skin and White identity enabled him to cross the border (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011, 2014; Pred, 2000; Spektorowski & Mizrachi, 2004).

The discourses of anger, suspicion and fear (with each of these overlapping into the other) can thereby serve as resources in the operations of borderwork, intimately connected to a Sweden in mourning. The 'ontological insecurity' (re)produced through the construction of narratives, discourses and representations associated with emotions can be exploited and addressed towards particular 'targets' and an Other which, in a far from direct causality, becomes entwined and complex (Kinnvall, 2018). Bound up within this is the role of memory, nostalgia and mourning, by which narratives and discourse seek "to locate the Self in the past and the future", a Self that in the Nordic countries is inseparable from Whiteness (Berenskoetter, 2014, p. 274; Lundström & Teitelbaum, 2017). In the (re)production of this discourse, "[m]aintaining such a narrative" is not only "a form of governance" but a form of borderwork that may carry significant repercussions (Berenskoetter, 2014, p. 279).

7.5 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the dynamic of emotion as a political resource and its association with borderwork. It has sought to engage with the research question of: To what extent is emotion as a resource important in the operations of borderwork? Building on the previous two chapters, the role of emotion explored in the pages above has been seen as an important component to borderwork for both state and civil society actors. In a similar manner to how

moments of heightened visibilities could be appropriated and framed to achieve a political end, this chapter has argued that a similar dynamic is present for emotion. By discursively constructing emotion within particular narratives, discourses and representations (this chapter has explored anger and fear), emotion can be manipulated and used as a political resource and serve as an important function in the (re)production and operation of borderwork.

Anger as a political resource was firstly addressed, particularly concerning the rhetoric of Alexander and Axel (male Members of Parliament for the Sweden Democrats) as well as Amelia and Sara (a female left-wing politician and a female anarchist). In both similar and contradictory ways, anger was an important political resource in the discursive constructions by each of the participants, making use of such emotion for political ends. A common sub-theme among participants was the notion of 'anger at the system', with 'system' meaning very different things for the participants. Anger expressed towards the 'system' could be given a political direction via the 'plain talking' Sweden Democrats who appealed to a populace that felt unaccounted for due to 'silent' politicians (Tomson, 2020). The right-wing party of Alexander and Axel appealed to the Enlightenment concerning reason being considered superior to emotion (with masculinity being associated with the former and femininity with the latter), portraying themselves as a strongman political party which had been awarded foresight to the 'challenges' presented by the immigration into Sweden, for which their 'rational' and 'plain talk' would provide the populace with a clear direction for their emotions (Degerman, 2019; Tomson, 2020). Despite the likes of Alexander and Axel from the Sweden Democrats seeking to portray themselves as "guardians of dispassionate reason", such "parties of power thus deploy anger every bit as aggressively as the most radical of outside protestors" (Ost, 2004, p. 230).

For Amelia and Sara, anger was similarly used as an important resource in borderwork, however in a quite different way. Anger was seen as a mobilising resource in the borderwork of care for Amelia, as well as in Sara's work with the Left Party. Amelia raised the insightful dynamic between the emotions that she was presented with of sadness and anger, with Amelia through volition utilising the latter as a resource to mobilise in the borderwork of care more effectively. In a similar manner to Alexander, Amelia directed anger towards the Swedish state and the 'system' more broadly, however whereas Alexander utilised this anger for the political promotion of his party and for anti-immigration policies, Amelia (from an anarchist perspective) drew on this discourse to more effectively mobilise within civil society.

The Sweden Democrats utilised the discourse of suspicion in their discursive constructions in which as part of this appeal, the vulnerable (White) female (Swedish) body was used to create, foster and portray a need for the Sweden Democrats to intervene and defend such bodies from a threatening Other. This discourse of suspicion and hostility towards the Other did not emerge out of 2015-2016 but was present long before, in which both subtle and open racisms and xenophobic attitudes and actions had pervaded Sweden (Pred, 2000).

The spatial-racial (Pred, 2000) grounding of narratives of 'immigrant boys' on the street situated the bodies as out of place and threatening, capable at any moment of committing a crime against one of Sweden's White (female) citizens (Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021). Through this resourceful use of emotion and suspicion, the Sweden Democrats could tap into and foster fear within the wider (re)production of borderwork whereby appealing to such sentiments, the normalisation and legitimisation of the policies addressing the 'threat' would be more readily justifiable, portraying themselves in a 'strongman' political light to secure the (White) Swedish

territory indefinitely. In so doing, the combination of anger, suspicion and fear could all contribute to a co-production of borderwork within a discourse of 'caring racism' in which such emotions, if successfully drawn upon, would be 'channelled' to the 'caring' end of stricter immigration policies to benefit (White) Sweden (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012; Ost, 2004).

Themes of the protection of the Self and fear of the Other were common sub-themes in which a 'parallel society' was constructed not only as Other but also used as a justification for the defending of one's immediate vicinities. Suspicion and fear thereby served for Axel as a political instrument (cf. Hochschild, 2003), through which discourses present within Sweden for decades (Pred, 2000) could be (re)circulated and utilised to shape political futures. By fostering a milieu of fear, emotions could be appropriated and deployed by the Sweden Democrats (and others) to (re)enforce narratives and discourses according to their agendas to great effect (Salmela & Von Scheve, 2017; cf. Widmann, 2021).

Axel as an MP for the Sweden Democrats demonstrated an "ethno-nationalist belief that natives have precedence in their native country" (Hellström et al., 2012, p. 203). Accordingly, fear was discursively constructed by Axel and utilised as a political instrument not just for 'mourning' the loss of the Sweden of old, but also in the (re)production of a White Sweden through constructing immigrant boys as out place (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011; Koefoed & Simonsen, 2021). This chapter confirms the finding then of Özer and Kaçar Aşçı (2021, p. 188) who recognised that in "magnifying fear", populist parties "legitimise enmity towards the refugees systematically". In other words, through a resourceful appropriation of emotion, fear can be utilised by the likes of the Sweden Democrats to (re)produce a division between 'Us' and 'Them', and accordingly strengthen the case for a particular form of borderwork.

The question from Ebbe of 'Is this Sweden?' is situated in a long-term contextuality of anti-immigration sentiments and demonstrates a powerful rhetorical device in the operation of borderwork by raising the question of who belongs to Sweden (Pred, 2000). The powerful narrative of mourning the loss of the 'old' and the 'good' Sweden can draw on particular emotions in the (re)production of discourses and through this, new horizons and possibilities of borderwork can be opened up and undertaken, concerning both the mobilisation of care as well as anti-immigration policies and border controls (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). The armed guard securing Swedish territory was constructed by Ebbe as something fearsome and far from the Sweden in which he grew up, demonstrating the mourning of a passing 'good' Sweden. In juxtaposition, the 'common-sense nationalism' employed by Axel and abounding within the narrative of fear that is constructed concerning the Other, such rhetorical devices allude to the mourning of an 'old' Sweden (Hellström et al., 2012). In this way, emotion can function as a political resource in borderwork at multiple scales through the (re)production of discourses, narratives and representations.

Chapter 8 – Conclusions

“[Y]ou look at what’s happening last night in Sweden. Sweden, who would believe this. Sweden. They took in large numbers. They’re having problems like they never thought possible”

(President Donald Trump, quoted in BBC News, 2017, p. np).

8.1 Introduction

This thesis has explored an EU internal border in Northern Europe during the events of 2015-2016 (August 2015 – July 2016), seeking to engage with the question of how borderwork is deployed, negotiated and navigated by the state and civil society in a crisis scenario. The findings, analysis and contributions of this thesis are contextually grounded, however such theorisations may be applied in scholarship pertaining to other contextualities in Sweden, Denmark and beyond. This thesis has proposed a series of analytical and conceptual tools to assist in the understandings of borderwork in a European context during a crisis scenario. By theoretically engaging with the notion of ‘political moments’ and how occasions of heightened visibilities can be appropriated, I illustrated how such moments can be brought into the political and used in the operations of borderwork by state and non-state actors. In my findings I have demonstrated the complexities within civil society and the state, with both being entwined within the other concerning the operations of borderwork. Further, emotion as a political resource (which can be appealed to, framed and (re)produced to shape discourses) was analysed and seen vis-à-vis the political left and right as a mobilising force in both bordering and debordering. Whilst the contributions of this thesis emerge out of the contextuality from which they were explored, it is hoped that these theoretical contributions can be utilised to great effect within geography and critical border studies more broadly.

8.2 Critical Summary

In the fallout of the ongoing Syrian Civil War and instability in the Middle East, millions of individuals have been displaced, with many fleeing their countries of origin seeking a new life in Europe. During the key year of 2015 (when the continent received 1.2 million applications for asylum), despite Sweden's Prime Minister claiming that his "Europe doesn't build walls", as Sweden's number of asylum applications continued to grow by the thousands, Sweden soon implemented its first of three forms of border controls (EuroStat, 2020; The Local, 2015c, p. np). The moment was significant, in effect marking the end of nearly sixty years⁷⁸ of passport free movement between Sweden and Denmark, in addition to a rupturing of Sweden's (inter)national reputation as a 'humanitarian superpower' that the Prime Minister sought to (re)produce (cf. Hübinette & Lundström, 2011; cf. Pred, 2000).

This thesis therefore examined in detail the operations of borderwork and the deployment of Sweden's border controls, in addition to the mobilisation of civil society in a borderwork of care. Emerging out of a processual turn within border studies, Chris Rumford's use of the term 'borderwork', first appearing in 2006 and then developed further in subsequent years (2007, 2008, 2012), has been at the forefront of this thesis' analysis, where it has been adopted and applied to both state and civil society actors in the processes of bordering and debordering. By engaging with literature from humanitarian borders (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Walters, 2011a) and biopolitics (Ajana, 2007; Deleixhe, 2019; Topak, 2014; Walters, 2002), I have demonstrated that the borderwork operating within Sweden during this time frame was highly complex,

⁷⁸ The ten-hour re-introduction following the Oslo shooting in 2011 is the only exception (European Commission, 2022).

occurring within the specific legal architecture of international agreements and the European Union. The dialectical relationship between the state and civil society (recognising that these are not neatly arranged containers and contain profound diversity within and between them) concerning borderwork in a crisis scenario gives an indication of its operations.

An important component to *how* this borderwork is undertaken has been analysed in this thesis through the notion of ‘moments’, namely events and circumstances that serve as occasions of heightened visibilities that may be appropriated accordingly and utilised resourcefully as part of a constellation of other dynamics towards achieving particular political ends such as the provisions of care or the deployment of borders. This thesis explored six of these moments that were utilised differently by various actors and organisations ‘multiperspectively’ (Brambilla, 2015; Rumford, 2012). Through such moments, individuals and organisations could draw on these resources to (re)produce particular narratives and discourses as part of their political operations, whether this may result in border controls or the provision of care (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Walters, 2011a). This ‘emergent’ process of borderwork eschews any notions of direct causalities and rather operates in a complex and diverse manner, recognising the multiple directions, pressures, tensions and contextualities that shape and form borderwork at a territory’s edge and beyond (Brambilla & Jones, 2020).

Within the first analysis chapter, the following research question was engaged with: Concerning the Swedish-Danish border, how did the Swedish state react to the events of the large number of new arrivals into the respective countries, particularly regarding their governance? Within a specific legal architecture, Sweden responded to the situation by introducing three forms of border controls: ‘temporary’ border checks in November 2015

(centred at Sweden's train station of Hylle and the harbour town of Trelleborg), identity control in January 2016 (primarily at Copenhagen Airport train station) and the 'temporary' law from July 2016 that moved Sweden's asylum policies down to the EU minimum. As part of the debate concerning the situating of the border rehearsed in Chapter 2, a topological and topographical complementarity was demonstrated in Sweden's deployment of three forms of border controls associated with the presence of the new arrivals and their governance (cf. Coleman & Stuesse, 2014). The decisions made by Sweden demonstrate the importance contemporary states award to governance and the management of populations via "*control and steering mechanisms*" (Rosenau, 1995, p. 14, emphasis in original).

These actions by the Swedish state illustrate how an EU state in Northern Europe responded to (and (re)produced) a 'crisis' narrative using 'moments' as political resources in which border control measures and governance could unfold. Sweden negotiated borderwork within a particular legal architecture and appealed to the relevant Article(s) within the Schengen Border Code to 'temporarily' re-introduce border checks as part of 'signal politics'. In addition, they awarded themselves (and those they deem appropriate) exceptional 'powers' through domestic legislation as a precursor to the identity controls. Moreover, by engaging with the EU's asylum laws to match the EU minimum, Benedek's (2016) assertion of a 'race to the bottom' regarding asylum policies is confirmed. Protected by the Danish law that would incur penalties for those 'trafficking' new arrivals, power was shown to operate in a Foucauldian image of capillaries, pervading society and the state's extension, down to the taxi driver serving as a 'citizen detective' and border agent (Davitti, 2018; Fraser, 1981; Vaughan-Williams, 2008).

In this thesis, I have demonstrated the importance of such legal apparatuses concerning policies of mobility and asylum. Though states can (and did) reject the EU legal framework during this time (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic refusing to receive asylum application re-allocations in 2015 is one example, see EU Court of Justice (2020)), for Sweden the legal architecture was important in shaping and steering the possibilities of borderwork and the border controls that they could deploy, confirming Zamboni's (2019, p. 119) reflection that Sweden was "bound by EU law obligations".

The second research question that this thesis has critically discussed is: How did Swedish civil society contribute to actions of borderwork and what was the nature of such interactions with regards to state and civil society actors? This thesis, as part of its contributions (Section 8.3), has brought to light the complex nature of borderwork and its operations with(in) and between civil society and the state. In contrast to understanding civil society only as a "living apology" contra the state, the borderwork undertaken by the state during the key months was both challenged as well as supported by parts of civil society, with boundaries between the operations of one and the extension of the other being blurred (Sciascia, 2013; Vandevordt & Verschraegen, 2019, p. 122). Civil society contributed significantly to the actions of borderwork undertaken during this time in both the provision of care and, via the state's extension, contributing to control (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a). To combat the spatial susceptibilities of sites such as the Central Station in Malmö, the Swedish state enacted 'the Snake', an underground route separated from the public where the City of Malmö would direct new arrivals to register at Posthusplatsen. Through 'biopolitical governance', at Posthusplatsen (under the gaze of the authorities) civil society provided 'care' on behalf of the state prior to

individuals being registered and managed by the Swedish Migration Agency (Fraser, 1981; Topak, 2014).

In similar fashion to the state, actors within civil society utilised political moments of heightened visibilities to assist in the mobilisation and deployment of borderwork. Through 'material necessities', civil society organisations of disparate agendas could unify (if temporarily) around overarching discourses, narratives and the framing of particular 'targets' (cf. Jasper, 1998). As part of this, how the Government was to be perceived by different organisations was found to be important in the nature of these interactions, adding further to the complex dynamics pertaining to the borderwork undertaken by the state and civil society (cf. Frykman & Mäkelä, 2019).

The third results chapter in this thesis explored the question: To what extent is emotion as a resource important in the operations of borderwork? This understanding was grounded in the discursive construction of emotion by which (political) actors could draw upon, (re)produce and circulate discourses associated with particular emotions to assist in achieving political ends. Emerging from the data were the key emotions of anger and fear that were appropriated and (re)framed as part of wider discourses and operations of borderwork.

Anger as a discursive construction within emotional language was utilised as an important political resource by those in favour and those against immigration. Though understood in different dimensions, anger at the 'system' was evidenced, functioning as a resource to be appropriated within an emotional discursive construction of the borderwork being

undertaken. Through the framing of “identifiable and tangible foes”, the likes of the Sweden Democrats could utilise anger and suspicion to draw into their party individuals who may otherwise have been politically disengaged (Magni, 2017, p. 101). For those with more sympathetic views to the new arrivals, anger could similarly be used as a resource in mobilisation and engagement within quotidian practices and a borderwork of care (Rodgers, 2010). Though media analysis has not been the focus of this thesis, it has nonetheless emerged as an important component to the evocation of emotion as a political resource in borderwork concerning the events in Sweden. This thesis has recognised the important role emotion can play as a resource vis-à-vis the (social) media and mobilisation of borderwork, and this should be explored further in future scholarship (cf. Chouliaraki & Stolic, 2017; Klein & Amis, 2021; Maier et al., 2017; Milan, 2018).

The theoretical frame of mourning the passing of the ‘old’ and the ‘good’ Sweden has been important and supported by the findings shown in my data (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011; Pred, 2000). This conceptual framing was captured most succinctly in the question by one of my participants: Is this Sweden? The ‘even in Sweden’ narrative pervades the present political milieu in Sweden concerning the mourning of the ‘old’ and the ‘good’, however the discourse is also present and circulated on the global scale, as seen in this chapter’s epigraph of President Trump’s lament in 2017 concerning immigration into Sweden (BBC News, 2017; Ericson, 2018; Hübinette & Lundström, 2011; Pred, 2000). The Sweden that was to be mourned was specifically a ‘White’ Sweden that was perceived as being threatened by an Other that exist in a ‘parallel society’ (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011). Therefore, emotion as a political resource was utilised concerning anger, fear and nostalgia in important ways concerning the operations of borderwork.

8.3 Contributions

As per the debate within Chapter 2 concerning the generalisability of a theory of a border, the contributions of this thesis are subjected to the contextuality (geographically, culturally, historically, socio-economically and legislatively) out of which they emerge. For example, as demonstrated in this thesis, Sweden's border controls were deployed in line with international laws and agreements (the EU and the UNHCR), and these contextualities should be considered accordingly. Nevertheless, within these contributions are theorisations that may be applied elsewhere within border studies. Whilst the contributions of this thesis are manifold, there are six particularly significant contributions (two connected to each research question) that are to be taken away from my findings and critical analysis.

Firstly, in the (re)production of a 'signal politics' (and the discourses of an 'acute situation', 'crisis' and exception(al) narratives more broadly), I have shown that the Swedish state could utilise political moments of heightened visibilities to regulate, govern, manage and even restrict new arrivals in Sweden. This is a significant contribution as recognising how states (and others) operate in borderwork through such moments and discourses can lead to substantial changes in asylum policies alongside cultural (re)presentations of the Other. This was demonstrated through the (re)production and circulation of discourses that the Swedish state fostered concerning the legal political climate, leading to a bill, for example, being passed in the Swedish Parliament awarding themselves 'exceptional' powers in December 2015 to pave the way for identity checks. This policy (addressed primarily at unaccompanied minors) and others confirm Walters' (2002) notion of a 'filtering' border regarding who is allowed into a

country or not, in addition to Vaughan-Williams' (2010) 'pre-emptive' understanding of contemporary borders.

Secondly, the borderwork that unfolded in Sweden occurred within a specific EU legal framework that shaped the realm of possibilities. By gathering large amounts of data concerning the new arrivals, including the collection of biometric data with fingerprints as part of the EURODAC database, Sweden co-produced the legal situation by which the state could control, govern, discipline and, if necessary, deport the new arrival or return them to the country in which they may have previously been registered (cf. Coleman & Stuesse, 2014; Joseph & Rothfuss, 2014; Walters, 2002). In this way, I have demonstrated that Sweden's governance operated within its EU legal architecture in line with the Dublin Regulation, Schengen Border Code and Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Through the 'temporary' law becoming permanent five years after its introduction, this is a clear example of how the 'exception' can become the 'norm' within asylum law (Agamben, 1998). Such a moment is significant because if 'even Sweden' can move from 'temporary' to permanently stricter asylum policies, a precedent is set within the European (and wider) context. Future research should therefore continue to explore the multiple, diverse and complex operations of border controls and borderwork within contemporary European states concerning their negotiation within the wider EU legal framework and architecture.

Thirdly, at Posthusplatsen, the Swedish state utilised civil society in biopolitical governance where 'care' was provided for the bodies until they were 'controlled' and bused to be registered to the Swedish Migration Agency as part of the biopolitical and humanitarian borderwork (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015a; Topak, 2014; Walters, 2011b). Civil society was found to

be implicated in a 'humanitarian' and 'biopolitical machine' in which docile bodies were managed (in line with the national and international legal frameworks) to be registered and more effectively governed in (co)production with the state (Sandri, 2018; Wiertz, 2021). The state could 'use' civil society (and moments of heightened visibilities) for its own political ends, to maintain both control and authority. This contribution is important, as though resistance was present during this timeframe (demonstrated for example by Kontrapunkt), the functioning of civil society at Posthusplatsen and 'the Snake' was shown to be one in which the state may 'steer' and 'command' those implicated within the operations of borderwork and care (Rosenau, 1995).

My findings have confirmed, therefore, Pallister-Wilkins' (2015a, p. 66) theorising that a 'paradox' may be present at humanitarian borders where the "spectres of rescue and 'push-back' [are] occurring within the same space". I have applied this theorisation and demonstrated in this thesis that a paradox was present via 'the Snake' and Posthusplatsen, where the 'rescue' operations of care for organisations such as the Salvation Army and the Red Cross were concurrent with the 'push-back' borderwork evident in the biopolitical management of bodies and life via the state's registration, management and biometrification of individuals, haunted by the prospect of 'deportability' (De Genova, 2002). This contribution recognises, therefore, the inter-penetrating and co-productive dynamic between the state and civil society and will be important in future borderwork scholarship.

A fourth contribution is that whereas some aspects of civil society were celebrated (or permitted), others existed in a more tortuous relationship as evidenced in the fines threatened to the Church of Sweden (and Kontrapunkt) made by the Swedish state concerning the

accommodation of individuals, confirming Dadusc and Mudu's (2020) notion of a 'criminalisation of solidarity'. This humanitarian borderwork tension was demonstrated at St John's Church when the state's interests of control superseded the moral imperative of care (for Roma individuals and the homeless of Malmö) following the end of the 'acute crisis' narrative that had been pertinent as a political resource in the enactment of the border controls. The change in action by the Swedish state from accepting the help of St John's Church in November 2015 to the fine being threatened to them in the following spring not only demonstrates the 'crisis' situation, narrative or perception of the key months of this context, but also confirms the literature's engagement with the question of 'deservingness', where the new arrivals were prioritised, and the Roma and homeless were not (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016; Kóczé & Rövid, 2017; Kyriakidou, 2021).

Fifthly, the Sweden Democrats sought to portray themselves as superior to emotion, whilst at the same time rely upon it heavily in their discursive constructions. In appealing to a 'virtuous' anger directed not at racial bodies but policies and decisions made by 'Swedes', the Sweden Democrats could normalise and legitimise a discourse that could lead to stricter asylum and immigration policies (Ericson, 2018; Schrock et al., 2017; Shirlow & Pain, 2003). The Sweden Democrats utilised emotional language (particularly of fear and anger) and sought to, through discursive construction, portray a scenario in which their party was the only reasonable option to mitigate the 'issues' being experienced. This finding is to be read in light of Mulinari and Neergaard's (2012) work, with the Sweden Democrats portraying themselves as the most appropriate, and even 'caring' party, to defend 'Sweden' via exclusionary representations. Such a contribution is highly important as populist parties in recent years have dominated the political scene across much of the West. Studying how populist parties appeal to and use

emotion has been prominent in research (for examples see Dowle, 2020; Kinnvall, 2018; Wirz et al., 2018), however within the English language, little has been written about the Sweden Democrats' resourceful use of emotion (for examples, see Đurić, 2015; Nilsson, 2022). Future scholarship should therefore continue to explore this phenomenon, specifically in the resourceful use of emotion in the official political rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats.

Finally, nostalgia has been shown to be an important emotional resource in the operations of borderwork. Hübinette and Lundström's (2011) conceptualisation of the 'old' and the 'good' Sweden has been confirmed in this thesis, particularly concerning the question of 'Is this Sweden?' Through the (re)production and appeal to nostalgia, the Sweden Democrats "legitimise[d] harsher stances toward immigrants and other countries" to safeguard a specific imagination of Sweden (Smeeke et al., 2021, p. 98). By constructing a narrative of fear and situating it in the grounded spatialities of (Swedish) streets, bakeries and libraries, the resourceful use of emotion could be deployed in pervasive discourses and imaginations of potential Sweden Democrat voters seeking to recover the Sweden of old. Similarly to this, the mourning of the passing of the 'good' Sweden was present, in which the imagination and construction "of the nation and the structure of feeling connected to the self-image of Sweden" was ruptured by the presence of non-Swedish (namely non-White) individuals (Hübinette & Lundström, 2011, p. 50). Therefore, this thesis has demonstrated that emotions as a resource are an important component in the operations of borderwork, where discursive constructions of emotion can be present and effective devices in (re)producing and steering narratives, discourses and representations pertaining to borderwork.

8.4 Limitations

This project has provided a rigorous and detailed account of the unfolding events of 2015-2016 in Sweden and Denmark, however, three limitations are worth noting. Firstly, as addressed in Chapter 3, interviews were undertaken in English and I have no experience in speaking Danish or Swedish. This challenge may have resulted in a dataset that is skewed towards either more educated individuals or the younger generation, as only participants capable and confident in English could be interviewed. Secondly, completing fieldwork several years after the events brings issues of memory into effect regarding how participants not only experienced 2015-2016, but equally how it was remembered. Though this will have influenced discussions during the interviews, certain visceral and distinct memories will likely prevail, carrying a merit of their own.

Thirdly, in this thesis I have not interviewed asylum seekers and those who crossed the Swedish-Danish border during the period of 2015-2016. Engaging with these voices would add a further dimension to the theorisations and operations of borderwork and its entwined dynamic with the state and civil society (see Burrell & Schweyher, 2021). Instead, this thesis has explored in detail the governance and deployment of borderwork for both the state and civil society, recognising the complexity of their dynamics and actions. Incorporating voices from the new arrivals who experienced the various effects of borderwork throughout this case study (including Hyllie, 'the Snake' and Posthusplatsen) is likely to prove highly fruitful in future scholarship concerning the operations of borderwork, the use of political moments and how emotions may be used as resources by the new arrivals.

8.5 Aftermath of 2015-2016

Since the events of 2015-2016, the ‘temporary’ law in Sweden of 2016 was extended in 2019 (see Hagelund, 2020). In June 2021, the Swedish Government (consisting at the time of the left-leaning Social Democrats and the Greens) signed into legislation a law that codified the transition from permanent to temporary residence permits for those given refugees status, breaking a trend going back to 1984 (Euronews, 2021a, 2021b). Speaking of the proposal in April 2021, Minister for Migration Morgan Johansson stated that the law would mean that Sweden would “no longer [be] a magnet for asylum seekers as we were in 2014 [and] 2015” (Euronews, 2021a, p. np). The events of 2015-2016 had revealed a legislative frailty and the ‘exception’ became the norm, bringing about a significant change in migration policy for Sweden and a convergence with their European neighbours’ strict(er) asylum policies and the EU’s legal architectural framework (Agamben, 1998; Hernes, 2018; Zamboni, 2019).

From receiving over 160,000 asylum applications in Sweden during 2015, the number dropped to approximately 29,000 the year after and by 2021 the numbers were approximately 11,400 (AIDA (Asylum Information Database), 2022; Migrationsverket, 2021a). Concerning residence permits, in the years that followed the crisis event, such permits dropped from 71,520 in 2016 to 10,279 in 2020, where the number of quota refugees (which allow for more control and planning for the state) increased and ‘convention refugees’ decreased (Migrationsverket, 2021b, 2021c). How much of this drop in the number of residence permits from 70,000 to 10,000 in the space of four years stemmed from Sweden’s border controls is difficult to determine, however its effects are likely to not be insignificant.

8.6 Conclusions

Prior to this thesis' submission in July 2022, in the past year the issue of borders and migration have once more been brought to the global media's attention following President Biden's withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 and Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine in the spring of 2022. In August 2021, The Wall Street Journal (2021) ran an op-ed entitled "The Coming Afghan Migration Crisis" and Reuters (2021) had a Factbox article with the title, "Will the Afghan crisis trigger a new refugee crisis for Europe?" In the same month, the European Union released an official statement relating implicitly to the very events that this thesis has reflected upon:

"Based on lessons learned, the EU and its Member States stand determined to act jointly to prevent the recurrence of uncontrolled large-scale illegal migration movements faced in the past, by preparing a coordinated and orderly response"
(Council of the EU, 2021, Article 6, emphasis added).

The European Union's rhetoric was clear that whilst care and support should be offered to those in need when proximate to Afghanistan, Fortress Europe's 'humanitarian border' has no intention of letting individuals enter its territory illegally (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015b). At the end of June 2022, approximately 5.5 million individuals had fled Ukraine, primarily seeking refuge in the Schengen area, surpassing by a significant margin the number of new arrivals into Europe predominantly from the Middle East and Africa during 2015-2016 (UNHCR, 2022). In contrast to the events of 2015-2016 and the instability in Afghanistan, the European Union's approach to Ukraine has been referred to as a 'double standard' due to the contrasting approaches towards the ethnically disparate groups fleeing their countries (Venturi & Vallianatou, 2022). Scholarship exploring the rhetoric of policy makers, politicians, activist organisations and the

media concerning the events in Europe of 2015-2016, Afghanistan and Ukraine, will likely prove fruitful and insightful regarding the complex operations of borderwork and its connection to the question of 'deservingness' in the asylum process.

The two events in the past year of Afghanistan and Ukraine draw to light the urgency and importance of this thesis' contributions to the understanding and operations of borderwork. The use of political moments and how they are appropriated by actors and organisations (with the potential to be drawn upon to devastating effect) can be applied and (re)contextualised in these and other situations (cf. Ferdoush, 2018). Similarly, the plurality of actors concerned in the operations of diverse processes of borderwork has been shown to be important, alongside the complex dynamic within and between civil society and the state. Further, emotional language and discursive construction of emotion draws upon both of these previous assertions, where emotion can be utilised as a pivotal tool in the deployment of borderwork, a process especially pertinent in populist political parties. The use of anger, fear and nostalgia can be powerful narratives and discourses in shaping a society's view of immigration, borders and the nation. The political future remains perplex, shadowed by countless uncertainties and struggles, with borderwork functioning at the centre of the unfoldings. Understanding the complexity of how borderwork is deployed and operationalised is essential for critical border scholarship and to neglect its importance in scholarship is a perilous move.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Ethical Approval

22nd August 2019

Lewis Dowle

Geography and Sustainable Development

| | |
|--|---|
| Ethics Reference No: <i>Please quote this ref on all correspondence</i> | GG14532 |
| Project Title: | Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters |
| Researchers Name(s): | Lewis Dowle |
| Supervisor(s): | Dr Sharon Leahy, Dr Mike Kesby & Dr David McCollum |

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered by the Geography and Geosciences School Ethics Committee on the date specified below. The following documents were reviewed:

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1. Ethical Application Form | 8 th July 2019 |
| 2. Participant Information Sheet | 8 th July 2019 |
| 3. Participant Consent Form | 8 th July 2019 |
| 4. Participant Debriefing Form | 8 th July 2019 |
| 5. Semi/structured interview questions/focus group guide | 8 th July 2019 |

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Antje Brown
Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

UTREC School of Geography and Sustainable Development Convenor, Irvine Building, North
Street, St Andrews, KY16 9AL

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Appendix B: Table of Interview Participants

| <i>Participant's Pseudonym</i> | Country | Type of Sector | Role | Interview Medium | Approximate Interview Duration | Date of Interview |
|--------------------------------|---------|----------------|---|------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| <i>Frederik</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Helps run 'Techfugees' Denmark | Video Call | 50 Minutes | Thursday 12 th September 2019 |
| <i>Andreas</i> | Denmark | Private | Professional Photographer | Video Call | One Hour | Tuesday 17 th September 2019 |
| <i>Alfred</i> | Denmark | Politics | Member of Parliament (Danish People's Party) | Audio Call | 55 Minutes | Friday 20 th September 2019 |
| <i>Johan</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Volunteer for Danish NGO | Video Call | 65 Minutes | Monday 30 th September 2019 |
| <i>Tobin</i> | Denmark | Politics | Member of European Parliament | Audio Call | 30 Minutes | Wednesday 2 nd October 2019 |
| <i>Lars</i> | Denmark | Politics | Member of Parliament. Spokesperson for 'Venstre' on Migration and Integration | Audio Call | 45 Minutes | Friday 4 th October 2019 |
| <i>Christian</i> | Denmark | Private | Senior Vice President of DSB Trains | Audio Call | One Hour | Monday 14 th October 2019 |
| <i>Klara</i> | Denmark | Politics | Member of Parliament (Danish People's Party) | Audio Call | 40 Minutes | Monday 15 th June 2020 |
| <i>Markus</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | 'Trampoline House' Executive Director | Video Call | 35 Minutes/55 Minutes | Monday 15 th June 2020/Tuesday 16 th June 2020 |
| <i>Marie</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Senior Advisor at Danish Refugee Council | Video Call | One Hour | Friday 19 th June 2020 |
| <i>Emil-Anton</i> | Denmark | State | Employee in Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman's Office | Audio Call | 70 Minutes | Monday 22 nd June 2020 |
| <i>Frida</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Senior Child Protection Advisor at Danish Save the Children | Video Call | One Hour | Wednesday 24 th June 2020 |
| <i>Victor</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Member of Venligboerne | Audio Call | 65 Minutes | Thursday 25 th June 2020 |
| <i>Robin</i> | Denmark | State | Employee at the Danish Immigration Service | Audio Call | One Hour | Wednesday 1 st July 2020 |
| <i>Monica</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Technical Advisor on Refugees and Social Inclusion for Danish Red Cross | Video Call | 85 Minutes | Thursday 2 nd July 2020 |

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|----------------------|---------|---------------------|---|------------|-----------------------|---|
| <i>Therese</i> | Denmark | Civil Society | Danish Red Cross employee involved with the 'Safe Zone' at Copenhagen Central Station | Audio Call | 65 Minutes | Monday 28 th August 2020 |
| <i>Mikael</i> | Denmark | Private | CEO of Securitas Denmark | Audio Call | 30 Minutes | Wednesday 2 nd June 2021 |
| <i>Oscar</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Lecturer/Founder of 'Sport Open' | Video Call | One Hour | Thursday 29 th August 2019 |
| <i>Olle</i> | Sweden | State | Former head of City Planning for Malmö | Audio Call | One Hour | Monday 2 nd September 2019 |
| <i>Ebbe</i> | Sweden | State/Civil Society | Lecturer/Works at Swedish Police Authority | Video Call | 75 Minutes | Tuesday 3 rd September 2019 |
| <i>Matilda</i> | Sweden | State | Involved in Refugee Documentation at Helsingborg Museum | Video Call | One Hour | Wednesday 4 th October 2019 |
| <i>Ingrid</i> | Sweden | State | City of Malmö Archivist | Video Call | 70 Minutes | Thursday 5 th September 2019 |
| <i>Elise</i> | Sweden | State | Employee at Kulturen, Lund | Video Call | 50 Minutes | Thursday 5 th September 2019 |
| <i>Isak</i> | Sweden | Politics | Örebro Council for Gymnasium Schools (Liberals) | Video Call | 70 Minutes | Tuesday 10 th September 2019 |
| <i>Jacob</i> | Sweden | Politics | State Secretary for Minister for Education in Swedish Cabinet | Audio call | 30 Minutes | Tuesday 17 th September 2019 |
| <i>Emelie</i> | Sweden | State | Chief at Öresunddirekt Information Centre | Video Call | One Hour / 55 Minutes | Thursday 19 th September 2019/Monday 21 st October 2019 |
| <i>Carl</i> | Sweden | State | Chief of Border Police for Southern Sweden | Video Call | One Hour | Saturday 21 st September 2019 |
| <i>Märta</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Helped establish 'Kompisbyrån' in Örebro | Video Call | 65 Minutes | Tuesday 24 th September 2019 |
| <i>Robin</i> | Sweden | Politics | Cabinet Member for Sweden 2014-2016 | Audio Call | 55 Minutes | Friday 27 th September 2019 |
| <i>Alexander</i> | Sweden | Politics | Member of Parliament (Sweden Democrats) | Audio Call | 50 Minutes | Friday 4 th October 2019 |
| <i>Deacon Maryam</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Vicar in the Church of Sweden and Project Manager for Migration Support Team in Lund | Audio Call | One Hour | Monday 7 th October 2019 |
| <i>Axel</i> | Sweden | Politics | Member of Parliament | Audio Call | 45 Minutes | Wednesday 9 th October 2019 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------|------------------------|---|------------|------------|---|
| | | (Sweden Democrats) | | | | |
| <i>Melina</i> | Sweden | State | Senior Officer in City of Malmö (Labour and Social Services) | Video Call | One Hour | Friday 11 th October 2019 |
| <i>Hilma & Amelia</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Member of 'Kontrapunkt' | Video Call | 65 Minutes | Wednesday 16 th October 2019 |
| <i>Jacques</i> | Sweden | Politics | State Secretary to Minister for Justice and Migration | Audio Call | 30 Minutes | Friday 18 th October 2019 |
| <i>Luna</i> | Sweden | State | Integration Developer for County Administrative Board for Skåne | Audio Call | 55 Minutes | Thursday 31 st October 2019 |
| <i>Maria & Isabella</i> | Sweden | State | Head (Maria) and employee (Isabella) at City of Malmö Social Services | Video Call | One Hour | Monday 4 th November 2019 |
| <i>Hanna</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Migration Advisor for Swedish Red Cross | Audio Call | One Hour | Tuesday 5 th November 2019 |
| <i>Rashid</i> | Sweden | State | Coordinator at 'Posthusplatsen' at Malmö Central Station. Employee of City of Malmö | Video Call | 50 Minutes | Wednesday 17 th June 2020 |
| <i>Elsa</i> | Sweden | State | Swedish-Danish Relations Employee at Region Skåne | Video Call | 40 Minutes | Wednesday 17 th June 2020 |
| <i>Sara</i> | Sweden | Politics/Civil Society | Left Party Employee, Malmö | Video Call | One hour | Thursday 18 th June 2020 |
| <i>Petra Kauraisa</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Founder of 'Vi Gör Vad Vi Kan' | Video Call | 50 Minutes | Friday 19 th June 2020 |
| <i>Augusto</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Founding member of Refugees Welcome Sweden | Video Call | 65 Minutes | Friday 26 th June 2020 |
| <i>Catarina</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Social worker at the Salvation Army | Audio Call | One Hour | Friday 26 th June 2020 |
| <i>Arthur</i> | Sweden | Politics | Youth Wing Co-Chairperson for the Green Party | Video Call | 80 Minutes | Monday 29 th June 2020 |
| <i>Åsa Romson</i> | Sweden | Politics | Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden 2014-2016 | Video Call | 40 Minutes | Monday 29 th June 2020 |
| <i>Elliott</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Member of 'Allt Ät Alla' (anarchist organisation) | Video Call | One Hour | Tuesday 30 th June 2020 |
| <i>Reverend David</i> | Sweden | Civil Society | Vicar in Church of Sweden associated with Sankt Johannes Kyrka Malmö | Video Call | 75 Minutes | Wednesday 1 st July 2020 |
| <i>Maximilian</i> | Sweden | State | Director of Community Affairs on Skåne | Video Call | 75 Minutes | Thursday 2 nd July 2020 |

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|---------------|--------|----------------------|---|------------|------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Administrative Board | | | | |
| <i>Harper</i> | Sweden | State | Employee at Swedish Migration Agency | Video Call | 65 Minutes | Friday 17 th July 2020 |
| <i>Anna</i> | Sweden | State | Head of Administration for Labour Market Department in Trelleborg | Video Call | One Hour | Wednesday 22 nd July 2020 |



Participant Information

Project title: Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters
Researcher name: Lewis Dowle

What is the study about?

I invite you to participate in a research project about the so-called European 'migration crisis' of 2015-2016 from Sweden and Denmark's perspective. I am interested in looking at the Swedish/Danish border, how it changed over time, how it was managed, and how it was experienced. My research is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council Standard Research Studentship [ES/P000681/1].

What would I be required to do and do I have to take part?

You will be asked to partake in an interview lasting approximately one hour. It is your decision if you would like to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason.

Are there any risks associated with taking part?

There are no significant risks involved in this interview process. We will be covering some difficult topics, but you are free to skip questions without providing a reason. If you feel traumatised by the topic of the interview, guidance will be provided. Whilst every effort will be made to ensure pseudonymity (if requested), the identity of yourself/your organisation cannot be guaranteed. For those in the public eye, your answers could reveal your identity.

Informed consent

It is important that you are able to give your informed consent before taking part in my project and you will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to the research before you provide your consent (oral or written).

What information about me or recordings of me ('my data') will you be collecting?

Your opinions and experiences of the events of 2015-2016 will be sought, alongside five categorical questions about yourself (age, gender, ethnicity, income and level of education). Your consent will be further sought to be audio recorded.

How will my data be stored, used and shared? Who will have access to it?

On the consent form, you will be provided with the option for your data to either be pseudonymised or fully identifiable. Your research data will be analysed as part of the research study, and may be published and used for future scholarly research without further consultation.

- Your data can be stored in a **PSEUDONYMISED** form, which means that your data will be edited so that you are referred to by a unique reference such as a different name (used in publications and storage), and the original data will remain accessible only to myself and my supervisors. Your data will be stored on an encrypted USB-drive which only myself and my supervisors will have access to. There will be a 'key' document, which will link your pseudonym to your real identity. The key will be kept on a different encrypted USB-drive and stored in a locked drawer within my supervisor's office and only myself and my supervisors will have access to it.
- Your data can be stored in a **FULLY IDENTIFIABLE** form, which means that your data will be identifiable and attributed to you in storage and in publications. Your data will be stored on an encrypted USB-drive only accessible by myself and my supervisors.

Audio recordings will be taken on an audio recording device, transferred onto an encrypted USB-drive and transcribed at the earliest opportunity before being archived for future use and stored indefinitely. The audio recording will then be deleted from the original audio recording device.

International data transfers – Personal data

Your data will be stored (upon return from fieldwork) and processed in St Andrews, Scotland. No matter their physical location, researchers are required to store and make use of personal data as if they were in the UK; University requirements and the provisions of the data protection law apply at all times.

Will my participation be confidential?

- If you select ‘pseudonymised’ data sharing: Yes, your data will be confidential (though this cannot be guaranteed) and participation will only be known to myself and my supervisors who have access to the identifiable data and consent forms.
- If you select ‘fully identifiable’ data sharing: No, your data will not be confidential and participation will be a matter of public record.

Ethical Approvals

- This research proposal has been scrutinised and subsequently granted ethical approval by the University of St Andrews Teaching and Research Ethics Committee.

Lawful basis for making use of personal data and data protection rights

The lawful basis that the University will rely on to make use of your personal data during the research and for related research projects in the future, as described to you is a public task; where special category personal data are used the lawful basis is archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.

The University of St Andrews is a Data Controller for the information you provide about you. You have a range of rights under the data protection legislation, including the right of complaint. However, some of those rights may not be available where you provide personal data for research purposes. For questions, comments or requests, consult the University website at <https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/terms/data-protection/rights/>, or email dataprot@st-andrews.ac.uk.

Further Questions?

Do you have any questions that you would like to ask regarding this research project?

What should I do if I have concerns about this study?

In the first instance you are encouraged to raise your concerns with the researcher (myself) and if you do not feel comfortable doing so, then you should contact my supervisors (listed below). A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee is available at www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/guidelinespolicies/complaints/

Contact details

| | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| Researcher(s) | Lewis Dowle LD56@st-andrews.ac.uk | Supervisor(s) | Sharon Leahy SL65@st-andrews.ac.uk |
| | | | Mike Kesby MGK@st-andrews.ac.uk |
| | | | David McCollum David.mccollum@st-andrews.ac.uk |



Topic Guide – First Sector

Project title: Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters
Researcher name: Lewis Dowle

The University of St Andrews is incredibly grateful for you considering being part of this research project. The interview that you have been requested to complete is part of the PhD research of Lewis Dowle of the School of Geography and Sustainable Development. Please find below a series of questions which will likely be discussed during the interview. Some questions may be more or less relevant depending on your line of work and your organisation. Please do not share anything that compromises your safety or the safety of others. Please note that you are entitled to skip any question during the interview without providing any justifications.

- I. How long have you been working within your organisation?
 - a. Have you noticed a change over time in your organisation, especially in relation to the migration through Denmark and Sweden, and accompanying asylum applications in 2015-2016?
 - b. What was your role in your organisation during 2015-2016?
 - c. Did this role change as a result of the events?
- II. What was a 'normal' day at work for you during this time?
 - a. Is there a memorable story or event for you from this time that you would like to share?
- III. Did you perceive the event as a 'crisis'?
 - a. If yes, what made it a crisis?
 - b. If not, what made it not a crisis?
- IV. Is the Swedish/Danish border important to your organisation?
 - a. If yes, in what ways?
 - b. Has the border always been important or is this something new?
- V. Was your work connected to the crossing of the Danish/Swedish border?
 - a. How did the border change during this time?
 - b. In November 2015, Sweden reintroduced border checks. Did this affect your organisation at all?

- VI. Was your organisation linked to any other organisations in other countries, particularly regarding the connection between Denmark and Sweden?
 - a. How was this connection affected by the events of 2015-2016?
 - b. Was the European Union connected to your organisation at all?
- VII. Did the events in continental Europe affect your work or your organisation, particularly acts of terror and the political decisions made by European countries?
 - a. If yes, how and in what ways? Was the Danish/Swedish border specifically affected?
- VIII. Were you in personal contact with asylum seekers or refugees during this time?
 - a. If yes, what was your connection with them?
- IX. Would you say that emotion was important regarding your role at this organisation?
 - a. What triggered such emotional reactions?
 - b. How would you describe the emotional situation of the events of 2015-2016 in your region, your organisation and your day-to-day life?
 - c. Was emotion important in your decisions and the decisions made by your organisation?
- X. Is there anyone or any organisation that you would suggest I contact for further information?

*If you have any questions regarding this topic guide, please do let me know.
Lewis Dowle – University of St Andrews*



Topic Guide – Second Sector

Project title: Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters
Researcher name: Lewis Dowle

The University of St Andrews is incredibly grateful for you considering being part of this research project. The interview that you have been requested to complete is part of the PhD research of Lewis Dowle of the School of Geography and Sustainable Development. Please find below a series of questions which will likely be discussed during the interview. Some questions may be more or less relevant depending on your line of work and your organisation. Please do not share anything that compromises your safety or the safety of others. Please note that you are entitled to skip any question during the interview without providing any justifications.

- I. How long have you been working within your company?
 - a. Have you noticed a change over time in your company, especially in relation to the migration through Denmark and Sweden, and accompanying asylum applications in 2015-2016?
 - b. What was your role in the company during 2015-2016?
 - c. Did this role change as a result of the events?
- II. What was a 'normal' day at work for you during this time?
 - a. Is there a memorable story or event for you from this time that you would like to share?
- III. Did your company perceive the event as a 'crisis'?
 - a. If yes, what made it a crisis?
 - b. If not, what made it not a crisis?
- IV. Is the Swedish/Danish border important to your company?
 - a. If yes, in what ways?
 - b. Has the border always been important or is this something new?
- V. Was your work connected to the crossing of the Danish/Swedish border?
 - a. How did the border change during this time?
 - b. In November 2015, Sweden reintroduced border checks. Did this affect your work at all?
- VI. Was your company linked to any organisations in other countries, particularly regarding the connection between Denmark and Sweden?

- a. How was this connection affected by the events of 2015-2016?
- b. Were you affected by decisions made by:
 - i. The Government?
 - ii. The European Union?
 - iii. The third sector (such as charities, activists and faith-based organisations)?
- VII. Did the events in continental Europe affect your work or your company, particularly acts of terror and the political decisions made by European countries?
 - a. If yes, how and in what ways? Was the Danish/Swedish border specifically affected?
- VIII. Were you in personal contact with asylum seekers or refugees during this time?
 - a. If yes, what was your connection with them?
- IX. Would you say that emotion was important regarding your role at this company?
 - a. What triggered such emotional reactions?
 - b. How would you describe the emotional situation of the events of 2015-2016 in your region, your company and your day-to-day life?
 - c. Was emotion important in your decisions and the decisions made by your company?
- X. Is there anyone or any organisation that you would suggest I contact for further information?

*If you have any questions regarding this topic guide, please do let me know.
Lewis Dowle – University of St Andrews*



Topic Guide – Third Sector

Project title: Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters
Researcher name: Lewis Dowle

The University of St Andrews is incredibly grateful for you considering being part of this research project. The interview that you have been requested to complete is part of the PhD research of Lewis Dowle of the School of Geography and Sustainable Development. Please find below a series of questions which will likely be discussed during the interview. Some questions may be more or less relevant depending on your line of work and your organisation. Please do not share anything that compromises your safety or the safety of others. Please note that you are entitled to skip any question during the interview without providing any justifications.

- I. How long have you been working/volunteering within your organisation?
 - a. What is the primary aim of your organisation?
 - b. Have you noticed a change over time in the organisation, especially in relation to the migration through Denmark and Sweden, and accompanying asylum applications in 2015-2016?
 - c. What was your role in the organisation during 2015-2016?
 - d. Did this role change as a result of the events?
- II. Why did you choose to work/volunteer for this organisation?
 - a. Was this as a result of the events of 2015/2016?
 - b. Was emotion part of your decision to volunteer/work?
- III. What was a 'normal day at the office' for you during this time?
 - a. Is there a memorable story or event for you from this time that you would like to share?
- IV. Did you/your organisation perceive the event as a 'crisis'?
 - a. If yes, what made it a crisis?
 - b. If not, what made it not a crisis?
- V. Is the Swedish/Danish border important to your organisation?
 - a. If yes, in what ways?
 - b. Has the border always been important or is this something new?
- VI. Was your work connected to the crossing of the Danish/Swedish border?
 - a. How did the border change during this time?

- b. In November 2015, Sweden reintroduced border checks. Did this affect your organisation at all?
- VII. Was your organisation linked to any other organisations in other countries, particularly regarding the connection between Denmark and Sweden?
 - a. How was this connection affected by the events of 2015-2016?
 - b. Were you affected by decisions made by:
 - i. The Government?
 - ii. The European Union?
 - iii. Other organisations within the third sector (such as charities, activists and faith-based organisations)?
- VIII. Do you think the state responded well to the events of 2015-2016?
 - a. If yes, what did they do well?
 - b. If no, what did they not do so well?
- IX. Did the events in continental Europe affect your work or your organisation, particularly the acts of terror and the political decisions made by European countries?
 - a. If yes, how and in what ways?
- X. Were you in personal contact with asylum seekers or refugees during this time?
 - a. If yes, what was your connection with them?
- XI. Would you say that emotion was important regarding your role at this organisation?
 - a. How would you describe the emotional situation of the events of 2015-2016 in your region, your company and your day-to-day life?
 - b. Which emotions were the most common and powerful for you during this time?
 - c. What triggered such emotional reactions?
 - d. Was emotion important in your decisions and the decisions made by your organisation?
- XII. Is there anyone or any organisation that you would suggest I contact for further information?

*If you have any questions regarding this topic guide, please do let me know.
Lewis Dowle – University of St Andrews*



Consent Form - Participants

Project title: Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters
Researcher name: Lewis Dowle

The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research. We therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature confirms that you are willing to participate in this study, however, signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free to withdraw your participation at any time.

Please initial box

- I understand the contents of the Participant Information Sheet (marked 'Participant Information Sheet') and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
- I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw from the study at any time without giving an explanation.
- I understand that I can choose not to answer a question at any time without giving an explanation.
- I understand who will have access to my data, how it will be stored, in what form it will be shared, and what will happen to it at the end of the study.

Identity and Confidentiality

As described on the Participant Information Sheet, I am willing for my data to be (please check one of the following two boxes):

- Fully identifiable** (my data will be identified as mine) and I am happy to be quoted accordingly.
- OR
- Pseudonymised** (my data will be edited so that I will be referred to as a pseudonym) and I am happy to be quoted accordingly.
 - I recognise that whilst every effort will be made to maintain the confidentiality I have checked above, this cannot be guaranteed.

Skype

If not applicable, please leave blank.

- I agree for the interview to be undertaken via Skype.
- I am aware that Skype as a software is part of the Microsoft Corporation and therefore the conversation

is subject to monitoring by Microsoft and may therefore not be considered secure more generally.

- I am aware that total privacy cannot be guaranteed via Skype due to such concerns.

Use of Interpreter

If an interpreter is to be used, please answer the following:

- I understand that the interpreter will have to sign a confidentiality form prior to the interview and that the interpreter will not be allowed to share my information with anyone other than the researcher and the supervisors.

Audio Recordings

Audio data that is transcribed can be a valuable resource for future studies and therefore we ask for your additional consent to collect this data for this purpose.

Either

- I agree to be audio recorded during this interview.

OR

- I do not consent to be audio recorded as part of this process.

If willing to be audio recorded:

- I understand that these recordings will be kept securely and stored separately to any identifiable information, i.e. consent forms.

- I agree for the audio recording to be transcribed and the data stored as per the Participant Information Sheet.

- I agree to the written content of this audio recording to be published as part of this research and in future studies without further consultation.

Consent

- I agree to take part in the above study.

Signatures

I confirm that I am willing to take part in this research

| | Print name | Date | Signature |
|-------------|------------|------|-----------|
| Participant | | | |
| Researcher | | | |



Debrief

Project title: Theorising the Border: Migrants, Borders and Emotional Encounters
Researcher name: Lewis Dowle

Thank you for taking part in my research project; your contribution is valuable and gratefully received. Your time and willingness to participate is incredibly appreciated.

Sources of support

If you feel traumatised by the topic of the interview, please consult the relevant helplines below:

- Sweden: NSPH (The Swedish Partnership for Mental Health) at +46(8)-120-488-40.
- Denmark: Livslinein (A crisis support charity available for online chats and phone calls) at +45 70 201 201

Contact

If you have concerns or if you would like to view a summary of the results of this research, please email the researcher *or* the supervisors detailed below.

Researcher

Lewis Dowle
LD56@st-andrews.ac.uk


Supervisors

Sharon Leahy
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
Mike Kesby
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David McCollum
David.mccollum@st-andrews.ac.uk

Appendix I: Extended Initial Coding Tree for Research Question One



Appendix J: Extended Initial Coding Tree for Research Question Two



Appendix K: Extended Initial Coding Tree for Research Question Three

