


MIND, EMOTION, AND RESPONSIBILITY: STUDIES IN HOMERIC
PSYCHOLOGY

Joshua Charles John Crofts

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



2022

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Mind, Emotion, and Responsibility: Studies in Homeric Psychology

Joshua Charles John Crofts



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

at the University of St Andrews

January 2022

Abstract

I examine several aspects of Homeric psychology, deploying a variety of theoretical approaches, whilst orienting my discussion around the ideas of three classical scholars: Bruno Snell, Eric Dodds, and Arthur Adkins. After a methodological and thematic prologue, chapter 1 discusses the work of Snell, especially his *Discovery of the Mind*, and how the radical and now unpopular ideas about the ‘Homeric mind’ expressed there might, in light of recent work within linguistics and an exploration of Snell’s intellectual antecedents, be provisionally and partly rehabilitated. Chapter 2 focuses on Dodds’ *The Greeks and the Irrational* and its relationship to the anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s work, particularly vis-à-vis shame, and how adopting an alternative to the view that shame is necessarily a ‘social’ emotion might facilitate more complete readings of Homeric scenes in which it is implicated. Chapter 3 concerns Adkins’ *Merit and Responsibility*, exploring how Adkins’ erroneous perspectives on contemporary ethics encouraged his misreading of several Homeric scenes in which responsibility assessments are at issue. This concludes with a reading of ‘Agamemnon’s Apology’ within the *Iliad*, through a lens of responsibility tied to ‘aretaic appraisal’, rather than the (in)ability which Adkins privileged. The chapters are followed by an epilogue, in which a key theme connecting the chapters, especially 2 and 3, that of ‘agent-centredness’, touched upon throughout the thesis, is highlighted, and directions for future study proposed.

Candidate's declaration

I, Joshua Charles John Crofts, do hereby certify that this thesis, submitted for the degree of PhD, which is approximately 81000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

I was admitted as a research student at the University of St Andrews in September 2016.

I received funding from an organisation or institution and have acknowledged the funder(s) in the full text of my thesis.

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For Sam

General Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Stephen Halliwell, for his unfailing scholarship, encouragement, and thoughtful and penetrating consideration of both my work and the issues surrounding it. Without his careful supervision, this project would have fallen far short of its potential, though what errors of fact and analysis remain are strictly my own. My thanks also go to my family, for their consistent support throughout the duration of both this and my previous academic work; and most of all to my partner, Sam, for her love.

Funding

This work was supported by the Scottish Graduate School for Arts & Humanities.

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Note to the Reader

Abbreviations usually conform to those of the fourth edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (eds. Hornblower, S., Spawforth, A. & Eidinow, E. (2012), Oxford: Oxford University Press), abbreviations of New Testament works generally to the second edition of *The SBL Handbook of Style* (ed. Collins, B. J. (2014), Atlanta, GA: SBL Press). The exceptions are as follows:

Autenrieth = Autenrieth, G. (1891). *A Homeric Dictionary for Schools and Colleges*.
New York: Harper and Brothers.

Cunliffe = Cunliffe, R. J. (1924). *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*.
London/Glasgow/Bombay: Blackie and Son Limited.

LfgrE = eds. Snell, B. *et al.* (1955-2010). *Lexikon des Frühgriechischen Epos*. Vols. 1-
4. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Σ = scholion/scholia

Smyth = Smyth, H. W. S. & Messing, G. M. (1956). *Greek Grammar*. Revised ed.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

v(v). = verse(s)

Enclosing an ancient author's name, or an ancient work, within square brackets ('[...]') indicates the assignation of the work in question to the author is doubtful. On translations, Greek and Latin is generally left untranslated, whereas other languages are usually translated into English and the original text provided in the notes. All translations are my own, save on the few occasions where I indicate otherwise. Ancient names are in whatever form is most familiar to an anglophone reader.

For Homer, I use Martin West's edition of both the *Iliad* (*Homeri Ilias* (1998-2000), Vols. 1-2, Stuttgart/Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter) and *Odyssey* (*Homerus Odyssea* (2017), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). For other ancient works, the editions used are listed in the

Bibliography under 'Editions of Ancient Texts'; where the edition used may be ambiguous, this is clarified by inclusion of the editor's surname in the reference.

Prologue

And then suddenly there was a frenzy of joy in his soul, and he had to stop for a minute to catch his breath. The past, he realized, was linked to the present by an unbroken chain of events, which flowed from one into another. And it seemed to him that he had just seen both ends of this chain: he had touched one end and the other had moved.

(Anton Chekhov, *The Student*)¹

What began as an attempt to explore notions of culpability in the Greek world has ended up at once both much wider and narrower in scope. Homer was initially supposed to be a way into what I judged the far richer material of the Classical Greek, especially Athenian, *Gedankenwelt*. Now his epics are the focus of the entire thesis. If that makes it in one sense rather less encompassing than originally intended, then it is now at least thematically more ambitious. Though I do devote chapter 3 to conceptions of ethics and responsibility, in chapters 1 and 2 I respectively discuss, to speak loosely, the ‘Homeric mind’ and the emotions of shame and guilt. The overarching topic is therefore Homeric psychology, broadly conceived; and, despite this more promiscuous approach to research, as I discuss at the conclusion of chapters 1 and 2, as well as in the Epilogue, a certain connection has emerged, which may not only bring the chapters into dialogue, but also offer some avenues for further investigation. I have found it helpful to approach the themes of the chapters by relating them to three significant classical scholars of the twentieth century: Bruno Snell, Eric Dodds, and Arthur Adkins. This has involved considerable attention to what might be considered the history of classical scholarship, namely the identification and scrutiny of these men’s intellectual influences, whether movements, individuals, or philosophical commitments, and the evaluation of their work in light of this. The purposes of such evaluation vary by chapter: in each I use it to inform my analysis of the themes to which I refer above, even whilst, principally in chapter 1,

¹ Chekhov, 2004: 106, Bartlett’s translation. The text is taken from the conclusion of the titular short story, published in 1894.

(re)evaluation of their work remains itself important. The result of this is that I do not seek to give a comprehensive intellectual history of the work of any of these scholars, but select those precursors or assumptions that seem most relevant to my task. This then is the outline of what follows; and I proceed now to provide some methodological prolegomena.

As will quickly become obvious, I tend towards extensive theoretical discussion in all three chapters. There are prolonged periods of no interaction with the ancient evidence, but substantial commentary on psychological, philosophical, sociological, and anthropological material, and more besides. Whilst this approach is somewhat unusual, it is nevertheless deliberate, and, beyond a general commitment to interdisciplinarity, done for two reasons. The first is that my readings of the Homeric material, and sometimes the scholarship written upon it, can be novel and unfamiliar. Thus, though I think they can claim a degree of independent plausibility, theoretical exposition is needed to buttress them, especially when they lock horns with received theoretical or interpretative wisdom. The second is that the views of others, whether of those with whom I agree or not, do not always interact with what I take to be important theoretical issues that may challenge, qualify, or otherwise impinge upon much of what they say. In such circumstances, there is a sense in which trading lines from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* may be otiose, opposing readers of the poems simply talking past each other.² This is not to deemphasise the importance of the evidence, and I do not wish to advance a kind of interpretative reductivism, in which disagreements about the proper interpretation of that evidence devolve into merely getting clearer about the relevant theory. But such clarity will at least help to expose where so much disagreement really lies; perhaps it will also help to

² A good example of this is what I will say about Snell and his critics in chapter 1. It is important to test the views of both against the Homeric evidence. But when we encounter Snell's views on the allegedly 'fragmented' or 'disintegrated' Homeric agent, and the criticisms thereof, it is presumably worth asking what exactly Snell was arguing, and what commitments helped shaped this.

adjudicate between competing perspectives, or even to suggest new perspectives entirely.³ Furthermore, it is worth noting that even in respect of those who have engaged in sustained theoretical discussion, many of the disciplines involved, especially the social sciences and the intersection of these with Analytic philosophy, advance quickly, with the result that new evidence has emerged of which they could not have been aware.⁴ In that case, my own discussion seeks to supplement their work with theory which is more up to date.

It is worth seeing, even if only in miniature, how this will play out, and in the process illustrate my broader interpretative approach.⁵ Consider Leiodes, the suitors' priest, standing in the seething blood of his erstwhile companions, beseeching Odysseus for mercy:

γουνουῦμαί σ', Ὀδυσσεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἶδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον·
οὐ γάρ πώ τινά φημι γυναικῶν ἐν μεγάροισιν
εἰπεῖν οὔτέ τι ῥέξαι ἀτάσθαλον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους
παύεσκον μνηστῆρας, ὃ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι. [315]
ἀλλὰ μοι οὐ πείθοντο κακῶν ἄπο χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι·
τὼ καὶ ἀτασθαλίησιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐπέσπον.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ μετὰ τοῖσι θυοσκόος, οὐδὲν ἔοργῶς
κείσομαι· ὥς οὐκ ἔστι χάρις μετόπισθ' εὐεργέων.

(*Od.* 22. 312-319)

Leiodes pleads that not only has he not done anything wrong (οὐδὲν ἔοργῶς), but that he has tried to stop the suitors from committing the degradations of which he himself is totally innocent, the repetition of ῥέξαι... ῥέζοι, ἀτάσθαλον... ἀτασθαλίησιν sharpening the distinction between the suitors and the mere “priest among them”. He may have had a point:

³ I will suggest that such a perspective may be the interpretation I pursue of Agamemnon's exculpatory strategy in chapter 3, utilising recent work on 'aretaic appraisal' within the philosophy of responsibility.

⁴ I have in mind here primarily the publication of many empirical studies (though not only these) querying the allegedly essential social nature of shame, as I discuss in chapter 2, as well as the developing field of experimental philosophy, discussed in chapter 3.

⁵ I intend for what follows to be helpful for general orientation to the thesis, but it will be closest to what I will say in chapter 3 about Arthur Adkins and his *Merit and Responsibility*.

ἀτασθαλίας δέ οἱ οἴωι | ἔχθρα ἔσαν, πᾶσιν δὲ νεμέσσα μνηστήρεσσιν (*Od.* 21. 146*f.*) says the poet, the audience thereby able to recognise the truth of his desperate defence. But a scowling Odysseus is indifferent:

εἰ μὲν δὴ μετὰ τοῖσι θυοσκόος εὖχεαι εἶναι,
πολλάκι που μέλλεις ἀρήμεναι ἐν μεγάροισιν
τηλοῦ ἐμοὶ νόστοιο τέλος γλυκεροῖο γενέσθαι,
σοὶ δ' ἄλοχόν τε φίλην σπέσθαι καὶ τέκνα τεκέσθαι·
τὼ οὐκ ἂν θάνατόν γε δυσηλεγέα προφύγοισθα. [325]

(*Od.* 22. 321-325)

He then delivers the inevitable *coup de grâce*. Why is Odysseus so unmoved? Explanations may be many. But consider the following suggestion: that in Odysseus' society, in many circumstances, pleas of inability do not exculpate, with expressions of what one wanted, or intended, being of no moment. This is the reason, when Leiodes seems to make something like such a plea (314-316), that Odysseus ignores it: Leiodes' attempt to disclaim responsibility is simply of no exculpatory currency in these men's world.

How do we appraise this explanation? In the first place, we might reply that it is potentially a mistake to tie Odysseus' response to grander notions of responsibility in such a world. After all, the epics are stories of, even if fictional people, nevertheless *people* all the same. A passage may disclose something about attitudes towards responsibility in the world the poet relates; but it may simply depict in stark relief what it is to be a human who is angry at his kith and kin's mistreatment. The poems are, we remember, not philosophical treatises intended to express unwaveringly consistent approaches to responsibility, or indeed anything else.⁶ In the second, we might also suggest that a certain degree of theoretical ecumenicalism is appropriate when interpreting scenes such as this one. A variety of explanations could be

⁶ Indeed, it is the less explicitly 'theoretical' nature of the poems that arguably requires greater theoretical sophistication of the interpreter.

advanced for Odysseus' behaviour, but they need not all be mutually exclusive: as is so often the case in holding others responsible, whether in the fictionalised past or factual present, a univocal account is unlikely to do the situation justice. These concerns are important, and will recur, more or less explicitly, in the chapters which follow.

Nevertheless, preambulating aside, how else could we appraise the foregoing explanation? Perhaps we might highlight those occasions in Homer, which are not difficult to find, in which inability *does* seem to exculpate; it may be that the advocate of this position has simply not looked hard enough at the available evidence, and therefore offered an explanation based on generalisations that cannot withstand sustained *empirical* scrutiny. But where the sort of *theoretical* scrutiny to which I referred earlier can help is in puncturing such an advocate's reasoning in a rather different way. Why, exactly, are they approaching this passage with the primacy of ability in mind in the first place? It seems to me that they do so because they suppose that in their own world, even if not in Odysseus', pleas of inability do exculpate; and perhaps because they assent to the concomitant view that such a close relationship between ability and responsibility is a 'true' account of human responsibility practices. In that case, viewing the passage through the lens of ability must be quite natural. Yet by appealing to philosophical analysis of the relationship between 'ought' and 'can', it may turn out that not only is that relationship 'in fact' much more casual than the advocate supposes, but also that this is already recognised in their own society, even if not by them: it may well be false that 'ought implies can', and few of their contemporaries may consistently believe this in the first place. If then the impetus of the advocate's explanation seems reduced, might there be another way to approach the passage, making use of philosophical theory which points in a different direction?

To that end, we should wonder why Odysseus is not as uncompromising elsewhere. Immediately after Leiodes is dispatched, he encounters Phemius, who petitions him for mercy (22. 344). Telemachus confirms that Phemius is ἀνάτιος (356), the old retainer Medon also

makes his plea (367-370), and Odysseus, smiling (371), kindly dismisses both Phemius and Medon, without so much as a word spoken directly to the former. The treatment of Phemius differs radically from that of Leiodes; and this seems to be something the audience is supposed to reflect upon, given that both bard and priest implore γουνοῦμαί σ', Ὀδυσσεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἶδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον (312=344) by way of an introduction to their pleas, a formula that is rare in the epics, with the two present instances being the only times in the *Odyssey* that γουνοῦμαι is meant literally.⁷ Whence the difference? After the poet's comment that ἀτασθαλῖαι were foreign to Leiodes, he describes how he was the first to vainly try to string Odysseus' bow (21. 148-150), success in which would have entitled him to Penelope's hand. Evidently, the ἀτασθαλῖαι which Leiodes forswears are the various degradations of which the other suitors are guilty; the poet does not mean that Leiodes was not, after all, a suitor *qua* suitor, one interested in wooing Penelope and acquiring Odysseus' property. As we have seen, this is just Odysseus' issue: as the suitors' priest, Leiodes must have been praying that Odysseus would not return, and that Penelope would bear his own children. Odysseus' concern is therefore not that Leiodes has done just what the other suitors did; nor is it that Leiodes attempted to string his bow *per se*. Rather, he impugns what seem to be Leiodes' desires, his disposition: the concern is less what he did, but what he wanted to do, what his intentions, goals and attitudes were. By contrast, Phemius, though he provided the hymnic backdrop to the suitors' revelry, did not share with Leiodes, to speak generally, such a *character*; he was, like Medon, Odysseus' φίλος. But Leiodes' indiscretion, the kind of man he is, is one he does not, and cannot, deny; and it is for this reason he dies.

This argument reflects in nascent form the recent development among philosophers of the concept of 'aretic appraisal' and the kinds of responsibility which are predicated upon it,

⁷ Elsewhere only at *Il.* 21. 74 (Lycaon to Achilles) and *Od.* 6. 149 (Odysseus to Nausicaa). In the latter, γουνοῦμαι must be metaphorical (*i.e.* "beseech" *simpliciter*), given vv. 145-148.

which I will elaborate upon in chapter 3; it is also closely related to what I will say about shame in chapter 2, and not unrelated to what I will say about Bruno Snell in chapter 1. For now, this is the kind of contribution of theoretical discussion I have in mind: in unison with other modes of criticism, such discussion can serve to undermine suspect explanations, whilst fuelling the emergence of fresh ones.

~

So much, then, for exemplifying the sort of approach I will take to the Homeric material and existing interpretations of it, and how theoretical exploration features in this. But above we also saw the advocate's decided commitment to an ethical cleavage, with respect to 'ought implies can', between their own world and that depicted in the epic material, even in the face of empirical and theoretical evidence to the contrary. It is to what might motivate such a determined distinction that I now turn.

It seems to me that that such a commitment betrays a weddedness to the ideology of 'progressivism', the view that humanity is, some occasional missteps notwithstanding, on an inexorable march from a benighted past towards a different, better future. Thus, in the foregoing case, whereas once ability was wrongly detached from obligation, now it is correctly realised that these are properly considered bedfellows. Odysseus' violent indifference to Leiodes' plea of inability is therefore simply a product of his tenebrous ethics, in which such detachment occurs; we would behave differently, because we know better. This is a theme that will reappear consistently, especially in chapter 1. I will not pre-empt discussion there, save to note some preliminary points here.

For the avoidance of doubt, I believe that this ideology is straightforwardly false, being a distortion of a much more defensible *technological* progressivism. This much must be undeniable, particularly given the technical innovations of the past century. Yet it is easy to let

this uncontroversial position lure one into the belief that there has been, in the same period and even before, a similarly thoroughgoing *cultural* advancement. But if this position is mistaken, then the reasons for that mistake might not always be easily predictable. For what has emerged during this thesis is the extent to which progressivist belief can arise as much out of errors about the *present* as out of misjudgements about the past. I have already alluded to some of these in the context of responsibility, in which contemporary adherence to ‘ought implies can’ may be overestimated. But a particularly infamous example will serve as a useful further illustration.

In the *Historia Animalium*, Aristotle makes the following curious suggestion: Ἐχουσι δὲ πλείους οἱ ἄρρενες τῶν θηλειῶν ὀδόντας καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐπὶ προβάτων καὶ αἰγῶν καὶ ὑῶν (501b 19-21). According to Bertrand Russell, in his *The Impact of Science on Society*, this was a terrible blunder, since of course men do not have more teeth than women. But the mistake, says Russell, goes to show how far the modern world has come *versus* the ancient:

Observation versus Authority: To modern educated people, it seems obvious that matters of fact are to be ascertained by observation, not by consulting ancient authorities. But this is an entirely modern conception, which hardly existed before the seventeenth century. Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by examining his wives’ mouths.⁸

Russell goes on to exhibit further claims of Aristotle’s, mostly also from the *Historia Animalium*, that he also took to be indicative of antiquity’s observational poverty, concluding that “[n]evertheless, classical dons, who have never observed any animal except for the cat and the dog, continue to praise Aristotle for his fidelity to observation”.⁹

The problems with this are many. Most basic is that the claims Russell picks on, including the much-maligned dental one, may not be false in the first place, whereas on some

⁸ Russell, 1952: 15f.

⁹ *Ibid.* 16.

occasions Russell seems simply to have misunderstood or misattributed them.¹⁰ Likewise, given the overall tenor of his work, both within and without his treatment of animals, we might look askance at the claim that Aristotle was indifferent to observation; and similarly it is difficult to locate such an indifference in the ancient world in general, in which, at least at first blush, observation seems no more or less important than it does in the modern. Indeed, it is ironic that, in the context of vaunting modernity's putative commitment to observation, Russell seems not to have registered the words which follow the offending quotation: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τεθεώρηταί πω (501b 21). Evidently, Aristotle takes the claims he is making to proceed from observation; and if Russell were to complain that this is to refer simply to another's observation, amounting to mere consultation of authority, we might then ask him how committed "modern, educated people" are to the 'pure' observation which he would now be demanding. Observation in this sense is something Russell himself is unlikely to have consistently practised in any sphere, and it is improbable that other comparably educated people would go around counting teeth either, preferring instead to rely on the report of those who had done so already.¹¹ Russell's is an idealised, perhaps even naïve, view of the epistemic practices of his fellow Britons of the mid-twentieth century: his progressivism is therefore born not only of a misunderstanding of Aristotle, but of a misunderstanding of himself and his contemporaries.

We will see how this plays out at greater length in the chapters that follow. Before outlining what the shape of those will be, I note two final, sundry points. Firstly, some of the

¹⁰ Aristotle's dental claim is usually taken to be false, yet there is evidence that women suffer from hypodontia at a greater rate than do men at least in contemporary cultures: *cf.* Polder, Van't Hof, Van der Linden & Kuijpers-Jagtman, 2004; Rakhshan, 2015. Interestingly, Darwin, perhaps the most prominent representative of the empiricism of which Russell was so fond, referred to Aristotle "as one of the greatest, if not the greatest observers, that ever lived" (Gothelf, 1999: 16).

¹¹ Perhaps resulting in very real, widespread scientific errors that could be remedied with the empirical inquiry Russell finds wanting in Aristotle. Among many others, this includes the belief that a body of water drains in different directions depending on the hemisphere in which it is located; that certain parts of the tongue are associated with the sensation of specific flavour profiles (*i.e.* bitter, sweet, salty, sour); and that lightning does not strike the same place twice consecutively.

material I draw upon, particularly during the theoretical discussions to which I have referred, might be thought somewhat unorthodox. Alongside evidence from the social sciences and humanities mentioned already, I also make liberal use of newspaper articles, everyday observations, a wide range of fiction, and more besides. This is not to bamboozle the reader with a potpourri of sources, but to try to show that the merits of the positions I adopt, as well as the flaws of those I reject, are diverse. Relatedly, it will quickly become clear that I am not averse to footnotes, including lengthy ones. Beyond the fact that I take these to be an uncommonly useful feature of academic writing, they often facilitate the exploration of ramifications that cannot easily be explored in the main text, but that it would be a pity to omit entirely. These frequently also help to further develop arguments made in the text; if at times they seem to stray into a preoccupation with punctilio, I trust they will be interesting all the same.

Secondly, my approach to the Homeric material is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive. I do not attempt to deal with every passage that may bear on the topics I am discussing, mainly because none of the arguments I make require me to, but also because to do so would be impossible in the space available. My approach instead has been selective, highlighting those passages that seem to offer the most illuminating ‘case-studies’ of the issues I discuss, and analysing them closely and in-depth. On some occasions, these are passages that are particularly well known, or have been thought to redound to the validity of a view opposing my own. In selecting these, then, I have also tried to present the opposition in the best possible light; and if my own approach can make good sense of them, this seems to me a significant mark in its favour.

~

In chapter 1, I explore the work of the German philologist Bruno Snell, especially his *Discovery of the Mind (Entdeckung des Geistes)*. This book was primarily concerned with describing the progressive development of the mind in ancient Greece, from Homer onwards, being contrasted with the psychological situation of the modern European. In Snell's view, Homer was the earliest recoverable witness to ancient Greek psychology, and hence the furthest removed from European contemporaneity; and this, as we will see in some detail, accompanied radical claims about the differences between the two. After surveying both these and the often hostile reception of Snell's views among classical scholars, I proceed to criticise much of what Snell had to say in detail, particularly his views on Homer's supposed psychological 'disintegration'. I then move to evaluate some of Snell's ideological and methodological presuppositions that might have motivated his views, arguing that whilst some of Snell's broader assumptions, especially his progressivism (whose antecedents, especially vis-à-vis Homer, I also touch upon), were as indefensible as they were inexplicable, certain of his theoretical presuppositions were not as seriously defective as many of his critics have thought them to be: not only was Snell's articulation of them sometimes more subtle than he is often given credit for, but more recent work, especially in linguistics, implies a degree of vindication. I then return to the issue of psychological disintegration, where I attempt to clarify and contextualise what Snell was saying, including by examining an important element of his intellectual background, namely, especially German, Romanticism. After doing this, and revisiting the Homeric evidence, I suggest that Snell may have in a sense been right, or at least less wrong, about Homer and psychological integration after all. Finally, I suggest that this revision is not as trivial as it may first appear, if one is prepared to accept substantive continuities between the Romantic movement and contemporary 'Western' culture.

In chapter 2, I examine interpretations, in modern classical scholarship pioneered (or at least popularised) by Eric Dodds and in antiquity represented by Aristotle, of certain scenes in

the Homeric epics in which the emotion of shame is involved. In these scenes, Homeric heroes say things that by common consent express their (anticipated) shame at what they have done or will do. The interpretations of what they say are predicated on a view of shame as being primarily *social*: the idea is that shame arises on account of our concern with what others might, or do, think or say about us. I explore the explication of this view in Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational*, and likewise in the work of the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, especially *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, upon which Dodds leaned heavily. It is of interest that classical scholars have already issued theoretical correctives of both of these works. But those correctives have perhaps served more to amend than genuinely correct, inasmuch as they suggest that the Dodds-Benedict view of shame is too restrictive in its conception of what might constitute an 'other'. This, they say, could as much be 'internalised' as 'externalised', the 'other' now variously interpreted as an external, real audience, or an internalised, fantasied one; in some cases, the 'other' is paradoxically supposed to be the self-critical eyes of the ashamed agent himself. After advancing some reasons to be sceptical of this social view of shame, whilst accepting that shame may nevertheless indeed often be social, I will advance a different approach to the emotion. This I term the 'characterological' approach, popularised by the psychoanalyst Helen Block Lewis, which stresses our concern with the sort of person we have become after we have done something that, in our view, has borne irremediably on our valuation of ourselves. I believe there is much to commend this approach. Nevertheless, as I reiterate later, I do not advocate this approach to shame in order to supplant the social one espoused by Dodds *et al.* Rather, it is intended to work in tandem with this; it is not that my approach is necessarily preferable *simpliciter* to the other, but that the two are better together. To see how, I interpret at length two scenes from the *Iliad* which Aristotle once used to exemplify shame's society, showing that bringing a characterological approach to bear allows

us to make good sense of these scenes, whilst sidestepping certain problems that might arise if we were to treat them through too narrow a social lens.

In chapter 3, I consider Arthur Adkins' endorsement, especially in his *Merit and Responsibility*, of the supposedly Kantian principle of 'ought implies can' (OIC) in the context of Homeric ethics and notions of responsibility. Adkins takes this principle to be an axiom of ethical reasoning and responsibility in the modern Western world, but one largely eschewed in the Homeric epics, even as he supposes it is the best prism through which to interpret scenes of ethical interest in the latter. I first briefly address Adkins' assertion that OIC is a principle of Kant's, demonstrating that if this is true, it can only be so in a way Adkins did not anticipate. At greater length, I go on to question the philosophical validity of the principle, an interrogation which blurs into a challenge to its alleged contemporary universality and the corresponding claim that in the endorsement (or otherwise) of OIC there is a substantive difference between Homer's characters and 'us'. From here, I try to show that not only was OIC more widely deployed in Homer than Adkins supposed, but, more importantly, that there may be better ways of examining scenes of ethical significance in Homer than invoking it. By way of an alternative, I will advance the notion of 'aretaic appraisal', which has formed part of many recent philosophical attempts to explicate a theory of responsibility. As opposed to Adkins' emphasis of 'ability', this focuses rather on how responsibility may be bound up with thoroughgoing assessments of the sort of person the appraised agent is; this can relate to considerations of (in)ability, but is far from co-extensive with them. After some preliminary arguments for this approach, I suggest it can make good sense of a thorny issue in Book 19 of the *Iliad*, that of Agamemnon's Apology, in which the king seems, from different angles, to disclaim, admit, or some combination of both, responsibility for his earlier conduct towards Achilles. I argue that an approach predicated on aretaic appraisal fares well under scrutiny, making sense of

Agamemnon's reference to a personified Ἄρτη, and can offer a more compelling, even if not complete, account of Agamemnon's intricate attempt to defend himself.

Mind: Snell, Whorf, and the Romantic Self

“Wine-dark sea: where have I heard that before?” Bianchi wondered. “The sea is not the color of wine; Miccichè’s quite right. Very early in the morning, maybe, or even in the sunset, but not at this time of day. Yet the child has stumbled onto something. Perhaps it’s the effect, almost like the effect of wine, which a sea like this produces. It isn’t drunkenness, but it overpowers the senses, harks back to some ancient wisdom...”

(Leonardo Sciascia, *The Wine Dark Sea*)¹

The three greatest blessings of which human nature is capable, are, undoubtedly, Religion, Liberty, and Love. In each of these, how highly has God distinguished me! But here are whole nations around me, whose languages are entirely different from each other, yet I believe they all agree in this, that they have no words among them, expressive of these engaging ideas: from whence I infer, that the ideas themselves, have no place in their minds.

(John Newton, *Letters to a Wife, By the Author of Cardiphonia*)²

I

If someone were to claim of Homer that his characters did not know sight, that they had no notion of body or sense of individuality, and that they could not make real decisions, we might wonder what poems our interlocutor had been reading. Yet such were some of the thoughts of one of the most influential and celebrated classical scholars of the twentieth century, the German philologist Bruno Snell. These were most comprehensively presented in the collection of essays entitled *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, first published in 1946 and continually revised thereafter, and usually translated into English, somewhat misleadingly given the intended Hegelian allusion, as *The Discovery of the Mind*.³ As the subtitle, *Studies in the Development*

¹ Sciascia, 2001: 59, Bardoni’s translation; the story was originally published in 1973. Miccichè is the father of an obstreperous child, Nene, who insists, in defiance of his exasperated parents who assume he is colour-blind or obstinate, that the sea looks like wine.

² Newton, 1793: 188. The letter is dated to 1753, during the ‘Amazing Grace’ composer’s tenure as a slave-trader.

³ Snell was almost certainly alluding to Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (cf. Gill, 1996: 36), nowadays usually translated as “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, a reference therefore clear in the German whilst opaque in

of *European Thought among the Greeks*, indicated,⁴ Snell's overall approach was progressive: the Greeks were supposed, from Homer onwards, to have attained gradually a *Geist* that would eventually result in "our European thought".⁵ About this Snell was unequivocal: "one must understand the 'beginning' of thought among the Greeks in a radical sense",⁶ for they did not with prior "aids... of thought"⁷ produce new subjects (like science and philosophy) and enhance existing methods (such as those of logic), "but first created what we term thought: the human mind as active, searching, researching mind is discovered by them; a new self-understanding of mankind underpins this".⁸ In Homer, however, progress was incipient: he is "the most distant and strangest stage of Greek culture",⁹ and a long way from the modern European mind. Nevertheless, "[t]he Homeric self-understanding of mankind... is not only primitive, but also points far into the future—it is the first stage of European thought".¹⁰

the English. This is probably due to an historical accident: when the first (and only) English translation of *Entdeckung* was published in 1953 (that of T. G. Rosenmeyer), Hegel's work was in English known primarily via Baillie's 1910 translation, entitled "The Phenomenology of Mind". However, the later, influential translation of Miller, in 1977, opted for "The Phenomenology of Spirit", and henceforth Snell's reference was lost to his anglophone audience. Despite this Hegelian allusion, Snell is often not Hegelian in his readings of the Homeric epics: Hegel's quasi-allegorical treatment of the interventions of the Homeric gods is, for instance, far from Snell. Nevertheless, in their progressive outlook, the two resemble each other closely, something evident in Snell's reference in a later afterword to *Entdeckung* to "the general tendency [which] may be called the road from Mythos to Logos, or the 'Enlightenment' of the Greeks, the 'progress of consciousness', which Hegel viewed as essential for the history of Greek culture" (Die allgemeine Tendenz mag man den Weg vom Mythos zum Logos nennen, oder die ‚Aufklärung‘ bei den Griechen, den ‚Fortschritt des Bewußtseins‘, den Hegel als wesentlich für die Geschichte der griechischen Kultur angesehen hat) (Snell, 2011: 283). On the further relevance of Hegel to Snell, cf. pp. 53-55.

⁴ "Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen"; the 'free' translation of Rosenmeyer, "The Greek Origins of European Thought", neglects the progressivist tone. This is one of several infelicities of Rosenmeyer's translation (herein referred to as Snell/Rosenmeyer, 1953), upon which I will occasionally comment. The widespread use of Rosenmeyer's translation in English scholarship is unfortunate: even critiques as careful as Gill, 1996, Williams, 1993 and Pelliccia, 1995, among many others, contain no German edition of *Entdeckung* in their bibliographies.

⁵ Snell, 2011: 7, "unser europäisches Denken". Throughout this chapter I will generally utilise this most recent, ninth printing of *Entdeckung*. At times, this significantly departs from the second (Snell, 1948), which is the basis of Snell/Rosenmeyer, 1953, and from the third (Snell, 1955), both of which can also depart from one another. Substantive revisions to the text seem to have been made for the third printing, as well as a fourth published in 1975, from which Snell, 2011 is little, if at all, changed.

⁶ Snell, 2011: 7, "muß man das „Anheben“ des Denkens bei den Griechen radikal verstehen".

⁷ *Ibid.* "Hilfe... Denkens".

⁸ *Ibid.* "sondern haben, was wir Denken nennen, erst geschaffen: der menschliche Geist als tätiger, suchender, forschender Geist ist von ihnen entdeckt; eine neue Selbstauffassung des Menschen liegt dem zugrunde".

⁹ *Ibid.* 12, "entfernteste und fremdeste Stufe des Griechentums".

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 29, "Die homerische Selbstauffassung des Menschen... ist nicht nur primitiv, sondern weist auch weit in die Zukunft – es ist die erste Stufe des europäischen Denkens".

Accompanying Snell's progressivism was his belief that Homer lacks a great many things which contemporary Europeans possess as part of their basic conceptual and linguistic apparatus. Thus, Homeric Greek, whilst it may have a variety of words to denote certain *types of seeing*, such as δέρκομαι and παπταίνω,¹¹ lacks a verb which corresponds exactly to the German 'sehen' (or English 'to see'), and therefore "what we rightly regard as the real function, as the 'objectivity' of sight, was for them apparently not important",¹² and so "in this sense one can say that they did not yet know sight itself...".¹³ What is true of sight is also true of the body, for "the early Greeks neither in their language nor in their visual art grasped the body in its unity",¹⁴ but rather the body "was understood as a composite".¹⁵ Accordingly, "Homeric men... did not know it [*sc.* their body] 'as' body, but only as a sum of limbs. One can thus also say that the Homeric Greeks still had no body in the concise sense of the term".¹⁶ As for these, so also for Homeric man's conception of the mind, since "[I]ikewise, Homer also has no true word for 'soul' or 'mind'... Here as well there seems to initially be a gap in the Homeric language, which, just as in the case of the 'body', other words fill, which in fact do not have the same focal point as the modern expressions, but cover their territory".¹⁷ Of words like these, such as θυμός or νόος, "one might think that [they] are nothing other than the parts of the soul, of which Plato spoke. But this presupposes the unity of soul, which Homer just does not

¹¹ *Ibid.* 13-16.

¹² *Ibid.* 16, "was wir mit Recht als die eigentliche Funktion, als das „Sachliche“ des Sehens auffassen, war ihnen offenbar nicht das Wesentliche...".

¹³ *Ibid.* "In diesem Sinne kann man also sagen, dass sie ein Sehen noch nicht kannten...".

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 18, "die frühen Griechen weder in der Sprache noch in der bildenden Kunst den Körper in seiner Einheit erfassen".

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 17, "als Vielheit begriffen wird".

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 18, "...die homerischen Menschen... wussten ihn nicht „als“ Körper, sondern nur als Summe von Gliedern. Man kann also auch sagen, die homerischen Griechen hatten noch keinen Körper im prägnanten Sinn des Wortes". Snell/Rosenmeyer, 1953: 8 incorrectly renders "im prägnanten Sinn des Wortes" by "in the modern sense of the term".

¹⁷ Snell, 2011: 18f., "So hat denn Homer auch für „Seele“ oder „Geist“ kein eigentliches Wort... Auch hier scheint zunächst eine Lücke in der homerischen Sprache zu sein, die aber, genau wie im Bereich des „Körpers“, andere Wörter ausfüllen, die zwar nicht denselben Mittelpunkt wie die modernen Ausdrücke haben, aber doch deren Gebiet bedecken".

know”.¹⁸ It is not that Homer has no soul or mind at all, but that “what we call mind is understood by Homer in another form, that ‘mind’ in a certain sense existed already for him, but not exactly ‘as’ mind”.¹⁹ Thus, Snell takes the phenomena of sight, body and mind to be things which Homer talked about, and conceived of, in radically different ways to modern Europeans. Indeed, Homer seems only to be capable of talking ‘around’ these things, still looking through a glass darkly, whilst Snell and his fellow Europeans know how to capture them in truly talking *about* them.

But if Homer does not know how to do this, there are a great many other things of which he is ignorant. He does not know abstraction, for “it has long been observed that in a relatively primitive language abstraction is undeveloped”,²⁰ this only appearing later;²¹ and connected with this is the fact that Homer is not living in a time of rationality and logic, which too had to evolve.²² He is caught also in a physical mindset, for

Heraclitus was the first to express the new conception of the soul. He calls the soul of living man ‘psyche’; for him, man consists of body and soul, and the soul acquires qualities which in principle differ from those of the body and bodily organs. Indeed, these new qualities differ so radically from what Homer can conceive of, that in Homer himself the linguistic prerequisites are missing to articulate what Heraclitus assigned to the soul...²³

Relatedly, Snell claims that what he calls “intensity”, defined as “the particular dimension of the spiritual”,²⁴

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 24, “Man könnte meinen, Thymos und Nóos seien nichts anderes als etwa die Seelenteile, von denen Platon spricht. Aber diese setzen das Ganze der Seele voraus, das Homer eben nicht kennt”.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 9, “daß das, was wir Geist nennen, von Homer in anderer Form aufgefaßt wurde, daß „Geist“ in bestimmten Sinn auch schon für ihn da war, doch eben nicht „als“ Geist”.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 13, “Längst ist beobachtet, daß in einer verhältnismäßig primitiven Sprache die Abstraktion unentwickelt ist”.

²¹ *Ibid.* 211.

²² *Ibid.* 194f.

²³ *Ibid.* 25f. “Die neue Auffassung von der Seele trägt als erster Heraklit vor. Er nennt die Seele des lebenden Menschen Psyche; der Mensch besteht ihm aus Leib und Seele, und die Seele bekommt Qualitäten die sich prinzipiell von denen des Körpers und der körperlichen Organe unterscheiden Ja, diese neuen Qualitäten sind so radikal anders als das, was Homer denken kann, daß bei Homer selbst die sprachlichen Voraussetzungen fehlen um das zu bezeichnen, was Heraklit der Seele zuschreibt”.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 27, “Intensität”, “die eigene Dimension des Seelischen”.

is not present in Homer either, in the original sense of the word, as ‘tension’... There is as little conflict in the soul in Homer as there can be conflict in an eye or conflict in the hand. Here also what can be stated of the soul remains completely in the sphere of what was the case for the bodily organs. There are no divided feelings in Homer... There is... in Homer no real reflection, no dialogue of the soul with itself, *etc.*²⁵

A consequence of Homer being unable to ‘really’ reflect is that he is unable to make ‘real’ decisions, and on this, one of his more controversial claims, Snell asserted:

Whenever someone achieves more or says more than his previous behaviour would lead one to expect, Homer attributes this, if he wants to explain it, to the intervention of a god. Above all, Homer does not yet know men’s personal decisions; even in scenes of contemplation the intervention of the gods therefore plays such a role. The belief in such activities of the gods is the necessary complement of Homer’s ideas of the human mind and of the human spirit... Mental and spiritual effects are influences of externally active forces, and man is open to all manner of powers which intrude upon him, which can penetrate him.²⁶

Thus, of Achilles sheathing his sword rather than striking Agamemnon in the first book of the *Iliad*, “we would here introduce a ‘decision’ of Achilles, his own deliberation and his own action. But in Homer man does not yet feel himself to be the author of his own decision”.²⁷ Since Homer does not know such decisions, it is to be expected that he should also not fully know *moral* decisions, of which he is only dimly aware: Athena’s exhortation to Achilles in the aforementioned scene is merely the basis of a “primal moral phenomenon”,²⁸ and when Odysseus considers whether to retreat or stand and fight in *Iliad* 11. 404-10, “he does not reflect

²⁵ *Ibid.*, “gibt es bei Homer auch nicht in der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, als „Spannung“...Zwiespalt in der Seele gibt es bei Homer so wenig, wie es Zwiespalt im Auge oder Zwiespalt in der Hand geben kann. Auch hier bleibt, was man von der Seele aussagen kann, ganz in der Sphäre dessen, was für körperliche Organe gilt. Es gibt bei Homer nicht geteilte Empfindungen... Es gibt... bei Homer auch keine echte Reflexion, keine Zwiesprache der Seele mit sich selbst usw”.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 28, “Wo immer ein Mensch mehr leistet oder mehr sagt, als sein bisheriges Verhalten erwarten läßt, führt Homer dies, wenn er es erklären möchte, auf das Eingreifen eines Gottes zurück. Vor allem echte, eigene Entscheidungen des Menschen kennt Homer noch nicht, auch in den Überlegungsszenen spielt deshalb das Eingreifen der Götter solche Rolle. Der Glaube an solches Wirken der Gottheit ist also das notwendige Komplement für die Vorstellungen Homers vom menschlichen Geist und von der menschlichen Seele...Geistige und seelische Wirkungen sind Einflüsse der von außen wirkenden Kräfte, und der Mensch steht vielerlei Mächten offen, die auf ihn eindringen, die ihn durchdringen können”.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 36, “Wir würden hier eine “Entscheidung” Achills einsetzen, seine eigene Überlegung und seiner eigenen Tat. Aber bei Homer fühlt sich der Mensch noch nicht als Urheber seiner eigenen Entscheidung”. On my own interpretation of this scene and its relationship to divine intervention and decision-making, *cf.* pp. 62ff.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 153, “moralisches Urphänomen”.

individually on an abstract “good”, but on the [*sc.* aristocratic] circle of which he knows himself to be a member”.²⁹ Such abstract moral deliberation will only appear later, as will “the guilty conscience, [which] is in fact a condition that Euripides first discovered”.³⁰ And much as Homer’s characters do not reflect individually, Homer does not have a full appreciation of individual character, for “the awareness of the ‘character’ of individual men was absent. Here also it naturally should not be denied that firm contours circumscribe the great figures of the Homeric poems. But the great and typical ways of reacting were not explicitly understood as ‘character’ in their volitional and mental unity, not as personal mind and as personal spirit”.³¹

I have picked out these claims not only to refer back to many of them later in this chapter, but also to highlight what one of Snell’s critics has called the “counter-intuitive bizarreness”³² of his views of Homeric psychology, a queerness that seems to preclude Homeric characters functioning as recognisable agents at all. This is not to say that Snell has lacked his share of sympathisers. Snell’s views were welcomed by many, in English notably by Arthur Adkins and Eric Dodds;³³ and Snell’s influence extended beyond classical studies, the philosopher John Searle, in his iconoclastic *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, paying tribute in both the book’s title and introduction to “Bruno Snell’s classic”.³⁴ But especially since the nineties Snell’s reputation has suffered considerably. In perhaps the most influential critique of *Entdeckung*, Bernard Williams, in his *Shame and Necessity*, asserts that “the Homeric poems contain people who make decisions and act on them. It may seem extraordinary that this should

²⁹ *Ibid.* 156, “er besinnt sich nicht persönlich auf ein abstraktes „Gutes“, sondern auf den Kreis, zu dem er sich zugehörig weiß”.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 159, “Das schlechte Gewissen ist allerdings ein Zustand, den erst Euripides entdeckt hat”.

³¹ *Ibid.* 10, “das Bewußtsein vom „Charakter“ des einzelnen Menschen fehlt. Auch hier soll natürlich nicht geleugnet werden, daß feste Konturen die großen Gestalten der homerischen Gedichte umschließen. Aber die großartigen und typischen Reaktionsweisen werden nicht als „Charakter“ in ihrer willensmäßigen und geistigen Einheit explizit gefaßt, eben nicht als persönlicher Geist und als persönliche Seele”.

³² Pelliccia, 1995: 20.

³³ Adkins, 1970 (to be read in conjunction with Adkins, 1960) and Dodds, 1951; for other sympathetic receptions, of varying degrees, in English, *cf.* Harrison, 1960; Russo & Simon, 1968; Simon, 1978; Dihle, 1982; Bremmer, 1983; Padel, 1992; Russo, 2012; *cf.* n. 106. For a strongly Snellian view in German, *cf.* Fränkel, 1962.

³⁴ Searle, 1992: xv. More recently, the psychiatrist Iain McGilchrist has expressed admiration for Snell’s views (McGilchrist, 2019: 265), and briefly defended him from certain of his critics (265, n. 29).

need to be said, but there is a theory, proposed by Bruno Snell and others and still very influential, to the effect that even this fundamental capacity to understand people as being agents was beyond the Homeric reach”.³⁵ Williams proceeds to quote an aforementioned claim of Snell’s,³⁶ noting that “to anyone who has read Homer and not the scholars these remarks must seem surprising”, and then adduces *Iliad* 13. 455-59 by way of refutation.³⁷ For Williams, these lines help illustrate that “Homer’s characters are constantly wondering what to do, coming to some conclusion, and acting... Moreover, they seem able to regret what they have done, wish they had done something else, and much else of the same kind”.³⁸ Williams moves then to the matter of Homer’s conception of the body, suggesting, of Snell’s claim that Homer did not comprehend the body “in its unity”, that “every reader of the *Iliad* knows that this cannot be true”, citing *Iliad* 24. 405-13.³⁹ As his appeals to ‘everyone’ and ‘every reader’ and claim in a later essay that Snell’s arguments partly result from “a failure to read the text carefully enough and to think consequently about it”⁴⁰ indicate, what pervades much of Williams’ critique is a ‘common-sense’ reaction to the seeming absurdity of Snell’s positions: it is, on a plain reading of the poems, ridiculous to say that Homeric characters do not reflect on things, or make decisions, or possess the notion of the body, and so on.⁴¹

In this, Williams was not alone; Robert Sharples had ten years previously noted of Snell’s belief that Achilles makes no decision to avenge Patroclus that “[i]t may well be felt that there must be something wrong with an interpretation which leads to so paradoxical a conclusion”.⁴² Hugh Lloyd-Jones argues similarly, in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*:

³⁵ Williams, 1993: 21f.

³⁶ n. 27.

³⁷ Williams, 1993: 22. The lines concern a decision of Deiphobus’.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.* 24. The lines concern Priam’s questioning of the disguised Hermes about the state of Hector’s body.

⁴⁰ Williams, 2006: 65.

⁴¹ This is not to say that Williams *merely* responds to Snell in this way, and I will return to his views later in this chapter. But Williams, like many others, evidently finds something inherently preposterous in what Snell says. This is dialectically important in this chapter: cf. pp. 51ff.

⁴² Sharples, 1983: 1.

Snell's "theory, by depriving Homer's characters of all responsibility for their decisions, would make it impossible for the *Iliad* to be a poem dealing with great moral issues, a poem set against the background of definite moral attitudes".⁴³ Likewise, Margalit Finkelberg asserts that on Snell's approach "Homeric man is turned into an incognizable [*sic*] entity altogether estranged from everything understood as human today or in classical Greece. At the same time, the essential humanity of Homeric man is immediately felt by every reader of Homer...".⁴⁴ Comparable are those resorts of some scholars, in trying to refute Snell's perceived denial of true 'selfhood' to Homer, to pointing out what presumably 'every reader' could recognise, namely that verbs in Homeric Greek can be translated with first-person pronouns, with one going so far as to cite the fact that Homeric heroes have names and are said to possess things.⁴⁵

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Therefore, Snell says things which are *prima facie* absurd, indeed appear to deny that Homeric characters function as genuine agents at all, and so much has been recognised by many of his critics.⁴⁶ Accordingly, when one focuses in more detail on certain of Snell's claims, the

⁴³ Lloyd-Jones, 1983: 9.

⁴⁴ Finkelberg, 1995: 15.

⁴⁵ Respectively, Dover, 1974: 151, n. 5 and Sullivan, 1988: 4f. Cf. Teffeteller, 2003: 29, who asserts (n. 56) that "neither a proper name nor a personal pronoun is required to satisfy the criterion in question [*sc.* of selfhood]; this role is filled minimally but sufficiently by personal reference in the Greek (and Indo-European) finite verb", continuing "[i]ndeed, Snell would have done well to reflect on the implications of the existence, not just in Greek but in Proto-Indo-European, of the middle voice in the verb".

⁴⁶ Criticism to which Snell was not especially responsive. Though the more forceful of that criticism was published after his death, in his later afterword to *Entdeckung* (added in 1975 for the text's fourth printing) he showed no indication of giving any ground at all, dismissing Lloyd-Jones' aforementioned criticism by referring him to a then forty-year-old dissertation by someone else, and commenting that he had nothing else to say on the matter (Snell, 2011: 286f.). Indeed, as new versions of the text were published, far from retreating from his positions, he seems to have rallied around them. Thus, after making the comment quoted earlier on sight (*cf.* nn. 12, 13), in the third printing of *Entdeckung* Snell adds: "[i]n this sense it could therefore be said that they [*sc.* Homer's heroes] still did not know sight, or to put it even more paradoxically and provocatively, and therefore to here focus upon the present problem even more sharply, that they could not yet see" (In diesem Sinne kann man also sagen, daß sie ein Sehen noch nicht kannten oder, um es noch paradoxer und provozierender zu formulieren und damit das hier vorliegende Problem noch scharfer ins Auge zu fassen, daß sie noch nicht sehen konnten) (Snell, 1955: 21); "scharfer ins Auge zu fassen" is evidently pointed. In Snell, 2011:16 one finds "to put it completely paradoxically and provocatively, and therefore to here focus upon the present problem most sharply..." (um es noch vollends paradox und provozierend zu formulieren und damit das hier vorliegende Problem ganz scharf ins Auge zu fassen...), apparently aiming for further provocation.

impression is not always a compelling one. Consider the following, part of which I quoted above:

Intensity is not present in Homer either, in the original sense of the word, as ‘tension’... There is as little conflict in the soul in Homer as there can be conflict in an eye or conflict in the hand. Here also what can be stated of the soul remains completely in the sphere of what was the case for the bodily organs. There are no divided feelings in Homer; Sappho speaks first of bittersweet Eros. Homer cannot say “half-willing, half unwilling”, but says ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ, “he was willing, but his *thymos* unwilling”. This is not a conflict in the same organ, but a conflict between the man and his organ, as also we might say “my hand wanted to take it, but I held it back”. Two different things or beings act differently. There is therefore in Homer no real reflection, no dialogue of the soul with itself, *etc.*⁴⁷

This may be supplemented by a similar earlier passage, outside *Entdeckung*:

Homer does not yet know the reflexivity of the mind, what we term in the specific sense reflection and consciousness. In Homer, the mind cannot turn to itself, since this would assume a division of the ‘I’ and an inner tension... doubtless man can reflect on his θυμός (as he also can reflect on his hand). But the θυμός can as little turn to itself as the hand can grasp itself or the eye see itself. Whence it further follows that man cannot be alone with ‘himself’ and speak with ‘himself’, but only with an ‘organ’ of himself.⁴⁸

Taken together with the claims that “Homer also has no true word for ‘soul’ or ‘mind’” and did not know the “unity of soul”,⁴⁹ Snell’s view seems to be that Homer does not possess a ‘unified’ or ‘integrated’ mind, as Snell and his contemporaries do, but rather a fragmented or

⁴⁷ Snell, 2011: 27, “Intensität gibt es bei Homer auch nicht in der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, als „Spannung“... Zwiespalt in der Seele gibt es bei Homer so wenig, wie es Zwiespalt im Auge oder Zwiespalt in der Hand geben kann. Auch hier bleibt, was man von der Seele aussagen kann, ganz in der Sphäre dessen, was für körperliche Organe gilt. Es gibt bei Homer nicht geteilte Empfindungen – erst Sappho spricht vom bittersüßen Eros, Homer kann nicht sagen „halb freiwillig, halb unfreiwillig“, sondern sagt: ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ „er war willig, aber der Thymos widerwillig“. Das ist kein Widerstreit in dem einen Organ, sondern ein Widerstreit zwischen dem Menschen und seinem Organ, wie etwa auch wir sagen: meine Hand wollte zufassen, aber ich hielt sie zurück. Zwei verschiedene Dinge oder Wesen handeln also verschieden. Es gibt deshalb bei Homer auch keine echte Reflexion, keine Zwiesprache der Seele mit sich selbst usw”.

⁴⁸ Snell, 1931: 82, “Homer die Reflexivität des Geistes noch nicht kennt, das, was wir im speziellen Sinne Reflexion und Bewußtsein nennen. Bei Homer kann nicht der Geist sich auf sich selbst richten, denn damit wäre eine Spaltung des Ich und eine innere Spannung vorausgesetzt... wohl kann der Mensch auf seinen thumos reflektieren (wie er auch auf seine Hand reflektieren kann). Aber der thumos kann sich so wenig an sich selbst wenden, wie die Hand sich selbst greifen oder das Auge sich selbst sehen kann. Woraus weiterhin folgt, daß der Mensch nicht mit ‘sich’ allein sein und mit ‘sich’ sprechen kann, sondern nur mit einem ‘Organ’ von sich”. Pelliccia, 1995: 18, n. 4 highlights that in *Entdeckung* Snell refers the reader to this earlier publication, which suggests that using one to contextualise the other is permissible; this was repeated in Snell, 2011: 19, n. 18.

⁴⁹ nn. 17, 18.

disintegrated one. Evidence of this is then to be found in the prevalence and activity of the ‘psychic organs’, such as the θυμός, φρήν and κραδίη, whose allegedly distinct functions Snell explicates at some length before the foregoing passage from *Entdeckung*; consequently, such things as “real reflection” and “dialogue of the soul with itself” are impossible. Snell does not cite what Homeric passage he has in mind when he reproduces the words ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ, but this combination occurs only once, when Zeus allows Hera, on a *quid pro quo* basis, to do what she will to Troy: καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοὶ δῶκα ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ (*Il.* 4. 43). Presumably Snell felt that this illustrated particularly well the disintegratedness of the Homeric mind, the opposition between ‘the man’ (even if here a god) and his ‘organ’ (here the θυμός): the former wants to do one thing, the latter the opposite, rather than, as would supposedly be the case in an ‘integrated’ mind, the one, ‘unified’ agent being caught between two courses of action.

We have seen already what incredulity a position such as this would fairly attract. But it also does not seem to be borne out by the Homeric evidence in general or by prominent passages in particular. Consider the famous scene of Odysseus and his barking heart:

ἐνθ’ Ὀδυσσεὺς μνηστῆρσι κακὰ φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ [5]
 κεῖτ’ ἐγρηγορόων·...
 τοῦ δ’ ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν·
 πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, [10]
 ἢ ἐ μεταίξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἐκάστη
 ἦ’ ἔτ’ ἐῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι
 ὕστατα καὶ πύματα· κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει.
 ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῆισι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα
 ἄνδρ’ ἀγνοίησασ’ ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι, [15]
 ὡς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα.
 στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθωι·
 “τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλό ποτ’ ἔτλης
 ἦματι τῷ, ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἦσθιε Κύκλωψ

ἰφθίμους ἐτάρους· σὺ δ' ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις [20]
 ἐξάγαγ' ἐξ ἄντροιο οἰόμενον θανέεσθαι.”
 ὣς ἔφατ', ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ·
 τῷ δὲ μάλ' ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετληυῖα
 νωλεμέως. ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα·

(*Od.* 20. 5-24)

Here we are presented with a panoply of psychic organs, the θυμός, φρήν, κραδίη and ἦτορ. The θυμός is something within which Odysseus contrives evil for the suitors (5), but also which stirs in his breast (9), in which Odysseus deliberates about when he should end the suitors (10), and which itself deliberates shortly after this passage (38). His κραδίη famously barks within him (16), but is also assigned a desire to fight (15), can be rebuked, addressed and reasoned with (17-21), is said to have used μῆτις to escape the Cyclops (20*f.*), and can have expectations predicated of it (οἰόμενον θανέεσθαι, 21), whilst being responsive to Odysseus' attempts at persuasion (23*f.*). Likewise, the ἦτορ can be accosted in Odysseus' breast (22), and the φρήν can, like the θυμός, be a venue for Odysseus' deliberation (10), as it can the θυμός's (38). Amidst all this, Odysseus ponders, deliberates (as he continues to do, v. 28, as he considers how he might defeat so many suitors) and recommends forbearance.

Already the proximity of so many psychic organs, alongside Odysseus himself, acting and being acted upon (and indeed in) might suggest that an attempt such as Snell's to identify functions characteristic of each is likely to fail. So much has been confirmed by the work of Thomas Jahn, who has shown, with reference to the totality of evidence from both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, that such psychic organs do not differ from one another functionally, but rather are invoked on the basis of metrical felicity.⁵⁰ This then is evidence of the 'stylisation' of which

⁵⁰ Jahn, 1987: 211, 246. On Jahn's related, though secondary, claim that in many cases, especially when used adverbially, the psychic organs are merely 'pleonastic' additions, *cf.* n. 164. Jahn's work has been sympathetically received by many, though not everyone has been convinced by the totalising nature of it, *e.g.* Sullivan, 1991:

Snell was elsewhere so dismissive in *Entdeckung*,⁵¹ and at least means that his largely undefended claims about the distinct functions of the psychic organs cannot go through. Yet Jahn's work seems likely also to pose wider problems for Snell's apparent 'fragmentary' view of Homeric psychology.⁵² If the θυμός and the like do not possess idiosyncratic psychological functions, and are selected merely according to metrical convenience, why should we suppose that they constitute, as Snell seems to suppose they do, distinct *loci* of agency, almost as agential complements to Odysseus, Zeus, or anybody else? Indeed, though the foregoing scene is framed as a dispute between Odysseus and his heart (κραδίη), clearly the heart cannot here even be in an attenuated sense a discrete agent like Odysseus himself. For the heart's indignation contextually must be Odysseus': the heart growls within Odysseus (13) in response to the cavorting of the suitors and the women (6-8), and soon after growls again at their 'evil deeds', again 'inside' Odysseus, to whose indignance the poet adverts (ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα, 16); the fact that both verbs could take κακὰ ἔργα as object further stresses the overlap of the subjects.⁵³ Likewise, the reference to the heart's prior utilisation of μῆτις implies its equation to Odysseus: not only is Odysseus typically associated with μῆτις,⁵⁴ but during the escape from Polyphemus' cave it is his μῆτις that facilitates that escape, with

“[Jahn's] assertions about the interchangeable nature of psychic terms are, I believe, open to question. True, there is much overlap in meaning among psychic terms. True, the formulaic nature of Homeric verse strongly influences which term may appear. But detailed examination of passages shows that subtleties in meaning among these terms are present” (67); Sullivan presumably has Sullivan, 1988 in mind. Similarly, van der Mije, 2011 argues that a difference exists between φρήν/φρένες and θυμός vis-à-vis the nature of persuasion in each case: “πείθειν one's θυμόν presupposes (as πείθειν one's φρένα(ς) does not) an addressee who is emotionally 'occupied' and therefore not open to rational arguments” (453), on which cf. Schmitt, 1990: 175f. But even if this is right, this would seem to help Snell little: his own attempt to demarcate the functions of the psychological organs goes far beyond what even a qualified version of Jahn's thesis would allow.

⁵¹ Cf. n. 114.

⁵² So Long, 1992, in a positive review of Jahn, 1987: “J.'s work, though he does not labour the point, decisively refutes the over-influential claims of Bruno Snell concerning the fragmented psychology of Homeric man. On the basis of this book, there is no reason to say that Homer's poetry represent [*sic*] an ill-ordered set of independent psychological centres” (4).

⁵³ ὑλάκτεω is not used transitively in Homer, but is in later Greek (e.g. Isoc. 1. 29), as ὑλάω is at *Od.* 16. 5.

⁵⁴ Hence in the *Iliad* the description of Odysseus as being 'equal in μῆτις to Zeus' (2. 169, 407, 636), which only Hector shares (7. 47, 11. 200), a connection reinforced in the *Odyssey* (3. 120-122; 23. 125; cf. 13. 291-299).

the word there almost amounting to a name of Odysseus.⁵⁵ Beyond the heart, when Odysseus tells Athena why he is restless, his report that ἀλλά τί μοι τόδε θυμός ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει, | ὅπως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χειῖρας ἐφήσω | μούνοσ ἐών, οἱ δ' αἰὲν ἀολλέεσ ἔνδον ἔασιν (38-40) assigns to the θυμός the same deliberative activity in which he himself has just engaged: ὡσ ἄρ' ὅ γ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐλίσσετο μερμηρίζων | ὅπως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χειῖρας ἐφήσει | μούνοσ ἐὼν πολέσι (28-30).⁵⁶ Indeed, beyond this passage, on all the few occasions a psychic organ is made the subject of either μερμηρίζω or ὀρμαίνω, which usually mark out explicitly deliberative activity, there is never a sense that the organ is entertaining alternatives which the agent him- or herself is not considering,⁵⁷ just as there is never a sense in which such an organ can truly endorse a course of action that the agent does not.⁵⁸ On the view that Snell seems to expound above, this is surprising, for if the existence of the psychic organs really betokened a kind of psychological disintegration, we might expect them to entertain or endorse courses of action that were autonomous of, even at odds with, those of their heroic 'host'; but this they

⁵⁵ ἐμὸν δ' ἐγέλασσε φίλον κῆρ, | ὡς ὄνομ' ἐξαπάτησεν ἐμὸν καὶ μήτισ ἀμούμων (*Od.* 9. 413f.; *cf.* 9. 422); here the heart (even if the κῆρ) laughs at the fact that Odysseus' name and μήτισ have fooled Polyphemus, whilst μή τίσ in the mouths of Polyphemus' fellow Cyclopes is punningly equivalent to Odysseus' name Οὐτίσ and the capacity of μήτισ itself (9. 406, 410). *Cf.* Gill, 1996, "In effect, the heart becomes a partial substitute for 'much-enduring' Odysseus himself; it is treated as capable of 'bearing' short-term pain and outrage, though 'expecting' to die, until cunning or ingenuity (another Odyssean characteristic) brings relief" (184f.).

⁵⁶ For a similar, and fuller, discussion of this scene, *cf.* Cairns, 2019: 24-27.

⁵⁷ In addition to the case just commented on, Penelope's θυμός wondering whether to wait for Odysseus or leave the house with a suitor (*Od.* 16. 73-77) is of course Penelope's deliberation; the same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to Achilles and his ἦτορ, also subject of μερμηρίζω (*Il.* 1. 188-192), and the κῆρ that is subject of ὀρμαίνω (*Od.* 18. 344f.; 21. 85-87; 7. 82f. is less a deliberation, and more a general reflecting).

⁵⁸ However, psychic organs may entertain courses of actions of which an agent might not want to confidently declare ownership. In respect of this, Pelliccia, 1995 regards certain occurrences of the θυμός taking a verb of desiring as a "distancing device" (236), noting of *Od.* 18. 164f. (Εὐρυνόμη, θυμός μοι ἐέλδεται, οὐ τι πάροσ γε, | μνηστήρεσσι φανῆναι, ἀπεχθομένοσι περ ἔμπησ) that "Penelope is somewhat puzzled by her impulse, and partially dissociates herself from it by attributing it to her θυμός; this device succeeds in both accurately representing her inner experience and affording an acceptable public construction for the motivation of her action: it is admittedly irrational" (*ibid.*). *Cf.* his remarks (137) on the similar, 'scape-goating' function of ἀλλά τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλοσ διελέξατο θυμός;, the comments of Gill, 1996: 187-190 on how Odysseus' interaction with his heart in the scene discussed in the text helps distance himself from the desire to imprudently *immediately* revenge himself upon the suitors, and Zanker, 2019: 190f. Likewise, before the Phaeacians, Odysseus makes the cause of the end of his and Aias' brief exchange, which he says may have otherwise continued, his θυμός's desire to see the shades of others (*Od.* 11. 566f.), perhaps a way of veiling a slightly embarrassing indifference to continuing the conversation that is related to his lack of regret for winning the arms of Achilles in the first place (*cf.* pp. 149-151). But clearly these speakers are not saying that what their θυμός wants is something independent of, or foreign to, what they want; the desires of the θυμός are still their desires, even if it is delicate to directly admit as much to either oneself or others. Hence, in this connection, Pelliccia refers to the "near synonymy of θυμός and person" (60).

never do. Even in the passage to which Snell alludes, Zeus says that his θυμός is ‘unwilling’, but immediately goes on to give a rationale for why *he* was unwilling (4. 44-49), even if he nevertheless relented to avoid a dispute with Hera: the θυμός here is far from an independent originator of another attitude towards Troy’s fate.⁵⁹

In sum, the psychic organs do not seem to evidence the psychological fragmentation for which Snell seemed to argue.⁶⁰ They do not have distinct functions, a lack of which would

⁵⁹ In addition, contrary to Snell’s claim that in Homer “man cannot be alone with ‘himself’ and speak with ‘himself’, but only with an ‘organ’ of himself”, *cf.* Homer’s use of the adverbial διάνδιχα to pinpoint conflict within the ‘man’, rather than between the ‘man’ and his ‘organ’: Δηϊφοβος δὲ διάνδιχα μερμηρίζεν (*Il.* 13. 455). Likewise, against Snell’s claim otherwise, Homer is in fact able to speak of “conflict in the same organ”, as when he uses the adverbial δίχα: μητρὶ δέ μοι δίχα θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει (*Od.* 16. 73) says Telemachus to Eumaeus, explaining that Penelope’s options are to wait for her husband or give herself to a suitor. Indeed, later Penelope herself will say ὣς καὶ ἐμοὶ δίχα θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (*Od.* 19. 524), articulating to the disguised Odysseus the same dilemma. Snell’s response to these lines, when he at last acknowledged them (there is no recognition of them in either Snell, 1948 or Snell, 1955), was to suggest “[e]xpressions like *Od.* 19. 524... [and] 16. 73 mean that the thumos responds twice (*i.e.* successively) (Snell, 2011: 27, n. 46, “Wendungen wie *Od.* 19.524... 16,73 besagen, daß der Thymós zwiefach (d.h. nacheinander) reagiert”). The assertion is brief and bold, amounting to little more than this, and seems to be contradicted by later evidence: *cf.* Theognis, νῦν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ μέγα πένθος ὄρωρεν | καὶ δάκνομαι ψυχὴν, καὶ δίχα θυμὸν ἔχω. | ἐν τριόδωι δ’ ἔστηκα· δὴ εἰσι τὸ πρόσθεν ὁδοὶ μοι· | φροντίζω τούτων ἦντιν’ ἴω προτέρην (West, *IE*² 1. 908-911); Sappho, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅτι θέω· δίχα μοι τὰ νοήματα (LP 51); [Pindar], πότερον δίκαια τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει | ἐπιχθόνιον γένος ἀνδρῶν, | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἶπεῖν (213. 1-4). Snell would presumably have to maintain that the meaning of δίχα in all these cases was the same as that he assigns to the term in Homer, or else changed radically by the time of these poets. Neither view seems credible. Meanwhile, the significance of διάνδιχα when used vis-à-vis psychic organs, particularly in Achilles’ deliberation about what to do about the infuriating Agamemnon, Πηλεΐωνι δ’ ἄχος γένηται, ἐν δὲ οἱ ἦτορ | στήθεσσι λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμηρίζεν (*Il.* 1. 188f.), is unacknowledged.

⁶⁰ The ways others, including Snell’s critics, have treated psychic organs has preserved psychological ‘space’ for them, even whilst not sliding into Snell’s apparent inference to disintegration. Pelliccia, as I have noted (*cf.* n. 58), finds that the θυμός can distance an agent from certain desires, as part of his wider view that “[a] basic function of the organs is to make possible the depiction of a psychological condition of the “divided self”, that is, situations in which a person is assailed by conflicting impulses. The organs – especially the θυμός and κραδίη, which sometimes work in tandem – approximate to the emotions, and are often irrational and appetitive” (260). Hence, “the organs are depicted as often irrational forces operating within a person and conceded a certain degree of independence (specifically, from the rational faculties), for the purpose of explaining psychological ambivalence – the “divided self” (*ibid.*). This then is directly opposed to Snell’s view that ‘inner tension’ is absent from Homer: for Pelliccia, the psychic organs betoken division within the self, not a fragmentation of the self. Likewise, Gill, 1996, adopting a ‘objective-participant’ view of the self, refers to “the Greek tendency to represent thought as an internal dialogue”, which is a “mode of representation [that] conveys the idea of the mind as a complex of functions (engaged in ‘dialogue’, or communication, with each other) rather than as a unitary and self-conscious ‘I’. The psychological model that seems to be presupposed... is that of someone who acts on the basis of reasons, and of reasoning, rather than of a self-conscious ‘I’ who is a source of (conscious) volitions” (59); he further clarifies that “this is not to suggest that there is *no* coherence in Homeric psychological life (because there is no self-conscious unitary ‘I’); this is the view of Snell and Adkins... There is the kind of coherence that we find in models such as [Daniel] Dennett’s functionalist picture of psychological life as consisting in the interplay of parts” (59, n. 102). Later, in his chapter *The Divided Self in Greek Poetry*, he makes clear that the ‘self-division’ he has in mind implicates “unity and disunity [that] needs to be linked with... the objective-participant conception outlined earlier” (178), noting that “in Homeric and Greek philosophical thought, developed human beings are seen as, characteristically, psychologically unified in so far as their emotions and desires are closely interrelated with their beliefs and reasoning” (*ibid.*). This departs from Snell’s view “that Homeric thinking has not developed

already imply that they are poor candidates to evidence psychological disintegratedness; and they seem to blur into their ‘hosts’, rather than in themselves constituting real sources of agency. Perhaps we might have expected these conclusions to occur to Snell on account of something he himself notes: “meine Hand wollte zufassen, aber ich hielt sie zurück”. Contemporary German, much like contemporary English (‘I really want to, but my heart doesn’t’), furnishes us with many examples of psychological representation akin to Homer’s. Indeed, we can oppose not merely the man and his ‘organs’, but the latter alone, as when we set head (or brain) against heart. This is arguably a more intensive version of the phenomenon that Snell has in mind, yet Homer nowhere evinces it, even as we do.⁶¹ Furthermore, we, unlike Homer, may even not oppose the man and his ‘organs’ *or* the latter alone, but rather describe ‘other’ agents, such as angels and demons, God and the Devil, or even nondescript men, battling us or one another, whether within us or on our shoulders.⁶² But Snell would presumably

a sufficiently unified conception of the self (Snell presupposes a post-Cartesian model of the self) to allow for the possibility of self-division (that is, division *within the self*)” (177). Like Pelliccia, then, Gill thinks that the psychic organs can play a role in the self’s division, rather than its disintegration. More recently, Andreas Zanker has examined instances in which the θυμός, among other psychic organs, can “take on the functions of a sentient agent in its own right, commanding and sometimes “speaking” with its owner” (2019: 188). Of these, he comments that “[t]aken at face value, in these expressions the mind speaks to its owner, functioning as a homunculus or “little person” set within each hero; at times, it appears as if there are multiple minds (θυμός) within the same body...” (188f.). Noting that “[f]or Snell, [these instances] reinforced the idea that Homer did not have a concept of the unified mind” (189), Zanker proceeds rather to interpret these cases using conceptual metaphor theory and the ‘Subject-Self distinction’ of George Lakoff (‘Subject’= “a center of judgment/will”, ‘Self’= “the remainder of the individual – biography, normal impulses, body, etc.” (192). Hence “when a hero addresses his “great-hearted mind [*sc.* θυμός], etc., the Subject is querying the long-term Self made up of memories, interests, and goals in order to reach a decision” whilst “[i]n the “speaking θυμός” examples, it also appears as if the θυμός is performing roles broadly analogous to those of [the] Self split off from the rational and conscious Subject” (*ibid.* 195).

⁶¹ Cf. Sharples, 1983: 4, who suggests that the disintegratedness Snell attributes to Homer might more fairly be attributed to the Platonic theory of the tripartite soul, in which ‘the man’ seems to disappear almost entirely. Note that, in Snell’s view, Plato is further along the developmental continuum; for his general progressivism, cf. pp. 39ff.

⁶²A popular, and unusually intense, example is the ‘Conniving Man’ located within the protagonist, Wilfred James, of Stephen King’s short story *1922*: “I believe that there is another man inside of every man, a stranger, a Conniving Man... the Conniving Man inside Farmer Wilfred James had already passed judgment on my wife and decided her fate... I am not a monster; I tried to save her from the Conniving Man (4)... But the Conniving Man inside had already thought of the old well behind the cow barn (5)... I (or rather the Conniving Man) rejoiced at this... I nodded back, just as gravely, but inside the Conniving Man was grinning (8)... ‘I’m not,’ said the Conniving Man. He spoke with hearty sincerity” (10)... The Conniving Man, meanwhile, filled up her glass (13)...”. Indeed, “Inside me was the Conniving Man, but inside the Conniving Man was a Hopeful Man (9f)... Some devil – the creature that comes into a fellow, I suppose, when the Conniving Man leaves – made me say... (68)” (King, 2010). One wonders what psychological significance, vis-à-vis ‘disintegration’, Snell would have assigned to all this were it present in Homer, given the significance he would assign to *e.g.* αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ | χαῖρ’,

agree that these are not evidence of an unintegrated mind; they are merely ways of communicating that one agent is, perhaps very, conflicted. In these circumstances, we are entitled to ask why Snell does not treat these locutions as evidence of the disintegratedness that he appears to find in Homer. For Snell seems to be drawing inferences that are not only *prima facie* absurd and at odds with an examination of the Homeric evidence, including particularly famous scenes where we might expect his theories to be borne out, but also inferences that involve an element of special pleading: he does not draw the same conclusions about ‘us’ as he does about Homer, even as we engage in much the same kind of talk.

The answer, I think, resides in the conjunction of two commitments, one ideological, the other methodological. These, respectively, are Snell’s progressivism, to which I have alluded already, and what has been termed his ‘lexical’ method. I will examine both of these in turn, in the latter case partly contextualising what that method involved for Snell and what it should involve for us. Following this, I will revisit some of Snell’s claims I have touched on so far, especially the issue of psychological disintegration, and, by considering what I think constitutes one of Snell’s intellectual influences, cast them in a somewhat different light.

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I referred to Snell’s commitment to a progressivist scheme at the beginning of this chapter. Such a commitment is clear from the claims I reproduced there, but an explanation or justification of it peculiarly absent from the main text of *Entdeckung*. Snell attempts one in a 1974 afterword to the book, but his pat claim there that one of the main reasons is “factual” is hardly compelling.⁶³ Indeed, I suggest that the real reason has less to do with factual analysis

ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι ἀλλ’ ὕπαρ ἤδη (*Od.* 20. 89*f.*) and ὣς ἄρ’ ἔφαν ἀπιόντες· ἐμὸν δ’ ἐγέλασσε φίλον κῆρ, | ὡς ὄνομ’ ἐξαπάτησεν ἐμὸν καὶ μήτις ἀμύμων (*Od.* 9. 413*f.*), even as we know that King is simply representing James’ inner convolutions at the decision to murder his wife.

⁶³ Snell, 2011: 287, “sachlichen”. Here Snell in fact explicitly identifies the title of the book with progressivism: “that this book stresses the aspect of “discovery”, that is of progress...” (Daß dies Buch den Aspekt der „Entdeckung“ hervorhebt, und das heißt des Fortschritts...).

of Homeric (and for that matter contemporary European) psychology, and more to do with an adoption of a longstanding historical schema.

For such progressive views of the human mind were of course not unexampled prior to Snell, being famously a cornerstone of what we know as the, particularly French, ‘Enlightenment’ of the eighteenth century. That view of progress was paradigmatically articulated by Condorcet in his *Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain*, who built on Turgot’s similarly titled *L’Histoire du progrès dans l’esprit humain*. Both men did not merely think in terms of technological or economic development, but supposed too that culture, and *l’esprit humain* with it, were advancing. Condorcet divides his work into ten ‘epochs’, each of which constitutes a step forward on humanity’s journey to perfection, the last of which is in fact yet to be taken; the fourth is devoted especially to “[t]he progress of the human mind in Greece, until the time of the division of the sciences, around the age of Alexander”.⁶⁴ At this time, “in Greece, man had at least a sense of his rights, even if he was not yet familiar with them, even if he did not yet know how to fathom their nature, how to encompass and define their scope”.⁶⁵ Condorcet goes on to claim, of the emergence of the sciences, that “[o]ne can reproach the Greek and Roman scholars, and even their experts and their philosophers, for having totally lacked that spirit of doubt, which submits to the severe examination of reason both facts and the proofs thereof”. Indeed, “[i]n perusing, in their literature, the history of events or customs, of their achievements and of natural phenomena, of their artistic products and procedures, one is astonished to see them recount with tranquillity the most palpable absurdities, the most shocking miracles”.⁶⁶ Assuming that for Condorcet

⁶⁴ “Progrès de l’esprit humain dans la Grèce, jusqu’au temps de la division des sciences, vers le siècle d’Alexandre”.

⁶⁵ Condorcet, 1822: 78, “dans la Grèce, l’homme avoit du-moins le sentiment de ses droits, s’il ne les connoissoit pas encore, s’il ne savoit pas en approfondir la nature, en embrasser et en circonscrire l’étendue”.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 113, “On peut reprocher aux érudits grecs et romains, et même à leurs savans et à leurs philosophes, d’avoir manqué absolument de cet esprit de doute qui soumet à l’examen sévère de la raison et les faits et leurs preuves. En parcourant dans leurs écrits l’histoire des événemens ou des mœurs, celle des productions et des phénomènes

what applies to later Greek history *a fortiori* must apply still more to Homer, there are clear resemblances between his views and Snell's: both take Homer to be living in a not fully reflective and ratiocinative era, and to grasp only imperfectly key concepts which their European contemporaries see clearly. Turgot too makes a similar diagnosis, but in sharper terms:

It was not until after many centuries that one saw philosophers appear in Greece... Until then the poets had been at the same time the sole philosophers and the sole historians. When men are ignorant, it is easy to know everything. But the ideas were not yet sufficiently clear, the facts were not yet sufficiently large in number; the age of truth had not yet arrived... Morality, although still imperfect, suffered less from the infancy of reason.⁶⁷

Here we, not coincidentally, find much of what we did in Condorcet, Turgot stressing the inchoateness of the ancients' concepts; and we also find the suggestion that morality had not yet matured, a familiarly Snellian thought.

If we cast our gaze back further into the eighteenth-century, and even into the end of the seventeenth, we encounter the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*, a debate which makes Turgot and Condorcet's views possible, and one in which progressivism reigns just as strongly as it does later.⁶⁸ In one of the earliest, programmatic statements of the *modernes'* position, Charles Perrault, in his 1687 poem *Le Siècle de Louis le Grand*, boldly averred that “[I]earned antiquity, in all its duration | was never enlightened to the equal of our days”.⁶⁹ Homer himself is apostrophised: “[i]f heaven, favourable to France, | In the age in which we live had placed

de la nature, celle des produits et des procédés des arts, on s'étonne de les voir raconter avec tranquillité les absurdités les plus palpables, les prodiges les plus révoltants”.

⁶⁷ Turgot, 1913: 224, “Ce ne fut qu'après plusieurs siècles qu'on vit paraître des Philosophes dans la Grèce...Jusque-là les poètes avaient été à la fois les seuls philosophes et les seuls historiens. Quand les hommes sont ignorants, il est aisé de tout savoir. Mais les idées n'étaient point encore assez éclaircies; les faits n'étaient point en assez grand nombre; le temps de la vérité n'était point arrivé... La morale, quoique encore imparfaite, se sentit moins de l'enfance de la raison”.

⁶⁸ For a good, general account of this debate, with particular reference to Homer, cf. Simonsuuri, 1979 and Levine, 1991, chapter 5. Baron, 1959 locates the beginnings of the dispute in the Renaissance.

⁶⁹ Perrault, 1687: 6, “La docte Antiquité dans toute sa durée | A l'égal de nos jours ne fut point éclairée”.

your birth, | One hundred faults that we impute to the age when you were born, | Would not profane your exquisite works”.⁷⁰ But exquisite though they may be, they are hindered by the uncivilised times in which Homer lived. Thus, the heroes’ speeches are far too long, and of those who make them “[y]our talent would have formed those valorous demi-gods | Less brutal, less cruel and less capricious” had Homer resided in late seventeenth century France.⁷¹ Likewise, had Achilles’ famous shield been described in Perrault’s day, it would have been made “[f]rom a finer understanding and from a more skilful art”⁷² and thus “... in a wiser age, | Would have been more correct and less overworked”.⁷³ In a similar vein, a year later Bernard de Fontenelle, in his *Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes*, also impugns the ancients, insofar as they “are rather prone to not reason in the best possible way. Often some feeble expedencies, some small likenesses, some insubstantial disports of mind, some vague and confused discourses pass for them as proofs, as it costs them nothing to prove anything”.⁷⁴ If only Homer could have been transplanted from his ignorant, barbaric times, he would not have written characters of such barbarity and described objects, such as the impossibly large and detailed shield, of such absurdity. Whilst Perrault’s naked patronising of Homeric culture is not replicated in Snell, the broader idea which motivates such condescension, that the age in which ‘we’ are living is wiser and wields a “finer understanding”, evidently is; and, as in Turgot and Condorcet, Fontenelle’s disparaging of ancient reasoning is not alien to Snell either. Furthermore, beyond the *modernes* and their progeny, there are a number of resemblances between Snell’s views and those of the Italian jack-of-all-trades, Giambattista Vico, whose *Scienza Nuova*, first published in 1725, and republished twice thereafter (the third edition,

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 8, “si le Ciel favorable à la France, | Au Siecle où nous vivons eust remis ta naissance, | Cent defaults qu’on impute au siecle où tu naquís, | Ne prophaneroient pas tes ouvrages exquis”.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* “Ta verve auroit formé ces vaillans demy-Dieux, | Moins brutaux, moins cruels, & moins capricieux”.

⁷² *Ibid.* 9, “D’une plus fine entente & d’un art plus habile”.

⁷³ *Ibid.* “...dans un Siecle plus sage, | Eût esté plus correct & moins chargé d’ouvrage”.

⁷⁴ Fontenelle, 1955: 167, “sont assez sujets à ne pas raisonner dans la dernière perfection. Souvent de faibles convenances, de petites similitudes, des jeux d’esprit peu solides, des discours vagues et confus passent chez eux pour des preuves, aussi rien ne leur coûte à prouver”.

posthumously, in 1744) also placed Homer in a progressive scheme. For Vico, Homeric man was “stupid in his understanding”,⁷⁵ a comment that would be unlikely to win Snell’s approval. Yet he better approximates Snell’s views when he declares that Homeric men were “still coarse in counting and reasoning”⁷⁶ and indeed that “Homer flourished in a time when reflection, that is pure mind, was still an unknown faculty”.⁷⁷ By the third edition, these claims have become stronger still: “*the people [sc. of Homer’s day] were nearly all body, and nearly no reflection*”⁷⁸ and “the manners of the Homeric heroes are like children in the fickleness of their minds, like women in the robustness of their imagination, like violent youths in the ardent seething of their anger”.⁷⁹ Again, Snell would not have associated himself with all of these claims, or at least their tone; but several are in substance close to him indeed.

In the case of those we have surveyed, each approached the epic poet, and their own contemporaries, with the prior assumption that human history unfolds progressively, with Homer and contemporary Europeans then slotted into the appropriate positions on this continuum. Whatever lies behind this tendency (a question itself of much interest),⁸⁰ its results are profound, for it is a framework which strongly encourages a widening of the difference between Homer and ‘us’, and concomitantly motivates what seem to be extraordinary views of ancient, and Homeric, psychology. For if 2500 years of progress, not merely time, have passed between Homer composing his *Iliad* and Condorcet his *Esquisse*, how then could one *not*

⁷⁵ Vico, 2012: 2. IV, “stupidi d’intendimento”.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 3. XV [XVI], “rozze ancora di conti e di ragione”.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 3. XXVI [XXVII], “Omero fiorì in tempo che la riflessione o sia la mente pura era ancora una facoltà sconosciuta”.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 3. IX, “i populi, i quali erano quasi tutti corpo, e quasi niuna riflessione”.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 3. XIX, “i costumi degli Eroi Omerici, sono di fanciulli per la leggierezza delle menti, di femmine per la robustezza della fantasia, di violentissimi giovani per lo fervente bollor della collera”.

⁸⁰ It is curious that both Snell and Condorcet write just when their own situations would put a progressivist perspective into serious doubt: Condorcet composed the *Esquisse* whilst in hiding from the revolutionary authorities, and died soon after, whilst Snell wrote *Entdeckung* through the collapse of the Weimar Republic, with publication amidst a ruined Europe. Condorcet’s view is perhaps the more understandable, given his scheme’s suggestion of a brighter future for humanity, which might render the atrocities of the French Revolution things of the past. Snell’s optimism is more difficult to understand: if the Europeans contemporaneous with *Entdeckung*’s publication knew moral decisions more clearly than did Homer, those decisions resulted in depths of destruction and hatred perhaps unimaginable to the poet.

suggest that Homer was so very different to ‘us’, in matters of psychology and so much else? As for these writers, so also for Snell: he shares their belief in an unfolding of history, and situates both ‘us’ and Homer similarly. Small wonder, then, that now 2700 years distant from Homer, Snell should have articulated opinions that seem just as striking as those of Condorcet and the rest. Yet those opinions do not merely stress how different are we to Homer; they also insist that Homer is a certain way *which develops into* ours, and that ours is somehow *superior*. The paradoxes of Snell’s views, among those of the other progressivists, therefore result not merely from the widening of the gap between modernity and its forebears, but from the ideological or normative judgements which accompany this. Homer does not, unlike ‘us’, make ‘real’ decisions, ‘really’ reflect, or possess a ‘real’ concept of sight, because we are very different to him, and the way in which we are is better.

I think this goes some way to explaining Snell’s inconsistency of inference I referred to above. Though we can represent psychic conflict in much the same way Homer can, Snell does not suppose that we are psychologically disintegrated, in the sense he appears to think Homer’s heroes are, because he assumes that a great deal of psychological progress must have been made between the two. Snell thus does not infer for us what he infers for Homer, for the progressivist schema he adopts all but precludes such a procedure. As I indicated in the prologue, I have little sympathy for this progressivism, and the normative judgements it entails.⁸¹ But as I move to discuss the other reason for this inconsistency of inference, Snell’s ‘lexical method’, such sympathy may be easier to muster.

⁸¹ There is, however, no need to resort to the opposite extreme. When Williams said later (2006: 64), of *Shame and Necessity*, that “I concentrated on those ideas about which I was convinced that they bear a rather close relation to our own, in particular because I was concerned with using those ideas to *help us understand ourselves*” (emphasis mine), ideas which include “in particular ethical ideas such as agency, responsibility, shame, and constraint”, we might wonder just how close Homer must be to us to assist in that endeavour. The comment is nevertheless qualified: “but there are of course many other conceptions employed by the ancient Greeks (some of which I discussed) which are more alien to us, and I did not wish to deny it” (*ibid.*). In objecting to progressivism, there is perhaps a risk of stumbling into what Snell describes as the view that “there is a universal, unchanging

Hints of this method were present in the allusions to ‘absences’ in the Homeric vocabulary we saw earlier, but Snell was elsewhere open about his reliance upon a procedure that allows us to infer from the language of the Homeric epics, and indeed from its perceived lacunae, to the psychology of both Homer and his original audience: as he put it, “if they had no word for it, it did not exist for their consciousness”.⁸² It is fair to say that many of Snell’s critics have been left unconvinced by his adoption of such a methodology. Williams partly blames what he regards as Snell’s mistaken interpretations on Snell’s assumption that “the Greeks had a particular idea only if they had a word that expressed it”,⁸³ pressing the point that “it makes a difference whether we are reaching conclusions from what can be found or, as Snell did, from what supposedly cannot be found: inferences from presence are one thing, inferences from absence quite another”.⁸⁴ In a similar vein, noting that Snell’s view of Homeric psychology is “fundamentally unsound”, Bernard Knox asserts that “the lexical method itself, with its assumption that lack of a descriptive term argues the absence of the phenomenon for which there is no name, is a snare and delusion”, citing the example of *Schadenfreude* as a word whose corresponding emotion English speakers experience, but rely upon the German word to express.⁸⁵ Richard Gaskin too, in an article elsewhere critical of Snell’s denial of ‘real’ decision-making to Homer’s characters, remarks upon “the inadequacy of the so-called lexical

human ‘mind’” (es einen allgemeinen, sich gleichbleibenden menschlichen »Geist« gäbe ...) (1948: 31), a position which he characterises as “a rationalist prejudice” (rationalistisches Vorurteil) (*ibid.*) and about whose adherents he rhetorically wonders “[d]oes one expect of Homer the little Mr. Microcosm, whom Goethe mocked?” (Erwartet man sich von Homer den kleinen Herrn Mikrokosmos, über den Goethe spottet?) (30f). In Snell, 2011: 287 this part of the main text disappears and is partly replicated in the 1974 afterword, in which Snell quotes the lines from *Faust* alluded to here.

⁸² Snell, 2011: 16, “wenn sie kein Wort dafür hatten, existierte es für ihr Bewußtsein nicht”. This has conventionally been understood ‘if they had no word for it, for them it did not exist’ *vel sim.* (Rosenmeyer giving “and if they had no word for it, it follows that as far as they were concerned it did not exist” (Snell/Rosenmeyer, 1953: 5)), as we will see presently; but this may not be quite right (*cf.* pp. 48f.).

⁸³ Williams, 2006: 66.

⁸⁴ Williams, 1993: 23. *Cf.* 25, “He is fond of saying, for instance, that if the Homeric Greeks did not recognise a certain item, then that item “did not exist for them,” a form of expression that is almost certain to produce some error or other”. *Cf.* n. 82.

⁸⁵ Knox, 1993: 38, 41.

method”,⁸⁶ whilst Hayden Pelliccia refers to the “notorious assumption of Snell’s... that if a language does not possess a word for a concept, the speakers do not possess the concept”,⁸⁷ a position, particularly with respect to the inferences from silence, interrogated at length also by Robert Renehan.⁸⁸

There seem to me two points to make in this connection. The first is that the theoretical underpinnings of this lexical method, the hypothesis of ‘linguistic relativity’ (sometimes known as the ‘Sapir-Whorf’ hypothesis), the position, broadly, that features of language can more-or-less profoundly affect the way we think, is not as dubious as it might once have seemed. Consider first the work of the notional originator of the hypothesis, Benjamin Whorf, to whom is usually, and perhaps somewhat unfairly, attributed a simplistic and ‘deterministic’ view, in which language austere and radically diminishes the range of thoughts a speaker might have, including thoughts which come easily to speakers of another language:

Thus around a [*sic*] storage of what are called “gasoline drums” behavior will tend to a certain type, that is, great care will be exercised; while around a storage of what are called “empty gasoline drums” it will tend to be different—careless, with little repression of smoking or of tossing cigarette stubs about. Yet the “empty” drums are perhaps the more dangerous, since they contain explosive vapor. Physically the situation is hazardous, but the linguistic analysis according to regular analogy must employ the word “empty,” which inevitably suggests a lack of hazard. The word “empty” is used in two linguistic patterns: (1) as a virtual synonym for “null and void, negative, inert,” (2) applied in analysis of physical situations without regard to, e.g., vapor, liquid vestiges, or stray rubbish, in the container. The situation is named in one

⁸⁶ Gaskin, 1990: 3. On Gaskin’s other criticisms of Snell’s work, *cf.* pp. 62ff.

⁸⁷ Pelliccia, 1995: 17, n. 12.

⁸⁸ Renehan, 1979. It is worth noting that two of Snell’s critics were more reserved in their criticism of this Snellian methodology. Thus, Dover, 1974, “Even a judicious contrast between Homeric and later (including ‘our’) ways of talking about psychology and physiology... needs to be read with recognition of (i) a *certain autonomy* of language and thus a *possible divergence* between the direction of linguistic change and the direction of conceptual change” (151, n. 5, emphasis mine); Dover mentions Adkins in this connection, but it seems unlikely that Snell is not also in mind. Likewise, Halliwell, 1990 refers to Snell’s “lexical bias”, which is “an assumption... that individual lexical items and locutions, or the lack of them, are the most significant facts about the way in which a language shapes the conceptions expressible within it”. He continues: “It may be right to suppose that the language used to describe or analyse psychological experience is partly constitutive of the nature of that experience, but it is one-sided to translate this supposition into the principle that individual lexical items in themselves carry a greater weight than the total discourse of which they form a part” (37f.). Interestingly, as I will suggest momentarily (pp. 48f.), Snell seems to have something like what Halliwell calls “the total discourse” in mind.

pattern (2) and the name is then “acted out” or “lived up to” in another (1); this being a general formula for the linguistic conditioning of behavior into hazardous forms.⁸⁹

Whorf’s concern appears to be the way language might *mould* behaviour (along with the beliefs and concepts underpinning it), and it is difficult to resist the idea that he may have a point.⁹⁰ Accordingly, linguistic relativity has continued to grow in scholarly popularity since Whorf, and it is ironic that criticism of Snell’s lexical method became most keen just as the renaissance of linguistic relativity within linguistics occurred. Thus, the linguist John Lucy published in 1992 his careful restatement of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, which would be followed by a collection of important papers edited by John Gumperz and Stephen Levinson in 1996.⁹¹ By 2003, the latter, identifying his position as “neo-Whorfian”, could say that “given the architecture of the [*sc.* cognitive] system, once one puts serious semantic constraints on the output, the rest of the system will be forced to support, code and operate on those features [a]nd so the imprint of language-specific categories will run deep in cognitive processes”.⁹² More recently still, there has been considerable research interest in a variety of areas that might evidence linguistic relativity, including even the extent to which grammatical gender could

⁸⁹ Whorf, 1941: 75f.

⁹⁰ Lee, 1996 is a sympathetic reception of this example and others like it. *Cf.* the criticism of Lennenberg, 1953: “Clearly, English is capable of distinguishing between a drum filled with an explosive vapor, one that contains only air, and one which is void of any matter. This very sentence is my evidence. The person who caused the fire could have replaced the word *empty* by *filled with explosive vapor*. His failing to do so (as well as his careless behavior) points to a lack of experience with explosive vapors, perhaps complete ignorance of their existence. The linguistic—or rather stylistic—fact of the occurrence of the word *empty* in the individual’s insurance report would indeed be interesting if Whorf could have shown at the same time that this man had had plenty of contact with and knowledge of the explosive vapors which form in emptied gas drums. This Whorf did not try to do” (464). But Whorf is not denying that English can make such a distinction, nor that better education of those involved could have avoided the accident. His point is that language helped *contribute* to the carelessness with which the drums were treated. If it is a prerequisite of that contribution that the users of the locutions be scientifically ignorant in the relevant way, his point is unchanged: Whorf stressed the role of language in influencing thought and behaviour, not its exclusive role. The criticism of Pinker, 1994 is comparable to Lennenberg’s: “The seeds of disaster supposedly lay in the semantics of *empty*... The hapless worker, his conception of reality molded by his linguistic categories, did not distinguish between the “drained” and “inert” sense, hence, flick... boom! But wait. Gasoline vapor is invisible. A drum with nothing but vapor in it looks just like a drum with nothing in it at all. Surely this walking catastrophe was fooled by his eyes, not by the English language” (60). By “the seeds of disaster supposedly lay in the semantics of *empty*” Pinker seems to imply that Whorf took the relevant linguistic phenomena to be a sufficient condition of the worker’s ‘haplessness’; but he makes no such claim.

⁹¹ Lucy, 1992; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996.

⁹² Levinson, 2003: 301.

affect the way speakers conceive of nouns to which such genders are assigned.⁹³ Such work cannot be used to establish an all-encompassing or straightforward effect of language on cognition.⁹⁴ But nevertheless today linguists tend to agree that *some* form of linguistic relativity is true, even if it is difficult to determine precisely what form that is.⁹⁵

The second point is that Snell's endorsement of linguistic relativity, whilst not as subtle as that of modern linguists, is not nearly as naïve as some of his critics suppose:

Through Homer we learn of the early European thought-world, in poems of such detail, that we are able to have the confidence even to draw conclusions *ex silentio*; if in Homer things do not appear, which we, by dint of our modern thought, would readily expect, we may assume that he did not yet know them, especially when various such 'gaps' are internally connected, and when, by contrast, an initially strange preponderance confronts us, which with the gaps coalesces into a systematic unity.⁹⁶

⁹³ Thus, one recent experiment required participants, consisting of Romanian, German and French speakers, also proficient in English, to assign three adjectives to the most commonly used nouns in American English. The researchers found that "the grammatical gender of a noun in a particular language influences what adjectives are generated for it: feminine nouns tend to elicit relatively more feminine adjectives compared to masculine nouns" (Semenuks, Phillips, Dalca, Kim & Boroditsky, 2017: 1064), leading to the conclusion that their work "support[s] the view that grammatical gender affects object conceptualization" (1065).

⁹⁴ Note the admission of Semenuks *et al.*, 2017 that "significant grammatical-gender effects emerged starting with the second adjective participants generated for a given noun" (1064*f.*), rather than the first. Some studies, such as Montefinese, Ambrosini & Roivainen, 2019, have accordingly not found evidence comparable to that of Semenuks *et al.*, 2017, though still conclude with the view that "a more moderate view of linguistic relativity theory, assuming that some language-specific characteristics may affect thought under some specific circumstances, may explain better the dynamic link between language and cognition" (853). A recent systematic review of grammatical gender and linguistic relativity indicates "that the evidence for an influence of grammatical gender on conceptualizations is highly task- and context-dependent" (Samuel, Cole & Eacott, 2019: 1779*f.*), and calls for further research (1784).

⁹⁵ Samuel, Cole & Eacott, 2019: 1767, "The Sapir-Whorf or linguistic relativity hypothesis... takes various forms, but at its heart it contends that the idiosyncrasies of the languages we speak influence the way we think about the world. In its strongest incarnation—linguistic determinism—thought is constrained by language... At the opposite extreme is the "universalist" position, in which thought is said to be independent of language... Although there is no agreement as to where between these two opposing views the truth is situated, the broad consensus is that neither extreme is correct... Overall, investigating the ways in which language does and does not relate to thought now appears to be the prevailing approach". Cf. Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013: 504*f.*, "[W]e want to emphasize that most modern commentators fall somewhere between the extremes—either that language simply "is" or "is not" the crucial progenitor of higher order cognition. To our knowledge, none of those who are currently advancing linguistic-relativistic themes and explanations believe that infants enter into language acquisition in a state of complete conceptual nakedness, later redressed... by linguistic reformulation. Rather, infants are believed to possess some "core knowledge" that enters into the first categorizations of objects, properties, and events in the world. The viable question is how richly specified this innate basis may be; how experience refines, enhances, and transforms the mind's original furnishings; and, finally, whether specific language knowledge may be one of these formative or transformative aspects of experience". For generally favourable attitudes towards linguistic relativity, cf. Malt & Wolff, 2010, especially chapters 8-10; and Deutscher, 2011, who also has much to say on linguistic relativity in respect of colour terms and concepts in Homer.

⁹⁶ Snell, 2011: 11, "Durch Homer lernen wir die früheuropäische Gedankenwelt in so ausführlichen Gedichten kennen, daß wir den Mut haben dürfen, auch Schlüsse *ex silentio* zu ziehen; wenn bei Homer Dinge nicht

What exactly Snell has in mind is not fully clear. But it is obvious that we are not dealing with a view as simplistic as certain of his detractors have identified: Snell is evidently not suggesting, at least here, that we infer *straightforwardly* from absence of locution to absence of concept. Rather, such inferences from silence seem to be merited, on Snell's view, because the 'gaps' occur within a significant volume of detailed literary material; they are contrary to our expectations of what 'should' be there; they make one another comprehensible, each gap 'making sense' in the context of the others; and, together with what we *do* find, form something of a rational conceptual structure. I do not mean to defend such an approach to *ex silentio* inferences; my point is rather that the inferential process for Snell is a good deal more sophisticated than he has been given credit for. Indeed, the alleged *locus classicus* of the jejuneness of Snell's lexical method in *Entdeckung*, the claim that 'if they had no word for it, it did not exist for their consciousness', is somewhat more ambiguous than it initially appears: to say that something does not exist for *my consciousness* is not quite to say that it does not exist *for me*.⁹⁷ Moreover, even among Snell's critics, there seems to be a lurking, if unacknowledged, sympathy for this aspect of his work. For when they suggest that pronouns and certain forms of the verb indicate the selfhood or agency of Homeric heroes which Snell is taken to be denying, they are making inferences which have much in common with his own.⁹⁸

vorkommen, die wir nach unserem modernen Denken ohne weiteres erwarten, so ist zu vermuten, daß er sie noch nicht gekannt hat, zumal wenn verschiedene solcher „Lücken“ innerlich zusammenhängen, und wenn dem hinwieder ein uns zunächst befremdliches Mehr gegenübersteht, das sich mit den Lücken zu einer systematischen Einheit zusammenschließt“.

⁹⁷ The latter implies a total ignorance of the phenomenon in question, whereas the former is compatible with a kind of awareness that does not rise to the level of conscious reflection. In view of Snell's progressivism, there is the possibility of a pre-reflective, 'dim' cognisance of what later people would know fully; cf. e.g. n. 19, "mind" in a certain sense existed already for him" („Geist“ in bestimmten Sinn auch schon für ihn da war).

⁹⁸ Even if his critics are less controversial in not endorsing the arguments from silence to which I refer above. Cf. n. 45, especially Teffeteller, 2003: 29, n. 56 who, following the assertions I have already noted, continues "(although the weight attached to the concept of 'selfhood' indicated by pronominal reference [and, *a fortiori*, personal reference conveyed by the verbal morphology] varies widely from one theorist to another... the extreme position holding that our notion of a 'self' based on pronominal reference is at best a grammatical fiction, at worst a grammatical mistake)". Teffeteller is so convinced of the validity of the methodology which the critics of Snell reject—critics whom she approvingly cites (note her quotation of e.g. Gaskin on the same page)—that she judges "extreme" those who forswear an inference from "pronominal reference" to a "notion of a 'self'".

Snell's use of linguistic relativity further elucidates why he was unwilling to grant the same significance to our talk of conflict with, or between, our psychic organs as he assigns to Homeric talk of the same. If one takes there to be a close relationship between language and cognition, and permits perceived linguistic lacunae to carry great weight in that relationship, then when one finds that Homeric Greek has no direct equivalent for, say, 'Geist' or 'Seele', one will assume that, despite similarities in such talk, modern psychological experience must differ radically from Homer's. As we have just seen, Snell's procedure was somewhat more nuanced than this, with the lack of such equivalents gaining significance because of wider features of Homeric language and the source material in general. I nevertheless do not think that this approach, unrevised, is one now worth defending; but I also do not think it is so much inherently flawed as it is miscalibrated. For the overall importance Snell assigns to linguistic phenomena in disclosing the shape of Homeric psychology seems, in light of the contemporary status of linguistic relativity, to be credible.⁹⁹

With this in mind, I return now to Snell's claims, particularly in respect of psychological disintegration, and seek to recontextualise them. To do this, I will first refer to what controls Snell placed upon his claims in *Entdeckung*, after which I will examine what I

⁹⁹ For an openness to linguistic relativity vis-à-vis Snell, cf. Jeremiah, 2012: 11-15. Jeremiah endorses a moderate form of linguistic relativity in arguing that the (dis)use of reflexive pronouns partly constitutes identity, one's sense of self, including in Homer. Accordingly, Snell is treated with rather more sympathy than has been customary: "One grants that Snell may exaggerate his interpretation... by advancing a straightforward Whorfianism: what a culture does not have a word for, for them it does not exist... But if we weaken the correspondence between language and thought a little, a milder version of his thesis should... be uncontroversial: what a culture does not have a word for is not important for them as an object of inquiry or socio-cultural signifier" (11f.). He refers also to the "extreme universalism" (13) (contrast Snell's own "rationalist prejudice", n. 81) of certain of Snell's critics, his suggestions about their motivations being probing, and concludes that "what I retain of Snell is that how we theorise and talk about the reality of our internal subjective experience, as opposed to the reality of the world "out there", is more than just a manner of speaking and contributes substantively to the construction of this reality" (15). I am receptive to Jeremiah's approach, though demur on two points: i) his assignation to Snell (not to mention Whorf) of a simplistic type of linguistic relativity, perhaps ceding too much to Snell's critics on this score; ii) his claim that "what a culture does not have a word for is not important for them as an object of inquiry or socio-cultural signifier". This does not seem quite right: consider what have been termed 'religious experiences', the constitutive 'feelings' of which are subject to intense investigation both by those that have them and scientific researchers. These are plainly important "object[s] of inquiry", yet there is no word for many of them; indeed, the intensity of the feelings in question may be said by their 'sufferers' to preclude attempts to capture them linguistically.

regard as a key intellectual influence of the book, and what impact this must have on how we read—and evaluate—Snell.

II

In the introduction to *Entdeckung*, Snell placed several caveats upon the remainder of the book, especially the first chapter, the location of most of the claims I have touched upon so far. Foremost among these qualifications was Snell's explicit adherence to what has been termed 'anthropological realism',¹⁰⁰ the view that Homer and his characters are sufficiently like 'us' to enable sensible comparison between the two; or, to put it another way, that they are as fully human as we are:

if then in what follows it is claimed that Homeric men had no mind, no soul and consequently did not know a great deal else besides, it is not therefore meant that Homeric men did not yet experience joy or were unable to think about things, and so forth, which would be absurd; only that that sort of thing was not interpreted as the action of the mind or of the soul: in *this* sense there is still no mind and no soul.¹⁰¹

This is not an isolated case: later, of his comments on sight, Snell is at pains to point out that "[e]vidently, for Homeric men also the eyes fundamentally served 'to see', that is to make visual perceptions";¹⁰² and of his comments on the body, "[e]vidently, Homeric men had a body as too did the later Greeks".¹⁰³ Indeed, this expression of 'realism' is immediately preceded by a softening of the progressivism in *Entdeckung* upon which I commented earlier,

¹⁰⁰ The term is borrowed from Halliwell, 1990: 34.

¹⁰¹ Snell, 2011: 10, "Wenn im Folgenden etwa behauptet wird, die homerischen Menschen hätten keinen Geist, keine Seele und infolgedessen auch sehr viel anderes noch nicht gekannt, ist also nicht gemeint, die homerischen Menschen hätten sich noch nicht freuen oder nicht an etwas denken können und so fort, was absurd wäre; nur wird dergleichen eben nicht als Aktion des Geistes oder der Seele interpretiert: in *dem* Sinn gab es noch keinen Geist und keine Seele". Snell, 1948: 10f. is identical, save for the italicising of 'dem', a small but significant point of emphasis. Rosenmeyer/Snell, 1953: ix forgets to translate "was absurd wäre", an unfortunate oversight.

¹⁰² Snell, 2011: 16, "Selbstverständlich dienten auch den homerischen Menschen die Augen wesentlich zum „Sehen“, das heißt, optische Wahrnehmungen zu machen".

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* 18, "Selbstverständlich haben die homerischen Menschen einen Körper gehabt wie die späteren Griechen auch".

in which Snell suggests that, though we are far removed from the poet, there nevertheless remains a substantive connection between us and him:

Underpinning this is the conviction that this strangeness is nevertheless comprehensible to us... In particular, when Greek is at issue, we need not be overly sceptical on this point: our own spiritual past is at issue. What follows will perhaps show that what we at first exhibit for its radical otherness is very natural, at any rate more straightforward than complicated, modern ideas, and that we can not only enter into it through a remembrance, but also through the fact that these possibilities are preserved in us and in them we can recognise the threads of our often-interwoven thought.¹⁰⁴

Such a connection results in an ability to understand Homeric psychology with an immediacy beyond historical reflection ('remembrance'), flowing from the vestiges of that psychology which endure in our own. But if that is so, then Homer, and presumably his heroes, cannot for Snell be as 'incognizable' or alien as implied by the standard interpretations of his work. Indeed, it is worth considering that Snell refrained throughout *Entdeckung* from articulating views that would incontrovertibly cement that alienness,¹⁰⁵ unlike certain of his imitators.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Snell, 2011: 10, "Dahinter steht allerdings die Überzeugung, daß dies Fremde uns trotz allem verständlich ist... Zumal, wenn es sich um Griechisches handelt, brauchen wir in diesem Punkt nicht allzu skeptisch zu sein: handelt es sich da doch um unsere eigene geistige Vergangenheit, und das Folgende wird vielleicht zeigen, daß das, was zunächst in seiner radikalen Fremdheit aufgewiesen wird, sehr natürlich ist, einfacher jedenfalls als die komplizierten modernen Vorstellungen, und daß wir nicht nur durch eine Erinnerung an ihm teilnehmen können, sondern dadurch, daß diese Möglichkeiten in uns aufgehoben sind und wir in ihnen die Fäden unseres vielfach verwobenen Denkens erkennen können".

¹⁰⁵ Pelliccia, 1995, noting that "[t]he attribution of speech-powers to the organs is important to the Snell position because it contributes to the claim that "[t]here are no divided feelings in Homer", but conflict between separate and autonomous entities instead: the person is in conflict with an actual thing or organ that... can argue with him" (19), suggests that it is implicit in Snell's account "that a psychic organ, though not conceived as physically resembling a person, has a will independent of its host person, and can engage in actual verbal discourse... with the host person... [being] conceived as a real person, inside the person, yet independent of the person" (23), *i.e.* as an homunculus. Pelliccia suggests that the reason Snell does not explicitly endorse this "stronger homunculus theory" (*ibid.*) is that he will have been struck by "further implications that are difficult to deal with", such as the problem of infinite regress: "does the homunculus have a homunculus inside of it?" (24). My own proposal is that the reason Snell did not articulate that theory is perhaps that he did not believe it: it would violate the 'realism' he had already committed himself to in the introduction, and accordingly, as Pelliccia notes (*ibid.*), Snell never refers to homunculi in *Entdeckung*.

¹⁰⁶ I have in mind Jaynes, 1979 and Feyerabend, 1988. From the former, we can adduce an impressive miscellany: "The characters of the Iliad do not sit down and think out what to do. They have no conscious mind such as we say we have, and certainly no introspections. It is impossible for us with our subjectivity to appreciate what it was like... In fact, the gods take the place of consciousness" (72); "Who then were these gods that pushed men about like robots and sang epics through their lips? They were voices whose speech and directions could be as distinctly heard by the Iliadic heroes as voices are heard by certain epileptic and schizophrenic patients..." (73f.); "The gods are what we now call hallucinations" (74); "The Trojan War was directed by hallucinations. And the soldiers who

Thus, Snell does at least *profess* ‘anthropological realism’ vis-à-vis Homer’s characters, and with that the view that, like us, such characters are supposed to be real agents after all. How does this square with his claims that appear to tend towards the assignation of a psychological disintegration to those characters? Perhaps Snell is simply trying to have his cake and eat it, simultaneously espousing an anthropological, or what might be called ‘agential’, realism whilst expressing opinions with which that simply cannot be reconciled. But I think that examining a significant intellectual influence upon Snell and *Entdeckung* means we need not commit ourselves to that view, that influence recasting much of what he said in a different light.

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The examination of Snell’s intellectual underpinnings is not new: both Arbogast Schmitt and Christopher Gill, in particular, have considered them at length. For Schmitt, Snell was heavily influenced both by the ‘Innerlichkeitsphilosophie’ of the twentieth century, particularly the Existentialism originating in Kierkegaard,¹⁰⁷ and especially the thought of the ‘Goethezeit’, as represented mainly by Hegel and Schiller.¹⁰⁸ For Gill, Snell was, as far as his thoughts about Homeric psychology were concerned, deeply influenced by “a post-Cartesian conception of the self”.¹⁰⁹ Gill characterises this in the following way:

were so directed were not at all like us. They were noble automatons who knew not what they did... We cannot approach these heroes by inventing mind-spaces behind their fierce eyes as we do with each other. Iliadic man did not have subjectivity as we do; he had no awareness of his awareness [*sic*] of the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon” (75). These positions were matched by a commensurate level of philology: “The word *soma*, which in the fifth century B.C. comes to mean body, is always in the plural in Homer” (71), presumably save when it is not (*e.g. Il. 7. 79*); and the first words of the *Iliad* are supposedly “Menin aedie [*sic*] Thea”. Matters are not helped by Jaynes’ plagiarism (72*f.*) of Dodds’ (1951: 3) translation of *Il. 19. 86-90*, which is lightly, and badly, adapted. Teffeteller, 2003 points to both Jaynes and Feyerabend as “reverberations” (25) of Snell’s views, but does not seem to stress, as I think she ought, the key difference between them vis-à-vis realism.

¹⁰⁷ Schmitt, 1990: 28-35.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 53*ff.*

¹⁰⁹ Gill, 1996: 34. Gill also presses the influence of Kant on Snell’s view of what properly constitutes a moral decision, as well as of Hegel on what I have (though Gill does not) call Snell’s progressivism. Snell’s ‘Cartesianism’ in the sense described in the text is reflected also in his broader subscription to substance dualism,

A crucial part of Descartes's thinking was his assumption that the way in which I understand myself (who 'I' am) is both authoritative in itself and can form the basis of an understanding of his knowledge of the world. His belief that he was 'a thing which thinks' (*res cogitans*) was regarded by him as the sole one that was beyond doubt, and which could therefore serve as the basis of his reconstitution of his knowledge of the world. In effect, Descartes gives a fundamental role to what is now called the 'first-personal' view (*my* —uniquely privileged —understanding of who *I* am).¹¹⁰

Gill goes on to claim that "Snell sometimes makes it plain that he presupposes, as the background for his work, an intellectual tradition in which self-consciousness is conceived as the central human characteristic"¹¹¹ and notes that, beyond Descartes, Snell "explains that the larger context of his work on Greek culture is a question whose importance was brought out by Hegel, Schelling, and Nietzsche, that of the relationship between self-consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) and action (*Handeln*)".¹¹² I think there is much to Schmitt's and Gill's approaches to exposing Snell's intellectual background. But this seems to me amenable to still further exploration.

The passage to which Gill is alluding when he refers to Snell's explanation of the larger context of his work is Snell's response to a hostile review of his *Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama*, published in 1928 and a forerunner of *Entdeckung*:

the view, roughly, that the mind and the body are distinct entities or 'substances', the former not collapsing into the latter. Snell does not, to my knowledge, ever explicitly acknowledge that he is accepting this theory in either *Entdeckung* or anywhere else, but it nevertheless seems fair to characterise his position in this way. Note that *Entdeckung* was published (albeit shortly) before Ryle, 1949, a significant step on the way to contemporary philosophers' rejection of substance dualism (though *cf.* the recent defences in Lowe, 2009 and Robinson, 2016, as well as dualism in general in Lavazza & Robinson, 2014). Snell's assumption of this view of the mind has been marked by certain of his critics, *e.g.* Clarke, 1999: 118*f.*, "Snell adduced the lack of a word for 'body' as proof that for Homer 'the physical body was comprehended not as a unit but as an aggregate.' In the light of the argument in this chapter a simpler solution presents itself: to seek a word for 'body' is to ask Homer a wrong and unanswerable question. That a man should have a body makes sense only if he has another part to be distinguished from it: soul, mind, the ghost in the machine. Since we saw from the *θυμός* family that for Homer there is no mental part of man that can be distinguished from the body, it follows now that the body is indistinguishable from the human whole. A spear strikes a man's head or hand or foot or more generally it strikes the man, and that is all"; Long, 2015: 29*f.*, "[t]his was Snell's big mistake, great scholar though he was. Snell assumed that Homer did not fully understand human nature because he lacked Plato's sharp distinction between soul and body, a distinction that Snell took to be factually correct rather than the contestable theory that it actually is".

¹¹⁰ Gill, 1996: 34*f.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 35.

¹¹² *Ibid.* 35*f.*

In my book I returned to problems which under the marked influence of Herder were broached in the circle of German Romanticism (in Hegel and Schelling, but in Hölderlin, for example, or Kleist), which again in Nietzsche occupied a central position, but which in actual philology have hardly been touched upon. In short, it is a question of in what relation stands the consciousness of mankind, reflexion, to his action.¹¹³

I take the reference to the German Romantics here to be a pregnant one, which can help motivate an extension of the sort of influences Gill and Schmitt identified, thereby facilitating the recasting of Snell's work to which I referred at the end of the previous section. Consider therefore the following, from the second edition of *Entdeckung*:

It has been thought that the view that Homer did "not yet" know many things diminishes him, and so it has been suggested, to account for the difference between the constitution of the Homeric mind and our own, that Homer deliberately stylised his thinking, that he, for aesthetic or other reasons, omitted to depict an *Innerlichkeit*, whereby the secure grandeur of his heroes might have been lost.¹¹⁴

This *Innerlichkeit*, translated most conveniently by the English 'interiority', is a rare term,¹¹⁵ apparently coined by Klopstock in 1779, in the context of outlining a form of poetic representation:¹¹⁶ "through *Innerlichkeit*, or emphasising the true, innermost nature of a thing".¹¹⁷ The term is therefore a proto-German Romantic coinage, and achieved the peak of

¹¹³ Snell, 1929: 141, "Ich habe in meinem Buch zurückgegriffen auf Probleme, die unter dem deutlichen Einfluß Herders im Kreis der deutschen Romantik (bei Hegel und Schelling, aber auch bei Hölderlin etwa oder Kleist) aufgeworfen sind, die bei Nietzsche wieder eine zentrale Stellung einnahmen, die aber in der eigentlichen Philologie kaum angerührt sind. Es handelt sich kurz gesagt darum, in welcher Relation das bewußtsein des Menschen, die Reflexion, zu seinem Handeln steht".

¹¹⁴ Snell, 1948: 30, "Man hat gemeint, die Behauptung, Homer habe vieles >>noch nicht<< gekannt, verkleinere ihn, und hat darum versucht, die Verschiedenheit der homerischen Seelenauffassung von der unsrigen daraus zu erklären, daß Homer bewußt sein Denken stilisiert hätte, daß er aus ästhetischen oder anderen Gründen es vermieden hätte, eine Innerlichkeit zu zeichnen, wodurch die sichere Größe seiner Helden hätte verlieren können". Rosenmeyer translates "that for aesthetic or other reasons he avoided the description of *mental processes*" (Snell/Rosenmeyer, 1953: 16, emphasis mine), a translation that is badly wrong. Separately, the passage disappears entirely from Snell, 2011, for unclear reasons. For a similar earlier thought, cf. Snell, 1928: 33, "Only with this look into his future does one understand 'I' to be something truly inner— not as a mere 'It' or 'You', like in epic or lyric" (Erst mit diesem Blick in die eigene Zukunft begreift der Mensch sein Ich wirkliches Innen, — nicht als bloßes Es oder als Du wie in Epos oder Lyrik).

¹¹⁵ According to Google's Ngrams, as of 2012, *Innerlichkeit* constituted 0.0000519047 % of unigrams in the German (2012) corpus.

¹¹⁶ Heydebrand, 1976 s.v. 'Innerlichkeit'.

¹¹⁷ Klopstock, 1962: 1034, "Durch Innerlichkeit, oder Heraushebung der eigentlichen innersten Beschaffenheit der Sache". The latter clause is presumably exegetic of the coinage, rather than posing an alternative. As we have seen already, Schmitt noted the importance of *Innerlichkeit* themed philosophy to Snell, and went on to

its popularity about 1840, around German Romanticism's zenith.¹¹⁸ This was fitting, for the German Romantics, like the Romantics in general, were preoccupied with the inner self, its discovery and expression; indeed, this is perhaps the defining feature of their movement.¹¹⁹ As one account of German Romanticism puts it:

This sense for individuality, which also drove them into explorations of subjective interiority, led them to be dissatisfied with both the Kantian and Fichtean accounts of subjectivity, which seemed to them too formal, too dry, to be sufficiently engaged with the messy, lived, existential character of human life. Much rhetoric that is now familiar to us (and has become a bit of a cliché itself) of “finding” oneself and of exploring one's feelings to get at what is truly oneself was created by the early Romantics as a vocabulary to express what it was that they were trying to accomplish and what they were rebelling against.¹²⁰

Innerlichkeit thus forms part of a vocabulary with which these individual, subjective, psychonautical endeavours could be articulated.

It is curious that Snell elects to use this term when describing what in his view Homer had not depicted. The interest this holds only increases when we consider how often the Romantics and their immediate predecessors are mentioned in *Entdeckung*,¹²¹ and what we have seen Snell say about their movement and its relationship to his own work: in Snell's view, those whom he identifies as Romantics tried to answer questions which he too was trying to solve. Combined with his use of *Innerlichkeit*, almost a Romantic term of art, and his repeated references to the Romantics in *Entdeckung*, we might therefore wonder whether they and he share any answers to those questions. Certainly, among the Romantics we find a good deal of the progressivism we have seen in Snell; Friedrich Schlegel's claim that “in the ancients one

reproduce several passages of Hegel in which he uses the term (*e.g.* Schmitt, 1990: 53*f.*, though he does not advert to the occurrences). But Schmitt does not to my knowledge assign the same significance to Snell's use of the term as I do, nor connect it with German Romanticism in particular.

¹¹⁸ This, again, according to Google's Ngrams.

¹¹⁹ For overviews of this aspect of the movement, *cf.* Solomon, 1988; Gay, 1995; Schenk, 1979, especially the introduction by Isaiah Berlin. *Cf.* pp. 61, 69*f.*

¹²⁰ Pinkard, 2002: 136.

¹²¹ Kleist, the Schlegels, Schiller, Hölderlin, Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt, for example, are referred to, some multiple times.

sees the perfect letter of all poetry; in the moderns, one foresees the spirit emerging” is a particularly striking parallel.¹²² But, beyond this, there are similarities that are highly specific, suggesting Snell’s debt to the Romantics may be considerable indeed.

Snell was, we recall, convinced that Homer’s ‘mindset’ was a distinctly corporeal one, lacking the capacity for abstraction.¹²³ For August Schlegel, too, “[n]o matter how far the Greeks flourished in beauty and even in morality, we cannot grant their culture a higher character than that of a refined, cultivated sensuousness”.¹²⁴ Indeed, “the Greek ideal of mankind was perfect unity and symmetry of all forces, natural harmony”,¹²⁵ whereas “[t]he moderns, conversely, have come to an awareness of inner rupture, which makes such an ideal impossible”.¹²⁶ As much as it was for Snell, then, for Schlegel the Greeks, and therefore Homer with them, were corporeally bounded; and this further means that what Schlegel calls “inner rupture” was impossible, a view that seems to approximate Snell’s denial of “intensity” and “inner tension” to Homer.¹²⁷ A still more useful *comparandum* is Wilhelm von Humboldt, for he interrogates Homer in particular, contrasting him with modern poetry, especially Goethe’s

¹²² Schlegel, 1967: §93, “In den Alten sieht man den vollendeten Buchstaben der ganzen Poesie: in den Neuern ahnet man den werdenden Geist”. Cf. “the ancients are neither the Jews, nor the Christians, nor the English of poetry. They are not an arbitrarily chosen artistic people of god; nor do they have the last word on the beauty of belief; nor do they possess a monopoly on poetry” (Die Alten sind weder die Juden, noch die Christen, noch die Engländer der Poesie. Sie sind nicht ein willkürlich auserwähltes Kunstvolk Gottes; noch haben sie den alleinseligmachenden Schönheitsglauben; noch besitzen sie ein Dichtungsmonopol) (*ibid.* §91); Novalis, 1965: §34 (=534), “the poetry of savages is a story without beginning, middle and end. The pleasure which they take in it is merely experiential—simple pastime, merely dynamic stimulation of the power of imagination. The epic poem is refined primitive poetry. Essentially the same. The novel already stands much higher—epic poetry endures—the novel flourishes—in the former is progression arithmetic, in the latter geometric” (Das Gedicht der Wilden ist eine Erzählung ohne Anfang, Mittel und Ende—das Vergnügen, das sie dabey empfinden, ist blos pathologisch-einfache Beschäftigung, blos dynamische Belebung des Vorstellungsvermögens. Das epische Gedicht ist das veredelte primitive Gedicht. Im Wesentlichen ganz dasselbe. Der Roman steht schon weit höher—Jenes dauert fort—dieser wächst fort—in Jenem ist arhythmische, im Roman geometrische Progression).

¹²³ Cf. pp. 27f.

¹²⁴ Schlegel, 2018: 15, “Allein wie weit die Griechen auch im Schönen und selbst im Sittlichen gediehen, so können wir ihrer Bildung doch keinen höheren Charakter zugestehen, als den einer geläuterten, veredelten Sinnlichkeit”.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* 17, “Das griechische Ideal der Menschheit war vollkommene Eintracht und Ebenmaaß aller Kräfte, natürliche Harmonie”.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, “Die Neuere hingegen sind zum Bewußtseyn der innern Entzweyung gekommen, welche ein solches Ideal unmöglich macht”.

¹²⁷ Cf. pp. 27f., 32.

Hermann and Dorothea. In Homer, “the people that act not only mostly share simultaneously the same radiance, being heroes who stand between Olympus and mortality, but also are mostly only individuated by their outer forms, their actions, their speeches, not, as so often in the newer poets, according to their inner character-forms and convictions”.¹²⁸ We have seen Snell assert something similar,¹²⁹ both agreeing that in a qualified sense Homer draws his characters distinctly; we can tell an Achilles and a Hector apart. But for both Humboldt and Snell Homer does not distinguish his characters at, roughly speaking, a psychological level, for whilst Hector and Achilles might be told apart by their appearance or deeds, we cannot discriminate between them by their core attitudes or noetic structure. Related to this is Humboldt’s view of the permeability of Homer’s heroes. For in modern poets, unlike in Homer, “the inner man is separated from the outer reality, a border is drawn between the two, so that now there is a unique and new area beyond”,¹³⁰ an alleged Homeric deficit which Snell too identified.¹³¹ One can also see in these assertions hints of the denial of *Innerlichkeit* to Homer found too in Snell’s work, and about this Humboldt is elsewhere explicit. Against ancient poets, one will, upon reading *Hermann and Dorothea*, “not exactly find it bigger and better, but different and, only in another way, equally exquisite; he will not be attracted to it more forcefully, but will feel more deeply penetrated”¹³² for “if the ancients represent nature more in its sensual magnificence and greatness, it [*sc.* Goethe’s poetry] places more emphasis on the innerness of mankind”, the latter being more attractive to Humboldt’s contemporaries, “who live more in

¹²⁸ Humboldt, 1963: XL, “Die Personen, die sie aufführen, theilen nicht allein grossentheils zugleich denselben Glanz, sind Heroen, die zwischen dem Olymp und der Sterblichkeit in der Mitte stehen, sondern sie sind auch meistentheils nur nach ihren äussern Gestalten, ihren Handlungen, ihren Reden individualisirt, nicht, wie so oft bei den neueren Dichtern, nach ihren innern Charakterformen und Gesinnungen”.

¹²⁹ *Cf.* p. 29.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* XLIII, “der innere Mensch von der äussern Wirklichkeit getrennt, es wird zwischen beiden eine Gränze gezogen, so dass es nun auch Jenseits derselben ein eignes und neues Gebiet giebt”.

¹³¹ *Cf.* n. 26.

¹³² *Ibid.* XLI, “Er wird denselben nicht gerade grösser und besser, aber verschieden und, nur in einer andern Art, gleich trefflich finden; er wird sich von ihm nicht mächtiger angezogen, aber inniger durchdrungen fühlen”.

thoughts and feelings than in experiences and actions”.¹³³ Modern poetry thus possesses “a richer reserve for understanding and feeling, a finer mental individuality and... notes which intrude directly on our interior”,¹³⁴ since “what the ancients seek beyond the frontiers of the world of Olympus is something which our poets are obliged to extract from everyday life, to sink into the equally hidden depths of our mind”.¹³⁵ The ancient poet, in fact, “only looked at nature and the world, never subjectively back in himself”,¹³⁶ with the ancients in general “lack[ing] the richness and diversity of inner experience”.¹³⁷

What this means is that when Snell asserts that Homer did not depict an *Innerlichkeit*, he is repeating an assertion certainly shared by some, and likely by many, of the German Romantics. Thus, Snell is using a Klopstockian coinage, distinctly Romantic terminology; referring repeatedly to the Romantics in *Entdeckung*, whilst earlier suggesting that they were engaged in the same intellectual enterprise as he vis-à-vis antiquity; and adopting many of the same opinions as they about it. This all suggests that Snell’s claims about Homeric psychology should be construed as occurring within a context of an (at least partial) endorsement of German Romanticism. My suggestion is therefore that at least some of Snell’s claims are perhaps a good deal more complicated than they might initially appear. For rather than in all cases being claims about Homeric psychology *simpliciter*, they may in some circumstances be

¹³³ *Ibid.* XLI, “Wenn die Alten mehr die Natur in ihrer sinnlichen Pracht und Grösse mahlen [*sic*], so legt er mehr das Innre der Menschheit dar... die wir mehr in Gedanken und Empfindungen, als in Anschauungen und Handlungen leben”.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* XI, “einen reicheren Gehalt für den Verstand und die Empfindung, eine feinere geistige Individualität und ... Töne, die in unser Inneres eingreifen, entschädigen sollte”.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* XLI, “Was die Alten also ausserhalb der Gränzen der Erde im Olymp aufsuchen, das ist unser Dichter genöthigt, um es dem Alltagskreise der Begebenheiten zu entziehen, in die gleich verborgnen Tiefen unsres Gemüths zu versenken”.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* XLIII, “nur auf die Natur und die Welt, nie einseitig in sich zurück blickte”.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* XLIV, “an Reichthum und Mannigfaltigkeit der innern Erfahrung fehlt”.

claims about Homeric psychology as made through a German Romantic lens, whilst being further contextualised by an avowed agential realism upon which I have commented already.¹³⁸

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The question, then, is how framing Snell's work in this way might play out in practice, particularly when it comes to what we think about the accuracy of that work.¹³⁹ Consider the psychological disintegration that Snell seemed to attribute to Homeric characters. We saw how such disintegration could not fairly be predicated of Homer's heroes, for not only the 'counter-intuitive bizarreness' of such a predication, making of Homeric characters something unrecognisable as agents at all, but also for the fact that even in cases where characters deliberate about what to do and interact with a multitude of psychic organs when doing so, which one might consider *prima facie* evidence of such disintegration, the organs could not be in any sense discrete or competing agents, in the manner of their host: Odysseus' heart is at bottom just Odysseus himself. But in keeping with the Romantic influence and commitment to agential realism to which I have adverted, when Snell says things that seem to go to the

¹³⁸ My situating of Snell's claims within a context of German Romanticism is not intended to be an exhaustive account of his intellectual background, since evidently his influences were many; as I indicated in the text (p. 55), what I have said is intended to extend, not replace, both Gill's and Schmitt's own approaches to this issue. Where I properly diverge from both is that neither connect their examination of such influences with Snell's commitment to agential realism, a connection which results, as we will see, in a concomitant (albeit qualified) defence of *some* of what Snell, reinterpreted, had to say about Homer; *cf.* n. 139.

¹³⁹ The question of to what extent analysing Snell's assumptions might lead to a qualified re-evaluation of the accuracy of what he says has recently been taken up by Joseph Russo, in a passage worth quoting at length: "Gaskin and Williams are correct to criticize Snell for holding Homeric heroes to an unreasonable standard of self-aware volition, and thereby judging their decisions to be not truly their own. But while they are aware that Snell is using assumptions about consciousness radically different from theirs, and in fact post-Cartesian and post-Kantian, they never fully acknowledge the role of this underlying assumption in creating the radical difference between his interpretation and theirs. Had they done so, they might have conceded that by his own (admittedly narrow) standards Snell does make sense. When they differ in finding Homeric decisions to be autonomous, it is not so much that they are interpreting them more correctly than Snell did, as that they are bringing a different yardstick to the measurement... Gill's critique helps clarify the problem by allowing us to see that Snell and his critics are in a sense speaking different languages; and so their difference in evaluation may be seen not so much as disagreement over interpreting the same phenomena, as disagreement over which language (in this case, philosophic assumption) it is correct to use, and also which phenomena to highlight" (2012: 23); Russo generally pursues a modestly pro-Snell line, including on the issue of linguistic relativity. Russo goes on to quote Gill: "an initial response [*sc.* to monologues such as Hector's, in *Il.* 2. 98-130] may be that Snell and Adkins... and Gaskin and Williams... have (from very different standpoints) described correctly the character of Homeric deliberation" (1996: 49).

disintegration of the ‘Homeric mind’, this may not be an attribution of psychological disintegration *simpliciter*, but disintegration as viewed through a Romantic lens. What might the latter amount to? I suspect disintegration in this, ‘Romantic’ sense would describe any psychology that fails to conform to the radical individualism envisaged by the Romantics, an intensification of what Gill called the “‘first-personal’ view”. We have just seen how Snell, and certain of the Romantics, emphasised the importance of ‘inner tension’ *versus* tension between oneself and something else; how they pressed the interstice between oneself and ‘outer reality’; the importance of ‘inner experience’ over acting ‘out there’, in the world; and ‘interiority’, the ‘truly inner’, looking ‘subjectively back in oneself’, rather than out towards the world. This is indeed a psychological outlook in which “the person is conceived as an ‘individual’ in the sense of being the centre of a unique, subjective (first-personal) perspective... constitutive of personal identity”,¹⁴⁰ but sharpened almost to the point of a quasi-solipsism: the objective world ‘out there’ may exist, but it is the subjective world inside *my* head that really matters.¹⁴¹ Is Snell then right to judge psychological integration as viewed from *this* perspective absent from Homer?

¹⁴⁰ Gill, 1996: 9, outlining what he calls the “subjective-individualist conception of personality”, which he takes to be a conjunction of (post) Cartesian and (post) Kantian theories of mind and ethics, respectively.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Izenberg, 1992: 50, “All of them [*sc.* the first-generation European Romantics] put the unique individual—and more specifically, their own histories—at the center of experience, all of them believed that individuality demanded the expansion of the self towards infinity, and all of them insisted that this was not only compatible with, but dependent on, a fusion with totality conceived, or at least named, as a finite entity—nature, woman, form, Absolute, God, state”; Berlin & Hardy, 1997: 191, “the new romantic transvaluation of values substituted the morality of motive for that of consequence, that of the inner life for that of effectiveness in the external world”; Cunningham & Jardine, 1990: 1, “Around 1800 the self stood in unprecedentedly high esteem. What is God? What is man? What is nature? What is a work of art? What are the sciences? On what principles do they rest? What are their limits? How are they to be taught, learned, practised? In this ‘Age of Reflexion’ all these came to be perceived as questions of self-understanding”. Literary exemplars of the position I have outlined include Kleist’s chamberlain urging LITTEGARDE to “[p]ile up the feeling that lives in your breast, like a rock: cleave to it and do not waver, even if the earth and sky should perish beneath you and above you!” (türme das Gefühl, das in deiner Brust lebt, wie einen Felsen empor: halte dich daran und wanke nicht, und wenn Erd und Himmel unter dir und über dir zugrunde gingen!) (Kleist, 2002: 30*f.*) and Goethe’s Faust exclaiming “[m]y breast, which is cured of its urge for knowledge, | should henceforth not be shut off from pain, | and what is allotted to all mankind, | I will relish in my inner self, | with my spirit grasp the highest and the lowest, | their weal and woe amass in my breast, | and thus extend my own self to their self, | and, like they themselves, myself fail too in the end” (Mein Busen, der vom Wissensdrang geheilt ist, | Soll keinen Schmerzen künftig sich verschließen, | Und was der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt ist, | Will ich in meinem innern Selbst genießen, | Mit meinem Geist das Höchste und Tiefste

Consider in the first place the role of the gods, whose activity Snell deemed to preclude the making of ‘real’ decisions by Homeric heroes.¹⁴² This is not a claim that I think is now credible; but the gods’ prevalence in the poems, including their interventions in scenes of decision-making, studied at length by Gaskin and Williams,¹⁴³ may nevertheless argue for the absence of a Romantic sense of psychological integration. Pitting himself against Snell, Gaskin attempts to show that Homer’s heroes can make ‘real’ decisions, and quickly discounts the idea that divine activity precludes this, “since it has been conclusively demonstrated by several writers, and is now widely accepted, that the intervention of a god in a decision-making process does not derogate from the individual’s autonomy or responsibility for the action”,¹⁴⁴ citing Athena’s intervention in Book 1 of the *Iliad* to prevent Achilles killing Agamemnon as a prime example. I do not deny that Gaskin is right that Homeric heroes can make ‘real’ decisions; nor, as I have just indicated, do I endorse Snell’s views about the stuntedness of decision-making in Homer. But the question in which I am currently interested is to what extent the ways Homeric heroes make decisions can comport with psychological integration in the Romantic sense. In his discussion of the foregoing example, Gaskin argues that Athena does not force Achilles to do anything:

[Athena] does not force him into line: I have come, she tells him, to check your anger, αἴ κε πίθηαι. She offers him a threefold recompense for his loss if he heeds her, and finishes: cὸ δ’ ἴχθεο, πείθεο δ’ ἡμῖν. Achilles replies that he ought to obey her, because it is better to do so. Clearly there is no compulsion in this: Achilles could disobey if he wished, but chooses not to.¹⁴⁵

Williams adopts a similar perspective on this scene, suggesting that Athena merely gives Achilles an additional reason to not kill Agamemnon, and it is thanks to that new information

greifen, | Ihr Wohl und Weh auf meinen Busen häufen, | Und so mein eigen Selbst zu ihrem Selbst erweitern, | Und, wie sie selbst, am End auch ich zerscheitern) (Goethe, 2000: vv. 1768-1775).

¹⁴² Cf. p. 28.

¹⁴³ Gaskin, 1990 and Williams, 1993.

¹⁴⁴ Gaskin, 1990: 6.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 6f.

that he does not do so.¹⁴⁶ But whilst Williams and Gaskin are right not to see this scene as a case of a god straightforwardly robbing a mortal of their agency, they have perhaps gone too far in the other direction. Before Athena says a word to Achilles, she has grasped his hair, and can be seen by him alone (1. 197f.); Achilles is struck with wonder at the sight of her, and recognises her immediately (199f.). But we are then told that δεινὸν δέ οἱ ὄσσε φάανθεν (200), a description that seems likely to connote a degree of anger (or at least irritation) on the goddess' part, in the same way that we are told of Achilles himself, upon seeing the arms Thetis gives him whilst he cradles Patroclus' cadaver, ὧς μιν μᾶλλον ἔδου χόλος, ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε | δεινὸν ὑπὸ βλεφάρων ὡς εἰ σέλας ἐξεφάανθεν (19. 16f.).¹⁴⁷ Such a disposition seems incompatible with the offering of an uncompelled choice; and accordingly Athena's αἴ κε πίθηαι is a way of politely conveying a *demand*, akin to 'if you would kindly do as I say', not of inviting one to choose, and indeed is followed by a clear instruction: ἀλλ' ἄγε λῆγ' ἔριδος, μηδὲ ξίφος ἔλκεο χειρὶ (210).¹⁴⁸ This is in fact a demand to reverse exactly what Achilles has already started to do (ἔλκετο δ' ἐκ κολεοῖο μέγα ξίφος, 194), giving the scene a rather different complexion than that of an autonomous selection of alternatives: Athena does indeed supply Achilles with an additional reason to act a certain way, as Williams suggests, but this does not conduce to a surveying of possible alternatives preceding a choice, but to a rowing back of the choice upon which Achilles has already resolved. As for that additional reason, this is that Achilles will be

¹⁴⁶ "Achilles decides, and he does what seems to him better. The goddess has done more than help him to see that one course of action is better than the other in terms he was already considering; in this case, she has given him an extra and decisive reason, which he did not have before, for thinking that it is better" (Williams, 1993: 30).

¹⁴⁷ Cf. the connection of Odysseus δεινὸν παπταίνων whilst revenging himself upon the suitors (*Od.* 24. 178f.), an act in which presumably anger must be the predominant emotion. For the connection of a 'terrible' appearance with anger on the part of the person appearing, cf. the duel of Paris and Menelaus, ἐς μέσσον Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν ἐστιχόωντο | δεινὸν δερκόμενοι... καὶ ῥ' ἐγγὺς στήτην διαμετρητῶ ἐνὶ χώρῳ | σείοντ' ἐγχείας ἀλλήλοισιν κοτέοντε (*Il.* 3. 341f., 344f.).

¹⁴⁸ The construction αἴ κε πίθηαι occurs only twice elsewhere in the *Iliad*, both directed towards Achilles: Poseidon and Athena when reassuring Achilles that he will escape Scamander and telling him what to do thereafter (21. 291-297), and the shade of Patroclus, when telling Achilles to ensure their bones are buried together (ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω καὶ ἐφήσομαι αἴ κε πίθηαι, 23. 82). In neither case can it be reasonably assumed that the speakers intend the courses of action they 'recommend' to Achilles be optional: these are demands, not requests, a fact in Patroclus' case emphasised not only by his ἐφήσομαι, but the pathos of his plea. In the *Odyssey*, the phrase is used once (1. 279), by the disguised Athena to Telemachus, in the context of issuing a prolonged series of advice; here the tone is less demanding than advisory.

compensated generously for Agamemnon’s disrespect should he do as Athena asks (καί ποτέ τοι τρίς τόσσα παρέσσεται ἀγλαὰ δῶρα | ὕβριος εἵνεκα τῆσδε, 213f.). But Achilles will say that he *must* (χρῆ) do as Athena (and Hera) require, despite his anger, ὧς γὰρ ἄμεινον (217), ending with the aphoristic ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπέιθεται, μάλα τ’ ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ (218). His reasons for obeying the goddesses seem as much, if not more, to concern the prudence of doing what powerful divine agents say—and the imprudence of failing to do so—than on the acquisition of material compensation, the deprivation of which is anyway hardly Achilles’ real concern.¹⁴⁹ In general, one must wonder how plausible it is for Achilles to defy the goddesses in this scene: as Joseph Russo has recently commented of Gaskin and Williams’ reading, there is a risk here of “drama [being] turned into philosophy, as the vivid confrontation of unequal forces is abstracted into a philosophical weighing of equally valid alternatives”.¹⁵⁰ This is not to say that heroes cannot ever disobey the gods; but they seldom do so, and the sort of defiance to which

¹⁴⁹ Achilles is of course concerned by the loss of Briseis, but the problem is the public disregard Agamemnon shows in seizing her: ἦ γὰρ κεν δειλός τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καλεοίμην, | εἰ δὴ σοὶ πᾶν ἔργον ὑπέιξομαι ὅτι κεν εἶπης (1. 293f.); ἦ γὰρ μ’ Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὸν κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων | ἠτίμησεν· ἐλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας, αὐτὸς ἀπούρας (355f.), which is just Agamemnon’s point: ἐγὼ δέ κ’ ἄγω Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρηον | αὐτὸς ἰὼν κλισίηνδε, τὸ σὸν γέρας, ὄφρ’ ἐν εἰδήσῃ | ὅσσον φέρτερός εἰμι σέθεν, στυγῆ δὲ καὶ ἄλλος | ἴσον ἐμοὶ φάσθαι καὶ ὁμοιωθῆμεναι ἄνην (184-87).

¹⁵⁰ Russo, 2012: 24. Cf. Bravi, 2014: 18, quoting the same words of Gaskin as I have in the text: “The scholar’s claim does not seem to be justified by Achilles’ reply to Athena’s command... The words of the goddess, sent specifically by Hera, do not have the ring of advice that the hero is free to follow or not follow, but of a very precise and detailed demand about what he *must* do” (L’affermazione dello studioso non sembra giustificata dalla replica di Achille all’ordine di Atena... Le parole della dea, inviata appositamente da Era, non hanno i toni di un consiglio che l’eroe è libero di seguire o non seguire, ma quelli di un’imposizione ben precisa e dettagliata su ciò che egli *deve* fare).

Achilles would need to resort in this scene if he did not obey is unexampled in the Homeric epics,¹⁵¹ with perhaps only one exception.¹⁵²

I have dwelt on this scene because it is indicative of the spectrum of tension existing in the poems between mortal agency and divine interference, whether in the context of decision-making or not. Sometimes gods can engage in compulsion more explicit than that of the foregoing scene, as in Aphrodite's coercing Helen to see Paris (*Il.* 3. 413-417); sometimes they can even directly implant thoughts or dispositions into the heroes, as when Athena puts strength and courage into Telemachus' θυμός (*Od.* 1. 320*f.*) and Hera puts the idea to call an assembly into Achilles' φρένες (*Il.* 1. 53-55). This is not to say the gods are always involved, as when Odysseus independently deliberates about whether to retreat in the face of the Trojan advance

¹⁵¹ Gaskin cites two examples of what he imagines to be possible for Achilles: "Aegisthus does disobey the gods although he is warned by Hermes of the consequences (*Od.* 1. 32-43); and Odysseus decides not to take the advice proffered him by Leucothea (*Od.* 5. 333*ff.*)" (1990: 7). I think both have little in common with the present scene. Leucothea offers her veil to Odysseus and gives him instructions to save himself, suggesting he abandon his raft. But this is much more a good natured (*n.b.* ἡ ῥ' Ὀδυσῆ' ἐλέησεν ἀλώμενον, ἄλγε' ἔχοντα, 336) suggestion than a demand made with 'eyes shining terribly'; it prompts Odysseus' deliberation, performed once the goddess has departed, rather than reverses, in the goddess' presence, a decision already made; and does not provoke defiance because it does not even straightforwardly occasion disobedience: ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐ πῶ πείσομ', ἐπεὶ ἐκὰς ὀφθαλμοῖσιν | γαῖαν ἐγὼν ἰδόμην, ὅθι μοι φάτο φύξιμον εἶναι (358*f.*). Odysseus does not categorically reject Leucothea's advice, but defers following it because (he supposes) the circumstances in which it would make sense to follow it do not yet obtain, and he is worried that she might have been out to trick him anyway (356*f.*): this is temporising hesitation, not rebellion. Gaskin's other example, of Aegisthus, involves an imprudent decision to reject well-intentioned (Hermes ἀγαθὰ φρονέων, 1. 43) divine advice. Aegisthus does indeed technically disobey the gods. But Zeus is here not stressing mortal contumacy, but mortal stupidity, mortals who make their lot in life worse through their own folly (34), even when the gods not only are not responsible for what has happened, but try to avert it; and Aegisthus is thus elsewhere in the *Odyssey* not characterised by his disobedience. On both examples, *cf.* Russo, 2012: 24, n. 1: "to see these two situations as offering parallel possibilities for disobeying divine power is to misjudge seriously the different degree of compulsion in each case"; and Bravi, 2014: 19, criticising Gaskin's resort to the *Odyssey* for these examples, "where things will change profoundly" (dove le cose cambieranno profondamente) *versus* the *Iliad*. Lesky, 2001 seems to situate himself somewhere between the views of Russo and Bravi on the one hand, and Williams and Gaskin on the other: "the gods themselves respect this sphere of human freedom. Occasionally they express it with the utmost urbanity by adding the phrase αἶ κε πίθηται to their warning or advice... Certainly it is extremely ill-advised to set at naught a warning, however courteously expressed, from the mouth of a god. Achilles says so himself..." (188*f.*). Lesky goes on to cite Aegisthus as an example of the possibility of such disobedience (189), which, for the reasons discussed already, I do not think goes through.

¹⁵² This is Helen's rejection of Aphrodite's instruction that she should go and see Paris in Book 3 of the *Iliad*. Though the goddess makes her demand much more softly than does Athena to Achilles (390-94), Helen sees through what she regards as a deception (399, 405) and refuses anyway, provoking Aphrodite's threats and Helen's compliance. In view of Aphrodite's initial gentleness, I think something like Lesky's description of Helen's refusal as a "wild revolt" (2001:174) against the goddess is too much. Nevertheless, given Helen's perception that this is an unambiguous demand, there is here at least a *prima facie* model for the kind of disobedience Gaskin envisages in Achilles' case.

(11. 401ff.); and I repeat that I do not deny that decisions made under the circumstance of divine influence constitute ‘real’ decisions. Rather, my point is that such widespread divine influence as I have touched upon—very ‘real’, powerful divine agents routinely involving themselves not only in mortal life in general terms, including in the minds of the mortals living out that life, but also in mortals’ making of decisions of enormous consequence for themselves and others—cannot easily be reconciled with the specifically Romantic sense of what would constitute psychological integration.¹⁵³ We are here far from the radical version of the subjective-individualist model of mind I sketched above, and that distance is widened by revisiting the role of the psychic organs.

As we saw earlier, these may engage in a variety of activities, including typically ‘agential’ behaviour, encompassing the ability to make demands of their hosts, such as the θυμός and the καρδίη bidding or urging (κελεύει/ ἀνώγει) one to do something, occasionally at least *appearing* to suggest things that go against those hosts’ wishes.¹⁵⁴ Further, though we saw how infrequently the psychic organs are the subject of verbs of deliberation such as μερμηρίζω or ὀρμαίνω,¹⁵⁵ which usually take the host as their subject, nevertheless where the host is subject, the deliberation is commonly related to at least one psychic organ. μερμηρίζω, when used deliberatively,¹⁵⁶ admittedly presents a mixed picture: in the *Iliad*, the psychic organs are involved about a third of the time,¹⁵⁷ whereas just over half the time in the *Odyssey*.¹⁵⁸ But

¹⁵³ Lesky, 2001 is an exemplary account of the subtleties of divine and human causation in the Homeric epics, and to some extent the mingling of the two. Lesky rightly reserves a substantive role for mortals in determining their own affairs and the key events of the poems; but that role seems to me not nearly enough to satisfy the Romantic criterion to which I have referred in the text. Cf. Russo, 2012: 25, “The frequency of divine influence on the human mind and its operation, and specifically its decision-making process, surely lend [*sic*] some credence to the general idea that characters in Homer, particularly in the *Iliad*, are not as fully free agents as are characters in later Greek literature”.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. n. 58.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. p. 36.

¹⁵⁶ Not used deliberatively at *Od.* 1. 427; 2. 93, 325; 4. 533; 16. 256, 261; 19. 2, 52; 24. 128.

¹⁵⁷ The seven ‘exceptions’ are 8. 167; 10. 503; 12. 199; 13. 455; 14. 159; 16. 647; 20. 17, of eleven deliberative instances.

¹⁵⁸ The nine exceptions are 4. 791; 5. 354; 6. 141; 9. 554; 15. 169; 17. 235; 18. 90; 20. 28, 93, of twenty deliberative instances.

ὀρμαίνω, when used deliberately,¹⁵⁹ in the *Iliad* almost always denotes a pondering or wondering occurring within or by the θυμός, κῆρ or φρήν (φρένες),¹⁶⁰ and does so just under half the time in the *Odyssey*.¹⁶¹ Thus, the psychic organs are involved in deliberation denoted by these verbs more often than not, and still more so when one counts slightly less conservatively.¹⁶² The activity of the psychic organs is therefore pervasive and broad in scope, both within and without scenes of deliberation. As I argued earlier, the psychic organs do not amount to agents in the true sense of the term, and I do not mean to contradict that here. But they seem to play enough of a psychological role, however exactly that is to be conceived,¹⁶³ and sufficiently often, to run counter to a Romantic perspective of psychological integration,¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ The term sometimes denotes a general thinking about something, rather than deciding between alternatives: so *Il.* 10. 28; 18. 15 and *Od.* 3. 151; 4. 146; 4. 843; 7. 83; 18. 345.

¹⁶⁰ The two exceptions are 21. 64 and 22. 131, of eleven deliberative instances.

¹⁶¹ The six ‘exceptions’ are 3. 169; 4. 732, 789, 793; 15. 300; 23. 86, also of eleven deliberative instances.

¹⁶² For example, I have counted *Il.* 10. 503 as a case in which μερμηρίζω is used without reference to a psychic organ; yet it is evidently the same mental process as that denoted by ὀρμαίνω, which is said to occur κατὰ φρένα (10. 507).

¹⁶³ Cf. nn. 60, 164.

¹⁶⁴ A potential objection to this might lie in the claims of Jahn, 1987. I referred earlier (n. 50) to Jahn’s claims about the interchangeability of the psychic organs, but alluded also to his related claim about the potentially pleonastic quality of them, especially when used adverbially. This is not to say that Jahn thinks they are always pleonastic, since he accepts that some of these cases must be what he calls ‘prägnant’ (presumably ‘meaningful’); but “in expressions like χαῖρε δὲ θυμῷ the addition θυμῷ cannot be understood in principle as an indispensable element of the locution, since the message basically triggered by θυμῷ, “Note: inner event”, is here superfluous and the addition thereby in a semantic sense without a compelling *raison d’être*” (läßt sich in Wendungen wie χαῖρε δὲ θυμῷ der Zusatz θυμῷ nicht als prinzipiell unentbehrlicher Bestandteil der Aussage verstehen, da das von θυμῷ grundsätzlich ausgelöste Signal Achtung: innerer Vorgang! hier überflüssig und der Zusatz damit semantisch gesehen ohne zwingende Existenzberechtigung ist) (225). Thus Cairns, 2018/19: “There are what [Jahn] calls ‘prägnant’ cases, in which the reference to internal psychological functioning is not redundant, but pointed. For example, forms of the verb χαίρειν are found with θυμός, φρήν, κῆρ, ἦτορ, and with none of these. Normally, locutions such as χαῖρε δὲ θυμῷ (x7) [*sic*; there are six] and χαίρων ἐνὶ θυμῷ (x2) simply specify (pleonastically) that the internal psychological event of rejoicing is an internal psychological event. But still the adverbial phrase can be meaningful... In meaningful (*prägnant*) senses, the relevant locutions are, as Jahn puts it, *funktionsgleich*; in the other cases they are *funktionslos* – i.e. “he deliberated in his θυμός” not only means the same as “he deliberated in his φρένες”, but both of these just mean “he deliberated”” (16f.); cf. van der Mije, 2011, characterising one of Jahn’s conclusion about the psychic organs as being that “in the majority of cases, they have no meaning at all and are no more than metrical stopgaps” (447) and Cairns, 2019. The upshot of this is that there would in many cases be no incompatibility between the psychic organs, including when they occur with verbs of deliberation, and even the strictures of the Romantic sense of psychological integration: if “he deliberated/rejoiced/*etc.* in his θυμός” means simply “he deliberated/rejoiced/*etc.*”, then there is nothing to contradict even that model of integration. I accept that in many cases it is unclear what the mention of the psychic organ would contribute, but nevertheless the claim of meaninglessness seems too strong. As has been known since at least Frege, there is more to meaning than reference; it is for this reason that “the son of Atreus dishonoured Chryses the priest” (*Il.* 1. 11f.) and ‘Agamemnon dishonoured Chryses the priest’ do not mean the same thing, though they refer to exactly the same event, since e.g. propositional attitudes towards the claims can and almost certainly do differ (not least among novice readers of the poems); cf. Frege, 1997: 156. Even if the inclusion of

in which, as we have seen, the focus is on the unitary, subjective ‘I’ in an extreme sense.¹⁶⁵ Accordingly, important aspects of Homeric ‘theology’, as well as parts of the language for expressing cognition in Homer’s world (in conjunction with the contextualised terminological ‘absences’ discussed earlier), seem to stand at odds with the Romantic sense of psychological integration.¹⁶⁶ To the extent that that sense is what Snell had in mind when commenting on psychological disintegration in Homer, this implies that in this respect Snell’s work was in a qualified way more right than has sometimes been supposed, or at least less wrong.

the psychic organs in the relevant locutions results in no clear reference to a distinct function *versus* when they are omitted, it is nevertheless impermissible to infer meaninglessness. Separately, there are also factors that go beyond semantic meaning. As we saw in my discussion of linguistic relativity (pp. 46ff.), synonymous locutions in different languages can have varying psychological significance for their speakers, by dint of nouns’ grammatical gender; and synonymous locutions can also have different perlocutionary ‘force’ (cf. Austin, 1962: 101-103): ‘could I have a glass of water?’ and ‘could I have a glass of dihydrogen monoxide?’, even if synonymous and known to be so by one’s conversational partner, are liable to produce very different psychological and behavioural effects upon that partner. Given these points, whatever the mention of psychic organs contributes in what Jahn regards as non-prägnant cases, there is at least *prima facie* reason for thinking they possess minimally sufficient meaning (or at any rate broader ‘force’) such that an adherent of a Romantic sense of psychological integration might coherently regard them as incompatible with that model of integration.

¹⁶⁵ This is not to say that Romantic authors cannot themselves ever make use of psychic organs: “But be still, my heart! It is your last strength that you squander!” (Aber stille, mein Herz! Es ist ja deine letzte Kraft, die du verschwendest) (Hölderlin, 1958: 47) says Hyperion, the Romantic hero *par excellence*, after which follows a harangue of his heart to rival Odysseus’ in *Odyssey* 20 (the scene possibly even being loosely modelled, whether consciously or otherwise, on the Homeric one, for Hyperion is an Hellenophile and Homerophile: cf. *ibid.* 21). But the Herz *vel sim.* generally plays nothing like the outsize role of the κραδίη, *etc.*, and otherwise occurs within the Romantic context I have described.

¹⁶⁶ The tension between the gods and psychic organs on the one hand and Romantic psychology on the other is exacerbated by the normative claims that are commensurate with that psychology. The urge to “‘finding” oneself and of exploring one’s feelings to get at what is truly oneself” (cf. n. 120), for example, seems a poor fit for a world in which other (pseudo-) agents play such a significant role in my mental life: I cannot, for instance, easily ‘find my authentic myself’ or such like in a world as teeming with intervening deities as the poems describe. Separately, the argument I have been making in the text vis-à-vis Snell being (in a qualified and circumscribed sense) ‘right’ about psychological disintegration in Homer would not, to be clear, license the kind of crass ‘progressivism’ upon which I commented earlier, either in respect of the value-laden claims that come with it, or the categorical distinctions that are inherent to it. As I observed above (p. 38), we, just like the Romantics themselves (cf. n. 165), are able to make use of psychic organs in a manner not wholly dissimilar to Homer, and can even approximate something like the Homeric view of divine intervention: whilst Malebranche’s claim that “‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes” (Malebranche, 1997: 448) might be too much for most, the existing, widespread belief in an omniscient and intercessory god gives the lie to any simplistic, binary distinctions between contemporary and Homeric theology, at least in respect of divine intervention. In general, those who, like Snell, have been keen to stress absolute distinctions between past and present have largely turned a blind eye to the way in which Christianity connects, philosophically and theologically, the people of today with those of the past, and the impact this must have on progressivist ideology. Indeed, Snell himself refers (2011: 36) to Descartes and Occasionalism whilst explicating what role he thinks the gods play in Homer, without pausing to ask what roles they (or He) might play among his fellow Europeans. A similar mistake on the part of Arthur Adkins will be of some importance in chapter 3.

But it might fairly be argued that, even if this is granted, Snell has at most won a rather hollow victory.¹⁶⁷ We would after all not expect Homer to reflect a German Romantic view of anything in the first place, and if Snell's position that Homer's heroes are psychologically disintegrated amounts simply to saying they are psychologically disintegrated from the perspective of a specific German philosophical, literary and artistic movement of the early nineteenth century, we might think Snell could only ever be 'right' in a rather trivial sense of the term. I think this kind of response is initially reasonable, but offer the following as a provisional counterpoint. There has been much attention paid to how the Romantic movement, and German Romanticism in particular, have continued to exert considerable influence over the contemporary West. For Isaiah Berlin, Romanticism "recognised that there were certain aspects of human existence, particularly the inward aspects of human life, which were totally left out [*sc.* by classicism], so that the picture was distorted in a very violent degree".¹⁶⁸ This led him to a general evaluation of Romanticism's contemporary importance:

What can we be said to owe to romanticism? A great deal. We owe to romanticism the notion of the freedom of the artist... We also owe to romanticism the notion that a unified answer in human affairs is likely to be ruinous... The notion that there are many values, and that they are incompatible; the whole notion of plurality, of inexhaustibility, of the imperfection of all human answers and arrangements; the notion that no single answer which claims to be perfect and true, whether in art or in life, can in principle be perfect or true – all this we owe to the romantics.¹⁶⁹

This rather encompassing assessment has been supplemented by Berlin's work on the political ramifications of Romanticism,¹⁷⁰ but also by others' views on its impact upon many elements of contemporary, or near-contemporary, culture. Emphasis has been placed on the effect of

¹⁶⁷ *Cf.* n. 139.

¹⁶⁸ Berlin & Hardy, 1999: 139.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 146. *Cf.* Cunningham & Jardine, 1990: 8, "The political creeds which dominate our world, our views of human agency and morality, our arts and our conceptions of artistic creativity, all are rooted in the Romantic movement".

¹⁷⁰ Berlin & Hardy, 1997: 168ff.

Romanticism upon modern literary criticism and theory,¹⁷¹ twentieth-century literature,¹⁷² the visual arts,¹⁷³ modern scientific practice,¹⁷⁴ as well as popular culture,¹⁷⁵ connections implicit in the recent drive to bring German Romanticism especially into dialogue with modern philosophers' attempts to solve problems of concern to them.¹⁷⁶ Snell's perspective on what constitutes psychological integration is therefore not necessarily anchored in a rarefied intellectual fad of two hundred years ago, but in a broader cultural movement with whose legacies contemporary society continues to pullulate.

~

¹⁷¹ Swift, 2012: 245, "As has long been recognised, the concept of a world literature is a legacy of Goethe, and an idea of literature forms a key aspect of the aesthetics of Hegel and Herder; so too, historicism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism have been traced back to Herder, feminism to Mary Wollstonecraft, and literary theory to the Jena Romanticism. The contours of a philosophically inflected literary criticism, as well as the specialised subject of literary-critical reading—that is, literature itself, in its modern, post-Romantic designation as imaginative writing—are Romantic legacies".

¹⁷² Sandy, 2016; cf. Green, 2009: 17, "the following essays discuss the influence of Romanticism and chart the impact of particular Romantic works on subsequent understandings of the psyche, [and] on the relationship between the self and community" in several twentieth century authors.

¹⁷³ Honour, 1979: 319, "The influence of Romanticism has been so profound and pervasive that no account can encompass it. To some degree all subsequent Western art derives from it... Romantic ideas about artistic creativity, originality, individuality, authenticity and integrity, the Romantic conception of the meaning and purpose of works of art and the role of the artist continue to dominate aesthetic thought. So deeply are they embedded in our attitudes and ways of thinking that we are rarely aware of them. They emerge where least expected. Even the notion of an *avant-garde* marching ahead of popular taste is Romantic in origin".

¹⁷⁴ Cunningham & Jardine, 1990.

¹⁷⁵ Ferber, 2012: "But more interesting... is the afterlife of the Romantics in more popular culture... Almost a century after [William Blake] died, Charles Parry set Blake's sixteen-line poem "And did those feet in ancient time / Walk upon England's mountains green" to a memorable hymn tune. It was first intended for a patriotic rally during World War I, but it was soon taken up by the women's suffrage movement and the labour movement because of its moving evocation of a once and future Jerusalem in "England's green and pleasant land." It is now England's second national anthem, and is sung in America too... It also inspired the title and the music of the 1981 movie *Chariots of Fire*. Emerson, Lake and Palmer have recorded an acid-rock version of the hymn in *Brain Salad Surgery* (1973) and Billy Bragg made a more restrained but eloquent one in 1990. In 1948 William Blake "appeared" to Allen Ginsberg in a hallucination, and thus takes much of the credit (or blame) for the Beat poet's immense poetic works. I often see Blake's "Proverbs of Hell" as graffiti [*sic*] on walls or as slogans on bumper stickers. When I was an underpaid teaching assistant I joined a picket line carrying a sign I had made: "The tygers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction." Even as a well-broken-in horse of instruction today I still see much truth in that proverb".

¹⁷⁶ Nassar, 2014. Cf. Beiser, 2003: 2, "Quite apart from its historical importance, many of the aims and problems of romantic philosophy are still vital today. Like many contemporary philosophers, the young romantics sought an epistemology that valued criticism yet escaped skepticism, one that recognized the failures of foundationalism yet did not surrender to relativism. Their goals in the philosophy of mind have also lost none of their relevance... The chief problem of their political philosophy remains a central issue today... Finally, their aims in aesthetics are still a desideratum... If these goals and problems sound familiar, that is in no small measure because we are the heirs of the romantic legacy".

I have tried to do several things in this chapter. In the first place, I exhibited several of Snell's more controversial claims about Homeric psychology, and sampled some of the criticism with which they have been greeted. I then proceeded to show how these claims, including especially the position to which many of them seemed to tend, *viz.* that Homeric characters are psychologically 'disintegrated', as conventionally understood are not only questionable in themselves, but in large part invalidated by the Homeric evidence. I then asked why, given that evidence, Snell adopted such views, when he did not adopt them about modern society from comparable contemporary, including German, evidence. This inconsistency was explained by a survey of Snell's progressivist antecedents, which in a certain sense 'blocked' him from such a procedure; and his commitment to a somewhat ambiguous version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, which privileged linguistic 'absences' that could be 'located' in Homer but not in contemporary discourse. I rejected Snell's progressivism, but accepted his approach to linguistic relativity in at least general terms, suggesting that inferring from linguistic data to judgements about psychological situation was permissible, and in fact endorsed by many contemporary linguists. I then tried to clarify some aspects of Snell's work. To do this, I examined Snell's avowal of what I have called 'agential realism', and how this must place caveats on the interpretation of some of the claims, particularly relating to psychological integration, I discussed earlier in the chapter. This was not to provide a smokescreen for Snell's errors and overstatements, which were more numerous than they ought to have been: many of Snell's claims remain mistaken, or at least seriously flawed, regardless of these caveats. But such caveats raised the prospect that Snell was not denying that Homeric heroes are psychologically integrated *simpliciter*, which would be inconsistent with agential realism, but in another, more circumscribed way. By exploring what I took to be an important component of Snell's intellectual background, namely the German Romanticism of the turn of the nineteenth century, I suggested that we should understand Snell to be denying that Homeric

heroes are psychologically integrated from a specifically German Romantic perspective. I then proceeded to provide some reasons for thinking that Snell was right to find *that* sort of psychological integration absent from Homer, and have just provided at least a *prima facie* suggestion as to why that claim is not quite as toothless as it might first appear.

I think this chapter can therefore claim some significance in its own right. It has not been common to read Snell with an emphasis on his expressions of agential realism, nor to stress to the extent I have the impact of German Romanticism on much of what he says. Likewise, I have examined his progressivism somewhat more thoroughly than it has been hitherto, and situated his ‘lexical’ method, itself read in a rather more sympathetic way than it has been previously, within modern work on linguistic relativity in a way that has been little attended to in the past. The result is, unusually if not uniquely, a partial acceptance of some of what Snell had to say, as well as at least a provisional defence of the broader significance of the same.

But I should also comment on what I take the relationship to be between this chapter and the two that follow. Clearly, I do not believe Snell to be denying agential realism, of a kind which I will presuppose in the following chapters: in both I adopt, respectively, perspectives on shame and responsibility that can be characterised as ‘agent-centred’, which naturally could not work without a commitment to there being ‘real’ agents in Homer. But there are some further points of interest. In a sense, Snell’s embracing of German Romanticism seems itself to be a kind of exaggerated ‘agent-centred’ approach, given what I have said about the extreme ‘subjective-individualism’ of the movement. Where Snell and I differ in this respect is in the admission of social elements to our respective focuses upon the agent. In my view, as we will see, shame may relate to the judgement of others or one’s own judgement upon one’s character, as informed by values partly inculcated by society; whilst the kind of responsibility I prioritise, involving ‘aretic appraisal’, necessarily involves others’ assessments of the kind of people we

are. My approaches are therefore agent-centred, whilst Snell's seem to be so in a rather cruder way. There are two further important methodological points to make in this connection. Both myself and others have attempted to expose Snell's intellectual underpinnings, but the reason such work exists in the first place is due to some theoretical coyness on Snell's part: he is not anywhere near as clear as he could be about what theoretical commitments he is making in his work. This is perhaps partly attributable to the era in which he was writing, at least for the earlier editions of *Entdeckung* and its forerunners; but it highlights the importance of enunciating what commitments one is making, and why one is making them. This latter is my second point. If it is true that Snell is choosing to bring a German Romantic lens to the Homeric texts, and everything follows from this in the way I have argued, this still does not mean that that lens is the *right* one to use, regardless of its contemporary legacies. Though I do not advance a general view of what would constitute an 'ideal' theoretical standpoint to bring to bear on Homeric psychology, a criterion is unlikely to be that the standpoint in question promotes, as part of a broader progressivist scheme, the denial of features of contemporary psychology to Homer. Better criteria would instead involve assessing the scientific and philosophical virtues of such standpoints in themselves (which Snell does not do, and in fact cannot do, given his general unwillingness to talk about his theoretical decisions), as well as appraising the extent to which they can get the most out of the Homeric text, not least by opening up avenues for further interpretative inquiry. To see how I intend to go about this, I move now to the work of one of Snell's acquaintances and sympathisers, Eric Dodds.

Emotion: Dodds, Unseen Shame, and the Heroes' Flight

Aesimides, if he cared about people's disapproval,
nobody would enjoy very much worth enjoying.
(Archilochus)¹

This alone is denied even to a god:
to undo what has already been done.
(Agathon)²

I

In Book 3 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle discusses what he calls 'political' courage, an imperfect form of the true virtue. He explains: δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδίη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς (1116a 18-19), and goes on to illustrate what he means by citing two examples from the *Iliad*: τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἔκτορα· 'Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει'· καὶ Διομήδης· "Ἐκτωρ γὰρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων, 'Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο...' (1116a 21-26).³ Thus, he says, ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδίδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος (1116a 27-29). There is merit to Aristotle's selection of these two examples, as we will see. But a deeper consideration of these scenes, which I will undertake in the second part of this chapter, and an interrogation of what we mean by 'shame', which I will carry out presently, will show that

¹ Αἰσιμίδη, δήμου μὲν ἐπίρρησιν μελεδαίνων | οὐδεὶς ἂν μάλα πόλλ' ἡμερόεντα πάθοι (West, *IE* 2 14)

² μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκειται, | ἀγέννητα ποιεῖν ἄσ' ἂν ἧ πεπραγμένα (*TrGF* 1, 5).

³ The passages to which he refers are 22. 99ff. and 8. 147ff., respectively.

neither Hector nor Diomedes can so straightforwardly be taken to be concerned about the opinions of others.⁴

That Aristotle should refer to shame in this context should remind us of the considerable attention that has been devoted to this emotion within Homeric studies. Since Eric Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational*, which introduced classicists to the distinction, Homeric society has often been deemed a 'shame-culture', in opposition to a 'guilt-culture'. Dodds broaches this topic in the opening chapter of the book, 'Agamemnon's Apology', whilst discussing the function of ἄτη in distancing oneself from acts one regrets:

Evidently this is especially likely to happen when the acts in question are such as to cause acute shame to their author. We know how in our society unbearable feelings of guilt are got rid of by "projecting" them in phantasy on to someone else. And we may guess that the notion of *ate* served a similar purpose for Homeric man by enabling him in all good faith to project on to an external power his unbearable feelings of shame. I say "shame" and not "guilt," for certain American anthropologists have lately taught us to distinguish "shame-cultures" from "guilt-cultures," and the society described by Homer clearly falls into the former class.⁵

At this point Dodds clarifies, by way of a footnote, that "[a] simple explanation of these terms will be found in Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, 222ff".⁶ This is perhaps just as well, for whilst noting that he was "aware that these terms are not self-explanatory, that they are probably new to most classical scholars, and that they lend themselves easily to misconception",⁷ Dodds at no point offers a discussion of either of them. Thus, we must rely on his reference to *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* to provide the conceptual elaboration that *Greeks* does not.

⁴ Though it is worth noting that Aristotle does not take such concern to be an end in itself, for εὐκασι τὴν τιμὴν δῶκεν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοῦς ἀγαθοῦς εἶναι (*Eth. Nic.* 1095b 26-28).

⁵ Dodds, 1951: 17.

⁶ *Ibid.* 17, n. 106.

⁷ *Ibid.* 28.

Originally published in 1946, *Chrysanthemum* was the result of Benedict's production of an earlier, briefer wartime report on the nature of the Japanese character for the United States government, with a view to answering the question of how the Japanese ought to be treated, and what American occupiers could expect, once Japan had been defeated. For Benedict, an important difference between Americans and Japanese was that the former's culture was characterised by guilt, the latter's by shame; accordingly, America was a guilt-culture, and Japan a shame-culture. What did she mean by this? When we come to the pages Dodds cites, we read:

True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been made ridiculous. In either case it is a potent sanction. But it requires an audience or at least a man's fantasy of an audience. Guilt does not. In a nation where honor means living up to one's own picture of oneself, a man may suffer from guilt though no man knows of his misdeed and a man's feeling of guilt may actually be relieved by confessing his sin.⁸

A society that inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men's developing a conscience is a guilt culture by definition... In a culture where shame is a major sanction, people are chagrined about acts which we expect people to feel guilty about. This chagrin can be very intense and it cannot be relieved, as guilt can be, by confession and atonement. A man who has sinned can get relief by unburdening himself... Where shame is the major sanction, a man does not experience relief when he makes his fault public even to a confessor. So long as his bad behavior does not 'get out into the world' he need not be troubled and confession appears to him merely a way of courting trouble.⁹

[W]e do not expect shame to do the heavy work of morality. We do not harness the acute personal chagrin which accompanies shame to our fundamental system of morality. The Japanese do... Shame, they say, is the root of virtue. A man who is sensitive to it will carry out all the rules of good behavior... Shame has the same place of authority in Japanese ethics that a 'clear conscience,' 'being right with God,' and the avoidance of sin have in Western ethics.¹⁰

The primacy of shame in Japanese life means, as it does in any tribe or nation where shame is deeply felt, that any man watches the judgment of the public upon his deeds.

⁸ Benedict, 2005: 223.

⁹ *Ibid.* 222f.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 224.

He need only fantasy what their verdict will be, but he orients himself toward the verdict of others.¹¹

Whilst these assertions come as late as the tenth chapter of *Chrysanthemum*, Benedict had at several earlier points in the book anticipated them, even if the terminology of shame and guilt had then yet to be fully introduced. Thus, she referred to the fact that Japanese conduct during the war was largely motivated by the idea that the rest of the world was watching them: “Japanese seamen were warned that in case they were torpedoed and the order given to abandon ship, they should man the life-boats with the utmost decorum or ‘the world will laugh at you. The Americans will take movies of you and show them in New York’”, noting that “[i]t mattered what account they gave of themselves to the world [and] their concern with this point was a concern deeply embedded in Japanese culture”.¹² Further proof of this feature of their culture is found in the fact that American prisoners of war “tell... of how rigorously sentries required that the prisoners should cover up evasions of rules; the great crime was to evade openly”, with the illicit bringing back of food from work assignments outside the camp attracting little censure providing it was adequately secreted.¹³ Indeed, the entirety of chapter

¹¹ *Ibid.* Benedict’s views on shame were developed alongside those of her collaborator and friend Margaret Mead, especially as expressed in the latter’s *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples* (Mead, 1937). Mead too frames shame as an external sanction, and guilt as an internal one (493-495). But just as Mead was able to admit some flexibility to this scheme (“[s]hame may also, when it is very strongly developed, become a relatively internal sanction”, 494), Benedict’s own views were more complex than they initially appear: cf. n. 83. This is partly because Benedict, unlike Mead, was operating within a less rigidly homogenising psychoanalytic framework, *Chrysanthemum* flowing more from the cultural relativism of her mentor Franz Boas (cf. Boas, 1887: “In ethnology all is individuality... it is my opinion that the main object of ethnological collections should be the dissemination of the fact that civilization is not something absolute, but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes” (589); Brown, 2008: 364f.). Hence Modell, 1999: “In these versions [*e. g.* “[t]rue shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin”], Benedict’s concept echoes classic, Western psychoanalytic interpretations of shame. The plainness of her definition here and elsewhere in the book also reflects conversations she and Margaret Mead had that led to the shame-guilt contrasts in post-War national character studies. At the same time, in *Chrysanthemum* shame is thoroughly locked into the logic of Japanese culture, with two consequences: one, shame slips from its anchor in Western psychoanalytic writings to absorb Japanese meanings; two, the complex connotations that accrue to the concept turn into something far more powerful than a “catchword characterization” (200).

¹² Benedict, 2005: 29.

¹³ *Ibid.* 39.

8, 'Clearing One's Name', describes the rootedness of shame in Japan, even if not quite in those terms.¹⁴

Yet, despite the neatness with which she *conceptually* distinguishes shame- and guilt-cultures, Benedict regarded reality as considerably messier. Even in the foregoing quotations, we see that shame enjoys *primacy* in Japan; similarly, cultures "rely heavily on shame", others "heavily on guilt",¹⁵ but this is not to say any does so exclusively. About this Benedict is elsewhere explicit: "Japanese sometimes react as strongly as any Puritan to a private accumulation of guilt" and can be "overcome by guilt when other people know nothing of their misstep";¹⁶ conversely, an American may "suffer in addition [*sc.* to guilt] from shame when he accuses himself of gaucheries which are in no way sins".¹⁷ Here Benedict's thinking had evolved. In her earlier *Patterns of Culture*, originally published in 1934, to which *Chrysanthemum* served as sequel,¹⁸ she had discussed, albeit briefly, the role of shame among the 'primitive' peoples of the Zuñi, Dobu and Kwakiutl. In the latter's case, Benedict's view was that "[t]hey recognized only one gamut of emotion, that which swings between victory and shame",¹⁹ noting later that "[k]nowing but the one gamut, they used it for every occasion, even the most unlikely".²⁰ But by 1946, even if not twelve years earlier, 'shame-culture' and 'guilt-

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 145-176.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 222.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 222, 3, respectively. Note that for Benedict, "[t]he early Puritans who settled in the United States tried to base their whole morality on guilt" (223). This is of course false; as Ausubel, 1955 points out, "[t]he presence of the stock, the pillory, and the ducking stool in the public market place offers eloquent refutation" (387) of this claim. But what is relevant is that Benedict *thought* that Puritan culture was one singularly characterised by guilt.

¹⁷ Benedict, 2005: 222. *Cf.* "their extreme statements nevertheless point out correctly where the emphasis falls in Japan. It falls on the importance of shame rather than on the importance of guilt" (*ibid.*).

¹⁸ Note *Chrysanthemum*'s oft neglected subtitle, "Patterns of Japanese Culture".

¹⁹ Benedict, 1989: 215.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 220.

culture' were for Benedict matters of emphasis, not binary alternatives;²¹ and it is perhaps not insignificant that she never in fact calls Japan a shame-culture, true or otherwise.²²

How closely did Dodds follow this? I have already commented that his theoretical exploration is lacking, but nevertheless several comments suggest the dependence is heavy. Thus “Homeric man’s highest good is not the enjoyment of quiet conscience, but the enjoyment of *tīmē*, public esteem”²³ and “the strongest moral force which Homeric man knows is not the fear of god, but respect for public opinion, *aidōs*”;²⁴ he refers to a “tension between individual impulse and the pressure of social conformity characteristic of a shame-culture” and claims that “[i]n such a society, anything which exposes a man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to “lose face,” is felt as unbearable”;²⁵ moreover, “in a shame-culture gods, like men, are quick to resent a slight”;²⁶ noting finally that “the archaic sense of guilt becomes a sense of sin only as a result of... the “internalising” of conscience—a phenomenon which appears late and uncertainly in the Hellenic world, and does not become common until long after secular law had begun to recognise the importance of motive”.²⁷ That Dodds should have followed Benedict so closely is perhaps unsurprising. In the preface to *Greeks* he chides, albeit obliquely, those classicists whose intellectual horizons are too limited to take seriously the contributions of anthropology and psychology, whilst disclosing that the original lectures upon which the book was based were delivered to an audience consisting in

²¹ Cf. Creighton, 1990, “Benedict does not argue that guilt is absent in Japanese culture, that shame is lacking among Americans, nor that guilt and shame are unrelated to each other. What she does argue... is that shame sanctions play a greater role in regulating behavior in Japan than guilt sanctions” (281*f.*); Sabini & Silver, 1997, “Now, Benedict in fact saw the difference between these cultures as a matter of degree and emphasis, not as a categorical difference... although the popularization of her view makes this simplistic contrast... She did *not* assert that America had guilt but no shame whilst Japan had shame but no guilt” (9).

²² The point is pressed by Modell, 1999: 200.

²³ Dodds, 1951: 17

²⁴ *Ibid.* 18.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.* 32.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 36*f.* Note that in Dodds’ parlance the ‘archaic age’ follows, rather than encompasses, Homer. I take Dodds’ reference to the “internalising” of conscience” to reflect Benedict’s ostensible view that shame-cultures are characterised by external sanctions, whilst guilt-cultures are characterised by internal ones.

large part of anthropologists, among others with no specialist classical knowledge.²⁸ When Dodds refers the reader to Benedict, then, one can be sure he does so for good reason, and that she is providing the theoretical bedrock upon which his more desultory comments rest.

But Dodds did not follow Benedict, or at least *Chrysanthemum*, perfectly. For one, as we have seen, Dodds made much more of the shame and guilt distinction than Benedict did.²⁹ More importantly, however, he accepted, like the earlier Benedict but unlike the later, the possibility of a culture which could be characterised more-or-less *exclusively* by shame. This is not to say that he thought no cultures could be characterised by both, and about this Dodds' view was no less nuanced than that which we find in *Chrysanthemum*. Thus, he “recognise[s] that the distinction [*sc.* between shame- and guilt-cultures] is only relative, since in fact many modes of behaviour characteristic of shame-cultures persisted throughout the archaic and classical periods”,³⁰ noting later that “the contrast is less absolute than some scholars have assumed” and “[t]he discontinuity is not complete”.³¹ But these comments imply something else, made explicit in the title of *Greeks*' second chapter, ‘From Shame-Culture to Guilt-Culture’, namely a strongly progressivist view of Greek history.³² On Dodds' view, Homeric culture must be the shame-culture *par excellence*, followed by cultures increasingly, though incompletely, defined by guilt. These later cultures did indeed not differ absolutely from Homeric society, for they too incorporated shame into their emotional life, whilst guilt grew. But Homer's world, standing at the beginning of this progressive timeline, could encompass no substantial guilt at all. Thus, for Dodds, Homeric society is what the Kwakiutl were in

²⁸ *Ibid.* ‘Preface’.

²⁹ *Cf.* the recent examinations of Dodds' private correspondence, showing him inquiring about the origins of Benedict's distinction between shame- and guilt-cultures (Parker, 2019: 119, n. 13).

³⁰ Dodds, 1951: 28.

³¹ *Ibid.* 43.

³² *Cf.* my comments on this progressivist ideology in the Prologue and chapter 1, in the context of Snell's endorsement of the same; Snell and Dodds were in fact acquainted. Dodds is perhaps not as loyally wedded to the ideology as Snell, though the two share much in common about this broad outlook upon the past.

Patterns of Culture and what the Japanese were not in *Chrysanthemum*: an unadulterated shame-culture.

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These views attracted some criticism, even if it was not as widespread as we might expect. An early review of *Greeks* by Friedrich Solmsen (one of the few initial reviewers who had any significant criticism to make) suggested that Dodds had gone too far in emphasising the role of shame in Homeric society: guilt was present, too, and shame did not always play a role when one might expect it to do so, whilst often occurring in contexts in which it would occur in any culture.³³ Likewise, whilst Lloyd-Jones would suggest of the differentiation between shame- and guilt-cultures that “[i]n a general way this distinction can be useful”, nevertheless “among the cultures of which I have any knowledge, there is none in which both shame and guilt do not both play some part”, adding that “Dodds maintained that Ancient Greek culture began by being a shame culture, but by the fifth century BC had become a guilt culture”, whereas “in reply I argued that from the first Greek culture contained important elements of a guilt culture and that even after the fifth century it continued to preserve many elements of a shame culture”.³⁴ Later, James Arieti would offer a similar corrective. For he “should like to suggest that Homer originates the movement from shame to guilt, and that he does so in the figure of Achilles”,³⁵ who “becomes the inventor of guilt, of private conscience”.³⁶ This again is to say that guilt already existed for Homer, and that Dodds, in denying this, had gone too far, even if Arieti is keen to stress that he does not “[wish] in any way to undercut the conclusions and observations of [the] work” of any scholars who depend on the “assumption” that Homeric

³³ Solmsen, 1954: 193f.

³⁴ Lloyd-Jones, 1990: 253f.; the article was published earlier, in German translation, as Lloyd-Jones, 1987. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, 1983, “I know no example of a culture of the one type which does not contain elements of the other also, and I doubt whether it is possible to point to a specimen of either type which is totally without an admixture of the other” (25f.) and “from the start a shame-culture must contain elements of guilt-culture” (26).

³⁵ Arieti, 1985: 194.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 203; cf. 198.

society is a shame-culture.³⁷ Arieti's contribution, like that of Solmsen and Lloyd-Jones, can therefore be broadly characterised as *empirical*: all three are concerned only to rebalance Dodds' weighing of the amount of shame and guilt in Homeric culture (and even then, inasmuch as they continue to accept that Homeric culture is a shame-culture, to no great extent), whilst taking no issue (explicitly, in Arieti's case) with the *theoretical* underpinnings of that assessment. There is no attempt to question the validity of the shame (-culture) *versus* guilt (-culture) distinction, or to reassert that validity on alternative conceptual grounds.

For an interrogation of that distinction, there was nevertheless some work which came closer. James Redfield agreed with Dodds that Homeric culture was a shame-culture, and in many respects even mirrored Dodds theoretically: Homer's is "a world where "what people will say" is the most reliable guide to right and wrong",³⁸ and conscience "a concept which is certainly post-Homeric".³⁹ Shame is asserted to be "the most pervasive ethical emotion in Homeric society; it is basically a responsiveness to social situations and to the judgments of others";⁴⁰ it is "a vulnerability to the expressed ideal norm of the society";⁴¹ generally "an emotion provoked by the perception of one's place in the social structure and of the obligations which accompany that place"⁴² and "felt toward persons in the exercise of their social roles or when they are perceived as having a social relation to oneself".⁴³ Nevertheless, these commitments, Doddsian as they are, make it all the more surprising that Redfield should say, of the 'ideal norm', that it "is directly experienced *within the self*, as a man *internalizes* the anticipated judgments of others on himself".⁴⁴ On this point, Matthew Dickie took a comparable view: he also agreed, with Redfield, that Dodds was right on the matter of there

³⁷ *Ibid.* 194.

³⁸ Redfield, 1994: 116.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 115.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 116.

⁴² *Ibid.* 118.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 116, my emphasis.

being an Homeric shame-culture,⁴⁵ but argued similarly “that it is wrong to infer from the fact that a society is a shame culture that, in such a society, men’s conduct is governed solely by what they think others will say and not at all by internalized moral imperatives”.⁴⁶ Here then we might imagine there has been a theoretical innovation. For whilst Dodds endorsed Benedict’s ostensible view, as we saw earlier, that “[t]rue shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin”,⁴⁷ both Redfield and Dickie, though they thought that Dodds was right about there being an Homeric shame-culture, suggested even so that the notion of ‘shame-culture’ be revised, such that shame could be responsive to *internal* sanctions.

This matter of internal sanctions would inform the two most significant critiques of the Dodds-Benedict view of shame and shame-culture, both of which were published in 1993: Douglas Cairns’ *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* and Bernard Williams’ *Shame and Necessity*. Cairns, in his detailed study of αἰδώς, devotes a great deal of introductory space to systematically attacking what he views as a problematic distinction between shame and guilt, and their respective, corresponding cultures. Naturally, Dodds and Benedict (the latter more openly, given the former’s derivativeness) both feature as targets of this critique. Thus, quoting a part of *Chrysanthemum* we have already considered,⁴⁸ Cairns suggests that this describes “the basic distinction between shame as a response to external sanctions and guilt as a response, uniquely, to internal sanctions”.⁴⁹ This Cairns critiques as a “readiness to represent in terms of guilt any form of shame which has reference to internalized standards”, referring to “a fixation on external sanctions as the focus of shame”, which “leads Benedict, when she acknowledges the presence of internalized

⁴⁵ Dickie, 1978: 92.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 93.

⁴⁷ n. 8.

⁴⁸ n. 8.

⁴⁹ Cairns, 1993: 27.

standards and ‘conscience’ in Japanese society, to describe the phenomena in terms of guilt”.⁵⁰ This involves a “rigidity with which the criterion in terms of external and internal sanctions is applied”, which “thus prevents the recognition that the presence of internalized standards of behaviour may be all of a piece with those phenomena which are classified in terms of shame”.⁵¹ For Cairns, then, “such a conception of shame and guilt is untenable, since at all stages both shame and guilt possess an internalized component”.⁵² Furthermore, whilst Cairns earlier suggests that “shame bears a frequent, and some would say an essential, reference to the concept of an audience”,⁵³ he emphasises that “in spite of the explicit reference to the concept of an audience, internalized standards do come into play, and the proximate source of shame is the self’s judgement of the self”.⁵⁴ For, he continues, “[t]hat shame can occur in one’s own eyes is not surprising, given the role of internalized standards even in shame referring explicitly to others, and given the fact that explicit reference to an external audience may be nothing more than a projection of this internal standard”,⁵⁵ suggesting that “[o]ne can be one’s own audience, provided one comes to take up the position of a detached observer *vis-à-vis* oneself. References to the audience, then, and metaphors of ‘eyes’ and ‘being seen’ indicate the essential role of the detached observer in shame; thus shame does require the concept of an ‘other’, but the ‘other’ may be wholly internalized, such that one can be an observer to oneself”.⁵⁶ Accordingly, we are left with the following conclusion:

This formulation may seem rather like having one’s cake and eating it (shame requires the concept of the detached observer but not a real or hypothetical external observer, so that the notion of the observer may be at once essential and metaphorical), but it has the great merit of demonstrating how the structure of shame is the same in all cases—

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 28.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.* 27.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 15.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 17.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 18.

where there is a real audience, where an audience is present in fantasy, and where the role of the audience is played by oneself.⁵⁷

What then of Williams? On Dodds' central idea, he remarks that "[t]here is some truth in the idea that Homeric society was a shame culture... But if we are to make such a claim, we have to get clearer about what is involved in shame itself".⁵⁸ This Williams does at some length: "[t]he basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition. It is straightforwardly connected with nakedness, particularly in sexual connections... The reaction is to cover oneself or to hide, and people naturally take steps to avoid the situations that call for it... From this there is a spread of applications through various kinds of shyness or embarrassment".⁵⁹ For Williams, then, shame must also involve an audience. Yet it is not that "Homeric shame involves merely adjustment to the prejudices of the community" or that "the reactions of shame depend simply on being found out [and] the feeling behind every decision or thought that is governed by shame is literally and immediately the fear of being seen", for in that case "[n]o one would have a character, in effect, and, moreover, the very idea of there being a shame *culture*, a coherent system for the regulation of conduct, would be unintelligible".⁶⁰ Accordingly, Williams suggests that "[e]ven if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do".⁶¹ This 'other' is "internalised",⁶² amounting to the "internalisation of shame",⁶³ and they "need not be a particular individual, or, again, merely the representative of some socially identified group. The other may be identified in ethical terms. He... is conceived

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Williams, 1993: 78.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 81f.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 82.

⁶² *Ibid.* 84.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 83.

as one whose reactions I would respect; equally, he is conceived as someone who would respect those same reactions if they were appropriately directed to him”.⁶⁴

Thus, it seems clear that Dodds, apparently following Benedict,⁶⁵ was too quick to regard shame as a reaction to the disapprobation of external audiences and their sanctions alone, and this has appropriately informed a significant strand of criticism of *Greeks*. The foregoing scholars variously emphasise the importance of shame’s association with internal sanctions, values of one’s own, as well as the fact that the audiences before which one may be ashamed need not be ‘out there’ in the world, but can be audiences, including hypothetical and non-specific audiences, of one’s imagination, and indeed even audiences which amount to no more than oneself. But in none of the criticism to which I have referred has what I take to be a more fundamental commitment of Dodds, and Benedict with him, been interrogated: the importance of audiences to shame *simpliciter*.

II

There has been a long tradition of treating shame as being essentially characterised by its society,⁶⁶ necessarily involving the presence, in some sense, of an audience. This goes back at least as far as Aristotle, who defines shame in his *Rhetoric* as λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἄδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων (1383b 12-14). It is implicit in his use of ἄδοξία that shame must implicate others, and this is confirmed by his

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 84.

⁶⁵ As I will suggest presently, despite what I have quoted Benedict as saying in this section, her views about shame, guilt, and external and internal sanctions were more nuanced than they sometimes appear: *cf.* n. 83.

⁶⁶ I do not mean by this the relatively uninteresting view that shame, like all emotions, is developed from contact with others, which presumably everybody accepts; *cf.* Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011: “shame can be said to be trivially social for the rather uncontroversial reason that we learn *in situ* and in contact with others about those circumstances that merit shame... this claim about the social nature of the developmental path of shame is true of many emotions, if not all, and is not the philosophically more interesting and controversial claim promoted by the social conception of shame” (152*f.*). In this section, it is this ‘philosophically more interesting’ conception of shame that I am appraising, in which audiences, of various kinds, are taken to be necessary components of the structure of all experiences of shame. Any doubts I express about shame’s society *vel sim.* are to be interpreted in this light only.

subsequent analysis;⁶⁷ and, like the scholars discussed in the previous section, he permits that the others in question can be of one's own fantasy.⁶⁸ Aristotle would be followed by many distinguished philosophers. Thus Descartes: "Shame... comes from the opinion or fear of being blamed", adding that "when one feels so strong that one cannot imagine oneself to be scorned by anyone, one cannot easily be ashamed";⁶⁹ Hobbes, "*Grief*, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is shame, or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a sign of the love of good reputation... in old men it is a sign of the same..."⁷⁰; Spinoza, "Shame is sadness attendant upon some idea of ours, which we imagine someone to despise";⁷¹ Kant, "Shame is anxiety about the concerned contempt of a person who is present... Otherwise, one can also be easily ashamed without the presence of the person before whom one feels shame";⁷² and Sartre, for though "shame... realises an intimate relation of myself with myself", nevertheless "shame in its primary structure is shame *before someone*" and "I am ashamed of myself *as I appear to another*".⁷³ The views of these authors should not be conflated, either with one another or with Aristotle's. But despite any differences between them, all share an underlying commitment to the idea that shame necessarily involves exposure to audiences.

⁶⁷ 1383b-1385a. Cf. e.g. 1384b, where, when describing Αὐτοὶ δὲ ὧδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἄν (27), he goes on to list people before whom one will feel shame: οὗτοι ἢ ὀρώντες... ἢ ἄν πλησίον ὧσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἢ μέλλωσιν αἰσθήσεσθαι (31f., 35f.).

⁶⁸ Thus, when illustrating the first category (οὗτοι ἢ ὀρώντες), he says the following: ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγόρησεν· ἡξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὀρώντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἃ ἄν ψηφίσωνται (1384b 32-35). The Athenians are enjoined by Cydias to *imagine* (ὑπολαβεῖν) the Greeks watching them make their decision. Note the importance assigned to sight, to the Athenians being caught, in a sense, *in flagrante*; the contrast is between this and the remainder of Greece hearing about the decision after the fact.

⁶⁹ Descartes, 1964: §205. "La Honte... vient de l'opinion ou de la crainte qu'on a d'estre blasmé"; "lors qu'on s'estime si fort, qu'on ne se peut imaginer d'estre méprisé par personne, on ne peut pas aysement estre honteux".

⁷⁰ Hobbes, 1996: 1. 6, §44.

⁷¹ Spinoza, 1677: XXXI, "Pudor est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios vituperare imaginamur".

⁷² Kant, 1798: §76, "Scham ist Angst aus der besorgten Verachtung einer gegenwärtigen Person... Sonst kann einer sich auch empfindlich schämen ohne Gegenwart dessen, vor dem er sich schämt".

⁷³ Sartre, 1943: 265f., "[l]a honte réalise... une relation intime de moi avec moi"; "la honte dans sa structure première est honte *devant quelqu'un*"; "j'ai honte de moi *tel que j'apparais à autrui*".

Clearly, this, what I will call the ‘social’ approach to shame, is one with a long and distinguished philosophical pedigree; moreover, it is one that has enjoyed a great deal of scientific support, from Darwin to Freud to Erikson, and more recent advocates besides.⁷⁴ Yet whilst advocates of the social approach share a belief in the essential role played by audiences, the way in which they conceive of those audiences varies. As we saw in the previous section, and indeed in the quotations in the prior paragraph, for some the audience may be an ‘external’, concrete audience, for others an ‘internal’, fantasied one, whilst for still others a combination of both.⁷⁵ But other advocates of the social approach have adopted a distinct view, namely that

⁷⁴ Darwin, 1882 claims that “shame... relates almost exclusively to the judgment of others” (114); Freud, 1911 does not say much about shame, but his assertion that *e.g.* “reproach transforms (the sexual action having been performed in childhood) easily into shame (if another learns of it)” (verwandelt sich Vorwurf (die sexuelle Aktion im Kindesalter vollführt zu haben) mit Leichtigkeit in Scham (wenn ein Anderer davon erführe)) (105) marks out his position with relative clarity; Erikson, 1963 suggests that “[s]hame supposes that one is completely exposed and conscious of being looked at: in one word, self-conscious. One is visible and not ready to be visible... He who is ashamed would like to force the world not to look at him, not to notice his exposure. He would like to destroy the eyes of the world” (252*f.*). For more recent scientific defences of the social approach, *cf.* Smith, Webster, Parrott & Eyre, 2002, and literature cited therein; Ferguson, Stegge & Damhuis, 1991; Crozier, 1998.

⁷⁵ *Cf.* the views of Williams, 1993, to which I refer above (pp. 85*f.*); Galligan, 2014: 58, “private shame is either not shame at all, strictly speaking, or at least parasitic on public shame, so that the latter is the basic phenomenon”; Ben-Ze’ev, 2000: 513, “Shame is mainly derived from an interest in how others regard us... Shame seems to presuppose an audience... in a way that guilt... do[es] not... In shame there is typically a causal connection between what others actually feel and what we feel”; Elster, 1999: 149, “shame is triggered by the contemptuous or disgusted disapproval by others of something one has done. It is an internal interaction-based emotion: I feel shame in your presence because I know you disapprove of me”; 152, “Shame typically *needs*, for its actualization, the presence of others; guilt does not” (*n.b.* also n. 44, “I say “typically,” as I do not want to deny that shame can be triggered by thoughts about what others *would have thought* rather than by what they actually think...”); Scruton, 2006: 141, “Shame is a special case of embarrassment. The man who is ‘ashamed of himself [*sic*] shares the attitude that he fears... his fear of the other’s judgement becomes a fear of *discovery*, a fear that the other will know him, as he already knows himself... it is an instinctive manifestation of shame that the subject should seek... to hide his face in his hands, to cover that part of him where his perspective lies exposed, as it were, to the fearsome gaze of another’s judgement...”; 147, “In each of these [*sc.* forms of shame] there is the same fundamental thought that structures embarrassment: the thought that I come before the other, and am judged, as an individual”; Maibom, 2010: 567, “[Shame] is a profoundly social emotion uniquely sensitive to the opinion of social others”; 568, “Shame concerns failure to live up to norms, ideals, and standards that are primarily *public*; shame concerns our lives with others”; 569, “Central to shame is the idea of being observed or watched by others... even those who deny that an audience is required for shame affirm that it is connected with seeing oneself as *others* would see one. Central to shame, then, is the notion of a seeing other, of an audience. This audience, however, can be an imagined one... People stop themselves from doing what is shameful out of fear of the *imagined* reaction of others”; Deigh, 1983: 233, “shame is often more, when it is not exclusively, a response to the evident deprecatory opinion others have of one than an emotion aroused upon judgment that one’s aims are shoddy or that one is deficient in talent or ability necessary to achieve them”; 238, “a satisfactory characterization [*sc.* of shame] must include in a central role one’s concern for the opinions of others”; 242, “we should conceive shame, not as a reaction to a loss, but as a reaction to a threat, specifically, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the appearance of someone of lesser worth”.

the audience need not be an ‘other’ in the foregoing senses, but in fact merely oneself adopting a perspective *as though* of another. According to Adam Smith:

When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of.⁷⁶

Something akin to this view has more recently been endorsed by Gabriele Taylor:

There is, then, this point to the metaphors of an audience and of being seen: they reflect the structural features of the agent’s becoming aware of the discrepancy between her own assumption about her state or action and a possible detached observer-description of this state or action, and of her further being aware that she ought not to be in a position where she could be so seen, where such a description at least appears to fit. For particular cases of shame an actual or imagined observer may or may not be required.⁷⁷

Many have argued similarly,⁷⁸ including, as we have already seen, Cairns in the context of classical studies.⁷⁹ Indeed, it seems Benedict was also at times open to this more refined notion of what an audience could be. Admittedly, as we saw earlier, she described shame as “a reaction to other people’s criticism”, arguing that “a man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been made ridiculous... [shame] requires

⁷⁶ Smith, 2002: 131.

⁷⁷ Taylor, 1985: 66; *cf.* 53-68 for the wider discussion.

⁷⁸ *Cf.* López, 2017, who highlights approvingly (404) the claims of Adam Smith I reproduce above. Earlier endorsements may include Riezler, 1943: 457*f.*, “Man, as his own observer, can be ashamed of things of which no one knows... The mother reproves him: “Aren’t you ashamed?” Even if she adds, “Imagine if someone saw that you are afraid,” she wants her son to be ashamed of himself as his own observer”; Aldrich, 1939: 66, “shame is a social phenomenon... your shame is how people feel about your conduct. Or shame is what you feel about an act from a public point of view”.

⁷⁹ pp. 83-85.

an audience or at least a man's fantasy of an audience".⁸⁰ But elsewhere she explicates the notion of the 'observing-self':

In Western phraseology, the Japanese in the practice of muga and of 'living as one already dead' eliminate the conscience. What they call the 'observing-self', 'the interfering self,' is a censor judging one's acts... [the Japanese] undergoes... self-training to eliminate the self-censorship of shame (haji). Only then is his 'sixth sense' free of hindrance. It is his supreme release from self-consciousness and conflict... We have already seen how heavily this shame (haji) which they assign to 'the observing self' weighs upon the Japanese.⁸¹

Japanese feelings about the mirror are derived from the time before the 'observing self' was inculcated in the child. They do not see the 'observing self' in the looking glass. There their selves are spontaneously good as they were in childhood, without the mentor of 'shame.' The same symbolism they attribute to the mirror is the basis too of their ideas of 'expert' self-discipline, in which they train themselves with such persistence to eliminate the 'observing self' and get back the directness of childhood.⁸²

This 'observing self' seems close indeed to Smith's examining and judging 'I', suggesting that Benedict was not as committed to the less refined version of the social approach as she seems to be elsewhere in *Chrysanthemum*,⁸³ the surprise of the contradiction is perhaps lessened if we recall that, despite discussion of shame and guilt being an important feature of the book, it is disputable that Benedict ever intended *Chrysanthemum* to be known for this, with the backbone of the work constituting an analysis of peculiarly Japanese ethical values, such as *gimu*, *gimi* and *on*.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Benedict, 2005: 223.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 250f.

⁸² *Ibid.* 289.

⁸³ And so not as committed to the rigid 'shame: external sanction, guilt: internal sanction' framework that she endorses elsewhere in the book. Note that her programmatic "[t]rue shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin" (n. 8) is immediately followed by the claims that "[s]hame is a reaction to other people's criticism", involving one "being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been made ridiculous", which "requires an [*sc.* 'real'] audience or at least a man's fantasy of an audience". No reference is made here to the self-as-audience, 'observing-self', view quoted in the text, implying that such a programmatic statement was not as universally encompassing as it first seems.

⁸⁴ *Cf.* Kent, 1994 and Kent, 1999: 188f. for argument along these lines; Boles, 2006 provides a contrary, though unconvincing, impression. A judicious perspective is offered by Ryang, 2002: "The coinage of shame culture came as much from later re-readings of the book by Japanese scholars as from *Chrysanthemum* itself... In my view, whether Benedict truly intended [to portray Japanese culture primarily as a shame culture] or not is of less

The question, then, is to what extent the social approach to shame is a convincing one. To take what I have characterised as the less refined version first, admittedly not for nothing has it proved so popular: we need only take a moment to recall memories of being ashamed to remember that on many of these occasions audiences were crucial. Yet there has been no shortage of philosophers who have expressed doubts about this version, whether directly or by implication: long before Aristotle, Democritus could say φαῦλον, κἂν μόνος ἦις, μήτε λέξις μήτ' ἐργάσηι· μάθε δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων σεαυτὸν αἰσχύνεσθαι (DK B244),⁸⁵ and others have lately deemphasised the importance of audiences, whether of our fantasy or social reality.⁸⁶ To take one important objection, if this version must accommodate the belief that one

concern than how shame culture became, over fifty years, so important in the Japanese reading of Benedict and in Japanese self-perceptions" (91, n. 3). Early reviews bear out what is suggested in the text: no English language review refers to either 'shame-culture' or 'guilt-culture', and most do not use the terms 'shame' or 'guilt' at all (not referring to either 'shame-culture' or 'guilt-culture': Raglan, 1948; Hoijer, 1947; Bowles, 1947; Kroeber, 1947; Ackerknecht, 1947; Bogardus, 1947. Not using the terms 'shame' or 'guilt' at all: Useem, 1949; King, 1969; Embree, 1947; Clyde, 1947; Steiner, 1947; Fletcher, 1948; Morris, 1947; Rademaker, 1947). Even among early Japanese criticism, following *Chrysanthemum*'s publication in Japan in 1948, the issue was hardly central; in a 1953 English summary of these reviews (Bennett & Nagai, 1953), the terms are again not mentioned, whilst a more recent overview (Ryang, 2002) gives the same impression. Quite why the book became known for the shame-guilt distinction is therefore not clear. It may well be that Dodds, as one of the earliest scholars to emphasise this part of Benedict's work, facilitated by the popularity of *Greeks*, cemented it as part of *Chrysanthemum*'s legacy, at least in the Anglophone world. In Japan, the same role was probably played by Sakuta, Yagi & McKinney, 1986 (a translation of Sakuta's Japanese original, published in 1964).

⁸⁵ A fuller version of the same thought is found in DK B264, μηδὲν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἐωυτοῦ μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδῆσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἀνθρώποι· ἀλλ' ἐωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῆι ψυχῆι καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον. Note that one will only accept that this constitutes a pre-Aristotelian alternative to the social approach if these Stobaeian fragments are accepted as genuine.

⁸⁶ Cf. perhaps Isenberg, 1949: 11f., though initially suggesting that "the feeling of shame is bound up with the idea of publicity", goes on to say that "we must allow for the existence of an autonomous conscience, for the fact that a man may feel himself disgraced by something that is unworthy in his own eyes and apart from any judgment but his own... When we see public opinion for what it is, it turns out to be a smaller thing, for good or for ill, than what our fantasy projected. And... this seems to point to the existence of sources of shame independent of society. For if we can stigmatize ourselves more severely than others do and impute that judgment to them, if (in Spinoza's terms) we can "imagine others to blame us" more harshly than they do, there must be a spontaneous and factitious element in our sense of disgrace"; Gibbard, 1990, of the view that "[g]uilt and shame differ... in that guilt is internalized and shame is not: whereas I can feel guilt about things I alone know I have done, I can feel ashamed only of things that expose me to the judgment of others. Guilt can be over a secret, but shame must always be about things that are public", says "[n]ow that seems wrong. Some emotions close to shame must be over public matters—humiliation and embarrassment seem like that—but shame need not... Guilt and shame are both possible in secret, and they may each be intensified by exposure" (136f.). For more robust scepticism, cf. Boonin, 1983: 295, "The thesis of [this] paper is that morally significant experiences of shame not only can occur without an audience, actual or imagined, but that they are in an important sense more "internal" to the person than experiences

can be ashamed before an imaginary audience (the denial of which would implausibly entail that shame and solitude could never go together), this is phenomenologically problematic, for what is it to ‘imagine’ an audience? Surely it cannot be a necessary condition for experiencing this very common emotion that one, at the relevant time, conjures in one’s mind a mental ‘picture’ of an audience, for it seems obvious that we can experience shame quite successfully whilst not engaging in this very precise kind of fantasy.⁸⁷ But if not this, what imaginative exercise does the advocate of this version of the social approach have in mind? But perhaps more pressing is this version’s inability to accommodate the many empirical, scientific explorations of shame that have occurred especially in the last thirty years, which have shown that audiences, whether of one’s fantasy or not, are not nearly as indispensable as many have supposed. This is work to which I will return presently.⁸⁸

What then of the other version of the social approach, as represented by Smith, Taylor and others? This avoids the ‘phenomenological’ problem of its less refined cousin, since it does not make such committal claims about what one is imagining and how one is doing so.⁸⁹ Rather,

of guilt. It will be argued that... guilt is more social in nature than shame and this difference is crucial for understanding the distinct roles they play within human existence”; Richards, 1971: 257, “Both feelings [*sc.* shame and guilt] are equally internal, in the sense of being feelings which are derived from internalized beliefs and attitudes, and which are experienced quite apart from the actual or fantasied blame of others; where they are differentiated is in the characteristic beliefs and attitudes with which they are associated”.

⁸⁷ Cf. Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011: 25*f.*, “So, what are the consequences of the claim that all shame episodes involve a real or imagined audience that expresses or has unwelcome opinions about us? Taken literally, it would mean that to feel shame involves picturing in one’s mind such an audience. Because what is pictured is accessible to introspection, to be phenomenologically adequate the appeal to imagination should always put one in a position to answer the question “Who is expressing the unwelcome opinion about me?” Is it obvious that, each time we feel shame in the absence of any real audience—i.e., solitary shame—we are able to answer this question? If I realize that I have been walking along all day with a rather large stain on my shirt, the shame I might feel can involve more or less articulated thoughts about others, but certainly not necessarily the picturing of any one person or audience in particular”. Consider in this connection the phenomenon of ‘aphantasia’, of recent research interest (*e.g.* Zeman, Dewar & Sala, 2015), but described long ago by Francis Galton: “To my astonishment, I found that the great majority of the men of science to whom I first applied, protested that mental imagery was unknown to them, and they looked on me as fanciful and fantastic in supposing that the words ‘mental imagery’ really expressed what I believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had no more notion of its true nature than a colour-blind man who has not discerned his defect has of the nature of colour. They had a mental deficiency of which they were unaware, and naturally enough supposed that those who were normally endowed, were romancing” (Galton, 1880: 302). On the version of the social approach I am criticising, sufferers of aphantasia would never experience shame in private, since they could never in the required sense imagine an audience; but this seems unlikely.

⁸⁸ pp. 98*f.*

⁸⁹ Cf. Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011: 26.

what I take to be problematic about this version is its insistence that shame must involve a perspectival shift on what one has done, and that the newly acquired perspective must in some sense be an observer's perspective.⁹⁰ According to both Taylor and Smith, shame involves moving from a pre-reflective state, in which I am immersed in conduct I may soon find shameful, to an evaluative stance, in which I adopt an external, observer's perspective on what I have been doing, now seeing it, as it were, through another's eyes, and thereby feel shame. Yet there remain clear cases of being ashamed of what one is doing whilst one does it, especially in cases of *akrasia*, a situation that one can often fully anticipate. One can, for instance, be ashamed of giving in to an addiction even whilst one succumbs, having known that one would feel this way before yielding to temptation; there is no need for a shift in perspective, from one of absorption in my transgression to a realisation of the implications of what I am doing, an adoption of some notional observer's perspective on what I am doing. Likewise, as I will emphasise presently,⁹¹ shame seems often to be implicated in *enduring* characteristics of ours, that are (perceived by us to be) difficult, if not impossible, to change. Such perspectival shifts as envisioned by this version seem well-suited to things I discover or rediscover anew, whether a passing thought, transient behaviour, or what I think will become an enduring characteristic. But if that characteristic has long been known to me, even if there was a time of "becoming aware of the discrepancy between [an] assumption about [a] state or action and a possible detached observer-description of this state or action", that time may have been decades past. Yet still one can feel ashamed of a perennial flaw: if one is prone to succumbing to one's addiction, then one may feel ashamed of this weakness. Shame like this

⁹⁰ The arguments I make in this and the following paragraph largely follow Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011: 145ff. However, I will adduce additional objections, and am much more committed to the idea that shame relates to enduring characteristics than they are. For though they too recognise the importance of the latter, they can also say that "[m]ilder episodes of shame will be those in which the incapacity is thought to be grounded in a disvalue that one might easily shake off. As the French saying goes, sometimes "un moment de honte est vite passé" (105f.), taking as one of their paradigmatic examples of shame's provocation "walking along all day with a rather large stain on my shirt" (25).

⁹¹ pp. 97ff.

is as chronic and familiar as the defect that motivates it, and cannot be bound to a perspectival shift such as Taylor and Smith describe.⁹²

But even if it were the case that such shifts are necessary, why must the perspective arrived at amount to the adoption of some observer's perspective? Consider Taylor's example, which she adapts from Max Scheler:

A model who has been posing for an artist for some time comes to feel shame when she realizes that he no longer regards her as a model, but regards her as a woman. We have here to begin with a position in which she is at ease: she thinks, or unthinkingly assumes, that their relation is a wholly impersonal one. She then becomes aware of a changed point of view on the part of the artist, which is a view that clashes with the one held by her, or unthinkingly assumed by her. Awareness of this view forces her to abandon her own view of the situation, viz., forces her to see their relation as no longer impersonal. She does not, however, need to see herself as the artist sees her, she need not see herself as a woman in the sense of 'object of sexual interest'. She merely becomes aware that she is so seen. So in this respect she does not identify with the audience, she sees rather how she appears to the artist. Nor need she think of that audience's viewpoint as being at all critical of her; it is more likely in the circumstances that his attitude is one of approval. However, she must identify with some critical view of herself if we are to have a case of shame... as the result of realizing her relation to him [*sc.* the artist] she sees herself in a new light. The point can be expressed by introducing a second, higher order point of view from which she is seen not as an object of sexual interest, but is seen as *being seen* as such an object. With this point of view she does identify, and this point of view is a critical one. The adverse judgement, however, comes not from the artist, but comes from herself.⁹³

We have in this example the perspectival shift Taylor desiderates in a satisfactory account of shame, but there does not seem to be any clear reason to regard this newly acquired perspective as *inevitably* one of an observer, spectator, or the like. Rather, we have here a powerful illustration of the development of a *reflexive* attitude, what Scheler referred to as a 'turning to ourselves',⁹⁴ the way in which shame involves intensely evaluating one's situation and that situation's implications for one's valuation of oneself. Here the model has become, even if

⁹² Additionally, Smith's "[w]hen I *endeavour* to examine my own conduct, when I *endeavour* to pass sentence upon it..." (emphasis mine) not only implies, with Taylor, that a perspectival shift must precede shame, but also implausibly suggests that such a shift must be a voluntary one.

⁹³ Taylor, 1985: 61.

⁹⁴ Scheler, 1987: 15, Frings' translation.

inadvertently, the target of somebody else's erotic appreciation, and, realising as much and finding the situation unwelcome, she reflects on what this means for her: she is now the sort of person whom an artist views as a sexual object, rather than (only) as an object of proper aesthetic or technical interest. This, I think, is what the refined version of the social approach helps well to highlight, for such shifts in perspective as Taylor envisages bring out forcefully the importance of reflexivity.⁹⁵ But though it is quite *possible* that the adoption of a new perspective may amount not only to the assuming of a reflexive stance but also in some sense to the stance of an observer, the latter does not seem required in the manner of the former, since routine cases of shame, whether of the ashamed model or otherwise, seem explicable without it.⁹⁶ Further, it is worth stressing that, as we saw in the prior paragraph, such shifts in perspective are not the only venues for such reflexivity—the model may reflect just the same even if she visits the prurient artist's studio often, and her shame about the situation is longstanding.

Finally, I should comment briefly on something that could pose problems for both versions of the social approach I have explored. It seems to be the case that those things of which we are most ashamed are often those that are not only totally unexposed to others, but not even unambiguously exposed to ourselves. To take an example from literature, whilst the K. of Kafka's *Der Process* acknowledges what seems to be the social shame he feels at the manner of his execution,⁹⁷ we may suspect that the greater shame lies rather in a much earlier

⁹⁵ Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011: 148f.

⁹⁶ As Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011:148 touch upon, this version of the social approach tries to preserve some essential element of alterity even in the absence of a real or imagined audience, but it is not fully clear what the perspective of an observer *vel sim.*, over and above reflexivity, would add in this context.

⁹⁷ Kafka, 1990: 312, "with breaking [*sic*] eyes, K. still saw how close to his face the men were, their cheeks pressed against one another's, observing the decision. "Like a dog" said K. It was as though the shame should outlive him" (Mit brechenden Augen sah noch K. wie nahe vor seinem Gesicht die Herren Wange an Wange aneinandergelehnt die Entscheidung beobachteten. „Wie ein Hund!“ sagte er, es war, als sollte die Scham ihn überleben). The eyes of the executioners seem important to K's experience of shame (even if there is likely more to it than that), just as K.'s own eyesight begins to fail him. Note that I use the spelling 'Process', since it is Kafka's own; variant spellings are due to later editors.

scene, in which K. experiences a barely suppressed, and unacknowledged, sexual arousal as he witnesses his erstwhile arrestors being whipped by their superior.⁹⁸ These, especially when sexually charged, may be some of the most intense sources of shame, and yet never be put before an audience, whether real or imagined, a fact that seems at odds with the first version of the social approach. The more refined version is less clearly affected by this objection, but nevertheless can perhaps not comfortably accommodate it. If I am ashamed in the manner I suspect K. is, only incompletely or inconstantly acknowledging either what I have done or else the depravity of it, could I really in that circumstance amount to the kind of ‘self-as-audience’ as Taylor and Smith imagine, acknowledging and reflecting upon my conduct in the manner they describe? Indeed, there seem to be problems here even for the basic reflexivity implicit in these accounts, which I too have endorsed.⁹⁹ But this version of the social approach, by making of the ashamed agent his own observer, seems at risk of missing the emotion at its most potent: an ‘observer’ must at least be looking at something to merit the use of the term, rather than averting his gaze because he only fitfully acknowledges the existence and significance of what he is supposedly looking at.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ E. g. “The one man, who apparently was in charge of the others and first turned his eyes towards him, was in a kind of dark leather outfit, which left his neck deep to his chest and the entirety of his arms naked” (Der eine Mann, der die andern offenbar beherrschte und zuerst den Blick auf sich lenkte, stak in einer Art dunklern Lederkleidung, die den Hals bis tief zur Brust und die ganzen Arme nackt ließ) (*ibid.* 108f.); “‘Can the cane cause such pain?’” asked K. and examined the cane which the whipper swung in front of him. “We’ll need to strip completely naked”, said Willem. “I see”, said K., and looked more closely at the whipper. He was tanned like a sailor, and had a wild, fresh face... “Strip”, he commanded the guards” („Kann denn die Rute solche Schmerzen machen“, fragte K. und prüfte die Rute, die der Prügler vor ihm schwang. „Wir werden uns ja ganz nackt ausziehen müssen“, sagte Willem. „Ach so“, sagte K. und sah den Prügler genauer an, er war braun gebrannt wie ein Matrose und hatte ein wildes frisches Gesicht... „Zieht Euch aus“, befahl er den Wächtern) (110f.); “‘There are also such whippers” said Willem, who was now loosening his belt” („Es gibt auch solche Prügler“, behauptete Willem der gerade seinen Hosengürtel löste) (111); “If he had intended to do that, it would have almost been easier for K. to have undressed himself and offered himself to the whipper in place of the guards” (Wenn er das zu tun beabsichtigt hätte, so wäre es ja fast einfacher gewesen, K. hätte sich selbst ausgezogen und dem Prügler als Ersatz für die Wächter angeboten) (115). On Kafka’s masochism and this scene, *cf.* Stach, 2005: 482f.

⁹⁹ *Cf.* pp. 94f.

¹⁰⁰ In other words, these accounts seem to require of the agent an implausibly robust acknowledgement of what he has done and (roughly) its significance for himself. This is presumably easy to locate in the case of some emotions, like pride. But for emotions that are less pleasant, even aversive, such as shame, this is not quite so clear, potentially requiring too much cognitive ‘discipline’ of a beleaguered party who would prefer to look elsewhere, be someone else, or stop existing altogether.

To be clear, despite these reservations, I do not think the social approach to shame, in either of its versions, is ‘wrong’: some cases of shame are substantively tied to audiences, and those audiences may be real people, imaginary people, or ourselves. Rather, my objection is to the social approach’s insistence that the role of the audience in shame is ineluctable. This universalising tendency, in which all cases of shame are linked to audiences in this way, seems to run counter to the impression that it is at least *reasonable* to think that at least *some* cases of shame do not have such a connection to audiences, a view that, even if one remains unpersuaded by all the foregoing arguments for it, is suggested by the fact that some people, myself included, believe it.¹⁰¹

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So much for the social approach to shame. How else might one approach it? To answer this question, I turn now to the psychoanalyst Helen Block Lewis’ influential 1971 book *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*, and the impact this has had upon the study of shame in the context of the sciences, especially psychology. For here there has been the most consistent advocacy of a different attitude to shame, highlighting too the kind of reflexivity I referred to above.¹⁰² In her book, Lewis erected a distinction between shame and guilt that proceeded from their respective *targets*:

Shame... involves more self-consciousness and more self-imaging than guilt. The experience of shame is directly about the *self*, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt,

¹⁰¹ In other words, it has seemed to both me and others that our personal experiences of shame have not involved audiences of any kind. The advocate of the social approach may insist that we have simply erred in understanding our experiences of the emotion, and that audiences were implicated without our realising it. But on the less refined version of the social approach, this is straightforwardly impossible: I cannot be mistaken about whether an audience was there, or whether I was imagining one. As for the more refined version, this makes, as we have seen, claims about aspects of shame’s structure, aspects which one can lack in one’s own experience of the emotion. But further, if I were an audience in the manner described by this version, I assume it would *seem to me* that I were such an audience; but it does not. It is also worth noting that the social approach’s insistence that all cases of shame essentially involve audiences seems at odds with the diversity of experience that can occur within emotional episodes in general, a fact stressed by the increasingly in vogue theory of emotional constructionism, on which *cf.* Barrett, 2016, “My hypothesis... is that fear (or any other emotion) is a ‘category’ that is populated with highly variable instances” (3); “We must assume variability to be the norm, rather than a nuisance to be explained after the fact” (16). See further pp. 102-104.

¹⁰² Two important, nascent forms of Lewis’ work are Piers & Singer, 1953 and Lynd, 1958.

the self is not the central object of negative evaluation, but rather the *thing* done or undone is the focus. In guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself the focus of the experience.¹⁰³

Although there are many variants of affective state in shame, the cognitive content of shame is monothematic: the varieties of deficiencies of the self. In guilt, the cognitive content can be as varied as the varieties of transgression and accompanying circumstances. The self remains focal in awareness in shame; specific awareness of the self as an entity in experience may be absent in guilt as the person's thought about the *events* for which he is guilty carry him into many areas of life. One result of this difference in cognitive content is that the anxieties in shame are likely to be diffuse and nonspecific, except that they are about the state of the self. Anxieties connected with guilt are likely to be specific to the "real" events about which the ideation of guilt revolves.¹⁰⁴

Lewis illustrates this distinction by producing examples of statements one might make in the grip of either emotion:

The self-reproaches that are likely to be formed as guilty ideation develops might run as follows: how could I have *done that*; what an injurious *thing* to have done; how I *hurt so-and-so*; what a moral lapse that *act* was; what will become of *that* or of *him*, now that I have neglected to *do it*, or injured *him*. How should I be *punished* or *make amends*? *Mea culpa!*

Simultaneously, ashamed ideation says: how could *I* have done that; what an *idiot I am*—how humiliating; what a *fool*, what an *uncontrolled person*—how mortifying; how unlike so-and-so, who does not do such things; how *awful and worthless I am*. *Shame!*¹⁰⁵

This approach has proved immensely powerful, inspiring a profusion of sympathetic work, resulting in a consensus comparable to that of the social approach, especially in the social sciences.¹⁰⁶ Thus, in a recent article summarising the state of the field, three psychologists assert that "[c]urrently, the most dominant basis for distinguishing between shame and guilt

¹⁰³ Lewis, 1971: 30.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 86.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 35f.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994: 586f., 593; Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014: 799; Gilbert, Pehl & Allan, 1994: 33f.; Tangney & Dearing, 2002: 14-16, 18-24; Nathanson, 1992: 19; Tracy & Robins, 2004: 115; Tracy & Robins, 2006: 1345, 1349f.; Tangney, 1990: 102f.; Leary, 2007: 330f.; Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007²: 348-350; Lewis, 2003: 1187-1189, 1191, 1198-1200; Tangney & Miller, 1996: 1257, 1265; Tangney, 1992: 199f.; Lewis, 2008: 748f.

centers on the object of negative evaluation and disapproval. Shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self; guilt involves a negative evaluation of a specific behavior... This differential emphasis on self (“*I* did that horrible thing”) versus behavior (“*I did* that horrible thing”) gives rise to distinct emotional experiences associated with distinct patterns of motivation and subsequent behavior”.¹⁰⁷ On this view, shame is a response to the commission of certain acts which are treated as having negatively and irremediably borne on the sort of person one is. Guilt, by contrast, will arise where such acts are not taken to have such a disfiguring effect, and certainly not a permanent one, which is why the guilty tend towards reparation: they confess, or otherwise seek absolution, because their transgressions are removable stains which can be scrubbed clean, not indelible marks imprinted upon their soul. A paradigmatic illustration of this may be found in a minor episode from Mikhail Bulgakov’s *The Master and Margarita*. Frieda, an infanticide, is condemned to wake every morning to the sight of the handkerchief with which she suffocated her child, as a kind of torturous memento of her crime;¹⁰⁸ despite her attempts to dispose of it, it is always miraculously replaced by an assiduous chambermaid to her nightstand. Out of sympathy, the titular heroine Margarita, learning of this situation, spends the one wish granted her by the Devil to secure Frieda’s freedom, summoning her and declaring her forgiven, a mercy for which she is effusively grateful. This expresses in microcosm how easily guilt can be discharged: someone you take to be competent to do so declares simply “[y]ou are forgiven”¹⁰⁹ and guilt disappears, because, despite the seriousness of the actions which induced it, it does not properly go to *you*. But shame is not so easily shaken, for changing one’s ‘self’ is, even where possible, hardly straightforward. The ashamed therefore do not seek forgiveness, or indeed publication of their

¹⁰⁷ Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007: 25f.

¹⁰⁸ The baby is conceived as a result of a rape, and the infanticide motivated by an inability to feed it. The episode is loosely based on factual events with which Bulgakov was familiar, but is reminiscent also of *Faust*’s Gretchen (or Margarete).

¹⁰⁹ Bulgakov, 1997: 284.

misdeeds of any kind, since this is pointless: all it would achieve is letting others learn of the terrible truth one knows oneself already. As Clamence, in Camus' *La Chute*, a work of much relevance to shame and guilt in general, puts it:

You will please little a man in complimenting him on the efforts by which he has become intelligent or generous. He will light up, on the contrary, if you admire his natural generosity. On the other hand, if you say to a criminal that his fault does not relate to his nature or to his character, but to some unfortunate circumstances, he will be fiercely grateful. During your defence speech, he will even choose this moment to cry. However, there is no merit in being honest, or intelligent, by birth. Likewise, one is surely not more responsible for being criminal by nature than by circumstance. But these rogues want mercy, that is to say irresponsibility, and they shamelessly plead justifications from nature or excuses from circumstance, even if these are contradictory. The essential thing is that they should be innocent, that their virtues, by grace of birth, cannot be put in doubt, and that their faults, born of a passing misfortune, should never be other than temporary.¹¹⁰

To be ashamed, for one's faults to be regarded by oneself as immutably part of one's nature or character, rather than to be guilty, for one's faults to be temporarily attached, almost parasitically, to the same, is therefore an unfortunate situation indeed, and we may expect that the desire to avoid shame will be commensurately keen.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Camus, 2008: 733f, "Vous réjouirez médiocrement un homme en lui faisant compliment des efforts grâce auxquels il est devenu intelligent ou généreux. Il s'épanouira au contraire si vous admirez sa générosité naturelle. Inversement, si vous dites à un criminel que sa faute ne tient pas à sa nature ni à son caractère, mais à de malheureuses circonstances, il vous en sera violemment reconnaissant. Pendant la plaidoirie, il choisira même ce moment pour pleurer. Pourtant, il n'y a pas de mérite à être honnête, ni intelligent, de naissance. Comme on n'est sûrement pas plus responsable à être criminel de nature qu'à l'être de circonstance. Mais ces fripons veulent la grâce, c'est-à-dire l'irresponsabilité, et ils excipent sans vergogne des justifications de la nature ou des excuses des circonstances, même si elles sont contradictoires. L'essentiel est qu'ils soient innocents, que leurs vertus, par grâce de naissance, ne puissent être mises en doute, et que leurs fautes, nées d'un malheur passager, ne soient jamais que provisoires".

¹¹¹ It is worth commenting at this juncture on the reception of Lewis' view among classicists. Konstan mentions her without appraisal (2003: 1031f.), whereas Cairns, in *Aidōs*, appraises her at some length. Cairns has much sympathy for Lewis' distinction, which he thinks can explain "why shame tends to be assuaged by restoration or increase of self-respect, guilt by making amends, why causal responsibility is necessary for guilt, but not for shame, [and] why shame can be felt with reference not just to one's own actions and omissions, but also to wishes, desires, character traits, physical characteristics, passive experiences, and those actions of others which somehow reflect on oneself" (1993: 21f.). But he expresses scepticism about how thoroughgoing a distinction it can be, for "it is very doubtful that such a fine-tuned distinction between focus on self *simpliciter* and focus on self as agent of specific acts can be maintained in practice" (*ibid.* 23), noting that folk usage and intuition do not bear out such neat categorisations (*ibid.* 25). This is a salutary reminder that such theorising as Lewis engages in can only go so far; as much as a careful separation of shame from guilt might be a theoretical *desideratum*, it is unlikely to be tenable in all cases in the real world. Cairns further criticises the experimental basis of Lewis' distinction (*ibid.* 24, n. 56), and persuasively so; but, as I have shown in the text, the empirical picture has since changed.

I think this approach to shame can be very useful when reading Homer. Before I endeavour to show how, I should stress that whilst this, what I will call the ‘characterological’ approach to shame, has sometimes been framed as an *alternative* to the social approach, it must be regarded as its *complement*. As I indicated earlier, I do not take the social approach to be ‘wrong’, and it clearly has a part to play in thinking properly about shame; indeed, many of those who endorse Lewis’ distinction between shame and guilt, not least Lewis herself, do not deny the importance of audiences to shame.¹¹² It is indeed reasonable to imagine episodes of shame in which an audience is crucial, whilst the feeling of shame involves the sort of ‘self-as-target’ ideation Lewis described. But my point was that the social approach was in a certain sense ‘misconfigured’, arguing for a universal denominator of shame that cannot be sustained. Where this is recognised, one is prompted to ask what other features of shame, such as those stressed by the characterological approach, may be salient to the emotional experience, and how these features co-exist or interact with those underscored by the social approach. In Homer especially, there is of course ample justification for adverting to the role of audiences, and even those cases that seem to me to be amenable to the characterological approach will involve them. But in some scenes that involvement, combined with a general, universalising commitment to the social approach, has encouraged an emphasis on audiences to the exclusion of the other shame dynamics of those scenes. It is to two such cases that I now turn.

III

These, appropriately, are the scenes with which I began this chapter, and which Aristotle took to be indicative of a sensitivity to the opinions of others. I will start with a scene from Book 8 of the *Iliad*, involving an exchange between Diomedes and Nestor, after which I will address a

¹¹² Thus, some researchers try incorporating both Lewis’ approach and the social approach more or less equally, e.g. Leys, 2007: 18, “Shame... is held to concern not your actions but who you are, that is, your deficiencies and inadequacies as a person as these are revealed to the shaming gaze of the other...”; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna & Teroni, 2014.

later scene, in Book 22, involving a soliloquy of Hector's. In the former, I will attempt to exemplify how one can problematise an application of an exclusively social approach to shame to a scene in which audiences are implicated, by briefly considering the nature of the audience Diomedes imagines, as well as Nestor's attempts to reassure him. In the latter, I will do something comparable, considering again the sort of audience Hector invokes, after which I will examine how the social approach might then profitably be complemented by the characterological approach I have discussed.

Before doing so, however, I should comment briefly on my locating of shame within these scenes. I take both to somehow involve the emotion, as have many others, and accordingly I think the above discussion of shame is applicable to them. Yet 'somehow' is a necessary qualification, unless one is committed to the idea that shame *simpliciter* is a universal emotion. This seems unlikely, especially given the growing popularity of the theory of constructed emotion, the view, according to its foremost advocate Lisa Feldman Barrett, that "physical changes in the natural world (internal physical changes occurring within a perceiver, and sensory changes from the world such as from other people's facial muscle movements, actions, the physical surroundings, etc.) become real as emotion (as fear, anger, etc.) when they are categorized as such using emotion concept knowledge within a perceiver", such "concepts [being] learned from language, socialization, and other cultural artifacts within the person's day-to-day experience".¹¹³ Moreover, as the foregoing quotation suggests, linguistic relativity, which I endorsed in the previous chapter,¹¹⁴ and constructionism go in hand-in-hand, as Barrett elsewhere recognises.¹¹⁵ This has attracted further compelling research into the role of language

¹¹³ Barrett, 2014: 293; *cf.* Barrett, 2016 for a detailed recapitulation and response to objections.

¹¹⁴ pp. 46ff.

¹¹⁵ Barrett, 2006: 37: "... the conceptual act model [*sc.* the now retired name for the theory of constructed emotion] suggests an intrinsic role for language in the emergence of emotional events. It is consistent with a strong version of linguistic relativity... In the case of emotion, language shapes core affective phenomena into the emotional reality we experience [and] not only enters into the categorization process, but... also directs the development of emotion category knowledge in the first place".

in constructing emotion,¹¹⁶ even if the results of this have sometimes been met with a degree of scepticism.¹¹⁷

Nevertheless, I do not think constructionism and linguistic relativity leave one unable to talk coherently of shame in an Homeric context, even if they do preclude an easy universalism. As David Konstan has recently observed, a way of navigating the history of emotion is to suppose that

there exist instinctive or quasi-instinctive responses that are common to all human beings and are shared even by some of the higher species of animals: these include such affects as sympathy with fellow creatures, attachment to the young and the corresponding sense of loss when they are absent, aggressiveness in response to threat, or else a shuddering accompanied by the desire to flee. These elementary reactions are not quite emotions, though they resemble emotions. Thus, brute sympathy is something like pity or compassion, attachment is similar to love, loss is like grief, aggression like anger, and the urge to flee is analogous to fear; but none of these innate reactions is an emotion. The primitive responses are analogous to the innate or basic emotions posited by the universalist school, whereas the complex emotions that are constructed on the basis of these elementary affects may well vary from one society to another, as the social constructionists affirm.¹¹⁸

Though Konstan does not refer to Barrett's work here or elsewhere in his article, this resembles her view that 'affect' is one of several "psychological primitives... that work together to construct emotional episodes".¹¹⁹ This alone would presumably not entitle one to talk of shame in Homer, given how minimal an 'affect' might be (with Konstan, Barrett is open to the idea

¹¹⁶ Lindquist, Satpute & Gendron, 2015. For examples of pre-constructionist studies that press the role of language in emotion, cf. Harris, Ayçiçeği & Gleason, 2003 (claiming to find greater 'autonomic reactivity', taken to betoken emotional response, to taboo words spoken in a native language than in a second language) and Gutfreund, 1990 (finding greater emotional responses from English-Spanish bilinguals when answering in Spanish, regardless of which of the languages was the bilingual's mother tongue, contrary to the experimenter's expectation).

¹¹⁷ Sauter, 2018.

¹¹⁸ Konstan, 2016: §8. Konstan is not wholly persuaded by this view, however, given the difficulties of integrating it with the fact (as Konstan sees it) "that emotions that seem to be based on, or equivalent to, elementary or universal responses sometimes go out of or come into existence entirely" (§10).

¹¹⁹ Barrett, 2014: 296. I say 'resembles', because Konstan appears to believe that these "elementary reactions" are necessarily related to emotions, whereas Barrett explicitly does not, affect being for her one of the "basic features of consciousness that... are not unique to instances of emotion" (Barrett, 2016: 6). Konstan also thinks that sets of these reactions are tied in an essential way to a 'family' of related emotions: "brute sympathy" thus gives rise to the fully developed, distinct emotions of pity and (later) post-Christian, merciful compassion. But Barrett, as far as I can tell, does not accept such correspondences, the relationship between affect and fully-fledged emotion being for her much more plastic.

that they may be found in certain non-human animals). But I think that such universal *affective* experiences, combined with the specific features of the scenes I will discuss, as well as the emotional ‘familiarity’ of them to us, suggest that in such scenes we are at any rate in shame’s territory, and license the use of modern philosophical and scientific expositions of shame to, at least partly, elucidate Homeric material.

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In Book 8 of the *Iliad*, Diomedes and Nestor join forces to run riot among the Trojan lines, and so successful are they that Hector’s driver, Eniopeus, is killed, and Hector consequently provoked to grief. Yet, just as it might seem that Hector himself is within their sights, Zeus intervenes, casting a thunderbolt before their horses. Nestor prudently advises that both he and Diomedes retreat, for this day Zeus has decided to give glory to Hector, and, no matter how mighty a man may be, he cannot possibly check such a god. Diomedes agrees with his companion, but that is not the end of the matter:

ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες,
ἀλλὰ τόδ’ αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἰκάνει·
Ἔκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ’ ἀγορεύων·
‘Τυδείδης ὑπ’ ἐμεῖο φοβεόμενος ἵκετο νῆας’.
ὥς ποτ’ ἀπειλήσει· τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών. [150]

(8. 146-150)

Soothing Diomedes’ misgivings, Nestor suggests that there is no cause for concern,

εἴ περ γάρ σ’ Ἔκτωρ γε κακὸν καὶ ἀνάλκιδα φήσει,
ἀλλ’ οὐ πείσονται Τρῶες καὶ Δαρδανίωνες
καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι μεγαθύμων ἀσπιστάων, [155]
τάων ἐν κονίησι βάλεις θαλεροῦς παρακοίτας.

(8. 153-156)

It is unsurprising that Diomedes' words have seemed amenable to a social approach to shame, given both his and Nestor's explicit attentiveness to the response of an audience. This is how it seemed to one heavily influenced by the social approach, and especially Dodds' articulation of it, Arthur Adkins:

Nestor cannot say 'Don't worry. It isn't true.' If the Trojans believed, and spread it abroad, that Diomedes was *kakos* and lacking in valour, this would cause terrible *elencheie* for him. And naturally so: he lives in a society without writing, without permanent records which can be consulted later. What matters is what is said of him by his contemporaries, and remembered by future generations; and if that is false, there is no alternative source of information from which he could be rehabilitated. This is both a results-culture and a shame-culture: even where the result is not disastrous to the individual and his group, if the behaviour can be represented as being unworthy of an *agathos* by common report, this is *aischron* and entails *elencheie*... One's self, in the last resort, only has the value that others put on it: one cannot fall back, in Homer or for long afterwards, either on one's own opinion of oneself, or on the knowledge that one has done one's best.¹²⁰

I will have much to say in due course about Adkins' 'results-culture', and certain claims associated with it.¹²¹ For now, we may wonder at the peculiarity of Diomedes fretting at his being thought less of by a *Trojan* hero speaking to a *Trojan* audience: why should it matter to this great Achaean hero what Hector says to his fellow Trojans? It appears that Adkins noticed the oddity of this also, and (unconsciously or otherwise) took measures to soften it: one notes the idea of the Trojans "spread[ing] it abroad" (perhaps to Greece?) and the generic reference to "his contemporaries".¹²² Yet the text says nothing about anything being spread abroad, the audience is explicitly Trojan, and in the scene which immediately follows, when Hector's goading of Diomedes begins for real (8. 161-166), Hector recognises that the best way of needling his counterpart is to suggest his *own*, Achaean community will think less of him; it hardly occurs to him to tell Diomedes that the Trojans will now do so, for that would

¹²⁰ Adkins, 1970: 32.

¹²¹ For which see chapter 3.

¹²² A scholiast perhaps noticed the same, *κὰν τούτοις τὸ φιλότιμον Διομήδους ἐμφαίνεται, ὃς μὴ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν εὐδοκμεῖν σπουδάζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις* (ΣbT *ad* 148).

presumably be of little moment to him. I will develop this point further when considering the next scene; for now, I note simply that the audience Diomedes invokes is one which is in tension with his prospective experience of social shame.¹²³

Still, Adkins might insist that Nestor's focusing on the Trojan response is less problematically consistent with such an experience. After all, as Adkins suggests, Nestor does not try to reassure Diomedes that Hector's words would be false, but that they would not be believed by the Trojans.¹²⁴ But even here things may not be so simple. Zeus thunders and lets fly a lightning bolt, and it is the spectacular effect of this that motivates Nestor to save both himself and Diomedes from what the old man regards as a frightful, mortal danger. But Diomedes, who has just come so close to ending Hector, will need some persuading to not only give up the hunt, but also to accept the fact that he, not Hector, is now on the back foot. Consequently, after venturing the idea of retreat (139), Nestor is keen to press the role of Zeus and diminish that of Hector: ἦ οὐ γινώσκεις ὅ τοι ἐκ Διὸς οὐχ ἔπετ' ἀλκή; (140), *interrogatio* making the point elegantly yet firmly,¹²⁵ νῦν μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ Κρονίδης Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀπάξει | σήμερον... | ἀνὴρ δέ κεν οὔ τι Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαιτο | οὐδὲ μάλ' ἴφθιμος... (141-144). The idea is that Zeus, mentioned thrice in quick succession, is the cause of Diomedes' failure, and that in continuing the pursuit it will be Zeus, not Hector, against whom Diomedes, 'very strong' though he may be, will be futilely fighting. Still, all hope is not lost, since Zeus ὕστερον αὖτε καὶ ἡμῖν, αἳ κ' ἐθέλησιν, | δώσει [sc. κῦδος] (142*f.*), a reminder that this setback is not the final

¹²³ My point is not that resolving this tension is impossible. One might suggest, for example, that Diomedes has enough in common with the aristocratic stratum of Trojan society at least to care what his heroic counterparts in Troy think, by analogy with *e.g.* the shared values of honour possessed by English and French knights and nobleman during the Hundred Years War. But Diomedes' fear implicates a *generic* Trojan audience, not a noble one, and the importance of 'class' (at least when in competition with 'national' or ethnic factors) to generating cares seems little in evidence in the *Iliad*.

¹²⁴ Then again, the latter could be a way of implying the former: if I say "nobody will ever believe that you found the examination difficult", I may not only (if I am doing so at all) be reassuring you about what people will think, but also emphasising how implausible it is that you would in fact struggle. To give Adkins the benefit of the doubt, I do not stress this objection; but it is one with which I suspect he would have found it hard to deal.

¹²⁵ Cf. Eust. *Il.* 2. 549. 12-14, Τὸ δὲ «οὐχ' ἔπετ' ἀλκή» ἀστείως ἔχει. Ἐθέλει γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὡς, ἐπεὶ ἐθέλουσιν ἡμῖν διώκειν τὸν Ἑκτορα οὐκ ἐπακολουθεῖ θεόθεν ἰσχύς, στρεπτόν τοὺς ἵππους εἰς φυγὴν.

word on Diomedes' ability to enjoy martial success; and when Nestor points out that Zeus acts now—that is, for today—¹²⁶ in Hector's favour, it is for the nondescript 'this man' (τούτῳ) that he acts, Nestor refraining even from uttering the name of Hector until Diomedes does so (153).

For all this circumspection, Diomedes, as we have seen, does not come along quietly, even whilst acknowledging that *καὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες* (146), going on to express his fear of what Hector will claim about him. What does this say about Diomedes' appraisal of the arguments Nestor has just made? Adkins, if I have understood him correctly, believes that Diomedes finds those arguments compelling, and so, when he expresses his fear of Hector's boast, is implying that this boast would be untrue: accepting Nestor's account that this will be a rout at the hands of Zeus, not Hector, his concern is that Hector will *falsely* claim the contrary. Presumably Adkins would cite v. 146 in support of this, in which Diomedes endorses Nestor's advice.¹²⁷ Yet we need not think that with these words Diomedes grants that everything Nestor has said whilst giving that advice is accurate, for the phrase *κατὰ μοῖραν* denotes fittingness, not verity.

To some this is perhaps a relatively uncontroversial assertion, but it has been common to treat the phrase as referring essentially to some kind of narrative, orderly *accuracy*.¹²⁸ In the *Odyssey*, where it is more common, such fittingness can certainly in some circumstances

¹²⁶ *σήμερον* serves to delimit the scope of *νῦν*, a point well made by a scholiast, *δηλοῖ διὰ τῆς ἐπαναλήψεως ὅτι πρὸς ὀλίγον ἔσται αὐτῷ ἡ χαρά· νῦν γάρ φησι καὶ τὸ σήμερον προστίθησι, ἵνα μὴ τὸ νῦν ᾗ ἀόριστον* (Σb *ad* 141f.). The point is to encourage Diomedes to think of his setback as temporary; and the placement of *σήμερον* immediately before *ὑστερον* presses the point. Cf. the identical construction at *Il.* 7. 29f., as Apollo tries to convince Athena to temporarily halt hostilities.

¹²⁷ This seems to be the implication of Adkins, 1972: "Diomedes acknowledges the appropriateness of the advice... It would be appropriate to yield to the superior ἀρετή of Zeus, and no shame is involved in yielding to the gods... If Diomedes retreats before the superior power of Zeus, it will look as if he is retreating before Hector..." (17f.).

¹²⁸ Representative samples are collected and critiqued in Halliwell, 2011: 84-87.

amount to narrative truth.¹²⁹ But in other cases fittingness may, whilst being partly constituted by accuracy, not be completed by it,¹³⁰ and occasionally accuracy can logically not be in view at all, or else must be a much diminished concern.¹³¹ In the *Iliad*, when used outside a context of speaking, it can denote a disorderly retreat and the proper observation of silence during a sacrifice.¹³² What is in view here is the doing of something in the appropriate way; and this extends to the use of the phrase to characterise speech. Here, one exception notwithstanding,¹³³ it certifies as fitting a course of action someone has proposed, as when Nestor approves Achilles' proposal to award him the urn (ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, τέκος, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 23. 626); Agamemnon endorses Nestor's advice to reconcile with Achilles (ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 1. 286); Nestor accepts Diomedes' exhortation that the Achaeans not give up the fight against the Trojans (ἀτὰρ πεπνυμένα βάζεις | Ἀργείων βασιλῆας, ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 9. 58f.); Nestor accepts Diomedes' point that a younger man could be waking

¹²⁹ Odysseus says that when he came to Aeolia, Aeolus μῆνα δὲ πάντα φίλει με καὶ ἐξερέεινεν ἕκαστα, | Ἴλιον Ἀργείων τε νέας καὶ νόστον Ἀχαιῶν (10. 14f.). In turn καὶ μὲν ἐγὼ τῶι πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξα (16), presumably meaning that he gave an ordered, accurate account of what happened, because it is this that his interlocutor appears to be requesting, the references to Ilion, the Argive ships and Argive homecoming standing meristically for the Trojan War and its aftermath; cf. 12. 33-35, where Circe quizzes Odysseus similarly.

¹³⁰ In Alcinoüs' palace, Odysseus tells Demodocus αἶ κεν δὴ μοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν καταλέξῃς, | αὐτίκ' ἐγὼ πᾶσιν μυθήσομαι ἀνθρώποισιν, | ὡς ἄρα τοι πρόφρων θεὸς ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδίην (8. 496-498), a promise that is too generous if he need only accurately relay facts Odysseus knows already, and which he must have exceeded if we are to make sense of Odysseus' consequent weeping, on whose severity the poet dwells vividly (521-530). Likewise, Leiocritus says of Mentor's speech σὺ δ' οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες (2. 251) when the latter upbraids the Ithacans for failing to take the suitors to task; more than the 'accuracy' of what Mentor has said must be in view, given the insults with which Leiocritus opens his response (243). In both cases, the robust emotional response experienced and evinced by the speakers, particularly Odysseus, entails that their assessments, as indicated by (οὐ) κατὰ μοῖραν, of their interlocutors' words involve more than an assignation or denial of some kind of narrative accuracy: they may well mean that their interlocutors spoke truly or falsely, but there must be more to their appraisals than this.

¹³¹ After Odysseus has dealt with the suitors, he demands of Eurycleia to facilitate the palace's purification and gather the women together. She responds by telling Odysseus ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε, τέκνον ἐμόν, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες (22. 486), a statement inscrutable if accuracy were in mind, since Odysseus uses no indicatives and so there is nothing for him to be 'accurate' about. Rather, Eurycleia is simply signalling that she approves of what are fitting demands in the circumstances. Likewise, of Nestor's story (3. 254-328) in response to Telemachus' request for information (247-252), Athena, disguised as Mentor, says ὦ γέρον, ἦτοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξας (331). Given Mentor's position as one who would take care of Telemachus during Odysseus' absence, which has recently been signposted to the audience (2. 225-227), this cannot (at least primarily) be an assessment of the accuracy of Nestor's account, since Mentor would have no way of knowing this; 'he' must rather be complimenting something else about Nestor's account, perhaps an aesthetic quality, 'the way he tells it'.

¹³² ὡς τῶν ἐκ νηῶν γένετο ἰαχὴ τε φόβος τε, | οὐδὲ κατὰ μοῖραν πέραον πάλιν (16. 366f.); Διὶ χεῖρας ἀνασχὼν | ἠὔχετο· τοὶ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπ' αὐτόφιν εἶατο σιγῆν | Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ μοῖραν, ἀκούοντες βασιλῆος (19. 254-256).

¹³³ Cf. n. 135.

the men (ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, τέκος, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 10. 169); and Poseidon recognises Iris' oblique suggestion that he reconsider his bullish response to Zeus' demand that he stop fighting (Ἴρι θεά, μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 15. 206). But only in the first of these cases is there an explicit acceptance of the accuracy of the rationale the speaker has used to underpin their advice, Nestor expatiating on his agedness *versus* his prior glory (627ff.) to which Achilles has adverted. In the rest, whilst the speakers accept their interlocutors' suggested course of action, the accuracy of what they have said in the course of recommending it is not remarked upon: when Poseidon says of Iris that ἐσθλὸν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται, ὅτ' ἄγγελος αἴσιμα εἶδηι (15. 207), he is referring to her ability to offer prudent advice, not utter true propositions. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that certain of the speakers would *reject* some of the arguments their interlocutors employ. For beyond the fact that in many, if not all, of the foregoing examples is the endorsement of the proposed course supplemented by some kind of qualification,¹³⁴ it seems unlikely that Nestor would assent to Diomedes saying to Agamemnon ἀλκὴν δ' οὐ τοι δῶκεν (9. 39) or saying to himself that he is σκέτλιος (10. 164), or Agamemnon agree with Nestor that he should not seek to take Briseis (1. 275f.) and that Achilles μέγα πᾶσιν | ἔρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν πέλεται πολέμοιο κακοῖο (1. 283f.).¹³⁵

¹³⁴ My point being that if the advice is accepted yet qualified, then it is more probable that the speaker will take exception to at least some of the claims made in service of that advice. Agamemnon raises the problem of Achilles' imperiousness (1. 287-291); Nestor urges temporary consolidation (9. 65-67), suggesting that Diomedes οὐ τέλος ἴκειο μύθων (56); Nestor later implies that the Achaeans' position is such that it is all hands on deck (10. 171f.); Poseidon complains, in just the same words as Diomedes in our own passage, ἀλλὰ τόδ' αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἰκάνει, | ὅππότε ἂν ἰσόμορον καὶ ὁμῆι πεπρωμένον αἴσηι | νεικείειν ἐθέλησι χολωτοῖσιν ἐπέεσσιν (15. 208-210). Cf. Kelly, 2007: 180-182, who also detects, perhaps straining slightly, a qualification in Nestor's comments to Achilles to which I have referred.

¹³⁵ Additionally, of *Il.* 1. 286, there is no need to infer that when Agamemnon proceeds to qualify Nestor's advice, he was, when he described that advice as κατὰ μοῖραν, engaging in "lip-service" and "not listen[ing] to Nestor at all" (Pulleyn, 2000 *ad* 287; cf. Kirk, 1985 *ad* 286-291, "Agamemnon pays enthusiastic lip-service... to what Nestor has said, but obviously has not heeded a word of it"). Agamemnon accepts that there needs to be a rapprochement; he simply maintains that Achilles' attitude makes this impossible. Of *Il.* 15. 206, ΣβT remarks of τοῦτο ἔπος that Poseidon has in mind ἢ τὸ 'στρεπταὶ μὲν τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν' ἢ τὸ 'ὡς πρεσβυτέροισιν Ἐρινύες' ἢ, ὃ καὶ ἄμεινον, πάντα τὸν λόγον τῆς Ἴριδος. His point seems to be that Poseidon is not accepting the truth of any particular statement of Iris', but accepting the general thrust of what she is saying: do not prick Zeus' ire. Separately, the last (and exceptional) Iliadic occurrence of κατὰ μοῖραν, discussion of which I postponed in the text, is unusual. After Priam compliments the disguised Hermes, the god replies ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες (24. 379); here we have the only case in the *Iliad* in which what someone has said is assessed

I have dwelt on this point because it suggests that the present passage is likely to be of a piece with these. Diomedes accepts Nestor’s advice to retreat, the prudence of which is itself not really contestable: the Achaeans are clearly losing. But we need not further suppose that with the expression *κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες* he is evaluating the accuracy of every point made in service of commending that retreat.¹³⁶ If that is so, this leaves open the possibility that he is not persuaded by Nestor’s attempt to augment Zeus’ agency in the rout, whilst diminishing Hector’s. It is thus quite possible that Diomedes, even as he sees lightning strike, will not see his rout as being merely down to Zeus, but rather will see it as down, in large part, to Hector. Thus, against Adkins, when Diomedes accepts the judiciousness of Nestor’s counsel, it is possible that his worry is that Hector will be able to boast of something quite *true*: rejecting Nestor’s suggestion that this will be a rout at the hands of Zeus, not Hector, Diomedes’ fear is that Hector will *correctly* claim the contrary.

We have seen already that the audience Diomedes invokes is one which is in tension with his prospective experience of social shame.¹³⁷ What I have been arguing since implies that Nestor’s allusion to an audience does not easily negate this concern. Adkins claims that it is

as *κατὰ μοῖραν* even when they have not recommended a course of action. For Macleod, 1982 *ad loc.* the phrase is “[e]quivalent to the *ὀρθῶς γε* or *ὀρθῶς λέγεις* of Attic conversation”, comparing Plat. *Theaet.* 197b, 201a, adding that it “also indicates, with Olympian irony, that *μακάρων δ’ ἔξ ἔσσι τοκήων* is true in a sense Priam did not imagine”, approving also of the comment of Leaf, 1900-1902 *ad loc.* that it “expresses the god’s approval of Priam’s pious sentiments”; Brügger, 2017 *ad loc.* suggests that “[v]ia the formulaic verse... the speaker politely approves of what has previously been said in order to subsequently change the subject”. I assume that Hermes’ words are partly analogous to those with which Priam began his initial reply to the god, *οὕτω πηι τάδε γ’ ἔστί, φίλον τέκος, ὡς ἀγορεύεις* (373), but also highlight, as Leaf suggested, Priam’s unwitting piety: the god’s *κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες* simultaneously picks out the accuracy of what Priam has said and approbates as fitting his saying it.

¹³⁶ That is, Diomedes is recognising that Nestor’s recommendation of retreat is appropriate, but he is not necessarily thereby recognising that every claim Nestor makes when recommending that retreat is true. If one friend tells another who is in drink and gotten himself into a brawl “come on, we should go; you’re going to end up seriously hurting someone”, the drunk may well accept the merits of leaving, even if he does not think that what makes this prudent is the reason his friend has cited, and even if the friend’s gesture is appreciated.

¹³⁷ A more radical possibility worth mentioning at this juncture is whether shame of *any* kind is implicated in this scene, given the lack of traditional shame-vocabulary. I do not try to argue against this; for my present purposes it is enough that the passage has for a long time been treated as involving the emotion, which seems reasonable considering its general complexion (and *cf.* my comments on constructionism about emotions, pp. 102-104). Beyond this, *n.b.* Diomedes’ use of the rare phrase *τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών* (used only once elsewhere in Homer, *Il.* 4. 182), which is remarkably similar to ‘I wish the ground would swallow me up’ *vel sim.*, used during times of intense shame or embarrassment by English speakers.

the publication of what Diomedes thinks is a false claim that Diomedes fears. But suppose, as I have suggested, that what Diomedes fears is the publication of what he thinks is a true claim. In that case, what Nestor can say is presumably constrained not (only) by the kind of general cultural factors Adkins adduces, but by the more immediate matter of what his advisee believes. For if Nestor understands that Diomedes is afraid that Hector will boast of something true, then though Adkins is quite right that Nestor cannot say “Don’t worry. It isn’t true”, this need not be because he lives in a world in which “facts are of much less importance than appearances”,¹³⁸ but more because such a claim would seem to Diomedes fanciful, and therefore stand at odds with the careful rhetorical course Nestor has already steered. In other words, if Nestor proceeds to reassure Diomedes about what the Trojans will believe, this may simply reflect the impossibility of any substitute salve: if I cannot tell you, because you will not believe me, that unflattering things said about you are not true, I can at least try to tell you that they will not be believed.

Observations of this kind are not intended to prove that social shame is uninvolved in this scene: Aristotle highlights it for good reason, and Diomedes evidently is worried about what people will say about him. But there remain difficulties in treating this as a straightforward example of social shame, due both to the composition of the audience Diomedes conceives and the possibility that Nestor’s focus on what an audience may or may not believe reflects the lack of alternative encouragement. Certainly, social shame must be implicated here; but that is unlikely to be all. As we further examine Nestor’s response to Diomedes, we can perhaps see a glimpse of what else there may be. It is curious that the reason Nestor provides for the Trojans’ disbelief, Diomedes’ slaughter of them, would not necessarily provoke them to disbelieve what Hector is feared to boast. For the fact that Diomedes has killed so many Trojans hardly entails that he would not be routed; as a reassurance about what people will believe

¹³⁸ Adkins, 1960: 49, the location of an equivalent discussion in this earlier work.

Nestor's response is therefore slightly infelicitous. But where it does unambiguously succeed is in reminding Diomedes of his greatness. For Diomedes has ἐν κονίησι βάλεις... παρακοίτας (156) of the wives of the θαλερός (156) and μεγάθυμος (155) enemy. The reference to these men's widows, and the youth connoted by θαλερός, give Nestor's words a pathetic quality;¹³⁹ but the objective is of course not to arouse sympathy, but to induce self-satisfaction in Diomedes that he has inflicted such misery upon the Trojan community. As when Nestor obliquely comments upon Diomedes' strength (144), the point seems to be, at least in part, to encourage Diomedes to not take the retreat to heart, to not let it shake the sense he has of his own martial prowess, to not let it bear upon his view of himself. That seems to me to possibly reflect the operation of what I have called characterological shame, the invoking of which may well be able to complement Aristotle's account. But this can only remain a credible suggestion; it is to the other scene he discussed that we must turn if we are to find further reasons to appeal to the characterological approach.

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Consider then the much later scene, in which Hector himself ponders a retreat, deliberating over whether he should meet Achilles in battle or flee to Troy:

ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·
 “ὦ μοι ἐγών, εἰ μὲν κε πύλας καὶ τείχεα δύω,
 Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει, [100]
 ὅς μ' ἐκέλευεν Τρωσὶ ποτὶ πτόλιν ἠγήσασθαι
 νύχθ' ὑπο τήνδ' ὀλοήν, ὅτε τ' ὤρετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.
 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην· ἦ τ' ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν.
 νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ὤλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίησιν ἐμῆσιν,
 αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρωιάδας ἐλκεσιπέπλους, [105]

¹³⁹ Cf. Kirk, 1990 *ad* 155*f.*, “The addition of Trojan widows and the pathetic contrast of θαλερός and ἐν κονίησι lend further rhetorical force to Nestor's words”; Eust. *Il.* 2. 551. 15*f.*, Διὸ καὶ τὸ «θαλερός» ἔχει τι καὶ οἴκτου. οἰκτρὸν γὰρ τοὺς ἔτι θάλλοντας ὑπὸ κόνιν βαλεῖν.

μή ποτέ τις εἴπησι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο·
“Ἐκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὄλεσε λαόν’.
ὦς ἐρέουσιν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τότ’ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον εἶη
ἄντην ἢ Ἄχιλλῆα κατακτείναντα νέεσθαι
ἢ ἐκεν αὐτῶι ὀλέσθαι εὐκλείως πρὸ πόλης. [110]

(Il. 22. 98-110)

It is obvious how this scene might involve social shame, and accordingly it seemed to do so to Dodds, who illustrates his claim that “the strongest moral force which Homeric man knows is not the fear of god, but respect for public opinion, *aidōs*”, by adding “αἰδέομαι Τρῶας, says Hector at the crisis of his fate, and goes with open eyes to his death”.¹⁴⁰ As Irene de Jong puts it at greater length:

Hektor seems to be prepared to bear this reproach... coming from Poulydamas. He even exercizes [*sic*] severe self-criticism by calling his own behaviour ἀτασθαλίη... But it is something else to hear this same reproach... coming from the mouth of another, someone of a lower status than himself (or, for that matter, Poulydamas)... To avoid hearing this reproach from his own people, Hektor sees only one solution: to stay outside the walls and face Achilles. Thus, he will either return as victor of Achilles and, thereby, have made good his fault or he will be killed, but in such a way... that nobody will think of criticizing him anymore. Hektor’s words are a clear illustration of the Homeric *shame-culture*; comparable to these passages are XVII 93, where Menelaos... fears νέμεσις from the side of his fellow Greeks... should he leave the body of Patroclus...¹⁴¹

I do not deny that Dodds and de Jong, among others, have a point.¹⁴² Hector evidently expresses his fears in social terms, and with this we can paint a believable picture of his emotional situation. Hector first contemplates the lesser evil of what it will be like to be exposed to Polydamas’ censure should he return to Troy without meeting Achilles, and it is his anticipation

¹⁴⁰ Dodds, 1951: 18.

¹⁴¹ de Jong, 1987: 78f. Cf. de Jong, 2012 *ad* 99-110, “It is one thing for Hector to admit his fatal mistake to himself, but he cannot live with (and is hence prepared to die for) the idea that others would confront him about it”.

¹⁴² Cf. Redfield, 1994: 158, “Hector’s isolation here is thus not a lack of relation to his community but a negative relation with it: he is sure that his community—embodied in Polydamas and the anonymous “man worse than I am”—rejects him. Community takes precedence over family”.

of this unambiguously social shame that, in part, prompts him to stand his ground. Yet this situation, whilst bad, would still be bearable, for the admonition would come from only one man, and then a man who amounts to something of an equal. But this is not the only audience before whom Hector imagines his exposure, for he invokes another one also: not Polydamas, or indeed anyone else in particular, but an anonymous ‘someone’ described in unflattering terms, τις... κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο (106), who speaks on behalf of the Trojan community as a whole.¹⁴³ His anticipation thus becomes something far more generalised, blossoming into full-blown dread of a far greater evil: condemnation by many, indeed the community itself, and worse still at the hands of those much inferior to either him or Polydamas. For it is natural to suppose, as de Jong does, that the contemptuous characterisation of the anonymous critic goes to the intensification of the sort of social shame Hector fears: the proclamation of his failures would be bad enough already, but for someone so base to be able to say the same would surely make matters worse still.¹⁴⁴

Yet what else should we make of Hector calling his imagined Trojan critic τις... κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο? Earlier I discussed at some length the nature of the audiences possible on the social approach, but important too must be the regard in which those audiences are held by the person who stands before them. In this connection, one might return to Aristotle’s discussion of shame in the *Rhetoric* (1383b 12-14), which he follows with an analysis of the audiences before whom shame may be experienced, and I note his claim that since *περὶ ἀδοξίας*

¹⁴³ That he (or she?) serves as such a representative is contextually obvious, but is in any case confirmed grammatically; *cf.* n. 152.

¹⁴⁴ So de Jong’s comment that “it is something else to hear this same reproach... coming from the mouth of another, someone of a lower status than himself”. *Cf.* Gill, 1996, “The thought that he must face Polydamas and the Trojans, and that he will be (rightly) open to criticism from ‘someone who is worse than me’ makes his sense of shame more intense...” (83); ΣβΤ *ad* 106, ἔθος δὲ τοῖς χεῖροσι ψέγειν τὰ τῶν κρεισσόνων ἔργα, καὶ τοῖς μείζοσιν ἀνιαρὸν τὸ ὑπὸ ἡσσόνων κακολογεῖσθαι; Eust. *Il.* 4. 583. 7-10, ὄρα ὅτι τε εὐγενῶς ὁ Ἐκτωρ ἐπονειδίστου σωτηρίας θάνατον εὐκλεῆ ἀνθαιρεῖται, καὶ ὡς ὁμολογῶν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ ἀτασθαλίας ὀλέσαι λαόν, ὅμως ὑπὸ τινος ἐτέρου κακώτερου, ὃ ἐστὶ δυσγενοῦς ἢ δειλοῦ, ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἀνέχεται ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ; Richardson, 1993 *ad* 106: “κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο implies that it is more dishonourable to be criticized by a ‘baser’ man. Hektor is constantly concerned about what people will say...”.

φαντασία ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσχύνῃ... οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντα, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει (1384a 22-25). This 'respect' is taken to be inconsistent with a disregard for someone's opinion;¹⁴⁵ thus οὐκ αἰσχύνονται... ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεὶς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται) (1384b 22-24). I am not sure that such a categorical criterion as Aristotle appears to articulate here is universally valid. True, we do not feel shame before animals or children, because we do not care what they believe (for they have no worthwhile opinion to offer, if any opinion at all) and we do not, at least in the sense required to feel shame before them, respect them. But even if one cannot feel shame in some cases in which one lacks this kind of 'respect', other audiences for whom one lacks such respect might arguably be ones before whom one can yet be ashamed. Nevertheless, even if Aristotle's criterion cannot go through *unqualified*, presumably it is generally along the right lines: clearly, to be ashamed before others, one must at least *usually* have a minimum of respect for them.¹⁴⁶ Where one is dealing with an audience which one does not respect—indeed, as in Hector's case, an audience which one regards with contempt—shame before that audience will be unlikely, if not impossible. To recall Dodds' phrase, 'respect for public opinion' only exists where the public to whom the opinion belongs is at least minimally respected.

For Hector to call his imagined critic κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο therefore does not seem to sit easily with his feeling shame before that critic: as in the case of Diomedes fearing exposure before a specifically Trojan audience, we are here presented with an audience in

¹⁴⁵ 1384a 25-27, λόγον δ' ἔχει... καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης.

¹⁴⁶ Notably, this is true for Williams, as we will see momentarily (p. 116). Despite the impressive number of advocates of the social approach to shame I discussed earlier (pp. 87ff.), explicit discussion of whether and to what extent one respects the audience that provokes one's shame is limited. I suspect that this is because most take something like Aristotle's claim to be self-evident. But it is worth highlighting in this connection the two main representatives of the 'self-as-audience' view I examined. Taylor suggests that "if someone has self-respect then under certain specifiable conditions he will be feeling shame. A person has no self-respect if he regards no circumstances as shame-producing. Loss of self-respect and loss of the capacity for feeling shame go hand in hand" (1985: 80), implying that one must have respect for the audience (in this case oneself) to feel shame before that audience. Smith is not so unambiguous on this point, but immediately prior to the text I quoted above ostensibly argues, at least in an earlier edition of the text, that people who serve as spectators of themselves tend to think (whether justifiably or not) well of themselves (2002: 131, n. 3).

tension with the agent's otherwise comprehensible prospective experience of social shame.

Williams, whilst defending a general social approach to shame in Homer, seems also to note the problem:

[People] need not be ashamed of being poorly viewed, if the view is that of an observer for whom they feel contempt. Hector was indeed afraid that someone inferior to him would be able to criticise him, but that was because he thought the criticism would be true, and the fact that such a person could make it would only make things worse. The mere fact that such a person had something hostile to say would not in itself necessarily concern him.¹⁴⁷

Williams thus resolves the tension by suggesting that exposure before the critic may not *in itself* provoke shame, but exacerbate the shame that exists already through Hector's acceptance of the truth of the claim the critic is feared to make. Undoubtedly, Williams must be right that Hector thinks that claim is true: ἐπεὶ ὄλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίησιν ἐμῆσιν (104) he says, Ἐκτῶρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὄλεσε λαόν (107) says the critic, ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας' mirroring Hector's admission that οὐ πιθόμην (103) to Polydamas' advice. That being so, I take Williams' approach to offer a potential solution. But if we are to endorse that solution, we need to interrogate further what exactly is the nature of the shame that 'exists already' for Hector: what sort of shame may be occasioned by a recognition of the truth of the critic's imagined criticism, which exposure before that critic would intensify? I suggest a good candidate is characterological shame. In this, as we have seen, the agent's view of the truth is crucial: the sort of 'self-reproaches' to which Lewis referred all involve one's acceptance that one has 'failed', and would never arise were this acceptance absent. I think this makes the suggestion that Hector is experiencing characterological shame at least *prima facie* plausible. Further considerations may make it probable.

¹⁴⁷ Williams, 1993: 82. Another who noticed the tension is perhaps Wilamowitz: "[h]e [*sc.* Hector] cannot even stand reproaches from the mouths of more cowardly men, preferring to die honourably" (Vorwürfe auch aus dem Munde feiger Menschen kann er nicht ertragen, lieber in Ehren fallen) (1931: 353f.).

In the critic's words, we have what has been termed a 'potential *tis*-speech', the broader category of which is defined as "speeches formally marked by introductory and capping formulas containing the word *τις*", with the specific type identified as 'potential' defined as "those occurring in a character-text, as a speech within a speech"¹⁴⁸ which are "no quotation by the narrator of words actually said by a character, but... *imaginary* speeches, constructed by the speaking character itself [*sic*]"¹⁴⁹. Of this type of speech, the suggestion has been made that it is a means of representing what is going on in the actual speaker's head: "the fictitious speaker is used to give expression to the *inner* voice of the real speaker",¹⁵⁰ whilst elsewhere it has been argued that "[t]he content of a potential *tis*-Rede... reflects the psychology of the speaker who projects it".¹⁵¹ This much seems a safe assumption. In a comparable example from the *Odyssey*, we can hardly doubt that when in Book 21 Eurymachus, rejecting the idea that the disguised Odysseus should be given an opportunity to string his bow, says

ἀλλ' αἰσχυνόμενοι φάτιν ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν,
 μή ποτέ τις εἴπησι κακώτερος ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν,
 ἣ πολλὸν χεῖρονες ἄνδρες ἀμύμονος ἀνδρὸς ἄκοιτιν [325]
 μῶνται, οὐδέ τι τόξον ἐύξοον ἐντανύουσιν·
 ἀλλ' ἄλλός τις πτωχὸς ἀνήρ ἀλαλήμενος ἐλθῶν
 ῥηϊδίως ἐτάνυσσε βίον, διὰ δ' ἤκε σιδήρου.'

¹⁴⁸ de Jong, 1987: 69.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 76.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 83. de Jong continues, "This transposition of the character's own inner thoughts to some outward voice, fits in very well with the general picture of Homeric psychology". Cf. de Jong, 2001: 166, defining 'potential *tis*-speech' as "an imaginary, future speech, in which a speaker ascribes what in fact are his/her own feelings to an anonymous 'someone' (*τις*)"; de Jong, 2012: 86f., "[i]t is clear that, as always, the speech of the anonymous person in fact externalises the inner thoughts of the speaker himself..."; Nünlist & de Jong, 2000: 170, "Tis-speech: Direct speech of a figure (*τις*) not identified by name, often as an expression of 'what the general public thinks'. It is necessary to distinguish between actual *tis*-speeches... and *tis*-speeches imagined by other figures (=tertiary focalisation)... The latter say above all something about the figure doing the imagining" (TIS-REDE: Direkte Rede einer nicht mit Namen identifizierten→Figure (*τις*), oft als Ausdruck dessen, 'was die Allgemeinheit meint'. Zu unterscheiden sind tatsächlich gehaltene Tis-Reden... und von anderen Figuren imaginierte (= tertiär fokalisierte) Tis-Reden... Letztere sagen v.a. etwas über die imaginierende Figur aus); Beck, 2012: 48-55.

¹⁵¹ Wilson, 1979: 2.

we should understand that this anonymous speech is reflective of his own fears, not least because we are told by the poet, after the ‘beggar’ suggests he should try his hand, ὡς ἔφαθ’· οἱ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ὑπερφιάλως νεμέσησαν, | δείσαντες μὴ τόξον ἐύξοον ἐντανύσειεν (21. 285f.). Elsewhere in the *Odyssey*, we find something similar in the *tis*-speech Nausicaa gives the critic who would comment disapprovingly on her walking with Odysseus into the city (6. 276-284), admitting she would say the same things as the critic if she were in their position (286).

In these circumstances, presumably the identity of the imagined critic, already not uncomplicated given the text’s shifting between subject number,¹⁵² can never be absolutely distinguished from that of the speaker. If I say that I worry about what an indefinite someone will say about me, and what I anticipate they will say about me reflects my own beliefs, cares and concerns, then this imagined ‘other’ cannot be merely a discrete third party, but his identity must have in some sense blurred into my own.¹⁵³ What is curious, however, is the fact that even as these lines are blurred, the speakers seem to try to redraw them, distinguishing themselves from their critics by describing them by the disparaging term *κακώτερος*: we have seen Hector and Eurymachus do this, and Nausicaa does likewise (*Od.* 6. 275). In Hector’s case, however, this tendency is particularly marked. He is the only one of the three to give *κακώτερος* an explicit *comparandum*: Hector is the one against whom the critic is directly contrasted, whereas

¹⁵² In all three examples I have discussed, there is a seamless shift from the introductory εἴησι to the concluding ἐρέουσιν: the speaker is at once both an individual and a community. In Hector’s scene, we also have the preceding plural in αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳιάδας ἐλκεσιπέπλους (22. 105), further stressing this aspect of the speaker’s ambiguity.

¹⁵³ Among those scholars who have commented on *tis*-speeches, there has nevertheless been an unfortunate tendency to think of Hector straightforwardly imagining a third party to be berating him, a view that is explicitly credited to Dodds’ shame-culture. As we have seen, de Jong claims that “Hektor’s words are a clear illustration of the Homeric *shame-culture*”; cf. Wilson, 1979: 1, “[t]he history of a device that is so recognizably Homeric and so linked to the values of a shame culture is of ethical as well as stylistic interest”; Schneider, 1996: 114, “Hektor is so afraid of the public opinion of the Trojan men and women, that he is even ready to die because of it. Hence Dodds rightly calls it “the strongest moral force” of Homeric people” (“Hektor fürchtet die öffentliche Meinung der Trojaner und Trojanerinnen so sehr, daß er ihretwegen sogar bereit ist zu sterben. Mit Recht nennt Dodds sie daher auch „die stärkste moralische Kraft“ des homerischen Menschen”).

in the remaining cases no such comparison is made. Likewise, Hector is the only one of the three to describe the critic as ἄλλος, ‘other’. Such robust ‘distancing’ of Hector from his critic is reinforced by the particular sense κακώτερος takes in Hector’s mouth: in general, we should understand it to mean simply ‘baser’, ‘worse’ *vel sim.*, but for Hector it seems this shades into meanings of cowardice, particularly of the martial sort. Thus, when he refuses Andromache’s request that he not return to the war, he defends his decision by telling her that

ἀλλὰ μάλ’ αἰνῶς
αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρωιάδας ἔλκεσιπέπλους
αἷ κε κακὸς ὧς νόσφιν ἀλυσκάζω πολέμοιο.

(Il. 6. 441-443)

To be κακός here would amount to tremulously remaining within Troy’s walls. Similarly, when he scolds Paris for shrinking from duelling Menelaus, he refers to the κακά he has committed (Il. 3. 56f.), a term which perhaps encompasses his brother’s misdeeds in general, but contextually must highlight his characteristic pusillanimity. Furthermore, on one of only two occasions in the *Iliad* in which a rout is associated with being κακός, Hector, as we have seen, mocks Diomedes for his flight, dubbing him a κακὴ γλήνη (8. 164).¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, when Hector calls his critic κακώτερος, we may understand him to be not only generically referring to his critic as ‘worse’, but also *more cowardly* than he is. It is such cowardice that, as we have just seen, Hector consistently eschews throughout the *Iliad*, perhaps to a greater extent than any other hero; and therefore there is here a commensurate, further distancing of himself from the critic.

Yet for all this ‘distancing’, his ‘proximity’ to the critic, the degree to which the critic’s identity has given way to Hector’s, is reinforced by the fact, as I have noted, that Hector’s preface to the *tis*-speech uses words that are almost an exact match for his critic’s; neither

¹⁵⁴ The other being Odysseus wondering whether he should retreat (Il. 11. 404f., 408-410).

Nausicaa nor Eurymachus does this, or anything like it.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, should Hector return to Troy, having refused to face Achilles, and in that event a critic utter for real what he is imagined to say, Hector too would then be, by his own lights, κακός, having fled a test of martial strength against his counterpart among the Achaeans: the very flaw he would in that event be unable to disclaim is the one from which his detractor is imagined to suffer also.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, there may in the use of κακώτερος itself be an implication that Hector has already in some sense become, like his critic, κακός, perhaps through his military bungling or existing reticence to meet Achilles. This ‘regular’ comparative of κακός is in Homer and beyond rare; and where it does occur, it seems usually to carry an implication, unlike the much more common ‘irregular’ comparative χείρων, that the person who serves as the *comparandum* is implied himself to be κακός, the force of the comparative often being similar to the English ‘more bad’ rather than ‘worse’. In the latter, the *comparandum* need not be thought defective at all, but in the former this is strongly implied, if not entailed.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ A small difference between Hector’s words and the critic’s is that Hector refers bluntly to his ἀτασθαλία, whereas the critic is not quite so direct. The critic’s words are perhaps supposed to be lightly mocking or ‘smarmy’, though this does not much affect what I am trying to emphasise in the text.

¹⁵⁶ The critic’s words, mirroring Hector’s self-reproaches, focus on Hector’s prior failure to listen to Polydamas, and the ruin that followed. But if he compounds his prior poor judgement with cowardice, fleeing the confrontation with Achilles, Hector moves that much closer to his critic.

¹⁵⁷ ‘Morphy was worse in the endgame than Capablanca’ does not imply that Capablanca was bad in the endgame; exchanging ‘worse’ for ‘more bad’ implies that he was. This distinction, and the interpretation it might encourage, seems to have occurred to a scholiast: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴσων· οὐ γὰρ κακὸς Ἔκτωρ (ΣβΤ *ad Il.* 22. 106), glossing κακώτερος; he is evidently concerned to head off the ‘more bad’ understanding to which I have referred. In the Odyssean passages I have discussed, an implication of herself being in some respect κακός would be consistent with Nausicaa’s characteristic diffidence, and uncertainty that her dealings so far with Odysseus have been appropriate. In Eurymachus’ case, that he should likewise think himself, at least partly, κακός makes sense given his realisation that the much-maligned beggar may be able to do something he, noble suitor though he is, cannot. After Homer, in a fragment of Antisthenes, we find the aphoristic κακοὶ κολακευόμενοι κακώτεροι γίνονται (83); Theocritus’ Daphnis says to the unreceptive girl he is pursuing, in reference to Pan, δαιμαίνω μὴ δὴ σε κακώτερον ἀνέρι δώσει (*Id.* 27. 22), Daphnis humorously agreeing that he is ‘bad’, as the girl evidently supposes, but recommending that she had better settle, lest she end up with someone worse still; Aratus makes Justice declare Οἴην χρύσειοι πατέρες γενεὴν ἐλίποντο | χειροτέραν· ὑμεῖς δὲ κακώτερα τέκνα τεκεῖσθε (1. 123f.), the men of the Silver Age being already worse than those of the Golden, though their progeny will be worse still; in the *Dionysiaca*, Artemis is κακώτερα in anger than Athena (5. 343), in a passage in which Athena’s anger at the peeping Teiresias is in view; Orontes is worse still than the already dreadful sea-monster Perseus killed (17. 301); a stream is worse even than Dionysus (23. 102), because it beats the speaker more (harder?) with its currents than does Dionysus with his *thyrsoi*, ‘bad’ himself on account of such violence. By contrast, a similar usage is admittedly not evident in either the *Argonautica* or *Posthomerica*.

Here then there is a definite, in fact unusually acute, ambiguity in the critic's identity, and the extent to which his may overlap with Hector's is considerable: he is simultaneously a despised 'other' and Hector himself. I suggest that we have in such a syndrome a reason to invoke the characterological approach.¹⁵⁸ If one, due to prior thoughtlessness, has done something sufficiently awful, one is confronted with the terrible possibility that one is not the person one thought oneself to be. As I noted earlier, this is an extremely serious matter, and something one may take significant steps to avoid. Thus, perhaps one will try to disclaim the transgression as aberrant or exceptional, and maintain the previous valuation of oneself. But in cases where the misdeed is particularly severe, that will not be easily possible; and so there will arise a tension between resigned acceptance of the sort of person one has newly become and spirited rejection that one has become that sort of person in the first place. This is just the sort of ambivalence that I take to be reflected in the ambiguous identity of the critic. On the one hand, Hector tries to 'shore up' his own valuation of himself, contrasting himself, explicitly, with someone who is, he says, 'different... to me', a sharp distinction not made by his fellow users of the potential *tis*-speech. The manner in which he is different is that he is someone less courageous than Hector, courage being a virtue of particular importance to the latter, who is still trying to predicate it of himself as he regrets his prior military failures and agonises over whether he should meet Achilles in combat. Yet, on the other hand, Hector puts almost exactly the same reproach into the critic's mouth as he utters himself moments earlier, the characteristic "self-reproaches" to which we saw Lewis refer. Likewise, the language Hector uses to describe the critic is revealing: in describing him, unusually, as *κακώτερος*, there is a nascent admission of Hector himself being the *κακός* he could not bear to be. Indeed, if the critic were really in a position to utter his critique, Hector would have already fled Achilles,

¹⁵⁸ Cf. pp. 95f., on the potentially related issue of inconstant acknowledgement of the terrible thing one has done, or else the significance of it.

and thereby be confirmed as the *κακός par excellence*. This, then, seems to be indicative of the sort of resigned acceptance to which I have referred: Hector acknowledges, even if in a qualified way, that he is on account of his military failings the sort of man the critic is, even as he tries to suggest that he is a different sort of man altogether.

What kind of shame, then, is Hector experiencing? I think Aristotle is right that social shame must be implicated in this scene: clearly Hector does fear what those in Troy will say about him should he retreat to the city. But as Williams recognised, the way Hector characterises at least part of the Trojan audience is not easily reconcilable with an uncomplicated social approach to the scene. Williams' solution was to suggest that Hector feared that the disparaged critic would say something true, it being Hector's recognition of the accuracy of the critic's barb that would enable him to feel social shame before that critic: it was already bad that Hector really had failed his people, and the craven critic's declaring as much would only make matters worse. I think Williams was right about this, and have sought to invoke characterological shame to elaborate upon his initial suggestion. What motivates inclusion of this type of shame is that on it the agent's perspective on the truth of what has happened is essential: I can only feel the unbearable shame at being the kind of person I despise if I actually believe I have done something to make myself such a person. From there, a characterological approach can make sense of some of the unusual features of this scene, namely the various ways in which Hector seems simultaneously to identify with his anonymous critic, even whilst reviling him. But, as I noted earlier, I regard the characterological approach to shame to *complement*, not replace, the social approach. Whilst there might be a *theoretical* distinction between the two, it is worth remembering that the purpose of such theoretical exposition is to highlight differences in order to avoid, on the conceptual level, ambiguity or confusion. But it does not follow from this somewhat artificial practice that we should expect such neat distinctions to be observed in the emotional and imaginative 'wild'; indeed, on this

‘lived’ level, we should expect just the opposite, with different species of emotions interacting with, to some extent even bleeding into, one another. In Hector’s case, we have a complex interplay between the types of shame I have considered, with the two, though separable in theory, meeting at a phenomenological level to form a complex affective experience. Hector is afraid of what others will say about him; he is afraid of the reality of who he might now be; and he is afraid of the strains of shame which attend both.¹⁵⁹

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The purpose of this chapter was, in the words of Bernard Williams, to ‘get clearer’ about shame, especially in an Homeric context. This initially involved consideration of the ideas of Eric Dodds, as well as those of Ruth Benedict (whose thoughts about shame I argued were more nuanced than they sometimes appear), and the reception of these by other scholars who have also been interested in shame in Homer. After that, I embarked on a discussion of shame, the purpose of which was to show that, though what I have called the ‘social approach’ to the emotion is justifiably popular, it is likely that there are some cases of shame that do not involve an audience of any kind. This prompted a consideration of what other approaches to shame might also be helpful, a candidate for which I have called the ‘characterological approach’. I then applied this approach to two key Homeric scenes in which shame is implicated, suggesting that, whilst the social approach should still be deployed in both, there were at times some challenges in reading these scenes through a social lens, especially given the kinds of audience involved, and that the characterological approach, itself recommended by peculiarities of these scenes, might usefully supplement the social. The result was intended to be a richer picture of

¹⁵⁹ One may also see elements of the more nuanced, ‘self-as-audience’, social approach in Hector’s situation, beyond the social approach on which one’s ideation of an audience of others is crucial, which I do not take my argument to exclude.

the emotional dynamics of Diomedes' and, especially, Hector's situation, pressing the fact that shame in Homer can not only be approached in many ways, but suffered in many ways also.

By endorsing this characterological approach, I have also been endorsing the general utility of what I have called 'agent-centred' approaches to the Homeric epics. Whilst I have so far been focusing on what this might mean in the context of a specific emotion, it is natural to ask to what other, especially ethical, domains they might also be applicable. An obvious connection is suggested already by the features of shame I have discussed: if such evaluations of one's 'fundamental character' as I have described occur in shame, then it is plausible that these evaluations might involve *blame*, and thence be bound up with ideas of *responsibility*. I will reserve further comment on the relationship between agent-centred approaches to shame and responsibility until the epilogue, before which I will discuss the latter in some detail. For now, I turn to Arthur Adkins, and his rather different, though far from unique, views on what concepts of responsibility do and should involve, in Homer and beyond.

Responsibility: Adkins, OIC, and the King's Apology

“But don't you accept,” replied Martin, “that hawks have always killed pigeons when they come across them?” – “Without a doubt,” said Candide. – “Well, then,” said Martin, “if hawks have always had the same nature, why do you expect men to change theirs?”

(Voltaire, *Candide*)¹

The few existing writings against Kantian philosophy are the most important documents in the case history of sound common sense.²

(Friedrich Schlegel, *Athenaeum Aphorisms*)

I

Sixty years ago, Arthur Adkins, in his *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, proposed to trace “the development of the concept of moral responsibility in Greek”,³ an ambition which for him began with Homer and ended with Aristotle. Among other things, this involved a comprehensive account of Homeric ethics and values, which in Adkins' view were inseparably linked. According to Adkins, in Homer we find a value system which can be divided into ‘competitive excellences’ on the one hand and ‘cooperative excellences’ on the other. The former are ‘competitive’ in the sense that they relate to those “activities in which success is of paramount importance”,⁴ and the latter ‘cooperative’ in the sense that they relate to those “activities, such as contracts or partnerships, in which men co-operate with one another for a common end”.⁵ In the competitive realm, “commendation or the reverse is reserved for those who *in fact* succeed or fail... what a man intended to do is of little account in estimating

¹ Voltaire, 2005: 59, Cuffe's translation. The novel was first published in 1759.

² Behler & Willson, 1982: 123, their translation. The epigram was originally published in 1798.

³ Adkins, 1960: 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*

his performance”,⁶ whereas in the co-operative ‘fairness’ is key, and “[f]airness raises questions quite different from those of success or failure [and therefore] [i]t is perfectly reasonable to inquire whether any encroachment was deliberate or not, and to expect that different treatment will be given to the encroacher according to the answer”.⁷ These contrasting excellences allegedly motivate very different ethics: if in a society one set of excellences is highly prized, it follows that the complexion of that society’s ethical reasoning will be coloured accordingly. In the Homeric world, the competitive excellences were, says Adkins, predominant, as befitted a world riven by constant conflict.⁸ Thus, the ethical reasoning of Homer’s characters attends little to the intentions, states of mind, or situations of the agent in general, but adverts to the actual success or failure of the agent’s enterprises; Homeric culture is therefore not only, following Dodds, a ‘shame culture’, but also a ‘results culture’.⁹ On account of this, Homeric heroes supposedly have scant awareness of ‘moral’ responsibility, for in apportioning this assessing intentions *etc.* is necessarily involved. “Such” says Adkins “are the implications of the competitive scheme of values. *Moral* responsibility has no place in them; and the quieter [*sc.* cooperative] virtues, in which such responsibility has its place, neither have sufficient attraction to gain a hearing nor are backed by sufficient force to compel one”.¹⁰ To the extent moral responsibility develops ‘in Greek’, then, Homer represents at most its nascence.

Such views have attracted a good deal of dissent, and Adkins’ full account, which went almost totally unrevised throughout his thirty-five years of scholarly activity, has been attacked

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.* 7.

⁸ *Ibid.* 35-37.

⁹ The term is introduced in Adkins, 1970. *Cf.* Adkins, 1960, “Success is so imperative that only results have any value: intentions are unimportant” (35).

¹⁰ Adkins, 1960: 52. Adkins nowhere precisely defines what he means by ‘moral responsibility’ (on which *cf.* the complaints of Robinson, 1962 and Long, 1970: 121), though my characterisation of Adkins’ position seems fair in light of the overall tenor of his work; *cf.* Loudon, 1996: 7, and n. 16.

from several quarters.¹¹ But what I wish to focus on for the moment are his comments on the ethics of his own society:

For any man brought up in a western democratic society the related concepts of duty and responsibility are the central concepts of ethics; and we are inclined to take it as an unquestionable truth, though there is abundant evidence to the contrary, that the same must be true of all societies. In this respect, at least, we are all Kantians now. Surely, we assume, in any society ‘What is my duty in these circumstances?’ is the basic question which the agent must ask himself in any matter which requires a moral decision; and since, as we all know, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, anyone who has to pass judgement on any action must first inquire, in considering whether the agent did or did not do his duty, whether he could or could not have acted otherwise, and hence whether he may be held responsible for his actions or no.¹²

Adkins’ claim that “we are all Kantians now” has been controversial indeed, though, since it was not fully clear what view Adkins was characterising as ‘Kantian’, criticism has not always been as incisive as it might have been.¹³ It is therefore fortunate that Adkins would, even if three decades later, clarify this: “[m]y own use of “Kantian” has aroused much comment. If

¹¹ The arguments advanced in Adkins, 1997, his last publication, are unchanged from those in *Merit and Responsibility*, Adkins offering no reply to the key critique of Williams, 1993, a result perhaps of his declining health; that of Gill, 1996, came too late. The earlier criticisms of Long, 1970 and Gagarin, 1987 were addressed in detail in Adkins, 1971 and Adkins, 1987, respectively; the occasional jabs of Dover, 1974 perhaps provoked Adkins’ hostile review of this (Adkins, 1978), though Adkins would never respond to the riposte of Dover, 1983. The immutability of Adkins’ views is derided by Lloyd-Jones, 1983, his criticism largely unhelpful, even if entertaining. Adkins’ only two concessions of any significance relate to his reference to ‘Kantians’ in *Merit and Responsibility* (on which cf. n. 14), and the nomenclature of ‘cooperative’ and ‘competitive’ excellences. On the latter, he commented that “[t]he words are, of course, to be understood as defined in *MR* [*sc. Merit and Responsibility*] 6 f.; but I should be the first to acknowledge that as technical terms they have defects. I have not been able to devise anything more satisfactory, however; and possibly something like ‘x-values’ and ‘y-values’ would be least misleading, though it would not render *MR* noticeably easier to read” (1971: 3). The admission is presented as terminological and stylistic, and so inconsequential; but Adkins’ acceptance that two of his key theoretical terms were defective is not to be taken lightly.

¹² Adkins, 1960: 2.

¹³ Dover, 1974: 2, n. 3 focuses on the claim that duty is critical: “Adkins remarks that it is hard to accept the idea ‘that there should exist a society so different from our own as to render it impossible to translate “duty” in its Kantian sense into the ethical terminology at all’. But what exactly is ‘our own’ society? I cannot recall experiencing a temptation to use the word ‘duty’ in its Kantian sense (except, of course, when talking about Kant) and, at least in the course of the last five or six years, I do not think I have heard the word so used. Unless I am seriously deceiving myself, I and most of the people I know well find the Greeks of the Classical period easier to understand than Kantians”; cf. Williams, 1993: 41, n. 43, “[T]he respect in question is that of taking duty and responsibility to be the central concepts of ethics...”. Dover, 1983: 45 attends rather to the relative unimportance of the categorical imperative, though not only to this (cf. n. 23). Gill, 1996: 39f. criticises Adkins’ claim in passing; by contrast, Gagarin, 1987: 288 seems to accept it.

the word is read in its context, it becomes evident that my meaning, perhaps too flamboyantly expressed, is that all now agree that “ought” implies “can”.¹⁴

I will consider in a moment whether this claim is true; but first it is worth asking whether ‘ought implies can’ (herein ‘OIC’) is even Kantian. Certainly, when Kant says “if the moral law demands that we should now be better people, it necessarily follows that we must also be able to be so”,¹⁵ it seems that he accepted OIC, and he often says similar things elsewhere.¹⁶ But the truth is rather thornier. As we have just seen, Adkins refers to OIC in the context of a judge inquiring whether an agent should be held responsible for his conduct. Before concluding that the agent should be held responsible, the judge must, being someone who accepts OIC, ask whether the agent could have done otherwise than he did. If he discovers that the agent could not have done otherwise, he judges that the agent bears no responsibility for what he did, considering that his inability to do otherwise meant that he had no duty to do otherwise. Importantly, in this procedure, OIC serves to *restrict* the agent’s responsibility: the agent might otherwise have borne responsibility, but the judge’s resort to OIC ensured that he did not.

The trouble is that this procedure is not only not Kantian, but anti-Kantian. Recall that in the prior formulation Kant speaks of the “moral law” *demanding* virtue, from which it *follows* that we can be virtuous. This seems to suggest that the range of duties the moral law

¹⁴ Adkins, 1987: 313; note that for Adkins it is others, failing to read in context, who are to blame for the misunderstanding. Surprisingly, this article is missing from the bibliographies of both Williams, 1993 and Gill, 1996, for whose critiques the clarification would have been pertinent.

¹⁵ Kant, 1794: IV. 50, “wenn das moralische Gesetz gebietet, wir sollen jetzt bessere Menschen sein, so folgt unumgänglich, wir müssen es auch können”.

¹⁶ Cf. Kant, 1793: I. 287, “That one knows that he can do this, because he knows that he should do it: this opens up in him a depth of divine aptitude, which, as it were, facilitates his feeling a holy *frisson* at the greatness and sublimity of his true destiny” (Daß der Mensch sich bewußt Ist, er könne dieses, weil er es soll: das eröffnet in ihm eine Tiefe göttlicher Anlagen, die ihm gleichsam einen heiligen Schauer über die Größe und Erhabenheit seiner wahren Bestimmung fühlen läßt). For further references, cf. those collected in Stern, 2004: 53-55.

imposes has been securely fixed beforehand, obligation being firmly prior to ability. To see exactly what I mean by this, here is Kant's own example of OIC in action:

Suppose someone claims of his lustful appetite that, if the desired object and, in addition, the opportunity, were to present themselves, it [*sc.* that appetite] would be for him utterly irresistible. Ask him this: if gallows were erected where he encounters this opportunity, so that he, immediately after slaking his lust, should be hanged upon them, would he not now master his appetite? One would need not guess for long what his answer would be. But ask him whether, if his ruler, on pain of the same immediate penalty of death, demanded that he bear false witness against an honourable man, whom he [*sc.* the ruler] might want under a false pretext to ruin—ask him whether, so great even may his love for life be, would he think it possible to overcome it? Whether or not he would do it he would perhaps not venture to assure himself; but that it is possible for him he must concede without a second thought. Thus, he judges that he can do something, because he is aware that he should do it...¹⁷

There is no question here of OIC curtailing the agent's responsibility, of it restricting his duties, as it did for Adkins. Rather, it serves only to radically expand the agent's range of *capabilities*: the agent begins with the knowledge of what is obligatory (he should not indulge his lust; he should not traduce an honourable man) and from this infers what he can do (he can refrain from indulging and traducing), accepting that what is within the realm of duty must be within the realm of ability.¹⁸ Indeed, it is the moral law, and his knowledge of what it demands, that rescues the agent from resignation to agential impotence: he knows he is free, because he really can do everything the moral law commands.¹⁹ It is not, then, that Kant disagrees with Adkins about the truth of OIC: he agrees that if one has a duty, then one can perform it. Rather, it is

¹⁷ Kant, 1788: §6. 30, "Setzet, daß jemand von seiner wollüstigen Neigung vorgiebt, sie sei, wenn ihm der beliebte Gegenstand und die Gelegenheit dazu vorkämen, für ihn ganz unwiderstehlich: ob, wenn ein Galgen vor dem Hause, da er diese Gelegenheit trifft, aufgerichtet wäre, um ihn sogleich nach genossener Wollust daran zu knüpfen, er alsdann nicht seine Neigung bezwingen würde. Man darf nicht lange rathen, was er antworten würde. Fragt ihn aber, ob, wenn sein Fürst ihm unter Androhung derselben unverzögerten Todesstrafe zumuthete, ein falsches Zeugniß wider einen ehrlichen Mann, den er gerne unter scheinbaren Vorwänden verderben möchte, abzulegen, ob er da, so groß auch seine Liebe zum Leben sein mag, sie wohl zu überwinden für möglich halte. Ob er es thun würde, oder nicht, wird er vielleicht sich nicht getrauen zu versichern; daß es ihm aber möglich sei, muß er ohne Bedenken einräumen. Er urtheilt also, daß er etwas kann, darum weil er sich bewußt ist, daß er es soll..."

¹⁸ The same analysis is provided by Rödl, 2013: 42f.

¹⁹ Hence, immediately after the text I have quoted (n. 17), Kant's assertion, "and he recognises in himself the freedom which would otherwise have remained unbeknownst to him without the moral law" (und erkennt in sich die Freiheit, die ihm sonst ohne das moralische Gesetz unbekannt geblieben wäre).

what he *does with* OIC that differs, for whilst Adkins treats it with a *modus tollens* (you cannot perform this duty; therefore, you do not have this duty), Kant subjects it to a *modus ponens* (you have this duty; therefore, you can perform this duty).²⁰ Not for nothing, then, has it been suggested that for Kant the principle is less “Sollen impliziert Können” than “Du sollst, denn du kannst”.²¹ OIC is, therefore, technically a Kantian principle; but the purpose to which it is put in Kant bears little resemblance to how Adkins imagines it to work for us.²²

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So much for Kant. I return now to the claim “that all now agree that “ought” implies “can”, which was, on Adkins’ own account, what he was really getting at. Of this claim, many, I suspect, would not be sceptical.²³ It is, after all, difficult to imagine that we would, upon being

²⁰ For an excellent discussion of this and the foregoing, which has heavily influenced my own, cf. Martin, 2009: 109f. For how the approaches of Adkins and Kant would play out in the real world, consider the familiar example of a drug addict who accepts that he should kick his habit, but complains that his desire for the drug is too strong to resist. For Kant, it is about reminding the addict that, if he accepts he has a duty to refrain, then the drug must be resistible after all. By contrast, Adkins’ approach, assuming he believed the addict’s complaint of compulsion, would be to reassure him that he need not refrain after all. Such are the radically dissimilar consequences which can follow from accepting the very same principle of OIC.

²¹ So Timmermann, 2003.

²² This being so, we are confronted by a curiosity. Adkins judges OIC to be largely unimportant in Homeric society, on account of its emphasis upon the ‘competitive excellences’, which, as we have already seen, produces an emphasis upon results over all else. We might therefore expect that it follows that in Homeric society one is held responsible for a far greater range of conduct than one is in our own, since in the former one is without the ‘protection’ (as Adkins sees it) of OIC, a particular avenue for exculpation being there unavailable. Accordingly, Adkins asserts that “the difference between competitive and co-operative activities lies not in the demand that one should perform the action if possible... but in the willingness to accept excuses if it is not possible” (Adkins, 1971: 4). Consider then Penelope’s reproach of Telemachus for his failure to protect his family and guests (*Od.* 18. 215-225), of which Adkins suggests that “the responsibility falls to Telemachus alone; and since for this very reason the demand that he shall discharge it successfully is categorical, no excuses can be accepted” (Adkins, 1960: 35). I will return to this scene later. But for now I note that the curiosity consists in the fact that Kant would presumably have shared this uncompromising attitude towards Telemachus’ failure, even if Adkins says we do not. For given that Telemachus presumably thinks that he ought to evict the suitors, on Kant’s view he must also be able to evict them, and so can hardly successfully plead inability; indeed, if he were to do so, Kant would perhaps pose to him the gallows question. Paradoxically, then, Homer’s allegedly more uncompromising, capacious attitude to responsibility bears greater resemblance to Kant’s than does what Adkins says is our own, ‘Kantian’ view.

²³ For which reason, in addition to OIC’s *prima facie* plausibility (on which cf. pp. 134ff.), I discuss it at some length. Cf. the survey of Buckwalter, 2019: 83f. on the wide acceptance of OIC among Analytic philosophers, and their belief that it is intuitive and widely accepted among people in general. Nevertheless, as we will soon see, the consensus is not as broad as one might expect. Among critics of Adkins, it is Williams who has most directly challenged the claim of OIC’s universality: “Progressivist writers refer to a concept of moral responsibility that we supposedly enjoy and the Greeks lacked, but it is unclear what they have in mind. Their thought seems most typically to be that the Greeks, or at least archaic Greeks, blamed and sanctioned people for the things they did

asked ‘Do people have a duty to do what they cannot do?’ *vel sim.*, answer affirmatively. OIC seems to be intuitively obvious, its negation absurd; evidently it seemed so to Adkins, for nowhere in *Merit and Responsibility* (and, as far as I know, anywhere else in his published work) does he defend either it or his assertion of its universal approbation.²⁴

But if OIC is as embedded in the culture of “any man brought up in a western society” as Adkins says it is, then it conflicts with values and principles that are just as culturally entrenched. For the central figure of the West’s dominant religious tradition is portrayed as indifferent to our capabilities, even as he spells out our obligations: ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν Matthew’s Jesus exhorts his disciples (5. 48),²⁵ the unachievable duty to be perfect capping a chapter in which Jesus often seems unfazed by his listeners’ inability to do as he instructs.²⁶ Indeed, a pillar of Christianity in general seems to be

unintentionally, or again—though this distinction is often neglected—for things that... they did intentionally but in a strange state of mind. We are thought not to do this, or at least to regard it as unjust. But if this means that the Greeks paid no attention to intentions, while we make everything turn on the issue of intentions, or at least think that we should, this is doubly false... we do not, and could not, adjust our response to harm caused by an action simply to accord with what was intended” (1993: 64), Williams going on to cite, by way of example, the criminal standard of strict liability. My own discussion represents a significant intensification of his position. *Cf.* Dover, 1983: 45*f.*, “The question, ‘Was this person free to abstain from that action?’ is a question which understandably interests philosophers and theologians, and courts of law often have to pretend that it is answerable, but in most circumstances we ask a different question, ‘How *difficult* was it for this person to abstain from that action?’ The answer is commonly determined by our relations with the person whose action we are judging and by the function of the judgment in its practical context”. The point is interesting, but still seems too committed to the importance of OIC, a commitment also indicated by the rejection of the idea, identified as Kant’s, that we blame people for acts of theirs which (we believe) are determined (46).

²⁴ One of the few philosophical influences Adkins (1997: 695) mentions, R. M. Hare, does so in his *Freedom and Reason* (1963), but Adkins nowhere cites it.

²⁵ This use of the future tense here is presumably imperatival rather than promissory, given the extensive use of the ‘Jussive future’ (Smyth §1917) in the preceding text, mirroring the Septuagint’s use of this to translate both injunctions and exhortations in the Hebrew Bible; *cf.* Fantin, 2010: 9, esp. n. 11; 157, esp. n. 96. Alternatively, it might arguably be in some sense both imperative and promissory: “This example [*sc.* Luke 12. 2 *versus* Matt. 10. 27] enlightens the difference between the imperative and future indicative. In the former the outcome is not guaranteed. It is dependent upon the hearers’ response to the directive. In the latter the outcome seems more certain” (*ibid.* 173); *cf.* New, 1991: “The point of contrast between the imperatival future, positive or prohibition, and the imperative, then, is that the former is a command which purports to be fact, while the latter inclines to wishful command” (124). New goes on to rename this kind of future the ‘Injunctive future’, which “is a type of existential future in that it expresses ‘existential futurity’, a notion of the future which is ‘pre-supposed’ to be as real as a present or past state or event” (126).

²⁶ Though the previous obligation was not to murder, now it is not to grow angry with one’s brother (5. 21*f.*); *cf.* the previous demand to refrain from adultery, which is now regarded as something which is committed in one’s heart when merely looking at a woman with lust (5. 27*f.*). Yet refraining from anger and lust do not seem to be much under one’s control, even if the comments on the latter are complicated by vv. 29*f.* Beyond this, whilst I have presented these exhortations as examples of the rejection of OIC, it is possible that they are consciously

the quotidian requirement that people be better than they can be. When the Peter of *Acts* strikes down Ananias and Sapphira for embezzlement, his question of the former, διὰ τί ἐπλήρωσεν ὁ Σατανᾶς τὴν καρδίαν σου ψεύσασθαί σε τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ νοσφίσασθαι ἀπὸ τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ χωρίου; (5. 3), does not proceed from an assessment of whether Ananias could have done otherwise, and indeed implies that he could not.²⁷ In Pauline thought also we must be μιμηταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ (*Eph.* 5. 1), among whom the varieties of sin cannot even be named (5. 3-5), a task which is presumably impossible.²⁸ Likewise, it is difficult to make sense of the apostle’s reference to election, the σκευὴ ὀργῆς κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν (*Rom.* 9. 22), if for him ‘ought implies can’: those not elected to God’s kingdom should still worship God and accept Christ, which is why they will be condemned for failing to do so, even whilst being constitutionally unable to do so. Much later, OIC would even motivate what would be, thanks to Augustine, treated as the heresy of Pelagianism. Augustine reports of Caelestius, the disciple of Pelagius, that “[i]terum, inquit, quaerendum est, utrumne debeat homo sine peccato esse.

‘rhetorical’, being hyperbolic demands that are intended to communicate to readers the importance of virtuous conduct, rather than functioning as genuine obligations which they are expected to meet.

²⁷ Satan is in this interpretation taken to be an agent interfering with Ananias’ ability to do the right thing: despite that interference, Ananias is blamed for what he did, though unable to do otherwise. Cf. Barrett, 1994 *ad loc.*: “In itself the verb ἐπλήρωσεν could mean that Satan filled Ananias’s heart *with something*—that is, with the evil intention to retain part of his money for his own use whilst giving the impression that he had contributed the whole. But as Satan *entered into* Judas Iscariot [sc. *Luc.* 22.3] so probably the thought here is that he had entered into and filled Ananias’s heart, thus taking control of his actions (his heart being the thinking, willing agent that directed them)”, comparing *Acts* 2. 4, 13. 10. Either possibility Barrett raises would presumably secure Ananias’ inability to do otherwise, though the former more ambiguously. The matter is complicated by the peculiarity of the question (“does Peter really want to know why Satan acted as he did?” asks Barrett), and, more pressingly, by the following verse: τί ὅτι ἔθου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτο; (5. 4). Whilst a moment earlier Peter was asking why Satan filled Ananias’ heart such that he lied to the Holy Spirit and embezzled the money, now he asks why Ananias himself placed such a deed in his heart; the latter suggests that Ananias was not unable to do otherwise after all (cf. Fitzmyer, 1998 *ad loc.*, who also highlights the discrepancy). I note that the tension is remarkably similar to one encountered in Homer, e.g. Penelope’s comment on Helen: τὴν δ’ ἦτοι ρέξει θεὸς ὄρορεν ἔργον ἀεικέες| τὴν δ’ ἄτην οὐ πρόσθεν ἔωι ἐγκάτθετο θυμῶι | λυγρὴν, ἐξ ἧς πρῶτα καὶ ἡμέας ἵκετο πένθος (*Od.* 23. 222-224). Here, a god, Aphrodite, induces Helen to elope with Paris, yet Penelope is still comfortable remarking that Helen “put into her θυμός the sorrowful ἄτη”. I will comment further on ἄτη later in this chapter. For now, I note the striking linguistic coincidences between these lines and those of *Acts*, ἔθου≈ἐγκάτθετο, σου καρδίᾳ≈ἔωι... θυμῶι; and if we accept, following, *inter alia*, Codex Sinaiticus, the reading διὰ τί ἐπλήρωσεν ὁ Σατανᾶς, etc. (though a corrector restores the lambda), we have an equivalence to the ‘blinding’ or ‘damaging’ ἄτη. Cf. *2 Cor.* 4. 4, ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου [sc. Satan] ἐτύφλωσεν τὰ νοήματα τῶν ἀπίστων. My suggestion is not that the author of Luke-Acts intends to refer to the Odyssean passage; but a degree of influence, as has sometimes been suggested elsewhere in *Acts* vis-à-vis Homer, is not implausible.

²⁸ Though *n. b.* my earlier qualification of claims like this (n. 26).

Procul dubio debet. Si debet, potest: si non potest, ergo nec debet”,²⁹ a position which meant that there could be no such thing as unavoidable sin and by extension no ‘original sin’ either, and one which Augustine therefore condemned.³⁰ Later still, Luther and Erasmus would come to disagree about OIC, Erasmus questioning why, if we are not free to follow God’s commandments, he would give them in the first place.³¹ For Erasmus, when God demands of us to choose what is good, it must be possible for us to do so, since “[o]therwise, it would be as if one were to say to a man so bound that he could only raise his hand to the left: “See, you have the best wine at your right hand, you have poison on your left—choose which you will!””.³² Luther’s reply is instructive:

Now as to its being absurd, on the lines of the simile you have introduced, that a man with his right arm tied should be told to put out his hand on the right when he can do so only on the left; surely it is not ridiculous even for a man with both arms tied, if he proudly maintains or ignorantly presumes that he can do what he pleases on either side of him, to be told to put out a hand on both sides, not in order to make fun of him in his captivity, but to show the falsity of his claim to possess freedom and power, or to bring home to him his ignorance of his own captivity and misery. Diatribe [*sc.* Erasmus] persists in representing man to us as one who can either do what is commanded or at least knows that he cannot. But such a man nowhere exists; and if there were such a man, then truly it would either be ridiculous to give him impossible commandments, or the Spirit of Christ would be in vain.³³

As Luther says elsewhere, “[t]he words of the law are spoken, therefore, not to affirm the power of the will, but to enlighten blind reason and make it see that its own light is no light and that the virtue of the will is no virtue”.³⁴ Luther’s starting point is not unlike Kant’s, inasmuch as both begin with the agent’s robust knowledge of what he must do. But whereas Kant believed, per OIC, that one could safely infer from the knowledge of one’s duty to the knowledge of

²⁹ *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*. 3. 5.

³⁰ Cf. Matthews, 1981: 51-53, on how Augustine’s rejection of Pelagianism leaves him unable to disclaim responsibility for sexual misconduct in dreams on the basis of OIC.

³¹ For a similar analysis of the dispute between Erasmus and Luther, cf. Martin, 2009: 124-126.

³² Rupp, Marlow, Watson & Drewery, 1969: 55; the work in question is *De Libero Arbitrio*, and the translation the editors’.

³³ *Ibid.* 192*f.*; the work in question is *De Servo Arbitrio*, and the translation the editors’.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 190.

one's ability, for Luther the inference is to one's *inability*: by hearing what you must do, you come to understand that you *cannot* do it, and thence the wretched condition in which you find yourself, which only submission to God can remedy. Certainly, you *should* do as commanded, but the fact that you cannot does not extinguish your obligation, nor make God's command pointless. For Luther, therefore, there is no essential relationship between ought and ability; and, as we have seen from this brief survey, so much may be true of a great deal of Christian thought. It is not my position, however, that Christianity, either earlier or later, rejected OIC *in toto*: as Caelestius and Erasmus attest, there was still room for this principle, and other sources suggest something similar.³⁵ But there is a sense that, if OIC were for Christianity central, much violence would be done to the remainder of the religion's ethical and theological structure: whatever role OIC plays in Christian thought, it seems unlikely to be a crucial one. This seems to me to spell trouble for Adkins' position. For if we are the heirs to, even if not the adherents of, a potent religious tradition in which obligation is not *reliably* keyed to ability, how could it be "that all now agree that "ought" implies "can"?"³⁶

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The answer, I think, is to simply deny that all agree about this, despite what is 'intuitively obvious', or rather what we *imagine* is intuitively obvious. For whilst many might answer theoretical questions in the way Adkins would predict, thanks to the burgeoning discipline of experimental philosophy, we can observe that they largely dispense with OIC when asked about it outside the context of abstract philosophising. In one study, researchers provided

³⁵ Elsewhere in the Pauline corpus we see a deployment of OIC, *e.g.* πιστός δὲ ὁ θεός, ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει ὑμᾶς πειρασθῆναι ὑπὲρ ὃ δύνασθε (1 Cor. 10. 13). Likewise, the version of the earlier Matthean verse in Luke is much more achievable: Γίνεσθε οἰκτίρμονες καθὼς [καὶ] ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν (6. 36).

³⁶ This goes to the difficult issue of the extent to which the Western world remains a Christian one, on which I do not intend to comment at length. But I note that even if one were to locate the decline of Christianity in the West to as early as the First World War, it seems unlikely that its ethical influence could have so quickly waned to permit the generalisation Adkins makes. If one were to object that certain Christian *mores* have disappeared in this time, such as attitudes towards extra-marital sex, we might respond that underlying moral principles would be expected to change far more slowly: consider the high regard in which fidelity in a monogamous romantic context is valued, even if somewhat ambivalently.

participants with vignettes describing scenarios in which agents might find themselves. For instance, participants read:

Michael is relaxing in the park when he sees a small girl fall into a nearby pond. She is drowning and definitely will die unless someone quickly pulls her out. This part of the park is secluded and Michael is the only person around. But [Michael is stricken by a sudden paralysis in his legs/Michael's legs have been paralyzed since birth]. As a result, Michael is not physically able to save the girl.³⁷

They were then asked to select one of four statements describing the situation, each of which expressed a certain combination of ability and obligation (*i.e.* 'Michael ought to [ought not] save the girl, and Michael is [not] physically able to do so'). Strikingly, the researchers reported that "[p]articipants selected the 'Ought but Unable' [*sc.* 'Michael ought to save the girl, but Michael is not physically able to do so'] response for both Recent and (88%) Life-long (95%) conditions at rates exceeding chance...".³⁸ Physical disability, even of the congenital sort, was for these participants not enough to undermine the agent's obligation to act, and indeed participants reading other scenarios reliably judged the agent to have an obligation to do the impossible.³⁹ In another study, it was likewise found that, when presented with scenarios in which an agent makes a promise but subsequently becomes unable to keep it, participants continued to judge that the agent ought to stick to their commitment nevertheless.⁴⁰ Another group of researchers discovered that participants' assessments of responsibility did indeed vary

³⁷ Buckwalter & Turri, 2015: 10. The bracketed material was varied, to see whether participants' responses would change when the inability was longstanding rather than temporary.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ The trend was reproduced even where participants were asked to consider the same scenario, but the penultimate sentence changed to read "no human could swim fast enough to save the girl" (*ibid.* 12).

⁴⁰ Mizrahi, 2015. The following is an example of a scenario provided: "On Tuesday morning, Professor Smith talks with Sid, his student, about meeting during office hours later that day. As it turns out, however, Professor Smith forgets about having office hours that day. After waiting for twenty minutes and realizing that Professor Smith doesn't show up, Sid leaves the office without meeting Professor Smith" (236). Even where this scenario was altered to make Professor Smith's absence presumably less blameworthy, replacing the second sentence with "As it turns out, however, Professor Smith gets locked in his classroom before he is able to make it to his office" (*ibid.*), the same effect was found: "... participants were more inclined to judge that the agent... *ought* to perform an action (namely, keep an appointment) than they were to judge that the agent... *can* perform the action. Overall, even when they judged [that] the agent... *cannot* perform the action... participants still judged that the agent *ought* to perform the action" (237). *Cf.* Mizrahi, 2015², for the author's reply to published criticisms of his study.

based on the constraint an agent was placed under, responsibility diminishing as constraint increased. Nevertheless, even in the ‘absolute’ constraint condition, in which participants were told the agent was forcibly administered a drug which “makes individuals unable to resist the demands of powerful authorities” with “effects similar to the impact of expertly administered hypnosis”, and which “results in total compliance” and the agent’s sensation that “he was observing these events, feeling like a puppet, passively observing his body move in space”,⁴¹ participants continued to judge the agent responsible for his conduct (in this case, killing a treacherous friend), and especially where the agent *identified with* the act he was being forced to commit.⁴² In fact, in every constraint condition—whether “moderate”, “high” or the aforementioned “absolute”—responsibility assessments turned significantly on the agent’s perceived identification with his action, with curtailed ability hardly the factor we might have expected it to be.⁴³ Beyond this, further research has shown that even when participants are asked to imagine the existence of a supercomputer that predicts, with complete and exhaustive accuracy, all future events, agents who commit misdeeds in such a context are still overwhelmingly judged to be responsible for their conduct, whilst a majority of participants regard them as responsible even when they inhabit “a world where the beliefs and values of every person are caused completely by the combination of one’s genes and one’s environment”.⁴⁴ A more recent experiment, building on these studies, has indicated just the same. One scenario given to participants read as follows:

A woman is evaluating her employee’s performance. The employee performed excellently. Given the current condition of the woman’s brain, it is physically impossible that she can give the employee a positive evaluation. As a matter of brain

⁴¹ Woolfolk, Doris & Darley, 2006: 292*f*.

⁴² *Ibid.* 293, Fig. 3. Indeed, the agent was judged to be more responsible in the “absolute” constraint condition, providing he identified with the action he was performing, than he was in the “high constraint/ not identified” condition.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 287.

⁴⁴ Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer & Turner, 2005. *Cf.* Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer & Turner, 2006.

chemistry, it is literally impossible that she can give the employee a positive evaluation. She will give the employee a negative evaluation.⁴⁵

Participants were then asked to rate the extent to which “[t]he woman is morally responsible for the evaluation she gives the employee”⁴⁶ and the extent to which she was able to give the employee a positive evaluation. The result was, as we should now expect, that her ability was rated low, even whilst her responsibility rated high: there was for these participants no essential relationship between the two factors, even when they were told, in no uncertain terms, that it was “literally impossible” for the agent to do otherwise.⁴⁷

Our attitude towards OIC is therefore not quite as straightforward as Adkins assumed, and other research has lent credence to the disjunction between thinking about OIC in the abstract and putting it into practice: people will sometimes answer ‘practical’ questions as Adkins would predict, but, tellingly, only when talking about a world which is not their own.⁴⁸ When talking about the real world, the valuation of OIC is provisional and contextual; and this is perhaps not unrelated to the fact that, as the maxim Adkins takes it to be, OIC will not necessarily survive sustained philosophical scrutiny. Already as early as 1969, Harry Frankfurt was offering the first of what would become a genre of compelling thought-experiments which run counter to the importance of OIC. Frankfurt asks us to consider the following scenario:

Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he

⁴⁵ Turri, 2017: 70, 72.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 72.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 72f.

⁴⁸ Cf. Roskies & Nichols, 2008. When participants were asked to imagine an alternative universe, in which everyone’s decisions were completely determined by their genes and environment, they were much less likely to assign moral blame to agents who committed crimes in that universe than to those who committed such crimes in a universe described identically, save for it being their own.

wants him to do. Whatever Jones's initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way.⁴⁹

Having invited the reader to imagine whatever "effective steps" he or she finds most compelling (threats, magic, hypnosis, drugs, *etc.*), Frankfurt continues:

Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action, or to withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no role at all in leading him to act as he did. He would have acted the same even if it had not been a fact. Indeed, everything happened just as it would have happened without Black's presence in the situation and without his readiness to intrude into it.⁵⁰

Here, the agent's inability to do otherwise is not only unimportant, but simply irrelevant, to our assessment of their responsibility: Jones is responsible for what he has done, and we would be aghast at the thought that the mere fact he could not have done otherwise should get him off the hook. Elsewhere, it is our obligations towards others that impeach OIC, for in our intervening to prevent one person from harming another, the permissibility of our intervention seems unaffected by whether the malefactor is able to refrain from the harm they will commit.

Consider the following scenario, offered by Peter Graham, dubbed TRANSPLANT:

A surgeon has ten patients, each of whom will die of organ failure if he or she does not receive an organ transplant. The surgeon wants to save her patients and is convinced by philosophical arguments to the effect that it would be morally permissible to kill two people in order to save her patients. She notices that in another room of the hospital there are two innocent and unconscious tonsillectomy patients who are perfect organ matches for her patients. The only means by which the hospital janitor, who is aware of the situation, can stop the surgeon from chopping up the two and redistributing their organs among the ten is by shooting her with his pistol. He does so and thereby kills her.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Frankfurt, 1969: 835.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 836.

⁵¹ Graham, 2011: 345.

Having suggested that it is clearly true that “(1) It is morally permissible for the janitor to kill the surgeon” and “(2) If the janitor had not killed the surgeon, the surgeon would have morally impermissibly killed two people”,⁵² and that “the best explanation of (1)’s truth is that (2) is true”,⁵³ Graham then asks us to consider a revised scenario, TRANSPLANT (COMPULSION): “[e]verything is as it is in TRANSPLANT except that the surgeon cannot refrain from killing the two because the ten are her grandchildren, and she is as compelled to save them as is the most severe kleptomaniac to steal”.⁵⁴ Noting that we can here, à la Frankfurt, substitute whatever form of compulsion we like,⁵⁵ he goes on to suggest, what seems clearly to be the case, that (1) and (2) remain true in this revised scenario, and that (2)’s truth continues to explain (1)’s.⁵⁶ In other words, our intervention is permissible because it prevents the impermissible act of another in both cases; the advocate of OIC, however, must maintain that in the revised scenario our intervention is impermissible—the janitor would have no moral right to intervene—because the surgeon would, by dint of her compulsion, be doing nothing impermissible, nothing contrary to what she ought to do, in killing her patients. And this seems simply absurd.

One may be more or less persuaded by such imaginative exercises. But I think these thought-experiments at least serve to tease out something fairly obvious: that a great deal of what we regard people as obligated to do they cannot do, with their inevitable failure attracting our censure. We do not, for example, reliably pause to ask whether people could have avoided acquiring contemptible desires and attitudes before regarding them as responsible for possessing them, and even taking steps to severely reproach them on that account. If someone is known to have a bigoted attitude towards ethnic minorities, or to desire to engage in sexual

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.* 346.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 346, n. 21.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 346.

activity with children, we would, I suspect, be little concerned with whether the person could have alternative attitudes or desires, and we may even find any voluntary acts or omissions that fostered these (willingly associating with racists, for example) *less* blameworthy than the now unalterable dispositions to which they gave rise.⁵⁷ But this unconcern extends far beyond attitudes and desires alone:

[A]lthough the Kantian Principle [*sc.* OIC] is intuitively appealing, so too is an impressive array of apparently conflicting claims. These include the claims that people who actually do bad things are more blameworthy than those who merely would do them if given the opportunity; that people can be blamed for their bad traits as well as for their bad acts; and that people can be blamed or held responsible for acts or omissions of whose wrongness they were not aware—for example, acts they performed because they forgot or lost track of crucial elements of their situation, because they exercised poor judgment, or because they failed to display certain forms of moral insight or imagination. Because people do not willingly choose their circumstances, their basic traits, or their lapses of memory, judgment, or imagination, it is hard to see how we could both endorse these claims and maintain our allegiance to the Kantian Principle.⁵⁸

This is all familiarly mundane: if your friend is upset at you for having forgotten their birthday, you will chide yourself for your lapse, not console yourself with the thought that your poor memory was not under your control, and any such defence would be met with a combination of disbelief and ridicule.⁵⁹ Likewise, we expect children to apologise to relatives they have offended, an act which is expected to involve not merely the uttering of a certain combination of words, but a feeling of genuine remorse which the words should express. Yet despite the fact that children may well not be able to do so—how, exactly, can they make themselves feel remorse on demand?—we chide them if they do not, with the advocate of OIC, to the surprise of parents everywhere, committed to the view that the completely incorrigible child has no obligation to say sorry, even whilst the corrigible child does.⁶⁰ Even everyday speech is a

⁵⁷ *Cf.* Adams, 1985: 14, and *passim*.

⁵⁸ Sher, 2005: 181. *Cf.* Dennett, 1984, who also impugns the role of OIC in everyday, ethical life.

⁵⁹ So Smith, 2005.

⁶⁰ So King, 2014.

testament to the fragility of our commitment to OIC. ‘He can’t help himself’ may be said both of the severely disabled man who cannot remain quiet for a theatrical production and the philanderer who cannot remain faithful to his wife. Yet inability does not exculpate in the latter case, even whilst it is an absolute defence in the former. Indeed, in the latter it is not only no defence, but also a condemnation: the philanderer’s inability to stop is *itself* taken as something for which he should be blamed, perhaps even more harshly than for any particular infidelity of which he is guilty.

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That point is one I will consider more closely momentarily. For now, it is further evidence of what I hope is by now obvious: that drawing a distinction between Homeric heroes on the one hand and ‘us’ on the other, on account of our supposed commitment to ‘ought implies can’, is untenable. We are not, even in the qualified sense Adkins later endorsed, “all Kantians now”, because we are far from accepting OIC as the axiom of ethical reasoning that Adkins takes it to be for us. Of course, we evidently do, in a variety of spheres, adjust our thoughts about agents’ responsibility in proportion with our assessments of their ability, the constraints they are under. But we do not always do so, and in fact often do not do so; and even when we do, these assessments must frequently jockey for position with others. I have alluded at some points to what these others might be, and am about to elaborate upon them, as I engage in sustained readings of several Homeric scenes. But I note here that, if Homer depicts his characters as indifferent to OIC (and, as we will see, this is far from clear), valuing this principle less highly than others, then he has accidentally come closer to representing the practice of “any man brought up in a western democratic society” than Adkins ever did deliberately.

II

In the prior section, I alluded to another factor, quite apart from ability, which seemed to feature in our ethical reasoning. In one experiment, it was an agent's 'identification' with his deeds, even if he could not refrain from committing them, that was crucial to assessments of his responsibility. In the thought-experiment of Harry Frankfurt, it is plausible that something similar was in play. For we do not care that Jones could not have done otherwise than acted with unrelenting vice, because he *wanted* to act in that way, doing so free from Black's compulsion: he was performing acts that were in every sense *his*, even if they were unavoidable. The *locus* of these ethical assessments is less the extent of the agent's ability to do otherwise and more his disposition, his *character*. This is perhaps why we find the philanderer's inability to refrain from infidelity no excuse, whereas the disabled man's inability to remain quiet an absolute one: in the former case, unlike the latter, we are assessing the agent's character, and finding it contemptible.⁶¹ These thoughts represent, in inchoate form, what we will find a more appropriate and useful approach to Homeric ethics than an emphasis upon OIC, even if, as we will see presently, the latter is nevertheless more immanent in Homer than Adkins supposed.

I begin with a scene from the *Odyssey*: Penelope's rebuke of Telemachus for his failure to ward off the suitors. Of this, Adkins suggests that his failure is in an Homeric context inexcusable, the requirement for the head of the household to defend his dependants being

⁶¹ Cf. Hippolytus, of Chrysippus and Zeno: καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιοῦτω, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ἦ ἐξηρητημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ ἔπεται, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης · ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται· τὸ αὐτὸ δὴπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπωμένον εἰσελθεῖν (SVF II 975). Regarding the ethics of this passage, the Stoics' point seems to be that virtue consists in adopting the *correct disposition* towards one's *wholly determined* lot in life. Pleading that you could not have done otherwise than you did will be met with short shrift—Diogenes Laertius says of Zeno δοῦλον ἐπὶ κλοπῇ, φασίν, ἐμαστίγου· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος, “εἴμαρτό μοι κλέψαι,” ἔφη, “καὶ δαρῆναι” (SVF I 298)—when what matters is your attitude towards the inevitable.

“categoric”.⁶² This is supposedly ‘results culture’, and the corresponding rejection of OIC, in action, the predominance of the competitive excellences ensuring that Telemachus cannot successfully plead in his defence that he was unable to evict the suitors: he ought to evict them, and is responsible for not doing so, even whilst he cannot. Such is Adkins’ reading; but it is one difficult to reconcile with the text:

Τηλέμαχ’, οὐκέτι τοι φρένες ἔμπεδοι οὐδὲ νόημα. [215]
παῖς ἔτ’ ἐὼν καὶ μάλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ κέρδε’ ἐνώμας·
νῦν δ’, ὅτε δὴ μέγας ἐσσι καὶ ἥβης μέτρον ἰκάνεις
καὶ κέν τις φαίη γόνον ἔμμεναι ὀλβίου ἀνδρός
ἐς μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος ὀρώμενος ἀλλότριος φῶς,
οὐκέτι τοι φρένες εἰσὶν ἐναίσιμοι οὐδὲ νόημα, [220]
οἷον δὴ τόδε ἔργον ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐτύχθη,
ὅς τὸν ξεῖνον ἔασας ἀεικισθήμεναι οὔτω.
πῶς νῦν, εἴ τι ξεῖνος ἐν ἡμετέροισι δόμοισιν
ἤμενος ὧδε πάθοι ῥυστακτύος ἐξ ἀλεγεινῆς;
σοὶ κ’ αἴσχος λῶβη τε μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέλοιτο. [225]

(*Od.* 18. 215-225)

I will comment further on this presently; for now, I note only that Penelope has accused Telemachus of “letting” (ἔασας) the stranger be mistreated. Telemachus responds:

μῆτερ ἐμή, τὸ μὲν οὔ σε νεμεσσοῦμαι κεχολῶσθαι·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ θυμῶι νοέω καὶ οἶδα ἕκαστα,
ἐσθλά τε καὶ τὰ χέρεια· πάρος δ’ ἔτι νήπιος ἦα.
ἀλλὰ τοι οὐ δύναμαι πεπνυμένα πάντα νοῆσαι· [230]
ἐκ γάρ με πλήσσουσι παρήμενοι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος

⁶² Adkins, 1960: 35. Adkins discusses the scene, in a similar vein, in later work also: “In the field in which the success of the group, and the defence of its members against outsiders, is concerned, cowardice is not distinguished from error, and to allow a dependent to be harmed by enemies, whether from cowardice, error or malice and injustice, is *aischron*, and no excuse is acceptable... Telemachus cannot [offer the excuse of *force majeure*]... Telemachus in reply to Penelope’s rebuke... makes it clear that he knows what to do; but the fact that he is unable to do it, rather than wilfully not doing it, does not make his situation any less *aischron*” (1971: 5).

οἶδε κακὰ φρονέοντες, ἐμοὶ δ' οὐκ εἶσιν ἄρωγοί.

(*Od.* 18. 227-232)

Telemachus' defence is to declare himself "not able" (οὐ δύναμαι) to "plan everything sensibly" (πεπνυμένα πάντα νοῆσαι) on account of the suitors' actions, with "there being nobody to help me" (ἐμοὶ δ' οὐκ εἶσιν ἄρωγοί).⁶³ Both accuser and accused are therefore evidently interested in ability, Penelope implying that Telemachus is able to stop the suitors' depredations, though does not, whilst Telemachus disclaims that ability.⁶⁴ Adkins' point is of course that Telemachus' defence is *unsuccessful*, and it is this which exemplifies results culture, and the concomitant indifference to OIC. But aside from the fact that this is itself not very plausible—people seldom seek to defend themselves by making appeals which would necessarily lack exculpatory purchase in their culture—and that Penelope herself raises the issue of inability, it is not clear that the defence *is* unsuccessful: the conversation is interrupted by Eurymachus (18. 244), and no judgement on the merits of Telemachus' apology passed. It is therefore far from clear that this is the example of Homeric indifference to OIC that Adkins wants it to be.

Yet I do not take this scene to serve as evidence of the particular importance of OIC in Homer; indeed, to discuss OIC here seems simply to be missing the point. Certainly, Telemachus' ability to evict the suitors is relevant, but it is hardly the focus of either Penelope's attack or Telemachus' defence. For the thrust of Penelope's criticism concerns the *sort of person Telemachus is*: his thoughts are no longer firm,⁶⁵ he is now less wily than even he was

⁶³ Telemachus' claim here is of course disingenuous-cum-ironic, given that he is at this point aware of Odysseus' return, and is working with him to defeat the suitors.

⁶⁴ When making this claim and others like them, I am aware that there is an additional layer of complexity to this scene, in that Telemachus (and Penelope?) are partly engaging in a degree of deception: the sense in which they are "interested in ability", then, is not wholly straightforward. Nevertheless, for my points to go through, it need only be the case that both *talk about* ability in this way, even if they are doing so for somewhat opaque reasons.

⁶⁵ There are only two other occasions in the Homeric epics in which the phrase φρένες ἔμπεδοι occurs. It is used by Circe of Tiresias, whilst introducing the idea of the *Nekuia* to Odysseus, in which it functions to highlight that

as a child,⁶⁶ and his impressive appearance only belies his unsteady thoughts. Where his ability is implicated is in the claim, as we have seen, that he is *allowing* the suitors to continue their misbehaviour. As a result of this, he would be disgraced were the stranger to be seriously harmed, for he would have been shown to be the sort of host who, though able to prevent it, allowed his guests to suffer, being indifferent to their welfare. Accordingly, Telemachus reassures his mother that he does indeed understand what is right and what is not, having matured since childhood, and expresses his desire for the suitors to be brought to grief; his ability is relevant inasmuch as he emphasises that desire, the only reason he does not act upon it being that he cannot. It is not, therefore, that Telemachus' ability is inconsequential, but that Penelope's consideration of it is *subsidiary to* the broader assessment of the sort of man he is: if he really is *allowing* the suitors to mistreat his guests, then this tells her something significant about *who he is*.

the prophet has been granted νόος and, uniquely among the dead, the ability *πεπνῦσθαι*, by Persephone (*Od.* 10. 492-495). The use of the phrase here has no ethical significance; but it is clearly getting at something fundamental, even if only noetic, about Tiresias himself. More pertinently, it is used by Helen to describe Paris: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τάδε γ' ὄδε θεοὶ κακὰ τεκμήραντο, | ἀνδρὸς ἔπειτ' ὄφελον ἀμείνωνος εἶναι ἄκοιτις, | ὃς εἶδη νέμεσιν τε καὶ αἴσχεα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων. | τούτῳ δ' οὐτ' ἄρ νῦν φρένες ἔμπεδοι οὐτ' ἄρ' ὀπίσσω | ἔσονται τοῦ καὶ μιν ἐπαυρήσεσθαι οἴω (*Il.* 6. 349-353). Helen's speech, like Penelope's, is condemnatory; and the fact that the lack of φρένες ἔμπεδοι is taken to be permanent (352) and is associated with an inability to properly appreciate social criticism (351), for which Paris will reap the consequences (353), represents a grave indictment of the sort of man Paris is. Penelope's denial of φρένες ἔμπεδοι to Telemachus is therefore a serious matter, and one which suggests a thoroughgoing disparagement of his fundamental character. This denial Penelope re-emphasises with her almost identical assertion that οὐκέτι τοι φρένες εἰσὶν ἐναΐσιμοι οὐδὲ νόημα. This too is unusual language, for φρένες are elsewhere in Homer described as ἐναΐσιμοι only once, in Apollo's upbraiding of the other gods for their support of Achilles whilst he mistreats Hector's corpse: ἀλλ' ὀλοῶσι Ἀχιλῆϊ, θεοί, βούλεσθ' ἐπαρήγειν, | ὧι οὐτ' ἄρ φρένες εἰσὶν ἐναΐσιμοι οὐτε νόημα | γναμπτόν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι (*Il.* 24. 39-41). Apollo follows this accusation with the suggestion that Achilles is like a lion (41), and no longer knows pity or shame (44*f.*). Again, the assessment is particularly damning: both Helen and Apollo seem to be disputing their targets' ability to act as properly functioning human agents at all. This gives a commensurately biting quality to Penelope's speech, and highlights the extent to which she is performing, or at least appearing to perform, a thoroughgoing assessment of the sort of man Telemachus is.

⁶⁶ Claims that one's interlocutor is like a child are of course commonplace in Homer, but Penelope's is unusually vituperative: far from maturing from infancy to adulthood, the normal progression, Telemachus has declined with age, his understanding now not even amounting to that of a child. Cf. Penelope's latter comment to the disguised Odysseus that when Telemachus was νήπιος and (therefore) χαλῖφρων (19. 530), he would not let Penelope marry and leave the house (531); but now that he has matured, he is prepared to do so (533*f.*), being concerned about the continued consumption of his property. There is here possibly a 'soft' contradiction. In the earlier passage, Penelope impugns Telemachus' maturity, and φρένες, because of his failure to stop the suitors degrading the stranger, and by extension, perhaps, because of his supposed unwillingness to evict the suitors *per se*. Yet in the later passage, it was his willingness to do so that made him childish and his φρένες 'bad'. In neither case are Penelope's motives easily discernible.

This, I think, should be our priority when thinking through the ethical complexities of this scene; and if that is so, then contemporary philosophical discussion of responsibility may be of some theoretical assistance. In the language of that discussion, the evaluation Penelope makes of her son is ‘aretaic’, involving an assessment of “the agent’s excellences and faults—or virtues and vices—as manifested in thought and action”, being “concerned with the question of what activities and ways of life are [*sc.* to the agent] most choiceworthy”.⁶⁷ As the philosopher Gary Watson puts it:

Aretaic evaluations... differ significantly from other forms of appraisal. If I dance clumsily, it is inescapably true of me that I was (on that occasion) a clumsy dancer. But if what I do flows from my values and ends, there is a stronger sense in which my activities are inescapably my own: I am committed to them. As declarations of my adopted ends, they express what I’m about, my identity as an agent. They can be evaluated in distinctive ways (not just as welcome or unwelcome) because they themselves are exercises of my evaluative capacities.⁶⁸

Thus, in appraising Telemachus in this way, Penelope is not merely engaged in a ‘shallow’, contingent assessment of her son. The distinction is pressed by David Shoemaker:

Aretaic appraisals are familiar. We may judge of someone, in light of some action or attitude, that he is “cowardly,” “generous,” “cruel,” or a “hopeless romantic.” What occurs here is evaluative, agential predication... This is not mere superficial assessment (as in the deployment of predicates like “tall,” “skinny,” and “pretty”) for it goes to the heart of one’s actual motivations qua self-expressing agent, implicating the set of psychological elements that provide an explanation of one’s motives and attitudes in normative domains. These are the elements with which one is identified, whether or not one is conscious of, or endorses, the identification in question.⁶⁹

This is just the sort of ‘deep’ appraisal Penelope appears to be making, assessing the sort of person her son is, broadly speaking his ‘character’, and finding him wanting; and joined with

⁶⁷ Watson, 1996: 231.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 233.

⁶⁹ Shoemaker, 2011: 613.

her censure of Telemachus,⁷⁰ it seems clear that we should think of this as a genuine *responsibility* response, not merely adverse description.⁷¹

As I have noted, this appraisal, and the response to it, turn partly on Telemachus' ability to evict the suitors: his supposed ability, yet unwillingness, to do so informs Penelope's wider aretaic appraisal, whilst Telemachus' claimed inability, yet willingness, to do so informs his rebuttal. But it is important to note that nothing about aretaic appraisal *must*, even if it *can*, involve consideration of ability, since I may often assess the sort of person you are without

⁷⁰ Censure which is often taken to be *public*: Steiner, 2010 *ad* 215-25 seems to assume as much, without argument, and further suggests that Penelope intends that her words be heard by the suitors; de Jong, 2001 *ad* 227-42 concludes, albeit with argument, the same, though suggests that it is Telemachus who intends for what he says to be overheard. de Jong's argument for the exchange's publicity (*ad* 245-9) asks us to "note the echo" between v. 247, ἐν ὑμετέροισι δόμοισιν, and v. 236, ἐν ἡμετέροισι δόμοισι, but amounts to no more; one will probably only hear an echo if one is already convinced. It may well be that there is reason to suppose the conversation is private: Eurymachus makes no reference to anything either have said, instead picking up the theme of the suitors' attraction to Penelope temporarily set aside in v. 213; indeed, the conversation is sufficiently unrelated to what surrounds it that Wilamowitz recommended deletion (1884: 30). The fact of the conversation's publicity is therefore somewhat inconclusive, but "the characterization of the scene is good" says Stanford (1947/48 *ad* 214-43), and this is perhaps enough. Interestingly, given that no issue seems to be made of the exchange's publicity in the text, it is quite possible that there is no fact of the matter to discuss. On this, it is puzzling that de Jong and Steiner both further refer to what Penelope and Telemachus *intend*, when the text has nothing to say about these things even indirectly. Both are at risk of committing what Waldock, 1951 called the 'documentary fallacy', treating the poem as a partial record of historical events rather than as a complete record of fictional ones: Penelope and Telemachus only intend what Homer says, or implies, they intend; otherwise, they intend nothing. The fallacy perhaps did not go unnoticed in antiquity: Dio Chrysostom's discourse on Chryseis, intended to demonstrate her excellence, is a possible example, it being asked by Chrysostom's notional interlocutor, Καὶ τίνα ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν ἔχεις παρά γε Ὀμήρω τοῦ τρόπου τῆς γυναικός; οὐδὲν γοῦν πεποίηκεν αὐτὴν πράττουσαν ἢ λέγουσαν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τῷ πατρὶ διδομένην. (*Or.* 61. 3). Dio responds Τί γάρ; ἐκ τῶν γενομένων περὶ αὐτὴν οὐκ ἂν τις συμβάλῃ τὴν διάνοιαν μὴ πάνυ ἀπλῶς μηδὲ εὐήθως σκοπῶν (*ibid.*), to which the interlocutor responds simply Ἴσως (*ibid.*). Here the sort of investigation in which Dio is engaged seems to be problematised by his conversational partner, in keeping with the generally playful tenor of the piece; the interlocutor will add at the oration's conclusion οὐκ ἀντιλέγω τὸ μὴ οὐ φρόνιμον εἶναι τὴν Χρυσίδα, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω γέγονε (*ibid.* 18), to which Dio replies, somewhat mysteriously, σὺ δὲ πότερον ἀκούειν θέλεις ἂν ὡς γέγονεν ὄντως ἢ ὅπως καλῶς εἶχε γενέσθαι (*ibid.*), perhaps a nod to his interpretative creativity. However that may be, for my purposes, the fact that Penelope's criticism is enunciated at all, whether publicly or privately, is sufficient.

⁷¹ Some, such as Susan Wolf, have disputed this, a position to which Watson, 1996 is partly a response. Cf. Smith, 2008; Shoemaker, 2015: 61-63, esp. "There is... more than mere aretaic *predication* or *grading* going on here; there is also genuine praise or blame... and that seems sufficient to render it a type of responsibility. In addition, these are the sorts of engaged emotional responses that deeply affect our interpersonal relations with the praised or blamed agent, and this fact also seems to indicate that we are in a responsibility zone" (63). Note that, in Penelope's case, her aretaic appraisal of Telemachus is married with an open, if not public, reprehending (*cf.* n. 70) that is a classic case of the 'reactive attitudes' which, since the seminal paper of Strawson, 1962, have usually been taken to be inextricably bound up with responsibility.

ever considering whether you could have done otherwise.⁷² Consider in this vein the following scene, also discussed by Adkins:

ἔξαπίνης δ' Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνες ὑλακόμωροι·
οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς [30]
ἔζετο κερδοσύνηι, σκῆπτρον δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός.
ἔνθά κεν ὦι πὰρ σταθμῶι ἀεικέλιον πάθεν ἄλγος,
ἀλλὰ συβώτης ὄκα ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι μετασπών
ἔσσυτ' ἀνὰ πρόθυρον, σκῦτος δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός.
τοὺς μὲν ὁμοκλήσας σεῦεν κύνας ἄλλυδις ἄλλον [35]
πυκνηῖσιν λιθάδεσσιν· ὃ δὲ προσέειπεν ἄνακτα·
“ὦ γέρον, ἦ ὀλίγου σε κύνες διεδηλήσαντο
ἔξαπίνης, καὶ κέν μοι ἐλεγχεῖν κατέχευας.

(*Od.* 14. 29-38)

Adkins' suggestion is that here too is an example of Homeric indifference to OIC in the context of the competitive excellences, and another expression of results culture.⁷³ Certainly, it is true

⁷² What licenses aretaic appraisal is a connection between what you have done and your character, a connection which is not necessarily severed because of your inability to refrain from what you have done. If, for instance, you treat all people you meet rudely, I can appraise you aretaically, judging you a rude person, and justifiably react to you in certain ways (reprehension, disgust, *etc.*). But if I discover you treat people in this way and cannot do otherwise (because, say, you suffer from severe autism), whilst this might moderate the sort of reactions I have towards you, your inability to do otherwise does not mean my aretaic appraisal is rendered inappropriate: you really are still a rude person, a feature of your character which your rude actions disclose. *Cf.* Watson, 2019: 219, clarifying his earlier work: “weakness of will, as well as various forms of unreflective responses and omissions, can be ‘oneself objectified’ in action as well, even if one doesn’t endorse or stand behind them” (the phrase “oneself objectified” comes from John Dewey, who is quoted extensively at the beginning of Watson, 1996). However, certain kinds of inability *do* sever the connection, providing that the inability entails that your actions no longer tell us something about your character: “When I disdain someone in light of his pattern of psychological spousal abuse, I am... tracing these attitudes and actions to a fault, a *vice*, of his. By contrast, when an otherwise placid, loving person who has become involuntarily intoxicated snaps and yells at her spouse, we tend *not* to disdain her (or admire her, for that matter), that is, we tend not to attribute such an outburst to her for purposes of responsibility, as we view it to have been genuinely *out of character*. It just did not express who she really is” (Shoemaker, 2015²: 118). Consider also, as does Shoemaker, “pains, itches, and reflexes” (*ibid.*): if you burn yourself on a stove, reflexively withdraw your hand, and in doing so hit me in the face, your inability to do otherwise here precludes aretaic appraisal, for your hitting me does not permit inferences about the sort of person you are, inferences in which such appraisal consists.

⁷³ Adkins, 1960: 35f., “[t]he host must, as the case of Eumaeus shows, protect his guest against unforeseen accidents too, for if he does not *elencheie* results: and hence neither a plea of *force majeure* nor a plea of mistake can be accepted from anyone in this position. Thus, more exacting demands are made of the head of an Homeric household (for Eumaeus too, in relation to the ‘beggar’, occupies this position) than of his dependents: for the latter may successfully plead *force majeure*. His actions must be judged by results; for it is by results that the household continues to exist or fails to do so: and unless it or some larger community exists, the quieter virtues cannot be practised”.

that Eumaeus indicates that, if the dogs had injured Odysseus, he would have criticised him; Odysseus' response is predicted to consider 'results', namely his being savaged, not Eumaeus' ability to prevent the attack. Adkins can therefore now plausibly claim a successful example of Homeric indifference to OIC.⁷⁴ But what I want to press is that Adkins seems here to be missing the point. By making his treatment of the ethical dimensions of this scene, as of the previous one, about the presence or absence of OIC, because of his bold, and false, claims about that principle's contemporary importance, Adkins' approach is not so much *wrong* as *wrongheaded*. For it seems to me that Odysseus would 'pour scorn' on Eumaeus in the same way we might: we would decry, perhaps openly, what a thoughtless fool, idiot, and incompetent Eumaeus was. This is to say that our, and Odysseus', response would involve an assessment "concern[ing] the agent's excellences and faults—or virtues and vices—as manifested in thought and action", namely an assessment amounting to aretaic appraisal, and one which therefore need not attend to ability, as Eumaeus predicts Odysseus would not.

Adkins might plead at this point that I am only offering an *alternative* approach, that invoking 'aretaic appraisal', which is not demonstrably *preferable* to his own. But in addition to the fact that the former seems to be based on more reliable theoretical foundations than is the latter, we should consider its potential interpretative benefits *versus* the concrete cost of Adkins'. Consider, for instance, Aias' famous silence during the *Nekuia*. Odysseus' defence to Aias' shade for his winning of the arms of Achilles is that

οὐδέ τις ἄλλος
 αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς Δαναῶν στρατὸν αἰχμητῶν
 ἐκπάγλως ἤχθηρε, τεῖν δ' ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἔθηκεν. [560]

(*Od.* 11. 558-560)

⁷⁴ Of course, we do not know what Eumaeus' defence would have been: if, like Telemachus, he pleaded inability, then this example would be unsuccessful, for the reasons mentioned previously, *mutatis mutandis*.

This would doubtless have excited Adkins, given that Odysseus' defence of inability (insofar as his point is that, next to Zeus, he was powerless to alter proceedings) goes unheeded by Aias, who walks away in his fury. This would be an open-and-shut case of results culture in action; but there seems to be much more here than such a straitjacketed interpretation could expose. If we instead approach the scene with aretaic appraisal in mind, we might imagine that Aias is not receptive to Odysseus' defence less because he is indifferent to matters of ability *per se*, but more because he is aretaically appraising the sort of man Odysseus is, an appraisal which, as we have seen, inability need not block, from which his silence results. After all, even if what Odysseus says about Zeus is true, Odysseus still accepted and sought the arms and did not later cede them; and nothing of the traditional story as we know it portrays Odysseus as anything other than keen to acquire them.⁷⁵ Aias is not mollified by Odysseus' claimed inability; but the type of inability from which Odysseus supposedly 'suffered', the predetermination of events by Zeus, does not preclude Aias from drawing a disparaging conclusion about Odysseus' character. Not only do I think this sort of reading enables us to begin to develop a better account of the interaction between these heroes,⁷⁶ but it also chimes with other features of the scene which an approach modelled on the importance of OIC could not comprehend. In his report of the encounter to the Phaeacians, far from minimising his role in the winning of the arms, Odysseus emphasises it; and this encourages us to consider the extent to which Odysseus'

⁷⁵ In all sources, there is a competition between Odysseus and Aias for the arms, and this is how Odysseus represents the event to the Phaeacians. Cf. March, 1993; West, 2013: 175.

⁷⁶ Such an account should seek to make sense of Odysseus' defensive strategy and its failure. Adkins would suggest that Odysseus absurdly blunders by making a defence that would in his culture possess no exculpatory currency (cf. my comments on Telemachus and Penelope in this connection, p. 144), and it is for this reason that Aias rejects his overtures. My own account suggests that Odysseus makes a mistake, but a far more 'realistic' one: he fails to deploy the *correct* defence among a range that are broadly permissible in his culture, not giving Aias the grounds to draw a favourable assessment of the sort of man he is, perhaps not so much a blunder but a result of his not being especially regretful (cf. n. 77). As for Aias' silence, my reading contributes to what [Longinus] referred to as the silence being μέγα καὶ παντὸς ὑψηλότερον λόγου (*Subl.* 9. 3), for the silence's emphasis of Aias' fury seems to me to be lent greater depth (as we would say) if it is taken to be underpinned by a substantive, aretaic evaluation of, rather than mere anger at, Aias' erstwhile competitor.

overtures to Aias were sincere and his expressions of regret before the Phaeacians genuine,⁷⁷ inviting us to ponder further the fittingness of Aias' response and to perform, in a sense, our own aretaic appraisal of the sort of man Odysseus was and, in the course of his voyage, has become.⁷⁸

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In the first section of this chapter, I argued that Adkins' belief that OIC was a central element of our ethical reasoning was at best exaggerated, and at worse simply false. A result of this was my conclusion that, even if Adkins were right that OIC was often of little moment in Homer, it would enjoy much the same status in our own culture. In this section, I have suggested that Adkins is sometimes right, sometimes wrong, about his estimation of the importance of OIC

⁷⁷ A moment before Odysseus informs his audience that Aias νόσφιν ἀφροστήκει, κεχολωμένη εἵνεκα νίκης, | τὴν μιν ἐγὼ νίκησα δικαζόμενος παρὰ νηυσὶν | τεύχεσιν ἀμφ' Ἀχιλλῆος (544-546); by the repetition of νίκησ... νίκησα, and the proximity of μιν and ἐγὼ, Odysseus emphasises his individual success. Cf. ὡς δὴ μὴ ὄφελον νικᾶν τοιοῦδ' ἐπ' ἀέθλωι (548), ostensible regret which even so achieves much the same. Odysseus' account of how the contest was decided may also be supposed, depending on the versions of the story familiar to Homer and his audience, to appear somewhat self-congratulatory, for Odysseus claims that παῖδες δὲ Τρώων δίκασαν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη (547). Yet in the *Little Iliad* (Davies, *EGF F2^A*) the decision to award Odysseus the arms is 'made' by the Trojans, inasmuch as Nestor sends some men to eavesdrop upon what the Trojan women were saying to each other about the heroes; and it is Ἀθηνᾶς προνοία that one of the women argues against Aias' superiority, which decides the matter in favour of Odysseus. If Odysseus is supposed to be suppressing the extent of Athena's role in the arms' award (her assistance being a recurring theme in the *Odyssey* itself), then this may be a further sign of Odysseus magnifying his role in acquiring them: he claims a god *judged*, rather than *made*, him the winner. An alternative story told by a scholiast to the *Odyssey* suggests that Agamemnon put the question to Trojan prisoners, of whom he asked which of the heroes had most grieved them: εἰπόντων δὲ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, δηλαδὴ ἐκείνον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον κρίναντες τὸν πλεῖστα λυπήσαντα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ἔδωκεν εὐθὺς τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τὰ ὄπλα (HQV *ad* 11. 547). Given his role in the recovery of Achilles' corpse, in which Aias bore the cadaver and Odysseus protected him (on which cf. West, 2013: 176 and n. 11), the contest seems weighted in Odysseus' favour, which the tone of the scholion suggests: "of course" (δηλαδὴ) Odysseus wins, Agamemnon's concern being merely not to "appear to favour either" (τὸ δόξαι θατέρῳ χάρισσασθαι). If this is the background the audience understands, then again in his account to the Phaeacians Odysseus is highlighting his own agency: he adverts repeatedly to his victory, even whilst that victory was 'loaded' to his advantage. Note also the potential dismissiveness implicit in Odysseus' suggestion to the Phaeacians that he and Aias may well have spoken further, but his desire to see other of the dead precluded this (565-567); the "harsh[ness]" is recognised by Heubeck & Hoekstra, 1989 *ad* 565-7, and the lines defended against calls for deletion.

⁷⁸ It is not my intention to pursue these issues here, or grapple with the various complications they portend. My point is simply that deploying the concept of aretaic appraisal opens several interpretative avenues of inquiry which an approach such as Adkins' would not, and perhaps would even foreclose. Separately, I refer in the text to Odysseus' *sincerity*, a potentially thorny thing to implicate in a reading of any Homeric text, given the spectre of the documentary fallacy to which I referred earlier (n. 70). Perhaps it is better to say that we are encouraged to consider the extent to which Odysseus is emotionally *conflicted*, between the pride an Homeric hero is supposed to feel in competitive success and the regret he should feel at the misfortune of his friends. In that case, we might ponder the fittingness of Aias' response, as well as our own, to a contextually indelicate balancing between the two sentiments.

in the Homeric scenes he treats. But, more importantly, I have further suggested that such estimating is misplaced. Instead of making OIC the standard by which we measure scenes of ethical interest in the epics, we should instead look to other theoretical approaches, which would enable us to better expose their ethical richness; I have here advanced the concept of aretaic appraisal as a good candidate for doing so. But that concept may also serve the purpose of solving a problem. Certainly, this has been the case in contemporary philosophical literature.⁷⁹ But in Homer, too, I believe that applying aretaic appraisal to a particularly famous, and difficult, passage can make sense of something otherwise inscrutable.

III

This passage is Agamemnon’s Apology (*Il.* 19. 76-144), in which Agamemnon seeks to disclaim responsibility for seizing Achilles’ beloved Briseis, thereby causing the hero’s disastrous withdrawal from the Achaean campaign. ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι, he declares, | ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφοῖτις Ἐρινός, | οἷ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῆι φρεσὶν ἔμβalon ἄγριον ἄτην (86-88). If this were everything, we would not be puzzled: it is all too familiar human behaviour to blame others for what may be perceived as our own fault.⁸⁰ But Agamemnon has more still to

⁷⁹ For Shoemaker, 2015, aretaic appraisal—associated with a type of responsibility he calls “attributability”—helps make sense of our ambivalence in holding dementia sufferers responsible for their conduct, good and bad. Whilst it seems to Shoemaker inappropriate to hold them *accountable* for what they do, it may well be appropriate for us to regard them as what he calls “*attributability-responsible*” (209) for the same: “Suppose that when I visit my moderately demented grandfather, he reaches for a chocolate in the candy jar and brings it over to me, despite the great physical effort it requires... what he did was *kind*, and if he does this generally, it reflects on a trait of his character: *he* is kind. Such aretaic predications suggest that DSs [*sc.* dementia-sufferers] may thus be *attributability-responsible*, that is, their dementia may not necessarily undermine their ability to have a motivational structure that grounds various fitting attributions... These sorts of predications are anything but unfamiliar to us. And these assessments are deployed more confidently when they are traits continuous with those from their pre-demented days. “She was always patient like this,” we may say when watching our mothers with our own attention-deficient children. “He’s still so considerate,” we may say about my grandfather to another chocolate-receiving guest. Of course, matters are not always so rosy. Many demented parents and grandparents remain just as cranky or cantankerous as ever. Some are still stingy, callous, narcissistic, difficult, inconsiderate, or even cruel, displaying long-standing traits that have persisted through the dementia and continue to be expressed in actions and attitudes. But then here is how agential history may provide epistemic service once more: it can help us figure out whether the current expressions are indeed *remnants* of the agent’s pre-demented character (because consistent with it), and so help us figure out whether the agent is still responsible for his or her attitudes in the attributability sense in virtue of still *having* such quality of character” (209*f.*).

⁸⁰ And not only familiar to us; a scholiast complains that καὶ νῦν οἱ ἀδυνατοῦντες ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπολογεῖσθαι τῆ εἰμαρμένῃ τὸ ὅλον αἴτιον ἀναφέρουσιν (bT *ad* 19. 86).

say. For having told in some detail a story about a personified Ἄτη, he goes on to tell his audience ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην καὶ μοι φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς, | ἄψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα (137*f.*). This is the crux of the matter: if Agamemnon claims not to be responsible, why is he offering compensation to Achilles, thereby apparently admitting responsibility?⁸¹

One approach has been to embrace the tension in Agamemnon's remarks: he is in fact contradicting himself, but this is a result of a desperate man trying to save face.⁸² Oliver Taplin puts it strongly: "Thus... when he says that the gods are αἴτιοι, not he, and that *since* this is so he will give Achilles recompense... he is, according to my argument, indulging in obvious special pleading. This fudging is only left unchallenged because no one wants to prolong the quarrel".⁸³ One is sympathetic to such an approach, in that it emphasises that we are dealing with true-to-life human personalities. Thus, if we spot a tension in a character's statements, attempts to 'harmonise' the offending material may be undesirable. For it may simply be that the character is engaging in reasoning or speech that is highly motivated, and this need not, after all, be any respecter of consistency. Perhaps there is something to this in Agamemnon's case. The portrait of a man desperately trying to rescue his waning reputation is plausible, and he does after all remark, prior to the Apology proper, that he has been much vilified by the Achaeans (85*f.*). Yet, as tempting as this solution may be, it smacks of giving up too soon. Certainly, we can accept this as a partial account of Agamemnon's psychology and

⁸¹ Cf. Miller, 2009: 36, "Agamemnon's reasoning is perplexing. The reason why he is not to blame (*aitios*) is the very reason why he accepts responsibility. Is he confused? Or is he, perhaps, being disingenuous? Or does Agamemnon have a different concept of responsibility from our own?". My own solution, as we will see, rejects all three of Miller's suggestions.

⁸² After all, this is not the only tension that exists in Agamemnon's wider attempt to address his conduct: his much earlier ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέησι πιθήσας, | ἄψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα (9. 119*f.*) naturally invites comparison to 19. 137*f.*, especially vis-à-vis the former's elimination of divine agency from the event. For my purposes, I do not pursue this tension further in this chapter, though it lends credibility to the kind of position Taplin endorses. However, I will suggest that, at least when it comes to the tension within Book 19 I have identified, we can make some plausible attempts to reconcile the different things Agamemnon is saying.

⁸³ Taplin, 1990: 76. Cf. Taplin, 1992: 207*f.*

motivations.⁸⁴ But this need not commit us to the view that his statements cannot be reconciled; that he is not, despite his motivations, still speaking consistently.

To this end, an alternative approach is to try to distinguish between different *senses* of responsibility which Agamemnon may be employing in the respective parts of the Apology. Accordingly, Dodds, in his influential discussion of this scene, suggested that though “[b]y impatient modern readers these words of Agamemnon’s have sometimes been dismissed as a weak excuse or evasion of responsibility”, those who read carefully will agree that “[a]n evasion of responsibility in the juridical sense the words certainly are not; for at the end of his speech Agamemnon offers compensation precisely on this ground”, going on to cite vv. 137f.⁸⁵ Dodds implicitly acknowledges that Agamemnon’s denial of being αἴτιος is to merely deny one sense of responsibility, whilst later, in his offer of compensation, accepting another: “the juridical sense”. This distinction has proved popular indeed. Scodel refers to Agamemnon’s crafting “a sharp distinction between being responsible in a quasi-legal sense and being blameworthy”,⁸⁶ whilst in the view of Teffeteller:

It might be thought that Agamemnon does not by his claim attempt to evade responsibility since he ends by offering Achilles compensation. But here we must make a distinction between moral and practical, that is, legal or quasi-legal, responsibility. Agamemnon accepts practical responsibility for his action in so far as he does not deny that he did in fact take Achilles’ prize, and accordingly he offers Achilles compensation. But he rejects moral responsibility and the blame that attaches to it.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Cf. Versnel, 2011: 169-174 for discussion along these lines.

⁸⁵ Dodds, 1951: 3.

⁸⁶ Scodel, 2008: 120.

⁸⁷ Teffeteller, 2003: 18. Drawing the distinction along similar lines: Edwards, 1991 *ad* 85-138, explicitly agreeing with Dodds; Lloyd-Jones, 1983: 22f., distinguishing between “guilt” and “responsibility”, Agamemnon’s denial of being *aitios* a denial of the former; similarly, Lesky, 2001: 196f., distinguishing between Agamemnon’s “personal responsibility” and his “guilt”. Likewise, Williams, 1993: 53, “However his actions came about, he must compensate Achilles. In that sense, he does accept responsibility... It is in virtue of what he did that he must pay”; cf. perhaps Sullivan, 1988: 151f.; Konstan, 2010: 62f.; Coray, 2016 *ad* 137; with a similar distinction in mind, probably Gaskin, 1990, “Agamemnon blames Zeus for the onset of *ate* which led him to slight Achilles (*Iliad* 19. 86 ff.), but he nevertheless makes amends to Achilles: he does not regard the fact that he was overcome by *ate* as diminishing his responsibility” (6). By contrast, some implausibly imply that there is no tension in Agamemnon’s remarks since (they say) he never claims to not be responsible, e. g. Redfield, 1994: 97, “It should be observed that Agamemnon is not disclaiming responsibility; on the contrary, both times he refers to *ate* he is

Dodds himself did not specify what sort of responsibility he took Agamemnon to be denying in vv. 86*f.*, but only claimed that he was not there denying “the juridical sense”, which in vv. 137*f.* he was supposedly admitting. But the scholars just cited go further, insofar as they specify that Agamemnon’s denial of responsibility was a denial of something like what we might (and Teffeteller does) call ‘moral’ responsibility.

This approach too is initially attractive, and complements a trend in current philosophical work on responsibility, some of which I have mentioned already.⁸⁸ But the distinction drawn here seems rather clumsier than that drawn in such work, and is too *ad hoc* to withstand serious scrutiny. There is a sense that the cleavage between some kind of ‘moral’ *versus* ‘legal-liability’ responsibility is invoked to solve a particular problem, the tension in Agamemnon’s remarks, without due regard to the wider implications of that solution. Dodds, certainly, did not more broadly entertain this distinction within *The Greeks and the Irrational* prior to making it explain the tension in the Apology, and none of the scholars cited earlier lay any serious theoretical groundwork before erecting comparable distinctions. More pressing, however, is that it seems hazardous to assume that in Homer there could be such a cleavage, even if less sharply drawn, between juridical and non-juridical senses of responsibility, or that there could be an ethical standard which approximates to that of our ‘liability’.⁸⁹

taking full responsibility and offering restitution. He is not trying to deny his wrongdoing but rather to describe its quality”. But there is hardly a more emphatic way of denying responsibility (and especially “full responsibility”) in Greek than the words ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι, and it is obvious that ἄτη has in the Apology exculpatory significance. Cf. my comments on Adkins’ approach to this scene, p. 157.

⁸⁸ Cf. especially Shoemaker, 2015, who attempts to distinguish between three separate types of responsibility: attributability, answerability and accountability. Cf. n. 79.

⁸⁹ The scholars in question seem to believe that the ‘juridical’ sense of responsibility Agamemnon is accepting is equivalent to our tortious, or civil, responsibility, being here accepted regardless of intent, taking adequate care, and so on; that is, in terms of the legal standard of strict liability. But along with the danger of assuming a distinction of ‘juridical’ *versus* ‘non-juridical’ to which I have referred in the text, the standard of strict liability can hardly be assumed to be a universal of human ethical reasoning either. Indeed, that standard produces sufficiently strange results in law that it is unclear if even it exists in the everyday ethical reasoning of the contemporary anglophones, living in common law jurisdictions, for whom we would expect the distinction to be most familiar. Take, for example, the decision of the House of Lords to uphold the conviction of Winzar (*Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent*). Winzar had been convicted of being “found drunk in a highway for the purposes of section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872”. He appealed, ultimately to the House of Lords: “Lord Justice Goff said

This approach therefore does not seem to convincingly address the tension in Agamemnon's remarks. I have so far omitted Adkins' own attempt to do so:

Both in his relations with Achilles and as a leader of the Greeks against the Trojans, Agamemnon is regarded by himself and his followers as *agathos*. *Qua* more powerful chieftain... he has a claim to take Briseis if he will; *qua* leader of the Greeks, he must maintain himself as an *agathos*, and not fall into *elencheie*, as would be the case should the Greeks fail to take Troy. The one is permitted, the other demanded, by this competitive system of values. Agamemnon believed these two purposes to be compatible: having discovered this to be false, he relinquishes the minor purpose in order to achieve the major, and *acknowledges that he has made a mistake*. The fact that Agamemnon has incurred social disapproval for his failure gives the transaction an appearance of 'quiet' morality which it does not possess. The only aspect of *arete* in which Agamemnon has fallen short is success in war: the quieter virtues are so much less important that Agamemnon does not see the transaction in this light at all. In these circumstances, to plead *ate* cannot be an attempt to evade responsibility for one's actions, even if one says roundly 'I am not *aitios*', and maintains that no fewer than three gods were the cause: an assertion which may imply that the mistake is a curious one, and one which the agent feels he would not 'normally' have made, but which does not make the mistake anything other than a mistake.⁹⁰

Already we might suppose something has here gone badly wrong. Nevertheless, Adkins defends his position like so:

Firstly, it has been shown that only in special cases, of which this is not one, may responsibility be laid upon a god. These cases are 'literary'; and here we have not 'Literature', but 'Life', for Zeus, *moira*, and the Fury were not represented as deceiving Agamemnon in *Iliad* i. Agamemnon is thus speaking as men in Homeric society must have spoken in life, not making a statement which only the poet, from his position of omniscience, can know to be true. Secondly, since Agamemnon regards his action as a mistake, the sense of 'responsibility' is peculiar: in this sense responsibility is not moral, but cannot be avoided. No man can expect to evade the consequences of his

that the appellant had been brought to Ramsgate General Hospital on a stretcher. The doctor who saw him formed the opinion that he was drunk and that he was fit to leave the hospital, and thereupon asked him to do so. The appellant was seen slumped on a seat in the corridor, and the police were called. The police arrived and placed the appellant in a police car stationed on the hospital forecourt in Westcliff Road, whereupon he was taken to Ramsgate police station and charged with being found drunk in the highway called Westcliff Road. It was submitted for the appellant that his momentary, and involuntary presence on the highway provided him with a defence to the charge... [But] [i]t was enough to show that the appellant had been present in the highway, was drunk and was perceived as such. The words "found drunk" meant "perceived to be drunk". The fact that his presence there was not of his own volition and was momentary made no difference" (The Times, 1983). I suspect that most would regard this conviction, which exercised the strict liability standard, as deeply unfair, even absurd. But if strict liability is a standard potentially so foreign to the routine ethical reasoning of even those who live under a legal system in which such convictions are possible, why would we assume that standard is present in the epic poetry of Archaic Greece?

⁹⁰ Adkins, 1960: 51f.

mistakes: a man is very fortunate if he is able to rectify them. Thus Agamemnon ‘must’ recompense Achilles to rectify his mistake and bring Achilles once again into the fighting: he has no alternative.⁹¹

As best as I can tell, Adkins’ position is that Agamemnon’s failure to take Troy is a failure in the competitive virtues; that, as we saw towards the beginning of this chapter, in such a competitive context ‘moral’ responsibility, in which alone inability might be used as a defence, is irrelevant; and so when Agamemnon says ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι, claiming instead that a variety of supernatural agents, against whom he was powerless, are αἴτιος, this plea is not in service of denying ‘moral’ responsibility, or for that matter responsibility of any kind.⁹² Rather, what Agamemnon is doing here is admitting that he made a mistake, accepting something like the ‘legalistic’ responsibility invoked by Dodds, his later offer of compensation being similarly to admit this, whilst also serving as an attempt to secure Achilles’ much-needed help in battle.

This is puzzling. Adkins wants ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι to implicate an *admission* of a mistake and some associated form of responsibility. But there seems hardly a plainer way of *denying* responsibility in Greek than these words,⁹³ with the ‘Apology’ scarcely meriting the term if we cannot at least agree on this; and I assume that it is not a coincidence that Adkins is suspiciously cagey about telling us what exactly he thinks these words *do* mean.⁹⁴ Furthermore, if what is characteristic of ‘moral’ responsibility is its being successfully disclaimed by a plea

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 52.

⁹² Note that this puts Adkins at odds with many of the scholars I have discussed already, for they regard Agamemnon to be denying just that in vv. 86*f*.

⁹³ *Cf.* n. 87.

⁹⁴ An instance of Adkins’ habit, occasionally defended (*e.g.* Adkins, 1960²: 23*f.*), of only transliterating Greek terms, leaving the reader in some suspense about what he thinks they mean (*cf.* the complaint of Dover, 1983: 44*f.*). This notwithstanding, in general Adkins takes αἴτιος in Homer to be about causation: “[i]n *Iliad* xiii [*sc.* 222*ff.*], Idomeneus attempts to excuse the present failure of the Greeks: no man can be the cause, *aitios*, since all are skilled warriors, and none has displayed fear or hesitation” (Adkins, 1960: 14). *Cf.* Adkins, 1982: 320, n. 50, where he suggests that the only occurrence of αἴτιος in Homer which should be translated by ‘responsible’ is *Il.* 3. 164*f.*, because “Priam apparently adduces it as a reason for treating Helen kindly...”. Of our passage, we have seen that Adkins suggests that Agamemnon “maintains that no fewer than three gods were the *cause*” (emphasis mine), being as in the text they are indirectly stated to be *aitioi*. I assume the reason Adkins is reluctant to explicitly propose such a translation at v. 86 is that this presumably would devolve into the position he is arguing against: what purpose could a denial of being the cause serve if not a denial of responsibility?

of inability, how can Adkins deny the presence of ‘moral’ responsibility in this passage when this is precisely the defence Agamemnon makes? For ἀλλὰ τί κε ῥέξαιμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ (90) is a textbook example of just such a plea. It seems Adkins would once more have recourse to the view that the speaker is defending their conduct in a way that could not, even in principle, have any traction in their world, deploying a defence of inability in a ‘competitive’ matter in which it could never succeed. But regardless of what we think of Agamemnon’s success in defending himself, he presumably cannot be unsuccessful in *this* way. If that is so, it follows that Adkins must either abandon the idea that ‘moral’ responsibility and ability are related in the way he claims, sever the supposedly necessary connection between ‘moral’ responsibility and the ‘cooperative excellences’, or deny that the present context is a ‘competitive’ one, any one admission of which would pose serious problems to his reading of this passage and his wider thesis. On other points of detail Adkins fares no better: the distinction between ‘Life’ and ‘Literature’, erected earlier in *Merit and Responsibility*, is tenuous at best, and in reference to this distinction Adkins seems to suggest that Agamemnon is not attempting to deny responsibility because his defence is untrue, a singularly baffling assertion.⁹⁵ Beyond this, Adkins suggests in a footnote that pleas of temporary insanity and being afflicted with ἄτη are elsewhere in Homer not exculpatory,⁹⁶ a claim which, regardless of its accuracy, is irrelevant: ‘I was out of my mind’ does not always excuse in English, either, but certainly does sometimes. These justifications are as questionable as the position they seek to support; and it is revealing that, despite Adkins’ otherwise remarkably immutable opinions, he would later (inadvertently?) refer to “Achilles... in fact accepting Agamemnon’s apology, agreeing that

⁹⁵ In later work (Adkins, 1982: 320, n. 50), Adkins appears to suggest that because Agamemnon’s speech allegedly does not persuade its audience, it is not intended to deny his responsibility, an equally peculiar perspective.

⁹⁶ Adkins, 1960: 51, n. 18, “At *Odyssey* xxiii. 11 ff., Eurycleia is certainly not excused because, as Penelope thinks, the gods have made her mad. At line 21, Penelope expressly says that if any of the other servants had behaved as Eurycleia had done she would have been punished: Eurycleia escapes because she is an old family retainer. Again, Helen is not trying to avoid responsibility, *Odyssey* iv. 261, when she says that Aphrodite sent *ate* upon her, nor is it for this reason that Menelaus has not killed her”. I am not convinced by either of Adkins’ interpretations of these scenes; but even if I were, they hardly establish any broader view that invocations of ἄτη cannot exculpate.

ate was the cause of Agamemnon's behavior, and accepting also his face-saving ascription of *responsibility to Zeus*".⁹⁷ Adkins' view can be attacked along other lines also;⁹⁸ but it should be obvious that any approach which rejects that Agamemnon is denying responsibility at v. 86, whatever form of responsibility one claims is there being denied, is not a workable approach to the Apology. I move now to provide my own.

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I begin by noting an oddity in the Apology that has largely gone unnoticed. Let us return to the terms in which Agamemnon makes his offer of compensation, and thereby apparently accepts some form of responsibility: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀσάμην καὶ μοι φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς, | ἄψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμενάι τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα (137*f.*). There is something peculiar in these lines, in that they do not explicitly express the idea they are ordinarily assumed to contain. For most read the text something like this: "But since I was deluded and Zeus robbed me of my wits (*and I took Achilles' prize*), I wish in return to pay him [*sc.* Achilles] back, to give compensation past counting", with the emphasis on the implied, bracketed text: Agamemnon's mentioning his

⁹⁷ Adkins, 1982: 308, emphasis mine.

⁹⁸ We might point out that the function of the Apology is not to "bring Achilles once again into the fighting", since Achilles has already publicly resolved to join battle on account of Patroclus' death (19. 67*ff.*). We may also be disturbed by Adkins' reference to "Agamemnon... speaking as men in Homeric society must have spoken in life", inasmuch as this implies that 'Homeric society' has a direct historical referent. The view is criticised by Long, 1970, and is unapologetically defended, without revision, in Adkins 1971: "The 'facts of Homeric life' to which I endeavour to relate my analysis of Homeric values are those contained in Professor M. I. Finley's admirable *The World of Odysseus*. My very occasional disagreements are concerned with interpretations within an agreed framework: Professor Finley's framework" (1); the historicity of "any and every person and event therein portrayed" (*ibid.*) is the totality of what Adkins doubts. He continues: "I find it impossible to believe... that the bards of the oral tradition invented out of their own imaginations a society with institutions, values, beliefs and attitudes all so coherent and mutually appropriate as I believe myself to discern in the Homeric poems. This aspect of the poems is based upon some society's experience. (The identity of the society is an interesting question, but not relevant to the present discussion.)" (*ibid.*). Many, myself included, would find this equally impossible, and certainly Long did not take such an extreme position in his article; but Adkins' own position, that the Homeric poems can be read as a kind of 'handbook' to the social situation of the tenth or ninth century Aegean world, seems equally outlandish. Beyond this, Adkins' reference to the knowledge of the poet is confusing: aside from the fact that "Agamemnon is... not making a statement which only the poet, from his position of omniscience, can know to be true" is a claim that is rather difficult to parse (and how is the poet's knowledge relevant to the exculpatory, or otherwise, purpose of Agamemnon's words?), it is not clear that the poet is supposed to have omniscience in any case. I raise these points not to quibble with Adkins about technicalities, but to show that so much of what his bold statements stand upon is disputable at best and simply incredible, when not inscrutable, at worst.

delusion and Zeus' mischief is just an oblique way of referring to what followed from this, namely that he took Briseis, for which he intends to now pay. In his discussion of these lines, Bernard Williams offers a similar analysis:

He says, in fact, "*since* I was deluded," but he certainly does not mean by this that if he had not been deluded and had done the same thing in a normal state of mind, he would not have had to make compensation. When he says, "I must pay compensation because Zeus took my wits away," he means "because of what I did when Zeus took my wits away".⁹⁹

No doubt there must be some understanding that Agamemnon is partly referring to his conduct when he was deluded. But whilst Williams' position is essentially sound, perhaps he is too quick to gloss over why Agamemnon puts what he says this way.

It is plausible that Agamemnon is trying to establish that his conduct will be better in future; indeed, it is an improvement in his future conduct that Odysseus will soon carefully insist upon. If that is so, then a natural way of achieving this would be for Agamemnon to emphasise that he was not 'himself' when he mistreated Achilles, whereas now, behaving considerably better, compensating Achilles for what he did, he is himself once more. We can therefore understand "But since I was deluded and Zeus robbed me of my wits (*and so I was not myself when I took Achilles' prize*), I wish in return to pay him [*sc.* Achilles] back, to give compensation past counting (*because I am now myself*)", thereby guaranteeing the future harmony that the Achaeans must cultivate if they are to prosecute the war successfully. This is to say that the offer of compensation communicates that Agamemnon's actions now "[flow] from [his] values and ends" in a way which, on account of the delusive activity of Zeus and ἄτη, they previously did not. As my quotation of Watson indicates, I thus do not regard the offer of compensation as being primarily about *accepting* a form of responsibility, but rather

⁹⁹ Williams, 1993: 53.

about *denying* a form of responsibility, that involving the aretaic appraisal which I have discussed. By pleading that he was deluded and mentally assailed by Zeus, Agamemnon tells both Achilles and the other Achaeans that he should not be exposed to negative aretaic evaluations, and the concomitant disparaging talk, for what he did previously. By contrast, his offer of unlimited recompense *does* ‘flow’ from his values and ends, and it is on such behaviour, disclosing his true character, that he wishes to be evaluated. For Agamemnon, this is crucial: he must re-establish among the Achaeans that he is still a worthy leader, contrary to recent evidence otherwise; it is in fact for this reason that he is offering the Apology at all, not to cajole the already-persuaded Achilles to rejoin battle.¹⁰⁰ As I have noted, Odysseus, too, recognises the importance of making clear the aberrance of Agamemnon’s conduct: if Agamemnon swears that he never slept with Briseis, and agrees to be more just in future (176-183), then this further highlights that he is worthy of positive aretaic evaluation. For it would establish that he is a leader of ‘good character’, one who will confirm that he did not compound his initial error by lying with Briseis, an act which might suggest his mistreatment of Achilles was not so out of character after all, and one who will commit to behaving righteously henceforth.

What Agamemnon says at the end of his speech therefore mirrors what he says at the beginning. He earlier suggests that he was not responsible, because a series of supernatural agents deluded him, and that is why he did what he did; and he later reiterates his prior delusion, and offers compensation to show that he is now, unlike then, behaving in accordance with *his* ‘values and ends’. On this view, there is therefore no real tension in the Apology, for Agamemnon earlier and later denies the same type of responsibility: that of responsibility

¹⁰⁰ Cf. n. 98.

associated with aretaic appraisal. I take this to be at least a *prima facie* plausible explanation of the apparent tension between Agamemnon's remarks.

But if this explanation is to amount to more than merely plausible, then it must make sense of a lengthy story, which constitutes a preponderance of the Apology, Agamemnon tells about the personified Ἄτη's delusion of Zeus (90-133). Agamemnon prefaces this story like so:

ἀλλὰ τί κε ρέξαιμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ, [90]
πρέσβα Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄτη, ἣ πάντας ἀᾶται,
οὐλομένη. τῆι μὲν θ' ἀπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οὔδαι
πίλναται, ἀλλ' ἄρα ἦ γε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει
βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· κατὰ δ' οὖν ἕτερόν γ' ἐπέδησεν.
καὶ γὰρ δὴ νύ ποτε Ζεὺς ἄσατο, τὸν περ ἄριστον [95]
ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ θεῶν φασ' ἔμμεναι·

(90-96)

Coming immediately after Agamemnon's claim that Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινός, | οἳ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῆι φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην (87f.), we expect the story to press further how overwhelmed Agamemnon was by these supernatural agents and the potency of the ἄτη which they cast upon him. At first glance, Agamemnon's claims that Ἄτη πάντας ἀᾶται (91) and that καὶ γὰρ δὴ νύ ποτε Ζεὺς ἄσατο, τὸν περ ἄριστον | ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ θεῶν φασ' ἔμμεναι (95f.) seem to serve just this purpose. After all, if one as great as Zeus has been deluded, and Ἄτη deludes everybody, then *a fortiori* this goes to show how incapable Agamemnon was of resisting ἄτη, and the extent to which the connection between what he did and his true character was interrupted by those powerful agents who cast it upon him.

This is what we expect the story to proceed to illustrate; and yet it does no such thing. The outline of the tale is this: Zeus informs all the gods that on this day Eileithyia will give

birth to Heracles, who will be lord of all mortals. Alas, Hera, learning of this, tricks Zeus into swearing a slanted oath, that whichever of Zeus' descendants is born that day will rule over all (108*f.*). Once it is sworn, she proceeds to meddle in affairs such that Eurystheus, another of Zeus' offspring, is born first, whilst Heracles' birth is delayed, meaning that the former, not the latter, will be king, Zeus' oath nevertheless being technically fulfilled (114-119). Hera returns to mockingly report the bad news (121-124), whereupon Zeus, anguished, casts Ἄτη from Olympus (125-129), thereafter forever groaning whenever he sees Heracles at his labours (132*f.*). The point at which Zeus is said to have experienced ἄτη is the swearing of the unfortunate oath: ἀλλ' ὄμοσεν μέγαν ὄρκον, ἔπειτα δὲ πολλὸν ἀάσθη (113).

Yet the passive ἀάσθη is conspicuous, for nowhere in this story of Ἄτη's alleged power is she said to ἀἄται Zeus.¹⁰¹ This corresponds to the peculiarly small role Ἄτη seems to play in the story, despite our expectation it should elucidate her power. Indeed, once we consider more closely the circumstances preceding Zeus' fateful swearing, the impression is that Zeus' ability to recognise Hera's deception was hardly impaired by Ἄτη at all. For before Zeus swears, he οὐ τι δολοφροσύνην ἐνόησεν (112) of Hera, a δολοφροσύνη that is repeatedly attributed to the goddess in the preceding text (97, 106), and which is emphasised by her ironic suggestion that Zeus is the liar (ψεύστης, 107) in respect of his original claims about Heracles. The highlighting of Hera's craftiness draws our attention to Zeus' failure to recognise that craftiness and Hera's role in tricking her husband. To this, we can add that Zeus boasts (εὐχόμενος, 100) to all the gods (πάντεσσι θεοῖσι), a fact emphasised in the opening of his speech (101), of the glory that will attend Heracles in ruling over mortals; indeed, this is a speech which his own θυμός bids

¹⁰¹ As we have seen, Ἄτη is said to πάντας ἀἄται (91, 129), but there is no line with Zeus as object. Modern readers would likely think of v. 95, καὶ γὰρ δὴ νύ ποτε Ζῆν' ἄσατο. This reading is in fact given by all manuscripts, Eustathius (*Il.* 4. 289. 20), certain earlier editions (*e.g.* van Leeuwen, 1913), Leaf, 1900-1902, the Loeb translation (Wyatt, 1999), and lately van Thiel, 1996. But a scholiast claims that οὕτως ἐν ἀπάσαις Ζεὺς ἄσατο, καὶ ἔστι ποιητικώτερον. ἐν δὲ τισὶ τῶν εἰκαιστέρων Ζῆν' ἄσατο (ΣΑ *ad* 95b1) and that Ζεὺς was preferred by Aristarchus (*ad* 95b3). Ζεὺς was therefore printed by Ludwich, 1907, Allen, 1931, and West; *cf.* the agreement of Coray, 2016 *ad loc.* and (albeit more qualified) Edwards, 1991 *ad* 95-9.

him to make (102). Plainly, it is Zeus' burgeoning pride in his son, and Hera's mendacity, which occasions his incautiously swearing an oath. We therefore feel that Zeus' failure to perceive Hera's treachery was his own, something that had its origins in him, resulting from a determined conspiracy of his wife; the god hardly needs some external agent, Ἄτη, obtunding his awareness of his wife's duplicity, since he seems perfectly capable of achieving that on his own. Thus, as much as we might expect this story to express Ἄτη's power, since that would seem to help prove Agamemnon's case, it ends up doing no such thing; and, on the contrary, it seems to suggest that Ἄτη's role is almost ancillary: Zeus and Hera are the *dramatis personae* of Agamemnon's tale, with Ἄτη playing barely a supporting role.¹⁰² Agamemnon therefore appears to be doing himself no favours: not only has he failed to illustrate the potency of 'savage Ἄτη', but he has implied that the errors which he committed originated in himself, as Zeus' did in him. Why then does Agamemnon tell this story?

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To answer this question, we must analyse the only other scene in either the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* in which ἄτη is clearly personified: that of the Embassy to Achilles in Book 9 of the *Iliad*, and Phoenix's unsuccessful contribution to it:

καὶ γάρ τε Λιταί εἰσι, Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιο,
 χολαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθαλμῶ,
 αἶ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' Ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιοῦσαι.
 ἦ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρὴ τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὔνεκα πάσας [505]
 πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἴαν
 βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἶ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω.
 ὃς μὲν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἄσσον ἰούσας,
 τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καὶ τ' ἔκλυον εὐξαμένοιο·
 ὃς δὲ κ' ἀνήνηται καὶ τε στερεῶς ἀποείπη, [510]

¹⁰² Cf. Cairns, 2012: 15.

λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι
τῷ Ἄτην ἅμ' ἔπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτείσῃ.

(502-512)

At first, Ἄτη seems like an uncaused force of nature, wending her way over the earth as the Litae follow in her train. She is too fast to ever be caught, and therefore all the Litae can do is try to repair the damage she has already wreaked upon humanity. But when the Litae come to heal Ἄτη's wounds, the mortal recipient of their overtures can decide for himself whether to respect the Litae or ignore them. If the latter, the Litae go to Zeus and ask him to unleash Ἄτη upon the offender: just as Ἄτη originally was βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους, so the one who denies the Litae βλαφθεὶς ἀποτείσῃ at Ἄτη's hands. What we have here is a sort of 'confluence' between two kinds of antecedent of ἄτη. For divine and mortal decisions both contribute to Ἄτη's re-emergence, the initial picture of Ἄτη's unprecipitated, aggressive activity *versus* complete mortal passivity giving way to a human choice which determines, via a petition of the Litae to Zeus and a corresponding divinely sanctioned response, whether Ἄτη will return.

Yet Phoenix does not tell this story as an idle exercise in creative theology. He is here to persuade Achilles to relent, and the story is obviously about him: *he* is the mortal with the choice to accept the Litae's overtures, Litae who appear in the form of three Achaean heroes to λίσσεσθαι (520) him to accept gifts from Agamemnon.¹⁰³ Thus, Phoenix tells Achilles that he must πόρε καὶ σὺ Διὸς κούρησιν ἔπεσθαι | τιμὴν (513f.), contrasting him with the man who prompts those daughters to beseech Zeus to make Ἄτη follow him (512). Accordingly, after a relatively brief interlude, Phoenix begins another story, about the swine-slaying hero Meleager. This one is the more detailed and concrete; if the story of Ἄτη and the Litae was told to inform Achilles, in broad strokes, about the expectation of the Embassy and what the consequences of

¹⁰³ Cf. Cairns, 2012, 16: "... Phoenix's aim is precisely to prevent Achilles from making a mistake which it is in Achilles' power to avoid".

not meeting that expectation were, the next is told to provide Achilles with an ‘historical’ *exemplum* of someone in a comparable situation who (eventually) did as Achilles ought to do. But if this is right, it implies that this latter story should also concern Ἄτη,¹⁰⁴ and so perhaps also say something about the confluence of Ἄτη’s antecedents that Phoenix has expressed in ‘abstract’ terms already.

Ἄτη does not begin with Meleager himself, but with his father, Oeneus. In a prelude to the main tale, Phoenix explains:

καὶ γὰρ τοῖσι κακὸν χρυσόθρονος Ἄρτεμις ὤρσεν
χωσαμένη ὅ οἱ οὐ τι θαλύσια γουνῶι ἀλωῆς
Οἰνεὺς ἔρξ’, ἄλλοι δὲ θεοὶ δαίνυνθ’ ἑκατόμβας, [535]
οἴηι δ’ οὐκ ἔρρεξε Διὸς κούρηι μέγαλοιο.
ἢ λάθεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν, ἀάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῶι.

(*Il.* 9. 533-537)

Oeneus’ failure to sacrifice results in the Calydonian Boar being sent to ruin his orchards, which gives rise to the situation wherein Meleager will be faced with the choice to accept, or reject, the pleas of the Litae and (following the pattern established by Phoenix’s previous story) thereby determine whether Ἄτη will return. For Meleager, after slaying the boar, being angered at his mother’s imprecations, like Achilles refuses to fight, declining to defend the Aetolians against the invading Curetes (553-556). As the Curetes come closer to taking the city, τὸν δὲ λίσσοντο γέροντες | Αἰτωλῶν, πέμπον δὲ θεῶν ἱερῆας ἀρίστους (574*f.*). These, then, are the Litae, but not only they: πολλὰ δὲ μιν λιτάνευε γέρων ἱπηλάτα Οἰνεὺς... πολλὰ δὲ τὸν γε κασίγηται καὶ πότνια μήτηρ | ἐλλίσσονθ’ (581, 584*f.*). The impressive number of the Litae and their pleas is answered simply and strikingly: ὁ δὲ μάλλον ἀναίνετο (585). Meleager flatly

¹⁰⁴ Not everyone would grant this, though it seems to me a natural progression; *cf.* Alden, 2000: 235, “The story of Meleager is not told to illustrate the αἴτιος of the Λιταί, since we hear nothing of any visitation by ἄτη after Meleager’s repeated refusal of the λιταί of his earlier visitors”.

refuses their requests, despite the number and kinship of the Litae that have begged him, and despite the despair with which they do so: beyond the offer of a μέγα δῶρον, namely a sizeable tract of land (576, 578f.), the desperately pathetic manner of his father’s pleading (582f.) evokes strongly the extent of Meleager’s intransigence. Eventually, it comes to Meleager’s trustiest and dearest companions beseeching him (as the embassy does Achilles), ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὧς τοῦ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθον (587). Meleager will in fact only be persuaded as the enemy are all but on top of him, when his wife reminds him of the degradations wrought on a city’s population in a sack; thereupon τοῦ δ’ ὀρίνετο θυμὸς (595), and he goes on to fight, saving the day.

What I take all this to express is Meleager’s fighting (or otherwise) really is *up to him*, his unmoving refusal not presented as anything other than his, and his alone: it is a genuine choice of Meleager’s whether to reject the Litae, and therefore his choice whether Ἄτη will recur. This story is therefore consistent with the earlier, ‘abstract’ one Phoenix tells, insofar as it reasserts the confluence between man and deity articulated there: a man, here Meleager, finds himself a victim of Ἄτη, directly or else by dint of the circumstances it creates, but when the Litae come to aid him, *he* is the one who decides whether to accept their aid and thereby whether Ἄτη returns. On Phoenix’s view, it is the mortal, be it Achilles, Meleager, or anyone else, who is firmly in charge here.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Note also that even in Oeneus’ case, when he suffers from ἄτη, this is not something which exclusively comes from without, despite his situation being notionally equivalent to 19. 505-507, what I have called “Ἄτη’s unprecipitated, aggressive activity *versus* complete mortal passivity”. For he οὐ τι... ἔρξ’, he οὐκ ἔρρεξε (535f.), emphasis we would not expect if Oeneus were supposed to be an impotent, passive victim, to whom ἄτη just ‘happened’. A useful control on this impression are the descriptions of the episode we find elsewhere. In Bacchylides, Oeneus’ neglect is not directly mentioned at all, Meleager only alluding to it, emphasising instead, of his father’s subsequent attempts to placate the goddess, that it is χαλεπὸν | θεῶν παρατρέψαι νόον | ἀνδρῶσιν ἐπιχθονίοις... ἀλλ’ ἀνίκατον θεῶν | ἔσχεν χόλον (*Ep.* 5. 94-6, 103f.); it is unswerving divine anger, the goddess’ own implacability, that is the focus here, not the agency of Oeneus in provoking that anger. In Ovid, “solas sine ture relictas | praeteritae cessasse ferunt Latoidos aras” (*Met.* 8. 277f.) and in Apollodorus’ summary τὰς ἀπαρχὰς Οἰνεὺς θεοῖς πᾶσι θύων μόνης Ἀρτέμιδος ἐξελάθετο (*Bibl. Epit.* 1. 66); in both, Oeneus is supposed to make a mistake—the goddess’ anger is never unprovoked—but in neither is Oeneus’ role stressed quite as much as it is in Phoenix’s retelling of the story.

Consequently, the only other occasion in the Homeric epics in which ἄτη is personified is not dissimilar to Agamemnon's tale in Book 19. In both cases of ἄτη assailing either mortal or god, the latter retain a significant degree of control: victims are not helplessly subject to ἄτη's degradations, but rather their misfortunes are in large part down to them. But just as it seems inexplicable that Agamemnon would tell such a story, given it hardly serves his purpose of exculpation, it is also strange that Phoenix would tell a comparable story for his purpose of persuasion. Phoenix is trying to convince Achilles to return to the war, so it is in his interest to emphasise to him that his return is in his hands; he should hardly tell a story in which Achilles is implied to be agentially inert.¹⁰⁶ Yet whilst we have seen that to a certain extent Phoenix succeeds in this, it is unclear why he would talk about ἄτη even in this way: why make Achilles' return to *any* extent contingent upon the activity of ἄτη? The stories Agamemnon and Phoenix tell seem at best only imperfectly suited to the purposes of both men: ἄτη plays too little a role in Agamemnon's story to promote his exculpation, whilst too great a role in Phoenix's to fully emphasise to Achilles the enormity of what is *his* choice. In other words, ἄτη seems on the one hand, to use Douglas Cairns' terminology, too 'endogenous', whilst on the other still too 'exogenous'.¹⁰⁷

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But we should perhaps think more about its phenomenology than its aetiology. What is clear from a survey of the occurrences in Homer of ἄτη and its cognate ἄάω, as reflected in the

¹⁰⁶ Cf. n. 103.

¹⁰⁷ This goes to the much-discussed issue of the origins of ἄτη, personified or otherwise. The view that ἄτη is 'exogenous', being almost exclusively initiated from without, usually by divine activity, has been a popular one: cf. Dodds, 1951: 5; Bremer, 1969: 104, 110; Vlastos, 2005: 13; Wyatt, 1982: 258, 262; Doyle, 1984: 18; Saïd, 2013: 366; Sommerstein, 2013: 3f.; Williams, 1993: 53, though qualifying (n. 7) that this is true always and only when the subjective sense (cf. n. 108) is meant. The alternative view, that ἄτη may also be 'endogenous', being largely initiated from the poor decisions and behaviours of its nominal 'victims', is endorsed primarily by Cairns, 2012: 12-15, 48 and Padel, 1995: 171f. Cf. Arieti, 1988: 1f and Porter, 2017: 3f.

standard translations of ‘blindness’ and ‘delusion’ *vel sim.*,¹⁰⁸ is that there is in the use of the term a connotation of *aberrance*.¹⁰⁹ In order for conduct to be appraised in this way, one must have some *comparandum* in mind, against which that conduct is contrasted; and that *comparandum*, I suggest, may either be a general, normative standard of behaviour or a particular standard of behaviour notionally typical of the individual whose conduct is in view. Thus, when Achilles suggests that Agamemnon has acted in ἄτη (*Il.* 1. 412), or Helen suggests the same of Paris (*Il.* 6. 356), the idea is that the behaviour in question deviates from the standard expected of kings and husbands.¹¹⁰ But other uses of ἄτη denote behaviour that is also

¹⁰⁸ A distinction has long persisted in scholarship between two different senses of ἄτη, an ‘objective’ sense of ‘damage, harm, disaster’ and a ‘subjective’ sense of ‘blindness, infatuation, delusion’. Like many, my own view is that all, or almost all, of the occurrences of ἄτη and ἄω in the *Iliad*, at least, take the latter, subjective sense; in the *Odyssey*, the situation is more mixed. Acknowledging some kind of duality between objective and subjective senses: Yamagata, 2005: 21; Bremer, 1969: 110, n. 32; Wyatt, 1982: 247f.; Williams, 1993: 53; Neuburg, 1993: 494, though *cf.* the qualifications at 498f.; Saïd, 2013: 364 rejects any kind of duality. In favour of the view that in the *Iliad* the subjective sense prevails: Cairns, 2012: 9, “the prototypical sense of *atē* in Homer is clearly ‘delusion’”; Dodds, 1951: 5, “Nor does the word ever, at any rate in the *Iliad*, mean objective disaster... Always, or practically always, *ate* is a state of mind—a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness”; Doyle, 1984: 7; Sommerstein, 2013: 3f., and n. 13; Padel, 1995: 179; Vlastos, 2005: 13; Teffeteller, 2003: 17, n. 10. By contrast, *cf.* Dawe, 1968: 99, “In Homer *Verblendung* [*i.e.* the subjective sense] is certainly not the predominate [*sic*] meaning... The small role played by *Verblendung* in this classification will seem smaller still when we think of those places in Homer where *Verblendung* is very much in question, but where Homer declines to oblige the modern literary critics by using the word *ate*”.

¹⁰⁹ The connection of ἄτη to aberrance is discussed at length by Cairns, 2012, *e.g.*: “*Atē* can be used to exculpate, excuse, or mitigate because it facilitates a distinction between a person’s enduring character and a single sequence of action that can be represented as the result of a temporary, aberrant state of mind (one that may, but need not, be externally induced)” (19). However, whereas I take all cases of subjective ἄτη in Homer to denote aberrant conduct, Cairns does not, a result of my treating ‘aberrant’ more catholically; *cf.* n. 110.

¹¹⁰ *Cf.* Cairns, 2012: “At *Iliad* 1.244, Achilles predicts that Agamemnon will “tear his *thymos* in anguish that he paid no honour to the best of the Achaeans”; he reformulates this at 1.412 by saying that Agamemnon “will recognize his *atē* in failing to pay honour to the best of the Achaeans”... Both these passages mean no more than that Agamemnon will regret his action when its consequences become obvious... In calling Agamemnon’s action *atē* Achilles does not intend to hand his adversary an opportunity to claim, at a later point, that his action was ‘out of character’; rather Achilles represents it as typical” (19-21); the idea is thus not that ἄτη “always distinguishes the act from the agent’s settled character, but that it always refers to a single sequence of cause, action, and effect, not to character as such” (21). Though Achilles “calling Agamemnon’s action *atē*” *could not* involve an intention to enable Agamemnon to later plead that what he did was out of character, simply for the fact that he is neither in earshot nor will ever learn of what Achilles says to his mother, I take the point that Achilles is not seeking to portray Agamemnon’s actions as out of character. But I believe that he is attempting to frame them as ‘aberrant’ in the sense of their being a departure from normative standards of kingship which Agamemnon is expected to exemplify, ‘out of (the) character’ he *should* have: he wishes to retrospectively acquire a prize when distribution of booty has already been made (1. 122-26), he does not distribute it fairly (namely to Achilles himself) (163-68), and he is a coward, unwilling to fight with his men (226-28), accusations Achilles caps with a direct, sardonic attack on Agamemnon’s kingship: δημοβόρος βασιλεύς, ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις (231). Indeed, when Achilles comes to Agamemnon’s ἄτη, this is again connected with his defective kingship: when the Achaeans are dying, they will reap the fruit of their king, whose incompetence is not to honour his greatest warrior (409-412). As I will go on to suggest, when talking about (‘subjective’) ἄτη, usually it is out of character conduct that is in mind, with the potential for such comment on the violation of relevant norms also (*cf.* my comments on Odysseus as

aberrant in the other sense I have specified, being behaviour which is (believed to be) substantially *out of character*. When the disguised Odysseus suggests that he should take up the challenge of stringing the bow, Antinous responds that he has not even φρένες... ἡβαιαί (*Od.* 21. 288); but he goes on to speculate that the beggar's bold words result from wine which τρώει him (293). He illustrates his theory by reference to the centaur Eurytion, and his coming to grief at the hands of Perithous and the Lapiths, and it is here that we find references to ἄτη.¹¹¹ For οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον, ἀγακλυτὸν Εὐρυτίωνα, | ἄσ' ἐνὶ μεγάρωι μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο (295*f.*) says Antinous, and repeats that ὁ... φρένας ἄσεν οἶνωι (297). This ends badly for Eurytion, and φρεσὶν ἦισιν ἀσθεῖς (301) he leaves. Thus, ἐξ οὗ Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκος ἐτύχθη (303) explains Antinous, adding οἱ δ' αὐτῶι πρώτωι κακὸν ἤυρετο οἰνοβαρείων (304). The point is that Odysseus will meet a similar fate should he continue in his, so Antinous supposes, drunkenness; and he advises Odysseus to sit quietly, enjoy his drink, and not vie with those who are younger (309*f.*). What is relevant here is that Odysseus' and Eurytion's conduct, associated with their alleged ἄτη, is taken to derive from their inebriation, rather than any characteristic impudence: their deeds deviate from standard norms of behaviour (the proper behaviour of guests, not least indigent ones) *and* the ways in which Odysseus and Eurytion in particular would ordinarily have behaved, were it not for wine.¹¹² In another case, Agastrophus

beggar, p. 170). In 1. 412 and 6. 356, however, the latter sense, apparently exclusively, obtains. This creates a curious duality in the uses to which ἄτη can be put: as I will argue in Agamemnon's case, ἄτη can be used to avoid responsibility associated with aretaic appraisal when aberrance as 'out of character' is in view, but if aberrance as 'out of (normative) character' is in mind, then ἄτη may in fact form part of a broader negative aretaic appraisal, an *assignation* of responsibility. Appropriately, aberrance in this latter sense is therefore associated with 'fundamental' character defects: I have commented on this feature of Helen's condemnation of Paris already in this chapter (n. 65), and Achilles' criticism of Agamemnon presumably does not argue that the king's flaws run anything other than deep.

¹¹¹ Eurytion's indiscretion is the abduction of Perithous' wife, though Antinous does not refer to it directly; despite noting the omission, de Jong, 2001 *ad* 295-304 does not comment on why it might have been made. Perhaps the detail is elided because Antinous is, even in an attenuated sense, trying to do just the same thing to Penelope. There may be some irony in the *Odyssey's* audience being aware that Antinous is, unbeknownst to him, speaking to Odysseus, who would be analogous to Perithous: Antinous, a latter Eurytion, is unwittingly warning Odysseus, a latter Perithous, to not do as Eurytion did, lest Odysseus suffer a similar fate, even whilst Antinous himself does so, and is soon to meet an even worse one.

¹¹² It may be tempting to think that in Antinous' opinion Odysseus *is* characteristically impudent—both he and Eurymachus have at this point already upbraided Odysseus for acting presumptuously (*e.g.* 17. 445-452, 18. 389-

is wounded, but ἀάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῶι · | τοὺς [*sc.* his horses] μὲν γὰρ θεράπων ἀπάνευθ' ἔχεν (*Il.* 11. 340*f.*), losing his life πεζός (341) because his horses are unavailable to facilitate his flight; this misjudgement is presumably uncharacteristic, given the amateurishness of the mistake and his being a hero (339) who is δουρικλυτός (368) and died fighting among the πρόμαχοι (342). Another example occurs during the *Doloneia*. Dolon, having at last been caught by Odysseus and Diomedes, is interrogated by the former: ἦ σ' Ἴκτωρ προέηκε διασκοπιᾶσθαι ἕκαστα | νῆας ἔπι γλαφυράς, ἦ σ' αὐτὸν θυμὸς ἀνῆκε; (10. 388*f.*). The question is one of motivations: Odysseus has already asked for what purpose Dolon is here (385, 387), but now wishes to know what made him undertake his venture. Dolon, afraid (390), surmises that Odysseus' second option is dangerous to admit even if the truth (*cf.* 319-327), and claims that πολλῆσι μ' ἄτησι πάρεκ νόον ἤγαγεν Ἴκτωρ (391), promising him Achilles' horses and chariot (392*f.*), and that he ἠνώγει (394) him to undertake his mission. The deception is subtle, for Dolon accurately relates that Hector promised him Achilles' chariot and horses, and implies that he wanted them.¹¹³ The lie is in his suggestion that the desire for those prizes was not properly *his*, but something which Hector, with his magnificent promises, induced in him; Hector and Dolon's avarice both bade him go, but the latter only because of the blandishments of the former. ἄτη, then, is again associated with conduct that is out of character: in this case,

393)—and so ἄτη here not denote aberrant, in the sense of uncharacteristic, conduct. But it is easy to imagine that Odysseus is regarded as having reached such a pitch of arrogance—thinking that he, an aged beggar (as Odysseus himself emphasises, v. 283), could do what the suitors could not, and merely for the sake of seeing whether he could do it (ἦ μοι ἔτ' ἐστὶν | ἴς, 282*f.*) rather than to win Penelope, the objective for which the contest has been erected in the first place—that this is uncharacteristic even of him who otherwise acts above his station. Note also that earlier Melanthe and Eurymachus raise the possibility that Odysseus' impudence may result from drunkenness: ἦ ῥά σε οἶνος ἔχει φρένας, ἦ νύ τοι αἰεὶ | τοιοῦτος νόος ἐστὶν (18. 331*f.*=18. 391*f.*); the distinction seems to be between conduct arising from inebriation *as opposed to* from one's character, buttressing the argument advanced in the text.

¹¹³ A scholiast insightfully notes that ἐντέχνως, ὅτι 'ὑπέσχετο' μόνον ἔφη, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἠτήθη, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνοιαν εἰς ἐκεῖνον μετὰγων (*T ad 392f.*). Dolon admits he possessed a desire for Achilles' property, but only does so by implication; he does not openly say that this is so, for that would come dangerously close to admitting the truth.

Dolon's desire for the prizes, and his pursuit thereof, are portrayed as foreign to him, even if the suggestion is met with some scepticism.¹¹⁴

What I have been trying to stress in these cases is that the one who has experienced ἄτη has performed acts which are aberrant, in the sense of being substantially out of character. Might this aspect of ἄτη's phenomenology then be implicated also in the stories of Phoenix and Agamemnon? What is apparent in Phoenix's retailing of the fate of Oeneus and Meleager is the extent to which their (potential) mistakes are (or would be) so uncharacteristic of them. Oeneus rules Καλυδῶνος ἐραυνῆς (9. 531), and his error is to fail to offer to Artemis alone her share of the fruit of his orchard, one richly provisioned (541*f.*), whilst the other gods feast abundantly (535*f.*). In other words, Oeneus' mistake is exceptional, as his and his land's prosperity, impossible if such failure were habitual, attests;¹¹⁵ and accordingly his failure is a result not of a wilful snub, but because ἢ λάθεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν (537).¹¹⁶ Thus, whilst Oeneus' failure to offer to Artemis is his own, not provoked by any agent interfering with him, it

¹¹⁴ ἢ ῥά νύ τοι μεγάλων δῶρων ἐπεμαίετο θυμός, | ἵππων Αἰακίδαο δαΐφρονος (401*f.*) says Odysseus, smiling (400).

¹¹⁵ In Euripides' lost *Meleager* (*TrGF* 5. 1, 515), Calydon is said to possess παδί'... εὐδαίμονα (2), emphasising both the land's fortune and the connection of this to divine activity.

¹¹⁶ The clause's meaning is not immediately clear, but evidently the failure to sacrifice is not supposed to have been deliberate. Such has been the interpretation of many modern scholars, *e.g.* Hainsworth, 1993; Wilson, 1996; Griffin, 1995 *ad loc.* Wyatt, 1999, the revised Loeb, gives "whether perhaps he forgot, or did not notice"; the original of Murray, 1924, "whether haply he forgot, or marked it not"; and Lattimore, 2011, "He had forgotten, or had not thought". Ancient scholarship was more troubled by the contrast implied by ἢ... ἢ, and sought to categorically differentiate the verbs: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάθετο ἐκὼν παρέπεμψεν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐνόησεν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ νοῦν ἔσχεν (*ΣΑ ad 537a*), the idea being that the former denotes a deliberate snub and the latter an accidental omission; *cf.* *ΣβT ad 537c*; Eust. *Il.* 2. 792. 16*f.*, ἐκὼν ἠμέλησεν ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως ἔγνω θεὸν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν... Οἱ δέ, ὅτι ἢ ἐνθυμηθεὶς τὴν Ἄρτεμιν αὐθις ἐξελάθετο ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως ἐπὶ νοῦν αὐτὴν ἔλαβε. But ἐκὼν παρέπεμψεν will not do as a gloss for λανθάνω, despite LSJ *s.v.* II. C. 2. recommending "forget purposefully, pass over... chose to forget it" by analogy with Aesch. *Ag.* 39; but there the 'forgetting' is explicitly said to be ἐκὼν, and must be a special case. By contrast, Lucian, quoting the text (*Symp.* 25), seems to imply that the omission must have been accidental (*ibid.* 24, καίτοι ὅπως μὴ ἐς ἐκείνην ἔχης καταφεύγειν τὴν ἀπολογίαν ὕστερον, ἐπιλαθέσθαι λέγων ἐν τοσοῦτῳ θορόβῳ καὶ πράγμασι); and Eusebius (*Contra Marcellum* 1. 2. 2) claims that the heretic ἢ λάθεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν ἢ καὶ ἐκὼν διαστρέφει τὸν λόγον of Paul in *Galatians*, a likely Homeric allusion that takes the clause to imply an accident. Separately, the call of Leaf, 1900-1902 *ad loc.* for correction is unnecessary, as was Zenodotus' (*ΣΑ ad 537a*). The 'problem' many of the foregoing are trying to solve is Phoenix's framing of the verbs as though they express different ideas when they ostensibly do not. But we can take the first to refer to forgetting and the latter to realisation (*pace* Leaf, for whom "they can hardly be distinguished"): "either he forgot or did not realise", in the sense that Oeneus either forgot that sacrifices had not been made to Artemis or mistakenly supposed they had when they had not. *Cf.* Bacchyl. *Ep.* 5. 94-104, in which Oeneus attempts to rectify what is implied to be an accidental omission.

nevertheless does not seem to properly express his character: certainly, *he* made a mistake, but for all that an uncharacteristic one.¹¹⁷ Much the same is true of Meleager. As we have seen, his enmity with his mother means that he declines to continue protecting his fellow Aetolians. But he is represented by Phoenix as one who otherwise cares for his community, for it is he who slays the Calydonian Boar which Artemis sends as punishment (543), and it is he who once inveterately defended the Aetolians against the Curetan onslaught (550-552). Similarly, his anger is represented as something that attaches to him (ὅτε δὴ Μελέαγρον ἔδν χόλος, 553), which is represented as having a profound effect on one's psychology (οἰδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα, 554), even on those who are wise (περ φρονεόντων, 554). Meleager's conduct is therefore also atypical of him; it results from a potent anger that overwhelms his usual, characteristic prudence.

Since Meleager is transparently analogous to Achilles, identical points are of course being made about him: he too has ordinarily defended his fellow Achaeans, ensuring the continuation of his wartime 'community', and it would be unbecoming of him to now abandon them. Appropriately, Phoenix suggests that the reason for Achilles' inaction is anger, which, as with Meleager, has come upon him (ἐπεὶ χόλος ἔμπεσε θυμῶι, 436). This anger was hitherto blameless (523), an obliquely positive assessment of Achilles' evaluative capacities, but now it is disrupting his usual good sense.¹¹⁸ Consequently, Phoenix expects Achilles to be receptive to the pleas of those who are particularly dear to him, recognising their bonds of friendship (520-522), and to be sensitive to the Achaeans' great need in general (518); such receptiveness would be consistent with his possessing ἀρετὴ τιμὴ τε βίη τε (498), but, as with the gods who possess these in a greater degree, this is not inconsistent with being στρεπτός (498). Phoenix's story of a personified ἄτη is therefore suited to his attempt to persuade Achilles, because it

¹¹⁷ In a fragment of Hesiod (F280 M-W, 10), he is called δαΐφρων.

¹¹⁸ Phoenix's claim to have such knowledge of Achilles' character is underpinned by his account of his involvement in his childhood (485-495), a reminiscence that is not only pathetic, but also lays claim to a more intimate knowledge of Achilles which could be used as a basis for drawing a contrast between his character and current obstinacy.

serves as a robust means of communicating to him that to remain unpersuaded would be to act in ways which would be inconsonant with the sort of man he is, that Phoenix has hitherto known him to be.

If this is so, we have an explanation of why he invokes Ἄτη in the first place. Can we now at last explain why Agamemnon does the same? Earlier I argued that Agamemnon's defensive strategy, as embodied especially in 19. 86*f.*, was to emphasise that he was overwhelmed by powerful external agents, such that he behaved in ways not expressive of his true self, thereby denying the sort of responsibility associated with aretaic appraisal; his offer of compensation pressed the point that now, behaving in markedly better ways, his conduct was so expressive. We struggled to slot the story of a personified Ἄτη into this scheme, for it seemed that it should have highlighted the capacity of Ἄτη to overwhelm her victim. Yet we saw that it did nothing of the sort: the putative 'victim' in the story, Zeus, seemed to get himself into trouble, with Ἄτη playing at most a supporting role. But given what I have said about the cases of ἄτη in Homer, including Phoenix's story of a personified Ἄτη, this now seems explicable. For the story might serve to emphasise that aberrant, in the sense of out-of-character, dimension of ἄτη I have discussed, further pressing the point that what Agamemnon did to Achilles was not expressive of his character.¹¹⁹

If this is so, we would expect the Zeus of the story to be portrayed as also acting out of character; and I think this is the case. Of course, that Zeus can be deceived is by Book 19 not unfamiliar to the *Iliad*'s audience: Book 14 is largely occupied by Hera's deception of Zeus, and about the first quarter of Book 15 devoted to its discovery and resolution. But what I think makes Zeus' deception uncharacteristic in Book 19, in a way it is not in Book 14, is the *weakness* he exhibits in the former *versus* the latter. In 14, Zeus is certainly fooled; but at the

¹¹⁹ Cf. Cairns, 2012: 21-25.

beginning of 15, unlike in 19, his response is reflective of the sort of supremacy with which he is credited elsewhere in the poem.¹²⁰ Of Hector in his suffering, τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν ἐλέησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (15. 12), whilst he refers to his ἀζηγῆς ὀδύνη at Heracles' suffering (25); but his dismay in 19 is stronger, for there τὸν δ' ἄχος ὀξὺ κατὰ φρένα τύψε βαθεῖαν (125) and τὴν [*sc.* Ate] αἰεὶ στενάχεσθ', ὅθ' ἐὼν φίλον υἱὸν ὀρώϊτο | ἔργον ἀεικέες ἔχοντα ὑπ' Εὐρυσθῆος ἀέθλων (132*f.*). It is with Zeus' groaning that Agamemnon breaks off the story, Hera having just crowned her slick victory with bold mockery; our impression is that Zeus is left disconsolate and defeated. By contrast, in Book 15, Zeus not only catches Hera before his slumber results in total Achaean victory, something which he seems to cast as her incompetence,¹²¹ but confidently threatens her with the same sort of violence he used when previously she fooled him vis-à-vis Heracles, the details of which he triumphantly describes at length (17-24) to deter her from future plotting (31-33). Following Hera's denial of having done anything, and Zeus' disbelieving smile, itself an indication of his command of the situation,¹²² Zeus authoritatively sets out what amounts to a programme for the remainder of

¹²⁰ Aside from the generic references to his being *e.g.* father of gods and men, I have in mind Achilles' story of the two jars (24. 527-533), indicative of Zeus' sovereign control.

¹²¹ *Cf.* his reference to Hera's κακορραφία (16). Whilst the reference is here primarily to malicious mischievousness, and the word is usually understood in this way (LSJ: "contrivance of ill, mischievousness"; Cunliffe: "Planning or contriving of evil"; Autenrieth: "evil device, maliciousness"; LfgreE: "Anzetteln von Schlimmem (Anschlagen), Arglist"), Zeus probably also intends an accusation of incompetence. There are only two other occurrences in Homer. Telemachus uses it of the suitors: ἀλλ' ἦτοι μνηστῆρας ἀγήνορας οὐ τι μεγάρω | ἔρδειν ἔργα βίαια κακορραφίησι νόοιο· | σφὰς γὰρ παρθέμενοι κεφαλὰς κατέδουσι βιαίως| οἶκον Ὀδυσσῆος, τὸν δ' οὐκέτι φασὶ νέεσθαι (*Od.* 2. 235-238); the suitors are not only behaving unethically, but also are riskily staking their own lives on the false assumption that Odysseus will not return, an act of singular imprudence. In a later passage, reminiscent of our own, Circe tells Odysseus and his crew αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ δεῖξω ὀδὸν ἠδὲ ἕκαστα| σημανέω, ἵνα μὴ τι κακορραφίη ἀλεγεινῆι | ἠ' ἄλδος ἠ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἀλγήσετε πῆμα παθόντες (12. 25-27). It is unclear to whose κακορραφία Circe is referring, but if this is supposed to be, even if only *inter alia*, Odysseus and his crew's, then presumably incompetence is partly in view: Circe's advice pre-empts poor decisions on their part, tying in with the many mistakes made by Odysseus and his comrades after they leave Aea. Separately, a D-scholion glosses the term by κακοσυνθεσίας, κακοβουλίας (*ad Il.* 15. 16). The former is not especially useful given its own infrequency, though Eustathius, discussing the present passage, following a definition of κακορραφία that seems to tend towards maliciousness, continues: ἠ καὶ ἄλλως κακορραφία ἢ τοῦ νοὸς κακοσυνθεσία, οὐ ἀνάπαλιν φρενήρης ὁ τὰς φρένας ἀραρυίας ἔχων (*Od.* 3. 692. 20*f.*; *cf.* 1. 94. 28-30, on the aforementioned passage from *Odyssey* 2). κακοβουλία is more helpful, occurring far more frequently: in its first occurrence, in a fragment of Chrysippus (*SVF* III 265), it refers (at least) to incompetent deliberation, and likewise does so in Josephus and Plutarch.

¹²² That the smile indicates scepticism is strongly suggested by v. 53; *cf.* ΣΤ *ad* 41*f.*, ἐσοφίσατο τὸν Δία, οὐ περὶ ὧν ἀπολογουμένη τῆς ἀπάτης, ἀλλὰ δι' ὁ χολᾶ, τοῦτου ἑαυτὴν ἀλλοτριώσασα· καὶ μειδιᾶ Ζεύς; Halliwell, 2008:

the Trojan War, a plan which Hera is required to set in motion as a test of her claimed loyalty (53-77). Zeus may thus have been fooled before; but in Book 19, Hera's consummately successful deception and Zeus' painful defeat are not in keeping with the previous *Dios apatai* we witness in the *Iliad*, in which Zeus is little more than temporarily discommoded.

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In the first section of this chapter, we saw that among Arthur Adkins' audacious claims about the Homeric epics, it was asserted that the allegedly Kantian ethical principle of 'ought implies can' (OIC) was unimportant to Homer's characters, whilst it was critical to members of the modern Western world. It turned out that, beyond the principle of OIC being Kantian in a rather different sense than we, or perhaps Adkins, might have imagined, it was in fact nowhere near as relevant to the ethical reasoning of 'us' as Adkins supposed. Once we turned to the epics themselves, we saw that, far from Adkins' submission of OIC's unimportance, the principle was in fact deployed in Homer even where Adkins thought it was not. More importantly, it emerged that applying an alternative approach, involving the concept of 'aretaic appraisal', to passages both treated and untreated by Adkins potentially enabled us to get more out of these than an approach relying on the centrality of OIC. In order to further demonstrate the preferability of this alternative, 'aretaic appraisal' was applied to a notoriously thorny scene in the *Iliad*, Agamemnon's Apology; and we have just seen that, in its ability also to make sense

66, "his smile at 15. 47 is to some degree inscrutable: a veiled expression of his authority and an oblique signal of his confidence that he has Hera cornered". That Zeus should smile here perhaps reminds the audience of Hera's smiling upon receiving the *kestos* from Aphrodite, which was shortly before emphasised (μειδῆσεν... μειδήσασα, 14. 222f.). That earlier scene was ironic: Hera fooled Aphrodite into handing over the *kestos*, and smiled in consequence at the goddess with which smiling (φιλομμειδῆς being used in Homer exclusively of Aphrodite; cf. *Hom. Hym. Ven. 2f.*) deception (Hes. *Theog.* 205; cf. *Il.* 3. 405) is closely associated (cf. Krieter-Spiro, 2018 ad 222f.; Janko, 1993 ad 218-23). Now, with further irony, Zeus has the last smile as the erstwhile smiler attempts to deceive again, rather less successfully. Smiling elsewhere in Homer can imply a degree of 'knowing' condescension in the face of a lying subordinate: Odysseus' at the terrified Dolon (*Il.* 10. 400) and Athena's at the deceptive Odysseus (*Od.* 13. 287); cf. Calypso's smiling at the sceptical Odysseus (*Od.* 5. 180), in which it is not the smiler, but the one smiled at, who suspects deception. There are also smiles of comparable, 'knowing' patronage elsewhere, outwith a deceptive context: Achilles at the youthful insistence of Antilochus (*Il.* 23. 555), Menelaus at the naive impatience of Telemachus (*Od.* 4. 609), and Odysseus at the unmerited fear of Medon (*Od.* 22. 371).

of an ostensibly infelicitous story Agamemnon tells about Ἄρτη in the course of that apology, this was successful. 'Aretaic appraisal' is, of course, not the last word on how to read scenes of ethical significance in Homer. But it should, I think, be one of a range of conceptual tools available to readers of such scenes.

Epilogue

At the end of chapter 2, I referred to a potential relationship between agent-centred approaches to shame on the one hand and responsibility on the other. With what I have said about ‘aretaic appraisal’ and responsibility in chapter 3, it should now be clear that these and what I termed the ‘characterological’ approach to shame are in many ways two sides of the same coin. Both involve deep assessments of the people that we, or others, take ourselves to be, and the two must accompany each other in practice as much as in theory. Thus, when Hector contemplates the shame that will attend fleeing Achilles, I argued that this is a fearful *mélange* of both social and characterological concerns; but it is interesting that the public criticism he imagines at the hands of the inferior man might well equate to a publicly expressed aretaic appraisal. Likewise, though there seems to be little evidence that Agamemnon was ashamed of what he did, perhaps a more sensitive agent in similar circumstances would feel that way. It is surprising, then, that those whose ideas I have discussed in both chapters have tended not to explicitly make much of this connection, or at least not quite in the way I have.¹ It is therefore an open question how this connection can be elaborated, especially within classical studies, and which related concepts might be useful vehicles with which to do so.

In the prior chapter, I portrayed ‘aretaic appraisal’ as a mostly modern conceptual development, having its roots in contemporary Analytic philosophy. Whilst in its particulars this may be true, the broad normative ethical tradition of which it is a part, ‘virtue ethics’, is of course far from modern, conventionally tracing its roots back to Aristotle.² It is interesting,

¹ A partial exception is Cairns, 1993: 45. More recently, Shoemaker, 2015 unambiguously connects shame and aretaic appraisal, regarding the former as a “first-personal sentimental evaluation of character” (129), and as one of the “first personal attributability responses” (135) and an “aretaic attitude” (136). He suggests later, when combating cultural relativism about responsibility, that “[t]he non-Western emphasis on shame and honor is about *attributability*; what the instances bring out in particular is a focus on character” (229).

² A useful overview is provided by Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2018; perhaps the most famous modern example of this approach to ethics in action is Alasdair MacIntyre’s *After Virtue* (1985).

then, to examine where Aristotle might himself utilise something like aretaic appraisal, particularly where this collides with the extent to which one could not in some sense control what one did:

Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὅτιοῦν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ἦδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.

(*Eth. Nic.* 1110b 18-24)

Aristotle presses that the man who does not regret what he did in ignorance is different to the man who regrets what he did in the same circumstances, and so such men should be terminologically distinguished. How we should react to them is presumably the motivator of that distinction: those who act involuntarily may attract pity (1109b 31f.), whereas those who act ‘not voluntarily’, indifferent to the harm they caused (even if did not intend), will not be granted the same understanding. I assume Aristotle is evaluating agents’ responsibility in accordance with the sort of evaluation I described in chapter 3. A man who is causally ‘responsible’ for doing something terrible, yet could not help it, and then feels no regret for what happened, should have “a distinct name” (ὄνομα... ἴδιον) and not be pitied because he bears responsibility for what he did in the way the regretful man does not: he is responsible as one whose fundamental characteristics, such as callous indifference, are to be aretaically appraised negatively.³ But this passage holds significant additional interest for its connection

³ Cf. Irwin, 1999 *ad loc.*, “The distinction between the nonvoluntary and the involuntary is irrelevant to the agent’s relation to his action; for in either case he is not responsible for it. But it is relevant to his character. If he is pleased at something he has done because of ignorance, he shows what sorts of actions he is willing and prepared to do, and is rightly blamed or praised for his attitude to these actions. This passage is one that shows that Aristotle is concerned with more than responsibility for actions”.

of aretaic appraisal to *regret*,⁴ and thereby promises a way to unify the themes of chapters 2 and 3 in a heuristically useful way.

The notion of ‘moral luck’, originally explicated by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel,⁵ poses the problem of “when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control”.⁶ As Nagel puts it:

Whether we succeed or fail in what we try to do nearly always depends to some extent on factors beyond our control. This is true of murder, altruism, revolution, the sacrifice of certain interests for the sake of others – almost any morally important act. What has been done, and what is morally judged, is partly determined by external factors. However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-storey window while trying to rescue him. Similarly, there is a morally significant difference between reckless driving and manslaughter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light. What we do is also limited by the opportunities and choices with which we are faced, and these are largely determined by factors beyond our control. Someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina might have become an officer in a concentration camp if he had not left Germany for business reasons in 1930.⁷

Clearly, the literature on ‘moral luck’ could do much to augment my earlier discussion of OIC.⁸ But the significance it has here is in the phenomenon of ‘agent regret’, the name Williams gives to the sentiment which may be experienced by one who is morally ‘unlucky’:

⁴ Already the relevance of regret emerges from what I have said in the prior chapters. In chapter 3, note the relationship between the aretaic appraisal Agamemnon is trying to forestall, his admission of ἄτη, and his evident regret at what has happened, as well as Achilles’ connection of that ἄτη with his prediction that Agamemnon will rue his disrespect (*Il.* 1. 411*f.*). In chapter 2, the self-reproaches of shame that Lewis envisaged are clearly matters of regret; *cf.* p. 181.

⁵ Williams, 1981; Nagel, 1991. The latter was originally a response to the former, both papers delivered at the same conference. Williams’ was the more heavily revised for publication, answering some of Nagel’s criticisms, and was further clarified in a later paper (Williams, 1993²).

⁶ Nelkin, 2021.

⁷ Nagel, 1991: 25*f.*

⁸ Chapter 3 was framed more by the issue of the validity of OIC and the extent to which it represented everyday ethical practice, not least because this enabled extensive interaction with the growing field of experimental philosophy on the subject. For a recent, significant volume exploring ‘luck’ in philosophical (including ethical) and psychological contexts, *cf.* Church & Hartman, 2019.

But there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call ‘agent-regret’, which a person can feel only towards his own past actions (or, at most, actions in which he regards himself as a participant). In this case, the supposed possible difference is that one might have acted otherwise, and the focus of the regret is on that possibility, the thought being formed in part by first-personal conceptions of how one might have acted otherwise. ‘Agent-regret’ is not distinguished from regret in general solely or simply in virtue of its subject-matter. There can be cases of regret directed to one’s own past actions which are not cases of agent-regret, because the past action is regarded purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action. Agent-regret requires not merely a first-personal subject-matter, nor yet merely a particular kind of psychological content, but also a particular kind of expression. The sentiment of agent-regret is by no means restricted to *voluntary* agency. It can extend far beyond what one intentionally did to almost anything for which one was causally responsible in virtue of something one intentionally did. Yet even at deeply accidental or non-voluntary levels of agency, sentiments of agent-regret are different from regret in general, such as might be felt by a spectator, and are acknowledged in our practice as being different. The lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any spectator, even a spectator next to him in the cab, except perhaps to the extent that the spectator takes on the thought that he himself might have prevented it, an agent’s thought. Doubtless, and rightly, people will try, in comforting him, to move the driver from this state of feeling, move him indeed from where he is to something more like the place of a spectator, but it is important that this is seen as something that should need to be done, and indeed some doubt would be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily moved to that position. We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that there is something special about his relation to this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault.⁹

If the driver agentially regrets, as only an involved agent can, what he has done, what emotions might he be experiencing? Williams implies in his paper, and later confirmed in *Shame and Necessity*,¹⁰ that he thought this was a matter of guilt. Perhaps that is right; but I think it is plausible, indeed likely, that we will encourage the driver to move away from precisely the kind of self-reproaches that Lewis used to characterise *shame*, our ambition to persuade him to abandon the ‘reflexive’ attitude that I suggested was so important to that emotion. Thus, there seems to be an important sense in which agent-regret and shame are related. But important also is the puzzle of what we expect of the driver. Even as we encourage him to abandon his self-recriminations, we expect him to have them; and, as Williams suggests, if he had none to

⁹ Williams, 1981: 27f.

¹⁰ Williams, 1993: 93.

abandon, or abandoned them with alacrity or indifference, the result would be ‘some doubt’, if not reprehension. There have been several attempts to solve this paradox.¹¹ But I think the answer may plausibly implicate the different kinds of responsibility attendant upon aretaic appraisal on the one hand and the importance of control on the other, as discussed in chapter 3. For perhaps we would hold the lorry driver responsible in the former sense for failing to develop or maintain the agent-regret which would betoken what Susan Wolf called the ‘nameless virtue’ “of taking responsibility for one’s actions and their consequences”,¹² or else the contextually praiseworthy experience of specific emotions (not least shame),¹³ all the while encouraging him to not accept the kind of responsibility that was blunted by his inability. Thus, regret, particularly agent regret, may well comprise a large part of the experience of characterological shame especially, whilst serving as an index by which one may form aretaic appraisals of an agent. To that extent, regret, as conceptualised by Williams and others, may be a useful tool by which to study characterological shame and responsibility as aretaic appraisal in tandem, a usefulness enhanced in classical studies by the fact that the sentiment was of as much interest in antiquity as it is today.

¹¹ For example, Kamtekar & Nichols, 2019 suggest that this, what they call ‘the Observer Puzzle’, is to be solved by appealing to the distinction between ‘proper’ and ‘actual’ domains of the emotion the driver feels, and our evaluation of his emotional character on that basis: “if an agent fails to show guilt for outcomes that fall in the false-positive margin of the actual domain of guilt, that might count as a signal that the agent will also fail to show guilt for outcomes that fall in the proper domain of guilt. So if the lorry driver fails to show this guilt response, we might take that as evidence that he will also have a diminished guilt response for his *voluntary* wrongdoing. The same goes for shame... We think that it’s inappropriate in an important sense (*viz.*, it’s inappropriate_{PD}) for the lorry driver to feel guilt. But we also think that we can use the responses to cases in the margin as signals for people’s emotional character” (199*f.*). Evidently, aretaic appraisal, the utility of which in this connection I endorse in the text, is already implicated in their explanation. Note that the authors follow Williams in suggesting the driver is feeling guilt, but suggest that if one insists that it is a matter of shame, their argument is unaffected (182, n. 2).

¹² Wolf, 2001: 13.

¹³ *Cf.* n. 11.

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