# Foreign policy in the fourth dimension (FP4D): locating time in decision-making

Ryan K Beasley, and Andrew R Hom


| Date of deposit | 10 July 2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Document version | Author's accepted manuscript |
| Access rights | Copyright © The Author(s) (2021). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. |
| Citation for published version | Beasley, R. K., & Hom, A. (2021). Foreign policy in the fourth dimension (FP4D): locating time in decision-making. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *17*(2), [oraa028]. |
| Link to published version | https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraa028 |

Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/




University of St Andrews | FOUNDED 1413

## Introduction

In 1884 Greenwich Mean Time was agreed at the International Meridian Conference, thereby also creating the International Date Line, which definitively separated yesterday from tomorrow in the Pacific (NYT 2011). This political agreement unexpectedly endowed several Pacific island nations with a new foreign policy tool: time travel. In 1892 Samoa repeated the US independence day of July 4th twice, repositioning itself backward in time to facilitate trade with California. In December of 2011, given its shifted international trade patterns and citizens' connections with New Zealand and Australia, Samoa again conducted foreign policy by rolling its calendar forward through time, giving December 30 of 2011 a miss entirely. Samoa's location in time had been arbitrarily determined through a political negotiation by powerful international actors, who established a timing regime to facilitate international trade, which Samoa exploited as a means of conducting its foreign policy. Viewed through a simple clock or calendric conception of time, the Samoan case is merely a quirky if clever exploitation of its unique historical-geographic happenstance. But a deeper consideration moves us away from understanding time as a bedrock and objective reality, and instead emphasises the social and political activity of *timing* foreign policy. By introducing timing theory (Hom 2018a, 2020) to the study of foreign policy decision-making (FPDM), we propose a new perspective that allows us to consider temporal context as a feature of agency, temporal motivations, the timing of both policies and policymaking, and more broadly to illustrate the empirical and conceptual value for studying foreign policy in the fourth dimension (FP4D).

After decades of relying on time without thinking much about it, IR scholars recently began teasing out multiple temporal dynamics in international politics (Hom 2018a), many with implications for FPDM.[1] This comports with the field's wider turn away from rationality assumptions and static structures, both shifts already made in FPDM. Across these literatures, un-mooring rationality assumptions and setting structures in motion complement more diverse approaches to time (e.g. Hutchings 2008; Hanrieder 2015; McIntosh 2015). Critical scholars provided a primary vector of this temporal "turn" (see Hom 2018b) – both historically and in terms of the breadth and depth of research (e.g. Hesford and Diedrich 2010; Agathangelou and Killian 2016).

[1] Our concern with FPA and especially FPDM delimits our overview of time in IR. For more general surveys, see (Hutchings 2008; Stevens 2015 chps. 1 and 2; Hom 2020).

Yet to date FPA and time scholars have not engaged much with each other, despite promising reasons to do so. First, time studies reflect on the construction of events and crises (see Lundborg 2011; McIntosh 2015) that feature centrally in FPDM accounts. Second, FPDM research springs from Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's (1962) germinal proposition that we must understand decision makers' "definition of the situation". Not only does this overlap with critical IR and time studies' broad commitment to subjectivity (Solomon 2014), it also opens the door to a number of inquiries into the diversity of time perspectives and their political implications (Hutchings 2008; Stevens 2015:48). Finally, FPDM scholarship recognises the importance of context, which links up to critical and time studies' emphases on positionality, situatedness, and change (McIntosh 2015; Hutchings 2008). These common starting points suggest fruitful bridgeheads between FPA and time studies in IR.

We proceed by first presenting a review of FPDM approaches, arguing that existing models tend to assume decision makers operate "in and through time" without considering the nature or meaning of time in any detail. We then present *timing theory* as a novel and more dynamic approach to understanding temporal aspects of FPDM. We introduce its main concepts and demonstrate how it can provide new perspectives on approaches to FPDM, illustrated with empirical examples. We conclude with reflections on the benefits and challenges of bridging FPDM and theoretical approaches to time.

**Time in FPDM**

Many approaches to FPDM build from implicit temporal assumptions or feature time at various points in the decision-making process. Our review of these reveals a tendency to see time as a contextual or structural feature, typically associated with crises, that acts on decision-makers by putting them "under pressure", enhancing their cognitive biases and hindering effective decision-making. Scholars also objectify aspects of time when modelling decision stages, sequences, and occasions for decision. Finally, examinations of leaders' individual characteristics as they influence foreign policy recognise leaders' beliefs about political timing are significant, but fail to develop systematic conceptions of individual differences in temporal orientations. Thus, while time is an important element of many FPDM approaches, its key subjective features are narrowly conceptualised, its social construction unexplored, and time is not explicitly theorised as a central feature of foreign policymaking, leaving scholars with a fairly limited temporal view of dynamics central to

foreign policymaking processes. We illustrate this by presenting five areas of research that especially draw upon time or temporality in their formulation of decision-making dynamics.

*Time Pressure and Crises*

Charles Hermann (1963) posited three dimensions of foreign policy crises: an external threat to important values, an element of surprise, and a restricted amount of time in which to respond. Simulations of crisis situations devote significant effort to replicating their temporal dimensions, including mechanisms meant to "further the impression that the initial [crisis] periods [are] to be embedded in a series of longer time units" (Hermann and Hermann 1967:403) as well as variations in the time permitted to respond to new diplomatic messages during the crisis. The notion of crisis has undergone repeated modifications, but these typically concern the first two dimensions suggested by Hermann. Some sense of "time pressure" on decision makers has remained an enduring, central, and relatively unmodified feature (see Stern 2003:186-88; Haney 2002).

One way time pressure affects decision-making is through its impact on cognitive and group dynamics, in particular enhancing cognitive errors and biases. As limited information processors, decision behaviour is constrained by bounded rationality, which encourages decision processes that are fast, automated, and efficient rather than time-consuming, detailed, and laborious. Decision-makers become particularly vulnerable to novel or shocking developments, which constitute crises by reducing opportunities for information exchange and flexibility (e.g. Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Moreover, time pressure increases as crises drag on or proliferate (c.f. Aquilar and Galluccio 2007:24), and routines for managing such situations come at the expense of accuracy and introduce various problematic biases.

*Temporal Biases and Shortcuts*

Following Axelrod's (1984) notion of the "shadow of the future", time horizons feature centrally in some IR approaches to states' interactions (e.g. Toft 2006; Edelstein 2017). Streich and Levy (2007) specifically examined decision-making around inter-temporal trade-offs, arguing that individuals' temporal choices can deviate substantially from standard utility discounting models. These approaches tend to start with rationalist explanations of decision-making and focus on behavioural manifestations, with limited attention to individual differences or subjective constructions of time. While FPDM scholars focus more directly on psychological research and cognitive biases, few have focused specifically on time-related

biases. Krebs and Rapport's (2012) examination of Construal Level Theory (CLT) marks one notable exception. According to CLT, greater temporal distance from an event gives rise to more abstract, less detailed cognitions, promoting a focus on goals. Nearer time horizons allow for a less abstract, more concrete and detail-oriented focus on means (Trope and Liberman 2010). While explicitly temporal, CLT has seen limited applications to the study of foreign policy decision-making. Moreover all of these approaches to time horizons retain an objectivist conception of time, viewing it as an identifiable and ordered sequence through which foreign policy agents make trade-offs, facing the "now or later dilemma" (Edelstein 2017), iterated games (Axelrod 1984), or even subjectively imagined "near" or "distant" events (Krebs & Rapport 2012).

A more extensive and subjective, if less explicitly temporal, literature exists on the use of analogies in foreign policymaking (cf. Jervis 1976; Khong 1992; Houghton 1996; Neustadt and May 1986). These approaches focus on the use of analogical reasoning by decision-makers as a way to understand their representations of problems, emphasizing limited information processing capacities that induce decision-makers to reduce the complexity of current events by likening them to historical ones. This succinctly summarises a complex current reality while also prioritising certain policy choices that parallel those of previous decisions. Foreign policy scholars recognise these cognitive benefits while also noting analogies can encourage decision-making pathologies and problematic outcomes as information gets re-interpreted, selectively sought or discounted, and policy options are inappropriately evaluated for their effectiveness in relation to their success or failure in prior cases, whose "fit" with current dilemmas varies.

*Group Dynamics*

Irving Janis's (1972) "groupthink" pioneered subsequent FPDM scholarship linking faulty collective decision processes to poor foreign policy outcomes (c.f. Schafer and Crichlow 2010). While "groupthink" has become out-dated, challenged, and refined (c.f 't Hart, Stern, Sundelius 1997), it still represents a prominent reference point for scholars interested in group dynamics and foreign policy. Beyond "time pressure" (c.f. Neck and Moorhead 1995) time does not figure significantly in the groupthink model, nor has it been developed in subsequent modifications to the theory. Some features of groupthink draw attention to time in a limited way, such as the group's failure to engage in contingency (future) planning, and the impact of (past) recent failures on group morale. Groupthink's central motivation of

concurrence-seeking might also be seen as an effort to maintain the group's cohesion over time, in contrast to subsequent modifications focusing on compliance ('t Hart 1990).

Moving "beyond groupthink" Stern and Sundelius (1997) look more carefully at the development of a group over time, arguing that "new groups" may be especially vulnerable to pressure toward conformity, as many of the features of established groups are lacking, like how to manage conflict, members' relative status, roles, and the group's decision rules. The "shadow of the future" may also loom largest in new groups as they anticipate repeated interactions and steer clear of setting early precedents that may return to haunt them. New groups feature prominently in political transitions, making their dynamics and tendencies toward poor decision-making all the more important (Stern 1997). Importantly, as they gain experience interacting over time they are likely to develop clearer decision procedures and to better understand interaction dynamics, roles, and practices. Time here remains analytically separate from the agents who, in moving through it, gradually mitigate or eliminate challenges to effective decision-making.

*Individual Differences: Beliefs and Traits*

Extensive literatures exist focusing squarely on individual differences as explanations for policymaking behaviours. Numerous scholars use Operational Code Analysis to understand how beliefs impact policymaking, including five philosophical (P1-P5) and five instrumental (I1-I5) beliefs (c.f. Schafer and Walker 2006). Others (Hermann 2003) employ Leader Trait Analysis (LTA), examining specific political personality traits such as conceptual complexity, task-orientation, and self-confidence. While LTA does not directly deal with temporality, several operational code beliefs clearly involve some temporal elements. For example, philosophical belief P2 – "What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's values?", P3 – "Is the political future predictable", and P4 "How much control or mastery can one have over historical development" all involve beliefs about how history or the future unfold in relation to control and prediction. Instrumental belief I4 – "what is the best timing of action to advance one's interest" – directly involves the question of timing. Temporal orientation seems to be a defining feature of leaders' general beliefs about goals and instruments, but foreign policy scholars working with operational codes have not often explicitly incorporated such aspects in their analyses. More recent quantitative content analysis approaches fail to measure temporality in any appreciable way (Schafer and Walker 2006).

*Sequential Decisions/Occasions for Decision*

Scholars studying FPDM recognise that decision-making proceeds over time, and several frameworks elaborate sequential decision-making or decision stages. By focusing on diachronic analysis, FPDM scholars model the "sequential" importance (Ozkececi-Taner 2006) of the numerous "occasions for decision" (Hermann 2001) that characterise foreign policymaking. Sequential analysis allows a more nuanced conceptualization of the innards of crises, as in poliheuristic theory's observation that decision-makers first rule out unacceptable options before engaging in value maximisation processes (Mintz 2004; Brummer and Oppermann 2019). Many of these research programs and individual studies, however, have failed to interact with one another (Ozkececi-Taner 2006). As an alternative, Kuperman (2006) suggests dividing between ad hoc, sequential, and dynamic decision-making processes, based on how long problems exist, whether they can be fully eliminated, the importance of prior experience, and the time frame for payoffs. It is not entirely clear whether this framework proposes to describe how decisions are made or a way to model those decisions.

Each of these approaches slice up what may be lengthy, complex, and fluid decision-making processes, revealing a tendency for FPDM scholars to focus on events or "mini-events" – but always discrete happenings – as the "stuff" that FP models should organize and explain. They view time as a sequencing agent, stringing together steps or choice-points in the foreign policymaking process separated by feedback about changing events, circumstances, and responses from other actors. While the modelling of decision-making at each choice point may be sensitive to the subjective construction of the situation, the sequences themselves are typically imposed on the events by the analyst, often demarcated by either significant new information or the taking of important decisions, but the *subjective temporal* nature of that sequence is not typically a concern.

In sum, FPDM approaches see agents as psychologically fallible thinkers who proceed through time in analytically identifiable sequences or stages of decision-making. When individuals' subjective constructions of time are considered, they tend to be viewed through the lens of crises wherein short decision time "pressures" them into engaging in biased information processing or biased temporal reasoning in order to simplify policymaking. Individual differences among leaders' traits and beliefs are recognised as important, but

different temporal orientations are either not systematically examined or are measured poorly if at all. Overall, this presents a fairly limited and traditional "clock-time" view of time in foreign policymaking.

If time is instead viewed more subjectively, as a social construct rather than a bedrock and objective feature outwith but acting upon agents, then it may come in a variety of forms and may change depending on the agents and their interactions. From this view, time becomes a resource for agents that can be actively constructed, authoritatively allocated, manipulated and contested. Rather than focusing on time-pressured information processing and biases, decision-making may instead be viewed as purposeful attempts to stitch together change processes into a meaningful but useful pattern, mapping the present along the axes of the past and the future. Manipulating time also becomes a foreign policy tool targeting opponents' decision-making processes (e.g. putting *them* under "time pressure"), undermining their policy timing (e.g. disrupting their coordination of key decisions or events), and even potentially establishing broader timing regimes that can become institutionalised practices regulating inter-state relations (e.g. calendar time, or Greenwich Mean Time). We develop this perspective on time in foreign policymaking, drawing upon timing theory.

**Timing Theory**

Timing theory describes timing as the holistic and practical work of establishing dynamic relationships useful for social direction and control. Timing concerns not merely when a specific happening occurs, but rather human efforts to synthesize changing circumstances, processes, and actors by employing an overarching principle or idea, termed a *timing standard*. This can provide a rubric for integrating and coordinating those processes and actors into a meaningful series that unfolds toward some purpose.[2] Timing is thus distinct from the idiomatic sense of co-incidence by which we describe planned or surprising meetings (e.g. "bad timing, I just missed you"), or the "ripe moment" for an action to be most successful (Zartman 2001). Moreover, our notion of timing differs from work in historical institutionalist and other treatments of "path dependence", wherein timing is usually subordinate to sequencing – it refers to a specific step in a longer chain, rendered especially important by the steps or course of events that follow it (see Fioretos 2011:379, Pierson 2004). This way of thinking takes the chain of events as given or at least exogenous and

[2] This discussion summarizes points developed more fully in Hom (2018a and 2020 chp. 1).

treats any question of timing as a matter of discrete but impactful events. On this view, timing is the practical effort to forge a discernible and meaningful "chain of events" or some other processual series in the first place – it establishes the path along which some happenings might eventually exert "dependent" effects (see Hom 2020:33, 188-90).[3]

The most familiar example of a timing standard is that of the precise, consistent, and enumerated motion achieved by modern mechanical or atomic clocks. By dividing the day into nominally equal hours, minutes, and seconds, "clock time" offers a homogeneous and therefore highly flexible standard for arranging and ordering a huge variety of human affairs – indeed any activity or relationship that can be quantified in some way (e.g. *when* something happened, *how long* it lasted, or *whether* it co-incided with another related event). We might think that clock time today merely represents the motion of the heavens with unsurpassed accuracy. The continued labours of various groups and committees to ensure that "Universal Coordinated Time" runs *on time* and accommodates any celestial discrepancies (usually through the addition of a "leap second", see Stevens 2016) amply demonstrates its constructed nature. Indeed, Samoa's clever time travel manouevre was only made possible due to a politically contentious 1884 conference to divide the world into 24 time zones and nominate Greenwich, UK as the *standard* from which all other zones would *time* their hours (e.g. "GMT +/-1").

Timing also involves much more than the use of standardized clocks to reckon change and coordinate daily life. Consider the mundane example of cooking. Appetisers, main courses, and the like each can take different amounts of "clock-time" to prepare, and taking your eye off the clock can result in an over or under cooked dish. But making a "meal" requires different standards beyond the clock's numeric motion. A good chef does more than merely cook each element of the meal, s/he ensures they arrive on the table in the proper order; otherwise it is not a meal, but piecemeal. As the understanding of a "meal" varies across cultures (Mintz and Du Bois 2002), so too does this timing standard and the associated behaviours of cooking. In Japan food should arrive when ready so that diners taste the freshest preparation possible. Some European fare indexes dishes to serving courses in a predetermined order (*aperitivo, primi, secondi, insalata, formaggi, dolce, digestivo* in Italy)

[3] Additionally, 'path dependence' usually refers to unit-endogenous processes (see Hanrieder and Zürn 2017:95), while timing theory expressly focuses on relational links between 'internal' and 'external' elements.

or even having them arrive all at once (the traditional British Sunday roast). The notion of a "meal", then, operates like a timing standard, governing or synthesising the entire cooking process in ways that go well beyond preparing food with an eye on the clock. Such a conception of *timing* is also a crucial ingredient missing from the FPDM cookbook. Agents are not just choosing among various options (preparing dishes) or feeling "time pressure" as a deadline approaches, they are also *timing foreign policy*.

In order for timing to affect foreign policymakers and the policymaking process it must reflect, communicate, or otherwise establish an organizing frame or standard of reference, that is, a *timing standard*. However, this need not involve defined temporal increments (hours) or established measurable patterns (seasons) – it need only help bring together two or more dynamic and changing elements – such as actors, events, or procedures – so that they unfold towards an intended purpose. That is, a timing standard succeeds by being useful, by establishing effective relations between and among relevant actors and processes. The adequacy of this frame of reference, then, depends entirely on its *practical* efficacy within a *particular*, *concrete setting* (Hom 2020:60).

*Timing standards in foreign policymaking*

A wide range of timing standards may operate in foreign policymaking. These include clocks and calendars, which keep different change elements regularly coordinated and predictable, but also many less precise, less repetitive, and often more powerful organizing concepts. This could include emphasising important identities, norms, and roles, or creating and enacting procedures and rules for decision-making. In the same fashion as a clock or calendar sets a timing standard around which different changes can converge (we all quit working at 5pm, or the deal must be agreed by the end of October), these types of timing standards constitute powerful criteria for the practical coordination of actions and events. We next present three different examples of timing standards – decision procedures, identity, and analogies – selected to be conceptually familiar to the study of foreign policy, in order to clarify the different lens a timing perspective provides.

Decision Procedures

Establishing key decision procedures structures the relationship between two change processes – decision-making and events – and as such these can function as a timing standard. Procedures can involve determining the ultimate decision authority within a

government, establishing information gathering and dissemination practices, and deciding upon decision rules for aggregating differing preferences. They may be institutionalised or established norms within decision-making bodies, but may also depend in part on the interpretation of the challenge at hand and the time constraints associated with it. In "crises", vital change processes can become so uncoordinated and out of synch that there is great pressure to abandon established decision procedures as the timing standard in favour of something more able to align with events – such as moving from unanimity to majority decision rules, or from consensus decision-making in a group to relying upon an individual leader. This is not simply "time pressure" overwhelming cognitive capacities, or constricting decision-making control towards a smaller number of key decision-makers, but "timing pressure" demanding a different overarching standard for coordinating between decision-making, events, and the unfolding processes those decisions are meant to affect.

Struggles over decision procedures *may* reflect efforts to consolidate personal power or to ensure that a particular preference prevails, but they *intrinsically* involve efforts to establish a timing standard that allows decision-making to remain pertinent to or "keep pace with" relevant events. As timing standards, decision procedures are not just an institutional or normative antecedent condition (Janis 1972), but are themselves actively manipulated by decision-makers in order to better time foreign policymaking. Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU illustrate the use of decision procedures as a timing standard, and contrast *timing* with the clock-like notion of a precisely metered "deadline". In particular, we draw attention to actors' manoeuvres to establish the executive or legislature as the arena setting the pace of Brexit policymaking.

The June 2016 referendum to leave the EU led to a new Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, who sought to unilaterally activate Article 50 – formally beginning the Brexit process – in March of the following year. She was forced, however, by the UK Supreme Court to obtain Parliamentary approval, which she did, and thus the UK government and Parliament collectively established a two-year deadline, which could only be extended by the EU. While May embarked on a negotiation process aimed at producing a withdrawal bill mutually acceptable to the UK and the EU (Walker 2019), an election in June 2017 meant to strengthen her hand instead resulted in a hung parliament. Anti-Brexit Conservative MPs leveraged the political situation, pressuring the government to allow a "meaningful vote" for Parliament on any negotiated deal (Lynch, Whitaker, and Cygan 2019). This resulted in

considerable executive-legislative tensions regarding the ability to determine UK foreign policy, shifting ultimate authority for a Brexit deal from the comparatively fleet decision-making of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the cadenced, contemplative, and rule-bound procedures of Parliament.

Following meaningful votes in early 2019 that rejected the PM's negotiated agreement, Parliament instructed May to request a deadline extension from the EU, which agreed, but to a longer extension than was requested. Theresa May resigned and Boris Johnson became Prime Mininster and worked to negotiate a new deal with the EU. Parliament again passed legislation requiring either its assent to any negotiated deal or that the PM request another extension, to which Johnson responded that he would rather be "dead in a ditch" than do (Guardian 2019a). Remarkably, Johnson prorogued (suspended) Parliament, vying to sideline it in the run-up to the next Brexit deadline, and Parliament responded by securing a court ruling that proroguement was procedurally illegal, and passing a late legislative amendment slowing down the withdrawal process to prevent the PM from allowing the deadline to simply pass. Shortly thereafter Johnson did in fact request another extension from the EU (which it again set independently and granted). Through its use of legislative procedures then, Parliament repeatedly placed itself squarely at the centre of foreign policymaking on Brexit, thwarting executive control.

These dramatic back-and-forth manoeuvres were not simply a matter of shifting the distribution of relevant preferences toward one policy outcome or another (which no actor could align into a decision anyway). They can also be seen as efforts to establish the procedures and pace of decision-making relative to events and timelines being set and reset by the EU. While Theresa May gripped tightly the Government's control, she was pressed by MPs from her own party to cede a meaningful vote to Parliament on Brexit. In thrice rejecting her negotiated EU withdrawal agreement, Parliament effectively established a new timing standard between decision-making and Brexit events, one that changing Prime Ministers could not alter (despite Boris Johnson's unprecedented efforts). House of Commons leaders recognised the EU "deadlines" as significant but malleable external events, sticking to their procedures for amending and passing legislation – including a rejection not of PM Johnson's negotiated agreement but of his speedy three day timetable for passing it – while successfully seeking two deadline extensions in order to slow the pace of withdrawal procedures (Walker 2019). This tug-of-war between the Executive and Parliament for control

of foreign policy played out through a contest over a timing standard: which procedures would coordinate between decision-making and events, those of the Executive or those of Parliament. To view these events as simply an effort to "run out the clock" against a Brexit "deadline" in order to get a better deal misses foreign policy agents' nuanced timing manipulations between the decision-making procedures and the events they were meant to affect. Foreign policy agents were not simply "pressured by" or "running out" the clock, they were tinkering with its gears (see Hom and Beasley forthcoming).

Identities as Timing Standards

Another type of timing standard is an autobiographical narrative that emphasises identity, which helps social actors establish and maintain a stable and continuous sense of Self "over time" (Steele 2008:3; Subotic 2016). Narrative theory argues that stories compose subjects as agents and position them in coherent situations (Carr 1986:41-42) using a synoptic theme. This theme poses the overarching rubric for interpreting experience and change, providing a sort of "cognitive mold" or "frame" for "understanding both the past and the present in a simplified, schematic, and linear fashion" (Subotic 2016:615). Inasmuch as the synoptic theme of any autobiography is the emergence or presentation of the narrator's self, identity commitments function as a standard for timing the narrator (who is also an actor) and the events that concern it (Elias 2007:39).[4] That is, they provide the timing standard by which a "plot" is stitched together from a variety of experiences and unfolds in one way rather than many others. Foreign policy agents draw upon an autobiographical timing standard to privilege key identity features, historical events, and future aspirations, connecting these changes in ways that purposefully promote one set of policy options over others. For example, Jelena Subotic links the secondary narrative theme of Kosovo's "indivisibility" to the overarching "theme in the Serbian Kosovo narrative that equates Serbia with Jerusalem" (Subotic 2016:621). According to this timing standard, as the "thirteenth, lost and the most ill-fated tribe of Israel", Kosovo's indivisibility implicates "the preservation of Serbia's identity, its political soul" and so it is preferable to endure the short-term pain of withdrawal from Europe than to confront the prospect of Serbia's long-term dissolution (ibid).

Timing by analogy

[4] We draw here from Elias' argument about linking notions of time to the dynamic, practical activity of timing (see Hom 2018a:72).

Analogical reasoning is a familiar FPDM framework (cf. Houghton 1996; Jervis 1976; Khong 1992) focused on the coping strategies of foreign policy agents in unfamiliar or time-pressured challenges. This foregrounds simplification, biases, and bad decisions resulting from the misunderstanding or misuse of history (Neustadt and May 1986) or the lack of analogical sophistication (Khong 1992). Such accounts are excessively "presentist", underselling the temporality of analogies and their capacity to bring a particular order to relevant changes.[5] They are a way of (re) interpreting the past in order to discover creative ways of coping with uncertainty, ambiguity, and "time pressure" in some cases. Analogical reasoning is a form of timing that simplifies a complex present and makes sense of unprecedented events (Houghton 1996) by reference to the timing standard of a past event thought to hold key lessons for the current predicament.

While agents' complexity and expertise (Dyson and Preston 2006) may affect the scope and sophistication of analogies they use, from a timing perspective it is their capacity to offer an overarching framework for synthesizing important processes and decisions that matters. This re-centres analysis on the emergent agreement, or discord, around an analogy, as well as how many and which dynamic features it coordinates effectively, including events, actors, and sets of policies or behaviours. Some analogies recur due to their temporal organizing power across contexts, becoming a familiar and regularizing standard by which to assess and guide policymaking.

Consider the well-known "lessons of Munich", now a shorthand for the moral and strategic failure of appeasement and the attendant lesson that only quick and forceful action quells international aggression. As the United States confronted surprising events in the newly bipolar and thermonuclear world of the Cold War, decision-makers returned repeatedly to Munich's moral. Grappling with North Korean attacks on South Korea in 1950, Harry Truman recalled '"The Thirties" and how they ended in Munich (Neustadt and May1986:285). Invoking "'[o]ur indolence at Munich', Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge predicted of South Vietnam 'there is greater threat to start World War III if we don't go in'" (Khong 1992:134). George H.W. Bush invaded Iraq because "Half a century ago, the world had a chance to stop a ruthless aggressor and missed it. … We will not make that mistake again" (in Record 2007:163). A decade later, his son also went to war over the Mesopotamian

[5] See Brändström, Bynander, and 't Hart (2004) for political uses of analogies.

Munich (Record 2007:163-64). In each of these cases, the analogy held clear timing stakes. While Neville Chamberlain mistakenly thought that appeasement could ensure "Peace for our time", generations of decision makers after him recalled the historical lesson of Munich differently: "Time is not on our side … I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer" (George W. Bush, in Record 2007:164).

The timing power of analogies also manifests in debates and discord about *which* historical analogy applies in a given situation. For instance, in the late 1990s, NATO states invoked different but complementary historical analogies to grapple with a mounting humanitarian threat in Kosovo. For UK Defence Secretary G. Robertson, "appeasement did not work in the 1930s. Nor will it in the 1990s. And so we had to bring [Serbian President] Milosevic to heel" (quoted in Steele 2008:130). His Foreign and Commonwealth Office counterpart, R. Cook, recalled a much more proximate analogy – Serbian aggression against Bosniak Muslims and international heel-dragging during the Bosnian civil war (Steele 2008:130). The Clinton administration drew an analogy with the Rwandan genocide, over which Clinton admitted enduring shame and regret for not acting to stop a preventable disaster (Steele 2008:146). Drawn from different points in the past, these analogies all pointed to the common moral that NATO must take decisive action against Serbia to prevent history from repeating itself – a need to break from past behavioural patterns and foreign policies that produced unwanted consequences.[6]

Analogical timing can also be more competitive. In the mid-1960s, Lyndon Johnson's most trusted advisors drew contradictory lessons from past experience. Was Vietnam unchanged from a decade earlier, when guerrilla tactics successfully drove out French colonialists, or was it more like the Philippines and Greece, when guerillas faltered against conventional military might? Or was Vietnam a recapitulation of Korea, when decisionmakers "correctly" applied the lessons of Munich in deploying quick and forceful resistance to help restore regional stability and peace (see Khong 1992:133-135)? These analogical debates in the Johnson White House were conflicts over *which* timing standard from the past should be used

[6] Steele's account also shows how analogical reasoning interweaves with another timing standard, self-identity. For him, 'past failed attempts to live up to the national self' inflect how a state understands its present 'national purpose', as when the Rwandan genocide became 'America's main source of "shame" during the 1990s' (Steele 133:146). Similarly, analogies can intersect with decision procedures as a timing standard, such as the UK Parliament relying on the 2003 Iraq war as a foreign policy precedent for Syria in 2013 (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017).

to synthesize the future out of the present. The Philippines-Munich-Korea axis eventually prevailed, and the US undertook an escalating intervention in Vietnam.

*Active and passive timing*

Timing can be *active* or *passive* in terms of the quantity and quality of effort required to enact a given timing standard. Active timing uses the standard to establish particular sorts of relations through conscious decisions and laborious actions. It is provisional and therefore vulnerable to contestation about the timing standard and its means of integration and coordination (Elias 2007:41–42), such as competing identity narratives or disagreements about which historical analogy to employ. Passive timing "requires no decision" and so little effort that it proceeds almost subconsciously according to a standard that is taken-for-granted or that seems entirely obvious or natural (Elias 2007:43). Western standard time reckoning illustrates this. The clock itself is today so familiar and intuitive that we easily conflate its numeric readout with time *per se*. If successful, active timing may become increasingly passive thanks to repetition, diffusion, and institutionalization, up to the point where we employ it without noticing.

Neither passive nor active timing is ever finished or complete (Hom 2020:48-50) – nations can "unify" their multiple time zones into one to express a singular identity, or they can "jump" from one zone (and one day) to the next, as Samoa did in our opening example. Rather, both active and passive timing modes are more or less provisional and fraught thanks to the sheer size, complexity, and dynamic nature of foreign policy. In this respect, encounters with confounding events pose especially fraught timing challenges. When passive timing falters due to unexpected changes, unintended consequences, or some other slippage, decision-makers must return to a more active mode of timing in order to restore relations between change continua. This can be accomplished by reinterpreting or retrofitting a novel event in a way that renders it amenable to the extant standard and thus re-inscribes it within the extant timing mode – what FPDM scholars would recognise as cognitive distortion. Timing can also be restored by lightly revising the standard itself so as to accommodate the novel change and allow the slightly adjusted mode of timing to proceed. When confronted with a shocking crisis, for example, we might re-appraise previously inconsequential happenings as pivotal "moments", or slow-moving forces as deepseated "roots of the crisis" (Helleiner 2011). If even these efforts are inadequate for dealing with new developments, then decision-makers face the more daunting task of selecting or constructing a different

standard altogether, working out its implications for integration and coordination, and discovering how useful it is for these purposes. In such contexts we are likely to find talk of "new eras", revolutions, and other signs that actors are working to imagine unprecedented ways of re-establishing political relations in the wake of destabilizing change (Clark 2019:171-210).

"Active" and "passive" describes a continuum rather than a distinction (see figure 1). At its most active, timing involves a wholly unprecedented, *new timing* proposal about what standard we should use to coordinate policies and actions. *Re-timing* is slightly less laborious and contestable but still requires significant negotiation and effort.[7] Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are a familiar example of an increasingly passive *timing practice*, as they establish regular ways of proceeding and addressing well-known issues. Finally, at its limit passive timing become a widely institutionalized *timing regime*, one which actors no longer notice happening or think much about participating in, as when we employ standardized clocks or calendars to coordinate social life. Active/passive and subjective/objective describe complementary features of timing. As an originally subjective timing proposal gains assent, succeeds, and winnows its way into the practices of foreign policymaking it becomes a passive timing standard on which actors depend and is viewed more and more like an objective, independent feature of the world.

[Figure One Here]

*Timing Agents*

If many things can function as timing standards, so can multiple social agents effect timing. This pertains to any actor who can affect the definition of the situation, alter key decision procedures, or otherwise inflect the way that key processes unfold. The head of state, top advisor, or influential parliamentarian all might act as a timing agent in a particular setting. Because they propose to elevate some idea or continuum over others as the standard of "intellectual synthesis" and practical coordination (Elias 2007:60–61), timing agents either assume the willing assent of others to abide by their timing standard, or they must find ways to win their acquiescence (Hom 2020:50). Timing reflects a decision-maker's *will* to unfold events or situations in *this* way instead of *that*, to privilege some agents, procedures, or

[7] We return to the issue of re-timing in the conclusions.

commitments over others, and thereby enable and constrain actions, allocate resources, and encourage or forestall possibilities. In this sense, effective timing requires authority or power.

Timing theory goes further by suggesting something about the motivations of foreign policy agents with regard to the practice of timing. While some research recognises motives as a personal characteristic that varies across leaders (c.f. Winter 2005), most FPDM scholarship looks at agents' motivations in a fairly limited way, often simply assuming that decision-makers desire to solve a foreign policy problem, balance competing domestic interests, gain a political objective, maintain power, and/or prevail over an adversary. Yet *timing* involves a more general motivation to align disparate change processes. We propose the concept of *temporal dissonance,* drawing from research on cognitive dissonance.

Scholars applying cognitive dissonance theory to the study of foreign policymaking build on the idea of "consistency" or the relative consonance between two or more cognitions (beliefs) (Jervis 1976; Larson 1985; Beasley 2016). Dissonance describes the aversive feeling that arises within the individual due to inconsistencies in their experiences of and beliefs about the world, the self, and behaviours. Much dissonance work focuses on expectations about the future, which individuals develop in order to navigate it effectively. We expect food to sate not kill us, kindness to be reciprocated not avenged, and a host of other physical and social processes to work according to our expectations. When expectations are violated, dissonance arises and actors are motivated to reduce dissonance in various ways, typically by changing beliefs or behaviour (or both).

*Temporal dissonance* refers to misfits between our expectations about how processes and events will unfold relative to our knowledge of the past. From the perspective of timing, agents' expectations are temporal constructions based on past experiences and memories. Encountering novel experiences can violate those expectations and thus arouse temporal dissonance, in which the known past and uncertain future seem to collide in a discordant and uncomfortable present. Temporal dissonance can also arise because our sense of timing has slipped, perhaps due to the decreasing effectiveness of a passive timing standard or the presence of alternative timing standards that compete to coordinate significant changes. This activates responses that seek to reinforce, modify, or replace a timing standard in order to re-establish temporal consonance, moving agents from being passive to active timers. Timing involves the practice of "lining up" or establishing consonance amongst our past experience,

present beliefs, and future expectations into a synthetic continuum restoring our sense of a smooth flow of time. Temporal dissonance thus gives us insight into why decision-makers reconstruct their memories of the past and visions of the future in order to better align them with the present.

This need not only be ideational, but can have physical manifestations. Folkers (2019:497) explicitly looks at "stockpiling" as a way of freezing time, and stockpiles as a physical manifestation of expected security threats. In this sense stockpiles "…reduce uncertainty by establishing something to bank on in the face of an unknown future. This has a securing effect in the present even when the future they anticipate never comes to fruition." From the standpoint of *timing*, we can see this "securing effect" of stockpiling as a means of reducing temporal dissonance arising from the uncertainty about future changes to security *relative to* anticipated production and demand. These two change processes can be lined up through the application of a timing standard that establishes consonance between future supplies and future demands by specifying what is to be stockpiled in the present and at what levels – to then just sit there, securely, *over time*, until needed. Policies creating "strategic reserves" of oil, money, or nuclear weapons, for example, thus represent physical manifestations of efforts to reduce temporal dissonance using a timing standard that specifies stockpile practices.

Lupovici (2012) argues alternative explanations of Israel's unilateral pursuit of a separation barrier in response to the Second Intifada cannot account for the timing of that policy initiative, but that ontological dissonance can. This occurs when a state perceives threats to multiple identities, but responses needed to defend one are contradictory with responses needed to defend another. This results in anxiety and dissonance reduction efforts, such as behavioural changes, changing identities, and even avoidance measures such as ignoring information, redefining the situation, and constructing narratives that simply revalidate the threatened identities. Given that identities themselves can be a timing standard, we see Israel's actions as being driven by temporal dissonance arising from mutually incompatible and competing timing standards becoming simultaneously activated, as multiple identities came under threat following the Second Intifada. Israel's democratic identity, its Israeli-Jewish identity, and its identity as a "security provider" each elevated or diminished the importance of different changes, emphasising different solutions to its foreign and security policy dilemmas (Lupovici 2012:823-4). Each focuses on varying historical myths and narratives, highlights key persistent problems, and envisions different paths to security (see

also Barnett 1999). In this way, identities line up the past, present, and future along the axis of a coherent self-narrative, timing these change dynamics through a prominent identity. When different identities compete as the timing standard, they typically do so by emphasizing different changes that are important, relevant, or that can be ignored for guiding foreign policy. When different identities simultaneously are activated yet emphasise mutually incompatible change dynamics, temporal dissonance can arise.

*Timing FPDM Processes*

Decision-makers may come to realise – perhaps through experiencing temporal dissonance in crisis-like proportions – that their decision processes need to be re-timed to be more effective. The 1963 deployment of the "Hotline", a telex or double teleprinter Direct Communication Link (DCL) between the US and the Soviet Union, for example, was pushed forward by both the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Its intent was to reduce decision-maker anxieties by providing a quick, direct, and reliable means to avoid miscommunications that might unintentionally escalate to war. While the "information sharing" between adversaries aspect of its intended use is generally clear, the temporal aspect of its purpose with regard to decision process is less so, but no less important. Normal diplomatic lags in communication between adversaries could certainly give unwanted space for irrevocable escalatory responses by either side, but reducing these lags *too much* was also seen as a potential problem: "A written teletype link was chosen over the originally proposed telephone connection, because the latter could easily have increased – rather than decreased – the risk of war through hasty decisions, emotional outbursts, awkwardly phrased statements and mistranslations. In contrast, teletype was judged to be a cooler medium that would give decision-makers more time to consider their response and the consequences of their words" (Simon and Simon 2017:286). The choice of the teletype was an active timing proposal that yoked decision-making processes during crisis management to a specific timing standard, calibrated to avoid diplomatic lags but also to recognise subjective temporal experience during crisis decision-making with the aim of pre-empting individual decision-making foibles by delaying them *just enough*. The teletype hotline established a new timing practice at the heart of Cold War diplomacy, one that effectively set the pace of the superpowers' direct relations by timing their internal decision-making processes and external communications. It did so by providing a sort of *Goldi-clocks* solution to the all-too-frequent flashpoints of the early Cold War, ensuring that information travelled not too slow but also not too fast, for decision-makers to process.

This new practice of timing diplomacy gradually became established as a decision-making resource available during crises, but created subsequent and unexpected synchronisation problems for foreign policy makers. When leaders used the Hotline more extensively in the 1967 Six-Day War, they outpaced standard timing practices of their own regular diplomatic channels "…because the DCL, in replacing more traditional diplomatic tools, precluded the spending of time on gathering the sort of valuable information that might have been forthcoming through these slower channels" (Simon and Simon 2017:286). The Hotline, originally proposed to the government by a committee headed by game theorist Thomas Schelling,[8] re-timed diplomacy to what was then considered a more individually rational timing standard, but unintentionally compromised the broader foreign policy timing practices in which it became embedded.

*Timing relations*

Timing theory proposes that multiple timing standards can operate at different levels and between actors in different types of relationships. This opens the possibility of viewing timing activities not only as part of the decision-making process, but also as manipulations aimed at other actors within the international system – a tactical or strategic manoeuvre between states. For example, states can put each other "under time pressure", a very common tactic that has been noted but not theorised in FPDM. The use of timing as a *tool of statecraft* opens up the possibility of understanding foreign policy crises as arising from actors *timing and being timed* by each other. From this view, crises are not exogenous shocks or independent events that happen *to* decision-makers, but are more like "dislocations" (Nabers 2016:421-22) that arise because other agents have actively constructed the crisis by disrupting the timing of opponents' decision-making. For example, in the July Crisis of 1914, Austria-Hungary sat on their ultimatum to Serbia because of France's pending state visit to Russia, where the two powers might formulate a successful counter to the Austro-Hungarian provocation, including coming to Serbia's defence. Instead, "it was decided to time the ultimatum so that it would arrive at the most inconvenient point in time for Russia's and France's leaders, just when President Raymond Poincaré had boarded the ship *France* to begin his long journey home. He would not step on French soil until 29 July, leaving the

[8] See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2005/schelling/biographical/, accessed 31 March 2020.

French government essentially without effective leadership" (Mombauer 2018). Austria-Hungary actively timed their ultimatum to confounded their opponent's decision making process, contributing mightily to the July Crisis. Of course, that crisis quickly spiralled out of control, suggesting that even well-orchestrated timing gambits like the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum possess a "protean power" that opens up room for improvisation but also may exceed our individual or collective grasp (Katzenstein and Seybert:2018).

Returning to Brexit, we find ample evidence of timing relations on display. During extended negotiations of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU in early 2019, various agents, observers, and analysts referred to the "time pressure" under which the UK found itself. One senior EU official argued "they [the UK] do not need more time to think, they need reasons to make decisions" (Financial Times 2019). In timing theory, this time pressure results from timing processes by which agents rearrange the constituent parts, the order, and the pace of political relations *on purpose* – as a way of shaping and shoving their counterparts. France and Germany debated the length of the UK's second Brexit extension on just these sorts of terms – time was no mere quantity, it was an explicit source of political leverage. Was it best "to put Brexit on ice for a year, allowing the [EU] bloc to get through a politically tricky period", as Angela Merkel suggested? Or was a shorter extension necessary to "keep maximum pressure on the British", to "put an end to the can-kicking", and to encourage them to negotiate with an "enhanced duty of sincere cooperation", as Emmanuel Macron argued (see Guardian 2019b; Guardian 2019c)? The Franco-German split on this issue hung largely on whether they understood delay as a boon or a bane to the UK's decision-making process. Even the timing of its agreement to a second extension – from the 31 October 2019 until 31 January of 2020 – was managed by the EU, as they appeared to wait for the UK Parliament to respond to PM Johnson's call for a snap election before announcing their actual agreement to the extension (Politico 2019). Getting the best deal for the EU included helping to get a new parliament that could potentially pass one.

Similarly various spokespersons for the EU have used EU identity as a timing standard against which to assess Brexit. Recall that identity can function as a timing standard by activating or prioritising various events and change processes and de-emphasising others. The EU as a long-term integration project that helps to stave off a return to warring Europe emphasises unity and peace as key identity markers. Change processes that comport with this standard are well timed and consistent, while those that challenge this identity are not.

While UK policy exceptions for a single currency or the Schengen treaty might have deliberately slowed down the pace of European integration, Brexit was an express effort to "turn back the clock" by "tak[ing] back control". Assertions of British identity as a sovereign, autonomous, "island nation" poised to embrace "Global Britain" here clashed with EU identity commitments to a continent pacified by ever increasing political and economic integration, towards which Brexit is simply bad timing.

**Conclusions**

The timing perspective sketched here does not reject existing FPDM approaches, but offers a different lens for understanding the foreign policymaking process, with greater attention to the subjective experience of time, its social construction in decision-making, and its potential use as a policy resource. This does recast some prominent concepts, like the nature of crises, the use of analogies, and agent motivations. It also focuses our attention less on biased information processing under duress and more toward agents' active and passive constructions of temporal relations and attempts to manage different change processes. Our timing perspective also suggests some additional challenges and avenues of future research.

Analysing timing practices in FPDM will likely face similar empirical challenges found in the study of beliefs, traits, or information processing. However, timing theory offers a novel perspective on the linguistic underpinnings of temporality experienced by decision-makers and proffers a distinctive explanation for the concept of *time* itself. This opens the possibility of examining discursive practices around "time" as a promising empirical method for exposing subjectively experienced timing concerns.

Before it is explicitly conceptualized, the noun "time" emerges through ordinary language descriptions of practical timing activities (Elias 2007:38–39, Hom 2020:34-34). Representing and discussing such efforts can get very complex very quickly, given the huge variety or actors and processes potentially involved. Here the figural tendencies of human discourse help represent timing "in terms of reifying substantives" – the noun, "time", with attributes – rather than dynamic relations (Elias 2007:43; Hom 2018a:71). But precisely because it transmits simplified timing information readily and quickly, this figural and symbolic language also naturalizes timing's "instrumental character" and processual-relational aspects (Elias 2007:36, 85). Objectifying times and temporalities as freestanding objects of discourse without historical sensitivity thus makes it easier to imagine and elevate time as an objective

existential feature (Elias 2007:61). The way out of this *cul-de-sac* is *down*: timing theory treats *all* time utterances as *timing indexicals* – symbols that derive their content from the features of underlying timing modes, their challenges, and their capabilities. If timing causes us to speak of "time" or "temporality", then whenever we encounter such references we should look for underlying timing efforts. On this view, references to time as pressurizing, destabilizing, or otherwise problematic suggest actors grappling with important timing challenges, while references to time as homogeneous, orderly, or manageable signify the on-going and increasingly passive success of some timing regime. Rooted in both a subjectivist conception of human agency and a social constructivist account of temporalities, timing theory suggests timing indexicals as a tool for further empirical inquiry.

Timing also raises new possibilities for research focusing on information processing and individual leader traits, each with long traditions in FPDM research. Existing LTA traits, for example, might be connected to individual differences in timing behaviours. One LTA trait focuses on whether leaders are "task-orientated" or "interpersonally-oriented", with implications for how they manage information and advisors (Hermann and Preston 1994). Timing focuses our attention on how this trait may be connected to different timing practices in decision-making. Task-oriented leaders, who focus on problem solving, working to deadlines, and achieving goals may attempt to time decision-making more to unfolding events, yoking decision-making processes to their ability to manage situational changes. Leaders with an interpersonal orientation, in contrast, focus on maintaining relationships among decision-makers, teamwork, and communications. They may establish different timing standards for decision-making based on how others are being heard, holding up, and getting on. For another example, integrative complexity research uses content analysis of leader speeches to assess the degree of differentiation and integration in cognitive processing related to crises. Timing theory suggests active timing or re-timing is a response by leaders facing crises arising from some slippage in an existing timing standard. As (re-)timing involves recognising and purposefully integrating disparate change processes under a common standard, we might expect increases in integrative complexity when a new timing standard is being created or implemented. This is the opposite of decreased integrative complexity usually associated with stress from "time pressure", and could potentially help to account for observed variations in integrative complexity and crisis outcomes (Sudfeld and Tetlock 1977).

More broadly, timing pushes us to critically reflect on our concurrent intellectual commitments to both subjectivity and empirical rigor. Recognising that we must understand the decision-makers' "definition of the situation" in order to account for crucial variations in behaviour, we have often continued to embrace more objectivist modes of empiricism. Our timing perspective recommends explicit reflection about the ontological bases of sequential or stages-based analyses of decision-making, which depend both on the idea of "occasions for decision" as well as time studies' arguments about the "ripe" moments for action (Hutchings 2008:83) and the nebulous but persistent "flow" of lived time. Although FPDM studies do not always rely strictly on clock and calendar time, they often slice the general and open-ended flow of time into discrete parcels more amenable to analysis. This may result in subtle forms of conceptual violence that close down multiple perspectives and emergent experiences, sacrificing lived aspects of subjectivity and agency for analytic precision. Disclosing and scrutinizing our assumptions about the objective reality of time highlights a disciplinary-reflexive element to how FPDM scholars develop knowledge. As McIntosh (2015:492) argues, the ways in which time helps construct events as such suggests that scholars need to disclose and reflect upon the "temporal scope" of explanatory and predictive claims because our silent temporal assumptions impact *what* we think we are analysing in the first place – that is, FPDM scholars construct events as such prior to thinking about how they might interpret them.

A more explicit consideration of timing and time within FPDM also offers the possibility of bridging to International Relations Theory, something that FP scholars seek with some frequency (e.g. Boekle et al 2001; Houghton 2007; Thies and Breunning 2012). Much like FPA more generally, IR time studies challenge predominant theoretical perspectives in IR and have generated novel conceptions of agents and their practices. There is thus no time like the present to bring these approaches together in earnest in order to add a vital but previously overlooked dimension to our understanding of foreign policy decision-making agents and processes.

## References

Agathangelou, Anna M., and Kyle D. Killian, eds. *Time, temporality and violence in international relations:(De) fatalizing the present, forging radical alternatives*. Routledge, 2016.

Aquilar, Francesco, and Mauro Galluccio. 2007. *Psychological Processes in International Negotiations: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives*. Springer Science and Business Media.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The evolution of cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Barnett, Michael. 1999. "Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo." *European Journal of International Relations*, *5*(1):5-36.

Beasley, Ryan K. 2016. "Dissonance and Decision-Making Mistakes in the Age of Risk." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(5):771-787.

Boekle, Henning, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner. 2001. "Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory." In *German Foreign Policy Since Unification* edited by Volker Rittberger, 105. Manchester University Press.

Brändström, Annika, Fredrik Bynander, and Paul 't Hart. 2004. "Governing by looking back: Historical analogies and crisis management." *Public Administration*, *82*(1):191-210.

Brummer, Klaus and Kai Oppermann. 2019. "Poliheuristic Theory and Germany's (Non-) Participation in Multinational Military Interventions. The Non-compensatory Principle, Coalition Politics and Political Survival." *German Politics*:1-16.

Carnevale, Peter J.D. and Edward J. Lawler. 1986. "Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements in bilateral negotiations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *30*(4):636-659.

Carr, David. 1986. *Time, Narrative, and History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Clark, Christopher. 2019. *Time and Power*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Dyson, Stephen. B. and Thomas Preston. 2006. "Individual characteristics of political leaders and the use of analogy in foreign policy decision making." *Political Psychology*, *27*(2):265-288.

Elias, Norbert. 2007. *An Essay on Time*. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.

Edelstein, D. M. (2017). *Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

Fioretos, Orfeo. 2011. "Historical Institutionalism and International Relations" *International Organization* 65:367-99.

Financial Times. 2019 "Why the EU is Divided over Britain's Brexit Date." https://www.ft.com/content/e3ec2496-5b92-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a (Accessed April 25, 2019)

Folkers, A. 2019. "Freezing time, preparing for the future: The stockpile as a temporal matter of security." *Security Dialogue*, 50(6):493-511.

Guardian. 2019a "Boris Johnson: I'd rather be dead in ditch than agree Brexit extension." September 5, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/05/boris-johnson-rather-be-dead-in-ditch-than-agree-brexit-extension (Accessed 15 November 2019)

______. 2019b. "Macron's gilets jaunes speech is pivotal after Notre Dame disaster." April 17, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/17/macrons-gilets-jaunes-speech-is-pivotal-after-notre-dame-disaster (Accessed May 31, 2019).

______. 2019c. "Brexit: Theresa May's hopes dashed as EU targets delay of up to a year." https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/apr/09/conditions-for-short-brexit-delay-have-not-been-met-says-berlin (Accessed May 31, 2019).

Haney, Patrick J. 2002. *Organizing for foreign policy crises: Presidents, advisers, and the management of decision making*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hanrieder, Tine. 2015. *International organization in time: fragmentation and reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hanrieder, Tine and Michael Zürn. 2017. "Reactive sequences in global health governance." *International politics and institutions in time*, 93-116.
't Hart, Paul. 1990. *Groupthink in government: A study of small groups and policy failure*. Swets and Zeitlinger Publishers.
't Hart, Paul.T., Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., 1997. *Beyond groupthink: Political group dynamics and foreign policy-making*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Helleiner, Eric. 2011. "Understanding the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (1):67–87.
Hermann, Charles F. 1963. "Some consequences of crisis which limit the viability of organizations." *Administrative science quarterly*, 61-82.
Hermann, Charles F. and Margaret G. 1967. "An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I." *American Political Science Review*, *61*(2):400-416.
Hermann, Margaret G. 2001. "How decision units shape foreign policy: A theoretical framework." *International Studies Review*, *3*(2):47-81.
______. 2003. "Assessing leadership style: trait analysis." In J. M. Post (Ed.), *The psychological assessment of political leaders,* edited by Jerrold M. Post. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hermann, Margaret G., and Thomas Preston. 1994. "Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements." *Political Psychology 15*(1):75.
Hesford, Victoria, and Lisa Diedrich, eds. 2010. *Feminist Time Against Nation Time: Gender, Politics, and the Nation-State in an Age of Permanent War*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Hom, Andrew R. 2018a. "Timing Is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (1):69–79.
______. 2018b. "Silent Order: The Temporal Turn in Critical International Relations." *Millennium* 46 (3): 303–30.
______. 2020. *International Relations and the Problem of Time.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hom, Andrew R. and Ryan K. Beasley. Forthcoming. "Constructing Time in Foreign Policymaking: Brexit's Timing Entrepreneurs, Malcontemps, and Apparatchiks." *International Affairs.*
Houghton, David. 2007. "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *3*(1):24-45.
______ 1996. "The role of analogical reasoning in novel foreign-policy situations. *British Journal of Political Science*, *26*(4):523-552.
Hutchings, Kimberly. 2008. *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present*. Manchester University Press.
Janis, Irving L. 1972. *Victims of Groupthink.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaarbo, Juliet and Dan Kenealy 2017. "Precedents, parliaments, and foreign policy: historical analogy in the House of Commons vote on Syria." *West European Politics*, *40*(1):62-79.

Katzenstein, Peter, and Lucia A. Seybert, eds. 2018. *Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khong, Yuen F. 1992. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton University Press.

Krebs, Ronald R. and Aaron Rapport. 2012. "International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons." *International Studies Quarterly*, *56*(3):530-543.

Kuperman, Ranan D. 2006. "A dynamic framework for analyzing foreign policy decision making." *International Studies Review*, *8*(3):537-544.

Larson, Debra W. 1985. *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*. Princeton University Press.

Lundborg, Tom. 2011. *Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Lupovici, Amir. 2012. "Ontological dissonance, clashing identities, and Israel's unilateral steps towards the Palestinians." *Review of international studies*, *38*(4):809-833.

Lynch, Philip, Ridhard Whitaker, and Adam Cygan. 2019. "Brexit and the UK Parliament: challenges and opportunities." In *Brexit and Democracy*, 51-79. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

McIntosh, Christopher. 2015. "Theory across Time: The Privileging of Time-Less Theory in International Relations." *International Theory* 7 (3):464–500.

Mintz, Alex. 2004. "How do leaders make decisions? A poliheuristic perspective." *Journal of conflict resolution*, *48*(1):3-13.

Mintz, Sidney W., and Christine M. Du Bois. 2002. "The anthropology of food and eating." *Annual review of anthropology*, *31*(1):99-119.

Mombauer, A. 2018. "July Crisis 1914 | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)." 2018. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/july_crisis_1914.

Nabers, Dirk. 2017. "Crisis as Dislocation in Global Politics." *Politics*, 37(4):418-431.

Neck, Christopher P. and Gregory Moorhead. 1995. "Groupthink Remodeled: The Importance of Leadership, Time Pressure, and Methodical Decision-Making Procedures." *Human Relations*, *48*(5):537-557.

Neustadt, Richard E. and Earnst R. May.1986. *Thinking in time: The uses of history in policy making*. Free Press.

New York Times. 2011. "Samoa Sacrifices a Day for Its Future." December 29, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/asia/samoa-to-skip-friday-and-switch-time-zones.html (Accessed February 26, 2019).

Ozkececi-Taner, Binnur. 2006. "Reviewing the literature on sequential/dynamic foreign policy decision making." *International Studies Review*, *8*(3):545-554.

Politico. 2019. "EU will offer Brexit extension – but not until next week." October 26, 2019 . https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-will-offer-brexit-extension-but-not-until-next-week/ (Accessed November 17, 2019).

Record, Jeffrey. 2007 "The Use and Abuse of History: Munich, Vietnam and Iraq." *Survival*, 49(1):163-180.

Schafer, Mark., and Stephen Walker (Eds.). 2006. *Beliefs and leadership in world politics: Methods and applications of operational code analysis*. Springer.

Schafer, Mark and Scott Crichlow (2010) *Groupthink vs. High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations*. Columbia University Press.

Simon, Eszter and Agnes Simon. 2017. "The Soviet use of the Moscow–Washington Hotline in the Six-Day War." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 15(3):284-305.

Snyder, Richard C., Henry. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 1962. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Solomon, Ty. 2014. "Time and subjectivity in world politics." *International Studies Quarterly*, *58*(4):671-681.

Steele, Brent J. 2008. *Ontological security in international relations: self-identity and the IR state*. Routledge.

Stern, Eric K. 2003. "Crisis studies and foreign policy analysis: Insights, synergies, and challenges." *International Studies Review*, *5*(2):155-202.

______. 1997. "Probing the plausibility of newgroup syndrome: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs." In *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*.

Stern, Eric K. and Bengt Sundelius. 1997. "Understanding small group decisions in foreign policy: Process diagnosis." In *Beyond groupthink: Political group dynamics and foreign policy-making*.

Stevens, Tim. 2016. *Cyber Security and the Politics of Time*. Cambridge University Press.

______. 2016. "Governing the time of the world." In *Time, Temporality, and Global Politics* edited by Andrew R. Hom, Christopher McIntosh, Alasdair Mckay, and Liam Stockdale. Bristol: e-IR Press:59-72.

Streich, Philip and Jack S. Levy. 2007. "Time horizons, discounting, and intertemporal choice." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *51*(2):199-226.

Subotić, Jelena. 2016. "Narrative, ontological security, and foreign policy change." *Foreign policy analysis* 12(4):610-627.

Suedfeld, Peter and Phil Tetlock. 1977. "Integrative complexity of communications in international crises." *Journal of conflict resolution*, *21*(1):169-184.

Thies, Cameron G. and Merijke Breuning. 2012. "Integrating foreign policy analysis and international relations through role theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8(1):1-4.

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2006. "Issue indivisibility and time horizons as rationalist explanations for war." *Security Studies*, *15*(1):34-69.

Trope, Yaacov, and Nira Liberman. 2010. "Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance." *Psychological Review* 117 (2):440–463.

Walker, Nigel. "Brexit Timeline: events leading to the UK's exit from the European Union." Briefing paper no. 7960, 30 October, 2019. House of Commons Library.

Winter, David G. 2005. "Things I've Learned About Personality From Studying Political Leaders at a Distance." *Journal of Personality*, *73*(3):557–584.

Zartman, I. William. 2001. "The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, *1*(1):8-18.




**Figure 1: Activity and Subjectivity of Timing**