A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ALBANIA AND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

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A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ALBANIA AND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

Degree for a Doctor of Philosophy

Gazmen Xhudo

20 March 1995
This study demonstrates that, in the post Cold War era, US leadership becomes more crucial than ever. Through the adoption of a classical approach; a thorough case study of diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Albania coupled with America's response to the crisis in Bosnia, highlights the weakness of US policy in the former and its outright failure in the case of the latter. Historical analysis demonstrates that recent violent nationalism in the Balkans did not suddenly erupt into violence. Instead, it remains dormant until such time that power vacuums, the result of power politics, are created. Indeed, the work seeks to show the history of Western, especially US, policy failure and short-sightedness in the region and how past trends have invoked present failures and crises which have yet to be remedied. The examination of US relations with Albania, shows that much more is required in America's efforts to ensure that democracy succeeds in Albania, and that a deeper analysis demonstrates the need for greater mutual understanding between the US and Albania. The Bosnian crisis is an example of American and Western failure which should not be repeated elsewhere in the region. By reviewing the tenets of American foreign policy, the study seeks to shed light upon the theories which have dominated current debate. The aim of such a review is to examine the trend, or trends, which have surfaced from the foreign policy debate and, specifically, whether or not these indicate the direction American foreign policy towards the region should be taking in the post-Cold War era.
DECLARATIONS

I, Gazmen Xhudo, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date 21/3/95    signature of candidate

I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No.12 in October 1992 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in October 1992; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1992 and 1995.

date 21/3/95    signature of candidate

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

date 21. 11.    signature of supervisor
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Hostile to any foreign overlord, the Albanians developed their defense technique by forming half-wild bands in the least accessible parts of their country. Brigandage became an honorable profession, glorified in legends, ballads, and folklore. The rifle became the Albanian's most reliable friend.¹

It is more than a happy accident that the most grimly memorable wisecrack of the war in 1991 was made by Bosnia-Hercegovina's President Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim. Having to choose Presidents Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia, he remarked, is like having to decide between leukaemia and a brain tumour.²

A leadership role, once undertaken and firmly established, is difficult, if not impossible, to forsake. Indeed leadership, by its very nature, entails more than simply responsibility. It imposes a duty of care which invokes a willingness to act when decisive leadership becomes necessary. Such is the case of the United States and its position in the post Cold War era. Its resources; military, economic, past experience, and political influence, all signify that no other nation today is more ideally suited to assume such a task. And, more importantly, America's interests and her cultural links with Europe indicate that this should remain an area where US leadership is needed. And yet, as the crisis in the Balkans has demonstrated, America appears to have done the inadvisable. It has forsaken that which it did so much to build, its leadership responsibility.³

This failure, by the US, and to a large degree by her European allies, is not solely concentrated on her abortive efforts in Bosnia. What remains of that worn-torn republic, sadly, is no longer salvageable. State-building efforts in Bosnia are, most likely, no longer feasible. A write-off, however, is not the answer. What emerges from the rubble of the ex-Yugoslavia offers the US yet another chance to assume that which she has forsaken, her leadership role. The existence of some sort of quasi-Greater Serbia, once the conflict ends signals danger that the US should not disregard.

It is here that Albania represents the focus of this study. Containing potential regional hegemons requires a proactive approach on America's part. Democracy-building means more than the distribution of foreign aid and credit. It requires that which is most tenuous and unnerving for the region, security threats, be dealt with in a manner which allows for democracy and market capitalism to thrive and prosper. This means that, from the United States, diplomacy is necessary. Diplomacy, rather than

³ This point explained more fully in, Gus Xhudo, "Bosnia Offers Kick-off for New American Goals" The Scotsman 5 January, 1995 p.11.
crisis management, or lack thereof, would represent a concerted and determined effort on the part of America to see to it that the Balkans, part of Europe, and therefore of strategic interest to the US, should not be forsaken. To do so, would be worse than simply condemning nations such as Albania to; engrained security fears, deteriorating regional relations, possible future conflict, and creating an environment which would allow for streaks of authoritarianism. All these remain possibilities without the security guarantees that only the US could provide. A worse scenario for failure could be the creation of disgruntled refugees which aim for revenge against the West.  

This is not aimed at invoking a 'shock value' effect. It instead seeks to demonstrate that the need for US leadership remains greater than ever in today's world. The Clinton administration has recently understood that the possibility of deteriorating regional relations remains high and has dispatched its diplomatic corps to Greece and Albania in an attempt to ease relations between the former and the latter. Continuing polemics between; Greece and Albania, Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Turkey, Serbia and Albania, Macedonia and Greece etc., only highlight the inadequacy of policy formulation. The Balkans is an area without a homogeneous state. The rights of minorities, and the guarantee that they will not resort to violence in the promotion of their cause or plight, requires more than the facade of democracy. It requires, internally, the institutionalisation of democracy, something achieved only through time and trial and error. Externally, it obligates those nations which have an interest to see to it that time, without the hindrance of security threats, both internal and external, is provided to the democratising nations. Albania represents one of these nations while the United States represents the guarantor. This is not to imply that the latter assume a 'policeman of the world' role. It cannot. It does signify, however, that the US should not forsake the leadership role it did so much to build over the past forty-plus years in Europe, particularly in a region which represents a potential threat to those interests. Albania is but one place to start.

When embarking upon this task, two thoughts immediately came to mind. First, simply was, 'Am I mad?' Friends, acquaintances, colleagues and others all gave a similar reply when I responded with, US-Albanian relations...; 'I didn’t know there were any.' 'Exactly', said I. The work seeks to contribute to the field by offering more than description. It aims to provide a framework which addresses, the need for....Second, a topic which includes a major crisis, still under way, normally comes under the dictionary

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4 This type of possibility already exists among the Bosnian Muslim extremists who, it appears, are developing strong ties with Middle East terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. Their purpose, while not fully developed, will likely involve exacting revenge against those the extremists feel are responsible for their suffering, the West. This possibility and the existence of these links has been explored fully in; Dr. Magnus Ranstorp and Gus Xhudo, "A Threat to Europe? Middle East Ties with the Balkans and the Possibility for Terrorist Activity Throughout the Region", *Terrorism and Political Violence* vol. 6 #2 (Summer, 1994)
heading, 'ten-foot pole.' It becomes easy to fall victim to current events. Again, it is hoped that the theme of the work is what shines through. Current events are important and do matter, yet, one should not become a slave to them. The thorough examination of diplomatic efforts [with Albania], and the response to a crisis situation, [Bosnia], demonstrate more than the failure. Hopefully they provide a look into the need for a more concerted effort.

During the course of this work perhaps the most interesting aspect was the data collection from the sources themselves. Upon reflection I have considered myself fortunate that personal contacts have afforded me the opportunity to acquire first-hand knowledge that I have put to use in several side projects relative to my topic. Of course, friends, and to some extent, I also have expressed reservations about some of my antics during the past two-plus years vis-a-vis information gathering. However, my enthusiasm for the pursuit of knowledge, [or simply my stupidity. I am still debating which it is], has made the work exhilarating. I feel it is time to offer the reader a glimpse into some of these exploits, the sheer insanity of their pursuit, and the fruit they bore. First, newsbrief clippings do not, unfortunately, provide crucial facets of information such as motivation, intent and the like. This can only be acquired through direct contact. Upon a trip to a European capital, a 'friend of the family' who, beholden to family members offered their services to the author in direct contact, as it were, with parties who, shall I say, operate within the grey area of legality. A variety of reports from the Balkans tell tales of organised elements engaged in activities such as drugs and arms smuggling. More disturbing, however, were reports that some of these elements had links with counterparts in the Middle East. Relating this information to the family friend, the latter suggested I direct my inquiries to those parties involved in such activities. What happened next can only be described as life imitating art, specifically, any chapter from a Tom Clancy novel. Risking grievous bodily harm, I had the overwhelming feeling that none of my previous levels of education have prepared me for this. At a baser level, I felt like an idiot, and for the first time, actually missed the drab, overcast, and unspectacular view from Leuchars station. The meeting itself went off without a hitch, despite some difficulty with the participants as to the exact purpose of my inquiries. These men, whose profiles would offer Mario Puzo another trilogy of novels decided in the end that I was nothing more than an ambitious, if completely stupid, postgraduate student. My return to Scotland invoked two immediate responses from me. First, in a papal manner I, on my knees, blessed Leuchars station for its drabness. Second, and more importantly, the trip produced two publications of which I am proud.5

My trip to Albania also produced stimulating exploits. As a neorealist, I have expressed throughout this work that history teaches by example. Yet, like the proverbial moth drawn to the flame, I again found myself in interesting circumstances. Sitting at a roadside cafe with ex-government employees under the hot Balkan sun drinking raki, a potent spirit, or furniture varnish if you wish, conjured up images in me of those stories of pre-World War I Balkan intrigue I had read as a child. These ex-employees; with their rolled up cigarettes, hawk-stares, and slight leans forward when imparting information, have personalities which would have made Freud delight. Nonetheless, I listened with interest and replied, in kind, with a deliberate vagueness. They, somehow aware of my every move, seemed keen on my visit and went out of their way to assist me. As I travelled throughout the country I became aware of various police checkpoints set up for the dual purpose of keeping these men employed and to perhaps discourage criminal elements. My interest during one particular period was to acquire information regarding such criminal activity, as well as other relevant information. I related this desire to my relatives who, as they happen to know both current and former government employees replied that they would gladly help and accompany me. Interesting thing about travel in the Balkans; clear demarcations as to where one country ends and another begins are not present. Perhaps that is why so many territorial disputes arise since border checkpoints do not vary from ordinary internal checkpoints. In any case, my meetings proved fruitful. These are but two examples of the path my work has occasionally taken me to. I strongly believe that, while perhaps against the better judgement of my friends and supervisor, only such experiences can provide the work with a certain uniqueness unattainable through conventional methods of research gathering. When asked by one of my close friends; 'what have these experiences taught you?', I replied; 'Four things; one, common sense. Two, always carry dollars or deutschemarks east of Vienna. Three, don't forget to bring clean socks and four, make sure your life insurance policy is paid up and your beneficiary is clearly stated.'

The completion of this work would not have been possible without acknowledging those which have made the task so worthwhile. First, and foremost, I would like to extend my deepest thanks to Professor Paul Wilkinson. His constant encouragement, pointed insight and offering me the opportunity to pursue this degree when things looked bleak have turned my life around. For that I am continuously in his debt. To the 'guys in the department'; John, Mike, Guy, Gabe etc. for the levity offered when the scope of the work, which they too are suffering through, becomes unbearable. As for the department itself, a special thanks to Mrs. Gina Wilson for putting up with my continued mental deterioration and having to listen to the 'weirdest' conversations in Albanian over the past two-plus years. Also a special thanks to Myles Robertson for both his friendship and presence when I needed someone to bounce ideas off of. To Dr. Bruce Hoffmann, my sincere thanks. Although I have not known him long, he has
offered me friendship and positive encouragement. As for Dr. Magnus Ranstorp\(^6\), what can I say? He has been, and remains my friend, confidant, settler of nerves, and a man I feel privileged to work with. He has, and always will have, my utmost respect. And, after all, that is what it's all about. To Dr. Peter Hirst and his 'vintage' PhD. While '95 may not be a good year, I do not think he will complain much in twenty year's time when it will make one hell of a bottle of port. He has put of with me at my worst, and remarkably remains my 'paisan'. My respect, and admiration are the least his deserves.\(^7\)

To Katherine Edward, my friend. I can think of no one I would rather spend an afternoon with listening to Frank Sinatra. To my academic daughters Thallein and Rowan, thanks for the coffee breaks! To Paul and Jackie Schaeder; Paul for keeping me humble and offering me enough Republican inundations to make even me ill, and to Jackie, for helping me enjoy myself and in assisting Paul to lighten up. To my nearest friend Lou Pesenti, I offer my humblest thanks for your support, encouragement and friendship. When I was younger, I asked my mother for a brother. Now I know that I have one. Special mention of course to Lou's lovely and patient wife Grace, their beautiful children and Lou's brother and my friend, the incomparable Johnny the Boy!

Among my friends I wish to thank last is my dearest friend, Wendy Lazarus. I ask that she remember November, 1990 when we both looked at each other with complete and utter confusion and pain in reply to the question; 'what are the two of going to do with your lives?' I have known her for nearly six years and am still, to this day, amazed that she remains my friend and has not yet plunged a scimitar into my back.\(^8\) For this, she has my respect, unconditional loyalty and devotion. For her there are enough words to fill another thesis. Suffice it to say; 'My best wishes for the task upon which you have chosen! Thank for always being there... goodygoody'.\(^9\)

I would also like to express my deepest thanks for the family of Mr. Emin Murati and his two sons, Selim and Lulzimi. As to the former, he was my chaperon while I on my extended stay in Albania. He offered me his home and hospitality and kept me out of harm's way in the wilds of Albania. The latter has with his wife, my aunt Leti, given me constant encouragement in my studies. Finally I would like to express my thanks to my immediate family. To my sister Servete for the endless barrage of paperwork she has

\(^6\) I insert the prefix 'Dr.' because only now, do I realise the work, the pain and the joy of completing this thesis, and the respect it will always invoke from me. More importantly, I am acquainted with Magnus well enough to know that only he would appreciate a footnote at this point of the acknowledgements.

\(^7\) Not to mention a case of Sheridans; hand delivered to London, of course!

\(^8\) A quick note. I use scimitar rather than dagger for two reasons. First, a scimitar, unlike a dagger, is curved with a jagged edge and therefore would, I'm told by a friend who is a medical practitioner, cause much more pain. Second a scimitar or handzar, as it is referred to by its Turkish name relates to both the region given its name in Bosnia-Hercegovina and was an instrument widely carried by Albanians during the days of Ottoman occupation. In keeping with the spirit of the thesis, I felt that scimitar was more appropriate.

\(^9\) P.S. "Whose better than you?"
taken care of allowing me time to focus. Also, a special thanks for providing me with the that little shejtan and viq you call son and I call nephew. Lastly, to my mother and father. For my mother; for supporting me and urging me to go ever forward, for being there in times of darkness, for your belief in me, allow me to express my love for you. To my father, affectionately known by my friends as ‘Big X’; ‘Thank you Bab for getting up at 7AM every Saturday when you wanted to sleep in, for working upwards of fourteen hours on your feet when you had a flu and fever, for enduring the endless rhetoric of siblings inquiring as to why and what is your son doing?, for fulfilling my material needs while at St. Andrews despite your own obligations, for basically being my father.’ To both my parents, a thanks which transcends love. No son could have been so fortunate! I can never repay you for all you have done. I hope this helps?!
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INTRODUCTION

World events since 1989 increase the significance of the above statement. From the end of World War II the United States and her allies engaged the Soviet Union and her surrogates in what was to be emphatically labelled a 'Cold War'. This war, which, although not directly involving the two powers at large, did initiate an 'intense military competition and erupted into hot wars in Korea and Vietnam, as well as dozens of smaller engagements from the Bay of Pigs to Afghanistan'. To the US, its historic isolationist tendencies were cast aside to prevent the Soviets from extending their influence and form of government across the globe. The war, though it may not have directly involved, immediate threats to American interests became a war rooted in one form of ideology over another. To preserve principles of freedom and democracy from falling prey to repressive totalitarianism, the expenditure of resources and very cause of countering the Soviets itself became a justifiable necessity of the Cold War. When circumstances brought the world to the brink of nuclear destruction, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, not even its eventual avoidance resulted in calls for an abandoning of America's leadership role during the Cold War.

Today, nearly five decades after President Harry Truman addressed a joint session of Congress asking that the US send aid to Greece and Turkey to allay possible communist take-over in those two countries, the Cold War is over. Yet, after all the sacrifice in human lives and resources, the end of the Cold War and break-up of the Soviet Union has not produced the expected euphoria following victory. Indeed, as Richard Nixon so aptly states, 'the end of the Cold War produced only a sense of exhaustion and anticlimax'. A simple question of 'why' produces a myriad of answers often more confusing in their complexity than in their clarity. Yet perhaps the answer lies in the state of world events itself, particularly following the break-up of the USSR in December, 1991. Those that had hoped for a world of co-operative, peace-loving states to now take centre stage and for non-violent measures to resolve disputes through the United Nations were as wrong today as, sadly, they were at the time of the UN's inception. A

3 These 'Neo-Wilsonians' want equilibrium between national self-sufficiency and global institutions. Even during the period after W.W.II, they were criticised for their assumptions. ' The most serious fault of past US policy formulation lies in reliance upon legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems and the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of
host of messy, and especially bloody conflicts across the globe gave notice that the end of the Cold War has not meant the end of war. Others that may have believed that the US should command presence by reasserting itself and its mission to preserve peace and democracy were drowned out and, more importantly, drubbed out in the 1992 elections by those which felt the time had come for America to cure its domestic ills and abandon its over assertive world leadership role. Both sides, unfortunately, still appear to be wrestling over what America's role should be.

1.1 Objectives

In the wake of the end of the Cold War the once communist states of Eastern Europe now find themselves struggling to democratise and revamp their societies after decades of repressive counter-productive regimes which drained their land and people. The fate of these nations has become inextricably intertwined with America's new role and its place in the world today and for the foreseeable future. It is this which brings us to the purpose of this study. In an examination of US-Albanian relations one will witness two states that could not be further apart, in historical experiences, culture, political beliefs, economic systems...etc. From the period immediately following the Second World War the United States became engaged in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and her allies. For Albania, a brief stop within the Soviet camp preceded decades of isolation from the outside world and instilled within Albanian society a 'siege mentality' and inherent distrust for the outside world given Albania's historical experiences.

With the end of the Cold War the nations throughout Eastern and South-eastern Europe now find themselves attempting large scale reform of both their economies and political systems. With reform has come aid from the West, particularly from the United States as it seeks the transformation of these former communist societies into, eventually, fully-functioning democracies. Aid into the area, however, represents more than simply a desire by the US to see that these states achieve their objectives. The attempted transformation of these societies and their relations with the United States will test the capacity of the US to transform its international role to adapt to the needs of the twenty-first century. Relations with the democratising nations of Eastern Europe represent a new chapter to the Atlantic Alliance. The expansion of democracy eastward signals an entirely different stage in American foreign policy; specifically, that Europe, divided for nearly five decades, is now attempting to establish itself as a continent dominated

by democratic societies fully integrated with the West. For the US, failure to adopt a coherent strategy which addresses the problems and security concerns of the region may do more than doom efforts at reform; failure may result in heightened regional tensions, protracted low intensity conflict, and terrorism, and a reversion to authoritarian systems. Such a possibility should not be easily disregarded. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is a tragic demonstration of how things can go horribly wrong. In its efforts to adopt a new post Cold War strategy the US may want to consider that how it handles regional relations of a bilateral nature which in turn may affect its efforts to formulate new policy.

Grand strategy often means a general idea rather than specific measures, yet it is the nature of bilateral relations which offer the specifics of policy and contribute as the building-blocks of a greater vision. For the United States, how it handles its bilateral relations with the newly democratising nations of Europe, such as Albania, will explain more than whether or not the US is on the right track. Such relations will aid in the formulation of coherent strategy in times of uncertainty. The end of the Cold War has unfortunately not removed threats to national security. Problems ranging from regional warfare, and terrorism, to nuclear proliferation and conventional arms buildups, continue to pose threats to US interests across the globe. The Clinton administration came to power on a platform aimed at curing the domestic problems of America. However, the host of foreign policy crises which have plagued the Clinton team have served notice that foreign policy can be neither abandoned nor placed upon the back-burner of US concern. Clinton and his staff, ironically enough, have repeatedly expressed their belief that today's world has become increasingly interdependent and appear to adhere, as Neo-Wilsonians do, to visions of 'collectiveness' and 'multilateralism'. However, in what appears as a contradiction, they fail to stress the importance of 'linkage' from foreign policy to domestic and vice-versa. The United States is not a nation which can simply

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4 This point was reiterated by US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher at the NATO Foreign Minister's Meeting of 9 June, 1994 in Istanbul; 'The United States is committed to greater integration among European democracies, East and West. We are determined to extend to the East the benefits-and obligations- of the same liberal trading and security order that have been pillars of strength for the West. That is the best way to secure the gains of democracy in the East.', in, Foreign Policy Bulletin vol. 5 #1 (July/August, 1994): p.48.

5 This position was expressed even during the Cold War by Kaplan; '...policy not adjusted to regional circumstances may and likely will be counter-productive, however, policy that is adjusted to regional circumstances without consideration of and careful attention to, the impact of that policy on other regions and on the general framework of global policy is at best unwise, at worst potentially catastrophic.' See, Morton A. Kaplan, (ed.) Global Policy: Challenge of the 80s (Washington DC: Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984): p.10.


isolate itself from international events. Its place upon the world stage is secure given its power, resources, military and its influence. Voluntary isolation is not an option. Power entails responsibility and more so in the case of the US. As Henry Kissinger put it; 'A nation assumes responsibility not only because it has resources but because it has a certain view of its own destiny. ' While there are many critics who question the variety of missions relative to US foreign policy, its mission relative to scope cannot be anything but global in nature. America's role in world affairs during the twentieth century and especially following World War II ensured its destiny as a nation which must commit itself to an international role. This is the reality that the Clinton administration has had to try to come to terms with.

Whatever our intentions or policies, the fact that the United States disposes of the greatest single aggregate of material power is inescapable. A new international order is inconceivable without a significant American contribution.  

The emphasis upon domestic policy is not improper, yet it is vital to understand and recognise the interdependency between domestic and foreign policy and be willing to act upon it. Failure to understand the links and importance foreign policy plays on domestic policy will almost certainly lead to a negation of success in the field of the latter by blunders and inept handling of crises in the arena of the former as Bosnia demonstrates. 'Clinton's real choice is not between foreign and domestic agenda. If he cannot do both, he will fail in both. His administration must respond to the existing vacuum or doom the US to increasing irrelevance and the world to growing instability.

In its relations with Europe, the United States built upon principles of commonality to promote the advancement of democracy and market capitalism following World War II. The bedrock of this foundation became a Western alliance which confronted, the former Soviet Union both directly and indirectly, over a period of nearly fifty years. Today, as the Clinton team oversees the dismantling of the Berlin Brigade and of a large scale disengagement in Europe it appears to fail to comprehend that; 'it is reversing the entire trend of one of the most creative periods of American diplomacy.' The simultaneous voicing of policy requires linkage and depends upon intensity of the issues in the foreign policy arena.

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9 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.: p.57.; These beliefs were reiterated by Dr. Kissinger recently when he stated that despite a scaling back of the military by the present Clinton administration, only the US maintains the ability to engage itself militarily in several areas across the globe simultaneously. Statements made by Dr. Kissinger at the "Republican National Committee Forum on American Foreign Policy", (Washington DC: 27 July, 1994): broadcast by C-Span-2.


11 Kissinger (June, 1994), op.cit.: p.8.
principles such as enlargement within Eastern Europe, moreover, appear outright contradictory as the US scales back in both resources and presence in Western Europe. It is these principles, however, which bring us back to the purpose of this study.

In its relations with the East, US-Albanian relations represent a microcosm of US foreign policy. The success or failure of bilateral relations between the US and Albania will not likely affect vital US interests. However, measurement of success or failure should not examined by conventional methods. Moreover, it is believed that by an individual case study, a better understanding of US foreign policymaker’s challenges and options in relations with Southeast Europe will be achieved. For the US, success in relations with Albania would provide a healthy and stable democracy and likely preclude the possibility of another Yugoslavia type situation in the near future. Success may also serve as the basis necessary in the formulation of new purpose within American foreign policy in the Balkans. For Albania, a directed and less haphazard foreign policy oriented towards the US and the West would ensure its eventual transformation into a fully functioning market economy and democratic society. Such success with its bilateral relations with the United States would likely remove it from the chaotic state of backwardness and endemic violence historically associated with the Balkans.

In a brief look at the underlying foundations of both the US and Albania's foreign policy from the end of World War II up until the end of the Cold War, one can witness a certain level of consistency. The end of the Cold War and the arrival of democracy has destroyed this consistency for both states. And so, the state of flux that exists for both nations as each seeks to define a role for foreign policy carries over and becomes an integral part of their bilateral relations towards one another. This is why this study uses a three-pronged approach to examine US-Albanian relations and takes into account the US policy toward the Bosnian crisis. First, in examining the background to the Balkans by the US and Allied policy from

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12 This appeared to work during the Cold War as a 'systemic approach' demonstrated. As Haas has stated, 'Policy is incremental. It is made by moving from package deal to package deal without much thought for an overall scheme.' Such a scheme is required in policy formulation. See, Ernst B. Haas, The Web of Interdependence (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970): p.32., and some theorists believe that by individual case study, policymakers will avoid the pitfalls associated with systems analysis which tends to generalise areas and apply overreaching policy decisions to each state. Case study, it is believed, provides the 'building blocks' for credible theory and policy formulation. See George Andreopoulos, "Studying American Grand Strategy: Facets in the Exceptionalist Tradition", Diplomacy and Statecraft vol. 42 #7 (July, 1991): p.226.

13 Point was expressed in a country profile of Albania by Dr. Kees Zijlstra, "International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Assembly Draft Special Report", NATO (May, 1994): '....significant aid above current levels from international financial organisations as well as a stronger private donor commitment should be sought.....Albania appears to be on the verge of turning back the past and becoming a strategically important partner to Europe and the rest of the world. This opportunity should not be lost.' at p.13.
the period during and immediately following the Second World War, the study aims to demonstrate the status of relations with the area generally and Albania specifically. Historically, the region ranked low among the affairs of Europe's great powers, often part of their competing interests in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. The first prong of the study offers historical analysis in an effort to demonstrate that most often, present day complexities are grounded in the past. As Kissinger points out; 'The study of history offers no manual of instructions that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations'. The extent of US policy in the area prior to World War II was negligible at best. In deferring to the Europeans, and especially the British, the US stayed out of Balkan politics. By the eve of the Second World War the level of US interest in the region became apparent. 'Most of the Balkans came under the Division of European Affairs at the State Department.... The representatives in the field were well aware of the marginal interest of the US in their region'. With the outbreak of war, the US again deferred policy to the British given their historic role in the zone. The overriding concern of defeating the Axis despite the political consequences demonstrated the realist policy choices being made by the US even before the advent of the Cold War. The geostrategic importance of the region prompted US efforts after the war to see to it that Greece and Turkey remain within the Western orbit.

In offering a look into the policies that dominated the era the hope is that such historical analysis will clear up why these choices were made and their immediate consequences. More importantly, a historic glance provides for the opportunity to see how such policy choices affected the states of the region over the long term by specifically looking at the results in Albania. Again, the past does not offer mirror-type scenarios and answers. History teaches by example and analogy. Understanding present day difficulties requires analysis of the past, extracting those bits of importance and applying what is learned. This is accomplished three ways. First, an examination of the history of the region generally offers a look into the problems faced by previous powers in their efforts to formulate policy towards the area. While the main focus of the study remains Albania, a microscopic view limits the applicability of policy. Often, the history of the Balkans transcends the history of one individual state or people. The wide variety of ethnic groups throughout the region and the non-homogeneous status of most states results in an intertwining of

15 Peter B. Lane, *The United States and the Balkan Crisis of 1940-1941* (New York, New York: Garland Publishing, 1988): p.15., On how negligible such interest was; 'Economically, the US ranked well behind other continental European powers in trade with the Balkan nations. During the late thirties the overall value of trade between the Balkans and the US was only about one hundred million dollars', at pp. 12-13.
history. It is this which has all too often served as the base for conflict in the Balkans. This is why an examination of Albania must include periodic analysis of the region, especially with Albania’s immediate neighbours, Greece and the former Yugoslavia. The inextricable links which exist between these states are evident even today which is why they are also examined. Second, a look itself into the historic situation in Albania seeks to provide what exactly Western policy was towards Albania during the war. A look at the history of the nation from this period on hopes to provide the basis for which we can later examine the status of US-Albanian relations. Moreover, an examination of the rise of the Albanian state requires a brief, yet thorough review of nationalism. Given the recent trend, one in which ethno-nationalist aspirations and expressions are displaying themselves, especially in the Balkans, the study of Balkan and Albanian nationalism is necessary. Such a review will demonstrate whether or not the phenomenon of nationalism itself is destructive or constructive to the relationship between the US and the region generally and Albania specifically. The break-up and warfare in the former Yugoslavia underlies this premise and again shows the link between Albania and the region. It is not possible to simply remove Albania from events around it in the Balkans and study its relations with the US. Conversely, it is equally difficult to examine US policy towards Albania without scrutiny of US policy in the area, especially towards the ex-Yugoslavia. An overview of policy with regards to this crisis shows the state of US policy in the post Cold War era in the region and how it likely affects bilateral relations with Albania. Third, by looking at Albanian history, specifically its foreign policy after the war and up until 1989, the study seeks to demonstrate a pattern of consistency. Albania’s foreign policy during this period was always grounded in the notion of allying with those it felt would secure Albania’s integrity. The near destruction of the Albanian state on several occasions over the course of its history has instilled upon the Albanian psyche and political conscious an inherent distrust for outsiders. The relevance of this becomes clear when examining a case study in US-Albanian relations. Moreover, given its position in the Balkans and the always present potential for instability to arise, a review of Albanian foreign policy during the period may provide the background necessary to help assess options for US foreign policymakers in relations with Albania and with the Balkans generally.

The second prong of the study examines the present day status of Albania as it attempts reform following its long bout of self-imposed isolation from external

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16 Secretary of State Christopher made this point at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Istanbul; 'The war in Bosnia remains a grave threat to our goal of an integrated Europe. It threatens to draw other fragile democracies into a wider war. And violent nationalism undermines the security of all European nations.' Foreign Policy Bulletin (July/August, 1994): p.48.
influences. The collapse of communism and the subsequent outbreak of warfare in
the region have brought the Balkans from the margins of US interest to a more
prominent rank on the US foreign policy agenda. Adopting a series of bilateral
policies also means adopting a general policy for the entire region. To do so,
however, the US must understand the complexities of recent trends in the Balkans.
This is where the second prong of this study proposes to shed light upon such
developments. The status of reform and of present Albanian foreign policy,
especially in its regional relations, highlights the problems and security concerns of
Albania and the region as it attempts to fashion a coherent strategy in its foreign
policy. As the second prong demonstrates, Albania and the US are currently
suffering from the same problem, the inability to formulate a clear direction in their
respective foreign policies. The second branch of the study also, by examining
present developments, provides insight into the status of reform. The level of
success or failure will become apparent when compared to the third prong. A
study of US-Albanian relations could not be complete without a look into recent
developments. How else can the success of reform be measured? More
importantly, by looking at relations from the Albanian perspective, as well as, later,
the American viewpoint, the study hopes to highlight the concerns, interests, and
direction both parties appear to be taking.

The third prong of the study examines recent trends in American foreign policy
in the post Cold War era. Moreover, by highlighting both the successes and
failures of US policy and alternatives presented by various analysts, policymakers
and politicians over the past few years, it is hoped that some useful lessons can be
drawn. Again, attention is paid to US policy since the outbreak of the Yugoslav
crisis. The reasons for this are evident. United States relations with Albania have
been practically non-existent for over forty years. As the region democratises and
sheds its communist past, much of what will come in the future, be it success or
failure will be inevitably linked with how the US responds to crises in the region.
Albania's history has been one interwoven with that of the South Slavs, be they
Serbs or Croats. Whether they like it or not, they must accept that they are part of
Europe and, further, that Europe represents interests to the United States which
transcend the mere economic into the common bounds of 'culture and civilisation'.
This being the case, violence in the Balkans represents more than issues of
humanitarian concerns, it becomes a 'direct threat to Western interests'. At the
outset of the crisis, the Bush administration was wary over policy pronouncements

17 Nixon (1994), op.cit.; pp.84-87. Nixon aptly states the case; 'Even the agony in the former
Yugoslavia is covered as though it were an obscure disaster in a faraway place where we have only a
humanitarian interest. Yet Europe is just as important to the United States as ever...Its political
stability, its economic health, our access to its markets, are all vital American interests.' , at p.83.
which might return to haunt them with the presidential elections only seven months away. This perhaps was also the reason why the US was quick to defer to the Europeans in handling the crisis.\textsuperscript{18} However, the US was perhaps too quick to discount the problem in the former Yugoslavia and downgrade the importance its role played in the maintenance of European stability for nearly five decades. Despite its aversion to the terminology, America’s role in preserving a ‘balance of power’ in Europe rested firmly upon its commitment to institutions such as the Atlantic Alliance. Post-war American and European leaders were able to recognise that; ‘unless America was organically involved in Europe, it would be obliged to involve itself later under circumstances far less favourable to both sides of the Atlantic. That is even more true today.’\textsuperscript{19} Humanitarian concerns became part of the bedrock with which US foreign policy is imbued with morality. This does not mean that they should now become moot. However, neither does it imply that humanitarian concerns alone should guide policy decisions to act or not to act, especially in Europe. Convincing European allies of a continued US presence and interest on the continent involves an awareness by both sides that neither, alone, can sufficiently maintain the equilibrium required to achieve; peace and prosperity,\textsuperscript{20} access to new markets,\textsuperscript{21} avoidance of refugee spillover\textsuperscript{22} and deterrence to protracted low intensity conflict, perhaps through a new role for NATO.\textsuperscript{23} ‘America will need partners to preserve equilibrium in several regions of the world’\textsuperscript{24}, and the Balkans represents one of these regions. This also becomes the primary reason why a study into the relations between Albania and the United States, and particularly when examining US foreign policy, must also review US

\textsuperscript{19} Kissinger (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: pp.821-822.
\textsuperscript{20} ‘American leadership is indispensable. No other nation has our power or strategic position. Above all, we have the ability to rally others to a good cause...’ Nixon (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: p.92.
\textsuperscript{21} Former President Nixon believed that the key to the further integration of Europe meant a common economic and foreign policy which, with violence in the Balkans, has been ‘derailed’. Nixon (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: p.85.
\textsuperscript{22} ‘Europeans are deeply concerned about refugees from Eastern Europe and economic migration from North Africa. Both have triggered xenophobic reactions in Europe. Violence in the Balkans is a threat to Western interests.’ Nixon (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: p.87.
\textsuperscript{23} ‘Uncertainties in Central and Eastern Europe, war in the Balkans, and instability in Russia make NATO’s existence a source of comfort in Western Europe....The key is an expanded NATO rather than a weakened one, with a strong US presence and a new mission. For the United States, NATO is our principle link to Europe, and one we must not break.’ Nixon (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: p.86.
\textsuperscript{24} Kissinger (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: pp.810-811., Kissinger goes on to affirm the strong ties between the US and its European allies; ‘Disagreements with Europe have the grating character of family squabbles. Yet, on nearly every key issue, there has been far more co-operation from Europe than from any other area...In the post Cold War world, Europe may not be able to rally itself to a new Atlantic policy, but America owes it to itself not to abandon the policies of three generations in the hour of victory.’ at p.820.
policy to this particular crisis as an auxiliary consideration. The links are simply too strong to either disregard or brush aside with only a glance.

From the outset of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the US and the West Europeans foolishly believed that diplomacy alone could solve the problems of that multiethnic state. Bosnia has epitomised the Western failure and has shown that regional 'chaos' continues to be considered of minimal geopolitical importance. The examination of a brief history of Yugoslavia, with particular reference to Bosnia demonstrates that linkage does matter when areas which are not clearly delineated within one sphere of influence or the other, either the West's or Russia's, become the focal point of perhaps a new East-West divide, and more importantly, may accelerate the deterioration of relations between the US and its European allies. As some observers may have correctly pointed out, Bosnia should be remembered as a 'bipartisan, multinational failure of epic proportions.' The examination of it relative to US foreign policy indicates that where it has failed in Bosnia, US policy may be able to succeed elsewhere, such as in Albania, if it takes it upon itself to develop a coherent strategy to see to it that democracy does more than simply take hold. It must be nurtured and secured, free from regional conflagrations which threaten stability. Moreover, the study of Bosnia as an ancillary, yet fundamental, concern to US policy will show that despite its efforts through the Contact Group, failure by the US and Russia may perhaps be attributed to both sides spending valuable time competing for influence in Bosnia rather than in co-ordinating their efforts properly to achieve a settlement of hostilities.

The underlying premise throughout, however, is one which believes that a strong and dynamic policy by the US will secure both regional and American interests over the long term. The end of the Cold War seems to have brought a variety of cries calling for the abandonment of Cold War realpolitik. The men which practised ideas of power politics, stability and balance of power, it has been

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25 Chaos, as referred to here means; 'what you get when government breaks down... We [the West] still perceive most chaos as of limited geopolitical significance- we can live with it. We think it requires chiefly a humanitarian and multilateral response- two words by which we distance ourselves from direct responsibility' See, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Overstate the Chaos, Undermine the Help" The International Herald Tribune 26-27 November, 1994.

26 Jim Hoagland, "In Sum, Powerful Democracies Looked Evil in the Eye and Blinked" The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994; "the moral pettifogging that has enveloped the Western leadership can undermine NATO if it continues."


28 Some such as Michael Howard are clear in their rejection of such principles. In reviewing Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy, Howard states; 'We would not be wise to regard that limited slice of world history as a universally applicable norm and try to project its values onto the far more diverse yet interdependent world of tomorrow'. Howard, however, offers little in terms of alternatives which have any chance of succeeding as equally. See, M. Howard, "The World According to Henry", Foreign Affairs vol. 73 #3 (May/June, 1994): p.138.
argued, are now as outdated and inapplicable as the concepts they upheld for five decades. The realist tradition ingrained upon the US foreign policy establishment is being more than simply swept away by waves of 'triumphant liberalism', it is being slandered as 'not practical' in today's world and its achievements are negated and/or reversed. Kissinger correctly stated years ago that; 'the central task of American foreign policy is to analyse anew the current international environment and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable order'. To fully appreciate the importance of concepts which dominated the era of the Cold War and understand how and why they are still relevant today, these terms themselves require explanation.

1.2 Definition of Terms

In looking at US foreign policy options and bilateral relations in the Balkans with states such as Albania, it should be recognised that democratic liberalism will not come easy to an area with little historic experience of it. Promotion of principles such as stability, and balance of power should not be discounted as outdated, inapplicable, or contrary to the promotion of democracy and market capitalism. These realist traditions are not only applicable in the post Cold War era, they are necessary to ensure that the transition of societies, such as Albania, from authoritarian systems to democracies proceeds forward. Indeed, following the Second World War the United States responded to the reconstruction of war-torn Europe as a way to prevent possible communist expansion in the West. The 'general agreement in the American government was that communism thrived on chaos and poverty; the way to respond to it was to promote stability and prosperity through economic aid'. At the time, the US understood that principles such as stability and balance of power mattered, even if they publicly denounced them as perverted European machinations. Such principles became particularly vital to economic progress and moves toward democracy. During this period the US took it upon itself to 'advance a plan for global economic recovery based solely upon its

30 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.: p.91.
31 'Unless we are able to give operational meaning to terms such as superiority or stability, negotiations will lack criteria by which to judge progress'. See, Kissinger (1968), op.cit.: p.63.
32 'We have sought to extend economic institutions to the East because we understand that the quest for security in Europe cannot rely on security institutions alone. It also must rely on the political and economic reconstruction of newly democratic nations.' Warren Christopher (May/June, 1993), op.cit.: p.48.
own resources'. Now, as the US stands at the cross-roads of a new era in foreign policy, it should not be so quick to discard those principles which provided for a general sustained success for nearly five decades. The US can still provide for recovery and stability to those which are transforming themselves. It should, however, temper its judgement to provide for those which fall within the realm of its interests. After World War II this was achieved by aligning power with commitment in order to create policy. Today such commitment requires a 'selectivity' in policy and interest formulation. It is the contention of this study that Albania falls within such US interests. As such, principles such as stability promotion and containment represent the fundamentals necessary and proper to achieve a transition to democracy and lay the foundation for positive bilateral relations.

During the course of the Cold War, strategists tended to view situations in absolute terms. Zero-sum strategy during an era of bipolarity presented perspective which made gain for one automatically equate to loss for the other and 'every issue seemed to involve a question of survival'. Granted, such strategy has little relevance today without an overriding threat akin to the Soviet Union. Yet, America's foreign policy purpose is as imbued with moral purpose today as it was forty years ago, perhaps even more so. Government should take greater notice of the maxims, 'idealism without realism is naive and dangerous. Realism without idealism is cynical and meaningless'. This is why some 'outdated' principles still hold relevance. They would provide the congruence and balance necessary in fashioning new policy.

When we examine containment, for example, we see that its original purpose was to 'bring about the domestic transformation of the USSR'. During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, realists in America led by Walter Lippman believed that doctrines such as containment would entangle America in security arrangements that would unnecessarily drain US resources and weaken American

35 This notion arose out of US global commitment after W.W.II. During this period realists such as Walter Lippmann stated; 'policy can be formed when power and commitment can be brought into balance.' See, Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, Mass: Little Brown and Co., 1943): pp.100-108. The 'restoration of our selectivity in our commitment to national objectives in view of their essentiality and the possibility to attain them', found such pundits during the 1960s when it appeared the US was losing direction. See, Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York, New York: Praeger Press, 1969): p.14.
36 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.: p.56.
37 At that time the US understood the responsibility it had. As Dean Acheson states; 'The task of leadership is one of heavy cost and responsibility.' See, Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958): p.69.
38 Acheson (1958), op.cit.: p.192.
39 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.: p.86.
resolve. Containment, according to Lippman, 'permitted the Soviet Union to choose the points of discomfiture for the US while retaining the diplomatic, and even military initiative'. Critics today, such as Patrick Buchanan reiterate Lippman in calling for America to abandon ideological crusades and bolstering security institutions which drain American resources when no paramount threat exists. These critics, however, miss the point. Containment's applicability goes beyond the Soviet threat. It became instituted as a 'passive diplomacy' at a time when America was at its greatest power. It was a doctrine which was as 'idealistic' as it was realistic, yet, it should be duly emphasised, was 'abstract in its prescriptions'. It accomplished what it set out to do, realising that it would take both time and resources. A superpower threat does not confront the US as it did during the Cold War. However, threats have and will arise to American interests regionally from powers that do not subscribe to principles of democracy and liberalism. Though regional despots may not have the global reach, [one paramount reason why they are discounted by critics as not vital to US interests], today's world has shown that several nations with strong anti-US sentiments have been attempting to aggrandise military power, both conventional and nuclear. Allowing for these states to accomplish their programs would upset regional balances of power, hinder economic development as other nations must either live in fear or spend large sums on building up their military, and threaten pro-US states in vital areas that serve as actual or potential markets for US products. Hence, containment and transformation of regimes hostile to the US and her interests remains of primary importance. Even after warfare has ended in the Balkans, the potential for violence remains high as a volatile ethnic mix exists in the region. History has shown that Serbia has been, and will likely continue to be a strong power in the Balkans. The likelihood for such an occurrence increases as, peace settlements notwithstanding, Serbs throughout the area seek to unify. The probability that Serbia will embrace pro-Western principles of democracy is limited in the near future. As such, it threatens not only nations seeking to democratise in the region, such as Albania, but upsets the balance of power necessary to ensure that a powerful, authoritarian and anti-West Serbia does not, somewhere soon, dominate the region. In fostering bilateral relations with Albania, the US must be

42 Such concerns are especially high among Bosnian Muslims. Prior to the May, 1994 vote in the US Senate on whether or not to lift the arms embargo, Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister sent a letter to Senators Bob Dole [R-Kan] and Sen. Joe Lieberman [D-CT]; 'We want peace but peace is not possible without a balance of power. Without securing a balance of power, that is, arming the Bosnians,, there can be no peace.' See, "News From US Senator Bob Dole: Bosnia Arms Embargo Update" (Washington DC: 11 May, 1994): "letter from Prime Minister Haris Silajdic"
able to secure the stability of the area itself. Sanctions alone are not enough. The isolation of rogue states requires principles of containment which go beyond sanctions and international condemnations to carefully planned and concerted efforts to influence the domestic political scene so that they will not harm or endanger our interests and allies in the region.

A present day operational meaning for balance of power, however, requires that it be examined within its Cold War context. Writing during the era of bipolarity, Kissinger aptly stated:

Side by side with the physical balance of power, there exists a psychological balance based on intangibles of value and belief. The presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed drastically; those of the psychological balance remain to be discovered.43

Perhaps, we have reached the threshold today. Achieving balances of power, or a notion thereof, appears as archaic as Metternich or Castlereagh. Yet, their applicability may remain as witnessed by the Gulf War. A combination of states led by the US sought to curb the expansionist tendencies of a ruler in a region which is of vital interest to many within the alliance due to its energy supplies. During the 1980s, many within the US became alarmed at the growing economic power of Japan and saw it as a threat to the US. These alarmists, exemplified in 1992 through Ross Perot, believed that America must counter this growing power and achieve a consistency and hegemony it had years before. However, the growth of power, be it economic or military, will continue across the globe and at various speeds. This should not imply that balance is necessary.44 It became so at specific times when certain states threatened to control vast territory and/or resources to the detriment of others, thus the necessity to counter growing power and achieve balance. Power, in and of itself, is not the problem. How it is used, though, is. Following the Second World War, the US emerged as the greatest power. Its productivity base and military were unrivalled. The US foreign policy establishment believed sincerely that their unparalleled position granted them license to influence, directly or indirectly, all foreign policy decisions. This belief

43 Kissinger (1968), op.cit., p.85., and, Kissinger (1994), op.cit., 'The balance of power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation. By definition, a balance of power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order', at p. 21.

44 'More often balance of power is associated with a policy which simply reflects active concern with the power situation: This policy usage corresponds to the situational usage which identifies any given configuration of power.' See, Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York, New York: Random House, 1965): p.19.
became known as the arrogance of power. Yet, US power at the time was not seen as detrimental to other states. Indeed, it was seen as necessary and vital to ensure that democracies could rebuild and, once this had been accomplished, to protect them from overriding security threats. Balance therefore is relative to the international setting and circumstance. By the 1960s, critics and liberals alike began to criticise America's use of its power. Some of these critics also contend that notions of power balance will not hold up in a world that becomes increasingly democratic. Deterring threats to US interests means understanding principles of power and the ability to exercise it effectively to gain equilibrium. From the time of Vietnam, Americans have denounced ideas of power politics as 'crude, European perversions'. This may be why there has been aversion since the end of the Cold War to project American power unilaterally. Even in the Gulf War, where US vital interests were at stake, America felt compelled to pursue a multi-lateral solution rather than understanding and applying principles of power politics. To reject power and adhere to notions of decline is dangerous. Such a rejection may result in a 'nihilistic perfectionism which disdains the gradual and seeks to destroy what does not conform to its notion of utopia'. Kissinger qualifies his remark by stating that 'power does not automatically confer influence'. Large levels of development assistance, however, do, or rather, should. The exercise of power, however, becomes a necessity when seeking to carry out policy as difficult as the
promotion of democracy. Following World War II the Balkans had been an area 'rich in human and industrial resources and strategically vital to both sides, either to Russia as a buffer against the West, or to Germany and France as the gateway for an invasion of Russia'. Today, balance of power in the Balkans entails more than a collection of democratic, free market states. It means the prevention of an aggrandisement of power which would endanger others and risk upsetting the process of reform. This in turn would only lead to a multiplicity of military programs throughout the region. The focus on military spending would delay economic progress, and increase want. The viscous circle would require strong, and likely undemocratic rule to maintain power. To allay increasing depravity, those in power would seek scapegoats for their nation's ills. In the Balkans, these are all to available as history has demonstrated. To preclude this possibility, the US must strengthen regional bilateral relations, lessen security threats, and prevent potential imbalances in the regional power structure through an exercise of influence and power.

The Cold War process of influence meant a strengthening of the countries 'already on its [the US] side of the dividing line'. During the war, the US denounced doctrines of spheres of influence as dangerous, and undemocratic European power politics. However, even FDR's belief in a collective security arrangement such as the UN encompassed his conviction that it would be dominated and influenced by his 'Four Policemen'. He never fully rejected, therefore, notions of spheres of influence. The dividing line today is not between East and West but rather between freedom and enslavement, between prosperity and poverty, between chaos and stability. The exercise of power in the post Cold War era requires that democracy promotion carry with it attempts to influence nations that seek democracy.

Such endeavours, however, necessitate the promotion of stability. During the Cold War 'stability has always presupposed the existence of an equilibrium of power which prevented one state from imposing its will on the others'. Not much appears to have changed since an increasingly interdependent world brings with it greater degrees of interaction. With such interaction, 'cross-cutting loyalties that induce hostility' are likely to emerge. As nations perceive threats to themselves from rivals, the potential for instability rises. In the Balkans, where deep-seated hostilities prevail, and where, in an era of post Cold War uncertainty, co-operation,

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54 Kissinger (May, 1994), op.cit.; p.122.
55 Ambrose (1985), op.cit.; p.34.
56 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.; p.60.
trust and interaction is required, the capacity for instability remains high. Lofty principles such as enlargement demand relation to practice. Democracy cannot succeed where instability reigns. While the enlargement of democracy may still be the way forward, it still leaves too many questions unanswered; 'what precisely does enlargement mean? Whom does it imply we should support? With what means? Over what period of time and at what risk?'\(^{58}\) Moreover, should not the operational bedrock upon which it rests be those principles which aided in advancing US grand vision for forty-plus years? Granted, stability itself may not be an end to be pursued. However, the promotion of democracy and fostering of stable and healthy bilateral relations begs the question; 'should it not be but one mean towards a greater end [enlargement]?\(^{58}\) The answer most probably is yes.

1.3 Theoretical Foundations for Policy

For nearly five decades the US conducted bilateral relations within the framework of the Cold War. In an examination of US policy and relations with Albania, it becomes necessary to highlight this framework. After the Second World War, the US was in a position of power unparalleled by its closest competitor, the Soviet Union. President Truman faced a Congress dominated by Republicans, many of which, were now calling on the US to step back from international affairs and return to the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s. Several gifted members of the foreign policy establishment, however, thought otherwise. It was to be their vision and understanding that America stood on the threshold of a new era which was to propel US foreign policy into the international arena. Realising that the US must, with its own resources, help in the reconstruction of post-war Europe and simultaneously contain the USSR, the groundwork was laid for the establishment of US foreign policy which would guide it for nearly five decades. Among its characteristics were;

...a certain manipulativness and pragmatism, a conviction that the normal pattern of international relations was harmonious, a reluctance to think in structural terms, a belief in final answers- all qualities which reflect a sense of self-sufficiency not far removed from a sense of omnipotence.\(^{59}\)

When George Kennan wrote his famous X article in 1947 the US had already begun wrestling with what its post-war role would be.\(^{60}\) The foreign policy

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58 Kissinger (June, 1994), op.cit.; p.7.  
59 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.; p.79.  
60 'Kennan's recommendations were not immediately accepted by the Truman Administration, which was still hoping for a co-operative relationship with Moscow'. Paul Nitze, op.cit.; p.13., and on the impact Kennan made see, Kissinger (1994), op.cit.; pp.446-472, and Kissinger (May, 1994), op.cit.; 'It was surely the ultimate expression of America's national optimism and unimpaired sense of self-
establishment in Washington set out to implement Kennan's recommendations. The result became NSC-68. As its creator, Paul Nitze stated, NSC-68 should provide; 'guidance as America attempts to formulate a new national security strategy to meet with the challenges of the post Cold War world, especially in clarifying the objectives of a new strategy appropriate for this new and changed world'.

Nitze and his contemporaries understood that as a doctrine, communism saw itself destined for eventual triumph. The contest, therefore, became not over particular interests, but rather a struggle between ideologies. It was this struggle, however, which manifested itself through various interests across the globe. By 1947, the British informed the US that it could no longer support anti-Communist forces in Greece and Turkey. In addressing a joint session of Congress, Truman spoke of the dangers to US interests if both states were allowed to fall to communist regimes. The challenge posed by the Truman Doctrine had been America's 'moral gauntlet' cast down to the Soviets. This became the type of realpolitik Stalin best understood, and the type of hard-nosed politics Truman knew well from his days of machine-ward politics in St. Louis. The doctrine of containment and its role in Europe became one which recognised each side's sphere of influence and sought to maintain the balance. The US failure to respond in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 epitomises this recognition. The emergence of these spheres were traceable immediately after the Second World War. In Europe the delineation of these spheres was clear despite Moscow's attempts to disrupt Western consolidation by fomenting guerrilla warfare in Greece, and spurring unrest among the West European communist parties in France and Italy. Even America's aversion to 'spheres of interest' did not allay its need to consolidate these very same spheres under a guise of 'positions of strength'. This was apparent by the creation of NATO which, although not claimed by President Truman or his staff as a traditional military alliance meant to protect the balance of power in Europe, was precisely designed for such a purpose.

Delineating the competing spheres of influence, however, highlighted the inconsistencies with containment and

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61 P. Nitze, op.cit.: p.17.
62 IBID.
63 Kissinger (May, 1994), op.cit.: p.118.
64 'Hungary was a more complex case, for it would have required the application of its power in some form. Yet America's leaders were not willing to risk American lives for a cause which, however, offensive to their consciences, involved no direct American security interest. Principle permits no ambiguity and no gradations'. Kissinger (1994), op.cit.: p.556.
the balance of power doctrine. In Asia, for example, the US had to face the realization that Korea would fall to communist forces. By 1949, the US had removed its troops from the area and declared Korea outside the defence perimeter. This move, though, provided the onus for communist forces to strike since they assumed that Korea was not considered, by the US, to fall within its sphere of influence.

The communists in Moscow and Pyongyang had taken at face value the pronouncements of leading Americans that had placed Korea outside the American defence perimeter. They assumed that America would not resist a communist take-over of half Korea after having acquiesced to a communist victory in China, a bigger prize. [however] Truman’s decision to resist in Korea had a solid foundation in traditional concepts of national interest as well. Expansionist communism had been escalating its challenge with each post-war year. It had gained a foothold in Eastern Europe in 1945 as a by-product of occupation by the Red Army. It had prevailed in Czechoslovakia by means of a domestic coup in 1948. It had taken over China in a civil war in 1949.

Today, however, it has been argued that the only dividing lines within Europe are perhaps between rich and poor nations. This may hold some truth but does not explain why artificial distinctions between East and West remain. The promotion of stability and containment of problems before they blow out of proportion should precede attempts to democratise and continue while democracy and free markets are nurtured. No where is the US better suited for this task than in Europe. ‘We are in an excellent position to encourage and facilitate the peaceful resolution of nationalist tensions, containing and terminating conflicts quickly before they can develop into civil or cross-border warfare.’ For several decades, the Atlantic Alliance went beyond a mere formal obligation bound by various treaties, it was a relationship founded upon shared interests including the advancement of democracy and free markets. The Marshall Plan and NATO initiated an era when America held military, political and economic dominance over Europe. Yet this relationship was not one which the US sought to exploit for personal gain. The advancement of economic and political progress in Europe after the war did serve US national security interests by preventing for the possible expansion of

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67 'Having proclaimed a universal mission, it was inevitable that America would encounter gaps between its principles and its national interests. The confluence of Suez and Hungary was one such occasion. America’s great dream has always been a foreign policy which carries all before it by the compelling and universal nature of its maxims.' Kissinger (1994), op.cit.; p.565., and James Chace, The Consequences of Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (New York, New York: Oxford Press, 1992): 'Where the tines were clearly drawn, as they were in Europe, the risk of conflict was minimal.... In regions where the lines were not drawn- in Korea, in Vietnam, in Southeast Asia- proxy wars were fought... ', at pp.183-184.


69 Nitze, op.cit.; p.18.

70 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.; p.75.

71 Ambrose (1985), op.cit.; p.104.
communism westward. Yet, such an alliance also allowed for the progression of Western Europe from its war-torn ruins and historical animosities into an area today which thrives with democracies and free markets.

In the East, the US after W. W. II realised that Stalin had earned the right to have a major say in the politics of the region. Although not willing to abandon Eastern Europe altogether, Russia's security concerns coupled with American preoccupation with the West gave Stalin the sphere of influence he demanded. Today, the East plods forward in efforts to democratise and the US again seems reluctant to act with conviction. During the Cold War Kissinger time and again re-emphasised the moral obligations imbued within American foreign policy. His premise on the conflict between East and West recognised that where ideological conflict exists, 'political loyalties no longer coincide with political boundaries.' In the post Cold War world doctrines such as enlargement should perhaps take note of Kissinger's statement. The ideological conflict that exists today pits those that seek the expansion of democracy against those that oppose it and continue to cling to command economies and political repression as a means of maintaining power. Loyalty is a relative term to apply to the present day ideological conflict. A more apt term appears to be influence and, if we were to apply it accordingly, we would find that interdependency makes influence also not coincide with political boundaries. The notion of democracy should not be limited to a select few. Procedurally, democracy may not succeed in the majority of nations it is attempted due to, as sociologists, political scientists, and analysts alike state, historical/socio-economic/cultural experiences. Yet, substantively, democracy, as an idea cuts across boundaries and even in a few regimes where it is actively surpressed, it can never be wholly extinguished. This existence, regardless of its extent, creates influence.

The truth of this influence was not lost on the US after World War II. US power, unrivalled as it was, combined with confidence and moral purpose to create policy. The ideological underpinnings of containment and NSC-68 demanded a radical departure from past policy. The National Security Act of 1947 set America

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72 As one of the architects of US policy after W. W. II, Kennan believed that political societies themselves do not conduct foreign relations as their sole purpose, yet that political societies must conduct it in order to live... See, George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (New York, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1966): p.4.

73 Kennan, op.cit.: p.56.


75 Kissinger (1968), op.cit.: p.55.

76 Senator Fulbright aptly warns of the problem when this sense of purpose is lost; 'When a nation is very powerful but lacking self-confidence, it is likely to behave in a manner dangerous to itself and to others. See, Fulbright, op.cit.: p.22.
out on its radical new policy. Immediately following the war, Truman and others on his staff hoped to get the UN up and running, meanwhile lay out methods to collaborate with Stalin to ensure that the UN would run smoothly. Truman had also hoped that the British could be counted on to deal with the ensuing "chaos and trouble spots" that would arise in Europe. The inability to negotiate with Moscow coupled with Britain's justified focus on rebuilding itself made Truman rethink his posture towards the US international role. When the British signalled that they could no longer aid anti-Communists in Greece and Turkey Truman was convinced that America should undertake the effort. As the Cold War progressed, the "geographical position of the Balkans once again thrust it into the mainstream of world power politics." British withdrawal from the Balkans perhaps also demonstrated to the US the seriousness of the situation. For Britain, the area had been within its scope of influence and part of European power politics for years. Even during the war, the US recognised the importance with which the British held for the region. As British concerns increased, so to did American ones. Churchill had, during the war, repeatedly called for an Allied invasion of the Balkans. By late 1944, however, the US military was not "keen on such a prospect."

A strong post-war position in the area was not as vital to the US as it was to the British. After the war, the primary objective became ensuring the security of pro-Western Greece and Turkey, historic enemies under a common security umbrella. The threat today comes from not outside the region but from within. Ethnic tensions threaten stability and prosperity and again, as forty years ago, it appears the US can pick up the security slack. The joint efforts by the West Europeans in economic recovery do not go far enough as aid often carries stringent conditions and markets remain closed to goods from the East and South. It is unlikely the European Union can guarantee regional security while it wrestles with its own common security and defence policies. This task can only be achieved by the US, a nation the Balkan states looked to during the war as the "champion of self-determination."

The task America undertook after World War II rejected the arguments of Lippman and the realists. The latter felt that general principles were contrary to

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77 The act established the Department of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an independent Air Force and created the Central Intelligence Agency. NSC-68, a modified and updated version of NSC20/4, written by Kennan in 1948, called on greater conventional military buildups. It was approved by Truman in September, 1950 after North Korea attacked South Korea. See, Nitze, op.cit.; pp.14-16.
78 Nitze, op.cit.; p.12.
79 Lane, op.cit.; p.305.
80 Lane, op.cit.; p.28.
81 Ambrose (1985), op.cit.; p.28.
82 Lane, op.cit.; p.10.
America's interests. These should instead be defined by a case-by-case approach.\textsuperscript{83} The argument could not hold merit during the Cold War as the US sadly witnessed in Vietnam. Even case-study analysis, while it may limit American involvement, would not guarantee American influence nor success.\textsuperscript{84} Power alone, regardless of how vast, cannot impose will. This became true even during the Cold War. As Kissinger noted; 'Weaker allies have good reason to believe that their defence is in the overwhelming interest of their senior partner. Hence, they see no need to purchase its support by acquiescence in its policies.'\textsuperscript{85} Today, however, these 'weaker allies', especially among the democratising nations, must come to realise that while this may have held true during the era of bipolarity, without an overriding threat akin to the USSR, the United States is able to use discretion and aid those which will allow for both the promotion of policy and protection of interests. US relations with Albania present such an opportunity. Problems are bound to appear, yet the US must accept that, 'new world orders never emerge automatically, their birth pangs are marked by instability and turmoil.'\textsuperscript{86} Managing this turmoil becomes the primary task of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{87}

1.4 Literature Review

The difficulty in approaching such a study begins first and foremost with the available source material. For nearly five decades, Albania had been in a state of self-imposed isolation from the outside world. Much of the available literature on the nation came from the pre-war days when King Zogu I ruled Albania. The level of analysis of these sources was limited as many concentrated primarily on the people themselves rather than on domestic or foreign politics. Serving as nothing more than 'travel guides', these early works may have provided for a glimpse into life in primitive Albania, but it offered very little more. After the war, émigrés and those that managed to get out before the communists consolidated power, began to realise the need for more comprehensive studies on Albania. Some Western scholars also began to engage in early analysis of communism's progress in Albania. Many of these early post-war articles found their way to the pages of \textit{Survey} or \textit{East Europe}. They offered reports, many of which, relied on over inflated figures released by the Albanian Press Agency. Stavro Skendi's \textit{Albania},\textsuperscript{88} presented an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} Kissinger (May, 1994), \textit{op.cit.}; p.124.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ambrose (1985), \textit{op.cit.}; p.65.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Kissinger (1968), \textit{op.cit.}; p.56.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Kissinger (June, 1994), \textit{op.cit.}; p.6.
\item \textsuperscript{87} The United States must also accept that; 'change requires a modification of our principles and methods.' See, Stanley Hoffmann, \textit{Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy} (New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968): p.73.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Stavro Skendi, \textit{Albania} (Boston, Mass: Little Brown, 1956)
\end{itemize}
early comprehensive look into Albania, its history, both ancient and modern. However, the inability to provide for accuracy led many of these early works to serve as nothing more than descriptive guides. The natural bias many émigrés had for the communist regime often coloured their analysis.

The People's Republic of Albania offers better insight into the outside players involved in Albania's history, however, not much by way of analysis is made. The impact, repercussions and consequence such history has had on Albania, and its relations with outsiders gives way instead to perhaps too much emphasis on agricultural and productivity statistics that are grossly exaggerated. Pano's study also suffers from a common problem many of the works on Albania since the Second World War have, it does not adequately portray events during and immediately after the war, a crucial time in Albania's history. Both Skendi and Pano refer to the 'fierce, independent mountain clans' in Northern Albania yet offer little as to their role, or lack of it during the war. What comes across to many therefore is that the Albanian Communist Party was able to consolidate power quickly and faced little opposition, and that it was a unified force like so many other partisan forces throughout the region. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet, many of these early works suffer from inadequate portrayals and factual inconsistencies which colour later accounts.

Marmallaku's Albania and the Albanians often presents overstated claims. Its insight into the social structures of Albanian life remains unparalleled to this day. However, background into the formation of the Albanian state, the problems it encountered, and how it overcame these, appears, even to the novice, a bit overzealous as to the role Albania and the Albanians. The role of outside players is neatly summed up in brief passages and overall fails to present the considerations of power politics that were conducted, particularly after the First World War. Logoreci's The Albanians tempers the role played by the Albanians themselves. Its strength lies in its ability to explain Albanian foreign policy after the war. While Skendi offers little insight into Albanian nationalism, and Pano fails to discuss its importance, Logoreci's study properly links Albanian nationalism with Hoxha's brand of communism and correctly indicates that Albania's foreign policy was primarily motivated by nationalism. This would explain the excessive references to Logoreci in the section on Albanian nationalism. The only shortcoming of The Albanians appears to be in its treatment of Albania's wartime experience. More emphasis is spent on the eventual victors, Hoxha and his communists, while little is

submitted on the other groups seeking to gain power during this critical period. The analysis, however, is coherent, lucid and tempered, in spite Logoreci's obvious staunch anti-Communist posture.

Subsequent works such as *The History of Albania*, by Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto⁹², presented the history of Albania, both ancient and modern with one recurring theme, that Albania was a nation constantly under siege, always threatened by neighbours. While many of these claims hold validity, some works tend to exaggerate the scope of such claims. Much of the wartime history of Albania is found in several works by British authors, most of which served during the war in Albania as British Liaison Officers [BLOs]. As explained more fully in chapter one, these works often spend more time bashing, implying and in some cases explicitly implicating fellow BLOs. The charges by them against their fellow officers and against Albanians they encountered for being spies, communists and collaborators permeates much of the work. As the author can attest to, after having met several surviving BLOs, as well as personally knowing the members of the various Albanian families involved in these studies, animosity, pride and even notions of revenge continue to fester after all this time, on both sides. This is why only by thorough examination of all sides of Albanian wartime history can some semblance of the truth emerge.

The vast supply of works from Albania, most penned by Enver Hoxha, suffer an obvious flaw. Hoxha's cult of personality was matched only by his paranoia as evident in all of his works. Denouncing all around him as spies, saboteurs, collaborators, imperialists or revisionists, Hoxha's works received their just due as the recent government has decided to destroy and recycle tens of thousands of his volumes to make new educational books. Only his work, *The Titoites*⁹³, offers some verifiable accounts of his many conversations with Tito over the years. The main themes of many of these meetings were highlighted several years earlier by Auty's biography on Marshall Tito⁹⁴, yet Hoxha's work has naturally put him on the side of righteousness in every instance. Their limited use is quite apparent given their present regard by the Albanian government.

Biberaj's *Albania: A Socialist Maverick*⁹⁵, offers the best overall look into Albanian politics and history. Concise, clear and not overly biased, the study unfortunately is the only able guide in studying Albania, hence the unavoidable reliance upon it throughout this work. Biberaj is correct in his criticisms towards

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the Hoxha regime without simply engaging in communist-bashing rhetoric. His analysis of the wartime period of Albania's history aptly depicts the various factions within Albania, where their alliances stood, and the overall considerations by the British and Americans. Perhaps the only criticism of Biberaj's study is its lack of prognosis. It is a very capable piece of descriptive analysis yet, does not present very much analysis into Albania's future or recommendations as such. This shortcoming, however, is made up by the variety of journal articles Biberaj and others have contributed over the years.

Since the loosening of control by the central government beginning in 1990, many of the more both factual and in-depth pieces of analysis have come by journal and newspaper articles. The ability to travel freely in Albania has allowed researchers the opportunity to examine Albania first-hand. Yet, even many of these articles suffer from inconsistency or a one-sided bias. It appears communist rhetoric has given way to pro-democracy rhetoric. The Democratic Party controls much of the press releases and conferences conducted since their arrival to power in 1992. The statements made by other parties are often discounted or quickly brushed aside as childish polemics. Western press reports of the situation in Albania also appears to reflect a cosmopolitan view. That is, many of the reports which come from Tirana, the capital, are written without much field work done, usually relying on information of the outlying areas, and their developments, from source material in Tirana. Democratic Party Chair Eduard Selami was critical of this type of reporting when he stated; 'People think they know all there is to know about Albania by staying in Tirana. They come here, check into the Hotel Dajti and write about developments without seeing them firsthand.' Yet, the many press reports and journal articles represent the only up-to-date analysis of political developments in Albania. The journals and periodicals emanating from Albania are naturally skewed since each one is sponsored by a particular party. Many of these dailies spend more ink space attacking the other political parties then reporting the news, despite US efforts to send specialists in the news field to teach Albania Western news techniques. The recent work on Albania by Derek Hall of the University of Exeter offers the most recent comprehensive account of developments in Albania. His extensive account of Albanian domestic politics includes even a look into the variety of mountain tourist sites, and the revenue, both potential and actual, that they bring in. The myriad of statistics are current and most likely much more accurate than figures submitted during the communist reign. However, most of the background material on Albanian history and politics

96 Interview with Mr. Selami, Democratic Party Headquarters Tirana June, 1993
97 Derek Hall, Albania and the Albanians (London: Pinter, 1994)
relies on many of the aforementioned studies and therefore is subject to similar shortcomings. Hall's work offers a good thorough account of recent domestic trends spattered with foreign developments, yet does not significantly contribute to the study of international relations. Specifically, how these developments and trends affect or may affect regional relations, their context to adjoining areas, and issues of particular relevance to the field of international relations such as security and conflict studies. By not providing a thorough account of these linkages, Hall's work offers little more that a compilation of facts and figures.

From the other side of the study, that which deals with an examination of American foreign policy in the post Cold War era, the availability of resources presented no problems whatsoever. With the collapse of communism journals such as Foreign Affairs and dailies such as the New York Times and Washington Post have been replete with articles and editorials on the end of the Cold War and the direction of US foreign policy in this era. From Ambrose's The Rise to Globalism to Nixon's Seize the Moment and Kissinger's Diplomacy, the underlying theme has been one of realism. The significance of these studies is in their ability to imbue present purpose and direction with the lessons of the past. The reliance on history to make their point and case for an activist US foreign policy is perhaps best expressed by Gaddis' The United States and the End of the Cold War. 98 Gaddis spends a large portion of his study on the beginnings of the Cold War, as well as US policy trends at the turn of the century. Indeed, he does not specifically discuss the end of the Cold War and its implications until the very end of his work. This does not detract, however, from the insight Gaddis provides for US policy. The overabundance of literature on US foreign policy since 1989 ranges from predictions of the triumph of liberalism, 99 to the ideological crusades now under way in the name of democracy. 100 Many of these works, however, highlight hopes and/or beliefs rather than presenting calculative analysis and insight. As demonstrated in chapter four, the multiplicity of schools of thought which have arisen come with ample source material to make their case. It is the realist' approach, though, which offer the most level-headed analysis akin to the classical approach to international relations study. In an overview of the Balkans the area is one which has been the subject of European power politics for centuries. 101 Democratisation notwithstanding, who better to provide analysis into interest

98 John Lewis Gaddis (1992), op. cit.
evaluation towards the area and its component parts than realist theory and literature?

As for the material on Bosnia, given the nature of the war, and the fact that it still needs to be resolved, heavy reliance is placed upon tertiary source material such as newspaper, daily and journal articles. These have, however, provided ample source material and should not be discounted as to their relevance. As for specifics, five particular sources have proven most valuable. First, John Zametica’s *The Yugoslav Conflict*, although a journal article, and now slightly dated, still provides a thorough examination of events during the crucial period, 1989-1991. For an equally good account of events on the ground during the critical 1990-1992 period, Misha Glenny’s, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* offers a firsthand account of the situation from the author as he travelled across the republics meeting with many of the players in the conflict and offering a thorough firsthand look at them and their objectives. *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* by Sabrina Ramet looks at the nation as it existed in the post World War II era. It correctly highlights the inter-ethnic relations of the republics and examines how nationalism became, was and still is, a force in Yugoslavia. While it examines the role that Tito played as the 'ultimate arbiter' of conflict among the republics, it does not cover the true significance of Tito’s death with the same scope as Branka Magas’ *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Magas provides the reader with a detailed account of the situation, not simply among the republics, but among the players themselves following Tito’s death. Coupled with documentation such as memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences during the 1986-1988 period, the reader is left with a better understanding of how resurgent Serb nationalism was taking hold and, more importantly, how it was manipulated during this period by Slobodan Milosevic. While the above sources adequately cover the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the perhaps best overall coverage is, and will likely remain, Noel Malcolm’s *Bosnia, A Short History*. Malcolm presents the background of Bosnia from the ancient kingdom of the C12th BC, up to present day, 1994. Yet, the work offers itself as more than merely a history book. Malcolm succeeds in dispelling several myths regarding Bosnia, such as its immediate conversion and acquiescence to Islam once the Ottomans arrived. Moreover, it correctly highlights

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102 John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict", *Adelphi Paper* #270 published by Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies London (Summer, 1992)
105 Ramet (1992), op.cit.; p.xvi.
the interwar years of Yugoslavia a precursor for trouble presently and equally
demonstrates the failure by the West, especially the Europeans and their ineptitude
at handling the crisis once it began. Given its slant, yet not obsession for detail,
Malcolm's work represents the best of recent work on the subject. This accounts
for the repeated referrals to it in this work.

1.5 Methodology

Robert Keohane stated; 'political realism is deeply embedded in Western
thought. Without understanding it, we can neither understand nor criticise our own
tradition of thinking about international relations.' The approach which
underlies the study is one which relies heavily upon the principles of political
realism and neo-realist maxims. The soundness of these principles rests upon their
historical antecedents and attempts to use these as the basis for policy projections
and evaluations. This should not mean, however, as the study states, that such
foundations are without error. As Gaddis correctly points out;

We tend to think about the future by projecting past patterns forward; these patterns, in turn
are the means by which we try to make sense out of present and past realities. We too often
fail, though, to allow for the effects of change on the patterns we create in our minds. Despite
the obvious fact change- sometimes dramatic and sudden change- is what history is all about,
when we use history to think about the future we generally resort to a static version of it.

The statement holds merit when applied to the current events of the study.
Following the collapse of communism, the process of democratisation and the
beginning of dissolution and violence throughout the Balkans, much of the current
analysis and projections of the situation erroneously depicted events as following
the same path they did at the turn of the century. Violence was easily portrayed as
endemic due to 'deep-seated hatreds'. All these portrayals did contain kernels of
truth rooted in historical case analysis. Yet, many failed to understand that modern
complexities varied events despite their facade of familiarity. The 'effects of
change', indeed, were not accounted for. This is why when studies of this nature
are begun, both analyst and practitioner alike, must remain sceptical. The maxims
used in historical analysis should be taken seriously, yet one must endeavour
towards critical analysis.

The application of realist principles, therefore, seeks to develop a working
theory for the study, one which will cope with events under such critical analysis.

108 Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Robert Keohane,
110 Robert Keohane, op cit.: 'if the maxims apply only under certain conditions, or if the theory
underlying them is fundamentally erroneous in its understanding of the forces affecting
co-operation and discord, peace and war, they will be dangerously misleading.', at p.3.
The examination of international relations, and more importantly, the 'complexities of world politics', necessitates the use of theory. As the study demonstrates, however, events are indeed examined on the basis of historical relevance, yet, are also incorporated into modern maxims that account for the relationship between events, their importance and how they affect outcomes. It is for this reason that neo-realist principles are given more credence throughout the study than classic realist beliefs. Neorealism seeks to refine classical realism by developing a working relationship between the two. By endeavouring to integrate the two, 'a contemporary framework can be established based upon comparative analysis.'

In the current examination, such analysis provides insight into the nature of US-Albanian relations and must, therefore be relied upon, since the status of relations between the two does not offer much. This does not, nor should it, discount the importance of historical examination. Such methods, especially in the present study, aid in comparative analysis.

A study which focuses on US foreign policy during times of vast change would be remiss if it did not rely upon principles of realism. In an area such as the Balkans, traditions of liberalism remain low and practically non-existent. Security concerns, democratisation and other issues which affect the region adhere not to liberal maxims extolling the virtues of man and modern achievements but instead rest firmly upon the tenets of realism. After World War II, the US moved away American political tradition and adopted the values of realism which sought to explain power politics and the players within a system which had undergone widespread and fundamental change. As Keohane states; 'realism sought to reorient United States foreign policy so that American policymakers could cope with Soviet attempts at domination without either lapsing into passive unwillingness to use force or engaging in destructive and quixotic crusades to make the world safe for democracy.' Recent focus upon enlargement has brought criticism and comparison to the latter fears of 'visionary crusades'. Yet as realism permeated US foreign policy, the need for examination of the key and underlying concepts which dominated policy, became apparent. Power, balance of power and national interests continued to remain an integral part of theory, however, distinguishing between ends and means and how these concepts affected existing

111 Keohane, op. cit.; p.4.
112 R. Pfaltzgraff, op. cit.; p.119.
113 Keohane, op. cit.; p.9., 'This shift was particularly rapid in America, since the collapse of the European balance of power meant that the United States, no longer, merely an observer of European foibles, had accepted the burdens, along with the heady privileges, of becoming a hegemonic power-one with both the willingness and the ability to make and maintain the rules for world politics.'
political relationships required a modification of realist axioms. This is where neorealism took hold.\textsuperscript{114}

In times of great systems change, that has occurred with the downfall of communism, neorealism offers both analysts and policymakers firm principles which best explain the behaviour of states as actors within the international setting without adopting the determinist position classical realism held to. Rejecting declinist positions as too determinist, the study holds one preconceived notion, that the US has emerged from the upheavals of 1989 still a great power. The study accepts that classical realism views great power status by placing larger emphasis upon the tangible rather than intangible factors used to measure power. Neorealism recognises the multiplicity of power centres and seeks to relate power to the larger social relationships within the international context. Neorealism, as it pertains to the present study adheres to Kenneth Waltz's definition of "great power" and accepts its applicability to the current international setting.

A great power that is one among many learns how to manipulate allies as well as adversaries. Great powers have to accommodate some of their number in order to gain strength vis-a-vis others. In dealing with near equals, they design their policies to influence the actions of others. In a crowded field, those who play the great-power game well flourish; those who do not risk falling by the wayside.\textsuperscript{115}

The Clinton administration and its reliance upon the tenets of liberalism championed by Wilson appears to have little in common with the values of realism and neorealism. Its apparent position on these liberal traditions make it difficult to apply their lessons upon crises situations and, more importantly, to relations with nations, and regions, where the maxims of the former two continue to dominate. Their failure to, "articulate an operational theory and to relate individual events and crisis to it",\textsuperscript{116} has done more than limit administration policy, it has perhaps served notice that reliance upon the values of neorealism continue to hold merit. Though not perfect and not meant to be, neorealism offers the best explanation for understanding the concerns and interests of the actors involved, in this case, the United States and Albania. The standing of the actors and their relation to the international arena represent structural characteristics inherent within studies of systems and systems change.\textsuperscript{117} Critics will contend that studies such as this examine realist paradigms and concepts such as power with methods which do not

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\textsuperscript{115} Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics", in Keohane, \textit{op. cit.}; p.333.
\textsuperscript{116} Kissinger (June, 1994), \textit{op. cit.}; p.7.
\textsuperscript{117} Waltz, \textit{op. cit.}; p.327.
offer comprehensive accounts of the 'placement of states within a system.'118 Yet, it should be noted that placement becomes difficult, if not impossible, when the dynamics of the system are either static or have undergone wholesale change. As Keohane observes, international relations is an 'anarchic rather than hierarchic realm, populated by units [states] performing similar functions.'119 Acceptance that these units vary in degrees of power, even if we cannot agree to a proper definition of the latter term, makes it even more difficult to place states within a system.120 While the units perform the functions of actors within international politics and therefore are part of the international structure, determining their position within the system cannot be achieved when the system undergoes change. Should the units themselves undergo change, what we are then left with is a situation in which the stability of the entire system is compromised.

Structural changes alter a system's dynamics. Systemic effects cannot be reconstructed from the system's interacting parts since the parts behave differently because they are parts of a system. The constraints and incentives of a system, its dynamics, change if its structure changes or is transformed.121

This appears to be what has happened when viewing the events since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The integrity of the system became compromised since power relationships no longer functioned as they did during the era of bipolarity. With critical theory, the analyst can understand change within the system. By examining the dynamics themselves as they too change, the study, by exploring changes within a democratising nation such as Albania, and its relations with the US, alterations with the system itself are highlighted.122 Such a case study imbued with the principles of political realism, with heavier reliance upon neorealism allows for greater applicability in international relations. It is hoped that the study presents such applicability as a guide into comprehending both change in the system as a whole, [the collapse of bipolarity], and the changing dynamics within the system itself, [power relationships in the Balkans], and how these affect the relationship between the dominant unit of the former, the United States, and a new state-as-regional actor in the latter, Albania. It is accepted, however, as Keohane properly observes; 'each proposition of any theory... should be scrutinised carefully to ascertain the range of its applicability, its robustness under different conditions, and the likelihood of its being overtaken by events.'123

120 Waltz, op.cit.; p.329.
121 Waltz, op.cit.; p.342.
123 Keohane, op.cit.; p.5.
Chapter One

THE HISTORICAL DILEMMA

1.0 BACKGROUND

The year 1991 was one of marked importance to the United States. After successively leading her allies in the Gulf War, America ended the year witnessing the disintegration of the Soviet Union. With communism in full retreat since the fall of the Berlin Wall two years earlier, the dissolution of the USSR, America's Cold War adversary for nearly five decades, it seemed communism acknowledged defeat. President George Bush hailed the upcoming era as a possible 'new world order', and it appeared many echoed his sentiment. However, events moved quicker than rhetoric. The post Cold War euphoria felt by both citizens and policymakers alike was gone. World wide recession, resurgent hyper-nationalism, irredentist violence, and failing programs among the fledgling democracies all helped to destroy hopes of peace and prosperity contributing instead, to an increasing 'disorder'.

A glance at the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia and republics of the former Soviet Union seems to point the way, not to the original vision for the post Cold War world; but a vision of decreased military violence and sweeping multilateral co-operation which would perhaps at last fulfill the image and mission intended for such organisations such as the United Nations. Instead, escalating warfare in areas such as Bosnia appeared to typify the immediate future as all Western nations seemed capable of is condemnation of action there and provision of humanitarian assistance while both UN and individual nation's peace envoys and policy makers shook their heads in dismay that yet another cease-fire has not held. Meanwhile, neighbouring countries and/or republics desperately tried to contain the spread of violence [as well as refugees], while calling for the protection of the rights of the respective ethnic minorities which may be located in the war zone. Simultaneously they must battle unrest within their borders as food and unemployment lines mount and more conservative elements gain force and popularity as the struggle to achieve market style capitalism seems to be failing.

It is the dilemma in the former Yugoslavia however that has caught the attention and raised the anxiety level of analysts and politicians alike, as televised images of the carnage could no longer be ignored or discounted away as outside the realm of interest. A look into the history of the region sheds light upon the problem. This particular section of South-Eastern Europe commonly referred to as the Balkans [Turkish meaning simply 'mountain'] has had a history steeped in violence and bloodshed over territory, widespread political and cultural fragmentation, and one form or another of authoritarian rule replete with secretive deals, negotiations and other forms of traditional 'power politics'. During the early part of the twentieth century
Balkan nations have been both the instigator and forum of at least five wars involving the region.

1.1 Brief Historical Background

Following the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, Italy began a policy of asserting herself territorially in the Mediterranean. Through discreet negotiations the Foreign Office at Rome made sure that neither the French nor the British had aims in Tripoli, at this time part of the declining Ottoman Empire. Securing general approval Italy dispatched troops to Tripoli by September, 1911 initiating the Turko-Italian War.¹

After centuries of domination in the Balkans, the power of the Ottoman Empire was waning rapidly. West European expansion [helped largely by modern means of warfare and weaponry] in the Mediterranean coupled with rising nationalism from Albanians and Serbs among others exacerbated existing internal problems;² radical economic changes in the late nineteenth century and the Young Turk revolt of 1908 forced the Ottomans to negotiate for peace by 18 October 1912. Italy subsequently reconstituted Tripoli and the surrounding area into modern day Libya.

Seizing the opportunity, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro embarked upon a course to further purge the Ottoman influence from the Balkans and perhaps seize large chunks of territory, especially Macedonia, to which all four 'allies' laid claims to. The irony in this alliance was that all four had ill feelings towards the other making the likelihood of alliance improbable. The treaties however were negotiated between the Spring and Summer of 1912 although the four did not specify how to divide the spoils. Nonetheless, the First Balkan War commenced by December 1912.

In a drive to secure territory both Greece and Bulgaria moved towards Macedonia and Saloniki. Serbia moved quickly through Albania to gain access to the Adriatic via Valon, Alessio and Durrës. The Treaty of London, 30 May 1913 ended hostilities but still left the question of the Turkish spoils including, Crete, Epirus, Thrace and Macedonia unanswered. As expected, negotiations proved hopeless. The resulting Second Balkan War [29 June 1913 - 20 July 1913] included Serbia, Greece and Rumania³ against an already militarily spent Bulgaria. Macedonia was divided among Serbia and Greece while Kosova was awarded to Serbia, albeit against Albanian

¹ Ferdinand Schevill, op.cit.; pp.467-469.
² These internal problems can be referred to in this context by Paul Kennedy's definition of 'imperial overstretch'-when interests and obligations of a particular country [in this case empire] become larger than that empire's ability to defend them all. see Paul Kennedy, Decline and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (London: Hyman, 1988): p.515. By this time even Ottoman Tripoli was not defended by the Turks but by Arab tribes which were given a large degree of autonomy in return for defence of and deference to the Ottomans. see Schevill, op.cit.; p.468.
³ Rumania, though not part of the First Balkan War, sought territory, specifically Bulgarian Dobrudja while at the Treaty of London. Seeing the opportunity to obtain more territory they joined the Serbo-Greek alliance. Schevill, op.cit.; pp.475-476.
As for the latter, fearing partition from the victors, especially by Greece's claims to 'Northern Epirus'-southern Albania, the Albanians had little recourse on the Kosova matter. Instead they were forced to accept the loss of Kosova but did receive reaffirmation of their sovereignty and independence by the Great Powers.4

No sooner had these conflicts been concluded when the First World War had broken out. This war again not only included the Balkan nations of Serbia, Montenegro and eventually Greece [1917] on the side of the Allies against the Ottomans and Bulgaria, it also committed the participants to the more damaging peace process, albeit without their best interests or participation in the peace negotiations a consideration. This often meant ceding territory and redrawing national boundaries irrespective of ethnic, cultural, or linguistic demarcations that have either been in place for centuries or in a continual state of flux. Yugoslavia, the land of the 'South Slavs'5 is but one product of the peace process. World War II did little or nothing to correct the problem. If anything it exacerbated it as now most of the region fell into the hands of Communist administrations and within the sphere of the Soviet Union. An area with a propensity for ethnic conflict now found itself compelled to suppress ethnic identity for nearly fifty years as 'nationality' was not compatible with Marxist-Leninist ideology. The failure of communism then released the pent up ethnic identification of decades and with it; renewed ethnic tension, hatred, fragmentation, nationalist aspirations, and resulting violence. This is what the West must contend with. Indeed, the events in the former Yugoslavia and the surrounding area should come as no surprise to Western politicians. An artificial creation from the outset, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the West ethnic rumblings long before its present dissolution. Certainly the 1971 Croatian Crisis could have indicated the complexity and signalled the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. By 1971 Croats, fearing a policy of Serb assimilation, sponsored a revival of Croatian nationalism which included more autonomy for Croats. Fuelled by economic concessions through the early 1960s, Croatia began to call for the outright restoration of territory within Bosnia. The Croatian Crisis resulted in the severe repression by Tito of Croat nationalism and the expulsion, imprisonment, demotion or removal from post of over one thousand Croatian Communist Party members, journalists and academics etc.6 The resulting

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4 The struggle for Albanian independence dates to the ill-fated attempts by the League of Prizren [1876] and their efforts to free themselves from the Ottomans. Their failure and non-recognition by Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin put them on a path towards repeated conflict with their neighbours and instilled a deep distrust within the Albanians to the powers of western Europe. see Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto (1981), op.cit.; pp. 146-152.
5 After the First World War, the "Kingdom of Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia" was not officially recognised as "Yugoslavia" until 1929.
6 Interestingly one Croat sentenced to twenty-two years of imprisonment was a historian writing for Matica Hrvatska [the Croatian Cultural Organisation], who was in favour of both Croat nationalism and the restoration of Bosnian territory to Croatia. He is Franjo Tudjman, the current President of Croatia. see Sabrina Ramet (1992), op.cit.; p.131.
concessions witnessed by the 1974 constitution solidified the nationalist differences in Yugoslavia and sped it on its course towards the present day conflict.7

Nor can Western policymakers claim ignorance of history as a defence. Before the present outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, a CIA 'leaked' report warned of the "break-up" of Yugoslavia followed by possible "civil war".8 The shortsightedness and inaction in policy therefore did not exempt the West from taking an early look at the problem. This failure to act promptly did not alleviate the situation. In fact it made it worse as the population saw Western indifference as part and parcel of a policy of non-intervention when no vital Western interests are at stake. It was only when the conflict risked spreading into a regional conflagration did the West seek to end the hostilities. Still, even the negotiated Brioni Accord nor the recent Vance-Owen Plan will not work "in a country where deceit is the most common political currency".9 Perhaps though they feign ignorance and shock because they either have no clue how to solve the situation or genuinely cannot identify the problem or problems.

To state that nationalism alone is the problem or root of it is a gross oversimplification. This explanation does not offer reasons why the conflict has not spread to areas such as Slovenia, or why the split between the Czech and Slovaks occurred without bloodshed. Nor does this solution reveal why it was a majority of ethnic Russians which voted for secession and identify themselves as "citizens of Lithuania". To effectively grasp the question in hand nationalism itself must be examined. It must be sufficiently defined and applied in context to the area both generally and specifically. This entails highlighting the characteristics of nationalism; their role in ethnic tension during the Second World War and after; the differences, if any, with Western style nationalism; why nationalist tensions appear isolated to select "zones of conflict" while surrounding areas, with equal potential for violence, are not experiencing separatist tendencies; what Western policy in the region has been and, more importantly, what direction such policy should take regarding nationalism if mounting pressure in the Balkans is to be alleviated.

Selecting a point from which to begin is always difficult, particularly when dealing with the Balkans.10 However, to fully appreciate the folly of Western policy in

8 "Civil War Claim" *The Times* 29 November, 1990, and for a view that despite this prior knowledge nothing was done see, Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War* (London: Mandarin Press, 1994); "Whatever the CIA may have read in the tea leaves, the Administration and especially the State Department were unwilling to face up to the prospect of the disintegration of a country into whose stability so much effort and so many tax dollars had been put."; at p.44.
10 For a comprehensive overview of the area which displays western interest and power policy see Schevill, *Op. Cit.* particularly part three; "The Epoch of Liberation, the 19th century", pp. 293-407., Felix Gilbert and David C. Large, *The End of the European Era: 1890 to Present* (New York, New
the Balkans, it is best to survey the Western or Allied policy at the outbreak, during and immediately after the Second World War. Here the West, specifically Churchill and Roosevelt, though their intentions may have been otherwise, were predisposed to side with anti-fascist rather than anti-Communist elements in the Balkans. The consequence being a disregarding of nationalist needs, territorial or otherwise and later, open hostility towards [in the wake of the Cold War] the very same regimes the West indirectly helped to create with failed policy which even today it does not adequately align. Understanding the culpability of Western policy towards the Balkans is best expressed by Jonathan Eyal who states;

The West's biggest mistake was to assume that nationalist aspirations could be reasoned away. Nationalism remains potent and can be harness by every political ideology precisely because it is not a rational feeling. Pleas of economic necessity are useless if only because nationalism feeds on the myth of triumph over adversity and sagas of epic struggle.11

Although writing in reference to the current situation in the former Yugoslavia, Eyal's statement properly reflects Western short-sightedness of policy whether used today or fifty years ago. This statement does not imply however that circumstances are identical, hence outcome is equally clear. Rather, it should be understood that the factors which were the cause of warfare in the Balkans this century, nationalist ambitions and poor policy, are exhibiting themselves in similar means. They must be dealt with therefore with the methods which will account for nationalist and separatist needs if they are to be contained, or more precisely, if they are to be prevented from developing into violent conflict, as has happened in Bosnia. A review of the history will show that the recent debacle is not a new phenomena and, more importantly, should have surprised no one in the West.

1.1.1 The Case of Bosnia

A brief look at the history of Bosnia demonstrates how the aforementioned qualities have been perverted and resulted into the present day morass. 'Given the march of nationalism elsewhere in Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that the different ethnic groups in Bosnia likewise embraced. Each saw his group identity under threat from the others. This was not politics, but a preparation for a possible war.'12 Since no group claimed an outright majority [Muslims-43%, Serbs-32%, Croats-17%], it seemed inevitable that Bosnia would degenerate into conflict.13 The history of the

11 Jonathen Eyal The Independent 17 December, 1992
and, Stephen F. Larabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans", Survival vol. 34 #2 (Summer, 1992)
region has, unfortunately, placed Bosnia in a position, both geographically and, to an
equal sense, politically, which saw it as a bone of contention between Serbs and
Croats.

Historically, the inhabitants of Bosnia trace their ancestry to the Slav invasions
of the C6th and C7th AD. The Slavs came in large numbers, possibly from Southern
Russia and the Caucasuses. They were able to displace the earlier inhabitants, the
Illyrians. The latter were made up of a series of tribes which moved into the Balkans
well before the Slavs, sometime around 1500 BC.14 Of the two tribes which settled
into the region, the Albanoi continued southward once the Slavs arrived, eventually
settling in present day Kosova and Albania. The other tribe, the Delmatae, moved
west, towards the Adriatic coastline taking up residence on that strip of coast which
still bears a variation of the tribe's name, Dalmatia. The Slavs, descendants of latter
day Serbs and Croats recruited the indigenous tribes for assistance against, first the
Romans, and later the Byzantines, the latter which launched a series of raids well into
the C9th AD. Given the terrain and the concerted effort, the Slavs were able to
dominate the area for several centuries until the arrival of the Ottomans during the
C14th and C15th.15 During the interim, Bosnia experienced the only moment of
kingdom it would have in its long history. The creation and expansion of the medieval
Bosnian state occurred from the latter part of the C12th until the latter C14th. Three
rulers marked this period when Bosnia was expanded to include the territory to the
south, Hum [Hercegovina].16

The arrival of the Ottomans was due to their desire to acquire the region, rich
with minerals and exploit its strategic location both for economic and military
purposes. Muslim and Arab traders and merchants were no stranger to Bosnia, arriving
as early as the C9th.17 With the growing power of the Hungarian empire to the north,
seemed that Bosnia would no longer survive as a medieval state. The Sultan’s
armies conquered most of Hercegovina and Bosnia by the Summer of 1463. King
Mathias of Hungary, however, was able to drive the Turks south, past present day
Jajce. The fear, however, of the Slav inhabitants of losing themselves within the
Hungarian empire made the former not assist Mathias in maintaining his advantage.
The Ottomans continued to pressure the resisting forces and eventually succeeded in
conquering the Hungarian army in 1527.18

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14 Chevill, op.cit.; pp.25-30., and, Nicolas K. Martis, The Falsification of Macedonian History
15 Dusko Doder, "New War, Old Hatreds", Foreign Policy #91 (Summer, 1993): pp.5-6., and, Brogan
(1990), op.cit.: p.145., and, Peter Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign
16 Malcolm (1994), op.cit.: p.13., The rulers were; Ban Kulin [1180-1204], Stephen Kotromanic
[1322-1353], Stephen Tvrko [1353-1391]
17 Malcolm (1994), op.cit.: p.43., and, Chevill, op.cit.: pp.175-177., and, Philip Robins, Turkey and
Consolidating their gains, the Ottomans set up an administrative system which relied heavily upon the local population for oversight and support with coercion, if necessary, provided by the Sultan's armies. The treatment afforded the inhabitants of Bosnia; land, title, and education of the male youth in the Sultan's service, resulted in a gradual Islamisation of the local population, a process which took perhaps one-hundred fifty years and accounts for the present day Muslim Slav population of Bosnia. 19

The Ottoman administration of the region continued for the next two centuries, without many disturbances from the Hungarians, up until the early part of the CI9th. With its internal structure showing signs of stress and corruption, especially within the military, several of the indigenous peoples of the Balkans began to express desires for independence from Ottoman control. The Greek War of Independence was successful [1823] with British assistance, while Serbs similarly expressed a wish to revive their once great CI4th Serbian empire of Stefan Dusan. 20 Bosnia also sought to escape the control of the Turks but were not as successful as the Greeks and, later, the Serbs would be. Action taken by the Sultan against the semi-independent Muslim warlords throughout the 1820s and early 1830s saw Mostar, Banja Luka and Sebrenica regularly invaded and occupied by the Sultan's troops. 21 While the Greeks had the support of Great Britain and the Serbs had the support of Russia, their Orthodox Slav brethren, the Bosnian Muslims, unfortunately, had no European power which either, recognised their very existence, or felt inclined to sponsor their drives against the Porte. 22

This position became painfully evident by the Congress of Berlin [1878]. The European powers sought to limit Russia's new-found influence in the Balkans and, more importantly, to repudiate the earlier Treaty of San Stefano [1878] which had created a Greater Bulgarian state, and had placed much of Bosnia at the mercy of Serbia. 23 Agreeing that minorities, especially Serbs would be protected by legislative reform, Bosnia-Hercegovina would remain, according to the Great Powers, part of the Ottoman empire yet was to be administered by the Austro-Hungarian empire. The latter believed it would be welcomed by the Bosnian Muslims, however, this was not to be the case. Baron Joseph Filipovic, a Croat, was sent at the head of an Austro-Hungarian army numbering more than 80,000 men. 24 The Croats became wary of

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22 ‘During the Greek Revolution of 1821, England interpreted the Tsar’s desire to protect the Christian population of the collapsing Ottoman Empire as the first stage of Russia’s attempt to conquer Egypt. With British interests at stake, Castlereagh did not hesitate to appeal to the Tsar...’ See, Henry Kissinger (1994), op. cit.; p.89.
increasing Serb power since the early to mid-C19th. The Croats were concerned, with good reason, that Serbian dreams of a Greater Serbia included parts of Croatian territory and land within Bosnia which the Croats felt was rightfully theirs even if they too were administered by the Austro-Hungarians. In an effort to distance themselves from the Serbs, and as an opportunity to exercise authority over them, many Croats took to military service within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Filipovic was but one example. Although the Bosnians put up fierce resistance, they were eventually defeated and occupied by October, 1878.

Rule within the Austro-Hungarian empire had not been pleasant for the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Ruled by a military governor in Sarajevo, the empire was required to maintain a force ranging between 15,000 and 20,000 men in Bosnia-Hercegovina to put down the periodic outbursts of violence during the latter C19th and early C20th. Protesting Austro-Hungarian legislation, Bosnian Muslims found themselves hindered in religious practice, heavily taxed, forced into conscription and inundated with a heavy bureaucracy and Customs Union which made it difficult for the local population to conduct trade. The Austro-Hungarians, however, did recognise the importance of agriculture and set up 'model farms' throughout the region, particularly in and around Mostar. The success of these farms and their habitation by large numbers of Muslims led some local leaders to seize an opportunity at greater autonomy. One such leader, Mula Mustafa Dzabic sought, in 1899, the establishment of an autonomous Vakuf Assembly. [vakuf was the name given to a small agricultural administrative unit within the empire] A series of such assemblies, it was hoped, could constitute a Provincial Assembly with delegates from each vakuf. Dzabic and other local leaders were able to organise and send delegates to Budapest to plead their case by the Summer of 1900.

It was at this time that Finance Minister of Bosnia, Benjamin Kallay [1882-1903], felt that the growing political moves from both Serbs and Croats signalled danger for the integrity of Bosnia, even though it technically did not exist, except as a minority within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Kallay, along with Dzabic and others, including most of the local Muslim clergy, rejected any notion that 'Bosnians' did not exist and were in fact nothing but Serbs or Croats. The Austro-Hungarian empire,

25 Alex Dragnitch, op. cit.: p.21.
26 Jelavich, op. cit.: p.59.
27 The actual occupation of the provinces was accomplished only with great difficulty...The military occupation was carried through divisions of the Croatian Thirteenth Army Corps, stationed in Croatia, under the command of General Josip Filipovic. He set up a provisional government, staffed largely by Croatian civil servants... Ibid, pp.59-60.
30 'The most controversial aspect of the Hapsburg policy during the Kallay administration was the treatment of the national question....With the increasing emphasis on the national origin, the great
while not actively supportive of the vakufs and the Muslim clergy, nonetheless made little or no attempts to stop them since they sought to counter Serb designs in the region and Bulgar ones in the south, both of which Austro-Hungary felt were actively sponsored by the czar in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the Hungarian governor of Croatia recognised the difficulty in governing a land with both Serbs and Croats, both of which continued to harbour dreams of ancient kingdoms. The governor deliberately set Serbs against Croats and vice-versa through a series of legislation that antagonised both.

The Serbs, without an outlet to the sea and bitter over not being able to exploit such an opportunity in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Dalmatia, saw relations with Austro-Hungary deteriorate in the early C20th, culminating in the ‘pig war’ of 1906. With their own power perhaps waning, and growing unrest among the large numbers of ethnic minorities within their borders, Austro-Hungary decided to consolidate its position in the Balkans, at Serbia’s intense displeasure. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Baron von Aehrenthal announced the full annexation of Bosnia on 5 October, 1908. In Belgrade, ultra-nationalists which believed fully in Ilja Garasanin’s memorandum [Nacertanje], were outraged by Austro-Hungary’s move. Garasanin, a former Serbian Interior Minister, published Nacertanje in 1844. It called for the re-establishment of Greater Serbia, which included Bosnia. The ultra-nationalists moved quickly establishing several ‘secret societies’ which campaigned for a Greater Serbia, often through terrorist methods. Two of the more notorious, Narodna Odbrana [National Defence] and Crn Ruka [The Black Hand], called on Serbia to declare war on Austro-Hungary. The government in Belgrade was tempted, given its question in Bosnian politics was the nationality of the Muslims, who were Slavic and Serbo-Croatian speaking. Both Serbs and Croats put forth claims to these people’, Kallay served from June, 1882 until 1903 as head of the Bosnian administration for the Hapsburgs with the title of Consul-General

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32 Vienna abolished direct control of the Military Frontier [the Krajina] which had a large Serb population and incorporated it within Croatia by 1881. From 1883 to 1903, Count Karoly Khuen-Hedervary was ban [governor] of Croatia. He was a Hungarian landowner who, unlike previous bans who were anti-Serb, became pro-Serb and anti-Croat. This antagonised relations between Croats and Serbs in the Krajina and between Croats and the newly independent Serbian state. See, Jelavich, op. cit. - pp. 66-68.
33 Serbia’s chief export to Austro-Hungary was pigs. The empire, seeking to restrict Serbia’s movements after the latter sought alternative markets and was unsuccessful, restricted all livestock trade in the latter half of 1905, precipitating a crisis in Belgrade. See, Malcolm (1994), op. cit.; p.150.
34 The Austro-Hungarian and Turkish governments completed the formal agreements in February, 1909. Austro-Hungary received full rights over Bosnia and would have to guarantee full freedom of religion for Bosnian Muslims and pay 2.5million Turkish pounds to Istanbul. See, Malcolm (1994), op. cit.; p.151
36 “The intensification of Serbian national sentiment prior to World War I had led to the formation of two societies. The first, the Narodna Odbrana... was founded in December 1908 at the time of the
recent tensions with both Vienna and Budapest, yet was advised against doing so by Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister. Russia believed that in the Great Power scheme of things it would not be able to assist Serbia and, moreover, would likely encounter resistance from Britain and Germany, both of which still remained committed to denying Russia or her surrogate Serbia access to the sea.  

With full annexation over Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Dual Monarchy sought to initiate reform which, it was hoped by Budapest, would allay the nationalist concerns of Bosnia's ethnic minorities. This was not to be the case. The Serbs and Croats within Bosnia, most likely with assistance from ultra-nationalists in Belgrade, [a situation hauntingly all too familiar] set up their own political organisations. The Serbian National Organisation [1907] and the Croatian National Organisation [1908], though they had their differences, saw a common enemy in the Bosnian Muslims. Croats too, grew to resent control from Budapest and moved into a series of political alliances within Bosnia via these cultural/political organisations with aims at creating a common Slav state. After 1910, students within Bosnia rallied anti-Hapsburg sentiment into a common pro-Yugoslav [south Slav] campaign. It was from these efforts that Mlada Bosna [Young Bosnia] was born.  

The outbreak of the First and Second Balkan Wars [1912-1913] saw many of these students volunteer for service in the Serbian Army. Following the outcome of the wars, Serbia was nearly doubled in size as Serbs even acquired what they most sought, access to the sea, by seizing and holding large tracts of land on the Albanian coastline from north near the Montenegrin border south almost to Durres. The Serbs and the student volunteers from Mlada Bosna took the opportunity to kill thousands of Albanians, Pomaks [Slav Bulgars] and Turks during these campaigns, something Albanians would not forget later during both the First and Second World Wars, when retribution would be at hand. The military governor of Bosnia, General Potiorek was,
however, strongly anti-Serb and committed to keeping Serb gains as minimal as possible. Following the Treaty of London [30 May, 1913], Austro-Hungary, on Potiorek's advice, abjured Serbian gains by instead supporting the claims of Albanian statehood, declared on 28 November, 1912, thus denying Belgrade of the prize she most wanted and had fought hard for, the Albanian coastline.42 It was this series of events which set the stage for a continued deterioration of Serb-Austro-Hungarian relations and for a student leader of Mlada Bosna, Gavro Princip, to assassinate the heir to the Hapsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June, 1914.43 By 28 July, 1914 Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia and precipitated the First World War.

1.1.2 The First World War and the Peace

The disruption of the status quo on the Continent, especially in the Balkans, drew in alliances which had previously been established for strictly 'defensive purposes'. By the beginning of the C20th two such major alliances sought to maintain continuity in the Balkans by balancing off competing interests and not caving in to ethnic demands unless prudent or no other solution was evident or possible. The Dual Alliance incorporated Germany, the strongest military power, and Austro-Hungary. The second bloc, the Triple Entente consisted of Russia and France while Britain had signed individual treaties with both nations in 1904 and 1907 respectfully. Great Britain knew that Russia had long desired access to the sea and saw itself as the protector of Orthodox Slavs throughout the Balkans. Britain was concerned, however, that by not allying itself with Russia, it would witness the continued growing power of Germany threaten British interests in the Lowland countries. Hence it was the invasion of neutral Belgium [4 August, 1914] which precipitated Britain's entry into the war and confirmed British suspicions of Germany's intentions.44 Yet, as the period after W.W.II demonstrated, as it too consisted of two power blocs on the Continent, both the Alliance and the Entente did not clearly delineate the respective spheres of

42 'The Serbs were less successful in their demand for Albanian territory which would give them direct access to the Adriatic Sea. The great powers, meeting with the Balkan nations in London, forced Serbia and Montenegro to accept the creation of an independent Albania. Serbia remained cut off from the Adriatic.' See, Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era, 1890 to Present 4th edition (New York, New York: WW Norton, 1991): p.112.
44 'During the critical week before the German violation of Belgian neutrality, the Conservatives had favored the participation of Britain because of its ties with France and its interest in maintaining the balance of power.' Gilbert, op.cit.; p.118., and, With the French Navy on the Mediterranean, the entire coastline of northern France would be wide open to the German Navy if Great Britain had stayed out of the war. See, Kissinger (1994), op.cit.; pp.212-213.
influence in present day Yugoslavia, a situation which continues to haunt both the West and Russia as they compete for influence in Bosnia.45

The military campaigns in the Balkans served as a side-show to the main battles being fought on the Continent. With the Great Powers mired in a stalemate along northern France's trenches, and the now realisation that the war would continue for quite some time, Balkan nations were seen as allies which, though small, might be able to tilt the balance. Indeed, the Serbs, well-seasoned fighters from the Balkan Wars were able, with Russian assistance, to drive back Austro-Hungarian troops in the latter part of 1914, recapturing Belgrade by December, 1914.46 The Serbs, however, suffered heavy casualties throughout 1915 and with the Turks in the war on the side of the Germans, [November 1915] Allied shipping lanes through the Near East and Dardanelles were closed to re-supply convoys.47 The disastrous military campaigns at the Dardenelles and Gallipoli hurt the Allied cause and gave Italy, which remained neutral, ample opportunity to negotiate for land in present day Yugoslavia, Istria and Dalmatia, and Albania, specifically the ports of Sazan and Vlore.48 The Allies were caught in a quandary. Promising Istria and Dalmatia to Italy would deny Serbia, an ally, access to the sea. Britain and France, however, began to recognise weakening Russian support, the Serbs in full retreat towards Corfu, and losses in the Near East to the Turks. Although against Russian wishes, Britain and France promised Italy what she wanted. The latter entered the war on the Allied side in May, 1915.49

Bulgaria at first remained neutral yet was of strategic importance to both sides. Seeking to regain its losses in Macedonia and Dobrudja, and thereby recreate San Stefano, they eventually joined Germany by early 1915. In a massive military campaign, Serbia's capital Belgrade fell during the Winter of 1915 and Montenegro followed by January, 1916.50 The move by Bulgaria swayed the last two neutral Balkan countries, Greece51 and Romania52, to enter the war on the Allied side since a

45 The Russian ambassador to Sofia sent a telegram to Russia stating that if Russia backed down; 'our presence in the Slav world and in the Balkans would perish never to return.' in, Kissinger (1994), op cit., p.214., and, Sergei Goraychcv "interview on CNN", op cit., regarding spheres of influence in the region.
46 An attempt was made in February and March, 1915 by the French and British Navies to force a passage through the Dardenelles. It failed as both navies lost many ships. See, Jelavich, op cit., pp.115-117., and, Gilbert, op cit.; p.129., and, Schevill, op cit.; pp.491-492.
47 Schevill, op cit.; p.492.
48 Jelavich, op cit.; p. 117.
50 Schevill, op cit.; pp.492-493.
51 After Bulgaria entered the war, the Allies put pressure on Greece to assist Serbia. Greece was obliged to do so by the treaty she signed in 1913. Tensions between the government and the King forced the Premier, Venizelos to leave Athens and form a government recognised by the Allies in Thessaloniki. By June, 1917, King Constantine, under severe internal pressure surrendered his throne to his second son Alexander. Venizelos returned to Athens, formed a government and declared war the same month [June, 1917] Jelavich, op cit.; p.121.
52 Romania in 1914 was linked with the Central Powers by a defensive alliance treaty signed in 1913. King Charles favoured honouring the commitment but was opposed by Ion C. Bratianu, the Premier.
‘Greater Bulgaria’ would threaten them both through territorial concessions. Serb losses during the winter campaign of 1915 were enormous. They suffered a loss of more than forty percent of their military corps as they marched without food or supplies through Albania in full retreat. Many Albanians saw this as a golden opportunity to repay the Serbs for their actions during the First and Second Balkan Wars. Eventually the Serbs made it to Corfu where they were evacuated by Allied ships. The Serbs regrouped and managed to create a government-in-exile with Prince Regent Alexander and his Premier, Nicola Pasic.

As for the Bosnians, resentment with Austro-Hungarian rule saw many join the Serbian Army before the Winter retreat of 1915. Confusion surrounded the Bosnian Muslims, however, as they had no great love for the Serbs. Many more remained loyal to the Austro-Hungarians, joining the ranks of the army while Bosnian Croats were caught in the same quandary, join the Austro-Hungarians who they disliked, side with the Serbs, or remain neutral. In the Balkans, though, history has shown that neutrality is usually the worst option and does not guarantee integrity. This characteristic has been engrained upon the collective psyche of the local populace who feel, and continue to do so today, that it is better to fight and continue fighting for what is sought, since neutrality and a cessation of hostilities will most likely lead to an imposed settlement which is likely to destroy both integrity and identity.

With the war nearing its end, the Austro-Hungarian crown sought to increase the level of autonomy for Bosnia, either within the empire or within a Greater Croatia. By the late Spring of 1918, however, such proposals were moot. With the US having entered the war and Allied gains reversing losses incurred by the Central Powers, the idea of a ‘South-Slav state’ of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes began to take hold. Muslim leaders in Bosnia became bitter over proposals by both sides. They, led by a former Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Mehmed Spaho, felt, however, that the creation of a Yugoslav state would at least remove Austro-Hungarian rule and perhaps enable Muslims to receive some autonomy. By October, 1918 the National Council of Bosnia met with the Croat and Serbian leaders to declare the First National Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina [3 November, 1918].

The latter exploited the advantage by signing agreements with Russia for Translyvania and Bukovina in exchange for the allowance of goods and supplies from Romania. Charles died in October, 1914. His successor, Ferdinand, his nephew, was pro-French making it easier for Romania to join the allies. Ibid, pp.118-120.

Laffan, op.cit.; p.224.

IBID


Conversation with Dr. Dilaver Sidakaj, Professor of C20th European History University of Tirana at Pembroke College Cambridge University Anglo-Albanian Seminar, (28-30 March, 1994)


Ibid, p.162.,and, 'The situation in the Balkans and eastern Europe held two particular dangers for the stability of Europe as a whole. Democracy there had succumbed because of contrasts between nationalities...' Gilbert, op.cit.; p.172.
army to Bosnia, however, was not welcomed with open arms, as many Serbs felt the Muslims were, not only historic enemies, but had also assisted Austro-Hungary. At Versailles, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points believed, ‘the aim would be a just peace based on self-determination and conciliation between the victor and the vanquished.’

This position would suit those defeated since many Allies, including Italy and Greece, felt that concessions and secret treaties should now be carried out. While concessions were offered, the Allies, especially Wilson, remained committed to the notion of self-determination. When the final agreements were signed Romania, for example, received Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina in the Treaty of Trianon. [1920] The creation of the Yugoslav state, dominated by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came into existence on 1 December, 1918 in Belgrade. The type of political system was to be decided by a secret ballot. The Montenegrin National Council in Paris endorsed the idea and even accepted that the Yugoslav state would be a constitutional monarchy under the Karadjordjevic dynasty of Prince Regent Alexander, despite the objections of the Montenegrin King, Nicolas, who had escaped during the war to Italy. The key question became whether the new Yugoslav state would be ‘unified and centralised’ as the Serbian exiled Premier Nicola Pasic had wanted, or would it be a loosely organised and decentralised state, as Bosnian Muslim leader Mehmed Spaho wanted. Spaho and many of his Muslim supporters found allies in the Bosnian Croats and from Croats in Croatia. Both the former, and their leader, Josip Sunaric, and the latter sought a confederal Yugoslavia which would give Bosnia ‘autonomous unit’ status within the Slav state and, more importantly, remove power from centralists in Belgrade. Bosnian Serbs, much like those fighting today, felt that Pan-Serbianism included a central state controlled from Belgrade and believed in the incorporation of Bosnia to Serbia.

1.1.3 The Inter-War Years

Yugoslavia, like other post-war states in the Balkans, suffered through many early problems. The country-wide elections were held on 20 November, 1920. Spaho’s Yugoslav Muslim Organisation Party won twenty-four seats in the

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59 Jelavich, op.cit., p.122.
61 Brogan (1990), op.cit., p.149.
62 Jelavich, op.cit., pp.143-144.
65 Gilbert, op.cit., p.158.
66 ’The 1918-1945 period in Yugoslav history is the key to an understanding of the current political situation in the country as far as the crucial Serbo-Croat aspect of the national question is concerned. The post-war communist phase either suppressed or mismanaged the national question.’ Zametica, op.cit., p.9.
Constituent Assembly. With Serb, Croat and Slovene political parties all vying for
dominance and/or influence, Spaho was able to manipulate the situation and receive for
Muslims, land reform, as well as other rights and concessions from the other Yugoslav
political parties. However, Spaho and Bosnia had to pay for the concessions. The
Serbs managed to pass, with Muslim acquiescence, a centralist Constitution through
Parliament, fittingly for Serbs, on 28 June, 1921, the 532nd year anniversary of the
Battle of Kosova. Yugoslavia was reorganised into thirty-three administrative units or
oblasts. Bosnia maintained its territorial identity yet the reorganisation did succeed in
fomenting unrest between Zagreb and Belgrade, which was to continue throughout the
inter-war years and during World War II. In the political wrangling which ensued
between Croatia and Serbia, the Bosnian Muslims usually sided with the Croats, fearful
of power accumulation and manipulation by Belgrade. Worse still, Bosnians were still
referred to as either ‘Muslim Serbs’ or ‘Muslim Croats’ even though many delegates to
Parliament willingly accepted such references.

The issue over centralisation and decentralisation would dominate Yugoslav
politics throughout the 1920s. Even the government of Monsignor Korosec, a Slovene
which formed a coalition with Spaho’s party, was not enough to dissuade the ever
growing rift between Zagreb and Belgrade. The centralists, led by Nicola Pasic,
could not maintain a government coalition and were forced to dissolve when Spaho
removed his party from the coalition government in 1924. Distrust, mutual suspicion
and a series of interim governments often in power not long enough to make any
impact, typified Yugoslav politics during the 1920s and early 1930s.

‘Yugoslavia had the most complex internal history of any Balkan nation at this
time, and its problems illustrate many of the basic difficulties and contradictions in the
national movements.’ The Croatians and Slovenes never accepted the centralist
Constitution passed by Pasic and his Serbian Radical Party. The Serbs had achieved
dominance within the new Yugoslav state but at a high price. Opposition from the
Croatian Peasant Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation made it increasingly
difficult for any future legislation to pass through Parliament without vicious objections
by non-Serb parties that felt most legislation initiated by Pasic would benefit only
Serbs. Despite elections in March, 1923, neither Croats nor Serbs were able to attain
an outright majority. Tensions increased as Pasic, in his position as Premier, had

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68 For a breakdown of the interwar elections see Joseph S Roucek, *Balkan Politics: International
69 Jelavich, *op.cit.*: p.149, ‘Exploiting the antagonistic Serb and Croat stands, the Slovenes and the
Bosnian Muslims were able to strengthen their influence in the political system.
71 ‘Within months the Croats began to feel betrayed. Instead of Hungarian overlords, they had a
Serbian King, his army, police, administration, and the Orthodox church. Yugoslav politics quickly
degenerated into tribalism.’ Doder, *op.cit.*: pp.10-11.
73 IBID, p.143.
Croatian Peasant Party leader Stephen Radic arrested after the latter returned from a meeting in Moscow in the Summer of 1924 of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. Accused of conspiring with communists, Radic’s arrest only heightened animosity between Serbs and Croats, with Muslims and Slovenes caught in the middle.

The death of Pasic [December, 1926], and of Radic [who was shot in Parliament by another MP, 28 June, 1928], did not allay tensions. Croatians believed that Radic’s murder had been a conspiracy to coincide with Vivodvan’s Day [28 June]. Riots in Zagreb and Croatian delegates walking out of Parliament forced King Alexander into drastic action. On 6 June, 1929, he ended Constitutional rule, dissolved Parliament, abolished political parties and ruled by decree until his assassination in 1934. The King also reorganised the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by first renaming his kingdom Yugoslavia, and second, by redrawing internal boundaries. ‘Banovinas’, a Croat term, were drawn up with a ban, or governor, appointed by the King to administer each banovina. Alexander’s moves, however, did little save confirm Muslim and Croatian suspicions that a Serb conspiracy was behind the entire Yugoslav mess. Muslims had little recourse while Croats, led by Ante Pavelic, began to mobilise political support. Pavelic left Yugoslavia during the early 1930s for Italy and, with Mussolini’s assistance, established the Ustashe movement, a political organisation which called for the creation of an independent Croatian state. From Italy, with Hungarian assistance, Ustashe agents were successful in assassinating King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934.

The regent Prince Paul, acting on behalf of King Peter [then only 11], ended rule by decree and called for new elections in 1935. He appointed Milan Stojadinovic, a Serb, as Premier. Stojadinovic together with Korosec, the leader of the Slovene Catholic People’s Party and Spaho formed a coalition which lasted until February, 1939, when the latter two withdrew support. Prince Paul then appointed Dragisa Cvetkovic in Stojadinovic’s place. Cvetkovic and Vlatko Macek, Radic’s successor, recognised the growing influence of Croats within the new international climate. With Hitler’s moves into Czechoslovakia [1938], and Pavelic gaining increasing support for his Ustashe movement in both Rome and Berlin, Cvetkovic knew that Croats would seek greater autonomy. Over the initial objections of Prince Paul, negotiations began for a tripartite federal structure of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. Bosnia was to be carved up with only two small banovinas left to signify what was once Bosnia. The Sporazum [Agreement] was concluded by August, 1939.

74 ZaMetica, op.cit.; p.84.
76 Ibid p.169., and, Brogan (1990), op.cit.; p.150.
77 Brogan (1990), op.cit.; pp.150-152.
79 Xhudo (Winter, 1993), op.cit.; p.316.
80 Jelavich, op.cit.; pp.203-204.
Bosnian Muslims had little recourse. Their champion for equal, or at worse, semi-equal status, Mehmed Spaho, died in June, 1939. His replacement, Dzafer Kulenovic, could not accomplish much and was ignored by both Croat and Serb leaders. With Hitler on the march and Britain committed to maintaining the integrity of Poland, signs on the horizon pointed to another massive military showdown on the Continent. The Italian invasion of Albania in 1939 did not bode well for Yugoslavia. With access to the sea denied, Germans on their northern border, and Croats becoming more vocal in their demands for outright independence, Yugoslavia was pressured into joining the Tripartite Pact led by Germany, and followed Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, which also joined. The annexation of Austria [1936], invasion of Czechoslovakia [1938], the fall of Albania [1939], the surrender of France [1940], and the attack upon Greece [1940] left Prince Paul little choice but to capitulate to Hitler's demands. Yugoslavia officially signed the Pact in March, 1941.

2.0 BIG POWER POLICY TOWARD THE BALKANS

The outbreak of World War II did very little to set a fixed policy towards the Balkans. The British called for armed resistance to the Axis powers and their puppet regimes established throughout the area. By this time however it was primarily the communist groups that were the best equipped and organised to fight both the Germans and the Italians. Most of these bands though were not quick to react against the Axis, particularly in light of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Certainly, COMINTERN activity in the Balkans was an accepted fact throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s. Ideologically, the pact presented problems. These groups received their orders [and a handful of their leaders training] from, Moscow. Now they had to reconcile an agreement with a fascist government contrary to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Most accepted Moscow's reasoning that such an accord was necessary to preserve the USSR and stave off a Nazi attack, giving Moscow time to prepare. With the attack on the Soviet Union and the United States entry into the war, these communist groups received de-facto recognition as anti-fascist guerrillas by the same Allies they had earlier condemned. Still receiving their orders from the COMINTERN,

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81 IBID
82 Gilbert, op. cit.: p.328., and, Hitchens, op. cit.: p.135.
83 Roucek, op. cit.: pp.105-106.
84 For such concerns and reasoning see, Phyllis Aty (1974), op. cit.: pp.175-179., Stephen Clissold, [ed.] Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: A Documentary Survey 1939-1973 (Oxford: University Press, 1975): 'the Fifth Yugoslav Party Conference, October, 1940, It has become clear as day that the English and French imperialists have not unleashed the conflagration of war in defence of freedom, democracy, and independence of the small nations, but in order to defend their own colonial dominions and hegemony...', at p.30., For Soviet interests in the Balkans see "Russia in the Balkans", in Ivo J. Lederer, [ed.] Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, 1962): Historically, the substance of policy was that Russia should take the lead in both liberating and uniting the Slavic peoples under an all embracing federation across Southeastern and Eastern Europe., at p.26.
these groups were instructed to co-operate with both British and American agents sent to mobilise resistance and with other anti-fascist, though be it, non-communist factions. Moscow soon learned, however, that interests among Balkan communist groups were not always uniform with COMINTERN policy.

Here the Soviets received their first taste of Balkan politics, for the relationship between Balkan Communist parties...in many ways mirrored the complexities of traditional Balkan nationalisms...The difficulty was that Balkan Communists were as divided over nationalist issues as their bourgeois foes. 85

By 1940, British interests in the region were severely compromised. Two years earlier they were asked to remove themselves and their claims from Albania. These interests in Albania included a share in Albanian oil fields through Anglo-Persian Oil. Italy's ties with Albania though were stronger dating throughout the 1920s and 1930s during the reign of King Zogu. It was likely then that Albania, in a state of backwardness and totally dependent upon Italy, was pressured by the latter into asking the British to leave Albania thereby securing Italian predominance and interests in Albania. 86 The subsequent Italian invasion of Albania during April, 1939 further endangered British interests in neighbouring Greece, which Mussolini invaded via Albania in October, 1940. Together with Greek resistance, the British were able to repel the Italians. The British stake in the area was lost however as Germany attacked Greece in force while, by February 1941, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia all signed the Tripartite Agreement thereby wholly depriving Britain of her oil, chrome and copper claims to the area. To the British, Greece remained, throughout the war and immediately after, her primary concern. Great Britain's strong partiality towards Greece and her determination to preserve Greece at all costs may be due to three factors. First and foremost was the historical factor. The Greek War of Independence from the Porte [concluded 1832], was due in large part to British support. The latter sought to curb Ottoman influence and prevent the Greeks, Orthodox in tradition, from perhaps turning to tsarist Russia for assistance. British policy, it must be noted, throughout the C19th had been to ensure that Russia secure no land corridor to the Mediterranean. Therefore, full support for Greece was forthcoming. The military aid given by the British instilled in them, a strong sense of responsibility vis-a-vis Greece. With the outbreak of World War II, and Britain still grounded in colonial possessions,

85 Lederer (1962), op. cit.: pp.444-445., Soviet interest in the Balkans was not lessened during the Non-Aggression Pact. See on secret negotiations, Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965): Between November 12th to 14th, 1940, Molotov met with Hitler about a new German-Soviet pact regarding the Balkans. The USSR wanted a base within the Straits on Bulgarian soil along with a withdrawal of German troops from Finland, and Japanese renouncement of all claims to territory in Northern Sakhalin. The Germans refused and the pact was no longer discussed, at pp.184-185.
this sense of responsibility carried over, as did the traditional balance of power politics
that dominated the Foreign Office throughout the war.\textsuperscript{87} Second, economics played its
part. Geostrategically Greece, as a historic seafaring nation itself, offered long
costlines and easy access to the Aegean, Atlantic and Mediterranean Seas. The British
have for long managed to rely upon Greece as the vital link to UK interests throughout
Southeast Europe and North Africa. Lastly, the British elite, specifically the Oxbridge
elites which dominated the Foreign Office had a natural affinity towards the Greeks.
Educated on the classics, it was much easier, and more desirable, to identify themselves
with the civilised historic Greek culture than [to them] the entirely alien culture of
other ethnic groups in the region, especially the Slavs.\textsuperscript{88} With Greece in Axis hands
therefore, Hitler would have a free hand throughout the Mediterranean. Of equal
concern was keeping Turkey pro-British, or at best, neutral.\textsuperscript{89}

Aside from Greece, however, the Western Allies still fumbled to define Balkan
policy. By 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt had outlined the principles for the Atlantic
Charter. These called for; (1) opposition to aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise,
(2) opposition to territorial changes without the freely expressed wishes of the people
cconcerned, and (3) support of the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they all live. It was these principles which Roosevelt and
Churchill were accused of violating ,later, in their concessions to the USSR at Yalta.\textsuperscript{90}

Later that same year, British foreign minister Anthony Eden met with his Soviet
counterpart Molotov in an attempt to witness and report firsthand, Stalin's demands in
eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{91}

Aside from territorial concerns, the Allies [particularly the British] discovered a
host of new problems arising from their relations with both resistance groups within
the Balkan nations and with the collection of waiting governments in exile of these
same nations. The political problems involved in these relationships depended upon
whether there were important resistance groups inside the occupied home territory
which challenged the right of the exiled government to represent the occupied nation.
If there were not any such groups, the resistance presented no political problem. If
there were challenges to the recognised government then the question of succession,

\textsuperscript{87} Schevill, \textit{op.cit.}: pp. 327-341.
\textsuperscript{88} Interview with Mr. M. Mackintosh, former Cabinet advisor on Soviet Affairs to Margaret Thatcher,
(2 February, 1993), and, Almond, \textit{op.cit.}: "It was easier to romanticise the Greeks as the inheritors of
classical civilisation than to find a convenient legend to arouse aesthetic emotions on behalf of the
Serbs.", at p.91.
\textsuperscript{89} Eden, \textit{op.cit.}: p.193.
\textsuperscript{90} John L. Snell, (et al. eds.) \textit{The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of
\textsuperscript{91} Among these were; a) Austria was to be restored to independence, b) Poland was to receive East
Prussia, c) the Sudentenland was to revert to Czechoslovakia, d) Albania should be made
independent...For a full text of the demands see, Forrest C. Pogue, "The Struggle for a New Order", in
Snell, \textit{op.cit.}: p. 12.
restoration, and the big power relations served to complicate the whole situation. In
nations such as Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania these types of 'problems' were
commonplace.

As for the United States, from its entry into W.W.II in 1941 up to 1943, the
Balkans were primarily looked upon from a strictly military stand-point. The position
of the President and his staff was that the Balkans and their troubles were outside the
proper sphere of United States action. Understandings reached at Casablanca in
January 1943 between the Americans and the British had assigned the eastern
Mediterranean as an area of primary British activity. Roosevelt was prepared to give
Churchill a free hand in southeastern Europe as long as the focus remained chiefly
military.

[T]he American preference would be to stay out of the political complications that were
involved in resistance and partisan activities, and let the British take the lead. Two basic
factors counselled such an attitude; first, the British had been involved in European politics
for centuries and had acquired skills, attitudes and policies which would justify a
predominant British political say; second, the numerous European governments-in-exile were
located in London, under the British protection and dependent largely on British financial
support...The American preference, consequently, would be to deal with the various
resistance movements within the framework of purely military considerations, basing
decisions on an estimate of the military contribution that a resistance movement might
make... 94

Military considerations took a backseat, however, to political motives.
American and British political aims often clashed in areas such as Greece, Yugoslavia
and Albania, particularly from early 1943 onwards. For example, a US State
Department memo with respect to Greece, prior to the Cairo Conference stated that
Great Britain may seek to reimpose the Greek monarch George II. Concern was over
Greek opposition which the Americans felt, may turn to the Soviets for help rather
than allow the monarchy to return to Greece. But by the time of the conference in
December, 1943, the positions had rotated fully. It was the US which now sought to
install George II while Great Britain sought his abdication. 95 This attitude towards
King George did not however reduce in the slightest, the British commitment to
Greece, in keeping it out of both Axis and communist hands. In a telegram to the
Prime Minister, Anthony Eden reaffirmed Britain's resolve towards Greece.

As regards general prospects of a Greek campaign, it is, of course, a gamble to send forces to the
mainland of Europe to fight Germans at this time. No one can give a guarantee of success, but...we

92 Norman Kogan, "American Policies Towards European Resistance Movements", in Proceedings of
the Second International Conference on the History of Resistance Movements (Milan, Italy: March
93 IBID, p.90.
94 IBID, p.72.
95 Francis L. Lowenheim, [et al. eds.] Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime
were prepared to run the risk of failure, thinking it better to suffer with the Greeks than to make no attempt to help them. This is the conviction we all hold.  

Such distinctions though between political and military objectives were not made nor recognised by the British. Indeed, British Special Operations Executive [SOE], one of its wartime intelligence units aimed at aiding guerrilla resistance groups, was intensely political. SOE's American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services [OSS], founded in June, 1942 had worked out a division of operations between itself and SOE clandestine missions. OSS would supervise all operations in northwest Africa and the east coast of Asia while SOE was given free run elsewhere. This division of spheres between the US and Great Britain gave to SOE all the problems associated with Balkan politics as easily evidenced by SOE operations in Greece.

The basic problem in Greece was far from simple. Greek politics are notoriously complicated...ELAS and EAM, the political movement that backed it, purported to be nationwide groups struggling for a free Greece, and were in fact being used by the KKE, the Greek communist party, in an attempt to seize power in the teeth of whatever wishes the bulk of the Greek people might have. [Greek army colonel] Zervas movement, EDES, was anti-monarchical, but stood a lot further to the political right than EAM. EDES was the only one of the non-communist dominated Greek resistance armies that managed to stay in the field till the Germans left the country; ELAS took care to swallow all the others up, either defeating them in the field or subverting them without a battle. SOE was valuable to ELAS because it provided arms and money [sovereigns], in the largely mistaken belief that ELAS would use the arms against the Germans. SOE was valuable to EDES because, again, it provided arms and money; and because there were enough SOE officers with EDES just to keep it alive when ELAS launched a major attack on it... 

While Churchill was a staunch anti-Communist, his primary concern remained focused on which group was doing the most damage to the Germans and the Italians in the Balkans? If this meant open as well as material support for a group which was clearly communist, so be it, hoping to perhaps iron out political considerations at a later date. For Greece, however, whether Russia was tsarist or communist, primary concern meant denying it access to the Mediterranean. This involved ensuring a non-communist Greece at all costs.

In Yugoslavia the situation was just as complex as in Greece. The regency of Prince Paul had been overthrown by 27 March, 1941 by General Dusan Simovic who installed the young King Peter to the throne. This move prompted Hitler to invade Yugoslavia on April 6th, 1941 and force its capitulation, Peter's abdication to London,
and Yugoslav partition by 17 April, 1941. As in Greece and Albania, Yugoslavia had its communist resistance group led by Josep Broz Tito, a Croat, and a pro-monarchy resistance group led by army colonel [later general], Draza Mihailovic, a Serb. Aware that nationalist tendencies were high in Yugoslavia and throughout the Balkans, Hitler sought to keep the variety of resistance groups at odds with each other thereby diverting their energies away from the Nazis. In Yugoslavia this meant; the establishment of a puppet regime incorporating Serbia and part of Montenegro, reincorporation of Kosova and most of western Macedonia into a "Greater Albania", the rest of Macedonia into Bulgaria, and the creation of an independent state of Croatia [Ustasi] under Dr. Ante Pavelic. This policy worked well. Fearful that Mihailovic and the King Peter regime represented age old designs for a "Greater Serbia", many 'Yugoslavs' joined Tito and the Partisans. Others, either pro-monarchy, anti-Communist or both sided with Mihailovic and his Cetniks. Still others, especially ultra-nationalist Croats, gave support to the Ustasi regime which began a large scale Serb eradication campaign. The exact number of Serb deaths is in dispute to this day, but has been estimated between 200,000 and 250,000.

It was Tito's partisans though that were the best equipped to fight the Germans and continuously, the Cetniks. This was due to four reasons. First, the communist party of Yugoslavia had received backing and support from the COMINTERN well before the outbreak of the war. Establishment of military units from the political cells was not very difficult then once the war began. Maintaining communist doctrine could be accommodated by the placement of a political commissar within each military unit. Second, the bulk of Tito's officer corps were trained directly by Tito himself, many of which fought with him in the International Brigades during the civil war in Spain several years earlier. This gave Tito an opportunity to solidify his leadership, a leeway not enjoyed by other resistance group leaders who were always on alert for internal dissension and/or coup attempts. Third and most importantly, partisan focus remained, even while warring with Cetniks, in killing the maximum amount of Nazis possible. The Cetniks however, while some were pro-Serb, were to a greater degree anti-Communist rather than anti-German. This led to their occasional collusion with the Germans against the partisans. These actions however did not sit well with the British which then had little choice but to back, with arms and money, the partisan [communist] forces. As the war reached its conclusion these communist groups throughout the Balkans [except for Greece], were in an ideal position to consolidate


101 Glenny (1992), op.cit.: p.81., figures have even been quoted as high as one million. These figures are from Serb sources and are subject to scrutiny.
their positions of power, destroy all opposition, and reject any return of any
government in exile. Lastly, although a Croat, Tito did not limit his recruitment along
ethnic lines. His call to return to each nationality its rightful pre-war boundaries sat
well with many Serbs who saw their republic lose Kosova and Macedonia and were
not willing to fight with the Cetniks who collaborated with Nazis. As the war dragged
on and Germany was losing ground, many Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins also
joined Tito in hopes of being on the winning end and keeping their republic's
boundaries intact.

Before the full backing of Tito's partisans the Allies, including the Soviets,
sought a reconciliation between Tito and Mihailovic. Reasons for the failure are
numerous but can be confined to three arguments. First, simply, Tito saw Mihailovic
as a collaborator and enemy. Seeing Mihailovic as a threat to his power, Tito
sought to discredit him at every opportunity not just to King Peter's government but
more importantly to the British since it was they who were providing material support.
Second, by late 1942 early 1943 the Western press had turned its earlier wartime
attention away from Mihailovic's Cetniks and focused the majority of its stories on
Tito's partisans and their successful campaigns against the Nazis. This led to public
support and, as reports of Cetnik collusion filtered in, made it more difficult to attempt
reconciliation. Third, there were allegations that support for the host of Communist
groups throughout the Balkans was secure due to the pro-Communist leanings present
within key posts at SOE that were responsible for obtaining and passing information

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102 Clissold (1975), op. cit.; A large number of correspondence between Tito and the COMINTERN,
the Soviets and British and the Yugoslav exiled government from November, 1941 through May,
1942 all indicate the desire and problems faced in an attempted Tito-Mihailovic reconciliation.
Moscow asked Tito to unite with Mihailovic against the Germans, 13 November 1941, at pp.133-134.
Tito protested Moscow's radio support of the Cetniks, 25 Nov. 1941, at p.132., Yugoslav Prime
Minister in exile, Jonaovic complained to and called on the Soviets to instruct Tito to cease attacking
Mihailovic, 16 May 1942, at p.135. A more likely explanation though was perhaps that the Soviets
had to appear to give support to the British and US sponsored King Peter government before any Tito
proposed nationalist government. COMINTERN to Tito: April 1942; "it would be politically
opportune for you to [form a government]... through a general approach to the Yugoslav
Government..., [at p.143], World public opinion must first and foremost be mobilised against the
invaders; unmasking the Cetniks [of collaborationist activity] is secondary", at pp. 145-146.
103 Reassessment of the press also points out that much of it was too 'left' if not blatantly pro-
Communist. This may have perhaps been the reason for a host of later known misinformation of
events. For example, by early October, 1943 Mihailovic's Cetniks blew up several bridges over the
Drina River and a vital rail link between Serbia and Bosnia to the Adriatic killing more than 100
Bulgarian soldiers and were able to capture Visegrad with over 300 Nazi casualties. Such events were
witnessed by Brigadier C.D. Armstrong, British Liaison Officer [BLO] with Mihailovic. The BBC
radio reported that it was Tito's forces that accomplished all this. Armstrong radioed SOE Cairo but
neither were changes made nor reasons given as to why such a radio report was given. see David
Martin, "Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder: Pre-Cursor to the Yugoslav Tragedy", Journal of Intelligence
intelligence mission head verified such testimony after his stint in Yugoslavia, August 1944, that
most towns in Serbia were liberated by Mihailovic forces. None of this was heard by the outside world
especially since by this time, the British were firmly committed to Tito., IBID, p.428.
along to SOE London and eventually the Foreign Office. Although this latter explanation sits well with certain BLOs and conspiracy theorists, [even if it contains partial or whole truths], it certainly cannot provide the causal link as the determining factor for policy eventually adopted by the Foreign Office. Indeed rationale for supporting Tito was far simpler than most would imagine. To spurn communist help, when the principal communist power, Tito's partisans, was gradually grinding the Wehrmacht into the mud and dust of the eastern front was not likely to bring the day of victory any closer. Brig. Fitzroy MacLean's depiction of events in Yugoslavia sums up Britain's attitude towards the resistance groups and who to support. After MacLean conveyed his convictions about the politics of Tito's partisans to Churchill he was told that as long as the Nazis remained a threat, attention cannot be diverted to consideration of long term policy or effects. Upon further expressing his concern that the Communist partisans would become the decisive political factor after the war in Yugoslavia the Prime Minister chided MacLean;

'Do you intend,' he asked, 'to make Yugoslavia your home after the war?' 'No Sir', I replied. 'Neither do I', he said. 'And, that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide. What interests us is, which of them is doing the most harm to the Germans?'

2.1 THE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

By the end of 1943 and throughout 1944 Churchill came to the realisation that there was very little the British could do presently regarding the forms of government pursued by the resistance groups in the Balkans. It was by early May, 1944 that he, on his own initiative, then contacted the US, wishing to inform them of his intentions. These included negotiations with the Soviets in an attempts to stake a claim for the West in South-Eastern Europe concerning the respective degrees of leadership. A meeting was set between Churchill and Stalin for October of that year in Moscow. The Americans, particularly then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull were cautious about too readily accepting such an agreement, which they viewed as a deliberate attempt to carve up the Balkans into "spheres of influence". Recognising Roosevelt's

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104 For such examples regarding Greece see, Foot, op.cit.; The SOE was the "butt of the Foreign Office"...that it was muddying the political waters: a complaint that stemmed in part from the incompetence of SOE's cipher office in Cairo, where reports from Greece- even with high priorities- were sometimes held up for two or three weeks., at p.237., For Yugoslavia see, IBID, and p.467, footnote two regarding Major J. Klugman, for Albania see Julian Amery, Approach March (London: Hutchinson, 1973), David Smiley, Albanian Assignment (London: Chatto and Windus, 1984) 105 Foot, op.cit.; pp.155-156. 106 IBID, pp.155-157. 107 Delzell, op.cit.; p.88.
apprehension at such an idea, Churchill began a correspondence with FDR in an attempt to allay US doubts.108

Churchill was a realist. With the war nearing its conclusion, he saw that the post-war landscape would place the US and USSR at the head of respective camps. The Soviets knew this also. This is why they began by the Spring of 1944 to criticise British policy in Greece and came out in open support for the communist led EAM. This signalled danger to the British who feared a possible "link-up" of pro-Soviet movements in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania.109 With the fate of the Balkans still undecided and Churchill seeking to recapture some influence and power for Britain when it appeared its post-war role would be greatly lessened, the proposed meeting with Stalin was more than necessary, even if against American wishes. With the Red Army on the move, Churchill's concern was to protect Greece at all costs and forestall Russian expansion.110 This was witnessed from the landing of British troops in Greece by October 4th, 1944, just as the Moscow Conference was to begin. Roosevelt bowed to Churchill's desire for an agreement with Stalin qualifying it as a three month temporary agreement over Hull's objections who did not know of FDR's approval until after it had been given.111 Roosevelt however was aware though that both the British and Soviets were likely to pursue their policy of "spheres". This is why he insisted on reports from his special envoy to Moscow, Averill Harriman, who kept FDR well informed.

As to the division itself, Britain was keen on retaining whatever pre-war power and influence she could, principally in Greece where she would not allow a communist

108 Lowenheim, op.cit.; beginning by 31 May 1944; PM to FDR, 'We do not wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence....and in the agreement should make it clear that it only applied to war conditions...'[Doc.369#687], at pp.502-503., 10 June 1944 FDR to PM, '....we acknowledge that the military responsible government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by the type of agreement suggested...'
[Doc.378#557], at pp.526-527., 11 June 1944 PM to FDR, 'The events will always outstrip the changing situation in these Balkan regions. Somebody must have the power to plan and act.'
[Doc.379#700], at p.527., 12 June 1944, FDR to PM, 'I am in agreement with your proposal...[but] we must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war spheres of influence.'[Doc.383#560], at pp.531-532.


110 Such concerns were evident by the time of the Second Quebec Conference, September, 1944. see, Churchill (1956), op.cit.; vol.VI., Churchill states by this time the Hungarians would have considered surrendering to the British if they arrived in force., at pp.131-132., see also Kimball, op.cit.; for fear that Stalin would allow Bulgarian territorial gains in Macedonia and Serbia after Bulgaria signed an armistice with the Soviets., at p.350., For an alternate view on Bulgaria and Rumania see, Churchill (1956), op.cit.; 'As the victory of the Grand Alliance became only a matter of time it was natural that Russian ambitions should grow....I never felt that our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria in the past called for any special sacrifices from us....',at p.180.

led take-over at any cost. Churchill knew however that Stalin would seek as much territory and influence as possible while FDR would continue to oppose anything other than a 'temporary strictly military' agreement. For this reason the Prime Minister continued to play the US off against the Soviets in efforts to secure Britain's interests in the Balkans. After the agreement was reached Britain sought to play it down to the Americans as a 'chance remark' made to Stalin that was turned into a formal proposal. Such an explanation though was a lame one indeed as Britain knew exactly what she was doing and that the Soviets, especially Stalin would take any such territory carving scheme, where he always had designs, seriously.

Russian interests in the Balkans are long-standing, and the historical links with the past seem not to have escaped the supposed novelty of the Communist regime. Stalin, the prime architect of Soviet foreign policy of the time, was a man who had never been outside of Russia, and so he fashioned a Russia-centre policy which, despite Communist rhetoric, established its roots deep in the past. Stalin, for instance, fully appreciated Peter the Great's diplomacy the territories which had belonged to Russia before the Tartar conquest, a policy which oriented Russia south...

The Russians and the vast majority of peoples in the Balkans share a common Slav origin. Historically, Russia has always come to the aid of these Slavs and vice-versa. Their affinity towards Balkan Slavs does not leave out therefore, the idea of achieving Slav unity. Even if the British and Americans however refused to belief this argument they should have understood Stalin's objectives.

In Stalin's mind, land was power and power was the ability to promote world revolution, so that offence and defense, security and chance, the Russian state and Communist ideology, nationalism and internationalism were always linked instead of being mutually exclusive as was often the West's perception of Stalin's aims.

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112 At his first meeting with Stalin, Churchill took out a small sheet of paper and wrote on it a series of figures that he may or may not have calculated in advance. According to Churchill's proposal, the Russians might have a 90% predominance in Rumania, the British the same in Greece. Yugoslavia was to be shared on a 50-50 basis, as was Hungary [which Eden later was to offer a 75% split to Molotov]. In Bulgaria, the Soviet Union was to have 75% predominance. Stalin took out his pen and 'ticked' an approving mark. see Lowenheim, op.cit.; p.584., Eden, op.cit.; p.462., Kimball, op.cit.; p.175. As for Czechoslovakia, Stalin had already worked out an agreement with Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes regarding Ruthenia, known as Carpatho-Ukraine. Well before 1944, Benes realised that the USSR would play a dominant role in Central European affairs. To place himself in the good graces of Stalin he 'offered' Carpatho-Ukraine to the USSR given its large Ukrainian population. Even a Churchill objection over Czechoslovakia would not have meant much since, by October 1944, Red Army was in total control of Carpatho-Ukraine. see Robert R. King, Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973): pp.25-30.

113 Marilynn G. Hitchens, Germany, Russia, and the Balkans: Prelude to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983): p.135., Kimball, op.cit.; pp.200-201., for Stalin's literal interpretation see, Lederer (1962), op.cit.; 'where the Balkans and all southeastern Europe were concerned, there is every reason to believe that toward the end of the war Stalin seriously entertained the idea of partition, along the lines of the percentages agreement., at p.449.

More explicitly, the British should have realised that Stalin was all too familiar with the role he sought for the USSR after the war. It is unlikely therefore that the percentages agreement were anything but a 'chance remark'. Rather Stalin was engaging the British in a game of power politics, something the latter was all to familiar with in its past, and seemed willing to employ once more. Only this time, they were not operating from a position of superiority, as they often had.

With regards to Yugoslavia, Churchill had hoped that an accord could be reached between Tito and the King Peter government. In summoning Tito and Peter's new Prime Minister Subasic, Churchill was able to get the two sides to agree to a joint power sharing formula with the restoration of the monarchy to be left up to public referendum.\textsuperscript{115} By this time however Tito was paying lip service to Britain as he had no desire to share power with anyone. The results of the Moscow Conference left the British at a severe disadvantage regarding their position in the Balkans. It was highly doubtful that Stalin would pass up any opportunity to exert more than his allotted 'share', particularly when Red Army was moving in from the east inflicting nearly 900,000 German casualties.\textsuperscript{116} This rationale left Churchill no recourse but to seek large scale troop deployment to the Balkans as the best possible way to secure British interests in accord with the percentages agreement. After all, diplomatic arrangements were a poor substitute for British and American troops in the region. The British Prime Minister had become increasingly worried about the political situation in the southern Balkans, [particularly in Greece].

Even though his advisers warned that the Soviet Union would probably redirect its offensive more towards the Balkans if the Allies began major operations there, Churchill remained fascinated by the opportunity to put British armies in Yugoslavia and Greece. He had already tacitly agreed to a division of British and Russian influence in the Balkans, but the presence of British forces would be a far stronger bargaining chip than diplomatic agreements.\textsuperscript{117}

Churchill however failed to predict the high level of opposition such a troop deployment idea would incur from the US. As early as 1943, FDR was disinclined to commit US forces in the Balkans. This view was in accordance with his notion that southeastern Europe was not within the United States sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{118} Of

\textsuperscript{115} The Tito-Subasic Agreement [July, 1944], Eden, \textit{op.cit.}; p.463., see also Delzell, \textit{op.cit.}, on the 50-50 split in Yugoslavia, and the 'fusion' of Tito's Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation [AVNOJ] and the Regency Council., at p.98., for US reaction and assessment see memo of US Secretary of State E. Stettinus Jr. to President Truman, 13 April 1945, '...[The British] were anxious to buttress their position vis-a-vis the United States and Russia...,' Lowenheim, \textit{op.cit.}; p.633.

\textsuperscript{116} Delzell, "Russian Power in Central-Eastern European", in Delzell, \textit{op.cit.}; pp.85-86.

\textsuperscript{117} Kimball, \textit{op.cit.}; p.198.

\textsuperscript{118} A correspondence between FDR and Churchill indicates the former's opposition to Balkan troop deployment., see Kimball, \textit{op.cit.}; [FDR to PM] 'At Teheran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack...Now that we are fully involved...history will never forgive us if we lose precious time and lives in indecision and debate...[over the Balkans]', at p.223., 'You are aware of the difficulty of my getting involved in any operations in the Balkans that are not essential to the early defeat of Nazi
course the situation by late 1944 indicated to those at the British Foreign Office and the US State Department that the Soviets were to become the principal force in Eastern Europe and, as such, any troop deployment notion would not prove beneficial to future relations with the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{119} FDR also realised that with the war still raging in the Pacific, all available troops from Europe must be diverted, thereby making it impractical for Churchill to carry out his wishes.

By the time of the Yalta conference it became clear to the Foreign Office that the destiny of Eastern Europe was well established. By Yalta, Soviet armies had occupied Romania, Bulgaria, most of Poland and were firmly entrenched in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, within one hundred miles of Berlin. Military reality indicated to the British and Americans that there was very little, if anything they could have done short of large level troop activity to reverse communist gains in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{120}

2.1.1 The Situation in Bosnia

The creation of a Greater Croatian state by Italy [10 April, 1941], saw all of Bosnia-Hercegovina incorporated by the Ustashe.\textsuperscript{121} Administered by Zagreb, Bosnia-Hercegovina was divided between German and Italian military zones. Many Muslims did not openly resent the establishment of Croatian rule.\textsuperscript{122} The Ustashe, however, lacked the political experience to administer effectively since many of the more capable Croat leaders were either held, neutralised or remained passive, giving way instead to ultra-nationalists with more zeal for revenge than rule.

The enlarged Croatian state contained some of the wildest and most remote areas of Yugoslavia, places where repeated rebellions had been centered in the past and where national antagonisms had always been particularly bitter. Regular administration soon broke down, and conditions of complete anarchy followed. The situation became worse when the new Croatian leadership embarked on a policy of annihilation of the Serbian third of the population. Muslims joined with Croats against the Serbs, who were often faced with the alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{119} Delzell, \textit{op. cit.}; p.94., The US especially thought that Stalin did not need any more weight to take to the post-war negotiations. Given his shrewd style, he was always quick to use any events or actions by Roosevelt and Churchill against them. "When the subject under discussion dealt with an area under Soviet control, such as... the Eastern Balkans, he showed himself to be a master of evasive and delaying tactics...", see "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context For US Diplomacy", (US House of Representatives House Committee on Foreign Affairs C. Zablocki [chair] Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979): p.192.

\textsuperscript{120} Delzell, \textit{op. cit.}; p.97., Delzell, \textit{op. cit.}; p.125., Churchill (1956), \textit{op. cit.}; p.110.

\textsuperscript{121} Brogan (1990), \textit{op. cit.}; p.162.

\textsuperscript{122} Malcolm (1994), \textit{op. cit.}; p.174.

\textsuperscript{123} Jelavich, \textit{op. cit.}; p.264.
The policies of the Ustashe made Bosnian Serbs join the ranks of either the Cetniks or Tito’s Partisans. The Muslims were seen by Pavelic as a good counter to the Serbs within Bosnia. Assured by Zagreb of no infringement upon their Islamic culture and religion, many Muslims had no qualms of conducting anti-Serb activity. Mihailovich’s Cetniks, loyal to the crown, often took in extreme Serb elements who felt that the Yugoslav idea was a dead, even if their leader never publicly expressed such a notion. Some of his key personnel, including Steven Moljevic, a Serb lawyer from Banja Luka openly called for the incorporation of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Serbia after the war and for a ciscenja, or cleansing campaign of all non-Serb lands. Other Bosnian Serbs joined Tito’s Partisans. The Partisans recruited heavily among the Bosnian Serbs, particularly in the Foca [1942], Bihac [1942-43], and Jajce [late 1943] regions. For their part, Bosnian Croats either remained passive, supported the Ustashe, or joined the Partisans in small numbers from the Drina Valley area.

The continued terror campaigns by the Ustashe shocked even the SS. The German commander of the occupation forces, General Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, believed the anti-Serb policy only served to strengthen both the Cetniks and Partisans. As the war continued, Muslim disillusionment with Zagreb began to increase. With Allied victories increasing Muslims began to also worry of being on the losing end, particularly following their treatment of Serbs throughout 1941 and early 1943. By the Autumn of 1943 the British dropped their support for Mihailovic and fully backed Tito’s Partisans. To the Muslims this signalled a positive development. Tito offered Muslims a better opportunity to hold onto some semblance of Bosnia after the war. Moreover, Muslims had no delegates representing them in the London based, Yugoslav government-in-exile. To the Muslim leaders such as Fehim Spaho [Mehmed’s brother], this meant only one thing, the dissolution of Bosnia if the Cetniks were victorious.

124 ‘Mehmed Spaho’s brother Fehim, who was Reis ul-ulema [head of the Muslim religious community] from 1938 to 1942, was a self-identified Croat who played a leading role in the pro-Croat Muslim cultural organisation, the Narodna Uzdanica...But Fehim Spaho was also keen to preserve the special identity of the Muslims, which he felt was under threat.’ Malcolm (1994), op.cit.: p.185 See also, Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo, Struggle for the Balkans (London: Merlin Press, 1990)
125 Doder, op.cit.: p.10.
126 ‘The Serbian campaign to cleanse a territory of another ethnic group, while gruesome and tragic, is historically speaking neither new nor remarkable.’ See, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing”, Foreign Affairs vol. 72 #3 (Summer, 1993): p.110.
127 Tempo, op.cit.: pp.5-7.
128 ‘A certain Kurt Waldheim played a modest role at Koraza [extermination camp] as a junior intelligence officer. Ten thousand Serbs, refugees and Partisans, including 4,000 children, were captured after Koraza; almost all were slaughtered....Koraza is followed swiftly by Jasenovac... the most dreadful Ustasha extermination camp whose facilities were grim even by the standards of Axis Europe...’ Glenny, (1992), op.cit.: p.81.
129 David Martin, op.cit.: pp.421-423.
As early as August, 1941, a Muslim ceta did join the Partisans. Muslim suspicions were confirmed when Cetnik units killed thousands of Muslims during the Winter of 1941-42 and throughout the Summer of 1942 in the Foca-Cajnice region. Muslims actively sided with Tito throughout 1942-43 from Foca, Zenica and across most of Eastern Bosnia and Hercegovina. With this added support, and Britain’s role in actively backing him, Tito moved quickly throughout Yugoslavia seizing control and setting up administrative structures. As for King Peter’s government-in-exile, it could not attain any power without its chief military arm, the Cetniks of Mihailovic [by this time Minister of War, 1944], no longer supported by the Allies;

The London regime, despite the fact that it held a strong international position, did not have an administrative structure within the country. In contrast, Tito was in fact in effective control of the state. Wherever the Partisans had occupied a region, they had organized committees of peasants to run local affairs and maintain law and order. Even when the Partisans lost control of an area, these political auxiliaries remained active. In November 1942 the Partisan leaders held a conference at Bihac, where they established a central authority called the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia [AVNOJ]... This organisation, an assembly of fifty-four representatives from different sections of the country, was set up on a broad political basis, but the Communist Party was the dominating force. The popular front program, which was announced at the conference, called for the establishment of a freely elected government after the war, and, most important, a federal organization for the state. In November, 1943 a second meeting was held in Jajce in Bosnia. AVNOJ was declared to be the government of Yugoslavia; a ministry was appointed, and Dr. Ivan Ribar became president. Tito received the title of marshal and remained in command of the armed forces....Most significant, the authority of the government-in-exile was repudiated...The federal organization was again reaffirmed.

Although they supported Tito, local Muslims and their leaders quietly expressed reservations about what, precisely, their status would be within a federal Yugoslavia. Caught between the greater nation ideals of both Serbs and Croats, Muslims believed autonomy would be their only salvation. As early as November, 1942 Muslim leaders appealed directly to Hitler for the dissolvement of Croatian rule in Bosnia-Hercegovina and autonomy for themselves. Hitler responded by allowing for the formation, in February, 1943 of the Thirteenth SS or Handzar Division. With an all Muslim force of nearly 21,000 men, the Hanzdar division, after brief training in Silesia, returned to Bosnia in March, 1943. Although based near Banja Luka and Sarajevo, the division was stationed in the north-eastern sections of Bosnia near Tuzla,
Brcko and Zvornik. Here it engaged in a harsh anti-Serb campaign killing thousands. As the war progressed and the Germans were being forced back, large numbers of Muslims from the division defected to Tito and, eventually, the Hanzdar division was officially disbanded by October, 1943.

As the war progressed, it became evident that the Germans could no longer hold the area alone, especially following the surrender of Italy in 1943. By the Summer of 1944, German divisions began to withdraw from the Balkans en masse. As they did, the Partisans quickly moved into areas vacated by the Wermacht and, with their local political committees already in place, Tito swiftly consolidated his position placing himself in a favourable spot from which to dictate terms in Yugoslavia. At Naples, in August, 1944, Tito met with Churchill, the latter still hoping that some reconciliation with King Peter’s government was possible. By September Tito, unknown to either the British or Americans, flew to Moscow to confer with Stalin. The Soviet leader complied and, with help from the Red Army, the Partisans took Belgrade fully, by October, 1944. With the end of the war in sight Tito did not have to worry so much about external opposition. He took the opportunity to eradicate all remnants of military and political opposition throughout the country. This he did with a thorough ruthlessness. To add to the injury, neither the British nor the Americans did a thing to stop Tito, still foolishly believing he could be manipulated.

The end of the war was marked with typical Balkan savagery. About 250,000 Croats had fled across the border into Austria to escape Tito’s avenging sword, but the Western allies refused them refuge and sent them back. Thousands were summarily executed, and in the next months, there was a general terror throughout Yugoslavia as surviving Ustashis, Cetniks, monarchists, and democrats were purged. The exact number of those killed is not known but no doubt it ran into tens of thousands.

The Allies believed, without justification or reason, that Tito would because of their backing fall quickly into line once the war had ended. Indeed, it was, to some extent, that Tito’s rise to power was attributed to the Allies. By backing Tito over Mihailovic, both the British and the Americans removed the only hope of installing a pro-Western government in Yugoslavia. Without any force on the ground supporting him and fighting on his behalf, King Peter’s government could not be

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139 Peter V. Brojovic-Duro, Yugoslavia in the Second World War (Belgrade, Serbia: Borba, 1977), and, Hitchens, op.cit.
141 The Partisans required some assistance but the Red Army did not actually occupy Yugoslavia. see, Jelavich, op.cit., p.271., and, Gilbert, op.cit., p.358.
142 Patrick Brogan, op.cit., p.156.
143 Eden, op.cit., p.463., and, Delzell, op.cit., p.98.
expected to be in any position to dictate terms in the post-war settlement. This was but one 'blunder' by the West in the Balkans. There would be many more to follow. The repercussions for those sided against the Partisans were high. In Bosnia, Sarajevo was liberated by the Partisans on 6 April, 1945, with the rest of Bosnia under Partisan control within several weeks. For Muslims, over 75,000 died in the war. With most of them fighting on a variety of sides, loyalty was questioned and eventually resulted in large numbers being eradicated. Even Muslims who fought with the Partisans now faced the prospect of a Communist-dominated Yugoslavia, where their status was in question, as was the identity of Bosnia-Hercegovina itself.

2.2 The Situation in Albania

To fully understand the failure of Western policy in the Balkans, one need look no further than Albania. For centuries this small mountain country had been under one type of foreign domination or another, often relying on outside assistance for its very survival. Throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s it had come to dependence on the Italians for economic support and the British for material support as well, including a British led reorganisation of its Gendarme. It was with the Italians though that Albanian King Ahmed Zogu had the most thorough relations. As the Italian government pressed for more and more concessions, King Zogu finally protested. Italy replied by invading Albania on Good Friday, April 7, 1939 and forcing Albanian capitulation. Zogu fled to London and the Albanian crown was presented to King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. When news of the Italian invasion reached Britain, Chamberlain dismissed the incident, refusing to believe that Mussolini had serious designs in the Balkans. Because the invasion occurred almost a year before Italy formally entered the war, the British were ready to dismiss Albania as part of Britain's general policy of appeasement.

Italian encouragement of its designs in the Mediterranean without fear of British reprisals was due to two factors. First, the Anglo-Italian agreements of 1937-1938 reinforced the understanding between the two states regarding their respective interests in the region. The aim was to maintain some form of status quo in the

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147 see Wesley M. Gewehr, The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans (London: Archon Books, 1967); The first Treaty of Tirana had been signed with Italy on 27 November 1926 pledging 'mutual support and cooperation', which in fact had created little more than an Italian protectorate. at p.118.
region.\textsuperscript{149} Second, the understanding reached between the British and Mussolini's Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, in Rome [January 11-14, 1939], reaffirmed that Italy sought in no way to compromise British interests in the area. The British, it appears, were ready to accept the Italian version of events which stated that Zogu had asked for Italy's assistance against potential Serb aggression from Yugoslavia. Their reluctance and confusion over what to do was evidenced even after the invasion took place. In his speech to the House of Commons, Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax had stated;

...that on the information then at my disposal it seemed to me that the situation was likely to raise in an acute form the whole question of the maintaining of the \textit{status quo} in the Mediterranean which formed, in our opinion, so important an element in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16 last year.\textsuperscript{150}

While the invasion may have been seen as a disruption in the status quo, the British took no official action towards the Italians, even in an official condemnation of the action. Instead, Halifax made it clear to the Commons that should any action be taken against Rumania or Greece, that this would clearly violate the agreement and force the British to support Rumania and Greece with all their power.\textsuperscript{151} This was perhaps also the most likely reason why Zogu was unable to form a government in exile as other European leaders and monarchs had done.\textsuperscript{152} When Zogu had requested that the British remove themselves and all their interests from Albania in 1938, [albeit at Italy's request], the British severed diplomatic ties with Albania as well. Recognition of a Zogu government in exile now would discredit the British on the earlier stance they had taken towards Zogu and Albania vis-a-vis Italy. More importantly, Britain's primary allegiance was to Greece. Recognition of Zogu may have been interpreted by Greece as British acquiescence of Albania's claims to territory the Greeks believed was rightfully theirs [Epirus]. Throughout the war then, Britain made well sure that Greece was kept strongly pro-British. The best way to ensure this was the continued non-recognition of any Albanian government in exile.

Resistance to the Italians was limited and ineffective as resistance groups were poorly organised and scattered throughout the country. Even the communists were not fully mobilised by late 1941. With the Italians losing ground in the Balkans and eventually retreating, the Albanians had now to contend with German troops within their boundaries. The Germans established a puppet regime and, in efforts to sway Albanians towards their cause, the Nazis reincorporated parts of western Macedonia

\textsuperscript{149} Pollo and Puto (1981), \textit{op. cit.}: p.217.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{IBID}, p.258., see also Halliday, \textit{op. cit.}: p.21., p.349 note one., Pollo and Puto (1981), \textit{op. cit.}: p.218., Paqrami, \textit{op. cit.}; where British intelligence communiqués to Albania after 1940 state, 'After you asked our Gendarme Officers to leave [in 1938], we gave Italy a free hand in Albania'. p.8.
\textsuperscript{152} Logoreci, \textit{op. cit.}: p.77.
and all of Kosova into a Greater Albania. While the British did not recognise such boundaries, there were some who felt that enunciating a policy acknowledging certain territorial gains would make it easier for BLOs to unify the various resistance groups in Albania. With the British committed to Greece and Yugoslavia however, such concerns were rejected.

Within Albania resistance groups lacked effective organisation. The Albanian Communist Party [ACP], led by Enver Hoxha, felt that the time had come to unite the resistance groups. By 16 September 1942, a meeting was convened in the village of Peze near the capital, Tirana. While the meeting was dominated by the communists, one non-communist of significance present was Abas Kupi, a member of Zogu's Gendarme and a northern tribal chieftain. The Peze Conference resulted in the formation of the National Liberation Front [LNC]. The Front held for approximately one year and was concentrated in the centre and southern regions of Albania. Problems within the LNC over leadership and political leanings led to its disintegration as communist and non-communist forces battled each other from the Front's inception.

Less than two months after Peze several 'nationalists' sought to gain control of the LNC. Unable to do so, and finding themselves pitted against both pro-Zogu and pro-Communist forces, they created their own National Front known as the Balli Kombetar [BALKOM], founded by What Frasheri and Ali Klissura. It was the platform of the Balli Kombetar which was to doom it to failure from the outset.

153 IBID, on the handicap facing BLOs without prior clear policy towards Albania., at p.77., on territorial unity and the role it played regarding policy formulation., see Halliday, op.cit.: p.31., Smiley, op.cit.: p.120., Foot, op.cit.: p.241.
154 Logoreci, op.cit.: p.72., see also Peter Priti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments (Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1978); who indicates that the meeting was doomed to failure from the start since important clan leaders such as Midhat Frasheri and R. Kelyca were not present making it impossible to form a broad united front., at p.13. Frasheri and Ali Klissura would later go on to form the Balli Kombetar [National Front] group which rivalled the ACP throughout the war. see Nicholas Pano, The People's Republic of Albania (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins, 1968): p.49., Other chieftains not present included Bey Kryeziu and Muharrhem Bajraktari who left the conference early after a fallout with the communists realising they would dominate the front. This statement is made from recollections the author has from conversations with his great-great uncle, the latter, M. Bajraktari prior to his death in February, 1989. These personal recollections were reaffirmed by Mr. Gene Bajraktari and Mr. Isat Bajraktari, the latter's two remaining sons. Hereafter cited as Conversations....
155 For a wide range of contradictory views see, Halliday, op.cit., that the ACP did the bulk of the fighting., at p.23.; Priti (1978), op.cit.; 'a broad based coalition', at p.13., Logoreci, op.cit.; 'not broad based', Pollo and Puto (1981), op.cit.; p.231., Smiley, op.cit.; 'that the ACP did not early on do the bulk of the fighting', at p.67., Elez Biberaj (1990), op.cit.; p.18., plus recollections based upon Conversations...., H.W. Tilman, When Men and Mountains Meet (Massachusetts: Cambridge, 1946) ...,the LNC embraced all classes and political opinions and their leaders..., at p.108.
156 Logoreci, op.cit.; p.72., Pagrami, op.cit.; 'that BALKOM was able to recruit conservative politicians, agrarian radicals and moderate liberals on a platform of attaining and securing an ethnic Albania which included Kosova', at pp.15-17, see also, Koco Bihiku, [et al. eds.] Historia E Shqiperise: Vellimi I Trette (1912-1944) [History of Albania vol III] (Tirana, Albania: Akademia E Shkencave, 1984): the conference at Peze, at p.517., formation of BALKOM, at p.523.
BALKOM sought to restore and maintain after the war, Albania to her ethnic boundaries. This included Kosova. While BALKOM was not pro-Zogu, they were nationalist and strongly anti-Communist. The Germans took advantage of this. After they occupied Albania the Nazi creation of a 'Greater Albania' won it many supporters, particularly among BALKOM, of which some openly collaborated with both the Nazis and the government in Tirana. By arming these pro-German BALKOM and by spreading false information as to how many did collaborate, the Germans were able to accomplish two tasks. First, they were able to keep rival groups at odds with each other rather than fighting against the Axis. Second, by re-establishing a 'Greater Albania' and winning some BALKOM support the Nazis were able to thwart BLOs plans to consolidate resistance as Britain would not support anyone they thought was guilty of collaboration, even if they were anti-Communist.

Despite the Peze agreement, by 1943 resistance groups throughout Albania were still unorganised and quarrelling amongst each other. With the help of an influential yet neutral landowner, Ishan Toptani, BLOs were able to call a meeting of the resistance groups on 1 August 1943 in the village of Mukaje. Among those present were representatives from BALKOM, the LNC, Abas Kupi and several 'independent' clan leaders with a stake in the fighting. Other noteworthy representatives were Milidan Popovic and Dusan Mugosa, sent by Tito from the Yugoslav Communist Party, which had aided the ACP throughout the war. The Mukaje Conference aimed to finally create a truly broad based coalition leaving party politics aside for the time being. By the following day an accord was reached based upon four principles. First, a 'Committee for the Salvation of Albania' was to be created with twelve members [six from the LNC, six from BALKOM]. Second, all parties agreed to fight the common enemy. Third, they agreed that the form of government in Albania would be decided by the people after the war. Lastly, all agreed that the future of Kosova would be determined by Kosovars after the war with a national referendum. Less than one week after Mukaje the agreement fell apart. While the communists offer reasons ranging from; BALKOM forces violated the truce, to problems over allowing 'collaborationists' within a war and/or post-war government, to what constitutes ethnic borders, it was the latter reason which most likely accounted for Mukaje's failure. Specifically, Tito likely would not allow the

158 Conversations..., Politics however was still the determining factor. M. Bajraktari attended Mukaje but, just as at Peze, he left after severely arguing with members of the ACP. He left his younger brother, Bajram at the meeting in the hopes of future reconciliation which was not to occur.
159 Smiley, op. cit.: p. 90., For no mention of the Yugoslav representatives see, Halliday, op. cit.: p. 65., For a view that the meeting was called by the ACP and not Toptani see, Logoreci, op. cit.: p. 72., Puto (1981), op. cit.: p. 236.
future of Kosova, for centuries claimed by both Serbs [who Tito needed for support] and Albanians, to be decided by referendum after the war, especially since it was predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Incensed by the decision that Kosova's future should be settled by a post-war plebiscite, the Yugoslav communist party sent Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo to Albania for the purpose of getting the communists there to reneg on this decision. This was promptly done.161

The Mukaje collapse led to three events. First, faced with the possibility of no definitive fighting force to combat the Germans, BLOs with Hoxha and the LNC organised the First Partisan Shock Brigade, led by Mehmet Shehu. With arms and supplies from the British, the First Brigade was able to effectively fight both the Germans and the anti-Communist forces in Albania, more often the latter rather than the former. Second, the breakdown of Mukaje led to Abas Kupi's withdrawal from the LNC and taking up the leadership of a pro-Zogu movement known as Legalitati, also known as Zogista.162 Last, and most importantly, the inability to maintain an accord at Mukaje resulted in full scale civil war among the ACP led LNC, the BALKOM, Legalitati, and the independent clansmen who owed allegiance to none save themselves. With BLOs assigned to the various groups the dilemma was in a flood of contradictory reports sent from BLOs to SOE headquarters Cairo, later Bari.163 With the British looking for the group most likely capable of killing the most Germans, they were drawn to the LNC and with it, the communists. Realising that the British would arm any group willing to fight the Nazis, the ACP was disciplined enough to do so, yet at the same time combat other groups such as BALKOM and Legalitati, justifying their actions to the British as attempts to destroy pro-Axis sympathisers and collaborationists. Their actions eventually led to a series of reports from the field including a seven-point telegram from Brig. General 'Trotsky' Davies and others, even anti-Communists, calling for open support of the LNC.164 With British backing, the

161 Logoreci, op.cit., p.75., see also Raymond Hutchings, "Albania's Inter-War History", in Tom Winnifreth, (ed.) Perspectives on Albania (London: Macmillan, 1992); '...though Albania could scarcely have upheld any such claim [to Kosova] against Tito's Yugoslavia...'; at p.117., see also Ramadan Marmallaku, Albania and the Albanians (London: C. Hurst, 1975)

162 Halliday, op.cit. - claims Kupi broke away and 'created' a pro-Zogu movement., at p.24., see also Smiley, op.cit., which states that Legalitati was in existence and merely 'reactivated' by Kupi after he left the LNC., at p.90., and Conversations..., who stated that Zogistas were in existence throughout the war especially in the north yet were disorganised and scattered along clan lines such as those with Bey Kryeziu and Selim Noke a sub-clan leader. These groups were engaged in sporadic anti-Axis activity well before Kupi broke with the LNC.


164 Davies telegram to Bari 17 December 1943, '...I recommend an open declaration for the LNC. For a full text see, Halliday, op.cit.; p.375., also note passed on to SOE London and commented on by the Foreign Office in FO 37/37145-3741., see the Amery-Smiley-McLean report after the latter two's first mission to Albania in Smiley, op.cit.; 'We should back the partisans with military aid, as the most effective military force in the country...'; at pp.101-102., Major Alan Palmer cited in Halliday, op.cit.; 'to beware of right wing British agents like McLean and Amery and...it is beyond dispute that
LNC was able to consolidate its position at the expense of the other groups as Albanians saw it was the LNC which was receiving Allied support.

The Communists managed to convince the British that they were the only ones ready to fight the Germans occupying Albania after Italy's collapse; they received the bulk of the war materials sent to Albania by the Allies and with it were able to defeat the nationalists... The Nationalists, unable to recover from the damages suffered during this initial blow [after Mukaje], waged a losing battle...\(^\text{165}\)

To the Foreign Office as well as to the Americans, the decision to supply the LNC did not make either party oblivious to the fact that the LNC was led by the communists. In fact, those at FO were aware that they were likely dealing with a future potential enemy. To avoid an embarrassing situation, since, even though backing LNC the FO still sent limited supplies to Kupi, FO kept many of its agents in the field assigned to the non-communist resistance well into 1944.\(^\text{166}\) SOE headquarters, London, gathered information from its BLOs in Albania as well as other parts of the Balkans. This information was then passed on to the FO who determined which resistance group it would back.\(^\text{167}\) In Albania the decision for the FO was one which left it very little choice. Whether it was ineffective organisation or combat against the Axis forces by those beside the LNC;\(^\text{168}\) pro-Communist tendencies at SOE, Albanian section;\(^\text{169}\) or that the LNC truly was the only potent fighting force embracing the general populace,\(^\text{170}\) is irrelevant. To the FO, Albania did not merit the level of concern afforded Greece or Yugoslavia since its pre-war ties to the country were not as extensive as in the latter nations. Therefore, those at the FO were merely concerned with 'who was killing the most Germans'? Since the ACP was organised, [be it loosely], and carrying out the preceding directive, it would receive the bulk of support, irrespective at present, of political considerations.

The lack of interest in Albania from the British is traceable to its wartime position. First, was Britain's refusal to recognise King Zogu as the official government in exile for Albania. With no set policy towards Albania, Britain was concerned that recognition would further alienate the resistance groups and make even an attempt at reconciliation impossible. This did not prevent it from recognition of King Peter in Yugoslavia, but again, Britain's interest there was higher than in Albania. Second, at

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\(^{\text{167}}\) Foot, *op.cit.*: p.154.

\(^{\text{168}}\) see Davies telegram in Halliday, *op.cit.*: p.375.


the Moscow Conference and the eventual 'percentages split', Albania did not figure in the final agreement. It has been asserted that Anthony Eden informed Churchill that the LNC would not accept Zogu back in Albania. This mattered little since Britain offered no formal recognition. Accordingly, the Prime Minister is said to have replied to Eden:

> We did not mention Albania the other night, but personally I think we should insist upon a fifty-fifty arrangement with the Soviets. Of course if none of the Kings are allowed to go back into any of their respective countries and strike a blow on the Allied side, the establishment of Soviet-controlled Republics will be the universal pattern...As for 'no significant group wanting the King back', there are very few countries in which anybody wants anyone back.\(^{171}\)

By Moscow however the fate of Albania was sealed. The LNC had 'liberated' most of the nation, secured its hold and mopped up any anti-Communist resistance which still remained. It would, approximately one month after Moscow, march into Tirana, establishing provisionally, the People's Republic of Albania, on 28 November 1944. To the large number of non-communist resistance groups, especially Legaliteti and the fragmented clan chieftains, their belief that the Allies would not permit communist-led organisations to take the lead was absurd. Stalin himself at Yalta used Albania as an analogy to explain away the belief that the Allies had shed blood to liberate the small nations. These nations then should have no say in the post-war settlement. For nations such as Albania, the Allies, especially Britain and the US, were handcuffed into accepting the reality of the situation where regard was given only if interest was paramount and circumstances permitted.\(^{172}\)

### 2.3 ALBANIA, THE COMMUNISTS AND ALLIED POLICY

The root of a communist rise to power pre-dates the war itself. Given the Albanian social structure and its complexities it was not difficult to see that the communists offered an appeal which cuts across family, religious, and more importantly, clan lines. The inability of the Zogu regime to bring Albania out of state of backwardness and his deference to tribal chieftains alienated a large portion of the young urban students who formed the base of early support for the various Albanian

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\(^{171}\) Martin Gilbert, *op.cit.*; p.1001., see also Eden, *op.cit.*; for impressions on Moscow and King Zogu reference, at p.485., Interestingly enough the Albanian accounts are still to this day subject to dispute. Presently, the Socialist party [former communists] are in an uproar over what they perceive as the 'rewriting' of history by the party in power, the Democratic Party. They claim that their role in the fighting is being left out entirely. Also, more importantly, they claim, with regards to their leaning towards Moscow, that 'those fighting had no desire to turn towards the East but were forced to do so according to the percentages agreement which they thought sacrificed Albania to the Soviets leaving them little recourse', see, Zihni Muco, "Vetem te Bashkuar mund te Luftojme per Demokraci" [Only Together can we Fight for Democracy] *Zeri I Popullit [Voice of the People]* 16 January 1993

communist groups. From this the COMINTERN sent to Albania, Ali Kelemendi, who during the 1930s, attempted to organise communist cells throughout Albania.\(^{173}\) By the time of the Italian invasion these cells, while widespread throughout the centre and south were still as of yet centralised into one communist organisation. It was the ties with the Yugoslav Communist Party of Tito that allowed for the eventual creation of the ACP. The link with the YCP increased after the Italian invasion and was especially strong with the group of Kosova Albanian Communists [KOSMET, from the area known as Kosova-Metohija]. With no direct contacts with Moscow, even throughout the war, the Albanian communists came to rely on both the KOSMET and YCP for the co-ordinating of activity and for relaying messages from the COMINTERN.

Prior to the Peze conference the northern tribal chieftains assembled their own meeting in March, 1941 at an area known as Krajhina Bardhe [the White Province]. The Bardhe conference aimed at unifying the northern clans together to combat the Italian occupiers. The conference failed however for two reasons. First was the question of leadership. There were many present who felt that, as a former deputy of the Gendarme, Muharrem Bajraktari should command this unified force. An equal number were against the idea either believing he had personal designs or they simply favoured themselves. The second reason, linked closely to first, was clan rivalry. [see infra, heading on Albanian Nationalism] Clan rivalry and hatred dates back centuries, particularly in this part of Albania. Getting these groups together in itself is an achievement, however, securing an agreement for them to work together is highly improbable. Even attempts to galvanise the clans together under the premise, 'for Albania', was futile since these rivalries often pre-dated the existence of the Albanian state itself. The irony was that many of these clan leaders were often related.\(^{174}\)

With the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Tito realised that the Albanian communists must unite. He sent his two envoys, M. Popovic and D. Mugosa to Albania to unify the communists and any anti-fascist organisations in existence. While Hoxha downplays any assistance on the part of the YCP, it did secure a meeting in Tirana held between 8 November and the 14th, 1941. The result was the establishment of the Albanian Communist Party [ACP], a Central Committee and Enver Hoxha as its leader.\(^{175}\) The Tirana Conference itself included approximately twenty delegates representing the three major communist groups in Albania. These were the groups from Korca, Shkodra and the youth communist group known as Zjarri [Fire]. After the conference, one hundred and thirty communists were admitted into

\(^{173}\) Logoreci, op. cit.; where he succeeded in doing so primarily in the south of the nation. The north was dominated by the clans who saw communism as a threat to their feudal system., at p.71., Pollo and Puto (1981), op.cit., on party recruitment, pp.226-227.

\(^{174}\) Conversations with Messrs. Isat and Genc Bajraktari, (29 December 1992 to 3 January 1993)

Within one year, the ACP had established five provincial committees across the south-east of the nation, in Pogradeci, Erseka, Ballshi, Peshkopja, and Kukes. These committees took directives from the eight larger regional committees based in Shkodra, Elbason, Durres, Tirana, Beret, Vlora, Korca, and Gjrokastra. As for military capability, initially, it was limited. By late 1941, early 1942, there were approximately eight cetas ranging in size from fifty to one hundred men. Their activity was primarily guerrilla action aimed at disrupting communication lines. And, even while the ACP sought its own direction, it still counted on the better organised YCP for specific directives from Moscow and to maintain a liaison with KOSMET in Kosova and EAM in Greece.

The formation of the ACP did little though to unify action against the Italians in any degree of impact. Some northern clans were still fighting, not only amongst themselves, but sporadically against the Italians, limiting their action to small guerrilla type combat. And now, with the creation of a unified communist party, whose very ideology presented a threat to their way of life, many clans abandoned the fight against the Italians and took up arms against Hoxha and the ACP. By the start of 1942, the LNC, and more importantly, the First Partisan Shock Brigade had not yet been formed. Anxious to unite anti-fascist forces in Albania, COMINTERN transmitted to Tito instructions to be passed on to the ACP. The ACP had sought permission to convene a communist party conference with intentions of electing a permanent Central Committee. Moscow authorised the conference, but did so on four conditions; (1) The conference must be thoroughly safeguarded on all sides against any penetration and on no account must suspect persons be allowed to attend. (2) The basic task of the conference should be the formation of a reliable party leadership and the adoption of concrete decisions. (3) The organising and strengthening of the national front of all Albanian patriots, avoiding for the time being launching slogans which go beyond the scope of the national liberation of Albania. (4) Inclusion in the leadership of the partisan struggle of as many honest Albanian nationalists and patriots as possible as

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176 Pano (1968), op.cit.; p.43.
177 Bihiku, op.cit.; p.507., Figures as to actual numbers of membership are disputable since, as with most communist parties after the war, history was written to favour and cast the victors in a favourable light.
well as communists.\textsuperscript{181} The resulting Peze conference, 16 September, 1942 created the National Liberation Council [LNC], incorporating the Moscow directives. Moscow, however, did not directly involve itself in Albania leaving it to the YCP to convey messages.

This subordination of the ACP to the YCP by Moscow was evident throughout the war and up until the Soviet-Albanian alliance of 1948. The more organised Yugoslav communists would serve as a link for Moscow who either had no desire for direct contact with Albania, or deferred to Yugoslav leadership and experience with the ACP, seeing as it was they who had a large role in its creation. Later Hoxha would accuse Tito and the YCP of deliberately blocking attempts of the ACP to contact Moscow. This does contain some truth since towards the end of the war and immediately after, Tito envisaged a Balkan federation which would have included, Bulgaria, parts of Greek Macedonia and Albania, with Yugoslavia as a regional hegemon, and the others relegated to republic status within Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{182} While Tito may have had designs for Albania becoming the 'Seventh Republic' of Yugoslavia, this approach does not take account of the fact that Moscow simply was not as concerned with Albania as it was with Yugoslavia. This attitude is evident when one sees that the first Soviet mission representative, a Major Ivanov did not arrive in Albania until August, 1944. By this time the ACP was well on its way to establishing a firm grip over the entire country.\textsuperscript{183}

The arrival of David Smiley and William McLean, the first British Liaison Officers, in April, 1943 did not signal the formation of a set policy towards Albania. While the nation was strategically located, the British, Americans and even the Russians had no settled policy in Albania other than aiding anti-fascist resistance groups.\textsuperscript{184} Perhaps the reason for this is due to the society itself. Like Yugoslavia and Greece, Albania faced an occupying power with both nationalist and communist groups battling Axis and pro-Axis collaborators. Unlike the former two, the difficulty in Albania lay in the 'bewildering and complex social structure' which made any negotiations towards it awkward.\textsuperscript{185} In Greece the population recognised itself as Greek. In Yugoslavia, distinctions were made among Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc. Yet in Albania these differences went even further. Northerners [Ghegs] were

\textsuperscript{181} Clissold, op.cit.; p.153.
\textsuperscript{183} Halliday, op.cit.; p.62.
\textsuperscript{184} Amery, op.cit.; p.328., US Secretary of State C. Hull's promise to deliver aid in 'driving the enemy from the Albanian soil', cited in "AMERICAN PROMISE TO ALBANIA" \textit{The Times} 11 December, 1942., see the similar "BRITISH DECLARATION", \textit{The Times} 18 December, 1942., and Churchill's statement on Albanian guerrillas, IBID 5 November, 1943.
\textsuperscript{185} Amery, op.cit.; p.330.
different, culturally and linguistically from Southerners [Tosks]. Muslims separated themselves from Orthodox and Roman Catholic. Dissimilarity of the variations went even further as the phrase, "Pre ku je?" [Where are you from?], often was replied with a geographic region such as, "Lluma, Korca, etc." This reply however did more than signify location. It told the inquisitor your family background, religious affiliation, and often political leanings. These distinctions made negotiations impossible as it became challenging to reconcile the populace and even more so since the multitude of clan leaders, [northern Gheg], each represented a particular area and saw himself as 'king of his personal hill'. This was also one of the reasons why the ACP was able to recruit so many Albanians. It cut across family, religious and economic lines, seeking a broad base of support. For many youths and women, the latter who under the old system were seen as nothing more than chattel, the ACP offered a clean break from the past. This is perhaps also the reason why the British eventually endorsed the LNC as they were led to believe that they received full public backing.

As more BLOs were sent to Albania they still came with the intention of unifying the northern clans that still were operating independently of the LNC. The arrival of the Nazis in force sped the course towards civil war. Already at each other's throats over anti-Communist versus anti-monarchical or simply nationalist tendencies, German policy created a larger wedge between the groups. First, they released all political prisoners held by the Italians and ended the union with the Italian crown. By recognising a 'Greater Albania' as independent, they formed a Regency Council and government in Tirana led by Fiqri Dine. Elements within groups such as the ultra-nationalist BALKOM responded favourably to German occupation. This led to many siding with the Nazis against the ACP who they saw as communists that did not care for Albania, and were merely YCP puppets.

With the failure of the Mukaje Conference, civil war ensued. The British still hoped to reconcile the groups especially aiming at Abas Kupi and his Legalitati movement. The problem however appears to have been that there was no coordination among the British as SOE Bari, SOE London and the Foreign Office all were putting out contradictory directives based on a variety of BLO reports from the field. Among these were from BLOs such as Julian Amery, Billy McLean and David Smiley who were concentrated in the north with Kupi and northern clan leaders. They

186 These two groups have been at odds with each other for centuries. Historically, the Ghegs were more homogeneous and isolated geographically maintaining the clan culture much longer than the more heterogeneous Tosks. The ACP, predominantly Tosk, had its problems throughout the post-war period subjugating the Ghegs to communism. For a relevant and proper look into the differences see, Marmallaku (1975), op.cit.; pp.82-84., Arshi Pipa, The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) on cultural differences..pp.200-201., on membership to the party, at p.223., These differences and resentment still exists today as author can attest to witnessing the distinctions firsthand, coming from a Tosk-Gheg background.

made it known to Bari that Kupi was willing to negotiate with the LNC but first needed arms with which to fight the Germans. Bari refused, stating that supplies would only be given if proof of action against the Nazis could be shown. From here on began the flood of contrary reports. These include Kupi's offer to negotiate with the ACP for joint action;\(^\text{188}\) reports that northern leaders sheltered some partisans, aided BLOs and attacked German convoys;\(^\text{189}\) to SOE calling upon Amery, Smiley and McLean to turn themselves over to the communists for evacuation and their refusal to do so.\(^\text{190}\) This confusion, so prevalent in general British policy, apparently prompted Churchill to send Eden a memo in late July, 1944, while civil war continued, asking, "Let me have a note on this, showing which side we are on".\(^\text{191}\) With regards to Albania, London was unduly cautious in either outlining or formulating a specific policy. Because they had not had one before the war they felt that something specific now, such as recognition of Zogu, would alienate resistance making it difficult to carry out any anti-Axis activity there. This is also why they refused Abas Kupi's request for a personal letter from Zogu instructing Kupi to work with the ACP. Britain felt that by allowing such a letter it may be viewed as implicit recognition of Zogu.

Several BLOs would claim, with hindsight, that the problems of British policy towards Albania, were largely caused by their fellow BLOs and SOE headquarters. Both the former and the latter either did not understand that the communists controlled the LNC and would do so throughout the nation, and that there were pro, if not outright, communist sympathies at SOE.\(^\text{192}\) Even though this argument may be true it still does not prove that the situation in Albania would have been altered one bit. Understanding British policy in the Balkans is difficult enough. Examining it towards Albania is an exercise in futility. Amery himself writes, "It was perhaps inevitable that we should give exclusive support to the Communists in Yugoslavia and Albania. But such a policy involved the sacrifice of significant British interests".\(^\text{193}\) What he and the

\(^{188}\) Amery, op.cit.: p.356., apparently prompting Bari to send Philip Leake [head of the Albanian section-SOE] to partisan headquarters. He was killed however in a German air raid.

\(^{189}\) Ibid., pp.352-353., Smiley, op.cit.: p.105., Hibbert (1991), op.cit.: pp.207-208., Conversations...

\(^{190}\) This latter statement was of especial interest. Apparently, according to Smiley and Amery, they feared that following SOE's directive would endanger their lives since the ACP, they had learned, were searching the country for them and in a party meeting had found them guilty of aiding the collaborators thereby sentencing them to death. Their concern, and rightly so, was over 'accidental' death or 'shot while attempting escape'. See, Halliday, op.cit., for the Hoxha report, at p.41., Smiley, op.cit., on Bari's reaction p.135., Amery, op.cit.: p.402.

\(^{191}\) cited in Halliday, op.cit.: pp.32-33., For an opposing view that by this time London was already, 'tending to favour the partisans' see, Logoreci, op.cit.: p.78., Also for confusion due to a continued failure to recognise the Zogu government see, Smiley, op.cit.: p.118., Amery, op.cit.: p.346.

\(^{192}\) Amery, op.cit., 'Our HQ...failed to be an influence on the ACP and indeed had become an instrument of Hoxha in the British camp...', at p.405., Smiley, op.cit., 'it seemed incomprehensible that senior British officers could not understand the most simple principles of Communism', at pp.153-154., Foot, op.cit.: p.241.

\(^{193}\) Amery, op.cit.: p.403., Prior to his trip to Albania, Amery helped to prepare a report with Smiley and McLean on the latter's first mission to Albania. This report itself stated that the LNC was better
others failed to recognise were two things. First, Britain was at the time willing to compromise its 'interests' if this meant the early defeat of Germany. It was not until later that Churchill attempted, in vain, to mitigate the damage regarding communism in his 'percentages split' with Stalin. More importantly, these interests could not have been that important to Britain since Foreign Office concern for Albania before the war could never match regards for Greece or Yugoslavia. Second, the communists were the better organised resistance in Albania. By seeking a wide base of support the communists aimed at distancing themselves from the petty feuds and clan rivalries which had so divided the nation. Their success in the civil war was due not only to British supplies but in being banded together against dozens of small groups which could not even put aside differences and unite against the same communists they claimed to despise. Opting instead to strike at the Germans when they pleased, and securing their own areas, the clans and groups such as BALKOM and Legalitati sealed their own doom. Pro-Communist SOE staff notwithstanding, Britain's short term needs offered it no choice but the support of the LNC and with it the ACP.

By the time Churchill sought to forestall a communist take-over in Albania it was too late. A proposed Allied troop landing request in the southern coastal port of Sarande was refused by Hoxha in September, 1944. The Allied plan, apparently drafted by the Americans and endorsed by Britain, called for at least five thousand troops to be deployed to Sarande then onto Tirana and Durazzo [Durres], in the north. The plan never came into being. The British did manage to send a superfluous contingent of commandos to Sarande. By the time they arrived however, the town was on its way to capture by the partisans. Regardless, the group was too small to endanger the position of the ACP and its hold on the nation. If anything, the landing perhaps sped the seizure of power by the ACP. With British troops landing in Albania and in less than one month, in Greece, Hoxha believed that a large scale troop deployment, possibly with aims to restore Zogu, or some other pro-British government was not far behind. He therefore made sure that all resistance were thoroughly found out and destroyed at the expense of attacking retreating Germans, which the Allies had desperately initially wanted.

2.4 THE FAILURE OF POLICY

The level of short-sightedness and the failure of the US and especially the British in formulating a specific policy in the Balkans was matched only by Soviet

organised than the other resistance., see Smiley, op.cit.: pp.101-102., 'We should back the partisans with all our aid...'

designs in the region. The failure of a comprehensive political solution which would address the area's security concerns demonstrated; not only the West's lack of interest and understanding of the region's problems, but also doomed the Balkan nations to live with these security concerns for decades after the war, which presently find expression in irredentism, distrust, authoritarianism and conflict. As regards the Americans, their miscalculation was increased when they assumed that immediately after the war, the Soviet Union would be more than willing to conduct itself in a 'co-operative' mood. The US felt that the reconstruction of the areas destroyed by war with Germany would require the USSR to focus on domestic concerns for years after the war. To FDR, Soviet expansionist tendencies would be delayed when it won its security on its European frontiers. Eastern Europe would be accepted as an area of Soviet influence, but some at the State Department did not want total Soviet domination as was the case. Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph Berle did not object to, "the small nations of Eastern Europe being within the Russian orbit". However, he and others, such as veteran Moscow observers Loy Henderson, Raymond Murphy, Raymond Atherton, and Charles Bohlen felt that some democracy in Eastern Europe was necessary to allay Soviet expansionist tendencies, only just being realised. For their part the USSR saw the percentages split as Western recognition of long time Soviet designs on the area. They therefore took the necessary political and military steps to ensure their post-war gains.

It was the failure of American and British policy however that was to be the cause of future problems in many of these Balkan nations. Whether it was merely ignorance of Soviet intentions or a delusion that Britain could recapture its influence in the region is hardly relevant. The fact is that their short term goals made for a total disregard of the needs of the indigenous peoples of the Balkans. Granted, there may have been little if anything Britain could have done to change the post-war situation in the Balkans, however;

This ignorance about both the Balkans and Soviet aims there has been responsible for the suicidal initiatives undertaken by various British governments....The realities of geography and military power may have made Soviet domination over Eastern Europe unavoidable in the long run. But the easy rape of these countries was in no small degree due to deliberate Western decisions....

196 Pogue, "YALTA IN RETROSPECT" in Delzell, op.cit.; p.205., see also, Barry Ruben, op.cit.; p.38.
197 Ibid, p.38 and p.44.
The post-war landscape in the Balkans made the British realise to their dismay that their short term concerns would now have long term repercussions. Examples were evident in the Greece where the remnants of Greek communist guerrillas with aid from communists in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, launched renewed efforts of capturing the government by the Summer of 1946. More importantly the Cold War forced a policy in which, for political and/or strategic reasons, ethnic boundaries in the region which were never corrected after the First World War again were of secondary import to political frontiers. The result, which would remain evident up to present day, is the large scale fragmentation in nations like the former Yugoslavia where irredentist claims prevail.

3.0 POST-WAR ALBANIA

With the communists in power, Enver Hoxha could now concentrate on rebuilding Albania in his own image. More importantly, he would from immediately after the war until his death seek alliances that would protect the territorial integrity of her borders. With the end of the war Albania expressed a desire for normal relations with the Allies. But it was made known that pre-war treaties would be invalid and territorial demands by Albanians neighbours would not be recognised. The US, British and USSR issued broad statements that post-war frontiers would be decided by the peace settlement. For their part the British and Americans called for free elections within Albania to ensure the rights of the population in choosing their form of government. It was these elections which initially placed Albania on the road away from the US and the British.

By November, 1945 the Soviets recognised the provisional government of Albania as did the US and British even if the ACP dominated the elections under the guise of the Democratic Front. Earlier, in March 1945, Albania was not allowed to the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. Fearing that it was deliberately being left out of any peace settlements, Hoxha was able to play on nationalist anxieties and push Albania further away from the West. The belief was that the West would make due on its promises to the Greek government and their territorial claims to 'northern Epirus'- southern Albania. This fear was heightened when the Greek foreign minister, Rendis made the refusal of Albania into the UN a matter of principle since the

201 Lendvai, op.cit.; p.17.
203 At the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist League, 20 October 1944, the ACP established an eight point declaration, point four which stated; 'After the complete liberation of Albania...the Democratic Government of Albania shall hold free elections on a democratic basis...' Logoreci, op.cit.; p.56.
Greeks felt the Albanians had participated in the war against Greece, referring to the Italian campaign launched against Greece through Albania. To Hoxha, British and American silence in response to these charges reaffirmed his belief that Albania would not even be a consideration at any peace talks. 204

After recognition, however, Albania was invited to Paris in November, 1945 to determine war reparations from Germany. With the matter still unresolved, the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York a year later did award five million US dollars to Albania from Italy. The survival of the nation though rested on the more than twenty-six million provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration [UNRRA]. 205 Hoxha, however, still believed that the West would in no way make efforts to ensure the integrity of Albania proper. Even during the elections which were held in October-November 1945 Hoxha complained that the US and British missions in Albania were exerting improper influence in attempts to undermine the elections. His attitude towards the missions and of the war reparations did not endear him to the West and furthered his country's alienation from them.

For his part, Hoxha showed himself unwilling to improve relations with either Britain or the United States, partly because he feared their diplomatic presence in the nation, partly because he found it useful to continue to make them targets of his relentless domestic and external propaganda against the West in general. Britain and the United States, on the other hand, had no strategic, political or economic interests in Albania that were sufficiently important to surmount their instinctive reluctance to have any dealings with an extremist and unpredictable leader like Hoxha. Their indifference played straight into his hands enabling him to generate... a veritable psychosis of siege in the minds and hearts of his fellow countrymen. 206

This siege mentality made Hoxha view any foreign missions with suspicion. He imposed severe restrictions on the movements of foreign officials who he felt were all plotting to undermine the regime. 207 This prompted the British to withdraw their mission from Albania in April, 1946. The US followed suit before the end of the year. The alienation of Albania increased over the next two years partly due to two events. The first was the Corfu incident. Albania claimed that the area between its shores and the Greek island of Corfu was not international waters. The British claimed it was. In a show of 'gun boat diplomacy' British ships sailed through the waterway and were fired upon by shore batteries, 15 May, 1946. Later in the year a British ship struck a mine in the channel killing forty-four people. Taking its case to the International Court, the British won their plea. The Albanians refused to pay, prompting the British and Americans to withhold Albanian gold looted by the Germans after World War

205 Logoreci, op.cit., most of which was funded by the United States. p.93., Puto (1981), op.cit.; pp.256-257.
206 Logoreci, op.cit.; p.203.
207 IBID, p.91.
Corfu would close diplomatic relations between Albania and Great Britain for nearly fifty years. The issue was finally resolved in the Spring of 1992. The second event was the Greek civil war. Believing that the communist KKE were being supplied by Albania, the UN sent investigative teams in to corroborate these charges. Again denying these accusations, the two events helped effectively to isolate Albania from the West.

It was Hoxha's early relations with Yugoslavia however which would be the most immediate threat to post-war Albania. During the war the Yugoslav and Albanian communists maintained close relations. But Tito was wary of Kosova and his belief that after the war they would seek to unite with Albania proper. Because Hoxha originally agreed to the principles of the Mukaje Conference, including possible reincorporation of Kosova, he was seen as potentially dangerous by Tito. This prompted Tito to send Velimir Stojnic to the Second Party Plenum in November, 1944 to indicate Yugoslavia's position on Kosova. Stojnic used the occasion to attack Hoxha and his leadership of the party. Tito also used pro-Yugoslav members of the ACP to push Albania towards greater integration with Yugoslavia and eventually into making the former into the 'Seventh Republic' of Yugoslavia. Two of these members were Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, of the Central Committee. Realising that he could do little to prevent Tito's designs for Albania Hoxha went along with the integration. He could not turn to the US or British since relations with them were already strained. As for the Soviets, Tito's emissary to Moscow, Milovan Djilas was surprised to see that Molotov and Stalin agreed to a 'swallowing up' of Albania by Yugoslavia.

Upon his return to Yugoslavia, tense relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia over what the latter saw as imperialist designs caused a deeper rift in light of discussions over Albania. After the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform, 28 June, 1948 Hoxha saw his chance. By July 1st, 1948, Albania breached twenty five of twenty seven treaties with Yugoslavia and its remaining two on July 2nd, 1948.
Supporting Moscow on its decision, Hoxha was able to spare Albanian incorporation into Yugoslavia and more importantly to save his political life. By now tying himself to the USSR, Hoxha found an ally that would help his nation with aid and still not be dangerously close to Albanians borders.

The alliance with Moscow was to greatly influence Hoxha and his policy towards his nation well up to and shortly after his death in 1985. The alliance also allowed him the opportunity to purge those he thought were members of the pro-Yugoslav faction such as Xoxe, who was tried and later executed. The Soviet influence was great as Hoxha imposed Stalin's model of heavy industrialisation upon Albania as the best method of bringing it out of its backwardness. To the Soviets, Albania represented an ally close enough to irritate and concern Tito. Albania also gave the Russians a new submarine base at Vlora and the vital access to the Adriatic and subsequently, the Mediterranean. To Hoxha, Moscow saved Albania from an aggressive neighbour with designs which Albania could do little to prevent.

To the Americans and the British, Albania represented a lost chance even if it was their policy which indirectly helped the communists to come to power. In an effort to correct this policy, first the British then the Americans sought to conduct covert activity aimed at toppling the Hoxha regime. Beginning in 1949, the British recruited exiled or escaped Albanian émigrés and began training them for covert action in Albania. The US and Great Britain hoped that a weak regime such as Hoxha's without its Yugoslav ally would be easy prey to rebellion and may start a trend in other east European nations. This early action by the Americans characterised their policy of communist containment and even of rollback as the attempt was aimed at overthrow of a communist regime.

The attempts however by both the US and British failed miserably for several reasons. The first and the most common reason given was the betrayal by British agent Kim Philby who, it was later learned, was working for the Soviets who kept Hoxha informed of the plot. This reason however is not the only one of greatest importance. More likely, the reason was that the planned action itself was not well thought out by

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1946. Hoxha felt this would be necessary to one day resume relations with Yugoslavia. see, Pano (1968), op.cit.: p.21.
214 Biberaj (1990), op.cit.: p.17., see also, Puto (1981), op.cit., p.264., for Soviet influence dating from the arrival of Major Ivanov, September 1944, Hibbert (1991), op.cit.: p.200., Logoreci, op.cit.: p.80., recognition of the provisional government, Ibid, p.86., Also Halliday, op.cit., where according to Hoxha, it was Stalin who recommended that the ACP change its name to the People's Labour Party of Albania which it did., at pp.97-99.
216 Ibid., Also, in a letter from a British agent to M. Bajraktari dated July, 1955. This policy is made implicitly evident, stating; "you will have learned that we intend to leave it to the Americans to take an interest in Albanian affairs. This is, of course, something which is happening in many parts of the world and is being done to make best use of our resources", letter obtained week of (28 December, 1992 to January 4, 1992) from M. Bajraktari's private file, courtesy of Mr. Isa Bajraktari
either the US or British. While both recruited from émigré groups, these were hopelessly divided among themselves as some were remnants of the wartime Balli Kombetar and others were from Legalitati while most were simply anti-Hoxha. Even if successful, it was doubtful these groups could have agreed to anything since they lacked any form of message or cohesion. These attempts even without Philby's betrayal were doomed from the start as each group claimed its own legitimacy.

Second, technical disagreements arose between the US and Great Britain over the best method of guerrilla deployment into Albania, small craft landings and cross border infiltration or parachute drops. This was minor though as the latter reason indicates that Western policy was once again not thinking along long term paths but rather aiming for short term gain. Regardless, the plans were futile at best.

3.1 **ALBANIAN NATIONALISM**

From the time of its inception, the Hoxha regime sought alliances with states that, on their face, appeared as attempts to ensure Albania's territorial integrity and very survival. More likely, these alliances were merely opportunistic ploys by a twisted leadership whose rule over Albania for four decades condemned it to an existence of poverty and despair unmatched in Europe. These alliances, however, do bring to question whether or not Hoxha's brand of communism was tainted with nationalist overtones, and should thereby be construed as a form of Albanian nationalism. In *The Albanians*, Anton Logoreci states that on at least three separate occasions during and since the Second World War, Albanian nationalism can be witnessed. The first was during the Italian occupation when, he states, the Italian policy was falsely based on the assumption that Albania was still a mixture of Ottoman feudalism and ancient tribalism. The second instance was in the problem with Kosova and the YCP. Marxist theory could neither eradicate nor pre-date the centuries old feud between Albanians and Serbs for Kosova. Accordingly, nationalism proved stronger than Marxist theory.

Finally, in allying with Moscow in 1948, Logoreci states that Hoxha did this not out of any love for the USSR or Stalin's principles but for 'nationalism, pure and simple'. While nationalism may have been present after the war, it was not as strong a force, however, before or during the war.

According to Theodor Zaviani, the preconditions for Albanian nationalism were not in existence, especially before the war. He states:

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218 Dravis, *op. cit.*: p.428.


220 IBID, p.87.

221 IBID, p.101.
Among the preconditions for its growth the following appear to have been the most important: advanced centralisation, religious unity, leadership by a self-conscious class [aristocracy, bourgeoisie, intelligentsia], foreign intellectual stimulus, discontent with foreign rule, and linguistic unity. Albania enjoyed none of these preconditions for the development of modern nationalism.222

Certainly, there was little if any centralisation by the time of Italian occupation. The failure to unite the northern tribes was due not simply to political differences. Indeed most of these clans were in agreement as to their anti-Communist posture. Instead it was the same 'Ottoman feudalism and ancient tribalism' which caused differences and inability in uniting these clans. Well up to World War II, clan culture was the predominant form of life in northern Albania particularly. Several families united by blood would often form one group or fis. They would originally live together in the same village until their numbers caused them to spread to surrounding areas. The geographic area encompassing two or more villages would then be called a bajrak. A village elder would be responsible for the administration of his fis as would a comparable leader of the bajrak. [ahga and behg respectively] They in turn would pay deference to the leader of two or more bajraks, a bajraktar, leader or clan chieftain of a krajhina or region. This tribalism dominated Albanian life throughout the Zogu years and was not abandoned during the war. It subsequently made it difficult for these groups to choose leadership since bajraktars would not easily give up regional authority. Linguistic divisions between the northern Gheg and southern Tosk also demonstrated the lack of cohesive nationalism before and during the war. This became evident to BLOs, especially as they found it difficult to find proper translators when moving from one part of the country to another.

Indeed, as contradictory as it appears, it was not until communism dominated Albania that nationalism can be seen, especially vis-a-vis Albanian foreign policy. Nationalism is undoubtedly the most important factor in that policy. While professing fierce loyalty to proletarian internationalism and the interests of socialism and world revolution, Albania has always subordinated such loyalty to her national interests whenever the two have come into conflict with each other. Albania's foreign policy reflects, above all, a 'concern to preserve...at all costs the autonomy and integrity of the state.'223

While perhaps placing too much emphasis on it, Prifti does make the point for Albanian nationalism after the communists came to power. Hoxha may have had nationalist ambitions in preserving Albania's borders but also aimed at keeping his position of power. His post-war alliances with Yugoslavia then Moscow and finally with China in 1961 before going it alone from 1977 on, show an inclination to

opportunism rather than nationalism. The alliances, however, were geared towards the preservation of Albania's national independence, thereby ringing with nationalist tendencies.

Indeed it was the Hoxha regime which perhaps could lay claim to the rise of the Albanian nation. In *Origin of a Nation*, Anthony Smith traces the stages of nation development along four prescribed routes. While analysing the development of Albanian history relative to the rise of the nation warrants significant consideration, Smith's model can adequately serve as a rough guide to the formulation of the Albanian nation.  

Smith's first stage looks at the unification of clans and tribes, settlements and villages into a series of wider cultural and political networks. This stage most closely parallels the tribal organisation of Albania following the period after Ottoman conquest in the C15th up to the present day. However, this form of clan culture preservation was confined primarily to the northern Gheg tribes of Albania. The geographical isolation of the Ghegs by both the Shkumbin River and the Dinaric Mountains allowed them to maintain the notion of fis and bajrak well into the C20th. The social importance of the tribe was equalled by its economic importance. It was the bajrak then that also served as a system of administration providing a modest form of political network. The southern Tosks however were subject to a higher degree of 'cultural contamination' by Greeks, Bulgars and Serbs etc. The Tosk's inability, or unwillingness to steadfastly associate with foundation myths and myths of ancestry would aid them in the post-war era. After the communists came to power in Albania, it became evident that the Albanian Party of Labour was and would be dominated by the Tosks, to the detriment of the Ghegs. By not strongly attaching themselves to clan culture, communism was seen as viable alternative to the Tosks. Moreover, it allowed them the opportunity to persecute the Ghegs with impunity. This stage of development though did little towards the formation of the Albanian nation. On its face, this system of clans may have displayed centralisation. In actuality, as indicative of attempts to unify the clans during the war marks, the clans operated on a loose association, each protective of his particular area.

The second stage of development is registered by a 'period of ethnic consolidation, later recalled as a golden age'. This period, to Smith is associated with the 'flowering of ethnic culture'. Historical saga, military exploits, tales of heroes, patriots, saints, etc. predominant an often exaggerated base for ethnic identification. It is at this stage that two features of the later concept of 'nation' become evident. First, religion coincides with ethnicity. The 'twin circles of religion and ethnic identity

224 Anthony Smith, "Origin of a Nation", in The Times Higher Perspective 8 January 1993 pp.15-16.
225 Ibid, p.15.
226 also, Marmallaku, "The Family and Tribal Tradition", in Marmallaku (1975), op.cit.; pp.82-91.
become very close, if not identical'. It is this symbiotic relationship between
ethnicity and religion which, even to this day has symbolised the difference between
nationalism in the West and in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. The second
feature becomes the 'ethnic concept of a nation'. The emphasis becomes on a
community of birth and native culture. While territory is important to the ethnic
group, the stress is on 'descent or presumed descent rather than territory'. After
centuries of Ottoman domination, the Albanians certainly did achieve a high level of
religious unity as most of Albania adopted Islam. By the C19th, several of the
prerequisites for ethnic consolidation were present. The failure of the League of
Prizren in 1878 to form the 'Albanian Nation'; formed by a collection of 'wealthy beys,
politicians and intellectuals', harshly suppressed by the Turks, formed an attachment for
later Albanians to their 'golden age'. However, centralisation still was not present as
Ghegs and Tosks continued to feud. Even religious unity was suspect as northern
Albanians adopted Sunni Islam while southern Albanians, reflective of 'culture
assimilation' adopted the more heretical and liberal Bektashi sect of Islam.

Smith indicates that the third period of development is often seen as a period of
decline. The community ossifies and decays and may be conquered. It is here then
that, 'nationalism finds fertile soil'. While myth still represents a basis for common
attachment, there is one significant difference. It is here that the 'nationalist myth
represents a break with the past'. Instead the nation ties itself to visions of the future
more so than visions of the past. The significance of the past becomes the 'selective,
singing out' of those myths that impart on the people a sense of 'national destiny'.
Myths may also be rewritten or recast to accommodate the nation and its mission
which often includes a 'cleansing of alien disfigurements'. Tracing this stage of

230 Marmallaku (1975), op. cit.: pp.25-27., see also, Zavlani, op. cit.: p.60.
231 For a proper explanation of the sects of Islam and Bektashi see, Moojan Momen, An Introduction
to Shi'ite Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (New Haven, Conn: Yale, 1985); 'The
Bektashis were accommodated within the Ottoman Empire as a Sufi order', at p.100. Enver Hoxha
himself belonged to a Bektashi family. The spelling of his name, 'Hoxha', is the Albanian spelling for
'hodja' meaning priest or rather Imam see Pipa, Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects (New
232 Smith (1993), op. cit.: p.15.
233 Ibid
234 Ibid, This portion of the nationalist myth becomes the most difficult to contain or rationalise since visions
of the future are not tied to any tangible base. Instead they find haven in the distorted past.
Nationalists then prey upon these recast images of bygone days of glory to rally support to their
nationalist cause. This situation is certainly displaying itself in the former Yugoslavia as Serbs
throughout the former Yugoslavia refuse to discard the image of a 'Greater Serbia'. Ironically
enough, there is not one Serb in Yugoslavia who can recall Greater Serbia as it predates any Serb
alive in Yugoslavia. The national programme for Greater Serbia last dates to Ilija Garasanin's
Nacertanje [Outline], published in 1844 which called for the recestablishment of Stefan Dusan's C14th
Serbian Empire. see, Christopher Cvic, Remaking the Balkans (London: Pinter, 1991): p.66. This fact
however will not deter Serbs and Croats from each seeking to fulfil their 'destiny', see, Glenny
(1992), op. cit. For the Albanian view of this form of national display and 'myth building' see, Shukri
development within the Albanian nation is the most difficult. After the formation of the Albanian nation, recognised by the Great Powers, on 28 November 1912, the 'nation' was already on its way towards ossification and decay. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s during the Zogu regime, the inability and unwillingness to break the northern clan system kept the idea of the Albanian nation from, if not developing, at the very least from maturing properly. This is hardly surprising since Zogu, himself a Gheg, sought deference from clan leaders and understood the importance each clan leader placed upon their territory. By the time of the war an after, the territorial integrity of Albania became the primary 'vision of the future' for the Party of Labour. Nationalism and national identification recast the foundation of the Albanian state in 1912 and that period up to Zogu to impart the sense of attack and jeopardy of Albania's territory. Foreign policy under the communists then served as the highest form of nationalist expression, a method to keep the boundaries of Albania intact and the nation alive.

Smith's final stage becomes the period of the modern nation. Characteristic of the modern nation; 'the provision of a national constitution, the institution of a regular political system, the development of a modern economy and legal order, and the emancipation and provision of social welfare for all'. These characteristics of the modern nation in Albania were evident with the rise to power of the communists after the war. By March, 1946, the ACP introduced a new constitution modelled closely to the Soviet constitution. Political consolidation by the Hoxha regime aimed at breaking the clan system so that a 'regular political system' could be instituted. The advent of a modern economy sought Stalin's model of heavy industrialisation and agrarian reform beginning by late 1944- early 1945. Advanced centralisation was present as the Hoxha regime crushed any opposition and consolidated power in the hands of the Albanian Communist Party, most of whom were Tosks. The intelligentsia provided the self-conscious class leadership for the Albanian state while Zavlani's pre-requisite for linguistic unity also was visible, be it through the suppression of the Gheg dialect by Hoxha during his time in power. Hoxha used the fears of previous infringements on Albanian territory to express 'discontent with foreign rule'. More importantly, it allowed him to instil upon the populace a continual siege mentality thereby unifying the people behind Albanian nationalism and the Albanian nation-state.

To fully comprehend the nuances of nationalism in Albania, one should examine the concept of nationalism in the Balkans generally. The misconception of the West has been in either its inability or unwillingness to realise that in the Balkans it is

235 Smith (1993), op. cit.: p.15.
nationalism which more often than not is a vital component of so many problems both past and present. It is this phenomenon which has often not been given proper consideration in the construction of either state boundaries and foreign policy to the region generally and individual countries as well. Indeed, policymakers simply have either disregarded or fail to realise the most fundamental aspect of policymaking; "the content of different national ideologies distinguishing among common goals of nationalist movements is a necessary initial step in formulating policy". A glance at its complexities may explain the failure of Western policy in the region.

4.0 THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS

Tracing the roots to Balkan nationalism in hopes of finding a workable definition is difficult. In Centrifugal Nationalism, Leslie Tihany cites Illyrianism, from the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula, as a 'proto-nationalist' movement of the South Slavs. Emerging from Ottoman domination, it was the 'intellectual aspiration of a stateless people'. This statement fails in its reasoning on two grounds. First, Illyrianism cannot be equated with the South Slavs. The Slavs are a different people from the Illyrians. The latter were the indigenous population of that part of South-Eastern Europe well before the arrival of the Slavs from the east, which explains why Russians show an affinity to Serbs since both are of Slav origin. True there has been a great deal of outside intervention in the Balkans resulting in free intermingling of the peoples there, most likely due to no effective land barrier in the Balkan peninsula. However this still does not place south Slavs in the same category as Illyrians. The Illyrians themselves are recognised as later day Albanians. Their intermingling with Slavs was minimal particularly since the latter, during their penetration into the Balkan peninsula, drove the Illyrians further away from the south and into the western shores of the Balkans. Secondly, nationalism itself cannot rise from 'an intellectualism aspiration'. Granted, centuries of Ottoman domination may have furthered nationalist characteristics. However, such rule did not create nationalism nor proto-nationalism in the Balkans or the Slavs. Instead, the Ottoman influence resulted in an eventual furthering of nationalism albeit of a type unfamiliar to the rest of Europe.

In the Balkan Peninsula, nationalism developed even later because social conditions contributing to the rise of nationalism were even less advanced in areas which had been part of the Turkish Empire.

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240 Schevill, op.cit.: pp.71-72.
than in Central Europe. Ottoman administrative structure had a profound impact on the type of nationalism that emerged in its former territories.\footnote{Robert King, \textit{op.cit.}; p.8.}

Also, the continual outside influence from the Roman to the Ottomans to the Italian city-states and Austro-Hungarian Empire did little to allay indigenous differences. In fact intermixing of peoples increased differences. The circumstances that made linguistic demarcations usually coincide with institutional, social, and economic differentiation made the bridging of the many gaps even more difficult. The result of all these divisions produced numerous small segments whose xenophobia extended to everybody who belonged to another group. The xenophobia both hindered and advanced the development of nationalism in Eastern Europe. It divided every nationality into so many antagonistic fragments that it proved difficult to pull them together. But once this was done the distrust of everything foreign became a force in developing the identity and cohesion of the various nationalities.\footnote{Peter Sugar (1962), \textit{op.cit.}; p.37., see also A.M. Rosenthal, "In Balkan Separations, a Lesson for Lucky America" [opinion] \textit{International Herald Tribune} 9 December, 1992; "Bosnians, Serbs, Croats, Albanians....., come out of a world where for centuries loyalties were built on the importance of separateness. The separate clan, tribe, family and village gave protection. The histories and fantasies of the individual group gave meaning and texture to life. The separateness created fear of others, which was intensified when the outsider was too close, a neighbour.}

\section*{4.1 NATIONALISM DEFINED}

Understanding nationalism in the Balkans requires that it be defined in a way that is readily applicable to the problems and policy of that region both past and present. This necessitates not only a definition but understanding nationalism's place in relation to the state; nationality itself, its characteristics, the sources in Eastern Europe, and differentiating it from nationalism in the West. First one must determine whether nationalism is an end which developed over a period of time in the Balkans, or a means unto itself, a self-perpetuating entity that requires no state in the classic sense. Most likely it is both. Smith defines nationalism as;

\ldots an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'.\footnote{Smith (1991), \textit{op.cit.}; p.73.}

The latter he conceives as;

\ldots the territorial \textit{patria}, the place of one's birth and childhood, the extension of hearth and home. It is also the place of one's ancestors and of the heroes and cultures of one's antiquity.\footnote{IBID, p.117.}
Smith qualifies the definition of nationalism by equating it with an ideology. It is a conviction that may be linked to a particular geographic location but it does not have to be. This is why Smith deliberately avoids the term 'state' and opts instead for nation. The former relates to specific territorial boundaries that are definable, recognised by others as legitimate and have stood the test of time. The latter refers to a group with a shared sense of culture and language, of common myths, an ethnie. In itself nationalism has no morality attached to it. Nor is it beholden to a particular form of government for its creation or continuation. While its effects can be moralised, nationalism itself is neither 'good' nor 'bad'.

Both Smith and Dunn, though, would concur that the idea of 'nation' preceded that of nationalism. To Smith, the lack of cultural and educational resources, especially in the Balkans, may produce a weaker form of nationalism than in other parts of Europe, but one that is not as intense. Smith states that nationalism was a relatively new phenomenon of the C19th. Dunn agrees indicating that a nation promotes a common ancestry and from this, nationalism arises. This signifies then that common cultural characteristics of a particular group were in existence before the means of their promulgation, the nation, came into being.

Differentiating nationalism in the East from the West highlights the Western misconception of nationalism. There, nationalism is popularly regarded as a; 'reversion to primitive tribalism in which quiescent atavistic sentiments are excited and released, and so it is a barrier to both order and progress'. It is illiberal and undemocratic promoting disruption and revolution, and, as such, can never be a stable embodiment of law, morality, tradition and order, all those principles which western institutions rely upon to hold their states together.

It is this attitude from the West which has made statesmen wary of supporting nationalist groups in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans. Such support of what is seen as disruptive elements may further buttress these national groups. Recognition of them, or more importantly, of their territorial claims would inspire their

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246 Dunn, op.cit.: p.10.
247 Dunn (1991), op.cit.: p.81.
249 Dunn, op.cit.: pp.8-11., Smith (1983), op.cit.: p.149., see also, Smith (1991), op.cit., where he differentiates between the western view of nationality and territory with that in the Balkans; 'Whereas the Western concept laid down that an individual had to belong to some nation but could choose to which he or she belonged, the non-Western or ethnic concept allowed no such latitude. Whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of your birth and were forever stamped by it'. at p.11., see, King, op.cit.: p.7.
250 Dunn, op.cit.: pp.8-9.
nationalist cause and legitimate it, perhaps leading to violence or war over attempts to gain what is theirs. Ironically, in seeking to avoid conflict, this very position has led the West into conflict this century. It is the West's failure to correct the problems caused by nationalism which may again lead it into hostilities in the Balkans, witnessed by present day Yugoslavia. Also, it was Western ineptitude regarding these claims of territory that caused it twice to redraw boundaries irrespective of ethnic demarcations. Granted, demographics and simple practicality make this notion difficult if not impossible. However, greater care and consideration should have been exercised. It is this 'uninterested' point of view, aside from the political and economic interests of the West, which will continue to plague its historically inadequate policy.

The inability to deal effectively with nationalism as a force was not isolated to the Western statesmen and policymakers. The communist regimes of Eastern Europe have at various times and in different nations either suppressed it, supported it, co-opted it or spurred it on. First Secretaries of the communist parties of East European nations realised that 'broader and deeper popular support' for their socialist platform often requires that they take a stand as both socialists and nationalists, not necessarily in that order. In Albania for example, Hoxha had stated; "The continuity of the defiant spirit of nationalism, which seeks inspiration from the past and takes a fierce pride in the country's achievements under communism, however modest, is the single most important trait in Albanian politics". Leaders such as Tito, Hoxha and Ceausescu understood nationalism has the power to unite their peoples behind them. This became especially useful to these leaders when threatened from other 'socialist' allies such as the Soviet Union. The use or co-optation of nationalism, however, does create problems as well. Because it does not operate on reason, nationalism cannot be properly controlled. Its ability to fracture societies even further along ethnic lines, as in Yugoslavia, indicates how communism more often than not repressed it, or sought to, rather than use it frequently. In multi-ethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union such repression further divided the groups. Unlike the West, where nationalism was used as a symbol of patriotism openly underpinning state policy, nationalism in the East became a tool used to defy state policy and repression. Further suppression, such as the quashing of Croat nationalists in 1971 or Kosovar Albanians in 1981, increased group nationalism and identification.

252 Glenny (1992), op. cit.: pp.177-178.
253 Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe", in Lederer, op.cit.: p.573.
254 quoted in Lendvai, op.cit.: p.205.
Once the communist regimes fell, the states, artificial creations themselves, ceased to have purpose as fragmentation more often became the result. Paul Lendvai best expresses this phenomenon occurring in Eastern Europe:

...the ideological vacuum created by the lack of any realistic alternative to the Communist brand of authoritarian system and by the complete erosion of a thoroughly discredited Communist ideology is being filled by the possibly most primitive, but undoubtedly most powerful ideology—nationalism.\(^{256}\)

It is a Western myth to believe that nationalism in areas such as the former Yugoslavia, former USSR, the area between Moldavia and Romania (Bessarabia) or Romania and Hungary (Transylvania), etc. ‘suddenly’ appeared once communism crumbled.\(^{257}\) Nationalism in these areas, as well as others in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, has been present long before communism in most nations. Its revitalised spirit is due to the fact that communism is no longer capable of suppressing it. This is why it now has exploded with such force and with it all the territorial claims of the various ethnic groups.

### 4.2 THE LINKS WITH RELIGION

For most of their modern history, East Europeans lacked an identifiable national state. National consciousness then often relied on factors such as religion as a source of inspiration.\(^{258}\) Indeed, even though ruled by four decades of communism, religion survived the socialist call for atheism. In some cases, religion even became the keeper of the nationalist faith and protector of culture within the Balkans.\(^{259}\) In Yugoslavia, for example, Tito recognised inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Croats

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\(^{256}\) Lendvai, op. cit., p.9.

\(^{257}\) See, for a view that such an interpretation is simplistic, Dr. JF Dunn, "Yugoslavia", in Instabilities in Post Communist Europe 1994 (London: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1994), and Nicolas Gvosdev, "The Disintegrating Face of Eastern Europe", Woodstock Road Editorial issue #12 (1992); ‘The assumption that ethnic conflicts were inevitable in the region once Soviet totalitarianism crumbled, however, fails to explain why clashes have only occurred in some cases and not in others’. at p.2. and on Yugoslavia, Noel Malcolm talks of a Muslim identity well before its recent revival; The first sign of change came with the 1961 census, where people were allowed to call themselves Muslims in the ethnic sense... Despite fierce objections in Belgrade from Serbian nationalist Communists... this policy was accepted by the central government. And so, on the 1971 census form, for the first time, the phrase appeared: Muslims, in the sense of a nation... in Malcolm (1994), op. cit.: pp.198-199., On Yugoslavia, also see Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans", Foreign Affairs vol. 71 #4 (Fall, 1992); ‘Western officials and publications circulate myths that perpetuate misunderstanding about the nature of the war and render any effective countermeasures more elusive.’, at p.80., and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism", Foreign Affairs vol. 68 #5 (Winter, 1989-1990); ‘Until recently the West preferred to downplay the reality of East European nationalist aspirations...’, at p.1.

\(^{258}\) Dunn, op. cit.; p.11.

\(^{259}\) see, King, op. cit., for example of the Ottomans, p.8., also, Smith (1991), op. cit.; ‘Not only have nationalists often found it necessary to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses, but they have also found it relatively easy to identify the nation with the religious community...’, at p.49.
or Serbs] as Bosnian Muslims, a separate ethnic group, albeit with a religious connotation. The ties of religion with nationalism often comes, in the form of 'spiritualising' the concept of nationalism. This usually occurs when a nationality assumes that it becomes a 'chosen people'. As such national destiny is seen as the preservation of its ethnic culture, including religion, and the restoration of its historic lands which give the culture intrinsic value and perpetuates the myth.

To the communist parties of Eastern Europe religion was treated in much the same way as nationalism, alternating between periods of repression and co-optation. To many communists religion was seen as, 'a threat to its organisational and ideological monopoly and as an impediment to its utopian program'. Since religion championed the cause of nationalism it became lumped together with it to form an ideological rival to communism. To Western scholars and statesmen the two had little in common. However, to Eastern statesmen, the two or rather one ideal became the justification for policies of repression aimed at; determining loyalty, size and ethnic make among other things.

The period of co-optation of religion can be traced to immediately after the war. In the USSR it was the Orthodox church which helped to rally Russian nationalism against the invader. By war's end, Moscow saw the potential in solidifying its position in eastern Europe through use of the church. By forcing a conversion of the Russian Uniates to Orthodoxy and subordinating them to a Moscow Patriarchate, they would both undercut religion's base and consolidate it. This plan failed...
however. What the Soviets did not foresee was that in their attempts to mollify religion, they intensified it. This was due to the ties it formed with nationalism. Manipulation raised the old rivalries and feuds among East European neighbours increasing the divisions between socialist parties over Moscow attempts to unify them with it at the lead.265

For example, in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church protested the formation of the Macedonian Patriarchate. The Serbian church relied upon the central government for funds and believed that a rival was not needed in an area they saw as 'Southern Serbia'.266 Conversely in Albania it was the Catholic church which faced problems. Immediately after the war there were ninety-three Catholic priests active by 1945. Of these, twenty-four were murdered, thirty-five imprisoned or sentenced to hard labour, ten were missing, eleven were drafted and three fled leaving only ten by 1953.267 Hoxha, though, understood that the church could be used to promote policy as well. Even his harsh policy against Catholicism was aimed at securing support from women which he claimed the church canons treated as a commodity.268 Even maintaining 'Albanian Orthodoxy' separate from the Moscow Patriarchate was important in keeping a sense of nationalism.269 Bulgaria itself forced a 'Bulgarianization' campaign which was aimed at 'Christianising ethnic Turks in Bulgaria.270 Co-optation of religious/national groups did not exempt them from later persecution, nor was it meant to. Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and especially the Balkans, sought to take advantage of a force which existed before communism. Their failure was not due to secular aims or attitudes. Instead it was that a force such as this, relying on myth and emotion, cannot be properly controlled. Attempts to do so, often through persecution and other forms of suppression, intensify allegiance as religion and nationalism fuse and fragment along ethnic/religious lines. This perhaps

It is necessary to assume that the Soviet authorities had good practical reasons for encouraging these Church efforts', at pp.298-299.

265 Lendvai, op.cit.: p.353.
266 Ramet (1989), op.cit.: p.415., see also, C. Cvic (1985), op.cit.: 'In 1966 the Macedonians formally demanded autocephaly and after the Serbian Patriarch turned them down, summoned an ecclesiastical council in Orhid in July 1967 and proclaimed the autocephaly of the Macedonian Church. Only political pressure by the Yugoslav government prevented the Serbian Patriarch from casting an anathema against the Macedonian Church....But it [the government] so far has proved unable to talk the Serbian Orthodox Church into a reconciliation with the Macedonian Church', at p.200.
268 Hoxha among others often associated the Catholic Church with Italy and the Vatican. The Albanian-Catholics who 'collaborated' with Italy during Italian occupation were seen as enemies as was the religion the practised. Halliday, op.cit.: p.14., see also Hoxha's view on the church regard of women; 'The canons of...the church, treated women as a commodity, a thing to be bought and sold by the male...', in Enver Hoxha, Mendimat ne Arabise [Reflections on the Middle East] (Tirana: Nentori, 1958): p.355.
269 A decree issued by Tirana on 4 May 1950 encouraged the church to maintain contacts but expressly forbade any relations with churches under the Moscow Patriarchate., see Ramet (1989), op.cit.: p.416.
270 IBID, p.32.
also explains why Tito, at various periods in Yugoslavia’s post war history, sought to address nationalist and ethnic problems among the republics, not so much by force and a strategy of centralising power. Instead, he continued to decentralise the federal structure, believing this would allay nationalist/religious divisions. As was seen, this strategy only sped Yugoslavia towards eventual disintegration.

4.2.1 Within Tito’s Yugoslavia

With the end of the war Tito began to consolidate his power base. With his Partisan committees scattered throughout the country, he used both the AVNOJ and his newly formed secret police, OZNA, to round up all those who might oppose him.\footnote{Geoffrey Swain and Nigel Swain, *Eastern Europe Since 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1993): p.27., and Bell-Fialkoff, *op.cit.*: p.117.} As for recognition from the Allies, Stalin convinced Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta to agree to a recognition formula for Tito’s government. King Peter’s government-in-exile would provide six cabinet members, part of a coalition, which could serve as a government until proper elections could be held.\footnote{Roucek, *op.cit.*: p.116.} Tito agreed to the formula but the new government became only a facade as real power rested with the party.

The party committees moved into areas throughout Yugoslavia to assist in the administration of the war-torn infrastructure. Faithful to his Moscow training, Tito refashioned Yugoslavia along the Soviet model.\footnote{IBID, p.117., and, Auty (1974), *op.cit.*} The Constitution of 31 January, 1946 was practically a carbon copy of its Soviet counterpart. Not surprisingly, the Serbs felt that they were the victims of Yugoslavia throughout the inter-war period and, especially, during the war. Given their numerical superiority Tito sought to devolve power by creating six federal units; Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia.\footnote{Jelavich, *op.cit.*: pp.314-315.} Together, these units would constitute the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. More importantly, a federal structure re-imposed internal boundaries which separated Serbs, who perhaps clung to Greater Serbia notions. Despite official recognition from the United States on 22 December, 1945, relations between Tito and the West began to unravel.\footnote{Swain, *op.cit.*: p.57., and, Roucek, *op.cit.*: pp.117-118.} The United Nations Relief Administration [UNRRA] had moved into Yugoslavia after the war in efforts to assist and monitor the situation on the ground.\footnote{Delzell, *op.cit.*: p.101.} The US State Department grew increasingly agitated over reports of harassment and the virtual imprisonment of its personnel in Yugoslavia.\footnote{Roucek, *op.cit.*: p.121.} Indeed, following recognition by the US, a note sent by the
State Department to Tito’s emissary in Washington stated specifically State’s displeasure and that US recognition; ‘does not imply approval of the policies of the regime, its methods of assuring control, or its failure to implement the guarantee of personal freedom promised to its people.’ A large measure of the deterioration between Tito the US and Great Britain had been initially over Trieste and the Istrian peninsula. Tito coveted these territories and strongly believed that he, and not Italy, was entitled to them. The Allies, however, did not share Tito’s presumptions. In an effort to perhaps intimidate Tito, US Air Force planes flew over Yugoslav territory without permission during the first part of 1946. With Tito claiming that more than thirty-two violations of Yugoslavia’s airspace had occurred in one week, the stage was set for a crisis. Tito’s troops were already engaged in sporadic skirmishes with US and British troops near Trieste despite protests by both UNRRA and the State Department. Tito went too far when, in 1946, he shot down a US Air Force plane killing its five-man crew. The US was livid over the affair. Not willing to provoke the US and the British so quickly after the war, Stalin had Tito formally apologise for the affair. More importantly, Moscow did not back Tito and his claims for Trieste or Istria at the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference in 1946. This slap in the face, as Tito saw it, perhaps was the beginning of a series of events which would eventually result in the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948.

The significance of the split was not so much in how the Soviets reacted, believing that Tito would fall into line, but in how the US and British responded. By June, 1948, the Cold War was well under way following the Berlin Blockade, the civil war in Greece and Mao set to take China. Within this context, the US saw to it that Tito would remain in power:

The Americans and the British showed understanding: when the time came, they offered to help Yugoslavia without attaching any intolerable strings. The West was perfectly ready to forgive the misapprehensions of the previous three years. There were conditions, of course. In 1949, Yugoslavia ended its support for the Communist guerrillas in Greece and the civil war there soon came to an end. The US returned Yugoslavia’s gold reserves, which it had held since before the war. The British signed a trade agreement worth L 30 million in December, 1948; the first American assistance arrived nine months later; and soon Western military and economic aid was pouring in.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson even went so far as to imply that a secret deal had been struck between the US and Tito should the Soviets decide to send their

278 Roucek, op.cit.: p.121.
279 Jelavich, op.cit.: p.315.
281 IBID, and, Roucek, op.cit.: p.119.
282 Brogan (1990), op.cit.: pp.157-158.
283 Jelavich, op.cit.: p.323.
284 Swain, op.cit.: pp.61-64., and Brogan (1990), op.cit.: p.159., and, Clissold, op.cit.
285 Brogan (1990), op.cit.: p.162.
armed forces across Western Europe. Acheson was purported to have said that Yugoslavia was the 'ace in the hole' if Soviet troops mounted an offensive. Yet the maintenance of Yugoslav integrity was not due solely to its reliance upon Western assistance. Given its multiethnic makeup, the existence of Yugoslavia depended heavily upon Tito and his secret police.

So deep were the divisions in Yugoslav society in 1945 that the Communist party had little with which to hold the country together except the partisan myth, promises of a future cornucopia, and coercive force. The break with the Cominform certainly helped in this respect, for even anticommunists rallied to Tito rather than risk Sovietization. But the promises remained important. The regime had pledged, for example, to intensify industrialization - a clearly perceived need - and to level interregional economic disparities. This was to be done by funnelling a disproportionate amount of new investment into the poorer regions of the south.

In Bosnia the situation did not improve significantly after the war. Even though it was given republic status it fell within the 'underdeveloped regions' classification of Yugoslavia despite its 'important reserves of coal, iron ore, lumber and a sizeable potential source of hydro-electric power.' Tito felt that economic decentralisation among the republics would allay separatism among the various nationalities. However, as economic figures began to dip, politicians within the republics began to express their resentment at having to divert federal funds to the less developed areas. The Muslims of Bosnia paid a heavy price for their various loyalties during the war. Forced to work on brigades, large portions of the republic were collectivised and all facets of Islamic law and practice were strictly forbidden. Slight efforts at religious reform towards the Islamic community did not occur until the late 1950s and early 1960s when Tito sought to appease Egyptian leader Nassar and Indonesian leader Sukarno and thereby gain their support for the Non-Aligned Movement [NAJA].

Tito, however, still did not believe, as many Serbs and Croats did not also, that Bosnia Muslims existed as a distinct identity. Still believing they were either Muslim Serbs or Muslim Croats, the federal census of 1953 offered Bosnian Muslims little choice except perhaps for the Yugoslav designation, even having removed the Muslim prefix. To Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs within Yugoslavia, Serbian

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286 Barry Ruben, op. cit.: p.68.
288 Ramet (1992), op. cit.: p.29.
289 [IBID](http://example.com)
290 Joze Maravec, (ed.) *Yugoslavia and her Republics* (Belgrade, Serbia: Interpress, 1969)
295 [IBID](http://example.com), p.197., and, Maravec, op. cit.
memories and dreams of Greater Serbia presented a real threat to them, as Serbs still saw themselves as the 'big brother' within the federal system. Muslim suspicions were only perpetuated after the war, up until the early 1960s, when the Bosnian Communist Party was dominated by Serbs, who constituted over sixty percent of its membership. By this time it also became apparent that economic reform was not making significant progress in Yugoslavia's underdeveloped regions such as Bosnia. Throughout the 1960s Bosnia suffered the largest per capita income decline of any of the republics. More importantly, for the entire period, 1952-1968, Bosnia had only a 4.2 % average in annual growth, the lowest rate among the republics and well below the national average. The economic situation in Bosnia did little to improve relations between the Muslims and the republic's Serbs and Croats. The lack of identity crisis which existed until the 1960s only made the Muslims resent the federal centre, which they felt was dominated by Serb chauvinism. Moreover, the beginning of these divisions within the federal structure only heightened social tensions and increased ethnic polarisation.

In a multiethnic state, diverse social problems also manifest themselves as interethnic problems. The involvement of ethnicity and the possibility for the mobilisation of group loyalty and group resources transmogrify political processes. Social antagonisms are expressed differently in a multiethnic state from the way in which they are expressed in an ethnically homogeneous or binational state. Politics in a multiethnic state is essentially different from politics in a nation-state. Multietnicity becomes the justification for introducing a federal system in which ethnic and republic boundaries coincide. Middle-level interest groups tend to follow the lead of their republic leaders during times of intercommunal crisis, since intercommunal stability is, to a large extent, hinged on the viability of the federal system as a mechanism of conflict regulation and crisis management.

Perhaps realising that social unrest among the ethnic groups within Bosnia would only antagonise ethnic divisions elsewhere, Tito began to grant the Muslims the recognition of formal identity they so wanted. In 1961 the federal census allowed for Bosnians to list themselves as 'Muslims in the ethnic sense'. The 1963 Bosnian Constitution's preamble identified Muslims as a 'nation' despite Serb protests. Tito understood Serbs would not willingly agree to such a Muslim designation. By 1965 he removed Bosnia Communist Party Chief, and ethnic Serb, Djuro Pucar from his post. The following year, Tito's chief of security and number two man in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], Alexander Rankovic was also purged.

296 IBID, p.24.
298 IBID, pp.138-143.
299 Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Threat", Orbis (Spring, 1984)
300 Ramet (1992), op.cit.: p.19.
Muslim intelligentsia, led by Professor Muhammed Filipovic and Atif Purivatra saw these moves by Tito as positive developments in the quest for Muslim national identity. The 1968 Bosnian Central Committee formally designated Muslims as a 'distinct nation'. By 1971 the Yugoslav census affirmed Muslims as a nation.304

4.2.2 The Bosnian Nation within the Yugoslav State

The Bosnian Muslim nation identification gave people like Filipovic hope that equal standing and status would ensue within the federal structure. This, however, was not the immediate result.305 'Inevitably, the non-Muslim nationalities of Bosnia, that is, the Croats and Serbs, felt threatened by the spectre of a new ethnic force, while Muslim factions were eager to legitimise the fruit of a long campaign.'306 With its economy lagging throughout most of the 1960s, new-found republic pride made many Muslims reinvigorate the Bosnian economy in the 1970s through a series of public works projects.307 Muslim self-identity was also seen as a useful counterweight for Tito during the 1969-1971 period when Croatian nationalism was on the rise.308 With federal money being diverted to Bosnia, Kosova and Montenegro, Croats began to openly complain of being nothing more than a 'junior partner' within the federal structure.309 A series of nationalist/cultural organisations sprang up throughout Croatia, particularly in Zagreb, the capital. The largest of these, Matica Hrvatska, began to increase its demands for more autonomy from the centre, and less domination by the Serbian Communist Party.310 Throughout 1971, their demands again increased.311 Tito at first believed in the self-regulating capability of the republics. However, Croat nationalists, such as Zagreb city conference chief of the local Central Committee, Srecko Bijelic and LCC member Miko Tripalo began to call for the reincorporation of territory, specifically, Bosnia, to Croatia.312

To make matters worse, the LC of Serbia did not condemn Croatian activity, as it should have, in the Federal Parliament. [the Shkupstina] Instead, it felt that it was entitled to the eastern portion of Bosnia. Tito now realised he would have to respond or risk dissolution along ethnic lines. He considered sending in the Federal Army

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305 Ramet (1992), op.cit.: p.179.
308 Dennis Rusinow, op.cit.
310 Cohen, op.cit.: and, Magas, op.cit.: p.138.
311 Botic, op.cit.
312 Ramet (1992), op.cit.: p.125.
Instead, riot police and helicopters were dispatched to Zagreb to occupy strategic points throughout the city. Following the Twenty-First Session of the LCY collective presidency, Tito engaged in a full scale purge campaign of the LCC, expelling thousands of members, and sentencing most of their leadership to prison.314

Following his crackdown against Croatia, Tito did not centralise authority within the federal system. He instead went the opposite route, as epitomised by the new 1974 Constitution.315 Believing that centralisation would only heighten anti-Serb sentiment Tito felt a new constitution was in order, one which would continue to decentralise authority among the republics.316 This, it was hoped, would allay nationalist and ethnic concerns by devolving more power away from the federal capital.

The new constitution of 1974 introduced a massive shift in power away from the federal level to the six republics and the two autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Except in the areas of defence, foreign affairs and some joint economic concerns, the federation continued, but in name only, and in effect it became a cross between a federation and a confederation, consisting of eight units [six republics and Serbia’s two autonomous provinces]. A similar fragmentation took place on the party level. Yugoslavia became feudalised, an unwieldy collection of eight small states with small economies competing against each other. The system was designed to offer decentralisation as a substitute for political pluralism. In fact, it was a recipe for chaos.317

The 1974 Constitution only heightened tensions and, simultaneously, Serb nationalism. Serbian Communist leaders, such as Dobrica Cosic, felt Tito was deliberately keeping Serbs in an inferior position both politically and economically.318 The constitution, which gave more autonomy to Vojvodina and Kosova made Serbs believe that Tito was purposely conspiring to break up Serbia by using the Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosova as counter-weights to Serbian national expression.319 Despite this growing Serb animosity over the new constitution, and Croatians, still smarting over the repression of their nationalist revival, the remainder of the 1970s saw little backlash as Tito still held authority and had the final say over vital matters given his firm control over the JNA.320

314 Ramirez (1992), op.cit.: p.131.
315 Zametica, op.cit.: pp.9-10.
317 Zametica, op.cit.: p.10.
318 Glenny (1992), op.cit.: p.33.
320 Shoup, op.cit.
The Death of Tito

Tito's death in May, 1980 signalled the end for Yugoslavia. The continually decentralising federal structure held its illusion of cohesion because of Tito. With him gone, it would remain unlikely that Yugoslavia would hold together. Sabrina Ramet provides four reasons why Tito's system would no longer succeed without him:

First, without Tito, the LCY lacked an ultimate arbiter and was therefore tangibly weaker than before. The divided party leadership could not assert itself because, in many cases, the will of the party could not even be determined. Second, important power centers within the party wanted change [albeit change disguised as continuity] and pressed for a measure of relaxation. Such relaxation as did take place probably exceeded the limits of what the party liberals had in mind, since a retrenchment was set in motion in the Summer of 1982 met no serious overt resistance within the party. Third, the tangible economic deterioration that began in 1979 threw the entire system into disarray, and numerous officials blamed the federal balance, that is, the distribution of powers between the federation and the federal units, for the country's economic problems. And, fourth, the explosion of violence in Kosovo in April 1981, when discontented Albanians burned cars and attacked Serbs, produced a nationalist backlash throughout Yugoslavia. Kosovo was placed under military occupation, and the entire episode reopened the question of the utility of federalism as a solution for interethnic tensions and distrust.

The Kosova riots of 1981 not only increased the historic Serb-Albanian hatred for one another, it moreover heightened the general sense of anti-Islamic feeling Serbs had for Bosnian Muslims as well as Muslim Kosovar Albanians. In 1983, radical Serb nationalist Vuk Draskovic published a virulently anti-Muslim novel entitled, The Knife, which was followed in 1985 by Dobrica Cosic's own novel aimed at portraying some Serb Cetniks in a positive light. The increasing nationalism on the part of Serbia actually increased after the Twelfth Party Congress [26-29 June, 1982] which pitted those seeking greater autonomy against conservatives calling for a stronger central authority. Ironically, however, Serbian leadership felt a stronger federal structure would be necessary. Mitja Ribicic, chair of the Federal Party Presidium and Milka Planinc, chair of the Federal Executive Council appointed Tihomir Vlaskalic, a Serb, to head a special political commission which was to examine the debate between the centralists and the decentralists. For Serbs, anxiety was high following the 1981 riots. Kosova was, and still is, of vital historic importance to Serbs. If they were to

322 Ramet (1992), op.cit.; pp.xvi-xvii.
324 Fred W. Neal, "Yugoslavia's Approach to the Nationalities Problem", East European Quarterly (September, 1984)
325 Ramet (1985), op.cit., and, Bruce McFarlane, Yugoslavia in the Age of Democracy (New York, New York: Pinter, 1988)
support the continued calls for increasing autonomy, they risked losing Kosova altogether, perhaps, as Serbs saw it, to a Greater Albanian reincorporation.\textsuperscript{327}

The report, delivered in December, 1985 recommended that a greater central authority would be needed and should be invoked by amendments to the 1974 Federal Constitution.\textsuperscript{328} Croatian and Slovene leaders were not quick to support the report’s findings. Slovene sociologist and party member, Dimitrij Rupel denounced the October, 1986 amendments to the Constitution believing that Slovene [and Croatian] autonomy would be severely ‘curtailed’.\textsuperscript{329} Reiterating a point made at the Thirteenth Party Congress [25-28 June, 1986], Slovene Central Committee member Ciril Ribicic accused the Serb leadership of deliberately interfering in other republic’s economic affairs without just cause. It was these tensions between the Slovene leadership and Belgrade which set the stage for the drives toward Slovene independence in 1989-1990.\textsuperscript{330}

Despite their pleas for a more central authority, Serb leaders did not hinder the ever increasing activity of the Serbian intelligentsia, especially within Belgrade.\textsuperscript{331} In 1986 the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences drew up, the now infamous, \textit{Memorandum}.\textsuperscript{332} It was the Memorandum which was to characterise the years, 1987-1989, by the ‘revival and proliferation of exclusivist nationalism throughout the republics and provinces, [including] a growing criticism of Tito [emanating above all from Serbia].’\textsuperscript{333}

The fundamental argument of the Memorandum was that the \textit{Serb people} throughout Yugoslavia was a kind of primary entity, possessing a unitary set of rights and claims which transcended any mere political or geographical divisions: \textit{The question of the integrity of the Serb people and its culture in the whole of Yugoslavia poses itself as a crucial question for that people’s survival and development.} It was the pursuit of that \textit{integrity} which would eventually destroy Yugoslavia, and bring about the destruction of Bosnia too.\textsuperscript{334}

Within Bosnia, Muslim leaders such as Hamidija Pozderac, felt that growing Serb nationalism did not need further excuses to increase its support. He had called on the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina to refrain from actively practising Islam, opting instead for a secular approach.\textsuperscript{335} Pozderac condemned Bosnian Muslim cultural organisations such as the Young Muslims, and supported the arrest and imprisonment

\textsuperscript{327} Prifti (1978), \textit{op.cit.}; p.222.

\textsuperscript{328} Ramet (1985), \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{329} Patrick IFR Artisien, \textit{Yugoslavia to 1993: Back From the Brink?} (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989)

\textsuperscript{330} Lydall, \textit{op.cit.}, and, Ramet (1992), \textit{op.cit.}; p.219.

\textsuperscript{331} James Seroka, “Prognosis for Stability in Yugoslavia in the Post-Tito Era”, \textit{East European Quarterly} (June, 1988 )

\textsuperscript{332} Webb, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{333} IBID, p.221.

\textsuperscript{334} Malcolm (1994), \textit{op.cit.}; pp.207-208.

\textsuperscript{335} Pozderac was a former Vice-President of Yugoslavia Malcolm (1994), \textit{op.cit.}; pp.207-208.
of thirteen ‘Muslim activists’ in 1983. Among these activists was a lawyer from Sarajevo who had just completed his PhD, Dr. Ilija Izetbegovic. Izetbegovic’s thesis, The Islamic Declaration, was, and still is used by Serbs to signify the former’s wish to create an ethnically pure Muslim Bosnian state.

4.2.4 The Rise of Slobodan Milosevic

The Memorandum and increasing Serb chauvinism coupled with a poor economic state in most of the republics except perhaps Slovenia, allowed for Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to fill the power vacuum created since Tito’s death. With a degree in law from the University of Belgrade, Milosevic went on in the early 1970s to become a director of a state co-operative before heading the Belgrade Bank in 1978. Ivan Stambolic, his friend and political mentor, was instrumental in bringing Milosevic into politics during the early 1980s. By April, 1984, Stambolic had become chair of the Serbian CC and recommended Milosevic for the post of Chair of the Belgrade city committee. Less than two years later, Milosevic succeeded Stambolic as Serbian CC chair [January, 1986] when the latter became President of the Serbian Republic. From this position, Milosevic began to consolidate his power. Unlike Stambolic, who never openly embraced Serbian nationalism, Milosevic recognised its appeal among the students and intelligentsia of Serbia. He publicly called for a revival of Serbian culture and the Orthodox religion. With his power base slowly increasing, he took every opportunity to exploit Serb nationalism to his advantage. At a party delegate meeting in Kosova [April, 1987], thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins attended the meeting without invitation. Milosevic played the nationalist card to the crowd, assuring the throng that the Albanians, and the other minorities of Yugoslavia, would never again injure ethnic Serbs. With the Serb media highly nationalistic, Milosevic was given a high profile which only strengthened both his personal confidence and his power. More importantly, his nationalist tilt gave him the opportunity to exploit the press for his own purposes.

By the beginning of 1988, Stambolic continued to not openly support Serb nationalist tendencies. Seizing the opportunity, Milosevic turned on his best and most trusted friend. By not directly attacking Stambolic but instead going after his protégé,
Dragisa Pavlovic [who succeeded Milosevic at the Belgrade city committee chair], Milosevic was able to garner the support of party cadres without alienating them with a direct assault on Stambolic. With cadre support waning, Stambolic saw his position become increasingly untenable. By December, 1988, he requested the Serbian Parliament to vote him out of office. The latter complied and voted in Milosevic as the new President of the Republic of Serbia in May, 1989. By the time of his ascension to the Presidency, Milosevic had aggrandised his support to a point of no turning back. His consolidation was accomplished in three major phases which began roughly in early 1987 and ended during the latter half of 1989. During the first phase Milosevic stoked the nationalist fires by embracing most methods by the intelligentsia during this period, in promoting pro-Serb ideals. Everything from publications to nationalist demonstrations were endorsed by Milosevic. His appeal as a populist increased when he actively backed the Serbian Orthodox Church and their promotion of rallies and demonstrations boosting Serb awareness of its folk culture and religion. Second, and perhaps most important, Milosevic and his supporters began to gather followers outside of Serbia, especially amongst the Serbs of Montenegro and Bosnia. In late 1988, the Serbian Assembly, upon Milosevic’s request, established the ‘Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins’. Between July and September, 1988, the Committee organised rallies of over 150,000 people at a time. Miroslav Solevic, chair of the Committee summed up the organisation’s fundamental premise, ‘If we don’t get our rights, we will take up arms.’

The autonomous provinces, Kosova and Vojvodina called sessions of their party leadership, as well as of the collective presidency. They failed, however, to achieve what they most wanted, the ouster of Milosevic. The latter responded on 6 October, 1988 with a demonstration of over 100,000 supporters in Novi Sad, the Vojvodin capital. With little choice left, the entire Vojvodin Politburo resigned by the end of October, 1988. Milosevic, moving swiftly, placed Nedeljko Sipovac, his protégé, as party chief in Vojvodin and Mihalj Kertes as province President. As for Kosova, this province became the key to Milosevic’s consolidation of power. Its mystical importance to Serbs meant reducing it and its autonomy to nothing more than a Serb possession, at the expense of the overwhelming Albanian population. Earlier in August, 1988, Milosevic succeeded in removing Azem Vllasi and Kolj Siroka from

346 Magas, op.cit.: p.162.
347 Ramet (1992), op.cit.: p. 234.
349 Djilas (1993), op.cit.: p.188.
351 cited in Ramet (1992), op.cit.: p.231.
352 Biberaj (1990), op.cit.: p.128.
353 Zametica, op.cit.: pp.28-29.
their leadership posts in the Kosovar leadership and replacing them with Rahman Morina, former director of a Kosova state co-operative in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{356}

October/November, 1988 witnessed the Federal Central Committee formally register its disapproval with Milosevic. The latter, however, continued to build up his power base outside of Serbia. Despite Milosevic's failure to have Federal President Stipe Suvar removed in May, 1989, Milosevic was able to push forward and place personnel in key positions in Montenegro.\textsuperscript{357} Throughout the latter half of 1988 demonstrations in the Montenegrin capital of Titograd [now Podgorica], grew increasingly violent over the poor economic conditions.\textsuperscript{358} Protesters called on the Montenegrin leadership to resign. Following riots which lasted two days, the entire Montenegrin leadership caved in to pressure and resigned [11 January, 1989].\textsuperscript{359} Milosevic replaced them with men loyal to him and, more important, also replaced the Montenegrin delegates to the Shkupstina, Marko Orlandic, Vidoje Zarkovic and Slobodan Filipovic.\textsuperscript{360}

By March, 1989 the Serbian Assembly passed constitutional changes effectively abolishing the autonomy of Kosova and Vojvodina. Despite riots in Kosova, Milosevic continued to antagonise Kosova Albanians. In May, 1989 Serbo-Croatian was made a mandatory language subject in all schools and Albanian was forbidden to be taught at all. Thousands of Albanians were removed from their positions as teachers, engineers and police constables. Troops were sent into Prishtina, the capital, and Kosova was essentially placed under a state of martial law.\textsuperscript{361} To add insult to injury, Milosevic supporters organised a rally outside the Kosova capital on 28 June, 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosova. Over 200,000 Serbs, most bussed in from outside Kosova, attended the ceremony which marked the high point in Milosevic's quest for power.\textsuperscript{362}

Third, from the latter half of 1989, Milosevic began to concentrate his efforts on the 'plight of Serbs' outside of Serbia. It was here that he first began to mention the poor treatment, he felt, that Bosnian Serbs were receiving at the hands of both Muslims and Croats.\textsuperscript{363} All he succeeded in doing, however, was in antagonising the latter two ethnic groups. By December, 1989, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims looked to Slovenia and Croatia for assistance. These two republics were, by this stage, openly denouncing Milosevic and called on him to resign. More importantly, they

\textsuperscript{356} Biberaj (1990), \textit{op.cit.}, pp.128-129.
\textsuperscript{357} Ramet (1992), \textit{op.cit.}, pp.231-232.
\textsuperscript{358} IBID
\textsuperscript{359} Djilas (1993), \textit{op.cit.}, and, Zametica, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.22-24.
\textsuperscript{360} Mark Thompson, \textit{op.cit.}, p.135.
\textsuperscript{361} Biberaj (February, 1993), \textit{op.cit.}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{362} IBID, pp.3-4.
\textsuperscript{363} Thompson, \textit{op.cit.}, p.136.
were, by late 1989, requesting for a confederalised Yugoslavia which should include Vojvodina and Kosova as fully-fledged republics.

As 1989 approached its final days, the winds of change were indicating that Yugoslavia would no longer remain together. Milosevic by this point had full control of Serbia and, more importantly, controlled four out of eight votes in the Shkupstina; Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosova and Montenegro. He could now effectively block any legislation which did not appeal to him. This possibility was firmly rebutted by Slovenes, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Realising that Milosevic sought a stronger centralised authority, as long as he was the authority, leaders in Zagreb and Lubljana began to talk increasingly of a confederal Yugoslavia. Developments during the 1987-1990 period were moving quickly, yet most of them were orchestrated by Milosevic.

Milosevic had a profound effect on developments in Yugoslavia. His concerted campaign to refashion Yugoslavia along centralist lines and to erode the two autonomous provinces provoked a powerful anti-Serbian reaction throughout the rest of the country, a reaction that wedded prodemocracy sentiment to proconfederation sentiment, and probably accelerated Bosnia’s ultimate embrace of political pluralism.

The advent of political pluralism saw a variety of political parties form throughout the republics. Some monarchist, others socialist, yet most were nationalist in orientation. By October, 1989 the Slovene Assembly expressly declared the right to secede from the federal structure. Less than four months later [June, 1990], the Slovenes broke links with the LCY after walking out of a special meeting of the Fourteenth Extraordinary Conference. Croatia followed suit. Both Croatia and Slovenia held elections in April, 1990 which brought the centre-right democratic opposition to power in Slovenia [DEMOS], and the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] victory in Zagreb.

These moves made Milosevic support Serbs in Croatia, especially those in the Knin area, a region Serbs refer to as the Krajina, and part of historic Greater Serbia. Efforts to establish Serb cultural societies in this region during the Summer of 1989 were quashed by Zagreb authorities, who saw the actions as attempts by Milosevic to stir unrest. Croatian Serbs, however, held their own referendum in mid-August, 1990 and declared autonomy within Croatia. Armed with AK-47s, Croatian Serbs began to block entry into Knin and engaged in skirmishes with federal troops sent in to

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364 Glenny (1992), op. cit.; p.143.
368 IBID
369 Zametica, op. cit.; pp.16-17.
370 Chandler Rosenberger, "The Next Balkan War", The National Review (7 June, 1993)
restore order in October, 1990. Undeterred, Croatian Serbs created the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] and were led by former dentist, and one time Croatian CP member, Milan Babić. Zagreb and the HDZ, headed by former Partisan General and, history professor, Franjo Tudjman, continued to declare the SDS and their activities illegal. Following Slovenia's lead, Croatia and Slovenia declared 'sovereignty', not independence, by July, 1990. Slovene President Milan Kucan continued to hold onto vague notions of a confederal Yugoslavia, yet this simply was not feasible by the end of 1990.

Despite interrepublican talks and conferences which began in February, 1991, collective Prime Minister, Ante Markovic was unable to get many of the delegates to remain at the meetings. A host of confederal plans were presented and rejected. By this time signs were already pointing to all out conflict. Earlier, in January, 1991 the SDS declared the Serbian Autonomous Region of the Krajina. Zagreb refused to recognise any such territorial unit. As the SDS began to harass Croats in the Knin area, Tudjman, elected President of Croatia by this time, sent in police units to try and disarm the Serbs [May, 1991]. Sporadic fighting ensued and several Croatian police were shot and killed. With little left of the federal structure and both Croatia and Slovenia not sending any delegates to the Shkupstina, Yugoslavia was dead. All that remained was the formal declaration. This came on 25 June, 1991 when Zagreb and Lubljan declared their independence. The civil war had begun.

4.3 CONCLUSION

The collapse of communism made more people turn to concept of nationalism as the only identifiable power. Statesmen harness its political potential to rally behind the idea of a 'Greater Serbia, 'Ethnic Albania', etc. To the West, a generalised view of the problems confronting these countries today will not prove beneficial. The west has in the past and at present continually underestimated the forces of nationalism in the Balkans. Ironically, the West's failure to understand religion/nationalism in this region is not due to secularism. Indeed, religion is at the root of Anglo-Saxon democracies. US foreign policy particularly has at times this century been a sort of 'religious crusade' used to justify policy against threats to democracy. Certainly, attempts at rollback of communist regimes in Southeast Asia during the 1960s is

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372 IBID
373 Babic, a former dentist, joined the Croatian Communist Party following the large scale purges in the early-1970s. Sec, Glenny (1992), op.cit., p.16., and Thompson, op.cit.; p.270.
374 Zametica, op.cit.; p.16.
376 Harris, op.cit.; p.144.
378 Harris, op.cit.; p.144.,and, Thompson, op.cit.; p.8.
379 Ethridge and Black, "Negotiating on the Balkans", in Dennet (1951), op.cit.; pp.172-173.
arguably one example of US policymaker's wish to impose their political systems on other peoples, harkening back to the days of 'manifest destiny'. It is odd then when Western statesmen and policymakers refuse to believe or understand how religion/nationalism is a force elsewhere. The problem with their policy then has been that in areas such as the Balkans, this force has manifested itself in often violent ways. This has prompted the view that Balkan nationalism is a fierce, disruptive force that must not and cannot be nurtured or supported. The resulting paradox and dilemma for the West is that this non-support does not diffuse nationalism. Instead it strengthens it as these groups see short-sighted policy or indifferent attitudes from the West as proof positive of the latter's plot against them. Western policy then fortifies the myth of epic struggle and nationalist group's belief as the 'chosen people' destined to eventually triumph. Such policy also presents the possibility that more radical elements throughout the area may use ethnicity and/or religion as the bedrock necessary to create and launch terrorist-type activity across Europe directed against the US and the West in protest of Western policy.
Chapter Two

ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

1.0 THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER [1944-1946]

The position of Hoxha and the ACP was one of relative security by November, 1944. By this time they had succeeded in capturing power throughout most of the southern portion of the nation. More importantly, two factors aided the communists in the consolidation of their power. First, Hoxha and his compatriots had achieved victory primarily on their own. They received no large level military assistance from either the Soviets or the Yugoslavs. Second, with no recognised government in exile, Hoxha was able to present himself as the legitimate government for Albania. All that remained now was to rout what resistance remained to the communists and seek formal recognition from the Allies.

Opposition to Hoxha came primarily from the northern Gheg clans who saw communism as a threat to their way of life, one based upon the feudal set of laws, the unwritten Canon of Lek. The better organised and more heavily armed communists were able to crush their enemies in the north, many of whom were later tried as 'war criminals and traitors of the people'. Motivated by revenge yet driven by stupidity, Hoxha established a war crimes tribunal in January, 1945. This tribunal, presided over by Minister of the Interior Koci Xoxe began a series of show trials which succeeded in eliminating hundreds of former politicians and civil servants, the latter of which were certainly needed in helping to run the every day functions of the new government.

Obtaining recognition from the Allies would be difficult. By 4 January, 1945, Hoxha had sent a communiqué to the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union seeking official recognition for the communists. He had assumed that since there was no other legitimate contender to lead Albania, recognition from the West would be forthcoming.

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1 This did not initially present a problem as early reports from the British Military Mission in Tirana were 'favourable on the Hoxha team', recognising it as communist, but, apparently popular. See, "Recognition of Albania", *The Economist* vol. 149 (17 November, 1945): p.714.

2 Aside from steadfast adherence to the concepts of aghas, bokhs, bairaks, etc., the Canon of Lek stood by two principles which are still followed, to some extent, to this day. The first is the idea of *patria*, a male dominated society where women, [although used by the communists as equals], were treated as "forms of life lower than animals with no rights whatsoever". Second was the *besa*, or promise. This incorporated not merely a man's word but was reflective of his and his entire family's honour. Because loyalty to the Canon of Lek superseded any loyalty elsewhere, Hoxha sought to eliminate the 'old ways'. See, Misha Glenny, *The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy* (London: Penguin, 1993): p.149.

3 Logoreci, op. cit.; p.85., Puto (1981), op. cit.; pp.246-247., Marmallaku (1975), op. cit.; p.114., See also, "Albania's Foreign Policy", *The Economist* vol. 150 (13 April,1946); 'His [Hoxha's] chief troubles are that it is difficult to impress his doctrines on a backward people and that,... he has been hard pressed to find a cabinet, let alone a civil service. pp.579-580.
deed Hoxha was confident in this position, especially since Yugoslavia offered official recognition to Albania by 28 April 1945. They were followed suit by Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and the Soviet Union all by or before 10 November, 1945. The US and Great Britain though were not willing to extend recognition without establishing criteria they felt Hoxha's "government" must fulfill. The US and Great Britain understood that Albania was now in the hands of the communists. Sensing that little if any emphasis was placed upon the future of Albania once the war had ended, the British and Americans perhaps now thought that they might be able to secure a position of influence in Albania. To assess the situation the US sent an 'informal mission', led by Foreign Service officer Joseph Jacobs who was to 'survey conditions' which would then determine whether or not recognition would be forthcoming. His mission entered Albania by 8 May, 1945 followed by the British mission. Once there they had linked up with two Anglo-American organisations already in Albania. The Military Liaison [ML] and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration [UNRRA] had been in Albania since February, 1945. The US and British believed that Hoxha's desire to gain their recognition would join with Western Allied hopes for genuinely free elections, an implicit part of the Yalta agreement. With a small, yet sustained aid effort provided by the British and the US during the war, the latter two believed that Hoxha and his communist led provisional government would accept allied calls for full and free elections. To perhaps nudge Hoxha in the right direction, the aim Western allied aim therefore was to tie economic aid and formal recognition to assurances of influence via a more 'democratic' government.

...[T]he British and American governments informed the Albanian side....through their representatives in Tirane that their recognition would be conditional on the holding of free elections devoid of intimidation or anti-democratic practices. The elections should be held at an early date, all anti-fascist parties should be enabled to put up candidates, and foreign journalists should be allowed to report on them freely.  

Fland, head of the first UNRRA mission to Albania later confirmed that the goal was to present Hoxha with an 'ultimatum', as well as a contingent of ML troops, approximately one thousand, which would demonstrate visible proof of US and British presence and lay the groundwork for future influence. The US also expressed its desire that the new regime was beholden for any and all treaties and agreements Albania had with Britain and the US during the Zogu regime. Hoxha refused the

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5 Skendi (1956), op.cit.; p.305.

6 Marmallaku (1975), op.cit.; p.114.
conditions and after their failure to convince him, UNRRA and the ML allowed the
distribution of aid to rest in the hands of the Albanian authorities. With the nation in
ruins and wartime aid primarily from Anglo-American sources, the US and British
believed that their ability to direct the course of events in Albania after the war would
be met with little resistance.

For their part, the British and American missions at Tirane did not spare any efforts to
integrate hostile forces into the new regime, hoping for an imminent Anglo-American
landing in Albania. But even though they presented the new regime with numerous
problems, they did not achieve their objective, because the new regime, despite the enormous
difficulties they had to surmount, enjoyed enormous popular support.

Holding firm to his belief that the ACP represented the legitimate government
in Albania, Hoxha still sought official recognition from the US and Great Britain. The
reason for this is clear. Although a communist, Hoxha was a realist. He understood
that the Greek government, as well as the Yugoslav one, would now with the war
ended, press for territorial demands well within Albania's borders. This had been the
situation in the past following all conflicts in the Balkans. To preserve her territorial
integrity, Hoxha understood that this could only be achieved by formal recognition.
He also realised that, regarding Greece particularly, Western sentiment was high and
favourable. To appeal to the West's demands an agreement was reached for general
elections to be held on 2 December, 1945. The provisional government went to great
lengths in trying to convince the West that the elections were free and democratic.
Western journalists were allowed to circulate freely; a Writer's Union was created in
October, 1945, an election campaign went on for two months, and the Council for
National Liberation was reorganised into the Democratic Front [DF]. The slate of
candidates for the DF though was strictly monitored by the communists ensuring that
they would be victorious in the general elections. With the arrival of those elections in
December, 1945 it was hardly surprising then that the communists captured all eighty-
two parliamentary seats with a nearly ninety per cent majority. The new National
Assembly then met in Tirana in January, 1946 and formally abolished the monarchy,
proclaiming the People's Republic of Albania. The less than democratic elections
however, began to strain relations between the West and Albania. Later, Hoxha would

10 Marmallaku (1975), op.cit.; p.86.
accuse the US and British missions of undue influence, attempts at espionage and sabotage all aimed at toppling his regime.\(^\text{11}\)

It was these elections, which the US and Great Britain rightly accused Albania of violating the latter's commitment to the Yalta Declaration. Realising that Hoxha would not cave in, the US blocked Albania's bid for entry to the United Nations. Hoxha responded by imposing severe guidelines on the actions and movements of both US and British officials within Albania. Believing that their officials were mistreated and after failing to receive an formal apology from the Albanian government, the British severed their diplomatic relations with Albania and withdrew their mission in April, 1946. The US did the same by 6 November, 1946. Two events during the interim, and one series of events after 1946 prompted the anti-Albanian stance the US and Great Britain would maintain for several decades.

1.1 The Greek Claims

Most nations' claims to any territory in the Balkans almost certainly have their basis in history. Greece was, and is, no exception. At the time of the Congress of Berlin [1878], Greece sought to increase her territory at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire. With Bismarck not recognising any Albanian 'nation', Greece was given a free hand to negotiate with the Porte for land in Southern Albania. With haste, Greece and the Porte concluded negotiations by 1881. These resulted in the northern expansion of Greek territory to incorporate Thessaly, which it still holds, and Northern Epirus, now part of Southern Albania.\(^\text{12}\) The Great Powers, especially Great Britain, did not protest the new northern boundary of Greece. Indeed, their considerations of allowing Greece to negotiate the boundaries herself included the realisation that such demarcations would deny Russia access to the Mediterranean, something Britain was keen on preserving.

By the end of the Balkan Wars [1913], Greece had acquired even more territory within Northern Epirus, specifically, the capital city of Jannina.\(^\text{13}\) The First

\(^{11}\) Marmallaku (1975), \textit{op.cit.}; p.86., Halliday, \textit{op.cit.}; p.88., See also Pollo and Puto (1981), \textit{op.cit.}; who claim that the US and Great Britain did actually establish several groups whose goal was the ouster of Hoxha. Led by Joseph Jacobs and General D.E.P. Hodgson, the head of the British mission, these 'groups succeeded in forming a number of clandestine organizations like the Albanian Unity of the Catholic Clergy, the Independents Group, the Resistance Group and the social-democratic and monarchist groups. They had the dual task of, on the one hand, setting themselves up as an opposition party to the new regime either outside or within the Democratic Front, and, on the other hand, of secretly organizing acts of economic sabotage as well as armed action to overthrow the government in power., at p. 250., The Hoxha regime also confined the British ML to Tirana and it expelled members of the British War Graves Commission; \textit{The Economist} (13 April, 1946): p.579.

\(^{12}\) Schevill, \textit{op.cit.}; p.405.

\(^{13}\) \textit{ibid.}, p.477. Today the Greek city of Ionnina, some fifty miles within Greek territory is still claimed by some Albanian nationalist parties as historically part of Greater Albania. The area is known as Cameria and the Albanians, as 'Chams'.

World War saw the Greeks, Italians, and the Serbs occupy most of Albania. The Treaty of Paris recognised the Albanian nation and the League of Nations vetoed any Serbian claims to Scutari in the north. Greece had lost most of Northern Epirus, acquiring Thrace as compensation.14

However, immediately after World War II, Greece still believed that it was entitled to Northern Epirus. This was doubly felt by Greeks within the region who, after the war, took it upon themselves to promote their cause to the Allies. By February, 1946 a Greek delegation from Northern Epirus travelled to London and the United States to argue their case. They believed that apart from ethnographic and cultural reasons;

...on January 13, 1920, the Supreme Allied Council unreservedly recognised that the Greek claims to the region was just, and decided to hand it over to Greece. First, however, King Constantine's return and afterwards the desire to appease Fascist Italy prevented the decision from being carried out.15

As for the Greek government itself, it sent to the Paris Conference Council of Foreign Ministers a memorandum holding fast to its claims. Reiterating the delegation's stance, the memo points to both the Venizelos-Tittoni accord of 1919 and the US Senate resolution of 1920, both in favour of Northern Epirus' incorporation into Greece.16

By this time Albanian relations with the US and Great Britain were already beginning to sour. Britain was complaining of the treatment its missions to Tirana were receiving, and were already moving towards a severing of relations.17 Washington also believed that Hoxha's actions against US and British missions would not help his aim in the peace process. More importantly, to the US and Great Britain such actions were interpreted, by them, as deliberate attempts by Hoxha to isolate Albania from the West.18 The immediate result was to bolster the Greek claims as evidenced by the Pepper Resolution.[ infra]

Perhaps still hoping that Hoxha could be kept near the Western orbit, Secretary of State Byrnes removed the Resolution from consideration at the Paris Conference. Albania, however, still understood that Greece would never wholeheartedly relinquish its claims to Northern Epirus. Also, after the war, Greece found itself in the throes of a civil war against the communist backed KKE, under the leadership of Nikos Zakhariadis. Beginning by late 1944, Hoxha's partisans had made contact with the military wing of the KKE, the ELAS. Hoxha even placed several small units under ELAS command. In return ELAS turned over 'war criminals' that had fled to Greece

14 Ibid., pp. 511-516.
15 "Northern Epirus Seeking Union with Greece", The Times 9 February, 1946.
16 "Greek Claim to Northern Epirus", The Times 17 April, 1946
17 The Times 5 April, 1946.
18 The Times 30 May, 1946.
prior to the communist take-over in Albania.\(^{19}\) When the war had ended, the Greek government began its call for territory within Albania. After partial recognition was given to the provisional government of Hoxha in 1945, over one hundred thousand Greeks protested in Athens for the Allies not to recognise Albania nor its present boundaries. The KKE however, did not make any mention of territory within Albania, for good reason. Resentment towards Albania intensified between 1945 and 1947 since the KKE and its military, the Democratic Army was being aided by the neighbouring nations of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.

\(^{20}\) The actual military aid given to the Democratic Army in the first place was small and mainly restricted to food, but its unlimited freedom to flit unharmed across the Albanian border into Greece and back again to security whenever harried by the Greek National Guard was of inestimable value. This allowed Democratic Army units to raid Greece for food and whatever else they could pick up.\(^{20}\)

This prompted two reactions from the Greeks. The first was a series of border skirmishes which occurred within Albanian territory throughout 1946-1947, led by Greek General Zervas. The second response was the continual demands by Greece for the territory within Albania which it called 'Northern Epirus'. This area which includes the Albanian towns of Korce and Gjirokaster has a large Greek minority which has repeatedly called for incorporation into Greece. With the US now just as firmly committed to keeping Greece pro-West and non-communist, the territorial demands against communist Albania were treated favourably. This was evident first by the Greek foreign Minister Rendis vehemently opposing Albanian entry into the UN until the question of 'Northern Epirus' is solved.\(^{21}\) Rendis also filed an official protest with the UN Security Council accusing Hoxha of aiding the communists thereby interfering with the internal affairs of the Greek government. The General Assembly created commissions to look into the Greek claims.\(^{22}\) These inquiries confirmed Albania's aid to the KKE and issued a declaration for Albania to cease all such activities.\(^{23}\) Greek

\(^{19}\) Hikuban, \textit{op. cit.}, p.630.
\(^{22}\) The one of primary import was the Special Commission of the United Nations for the Balkans.
\(^{23}\) Puto (1981), \textit{op. cit.;} p.258., Hoxha rejected all such declarations and condemnations from the UN which he felt were under US and British control. As to the Greek communists, Hoxha continued to aid them well into 1949. In fact some Albanian soldiers had joined the Democratic Army in the fighting throughout 1948-1949 near Visti on the Greek-Albanian border. Hoxha finally cut aid to the KKE on 26 August, 1949, believing that the KKE was doomed to failure. Some observers claim that Hoxha cut aid fearful that the Greek Army [GNA] may invade Albania with British and American help and without Yugoslavia's aid [Albania and Yugoslavia broke ties in July 1948], the Albanian army would not be able to repel the attack thereby risk losing territory in the south. This reasoning though fails to take the context of the Cold War, then well under way, into account; "...Hoxha knew that for long the GNA was in no fit condition to look after its own territory, let alone invade Albania, and he also believed he was sheltering securely under the Soviet umbrella. He thought that if the GNA lost patience and marched into Albania, Soviet troops and those from other Communist Balkan countries would rush to his aid. He counted on the USA and Britain restraining Greece from invading Albania,
claims received their strongest support from the US Congress itself who, on 29 July, 1946 passed the Pepper Resolution which put on record, 'the unanimous approval' of the US Senate towards awarding the territory to the Greek government.24

Realising the problem the issue would bring, US Secretary of State James Byrnes managed, one month later, to remove the Resolution from the Paris Foreign Ministers Meeting, which Hoxha personally attended. The US policy towards Greece vis-a-vis Albania had left its mark however, the act;

...presented the communists with a potent tool with which to build up anti-American sentiment in Albania. It also provided them with a convenient excuse to reject on August 13, 1946, the American stipulation that recognition of all existing bilateral treaties was a prerequisite for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two nations.25

The Greek government did attempt some sort of reconciliation with Albania. These overtures were rejected by Hoxha who firmly believed that the US and British were determined to either award territory to Greece at Albania's expense and/or undermine his regime. He was perhaps not too far from the truth regarding Western attitudes towards Albania. By August, 1949, an Albanian soldier deserted and fled to Greece. His report on conditions in Albania to the Western press was followed by statements which, in many ways, were reflective of both the US and British attitudes, and later, actions towards Albania.

The majority of them were anti-Communist and disaffected, he declared, and were willing to revolt against the Enver Hodja [sic] regime if encouraged. From his testimony it is thought here that Albania, in her present impoverished and isolated state, could by dint of Palmerstonian persuasion from the West be snatched from the Cominform orbit. Greece's claims to northern Epirus could then, many here assert, be settled. If northern Epirus had been in Greek hands during the past three years, Albanian support for the Communist rebellion would have been almost impossible, and many of thousands of Greek lives and much British and American treasure would have been saved.26

The previous statement typifies the Western posture towards Albania by this time. A British anti-Albanian stance was warranted in the wake of the Corfu incident. [see below] The US, as well as their attempts to aid the Greek government against the communists were testing the limits of their restraint since the rebels were regrouping

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26 The Times 29 August, 1949.
and refitting themselves in Albania. The Greek territorial claims as well and the Greek minority in Southern Albania would also be the cause of continual strained relations between the two nations and further push Albania from the West. The two even maintained a 'state of war' towards each other well into the 1980s, an anomaly since, Greece was invaded by Italy through Albania in 1940.27

1.2 The Corfu Incident

The second event involved the British and two of its warships. In May, 1946, British ships had sailed through the narrow waterway between the Greek island of Corfu and the Albanian coast. Albanian shore batteries fired upon the ships causing no damage or injury. After a formal apology to Great Britain, Albania informed the British that the area within three miles would be considered Albanian territorial waters. The British rejected this claim stating that the Corfu Channel [less than three miles in some areas], constituted international waters. Deciding it would test its resolve, the British destroyers Volage and Saumarez sailed through the channel on 22 October, 1946 and struck mines in the channel, resulting in the loss of forty-four lives. Britain charged that Albania had mined the channel. The Albanians rejected the charge. Taking their case to the UN Security Council, the Council found in favour of Britain by a seven to two vote. However, the Soviet veto28 in the Security Council prevented any action from being taken against Albania. The British then took their case to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Court, presided over by Dr. Guerrera of El Salvador listened to the charges beginning on 26, February, 1948. Although actual proof that Albania had laid the mines was not presented, the Albanians were found guilty of violating a 'duty of care' by a eleven to five vote. The Court had awarded damages to the British in the amount of £844,947. The Albanians refused to pay, prompting the US and British to impound approximately 7,100 kilos of Albanian

27 The Greek Civil war coincided with Yugoslavia's expulsion from COMINFORM [June,1948]. The US and Great Britain tried to reconcile Greek-Yugoslav relations seeking to counter Soviet influence in the region. Albania's role stemmed from its aid to the KKE guerrillas. According to reports, the Greek government submitted to Washington, in April, 1949 a proposal suggesting a military operation in Albania, in the event of satellite or Soviet aggression against Tito. By August, however, US and British opposition to the plan and their threats of a 'review of policy towards Greece entirely', should it act unilaterally on such a plan made the latter drop it. "The Western powers, although not happy at all with the situation in Albania, were concerned not only with possible Soviet reactions but also with the repercussions a Greek invasion might have on Belgrade's attitude towards Greece and the West." See, Ioannis Stefanidis, "United States, Great Britain and the Greek-Yugoslav Rapprochemen, 1949-1950", Balkan Studies vol. 27 (1986): p.324.

28 The veto caused the British to amend their initial resolution which now claimed that Albania, even if it did not lay the mines, must have known of their existence and, therefore, had a duty of care in reporting such knowledge. The veto by the Soviets was initiated and defended by their representative to the UN, Andrei Gromyko. See, "The Corfu Strait Appeal", The Economist vol. 152 (15 March, 1947): pp.370-371., "The Veto Protects Albania", The Economist 29 vol. 152 (29 March, 1947): p.448.
gold looted by the Nazis and held by the post-war Tripartite Commission of the US, Great Britain and France. The British and Albanians remained at an impasse over the gold and damages for nearly five decades. The matter was finally resolved in May, 1992.29

Corfu would sever all ties with little chance of resumption between Albania and the West.30 The British and Americans though should have known that, regarding Corfu, Albania could not have been liable. In *The Albanians*, Anton Logoreci states the British and US failed to take into account, 'the harsh political realities of the situation'. By 1946, Albania was a 'vassal' of Yugoslavia, not a sovereign state. With that being so, it was doubtful that mines could have been laid without Tito's knowledge.31 This may contain some truth to it since by this time Tito was having problems with the Allies over his demands for territory in Trieste and for his and Hoxha's apprehension of strong Western support for anti-Communist forces in neighbouring Greece. Fearful of a potential Western attempt against Yugoslavia or Albania may have led to mining the channel to forestall such action. The Soviet ambassador to Albania immediately after the war, Dimitri Chuvakhin would afterwards state both expressly and implicitly that the Albanians, 'had neither the means nor the opportunity', to mine the channel. He also accused the US and Great Britain of 'incessantly harassing' Albania in the difficult years after the war.32 Regardless of apportioning blame, the incident set Albania upon its course of isolation from the West.33

1.3 Intelligence Operations

The only other involvement in Albania by both the British and Americans was during the years, 1949-1954. During this period British SOE had transferred its covert operations to MI6. The US had replaced OSS first with the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 [CIG], which a year later became the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. Coordinated activity between the two was aimed at fighting the Cold War. The British with their historic knowledge of Europe and intelligence gathering ability were given the first opportunity. Albania was chosen by MI6 as a likely candidate for covert

29 By 8 May, 1992 the Commonwealth Office announced its intention of returning the Albanian gold, now estimated at £10,000,000. In return, the Albanian government would pay £1,100,000. For an account of Corfu see, Halliday, op.cit.; pp.345-346., Logoreci, op.cit.; pp.90-91., Marmallaku (1975), op.cit.; pp.115-116.
31 Logoreci, op.cit.; p.92.
activity. The British, with American financing, gathered many escaped Albanian émigrés and began to train them with the idea of sending them back to Albania and try to topple the Hoxha regime.\(^{34}\) The various émigrés were trained abroad in Cyprus, Malta and Germany by the British and were to depart from Italy and Greece. The first attempt was a seaborne landing in October, 1949. Further operations were undertaken by the British in both 1950 and 1951 but all missions failed miserably. The US continued to make attempts up to 1954, yet none led to any success in overthrowing or fomenting unrest towards the Hoxha regime. Several reasons accounted for the failure of Anglo-American covert activity. The most acceptable and most frequently used explanation was the betrayal of the missions by Harold [Kim] Philby, a Soviet spy who had successfully infiltrated MI6 and had access to CIA-MI6 covert activity. This reason however, is not of primary importance. The US and British had failed to adequately co-ordinate activity, disagreeing frequently over tactics of covert action in Albania.\(^{35}\) A more important factor were the Albanian émigrés themselves. Those chosen had little in common with each other. Some were remnants of the national Balli Kombetar while others were Zogistas or northern clan leaders or members. With no plan as to what to do if successful, the only commonality these men had was that they were all anti-Hoxha, hardly the material necessary for such an undertaking since they constantly bickered among themselves.\(^{36}\) The poorly equipped émigrés, even without the Philby betrayal had little chance for success against a regime and people that were instilled with the belief that external forces were at work with designs to destroy the Albanian nation and distribute it to its neighbours.\(^{37}\)

From the end of the war up until the end of American covert activity in Albania [1954], the US and British deliberately missed their opportunity to bring Albania within the Western camp or at the very least, to keep Hoxha pro-West. During the war their willingness to deal with the communists against the fascists was now transformed into a narrow 'black or white' approach. They failed to see that immediately after the war Hoxha and others, specifically Sejfulla Maleshova and Dr. Dishnica [the former a Politburo member, the latter, Minister of Health], had leanings towards the West hoping to preserve Albania's independence from both Greece and Yugoslavia, the latter which had designs for Albania as either part of Yugoslavia as


\(^{37}\) 'It is also inevitable that small nations which for centuries were ruled by alien conquerors... should be extremely sensitive about their national independence.' "Communists and Nationalism", The Economist vol. 152 24 (May, 1947): p.799.
republic or part of a larger Balkan Federation. Tito's designs on Albania naturally made him stand against any attempt by Hoxha to seek or gain formal recognition from the US or Great Britain. The West's pressure on Albania and the latter's opposition to anything it believed was a threat to its territorial integrity left Hoxha with little recourse. Surrounded by nations that have always had territorial ambitions within Albania forced Hoxha into the arms of Tito and Yugoslavia. This relationship was cemented after a delegation led by Hoxha and the pro-Yugoslav Albanian Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe went to Belgrade and signed the Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Co-operation with Yugoslavia on 9 July, 1946. The irony of the entire post-war era regarding US relations with Albania [or lack thereof], was that, following the Yugoslav break with Moscow in 1948, Yugoslavia was seen at the very least a non-aligned nation within the Eastern bloc and at best, a pro-Western communist nation within the bloc, a position Albania could have filled immediately after the war. Hoxha and the Albanian people's desire was first and foremost to remain a nation-state, something it was constantly fighting for throughout its history. This sense of nationalism among the Albanians superseded any communist ideology. A factor which the West failed to recognise.


With the deepening rift between Albania and the West, Hoxha became more preoccupied with protecting Albania's independence. Aware that Tito and Bulgarian communist leader G. Dimitrov had discussed plans for a Balkan Federation which would include Albania, Hoxha had to contend with pro-Yugoslav sympathisers within the ACP. Among the most powerful was Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe. Hoxha was unable to turn towards the West for assistance. His attempts to contact the Soviet Union were subtly deflected, the latter preferring to contact Albania by way of Yugoslavia. With the large role the YCP played in helping to create the ACP and the Soviets conveying their messages to Hoxha via the YCP throughout the war, it was not difficult to imagine that most within the communist camp saw the Albanian communist party as the 'fledgling' offshoot of the YCP. With nowhere else to turn and

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38 Skendi (1956), op. cit., pp. 307-308. The evidence that Hoxha may have been pro-west is based upon two significant events. First was a cable sent from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office on 5 December, 1944: 'OSS has recently been trying to persuade the State Department to adopt a more encouraging attitude towards Hoxha on the ground that besides being independent of the political fight at present, he is neither a Communist nor a fellow traveler and is sincerely anxious to establish a westward orientation for Albania'. [FO report 371/43554] The second was immediately after the war when Hoxha, speaking to a youth communist group said that the liberation of Albania would not have been made possible without the US and Great Britain and the leadership of Churchill and Roosevelt.
fearful of losing power, Albania and Hoxha bowed to the pro-Yugoslav faction of Xoxe and signed the Treaty of Friendship in July, 1946. The pact;

...provided for the establishment of an agency to coordinate the economic plans of the signatories, for the standardization of the Albanian and Yugoslav monetary systems, and for the creation of a common price system and customs union between the two nations. The two economic systems were merged for all practical purposes.39

Albania soon found itself flooded with Yugoslav economic and military advisors and specialists of various fields whose aim was to quicken the pace for incorporation into Yugoslavia. Albania's 'alliance' with Yugoslavia was certainly not one based upon equal footing nor as one of junior partner to senior but rather as a sub-satellite. This became evident by September, 1947 at the creation meeting of COMINFORM. Albania was not invited to this meeting since it was felt that they were adequately represented by Yugoslavia.40

Relations between the two nations began to sour immediately. The joint economic policy began to take its toll on the Albanian economy. Many within the leadership openly voiced their protest of 'imperialist' designs by Tito aimed at benefiting Yugoslavia at Albania's expense.41 The situation began to deteriorate rapidly by the Summer of 1947. In June, Tito addressed the ACP and criticised it for its anti-Yugoslav posture. He based his remarks on two related events that occurred earlier in the year. The first involved the visit to Belgrade in April by Nako Spiru, Chairman of the Albanian State Planning Commission. Spiru was dispatched to Yugoslavia to ease the increasing tensions between the two nations and to receive a pledge of economic assistance from Tito so that Albania could invest in her light and petroleum industries. The Yugoslavs refused to pledge anything until the Albanians agreed to the formation of a joint commission with aims to further consolidate the Yugoslav-Albanian economies. Spiru was also informed that assistance would still arrive from Yugoslavia even in the event of a change of government in Tirana. Tito proposed that a secret pact be drawn up to ensure such a situation, should it arise. Spiru rejected the plans by Yugoslavia sensing that they were aimed at destroying the Albanian nation. This incensed the Yugoslav leadership which then contacted its people within the Tirana leadership, namely the Xoxe faction, and its chief collaborator, Pandi Kristo, and began plans for the removal of the Hoxha clique. Upon his return and report to the ACP, Hoxha rejected the Yugoslav proposals. Hoxha though realised that he could not openly attack the Xoxe faction and risk his own

39 Pano (1968), op.cit.; p.73.
40 Marmallaku (1975), op.cit.; p.120.
41 The Yugoslavs objected to any Albanian economic planning, believing that Albania's 'task' was to furnish Yugoslavia with raw materials. "Albania and Tito", The Economist vol. 156 (1 January, 1949): p.22.
removal. By May, 1947 Xoxe called for the removal of nine members of the Popular Assembly accused of plotting against the state, namely in anti-Yugoslav activity. Notable among these was Maleshova. Xoxe also succeeded in having Shehu removed from his post as Army Chief of Staff and having himself placed as chief of the Sigurimi [Security Police]. With Yugoslav assistance, Xoxe was able to place himself second in the leadership behind only Hoxha. The second event was the Hoxha visit to Belgrade in June, 1947. Tito informed Hoxha that relations between the two nations should be strengthened to prevent a potential infringement by the Western powers. Hoxha however, realised that Tito's plans for a Balkan Federation would not involve Albania in any other role than of an integrated part of Yugoslavia, its sovereignty sacrificed. Hoxha also saw the threat to himself when at a formal state dinner, the place of honour was reserved not for Hoxha, but for Xoxe.42 When, in the same month Tito criticised the ACP, the charges were rejected. By this time, leading Albanian intellectuals openly condemned Yugoslavia and anti-Yugoslav rhetoric was evident in both public and private circles.43 Following the Yugoslav visit Hoxha paid a ten day visit to Moscow and met with Stalin. The two discussed the situation in Albania and the status of relations vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Stalin apparently informed Hoxha that the Soviet Union was in favour of Albanian independence and that she should protect herself in relations with other states. As a result of the meeting:

...Albania was granted a credit of US $6 million on rather easy terms. The credit covered some specific agreements on supplies. Simultaneously hundreds of Soviet specialists were dispatched to Albania to organise and supervise the construction of a number of economic projects.44

The Yugoslavs were indignant at the Albanians for not receiving prior approval before taking the trip to Moscow. They had demanded a copy of the economic agreement text and saw the ties with the USSR as an anti-Yugoslav gesture. This prompted more recriminations from Tito in July, 1947. The Xoxe faction placed the blame on Spiru, and called for him to appear to the Politburo to defend himself. Spiru turned to Hoxha for help. The latter would not, or more accurately, could not since doing so would run the risk of a direct confrontation with Xoxe at a time when Hoxha was not fully prepared. Spiru, apparently despondent, committed suicide by November, 1947.45

44 Chuvakhin, op. cit.; pp.133-134.
45 Pollo and Puto (1981), op. cit.; p.262., The situation between Stalin, Tito, and Hoxha was part of a larger scheme involving the struggle for leadership and power in the Balkans after the war. At first, Stalin supposedly approved of a plan for a Balkan Pact led by Tito, protected by the USSR thereby securing Soviet access to the Mediterranean. By the beginning of 1946, Tito's visit to Moscow first
The suicide of Spiru was brought up by Stalin when, in January of 1948, Milovan Djilas journeyed to Moscow. Stalin questioned the 'special relationship' between the Albanians and Yugoslavs when one of the former's top leaders takes his own life. It was at this meeting that Stalin and Molotov expressed no objection to Yugoslavia 'swallowing up' Albania. Djilas objected to the use of the term and stated that Yugoslavia sought only to incorporate Albania into joint plans. With the growing rift between the Yugoslavs and Stalin, Djilas sensed that a trap was being set by the Soviet leader. By the time of the Eighth Plenum of the Albanian Communist Party [26 February - 8 March, 1948], it appeared as if the Xoxe faction would seize power. To keep his position as General-Secretary of the party, Hoxha had to admit his past wrongs. Xoxe also succeeded in having Liri Belishova, widow of Spiru and a prominent party member removed from the party as well as having Shehu dropped as a candidate from the Central Committee. Together with the Yugoslav emissary sent to Tirana, Savo Zllatic, Xoxe made plans to merge the economies and armed forces of the two nations. At the scheduled Politburo meeting of April, 1948, he was to formally apply Albania for membership within the Yugoslav Federation. At the Politburo meeting Xoxe failed to get his proposal approved. The growing tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were causing a great deal of anti-Yugoslav feelings within Albania. By June, 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from COMINFORM and the Soviet bloc.

News of the expulsion was received with great jubilation by Hoxha and some of his colleagues. Immediately afterwards, the Albanian government repudiated all its economic agreements with Yugoslavia on the grounds that they were incompatible with national sovereignty; expelled all Yugoslav specialists and advisors, and set in motion a frantic press and radio propaganda campaign against Tito.

The Yugoslav specialists were quickly replaced by Soviet ones who concluded an economic agreement with Albania in September, 1948. Feeling secure in his

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48 Logoreci, op.cit.: pp.99-100.
position, Hoxha now launched an attack upon the opposition. At the Eleventh Plenum Meeting, [mid-September, 1948], Shehu, Belishova and others wrongly purged were reinstated to their previous posts. Xoxe was removed as Interior Minister and at first made Minister of Industry. At the plenum the ACP also approved a name change to the Albanian Party of Labour [APL]. The minor punishment of Xoxe apparently was due to Hoxha seeking Stalin's approval for meting out 'proper' punishment. When this was received Hoxha removed Xoxe and his faction from the party entirely. At a secret trial in May, 1949, Xoxe was found guilty and executed.

The break from Yugoslavia moved Albania out of sub-satellite status into that of a formal satellite of the USSR. For their part, the Soviets now had someone close enough to Tito to cause harassment and concern as well as access to the Adriatic and Mediterranean. It also provided Stalin with a formal excuse to dismiss the idea of a Balkan Federation which would move Tito to a position within the world communist movement on par with Stalin. More importantly, the Soviets were able to continue exercising their influence in the Balkans. The extension of such influence has been part and parcel of Russian aims since the time of the czars. The break with Yugoslavia did more than highlight an early rift within the communist bloc. By parting with the Soviets, Yugoslavia not only limited Russian access to warm water ports, it more significantly severed historic ties between the Russians and Yugoslavia's largest ethnic group, the Serbs. It has been these ties and kinship among Russians and Serbs, both Slavs, which most likely made the USSR welcome links with Albania, thereby compensating for its loss in Yugoslavia. Moreover, it offered the Soviets continued presence and an opportunity to further its influence in the Balkans, something it presently is maintaining. Although formal ties with Yugoslavia were limited following the break, present Russian efforts at attempting to influence the outcome of the current crisis demonstrate both the renewed kinship with the Serbs and Russian measures to assure itself influence in an area the latter strongly feels is within its sphere of concern.

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50 For view on historic Russian aims see; Thomas Anthem, "Russia in the Mediterranean", *Contemporary Review* vol. 212 #1226 (March, 1968); "Throughout the nineteenth century, and down to the outbreak of the second world war, it was Great Britain's determined policy to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean." at p.132., and, Barbara Jelavich, op.cit.; 'In foreign relations the adoption by the Soviet Union of an active policy in European affairs....forced the Balkan governments to adjust their attitudes to the changed relationships of the great powers [after W.W.I].... With the recovery from these shocks....Russia [was]...in a position to exert a strong influence on the thirteen small countries that stretched from the Baltic to the Mediterranean....' at p.192., and, Kissinger (1994), op.cit. -'As Austria grew more and more dependent on Russia, Metternich's most perplexing question became how long his appeals to the Tsar's conservative principles could restrain Russia from exploiting its opportunities in the Balkans....Nicolas I was enraged that Napoleon III, whom he regarded as an illegitimate upstart, should presume to step into Russia's shoes as protector of the Balkan Slavs....' at
For Hoxha, the alliance with Moscow preserved the territorial integrity of Albania. The alliance was prompted by nationalistic tendencies on the part of the Albanians. The USSR offered Albania a protector who was not directly adjacent to Albanian territory and who could provide far more aid than Yugoslavia. The revolt against the latter was as Pano states, 'fostered by nationalism'. Indeed, Albania and Hoxha had fought for the territorial integrity of the nation and were willing to ally themselves with those that would ensure independence even if within the framework of a Soviet satellite. Logoreci claims that indeed;

...the initial impulse that drove the Albanian leaders into a close alliance with the Soviet Union was neither any special love for Moscow nor even an affinity with Stalin's methods of government, but nationalism pure and simple.

The communist regimes of the Balkans were theoretically united under the socialist umbrella. The idea of a Balkan Pact was not new. It had been entertained as a unification of communist groups in the Balkans throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Yet nationalist feelings were to overcome socialist brotherhood, especially in Albania where 'Albanian Socialism' was used to rally support for Albania, a nation whose sovereignty was constantly being challenged for centuries. Support for 'Albania' as Albania was paramount. If it was the APL which could ensure this then it would receive backing. This mode of reasoning would be the guiding force for Albanian foreign policy throughout the Hoxha regime, alliances with those that respected and offered assistance which would preserve Albanian independence.

3.0 A SOVIET SATELLITE [1948-1961]

With the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, Albania not only served as a propaganda base in the Balkans, but, also became of strategic importance. This was due to access to the Mediterranean and, after Greece and Turkey's entry into NATO [February, 1952], as a counter-weight to NATO's 'southern flank'. Hoxha though still believed both he and Albania were in a precarious position. While the

pp. 91-93., and, on the view that ties do still exist between Russia and the Serbs vis-a-vis the present crisis see; Kemal Kurspahic, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994 'All well-intended resolutions and initiatives in the name of unity of the alliance and the contact group- which includes Russia, the Serbs' main ally- turn out to be window dressing for a collection of failures.', and, Laura Silber, The Financial Times 30 November, 1994 'Mr. Mirok Pejanovic, an ethnic Serb member of Bosnia's collective presidency, disclosed in London that he had been in touch with aides to Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister.'

52 Pano (1968), op.cit.; p.86.
54 Hoxha used his popularity, 'however, nationalism rather than Marxism-Leninism was the primary force that allowed him to create a fairly solid social base for his programme'. Glenny (1992), op.cit.: p.150.
Soviets made guarantees to Hoxha on preserving Albania's territory, it was both a blessing and curse that Albania shared no common border with the USSR. To the north, Yugoslavia, from 1950 on, began to make overtures to the west, particularly the US. To the south, with the Greek civil war in full swing, the northern Epirus question threatened Albania. In both cases Hoxha became wary that the US, and the strong anti-Communist posture embodied within the Truman Doctrine made his position and Albania's, tenuous at best.

Hoxha was not sure of his future. In the Spring of 1949 he had secretly asked Britain and the United States to grant him diplomatic recognition. It was refused. Important for the United States, however, was the fear that any move to upset the Albanian regime—whether inspired by the West or not—might be used by Moscow as an excuse to go to its rescue, to accuse Yugoslavia of expansionist aims toward her small neighbour and to take violent action against Tito. Since the West wished to avoid the possibility of a world war arising from such an action, the United States appeared wary of seeking a change in the delicate Albanian situation.\(^5^5\)

Hoxha's secret overture to the West may have arisen from three factors. First, realising that the US was backing the anti-Communist forces in Greece and granting economic aid to Yugoslavia, Hoxha was wise to the fact that without formal recognition from the West, Albania's territorial integrity was suspect and subject to a variety of claims which the West may endorse. Also, although the US was perhaps not willing to subscribe to military action and risk Soviet intervention, this did not preclude it from endorsing, aiding, and later conducting covert activity aimed at Hoxha himself. An overture to the West would secure his and Albania's position.\(^5^6\)

Second, Albania's inter-bloc relations were not on a level of equality. Although, in the early months of 1949, several communist bloc nations sent aid aimed at improving the Albanian economy, Albania was not invited to the second 'significant' communist bloc meeting, the formation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON], in January, 1949. Albania did join COMECON yet still was not treated with the same level of importance as the others, a fact which would be revealed later when Khrushchev took power.\(^5^7\)

Third was Albania's relations with the Soviet Union herself. Between 1949 and 1953, Albania's internal problems were quite evident in the amount

\(^{55}\) Skendi, (1956), \textit{op.cit.}, Kertesz, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.311-312.

\(^{56}\) see Pano (1968), \textit{op.cit.}, p.91., on the overture to the West. Dravis, \textit{op.cit.}, on covert activity and its failure. For a contradictory stance from the US side, H. Leman by 1951 told the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate; 'the battle of nerves against Albania can be considered lost.' Yet by this time, the US still conducted anti-Albanian propaganda such as, 'dropping leaflets over Albania', and gathering anti-Communist émigrés for US led covert activity still to come [1953-1954] see, Pollo and Puto (1981), \textit{op.cit.}, p.266.

\(^{57}\) There was no official explanation why Albania was not present at the initial COMECON meeting, yet, Marmallaku offers a reasonable interpretation when he states; '...the Soviet Union was probably not interested in inviting Albania, since it did not border with the USSR and was the most backward of all the countries in the communist bloc'. Marmallaku (1975), \textit{op.cit.}, p.121.
of aid required to keep the nation functioning. This 'dependency', it was thought may lead to a subservience which would undermine independence. Skendi admits that once the alliance with Moscow took hold, "An important role in the change of control was played by the Soviet Minister in Tirana, Dimitri Chuvakhin. The Albanian Government was under his orders."58 Also, to counter Western sea power, the Soviets had by 1950 designed plans to reactivate the Nazi-wartime submarine base on the island of Sazan in the Bay of Vlora, less than fifty miles from Italy. By 1952, the base became operational and housed twelve W-class Soviet subs and support craft.59 Although the Soviets spent nearly $30 million on development and maintenance of the base between 1950 and 1960, their inherent lack of confidence in the Albanian leadership prevented them from large scale development of the base, thereby turning it into a major base of operations in the Mediterranean.60 Albania, facing food shortages, high levels of inflation, widespread illiteracy, unemployment, general impoverishment and hostile neighbours had little choice but the 'Faustian alliance' with Moscow. While it is debatable that nationalism is not found in the unswerving obedience to another, Hoxha and the APL were able to preserve, by cunning, guile and a great deal of luck, Albania's borders. If national preservation meant, presently, satellite status to Moscow then so be it. Bulgaria, arguably the most loyal and subservient bloc nation for quite some time did not lose its 'Bulgarian' identity while within the Soviet sphere.61 Albania also, though highly influenced by Moscow and guided by it in policymaking, did not lose touch with its Albanian national identity. Indeed, even Albanian anti-Communists would not admit that their identity as 'Albanians' was lost when, during the Zogu regime throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Albania was quite literally, a vassal of Italy. For Hoxha and the APL Albanian nationalism and communism were compatible as 'Albanian socialism', even if protected by Moscow. By the time severe internal difficulties were alleviated in late 1953, a new series of challenges would threaten Albania and her relationship with the Soviets.

Concern from immediate neighbours was heightened in 1953. It was in February of that year that the nations of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact Treaty on Friendship and Collaboration.62 The pact also included the clause which allowed the communist member nations to join if they broke from the Soviet Union. Hoxha denounced the pact calling it an American imperialist plot to

58 Kertesz, op cit.: p.312.
59 Pano (1968), op cit.: p.90., see also, Dokumenta Kryesore te Partise se Punes se Shqiperise [Principal Documents of the Albanian Party of Labour] (Tirana: Instituti I Historise, 1970)
60 Pano (1968), op.cit.: p.91., for Soviet aims see, Thomas Anthem (1968), op.cit.: pp.132-137.
61 This was especially true during the 1970s when Zhikov, '...began to permit the development of a much stronger Bulgarian national consciousness...', Glenny (1993), op.cit.: p.168.
62 Skendi (1956), op.cit.: p316., On the belief that the pact invitation to join represented a piece of 'psychological warfare', "Liberation without Fears?", The Economist vol. 166 (21 February, 1953): p.470.
overthrow the regime and points to the Foreign Ministers meeting of the pact
signatories on 11 July, 1953, where, they declared Albania, 'an important element for
peace and stability in the Balkans'. Worried that the pact represented implicit if not
official US blessings for Greek and Yugoslav territorial designs on Albania, Hoxha
pleaded with Moscow to make specific guarantees for Albania's safety. This
Moscow did by first raising their diplomatic missions in Tirana from the ministerial to
the embassy level in August, 1952. This was followed, more significantly, by Albania's
entry into the Warsaw Pact on 14 May, 1955. Hoxha's fears would be allayed for the
moment now that military assurances were provided by the pact. Of equal concern for
Hoxha was when on 5 March, 1953, Joseph Stalin, the protector of Albania and its
ideological mentor died. The new Soviet leadership soon found that the obedience
provided to it by Albania would lessen greatly as its policies were increasingly seen as
new threats to Albania's independence.

3.1 The Khrushchev Years

Following the death of Stalin, the USSR quickly sought to heal any divisions
within the bloc and among the communist nations. This became evident when
Moscow pressured Tirana to seek rapprochement with Yugoslavia. With little choice
Albania and Belgrade resumed partial diplomatic relations by December, 1953. Hoxha
understood that although Albania traded more freely with other nations within
the communist bloc, Albania's economy was still heavily dependent upon the USSR.
Taking advantage of the leadership struggle in the USSR and since polemics had yet
come into the open, Hoxha used the opportunity to search elsewhere for aid. By
October, 1954 Albania signed a series of cultural and scientific agreements with China.
The latter also presented a commodities and loan gift to Albania beginning in 1955.
This marked the first overtures between the two nations that were to be of importance
later.

The turning point in Soviet-Albanian relations, however, came about in April-
May, 1955. At the Central Committee meeting of the APL [April 1955], the deputy
Prime Minister Tuk Jakova and Minister of Education Bedri Spahiu openly criticised
the course of the nation. They were branded 'revisionists' and pro-Yugoslav,

63 IBID, p.317.
64 At this time, Marshal Papagos of Greece maintained Greek claims to Epirus but also stated that
Greece wishes an independent Albania on its border. See, "Outpost on the Adriatic", The Economist
65 Pano (1968) op.cit.; p.113.
(February, 1962), By 1957 the USSR accounted for approximately, sixty-three percent of Albanian
exports and made up nearly fifty percent of her imports. at p.70.
67 Pano (1968), op.cit.; p.115.
eventually relieved of all official duties.\(^{68}\) The following month, Khrushchev and
Bulganin paid a visit to Belgrade in an attempt to normalise relations between Tito and
Moscow. Speaking at Belgrade, Khrushchev expressed regret that relations between
Yugoslavia and the USSR had soured after the former's expulsion from the
COMINFORM in 1948. Lavrenyi Beria, Stalin's security chief [purged and executed in
1954], was blamed for disrupting relations between the two nations. After his trip to
Belgrade Khrushchev called for the full normalisation of ties between Albania and
Yugoslavia and for the rehabilitation of Xoxe. Hoxha refused to comply.

'With fresh memories of Yugoslav domination before 1948, Hoxha apparently
feared that Khrushchev and Tito might reach an understanding giving the latter a free
hand in Albania...'\(^{69}\) Hoxha's concerns became more pronounced following the
Twentieth Party Conference of the Soviet Union in February, 1956. The denunciation
of Stalin and the cult of personality was a severe blow to Hoxha and the APL which
now faced similar charges from both outside and within the party. At the Third Party
Congress of Albania, however, Hoxha was able to put down the opposition and purge
the remnants of the Jakova-Spahiu clique and their excessive pro-Soviet tendencies
while simultaneously gaining a vote of confidence from the Central Committee. The
apparent popularity that Hoxha had enjoyed immediately after the war had waned
significantly in ten years. The move toward the USSR had not delivered the economic
prosperity Albania had hoped for. Instead, heavy industrialisation coupled with non-
existent currency reserves, bad weather and poor crop yields embittered both the
population and led to internal divisions such as the Jakova-Spahiu faction. Hoxha
believed that the latter's embrace of Khrushchev and his more moderate, anti-Stalin
principles would lead most likely to rapprochement with Yugoslavia and, eventually,
Hoxha's ouster.\(^{70}\)

While Soviet aid to Albania continued from 1956 onwards,\(^{71}\) Hoxha expressed
his opposition to Khrushchev's Yugoslav visit and policy of peaceful coexistence. He
also did not share Khrushchev's belief that a 'zone of peace' in the Balkans was

\(^{68}\) Pano (1968), op. cit.: p.116., Logoreci, op. cit.: p.115.
\(^{69}\) Biberaj (1990), op. cit.: pp.21-22.
\(^{70}\) 'Albania's economy continued to be characterized by her highly centralized, rigid, authoritarian,
and generally primitive planning system...', According to Albanian statistics the annual average
growth rates in industrial production totalled 22.6% for the period, 1951-1955[the 1st Five-Year
Plan]. Broken down, these statistics included, a 7.4% increase in oil production, 18.5% in chromium,
36.5% in coal, 3.2% in copper, 14.9% in food. Industry accounted for slightly over 52% of all
domestic investment during the same period. See Prifti (1978), op. cit.; especially pp.52-89 "The
Socialization of the Economy", and, Orjan Sjorberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania
\(^{71}\) By 1 January, 1957 the government of the USSR cancelled the debts accrued up to 1957 which
totalled more than four-hundred and twenty million rubles and granted Albania new grant credits
later in the year worth over an additional one-hundred sixty million rubles. These were added to two
further grants of three-hundred forty eight million rubles and seventy-four million rubles for plants,
equipment purchases and food delivery payments. see Glovinsky, op. cit.: p.71.
possible through the close collaboration of the Balkan nations or the ill fated Stoica Plan aimed at such an idea. Hoxha also was resentful that Moscow was deliberately stalling food and grant deliveries to Albania since the latter did not automatically bow to Khrushchev's call for renewed ties with Yugoslavia and the rehabilitation of Xoxe. Albania became increasingly agitated at what they perceived as tying aid to specific 'political control' and 'military arbitrariness' on the part of Moscow. Recognising that Albania no longer served the strategic importance Moscow first placed upon her in the advent of the atomic age, and the economic pressure beginning to be exerted upon her, Hoxha starting from 1956-1957, turned increasingly towards China as his primary trading partner outside the Soviet bloc. With his confidence increasing, Hoxha's attacks upon Khrushchev continued. The latter, at first perhaps considering Albania too insignificant now made overt attempts to whip Albania, and Hoxha into line. As early as Autumn, 1959 Moscow blocked credits to Albania and began to withdraw its technicians and specialists. It was at this time that Hoxha also revealed a 'plot' aimed at his ouster. Though he claims that it originated from the Yugoslavs, Greeks and US Sixth Fleet, it was more likely initiated by Khrushchev with help from Tito as a way to normalise relations between Yugoslavia and Moscow. The ever growing problems between Moscow and Tirana grew as January, 1960 approached becoming a part of the wider conflict within the world communist movement, the Sino-Soviet rift.

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72 The Stoica Plan was issued by Romanian President Chivu Stoica in September, 1957. It called on the nations of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece, and Turkey to confer periodically on matters that threaten Balkan security. Although it left out mention of a Balkan federation it left the idea open, and was undoubtedly Moscow sponsored. See, Stefan Yowev, "Soviet Activity in the Balkans", Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR vol. 4 #10 (October, 1957): pp.22-25.

73 Jan Prybyla, "The Economic Causes of the Soviet-Albanian Quarrel", Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR vol.10 #3 (March, 1963): p.16., Prybyla also refers to the 'zone of conflict' and Khrushchev's suggestion that following the US proposal to station missiles in Italy, Moscow may be forced to do the same by installing a missile base in Albania targeting Italy and Greece thereby heightening tensions in the Balkans. at p.14.


75 J.F. Brown, "Albania, Mirror of Conflict", Survey #40 (January, 1962): pp.26-27., Khrushchev's visit to Albania in the Spring of 1959 may have also made him realise that Hoxha would not ease his polemics against Tito thereby reaffirming the former's belief that Hoxha had to be removed before Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement could proceed any further. See, "The Mediterranean", The Economist vol. 191 (30 May, 1959): pp.815-816., Indications that Hoxha suspected something are evident when one also saw that coincidentally, with Khrushchev's visit to Albania, a Chinese military delegation headed by Marshal Peng Teh-huai was met by Albanian Minister of Defence, General Balluku in Tirana., "Peninsula of Peace", The Economist vol. 191 (6 June, 1959): p. 1054.

3.2 Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift

In the Autumn of 1959, Khrushchev visited the United States and was still holding firm to his idea of peaceful coexistence. Immediately afterward he travelled to Peking trying rally support for his programs realising full well that he would need the backing of Mao. By this time however, a rift had developed between the USSR and China, the latter believing that Khrushchev’s policies, especially towards Yugoslavia were 'revisionist'. The beginning of dissension gave Hoxha the opportunity he needed. Khrushchev did not endear himself with the Albanians when, in May, 1960, he gave an interview with Greek liberal leader Sophocles Venizelos regarding Moscow's apparent approval at discussion of autonomy for Northern Epirus. Khrushchev had suggested that Venizelos discuss the option at the 'little summit' of communist parties upcoming in June, 1960 in Bucharest. Upon hearing of this, Hoxha knew that Khrushchev's posture threatened Albania's integrity. This, J.F. Brown believes was the cause for the deviation from Moscow on Albania's part, 'nationalist concerns'.

Neither Hoxha nor Shehu attended the Bucharest Conference, opting to send Hysni Kapo, third in the party hierarchy. At Bucharest a secret session brought out the differences between Moscow and Peking. Kapo openly supported China and their delegate, Peng Chen. The dispute between Moscow and Tirana was now on. At the General Assembly Meeting of the United Nations in the Fall of 1960, Hoxha did not attend, a deliberate move intended to express his dissatisfaction with Khrushchev. The Soviet leader replied by not meeting with Premier Mehmet Shehu and, to add further insult, met with Tito twice. At the subsequent Communist Parties Meeting of November, 1960 in Moscow Hoxha openly attacked Khrushchev as a 'traitor to the Communist idea'. The Soviet leader allegedly promised that Hoxha would 'pay for the offense'. The personal antagonism created between Khrushchev and Hoxha moved Albania closer toward China and lent credence to the notion that Moscow may attempt to use both its personnel and Albanians within Albania to get rid of Hoxha. Hoxha consolidated his position by fresh purges of the party leadership during the period September, 1960 to May, 1961. Several party members were arrested or ousted for conspiring with Soviet Ambassador Ivanov of trying to form a pro-Soviet faction within the APL. Hoxha’s speech to the APL on 8 November, 1961 signalled to

77 Brown (1962), op.cit.; p.25.
78 Ibid
79 Skendi (1956), op.cit.; p.473.
members of the party that such moves were well known and doomed to failure. The situation came to a head at the Twenty Second All Party Congress in Moscow, October, 1961.

Khrushchev now openly and officially attacked the Albanian leadership accusing them of perpetuating the cult of personality and of being 'unreconstructed Stalinists'. His charges were followed by Mikoyan's who further accused Hoxha and his followers of straying from Marxism-Leninism and following a path of nationalism. Khrushchev's attacks upon the Albanians and the Chinese were not spontaneous. He had assumed that China would fall into line as would Albania, not believing China would support Hoxha at a time when she needed Soviet aid as much as others within the communist bloc. Hoxha followed Khrushchev's attacks with a vicious one of his own calling the latter a 'splitter' and 'revisionist' accusing Khrushchev of straying from the truth path of Marxism-Leninism. Chou En Lai, the Chinese delegate then tried to mediate calling for a settlement of the dispute peacefully but was against the idea that Moscow could on her own initiative attempt to expel someone from the world communist movement. This Chou felt, had to be decided upon by all leading parties. Incensed, Moscow cancelled a scheduled aid package to Albania and all credits due to them. These were taken up by China which was able to cover a large, though not complete percentage of the aid due to Albania. For China, the support of Albania was strictly a face saving measure. In their struggle with Moscow, support for Hoxha gave China the prestige she needed to compete with the USSR in their dispute. Abandoning Albania would be to openly admit failure and would undermine Mao's position within the communist movement, especially among the Third World movements which were increasingly turning towards him. The shift towards Peking was, for Hoxha, one grounded in opportunism rather than practicality. The remoteness of China and her own struggle with modernisation made the idea of a 'protector of Albania's integrity' inconceivable. Instead, the move gave Hoxha the opportunity to further consolidate his leadership and maintain some credibility within the communist

82 For figures on Soviet and bloc aid to Albania see, "Albania's Economic Ties with the Soviet Bloc", East Europe vol. 10 #6 (June, 1961): pp.36-37.
84 In April, 1961, the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments informed Albania that a scheduled credit package of $132 million earmarked for Albania's Third-Five Year Plan would not be available. The Chinese granted Albania $123 million in credit for the plan. At this time all Soviet and East European specialists and technicians were withdrawn and all Albanian students attending universities within the USSR were sent home. Logoreci, op. cit.; p.129.
The United States has never had a realistic and effective foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. During World War II the official American position was that the disposition of Eastern European problems should await the peace settlement, but this was primarily a rationalization for a lack of policy. 87

4.0 THE TURN TOWARDS CHINA [1961-1978] 88

By December, 1961 Albania had broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and maintained only a mission status with the other nations of Eastern Europe. Although Hoxha may have foreseen the break with Moscow, his preparation did not make the transition to China any smoother.

The split with the USSR in 1961, however, brought about a sudden and drastic alteration in Albania's political situation, in that the country was now largely isolated from Western as well as from Eastern Europe. To offset the psychological effect on the Albanian population of this near-total isolation in Europe and to discourage a possible coup d'état by disaffected elements, the regime laid great stress on Albania's alliance with the...Chinese...[It] was a sound and useful exercise in political craftsmanship. It enabled the Party and the government

88 Evidence that Hoxha was leaning towards China were apparent as early as 1958. After Mao had proposed his 'communes' idea only one nation in the eastern bloc adopted Peking's line. This was Albania which passed two decrees. One concerned 'model farms' patterned after Chinese models. The other called on all state and party functionaries to spend one month per year in manual work. The party daily, Zeri i Popullit confirmed that the Chinese experience would prove useful. See, "Three Flowers of Communism", The Economist vol. 189 (29 November, 1958): p.778., On Hoxha's resolve towards China see, "Dear Comrades?", The Economist vol. 198 (14 January, 1961): p.118., "Mr. Hoxha Stands Firm", The Economist vol. 198 (18 February, 1961): p.643., "Steel Like Unity", The Economist vol. 198 (25 February, 1961): p.742.
to achieve a remarkable degree of stability and to project an image of self-confidence abroad through most of the decade of the sixties. 89

The alliance with China was unlike that with Moscow, as Albania was soon to discover. China was quick to replace Soviet advisors with their own and grant long term, interest free loans and credit grants to the Albanian government. During the first half of the 1960s, Chinese technicians worked in close cooperation with their Albanian counterparts accepting the same rate of pay as the locals and, generally, realizing that the Albanians were a proud and independent people. As such they were treated as equals rather than in a 'heavy-handed manner' as by the Soviets. 90

By 1963 Chinese aid to Albania was arriving regularly. With this aid, Albania was able to proceed with its plans for the Third-Five Year Plan. This included approximately twenty-five industrial projects and agencies such as the Sino-Albanian Commission for Scientific and Technical Co-operation and the Sino-Albanian Shipping Company. 91 Aid culminated in a new loan of $214 million for the Fourth-Five Year Plan [1966-1970]. Collaboration between the two reached its peak during this period. Adopting Mao's principles, yet not his methods, Hoxha embarked upon his version of the 'Cultural Revolution', beginning in 1966 and carrying through most of 1967. The size of government and the civil service was reduced; decentralization at all levels was underway, party officials were required to spend time working on collectives, collectivization was instituted at a more rapid pace, schools and their curricula were revamped, women were given greater rights within the party, and finally, Albania abolished all religions and their institutions and proclaimed itself the world's only 'atheist state'. 93 Unlike China, however, Hoxha's type of revolution did not involve campaigns of terror against 'bourgeois and revisionist elements, no violent clashes with opponents of reform..., no massive parades in the streets, and no public turmoil. 94 Like China, however, the main aim of Albania's Cultural Revolution was

89 Prifti (1978), op.cit.: p.244.
90 Prifti (1970), op.cit.: p.120., see also, Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons", Problems of Communism XXI (January-February, 1972): pp.30-39., by 1965, China had accounted for nearly sixty percent of Albania's foreign trade and went to great lengths to develop her oil and mining industries. at p.33.
91 The latter agency aided in the expansion of the Durres harbour facilities. See Prifti (1972), op.cit.; pp.32-33.
92 For general information regarding the extent of this program see, Peter Prifti, "Albania's Cultural Revolution", East Europe vol. 16 #4 (April, 1967): pp.27-29.
94 Prifti (1978), op.cit.: pp.143-150, As to why China and Albania were likely to embark upon cultural revolutions Prifti offers the following explanation; 'Both China and Albania have known great poverty- a factor which possibly accounts, to a degree, for their impatience to industrialize and their willingness to try radical measures to achieve industrialization. Both have a keen memory of the
the educational system, and both its role and place in society. Attempts were made to
develop loyal and productive cadres by closing the gap between mental and physical
labour. Due to its less radical nature, however, the Albanian Cultural Revolution did
not meet with much popular resistance. The sector hit hardest, the military, did not
initially respond to reform. This may explain why Hoxha had several admirals and
other high-ranking military personnel removed or purged during the early-1970s.

During this period relations with the USSR did not improve. Towards the
latter half of 1963 trade resumed between Albania and the other COMECON nations
except for the Soviet Union. Moscow apparently gave the others the green light to
resume trade with Albania so that she would not be tempted in turning to the West.
These concerns may have stemmed from China serving as the intermediary for Albania
in material she needed outside the bloc such as grain shipments from Canada.

Following the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviets made overtures to Albania in
1966. These were rejected by Hoxha. The final de facto break with Moscow came
after the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. By September, 1968, Albania withdrew
from the Warsaw Pact. The invasion made Hoxha wary of potential aggression
against Albania. He received assurances from China on the preservation of Albania's
borders.

Although, as mentioned, the military practicality of these assurances was in
question, it did not prevent him though from lashing out against Moscow and its
' imperialistic ' designs. Hoxha used the opportunity to rally support around himself and
implanting the ' siege mentality ' on Albanians. This made Hoxha, during Albania's
cultural, revolution mobilise the populace to paramilitary service. It also made him

exploitation and humiliation they have suffered at the hands of foreigners. Both have felt betrayed by
the revisionist Khrushchevian leadership of the CPSU. Both perceived themselves as encircled and
threatened by enemies- Albania by the capitalist-revisionist-fascist encirclement of Yugoslavia,
Greece, the US Sixth Fleet, and Italy; and China by the Ring of Fire forged allegedly by the US,
USSR, India, and Japan. Both have great respect for Stalin, and both are intensely nationalistic. ' at
p. 144.


' All military ranks were abolished, party committees were established in army units, and political
commissars were introduced into military headquarters at all levels. The military’s role was
decreased, and professionalism in the military establishment was relegated to a position secondary to
ideology and economics. ', see Biberaj (1990), op. cit.: p. 25., and, Prifti (1978), op. cit.: on those
purged; General Beqir Balluku, Albania's Defence Minister [July, 1974], Army Chief of Staff General
Dume, Head of Army's Political Directorate Hito Cako, Deputy-Chief of Staff General Rahman
Perllaku, Deputy-Political Directorate Halim Ramohito., at p. 213.

The Pact had tried to keep Albania within its fold by offering to support it in event of an attack
from Greece. The offer was refused by Hoxha in a speech made to the Fourth Congress, 14 September,

Actual Chinese 'military' assistance, however, was not immediately forthcoming as China did not
begin to supply Albania with military supplies until late 1970- early 1971 when, they began to export
MIG-21 fighter planes to Albania. See, Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "Recent Sino-Albanian Relations",
build thousands of impractical, concrete pillboxes along the Albanian coastline as a last line of defence, which remain to this day as unsightly reminders of the past. 99

4.1 Looking Elsewhere [1970-1973]

By the start of 1970, Hoxha began with a series of open disagreements with the Chinese on several foreign policy issues. 100 The first of these was when Yugoslavia openly denounced the Czechoslovak invasion and threatened to fight any similar attempt. China, perhaps seeking even more influence in Europe, relaxed its hard-line policy towards Tito and sought the resumption of diplomatic relations with Belgrade in 1970. Understanding full well that Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement may endanger Albania, Hoxha nonetheless went along with Peking and resumed full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1971. Later on in the same year, ambassadors were exchanged with Greece and some overtures were made to West European nations, primarily by way of a loosening on tourism controls. Hoxha sought, however, to explain this position in foreign policy by stating;

When the bourgeoisie and the modern revisionists recognized that their methods did not have any effect on socialist Albania, they changed their tactics but not their aims. . . . [T]hey represent each of our diplomatic moves as a reversal of our previous policies. They interpret their changes of tactics towards us as our changes towards them. We have made no changes in our policy. 101

Hoxha would, later make true his position on his firm stance to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and any deviation from them. His words had no impact on the Chinese who, by November, 1971 expressed their wish to seek accommodation with the United States. This was followed by the February, 1972 visit of President Nixon to China. Hoxha rejected the move and China's suggestion that Albania seek more aid from the West. To demonstrate his resolve Hoxha initiated a series of purges in 1973 aimed at the Albanian youth which recently had been calling for change. 102 These purges were part of the trend in Albania during most of the early-1970s. The APL had expressed its concern over the intelligentsia and did an about-face on policy towards the latter. The APL had first set out to purge the nation of the 'evils of archaic and conservative thought and activity. By 1971-72, this policy focused instead on the 'evils of liberalisation, 'or modernist trends in the arts and culture, including literature,

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99 The best bit of satire on these 'bunkers' comes from Isabel Fonseca who states that should tourism take off in Albania and its unspoiled coastline these remnants could serve as 'solid, ready made beach front cabanas'. see I Fonseca, "Last to Leave, Turn Out the Lights", The Nation (5 October, 1992): p.358.
100 Pano (1977), op. cit.; p.33.
fashions, music, radio, the theatre, television and the dance. The creation of the Committees of Culture and the Arts [1971], sought to counter the effects of foreign culture, often via Italian television, and recruited members in each district to actively guide the intelligentsia, among them poets, writers, and artists to produce work more reflective of the working masses and similar Albanian themes. It became difficult, however, to dissuade the intelligentsia from external influences. Realising that he could not allow for the contamination to continue further, Hoxha and the APL initiated a wholesale purge of the League of Albanian Writers and Artists [LAWA] in July, 1973.

Hoxha's suspicions on the Nixon trip were confirmed [in his eyes], when less than one year later, beginning in 1973, the US;

...expressed willingness to resume ties with Albania. It was in the United States' interest that Albania continue to pursue an independent foreign policy and not reestablish close-especially military- ties with the Soviet Union. A revival of the Albanian-Soviet alliance would give the USSR military access to the Adriatic, increase potential Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia and Greece, and heighten the threat to NATO's southern flank. An independent, non-aligned Albania was thus important for Western policy in the volatile Balkans.

Despite these differences, relations between China and Albania took a warm turn in 1974-1975. The Chinese, as mentioned, treated Albania with a higher level of equality then did the Russians. Understanding their concerns, Mao sought to allay Albanian fears by sending, in November, 1974 Politburo member and candidate member Yao Wen-yuan and Wu Kuei-hsien to Tirana to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Albania's liberation. The Chinese delegation reaffirmed China's support for the Albanian leadership and the ties of friendship between the two nations.

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103 Pfiffi (1978), op. cit.; p.185.
104 Hoxha sensed trouble when his Vice-Minister of Education and Culture, Mantho Bala stated publicly that, 'we must learn from others', and 'we are in Europe'. This led to a plenum by the APL on 24-25 July, 1973. 'The plenum resulted in a shake-up of the entire LAWA leadership. [Naim] Shuteriqi, president of LAWA since 1946, fell from power and was replaced by poet Dritero Agolli, who also delivered the main report to the plenum. Vilson Kilicia was replaced as general-secretary of the league by Xhemal Dini, and Hamide Stringa and Ksenofon Dilo were replaced as secretaries of the league by Anastos Kondo and Kujtim Buza.....From all indications, the central motive for the campaign against liberalism in the arts was not so much to combat alien influences as to maintain the Party's Stalinist control over the intelligentsia, as a means of preserving state power. To stifle rising voices of dissent, the Party went so far as to invade the privacy of individuals and dictate to the citizenry on matters of manners and morals.' Others within the APL felt that unless the intelligentsia were kept in check, they would eventually seize momentum; 'Albanian communists maintained that, unless checked in time, liberal attitudes in the arts translate into liberal manifestations in morals, and liberalism in morals translates into liberalism in ideology and politics, ending finally in the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet, despite the intense campaign against liberalism, or the penetration of Soviet and Western cultural influences, influential segments of the artistic intelligentsia persisted in their dissent from the Party directives on art and culture.' IBid, pp.187-189.
105 Biberaj (1990), op. cit.; p.90.
106 Pano (1977), op. cit.; p.38.
The death of Mao in 1976, however, marked the beginning of the end for the Sino-Albanian alliance. At the Seventh Party Congress of the APL, Hoxha attacked the post-Mao leadership for its purge of the more radical elements of the Chinese communist party, specifically the Gang of Four. Hoxha also did not endorse the leadership of Hua Guofeng and openly criticised the rehabilitation of Deng Xiao-ping, believing that Mao's principles were being violated.107 China responded by reducing the level of aid for Albania's Sixth-Five Year Plan [1976-1980]. Although exact figures vary and are subject to scrutiny due to their originating from communist Albanian sources, the decrease in aid from China made Albania start to turn towards self-reliance, as evidenced from the creation of the Constitutional provision banning any foreign aid, promulgated during the Sixth FYP [1976]. The decrease in aid from China also led to delays on the construction of an oil refinery, a hydro-electric facility, and a metallurgical combine.108 By the Summer of 1977, the visit of US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to China demonstrated the latter's aim at continuing détente with the Americans. With the differences between Hoxha and the new Chinese leadership widening and with little chance at narrowing them, China ended all economic and military aid to Albania, recalled its specialists and suspended trade by July, 1978. It did not though break diplomatic ties.109 The break with China now left Albania truly isolated. Hoxha wasted little time in looking elsewhere for economic aid, increasing trade with neighbours including Yugoslavia and, surprisingly, the US in amounts of $157 million by 1975-1976.110

This aid, however, was short term and should not be construed as efforts to open up. The isolation, it seems, played directly into Hoxha's lap. Paranoia over plots to remove him and the perversion and continuation of the cult of personality typified the Hoxha regime during this period. His unrealistic view of the world around him doomed the nation to endless strife. His doctrine of self-reliance has resulted in the creation of poor quality goods, even by communist standards. Moreover, it has been

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107 IBID, p.33., Zeiri I Popullit 2 November, 1976., see also Biberaj (1990), op.cit., which implies that a reason for the attacks may have been personal since Beijing announce it had invited Tito to China, an obvious affront to Hoxha., at p.28.

108 These delays were due specifically to Chinese reduction in aid during this period. The Fierze hydro-electric power station, Ballsh oil refinery, and metallurgical combine at Elbasan were not completed until the 7th FYP [1981-1985]. 'Midway through the sixth plan period, efforts to make up for these losses had to be made... The overall result, then, was that import substitution continued and the most drastic effects in the province of economic strategy were delays and marginal modifications rather than outright alteration in priorities. No changes of consequence appear to have emerged since then..." Sjoberg (1991), op.cit., p.83., and, for figures indicative of the level of self-reliance necessary due to the decrease in aid see Ibid; ie. number of state employees within agriculture [# in thousands] increased from 86.2 [1973] to 136.9 [1980], at p.116, and, number of apartments and houses built decreased from the 5th FYP to the 6th FYP. [from 61,908 (1971-1975) to 56,390 (1976-1980), those built by the state; 32,038 to 26,326 (same periods)] at p.155.

109 Biberaj (1990), op.cit.; p.28.

his utter contempt for the outside world which continues to plague present day economic reform. The need for external investment and, equally important, for foreign trade has led to the current situation, one in which Albania finds itself with a foreign debt over $800m [US] and exports totalling only $44m in 1993 while imports exceeded $244m. How else does one justify the creation of over one million concrete pillboxes as 'lines of defence' in a nation of only three million? With over one meter of concrete and steel used for each bunker, Hoxha's Stalin-type insanity was matched only by his stupidity. The resources alone for this project, not only depleted Albanian coffers, but more importantly, signified marked failure for Hoxha's foreign policy. A deliberate turn away from the East, West, Far East, and the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] relegated Albania to the 'Fourth World'. The damnation of the state by the Hoxha regime to the self-interest of the latter is evident today as Albania struggles towards democratisation and modernisation. The present difficulty in these processes is directly attributable to Hoxha's rule, and perhaps lends credence to the old adage; "it is easier to destroy, than to create".

5.0 GOING IT ALONE [1978-1985]

Hoxha steered Albania on the path towards an end to outside dependency opting instead for true 'Marxist self-sufficiency'. One way to ensure this was by the constitutional prohibition of receiving foreign credits embodied in the new 1976 Albanian Constitution. Albania also was the only European nation that refused to sign the Helsinki Final Act on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975. Hoxha pursued Mao's 'dual adversary doctrine', believing that such conferences and organisations were instruments solely for the benefit of the 'revisionist' Soviet Union and 'imperialist' United States. Convincing the average Albanian would not be too difficult. Many did not care, merely paying lip service to Hoxha's views under terror of prison or death. As for others, Hoxha relied on geographic and historical factors.

The absence of adequate internal communications and the lack of railway and motor-road links with other countries had bred in many Albanians the feeling that they lived on an island off Europe which had for centuries been surrounded by a world that was either hostile or merely indifferent to their interests and general welfare. The long isolation together with the awareness of hostility or indifference, greatly strengthened by their bitter historical experiences, had in turn engendered in many of them similar feelings towards other

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111 Dr. Kees Zijlstra Albania, "New Beginnings Amidst Immense Challenges", Draft Special Report International Secretariat of the European Union (May, 1994): p.2., and unemployment in outlying areas up to nearly 60% of the local population, an upcoming budget of $741m with foreign assistance expected to reach $461m for FY1995. See The Economist (2 April, 1994).

countries. Such sentiments had in time tended to produce a somewhat self-centered and apathetic attitude to what went on beyond their borders.  

By the start of 1980, the doctrine of self-reliance was causing severe economic difficulty for Albania. This became evident when Mehmet Shehu, apparently clashed with Hoxha over Albania's need to open up to the West. After an argument over what path to choose, Hoxha announced that on 18 December, 1981, Shehu had apparently, 'committed suicide'. After his death it was revealed that Shehu had been a multiple agent and spy for the British, Americans, and Yugoslavs among others. His followers, and appointees, many of whom were family were subsequently purged, removed or arrested. One such person arrested was Ali Cena, chief of the Prime Minister's personal bodyguard. Cena recently has offered a personal account of the events which led to Shehu's death. The former is adamant in his belief that following a dispute at a Politburo meeting on the night in question [16 December], Shehu was shot on the direct order of Hoxha. The meeting, according to Cena, was the focal point of the entire incident. For a long period of time during the late 1960s and throughout the early 1970s, it was believed from many within the party that

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113 Logoreci, op.cit.: pp.201-202., The common misconception was that Albania simply closed her doors following the break with China. This is not so; 'To be sure, by autumn 1977, Albania had established diplomatic ties with a total of eighty nations, including all West European nations with the exception of Spain, West Germany, and Great Britain. Nonetheless, owing to her militant ideology, revolutionary stance, polemical warfare against both East and West Europe, and refusal to have broad cultural exchanges with European and other nations, Albania remained a Cold War island in the Balkans and Europe.' Prifti (1978), op.cit.: p.252.

114 Though they broke with China, Albania retained characteristics of Chinese socialism which can be aptly named, 'muscular socialism', that is, labour intensive, grandiose economic projects, i.e., dam building etc., terrace farming reclamation programs, youth brigades, and mandatory agricultural cooperative work for all desk-bound party members. See, Michael Kaser, "Albania's Muscular Socialism", Contemporary Review vol. 243 #1411 (August, 1983): pp. 89-94.

115 Halliday, op.cit.: pp.327-328., see Biberaj (1985), op.cit.; for specific differences on trade policy; 'Given its emphasis on the development of heavy industry, Hoxha's regime had paid little attention to supplying more and better consumer goods. One of the charges Hoxha had leveled against Shehu was that the former Prime Minister had advocated the development of a consumer society. Shehu reportedly had called for a reallocation of resources away from heavy industry so as to boost the consumer-goods sector'. at p.74., See also "Interview with Milto Kola, Military Construction Supervisor", Associated Press 26 September, 1984 who states; 'Most Albanians are convinced that Shehu was shot on Hoxha's orders...'

116 For the view that Shehu's death was a matter of who Hoxha wanted to succeed him see, Patrick Artisien, "Albania in the Post-Hoxha Era", The World Today vol. 41 (Dec/Jan 1986); 'I suggest instead that Shehu's demise was related to the question of succession. Since the late 1970s, Ramiz Alia had received extensive exposure in the press, including frequent appearances on Hoxha's side. While Shehu was alive, however, Hoxha could not ignore the fact that Shehu stood in the way of his hand-picked successor and that Shehu's reputation for ruthlessness and support in the party hierarchy represented a major threat to Alia's smooth succession. Shehu's brother-in law, Kadri Hazbiu, was Minister of Defence; his nephew Fecor Shehu, held the post of Interior Minister; and his wife, Fiqret, was Director of the Lenin Party School. Given Shehu's power base, the question of succession became clouded as a struggle for Hoxha's place between Alia and Shehu, or a Shehu designate, appeared inevitable. The evidence given by Paul Milliez, Hoxha's French doctor who last saw him in December 1984, confirms that the Albanian leader elected to destroy Shehu's power base in order to forestall a
Shehu would naturally succeed Hoxha, given the latter’s poor health. According to reports, Shehu had clashed with Hoxha over the poor state of the Albanian economic reforms program and felt the time had come for Albania to open up to the West. At a Politburo meeting on 16 December, 1981, Cena reports that Shehu emerged despondent, ‘fiercely criticised by the Party’. Whether Hoxha’s paranoia was responsible for Shehu’s death, or whether their was a genuine dispute over the course of reform matters very little. What can be established is that it is not likely that Shehu neither committed suicide nor was a multiple agent. With Hoxha’s health failing, he sought to see that there was a smooth transition of power after his departure from the scene. He brought in long time party member Ramiz Alia who emerged from late-1983, early-1984 as Hoxha’s heir apparent.

Hoxha near his end, began a cautious approach to outside links for Albania. In 1982, Albanian trade with the US amounted to nearly US $20 million. Not discarding his dual adversary doctrine, Hoxha conducted all such trade through third parties, often the French or Canadians. By 1983-1984; spare parts were purchased from Italy for old Chinese machinery, air connections were opened between Greece and Tirana, telephone links were set up, a ferry service was established between Durrës and Trieste, Austrian television was allowed in Albania, and a series of cultural, scientific, and technical agreements were signed with Greece, Turkey, Italy, West Germany, Austria, [renewed trade ties with] China and Yugoslavia. It was relations with Yugoslavia, however that were to influence Albanian foreign policy throughout the remainder of the 1980s fluctuating between periods of co-operation and deterioration. By early, 1981, plans for extensive ties with Belgrade including a rail link were met with positively by Yugoslavia. But, by the Kosova riots of March-April, 1981 following Tito’s death, problems arose. Belgrade accused Tirana of fomenting unrest within the Kosova province and of territorial designs there since more than ninety succession crisis. Hoxha confided in his physician that, ’he was prepared to die peacefully because the question of his succession had been settled.’, at p.109.

117 For a good account of the events and reports surrounding the Shehu incident see, Barry Baldwin, "The Mehmet Shehu Mystery Solved?", Besa [Newsletter] Published by the Friends of Albania Issue #8 received by author (October, 1994): pp.18-26., On the question of suicide Cena stated that Shehu had been found on his bed killed by one shot through the heart. The doctors explained that ‘it is quite abnormal for anyone to shoot himself in the heart: the natural instinct is always to shoot yourself through the temple., at p.22, and on the question of Shchu having been a multiple agent, Baldwin states; ‘Incidentally, not only are we asked to believe in the polyagency of Mehmet Shehu, we also have to swallow the hilarious claim that every single Minister of the Interior (the Sigurimi were in this official’s fief) from 1945-1982 was actually a foreign agent!', at p.18.

118 Biberaj (1990), op.cit. p.88.


percent of the population is of Albanian origin. Tirana rejected all territorial claims but criticised Belgrade of its repressive measures against the Albanian populace of Kosova. Indeed, Kosova was to become the cause of strain between the two nations and to this day remains a potential flashpoint of violence and instability in the Balkans.\footnote{Henry Kamm, "Albania Cautiously Looks For Friends", \textit{New York Times} 16 October, 1984.} The potential for conflict in Kosova and its impact upon Albania will be fully analysed in a subsequent chapter, relative to the present Yugoslav crisis, however, a brief synopsis at this stage may aid in the understanding of why it has been and still is a major 'bone of contention' between the Albanians and the Serbs.

the benefits conversion would bring within the millet system, Albanians adopted Islam and began to populate the area after Serbs either left voluntarily, or by force. The centuries that followed down until the 20th saw a growing dislike develop between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians [Kosovars] which periodically resulted in occasional violence.

As for Kosovo, the region was becoming predominantly Albanian. By 1878, the ill-fated League of Prizren was seen later, by Albanians, as the birthplace of Albanian nationalism. As such, both groups attach significant importance to Kosovo within their respective cultures. The official Turkish census of 1910 listed Kosovars as making up sixty percent of Kosovo while Serbs, Turks and Bulgars constituted the remaining forty percent. World War I saw Albania divided and occupied. The peace process afterwards placed Kosovo, over ethnic Albanian protests, within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. With administration falling under Serb rule, Kosovars began to feel the wrath of Serbs and their attempts to; repopulate the area or 'Slavise' it, invest resources sparingly or inefficiently, repress or not allow Kosovar cultural and social events, and, generally, disrupt many of the traditional relationships in existence.

The future of Kosovo was still in doubt during World War II. While Tito toyed with the idea of rights guarantees and self determination for Kosovo, he understood the significance Kosovo played for the Serbs. Himself a Croat, Tito needed Serbs, the largest ethnic minority in Yugoslavia to back his cause. One way of doing this was to assure them that Kosovo would remain within Serbia's hands. Nazi occupation resulted in Kosovo's reincorporation to Albania. It was here that the foundations for the intense post-war hatred between Serbs and Albanians stems from.

...[The Kosovars were treated with open hostility, often deprived of elementary civil and human rights. Such a behavior gave rise to an irredentist mood, which materialised when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was destroyed by the fascist-nazi aggression. The territories in question were annexed to Albania, to the elation of their Albanian inhabitants, who saw foreign administrations as a change for the better in their dejected situation...[W]hen the Nazi troops occupied them, an Albanian unit of volunteers joined the SS troops. Now it was the turn of the Albanians to harass the South Slavs, an affront avenged by the Yugoslav Partisans soon after the end of the war...]

Immediately after the war a delegation of Kosovar Albanians met with Tito and received guarantees on rights. Although the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution described Kosovo as an, 'autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia', Albanians were treated as second class citizens. Their persecution was carried out by Tito's Vice President, number two party man and head of the secret police, Alexander Rankovic.

124 Ibid, p. 164. Appealing to Albanian nationalism, the Nazis created the appropriately named 'Skanderbeg SS' division, named after the 15th Albanian noble who drove the Ottomans from most of northern Albania for approximately, thirty years. See Hisani, op.cit.
With Rankovic's fall from grace in 1966, Kosovars took to the streets in large and violent demonstrations seeking greater rights. This culminated in large concessions by Tito in 1968. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Kosovars would periodically demonstrate against harsh Serbian policy aimed at keeping the Albanians in an inferior position. The Hoxha regime for its part did not come readily to the defence of Kosovars. While Hoxha and the post Hoxha leadership occasionally spoke out against human rights abuses in Kosovo, they did little or nothing in actual aid of Albanians in Kosovo. Opting instead to publicly denounce the government in Belgrade, Albania launched a series of inflammatory articles in the Albanian press against the treatment Kosovars were receiving. As for an official position, Hoxha stated at the Seventh APL Congress [November, 1976], that; 'fraternal ties of blood and language with the Albanians in Kosovo...and ties of tradition...gave the Albanian leaders and people the right to interest themselves in their conational in Yugoslavia.' This position most likely originates in the premise that fomenting unrest in Kosovo could result in risks to the Albanian leadership which would prove too costly at a time when Albania could do nothing positive by provoking the neighbouring Yugoslav leaders. Indeed, following the Kosovo riots of 1981, Hoxha never raised the issue of human rights abuses in any international forums such as the United Nations or the European Commission on Human Rights. Even his earlier public denunciations were tempered and, as Belgrade became increasingly annoyed with both Tirana and the Kosovars, Albania realised its precarious position. This prompted Hoxha to even assist the Yugoslav State Security Administration [Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti UDBa] during the period 1981-1983, when, the former detained and returned 249 Kosova Albanians which sought refuge in Albania. This did not, however, prevent Albania and Yugoslavia from accusing each other.

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125 'Hoxha was totally silent on the question of a merger of Kosovo with Albania. This is perhaps not surprising, in view of the fact that Albania has not pressed any territorial claims on Kosovo. Indeed, APL's first secretary did not even lend support to the demands of Kosovar Albanians for a republic of their own. In brief, since normalizing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1971, Albania has been content to develop cultural relations with Kosovo and to ignore the larger and more pressing political questions which, in recent years, have been a source of increasing friction between the Albanians of Kosovo and the Yugoslav government', Prifti (1978), op.cit.; p.238., and, The New York Times 24 November, 1975.

126 See Arshi Pipa "The Political Situation of the Albanians in Yugoslavia with Particular Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach", East European Quarterly vol. 4 #6 (June, 1989): pp.162-174, and, Branka Magas, op.cit.; 'When after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968, Albania made a first tentative attempt to mend its severed links with its northern neighbour, it met with a ready and immediately positive response. Yugoslavia opened its frontiers with Albania, and Kosovo became the host for many cultural and scientific exchanges with Albanian artists and intellectuals. The growing warmth between the two countries throughout the seventies found its peak in their joint celebration in 1978 of the centenary of the foundation of the League of Prizren. Clearly, however, these developments were also seen as something of a threat to the Hoxha regime in Tirana, which restricted the entry of Yugoslavs into Albania and never allowed its own citizens to visit its neighbour freely. Thus the 1981 events in Kosovo, and the rapid cooling of Albanian-Yugoslav relations, must in reality have come as a relief to the dominant tendency inside the Albanian Party.', at p.38., and, Biberaj (1990), op.cit.; who correctly points out that Albania
other of violations and promoting unrest in Kosova. Ultimately, any 'thaw' or general rapprochement between the two nations would eventually turn to Kosova, which has and still serves as a large impediment to Albanian-Yugoslav [Serb] relations.

6.0 THE POST HOXHA ERA [1985-1990]

On 11 April, 1985, Enver Hoxha died. His succession was quick and easy as Ramiz Alia now sought to slowly, and subtly move Albania away from her self imposed isolation. So as not to deviate from Hoxha's ideology and risk alienating party hard-liners, a posthumous work of Hoxha's was released indicating that when ready, and necessary, Albania would open ties with the rest of the world in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. With legitimisation, Alia began the process of slowly bringing Albania into the modern age. At the Fortieth Session of the United Nations, Albanian Foreign Minister Reiz Malile signed several agreements and met with representatives from Greece, Turkey and Austria, seeking to exchange delegations and cooperate on economic and cultural programs. Malile had also reiterated the position of the Albanian government that co-operation among the neighbouring Balkan nations was not only necessary, but vital to securing peace and stability in the region.

Despite its moves away from isolation and into the international community, Albania reasserted its desire to avoid ties with both the US and USSR, even though

recognised, "the fluctuation and instability of their relations with Yugoslavia, [and] tried to minimize the costs of potential punitive actions...", at p.98., and for his insightful analysis of the position of Albania immediately following the death of Hoxha; "...Albania had nothing to gain from disturbances in Kosove and the destabilisation of Yugoslavia. Despite long-standing political and ideological differences with Yugoslavia, the Albanian government expressed support for its neighbour's independence and national integrity. Officials in Tirane repeatedly stated that Albania had no territorial claims on Yugoslavia. In his keynote address to the Ninth APL Congress in November 1986, Alia said; 'We do not want the situation in Kosove to grow worse. In no instance and in no way have we sought or do we seek to destabilize Yugoslavia. It is not in the interest of the peoples in the Balkans, nor in our interest, that [Yugoslavia] should be turned into an arena of quarrels and dissent, a situation which could facilitate the interference of foreign powers.' at p. 95., and, Ramiz Alia Report to the Ninth Congress...[for the original text], at pp.186-187.

127 Within a year evidence of Alia's move outwards was displayed at the party congress when he stated; 'We wish good relations with neighbours as well as others and have declared so publicly. No harm will come from such relations and we have indicated this not only with words but with actions as well.' see, Ramiz Alia, Raport Ne Kongresin IX Te PPSII [Report of the Ninth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour] (Tirana: Shtepia Botuese, 1986): pp. 170-171.

128 Elez Biberaj, "Albania After Hoxha: Dilemmas of Change", Problems of Communism vol. XXXIV (November-December, 1985): p.41., By the end of 1985, the border road separating Greece from Albania was reopened and plans for a Greek company to build a chrome processing plant in Albania were finalised, at p.43.

129 Biberaj (1985), op.cit.; p. 47., For a somewhat critical view that these ties are limited due to their strictly bilateral basis see, Mladen Gavrilovic, "The Balkans Bloc and a Peace Zone", Contemporary Reviewvol. 247 # 1434 (July, 1985): pp.6-9.
both nations expressed their wish to pursue relations with Albania. It is not unlikely that such a policy is an attempt by the Albanian leadership to avoid ties with nations that may later result in 'internal' changes. The difference being that while Albania seeks to 'open up' to the outside world, ties with a nation such as the US may lead to threats to Albania's leaders if the populace, especially the disenchanted youth, are allowed to experience the benefits of the West.

6.1 Regional Relations

From the start of 1987, several developments furthered Albania and Alia towards co-operation with the rest of Europe. In that year, the Greek government of Papandreou formally ended its state of war with Albania, an aberration since 1940. A series of agreements established a ferry link between Corfu and Sarande with long term industrial projects also agreed upon. By 1987, Albania had extensive dealings with Italy, Austria, West Germany and Canada, all in efforts by the Alia government to bring Albania out of its state of backwardness and remove the stigma as Europe's 'poorest' nation. More important, however, were Albania's relations with the other nations of the Balkans. Taking the initiative, Yugoslavia sent out invitations to the capitals of Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, and Albania in the Summer of 1987. The aim was for a 'Balkan Conference' whose purpose was to strengthen ties among these nations and achieve some level of co-operation which would not leave them in

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130 For general policy see Patrick F.R. Artisien, "Albania in the Post-Hoxha Era", The World Today vol. 41 (June, 1985): pp.107-111. For specific Albanian view see Alia, op.cit.: pp.134-135. For Soviet position following the coming to power of Gorbachev in 1985, and their faulting Khrushchev for the break in Albanian-Soviet relations see Biberaj (1985), op.cit.: pp. 103-104. Specific US overtures towards Albania were made immediately after Hoxha's death when Mr. Edward Djerejian, US Department of State Acting Press Spokesman declared in a daily press briefing: 'Following the death earlier this year of longtime Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, the United States reiterated its view that, should Albania indicate an interest in resuming relations with us, we would be prepared to respond. To date, however, despite some gradual improvement in relations with some west European countries, the Albanian Government has firmly restated its opposition to any relationship with either the Soviet Union or the United States,' US interest in Albania was also expressed in general US East European policy when it stated: 'The United States continues to have virtually no relations at all with Albania, a tiny, poor, but strategically located country. Some have suggested that the United States should seek to improve relations with Tirana, though Albania has not been receptive to such overtures in the past.' see, US Policy Towards Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia Document 161 American Foreign Policy Current Documents (Department of State Washington: US Printing Office, 1985): p.413. "US Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1985 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East (House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs: Ninety-Ninth Congress First Session 2-7 October, 1985): p.243.

131 'Again with the exception of the two superpowers, Albania is today prepared to establish relations with all countries and to pursue cooperation with them to the extent allowed by its objective possibilities and interests, but cautiously and with constraint, lest such cooperation have repercussions on its internal system.' See, Mile Veljovic, "The Extent of Albania's Opening to the World", Belgrade Review of International Affairs vol. XXXVIII #901 (October, 1987): pp. 8-11.
the 'backwaters of foreign technology development in Europe'. Though initially wary of such a proposal, Albania relented and agreed to attend the conference scheduled for February, 1988. Albania attended the meeting and expressed the joint hopes of the participants that regional disputes could be settled peacefully. Albania also agreed to host the meeting scheduled for January, 1989 in Tirana, and during the interim attended the gathering at Sofia in June, 1988. The other Balkan nations welcomed the opening up process of Albania and expressed their concerns that they join efforts or be left behind in the new developments taking place in Europe;

Today, we are on the threshold of the XXI century and international relations are facing new challenges. Consequently, all the Balkan states, realising their historical responsibilities are seeking to answer a vital question- how to prevent the Balkans from being relegated to the fringes of current favourable international trends and what to do so that this region may shake off the fetters of its past.

With the Albanian economy in disarray and reforms taking place throughout the communist bloc of Europe, Albania's move in foreign policy displayed a pragmatic and realistic approach.

6.2 The Impact of 1989

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the televised pictures of Ceaucescu's fall in Romania, [which were seen in Albania via Italian TV], impacted both on Alia and the vast number of Albanian youth which had now been openly calling for reform. Initially, Alia, at the Albanian Trade Unions Council [December 1989] announced that the changes in Europe would not have any bearing on Albania;

Albania and the European East have developed along completely different ideological, political, economic, and social roads. Therefore, the problems are not and cannot be the same. The crisis that is sweeping the countries of the East is the crisis of what used to be

133 Rade Bogdanovic, "Balkan Cooperation in Transportation", Belgrade Review of International Affairs vol. XL #931 (January, 1989): pp.16-18., For views and results of the various conferences see, Dobrivoje Vadic, "What Are the Unsettled Questions in the Balkans?", vol. XXXIX #906 (January, 1988): pp. 7-8., Vladen Jelic, "Continuing Balkan Cooperation", vol. XXXIX #922 (September, 1988): pp. 17-19., Cedomir Vuckovic, "Strengthening Balkan Cooperation", vol. XL #932 (February, 1989): pp. 9-10., For the belief that Albania had little choice but attend these conferences see, Milorad Komatina, "Albania and the Balkan Meeting", Belgrade Review of International Affairs vol.XXXXIX #911 (March, 1988); 'Probably, Albania took the view that if she absented herself from the Balkan conference, she would deprive herself of the possibility of participating in and influencing the shaping of cooperation between neighbouring countries and revive suspicions on the part of Balkan and other countries regarding her present policy of a more dynamic, flexible and diversified international cooperation, in other words cast doubt on the credibility of her more active opening to the world', at p.13. For view that these cooperative efforts were failing due to Albania's continued reliance on barter trade see, Elez Biberaj, "Albania's Economic Reform Dilemma", The World Today vol. 43 (October, 1987): pp. 180-183.
called the socialist community, but, not the crisis of socialism as a theory and practice. Consequently, the events taking place over there have nothing to do with us.\textsuperscript{134}

Alia, though, understood that Albania needed to 'democratise' if it was to survive economically. Not wasting any time, the People's Assembly waived the constitutional provision against accepting foreign credits in January, 1990. The turning point in Albanian foreign relations, however, was at the Albanian Labour Party's Tenth Plenum in April, 1990. Reflecting current trends and growing unrest, Alia declared that after nearly five decades, Albania would finally seek to re-establish ties with the US. At the plenum meeting, he also announced Albania's desire to join the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE]. This was followed up by Albania's intention to also sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in August, 1990.\textsuperscript{135}

Joining the international community, however, also meant that Albania would have to abide by universal principles on human rights, which they were guilty of violating throughout the rule of the communist party. The Twelfth Party Plenum [6-7 November 1990] therefore saw the introduction of a series of constitutional changes which; legalised small businesses, created programs to decentralise the economy, allowed for independent political organisations, removed travel restrictions, allowed the State Bank to negotiate with the IMF and World Bank, and removed restrictions and prohibitions on religious worship. The moves by Alia, however, opened a 'Pandora's box'. Hoping to control the rate of democratisation, Alia increasingly gave way to pressure for reform. By the end of 1990, [22 December], over fifty-thousand Albanians demonstrated in an anti-government rally in Tirana calling for; democracy, release of all political prisoners, postponement of the elections to May, 1991, and the revision of the electoral law.\textsuperscript{136} The rally came just ten days after leading intellectuals and students led by Gramoz Pashko [economist], Ismail Kadare [writer], Besnik Mustafaj [writer], Remzi Lani [chief editor youth paper Zeri i Rinise /Voice of the Youth], and Sali Berisha [heart surgeon] met to formally create Albania's first, and true opposition party, the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{137}[for a profile of political parties in Albania, their aims, leaders and organisation see Table 1.] By giving in to the calls for reform, Alia, in attempting to secure his and his party's position ensured their eventual demise.

\textsuperscript{134} Ramiz Alia, \textit{Zeri I Popullit} 13 December, 1989.
In keeping with the spirit of Albanian foreign policy, the Albanian leadership did what it had to in order to preserve Albania's integrity or else be left behind just as the rest of Europe was moving forward and, more importantly, just as the beginning of rumblings of civil war were underway in neighbouring Yugoslavia. A position of isolation or of simple bilateral ties would do little if full scale conflict were to erupt in Yugoslavia thereby threatening Albania as well. Unfortunately for Alia, these changes reflective of current developments also led to the eventual demise of himself and the Albanian Party of Labour.

6.3 The Role of Nationalism in Guiding Foreign Policy

In Albanian Stalinism, Arshi Pipa opposes the notion that nationalism is a viable concept within the communist framework. 'True independence', he states, 'cannot but be national. And those who think that communism can fraternize with nationalism have a poor idea of the former's essence.' While Albania's borders were kept intact, Pipa believes that the Albanian state under communism was never truly independent.

Independence may be lost not only through foreign invasions, but also through treasonous devotion to foreign powers. The chief mark of national sovereignty is the will to preserve and increase, within the frame of a truly independent state, those elements which make for the individuality of a nation. Communist Albania is the negation of that concept.

Pipa's critical analysis, however, fails to take the underlying principles of nationalism and link them to the historical factors of the Albanian nation. Granted, by design communism, as an ideology was not intended to be superseded by a rival ideology. Communist leaders knew, however, that popular support for communism would need more appeal than, 'workers of the world unite'. Nationalism, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where ties to historical boundaries and homelands runs deep, offered these leaders the rallying cries they needed to gain support for their communist cause. Nationalism then became co-opted by communism, especially in Albania. Appealing to the population's baser instincts mobilises them against outsiders including those neighbouring nations that have in the past had territorial ambitions against the home nation. Justifying themselves within the communist principles became easy as 'Albanian socialism' or 'Romanian socialism', etc., accused the others of straying from the true path of Marxism-Leninism, of 'revisionism', neo-imperialism, and the like, all the while maintaining that their 'brand' of communism was the true form.

139 Ibid
Pipa may criticise Albanian communism of 'treasonous devotion', hence lacking in nationalist principles. However, Albanian communism was nationalist in nature as evidenced by its foreign policy from the time of its creation. The 'devotion' of the Albanian leaders lasted only until it became obvious that Albania's patron had designs above and beyond 'socialist brotherhood'. True adherence to communism would not have made Hoxha reject incorporation into Yugoslavia in 1948, nor break with Moscow in 1961 when it became apparent that Russian influence in Albania was becoming too great. After all, theoretically, the eventual apex of communism was the removal of all borders, and Hoxha fancied himself a true communist. Yet, the notion of preserving the historic 'homeland' is an idea that certainly predates communism and is part of the motivation behind nationalism. One need look only to the period after the break with the USSR to witness how Hoxha played the nationalist card to his advantage. Between 1965 and 1970, Hoxha and the APL; promoted Albanian literature, local songs and dance, folklore, celebrated the 500th anniversary of the death of Skanderbeg and surprisingly, the 90th anniversary of the League of Prizren. Why? Peter Prifti offers a valid answer when he states;

The resulting isolation...induced the leadership to foster nationalism as a means of strengthening the country's defences, and promoting the party's programme for socialist construction...To be sure, Albania practised national communism, but in this case nationalism was used to reinforce communism rather than as an alternative to it. In other East European countries still under the influence of Moscow, nationalism as a force had tended to erode the power and authority of the communist party. In Albania, the communist leadership, being relatively free of outside control, appeared more and more to be using nationalism for ideological ends...140

The intention is not to glorify the Albanian communist leadership for their unswerving devotion to the Albanian nation. Indeed, opportunism gratified Hoxha's paranoia. Nationalism presented him with a tool he could manipulate to fulfil his own self-interest. Instead the intention is to demonstrate that, within the realm of foreign policymaking, the communist leadership used the historic concern of Albanians to instil the idea that Albania is alone. These concerns included Yugoslav, Greek, and Italian aims and territorial designs. Past Western activity towards Albania, either covert activity and/or indifference also fuelled this feeling. As such Albania must fight to preserve not only its territory, but, its culture and national identity, all that is associated with being 'Albanian'. Execution of these goals could, the APL argued, only be achieved through obedience and loyalty to the Albanian communists. Biberaj reaffirms this when he states;

Several interrelated factors determined Albania's foreign policy. Nationalism no doubt was the most important determinant. Historically, the fate of Albania had been one of domination and threat by its more powerful neighbours—Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The nationalist aspirations of the Albanian nation remained unfulfilled. The country's partition in 1912 and the loss of Kosovo and other compact, Albanian-inhabited territories had psychologically scarred the Albanian nation, fostering xenophobia and a siege mentality on the part of many of its citizens and leaders. The Albanians attributed their inability to achieve national union to the hostile policies of their neighbours, supported by the major powers.141

Pipa admits that, 'Albanian communism grew to unbelievable proportions because it championed the national feeling of resistance to a foreign invader'.142 It was also the motivation for Hoxha to ally with those who would serve as protectors and patrons for Albania when neighbours, be they communist or not, exerted their designs upon Albania.

This mentality has not passed from Albania simply because the communists have lost their grip on power. The 'siege mentality' continues for Albanians. This is especially true presently when one views the area. While analysts, officials, and politicians argue over what are the causes of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Albanian concern mounts. At its simplest, and perhaps most correct form, the conflict in nearby Yugoslavia is a battle for land. Nationalism is used as the driving force, however. Supported by images of historic boundaries and revenge for past injustice, nationalism has mobilised civilians, both young and old, women and children, to war for territory they once shared with those they now kill and land that will most likely be unusable for quite some time after the warfare ceases.

The US has applauded Albania's moves towards democracy and is seeking to help the process. The post Cold War world, however, is not one where democracy will come easily, and Albania is no exception. The US must realise that while these 'democrats' and 'reform communists' may have abandoned the old system, many have not discarded their views, positions, and attitudes on foreign policy. Warfare on their doorstep, heightening tension, and risk of escalation and spreading of violence will not make the road to democracy any easier for Albania, particularly when domestic concerns, i.e., unemployment, inflation, food shortages, rising crime, etc., are also on the rise. An examination of US policy towards Albania may bring to light the measures being taken to create and nurture a democracy where one has not existed before. More importantly, focus on US-Albanian relations may help to answer several wider and more fundamental questions about US policy towards the Balkans, and whether a change is taking place in US foreign policy in the post Cold War world. Specifically; will the US policy adapt to meet changing needs and considerations of the region and Albania, or will it be fundamentally unaltered, a continuation of short-term and often

141 Biberaj (1990), op.cit.; pp.85-86.
142 Pipa (1991), op.cit.; p. 3.
ineffective policies? The need for US policymakers when looking at Albania is to take full account of indigenous factors and, [with warfare in neighbouring Yugoslavia continuing], historical ones as well. Serious policy failure may lead to widespread conflict and general instability in the region, the price of which, would be much higher for the region, Albania, and the US.

But first, an examination of recent developments within Albania will accomplish two tasks. First, it will lay the groundwork for analysis of US-Albanian relations in the post Cold War. Second, and more importantly, it will provide insight into current factors, such as the rise of nationalism, that will not only determine the outcome of democratisation, but help map out which direction US policy will take and why. A look into the dynamics of Albanian internal politics and the status of regional relations should help in analysing US foreign policy formulation.
Chapter Three
TOWARDS REFORM

1.0 OPENING UP [1990-1992]

The revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe in 1989 left no state unscathed except, of course, Albania. Keeping true to its mantle as, 'the most backward country in Europe', it appeared that Albania would hold on to its hard-line policies and reject any opportunity to look westward. Immediately after the death of Hoxha, Ramiz Alia made it clear that 'isolation' would remain the norm.

...[T]hose who dream of and expect changes in our line, who interpret the usual normal political and diplomatic acts of our independent and sovereign state as 'opening up' of Albania or 'tendencies' to get closer to one side or another, are wasting time. 1

The stance on outside ties was not only impractical for Albania but simply foolish. The statement by Alia, while perhaps meant to appease hard-liners within the party, actually reflected most of the old guard's views on foreign ties. 2 Centuries of foreign domination made Albania wary of not only its immediate neighbours, and their various territorial claims, but also of the larger powers that in the past have sponsored and promoted these claims. 3 The belief that with a state such as the United States, Albania could never hope to enjoy an equal status perpetuated isolationism and, unfortunately, Albania's position as the poorest nation within Europe.

Alia, however, unlike Hoxha was a pragmatist. 4 In an increasingly interdependent world Albania was being left behind as perhaps the only Third World state within Europe, less developed than even its fellow communist neighbours. By mid-1991 Albania had accumulated a budget deficit of approximately $580 million, a balance of payments deficit of $400 million, and a foreign exchange deficit of $170 million [US]. Its economy was in a state of chaos, still patterned upon the Stalinist

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2 See Biberaj (1986), op.cit.; The Old Guard included; Adil Carcani [the Premier], Rita Marko and Manush Myftiu [Politburo members since 1956], and Nexhmije Hoxha [head of the Democratic Front, a powerful grouping of cultural, social and intellectual organisations which included older Party members], at pp.2-3.
3 S. V. Papacosma and Mark Ruben, (eds.) Europe's Neutral and Non-Aligned States (Delaware: SR Books, 1989): p.219. The party played on this attitude to instil a siege mentality upon the populace. This involved using history as a base to promote class struggle. The view became one of seeing foreign powers as untrustworthy and generally oppressive. This in turn made both alliance and reliance on them simply unfeasible since they would seek to take advantage which in turn would undermine Albanian culture and nationalism.
4 Alia sought to consolidate his power base as early as 1982. Then, as titular head of Albania, Alia supported the Politburo membership of Lenka Cuko and Simon Stefani [November, 1981]. Following his ascension in 1985 he supported the candidate membership of Foto Cami and Besnik Bektashi, the deputy Premier. See Biberaj (1986), op.cit.; p.12.
model of industrialisation and collectivization. This general state of depression and stagnation left Alia little choice but to look towards the West. Hoping perhaps to control the pace of reform, it appeared that Albania would pattern itself upon the Chinese model of economic liberalisation and political conservatism. Alia, 'understood the link between liberalisation and democratic values on the one hand and economic development and international assistance on the other'. Unlike China, Albania was not in the same bargaining position. If it sought to open up to the West, especially the United States, aid would only come if political democratisation was also part of reform. This naturally entailed political pluralism and with it, the rise of opposition parties. By 17 December, 1990 the Democratic Party [DP], originally representing disgruntled students, was recognised by the government. It soon incorporated reform minded communists and others and quickly became the largest opposition party in Albania.

Well motivated, the DP began to organise a series of rallies across Albania calling for full democratisation and a quicker pace of reforms. While eager to reform the economy, Alia was not ready for the vast resistance from the various opposition groups. [See Table 1. source: Albanian Information Agency]

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**TABLE 1 ALBANIA'S POLITICAL PARTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pol. Party</th>
<th>Chair/Bio</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Eduard Selami- attorney and former philosophy prof., Deputy in Assembly</td>
<td>to establish a democratic Albania based upon the rule of law, human and economic rights</td>
<td>privatise state farms &amp; industry, restructure foreign debt, liberalise prices, 'shock therapy'</td>
<td>most popular, yet, may fragment due to domestic and foreign issues within 1-3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>Fatos Nano- For/Econ Minister under Alia. Former economist and Prime Minister, 28 March- 15 May, 1991</td>
<td>to setup a social security net and move into the European mainstream through a gradualist approach</td>
<td>socially responsible market economy, welfare state, continuation of state co-ops, no new taxes on farmers</td>
<td>popularity in outlying areas may wane as PSS offers little legislation and continues to block efforts at reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party</td>
<td>Meno Gjoleka- joined Bufigovt. [June, 1991] as Secretary for Agriculture</td>
<td>to deal exclusively with the nation's farmers, rural areas and their problems</td>
<td>greater regulation over land privatisation, right to voluntary farm co-ops, Agricultural Bank,</td>
<td>weakening and may be absorbed by PSS or PDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>Sabri Godo- minor novelist and member of the intelligentsia</td>
<td>creation of a managerial technocracy under the democratic direction of the rule of law</td>
<td>greater foreign relations w/neighbours, streamline bureaucracy, greater system of checks and balances in govt.</td>
<td>weakening, relying on right-wing emigree support. May be absorbed into PDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance [PAD]</td>
<td>Neritan Ceka- MP and Archeology Prof. Tirana University</td>
<td>creation of the institutional democracy and equilibrium in govt.</td>
<td>greater long-term foreign policy strategy, economic reform for creation of middle class</td>
<td>membership growing, could pose long term rival if properly funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democrat</td>
<td>Skender Gjinushi- former Minister of Education under Alia</td>
<td>to integrate Albania into mainstream of Europe's Social-Democratic systems with a high degree of social welfare</td>
<td>modernisation of agriculture, housing reform, balance in urban &amp; rural construction, higher focus and aid towards education at all levels</td>
<td>may continue to distance itself from PSS in effort to increase support. Needs to revamp party program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note there are currently 18 political parties recognised by law in Albania. Many receive funding from emigrees.

^ Nano was arrested in July, 1993 on embezzlement and corruption charges and is currently serving a nine year sentence. The Socialists are led by Servet Pellumbi, number two man and former philosophy professor, Tirana University.

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6 IBID p.1.
He failed to realise that once the door on reform had been opened he could not control its pace. The only viable option, which some hard-liners advocated, was severe repression backed up by the military. While this would have led to widespread bloodshed and perhaps even civil war, it was not outside the realm of possibility. Indeed, Alia even called for military backing according to his accounts. On February 20th, 1991 a crowd of over 100,000 people gathered in Tirana's main square. Fed up with the state of the nation and the pace of reform, they openly denounced the government and the old system. Seizing the moment, they toppled the large bust of Enver Hoxha while troops stood by and observed the scene. Prime Minister Adil Carcani, himself a conservative along with several military hard-liners questioned Alia as to why no action was taken. Alia responded that he had ordered troops to fire at the crowd. According to later accounts, however, Interior Minister Hekuran Isai apparently did not carry out Alia's orders fearful that this would lead to large scale violence and bloodshed. With elections scheduled for March, 1991, Alia saw that such acts would undermine both the party's ruling position and, more importantly, general order within the nation. He therefore assumed full control and many both within the party and outside it saw Alia as necessary to guide Albania through its difficult period. In an effort to appease the hard-line 'Enverists', Alia formed a nine member Presidential Council with prominent conservatives on it. The March 31st, 1991 elections not surprisingly handed the APL 169 of 250 seats in Parliament and a general state-wide victory. The DP had little time or money to properly organise its campaign. It did, however, manage to embarrass the APL by a strong showing in the cities, including a defeat for Alia, Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani and party secretary Spiro Dede within Tirana. The DP also managed to gain seventy-five seats in Parliament. Alia, however was elected President and asked Fatos Nano, a young economist, to form a new government.

1.1 The Nano Government

According to international monitoring groups sent by the Helsinki Watch, the 1991 elections were, by their standards, free and fair. Opposition groups though, felt that government intimidation tactics were improper. Contesting the results of the election in several cities, the DP often clashed with police. Such resulting violence in the northern city of Shkoder accounted for four deaths, including local DP leader Arben Broxhi, prompting outcries by the DP. With the Nano government Assembly

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8 Ibid, p.8. These included people such as Carcani, Nexhmije Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi and Xhelil Gjoni

set to convene on 10 April it was hardly a shock when the DP delegates initiated a boycott of the proceedings. Seeking an official investigation into the killings, they finally reconvened on 17 April. Approximately one week later, despite its two-thirds majority in the People's Assembly, a new draft constitution was presented to the ruling APL. The significance of this was that it called for the renaming of the Albania from the 'Socialist People's Republic' to the 'Republic of Albania'. While pledging reform and adherence to social equality, protection of rights, and political pluralism, the Nano administration faced a no win situation. Linked with the old guard and not anxious to sever all ties to it, the new government would never be able to appease the opposition parties or their followers. Despite this natural disadvantage, the Nano government did succeed in moving Albania closer to the outside world and in some internal liberalisation.

In an effort to distance itself from the Hoxha legacy, Nano pledged on 28 March, 1991 to release all political prisoners and move Albania 'towards democracy and into the civilised world'. Realising this meant foreign investment and foreign aid, the administration succeeded in repudiating the 1976 Stalin Constitution. This meant the formal lifting of the ban on foreign aid. The government also sought assistance from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the newly formed European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Joint ventures were encouraged and foreign investment was scheduled to take place by May, 1991.

These measures, however, were not enough in either scope or swiftness. Following the Skoder riots and killings, the DP organised hunger strikes and general work strikes throughout Albania. The trade unions organised a general strike of over 250,000 workers set for 15 May, 1991. With increasing pressure, Nano submitted his resignation on 4 June, 1991, less than two months after he had taken the post of Prime Minister. With the economy in shambles, lawlessness rampant, refugees fleeing in the tens of thousands to Greece and Italy, and an almost total dependence on outside assistance for the most basic of foodstuffs, Nano's attempts at a gradualist approach to reform would simply not do the job. [see Table 2] His resignation, therefore, came as no surprise. Instead it highlighted the desperate situation and the need to remove hard-liners from positions where they may block reform. This occurred at the APL meeting of 14 June, 1991. Several conservatives were expelled from the party. For his part, Fatos Nano was named chair of the now renamed, Socialist Party. While

10 FO, op.cit.; p.5.
11 Sources on figures in the table range from; Keesings Contemporary Archives, (August, 1991), and (January, 1992), and, RFERL (3 January, 1992), (6 February, 1992), and, The New York Times 5 August, 1993, and, Derek Hall, op.cit.; pp. 189-190. Note also that labour migration figures were not displayed. For FY 1993; 1500-2000 went to Italy, 1000 to Germany and 300-1000 in Austria and Switzerland. Approximately 200,000 Albanians are currently working abroad. For more information see, "Survey of Albania", The Financial Times 21 July, 1994 and RFERL (18 February, 1994)
generally considered a failure, the Nano administration did succeed in one major area, the foreign policy front. Specifically, it formally reestablished ties with the United States, suspended since 1946. The resumption of diplomatic ties with the US now afforded Albania the opportunity to head down the path of full democratisation and economic reform, with outside assistance.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE. 2 Albanian Refugee Flow [approx.]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITALY:</strong> Italian authorities repatriated over 25,000 Albanians between August/91 and January/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 January to December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **GREECE:** Expelled 83,000 [1991], 380,000 [1992], 92,000 [between January-August 1993] ^ |
| 10,000 January to | 10,000 January/91 | 12,000 [January] 200,000 June-Sept. | 130,000 by February | 600-1,500 a day during the Summer harvest season [May to Sept.], 70,000 repatriated during the month of August, 1994** |

* With Operation Pelican, Italian troops were able, not only to distribute food, but more importantly monitor the Albanian ports of Vlore, Sarande, and Durres thereby stemming the flow of refugees. The operation began in 1992.

^ Greek and Albanian government sources vary as to the actual numbers of refugees and illegal workers in Greece. Many are expelled from Greece and return immediately during the harvest season where Greek farmers use them as a source of cheap labour. Their numbers are usually tacked onto existing figures.

** Expelled following the trial of five ethnic Greeks accused of spying for Athens. See heading [infra] on relations w/Greece

1.2 The Bufi Government of 'National Stability'

Following the resignation of Nano, President Alia was left little choice but to cede to the demands of the opposition parties, particularly, the DP. An agreement was reached to form a coalition government with aims to 'stabilise' the nation until general elections could be held in either May or June, 1992.

According to the agreement, ministers in the new government had to resign from their parties and were prohibited from running for office in the next elections. The communists' choice for prime minister was Ylli Bufi, a young and relatively unknown candidate member of the party's Central Committee who had served as minister of food since July 1990. He formed a government of experts dominated by noncommunists.  

The Bufi government was faced with an almost impossible task. Industrial and agricultural production was down by nearly fifty percent. Albania's foreign debt had reached more than $400 million [US], its export values had declined from $300-350

12 The agreement, restoring relations, was signed on March 15, 1991 in Washington by Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani. See, Keesings Contemporary Archives March 1991 p.38106.

million in previous years to only $60-65 million by 1991, and inflation was running rampant at six hundred percent. Unemployment figures vary, yet estimates, conservative at that, placed more than one-quarter of a million people out of work, in a population of three million. To make matters worse, the government, in an effort to stem potential violence from these vast numbers of unemployed, was continuing to pay approximately eighty percent of the workers wages. This severely depleted government funds resulting in the increased printing of money, and with it, even higher inflation and debt.\textsuperscript{14} With this many people unemployed and obviously alienated, crime increased exponentially. Reports of gangs roaming the country robbing, looting and causing general unrest continued to spread.\textsuperscript{15} This atmosphere only increased Albania's problems as foreigners became wary of investing money when instability and lawlessness appeared the norm. Indeed, Albania seemed to be headed towards total collapse both economically and socially.

It was amidst this climate that Buçi took the reigns of government. The DP leader, Sali Berisha, as well as other opposition members, felt that a coalition was necessary to return Albania from the brink of anarchy and prevent the quite possible imposition of military rule.\textsuperscript{16} Nurturing external ties and aid, Albania looked to Europe and the United States. It was admitted as a member of the CSCE and established links with the European Community. The latter quickly moved to help Albania, providing a measure for emergency aid on 13 June, 1991. The aid, however, was predicated upon continued commitment by the Albanian government for democracy and respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{17} By the end of June, the United States Secretary of State James Baker paid a visit to Albania. Calling for the continuation of democratisation and reform within Albania, Baker pledged six million dollars in US assistance. The aid, however, was conditional on further measures towards democracy. Fearing that Albania's collapse would lead to an even larger refugee exodus, other nations followed suit. Italy, which bore the brunt of refugees, granted more than $150m in humanitarian and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14} Zanga (January, 1992), op.cit.: p.76.  
\textsuperscript{17} Commissioner Frans Andriessen confirmed that the development of relations with Albania depended upon respect for human rights and the development of democracy. He said, however, that the General Affairs Council....will be considering the opening of diplomatic relations between the EC and Albania, and if this happened, then the Commission would hold exploratory talks on the prospects for a trade and co-operation agreement. The EC has already given 1.5m ECU for refugees and another 0.5m ECU was being considered as emergency aid..' See the \textit{European Parliament Report} (Brussels: 10-14 June, 1991): p.28.}
emergency aid. Greece, which witnessed tens of thousands of refugees spill over its borders also, with Turkey pledged approximately $20m each.\textsuperscript{18}

While the West has been more than willing to assist in humanitarian and emergency aid for Albania, it has been wary to grant large levels of hard currency. Realising that the entire system needs reforming, the West believed that hard currency grants might have the effect of slowing down reform by perpetuating the old system. Buff, who has not advocated a 'shock therapy' approach, only confirmed the West's suspicions. The result was a lack of private investment and enterprises that were dominated by a communist party installed bureaucracy, reluctant to reform a system which would thereby jeopardise their position.\textsuperscript{19} More importantly, there was a legitimate concern that continued Western assistance would create a situation akin to the welfare system of the United States. This meant the establishment of a permanent underclass, lacking of initiative, unwilling to work, and totally dependent upon outside aid.\textsuperscript{20}

With Albania suffering from a lack of basic necessities, Buff made the provision of vital consumer goods his first priority. Price controls were lifted on certain goods and enterprises and low level privatisation was instituted. There was even speculation that Albania would establish 'free economic zones' to encourage investment.\textsuperscript{21} These, however, could not work when the entire nation was in a state of civil unrest and instability. 'Extortion, prostitution, drug-running, indeed, crime per se [were] the order of the day.'\textsuperscript{22} Concerted efforts, however, were made. A Foreign Investment Agency, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, began operations on 1 October, 1991. Immediately prior to its formation, the EC stepped up its trade links with Albania;

The Commission...put forward a proposal for a trade, commercial and economic cooperation agreement with Albania designed to remove restrictions on Albanian exports to EC markets over a ten year period and to help the Albanian economy in a market led

\textsuperscript{18} Keesings (March, 1991), \textit{op cit.}
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{20} A similar view was expressed by the German State Secretary Erich Riedl while on a visit to Albania. When Albanians asked for more German aid, Riedl was quoted as 'having bluntly told the Albanians to stop acting like beggars on the world stage and to roll up their sleeves'. Zanga (January, 1992), \textit{op cit.}, p. 75.
Although there is no specific mention of financial assistance, the Community has already allocated 35m ECU to Albania under the 1992 budget and will provide about 50m ECU in the 1993 budget.\textsuperscript{23}  

The attempts at reform, while creating some degree of normalcy, fell short, as increased demands by the opposition and the populace further undermined the government for national stability's position. A CSCE rapporteur mission to Albania [16-19 September 1991] agreed that while positive steps were being taken, the road to democracy in Albania would be, 'neither easy nor rapid'.\textsuperscript{24} This only amplified the demands by the DP. With social unrest rising and the continuing polarisation of the parties within the government, DP chair Sali Berisha issued an ultimatum to the government at the DP party meeting of 26 November, 1991 in Tirana.

The democratic opposition had repeatedly demanded that its continued participation in state affairs be guarantied by both the government and President Ramiz Alia. It had also demanded that the late dictator Enver Hoxha's widow, Nexhmije, and former ranking communist party officials be arrested; that the directors of the Albanian Radio and Television be replaced; and that the trial of those considered responsible for the Shkoder massacre be reopened; and that the general elections be brought forward to February.\textsuperscript{25}

If these demands were not met, the DP promised to withdraw from the coalition government precipitating its downfall. The government bowed to the pressure and acquiesced to the DP demands. On 4 December, 1991, however, the DP announced that it would withdraw from the government. The Bufi government fell immediately. This move by Berisha and his followers had two direct consequences. First, it threw Albania into an even deeper state of civil unrest as looting, violence and resulting deaths occurred throughout the nation.\textsuperscript{26} Second, and more importantly, the move exposed a growing rift within the Democratic Party itself between Berisha and those more moderate elements who felt that the Bufi government should have been supported rather than abandoned at this critical stage of reform.\textsuperscript{27} As for the performance rating of the Bufi administration:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Bufi's order to resign, on 6 December 1991, was followed by rioting- attributable largely to economic shortages- which caused 40 deaths, and a protest rally in Tirana on 9 December against the failure of government, President and parliament to improve living conditions. FO, \textit{op. cit.}; p.8., Liam McDowall, "Albania Learns the Art of Wrecking", \textit{New Statesman and Society} (13 December, 1991): pp. 18-19., Brenda Fowler, "Crimewave Fills Tirana with Fear", \textit{The Times} 17 February, 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Berisha's announcement to withdraw from government provoked a dispute within the DP as Neritan Ceka, acting deputy chair of the DP resigned from his post and from that as parliamentary leader, accusing Berisha of acting without a mandate, describing Bufi as a 'devoted patriot', and extolling the successes of his administration, which he said was the, 'best post-war government we have ever had'. \textit{Keesings Archives} (December, 1991): p.38686. Ceka, along with fellow DP founder Gramoz Pashko and Arben Imami would later form their own party, the Democratic Alliance.
\end{itemize}
Observers at home and abroad have noted that foreign policy was the only field in which the previous cabinet performed well. In the six months that Bufi’s government was in office, Albania gained membership in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Moreover, it won the support of the Group of 24 and the European Community, among others. Bufi is thought by many observers both at home and abroad to have performed well as prime minister under extremely difficult conditions.

President Alia was now faced with either seeking a new coalition government or a caretaker government until new elections could be held. After consulting with the leaders of the five coalition parties, the latter alternative was chosen. On 10 December, 1991, former Nutrition Minister Vilson Ahmeti, a non-communist party member was asked to form a caretaker administration. The new nineteen member government of “technocrats” was announced on 14 December, 1991. One week later, Alia announced that new general elections would be held on 22 March, 1992.

1.3 The Caretaker Administration

The new cabinet was to concentrate on furthering economic reform, particularly, in land privatisation. It also sought raw materials and a strengthening of outside ties as a way to move Albania, a nation at one point self-sufficient, away from a now almost total foreign aid and food dependency. By the end of January, 1992, over three thousand tonnes of wheat were arriving daily to Albania by both rail and sea, provided by the EC members and the US. These measures, however, failed to alleviate the crisis in Albania as problems arose over storage, distribution, and looting of the warehouses where the grain was kept. Indeed, the months of January and February were witness to widespread crime and violence which threatened to bring Albania to the point of near total anarchy and chaos. Crime had reached such proportions that people would not venture outside after dusk. The situation had even the police frightened and risked paralysing the whole nation. The Ahmeti administration introduced a bill to Parliament to alleviate the crime by imposing stiffer penalties on offenders and putting more police on the streets. This would not solve the problems though as many Albanians understood that the crime sweeping the nation was not the random acts of individuals, but the co-ordinated efforts of “urban Mafioso” which sprang up in the last two years. Liberalisation had brought with it corruption and

28 Ibid, p.18.
30 Brenda Fowler (February, 1992), op cit.; The situation on looting only got worse as resulting violence led to many deaths including three women raped and killed within a two week period and two elderly women suffocated to death in a grain warehouse looting raid. See, "Raiders Grab Food Aid", The Times 27 February, 1992.
31 David Binder, "Revamped Police Slow Albanian Slide Into Chaos", International Herald Tribune 30 October 1992
profiteering by ruthless men who were diverting much needed aid leaving the police
with little they could do since, in all likelihood, some within their ranks also saw the
opportunity to profit from the widespread chaos.\textsuperscript{32}

As for continued outside assistance, Albania was forced to spend most of its
foreign currency reserves on obtaining basic necessities. This increased its foreign
indebtedness to over $600m, up from $400m in less than one year.\textsuperscript{33} Its continued
economic plight jeopardised its already weakened political stability. And, as
mentioned, this aid would not further reform.

Although Western food aid is vital and has kept Albanians from starving, it will not reinvigorate the
economy. Rather, Albanians must create an economic base by producing goods both for domestic
consumption and for export. It must also resolutely promote the development of private ownership and
a market economy.\textsuperscript{34}

With little relief in sight, many Albanians fled the country hoping to gain work and a
better life. The resulting flood of refugees to Italy and Greece in the tens of thousands
forced those two nations to impose strict measures to stem the tide of this illegal flow.
Before the start of the new year [1992], Italy dispatched eight hundred troops to the
Albanian port city of Durres, part of 'Operation Pelican'. The troops are there to aid in
food distribution and together with patrol boats along the coast, see that Albanians do
not attempt to board ships headed for Italy. Greece also became burdened by an influx
of refugees which Greek government estimates placed at over 200,000 and rising.\textsuperscript{35}
Albania and Greece, historically had never much cared for one another. Now, the
refugee problem only exacerbated the situation. With possibly more than one hundred
thousand Albanians in Greece illegally, and the Greek economy itself hurting, it did not
take much to incite unrest, violence, and border incidents which brought charges and
counter-charges by both sides. Many of the Albanians, young males in their twenties
and thirties, usually unskilled labourers, once in Greece often found little or no
employment. This resulted in many of them 'roaming the streets' and engaging in
criminal activity. With pressure from Greeks to do something, the Greek Prime

\textsuperscript{32} The chief of the Tirana police admitted that, at one point, his men no longer had any control over
the situation. The police were also wary of harsh measures since many still saw them as instruments
of the repression typified by the old regime. This undermined their authority and, in some instances,
threatened their existence as reprisals were sought. James Pettifer, "Dispirited Albania Prepares to
Vote", \textit{The Times} 11 March 1992, Anne McElvoy, "Ballot Offers no Way Out for Albania's Ills", \textit{The

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Zeri i Popullit} 29 December 1991

\textsuperscript{34} Louis Zanga, "Albania Reduced to Total Dependence on Foreign Food Aid", \textit{RFE/RL} (21 February,

\textsuperscript{35} Robert Austin, "Albanian-Greek Relations: The Confrontation Continues", \textit{RFE/RL} (20 August,
1993): pp.30-35., Greek estimates also claim that 1500 to 1600 Albanians try to cross into Greece
daily and are turned back by Greek authorities. Henry Kamm, "With Nothing to Lose, Albanians
p.16. Expulsion figures for 1992 indicate 379,093 Albanians were sent back by the Greek authorities.
Minister, Constantine Mitsotakis launched 'Operation Broom', an effort to expel thousands of Albanians in Greece without proper documentation. Both opposition and Socialist party members in Albania denounced this decision by Greece and called on a softer stance. Greece rejected the call by Albania and later protested the Albanian government decision to ban parties within Albania that represented ethnic minorities. Specifically, Omonia, a Greek minority party within Albania sought status as a political party, able to field candidates in the upcoming March 22 elections. A tide of anti-Greek sentiment, however, was expressed by the majority of the Albanian Parliament as they passed the legislation against this unanimously. Greece took its case to the EC and in a strongly worded letter to President Alija, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumiere called on Albania to recall its pledge to respect minority rights or risk losing its guest status in the EC Parliamentary Assembly. Alija responded that while groups such as Omonia were not recognised as political parties, they were not prevented from fielding independent candidates in the general election.

With foreign troops in Albania; the economy in shambles; increasing dependency on outside aid for basic foodstuffs and crime running rampant, the stage was set for the March 22 general elections. The Ahmeti government of technocrats served little purpose but to serve as a caretaker government handcuffed by the situation and events. The elections of March reversed the 1991 results. With approximately ninety-one percent of the population voting, the opposition parties received nearly seventy percent of the vote. The DP was clearly the winner as it gathered sixty-two percent of the vote and ninety-two seats in the new one hundred forty seat Parliament, followed by the Socialists with twenty-six percent of the vote and thirty-eight seats. With its clear majority, the DP controlled government, the first time a non-communist government had power in roughly five decades. DP chair Dr. Sali Berisha, a former heart surgeon was elected President and called upon Alexander Meksi, a co-founder of the DP and chair of the People's Assembly from 1991 to 1992 to form a government. The complete victory by the DP in the elections seemed to justify their decision to withdraw from the government coalition. This is what Berisha had expected.

38 With the worst situation of all the East European nations, Albania belonged, along with only the former Yugoslavia, in a 'third group' of regionally classified economies. This meant that the transition to capitalism was not of the utmost priority despite official statements. Instead social and political stability took precedence. See, Ben Slay, "The East European Economics: Uneven Progress", RFE/RL (1 January, 1993): pp.113-118
He expertly timed his party's exit from the coalition government, quitting at the height of the civil unrest last December and thus ensuring that fresh elections would be held in a climate of disillusion and uncertainty and that the electorate would be ready for a change. 40

2.0 THE DEMOCRATIC ARRIVAL [March, 1992]

The first true non-communist government of Albania inherited a nation in dire straits. President Berisha affirmed that the state of affairs was so grave that it would perhaps take Albania twenty years to achieve a standard of living and prosperity comparable to Western standards. 41 Albania's gross domestic product was falling rapidly by ten percent for each fiscal quarter. Inflation was rising equally at ten percent and figures indicated that almost half of the population was out of work. 42 The DP led government was officially sworn in on 19 April, 1992. All except four of the eighteen member Council of Ministers, dubbed the 'cabinet of hope', were part of the DP. 43 Criticising its makeup, the Socialists immediately lashed out at the Meksi cabinet claiming that it was filled with inexperienced personnel. While the charge is true, the DP filled its ranks, and those of the cabinet with a host of intellectuals and professionals including, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and engineers.

Although brought in on a wave of hope, the new government will in all likelihood not be given much of a grace period. The Albanian people are pragmatic and realise that whole-sale change will not be achieved overnight. However, the DP has made many promises during the election campaign, some of which were from the time of their utterance, not capable of being achieved. Among these, President Berisha hinted that now, Albania could achieve access to Western Europe, its markets and labour possibilities. Also, he believed that economic reforms would reflect positive gains within two years. With Albania free and open, foreign investment would follow, both rapidly and in abundance. 44 This, unfortunately, was not to be the case. And now, with power in their hands, the Albanians will not accept excuses, but demand results. With a multiplicity of opposition led by the well organised and well funded Socialist Party, the government will be hard pressed to initiate and, more importantly, implement sweeping reform legislation when the former SP will block, criticise, seek to water down, and protect its own interests within government. While these interests

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vary, The SP seems more content simply opposing every DP move and proposal rather than formulate viable initiatives themselves. Indeed, aside from an open and vehement rejection of the shock therapy approach, the SP *modus operandi* appears as deliberate attempts to undermine the legislative process. With this in mind, the Assembly, prior to the Presidential elections made 'swift amendments to the Constitution in an effort to bolster the powers of the President. The move was an attempt to grant Berisha powers to call, attend, chair cabinet meetings and to give direct orders to members of the government, akin to the US Presidential powers regarding the cabinet. Should this not work, however, and the new government fail, always a possibility in a nation with a history of instability, there is a strong chance that a new non-democratic system could gain power. While not a reversion to the past, as most simple analysis indicates, this new system would at worst, be authoritarian in one shape and at best, adopt a slower more 'gradualist' approach to reform thereby keeping Albania out of the European mainstream once more.

2.1 Domestic Reform

The new government had to deal with four problems. First, the continuing breakdown of order threatened to undermine any attempts at stabilisation. With Albania dependent upon, and actively encouraging, foreign investment, law and order became a top priority.

The demolition of the institutions of the one-party state has meant that in many spheres of life there is no state authority at all, and in some cities the police do not appear to be capable of enforcing the law. Traditional patterns of revenge killing are beginning to appear. A climate of serious violence as part of a turbulent street culture is growing and is bound to deter domestic or international investors, however much they may wish to help Dr. Berisha shake off the Communist heritage.

With Albania actively seeking to pattern itself on a West European model, the need for western investment was vital. While a series of law and order legislation was passed in the Assembly which brought about some stability, investment was still not up to the levels expected by the Albanians. Reasons may vary as to why. However, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia certainly plays a large role in dissuading investors. [See infra, foreign policy] With the advent of dissolution there, West European inability and a lack of understanding of the problem, or how to solve it, sped Yugoslavia on its course to destruction. Inefficiency, indifference, and general foolishness highlighted the European Union's policy. This, at a time when comprehension, intuitiveness, and initiative were needed. But, instead of seizing the opportunity to do something which

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48 Zanga (January, 1993), *op cit.*: p.75.
would benefit themselves and the area, the Europeans flinched. With regards to Albania, James Pettifer expresses this position;

The ball is now firmly in Europe's court, and in the absence of the old scapegoat some sort of more considered policy response to the poverty and misery of Albania will presumably be needed. This will inevitably involve very large sums of money and a degree of political will implying the potential for integration into Europe of this small Balkan country. It remains to be seen whether this will be forthcoming, now that other aspects of the Balkan crisis appear to have fundamentally affected the way the region is seen in Brussels.49

The need to stabilise the situation in Albania has led to a decrease in the levels of crime. In the past year, the percentage of violent crime [murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery etc.], has decreased. However, the level of non-violent crime [petty theft, misappropriation etc.], has actually increased by roughly four percent. This, to some degree, also factors into potential investor's decisions whether or not to inject time and money into Albania.50

The second problem encompasses the slow pace of economic recovery. With the most backward economy in Europe, Albania embarked upon the Jeffry Sachs program of 'shock therapy'. Co-operatives were broken up and large-scale privatisation schemes were instituted. Disputes immediately broke out over ownership resulting in violence51 in the outlying areas and foreign firms became wary of investing since future land claims would disrupt business activity.52 Also, although only twenty-nine percent of the population was employed in industry, the closure of outdated, inefficient plants left tens of thousands without work. The high unemployment figures, estimated at fifty percent, do not take into account the high proportion of the 'underemployed'. These include the vast numbers of street vendors, bazaar merchants and transient workers who illegally cross into Greece or Macedonia, work for the harvest season, and return to Albania with their winnings. When factored in, they may represent an additional twenty percent of the population, although exact figures are difficult to attain. Shock therapy exacerbated inflation and unemployment while privatisation and market mechanisms destroyed many of the social benefits previously received by the populace. The situation did not bode well for the DP as Albanians grew restless with reform. The government defended its program, however, as the only means to shake Albania

49 Pettifer (June, 1992), op.cit.: p.97.
50 Informal conversation with top Executive Branch official, (Tirana: 14 June, 1993)
51 A series of hunger strikes over privatisation resulted in President Berisha calling in police to break up the strike in the northern city of Shkoder in May, 1993. Zanga (July, 1992), op.cit.: p.24.
52 From the start of the Bufl administration, June 1991 to June, 1993, Albania has managed to privatise ninety percent of the land. These were divided up amongst five hectare plots to farmers. Disputes broke out, however, between the new owners of property and the pre-war landowners whose property was seized by the communist regime. Many of these landowners are part of, and voice their claims through the émigré group communities. Two primary ones are leftovers from the war, still active today; Balli Kombetar, and Legalitati. See Louis Zanga, "Albanian President Defends His First Year in Office", RFE/RL, vol.2 #29 (16 July, 1993): pp.23-26.
from the communist foundations of its centrally planned past. President Berisha's chief adviser, Mr. Genc Pollo reiterated earlier statements regarding shock therapy by stating; 'while it creates problems, these are short term. Shock therapy, however, provides the best answer for a system such as Albania that was the most backward in Europe'.\(^{53}\) To others within government, Albania's economic woes and the means to combat them do not necessarily imply the use of 'shock therapy'. Mr. Leonard Demi, of the Albanian Foreign Ministry represents this latter view.

I think the term 'shock therapy' is subjective and therefore relative to the situation at hand. Albania had the worst economic and political situation in all of Europe. Only now, after nearly five decades, are we seeking to reassert ourselves on the international scene. Naturally you are going to have immediate problems such as unemployment but these are expected, particularly when you embark upon large scale economic reform.\(^{54}\)

One of the first measures of the new government was to stop paying eighty percent of unemployed worker's wages. While these moves were highly unpopular, Berisha was merely following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and seeking to preserve already depleted coffers. The high levels of the unemployed also threaten to increase the crime rate and divert even more time and resources to preserve order. Opposition to the government's decision to close various industrial plants was widespread as some thought that outside aid, coupled with comprehensive retraining programs would alleviate the employment problem. Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party, adheres to this view. When asked what was the biggest problem in Albania, he responded;

The de-industrialisation and closure of the various plants. They have left many people unemployed and put many more on social assistance. We now are forced to import various products from the West when these plants could have been and should have been converted, and their employees retrained, so that we could have produced these products ourselves. This would then result in jobs, goods, and a prosperous economy.\(^{55}\)

This position, while possessing merit, is simply not feasible for several reasons. First, modification and retraining requires large amounts of assistance. Albania has been hard pressed in obtaining such amounts, particularly when the likelihood for positive return on investment remains sketchy at best. Second, recent aid has been earmarked for more pressing needs such as social welfare programs and fulfilling basic necessities, especially since sectors of Tirana, the capital, continue to operate without proper sewage disposal, running water and lack of communication and power lines. Third, Albania is not the only reforming ex-communist system in need. Aid has been

\(^{53}\) Interview Genc Pollo, (Tirana: 7 June, 1993)
\(^{54}\) Interview, Mr. Leonard Demi Director Third Department Albanian Foreign Ministry, (Tirana 4 June, 1993)
\(^{55}\) Interview, Mr. Sabri Godo, Chair Republican Party of Albania, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993)
distributed across the nations of Eastern Europe based upon need, yet in consideration of, level of reform, extent of democratisation and privatisation, potential for success, etc., and other factors which naturally limit the amount of aid presently available. Lastly, aid geared for retraining cannot work when a large percentage of the population is comprised of unskilled labourers. With over sixty-five percent of the population involved in simple peasant agriculture, retraining would take time. Such time would mean the short term perpetuation of outdated plants producing not only poor quality goods by East European standards, but the further depletion of resources needed to keep these inefficient plants operating. Such a disproportionate amount of the population in rural areas may also contribute to economic hardship. Urbanisation may bring short term problems such as overcrowding, poor living standards, crime, etc., but it does also bring economic prosperity in the long term. Skender Gjinushi, chairman of the Social Democratic party believes that by 'privatising and modernising' rural areas a new class of urban and suburban dwellers could be created in the long term. This is not only critical but one key to proper economic reform as is ensuring that a proper mix of urban and rural inhabitants is created. Gjinushi goes on to state that hopefully over ten to fifteen years, the number of rural dwellers will decrease and subsequently, growth can be maximised. He feels, however, that the government is not pursuing this within the framework of a well thought out plan. Gjinushi also feels that education and continued promotion of it, including specialist programs along Western models and standards would benefit Albania's short and long term economic reform. He does receive support from those within Albanian academia. Low level exchange programs have begun with Germany, Italy and Great Britain and are expected to begin with the US. Even when positive strides are being made in education, problems arise. Rector of the University of Tirana, Mr. Gezim Karapici had stated that while a larger variety of courses are now available and steps are being taken to instruct Western techniques, the problem becomes making sure the capable stay in Albania. What did he see as the largest problem to economic progress?

The 'brain drain' situation is the greatest impediment to reform, not only among the staff, but among the brighter graduates. As rector of this university I make approximately $55 a month (£ 40). Most professors make half that and most qualified graduating students have a chance to do no better presently. Given the circumstances it is not unusual, therefore, that these students and professors should seek better jobs and pay elsewhere. We cannot hold them here by force. The result then is that their skills, which could be most helpful in Albania, will be used elsewhere.

56 Prime Minister Meksi stated flatly that he highly doubts any foreign investor would be willing to invest large sums to renovate the Stalin-era enterprises. Zanga (July, 1993), p.24.
57 Interview, Mr. Skender Gjinushi Chair, Social Democratic Party, (Tirana: 18 June, 1993)
58 IBID. This position makes sense when one considers that Gjinushi at one time under Alia served as a former Minister of Education.
59 Interview, Mr. Gezim Karapici Rector University of Tirana, (Tirana: 5 June, 1993)
Generally, pegging educational reform to increased levels of urbanisation results often in the move away from urban decay and to a more prosperous economy and efficient infrastructure. "The tight relationship that exists between economic development, educational levels, and democracy is illustrated quite clearly in Southern Europe". In using Greece and Spain as examples from the 1950s through the 1970s, Fukuyama compares the level of urbanisation with rising education levels and prosperity concluding; "with urbanisation came higher degrees of education and personal income, and an appreciation of the consumer culture..."

The problem with attempted urbanisation is the difficulty in attracting rural dwellers to cities when jobs and homes are not available. This then relegates many to the rural areas and denies them and their children educational possibilities as they must now either tend a small private plot to keep their family alive or simply have nowhere to attend intermediate and higher level schooling in outlying areas. Gjinushi's suggestion of modernising these outlying areas would certainly help. However, the immediate need seems to be alleviating the state of unemployment. This requires continued investment, particularly in the cities. This would create more jobs which would draw labour in from rural areas nurturing the urbanisation needed to promote education and prosperity. This in turn would spur on economic reform.

In the short to medium term, however, it appears that Albania will focus on agriculture as its top priority. At a rally in Korca, Berisha stressed the importance of making Albania self sufficient in food production which meant the improvement of the agricultural sector. Because of past bread shortages and the riots they led to, Albania's bread production is still under state supervision. The nation consumes 600,000-650,000 tonnes of grain annually, yet domestically produces 350,000 tonnes. Imports and food aid do not necessarily solve the difference as the government resells much of this for hard currency. This has led to a nearly two-fold increase in the price of bread beginning on July 1, 1993. Berisha had stated that beginning in 1994, farmers' taxes would be lessened and/or deferred for a two-three year period. The agricultural sector would receive investments of $50m towards new machinery, renovated irrigation systems and two thousand new tractors. The government also hopes to boost productivity by providing subsidy incentives and paying twice as much to farmers for a kilogram of grain. The government's fiscal austerity programs based upon IMF

60 Francis Fukuyama (1992), op. cit.; p.110.
61 Ibid. The transformation of the Greek and Spanish systems led to high growth. Beginning in 1958, Spain's economy grew by 7.1% yearly, Greece's by 6.4%. He attributes this to the social transformations that occurred in those nations. By 1950, only 18% of the Spanish population lived in cities. By 1970, this increased to 34% while maintaining continued growth rates over seven percent.
62 Up to 1 July, 1993 bread prices rose from 240 leks to 460 leks per loaf. Two factors bear consideration; first, the average Albanian family consumes 19.2 kilos of bread a month, quite high for European standards. Second, an average Albanian salary ranges from 10,000 to 20,000 leks a month. When factored with daily consumption and purchase, Albanians may spend as much as one-third
recommendations have yielded some success. Exports have increased by eighty percent over 1992 figures. Inflation, at one time running over two-hundred and fifty percent is down to under one percent. The lek has also stabilised at 100-110 leks per US dollar. Goods not available two years ago are freely obtainable on the market as Western merchandise makes its way across Albania. Price liberalisation has fortunately not led to wild price increases though there have been steady and constant increases. Yet, for all the positives, the situation is still one of general want and disparity. Social assistance is a measly 5,400 leks/month and is procurable for only six months to one year. Unemployment still includes nearly half the population and charges of corruption fill the headlines of opposition dailies. An assessment of economic reform indicates that;

Berisha can point with some pride to some of his government's achievements. But generally speaking, the country's economic situation remains precarious; and the trend seems to be towards degeneration, not regeneration.

A possible explanation for the pace of economic reform may lie in the implementation of the proper measures. This brings one to the third problem of domestic reform, the infrastructure. The bureaucracy of Albania, like other communist nations was highly centralised and reluctant to give up their positions easily. The authoritarian command structure of government made it difficult to implement reform when democratisation meant decentralisation. The conflict that occurred between the two competing methods often resulted in nothing getting accomplished as identifying and carrying out decisions of utmost importance left many without a clue. Upon entering office, President Berisha stressed the need for decentralising when he stated;

I am trying to delegate as much as possible, but one of our greatest tasks is to find the right people to help run the country. There are many very talented people in Albania and for the moment they have not left, but we must find them quickly.

Delegation of power though is not that simple. Under the communist system, the nation was divided up into twenty-seven districts, each with a party leader. Following the July, 1992 local elections, these were increased to thirty-seven districts which are

their salaries on bread alone. Zanga (July, 1993), op. cit.; pp.23-24., Farmers receiving 850 leks per kilo were expected to receive 1,400 leks per kilo. IBID

These recommendations included generally; 1) keeping a lid on inflation by holding down wages, 2) budget outlays should be reduced, 3) financial discipline should be instituted within enterprises along with structural reform, 4) ownership restitution, 5) land sales and leasing programs 6) privatisation strategy and enterprise restructuring, and 7) price reform. "Letter from Mr. Jacques R. Artue, Acting Director, European Department International Monetary Fund to President Sali Berisha", (Washington: IMF, 2 April, 1993)


The government also increased the power of local mayors, empowering them with a degree of decision making locally which includes; housing allocation, distributing state aid, establishing local administrative structures and services such as doctors and police. Berisha has also ordered the early retirement and removal of many bureaucrats and replaced them with more reform minded individuals. The dual purpose of this restructuring was to decentralise authority and increase DP support in the rural areas where the Socialist power base is strong.

The infrastructure programs, however, are filled with problems and shortcomings. First, services are so lacking that it may take years for them to be instituted. Basic services in cities such as Tirana, including garbage disposal, often rely upon the individual's responsibility who then either let it mount or take to burning refuse openly. The pathetic state of Albania's infrastructure may never adequately be solved as some estimate it may take more than $10 billion to repair the infrastructure alone. Second, the attempts to delegate power locally often fail as localities lack the funds necessary to provide basic services and taxation as a means to gather funds is met with strong opposition by those without work and on state assistance. And now, with the agricultural tax break for farmers about to be instituted, localities will be hard pressed to find ways to provide basic services without central government co-ordination. This has led to charges by the opposition SP and their leader, Fatos Nano that the Berisha government is more authoritarian than the old system. It was amid these charges that the July 24, 1992 local elections were held. In a strong showing, the Socialist Party gathered 40.91% of the total votes to 43.24% for the DP. In the municipal councils, however, the SP received 281 seats, or 43.57% to 266 seats and 41.24% for the DP. The former also gained twenty-three mayorships to nineteen for the DP and 117 commune chairmanships to 113 respectively. The paradox was now that the SP controlled power at the local levels while the DP controlled it at the centre. This may have been the reason for the DP's reversal on immediate decentralisation as it

67 IBID
68 Refuse mounted up in parts of Tirana included rat infested piles of garbage outside of the first floor window of Tirana's largest hospital posing health risks for the population. Street cleaning in the capital consisted of women with 'brooms' made of several branches of pine tree tied together and a sweeping of the gutter into piles for removal. Author's personal account after one month visit to Albania (3 June- 25 June, 1993)
now appears to be foot dragging in that area. Fearful that they may lose their advantage, they have rejected any notion of power sharing or power distribution since, they claim, Albania lacks the, 'sound socio-economic and political systems found in advanced capitalist countries', which prevents immediate and widespread decentralisation.\(^\text{72}\)

The general opposition has offered varied criticism and ways to battle the infrastructure problem. One example is Mr. Arben Imami, deputy chair of the Democratic Alliance party and Parliament delegate from Tirana. When questioned about the state of the bureaucracy, he replied; 'today the bureaucracy is larger and more corrupt than under the old system. The old system at least had checks upon it to prevent corruption. Today, millions have been lost due to the present bureaucracy. This is why the DP for three months lost 500,000 votes from the March, 1992 elections to the July, 1992 elections.'\(^\text{73}\) Following up Imami’s statement, Democratic Alliance chairman, Neritan Ceka offered a way to recondition the bureaucracy.

> You must have, I believe, comprehensive constitutional reform which will create the framework and then take a model such as the US, German or French model and modify it accordingly, then apply it. The bureaucracy must then be democratised and made sure that it provides stability by placing it above party politics. Only then will a coordinating system with intellectuals, the Albanians themselves and others who understand the nation's indigenous needs be able to function.\(^\text{74}\)

Other opposition leaders echo Ceka's comments and recommendations calling for more power at the local levels. Among these is Sabri Godo, chair of the Republican Party. The criticisms over a still centralised economy were voiced by foreigners as well, particularly from the US embassy in Tirana which feels that further decentralisation is vital to reform.\(^\text{75}\) In seeking to deflect criticism, President Berisha has stated that the bureaucracy 'requires time to modify'. The Albanians are engaged in grant programs aimed at restructuring but 'change will not occur overnight'. In defended present conditions, Berisha added that the present system, albeit with problems, 'was not totally inadequate'.\(^\text{76}\)

The opposition, however, did voice criticisms that were well founded. Realising the severe condition of the Albanian economy, President Berisha and the DP have engaged in some degree of power manipulation. This may be the only answer though for a nation in such a situation. While 'extreme times may [in this instance], not require extreme measures', they do demand a firm hand and strictly supervised

\(^{72}\) Zanga (September, 1992), op.cit.; p.29.

\(^{73}\) Interview Arben Imami, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993)

\(^{74}\) Interview, Mr. Neritan Ceka, Chairman Democratic Alliance Party, (Tirana: 12 June, 1993)

\(^{75}\) Interview with Sabri Godo, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993), and Interview with Mr. David Kostelancik, Second Secretary, Political and Economic Section United States Embassy, (Tirana: 7 June, 1993)

\(^{76}\) Interview, President Sali Berisha, (Tirana: 9 June, 1993)
guidance ensuring, however, proper democratisation. This may sound contradictory, but it should not since strong leadership can coexist with democratic principles. The key is the proper amount of decision making delegation to those within government. Presently, the system remains centralised in key areas and slows down reform as directives and approvals for projects, legislation implementation, resource allocation, etc., must often come from the highest levels, either the minister himself, even the President. Perhaps deferring to the need to depoliticise the system, or bowing to pressure from the opposition, especially the SP [which has repeatedly called for the Meksi government to resign], Berisha announced that he would institute cabinet changes aimed at subduing the 'weaknesses and shortcomings of economic reform'.

Ministers of Education and Tourism, Ylli Vejsiu and Osman Shehu were replaced by political independents Xhazair Teliti and Edmond Spaho respectfully. These two fields showed little, if any improvement in the last year. The ministries of Internal Affairs and Agriculture, which witnessed some improvement were now headed by DP members, Agron Musaraj and Petrit Kalakula. These changes did very little to allay criticism as charges of nepotism and corruption continued from the SP.

The strong leadership tendencies of Berisha though may be due to the limited choice offered by the political climate. The various political parties which have sprung up in the past three years represent the fourth, and perhaps biggest problem to domestic reform. The polarisation of the parties has and continues to stall any attempts at reconciliation and compromise which would benefit Albania. When asked what he believed was the largest obstacle to reform in Albania, Social Democratic chair, Gjinushi replied;

There is not enough coordination between the parties on legislation for Albania. Each group becomes so engrossed in having a say in legislation that often there is little or no compromise whatsoever. The

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77 An example of the latter incident was witnessed by the author while waiting for a meeting with the President. In the waiting room were two other gentlemen, representatives from a foreign petroleum company. The discussion between us turned to their exasperation at having to meet with the President to get approval for a project which would bring jobs and revenue to Albania. They were sent from ministry to ministry for days in attempts to receive approval, which apparently, no one had the authority to do so. Finally, in desperation, they sought a meeting with President Bersiha who gladly welcomed their proposal. Interview with Oil Company Representatives, (Tirana: 9 June, 1993). This total hands on approach by the President is the source of opposition criticisms of authoritarianism. An unattributable government source stated that Berisha's need to become involved in all aspects of decision making even extends to his own choosing of his chauffeur. Imami, op cit.


79 The former minister of Internal Affairs, Bashkim Kopliku was made Deputy Prime Minister and former Agricultural Minister, Rexhep Uka was placed in charge local administration. See Louis Zanga (May, 1993), op.cit.; p.15. By 1994, however, Kalakula was dismissed for openly calling himself a 'fascist' and believing in 'Greater Albania'. He and Abdil Bleta have since left the DP and formed the Democratic Party of the Right, allied with and often receiving their funding from Legaliteti and Balli Kombetar. See, Illyria March 18th, 1994.
result then is when legislation gets passed or is on the floor, each party will raise an objection rather than trying to reach a compromise.80

The polarisation of the parties was evident by the time of the July 1992 local elections. From the time of the DP victory in March, an 'unofficial' alliance existed between the DP and the Republican and Social Democratic parties. The latter two, though, appear to have also lost faith in the DP ability to reform and rule Albania. This led to a dissolution of the alliance, and a significant reason for the positive showing for the SP.81 The polarisation and rifts among and between the parties appear to have finally been too much for the Albanian people. They were constantly being inundated with charge and counter-charge from the political parties. Rather than offer concrete steps as to how to move Albania forward, each party became engaged in useless polemics. The result of the voter dissatisfaction was a significant drop in turnout. Whereas ninety percent voted in the March elections, July witnessed a high twenty percent fall-off.82 A look at the parties shows that the DP and the SP represent the largest two in the nation surrounded by 'fringe' parties to the left and right. These fringe parties, however, are worthy of consideration since, dissatisfaction with the main two push the populace towards the others and swell their ranks. Many, such as the Social Democrats [SDP], have sought to pattern themselves on West European models and simultaneously distance themselves from the DP. Their chairman, Skender Gjinushi has formed links with European Socialists and is trying to gather dissatisfied members of both the DP left and SP right.83 Others, such as the Republican Party [RP] have only recently realised that to succeed, they must distance themselves from the DP. Representing the right, the RP has undergone internal changes in effort to formulate an independent reform policy. Believing that the system is still too centralised, it has called for a thorough democrtatisation of all state institutions and more local power.84

A more significant rift, however, was the one within the DP. Originally, a student movement, the DP brought in a host of intellectuals and anyone else opposed to the old regime. This broad base would naturally lead to dissension. When Berisha announced his decision to withdraw from the Bufi government, leading members within the DP rejected the move, beginning the rift which was to result in the expulsion and withdrawal of party members, Gramoz Pashko, Neritan Ceka, and Arben Imami.85

80 Gjinushi, op.cit.
81 Zanga (September, 1992), op.cit.: p.28.
82 IBID, p.29., The DP has offered reasons for the drop in voter turnout ranging from apathy to an expression of dissatisfaction from the youth, and even the weather. The elections of July, 26 were free and fair; there were no signs of irregularities. The hot weather though probably played its part. As it was Sunday, part of the electorate from the countryside had gone to the beaches. This, accompanied by a growing indifference towards elections, led to the fact that 30 per cent of the electorate did not take part in the election. "The Democratic Party of Albania", (Tirana: 13 August, 1992): p.23.
84 Interview Sabri Gudo RP Chair, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993)
85 Zanga (July, 1992), op.cit.: p.17.
At the June, 1992 DP Congress, Pashko, a co-founder and leading intellectual within the DP was expelled from the party. These three later went on to create the Democratic Alliance Party [DA]. The move was downplayed by the DP who called it a case of sour grapes and disloyalty. The move though, by three of the brightest minds within the DP certainly signalled warning bells as the dissension was exploited by opposition parties. When questioned about the decision to split and the 'sour grapes' issue, deputy chair Arben Imami of the DA replied:

When we created the Democratic Party, we did so with one objective in mind, the removal of the communists from power. This objective was widely accepted within the party as the only way to achieve democratic aims. This is why in the beginning the Democratic Party was a truly national movement and united the various factions within the nation. After the March, 1992 elections it merely was no longer simply removal of the communists or uniting the anti-communist forces that could stand as the prime objective but the beginning of a truly democratic state with set objectives. At the start of democracy, Neritan Ceka, Eduard Selami, Sali Berisha and myself were in agreement up until August, 1991. During this period Berisha was pressured from outside groups, especially from the US and in this his politics resulted in an internal party conflict. It was at this point that the split began and it appears will continue for quite some time.....For all of this our group split because we were not in agreement with the objectives of the DP even though we had more specific plans and were better organised. It is not a question of sour grapes. We had positions in government available to us but turned them down when we realised that the DP has no specific long term plans. 86

Imami continued to reaffirm Gjinushi's believe that there is no co-ordination among the parties. He states the major party representatives should meet in a series of talks aimed at finding ways to ease the polemics between them. He doubts though that this will occur. Apparently, Imami, Pashko, and Ceka twice sought a meeting with President Berisha to discuss the matter. They were refused both times. 87

The Albanian émigré groups also have recently become active in Albania. The two chief parties are the leftovers from the war, Legalitati, and Balli Kombetar. The latter, a party to the right, has sent representatives to Albania in the past two years and formed links with members of various political parties in efforts to influence political decisions and seek political power. Legalitati, advocating a return of a constitutional monarchy led by Zogu's son in exile, King Leka, has also been very active in forming ties within Albania and seeking to influence outcomes. At first glance, these émigré groups appear downright foolish; lacking little or any political experience, and/or education, proposing unrealistic goals and positions, lacking specific reform measures, and led and staffed by men who, although away from Albania for forty to fifty years genuinely believe they can set the nation on the right course. 88 These groups, however, should not be discounted as the fantasies of foolish old men. They are much

86 Imami, op.cit.
87 IBID
88 Berisha's chief advisor, Genc Pollo believes that while Albania welcomes the Diaspora's help they are 'out of touch' with the present circumstances and too disorganised. Interview with Executive Branch Official, (Tirana: 7 June, 1993)
more organised then a superficial glance would indicate. Albanian émigrés also contribute approximately $400m annually to the Albanian economy, much of which comes from Balli and Legalitati. The continued presence of their representatives in Albania has caused some concern among the DP as well as other groups, though not officially expressed. Recent disagreements between President Berisha and DP Secretary-General Tomor Dosti have led some to believe émigré group influence is a factor. Proponents of this position point out that Dosti's father, Hasan Dosti, was a founder of Balli Kombetar during the war. The position is perhaps far-fetched, but, should not disregard the potential power base of the diaspora.

This may only add to the polemics as each party seeks to undermine the position of the other while placing the reform of Albania second on their respective list of priorities. A reason for this situation may be due to the inherent attitudes of the old system, not easily discarded. Neritan Ceka adheres to this position. Questioned on the possibility of reconciliation between the political parties, he responded;

No I don't believe so. Even though I hope it will happen I cannot foresee it because the members of the Democratic Party and the government come from the old attitude and mentality which believes that if you have a split or disagreement you must remain enemies forever. For example, splits within the communists resulted in either prison or death. This is what I mean by enemies. This attitude is preserved and governance is under the same psychology.

Within Albania, however, the continued clashes between the DP and SP threaten the stability of the nation. Each group often spends more time and energy traversing Albania in attempts to defend its position while degrading the stance, actions and very existence of the other. With Albania in such a sorry state, most would think this would not occur, but it continues to, to the detriment of the Albanian people. This is best expressed by Louis Zanga when he states;

One would think that under the new circumstances, Albania's two main political blocs would have little choice but to cooperate and seek a modus vivendi for the country's economic and political survival. Yet the bitter fight between these two blocs has become more intense with each passing day and seems to indicate that the two sides are not much inclined to seek accommodation. Instead, they seem intent on proceeding according to the primitive tradition of political extremism.

While perhaps not wholly attributable to a 'primitive tradition', Albanian party quarrels are certainly a combination of Albanian stubbornness and a belief that power must be concentrated and not shared, hence the steadfast approach to party politics.

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90 Ceka, op.cit.
91 Zanga (September, 1992), op.cit.: p.29.
2.2 Assessing Domestic Reform

When it came to power in March, 1992, the newly elected DP government was faced with a situation unlike other former communist nations of Eastern Europe. Its years of self-imposed isolation from even the latter group compounded the already insurmountable problems. The nation faced total lawlessness, widespread violence, food shortages and nearly complete economic upheaval and bankruptcy. The new government has made some positive steps in restoring law and order, keeping inflation down, stabilising the currency, privatising land, and promoting freer Western style markets. Problems continue, however, as unemployment and underemployment increase. Resulting moves by Albanians to leave Albania [often illegally] in search for jobs and a better life has heightened tension between Albania and her neighbours, especially Greece, making diplomatic relations tenuous and threatening stability in the already volatile region [infra]. A lack of services, charges of corruption and continued centralisation also plague the successes of the DP.

The problems are evident to the population as it has voiced its discontent. Between 1 and 11 November, 1992, a Eurobarometer Gallup Poll of 1,049 Albanians indicated that, while 77% thought the nation was moving in the right direction, only 44% were satisfied with the development of democracy compared to 55% not satisfied.92 These polls also indicated that 56% felt economic reforms were proceeding too slowly, as was privatisation, while 72% favoured a market economy. However, only 46% felt the economic situation had improved in the last twelve months with 13% believing it stayed the same and 39% indicating it had gotten worse.93 Perceived failure with government has led to a drop in government support. A January, 1993 poll indicates that only 52% felt the nation was moving in the right direction, a 25 point drop. When broken down by age categories, those age 18-24 and 25-29 polled 58% in favour of the general direction of Albania. Of the largest group which felt the nation was moving in the wrong direction, those over age 50 polled 31% followed by the 35-49 age group registering 28%.94 When questioned on the largest problem, an overwhelming 61% said economic problems followed by unemployment with 8%. A paradox though was the results of perceived conditions for one's self and family compared to conditions for Albania in general. When asked to compare economic conditions today with three years ago; 47% felt they were better for themselves and their families, 22% thought they remained the same, and 27% thought they were worse. The same question regarding Albania, however, indicated only 35% better,

92 Eurobarometer/Gallup Annex Figure 11, see also Zanga, "One Year of Democracy in Albania", RFE/RL (2 April, 1993): pp.26-27.
93 IBID, annex figures 7,8,6,2.
42% worse, and 14% the same. Part of the reason for this though may be in a large percentage of Albanians with relatives abroad who have contributed much in the last three years to their well being.

The situation though does not bode well for Berisha and the DP government. Significant improvements have been made due partly to his initiative. Yet these may not be enough as party polemics, unemployment, growing class differentiation, and a general sense of apathy and despair pervade Albanian life. Albania's domestic reform appears to have been reactive rather than proactive. It relies on ad hoc approaches and often adheres to outside advice from 'experts' which does not always take indigenous factors into account. In any case, the drop in support, witnessed by recent polls perhaps is evidence of the 'degeneration trend' of domestic reform.

3.0 FOREIGN POLICY

While domestic reform may be lagging, many observers in the West feel that for Albania, 1992 was a year of immense success on the foreign policy front. After years of isolation, preceded by a constant, unequal, patron-client relationship, Albania made strides in linking itself with the world around it, albeit with problems. Realising that it in no way can reform without outside assistance, Albania has abandoned a cautious opening up policy for a widespread, multi-pronged, and perhaps haphazard foreign policy approach.

3.1 The Initial Turn

While the reform communists still held power their aim was to link Albania to the social-democratic systems of Western Europe. The belief being that this form of governance best suited Albania during its difficult transition and provided the necessary social welfare guarantees expected by the general population. Also, Albania felt that it needed to integrate itself on the European stage, particularly at a time when Western Europe was moving towards a single market. Hoping for aid from multilateral institutions such as the ERBD and the World Bank, the Nano administration sent the President of the Albanian Chamber of Commerce, Ligor Dhamo to London on 9 May, 1992.

95 IBID, pp.4-5.
96 When asked about these foreign experts and press agents, Democratic Party Chairman Eduard Selami responded, 'I think that they tend to believe that Albania is merely Tirana and that we are a simple people. We are not as simple as they believe. For example, they come here and stay at the Dajti Hotel and think they know all there is to know and see about Albania. They must realise that 65% of the population live in the countryside. Foreigners then leave here as well informed people on Albania'. Interview, Mr. Eduard Selami Chairman Democratic Party, (Tirana: 9 June, 1993)
During his three day visit, which was followed up by Nano himself, talks turned to joint venture, foreign investment, and privatisation legislation with the ERBD and Great Britain. More importantly, Albania and Britain were able to restore diplomatic relations on 29 May, 1991, after forty-five years. Britain's historical ties to the area and its EC membership marked a positive move for Albania and its efforts to turn towards Europe. Public and private groups moved to aid Albania in the difficult times it faced. Through the British Red Cross and the Feed the Children organisations, the British public collected more than two million pounds. The government followed suit by committing £500,000 in emergency assistance. Organisations such as the British-Albanian Law Association also sought to bring Albania into a West European system by providing legal aid and expertise in privatising, and joint venture contracts.

The British regard for Albania, however, may not be as high as Albanians think or hope for. With the civil war raging in the former Yugoslavia, British concern was that Albania may become involved, further destabilising the Balkans and any possibility of foreign investment. More importantly, fear of destabilisation and spread of conflict would naturally endanger long time British ally and fellow EC member Greece. This may have been one reason why Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Minister visited Tirana in July, 1992, to assess the situation. Several months later, British MPs, wary of Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, pressed the minister and government for guarantees that Britain would not sell arms to Albania which could be exported to Kosova. The fear was that this might lead to a spread in the conflagration and their primary concern vis à vis Greece. The level of importance Britain attaches to Albania is especially evident by their political presence there. Although offered a host of villas to choose from, Britain's 'embassy' is in the basement of the French embassy. Their representative there receives directives from the British ambassador to Italy and can be contacted via the French switchboard.

More positive links were and still are with Italy. Its proximity and history of ties throughout the Zogu years made Italy a natural candidate for Albania to foster ties.

100 *IBID*, p.7.
101 *IBID*, p.9.
102 The British felt that a Western style legal set-up was vital if Albania is to attract foreign investment. With no experience on negotiating let alone drawing up a western business contract, the task became, not only modernising the legal profession, but establishing it as well. Hoxha had banned it and now there are only about 120 attorneys for a population of 3.2m. See, Tom Walker, "Albania Gets a Computer Boost", *The Times* 6 August, 1992. The lack of legal experience perhaps also explains why Albanian legislation is 'difficult to follow and often wordy'. Interview, Mr. Elez Biberaj, Director Albanian Section Voice of America, (Washington D.C.: 9 August, 1993)
with. Indeed, Albania even during the early 1980s looked to Italy to replace Yugoslavia as its primary trading partner. In exchange for industrial technology, Albania was to provide raw materials. Links were formed until the mid-1980s and resumed with full force after 1990. With the advent of reform and the supposedly imminent travel restrictions, Italy was forced to deal with Albania once more. In March, 1991, hoping for a chance at a better life in the West, tens of thousands of Albanians stormed the port at Durres and hijacked anything that would float and set a course for Italy. From 1 to 7 March, over twenty-thousand Albanian refugees arrived at the Italian ports of Bari, Brindisi and Otranto. Overwhelmed, the local authorities did not know how to handle the situation. For their part, both the Italian and Albanian governments mismanaged the entire affair. The former ordered navy ships to turn back any ship bound from Albania to prevent more refugees. With no place to keep the first group, Italian authorities were at a loss as to what to do with the Albanians. After inaction, they decided to deport most of the refugees. The Albanian government, not much better, tried to seize the port of Durres with military force on 7 March. With thousands of Albanians still at the port seeking to leave, violence erupted resulting in several deaths. The Italians repatriated roughly half the refugees and made no plans to deport the rest. The situation changed, however, when in August, a 17,000 strong 'flotilla' arrived at Bari. The Italians put the Albanians in a soccer stadium with no facilities or proper shelter for several days in thirty-five degree centigrade temperature. Rumours spread amongst the Albanians that they were to be returned prompting rioting and injury. The incident caused severe outrage as images of pathetic refugees being doused with tear gas filled television screens. High level meetings between the two governments resulted with Italy promising to send Italian troops to Durres to aid in food distribution and a $50m grant to assist Albanian industry to modernise and meet its domestic needs. Immediately following the March refugee crisis, talks ensued between Foreign Minister Kapllani and his Italian counterpart, Gianni de Michelis over a proposed three year economic aid package. Italy acting on its self interest could ill afford to see a failed economic Albania so close and

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104 Even during the Hoxha regime, trade agreements between the two were signed. Political contacts included Sokrat Plaka, the First Deputy Foreign Minister visiting Rome in 1984 followed by his counterpart Bruno Corti visiting Tirana one year later. Relations soured, however, in late 1985 when six Albanians sought refuge in the Italian embassy. The Italians did not surrender the six until assurances that they would not be persecuted were given by the Alia government causing the latter embarrassment and forcing internal control relaxation. See Biberaj (1986), op.cit., pp.14-15.

105 'The sudden arrival of thousands of refugees on the eastern coast left Rome little choice but to reverse its policy of taking relatively little interest in Albania and to improve relations'. Zanga (January, 1992), op.cit.; p.75.


108 Selami, op.cit., The three year deal involved approximately $800m. Italian officials estimated that some $200m a year was necessary for Albanian industry. Biberaj (August, 1993), op.cit.
risk a continued inundation of refugees. Albania, unrealistically, hoped that Italy could serve as a mediator on its behalf for eventual EC membership. For its part, Italy contributed much during this initial crisis time in Albania. Its total aid package to Albania in 1991 alone amounted to $120m plus food aid worth an additional $98m. Italian authorities also sent 800 troops as part of Operation Pelican to Durres assist in food and aid distribution aside from dissuading further refugee emigration. Despite Italy's internal problems, it has continued its strong ties with the Berisha government. This has prompted some within the Albanian government to call for a more cautious approach towards Italy. It was, after all, a series of strong links with Italy during the Zogu regime that eventually led to the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939. While a repeat of this is foolish to believe, some Albanians feel that;

With their economy in a shambles, many are concerned that a full opening up could lead to Albania being 'bought out' by foreigners, especially the Italians, who dominated the country during the interwar period and then annexed it in 1939. Although Tirana has welcomed the considerable humanitarian and economic assistance it has received from Italy, the Albanians fear Italian domination. The belief that Bersiha is 'selling out' Albania is voiced vehemently by the SP. Fatos Nano has stated, expressly, that the government has put Albania up for 'auction'. Excessive reliance on Italy, for a host of projects, has made the Albanians stagnate, according to most SP officials. More importantly, they feel that Italy's real interest is not in Albania, but in using Albania as a wedge to counter renewed German interest in the area.

The fear may be well founded but fails to recognise three key factors. First, Italy is presently undergoing a fundamental shift in government so profound that it will be forced to concentrate on internal matters for quite some time. Second, rather than turn away from Italy, Albania needs all the strong links it can get since it not only requires aid, expertise and investment to proceed forward, but stable relations with neighbours in the always volatile Balkans. Lastly, after two years, the Italian government has finally ended Operation Pelican. The program has ended its emergency aid distribution and will now concentrate on technical co-operation. This is seen by government

109 FO, op.cit.: p.9.
110 Fonseca, op.cit.: p.357. Albanian authorities were also to receive training from Italy on how to handle the illegal migrants. Biberaj (August, 1993), op.cit.
111 Biberaj (1991), op.cit.: p.16.
112 Illyria 5 August, 1993
113 Interview Mr. Bashkim Zeneli, Vice-President Foreign Policy Commission [SP] Albanian Parliament, (Tirana: 4 June, 1993). See also, Spyros Economides, The Balkan Agenda: Security and Regionalism in the New Europe (London: Brassey's Centre for Defence Studies, February, 1992): especially p.29; 'Italy is keen to counter the influence of Germany in a region which it considers will be beneficial to the development of trade and general economic links.'
114 Operation Pelican officially terminated on 3 December, 1993. It succeeded in distributing 664,000 tonnes of food and clothing and performing 205,369 medical examinations and operations. See Louis
officials and outside observers as a sign that positive steps are being taken to reduce Albania's external dependence.

3.2 *A Multilateral Approach [Economic]*

With the start of refugees leaving for Greece [February, 1991] and Italy [March, 1991], the EC realised that it must do something regarding Albania. Although the EC placed emphasis upon human rights violations, the severe problems of Albania warranted some reply. At their February 21, 1991 meeting Euro-MPs called on aid for Albanian refugees in Greece and felt that Albania could possibly be included as part of the PHARE package. Aside from the 1m ECU granted to Albania, further aid depended upon the upcoming March elections. The EC wanted to ensure that elections were free, fair and that parliamentary reform and democratisation were proceeding forward before any new aid grants.115

The Berisha government did not alter the position of Albania towards the EC. The risk of total collapse and general socio-economic chaos made the DP stress that its program and Albania's future lay in 'integrating, as soon as possible, into the European family, where Albania belongs'.116 Initial support for this position appeared widespread as ninety-one percent of Albanians polled favoured full EC membership.117 Surprisingly, however, only twelve percent felt Albania was ready for EC membership immediately, with fifty-five percent opting for five to ten years time and nineteen percent believing Albania would never be ready.118 For its part the EC PHARE program allocated 110m ECU to Albania in 1992. Problems, however, arose over distribution of aid and technical expertise by the EC. Complaints by Albania, as from other East European recipients, claim that EC consultants do not stay long enough for a proper look to the problems. Also, program projects are subject to stringent EC guide-lines and decisions leaving little chance for the recipient nation to involve itself in aid and projects supposedly earmarked for it.119 This perhaps may explain the disillusionment felt by many Albanians over participation in the EC. When asked if they often considered themselves 'European', only fifteen percent stated they often do

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117 Eurobarometer, op.cit.; annex figure #47.
118 IBID, annex #48.
compared with an overwhelming fifty-seven percent who said they never do. The EC is naturally wary of allowing nations such as Albania to enter any time soon. Perhaps regretful over Greece's entry in 1981, it does not seek to grant membership to weak nations from a potentially unstable area such as the Balkans. Not only would they constantly draw off the already depleted cohesion fund, they would internalise historical tensions thereby further disintegrating EC decision making. Even it could enter, though, Albania is still minimally fifteen to twenty years away.

President Berisha has called on multilateral institutions to assist Albania in its transition to a market economy. He hopes that with such assistance foreign investment will follow. In an apparent contradiction, however, he does not want to follow the large scale foreign investment of Poland or the Czech Republic believing this constitutes a 'sell-out' to foreign powers. He fails to realise that these nations, part of the Visegrad Triangle, have the greatest possibility of EC membership. Berisha, though, continued to bank on multilateral support. Following a meeting in Tirana by representatives of the G-24 on 22 July, 1992, additional aid guarantees for agricultural investment and balance of payments rescheduling were agreed upon through 1993. The IMF and World Bank also have tried to step up aid to Albania. After its acceptance as an IMF member (15 October, 1991), food aid and technical assistance has arrived regularly. A standby agreement pledged $28m for economic reform through 1992-1993. This was followed by the International Development Association, affiliated with the World Bank, pledge of a $15m interest free loan for new home construction. Yet despite over $1b in aid to date many are sceptical of success. The crumbling infrastructure and continued internal problems have led many multilateral agencies to conclude that Albania is a watershed and that pumping more aid into it would be useless.

Towards the end of 1991, Albania became a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. [ERBD] Participation in this body, however, has done little towards the vital areas of domestic economic reform, which was the bank's basic intention. Its initial strategy was to focus on 'technical assistance, especially in commercial banking, telecommunications, tourism, transport, energy and the environment'. After more than a year though, of those Albanians polled, only thirty-one percent have ever heard of or were aware of the ERBD presence within

120 Eurobarometer, op.cit.; annex # 28.
122 Fonseca, op.cit.; p.358.
Albania. A large part of the problem is the ERBD itself. Criticism over the spending policies of the bank, such as £55.5m on office furnishings and marble slabs forced the eventual resignation of bank president Jacques Attali. The bank though must still undergo fundamental changes if it is to aid nations such as Albania. For example, the $75,000 spent on a ERBD Christmas party 'seems excessive given that Albania received only $872,772 from all sources from January, 1991 to July, 1992.'

Regardless, multilateral aid to Albania has not provided it with the boost it needed in pushing towards a market system. Instead, most aid has been in the form of emergency assistance or simply has not been enough to tackle the large scale problems Albania has with its domestic reform.

3.3 Multilateral Institutions [Political/Military]

At the 1975 Helsinki Conference all the nations of Europe signed the Helsinki Final Act except one, Albania. Sixteen years later, in 1991, Albania became a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]. In keeping with its 'initial turn' strategy, Albania saw the CSCE as a mechanism for political and economic co-operation and the future of a pan-European collective body which would address Europe's problems. The CSCE, however, does not have any enforcement capabilities, and aside from dispatching 'observers', it can do very little when it requires unanimity on any decisions. As for its impact on Albania, less than half of the population have actually heard of the CSCE. Within the body, Albania has used its veto to block admission for Macedonia and has agreed to retract it when the Albanians within Macedonia were granted 'constituent nation' status. The Macedonian government has refused to do so fearing that this would perhaps fuel secessionist activity as well as give the Albanians the right to veto changes in the Macedonian Constitution. Given the present situation in the Balkans, Albania's position does very little save fuel suspicions and heighten tensions while organisations such as the CSCE cannot unfortunately do much. Attempts to coerce Albania on their stance have failed. Measures to withhold assistance are not practical but rather counterproductive as they may further destabilise the nation and subsequently the area.

126 Eurobarometer, op.cit.; annex #31.
128 Eurobarometer, op.cit.; annex #30
129 In May, 1993, the US, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Spain signed the Washington Declaration which supported a political solution in Bosnia acceptable to all three warring sides. Following the declaration, the leader of the Macedonian Party of Democratic Prosperity, [made up of predominately Albanians], Mr. Nevzat Halili sent a letter to Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov calling for constituent nation status for Albanians within Macedonia. Three days later, Albania blocked Macedonia's bid for CSCE entry. See Misha Glenny, "Is Macedonia Next?", The New York Times 30 July, 1993.
Cognisant of history and fearful that present circumstances will endanger their security, Albanians believed entry to NATO would ensure their borders and perhaps prevent the Yugoslav conflict from spreading to Albania. Support for this position was also expressed by German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Following his third state visit to Tirana on 22 April, 1992, Genscher told a news conference that Albania should be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Admission would secure Albania's integrity and dissuade Serbs from attempting to move the Balkan conflict south.¹³⁰ Later in the year, President Berisha travelled to Brussels to meet with NATO representatives. He expressed Albania's concern over the Yugoslav war and fear that 'ethnic cleansing' would not be tolerated in the province of Kosova where Albanians make up ninety percent of the population. Strongly believing that such cleansing would lead to a larger Balkan war, Berisha saw NATO as a 'pillar of stability in Europe'. With that, Albania became the first of the former Eastern bloc nations to formally apply for NATO membership.¹³¹ Her request was politely denied.

While NATO offered standard reasons such as Albania not being ready for membership, four reasons demonstrate why membership was denied. First, there are several differences between the West and East such as cultural, and political differences that make immediate integration within NATO not feasible. From a simply practical position, questions arise as to how can these former bloc nations pay their way if they were granted membership, particularly Albania, which is suffering through severe economic reform. Second, NATO will not be quick to admit new members which may cause immediate animosity and cripple the alliance in times of crisis. Greece, Turkey and the 1974 invasion of Cyprus handcuffed NATO into inaction as both nations are members. Long standing tension between Greece and Albania would only exacerbate the situation and cleave the alliance, especially when Albania is on very friendly terms with Turkey, Greece's long time enemy. Third, key officials within NATO are wary not to quickly incorporate members of the Eastern bloc. This, they state, would only lead to an encirclement of Russia by its former allies of the Warsaw Pact. Such encirclement may only heighten tension within Russia, fuelling more anti-West radicals and becoming a potentially destabilising force within the nation.¹³² Last, and more importantly, in the post Cold War era, NATO has been wrestling with what

¹³² These three positions were expressed by General Robert Oakes, Chief NATO Central Air Command, at a seminar on "NATO and Security in Europe" (St. Andrews University: 16 April, 1993) See also, "Red Rag to a General", The Times 12 October, 1993 on Russian military 'paranoia' regarding encirclement., Michael Brenner and Phil Williams, "The United States and European Security in the 1990s", in Colin McInnes, (ed.) Security and Strategy in the New Europe (London: Routledge, 1992): p.158. As for the second position, Gen. Oakes stated that Greece and Turkey represented the single biggest problem within NATO.
its new role should be. The Clinton Administration believes that NATO must evolve and has led the way for its program, the Partnership for Peace. In seeking to outline new goals and the possibility of expanding NATO's commitments to 'out of area' operations, the US hopes that the eventual enlargement of NATO will ensure European security. At the same time, Partnership for Peace aims to allay Russian fears while delaying entry to nations still wrestling with economic reform and political stability. Otherwise, NATO must accept the possibility that immediate membership of the former bloc nations may, in the future, involve it in low intensity conflict based upon ethnic hatred between member states. Such a possibility, like Greece and Turkey would incapacitate NATO over how to handle such a situation and whether it should back one party over another, thereby violating fundamental NATO principles.

The ready acceptance of these principles, however, does raise doubts. Reports of renewed anti-Western feelings in Moscow may have some merit. The belief being that haphazard expansion would not revive NATO nor would it allay security concerns. Indeed, critics of NATO's eastward expansion believe that incorporating the East would involve a new set of security obligations and perhaps strengthen Russian nationalist elements thereby actually threatening, rather than allaying European security concerns. These same critics point to US-Russian divisiveness over Bosnia, coupled with Russia's refusal to sign off on the incorporation of the eastern bloc to NATO. As Bosnia has demonstrated, the argument states, NATO indecisiveness between its own members as to a course of action in the Balkan crisis will only be increased exponentially as new members are brought in. Recent Russian calls for a

133 US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher has stated that Partnership for Peace is a; ".... process that should be non-discriminatory and inclusive. It should not be tied to a specific timetable or criteria for membership....Our idea is to build the Partnership for Peace over time, at a pace geared to each partner's interest and capabilities. The Partnership would involve tangible co-operation and would channel member's defence efforts toward the ability to participate with NATO in a range of multinational missions." For full text, see Warren Christopher, "American Foreign Policy: The Strategic Priorities", Delivered before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington DC: 4 December, 1993) in Vital Speeches of the Day vol. 60 #6 (1 January, 1994): pp.162-167.

134 'Meanwhile, reports from Moscow tell of rising anti-Western feelings, a belief that the West is conspiring to keep Russia down and must be resisted. That is not reassuring for Europe, especially a Europe deprived of a strong sense of collective security based on NATO.' See, Flora Lewis, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994

135 'Some US policymakers believe that the way to revive NATO is to enlarge it by offering membership and military guarantees that membership confers to a few countries in Eastern Europe... That is a questionable idea. If Washington continues to move in this direction, it is sure to generate more trans-Atlantic divisiveness. It will burden NATO's existing members with risky new obligations....Worse yet, expansion could strengthen Russian nationalists opposed to Boris Yeltsin and his Western oriented reformers. The net result is that a larger NATO could diminish rather than strengthen European security...Moreover, giving a pre-eminent security role to an American-led NATO is certain to arouse resistance from France and others that would like to strengthen intra-European security arrangements.' See, "No Rush to Expand NATO", The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994

136 'But the moral pettifogging that has enveloped Western leadership can undermine NATO if it continues. On Bosnia, these is so little moral high ground on which to stand that Western leaders
more concerted effort on the part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE, now the OSCE, Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe], lend credence to the argument that the former is not ready to accept NATO as the sole guarantor of European security, since in Bosnia, it has been plagued with division.137

The present US policy of November/December, 1994, initially backed a tough military role against the Bosnian Serbs. The resistance this position met from fellow NATO members, Great Britain, France and Germany made the US adopt a more conciliatory stance, one which again called for the maintenance of UN peacekeepers and for a negotiated political settlement which would, in essence, reward the Bosnian Serbs with what they most want, political links with Belgrade. The US Administration felt that by backing away, it would help to heal the divisions and maintain the integrity and cohesion of the Alliance.138

Understanding, however, that it must incorporate former bloc nations somehow or risk destabilisation in the area, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. [NACC] in November, 1991. The NACC has offered foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs of staff the opportunity to confer with one another and discuss possibilities for regional security and stability. With Germany and Italy offering support for Albania, the latter was admitted to the NACC in June, 1992. The

jostle each other in the competition to seize it. Susicion and mistrust that will crack alliance cohesion take root in the atmosphere of blame and self-justification.’ See, Jim Hoagland, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994, and, for a different view on why NATO is suffering, Flora Lewis; ‘NATO is imperiled now for a different reason. Too many members have lost a sense of strategy and have tied it in knots to serve short-term political goals and escape hard decisions.’ IBID. 137 ‘Mr Yeltsin expressed angry frustration with what he said were attempts to sideline Russia in Europe’s future security structures....Mr. Yeltsin also vigorously criticized plans to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the former Soviet satellites....The summit [in Hungary] will endorse a plan to give the CSCE widened powers to organize conflict monitoring and peacekeeping missions, using troops from various member states. It will also establish a code of conduct that requires members to follow a common set of guidelines on civilian control of military and openness of their defense budgets.’ See, Mark N. Nelson, "Uninvited Guest", The Wall Street Journal Europe 6 December, 1994

138 President Clinton stated that the US would be willing to supply up to half of the 25,000 NATO forces for a UN peacekeeper pullout. See CNN World News Teletext (9 December, 1994), and, for a view that France and Russia believe the only way to settlement in Bosnia would be for the Muslims to accept defeat and that the US would only keep the conflict going by aerial force, Flora Lewis, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994., and, Tom Rhodes, The Times 30 November, 1994; ‘In a move intended to close ranks with its European allies over Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Clinton Administration.....abandoned military pressure and decided to offer the Bosnian Serbs significant concessions if they accept an international peace plan...This would open the way to a political link between the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade....The new US policy, presented to President Clinton... reflects a recognition by Washington that its leverage with the allies has been sharply reduced by a reluctance to send American ground troops to the Balkans. Its relations with Britain, meanwhile, are at their lowest point since the Suez crisis. ‘The new US policy would require the Serbs to sign the partition plan...In return, America wants to offer some form of link with Belgrade....Douglass Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, confirmed that the Contact Group was considering ways of allowing the Bosnian Serbs to have some links with Serbia.’
hope was that admission would provide Albania with, 'some security in view of the
tension caused by the Yugoslav conflict and Serbia's treatment of ethnic Albanians in
Kosova'.¹³⁹ For the Albanians, NATO was seen as the only way to guarantee their
integrity. They sought membership because they felt it was; 'a normal step. In that
region, history plays a larger role than present day politics. This is why we fear for our
security and integrity'.¹⁴⁰ This view was reaffirmed by Albanian Defence Minister,
Safet Xhulali. When questioned as to why Albania sought admission, he replied;

We sought NATO membership because we felt we fulfilled the requirements necessary. Our
geographic position is not East. We are not a Slavic people and should not have to risk their
consequences. The victory of democracy was absolute and as such we naturally looked West. We now
understand we have a long way to go but hope to enter NATO when they deem us fit.¹⁴¹

With Albanians numbering nearly seven million and spread across five states in the
region,¹⁴² Albania believed that it could provide NATO with a stabilising force in the
Balkans. The variety of ethnic groups and accompanying territorial claims give NATO
the ability to offer a 'factor of protection' for both Albania and the area.¹⁴³
Realistically, however, NATO may want to consider the creation of a coherent strategy
for probable conflict. Partnership for Peace may be the way forward, however, its
foundations appear too limited and still do not provide the security guarantees so many
East Europeans desire.¹⁴⁴ While NATO was created to counter the Soviet threat and
not to involve itself in low level, ethno-nationalist conflicts in the Balkans, it risks
obscurity, internal divisions, and becoming obsolete as it is these very same type of
conflicts which appear to indeed represent the new security threats to Europe in the
post Cold-War era. Redesigning its purpose is its first priority. Determining what to
do with nations such as Albania must come later.

3.4  Relations Within the Area

Of natural concern to the West and to Albania are the steps towards relations
with the other nations of the Balkans. The history of violence, territorial claims and
present widespread instability has caused many to approach regional diplomatic ties
with renewed interest. Tension in the Balkans has always been high. And now, with
newly democratising nations, nationalist elements have vocalised their demands

¹³⁹ Alfred A. Reisch, "Central and Eastern Europe's Quest for NATO Membership", RFE/RL (9 July,
¹⁴⁰ Interview, Mr. Genc Pollo, Chief Advisor to the President, (Tirana: 7 June, 1993)
¹⁴¹ Interview, Mr Safet Xhulali, Defence Minister, (Tirana: 22 June, 1993)
¹⁴² The figures include the 3.2m in Albania, 2m in Kosova and other 2m in Greece, Macedonia and
Montenegro.
¹⁴³ Interview Mr. Leonard Demi, Albanian Foreign Ministry, (Tirana: 4 June 1993)
¹⁴⁴ For general overview and valid criticisms of the plan see, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Way
Forward for an Inspired NATO", International Herald Tribune 2 December, 1993, Ole Diehl,
resulting in suspicion and anxiety over 'alliances' and agreements that may simply be reincarnations. Albania is no exception. With the West, especially the US, anxious not to see conflict spread, close tabs are being kept on Albania's relations with its Balkan neighbours and to what extent these may exacerbate the situation in the region.

3.4.1 GREECE- The fall of communism in Albania did little to ease tensions between Albania and its long time enemy Greece. Indeed, while there have been attempts to improve relations, many have been either half-hearted or have degenerated by one incident or another. The situation with Greece has impact not only between the two nations and the area's stability, but also upon the West since Greece is both a NATO and EC member. As such, a worsening situation between Greece and Albania may represent, 'the single greatest threat to Albania's internal stability'. Greece's long standing claims to 'Northern Epirus' appear to have been abandoned since Greece recognised the Florence Protocol of 1925 which fixed present borders. Greece, however, has criticised the Albanian government for the mistreatment of the ethnic Greek minority in the south of Albania. Greece also claims that the numbers of Greeks in Albania are actually much higher than the 50,000 to 75,000 listed by the Albanians. The Berisha government has criticised the Greek government for fomenting unrest in the area and is especially wary of a possible Greek-Serbian alliance which many Albanians see as an immediate threat. Recent problems between the two have been over the flow of refugees from Albania into Greece in the past three years. By the end of December, 1990 the number of illegal refugees crossing into Greece numbered more than six hundred per day. In a visit to Tirana in January, 1991, Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis urged that ethnic Greeks stay put in Albania without fear of reprisals and that Albanians without passports or visas would not be allowed to enter Greece. This did not stop the flow as less than a week later, Greek authorities repatriated over five thousand refugees. The Greek authorities stated that the vast numbers of illegal Albanians in Greece were more trouble than their worth. Incidents of widespread crime and of roaming vandals caused great concern among the Greek populace and chauvinist anti-Albanian sentiments became commonplace. The Greek ambassador to Albania met with the Albanian government in attempts to find a solution. The Albanian government criticised Greece for its position and poor treatment of ethnic Albanians claiming they only sought work and a better life, given the poor conditions in Albania. The situation became tense when reports of border shootings by Greek patrols of Albanians attempting to cross into Greece reached

145 Biberaj (August, 1993), op.cit.
147 IBID
Albania. Greece continued to counter with the ill treatment its minority was receiving in the south. Albania maintained that many ethnic Greeks within Albania were demanding special status as well as spreading literature throughout the area seeking autonomy and/or a return to Greek hands.

In an effort to resolve differences, Mitsotakis visited Tirana in May, 1992. Meeting with President Berisha, Mitsotakis stated that by now over 150,000 Albanians were in Greece, more than half of which were there without proper documentation. The two discussed right guarantees for both Greeks in Albania and the ethnic Albanians residing in Greece in an area known to Albanians as Cameria, historically part of 'Greater Albania'. The talks did not accomplish much. The flow of illegal Albanians into Greece continued throughout 1993 and numbered perhaps more than 100,000. Despite attempts to rid themselves of the Albanians some Greeks have learned to make use of them on the black market. Many smuggle consumer items across the border paying a kickback to both Greek patrols and Albanian border guards. Towards the harvest season many Greek farmers welcome illegal Albanians as a source of cheap labour and Albanians are all too willing since they can make more than they would in Albania.

Of equal concern for Albania are the nationalist sentiments Greeks have been displaying lately. With the Macedonia issue still unresolved, Greeks refuse to budge on any usage of the term 'Macedonia', believing it implies designs on Greek territory. Coupled with a call for right guarantees and territory in Albania, Greeks appear to have been demonstrating nationalist traits, the kind of which would make anyone in the Balkans edgy. Given the recent crisis in the region, Albania has also expressed misgivings about meetings between Mitsotakis and Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic. To the average Albanian, this smacks of the historic alliance between

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151 This figure is subject to dispute depending upon the source used. Greek estimates that perhaps as many as 200,000 illegal Albanians have been in Greece since 1990-91. See Henry Kamm, "With Nothing to Lose, Albanians Invade Greece", *The New York Times* 5 August, 1993, Tony Barber, "Athens-Tirana Relations Sink to New Low", *The Independent* 30 June, 1993, *Illyria* 1-3 November, 1993 p.1. [on figures that as many as 300,000 have fled to Greece since 1990]. The 100,000 for 1993 alone is perhaps accurate considering that Greek authorities had expelled 92,000 by September, 1993. See Kamm article. Figures also verified by *US State Department Official* by phone (August, 1993)
152 One Albanian border guard, when questioned about the illegal trade stated; 'Times are difficult, and many are without work. If someone who you know is trying to smuggle goods across the border says to you, "please, I need this to help my family" what are you supposed to do? We are all Albanians and must take care of our own. Of course I either turn my back or ask for a small token. This is expected.' Unattributable meeting with border guard, (21 June, 1993) On illegal trade see, "Skoupa-Dooper Profits", *The Economist* (20 June, 1992): p.51., Tony Barber, "Cheap Labour Costs Greece Dear", *The Independent* 8 December, 1992.
153 John Carr, "Greek Nationalist Bug Makes its Neighbours Itch", *The Times* 22 August, 1992
Greece and Serbia which nearly destroyed Albania. To those within the Albanian government, the meetings represent a deliberate attempt to 'polarise relations' and add to tension in the Balkans.  

Relations were moving forward, albeit slowly, when a recent incident added fuel to the tension between Greece and Albania. In the predominantly Greek towns of Gjirokastra and Sarande, Orthodox priests from Greece have been allowed to preach their faith in Albania, part of the religious freedoms granted by the Berisha government. In late June, 1993, however, the Albanian government forcibly expelled one Greek cleric for preaching 'anti-Albanian' propaganda and advocating secession for the southern portion of Albania. In protest, Greeks marched on Gjirokastra but were turned back. Resulting violence injured several and Greece responded by forcibly expelling thousands of Albanian refugees in Greece. More importantly, the incident worsened relations. Mitsotakis has accused Albania of mistreatment of Greeks in Albania and called for the reinstatement of the expelled cleric. Berisha has repeatedly claimed that the ethnic Greeks are receiving equal rights. However, irredentist activity will not be tolerated. He has stated that recent Greek activity aims to 'destabilise the south Balkans and aggravate and expand the crisis in the former Yugoslavia'. Tomo Mico, Greek representative to the Albanian Parliament also expressed contempt for Albania's media coverage, which he claims, in no way explains the concern of ethnic Greeks in Albania but instead depicts them as unruly and dangerous, as well as conveying images of pathetic Albanian refugees being rounded up and sent back across the border.

The status between Greece and Albania has naturally caught the West's attention. With its inability to handle the current situation recent events do not bode well for future stability. Realising that recent economic woes have heightened these national elements, Albanians have been easy targets for pro-Greek fervour. It was amid this Greek nationalist revival that former Prime Minister, and leader of the Socialist PASOK Party, Androuss Papandreou won the October, 1993 elections. The seventy-four year old leader has raised fears in Albania that a hard stance will be taken on

154 Gjinushi, op.cit.
157 "1993 US State Department Human Rights Report", (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993): p.2. The report highlights the 'tension' between the Greeks and Albanians emphasising the alleged mistreatment of refugees by Greek authorities. Inferences can be drawn that the State Department keeps tabs on such reports in order to preclude the possibility that incidents will not get out of control., Also, The Economist (6 November, 1993); "The Americans now want the Greeks to be less fractious towards their Balkan neighbours....The [Greek] Socialists hope that the Clinton people- who are on good terms with Mr. Berisha- will help patch things up", at p.46. On Albanian sources that the US monitors Greek-Albanian relations, and that more must be done, see, "Cfare Pritet pas Zgjedheve ne Greq? [What Wait after the Greek Elections?]", Bashkim 2 October, 1993 p.1.
Balkan policy much to Albania's detriment. No sooner had Papandreou taken office when incidents of border shootings resulted in the filing of formal diplomatic protests in Tirana by Greece, and, more importantly, the recalling of the Greek ambassador to Athens for 'consultations'. Some Greeks also are wary of Albania's road to reform since they may feel that increased attention by the West and Albania's high potential for tourism, and mineral/oil production will detract much needed profit from Greece, the West's long time bastion of democracy in the area. Albania has also exacerbated relations. While new faces may inhabit the corridors of power, many still will not give up old attitudes, especially towards the Greeks. Others within the Berisha government, the President included, have displayed poor management skills regarding the crisis. With warfare on its doorstep, Albania needs to allay fears of increasing tensions. 'Immediate neighbours should take immediate presence'. This means that rather than charges and fiery speeches denouncing Greek actions, Albania should be taking positive steps to; ensure minority Greek rights, initiate a proper census to reflect the actual number of Greeks in Albania, speed up joint ventures projects and perhaps even mutual defence pacts to ensure each other's territorial integrity. Some steps in this direction were taken when Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias met with Albanian counterpart, Alfred Serreqi in early November, 1993. The two discussed ways to ensure rights for their respective minorities and ways to improve regional relations, perhaps through a Balkan summit. The West should encourage such action and take more initiative in promoting it. The likelihood that relations may break down [given deep seated mutual suspicions, historically rooted hatred and general regional instability], are high.

Indeed, efforts by both the Albanians and the Greeks appear as simple cosmetic gestures, subject to circumstances which undermine any attempts at easing polemics.


160 'Greece is still hampered by a weak economy. The country has the lowest productivity, highest inflation and largest external debt in the EC'. The Times 12 October, 1993 p.15., The downward spiral of the Greek economy costs the EC almost $6 billion a year from the cohesion fund. Inflation is running at over 12% and GDP growth barely reached 1%. For comprehensive accounting see; The Economist (16 October, 1993): p.19., and pp.47-48., Brian Beedham, "The Economist Survey of Greece", The Economist (22 May, 1993): particularly pp.4-13.

161 Interview Mr. D. Kostelancik, (US Embassy Tirana: 7 June, 1993), who stated; 'there is naturally a concern on Greece's part in the greater interest in Albania on the part of the US, Germany, Italy and Turkey...'

162 Interview Mr. S. Godo, Chair Republican Party, (Tirana: 10 June, 1993)

This view was reinforced by two major occurrences in 1994 which do not lessen regional tensions and further add to potential area-wide stability. First, in April, 1994, two Albanian soldiers were killed and three others were injured at an army barracks at the Albanian-Greek border village of Peshkepia. The Albanian government has stated that Greek terrorists were responsible. The group which claimed responsibility for the act called itself the National Liberation Front of Northern Epirus [MAVI]. The Berisha government was quick to denounce the act as a planned terrorist action with the possible assistance and/or knowledge of the Greek Intelligence Services. Greece has countered by vehemently denying such charges, claiming Albania is deliberately seeking to derail bilateral relations. The arrest, trial and seizure by Albanian authorities, of five ethnic Greeks and weapons contraband less than one month after the border killings, confirmed, to Greek authorities, that Albania is deliberately persecuting the Greek ethnic minority in the south without justification. Greece responded by threatening to close the common border with Albania and, more importantly, has announced its may organise civilian militias on the border of Albanian territory. Moreover, Greece has vetoed the disbursement of $30m. ECUs, much needed investment credits to Albania. Although Albania backed down on its claim that the five men tried were working with Greek government assistance, Tirana did accuse the men of spying for Athens and sentenced them all to sentences ranging from six to eight years. Athens answered these charges by expelling over 70,000 Albanians in Greece illegally since the trial started in mid-August, 1994. Also, Athens has claimed that Turkey is behind Albania’s policy as part of a 'Balkan conspiracy against it.' With tensions running high, President Clinton in a letter to President Berisha stated; 'It is in the interest of both countries, as well as all the world, to avoid the creation of another big conflict in the dangerous region of the Balkans.' He subsequently sent his chief National Security Advisor for Europe, Richard Schifter, to mediate between Greece and Albania, while Under-secretary of State Peter Tarnoff


166 The men arrested were charged with, among weapons smuggling and possession, anti-Constitutional acts. See, "Albania Seizes 11 in Southern Weapons Sweep", *Illyria* 28-30 April, 1994, and, on the militias; James Pettifer, "Albania, Greece and the Vorio Epirus Question", *The World Today* (August-September, 1994); "...Greeks living close to the Albanian border in northern Greece have been subjected to a widespread and pervasive revival of traditional patterns of Balkan banditry, carried out by armed gangs of ethnic Albanians, and a general breakdown of law and order and widespread thefts of property by ethnic Albanian itinerants. In these conditions, with many residents of northern Greece believing the government in Athens does not take their problems sufficiently seriously, there has been an increase in the possession of small arms and in the formation of informal vigilante groups to protect property, a reversion to the pattern of life in pre-industrial times. The government in Athens has recently announced its intention to form organised citizens' militias to try to improve public order in these border regions.", at pp.148-149., and, on the border closing possibility see, Helena Smith, *The Guardian* 31 May, 1994
was sent to Greece and Turkey to stress the importance Washington places on good relations between those two countries.167

Second, President Berisha has sought to increase his presidential authority by way of a referendum on Albania's new proposed Constitution, believing that this will allow him to push through deliberate efforts to block reform. Moreover, it would give him a free hand to deal with, as he sees it, the separatists and radical Greek elements in the south. Rather than present the draft Constitution to Parliament for debate, Bersiha relied on a public referendum. The result of which was an overwhelming rejection of the draft by both the Socialists and their followers who feel Berisha already has too much power, and by the ethnic Greek minority who believed that a yes vote would result in a curtailing of Greek educational and religious rights.168 These two events, and the ones that will likely occur, demonstrate that even US and Western mediation attempts fail to address the core issues, since these cannot be addressed by simple diplomatic efforts.

3.4.2 TURKEY- The historic ties between Turkey and Albania date back centuries. These close relations include what President Berisha labelled, 'blood relations', referring to the number of Albanians who over years have moved to and were assimilated into Turkey.169 With the outbreak of war in Bosnia, Turkey has repeatedly called for action to aid Bosnia's Muslims. Turkish President Turgut Ozal has made several trips to the nations of the Balkans in efforts to seek regional solutions to the problems. With the advent of democracy in Albania, Turkey moved forward and made efforts to assist Albania in the transition to a market economy. Between January, 1991 and December, 1992 humanitarian aid amounted to $21.9m, second only to Italian assistance.170 Links between the two nations have covered virtually every field as it appears that Turkey is seeking to cement, once more, a long term relationship with Albania. As for its interest in Albania;

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167 See Nikos Konstandaras, "Greece Wages Diplomatic Battle on Balkan Fronts", Associated Press 23 September, 1994
168 See, The Economist (7-12 November, 1994), and, Helena Smith, The Guardian 9 November, 1994. On Berisha's leadership style, 'In recent months the criticism has been echoed by Western observers, who say Mr. Berisha has increasingly resorted to repressive tactics in dealing with his opponents...There is no doubt that Berisha has a repressive streak, said one European Union diplomat. He has become ever more authoritarian'.
169 The blood relations extend to figures such as Mehmet Akif Ershoy, the Turkish poet and writer of the national anthem who was of Albanian origin or the mother of the founder of the modern Turkish state, Kemal Attaturk who was also Albanian. See, Louis Zanga, "Albania and Turkey Forge Closer Ties", RFE/RL (12 March, 1993)
170 IBID, p.31.
Although it is unlikely that Albania will become a satellite of Turkey, it is certainly not too farfetched to argue that it could become another bridgehead in Europe, something the Ottoman Turks once tried... this time, however, to be achieved through diplomacy and other peaceful means.\(^{171}\)

For Albania, its proximity to conflict in the Balkans coupled with its weak position has made it search for protectors. Turkey offers it the best chance to gain such protection given that Turkey is part of NATO and has one of the more modern militaries in the area. With that in mind, the first high-level military delegations visited one another in the Summer of 1992. Albanian Defence Minister, Safet Xhulali toured Turkish weapons facilities and more importantly, signed a military co-operation agreement with Ankara. The agreement, apparently with NATO's blessing, will include; exchanges of military delegations, bilateral co-operation in military weapons production, training and education of personnel, and joint military exercises.\(^{172}\) Joint commissions are to be established as well to explore the possibility of expanding military links in the future.

While touring the Balkans in March, 1993, President Ozal stopped in Tirana to meet with Berisha. He pledged to continue the level of friendship with Albania and sought to seal a fifteen year economic package with Albania, covering areas from tourism, to port renovation and further military assistance. Ozal also urged Berisha to recognise Macedonia believing that a normalisation of relations between the latter two would help stabilise the area and prevent the war from spreading.\(^{173}\) Recent moves by Turkey in the Balkans have been treated with suspicion by its long time enemy, Greece. Following the conclusion of the Gulf War, Turkey's contribution to the US-led effort became apparent. President Ozal has perhaps finally realised that Western Europe, specifically the EC, will not any time soon accept Turkey into its fold. Seeking to cash in on the positive position it holds presently with the US, Turkey has been taking steps to reassert itself in the area. Its Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme [BECS] looks to establish an EFTA-type organisation throughout the Balkans and along the former Soviet republics bordering the Black Sea. These predominantly Islamic republics are searching for foreign policy direction and assistance, something Turkey has sought to provide. The US apparently would rather see these republics copy Turkey as a pro-West, secular state rather than look towards the more fundamentalist nations just to the south, especially Iran.\(^{174}\) Ozal's activist approach to the conflict in the Balkans has made some Greeks fear a Turkish attempt to revive the

\(^{171}\) Zanga (March, 1993), op.cit.; p.30.
\(^{172}\) "Military Cooperation Pact Signed with Turkey", \textit{RFE/RL} (2 February, 1993): pp.5-6. The Turkish destroyer, \textit{Fevzi Calmak} docked in the port city of Durres, the first visit ever of a Turkish warship since the days of the Ottomans.
\(^{173}\) Austin (July, 1993), op.cit.; p.32.
heyday of the Ottomans, a foolish proposal at best. But it does, in any case,
demonstrate Turkey's willingness to not stand by idly since it relies upon area stability
for its own prosperity. After Ozal's sudden death on 17 April, 1993, there was
naturally concern over what position Turkey would now take. It appears, however,
that President Sulyeman Demirel and his Prime Minister, Tansu Cillar will continue to
take an activist foreign policy approach.175 This bodes well for Albania as it has come
to depend upon Turkey for assistance and a high degree of military security. For the
US, it will want to foster Turkey's links to the area. Turkish 'insight, influence and
access to the Balkans offers a constructive approach to area problems and also ensures
that Turkey will not add to the instability'.176 This does not ease Greek fears over what
they see as a split of the Bosnian war into religious camps. With over two million
Turks of direct Bosnian descent, and Turkish links with Albania, a nation with over a
seventy percent Muslim population, Greece feels Turkey is allying itself with the
region's Muslims. Turkey denies such a charge.177

Such charges have also been applied to Albania. Its close ties with Turkey have
made some within and outside of government accuse it of moving closer to Islamic
nations. These charges reached new heights when Albania joined the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference [OIC], on 2 December, 1992. This made Albania the only
other European nation aside from Turkey to be a member. Critics of Berisha's move
claimed that it would move Albania further from Europe and the West and result in
'internal religious polemics'.178 Berisha has stated that the entry to the OIC represents
a positive move and will not harm Albania since it is, like Turkey, a secular nation. As
to why they did join;

> It is generally assumed that the decision to join the OIC was prompted by political and
economic motives rather than religious ones. Yet it could be due in some measure to growing
disillusionment on Tirana's part with Western Europe's failure to deal effectively with the crisis
in Bosnia and Hercegovina and to the increasing concern that the West will remain inactive if
the conflict spreads to Kosovo and beyond. Albanians may feel that the Islamic states are a
potential source of support if the situation in the Balkans deteriorates further.179

Berisha had hoped that the OIC would contribute large amounts of assistance.
While it appeared early on that such aid would not be forthcoming, recent indicators
demonstrate 'significant financial contributions to bankrupt Albania', by the Arab

175 'The momentous upheavals in areas contiguous or close to Turkey have compelled Mr. Demirel,
for all his preoccupation of domestic policy, to pursue a more active foreign policy than he ever did
during his previous terms in office.' Kenneth Mackenzie, "Turkey's Circumspect Activism", *The
pursuing solutions for regional crisis, see, K. Ahmet Parla, "No More Dark Pages in History", *The
Turkish Review* vol. 7 #31 (Spring, 1993): pp.15-19.
world. As to the Bosnian crisis, fellow OIC member Turkey has been trying to not portray the conflict as a religious war and has urged Albania to do the same. Berisha agreed, yet did not quell critics when he met an Iranian delegation to Tirana led by Iranian Foreign Labour Minister, Dr. Ali Akbar Velajet. While the two discussed ways to strengthen ties, they also alluded to the Yugoslav crisis and Iran gave its support to Albania's problem regarding Kosova. Iran, another OIC member has been vehemently insisting on calling the Bosnian war a religious war, or *jihad*.

Albania, is a nation in which over seventy percent of the population profess the Muslim faith. President Berisha has stated that 'religion in Albania remains divided from the state', and as such, Albania and the West need not fear the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The frequent and often passionate statements by the government increased following reports from a Helsinki Human Rights Committee to Albania in September, 1993. The committee stated that Muslim missionaries were using their position to 'incite religious differences and [were] offering bribes to impoverished people to join their faith'. Claims were also made that the head of one state institution was using religious criteria to hire staff. Links with the Muslim world have increased, yet these are hardly the basis for accusations implicating Albania as a potential base for militant fundamentalism in the near future. Indeed, they more likely represent simple opportunism on the part of Bersiha. Renewed interest by several Middle East states in the Balkans, whether genuine or responsive to the crisis there, still offers Albania the opportunity to expand its links and perhaps gain much needed assistance. Balkan Muslims are scattered throughout the former Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. Increased activity in the region, especially by Turkey, has alarmed some, such as Greece and more radical Orthodox Serbs. Yet links between Albania and Turkey, and the latter's activist approach represent a stable, secular approach to regional solutions for regional problems and attempts to protect potential economic interests in the Balkans. As such they should be encouraged rather than condemned and treated with suspicion.

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180 Zanga (January, 1994), op. cit.; p.105. These contributions include a soon to open Arab-Albanian bank, a host of new mosques, and intentions for large foreign investment.
182 Pettifer (August-Sept, 1994), op. cit.
183 IBID
185 This point is reiterated by Elez Biberaj, "Albania's Road to Democracy", *Current History* (November, 1993): p.384.
3.4.3 **MACEDONIA** - For centuries Macedonia has been the 'bone of contention' in the Balkans. Three states, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria all claim some portion of territory referred to as historic Macedonia. Some Albanians also feel that the Western borders of present Macedonia should be part of a Greater Albania, as they once were during World War II. By late 1990, Macedonia followed the Croatian and Slovene examples and slowly moved away from the Yugoslav federal structure. More nationalist elements within Macedonia pushed the move and elections to a Macedonian Parliament were held by November, 1990. The resulting coalition government named Kiro Gligorov, a former economist, President. Less than a year later, a public referendum indicated that seventy-five percent of the registered electorate voted for independence. With the tense situation in the Balkans, and the multi-ethnic configuration of Macedonia, neighbours immediately voiced concern, and suspicion over a sovereign Macedonia. With a population slightly over two million, Serbs comprise approximately forty-four thousand, though they claim figures as high as 300,000. Serbia has always regarded Macedonia as 'Southern Serbia'. These claims did not bode well for Macedonia when Milosevic and Mitsotakis met after the referendum to discuss Macedonia's future. Greece has yet to recognise the republic which includes any name reference to Macedonia. They strongly believe that Macedonians have always been Greek or "Slavophone Greeks", as they are called. Their stubborn refusal to compromise on the name issue has even involved human rights violations and a strong propaganda campaign all over Greece.

The Macedonian government, however, has placed greater concern on the Albanians within its borders. Exact figures vary from a low of 200,000 and twenty percent of the population, to a high of 700,000 to 900,000 and forty-five percent of the population. Since they boycotted the 1991 census, determining their exact number will take time. What is sure, however, is that ethnic Albanians make up the largest minority in Macedonia. They have organised themselves into political parties

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187 Aegean Macedonia makes up 51% between Greece and present Macedonia; South-western Bulgaria forms 10% of Pirin Macedonia and 39% is present day Vardar Macedonia. See John Zametica, *op.cit.*: p.34.


190 'More worryingly, Greeks who disagree publicly with their government on the subject can find themselves in court. Next month [September, 1993], four members of an anti-nationalist group will appeal against a 19- month sentence for disseminating false information and attempting to incite violence. Their offence was to distribute a leaflet with the title, Our neighbours are not our enemies. *No to nationalism and to war. "Do Not Disagree*, *The Economist* (14 August, 1993): p. 46.


192 Elez Biberaj (February, 1993), *op.cit.* p.16.

193 The PDP has called for an internationally monitored census. One is scheduled for April, 1994 and will be funded by the international community at a cost of $1.5m. Poulton, *RFE/RL* (4 June,1993): p.25.
and are voicing their demands over equal nation status. This has raised concerns within
the Gligorov government. He has attempted to quell nationalist tendencies by placing
five ethnic Albanians in ministerial posts. The Albanian Party for Democratic
Prosperity [PDP], and its leader, Nevzat Halili have stated that Albanians be regarded
as an equal nation within Macedonia. This has raised anti-Albanian positions from
VMRO-DPMNE, the nationalist Macedonian party and largest opposition party.
Albanians in Macedonia believe that they are being denied rights such as recognition of
the Albanian language, language education, free use of national symbols, and more
local decision making in areas where Albanians make up over ninety percent of the
population. These claims have solidified Albanian groups in Macedonia, Albania,
and Kosova have increased suspicions of Greater Albanian designs. Kosova's
Democratic Alliance, [DSK] the PDP and the DP do co-ordinate their activities, but
have made it expressly clear that Macedonia remain intact. This position was a
more toned down stance than one earlier expressed by Berisha and DSK leader,
Ibrahim Rugova.

Sali Berisha, president of Albania, has asked that Albanians in Macedonia be afforded better
possibilities for schooling in their native language and an expansion of Albanian-language radio
broadcasts. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosovo, has demanded that Macedonia either
allow its Albanians to seek annexation by Kosovo or grant them wide internal autonomy.

Berisha has since toned down his rhetoric and called for the Albanian groups
within Macedonia to work with the Gligorov government. Tensions remain however,

194 'Albanians believe their status as defined by the Macedonian Constitution is unclear. The
Preamble reads in part, Macedonia is constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people.
Albanians argue that on the basis of that clause they are second-class citizens and that they should be
accorded equal status.' See Hugh Poulton, "The Republic of Macedonia After United Nations
195 VMRO-DPMNE [Vнатрешна Македонска Revolucionerna Organizacija-Demokratska Partija za
Makedonska Nacionalno Edinstvo] 'is a reincarnation of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation, which sought to liberate Ottoman Macedonia at the turn of the century. Its leader,
Ljupco Georgievski, was for some months the republic's vice-president. [no political experience,
Georgievski was a former theatre director] While Georgievski has moderated his public statements of
late, he still seems to support the goals articulated by the VMRO-DPNINE founding congress in 1990,
which called for the forging of a spiritual, economic and ethnic union of the divided Macedonian
[read Slavic] people and the creation of a Macedonian state in a future united Balkans and a united
Europe.' When Macedonia was accepted into the UN under the name, The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia [FYROM], VMRO believed this constituted a sell out and mobilised a vote of non-
confidence against President Gligorov, which failed on 13 April, 1993. The moderates backed the
Gligorov government by a comfortable margin. IBID, p.22. VMRO has currently 35 deputies to the
120 seat Macedonian Parliament. VRMO has sought to revamp its image yet still was not able to
pose a serious threat to Gligorov in the October, 1994 elections. See, Duncan Perry, "Macedonia:
From Independence to Recognition", RFEIRL (7 January, 1994), and, Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan
Problem and a European Dilemma", RFEIRL (19 June, 1992), and, Kerin Hope, The Financial Times
14 October, 1994
particularly when incidents of border shootings of Albanians have continued in the past year. Albanians, with the poor economic conditions often illegally cross the border into Macedonia, gathering as many goods as they can and return with them to sell in street bazars in Tirana.\textsuperscript{199} Albanian officials have called on Macedonia to detain rather than shoot Albanians that enter illegally and believe that such action will only exacerbate the area's precarious condition.\textsuperscript{200} President Berisha does, however, believe that given the conflict in the area, Macedonia is a more likely target for Serbian aggression and possible invasion.\textsuperscript{201} With increasing Serbian pressure against Albanians in Kosova, many have fled to Macedonia, heightening stress within the republic. PDP leader, Halili has continued to call for 'constituent nation' status for Albanians and he was supported by Albania three days later when it blocked Macedonian entry to the CSCE until such status was given. 'All Macedonians consider this the first step on the road to secession\textsuperscript{202} The Albanian government denies that it is seeking any secession on the part of Macedonia's Albanians. In an editorial reply, Berisha's chief adviser, Mr. Genc Pollo stated;

As for the Albanian negative vote to admission of Macedonia into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it is only conditioned by the failing of the Macedonian government to give the Albanian community living there the rights it was committed to give, such as proportional representation in the state apparatus, more schools, an Albanian university and more access in the national media. Furthermore, the Albanians in Macedonia are crucially supporting the internal stability of that young state.\textsuperscript{203}

Current Western attention towards Macedonia has resulted in 1000 UN troops, [three hundred of which are Americans], deployed there to ensure that the war in the former Yugoslavia does not spread south. For the US, the troop deployment is viewed by many critics of Western inaction as a way to demonstrate some level of positive engagement by the Clinton Administration. Washington sources believe that US troops in Macedonia would serve to not only deter cross border aggression, but also to assist in enforcing the UN embargo placed against Serbia.\textsuperscript{204} The question then becomes one of effectiveness. While the West continues to fail in its efforts to find a solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, UN troop monitors may simply not

\textsuperscript{199} Witnessed firsthand by author while on one month stay in Tirana. Acquaintance indicated that he, along with several friends, would cross into Macedonia and head for Skopje, the capital. They would purchase whatever they could with money received by state assistance and/or money from relatives abroad, if available. They would smuggle material back into Albania, sometimes bribing a border guard and sell the merchandise in one of Tirana's many bazars. (3 June - 25 June, 1993)

\textsuperscript{200} Ilyria 6 March, 1993 p.2.

\textsuperscript{201} Flora Lewis, "In Tirana, Tension Grows", \textit{International Herald Tribune} 17 March, 1993

\textsuperscript{202} Misha Glenny, "Is Macedonia Next?", \textit{The New York Times} 30 July, 1993

\textsuperscript{203} Genc Pollo, "Albania Takes Refugees, Not Terrorists", \textit{The New York Times} 5 August, 1993

offer any real comfort, particularly when their efforts appear 'impotent' at best. This is because the problem with Macedonia lies from within. Its weak economy, and proximity to the neighbouring conflict do not show promise for stability. Links with its neighbours are also subject to question. Greece refuses to budge on the name, 'Macedonia', despite fellow EC members Germany, Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands recent initiation of the recognition process.

Within Belgrade, Serb radicals have called for aid to their fellow Serbs in Macedonia. Albania, although it has sent representatives to Skopje to discuss better links, has not improved the possibility for stability in the region with its recent posture. Incidents of border shootings have increased as have allegations of black market dealings involving drug and arms smuggling by Albanians to their compatriots in Macedonia. The latter's authorities also have seized weapons and files in late 1993, allegedly part of a plot by Albanians to initiate large-scale civil unrest with aid from Albania. President Bersiha denied such contentions, accusing Macedonian authorities with needlessly harming relations. What is needed, perhaps, are assurances of human rights guarantees for the various ethnic groups. Albanians, for their part, have repeatedly demanded 'better access to education in their native tongue, a louder voice in government, and a stronger commitment from Macedonia on promoting the Albanian language media.' Perhaps, the best way would be to ensure rights predicated upon immediate resident citizenship rather than ethnicity. This would remove the offending clause from the constitution and secure a feeling of equality status for all involved. More importantly, Albania needs to strengthen trade links with Macedonia. With no outlet to the sea, Macedonia will be hard pressed to gain favour with Greece over use of Saloniki. It could, however, make use of the port of Durrës. The talks of a super highway link from Durrës to Skopje Sofia to Istanbul should be given high level priority since such a link would increase trade and prosperity throughout the region, making the likelihood for internal dissension remote. The first step though must be in greatly improving relations between Macedonia and Albania.


206 Perry (June, 1992), op.cit.

207 France and Italy are expected to follow. Greece has sent official letters of protest to each state. Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition*, *RFE/RL* vol. 3 #1 (7 January, 1994): p.118.


209 Austin (October, 1993), op.cit.: p.22.
In tracing the rise of Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, one is led to the Kosova issue. Following the ouster of his mentor Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic used Kosova to initiate an anti-Albanian campaign, beginning in 1987. Fanning the flames of discontent, he took a hard-line position against Kosova's Albanians. Following a wildcat strike at the Trepca mines which brought the province to a standstill, Milosevic rallied over 500,000 Serbs in Belgrade's main square. He promised that those responsible would be punished and that Serbia would never give up Kosova. He succeeded by late 1989 to increase police precincts in Kosova by 63%, police units by 58% and, more importantly, to gain the majority he needed in the Kosova Assembly to retract Kosova's status as an autonomous province. Moving swiftly, Milosevic used the Serb led Assembly to legislate Serbia's control over Kosova's police, civil defence, courts, and selection of officials. The outbreak of conflict and dissolution of Yugoslavia has brought renewed attention to Kosova as many both within and outside the region feel that should the conflict spread, it will likely do so in Kosova.

The exact numbers of Albanians in Kosova are not known since they, like their brethren in Macedonia, boycotted the 1991 census. They are, however, believed to number nearly two million representing ninety percent of Kosova's population. In removing any legal base Albanians may have had for autonomy, Serbia completely abolished the Kosova legislature by mid-1990. With little choice, the Albanians went underground. By 30 September, 1991, they met in the town of Kacanik to approve a constitution which declared a 'sovereign and independent state of Kosova'. The only nation to recognise the 'Republic of Kosova' was Albania on October, 1991. Viewed upon as illegal and reaffirming to Serb eyes, their convictions that this meant secession and union with Albania, Milosevic used the opportunity to gain even more support by punishing the Kosova Albanians with impunity. After the Kacanik Constitution, more than one hundred thousand Albanians were removed from their jobs. Albanian symbols were removed and street signs were changed to the Cyrillic alphabet. A Serbian curriculum was imposed and thousands of Albanian teachers were removed from their posts. This did not dissuade the underground movement. Albanian political parties were set up and quickly gained followers despite Serb reprisals. The largest of these parties is the Democratic Alliance of Kosova [DSK] led by Ibrahim Rugova, a writer. In underground elections, Rugova was made Republic

211 The only guide observers have to go on is data from the 1981 census of Yugoslavia, now long out of date. Kosovar Albanians have the highest birth rate in Europe, making estimation difficult. For a good accounting, however, see, Patrick Moore, "The 'Albanian Question' in the Former Yugoslavia", RFF/RL (3 April, 1992): pp.7-15.
212 Moore (April, 1992), op cit.; p.10.
213 IBID, p.11.
President and Bujar Bukoshi was chosen Prime Minister. Serbia has refused to recognise any legitimacy on the part of Kosova's Albanians. Their continued crackdown of rights in the territory has led to over three hundred thousand Kosova Albanians fleeing Kosova for either Macedonia or Albania. The United States, a signatory of the Helsinki Accords, does not recognise an independent Kosova Republic. It instead believes that Kosova should be reinstated as an autonomous province and that human rights violations should cease. This, simply, will not provide Kosova with the security guarantees that it requires. Crackdowns by Serbian authorities have led Western observers to believe that a campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' is not far off. By adhering to the Helsinki Accords the US and the international community find themselves paralysed. Serbia has gone even further and forced all CSCE monitors in Kosova to leave in July, 1993 pending the former's reinstatement to the CSCE. This has virtually guaranteed no international presence of any credibility in Kosova. The UN has offered to broker talks aimed at settling reported human rights violations. These broke down by September, 1993 when Serbia felt that discussing the situation in Geneva rather than Belgrade would internationalise the condition removing it from Serbia's hands. The international community has not challenged the Serbian view despite Albanian's claims that the removal of autonomy, by its very nature, was a constitutional violation thereby justifying a legal break. Regardless of which interpretation is valid the bottom line is that aggression in Kosova will likely continue. This, despite the Clinton Administration's reaffirmation of George Bush's pledge to not tolerate ethnic cleansing in Kosova, will not change matters. Even if the US decided to halt any such cleansing through the use of military force, Kosova would still remain within Serbia. This would not appeal to the more radical Kosova Albanian elements that see conflict as the only answer. As the situation continues to degenerate, their appeals to the West continue to remain unanswered. The likelihood for radicalisation increases as more and more Kosovars join their numbers.
As to Albania itself, it has changed its position on Kosova from a demanding one to a more toned down approach. When questioned on the Kosova issue, Berisha had stated in early, 1991:

The Democratic Party of Albania cannot accept the division of the Albanian nation as eternal; therefore, it will struggle by peaceful means and within the context of the processes of integration in Europe to realize their rights for progress and national unity.\(^{221}\)

Following his entry to the Presidency, Berisha held firm to his position indicating that Albania would `resist by any means', a spread of ethnic cleansing to Kosova.\(^{222}\) Since, he has understood that pushing for republic status for Kosova will not ease tension in the Balkans, nor will it likely be appreciated by either Europe or the US. With this in mind, Albania has subtly dropped public references to the `Republic of Kosova', instead calling for a halt of `Serbian aggression' there.\(^{223}\) Rights violations by Serbs in Kosova have included; raids on Albanian stores and factories, seizing goods for Serbs fighting in Bosnia, detainment and arrest of Albanian intellectuals, and even some reports of parents arrested and held hostage so that their children will engage in military manoeuvres and operations.\(^{224}\) Serbs have denied most of these charges and countered with their own against `Albanian extremists' bent upon violence and seeking the secession of Kosova.

Serbian police have jailed prominent Albanian journalists and political activists and broken up weapons-smuggling rings organised by local Albanians, while Serbian authorities have refused to recognise Rugova's legitimacy as spokesman for the Albanian population of Kosovo. Meanwhile Tanjug, the Serbian news agency, has reported that Kosovo's Albanians have succeeded in smuggling some arms and have set-up guerilla forces to oppose the Serbs. These Albanian guerillas were said to have obtained basic training across the border in Albania.\(^{225}\)

Rugova denied these Serb allegations\(^{226}\) as did Albanian Defence Minister Safet Xhulali.\(^{227}\) The increasingly hostile state in Kosova naturally has worried Albania and its neighbours, as the West grapples with how to prevent a possible conflict there. US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher has expressed such concerns. However, these concerns do not outline any other policy aside from `negotiation' through what Christopher calls a `global solution', without clarifying what exactly this entails.\(^{228}\)

\(^{221}\) quoted in Biberaj (1991), op.cit.; p.6.
\(^{222}\) "Albanian Urges West to Shield Kosovo", International Herald Tribune June 1, 1993
\(^{225}\) RaMet (Fall, 1992), op.cit.; p.89.
\(^{226}\) Rugova has also denied Serb allegations that Kosovars had built tunnels across the border and were using these to smuggle the arms and military supplies in from Albania. Illyria 14 November, 1992 p.1.
\(^{227}\) IBID
\(^{228}\) In his speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Christopher "respond[ed] to our strategic interest in preventing the conflict from spreading....' He also stated that; 'Negotiations offer the only
The situation has resulted in a degeneration of the entire Kosova issue into right-wing nationalist fervour by elements that favour a military approach. Serbian opposition leader of the Serbian Renewal Party, Vuk Draskovic confirmed such developments. In a statement issued on 24 May, 1993, Draskovic claimed that Serbian nationalist 'madmen' have started to implement plans to 'set Kosovo ablaze'. He went on to claim that these men were under orders from Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman would use the situation to stir unrest in Kosova as a diversion for the Croat army to move against Serbian Krajhina, which Croatia lost in the 1991 conflict with Serbia. Specifically, he was referring to individuals such as Voislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic, and Sinisa Vucinic. These men have advocated an even harder stance than Milosevic regarding Kosovar Albanians and manage to enforce their beliefs with several paramilitary groups under their command. Milosevic has been able to isolate more radical factions, particularly after the December 19, 1993 elections in Serbia. His ruling Socialist Party was able obtain a majority in Parliament. However, a victory over Seselj and Draskovic does not necessarily mean an abandonment of the Greater Serb ideal by Milosevic or his party. Presently, though he is avoiding public advocacy of such a posture while he continues to seek the removal of UN sanctions which have crippled the Serbian economy.

As for the Albanian extremists, Rugova has been able to suppress their demands, but outsiders question how long this can be kept up. Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi has advocated a stronger response from the West. Recent troop and police build-ups by Serbia in Prishtina, Kosova's capital, are seen as evidence of a new campaign to be launched against Kosova. The imposition of martial law in all but name has made Bukoshi appeal for assistance.

This situation cannot go on. We have preached and lived by peaceful opposition to Serbian brutality. Yet, unless we are allowed to pursue our basic rights, our people will have no way to a practical solution. The negotiators have also explored the option of a global solution that would embrace Croatia, Kosova, and other areas of conflict in the region. Christopher (January, 1994), op.cit: pp. 166-167.

229 "Serbian propagandists in western Europe are again talking about Albanian-populated Kosovo, inside Serbia, as 'a sacred Serbian land systematically occupied, usurped, ravaged, its population massacred, forced into Islamic conversion or expelled, its churches profaned...by a foreign people ferociously hostile to Serbs [supported by foreign journalists and politicians who are] professional instigators of the murder of the Serbian nation. The implication is that something will be done about this". William Pfaff, "What Ought to be Done About Bosnia Won't be Done", International Herald Tribune 2 December, 1993


231 "Roots of War", The Economist (December 25th, 1993- January 7th, 1994): pp.45-46., and, For the belief that Milosevic is using the Serbian economy as leverage against the Bosnian Serbs see, RFERL Newsbriefs (24 August, 1994), and, For belief that this is all a well orchestrated plot by Milosevic who continues to violate the arms embargo and has not reneged on a Greater Serb idea see, Chuck Sudetic, The New York Times 4 December, 1994, and, Martin Preva, The International Herald Tribune 10-11 December, 1994.

232 Illyria 3 April, 1993 p.2.
recourse but to take matters into their own hands. That would present Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, with an excuse for a military crack-down. The disastrous result would make the tragedy in Bosnia pale in comparison.233

The situation has also led to a flood of rumours and increasing polemics between Belgrade and Tirana. Albania has called for international observers to be sent to Kosova and for the entire area to be demilitarised under a UN protectorate status.234 A Croatian daily also fuelled unrest by publishing an interview with an Albanian military officer who indicated that the Kosovar and Tirana leadership have held consultations about possible 'joint action' should the conflict spread to Kosova.235 The Berisha government has denied such claims and instead looks to the West to halt the spread of conflict.236 Berisha has even called on NATO troops to be deployed to Kosova so as to contain the conflagration.237 Albania has repeatedly indicated its anxiety over Kosova, particularly since it knows full well that it is not equipped, militarily, to fight a war with Serbia. Also such a conflict would result in perhaps as many as one million refugees flooding across the border, something Tirana is in no condition to handle.238 The turn around policy on Kosova has led to some criticism of Berisha by both right wing nationalists who feel that Albania has betrayed Kosovars and opposition leaders who believe Berisha is caving in to Western pressure over Kosova.239 Regardless, the Kosova issue remains high on Albania's agenda. The historical importance placed upon it by Serbs and Albanians makes it unlikely that either side is willing to compromise on it any time in the near future. The more recent importance of Kosova has made the West wary as well that any incident could ignite more warfare. To Albania, this would spell disaster as warfare may undermine the

233 Bujar Bukoshi, "Act Now to Save Kosovo", International Herald Tribune 19 May, 1993
236 President Berisha has reiterated the request made by Kosova Prime Minster [of the illegal government], Bujar Bukoshi. The plea from Bukoshi was made at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June, 1993. Specifically, the latter called on the UN to place Kosova under an international trusteeship. He feels that such a move would provide a 'temporary solution, allowing life to return to normal and creating a suitable atmosphere for negotiations'. Berisha, in a similar statement to the conference replied; 'We consider urgent and extremely important the placing of Kosova under UN control, its declaration as a neutral zone'. Illyria vol. 3 #204 17-19 June, 1993 p.1.
237 Berisha made such remarks in response to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner's call for NATO troops in Kosova. The demand was part of a plan to halt the violence in the Balkans formulated by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Illyria vol. 3 #248 18-20 November, 1993 p.1.
239 The nationalist elements were expressed through leader of the Albanian National Unity Party, Mr. Idajet Beqiri. His recent slanderous remarks against the government for its repeated failure and 'fascist ways' have resulted in a six month prison term. Robert Austin, RFE/RL Newsbriefs (13 July, 1993): p.12. The 'pressure' view was expressed by Bashkim Zeneli, Foreign Policy Chair, Socialist Party. Interview (Tirana: 5 June, 1993)
stability of the government itself and could perhaps lead in a reversion to a more authoritarian regime. Isolating itself from the situation is not possible since the 'fate of Albania is linked with the former Yugoslavia'.

4.0 Within a Balkan Context

Regional relations between Albania and her neighbours take on added significance with warfare in Bosnia still proceeding. Should the conflagration subside the potential for instability in the region remains high as the seeds for future conflict have already been sown during the period 1991-1994. The external situation has been, by far, the 'biggest hindrance to a successful political transition in Albania', since the Yugoslav disintegration has, 'coincided with the most difficult period in Albanian history'. This perhaps explains why President Berisha has sought to foster ties with a host of states, both East and West. Witnessing the ineffective policy of the West towards Bosnia certainly would give Berisha cause for concern should the war engulf Albania as well. Despite former President Bush's and President Clinton's warning that the US is prepared to 'employ military force against the Serbs', should war erupt in Kosova, Albanians believe that empty promises from the West, already given to Bosnians, can easily be repeated in Kosova. This may explain why Albania, while seeking a strong relationship and commitment from the US, has also turned its focus to the Islamic world for both 're-equipment and financial assistance'.

Berisha has stressed the high probability of war in the Balkans. One way out, he feels, is a strong Western commitment such as a bombing of Serbian military targets thereby decreasing Serb warfare capabilities. Until the West takes such concerted action Berisha believes that reform cannot proceed at a rapid pace. He has stated that:

The shadow of the war next door, is the biggest problem on the way to reform because this shadow compounds the internal problems and prevents investment. The war also prevents the free movement of goods throughout the region.

240 Interview Mr. Jonathan Benton, Albania Desk, State Department (Washington DC: 10 August, 1993)
241 Gjinushi, pp. cit.
243 Austin (Spring, 1993), op. cit.; p.277.
244 New York Times 28 December, 1992
246 "Athens Names its Price", The Independent 28 November, 1992
247 Interview, President Sali Berisha (Tirana: 9 June, 1993); The view was supported by Mr. Kostelancik of the US Embassy, Tirana who stated that the crisis; 'certainly dissuades investors, perhaps not as much as the Albanians imagine, but it does undermine investor confidence in Albania and provides at best, a nebulous, undefined investing climate'. Kostelancik, op. cit.
Berisha may, however, be attempting to prepare for the inevitable. While publicly advocating that Albania is not exacerbating the situation in any way, unconfirmed reports indicated that Albania was conducting military manoeuvres near the Kosova border and visual accounts attest to tanks being moved out of Tirana.248

The impact on the area is significant.249 Warfare and weak economic systems have already led to refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands. And, with Greece, a NATO and EC member concerned about Albania and vice-versa250, the level of potential, and actual instability is superseded only by the level of anxiety and the West's failed policy to date. This is why the West, especially the US, has been urged by some observers to pursue a more activist approach in the region.

It would behoove Washington to recall that Albania borders on Serbia, a country at war, and that the possibility of a failed Albanian regime going to war against Serbia is not at all far-fetched. No doubt it is rewarding to bet on the winners in East-Central Europe. But Washington should also calculate the consequences of creating losers.251

Berisha concurs with this stance. He has stated that given the geostrategic position of his nation, Albania could provide the US with a 'key of stability and peace in the region'. As such, Albania should 'represent a vital interest'.252 Democratic Party Chairman, Eduard Selami was much more adamant in his posture. He questioned that, should the US seek to solve the area's problems, why not then invest heavily in Albania? This would stabilise the nation and provide a 'steadiness factor' in the Balkans.253

The United States, however, does not appear either ready or willing to commit itself entirely to Albania and the Balkans. Given Albania's past record and potential future, it is not surprising that it has 'a low position on the West's agenda'.254 Reasons for this level of interest highlight both the inadequacy and contradiction of US policy. The inability to define specific goals and co-ordinate them with ever decreasing or scaled back resources is indicative of no set policy in the post Cold War era. President Clinton's 'new internationalist' approach to foreign policy does very little except relegate nations such as Albania to the backburner of US interests. This

249 A more doomsayer approach has been repeatedly advocated by BBC journalist Misha Glenny, who believes that if the war does not stop by October, 1993, 'the danger of the southeast European security situation deteriorating into a morass like the one that preceded World War I will become acute.' See "Carnage in Bosnia, For Starters", New York Times 29 July, 1993.
251 Austin (Spring, 1993), op.cit.; p.277.
252 President Berisha, op.cit.
253 Mr. Selami, op.cit.
254 Austin (Spring, 1993), op.cit.; p.277.
'multilateralism' [the co-ordination of activity with allies], has left the US with 'no capacity for movement and initiative'.

4.1 The U.S. Interest?

In early 1991, the US had re-established relations with Albania. Following Secretary of State James Baker's June, 1991 visit to Tirana, Albanians believed, falsely, that the US would now serve as their chief benefactor on the road to full democratisation and a market economy. A year after the Baker visit, President Berisha went to Washington and met with President Bush. The US promised over $60m in aid over and above the $35m already delegated to Albania. The aid was divided into agricultural assistance [$23m], food aid [$17m], technical assistance [$2m], and management training [$850,000]. A subsequent visit by then Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger concluded a trade agreement between the US and Albania and conferred Most Favoured Nation status for Albania on 16 June, 1992.

The United States has more importantly sought to alleviate Albania's fears over the war next door. Its admission to the NACC has been followed by talks between Albanian Defence Minister Xhulali and a US military delegation led by Brigadier General Lenon. The two discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia and agreed in a 'Memorandum of Understanding', that they would meet to identify and discuss problems and ways to encounter them. The agreement also tied the Albanian Defence Ministry with the US Command Headquarters, Europe. The pro-US posture by the Berisha government has led to reports of a 'US bridgehead' in the Balkans. These reports, however, are at best, 'exaggerated'. The present situation presents the US with an opportunity which it is using to ensure that Albania does not exacerbate the crisis. It is doing very little more, however, as amorphous goals, such as 'democracy promotion' will not work when specific guide-lines are not laid out.

Albanians view US relations with mixed results. Some, such as Neritan Ceka believe that Albania will never be more than a 'peripheral interest' for the US and the latter has no set plans for Albania since it has no specific policy. Others feel that US-Albanian relations are proceeding forward with positive results. More importantly, some such as Berisha's chief adviser, Genc Pollo, feel that 'given the present and future problems in Europe, the assertion of US leadership and presence is vital for a

255 "Bosnia Farce", The Washington Post 10 August 1993
258 IBID. The Eagleburger visit concluded on 30 May, 1992.
261 Mr. Ceka, op.cit.
politically and economically prosperous Europe.\textsuperscript{262} The US, however, has not indicated any commitment for long term policy and aid to Albania. Partly perhaps due to indifference or ignorance, but perhaps more so due to the rudderless direction of US foreign policy in the post Cold War era. The inability to define a set policy towards the former Yugoslavia only typifies the Bush and present Clinton administration's shortcomings. Hanging on to Cold War mentality without the Cold War threat means contradictory policy. How else can the State Department consider the Balkans within the national interest yet abandon the individual nations that make up the Balkans? A fostering, strengthening, and continuation of links with nations such as Albania offers the US an opportunity it should not pass up. Robert Austin best expresses this;

Given the overwhelming instability that now envelopes the Balkan region, Albania presents the West, and particularly the United States, with an excellent opportunity to foster stability in the one of the region's key countries. If the right forces are encouraged during Albania's transition to democracy, the country's stability will lessen considerably the potential for a worsening of the Serbian crisis.\textsuperscript{263}

4.2 Assessment

The coming of democracy to Albania has not resulted in immediate benefits believed by many. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia has heightened Albanian fears and concerns within the present leadership that a spread of conflict may undermine the stability of the whole nation. The search for allies and benefactors has certainly opened Albania up to the outside world. However, its foreign policy links seem to be 'without a clear objective' and based solely upon a 'base for economic profit'.\textsuperscript{264} The need for specific strategy was reiterated by Republican Party Chair, Sabri Godo who stated, 'Albanians need a plan, something which will guide them in the long term'.\textsuperscript{265} In its links with the United States, Albania has looked to the US as its 'salvation'. The latter has been struggling to modify its Cold War Balkan strategy to meet present and future circumstances. The two, however, do share one fundamental characteristic; both are desperately trying to fashion a foreign policy that defines specific goals, an operating framework to accomplish these, and a priority list which accounts for resources available. For the US, the conflicting trends of post Cold War foreign policy thought continue to plague the present Clinton administration as it seeks to redefine America's place and mission in the world. The contending theories of direction bear further examination as to their objectives, methods, pros and cons, and application to nations such as Albania and to crisis situations, such as in Bosnia, to determine their impact on the US, Albania, and the Balkans generally.

\textsuperscript{262} Mr. Pollo (June, 1993), \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{263} Austin (Spring, 1993), \textit{op.cit.} p.259.
\textsuperscript{264} Mr. Ccka, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{265} Mr. Godo, \textit{op.cit.}
Chapter Four
THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE

1.0 A TEST CASE FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of communism have done very little to promote world-wide peace, let alone any semblance of stability in key areas across the globe. 'Winning the Cold War' accomplished even less for the United States as it appears that the position it once held, that of superpower, may be in jeopardy. As regional crises arise the US struggles with efforts to determine; not only whether or not to reply, but, specifically in what manner, and, alone or in conjunction with others. More importantly, even determining vital US interests in the post Cold War era appear to have assumed a vagueness not present during the days of bi-polarity. From the struggle of democratisation in Russia, to the debacles in Somalia and Bosnia, to strained relations with China and North Korea, the problem with policy formulation has, and remains evident for the US. Solving and/or diffusing these crises in and of itself is not the answer. The damage they have incurred to American leadership represents a much more fundamental problem, the inability of the US foreign policy establishment to fashion a policy for the US in the decades to come. In the short term this failure has served to undermine US leadership and credibility in capitals around the world. US Senate minority leader Bob Dole [R-Kan], best expresses this frustration;

Unfortunately, our image and position abroad is on the same downward spiral as during the Carter years, when the United States was feared by none, respected by few and ignored by many. The bottom line is that America, under the Clinton administration, is abdicating American leadership at the United Nations, at NATO and around the globe.¹

The bipartisan jab notwithstanding, the statement does make a case for the situation at hand. To fix blame upon one administration over another, however, is not the answer. It is unlikely that a second term George Bush would fare better.² This does not suggest that President Clinton or his foreign policy team should be absolved from fault. After all, since the days of World War II, US presidents have been

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¹ Bob Dole quoted in the International Herald Tribune 12-13 February, 1994 p.3.
² Even long time respected US senator Daniel P. Moynihan [D-NY] adheres to this position by stating; '...the inadequacy is not to be ascribed to one President or one administration. There has been and continues to be an inadequate understanding of what has made the world turn upside down...There was enough of a knowledge base, both theoretical and practical, to make possible a sufficiently accurate anticipation as to what the present era would look like. Let us hold firm to that. The world does not defy understanding; and what can be understood can sometimes be modified'. See, D.P. Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford: University Press, 1993): pp.167-168.
It could be argued that President Clinton and his staff now have the options of either adopting a proactive approach or reactive policy formulation. In this context, Albania demonstrates, not only a chance at a US foreign policy success, but also shows how past and current US policy in area vis-a-vis Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia has failed miserably. It is this failure which in turn may lead to unrest and destabilisation throughout the Balkans, with larger repercussions. This latter statement does not imply that the Balkans will again become the starting point for a world-wide conflict. It is a parochial view at best and foolish notion at worst to suggest that patterns of conflict in that region that are manifesting themselves in similar means will automatically produce world war.

Instead, what will be suggested is that failure by the US to formulate, adopt, implement and nurture a comprehensive foreign policy towards states such as Albania will, eventually, result in negative effects for US vital and secondary interests. Moreover, the failure to handle crisis situations such as Bosnia will undermine US foreign policy direction.

1.1 Bosnia and the Western Failure

The dissolution of Yugoslavia by 1990 did not catch the West off guard. Yet, the pitiful reply made it appear so. In the United States, President Bush sent Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade in June of 1991 in a vain attempt to keep Yugoslavia together. Baker, armed only with rhetoric, reiterated Bush's pleas that Slovenia and Croatia would not be recognised and, moreover, that the US would continue to recognise the federal state. In a similar statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry echoed US sentiment that it would also continue recognising a federal

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4 Serbia's aggression against Bosnia, in particular the genocidal practice of ethnic cleansing, was an early and crucial test of the New World Order proclaimed by George Bush and others at the end of the Cold War. On almost all counts, the cooperative security structures established in Europe... proved inadequate. Neither the...(CSCE) nor the various associations of Western democracies- the EC, NATO, the WEU- or any of their constituent governments, had the will to punish Serbia for violating the rights minorities on its territory or for its blatant aggression against Bosnia....Little action was taken by the Western powers in the late 1980s to curb Serbian bullying of Albanians,... or to reprimand the Croatian government for its failure to grant full rights to its Serbian minority... in the summer of 1991.' See Jane M.O. Sharp, "Intervention in Bosnia-the case for", The World Today vol. 49 #2 (February, 1993): p.30

5 IBID, and for the belief that the West feared recognition would set a bad precedent see, Glenny (1992), op.cit.; "The West looked at Yugoslavia through the filter of the Soviet Union- as Yugoslavia was careering towards an explosive war, caused to a large degree by Serbia's commitment to a unitarist structure, the West supported this political anachronism for its fear that an outbreak of secession among the constituent republics might have provoked a similar process in the Soviet Union.", at p.178. and, Almond, op.cit.; "...the US government supported the 'territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within its present borders' and declared 'the US shall not encourage or reward secession.'", at p.40.
Yugoslavia. The Bush Administration, with the re-election year fast approaching, most likely did not want to commit the US to a policy, or worse, to action which eventually might have undermined his chances at re-election. Given America’s passive position to the revolution’s of 1989, Bush perhaps thought that a similar posture should be adopted with regards to Yugoslavia. It also perhaps explains why the US was so willing to defer to the Europeans, specifically the EU, in the matter. The EU believed that their time at demonstrating unity had come. Jacques do Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister proclaimed this was, ‘the hour of Europe.’

Yet the crisis signified the shortcomings of the EU. They were too busy arguing about their own collective future, especially vis-a-vis a common foreign and defence policy, to come up with anything vaguely resembling a united front on Yugoslavia. During the Summer of 1991 the EU presidency passed to Luxembourg. From June until the end of the year, the EU sent its diplomatic corps to Belgrade, Zagreb and Lubljana in hopes of negotiating a cease-fire. Gianni de Michelis, Jacques de Poos and Hans van den Broek; the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands respectively, travelled to Belgrade and Zagreb following the fall of Vukovar after months of intense shelling [20 November, 1991]. The ministers announced that they had a ‘signed agreement’ which would end all fighting. Less than twenty-four hours later, heavy fighting resumed. Collectively, the EU negotiated fourteen cease-fires alone during the latter half of 1991, all of which did not last more than a few days. Their ineptitude and contradictory positions; encouraging democracy without supporting separatism while still recognising the federal government, only

6 For both the US and the Russians, it appeared that recognition of the republics would provide the justification needed by ethnic groups to break away from their host state. The precedent set by Yugoslavia would then have far reaching consequences since it might create the onus for a dissolution of other multiethnic states, specifically Russia, with more dangerous ramifications. See Nikolaos A. Stravrou, "The Balkan Quagmire and the West's Response", Mediterranean Quarterly vol. 4 #1 (Winter, 1993), and, on Bush’s statement The New York Times 27 June, 1991. Malcolm (1994), op.cit.; pp.239-240, and, Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs vol. 70 #1 (Winter, 1991); 'The attribute he lacks-the capacity to define clearly American interests abroad and the policies necessary to pursue them...., at p.6.


8 Point reiterated by former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who said that European policy towards the breakup was, 'weak and indecisive' "Interview on CNN International Hour", (19 December, 1994), and Noel Malcolm, "Is There a Doctor in the House?", The National Review (5 July, 1993); 'The EC does not and cannot have a single defense policy, for the simple reason that it does not have a single army. And in circumstances such as the Yugoslav crisis, a foreign policy without a defense policy is like a gun without ammunition-it is effective only until the moment when your opponent realizes that you arc bluffing.' at p.41., and, Chandler Rosenberger, "The Bridge on the Drina", The National Review (7 June, 1993) Misha Glenny (1992), op.cit., pp.97-100., and Zametica, op.cit.; p.59.10 The fall of the ruined Croatian town of Vukovar (once a town of some 50,000 inhabitants, 43 per cent Croat, 37 per cent Serb, 20 per cent Hungarians and others), two days after its besiegers had solemnly signed yet another cease-fire brokered by Lord Carrington, stands as a stark monument to the inadequacy [or cynical complicity] of the outside world’s response to the degradation of the Yugoslav crisis into war and barbarism. ' Branka Magas, op.cit.; pp.356.

9 Point reiterated by former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who said that European policy towards the breakup was, 'weak and indecisive' "Interview on CNN International Hour", (19 December, 1994), and Noel Malcolm, "Is There a Doctor in the House?", The National Review (5 July, 1993); 'The EC does not and cannot have a single defense policy, for the simple reason that it does not have a single army. And in circumstances such as the Yugoslav crisis, a foreign policy without a defense policy is like a gun without ammunition-it is effective only until the moment when your opponent realizes that you arc bluffing..' at p.41., and, Chandler Rosenberger, "The Bridge on the Drina", The National Review (7 June, 1993)
brought the EU criticism from the local population of the republics and, more importantly, destroyed their credibility within the international community. The Yugoslav Peace Conference at the Hague was set up in September, 1991 under the direction of British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. The EU believed that it could convince the republics to stay together within a federal system by offering an association agreement. Failing to realise that the republics themselves rejected a host of confederal plans, the EU desperately, and somewhat foolishly, now felt that it could bribe the republics into maintaining a federal structure, even more constraining than a confederal system, once blood had been spilt. The republics promptly refused the gesture and the Conference remained in limbo from October, 1991, onwards. With failure now apparent, dissension began to formulate within the EU as Germany expressed its belief in recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, as early as July, 1991. EU members France and Great Britain refused German proposals, as did the United States, all still clinging to the belief that recognition was a clear violation of the 1975 Helsinki Principles which recognised Europe's post World War II borders. Foolish, however, was the notion that Yugoslavia itself existed. The EU failure only perpetuated the violence by giving legitimacy to Milosevic's use of the JNA, now predominately Serbian led, as a pretext to invade the other republics, all in the name of preserving the federal integrity. The belief that the EU could have succeeded was, as Noel Malcolm aptly states, a 'fantasy';

The fantasy here is that Europe [or at least that group of twelve countries which has appropriated the name of the whole continent], can act on the world stage as a single force with superpower potential, shouldering the burden of responsibility which superpower status entails. And the suffering children onto which this fantasy has been projected are the infant states of ex-Yugoslavia. [sic]

In an attempt to stop the fighting, the rest of the EU eventually gave in to German pressure and recognised Croatia and Slovenia [15 June, 1992]. Former US Secretary of State and now UN special representative, Cyrus Vance managed to broker a cease-fire which, unfortunately, did not indicate what the precise status of Serb held territory

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12 'Hence Yugoslavia became the first major test of the European Community's (EC) multilateral foreign policy. Its failure was conspicuous. Not only have the Europeans been unable to stop a civil war on their doorstep, but some of their contradictory responses have aggravated it.' See Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds", Foreign Policy #91 (Winter, 1992): p.4.
13 Zametica, op.cit.; p.61.
15 Zametica, op.cit.; p.64.
in Croatia would be. With fighting having ended in Slovenia after only ten days, following the EU negotiated Brioni Accords [7 July, 1991]20, only Bosnia remained left for the Serbs to now carve up. The Vance cease-fire and Brioni Accords however, should not signify any great success for either the West or EU. The fighting between Croatia and Serbia ended simply because the Serbs realised that a massive military campaign was needed to capture all of Croatia, something they were not prepared for.21 Indeed, they would have had to delay their ultimate goal, which was a link up of all Serb dominated lands that made up Greater Serbia. In this respect, the end of all out hostility between Serbia and Croatia still witnessed the Serbs gain what they most wanted from Croatia, the Krajina.22 As for Slovenia, the 1991 census of Yugoslavia stated that no more than 5,000 Serbs lived in the republic and this figure most probably was slightly inflated. Many of the republic’s Serbs, also did not want to identify themselves with Serbia since they were relatively prosperous in Slovenia.23 The republic of Slovenia, also, was well prepared for possible attack. It territorial defence militias effectively blocked the JNA units that appeared confused in early June, 1991 action.24 Realising that it was not worth it to engage in a long battle of attrition, Milosevic bid good riddance to Slovenia.25 It was Milosevic’s desire not to pursue an active military campaign against Lubljana, and not the EU’s poor diplomacy which ended the conflict there.26 Bosnia, however, represented a different case.

Bosnia typified Yugoslavia in microcosm27, and its status was not clear once the other republics made overt moves toward independence. In May of 1990 the formation of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] was created and severed links with

21 Roger Boyes, "Why the Serbian Generals do not want a Wider War", The Times 31 December, 1992, and, Patrick Moore, "A Return of the Serbian-Croatian Conflict?", RFE/RL vol.2 #42 (22 October, 1993): p.19; 'Many analysts ...think that a major conflict is unlikely because the Serbs are reportedly worn out and the Croats are under strong international pressure.'
22 'Krajina was crucial to Serbia’s strategy for subduing Croatia. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav military arm the self proclaimed Serb Republic of Krajina and used federal MiGs to turn away Croatian helicopters trying to reestablish control.' See, Chandler Rosenberger, "The Next Balkan War", The National Review (6 September, 1993): p.22.
26 'The European Community and the United States started dealing with the Yugoslav crisis in unison: both believed that the country’s disintegration should be avoided at all costs and both assumed that , given the right diplomatic pressure, the conflict could be handled with relative success. The approach has proven to be a monumental failure.' See, "The Ruins of Yugoslavia and a New Balkans", RUSI Newshrief vol. 12 #6 (June, 1992): p.41.
27 Jonathan Eyal Seminar at University of Stirling, (15 March, 1994)
the LCY.\(^{28}\) The SDA was led by Dr. Alija Izetbegovic, who had been released from prison in 1988. By August, 1990 Bosnia-Hercegovina followed Croatia and Slovenia by declaring itself a ‘sovereign democratic state’ and, announced it would hold multi-party elections in November, 1990.\(^{29}\) The elections to Bosnia’s 240 seat Assembly were tallied by December. The SDA won 86 seats. The Bosnian Serb Party, the SDS, and their leader, Sarajevo psychiatrist Radovan Karadzic, obtained 72 seats.\(^{30}\) The Bosnian Croats [HDZ of Bosnia] received 44 while a rival Muslim Party led by Adil Zulfikarpasic, the Bosnian Muslim Organisation [MBO], tallied 13 seats.\(^{31}\) With a plurality, Izetbegovic set out to create a government of national unity which would incorporate Bosnia’s ethnic minorities. With rising Croat nationalism, however, it became increasingly difficult for Izetbegovic to govern. The HDZ in Croatia and other nationalist groups such as the Croatian Party of Law, led by Dobroslav Paraga, were, by February, 1991, publicly expressing their desires for either the partial or complete annexation of Bosnia by Croatia.\(^{32}\)

Bosnian Muslims also expressed their concern and anxiety over reports that Milosevic was, not only in touch with the SDS, but actively supporting it by July, 1991 through secret arms shipments aimed at building up the paramilitary Serb militias which were forming in Bosnia.\(^{33}\) Within one month, sporadic shooting incidents were being reported from within Bosnia.\(^{34}\) It was these incidents which made the SDS ask the JNA to intervene on behalf of protecting the Serbs. Milosevic sponsored these calls by the SDS claiming it was necessary to protect the ethnic Serb minority in Bosnia. By 20 September, 1991, JNA troops numbering over five-thousand men and one-hundred tanks marched into Western Bosnia and attacked Muslim and Croat paramilitary units near Visegrad and Nevesinje.\(^{35}\) Claiming that the government was no longer tenable, Karadzic and the SDS delegates walked out of the Bosnian Assembly by 14 October, 1991. Less than one week later, the SDS established the Serbian National Assembly of Bosnia, based at first in Banja Luka and later moved to Pale.\(^{36}\) As for the Bosnia Croats, many supported Bosnian independence, yet realised that if Serbs were to

\(\text{\(^{29}\) Malcolm (1994), op.cit., p.219.}\)
\(\text{\(^{31}\) Malcolm (1994), op.cit., p.219}\)
\(\text{\(^{32}\) Ramet (1992), op.cit.; p.203., and, Magas, op.cit.; who describes Paraga as a one time ‘prisoner of conscience’, at p.125. Paraga was one of the student leaders during the Croatian crisis. See Ramet (1992), op.cit.; pp. 203-204.}\)
\(\text{\(^{34}\) Zerti I Popullit 8 August, 1991}\)
\(\text{\(^{35}\) Mark Thompson, op.cit.; p.189.}\)
\(\text{\(^{36}\) Magas The Destruction of...p.xv.}\)
establish 'autonomous regions'\textsuperscript{37} within Bosnia, then they also should not be left out. Croatians from Hercegovina, led by Mate Boban supported the March, 1991 meeting between Croatian President Tudjman and Milosevic over ways in which Bosnia should be divided amongst them.\textsuperscript{38} By 19 December, 1991, the Bosnian government formally requested EU recognition yet was refused.\textsuperscript{39}

The decision of the EU can only be seen as stupidity. Attached to the Hague Conference was the equally inept, and culpable, Badinter Arbitration Commission. The Commission’s findings, which were released in January, 1992, called on a referendum of all the citizens of Bosnia regarding the question of independence.\textsuperscript{40} Should the referendum prove favourable, then, and only then, would formal recognition be considered. At the start of the new year [2 January, 1992], Izetbegovic appealed for UN peacekeepers, yet was refused because Bosnia had not yet been recognised.\textsuperscript{41} As for the EU, many Muslims, Croats and Serbs believed that, given its proximity to the conflict, and the historic alliances and animosities which existed between several of the EU members states and the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, any EU actions are likely to be strictly politically motivated.\textsuperscript{42} Despite this, the referendum was held in Bosnia on 29 February, 1992. Serbs and many Croats boycotted the referendum.\textsuperscript{43} The overwhelming response was in favour of an independent Bosnia.\textsuperscript{44} The SDS declared the referendum illegal. Their leader, Karadzic went to Austria in February, 1992 to meet with Tudjman and Milosevic over ways to carve up Bosnia.\textsuperscript{45} Following the results of the referendum the EU still withheld recognition and instead called for a 'canton' plan for Bosnia which would ethnically divide the republic into ten autonomous units modelled on the Swiss Confederation plan.\textsuperscript{46} Still believing it could prevent conflict in Bosnia, the EU, through Lord Carrington tried to push the cantonization proposal in early March, 1992. The multiethnic makeup of Bosnia, however, left too many ethnic minorities within other proposed cantons. The problem

\textsuperscript{37} Ramet (1992), \textit{op.cit.}: pp.260-261., and, Ramet (Fall, 1992), \textit{op.cit.}: p.84.


\textsuperscript{39} Burns, \textit{op.cit.}: appendix I

\textsuperscript{40} Zametica, \textit{op.cit.}: pp.61-63.

\textsuperscript{41} Stavrou (1993), \textit{op.cit.}: pp.36-37.

\textsuperscript{42} Zametica, \textit{op.cit.}: p.67.

\textsuperscript{43} Malcolm (1994), \textit{op.cit.}: p.231.

\textsuperscript{44} Magas, \textit{op.cit.}: p.xviii.

\textsuperscript{45} RFE/RL Newsbriefs (19 February, 1992)

\textsuperscript{46} Doder, \textit{op.cit.}: p.20., and, John J. Mearsheimer, 'The Vance-Owen plan for peace in the former Yugoslavia is already a failure. Bosnian Muslims dislike it and have accepted it grudgingly. Serbs thumb their nose at it.' in, "Balkan Peace: Shrink Bosnia to Rescue it, and Threaten Force", \textit{The International Herald Tribune} 1 April, 1993, and, for a full explanation why the parties to the plan do not accept it see, Patrick Moore, "Bosnian Impasse Poses Dilemmas for Diplomacy", \textit{RFE/RL} (2 April, 1993): pp.28-29., and, \textit{New Statesman and Society} (7 May, 1993): p.5., and, Pfaff (Summer, 1993), \textit{op.cit.}: p.106.
EU negotiators failed to either recognise or admit was that Bosnia, as a map, is not simply a tri-coloured entity with each ethnic group represented by one colour and the lines clear and distinct. Bosnia instead can be described as a series of 'dots' where the lines are anything but clear and distinct. It was not surprising then that the SDA and HDZoB rejected the plan by 24 March, 1992. Three days later the SDS declared the link up of autonomous units within Bosnia as The Serbian Republic of Bosnia. Ironically, Izetbegovic asked for UN peacekeepers, which had been stationed in Split, in Croatia, to be re-deployed to Bosnia-Hercegovina on the same day of the declaration. Izetbegovic’s request was denied and sped Bosnia on its course towards destruction.

Federal Army General Adzic announced on 30 March, 1992 that he was prepared to invade Bosnia to protect Serbs there. By 2 April, Serb paramilitary units from Serbia, most notably Arkan’s Tigers, marched into Bijeljina and Banja Luka. By 4 April, mortar attacks began and one day later, JNA MiG-29 jet fighters attacked strategic positions within Bosnia-Hercegovina. Muslims in the towns of Zvornik, Visegrad and Foca were forced from their homes, many more were captured. By 6-7 April, 1992, with little done, the EU and then the US officially recognised by Bosnia. By this time, it was too late. The West’s failure of Bosnia was already complete.

Bosnia-Hercegovina, internationally recognised and a member of both the CSCE and the United Nations, is nevertheless a phantom state. It future viability as a multiethnic entity depends critically on the willingness of the Muslim component to settle for an internal constitutional arrangement based upon a territorial division of power. The trouble is that the Muslims find this most unattractive because it would leave them with little territory, little power, and only a semblance of a state. For they too want a state.

47 This point was made by Jonathan Eyal, "Seminar on Yugoslavia", University of Stirling (15 March, 1994)
50 Burns, op.cit.; appendix I
51 Malcolm (1994), p.235-236., and Glenny (1992), op.cit.; Glenny indicates that General Blagoje Adzic were ‘cajoling the other members of the collective Presidency into agreeing to a state of emergency and the imposition of martial law throughout the country’, As for Azic himself, he was ‘from Croatia where, during the Second World War, the Ustashes killed his entire family.’, at pp. 61 and 122.
52 The Times 4 April, 1992 and 20 April, 1992
54 The exact numbers of those captured varied depending upon the sources used. Following reports that civilians captured were beaten and tortured, the EU dispatched former Polish Prime Minister Tadczuł Mazowiecki to investigate war crimes charges. See, John Fenske, op.cit.; p.354.
55 Zametica, op.cit.; p.88.
1.2 Identifying the Problem

During the era of bi-polarity US policy towards Eastern Europe and the Balkans fell within the framework of the Cold War. The US acknowledged, in official statements, that the latter two regions were historically within the area of Russian influence, thereby placing them on the 'periphery' of US interests. As early as 1985, official Washington policy stated;

U.S. interests in Eastern Europe fall into two general categories, strategic—those related to the superpower rivalry and to the U.S. relationship with its key NATO allies—and those related directly to the region in its own right. The first include primarily allied security interests in the region as a potential asset or liability to Soviet strength and as a source of stability or instability in Europe. They can involve economic and other issues as they relate to these interests. The latter type of interests can include trade and economic opportunities, humanitarian considerations, and interests stemming from a sizeable East European ethnic population in the United States. In recent history, there seems to have been a tendency for heightened superpower tensions to bring the strategic considerations to the fore while periods of U.S.-Soviet détente have allowed local interests to gain greater weight. [sic]

This view held to the belief that the US and the USSR sat atop the heads of respective camps and organised the globe into a series of alliances. These alliances were able to 'create an atmosphere of mutual deterrence in relation to vital interests. From this a strategic balance was achieved'. And yet even the 1985 US position admits that interests are categorised into general areas. The same government legislators that produced this statement admit that there is 'no firm consensus on basic US interests and objectives'. Bi-polarity, however, did produce an identifiable enemy. With this, a sense of discipline was achieved as the US was able to lead allies against the threat of Soviet expansionism. And now, even though it appears that the US is pursuing the 'latter' option in its 1985 position, it finds it increasingly difficult, if not impossible to achieve the latter without simultaneously pursuing the former.

Herein lies the problem for policymakers. It is not enough to simply state the obvious; that the former are struggling with creating a new policy, to outline specific interests and programmes, and to co-ordinate these with the resources available. Rather, the end of the bipolar system requires an entire new framework for analysis. This, however, is easier said than done. It may come as a shock to policymakers and politicians in Washington, yet they must realise that not every problem has a solution. As a crisis unfolds, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, ineptitude, inefficiency, and shortsightedness destroys US credibility. This in turn produces futility among the

policymakers and tends to highlight the problem with US foreign policy. The outset of crisis in the former Yugoslavia has unfortunately coincided with the process of democratisation throughout the Balkans. Failure to recognise and, more importantly, to understand, the link between these two events will do more than reflect failed US policy. It will result in the inability of the region to produce healthy democracies in an area that sits between two regions vital to US interests, Western Europe and the Middle East. This is why policy-building towards states such as Albania deserves greater attention by policymakers.

The issue of instability in areas such as the Balkans is as old as the region itself. The competing blocs of the Cold War managed to quell territorial claims. Yet, issues of security persisted throughout the World War II era and were subsidised by the superpower rivalry. Since 1991, however, the situation has radically altered.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Communist regimes in the East European region radically transformed inter-state relationships in the Balkans. Age-old ethnic issues, particularly those involving national minorities and rapidly growing Muslim populations, are likely to disturb the delicate post-Second World War Balkan balance. The tendency manifested by some minority leaderships to identify themselves with neighbouring countries—thus unleashing secessionist and irredentist threats—could lead to uncontrollable external involvement and serious complications. Human rights issues will then automatically be transformed into diplomatic and even military confrontations. Moreover, the disintegration of the Communist system has created a large vacuum in political, economic and security terms.

While the breakup of the Warsaw Pact did not automatically signal the demise of NATO, it certainly required a rethink as to its role. The Bush administration acknowledged that NATO modify its purpose in order to meet new threats. More likely, Bush and his advisers were desperately seeking ways to justify a continued US presence in Europe now that the Soviet menace was gone, according to most public perceptions within the US. NATO legitimatized this conviction. And yet, the US,


60 Following the success in the Gulf War President Bush proclaimed a new world order. To the vast majority of Americans, most of which grew up during the era of post WWII US-USSR antagonisms, this proclamation meant an end to the Cold War and no need, therefore for pursuing the large levels of military spending which had proceeded for nearly five decades. Yugoslavia, however, has shown that threats remain; ‘...none of this would have been possible unless the West shoulders the weight of a consistent foreign policy. Its failure to do so since 1990 is partly a matter of mistakes made by western politicians. George Bush should have pursued the Gulf War in 1991 until Saddam Hussein was overthrown. Bill Clinton ought to have been tougher with North Korea in the nuclear negotiations of 1994. John Major and Francois Mitterand might have prevented the worst horrors in ex-Yugoslavia if they had put a few battalions on the Croatia-Serbian border as soon as Yugoslavia disintegrated. But no honest democrat can put all the blame on politicians. The politicians would have done things differently if they had known their people wanted them done differently. The main reason for the West's post-Cold war failure is that most people in Western Europe and America wanted to believe that the end of the Cold War was, in that fatal phrase, the
as the conflict in Yugoslavia broke out, rather than act through the very institution it sought to perpetuate and modify, deferred to the Europeans in handling the crisis.\textsuperscript{61} The latter's ineptitude in creating a solution through its champion, the EC has shown that US presence in Europe is not only favourable, but necessary.\textsuperscript{62} The US, however, has so far done very little itself. By deferring foreign policy to the various departments in Washington, President Clinton has entrusted the vestiges of foreign policy power into hands that have returned vague and contradictory statements. This has made the administration seem timid and uncertain. The fear of engagement within the foreign policy arena has made those at the State Department tentative in their approach to most foreign dilemmas. The result being a superpower back-pedalling or, at best, standing still at a time it should be moving forward. Former National Security Adviser to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski highlights this hesitancy when he states:

...it does appear that Washington is currently pursuing an essentially minimalist foreign policy. Though not deliberately isolating itself from the rest of the world, the United States at this stage seems inclined to define its obligations in the most narrow fashion, exercising its leadership responsibilities only in exceptional circumstances, when the necessity for action becomes overriding.\textsuperscript{63}

Recent sabre rattling via NATO in Bosnia demonstrates this 'necessity for action'. Peace proposals coupled with threats of air strikes and the US openly siding with the Bosnian Muslims do not discount that the administration's policy towards Bosnia was, for quite some time, in a 'holding pattern'.\textsuperscript{64} Even the immediate outbreak of peace, however, will not address the primary issues in the region, security and stability. These were only available, in recent memory, through the structural framework provided by the Cold War. Even then, only Greece and Turkey were afforded some semblance of security from the predominant Soviet threat. 'As of yet, no clearly defined system of power relationships has developed in place of the bipolar


\textsuperscript{62} This position is reiterated by Dusko Doder who states; "Yugoslavia became the first major test of the European Community's [EC] multilateral foreign policy. Its failure was conspicuous. Not only have the Europeans been unable to stop a civil war on their doorstep, but some of their contradictory responses have aggravated it. From the beginning, the absence of policy poisoned relationships within the EC'. See, Dusko Doder, \textit{op cit.}; p.4.

\textsuperscript{63} Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Great Transformation", \textit{The National Interest} #33 (Fall, 1993): p.13. The latter has also stated recently that Clinton's foreign policy staff's general strategy is 'flawed in its assumptions' which may hold serious 'geopolitical consequences'. See \textit{The Economist} (12 March, 1994): p.60.

\textsuperscript{64} This position was expressed by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers. Quoted in Vin Weber, "Bosnia: Strange Alliances", \textit{The National Review} (7 June, 1993): p.24.
system and the tight alliances of the cold war period. More importantly, the perceived removal of an external regional threat may have even turned the former two states against each other with renewed vigour as the area's nations become increasingly hostile towards one another. Revitalised nationalism and potent irredentism in that quarter threaten state integrity, political stability, economic growth, and regional security. Implications of which do not bode well for either the rest of Europe or the United States.

The assumption by most in Washington is that the Europeans will defer to US leadership in the post Cold War era. This does not mean allowing the US to act unilaterally but, rather what is openly being termed a 'multilateral' approach. For Clinton and his staff, the belief is that the end of the Cold War will provide a willingness to cooperate on the part of the Europeans. This belief, however, may be erroneous. Nowhere is this more evident than in recent events in the northwest corner of Bosnia, an area known as the Bihac pocket. Bihac became a very strategic site for all parties involved in the conflict. As a predominately Muslim enclave, it sat amidst the Serbian held Krajina and, if captured, could serve as a vital link of supplies for Serbs in Knin and Pale to the South. Although designated as a UN 'safe area', the Serbs had the area surrounded and appeared content to isolate Bihac until they were ready to attack. Instead of waiting, the Bosnian Muslims, specifically the Fifth Corps, launched an offensive by late October, 1994. Catching the Serbs off guard, and with

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66 Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: American Alliances after the Cold War* (Washington DC: CATO Institute, 1992) Carpenter cynically predicts that; 'International relations theory would predict the gradual dissolution of Cold War era Western solidarity now that there is no longer a credible common threat to promote cohesion among the allies', at p.151. For the alternate view vis-a-vis the US position and NATO see, John A. Thompson, "The Problem for United States Foreign Policy", in David Armstrong and Erik Goldstein, (eds.) *The End of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 1990); who believes that the European cries of 'Yankee go home' are unlikely., at pp.67-68.
67 Bihac and the surrounding towns of Bosanska Krupa and Velika Kladusa were part of a Muslim pocket that held out against Serb efforts to take the entire area. 'Because Velika Kladusa has not been declared a safe area by the United Nations, it has received less attention than the town of Bihac....[Fighting in December, 1994]...pits Muslim against Muslim as well as Serb against Muslim. Rebel Serbs in Croatia, just north of the Bihac pocket, have armed and supported tens of thousands of Muslims who are opposed to the Bosnian government. These Muslims took the northern half of the Bihac pocket in 1993 before being defeated by the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army last August [1993]. They support a businessman and politician named Fikret Abdic...' Abdic, during the late-1970s/early-1980s ran Agrokomerc, one of the largest and most prosperous state cooperatives in Yugoslavia. He was very popular with the local Muslims surrounding Bihac, where the co-op was located. This popularity helped Abdic as many of his loyal supporters were ex-employees. See Roger Cohen, "Muslim vs. Muslim vs. Serb", *The New York Times* 4 December, 1994 p.22., and, on the question of whether or not Serbs were arming Muslims as early as 1993 for action against Croats see *RFERL Newsbriefs* (29 October, 1993): p.18.
assistance from the Croatians, the Fifth Corps advanced nearly two-hundred kilometres to Bosanska Krupa and captured Serb artillery left behind.69

By the end of November 1994, however, the Serbs, seemingly resupplied70, began their counter-offensive. The Fifth Corps was driven back to the interior of Bihac, while Serbs cut off all escape routes and, in flagrant violation of the UN safe haven designation, began a siege of Bihac with tanks and heavy artillery. The counter-offensive by the Serbs marked the now highly visible cracks between the US and its Western allies. The United States was unwilling to send ground troops to Bosnia until the fighting had ended, yet could not impose its will upon the allies with troops already present, specifically French and British soldiers engaged in humanitarian missions.71

The rift between the US and its allies began by the mid-November, 1994 Congressional elections in the US. The elections brought the Republicans, led by Senator Bob Dole, majorities in both the House and the Senate.72 Earlier in the Summer of 1994, the Senate, on Dole's initiative, tried and failed on several occasions, to pass a resolution which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.73 Perhaps in

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69 "Voice of America", report (26 October, 1994)
70 "Diplomats and UN officials say a growing body of circumstantial evidence suggests that President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia is secretly breaking his own embargo on the Bosnian Serbs. These sources cited increasing signs that Mr. Milosevic....has continued supporting the Bosnian Serb Army....with guns, troops and fuel....UN officials said the reports suggested that rumours of Mr. Milosevic's split with the Bosnian Serbs' self-declared government in Pale have been exaggerated, if not stage-managed, and that recent Bosnian and Croatian Serbian onslaught against the Bihac pocket suggests support from Belgrade. UN officials and diplomats pointed to the following developments... A large number of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems have appeared in Serbian held parts of Bosnia since Mr. Milosevic announced the embargo.....The Bosnian Serbian Army, which six weeks ago was reported to be low on fuel, suddenly has a surfeit....There are increasing numbers of suspicious helicopter sorties close to Serbian territory along with indications of troop movements from Serbia into Bosnian Serbian-held turf.' John Pomfret, "Belgrade Suspected of Breaking its Embargo", The International Herald Tribune 10-11 December, 1994
71 Michael Gordon, (et. al.) "US and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed", The New York Times 4 December, 1994, and, for a look into the UN missions see, The Economist (17 December, 1994); The UN has two operations in Bosnia: the blue helmets of the UN Protection Force [Unprofor], and the humanitarian missions run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. Between them, they do three main jobs: Aid Provision...Protecting Minorities...Peacekeeping..., at p.39.
72 The Economist (12 November, 1994)
73 "Lift Bosnias Arms Embargo", (Newsletters from the Office of Senator Robert Dole, July, 1994) [R-Kan]; 'I am pleased to be joined once again by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, in introducing this amendment to lift the US embargo on Bosnia-Hercegovina....For more than two years now the United States has gone along with failed policies in the name of consensus. For more than two years we have forsaken principle and ignored international law in the naive hope that this war will end by the good graces of the very perpetrators of this aggression...Now don't get me wrong. I would like to see a peaceful settlement....But, for the moment, let us put aside issues of justice, morality, principle, or Bosnia's legal rights. There is one big question that no one in the administration can answer, or anyone else that advocates denying the Bosnians their right to self defense, and that is: who or what is going to make the Bosnian Serbs withdraw from 70% of Bosnia to 49% as proposed by the so-called contact group?....History has shown us that a stable peace can be achieved when there is a balance on the battlefield. Our own history of negotiations with the Soviets taught us that.' [24 June, 1994], and, on the question of jeopardising relations with the allies; [1 July,
an effort to delay the Republican move once it takes control of both houses, President Clinton announced in mid-November, following the elections, that the United States would no longer enforce the arms embargo against the Muslims. This signalled the first major rift between the US and her NATO allies at this particular moment. The US did not condemn the Muslims for launching attacks by late-November, 1994, claiming that the Muslims were the victims of Serb aggression. Britain and France, frustrated in their efforts both through the EU and the Contact Group to gain an international peace settlement, argued that, indeed, it was the Muslims who were the aggressors in Bihac. Undeterred, the US was able to get NATO to launch, in November, 1994 a raid of NATO aircraft designed to limit Serbian military advances by bombing the Udbrina airfields on the Croatia/Krajina border. By the end of November, however, the rift between the US and its allies was significant. Serbs had seized UN peacekeepers, holding them hostage in an effort to halt allied bombing. The tactic appeared successful as the US and NATO countries France and Britain questioned the military strategy of bombing since it might jeopardise their troops on the ground. The incoming Senate majority leader, Bob Dole, highlighted the gap between the allies by calling for a heavier bombing campaign against Bosnian Serbs and a lifting of the arms embargo. His position was seen by Britain as the policy to

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1994], and, rebutting the Geneva talks; [21 July, 1994], and, condemnation of new wave of violence following Bosnian government’s signing on to the Geneva proposals; [26 July, 1994].

74 "CNN World News", (28 November, 1994), and, on possible impact, "CNN Interview with Michale Clarke", Centre for Defence Studies London (19 December, 1994), and, for reaction from allies such as French President Mitterand’s reply that this move would ‘add war to war’ see, William Pfaff, "The Death of an Ideal Darkens Europe", The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994


76 IBID, and, for view that the allies are at fault in this respect; ‘...the French and British effort to use their peacekeeping presence to slow and shape [but not directly oppose] a Serbian victory could be described as a success- particularly if the major powers continue to avoid seeking national advantage in this conflict that would upset the balance of power in European security.’ Jim Hoagland, "In Sum, Powerful Democracies Looked Evil in the Eye and Blinded", The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994

77 The raid on Udbina was aimed at changing Serbian behavior following three Serbian bombing raids that originated from the airfield and targeted Bosnian Muslim areas in the Bihac pocket. Serbian jets dropped napalm and cluster bombs during one attack.’ See, John Pomfret, "Shrugging off NATO Attack, Serbs Repair Airfield", The International Herald Tribune 6 December, 1994

78 NATO’s strike at Udbina, followed on Nov. 23 by two more raids against Serbian anti-aircraft systems, touched off a Serbian roundup of UN personnel and triggered fears among UN officers that the Serbs would retaliate by killing UN soldiers. Although Serbian forces released two convoys of British and Dutch peacekeepers, totaling 53 soldiers, about 350 UN soldiers remain under detention.’ IBID, and, for a view that; ‘soldiers exist to fight and, if necessary, to die. That is the contract a soldier undertakes. The democracies, not to speak of the United Nations, no longer seem to take this very seriously. No doubt this is a tribute to the democracies’ sensitivities, but it is not a tribute to their prudence or intelligence when their unwillingness to employ their soldiers as soldiers produces more war, not less.’ William Pfaff, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994

79 Dole called for a ‘strike and lift’ strategy. This meant more concerted and heavier air bombing raids against the Serbs coupled with a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. See, John Darnton, "In UK, Dole Adds to Alliance Tension", The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994
expect from the US once the Republicans controlled Congress. Dole’s views were criticised by both the Foreign Secretary, Douglass Hurd, and French President Mitterand who believed it would only increase the fighting.

More importantly, talk now focused on whether or not UN peacekeepers should be removed, as the British and French threatened to do so with their troops. United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali acknowledged that such a measure may be necessary. The British and the French appeared willing to accept a proposal that if UN peacekeepers were removed, the US would supply more than half the men necessary, through NATO, of the approximately 25,000 soldiers needed to cover withdrawal and safeguard the removal of UN personnel. US Secretary of Defence, William Perry acknowledged that should NATO agree to such a military move, a US force would be ready and capable for the task at hand.

The Europeans, however, by December 1994, backed away from their earlier threat to remove their peacekeepers. They believed that, were they to remove their troops, they would fulfil Senator’s Dole’s call, and perhaps the United States’ one as well, to escalate the conflict by a ‘strike and lift’ strategy. This only heightened differences among NATO allies who were too busy with mutual accusations and claims of seeking to undermine the alliance while the fighting in Bosnia only increased. In an

80 Ibid, and, for view that Sen. Dole has cited Britain as the ‘chief obstacle to decisive and co-ordinated action in defence of Bihac...’ see, Tom Rhodes, “US Drops Demands for Bosnia Military Solution”, The Times 30 November, 1994
81 W. Pfaff, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994
82 The Secretary-General stated; ‘My message to them [Bosnian Serbs and Muslims] is that unless they do this [cooperate with UN mission] it will become impossible for me to persuade the Security Council to keep the United Nations protection force here.’ See, Roger Cohen, “Bosnia’s Factions Rebuff UN Chief”, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994
83 *US Force in Bosnia Would be Ready for Combat, Perry Says”, The International Herald Tribune 10-11 December, 1994
84 Ibid, and, on the logistical problems between the British and American military see peacekeeping differently, ‘The British Army view is that if a UN peacekeeping force has been allowed into a conflict area with the consent of all parties, its conduct must be aimed at preserving that consent. The Americans, however, have to have an enemy to sort out whereas the British refer only to conflicting factions. The American peacekeeping slogan is: Behave or else. The British slogan, even after two years of endurance in Bosnia, is: Trust us, we are here to help you.’ See, Michael Evans, “British Army Blueprint on Peacekeeping Highlights Rift with Washington”, The Times 30 November, 1994, and, for an overview of the peacekeeping rules see, Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia”, Orbis (Fall, 1994)
85 Michael Evans, "Rifkind: Pullout Serious Option", The Times 6 December, 1994
87 ...the Europeans say that reviving the lift and strike strategy once the UN peacekeepers would be safely removed from Bosnia would quickly lead to a nightmare situation, involving a confrontation among the major powers, civilian massacres and a serious escalation in fighting throughout the Balkans.’, Ibid, and, Roger Boyes, "EU’s Brave Words Fail to Concel Bosnian Disarray", The Times 12 December, 1994, and, for a look at the various cleavages among the allies; Germany and France managed to smooth over differences when Helmut Kohl’s, ‘Chancellor [Wolfgang Schausble, Kohl’s most trusted lieutenant] urged Germany to embrace the American call for a lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. France, with troops on the ground in Bosnia, quite plainly does not
effort to close ranks and save the unity of the alliance, the Clinton administration backed down from earlier statements on the need for tougher measures in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{88} They now reaffirmed their pledge that UN peacekeepers should remain and that a diplomatic solution should be sought, even if this meant offering greater concessions to the Bosnian Serbs, specifically, political links with Belgrade.\textsuperscript{89}

In the midst of this 'muddle'\textsuperscript{90}, was the scheduled meeting of the CSCE in Hungary during the first week of December, 1994. The meeting in Hungary was attended by President Clinton who sat while Russian President Boris Yeltsin launched a verbal barrage on the West, specifically the US, and its plans to expand NATO eastward.\textsuperscript{91} Yeltsin rejected the claim that NATO alone should be regarded as the sole European security organisation and in a phrase reminiscent of polemics past stated; 'Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War and is in danger of plunging into a 'Cold peace.'\textsuperscript{92} The statement by Yeltsin appear to have also driven a further wedge between the US and Europe over NATO expansion eastward.\textsuperscript{93} Critics believe that NATO expansion will only increase Russian authoritarian tendencies over

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88 Drozdiak, Qpsift-
99 'The Clinton Administration began by condemning the Vance-Owen plan of early 1993 as a sellout of Bosnia. Now it seems ready to concede to the Bosnian Serbs both the right to confederate with Serbia- to form what would be the Greater Serbia of President Milosevic's dreams- and the right to remain in control of all the territory they have seized by force until they obtain satisfactory constitutional arrangements from the Bosnian government. All of this, offered behind the backs of the Bosnian authorities, would be conceded in exchange for the Serb's willingness to stop using force.' See, Stanley Hoffmann, "Appeasement Again: Like Ethiopia, Like Czechoslovakia", The International Herald Tribune 6 December, 1994, and Stanley Hoffmann, "What Will Satisfy Serbia's Nationalists?", The New York Times 4 December, 1994
85 Drozdiak, op.cit.
89 'The Clinton Administration began by condemning the Vance-Owen plan of early 1993 as a sellout of Bosnia. Now it seems ready to concede to the Bosnian Serbs both the right to confederate with Serbia- to form what would be the Greater Serbia of President Milosevic's dreams- and the right to remain in control of all the territory they have seized by force until they obtain satisfactory constitutional arrangements from the Bosnian government. All of this, offered behind the backs of the Bosnian authorities, would be conceded in exchange for the Serb's willingness to stop using force.' See, Stanley Hoffmann, "Appeasement Again: Like Ethiopia, Like Czechoslovakia", The International Herald Tribune 6 December, 1994, and Stanley Hoffmann, "What Will Satisfy Serbia's Nationalists?", The New York Times 4 December, 1994
91 Andrew Marshall, "Russia Warns Nato of a Cold Peace", The Independent 6 December, 1994, and Michael Binyon, "Yeltsin Clashes with Clinton over Nato at Russia's Door", The Times 6 December, 1994
a fear of encirclement and perhaps rejuvenate the threat from the East.\(^{94}\) As for the US, Clinton did not discount NATO expansion eastward, but did try to close the gap with Yeltsin by agreeing for a more concerted effort by the CSCE as perhaps the first line of defence for a European security network.\(^{95}\) This, however, appeared contradictory to other views within the US, specifically, of the incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair, Senator Jesse Helms. Helms' leading advisor, Steven Berry, reiterated Helm's belief that Russia should be encircled by NATO.\(^{96}\) This would ensure that it is not tempted towards military expansion and would speed it on a course to democritisation. Helms' view, however, is characterised by his inconsistency over Yugoslavia. Back in 1983 it was Helms who believed that to counter possible Soviet expansion in the Balkans;

The USA should work towards a rearrangement of South-Eastern Europe, based on a confederation of free Balkan nations each within its own natural ethnographic borders, and, whose integrity and sovereignty would be guaranteed by the USA. He described Yugoslavia as an artificial state and welcomed its [possible] disintegration as natural evolution.\(^{97}\)

Today, however, Helms believes the US should not throw its money away on democratising nations in Eastern Europe and feels that Bosnia is 'Europe's problem.'\(^{98}\) President Clinton and his NATO allies though, faced, at Budapest, a more stinging denunciation from Bosnian President Izetbegovic.\(^{99}\) In an accurate assessment, the Bosnian leader called the Western efforts in Bosnia, 'a mixture of incapability, hesitation and ill will' which would 'discredit the UN, ruin NATO and demoralise nations.'\(^{100}\) Izetbegovic also rebutted the claim by William Perry, US Defence Secretary, that the Muslims had lost.\(^{101}\) The former stated in defiance that his people would continue to fight and ended by blasting NATO, 'The whole international community and even the mighty NATO cannot save one single city.'\(^{102}\)

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\(^{94}\) The New York Times 4 December, 1994 p.22., and, Michael Binyon, The Times 6 December, 1994, and "No Rush to Expand NATO", The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994, and The Times 12 October, 1993; 'The Russian military has almost a paranoia about being encircled by its foes....Defence secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, sought to allay Russian alarm in Moscow...rightly saying that Nato must not create new areas of contention and mistrust. France and Britain have long counselled caution..'

\(^{95}\) Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton NATO Vision Leaves Yeltsin Cold", The International Herald Tribune 6 December, 1994

\(^{96}\) Anatol Lieven, The Times 6 December, 1994

\(^{97}\) Michele Lee, "Albania’s Isolation in Post-War Politics", Labour Focus on Eastern Europe (Winter, 1984)

\(^{98}\) "Jesse Helms Interview on Evans and Novak CNN" (12 November, 1994), and The Economist (19 November, 1994)

\(^{99}\) Michael Binyon and James Bone, "Izetbegovic Blasts West and UN for Betrayal of Bihac", The Times 6 December, 1994

\(^{100}\) The Times 6 December, 1994

\(^{101}\) Ibid

\(^{102}\) The Times 6 December, 1994
The recent debacle over Bihac has made it hauntingly clear for Clinton that NATO may not be as cohesive as first appears. Yet the problem runs deeper than Bosnia;

The story of how and why the allies failed to act in Bihac, pieced together from interviews with American, British and French officials, goes well beyond the Balkans. It is a tale of the changing dynamics within the 45-year old NATO alliance, which is still searching for a role in a world with no clear adversary such as that embodied for decades by the Soviet Union. With a common enemy gone, it has become increasingly hard for the United States, Britain and France to find the point where their national security interests converge.103

The latter statement though, should not hold much weight. The post Cold War era may have removed the monolithic threat that existed during the days of bi-polarity. However, this does not mean, conversely that no threat to the East exists.104 Logically then, it more importantly signifies that security interests between the US and its Western allies have not vanished. It does, however, bring to light the inadequacies of policy formulation for the Americans. Security concerns have engulfed Europe. However today these concerns are not being examined from their constituent parts. Instead, they remain tied to outdated notions of security that limit the US and its allies into an 'all or nothing' approach. Flexible response may have been a doctrine adopted during the era of the Cold War. It has, however, little relevance when ethno-nationalist conflicts, civil war and civil unrest due to struggling democratisation seem to be the pattern emerging throughout Europe. Most views on this pattern are inadequate as they fail to recognise that they are not the same pre-war patterns that preceded the Cold War. Colin McInnes best outlines this new pattern;

...the new security system in Europe will be determined not only by its institutional architecture, but also by the changing pattern of bi- and multilateral relationships in the continent. The political and economic dynamics of these relations are already very different from what they were in the Cold War years of rigid bipolarity. With the greater fluidity which now exists in European interstate relations, more traditional patterns on conflict and cooperation [determined by a mixture of geopolitics, cultural affinities and history] are manifesting themselves. However, this does not mean that European politics are simply reverting to older, pre-war behavioural norms. These traditional patterns of conflict and cooperation are emerging in the context of a continent substantially transformed by thickening networks of interdependence, radically new forms of supranational integration, higher levels of socio-economic development and a much more widespread acceptance of democratic values. The past can thus serve only as a partial guide to the future of European security.105

103 The New York Times 4 December, 1994
104 "As always in dealing with Moscow, the West is torn between roles as strategist and therapist. Strategy is simpler. Surely the West could, by being smart and careful over time, deal with Russia’s perfectly reasonable insistence that no NATO move diminish Russian security. Therapy is the hard job. How to deal with the apparently widespread Russian perception that alliance enlargement is an anticipatory vote of no confidence in the prospects of Russian democracy?" See, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Between Strategy and Therapy: The Russian Dilemma", The International Herald Tribune 10-11 December, 1994
105 Colin McInnes, op. cit.; pp.39-40.
McInnes makes a valid point regarding history. Unfortunately, when relating these security concerns to states such as Albania, and the Balkans generally, history of the region must serve as the guide. It is the outlook of past events superimposed onto present circumstances that should be viewed with scepticism. Manifestations of previous conflicts and tensions are firmly rooted to the past. To discount the validity of the various claims to simple drives for territory and opportunism is to undermine the very foundations of international relations, to assume that history does not matter. Granted, present day tensions and conflict throughout the Balkans are at some basic levels, drives for land and/or political opportunism. These, however, by their very nature require motivation to rally support and the large-scale expenditure of resources, both diplomatic and otherwise. The resurgence of nationalism in the area therefore is not the product of random happenstance, as claimed by many in the West. It was instead the calculated manifestation of actors in the area that use it as their tool to foment unrest, making sure that its base rests within the same historical foundations many policymakers either discount or do not fully understand. This is best expressed by Branimir Jankovic, one time professor of international relations at the University of Belgrade. He is worth quoting at length;

The history of the Balkans is complex because it is the history of a region and not just of one single country or nation. Matters are further complicated by the fact that for many reasons, certainly more of a historical than of a geographical nature, the Balkans have been treated as a single historical entity. When such entities, which are acted on by very dynamic, diverse and even mutually contradictory trends of development, are viewed in historical terms, the identification of certain specific patterns of development bestows coherence upon them. It is these patterns which, notwithstanding the highly specific features of Balkan history, place this region in the mainstream of European and world history. Regarded from this perspective, the peculiarities of Balkan history appear simply as variations of universal trends, and not as unique features that make the Balkans something different, something separate from the general course of history.

Clear implications of this view is that the 'nostalgia' of Cold War diplomacy cannot provide solutions to the security concerns of today. Current reality shows that there is no homogeneous state in the Balkans. Efforts, therefore to apply some universal principles of conflict resolution fail when they simply do not provide realistic proposals for addressing this fact. Calls for a third C20th peace conference to formulate answers would, by their own admission, not provide 'precise solutions'. Instead, the West, particularly the United States, should realise that fragmentation

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106 See Armstrong, op. cit.: 'The lessons of the past provide at least a key to some of the potential problems to be faced by the post-cold world...', at p.11.

throughout the Balkans is not solvable by 'conventional means'\textsuperscript{108} Those US policymakers and academics that hold onto visions of a 'new world order' by adopting and modifying the principles of Wilson are deluding themselves with their assumptions. The 'neo-Wilsonians' criticise the realist argument, challenging the view that 'many polities refuse to accept limited goals or the methods of traditional diplomacy'.\textsuperscript{109} Granted that the changing world has undermined the foundations for the type of traditional diplomacy preached by the realists. The former, however, have not been able to provide any alternative and some have even concluded that either 'history has ended', or that common liberal values will sweep across the globe. Events in the past few years have shown instead that, 'discontinuity is the central reality of our contemporary history...''\textsuperscript{110}

If this is taken as such, it should not imply that the future of American foreign policy formulation will be akin to a large ocean liner travelling on stormy seas, rudderless. Instead, the challenge for the US in the post Cold War era, will be to 'shape an influential world role for the United States that takes due account of the limits on American power'.\textsuperscript{111} In areas such as the Balkans the US has the option of taking a rather different role, as expressed by veteran analyst Paul Shoup, 'draw on its capital of goodwill to act as a stabilising force in the region, hoping to contain conflict and to encourage modernization and reform'.\textsuperscript{112} But first, an examination of the course of US foreign policy will determine, not only its direction, but whether its goals are identifiable, compatible with its resources, and Albania's place in relation to the US policy.

\textsuperscript{108} On the idea of a conference, former RAND researcher J.F. Brown proposed that it be through 'inter-action between NATO, the European Community, the United Nations and the United States. This inter-action could generate the necessary will, money and military force. It would also influence the sides concerned in disputes to make their own bilateral efforts...' J.F. Brown, \textit{Nationalism, Democracy and Security in the Balkans} (Dartmouth: RAND, 1992): pp.186-187. By conventional means, the implication that the US and international community have from the outset of the Balkan crisis relied on sanctions and recognition of sovereign nations as methods to stem the violence. Nicolas Stavrou believes; 'There are no monocentric states in the Balkans. Applying this dubious model would mean that each and every time an ethnic group sets up barricades, occupies military barracks, and declares independence, the rest of the country must either stand by and accept its amputation or face international sanctions if it uses force to restore sovereignty'. See, Stavrou (1993), op.cit.; p.39., Also, Moynihan who feels that a more 'confident world order' can be achieved from a 'reasonnable commitment to international law, [and] a realistic deployment of international organization...' Moynihan, op.cit.; p.145.


\textsuperscript{111} McInnes, op.cit.; p.153.

1.3 The Direction of Policy

The defeat of the Iraqi army during the Gulf War seemed to mark a watershed in the direction of US foreign policy. President Bush had achieved what he and his staff initially set out to do. By using the United Nations to condemn, and then, sanction the use of force, the US appeared to be using the UN, finally, in the role it was originally designed for. President Bush saw the unravelling of communism throughout Eastern Europe as the beginning of a new era, an era where co-operative multilateralism would be the norm, and where organisations such as the UN would not become gridlocked by an East-West divide. This was to be his vision for which he proclaimed a 'new world order'. What, however, did this exactly mean? It should not have been interpreted as Bush's belief that all the world's problems would vanish once the USSR ceased to exist. Bush never went into specific detail in defining the new order. In general terms though, 'it referred to a world in which stability no longer rested on the balance of power between competing military blocs and, in which problems were solved through cooperation and the beneficent intervention of the U.S.'

The immediate implications of this order for the US were unfortunately negative. The positive attitudes after the Gulf War hid a more deep seated problem for Washington policymakers, namely what would now constitute US objectives and goals? It is simple enough to state that the security and prosperity of the American people has and always will constitute a viable, definable goal. However, policymakers in Washington soon realised that determining the link between ends and means was not so simple. 'The security and prosperity of the American people and the achievement of any particular foreign policy objective' has historically plagued foreign policy makers in the US.

The question of how to achieve these goals brings to light the outlay of resources. Irrespective of arguments over whether or not the US is declining in power, the issue instead is whether or not the US has the resources, and in some cases, the political will to expend those necessary for the achievement of its goals. Resource expenditure and its inconsistency is particularly evident in the Clinton administration.

Clinton continues to speak, as he did during his campaign, of the need to maintain America's global leadership- to 'build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growth'- but his first defense budget submission is inadequate to such a grand task.

Clinton's supporters have been quick to criticise past US government crusades in search for stability at the expense of human rights and democracy. And yet, what policy are they themselves engaging in if not some global crusade to promote

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113 Ray Moseley of The Chicago Tribune (24 May, 1992); quoted in Moynihan, op.cit.: p.18.
114 Armstrong, op.cit.: p.77.
democracy, human rights and market capitalism? Their assumptions falsely rely on what they see as the strong link between the former and the latter. Present realities have shown that nations such as China offer alternate models to nations searching for identity and a pattern of growth. More importantly, the scaling back of resources in the name of domestic consumption may not allow for the grandiose projects of democracy building currently being espoused by Washington.

The demise of communism appears to have also placed about the notion that with one superpower gone, the global playing field has somehow been levelled. The scope and change of recent events would indicate otherwise. Brzezinski rightly states that, "the world...is still divided into leaders and followers. The pace and style of political change is set by what might be called the catalytic nations, radiating their influence to their more immediate neighbours." It seems to follow then that the more complete a power the nation is, the greater its range of influence. The US is, and continues to be such a nation. It is the latter statement, however, that continues to be debated among the corridors of power in Washington.

The direction of policy has done more than pit Democrat against Republican. It has made each party re-evaluate its position of America's place and role in the world.

For the Democrats, the challenge is a struggle with their past. They must answer a vital question: Are they really 'New Democrats', willing and able to use military force decisively?...For the Republicans, the challenge puts them at a philosophical crossroads: With the end of the Cold War will the GOP return to its older isolationist roots and adopt an 'America First' foreign policy? Or will the party continue to support America's engagement internationally and our position as leader of the free world?117

It is this 'fault line', argues Alan Tonelson, that will produce a more 'generic model of foreign policy' competing with a more 'passive strategy'. Tonelson defines the former approach as one resting on the notion that American activism abroad is, in itself, a key to US security and prosperity. The latter belief, one seen as much more radical in nature, sees its primary objective in 'consolidating American military and economic strength, and enhancing America's freedom of action.'118

Observations of the two US administrations since the disintegration of the Soviet Union would indicate that Bush and his staff adhered to the first model, while Clinton and his team have opted for the second. This appears evident when witnessing the respective administration's policy once the crisis in the former Yugoslavia began. For the Bush staff, initiative was not the watchword as it sought to mitigate damage

116 Brzezinski (1993), op cit.; p.94.
117 Vin Weber, "Bosnia: Strange Alliances", National Review (7 June, 1993): pp.22-23. Weber also highlights the cleavages among the Republicans, specifically over Bosnia where more traditionally conservative leaders such as Trent Lott, Thad Cochran and John McCain are all Bosnia 'doves', at p.24.
and downplay the crisis, opting instead for outdated policy. By holding onto visions of Yugoslavia, Bush failed to realise that the combatants there had already reached the point of no return. Bush's policy in Yugoslavia instead demonstrated that, 'the pattern of the conduct....showed bias in favour of order and stability and an aversion to change and instability'. Once the Clinton team came in, there appeared to be the same aversion towards any new policy which would radically alter the situation. A 'muddling' type approach was adopted. This policy sought answers through vague promises, empty assurances, and hopes of consensus among allies who had a very different list of priorities regarding themselves and the crisis at hand. Indeed, it seems that, regarding the latter, Americans have still yet, either not understood or refuse to believe, that what Washington sees as within its realm of vital interests and what its European allies see as such is not in harmony.

What then is the reality? Perhaps it is somewhere in between the previous two positions. Probably not however. The reality of American foreign policy should be that factors which guided policymakers for nearly five decades do still exist. Understanding their place in present policy formulation becomes difficult if those which make policy cannot agree that these factors do still matter. For example, the notion of geopolitics which was relevant during the era of bipolarity is currently being debated as to its importance and very existence. In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama argues that the US must comes to grips with the idea that geopolitics, part of the 'rules and methods of the historical world are not appropriate to life in the post-historical one.' Abandoning the principles of power politics should then naturally follow the demise of communism. And yet, regional instabilities across the globe seem to destroy Fukuyama's premise. Instead, it appears that former President Richard Nixon is correct when he states;

In charting our course, practical idealism and enlightened realism should guide our policies. The world has not changed to the extent that we can ignore the realities of power politics. But it has changed enough so that we can devote more resources and attention to issues other than security in the narrowest sense.

The former argument suffers from what Samuel Huntington rightly labels, the 'single alternative fallacy theory'. The collapse of communism should not assume that no other alternative exists other than liberal democracy. It subsequently implies then that the characteristics and realities of Cold War politics, including geopolitics will not vanish once the USSR does.

119 Carpenter (1992), op.cit.; p.146. Carpenter believes that such policy by the Bush administration was a 'reflexive policy typical of a status quo power'.

120 Fukuyama (1992), op.cit.; p. 283.

121 Nixon (1992), op.cit.; pp. 35-36.

It would seem then that the only thing the demise of communism has done is to rearrange priorities among the European allies, much to the dismay of the US. The security concerns of Europe differ from those of the US as exemplified by the Balkan crisis. With no immediate vital threats in jeopardy, the US deferred to the Europeans in handling the affair. Their 'embarrassing' display only served to demonstrate the inconsistencies in interest co-ordination between the US and Europe. More importantly, it showed that regional balance of power politics does still matter.\textsuperscript{123} This situation does not bode well for democratising states such as Albania simply because defining the security threats as they see them will, in all likelihood, vary greatly from how the US and its West European allies view regional instabilities. Indeed, it is security threats, and what constitutes them, which highlight the contradiction between America and her allies vis-a-vis the Balkans.

Colin McInnes aptly explains that during bipolarity, defence and security were 'virtually synonymous'. The traditional idea of security was centred upon the individual states, that such policy sought status quo preservation, and that effective military defence were of primary importance.\textsuperscript{124} It was these concerns which caused the US to adhere firmly to the belief that the security and prosperity of its European allies depended upon strong political links between the US and Europe. And yet the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated the distance between US and European interests and concerns. It more importantly appears to show that US leadership and presence are still necessary to Europe.\textsuperscript{125}

For the nations to the east, their desire to join NATO has not waned, and has instead increased, as regional instabilities have also.\textsuperscript{126} Their wish to join NATO, as well as the EU, signifies that, to them, security and prosperity are symbiotic in nature. They want to achieve economic prosperity and market capitalism and believe that

\textsuperscript{123} See Brzezinski (1993), op.cit., who believes that Europe's failure was symptomatic and demonstrates the 'socioeconomic and geopolitical turbulence' that Europe will likely face in the future..., at pp. 139-140. His criticism towards Europe's failure to respond is also made expressly evident; 'The failure of Europe to react firmly to the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia similarly reflects the combination of parochialism and selfishness that currently permeates the European outlook. The collapse of that multinational state produced the most bloody outbreak of sustained violence within Europe since 1945. But, unlike some local conflicts during the years of the Cold War, it did not pose the danger of escalation to an international collision among the superpowers. A firm reaction to the brutal 'ethnic cleansings' thus entailed tolerable risks. Yet Europe's posture was one of military timidity, political passivity, and social indifference. Its failure to react dramatized how long a road Europe still has to travel before it becomes a truly constructive political force in world affairs.', at p.145.

\textsuperscript{124} McInnes, op.cit.; p.4.

\textsuperscript{125} Brzezinski (1993), op.cit.; p.134.

\textsuperscript{126} Brian Beckham, "Russia Gains, Germany Loses, America Should Stay", The International Herald Tribune 15 December, 1994, and, Aaron Rhodes, "Threats to Human Rights in Europe are Threats to Security as Well", The International Herald Tribune 15 December, 1994
joining the EU is the way this can be achieved.\textsuperscript{127} However, they have seen that the EU still lacks a common foreign and defence structure. The East Europeans may want to become part of the EU, yet feel that it cannot protect them as they attempt to democratise and gain market economies. Such interests can only be protected by NATO, and more specifically, by the leader of NATO, the United States, which has stood as the guarantor of Western Europe’s security for nearly five decades.\textsuperscript{128} The problem, however, then becomes how to reconcile the new security considerations and their place vis-a-vis vital and non-vital interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Yugoslavia has shown that accomplishing this task is not easy. After the blunder in handling by Europe, Washington sought damage mitigation. It too, soon realised that conventional responses would not work.

With the precipitous collapse of the Eastern bloc, a new policy was adopted in Washington, which for lack of a better name can be called, ‘one size fits all’. Pleas by a distinguished Yugoslav diplomat and friend of the United States ‘not to lump Yugoslavia into the former iron curtain basket’ fell on deaf ears. ‘We [the US] treat all Communists the same’, was the response. ‘Communism must go’. A shift in American positions- even if not with evil intent- contributed significantly to the current phase of the Yugoslav tragedy.\textsuperscript{129}

Arguments can be made as to whether or not the policy was in fact new. It appeared instead that Washington sought to preserve the Cold War status quo ante without the same threat. Once civil war ensued, the Bush administration could not gain consensus on policy. After realising, too late, that Yugoslavia would cease to exist, they drew a line at ethnic cleansing in Kosova. This, however, was not, and probably still not, is taken seriously by the combatants in the crisis. Allowing gains through force and the changing of borders in the same manner violates the very principles the US adhered to when it signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia did not serve as the catalyst to combat, but it certainly sped along the process. And, by non-recognition of an independent Kosova on principles that it would violate the Helsinki Accords seemed outright contradictory following the secession and recognition of the other republics. More importantly, the empty threats

\textsuperscript{127} Flora Lewis, "The World Community is Betraying the Victims", \textit{The International Herald Tribune} 1 December, 1994

\textsuperscript{128} "Reassuring an Insecure Europe", \textit{The New York Times} 4 December, 1994, and, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Way Forward for an Inspired NATO", \textit{The International Herald Tribune} 2 December, 1993, and, Warren Christopher, "The United States has an enduring political, military, economic, and cultural link to Europe that must be preserved. The European Community is our largest single trading partner, and we have a powerful stake in the collective security guaranteed by NATO. This alliance of democracies- the most successful in history- can lay the foundation of an undivided continent rooted in the principles of political liberty and economic freedom. To meet the new challenges in Europe, the Alliance must embrace innovation or risk irrelevance.", Speech before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [4 November, 1993], in "American Foreign Policy: The Strategic Priorities", \textit{Vital Speeches of the Day} vol. 60 #6 (1 January, 1994): p.164.

\textsuperscript{129} Stavrou (1993), \textit{op cit.}; p.32.
by the US would probably not, in any manner, gain what it most sought, regional stability. By ‘calling the US bluff’, the Serbs realised that Washington was not ready to involve itself in ‘nasty, intractable conflicts which would strain resources’, particularly when objectives were not clear. It appeared that the spectre of Vietnam still haunted Washington, despite the rhetoric following the Gulf War.

The fundamental problem on the part of America, once the crisis began, was in ignoring factors that contributed to and perpetuated the conflict.

When analysts have looked at territorial conflict, they have done so in a limited and conventional way. The explanations for whether military conflict has occurred or whether the dispute was resolved peacefully relate to the attributes of the states or pairs of states in the dispute; the relational and intrinsic importance of the territory to the states involved are ignored.

This discrepancy also typifies the problem with American foreign policy presently. The deep-seated attachment to historic homeland coupled with opportunism and security fears much different from the US and/or Western Europe doomed the latter two to failure as they adopted responses that did not take these nuances into account. The factors highlighted above will, in all likelihood, continue in the post Cold War era so long as the US fails to develop coherent policy.

Concurrently, these factors will increase in intensity for democratising states such as Albania, now that humanitarian issues link themselves with aid and exacerbate irredentist claims which use this new democracy as a forum to present long-standing grievances. The failure to comprehend regional instability is of primary concern to Albania vis-a-vis the US. The former has expressly stated that the crisis next door is more than simply an impediment to democratisation. It has increased the likelihood that, should it continue, it may drag in Albania. Even if warfare ends quickly, it still does not address the more fundamental issue of security in the area among the region's states. The affect of this consideration is high and put well by Paul Shoup;

From the U.S. point of view, it is the post-cold war era. For the peoples of Southeastern Europe, however, this new chapter in their history is part of a long and continuing battle for security and progress. It is a struggle that often seems unending. New obstacles appear as soon as worsting ones are overcome.

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130 Carpenter (1992), op.cit.: p.149.
132 There appears to be some justification for this premise. Goertz and Diehl have stated that; ‘... a state with a warring neighbour was three to five times as likely to be at war as one that did not have a bordering state at war...[W]arring borders increase uncertainty and decrease the degree of control that states have in a given area and therefore increase the prospects for war...The type of war [internal or external] does not seem to affect the diffusion across borders.' IBID, p.9.
133 Shoup (1992), op.cit.: p.276.
The above statement puts well the divergence in US attitudes towards the Balkans and the states that make the area up, and the region's in-built tendency for fragmentation, and, as history has shown, a distrust for the West.

The present outlook by the US and its idea of democracy promotion by way of enlargement demonstrates that it still has not understood that America should not, and in the Balkans, cannot remake the world in its own image. This is not to suggest that it has embarked upon such a policy. Indeed, is the contention that a doctrine of non-policy exists in the area generally, and Albania specifically. Again, we may ask, 'what should guide US policy then'? An affirmative role is necessary and should be prepared for short and long term considerations. Shoup again best expresses this;

    The short-term objective of U.S. policy must be to act as a stabilising force, vigorously opposing the use of violence and repression [especially towards minorities] and the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism. The long term objective must be to facilitate the transition from state-run economies to market driven economies, supported by pluralistic institutions. Working toward this objective need not mean a vast commitment of American resources, but should be a highly visible element in U.S. policy. It must encompass long-term projects in countries not yet ready for reform as well as more blunt assessments of failure in those countries that are now engaged in efforts to marketize their economies.

To take on such a grand task requires first that the US define and outline its goals and, what it sees as, its threats, the linkage between the two and amount of resources at its disposal able to carry out this task. Goals will be examined synonymously with interests later on. First, threats will be viewed with particular emphasis on militant nationalism and the Yugoslav crisis. This is because given the present case study, Albania's proximity to, and anxiety over, Yugoslavia, represents more than a look into the problem with US foreign policy. It will perhaps demonstrate the direction in which it is heading, and more importantly ask; 'do irredentist movements which manifest themselves by way of violent conflict, as in the Balkans, represent the new threat to peace and stability in the post Cold War world? If so, how do these affect US policy, how should the US respond, and does this threat seriously jeopardise democratisation in states such as Albania and stability in the Balkans as a whole?'

1.4 Nationalism Revisited

    It is perhaps no surprise that nationalism finds fertile breeding ground in states which are not well developed or economically sound. A strong link between stability and prosperity does exist. And yet while their remains a 'growing gap between the world's rich and its poor which may, [in and of itself], create regional insurgencies,

134 See Nixon (1992), op.cit.; "We should not set out to try and remake the world in our image, but neither should we retract from our global responsibilities. We should set goals within the limits of our resources while working to the limits of our power.", at p. 278.
135 Shoup (1992), op.cit.; p.266.
this alone does not provide the onus for the new forms of violent irredentism. Indeed, in examining the potential threat crises such as in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union pose to both Europe and the US, it is vital to understand this link.

Russian troops in Chechenya only highlight the failure of the West and demonstrate that Moscow is still capable of pursuing its interests when it believes they are threatened. 'Although the West is not currently confronted with a major military threat from post communist Europe, it does face a series of risks emanating from small, but intense regional disputes. In general, these risks are much less predictable and less manageable than the previous superpower confrontation.' Russia's near abroad has made it clear that nationalist factions within the Russian Defence Ministry still exert influence. Russian troops have encouraged regional conflicts which appear aimed at restoring Moscow's will in regions within their sphere of influence. As this circle is enlarged to include the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Western meddling and US measures which would perhaps perpetuate the conflict, and moreover appear to take the Muslim side, only; strengthen the influence of Russian nationalists, worry US allies in Europe, force a re-think in Washington and heighten regional chaos. In the final outcome Russia gains the most while highlighting Western confusion and driving a wedge between Washington and its West European allies. More important, this confusion reaffirms that the threats to the East do continue to exist.

136 The previous believe is held by US Marine Corps General A.M. Gray who believes that the gap between rich and poor will provide the foundation for insurgencies which, in their struggle for limited resources, have the potential to threaten regional stability and, concurrently, threaten US access to vital resources it may have in these particular regions. Quoted in Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Vintage Press, 1991): p.31.

137 'The implications of a collapse of Yugoslavia for the Soviet Union were clearly on the minds of Bush's officials.' Almond goes on and presents a statement by then Deputy-Assistant Secretary of State, James Dobbin which implies Administration policy of this link. '...his error revealed the close interlinking between US policy towards ostensibly non-aligned Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.' See, Almond, op.cit., p.45.


139 Post Communist Europe, op.cit.; p.21-3.

140 IBID

141 Flora Lewis, The Tribune 1 December, 1994

142 'Foreign policy flops....have unsettled America's European allies and given the Clinton administration a reputation for foreign policy incompetence. A reputation for incompetence, once established, is not easy to reverse.' See, Daniel Franklin, "How about a foreign policy?", The Economist World in 1995 published by the Economist Intelligence Unit London (December, 1994): p.61.

143 IBID, and, "CNN broadcast of Face the Nation Interview with Senator Dole", (2 January, 1995)

144 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Overstate the Chaos, Undermine the Help", The International Herald Tribune 26-27 November, 1994

145 John Darnton, The International Herald Tribune 1 December, 1994
These conflicting interests have been demonstrated in Croatia and Serbia, where government is dominated by extreme nationalists who are prepared to sustain conflict and confront the West if or when it furthers their political agenda. This conflict of interests would be particularly dangerous in a nuclear-armed state. Warren Christopher...has pointed to the threat posed by a possible reversal of reform in Russia...However, a renewed military confrontation is only the most obvious threat to Western interests. Other more subtle dangers have been developing since 1991.146

Yet, it should be understood that questions of 'security', particularly in Europe are, as Colin McInnes aptly put, 'in a conceptual flux'.147 The threat posed by irredentism is not simple to define. Most general analysis states that the removal of communism has opened a 'Pandora's box' of sorts.148 Now, after decades of suppression national expression has found itself, and all the claims that go with it. The question, however, still remains, 'does this pose a threat to the US?'

By mid-April, 1994, NATO jets struck at Serb positions in Bosnia. After all the criticism of non-action the US move via NATO appeared a desperate ploy to demonstrate resolve. The US National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake stated that 'America cannot afford to ignore conflicts in Europe'. He went on to mention that conflicts, such as the Yugoslav one, 'presents a clear challenge: to NATO's credibility and to our very vision of a post- Cold War Europe'.149 Why the sudden change of heart on the part of the US? More importantly, is such concerted action meant to show that the US now does view ethno-nationalist conflicts as credible threats to their interests? Moreover, what vision exactly, does Lake and the US have for post-Cold War Europe? The growth of militant irredentism 'poses major problems to governments throughout the world'.150 It not likely, nor possible, for the US to engage itself in all of these actual or potential conflicts. Yet it is safe to assume that Lake, and

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146 Post Communist Europe, op.cit.; p.21-3.
147 McInnes, op.cit.; p.59.
148 An alternative view comes from E.J. Hobsbawm who states; 'The changes in and after 1989 were thus essentially not due to national tensions, which remained under effective control even where they genuinely existed,...so long as the central party operated, but primarily to the decision of the Soviet regime to reform itself,...Nationalism was the beneficiary of these developments but not, in any serious sense, an important factor in bringing them about'. See Hobsbawm (1990), op.cit.; p. 167., For a view that concurs with the premise see, Victoria Syme and Philip Payton, "Eastern Europe: economic transition and ethnic tension", in Michael C. Pugh, European Security Towards 2000 (Manchester: University Press, 1992); 'Economic concerns are aggravating, and in some cases, causal factors in inter-ethnic antagonisms. In the difficult and uncertain period of economic transition- with all its imponderables, false starts and unmet expectations-the potential for further conflict and dislocation in the next decade is enormous. Inexperienced and often inarticulate practitioners of democracy that they are, politicians in Eastern Europe find it difficult to explain to their restive peoples why full employment or fixed prices are impossible to maintain, pushing many critics towards the panacea of nationalism.', at p. 101.
the US, given its ties and commitments to Europe for decades, will not and cannot stand idly by with conflict within Europe's boundaries. The concerns of the various minority groups within Europe will likely experience, what they perceive as, threats to their security and very existence. These fears will in turn produce a 'demand for minority self-definition'.\(^{151}\) This will then likely find forms of violent expression as in the former Yugoslavia. Should the US then hold these forms of expression as the new threat to, [if not world], at least regional peace in an area of vital interest? To automatically engage in such a policy, however, smacks as a somewhat desperate attempt by hawks to replace the USSR as the chief threat and enemy with violent nationalism in its place. For the US, however, basing a foreign policy upon irredentism is not only impractical but foolish. Brzezinski believes that, 'extremist nationalism is a minority phenomenon..., defensive rather than offensive'. And yet, he concedes that 'intense European nationalism is not fully over'.\(^{152}\) Implications for policy though remain cloudy. Perhaps the idea of enlargement was meant to remedy the problem violent nationalism would bring. Establishing the conditions for democracy, it is hoped, will also bring respect for minority rights. This should then quell extreme separatist trends. Sadly, as recent events show, the advent of democracy has not guaranteed such rights. Poor relations between Albania and, for example, Greece and her neighbours remain despite long democratic traditions in the latter and the recent arrival of democracy in the former. It seems rather that democracy and its principles are being manipulated to promote the very causes of violence throughout the Balkans. The results appear similar, undisciplined leadership in the area has, and is, using non-democratic means to suppress nationalist claims, the results of which threaten to destabilise an entire region.

It may be simple enough to state that in such instances the US should respond by threatening to withhold aid and integration of the democratising country into the West. However, to do so would likely slow the rate of reform, heighten anxiety within the state, mobilise extremist positions, and thereby quicken the pace of destabilisation. Herein lies the problem with the way the US sees nationalism. ‘Western officials and publications circulate myths that perpetuate misunderstanding about the nature of the war and render any effective countermeasures more elusive’.\(^{153}\) Some observers believe that a ‘fundamental error prevalent in the Western policy debate was that nationalism was an unmitigated evil threatening to unleash instability and violence’,\(^{154}\) which could

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152 Brzezinski (1993), *op.cit.*, p.142., As to the defensive and offensive varieties of nationalism, Vincent Cable believes that regardless of their nature [in places like the Balkans], they do have a common thread which binds them; 'all reflect attempts to express a sense of threatened cultural identity in political form, a new politics of identity'. Cable, *op.cit.*, pp. 3-4.
be tackled by simply applying economic pressure. Once this perception is fused with the earlier premise regarding poor economies, one sees the statements such as those by Fukuyama; 'these new manifestations of nationalism must be put into proper perspective. First, the most intense ones will occur predominately in the least modernised parts of Europe, particularly in or near the Balkans.'155 Such perceptions on the part of the US will not aid it in finding direction of policy. More importantly they do not address the actual affects and concerns on both the Balkans and its states such as Albania.

These previous theories have a kernel of truth yet seem to imply, as economic determinists do, that poor economic conditions create or spur on nationalist tendencies. Granted, they may serve as catalysts, however, this should not mean that once economic modernisation is achieved and once a fully functioning market economy is in place, will irredentism cease to exist, particularly in the Balkans. Spyros Economides best expresses this;

National questions have been the scourge of stability in the Balkan region for generations. Nationalism is manifested in a variety of ways and is not a discrete problem. Not only do nationalist rivalries lead to international tensions in their own right, they also spawn ethnic and territorial disputes which are highly detrimental to regional peace and security. Furthermore, nationalist rivalries have been, and are used internally within all Balkan states as a legitimatizing and propaganda tool in the face of internal unrest or unpopularity.156 This would indicate that programs such as enlargement may not succeed. After all, economies may prosper, yet irredentist claims will remain. The process of democratisation, however, should continue in the Balkans. Concurrently, the US should encourage and aid in its development and growth. It still offers the best path towards regional stability and, more importantly, an opportunity for minorities to address grievances.157 The importance of regional stability to the US and to Europe is

155 Fukuyama (1992), op. cit.; p. 273., Fukuyama also states that if labour markets function effectively and becomes more mobile, the result eventually would be an undermining of traditional social groups 'like tribes, clans, extended families, religious sects and so on', at p.77. This underscores, however, the importance of these groups in areas such as the Balkans. They have been in existence for ages and have been used as means to counter negative effects from one form or another of authoritarian rule throughout the Balkans be it monarchies or communists. It is not likely that they will be readily given up with the advent of modern labour. Democracy promotion has often solidified such social groups by now allowing for even more open expression. 'It is not clear that democratic regimes will be consolidated even where elements of democracy have already been established. In some cases, greater openness has accelerated political and cultural polarisation.' See, S. Burg, "Nationalist Redux: Through the Glass of the Post-Communist States Darkly", Current History vol. 92 #573 (April, 1993): p.164.


157 Advocated well by Stephen Burg, op. cit.; p.164., "The strength of nationalist political movements, the popular appeal of avenging long-held grievances, and the resultant escalation of ethnic conflict impede the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Democratization involves the creation of stable political institutions and processes 'that make conflict, change, and conciliation possible without institutional collapse'. Nationalist conflict suppresses the importance and, in some
to prevent, in the future, a 'Lebanon-type' situation from being created in Europe.\textsuperscript{158} The potential for future violence is high, which in turn would negate possible investment and harm relations with allies in the region. This is where the US should pay heed. For a state such as Albania represents the fundamental problem with the Balkans. The incursions of war, the variety of peace processes and the careless drawing of boundaries has resulted in a nation with more Albanians living outside the borders of Albania than within. Most of these are not very far, often in the surrounding states of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece and Italy. And, with the present conflict in Yugoslavia, the Albanian question could become, for the US, 'perhaps the most urgent and problematic'.\textsuperscript{159}

To the realist, the impact on American interests would, at first, second and even a third glance, appear negligible. Addressing the interests of the US to such advocates results in a 'black or white' approach, or examining the 'ledger book' of American concerns via time and money put in. Scholars such as Carpenter highlight this belief;

\begin{quote}
Although ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes might be extremely important to the parties involved, they would rarely affect even the European, much less the global, geopolitical balance and are therefore not threats to America's security. Taking the risk of becoming entangled in the ancient and intractable conflicts of Eastern Europe is not merely unnecessary; it would be foreign policy masochism.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

In the cold, hard reality of US interests, statements such as Carpenter's are valid. Yet they fail to realise that interests are simply not those that can be measured by cost-benefit analysis. Intangible as well as tangible factors ought to guide policy. Conversely, the argument that humanitarian issues should act as a guide are also faulty. To state that aggressive nationalism should be stopped before bloodshed ensues, yet only in Europe, invites cries of hypocrisy, and rightly so, for the tens of thousands being killed in the sub continent. Carpenter is correct in believing that the US need not, and should not, displace the old Soviet threat with aggressive nationalism. Yet he...\textsuperscript{158} James Chace believes that it is unlikely that the civil war in Yugoslavia would provoke a larger conflagration in Europe, yet feels the Lebanon type scenario is a distinct possibility. See, James Chace, \textit{The Consequences of Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy} (New York, New York: Oxford Press, 1992): p. 46.

\textsuperscript{159} H. Poulton (1993), \textit{op. cit.}: pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{160} Carpenter (1992), \textit{op. cit.}: p.6., and at p. 2. where he states; 'Washington's Cold War era alliances also have the potential to entangle the United States in a host of obscure conflicts that have little relevance to America's legitimate security concerns. The ongoing transformation of NATO from an alliance to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe into a regional crisis management organization is a case in point. That new mission blurs the boundaries of NATO's traditional theater of operations and threatens to involve the United States in volatile and intractable conflicts in Eastern Europe'.

is wrong in discounting its credibility as a force to be reckoned with. Granted, it may
dnot represent a threat to vital US interests [infra for definitions of these]. Yet, how can
the US and NATO justify the existence of conflict within Europe, an area designated as
part of the theatre of operations. The only 'blurring of its boundaries' is in the threat,
militant nationalism as opposed to Soviet troops. Yet, is not the premise similar? To
protect and secure allies' territory from the possibility of incursion. Greece is a long
time NATO ally. Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have all applied for membership to
the Partnership for Peace plan. Do not the variety of irredentist claims among these
states threaten to engulf them in conflict? The possibility exists, and as such may
factor into US policy making. At a more basic level, every US politician knows the
value of a vote and the power generated by lobbyists who may or may not wish to cast
these votes. Ethnic groups in America represent some of the more powerful,
motivated, and vocal groups present. It was the powerful Greek lobby which recently,
made the US step back on its initial proposal to officially recognise the Republic of
Macedonia.161 Albanians in the large New York borough of the Bronx number more
than 200,000 and own one-third of all private land there.162 These groups, more
importantly, are highly concerned towards their respective homelands which in turn
make many US politicians 'respond strongly to their ethnic appeals'.163 Since most
came to America embracing and believing in the principles of democracy, they all vote
and make their nationalist concerns known to politicians. Carpenter and his like must
understand that the realities of politics supersede what on paper may appear as 'no
vital interests'. In most cases, they are seen as such to the vast electorate most realists
claim would be difficult to sway in promoting a more activist US approach in places
like the Balkans.

For institutions such as NATO, the US appears to have already decided that
irredentist conflicts within NATO's field of operations may indeed constitute the new
threat to peace. Prior to the decision to send NATO jets on bombing missions over
Bosnia, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated; 'NATO must improve its
ability to deal with the disorder of ethnic conflict and aggressive nationalism,
proliferation, and political and economic instability'.164 The discontinuity of policy,
however, will not help either NATO's or America's credibility. The first steps by the
US and international community were condemnations followed by economic sanctions
with poor results.165 It appears that for the US the management of crisis follows
logical steps and assumes a level of rationality on the part of those involved. Yet as

163 Hobsbawm (1990), op.cit.: p.155.
164 Warren Christopher, "Speech to NATO", February, 1993 in US Foreign Policy Bulletin vol. 3 #6
the crisis has demonstrated, violent nationalism is a phenomena that has very little to do with rationality. It may proceed forward with rational means, however, its premise is not rational. Despite sanctions against Serbia which have practically destroyed the economy, Serb public opinion has continued to support to Milosevic as witnessed by the December, 1993 elections. Of course, drives for land are often rational, calculating and ruthless. However, nationalism has, and is being used to motivate action and justify purpose. This is where the US and the West must understand that peace processes involving the redrawing of borders is not the answer in the long term despite short term success. Satisfaction of one group's claims, especially in the Balkans will, more often than not, involve 'threatening the identity and security of other minorities', which may likely find expression through violence.

Democratisation offers hope, yet trying to manage its pace and the unfortunate consequences is often nothing more than an exercise in futility. How should the US respond to someone like President Berisha when border incidents with neighbouring Greece threaten to destabilise the area? Criticisms by minorities and opposition groups point to an increasingly authoritarian command structure where dissent with Berisha's government is not being tolerated. The pro-US position and ties between Albania and the US cloud what may be a short-sighted policy approach. It appears that governments in the Balkans are taking a somewhat hard stance against minorities. Perhaps the situation in the former Yugoslavia has instilled a fear that minorities within their borders may seek similar solutions. Western policy has not alleviated their fears either as recognition of Bosnia followed by acceptance of peace plans involving its 'carving up' show, to area leaders, that perhaps no boundaries are safe. The precedent set in the former Yugoslavia may provide the onus for irredentist groups to begin more concerted activity. At the very least, regional relations and security concerns have,

167 Cable, op.cit.; p.45.
168 Best expressed by Stephen Burg, op.cit.; 'The supporters of democratization in the region...confront a vexing dilemma: the collapse of authoritarianism has unleashed forces that make the establishment of liberal democracy difficult. Yet to suppress these forces would require actions that might make democracy impossible. Some accommodation of the national aspirations of local populations is essential in order to avoid violence, to strengthen the legitimacy of new democratic institutions, to motivate these populations to endure the sacrifices associated with transitions...' p.165.
169 Recent incidents near the border towns of Korca and Gjirokaster include the killing of Albanian soldiers by what the Albanian government has called, 'Greek terrorists'. They claim the group [Northern Epirus Liberation Front] may be sponsored by the Greek government. Albania has recalled its ambassador from Athens and cut its embassy staff in half. It is the most serious incident to date. See The International Herald Tribune 14 April, 1994 p.2.
171 Nicolas Stavrou emphasises this point regarding recognition. The cardinal principle that defined Helsinki was the legitimization of post-WWII borders. Tito accepted this in multi-ethnic Yugoslavia as international recognition of existing borders. When Prime Minister Markovic tried to restore borders...things changed. Yugoslavia was told, in effect, that the rules had changed: internal and administrative borders became, overnight, international'. See Stavrou (1993), op.cit.; pp. 37-38.
and will probably continue to affect pro-Western states in the area such as Greece and Turkey. The latter's perceptions of regional security coupled with its internal problems\textsuperscript{172} should make it a concern to the US as it seeks to promote regional stability.

The disappearance of the dampening effect of the cold war has been accompanied by the revival of nationalism, ethnocentrism and minority issues especially in the former Soviet Union, [and] the Balkans.... The course of future political developments in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, where such issues abound, is of particular importance for Turkey....Instability and conflict within and across national borders in the Balkans could swiftly draw into their orbit of interaction the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, possibly mobilizing new waves of immigration to Turkey, as well as tensions in bilateral relations. [sic]\textsuperscript{173}

During the Ozal presidency, there were efforts by Turkey to assist in regional co-operation hoping that aiding democratisation would in turn aid in regional relations. One option for the US could perhaps be to promote these efforts more openly and strongly. Doing so might not only address grievances but may further bilateral and regional co-operation. The US would need to appreciate, however, that while it advocates democracy, the often lengthy process involved requires that it create a much more improved damage mitigation technique(s) in the short to medium term.\textsuperscript{174} This, however, is easier said than done. There appears almost an apprehension on the part of the West to come up with anything radically new. Also, there seems to be an angst among Western capitals to allow such 'solutions' or 'conflict management techniques' to be settled by the nations in the area themselves.\textsuperscript{175} The latter development appears as part of the trend after the Cold War that very little will be treated as within the realm of a state's exclusive license. Civil war, such in Yugoslavia then, is internationalised with the West taking it upon itself to solve the problem. The former concern, however, may be the more vital one. Creating a technique, in and of itself, is difficult, if not impossible. How to fashion a specific response to ethno-based conflicts must turn on; not only how to implement policy, but also to how can it take into account the resources available, the political will necessary, and whether or not the US should adopt a uni or multilateral approach.

\textsuperscript{172} Turkey, aside from the continuing problems it faces with its Kurdish minority, has been experiencing a severe economic crisis as well. The Turkish lira has devalued by 28% against the dollar forcing a three month austerity package by the Ciller government. \textit{The Economist} (9 April, 1994): p.6.

\textsuperscript{173} Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Prospects for Southern European Security: a Turkish Perspective", in Roberto Aliboni (1992), op.cit.: p.121.

\textsuperscript{174} Nixon reaffirms this premise by stating; '...democracy is not an Alice in Wonderland solution to these problems. Much of the underdeveloped world lacks the political traditions necessary to make democracy function properly. In some countries, ethnic hatreds, class divisions, and even tribal rivalries would frustrate the most well-intentioned advocates of democracy....' Nixon (1992), op.cit.: p. 248.

\textsuperscript{175} McInnes, op.cit.: p.73.
It must be remembered that in creating foreign policy, implementation matters.\textsuperscript{176} Most of the difficulty in the Balkan crisis involved, not in being able to formulate plans and alternatives, but in how exactly these would be implemented and their repercussions. From this, consensus became almost impossible to achieve. In spite of what appears as strong Western resolve recently, fashioning a policy approach towards the region will likely still present the US with problems.\textsuperscript{177} Much of this potential difficulty comes from what Andrew Bacevich refers to as the, 'summoning of popular support necessary for implementation'.\textsuperscript{178} The American populace has had to face the recent reality that the US seems adrift in formulating a foreign policy capable of meeting post- Cold War threats.

Fashioning a foreign policy response to address, as NATO appears to be doing, ethno-nationalist conflicts within Europe would require, however, both the political will, and the ability to implement such policy. As to the policy itself, Jack Snyder offers a general guide:

1) Eliminate military threats to state's security
2) Provide economic resources so that states can legitimate their rule through economic growth
3) Encourage the spread of liberal, transnational, economic and cultural ties
4) Cushion the impact of market reforms on disadvantaged groups
5) Co-opt intellectuals
6) Promote constructive dialogue between nationalities at the local level.\textsuperscript{179}

All these considerations are constructive points. Yet they still do not specify the simple questions of, how, to what extent etc.? For example, point one makes a good case, 'remove or eliminate a military threat to a state's security'. Yet such a point implies that the US and the West engage upon proactive policy, to eliminate or lessen the potentiality of military threat from a state before it gets out of hand. Such a method of conflict prevention does not appear to suit the US as it often is not prepared to undergo the process. Again, implementation remains vital. Jonathan Eyal may be correct in assuming that;

...the notion of conflict prevention does not square with the nature of Western democracy.

Foreign policy issues are usually viewed by the electorate as diversions from the

\textsuperscript{176} Smith and Clarke, \textit{op.cit.}; p.2.

\textsuperscript{177} IBID 'What must be stressed is that decisions make different patterns of demands for implementation. We must be clear initially what form and degree of implementation is required by a particular decision. Some may not require implementing, or may require it only in the indefinite future; some may be declaratory, merely to posture, or procedural, for their own sake; some may conflict with established patterns; some may be incapable of being carried out; and some may be programmatic decisions, as in cases in the field of foreign aid, where a structure and plan of action is prerequisite to a decision being taken.' p.6.

\textsuperscript{178} Andrew J Bacevich, "Strategic Studies: In From the Cold", \textit{SAR Review} vol. 13 #2 (Summer-Fall 1993): p. 17.

\textsuperscript{179} Jack Snyder, "Controlling Nationalism in the New Europe", cited in S.W. Griffiths (1993), \textit{op.cit.}; p.89.
government's real task of improving economic wealth; they only assume importance once a crisis is acute. No politician has won votes by claiming to have prevented a conflict, which by definition, never existed because it was prevented. 180

Yet Eyal fails to explain why then was President Truman able to move the US towards large-levels of commitment after World War II when most Americans were all too ready to revert to another era of isolation from Europe? The US populace most certainly understand the simple notion that prosperity today requires firm commitment abroad, particularly when the world is becoming increasingly economically interdependent. Swaying public opinion to a policy geared to protect interests, or potential threats to interests can be reconciled to the American people. But first, they need a coherent policy to which they can rally behind.

This is why the Balkans should have mattered much more to the US. Not because they did not, as realists espouse, affect vital US interests or threaten US strategic security. To realists, however, the situation in the Balkans, from democratising nations such as Albania, to strained relations amongst neighbours, to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, all represent the missed opportunity by the US181 to demonstrate resolve and maintain credibility within the international community. This is not to imply that such credibility is destroyed. It is, however, damaged, or rather lessened in stature. Moreover, the Balkans could have become the staging ground for a new US policy that was much more coherent than the frequently heard cries of 'democratisation', or 'new world order'. From the outset of crisis in the Balkans, however, the US seemed to devolve to the Europeans in handling the crises that arose. While perhaps not a blatant error, such a move can be construed as an error in judgement. As 'architects of the new world order', or certainly at least, the driving force in world politics for nearly fifty years, the US should have understood a simple rule; 'power entails responsibility'.182 Devolution of responsibility to the Europeans should not preclude the idea that the US 'work with the continent's leaders to channel the new East European nationalism in constructive directions'.183 Multilateralism offers its benefits [infra for details]. However, it appears that, recently, the US has a tendency to act in conjunction with allies automatically without fully examining the consequences of unilateral action. Discrepancies of interest between the US and its European allies have often led to non-policy making the US appear indecisive,

180 J. Eyal, "No One Cares Until it's War", The Independent 10 March, 1994
181 Point reiterated by Warren Christopher, 'The West missed too many opportunities to prevent or contain this suffering, bloodshed, and destruction when the conflict was in its infancy. The lesson to be learned from this tragedy is the importance of an early and decisive engagement against ethnic persecution and aggressive nationalism'. Christopher (May/June 1993), op.cit.; p.56.
confused and weak. Again, we come to the question of threats. The notion of democracy establishment in places like the Balkans has merit. 'Stable democratic regimes are strategically important to Western society. They aid in the formation of a security framework'. But, are ethno-nationalist conflicts the specific threats to this notion that the US must address in the post Cold War era?

In states such as Albania, territorial claims precede the existence of the Albanian state. Nationalism has been explained in that country as a means to promote the Albanian cause and perpetuate the myth of a nation besieged by outsiders, deliberately separated by the Great Powers. [supra heading on Albanian Nationalism] The advent of democracy in Albania has not resulted in the heightening of nationalism among the Albanian people. The conflict next door did raise concerns on the part of the West that violence could spread to neighbouring Kosova. Indeed, the threat of Albanian nationalism appears stronger from Albanians in the adjoining areas of Kosova, Greece and Macedonia to rejoin Albania proper. The ideal of a Greater Albania certainly does hold popular appeal. However, groups and political parties within Albania that are advocating such a notion are either few in number and/or do not wield much political influence. President Berisha has repeatedly warned of the possibility of conflict spreading to Kosova. His government has toned down its initial rhetoric which called for an independent Kosova, perhaps a prelude to unification with Albania and thereby a final redressing of grievances. His foreign minister, Alfred Serreqi has indicated, however, that any final solution to Yugoslavia must include Kosova. To the other states in the Balkans Albanian nationalism may pose a threat. The large numbers of Albanians outside of Albania represent possible and actual irredentism for years to come. For Albania, their anxiety over becoming engulfed in conflict has preoccupied their time with 'a consolidation and purification of national identity', in other words, with a maintenance of their present boundaries.

The implications for relations with the US, however, do not appear immediately clear. A strengthening of ties should aid in the development of democracy. The US may want to consider though that, 'policies toward individual states must reflect the nature of the threat to democracy in that state. And, where democracy is threatened by interethnic conflict, counterweights must be built'. In Albania's case, strong bilateral

184 S. Burg, op.cit.: p.163.
185 As to the latter, it appears that religion also factors into Albanian nationalism. Islam is seen by the 'Macedonian authorities as a tool of Albanian nationalism and as a way for Albanians to assimilate other small Islamic minority groups...' Poulton (1993), op.cit.: p.82.
187 IBID
188 Fukuyama (1992), op.cit.: p.272.
189 S. Burg, op.cit.: p.166., 'Events in the former Yugoslav states,...make it clear that the use of force in pursuit of nationalistic goals threatens the stability of neighbouring states and raises the prospect of direct military involvement by outside actors, including the West. The costs and
relations should be tempered with an understanding that threat may come from the surrounding states. Prevention may be achievable, yet requires strong, unilateral 'presence of action'. The possibility of deterioration in relations, however, remains high as states in the Balkans have had the opportunity to witness, firsthand, the less than stellar performance of US policy in the region.

The tensions that have characterised relations between Southern European countries and the USA could re-emerge and perhaps even intensify, as has always happened when the national dimension of the American presence in the Mediterranean has prevailed. Furthermore, the reassertion of the national dimension of European countries could result in differences between European and American objectives that would be harder to reconcile through the Alliance's multilateral constraint. The renascent national dimension would be ushered in by traditional balance-of-power policies, which would weaken the collective European-security organization and jeopardize the creation of a similar trans-Mediterranean organization. 190

The historical failure of the West and its relations with Balkan states is made explicit in the variety of irredentist claims that have arisen in the area since the demise of communism. The US is currently on good footing in Albania. However, is it prepared to address the possibility of a reversion to a more authoritarian system? Moreover, if the Albanians of the Balkans decide to express their claims more vehemently, how will, and should the US respond? The US may have to come to terms with the fact that ethno-nationalist conflicts are not the new threat of the post-Cold War era. However, they do represent one of the major threats to US interests. For democratizing states, such as Albania, they are the main threat. Reconciling the two points of view requires that America first lay out a comprehensive outline of its interests. In doing so, it can define where both the Balkans and Albania fit. It would then follow that policy responses can be formulated that take such interest considerations into account. More importantly, hammering out a policy itself may be achieved, and with it, the consensus needed to support it and carry it through.

1.5 Consensus Building v. Interest Identification

Recent analysis on US foreign policy has been replete with calls for a protection of 'vital, primary, or important' US interests and goals. Specification of these interests, however, has been difficult. It would seem natural that there is an order of priority regarding US interests. Generally, they may lie within one of three categories. First are those of primary importance to the US. These are 'vital interests', and may be defined accordingly;

controversy such involvement would create place a premium on preventing and resolving these conflicts before they turn violent."

...one for which the nation must be willing to fight a major war, if necessary. A threat to a vital interest would automatically involve the very survival of America as a free society, and repelling such a threat would justify all but suicidal exertions. 191

Former President Nixon concurs in this definition of a vital interest by relating it directly to the 'security of the United States'. 192 Such threats should, by definition then, entail the use of force. Yet such explanations of vital interests would imply then that states have the requisite ability to defend these interests when the situation warrants. Even from the realist's vantage point, such security requires the 'accumulation of power'. The latter, however, also refers to, 'those material and non-material assets which enable actors to shape the behaviour of others in desired ways'. 193 Seen from this perspective, such accumulation may refer to factors outside the realm of a state's physical security. Strong economic links and reliance upon trade, etc. may also describe something as a 'vital interest'. As such, military action by the US in defence of this type of vital interest would be justifiable. American response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not, first and foremost, a desire to stop an aggressor, as it was to ensure that large portions of the Middle East's oil supply do not fall under the control of a state which was seen by the US as non pro-Western. Protection of energy supplies and their access by the US made the Iraqi invasion fall within the realm of vital American interest. This would seem to undermine the premise by some analysts that 'milieu goals-especially stability', should not be pursued by the US. 194

However, if we are to assume that vital American interests outside the physical security of the United States can also affect the US, then goals such as stability should not simply be aspired towards, but actively pursued, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Democratisation has shown that it will require time to develop and prosper. In Eastern Europe, reversion to more authoritarian forms of governance are already visible. The short term requires that stability promotion in key areas should perhaps be pursued rather than shunned as an outdated method of the Cold War. American interests in Western Europe, the Middle East and Asia have shown recently that regional events do affect regional allies. The US cannot simply turn its back on these circumstances which are likely to negatively affect American interests in the long term. Two factors, however, should be outlined in regards to such an approach. First, practicality dictates that the United States cannot unilaterally respond to crisis situations across the globe. Second, the US should not limit itself to support of those states and leaders which, on their face, are simply pro-US. The Cold War

192 Nixon (1992), op.cit., p.36.
193 McInnes, op.cit., p.7.
unfortunately forced hard choices upon the States to support those which, although anti-Communist, by their very rule destroyed, perverted, and simply ignored the most basic principles of democracy the US upholds. This is not to imply a sense of moral righteousness on the part of the US. To do so would highlight past US policy hypocrisy. More importantly, to anchor oneself literally to the statement would also demonstrate the contradiction in the principles of democracy promotion with stability promotion. Instead, it should be realised that the end of the Cold War has indeed presented the US with choices. It can now weigh options against interests without examining the possible repercussions within a bi-polar context.

The current crisis in the former Yugoslavia can serve as the proper yardstick for the weighing of such options. Opponents of a more active US approach, including the use of military force, make several points. The US should not, they claim, involve itself in a civil war which would mean forcing the US to take sides. Doing so may involve the US in long, protracted warfare. Also, to take sides may damage US relations with states such as Russia, particularly since the latter has been outspoken against further US action in Bosnia without prior consultation.\(^{195}\) Moreover, opponents correctly point out that Bosnia is not a vital US interest, nor is likely ever to become one. Carpenter makes such a case;

\[\ldots\] such internecine or bilateral conflicts do not affect the global- or in most cases, even the European-geopolitical balance and, therefore, do not impinge on vital American security interests. Indeed, it would be better to insulate the United States from [such] a conflict...than to preserve security arrangements that might entangle American troops in it.\(^{196}\)

The point is valid. The reluctance by the Bush and Clinton administrations to act unilaterally in the former Yugoslavia may demonstrate that it does not hold a high spot on the West's agenda. Yet, the US should perhaps realise that other considerations do factor into assessing what constitutes a vital interest, as well as what may threaten such an interest. Regional security to long time allies in the area has become seriously jeopardised with the outbreak of conflict. Concurrently, the crisis has led to the polarisation of allies in the area against one another. While they all agree on the need to 'do something' to stop the bloodshed, they continuously argue over the means to do so. The poor efforts and recent undiplomatic measures by some states in the Balkans have only served to raise tension levels and exacerbate existing suspicions. The Clinton administration has understood the regional ramifications to some degree. The early attempts, for example, to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia may have, 'been influenced partly by the perception that Turkey has become crucial to American strategic interest in the Near East, surrounded as it is by an oil-rich Azerbaijan, Iran

\[^{195}\] International Herald Tribune 19 April, 1994 p.4.
\[^{196}\] Carpenter (1992), op.cit.; p.34.
and Iraq. Turkey's role in the current crisis has increased with its deployment of troops as part of the peacekeeping force. The active role being played there by Turkey has not been well received by either the Greeks or the Russians, both of which feel that pro-Bosnian sentiments by the Turks may compromise an already delicate situation.

As the bloodshed continues, however, it is likely that the rest of Europe will feel the results as hundreds of thousands of refugees flood across borders. The level of violence has brought to light the humanitarian issue vis-a-vis vital interests. For the US, its stake in Western Europe supersedes the mere economic interests to include the premise of former US Secretary of State James Baker's pledge that Europe remain 'free and whole'. Baker's plea, however, highlights the US hypocrisy as it was he who travelled to Yugoslavia before its dissolution in the Summer, 1991, clinging to the, by then, already defunct notion of a federated state. The wider repercussions of the crisis demonstrate that an interest 'may not be found in the Balkan war itself, but in the European order'. The roots of US involvement on humanitarian grounds alone dates to the early days of the republic. Many states, such as the US, have in the past 'rushed to the aid' of others even if not within American vital interests, motivated, as they were by altruism. Yet the US cannot base a foreign policy upon the principles of altruism, regardless of how noble. For America, its opportunity to take a more active approach in the Balkans should depend upon its concern over a wider European order and security for the long term. 'Interests, not altruism, lead states to cooperate. We must recognize that in the coming decades the thrust of our policy in Europe should center on those states that most need the US connection'. Regional security and stability directly affect those states in the Balkans which are currently pro-US. The likelihood of long term periodic outbursts of conflict pose threats to these states which in turn may affect US interests through their European allies. This is not to suggest some revamped version of the domino theory within a post-Cold War context. That theory was hardly valid during the Cold War. Instead, it is meant to imply that a more determined US policy in certain areas may aid in the security and stability of US interests that could be indirectly affected. For the Balkans, its geostrategic position between both Western Europe and the Middle East should perhaps make the US more concerned in adopting a coherent, long term policy for the region.

200 Muravchik, op.cit.; p.25.
201 Ibid, p.29.
To the newly democratising states such as Albania, instability in the Balkans offers it little hope in a smooth, successful transition to a democratic, prosperous state. Its preoccupation with its neighbours and security concerns supersede its desire to move forward. Some analysts may state the unlikelihood of the Yugoslav crisis from spreading. However, many do not offer the consequences of failed democratisation in the region. Failure may lead to a return of authoritarianism at best, and widespread irredentism, low intensity conflict, and area-wide destabilisation at worst. On its face Albania is not, and probably will not ever constitute a vital US interest. Business interests in that country are negligible. Security threats through Albania are minimal, and its influence throughout the region are trifling. Yet states such as Albania should not be so quickly discarded as outside the realm of US interest. With large numbers of ethnic Albanians scattered throughout the Balkans, poor relations continuing, and the pains of reform, Albania may represent the possibility for either success or failure in fashioning a foreign policy in places like the Balkans. Albania’s proximity to the former Yugoslavia has not been lost by US policymakers which have sought to use it for information gathering on the crisis. The failure of reform, and even of conflict within or involving Albania will not likely affect the US directly. Abandoning a comprehensive policy, however, does not take into account the likelihood that conditional or secondary interests are affected. It is the affect of these interests upon those vital ones which may also require specific policy responses from the United States.

Secondary or conditional interests also have a tendency to impact heavily upon US foreign policy formulation. Their influence upon and relation to primary interests therefore require equal attention from policymakers. As Nixon defines them, critical interests are those which, 'if lost, would create a direct threat to one of our vital interests'. Determining such interests, however, often is more difficult than ascertaining vital ones. This is because secondary interests are those which in and of themselves are not of supreme import until a crisis arising from them is seen as having the likely possibility of affecting, directly, the primary interests. Conditional interests, therefore, become even harder to determine for the US in the post-Cold War era. Deciding which areas are strategic in relation to vital interests requires that the US establish policy projections which are specific and subsequently formulate policy

205 terms from Carpenter (1992), op.cit.; p. 176. He defines them as; '... assets that are pertinent but not indispensable to preserving America's physical integrity, independence, and domestic liberties. Preventing the domination of either Western Europe or East Asia by a power hostile to the United States would be a prime example of a conditional interest'.
206 Nixon (1992), op.cit.; p.36.
options to handle any threats to secondary interests. Such requisite proactive policy, however, has not been available to date.

In applying the principle of secondary interests to the Balkans, a case for a more assertive US role;

...begin[s] with the premise that Western Europe is indisputably a vital US interest; move on to assume that if the conflict in Yugoslavia spilled over its borders, it would pose a threat to Western Europe; and then conclude that stopping the existing fighting...is a vital interest of the United States.\textsuperscript{207}

The view held by some observers, that the conflict will probably not spill over outside the boundaries of Yugoslavia,\textsuperscript{208} should not be the should not be the focus of US interest determination in the Balkans. If it were the case, this would harken back to the foolish notion of some sort of domino scenario in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Instead, it should be understood that it is the conflict itself which threatens; to limit investment in the area,\textsuperscript{209} slow the pace of regional democratisation,\textsuperscript{210} alienate regional allies,\textsuperscript{211} generally destabilise the area,\textsuperscript{212} and heighten already existing tensions, relations, and security concerns. The Clinton administration has repeatedly clung to the Wilsonian premise that democracies do not wage war upon one another. The pursuit of prosperity and of a free society benefits all involved. Even Nixon agrees that;

Beyond it security concerns, the United States has a profound interest in the survival of democratic states, the expansion of economic prosperity through free trade and development, and the promotion of democratic forms of government.\textsuperscript{213}

The foregoing premise of this view relies upon the current belief in enlargement. It should not, however, have to rest solely upon this foundation. A

\textsuperscript{207} Carpenter (1992), \textit{op.cit.}; p.172.
\textsuperscript{208} McInnes concurs by stating; 'The risk that Balkan conflicts might escalate into a general European war, as in 1914, is so minuscule as to be irrelevant'. He does, however, go on to believe some danger is possible; 'Even so, the fear of some spillover effect is justified; it could take the form of large population movements, economic dislocation, or some military intervention by neighbouring countries on behalf of fellow nationals living as minorities in regions of conflict. All this means that any violence in East or Central Europe or the Balkans must be of general European concern'. McInnes, \textit{op.cit.}; p.22.
\textsuperscript{209} Both Greece and Albania can testify to this point, see \textit{The Economist} (22 April, 1994): p.6.
\textsuperscript{210} Referred to by President Berisha, Interview (Tirane: 9 June, 1993)
\textsuperscript{211} For example, Turkey which has repeatedly called for more concerted action and Greece which rebuked the idea of air strikes. See, Aliboni (1992), \textit{op.cit.}; pp.129-133.
\textsuperscript{212} Expressly stated by Misha Glenny, "Carnage in Bosnia, for Starters", \textit{The New York Times} 29 July, 1993
\textsuperscript{213} Nixon (1992), \textit{op.cit.}; p.37.
simpler method would show that US ‘failure in the Balkans', would undermine credibility, result in ‘recriminations', and weaken the link with our European allies.214 Such a process already seems to exist. Turkey, for example, has recently hung on to its belief in the role it could, and perhaps should play in the Balkans. Strong links with Albania, Croatia, Bosnian Muslims, and Bulgaria seem to demonstrate Turkish resolve in showing the US that Turkey can offer itself as an ‘island of stability',215 in the Balkans. The validity of this claim may be subject to interpretation.216 Regardless, Turkish interest and influence in the area are, and have been, growing in recent years. Promoting links and strengthening ties with such states offers the US the opportunity to not only advance the case for democracy, but would aid it in developing policy geared specifically at building strong, conditional interest states.

It would appear that this is also where Albania may find a place in the interest formulation of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The way forward to both security and stability is through success in ensuring that democracy succeeds. The lack of experience a state such as Albania has in such a task coupled with its precarious position in the volatile Balkans requires that the US do more to nurture the process of democracy along in Albania. Quicker integration of Albania into the West European community would provide for yet another anchor of steadiness in an area in desperate need for security and stability. Democracy and market capitalism may not erase deep-seated suspicions between Albania and her neighbours. Yet, significant strides forward would undermine extremists and those that may search for scapegoats for failed democratisation. Successful democracies also, eventually provide safer minority rights guarantees once they are firmly established. For the US, a long term, comprehensive policy towards Albania to ensure its successful transition would help solidify US influence in the region. Consequently, the area itself, of secondary interest due to its strategic location, would be provided with another economically viable, democratic, and pro-West state. The subsequent prosperity and democratisation of the Balkans, beginning with states such as Albania, would serve to secure US vital

214 Tucker and Hendrickson (Fall, 1993), op.cit.: p.25.
215 Point expressed by former President Ozal; ‘The Middle East will retain its strategic importance for the West. And Turkey will be an even more significant island of stability in this troubled region. Turkey will be a vital bridge between the Islamic World and the West. With the developments taking place....in the Balkans, a strong element of stability and predictability is needed more strongly than ever, and that Turkey can and does provide'. Turgut Ozal's address to the International Club of Washington DC, 17 January, 1990, full text in "European Order and Turkish-American Relations", Turkish Review Quarterly, vol. 4 #19 (Spring, 1990) p.111.
216 The notion is dismissed by Philip Robins; “Its place in both the Council of Europe and the ICO has led to repeated claims that it is a bridge from one continent to another, from one culture to another. Such claims are weak and unconvincing. The truth is that rather than understanding both continents and both cultures, and hence having a unique role as interpreter to both, Turkey comprehends neither adequately to fulfil this role. Its relationship with the Arabs, the Persians and the majority of the Islamic states is confused and tentative'. P. Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Pinter Press, 1991): pp.13-14.
interests in Europe. For Albania, their pro-US position is built primarily upon the need for economic aid and investment and, which of course, is presently overridden by quite tangible security threats emanating from both the crisis next door, potential unrest from ethnic Albanians outside its borders, and poor relations with neighbours. The US has sought to ease Albanian anxieties by small levels of economic aid, and through the latter's recent incorporation within the NATO Partnership for Peace plan. The US has also expressed strong support for the Berisha government. Such support also appears to be highlighted by the Americans turning a blind eye to an alarming trend in Albanian politics; the growing authoritarian leadership style of the present government and its increased intolerance to dissent, and continued failure at strengthening regional/bilateral relations. The US appears to have placed all its support behind Berisha without planning for other possible contingencies or perhaps in strengthening its ties with viable players outside the present leadership. Such a move, unfortunately, may be construed by the latter as implicit hopes in its failure by the US. This need not be the case. Granted, in a country where suspicions of outside powers are high, the US nonetheless ought to explore the long-term possibilities of links with other players in Albania. Open, and present support should continue, yet in its relations with Albania, America may want to consider the consequences failure may bring to the region, particularly if it backs such failure or does little to prevent it.

Present policy moves in the area, however, seem to have relegated designs to the final category of interests, peripheral interests. These interests are those which, 'if taken by a hostile power, would only distantly threaten a vital or critical interest'. From the outset of conflict in the Balkans, the US sought to distance itself from the situation by deferring to European crisis management. American diplomats and politicians alike were also quick to point out that any conflict in the region was of marginal interest to the US, that it was a 'European affair', or an internal civil conflict and, therefore should not involve the US at all. Early pundits for an activist US role, particularly those which believed that this sort of conflict was exactly the type meant to demonstrate NATO's new role and moreover to solidify President Bush's vision for a 'new world order', were quickly drowned out by those seeking a minimalist role for the US now that the Cold War was over. Resurgent nationalism was seen as a new virus across Eastern Europe. As such, the prospects for instability remained high. For this reason the US should not, therefore engage itself in 'stability missions' which would likely involve needless 'entanglements', and where the scope of interest is marginal at best. Such reasoning also would allow for a further reduction in the US military commitment to Europe now that the Soviet threat was gone.

217 Nixon (1992), _op.cit._; pp.36-37.
218 Carpenter (1992), _op.cit._; p.33.
Advocates of the minimalist approach, which seek to place the Balkans and crises there, on the heap of peripheral interests, also seem fond of shouting the praises of the Europeans. ‘Greater European initiative and self-reliance on security issues’ seemed the catchphrases most bandied about Washington at the outset of crisis. Allowing for greater range in European crisis management would also aid in alleviating American military burdens on the continent, so the argument went.\(^\text{219}\) The pathetic European response did more than highlight the incompetence of the European Union in handling the situation. It demonstrated exactly how most West Europeans felt about their brethren to the East and South. Washington should have perhaps taken its cue that Europe was not interested at all in the Balkans despite cries from Jaques Delors for the Americans to ‘stay out of it’. During a parliamentary representative group of the Council of Europe visit to the US in 1990, a high ranking European official expressed the following sentiments;

He told his audience that West Europeans felt Central Europe—by which he meant Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany—to be of direct concern to them, part of ‘larger Europe’ to be brought into the ‘European mainstream’ as soon as circumstances permitted. The Balkans, however, here meaning Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria—were of ‘no concern’ to Europe, now or, presumably, ever. If they wanted to ‘tear themselves apart’, that was their business and theirs alone. What went on in the Balkans, even the direst calamity (which he considered by no means unlikely) was certainly no concern of the West European countries because it could make no impact on them. This indifference was uttered by a man well-versed in international affairs and, in some respects, not without a certain breadth of view.\(^\text{220}\)

This prevalent attitude most likely remains regardless of ‘exhaustive’ European efforts to end the conflict. Yugoslavia undoubtedly thrust itself onto the table of West European interest, yet the other ‘Balkan countries have always been regarded by the West as a lower priority than Central Europe’,\(^\text{221}\) and will likely continue to be so. For these other states, the fear of being ‘marginalised and singularised’ adds to their already heightened sense of insecurity. The trend to isolate the Balkans highlights a ‘shift of Europe’s centre of gravity towards the north’ and the polarisation of the south.\(^\text{222}\) By placing, however, these nations on the backburner of Europe’s interests the possibility that future problems may arise with direct consequences remains.

\(^\text{219}\) IBID, pp.17-18.
\(^\text{220}\) quoted in J.F. Brown (1992), op.cit.: p.181., Brown reiterates the point well with a question; ‘...the poverty-stricken Balkans were never as important as the oil-rich Middle East. Will instability there, war even, make much difference? Are not the Balkans, in any case, so insignificant that any instability would be self-circumscribing, or would have very few wider ramifications even if it were not?’, IBID, p.179., Colin McInnes also points to this north-south divide in Europe; ‘...one danger for Europe is that instead of seeing itself as a bridge between old and new ways of thinking and acting on North/South issues, it will drift and be co-opted into playing an increasingly neo-imperialist role, and so exacerbating a bitter and explosive divide between the rich and poor’. McInnes, op.cit.: p.31.
\(^\text{221}\) Cvic (1991), op.cit.: p.91.
\(^\text{222}\) Aliboni (1992), op.cit.: pp.11-12.
For the US, it may want to consider the ramifications such problems may present for Europe, an area of both vital and secondary concern. American allies in the region include Greece, Italy and Turkey. While of marginal interest to the rest of Europe, the Balkans is, and will probably remain, 'an area of immediate regional concern' for these latter three states. Stalled or poor efforts at democratisation, a resultant refugee influx, heightened tensions and security issues all weigh heavily into the formulation of interests for these allies. It is these reasons which appear to have made nations such as Italy and Turkey take a more active approach in strengthening ties with the area. Such measures, though, should not be tackled alone. Co-ordinated aid and development packages on the part of the US via states such as Italy, Greece and Turkey would accomplish two tasks. First, such efforts would demonstrate US resolve in seeing that democratisation and development proceed in this region. This would also remove some of the burden from allies who would not be able to engage themselves in comprehensive development schemes over an extended period of time. Through multilateral efforts, America aid and links would help in solidifying its credibility with allies in the area as to their concerns, both security and otherwise. Second, 'diplomacy, foreign aid and hardheaded negotiating would strengthen ties with the area which in turn may allay security fears over the long term.

There may be a tendency, as stated, to place the Balkans within the scope of peripheral interest. Granted, these types of interests should not involve extensive US commitment, particularly of a unilateral nature. Realists of American foreign policy would be quick to point out that peripheral concerns require marginal assistance at best. They may want to consider, however, that their premise often fails to account for contingencies such as the passage of time. International relations teaches us, not only that 'nature abhors a vacuum', but that policy cannot and should not be formulated within the very same vacuum. Regional situations, particularly in an area undergoing such change as the Balkans, are continuously in a state of flux. Relegating regions and/or individual states to a zone of marginal interest now and forever is

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223 IBID, p.65.
224 Aliboni (1992), op.cit.; 'Owing to its geographic location, Italy feels directly affected by instability, both to the east and to the west', at p.23., 'Developments in Eastern Europe could also spur southern members into action: Italy's revived regional vocation in southeastern Europe with its effort to create an area of influence in the Danube and the Adriatic and its special concern for Yugoslavia...could be complemented by Greece which, by virtue of its geopolitical location, could extend this role into southern Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The predominant Christian Orthodox religion of these populations constitutes another important factor enhancing the potential role of Greece as an agent of the EC in the Balkans', at p.36. For Turkey, 'its adjacent position to an area politically volatile and unstable', subjects it to 'spill-over effects of regional conflicts'. All this is factored into Turkey's regional defence strategy. See, Necip Torumtay, [former Turkish Defence Minister] "Turkey's Defence Strategy", Turkish Review Quarterly vol. 4 #19 (Spring, 1990): p.8.
225 Nixon Seize the Moment... p.37.
impractical and foolish. Circumstances have sometimes shown that such a situation often results in scenarios which come back to haunt the US and the West. Failure to adopt policy for even the slightest of interest can be detrimental, certainly not perhaps in money, men or territory, but rather in credibility and influence. Accomplishing the formulation of policy in conjunction with US interests vis-a-vis threats would require then that the US first determine which direction it appears to be heading within the foreign policy arena. Recent analysis has been replete with everything from the triumph of America and its new place as the world's only superpower to those which have signalled the beginning of long and steady decline. The inevitability of either course or of some approach between the two extremes smacks of determinism. Since when, however, has the US been subject to mysterious, overwhelming forces of nature and history to which it can do nothing and must acquiesce to its fate? Acceptance of such a notion seems to imply a futility even in the formulation of any policy. Instead, review of the various premises may offer choice or rather, the direction in which the US may be headed.

2.0 The United States General Orientation

Understanding the link between interests and threats to those interests also requires that America examine its place and role in the post-Cold War world. There appears from recent analysis three schools of thought as to the direction or orientation of American foreign policy. They are the declinists, the triumphalists, and the multilateralists. The declinist debate actually traces its roots to the early days of the Reagan administration and has been, to date, the most controversial of the three. The notion of the US on some downward spiral with little, if any recourse, has 'touched a raw nerve in American politics'. Nye correctly argues that many people react emotionally against such notions primarily out of national pride. He does, however, state that some 'natural decline in power is inevitable and only power'. This should not, though, naturally imply steady or continued decline in relative power. Further examination of the declinist theory may shed light upon the validity of these claims and their applicability to present circumstances.

2.1 The Declinists

The debate on decline received large attention from econo-historian Paul Kennedy's work, The Decline and Fall of Great Powers. In this work Kennedy argues that the US, like great powers before it, is suffering from 'imperial overstretch'; when interests and obligations of a particular country become larger than that empire's ability

to defend them all'. Yet such ideas of decline predate Kennedy's premise to the days of Ronald Reagan and while they may use varying facts for their conclusions, all point to the same end, the US is in decline. It seems even President Clinton adhere to this premise. In early, 1988, then still Governor of Arkansas, he commented on America's place in the world:

What we are seeing is a widespread awareness that we have come to the end of the postwar era... We don't dominate as we once did. There is a growing belief that America has been living in her past during the 80's. We can't move back anymore.

Understanding this conclusion, however, requires some idea of what declinists mean by power. Such a definition and 'measurement of power relative to a state's rate of decline has plagued international relations scholars for years'. Goertz and Diehl aptly point out that, 'power is clearly a dynamic, intangible relationship that is not open to direct empirical observation or measurement'. But to most declinists arguments appear to relate to capabilities, that is tangible factors such as economic output and production, military capability and expenditure and a state's relative debt. Charles Doran indicates that such factors, 'involving the future trajectory of US power and its foreign policy', constitute part of the 'structural theory' and its place within the international system and 'dynamics of international politics'. As such, Doran believes that whether the analysis talks of decline or otherwise, these theorists should realise that such changes may also rely upon change in the structure of the international system itself.

Such an approach accounts for dynamics of the international system. Whether or not the US in decline, it would seem highly unlikely that this occur without influence and impact both upon and from the international system. Doran then points out that decline must then follow, 'at the inflection point where... rate of growth in relative

229 Noam Chomsky points to the 'relative decline in US economic power during the Reagan years'... which has, 'reduced the United States' capacity to compete for this rich prize [Eastern Europe]'... See, Noam Chomsky, op.cit.; p.62., also, Muravchik, op.cit.; 'Declinism sounds as though it was formulated in explicit rebuttal to Ronald Reagan's reelection theme of 1984, It's morning In America. The declinists want to convince us that in truth it is evening. They want especially to convince us that Ronald Reagan's presidency was not the success that it appears to have been.' pp. 61-62.
231 Goertz and Diehl, op.cit.; p.68.
233 IBID
power begins to fall off even as the level of relative power continues to rise'. The general premise reached, according to Kennedy then, is that of overstretch. Yet such a premise is subject to scrutiny. Kennedy also implies that the US would have to come to terms with its own constitution to tackle decline due to a 'division of constitutional and decision-making powers' which hampers the ability of the US to make swift decisions as opposed to nations without so many constitutional constraints.

Kennedy's statement, however, obviously does not take into account the most fundamental point, the United States constitution is a living document. Its flexibility has been recognised from the time of its origin. The realm of foreign policy constitutes eleven of eighty-five papers of the *Federalist Papers*. There has been little incidence when constitutional constraints have handcuffed the foreign policy establishment of the US. The principle of overstretch also raises a more basic question:

"...Whether America should stretch itself at all, of what would be the proper degree of stretch, of whether there is any such thing as understretch. The declinists never even ask, much less answer, such questions. Are any military expenditures or any foreign alliances or bases ever justifiable? If a country can make itself vulnerable by overexerting itself, can it not also do so by underexerting itself? If this undeniable point is granted, then the debate must turn to concrete evaluations of needs, interests, and strategies. Such evaluations cannot be waived away with airy generalizations. [sic]

For the Clinton Administration, lowering military spending and a decreased military presence abroad seem to point the way to a lesser role in world affairs. The late 1990s indicate only 3% GNP will be spent on defence, nearly a third of that spent during the 1950s and 1960s. This would imply greater flexibility in international affairs for the US. Overstretch, however, 'is a political, not purely economic concept'. By simply arguing the numbers discrepancies in many of the declinist's arguments can be found. The counter proposal by declinists point to an

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234 Doran, *op.cit.*: p.73., Doran relates his point to the international context by stating; 'For others... decline seems to mean extensive movement downward on the relative power curve, perhaps even past the time of the second inflection point when the rate of relative decline slows down...A more familiar benchmark is the apex of the relative power curve, the point at which declining competitiveness begins to chip away some of the previously held share of relative power.'


237 Joshua Muravchik, *op.cit.*: p.58.

238 Alan Tonelson (Winter, 1993/94), *op.cit.*: p.17.

239 By pointing to US percentage of GDP immediately after WWII and then twenty years later, Kennedy indicates that the US share has decreased dramatically from 45% to 22%. Nye counters by stating: 'Charles Wolf of the RAND Corporation notes that if a more appropriate and representative base year is used- say, the mid-1960s for even a pre-World War II year such as 1938]- the remarkable fact is that the US economy's share of the global product was about the same 'then' as it is 'now': about 22% to 24%... Similarly, the American Council on Competitiveness finds that the US share of world product has held constant at 23 percent since the mid-1970s, and actually that its share of the product of the major industrial democracies actually increased slightly in the 1980s... The
unwillingness to engage in overseas commitments and more importantly, to a lessening of American influence, respect and credibility abroad. It is this then which finds expression in policy making typified by the Clinton defence budget. By scaling back, Clinton seems to accept the declinist's fundamental argument; 'the country's best strategy for long-term security and prosperity is to scale back an overextended foreign policy'.\(^{240}\) By concentrating less on influencing the international landscape America can, so the argument goes, 'consolidate national power'.

The logical conclusion arrived at for the declinists is that the post Cold War era should not automatically mean the extensive overseas commitment of the US in grandiose schemes such as democracy promotion. Pundits of an activist overseas role view areas such as Eastern Europe as new bases for resources and markets, as high potential investment regions with cheap labour. Moreover, an activist role would help in creating like minded democracies and preserve peace and stability. Advocates against this approach are quick to purport that such a notion is not lost on the West Europeans. Carpenter mentions that the European Community collectively constitutes more than 342 million people and a GDP of nearly $6 trillion. How then could it, not only take advantage, but also solve problems which may arise from the area?\(^{241}\) The argument has some validity yet fails to consider a basic notion;

The EC does not and cannot have a single defense policy, for the simple reason that it does not have a single army. And in circumstances such as the Yugoslav crisis, a foreign policy without a defense policy is like a gun without ammunition- it is effective only up until the moment when your opponent realizes that you are bluffing.\(^{242}\)

Carpenter also states that the US must realize that its interests, though some overlap is likely, will not match those of its allies in Western Europe, thereby widening the trans-Atlantic gap.\(^{243}\) There should be, however, no surprise in this, nor cause for alarm. To imagine that America's allies would precisely match her own is 'self-deluding'.\(^{244}\) Indeed, it has been the crisis in the former Yugoslavia which appears to lend credence to the declinist's premise. The changing security environment in the post Cold War world no longer reflects US posture during the time of bi-polarity. The case is then made that this change in environment shows 'US incapability at preventing or even at repelling aggression'.\(^{245}\) The declinist's argument, however, suffers from

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results of these studies conflict with the view that American decline has been precipitous or continuous.' [emphasis in original] Nye (1990), op.cit.; pp.6-7.
240 Alan Tonelson (Summer, 1993), op.cit.; p.166.
241 Carpenter (1992), op.cit.; p.45.
242 Noel Malcolm (July, 1993), op.cit.; p.41.
243 Carpenter (1992), op.cit.; p.41.
244 John Gray, "Backward into the Future", National Review (29 March, 1993): p.27. Point made in reference to the Yugoslav crisis which Gray believes will only 'strengthen American isolationism and cloud American perception of the real dangers to global security'.
several flaws in reasoning. First, 'it tends to be highly deterministic and suggests that man's fate is largely the product of inanimate forces around him'. The notion that decline is inevitable would have us believe that methods to correct this dilemma are useless and that, instead, the US should manage its decline gracefully to ensure that upheaval does not occur. If this is the case, then current measures by the Clinton administration to trim defence spending and overseas commitment reflect this prevailing attitude. The irony of this policy, however, is that military spending during the time of America's peak economically has not been matched since the late 1950s when industrial growth was spurred on by military production spending. 'Why then do declinists treat it as self-evident that America can slow its decline by cutting military spending?' To proceed in the present policy demonstrates nothing but a willingness on the part of the US to disengage from Europe at a time when the latter still requires US influence, direction, security guarantees, aid and general presence. Non-predictability and potential instability require a more concerted effort, not a decreasing one. This should not imply an ever burdening debt or mortgaging America's future to non-vital interests. It may, however, require a rethink as to the level of activism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and overall reconsideration to the benefits of unilateral action.

Second, the notion that America has lost its 'empire' or that it should even be called one loses touch with the realities of current circumstances. Mead referred to the US as the 'greatest empire in history'. Since when, though, has imperialism dominated American foreign policy making? Muravchik correctly points out that, 'the American empire, conversely, consists of states that trade with America, some that receive aid from America, and some that have mutual defence treaties with America. But none lacks the freedom to govern itself, and none fails to defy American wishes when it wishes'. The idea that the US is an empire in the classical sense does not accurately reflect that America has 'neither sought wealth nor territory. Ours is an

\[246\] Muravchik, op.cit.; pp.53-54.
\[247\] IBID., 'the classical self-contradiction of determinists. Namely, if our history is shaped by forces larger than ourselves, then there is little point to exhorting one another to political action...', p.55.
\[248\] Muravchik, op.cit.; p.57.
\[249\] Walter Russell Mead, *Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition* (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1987): p.3. 'The inevitability of Mead's premise states; 'If we are correct in our belief that this decline is inevitable, our attitudes towards it matter no more than a pebble matters to the course of the Mississippi...The tides of history created the American Empire...Once the tides began to flow against the empire, no president and no Congress could stop them'., p.198. Muravchik counters Mead's premise claiming that the deterministic approach 'descends into mysticism...it is unclear what force drives Mead's tides. His religious position in which it is assumed that God is the mover. Rather, like Hegel and Marx, he seems to reify history, to treat it as if it were a being with an intent of its own, unaffected by the decisions of human beings'. Exporting....p.55.
\[250\] Muravchik, op.cit.; p.61.
imperium of values. Advancing the cause of democracy, of free markets and its like are ideals that have found supporters across the globe since the demise of communism. The progress of democracy and of free markets should not signal decline but success. Granted, the US share of global wealth and production may decrease relative to this rise. Yet, is it not better to witness this phenomenon which in turn provides for a safer and more secure world than to see its failure and witness, instead widespread regional instability and the potential for more in areas of strategic importance such as the Balkans?

The third weakness, as previously mentioned, offers a plethora of economic indicators and statistics to demonstrate America's steady and continuing decline. For every statistic offered by the declinists, however, an equally valid one can be dredged up to indicate otherwise. Declinists are quick to point to the budget debt and its sharp increase during the Reagan era as proof positive that the US has declined. From the world's largest creditor to the world's largest debtor surely smacks of relative economic decline. Yet, even the declinists may want to consider that power, an amorphous beast, cannot be measured by data alone. Has the US, since the Reagan era lost its stature upon the international arena? More importantly, how exactly can this be measured, and who is to judge?

The fourth inconsistency relates to the declinist's view that decline can be managed, and perhaps even reversed or slowed. This argument though contradicts simple notions of international politics. If we are to agree with the premise of declinists that the world is becoming smaller and more interdependent, then logically America 'cannot seal off its fate from the fate of others'. To make various parts of the globe unimportant represents a failure to understand the dynamics of global politics. Realists would have the US scrap ideas of commitment in regions where vital interests are not present, such as the Balkans. Albania, also would reflect minimal interest and therefore should not rely upon American activism. Expenditure of resources into these areas would hasten decline. Others would argue that some level of involvement should proceed yet be confined to diplomatic gestures. Such moves would not severely hamper American resources and still demonstrate US involvement on the world scene. Yet the recent crisis has shown that diplomacy without the backing of American will supported by US resources does very little save weaken US resolve, cloud US consensus, limit US influence and damage US credibility. Such a policy highlights the fifth, and perhaps most damaging belief of the declinists. By relying upon, and couching their theory on past and present data and circumstances, declinists offer very little recourse for the future of American foreign policy making except the

252 Muravchik, op.cit.; pp. 44-45.
preconceived notion of decline. It appears that they also are very adept at descriptive analysis with limited availability to a prescriptive method aside from a decrease in military expenditure and overseas commitments. Were it that simple, would it not be likely that the large foreign policy establishment in Washington would have taken appropriate measures to allay decline? Perhaps not, yet the question does raise a more pertinent one; how can declinists be so sure that their measures of ‘retrenchment’ will succeed? Again, power does entail responsibility. The US may consider that drawing back from the international arena may do it more harm than good. Nye makes the case;

Policies of retrenchment are premature and, ironically, they could produce the very weakening of American power they are supposed to avert. Withdrawal from international commitments might reduce American influence overseas without necessarily strengthening the domestic economy. Further, the nations of the world have become so inextricably intertwined that efforts to draw back would be difficult at best.253

Advocates of the counter-declinist argument are quick to point out these faults. Many, however, adhere to the second broad category of US foreign policy orientation, the universalists or triumphalists.

2.2 The Triumphalists

The notion of superpower varies to some degree with the triumphalists from those that believe in the universality of American dominance, to those that feel the US may be a first among equals, and to others who see American hegemony yet also see threats to such hegemony. However scholars of this approach do agree that with the end of the Cold War the US has emerged as the only superpower, that is, the only complete superpower. While this ideal encompasses economic, political and military capability and dominance, it also includes certain intangible factors difficult to quantify. Brzezinski offers some explanation;

The emergence of great powers is also the consequence of special historical opportunity combined with inherent physical capability. The moment- or the historical trend-must be congenial to the flowering of a dominant, catalytic state that has something of importance to say to the world at large- be it through a mission civilisatrice or a doctrinal revelation or a compelling social example- to which others are historically receptive. Last, but not least, extant must be necessary sinews of power, economic and also military.254

Indicators and statistics can reaffirm the cries of the triumphalists that America is indeed dominant in relevant fields compared with others. The end of the Cold War does, moreover, put the US in a 'pivotal' position in world politics.255 Retrenchment from world affairs now would not only be foolish but would also be incompatible with

253 Nye (1990), op. cit.: p.4.
254 Brzezinski (1993), op. cit.: p.117.
255 Armstrong and Goldstein, op. cit.: p.4.
America's place in the world given its sole superpower status. Triumphantists such as Wattenberg do not contend the rise of others, especially economic and/or military powers in Europe and the Pacific Rim. Yet, they do claim that the end of the Cold War has signalled triumph for the US of something perhaps of more weight, American universality of ideals. The 'American way of life', Wattenberg claims, is 'the pervasive, persuasive, universal model for activity all over the world'. D The premise is that America has demonstrated to others that American ideals are an 'imperium of values', a culture that has been and is being duplicated and sought after.

It may, however, be premature to believe that others will automatically subscribe to the 'American way of life'. The US, for all its positive points, has not exactly been a paragon of virtue, as the Los Angeles riots demonstrated. Problems do persist and it is these internal factors which may undermine the triumphalist's premise. Some, such as Nixon do not support Wattenberg's theory yet agree with the basic prescription of America's dominance in world affairs. As most realists do, Nixon weighs the tangible factors and it is these which offer the US the opportunity to lead in the post Cold War era.

As the world's complete superpower, the United States must exercise leadership without imposing its political and cultural values on others...we can advance our values and ideals with restraint dictated by realism. We should cultivate the growth of democratic principles where a reasonable prospect exists for their success and where they would be supported by nationalist traditions, customs, and institutions. We should not, however, engage in an indiscriminate global ideological crusade. 257

Brzezinski concurs with the tangible factors approach yet addresses the intangible ones as those which require the US to 'transform its power into a leadership that commands moral legitimacy'. 258 Both approaches seem to believe that American activism abroad is not only capable, but necessary. While the circumstances of global security have shifted from the days of bi-polarity, threats still require US presence and leadership, so the argument goes. The shift may represent the US moving from a position of 'protector and dominator' to that of 'coalition-builder and persuader'. Regardless, the 'mantle of leadership will still tend to fall to the United States'. 259 These advocates do not adhere to the call for isolationism espoused by some which base their notion upon curing America's ills before getting involved abroad. Indeed, those that believe in US

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256 Wattenberg, op.cit.: p.9., Wattenberg's chief contention is that America's chief export is her culture despite claims of rivals overtaking us economically; 'The tapes being fed into a quarter of a billion VCR's around the world typically show American movies, and if you'll excuse the expression, American music. If you're in the superpower, super-culture business, it's better to own the software than the hardware. The Japanese, in short, have mass-produced and mass-marketed a machine to disseminate American popular culture.', at p.18.

257 Nixon (1992), op.cit.: pp.299-300.

258 Brzezinski (1993), op.cit.: p.103.

resurgence, and the need to maintain it, feel an inextricable link exists between the domestic and the foreign. By having and equally strong domestic policy, our interests at home can be served while simultaneously enhancing US interests abroad.\footnote{Nixon (1992), op.cit.: p.278.} This may contain truth, yet formulating such a policy requires being equally capable to convince the American public that a strong, activist approach in foreign policy serves US domestic interests. It appears that the present administration has been either unwilling or incapable of doing this so far.

For the democratising nations of Eastern Europe this technique involves continued 'responsibility to act', and subsequent aid to assist in democratisation. This may appear a grandiose project yet, as realists contend, 'this does not mean that [the US] should write a blank check'.\footnote{IBID, pp. 234-235. Nixon believes the key is to start at the basic levels; 'after helping achieve macro-economic stability, we should focus not on big ticket government-to-government aid but on jump-starting the system at the microeconomic level. Before the East Europeans can set the wheel of capitalism in motion, they have to reinvent it. Private property- the link between work and reward- is the key', at p. 132.} It instead requires that US leadership also involves prudence and scrutiny and programs which encourage states to help themselves. Such a policy would continue to promote US involvement abroad yet not hamper America by a unnecessary drain of time and resources on 'no-win' situations. Former US ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirkpatrick takes this notion further by criticising the American ideal that states could be 'democratised anytime and anywhere'.\footnote{Jean Kirkpatrick quoted in Fukuyama (1992), op.cit.: p.9.} The US can and should take hold of its mantle as leader, yet be able to temper its policy where and when necessary. Critics of the triumphalists school believe that the US nature of power is not geared for the new threats of the post Cold War world. By examining the tangible factors of power, such as military strength, they conclude that America will likely not be capable of adjusting to the new threats. 'A superpower, they contend, is essential only for major military tasks, such as deterrence'.\footnote{H. Branden, op.cit. p.140.} In this realm the United States has fared well throughout the Cold War. Now, however, as ethno-nationalist conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have shown, the US finds itself handcuffed by inaction or action of a limited nature, subject to allied approval and of little likelihood for success. This, the critics contend, is not the mark of 'unipolarity' nor of America's opportunity to lead, but instead may demonstrate the pattern for the upcoming decades.

It is this contention, though, that triumphalists feel can be reversed by assertive US leadership, the type they believe is not currently being practised. By scaling back the military, for example, some feel that the Clinton administration is deliberately abandoning the 'security structures that kept the peace' during the Cold War.\footnote{John Gray (March, 1993), op.cit.: p.27.} Such
policy, they assert, is 'folly', particularly at a time when the potential for high-tech weapons proliferation is increasing and key regions are subject to potential instability. As for those critics which see deferment of responsibility on the part of the US, as in the case of Yugoslavia, advocates of US leadership, such as Nixon offer less than a flattering reappraisal;

In Yugoslavia's internal crisis, mediators from the European Community responded like Keystone Kops. During the initial phases of the crisis, European powers split over whether to support the Communist Serbian and central government or the democratic secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The community sent teams to act as ceasefire observers but did not marshal its massive political and economic leverage to demand a nonviolent resolution based on democratic self-determination. In the first major political play in the post-cold war period, Europe fumbled the ball.265

Nixon, may perhaps have failed to realise that at the outset of problems in Yugoslavia, the United States under the Bush administration was, not only too delighted and ready to let the Europeans handle it, but also clung on to the already defunct idea of a federated Yugoslavia. Granted, triumphalists claim that pre-emptive, concerted action may have been successful. However, hindsight unfortunately is always 20/20.

These scholars though are not easily swayed by such arguments. Indeed, some believe that the general situation in the Balkans was perhaps typical of the need for US leadership and America's first true opportunity to act.

Accordingly, throughout this decade and into the next century, the world's political affairs will be dominated by issues and conflicts that are the product of conditions, histories, and concerns of an essentially regional character. The world's political power is likely to be distributed in terms of... several clusters....with America not only dominating one of them directly but still intruding to a significant degree in several of the others.266

Yet, even Brzezinski admits that the US cannot 'extinguish all regional fires' that are likely to erupt.267 The US may stand alone but it does so in an era when the environment of global affairs is in a chaotic state of flux. By not being able to adapt and to do quickly and efficiently, the United States risks not being able to lead and shape the post Cold War world it did so much to help create. The Clinton team may be correct in its domestic focus but so far appears unable to understand that the link between domestic and foreign interests require and equally strong, comprehensive foreign policy. The domestic interests of America may limit its foreign policy power

265 Nixon (1992), op.cit.: p.126. As for other Europe-based organisations such as the CSCE, Nixon felt that without its own military force structure the CSCE would be doomed in a crisis, 'never capable of doing more than adopting nonenforceable, wrist-slapping resolutions', at p. 128.


267 IBID
projection and it is in this realm that the US, and the Clinton administration, may want to consider addressing the policy inadequacy.\textsuperscript{268}

For areas like the Balkans, and Albania specifically, America should consider the option of taking the lead in stabilisation and democracy promotion. If the region is placed within the scope of US strategic interest, it would make little sense for the United States to allow the West Europeans to attempt leadership in the region. The European Union states have demonstrated to date that they are not able to readily gain consensus, invest heavily in the free market capitalisation of the zone, and secure the safety and integrity of the constituent nations. It has been argued that the 'alternative to- not only regional- but general American leadership [then] is global anarchy.'\textsuperscript{269} In the case of Albania then, the US is presented with the opportunity to foster the growth, success, and democratisation of a state which already is strongly pro-US, in a region of, marginally, conditional interest, in an area of strategic importance.\textsuperscript{270} Ensuring stability and continued aid in the short to medium term would likely achieve prosperous and stable growth in the long term, perhaps with regional consequences. A minimalist approach, however, relying upon diplomatic initiative, low level aid and offering lip service instead of concrete security guarantees in a volatile area does very little save promote unrest and hinder development. This in turn will likely have a damaging affect an area of strategic importance to the US and cost it more so in the long term.

2.3 The Multilateralists

Apart from the previous two schools of thought are the multilateralists. They may include those which do not deny US power and leadership capability with those that feel the US may indeed be heading away from its once superpower status. They

\textsuperscript{268} Point reaffirmed by Brzezinski; '...while the United States is now without a peer, with none of its rivals capable of replacing its comprehensive power, America's domestic dilemma's inhibit the physical scope of America's power and impede the translation of that power into acknowledged global authority. As a consequence, the United States cannot be the global policeman, nor the global banker, nor even the global moralist. The first requires legitimacy, the second must be based on liquidity, and the third has to be derived from unblemished example. However, despite these limitations, the innovative- even if philosophically troubling- character of the American social system makes America the catalyst of global change', (1993), op.cit.; p.149.

\textsuperscript{269} ibid., p.146.

\textsuperscript{270} Tucker and Hendrickson refer to the strategic importance of the Balkans vis-a-vis the Bosnian crisis; 'To respond that the conflict is primarily a European problem is to acknowledge that the possible consequences of failure do not engage our interest or, at any rate, do not engage our interest sufficiently to warrant committing ourselves militarily in a manner the American government has so far refused to do. But if this is the case, then a momentous change has indeed occurred in the nation's foreign policy. It has occurred not because our resources are limited and we cannot impose our will everywhere, all of which is certainly true, but because we have determined, consciously or unconsciously, that what was once our most vital interest no longer merits even the modest commitment [modest by former standards of the Cold War] that Bosnia might require'. Tucker (Fall, 1993), op.cit.; p.24.
do, however, agree that the US should, with the Cold War over, operate within the arena of world affairs on a multilateral basis. This entails the notion of 'great power cooperation, rather than unilateralism'. Some such as Bruce Cummings call on the US to 'ally with rising capitalist powers'. By doing so, the 'multilateral arrangement would focus on New York, Berlin, and Tokyo, with Washington still hegemonic'. It appears that multilateralism has indeed become the watchword for the Clinton administration. It should be noted, however, that multilateralists themselves often encompass those that may be called declinists or resurgence theorists. The distinctions in some cases are subtle, in others they are vast in contrast to declinists who believe that multilateralism would only accelerate decline.

The basic premise though is that the world has become increasingly multi-polar, that is that other centres of power be they economic and/or military have sprung up to either challenge the notion of unipolarity or to make it known that they too are now players on the world stage. In this environment, the US may still be the most powerful nation, however, it will likely no longer enjoy hegemonic status. The alternative then is to accept the premise that other centres of power exist and should be dealt with in a co-operative manner to deal with the new global threats. Some multilateralists though believe that the United States, even within a multi-polar world, still should take the lead in concerted action. Its place within the hierarchical structure of states should continue to reflect its status as great power. Therefore, it should be willing and able to make the 'important strategic decisions which do not necessarily cater to the interests of its smaller allies'. It is natural to assume that within a multi-polar system a disparity of power does exist. The greater such disparity, the greater the range of decision-making. The US believes that multilateralism in conjunction with its European allies, for example, offers it the best possible route to protecting its vital interests, maintaining presence within Europe, and yet not severely draining its resources through unilateral action. To achieve the premise, however, of the US as a 'chairman of the board', it may must negate the image of 'weakness' and decreasing credibility among its European allies. Within the domestic context, the US should take care to 'put its economic house in order'. The Gulf War demonstrated that the US was dependent upon others to pay for the cost of war. A superpower or, first among others, should not be so dependent. Granted, the US has for some time been calling

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271 Bruce Cummings, "The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East", in M. Hogan, op.cit.: p.94.
272 Carpenter (1992), op.cit.: p.140.
274 James Chace, op.cit.: p.69.
275 IBID, p.13.
for a burden-sharing among its allies. The question, however, becomes whether such burden-sharing also entails a devolvement of the 'political and moral responsibility' for concerted action. This notion of interdependence lends credence to multilateralists. By accepting that the world indeed has become a smaller place and that the gap between domestic and foreign is shrinking, multilateralists claim that such interdependence cannot be managed unilaterally. In other words, 'the management of interdependence needs an expansion of political capacities to shape events at the supranational level.' The operation, then, of the United States within a multilateral framework would seem a logical outcome.

In the addressing the security threats that would arise, multilateralists opt for co-operative efforts which do not discount the possibility of a military response. What is necessary, however, for a 'Western alliance is to redesign and adjust their security structures.' By doing so, the belief is that consensus can be reached and threats to the security and stability of Europe can be met. Yugoslavia has demonstrated otherwise. By immediately placing the issue within the realm of the United Nations Security Council, the US removed any possibility of acting unilaterally in a region of strategic interest. It is natural to assume that even like minded democracies will not be in accord with ways to combat crisis. Deliberately placing Yugoslavia within the international arena removed any possible alternatives unilateral action may have presented. Moreover, multilateralists are not in accord with democratisation. By embarking upon the policy of democratisation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans via enlargement it appears the US is engaged in contradictory policy. To seek to democratisate an entire region yet, should crises arise in that region, to address them within a multilateral framework is assume much on the part of our allies. For one, that our interests coincide. Our allies may not deny that democratising the Balkans is a 'good thing'. Yet they, like America, may want to admit that they 'have no special wisdom about the process of transition'. Further, security threats will meet with opposing views as to how to handle them, thus crippling initiative and delaying solutions as appears the present case in the Balkan crisis.

Those who call for democratisation may want to consider that democracy encompasses more than the rule of law and free market capitalism. It also, by its nature, implies the security and integrity of peoples without fear of subjection. In the Balkans democracy cannot be built without addressing 'long-standing ethnic

276 H. Branden, op. cit.: pp. 64-65.
278 IBID, p.157.
grievances'. Concerted action by the international community has shown that 'redrafting maps' does not relieve the 'ethnic insecurity of minorities'. And without such guarantees on behalf of minorities, democracy cannot succeed. These security guarantees are part and parcel of democratic tradition and are not likely to be ensured by multilateralism. Multilateralists contend, however, that indeed regional and international organisations offer the best protection for these rights. Group action has greater chance for success than action taken individually. In the Balkans, for example, international guarantees of existing borders protected by NATO, would, so the argument goes, 'deprive transnational ethnic rivalry of its political and military explosiveness, [and may] provide one substantial defense against the spread of violence and disorder'. NATO air strikes and threats of more, may have achieved their limited objectives, but, they have hardly dissuaded Bosnian Serbs from continuing the fight. Gaining consensus on the crisis in the Balkans has been difficult and will likely continue to be so. For the United States, such multilateral actions may also highlight inconsistencies with its proposals of democracy promotion.

It was hoped by many within the Clinton administration that the end of the Cold War would, at last, bring to the fore the principles espoused by President Woodrow Wilson following the First World War. The belief of these 'neo-Wilsonians' is that 'democracies do not wage war upon one another'. Further, that 'political order was based upon liberal democracy'. As such, it was naturally assumed that the goal of foreign policy then was to 'speed or assist the global convergence on democratic institutions, and thereby bring about the cessation of war'. The assumption should not be that democracy, in and of itself, curbs 'man's natural instincts for aggression and violence', but instead that democracy represents ideals which run counter to ideas of domination by one or many over another and thereby eliminate the 'motive for imperialism', often the cause of war itself. For multi-lateralists, democratisation meant aid packages through organisations designed to achieve political and economic development. Yet, as the end of the Cold War has demonstrated, aid levels are not readily available and in fact are decreasing. While the US Congress has been ready

280 Shoup (1990), op. cit.: p.11.
281 William Pfaff (Summer, 1993), op. cit.: p.106.
282 IBID, p.107.
283 Noel Malcolm uses early 1991 to demonstrate the failure of concerted action on behalf of the EC. 'During a lull in the fighting in September, 1991, Croatia and France suggested sending 50,000 soldiers to enforce a ceasefire from the WEU. The idea was seized upon by integrationists as the first step toward a European army. The British seeing it in a similar light, became alarmed and vetoed it accordingly. From then, the paralysis of the EC was assured.' See, Malcolm (July, 1993), op. cit.: p.41.
284 John Gray, op. cit.: p.27.
285 Fukuyama The End of History.... p.263.
286 The OECD's Development Assistance Committee [DAC] released figures indicating that DAC's 1991-1992 aid disbursement increased by only 0.5%. Other figures show that UN agencies have frozen their budgets. See The Economist (7 May, 1994): pp.21-23.
to assist developing nations in the past, recent budget constraints indicate that
programs such as America's Agency for International Development [AID] has had to
cut back. AID’s chairman has outlined four goals which seek to correspond with the
Clinton administration’s foreign policy goals of enlargement;

* foster and help build democracy *
* protect the environment *
* foster sustainable economic development *
* encourage population control*287

Eastern Europe is currently competing with the rest of the Third World for limited
resources. Given this, it becomes difficult for multilateralists to accomplish their goals
without realising that tough choices may be necessary. Democratists may want to also
consider that aid alone is often not the sole answer to fostering democracy, particularly
in areas where there has been no past experience with it.288

The promotion of democracy may have its merits yet the US should also realise
that its vital and strategic interests require it view international politics with an eye
towards national security. Multilateral aid to Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the
former USSR may be earmarked for democracy promotion, however, such aid must
also take the realities of international politics into account. Aid to these areas is seen
by the US in ‘strategic terms’,289 and should also be balanced in accordance with its
interests, once the latter are defined. Advocates of the democratist approach criticise
the realists for assuming that democracy promotion represents grandiose schemes with
‘no geographic limits’ and believe that the US should instead be dictated by interests.290
These criticisms may hold some validity. ‘The assumption and expectation that the
American model would be enthroned in Eastern Europe...[is] more an reflection of
optimism than reality’.291 Democratists who would advocate democratisation across
the globe and based upon the US model assume that the US has either the resources
available for such a grand task or believe that multilateral institutions should naturally
embark upon such a course. Both assumptions are false. Yet realists should not be so
quick to criticise democratisation. As a foreign policy goal, it does have merit.

Granted, the US model may not be the most applicable or even the most practical one
available. This should not preclude the possibility of democracy. Democratists are
correct in stating that foreign policy is sometimes driven by factors other than vital or
strategic interests. Yet, they should also understand that foreign policy without the

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287 IBID, p.21.
290 Muravchik, op.cit.; pp.24-25.
direction and influence of interests is not policy but instead represents the random instances of crisis management. The democratists and the realists can coexist but need to make clear certain points. By outlining interests in key areas, democracy promotion can proceed in those regions where vital and/or strategic interests predominate. The US can operate such a policy unilaterally via enlargement assisted by multilateral organisations in areas where vital or strategic interest are not of primary concern.

Realists have argued that Wilsonian ideology, however, should be abandoned as a base for American foreign policy. The end of the Cold War has created a 'global power vacuum' which, as seen in the cases of Yugoslavia and North Korea, has triggered instability in Europe and rearmament in the Far East. Yet these realists may also want to consider if such Wilsonian ideology was performed on a proactive basis instead of the present reactive one, such instability may not have arisen. Democracy promotion has its value yet multilateral aid alone is not the answer. Democracy must entail stability promotion in the short term, coupled with the creation of institutions which would help instil a 'civic culture', and economic development in the medium term, followed eventually by democracy over the long span. Granted, democracy may be tougher in areas such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe where it has a limited history. The likelihood for more 'authoritarian structures' to emerge in that region are high. This should not, however, preclude the policy of democracy promotion in the area, particularly since US vital, or at least, conditional interests are likely affected. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher has reiterated the US position on enlargement. By promoting democracy, the belief is that America's security also benefits. By doing so through multilateral institutions, the US reduces its resource expenditure. With success comes therefore a group of democracies which would not only make the world more peaceful, but would lessen the military burden of the US. As such, enlargement would be cheaper to maintain than the military spending and the series of alliances kept during the Cold War.

Europe's long term security-like America's- requires that we actively foster the spread of democracy and market economies. Democracies tend not to make war on each other. They are more likely to protect human rights and ensure equal rights for minorities. They are more likely to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and environmental protection....Assisting them is not charity; it is essential to our common security. We must provide political support for reform, keep our markets open to their products, and target our

292 John Gray, op.cit.: p.28.
293 Fukuyama believes such a culture is essential to healthy stable democracies. See, Fukuyama (1992), op.cit.: p.215. Civic culture implies the intangibles of democracy aside from 'the political process, the constitutional system, the sovereignty of law and the preservation and enhancement of individual rights. It also entails the role played by culture and philosophy which together generate the values that motivate and shape social behaviour'. Brzezinski (1993), op.cit.: p.75.
294 Geir Lundestad, "The End of the Cold War, the New Role for Europe, and the Decline of the US", in, M. Hogan, op.cit.: p.199.
Isolationists and the realists, among them political commentator and former Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan, continue to criticise democracy promotion. 'We are not the world's policeman, nor its political tutor. Whence comes this arrogant claim to determine how other nations should govern themselves, or face subversion by the National Endowment for Democracy [NED], the Comintern of the neo-conservatives? What have the 'democracies' done for America lately?' Buchanan's scathing rhetoric, however, suffers from the most fatal flaw for most realists, it deals with the present. Democracy promotion in key areas not only would ensure our interests in these regions but would also aid in securing and creating 'zones of stability' and perhaps a safer world. But even the democratists should realise that promoting democracy entails more than 'procedural democracy'. In Eastern Europe, for example, there has been little history of democracy. The latter is not some good that can be traded or bartered. It can, however, become subject to outside influence.

Hyper-democratists such as Wattenberg who opt for democracy promotion based upon the 'American model' may be too extreme, particularly in his calls for a doctrine of 'neo-manifest destinarianism'. Yet he does raise the point that America's foreign aid budget along with that for the NED should be raised to ensure that programs such as enlargement take off. For the declinists, managing US decline should preclude any such notion of democracy promotion especially if handled unilaterally. To do so would only further deplete US resources and thereby hasten decline. Regardless of the position, democracy promotion does raise the question, 'does aid foster democracy and whether or not it should be pursued by the US unilaterally or through multilateral institutions?' More importantly, critics would argue that the US is currently operating an inconsistent policy when it calls for democracy promotion yet continues to scale back resources. Vital and strategic interests are necessary to protect, yet democratists may want to consider that such interests

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296 Warren Christopher (May/June, 1993), op. cit.; p.55.
297 quoted in Wattenberg, op. cit.; p.198.
298 IBID, p.18.
300 'Democracy arises from certain social circumstances,...A solid case can be made that literacy, affluence, national unity, peace, and the like are factors that make democracy easier to create or preserve. It is equally true, however, that democracy is created; it does not just arise. It is created as a result of political, cultural, or intellectual processes that persuade a body of people to create democratic structures. Those processes are manifestly subject to external influence', Muravchik, op. cit.; p.81.
301 Wattenberg, op. cit.; p.196.
302 Exporting Democracy... pp.49-50.
conflict with the promotion of democracy, they may be hard pressed to automatically choose the latter and thereby forfeit the former. The case of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former USSR presented the West with an opportunity to construct policy which would perhaps dictate relations with these areas for the next several decades. In its natural apprehension not to cause further disruption, the West became caught between seeking stability and furthering democracy. This was particularly evident in the Balkans.

The rapid disintegration of the 'evil empire' affected the Balkans in a profound way. No plans were formulated for an orderly transition to democracy in a region that had very little of it prior to 1945, when communism came to power. It was assumed that because American ideals were internalized by the students of Beijing and Moscow, they would also be adopted by prewar émigré elites, their offspring, and recycled Communists who crashed the gates of democracy to lead again. This assumption was still firmly embedded in the minds of Western officials and was even integrated into the preelectoral rhetoric of American presidential candidates. What the West seemingly failed to notice in the Balkans, however, was that prewar elites and opportunists leapt to the front with old scores to settle. In some countries, these opportunistic elements succeeded in hijacking the bandwagon of democratization and moved to pursue their age-old agendas. 303

However, the most fatal flaw in the reasoning of multilateralists and the democratists may rest upon a simple premise, that democracy is the sole ideology that should be pursued. Indeed, the more basic premise assumes that the rest of the world wishes to cooperate with the West. 'The West should understand that the one billion Moslems [for example] will not be impressed by a West that is perceived as preaching to them the values of consumerism, the merits of amorality, and the blessings of atheism. To many Moslems, the West's (and especially America's) message is repulsive'. 304 Brzezinski's point is a valid one. Moreover, it raises the more recent argument by Samuel Huntington 305 Huntington makes the case for a new paradigm within international relations, one based upon a 'clash of civilizations'. 306 'Western ideas of individualism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.' 307 These latter cultures represent over half of the world's population. To believe that Western culture, including politic culture, can be superimposed or replace cultures

305 Huntington, "A Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs vol.72 #3 (Summer, 1993)
306 Huntington explains the latter as; 'A civilisation is...the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species...A civilisation may include several nation states..., or only one....Civilisations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilisations...Civilisations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilisations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge'. (Summer, 1993), op cit.; at p.24.
that have been in position for millennia is more than foolish, it fails to understand the basic notion democracy itself is meant to protect, that culture is indigenous and part of what distinguishes one peoples from another. Huntington's argument deserves greater attention. He has presented the case that the end of the Cold War will witness threats of a primarily 'cultural nature; that is that conflict will pit civilisations against each other as non-Western societies struggle against attempts to 'Westernise' while simultaneously seeking to 'modernise' themselves.308 Religious differences, such as those being felt in the Balkans are but one example of this clash.

Huntington claims that as the post Cold War evolves, co-operation will abandon the traditional balance of power politics. It will instead opt for co-operation among states based upon elements of commonality.309 These elements are likely to come from common culture. As coalitions form among the cultures, differences will be apparent. It is these differences, then, once exacerbated which will form the root of conflict. Huntington examines the conflict in Bosnia and portrays it as just such a clash. 'With respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims... Huntington sees Yugoslavia as the epitome of the cultural clash of civilisations. It is there that three separate and distinct cultures have come together. Croatia represents the dividing line between the Western world, Catholicism and Bosnia which belongs to the Islamic world dating from its Ottoman days, to the Serbs, representatives of the Eastern Orthodox Byzantine culture.311 The Islamic world has from the outset of warfare in Bosnia been highly critical of the West for allowing the slaughter of Muslims. They were particularly angry over a refusal by the UN for a request to supply 15,000 peacekeepers from Islamic states, 10,000 of which were from Iran. UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali did, however, allow for Russian troops to be deployed in Bosnia, but feared Islamic forces may

308...the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural...Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world'. Huntington (Summer, 1993), op.cit.: p.22.
309 IBID, p.35.
310 Huntington (Summer, 1993), op.cit.: p.37.
311 'As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged...In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires....The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems', IBID, at pp.29-31.
become involved. Huntington recognises such circumstances as the precursor to a civilisations clash.

Even democracy promotion appears to suffer in such circumstances. Democracy is based upon a 'concern for people'. In Bosnia, the West has, perhaps too late, recognised that people are dying and that something should be done. Yet the far greater number of people slaughtered in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Liberia all within the past two years has evoked little press or response from the West. It appears that Western policy based upon principles of democracy not only 'lacks integrity, but such a policy of avoidance appears racist'. This discrepancy in Western, and US policy is not lost on the non-Western world. It is the cultural differences, as they see it, which turns the West against them, or worse, not even pays attention. This inbuilt 'unfairness is then turned into populist politics', the kind of which men such as Milosevic have turned to their advantage by portraying themselves as underdogs against the West.

Such views may hold weight and seem to reaffirm Huntington's theory. Yet, there are inconsistencies. Huntington offers six reasons why civilisations clash to perhaps explain away the inconsistencies. First, 'differences among civilisations are real'. These differences go beyond the political ideologies yet do not necessarily mean conflict and violence. It has been these differences, however, that have often caused the most violent conflicts throughout history. Second, the growing interaction throughout the world is shrinking the globe. As this proceeds, an increasing civilisations consciousness will intensify differences, and draw common peoples together. Third, economic modernisation and social change has weakened the nation-state as a source of identity. The void created has been filled by religion and culture. Fourth, as the West grows in power, the non-Western world will mobilise itself among common cultures with an increasing desire to shape the world in non-Western ways. Fifth, cultural characteristics are not so easily compromised as political or economic ones. This will solidify cultural consciousness. Finally, the growth of economic regionalism will reinforce cultural consciousness. Success of such regionalism will depend upon a common civilisation.

In examining the applicability of Huntington's theory one should look to the current trend among the West, especially the United States to democratise. The values of democracy cannot be treated as universal principles. To do so risks encountering

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313 Charles Doran (Summer/Fall, 1993), op.cit.: p.83.
314 Vincent Cable, op.cit.: p.56.
315 Huntington (Summer, 1993), op.cit.: p.25.
318 IBID
319 Huntington (Summer, 1993), op.cit.: p.27.
320 IBID
stiff opposition from the non-Western world. Critics may state that Huntington's premise does not account for violence within cultures. He believes that these will occur yet are likely to be less intense. This should not, however, provide impetus for a crusade of democratisation. The non-Western world views the West, led by the US as seeking to use institutions backed up by military, political and economic power and influence, to shape the world in a way which protects their interests and values. This cannot be and will likely become an inherent source of conflict. Hyper-democratists such as Wattenberg claim the 'American style democracy' which carries with it American style culture should not present a problem. Using 'traditional diplomacy, or necessary military muscle, or geopolitical gamesmanship' is necessary to accomplish the task. Culture, he claims, would be 'enhanced, not replaced'. The US, however, would likely be hard pressed to convince states of this. For them, such a policy of democratisation is anathema to their existence. Why then does the West continue to pursue such policies?

The West considers itself to be inherently superior, not only on the level of economic development but in political maturity. Much of the West's political rhetoric about the world reflects that attitude: the less developed countries are viewed as politically primitive, economically backward, and religiously fanatic. And while there may be some justification for such feelings, they also tend to betray a patronising and parochial attitude, insensitive to the historical and cultural factors that prevented other societies from pursuing the same path of development as the West. Moreover, inherent in that attitude is the assumption that historical development is unilinear, and that imitation of the West is the only positive option open to others. The West's concept for religion is also part and parcel of this mindset.

What then, if this statement holds any truth, are the implications for US policy? For Huntington it means that the short term should witness Western efforts to promote greater unity and cooperation within its own civilisation'. As for the long term, the West should maintain economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to other civilisations. It would appear, however, that such a policy would itself intensify differences and set cultures against each other. Yet this is precisely what Huntington has tried to lay out, that a world of 'clashing civilisations is inevitably a world of double standards', where actions against 'kin countries' as Huntington calls them, will not resemble actions against contrary cultures. In looking at the Balkans, states such as Turkey present a 'presentable face of Islam' as opposed to the, as the US sees it, type of Islam preached by states such as Iran. Indeed, Turkey and now even Albania, a nation predominately Islamic, offer a 'force for Islamic

321 Huntington (Summer, 1993), op. cit.; p.38.
322 IBID, p.40.
323 Wattenberg, op. cit.; p.205.
325 Huntington (Summer, 1993), op. cit.; pp.48-49.
326 IBID, p.36.
moderation and secular political and economic development in the region. Fear of fundamentalism on the part of the West has made it seek states that opt for a more secular, Western approach.

Coalition-building on the part of the US in the post Cold War era may fluctuate between the desire to promote democracy and stability. Yet Huntington's theory may preclude the possibility of both. Adherents of the view would not condone an activist policy since both stability and democracy promotion represent 'arrogant social engineering schemes on an international scale'. Yet such critics are not so quick to offer viable policy options. Critical analysis may be insightful, however, it does very little by way of recommendations. The United States policymakers may be incorrect in attempting to impose ideology and/or political systems on other cultures. Yet, what are the alternatives? Should interests be simply abandoned or worse, not even formulated or given consideration merely because others may view attempts to protect them as some form of 'cultural imperialism'? The promotion of democracy in areas of vital and/or strategic interest does not mean to 'foist democracy on others by force. Nor does it mean to seek carbon copies of American institutions. Of course the underlying assumption is that people seek the basic premise of democracy, that they should not be subjugated to the will of others by force. To claim this as a value is indeed, an 'unprovable axiom', yet to automatically discount it, is likewise to reject the foundation of American foreign policy, that it includes within its formulation tenets of morality. The ouster and demise of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans has revealed that people do not wish to be governed without consent. This failure of communism, however, should not automatically mean subscription to liberal democracy. The case of the three general schools of US foreign policy orientation all share a basic characteristic, all share the desire to witness the promotion of American interests, even if they either do not agree what these interests may be. Differences become apparent as to the direction of the United States given its relative place within the international system and the means it should take reflective of this position, its interests, and the resources available at its command. Accounting for these factors, and how, exactly a state such as Albania fits within them takes one to the issue of policy formulation on the part of the US in the post Cold War era.

327 SW Griffiths (1993), op. cit.: p.76.
329 Muravchik, op. cit.: p.35.
330 IBID
331 Brzezinski (1993), op. cit.: p.48., Known as the Single Alternative Fallacy Theory, that the failure of one necessitates the rise and replacement by the other.
Chapter Five

A PROACTIVE APPROACH

1.0 Policy Recommendations

The end of the Cold War has raised doubt among some in Washington that the concern for American activism on the world scene will diminish significantly, especially with the arrival of the Clinton team, an administration much more comfortable with domestic policy. Indeed, during the days of the Cold War, the American people were made to realise that communism presented a threat to American interests as well as to the American way of life. Such a threat, therefore meant that the US could not shy away from its international commitments. Now, however, with the dissolution of what once constituted the primary threat to the United States for nearly five decades, the prospect of convincing the US public of a need for continued international activism becomes less defensible. Gaddis Smith correctly asks the question; 'how does a democracy, with leaders who can be replaced at the polls, convince its citizens to make sacrifices whose benefits may not be apparent for decades?'

Indeed, for the American public success or failure of its elected officials is usually measured in how well they perform during crises. Convincing them to subscribe to a policy, the effects of which will likely not be felt for years, if at all, would be difficult. However, proactive policy measures should not be so quickly discounted. Policy, it is said, cannot operate within a vacuum. And while most policy is meant to 'counterbalance the prevailing trends of a given time', proactive policy may allay the possibility of crisis and protect interests in the long term. Cynics may claim that this will not win votes for elected officials. Should this mean then that the adoption of a comprehensive strategy of foreign policy should be abandoned so that only success vis-a-vis crises situations can continue to justify the self-aggrandisement of public officials? Most likely, no.

The end of the Cold War has instead placed the United States once again at the cross-roads of policy formulation. The Bush and Clinton administrations may have recognised the dynamics of the international system, yet have done little by way of strategy formulation. While members of the latter administration have continued to express the merits of diplomacy as the method most likely to pursue 'national security interests', they have failed to understand that 'negotiation that worked in the 1940s and

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1 Indeed, the US public perception of the crisis in Bosnia appears to be waning from the public's interest. In a December, 1994 Associated Press poll, the crisis in Bosnia did not even make it onto 'the top ten news stories for 1994'. Whether 'de-sensitized', disinterested, apathetic or a combination of all these, was not made clear. What the poll perhaps does indicate it that the US public is pushing the Bosnian crisis away from what it considers of vital news interest. Poll results given on "CNN World News" (26 December, 1994)


3 H. Branden, op. cit.: pp.56-57.
1950s will not work in the 1990s. The changing international environment is certainly one reason for this. A far greater reason perhaps has been in the administration's inability to outline its strategic interests. Democratists such as Muravchik criticise the realists for attempting to 'fix geographic definition's to America's interests'. Granted, the realist's argument is limited in that it relies on the tangible factors. Democratists, though, do not contend the growing interdependency of the world. If democracy is to spread then certainly markets, and hence US interests will also spread out across the globe. Democratists may not also contend that it folly to believe that the entire globe will become 'democratised'. They admit that, 'less virtuous states may pursue their own interests without such qualifications [fairness, respect for others and for law], or scruples'. If this is to be the case, then is not the formulation, identification and strategy creation of policy necessary for ensuring US interests? These need not rely solely on the realist's premise of vital, tangible, geographic locations. They do however require formulation.

1.1 Interest Formulation

The Balkans, the crisis there, and the potential ones that may arise have demonstrated that the US is not prepared to identify its goals in the region. As the conflict broke out, it was not perceived as a serious threat to US interests. However, the US should take notice. 'In aggregate, unconventional conflicts have shaped [and are shaping] the international security environment and in the long term, some may pose serious threats to US interests. Such conflicts often threaten to institutionalize regional instability- instability that threatens efforts at establishing regional democratic systems.' If we are to take this statement, or part of it as containing seeds of truth, then it would seem to serve notice that present US strategies such as enlargement may not succeed. Establishing set goals and priorities become a necessity then for policymakers in Washington. Proactive policy measures may aid the US in formulating strategy which would make the US act in 'anticipation of events, rather than in response to events'.

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5 Muravchik, op.cit.: p.33.
6 IBID
7 Stavrou (1993), op.cit.: 'In the cacophony of ethnic-driven human rights advocacy, post-Cold War United States policy toward the region and the American interests that are actually- or presumed to be- affected by the ongoing strife in Yugoslavia have yet to be delineated. In fact, an argument can be made that they are being flat out ignored', at pp.24-25.
9 Moynihan, op.cit.: pp.165-166.
For the Clinton administration, it may want to first consider that while it rode in recognizing a need to combat lagging domestic policy, it should realize that foreign policy also requires an equal amount of initiative, planning, depth and capability. The links between domestic and foreign policy are continuing to shrink in the post Cold War world. Recognising this means the US should seek the 'appropriate balance'\textsuperscript{10} between the domestic and the foreign policy requirements of the United States. In formulating its interests, the US needs to determine the placement of areas within the categories of interests; vital, conditional, or peripheral. Relations with Albania and the Balkans should perhaps be considered within the realm of secondary interests. As previously mentioned, the region sits between two areas of vital importance to the US, Western Europe and the Middle East. Coalition-building of pro-US states in the area would aid in securing interests. In the future, strong links with the states in the Balkans, such as Albania could aid in promoting stability in an area historically rife with conflict. Advocacy of democracy still offers the best possible path for Albania and the region. The short term, however, requires stability and concerted efforts of diplomacy backed up by force if necessary.

US-Albanian relations have increased dramatically since 1990. While they continue to move forward, more concrete steps are needed to solidify US commitment to Albania. Relations may be positive, yet are not on par with links between the US and her allies. Instead, current ties can be designated as relations between 'friends'. 'Friendly relationships are characterised by positive affect, low or variable commitment, and limited scope. They are different in kind from either allied or adversarial relationships and present unique problems...'\textsuperscript{11} Brady's definition of 'friendly relations' seems apt when considering the US-Albanian association. She goes on to state that parties to this relationship lack long-standing ties. The effect of this is that 'specific negotiations tend to be approached on an ad hoc basis'.\textsuperscript{12} While the definition refers to the applicability of the negotiating process, it has equal applicability to building a relationship with interest ramifications.

For nearly five decades, Albania has isolated itself from the West. During the days of the Cold War the policymakers of Washington tended to view states and their political regimes through a narrow lens. Failure after W.W.II to co-opt Albania into the Western orbit left the US with little, if any influence in the region. This failure led


\textsuperscript{11} Brady (1991), \textit{op. cit.}: Brady continues identifying the relationship by stating that friendly relations seek, '...the pursuit of individual, rather than common interests. The absence of a long-standing relationship between the parties reinforces a one-shot mentality. The parties consider negotiations in isolation from the broader relationship-because no broader relationship exists. The parties also find it difficult to identify common interests and objectives', at p.151.

\textsuperscript{12} IBID, p.29.
to a lack of understanding of the political climate in the Balkans, a deficiency all too
obvious once the crisis broke out in 1990. Brady mentions that it is the lack of long-
standing ties which often leads 'friends' less likely to trust each other. With this, it
becomes difficult to identify common interests and possibly heightens misperceptions
and miscalculations.\textsuperscript{13} US interest in Albania may be to see that the transition from
communism to democracy is successful. It may also have an increasing interest due to
Albania's proximity to the former Yugoslavia. These two factors, however, can not
serve as the base for a fruitful relationship. Interests are not readily identifiable.
Albania may express the merits of democracy and its desire to see it succeed. Yet,
security concerns in a region not particularly stable predominate the political climate.
By viewing the US ineptitude in handling the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and in the
likelihood that Bosnia will lose the territorial integrity it once had, the idea of trust, the
basis for any relationship, will not likely be high. By not understanding the Albanian's
security fears the US has demonstrated, to Albanian perceptions, that it may not be as
committed to democracy as was first thought.

Democracy promotion entails with it the semblance of equilibrium, that
minority rights are protected, and the notion of security. None of these factors appears
firm in the Balkans. 'Western powers are deterred from engaging in more than the
promotion of basic political order in the region.'\textsuperscript{14} This attitude, however, will likely
bar the prospects for coalition-building in the area. Moreover, by not stating interests
that have some basis of commonality with the region's states, the US will probably
continue to maintain links with states such as Albania in 'friendly' terms only. The
interests themselves need sound expression, as do the means to ensure their security.
The Clinton administration has pledged itself to the promotion of democracy, and
rightfully so. However, by not outlining its interests, it risks a confrontation between
the processes of democracy and more traditional balance of power political concerns.
Democratisation is not some process that the United States has the political blueprints
for. To imagine that is to fall victim to Wattenberg's outrageous claim of 'neo-manifest
destinarianism'. The US is not a nation chosen by God, to 'do good'.

This should not, however, preclude its responsibility to ensure the task it has
set out to do, to seek the steady transformation of Eastern Europe and the Balkans to
democracy. Efforts which fall short of whole-hearted commitment may not result in a
return of communism, yet may not rule out a return to some form of

\textsuperscript{13} Brady (1991), op.cit.
\textsuperscript{14} This point believes that even 'imposed solutions by external actors, be they states or regional
organisations, will not solve problems. In fact they may simply delay the need to confront the
problems'. see, Spyros Economides, op.cit.: pp.20-21.
This appears likely in the short term when reform measures meet with resistance and the effects of shock therapy hit the populace hard. Leaders, most of which are themselves reform communists, find it difficult to avoid a 'heavy handed' approach to carry out policy. US efforts towards democratisation carry with them concerns then which require comprehensive measures. First, economic reconstruction will require more than mere co-operation of the states involved. Supranational co-operation may be a necessity but should not mean a new Marshall Plan for Europe. Current US economic efforts to the Balkans and Albania have been marginal. Scaling back military resources, however, should not be the answer. As stated, democracy promotion should entail being ready and capable to also ensure the stability required for the nurturing process of democracy. Arguments can be made that raising the taxes of the American public would provide the funds for more foreign aid. The US currently holds the lowest tax rate of the G-7. This would not endear politicians to their constituents and would again require sacrifices that can not be easily explained. Greater efforts, though, should be towards aiding nations to help themselves. Private sector investment can spur on growth. In Albania, however, investment has been especially low. The conflict next door certainly is a contributing factor and highlights the need for US activism in promoting stability. Aside from limited US aid to the Balkans, it appears that economic concerns in the region have been reserved instead for economic sanctions. Such deterrent methods, however, do very little except mobilise anti-US opinion and hinder future US influence in the area. Foreign economic policy in the area needs an objective which recognises goals beyond the hope for a market economy. Simply advocating the latter may take a minimum of ten years before some 'ambiguous success can be declared. Intermediate objectives should be outlined yet even these will suffer from a fatal flaw, 'how can they be assessed?'

The general premise of economic reform in the Balkans has often related to past failures due to great power intervention or a 'ethnocentric theory of Balkan backwardness'. The former premise may hold some truth yet places undue weight on the cause of failure. The latter premise is simply racist. Views of aid being thrown into a vortex of mismanagement, corruption and endless bureaucracy pervade thoughts of those who would not have the US assist in economic reform. They are correct. Yet,

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15 Brzezinski claims that while, political consensus is necessary for a successful democratic process, the need for authoritarianism may arise. Such a social sacrifice, however, is not desirable. See, Brzezinski (Fall, 1993), op.cit.; p.6.
17 'Expanding our diplomatic objectives while cutting back our power [military shrinkage] can only be called voodoo national security policy'. See, Peter W. Rodman, "Intervention and its Discontents", National Review (29 March, 1993) p.29.
18 JMC Rollo, op.cit.; p.129.
19 Shoup (1990), op.cit.; p.10.
does the alternative of allowing states of conditional interest, such as Albania, to fall into the abyss of perpetual economic backwardness and instability contribute to US interest in the long term? Such a posture would only cost the United States more in the long term. Worse, it would make the task probably more difficult since for Albanians, who would believe it was the US which caused their plight. The simple premise asks, 'why create enemies when you can create allies?' The more complex version of this premise adds that the US can spend far less than it ever did during the days of bipolarity to assist in the formation of stable, healthy democracies; of trading partners, of allies in regions of strategic interest, with interests themselves in the perpetuation of prosperity and stability. Or, America can abandon its role of activism; it can seek short term, ad hoc solutions, create adversaries, alienate marginal states, risk regional strife and address problems in the medium to long term with military solutions, the price of which, would be much higher.

'America has stood for half a century as the guarantor of the European balance of power. It need not abandon that role... It should, however, understand that the balance it helped to maintain is not secure on Europe's eastern and southern quarter. To preserve some semblance of stability and order in the short to intermediate term the US should identify its goals in the region as follows;

.....preservation of the states’ system and international society; the maintainence of the sovereignty of individual states; peace; and the common goals of all social life, namely life, truth and property- the limitation of violence, the keeping of promises, and the stabilisation of possession. [emphasis in original]\(^{21}\)

McInnes refers to Grotians and their reliance on power when making the above statement. By order, he means that, 'the goals of the actors are predictably maintained through shared norms and values'.\(^{22}\) The compatibility of democracy with short term stability promotion need not be discounted then as not possible. The influx of aid is but a preliminary step. By reducing the security concerns of states in the region through US guarantees, accounting for the balance of power in the Balkans, America can ensure that 'catastrophic scenarios' will not be repeated.\(^{23}\) Such a US role would accomplish several tasks. It would ensure US vital interests by seeing that its conditional ones remain stable. It would also maintain the system of states, their sovereignty, integrity, and allow for their eventual transition to viable democratic nations. As Brzezinski states; 'The first need is still for a long-term and comprehensive strategy that integrates geopolitical and economic objectives...It must deal with the

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\(^{20}\) James Chace, op. cit.: p.71.

\(^{21}\) McInnes, op. cit.: pp.7-8.

\(^{22}\) Ibid

\(^{23}\) McInnes, op. cit.: p.13.
change within it.  

An addendum to this requires recognising the degree of varied interest from area to area and state to state vis-a-vis interests.

The identification of interests smacks of realist overtones and adds credence to Brzezinski's statement. Yet as democracy should remain the long term objective, some realists would balk at the infusion of morality to foreign policy. However, as Muravchik correctly ponders; "why can't national policy attempt to combine respect for the requisites of self-preservation with adherence to honorable means and with respect for the legitimate claims of other nations?" Morality remains part of American foreign policymaking because morality is engrained upon the American political culture. As such, the prioritisation and identification of interests carries with it realist's 'baggage', yet with streaks of Wilsonianism.

1.2 The Necessary Framework

From the end of the Second World War up to the demise of communism within the Soviet Union, the United States has operated its foreign policy machinery within the framework of the Cold War. 'Negotiations', and policy were conducted within this framework, one which identified states as either 'allies or adversaries'. Strategies were concocted to achieve objectives in accordance with the structure of the Cold War. This structure is now obsolete. Creation of a workable framework for analysis and policy implementation does not require that the US abandon all its pretexts of the past forty-five years. After all, the notion of foreign policymaking still holds firm to principles of outcomes, outputs, national interest, strategy, objectives...etc. Yet before it can formulate a new framework the US should consider the more basic task, whether it will act directly within the international arena attempting to directly influence events or adopt a more passive strategy. Before it can determine the structure within which it must operate, the US should define the parameters of this framework; will it operate an activist or passive foreign policy in relation to its objectives.

Believers of the passive approach feel that the US has done its bit to secure some semblance of European order and has witnessed the proliferation of democracy

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24 Brzezinski (Fall, 1993), op.cit.: p.12.
25 Muravchik, op.cit.: p.35.
26 'Americans are, after all, most comfortable with a foreign policy imbued with moral purpose. Even when the pursuit of justice has led to unintended consequences, even when our ideals have concealed from ourselves as well as others, motivations of a darker and more complex nature, we have preferred a policy that at least rhetorically is based on moral purpose rather than self interest'. James Chace, op.cit.: p.170.
27 For definitions see, L. Brady (1991), op.cit.: p.3.
and market economies spring up in ample numbers since the end of the Second World War. Adoption of a new framework, they argue, should first consider that the end of the Cold War should not be analysed by terms of 'victory or defeat'. These concepts, in and of themselves, are terms from the Cold War.30 Their application to present circumstances does not provide the proper forum for analysis or policymaking. The world has indeed become less predictable and therefore the US must allow itself room to manoeuvre within the realm of foreign policy.31 By sticking with an outdated framework for analysis, however, the US hinders the multiplicity of options in the foreign policy domain. Worse, it hinders its own ability in formulating a policy since the fundamental base for any such policy is itself obsolete.

US policy in the Balkans, especially since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, highlights this flaw. Two fatal early mistakes led to failure in grasping the situation at hand. First, the US hung onto the notion that the territorial integrity of 'Yugoslavia' must be maintained even after it became apparent that such a concept ceased to exist.32 By sending then Secretary of State, James Baker to Belgrade in 1991, the US hoped to convey its express desire that it would not accept the dissolution of the federal Yugoslav state into its constituent parts.33 This hope of keeping Yugoslavia intact confused US wishes of keeping stability in the area with the realities of the situation. It may have also given Serbia an excuse to justify aggression against the breakaway republics by believing the US would back 'federal efforts to preserve federal integrity'. Baker's trip to Belgrade was fruitless if only because travelling to the federal capital and yet not to the capitals of Slovenia and Croatia might, the US believed, be interpreted as implicit recognition of the republics, something the US was not prepared to do. Yet this desire to maintain some semblance of stability in the region rested upon Cold War premises. By sanctioning the break-up of Yugoslavia, the US would also have sanctioned a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the region, for which it was not prepared. Clinging to these outdated Cold War notions of stability doomed the US to muddled policy in the region, something it has yet to adjust. The second failure came after the warfare began. Assumptions that the war still held the character of a 'civil conflict', even after recognition of the republics, forced two consequences which may likely limit US influence in the region for some time to come. First, the US and the West held false beliefs that the violence in the Balkans is endemic to the region. Indeed, the aggressors in most cases hoped that the US and the West would feel this way, as if to warn them that; 'warfare is part of our primitive, non-Western culture.

30 Alexei Filitov, "Victory in the Postwar Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of it?", in M. Hogan, op.cit.: p.77.
31 Alan Tonelson (Summer, 1993), op.cit.: p.178.
You can do very little here. Do not waste your time, money or risk human life for something you have minimal, if any interest in. This strategy worked. Western and US 'acquiescence in aggressive war and their indirect collaboration in Yugoslavia's ethnic cleansing' became rationalised along this very same premise.  

Second, US and Western policy, or lack thereof, established bad precedent with the other states of the area and puts relations with them on tenuous ground despite appearances of positive progress. Negotiated settlements notwithstanding, the allowance of a minority within an already recognised state, [Serbs within Bosnia], to capture through aggression and then keep territory in that state does not bode well for the other states of the Balkans. The non-homogeneity of states in the area coupled with existing tense regional relations and security fears places the US in a poor position to further bilateral relations, maintain stability and adopt a comprehensive policy for the region.

For the US, the Clinton administration has stated that institutions such as NATO would allow the US the flexibility it required in the area and perhaps further its regional relations. By readapting its role, the US believed NATO could meet the new security environment of Europe. What it has failed to understand, however, is that the environment, per se, is not new although the circumstances may be. NATO represents more than simply US wishes to not be left out of the security decision-making process of Europe. The possibility of 'out of area' operations are still representative of the same security concerns that dominated US thinking during the Cold War. It is the threats which may have changed and the predictability, yet NATO seeks to maintain its role as the 'guarantor of collective defense'. If the US seeks to modify the role of this vital collective defence organisation, it should realise that Eastern and Southeastern Europe still face threats over concepts that have not disappeared with the Cold War. Recent Russian tendencies to flex its muscle, especially in its 'near abroad' doctrine suggest that it will not easily abandon claims to areas it strongly feels are within its sphere of influence. The maintenance of Nato's collective security pact means more in the post Cold War world. 'Concern for Eastern Europe was an excellent beginning,' as Nixon states, yet 'we must go further, putting down a marker that no potential aggressor could ignore'. Adoption of democracy promotion principles enforced by NATO fits well within 'the non-military aspects of Mediterranean security'. The NATO alliance was instrumental in maintaining the balance of power in Europe for nearly five decades. Its framework ought not to be discarded in the post Cold War era. The maintenance of balance is still sought. Why

34 William Pfaff (Summer, 1993), op.cit.; p.99.  
36 Warren Christopher (May/June, 1993), op.cit.; p.54.  
37 Nixon (1992), op.cit.; p.130.  
38 Aliboni (1992), op.cit.; p.78.
else would the states of the former Eastern bloc continue to voice security concerns if not because threats to the security and hence balance of Eastern Europe are, and will likely be continuously threatened. These states have recognised that their geopolitical position has not shifted with the demise of communism. They sit between competing blocs of power. As such, NATO offers them the idea of similar security guarantees offered to Western Europe after W.W.II. The US cannot offer these guarantees unilaterally.

Hegemonic stability theorists would state that the US is in decline yet claim that the necessary condition for stability required in Eastern Europe and the Balkans necessitate a 'single dominant state willing and able to use its power to create a set of political and economic structures....that maintain order in the system.' The US can fill the role of this state, yet should operate within organisations such as NATO to secure this stability and order. The expansion of democracy, and with it market economies, into areas of strategic interest requires from the US a commitment minimally equal, if not greater to, the one given to those states of Western Europe it sought the equivalent for following the Second World War.

1.3 *An Active Role*

Fashioning a foreign policy requires first and foremost that America accept a simple premise; it cannot 'stick its head in the sand', shirk responsibility and must instead opt for an activist approach to world affairs. Multilateralism should not be discounted or discredited. Practicality dictates that America simply does not have the resources to tackle every problem alone. However, where its strategic interests are at stake, unilateralism should present a first option rather than a last one. No where is this more evident than in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. If the world is indeed becoming increasingly multipolar, as it appears it is, then areas such as Eastern Europe and the Balkans are 'up for grabs' as it were. Activism on the part of the US is needed to obtain and secure these markets and thereby foster order in the region. US influence in the region will continue to increase as more concerted efforts are made, aid efforts which demonstrate firm US resolve in seeing democracy succeed. The United States should also take advantage of the opportunity at a time when the European Union still wrestles with whether or not it will eventually deepen and widen eastward. It appears, however, that this possibility is low, particularly in the short term. The point is aptly made by Rollo;

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40 Brzezinski makes this point that the 'scope of US influence in Eastern Europe will be largely defined by the degree to which Europe does or does not move toward a widening and deepening'. See, Brzezinski (1993), op.cit.; pp.208-209.
To try and absorb the East-Central Europeans [and the Balkans in due course], with their economic structures in transition and their lower standards of living, is difficult to contemplate. The prospect of managing a community of up to 25 states, at all different levels of economic development, is daunting.41

While some believe that civic democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans requires tying these areas to the democratic institutions of the EU,42 the latter may not be ready or willing for quite some time. By seizing the opportunity in the short term, the US can foster stable democratic states for the long term. This is not to suggest some adversarial contest between the US and the EU, with the East and South as some prize to be won. The Atlantic partnership still represents one of the most sound, cohesive relationships on the planet and should not be decreased in its scope or intensity.43 Instead, it should suggest that the US is currently in the position to lead and influence the more strategic areas of interest in the East, success of which, will benefit both the US and the EU. Indeed, if the US and Europe `seek to build a common transatlantic home, [they] must find ways to include those nations in Eastern Europe.44

The Balkan crisis has demonstrated the fragile nature of the balance of power in the former communist bloc. During the days of the Cold War the spheres of influence were evidenced by clear lines of demarcation between the superpowers and their allies which preserved the balance of power. This also served to limit an active Western role in the region. Today, however, these lines are not easily delineated. An active role, therefore on the part of the West, led by the US is needed to ensure that some balance is achieved. The consequences of failure through poor policy, indifference, or inaction may result in widespread regional instability. This should not mean, however, that the West, and the US, should seek, as its primary objective, to maintain balance by erecting a 'cordon sanitaire' around the current conflict and area so as to prevent a larger Balkan war.45 This may provide stability in the short term, something which certainly is necessary.46 However, without political blueprint for the intermediate to long term future of the region, the West risks not being able to create

41 Rollo, op.cit.: p.114.
42 Chace, op.cit.: p.51.
43 "The problems of Eastern Europe...are even more formidable, and can only be overcome if all the EC countries as well as the United States are willing to make significant contributions to the region's recovery. If the EC and the United States cooperate in rebuilding the East, they will help to prevent the development of friction that might otherwise occur between American trade interests and European efforts to create an integrated Western European market....It is imperative that the EC not become a rival to the United States in relations with Eastern Europe. If a rivalry develops the economic recovery of the East will be delayed, to the detriment of the peoples of both the East and the West." See, Hermann J. Rupieper, op.cit.: pp.181-182.
45 This policy is recommended by John Gray, op.cit.: p.30.
46 For a view into the pros and cons of this see, Mark Thompson, The Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia (London: Vintage, 1992)
stability and balance which would ensure repetition of the current crisis on some future and larger scale.47

America's economic agenda should seek to ensure that the aid it distributes eastward is not mismanaged. More priority could be given to privatisation projects as well as rebuilding most of the area's infrastructure so that corruption is at least limited. Moreover, the US could extend aid more 'on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis'. Multilateral organisations will not, in each instance, have the same level of interest toward a particular region and/or state as the US.48 Such a move would only strengthen American influence, further relations along a positive track, and demonstrate US resolve in acting unilaterally, 'where we must'.49 More importantly, the US could find ways to work towards the 'articulation of more positive, hopeful, and constructive' ways of persuading the people of the region that domestic support is necessary and that social sacrifices must be made. This would be particularly vital during the 'initial phase of transformation'.50

Recent US efforts to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims51 may not provide either short or long term answers. Those in favour of this approach believe it will 'level the playing field' and perhaps force the Serbs to the bargaining table. Advocates also look to the past example of Afghanistan and US efforts in arming the mujahedins and their success against Red Army as proof that similar progress could be made against the Bosnian Serbs.52 Stavrou mentions that present US efforts to convince the US public that we must assist Bosnian Muslims is part of a US press campaign which plays upon the 'innate goodness of the American people, to not sit idly by while crimes against the innocent are being committed'.53

47 'A punitive military venture, as demanded by some in the West, is hardly a way to peace in the Balkans. Without a clear political blueprint, the deployment of American soldiers would be simply foolish, a prelude to US involvement, justifications for which would have to be manufactured later.' See, Dusko Doder, op. cit.: p.21.
49 The case for unilateral action was made vehemently by President Clinton while on the presidential campaign trail; 'We will never abandon our prerogative to act alone when our vital interests are at stake. Our motto in this era will be: together where we can; on our own where we must.' As for his belief in an active US role; 'In a world of change, security flows from initiative, not from inertia.' On the former statement see, "Clinton would stress economic issues in foreign policy", address to world affairs council, Los Angeles (13 August, 1992): p.20., on latter, "Clinton says US should lead alliance for democracy", address to foreign policy association, (1 April, 1992): p.38 Text obtained from, the (London: Reference Centre, United States Information Service, United States Embassy.)
50 Brzezinski (Fall, 1993), op. cit.: pp.7-9.
51 The United States Senate voted 50-49 in favour of lifting the embargo. See, The International Herald Tribune 16 May, 1994 p.1.
53 Stavrou, (1993), op. cit.: p.41., Stavrou claims that approximately $36 million [US] has been spent in seeking to shape US public opinion in myths designed to sway policymaking. Among these myths the campaign sought to instil: 1) only Serbs commit atrocities, violate truces, destroy historic sites and maintain prisoner/concentration camps. 2) Serbs occupy land belonging to others, Muslims and Croats secure land. 3) Serbs have superior weapons, Muslims are unarmed. 4) Other Muslim military
However, lifting the arms embargo is likely not sufficient, in and of itself. This may contain some truth. It fails to address, however, the basic notion, that US foreign policy has been and is charged with moral purpose, it is part of the American democratic tradition and not easily disposed of, nor should it be. Activism along the lines of intervention may stop warfare, yet with more damaging results. The area may witness violence of 'another sort' as instability would likely reign. Moreover, the conflict has already highlighted the divergence between the US, its allies, and more importantly, the Russians.\textsuperscript{54} An active role with consideration towards military solutions should exercise great care in ensuring that it does not perpetuate the conflict. Such a policy is not conducive to stability. Realists which imbue their ideals with morality are correct in their beliefs on the need to level the playing field. However, as Kissinger states; 'the American foreign policy trauma of the sixties and seventies was caused by applying valid principles to unsuitable conditions. Care must be taken not to repeat the same tragedy in the nineties with a wider set of equally important principles.'\textsuperscript{55} Containment of the conflict may appear a 'valid principle', and seems to offer the only present solution for the US and the West. Granted, it does not solve the problem and arguments against a 'cordon sanitaire' have been expressed. Yet it must be realised that a perfect solution simply does not exist nor is it likely to in the near future. Activism should now incorporate a diplomatic mission. The goal now must be to strengthen the area's other states and ensure that instability does not spread. Regional democracy and market capitalism may not flourish in the short to medium term under neighbouring conditions, however, they should at the very least be afforded the opportunity to do without overriding concern that instability will spread. More importantly, for states such as Albania, they must be made secure in the belief that the US recognises their importance to the region in maintaining a balance, security and stability.

2.0 The US, Albania and the Region

The challenge for the United States involves more than a mere recognition that the international climate has changed drastically since 1989. For the US, foreign policy towards the Balkans and Albania specifically, requires that the former engage itself to

\textsuperscript{54} IBID, pp.26-27. The French and Russians have expressed their objections over the US Senate vote to lift the arms embargo. The French have threatened to remove their peacekeeping forces from Bosnia if no solution is agreed upon before the end of 1994. Currently, they constitute the largest portion of the peacekeeping unit. The Russian assembly has gained consensus over supplying arms to Serbs if the US arms the Muslims. \textit{International Herald Tribune} 16 May, 1994 Following the Senate vote the Russians 'at once urged the same for Serbia'. See \textit{The Economist} (21 May, 1994): p.42.

\textsuperscript{55} quoted in S. Griffiths (1993), \textit{op. cit.}: p.117.
long term commitment which aims to strengthen existing relations of a bilateral nature where they did not exist before. Diplomacy still should remain the key to positive relations and to dealing with crises, however, the US must be willing to back up such policy with firmness and military force. In its relations, the US 'must pay more attention to understanding the historical, cultural, social, and political dynamics of international negotiation'.

US-Albanian relations have been non-existent for more than fifty years. Establishing good relations between the two requires more than simply aid packages. Albania has had the 'worst starting-line of any country in systemic transition', in a region which is currently manifesting tendencies of violence that in the past led to large levels of violence and warfare. Maintaining stability so as to ensure the growth of democracy, however, necessitates greater US involvement. Economically, the US has announced efforts to assist in the formation of an American-Albanian Enterprise Fund. A visit by the US ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright to Albania brought US allocation of $25m [US] for small business development. As part of the 1989 SEED Act [Support for East European Democracy], the money is intended to spur on the Albanian economy, especially the private sector. Support for this program, however, needs a substantial boost. Despite high growth, the Albanian economy still requires large levels of foreign investment. Even with the arrival of democracy in 1992, investment has been low over fears of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Even those that may not believe the conflict will spread still feel that the potential for destabilisation is high as refugee movements and low intensity conflict, terrorism and continued irredentism remain high thereby dissuading investors.

The conflagration in the former Yugoslavia has renewed US interest in Albania due to both its proximity to the conflict and to the large numbers of ethnic Albanians in the region. Keeping tabs on the war has included NATO ships patrolling the Adriatic, making use of Albanian ports. The US has also sent CIA spy planes to Albania in efforts to gather intelligence and monitor military targets. US Defence officials have also stated that plans for a ground satellite transmission station have been approved for location inside Albania near the Albanian-Montenegrin border. Albania, however, continues to ask for greater security guarantees from the US. Concern over Albanians in Macedonia, Greece and Kosova have repeatedly plagued relations with neighbours.

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56 Brady (1991), op. cit., p.11. Brady also maintains that such negotiations are often not 'one-shot affairs but occur in the context of a preexisting relationship which will be maintained over a long period. Thus, negotiations are influenced by the history of interaction between the parties...'; at p. 26.
58 Illyria 27-29 January, 1994
59 Illyria 3-5 February, 1994 p.1. The US initially had asked Italy if they could fly the remote control spy plane drones from there. The then Italian Minister of Defence, Fabio Fabbri turned down the request fearful that the drones may threaten civilian airspace.
and continue to threaten area wide destabilisation. For its part, the US is trying to tone down recent polemics between Albania and Greece over the Greek minority in southern Albania. America should realise, though, that if democracy is to succeed in Albania and the Balkans, greater security guarantees are needed to ensure the balance of power in the region. Cross border migrations of Albanians seeking work and a better life only add tension to the area as they mobilise anti-Albanian sentiment wherever they go. The results in most cases are incidents of one type or another which only heighten tension and worsen relations. Efforts by the US to move Albania out of its state of backwardness require more comprehensive aid packages, higher levels of investment, and more importantly, security guarantees for Albania, particularly if conflict in the former Yugoslavia leads to mass migrations of ethnic Albanians from Kosova and Macedonia. The Albanian economy is not equipped for such an influx of refugees.

The fear of Albanian involvement in the conflict remains a concern for the US. Questionable leadership in diffusing trouble spots on the part of Albania increases possibilities that they may precipitate violence. Relations are tense and the US should make it known that if Albania were to instigate direct military action in the neighbouring conflict it should be left to its own devices. President Berisha has repeatedly stated that Albania would not stand idly by if ethnic cleansing were to spread to Kosova and the large Albanian minority there. He should realise, however, that Albania is ill equipped for prolonged conventional warfare. The US should consider making it known that it would assist Albania provided the latter assume a defensive position should conflict spread southward. By not initiating violence, the US would be justified in action which would maintain a state that could serve as a stabilising factor in the area. Proactive policy would, however, offer the best solution to both parties. The NATO Partnership for Peace plan offers positive first steps, yet more should be done to ensure some definite timetable for entry to the Alliance. The United States may want to consider that nations which are a party to PoP include those which are currently suffering, and have in the past, poor relations with one another such as Albania, and present NATO member, Greece. The Clinton administration has sent Robert Schifter, the National Security Advisor for European Affairs to Athens and Tirana in an effort to ease tensions between the two countries. While this is a positive step, more could be done. Specifically, material aid which is disbursed through PoP should await constitutional guarantees from both nations over the major cause of tensions, their respective minorities within each state. Institutionalising these rights makes them slightly more secure, and entry could be attached to specific rights.

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60 Nixon (1992), op.cit: "...the current vacuum creates an incentive for adventurism, [therefore], the East European democracies must be brought into NATO's security sphere...", p.129.
provisions which are agreed upon by both parties.\textsuperscript{61} Steps of a bilateral nature may require that the US make overt gestures to provide for preliminary conflict management. This is where a military role would be useful. Rather than remove and cut the level of military spending, in Europe, the US should take steps to place new military installations into potential trouble spots. A military base in Albania with an extended lease would pump money into the Albanian economy, demonstrate US resolve and activism in the region, and perhaps allay Albanian security concerns. More importantly, as the region finds itself increasingly subject to outside powers seeking to gain influence in the area, the US could, through such an installation make it known that Albania should fall within the West's sphere of influence. Such a move would likely allow for positive steps forward on the road to a fully functioning and healthy democracy.

During the Cold War, the US tended to view states as either allies or adversaries.\textsuperscript{62} States such as Albania were not trusted due to their neutral status vis-a-vis the competing power blocs. Today, however, the opportunity to exert influence in the region and states such as Albania should not be passed up by the West and especially the US. The Yugoslav conflict has shown that the balance of 'power distribution' is greatly impacted upon by war within a particular region.\textsuperscript{63} This makes the need for US activism in the region more imperative as the leadership role of the US would perhaps fill the vacuum created by the current European mismanagement of the situation.\textsuperscript{64} The crisis in the Balkans has also shown that irredentism will likely remain a problem for quite some time even if the possibility for actual conflict remains minimal.

Even if military conflict is unlikely in Southeastern Europe in the coming decade, US policymakers must contend with the possibility that the nations of Southeastern Europe will shift their attention away from external threats... towards regional concerns- a change in perceptions that might itself aggravate tension.\textsuperscript{65}

The US may want to consider the implications for states within the Western orbit such as Italy, Greece and Turkey, all of which have a natural concern over potential instabilities in the Balkans and all of which are currently vying for influence among the states of the region. These competing pockets of power may themselves

\textsuperscript{61} Warren Christopher makes mention of NATO's members which all have a common stake in each other's security and President Clinton asked Congress in July, 1994 for a $100,000 million appropriation for the PoP members. See, Christopher, "Speech to NATO", 2 December, 1992 in Foreign Policy Bulletin vol. 4 #4-5 (January/April, 1994): p.6, and President Clinton's, "Speech to Polish Parliament", 7 July, 1994 in Foreign Policy Bulletin vol. 5 #2 (September/October, 1994): p.59.

\textsuperscript{62} Raymond Garthaff, "Why did the Cold War Arise, and Why did it End?", in Hogan, \textit{op.cit.}: p.132.

\textsuperscript{63} Goertz and Diehl, \textit{op.cit.}: pp.10-11.

\textsuperscript{64} Doder, \textit{op.cit.}: p.21.

\textsuperscript{65} Shoup (1990), \textit{op.cit.}: p.269.
cause further deterioration in the political climate of the area as each state becomes increasingly wary over revival of old time alliances which in the past were often the cause of regional conflict. By pursuing an overriding influence in the region, the US may aid in precluding this possibility by using its influence with regional powers such as Greece, Turkey and Italy to assist each other through multilateral schemes which would benefit the area as a whole. Italy's Pentagonal and Turkey's BECS proposal are but two examples. With US assistance and encouragement, these schemes could be expanded to include the remaining Balkan states. The eventual tying of these schemes with the organisations of Western Europe might also smooth the transition of these states to the Western sphere.

States such as Greece have, since their arrival to the Western alliance, viewed regional security concerns as vital and part of historic East-West relations. Western failure, as the Greeks see it, over the Cyprus situation of 1974 for example, made Greece 'reduce its reliance on the USA'. It appears that they are witnessing similar failure in Yugoslavia. America could take steps to prevent them being alienated from the Western orbit. Their current leadership has, however, appeared to distance itself from both the US and the EU over policy in the Balkans. Greeks should take notice. They have the opportunity to exercise considerable influence in a region desperately in need of states which have functioning democracies and market economies. The same should be said of Turkey. While relations with Turkey improved significantly during the Ozal period, steps should be towards continuing efforts to cajole Turkey into the 'role of formulating Western policy in the region'. This may not appeal to the Greeks. They could, however, be afforded the equal opportunity in this task since they will feel the effects of either success or failure. As for Albania, it could fill the role of moderate player in the region. Success of reform coupled with a large diaspora that is contained from initiating violence could help to serve as both example and as a stabilising factor in the Balkans. Albania has for quite some time 'remained a footnote in US foreign policy', 'subordinated [regionally] to purely US-Soviet considerations.'

The geostrategic location of the Balkans was recognised during the Second World War as was its place within the post-war considerations regarding the balance of power. Military considerations, however, precluded the possibility of an exerted Western effort throughout the area, aside from the successes in Greece and Turkey. Today, similar opportunities confront the West, especially the US. America could secure influence in the area and maintain a favourable balance of power which will not disrupt regional stability any further. The current conflict may require policies of

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68 Shoup (1990), op.cit.: p.253.
containment in the short term. However, the US must try not to cordon off or engage in a process of the 'ghettoization' of the Balkans in the long term. Such a program would only alienate the region's states and perhaps promote anti-Western sentiment and activity among the area's four million Muslims, something the West does not need. More importantly, failure to 'produce a better life' in the region could lead to a return, perhaps not of communism, but of some 'other authoritarian or statist systems. The immediate challenge for the US must be to maintain the pace of economic reform, yet, quelling conflict by containing it may offer the best solution. In due course the US and Western efforts should become more 'adaptive' and long-term oriented. Applying strategy to the Balkans entails a US commitment in conjunction with its Western allies that takes this point into account.

...Eurocentric themes of balances of power need to be applied to specific regions where Western interests might be vulnerable to challenge; and that this cannot be achieved unless there is demonstrable military power, and the will to use it in support of economic and political interests...According to this argument, military forces of a global, policing nature would have to be able to enforce stability as well as maintain it. Deployments should therefore not be solely reactive but be precautionary, thereby serving the purposes of deterrence wherever this was deemed desirable or necessary.

This should not imply that the US revert to hard, Cold War thinking in its fashioning of a foreign policy. Yet, principles with present day applicability, such as containment and balance of power should not simply be discarded for grandiose schemes rooted in amorphous methods and backed by rudderless policy. Idealism has a place in foreign policy and should continue to do so for the US. But for the sake of practicality, 'idealism must express itself with due respect for reality, and that policies must be judged by their consequences, not by the nobility of intentions'. The Clinton administration's goals are workable and within the vital interests of the United States. However, due consideration should be given to the premise that great projects require not only great thinking, but appropriate investment of military and economic power as well.

69 Christopher Cvic (1991), op.cit.: p.88.
70 This possibility and the negative consequences that accompany it, such as irredentism, militant Islam and terrorism are well summarised by Graham Fuller; "...the very one-sided and disproportionate suffering of the Bosnian Muslims may be the issue that will guarantee the existence of rich soil for Muslim radicalism in the Balkans in the future....Even moderate Muslims have nagging suspicions that the West is determined never to allow real power to emerge anywhere, especially in the heart of Europe....A settlement seen by Muslims as unjust could well feed a decades long guerrilla struggle for rights and land-one that could even spill over into terrorism in Europe as a means of getting attention: a second 'Palestine' cause'. See, "A Bosnian 'Palestine'? Iran Muddies the Waters", International Herald Tribune 16 May, 1994
73 IBD: p.117.
74 McInnes, op.cit.: p.86.
75 Muravchik, op.cit.: p.36.
2.1 Conclusion

The nations of the Balkans have throughout much of the modern era managed to cause a considerable deal of grief for the great powers. History has shown that despite repeated attempts to correct border disputes, quell ethnic tension, national aspirations and the like, Western efforts have been continuously short-sighted, inefficient or simply foolish. It appears that the West, the US especially, has not taken to heart lessons from history in a region where history continues to matter. Circumstances dictated during World War II that political considerations be given a back seat to the more pressing issues at hand, namely defeating the Axis. After the war, without a firm foothold in the region, and with British power both waning and not able to exert either the will or power necessary in the Balkans to maintain a sphere of influence for the West, the USSR was able to both exert and maintain a foothold of influence in the region. The Soviets were correct in assuming that despite their spheres of influence' percentage agreement with Britain, they would be capable of reneging on it without much British resistance. The Americans would not likely contest Soviet gains since the US had limited if any interest in the region and since Soviet troops were firmly entrenched in the zone. Once it became apparent that Greece was threatened by communist take-over and that Britain would no longer be able to assist, the US became involved. By doing so the US not only halted communist expansion in Greece but also delineated the spheres of influence between the West and the Soviets in the region for the next fifty years.

The US, however, failed in its policy approach towards nations such as Albania immediately after the war. It failed to recognise that, although in communist hands, Albania continued to fear for its integrity, particularly from its communist neighbours. The ability to lure it into the Western camp was lost once the US bowed to pro-Greek pressure over territorial concessions. Albanian siege mentality coupled with a limited US 'black and white' view of communism resulted in a sacrifice of possible US-Albanian relations immediately after the war. Without a foundation from which to build the US now finds itself trying to establish and strengthen ties with Albania in the dawn of a new era in international relations. The post Cold War world has, and is, continuously showing both politician and analyst alike that 'traditional assumptions are coming under increasing pressure' to re-evaluate.76

Traditional spheres of influence created after the war have been undermined by communism's demise. The void that these have produced will likely be filled with situations such as those in the former Yugoslavia. Nationalism has demonstrated that it can be a force to reckon with in the post Cold War era. Its rejuvenation finds itself

76 Paul Kennedy (1993), op.cit.; p.127.
side by side with efforts toward democratisation and market capitalism. Since both efforts are difficult and produce in their wake disgruntled peoples, nationalism finds fertile breeding ground amongst the fringes throughout the democratising ex-communist states. The need for 'order and stability' often become convenient excuses for these fringes and even mainstream groups to both search for scapegoats and lean toward more authoritarian type democracy. This appears to be the trend in Albania. This is where US-Albanian relations stand at the cross-roads. Failure by the US to take more concerted and positive steps to preclude the former possibility may lead Albania to assume an alternate model toward development. Such a model, patterned after perhaps the Chinese, would witness political and social liberalisation take a back seat to economic growth. This possibility is not outside the realm of reality. Albania, has in its past had a fruitful and positive relationship with China. The Chinese and Albanian similarities in culture, patriarchal societies based upon collective progress, may present Albania with options for strong leadership forgoing human rights and true democracy, in return for economic growth. On its face, such a possibility does not threaten vital US interests. Yet, the US may want to consider that if it is to consensus build around democracy, vis-a-vis enlargement, or some variant of it, it must take a more activist approach to prevent the possible alternate model approach. Such an approach would also not bode well toward regional security as it would continue to promote bilateral tensions throughout the Balkans. Such tensions in turn would limit potential investment thereby fuelling defence spending, perhaps contributing to mid-to-long term low intensity violence and terrorism which eventually would destroy any possibility for creating a balance of power in the region.

It appears, however, that the present US administration still does not grasp the nuances of traditional power politics. Recent trends indicate that the US still feels that rationality can prevail without credible threats to back up rhetoric. For example, in the Bosnian war, the US now is hoping to divide the Bosnian Serbs from their sponsorship in Belgrade. By approaching Milosevic, the US hopes that it can use the carrot of lifted sanctions against Serbia to isolate Bosnian Serbs resulting in a removal of their leadership and perhaps approval by them of the recent peace agreement granting them forty-nine percent of Bosnian territory.77 The US fails to realise, however, that Bosnian Serbs have fought hard for nearly two years and have shed much blood in their acquisition of approximately seventy percent of Bosnia. They will be hard pressed to relinquish such gains by simple negotiations. The US must also understand that Milosevic, despite sanctions, came to power in Serbia under the banner of 'Greater Serbia'. His recent election victory affirmed his staunch belief that Serbia is alone and cannot trust the West under any circumstances. More radical elements exist

within Serbia as viable opposition than do moderate elements. Yet, the US continues to believe that sincere negotiations can be conducted. It is in this climate that recent Greek and Albanian tensions have also arisen over alleged refugee abuse and terrorist activity. Increased tensions in Kosova, problems in Macedonia over Albanians there and a general breakdown in regional relations all add to the potential for area-wide instability which could have severe consequences ranging from border conflict spillover, to refugee exodus to Western Europe, to continued terrorist-type activity throughout the area and eventually against Western targets.

US-Albanian relations would not solve all these problems, but they would demonstrate US resolve in maintaining a balance of sorts in the region and would mark the first step toward a proactive coherent policy. Lessons of the Cold War should be used by the US in fashioning its bilateral relations with Albania. It is these ‘core beliefs’ that were successful, such as containment, balance of power, stability promotion etc., that need to be re-evaluated and perhaps modified if constructive change is to ensue. It is likely that in the post Cold War era, threats to US interests will not be fixed as they once were. Threats will likely float and arise as circumstances dictate. To preclude this possibility the US can see to it that in areas of vital interest, or of conditional and strategic interest, it would be wise to contain possible threats thereby preventing or limiting their capacity to rise in force. The Balkans, given its strategic position between both the Middle East and Western Europe needs such an activist, proactive approach. David Gompert aptly states that once warfare ends in the former Yugoslavia, Serbia would likely offer itself as a disruptive presence in the regional balance of power. This the US should prevent.

The West cannot treat them [the nations of Southeastern Europe: Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania] as expendable. Instead, the EC and the United States should expand and sustain economic support so that these frontline states can survive and succeed as Serbia falters. Supporting struggling societies recently liberated from communism is a worthy cause in any case. It has done much for the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs. The cost has been affordable, and the results are promising. And, of course, the West would not be helping the Balkan democracies in the long run by ending Serbia’s isolation and letting Milosevic emerge as the victorious leader of a menacing local power.

The US may want to consider that recent overtures by Serbian leadership may be attempts to consolidate gains and bide time for a later date. The Cold War may be

80 Brzezinski (1993), op. cit.; p.228., and John Lewis Gaddis who states that old assumptions such as stability ‘no longer apply’. See Gaddis, "The Cold War and the Long Peace", in M. Hogan, op.cit.; p.38.
over for the US yet regional leadership in the Balkans still has not abandoned the
traditional notions of power politics. It would be ‘wiser for the US if it remembered
the maxim that it is the capacity of a potential enemy, not his conjectured or professed
intentions, that matters most.82 Since the arrival of democracy to Albania in March,
1992, the primary concern for Albania has been its fear of regional conflict spreading
south. Inexperienced leadership has not helped matters as poor diplomacy has led to
continuous heightened bilateral tensions. US failure to extend security guarantees to
nations such as Albania will only sour relations and make regional states continue to
harbour suspicions of their neighbours. With superficial ties with Albania, the US
implicitly sends a clear message to would be aggressors; territorial claims and ethnic
violence will not be dealt with on a proactive basis. By not explicitly stating where
Albania stands within the hierarchy of US interests, the US has abandoned it to its own
devices. Without a comprehensive policy which delineates its interests, the threats to
such interests, and the steps it will take, given the proper allocation of resources, to
protect and nurture those interests, nations such as Albania will be lost.

The post Cold War era has also demonstrated a new trend within the study of
international relations which, it is hoped, this study has outlined. Given the crises
which have and will likely arise in the Balkans, international relations study in the
region finds itself ‘renewing pleas for a new methodology’; one which is based upon
the investigation of historical processes and changes in the factors affecting
international life. These past relations should be examined more creatively, in order to
uncover patterns running even to the present day, which would provide a frame of
reference for assessing them...83 An examination of Albanian history has shown that
history does matter in a region where ethnic tensions run high. The US can build
relations with the various Balkan states yet needs to understand the complexities that
history presents to such relations. For the Balkan nations, economic progress gives
way to security concerns. The same can be said of Albania. Despite its rhetoric on the
virtues of democracy and market capitalism even the present democratic leadership
expresses more concern over possible territorial infringement and general area wide
instability than over a need for a growing middle class.

The United States should understand that security concerns and guarantees will
provide the key to stable and prosperous relations with Albania. Instability, be it
generated from within or from without, tend to trigger problems which ‘feed back’ and
are likely to affect the surrounding system.84 In the present case, inability to provide

82 John Gray, op.cit.; p.31.
83 Branko Jankovic, op.cit.; p.13.
84 Such a possibility is well explained by Paul Shoup; ‘Instability, then, is a condition of symbiotic
relationships among actors at various levels. This interaction, in which activities in one area of the
system affects the activities of the other areas, other parts of the system...’ In defining instability
Shoup states; ‘Instability... refers to a situation in which established procedures, processes, behaviour
for the security guarantees that Albania and other Balkan nations require will only heighten regional tensions, increase animosity toward the West, and deteriorate relations in the long term. 'The West, [and the US especially], needs to produce bilateral policies with each of the communist states of the area, taking into account country-specific conditions, leaders, and development trends. Increased concern will help fashion policies that can foster change, reform, and constructive instability, which, in turn, will help reduce the likelihood of massive and destructive instability in the intermediate run.85

Democratisation of Albania in the long run remains the key to promoting stability, particularly when nearly four million Albanians live outside Albania proper in the surrounding nations. By providing for security guarantees the US would be assisting in the furthering of positive ties between Albania and its immediate neighbours. The US, however, should consider two points. First, the US cannot impose its system upon others regardless of how they may want it. Albania, must be allowed to proceed at its own pace.86 Artificial methods to control the rate of economic liberalisation will only lead to economic chaos. As chapter three has indicated, the Albanian economy is proceeding forward with shock therapy. Yet, in a society which does not have neither the reserves needed for large scale market reforms, nor the social buffers in existence to provide for the periods of market lag and recession which are likely to occur within the first five to ten years, excessive government regulation and control will only lead to economic instability despite facades of growth. Second, the US should realise that in the short term, the promotion of stability should supersede the promotion of democracy. This should not imply that the latter be abandoned. Instead, that democracy will only flourish in an environment where it is not threatened by external sources. Recent US measures to withdraw its military presence from Europe does not offer nor demonstrate the resolve necessary to provide adequate security guarantees of US allies in Europe's forgotten corridors, such as the Balkans. More importantly, such measures by the US seem to forget the most basic aspects of human nature, that pacifism, unfortunately, has, as history has shown, been a sure way of inviting aggression.87 In its relations with Albania, the US must recognise its own limits. It cannot engage upon a crusade aimed at a global vision of a Pax Americana. Yet, in Europe, where its interests remain of vital and strategic

patterns, and formal structures of decision making no longer function in the manner expected or previously experienced, thus upsetting the established ways of doing business politically...' See, Shoup (1990), op. cit.; pp. 41-42.
83 IBID, pp. 65-66.
85 Point reaffirmed by Nixon; 'we should not insist that other nations copy our particular form of government. Many countries are not ready for it. Each nation must develop its own institutions and advance at its own pace.' See, Nixon (1992), op. cit.; p. 301.
87 J. Muravchik, op. cit.; p. 31.
importance, the US can involve itself in a 'more limited engagement than the attempt to act as the guarantor of peace and security everywhere, and one which could command the support of America's allies in Europe..." Such a strategy vis-a-vis Albania would recognise that it holds a place of secondary or conditional interest within an area of strategic concern to the US. As such, the US should seek to promote stability in Albania, externally, by containing potential and actual threats, and internally, by increasing the level of assistance which would accelerated the pace of reform and provide the atmosphere necessary for democracy and market capitalism to thrive.

The question in the post Cold War era remains; how would the US embark upon such a course? First, the US must comes to grips with itself. Through careful self-evaluation and self criticism, the US will recognise that for 'the first time in its history, America is currently part of an international system in which it is the strongest country. However, old notions, despite present similarities, offer the following inescapable conclusion: the US cannot impose its will upon others, regardless of its overwhelming military superiority.' The answer to such a question can never offer perfection. Instead, the US must accept the best of possible solutions. In the post Cold War era, the US should consider that the best, 'and [most] constructive solution would be a partially overlapping alliance systems, some focusing on security, others on economic relations. The challenge for America will be to generate objectives growing out of American values that can hold together these various groupings." In its relations with Albania, focus should remain upon the security aspects with those economic concerns of secondary importance. The key, however, remains that regardless of the overlapping alliance systems, US leadership and the willingness to act unilaterally to make its threats credible, remains vital in any set of relations. The US can still hold a share, most likely the largest share, of power and influence in the upcoming century. The possibility that this type of power will be constructive will depend upon American willingness to define its interests specifically and act to see that these interests are promoted. Albania represents a case study which to date has shown that the US is neither willing nor ready to assume the mantle of leadership necessary in the post Cold War world.

88 J. Gray, op. cit.; p.32.
90 IBD, p.167.
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