


Twilight of the princes : the fall and afterlife of monarchy in southern Germany, 1918-1934

Jonathan Triffitt

A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
at the
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TWILIGHT OF THE PRINCES

The Fall and Afterlife of Monarchy in Southern Germany, 1918-1934

JONATHAN JAMES TRIFFITT



This thesis is submitted to the
School of History of the University of St Andrews
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2020

For M, D, & P

Eine Republik zu bauen aus den Materialien einer
niedergerissenen Monarchie ist freilich ein
schweres Problem.

Es geht nicht, ohne bis erst jeder Stein anders
gehauen ist, und dazu gehört Zeit.

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg

Der Deutsche wird die Majestät
Behandeln stets mit Pietät.
In einer sechsspännigen Hofkarosse,
Schwarz panachiert und beflort die Rosse,
Hoch auf dem Bock mit der Trauerpeitsche
Der weinende Kutscher—so wird der deutsche
Monarch einst nach dem Richtplatz kutschiert
Und untertänigst guillitiniert.

Heinrich Heine

Warum denn wie mit einem Besen
Wird so ein König hinausgekehrt?

Wären's Könige gewesen,
Sie stünden noch alle unversehrt.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Abstract

This thesis is a comparative investigation into the afterlives and legacies of dynastic monarchy in southern Germany. Within a few days in November 1918, Germany's monarchical edifice collapsed, suddenly and completely. In all twenty-two of the *Kaiserreich's* monarchical states, the sovereign was overthrown as councils of soldiers and workers assumed power and the people's flag was unfurled in triumph from castle turrets. Despite spelling the end for an ancient social and political order—and concurrently creating the first German republic—these events and their consequences are curiously underresearched. As Karl Ferdinand Werner observed in 1985, they remain historiographical “non-events.” The present study addresses this lacuna by examining the processes, experiences, and consequences of what may be termed the ‘de-monarchification’ of Germany after 1918—namely, its transition from a patchwork of principalities to a centralised state of republican provinces. It asks how this change unfolded and under whose direction; how it was received by the deposed dynasties and their former subjects; which elements of the monarchy were repealed and replaced; and which were merely adopted and adapted. In short, by isolating how, when, and where the German people encountered and engaged with monarchy after 1918, the thesis seeks to determine how great a caesura the revolution truly was.

These questions are approached from three perspectives in three states—Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg. Chapters one to three firstly consider the republican leaders unexpectedly brought to power and faced with the herculean task of dismantling and replacing their monarchical inheritance. Chapters four and five then investigate how the deposed royal dynasties experienced the revolution and the republic, both as individuals and as members of a wider national and transnational social class. Chapter six, finally, considers popular responses to the upheaval and the fate of monarchism and dynastic loyalty amongst the German people. The thesis concludes that November 1918 did not signal the end for monarchy in Germany. Whether through the dynasties, who remained visible and active in their states, or through questions of de-monarchification, which dominated government agendas, monarchy remained present and demanded attention. At the constitutional level, its removal had been almost total, but its cultural roots remained strong and were, in some cases, institutionalised and made part of the new republican states. The revolution thus inaugurated the twilight of the princes; their formal influence and power had passed beyond the historical horizon, but they continued to cast a light by which historians may examine continuities in recent German history and the political culture of its most familiar and critical period.

Acknowledgements

My heart is filled with the warmest, most sincere thanks
for the faithful and devoted support I always received from you...¹
—WILHELM II OF WÜRTTEMBERG to his ministers, 30 November 1918

A doctoral thesis is a curious thing. In due course, a single name will be emblazoned in gold across its cover. That name will then be called out to polite applause amidst the trappings of ancient ceremony and its bearer flourishingly garrotted with a hood of ‘spectrum blue silk’. And yet, despite all appearances, it is far from the work of a single individual. I am delighted, therefore, to thank everyone who has accompanied, accommodated, encouraged, advised, and goaded me along the way.

My greatest debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Frank Lorenz Müller and Professor Riccardo Bavaj for their guidance, generosity, and good humour since we first cooperated on my undergraduate dissertation. From applications and archives to arguments and *Anrede*, their advice has been indispensable, and I shall forever count myself fortunate to call them my *Doktorväter*. Within the School of History, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Melanie Forbes, Lorna Harris, Elsie Johnstone, and Jennifer Todd in all things administrative and thank them for always providing a warm welcome in St Katharine’s Lodge. I also extend my thanks to Professor Monica Azzolini for being so generous with her time in writing references for my original applications.

Many of the archival sources cited in this work form part of private collections; for their gracious permission to consult and publish this material, I express my sincere gratitude to Duke Franz of Bavaria; Duke Carl of Württemberg; Duke Wilhelm Albert of Urach, Count of Württemberg; Prince Rainer of Hessen; and the board of the *Hessische Hausstiftung*. At these dynastic archives, I was greatly aided and assisted by Dr Rainer Maaß (Großherzoglich Hessisches Haus- und Familienarchiv), Dr Gerhard Immler (Geheimes Hausarchiv), Dr Eberhard Fritz (Archiv des Hauses Württemberg), and Eberhard Merk (Archiv der Herzöge von Urach), whom I thank here most warmly. For their invaluable guidance before and

1. HStAS, Q 1/6, Bü 2, 30.11.1918.

during my research trips to Germany, I am further indebted to Dr Johannes Kistenich-Zerfaß and Michael Scholz (Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt); Dr Peter Engels (Stadtarchiv Darmstadt); Dr Elisabeth Weinberger and Andreas Leipnitz (Geheimes Hausarchiv); Dr Albrecht Ernst (Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart); Martin Geyer (Stadtarchiv Worms); Sylvia Rose (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz); Dr Bettina Pfothenhauer (Stadtarchiv München); Matthias Frauenreuther (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München); Susan Kleine (Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt), and Dinah Berner (Münchener Stadtbibliothek).

I also thank Dr Jonathan Boff, Dr Christopher Dowe, Dr Moritz Föllmer, Dr Dina Gusejnova, Dr Norbert Haag, Dr Katharina Küster-Heise, Professor Martin Kohlrausch, Professor Lothar Machtan, Dr Stefan März, Dr Bernhard Post, Professor Hannelore Putz, Dr Dirk Richhardt, Dr Daniel Rittenauer, Dr Ursula Rombeck-Jaschinski, Dr Nadine Rossol, Dr Karina Urbach, Professor Dieter Weiß, and Professor Monika Wienfort for advice, comments, and suggestions shared with me over the past three years. I am additionally grateful to the convenors and participants of the German Historical Institute Postgraduate Conference (2019 and 2020), the German History Society Annual Conference (2019), the Early Modern and Modern History Postgraduate Forum at the University of St Andrews, and the German History Research Group at the University of Cambridge for their questions, recommendations, and encouragement.

I thank the *Familien* Albano-Longobardi, Eckert, Lewald, Wolf, and Zank for their warm hospitality during my travels in Germany, and Julie Poole for providing me with a home away from home in St Andrews (not least during the pandemic-beshadowed write up!).

I gratefully acknowledge the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, without whose funding this project would neither have materialised nor succeeded.

Finally, I must thank my family for their unfailing enthusiasm, encouragement, and support throughout my whole academic career. I dedicate this work to them.

JJT

Street, October 2020

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List of abbreviations

Archives

AHU	Archiv der Herzöge von Urach (Stuttgart)
AHW	Archiv des Hauses Württemberg (Altshausen)
BayHStA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Munich)
DLAM	Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach
FHHDA	Fürstlich Hohenzollernsches Haus- und Domänenarchiv (Sigmaringen)
GHA	Geheimes Hausarchiv (Munich)
GHHFA	Großherzoglich Hessisches Haus- und Familienarchiv (Darmstadt)
GLAK	Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe
GStAPK	Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin)
HStAD	Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt
HStAS	Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
MGHFA	Markgräflisch/Großherzogliches Familienarchiv (Karlsruhe)
StAS	Stadtarchiv Stuttgart
StAW	Stadtarchiv Worms
StBB	Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
ULBD	Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt
WLB	Württembergische Landesbibliothek (Stuttgart)

Parliamentary proceedings

<i>Verb. bay. LT.</i>	<i>Verhandlungen des bayerischen Landtags</i> , 33 vols. (Munich, 1919-1933)
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<i>Verb. LT. Hess.</i>	<i>Verhandlungen der Volkskammer der Republik Hessen</i> , 2 vols. (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske, 1919)
	<i>Verhandlungen des Landtags des Volksstaates Hessen</i> , 22 vols. (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske, 1920-1933)
<i>Verb. RT.</i>	<i>Verhandlungen der verfassungsgebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung</i> , 18 vols. (Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlags-Anstalt/Julius Sittenfeld, 1920)
	<i>Verhandlungen des Reichstags</i> , 116 vols. (Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlags-Anstalt/Reichsdruckerei, 1921-1939)
<i>Verb. LT. Württ.</i>	<i>Verhandlungen der verfassungsgebenden Landesversammlung beziehungsweise des Landtags des freien Volksstaates Württemberg</i> , 7 vols. (Stuttgart: Carl Grüniger Nachf. Ernst Klett, 1920)
	<i>Verhandlungen des Landtags des freien Volksstaates Württemberg</i> , 45 vols. (Stuttgart: Carl Grüniger Nachf. Ernst Klett, 1921-1933)

Legal codes

EGBGB	Einführungsgesetz zum bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Introductory Law to the Civil Code)
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State constitutions

Bay. Verf. 1808	Verfassung des Königreichs Bayern (Constitution of the Kingdom of Bavaria, 1 May 1808)
Bay. Verf. 1818	Verfassungsurkunde für das Königreich Bayern (Constitution of the Kingdom of Bavaria, 26 May 1818)
Bay. Verf. 1919	Verfassungsurkunde des Freistaates Bayern (Constitution of the Free State of Bavaria, 14 August 1919)
Hess. Verf. 1820	Verfassungsurkunde für das Großherzogtum Hessen (Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Hessen, 17 December 1820)
Hess. Verf. 1919	Verfassung des Volksstaates Hessen (Constitution of the People's State of Hessen, 12 December 1919)
WRV	Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Constitution of the German Reich, 11 August 1919)

Württ. Verf. 1819	Verfassungsurkunde für das Königreich Württemberg (Constitution of the Kingdom of Württemberg, 25 September 1819)
Württ. Verf. 1919	Verfassung des freien Volksstaates Württemberg (Constitution of the Free People's State of Württemberg, 25 September 1919)

Political parties

BBB	Bayerischer Bauernbund (Bavarian Peasants' League)
BMP	Bayerische Mittelpartei (Bavarian Middle Party)
BVP	Bayerische Volkspartei (Bavarian People's Party)
DDP	Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party)
DNVP	Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's Party)
DVP	Deutsche Volkspartei (German People's Party)
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
MSPD	Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany)
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party / Nazi Party)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany)
WBP	Württembergische Bürgerpartei (Württembergian Citizens' Party)
ZP	Zentrumspartei (Centre Party)

Nomenclature and conventions

This thesis follows the standard convention of referring to former monarchs by the title they held whilst reigning. Forenames are given in the original German, states in the English form.

In archival collections, private correspondence is grouped into bundles according to the intended recipient. As such, each letter in a bundle may be distinguished from another solely by the date it was written. Citations of these documents will thus take the following form:

archive fonds bundle date
AHU, GU 119, Bü 1099, 04.03.1919.

Official documents, including governmental correspondence and memoranda, may be distinguished by their internal reference numbers, and will thus be cited as:

archive bundle date
HStAD, O 24, 50/24, Nr. 5194 B, 22.05.1922.
fonds reference no.

If a document did not receive a reference number, but had either a title or was an item of correspondence between two individuals or authorities, the adopted form is as follows:

archive bundle document title date
AHW, 331, Nr. 1093, Ausführungen der Verwaltungsreferenten zu dem Etat 1926, 04.01.1926.
fonds

archive bundle sender and recipient date
BayHStA, MF, 70359, Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 27.02.1931.
fonds

Brief descriptions will be provided for documents with no title.

Introduction

Weimar through the royal looking glass

2am, 25 November 1918

Ernst Ludwig, Grand Duke of Hessen and by Rhine, could not sleep. It was not excitement which caused his restlessness, even though it happened to be his fiftieth birthday. Nor was he awoken by the peal of Darmstadt's *Glockenspiel*, which had tunefully marked the hours since 1671. Nor was the accomplished poet and playwright disturbed by a visitation from the muse. Sat wearily at his desk, in the glow of candlelight, he explained his unease to posterity:

It is done. The great war has defeated us. The enemy pushes deep into our territory and will occupy it. Every throne has fallen. The Kaiser has fled. Every prince has retreated to a lonely castle; only my family and I remain in Darmstadt. Germany is a single great republic, the states now small. Everything is run by a single class.¹

Untangling Ernst Ludwig's stream-of-consciousness scribbles, we learn the state of play. Imperial Germany, at war with the Allies since August 1914, had been defeated and its western territories—including Ernst Ludwig's former realms in *Rhein Hessen*—faced a decade or more of administration by the victors. The German war machine and the German state both lay in ruins. Founded amidst the splendour of Versailles' Hall of Mirrors as an "eternal union" of the German princes and city-states, the *Kaiserreich* had lasted a mere forty-seven years. In early November 1918, a revolution borne of war-weariness, anger at the impending defeat, and frustration at Germany's ossified autocracy had swept across the empire, toppling all twenty of the remaining monarchs. In each residence town, events followed a similar pattern. Disenchanted soldiers, responding to news of defeat at the front and mutiny in northern naval ports, rebelled in local garrisons before leading demonstrations to the heart of the city. There, alongside the trade unions and socialist associations, they tempted security forces away from the defence of public buildings, including the palace. Inside, hurriedly

1. Ernst Ludwig Großherzog von Hessen, *Grundideen eines konstitutionellen Fürsten. Mit einem biographischen Essay von Golo Mann zum 40. Todestags des Großherzogs*, ed. Eckhart G. Franz (Darmstadt, 1977), pp. 47-48.

assembled war councils consisting of the monarch and his ministers considered their options and the evident failure of their pre-emptive (yet overdue) attempts at democratic reform. Realising the seriousness of the situation, not just locally, where Soviets were springing up with disconcerting rapidity and passion, but in neighbouring territories, which sent reports of royal flight and red flags fluttering from ancient turrets, the chief minister convinced his sovereign to abdicate. From beginning to end, the performance lasted only a few days and—in many cases—concluded without a shot fired.

On 30 November, Wilhelm II of Württemberg became the final German monarch to abdicate, but the revolution had long since reached its zenith.² Three weeks earlier, on 9 November, Germany's "supreme war lord," Kaiser Wilhelm II, having first withdrawn to his military headquarters at Spa in Belgium, had fled into exile in the Netherlands. While increasingly sidelined during the war, to the extent that he appeared a "shadow emperor" to some, the announcement of Wilhelm's abdication—made without his consent and with questionable legality by his Chancellor and cousin, Prince Max of Baden—signalled the symbolic end of the *Kaiserreich*. Faced with few other options, Prince Max handed over power to the leader of the Majority Social Democrats, Friedrich Ebert, a former saddlemaker. For the first time in recent history, the German lands were republican.

This thesis asks the simple questions: what happened next, why, and to whom? The speed and relative civility of the revolutions disguise their enormous significance, for in many ways they were wholly unprecedented. Never before had a state experienced mass and rapid abdications of this kind. Few contemporaries, moreover, had imagined that such a thing was possible or, indeed, likely to happen. More fundamentally, the revolutions signified a shift in the political structure and governance of Germany without equivalent in its history. Monarchies which had existed for centuries were lost in as many hours. The Wittelsbachs had ruled in Bavaria since 1180; the Wettins in Saxony since 1089; and the Zähringens in Baden since 1061. Almost overnight, divine right had given way to the sovereignty of the people. This thesis proceeds from the assumption that such a wholesale, sudden, and unexpected upheaval of a long-established order cannot have created a watertight seal on all that had preceded it. The German monarchies were not merely systems of government, but

2. Neither Ludwig III of Bavaria nor Ernst Ludwig of Hessen formally abdicated.

social, cultural, and political structures which, over the centuries, had become interdigitated into all facets of life. Consider Ernst Ludwig's summation once more. What became of the royals who fled their capitals? How were fallen thrones refashioned into republican and democratic seats of power? Were the German provinces actually diminished by the loss of their monarchies? How did the princes and the people respond to this *fait accompli*? In short, how—and how far—was Germany 'de-monarchified' after 1918? This thesis considers these questions from three perspectives in three different states: Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg. The first perspective is that of the republicans unexpectedly tasked with dismantling their monarchical inheritance. The second is that of the deposed dynasties seeking to survive within a society which had formally abolished privileges of birth. Finally, the thesis considers the experience of the German people, many of whom, it is argued, remained sympathetic to their dynasties up to and beyond 1918. By examining Weimar through this royal prism, the thesis offers the first comparative investigation into the afterlives and legacies of monarchy, the processes by which it was deconstructed and replaced by its republican successor, and the consequences revolution ultimately had for the German dynasties and their former subjects and territories.

The revolution and its legacies

Historians have generally been consistent in their diagnoses when examining the collapse of the German monarchies.³ By 1918, it is argued, a combination of contingencies—some temporal, others relating to the *Kaiserreich's* unique federal structure—had weakened the

3. Cf. Karl-Heinz Janßen, 'Der Untergang der Monarchie in Deutschland', in: Hellmuth Rößler (ed.), *Weltwende 1917: Monarchie, Weltrevolution, Demokratie* (Göttingen, 1965), pp. 90-133; Werner K. Blessing, 'The Cult of Monarchy, Political Loyalty and the Workers' Movement in Imperial Germany', *Journal of Contemporary History* 13:2 (1978), pp. 357-375; *Staat und Kirche in der Gesellschaft: Institutionelle Autorität und mentaler Wandel in Bayern während des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 1982); Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 'Der Zusammenbruch der Monarchie und die Entstehung der Weimarer Republik', in: Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.), *Die Weimarer Republik: Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* (Bonn, 1987), pp. 17-43; Helmut Neuhaus, 'Das Ende der Monarchien in Deutschland 1918', *Historisches Jahrbuch* 111 (1991), pp. 102-136; Lothar Machtan, 'Die Entkrönung der deutschen Bundesfürsten im Herbst 1918: Skizze eines von der Gerda Henkel Stiftung geförderten Forschungsprojektes', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 55:3 (2007), pp. 251-264; *Die Abdankung: Wie Deutschlands gekrönte Häupter aus der Geschichte fielen* (Berlin, 2008); 'Der erstaunlich lautlose Untergang von Monarchie und Bundesfürstentümern—ein Erklärungsangebot', in: Alexander Gallus (ed.), *Die vergessene Revolution von 1918/19* (Göttingen, 2010), pp. 39-57; Heinz Gollwitzer, 'Die Endphase der Monarchie in Deutschland', in: idem, *Weltpolitik und deutsche Geschichte: Gesammelte Studien*, ed. Hans-Christof Kraus (Göttingen, 2008), pp. 363-383; Michael Horn, 'Zwischen Abdankung und Absetzung: Das Ende der Herrschaft der Bundesfürsten des Deutschen Reichs im November 1918', in: Susan Richter and Dirk Dirbach (eds.), *Thronverzicht: Die Abdankung in Monarchien vom Mittelalter bis in die Neuzeit* (Weimar, 2010), pp. 267-291; Frank Lorenz Müller, 'The German Monarchies', in: Matthew Jefferies (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Imperial Germany* (Farnham, 2015), pp. 55-74.

monarchies to such a degree that they were neither able to withstand the rigours of total war nor convincingly prove that they retained a purpose in modern society. Three contributing factors stand out. Firstly, the rise of a national-imperial monarchy under the House of Hohenzollern steadily encroached upon the provincial monarchs' traditional monopoly over their subjects' attentions and devotions. Extending his reach through institutions like the army and the media, the Kaiser outgrew his initial role as *primus inter pares* of the federal princes to become a domineering figure beyond the borders of Prussia. Faced with an emperor pavilioned in splendour, the provincial royal cults "had nothing of similar value to offer" (Werner Blessing).⁴ Indeed, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde surmises, this gradual centralisation of authority—both symbolic and actual—contributed to a diminishing of the states as separate and unique "historical-political entities."⁵

Secondly, Germany's fractured and authoritarian political system ultimately came off second-best in its inevitable clash with modernity. Seventeen of the twenty-two monarchies collectively contained less than one tenth of the *Kaiserreich's* population and territory.⁶ In an increasingly dynamic era, these statelets and their charmingly inconsequent rulers appeared anachronistic. On a wider scale, the virtues of monarchy were no longer self-evident. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, socialism was on the rise (notably so in Germany) and calls echoed for broader franchises and greater democratic accountability. The belief grew stronger that political power, if not in the gift of "the people," increasingly rested on their consent as Europe entered what has been termed the "age of the masses."⁷ Dynasties across the continent realised, with varying degrees of astuteness, that if they were to survive, they had to reform. Modernisation, nationalisation, and embourgeoisement became fashionable elements of monarchical self-portrayal and royal attempts to move with the times. This response was not uniform, however, and historians have pinned the blame for

4. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, p. 235. For a recent discussion of the Kaiser's position in Imperial Germany, see: Oliver F. R. Haardt, 'The Kaiser in the Federal State, 1871-1918', *German History* 34:4 (2016), pp. 529-554.

5. Böckenförde, 'Zusammenbruch der Monarchie', p. 18. Lothar Machtan typically goes further, implying that the federal princes ceased to be monarchs in any meaningful sense in January 1871, see: Machtan, *Abdankung*, pp. 59-74.

6. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, 'Zur Beurteilung des 'Monarchismus' in der Weimarer Republik', in: Gotthard Jasper (ed.), *Tradition und Reform in der deutschen Politik: Gedenkschrift für Waldemar Besson* (Frankfurt a.M., 1976), p. 143.

7. Michael Biddiss, *The Age of the Masses: Ideas and Society in Europe since 1870* (Harmondsworth, 1977). See also: Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, 2011).

the collapse of monarchy in Germany on its princes' latent indifference to these demands.⁸ Lothar Machtan makes the argument most forcefully, highlighting "a fatal misjudgement of the *Zeitgeist*," which left the German people little choice but to take matters into their own hands.⁹ Werner Blessing and Theodor Schieder agree, contending that the gap between Germany's industrial society and the political system embodied by the monarchs had become too great to bridge by 1914.¹⁰

The final and most significant factor in the monarchs' demise was the First World War. Republicanism was almost unheard of in Germany prior to 1918 and the complete collapse of the monarchical order is difficult to imagine beyond the context of total war. The glee with which certain monarchs—such as Ludwig III of Bavaria—spoke of annexing enemy territory and augmenting their realms fundamentally alienated Germans who had bought the official line that they were fighting a defensive war.¹¹ Indeed, for Benjamin Ziemann, Ludwig's advocacy for annexations was "the main reason why soldiers rejected the monarchy" in Bavaria.¹² Royal activity at the sand table was complemented by regular visits to frontline troops, but their lack of command experience and visible leadership in battle ultimately made the provincial monarchs complicit in the failings of the German war effort.¹³ Ludwig, for instance, was openly excoriated as a "puppet of Berlin."¹⁴ Conditions of total war only exacerbated extant processes of centralisation, leaving regional dynasties increasingly side-lined and overshadowed by new, dynamic, and—more to the point—*national* heroes like Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.¹⁵ Nevertheless, for all their outward loss of authority, the monarchs were still held responsible for a war which was rapidly turning against Germany. The revolution succeeded not because the German people

8. Cf. Janßen, 'Untergang der Monarchie', p. 92.

9. Machtan, 'Der erstaunlich lauterloser Untergang', p. 43.

10. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, pp. 231-232; Theodor Schieder, *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich von 1871 als Nationalstaat*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen, 1992), p. 83.

11. For a discussion of the planned annexations, see: Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/1918*, 2nd ed. (Düsseldorf, 1962), p. 211ff.

12. Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany 1914-1923*, trans. Alex Skinner (Oxford, 2007), p. 153.

13. Machtan, *Abdankung*, pp. 92-106.

14. Karl Bosl, 'Gesellschaft und Politik in Bayern vor dem Ende der Monarchie: Beiträge zu einer sozialen und politischen Strukturanalyse', *Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* 28 (1965), p. 26; Robert Garnett, 'Lion, Eagle, and Swastika: Bavarian Monarchism in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1989), pp. 42, 50.

15. Cf. Janßen, 'Untergang', pp. 94-98; Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Wandlungen des deutschen Kaisergedankens 1871-1918* (Munich, 1969), pp. 216-219; Jeffrey R. Smith, *A People's War: Germany's Political Revolution, 1913-1918* (Lanham, 2007), p. 142ff.

opposed monarchy. It succeeded because they demanded peace at any cost, and that cost was the overthrow of the defenceless and dispensable monarchs.

While historians have produced a number of blow-by-blow accounts detailing the collapse of monarchy, even in the smallest of Germany's provinces and residence towns, in-depth analysis of its *legacies* remains elusive. As far back as 1985, Karl Ferdinand Werner observed that the fall of monarchy was a historiographical “non-event.”¹⁶ With only a few leaks, Werner's judgement continues to hold water thirty-five years later. Lothar Machtan's *Die Abdankung*, the sole monograph-length work to engage with the mass abdications, finishes the story in December 1918. Other studies, meanwhile, use Weimar as a preface to the more pressing question of royal complicity in National Socialism.¹⁷ Treatment of the federal princes in more general works on Weimar tends towards the dismissive. As Germany's supreme war lord and president of the federation, Kaiser Wilhelm II is usually honoured with a paragraph or two. For his part, Ludwig III, the first monarch to be deposed, may earn a sentence. Their eighteen other colleagues, however, are lucky to receive a mention at all. Such neglect is a symptom of a wider mentality which frames monarchy as irrelevant by and after 1918. As implied by Machtan's subtitle, the revolutions are taken to signal the moment when “Germany's crowned heads fell from history.” This approach is not limited to overviews of Weimar but may also be found in studies of the deposed monarchs themselves. The few biographies published on the ‘last generation’ of monarchs treat the years after 1918 as something of a race to their eventual demise—an epilogue which the author is obliged to include, but in which they have little interest.¹⁸ Historical accounts of whole dynasties are

16. Karl Ferdinand Werner, ‘Fürst und Hof im 19. Jahrhundert: Abgang oder Spätblüte?’, in: idem (ed.), *Hof, Kultur und Politik im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bonn, 1985), p. 11.

17. Jonathan Petropoulos, *Royals and the Reich: The Princes von Hessen in Nazi Germany* (Oxford, 2006). For further discussion of this relationship, see: Anke Schmeling, *Josias Erbprinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont: Der politische Weg eines hohen SS-Führers* (Kassel, 1993); Karina Urbach, *Go-Betweens for Hitler* (Oxford, 2015); Hubertus Büschel, *Hitlers adliger Diplomat: Der Herzog von Coburg und das dritte Reich* (Frankfurt a.M., 2016).

18. Aside from the vast literature devoted to Kaiser Wilhelm II, see: Ulrike Leutheusser and Hermann Rumschöttel (eds.), *König Ludwig III. und das Ende der Monarchie in Bayern* (Munich, 2014); Kurt Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach, Kronprinz von Bayern* (Munich, 1954); Dieter J. Weiß, *Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern: Eine politische Biografie* (Regensburg, 2007); Manfred Knodt, *Ernst Ludwig Grossherzog von Hessen und bei Rhein* (Darmstadt, 1978); Paul Sauer, *Württembergs letzter König: Das Leben Wilhelms II.* (Stuttgart, 1994); Bernard Post and Dietrich Werner, *Herrscher in der Zeitenwende: Wilhelm Ernst von Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, 1876-1923* (Jena, 2006); Lothar Machtan, *Prinz Max von Baden: Der Letzte Kanzler des Kaisers. Eine Biographie* (Berlin, 2013).

similarly structured with the family's fall from grace rarely acknowledged with more than a few prosaic comments.¹⁹

How might this neglect be explained? In his assessment, Karl Ferdinand Werner isolated three main factors. Firstly, he argues, historians viewed the German monarchies as superficial entities more suited to the stage than serious academic study. Offering anecdotes rather than avenues for analysis, they sat in the purview of popular historians who were welcome to keep them. Writing in the 1980s, at the tail end of a movement which had emphasised history “from below,” Werner secondly noted that kings and princes could gain little traction in an intellectual climate which favoured the common, the forgotten, and the oppressed. Most interestingly, however, he diagnosed an unconscious determination amongst historians (particularly those in the Federal Republic) to deny that undemocratic and supposedly “backward” structures and belief systems—such as monarchy and monarchism—had survived in Germany until 1918 and, in the latter case, far beyond.²⁰ Werner's comments were later echoed by Frank-Lothar Kroll, Wolfgang Weber, Thomas Biskup, and Martin Kohlrausch, and go some way to explaining the curious disregard which the study of monarchy experienced before its revival twenty years ago.²¹ An additional practical point should be considered, however. Until comparatively recently—certainly after Werner's analysis—historians were hamstrung by regulations limiting access to dynastic archives. Many such collections in Germany do not allow consultation of files which refer to, or whose publication may affect, living agnates. Only now, a century on from the revolutions and eighty-five years since the Nazi seizure of power, are documents relating to the royal experience of Weimar and the afterlives of monarchy readily available.

19. See, for example: Robert Uhlend (ed.), *900 Jahre Haus Württemberg: Leben und Leistung für Land und Volk* (Stuttgart, 1985); Eckhart G. Franz, *Das Haus Hessen: Eine europäische Familie* (Stuttgart, 2005).

20. Werner, ‘Fürst und Hof’.

21. Frank-Lothar Kroll, ‘Monarchische Modernisierung: Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Königsherrschaft und Elitenanpassung im Europa des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts’, in: Frank-Lothar Kroll and Martin Munke (eds.), *Hannover—Coburg-Gotha—Windsor: Probleme und Perspektiven einer vergleichenden deutsch-britischen Dynastiegeschichte vom 18. bis in das 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2015), pp. 201-242; Wolfgang Weber, ‘Einleitung’, in: idem (ed.), *Der Fürst: Ideen und Wirklichkeit in der europäischen Geschichte* (Cologne, 1998), pp. 1-26; Thomas Biskup and Martin Kohlrausch, ‘Das Erbe der Monarchie: Nachwirkungen einer deutschen Institution’, in: idem (eds.), *Das Erbe der Monarchie: Nachwirkungen einer deutschen Institution nach 1918* (Frankfurt a.M., 2008), p. 20.

These topics receive their most direct treatment in Biskup and Kohlrausch's edited collection *Das Erbe der Monarchie*.²² Originally presented as papers at a similarly entitled conference in early 2007, its chapters explore the paradoxical state in which monarchy existed after 1918—one in which it was simultaneously present and absent.²³ While the revolution had, in no uncertain terms, pulled the constitutional rug from beneath their feet, Germany's royals remained "remarkably visible" in provincial life.²⁴ The institution of monarchy, moreover, left legacies which were both material (in castles and art collections) as well as "structural-cultural" (such as the sentimental participation in royal events, both at home and abroad). As such, the authors contend, the climax of the First World War cannot be seen to create a *tabula rasa* in Germany. Strands of continuity survived throughout the interwar years and even into the latter half of the twentieth century. These strands are revealing of these later periods, but they also inform the historian of what mattered *before* 1918 by isolating those elements of monarchy which were sufficiently robust to survive the tribulations and transitions that followed.

The present thesis builds on the premise laid down by Biskup and Kohlrausch, namely that there are discernible aftereffects [*Nachwirkungen*] of monarchy beyond its fall in 1918 which are revealing of German politics, culture, and society both before *and* after the revolution. In isolating these legacies, the thesis examines two main strands relating to the idea of 'demonarchification'—Germany's progression from a federation of ancient principalities to a more unitary, centralised republic. The first considers the formal processes by which it was completed. On their sudden and unexpected arrival in high office, Germany's provincial republican leaders were faced with the daunting task of building new states. The construction of new republics simultaneously involved the dismantling—or at least the altering—of the old monarchies. As Georg Christoph Lichtenberg observed in revolutionary France, moulding a republic from the ruins of a fallen monarchy "can only succeed when every stone has been reshaped."²⁵ How, then, were the powers of the monarch distributed amongst new republican institutions? How were monarchical state symbols replaced or adapted for the new order? What became of castles, palaces, and follies which dotted the landscape as tangible reminders of Germany's monarchical past? This thesis investigates how decisions

22. Biskup and Kohlrausch (eds.), *Das Erbe der Monarchie*.

23. Biskup and Kohlrausch, 'Das Erbe der Monarchie', p. 16.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

25. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, *Vermischte Schriften* (Göttingen, 1844), vol. I, p. 253.

on the fate of Weimar's royal inheritance were made and by whom. It also considers, furthermore, the degree of change discernible after 1918. To take Lichtenberg's metaphor further, we may ask how indiscriminately Weimar's republican leaders wielded their mallets and chisels. As will be discussed, the stones which comprised the monarchs' constitutional role were broken into new pieces and distributed amongst the republics' foundations. Decorative elements, meanwhile, which were generally more popular and valuable in their own right—such as royal coats of arms or palaces—were retained, renovated, and transferred whole into their new settings.

The second strand concerns how these processes and their consequences were experienced. Few Germans were likely to take an indifferent stance on the revolution of November 1918 for it implied a fundamental upheaval of the political and cultural status quo. The disappearance of the local monarch also meant the disappearance of autocratic hierarchies, dynastic medals, royal processions, and the state's links with the church and military. In the main, the revolutions were small-scale urban affairs which revolved around the palace. Beyond the city streets, news of the upheaval was met with shock and disapproval. Even those who ideologically questioned the monarchy still felt unnerved by the instability wrought by its collapse. This thesis thus asks how the German people perceived and encountered the monarchy after 1918 and whether a measurable degree of sympathy or loyalty made it unscathed through the maelstrom of revolution. It secondly considers the royals themselves. Deposed from their lofty positions, Germany's dynasties were forced to contend with, and reconcile themselves to, a dramatic loss in fortunes and status, and threats to their financial wellbeing, freedom, and even safety. How did they acclimatise to this change and which strategies did they develop to counter it? In short, can any continuity be discerned in royal behaviour (and in popular attitudes towards the royals) after the revolution pulled away the platform on which monarchy had rested?

Arguments and historiography

Revolution and continuity

This thesis argues that the southern German revolutions of November 1918 were not the caesurae one might imagine them to be. For all their suddenness and the shock they instilled in onlookers, they cannot be said to have razed provincial monarchies to the ground in preparation for the new republic. State symbols after 1918 were frequently simplified

adaptions of royal coats of arms and dynastic motifs, retained to lend gravitas and stature to nascent provincial republics and to placate the still-ripe monarchist sentiments of the population. Castles and palaces, meanwhile, retained their function as loci of power and government, or were transformed into museums which explicitly celebrated the history of the monarchy. Monarchs and their families, meanwhile, remained patrons of the arts, regional magnates, and the focus of state-wide attention. November 1918 was certainly an upheaval at the constitutional level, but cultural continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary orders remained considerable. As such, this thesis concurs with Alexander Gallus' description of the revolution as *kontinuitätsgebremst*—that is, one which was slowed by continuity, but not thwarted by it.²⁶ Some elements of the monarchy passed through intact, others in new forms and constellations, and some not at all.

Despite its obvious significance, both to contemporaries and for Germany's subsequent path, interest in the November Revolution has been spasmodic in the intervening century. When historians first turned to the Weimar Republic in the 1950s, they busied themselves—in the context of post-war state-building—with the thorny question of its demise.²⁷ The republic's birth was seen less as a revolution than the simple collapse of the old order, with continuity between the two secured by Friedrich Ebert's cooperation with the imperial elites. According to the prevailing interpretation outlined by Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Ebert had little choice, for inaction would seal victory for Bolshevism in Germany.²⁸ This “either-or” interpretation was based on the assumption that Germany's revolutionary councils were dominated by dangerous radicals and communists, a point of view strongly challenged during the later “rediscovery of the revolution” (Reinhard Rürup).²⁹ As the pioneering studies of Eberhard Kolb, Heinrich August Winkler and others revealed, the councils' membership was predominantly oriented towards the Majority and Independent Social Democrats and not

26. Alexander Gallus, 'Eine kontinuierlich gebremste Revolution: Deutschland an der Weggabelung zwischen Monarchie und Demokratie', in: Thomas Biskup, Truc Vu Minh, and Jürgen Luh (eds.), *Preussendämmerung: Die Abdankung der Hohenzollern und das Ende Preussens*, Kulturegeschichte Preußens—Colloquien 8 (2019), pp. 23-37.

27. Cf. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie* (Stuttgart, 1955).

28. See: Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 'Rätestaat oder parlamentarische Demokratie?', in: idem (ed.), *Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte. Band 4: Die Zeit der Weltkriege* (Stuttgart, 1959); 'Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 3:1 (1955), pp. 1-19.

29. Reinhard Rürup, 'Demokratische Revolution und "dritter Weg": Die deutsche Revolution von 1918/19 in der neueren wissenschaftlichen Diskussion', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9:2 (1983), p. 286.

the Communists.³⁰ The logical implication of this conclusion—namely that Ebert had alternatives open to him between continuity and chaos—occupied historians throughout the 1960s and 1970s.³¹ Why, given its supposed freedom of action, did the MSPD fail to achieve its democratic and socialist ends? As Andreas Wirsching summarises, this research concluded that the party was both too reticent (and too determined to delegate to a future national assembly) and too fearful of Bolshevism to institute the thorough reforms it desired.³²

In subsequent decades, interest in the revolution waned, leading Gallus in 2010 to diagnose a “collective amnesia” amongst his colleagues.³³ In the introduction to *Die vergessene Revolution*, a pointedly titled collection of essays, Gallus argued that the 1918 revolution’s lack of supporters condemned it to neglect and a permanent place in the shadow of the more ‘dramatic’ caesurae of recent German history: 1933, 1945, and 1989.³⁴ Whether intended as a call to arms or not, the collection was followed by a noticeable surge in interest.³⁵ While earlier studies were predominantly works of political history, focusing on the complexities of the war-time *Reichstag* or the soldiers’ and workers’ councils, historians have begun to consider the revolution’s cultural aspects and consequences. As Ewald Frie writes, the 1918 revolution—and the post-war moment more broadly—is being spatially, temporally, and conceptually reinterpreted as the centenary of its unfolding passes by.³⁶ The upheavals which birthed the Weimar order are increasingly placed in the transnational context and even

30. Eberhard Kolb, *Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918-1919* (Düsseldorf, 1962); Heinrich August Winkler, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Revolution von 1918/19: Ein Rückblick nach sechzig Jahren* (Berlin, 1979). Peter von Oertzen, by contrast, continued to discern revolutionary potential (albeit squandered) in the council system, see: *Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution: Eine politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der betrieblichen und wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19* (Düsseldorf, 1963).

31. For overviews of this research, see: Andreas Wirsching, *Die Weimarer Republik: Politik und Gesellschaft* (Berlin, 2008), p. 51ff; Eberhard Kolb and Dirk Schumann, *Die Weimarer Republik*, 8th ed. (Munich, 2013), pp. 166-179.

32. Wirsching, *Die Weimarer Republik*, p. 53.

33. Alexander Gallus, ‘Einleitung’, in: idem (ed.), *Die vergessene Revolution von 1918/19* (Göttingen, 2010), p. 11.

34. Alexander Gallus, ‘Die vergessene Revolution von 1918/19—Erinnerung und Deutung im Wandel’, in: idem (ed.), *Die vergessene Revolution*, pp. 14-38.

35. See: Klaus Weinbauer, Anthony McElligott, and Kirsten Heinsohn (eds.), *Germany 1916–23: A Revolution in Context* (Bielefeld, 2015); Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919* (Cambridge, 2016); Volker Stalman, ‘Die Wiederentdeckung der Revolution von 1918/19: Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven’, *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 64 (2016), pp. 521-541; Joachim Käppner, *1918: Aufstand für die Freiheit: Die Revolution der Besonnenen* (Munich, 2017); Wolfgang Niess, *Die Revolution von 1918/19: Der wahre Beginn unserer Demokratie* (Munich, 2017); Andreas Braune and Michael Dreyer (eds.), *Zusammenbruch, Aufbruch, Abbruch? Die Novemberrevolution als Ereignis und Erinnerungsort* (Stuttgart, 2019). Amongst earlier works see, in particular, Martin Geyer, *Verkehrte Welt: Revolution, Inflation und Moderne. München 1914-1924* (Göttingen, 1998).

36. Ewald Frie, ‘1918/19. 100 Years On: Open Futures’, *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History* 15 (2018), pp. 2-18.

fundamental assumptions, such as their timing, are subject to challenge.³⁷ Jeffrey Smith (1913), Matthew Stibbe (1914), Anthony McElligott (1916), and Boris Barth (1917) have all argued, for example, that opening accounts in 1918 is to begin *in media res* and overlook vital context.³⁸

The result of these methodological changes has been a decisive move towards depicting the 1918 revolution as an open-ended, even successful affair. Greater appreciation for what the leaders of the revolution accomplished under difficult circumstances has begun to replace criticism for what they did not.³⁹ In these studies, the events of November 1918 are something genuinely revolutionary, engineered by forces from below, rather than legacies of a regime which collapsed of its own accord. The republic they created, meanwhile, is held to have possessed far greater potential than it is usually afforded. The twin ideas of opportunity and optimism are taken furthest by Rüdiger Graf and Moritz Föllmer in their deconstruction of the idea of “crisis”.⁴⁰ Owing to the frequency of its use by contemporaries to describe Weimar, the interwar period has come to be seen as a time of persistent and inescapable crisis. By interrogating the term and its use, however, it reveals itself as a rhetorical device designed to force engagement with (and plans for) alternative futures, rather than a genuine and sober evaluation. Crises reveal possibilities and call for choices. In short, they can be

37. Robert Gerwarth, *November 1918: The German Revolution* (Oxford, 2020). See also the contributions by Tim B. Müller and Hedwig Richter in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 44:3 (2018) and the comments by Müller in: ‘Demokratie und Wirtschaftspolitik in der Weimarer Republik’, *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 62:4 (2014), p. 569ff.

38. Smith, *A People’s War*; Matthew Stibbe, *Germany, 1914-1933: Politics, Society, and Culture* (New York, 2010); Anthony McElligott, *Rethinking the Weimar Republic: Authority and Authoritarianism, 1916-1936* (London, 2014); Boris Barth, *Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1933* (Düsseldorf, 2003), pp. 200-212. See also: Jörn Retterath, “Was ist das Volk?": *Volks- und Gemeinschaftskonzepte der politischen Mitte in Deutschland, 1918-1924* (Berlin, 2016); Daniel Führer, *Alltagsorgen und Gemeinschaftsnebenstücke: Tagebücher der Weimarer Republik (1913-1934)* (Stuttgart, 2020).

39. See: Conan Fischer, “A Very German Revolution?: The Post-1918 Settlement Re-Evaluated”, *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London* 28:2 (2006), pp. 6-32; Klaus Weinbauer, Anthony McElligott, and Kirsten Heinsohn, ‘Introduction: In Search of the German Revolution’, in: idem (eds.), *Germany 1916-23: A Revolution in Context* (Bielefeld, 2015), pp. 7-36.

40. Moritz Föllmer and Rüdiger Graf (eds.), *Die “Krise” der Weimarer Republik: Zur Kritik eines Deutungsmusters* (Frankfurt a.M., 2005); Rüdiger Graf, ‘Optimismus und Pessimismus in der Krise—der politische-kulturelle Diskurs in der Weimarer Republik’, in: Wolfgang Hardtwig (ed.), *Ordnungen in der Krise: Zur politischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands 1900-1933* (Munich, 2007), pp. 115-140; *Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in Deutschland 1918-1933* (Munich, 2008); ‘Either-Or: The Narrative of “Crisis” in Weimar Germany and in Historiography’, *Central European History* 43:4 (2010), pp. 592-615; Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Barndt, and Kristin McGuire (eds.), *Weimar Subjects/Weimar Publics: Rethinking the Political Culture of Germany in the 1920s* (New York, 2010); Christoph Thonfeld, ‘Krisenjahre Revisited: Die Weimarer Republik und die klassische Moderne in der gegenwärtigen Forschung’, *Historische Zeitschrift* 302:2 (2016), pp. 390-420.

moments of positivity and potential. To label the Weimar Republic a land of crisis, it is argued, is to misread the intentions of those who experienced and commented on it.

This thesis maintains the position that the monarchies of the *Kaiserreich* were not forcibly toppled but disintegrated independently. Nevertheless, it concurs with the interpretation above that, at the constitutional level, the revolution instituted dramatic change and succeeded in producing relatively stable, democratic regimes in the German provinces. Much of this stability, it is argued here, was founded on the *cultural* survival of monarchy after 1918. In this sphere, the revolution was far less thorough in wiping the monarchical slate clean. By stressing continuity, however, the thesis does not revert to assumptions that the revolution failed or was foiled. Instead, it argues that royal residuals survived precisely because the new regimes and elements of the German people (sometimes in implicit cooperation with the deposed dynasties) either desired that they did or, at least, did not object to their partial survival. To new regimes seeking to establish themselves, the monarchies bequeathed a ready-made canon of state symbols and cultural practices which enjoyed popular support, as well as palaces from which to operate. For many Germans, meanwhile, their local dynasty remained blameless, despite the revolution, and deserving of ancient loyalties. The old order thus lingered on in areas of life where official, popular, and royal interests coalesced and aligned.

Democracy and democratic culture

Renewed interest in the 1918 revolution has run in parallel with the rise of *Demokratiegeschichte*, the comparative and historical examination of democracy and its emergence in the modern world.⁴¹ Spearheaded by the sustained efforts of Tim B. Müller, Adam Tooze, and Hedwig Richter, it seeks to assign pre-1945 democracy greater vitality, originality, and potential than it is usually afforded. The interwar period, Müller contends, was the time of a strong and energetic “transnational democratic dynamic.”⁴² On the ground, moreover, democrats were

41. Cf. Tim B. Müller, *Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Lebensversuche moderner Demokratien* (Hamburg, 2014); Tim B. Müller and Adam Tooze (eds.), *Normalität und Fragilität: Demokratie nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Hamburg, 2015); Tim B. Müller and Jeppe Nevers, ‘Narratives of Democracy: A Call for Historical Studies’, *Journal of Modern European History* 17:2 (2019), pp. 123-134; Heidrun Kämper, Peter Haslinger, and Thomas Raithel (eds.), *Demokratiegeschichte als Zäsurgeschichte: Diskurse der frühen Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 2014); Hedwig Richter, *Demokratie: Eine deutsche Affäre* (Munich, 2020). For discussion of other recent works and trends, see the introduction by Müller and Richter and the contribution by Tooze in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 44:3 (2018).

42. Müller, ‘Demokratie und Wirtschaftspolitik’, p. 569.

conscientious and confident in their ideologies and the structures built to defend them. In the case of the Weimar Republic, this line of thought is framed as a challenge to historians who speak of volatility and political violence without interrogating these concepts, or who isolate the republic's democratic experience—wrongly, it is argued—as somehow uniquely deficient.⁴³ In place of these pessimistic readings, Weimar's democratic culture is now defended as viable, imaginative, innovative, resilient, and—most importantly of all—fundamentally popular.⁴⁴ This optimism has long since established itself as the dominant *modus operandi*. As far back as 1996, Peter Fritzsche observed that the Weimar Republic which “emerges from the recent historiography is strikingly open-ended.”⁴⁵ Once treated merely as a prelude to the Third Reich, it has regained contingency and agency and now enjoys attention as a polity worthy of study in its own right.⁴⁶ As a second consequence, the republic has been relieved of the damning descriptors “doomed,” “tragic,” and “inevitable.” Moving away from 1918 and 1933 and their overtones of failure, historians now discuss the

43. Tim B. Müller, ‘The Opportunities and Challenges of Democracy: Weimar and Beyond’, *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington* 65 (2019), pp. 111-129. For historiographical summaries of recent work on Weimar's democratic culture, see: Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Weimar was Weimar: Politics, Culture, and the Emplotment of the German Republic’, *German History* 28:4 (2010), pp. 542-571; Nadine Rossol, ‘Chancen der Weimarer Republik’, *Neue Politische Literatur* 3 (2010), pp. 393-420; Ursula Büttner, ‘Ausgeforscht? Die Weimarer Republik als Gegenstand historischer Forschung’, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 68:18-20 (2018), pp. 19-26.

44. Manuela Achilles ‘Re-forming the Reich: Symbolics of the Republican Nation in Weimar Germany’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2005); ‘Nationalist Violence and Republican Identity in Weimar Germany: The Murder of Walther Rathenau’, in: Christian Emden and David Midgley (eds.), *German Literature, History, and the Nation: Papers from the Conference ‘The Fragile Tradition’*, Cambridge 2002 (Bern, 2004), vol. II, pp. 305-328; ‘Reforming the Reich: Democratic Symbols and Rituals in the Weimar Republic’, in: Canning, Barndt, and McGuire (eds.), *Weimar Subjects/Weimar Publics*, pp. 175-191; ‘With a Passion for Reason: Celebrating the Constitution in Weimar Germany’, *Central European History* 43 (2010), pp. 666-689; ‘Anchoring the Nation in the Democratic Form: Weimar Symbolic Politics beyond the Failure Paradigm’, in: Geoff Eley, Jennifer L. Jenkins, and Tracie Matysik (eds.), *German Modernities from Wilhelm to Weimar: A Contest of Futures* (London, 2016), pp. 259-281; Nadine Rossol, ‘Flaggenkrieg am Badestrand: Lokale Möglichkeiten repräsentativer Mitgestaltung in der Weimarer Republik’, *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 7/8 (2008), pp. 617-637; ‘Fahne, Adler und Hymne: Kulturpolitische Grundsatzdebatten in der Weimarer Republik’, in: Christian Welzbacher, (ed.), *Der Reichskunstwart: Kulturpolitik und Staatsinszenierung in der Weimarer Republik 1918-1933* (Weimar, 2010), pp. 136-156; *Performing the Nation in Interwar Germany: Sport, Spectacle and Political Symbolism, 1926-36* (Basingstoke, 2010); ‘Visualising the Republic: State Representation and Public Ritual in Weimar Germany’, in: J. A. Williams (ed.), *Weimar Culture Revisited* (New York, 2011), pp. 139-159; Erin Hochman, *Imagining Greater Germany: Republican Nationalism and the Idea of Anschluss* (Ithaca, 2016); Benjamin Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations: Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture* (Cambridge, 2012); Thomas Mergel, *Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik: Politische Kommunikation, symbolische Politik und Öffentlichkeit im Reichstag* (Düsseldorf, 2012); Andreas Braune and Michael Dreyer (eds.), *Weimar als Herausforderung: Die Weimarer Republik und die Demokratie im 21. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2016); Sebastian Elsbach, Marcel Böhles, and Andreas Braune (eds.), *Demokratische Persönlichkeiten in der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 2020).

45. Peter Fritzsche, ‘Did Weimar Fail?’, *The Journal of Modern History* 68:3 (1996), p. 632.

46. Cf. Jochen Hung, Godela Weiss-Sussex, and Geoff Wilkes (eds.), *Beyond Glitter and Doom: The Contingency of the Weimar Republic* (Munich, 2012); Franka Maubach, ‘Weimar (nicht) vom Ende her denken: Ein skeptischer Ausblick auf das Gründungsjubiläum 2019’, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 68:18-20 (2018), pp. 4-9.

previously overshadowed positives found within. Examinations of events like Constitution Day, institutions such as the *Reichskunstwart*, and pressure groups like the *Reichsbanner* have contributed to a dismantling of the previously dominant assumption that Weimar was the home of “bad politics,” but “good culture”—one to which even pioneering historians like Detlev Peukert ultimately reverted.⁴⁷ Indeed, it has dismissed the premise that politics and culture are mutually exclusive phenomena. By combining the two, advocates of this interpretation contend that the epithet “a republic without republicans,” with which Weimar has long been burdened, is no longer convincing.

While these developments are welcome, blindspots are still evident. Much of this research is monofocal and refers infrequently to local experiences, tensions between federal and regional planes, or comparative perspectives. Focus remains, for example, on democratic cultures designed and propagated from Berlin. The present thesis contends, however, that the deployment of new state symbols or the implementation of new ideologies must appreciate the local level of analysis. As Ewald Frie writes, “it is only in the local that we can examine the almost imperceptible shifting of moods and balances of power over time.”⁴⁸ To what extent, for example, did the inhabitants of Berchtesgaden, Romrod, or Altshausen—the rural and isolated communities to which our dynasties withdrew—buy into bespoke democratic cultures deployed from a distant capital? Much of this research examines new structures and cultures. To fully understand interwar Weimar, however, the (as yet neglected) parallel processes—namely the decline and dismantling of monarchical cultures and symbolisms—must be considered. This thesis determines to do so by examining why, when, and where elements of the old order were compatible within the new. Weimar’s regional political culture, it is argued, contained many recognisably royal and dynastic elements. This was a consequence of implicit understandings between the governments and the people that change would be limited. Regimes compromised where necessary, handled complicated issues with aplomb and were, when compared with the supposed instability and “bad politics” of the federal state, relatively stable and secure.

47. Jochen Hung, “‘Bad’ Politics and ‘Good’ Culture: New Approaches to the History of the Weimar Republic”, *Central European History* 49 (2016), pp. 441-453; Detlev Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Berlin, 1987).

48. Frie, ‘1918/19’, pp. 12-13.

Monarchy and modernity

The divergence between the constitutional aspects of monarchy, which disappeared after 1918, and its cultural elements, which survived in some form, was noticeable long before the revolution. As royal power declined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dynasties compensated by bolstering their legitimacy through ceremonial, symbolism, and performative acts, often anchoring monarchy in the solid bedrock of nationalism. The last two decades have seen a renaissance in the study of modern monarchy which seeks to answer a deceptively simple question: how did Europe's dynasties survive—indeed, thrive—in the aftermath of the age of revolution? Collectively, these works have helped to reclaim the nineteenth century as a monarchical century and the topic from professional condescension. As Frank-Lothar Kroll has written, terms such as “court” and “dynasty” no longer gather dust “at the bottom end of the spectrum of historical interest.”⁴⁹

Earlier works, notably by David Cannadine and Manfred Hanisch, considered royal use of manufactured traditions and myths as a means for securing uneasy thrones.⁵⁰ The floodgates were opened, however, following Johannes Paulmann's examination of royal and state visits in *Pomp und Politik* (2000).⁵¹ In these new works, the revolutions of 1848 are depicted as

49. Kroll, 'Monarchische Modernisierung', p. 201.

50. David Cannadine, 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition" c. 1820-1977', in: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 101-164; Manfred Hanisch, 'Nationalisierung der Dynastien oder Monarchisierung der Nation? Zum Verhältnis von Monarchie und Nation in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert', in: A. M. Birke (ed.), *Bürgertum, Adel und Monarchie: Wandel der Lebensform im Zeitalter der bürgerlichen Nationalismus* (Munich, 1989), pp. 71-91; *Für Fürst und Vaterland: Legitimitätsstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution 1848 und deutscher Einheit* (Munich, 1991).

51. Johannes Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg* (Munich, 2000). For a discussion of this work's impact, see: Torsten Riotte, 'Nach "Pomp und Politik": Neue Ansätze in der Historiographie zum regierenden Hochadel im 19. Jahrhundert', *Neue Politische Literatur* 59 (2014), pp. 209-228. Cf. Simone Mergen, *Monarchiejubiläen im 19. Jahrhundert: Die Entdeckung des historischen Jubiläums für den monarchischen Kult in Sachsen und Bayern* (Leipzig, 2005); Martin Kohlrausch, *Der Monarch im Skandal: Die Logik der Massenmedien und die Transformation der wibelminischen Monarchie* (Berlin, 2005); Frank-Lothar Kroll, 'Zwischen europäischem Bewußtsein und nationaler Identität: Legitimationsstrategien monarchischer Eliten im Europa des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts', in: Hans-Christof Kraus and Thomas Niklas (eds.), *Geschichte der Politik: Alte und Neue Wege* (Munich, 2007), pp. 353-374; Martina Fetting, *Zum Selbstverständnis der letzten deutschen Monarchen: Normverletzungen und Legitimationsstrategien der Bundesfürsten zwischen Gottesgnadentum und Medienrevolution* (Frankfurt a.M., 2013); Volker Sellin, 'Monarchie und Nation in Deutschland, 1848-1914', in idem, *Politik und Gesellschaft: Abhandlungen zur europäischen Geschichte* (Berlin, 2015), pp. 415-434; Frank-Lothar Kroll and Martin Munke (eds.), *Hannover—Coburg-Gotha—Windsor: Probleme und Perspektiven einer vergleichenden deutsch-britischen Dynastiegeschichte vom 18. bis in das 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2015); Frank-Lothar Kroll and Dieter J. Weiß (eds.), *Inszenierung oder Legitimation? Die Monarchie in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Ein deutsch-englischer Vergleich* (Berlin, 2015); Anja Schöbel, *Monarchie und Öffentlichkeit: Zur Inszenierung der deutschen Bundesfürsten 1848-1918* (Cologne, 2017); Benjamin Hasselhorn and Marc von Knorring (eds.), *Vom Olymp zum*

existential threats to the crowns of Europe and triggers for the institutional modernisation of monarchy across the continent. In a concerted effort to regain ground from democratic and republican forces, the dynasties became highly malleable and adept at refashioning themselves to suit changed circumstances. Once distant and reserved monarchs engaged in a “process of convergence” (Frank-Lothar Kroll) with their people, appearing regularly in public and undertaking strenuous progresses through their dominions.⁵² Royal events, meanwhile, such as anniversaries, jubilees, weddings, and funerals, became “mechanisms of stabilisation” (Simone Mergen) by which the population was integrated into the monarchical status quo.⁵³ In tracing royal responses to adversity, historians have isolated three main strategies. The first involved linking the monarchy to the idea of the nation (which was implicitly decoupled from republicanism), such as by stressing the dynasty’s great history or its modern service to the military. Secondly, royal families across Europe underwent processes of embourgeoisement, reflecting the modest and upright fashions of their new middle-class subjects. Finally, they gave way—if only marginally—to parliaments and ministers, starting the journey towards constitutional monarchy. As a consequence of these manoeuvres, Europe’s monarchies became increasingly cultural, rather than political, institutions.

This thesis continues the analysis of monarchy as a cultural entity by taking the story beyond 1918. It demonstrates the effectiveness of pre-revolutionary reforms by revealing how their effect was still felt once monarchy itself had fallen. Monarchism in the Weimar era, particularly in Bavaria, was intrinsically linked to the dynasty’s centuries-long connection with the land and its people. Even after their deposition, the Wittelsbachs were held aloft by their supporters as paragons of Bavarian identity, as King Maximilian II had envisaged in the mid-nineteenth century.⁵⁴ Events in the lives of the respective dynasties continued to thrill and excite after 1918, as did visits to their former realms. Throughout, media curiosity in the royals remained strong, as did dynastic interest in newspapers as a means for disseminating their position, rebutting criticism, and protecting their interests. These continuities underlined the fact that even before 1918, Germany’s monarchies had become divorced from

Boulevard: Die europäischen Monarchien von 1815 bis heute—Verlierer der Geschichte? (Berlin, 2018); Frank Lorenz Müller, *Die Thronfolger: Macht und Zukunft der Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2019).

52. Kroll, ‘Zwischen europäischem Bewußtsein und nationaler Identität’, p. 363.

53. Mergen, *Monarchiejubiläen*, p. 17.

54. Cf. Hanisch, *Für Fürst und Vaterland*.

their original constitutional and governmental functions. These duties could thus be assumed fairly easily by another power (namely the new republics), helping to explain the revolutions' curiously calm and genteel nature.

Elites and societal change

Biographies of the German royals rarely consider their post-revolutionary existences at any great length. John Röhl's mammoth trilogy on Kaiser Wilhelm II, for instance, devotes only eighty of thirty-eight hundred pages to the final twenty-three years of his life.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, historians have begun to consider the fate of deposed or exiled monarchs as part of the general upswing in fortunes of monarchical history.⁵⁶ Torsten Rotté, for example, has examined the variegated schemes they developed to ensure "dynastic survival" [*dynastisches Überleben*] once the umbilical of privilege and public funds had been cut.⁵⁷ The principal task of these erstwhile rulers, he argues, was to maintain familial harmony and a fitting lifestyle in the shadow of the throne. Rotté's subjects—the French Legitimists (overthrown in 1830) and the Guelphs of Hannover (1866)—were not side-lined by republican revolution, however, but by other royal dynasties. Their lives beyond the crown were at least cushioned by the continued existence of monarchy. Indeed, only Matthias Stickler's investigation on the Habsburgs has analysed in depth a dynasty plunged into a new and egalitarian world.⁵⁸ The discussions in chapters four and five of the present thesis thus break new ground by considering the German royals' experience of the Weimar Republic. What the historian lacks in this area, however, they make up for in a superabundance of scholarship on the fate of the non-ruling nobility.⁵⁹ Time and again, the same concepts appear in new titles. Consider Silke

55. John C. G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941*, trans. Sheila de Bellaigue and Roy Bridge (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 1188-1267.

56. Torsten Rotté and Philip Mansel (eds.), *Monarchy in Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (New York, 2011).

57. Torsten Rotté, *Der Monarch im Exil: Eine andere Geschichte von Staatsverdrängung und Legitimismus im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2018).

58. Matthias Stickler, 'Abgesetzte Dynastien: Strategien konservativer Beharrung und pragmatischer Anpassung ehemals regierender Häuser nach der Revolution von 1918—Das Beispiel Habsburg', in: Markus A. Denzel and Günther Schulz (eds.), *Deutscher Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Büdinger Forschungen zur Sozialgeschichte 2002 und 2003* (St. Katharinen, 2004), pp. 397-444.

59. In addition to those cited below, see: Karl Otmar von Aretin, 'Der bayerische Adel: Von der Monarchie zum Dritten Reich', in: Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Anton Grossmann (eds.), *Bayern in der NS-Zeit: Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt* (Munich, 1981), vol. III, pp. 513-567; Iris Freifrau von Hoyningen-Huene, *Adel in der Weimarer Republik* (Limburg, 1992); Stephan Malinowski, *Vom König zum Führer: Deutscher Adel und Nationalsozialismus*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 2003); Monika Wienfort, 'Adlige Handlungsspielräume und neue Adelstypen in der "Klassischen Moderne" (1880-1930)', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 33:3 (2007), pp. 416-438; 'Alte Eliten in der neuen Republik', in: Horst Dreier and Christian Waldhoff (eds.), *Das Wagnis*

Marburg and Josef Matzerath's compendium on the Saxon nobility subtitled *Der Schritt in die Moderne*, or the edited collection *Adel und Moderne* by Eckart Conze and Monika Wienfort, or Conze's later work, in association with Wencke Meteling, Jörg Schuster, and Jochen Strobel, on *Aristokratismus und Moderne*.⁶⁰ De Gruyter's series *Elitenwandel in der Moderne*, meanwhile, now spans an impressive twenty-two volumes.

This scholarly grappling with modernity (and the place of social elites within it) is part of a historiographical trend dating back to the turn of the century. For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, Europe's nobles suffered a similar fate to their royal counterparts, cast in an unfashionable light by the academy's interest in the common man. Studies like Arno Mayer's *The Persistence of the Old Regime* (1981), which argued that a pre-industrial noble elite remained strong until the outbreak of the First World War, and David Cannadine's *Decline and Fall* (1990), which argued the opposite, breathed new life into dusty fields of study.⁶¹ Dominating the subsequent raft of works was the question hinted at by Mayer and Cannadine: did the *Belle Époque* signal the inevitable decline of Europe's social elites? By implying that there was more than one answer, they already challenged the dominant thesis put forward by proponents of Marxist history and modernisation theory that nobilities were incompatible with modernity and destined to collapse in the face of it.

This assumption no longer holds water. As the studies above have illustrated, Europe's nobilities were remarkably adept at changing with the times and finding a place in new, modern societies. They developed strategies for survival, revealing an inner dynamism usually ignored by depictions of ossified, pre-industrial elites. This is not to deny that the continent's aristocracies suffered some loss of status; it is instead a call to examine the tension between this loss and noble determination to remain atop society.⁶² Chapters four and five of this

der Demokratie: Eine Anatomie der Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Munich, 2018), pp. 241-262; Dina Gusejnova, *European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957* (Cambridge, 2016).

60. Silke Marburg and Josef Matzerath (eds.), *Der Schritt in die Moderne: Sächsischer Adel zwischen 1763 und 1918* (Cologne, 2001); Eckart Conze and Monika Wienfort (eds.), *Adel und Moderne: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2004); Eckart Conze, Wencke Meteling, Jörg Schuster, and Jochen Strobel (eds.), *Aristokratismus und Moderne: Adel als politisches und kulturelles Konzept, 1890-1945* (Cologne, 2013). See also: Heinz Reif (ed.), *Adel und Bürgertum in Deutschland*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 2000 and 2002).

61. Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (London, 1981); David Cannadine, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy* (New Haven, 1990).

62. For an early discussion of this idea, see: Rudolf Braun, 'Konzeptionelle Bemerkungen zum Obenbleiben: Adel im 19. Jahrhundert', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 13 (1990), pp. 87-95.

thesis investigate this tension in the monarchical context, arguing that the German monarchs and their families acclimatised remarkably well to the new order whilst managing to retain an air of social superiority and class cohesion. Like the Prussian nobles examined by Eckart Conze and Shelley Baranowski, the royals also remained influential regional magnates.⁶³ Tracing how elites adapt to change provides insight into what an “elite” actually is and what it means to belong to it. Conze, Heinz Reif, and Stephan Malinowski have constructed the idea of *Adeligkeit*, or the intangible state of being noble, from the various qualities and strands of identity which separated the nobility from other classes.⁶⁴ As yet, we lack a comparable concept for the (ruling) higher nobility, but chapter five of the present thesis discusses how one might be framed.

Methodology and sources

The history of monarchy in Germany is inherently bound up with the history of German fragmentation and federalism. In many ways, the constituent states of the Holy Roman Empire (and later the *Kaiserreich*) were synonymous with the dynasties which ruled within. Their curious shape on the map—often comprising seemingly random pockets of territory—reflected their origins as the private land holdings of the monarch, gained through purchase, barter, and inheritance. No map, however, could hope to remain accurate for long. With the stroke of a pen and a handshake, a single dynasty could modify the make-up of an entire region. At its most extreme—as shown by the Thuringian Principalities of Reuß Elder Line and Reuß Younger Line—this system produced state names which simply described the seniority of its royal house within a wider dynasty. In short, the peculiarities of the German states only made sense “in terms of their relationship with a particular monarch” or dynasty.⁶⁵

As has been stressed in recent literature, the German monarchs continued to embody their states until the revolution. Indeed, as the increasingly dominant Wilhelm II soaked up their political power, their role as bulwarks of local culture against Borussianisation only grew in

63. Shelley Baranowski, *The Sanctity of Rural Life: Nobility, Protestantism, and Nazism in Weimar Prussia* (Oxford, 1995); Eckart Conze, *Von deutschem Adel: Die Grafen von Bernstorff im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2000).

64. In addition to the above works by Malinowski and Conze, see: Heinz Reif, *Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1999); Eckart Conze, ‘Adeliges Familienbewußtsein und Grundbesitz: Die Auflösung des Gräfllich Bernstoffschen Fideikommisses Gartow nach 1919’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25:3 (1999), pp. 455-479; Stephan Malinowski, “Wer schenkt uns wieder Kartoffeln?": Deutscher Adel nach 1918—eine Elite?, in: Denzel and Schulz (eds.), *Deutscher Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, pp. 503-538.

65. Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 62.

significance.⁶⁶ As Janus-faced entities, moreover, which were at once independent *and* subsumed under a wider German culture and sovereignty, the federal states are ripe for comparative analysis. On this basis, recent studies have contrasted Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg (Frank Lorenz Müller's *Royal Heirs*); Saxony and Bavaria (Simone Mergen's *Monarchiejubiläen*); Saxony, Hessen, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Meiningen (Martina Fetting's *Zum Selbstverständnis*); and Saxony, Bavaria, Hessen, and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (Anja Schöbel's *Monarchie und Öffentlichkeit*). That certain case studies dominate should not surprise; this is a consequence of their stature—Saxony and Bavaria, for instance, were two of only four kingdoms in the *Kaiserreich*—and the vagaries of archival holdings which survive, or are made available, more readily in some places than others.

These comparative investigations form part of a wider trend in the historiography of modern Germany which stems back nearly forty years: namely a focus on “the ambiguities of German identity in the age of the nation state” (David Blackbourn and James Retallack).⁶⁷ To label this regional turn a ‘trend’ is increasingly misleading, but its dominance was not always so assured. Beginning with the Borussian School under Heinrich von Treitschke and Heinrich von Sybel in the late nineteenth century, history was a canvass on which Prussia's destiny to unite the German territories was painted in broad and triumphal strokes. The nation loomed above all else, leaving the non-Prussian territories in the shadows. If the German provinces were discussed, it was as particularist and obstreperous antagonists which the nation had to thwart (and did) in order to prevail. Methodological change was first discernible in the 1960s and 1970s,⁶⁸ but the greatest endorsement for a more pluralistic approach came from James Sheehan's seminal article ‘What is German History?’ in 1981.⁶⁹ In the midst of the so-called *Preußenwelle*,⁷⁰ Sheehan called for nations to be understood more intricately and, in the German case, with greater awareness of historical fragmentation. German history, he

66. Ibid., chap. 2; Frank Lorenz Müller, *Royal Heirs in Imperial Germany: The Future of Monarchy in Nineteenth-Century Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg* (New York, 2017), esp. chap. 4.

67. David Blackbourn and James Retallack, ‘Introduction’, in: idem (eds.), *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860-1930* (Toronto, 2007), p. 4.

68. See, principally: Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871* (Ithaca, 1971). See also: Heinz Gollwitzer, ‘Die politische Landschaft in der deutschen Geschichte des 19./20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Skizze zum deutschen Regionalismus’, *Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* 27 (1964), pp. 523-552; Thomas Nipperdey, ‘Der Föderalismus in der deutschen Geschichte’, *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 94:3 (1979), pp. 497-547.

69. James J. Sheehan, ‘What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography’, *The Journal of Modern History* 53:1 (1981), pp. 1-23.

70. Cf. T. C. W. Blanning, ‘The Death and Transformation of Prussia’, *The Historical Journal* 29:2 (1986), pp. 433-459.

continued, is the story of the struggles between unification and centralisation on the one hand, and diversity and regional cultures on the other. Nations “contain many different histories which often converge, overlap, or intersect, but which sometimes move in quite different directions.”⁷¹ Combined with Benedict Anderson’s 1983 theory of the “imagined community”—in which nations are not political entities, but communities constructed by their self-appointed inhabitants—Sheehan’s approach contributed to a cultural turn in studies of nationalism and identity.⁷²

Led by Celia Applegate, Abigail Green, Alon Confino, and Siegfried Weichlein,⁷³ historians began to use geographical factors (rather than social ones, such as class) to examine identity. Regions became objects of interest in themselves, not just in the roles of separatist polities or would-be nations they had played in earlier nationalist narratives.⁷⁴ During the 1990s and early 2000s, this approach produced three key arguments. Firstly, that regional identities were not subordinate to national ones, but constitutive of them.⁷⁵ Indeed, a running theme through these works is the assumption that identities are created by the interaction between the centre and periphery to the extent, Confino argues, that local and national ultimately become equated.⁷⁶ Secondly, these historians stress that the German provinces developed strong and unique identities in the nineteenth century which, in response to the states’ diminishing political stature, took on increasingly cultural foundations.⁷⁷ As patrons and

71. Sheehan, ‘What is German History?’, p. 8.

72. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983). Cf. Nancy Reagin, ‘Recent Work on German National Identity: Regional? Imperial? Gendered? Imaginary?’, *Central European History* 37:2 (2004), pp. 273-289.

73. See, principally: Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill, 1997); Green, *Fatherlands*; Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich* (Düsseldorf, 2004).

74. Celia Applegate, ‘A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times’, *The American Historical Review* 104:4 (1999), pp. 1157-1182; Eric Storm, ‘Regionalism in History, 1890-1945: The Cultural Approach’, *European History Quarterly* 33:2 (2003), pp. 251-265.

75. In addition to the works cited above, see: Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1995); Siegfried Weichlein, ‘Das Spannungsfeld von nationaler und regionaler Identität’, in: Werner Bramke (ed.), *Politische Kultur in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa* (Leipzig, 1999), pp. 241-252.

76. Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*; Georg Kunz, *Verortete Geschichte: Regionales Geschichtsbewußtsein in den deutschen Historischen Vereinen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 2000); Abigail Green, ‘The Federal Alternative? A New View of Modern German History’, *The Historical Journal* 46:1 (2003), pp. 187-202.

77. Green, *Fatherlands*; Dieter Langewiesche, ‘Föderativer Nationalismus als Erbe der deutschen Reichsnation: Über Föderalismus und Zentralismus in der deutschen Nationalgeschichte’, in: Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (eds.), *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandskonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 2000), pp. 215-242; Abigail Green, ‘Political Institutions and Nationhood in Germany, 1750–1914’, in: Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer (eds.), *Power and the Nation in European History* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 315-332; Siegfried Weichlein, ‘Regionalism, Federalism and Nationalism in the German Empire’, in:

power-holders, the monarchs played a vital role in this process. Thirdly, and finally, 1918 has been isolated as a major caesura in the history of regionalism. Revolution and republic radicalised the idea of *Heimat* leading, in Jasper Heinzen's words, to a "resurgence of strong ethno-regional movements" and calls for the dismemberment of Prussia.⁷⁸ Despite the fervour of some advocates, these plans ultimately faltered. As similar as they may have been, the revolutions of November 1918 were each particular to the state in which they unfolded. More importantly, as a consequence of the relatively calm transfer of power, they rapidly produced new governments in each state, thus anchoring the internal borders of the imperial regime in the new order. There were only two exceptions to this rule. In May 1920, eight of Germany's smallest states amalgamated to form Thuringia (a ninth, Coburg, joined Bavaria two months later). Nine years on, meanwhile, Waldeck-Pyrmont, another particularist anachronism, merged with Prussia. Studies of Weimar retain a strong regional flavour, testifying to the continued importance of political, social, and cultural boundaries within post-war Germany.⁷⁹

Considering the interdigitation of dynasty and province outlined above, and the lingering importance of regionalism after 1918, it is only right that a study which investigates the afterlives and legacies of monarchy should do so at the state level. This thesis is thus based around three of the twenty-two monarchies which were swept away in November 1918: the Grand Duchy (later People's State) of Hessen, the Kingdom (Free State) of Bavaria, and the Kingdom (Free People's State) of Württemberg. Occasional reference will also be made to other states, most notably the trio's neighbours in the south, Baden and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. These three have been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, they avoid one of the major pitfalls of taking a regional approach to Germany, namely choosing a small and

Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (eds.), *Region and State in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism* (Basingstoke, 2012), pp. 93-110.

78. Jasper Heinzen, 'Making Democracy Safe for Tribal Homelands? Self-Determination and Political Regionalism in Weimar Germany', *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 26:5 (2019), p. 808. See also: Martina Steber, *Ethnische Gewissheiten: Die Ordnung des Regionalen im bayerischen Schwaben vom Kaiserreich bis zum NS-Regime* (Göttingen, 2010).

79. For discussions on post-WWI regionalism in addition to those above, see: Eric Storm, 'Nation-Building in the Provinces: The Interplay between Local, Regional and National Identities in Central and Western Europe, 1870-1945', *European History Quarterly* 42 (2012), pp. 650-663; Jeremy DeWaal, 'Regionalism and its Diverse Framings in German-Speaking Europe across the long Twentieth Century', in: Xosé M. Núñez Seixas and Eric Storm (eds.), *Regionalism and Modern Europe: Identity Construction and Movements from 1890 to the Present Day* (New York, 2019), pp. 169-192. This approach is particularly noticeable in studies on the rise of Nazism, as Riccardo Bavaj discusses in: *Der Nationalsozialismus: Entstehung, Aufstieg und Herrschaft* (Berlin, 2016), pp. 16-25.

unrepresentative focus point and treating it *pars pro toto* for the nation as a whole. As David Blackbourn wryly observes,

[w]hatever our period, we are familiar with the work that advertises itself as being about ‘Politics, Society and Culture in Germany’, and turns out to be concerned entirely with the history of Lippe-Detmold.⁸⁰

Unlike the Lilliputian Principality of Lippe, Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg were substantial enough for a rich vein of archival and primary source material to have survived, and for conclusions reached on the basis of their experiences to be of general interest and significance. Of additional importance is the fact that their dynasties retained an obvious non-constitutional purpose by 1918. Ernst Ludwig of Hessen and Wilhelm of Württemberg were both renowned patrons of the arts, while Ludwig III of Bavaria was an expert in agriculture, science, and technology. Collectively, they also represented and safeguarded the unique identities of their states. One can assume, therefore, that their deposition meant more than the loss of just a constitutional construct. Finally, the three states offer a useful balance between similarity and difference. Since the early nineteenth century and their cooperation with Napoleon, they had pursued a relatively liberal path and introduced some of Germany’s earliest written constitutions. Partly as a result, they had formed a consistent anti-Prussian coalition in defence of their independence and were amongst the last powers to sign off on German unification in 1871. Enjoying geographical proximity and a number of common borders, they also developed extensive cultural and political ties. Nevertheless, they were not identical. Bavaria’s population was twice that of Hessen and Württemberg combined and, uniquely, predominantly Catholic. Hessen, meanwhile, was generally more industrial and urban than the other two. At the dynastic level, finally, the isolated House of Württemberg paled alongside the sprawling House of Wittelsbach and the transnational House of Hessen. The commonalities of the three states allow discussion of the role each variable played in the implementation and reception of de-monarchification after 1918.

80. David Blackbourn, *A Sense of Place: New Directions in German History. 1998 Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute London* (London, 1999), p. 8.

As mentioned above, some historians have argued that Weimar's temporal goalposts should be moved beyond the "strict periodisation" (Jochen Hung) of 1918 and 1934.⁸¹ Most notably, Anthony McElligott has highlighted important continuities which stretch beyond these boundaries, contending that the two-decade span between 1916 and 1936 better encapsulates the social and political processes and developments which came to define Weimar.⁸² Such approaches have their value, but the present thesis will rely on the standard parameters. At its heart, this is a study of change and responses to change must begin at the moment of transition—1918. To measure change, one requires a baseline and this thesis will thus also discuss the pre-revolutionary context. At the other end of the scale, the study ends in 1934. The Nazi seizure of power a year earlier was met with mixed responses in Germany's palaces, and even within individual families. The Grand Duchess of Hessen welcomed it as a restoration of order and stability, while her son Ludwig, a student in Munich with many Jewish friends, was more sceptical.⁸³ In the short term—and in comparison with what would come in later years and during the Second World War—Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933 was neither immediately significant for the afterlife of monarchy, nor a major caesura in the royals' relationship with the state. Of greater importance was the 'Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich,' introduced by the National Socialists exactly a year later, which by abolishing the regional parliaments and governments diminished the states they had administered to mere provinces of a centralised regime.⁸⁴ As a comparative investigation founded upon the German states (specifically, the republican successors of the monarchies of the *Kaiserreich*) it makes sense to conclude at the point when these polities ceased to exist. Half of the final generation of monarchs lived to experience Nazism; a third survived to witness its downfall. But the territories over which they had once ruled would never be recognisably the same.

This thesis is built around a diverse and complex collection of primary sources uncovered in more than fifteen archives across Germany. The majority were found in six institutions—the public state archive and the private dynastic archive in each of the three case study regions. Relying on these latter collections poses a number of challenges for the historian.

81. Jochen Hung, 'Beyond Glitter and Doom: The New Paradigm of Contingency in Weimar Research', in: Hung, Weiss-Sussex, and Wilkes (eds.), *Beyond Glitter and Doom*, pp. 12-13.

82. McElligott, *Rethinking the Weimar Republic*.

83. GHHFA, D24, 53/3, 14.11.1931, 27.02.1932, 11.04.1932 and 18.09.1932; GHHFA, D26, 11/2, 18.11.1931; GHHFA, D26, 4/2.

84. Gesetz über den Neuaufbau des Reichs vom 30. Januar 1934, *Reichsgesetzblatt* (1934), part I, p. 75.

Survival of key documents can be patchy and restrictions on access limits the range of possible case studies. In some instances, collections from this time simply no longer exist; this is the case in Oldenburg, or in Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, where dynastic property was expropriated by the Soviets after the Second World War. Elsewhere, as in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, extensive material remains, but is catalogued either poorly or not at all. For a number of Germany's former ruling houses, the interwar period remains a delicate topic and holdings, while rich and in order, are withheld from outside scrutiny. The House of Hessen, by contrast, actively welcomes engagement with its legacy and, like the Wittelsbachs in Bavaria, stores its collections in the main state archive. Württemberg's dynastic collections are still administered privately at Altshausen Castle (where the family resides to this day), but scholars are just as warmly received.

The primary sources consulted here may be divided into three categories which mirror the perspectives reconstructed in this thesis. Royal reflections on the revolution and the republic are gleaned principally from correspondence. This material, which survives in private archives, is extensive and rarely, if ever, consulted. Duke Albrecht of Württemberg had six children and two brothers and wrote to them frequently; Ludwig III of Bavaria had even more progeny and did likewise. While sometimes offering little more than anodyne reports on the weather, hunting exploits, and minor ailments, these letters nonetheless provide a revealing snapshot of royal life after 1918 and astute observations on the progress of demonomarchification. For more forthcoming observations on current affairs and the state of Germany, the historian must look to correspondence outside the family circle (and often to other archives). As patrons of the arts, army commanders, and pillars of the body politic, Germany's monarchs—even after their abdications—regularly communicated with authors, artists, military officers, and politicians. Wilhelm II of Württemberg, for example, engaged in frank and highly revealing discussions of domestic and foreign affairs with his final chief minister, Karl von Weizsäcker, long after both had vacated office. Private thoughts may also be found in journal entries; we are fortunate to have accounts of the revolution in Hessen penned by Grand Duchess Eleonore, and from a different angle by her husband's adjutant, Fabian von Massenbach. Accounts and reports retained by the dynasties' respective *Hofdomänenkammer*, meanwhile, shed light on the royals' finances and the administration of their courts and estates after 1918.

Engagement with the afterlives of monarchy within the governments is reconstructed from the wealth of sources available in the states' *Landesarchive*. These include cabinet minutes, ministerial memoranda, expert legal opinions, and diplomatic dispatches from the governments' remaining intra-German emissaries. Minor issues generated reams of paper; major events, such as royal funerals, meanwhile, could dominate the agenda for weeks or, in the case of the property dispute, for months at a time. The latter controversy provoked fiery debates in the respective state assemblies, making their verbatim transcripts a further invaluable source. These bureaucratic and parliamentary sources are augmented by the correspondence and reflections of leading political players, including Hessen's first two state presidents, Carl Ulrich and Bernhard Adelung, their counterpart in Württemberg, Wilhelm Bos, and Wilhelm Keil, president of Württemberg's constitutional assembly.⁸⁵ Public awareness and perceptions of monarchy, meanwhile, will be gleaned from newspaper articles (from both the left and right), letters from members of the public to their former monarchs, testimonies from regional governors about popular sentiment, and surveillance reports on monarchist agitators.

Collectively, these sources will be used to provide a snapshot of the Weimar Republic through its relationships with the monarchies it replaced. They reveal opposing perspectives on the processes of de-monarchification and reconstruct experiences of change, decline, and reform. Lengthy and repeated engagement with dynastic sources—particularly private and occasionally pathos-laden correspondence—can lead the historian to see things through royal eyes. The comparative nature of the present study—with regards to both the case studies and differing vantage points within them—mitigates this risk. It allows the historian to note if experiences or observations were simulated elsewhere in the south, or if they markedly differed. The introduction of external sources, either from government agencies or the press, meanwhile, provides vital context and a balanced picture. By way of example, chapter three relies on a complex combination of royal budgets and state papers to dissect the property question; chapter six, meanwhile, considers monarchism from the palace, the parliament, and the peasant's cottage.

85. Carl Ulrich, *Erinnerungen des ersten hessischen Staatspräsidenten*, ed. Ludwig Bergsträsser (Offenbach a.M., 1953); Bernhard Adelung, *Sein und Werden: Vom Buchdrucker in Bremen zum Staatspräsident in Hessen*, ed. Karl Friedrich (Offenbach a.M., 1952); Wilhelm Bos, *Von der Monarchie zum Volksstaat: Zur Geschichte der Revolution in Deutschland insbesondere in Württemberg*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1922); Wilhelm Keil, *Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1947).

Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into six chapters which, in turn, examine the consequences of November 1918 from the perspectives of the governments, the royal dynasties, and the people. Chapter one opens by investigating the formal dismantling of dynastic monarchy at the constitutional level. By examining how the oft-neglected state constitutions divided up the powers and prerogatives of the ex-monarchs, the chapter argues that the November Revolution led to a dramatic inversion of the pre-revolutionary status quo. The supremacy of the executive gave way to that of the legislature, now bolstered by the omnipotent sovereignty of the *Volk*. This change was furthered by the disappearance of the head of state, which was dispensed with by each constitution and unable to be replicated by the conservative right. Finally, the chapter broadens the scope to take in ecclesiastical affairs, contending that of the monarch's many hats, his mitre as *summus episcopus* survived mostly intact.

Moving from the constitutional to the cultural sphere, chapter two considers state symbolism at the provincial level. As part of the recent trend to view Weimar as a more open-ended and optimistic venture, historians have pointed to the development of extensive, robust, and, most importantly, democratic-republican symbols after 1918. By analysing the parallel process, namely the removal of monarchical symbols, this chapter argues that symbolic dem monarchification was far from total at the state level. Hessen, Württemberg, and Bavaria all possessed highly ambivalent symbolic orders in the Weimar era. New designs sat alongside royal remnants which had survived, either because their removal was inherently impractical or, more revealingly, because governments explicitly sought to recycle monarchical ciphers to lend legitimacy and gravitas to their unproven regimes. Germany thus remained royally decorated right up to the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Chapter three continues with the visible and tangible legacy of monarchy by discussing the fate of royal property. Before 1918, the ownership of royal domains—a tangled portfolio of properties, lands, and rights—was governed by an equally complicated combination of tradition and statute law. As the chapter reveals, negotiations between the new republics and the deposed dynasties over the domains' future dominated the domestic political scene until 1930, belying the almost obsessive focus of the existing scholarly literature on the 1926 expropriation referendum. While contentious, even threatening the survival of state governments, the matters were eventually settled in a remarkably conciliatory way. A steadfast belief in the rule of law and an official policy of

generosity, borne of respect for the dynasties and their works before 1918, produced a series of golden handshakes for the royal parties. Consequently, they remained financially secure and, unusually for deposed rulers, resident in their former territories. The concomitant transfer of the domains to state ownership, meanwhile, brought about a limited democratisation of royal property as palaces once home to monarchical governments became state museums and grace-and-favour apartments for the loftier members of the new establishment.

Chapters four and five look further at the dynasties' response to the revolution and their experience of the Weimar Republic, both as individual families and as members of a wider, national (even transnational) social network. Investigating how the revolution was framed and explained in family letters and diary entries, chapter four examines the royals' emotional response to their overthrow. It concludes that while Germany's royals were initially shocked, dismayed, and fearful at the sudden and unexpected turn of events, they eventually experienced the revolution as a liberation. Safe, unharried, and released from the twin burdens of responsibility and expectation, they were able to devote greater energies to pet projects and to new avenues of activity. As such, their engagement with the republic was the reverse of that usually ascribed to the population as a whole—euphoric hope and optimism followed by crushing disappointment and alienation. Beyond concern for their physical safety and the future of their former territories, the royals were uniquely troubled by the fortunes of their class. Chapter five thus investigates the survival, or not, of a high noble class consciousness after 1918 once the pillars which had held it aloft—legal privileges and a pan-European dynastic network—had been abolished or swept away. The chapter concludes that while the royal *Standesbewußtsein* took a battering in 1918 and the following years, it survived remarkably well. Royal-royal marriages declined, but attachment to titles remained strong, as did a determination to protect dynastic and noble honour against infringements by the republic. Constitutionally, the citizens of Weimar Germany were all equal, but the collective imagination continued to be imprinted with social hierarchies which the royals, to a considerable extent, managed to stay atop.

Chapter six, finally, considers the downfall of monarchy from the perspectives of the German monarchs' former subjects. It is a common assumption in existing literature devoted to the Weimar Republic that monarchism was an insignificant and unsuccessful political

creed whose failure is plain from the lack of a restoration (or even an attempt at one) after 1918. By examining the post-revolutionary points of contact between the German people and their former royal rulers, the chapter shows this argument to be flawed. Indeed, there existed a significant strand of what may be termed folkloric monarchism after 1918 which, while neither desiring nor seeking the return of the monarchy, nevertheless enjoyed, elevated, and sought out its remnants. Ordinary people continued to write letters to the monarchs, celebrating birthdays and mourning deaths. In the vicinity of their castles, meanwhile, the royals patronised local institutions and generally remained provincial benefactors and *grand seigneurs*. At the largest scale, finally, their funerals and weddings became state events, seizing, if only briefly, headlines and attention.

Chapter I

From royal to republican: The constitutional dismantling of monarchy

In the weeks that followed the armistice of November 1918, millions of German troops returned to a country unrecognisable from the one which they had departed. As Württemberg's ministry of labour warned them,

[y]ou will find our homeland has changed since you left; with war outside, old orders within have fallen like trees in a storm. But who—even he who loved what is lost—can deny that it was a storm of our time?¹

Revolution had uprooted centuries-old monarchies with remarkable ease. The question which now faced Germany's state builders was this: what role, if any, should these fallen timbers play in the reconstruction? By examining how republicans approached the task of dismantling and refashioning their monarchical inheritance, this chapter will reveal the constitutional consequences of November 1918 at the oft-neglected state level. In short, it seeks to determine how monarchy was repealed, replaced, adapted, and adopted by the new regimes. Based on a broad conception of "constitution," which considers ecclesiastical as well as state foundations, the chapter will investigate three elements of the pre-revolutionary order. Beginning with monarchical government, it will contend that the revolution induced a dramatic inversion of the traditional relationship between the legislature and the executive which left the latter unprecedentedly weak. Moving secondly to the political role of the monarch, the chapter will argue that the position of head of state disappeared in 1918. In dispersing the monarch's powers, duties, and prerogatives amongst various authorities, the new state constitutions ensured that no republican could ever ascend his throne and replace him. Thirdly and finally, the chapter will examine the fate of the monarch's role as the state's supreme bishop which, while surviving comparatively intact, revealed a total break in the ancient link between church and state. Collectively, the changes show the revolutions to have

1. HStAS, E 130 a, Bü 200, An heimkehrenden Schwaben, nd.11.1918.

been dramatic caesurae in the states' respective histories. Government was no longer authoritarian, but democratic; no longer theocratic, but secular; no longer led by a single, exalted individual, but by a group of lowly ministers; and no longer legitimised by divine right, but by the approval and innate sovereignty of the people.

By contrast with Weimar's federal constitution, which has been obsessively combed to explain the republic's eventual demise, its equivalents at the state level remain relatively neglected. This was not always so; at the time, jurists regularly examined and compared Germany's various political systems, reaching one common conclusion: the constitutions produced in 1919 were remarkably homogeneous.² Their most obvious similarity lay in their common status as republican documents. Weimar's federal constitution implicitly made this a necessity by demanding that state governments enjoy the support of the people's elected representatives [the *Volksvertretung*]. This clause merely confirmed the status quo for, by August 1919, each state had already established such a system. Twenty-two monarchies gave way to twenty-two republics. Only Baden, however, was actually designated a republic; the rest, after considerable indecisiveness in some cases, became Free States and People's States (or a Free People's State in the case of Württemberg).³ First appearing in the German language in 1731 to refer to Switzerland,⁴ "Free State" [*Freistaat*] originally described a polity which was independent and characterised by the liberties of its inhabitants. Over the nineteenth century, however, it took on an increasingly anti-monarchical tone.⁵ At the 1832

2. Michael Stolleis, *A History of Public Law in Germany, 1914-1945* (Oxford, 1999), p. 107. See, for example: Otto Koellreutter, 'Die neuen Landesverfassungen', in: Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma (eds.), *Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts* (Tübingen, 1930), p. 144; Max Wenzel, 'Die reichsrechtliche Grundlagen des Landesverfassungsrechtes', in: Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma (eds.), *Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts* (Tübingen, 1930), pp. 604-619. For discussions of the drafting of the constitutions, see: Tobias von Erdmann, *Die Verfassung Württembergs von 1919: Entstehung und Entwicklung eines freien Volksstaats* (Baden-Baden, 2013); Wilhelm von Blume, *Die Verfassung Württembergs vom 25. September 1919: Textausgabe und Anmerkungen* (Tübingen, 1921), pp. 3-4; 'Die württembergische Verfassungsgesetzgebung des Jahres 1919', *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechtes IX* (1920), pp. 171-179; Hans Gmelin, 'Verfassungsentwicklung und Gesetzgebung in Hessen von 1913 bis 1919', *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechtes IX* (1920), pp. 204-217; Eckhart G. Franz and Manfred Köhler, *Parlament im Kampf um die Demokratie: Der Landtag des Volksstaats Hessen 1919-1933* (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. 29-32; Manfred Köhler, "'Im Sinne der allgemeinen Gerechtigkeit': Die Verfassung des Volksstaates Hessen von 1919", in: Bernd Heidenreich and Klaus Böhme (eds.), *Hessen: Verfassung und Politik* (Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 223-257; Tobias Haren, *Der Volksstaat Hessen 1918/19: Hessens Weg zur Demokratie* (Berlin, 2003), pp. 148-186; Robert Piloty, 'Die bayerische Verfassung vom 14. August 1919', *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechtes IX* (1920), pp. 129-162; Christian Georg Ruf, *Die bayerische Verfassung vom 14. August 1919* (Baden-Baden, 2015), pp. 61-101.

3. See: Johannes Merz, "'Freistaat Bayern': Metamorphosen eines Staatsnamens', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 45 (1997), pp. 121-142.

4. Johann Jacob Moser, *Grund-Riß der heutigen Staats-Verfassung des Teutschen Reichs* (Tübingen, 1731), p. 55.

5. For an etymology of the term, see: Merz, "'Freistaat Bayern'"; Andreas Dornheim, *Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Begriffs "Freistaat"* (Erfurt, 2001).

Hambach Festival, Johann Georg August Wirth ended a fiery speech attacking the power of Europe's monarchs with hurrahs for "the united free states of Germany." In 1848, the term received official recognition when Lübeck became the first German state to formally adopt the designation.⁶ The term "People's State" [*Volksstaat*] was likewise first deployed to describe Switzerland, or more specifically the Canton of Grisons, as a democracy in which all men had an equal vote, and therefore an equal say, in the administration.⁷ This egalitarian and inclusive meaning held true during the nineteenth century and was gradually institutionalised during the First World War.⁸ What, however, did these new designations mean in practice after 1918?

Monarchical government

Germany's post-revolutionary constitutional arrangements entailed a fundamental inversion of the relationship between the legislature and the executive which had existed before 1918. With limited exceptions, the twenty-two kingdoms, grand duchies, duchies, and principalities of the *Kaiserreich* had been constitutional monarchies.⁹ At its most basic, these states were monarchies in which the absolute power of the monarch had been limited in some way by a written constitution, usually through the granting of rights to a parliament. In order for the state to function, the monarch and the representatives of the people were theoretically required to compromise and cooperate.¹⁰ As Cajetan von Aretin writes, this idea was "the decisive and essential feature of all German constitutions" in the nineteenth century.¹¹

6. Dornheim, *Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, p. 6.

7. August Ferdinand Lueder, *Einleitung in die Staatskunde nebst einer Statistik der vornehmsten europäischen Reiche* (Leipzig, 1792), part I, pp. 92-93.

8. Steffen Bruendel, 'Die Geburt der "Volksgemeinschaft" aus dem "Geist von 1914": Entstehung und Wandel eines "sozialistischen" Gesellschaftsentwurfs', *Zeitgeschichte-online*, Thema: *Fronterlebnis und Nachkriegsordnung. Wirkung und Wahrnehmung des Ersten Weltkriegs* (May 2004); Heiko Bollmeyer, 'Das "Volk" in den Verfassungsberatungen der Weimarer Nationalversammlung 1919—ein demokratietheoretischer Schlüsselbegriff zwischen Kaiserreich und Republik', in: Gallus (ed.), *Die vergessene Revolution*, pp. 57-83.

9. The twin grand duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz, governed by a feudal constitution (or, more accurately, a dynastic agreement) passed in 1755, were prime examples of outliers. Neither of the two states possessed an elected legislature, but shared a corporative assembly of nobles, landowners, and town mayors who met in Schwerin. See: Herman Brunswig, 'Die mecklenburgische Verfassungsfrage', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 2 (1909), pp. 107-118.

10. Martin Kirsch, *Monarch und Parlament im 19. Jahrhundert: Der monarchische Konstitutionalismus als europäischer Verfassungstyp. Frankreich im Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1999), p. 45; Cajetan von Aretin, 'Das monarchische Prinzip in den deutschen Verfassungen des 19. Jahrhunderts', in: Alois Schmid and Hermann Rumschöttel (eds.), *Wittelsbacher-Studien: Festgabe für Herzog Franz von Bayern zum 80. Geburtstag* (Munich, 2013), p. 667; Böckenförde, 'Zusammenbruch der Monarchie', p. 19. For a contemporary analysis, see: Hermann Rehm, *Das politische Wesen der deutschen Monarchie* (Tübingen, 1916).

11. Aretin, 'Das monarchische Prinzip', p. 663.

Despite its apparent implications for popular sovereignty, there is no doubt that Germany's many monarchs remained uniquely powerful within their own states.¹² The truth of Bismarck's famous declaration that "the real and true minister president of Prussia is His Majesty the King" could be doubted in day-to-day practice, but it was constitutionally sound.¹³ Unlike in states such as Belgium, where the constitution was the source and foundation of the king's authority, in Germany these documents proclaimed the monarchs' sovereignty and offered only minor restrictions. This is evident from their initial clauses.¹⁴ The states under consideration here each declared that the monarch "embodie[d] all rights of state sovereignty and exercises them in accordance with the conditions of this constitution."¹⁵ In only three states, furthermore, namely Oldenburg, Reuß Elder Line, and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, was a new sovereign obliged to take an oath before assuming these powers.¹⁶ The minister president and his cabinet colleagues served at the pleasure of the monarch, who retained all executive authority and control over the sole legal source of force, the army. Deputies could neither instruct the government nor force its dissolution. Indeed, the legislature's own dissolution rested on the whim of the monarch, who was obliged to summon it once only every three years.¹⁷ The competencies of the legislature were closely regulated and encompassed little of note beyond the right to approve or reject direct taxes and the state budget.¹⁸

The constitutions of Hessen (1820), Bavaria (1818), and Württemberg (1819) were formulated in the immediate post-Napoleonic reconstruction era. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the monarchs to whom so much authority had been given intervened only rarely in day-to-day government. Throughout the nineteenth century, dynasties across Europe focused on securing popularity above political power, with the consequence that they gradually shifted from being constitutional to cultural institutions.

12. Gollwitzer, 'Endphase der Monarchie', p. 365; Matthias Stickler, 'Monarchischer Konstitutionalismus als Modernisierungsprogramm? Das Beispiel Bayern und Württemberg (1803-1918)', in: Frank-Lothar Kroll and Dieter J. Weiß (eds.), *Inszenierung oder Legitimation? Die Monarchie in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Ein deutsch-englischer Vergleich* (Berlin, 2015), p. 53.

13. *Verh. RT.*, 1881/82, 33. Sitzung, 24.01.1882, p. 895.

14. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 'Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert', in: idem, *Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit: Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht* (Frankfurt a.M., 1976), pp. 114-123.

15. Tit. II, §1, Bay. Verf. 1818; §4(1), Hess. Verf. 1820; §4, Württ. Verf. 1819.

16. Hans Gmelin, 'Das Staatsrecht der Einzelstaaten', in: Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma (eds.), *Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts* (Tübingen, 1930), p. 81.

17. §64, Hess. Verf. 1820; §122(1), Württ. Verf. 1819; Tit. VII, §22, Bay. Verf. 1818.

18. See, for example, Tit. VII, Verf. Bay. 1818.

Each of the states' final monarchs—Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, Ludwig III of Bavaria, and Wilhelm II of Württemberg—were praised for their restraint and scrupulous care to act within their constitutional boundaries. Ernst Ludwig and Wilhelm even enjoyed warm relations with their state's Social Democrats, who began to play increasingly important roles in local politics. Wilhelm's benevolence was forgotten in 1913, however, when the Social Democrats—in a demonstration of the legislature's growing stature—loudly and acrimoniously (albeit unsuccessfully) opposed an increase in his funding. In the same year, the parliament in Bavaria also flexed its growing muscles, this time to the monarch's advantage, when it engineered the elevation of Ludwig III to the crown while his cousin, the unfit King Otto, was still alive.¹⁹

In short order, the November Revolution dramatically advanced this trend to its conclusion. New constitutions imbued the people with all state sovereignty, which they symbolically bestowed on their elected representatives. The aristocratic, corporative, and feudal first chambers of the monarchical era were abolished, leaving a single, wholly elected chamber. Legislatures now convened, at a minimum, once per year and were called, as a matter of course, by the government or the president of the *Landtag*.²⁰ Radical enfranchisement, moreover, made the legislatures genuinely representative. Voting was now general, equal, secret, and direct, and the right of all citizens who were of age—including women, who had been excluded before 1918.²¹ Voters secondly assumed the right to dissolve the legislature during a session. By law, a binding referendum was required to follow the submission of a petition bearing signatures of one fifth (Bavaria and Württemberg) or a mere twentieth (Hessen) of all eligible voters.²² A majority of states codified similar rights in their constitutions, but only once, in Oldenburg in 1931, did an electorate actually force the recall of its parliament.²³ As a consequence of its new legitimacy, the legislature enjoyed greater

19. Ludwig III ultimately suffered from accusations that he reigned “by the grace of the Centre Party,” see: Allan Mitchell, *Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919: The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic* (Princeton, 1965), p. 20. Cf. Müller, *Royal Heirs*, pp. 28-30.

20. On the frequency of sessions: §30(1), Bay. Verf. 1919; §23, Hess. Verf. 1919; §15(1), Württ. Verf. 1919. On the calling of a parliament: §30(2), Bay. Verf. 1919; §23, Hess. Verf. 1919; §15(3), Württ. Verf. 1919.

21. Cf. Birte Förster, ‘Den Staat mitgestalten: Wege zur Partizipation von Frauen im Großherzogtum und Volksstaat Hessen, 1904–1921’, in: Hedwig Richter and Kerstin Wolff (eds.), *Frauenwahlrecht: Demokratisierung der Demokratie in Deutschland und Europa* (Hamburg, 2018), pp. 221-248.

22. §30(4), Bay. Verf. 1919; §24, Hess. Verf. 1919; §16, Württ. Verf. 1919.

23. Christian Engeli, ‘Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid im Kommunalverfassungsrecht der Weimarer Zeit’, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 25 (1985), p. 301. Cf. Hans-Jürgen Wiegand, *Direktdemokratische Element in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Berlin, 2006), p. 95ff.

stature and authority vis-à-vis the government. Legislating was no longer the preserve of the executive but could be initiated by individual deputies.²⁴ State treaties, once a prime example of the monarch's monopoly on foreign policy, also required parliamentary approval.²⁵ Even ministers, who before the revolution had been answerable only to the monarch, could be summoned to explain themselves and their actions before the house;²⁶ should they demur or ill-acquit themselves, then disgruntled deputies could dismiss them—or, indeed, the entire cabinet—from office.²⁷ What the *Landtag* gave, the *Landtag* could take away.

Such was the supremacy of the legislature that the government essentially became one of its committees, as the conservative Wilhelm Bazille grumbled in his commentary on Württemberg's constitution.²⁸ The monarch was replaced as chairman of the cabinet by a minister president elected by the parliament who, in most cases, also relied on its approval of his choice of colleagues.²⁹ As a consequence, Weimar's state governments were filled with a greater number of career politicians than those before the revolution, which regularly comprised officials with little or no parliamentary experience.³⁰ While the executives retained the right to pass legislation, and were responsible for drafting and publishing it, they lacked the power to veto bills passed by a rogue parliament. Their best hope was to call a referendum and rely on the support of the people.³¹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the curtailing of their competencies, the post-war governments were smaller than their *Reich* counterpart (though often larger than they had been before 1918). Ten state secretaries sat round the *Reich* cabinet table. In Prussia, the largest state, there were only seven, while in the Free State of Schaumburg-Lippe, the business of government could be executed tête-à-tête between the minister president and his sole colleague.³² As a rule, these governments were also more stable. Between 1918 and 1933, twelve men led fourteen cabinets at the federal level. In

24. §44, Bay. Verf. 1919; §§4, 7, 36, Hess. Verf. 1919; §7, Württ. Verf. 1919.

25. §50, Bay. Verf. 1919; §7, Hess. Verf. 1919; §32, Württ. Verf. 1919.

26. §53, Bay. Verf. 1919; §32, Hess. Verf. 1919; §§8(1), 20, Württ. Verf. 1919.

27. §55, Bay. Verf. 1919; §38, Hess. Verf. 1919; §28, Württ. Verf. 1919.

28. Wilhelm Bazille (ed.), *Verfassungsurkunde des freien Volksstaates Württemberg vom 26. April 1919: Textausgabe mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen* (Stuttgart, 1919), p. 17.

29. §§58-59, Bay. Verf. 1919; §26-27, Württ. Verf. 1919.

30. Eckhart G. Franz, 'Hessen-Darmstadt, 1820-1935', in: Klaus Schwabe (ed.), *Die Regierungen der deutschen Mittel- und Kleinstaaten, 1815-1933* (Boppard a.Rh., 1983), p. 108.

31. In Saxony, Thuringia, and Lippe the executive could bounce back a law passed by the legislature for reconsideration. See: Stefan Malorny, *Exekutive Vetorechte im deutschen Verfassungssystem* (Göttingen, 2011), p. 152ff.

32. Wilhelm Heinz Schröder, "'Genosse Herr Minister': Sozialdemokraten in den Reichs- und Länderregierungen der Weimarer Republik 1918/19-1933', *Historical Social Research* 26:4 (2001), pp. 21-23.

Hessen, meanwhile, four cabinets were chaired by a mere two *Staatspräsidenten*, the Social Democrats Carl Ulrich and Bernhard Adelung.

The new relationship between the executive and the legislature, and the tensions it produced, are revealed by the question of precedence. The social democrat Wilhelm Blos, who in his memoirs describes the colour and splendour of state openings of parliament in 1890s Württemberg, noted with satisfaction the muted and simple ceremonies of the post-revolutionary era.

No more... old pageantry, no more glittering uniforms and flamboyant garments.
No speech from the throne, no more authoritarian ministers. No more high nobility...No processional carriages, no state coach, no more troopers on horseback.³³

Germany's state governments lacked a mystical aura lent by centuries of history or divine right and thus had to engineer outward displays of authority in other ways. From the surviving evidence, the executive in Munich was most concerned by its own position vis-à-vis the other branches of government. In January 1920, the ministry for education and culture instructed the authorities of Munich's theatres to save two seats per performance for members of the cabinet. While ministers would be seated "in one of the front rows" at the Prince Regent theatre, at the national theatre they were to be ensconced "in one of the first-class boxes immediately adjacent to the former royal box."³⁴ From 1930, the minister president was given a standing reservation of five seats in a first class box.³⁵ On the whole, questions of precedence were most pressing when significant state occasions loomed on the horizon. The funeral of Ludwig III and Queen Marie Therese in October 1921 was an early example (see chapter six). Minister president Hugo von Lerchenfeld informed the cabinet that *Landtag* authorities "placed great weight on being recognised as the sovereign representation of the people [*souveräne Volksvertretung*]" and therefore wished to precede the government in the procession. A compromise was reached in which Lerchenfeld and the president and deputy presidents of the *Landtag* would walk first, followed then *en masse* by

33. Blos, *Von der Monarchie zum Volksstaat*, vol. II, p. 12.

34. BayHStA, MA, 102048, Nr. 1866, 24.01.1920.

35. BayHStA, MA, 102048, Nr. VII 2802, 25.01.1930.

the other deputies and, finally, the remaining members of the cabinet.³⁶ This was the order adopted at other events, including Munich's annual *Corpus Christi* procession, and demonstrates the lowly status of the executive under the new regime.³⁷ In advance of Friedrich Ebert's visit to Munich in the summer of 1922, however, the government determined to rectify this. It was decided that the President would be greeted first by the ministers and only then by representatives of the legislature.³⁸

Under Heinrich Held, Bavarian minister president between 1924 and 1933, this practice was solidified. In December 1926, he devoted a whole session of the cabinet to this question. The constitution, he noted, did not define "who is to count as representative of the state's sovereignty." Held's solution, unsurprisingly, was that the cabinet fitted the bill and that, as chairman of the cabinet, he outranked the rest. The president of the *Landtag* would be granted equal status with Held, out of courtesy, but the other legislators would have to bring up the rear. Each department was to employ an official tasked with ensuring "that the government [*Staatsministerium*] is always provided with appropriate seating during public appearances and is able to participate in events organised by third parties in a manner befitting its dignity."³⁹ Six months later, shortly before the 1927 *Corpus Christi* procession, the matter surfaced once again. Objections from the *Landtag* over its now diminished position in the hierarchy threatened to cause complications. Held nevertheless stood firm. As the "outwardly representative organ of state sovereignty," he declared, the cabinet could not possibly walk behind members of the legislature. To pre-empt rebuttal, he commissioned a legal opinion to that effect.⁴⁰

The government in Württemberg was generally more relaxed over such questions, but, as in Bavaria, the death of the ex-monarch forced it to make contingencies. Like his counterpart in Munich, state president Johannes von Hieber informed the cabinet in Stuttgart that "if the government is to participate [in the funeral of King Wilhelm II] then it must claim the right to be honoured as such." The possibility that the cabinet may have to walk behind Wilhelm's courtiers ("even the most junior officer") was, as justice minister Eugen Bolz commented,

36. BayHStA, MA, 99517, Ministerratssitzung, 26.10.1921.

37. BayHStA, MA, 102022, undated memorandum on precedence.

38. BayHStA, MA, 99517, Ministerratssitzung, 09.06.1922.

39. BayHStA, MA, 102022, Ministerratssitzung, 09.12.1926.

40. BayHStA, MA, 102022, Ministerratssitzung, 20.06.1927. If such an opinion exists, it does not survive in the government's archival file devoted to questions of precedence and rank.

simply impossible. To retain an aura of authority, the cabinet agreed to simply congregate at the graveside and avoid the procession altogether.⁴¹ The comparative importance of such issues in Bavaria, as compared with other states, may be explained by two main factors. Firstly, after the spring of 1919, Bavaria's executives rested on pillars of sand and required means to establish their authority. Lacking a *Staatspräsident* and opposing a particularly powerful and truculent legislature, every symbolic advantage had to be taken. Secondly, Bavarian cabinets were predominantly conservative from March 1920 until the Nazi takeover and were thus guided by a political ideology which favoured strong leadership and, in parallel, disapproved of upstart deputies and their calls for parliamentary absolutism.

As tensions between the branches of government reveal, the November Revolutions constituted a significant and dramatic upheaval in the constitutional histories of Germany. While the balance of power had been moving towards the legislature for some years, the revolution was undoubtedly a tipping point. Within months of November 1918, the centuries-long primacy of the executive over the legislature was overhauled and reversed for good. With remarkable consistency across the three states, new constitutions imbued the parliaments with extra powers, including the right to choose the head of the government and his cabinet, allowing it to stand front and centre on the political stage. This shift was further evident on the field of precedence, where demoted cabinets sought compensation for their constitutional status by ceremonially outranking the *Landtag* at important state events.

Monarch as head of state

These developments prompt further questions. What, for example, became of the monarch's position as head of state in Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg? Who, if anyone, assumed the prerogative and ceremonial functions which had long been held by kings and grand dukes? Was there any attempt to recreate a similar, quasi-monarchical position within the republican framework? There are two ways in which the first question may be answered. If one were to consider the position of head of state from a purely technical point of view, namely as the individual or collective which held ultimate authority in the state, then it would have to be assigned to the *Volk*. After all, as the states' respective constitutions declared, with very minor differences in phrasing, "all state authority" proceeded from the people.⁴² This was

41. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 05.10.1921.

42. §2, Bay. Verf. 1919; §3, Hess. Verf. 1919; §3, Württ. Verf. 1919.

the realisation of a symbolic empowering of the *Volke* which had gripped Germany since the outbreak of war in August 1914.⁴³ Popular power existed on an abstract plane, however, and was deployed only in elections and occasional referenda. Royal prerogatives, moreover, such as bestowing pardons and representing the state diplomatically could hardly be exercised by an entire population. If instead one looks to actual practice, and takes a holistic interpretation of “head of state,” then it becomes evident that such a position simply did not exist after 1918, at least not in the form of the single, elevated individual which most other states possessed. How did this curious state of affairs come to be?

Each state quickly concluded that its constitutional firmament demanded only a single star, and that a separate role, in addition to the head of the government, was unnecessary. Indeed, the provisional governments of Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg came together in December 1918 to declare their united opposition to such a move.⁴⁴ Firstly, it was understood that the *Reich* constitution, drafted simultaneously in Weimar, would produce a more centralised nation state than had existed before the revolution, leaving comparatively little for state governments to do. With a minister president picking up the leftovers, a state president would simply be an expensive, if decorative non-entity.⁴⁵ Secondly, there was an acute awareness that the complexities of the pre-revolutionary order had to be overturned. As Wilhelm Blos remarked in Württemberg, “twenty-two presidents should not take the place of twenty-two princes.” Adorning every state with a president would simply perpetuate the anachronistic state structure which had delayed progress in Germany for so long.⁴⁶ This concern took on a secondary dimension in the south. Before 1918, the positions of *Reichskanzler* and minister president of Prussia had been held in personal union, and the founding fathers of Germany’s new southern republics were determined that this

43. Cf. Bollmeyer, ‘Das “Volk” in den Verfassungsberatungen der Weimarer Nationalversammlung 1919’; Bruendel, ‘Die Geburt der “Volksgemeinschaft” aus dem “Geist von 1914”’; Jörn Retterath, ‘Der Volksbegriff in der Zäsur des Jahres 1918/19: Pluralistisches und holistisches Denken im katholischen, liberalen und sozialdemokratischen Milieu’, in: Kämper, Haslinger, and Raithel (eds.), *Demokratiegeschichte als Zäsurgeschichte*, pp. 97-122; Michael Wildt, ‘Volksgemeinschaft und Führererwartung in der Weimarer Republik’, in: Ute Daniel (ed.), *Politische Kultur und Medienwirklichkeiten in den 1920er Jahren* (Munich, 2010), pp. 181-204; Sven Oliver Müller, *Die Nation als Waffe und Vorstellung: Nationalismus in Deutschland und Großbritannien im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 298-299.

44. Hermann Bohnacker, ‘Die Frage des Staatsoberhauptes in dem Verfassungsrecht der grösseren deutschen Länder nach der Revolution von 1918’ (Doctoral dissertation, Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen, 1923), p. 91.

45. For comments on expense, see: *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, 54. Sitzung, 23.09.1919, pp. 1236-1237, 1239-1241.

46. HStAS, E 131, Bü 100, Sitting of the constitution committee, 17.12.1918, pp. 2-3.

constitutional quirk be consigned to history. If they were to establish state presidencies for themselves, Prussia would likely follow, and even if the position of a Prussian state president were to remain separate from the *Reichspräsident*, rivalry between the two would be inevitable and intolerable.⁴⁷ Thirdly, and finally, the decision was reflective of the ideologies and experiences of Germany's new provisional governments. Social democracy, the dominant force in late 1918 and early 1919, had not agitated for decades in favour of parliamentarisation and parliamentary supremacy—and at least theoretically, a republic—to negate its sudden arrival by installing a quasi-monarchical president. As the SPD's Friedrich Ackermann framed it in Bavaria, “the *Landtag* must be, and remain, the sole representative organ of the sovereign people.”⁴⁸

Arguments in favour of a separate state president were not unheard of, nor was the above stance watertight. Indeed, in February 1919, only three months after the joint declaration, Hessen's constitutional committee declared that it was “still an open question.”⁴⁹ This was likely a consequence of the committee's membership which included parties not represented in the government and outside experts—often jurists of a conservative disposition—who were more amenable to the benefits of a president. Aside from acting as a representative symbol of the state, they would provide stability and continuity, most particularly during the uneasy period between the withdrawal of one government and the appointment of another. In Württemberg, the WBP tried twice to introduce a plebiscitary head of state to the constitution, arguing that it would solve the three evils of parliamentary democracy: the innate chaos of coalitions, the self-centredness of political parties, and the widespread corruption of officials.⁵⁰ Speaking in September 1919, Wilhelm Bazille proclaimed that in the short time since the revolution, the people had come to appreciate “the great worth which has been lost with the constitutional monarchy.”⁵¹ His design, described not unjustly by Christian Trippe as “akin to a viceroy for the deposed monarch,” drew rebuttals and scorn

47. Bohnacker, ‘Die Frage des Staatsoberhauptes’, pp. 181-183; ‘Die preußische Verfassung’, *Allgemeine Zeitung* 48, 05.12.1920, p. 3.

48. Bohnacker, ‘Die Frage des Staatsoberhauptes’, p. 89. Cf. Hans F. Zacher, ‘Das Staatsoberhaupt Bayerns’, in: Bodo Börner, Hermann Jahrreiß, and Klaus Stern (eds.), *Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit: Festschrift für Karl Carstens zum 70. Geburtstag am 14. Dezember 1984* (Cologne, 1984), vol. II, p. 962.

49. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 21, 17.02.1919.

50. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilage Nr. 211, 23.09.1919.

51. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, 54. Sitzung, 23.09.1919, pp. 1234-1235.

across the *Landtag*.⁵² Bavaria's *Volkspartei*, led by Heinrich Held, was similarly enthusiastic, if just as unsuccessful. Interestingly, Held turned one of the key arguments against a state president—that *Reich* centralisation made it pointless—on its head, maintaining that the position was the sole means of protecting what remained of Bavaria's “independence and sovereignty.”⁵³ Acting as a bulwark of state power and identity against encroachments by the national government had been a fundamental responsibility of the monarch under the *Kaiserreich*, and one which Held wished to restore. Indeed, as was no doubt clear to his adversaries, Held's envisaged president had more than a tinge of the monarch about it. “I consider him to be,” Held mused, ticking off the ex-king's various duties, “the agent of the state in dealings with the other states and the *Reich*..., with the authority to sign and publish laws, to conclude treaties, and to bestow pardons.”⁵⁴

Ultimately, advocates of a state president in Hessen and Württemberg scored a minor victory when the originally conceived position of minister president was elevated to assuage their concerns. Most obviously, and somewhat undeservedly, the role was renamed “state president” [*Staatspräsident*] despite its limited stature. The government in Hessen explicitly noted in its draft constitution that this appellation was designed “to elevate its prestige and dignity in the eyes of the population.”⁵⁵ In trying to pre-empt accusations of vanity, Carl Ulrich, the first incumbent, stressed that the title would ensure lexical uniformity in the south, after Baden and Württemberg had adopted the same term.⁵⁶ In addition to a new designation, the positions were granted powers beyond what might normally be expected of a minister president. For one, they represented the state beyond its borders, such as at the annual Constitution Day celebrations in Berlin. This was a hangover from the pre-revolutionary era when minister presidents concurrently held the position of foreign minister. During the Weimar period, some incumbents made more of this than others. Gustav von Kahr, for instance, regularly used foreign policy to bolster Bavarian autonomy in opposition to the

52. Christian F. Trippe, *Konservative Verfassungspolitik 1918-1923: Die DNVP als Opposition in Reich und Ländern* (Düsseldorf, 1995), p. 131. Cf. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, 54. Sitzung, 23.09.1919, pp. 1236-1241.

53. Richard Keßler, *Heinrich Held als Parlamentarier: Eine Teilbiographie 1868-1924* (Berlin, 1969), p. 370.

54. Carl Kauffmann, ‘Das System der Staatspräsidentschaft in Württemberg unter Berücksichtigung der Verfassungen Preußens, Bayerns, Sachsens und Badens’ (Doctoral dissertation, Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen, 1928), p. 26.

55. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 237, 09.10.1919.

56. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, 39. Sitzung, 04.12.1919, p. 997.

Reich government in Berlin.⁵⁷ Bavaria's minister president was additionally empowered to cast deciding votes in cabinet and to consult officials from all departments, one of Walter Bagehot's trio of monarchical rights. Württemberg's *Staatspräsident*, much the strongest of the three, meanwhile wielded the right to appoint ministers without approval from the legislature (which his counterparts required) and to dismiss them at will (which his counterparts could not). In addition, the ancient monarchical prerogative to grant pardons, delegated in other states to the cabinet as a whole, was his to exercise alone.

It should not be thought, however, that any one of these positions afforded its holder wide-ranging powers or the ability to dominate the political scene. Each was beholden to the legislature which had elected him and chaired a government which resembled one of its committees. None, moreover, had the sole right to determine government policy; except in Bavaria, their vote held no greater weight than that of their colleagues. The regimes were thus inherently collegial or directorial and, save the occasional perk or prerogative, the president remained a *primus inter pares*. While the *Reichkanzler* was treated at great length in the federal constitution, the heads of the state governments were more often than not subsumed under generic references to "the ministers."⁵⁸ A need for compromise within cabinets, which regularly contained independent-minded ministers from different parties, and for the support of rambunctious legislatures—which, unlike the monarch, the president had no means to dissolve—further weakened the role. As Daniel Rittenauer writes in the Bavarian case, even a figure as domineering and energetic as Gustav von Kahr struggled to enforce his will onto the body politic.⁵⁹

Considerable discussion has been devoted by historians to the question of whether the *Reich* president was an *Ersatzkaiser*, or "replacement emperor."⁶⁰ At the state level, this question is moot. In almost all regards, Weimar's state presidents were considerably less substantial than the monarchs they replaced or, for that matter, the latter's own chief ministers. This was true

57. See: Hans Hinterberger, 'Unpolitische Politiker? Die bayerischen "Beamtenministerpräsidenten" 1920-1924 und ihre Mitverantwortung am Hitlerputsch' (Doctoral dissertation, Universität Regensburg, 2016), p. 95ff.

58. Hans Nawiasky, 'Die Stellung des bayer. Ministerpräsidenten', *Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter* 74:7 (1926), pp. 116-117.

59. Daniel Rittenauer, *Das Amt des bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten in der NS-Zeit* (Munich, 2018), p. 75.

60. See, most recently: Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, 'Der Reichspräsident—ein republikanischer Monarch?', in: Horst Dreier and Christian Waldhoff (eds.), *Das Wagnis der Demokratie: Eine Anatomie der Weimarer Reichsverfassung* (Munich, 2018), pp. 219-240.

not just constitutionally speaking, but in terms of their status as a locus of state identity and as an elevated and exalted figure. In seventeen of the *Kaiserreich's* royal states, the monarch, as fount of all sovereignty, was declared immune from having the law used against him. Ten states described their monarch as “sacred and inviolable,” five as simply “inviolable,” one as “inviolable and unaccountable,” and one (Saxe-Meiningen) as “above all personal liability.”⁶¹ No such protection existed after 1918. Symbolic traditions also fell by the wayside or were delegated to other bodies. Before 1918, it was customary for King Wilhelm II of Württemberg to stand as godfather for every seventh son born in the state (who would usually take his name).⁶² In the Weimar era, respective governments continued to present gifts to these children, but there was no question of the *Staatspräsident* ever acting as godparent.⁶³ He could, however, be accused of adopting a less positive familial role. Both Wilhelm Blos and Carl Ulrich, the first *Staatspräsidenten* of Württemberg and Hessen, were dismissed during their tenures as “stepfathers of the nation” [*Landesstiefväter*], a play on the monarch’s traditional appellation as “father of the nation,” and one which implied cold and overbearing usurpation.⁶⁴

Only in Bavaria were subsequent attempts made to “remedy” these shortcomings. Amongst the Bavarian right, the state constitution—drafted in isolation in Bamberg—was held to be somehow illegitimate and detached from the needs and desires of the people. The leading monarchist Erwein Freiherr von Aretin was convinced that “such a dreadful” arrangement did not exist anywhere else in the world. “It did away with the head of state,” he later exclaimed, “[it was] like a court without a judge!”⁶⁵ Any number of articles in the press created theoretical positions of great power and ceremonial heft to fill the gap. Suggestion was even made that Crown Prince Rupprecht be encouraged to stand for the position to rejuvenate it and lend gravitas.⁶⁶ For many, however, the personnel were not the problem; instead, it was

61. Franz Kirsch, ‘Die Unverletzlichkeit des Monarchen nach deutschem Staatsrecht’ (Doctoral dissertation, Königliche Universität zu Greifswald, 1917), p. 28.

62. Hans Haug, *Königin Charlotte von Württemberg: Bebenhausen wurde ihr zur Heimat* (Tübingen, 2015), p. 81.

63. See: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 217, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 30.10.1922; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 218, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 24.04.1923; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 219, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 30.01.1924.

64. Blos, *Von der Monarchie zum Volksstaat*, vol. II, p. 95; ‘Warum? Warum nicht?’, *Wormser Tageszeitung* 160, 19.06.1926.

65. Erwein von Aretin, *Krone und Ketten: Erinnerungen eines bayerischen Edelmannes*, ed. Karl Buchheim and Karl Otmar von Aretin (Munich, 1954), p. 37.

66. ‘Politische Rundschau’, *Allgemeine Zeitung* 150, 30.06.1920, p. 2. At the *Reich* level, the SPD almost succeeded in introducing a clause to the federal constitution prohibiting Germany’s former royals from standing for the *Reich* presidency. The provision was struck out in a vote just days before the final

the lack of single, powerful, and elevated position for them to occupy. This sentiment was given official impetus in March 1920 when the BVP's Gustav von Kahr succeeded Johannes Hoffmann as *Ministerpräsident*. Outlining his government's programme of policies to the *Landtag*, von Kahr mooted the creation of a Bavarian *Staatspräsident*, "who would specifically embody Bavaria's sovereign identity [*Staatspersönlichkeit*]." ⁶⁷ This proposed incision into the Bavarian body politic was hidden amidst a swath of other promises and received relatively little attention in the ensuing debate. Nevertheless, responses ultimately divided along party lines. The SPD and USPD dismissed the idea immediately as unnecessary and ridiculous. ⁶⁸ Both Pius Dirr (DDP) and von Kahr's party colleague, the future *Ministerpräsident* Eugen von Knilling, were receptive but expressed concerns—with great foresight, as it turned out—over the practicality of amending the constitution. Taking heed of examples in other states, they advocated the compromise adopted in Baden, Württemberg, and Hessen, where the *Ministerpräsident* had been granted further powers and privileges. If, out of a need to lend weight to the office, it were to be renamed *Staatspräsident*, then so be it; a second and separate high-ranking official was not needed. ⁶⁹ Only the BMP, through its spokesman Johann Michael Hilpert, offered full throated support. "What we want to restore is strong government [*Ordnungsstaat*]," Hilpert declared, "for the revolution destroyed it in a blind rage while imagining that it was destroying a police state." ⁷⁰ Beyond the legislature, von Kahr's proposal also found favour with the local military commander, General Arnold von Möhl, who offered to discuss the powers a hypothetical state president would have over troops. ⁷¹

While little immediate progress was made, the idea enjoyed sufficient support to survive von Kahr's fall from office in July 1921. This was due, in no small part, to the lobbying of Fritz Schäffer, a young BVP deputy who made the cause his own. Supported by sixty-five colleagues, he tabled a motion in the *Landtag* in September 1921 calling for the immediate creation of a state president. His motivations may be gleaned from an article he contributed to the periodical *Politische Zeitfragen* the following January. Schäffer began by denigrating the existing political order. The revolution, he argued, was a result of the demagoguery of those

document was signed by Friedrich Ebert. See: *Verh. RT.*, Nationalversammlung, Aktenstück 391, pp. 278-280, 285-286, 541-542; *Verh. RT.*, Nationalversammlung, 63. Sitzung, 22.07.1919, pp. 1820-1827; *Verh. RT.*, Nationalversammlung, 71. Sitzung, 31.07.1919, p. 2191.

67. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 2. Sitzung, 16.07.1920, p. 8.

68. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 4. Sitzung, 21.07.1920, pp. 63 (SPD), 67 (USPD).

69. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 4. Sitzung, 21.07.1920, pp. 48 (Knilling), 94 (Dirr).

70. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 5. Sitzung, 22.07.1920, p. 82.

71. BayHStA, MA, 102019, Generalleutnant von Möhl to Ministerpräsident, 10.11.1920.

who wished to pin blame for the war entirely on the federal princes. The constitution, meanwhile, was a regrettable compromise concocted in secret and with little popular consultation. It created an omnipotent legislature and demanded urgent remedy, preferably through the insertion of a *Staatspräsident* who would be “the protector of the people’s rights against the danger of parliamentary dictatorship.”⁷² On the political right, Schäffer’s views tapped into a rich vein of support. Bavaria’s leading monarchist organisation, the *Bayerischer Heimat- und Königsbund*, was in favour, as was the BVP, which passed a resolution to that end at its annual conference in 1922.⁷³ The party’s leader, Heinrich Held, was an outspoken advocate and, like Schäffer, focused on more than internal constitutional matters.⁷⁴ Schäffer had argued that a state president would “strengthen the awareness of an individual state independence” amongst the people and give Bavarian rights greater weight in discussions with Berlin.⁷⁵ Held likewise believed that the role would demonstrate that “Bavaria was not a province ruled from Berlin, but a state within the German *Reich*.”⁷⁶ It was vital, he maintained, to have a single individual to act as “the crystallisation point of the national ideas and beliefs of the whole people.”⁷⁷

Schäffer’s proposals found lukewarm support in Hugo von Lerchenfeld’s cabinet but were ultimately rejected on the basis, ironically, that they would weaken the government.⁷⁸ Their appeal remained strong, however, and once Lerchenfeld was replaced by the BVP’s own Eugen von Knilling in November 1922, the path seemed clear to victory.⁷⁹ It was not to be. The government forwarded Schäffer’s plan to a committee of the *Landtag*, which split predictably along ideological lines,⁸⁰ before the interior ministry drew up a final bill in April 1923. Under its provisions, the people would elect a state president for a seven-year term.

72. Friedrich Schäffer, ‘Ein bayerischer Staatspräsident! Kritische Betrachtungen und Vorschläge zur Bayerischen Verfassung vom 14. August 1919’, *Politische Zeitfragen. Monatschrift über alle Gebiete des öffentlichen Lebens* 4:1 (25 January 1922), pp. 1-24.

73. Ludwig Franz Gengler, ‘Die deutschen Monarchisten 1919 bis 1925: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Rechten von der Novemberrevolution 1918 bis zur ersten Uebnahme der Reichspräsidenschaft durch Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg 1925’ (Doctoral dissertation, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen, 1932), p. 137; Keßler, *Heinrich Held als Parlamentarier*, p. 473.

74. Keßler, *Heinrich Held als Parlamentarier*, p. 473.

75. Schäffer, ‘Ein bayerischer Staatspräsident!’, p. 18.

76. Keßler, *Heinrich Held als Parlamentarier*, p. 474.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 475.

78. BayHStA, MA, 102019, Ministerratssitzung, 07.11.1921.

79. See, for example: ‘Die Staatspräsidentenfrage’, *München-Augsburger Abendzeitung* 21, 17.01.1922; ‘Ein Staatspräsident in Bayern’, *München-Augsburger Abendzeitung* 53, 06.02.1922; ‘Die Frage des Staatspräsidenten in Bayern’, *Bayerischer Kurier* 377, 12.10.1922.

80. *Verh. bay. LT.*, III. Landtag, Beilage 3122, 12.12.1922.

He would assume the cabinet's role of representing the state, would appoint the minister president and his colleagues, have the authority to dissolve parliament, grant pardons, and wield special powers in times of crisis.⁸¹ The bill never reached the legislature, however. In an account written shortly afterwards, the government claimed that it had not wished to overburden the *Landtag* at the end of its session.⁸² Cabinet minutes reveal, however, that not only was the government itself split—the BBB withdrew support at the crucial juncture—but that it seriously doubted whether it had the necessary votes (two thirds of the *Landtag*) to amend the constitution at all.⁸³ In another ironic turn, Schäffer and his colleagues were defeated by the very adversaries they had sought to wipe out: the Bamberg constitution and the supremacy of parliament.

Germany's provincial heads of state thus disappeared in 1918. No provision was made in any state constitution to replace the Grand Duke of Hessen or the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg. Instead, their powers and prerogatives fell away, or were divided between the cabinet, the head of government, and the president of the *Landtag*. Despite representing the state beyond its borders and being the senior member of the cabinet, the *Ministerpräsident* or *Staatspräsident* additionally lacked the symbolic clout to step into the monarch's shoes. Collectively, parliamentarism and *Reich* centralisation made such a position unnecessary; as discussions in early 1919 reveal, it was barely even considered. Only in Bavaria were attempts made to introduce a quasi-monarchical figurehead, revealing the House of Wittelsbach's importance before 1918 as a bulwark of Bavarian identity. Like Max Weber, Friedrich Meinecke, and other *Vernunftrepublikaner* at the federal level, Bavaria's conservatives saw a powerful plebiscitary president as the means "to preserve as much monarchy as possible."⁸⁴ That they ultimately failed—and that their colleagues in Hessen and Württemberg never tried—lends further weight to the conclusion that 1918 was a constitutional caesura, and that the monarchs had become politically superfluous by the revolution. As Goethe had remarked of princes who fell afoul of Napoleon, they were "swept away as with a brush," without fuss or ceremony. "Had they really been kings, they would still be standing unscathed."⁸⁵

81. BayHStA, MA, 102019, Nr. 510 a 1, 07.023.1923; BayHStA, MA, 102019, Nr. 510 a 3, 30.04.1923.

82. BayHStA, MA, 102019, Nr. 450 a 7, 20.09.1923.

83. BayHStA, MA, 102019, Ministerratssitzung, 25.05.1923. For the provision on amending the constitution, see: §92, Bay. Verf. 1919.

84. Cf. Harm Klueting, "Vernunftrepublikanismus" und "Vertrauensdiktatur": Friedrich Meinecke in der Weimarer Republik', *Historische Zeitschrift* 242:1 (1986), pp. 69-98.

85. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 'Zahme Xenien VI', quoted in: *Goethe's sämtliche Werke* (Stuttgart, 1863), vol. I, p. 236.

Monarch as *summus episcopus*

Politically speaking, little of the pre-revolutionary *Landesherren* made it through the filter of revolution intact. But each federal prince held constitutional functions which were more than purely political. The most important of these, arguably, was their role as their state's *summus episcopus*, or head of the Protestant church. This role dated back to the Reformation and was deemed necessary to fill the power vacuum created by the Catholic Church's loss of authority in Protestant states. Under the doctrine of *cuius regio, eius religio*, laid out by the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, the temporal ruler of a state determined its official religion and ensured, at least in theory, denominational unity throughout his territory. Alongside the administration and the armed forces, the church formed one of the key pillars of state, and therefore monarchical, power.⁸⁶ As Werner Blessing writes, since the time of Constantine, western civilisation has viewed social and political order as a "reflection of the divine."⁸⁷ Criticising monarchical government, or calling for democratic reform, was thus tantamount to blasphemy, hence Ernst Troeltsch's observation in the Prussian context that Protestantism was the "spiritual twin" [*geistlicher Zwilling*] of authoritarian government.⁸⁸ Monarchy upheld the church and in return the church propagated the legitimacy of the monarchy amongst the people.⁸⁹

While the monarch's new title, literally translated, made him "supreme bishop"—adding *ius in sacra*, authority within the Protestant church, to his pre-existing *ius circa sacra*, or secular authority over all churches—by the late nineteenth century there was little question of his intervening in day-to-day ecclesiastical administration. As a rule, the role was reinterpreted by each successive holder. In Württemberg, Wilhelm I (r. 1816-1864), was fiercely protective of his rights as *summus episcopus* and repeatedly resisted attempts to introduce democratic or elected elements to the church. His grandson and namesake, Wilhelm II, was, by contrast, content to supervise from the side-lines, acting more as a ceremonial president than an executive director.⁹⁰ Similar variation was on show in Bavaria. Over the course of the

86. Jochen Jacke, *Kirche zwischen Monarchie und Republik: Der preußische Protestantismus nach dem Zusammenbruch von 1918* (Hamburg, 1976), p. 15.

87. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, p. 75.

88. Quoted in: Jacke, *Kirche zwischen Monarchie und Republik*, p. 16.

89. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, p. 76.

90. Katja Lutz, 'Die evangelische Kirche in Württemberg während der Industrialisierung: Aspekte eines komplexen Beziehungsgeflechts mit dem Fallbeispiel Cannstatt' (Doctoral dissertation, Universität Stuttgart, 2014), pp. 212, 218-219; Günther Widmer, 'Die Entwicklung der württembergischen

nineteenth century, Bavarian Protestants dealt with the pragmatic Max I Joseph who oversaw the creation of their state church and their integration into the new Bavarian kingdom; the romantic and spiritual Ludwig I, whose restoration of a pre-revolutionary Catholic religiosity induced considerable mistrust and concern amongst his Protestant subjects; the respectful and accommodating Max II, whose crown, precarious in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, sorely needed ecclesiastical support on all sides; the invisible and preoccupied Ludwig II; and the distant Prince Regent Luitpold who, while devout, invested his energies in other areas and avoided intervention in religious politics.⁹¹

Whatever his involvement in ecclesiastical affairs, the flight of the supreme bishop brought considerable uncertainty to the state churches. Royal sovereignty over the church [known as the *landesherrliches Kirchenregiment*] had not been without its critics over the previous century. In 1849, its abolition was adopted by the Frankfurt Parliament, followed in 1869 by the SPD. In the words of Daniel Borg, it was seen by many as “little more than sleight of hand to conceal [the] advancement of Protestant and conservative interests.”⁹² In November 1918, however, advocates of abolition held executive power for the first time. As it was, church leaders in the states did not have to fear intervention. The manifesto of the *Reich's* provisional government, the *Rat der Volksbeauftragten*, of 12 November guaranteed freedom of conscience, leaving the finer details to state governments and church authorities which, in some cases, had already begun to act.⁹³ As a consequence of the royal house's confessional make up, Württemberg was unusually prepared for this turn of events.⁹⁴ With the exception of four eighteenth-century dukes—Karl Alexander and his sons Karl Eugen, Ludwig Eugen, and Friedrich Eugen—Württemberg had been ruled by Protestant monarchs since the Reformation. By the late nineteenth century, however, change was on the horizon. Wilhelm II was the last male in his branch of the family; he had no siblings or close cousins, and his

evangelischen Landeskirche im Spiegel der Pfarrberichte bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts' (Doctoral dissertation, Universität Stuttgart, 2003), p. 229.

91. Werner K. Blessing, 'Summus Episcopus: Bayerns Herrscher und die protestantische Kirche im paritätischen Königreich. Eine Annäherung', in: Schmid and Rumschöttel (eds.), *Wittelsbacher-Studien*, pp. 607-620.

92. Daniel R. Borg, *The Old-Prussian Church and the Weimar Republic: A Study in Political Adjustment, 1917-1927* (Hanover, NH, 1984), p. 9. See also: Jacke, *Kirche zwischen Monarchie und Republik*, pp. 41-42.

93. Aufruf des Rates der Volksbeauftragten an das deutsche Volk vom 12. November 1918, in: *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* (1918), Nr. 153, p. 243.

94. For overviews of the separation of church and state in Württemberg, see: David J. Diephouse, *Pastors and Pluralism in Württemberg, 1918-1933* (Princeton, 1987), pp. 55-77; Siegfried Hermle, 'Kirche nach 1918: Ende und Neuanfang', in: Rainer Lächele and Jörg Thierfelder (eds.), *Württembergs Protestantismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 2003), pp. 11-31.

only son Ulrich had died as an infant in 1880. After a decade of childless marriage, moreover, it appeared unlikely that his second wife, Charlotte, would produce a son. Wilhelm's heir was thus his third cousin, Albrecht, from the dynasty's devoutly Catholic line. This posed a problem. Although Württemberg's Catholic monarchs had published decrees acknowledging Protestantism as the state religion (the so-called *Religionsversalien*),⁹⁵ and Protestants outnumbered Catholics by two to one, the thought of "King Albrecht" remained unpalatable to many. Indeed, one infamous 1909 article in the *Tägliche Rundschau* questioned the "Jesuit partisan's" right to inherit in the first place.⁹⁶

In 1898, Wilhelm and the Protestant church authorities introduced contingencies for the eventuality that Albrecht succeeded. The law which resulted would strip Albrecht of his sovereignty over the church and hand it to a committee of the consistory comprised of two Protestant cabinet ministers (or two other officials, if none existed), the president of the state synod, and the general superintendent. Revolution prevented Albrecht from assuming the throne, but the law nevertheless came into force. Recognising the shifting sands on 9 November 1918, the consistory rapidly drafted an order which would enact the 1898 regulations should Wilhelm II ever be hindered in executing sovereignty himself (as appeared increasingly likely throughout the day). The order was whisked over to the *Wilhelmspalais* and signed by Wilhelm in one of his final official acts as monarch.⁹⁷ In search of the two statutory Protestant cabinet ministers, the consistory first approached minister president Wilhelm Blos and finance minister Theodor Gottfried Liesching. Both declined, with Blos responding that he "didn't particularly see [himself] suited for the role of state bishop." Quite content to recruit suitable replacements of their choice, the ten-man selection committee outlined in the act elected *Staatsrat* Heinrich von Mosthaf and *Stadtdekan* Theodor Traub.⁹⁸

95. See, for example: Reversales welche an das Corpus Evangelicorum auf dem Reichs-Tag zu Regensburg ausgestellt worden, 27.03.1734, in: *Württembergische Religions-Urkunden in historischem Zusammenhang* (1741), pp. 117-121.

96. 'Ist der katholische Herzog Albrecht der rechtmäßige Thronfolger in Württemberg?', *Tägliche Rundschau* 153, 01.04.1909.

97. HStAS, J 40/19, Bü 1, Richard Fischer, 'Die Landeskirche zwischen den beiden Revolutionen vom 9. November 1918 und 30. Januar 1933'. Diephouse notes that a similar decree had been initialled by the king in late October, "suggesting that the role of the *summus episcopus* might have been terminated without the impetus of abdication." See: Diephouse, *Pastors and Pluralism*, p. 56n.

98. Blos, *Von der Monarchie zum Volksstaat*, vol. I, p. 42; Hermle, 'Kirche nach 1918', p. 14.

As in many other states—Anhalt, Baden, Bavaria, Hessen, Oldenburg, Lippe, and the Mecklenburgs—the new government showed no inclination to interfere or claim authority over the church, and permitted the existing leaders to oversee its disestablishment and transition to independence.⁹⁹ In Bavaria, the provisional government handed nominal leadership of the Protestant church to Johannes Hoffmann, the then minister for education and religious affairs, who held the position until theocracy was abolished by the Weimar constitution in August 1919.¹⁰⁰ Under the church’s 1921 constitution, the role of the *summus episcopus* was then given, essentially intact, to the incumbent president of the *Oberkonsistorium*, Friedrich Veit, who served as *Kirchenpräsident* (and latterly as *Landesbischof*) until 1933.¹⁰¹ In Hessen, the job was similarly passed around, but without any government involvement. In December 1918, the state’s *Oberkonsistorium* announced that it was unilaterally assuming the grand duke’s authority until an agreement could be reached with the synod, which itself collectively led the church from 1919 to 1922. As in Bavaria, a new church constitution then nominated a single figure—the chairman of the college of superintendants, known as the *Prälat*—to take on the mantle. Like his colleague Friedrich Veit, Wilhelm Diehl held office until the Nazi takeover.¹⁰²

The dethroning of the monarch—and his concomitant defrocking, as it were, as supreme bishop—had additional consequences for worshippers. Under the monarchy, it was customary for prayers to be offered for the good of the monarch and his family, for the safe arrival of royal infants, and the deliverance from illness.¹⁰³ In Bavaria, for instance, the state’s first king, Maximilian I Joseph, decreed in 1806 that it was “the duty of Christian subjects to prove their sentiments and wishes for the welfare of their sovereign through public and religious acts.” His chosen wording for a prayer to facilitate this was succinct and to the

99. Diephouse, *Pastors and Pluralism*, p. 55; J. R. C. Wright, “Above Parties”: *The Political Attitudes of the German Protestant Church Leadership 1918–1933* (Oxford, 1974), p. 27.

100. §137(1), WRV; Andrea Schwarz, ‘Verfassung der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche im rechtsrheinischen Bayern, 1921’ (11.05.2006); in: *Historisches Lexikon Bayerns* [http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/Verfassung_der_Evangelisch-Lutherischen-kirche_im_rechtsrheinischen_Bayern_1921, last accessed 30 April 2020].

101. Helmut Baier, ‘Kirchenpräsident, 1920-1933’ (11.05.2006), in: *Historisches Lexikon Bayerns* [https://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/Kirchenpräsident_1920-1933, last accessed 30 April 2020].

102. Julia Csehan and Malte Dücker, ‘Hessische Kirchenleiter, Prälaten, Präsidenten von 1918/19 bis 1947—Die Vorläufer der Kirchenpräsidenten: “Männer der Mitte”?’, in: Gisa Bauer (ed.), *Politik—Kirche—politische Kirche (1919-2019): Die evangelischen Kirchen in Hessen und Nassau im Spiegel ihrer kirchenleitenden Persönlichkeiten* (Tübingen, 2019), pp. 34-35.

103. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, p. 78.

point: “save our king Maximilian Joseph” [*salvum fac Regem nostrum Maximilianum Iosephum*].¹⁰⁴ In November 1918, Michael von Faulhaber, Archbishop of Munich and a future cardinal, was urged by his colleagues to clarify the church’s position on the prayer. In the hope that dropping references to the royal family could be done inconspicuously, Faulhaber advised replacing the prayer with another, either for peace (the *oratio pro pace*) or the welfare of Bavaria (the *ora pro nobis, patrona Bavariae*). With the exception of the bishop of Regensburg, who would only accept Ludwig III’s willing abdication (which never came) as a reason to upend the status quo, the prelates were quick to comply. Some dioceses retained a prayer “for those who govern” [*die Regierenden*], used only on festal occasions, but the link between church and state was otherwise severed by revolution.¹⁰⁵

Despite the new arrangements, some connections persisted between the churches and the old order. Royals continued to be devout worshippers, remained patrons of palace chapels, and maintained close relationships with church leaders. To a certain degree, the ideals of throne and altar also lingered—as the Prussian court preacher Bruno Döhring proclaimed in late October 1918, “the kingdom...is a thousand times more than a political question; for us, it is a question of faith.”¹⁰⁶ The 1922 *Katholikentag* was described by a frustrated Konrad Adenauer, who played a leading role in its organisation, as basically “an event for honouring the house of Wittelsbach.”¹⁰⁷ In Prussia, meanwhile, Protestantism became a foundational pillar of post-revolutionary monarchism.¹⁰⁸ The *Bund der Aufrechten*, perhaps the most notable Weimar-era monarchist organisation, published its periodical under the subtitle “A Fighter for Christian-German Renewal.”¹⁰⁹ During the 1926 referendum on princely property, furthermore, the monarchs found staunch allies in their former clerical colleagues.¹¹⁰

104. Königliche allerhöchste Verordnung, das öffentliche Kirchengebet für die königliche Familie betreffend, in: *Königlich-Baierisches Regierungsblatt* (1806), pp. 109-110.

105. Susanne Kornacker, ‘Oratio pro rege, 1806-1918’ (07.08.2006), in: *Historisches Lexikon Bayerns* [http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/Oratio_pro_rege_1806-1918, last accessed 16 August 2018].

106. Quoted in Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen: Deutsche Geschichte vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Untergang der Weimarer Republik* (Munich, 2000), p. 376.

107. W. R. Ward, ‘Guilt and Innocence: The German Churches in the Twentieth Century’, *Journal of Modern History* 68:2 (1996), p. 420.

108. Christoph Weiling, *Die “christlich-deutsche Bewegung”: Eine Studie zum konservativen Protestantismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen, 1998).

109. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

110. See: Thomas Kluck, *Protestantismus und Protest in der Weimarer Republik: Die Auseinandersetzung um Fürstenenteignung und Aufwertung im Spiegel des deutschen Protestantismus* (Frankfurt a.M., 1996).

To the extent that these sentiments brought about any concrete change, they were ultimately superficial, though one isolated incident suggests the survival of some behind-the-scenes influence. The affair played out in the context of the French occupation of the Rhineland. In early 1921, Georg Heinrich Kirstein, bishop of Hessen's second city, Mainz, was mortally ill with cancer. Constantly worried by French activity in his former territory, Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig feared that the occupying forces would use Kirstein's death to install a pro-French cleric more amenable to plans for a satellite Rhenish republic. In a letter to his advisor Willi Wilbrand, Ernst Ludwig noted that the French had already lined up a military chaplain for the post and would pressure the curia to accept him. In reply, Wilbrand drew Ernst Ludwig's attention to a clause in the Catholic Church's code of canon law which permitted the curia to appoint an auxiliary to a diocese with the right to succeed an ill bishop or one approaching retirement (a so-called *coadiutor cum iure successionis*). Acting quickly, Ernst Ludwig travelled to Bavaria to meet with Crown Prince Rupprecht, a close friend, to hatch a plan. Together, they consulted with Faulhaber who used his contacts in the Vatican to have the reliable Ludwig Maria Hugo installed in Mainz and the French scheme quashed.¹¹¹

Conclusion

At the opening sitting of the German Republic's national assembly at Weimar, Friedrich Ebert began his address with the grand claim that "the old kings and princes are gone for good." Constitutionally speaking, he was right. The revolutions which unfolded three months earlier entailed a drastic alteration to the political fabric of the German territories and one which is revealing of the state of play both before and after 1918. The foundational documents of Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg, published between May and December 1919, flipped the old order on its head, elevating the elected representatives of the people above their executive officials. For the key players in the revolution and its aftermath, the Social Democrats, this was a victory which crowned decades of agitation in favour of parliamentary supremacy. The credit was not entirely theirs, however. The ease with which the monarch, as head of state, was removed from the body politic testifies to his reduced stature in the south by 1918. The centralisation of the *Reich* under the Weimar order, moreover, left the state executives with comparatively few competencies. Unlike at the federal level, there was no question (or contention) over the head of government being a

111. HStAD, O 13, 470, Die Wahl des Regens des Priesterseminars in Speyer, Maria Hugo, zum Bischof von Mainz.

potentially dangerous *Ersatzkaiser*. As will be touched on in chapter six, it was for these reasons that Weimar's monarchists almost uniformly acknowledged the impossibility of a wholesale and true restoration, not least one encompassing all twenty-two monarchical states. The role of the monarch survived most obviously in the post-war position of the *Kirchenpräsident*, a single individual who, unlike the various authorities who shared the monarch's political prerogatives, inherited his ecclesiastical duties almost intact. His very existence, however, underlined the final and complete break in the ancient link between church and state. The constitutional de-monarchification of Germany unfolded quickly and completely, but as Ernst Ludwig's escapades in Mainz reveal, the monarchs did not simply melt away. They, and the non-political elements and remnants of their rule, lingered on.

Chapter II

Heraldic hangover: The persistence of royal and dynastic symbols

In July 1922, in the small town of Kochendorf, just west of Heidelberg, three local men were apprehended by police after breaking into the town hall. Prosecuted for “jointly, deliberately and unlawfully” causing irreparable damage to public property, they were each fined three hundred Marks and sent on their way. What was it that they had conspired to destroy? Nothing less, the *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* gleefully revealed, than portraits of the Kaiser, the Kaiserin, and the King and Queen of Württemberg, which still hung in the main meeting hall. The editor’s evident satisfaction that justice had been done to these royal “war criminals” was, however, dwarfed by anger and frustration that the men in question had been punished in the first place. After all, by getting rid of Kochendorf’s “monarchical Kitsch,” they had simply solved a problem that a supposedly republican government in Stuttgart had failed to address: the lingering reminders of Germany’s royal past.¹

Alongside portraits in public places, such as the town hall in Kochendorf, Imperial Germany was royally decorated with coats of arms, flags, stamps, seals, and inscriptions, which all underlined and alluded to the monarchical basis of society. The removal of these symbols and representations of royal authority after 1918 was a controversial undertaking. It made great claims to the time and attention of ministers and officials at both *Reich* and state levels. While this process has been acknowledged, existing scholarship focuses predominantly on the complementary development, namely the design and dissemination of specifically republican state symbols after 1918.² Over the past fifteen years, these investigations—by Manuela Achilles, Nadine Rossol, Erin Hochman, and Kathleen Canning, amongst others—have sought to challenge the previously orthodox interpretation that the Weimar Republic was devoid of the symbolic appeal necessary to ensure the loyalty, engagement, and

1. ‘Bestrafung der Bilderstürmer’, *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* 188, 15.08.1922.

2. Manuela Achilles briefly considers the symbolic “residuals of empire” after 1918, see: Achilles, ‘Re-forming the Reich’, pp. 139-145.

enthusiasm of its citizens.³ Under this argument, Weimar was insufficiently “strong or able to defend itself...[or to] prevent its absorption into the national-socialist *Führerstaat*”.⁴ By more closely analysing the people and guiding philosophies behind Weimar’s democratic culture, however, this recent research depicts a republican order which was much more robust and self-confident than is often assumed.

While undoubtedly welcome, this development leaves questions unanswered. The removal of rival, monarchical symbols—which was just as important in the battle to establish a lasting republican regime as the design of new ones—remains relatively neglected. A focus on decisions made at the *Reich* level, visible most notably in discussions of the *Flaggenstreit* and the *Reichskunstwart*, additionally means that equivalent processes of symbolic de-monarchification at the state level are overlooked.⁵ Both before and after 1918, however, *Kulturpolitik* was the exclusive competence of the individual states. While processes at the state level were similar, as will be discussed, focusing purely on designs and ordinances emanating from Berlin produces an incomplete picture. The elements they affected, moreover, such as state coats of arms, were regularly introduced some years after 1918, creating a stopgap period which remains similarly under-researched.

By examining provincial engagement with royal symbols after 1918, this chapter advances four main arguments. Firstly, it agrees with Manuela Achilles’ observation that the Weimar Republic possessed a “highly ambivalent symbolic order” in which newly introduced designs sat alongside remnants of the old monarchies.⁶ While Achilles ends this state of affairs in August 1919 (the signing of Weimar’s constitution), this chapter contends that it lasted throughout the republican era and gradually became institutionalised. Secondly, it argues that the survival of pre-revolutionary symbols was just as much a result of practical difficulties inherent in their removal than of government intent. Thirdly, when the governments *did* intend to retain symbols, those selected were more than simply “gestures of conciliation”

3. See pp. 13-15 of the present study.

4. Kurt Sontheimer, ‘Die politische Kultur der Weimarer Republik’, in: Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.), *Die Weimarer Republik: Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* (Bonn, 1987), p. 456.

5. On the *Reichskunstwart*, see: Annegret Heffen, *Der Reichskunstwart. Kunstpolitik in den Jahren 1920-1933: Zu den Bemühungen um eine offizielle Reichskunstpolitik in der Weimarer Republik* (Essen, 1986); Gisbert Laube, *Der Reichskunstwart: Geschichte einer Kulturbehörde, 1919-1933* (Frankfurt a.M., 1997); Christian Welzbacher, (ed.), *Der Reichskunstwart: Kulturpolitik und Staatsinszenierung in der Weimarer Republik 1918-1933* (Weimar, 2010).

6. Achilles, ‘Re-forming the Reich’, p. 66.

(Achilles) aimed at placating a nostalgic public. This was undoubtedly a motivation, but ministers in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Munich were just as cognizant of the importance of history and tradition in solidifying the foundations of their embryonic and unstable republics. Over time, moreover, as governments in Bavaria and Württemberg became increasingly conservative, holding on to symbolic remnants of the past became a key tactic in cultural skirmishes against the political left. Fourthly, and subsequently, it becomes clear that these leaders did not see royal symbolism as a threat to their authority, but as a repository of tools for building the future. Old emblems were routinely adapted and refashioned and complaints over their survival dismissed, most notably in Württemberg, with growing irritation and frustration. The chapter also notes two divergences in southern Germany's processes of demonarchification. While dry administrative symbols (such as stamps, seals, and headed notepaper) were the subject of the earliest and most expansive reforms, more emotive and decorative elements (portraits in town halls and state coats of arms) were handled later and with a much lighter touch. Between the states, meanwhile, one perceives noticeable differences; while Hessen acted swiftly, thoroughly, and persistently to implement change, Bavaria and Württemberg did so only lethargically, cursorily, and initially.

The removal of monarchical emblems was introduced with great haste in Bavaria and Hessen. On 11 and 16 November and 14 November respectively, the provisional governments published guidelines for their officials. The solutions they offered were necessarily temporary and unpolished. In Munich, pre-prepared letterheads and forms were to be edited by hand with the offending modifier “royal” (either *Königlich*, *Königl.*, *Kgl.*, or *K.*) being crossed out wherever it appeared.⁷ Across the country in Darmstadt, the advice was similar: “grand ducal” (*Großherzoglich*, *Großherzogl.*, *Großb.*, or *Gr.*) was to be removed and replaced—at least in external correspondence—with “Hessian.” As for official seals and stamps, these were “to be used until otherwise determined.”⁸ In Württemberg, by contrast, reforms were introduced in May 1919 after a six-month delay and only then when two SPD deputies—who professed no great concern over such matters—visited neighbouring Baden

7. BayHStA, MA, 102010/1, Finanzministerium to sämtliche dem Staatsministerium der Finanzen unterstellten Stellen und Behörden, 11.11.1918; BayHStA, MA, 102010/1, Auszug aus der Bayerischen Staatszeitung Nr. 267 (2. Blatt), 16.11.1918.

8. HStAD, G 21 A, 4/4, StM 11926, 14.11.1918.

and suggested the government in Stuttgart imitate its new policies.⁹ As in other states, officials were instructed to remove the word “royal” from stamps and official papers and to judge more major changes (such as modifications to border posts and façades of public buildings) according to cost and practicality.¹⁰ This delay is confusing, for the intent to bring about change was evident after the revolution. On 17 November, state president Wilhelm Blos addressed the assembled soldiers’ and workers’ councils in the state’s capital and laid out, in grand terms, his vision of “a new Württemberg...one *no longer decorated with the old emblems*, but one in which the people themselves determine their own destiny!”¹¹

Bavaria and Württemberg essentially ceased to update or augment their regulations at this point. Royal portraits were the focus of a brief cabinet discussion in Munich in early 1919,¹² but aside from a one-off reminder about stamps in 1928, the Bavarians took no further steps.¹³ In Darmstadt, by contrast, the task had merely begun. In August 1919, officials in Hessen were ordered to remove depictions of “former princes” from public buildings¹⁴ and from June 1920, the word “grand ducal” was to be erased from stone inscriptions.¹⁵ December 1920 and August 1921 then witnessed further reminders to officials in the justice ministry, on pain of disciplinary action, to delete the modifier from their stamps.¹⁶ By September 1921, the cabinet was sufficiently confident to circulate a memorandum to all subordinate offices setting a deadline of 1 November for the completion of the state’s symbolic de-monarchification.¹⁷ A final reminder was published in July 1922, but after that the paper trail dries up.¹⁸

Persistence and outside intervention

Their differences in rigour aside, the regulations passed in the state capitals essentially covered the same issues and instigated a repainting of the symbolic landscape on a scale

9. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, Matthias Fleig and Wilhelm Schifferdecker to Wilhelm Blos, 06.05.1919. As it happens, the Badenese government had only introduced their regulations that month, see: GLAK, 231, Nr. 3396, 33750, 03.05.1919; GLAK, 231, Nr. 3396, 40194, 31.05.1919.

10. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, StM 1912, 08.05.1919.

11. HStAS, E 135 b, Bü 18, Protokoll der Landesversammlung der Soldaten-Räte Württembergs, 17.11.1918, p. 6. Emphasis added.

12. BayHStA, MA, 99513, Ministerratssitzung, 26.03.1919.

13. BayHStA, MA, 102015, 3008 d 1, 18.02.1928.

14. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 2373, 19.08.1919.

15. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 30003, 22.06.1920.

16. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, No. 29483, 13.08.1921; HStAD, G 21 A, 4/4, JM 37971, 26.12.1920.

17. HStAD, G 21 A, 4/4, StM 16182, 13.09.1921.

18. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, No. 9907, 09.07.1922.

hitherto unseen. Despite their ambitions, both to bring about change and to cover all conceivable circumstances, some royal symbols evaded their fate and continued to adorn Germany until the demise of the Weimar Republic. A traveller in Germany could still find royal institutions, portraits of monarchs in town halls, official documents certified with crowned stamps, and state coats of arms bearing indisputably royal elements. In many cases these examples were aberrations—accidental blips permitted by the cost, complexity, and scale of mass de-monarchification. On other occasions, however, regimes fully intended to adapt and refashion royal symbols to create an ambivalent symbolic order. Before considering the reasons for this, however, it is necessary to explain how this symbolic survival can be deduced in the first place.

The number of reminders circulated to officials in Hessen suggests that there was a problem. Between November 1918 and March 1928, at least ten major memoranda were issued by the cabinet in Darmstadt, two of which threatened disciplinary consequences for non-compliance. In other instances, cabinet minutes divulge evidence; the record for 7 April 1921, for instance, shows that Eugen Bolz, Württemberg's interior minister, made a complaint about royal portraits hanging in his ministerial office.¹⁹ Observations from those outside the corridors of power provide the most fruitful source of information, however. As Erin Hochman writes in *Imagining Greater Germany*, the question of state symbols in Weimar “served as both a marker of one's opinion about the imperial past and as a barometer for one's feelings on the current form of government.”²⁰ Contention over the design for Weimar's flag, for example, was fierce and lingered long into the 1920s. In the summer of 1927, beachgoers in Prussia were treated to the bizarre sight of policemen, on the orders of the state's interior minister, guarding sandcastles decorated with black, red, and gold flags against vandalism by opponents of the republic.²¹ State symbols were fundamental representations of the new order and everything it represented. Attacks against them, and, by implication, the survival of older emblems which embodied diametrically opposing values, were seen as inherently threatening by the political left and supporters of the republic. We know that royal symbolism survived precisely because individuals and institutions who

19. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 07.04.1921.

20. Hochman, *Imagining Greater Germany*, p. 52.

21. Rossol, ‘Flaggenkrieg am Badestrand’.

rejected “the imperial past” and supported “the current form of government” spoke out against them. It is this contention that makes their survival worth examination.

Perhaps the most common avenue for outrage was provided by Weimar’s newspapers, particularly the party organs of the socialist and communist parties. Throughout the 1920s, they published articles attacking the sloth-like progress of de-monarchification and shaming the authorities and institutions which, symbolically speaking, remained stuck in the past. Sarcastic and snippy strikes on Weimar’s monarchists were interspersed with bouts of genuine anger and frustration fuelled by the fear that the republic would never be stable or complete while signs of the monarchical age persisted. In Württemberg, the SPD newspaper *Schwäbische Tagwacht* led the crusade. Articles entitled “Everything that’s still royal in Stuttgart,” “In the fourth year of the Republic...,” and “The Republic’s ‘royal authorities’” provided readers with a litany of incidents in which monarchical crests and inscriptions had slipped through the government’s net.²² In 1921 and 1922, in Stuttgart alone, the state mint, the foreign ministry, the war ministry, the forestry office at Solitude Palace, the district court, the state library, and the riding school all bore signs which still proclaimed them *königlich* in one form or another.²³ Indeed, the complex of government buildings between the *Schloß*-, *Linden*- and *Militärstraßen* remained “positively feudal.”²⁴ The Technical University was yet another offender: “[w]hat a marvellous feeling it must be for the monarchist”, the newspaper sneered in 1926, “to be reminded at every turn...of the wonderful and glorious *Königszeit*.”²⁵ The editors repeatedly expressed disbelief and consternation that nothing was happening. Evidently, they concluded, the government’s chosen method was to simply wait for natural erosion.²⁶

In part, this response was an eruption of latent frustrations from the pre-war era. The most commonly expressed sentiment attacked the apparent double standard that royal symbols were accepted under the Republic, but republican symbols repressed under the monarchy. As the *Schwäbische Tagwacht* asked in April 1922, “would a single envelope bearing the emblem

22. ‘Was in Stuttgart noch alles “königlich” ist’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 96, 24.04.1922; ‘Im vierten Jahr der Republik’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 226, 28.09.1922; “‘Königliche Behörden’ der Republik’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 70, 25.03.1926.

23. ‘Im vierten Jahr der Republik’; ‘Endlich fort mit den “kgl.” Ueberbleibseln!’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 210, 09.09.1921.

24. ‘Was in Stuttgart noch alles “königlich” ist’.

25. ‘Die “königlich” Technische Hochschule in Stuttgart’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 11, 15.01.1926.

26. ‘Was in Stuttgart noch alles “königlich” ist’.

of the republic [*Kopf der Republik*] be tolerated for a single day under the monarchy?”²⁷ The *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* took a more direct and cynical approach. It argued that were committed and honest republicans to force the issue, it would be akin to “stirring up a hornets’ nest of bourgeois and philistine “republicans”” in the corridors of power. These officials wanted to keep their royal portraits—“signs of a servile age”—because they one day hoped that the rulers depicted would return in triumph.²⁸ In an article from July 1922, entitled “Workers, begin the Purge!”, the *SAZ* called for the “immediate removal” of royal symbols. Revealing their lack of trust in the bureaucratic machine, the editors added that “this demand must not be left on paper.”²⁹ Their call to arms struck at least one chord; only days later, the town of Kochendorf saw the iconoclasm described at the start of the chapter. Undoubtedly buoyed by this attack on the old order—which it joyfully reported—the *SAZ* repeated its appeal a month later. “When will this royal rubbish [*Unrat*]... finally be swept away? It is high time that work begins here; the workers of Württemberg *must ensure that it happens.*”³⁰

Many of the complaints featured in left-wing newspapers of the mid-to-late 1920s stemmed from a single source, the so-called *Republikanische Beschwerdestelle* (RBS). Initially formed in 1922 as a wing of the *Republikanische Jugendbund Schwarz-Rot-Gold*, it became an independent organisation in 1924 and has since passed by historians of Weimar almost unnoticed.³¹ Its self-proclaimed tasks were the “encouragement of republican sentiment” and—remarkably for an unofficial, non-governmental body—ensuring that citizens and officials alike fulfilled their constitutional duties. For its *modus operandi*, the RBS relied on §126 WRV, which granted all Germans “the right to address in writing petitions or complaints to the competent authorities or representative bodies.” Members of the public were thus encouraged to inform the RBS of symbolic infractions, from a school missing a black-red-gold flag to a marriage certificate notarised with outdated stamps. The complaints would then be anonymised and directed to the responsible government ministry.³² If the official response was unsatisfactory, the RBS would print the complaint in the press or, in some cases, pass the material to a

27. Ibid.

28. ‘Ein republikanischer Skandal’, *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* 176, 01.08.1922.

29. ‘Arbeiter, beginnt mit der Säuberungsaktion!’, *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* 151, 03.04.1922.

30. ‘Und in Württemberg?’, *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* 181, 07.08.1922. Emphasis added.

31. Even after two decades of renewed interest in republican political culture, the only in-depth investigation remains Otmar Jung, ‘Verfassungsschutz Privat: Die Republikanische Beschwerdestelle e.V. (1924-1933), *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 35:1 (1987), pp. 65-96, here 67-71.

32. Rossol, ‘Flaggenkrieg am Badestrand’, p. 633.

sympathetic *Reichstag* deputy to be aired in parliament.³³ Initially, this process was coordinated from Berlin, but over time branches sprang up across the country.

During the latter half of the 1920s, the RBS fielded approximately six hundred complaints per year, but its crusade was far from an unmitigated triumph.³⁴ State governments across Germany tried repeatedly to weave around its objections or to ignore them entirely. The organisation's methods—which combined what looked suspiciously like denunciations with a gratingly high-handed and moralising tone—provoked widespread criticism. Though crossing party lines, this disapproval was strongest on the political right. Emil Berndt of the DNVP dismissed the RBS in the *Reichstag* as Weimar's "organised centre of snitching and slander" [*organisierte Spitzel- und Verleumderzentrale*].³⁵ On another occasion, the DVP's Franz Brüninghaus mocked the decidedly trivial nature of many of its grievances. The day before, Otto Wels had given a speech in opposition to the building of new battleships and had, in his haste and fervour, mistakenly ennobled the chief of the naval command, Admiral Hans Zenker. Brüninghaus gleefully picked up on this error: "Colleague Wels, you were certainly in a generous mood yesterday! You elevated various officers to the personal nobility—*von Zenker and so on*. I do hope that the *Republikanische Beschwerdestelle* doesn't come after you for that!"³⁶ The *Schwäbischer Merkur*, a conservative newspaper in Württemberg, spoke for many in 1927 when it asked that if the problem were so enormously pressing, why the RBS did not simply furnish offending school boards (or other institutions) with appropriate stationery itself.³⁷ Opposition to the RBS came to a climax in 1926 and 1927 when the governments of Prussia (unsuccessfully) and Württemberg (successfully) ordered its civil servants to ignore all petitions from the body.³⁸ Its critics aside, the very existence of the RBS reveals that symbolic de-monarchification was deficient to the extent that defenders of the republic felt compelled to establish a large-scale organisation to see it concluded.

33. See, for instance, Franz Künstler's (SPD) criticism of the *Reichswehrministerium*, in: *Verh. RT.*, III. Wahlperiode, 169. Sitzung, 03.03.1926, p. 5878.

34. Jung, 'Verfassungsschutz Privat', p. 76.

35. *Verh. RT.*, V. Wahlperiode, 10. Sitzung, 06.12.1930, p. 397.

36. *Verh. RT.*, IV. Wahlperiode, 15. Sitzung, 16.11.1928, p. 356. §109(4) WRV had banned the bestowal of noble titles by the state.

37. 'Strömungen und Fragen', *Schwäbischer Merkur* 182, 21.04.1927.

38. For the situation in Prussia, see: Jung, 'Verfassungsschutz Privat', p. 80. For Württemberg, see the lengthy correspondence between the conservative state president Wilhelm Bazille and the RBS in: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2.

Alongside Hermann Müller, Otto Wels had forced the *Reich* government in 1922 to reiterate and expand on its regulation of symbols—a reason, perhaps, for Brüninghaus’ mockery. In September 1921, the two SPD deputies had tabled a lengthy question asking the federal government (a) if it planned to order the removal of monarchical emblems and royal portraits from federal buildings by a set date, (b) whether it would discipline officials who did not comply, and (c) whether it would put pressure on the state authorities to act similarly.³⁹ These questions were simultaneously directed at certain state governments.⁴⁰ After a pair of meetings in January and February 1922, at which the cabinet in Berlin divided sharply over the practicality and advisability of such measures,⁴¹ the *Reichsinnenminister* Adolf Köster submitted his formal response. The government would set deadlines by which symbols had to be removed and, if necessary, issue reprimands to recalcitrant officials.⁴² To this extent, Wels and Müller scored a success, but Köster’s proposed regulations were littered with loopholes and excuses for delayed implementation. This was far from unusual; as late as 1928, social democrat deputies in Württemberg tabled motions to do away with royal emblems. Even ten years after the revolution, it would seem, the job remained unfinished.⁴³

In his reply to Wels and Müller, Köster made no reference to their third demand, namely that state governments be encouraged to act in line with *Reich* guidelines. Instructions were, nevertheless, dispatched from Berlin later that month. Officials in the state capitals were requested to ensure that “symbols of the old order...are removed from offices and buildings of *Reich* authorities within set deadlines.” The work was to be completed by 1 October 1922 and noncompliant officials would be subject to disciplinary proceedings.⁴⁴ Beyond these instructions, which applied solely to federal buildings, *Reich* authorities rarely felt compelled to intervene and when they did, it was not appreciated. In early 1928, Anna Radasewsky, a Latvian national, was denied entry to Germany at Eydtkuhnen in East Prussia because her travel pass had been stamped in a Bavarian district office with a crown and the forbidden *Kgl.* In response to inquiries from the *Reichsinnenministerium*, the Bavarian government expressed regret, noting that while old stamps were regularly used to save money, their

39. *Verh. RT.*, IV. Wahlperiode, Aktenstück Nr. 2658, 10.09.1921.

40. See, for example: *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 845; *Verh. LT. Hess.*, II. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 325.

41. *Akten der Reichskanzlei: Weimarer Republik*, Das Kabinett Wirth I/II, Nr. 195, 196.

42. *Verh. RT.*, I. Wahlperiode, Aktenstück Nr. 3693, 02.03.1922.

43. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, Antrag, 19.06.1928.

44. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, I. 1815, 21.03.1922.

monarchical elements were usually crossed out. Most states would have ended the letter here, but the Bavarians, who never took kindly to overbearing central authorities, went on the attack. They deflected any blame onto the incompetent border guards who should have realised that the stamp was genuine and legitimate. Any Bavarian official who had committed such an error, they unobtrusively added, “would be in for the severest disapproval” of his superiors. This example speaks not only to the survival of royal symbolism but also to the underlying tensions present in Weimar-era *Kulturpolitik* and the tenacity with which states stressed their continued monopoly over it.⁴⁵

Practical difficulties

It is not possible to quantify, in either definite or relative terms, the persistence of royal symbolism after 1918. The sources of evidence described above simply disclose that markers of the monarchy survived the revolution in sufficient numbers to be of concern to those who supported the republic and the full implementation of its laws. This persistence was both unintended (as was the case for administrative symbols affected by the earliest reforms) and intended (as with portraits and coats of arms). In the first instance, unintended survival was the product of the cost, impracticality, and consequences of change. In July 1922, for example, Württemberg’s government estimated that the purchase of new metal stamps for ministerial offices and signposts for the state’s borders would cost the treasury 2.3 million Marks—as much as the *Staatsministerium’s* budget for the entire year and forty percent more than was earmarked for the *Landtag*.⁴⁶ Practical difficulties were most obvious when dealing with official buildings whose function was either inscribed or picked out in raised relief on outside walls. Many of the complaints made by the left about “royal” ministries, banks, and universities focused specifically on these architectural features. While the letters *Kgl.* could be removed with relative ease from small rubber stamps, stone and concrete were less pliable media. The same buildings crop up repeatedly in press complaints precisely because, either structurally or financially, the governments could not disguise their origins. The third factor in the triad was that of aesthetic consideration. In certain cases, it was both financially viable and practically feasible to remove large inscriptions or metal signs, but fear of the harm caused by the necessary work—and the emptiness left by the removal—stalled action.

45. BayHStA, MA, 102015, Nr. 2829, 10.02.1928.

46. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, Nr. 3448, 21.07.1922; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 6, Nr. I. 7157, 08.05.1922; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 3, Nr. III 3481, 05.08.1922; *Verh. LT. Württ.*, Entwurf des württembergischen Staatshaushaltsplans für 1922, Beilagenband 4, p. 2.

Indeed, both Hessen and Württemberg made exceptions for symbols whose removal would “infringe artistic considerations”⁴⁷ or cause “damage or blemishes.”⁴⁸ The Technical University in Stuttgart, a long-term bugbear of Social Democrats in Württemberg, was a prime example of a building that remained “royal” for these reasons.⁴⁹

Of the three states, Hessen confronted these problems with the most vigour and with something of a make-do-and-mend attitude. As in other states, rising costs and a lack of material repeatedly delayed the date by which new stamps were to be introduced.⁵⁰ In response, bureaucrats were advised to take their metal stamps to a local ironmonger and have the word “grand ducal” filed away for good.⁵¹ Similar steps were taken to counter the lack of national flags. In February 1921, state president Carl Ulrich instructed officials to create the new black-red-gold flag of the Weimar Republic from Hessen’s red-white-red tricolour. By coincidence, their designs meant that this was easily done. The bottom band of red would be removed, the white band dyed gold, and a black band added to the top.⁵² Following a warning by finance minister Konrad Henrich in July 1922 that the total cost of producing the required flags (and flag poles) would top two million Marks,⁵³ this cottage industry was officially adopted and centralised. District councils and other authorities would post their unwanted state flags to Darmstadt, where they would be modified “as far as possible” and returned.⁵⁴ Regrettably for Ulrich, however, this policy did not completely alleviate the shortage. In advance of Constitution Day in August 1922—an event introduced the previous year by the *Reich* government to encourage identification with the republic—Ulrich was forced to pre-empt probing comments on Hessen’s relative lack of republican decoration.⁵⁵ Un-flagged public buildings were the consequence of fabric shortages and not, he stressed, due to either a misunderstanding or rejection of the rules.⁵⁶

47. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 30003, 22.06.1920.

48. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, StM 1912, 08.05.1919.

49. ‘Aus Stuttgarter Hochschullehrerkreisen’, *Frankfurter Zeitung* 464, 02.06.1927.

50. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 9913, 27.09.1922.

51. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 29483, 13.08.1921.

52. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 9886, 25.02.1921.

53. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, 1921/24, Drucksache Nr. 348, 22.07.1922.

54. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 9907, 09.07.1922.

55. For discussion of Constitution Day, see: Achilles, ‘With a Passion for Reason’.

56. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, 1921/24, 28. Sitzung, 03.08.1922, p. 559.

Such enterprise was not on show in Bavaria or Württemberg. Indeed, key players in both states were seized by a curious lethargy or indifference. When a memorandum from the culture ministry passed across his desk in April 1919 suggesting the announcement of an open competition for designs, Adolf Freiherr von Lutz, the *Minsterialdirektor* in Munich tasked with overseeing the new coat of arms, simply responded that “the matter is not very urgent.”⁵⁷ The question of a new coat of arms for Württemberg was raised at cabinet over a year later in November 1920 (and six months after Hessen had finalised its own), but state president von Hieber still dismissed it as an issue of “no particular urgency.”⁵⁸ Indeed, no ministry in Stuttgart appears to have attached great value to haste in these matters. In 1922, they went around the cabinet table to decide a suitable deadline by which the switch to new stamps and seals should be completed. The earliest date suggested was 1925 (by the labour ministry), but both the justice and foreign ministries were quite content to wait until 1932.⁵⁹ During the tenure of the monarchist and nationalist state president Wilhelm Bazille (1924-1928), the pace slowed even further; indeed, Bazille’s determination to ignore any complaint relating to the survival of royal symbols saw de-monarchification cease entirely.

In all states, the efficacy of reforms was additionally and routinely hampered by limits to governmental authority. Central governments could issue ordinances, but these only applied to offices directly under its auspices and not to local authorities. The town of Ebingen in central Württemberg was a case in point; in July 1922, by a vote of eleven to eight, the town council voted against removing monarchical symbols from the town hall.⁶⁰ Such incidences were not rare and provoked confusion and anger on the left. During the previous autumn, a deputation of trade unionists left a meeting with the state president much disappointed with his explanation that the town hall in Ludwigsburg (and its royal portraits) were beyond his purview.⁶¹ Indeed, this form of local autonomy was so strongly entrenched that official experiments at forcing compliance could backfire very publicly. In 1927, the state government of Prussia was reprimanded by the supreme court in Leipzig for abusing emergency powers in an attempt to force communes to fly the national flag on Constitution

57. BayHStA, MA, 102014, Nr. 11965, 04.04.1919.

58. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 215, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 24.11.1920

59. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 6, Staatsministerium memorandum, 21.06.1922.

60. ‘Aus dem Bezirk und Umgebung’, *Volksville* (Ebingen) 174, 29.07.1922.

61. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2, Auszug aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 07.11.1921.

Day.⁶² Even when state governments could order authorities to act, there were difficulties, as Hessen's in-house production of metal stamps and flags reveals. The implementation of symbolic policies was an inherently decentralised process. The responsible minister could not remove royal symbols himself, nor travel around the state inspecting that others had done so. As with so much of the administration, the success of de-monarchification relied on the central government's trust that its policies would be enacted in places it could not itself see.

This trust was not always justified or repaid. The November Revolution had brought Germany's socialists and Social Democrats to power, suddenly and sometimes unwillingly. Lacking a cadre of like-minded and fully trained bureaucrats to put their policies into practice, they had to rely on incumbents who were frequently committed to the old monarchical order and the values it had represented. The vast majority evidently remained loyal to the state (rather than its form) and fulfilled the wishes of their new republican masters, but a few were determined to make life difficult. As Christian Welzbacher writes in the federal context, scepticism towards Edwin Redslob's "artistic shaping of the *Reich*" [*künstlerische Formgebung des Reichs*] allowed officials "to vent their disquiet at the republican order."⁶³ Some on the left were less euphemistic; in the words of the *Schwäbische Tagwacht*, the SPD organ for Württemberg, these men were "nationalist provocateurs" who "claim[ed] that anything which is not expressly forbidden must be considered permissible."⁶⁴

An example from each state gives a flavour of these "provocateurs." In Oberingelheim, a small town near Mainz, the chief judge was reported to the justice ministry in Darmstadt for hanging portraits of the Kaiser and Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig on his office walls.⁶⁵ As he was subsequently informed, this contravened the government's ordinance of August 1919, which called for the removal of such portraits from public spaces.⁶⁶ The judge responded in a lawyerly fashion, arguing that as his office was not in "constant" [*ständig*] use, he was

62. Hans Hattenhauer, *Deutsche Nationalsymbole: Geschichte und Bedeutung* (Munich, 2006), p. 50; Peter Reichel, *Glanz und Elend deutscher Selbstdarstellung: Nationalsymbole in Reich und Republik* (Göttingen, 2012), pp. 129-130.

63. Christian Welzbacher, "Die künstlerische Formgebung des Reichs": Der Reichskunstwart und die Kulturpolitik in der Weimarer Republik 1918-1933', in: idem (ed.), *Der Reichskunstwart*, p. 28. Cf. Heffen, *Der Reichskunstwart*, p. 123.

64. 'Endlich!', *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 64, 17.03.1922.

65. HStAD, G 21 A, 4/4, JM 29626, 09.09.1921.

66. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 2373, 19.08.1919.

complying with the letter of the law.⁶⁷ Unimpressed by this legerdemain, the ministry once again ordered removal, writing to all subordinate officials the following month to extend the ban to privately-owned portraits.⁶⁸ Opponents of symbolic change had greater success elsewhere. In Bavaria, the mayor of Waldberg was let off, not just for using an outdated stamp, but for responding to complaints from Hessen in fiery tones which violated his constitutional oath. “We do not care,” he wrote, “if we live in the former Kingdom of Bavaria or in the Free State of Bavaria.”⁶⁹ Gustav von Kahr, who led Bavaria as minister president in 1920/21 and *Generalstaatskommissar* in 1923/24, regularly used the kingdom’s full coat of arms when governor of Upper Bavaria.⁷⁰ In Württemberg, meanwhile, plans in Berlin to rename a trio of steamships on Lake Constance—from *König Wilhelm*, *König Karl*, and *Königin Charlotte* to *Hohenstauffen*, *Hohenneuffen* and *Lichtenstein*—foundered when the mayor of Friedrichshafen, where the ships moored, orchestrated a campaign of public outrage. The townsfolk were proud of Friedrichshafen’s history as a royal residence, he argued, and would not take kindly to anti-royal interference from afar. After Baden and Bavaria acquiesced, the *König Karl*, *König Wilhelm* and *Königin Charlotte* were the only “royal” vessels to remain on the lake.⁷¹

Institutionalised ambivalence

It is clear that a gap existed between regulation and reality and that ministers in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Munich struggled to fully implement the revolutionary policies of 1918 and 1919. But this is not simply a story of governments thwarted by external forces and contingencies. Instead, the present chapter contends that much of the symbolic ambiguity visible after 1918 was explicitly engineered and favoured by the new republican states. This was most notable in the more emotive and decorative realm of state symbolism whose purpose lay beyond the needs of the bureaucratic machine. Royal portraits, for example, were formally permitted to hang in official buildings, while state coats of arms consciously appropriated elements of past, dynastic iterations.

67. HStAD, G 21 A, 4/4, JM 32362, 24.09.1921.

68. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 28697, 25.10.1921.

69. BayHStA, MA, 102015, I. Bürgermeister Waldberg to Standesamt Vilbel, 21.04.1929; Nr. 3008 e 19, 06.06.1929; Nr. 20073, 27.06.1927.

70. Daniel Rittenauer, ‘Staatswappen im revolutionären und nachrevolutionären Bayern (1918–1923)’, *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 73:3 (2010), p. 836.

71. ‘Entfernung der Wappen und Anschriften an den Bodenseedampfern’, *Seeblatt* 209, 11.09.1923; Jürgen Oellers, “‘Schnelle Communication’: Der Übergang von der Segel- zur Dampfschiffahrt in Friedrichshafen”, *Friedrichshafener Jahrbuch für Geschichte und Kultur* (2007), p. 127; Karl F. Fritz, *Vom Raddampfer zur Weissen Flotte: Geschichte der Bodenseeschiffahrt* (Erfurt, 2013), p. 49.

The reasons for this are fourfold. Firstly, it was feared that rapid and wholesale dem monarchification would be incendiary, particularly in the south where dynastic loyalty survived the strongest. Portraits of former rulers were thus phased out either slowly, or not at all. Secondly, those responsible for developing new state symbols—both for the Weimar Republic and for Weimar’s republics—were conscious of the power of history in shaping identity and were reluctant to wipe the slate clean. Thirdly, against the backdrop of revolution and centralisation, the new governments lacked obvious legitimacy and full sovereignty. Power had been suddenly assumed by small groups of political outsiders who oversaw the diminution of the states’ competencies in favour of the growing federal government. By adopting powerful emblems of recently enjoyed authority—such as the crown—they could symbolically compensate for these shortcomings. Fourthly and finally, persistence was permitted (and encouraged) in certain cases because the presiding government was inherently conservative (even monarchist) in its outlook and resisted attempts at outside intervention and regulation. In every case, however, the new governments did not simply adopt old forms, or permit them to linger untouched, but carefully adapted and modified them. Designs were variations of their predecessors, rather than copies of them, and the persistence of even the most popular symbols was subject to certain conditions. The republic—not the deposed monarchy—had to have the last word.

As the so-called “provocateurs” reveal, not everyone was enamoured with the instigation of mass symbolic change. Stamps and seals, however, are far from the most evocative or stirring symbols in the state’s armoury. Nor, moreover, were they that frequently encountered by the average citizen. When state governments openly feared negative public responses to their policies, it was not staid tools of officialdom they worried about, but something grander and more redolent, namely portraits of beloved former monarchs. Portraits had a dual function. Depicting the (usually) uniformed and beribboned monarch in a formal pose and against a non-descript background, they possessed a “relatively timeless and historical nature,” making them recognisable and reproduceable many years after their first release.⁷² They were thus the perfect static symbol for the projection of a monarch’s sovereignty across his realm. Looming over proceedings from the smallest town hall to the grand office of the state’s

72. Alexis Schwarzenbach, ‘Royal Photographs: Emotions for the People’, *Contemporary European History* 13:3 (2004), pp. 267-268.

minister president, the royal countenance provided a visible representation of the local hierarchy of power. The portrait's innate military overtones, embodied by the monarch's uniform and medals (dominated by the riband of the dynasty's highest order), further identified him as the commander-in-chief and the fount of all honour in the state. In so doing, it tapped into an enthusiasm for the military—termed “folkloric militarism” by Jakob Vogel—which was a foundational element of German nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁷³ Indeed, across Europe, royal dynasties militarised to keep aligned with nationalist values and sympathies.⁷⁴ As Richard Meyer Forsting writes in the Spanish context, portraits of uniformed princes played to “new middle-class virtues of merit and competence, as well as [to] the older aristocratic notion of service and manliness in battle.”⁷⁵

The state governments were conscious of the potential fall-out that would result from the wholesale removal of portraits. The Bavarian culture ministry strongly pushed for its government to delay implementation (or to introduce such distant deadlines that portraits would remain indefinitely).⁷⁶ Württemberg's state president Johannes von Hieber, meanwhile, responded to disgruntled trade unionists that removing these pictures from schools would “provoke considerable indignation in many quarters.”⁷⁷ These predictions were not simple conjecture, as two examples from Prussia, which enacted this policy more quickly, will demonstrate. In the autumn of 1919, schoolchildren in the Baltic town of Stettin returned from the summer vacation to find portraits missing from their classrooms. In response, over one thousand pupils gathered in the town's central square and submitted a formal telegram of complaint to Konrad Haenisch, the Prussian minister of culture.⁷⁸ Only a few months earlier, members of the workers' council in Bochum had been indicted by the city's parliament on charges of “breaking and entering” and “property damage” after they

73. Jakob Vogel, ‘Military, Folklore, Eigensinn: Folkloric Militarism in Germany and France, 1871-1914’, *Central European History* 33:4 (2000), pp. 487-504. For discussion of this phenomenon in the years before unification, cf. Frank Lorenz Müller, ‘The Spectre of a People in Arms: The Prussian Government and the Militarisation of German Nationalism, 1859-1864’, *The English Historical Review* CXXII:495 (2007), pp. 82-104.

74. See: Miriam Magdalena Schneider, *The Sailor Prince in the Age of Empire: Creating a Monarchical Brand in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 2017).

75. Richard Meyer Forsting, ‘The Importance of Looking the Part: Heirs and Male Aesthetics in Nineteenth-Century Spain’, in: Frank Lorenz Müller and Heidi Mehrkens (eds.), *Royal Heirs and the Uses of Soft Power in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 2016), pp. 181-200, here p. 189.

76. BayHStA, MA, 99514, Ministerratssitzung, 04.11.1919.

77. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 217, Sitzung des Staatsministerium Stuttgart, 19.07.1922.

78. ‘Die Bilderstürmerei’, *Deutsche Tages-Zeitung*, 450, 11.09.1919.

surreptitiously removed depictions of Kaiser Wilhelm II from their local schools.⁷⁹ Gabriella Elgenius has argued that national symbols and ceremonies provide “anchorage in an unstable world” and offer the “security and comfort of certain things remaining constant during times of loss and change.”⁸⁰ The removal of these portraits, perhaps the most frequently encountered representation of the monarchy beyond postage stamps, unleashed an emotional response concomitant with this loss of certainty and stability.

The southern states were prepared to let the portraits remain but certain exceptions had to be made. In other words, some princes would be more equal than others. For the most part, the dividing line between those considered laudable, or at least tolerable, and those considered unsuitable (or even provocative) was generational.⁸¹ Germany’s “final generation” of monarchs—that is, the twenty who abdicated or were overthrown in November 1918—were *personae non gratae* while their forebears were allowed to stay.⁸² Such policies existed, at the very least, in Baden, Hessen, Prussia, Thuringia, and even the city-republic of Hamburg.⁸³ In Hessen, official clarification took time; initial regulations simply and vaguely required the removal of “former princes.”⁸⁴ Exemption for long-dead rulers was nevertheless considered self-evident by many. Referring to this rule in a letter to his counterpart in Worms, the mayor of Darmstadt, Wilhelm Glässing, professed his conviction that the government could not possibly intend to expel “all princes...no matter in which century they lived.”⁸⁵ Glässing was right. Only a month later, the rules were revised. While depictions of Ernst Ludwig had to go, those of his predecessors were not only permitted to remain, but were expressly declared “works of art,” thereby making debates over their value aesthetic and pointedly non-political.⁸⁶ Prussian authorities used similar language, describing images of the emperors

79. ‘Die Kaiserbilder in der Republik!’, *Vorwärts* 323, 27.06.1919; Cf. Moritz Föllmer, ‘The Unscripted Revolution: Male Subjectivities in Germany, 1918-1919’, *Past and Present* 241 (2018), pp. 1-32.

80. Gabriella Elgenius, ‘Expressions of Nationhood: National Symbols and Ceremonies in Contemporary Europe’ (Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2005), p. 34.

81. Hessen additionally permitted royal portraits to remain if they depicted the patron of the building or institution in which they sat, see: HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 2373, StM 13632, 19.08.1919.

82. Bavaria appears to have been an exception. In March 1919, the cabinet decided to proceed with a policy which included *all* former kings, as well as their consorts and the German emperors. Notably, the most popular of the Bavarian royals—Crown Prince Rupprecht—did not fit under this rubric. See: BayHStA, MA 99513, Ministerratssitzung, 26.03.1919.

83. Authorities in Thüringen referred specifically to the “last generation,” while in Hamburg the criterion was slightly different, encompassing those “who lived after 1870”. See: ‘Die Entfernung fürstlicher Hoheitszeichen’, *Vorwärts* 339, 20.07.1922; ‘Reinigung von Monarchistenbildern’, *Vorwärts* 340, 21.07.1922.

84. See: HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 2373, 19.08.1919; HStAD, G 21 A, 4/4, StM 16182, 13.09.1921.

85. StAW, 005/1/04320, Oberbürgermeister Darmstadt to Oberbürgermeister Worms, 28.09.1921.

86. HStAD, Fonds R 1 B, Nr. 28697, 25.10.1921.

Wilhelm I and Friedrich III as being “of artistic value” [*künstlerisch wertvoll*].⁸⁷ Significantly, these rules were passed with little reference to individual monarchs, but purely to the time in which they happened to reign. Hessen’s final ruler, Ernst Ludwig, was a poet, playwright, and patron of the arts. His friendliness with local Social Democrats and concern for progressive causes led him to be known as the “red Grand Duke.” In short, he was a wholly unobjectionable figure, but the new authorities had to draw a line somewhere. Moreover, as a living, wartime ruler, he not only embodied a time better forgotten but posed a threat—however unlikely—as a monarchist usurper. Retaining images of his father and grandfather, by contrast, was a much safer bet. They posed little threat and evoked rose-tinted memories of a more successful and stable past—of the exaltation of unification and the forging of Germany’s ‘place in the sun’.

In Karlsruhe, meanwhile, the president of the Badenese *Landtag*, Ferdinand Kopf, essentially dictated government policy by insisting that busts of four nineteenth-century grand dukes be permitted to remain in the debating chamber. These men, he argued, were “historical figures who do not deserve to have memories of them forcibly wiped away.” Furthermore, he wrote, they embodied the region’s proud liberal tradition, having ruled over the introduction and subsequent reform of the state’s constitution.⁸⁸ Kopf’s suggestion was applied by the government elsewhere; in the summer of 1919, the *Bezirksamt* in Freiburg was permitted to keep portraits of Kaiser Wilhelm I and his son-in-law, Grand Duke Friedrich I, as historical memorials.⁸⁹ Robert Gerwarth advises that Weimar’s political culture can only be fully grasped if one considers its “search for historical roots” and “struggle for legitimacy.”⁹⁰ The question of legitimacy will be considered below, but it is clear that history was just as important to the shapers of interwar symbolic policy as it is to those who study them. Edwin Redslob, the *Reichskunstwart* and the most visible of these policymakers, was a forceful proponent of the centrality of history. On being informed by the RBS that the new Republic of Czechoslovakia had undertaken a wholesale dismantling of its Habsburg inheritance, Redslob deflected the inference that Germany do likewise. “I consider it most desirable,” he wrote,

87. See: Wienfort, ‘Alte Elite in der neuen Republik’, p. 243.

88. GLAK, 231, Nr. 3396, Präsident des Landtags to Archivariat der Nationalversammlung, 16.05.1919.

89. GLAK, 231, Nr. 3396, Nr. 53618, 24.07.1919.

90. Robert Gerwarth, ‘The Past in Weimar History’, *Contemporary European History* 15:1 (2006), p. 21.

that some memories of the past be allowed to remain. *We are talking about the history of our own people...*and it would be a falsification of history if every remnant of a time which lies behind us were to suddenly vanish.⁹¹

As Manuela Achilles writes, Redslob did not seek to create a *tabula rasa* in Germany, but rather hoped “to foster “the pervasion of tradition with modernity.””⁹² More was at stake than simply placating the public; it was a matter of self-portrayal and of looking to the past for symbolic elements which could provide stature and legitimacy to new, precariously-placed regimes. This attitude was most neatly encapsulated in the coat of arms designed for the Free People’s State of Württemberg in 1921.

In many states, the republican authorities essentially retained the monarchical coat of arms but relieved it of any outwardly royal or militaristic symbolism. The lion rampant featured on Hessen’s shield, for instance, lost its crown and sword. Prussia’s eagle, meanwhile, was deprived of its crown, orb, and sceptre. This simple approach was eschewed in Württemberg and Bavaria, however, as the existing designs had long been found wanting. For leading experts, the revolution offered a rare opportunity to put right heraldic wrongs. Hugo Gerard Ströhl, the preeminent Austrian herald, was particularly vocal. In his seminal 1897 *Wappenrolle* he euphemistically dismissed the Bavarian design (the personal work of King Ludwig I) as stemming from a time “which one can hardly call a heraldic renaissance.”⁹³ Less concerned about hurting royal feelings, his comments for Württemberg were blunter. Its 1807 design, he intoned, offered “a magnificent example of how *not* to lay out a coat of arms. Change is urgently needed for it does not even get halfway to satisfying historical or heraldic demands.”⁹⁴ Following consultation with artists and experts, Johannes von Hieber’s government submitted a new design to the *Landtag*, which was approved in December 1921.⁹⁵ In it, the shield was quartered, with the upper-left and lower-right fields occupied by the emblem of the House of Württemberg (three black antlers on a gold background) and the other two by jagged stripes of the state’s colours, black and red. The retention of the antler motif, which was strongly opposed by ex-King Wilhelm II (and subsequently by his

91. Quoted in: Heffen, *Der Reichskunstwart*, p. 125. Emphasis added.

92. Achilles, ‘Anchoring the Nation’, p. 270.

93. Hugo Gerard Ströhl, *Deutsche Wappenrolle, enthaltend alle Wappen, Standarten, Flaggen, Landesfarben und Kokarden des Deutschen Reiches, seiner Bundesstaaten und regierenden Dynastien* (Stuttgart, 1897), p. 28.

94. Ibid., p. 76. Emphasis added.

95. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, 106. Sitzung, 20.12.1921, p. 2651.

supporters),⁹⁶ was justified by appeals to history and through a process which disassociated it from the royal dynasty and claimed it for the state as a whole. As Leopold Hegelmaier, representing the government, explained to the *Landtag*, the antler motif was a vital symbol of Württembergian identity, one “which ha[d] been inseparable from the name ‘Württemberg’ since the thirteenth century.”⁹⁷ Wild deer roamed the parks around Stuttgart and the state’s border was demarcated by ancient stones into which either one or three antlers had been carved. The emblem was synonymous with the state and its history and not even piety (as it was described) to a popular monarch could eclipse it.

This bold claim was a calculated display of sovereignty and independence. As the report compiled by the parliamentary committee tasked with finding a new design concluded:

Legally, the People’s State of Württemberg is entitled and—according to the constitution—obliged to determine the state’s coat of arms. It may and will reach back to the old design to do this. Neither private nor public claims exist [on the old design], not even for members of the former royal family.⁹⁸

At a time when the prerogatives, powers, and heritage of the individual states were under attack, this was a bold statement of particularist identity and a vicarious requisition of the sovereignty and independence which the state had enjoyed for centuries under its royal house. In modifying the design—with the addition of the state colours—the authorities ensured that they were not slavishly adopting old symbolism but adapting it to create something new and distinct for the latest chapter in Württemberg’s long history.

A desire to emphasise state sovereignty—such as it was—and to retain a degree of dignity and gravitas lay behind a different and somewhat curious element of other Weimar-era coats of arms. Take the designs produced by Hessen and Bavaria as examples. Both were adorned with what look suspiciously like coronets, a classic emblem of monarchical power. Before 1918, this was quite normal; the simplified coat of arms used to certify official documents (known as the *kleines Wappen*) usually featured a shield topped with a crown. After 1918,

96. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 141, Nr. 4, Alfred Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg to Württembergisches Staatsministerium, 15.04.1921.

97. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, 105. Sitzung, 02.12.1921, p. 2623.

98. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilagen-Band 3, Nr. 600, p. 84.

however, neither state was quite prepared to acknowledge this continuity. The Bavarians labelled theirs a *Volkskron*e, or people's crown, while the Hessians spoke even more obliquely of "a wreath of golden leaves" [*ein Gewinde aus goldenem Laubwerk*].⁹⁹ In both cases, their inclusion was due to the efforts of Otto Hupp, a Munich-based artist and herald retained by the two governments. An enthusiastic advocate for this adapted coronet, he defended his choice by arguing that society had "become far too accustomed to seeing the crown as a symbol of royal power...it is instead the symbol of the highest achievement, the highest decoration of honour."¹⁰⁰ The power of the princes had fallen to the people, he continued, so why should they not adopt their glittering symbols of sovereignty? In the same way that republicans, for instance, relied on liberal tradition to legitimise the black-red-gold flag, Hupp accentuated the long and decorated history of non-royal crowns, such as the wreaths worn by Roman citizens.¹⁰¹ Just as Württemberg requisitioned a dynastic motif and divested it of its royal associations, Hupp thus democratised the crown, giving the people the right—indeed, the duty—to wear it. He did not simply lift the old kingly or grand ducal crowns from pre-revolutionary coat of arms but (again, as in Württemberg) set out to design something new and unique.

In Bavaria, Hupp was aided by the laissez-faire approach of *Ministerpräsident* Johannes Hoffmann, who determined to leave questions of design up to the experts.¹⁰² He also understood that without recourse to historical motifs, artists and designers would be severely restricted. Such symbolism, in his view, should "fall into place without any encouragement."¹⁰³ Hoffmann initially envisaged the retention of the white-and-blue *Rauten* and perhaps the lions, rather than the crown, but quickly accepted Hupp's arguments. Voice was given to concerns by others at various points in the process, however. In response, Hupp rather huffily submitted an alternative design—in which the shield was mounted with an enormous golden lion rather than the *Volkskron*e—which was so obviously (and likely intentionally) ludicrous that the culture ministry dismissed it out of hand. "This solution can

99. Beschreibung des Staatswappens, 22.05.1920, in: *Hessisches Regierungsblatt* Nr. 14 (1920), p. 115.

100. Otto Hupp, *Wider die Schwarmgeister! Dritter Teil. Zu den neuen Staatswappen. Zum Wappengebrauch der Städte und der Bürgerlichen. Der Runenstar. Zantgemal und Wappen* (Munich, 1919), p. 8.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 9. For the use of history in defence of the Republic's tricolour, see: Eric Bryden, 'In Search of Founding Fathers: Republican Historical Narratives in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis, 2008), chap. VI; 'Heroes and Martyrs of the Republic: Reichsbanner Geschichtspolitik in Weimar Germany', *Central European History* 43:4 (2010), pp. 639-665.

102. BayHStA, MA, 102014, Johannes Hoffmann to Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, 26.03.1919.

103. BayHStA, MA, 102014, Nr. 6510, 04.08.1919.

surely satisfy no-one,” it declared.¹⁰⁴ In December 1922, the government laid a bill before the *Landtag* which put forth Hupp’s original design and his arguments almost verbatim. It was eventually passed in July the following year.¹⁰⁵ By this point Bavaria was the only state without a new coat of arms, but the design did not find favour with all. The left-wing press was especially suspicious, with the *Münchener Post* calling Bavaria the “Royal Bavarian Republic” and *Vorwärts* concurring that it could “easily be mistaken for a monarchy.”¹⁰⁶ Even the *Frankfurter Zeitung* chimed in, conspiratorially suggesting that the *Volkskrone* was “a curtain behind which Bavaria’s current rulers hide their hopes of monarchical restoration.”¹⁰⁷ Their comments were toothless; aside from the years of Nazi rule, the Bavarian *Volkskrone* has lasted to this day and is a fundamental part of further state coats of arms in Hessen, Baden-Württemberg, and Rheinland-Pfalz.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that southern Germany possessed a highly ambivalent symbolic order in the fifteen years following the 1918 revolution. Reforms enacted in the earliest days of the revolution to wipe away external evidence of the monarchy were blighted by practical difficulties inherent in their scale, resistance on the ground, and the relative weakness of the states’ central governments. As governments became gradually more conservative, enthusiasm for the strict implementation of these rules waned in parallel with a determination to retain emotive and decorative elements of the monarchical symbolic canon. Dictating symbolic policy was in itself a symbolic act which broadcasted the state’s ambitions and fears. Over time, ambiguity thus became institutionalised. Firstly, the south German governments were acutely aware that their sudden elevation to power—and the concomitant disappearance of beloved monarchs—was not uniformly welcomed. By permitting symbolic baggage of the pre-revolutionary era to remain, if in a modified form, they sought to reassure, to stress continuity, and to avoid unnecessary antagonism. Secondly, and relatedly, the new regimes saw in the dynastic and royal motifs of the past ready-made means to acquire stature, gravitas, and legitimacy in a volatile political landscape. States’ rights were dwindling; in some circles, their very existence was questioned. The third reason for

104. BayHStA, MA, 102014, Nr. 47488, 24.12.1919.

105. BayHStA, MA, 102014, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über das Wappen des Freistaates Bayern, 27.12.1922.

106. ‘Königlich Bayerische Republik’, *Münchener Post* 70, 24.03.1923; ‘Die Krone als Staatssymbol’, *Vorwärts* 141, 24.03.1923.

107. ‘Die bayerische Volkskrone’, *Frankfurter Zeitung* 225, 25.03.1923.

retaining royal symbols was thus to celebrate and amplify the history and culture of the state in its most reproduced and important graphic representation. *Kulturpolitik* remained one of the few competencies of the provincial governments and one which they protected fiercely. This was no more the case than when conservative parties held power. For those on the right, state symbols acquired a new significance in cultural battles with the left; the defence of old motifs, fourthly and finally, became a means of political self-definition. Weimar did not simply copy the old order, however, and royal symbols were not adopted outright, but carefully adapted and refashioned. Only select royal portraits were allowed to remain; the dynastic antler motif in Württemberg became only one element of a larger design; and Otto Hupp's *Volkskrone* was a new model, rather than a copy of an old one. At each stage, the republicans made these symbols their own.

Engagement with royal symbols was one of the few areas in which the case study states followed different paths. The opposition was not total; all three states, for example, permitted royal portraits to hang and retained dynastic motifs in their coats of arms. Hessen's policies regarding administrative symbols, however, were far more thorough and detailed than those of either Bavaria or Württemberg. They were implemented, moreover, with greater persistence and an ingenuity which failed governments elsewhere when practical difficulties arose. From the surviving record, furthermore, Hessen appears to have been alone in adopting the *Reich's* policy on disciplining wayward officials. If we remember, the judge in Oberingelheim was reprimanded, while the mayor in Waldberg was let off. This divergence was augmented by the lethargy, even opposition, of governments in Bavaria and Württemberg towards reform after 1919. A key reason—though undoubtedly not the sole one—may be the political make-up of the respective states. The government in Hessen retained a stronger socialist streak until much later than elsewhere. While Bavaria had no SPD ministers after 1920, and Württemberg had only one, Hessen was governed by a socialist *Staatspräsident* until 1927 who could additionally rely on a majority (or at least a sizeable minority) of party colleagues in cabinet. It cannot be disputed moreover that, during this socialist hegemony in Hessen, both other states were run by monarchists, such as Gustav von Kahr, Heinrich Held, and Eugen von Knilling (Bavaria) and Johannes von Hieber and Wilhelm Bazille (Württemberg). As Bazille's public disputes with the *Republikanische Beschwerdestelle* revealed, this could have major implications for symbolic politics.

Notwithstanding its causes, this symbolic survival is revealing both of governmental priorities after 1918 and the elements of the pre-revolutionary order which were seen as valuable and worth keeping. More generally, it reveals ideological disagreements—just as often between factions of the left than between the left and right—over what was acceptable within the Weimar Republic’s framework and, fundamentally, what the Republic ought to be or ought to look like. At the state level, a purely democratic symbolic culture did not possess a monopoly. Symbols developed by Edwin Redslob and his colleagues sat alongside remnants of the old order and themselves drew inspiration from the monarchical past. The new historiographical orthodoxy, which focuses predominantly on decisions made at the *Reich* level and contends that Weimar possessed a solid and carefully choreographed democratic culture, thus needs to be tempered by this additional, provincial perspective. The challenge presented here is limited, however. For one, Germany’s southern states enjoyed a relationship with monarchy which was not generally reflected elsewhere. Relative to their counterparts across Germany, monarchs in the south interfered little in politics and enjoyed surprisingly cordial relations with their ideological foes on the left, including the SPD. Where Kaiser Wilhelm II was active and partisan, his namesake in Württemberg was detached and benign. Secondly, existing evidence does not permit quantitative judgements on the extent of this persistence. Finally, popular responses to the whole process can only be grasped through the partisan filters of political newspapers. It can nevertheless be said with certainty that the dream of Wilhelm Blos and the Württembergian workers of a new Germany “no longer decorated with the old emblems” did not come to pass.

Chapter III

Mortal rights of kings: The question of princely property

On the evening of 9 November 1918, the typesetter Wilhelm Knoblauch, chairman of Darmstadt's soldiers' and workers' council, rose to address his excited colleagues. Reflecting on the dramatic events which had catapulted them to power that day, he triumphantly declared that "the age of the divine rights of kings has come to an end!"¹ As Knoblauch's successors in Hessen, and state governments across Germany, were to discover, however, the revolution also spurned the dawning of a new age—of the mortal rights of kings. By 1918, the legal status of vast tracts of land and property in Germany was a confused mess. What was clear, however, was that systems of ownership which prevailed before the revolution fundamentally rested on the assumption that each state had a monarch. Once this foundation had been forcibly removed, the rules had to be quickly rewritten.

The financial settlements which Weimar's republics eventually reached with their former dynasties were the most contentious and public legacy of monarchy in interwar Germany. They forced the German people to encounter and evaluate their royal past and define their new societies against the old. Despite their significance, however, existing scholarly literature is often one-dimensional. Studies of individual states, such as Norbert Stieniczka's investigation on Hessen, are few and rarely offer more than a recitation of parliamentary votes, property holdings, and dates of negotiations.² Rarely do they submit a comparative perspective, or discussion of the parties' motivations, the consequences of their conclusions, or what the whole affair reveals of the Republic's relationship with monarchy. The great

1. Hans Riehl, *Als die deutschen Fürsten fielen* (Munich, 1979), p. 195.

2. Norbert Stieniczka, 'Die Vermögensauseinandersetzung des Volksstaates Hessen und seiner Rechtsnachfolger mit der ehemals grossherzoglichen Familie 1918-1953', *Archiv für hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 56 (1998), pp. 255-308. See also by the same author, 'Die Absetzung des letzten Großherzogs von Hessen und ihre vermögensrechtlichen Folgen', in: Bernd Heidenreich and Eckhart G. Franz (eds.), *Kronen, Kriege, Künste: Das Haus Hessen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2009), pp. 220-261. In his study of the 1926 referendum, Otmar Jung devotes a short chapter to each of the twenty-two former monarchical states, see *Volksgesetzgebung: Die "Weimarer Erfahrungen" aus dem Fall der Vermögensauseinandersetzungen zwischen Freistaaten und ehemaligen Fürsten*, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1996), vol. I.

majority of works focus neither on single states nor on the period as a whole, but on failed attempts in the mid-1920s, encapsulated most notably in the referendum of June 1926, to take the regulation of royal property out of the hands of the states and solve it at the *Reich* level. In his study, Franklin West confidently asserts that the referendum “reduced itself to the formula: Republic *versus* Monarchy,”³ but from the existing scholarship, the unschooled observer would be justified in assuming that it had little to do with monarchy at all.

The referendum is almost never deployed as a means of examining the afterlife of monarchy in Germany. Instead, it has provided an (often fruitful) case study for investigations into *Innenpolitik*,⁴ the high nobility,⁵ social and regional milieux,⁶ intellectuals,⁷ political parties,⁸ the use of political propaganda,⁹ popular legislation,¹⁰ the judicial system,¹¹ and even the role of the Protestant Church.¹² For insight into negotiations at the state level, however, the referendum is not helpful. Indeed, viewed from Darmstadt, Munich, and Stuttgart, it was essentially a sideshow. Firstly, concentrating on one year ignores the fact that negotiations between the new republics and the royal houses began in 1918 or 1919 and frequently lasted for more than a decade. The referendum, moreover, does not tell us anything about deals

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3. Franklin C. West, *A Crisis of the Weimar Republic: A Study of the German Referendum of 20 June 1926* (Philadelphia, 1985), p. 11.
 4. Ulrich Schüren, *Der Volksentscheid zur Fürstenenteignung 1926: Die Vermögensauseinandersetzung mit den deposierten Landesherren als Problem der deutschen Innenpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in Preußen* (Düsseldorf, 1978).
 5. Karl Heinrich, ‘Fürstenabfindung oder Fürstenentschädigung? Der Kampf um das Hausvermögen der ehemals regierenden Fürstenhäuser im Jahre 1926 und die Innenpolitik der Weimarer Republik’, in: Denzel and Schulz (eds.), *Deutscher Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, pp. 261-288.
 6. Johannes Horstmann, ‘Katholiken, Reichspräsidentenwahlen und Volksentscheide: Ausgewählte Aspekte zum Wahlverhalten der Katholiken in der Weimarer Republik mit statistischem Material’, *Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften* 27 (1986), pp. 61-93; Holger Horstmann, “Keinen Pfennig den Fürsten!”: Der Volksentscheid zur Fürstenenteignung 1926’, *Hannoversche Geschichtsblätter* 45 (1991), pp. 87-144; Markus Wieland, ‘Der Volksentscheid über die Fürstenenteignung von 1926 im Amtsbezirk Wertheim’, *Wertheimer Jahrbuch* (2002), pp. 301-314; Dirk Hänisch, ‘Zur Soziografie der Volksbegehren und Volksentscheide 1926 und 1929 in der Weimarer Republik’, *Jahrbuch für direkte Demokratie* (2013), pp. 55-90.
 7. Robert Lorenz, ‘Zivilgesellschaft zwischen Freude und Frustration: Der Aufruf von Intellektuellen zur Enteignung der Fürsten 1926’, in: Johanna Klatt and Robert Lorenz (eds.), *Manifeste: Geschichte und Gegenwart des politischen Appells* (Bielefeld, 2011), pp. 135-167.
 8. West, *A Crisis of the Weimar Republic*.
 9. Hildegard Pleyer, ‘Politische Werbung in der Weimarer Republik: Die Propaganda der maßgeblichen politischen Parteien und Gruppen zu den Volksbegehren und Volksentscheiden “Fürstenenteignung” 1926, “Freiheitsgesetz” 1929 und “Auflösung des Preussischen Landtages” 1931’ (Doctoral dissertation, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (Westf.), 1959).
 10. Otmar Jung, *Direkte Demokratie in der Weimarer Republik: Die Fälle “Aufwertung”, “Fürstenenteignung”, “Panzerkreuzverbot” und “Youngplan”* (Frankfurt a.M., 1989); Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*.
 11. Rainer Stentzel, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Politik in der Weimarer Republik: Der Streit um die sogenannte Fürstenenteignung’, *Der Staat* 39:2 (2000), pp. 275-297.
 12. Kluck, *Protestantismus und Protest*.

reached in each state, or their consequences and significance. As it was envisaged by its most fervent supporters as a means of solving the logjam in Berlin between the Prussian government and the House of Hohenzollern, studies of the referendum regularly produce heavily Prusso-centric conclusions. A number of states, meanwhile, including Bavaria, had already concluded deals with their former ruling dynasties by 1926. Relatedly, *Reich* regulation was rejected by both Bavaria and Württemberg as an infringement of state autonomy and, in any case, neither side in the referendum expected the motion—calling for expropriation without compensation—to pass. Finally, the referendum had a negligible effect on subsequent negotiations. Seldom were the results of the referendum weaponised by either side. Only in Hessen can any consequences be discerned, and these were minor; for one, negotiations were put on hold for a year while the campaign played out, and secondly, the referendum pushed the SPD to the left, forcing it—ultimately in vain—to reject a deal in 1928.

This chapter will explore the life of the property question in the longer term. It will first discuss the historical developments which had shaped royal ownership of property prior to the revolution, arguing that the settlements concluded after 1918 were the final stop on a legal journey begun a century before. These pre-existing arrangements differed in the three states, but the following section of the chapter demonstrates that negotiations in the interwar period followed notably similar patterns and produced analogous results. These commonalities are then explained with reference to the guiding motivations of the state governments and the importance of royal property to republican state building in the early post-war years. The chapter concludes by discussing the reception of the financial settlements in the states' respective legislatures and the consequences they ultimately had for the states as a whole. While opposition was fierce on the political left, the final division of assets led to a moderate democratisation of royal property which not only benefited the states but anchored the memory of monarchy in the public consciousness.

Royal property before 1918

The financial settlements reached in Bavaria (1923), Württemberg (1919 and 1927), and Hessen (1919 and 1930) signified the conclusion of a process which had been underway since at least the start of the previous century: the acquisition by the state of royal domains. Until the nineteenth century, domains were the undisputed property of the monarch and his

family. Simply put, the domains of a state were a unified and entailed portfolio of properties (mostly lands and forests, though also mines, ironworks, capital, and the *jura regalia*) which through long-standing custom were used to finance the upkeep of the royal house, its court, and its administration of the state.¹³ These possessions had been acquired since the high middle ages in various ways—through inheritance, conquest, marriage, purchase, and, in early times, through fiefdoms granted by the Holy Roman Emperor or other feudal lords. Ultimately, these latter territories, originally held only *in persona* by the enfeoffed lord, became entailed and could thus be inherited agnatically by his descendants. For Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg the most significant territorial growth came as a result of the gradual dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. The *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* of 1803, described by Joachim Whaley as “the most extensive redistribution of property in German history prior to 1945,” secularised and reassigned ownership of nearly 80,000 square kilometres of ecclesiastical territory to victims of French expansionism.¹⁴ Some states received more than their due; Württemberg, for example, gained four times the amount of territory it had lost.¹⁵ Hessen also benefited, so too Bavaria, which acquired large tracts of Franconia to the north.¹⁶ Mediatisation following the final disbanding of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 led to further expansion, as did the Treaty of Vienna, signed in 1815 after the final defeat of Napoleon.

In the early nineteenth century, the dynasties agreed—to various extents—to hand over their domains to the state. This was a significant moment in German constitutional history. As Winfried Klein notes, for centuries the domains had been the principal foundation of the monarch’s sovereignty; as a result of these transactions, the state became sovereign and the monarch an organ of the state. It symbolised, to a degree, the end of absolutism in these lands.¹⁷ The process was concluded earliest in Bavaria when King Maximilian Joseph passed an ordinance in 1804 regulating the Wittelsbachs’ entailed domains (the so-called *Domanialfideikommisspragmatik*). Under §2, their hereditary holdings, including lands and rights,

13. See: F. W. R. Zimmermann, ‘Geschichtliche Entwicklung und derzeitiger Stand der Rechtsverhältnisse am Domanium in Deutschland’, *Finanzarchiv* XXXV:2 (1918), pp. 2-10.

14. Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume II: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648-1806* (Oxford, 2012), p. 620.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 621.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 626.

17. Winfried Klein, *Die Domänenfrage im deutschen Verfassungsrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 2007), pp. 46, 50.

would be packaged into a “single, indivisible and inviolable” unit.¹⁸ As the wording implied, this complex of property could neither be broken up nor individual elements of it sold. This ruling was confirmed in Bavaria’s constitution of 1808 and expanded upon in the constitution of 1818 which applied the language of “single, indivisible and inviolable” to the entirety of the kingdom.¹⁹ While not as explicit as laws passed elsewhere, jurists accepted that these clauses transferred ownership of the domains to the state.²⁰

Owned, administered, and used by state		
Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, Württemberg		
Owned by monarch		
<i>Administered and used by state</i>	<i>Administered and used by monarch</i>	<i>Administered by monarch; benefits shared</i>
Baden Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt Schwarzburg-Sondershausen	Reuß Elder Line Reuß Younger Line	Saxe-Coburg Schaumburg-Lippe Lippe
Ownership divided between state and monarch		
Hessen, Oldenburg, Saxe-Altenberg, Saxe-Gotha		
No regulation of ownership; disagreement over administration and use		
Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Waldeck-Pyrmont		
No regulation of any sort		
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz		

Table 1. Regulation of domains by state (1918)²¹

Similar regulations were introduced by Württemberg’s 1819 constitution; the pre-existing entailed ducal estates were amalgamated into the “royal crown lands” [*königlicher Kammergut*] and declared “state property inseparable from the kingdom.”²² Unlike in Bavaria, however, the House of Württemberg retained private ownership over the *Hofdomänenkammergut*, a

18. Höchstlandesherrliche Verordnungen, die neu errichtete Domanialfideikommißpragmatik des Churhauses Pfalzbaiern betreffend, in: *Churpfalzbaierisches Regierungsblatt* (1805), V. Stuck, pp. 161-179.

19. Tit. II., §11, Bay. Verf. 1808; Tit. III., §1, Bay. Verf. 1818.

20. Klein, *Die Domänenfrage*, p. 56.

21. Zimmermann, ‘Geschichtliche Entwicklung’.

22. §§102-103, Württ. Verf. 1819.

separate complex of properties established by Eberhard III in 1674 in response to increased intervention by the feudal estates in the administration of his domains.²³ In Hessen, meanwhile, the grand ducal house preserved ownership over rather more. The 1820 constitution shared the domains between the state, which received one third, and the dynasty which kept the rest.²⁴

As discussed above, one of the principal functions of the domains was to provide the monarch with sufficient funds to keep his household in a manner befitting both his status and the rank of the state. In assuming ownership of the domains, the state simultaneously accepted the responsibility for providing these funds. This was generally done in three ways: through civil lists, apanages and jointures, and the provision of what was known as the *Krondotation*. The civil list was an annual sum paid to the monarch by the state.²⁵ In Württemberg and Hessen, they were introduced by the constitutions and the level of funding was fixed for each reign.²⁶ By 1918, Wilhelm II received 2.15 million Marks and Ernst Ludwig 1.26 million.²⁷ Bavaria took a diverging path in that its constitution did not provide for a civil list. Until 1834, sums paid to the king were determined by the state budget, debated every six years by the parliament (in 1819, 1825, and 1831).²⁸ Wishing to wrestle his finances from parliamentary control, Ludwig I passed a law establishing an independent civil list, initially worth 2,350,580 Gulden per year.²⁹ By 1913, this had increased to 5.4 million Marks, considerably dwarfing payments made in neighbouring states.³⁰

23. §108, Württ. Verf. See also: Zimmermann, 'Geschichtliche Entwicklung', p. 68; Eugen Locher, *Das württembergische Hofkammergut: Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Studie* (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 13-15.

24. Tit. II., §§6-7, Hess. Verf. 1820.

25. For an overview of the payments made to each federal prince at the end of the *Kaiserreich*, see: Johannes Pfitzner, 'Die Ausgaben der deutschen Einzelstaaten für das Staatsoberhaupt', *Finanzarchiv* XXXIII:1 (1916), pp. 143-160.

26. See: §104, Württ. Verf. 1819; §7(2), Hess. Verf. 1820.

27. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Gutachten des Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart über die Ansprüche der früheren landesherrlichen Familie an den Staat, 30.12.1924, pp. 38-39; Eckart G. Franz, 'Hof und Hofgesellschaft im Großherzogtum Hessen', in: Karl Möckl (ed.), *Hof und Hofgesellschaft in den deutschen Staaten im 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert* (Boppard a.Rh., 1990), pp. 162-163.

28. Dietmar Willoweit, 'König Ludwig III. und die ottonische Erbschaft', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 76:3 (2013), p. 794.

29. §§2-3, Gesetz, die Festsetzung einer permanenten Civilliste betr. vom 9. Juli 1834, in: *Gesetzblatt für das Königreich Bayern* (1834), pp. 25-32; Michael Kotulla, *Deutsches Verfassungsrecht 1806-1918. Band II: Bayern* (Berlin, 2007), §1460.

30. *Die Vermögensverhältnisse der früher regierenden Fürstenhäuser, zusammengestellt von ihren Vertretungen* (Berlin, 1926), p. 10.

The civil list was augmented by a raft of other payments including dowries, apanages (for the monarch's children and siblings), and jointures (widows' pensions). The value of apanages was calculated on the basis of proximity to the throne; in Bavaria, for example, the 1834 law provided the crown prince with 230,200 Gulden per year and roughly half that for his younger brothers.³¹ The total value of these additional payments naturally varied according to the size of the dynasty. While the House of Württemberg received roughly 140,000 Marks per year by 1918 on top of the civil list, the sprawling House of Wittelsbach cashed in 1.5 million.³² In each state, these annual stipends were supplemented by the *Krondotation*, or "crown endowment." This was a subset of properties and valuables within the domains which the state, after assuming ownership of them, made available to the monarch to ensure that his reign was appropriately dignified and glittering. Palaces and castles were the most obvious examples of such elements; the *Krondotation* in Hessen, for example, included the *Altes Schloss* and *Altes Palais* in Darmstadt, Schloss Romrod, and the grand ducal palace in Mainz.³³ Other common items included the crown jewels, diadems and parures, the royal library, artworks, pieces of furniture, and ceremonial silver services. The monarch did not own these items but had access to them by right as the sovereign and paid for their upkeep with funds from the civil list.

Negotiations and financial settlements

The revolution of November 1918 swept away a number of assumptions and pre-requisites which had held this system aloft. There was no longer a sovereign dynasty to keep comfortable, let alone glittering; constitutional positions such as "crown prince" had become meaningless; and there was a noticeable drop in demand for crown jewels. How would these arrangements be interpreted by the new republican governments? Had the revolution voided the constitutions and returned the domains to royal ownership? If not, did the royals have any claim to compensation for the loss of payments predicated on their original transfer? These were not simple questions, nor, remarkably, had anyone considered that they might be asked. As Wilhelm Föll, *Ministerialrat* in Württemberg's finance ministry wrote in 1925,

31. Pfitzner, 'Die Ausgaben der deutschen Einzelstaaten für das Staatsoberhaupt', pp. 146-147.

32. Entwurf des Staats-Haushalts-Plans (Hauptplans) für die Zeit vom 1. April 1919 bis 31. März 1920, in: *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilagen-Band 1, p. 458; *Die Vermögensverhältnisse*, p. 10.

33. HStAD, O 24, 50/20, Hof- und Krondotationsgebäude Stand 1919.

...[n]either laws, nor ordinances, nor discussions in parliament, nor acts of administration, nor even legal scholarship foresaw or dealt with the possibility that a princely house, which had handed its property over to the state, could be stripped of its sovereign rights and thereby face the danger of completely, or partially, losing the economic foundations of its very existence.³⁴

Württemberg

Solving this problem would occupy politicians, courtiers, and jurists for much of the 1920s, and provided the closest and longest-lasting point of contact between the new regimes and the old. Württemberg was the first of the three to conclude a settlement. It was also unique amongst all German states in that the family of the monarch disputed it after his death. The initiative was taken by Alfred Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg, director of the *Hofkammer*, and Theodor Gottfried Liesching, Wilhelm II's last chief minister and the first finance minister of the new republic. Recognising the ruin Wilhelm would face were his funds were cut off completely, Stauffenberg approached Liesching in mid-November 1918 in the hope that the king might be granted a pension and a place to live. The social democrat Wilhelm Blos, Liesching's successor as minister president, had wished to leave such matters to a hypothetical national assembly, but Liesching pushed ahead anyway.³⁵ A deal was reached with remarkable speed. For renouncing his claims to the civil list or use of the *Kronotation*, Wilhelm would receive an annual stipend of 200,000 Marks, with a jointure of 100,000 Marks per year for Queen Charlotte should he predecease her. In addition, the pair was granted the right to reside at Bebenhausen, a cloister-turned-castle north of Tübingen, for life.³⁶ Wilhelm signed the agreement on 29 November 1918 and abdicated the following day. The third element of the pre-revolutionary deal—apanages for lower ranking members of the dynasty—was dealt with in cabinet on 6 December. Payments to Wilhelm's heir, Duke Albrecht, and his family would cease at the end of the month and their right to reside in state properties at the end of March the following year.³⁷

34. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Vortrag des Ministerialrats Wilhelm Föll betr. Auseinandersetzung mit der früheren landesherrlichen Familie, 01.07.1925, pp. 10-11.

35. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 214, Sitzung der provisorischen Regierung Württembergs, 24.11.1918; Leopold Hegelmaier, *Beamter und Soldat 1884-1936: Lebenserinnerungen von Dr. Leopold Hegelmaier, Wirklichem Staatsrat und Major der Landwehr a.D.* (Stuttgart, 1937), p. 239.

36. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilage 1, §92.

37. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 214, Sitzung der provisorischen Regierung Württembergs, 06.12.1918.

For the next three years, nothing changed. King Wilhelm was satisfied with his share of the deal and his general popularity precluded any significant attacks on the arrangements. The status quo was disrupted, however, by Wilhelm's death in October 1921 and new demands subsequently tabled by Queen Charlotte and Duke Albrecht. The ensuing negotiations lasted, intermittently, until 1927. Firstly, there was the question of Charlotte's jointure. With the onset of inflation in 1922, the 100,000 Marks earmarked for her in the original agreement quickly lost real value. Indeed, if one is to believe representations made by Stauffenberg in May 1922, it no longer covered the queen's heating bills.³⁸ The cabinet was receptive and voted to triple the stipend. Naturally, as inflation took hold, the figure had to be constantly updated: by the time the budget was written, it stood at 460,000 Marks before ballooning to 2.7 million when actually debated by the *Landtag* committee in February 1923.³⁹ Once the crisis had subsided and the new currency was in place, the stipend was temporarily fixed at 36,000 Marks *per annum* until a final deal with the dynasty could be reached.⁴⁰

Much to the irritation of the government, Charlotte's claims were accompanied a month later by new demands submitted by Duke Albrecht. Charlotte was not personally popular, but as the widow of a revered king, she could confidently expect sympathy; the cold and disquietingly Catholic Albrecht, meanwhile, always struggled to win the hearts of most Württembergers. Above all, however, the government's response was motivated by frustration. Württemberg appeared to have been spared the complex, contentious, and distracting negotiations which plagued other states. Now, having said nothing for four years, Albrecht emerged from his anonymity with a thorn in search of a side. His demands amounted to a wholesale revocation of the 1918 deal which, he argued, Wilhelm signed only for himself. A new deal was necessary, he maintained, which would grant the House of Württemberg extensive compensation for the loss of their apanages and the use of the *Krondotation*. This was envisaged initially as comprising a yearly stipend and the return of select valuables from state ownership.⁴¹ Arguing that the 1918 agreement put an end to the matter, and that the prevailing financial circumstances ruled out further payments, the government was reluctant to acknowledge these demands. Nevertheless, negotiations began

38. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 09.05.1922.

39. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 217, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 02.07.1922; *Verb. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilagen-Band 4, Heft VIII, p. 6; *Verb. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilage 1008, Kap. 80.

40. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 219, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 16.09.1924.

41. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Gutachten des Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart über die Ansprüche der früheren landesherrlichen Familie an den Staat, 30.12.1924, p. 2.

in February 1923 and a specially appointed *Landtag* committee convened in July. By November, the government had a satisfactory draft deal which enjoyed the backing of a majority of the committee (only the SPD withheld approval). The House of Württemberg took umbrage, however, at merely receiving Bebenhausen in exchange for their vast and priceless art collection and, in early 1924, refused to sign. Their price was accommodation in Stuttgart. With the economic climate still stormy and *Reich* regulation being mooted at the highest levels, the government was in no mood to oblige and negotiations stalled.⁴²

In early 1925, the House of Württemberg reinitiated talks and laid out their demands.⁴³ In exchange for relinquishing claims to the civil list, apanages, and use of the *Krondotation*, Albrecht and his family requested a yearly stipend of 130,000 Marks (and an increase in Charlotte's pension), living quarters in the *Altes Schloss*, the crown jewels, tapestries, furniture, and items of precious metal, including the *Augsburger* silver service. The contentious art collection, meanwhile, would be handed over for either 2 million Marks' worth of forest or an additional 70,000 Marks added to the annual stipend.⁴⁴ Such issues required lengthy investigation by lawyers and economists across the government and the delay caused considerable irritation in Altshausen, the seat of the royal family. Indeed, in May 1925, state president Wilhelm Bazille had to talk Albrecht out of taking the whole thing to court.⁴⁵ Face to face meetings eventually played out in November and December before the government made its offer.⁴⁶ In some areas it was receptive; Queen Charlotte would receive an increased pension and the dynasty was welcome to the *objets d'art* it had specified. Elsewhere, there were problems. The position of the government, namely that the royal house had no legal right to compensation for the loss of pre-1918 payments, remained steadfast. Albrecht would not get his annual stipend or a house in Stuttgart, but the "generous" authorities would provide him with a one-off lump sum of 750,000 Marks. As it was on permanent public

42. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Nr. 9348, 20.11.1923; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Nr. 12214, 20.12.1925; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Vortrag des Ministerialrats Wilhelm Föll betr. Auseinandersetzung mit der früheren landesherrlichen Familie, 01.07.1925.

43. In the meantime, the government concluded a deal with Wilhelm's grandsons over his private property, see: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Vertrag der Württ. Staat und die Privaterben Sr. Kgl. Hoheit des verstorbenen Herzogs Wilhelm zu Württemberg, 04.03.1924.

44. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Gutachten des Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart über die Ansprüche der früheren landesherrlichen Familie an den Staat, 30.12.1924, p. 13f; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Nr. 12214, 20.12.1925.

45. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Nr. 4485, 10.05.1925.

46. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Ergebnis der Besprechung Seiner Excellenz und des Referenten mit dem Staatspräsidenten Bazille am 13.11.25 im Staatsministerium in der Auseinandersetzungssache des Hauses Württemberg und des Volksstaates Württemberg.

display and had been administered by the state since 1817,⁴⁷ the government questioned whether the dynasty actually owned the art collection in any meaningful sense and offered a mere 250,000 Marks to end the argument.⁴⁸ The royal house was less than impressed with this stance, not least the “rather tortuous and legally tenuous grounds” on which they believed it based.⁴⁹ For the second time in two years, a royal rejection of terms brought a temporary end to proceedings.

The final phase of negotiations in Württemberg unfolded in early 1927 and with a tempo unmatched since the revolution. By this point, the dynasty’s financial situation, which had been in steady decline for some years, had reached crisis point, forcing Albrecht to approach the government once more.⁵⁰ Recognising its relatively strong position vis-à-vis Albrecht, the cabinet tabled a simple and final offer.⁵¹ Once again, the queen’s pension was approved. In exchange for renouncing all other claims, meanwhile, the dynasty would receive 3 million Marks, of which roughly one sixth would be paid in kind with objects from the *Krongut* and the rest in annual instalments of 5% (equivalent to 123,800 Marks).⁵² From his compromised position, Albrecht could ill afford to object and the agreement was signed by Stauffenberg at a modest and brief ceremony in April.⁵³

Hessen

Examined from a distance, the process in Hessen mirrors that of Württemberg; an early deal negotiated with the monarch was followed in the 1920s by secondary claims made as a consequence of inflation and then by a final deal concluded at the end of the decade. Certain differences will become clear, however. For one, the initial deal was later disputed by the man who signed it—Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig—rather than his family. Secondly, Ernst

47. Königl. Rescript, die Vereinigung des Münz- und Medaillen-, des Kunst-, des Mineralien- und des Naturalien- und Thier-Kabinetts mit der Königl. öffentlichen Bibliothek betreffend, 17.02.1817, in: *Regierungsblatt für das Königreich Württemberg* (1817), Nr. 12.

48. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Nr. 12214, 20.12.1925.

49. AHW, 331, Nr. 161, 13.01.1926.

50. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 68, 08.02.1927.

51. For the discussions behind this deal, see: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 68, Protocol of meeting between Hegelmaier and Stauffenberg, 23.02.1927; AHW, 331, Nr. 1093, Kurze Niederschrift über das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen in Auseinandersetzungssache des Hauses und des Staates Württemberg, 23.02.1927.

52. AHW, 331, Nr. 1093, Ergebnis der Besprechung des Herrn Rentkammer-Vorstandes mit Staatsrat Hegelmaier in der Auseinandersetzungssache des Hauses Württemberg mit dem Staat Württemberg, 11.04.1927.

53. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 68, Niederschrift über die Unterzeichnung des Vertrags über die Vermögensauseinandersetzung zwischen dem Württembergischen Staat und dem vormals landesherrlichen Haus Württemberg.

Ludwig actually went through with a threat of court action in the mid-1920s. Thirdly, talks in Hessen were complicated by the fact that, as outlined in the 1820 constitution, the grand ducal house still owned two thirds of the domains and thus negotiated from a stronger position. The first recorded manoeuvres took place in January and February 1919, following the election of the state's constitutional assembly. Carl Ulrich, the new minister president, tabled a motion abolishing civil list payments to the grand ducal house and received a formal mandate from the legislature to enter into negotiations.⁵⁴ His aim, Ulrich declared, would be to forge a deal which corresponded "to the interests of the state on the one hand, and those of the grand duke on the other."⁵⁵

Royal proposals were subsequently laid out by Gustav von Römheld. For his part, Ernst Ludwig would acknowledge state ownership of the domains and renounce claims to payments under the pre-revolutionary system. In addition, he agreed to hand over the court theatre and court library. In compensation, he would receive an annual stipend and various valuables—including Wolfsgarten Castle—from the *Krondotation*, as well as more minor benefits, such as hunting rights in Kranichstein and a lodge at the theatre.⁵⁶ A specially appointed government committee then convened in March to debate these suggestions. While generally receptive, disagreement was apparent over the value of Ernst Ludwig's hypothetical stipend, with arguments ranging from 200,000 to 1 million Marks.⁵⁷ It was thus decided that a different approach would be more suitable. At the start of April, Ernst Ludwig was instead offered a sum of 10 million Marks—to be paid out at 4% per annum—for his share of the domains. Warned by his advisors that the SPD was becoming restless and unlikely to make such a favourable offer again, Ernst Ludwig accepted.⁵⁸ The final agreement, tabled in the *Landtag* on 16 April and passed on 6 May, closely reflected the grand ducal house's original proposals.⁵⁹ It was unusual in one particular regard, however. Under §1, the remaining two thirds of the royal domains—valued at 300 million Marks—would be transferred into state ownership. But unlike in other states, where this transfer began immediately, the concord in Hessen postponed a handover until an unspecified later date,

54. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 2, 31.01.1919; *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 19, 17.02.1919.

55. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, 4. Sitzung, 21.02.1919, pp. 74-78.

56. HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3c, Kabinetts-Direktion to Staatsministerium, 21.02.1919.

57. HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3c, Sitzung der Kommission zur Prüfung der Rechtsverhältnisse der Domänen des Großherzoglichen Hauses, 05.03.1919.

58. GHHA, D24, 43/8, 03.04.1919.

59. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 123, 16.04.1919 and 19. Sitzung, 06.05.1919, p. 478.

reflecting an awareness that both sides had to prepare for such a massive undertaking. Only once the state had taken full possession would Ernst Ludwig get his 10 million Marks; in the interim, he received a yearly stipend of 440,000.⁶⁰

The second phase began, as in Württemberg, against the background of rising inflation. Under the agreement, one quarter of Ernst Ludwig's annual stipend was earmarked to cover the salaries and benefits of his court staff.⁶¹ By November 1922, however, trouble at the grand ducal treasury was becoming acute. Queen Charlotte had complained that her stipend did not cover the heating bills; Ernst Ludwig, meanwhile, demonstrated that his did not pay for a single courtier. If the state did not act immediately, by increasing funds in line with inflation (and providing 8 million Marks' worth of forests as collateral), then the grand ducal family would be imminently threatened with "catastrophic financial collapse."⁶² Both the finance and justice ministers were satisfied with the propriety of Ernst Ludwig's requests and undertook to act. After all, the 1919 agreement was designed to ensure "that he could continue to live as the most distinguished [*vornehmste*] citizen of the state."⁶³ Unfortunately, the government's best intentions were undermined by its need to consult all parties in the *Landtag* and despite their colleagues forming a majority in the cabinet, the members of the SPD's parliamentary group were vigorously opposed.⁶⁴ When, by the end of March 1923, nothing had been accomplished and the government had stopped responding to Ernst Ludwig's entreaties, he took the state to court.⁶⁵ The government publicly responded that it saw the 1919 agreement as final—a stance somewhat undermined by internal correspondence which suggests the opposite—and blamed the *Landtag*, without which, it argued, it could not act.⁶⁶ Dispensing with oral arguments, a move which confirmed the lingering monarchism of the judiciary in the minds of the left, the *Landgericht* in Darmstadt ordered the government to pay 30 million Marks.⁶⁷ After a lengthy back-and-forth between various government departments over whether Ernst Ludwig was actually entitled to file a

60. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 123, 16.04.1919.

61. Stieniczka, 'Die Vermögensauseinandersetzung', p. 264.

62. HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3, Kuno Graf von Hardenberg to Gesamtministerium, 10.11.1922.

63. Quote from: HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3, JM 34709, 12.12.1922. For the finance ministry's position, see: HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3, FMI 87160, 14.12.1922.

64. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, II. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 690, 22.02.1923; Eduard David, *Die Berichte Eduard Davids als Reichsvertreter in Hessen 1921-1927*, ed. Friedrich P. Kahlenberg (Wiesbaden, 1970), Nr. 57.

65. 'Zur Abfindung des Großherzoglichen Hauses', *Hessische Landeszeitung* 73, 27.03.1923.

66. David, *Berichte*, Nr. 61; 'Die Abfindung des ehemaligen Großherzogs', *Darmstädter Zeitung* 76, 31.03.1923.

67. David, *Berichte*, Nr. 61.

lawsuit in this case,⁶⁸ an agreement was finally reached in July; the government would cover the wages of the grand ducal staff, in line with inflation, until the end of 1924.⁶⁹

Talks recommenced in August 1927. It should be remembered that the 1919 agreement had yet to be fully implemented and that the grand ducal house still owned their two-thirds share of the domains. As such, the proposals put forward in 1919 remained the basis for further discussion and were essentially reproduced in the final draft put before the *Landtag* in June 1928. As before, Ernst Ludwig would relinquish ownership of the domains and claims to pre-revolutionary payments in exchange for Wolfsgarten Castle, Romrod Castle, a lump sum of one million Marks, and an annual stipend of 590,000.⁷⁰ The ensuing debate in the legislature was stormy and ill-tempered with the SPD—which nominally led the government but opposed the deal—drawing flak from all sides. Indeed, such was the apparent abdication of responsibility by the SPD that discussion of the bill was followed by a series of no-confidence votes which the government barely survived. The bill itself passed its first reading by four votes and squeaked through the second reading by a mere two.⁷¹ It was eventually signed—after agreement had been extracted from the House of Hessen’s other branches and from Prussia, where some of the domains lay—in May 1930 at a ceremony held in the specially decorated *Altes Palais*.⁷²

Bavaria

Negotiations between the House of Wittelsbach and the Bavarian government began later than in other states. This was due, principally, to the volatility of the new regime—or regimes, as was the case in the spring of 1919—and royal refusal to engage with any government that did not enjoy parliamentary backing.⁷³ As Karl Friedrich Speck, finance minister in the first cabinet to meet this requirement, declared in July 1919, negotiations had “yet to progress beyond initial soundings.”⁷⁴ Earlier regimes had considered solutions to the property question; indeed, they were brought up in the earliest meetings of Kurt Eisner’s cabinet. The

68. HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3, FM I 67161, 19.04.1923; Justizrat Werthauer to Finanzministerium, 17.05.1923; JM 14867, 30.05.1923; FM I 42137, 18.06.1923.

69. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, III. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 6, 29.12.1924 and Nr. 30, 13.01.1925.

70. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 243, 01.06.1928.

71. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 25. Sitzung, 05.06.1928, pp. 603-609 and 26. Sitzung, 08.06.1928, pp. 622-633.

72. HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3a, Ausfertigung, 06.05.1930; Adelung, *Sein und Werden*, p. 319.

73. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, vol. I, pp. 47-48.

74. *Verh. bay. LT.*, I. Landtag, 16. Sitzung, 04.07.1919, p. 281.

contents of the civil list, for example, were declared state property on 11 November 1918.⁷⁵ For the most part, the protocols of these meetings are brief and fail to distinguish between what was discussed and decided. Nevertheless, we know that the pension arrangements for courtiers were also an early topic of conversation, as were the Wittelsbachs' future living arrangements and a hypothetical "expropriation of royal castles."⁷⁶ Even amongst this cadre of revolutionary ministers, opinions differed over how conciliatory the government should be.⁷⁷ Evidently realising the scale and complexity of the issues at hand, the government commissioned a series of expert opinions and delegated the negotiations to departmental committees and a dedicated commission, established in December 1918.⁷⁸ Ultimately, this was all Eisner's regime accomplished before his assassination in February 1919, but it laid the groundwork for the deal which would follow four years later.

On the return of Johannes Hoffmann's government to Munich in the late spring of 1919, discussions resumed. Following initial consultations in writing, in which the Wittelsbachs' lead negotiator, Ferdinand von Miltner, laid out their provisional claims, the two parties met face to face for the first time in December. Disagreements which had arisen from the written discussions—the royals asked for full compensation for the loss of the domains, while the government merely felt obliged to provide a "an income becoming [the royals'] rank"—were resolved through a third option: the state and dynasty would jointly establish and administer a fund. This solution would avoid lengthy negotiations with each individual member of the dynasty, would provide the royals with an income (from the earnings of its contents), and permit the government some control over royal assets.⁷⁹ As Cajetan von Aretin observes, it is difficult to follow the subsequent path as negotiations were predominantly completed in person, leaving little in the way of a paper trail.⁸⁰ Questions submitted to the government ostensibly requesting updates on the state of play offer little insight either and typically degenerated into lengthy and contentious shouting matches in the *Landtag* on the very merits of compensation.⁸¹

75. Cajetan von Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto von Bayern: Höfische Politik und Wittelsbacher Vermögensrechte 1916 bis 1923* (Munich, 2006), p. 226.

76. BayHStA, MA, 99512, Ministerratssitzung, 14.11.1918, 15.11.1918 and 16.11.1918.

77. BayHStA, MA, 99512, Ministerratssitzung, 16.11.1918 and 29.11.1918.

78. Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto von Bayern*, pp. 229, 240-242; BayHStA, MA, 99512, Ministerratssitzung, 27.11.1918, 28.11.1918 and 31.12.1918.

79. Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto von Bayern*, p. 236.

80. Ibid.

81. See, for example, *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 3. Sitzung, 07.05.1920, pp. 144-158.

We know, nevertheless, that the first draft of an agreement was produced in late 1921 and approved by the cabinet in June 1922.⁸² This approval came at a time of heightened political volatility. At the end of the month, Walter Rathenau, the *Reich* foreign minister and a leading DDP politician, was assassinated in Berlin by members of the nationalist group *Organisation Consul*. Sentiment towards conservatives became increasingly vitriolic—summed up most infamously by Chancellor Joseph Wirth’s declaration that “the enemy stands on the right”—and monarchy (which it was assumed the assassins wished to restore) was subject to repeated attacks in *Reichstag* debates.⁸³ Facing such a scene, the cabinet in Munich determined that, rather than throwing oil onto the fire, it would withhold the deal from the *Landtag* for the foreseeable future.⁸⁴ In the interim, the two parties made modifications to the initial agreement, introducing a separate foundation which would manage the dynasty’s extensive art collections. Eventually signed in January 1923 and approved by the cabinet a month later, the treaty weathered a turbulent debate in the *Landtag* in early March and passed into law.⁸⁵ Under the deal, the dynasty recognised state ownership of the domains, including such symbolic sites as the residences in Ansbach, Aschaffenburg, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Landshut, Munich, and Würzburg. In exchange for twenty million Marks compensation, they additionally relinquished the court theatre and its contents along with numerous paintings and furnishings.

To ensure the upkeep of the royal house, a subset of properties belonging to the domains was given over to the so-called Wittelsbach Compensation Fund [*Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds*] to be jointly administered by the state and the dynasty. Amongst other things, the fund received palaces in Berchtesgaden, Ludwigshöhe, and Neuburg, large areas of forests, certain valuables from the state museum, Ludwig I’s priceless art collection, and a lump sum of forty million Marks. Members of the house were additionally granted the right to reside at the palaces of Würzburg, Nymphenburg, and Herrenwörth. The dynasty’s remaining art collections, meanwhile, would form part of the abovementioned Wittelsbach State Foundation for the Arts and Sciences [*Wittelsbacher Landesstiftung für Kunst und Wissenschaft*],

82. Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto von Bayern*, p. 237; BayHStA, MA, 99517, Ministerratssitzung, 14.06.1922.

83. See, for example, comments made by Arthur Crispian (USPD) and Otto Wels (SPD) during the sitting on the day after Rathenau’s assassination in: *Verh. RT.*, 236. Sitzung, 25.06.1922, and by Kurt Rosenfeld (USPD) shortly afterwards in: *Verh. RT.*, 244. Sitzung, 05.07.1922.

84. Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto von Bayern*, p. 237.

85. *Verh. bay. LT.*, III. Landtag, Beilage 3298, 07.02.1923 and Beilage 3375, 09.03.1923.

managed solely by the state.⁸⁶ The fate of King Otto's inheritance, which had taxed Bavaria's greatest legal minds since his death in 1916, was also finally decided and incorporated into the deal. Comprising some of Germany's most recognisable properties—including Ludwig II's fairy-tale palaces at Linderhof, Hohenschwangau, and Neuschwanstein—the bequest was divided between the state and dynasty (generally in favour of the former) in a move grounded more in pragmatics than any legal basis.⁸⁷

Unlike their colleagues in Stuttgart and Darmstadt, ministers in Munich were not forced to see out the rest of the 1920s with renewed and repeated royal claims hanging over them like a Damoclean sword. The parties signed a single deal which, on the surface, settled everything and did not require revisiting. But as in other states, the pervasive financial crisis hit the Wittelsbachs hard. Indeed, their forty million Mark windfall was almost immediately worthless, a state of affairs aggravated by the lack of any contingencies in the deal for inflation. All the Wittelsbachs could do was convene the arbitration tribunal envisaged under §18 for disagreements between the parties. The 1928 outcome, however, was a major disappointment. Hoping for a grant of 10 million RM, the royals walked away with a mere 100,000—one percent of their demand.⁸⁸ In the spring of 1931, amidst renewed financial chaos, the Wittelsbachs were forced to sell off various valuables, including items of the crown jewels, at auction in London.⁸⁹

Motivations and guiding principles

In each state, the first concern was to uphold the rule of law. Provisional governments in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Munich were simply unprepared to follow the lead of their counterparts in Vienna and confiscate all royal property without compensation. Indeed, of all the successor states of Imperial Germany, only Saxe-Gotha passed a law confiscating the duke's property, a contravention later reversed by the *Reichsgericht* in 1924.⁹⁰ The revolution was not held to have wiped the legal slate clean; constitutions and house laws passed before

86. On the division of art collections, see: Cajetan von Aretin, 'Vom Umgang mit gestürzten Häuptern: Zur Zuordnung der Kunstsammlungen in deutschen Fürstenabfindungen 1918-1924', in: Biskup and Kohlrausch (eds.), *Das Erbe der Monarchie*, pp. 162-183.

87. For discussion of the so-called Ottonian inheritance, see: Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto von Bayern*; Willoweit, 'König Ludwig III. und die ottonische Erbschaft'.

88. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, vol. I, pp. 54-55.

89. BayHStA, MF, 70359, Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 27.02.1931; BayHStA, MA, 99523, Ministerratssitzung, 08.05.1931.

90. Stentzel, 'Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Politik', pp. 276-278.

1918 still had weight and left their imprints on the final deal. As Joseph Graf von Pestalozza stressed when introducing Bavaria's 1923 agreement to the *Landtag*, "whatever the House [of Wittelsbach] receives, it receives as a matter of law and the law must always be upheld, no matter how acute the economic plight of the moment may be."⁹¹ One principal cause of the many delays which frustrated the royal houses was this determination by the governments to do things by the book. They commissioned university dons, state court judges, and counsel in various ministries to compose lengthy, dry, and highly technical expert opinions running to hundreds of pages. Even when disadvantageous to the governments, their advice was generally adhered to. While undoubtedly the "correct" path to take for many, this resort to the law had additional advantages, particularly for socialist governments, as it allowed them to advocate and accept politically inexpedient settlements which circumstances demanded but which they would not have accepted in opposition.

At a less phlegmatic level, the governments were guided by two somewhat nebulous concepts, namely "fairness" or "propriety" [*Billigkeit*] and the need to furnish the deposed dynasties with a lifestyle "befitting their rank" [*standesgemäß*]. Propriety is an indefinite legal concept and the regimes of the Weimar era did little to illuminate their own understandings of it. Indeed, the original position of Eisner's finance ministry was that payments should only ensue for reasons of propriety.⁹² Under his successor but one, Gustav von Kahr, the finance ministry spoke of the need for "a certain magnanimity" in negotiations.⁹³ In Württemberg, meanwhile, the dynasty's claims were regularly batted away with the two-pronged response that no legal basis existed for them, "but out of propriety" [*dagegen aus Billigkeit*] the government would consider a suitable alternative.⁹⁴ The Hessian government did likewise, purporting to act jointly on "legal and fairness grounds" [*Rechts- und Billigkeitsgründen*].⁹⁵ As much as the motivation for this approach is revealed in official documents, it was tied up with a fundamental recognition of the dynasties' association with the states and their contributions to them. Graf von Pestalozza again spoke revealingly:

91. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, p. 1078.

92. Aretin, *Die Erbschaft des Königs Otto*, p. 231.

93. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 3. Sitzung, 07.05.1920, p. 145.

94. Cf. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Nr. 12214, 20.12.1925; HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Draft letter to Herzogliche Rentkammer, n.d. [likely 1925].

95. Cf. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, II. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 648, 20.02.1923.

It is not simply a legal matter, but a matter of propriety that a House, which has done so much for the Bavarian people and nation, for its art and its science, over a thousand year history, should not be seen off by the state empty handed.⁹⁶

Although the pre-revolutionary *Krondotation* had been established to ensure it, a quantitative definition of a “befitting” livelihood remained similarly elusive, if just as frequently invoked. The expert opinion on which Württemberg heavily relied mentions it on several occasions, as did the Wittelsbachs when pointing out the shortcomings of their own deal.⁹⁷ Even on the left, it found traction. In one early cabinet meeting, the social democrat Eugen Bolz acknowledged the government’s “moral obligation to provide the Duchess [Queen Charlotte] with an appropriate livelihood.”⁹⁸ Pius Probst, the *Oberlandesgerichtsrat* retained by the government in Stuttgart to write an expert opinion, came close to outlining what was required, namely “a palace in Stuttgart, a country seat with park, and the necessary furnishings,”⁹⁹ but a high-noble lifestyle relied on more than just land and property. This is implied by the financial deals themselves. In Darmstadt, the grand duke received a lodge in the state theatre and the right to be consulted over future use of his former *Residenz*. All three dynasties, moreover, received the right to continue that archetypal royal pastime, hunting, and to maintain modest court staffs. While they never concretely elucidated their criteria, it is clear that each government had an image of the lifestyle a deposed dynasty should lead and determined to reproduce it, so far as was legally tenable.

Ultimately, however, a principled approach which extolled the virtues of judiciousness, fairness, and generosity could only go so far. As Walter Leisner writes with regard to Bavaria,

[i]t was universally recognised that division according to strict equity was hardly possible in certain cases...a thorough allocation which corresponded to the true and original legal status [of each asset] would inevitably have failed, or at least taken many years. Uncertainties did not merely lie in a past which was distant and

96. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, p. 1078.

97. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Gutachten des Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart über die Ansprüche der früheren landesherrlichen Familie an den Staat, 30.12.1924; BayHStA, MF, 70359, Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 27.02.1931.

98. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 217, Sitzung des Staatsministerium Stuttgart, 02.07.1922.

99. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Gutachten des Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart über die Ansprüche der früheren landesherrlichen Familie an den Staat, 30.12.1924.

hard to reach in the archives; they had almost been institutionalised through the theory and practice of patrimonial and domanial law. The inevitable blending of state property and dynastic property had only increased over the previous century. Any attempt at division would have left the legal status of Bavaria's cultural goods hanging intolerably in suspense and the House of Wittelsbach without any financial foundation.¹⁰⁰

At a certain point, pragmatism had to take over, as did a number of unique concerns which afflicted the new regimes. The first was an urgent need to accommodate the burgeoning state administrations. Responding to the chaos unleashed by the war, governments grew larger with the addition of specially created departments for social security (Bavaria), labour, and food supply (both Württemberg) to those left over from the monarchical era.¹⁰¹ As the administration waxed, however, available office space became increasingly scarce and royal palaces—capacious, symbolically imposing, centrally located and, importantly, now lacking a purpose—offered an obvious solution. Their value becomes clear when one examines their various fates. In March 1919, the cabinet in Stuttgart surveyed its new property portfolio.¹⁰² The nascent and expansive ministry of labour was earmarked for the *Prinzenbau* (former home of Duke Albrecht's parents and his brother Robert),¹⁰³ as well as the king's former cabinet room, and the apartment of *Kammerherr* Konstantin von Neurath. The *Altes Schloß*, meanwhile, would provide offices for the *Kriegsnacheramt* (a wartime agency established to counter profiteering) and the police force in addition to grace-and-favour apartments for government ministers.¹⁰⁴ Württemberg's postal service, meanwhile, would work from the *Königsbau* and the former royal mews. Even properties beyond Stuttgart were set aside for government use; the enormous baroque palace at Ludwigsburg, for example, housed a number of institutions, including the district authorities and the archives of the finance and interior ministries.¹⁰⁵ Before long, these somewhat haphazard allocations proved lacking as certain departments came to require more space. In late November 1920, it was therefore decided to establish a special committee to which the examination of such needs would be

100. Walter Leisner, *Monarchisches Hausrecht in demokratischer Gleichheitsordnung: Der Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds in Bayern* (Erlangen, 1968), p. 27.

101. Alfred Dehlinger, *Württembergs Staatswesen in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung bis heute*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1951-1953), vol I, p. 174.

102. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 1664, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 15.03.1919.

103. *Adreß-Buch der Königlichen Haupt- und Residenzstadt Stuttgart* (Stuttgart, 1918), pp. 1-2.

104. Wilhelm Kohlhaas, *Chronik der Stadt Stuttgart 1918-1933* (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 264.

105. Dehlinger, *Württembergs Staatswesen*, vol. II, pp. 789-791.

delegated.¹⁰⁶ A similar move was undertaken in Bavaria in March 1921 after conflicting requirements brought cabinet meetings to a gridlock.¹⁰⁷ In Darmstadt, the government's focus rested on the *Altes Palais* in the city centre. By June 1922, its 152 rooms were occupied by the state's revenue office, the labour ministry, the department for agriculture and food, and the police force. But even this was insufficient. In October 1919, the government approached the *Landtag* for 174,000 Marks to renovate the building.¹⁰⁸ By mid-1922, the sum had grown to 2.6 million Marks, covering not only a renovation of the existing structure but the addition of a whole new story and thirty-eight offices.¹⁰⁹

Despite considerable pressures to keep the ship of state afloat, even the most radical ministers were not prepared simply to gut historic buildings. In February 1919, when the workers' council in Munich was crying out for extra space, the possibility of opening up state rooms in the *Wittelsbacherpalais* or the *Residenz* was vehemently slapped down by USPD stalwarts Hans Unterleitner, the minister for social security (and son-in-law of Kurt Eisner), and finance minister Edgar Jaffé.¹¹⁰ In the mid-1920s, Wilhelm Bazille, at the other end of the political spectrum, spoke similarly in response to a request by a charity to use the White Hall of the *Neues Schloß* in Stuttgart. "It would hurt [my] feelings of piety," he declared, "to just hand over the palace for any old event. [It] simply must be retained for symbolic events of state."¹¹¹ A similar sentiment was expressed in Württemberg regarding the *Wilhelmspalais*. It had been inherited by King Wilhelm's grandsons in 1924, who then sold it to the *Württembergische Girozentrale*, spurning a less generous offer from the government. The regime eagerly hoped to reacquire the superbly located palace to accommodate the *Staatsministerium* and bolstered its case with emotive appeals to reverence and respect. How could they sit by and permit the beloved king's home to be used for unseemly private business?¹¹² This stance received support in the press,¹¹³ but evidently had little effect on the *Girozentrale* which held out for five years before sanctioning a sale.

106. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 215, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 02.11.1920.

107. BayHStA, MA, 99516, Ministerratssitzung, 30.03.1921.

108. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, 38. Sitzung, 16.10.1919, p. 990.

109. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, II. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 287, 13.06.1922; *Verh. LT. Hess.*, II. Landtag, 31. Sitzung, 09.08.1922, p. 649.

110. BayHStA, MA, 99512, Ministerratssitzung, 18.02.1919.

111. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 219, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 19.12.1924.

112. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 1664, Nr. 205, 23.01.1925.

113. 'Die Zukunft des Wilhelmspalasts!', *Schwäbische Kronik* 31, 21.01.1925; 'Vom Wilhelmspalast', *Stuttgarter Neues Tageblatt* 32, 21.01.1925.

A further guiding motivation of the governments' negotiators was a concern to protect and maintain the cultural goods of the state. Like offices for civil servants, spaces for the storage and exhibition of Germany's natural history, art, and ethnographic collections were scarce, and had been for some years. As early as 29 November 1918, the Württembergian ministry responsible for education and culture raised the possibility of using the state's fortress-like castles to alleviate the problem.¹¹⁴ Only a day later, the *Münchener Zeitung* echoed this call in Bavaria. Its correspondent suggested moving the state's collection of modern art into the *Königsbau*, but it was the main residence which drew the greatest attention. As a building of such symbolic value and provenance, "it can—indeed, it must—be used solely for the storage and exhibition of state collections." Having been continually and consistently modified by a succession of Bavarian monarchs, each inspired by the styles of their time, the residence was a living embodiment of architectural history—a ready-made museum in and of itself. In bidding farewell to the Wittelsbachs, the Bavarian people would gain a cultural institution without equal in the world, and all without spending a Pfennig.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, the call to treat palaces as artefacts in their own right found support in an unlikely place. Württemberg's soldiers' and workers' council addressed concerns to the provisional government in early 1919 that its members had noticed a number of paintings missing from the *Altes Schloss* after it inspected the premises. These artworks were the private property of the House of Württemberg and had been removed following the deal in November the previous year. In its letter, the council demanded that they be returned, citing the necessity that the palace—"a historic landmark of the erstwhile splendour and sovereignty of [Württemberg's] rulers"—be kept wholly intact and passed to the next generation of citizens.¹¹⁶

Requisitioning royal palaces for government offices and state museums was intrinsically bound up in the self-portrayal and outward representation of the respective regimes. This was not new. As Mikolaj Getka-Kenig writes, palaces were a vital tool for post-revolutionary regimes in the early nineteenth century in their drive to emphasise prestige and stability.¹¹⁷ Pragmatics may have moved many provincial administrations into palaces and castles, but it

114. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 1664, Nr. 7973, 29.11.1918.

115. H. Sepp, 'Die Zukunft der Residenz und der Königsschlösser', *Münchener Zeitung* 334, 30.11.1918.

116. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 1664, Landesausschuss der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte Württembergs to Provisorische Regierung, 05.03.1919.

117. Mikolaj Getka-Kenig, 'In Pursuit of Social Allies: Royal Residences and Political Legitimacy in Post-Revolutionary Europe, 1804-1830', in: Elena Woodacre et al. (eds.), *The Routledge History of Monarchy* (London, 2019), p. 375.

cannot be doubted that their lavish quarters also provided a form of outward representation with which people were familiar. This continuity and symbolism were vital for regimes still tottering in the shadow of the fallen monarchy. Senior ministers were installed in grace-and-favour apartments in former royal palaces, including Württemberg's first *Staatspräsident* Wilhelm Blos, who resided in the court chamberlain's five-room apartment in the *Altes Schloss* until his death in 1927.¹¹⁸ In Bavaria, meanwhile, the *Prinz-Karl-Palais* was earmarked for the minister president.¹¹⁹

One final motivation, uniquely followed by negotiators in Württemberg, was a desire to establish a republican monopoly on symbolic state buildings. In Darmstadt and Munich, deposed royals continued to reside in urban palaces throughout the Weimar era. This was not to be so in Stuttgart. Before the end of 1918, the new republican government rescinded the right of Duke Albrecht and his brothers, Dukes Robert and Ulrich, to live in the state-owned *Prinzenbau* and *Kronprinzenpalais*, forcing them to vacate their homes by the end of March 1919.¹²⁰ There was little risk of the family being made homeless, however. In December 1918, ex-King Wilhelm offered Altshausen Castle to his three cousins, who moved in shortly afterwards. Altshausen was part of the *Hofkammergut* and therefore out of the government's reach. As happy as the family may have been, tucked away in the countryside, they still fought to maintain a presence in the former residence city. The divorce from Stuttgart had been sudden and upsetting; in the spring of 1919, as he packed away the contents of the *Kronprinzenpalais*, Duke Philipp Albrecht wrote to his father that "it all looks so sad in the palace—completely cold and empty."¹²¹ As discussed above, the family rejected the government's offer in 1923 to relinquish its art collection for Bebenhausen Castle, holding out for property in Stuttgart itself. Wary of the political implications such a move would entail (and realising the value of urban properties, both financially and for the administration), the state demurred, and the final deal made no provision for property in the city.

118. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Nr. 149, 18.04.1925.

119. BayHStA, MA, 99514, Ministerratssitzung, 03.01.1920.

120. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, I. Landtag, Beilage 1, p. 40.

121. AHW, 331, Nr. 160, 16.02.1919.

Parliamentary scrutiny

Negotiating with the former royal houses was the reserve of the executive or, more specifically, of senior officials in the ministries of justice and finance. The respective legislatures, meanwhile, empowered the governments to approach the royal houses and reserved the right to approve resultant deals. This was a long-standing right; before the revolution, approving the civil list—usually on the accession of a new monarch—was the only opportunity elected politicians had to regulate and openly scrutinise the monarchy. Signatories to the deals in 1918, 1919, 1923, 1927 and 1930 would no doubt recall the contentious and violent debates which erupted on these occasions.¹²² Deputies in Stuttgart, for example, had last been called upon to adjudicate in 1913, when the SPD loudly refused to approve an increase in King Wilhelm's funding.¹²³

With one exception, each financial settlement had to overcome similarly stormy receptions. This applied whether the government which passed it was predominantly socialist, as in Hessen in 1919 and 1930, or dominated by the *bürgerlich* parties, as in Bavaria in 1923 and Württemberg in 1927. The unique ease with which Württemberg's 1918 deal passed may be explained by King Wilhelm's considerable popularity, even amongst the state's socialists, and the fact that Wilhelm Bloch secured the backing of the soldiers' and workers' councils (as well as his two cabinet colleagues from the USPD). Subsequent governments, however, were confronted by opposition based around one or more of the following five arguments. Firstly, there was rejection based on a fundamental disagreement with the government's reliance on (and interpretation of) the law and the consequent implication that it was blind to contingent political and economic crises. This position was summarised most cogently by the Bavarian SPD deputy Max Süßheim: "[w]e Social Democrats protest that this question is only receiving formal judicial attention without consideration of the total overhaul of legal and political conditions which was induced by the revolution."¹²⁴ How could the government be throwing pots of money at the deposed dynasties when the people lived in squalor and deprivation? The issue of housing is one which was raised repeatedly. To left-wing deputies in Bavaria, Wittelsbach ownership of palaces would leave them empty and wasted.¹²⁵ In

122. See, for example: Müller, *Royal Heirs*, pp. 30-35, 211.

123. See: *Die Erhöhung der Zivilliste des Königs von Württemberg: Eine Auseinandersetzung über Monarchie und Republik im württembergischen Landtag*, ed. Landesvorstand der Sozialdemokraten Württembergs (Stuttgart, 1913).

124. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 3. Sitzung, 07.05.1920, p. 146.

125. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, p. 1080. See also: *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 3. Sitzung, 07.05.1920, pp. 148-149.

Hessen, meanwhile, the communist Heinrich Galm argued that the fifteen million Marks earmarked for the grand ducal family would solve the state's housing crisis at a stroke.¹²⁶ It became a common refrain to expound on the dynasties' vast existing wealth; why should they be further subsidised by the state?¹²⁷

These criticisms were inherently tied up with additional disagreement over the government's interpretation of the law—influenced, in the minds of the left, by expert opinions from the still strongly monarchist judiciary—which appeared to consistently side with the royals.¹²⁸ Two examples give a flavour of these complaints. Deputies in Stuttgart dismissed the authorities' dubious logic that Queen Charlotte's pension was *staatsrechtlich* (and thus eligible for increases in line with inflation) rather than private because King Wilhelm had still been head of state when he signed the 1918 treaty.¹²⁹ To their colleagues in Munich, meanwhile, the Wittelsbach Compensation Fund looked suspiciously similar to the *Familienfideikommission* which Bavaria had banned in 1919.¹³⁰ Unsurprisingly, these observations were accompanied by vociferous allegations of unfair play and preferential treatment.

Opposition was further motivated by a more visceral rejection of monarchy, both as a constitutional construct and as a blight on German history. While the Social Democrats were, for the most part, respectful, Communists and Independent Socialists pulled no punches in their evaluations. The royals were “parasites and bloodsuckers”—indolent individuals who had led wholly unproductive lives and brought murder and misery to Germany by plunging the empire into war.¹³¹ Respective *Landtagspräsidenten* were regularly forced to call deputies to order for unparliamentary language.¹³² In Darmstadt, the grand duke was enjoined to be grateful that he had escaped the revolution with his life.¹³³ Further south in Stuttgart, Gustav

126. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 25. Sitzung, 05.06.1928, p. 605.

127. This line of argument was regularly disseminated to the public through party organs. In the case of Württemberg, see: ‘Seh’n Sie: das ist ein Geschäft!’, *Neckar-Echo* 73, 26.03.1924; ‘Etwas von armen Leuten’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 75, 28.03.1924; ‘Verschwendung von Staatsgeldern’, *Volkszeitung Eßlingen* 101, 01.05.1924; ‘Monarchischer Lügenschmus’, *Donau-Wacht (Ulm)* 240, 15.10.1926.

128. Cf. Stentzel, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Politik’; Lorenz, ‘Zivilgesellschaft zwischen Freude und Frustration’, p. 136.

129. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, II. Landtag, Beilage 1008, 07.02.1923, pp. 215–218; *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 163. Sitzung, 30.06.1927, p. 4155.

130. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, p. 1080. Entailed estates had been abolished by the *Gesetz über die Aufhebung der Fideikommissionen vom 28. März 1919*. Cf. Hartmut Fischer, *Die Auflösung der Fideikommissionen und anderer gebundener Vermögen in Bayern nach 1918* (Baden-Baden, 2013), chap. 6.

131. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 125. Sitzung, 16.10.1931, p. 3322.

132. Cf. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 160. Sitzung, 18.06.1927, pp. 4145–4146.

133. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, III. Landtag, 3. Sitzung, 29.01.1926, p. 14.

Köhler (KPD) likewise regretted that the Germans had not followed the examples of January 1793 and July 1918.¹³⁴ The war was the focal point of many attacks,¹³⁵ especially in Bavaria where King Ludwig III's wartime annexationism still riled, but deputies also looked to the past. In a rare, if typically 1848-inspired rebuke from the DDP benches in Hessen, Julius Reiber painted the German dynasties as perennial obstacles to progress and national unity.¹³⁶ In slightly less dreamy tones, meanwhile, both the Hessian and Württembergian dynasties were accused of selling off their own *Landeskinder* to foreign states and military forces, including Napoleon's *Grande Armée*.¹³⁷ It is evident that these debates offered the opportunity to release pent up frustrations; proceedings were highly charged and rambunctious with numerous shouting matches taking place during speeches. Most accusations were aimed at whole dynasties or the idea of monarchy in general. Of individual royals, Duke Albrecht of Württemberg received the most flak. Indeed, the impersonal, Catholic, and *habsburgnah* Albrecht suffered so much from unfavourable comparisons with the late King Wilhelm, who was still lauded by Social Democrats some years after his death, that his confidant, *Staatspräsident* Wilhelm Bazille, was forced to intervene and downplay Wilhelm's commitment to democracy in order to protect Albrecht's reputation.¹³⁸

Attacks on Albrecht were motivated by a fear that state funds would be used for subversive ends. This was a particularly thorny issue in Württemberg. Unlike the ex-king, Albrecht had never formally renounced his claims to the throne, despite persistent prodding by the provisional government in late 1918. His habits, moreover, of styling himself "Royal Highness" and attending veterans' events in military uniform (both standard practices for class-conscious royals seeking to maintain social standards, as will be discussed in chapter five) were interpreted as revealing outright rejection of the republic and implying seditious agitation.¹³⁹ Albrecht was far from the only victim of such accusations. In one particularly perplexing instance, the SPD in Hessen called on the government to prohibit the grand duke

134. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 160. Sitzung, 18.06.1927, pp. 4105-4106.

135. Cf. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 3. Sitzung, 07.05.1920, pp. 148, 152; *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, pp. 1085-1086.

136. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 125. Sitzung, 16.10.1931, p. 3324.

137. Cf. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 160. Sitzung, 18.06.1927, pp. 4095, 4156; *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 125. Sitzung, 16.10.1931, p. 3331.

138. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 160. Sitzung, 18.06.1927, p. 4099; 163. Sitzung, 30.06.1927, pp. 4157-4158.

139. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 160. Sitzung, 18.06.1927, pp. 4092, 4105.

from using his allocated funds “for the purposes of high treason.”¹⁴⁰ For the Bavarian left, meanwhile, the fact that the Wittelsbachs had been granted palaces scattered across the state was especially suspicious and revealed a cunning plan to drum up support amongst disparate sections of the population for a monarchist restoration.¹⁴¹

A final ploy of the left was to imply that the property the royals claimed had been illegitimately acquired. This argument tied in with the historical criticisms of monarchy mentioned above. In all three states, the dynasties were accused of compiling their extensive portfolios through centuries of extortion, violence, and theft, to the constant detriment of their own people.¹⁴² Heinrich Galm of the KPD in Hessen excoriated the government’s deal for changing nothing and acknowledging Ernst Ludwig’s continued right “to plunder the Hessian people.”¹⁴³ In Bavaria, such arguments had an additional dimension. Throughout the Weimar era, the Wittelsbachs were cocooned by their supporters in the rhetoric of an “ancestral dynasty” [*angestammtes Herrscherhaus*] which enjoyed a 1000-year-long relationship with its people.¹⁴⁴ During the *Landtag* debates, Franz Aenderl of Regensburg (Bavarian since 1810) and Friedrich Ackermann of Edenkoben in the Palatinate (Bavarian since 1816) took exception. For the greater majority of Bavarians, they argued, the Wittelsbachs had been rulers—sometimes distant ones—for little more than a century and had taken control of their homelands through force and underhand tactics.¹⁴⁵

Democratisation of royal property

For all of its noise and rancour, the opposition of the Weimar left was ultimately thwarted by the operative and quiet support of the ZP, DDP, and bourgeois parties for the settlements. Once passed, the deals instituted a fundamental change in the status of royal property and the people’s relationship with it. During the Weimar era, palaces which had once stood as impenetrable edifices of royal power were opened to the public as museums and adopted by their representatives as ministerial offices. In comparison with pre-

140. *Verh. LT., Hess.*, II. Landtag, 61. Sitzung, 11.06.1923, p. 1302ff. See also: *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 25. Sitzung, 05.06.1928, p. 606.

141. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, p. 1087.

142. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 25. Sitzung, 05.06.1928, p. 606; *Verh. LT. Württ.*, III. Landtag, 160. Sitzung, 18.06.1927, pp. 4094-4095, 4136.

143. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, IV. Landtag, 125. Sitzung, 16.10.1931, p. 3321.

144. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 178. Sitzung, 08.03.1923, p. 1084.

145. *Ibid.*

revolutionary arrangements, this signified a noticeable democratisation. It was, however, modest compared with the demands of some, who called for confiscation of all palaces without compensation. This radical policy came to the fore during the 1926 referendum campaign but had already been considered and advocated for some years. Even before Wilhelm II departed the *Wilhelmspalast* in the evening of 9 November 1918, revolutionaries had graffitied “property of the people” [*Volkseigentum*] on its outer walls.¹⁴⁶ Two weeks later, the city’s workers’ council passed a resolution to “declare all parks and palaces property of the people and to immediately open them up to the general public.”¹⁴⁷ To the south of the state, the council in Friedrichshafen wrote directly to Wilhelm II, asking him to relinquish possession of the town’s castle.¹⁴⁸ The most heavy-hitting support for this general policy came from the USPD and KPD which inundated governments at both *Reich* and state level with motions demanding its implementation.¹⁴⁹ Each of these advocates hoped to use Germany’s palaces as convalescent homes [*Erholungsstätte*] or affordable housing to provide relief for its downtrodden population and returning troops.

At a less dogmatic level, individual German citizens also looked to royal palaces for their salvation. After its financial agreement with the former grand duke was published in early 1919, the government in Darmstadt was besieged with requests from hard-up locals wishing to take advantage of this apparently communal windfall.¹⁵⁰ A company of tax accountants asked for rooms in the *Altes Palais*, *Jagdhaus* or *Kanzlei* as the building from which they customarily operated was being sold. A stenography school was forced to leave its premises after they were requisitioned to battle the city’s housing shortage. The school asked if any “former grand ducal” building might be available for them to use. Most delightfully, one Wilhelm Wagner petitioned the government for a meadow in the *Herrngarten*—a large, former royal park in the centre of Darmstadt—on which to graze three goats he had bought during

146. Oskar Gerhardt, *Unser unvergeßlicher guter König! Ernste und heitere Erinnerungen aus dem Leben Wilhelms II. von Württemberg*, 4th ed. (Stuttgart, 1934), p. 51.

147. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, vol. I, pp. 413-414.

148. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Nr. 864, 15.04.1919.

149. See, for example: *Verh. RT.*, I. Wahlperiode, 111. Sitzung, 03.06.1921, p. 3786; *Verh. RT.*, I. Wahlperiode, Aktenstück 2701, 27.09.1921; *Verh. RT.*, I. Wahlperiode, 236. Sitzung, 25.06.1922; *Verh. RT.*, I. Wahlperiode, Aktenstück Nr. 4737, 12.07.1922. This campaign was particularly persistent in Hessen, see: *Verh. LT. Hess.*, III. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 405, 08.12.1925; III. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 428, 12.12.1925; IV. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 968, 29.09.1931; IV. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 969, 29.09.1931; IV. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 983, 12.10.1931; V. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 183, 12.02.1932; VI. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 24, 07.07.1932; VI. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 54, 14.07.1932.

150. See HStAD, O 24, 50/19.

the war and could no longer afford to feed. Despite the evident distress and urgency of these requests, each was returned with a standard and simple, though unexplained note of rejection. Similar representations were made in Stuttgart, but as in Hessen, royal property did not become *Volkseigentum* in Württemberg, or anywhere else, after 1918. Instead, it housed government offices, grace-and-favour apartments, and state museums. Citizens of the new republics could make themselves at home, but only until closing time.

Many German palaces emerged in the post-monarchical world as museums of state culture and state history. To some degree, this repurposing was merely a continuation of trends and processes many decades old.¹⁵¹ Under the *Kaiserreich*, so-called *Heimatismuseen* reached their zenith with over three hundred and seventy being founded between unification in 1871 and the revolution in 1918.¹⁵² Monarchs, meanwhile, patronised museums on similar lines, either as “prestige projects” or as a means for implanting the historical legitimacy of their dynasties in the minds of (often recently annexed) subjects.¹⁵³ Before his deposition, Ernst Ludwig of Hessen had been a dedicated patron of Darmstadt’s *Landesmuseum*, overseeing the construction of a palatial and specially-designed home for its collections in 1897. In 1924, he took up the reigns once more, donating his vast collections to establish a museum in the now state-owned *Altes Schloss* in the centre of the city. In ninety-seven rooms across three floors, this curious example of royal-republican cooperation painted Hessen’s history through books, works of art, military uniforms, weapons, natural history curios, musical instruments, silhouettes, and over nine hundred painted miniatures.¹⁵⁴ Together, these treasures attracted over thirty-five thousand visitors between 1924 and 1929, with the vast majority taking tours during the summer months. The museum was not a money-making scheme. Rooms in the *Altes Schloss* were made available by the state free of charge and the enterprise was administered by Kuno Graf von Hardenberg—Ernst Ludwig’s court chamberlain—without pay. Any profit which did accrue went straight into the state’s coffers.¹⁵⁵ In the first sixth months of the 1924 financial year, the museum produced a profit of 2,125 Marks and in the

151. Cf. Constanze Breuer, Bärbel Holtz, and Paul Kahl (eds.), *Die Musealisierung der Nation: Ein kulturpolitisches Gestaltungsmodell des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 2015).

152. Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, p. 134.

153. Mergen, *Monarchiejubiläen*, pp. 34-37; Dieter J. Weiß, ‘Das Wittelsbacher Königtum—Entwicklung des Legitimitätsprinzips’, in: Hasselhorn and von Knorring (eds.), *Vom Olymp zum Boulevard*, p. 166.

154. *Ernst Ludwig Großherzog von Hessen und bei Rhein: Eine Erinnerung an seinem Heimgang, 8.-12. Oktober 1937* (Darmstadt, 1937), pp. 14-15.

155. HStAD, O 24, 50/19, Abteilung III to Finanzministerium, 30.01.1925.

following half-year only 210 Marks.¹⁵⁶ By the end of 1926, the total profit since the museum's grand opening stood at the princely total of eleven Marks and eleven Pfennigs.¹⁵⁷ This was partly a consequence of deliberately low ticket prices; in line with practice at equivalent institutions in Berlin and Munich, adults were charged one Mark (or two if foreign) and children and students were admitted at half-price.¹⁵⁸

Elsewhere, most notably in Bavaria, former royal palaces were opened to the public as museums in themselves which provided a glimpse into the glittering lives of past kings. Some sites, most notably Linderhof, Herrenchiemsee, and Neuschwanstein, were established attractions before the revolution, but the practice took off noticeably after 1918. In 1920, the *Residenz* in Munich was opened up and by 1937 its 157 rooms made it the world's largest historically furnished palace museum.¹⁵⁹ Following the conclusion of the 1923 settlement, the Bavarian government gained ownership of a further slew of historic buildings and the right to admit the public to others when the royals were not in residence. In the first year after the deal was signed, nearly 325,000 tickets were sold at fourteen sites across the state, with more than a third of all visitors making the trip to Herrenchiemsee or Neuschwanstein. In the process, the government's funds were augmented to the tune of 620,000 Marks.¹⁶⁰ This level of interest was generally steady across the period—by 1931, the properties had brought in nearly five million Marks—though it is clear that exigent circumstances could rapidly curtail the palaces' value to the state. Inflation in 1922 and 1923, for example, saw a rapid decline in visitor numbers to those palaces already open, leading to concerned reports from the *Regierungspräsident* in Upper Bavaria. Bloated entry fees—reaching at least 150 Marks per person at Linderhof—were beyond the means of the average Bavarian, Gustav von Kahr warned, and were scaring away groups of foreign tourists whose “thirst for culture” [*Bildungsbedürfnis*] did not outweigh their pecuniary prudence.¹⁶¹ The contentious referendum on princely property in 1926 had a similarly deleterious effect with fourteen of the fifteen palaces then open recording a drop in visitor numbers on the year before.¹⁶²

156. HStAD, O 24, 50/26.

157. HStAD, O 24, 50/26, HD 1515, 22.11.1927.

158. HStAD, O 24, 50/24, Allgemeine Bestimmungen über den Besuch des Schloßmuseums in Darmstadt.

159. Marc Schalenberg, ‘Schlösser zu Museen: Umnutzungen von Residenzbauten in Berlin und München während der Weimarer Republik’, in: Biskup and Kohlrusch (eds.), *Das Erbe der Monarchie*, pp. 194-197.

160. BayHStA, MF, 70351, Besuch der Schlösser, n.d. [likely 1931/32].

161. BayHStA, MA, 102136, Halbmonatsbericht des Regierungspräsidenten von Oberbayern, 23.05.1922 and 22.06.1922.

162. BayHStA, MF, 70351, Besuch der Schlösser, n.d. [likely 1931/32].

While the financial settlements benefited the states and their people in a number of ways, their consequences for the royals were more ambivalent. During the *Landtag* debate on Württemberg's 1927 deal, the DDP deputy Adolf Scheef suggested that "the House of Württemberg is facilitating the people's farewell to its former royal house." Was he right? In a sense, yes. The passing of the final financial settlement brought a decade of contentious negotiations to an end and removed the dynasty from local headlines. Monarchy's place in the public consciousness was undoubtedly not as dominant thereafter. But it is possible to take this argument too far. The House of Württemberg withdrew to the countryside, a move motivated by its private holdings in the south of the state and the government's monopoly on palaces in Stuttgart. Unlike its predecessors of centuries past, however, it did not flee into foreign exile. The royal dynasties in Hessen and Bavaria, meanwhile, remained visible presences in their former residence towns—a direct consequence of the financial settlements. Under the deal of April 1919, Ernst Ludwig was entitled to maintain offices for his administration in the castle.¹⁶³ The government also permitted him to rent various storage rooms, including the wine cellar, the linen room, and the silver, glass, and porcelain chambers. By the mid-1920s, grand ducal motor cars still occupied half of the former court garage.¹⁶⁴ In some cases, this largesse on the part of the government bordered on full cooperation, particularly when cultural or charitable causes were concerned. In 1922, Ernst Ludwig rented the so-called *Prinz-Georg-Palais* (actually a large, late baroque garden house in Darmstadt's *Herrngarten*) in which to house his extensive collection of porcelain.¹⁶⁵ The annual rent of two thousand Marks was waived by the government in 1925 on the basis that there existed "a public interest in making [such] a valuable collection open to the public."¹⁶⁶ A year later, the government permitted the grand ducal court to use the office of the former court quartermaster rent-free "so long as the room is exclusively used for the purposes of welfare work."¹⁶⁷ In Darmstadt one could thus catch a glimpse of a curious sight: representatives of the old order and the new working from the same palace.

163. HStAD, O 24, 50/19, Abteilung III to Finanzministerium, 30.01.1925.

164. Ibid.

165. HStAD, O 24, 50/23, Mietvertrag, 22.07.1922.

166. HStAD, O 24, 50/24, FMB 5083, 05.04.1929.

167. HStAD, O 24, 51/20, FMB 5429, 09.02.1926.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the property dispute between the dynasties and the states was the high point of the Weimar Republic's confrontation with its royal past. More than any other issue, it forced leading republicans, as well as the general population, to take a stance on the legacy of monarchy. Existing literature focuses almost exclusively on what was *not* achieved by the referendum of 1926. This approach, however, paints a misleading picture—namely one of a highly contentious, fraught, and Manichean struggle. By examining the question of princely property from the beginning (and from the perspectives of the dynasties, the executives, and the people), this chapter has challenged this image. While lengthy, negotiations were usually respectful and civil and served as a means of thanking the dynasties for their contributions to the state. The question at the heart of the issue—whether the royals had a right to maintain a pre-revolutionary lifestyle—was simple, but it demanded far more than a choice between expropriation or nothing.

In each state, the ultimate answer was one of qualified approval, principally because the law required that it be so, but also because an appreciation and reverence for the dynasties and their historic ties to the states demanded equity, even generosity. In no sense did this involve a restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*, but it cannot be denied that the dynasties continued to live in considerable comfort and splendour after 1918. As debates in the respective legislatures also reveal, however, the issue was inherently polarising. It caused dramatic rifts between the political right and left and even within individual parties; at various points in the 1920s, the SPD-led government in Hessen was threatened with collapse as it struggled to convince its own party of the virtues of a settlement. Of note, secondly, is the significance of the property question in demonstrating the sea-change in German political, social, and cultural life. The financial settlements reveal the federal princes' pre-revolutionary monopoly on palaces and castles and their roles as employers and cultural patrons; once they were signed and passed, however, this was inverted. Royal property became gradually and moderately democratised as the state took over as the protector of its cultural heritage. While Germany's royals no longer ruled from their palaces, the financial settlements of the 1920s codified their right to reside within them (and, more importantly, provided the means so to do). The following chapter will explore what life was like inside and depict Weimar as it was seen by the monarchs from atop their ancestral turrets.

Chapter IV

Federal prince (ret'd): The royal experience of revolution and republic

The weeks and months which followed the German revolutions were a time of high and ambivalent emotion. The war was lost, and the familiar order had collapsed with disconcerting ease. Fear of revolutionary violence—and anti-revolutionary reprisals—was widespread, as was worry at the presumed impending chaos of mass demobilisation.¹ Ernst Troeltsch, the Berlin-based theologian and historian, wrote revealingly at the end of November 1918 that “[o]ne still fears for the most elementary personal existence...when you leave the house, you cannot help to wonder that houses and trees are still standing.”² In some cases, shock and despair had psychosomatic effects. Moritz Föllmer has discussed, for example, how heart attacks, chest infections, and nervous breakdowns were not uncommon amongst elites overworked by the war and concerned by threats from France and the German left wing.³

Nevertheless, this was also a period of hope and opportunity. Revolution accelerates time and widens the spectrum of what appears possible, and in Germany things were no different.⁴ With the *Kaiserreich* seemingly consigned to history, visions abounded of a reformed and truly united Germany; of welcoming Austria into the fold; of erecting an all-encompassing welfare society; and of taking to the world stage on a par with the great powers. Beside the conviction that Germany remained undefeated—stoked most infamously by Friedrich Ebert—such exaltation of the possible made this period a “dreamland,” as Troeltsch observed.⁵ Some

1. For a discussion of fear in this period, see: Russell A. Spinney, ‘A Nation in Peril? Rethinking how Fear Influenced Everyday Life and Politics in the Weimar Republic’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2009), here pp. 124-135.

2. Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Der Ausbruch der Revolution’ [30.11.1918], in: *Spektator-Briefe: Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik 1918/1922* (Tübingen, 1924), p. 23, quoted in: Jones, *Founding Weimar*, p. 110.

3. Moritz Föllmer, ‘Der “kranke Volkskörper”’: Industrielle, hohe Beamte und der Diskurs der nationalen Regeneration in der Weimarer Republik’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27:1 (2001), pp. 41-67.

4. Reinhart Koselleck argues that revolution produces an “unconscious secularisation of the eschatological expectation,” see: ‘Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution’, in: idem, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA, 1985), p. 47.

5. For Ebert’s remarks, see: Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (London, 2003), pp. 203-205; Barth, *Dolchstoßlegenden*, p. 214f.

historians, most notably Rüdiger Graf and others who have worked to recast “crisis” in a positive and productive light, maintain that “creative optimism” [*Gestaltungsoptimismus*]⁶—defined, at times, so broadly as to be all-encompassing—crossed party divides and survived throughout the Weimar era.⁶ Graf’s interpretation is a direct challenge to the more dominant diagnosis of a widespread pessimism which gripped Germany once the dusts of the revolution had settled. According to this line of argument, the utopian expectations aroused in late 1918 and early 1919 were unrealistic and, in the words of Thomas Mergel, “essentially doomed to be disappointed.”⁷ While a moment of great excitement, the revolution was also Weimar’s Achilles heel. The discrepancy between aspiration and reality—which lies at the heart of emotional responses to historical events—induced noticeable dissatisfaction after 1918 and alienation from the republic. Indeed, Peter Fritzsche goes so far as to argue that historians, in seeking to understand the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, must first grasp the shattering of “expectations for national renewal” in 1914 and 1918.⁸

Against this background, the present chapter seeks to explore how the deposed royal dynasties experienced the revolution and the Weimar Republic. Their perspective is of interest for two principal reasons. Firstly, and unusually for deposed royalty, they remained in their territories and uniquely witnessed the construction of the republic which succeeded them. Secondly, the royals were the most obvious victims of the revolution. Of all Germans, they tumbled from the greatest height—but arguably did not fall furthest. How did they react to and explain their downfall? To what extent was November 1918 a major turning point in their lives? Was the experience common to all members of the former ruling class? In answering these questions, the chapter makes two main arguments. Firstly, that royal responses were complex and ambivalent. In a reversal of the ‘classical’ response outlined above, the royals’ initial feelings of shock and fatalism, which were provoked by their curious

6. Cf. Graf, *Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik*.

7. Thomas Mergel, ‘High Expectations—Deep Disappointment: Structures of the Public Perception of Politics in the Weimar Republic’, in: Canning, Barndt, and McGuire (eds.), *Weimar Subjects/Weimar Publics*, pp. 192–210. See also: Thomas Mergel, ‘Führer, Volksgemeinschaft und Maschine: Politische Erwartungsstrukturen in der Weimarer Republik und dem Nationalsozialismus 1918–1936’, in: Wolfgang Hardtwig (ed.), *Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918–1939* (Göttingen, 2005), pp. 91–127; Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford, 1993), p. 254; Moritz Föllmer, ‘The Problem of National Solidarity in Interwar Germany’, *German History* 23:2 (2005), pp. 202–231; McElligott, *Rethinking the Weimar Republic*, p. 70.

8. Peter Fritzsche, ‘Breakdown or Breakthrough? Conservatives and the November Revolution’, in: Larry Eugene Jones and James N. Retallack (eds.), *Reform, Reaction and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945* (Providence, 1993), pp. 301–302.

perspective on events, gradually gave way to acceptance, even relief. Indeed, notwithstanding a tangible (if relative) decline in their quality of life, the revolutions of 1918 may be seen as a form of liberation for the deposed dynasties. For the most part, they were safe and unharried, and able to devote energies to personal projects without the burdens of responsibility and expectation which came with the crown. Moving on, the chapter secondly argues that the royals assimilated surprisingly quickly and quietly into republican life. If neither model nor devoted republicans, they nonetheless participated in elections, opposed putschism, were politically informed, and praised the performance of their democratically elected successors. These responses were similar across (and within) the various German dynasties, but they were not totally uniform. Age, in particular, played an important role in determining the rate and scale of a prince's acclimatisation.

Fear and fatalism

The November Revolutions unleashed a multitude of emotions. Indifference was not amongst them. Aside from the weight of history and tradition which came crashing down, the story had a personal side as well. As Martin Kohlrausch notes in his study on media in the *Kaiserreich*, by 1918 everyone had an opinion on Wilhelm II, and thus all had an opinion on his downfall.⁹ Some were ecstatic, others incredulous, as one would expect from such a divisive figure. The German nobles and monarchs, naturally, were members of this second category. Indeed, as Stephan Malinowski has demonstrated, “fear, despair and fury” were defining leitmotifs in noble depictions of the revolutionary period.¹⁰ In his memoirs, the Badenese diplomat and nobleman Eugen von Jagemann opened his chapter on 1918 with the sad reflection that “this was the saddest year of my life.”¹¹ Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau, a preeminent Junker, meanwhile struggled to “find the words to describe [his] pain...to illustrate what shattered inside [him].” In November 1918, he “felt a world collapse and bury beneath its wreckage everything which had made up [his] life.”¹²

As will be discussed below, the royals initially felt similar pangs of misery and fatalism, but their first emotion was one of profound shock. Even amongst the far left, the abolition of the monarchy had never been seriously mooted and yet, within a few days, a supposedly

9. Kohlrausch, *Monarch im Skandal*, p. 302.

10. See: Malinowski, *Vom König zum Führer*, pp. 203-209.

11. Eugen von Jagemann, *75 Jahren des Erlebens und Erfahrens (1849-1925)* (Heidelberg, 1925), p. 284.

12. Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau, *Erinnerungen* (Leipzig, 1936), p. 208.

stable monarchical system collapsed completely. With few exceptions, the royals showed little inkling of what was to come. On 7 November, Ludwig III famously had to be retrieved from his afternoon stroll in Munich's *Englischer Garten* once protests in the city took on revolutionary overtones.¹³ He fled hours later, never to return. The following day, the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hessen passed through Darmstadt without let or hindrance (indeed, according to Eleonore's diary, they were "greeted warmly").¹⁴ By the next morning, they too had been deposed. A day later still, the revolution in Württemberg reached its climax with the storming of the *Wilhelmspalais* as Wilhelm II swore in his cabinet inside. Like Ludwig III, he departed his capital that evening for the final time. Unsurprisingly, disbelief reigned. On learning of events in the Bavarian capital, Crown Prince Rupprecht supposedly replied, "in Munich?! Just where you would *least* expect this!"¹⁵ Incredulous letters flowed from palace to palace asking the simple question: "whoever would have imagined it?"¹⁶ Images of the detached monarch caught unawares were smugly reproduced in the antimonarchist press, with Ludwig receiving particularly direct treatment. In one poem by Wilhelm Craemer, the clueless king, on hearing cries of "Ludwig!" and "get him out!," comically mistakes angry protests outside the palace for demonstrations of loyal devotion. "How wonderful," Ludwig exclaims, "that even at night, my dearly beloved Bavarians wish to honour me with a serenade!"¹⁷

Shock at proceedings was accompanied by a form of solipsist denial in which the southern German monarchs tried to escape the maelstrom by simply ignoring it. They took to describing the revolution as a 'development,' suggesting some form of modified continuity rather than a total caesura. On 9 November, Friedrich II of Baden's proclamation to his people referred to "the development of the German *Volksstaat*," while his neighbour Wilhelm of Württemberg made clear his determination "never to be an obstruction to the majority's desired constitutional development."¹⁸ The idea of revolution, and its implications of irrevocable change, was not welcome. Nor, for the same reasons, was formal abdication.

13. Ludwig Graf von Holnstein, 'Die Revolutionstage König Ludwigs III.', *Die Heimat: Unerhaltungs-Beilage der Münchner Neuesten Nachrichten* 10, 07.11.1928.

14. GHFA, D24, 43/8.

15. Weiß, *Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern*, p. 163. Emphasis added.

16. Two examples being: AHW, 331, Nr. 343, 10.11.1918 and HStAS, P 13 Doertenbach, Bü 193, 22.12.1918.

17. Wilhelm Craemer, 'Die Revolutionsnacht vor der Residenz', untitled and undated newspaper clipping in: GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III, Nr. 24.

18. 'An das badische Volk!', *Karlsruher Tageblatt* 312, 09.11.1918; *Verh. LT. Württ.*, 1919/1920, Beilage 1, p. 5.

Ernst Ludwig of Hessen never formally renounced his rights, evading all attempts by *Staatspräsident* Carl Ulrich to induce him to do so.¹⁹ In Württemberg, Wilhelm II's successor Duke Albrecht rebuffed similar entreaties. In Bavaria, meanwhile, whether Ludwig III abdicated was a question of interpretation and one which revealed allegiances. On 13 November, Ludwig released officials from their oath of loyalty to him. This was not intended as an abdication but was announced as such by the new regime. In the fast-flowing tumult, political expediency trumped technicalities. Nevertheless, Ludwig and the Bavarian court clung to the fact (or fiction) that he retained his rights. In the Wittelsbach archives in Munich, the papers of court treasurer Hans Freiherr von Laßberg contain a newspaper clipping from 14 November informing readers that the provisional government "had acknowledged Ludwig's abdication [*Thronverzicht*]." The operative word has been angrily underlined and adorned with several question and exclamation marks.²⁰ Following Ludwig's death three years later, Crown Prince Rupprecht caused a stir by announcing that he had "assumed the rights of [his] father."²¹ Ultimately, this evasion of reality had little tangible consequence, but it provides evidence of the confused state of mind pervasive amongst the royals and of their tactics in seeking to cope with their loss.

Considering these mental gymnastics, it is surprising that the royals developed relatively few theories to explain their demise. Only Ernst Ludwig apportioned blame onto the federal princes themselves, claiming in his memoirs to have "long ago realised the great failings of the old system."²² More commonly, the monarchs reached the reassuring and exculpating conclusion that their overthrow was an aberration promulgated by external forces. In Schwerin, for example, Grand Duke Friedrich Franz grasped at a silver lining when it transpired that the soldier who demanded his abdication was not a local, but from Vienna. Thereafter, he stuck firmly to the notion that his overthrow had been orchestrated from abroad.²³ Ludwig III likewise refused to accept any Bavarian agency in his deposition. "In Bavaria we must bear the consequences," he fulminated to his sister, Therese, "even though we had nothing to do with it. The revolution of 7 Nov[ember] was completely

19. GHFHA, D24, 62/4, Diary of Fabian Freiherr von Massenbach, 29.11.1918, 12.02.1919, and 17.02.1919.

20. 'Eine Erklärung des Königs', *Bayerischer Kurier und Münchner Fremdenblatt* 317, 14.11.1918, in: GHA, Kopien, Drucke, Tafeln, Nr. 701.

21. Quoted in: Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, p. 462.

22. Ernst Ludwig Großherzog von Hessen, *Grundideen eines konstitutionellen Fürsten*, pp. 48-49.

23. Friedrich Franz's son, Christian Ludwig, recalls the encounter in his memoirs, see: Christian Ludwig Herzog zu Mecklenburg, *Erzählungen aus meinem Leben* (Schwerin, 1998), p. 53.

unnecessary...there has never been a more loyal people than the Bavarians.”²⁴ Ludwig’s son Rupprecht approached the matter slightly differently, but still deflected blame from the dynasties. In his evaluation, the undeniable participation of the people in the overthrow of monarchy was an uncharacteristic response provoked by four years of total war. The November Revolution, he deduced,

was not the act of reasoning minds. It was the child of hunger psychosis, of the pathological condition which malnutrition had produced. We were simply at the end of our human strength. The German people were no longer themselves, and they still aren’t.²⁵

In most cases, explaining the chaos did not bring catharsis. Ernst Ludwig may have claimed to have foreseen the revolution, but his wife Eleonore informs us that he nonetheless “suffered terribly” from the change of circumstances.²⁶ More was at risk than crowns and thrones; amidst the tumult, no-one could be sure of the safety of friends, family, or even themselves. The full extent of the massacre of the Romanovs was not known outside Russia until mid-1919, leaving Ernst Ludwig of Hessen (brother of the Tsarina) in awful suspense.²⁷ Grand Duchess Eleonore, meanwhile, worried for her sister—resident in Schweidnitz in Silesia—and the threat of Polish incursions over the new border.²⁸ With hindsight, we know that no German royal was hurt—or even threatened with injury—in 1918 and 1919, but at the height of the uprisings, they could not know which path proceedings would take. During the night of 8/9 November 1918, rumours reached Darmstadt that the nearby garrison at Griesheim had mutinied and that armed troops were advancing on the city. The royal children—Princes Georg Donatus (12) and Ludwig (10) of Hessen—were quickly awoken and taken to the house of the family doctor, *Geheimrat* Happel.²⁹ As nephews of the murdered Tsar, this was a terrifying turn of events for the youngsters. Ludwig later noted his great relief at not being led into the cellar as he “knew very well what that meant.”³⁰

24. GHA, Nachlass Prinzessin Therese, Nr. 69, 24.11.1918.

25. ‘Ein Gespräch mit Kronprinz Rupprecht’, *Telegramm-Zeitung* 199, 25.10.1926.

26. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 13.11.1918.

27. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 29.03.1919.

28. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 13.02.1919.

29. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, undated account of the revolution in Hessen by Grand Duchess Eleonore.

30. GHHFA, D26, 4/1.

Fears for his safety forced the elderly Ludwig III of Bavaria into an uncomfortable and strenuous peripatetic existence in late 1918 and early 1919. Having fled Munich on 7 November for his estate at Wildenwart, reports that communist revolutionaries were seeking his head stalked him to safe houses in Traunstein, Bad Reichenhall, Berchtesgaden, St. Bartholmä, Anif (in Austria), and back again. In the aftermath of Kurt Eisner's assassination in February the following year, he was on the move once more, spending time in the Tyrol, Zizers in Switzerland, and even Vaduz in Liechtenstein.³¹ While Ludwig resided in Switzerland, his family employed a complex system of codenames to ensure his safety. The king and queen were *Alois* (or sometimes *Niedermaier*) and *Dora* respectively, while Crown Prince Rupprecht masqueraded variously as *Adolf* or *Andres*.³² In addition to adopting these personae, the family agreed never to mention the Swiss towns from which their letters were posted.³³ In both Württemberg and Hessen, meanwhile, the royal houses made contingency plans to escape to Swiss properties (Villa Seefeld in Rorschach and Tarasp Castle in Engadin respectively) should a French invasion or Munich-style uprising materialise in their states.³⁴ At no point had the revolutions hinted at regicide and the royals were unlikely targets after 1918. Nevertheless, these (ultimately unnecessary) exigent measures reveal the level of fear which gripped some in the former ruling classes. Even if the royals did not personally encounter violence, the simple spectre of it, as Helmut Neuhaus observes, was enough to affect them.³⁵

For veterans of the war like Duke Albrecht of Württemberg (an army group commander in the west) or Ludwig III's brother, Prince Leopold (Germany's supreme commander in the east), existential threats were not posed by the new regime alone, but by their former battlefield enemies. Following the armistice of 1918, the Allied powers determined to bring to justice those whom they held responsible for the conflict and its tragedies. In February 1919, a committee of the peace conference in Versailles set about drafting a list of suspects. Under §§227-230 of the final treaty, signed in June 1919 and effective from January 1920, the Allied powers assumed the right to try these men and to demand their extradition from

31. Cf. Arthur Achleitner, *Von der Umsturznacht bis zur Totenbahre: Die letzte Leidenszeit König Ludwigs III.* (Dillingen a.d.D., 1922), chaps. 5, 6, 7.

32. AHU, GU 119, Bü 651, Verzeichnis der bei der Korrespondenz des Hauses Bayern verwandten Decknamen; AHU, GU 119, Bü 1112, 19.08.1919.

33. AHU, GU 119, Bü 1099, undated instruction.

34. GHFFA, D24, 62/4, 10.11.1918 and 06.03.1919; AHW, 331, Nr. 343, 31.05.1919.

35. Neuhaus, 'Das Ende der Monarchien', p. 118. Michael Horn offers a similar argument in the context of November 1918, see: Horn, 'Zwischen Abdankung und Absetzung', p. 269.

Germany.³⁶ A final list of names—numbering almost nine hundred—was only formally presented in February 1920, but in the interim, rumours swirled over their possible identities. At the top of the list, it was clear, would be Germany’s “all-highest warlord,” the Kaiser, whose notoriety earned him his very own clause in the treaty.

The prospect of German citizens being dragged before international tribunals was outrageous and horrifying, not merely for those likely to be implicated. Wilhelm II of Württemberg spoke for all concerned in labelling the prospect “so awful, so iniquitous.”³⁷ The responses of those at risk of indictment varied. Duke Albrecht of Württemberg supposedly declared that he “could be reached at Altshausen at any time,”³⁸ though letters by Wilhelm which survive suggest that, notwithstanding his outward nonchalance, Albrecht was resigned to an inevitable death penalty.³⁹ Ernst Ludwig of Hessen was similarly passive, though less concerned. According to his wife’s diary, he planned to do nothing which would help the Allies in their cause, leaving it to them to find him, safe in the knowledge “that they cannot bring anything against him which he cannot counter.”⁴⁰ Most active of all was Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. He was convinced of his innocence and of the injustice of the Allied accusations, describing them as simply “plucked from thin air.”⁴¹ Once his offer to stand in place of all those accused had been rejected by the French, he called on other officers to submit to *German* courts “in the interests of maintaining the honour of our army and our people.”⁴² Rupprecht and his colleagues occupied this existential limbo until early 1920 when the Allied governments agreed to limit their prosecutions. Indeed, during the trials—held a year later under German, and not Allied, auspices—only twelve suspects eventually took the dock. None was royal and six were acquitted.⁴³

36. See, principally, William A. Schabas, *The Trial of the Kaiser* (Oxford, 2018), also James F. Willis, *Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War* (Westport, 1982), chap. 6. On specifically British attitudes towards Wilhelm during and after the war, see Lothar Reinermann, *Der Kaiser in England: Wilhelm II. und sein Bild in der britischen Öffentlichkeit* (Paderborn, 2001), pp. 441-480.

37. AHW, 331, Nr. 343, 18.08.1919.

38. ‘50jähriges Militär-Jubiläum des Herzogs Albrecht von Württemberg’, *Tübinger Chronik* 191, 18.11.1933.

39. HStAS, Q 1/18, Bü 152, 09.02.1920.

40. GHHEA, D24, 43/9, 07.02.1919 and 05.02.1920.

41. GHA, Nachlass Ludwig III, Nr. 59, 06.07.1919; quote from: Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, p. 441.

42. GHA, Kopien, Drucken, Tafeln, Nr. 752, Zuschift an die auf der Auslieferungsliste stehenden Heerführer, 09.12.1919.

43. Ernest Pollock, ‘Introduction’, in: Claud Mullins, *The Leipzig Trials: An Account of the War Criminals’ Trials and a Study of German Mentality* (London, 1921), pp. 5-14.

The sudden and unexpected collapse of monarchy and its perceived threats combined to create a fatalist, even morbid, attitude amongst older members of the German dynasties. In particularly vivid examples of ‘better place’ bargaining, for instance, family deaths were greeted after 1918 as a release from the unhappy chaos of the new regime. Queen Marie Therese of Bavaria died only months after the revolution in March 1919. Already mortally ill as disorder broke out in Munich, the stress of her husband’s abdication and their enforced itinerant existence undoubtedly hastened the end. Nevertheless, her daughter Wiltrud allowed herself to see the bright side. “What a blessing it is that [Mama] no longer has to experience all of this,” she wrote to Ludwig III, “she would only have worried too much about you and us.”⁴⁴ In the spring of 1920, Wilhelm of Württemberg confided in a friend that he had visited his family’s crypt at Ludwigsburg, thanking God “that He had not allowed my son [Ulrich, who died in 1880] to endure the current misery and had spared my wife so much sorrow.”⁴⁵ Poignantly, only two years later, Wilhelm’s second wife expressed similar sentiments following his own death. “We must all be thankful that the good Lord called Wilhelm to him,” she wrote, “[and] that he...no longer need suffer the miseries of our age and Fatherland which had already caused him such anguish.”⁴⁶ This fatalism appears to have become more entrenched over time, as letters exchanged each New Year reveal. In late 1922, Duke Albrecht of Württemberg wrote to Wilhelm of Urach that the future “ascent of the fatherland” did not look likely.⁴⁷ Twelve months later, the prospects were “just as dark as we have become accustomed to over the past four years.”⁴⁸ By 1932, a tone of desperation creeps in with Albrecht bargaining that “it must eventually get better after so many years of struggle!”⁴⁹ Even if an eventual German rebirth were anticipated, it was generally envisaged in some distant future. Albrecht—and his cousin Wilhelm, amongst others—accepted that they would not live to see it, but that their children (or perhaps only their grandchildren) would survive to reap its rewards.⁵⁰

44. AHU, GU 119, Bü 1099, 22.03.1919.

45. Anni Willmann, *Der gelehrte König. Wilhelm II. von Württemberg: Ein Porträt in Geschichten* (Stuttgart, 2007), p. 179.

46. AHW, 331, Nr. 353, 04.10.1922.

47. AHU, GU 117, Nr. 1044, 15.12.1922.

48. GStAPK, VI. HA, Familienarchiv von Morsbach, Nr. 63, 04.01.1923.

49. AHU, GU 119, Bü 1, 23.12.1932.

50. See, for example: AHU, GU 117, Nr. 1305, 14.03.1929; HStAS, M 660/034, Bü 22, 13.11.1920; HStAS, P 13 Doertenbach, Bü 193, 24.12.1928.

In both 1922 and 1932, Duke Albrecht was writing against the background of growing financial crisis. Employment rates plummeted, savings were wiped out, and starvation, disease, and violence were on the rise. Even Germany's social elites struggled to avoid precarity. During the 1920s, the *Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft* frantically tried to keep its less-well-off members afloat with donations of food and firewood. In 1925, its Bavarian branch provided financial aid to over three hundred suffering aristocrats in Munich alone.⁵¹ The deposed dynasties, meanwhile, watched in alarm as the payments discussed in chapter three dramatically declined in value. Queen Charlotte of Württemberg's monthly outflows for the latter half of 1923 bear witness to this crisis.

Month	Total expenditure in Marks
July	30,444,723
August	2,634,977,620
September	17,176,798,565
October	2,457,401,763,750
November	1,044,155,520,793,200
December	2,113,427,285,000,000

Table 2: Queen Charlotte of Württemberg's monthly expenditure, July-Dec. 1923⁵²

These figures, and classic anecdotes which recount loaves of bread costing billions of Marks, are almost beyond comprehension. More tangible insights into the decline in material standards may be gleaned from royal letters and diary entries. Birthday and Christmas gifts, for instance, became simple and, above all, practical. In 1920, the Grand Duke of Hessen was profusely grateful for a pair of gloves which, he claimed, he previously did not possess.⁵³ For his seventeenth birthday three years later, his son received some socks, a tie, and a

51. Malinowski, "Wer schenkt uns wieder Kartoffeln?", pp. 520-521.

52. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 815, Zusammenstellung der Einnahmen und Ausgaben der Hofhaltung Ihrer Königlichen Hoheit der Herzogin Charlotte zu Württemberg in der Zeit vom 1. Juli 1923 bis 31. Dezember 1923.

53. GHHA, D24, 35/4, 27.12.1920.

waistcoat.⁵⁴ Indeed, in 1922 the grand duke wrote morosely that owing to financial hardship, Christmas presents were “nearly out of the question.”⁵⁵ This lack of disposable income—and the shortages of certain goods in Germany—forced Ernst Ludwig on more than one occasion to seek assistance from family members abroad. In 1922, he asked his sister Victoria, resident at Kensington Palace, for a silk shirt and some cinnamon to treat his sons’ colds. On other occasions, he thanked Victoria warmly for gifts of cigarettes and simple staples, such as writing paper and ink.⁵⁶ Grand palaces became white elephants, costing a fortune to heat and protect from damp. For the first few years after 1918, the Hessens lived out of one floor of the *Neues Palais*, while by the early 1930s Crown Prince Rupprecht could no longer afford his summer retreat in Berchtesgaden.⁵⁷ The abolition of civil lists in 1918 and 1919 additionally meant that court staffs of the pre-war era were beyond the means of privy purses. Only so many cuts could be made, however, before those who remained were overburdened,⁵⁸ forcing the Grand Duchess of Hessen and others to take on domestic duties.⁵⁹

The relative precarity of the royals’ finances may seem surprising when one considers the handsome redundancy payments discussed in chapter three. As the cases of Württemberg and Bavaria demonstrate, however, these lump sums and state stipends were frequently insufficient or simply not available. Until 1927, Duke Albrecht’s family was reliant on savings, his army pension, and the capricious returns of their land holdings. As the annual reports of the *Herzogliche Rentkammer* reveal, this was not enough. In 1924, for instance, a yearly gross income of 646,000 Marks was decimated by various taxes (accounting for almost half) and the high costs of the ducal court (another third), leaving Albrecht to keep his family—numbering at least fifteen at this point—on 93,000 Marks a year. When one inspects the costs of their households, this was a wholly inadequate sum. In 1925, Albrecht’s brothers were budgeted 40,000 Marks between them, while his son Philipp Albrecht was earmarked 42,000 Marks, and Queen Charlotte over 110,000 Marks. Unlike the others, Charlotte did receive a pension from the state, as widow of the last king, but this barely covered a third of

54. GHHFA, D24, 56/8, 11.11.1923.

55. GHHFA, D24, 35/4, 22.12.1922.

56. GHHFA, D24, 35/4, 14.01.1922, 21.06.1922 and 22.12.1922

57. GHHFA, D26, 4/1; GHHFA, D24, 35/4, 31.12.1923; AHU, GU 119, Bü 301, 13.05.1931. The presence of Adolf Hitler, whose *Berghof* headquarters lay nearby, is additionally cited by Dieter Weiß to explain Rupprecht’s withdrawal, see: Weiß, *Kronprinz Rupprecht*, p. 233.

58. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 11.01.1920.

59. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 27.10.1919.

her outlay.⁶⁰ With debts of over one million Marks—predicted to top four million within two years—it is hardly surprising that the *Rentkammer* concluded its 1926 report with the grave advice that Albrecht introduce “the strictest simplification and austerity in the administration.”⁶¹ In 1931, the *Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds* outlined similar difficulties in a report to the Bavarian ministry of finance. Its highest income in any one year since the war had been 691,000 Marks in 1927/28, but even this, when divided between the dynasty’s seventeen members (who often owned little private property), hardly provided the status-befitting lifestyles the WAF had been established to secure.⁶²

Heavily reliant on farmland and forests, the dynasties suffered from decreased yields and incomes after 1918 and were forced to sell off the proverbial family silver to stay afloat. Between 1924 and 1927, the grand ducal coffers in Hessen were augmented to the tune of 690,000 Marks through the sale of property and another 95,000 from extraneous furniture, books, and paintings.⁶³ In the early years of the following decade, the Bavarians took this idea one stage further. By 1931, the royal house had already raised over 900,000 Marks through the sale of Schloss Fürstenried in Munich (at approximately two thirds of its true value) and a collection of paintings, jewels, and *objets d’art*.⁶⁴ But even this was insufficient. Having convinced the Bavarian government that their financial situation was untenable, the Wittelsbachs received permission in June that year to sell off a further three million Marks’ worth of WAF assets.⁶⁵ Taking their wares to London, where it was believed that the population had greater purchasing power, the royals relinquished possession of glittering jewels and beloved family heirlooms, including an altarpiece once owned by Mary Stuart.⁶⁶

60. AHW, 331, Nr. 1093, Zusammenstellung der Zahlungen für die Nutzungsberechtigten des Rentkammergeguts im Jahr 1925, 22.02.1926.

61. AHW, 331, Nr. 1093, Bericht der Herzogl. Rentkammer betreffend Beantwortung der in Beilage 1 gestellten Fragen, 25.02.1926; Ausführungen der Verwaltungsreferenten zu dem Etat 1926, 04.01.1926.

62. BayHStA, MF, 70359, Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 27.02.1931.

63. HStAD, O 24, 49/19, Nachweisung der seit 1. Januar 1924 erzielten extraordinären Einnahme der Grossherzoglichen Verwaltung durch Verkäufe von Grundstücken u.s.w. und der vorhandenen Schulden.

64. BayHStA, MF, 70359, Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 27.02.1931.

65. BayHStA, MF, 70359, Nr. 22646, 04.06.1931.

66. BayHStA, MF, 70359, Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Reichsbankhauptstelle München, 15.12.1931; Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 02.02.1932; Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds to Finanzministerium, 14.03.1932.

The republic as liberation

Fear, fatalism, and financial disarray took their toll. On visiting the Grand Duke of Baden in late 1919, Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg found him “much aged and slightly unkempt,”⁶⁷ while the Prince of Waldeck was similarly described by a visitor as being “very much aged” at only fifty-five.⁶⁸ It should not be assumed, however, that the royals’ response to 1918 was entirely negative, or that they were so overcome with despondency as to miss the silver linings. In some cases, the immediate reaction was relief—at the end of war, at the relative peacefulness of the revolution, or at release from the strictures of court life. Throughout the later years of the war, Crown Prince Rupprecht had been something of a Cassandra—a voice in the wilderness prophesying German defeat. His predictions of doom generally went unheeded, leaving figures like the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg to later regret “that we did not listen to your warnings or follow your suggestions in time.”⁶⁹ Rupprecht’s feelings of relief after November 1918 were far from motivated by the satisfaction that he had been right, however, but by gratitude that the Damoclean sword had finally dropped and ended the war. The eight months preceding the revolution had been far worse than the uprising itself, he believed. “Better a horrific end than horror without end.”⁷⁰ In Darmstadt, meanwhile, Grand Duchess Eleonore gave thanks that the revolution had dissipated with little violence. On 9 November, the morning edition of the *Hessischer Volksfreund*, the organ of the MSPD in Hessen, essentially deposed Ernst Ludwig with its banner headline: “The Socialist Republic of Hessen.”⁷¹ For Eleonore, this was “a great relief [and] far better than [Ernst Ludwig] being forced to abdicate.”⁷²

As will be discussed in the following chapter, relief could rest on more personal, even selfish desires; for young royals, the revolution permitted a diversion from pre-planned (and resented) career paths in the military or the opportunity to marry for love rather than social or political expedience. One example will suffice here as a prelude. After 1918, Princess Adelheid of Schaumburg-Lippe spent prolonged periods staying with her sister, the Queen of Württemberg, at Bebenhausen rather than her marital home in Altenburg. Her husband

67. AHW, 331, Nr. 160, 21.10.1919.

68. GHHEFA, D24, 44/6, 11.05.1920.

69. GHA, Nachlass Kronprinz Rupprecht, Nr. 882, 14.01.1929.

70. GHA, Nachlass Prinzessin Therese, Nr. 100, 09.12.1918.

71. Judith Pákh, ‘Die Revolution in Hessen—einige Grundzüge’, in: Ulla Plener (ed.), *Die Novemberrevolution 1918/1919 in Deutschland* (Berlin, 2009), p. 135.

72. GHHEFA, D24, 43/8.

Ernst, the final duke of Saxe-Altenburg, was a notorious womaniser and Adelheid seized the loss of her public position to escape. According to Hans Haug, a biographer of Queen Charlotte, Adelheid supposedly remarked that “as mother of the nation [*Landesmutter*], I bore the shame [of Ernst’s adultery], but as a normal wife I am no longer prepared to do so.”⁷³ Adelheid’s brother-in-law, King Wilhelm, was undoubtedly the poster child for royal acceptance of the revolution. Unlike his Prussian namesake, Wilhelm was at heart a modest and unassuming man whose connections with the people and the city of Stuttgart are still fondly remembered.⁷⁴ He was known to walk the streets with his dogs, distributing chocolates to children who would greet “Mr King” in return. Indeed, his peculiarly unaffected manner so perplexed the Kaiser that he questioned Wilhelm as to “what on earth is going on in your republic down there?”⁷⁵ During the tense hours of the revolution, King Wilhelm’s concern had been for the people; as mentioned above, he declared the hope that he would never be an obstacle to the democratic development of the state. As such, he left office “without resentment or bitterness,” a phrase he used in letters to Ludwig Darmstädter, Marie Auguste von Neurath, and others.⁷⁶ This magnanimity was undoubtedly aided by the circumstances of Württemberg’s revolution. Stuttgart had witnessed little to no violence during the handover of power and the new republican authorities had swiftly approved a generous financial settlement for Wilhelm. This was not lost on the king, who wrote to a close friend that he had “every reason to be grateful” for his treatment.⁷⁷ Of perhaps greater importance to Wilhelm was the wave of goodwill he received from former subjects following his abdication (see chapter six). By March 1919, following the delivery of thousands of letters of loyalty on his birthday, he was able to declare that “the last remaining sting” of 9 November 1918 had fallen away, leaving him at peace with his new life.⁷⁸

The lightness of touch with which the revolutionaries handled Wilhelm was experienced by monarchs across Germany. Indeed, the November Revolution’s civility is one of its defining

73. Haug, *Königin Charlotte*, p. 54.

74. See: *Griß Gott, Herr König! Erinnerungen an das württembergischen Könighaus: Im Rahmen der großen Landesausstellung “Das Königreich Württemberg 1806-1918 Monarchie und Moderne”*, ed. Landesmuseum Württemberg (Stuttgart, 2006).

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 23.

76. StBB, Slg. Darmstaedter 1 1880: Wilhelm II., König von Württemberg, 6-7, 21.11.1918; HStAS, Q 3/11, Bü 388, 31.12.1918.

77. HStAS, Q, Nachlass von Reden, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Gottfried von Reden, 04.12.1918. I am grateful to Dr Albrecht Ernst of the *Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart* for permission to consult and quote Wilhelm II’s correspondence with Gottfried von Reden while it is being catalogued.

78. HStAS, Q 1/18, Bü 152, 13.03.1919.

aspects and reveals a striking dichotomy between what the royals actually experienced, and what they feared. Beyond 1918, the royals were further shielded from the worst excesses of Germany's post-revolutionary violence and volatility. With few exceptions, they vacated their city palaces and retreated to rural estates. Described by Eckart Conze as “islands of the noble-corporate [*adelig-ständischer*] way of life and exercise of power,”⁷⁹ these sleepy latifundia felt the waves unleashed by riots, strikes, and protests in Berlin or Munich as mere ripples, if at all. As Princess Wiltrud of Bavaria wrote to her exiled father on the eve of Munich's Soviet Republic, “the farmers do not show the slightest inclination to copy the big cities...aside from a short burst of gunfire yesterday, the valley was completely quiet.”⁸⁰ Elsewhere in Bavaria, situation reports submitted to Munich by provincial governors revealed a similar picture. In the towns of *Mittelfranken*, battalions of the *Freikorps* grew by the minute; “amongst the rural population, however, there is no interest at all.”⁸¹ In *Oberfranken*, meanwhile, the governor informed the interior ministry that “in their overwhelming majority, the country people completely reject the Munich Soviet Republic and the idea of soviet government itself.”⁸² Three years later, it was reported that in Holzkirchen—a town thirty miles to the west of the Wittelsbachs' home at Wildenwart—the local branch of the KPD had to cancel a gathering of supporters when only four turned up.⁸³ The same year, the district office [*Bezirksamt*] in Altötting, where the hearts of Wittelsbach monarchs are buried, wrote of “the unfathomable indifference towards world events which dominates the broad masses.”⁸⁴ This detachment from a disappointing reality (and the company of like-minded conservative people) was evidently a relief; “here in the country we sense and see very little of the prevailing conditions,” Duke Albrecht wrote at Christmas 1919, “and that is a stroke of fortune.”⁸⁵

The quiet isolation of royal exile did not suit everyone, especially monarchs who, accustomed to days filled with governmental, cultural, and military business, now faced empty schedules. As the Grand Duchess of Hessen confided to her sister on 13 November 1918, Ernst Ludwig “suffers so much from the state of things. His sense of duty doesn't allow him to just sit

79. Conze, ‘Adeliges Familienbewußtsein’, p. 456.

80. AHU, GU 119, Bü 1099, 11.04.1919.

81. BayHStA, MA, 102135, 29.04.1919.

82. BayHStA, MA, 102135, Nr. 419, 22.04.1919.

83. BayHStA, MA, 102136, 09.02.1922.

84. BayHStA, MA, 102136, 05.04.1922.

85. HStAS, P 13 Doertenbach, Bü 193, 28.12.1919.

still.”⁸⁶ For Germany’s more conscientious federal princes—like Ernst Ludwig—their powerlessness was maddening. Their reigns had been personal projects which, regrettably, would forever remain unfinished. In his diary, Ernst Ludwig listed the various things he had wished to achieve, but could not, as grand duke. “I am now fifty years old and my hands are tied. Will I be able to accomplish one or two before my death?” They ranged from personal projects, such as refurbishing the castle and building a bespoke house in Seeheim, to more ambitious plans. He hoped to improve local infrastructure by constructing new hospitals, roads, canals, and bridges over the Rhine and Main. Reforms in areas as diverse as animal husbandry, public health, and the relations between church and state also featured.⁸⁷ Further south, Duke Albrecht felt a similar listlessness. While initially convincing himself that the days passed quickly enough without a job, he later admitted to frustration and bitterness.⁸⁸ “Your work,” he wrote to his adjutant Engelbert von Morsbach, “may not offer much variety, but at least you have a regular occupation. Sadly, I could sing a whole song on what it means to give up such a thing.”⁸⁹

Despite these rather depressing forecasts, Germany’s royals—like their acquaintances in the lower nobility⁹⁰—proved remarkably adept at exploring new avenues of activity whilst maintaining tried and trusted ones, such as charity and cultural patronage. From the mid-nineteenth century, Frank Prochaska has argued, charity became an increasingly important tool in the royal armoury. It allowed royal houses “to consolidate and to expand [their] partnership with respectable society” and to counter developments which threatened the assumptions on which monarchy is based. Charitable work provided visible and noble activity to royals whose constitutional functions were on the wane and created avenues—through hospital openings and the like—for contact between the people and their rulers.⁹¹ Royal women were particularly involved. In Hessen, between 1862 and 1937, the state’s leading health charities were spearheaded by a succession of consorts and their daughters and daughters-in-law: Grand Duchess Victoria, Princess Victoria of Battenberg, Grand Duchess Eleonore, and Hereditary Grand Duchess Cecilie. In 1906, after the birth of their

86. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 13.11.1918.

87. Knodt, *Ernst Ludwig*, p. 382.

88. GStAPK, VI. HA, Familienarchiv von Morsbach, Nr. 62, 05.01.1920.

89. GStAPK, VI. HA, Familienarchiv von Morsbach, Nr. 62, 04.01.1921.

90. Reif, *Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, p. 53.

91. Frank Prochaska, ‘The Crowned Republic and the Rise of the Welfare Monarchy’, in: Kroll and Weiß (eds.), *Inszenierung oder Legitimation?*, pp. 141-150.

first son, the grand ducal couple founded the *Großherzogliche Zentrale für Mütter- und Säuglingspflege*. This was followed in 1911 by the *Eleonorenheim* (a children's clinic) and a school for paediatric nurses, and in 1912 by a specialist paediatric centre at Gießen university. The couple made material contributions—including 50,000 Marks in 1908 towards a foundation for antenatal care—and provided hands-on support, with Eleonore frequently stopping by the *Eleonorenheim* to assist.⁹² By the outbreak of the First World War, nurses trained in these centres were making 100,000 house visits a year and receiving a further 30,000 visits at advice centres throughout the state.⁹³

War and revolution did little to dent Eleonore's resolve or appetite. Indeed, in the early 1920s she took on further duties. In 1923, she became chairwoman of the *Deutscher Verband der Freundinnen junger Mädchen*, an institution designed to assist young women who sought a better life abroad.⁹⁴ As part of this role, and others, Eleonore continued to travel across Germany, supervising projects and chairing meetings. Letters to her husband show that in October 1926 she visited Stettin, Danzig, Swinemünde, Königsburg, Zoppot, Memel and Behlendorf on a tour of the Baltic.⁹⁵ Destinations in later years included Berlin, Dresden, and Breslau.⁹⁶ Ernst Ludwig occasionally worried about her heavy workload,⁹⁷ but she was aided in some regards by the new authorities' recognition of her activities. In 1920, the *Landtag* agreed to cover 60% of the costs of the *Alice-Eleonoren-Schule*, which taught domestic science to young women.⁹⁸ Six years later, the government waived rent for rooms in the *Altes Schloss* on the understanding that they be used for charitable purposes.⁹⁹ The arrival of Princess Cecilie in 1931 was an additional help, and Eleonore wasted little time in inculcating her new daughter-in-law into the work of the various hospitals and clinics in Darmstadt.¹⁰⁰ The pair cooperated up until their tragic deaths in the Ostende air disaster in November 1937; in June that year, for example, Eleonore opened a kindergarten at the *Säuglingsheim* and Cecilie gave a speech

92. Maria von Ewald, *Großherzogin Eleonore und ihr Werk* (Darmstadt, 1938), pp. 20-23.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

94. GHHFA, D24, 41/10, Zum Gedenken an I.K.H. Großherzogin Eleonore von Hessen, Nationalvorsitzende des Deutschen Verbandes der Freundinnen junger Mädchen; HStAD, O 13, 470, Meine Beziehungen zum Großherzog Ernst Ludwig von Hessen und zur Großherzogin Eleonore.

95. GHHFA, D24, 34/7, 03.10.1926, 06.10.1926, and 09.10.1926.

96. GHHFA, D24, 34/7, 18.05.1929, 19.03.1930, and 30.11.1930.

97. GHHFA, D24, 35/4, 05.04.1922.

98. *Verh. LT. Hess.*, 1919/1921, Drucksache Nr. 489, 30.07.1920.

99. HStAD, O 24, 51/20, HD 277, 12.03.1926; HStAD, O 24, 51/20, FMB 5249, 09.02.1926.

100. GHHFA, D26, 11/2, 07.11.1930.

on the British coronation, which she had attended, to the apparently rapturous nurses of the *Alice-Hospital*.¹⁰¹

As before 1918, Hessen remained the home of princely cultural patronage as Ernst Ludwig gladly exploited his sudden windfall of free time to devote himself further to drama, music, and art.¹⁰² During the First World War, the court theatre in Darmstadt had staged productions of Verdi's *Aida* and Wagner's *Parsifal* with scenery designed by the grand duke.¹⁰³ Throughout the interwar period, letters between Ernst Ludwig and his family were littered with references to operas and plays they had seen, mostly in Frankfurt and Bayreuth. In 1921, he decided to turn his own hand to playwriting. The final product, entitled *Ostern* and published under the pseudonym E. K. Ludhard, premiered in Hamburg in March that year. "The performance was simply marvellous," Grand Duchess Eleonore wrote to her sister, "the packed theatre was extremely attentive...it seems to have been very well received."¹⁰⁴ For Eleonore, Ernst Ludwig's endeavours were points of light in the darkness which enveloped German opera and theatre after the disappearance of princely patronage. An audience in Weimar Germany, she wrote, "makes no great demands of culture because it has none of its own. Civilised people no longer have the money [to attend the theatre]...we saw no familiar faces in Frankfurt."¹⁰⁵

Considering this pessimistic outlook, it is not surprising that the Hessian dynasty was at the heart of the most notable royal attempt to rejuvenate local culture after 1918: the so-called School of Wisdom [*Schule der Weisheit*].¹⁰⁶ Best described by Suzanne Marchand as "self-

101. GHHFA, D26, 11/3, 12.06.1937.

102. See: Anne Anderson, "Mein Hessenland blühe und in ihm die Kunst". Ernst Ludwig's Darmstädter Künstlerkolonie: Building Nationhood through Arts and Crafts', in: Milinda Banerjee, Charlotte Backerra, and Cathleen Sarti (eds.), *Transnational Histories of the 'Royal Nation'* (New York, 2017), pp. 177-202; Knodt, *Ernst Ludwig*, pp. 282-345; Eckhart G. Franz, 'Der erste und der letzte Großherzog von Hessen: Fürstliche Kunstförderung in Darmstadt', in: Werner (ed.), *Hof, Kultur und Politik*, pp. 291-311. For a contemporary take, see: Thaddäus Beerenbrenner [Karl Heinz Rüppel], 'Die Firlefanz des Großherzogs', *Das Tage Buch*, 14.06.1924, pp. 810-814.

103. Eckhart G. Franz, 'Vom Biedemeier in die Katastrophe des Feuersturms', in: Friedrich Battenberg, Jürgen Rainer Wolf, Eckhart G. Franz, and Fritz Deppert, *Darmstadt's Geschichte: Fürstenresidenz und Bürgerstadt im Wandel der Jahrhunderte* (Darmstadt, 1980), pp. 416, 420.

104. GHHFA, D24, 56/8, 29.03.1921. Underlining in original.

105. GHHFA, D24, 56/8, 05.01.1925.

106. Dina Gusejnova highlights the continuity in Ernst Ludwig's patronage, describing the School of Wisdom as "an enactment of the old, pre-revolutionary order in which the Grand Duke...appeared in his function as a patron of art and culture." See: *European Elites*, p. 128.

consciously half Platonic academy and half Buddhist outreach programme,”¹⁰⁷ the School held lectures throughout the year, culminating in its flagship general meeting in September. Encompassing topics such as “history as tragedy,” “between life and death”, and “fate and compulsion”—to take examples from the 1924 and 1925 conferences—categorising the School’s curriculum, so to speak, is not easy.¹⁰⁸ Even its own self-proclaimed mission “to help each and all to realise the full meaning of their life” makes no great claims to specificity.¹⁰⁹ It was, nevertheless, a considerable success. The School was founded in 1920 under the auspices of the Baltic nobleman and geologist turned wandering philosopher Hermann Graf von Keyserling.¹¹⁰ Ably assisted by Ernst Ludwig’s court chamberlain, Hardenberg, and a gift from the grand duke of 20,000 Marks, the School operated out of a modest building across the square from the *Neues Palais*.¹¹¹ Visiting speakers, who included the Jewish theologian Leo Baeck, the ethnologist Leo Frobenius, and the psychoanalyst Carl Jung, would stay as guests of the royal family at the palace.¹¹² The highpoint of the School’s activities, however, was undoubtedly the visit in June 1921 of the Indian philosopher and Nobel Peace laureate Rabindranath Tagore. His informal talks, given in English and translated concurrently by Keyserling, drew huge crowds to the palace gardens. Grand Duchess Eleonore recorded the “daily gatherings...of all sorts of people from every station, many of whom we didn’t know.”¹¹³ Her son Ludwig also noted the mixed crowd Tagore attracted. “The students and *Wandervögel* [members of a youth movement] were delighted. What the postmen made of it all is difficult to say.”¹¹⁴ In general, the success of Tagore’s message was attributed to its simplicity and its optimism. As Martin Kämpchen writes, war and inflation had made Germany a breeding ground for “emotional insecurity” and provoked a “renewed search for cultural and national identity and for meaning beyond life’s trivialities.”¹¹⁵ Prince Ludwig meanwhile highlighted Tagore’s advocacy for peaceful methods

107. Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race and Scholarship* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 482.

108. See: StAW, 185/0099, Programm der VI. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Freie Philosophie zu Darmstadt vom 14.-19. September 1924 im Hotel zur Traube; Programm der VII. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Freie Philosophie zu Darmstadt vom 13. bis 19. September 1925 im Hotel zur Traube.

109. HStAD, O 13, 533, ‘The Leaders of the Darmstadt Movement’.

110. ULB Darmstadt, Nachlass Hermann Graf Keyserling, Box 144, Kuno Graf von Hardenberg to Hermann Graf Keyserling, 10.06.1920.

111. Irma Louise Silberberg, ‘The School of Wisdom: An Experiment in Adult Education’ (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1932), pp. 12, 41.

112. GHHFA, D26, 4/1.

113. GHHFA, D24, 56/8, 28.06.1921.

114. GHHFA, D26, 4/1.

115. Martin Kämpchen, ‘Rabindranath Tagore and Hermann Keyserling: A Difficult Friendship’, *Asiatic* 5:1 (2011), p. 6.

and the fact that he hailed from an occupied country.¹¹⁶ In war-battered Europe, the refrain *ex oriente lux* enjoyed increasing popularity.

Being naturally less well-informed of world events and their significance than their parents and grandparents, it is unsurprising to find that royal children like Prince Ludwig often displayed far less anxiety in response to the revolution and its aftershocks. In her recent analysis of accounts of the revolution written by school pupils in Essen, Nadine Rossol has shone a light on youthful experiences of November 1918. These ranged from disappointment at the relative lack of drama (in stark contrast with tales told during lessons on the French Revolution) to giddy hopes and imagined futures.¹¹⁷ Ludwig may have initially feared execution in the cellar of the *Neues Palais*, but he and his brother Georg Donatus quickly fell into this second, hopeful category. They acclimatised to their new and drastically different life paths with a rapidity which bemused their parents.¹¹⁸ According to the grand duchess' diary, the ten-year-old Ludwig let it be known, with striking maturity, that personal concerns were beside the point [*Nebensache*], "so long as things are good for the people." Within a week of the revolution, the boys had excitedly informed their parents of their desire to attend a regular *Realgymnasium*.¹¹⁹ In Prussia, too, the youngsters showed remarkable calm. As his memoirs recall, Prince Louis Ferdinand's initial response to the news, tearfully delivered by his mother, that the Kaiser had been overthrown and the war lost, was great relief. "I realised immediately that I would no longer have to join the cadet corps at Plön."¹²⁰ For younger members of the dynasties, yet to be fully inculcated into the mystique of monarchy and less cognizant of the consequences its collapse posed, November 1918 was not necessarily a moment of crisis, but of opportunity.

As a general rule, Germany's deposed royals did not take up regular, salaried jobs—one reason why they were so reliant on state stipends and the vicissitudes of agricultural markets. Those who did were members of this younger generation; with greater energy and fewer

116. Ludwig Landgraf [Prince Ludwig of Hessen], *Erinnerungen eines Darmstädters 1908-1968* (Darmstadt, 1968), pp. 30-31.

117. Nadine Rossol, "Die Abdankung unseres Kaisers hat mich nicht besonders getroffen...": Emotionen, Erwartungen und Teilhabe an der deutschen Revolution 1918/19', in: Braune and Dreyer (eds.), *Zusammenbruch, Aufbruch, Abbruch?*, pp. 161-177.

118. GHHFA, D26, 4/1.

119. GHHFA, D24, 53/2, 13.11.1918. For further discussion on the education of heirs in Germany, see: Müller, *Royal Heirs*, p. 82ff.

120. Louis Ferdinand Prinz von Preußen, *Als Kaisererzkel durch die Welt* (Berlin, 1954), p. 52.

responsibilities, it was far easier for them to learn new trades. Two became priests (Georg of Saxony and Georg of Bavaria), others worked in banks, and the hereditary prince of Reuß Younger Line ran a travelling theatre company. Louis Ferdinand of Prussia and Georg Donatus of Hessen even plied the trades of revolutionaries who had overthrown them, working as mechanics for Ford and Opel respectively. Prince Ludwig chose a more familiar stage. Overcome by a “strong feeling of duty” in the early 1930s, he took up a position in the protocol department of the German embassy in London, delighted, as he informed his father, “to feel that I can help out in some way.”¹²¹

Once the jobs for which princes had been rigorously trained no longer existed, princely education naturally changed. A possibly apocryphal maxim attributed to Umberto I of Italy stated that kings need only know “how to sign [their] name, read a newspaper, and mount a horse.”¹²² In a world which—in theory—no longer recognised social status, princes like Louis Ferdinand, Georg Donatus, and Ludwig had to offer rather more. While the revolution of 1918 caused considerable disturbance at first, it also granted opportunities for a more academically minded cadre of princes to branch out from a social milieu often suspicious of intellectualism.¹²³ From a vital stage in the preparation to rule, princely education became an intellectual endeavour valuable in and of itself. Rather than acquiring a fleeting awareness of a wide range of subjects like their occasionally dilettantish ancestors, the young student princes of the 1920s focused on one or two in greater detail. In short, the university was less a place of “organised idleness and drinking” and more the site of serious study.¹²⁴

This was undoubtedly a consequence of the princes’ release from the onerous representative and military duties which had regularly put an end to academic careers in the pre-revolutionary era. The princes’ new freedom to devote time to learning is most clearly encapsulated in the arrival of the royal doctoral student. In Thomas Mann’s *Königliche Hoheit* (1909), the restless Prince Klaus despairs at having nothing to fill his day, surmising that “it must be good to have an ordinary surname—to be called Dr Fischer and to pursue a serious career.”¹²⁵ In 1918, none of the twenty ruling German monarchs held a non-honorary

121. GHHFA, D 24, 44/10, 23.04.1933; GHHFA, D24, 34/10, 01.11.1936.

122. Müller, *Royal Heirs*, p. 82.

123. Cf. Malinowski, *Vom König zum Führer*, p. 73ff.

124. Ibid., p. 78.

125. Thomas Mann, *Königliche Hoheit* (Berlin, 1909), p. 235.

doctorate, and yet by 1932, three of their heirs had followed the Klausian dream: Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg in 1925, Louis Ferdinand of Prussia in 1929, and Georg Donatus of Hessen in 1932. Georg Donatus' brother Ludwig also worked on a doctoral thesis for a time, before running out of motivation and willpower.¹²⁶ Interestingly, two rather older (and minor) princes—Wilhelm Karl of Urach¹²⁷ and Adalbert of Bavaria¹²⁸—also returned to university to complete their doctorates after their pre-revolutionary *raison d'être*, namely careers in the military, were wiped away by the revolution.

Assimilation into the republic

The younger royals' determination to find jobs and attain non-noble, professional titles was part of a surprisingly quiet and calm assimilation of the German dynasties into the new republic. In his study of Germany's lower nobility, Stephan Malinowski argues that defeat in war and the collapse of the *Kaiserreich* radicalised impoverished aristocrats whose worldview could not comprehend an alternative to the norms of the pre-war era.¹²⁹ Increasingly desperate and alienated, they threw their support behind the apparently all-solving power of National Socialism. Germany's deposed royals were by no means card-carrying republicans, but those under investigation here acclimatised with little fuss and did nothing to hint at subversion or explicit anti-republican agitation. For the most part, they withdrew completely from active politics.¹³⁰ Voting in state and national elections marked the extent of their political engagement with the new regime. Monarchs, whom constitutions and propriety had prevented from voting before 1918, suddenly found themselves enfranchised and revelled in it. In the days before Weimar Germany's first elections, in January 1919, Wilhelm of Württemberg informed various correspondents of his excitement and pride in "striding up to the ballot box, for the first time in my life, and dropping in my modest contribution."¹³¹ Friedrich Franz of Mecklenburg, who had been in Danish exile in January 1919, was

126. GHFA, D26, 4/2.

127. Sergej von Cube, 'Ein württembergischer Prinz auf dem Thron von Litauen, 1918', *Annaberger Annalen über Litauen und deutsch-litauische Beziehungen* 8 (2000), p. 115.

128. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Adalbert, Nr. 14, Lebenserinnerungen des Prinzen Adalbert, pp. 474, 512.

129. Malinowski, *Vom König zum Führer*.

130. As a former *Reichskanzler*, Prince Max of Baden saw fit to advise Anton Geiß (Baden's first state president) on maintaining stability in the state in early 1919. See: MGFA, FA N 5520, 4, Prince Max of Baden to Anton Geiß, 10.04.1919. It is not clear whether Geiß responded. Max's saviour complex is discussed by Lothar Machtan, in: 'Germany's Ersatz Kaiser? The Political Opportunities of Max von Baden: Royal Heir and Imperial Chancellor', in: Frank Lorenz Müller and Heidi Mehrkens (eds.), *Sons and Heirs: Succession and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 2016), pp. 263-279.

131. HStAS, Q 1/2, Bü 119, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Max von Mühlberger, 07.11.1919.

photographed by the press casting his own first ballot two years later.¹³² Surviving archival documents are quiet on which parties received royal favour, but those parties which are explicitly mentioned—the DVP by Wilhelm of Württemberg,¹³³ the ZP by his Catholic cousins,¹³⁴ and the BVP by Prince Adalbert of Bavaria¹³⁵—raise no eyebrows.

While tending to favour parties of the right, the dynasties of southern Germany continued the civil, even cordial, relations with social democracy which had so shocked and incensed Kaiser Wilhelm II before the war. Naturally, circumstances had changed. Prior to the revolution, the monarchs could afford largesse towards the socialists; now they relied on them, not only for their own livelihoods (see chapter three) but to stave off greater evils. As the ex-King of Württemberg wrote to his final chief minister in late 1919,

I cannot deny the men of the government a certain admiration that things are still proceeding as they are, bearing in mind that they are all autodidacts [and] have had no training other than in parliament and the party press. And now we must wish that this government survives to protect our poor land from *the horrors of Bolshevism*.¹³⁶

In Darmstadt, Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig similarly wished the new government success and fortune. A day before Hessen's constituent assembly first sat in February 1919, he wrote to his 'successor,' Carl Ulrich, to express his "most sincere good wishes to the new parliament for blessed and fruitful work in the best interests of our fatherland." Ulrich's calm and assured hand on the rudder, he added, had saved the Hessian ship of state during "the most serious transition" in its history.¹³⁷ Read aloud by the speaker of the parliament, and with the grand ducal family watching from the galleries, Ernst Ludwig's message was met with warm applause from the attendant deputies. Later that year, Crown Prince Rupprecht similarly addressed the state assembly, but with fewer platitudes and far greater urgency. With the threat of extradition looming over him, he used a public letter to the *Landtag's* president to

132. See: Bernd Kasten, *Herren und Knechte: Gesellschaftlicher und politischer Wandel in Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1867-1945* (Bremen, 2011), p. 284.

133. HStAS, Q, Nachlass von Reden, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Gottfried von Reden, 01.05.1920.

134. AHW, 331, Nr. 160, 14.01.1920.

135. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Adalbert, Nr. 14, Lebenserinnerungen des Prinzen Adalbert, p. 480.

136. HStAS, Q 1/18, Bü 152, 16.09.1919. Emphasis added.

137. For the text of the letter, see: Haren, *Volksstaat Hessen*, p. 167.

accuse the Allies of contravening Germany's right to self-determination and of acting as "enforcers of plutocratic world power."¹³⁸ After conferring with party leaders, the president, Franz Schmitt, responded, praising Rupprecht for refusing to submit to foreign investigation and calling on the *Reich* government to act.¹³⁹ These episodes reveal a mutual respect between the representatives of the new and old orders, as well as concrete royal recognition of the new republic and its authority.

Indeed, at no point under Weimar does any deposed royal appear to have considered contravening that authority. Their responses to attempts that were made are telling. The assassination of Kurt Eisner (Bavaria's minister president and spearhead of the revolution) did not find favour with Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg, for example. On hearing the news that the death sentence of his assassin, Anton Graf von Arco auf Valley, had been commuted to five years' imprisonment, Philipp Albrecht wrote home.

It is not right that Count Arco should be pardoned and celebrated like this. Even if it is a blessing that Eisner no longer lives, the act cannot be condoned, either morally or politically. Murder is murder and it is very dangerous for it to be exalted as a patriotic act—a communist idealist could not thereafter be judged if he, for instance, slayed a monarch.¹⁴⁰

The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, which unfolded the following year, received little more approval from Philipp Albrecht's cousin, the ex-king. While he regarded the intention as "perhaps a good one, namely to replace the current government with a better one motivated by the rule of law," Wilhelm saw its execution as thoroughly unfortunate and untimely.¹⁴¹ As he lamented to Karl von Weizsäcker, the exploits of Wolfgang Kapp and Walther von Lüttwitz had put back the necessary reconstruction of Germany by several years and would undoubtedly lead to worse countermeasures from the government.¹⁴² In all, it had been a "ridiculous and reprehensible" experiment.¹⁴³ This distant stance also extended to the thorny

138. Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, pp. 442-443.

139. *Ibid.*, pp. 444-445.

140. AHW, 331, Nr. 160, 21.01.1920.

141. AHU, GU 120, Bü 120, 17.03.1920; AHU, GU 117, Nr. 1305, 14.03.1920; HStAS, Q 1/18, Bü 152, 12.04.1920.

142. HStAS, Q 1/18, Bü 152, 12.04.1920.

143. HStAS, Q, Nachlass von Reden, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Gottfried von Reden, 07.04.1920.

question of monarchical restoration. With the exception of Crown Prince Rupprecht, who agreed in principle to be appointed *Generalstaatskommissar* in 1933, no royal showed any active interest in being restored.¹⁴⁴ Their involvement in monarchist organisations was limited to ceremonial patronage and pre-existing friendships with their (usually noble) leading figures.¹⁴⁵ They understood that restoration was highly unlikely, and, moreover, that failure would doom the relatively comfortable existence they had succeeded in carving out for themselves after 1918. One would not expect to see a prince or duke at a Constitution Day celebration, but nor were they the antagonists in Weimar's complicated story. The air of resignation and acceptance which characterised the revolution lingered on as the German royals took up their new roles as citizens alongside their former subjects.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined royal experiences of the November Revolution and the Weimar Republic and sought to paint a picture of the dynasties' post-revolutionary existence. It reveals that their emotional response to change was highly ambivalent, but also varied according to time and generation. Germany's sorry state in the immediate post-war years, coupled with financial chaos and perceived anti-noble or regicidal threats, instilled a considerable degree of fatalism, pointlessness, and unease. The revolution had swept away the foundations on which the royal world view had been built and the republic it established was unknown and dangerous. Like all Germans, moreover, the royals suffered from the ravages of inflation and material shortages. Over time, however, and in a reversal of the customary diagnosis, this pessimistic outlook was slowly overtaken by acceptance and contentment. Despite their loss of formal status and public funds, the revolution acted as a moment of liberation for many of Germany's royals. They were released from loveless matches, the burdens of government, and the gaze of public scrutiny. Withdrawing to rural estates, which remained monarchist microcosms of the pre-war order, they were surrounded by faces and philosophies which were familiar and unthreatening. Their sudden windfall of free time, furthermore, permitted greater engagement with pet projects in fundraising and the arts and the opportunity to explore new avenues. This was most obvious for the youth. Before the revolution, prescribed regimens saw them pass through military academies and set curricula to prepare them for government. With the monarchy gone, the future was theirs

144. Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, pp. 550-552.

145. Prince Adalbert, for example, was patron of the *Bayerischer Heimat- und Königsbund*.

to mould and many took the opportunity to study subjects of their choice and enter a profession. Age was not a universal factor in determining responses to the revolution, but it is clear that the younger generations were often more flexible and less weighed down by the ideological baggage of the monarchical past, or by emotional attachments to it. This chapter has considered the royals as individuals seeking to survive amidst change. What, however, became of the royal class as a whole? Indeed, can one speak of a single, coherent *Hochadel* after 1918? These questions will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter V

When regiment is gone: Royal identity and the struggle for social survival

The preamble to the German Constitution of 1871 grandly proclaimed that the German princes had forged “an eternal union.”¹ A mere forty-seven years later, in November 1918, this once eternal enterprise lay in tatters amidst the chaos of revolution. Legally, its royal founders followed soon after. §109 of the constitution of the Weimar Republic, passed in August 1919, called upon the German states to repeal the extensive and highly complex privileges enjoyed by their nobilities—including the deposed dynasties. This task was taken up with varying degrees of enthusiasm and diligence. Hessen’s government eventually reached abolition in June 1923 via a somewhat meandering route and only after the repeated pressing of the state’s Social Democrats. Württemberg, meanwhile, did nothing, on the basis that everything was already covered by the constitution’s claim that “all Germans are equal before the law.” At the other end of the scale, Bavaria was forced to tone down expansive legislation it had already introduced which not only abolished noble privileges, but nobility in its entirety.

Whatever the letter of the law, the *de facto* situation was the same: sovereign and subject became citizens alike. Dynasties, ruling classes, house laws, and hereditary titles no longer had a place within the new *Zeitgeist*. The republican states did not notice (at least theoretically) whether someone was a Mr, Mrs, or Royal Highness—let alone whether they were a *Royal* Highness or a *Serene* Highness. Royals could no longer rest easy under the protective canopy of monarchy. Constitutions which had once described monarchs as “sacred and inviolable” had fallen away, as had tenets of *lèse-majesté* and other privileges, such as freedom from lawsuits.² Europe’s royal dynasties had spent much of the nineteenth century in concert, warding off the approaches of modernity to uphold the monarchical system of government.

1. Gesetz, betreffend die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches, *Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt* 16 (1871), p. 64.

2. Kirsch, ‘Unverletzlichkeit’.

But now that this common cause and the privileges which had separated them from the masses had evaporated, what remained to unite them?

This chapter seeks to understand whether the German *Hochadel* survived as a recognisable and distinct social class after its legal abolition. As was discussed in the introduction, the nexus between nobility and modernity has received extensive scholarly attention in the past two decades. Historians disagree over the extent to which the lower nobility may be considered a social elite after 1918. In challenging the conventional interpretation that nobles adapted successfully to changing circumstance, Stephan Malinowski has argued that by remaining wedded to fields such as agriculture and the military, Germany's nobles were left behind by a modern society which placed elite power in the hands of scientists, industrialists, and financiers.³ Many, furthermore, subsisted on such low incomes that casting them as an "elite" is an unsustainable position. Whatever their conclusions, however, historians agree on the basic qualities which made someone noble. These are encapsulated in the idea of *Adeligkeit*, developed initially by Heinz Reif and later refined by Eckart Conze, Malinowski, and others. Connection to the land was a defining "noble" characteristic, as was glorifying one's family history, state service, protecting traditions, marrying within the class, and a general suspicion of modernity.⁴

As yet, we do not have a comparable concept for Europe's royal class. By examining three elements of royal identity and strategies for social survival, this chapter seeks to offer one. The topics of discussion are equal-birth marriage, the use and defence of noble titles, and organised, class-wide solidarity. Through these behaviours, we can evaluate the extent to which a coherent class consciousness survived the revolution of 1918 and how proactive, or not, Germany's deposed royals were in defending their morals, traditions, and customs. This chapter presents the view that, while eroded and battered, the identifying features of the German *Hochadel* survived the revolution and the interwar period, thanks mostly to the determination and efforts of its older generation. Rates of equal marriage declined precipitously, but former royals clung to their titles (despite a constitutional ban on their use) and effectively represented their interests against encroachments by the republic through

3. Malinowski, "Wer schenkt uns wieder Kartoffeln?", p. 510.

4. See pp. 18-20 of the present study.

nation-wide lobbying groups and solidarity organisations. Its privileges no longer dominated the statute books, but Germany's higher nobility could still be recognised.

Equal marriage

Throughout history, when it came to marriage, a young prince or princess—or, more commonly, their matchmaking parents—kept a list of criteria in mind, against which would-be suitors were ranked. These might have included their age and health, their confession, or the importance of their family as a potential ally. Personal qualities, such as appearance or personality, were also considered, but generally ranked near the bottom of such lists.⁵ Well might Friedrich Schiller's Queen Elisabeth lament that "kings are merely slaves of their station; their own hearts, they may not follow."⁶ At the top, and always at the top, came the nebulous concept of 'equal birth' [*Ebenbürtigkeit*].⁷ At the most general level, *Ebenbürtigkeit* refers to the mutual belonging of both bride and groom to a certain societal class, usually one elevated above all others. A marriage contracted by members of the same class was thus considered to be *ebenbürtig* or equal. In such a case, the children of the match would assume the status of their father and be entitled to inherit his property and privileges. In an unequal marriage, also known as a *Mißheirat* or by the French term *mésalliance*, offspring instead adopted the rank of their mother. As the German royal houses followed Salic law until 1918, under which only male and male-line descendants of a monarch could pass on succession rights, this distinction was of vital dynastic significance. Children of an unequal marriage would, therefore, not be members of their father's social class or dynasty. The nineteenth century jurist Hermann Rehm explained the reasoning: "the dignity of the high nobility—above all, of the ruling classes—demanded that it not be composed of members who owed their existence to the misdemeanours of their parents."⁸ In short, the strictures of equal marriage ensured that the class remained exclusive, small, and reliably uniform in its conservative philosophy.

5. See the discussions of Kaiser Wilhelm II's parents in selecting his bride in the 1880s, in: Daniel Schönplüg, *Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern: Verwandtschaft, Politik und Ritual 1640-1918* (Göttingen, 2013), pp. 67-68.

6. Friedrich Schiller, *Maria Stuart*, II:ii.

7. For a discussion of equal-birth marriage and the ruling nobility, see: Dietmar Willoweit, *Standesungleiche Eben des regierenden hohen Adels in der neuzeitlichen deutschen Rechtsgeschichte: Rechtstatsachen und ihre rechtliche Beurteilung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Häuser Bayern und Pfalz* (Munich, 2004).

8. Hermann Rehm, *Modernes Fürstenrecht* (Munich, 1904), p. 149.

The idea of *Ebenbürtigkeit* enjoyed considerable standing, having been originally enshrined in the *Sachsenspiegel*, a seminal thirteenth century legal text widely relied upon in the Holy Roman Empire.⁹ After falling away in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was reaffirmed by leading German princes in the early modern period.¹⁰ In his *Wahlkapitulation* of 1742, a form of treaty-cum-manifesto presented before imperial elections, the would-be-Emperor Karl VII promised the electoral princes that he would not elevate or promote any ruler who, amongst other things, permitted a child born of an unequal marriage in his family to use their father's titles or dignity. Nor, worse still, would he permit such a child to be declared *ebenbürtig*. These actions, he wrote, contributed inescapably to the “diminution of the house” and worked to “the disadvantage of [the] true heirs.”¹¹ This clause was copied, essentially verbatim, by each of Karl's successors as Holy Roman Emperor: Franz I in 1745, Joseph II in 1764, Leopold II in 1790, and Franz II in 1792.¹²

Unfortunately, the term *ebenbürtig*, while expressing a concept which was commonly understood, did not itself reveal who it applied to. Royals intending to marry thus had to resort to two founts of wisdom for guidance. In the first instance, their dynastic house law determined whom the family considered *ebenbürtig*, a right guaranteed by §57 EGBGB. These house laws, however, were rarely specific and, in the words of Daniel Schönplüg, provided “at best, [the] minimum standards” of an acceptable spouse.¹³ If the house law did not deliver a satisfactory answer, the next step would be to consider *Privatfürstenrecht*, a tangle of custom and codified laws which regulated such questions.¹⁴ Under *Privatfürstenrecht*, all European ruling dynasties were *ebenbürtig*, no matter their social background or the size of their territory.¹⁵

9. Richard Schroeder, ‘Zur Lehre von der Ebenbürtigkeit nach dem Sachsenspiegel’, *Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte* 3 (1864), pp. 461-480.

10. See: Rehm, *Modernes Fürstenrecht*, pp. 153-157; Hermann Schulze, *Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes* (Leipzig, 1881), vol. I, pp. 218-220.

11. §16(2), Wahlkapitulation Karls VII., 24.01.1742, quoted in: Wolfgang Burgdorf (ed.), *Die Wahlkapitulationen der römisch-deutschen Könige und Kaiser 1519-1792* (Göttingen, 2015), p. 441.

12. Burgdorf, *Wahlkapitulationen*, pp. 531, 624, 717, 807.

13. Schönplüg, *Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern*, p. 96.

14. Bernd Albers, *Begriff und Wirklichkeit des Privatfürstenrechts* (Münster, 2001), p. 53. For an encyclopaedic snapshot of *Privatfürstenrecht* and its history, see: Dietmar Willoweit, ‘Privatfürstenrecht’, in: Adalbert Erler and Ekkehard Kaufmann (eds.), *Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1984), vol. III, cc. 1966-1970. More thorough investigations are provided by Robert Martin Mizia, *Der Rechtsbegriff der Autonomie und die Begründung des Privatfürstenrechts in der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt a.M., 1995) and Dorothee Gottwald, *Fürstenrecht und Staatsrecht im 19. Jahrhundert: Eine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Studie* (Frankfurt a.M., 2009).

15. Schulze, *Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes*, vol. I, p. 222.

Sovereignty was thus vital, but *Ebenbürtigkeit* did not disappear when a family fell from power. Instead, sovereignty was deemed to be something immanent and inherent; once a family had been sovereign, it was subsequently considered *ebenbürtig*, notwithstanding its future fortunes. As such, an impoverished German *Standesherr* could be considered *ebenbürtig*, even when the most glittering British duke could not. This curious interpretation was codified in a curious place: the 1815 Constitution of the German Confederation [*Deutsche Bundesakte*]. In addition to restructuring the German territories, the delegates at the Congress of Vienna took it upon themselves—after considerable goading by the families in question—to regulate the status of the many dynasties which had lost their lands and sovereignty over the previous twenty-five years. The operative article, the fourteenth, began:

In order to create a uniform legal status [across Germany] for the former *Reichsstände* and *Reichsangehörigen* who were mediatised in and since 1806, the federal states have agreed that these princely and comital houses shall henceforth be considered part of the higher nobility in Germany and that the right of *Ebenbürtigkeit*, as it is currently understood, shall remain theirs.¹⁶

The constitution thus created a previously unrecognised social class—the ‘higher nobility’—whose members were all *ebenbürtig*.¹⁷ Alongside the ruling families were included the families which had been hereditary members of the curiae [*Reichsstände*] of the old imperial *Reichstag* on its dissolution in 1806. Unless their house law specifically ruled otherwise, a member of a German ruling house could therefore enter into a marriage, in the knowledge that it was equal, if their spouse was legitimate, Christian, and a member either of a European ruling house (or one of European extraction) or of a former ruling German house which had relinquished its sovereign rights in or since 1806.

The following section of this chapter shall consider the implications of the November Revolution on this central pillar of royal life. Between the foundation of the *Kaiserreich* in January 1871 and the outbreak of war in September 1939, one hundred and ninety-eight marriages were consecrated in which either the bride or groom (or both, as was often the

16. Karl Zeumer (ed.), *Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit* (Tübingen, 1913), vol. II, p. 543.

17. Heinrich Zoepfl, *Grundsätze des gemeinen deutschen Staatsrechts, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das allgemeine Staatsrecht und auf die neuesten Zeitverhältnisse* (Leipzig, 1863), vol. II, p. 98.

case), on the day of the wedding, lay within six degrees of consanguinity of the head of one of Germany's twenty-two ruling (or former ruling) houses. Dividing the period into the pre-revolutionary or monarchical era (1871-1918) and post-revolutionary or republican era (1918-1939), the number of marriages was as follows:

Period	Number of marriages
1871–1918	128
1918–1939	70

Table 3: Royal marriages, 1871-1939

Under the *Kaiserreich*, such a marriage occurred approximately once every four and a half months. Considering the relative disparity in size of the various dynasties, some families had rather more reason to celebrate than others. The Hohenzollerns in Prussia, for example, donned their finery on twenty occasions for the nuptials of one of their members. In sleepy Sondershausen, by contrast, the *Schlosskapelle* was never once called upon to host such an event. Although fewer marriages were consecrated in the inter-war period, the rate of marriage actually increased by more than a fifth over the pre-revolutionary era. This can be attributed to the natural expansion of families over time, but also to the fact that royals, who before 1918 may never have married due to restrictions on who they could choose, were more willing to challenge tradition amidst the progressive atmosphere of the Republic. Indeed, the rate of equal marriage declined noticeably after 1918, as the table below shows:

Period	Equal marriages	Unequal marriages
1871–1918	101 (78.9%)	27 (21.1%)
1918–1939	38 (54.3%)	32 (45.7%)

Table 4: Royal marriages by status, 1871-1939

Perhaps surprisingly, given the importance of *Ebenbürtigkeit*, more than a fifth of marriages involving a member of a ruling family before 1918 were unequal. This poses questions for the thesis presented by Daniel Schönplflug that Europe's royal houses became so selective and exclusive in their choice of spouses over the nineteenth century that by 1918 the ruling nobility was "a caste almost hermetically sealed off from everything below."¹⁸ Even if only as the second or third spouse of a monarch's younger sibling or distant cousin, commoners and members of the lower nobility could still break through the glass ceiling of the *Kaiserreich's* high nobility. After 1918, however, this enterprise became much easier, or at least far more common. Change was most notable at the dynasties' highest level. Between 1871 and 1918, twenty-seven marriages were consecrated in which the groom was either the head of his house or the heir apparent. Of these matches, only two were unequal, and in both cases, they were the groom's second marriage after his first had produced heirs.¹⁹ By contrast, of the eighteen equivalent marriages entered into between 1918 and 1939, exactly half were unequal. Customarily, it required the agreement of a dynasty's agnates to declare a dubious marriage *ebenbürtig*. Aside from being able to bypass another vital hurdle (namely, seeking his own permission for the match), a dynastic head wishing to marry unequally thus enjoyed no great advantage over other princes. As the supposed defender and representative of a dynasty's history and values, however, the symbolic capital produced by such an act cannot be underestimated.

Breaking these categories down further reveals a more nuanced picture. As discussed above, families which qualified as *ebenbürtig* were either ruling dynasties or those which had been mediatised since the early nineteenth century. Categorising the marriages in these terms produces the following results:

18. Schönplflug, *Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern*, p. 105.

19. They were the marriage in 1873 between Georg II, Duke of Saxe-Meiningen, and Ellen Franz; and the very brief match in 1884 between Ludwig IV, Grand Duke of Hessen, and Alexandrine von Hutten-Czapska.

Period	Equal marriages	Ruling house	Mediatised or deposed
1871–1918	101	68 (67.3%)	33 (32.7%)
1918–1939	38	7 (18.4%)	31 (72.6%)

Table 5: Equal marriages by origin of spouse, 1871-1939

Supporting Schönplug’s observation that the German royal houses aimed higher than the “minimum standards” provided by their house laws, this analysis shows that before 1918, marriages between ruling houses outweighed those between a ruling house and a mediatised house by a factor of two to one.²⁰ The subsequent and apparent exclusion of the German dynasties from Europe’s network of ruling families after 1918 appears precipitate, but an important caveat should first be considered. The number of ruling houses in this period was simply far lower than before the armistice of November 1918. As a result of the war, Europe lost not only the twenty-two German dynasties, but also the Romanovs in Russia, the Habsburgs in Austria-Hungary, and the house of Petrović-Njegoš in Montenegro. Only a few years earlier, in 1910, the House of Braganza had also been chased out of Portugal. This pattern continued after 1918; the Greek throne, for example, was abolished in 1924 and restored in 1935, on both occasions by referendum. If one adds in marriages to spouses who had been members of a ruling house before 1918, then the difference is not so striking.

Period	Equal marriages	Ruling house	Ruled before 1918	Other deposed or mediatised house
1918–1939	38	7 (18.4%)	15 (39.5%)	16 (42.1%)

Table 6: Equal marriages by pre-war status of spouse, 1918-1939

Nevertheless, it is clear that few German royals regained any hint of their former status by marrying into still-ruling families. Indeed, only seven did so in twenty years, few enough that the matches may be listed here: Rupprecht of Bavaria and Antonia of Luxembourg (1921), Konrad of Bavaria and Bona Margherita of Savoy-Genua (1921)²¹, Ernst Heinrich of Saxony

20. Schönplug, *Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern*, p. 96.

21. A member of the Italian royal house.

and Sophia of Luxembourg (1921), Albrecht Eugen of Württemberg and Nadezha of Bulgaria (1924), Sibylla of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha and Gustav Adolf of Sweden (1932), Christian of Schaumburg-Lippe and Feodora of Denmark (1937), and Frederica of Brunswick and Paul of Greece (1938). In only two cases, did a German princess marry a future monarch. To put this in perspective, in 1918 there were seven German-born consorts reigning in Europe's capitals.²² One might assume, therefore, that once deposed, the German dynasties were content to simply marry amongst one another. But this was not the case either, as the following table shows. Under the *Kaiserreich*, the twenty-two ruling dynasties provided both the bride and groom in more than two-fifths of equal marriages, with the other three-fifths shared roughly equally between other German noble families and non-German families. After 1918, however, the rate of inter-dynastic marriage within Germany halved.

Period	Equal	Within the 22	Mediatised	Non-Germans
1871–1918	101	43 (42.6%)	28 (27.7%)	30 (29.7%)
1918–1939	38	8 (21%)	15 (39.5%)	15 (39.5%)

Table 7: Equal marriages by geographic and social origin of spouse, 1871-1918

These figures are particularly interesting. They support Heinz Reif's argument that the abolition of the monarchy in Germany removed divisions between the ruling houses and the mediatised *Standesherren*.²³ If the distinction between them had remained significant, then one would not expect such a reversal in their marital fortunes. The pre-revolutionary desire to 'aim high' when choosing a spouse could no longer be satisfied; far fewer ruling houses existed and many which did—such as in Britain, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries—had been formal enemies during the First World War and were thus disinclined to see a German join their ranks. This was the principal reason behind Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg's aborted engagement to Princess Hilda of Luxembourg in 1921. The general dearth of marriages between the twenty-two dynasties, and the increase in marriages to non-German nobles, further suggests a breakdown in the solidarity of the ruling class. War and revolution

22. These consorts were Victoria of Baden (in Sweden), Sophia of Prussia (Greece), Alexandrine of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Denmark), Elisabeth of Bavaria (Belgium), Heinrich of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (The Netherlands), and Victoria Eugenie of Battenberg (Spain).

23. Reif, *Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, p. 2.

placed great stress on the group and prevented the mass meetings—such as weddings, jubilees, and national celebrations—at which members could mix and mingle.

The rise in unequal marriages after 1918 should not be taken to imply a general acceptance of them amongst Germany's former royals. Indeed, such unions often provoked considerable tension within families, especially when an heir was party to the match. The examples of Wilhelm of Urach and Albrecht of Bavaria are illustrative here. Prince Wilhelm of Urach was not a member of a ruling dynasty but was heir to a title—duke of Urach—and the headship of a cadet branch of the House of Württemberg. After serving in the First World War and studying mechanical engineering, he worked at a series of automotive companies in southern Germany. In 1927, he declared his intention to marry the daughter of a Stuttgart industrialist, in contravention of the creeds of *Ebenbürtigkeit*. This news caused considerable anguish for his ailing father, Duke Wilhelm Karl, an upstanding former army officer and perennial candidate for Eastern Europe's ephemeral thrones. Wilhelm Karl's sister-in-law, Princess Isabella of Bavaria, saw to the root of the issue: "this trouble with his eldest son must hit [Wilhelm Karl] hard—it really is a shame! But now that it's official (in the newspapers) there's nothing more that can be done. It's true, it's true—small children, small worries; big children, big worries!" Isabella additionally discerned the pressure that an unequal marriage would put on Wilhelm's younger brother, Karl Gero, who would inherit headship of the house. Karl Gero "deserves to find a nice wife," she wrote, "and right after this stupid affair with [Wilhelm] it is doubly vital that he looks out for a good match."²⁴ A 'good match', of course, being an equal one.

Two years later, Isabella was witness to a similar contretemps—this time rather closer to home. Her nephew, the shy and retiring Prince Albrecht of Bavaria, had fallen in love with Maria Draskovich von Trakostjan, a minor noblewoman, and announced his intention to marry her. Once again, this news was not warmly received. Albrecht's uncle Franz complained of the young man's "undoubted lack of a sense of duty" and his great-uncle Leopold fulminated that he was placing personal desire before the good of the dynasty.²⁵ Realising that he could not dissuade his son, Crown Prince Rupprecht announced the engagement with a minimum of ceremony. "I do not wish to delay informing you," he wrote,

24. AHU, GU 119, Bü 132, 03.11.1927.

25. GHA, Nachlass Kronprinz Rupprecht, Nr. 46, 05.01.1930.

“that Albrecht and Countess Marie Draskovich were engaged yesterday.”²⁶ Compared with the fulsome and flourishing messages which Rupprecht himself received from other dynasties publicising nuptials, this was a phlegmatic and skeletal announcement which revealed Rupprecht’s deep disappointment at the match. As Isabella noted shortly afterwards, “[i]t is understandable that Alb[recht]’s engagement is not a great joy for Rup[precht]...Sooner or later it will lead to problems.”²⁷ She was right. In an attempt to assuage the consequences of the marriage, Rupprecht and his brother Franz began a campaign to have it declared *ebenbürtig*. According to house law, this required the consent of the dynasty’s other agnates: their uncles and cousins. In this enterprise, they were supported by Bavaria’s monarchist *Standesherren*, led by Prince Erwein von der Leyen, who urged Franz to cajole his more obstreperous relatives into line. Franz’s comment on the intervention revealed the difficulty, however: “I am happy to write to them, but I fear that in the cases of Uncle L[eopold], K[onrad], and especially Georg, it would be completely in vain.”²⁸ So it proved. The agnates would not be moved, and the marriage was considered unequal. Further reflecting his disapproval, Rupprecht insisted that the rites take place modestly and *en famille* [*im engsten Familienkreis*].²⁹

This pair of examples is revealing in a number of ways. Firstly, they demonstrate that for prominent members of the former ruling class, the customs and laws which had guided personal lives before 1918 remained significant. Indeed, to some, like Ludwig III, they were more important than ever and an indispensable instrument of solidarity in the battle against the encroaching republic. They also reveal discrepancies and tensions, however. That the princes who challenged these long-held tenets were all in their twenties should not be overlooked; they had come of age in the twilight years of the *Kaiserreich* and the birth pangs of the republic. In the past, the house laws had always prevailed, but 1918 proved a turning point. As Wilhelm of Hohenzollern complained in 1920, “these misdemeanours, which we are legally powerless to prevent, are the consequences of the revolution.”³⁰ The November Revolution thus appears as a fork in the dynastic road, with the elder generation heading straight on and their children and grandchildren taking the road less travelled. The authority

26. AHU, GU 119, Bü 301, 15.04.1930.

27. AHU, GU 119, Bü 132, 25.04.1930.

28. GHA, Nachlass Kronprinz Rupprecht, Nr. 46, 09.05.1930.

29. AHU, GU 119, Bü 301, 11.08.1930.

30. FHHDA, DS 70 T 2, Nr. 30, 13.06.1920.

of the *paterfamilias* was no longer unquestioned and was, in some cases, openly resented. Sensing the shifting of the sands, Ludwig III wrote to the Wittelsbach princes as early as December 1918, reaffirming his position as the executive head of the house and calling for unity “in this so difficult and serious time.”³¹ That Ludwig was right to be suspicious is revealed by the memoirs of his cousin, Prince Adalbert, another young prince who married unequally in the interwar period. “As I quickly learned,” he wrote,

the assumption that we were now at least free and independent was false. In times of crisis we had to fend for ourselves, but as soon as things calmed down, the family chief sprang back into action more intensively than ever for, according to a 100-year-old house law, *we were now his only subjects*.³²

Titles and names

As is discussed below, unequal marriages raised complicated questions over which titles the spouse (and offspring of the union) would bear. A title is a fundamental hallmark of belonging for the nobleman or noblewoman. As Monique de Saint Martin writes, in a few words a title “evokes the family’s past, the geographical location of its estates [and] its relations with other noble families.” In short, it “summarise[s] and express[es] the symbolic capital of a family” and distinguishes it from the untitled masses. Unlike castles, estates, wealth, and formal status, which may be sold off, lost in war, fade away, or taken by revolution, a name remains as an intangible mark of identity and belonging.³³ As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the constitution of the Weimar Republic revoked public law privileges of the German nobility and ordered the conversion of noble titles into ordinary surnames. In practice, however, the states implemented the operative provision—§109(2) WRV—with varying degrees of enthusiasm and rigour. While an apparently simple measure, legally it proved highly complex and oblivious to the intricacies of the German nobility, the rights of the individual, and the powers of the government. Federal regulation was tried but also failed.³⁴ Even by the mid-1930s, authorities in Hessen could not specify their former

31. GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III., Nr. 23, 22.12.1918.

32. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Adalbert, Nr. 14, Lebenserinnerungen des Prinzen Adalbert, pp. 471-472. Emphasis added.

33. Monique de Saint Martin, ‘Die Konstruktion der adligen Identität’, *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 4 (1991), pp. 533-534.

34. This regulation was spearheaded by Prussia, whose 1923 *Adelsgesetz* had failed to bring the Hohenzollern into line with the constitution. A lack of support from the larger, southern states led to its failure.

ruler's name with any great certainty.³⁵ Indeed, in the seven editions of Darmstadt's official address book published between 1918 and 1934, Ernst Ludwig was listed nine times under five different names.³⁶

Amidst the confusion, Germany's royals continued where they had left off in 1918, with only minor adaptations to the new order.³⁷ Friedrich II remained grand duke of Baden, Ludwig III remained king of Bavaria, and so on and so forth. Occasionally, a former royal adopted one of their lesser titles. In a statement accompanying his instrument of abdication, King Wilhelm II of Württemberg let it be known that he wished to live as the "Duke of Württemberg." This title had been used by the heads of the House of Württemberg between the Diet of Worms in 1495 and the state's elevation to the electoral dignity in 1803. Three years later, under Napoleonic patronage, it became a kingdom. In letters to his friend Gottfried von Reden, Wilhelm lamented this promotion, calling it a "crown of thorns" [*Dornenkrone*].³⁸ A modest and retiring man, Wilhelm did not enjoy his status as one of only four kings amongst the twenty-two German federal princes. He was the only deposed monarch to use a different title, but his idea was copied by two heirs who became the heads of their dynasties after 1918. In neighbouring Baden, Prince Berthold (accessed in 1928) styled himself "Margrave of Baden," as opposed to "Grand Duke," with Friedrich Christian of Saxony (1932) also reverting to a mediaeval title as "Margrave of Meissen." In so doing, these two princes ensured that they were distinguished as heads of their respective houses without laying explicit claim to sovereign titles in a way which would agitate the republican authorities. Their choice of titles of ancient standing additionally highlighted their families' ancestral connection with the respective territories (a key tenet of *Adeligkeit*, as alluded to by de Saint Martin) and underlined their continued status as regional *grands seigneurs* even after the revolution.

Royal titles are based around the position of a member of a dynasty relative to that dynasty's *paterfamilias*. On the death of a monarch, therefore, the titles of his relatives will change depending on their relation to the new monarch. Although Berthold and Friedrich Christian

35. HStAD, G 11, 26/5, III/29707, 30.06.1937.

36. *Adreßbuch der Landeshauptstadt Darmstadt* (Darmstadt, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1929, 1930, 1933, 1934).

37. For a legal-historical analysis of German high noble titles before 1918, see: Hermann Rehm, *Prädikat- und Titelrecht der deutschen Standesherren: Eine rechtlich-kulturgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Munich, 1905).

38. HStAS, Q, Nachlass Gottfried von Reden, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Gottfried von Reden, 04.12.1918 and 06.07.1919.

were unique in adopting new titles after they ‘acceded,’ their practice reflected a belief common to all former royals that the titular dynamism of the pre-revolutionary age had ended in 1918. Germany did not see any new self-proclaimed kings, grand dukes, or dukes in the interwar period. Self-proclaimed is the operative word, however, as some royals—or perhaps their private secretaries—did use these titles in correspondence with one another. Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, for instance, was addressed as king after 1921 by both Duke Carl Eduard of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha and Kaiser Wilhelm II.³⁹

From time to time, however, occasion demanded that the full salutary panoply of titles be deployed, even by those who rejected such titles for themselves. Formal letters announcing deaths, marriages, and births to the princely community are a prime example. When Wilhelm II of Württemberg died, Albrecht (as his successor) wrote formally to inform Crown Prince Rupprecht, addressing him as “Your Royal Majesty.” Dispensing with the customary “dear Rupprecht,” which he would otherwise have used as his peer and former army colleague, Albrecht began the letter “most serene and puissant prince! dear brother and cousin!”⁴⁰ Similarly, when Friedrich Karl of Hessen-Kassel wrote to Albrecht to inform him that his elder brother was ‘abdicating’ as head of the house, he opened with “most serene Duke! kind brother and cousin!”⁴¹ These exceptions should not be taken for the norm; most letters exchanged between members of the former ruling *Hochadel* were informal and unceremonious. When events which were vital to the lifeblood of a dynasty occurred, however, it was only proper that they be conveyed in the formulaic court style of the pre-war era, in which titles were written out in full and as often as possible. The uncommon use of this highly symbolic style not only reflected the significance of events like births for the continuation of the dynasties, but also served as a periodic reminder of the correspondents’ imagined, elevated positions.

Further evidence of the significance of titles to the deposed dynasties is revealed by their attempts to protect them against misuse. As marks of belonging to exclusive families and outward demonstrations of *Ebenbürtigkeit*, it was vital that their use be restricted only to those entitled. As noted above, King Ludwig III’s cousin Adalbert marriedmorganatically in 1919.

39. See the telegrams received by Albrecht in: AHW, 331, Nr. 356 and AHW, 331, Nr. 530.

40. GHA, Nachlass Kronprinz Rupprecht, Nr. 890, 08.12.1921.

41. AHW, 331, Nr. 563, 15.07.1925.

In morganatic marriages, one partner is *ebenbürtig* while the other is not, barring the latter from claiming or acceding to their spouse's rank and titles. Arguing that the revolution had essentially revoked the dynastic laws on which this convention was based, Adalbert nevertheless asserted the right of his wife, Auguste, to use his name.⁴² Ludwig, however, was keen to protect the value of his dynasty's titles and refused to acknowledge a new 'Princess of Bavaria.' What were the alternatives? Ludwig's legal advisor, Freiherr von Stengel, recognised that under a precedent established following a similar contretemps in Saxe-Meiningen, Auguste could call herself "Countess of Bavaria." As this title also implied membership of the dynasty, Ludwig III wished to avoid it as well. He therefore suggested "Countess of Veldenz," a former Wittelsbach territory in the Rhineland.⁴³ State Secretary Schuster, a government official in whom von Stengel had confided, poured cold water over these plans, however. He pointed out that the concept of *Ebenbürtigkeit* had become unconstitutional and that royal wives, just like all others, took their husband's name. Seeing as Adalbert was not "Count of Veldenz," Ludwig's suggestion made no sense and the state would quickly see through any attempt to change his name.⁴⁴ In the face of such objections, Ludwig relented, but to pre-empt disagreement within the family, Adalbert was forced to sign an oath confirming that, despite her new title, neither 'Princess Auguste of Bavaria' nor their children would be members of the royal house.⁴⁵

The customary informality of royal correspondence mentioned above is revealed by the German royals' terms of self-reference. A common tactic, when discussing a third party in a letter, was to use the form "forename + territory." The Prince of Wales thus became "David Wales," and his cousin, the former Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, "Charlie Coburg."⁴⁶ When addressing a fellow royal directly, familial terms were used. By 1918, this was a tradition of centuries' standing. No matter how distantly related, an older or more senior royal would be addressed as 'uncle' or 'aunt' and a counterpart of a similar age as 'brother,' 'sister,' or 'cousin'. In an interview given late in his life, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia recalled referring to Tsar Nicholas II as "Uncle Nicky," despite having never met him.⁴⁷ Even when

42. GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III, Nr. 59, 22.10.1919.

43. GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III, Nr. 59, 18.04.1921.

44. GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III, Nr. 59, 08.08.1921.

45. GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III, Nr. 59, Vormerkung, 24.09.1921.

46. AHW, 331, Nr. 359, 12.12.1919.

47. Zeugen des Jahrhunderts, 'Kaiser auf Abruf: Prinz Louis Ferdinand von Preußen' (1986), ZDF [https://www.zeitzeugen-portal.de/videos/y5eveUVrO9M, last accessed 19 September 2019].

Duke Wilhelm Karl of Urach presented Duke Albrecht of Württemberg with a lawsuit in 1928, he signed off—somewhat incongruously—as “your most dutiful and obedient cousin.”⁴⁸ This natural and informal approach underlined the royals’ continued self-perception of their belonging to a single, noble family. In only using these terms with one another, furthermore, the royals stylistically isolated themselves from the rest of the population, while still acknowledging their own internal hierarchies (consider the distinction between “brother” and “uncle”).

The revolution of 1918 barely put a dent in another royal naming practice: the use of pseudonyms. Indeed, it remained noticeably widespread and is particularly remarkable because the pseudonyms chosen were, despite the Weimar Republic’s constitutional ban on aristocratic titles, invariably and consciously noble. Ludwig III of Bavaria, whom circumstances frequently forced into flight and exile between November 1918 and his death in October 1921, was identified in his passport as the Duke of Franconia.⁴⁹ This was a title assumed by the Wittelsbachs in 1803 on the secularisation of the Bishopric of Würzburg, which had held the territory—in the north of modern-day Bavaria—since the twelfth century. On other occasions, royals adopted names to which they had not been entitled before 1918, but which possessed symbolic or historical significance. In 1924, for instance, when Ludwig III’s son Rupprecht travelled with his wife to Italy, the pair were identified as the “Count and Countess of Scheyern,” a nod to the eleventh-century nobleman Otto Graf von Scheyern, the Wittelsbachs’ earliest confirmable ancestor.⁵⁰ Resorts to history like this—a defining feature of “noble remembrance” (Stephan Malinowski and Markus Funck)—peaked under the new order.⁵¹ A third option was to reference a piece of family property. This was an ancient noble tactic; the names Habsburg and Wittelsbach themselves respectively stemmed from castles in modern-day Switzerland and Bavaria. After 1918, however, name choices occasionally spoke to scenes of lesser grandeur. While the Hessens considered calling themselves “von Tarasp,” after their recently acquired castle in Switzerland,⁵² and the family of Prince Franz of Bavaria travelled as the “Pernau” family,

48. AHU, GU 10, Bü 91, 12.02.1928.

49. HStAS, E 40/59, Bü 157, Nr. A. 636, 22.09.1919.

50. BayHStA, Gesandtschaft Päpstlicher Stuhl, 162, 08.03.1924.

51. Marcus Funck and Stephan Malinowski, ‘Masters of Memory: The Strategic Use of Autobiographical Memory by the German Nobility’, in: Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche (eds.), *The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture* (Urbana, 2002), p. 91.

52. GHHA, D26, 4/1.

alluding to a Hungarian monastery,⁵³ Franz's cousin Adalbert became "Mr von Badenburger"—a summer house in the grounds of Munich's Nymphenburg Palace.⁵⁴

These names were ultimately necessary owing to the royals' lack of obvious *bürgerlich* surnames. For centuries, their names had taken the form "X forename of Z". What they did have, however, was a array of titles, many essentially foreign to non-experts, from which to choose. Before his overthrow, Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, for instance, gloried in the style

Grand Duke of Hessen and by Rhine, Prince of Hersfeld and Starkenburg, Count of Catzelnbogen, Dietz, Ziegenhain, Nidda, Hanau, Schaumburg, Isenburg and Büdingen, Lord of Friedberg and Wimpfen.⁵⁵

Any one of these would have sufficed. And in choosing one, Ernst Ludwig would have retained a tangible form of historical identity and a mark of distinction; having a pseudonym almost became an element of the royal identity, a sign that one was important enough to go under cover. Indeed, travelling incognito was far from the unique preserve of the German royals; most of Europe's ruling (and ex-ruling) houses were at it. King Boris of Bulgaria visited Cologne and Munich as the "Count of Wirsky"; Prince Carol of Romania went home to Sigmaringen as "Carol Caraiman"; the Crown Princess of Italy took in the splendours of Bayreuth's *Festspiele* as the "Marchioness of San Mauricio"; the Queen of the Netherlands rode the rails as the "Countess of Buren"; and King Alexander of Yugoslavia motored back-and-forth across Germany's eastern border as the "Count of Avala." Even non-royals got in on the act; independent Czechoslovakia's first President, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, for instance, crossed Germany on many occasions under the Anglicised alias "Thomas G. Marsden."⁵⁶

Organised solidarity

As was determined in previous chapters, the deposed royals were faced by common threats which affected them as a single *class*. By examining how, and if, they responded collectively to these threats, we can see whether a sense of royal solidarity survived the revolution of

53. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Franz, Nr. 168, Personalausweis, 04.09.1919.

54. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Adalbert, Nr. 14, Lebenserinnerungen des Prinzen Adalbert, pp. 486-487.

55. HStAD, G 21 A, 2/1, JM 13440, 03.05.1923.

56. See: BayHStA, MA 100102, Reisen fremder Fürstlichkeiten und Staatsmänner.

1918. Three examples shall be considered in this section: the *Verein deutscher Hofkammern*, the mooted *Verband regierender deutscher Fürstenhäuser*, and the one-off *Jungfürstentreffen* of 1928. The first two of this trio were essentially interest or lobby groups, the classic tool of a threatened or diminished social group seeking protection and strength through numbers. Even before the abolition of the monarchy and the nobility, this sort of organisation had been adopted by the ruling classes. The *Verein der deutschen Standesherren* was founded in 1863, followed in 1874 by the *Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft* [DAG]. Originally active only in the north, the DAG was decentralised after 1918 as noble members throughout Germany flocked under its protective wing.⁵⁷ As Eckart Conze writes, the “experience of loss” [*Verlusterfabrung*] induced by the revolution encouraged the homogenisation of the nobility and the first recognisably German—as opposed to, say, Westphalian or Mecklenburgian—noble self-awareness. Pressure grew after 1918 to “revitalise the organisation, to centralise it and to turn it into an advocacy group for the German nobility, now that its interests would no longer be represented by the state.”⁵⁸ While its impact in some southern states, particularly Bavaria,⁵⁹ was limited, the DAG still grew precipitously after the war. A membership of 1,600 in 1918 became one of 17,000 in 1933.⁶⁰ The DAG and its sister organisations were principally designed to advocate for the lower nobility and while former royals did occasionally grace their events, their participation was far from enthusiastic. As Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg reported to his father in 1929, “the evening at the *Adelsgemeinschaft* was, like all such events, not a pleasure.”⁶¹ Shortly after their arrival as students in Munich, the two sons of Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen were invited to a so-called *Adelsfest* in Preysing Palais.⁶² “It was so horrendously boring that I can’t even write about it,” Georg Donatus informed his mother, “we gathered at 9 o’clock, stood around for an hour and a half and then went away again. Simply ridiculous.”⁶³ Tellingly, when the boys were subsequently invited to two more events, Ludwig’s reaction was brief: “we want to dodge them if at all possible.”⁶⁴ In the event, it seems that his parents understood this reluctance. Ernst Ludwig viewed such occasions as useful for getting to know new people

57. Hoyningen-Huene, *Adel in der Weimarer Republik*, p. 56.

58. Conze, *Von deutschem Adel*, p. 69.

59. Aretin, ‘Der bayerische Adel’, p. 523.

60. Hoyningen-Huene, *Adel in der Weimarer Republik*, p. 59.

61. AHW, 331, Nr. 162, 12.04.1929.

62. GHFFA, D24, 34/9, 07.12.1928.

63. GHFFA, D24, 44/8, 13.12.1928. Underlining in original.

64. GHFFA, D24, 44/10, 09.01.1929.

but little else. “It ends in talking [and] taking resolutions which come to nothing,” he surmised.⁶⁵

Despite their apparent disdain for the social side of such interest groups, the former royal dynasties recognised their considerable value in countering the unknowns of the post-monarchical world. Comprised mainly of the dynasties’ *Hofkammerpräsidenten*, rather than their members, the *Verein deutscher Hofkammern* became an important forum for inter-dynastic communication in this period. Its chief aim, as elucidated by long-time chairman, Franz Freiherr von Coels von der Brügghen, was to “effectively advocate for the interests of the former federal princes.”⁶⁶ Prince Wilhelm of Hohenzollern later laid claim to the original idea,⁶⁷ but according to Otmar Jung the organisation was the brainchild of the *Hofkammer* in Schaumburg-Lippe, for which von Coels worked.⁶⁸ Recognising its relatively weak bargaining power in the smallest of the German Empire’s constituent states, the *Hofkammer* approached its counterparts in eight other petty principalities and established the nucleus of the future organisation at a meeting in Hanover in January 1919. Further meetings occurred in May, August, and October that year, with new members joining at each stage.⁶⁹ By 1922, all twenty-two dynasties which had ruled in 1918 were represented, as were ten cadet branches and the Grand Ducal House of Luxembourg.⁷⁰ Prussia adopted observer status only, underlining Jung’s judgment that the *Verein* was “in the first instance a non-Prussian/small-state interest group.”⁷¹ Minutes of the *Verein* show that no Prussian prince attended a meeting until December 1931, when Prince Wilhelm, eldest son of the former Crown Prince, joined regular delegates Georg of Saxe-Meiningen and Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg.⁷²

The *Verein* functioned as an arena both for discussion and instruction. Meetings frequently included lectures by visiting speakers on matters of noble interest; in December 1930, for instance, they covered forestry and the “Union for the Protection of Occidental Culture” [*Bund zum Schutze der abendländischen Kultur*], an active anti-Bolshevist group.⁷³ Other meetings

65. HStAD, D24, 35/4, 03.04.1929.

66. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 05.12.1930.

67. FFHDA, DS 70 T 2, Nr. 30, 13.06.1920.

68. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, vol. I, p. 575.

69. Ibid., vol. I, p. 576.

70. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 14.03.1922.

71. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, p. 578.

72. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 09.12.1931.

73. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 05.12.1930.

focused on specific issues of significance at the time, such as the fate of royal territories lost to the newly created Second Polish Republic.⁷⁴ State authorities evidently acknowledged the *Verein* as a formal representation of the deposed dynasties, if not one that actually had to be satisfied. In early 1921, the Prussian ministry of justice approached von Coels for the *Verein's* position on the state's impending *Adelsgesetz*, designed to abolish noble privileges. Coels prepared an expert opinion but was blindsided when the government simply handed over the final and unchangeable text of the law.⁷⁵ Beyond the corridors of power, Jung concludes, the *Verein's* headquarters in sleepy Bückeberg and its high degree of discretion meant that even its existence was unknown to most politicians.⁷⁶

This all changed following the *Verein's* high profile forays into the debate on expropriation discussed in chapter three. Within weeks of the first moves in December 1925 to force a referendum, the *Verein* established a committee through which it would advise the Reichstag and forward information gathered by the various dynasties.⁷⁷ A month later, this committee was joined by a dedicated press office tasked with “enlightening the public through the press.”⁷⁸ This approach had two prongs. Firstly, the press office would release material provided by the dynasties to refute false or misleading articles published by socialist or communist organs. In February 1926, for instance, the Württembergers rejected claims by the *Rote Fahne* that they owned three castles (they owned two: Altshausen and Friedrichshafen).⁷⁹ Secondly, articles arguing in favour of the princes' cause were circulated for the dynasties to discretely pass on to known sympathetic publications.⁸⁰ Naturally, this new wave of propaganda was expensive, not only prompting the *Verein* to double its membership fee, but forcing it to go cap in hand for extra donations. Not all were willing or able to comply; on behalf of the Wittelsbachs, Prince Eugen of Oettingen-Wallerstein enclosed 600 Marks, rather than the 7,500 requested, noting that any more would leave his

74. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 01.03.1921.

75. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 01.03.1921.

76. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, vol. I, p. 583.

77. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, J. Nr. 438, 08.12.1925.

78. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, memorandum, 14.01.1926.

79. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Herzogliche Rentkammer to Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 05.02.1926.

80. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern to Herzogliche Rentkammer, 22.02.1926 and 01.03.1926.

masters destitute.⁸¹ The indifference of those dynasties which had already finalised deals with their states acted as an additional breach in the wall of solidarity von Coels tried to erect.⁸²

Aside from pushing the princely programme, the *Verein* also acted as a vital conduit between the families and proceedings in Berlin. In his frequent memoranda to members, von Coels explained the positions of the various political parties, the parliamentary timetable, compromises developed by the government, and their respective merits.⁸³ In plenary sessions, the *Verein* moulded the position the princes would take, stressing, above all, that the contest should not be painted as a monarchist hurrah, but as the noble defence of ancient property rights.⁸⁴ While the referendum of June 1926 ultimately failed, the *Verein* should not be allocated great credit for this outcome. The group was only one of many campaigning against the motion and those voters whom they targeted were unlikely to have considered an opposing position. Minutes of *Verein* meetings from 1926 reveal a generally relaxed atmosphere; while the members recognised the threat posed by the referendum and the importance of campaigning, the possibility of expropriation being approved was not widely feared.⁸⁵ As an undertaking, it is nevertheless concrete evidence that the deposed royals cooperated after their overthrow to counter the encroachments of the new republic. This cooperation was not informal and occasional, but systematic, regulated, and focused on specific issues. The *Verein's* importance was underlined by the remarkable stability of its membership; while the Saxons left in 1928, all other delegations remained, unanimously passing a motion the same year to continue its activities.⁸⁶ The last recorded meeting took place in December 1942.⁸⁷

The *Verein deutscher Hofkammern* only represented the financial and legal interests of the deposed princes. The idea of an inter-dynastic organisation was appealing, however, and was quickly applied to private interests as well, as in the blueprints for a “Union of German Ruling Houses” [*Verband regierender deutscher Fürstenhäuser*] which floated around in the early 1920s. The most detailed plans flowed from the pen of Prince Wilhelm of Hohenzollern, but

81. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Eugen Fürst zu Oettingen-Wallerstein to Vereinigung Deutscher Hofkammern, 20.03.1926.

82. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, J. Nr. 438, 08.12.1925.

83. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, J. Nr. 230, 31.03.1926 and 19.04.1926.

84. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, J. Nr. 438, 08.12.1925.

85. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 442, Sitzung der Vereinigung deutscher Hofkammern, 28.04.1926.

86. AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, 952, Sitzung der Vereinigung deutscher Hofkammern, 12.06.1928.

87. Jung, *Volksgesetzgebung*, vol. I, p. 578.

whether the idea was originally his is not entirely clear. He acknowledged the contributions of the Crown Prince of Saxony and corresponded on the matter at length with an unnamed “cousin” (not the crown prince, whom Wilhelm would have addressed as “nephew”). In any case, the devised society was anything if not ambitious, resembling a cross between a regulatory commission and an arbitration tribunal. Under Wilhelm’s plans, every member of every former ruling dynasty was obliged to join as part of their “duty to protect our most sacred moral assets.” It was a fundamentally conservative plan; preservation and damage limitation were the orders of the day. “Now that the princely houses have ceased to hold a privileged position in society,” Wilhelm intoned to his mysterious correspondent, “it will be one of the duties of the *Verband* to defend our traditional world views and to keep them from being dragged into line with the spirit of the age.” This would be achieved, according to the *Verband*’s draft constitution, “through the maintenance of family tradition and the fostering of feelings of solidarity.”⁸⁸ Standards would be maintained by an eight-man *Fürstenrat*, the executive committee, whose approval would be required before any royal could marry or take a job.⁸⁹ Marriages had to be *ebenbürtig*, on pain of dismissal from the *Verband*, and only jobs from a predetermined list were permitted—those “which commit one to the Republic” were expressly forbidden. Any disagreements between members of the same dynasty, on matters such as house law interpretation, would also be adjudicated by the *Fürstenrat*. In short, the *Verband* would be nothing less than a military-style “court of honour for the royal houses.”⁹⁰

According to Daniel Menning, the noble society was an integral part of nineteenth-century plans for internal reforms of the aristocracy (so-called *Adelsreformpläne*). Seen against Menning’s analysis of these proposals, certain aspects of Wilhelm’s *Verband* clearly had historical precedent. The society’s role as an arbiter in private disputes between members, the need to prove sufficiently noble descent to attain membership, and the right of the society to exclude members who infringed its standards were all prefigured in this way.⁹¹ Indeed, as Karina Urbach writes, defensive societies like the *Verband* were mooted by high nobles in

88. FHHDA, DS 70 T 2, Nr. 30, Satzungen des Verbandes Deutscher Fürsten.

89. Ibid.

90. See: FHHDA, DS 70 T 2, Nr. 30, Prince Wilhelm of Hohenzollern to unknown, 13.06.1920; Satzungen des Verbandes Deutscher Fürsten; and Gründung eines “Verbandes der regierenden deutschen Fürstenhäuser”.

91. Daniel Menning, *Standesgemäße Ordnung in der Moderne: Adlige Familienstrategien und Gesellschaftsentwürfe in Deutschland 1840-1945* (Munich, 2014), pp. 64-67.

many “hysterical circular letters” at the end of the war.⁹² Despite Wilhelm’s evident enthusiasm and the apparently ripe moment, however, the *Verband* appears to have gone almost unnoticed outside of Sigmaringen. Only one other reference to it has been found in the course of this investigation. In May 1920, Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg met the former Grand Duke of Baden who casually mentioned “the Saxon idea for the foundation of a sort of ‘princes’ union’ [*Fürstenbund*] which he did not agree with; I could only add that I was of like mind.”⁹³ Germany’s proud and independent dynasties could hardly have taken kindly to the strict and overbearing arrogations of the *Verband*. The right to self-regulation of dynastic affairs—known as *Autonomie* and codified in §57 EGBGB—was a fundamental hallmark of belonging for the ruling classes and not one to be relinquished lightly. Its ultimate failure notwithstanding, the *Verband* is revealing of royal responses to the revolution. The risk that “centrifugal tendencies” (Matthias Stickler) within dynasties and the class as a whole would be exacerbated by the abolition of monarchy was a major concern.⁹⁴ In Wilhelm’s mind, royal houses evidently could not be relied upon to act according to class interests without some form of overarching regulatory authority. Before 1918, this had been provided by the institution of monarchy itself—or, more practically, by the Kaiser. In the volatile, post-revolutionary era, new structures were required.

Highly systematised and formal organisations were not the sole solution to waning class consciousness. Even simple get-togethers and meetings allowed for ligatures between families to be strengthened and an awareness of their distinct social background to be fostered. This was clearly the motivation behind Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen’s so-called *Jungfürstentreffen* at Schloss Wolfsgarten in 1928. Running over the Whitsun weekend, it was a curious combination of house party and networking event; attendance was by invitation only and limited solely to German princes born after 1900. As Ernst Ludwig wrote in his offer, “everyone may do or not do as he wishes,” whether it be tennis, swimming, or simply enjoying “our simple rural life of moor and woodland.”⁹⁵ More than a dozen young princes accepted. Again, it is not entirely clear whether the initiative originated with Ernst Ludwig. The former grand duke was known to enjoy being surrounded by youth and was an

92. Karina Urbach, ‘Zwischen Aktion und Reaktion: Die süddeutschen Standesherrn 1914-1919’, in: Conze and Wienfort (eds.), *Adel und Moderne*, p. 346.

93. AHW, 331, Nr. 160, 01.05.1920. If the idea did originate in Saxony, then the mysterious “cousin” with whom Wilhelm Hohenzollern communicated could have been the ex-king, Friedrich Augustus III.

94. Stickler, ‘Abgesetzte Dynastien’, p. 433.

95. GHFHA, D24, 37/4, undated draft letter.

avid supporter of the welfare of young people.⁹⁶ The invitations, furthermore, were all sent out in his name and the responses duly addressed to “Uncle Ernie.” As Ernst Ludwig was head of the house and owner of Wolfsgarten, this is hardly surprising and does not rule out outside inspiration. Archival evidence suggests that his sons, Georg Donatus and Ludwig, were at least involved in the development of the idea, if not its conception. An invitation list, containing eighteen names, is written in Ludwig’s hand, for instance.⁹⁷ And in his reply, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia teasingly suggested to Ernst Ludwig that “the young men” were really behind it all.⁹⁸

In any case, it is obvious from the enthusiastic response of those invited that the idea was very welcome. Louis Ferdinand, something of a cosmopolitan intellectual—or “lounge lizard,” if one is to believe Prince Ludwig—relished the opportunity to “discuss anything, without prejudice and with every opinion being considered.”⁹⁹ His more socially-minded contemporaries, on the other hand, looked forward to simply meeting one another, often for the first time. Indeed, their responses are revealing of the effect which the 1918 revolution had had on Germany’s *regierender Hochadel* as an interconnected social class. Berthold of Baden—son of the last Imperial Chancellor, Max of Baden—was unable to participate owing to term dates at Oxford and expressed his great disappointment “as it is so hard these days to get to know any of [his peers].”¹⁰⁰ Leopold of Lippe similarly noted his excitement at being able to “finally get to know all of the princes,”¹⁰¹ while Friedrich Ernst of Saxe-Altenburg described his fellow invitees as people “whom one usually only hears about.”¹⁰²

The occasion’s declared objectives—that the young men “should get to know each other a little...and spend a pleasant time with us”—were clearly met.¹⁰³ Dutiful thank-you notes received by Ernst Ludwig after the event are testament to this. Indeed, the whole affair appears to have brought out the romantic and poetic in some of his guests; Georg Moritz of

96. *Ernst Ludwig Großherzog von Hessen und bei Rhein*, p. 3.

97. GHHFA, D24, 37/4, Einladungen nach Wolfsgarten.

98. GHHFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia to Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, 28.03.1928.

99. *Ibid.* For Ludwig of Hessen’s judgement, see: GHHFA, D24, 73/4, 25.05.1933.

100. GHHFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Berthold of Baden to Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, 30.04.1928.

101. GHHFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Leopold of Lippe to Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, 19.04.1928.

102. GHHFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Friedrich Ernst of Saxe-Altenburg to Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, 05.06.1928.

103. GHHFA, D24, 37/4, undated draft letter.

Saxe-Altenburg reminisced about “beautiful days which passed by as in a fairy tale,”¹⁰⁴ while Louis Ferdinand of Prussia, not to be out-done in such things, waxed lyrically that his “inner disharmony became a wonderful harmony” amongst his peers.¹⁰⁵ Photographs taken by Hubertus of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha which survive in the Grand Ducal archive in Darmstadt give graphic proof of the laid-back atmosphere alluded to in these letters. They show young men doing handstands, playing tennis, lounging by a swimming pool, resting with a picnic on a grassy bank, and generally passing a joyous and relaxed time.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

In the aftermath of war and revolution, the German dynasties suffered a number of setbacks and attacks on the pillars of their identity. Privileges and ranks were revoked, titles abolished, castles and land relinquished, sovereign rights removed, connections with foreign dynasties severed, and outlets for activity—such as the officer corps—restricted. By appropriating and refashioning the idea of *Adeligkeit* for our royal subjects—and examining equal-birth marriages, the use of titles, and organised royal self-defence—this chapter has argued that while a distinct and defined *Hochadel* did survive until the latter end of the interwar period, its boundaries were blurred and hid internal conflict. A majority of royal marriages remained equal after 1918, but the transgressions of notable individuals were symbolically damaging and unleashed considerable tension within families. They also exacerbated generational differences as the crop of younger princes, like their peers of the lower nobility, became disillusioned with the rigidity of house laws and traditions. Despite their best efforts, the familial authority of the older generation did not compare with that of the institution of monarchy before 1918—a living and vital organ of expectation. As elements like *Ebenbürtigkeit* fell away, symbolic matters grew in importance. As for all nobles afflicted by the revolution, names and titles were clung to as bastions of identity which the state could not breach. As prisms, furthermore, they revealed what individuals held to be important. In many cases, this was history, family connections, or ancestral property: memories, namely, of what had gone before. Defined as a sense of commonality and common distinction, solidarity amongst the royals remained strong. But tangible manifestations of this solidarity,

104. GHHEFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Friedrich Ernst of Saxe-Altenburg to Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, 05.06.1928.

105. GHHEFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia to Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, 05.06.1928.

106. GHHEFA, D24, 37/4, Prince Hubertus of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha to Grand Duchess Eleonore of Hessen, 16.06.1928.

in the form of actual cooperation or mutual assistance, were few and based predominantly around material rather than social interests.

The existing literature has stressed the capabilities of the European nobility in adapting to adverse change and thereby surviving well into the advent of modern society. Such arguments occasionally fall foul of extrapolating without justification; the German nobility, for instance, was highly intricate and it can be doubted whether members of the lower nobility genuinely remained members of an elite class. On the basis of the preceding and present chapters, however, it can be said that Germany's former royal houses aligned with this interpretation. In spite of inflation and other difficulties, they remained relatively well off and retained the ciphers of noble prestige: titles, castles, and national and transnational connections. To these they added education and membership of influential lobbying groups. In a more abstract way, they remained atop the mental hierarchies of the German people, despite now (constitutionally speaking) being their equal. The revolution of 1918 removed the dynasties' political power, but with few exceptions their social standing remained solid. One's rank is ultimately shaped by the recognition of those around you. As Heinrich Heine once wrote, the nobility—like the Jesuits and the devil—exists only so long as one believes in it. The *Hochadel* persisted after 1918, but did people still believe in and engage with it? The fate of monarchism and the sovereign-subject relationship after 1918 will be the topics of the following and final chapter.

Chapter VI

A story of princes and peoples: Popular encounters with monarchy after 1918

On 13 February 1919, the Liberal politician Friedrich Naumann rose in Germany's nascent national assembly in Weimar. Reflecting on the tremendous upheavals which the deputies had experienced over the preceding months, Naumann concluded that the republican status quo—such as it was—offered the only possible form of government for Germany. The monarchy had done great things for the nation, but its time had passed. “That which has gone before retains its honour,” he said, “but as much as we uphold the glory of the past—German history remains what it has always been, a story of princes and peoples—a dividing line has now been drawn, *and that line is final*.”¹ This chapter will consider whether Naumann was right. Did the revolutions of November 1918 cause an irreparable breach between the German people and their former dynasties, or did certain sympathies, loyalties, and nostalgias linger on? What, namely, was the plotline of the latest chapter in this ‘story’?

Ever since the collapse of the Weimar Republic, historians have refined and augmented a litany of structural weaknesses and inopportune circumstances which, they argue, led inevitably to the “failure” of interwar monarchism. Outlined initially in the early 1930s by Ludwig Gengler and subsequently developed by Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Hermann Schreyer, Arne Hofmann, and others, it paints a picture of a political creed mired in confusion and unable to assert itself beyond the level of trivial *Vereinsmeierei*.² At every turn

1. *Verh. RT.*, Nationalversammlung, 6. Sitzung, 13.02.1919, p. 56. Emphasis added.

2. This review is based predominantly on the following works: Gengler, ‘Die deutschen Monarchisten’; Walter H. Kaufmann, *Monarchism in the Weimar Republic* (New York, 1953); Jack Sweetman, “Unforgotten Crowns”: The German Monarchist Movements, 1918-1945’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1973); Hiller von Gaertringen, ‘Zur Beurteilung des ‘Monarchismus’ in der Weimarer Republik’; Roswitha Berndt, ‘Monarchisch-restaurative Organisationen im Kampf gegen die bürgerlich-parlamentarische Staatsform der Weimarer Republik’, *Jenaer Beiträge zur Parteiengeschichte* 43 (1978), pp. 15-27; Hermann Schreyer, ‘Monarchismus und monarchistische Restaurationsbestrebungen in der Weimarer Republik’, *Jahrbuch für Geschichte* 29 (1984), pp. 291-320; Garnett, ‘Lion, Eagle, and Swastika’; Dieter J. Weiß, “‘In Treue Fest’: Die Geschichte des Bayerischen Heimat- und Königsbundes und des Bayernbundes 1921-1996’, in: Adolf Dingreiter and Dieter J. Weiß (eds.), *Gott mit dir du Land der Bayern: An der Schwelle zum dritten Jahrtausend—der Freistaat zwischen Tradition und Fortschritt* (Regensburg, 1996), pp. 9-54; Arne Hofmann, “Wir sind das alte Deutschland, das Deutschland, wie es war...”: Der ‘Bund der Aufrechten’ und der Monarchismus in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt a.M., 1998); ‘Obsoleter Monarchismus als Erbe der Monarchie: Das

on the route to restoration, there was a fundamental question to which the “monarchists” could not provide a unified or coherent answer. Who would be restored—all twenty-two dynasties, or just the Hohenzollern? If the latter, would the now toxically unpopular Kaiser return, or the crown prince, a superficial voluptuary unencumbered by any great aptitude or intellect? Then there was the matter of the future monarchy’s form, and whether it would be authoritarian, constitutional, parliamentary, or social. Finally, and as with any movement seeking change throughout history, monarchy’s supporters had to decide whether reform or revolution offered the surest path to success. Even if conditions were fertile for a restoration—and most historians sound the death knell for its prospects in 1925 (the election of Hindenburg) or 1926 (the referendum on princely expropriation)—the lack of a single plan or campaign ensured that it was a non-starter.

While a damning indictment, it is not unjustified. This chapter contends, however, that its narrow purview makes it simplistic and unsatisfactory. Running as a common thread throughout these studies is the assumption that monarchism and restorationism were one and the same. This was not so. Monarchism is no more a purely constitutional creed than a monarch is a purely constitutional construct. The federal prince wore many hats besides the crown; to soldiers he was a glorious commander, to artists a patron and benefactor, to Christians the supreme bishop, and to those who lived around his many castles a beloved and familiar lord of the manor. Limiting the aperture of investigation to his political role thus erases the attitudes and experiences of vast numbers of Germans who remained sympathetic towards their local dynasty and attached to the monarchical past, but who neither supported nor sought to engineer its return. This approach has additional downsides. Firstly, it lends itself to extensive engagement with monarchical organisations. Indeed, to be precise, existing scholarship on monarchism is scholarship on *organised* monarchism. This work is undoubtedly of value; after all, it makes sense to examine the structures erected by the most ardent supporters of monarchy to facilitate their ends. It is all too easy, however, to focus solely on the minutiae of the societies’ structure and administration and overlook the reasons why ordinary people were attracted to the idea of monarchy in the first place. The second downside relates to the case studies chosen in most works. Most restorationist schemes envisaged a single imperial monarchy under the Hohenzollern. As such, the non-Prussian

Nachleben der Monarchie im Monarchismus nach 1918’, in: Biskup and Kohlrausch (eds.), *Das Erbe der Monarchie*, pp. 241-260.

states—with the notable exception of Bavaria—are comparatively neglected and assessments of monarchism misleadingly distorted by the Hohenzollern's general unpopularity.

This chapter seeks to go beyond the exploits of the major restorationist organisations to investigate the ways in which the German people encountered the legacies of monarchy more generally in the Weimar era. As has been observed in previous chapters, the revolution of November 1918 was unusual since, in the great majority of cases, the deposed monarch did not flee to foreign exile but continued to live amongst his former subjects. It is contended here that the citizens of Weimar Germany met the royal past more frequently—and with greater enthusiasm—than is usually assumed and that they did so on a number of different spatial planes. At the lowest level, correspondence (often seeking money or assistance) continued to flow into the ex-monarchs' in-trays. In the vicinity of his castle, locals regularly encountered their former sovereign in his guise as a *grand seigneur* and benefactor. On certain festive occasions, such as funerals and weddings, meanwhile, he was placed front and centre in the consciousness of the entire state. These encounters, and the desire of the German people to manufacture them and participate in them, shall be used to reveal an extensive degree of dynastic sympathy and monarchist sentiment which, while falling below outright restorationism, was significant and reflects considerable continuity with the pre-revolutionary era. This generally apolitical sentiment, which may be termed romantic or folkloric monarchism, was motivated by a memory of the past, rather than the dream of the future which inspired restorationists. It was, in the words of Friedrich Meinecke, “monarchism of the heart” which sat alongside “republicanism of reason.”³ Political allegiances were not a zero-sum game, as some historians have implied.⁴ It was possible, and indeed common, to recognise the republic whilst retaining attachment to the monarchy. As a celebration of individual monarchs and dynasties, as well as of their histories and traditions, folkloric monarchism was a continuation of trends discernible under the *Kaiserreich* and the direct consequence of royal policies which had focused on popular support over political strength. As will be discussed, this sympathy was complex and motivated by a number of

3. Friedrich Meinecke, ‘Verfassung und Verwaltung der deutschen Republik’, *Die neue Rundschau* XXX:1 (1919), printed in: *Politische Schriften und Reden*, ed. Georg Kotowski (Darmstadt, 1958), p. 281. Cf. Andreas Wirsching and Jürgen Eder (eds.), *Vernunftrepublikanismus in der Weimarer Republik: Politik, Literatur, Wissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 2008).

4. Cf. Kaufmann, *Monarchism*; Benjamin Hasselhorn, ‘Das Monarchiesterben 1914-1945: Ein Siegeszug der Demokratie?’, in: Hasselhorn and Knorring (eds.), *Vom Olymp zum Boulevard*, pp. 47-60.

different factors. While no two monarchisms were identical, collectively they formed a noticeable underlying current in the complex political culture of the interwar era.

Responses to the revolution

As was discussed in the introduction, the significance of Germany's provincial monarchies declined in the pre-war decades as the national-imperial regime of the Hohenzollern and the arrival of an increasingly modern society cast doubt on their continued value. When, by the autumn of 1918, the German question had boiled down to "peace or the princes," the monarchs could not play a hand which would trump the war-weariness and disenchantment of the people. The November Revolution was aimed at the war, and only secondarily at the monarchy. This much is evident from its sudden outbreak and popular reflections once its consequences had become apparent. Even amongst nominally republican groups, advocacy for abolition was unheard of prior to November 1918. At the *Reich* level, Friedrich Ebert famously opposed the revolution.⁵ In Württemberg, meanwhile, Wilhelm Keil argued that there was "no reason at all" for regime change, a sentiment shared by his SPD colleague Ludwig Marum in neighbouring Baden.⁶ Further proof that the monarchs were essentially sideshows, even at the height of the revolutions, comes from eye-witness accounts. The Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hessen crossed Darmstadt repeatedly on 8 November without anyone batting an eyelid (indeed, they were "warmly greeted" according to Eleonore).⁷ In Munich, Prince Ludwig Ferdinand, in full uniform, bade the wounded farewell at a local field hospital and was enthusiastically applauded.⁸ In Stuttgart, the newly appointed USPD interior minister Arthur Crispian easily dispersed a crowd outside the *Wilhelmspalais* by telling them to "leave the old man [King Wilhelm] alone." His royal predecessor Ludwig von Köhler, meanwhile, was informed by a local Spartacist that the uprising unfolded not because of Wilhelm, "but because of the system."⁹

This latter sentiment was given greater weight by official rhetoric which absolved the monarchs of any blame in their own demise. The affable *Landesherr*, it was claimed, was the victim of historical circumstance rather than personal failing. Two weeks after the revolution,

5. Gallus, 'Eine kontinuierungsgehemte Revolution', pp. 27-28.

6. Keil, *Erlebnisse*, vol. II, p. 67; Gengler, 'Die deutschen Monarchisten', p. 22.

7. GHFA, D24, 43/8, 07.11.1918.

8. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Adalbert, Nr. 14, Lebenserinnerungen des Prinzen Adalbert, p. 465.

9. Keil, *Erlebnisse*, vol. II, p. 79; Eberhard Gönner, 'König Wilhelm II. (1891-1918)', in: Uhland (ed.), *900 Jahre Haus Württemberg*, p. 361.

the cabinet in Karlsruhe published a formal statement referring to the birth of the Badenese republic as “the consequence of world-political and pan-German developments,” and praised Friedrich II for making way.¹⁰ At the same time in Württemberg, the new *Staatspräsident* Wilhelm Bos labelled the ex-king as “a completely harmless man” in a speech to the state’s assembled soldiers’ and workers’ councils.¹¹ On Wilhelm’s death in 1921, it received a further airing. In its obituary, the *Schwäbische Tagwacht* described his overthrow as a “historical necessity” and the “inevitable consequence of the defeat which...dragged [the] crowned heads into the maelstrom.”¹² The *Württembergische Zeitung* took the same line, but cast Wilhelm in the role of a wise and insightful ruler who realised “that history had run its course [and] that the state always outranks the ruler.”¹³ Those less guided by laws of historical materialism sought to free both the monarchs and themselves from guilt by laying the blame at the feet of foreign interlopers. As Wilhelm Kohlhaas observes, the weeks following Württemberg’s revolution echoed with the refrain: “a proper Stuttgarter would never have done such a thing.”¹⁴

In later years, those who rejected the revolution poured scorn on the German people for failing to rise up and defend their monarchs. This passivity should not surprise; there was little to save and little reason to save it. Below the constitutional level, however, concern for the monarchs, their families, and what they represented remained robust. In the months following Wilhelm of Württemberg’s abdication, the postmaster and telegraph operator in Bebenhausen were run off their feet by a wave of letters and messages expressing regret, sympathy, and support for the beleaguered ex-monarch. Their value to Wilhelm is evident from the frequency with which he mentions these “endless declarations of love and devotion...from those who would have gladly kept me.”¹⁵ Alongside kind words, some correspondents included mementos. The sisters Anna and Fanny Ergenzinger forwarded a family heirloom—a photograph of the king’s mother—which he claimed never to have seen and which, from his highly emotional reply, appears to have affected him greatly.¹⁶ Lasting

10. GLAK, 233, Nr. 24312, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums, 22.11.1918.

11. HStAS, E 135 b, Bü 18, Protokoll der Landesversammlung der Soldaten-Räte Württembergs, 17.11.1918, p. 5.

12. ‘Herzog Wilhelm von Württemberg’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 230, 03.10.1921. Conrad Haußmann (DDP) made a similar argument in his obituary, see: ‘Wilhelm II. von Württemberg’, *Der Beobachter* 40, 08.10.1921.

13. ‘Herzog Wilhelm zu Württemberg †’, *Württembergische Zeitung* 230, 03.10.1921.

14. StAS, 2134/65, Das Ende der Monarchie in Württemberg, p. 222.

15. HStAS, Q, Nachlass von Reden, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Gottfried von Reden, 04.12.1918.

16. HStAS, Q 3/48, Bü 101, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Anna and Fanny Ergenzinger, 01.03.1919.

at least until the summer of 1919, this flow of communications served as a welcome reprieve against the bitter memories of the previous November. As he wrote to the poet Isolde Kurz,

I know that many loyal souls still think warmly of us, despite everything—I receive evidence of this sentiment in the declarations of all kinds and from all places which stream in almost every day. It does my heart untold good and I can give the assurance that I do not for one moment mourn what is lost; personally I am well off and compensated far beyond what I deserve by so much devotion and appreciation.¹⁷

It is evident that the revolution came as a surprise and disappointment to many Germans and that in its immediate aftermath, it was cast in a light which presented monarchy as a necessary, but regrettable victim of a larger process. Wilhelm's correspondence further implies that the uprising unleashed latent sympathies for monarchy. This raises a further question, though. Was this merely a visceral response inspired by the high emotions of late 1918 and early 1919, or did such sentiments last into the heart of the Weimar era? The remainder of the present chapter will explore this question by examining the relations between the princes and the people through the prism of their interactions and encounters. Starting at the everyday and low-key, it will move through increasingly large spatial scales, finishing with state-wide events, such as royal funerals and weddings.

Correspondence and personal encounters

The deposed monarchs received letters from their former subjects throughout the year, but they accumulated noticeably around certain significant dates. Birthdays, above all, provided an opportunity to express sympathy to the dynasty and to engage in wistful remembrance of the old order. It is a curious paradox of the Weimar era that while royal birthdays were celebrated with none of the glitter, pomp, and circumstance one would have seen before 1918, private sentiment, as embodied by these letters, reached new heights. One could no longer cheer a passing procession or donate to a royal fundraiser, but participation in the monarchical cult—such as it survived—remained possible with the simple purchase of a postage stamp or the signing of one's name. In 1919, the Berlin-based publishing house

17. DLAM, A: Kurz, Isolde, HS.2000.0053, 16.07.1919.

Reichsbote coordinated a mass birthday letter to the exiled Kaiser which eventually contained 436,912 signatures listed in thirty-seven volumes. Addressing Wilhelm II in its periodical, the *Bund der Aufrechten*, Weimar's predominant monarchist society, wrote: "Emperor! The 27 January has likely never been so well commemorated as today!"¹⁸ Later that year, members of the *Bund* sent 15,000 letters of good will to the Kaiserin on her own birthday.¹⁹ Even government authorities, if only at the municipal level, participated. Officials in Reutlingen were castigated by *Der Sozialdemokrat* in early 1919 for inviting the public to sign books of congratulation and "indelible gratitude" for Wilhelm of Württemberg on his birthday. "Has the revolution already degenerated so far," the editor pondered, "that monarchist declarations like this can be officially disseminated?"²⁰

Official encouragement was not necessary, for many ordinary Germans wrote on their own initiative. With a characteristically poetic flourish, Wilhelm observed how things had changed:

Celebrations on 25 February [1919] were completely different from before—there was no question of a masquerade ball, or a ceremony with the pealing of bells, the firing of cannon, and people in glittering uniforms. But in their introspection, they were still illuminated by rays of sunlight which shone forth into our forest seclusion [Bebenhausen] from the hearts of thousands of loyal Swabians.²¹

By his own estimations, Wilhelm received more than two thousand messages of congratulation on his first post-revolutionary birthday—"an unimaginable and overwhelming number...from all sides and strata of society."²² The following year, the letters reached "a previously unheard of level"; in 1921, the number was again "overwhelming."²³ Wilhelm took great solace in these letters. He had left Stuttgart in November 1918 deeply pained by the belief that he had lost the people's loyalty. Messages of support, which

18. Gengler, 'Die deutschen Monarchisten', p. 36.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

20. 'Amtliche monarchistische Propaganda', *Der Sozialdemokrat* 41, 19.02.1919.

21. HStAS, J 5, Bü 1, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Maria Fellingner, 30.03.1919.

22. HStAS, Q 1/6, Bü 2, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Ludwig von Köhler, 17.03.1919.

23. HStAS, Q 1/6, Bü 2, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to Ludwig von Köhler, 02.03.1920; WLB, Cod. hist. qt 333a, 677, Wilhelm II of Württemberg to "Herr Dekan", 08.03.1921.

stemmed from all corners of society—something which he regularly stressed and which spoke to his general popularity—helped to alleviate such fears. Attention even turned to lesser members of the dynasties. In Bavaria, Prince Alfons, a lowly cousin of Ludwig III, was touched in 1932 by “the friendly sentiments of so many who remain loyal.”²⁴ To a lesser extent, the royals felt a basic gratification at having not been forgotten, or even wonder at having been remembered. Queen Charlotte’s birthday haul never matched that of her husband, but she still expressed surprise at receiving over one hundred letters in 1931 and an “unexpectedly numerous” collection in 1934 which took many weeks to sort through.²⁵

Referring to the many letters he had received over the preceding months, Wilhelm claimed in September 1919 to perceive “a certain yearning for the old times,” which was borne out by direct encounters with the people. “Take yesterday,” he wrote to Karl von Weizsäcker,

when I had a long conversation with a worker, who was born and raised in Switzerland but is nevertheless a Württemberger...At first, he did not recognise me, but when a Swiss worker nearby remarked to him “surely that is your former sovereign,” he was greatly moved and as we took leave he said to me with tearful eyes [...] “the good times will come again!”²⁶

Wilhelm’s anecdote brings us to the next level of contact between the princes and the people, namely the in-person encounter.²⁷ As has been observed in previous chapters, many of the German dynasties retreated after their overthrow to rural castles and estates. Compared with the streets of the cities, where revolutionaries had marched and plastered posters, the lanes of the countryside remained relatively peaceful and the peasants conservative and loyal to their dynasties. In the vicinity of the royals’ new homes—such as Bebenhausen, Altshausen and Friedrichshafen (Württemberg), Romrod and Wolfsgarten (Hessen), or Leutstetten and Wildenwart (Bavaria)—the monarch-subject relationship took on a secondary and more informal quality, that of landowner-tenant or employer-employee. These spaces lingered as microcosms of the old patriarchal and monarchist order long after the formal end of royal

24. AHU, GU 119, Bü 254, 23.02.1932.

25. AHW, 331, Nr. 353, 12.10.1931 and 13.10.1934.

26. HStAS, Q 1/18, Bü 152, 16.09.1919.

27. For discussion of engineered encounters in an earlier age, see: Hubertus Büschel, *Untertanenliebe: Der Kult um deutschen Monarchen, 1770-1830* (Göttingen, 2006), chap. 5.

power. This is clear from the continuation of royal charity and beneficence after 1918. In Romrod, local children received confectionary from the royals at Easter, while confirmands were given copies of the New Testament, reflecting the grand duke's past association with the church.²⁸ To the south, meanwhile, in Ludwigsburg and Bebenhausen, the former King and Queen of Württemberg distributed Christmas gifts to local children.²⁹ On his estates, Prince Franz of Bavaria did likewise. In 1918 and 1919—and, one assumes, in subsequent years despite the lack of records—he presented his employees' children and each local school pupil with the princely sum of five Marks.³⁰ Franz's largesse put him little more than six hundred Marks out of pocket each Christmas, but the sentiment was significant and enveloped in pre-revolutionary ideals of *noblesse oblige* and his patriarchal role as a prince of the blood.

It is clear, however, that ordinary people also tried to engineer contact themselves. While walking around the tiny town of Bebenhausen, Wilhelm of Württemberg frequently found himself followed by people who had travelled considerable distances just to ask him for money. Wishing for nothing more than a quiet life, Wilhelm tended to give in, if grudgingly. On his departure for Villa Seefeld, a property on the Swiss littoral of Lake Constance, in the summer of 1919, Wilhelm supposedly exclaimed “it's high time I left [Bebenhausen], if I stick around any longer I'll become a pauper!”³¹ His successor Albrecht was the recipient of similar representations, if from an altogether loftier clientele. The House of Württemberg's archives at Altshausen Castle contain a number of plaintive letters from churches surrounding the residence seeking assistance.³² Clergy in Barendorf were faced with a bill of 1.5 million Marks to cure a woodworm-riddled organ and mend a dilapidated war memorial; their colleagues in Kehlen, meanwhile, sought to replace bells which had been smelted down for the war effort; in Hochberg, parishioners were restoring their meeting place, while in Fellbach they were constructing an entirely new one.³³ In each case, Albrecht was enjoined to contribute funds or building material from his extensive forests. For the most part, he

28. GHHFA, D 24, 43/9, 29.03.1919.

29. Gerhardt, *Unser unvergeßlicher guter König!*, p. 83.

30. See: GHA, Nachlass Prinz Franz, Nr. 204.

31. Gerhardt, *Unser unvergeßlicher guter König!*, p. 82.

32. Request letters of this kind have been described by Maarten van Ginderachter as “public transcripts of royalism,” see: ‘Public Transcripts of Royalism: Pauper Letters to the Belgian Royal Family (1880-1940),’ in: Jeroen Deploige and Gita Deneckere (eds.), *Mystifying the Monarch: Studies on Discourse, Power, and History* (Amsterdam, 2006), pp. 223-234.

33. See: AHW, Hofdomänenkammer, Nr. 872.

complied, but the dynasty's own financial circumstances, which became increasingly precipitous during the decade, rarely allowed him to be expansive. The locals approached Albrecht, not as pretender to the throne, but as a landowner like any other. He was reminded that he owned property in the respective parishes, or that other regional magnates—such as the Prince of Hohenzollern, the Prince of Thurn and Taxis, or the Count of Königsegg-Aulendorf—had played their part. The revolution had diminished his stature, but in the eyes of the inhabitants he still occupied a defined role.

While most noticeable in the small and close-knit rural communities to which the royals withdrew, the former royal houses also retained contact with city-dwellers through charitable works. This is most evident in Darmstadt, where the grand duke and grand duchess took it upon themselves to serve returning troops. Rooms in the attic of the grand ducal palace were opened up to veteran students of the city's *Hochschule*, and as prisoners of war returned to Darmstadt in early 1919, the royal couple ensured that they were “at home” to greet them twice a week.³⁴ On a single Saturday in February, they hosted twenty such guests. The couple was also closely involved with the so-called “Care Package Committee for Returning Prisoners of War” [*Liebesgabenausschuss der Kriegsgefangenenheimkehr*]. Again, Eleonore's diary records a revealing anecdote. In July 1919, news came that a train of prisoners was unexpectedly approaching Darmstadt. With nothing prepared, Ernst Ludwig and Eleonore hastened to a sugar shop in the *Wilhelminenstraße* and sat in the back room, filling 673 boxes with ten sweets each as homecoming gifts. As it was, the news was a false alarm; Eleonore chose to look upon it pragmatically, however, commenting that “at least it was good practice.”³⁵

The royals' post-revolutionary connections with the military and the latter's steadfast monarchist sentiment can be overplayed,³⁶ but it is clear that some affection between the grand duke and “his” troops survived the revolution. In March 1921, the Grand Ducal Hessian Lifeguard Infantry Regiment celebrated the three hundredth anniversary of its foundation. Ernst Ludwig—until November 1918, the Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment—planned to take part in the march-past through Darmstadt, but in a move which revealed his

34. GHHFA, D26, 4/1; GHHFA, D24, 43/9, 07.02.1919.

35. GHHFA, D24, 43/9, 11.07.1919.

36. Cf. Hiller von Gaertringen, ‘Zur Beurteilung des ‘Monarchismus’ in der Weimarer Republik’, p. 158.

disquieting popularity, the government prohibited him from doing so at the last moment. Nevertheless, the crowds and soldiers made their feelings known by cheering loudly as the column passed the palace and they caught sight of Ernst Ludwig standing at a window. Later that day he attended a celebratory dinner, quickly becoming the centre of attention. “Everyone wanted to see him and to shake his hand,” Eleonore noted proudly. Before long, Ernst Ludwig was signing autographs for those present; cannily, he began to charge for them and quickly raised 1,500 Marks for the *Denkmalfonds*.³⁷ He also found himself fielding questions about his sons—“where are they, what do they look like, can we see them?” Eventually, a lackey was dispatched to the palace and returned with the two young princes in tow. “When they entered the hall there was such clamour that the walls should have burst.”³⁸ Drink had likely heightened the soldiers’ enthusiasm by this stage, but their excitability still testifies to the affection many retained for their former royal family.

Public appearances

The Hessian princes’ exploits in the Darmstadt beer hall take us to the next level—public appearances. Throughout the Weimar era, it was rare to attend a major veterans’ event without catching a glimpse, amidst the grey uniforms, of a beribboned and glittering prince. Royal attendance at such events reached its peak in Bavaria, where male members of the House of Wittelsbach divided representative duties between them, as before the revolution. To give just a few examples: in October 1921, Crown Prince Rupprecht and Prince Leopold, both senior commanders during the First World War, attended the unveiling of a monument to the fallen in Munich;³⁹ a year later, Rupprecht was present at a similar event in Passau and treated as an active Field Marshal;⁴⁰ and in a few weeks in the summer of 1924, Rupprecht spoke at an event to commemorate the territories lost at Versailles,⁴¹ Prince Ludwig Ferdinand appeared at a meeting of the *Bayern und Reich* society,⁴² and Prince Adalbert joined seven thousand others to honour the war dead in Isengau.⁴³ Participation did not necessarily connote enjoyment, as a letter of May 1925 from Rupprecht to Leopold suggests. “June will

37. GHHFA, D24, 43/9, 16.02.1921.

38. GHHFA, D24, 56/8, nd.04.1921.

39. *Politik in Bayern 1919-1933: Berichte des württembergischen Gesandten Moser v. Filsecke*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Stuttgart, 1971), Nr. 65, 11.10.1921.

40. Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, p. 490.

41. *Politik in Bayern*, Nr. 69, 01.11.1921; Nr. 139, 15.06.1924.

42. BayHStA, MA, 102136, Halbmonatsbericht des Regierungspräsidenten von Oberbayern, 07.07.1924.

43. Ibid.

be even busier for me,” he wrote, “no Saturday or Sunday without an event, first in this town, then in the next. These invitations are not enjoyable, but it is hard to excuse oneself from them.”⁴⁴ Nevertheless, it would appear that this sense of duty was greatly appreciated by other attendees. Gustav von Kahr, *Regierungspräsident* in Upper Bavaria, reported on one typical event—the dedication of the regimental colour by Traunstein’s cavalry association in July 1923. “Crown Prince Rupprecht was present...as the guest of honour and was repeatedly and warmly greeted by those in attendance...Shouts of ‘Long live King Rupprecht’ were frequently heard, and without any objection.”⁴⁵

While renowned and respected for his wartime service, Rupprecht’s public appearances were not wholly dominated by the military and veterans’ affairs. As before the war, he remained an important figure in education and scientific patronage. In 1925, for example, he attended the ceremonial dedication of the *Deutsches Museum* in Munich as the second-ranking guest of honour (behind acting *Reich* president Walter Simons), while seven years later he gave an official speech in Würzburg to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the refounding of the city’s university.⁴⁶ Rupprecht’s most notable engagement with the people as their former crown prince, rather than as an army commander, was his visit in 1930 to the Pfalz. A Bavarian territory in the Rhineland, the Pfalz was occupied by French troops from the end of the war until July 1930. Its return to German administration was a major event and widely celebrated across the territory. Even before the French had left, Rupprecht determined to participate and, in the process, symbolically reclaim the Pfalz for Bavaria. To that end, he planned a royal progress lifted straight from the monarchical era. In five hectic days in September 1930, he passed through over fifty towns and villages, visiting churches, factories, and hospitals as he went. In each locality, he was met by the mayor to the peal of bells and the waving of flags and was waited upon by a coterie of former soldiers from regional veterans’ groups.⁴⁷

These public appearances confirm that the monarchy’s remnants retained an enticing aura. Rupprecht was ceremonially greeted in the Pfalz; he was a guest of honour at the *Deutsches*

44. GHA, Nachlass Prinz Leopold, Nr. 37, 15.05.1925.

45. BayHStA, MA, 102136, Halbmonatsbericht des Regierungspräsidenten von Oberbayern, 07.07.1923.

46. Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, p. 491.

47. GHA, Nachlass Kronprinz Rupprecht, Nr. 798, Reise des Kronprinzen Rupprecht von Bayern durch die Pfalz, 15.09.1930.

Museum; and at the funeral of Cardinal Frühwirth in 1933, he was escorted to his special pew by the Archbishop of Munich. Deference and preferential treatment lingered on, but these events were not without their controversy. Kurt Sendtner, essentially writing for the royal court, argues that Rupprecht's association with militaristic organisations "did not sanction hurrah-patriotism" or subversive nationalism. Rather, the crown prince intended to recognise Bavaria's military tradition and the bravery and loyalty of its soldiers.⁴⁸ Other observers were less generous. Independent Socialists and Communists regularly saw Bavaria as a hotbed of monarchist agitation and Rupprecht as a putschist in waiting.⁴⁹ Indeed, Rupprecht's closest advisor, Josef Graf von Soden-Fraunhofen, was forced to recommend that the crown prince stay away from Munich to avoid stoking rumours.⁵⁰ Even the liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* voiced suspicions, noting conspiratorially that Ludwig III and Luitpold "were never seen at these festivals so often" as Rupprecht.⁵¹ With hindsight, we know that Rupprecht rejected subversion and the overthrow of the republic, but the fears which his tame public appearances generated are testament to the support he had, and was perceived to have, amongst the wider population.

State events

Historians have long identified state events—such as coronations, jubilees, and royal weddings and funerals—as important stages for princely display and venues for contact between monarchs and their subjects.⁵² Before 1918, they had been high points on the provincial calendar, bringing glamour, spectacle, and foreign royalty to small residence towns. Often signifying change, whether in the marriage of an heir or his accession to the throne, they were moments of hope (or sometimes tension) which gripped whole populations. For as much as we may discern what the princely organisers of these events wished to achieve, evaluating their reception amongst the wider population is a far harder task. Indeed, in his study of such occasions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Hubertus Büschel questions whether the historian can learn anything of public opinion from

48. Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach*, p. 491.

49. See, for example, the comments by Theodor Neubauer (KPD): *Verh. RT.*, III. Wahlperiode, 129. Sitzung, 02.12.1925, p. 4721.

50. Andreas Kraus, "'Monarchistische Umtriebe' in Bayern 1925: Ein Beitrag zum Selbstverständnis der Bayerischen Volkspartei", in: Karl Dietrich Bracher (ed.), *Staat und Parteien: Festschrift für Rudolf Morsey zum 65. Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1992), p. 640.

51. 'Die bayerische Königsmacherei', *Frankfurter Zeitung* 831, 07.11.1924.

52. Cf. Cannadine, 'Context, Performance, and Meaning'; Mergen, *Monarchiejubiläen*; Schöbel, *Monarchie und Öffentlichkeit*.

attendance at royal events.⁵³ Nevertheless, by examining the funerals of Wilhelm II of Württemberg and Ludwig III of Bavaria, the present chapter contends that the public response to their deaths (and governmental involvement in the ceremonies) strongly suggested that monarchist sympathy had not atrophied since the revolution.

In a quirk of fate, Wilhelm and Ludwig—the first of the final German monarchs to pass away—died within three weeks of one another in October 1921. Tributes were led by the presidents of the respective state legislatures and the mayors of their capital cities, who formally notified the attendant deputies and councillors of the monarchs' deaths.⁵⁴ In both Stuttgart and Munich, members of the chambers stood, in silence and clothed in black, to receive the news and eulogies.⁵⁵ Considered in the context of nascent republics still finding their feet and seeing right-wing putschism lurking in every corner, their sentiments are remarkable. Karl Walter's address to the *Landtag* described Wilhelm II as an "honourable, benign, and good" prince whose first concern was the welfare of the people and who did not have a personal enemy in the whole state. The outpouring of grief triggered by his passing, Walter continued, was concrete proof that thanks and appreciation for Wilhelm's twenty-seven years of service had not subsided. Speaking for the government, Johannes von Hieber agreed, painting the public response as evidence of the affection and reverence which Wilhelm had enjoyed in all echelons of society.⁵⁶ Only a few weeks later, Heinrich Königbauer took up the mantle in the Bavarian legislature. Ludwig III was praised for his modesty, loyalty, integrity, and conscientiousness—he was, in short, a "ruler respected on all sides." The events which had precipitated the demise of his crown, when "abandoned by everyone, [the king and queen] were forced to flee helplessly across the borders of their homeland," would forever be a stain on the history of Bavaria.⁵⁷

53. Büschel, *Untertanenliebe*.

54. For the notably warm comments of the two SPD mayors, see: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2096, Nr. 291, 26.10.1921; StAS, 10 Depot 10, Nr. 766, Auszug aus dem Protokoll des Gemeinderats, 06.10.1921.

55. These eulogies provided deputies with an opportunity to dissent. City councillors for the KPD and USPD in Munich stood outside the meeting room until mayor Eduard Schmid had finished his speech, see: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 2096, Nr. 291, 26.10.1921. This tactic was not merely limited to those of a republican disposition, however. When Prince Max of Baden died in 1929, having spent the final decade of his life as a *persona non grata* in conservative circles for his role in the Kaiser's abdication, the NSDAP and DNVP fractions pointedly left the chamber for the dedication by the *Landtagspräsident*, see: 'Badischer Landtag', *Freiburger Zeitung* 304, 07.11.1929.

56. *Verh. LT. Württ.*, II. Landtag, 99. Sitzung, 24.11.1921, pp. 2484-2485.

57. *Verh. bay. LT.*, II. Landtag, 80. Sitzung, 25.10.1921, p. 100.

This mournful, yet glowing response was reflected in press obituaries, which coalesced around a selection of favourable qualities attributed to the two men. Wilhelm II was invariably depicted as a man of the people [*volksnah* or *volkstümlich*] and the epitome of a moderate, reformist, and constitutional prince.⁵⁸ Above all, he was remembered as modest and humble, but unfailingly dutiful and dedicated.⁵⁹ Collectively, these qualities had shaped his response to November 1918; the willingness he showed to give way to fate and accept the republic was widely praised, especially by the Social Democrats.⁶⁰ Indeed, the socialist organ, the *Neckar-Echo*, ended with the poetic promise that “as socialists and republicans, we also lower our standard in respect and personal sympathy.”⁶¹ On the whole, obituaries of Ludwig III were more objective and phlegmatic. Reflecting his cooler and more distant character, he was praised less for individual personality traits than his hard work and expertise in certain fields. The *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, *Augsburger Postzeitung*, and *München-Augsburger Abendzeitung*, for example, all made reference to the ex-king’s knowledge of agriculture and waterways.⁶² Where personal qualities found favour, they generally aligned with Wilhelm’s—modesty, simplicity, and piety. A lustre of pathos, meanwhile, was added by references to Ludwig’s tragic existence since 1918 (most notably following the death of his wife) and the fact that he had died in Hungary, so far from his beloved homeland.⁶³

These sentiments both reflected and reinforced public mourning. Despite the fall of monarchy, the people of southern Germany evidently retained an attachment to their former monarchs and felt their loss keenly. As the *Württembergische Zeitung* observed, “the grief could hardly be stronger or more genuine had it been the death of a reigning king.”⁶⁴ This is clear from the scale of the kings’ funerals. Wilhelm’s was more modest, thanks mostly to the court’s determination that it remain a private event and Wilhelm’s own wish that the cortege avoid Stuttgart. Nevertheless, 100,000 mourners supposedly made the journey to

58. ‘Herzog Wilhelm von Württemberg †’, *Freie Volkszeitung Göppingen* 230, 03.10.1921; Conrad Haußmann, ‘Wilhelm II. von Württemberg’, *Der Beobachter* 40, 08.10.1921; ‘Herzog Wilhelm zu Württemberg’, *Seeblatt (Friedrichshafen)* 227, 03.10.1921; ‘Herzog Wilhelm von Württemberg †’, *Neckar-Echo* 230, 04.10.1922.

59. ‘Unser früherer König gestorben’, *Tübinger Chronik* 230, 03.10.1921.

60. ‘Herzog Wilhelm von Württemberg †’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 230, 03.10.1921.

61. ‘Herzog Wilhelm von Württemberg †’, *Neckar-Echo* 230, 04.10.1921.

62. ‘Der Tod des Königs: Ludwig III. und München’, *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* 442, 19.10.1921; ‘König Ludwig III. †’, *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* 442, 19.10.1921; ‘König Ludwig †’, *Augsburger Postzeitung* 476, 19.10.1921; ‘König Ludwig III. von Bayern †’, *München-Augsburger Abendzeitung* 439, 19.10.1921.

63. See, for example: ‘König Ludwig †’, *Augsburger Postzeitung* 476, 19.10.1921; ‘König Ludwig III. von Bayern †’, *Bayerischer Kurier* 444, 19.10.1921; ‘König Ludwig III. von Bayern †’, *München-Augsburger Abendzeitung* 439, 19.10.1921.

64. ‘Herzog Wilhelm zu Württemberg †’, *Württembergische Zeitung* 230, 03.10.1921.

Ludwigsburg to participate in proceedings, aided by the provision of “ten overflowing special trains” laid on by the state’s railway administration.⁶⁵ In Stuttgart itself, the *Stiftskirche* was packed to the rafters for the public service of remembrance organised by the SPD mayor, Karl Lautenschlager.⁶⁶ Throughout the city, meanwhile, shopkeepers placed black-bordered portraits and wreaths in their window displays to honour the late king.⁶⁷

In Munich, the funeral unfolded on an altogether grander scale.⁶⁸ In all, two hundred and thirty-one deputations formed part of the procession as it snaked around the city centre. Societies, schools, government offices, state institutions, foreign royals, consuls and ambassadors—all participated or were represented in some way. The order of procession reveals some curious bedfellows. Staff of the city library marched alongside scientists from the fishing research institute; the illustrious members of the government of *Oberbayern* followed functionaries of the state vaccination office; and the orchestra of the national theatre accompanied the union of railway workers.⁶⁹ Such pairings may have left attendees scrambling for topics of conversation, but they speak indisputably to the breadth of popular involvement in the ceremony and the degree to which the death of Ludwig III was a public and state-wide event. Those who could not attend or participate communicated their condolences via telegrams. According to a press statement released by the royal court, messages streamed in from “innumerable military societies, artists’ unions, economic and industrial groups and societies, as well as countless private persons from Germany and abroad.”⁷⁰

Commemorations were also held beyond the cities, particularly in the vicinity of royal residences and in traditionally conservative districts. Thousands travelled to Bebenhausen—individually, but also as part of “communities, societies, student groups [and] school classes”—to pay their respects and sign condolence books by the castle where Wilhelm had

65. Gerhardt, *Unser unvergeßlicher guter König!*, pp. 66-67; ‘Des letzten Königs letzter Gang’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 235, 08.10.1921.

66. ‘Die Trauer um den König’, *Schorndorfer Anzeiger* 233, 06.10.1921.

67. Ibid.

68. For an overview, see: Dieter J. Weiß, ‘Zwischen Revolution und Restauration: Zum Tod und zu den Beisetzungsfeierlichkeiten für König Ludwig III. von Bayern’, in: Petronilla Gietl (ed.), *Vom Wiener Kongreß bis zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands: Betrachtungen zu Deutschland und Österreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Hubert Rumpel zum 75. Geburtstag* (München, 1997), pp. 183-206.

69. BayHStA, MJu, 16907, Zugordnung für die Beisetzung der Leichen weiland I.M. des Königs Ludwig III. und der Königin Marie Therese.

70. GHA, Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III, Nr. 35, undated press statement.

breathed his last.⁷¹ As reports from Gustav von Kahr reveal, *Oberbayern* was awash with services and ceremonies for Ludwig. “Poignant and dignified demonstrations,” both great and small, involved the “overwhelming majority of the population,” he wrote, and furnished a “point of light in [Bavaria’s] otherwise gloomy outlook.” By contrast, the third anniversary of the November Revolution, which followed only two days after the funeral, passed by without the barest acknowledgment.⁷²

The scale of commemorations in both states was inflated thanks to government involvement. Royal deaths posed something of a problem for the state governments as they were forced to take a public stance on the status of monarchy. Many delicate decisions had to be made: would cabinet ministers attend the funeral? Would telegrams of condolence be sent and, if so, to whom? Would flags be flown half-mast from government offices? Each act revealed the intricacies of the relationship between the old order and the new. With only minor concerns, usually brushed over, the authorities were fully prepared to play their part, so long as everything unfolded in a scrupulously apolitical atmosphere.⁷³ In Stuttgart, the cabinet ordered government buildings to fly the state flag alongside the republican tricolour for the duration of the festivities.⁷⁴ Their colleagues in Munich, meanwhile, permitted state officials to attend the ceremony and for schools to be closed for the day.⁷⁵ In both cases, the separate branches of government were represented at official events. Wilhelm’s funeral was attended by the presidium of the *Landtag* and decorated by wreaths sent by the cabinet and *Staatspräsident* von Hieber, who occupied front row seats at the service in Stuttgart.⁷⁶ Walking directly behind the grieving royals, meanwhile, Bavaria’s *Ministerpräsident* and

71. Gerhardt, *Unser unvergeßlicher guter König!*, pp. 66-67; Wilhelm Hoffmann, ‘Erinnerungen an und um König Wilhelm II. von Württemberg anlässlich seines 60. Todestages am 2. Oktober 1981’, *Zeitschrift für württembergische Landesgeschichte* 42 (1983), p. 318.

72. BayHStA, MA, 102136, Halbmonatsbericht des Regierungspräsidenten von Oberbayern, 09.11.1921 and 26.11.1921.

73. Johannes von Hieber and Karl Lautenschlager both expressed reservations that the commemorations would be hijacked by parties of the right, see: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, 03.10.1921; StAS, 10 Depot 10, Nr. 766, Trauerfeier zu Ehren des verstorbenen Herzogs Wilhelm z. Württemberg, 04.10.1921.

74. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 05.10.1921.

75. BayHStA, MJu, 16907, Bekanntmachung über die Beisetzungsfeierlichkeiten, 21.10.1921; BayHStA, MA, 99517, Ministerratssitzung, 21.10.1921. This measure was debated in Stuttgart, but the cabinet ultimately took no action, see: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 05.10.1921.

76. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 05.10.1921; ‘Die Beerdigung des Herzogs Wilhelm’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 134, 07.10.1921.

Landtagspräsident—along with consuls and various *Reich* officials—took a highly visible and prominent position in the funeral procession in Munich.⁷⁷

To a degree, this stance was motivated by public sentiment. When, for instance, a request arrived at the *Staatsministerium* in Stuttgart to hold a memorial service in the palace chapel—unused since 1918—the cabinet eventually acquiesced, knowing that refusal would unleash a “storm of indignation” amongst the greater majority of the population.⁷⁸ Initial reluctance had been motivated by the fear that the crowds likely to attend would threaten the safety of the palace itself, which now housed a number of government departments. Such visions were only partly realised. The chapel was ultimately too small to host every mourner, but the event passed by peaceably and without incident.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the government in Stuttgart also honoured Wilhelm when it knew that doing so might cause discontent in certain circles. Warm messages of condolence were forwarded to Queen Charlotte and Wilhelm’s daughter, Princess Pauline, despite an expressed awareness in cabinet that their publication would raise eyebrows on the left. Addressed with their royal titles, the women were reassured that Wilhelm’s memory would always be “preserved with loyalty and thanks.”⁸⁰

Indeed, the overriding sympathy for the remnants of monarchy is borne out by the relative *lack* of criticism directed at the scale and official nature of the commemorations. Outspoken dissent was rare and limited only to the furthest fringes of the left. In Württemberg, the *Schwäbische Tagwacht* was quite content for socialist cabinet ministers to attend Wilhelm’s funeral and donate wreaths.⁸¹ Its only complaint revealed a distaste that the state’s right-wing parties were abusing Wilhelm’s death and memory for political gain. In an article following the funeral, the paper quite rightly argued that the modest and unassuming Wilhelm would have loathed his posthumous attention and adulation (and the right’s continued determination to refer to him as “majesty”).⁸² Not only did it ignore Wilhelm’s wishes, but it distorted his reign and legacy. In short, Wilhelm was a curious hero for the conservative right to idolise. He had been a genuinely constitutional monarch; he opposed the wartime policies

77. BayHStA, MJu, 16907, Zugordnung für die Beisetzung der Leichen weiland I.M. des Königs Ludwig III. und der Königin Marie Therese.

78. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, Sitzung des Staatsministeriums Stuttgart, 05.10.1921.

79. Sauer, *Württembergs letzter König*, p. 325.

80. HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 216, 03.10.1921.

81. ‘Die Beerdigung des Herzogs Wilhelm’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 134, 07.10.1921.

82. In conjunction with his abdication, Wilhelm had announced that he would henceforth be known as Duke of Württemberg, rather than king, with the style “Royal Highness”.

of the Pan-German League and the ultra-nationalists; he spoke out against unlimited U-Boat warfare; and he gave up the throne to make way for the republic. “Was he not a shadow king in their eyes?”⁸³ Württemberg thus witnessed the curious situation of an explicitly republican party seeking to act as the guardian of a king’s legacy against mistreatment by his supposed supporters.

Like the Social Democrats, the Communists saw in the oleaginous obituaries an attempt to agitate for monarchy. But while the former were merely bemused, the latter were angry and suspicious. Surely the death of an ex-king was no more tragic than that of a Mr Maier or a Mr Schulze? By any measure, moreover, it paled in significance against the fates of Karl Liebknecht or Rosa Luxemburg who received no such official recognition.⁸⁴ Calling upon the memory of fallen revolutionaries proved a common response on the far left. The *Sozialisten* echoed these sentiments, writing forcefully that

the deceased...was a trivial little man compared with a Liebknecht, an Eisner or a Luxemburg. At the end of the day, the most significant thing about him was that he himself realised the nonsense of his monarchy and the historical necessity of bringing rule by divine right in Germany to an end.

From the socialist standpoint, the ceremonial and mourning dedicated to this “little man” reached repulsive and byzantine levels. Private commemoration was the right of everyone, but this state recognition of monarchy was dangerous and intolerable under a republic. The funeral, the editors thundered, was “a public demonstration of monarchism which all republican-minded citizens of Stuttgart must vociferously protest.”⁸⁵ It was proof, furthermore, of the failure of the revolution, which had merely created “a nebulous mirage with which the monarchy is momentarily disguising itself.”⁸⁶

Motivations

The level of participation in events commemorating Ludwig III’s life confused long-time observers of Bavaria and its politics. As Carl Moser von Filseck, who had served since 1906

83. ‘Zum Tode des Herzogs Wilhelm’, *Schwäbische Tagwacht* 236, 05.10.1921.

84. ‘Herzog Wilhelm von Württemberg gestorben’, *Kommunist* 280, 04.10.1921.

85. ‘Byzanz in Trauer’, *Sozialisten* 234, 08.10.1921.

86. ‘Von der “königlichen” Republik’, *Der Sozialist* 240, 15.10.1921.

as Württemberg's envoy in Munich, reported, "the cult which is now made of [Ludwig's] corpse is most disagreeable" when one considered "how little [he] enjoyed the love and devotion of his people" while he was alive.⁸⁷ In 1930, the late Prince Leopold was similarly fêted, including by *Reichspräsident* Paul von Hindenburg in his Bavarian regalia, who joined the "dense throngs of people" to honour the former army commander.⁸⁸ Later still, in 1933, the death of Prince Alfons of Bavaria seized "every level of society," in the words of Moser von Filseck, and saw mass attendance at the burial.⁸⁹ These observations raise a number of questions—most obviously: why did so many participate in royal funerals? Looking further back through the chapter, why did Germans continue to write to their former monarchs, seek them out in person, or look for them at public events? What was the intent behind engineering such encounters?

At the lowest level, these encounters reveal a tripartite loyalty to the individual monarch, to the region, and to history more generally. Much of the popularity enjoyed by dynasties in Hessen and Württemberg rested on the characters of the monarchs themselves. Sympathy for Duke Albrecht never reached the heights enjoyed by King Wilhelm and, in the view of Robert Garnett, Crown Prince Rupprecht was Bavarian monarchism's greatest asset after 1921.⁹⁰ The German people remembered the great deeds done by their monarchs, as press articles and obituaries after 1918 reveal. Both Ernst Ludwig and Wilhelm reigned for over twenty-five years and the stability and fruitfulness of their tenures was not quickly forgotten. It is also clear, however, that monarchy retained an allure or mystery after 1918. Receiving a letter, signed by a former monarch and stamped imperiously with his letterhead, still unleashed a thrill, as did catching a glimpse of royalty at a public event. For all of the federal constitution's attempts to declare the German people equal citizens, the mental hierarchies of many were still topped off by a crown. And as much as the republic sought a monopoly on the loyalty of the people, devotion to and affection for the dynasties lingered on. When Queen Charlotte of Württemberg visited the late king's grave in 1928, seven years after his death, she was touched to find mementos and flowers recently laid there.⁹¹

87. *Politik in Bayern*, Nr. 69, 01.11.1921.

88. 'Die Beisetzungsfeier in München', *Neues Münchner Tagblatt* 277/278, 05.10.1930.

89. HStAS, E 75, Bü 162, Nr. 268, 14.01.1933.

90. Garnett, 'Lion, Eagle, and Swastika', p. 179.

91. AHW, 331, Nr. 353, 25.02.1928.

Attachment to the local dynasty was simultaneously attachment to the state's unique identity, which the monarchy had embodied and (to some degree) protected against nationalisation and Prussianisation. This was particularly evident in Bavaria where the Wittelsbachs were at the heart of what may be termed *Rautenromantik*, the emotional celebration of Bavarian culture and identity. After 1918, Bavarian princes were regularly seen at "Weiß-Blau" days, and other events organised by the *Bayerischer Heimat- und Königsbund*. The society had a royal patron in Prince Adalbert and was Bavaria's most dominant monarchist organisation, but it was just as much a lobbying group for states' rights as a pure restoration movement.⁹² The link between monarchy and region is just as evident in Württemberg. Wilhelm II rarely referred to the letters he received as tokens of devotion from the people, but from "Swabian hearts" [*Schwabenherzen*]. In articles commemorating his birthdays and death, the press reciprocated, speaking on behalf of the *Schwabenvolk* as a whole. At a time when the states began to count for less, the dynasties remained an important bastion and embodiment of unique and ancient cultures. They were also representations of past glories and past stature, not just in living memory, but from the entire history of the state and the dynasty. Peter Fritzsche writes that living without the past was highly liberating in early Weimar,⁹³ but it is clear that many sought sanctuary from a gloomy or distressing present in commemoration of the past. Writing to a former monarch or attending his funeral was an anodyne activity which allowed one to forget present troubles and to engage with a world which was more familiar and comfortable. As Arne Hofmann writes, monarchism was ultimately imbued with a "fear of modernity."⁹⁴

While attendance at state-wide royal events was undoubtedly motivated by the above factors, their scale demands further explanation. The one hundred thousand who gathered in Ludwigsburg or Munich were not brought together purely by shared loyalty and devotion, but by factors which, historians have argued, related more to the new republic than the old monarchy. Musing over events in Munich in November 1921, Moser von Filseck diagnosed the remarkable attendance at Ludwig III's funeral as a mass attack of guilt. Writing to the government in Württemberg, he sensed a pervasive "remorse that is felt regarding the king,

92. Cf. Weiß, "In Treue Fest".

93. Peter Fritzsche, 'Historical Time and Future Experience in Postwar Germany', in: Wolfgang Hardtwig (ed.), *Ordnungen in der Krise: Zur politischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands 1900-1933* (Munich, 2007), pp. 140-164.

94. Hofmann, 'Obsoleter Monarchismus', p. 256.

whose protection no-one lifted a finger to ensure” in November 1918. Moser’s evaluation found support in the *Rote Hand*, a satirical newspaper which, despite its levity, published a serious poem entitled “The Return” [*Die Rückkehr*] describing the funeral.⁹⁵ The lines tell of a popular and loyal royal couple chased from their home in the dead of night by a treacherous—and ultimately repentant—population. As the last stanza read,

The bells toll. A guilty shiver // seizes the people who broke their sacred oath.
A tremor strikes the guilty walls // of the city—the idle witness of that disgrace!

An emotion such as guilt is obviously difficult to quantify. Indeed, Robert Garnett rules it out entirely as a factor in 1921.⁹⁶ Within the Bavarian context, however, it makes sense to assume that it played a role, if only a minor one. The demise of the Wittelsbachs in 1918 was notoriously undignified and chaotic and triggered by a mere handful of revolutionaries. The volatility which followed, particularly in the spring of 1919, would likely have prompted many to look back to the monarchy with fondness. As the first state to overthrow its monarchy, moreover, the Bavarians bore the implied guilt of allowing revolution to spread across Germany. This sort of sentiment, in whichever state, would have been strongest following the death of the final monarch, for funerals provided tangible evidence that an era had irretrievably passed. Such circumstances may explain why obituaries for Wilhelm II do not relay any obvious guilt. A second reason may be the differences between Ludwig and Wilhelm’s post-revolutionary existences. Indeed, guilt appears proportionate to their misery after 1918. While Wilhelm accepted his lot and lived relatively happily and peaceably in Bebenhausen, Ludwig never wholly reconciled himself to his demise, had to contend with the death of his wife of fifty years, was frequently uprooted by apparent threats to his safety, and died alone and far from home. The human element of the monarchical story—described by Christopher Clark as its “flesh-and-blood three-dimensionality”—grew increasingly significant by 1918 and, it would appear, continued to affect its reception thereafter.⁹⁷

In his study of Bavarian monarchism, Garnett suggests that attendees at Ludwig’s funeral engaged in an act of “passive resistance” towards the new regime. By participating in an

95. ‘Die Rückkehr’, *Rote Hand. Kritisch-Politische-Parteiose Illustrierte Wochenzeitung* 91/92, 08.11.1921.

96. Garnett, ‘Lion, Eagle, and Swastika’, p. 161.

97. Christopher Clark, ‘Das Erbe der Monarchie: Nachwort’, in: Biskup and Kohlrausch (eds.), *Das Erbe der Monarchie*, p. 318.

explicitly royal event, they were able to demonstrate disapproval of the republic in a quiet and dignified manner.⁹⁸ With regard to Prussia, Daniela Gasteiger makes a similar point, arguing that monarchism became part of “a comprehensive culture of opposition for the political right.”⁹⁹ This may have been the case, especially for the die-hard restorationists, but considering the close involvement of the republican governments in arrangements, both in Bavaria and Württemberg, it is difficult to claim that the funerals were overtly anti-republican. A related argument, namely that support for monarchy revealed a yearning for leadership which the republics could not provide, is similarly weak.¹⁰⁰ The former monarchs were rarely fêted as leaders (indeed, it was a lack of leadership which contributed to their downfall) and they certainly did not offer the prospect of authoritarian, messianic leadership those on the political right were searching for. As argued at the start of this chapter, the monarchism most dominantly on show after 1918 looked to the past, rather than to a hypothetical future.

A final factor which must be considered, especially in relation to royal funerals and weddings, is the simple attraction of spectacle and splendour. As Blessing writes with regard to Prince Regent Luitpold’s funeral in 1912,

[t]he masses who lined the funeral procession...were not brought together by loyalty. More than ever, a funeral cortege was a “sensation”: never before had one witnessed so many princes parade through the streets of Munich, or seen those streets decorated in such sombre splendour.¹⁰¹

The appeal such ceremonial had under the monarchy was only amplified during the dark post-war years. Sword hilts, jewels, and medals all shone brighter for their rarity and novelty after 1918. The funeral of King Ludwig and Queen Marie Therese brought glitter unseen in

98. Garnett, ‘Lion, Eagle, and Swastika’, p. 161.

99. Daniela Gasteiger, *Kuno von Westarp (1864-1945): Parlamentarismus, Monarchismus und Herrschaftsutopien im deutschen Konservatismus* (Berlin, 2018), p. 204.

100. On the yearning for leadership, see: Klaus Schreiner, ‘Politischer Messianismus, Führergedanke und Führererwartung in der Weimarer Republik’, in: Manfred Hettling, Claudia Huerkamp, Paul Nolte, and Hans-Walter Schmuhl (eds.), *Was ist Gesellschaftsgeschichte? Positionen, Themen, Analysen: Hans-Ulrich Wehler zum 60. Geburtstag* (Munich: Beck, 1991), pp. 237-247; “Wann kommt der Retter Deutschlands?": Formen und Funktionen von politischem Messianismus in der Weimarer Republik’, *Saeculum. Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* 49:1 (1998), pp. 107-160.

101. Blessing, *Staat und Kirche*, p. 229.

Bavaria since the revolution or, arguably, before it.¹⁰² Darmstadt's royal wedding in 1931, meanwhile, caused the great and the good of the Almanac de Gotha to descend on the city, replete with ribands and tiaras. Military events, no matter how grey the uniforms, gained a lustre with princely presence. Royal events, in short, always drew a crowd.

Conclusion

The present chapter has contended that monarchism survived the revolution of November 1918. This was not the monarchism of the radical restorationists or legitimists, however, but a quieter and more passive sentiment which permitted comforting engagement with the past and exciting spectacle in a time of worry and concern. It is further argued that the fate of these two strands of monarchism was a continuation of pre-war processes. Before 1918, dynastic sympathy was nurtured by the monarchies, but their political foundations were neglected. The war and the revolution only exacerbated this situation. While the constitutional role of monarchy was irretrievably undermined, the dynasties enjoyed a fresh wave of sympathy, thanks to the sudden nature of their downfall, the guilt of the people in not preventing it, and memories of 'good old days', against which the present paled in comparison. This sentiment has been revealed by examining public perceptions of monarchy through the prism of encounters between the princes and the people. After 1918, Germany's kings and grand dukes continued to receive correspondence from their former subjects, coverage in the press, and the attention of the crowds at public and state events. These interactions were manufactured by the people—or, intriguingly, by the governments—rather than the monarchs themselves and demonstrate a continued and rich vein of interest.

This sentiment is usually neglected by the existing scholarship which instead focuses on the exploits of a narrow elite of restorationists and *Gelehrtenpolitiker*. It assumes that because their plans for monarchical utopias floundered, monarchism was a failure. As this chapter has demonstrated, this was not so; warmth and sympathy continued to linger in the hearts of many, even if their heads might have never considered restoration or subversion. The findings here also question the simplistic assumption that the political left opposed monarchy, while the political right glorified it. Indeed, in Hessen and Württemberg the SPD continued its neutral-to-warm stance towards the monarchy and in the latter instance even

102. Slightly cynically, Moser von Filseck diagnosed the Bavarians with an abnormal "need for ceremonial events and...[an] obsession to show off and trump similar occasions in other states," see: *Politik in Bayern*, Nr. 69.

became spirited defenders of the final king's legacy. At the same time, the conservative right, disappointed by the performance of the monarchs in war and revolution, began to design new anti-republican and authoritarian states with non-monarchical leaders. Folkloric monarchism, by contrast, was not the foundation for future action, but an inherently passive, compensatory, past-facing, and escapist attitude. Many of its followers combined it with acquiescence in the republic. Over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the German monarchies had become increasingly divorced from their constitutional functions as they morphed into primarily cultural entities, embodying the history and identity of the state. Celebrating them was in no way incompatible with allegiance to the new order, as was proven by ministerial attendance at royal events. Friedrich Naumann, it seems, overreached in drawing his line in the sand, for Germany's story of princes and peoples did not end in 1918. The revolution was a twist in the plot, but a new chapter nevertheless began on the following page.

Conclusion

Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, the last surviving of the southern German monarchs, died in October 1937. As in Munich and Stuttgart sixteen years earlier, his passing was met with widespread sorrow and state mourning.¹ The differences with 1921, however, were striking. When Wilhelm II of Württemberg died, the government ordered that Stuttgart be decorated with the black-red-gold flag of the republic; for Ernst Ludwig's death, Darmstadt was bedecked in the swastika. Along the processional route, mourners saluted his coffin with outstretched arms as his cousins, Princes Christopher and Philipp, marched in the uniforms of the SS and SA.² The official telegram of condolence, meanwhile, was signed by Adolf Hitler, the German *Führer*, and the state's wreath laid by the regional *Gauleiter*, successor to the long-since abolished state president. For as much as the names, flags, and uniforms had changed, however, the people and authorities of Darmstadt were still honouring a man who had been overthrown nineteen years earlier. Despite the upheavals of 1918 and 1933, the allure of monarchy had survived.³

This thesis has sought to explain this survival by tracing the legacies and afterlives of monarchy in Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg from the collapse of the *Kaiserreich* to the Nazi seizure of power. In so doing, it has considered how dynastic monarchy was dismantled, replaced, refashioned, and adopted by Weimar's provincial leaders, and how these processes affected the deposed dynasties and their former subjects. The first three chapters investigated the many decisions which Germany's new republican rulers were forced to make regarding their royal inheritance: who should assume the monarchs' powers? What should become of the monarchy's complex and extensive system of symbols? To whom did the states' domains belong, and why? Chapters four and five then considered the revolution and republic from the vantage point of the deposed royals and discussed the ways in which they reconciled themselves to the loss of formal status, sources of wealth, and prescribed realms of activity.

1. 'Ernst Ludwig von Hessen und bei Rhein gestorben', *Hessische Landeszeitung* 277, 10.10.1937; 'Großherzog Ernst Ludwig †', *Darmstädter Tagblatt* 277, 10.10.1937; 'Die Beisetzung Ernst Ludwigs im Neuen Mausoleum', *Hessische Landeszeitung* 280, 13.10.1937.

2. Cf. Petropoulos, *Royals and the Reich*.

3. One could also add the caesura of 1945; Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria died in 1955 at the age of 86 and was afforded a state funeral in Munich.

Chapter six, finally, crossed the divide from princely to popular to explore how the revolution of November 1918 affected attitudes towards monarchy and what remained of the subject-sovereign relationship.

On the basis of this analysis, a number of conclusions were reached. Firstly, it is clear that 1918 was an ambiguous caesura in German history. Constitutionally, it ushered in a thorough and unprecedented change in how the German territories were governed, and by whom they were governed. The relationship between the legislature and the executive which had existed under the monarchy was turned on its head. Cabinets which had once been powerful instruments of the monarch became the elected committees of parliaments. Furthermore, the position of the monarch—a landmark which had dominated Germany’s constitutional scenery for centuries—did not recognisably survive the revolution. His duties and prerogatives, both political and symbolic, were broken up and distributed amongst various organs and individuals. The lion’s share landed on the table of the minister (or state) president, but even the most charismatic and forceful of this new breed of ruler could not hope to replicate his royal predecessor. As divine right gave way to popular sovereignty, the role of the provincial head of state disappeared for good.

At the cultural and social levels, however, we may discern considerable continuity between the monarchical and republican eras. In many regards, de-monarchification was not total, but allowed royal elements to survive in modified or adapted guises. State symbols such as coats of arms regularly drew direct inspiration from those of the deposed dynasties. Hessen’s “new” crest, for example was simply that of the old Grand Duchy relieved of its more overtly militarist and monarchist emblems. In government buildings, moreover, it was not unusual to walk past portraits of former monarchs, or for separate wings of the same city palace to house both ministerial offices and public museums which celebrated the state’s royal history. The financial settlements discussed in chapter three cemented much of this continuity. They ensured that palaces and castles remained highly decorated and ornate centres of power while also providing the dynasties with the means to remain in their former territories. Their choice to eschew exile permitted relationships between the people and the princes to survive. As chapter six suggests, Germany’s monarchs retained an aura of mystery and distinction despite their loss of formal status. Whether in the use of titles, the allocation of seating at special events, or simple day-to-day encounters, regional governments and populations continued

to treat the Hessens, Württembergs, and Wittelsbachs with deference. Attending royal weddings and funerals in their hundreds of thousands, and visiting royal museums in similar numbers, the German people explicitly demonstrated their interest in—and sympathies with—the dynasties which had ruled over them for so long.

How might one explain this qualified continuity? The present thesis maintains that it was the direct result of attitudes adopted by the governments, the dynasties, and the German people. At no stage was a wholesale wiping of the monarchical slate a defining policy. It was in the interests of the Weimar Republic's nascent provincial governments to tap into the *Kaiserreich's* rich capital of symbols and traditions. Requisitioning old coats of arms, or governing from former royal palaces, gave new regimes vital substance and gravitas as they sought to augment their authority. When constructing new states under trying and volatile circumstances and with little (or, indeed, no) previous political experience, such outward displays were a great support. Other elements, such as royal portraits in schools and civic buildings, slipped through the net of revolution because the regimes appreciated that their removal would cause widespread popular displeasure. Similar concerns go some way to explaining the governments' tendency towards generosity when negotiating financial settlements with the dynasties. The people did not wish to see venerable and beloved monarchs like Wilhelm of Württemberg swindled.

The royals may have capitulated without a fight in November 1918, but thereafter they played their part in ensuring that pre-revolutionary attitudes and customs survived. As was discussed in chapter five, they engineered numerous strategies to remain atop a republican society and to avoid the existential threats which it posed. They insisted on the continued use of royal titles and, on occasion, on preferential treatment at public events. They remained aloof, even magisterial, and maintained their courts in urban palaces and rural fortresses. Significantly, however, they also avoided aggravating the new republics or risking what they had succeeded in saving. Considering their naturally anti-republican biases, they acclimatised surprisingly quickly and in conceding property and valuables to the states furthered the success of their construction. For their part, meanwhile, the people contributed to the persistence of monarchy in the public consciousness by corresponding with former royals, attending their weddings and funerals, following their exploits in the written media, and making

representations to the governments when their policies went too far or, less often, not far enough.

Two final thoughts remain on the nature of de-monarchification after 1918. Surveying the experiences of Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg (as well as Baden and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen), we may conclude that de-monarchification unfolded in a remarkably coherent and homogeneous fashion across southern Germany. In almost all areas, the respective governments followed comparable policies and with analogous results. Only in the field of state symbolism did one state (Hessen) follow a markedly different path from the other two, but while intentions diverged, outcomes ultimately converged. This was undoubtedly motivated by the similar conditions in the states prior to the revolution; each was a relatively liberal, constitutional monarchy ruled by an amiable dynasty which retained a purpose until 1918 and continued to reside in its former territories thereafter. A further contribution to this outcome was the widespread interstate cooperation and consultation which preceded the implementation of these policies. The twin processes of republican state-building and de-monarchification were unknowns to all involved, but the provincial governments had the advantage of approaching them alongside their counterparts across the country.⁴ Most significant, however, was the common social democratic basis of the governments as the foundations of Germany's post-revolutionary engagement with monarchy were laid in late 1918 and early 1919. Indeed, divergence between Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg is only noticeable once the latter two had elected conservative, nationalist governments which not only resisted or thwarted de-monarchification, but attempted to restore and institutionalise remnants of the past like monarchical symbols and the ideal of a strong and Olympian head of state.

De-monarchification was almost the unique responsibility of state governments unencumbered by orders from Berlin, but their common policies and approaches raise questions as to whether divergence from the norm was actually possible after 1918. Limits on the provincial governments' range of movement came from southern Germany's political and cultural coherences which made certain choices natural and obvious, but it is also possible that major variation was simply not compatible with Germany's new, increasingly

4. A study of the political, diplomatic, and cultural relations between Weimar's constituent states remains an important desideratum in the historiography of the period.

unitary political framework. A flexible polity such as the *Kaiserreich*, which contained both monarchies and city republics, was simply no longer feasible. National parties, most notably the SPD, clearly played an important role in implementing general policies in each of the states after 1918. The Weimar Constitution had little to say on de-monarchification, but did require states to be republican, a provision interpreted with notable consistency by jurists across the nation. Further work is required to fully investigate the implications of the regional-federal relationship after 1918, but it may be concluded that the November Revolution struck Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg with equal consequence. The monarchies fell at the same time and for the same reasons and were, with brief aberrations in Bavaria, replaced and repealed by remarkably similar regimes.

De-monarchification was, secondly, a long-term process which arguably could not have been completed in Weimar's fourteen-year lifespan. Throughout the period, its various and complex questions made considerable demands on the attention of state ministers. Indeed, the legacies of monarchy formed one of their principal spheres of activity, a facet of politics obscured by examining Weimar from the *Wilhelmstraße*. Their endeavours were interrupted by various *forces majeures*, most obviously the inflation of the early 1920s which not only pushed other tasks up the governmental agenda but also complicated the implementation of reform. Regular changes of government at the start of the decade similarly disrupted progress, as did the resistance of the royals and administrative officials who remained loyal to them. Above all, however, was the simple fact that by 1918 monarchy had become so ingrained in every aspect of Germany's political culture and social structure that state ministers could neither seriously expect nor desire its rapid extraction.

The relative homogeneity of Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg cautions against extrapolating their experiences of de-monarchification to other states within Germany. It would nevertheless be revealing to consider how different states fared with the task—how did the afterlives of monarchy differ in the northern, feudal grand duchies of Mecklenburg, or in territories whose dynasties fled after 1918 (Brunswick or Schaumburg-Lippe), or those which ultimately joined other states (the Ernestine duchies or Waldeck-Pyrmont)? Of greater interest, however, would be an approach which tapped into the burgeoning fields of global and transnational history. The years between 1917 and 1923 were an age of revolution in

miniature.⁵ Besides Germany, imperial regimes fell in Russia (1917), Austria-Hungary (1918), and the Ottoman lands (1922). One recent study sought to compare how these monarchies experienced the war,⁶ but as yet a comparative, transnational study of the overthrow and legacy of monarchy in Europe remains a desideratum. How did a process steered by Social Democrats (Germany and Austria) differ from one directed by Marxist-Leninists (Russia) or military officers (Turkey)? What does this period reveal of the relationship between monarchy and modernity and of the differences between the royal states which survived and those which disappeared?

These are avenues for future research. As it stands, the existing literature has little to say on the place of monarchy in the Weimar Republic. Indeed, it is either dismissed out of hand as a relic of a failed and anti-democratic era, or—more frequently—simply ignored. At times, moreover, the German provinces take a backseat to the lights and music of the nation’s modernist capital. By examining Weimar through the prisms of the fallen monarchies, however, this thesis has demonstrated that new perspectives remain to be found. The turrets of the *Neues Palais* in Darmstadt, the *Residenzschloss* in Munich, or the *Altes Palais* in Stuttgart provide the historian with vantage points over contentious topics in Weimar historiography, from the significance of the 1918 revolution, to the success of republican state-building, to the importance of Germany’s federal structure in the modern era. Above all, however, this approach has shown that monarchy did not simply vanish *in toto* at the end of the First World War. Philipp Scheidemann’s infamous proclamation from the *Reichstag* balcony that “the old and rotten thing—the monarchy—has collapsed” was undoubtedly a stirring and suitable piece of rhetoric, but it did not tell the whole story. The sun did not set on German monarchy in November 1918; instead, the revolution inaugurated the twilight of the princes, whose glow offers a light by which we may examine a familiar and critical period of recent history in a new and fruitful way.

5. Cf. Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, 1975). See, more recently: Jochen Böhrer, ‘Enduring Violence: The Postwar Struggles in East-Central Europe, 1917–21’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 50:1 (2014), pp. 58–77; Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931* (London, 2014); Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished: Why the First World War failed to End, 1917–1923* (London, 2016); Stefan Rinke and Michael Wildt (eds), *Revolutions and Counter-Revolutions: 1917 and its Aftermath from a Global Perspective* (Frankfurt, 2017).

6. Matthew Glencross and Judith Rowbotham (eds.), *Monarchies and the Great War* (New York, 2018).

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GU 10	Vermögensverwaltung der Herzöge und Fürsten von Urach
Nr. 91	Documents relating to the <i>Prozeß Urach</i>
GU 117	Nachlass Herzog Wilhelm von Urach, Graf von Württemberg
Nr. 1044	Correspondence with the Philipp'sche line of the House of Württemberg
Nr. 1305	Correspondence from King Wilhelm II of Württemberg
GU 119	Nachlass Herzogin Wiltrud von Urach, Gräfin von Württemberg
Bü 1	Correspondence from members of the House of Württemberg
Bü 132	Correspondence from Princess Isabella of Bavaria
Bü 254	Correspondence from Prince Alfons of Bavaria
Bü 301	Correspondence from Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria
Bü 651	List of codenames used by the House of Wittelsbach
Bü 1099	Correspondence to King Ludwig III of Bavaria
Bü 1112	Correspondence to Princess Therese of Bavaria
GU 120	Nachlass Karl Fürst von Urach, Graf von Württemberg
Bü 120	Correspondence from King Wilhelm II and Queen Charlotte of Württemberg

ARCHIV DES HAUSES WÜRTTEMBERG (AHW)

331	Nachlass Herzog Albrecht von Württemberg
Nr. 160-162	Correspondence from Duke Philipp Albrecht of Württemberg
Nr. 343	Correspondence from King Wilhelm II of Württemberg
Nr. 353	Correspondence from Queen Charlotte of Württemberg
Nr. 356	Condolences on the death of King Wilhelm II of Württemberg
Nr. 359	Correspondence from Princess Pauline of Wied, née of Württemberg
Nr. 530	Correspondence from Kaiser Wilhelm II
Nr. 563	Correspondence from Landgraf Friedrich of Hessen-Kassel
Nr. 1093	Documents relating to the finances of the House of Württemberg
HDK	Hofdomänenkammer
Nr. 141	Coat of arms of the People's State of Württemberg
Nr. 442	Documents relating to the <i>Verein deutscher Hofkammern</i>
Nr. 815	Finances of Queen Charlotte of Württemberg

Nr. 872	Donations for the upkeep of local churches
Nr. 952	Documents relating to the <i>Verein deutscher Hofkammern</i>

BAYERISCHES HAUPTSTAATSARCHIV MÜNCHEN (BayHStA)

	Gesandtschaft Päpstlicher Stuhl
162	Journey of Crown Princess Rupprecht and Crown Princess Antonie of Bavaria through Italy
MA	Außenministerium
99512-99523	Protocols of cabinet meetings (1918-1931)
100102	Journeys by members of ruling houses through Bavaria
102010/1-2	Constitution of the Free State of Bavaria
102014-102015	State coat of arms and official seal
102019	Documents relating to the establishment of a Bavarian state president
102022	State representation
102048	Reserved seating in state theatres
102135	Situation reports from the provincial governor of Mittelfranken
102136	Situation reports from the provincial governor of Oberbayern
MF	Finanzministerium
70351	Museum in the Munich <i>Residenz</i> (1931-1936)
70359	<i>Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds</i> (1931-1934)
MJu	Justizministerium
16907	Death of members of the royal house

DEUTSCHES LITERATURARCHIV MARBACH (DLAM)

A: Kurz, Isolde	Nachlass Isolde Kurz
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FÜRSTLICH HOHENZOLLERNSCHE HAUS- UND DOMÄNENARCHIV (FHHDA)

DS 70 T 2	Fürstlich Hohenzollernsches Kabinett
Nr. 30	Documents relating to the <i>Verein regierender deutscher Fürstenhäuser</i>

GEHEIMES HAUSARCHIV (GHA)

	Kopien, Drucke, Tafeln
Nr. 701	Memoirs and correspondence of Hans Freiherr von Laßberg
Nr. 752	Correspondence from Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria to military officers on the Allied extradition list

- Nachlass Kronprinz Rupprecht**
 Nr. 46 Correspondence from Prince Franz of Bavaria
 Nr. 798 Documents relating to Crown Prince Rupprecht's progress through the Pfalz
 Nr. 882 Correspondence from Grand Duke Friedrich Franz IV of Mecklenburg-Schwerin
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 Nr. 14 Manuscript memoirs
- Nachlass Prinz Franz**
 Nr. 168 Identity papers
 Nr. 204 List of Christmas gifts for local children
- Nachlass Prinz Leopold**
 Nr. 37 Correspondence from Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria
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 Nr. 69 Correspondence from King Ludwig III of Bavaria
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- Vermögens- und Güterverwaltung Ludwig III.**
 Nr. 23 Negotiations on the safety and future home of King Ludwig III and Queen Marie Therese of Bavaria; preliminary discussions on a financial settlement with the state; exile in Switzerland
 Nr. 24 Newspaper clippings (miscellaneous political and economic topics)
 Nr. 35 Death of King Ludwig III of Bavaria
 Nr. 59 Marriage between Prince Adalbert of Bavaria and Auguste Gräfin von Seefeld-Buttenheim

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D24

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- Nachlass Großherzog Ernst Ludwig von Hessen
 34/7 Correspondence from Grand Duchess Eleonore of Hessen
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O 13 470 533	Familienarchiv Wilbrand Manuscript memoirs of Willi Wilbrand Assorted literature on the Grand Ducal House of Hessen
O 24 49/19 50/19 50/20 50/23 50/24, 26 51/20	Nachlass Hermann Hesse Grand ducal income from sale of property Public claims to grand ducal property Catalogues of buildings belonging to the <i>Krondotation</i> Rent of the <i>Prinz-Georg-Palais</i> Establishment of a museum in the <i>Altes Schloss</i> Use of rooms in the <i>Altes Schloss</i>
R 1 B	Ausschreiben der Landesbehörden
HAUPTSTAATSARCHIV STUTTGART (HStAS)	
E 40/49 Bü 157	Ministerium der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten Journeys by members of the Bavarian royal house through Württemberg
E 75 Bü 162	Württembergische Gesandtschaft in München Political reports from Carl Moser von Filseck
E 130 a Bü 200	Staatsministerium Public announcements of the provisional government (1918- 1919)
E 130 b Bü 2 Bü 3 Bü 6 Bü 67 Bü 68 Bü 214-219 Bü 1664 Bü 2096	Staatsministerium Removal of royal state symbols Replacement of royal border posts Use of the state coat of arms Documents relating to the House of Württemberg Financial negotiations between the state and the House of Württemberg Minutes of cabinet meetings (1918-1924) Use of former <i>Krongut</i> Documents relating to the former royal house of Bavaria
E 131 Bü 100	Pressestelle des Staatsministeriums Newspaper clippings relating to the state constitution
E 135 b Bü 18	Landesausschuss der Soldatenräte Württembergs First state congress of the soldiers' councils of Württemberg (1918)
J 5	Sammlung zur Geschichte des königlichen Hauses Württemberg

Bü 1	Correspondence from King Wilhelm II of Württemberg
J 40/19 Bü 1	Dokumentation zum Kirchenkampf von Richard Fischer History of the state church between November 1918 and January 1933
M 660/034 Bü 22	Militärischer Nachlass Walther Reinhardt Correspondence with politicians and military leaders
P 13 Bü 193	Familienarchiv von Doertenbach Correspondence from Duke Albrecht of Württemberg to Georg and Emma von Doertenbach
Q 1/2 Bü 119	Nachlass Conrad Haußmann Correspondence with political allies
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FA 16 N 5520	Nachlass Prinz Max von Baden Correspondence with Anton Geiß
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10 Depot A Nr. 766	Zentralregistraturen bis 1945 Death of King Wilhelm II of Württemberg
2134 65	Nachlass Wilhelm Kohlhaas Manuscript account of the end of monarchy in Württemberg

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005/1
04320

Stadtverwaltung Worms (1815-1945)
Removal of royal symbols

185
0099

Familien- und Firmenarchiv Ludwig C. Freiherr von Heyl
Societies, invitations, events

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Appendices

Financial settlements between the states and their former ruling dynasties¹

Hessen (1919)

in: *Verh. LT. Hess.*, I. Landtag, Drucksache Nr. 123, 16.04.1919.

Vereinbarung zwischen dem vormaligen Großherzog Ernst Ludwig von Hessen, zugleich in Vertretung des Großherzoglichen Hauses, und dem Hessischen Staate, vertreten durch das Gesamtministerium.

§1.

Sämtliche in Benutzung und Nutznießung des Großherzoglichen Hauses befindlichen Grundstücke, Gebäude nebst beweglichen Zubehörsstücken und Rechte, soweit diese zum „Familieneigentum des Großherzoglichen Hauses“ gehören — die sogenannten Krondotationen —, einschließlich des Hofmeiereifonds gehen in den Besitz und in die Nutznießung des Hessischen Staates über.

§2.

I. Ausgenommen von der Übertragung nach §1 sind:

Agreement between the former Grand Duke Ernst Ludwig of Hessen, simultaneously representing the Grand Ducal House, and the Hessian State, represented by the Cabinet.

§1.

All lands and buildings, along with their fixtures and connected rights, currently used and enjoyed by the Grand Ducal House and belonging to the “Family Domains of the Grand Ducal House” (the so-called crown endowments), including the court dairy, are transferred to the ownership of the Hessian State.

§2.

I. The following are exempt from transfer under §1:

1. All translations are by the author.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>a) das Jagdschloß Wolfsgarten nebst dem dazu gehörigen in die Einfriedigung einbezogenen Gelände, ferner das am Bahnhof Egelsbach liegende Gärtner-wohnhaus mit Garten; über die Einbeziehung des Geländes, mit dessen Eigentümern wegen einer Vereinigung mit Wolfsgarten bereits früher Verhandlungen eingeleitet worden sind und dessen Erwerb durch Tausch beabsichtigt ist, sowie über die Sicherung der Wasserversorgung Wolfsgarten bleibt nähere Vereinbarung zwischen dem Großherzog und dem Ministerium der Finanzen vorbehalten.</p> <p>b) das Schloß Romrod nebst Zubehör und entsprechenden Gelände nach dem auf der Kanzlei der Volkskammer offen liegenden Plan;</p> <p>c) die beiden Diener-Wohnhäuser, Besserungsstraße Nr. 38 und 40 in Darmstadt;</p> <p>d) die seither von dem Hofmarschallamt gepachtete 11.100 qm große Domanialgrundstück, welches innerhalb der Einfriedigung des das Schloß Kranichstein umgebenden Gartens liegt;</p> <p>e) das Hofwaschhaus in Darmstadt;</p> | <p>a) the hunting lodge at Wolfsgarten, including enclosed lands and the gardener's house and garden by Egelsbach railway station. Further agreement between the grand duke and the Ministry of Finance is reserved for the inclusion of this latter site (negotiations have already been initiated with the owners owing to a link with Wolfsgarten and its acquisition is envisaged via an exchange) and for the securing of Wolfsgarten's water supply.</p> <p>b) Romrod Castle, along with its fittings and grounds as depicted on the plan available to the Chancellery of the People's Chamber;</p> <p>c) The two servants' houses at 38 and 40 Besserungsstraße, Darmstadt;</p> <p>d) The plot of domanial land, measuring 11,100 square metres, which has hitherto been leased by the office of the court chamberlain and which is enclosed within the garden surrounding Kranichstein Castle;</p> <p>e) The royal washhouse in Darmstadt;</p> |
|---|--|

- f) der Leibstall daselbst im Umfang der seitherigen Nutzung

Die unter e und f aufgeführten Objekte bleiben nur solange in der Benutzung des Großherzogs, bis dafür vom Staate ein dem nach Auflösung der jetzigen Hofhaltung noch bestehenden Bedarf entsprechender Ersatz beschafft worden ist.

Der Staat überläßt außerdem unentgeltlich dem früheren Großherzog ein Anwesen für die ferner noch benötigten Amtsräume.

Zu Ziffer II und III bleibt nähere Vereinbarung zwischen dem Großherzog und dem Ministerium der Finanzen vorbehalten.

§3.

Für die Räumung der unter §1 genannten Objekte von dem im Privateigentum des Großherzogs stehenden beweglichen Inventar, ferner der Beamtenwohnungen in den Objekten der Kronotation werden zwischen der Regierung und den zuständigen Hofämtern Fristen vereinbart, die so ausreichend sind, daß die Großherzogliche Privatverwaltung, wie auch die Wohnungsinhaber nicht in Schwierigkeiten kommen. Der Regel nach soll die Räumung bis zum 1. Januar 1920 erfolgt sein.

§4.

- I. Die Schloßkirche im Residenzschloß soll auch fernerhin gottesdienstlichen Zwecken nach näherer Vereinbarung mit der

- f) The mews, as it is currently used.

Objects listed under e and f are to be used by the grand duke only until replacements are provided by the state, according to need, following the dissolution of the current court.

The state further provides the former grand duke with premises, free of rent, for necessary offices.

Further agreement between the grand duke and the Ministry of Finance is reserved for items II and III.

§3.

Deadlines will be agreed by the government and the responsible court officials which are sufficient to prevent the private grand ducal administration and the occupiers from coming into difficulty regarding the vacation of sites belonging to the private property of the grand duke in §1 and courtiers' apartments belonging to the crown endowment. As a rule, vacations should be completed by 1 January 1920.

§4.

- I. The court chapel in the Residence shall continue to serve a liturgical function in accordance with further agreement with the

evangelischen Kirchengemeinde der Stadt Darmstadt dienen.

- II. Die Regierung sagt zu, dem früheren Großherzog Gelegenheit zur Äußerung zu geben, bevor über die Verwendung des Schlosses oder seiner Teile endgültige Beschlüsse gefaßt werden.

§5.

Der Staat übernimmt die dem früheren Großherzog seinen Beamten und Bediensteten gegenüber obliegenden Verpflichtungen nach folgenden Grundsätzen:

- a) Diejenigen definitiv angestellten Beamten und Bediensteten, die nach dem eingereichten Verzeichnisse in den Dienst des Staates übertreten wollen, werden unter Wahrung der Ansprüche aus ihrem Dienstverhältnis in eine ihrer Vorbildung entsprechende Dienststelle des Staates übernommen. Solange eine geeignete Verwendung nicht vorhanden ist, erhalten diese Beamten vom 1. April 1920 ab anstatt ihres Gehaltes den nach Maßgabe ihres Dienstalters sich ergebenden Ruhegehalt als Wartegeld. Dieses Gehalt oder Wartegeld ruht solange und insoweit, als ein Beamter durch verwendungsweise Beschäftigung im Staatsdienst oder anderweite Tätigkeit ein ständiges Einkommen bezieht, durch das seine Gesamtbezüge (einschließlich Ruhegehalt oder Wartegeld) über das Dienst Einkommen hinaus erhöht würden, auf das er

Protestant parish of the city of Darmstadt.

- II. The government agrees to consult the former grand duke before final decisions are made over the use of the castle or of its component parts.

§5.

The state assumes the obligations of the former grand duke towards his officials in accordance with the following principles:

- a) Those permanently employed officials and servants who have expressed a wish in the submitted directories to transfer to the civil service shall be taken on by a state agency based on their previous education and experience and with respect to claims from their former employment. If no suitable position can be found, from 1 April 1920 these officials shall receive, in place of their salary, waiting pay calculated according to their seniority. This salary or waiting pay shall cease should the official otherwise receive a steady income through employment in public service or elsewhere which would increase his total remuneration (including pensions and waiting pay) above the income he would have received had he remained in his previous court position. Further agreement is reserved between the grand duke and the Ministry of Finance regarding officials and

bei seinem Verbleib in seiner früheren Hofstellung Anspruch gehabt hätte. Wegen der in der Übergangszeit vorübergehend noch vom Großherzog zu beschäftigenden Beamten und Bediensteten bleibt nähere Vereinbarung zwischen dem Großherzog und dem Ministerium der Finanzen vorbehalten.

- b) Die nicht im Dienste des früheren Großherzogs verbleibenden, nicht alsbald zu pensionierenden, aber auch nicht für den Staatsdienst vorgemerkten definitiv angestellten Beamten erhalten, — soweit im Einzelfall keine Sondervereinbarung mit ihnen getroffen wird —, ihr bisheriges Dienst Einkommen bis zum 1. Oktober 1919 und von da ab ein Wartegeld nach gleichen Grundsätzen und Bedingungen wie die Beamten unter a).
- c) Die bisher aus der Großherzoglichen Kabinetts- und Hofkasse bestrittenen Ruhe- und Gnadengehalte, ebenso die Ruhegehälter der aus Anlaß der Auflösung der Hofhaltung des früheren Großherzogs in den Ruhestand tretenden Beamten und Bediensteten werden auf die Staatskasse übernommen, vorbehaltlich der Prüfung der Dienstfähigkeit der einzelnen Beamten.

§6.

Die nach §5 auf den Staat übergehenden Verpflichtungen bestimmen sich nach

servants temporarily employed by the grand duke during the transition period.

- b) Officials who will neither remain in the service of the former grand duke nor soon retire, or who have not been earmarked for the civil service, shall receive their current salary until 1 October 1919, providing no further special agreement is made with them, and thereafter the waiting pay under the same conditions and regulations outlined in a).
- c) Retirement and voluntary payments previously made by the Grand Ducal Cabinet and Court Treasury, in addition to retirement payments due to officials and servants who retired on the dissolution of the former grand duke's household, shall be assumed by the state treasury, subject to the examination of each official's fitness to work.

§6.

Obligations which the state assumes under §5 shall be determined by those

den der bisherigen Kabinettskasse obliegenden Verpflichtungen. Der Staat ist nicht verpflichtet, den früheren Hofbeamten die gleichen Unterstützungen und Teuerungszulagen, die er seinen eigenen Beamten einschließlich der in den Staatsdienst übernommenen früheren Hofbeamten gewährt, zu bewilligen; doch ist die Regierung bereit, früheren Hofbeamten und den Hinterbliebenen von solchen ausreichende Beihilfen mindestens in dem Umfange zu gewähren, wie sie bisher aus den für diesen Zweck zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln gewährt wurden.

§7.

- I. Die Fürsorge für die zur Zeit vorhandenen Witwen und Waisen von Hofbeamten geht auf den Staat über, desgleichen die Fürsorge für künftige Witwen und Waisen der in §5 genannten Hofbeamten und Ruhegehaltsempfänger. Die Bestimmung in §6 findet entsprechende Anwendung.
- II. Die gemäß Artikel 27 des Gesetzes vom 30. Juni 1886, das Zivildienen-Witwen-Institut betreffend, an die Hofdiener-Witwen-Anstalt zu zahlende jährliche Rente von 8.000 Mark fällt weg.
- III. Von den Kapitalien der Hofdiener-Witwen-Anstalt verbleibt ein Betrag im Kurswert von 250.000 Mark, in Worten: Zweihundertfünfzigtausend Mark dem früheren Großherzog; der übrige Betrag geht in das Eigentum des Staates über.

hitherto incumbent upon the court treasury. The state is under no obligation to grant former court officials the same subsidies and cost-of-living allowances provided to its own officials, including court officials previously taken into the civil service; the government is nevertheless prepared to grant former court officials and their survivors sufficient aid in line with that hitherto provided from funds available for this purpose.

§7.

- I. Care for existing widows and orphans of court officials is assumed by the state, as is care for future widows and orphans of court officials and recipients of pensions covered by §5. The provision under §6 applies accordingly.
- II. The annual payment of 8,000 Marks to the Union of Court Widows under §27 of the Law of 30 June 1886 relating to the Union of Court Widows shall no longer be made.
- III. Of the capital held by the Union of Court Widows, a sum equivalent to a market value of 250,000 Marks, in words: two hundred and fifty thousand Marks, shall resolve to the grand duke; the remaining funds shall become the property of the state.

Maßgebend für den Kurswert ist das anliegende Verzeichnis.

Market values shall be determined by the attached directory.

§8.

- I. Die Übernahme der von dem früheren Großherzog genutzten Jagden und der Pachterlöse aus den zugunsten der Kabinettskasse verpachteten Jagden, ferner die pachtweise Überlassung von Staatsjagden von einer Fläche bis zu 4.000 Hektar bestimmen sich nach der hierüber zwischen dem früheren Großherzog und dem Ministerium der Finanzen zu treffenden besonderen Vereinbarung.
- II. Das Gleiche gilt für die zum Privateigentum des Großherzoglichen Hauses gehörigen Akten- und Urkundenbestände des Haus- und Staatsarchivs sowie für Kunst- und Sammlungsgegenstände, die gegenwärtig Bestandteile öffentlicher Sammlungen des Landes sind.

§9.

- I. Das Hoftheater geht auf den hessischen Staat über, der Eigentum und Betrieb in andere Hände zu übertragen berechtigt ist. Der Staat übernimmt alle dem früheren Großherzog aus dem Betriebe des Hoftheaters zukommenden Rechte und Pflichten, letztere in dem Umfange, wie sie auf Grund der von der Kabinettsdirektion beizubringenden Nachweisungen von dem Ministerium der

§8.

- I. The assumption by the state of hunts used by the former grand duke and proceeds from hunts leased by the court treasury, as well as the leasing of state hunts up to 4,000 hectares, shall be determined by special provisions agreed between the former grand duke and the Ministry of Finance.
- II. The same regulations apply to documents and records contained within the House and State Archive which are the private property of the Grand Ducal House as well as to works of art and collectables currently part of the state's public collections.

§9.

- I. The court theatre is transferred to state ownership; the state is entitled to pass on ownership and operations to other parties. The state assumes all rights and obligations of the former grand duke which arise from the operation of the court theatre to the extent that they are recognised or accepted by the Ministry of Finance on the basis

Finanzen anerkannt oder übernommen werden.

- II. Das gesamte Hoftheaterinventar wird dem Staat unentgeltlich zu Eigentum überlassen, die Barbestände der Kasse gehen in das Eigentum des Staates über.
- III. Die Forderungen der Staatskasse aus dem zur Aufrechterhaltung des Betriebs während der Spielzeit 1914/15 gewährten Darlehen von 50.000 Mark und aus der im Jahre 1905 bei der Staatsschuldenkasse aufgenommenen Schuld von 200.000 Mark werden nieder-geschlagen.
- IV. Die zur Zeit bestehenden Freiplätze bleiben bis zum Schlusse der laufenden Spielzeit bestehen.
- V. Im übrigen werden die aus Anlaß der Übernahme des Hoftheaters in Besitz und Betrieb des Staats noch notwendigen Vereinbarungen zwischen dem Großherzog oder seinem Vertreter und dem Finanzministerium getroffen.

§10.

- I. Die Staatskasse zahlt an den früheren Großherzog an Stelle aller Ansprüche, die ihm und seinem Hause seither zustanden, insbesondere zur Bestreitung der Kosten für die von ihm weiterhin zu unterhaltenden, nicht im §5 genannten Beamten und Bediensteten sowie zur Bestreitung der sonstigen auf der bisherigen Zivilliste ruhenden Lasten bis auf weiteres einen

of evidence provided by the court administration.

- II. The inventory of the court theatre is given over to the state in its entirety and without charge; existing funds in its account become the property of the state.
- III. The state treasury waives outstanding claims to the loan of 50,000 Marks granted to sustain operations during the 1914/15 season and to the debt of 200,000 Marks drawn in 1905.
- IV. Existing complimentary seating shall remain available until the end of the season.
- V. Further necessary agreements relating to the assumption by the state of ownership and operation of the court theatre shall be made by the grand duke, or his representative, and the Ministry of Finance.

§10.

- I. Until further notice, the state treasury shall pay the former grand duke an annual sum of 440,000 Marks, in words: four hundred and forty thousand Marks, in place of all claims to which he and his house have hitherto been entitled, to cover the costs of officials and servants whom he continues to employ and who are not named in §5, and all other debts arising from the

jährlichen Betrag von 440.000 Mark, in Worten: Vierhundertvierzigtausend Mark. Ferner werden der Hof- und Kabinettskasse diejenigen Beträge vergütet, die nach näherer Vereinbarung mit dem Finanzministerium zur Bezahlung der zu entlassenden Bediensteten nach dem 1. April d. Js. erforderlich sind.

- II. Der Staat verzichtet auf Ersatz der zur Gewährung einer einmaligen Teuerungszulage für die Hofbeamten der Kabinettskasse vorgelegten Summe.
- III. Alle weiteren seitherigen Zahlungen und Leistungen der Staatskasse fallen weg (z. B. Entschädigung für entgangene Nutzung am Teichhaus Darmstadt, Beitrag zur Unterhaltung der Wildgärten, Bauunterhaltungskosten u. dergl.).

§11.

Die vorstehenden Vereinbarungen treten, soweit im einzelnen nichts anderes vereinbart ist, mit dem 1. April 1919 in Kraft.

§12.

Beide vertragschließende Teile erklären sich zu einem von dem Ministerium der Finanzen noch zu bestimmenden Zeitpunkt zum Abschluß eines Abkommens in folgendem Sinne bereit:

- 1. Der frühere Großherzog ist für sich und sein Haus damit einverstanden, daß das „Familieneigentum des Groß-

current civil list. Following subsequent agreement with the Ministry of Finance, the court treasury shall be reimbursed with amounts required for the payment of servants dismissed after 1 April this year.

- II. The state waives reimbursement for the amount provided to the court treasury for a one-off cost-of-living allowance for court officials.
- III. All other payments and services hitherto provided by the state treasury shall cease (e.g. compensation for the loss of the *Teichhaus* in Darmstadt, contributions to the upkeep of wild game parks, funds for the maintenance of buildings, etc.).

§11.

The above agreements shall come into force on 1 April 1919 unless otherwise agreed in individual cases.

§12.

Both contracting parties agree to conclude a further agreement under the following terms at a time to be determined by the Ministry of Finance:

- 1. The former grand duke agrees, both for himself and his house, that the “Family Property of the Grand Ducal House” shall by law

- herzoglichen Hauses“ durch Gesetz zu vollem Staatseigentum erklärt wird.
2. Der frühere Großherzog verzichtet für sich und sein Haus:
 - a) auf die Zivilliste,
 - b) auf die Nutzung der Objekte der Kronotation einschließlich des Hofmeiereifonds,
 - c) auf den Anspruch auf die zu Bedürfnissen des Großherzoglichen Hauses und Hofes erforderlichen Summen (Artikel 7 der Verfassungsurkunde von 1820) und
 - d) auf die ihm zustehenden Jagdrechte und Domanialjagdpachtungen.
 3. Der hessische Staat gewährt dem früheren Großherzog eine Abfindungssumme, bestehend in einer in das hessische Staatsschuldbuchforderung im Nennbetrage von 10.000.000 Mark, in Worten: Zehn Millionen Mark und in einer Barzahlung von 900.000 Mark, in Worten: Neunhunderttausend Mark. Mit dem Tage, an welchem die Verzinsung dieser Abfindungssumme zugunsten des Großherzogs anfängt, fällt die in §10 vereinbarte Zahlung von jährlich 440.000 Mark fort. Bis zum 1. November 1920 bedarf jede Verfügung über die Kapitalbeträge der eingetragenen Schuldbuchforderung der
- be declared the full property of the state.
2. The former grand duke, for himself and his house, waives claims
 - a. to the civil list,
 - b. to use of objects from the crown endowment, including the court dairy,
 - c. to sums paid for the upkeep of the Grand Ducal House and court under §7 of the Constitution of 1820 and
 - d. to hunting rights and domanial hunting leases to which he has hitherto been entitled.
 3. The Hessian state grants the former grand duke compensation consisting of a claim to be entered in the Hessian state debt register of 4% of a nominal amount of 10,000,000 Marks, in words: ten million Marks, and of a cash payment of 900,000 Marks, in words: nine hundred thousand Marks. On the day on which payment of this compensation to the grand duke begins, the annual payment of 440,000 Marks under §10 shall cease. Any disposal of capital sums of the registered debt claim made before 1 November 1920 shall require the approval of the Ministry of Finance. From 1 May 1921, expenditure of sums exceeded

Zustimmung des Ministeriums der Finanzen; vom 1. Mai 1921 ab ist die Zustimmung des Ministeriums der Finanzen zur Verfügung über Beträge von mehr als zwei Millionen Mark jährlich erforderlich.

4. Durch Gesetz soll dafür gesorgt werden, daß mit dem Zeitpunkt des Übergangs des „Familien-eigentums des Großherzoglichen Hauses“ in das Staatseigentum die unter §2 Ziffer a, b, c und d aufgeführten Grundstücke, sowie die nach §2 Absatz II und III zu beschaffenden Grundstücke in das freie Eigentum des früheren Großherzogs übergehen. Mit den in §2 c erwähnten Diener-wohnhäusern werden Hofraum und Gartenland in einem durch das Ministerium der Finanzen noch näher festzustellenden Umfang überwiesen; dieses Gelände wird grundbuchlich mit einem Bauverbot belastet.

Vorstehende Vereinbarung wird in der durch die Volkskammer für den Freistaat Hessen genehmigten Fassung bestätigt und anerkannt.

Darmstadt, den 2. Mai 1919.

Der vormalige Großherzog, auch in Vertretung des Großherzoglichen Hauses:

two million Marks per annum shall require the approval of the Ministry of Finance.

4. Laws shall be passed to ensure that when the “Family Property of the Grand Ducal House” passes into state ownership, the lands listed under §2(I)(a, b, c, d) and those to be procured under §2(II, III) shall become the free property of the former grand duke. The courtyard and garden of the servants’ quarters referred to in §2(c) shall be transferred to an extent determined by the Ministry of Finance. This site is covered by a construction ban in the land register.

The above agreement is confirmed and authorised by the version approved by the People’s Chamber of the Free State of Hessen.

Darmstadt, 2 May 1919.

The former grand duke, also representing the Grand Ducal House:

Ernst Ludwig

Das Hessische Gesamtministerium

The Hessian Government:

Carl Ulrich

Konrad Henrich

Heinrich Fulda

Hessen (1930)

in: HStAD, G 21 A, 2/3a, Ausfertigung, 06.05.1930.

Übereinkunft

Der vormals in Hessen regierenden Großherzog Ernst Ludwig, für sich und als Vertreter des Großherzoglichen Hauses, sowie seine beiden Söhne Georg Donatus Wilhelm Nikolaus Eduard Heinrich Karl und Ludwig Hermann Alexander Chlodwig auf der eine Seite, der Volksstaat Hessen auf der anderen Seite, kommen überein wie folgt:

§1.

Durch Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 haben sich der vormals in Hessen regierende Großherzog Ernst Ludwig, dieser zugleich in Vertretung des Großherzoglichen Hauses, und der Volksstaat Hessen über die rechtlichen Beziehungen zwischen beiden Teilen, namentlich über die Rechtsverhältnisse der als „Familieneigentum des Großherzoglichen Hauses“ bezeichneten Vermögensmasse und insbesondere ihrer unbeweglichen Bestandteile (Domänen), geeignet. Beide Teile erkennen jene Auseinandersetzung als verbindliche Grundlage auch der gegenwärtigen Übereinkunft an. Demgemäß wird die Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 hiermit ausdrücklich bestätigt und als wesentlicher Bestandteil der gegenwärtigen Übereinkunft gleichzeitig mit ihr erneut vollzogen. Sie wird

Convention

The former reigning Grand Duke of Hessen, Ernst Ludwig, for himself and on behalf of his house, as well as his two sons Georg Donatus Wilhelm Nikolaus Eduard Heinrich Karl and Ludwig Hermann Alexander Chlodwig—on the one side—and the People's State of Hessen—on the other—agree to the following:

§1.

Through an accord of 5 May 1919, the former ruling Grand Duke of Hessen, Ernst Ludwig, concurrently representing the Grand Ducal House, and the People's State of Hessen agreed on the legal relationship between the two parties, with particular reference to the legal status of assets designated as the "Family Property of the Grand Ducal House" and its immovable components (the domains). Both parties recognise this agreement as the binding foundation of the present convention. The agreement of 5 May 1919 is thus herewith confirmed and renewed as an integral element of the present convention. It is augmented and implemented according to the following conditions.

durch die nachfolgenden Bestimmungen ergänzt und ausgeführt.

§2.

Die Vorschrift unter I, b des §2 der Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 wird aufgehoben. An ihrer Stelle wird vereinbart:

Am Schlosse Romrod steht dem vormals regierenden Großherzog auf die Dauer seines Lebens ein unentgeltliches Wohnrecht zu. Die Baulichkeiten und das Gelände, an denen dieses Recht besteht, sind in dem beigefügten Plane durch rote Umrandung kenntlich gemacht; außerdem erstreckt sich das Wohnrecht auf:

1. die Kraftwagenhalle im Stallbau,
2. die alte Wagenremise in der Schloßscheuer als Holzstall,
3. Anteil an der Waschküche nach Übereinkunft
4. ein Zimmer im Erdgeschoße und zwei Zimmer im Obergeschoße des Verwaltungsgebäudes.

Nach dem Erlöschen des Wohnrechts sind Schloß und Gelände spätestens innerhalb eines Jahres an den Hessischen Staat zurückzugeben.

Das Grundstück der Gemarkung Romrod Flur I. Nr. 219 1/10, Grabgarten, mit 8.882 Geviertmetern berechneten Inhaltes, 8.792 Geviertmetern reduzierten Inhaltes, das durch Vertrag vom 18. April 1922 vom Volksstaate Hessen auf den vormals regierenden Großherzog übertragen

§2.

The provision under §2(I)(b) of the agreement of 5 May 1919 is repealed. In its place, it is agreed that:

The former ruling grand duke is entitled to reside rent-free at Romrod Castle for life. The buildings and plot to which this right applies are marked by the red border in the attached plan; the right is additionally extended to:

1. the garage in the stable building;
2. the old carriage shed in the barn (as a wood store);
3. use of the washhouse, subject to agreement;
4. one room on the ground floor and two rooms on the first floor of the administration building.

Once this right has expired, the castle and premises must be returned to the Hessian state within one year.

The land in Romrod District (plot 1, Nr. 219 1/10, memorial garden), comprising 8,882 square metres (calculated area) and 8,792 square metres (reduced area), which was transferred from the People's State of Hessen to the former ruling grand duke by the treaty of 18 April 1922, is to be

war, wird alsbald auf den Volksstaat Hessen zurückübereignet.

§3.

- A. Nach den §§22 und 12 Nummer 4 der Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 stehen

das Hofwaschhaus zu Darmstadt (§ 2 I e),

der Leibstall daselbst im Umfange der seitherigen Nutzung (§ 2 I f),

ebenso wie alles übrige „Familieneigentum des Grossherzoglichen Hauses“ dem Volksstaate Hessen als volles Staatseigentum zu. Doch bleiben diese Liegenschaften solange in der Benutzung des vormals regierenden Großherzogs, bis dafür vom Staate Ersatz beschafft worden ist, der dem nach Auflösung der Hofhaltung noch bestehenden Bedarfe entspricht.

Hierzu wird festgestellt:

1. Das Hofwaschhaus ist inzwischen in Besitz und Nutzung des Staates übergegangen. Als Ausgleich dafür ist dem vormals regierenden Großherzog Raum im Leibstall zur Benutzung überlassen worden.
2. Beide Teile sind darüber einig, daß die Beschaffung von Ersatz für die Räumlichkeiten im Leibstalle—

returned to the People's State of Hessen at the first opportunity.

§3.

- A. In accordance with §§2 and 12(4) of the agreement of 5 May 1919

the court laundry in Darmstadt §2(I)(e),

the mews, as it is currently used §2(I)(f),

and the rest of the "Family Property of the Grand Ducal House" become the full property of the People's State of Hessen. The above properties will nevertheless be used by the former reigning Grand Duke until the state procures replacements corresponding to the needs which remain after the dissolution of the court.

It is thus determined that

1. The court washhouse is now in the ownership and use of the state. As compensation, the former reigning Grand Duke is given use of a room in the mews.
2. Both parties agree that the procurement of a replacement for premises in the mews—as well as insofar

(auch soweit sie als Ausgleich für das Hofwaschhaus dienen),—solange ausgesetzt bleiben kann, wie jene Räumlichkeiten dem vormals regierenden Großherzoge überlassen werden.

- B. Nach § 2 Absatz III der Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 überläßt der Volksstaat Hessen dem vormals regierenden Großherzoge unentgeltlich ein Anwesen für die ferner noch benötigten Amtsräume. Zur Zeit ist dem vormals regierenden Großherzoge zu diesem Zwecke Raum im alten Schloß zu Darmstadt überlassen. Auch hier gilt das Gleiche, was zuvor unter A 2) vereinbart ist.

§4.

Beide Teile sind darüber einig, daß der Zeitpunkt zur abschließenden Vollziehung der Vereinbarung, der nach dem Eingange des §12 jener Vereinbarung von den Finanzminister zu bestimmen ist, nunmehr gekommen ist. Der vormals in Hessen regierenden Großherzog Ernst Ludwig—für sich und sein Haus—und der Volksstaat Hessen treffen hiermit das vorbehaltene Abkommen wie folgt:

1. Dem Volksstaat Hessen steht das „Familieneigentum des Großherzoglichen Hauses“, insbesondere alle dazu gehörenden Liegenschaften, Rechte, beweglichen Bestandteile und Zubehör,

as they serve as compensation for the court laundry—may be suspended for as long as these premises are made available to the former ruling grand duke. Either party is nevertheless entitled to request that the provision under §2(II) of the agreement of 5 May 1919 be carried out.

- B. According to §2(III) of the agreement of 5 May 1919, the People's State of Hessen provided the former ruling grand duke with premises for necessary offices. Presently, the former reigning Grand Duke is provided with space for this purpose in the *Altes Schloss* in Darmstadt. The same provision as under §3(A)(2) applies here.

§4.

Both parties agree that the time has now come for the final execution of the agreement which, under §12 of that agreement, is to be determined by the Finance Minister. The former ruling Grand Duke of Hessen, Ernst Ludwig, for himself and his house, and the People's State of Hessen hereby conclude this reserved agreement as follows:

1. The "Family Property of the Grand Ducal House," including all incorporated properties, rights, movable elements, and fixtures, becomes the full property of the state, untouched

als volles, durch Rechte des vormals regierenden Großherzogs und seines Hauses nicht beschränktes Staatseigentum zu, soweit nicht nachstehend unter Ziffer 4) ein Anderes vereinbart ist. Dies wird durch Gesetz ausgesprochen.

2. Der vormals regierende Großherzog verzichtet für sich und sein Haus:

- a) auf die Zivilliste,
- b) auf die Nutzung der Objekte der Kronotation einschließlich des Hofmeiereifonds,
- c) auf den Anspruch auf die zu den Bedürfnissen des Großherzoglichen Hauses und Hofes erforderlichen Summen (Artikel 7 der alten hessischen Verfassungsurkunde vom 17. Dezember 1820),
- d) auf die ihm zustehenden Jagdrechte und Domanialjagdpachtungen.

3. Der Volksstaat Hessen erfüllt die Verpflichtungen, die ihm nach § 12 Nummer 3 der Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 obliegen, durch Zahlung von zwanzig Jahresbeträgen von je 400.000 Goldmark (in Worten: Vierhunderttausend Goldmark), als Kapitalabtragung, und ebenso zwanzig Jahresbeträgen von je 190.000 Goldmark (in Worten: Einhundertneunzigtausend Goldmark), als Verzinsung, zusammen also von alljährlich je

by rights of the former ruling grand duke and his house, unless otherwise specified under item 4. This will be confirmed in law.

2. The former grand duke, for himself and his house, waives claims

- a) to the civil list,
- b) to use of objects from the crown endowment, including the court dairy,
- c) to sums paid for the upkeep of the Grand Ducal House and court under §7 of the former Hessian Constitution of 17 December 1820 and
- d) to hunting rights and domanial hunting leases to which he has hitherto been entitled.

3. The People's State of Hessen fulfils its obligations under §12(3) of the agreement of 5 May 1919 by making twenty annual instalments of 400,000 Gold Marks each (in words: four hundred thousand Gold Marks) as capital transfers, and twenty annual instalments of 190,000 Gold Marks each (in words: one hundred and ninety thousand Gold Marks), as interest. The annual instalments shall run from 1 January 1928. The annual

590.000 Goldmark (in Worten: Fünfhundertneunzigtausend Goldmark). Die Jahresbeträge laufen vom 1. Januar 1928 an. Der auf die Verzinsung entfallende Betrag von alljährlich 190.000 Goldmark wird in nachträglich zahlbaren Raten von je 47.500 Goldmark (in Worten: Siebenundvierzigtausendfünfhundert Goldmark) nach Ablauf eines jeden Kalendervierteljahres gezahlt. Der als Kapitalabtragung zu entrichtende Betrag von alljährlich 400.000 Goldmark wird nachträglich nach Ablauf eines Kalenderjahres, zum ersten Male am 31. Dezember 1928, entrichtet. Die Zinsen für die Kalendervierteljahre, die seit 1. Januar 1928 verstrichen sind, werden fällig, sobald das Gesetz über die Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Volksstaate Hessen und dem vormals regierenden Fürstenhause in Kraft tritt.

4. Auf den vormals regierenden Großherzog gehen als freies Eigentum über:
 - a) das Jagdschloß Wolfsgarten nebst dem dazu gehörenden Gelände sowie das am Bahnhof Egelsbach liegende Gärtnerwohnhaus nebst Garten;
 - b) die beiden Dienerwohnhäuser Bessungerstraße No. 38 und Bessungerstraße Nr. 40 in Darmstadt sowie dazu gehörender Hofraum und Gartenland, die nicht bebaut werden dürfen;

interest payments of 190,000 Gold Marks shall be paid in instalments of 47,500 Gold Marks (in words: forty-seven thousand five hundred Gold Marks) at the end of each calendar quarter. The annual capital transfer of 400,000 Gold Marks shall be paid retrospectively at the end of each calendar year, with the first payment made on 31 December 1928. The interest due for the calendar quarter which has elapsed since 1 January 1928 shall be paid once the law regulating the dispute between the People's State of Hessen and the former ruling dynasty comes into force.

4. The former ruling grand duke receives the following as free property:
 - a) the hunting lodge at Wolfsgarten, including its associated grounds and the gardener's house and garden at the Egelsbach railway station;
 - b) the two servants' quarters at Bessungerstraße Nr. 38 and Nr. 40 in Darmstadt, along with the associated courtyard and garden, which may not be built upon;

- c) das etwa 11.100 Geviertmeter große Domanialgrundstück, welches innerhalb der Einfriedigung des das Schloß Kranichstein bei Darmstadt umgebenden Gartens liegt und vor Abschluß der Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 vom Hofmarschallamts zugepachtet war.

Dies wird durch Gesetz ausgesprochen.

Dem vormals regierenden Großherzoge soll ferner das Eigentum an dem bei Jagdschloß Wolfsgarten gelegenen Gelände beschafft werden, mit dessen Eigentümern wegen einer Vereinigung mit Wolfsgarten bereits früher Verhandlungen eingeleitet worden waren und dessen Erwerb durch Tausch beabsichtigt war.

§5.

Zur endgültigen Abfindung wegen aller Ansprüche, welche dem vormals regierenden Großherzoge und seinem Hause aufgrund der früheren Rechtsverhältnisse sowie der Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 für die Zeit bis zum Ablaufe des Kalenderjahres 1927 etwa zustehen, zahlt der Volksstaat Hessen den Betrag von einer Million Goldmark. Dieser Betrag wird vom 1. Januar 1928 an mit sieben vom Hundert verzinst. Er ist zahlbar, sobald das Gesetz über die Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Volksstaate Hessen und dem vormals in Hessen regierenden Fürstenhause in Kraft tritt. Mit Zahlung eines

- c) The domanial plot, measuring approximately 11,100 square meters, which lies within the enclosure of the garden surrounding Kranichstein Castle near Darmstadt and which was leased by the court chamberlain's office prior to the agreement of 5 May 1919.

This shall be enshrined in law.

The former reigning Grand Duke is also granted ownership of the grounds by the hunting lodge at Wolfsgarten, with whose owners negotiations were earlier initiated due to a link with Wolfsgarten and which was intended to be acquired through exchange.

§5.

The People's State of Hessen pays the sum of one million Gold Marks for the final settlement of all claims to which the former ruling grand duke and his house were entitled before the end of the 1927 calendar year due to previous legal arrangements, including the agreement of 5 May 1919. Since 1 January 1928, this sum has been subject to interest of seven percent. It shall be payable once the law regulating the agreement between the People's State of Hessen and the former ruling dynasty comes into force. The resulting interest obligation expires with the payment of an instalment.

Teilbetrages erlischt die daraus erfließende Zinspflicht.

Die Zahlung des einmaligen Kapitalbetrages nach Absatz 1 dient insbesondere auch zur Abfindung dafür, daß der vormals regierende Großherzog die Verpflichtung zur Zahlung aller Apanagen und Wittümer, die auf dem „Familieneigentum des Großherzoglichen Hauses“ etwa hafteten, persönlich übernimmt.

§6.

Bis zum Ablaufe des Kalenderjahres 1927 regeln sich die rechtlichen Beziehungen zwischen beiden Teilen nach dem bisher herrschenden *modus vivendi*, auch wenn die hiernach bewirkten Leistungen nur unter Vorbehalt bewirkt oder angenommen worden sind.

Die nach V zahlbare Summe wird ihrem vollen Betrage nach ausbezahlt werden. Demgemäß werden:

- a) die Leistungen, welche der Volksstaat Hessen für die Zeit bis zum Ablaufe des Kalenderjahres 1927 bewirkt hat und noch zu bewirken hat, nicht angerechnet,
- b) noch nicht erfüllte Ansprüche des hessischen Staates an den vormals regierenden Großherzog aus der Zeit bis zum Ablaufe des Kalenderjahres 1927 nicht aufgerechnet; diese Ansprüche gelten vielmehr als erlassen.

§7.

The payment of this one-off capital sum in paragraph 1 serves to compensate the former ruling grand duke for the personal obligation he assumes to pay apanages and jointures for which the “Family Property of the Grand Ducal House” was liable.

§6.

Until the end of the 1927 calendar year, the legal relationship between the two parties is governed by the hitherto prevailing *modus vivendi*, even where the obligations it defined were only fulfilled or accepted with reservations.

The sum payable under §5 shall be paid in full. Accordingly,

- a) the obligations fulfilled by the People’s State of Hessen up to the end of the 1927 calendar year and which are still outstanding shall not be counted,
- b) claims of the Hessian state against the former reigning Grand Duke from the period prior to the end of the 1927 calendar year shall not be made but are deemed to have been waived.

§7.

Alle Zahlungen erfolgen an den vormals regierenden Großherzog oder an diejenigen Stellen, welche er bestimmt.

Zahlungen, die nach dem Ableben des vormals regierenden Großherzogs zu bewirken sind, erfolgen an den ältesten Sohn, soweit im Testamente des vormals regierenden Großherzogs nicht ein Anderes verfügt und dies dem hessischen Finanzminister unter Mitteilung einer amtlich beglaubigten Abschrift des Testamentes ausdrücklich zur Kenntnis gebracht ist.

§8.

Sämtliche Gegenstände, die gegenwärtig Bestandteile des Landestheaters sowie der öffentlichen Sammlungen des Landes, insbesondere des Landesmuseums und der Landesbibliothek, sind, werden als volles und unbeschränktes Eigentum des Volksstaates Hessen anerkannt. Diese Anerkennung wird auch insoweit ausgesprochen, als es sich dabei um Gegenstände handeln sollte, welche nicht zum „Familieneigentum des Großherzoglichen Hauses“ gehören, insbesondere um Gegenstände, welche früher etwa einem besonderen Fideikommiss oder einem Rechtsgebilde ähnlicher Art angehört haben oder privates Eigentum des vormals regierenden Großherzogs gewesen sein sollten.

§9.

Beide Parteien verpflichten sich, soweit dies im Einzelnen erforderlich sein sollte, alle Eintragungen in den öffentlichen Büchern herbeizuführen

All payments are to be made to the grand duke, or to any place which he specifies.

Outstanding payments on the death of the former ruling grand duke shall be made to his eldest son, unless the will of the former ruling grand duke states otherwise and the Finance Minister is so informed and provided with an officially notarised copy.

§8.

All items which currently form part of the state theatre or the public collections of the state, in particular the state museum and the state library, are recognised as the full and unlimited property of the People's State of Hessen. This recognition applies additionally to items which do not belong to the "Family Property of the Grand Ducal House", in particular items which previously belonged to a special entailed estate or a similar legal entity or which were the private property of the former ruling grand duke.

§9.

Both parties undertake to make the appropriate entries in public registers, so far as this is necessary in each case, and to complete all formalities for the

und allen Förmlichkeiten zu genügen, um die Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 sowie die gegenwärtige Übereinkunft zu erfüllen. Dies gilt namentlich, soweit es sich um die Überschreibung von Grundstücken oder von Rechten an Grundstücken außerhalb des Volksstaates Hessen handelt.

Das Großherzogliche Haus und seine Angehörigen, namentlich der vormals regierende Großherzog, werden insbesondere auch dazu mitwirken, daß solche zum Familieneigentum gehörenden Grundstücke oder Rechte, welche bisher grundbuchmäßig überhaupt noch nicht eingetragen waren, in den Grundbüchern auf den Volksstaat Hessen eingetragen werden.

Zur leichteren Durchführung dieser Bestimmung wird vereinbart:

Dem Volksstaat Hessen wird hierdurch unwiderrufliche Vollmacht erteilt,—die auch durch Ableben der Vollmachtgeber nicht erlischt,—an Stelle und im Namen des Großherzoglichen Hauses und seiner Angehörigen, namentlich das vormals regierenden Großherzogs, selbst alle Rechtshandlungen jeder Art vorzunehmen, deren es zur Erfüllung der zuvor wiedergegebenen Vereinbarungen bedarf. Der Volksstaat Hessen wird zu diesem Zwecke von den Beschränkungen aus § 181 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches ausdrücklich befreit. Er wird zugleich ermächtigt, die ihm erteilte Vollmacht auf Andere zu übertragen.

§10.

Die noch nicht endgültig entschiedenen Rechtsstreitigkeiten zwischen den

fulfilment of the agreement of 5 May 1919 and of the present convention. This particularly applies to the transfer of real estate, or rights to real estate, which lie outside the People's State of Hessen.

The Grand Ducal House and its members, in particular the former ruling grand duke shall assist in ensuring that land and rights which are part of the family property and have hitherto not been included in the land register, are entered in the land register to the People's State of Hessen.

To facilitate the implementation of this provision, it is agreed that:

The People's State of Hessen is hereby granted irrevocable power of attorney (which does not expire on the death of the principal) in place of and on behalf of the Grand Ducal House and its members, in particular the former ruling grand duke, to carry out legal acts of any kind which are necessary for the fulfilment of the above-mentioned agreements. The People's State of Hessen is expressly exempt from the restrictions under §181 of the Civil Code. The State is also authorised to transfer this power of attorney to other parties.

§10.

Outstanding legal disputes between the two parties are declared settled. Each

Beteiligten werden für erledigt erklärt. Jeder Teil trägt die ihm dabei erwachsenen Kosten. Noch nicht beglichene Gerichtskosten werden niedergeschlagen.

§11.

Alle Verhandlungen über die Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem vormals regierenden Großherzoge und seinem Hause einerseits, dem Volksstaate Hessen andererseits, sowie alle zur Durchführung dieser Übereinkunft erfolgenden Rechtsgänge sollen von allen auf hessischem Rechte beruhenden oder der Regelung durch hessisches Recht unterworfenen Steuern, Gebühren, Kosten und Abgaben befreit werden.

Aufwendungen dieser Art, welche durch hessisches Recht nicht geordnet werden können, werden von Volksstaate Hessen übernommen.

§12.

Die Goldmark im Sinne dieser Übereinkunft entspricht einem Preise von $\frac{1}{2790}$ Kilogramm Feingold. Sofern sich für das Kilogramm Feingold ein Preis von nicht mehr als 2.820 Reichsmark und nicht weniger als 2.760 Reichsmark ergibt, wird jedoch die Reichsmark der Goldmark gleich geachtet.

Beide Parteien sind darüber einig, daß durch rechtliche Mängel, welche Teilen der zwischen ihnen getroffenen Vereinbarungen etwa anhaften sollten, die Wirksamkeit der Vereinbarungen im Übrigen nicht berührt werden soll. Eine

party shall bear the costs they incur. Outstanding court costs shall be waived.

§11.

All negotiations relating to the dispute between the former ruling grand duke and his house on the one hand, and the People's State of Hessen on the other, as well as all legal transactions resulting from the implementation of this agreement, shall be exempt from all taxes, fees, costs and duties due under or regulated by Hessian law.

Expenses of this kind which cannot be classified under Hessian law shall be covered by the People's State of Hessen.

§12.

The Gold Mark described by this agreement shall correspond to the price of $\frac{1}{2790}$ kilogram of gold. For as long as the price of a kilogram of gold is no more than 2,820 Reich Marks and no less than 2,760 Reich Marks, the Reich Mark and the Gold Mark shall be considered equivalent.

Both parties agree that legal shortcomings which affect sections of the agreements between them shall not affect the effectiveness of the

Anwendbarkeit des § 139 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs wird also ausgeschlossen.

Allen Verfügungen, die vom vormals regierenden Großherzoge Ernst Ludwig durch diese Übereinkunft oder auf Grund dieser Übereinkunft zu Gunsten des Hessischen Staates getroffen werden, stimmen auch seine Söhne, die Herren Georg Donatus Wilhelm Nikolaus Eduard Heinrich Karl Prinz von Hessen und bei Rhein und Ludwig Hermann Alexander Chlodwig Prinz von Hessen und bei Rhein ausdrücklich zu.

Als wesentliche Bestandteile der gegenwärtigen Übereinkunft wurden mit dieser die Anlagen, nämlich

1. die Vereinbarung vom 5. Mai 1919 (Anlage A),
2. die als Anlage dazu gehörende Aufstellung über das Vermögen der Hofdiener-Witwenkasse (Anlage B),

den Erschienenen vorgelesen.

Ebenfalls als Bestandteil der gegenwärtigen Übereinkunft wurde der dort im zweiten Absatze der Bestimmung II erwähnte Plan den Erschienenen durch Offenlegung zur Kenntnis gebracht. Dieser Plan ist mit der gegenwärtigen Übereinkunft durch Schnur und Siegel verbunden.

Alle Blätter dieser Urkunde und ihrer Anlagen sind nur einseitig beschrieben.

agreement. §139 of the Civil Code shall thus not apply.

All provisions made by the former ruling grand duke Ernst Ludwig which benefit the Hessian state under or on the basis of this agreement are expressly approved by his sons, Georg Donatus Wilhelm Nikolaus Eduard Heinrich Karl Prinz von Hessen und bei Rhein and Ludwig Hermann Alexander Chlodwig Prinz von Hessen und bei Rhein.

The following appendices, in addition to the present convention, of which they form an integral part

1. the agreement of 5 May 1919 (appendix A),
2. the list of assets of the court widows fund (appendix B).

were read to those present.

As part of the present convention, the plan referred to under II(2) was laid before those present and brought to their attention. This plan was bound to the present convention by cord and seal.

The pages of this document and its appendices are typed on one side only.

Vorgelesen, genehmigt und unterschrieben

Read, approved, and signed by:

Ernst Ludwig,
former ruling Grand Duke of Hessen and by Rhine

Georg Donatus,
Prince of Hessen and by Rhine

Ludwig Hermann,
Prince of Hessen and by Rhine

Bernhard Adelung
Wilhelm Leuschner

Ferdinand Kirnberger
Adolf Korell

Bavaria (1923)

in: *Verh. bay. LT.*, I. Landtag, Beilage 3298, 07.02.1923, pp. 497-503.

Übereinkommen

Zwischen dem Bayerischen Staate und dem vormaligen Bayerischen Königshause wird über die vermögensrechtliche Auseinandersetzung folgender Vertrag geschlossen:

§1.

Zur Durchführung der vermögensrechtlichen Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Bayerischen Staat und dem vormaligen Königshause wird

1. durch Landesgesetz ein Fonds errichtet, der die Bezeichnung „Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds“ führt,
2. errichtet der Chef des vormaligen Königshauses eine Stiftung mit der Bezeichnung „Wittelsbacher Landesstiftung für Kunst und Wissenschaft“.

§2.

- I. Die Verwaltung des Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds wird von einem Verwaltungsrat geführt, dessen Mitglieder das vormalige Königshaus ernennt; die Staatsregierung entsendet zwei Staatskommissare in den Verwaltungsrat. Die Staatsregierung trifft die näheren Bestimmungen über die Einrichtung der Verwaltung des

Convention

The following contract is concluded between the Bavarian state and the former Bavarian royal house regarding the property law dispute:

§1.

In order to execute the property law agreement between the Bavarian state and the former royal house, there shall be established

1. by law, a fund entitled the “Wittelsbach Compensation Fund”,
2. by the head of the former royal family, a foundation entitled the “Wittelsbach State Foundation for the Arts and Sciences”.

§2.

- I. The administration of the Wittelsbach Compensation Fund shall be led by a board of directors appointed by the former royal house; the state government shall delegate two commissioners to the board of directors. The state government shall make more detailed provisions regarding the

Fonds und seine ungeschmälerte Erhaltung.

- II. Die Organisation der Verwaltung der Wittelsbacher Landesstiftung für Kunst und Wissenschaft wird der Staatsregierung überlassen.

§3.

- I. Vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen in § 4 A anerkennt das Haus das Eigentum des Staates an den Residenzen, Schlössern, Waldungen und sonstigen Grundstücken, die früher zum Hausfideikommiß gehörten, überträgt daher, soweit ihm noch Eigentum oder sonstige Rechte an diesen Sachen zustehen, diese auf den Staat und verzichtet seinerseits auf die Geltendmachung wie immer gearteter Rechte an diesen Sachen.
- II. Diese Erklärung bezieht sich insbesondere auch auf die Residenz mit Nebengebäuden, die Allerheiligenhofkirche, die Theatinerhofkirche, den Wittelsbacher Palast, den Hofgarten, den Englischen Garten, den Hofblumentreibgarten, die Hofbauschule und die Feldherrnhalle (sämtliche Besitzungen in München), das Nymphenburger Schloß mit Park und mit den darin befindlichen Burgen, das Krongut Blumenburg, die Schloßgebäude in Schleißheim und Lustheim mit Hofgarten, den Hofgarten zu Dachau, die Fasanerien zu Hartmannshofen, Moosach und Schleißheim, das Jagdschloß zu St.

establishment of the fund administration and its upkeep.

- II. The organisation of the administration of the Wittelsbach State Foundation for the Arts and Sciences is the responsibility of the state government.

§3.

- I. Subject to the provisions under §4(A), the royal house recognises state ownership over the residences, castles, forests, and other properties which previously formed part of the dynastic entailed estates and thereby transfers these to the state, to the extent that it retains ownership or rights to them, and waives the assertion of any kind of rights over them.
- II. This declaration applies specifically to the Residence and outbuildings, the All Saints' court chapel, the Theatiner court chapel, the Wittelsbach Palace, the Hofgarten, the English Garden, the royal flower garden, the royal arboretum, and the Field Marshals' Hall (all in Munich); the Nymphenburg Palace, including the park and castles lying therein, the Blumenburg crown estate, the castle buildings and royal gardens in Schleißheim and Lustheim, the royal garden in Dachau, the pheasantries in Hartmannshofen, Moosach and Schleißheim, the hunting lodge

Bartholomä, die Residenzschlösser zu Landshut, Ansbach, Bayreuth, Bamberg, Würzburg, Aschaffenburg, die Hofgärten mit Gebäuden zu Veitshöchheim, das Pompejanische Haus zu Aschaffenburg, die Hofgärten mit Gebäuden zu Schöenthal und Schönbusch, das Jagdschloß Rohrbrunn, die Königliche Villa in Regensburg mit Park und die Befreiungshalle bei Kelheim samt Park.

III. Das Haus anerkennt, soweit nicht in diesem Verträge—§§ 4 B und 7—etwas anderes bestimmt ist, unter Verzicht auf die Geltendmachung wie immer gearteter Rechte an diesen Sachen das Eigentum des Staates an der in Tit. III § 2 Ziff. 4, 5 und 7 der Verfassungsurkunde vom 26. Mai 1818 aufgeführten Mobiliarschaft, am *fundus instructus* der früheren Hoftheater einschließlich der beiden Louis XVI.-Mobiliare und der aus dem Besitze des Grafen Bassenheim angekauften Kostüme und an den Musikinstrumenten des Hoforchesters.

IV. Der derzeitige Chef des Hauses übereignet dem Staate das Mobiliar des Festsaalbaues der Münchener Residenz, darunter auch die im Thronsaal stehenden Ahnenbilder, den Thron und die Kandelaber, ferner die Einrichtung des Hofballsaales und der Schönheitgalerie, die Bilder in dieser Galerie und im Siegestsaal, die Einrichtung des Königsbaues und der Zimmer König Ludwigs II. in der Münchener Residenz, die

at St Bartholomä, the residences of Landshut, Ansbach, Bayreuth, Bamberg, Würzburg, and Aschaffenburg, the royal gardens (including buildings) at Veitshöchheim, the Pompeian House at Aschaffenburg, the royal gardens (including buildings) at Schöenthal and Schönbusch, the hunting lodge at Rohrbrunn, the royal villa and park in Regensburg, and the liberation hall and park in Kelheim.

III. Unless otherwise determined in this contract under §§4B and 7, the house recognises state ownership of, and renounces claims of any kind over, the furnishings, *fundus instructus*, of the former court theatre listed in Title III, §2(4, 5 and 7) of the Constitution of 26 May 1818, including the two Louis XVI pieces, the costumes purchased from Count Bassenheim, and the musical instruments of the court orchestra.

IV. The current head of the House transfers the furnishings of the Festsaalbau of the Munich Residence to the state, including the ancestral paintings, throne and candelabra in the throne room, as well as the furnishings of the court ballroom and the “beauties gallery,” paintings in this gallery and the victory hall, the furnishings of the Königsbau and the apartments of King

Einrichtung des Absteigequartiers
König Ludwigs II. auf der
Tausnitz ob Landshut und die
Einrichtung in der Nürnberger
Burg.

Ludwig II in the Munich
Residence, the furnishings of
Ludwig II's quarters on the
Tausnitz by Landshut, and the
furnishings of Nuremberg
Castle.

§4.

Dem Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds
werden überwiesen:

A. An unbeweglichen Sachen:

1. In Berchtesgaden das Schloß,
das Hofgartenanwesen, die
Königliche Villa, die Villa
Brandholzlehen, das Plätzen-
auer Anwesen, das Wild-
meisterhaus, je mit
Nebengebäuden und Grund-
stücken, der Aschauer
Weiher, das Anwesen Pl.-Nr.
6 (altes Rentamtsgebäude);
2. in Berg am Starnberger See
das Schloß mit Park und
Gedächtniskirche, das Stall-
gebäude, die Poschinger
Villa, das Schweiger Haus
und Grundstücke außerhalb
des Parks;
3. Bei Edenkoben das Schloß
Ludwigshöhe mit Haupt-,
Kavalier- und Stallbau, das
Gasthaus Rosengarten und
Grundstücke;
4. In Neuburg a. D. das Schloß;
5. Die sämtlichen Gebäude und
sonstigen Grundstücke der
ehemaligen Hofgestüte
Rohrenfeld und Bergstetten

§4.

The following are transferred to the
Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds:

B. Immovable assets

1. In Berchtesgaden: the
castle, the court garden
estate, the royal villa,
Brandholzlehen villa, the
Plätzenau estate, the
gamekeeper's house, each
with their outbuildings and
plots, the Aschau pond, the
property on plot no. 6 (the
former revenue office
building);
2. in Berg on Lake Starnberg:
the castle park and
memorial church, the stable
buildings, the Poschinger
villa, the Schweiger house
and plots outside the park;
3. by Edenkoben: Ludwigs-
höhe palace with the main
building, cavalier building
and stables, the inn
"Rosengarten" and their
plots;
4. in Neuburg a. D.: the castle;
5. all buildings and other plots
of the former royal farms at
Rohrenfeld and Berge-
stetten, including Grünau

mit Schloß Grünau und dem sogenannten Exerzierplatz;	Castle and the so-called parade ground;
6. Die sämtlichen Gebäude und Grundstücke des ehemaligen Remontedepots Fürstenfeldbruck und der Nebenbesitzungen Zellhof, Puch, Graßlfing und Roggenstein;	6. all buildings and plots of the former remount depot at Fürstenfeldbruck and secondary possessions at Zellhof, Puch, Graßlfing and Roggenstein;
7. Die Staatswaldungen des Forstamts Neuburg-Ost und der Staatswalddistrikt Wolfsbrunn, Forstamts Kaisheim;	7. the state forests under the Neuburg-East forestry office and the Wolfsbrunn district of the Kaisheim forestry office;
8. Die Staatswaldungen des Forstamts Stammham;	8. the state forests under the Stammham forestry office;
9. Die Staatswaldungen des Forstamts Münchsmünster westlich des so-genannten Grenzstraßls;	9. the state forests under the Münchsmünster forestry office west of the so-called <i>Grenzstraßl</i> ;
10. Der Hirschgarten bei Nymphenburg;	10. the deer park at Nymphenburg;
11. Das Anwesen Hs.-Nr. 19 am nördlichen Schloßbrondell mit dem Hofküchengarten in Nymphenburg;	11. the property (house number 10) at the northern tower of the castle in Nymphenburg, including the royal kitchen garden;
12. Die Arcohäuser in München.	12. the Arco houses in Munich.
Bezüglich der nach Ziff. 1 bis 5, 10 bis 12 zu überweisenden Grundstücke ist der Umfang des früheren zivillistischen Staatsbesitzes maßgebend, soweit er im November 1918 noch als solcher bestand.	Property to be transferred subject to items 1 to 5 and 10 to 12 shall be defined by the extent of the state's former civil list possessions, insofar as they existed as such in November 1918.
Mit dem in Ziff. 7 bis 9 bezeichneten Staatswald gehen die Forstdienstgebäude in Weichering, Stammham, Bettbrunn, Denkendorf, Zant, Münchsmünster, Umbertshausen und	Along with the state forests named in items 7 to 9, the Fund shall receive the forestry service buildings in Weichering, Stammham, Bettbrunn, Denkendorf, Zant, Münchsmünster,

Straßberg und die dazugehörigen, bisher von den Stelleninhabern benützten landwirtschaftlichen Grundstücke, nicht aber der verpachtete Teil des als „Köschinger Waldhaus“ bezeichneten Staatsbesitzes an den Fonds über. Ferner erhält der Fonds mit den landwirtschaftlichen, forstlichen und gewerblichen Betrieben deren Zubehör nebst lebendem und totem Inventar und den Vorräten.

B. An beweglichen Sachen:

1. Die Einrichtungsgebäude der unter A bezeichneten Gebäude, soweit sie nicht dritten Personen gehören; bezüglich der ehemals zivilistischen Schlösser gelten jedoch die besonderen Bestimmungen der Anlage 1;
2. die Bestände der Betriebe des früheren Oberhofmarschallamts und des früheren Oberstallmeisteramts mit Ausnahme eines dem Staate zuzuscheidenden, noch zu vereinbarenden Teiles, ferner die Büchereien des Oberstkämmereramts, des Oberstzeremonienmeisters, des Oberstallmeisteramts, des Oberhofmarschallamts und der Hofjagddirektion, soweit sie für staatliche Zwecke entbehrlich sind. Bezüglich der Silberbestände der Silberkammer gilt die Ausscheidung nach Anlage 2;
3. Familienbilder nach besonderer Vereinbarung;

Umberts-hausen and Straßberg and the agricultural plots which belong to them, hitherto used by the incumbents, with the exception of the leased part of the state property designated as the “Köschinger forest house”. In addition to the agricultural, forestry and commercial businesses, the Fund receives their accessories, their live and dead stock, and their inventories.

C. Moveable assets:

1. The furniture stores of buildings listed under A, unless they belong to third parties; castles formerly on the civil list will be subject to the special provisions of appendix 1;
2. holdings relating to the operations of the former court chamberlain and the former head stable keeper (with the exception of a share, still to be determined, to be allocated to the state), as well as the libraries of the office of the court treasury, the director of ceremonies, the office of the head stable keeper, the court chamberlain and the court's hunting administration, insofar as they are unnecessary for state purposes. The silver collection is divided as in appendix 2;
3. family portraits by special agreement;

4. die in Anlage 3 aufgeführten Gegenstände der Schatzkammer;
5. die Bestände der Reichen Kapelle mit der Bestimmung, daß sie stets mit den Beständen des Residenzmuseums vereinigt bleiben müssen;
6. die in der Anlage 4 aufgeführten Gegenstände aus dem Bayerischen Nationalmuseum;
7. achtzehn Doppelstücke der Porzellansammlung in der Residenz (Porzellankabinett);
8. zweiunddreißig Nachbildungen nach Originalen der Nymphenburger und Frankenthaler Porzellanmanufaktur (insbesondere des Porzellankabinetts und der Porzellansammlung des Nationalmuseums). Die Nachbildungen werden auf Kosten des Bayerischen Staates in der staatlichen Porzellanmanufaktur Nymphenburg hergestellt.

Den Mitgliedern des Hauses wird das Recht vorbehalten bis zum 31. Dezember 1924 aus ihrem Privatbesitze Gegenstände von historischer oder künstlerischer Bedeutung dem Fonds zu überweisen.

C. An Rechten:

4. items in the treasury listed in appendix 3;
5. the contents of the Rich Chapel with the stipulation they remain united in perpetuity with the holdings of the Residence museum;
6. items from the Bavarian State Museum listed in appendix 4;
7. eighteen double pieces from the Residence's porcelain collection (the porcelain cabinet);
8. thirty-two replicas of originals from the Nymphenburg and Frankenthal porcelain factories (in particular the porcelain cabinet and the porcelain collection of the state museum). The replicas shall be produced by the state porcelain factory at the expense of the Bavarian state.

Members of the House reserve the right to transfer items of historical or aesthetic value from their private collections to the Fund by 31 December 1924.

C. Rights:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Das Fischereirecht in der Ramsauer und in der Bischofswiesener Ache bei Berchtesgaden; 2. ein Wohnungsrecht in den Empirezimmern und in den darüber und darunter gelegenen Nebenräumen des Würzburger Residenzschlusses; 3. ein Wohnungsrecht im Nymphenburger Schlosse, und zwar werden zur Benutzung überwiesen der Mittelbau, die beiderseits zunächst gelegenen Pavillons, die Zwischenbauten, die für die Bewohnung dieser Bauten erforderlichen Wirtschafts- und Nebenräume im Knaben- und Kapellenbau und in einem der anstoßenden Schloßflügel, ferner der nördliche und südliche Kabinetts Garten und das sogenannte Bauerngärtchen, endlich eine Badegelegenheit in einem der Wasserläufe im Schloßpark; 4. das Recht, die Gruft der Theatinerkirche und der Michaelskirche in München zu benützen und nötigenfalls zu erweitern; 5. das Recht der Benützung des auf Pl.-Nr. 2 und 12 des Forstbezirkes St. Bartholomä befindlichen Blockhauses mit einem Umgriff von ungefähr einem Hektar; | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fishing rights in the Ramsau and Bischofswiesen rivers near Berchtesgaden; 2. the right to reside in the empire rooms of the residence palace in Würzburg and the adjoining rooms above and below; 3. the right to reside in the Nymphenburg Palace, specifically in the Mittelbau, the pavilions on either side, the buildings in between, the utility and side rooms in the Knabenbau, chapel building, and one of the adjoining wings of the castle necessary for residing in these buildings, as well as the north and south gardens and the so-called farmer's garden and a bathing area in one of the watercourses of the castle park; 4. the right to use, and, if necessary, expand, the crypts of the Theatiner church and St Michael's church in Munich; 5. the right to use the log cabin located in squares 1 and 12 of the St Bartholomä forestry district and the surrounding area of approximately one hectare; |
|---|---|

6. das Recht zum unentgeltlichen Wasserbezug für das Schloß Berchtesgaden aus der staatlichen Wasserleitung in dem früheren Ausmaß und insolange der Staat im Besitze der Wasserleitung ist.

D. An Kapitalien: Ein vom Staate zu zahlender Betrag von vierzig Millionen Mark.

Außerdem wird dem Fonds das zuletzt vom Staate verwaltene sogenannten Elemosinariatskapital einverleibt.

§5.

I. Die Nutzungen der in § 4 A bezeichneten Besitzungen einschließlich eines drei Fünftel-Anteils an den am 1. April 1922 noch nicht vereinnahmten Holzgeldern aus den Fällungen 1921/22 und die Lasten einschließlich der Bewirtschaftungskosten und der Bauunterhaltung gehen vom 1. April 1922 an auf den Fonds über.

II. Soweit die in dem Anwesen Pl.-Nr. 6 zu Berchtesgaden vorhandenen Räume für staatliche Zwecke benötigt sind, wird der Fonds dem Staate gegen Zahlung eines zu vereinbarenden Mietzinses die Benützung gestatten.

III. Der Fonds wird dem Staate zu Lasten des Schlosses in Neuburg a.D. eine beschränkte persönliche Dienstbarkeit des Inhaltes einräumen, daß der Staat berechtigt ist die vom Bayerischen

6. the right to a free water supply for Berchtesgaden Castle from the state water supply, at the level of previous use and for as long as the state controls the water supply.

D. Capital: A payment of forty million Marks to be made by the state.

The so-called Elemosinariat fund, until now administered by the state, shall also be incorporated into the Fund.

§5.

I. The use of possessions referred to in §4(A), including a three-fifths share of the timber money not yet received from fellings in 1921 and 1922 and the debts, including management costs and building maintenance, are transferred to the Fund from 1 April 1922.

II. Upon payment of a rent, to be agreed, the Fund will permit the state to use rooms in the premises on plot number 6 in Berchtesgaden when required for state purposes.

III. The Fund will grant the state a limited personal easement to the contents of the castle in Neuburg a.D., permitting the state to use the rooms currently occupied by the Bavarian State

Staatsarchiv zurzeit belegten und von ihm später etwa noch benötigten weiteren Räume des Schlosses in Zukunft für Zwecke dieses Archivs zu benützen, wogegen der Staat auf die Dauer dieser Benützung die gesamte Baulast an dem vorbehaltenen Gebäudeteil zu bestreiten hat.

- IV. Das Haus hat Kenntnis davon, daß für eine Reihe der zu überweisenden Grundstücke zurzeit Miet- und Pachtverträge bestehen; der Fonds tritt in diese Verträge als Verpächter ein.

§6.

- I. Hinsichtlich der nach § 4, C 2, 3 und 4 dem Fonds zu überlassenden Räume gilt vom Tage der Überweisung an folgendes:
- II. Bauunterhalt am Äußern der Gebäude: Bei Bauten mit monumentalen Charakter, bei Kunstbauten und Figuren trägt der Staat den gesamten Bauunterhalt; der jeweilige Nutznießer wird nach rechtzeitiger Benachrichtigung durch die zuständige staatliche Stelle die Vornahme aller erforderlichen Bauarbeiten gestatten. Gebäude und Bauteile ohne monumentalen Charakter unterhält der Nutznießer im Verhältnisse des Rauminhalts der von ihm benützten Räume zu den übrigen Räumen.
- III. Bauunterhalt im Innern der Gebäude: In den dem Fonds zugewiesenen Räumen mit

Archive and rooms in the castle necessary for the future operation of the archive. For the duration of this use, the state will meet all building obligations vis-à-vis the reserved section of the building.

- IV. The House is aware that rental and lease agreements are currently in place for a number of the properties due to be transferred; the Fund shall enter into these contracts as the lessor.

§6.

- I. The following applies from the day of remittance to those rooms due to be transferred to the Fund under §4(C)(2, 3, 4):
- II. Maintenance of building exteriors: the state covers the upkeep of buildings with monumental character, artificial structures and figures; the respective beneficiary will permit all necessary construction work to be carried out following timely notification from the responsible state agency. The beneficiary shall maintain buildings and components of non-monumental character proportional to the size of rooms he uses relative to those he does not.
- III. Maintenance of building interiors: the state shall bear the upkeep costs for rooms of

monumentalem Charakter, die in einer besonderen Vereinbarung einzeln bezeichnet werden, trägt der Staat die Baulast. In allen übrigen überwiesenen Räumen einschließlich der Gänge und Treppen hat der Nutznießer die Baulast, und zwar hat er den gesamten inneren Ausbau zu unterhalten.

- IV. Ferner hat der Nutznießer nach dem Umfange der Nutzung und ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob die benützten Gebäude oder Räume monumentalen Charakter haben oder nicht, alle zu seinem Gebrauche dienenden technischen Anlage zu unterhalten und nach dem Umfange der Nutzung die in einer besonderen Vereinbarung zu bestimmenden laufenden Kosten und Abgaben (wie Kaminkehrerlöhne, Wasserzins u.a.) zu bestreiten. Leitungen außerhalb der Gebäude unterhält der Staat.
- V. Der Nutznießer wird die ihm obliegenden Bauunterhaltungsarbeiten auf seine Kosten nur durch die zuständige staatliche Bauverwaltung ausführen lassen.
- VI. Etwaige auf die überwiesenen Räume treffende örtliche Abgaben trägt der Nutznießer.
- VII. Der Staat ist berechtigt die zur Nutznießung überwiesenen Stilträume in der Zeit, in der sie nicht bewohnt sind, der öffentlichen Besichtigung zugänglich zu machen.
- VIII. Die Kosten einer Erweiterung der Gruft der Theatinerkirche trägt der Fonds. Die Arbeiten werden

monumental character transferred to the Fund, which shall be individually listed in a special agreement. The beneficiary shall bear the upkeep costs for all other transferred rooms, including corridors and staircases, and the maintenance of the interior as a whole.

- IV. The beneficiary shall furthermore maintain all technical installations which he uses, in line with the extent of use and notwithstanding whether the buildings or rooms in question are monumental, and all running costs and expenditures, according to use, such as payments to chimney sweeps, water taxes, etc., to be stipulated in a special agreement. Supply lines outside of the buildings shall be maintained by the state.
- V. The beneficiary shall only carry out building maintenance work incumbent upon him through the responsible state building administration.
- VI. The beneficiary shall pay any local dues applicable to the transferred rooms.
- VII. The state is entitled to open to the public decorated rooms transferred to the beneficiaries during periods in which they are unoccupied.
- VIII. The Fund shall bear the costs of expanding the crypt of the Theatiner church. The work

von der zuständigen staatlichen Bauverwaltung ausgeführt.

§7.

- I. Der Chef des Hauses überweist der Wittelsbacher Landesstiftung für Kunst und Wissenschaft die aus dem Wittelsbacher Hausbesitz stammenden Beständen
 1. der familieneigenen Handschriftensammlung der ehemaligen Hofbibliothek,
 2. der kurbayerischen Galerie,
 3. der Düsseldorfer-, der Mannheimer- und der Zweibrückener-Galerie,
 4. der Schatzkammer,
 5. des Porzellankabinetts,
 6. des Nationalmuseums und der staatlichen Münzsammlung, soweit es sich um diesen Sammlungen anvertrauten Wittelsbachischen Hausbesitz handelt,
 7. der Handzeichnungen der ehemals kurpfälzischen Sammlung.
- II. Ausgenommen von der Übereignung an die Stiftung sind die nach § 4 B dem Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds überwiesenen Sachen.
- III. Die Rechtsverhältnisse dieser Stiftung werden nach Maßgabe des in der Anlage 5 enthaltenen

shall be carried about by the responsible state building administration.

§7.

- I. The head of the House transfers items belonging to the Wittelsbach dynastic holdings to the Wittelsbach State Foundation for the Arts and Sciences from
 1. the family-owned manuscript collection of the former court library,
 2. the electoral Bavarian gallery,
 3. the Düsseldorf, Mannheim and Zweibrücken galleries,
 4. the treasury,
 5. the porcelain collection,
 6. the national museum and the state coin collection, insofar as this involves collections entrusted to the ownership of the House of Wittelsbach,
 7. the drawings of the former Electoral Palatine collection.
- II. The items transferred to the Wittelsbach Compensation Fund under §4(B) are exempt from transfer to the Foundation.
- III. The legal status of this Foundation shall be regulated according to the draft deed included in appendix 5.

Entwurfes einer Stiftungs-
urkunde geregelt.

- IV. Der Bayerische Staat und der Chef des Hauses behalten sich vor bis zum 31. Dezember 1924 aus ihrem Besitze Gegenstände von historischer oder künstlerischer Bedeutung der Landesstiftung zu überweisen.

§8.

- I. Der derzeitige Chef des Hauses ist Eigentümer der Kunstsammlung des ehemaligen Hausfideikommisses König Ludwig I.; er überweist diese Sammlungen dem Wittelsbacher Ausgleichsfonds.
- II. Die Sammlungen umfassen
- a) den größten Teil der Bestände der Glyptothek,
 - b) die Vasensammlungen,
 - c) einen großen Teil des Antiquariums,
 - d) die Sammlungen Boisserée und Wallerstein,
 - e) die Sammlung „Hausgut ältere Meister“,
 - f) die Sammlung „Hausgut neuere Meister“,
 - g) die Sammlung plastischer Werke,
 - h) die Porzellangemäldesammlung,
 - i) einen Teil der Bestände des Museums für Völkerkunde.

- IV. The Bavarian State and the head of the House reserve the right to transfer items of historical or aesthetic importance to the Foundation before 31 December 1924.

§8.

- I. The incumbent head of the House is owner of the art collection of the former dynastic entailed estate of King Ludwig I; he shall transfer this collection to the Wittelsbach Compensation Fund.
- II. The collections comprise
- a) most of the contents of the Glyptothek,
 - b) the vase collection,
 - c) a large part of the antiquities collection,
 - d) the Boisserée and Wallerstein collections,
 - e) the collection of old masters,
 - f) the collection of new masters,
 - g) the collection of sculpted works,
 - h) the collection of china paintings,
 - i) part of the contents of the museum of ethnology.

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| <p>III. Die vorbezeichneten Sammlungen sind dauernd wie bisher dem öffentlichen Gebrauche zu überlassen; Änderungen irgendwelcher Art können daran nur mit Genehmigung der Staatsregierung vorgenommen werden.</p> <p>IV. Die museale Verwaltung — hierzu gehört insbesondere die pflegliche Behandlung und die Aufstellung — wird vom Staate ausgeübt, der den Sammlungen jene Sorgfalt ausgedeihen lassen wird, die er seinen eigenen öffentlichen Sammlungen zuwendet.</p> <p>V. Die Eintrittsgelder für den Besuch der Sammlungen die in Staatsgebäuden untergebracht sind (b bis i) verbleiben dem Staate.</p> <p>VI. Ferner überweist der Chef des Hauses dem Fonds die aus dem Nachlaß des Prinzregenten Luitpold stammenden, dem ehemaligen Hausgutfideikommisse einverleibten Gegenstände (Widmungsgegenstände und dergl.), das zum ehemaligen Hausgutfideikommis gehörige Kollier des Gräfin von St. Leu, eine aus den Bibliotheken des Königs Otto, des Prinzregenten Luitpold und des Königs Ludwig III. zusammengestellte Bibliothek mit den Originalpartituren zu den Werken Richard Wagners und die aus dem Nachlasse des Königs Otto stammenden Prunkwägen und Schlitten des Königs Ludwig II., die im Residenzmuseum aufgestellt werden.</p> | <p>III. The abovementioned collections are to be handed over for permanent public use, as has been the case until now; changes of any kind may only be undertaken with the permission of the state government.</p> <p>IV. The museum administration, in particular the careful handling and exhibition of pieces, shall be executed by the state, which shall ensure that the same diligence is paid as it dedicates to its own public collections.</p> <p>V. Entry fees for visits to collections held in state buildings (b to i) resolve to the state.</p> <p>VI. The head of the House shall transfer items inherited from the bequest of Prince Regent Luitpold and incorporated into the dynasty's former entailed estate (dedication items and so forth); the Countess of St Leu's necklace, part of the dynasty's former entailed estate; a library comprising of works from the libraries of King Otto, Prince Regent Luitpold and King Ludwig III, including the manuscript scores of works by Richard Wagner; and King Ludwig II's ornate carriages and sledges, bequeathed by King Otto and now displayed in the Residence museum.</p> |
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§9.

- I. Der derzeitige Chef des Hauses verpflichtet sich das Gebäude der Glyptothek samt dem dazugehörigen Grundbesitz am Königsplatz, an der Arcis- und Luisenstraße dem Bayerischen Staat unentgeltlich zu übereignen.
- II. Vom Tage der Übereinigung an übernimmt der Staat die Kosten der Verwaltung der in der Glyptothek befindlichen Sammlungen. Die Eintrittsgelder fließen von diesem Tage an der Staatskasse zu.

§10.

Der Staat zahlt an die Mitglieder des vormaligen Königshauses für deren in § 3 III erklärten Verzicht auf ihre Ansprüche an der dortselbst erwähnten Mobiliarschaft den Betrag von zwanzig Millionen Mark.

§11.

Hinsichtlich des Geheimen Hausarchivs wird folgendes vereinbart:

1. Die Bestände des Geheimen Hausarchivs bilden auch fernerhin eine besondere, in sich abgeschlossene Abteilung des Bayerischen Hauptstaatsarchivs;
2. das Geheime Hausarchiv verbleibt in der Verwaltung des Bayerischen Staates unter der Leitung des Generaldirektors der staatlichen Archive; es steht dem Haus auch künftighin zur Hinterlegung der Archivalien zur Verfügung;

§9.

- I. The incumbent head of the House undertakes to transfer the buildings of the Glyptothek and the associated plots on Königsplatz, Arcisstraße and Luisensstraße to the Bavarian state free of charge.
- II. The state will assume the cost of managing the collections of the Glyptothek from the day of the agreement. Entry fees will resolve to the state treasury from this day.

§10.

The state shall pay the members of the former royal house a sum of twenty million Marks for relinquishing their claims under §3(III) to the furniture therein mentioned.

§11.

The following is agreed concerning the privy house archive:

1. The contents of the privy house archive constitute a special and discrete section of the Bavarian Main State Archive.
2. The privy house archive remains under the administration of the Bavarian state led by the general director of the state archive; it shall remain available to the House for future deposits of archival documents;

3. unter Vorbehalt der nach Ziff. 4 vorgesehenen Bestandsveränderungen steht dem Fonds das Eigentumsrecht an dem Geheimen Hausarchiv zu;

4. soweit das Organisationsdekret vom 26. Juni 1799, die Einrichtung der Archive und Registraturen betreffend, und das nach Ministerialauftrag vom 29. August 1821 aufgestellte System der Archivalien-Verteilung noch nicht durchgeführt sind, sollen diese auch künftig als Richtschnur für die Zugehörigkeit zu den Beständen des Geheimen Hausarchivs dienen; insbesondere sollen

a) alle Urkunden und Akten, die noch systemwidrig im Hausarchiv lagern, an die zuständigen Staatsarchive,

b) alle Archivalien (Urkunden, Akten, Korrespondenzen und sonstigen Familienpapiere), die noch systemwidrig in staatlichen Archiven oder in anderen staatlichen Instituten verwahrt sind, an das Geheime Hausarchiv abgegeben werden.

Die Durchführung dieser Änderungen erfolgt im gegenseitigen Einvernehmen der Staatsregierung und des jeweiligen Chefs des Hauses;

5. die Benützung des Geheimen Hausarchivs steht der Staatsregierung für staatliche Zwecke und mit Genehmigung des Chefs

3. Subject to the proposed modifications to the inventory under item 4, the Fund is entitled to ownership rights over the privy house archive;

4. The organisation edict of 26 June 1799 relating to the establishment of archives and registries and the system for dividing up archival material provided by the ministerial order of 29 August 1821 shall continue to serve as guidelines regulating which items shall belong to the privy house archive, insofar as these have not yet been implemented; in particular

a) all documents and records which are stored, contrary to the system, in the house archive shall be given over to the responsible state archive;

b) All archival material (documents, records, correspondence and other family papers), which are still stored, contrary to the system, in state archives or other state institutions, shall be given over to the privy house archive.

These changes shall be implemented with the mutual approval of the state government and the incumbent head of the House;

5. The state government shall be permitted to use the privy house archive for state purposes at any time; members of the House

des Hauses den Hausmitglieder jederzeit frei.

Privaten Personen ist die Benützung des Archivs nur mit Zustimmung des Chefs des Hauses zu gestatten.

§12.

Der Staat räumt den Mitgliedern des Hauses eine Proszeniums-Balkonloge im Nationaltheater und eine Proszeniumsloge im I. Rang des Residenztheaters zur Benützung ein.

§13.

I. Bezüglich der Liegenschaften aus dem Besitze des Königs Otto wird folgendes Teilung vereinbart:

1. Der Fonds erhält vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen in Ziff. 2 die in Nachstehendem aufgeführten Besitzungen, nämlich
 - a) das Schloss Hohenschwangau mit Nebengebäuden, Anlagen und sonstigem Grundbesitz in Hohenschwangau,
 - b) den Grundbesitz in Feldafing und die Roseninsel,
 - c) die Maxburg bei Hambach mit den dazugehörigen Grundstücken,
 - d) Grundstücke in den Steuergemeinden Ettal,

may do so with permission of the head of the House.

Private persons may only use the archive with the permission of the head of the House.

§12.

The state grants members of the House a proscenium balcony box in the national theater and a proscenium box in the first tier of the residence theatre.

§13.

I. The following division is agreed concerning the properties from the bequest of King Otto;

1. Subject to the stipulations under item 2, the Fund receives the properties outlined below, namely
 - a) Hohenschwangau Castle, with secondary buildings, grounds and other property in Hohenschwangau,
 - b) the estate in Feldafing and the Roseninsel,
 - c) the Maxburg by Hambach and its associated grounds,
 - d) estates in the municipalities of Ettal,

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| | Eschenlohe und
Schweigen, | | Eschenlohe und
Schweigen, |
| e) | das Gärtnertheater in
München, | e) | the Gärtnertheater in
Munich, |
| f) | das Schloß Fürstenried
mit den dazugehörigen
Grundstücken; ferner | f) | Fürstenried Castle and
its associated grounds,
and |
| g) | ein Wohnungsrecht an
den Räumen im II. Stock
des Ost- und Südflügels
des alten Schlosses auf
Herrenwörth. | g) | a right to reside in the
second floor rooms of
the eastern and
southern wings of the
old castle on
Herrenwörth. |
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| 2. | Der Staat erhält den übrigen
zum ehemaligen Besitze des
Königs Otto gehörigen
Grundbesitz, insbesondere
die nachstehend verzeich-
neten Grundstücke: | 2. | The state receives all other
properties formerly
belonging to King Otto, in
particular the properties
listed below: |
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| a) | Das Schloß Linderhof
mit Nebengebäuden und
Park; den Linderwald
und die dem Park
benachbarten
Waldungen; ferner die in
nächster Nähe dieses
Besitzes gelegenen
Grundstücke Pl.-Nr.
779, 790, 800, 802, 813
bis 817, 820 bis 826, 45
1/3 bis 1/6
(Hundingshütte) und 58
1/3 (Lindergries) der
Steuergemeinde Ettal, | a) | Linderhof Palace with
secondary buildings
and park; the
Linderwald and the
woods adjacent to the
park; the properties
lying next to these
properties at plot
numbers 779, 790, 800,
802, 813 to 817, 820 to
826, 45 1/3 to 1/6
(Hundingshütte) and
58 1/3 (Lindergries) in
the municipality of
Ettal, |
| b) | die Insel Herrenwörth
samt allen darauf befind-
lichen Gebäuden, den
Besitz auf Frauenwörth,
in Gstadt, Aigelsbuch
und am südlichen
Chiemseeufer, | b) | Herrenwörth island
including all buildings
found thereon, the
property on Frauen-
wörth, in Gstadt,
Aigelsbuch and the
southern bank of Lake
Chiemsee, |

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| <p>c) das Schloß Neuschwanstein mit Wirtschaft und aus der Waldung Distrikt I den Bezirk I am neuen Schloß,</p> <p>d) die Maximiliansanlagen in München,</p> <p>e) die Jagdhäuser auf dem Schachen (samt Nebengebäuden), Püschling, Brunnenkopf, Tegelberg, Herzogenstand, auf der Regenalpe, am Priesberg, in Vorderriß und einigen kleinere Jagddienstgebäude und Diensthütten (am Linder, Grieben, usw.).</p> | <p>c) Neuschwanstein Castle including the inn and district 1 at the new palace from the forestry district 1,</p> <p>d) the Maximiliansanlagen in Munich,</p> <p>e) The hunting lodges at Schachen (including secondary buildings), Püschling, Brunnenkopf, Tegelberg, Herzogenstand, on the Regenalpe, at Priesberg, in Vorderriß and other smaller hunting stations and service huts (at Linder, Grieben, etc.).</p> |
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| <p>I. Vorstehende Erklärungen erstrecken sich auch auf die zur dauernden Einrichtung der Gebäude bestimmte Mobiliarschaft.</p> <p>II. Die Nutzungen und Lasten der in Abs. I Ziff. 1 a bis f aufgeführten Besitzungen gehen vom 1. April 1922 an auf den Fonds über.</p> <p>III. Wegen der Wendung der Baufälle und der Zahlung öffentlicher Abgaben für die Räume des II. Stockes des Ost- und Südflügels des alten Schlosses auf Herrenchiemsee finden die einschlägigen Bestimmungen unter §6 entsprechende Anwendung.</p> <p>IV. Der Staat übernimmt die Erhaltung der Straße, die von dem Thoma-Haus in Hohenschwangau nach Schloß Neuschwanstein führt.</p> | <p>I. The above declarations additionally apply to the items of furniture intended to permanently furnish the buildings.</p> <p>II. The use and costs of properties listed in (I)(1)(a to f) shall resolve to the Fund from 1 April 1922.</p> <p>III. Owing to the renovations and payment of public funds for the rooms on the second floor of the eastern and southern wings of the old castle on Herrenchiemsee, the relevant provisions under §6 apply accordingly.</p> <p>IV. The state assumes maintenance of the road which runs from the Thoma house in Hohenschwangau to Neuschwanstein Castle.</p> |
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- V. Der Staat wird die Königsschlösser in der gleichen Weise wie bisher der öffentlichen Besichtigung zugänglich erhalten und sie nicht für andere Zwecke verwenden.
- VI. Der spätere Austausch der dem Ausgleichsfonds zugewiesenen Waldungen in den Steuer-gemeinden Ettal, Eschenlohe und Schweigen gegen entsprechenden Staatswaldbesitz bleibt vorbehalten.

§14.

- I. Wegen der Übernahme von Staatsbeamten der Verwaltungen der nach § 4 A an den Ausgleichsfonds zu überweisenden Grundbesitzungen wird folgendes bestimmt:
1. Die Verwaltung des Fonds wird mindestens acht dieser Beamten dauernd in den Dienst übernehmen und ihnen alle Ansprüche, insbesondere auf Besoldung und Versorgung in gleichem Maße und in der gleichen Art gewähren, wie sie ihnen bei Verbleiben im Staatsdienste zugestanden wären.
 2. Werden Beamte in den Dienst der Verwaltung des Ausgleichsfonds beurlaubt, so trägt der Fonds auf die Dauer der Beurlaubung die vollen Dienstbezüge und, sofern die Beurlaubung länger als zwei Jahre dauert, den auf die Zeit der Beurlaubung verhältnismäßig

- V. As has hitherto been the case, the state shall open the royal castles to public visitors and not use them for any other purpose.
- VI. Future exchange is reserved of woods given over to the Compensation Fund in the municipalities of Ettal, Eschenlohe and Schweigen for corresponding woods in state ownership.

§14.

- I. The following is agreed concerning the assumption of civil servants working in the administration of properties to be transferred to the compensation fund under §4(A):
1. The administration of the Fund will take on a minimum of eight of these officials into permanent service and recognise all of their claims, including to salaries and support, to the same degree as they would have been due had they remained in state service.
 2. Should officials in the service of the Compensation Fund be granted leave, then the Fund shall bear the full costs for the duration of the leave of absence and, if the leave of absence lasts longer than two years, the proportionate share of the support

treffenden Anteil an den Versorgungsbezügen dieser Beamten und ihrer Hinterbliebenen. Beantragt die Verwaltung des Fonds die Zurücknahme der Beurlaubung vom Beamten, die noch nicht länger als zwei Jahre beurlaubt sind, so wird das Staatsministerium der Finanzen diesem Antrag innerhalb einer Frist von höchstens einem Jahre stattgeben.

3. Werden Beamten, die in den Dienst der Verwaltung des Ausgleichsfonds übergetreten sind, später wegen Dienstunfähigkeit oder nach Erreichung des fünfundsiechzigsten Lebensjahres in den Ruhestand versetzt, so trägt die Staatskasse die Versorgungsbezüge dieser Beamten und ihrer Hinterbliebenen insoweit, als diese Bezüge auch zustehen würden, wenn die Beamten im Staatsdienst verblieben wären, und zwar nur verhältnismäßig nach Maßgabe der Zeit der etatmäßigen Dienstleitung dieser Beamten beim Staate. Entsprechendes gilt, wenn der Beamte im Dienste der Verwaltung des Ausgleichsfonds stirbt. Ob die Voraussetzungen zur Versetzung in den Ruhestand wegen Dienstunfähigkeit gegeben sind, ist nach den Bestimmungen der Art. 47 und 48 BG. zu beurteilen.

payments for these officials and their dependents that was paid when the leave of absence was taken. Should the Fund request that an official's leave of absence be countermanded within two years, the Ministry of Finance will grant this request within a maximum period of one year.

3. Should officials who have entered the service of the administration of the Compensation Fund later retire due to an unfitness to work or after reaching the age of sixty-five, the state treasury will bear the pension costs of these officials and their dependents insofar as these payments would still be due had the official remained in state service and then only in proportion to the length of time these officials spent in the regular service of the state. The same regulations apply should an official die in the service of the administration of the Compensation Fund. The conditions for retirement owing to an unfitness to work shall be judged against the provisions provided under §§47 and 48 of the civil code.

II. Mit Rücksicht auf die nach §13 vorgenommene Teilung der Liegenschaften aus dem Besitze des Königs Otto von Bayern wird hinsichtlich der Übernahme der ehemaligen Beamten des Königs Otto folgendes bestimmt:

1. Der Staat übernimmt die Besoldung und die Ruhestands- und Hinterbliebenenversorgung der Beamten, die auf den in § 13 II a, b, c, d, e genannten Liegenschaften verwendet sind oder im Zeitpunkte ihres Ausscheidens aus dem Dienste oder ihres Ablebens verwendet waren. Insoweit für die Bezüge dieser Beamten oder ihrer Hinterbliebenen vom 1. Dezember 1918 an der von den Erben des Königs Otto gebildete Pensionsfonds aufgekommen ist, werden diese Bezüge dem Pensionsfonds vom Staat zurückerstattet.
2. Der Fonds übernimmt vom 1. April 1922 an die Besoldung und die Ruhestands- und Hinterbliebenenversorgung der Beamten, die auf den in § 13 I a, b, c, d, e, f genannten Liegenschaften verwendet sind oder im Zeitpunkt ihres Ausscheidens aus dem Dienste oder ihres Ablebens verwendet waren. Insoweit für die Bezüge dieser Beamten oder ihrer Hinterbliebenen in der Zeit vom 1. Dezember 1918 bis zum 31. März 1922 der in Ziff. 1 erwähnte Pensions-

II. With regard to the division of properties in the prior possession of King Otto of Bavaria under §13, the following is determined concerning the assumption of King Otto's former officials:

1. The state shall cover salaries, pensions, and survivor benefits for officials who are employed on the properties listed under §13(2)(a-e) or who were employed at the time of their death or their departure from the service. The state shall reimburse the pension fund established by the heirs of King Otto insofar as the above payments for these officials or their survivors were made by it after 1 December 1918.
2. From 1 April 1922, the Fund assumes the payment of salaries, pensions and survivor benefits for officials who are employed on properties listed under §13(1)(a-f) or who were employed at the time of their death or departure from the service. In cases where these payments to officials or their survivors were made by the pension fund referred to in item 1 between 1 December 1918 and 31 March 1922, the

fonds aufgekommen ist, werden diese Bezüge dem Pensionsfonds vom Staat zurückerstattet.

3. Der Staat wird die rechtliche Stellung und die Bezüge der in Ziff. 1 erwähnten Beamten und ihrer Hinterbliebenen nach den für Staatsbeamte und deren Hinterbliebene jeweils geltenden Vorschriften regeln.

Der Fonds wird die gleichen Vorschriften auf die in Ziff. 2 erwähnten Beamten und ihre Hinterbliebenen entsprechend anwenden.

4. Der Staat übernimmt mit Wirkung vom 1. April 1920 an nach Maßgabe der für Staatsbeamte und deren Hinterbliebene geltenden Vorschriften die Zahlung der Wartegelder, Ruhegehälter und Hinterbliebenenbezüge der vormaligen Beamten und Bediensteten des Hofmarschallamts und der Fondskasse des Königs Otto und ihrer Hinterbliebenen; insoweit diese Bezüge einschließlich der Teuerungsbeihilfen seit dem genannten Tage von dem Pensionsfonds bestritten worden sind, werden sie diesem vom Staate zurückvergütet.
5. Die den Staat nach Ziff. 1, 2 und 4 treffenden Ersatzleistungen an den Pensionsfonds werden um den Betrag der Vorschüsse gekürzt, die der Staat dem Pensionsfonds

pension fund will be reimbursed by the state.

3. The state shall regulate the legal status and payments of officials mentioned in item 1, and their survivors, according to rules which apply to state officials and their survivors.

The fund will accordingly apply the same rules to the officials mentioned in item 2 and to their survivors.

4. With effect from 1 April 1920, the state assumes the payment of waiting money, pensions, and survivor benefits to former officials and servants (and their survivors) of the former court chamberlain's office and treasury of King Otto, in accordance with the rules regulating state officials and their survivors; these payments, including cost-of-living allowances, shall be reimbursed by the state insofar as they were covered since the date named by the pension fund.
5. The compensation payments to be made to the pension fund by the state under items 1, 2 and 4 will be reduced by an amount equal to the advances which

für die Aufbesserung der Bezüge der Beamten und ihrer Hinterbliebenen bereits zur Verfügung gestellt hat.

the state has already made available to the pension fund for the improvement of payments to officials and their survivors.

§15.

- I. Die mit der Errichtung des Fonds und den notariellen Verlautbarungen verbundenen Kosten trägt der Staat.
- II. Sollten auf die Bestände des Fonds, die dem öffentlichen Gebrauche durch Ausstellung zu dienen bestimmt sind, jemals Vermögenssteuern gelegt werden, so trägt sie der Staat.

§15.

- I. The state will cover costs arising from the establishment of the Fund and the notorial statements.
- II. Should items which belong to the Fund and are earmarked for public show in exhibitions be subject to property tax, then this will be covered by the state.

§16.

Insoweit in diesem Vertrag über die Ausscheidung von beweglichen Gegenständen für den Staat und für den Fonds Vereinbarungen noch vorbehalten sind, werden diese bis zum 31. Dezember 1924 durch eine Kommission getroffen, die aus drei Vertretern der Staatsregierung, einem Vertreter des Fonds und zwei Vertretern des Hauses zu bestehen hat. In den Fällen, in denen sich die Kommission nicht einigen kann, ist eine Einigung zwischen der Staatsregierung und der Fondsverwaltung zu versuchen; kommt auch sie nicht zustande, so entscheidet das nach §18 einzusetzende Schiedsgericht.

§16.

Agreements reserved in this treaty for the division of movable assets between the state and the Fund will be concluded by 31 December 1924 by a commission consisting of three representatives of the government, one representative of the Fund and two representatives of the House. In cases in which the commission cannot agree, an attempt will be made to reach a settlement between the state government and the fund administration; should resolution still not be reached, then the arbitration tribunal appointed in accordance with §18 will make a final decision.

§17.

- I. Wenn Mitglieder des vormaligen Königshauses, die nach den vor

§17.

- I. Once there are no living members of the royal house who

dem 8. November 1918 maßgebenden Bestimmungen Anspruch auf Leistungen des Staates hätten, nicht mehr vorhanden sind, wird der Fonds aufgelöst und sein Vermögen fällt an den Bayerischen Staat.

- II. Für den Fall, daß der Fonds vor der in Abs. I vorgesehenen Auflösung ohne Zustimmung des Hauses durch eine staatliche Anordnung aufgehoben werden sollte, fällt das Eigentum an dem Vermögen des Fonds, insbesondere auch das Eigentum an den in §8 genannten Kunstsammlungen des ehemaligen Hausgutfideikommisses sowie an den dem Fonds übereigneten Liegenschaften aus dem Besitze des Königs Otto an die Mitglieder des Hauses, denen zur Zeit der Auflösung des Fonds dessen Erträge zufließen.

§18.

Über alle Streitigkeiten, die sich bei Vollzug dieses Vertrags ergeben, entscheidet ein Schiedsgericht, für das der Staat und der Chef des Hauses je ein Mitglied benennt. Der jeweilige Dekan der juristischen Fakultät der Universität München ernennt den Obmann des Schiedsgerichts. Für das Verfahren gelten die Bestimmungen der §§ 1025ff. der Reichszivilprozeßordnung.

§19.

- I. Beide Vertragsteile erklären sich durch vorstehenden Vertrag mit allen ihren gegenseitigen, aus

had claims to payments from the state under regulations in place before 8 November 1918, the Fund shall be dissolved and its property shall resolve to the Bavarian state.

- II. In the event that the Fund is dissolved by governmental order without the permission of the House and prior to the dissolution described in (I), then ownership of the property of the Fund, in particular ownership of the art collections of the dynasty's former entailed estate named in §8 and the properties transferred to the Fund from the bequest of King Otto, shall pass to the members of the House to whom payments were made at the moment of the Fund's dissolution.

§18.

All disagreements which arise from the implementation of this treaty shall be adjudicated by an arbitration tribunal for which the state and the head of the House each name one member. The incumbent dean of the law faculty of the University of Munich names the arbitrator. The proceedings are regulated by the provisions under §§1025ff. of the Reich's code of civil procedure.

§19.

- I. Both parties declare that all of their mutual property law claims, notwithstanding the legal titles

irgendwelchen Rechtstiteln stammenden weiteren vermögensrechtlichen Ansprüchen als abgefunden.

- II. Sollten seitens eines Agnaten oder sonstiger Hausmitglieder aus ihrer Hausmitgliedschaft oder aus Anwartschaften auf Apanagenbezüge abgeleitete Ansprüche in der Richtung gegen den Staat erhoben werden, so hat der Staat einen Regreßanspruch an den Fonds.

§20.

Der derzeitige Chef des Hauses handelt bei dem Abschlusse dieses Vertrags zugleich im Namen der sämtlichen in Bayern lebenden volljährigen Agnaten, von denen er für den Abschluß dieses Vertrags Vertretungsvollmacht erhalten hat.

§21.

- I. Dieses Übereinkommen wird für die Mitglieder des vormaligen Königshauses mit der Unterzeichnung verbindlich; die Rechtswirksamkeit tritt erst ein mit der Verkündung des Gesetzes über die vermögensrechtliche Auseinandersetzung des Bayerischen Staates mit dem vormaligen Bayerischen Königshause.
- II. Die Bindung der Mitglieder des vormaligen Königshauses an dieses Übereinkommen erlischt, wenn es nicht bis zum 30. Juni 1923 Rechtswirksamkeit erlangt.

on which they are based, are settled by the above treaty.

- II. Should claims be made against the state by an agnate or other member of the House, by right of their membership of the House or entitlement to apanage payments, then the state has a right of recourse to the Fund.

§20.

In concluding this treaty, the incumbent head of the House acts concurrently in the name of all agnates of legal age who reside in Bavaria, from whom he has received plenipotentiary authority so to do.

§21.

- I. Once signed, this agreement is binding for members of the former royal house; its legal authority comes into force following the promulgation of the law concerning the property law dispute between the Bavarian state and the former Bavarian royal house.
- II. Members of the former royal house shall be released from their obligations under this agreement if it is not passed into law by 30 June 1923.

München, den 24. Januar 1923

Munich, 24 January 1923

Der Staatsminister der Finanzen:

The State Minister of Finance

Wilhelm Krausneck

Für den Chef des Hauses laut
beigefteter Vollmacht:

For the head of the House under the
attached warrant:

Wilhelm Freiherr von Leonrod

Hermann Freiherr von Stengel

Württemberg (1918)

in: HStAS, E 130 b, Bü 67, Abschrift, 29.11.1918.

Anlässlich des bevorstehenden Thronverzichts des Königs Wilhelm II. wird nachstehendes Abkommen zwischen den Vertretern des Königs und dem württembergischen Staat getroffen:

§1.

Der König verzichtet für seine Person auf die Zivilliste. Der Staat wird die Lasten der Zivilliste, insbesondere nach Maßgabe der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen die Gehalte, Wohnungsgelder und Teuerungszulagen der Beamten der Zivilliste einschließlich der Oberhofbeamten und der Hofgeistlichen, soweit die angeführten Beamten nicht unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Gehaltsansprüche in den Staatsdienst überführt werden, oder mit ihnen eine Vereinbarung getroffen wird, ferner die Pensionen aller Beamten und der Angehörigen des Hoftheaters mit Ausnahme der Gnadenpensionen sowie die Gratualien und die Witwen- und Waisenpensionen übernehmen. Ebenso wird der Staat von den Beamten der Hofkammer nicht mehr als 3 höher geprüfte Beamte, nicht mehr als 4 Beamte mit mittlerer Dienstprüfung und 1-2 Schreibfräulein sowie einen Aufwärter übernehmen. Endlich wird der Staat für die laufenden Pachtgelder der vom Hofjagdamt gepachteten Jagden, soweit nicht eine volle Rückgängigmachung der schwebenden Verträge oder eine Neuverpachtung zu dem bisherigen Pachtgeld erreichbar wird,

In light of the impending abdication of King Wilhelm II, the following agreement is concluded between the representatives of the king and the Württembergian state:

§1.

The king relinquishes the civil list for his person. The state will take on the debts of the civil list, specifically: the salaries and accommodation and cost-of-living allowances of civil list officials, including the senior court officials and court chaplains, so far as these officials, in consideration of their salary claims, are not transferred to the civil service or subject to a further agreement; the pensions of all officials and members of the court theatre, with the exception of voluntarily granted pensions, gratuities, and pensions for widows and orphans. The state also undertakes to accept no more than three highly qualified officials, three middle-ranking officials, one or two typists, and a steward from the court. Finally, the state undertakes to pay existing lease payments for hunts leased by the court hunting office unless pending contracts are cancelled or new leases are made at the current rent.

mit dem sich ergebenden Fehlbetrag eintreten.

§2.

Der König verzichtet für seine Person auf die Nutznießung des Kronguts.

Der König erhält auf Lebenszeit vom Staat eine Rente von jährlich zweimalhunderttausend Mark, zahlbar vom 2. Januar 1919 ab in monatlichen Raten, ebenso erhält die Königin als Witwe auf Lebenszeit eine Rente von einhunderttausend Mark.

Außerdem wird dem König das Schloß Bebenhausen einschließlich des Prälatengartens, so wie es ihm bisher zur Verfügung stand und einschließlich des im Schloß befindlichen zum Krongut gehörigen Mobiliarteils auf Lebenszeit überlassen; desgleichen ein lebenslängliches noch näher zu bestimmendes Jagdrecht auf staatlichen Grund vorbehaltlich des Fortbestehens des gesetzlichen Jagdrechts.

Wenn der König vor der Königin stirbt, steht der Königin das Schloß Bebenhausen in gleicher Weise wie dem König jedoch ohne Jagdrecht auf Lebenszeit zur Verfügung.

Die große Perlenkette des Kronschmucks wird dem König zum Eigentum überlassen.

Endlich soll dem König, wenn er es wünscht, die Kapelle auf dem Württemberg mit dem dazu gehörigen Grundstück überlassen werden.

Nähere Bestimmungen zu Ziff. 1) und 2) bleiben vorbehalten.

§2.

The king relinquishes use of the crown endowment for his person.

The king receives an annual stipend from the state of two hundred thousand Marks for life, payable from 2 January 1919 in monthly instalments; as a widow, the queen will receive a pension of one hundred thousand Marks for life.

The king additionally receives: Bebenhausen Castle for life, including the Prelate's Garden, as it has hitherto been available to him, and items of furniture contained within the castle which belong to the crown estate; a lifelong hunting right on state property, to be later defined, subject to the continuation of hunting as a legal right.

Should the king predecease the queen, Bebenhausen Castle will be available to her for life under the same conditions as the king, but without the hunting rights.

The large pearl necklace belonging to the crown jewels is given over to the king.

Finally, should the king so desire, the chapel on the Württemberg will be left to him, complete with its associated plot of land.

Further conditions regulating items 1) and 2) are reserved.

§3.

Im Anschluß an Ziff. 1) und 2) übernimmt der Staat die Führung der bisherigen Hoftheater mit allem Personal und Material und allen Rechten und Verpflichtungen vom 1. Dezember 1918 an. Nähere Bestimmungen insbesondere über die Abrechnung zwischen Zivilliste und Staat bleiben vorbehalten.

§4.

Das Hofkammergut wird staatlicherseits als reines Privateigentum anerkannt.

Auf das Hofkammergut wird seitens des Königs nicht verzichtet, vielmehr werden von ihm alle Rechte an dem Hofkammergut, wie auch alle Rechte als Oberhaupt der Königlichen Familie aufrecht erhalten.

§5.

Hinsichtlich der außer den angeführten Vermögensmassen vorhandenen, der Hof- und hofkammerlichen Verwaltung dienenden Fonds (Pensionfonds, Baureparaturenfonds, Hofdienerunterstützungskasse und dergleichen) sowie hinsichtlich der Hofapotheke werden weitere Verhandlungen vorbehalten. Ebenso hinsichtlich einer etwaigen Beibehaltung der Schloßkirche.

§6.

Den Oberhofbeamten und allen Beamten und Angestellten der Zivilliste,

§3.

Subsequent to items 1) and 2), the state assumes management of the court theatre from 1 December 1918, including all personnel, stock, rights, and obligations. Further provisions, in particular those regarding the settlement between the civil list and the state, are reserved.

§4.

The Hofkammergut is recognised by the state as private property.

The king does not relinquish the Hofkammergut but retains all rights to it and all rights concomitant with his position as head of the royal house.

§5.

Further negotiations are reserved for funds not listed but which support the court and the court administration (pension funds, funds for the upkeep of buildings, courtier hardship funds, and the like) and the court pharmacy. The same applies for a possible retention of the castle chapel.

§6.

Senior court officials and all officials and employees of the civil list who

die eine Wohnung in Krongutsgebäuden inne haben, wird diese mindestens bis zum 1. April 1919 unentgeltlich belassen. Auch werden für die Aufbewahrung der bei der Auseinandersetzung der Vermögensmassen in den Krongutsgebäuden anfallenden Mobilien Räume vom Staat insolange zur Verfügung gestellt, als nicht ein anderer Aufbewahrungsort für sie beschafft werden kann. Der Weinkeller im Alten Schloß soll der Hofkammer bis 1. April 1919 zur Verfügung bleiben.

§7.

Die Abrechnung und Auflösung des Zivillistehaushalts soll spätestens bis zum 1. Januar 1919 erfolgen. Bis zum Tag des Abschlusses wird die Zivilliste vom Staat fortbezahlt.

Die näheren Bestimmungen hinsichtlich der Abrechnung bleiben vorbehalten. Für die Auseinandersetzung der Vermögensmassen sollen Kommissionen gebildet werden.

Stuttgart, den 29. November 1918.

Mit diesem Abkommen sind einverstanden:

Die Vertreter des Königs, mit Genehmigung des Königs:

occupy accommodation in buildings belonging to the crown estate will retain these rent-free until at least 1 April 1919. The state shall provide rooms for the storage of furniture affected by the division of the contents of crown estate buildings if no other storage location can be procured. The wine cellar in the *Altes Schloss* remains available to the court until 1 April 1919.

§7.

The settlement and dissolution of the civil list budget shall be completed by 1 January 1919 at the latest. Civil list payments shall continue until the day of completion.

More detailed provisions regarding the settlement are reserved. Commissions will be formed to deal with the division of assets.

Stuttgart, 29 November 1918.

This treaty is agreed to by:

The representatives of the king, with his permission:

**Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath
Friedrich Wilhelm von Gessler**

Die Mitglieder der provisorischen
Regierung:

The members of the provisional
government:

Wilhelm Bloss
Berthold Heymann
Hugo Lindemann
Julius Baumann
Theodor Liesching
Arthur Crispian
Ulrich Fischer
Johann Baptist Kiene

Württemberg (1927)

in: *Verh. LT. Württ.*, II. Landtag, Beilage 489, 11.06.1927, pp. 93-95.

Vertrag über die Vermögensauseinandersetzung zwischen dem Württembergischen Staat und dem vormals landesherrlichen Haus Württemberg.

Treaty concerning the property dispute between the Württembergian state and the former sovereign House of Württemberg.

Der Württembergische Staat, vertreten durch die Bevollmächtigten des Staatsministeriums Staatsrat Dr. Leopold Hegelmaier und Ministerialrat Wilhelm Föll, und das Haus Württemberg und seine einzelnen Mitglieder, sämtlich vertreten durch den Generalbevollmächtigten Alfred Schenk Grafen von Stauffenberg, Vorstand der Herzöglichen Rentkammer in Stuttgart, schließen zum Zweck der Vermögensauseinandersetzung folgenden Vertrag:

The Württembergian state, represented by the commissioners of the government, state counsellor Dr Leopold Hegelmaier and under-secretary Wilhelm Föll, and the House of Württemberg and its individual members, represented collectively by the plenipotentiary Alfred Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, chairman of the Ducal Treasury, conclude the following agreement relating to the property dispute:

§1.

Das Haus Württemberg verzichtet auf jede weitere Geltendmachung von Ansprüchen auf Entschädigung für Wegfall der Zivilliste, der Kron-dotationsnutzung und der hausgesetzlichen Leistungen.

§1.

The House of Württemberg relinquishes the right to assert any further claims to compensation for the loss of the civil list, the use of the crown endowment, and payments under the house law.

§2.

Als Abfindung für die nachfolgenden Ansprüche des Hauses Württemberg

auf Herausgabe der durch Reskript König Wilhelms I. vom 17. Februar 1817 vorläufig mit den Staatssammlung vereinigten „Kunstkammer“ und der

§2.

As compensation for the House of Württemberg's claims to:

the return of the “Kunstkammer,” temporarily amalgamated with the state collections through the edict of King Wilhelm I of 17 February 1817, and

sonstigen durch dasselbe Reskript oder sonstwie vom Haus Württemberg an staatliche Sammlungen namentlich an das Münzkabinett und die Naturaliensammlung überlassenen und noch Teile der Sammlungen bildenden Gegenstände,

auf Entschädigung für die bei Errichtung der Krondotation im Krondotationsedikt vom 20. Februar 1819 von König Wilhelm I. dem Krongut unentgeltlich überlassenen beweglichen Gegenstände und für die später von den Königen Wilhelm I., Karl und Wilhelm II. oder von anderen Mitgliedern des Königlichen Hauses aus ihrem Privatvermögen dem Krongut unentgeltlich überlassenen beweglichen und unbeweglichen Gegenstände

verpflichtet sich der Staat zu folgenden Leistungen an das Haus Württemberg:

Der Staat bezahlt aus dem Ertrag des vormals zum Krongut gehörigen, von König Wilhelm I. in den Jahren 1855-1860 erbauten Königsbaus am Schloßplatz in Stuttgart vom 1. April 1927 ab eine jährliche, in monatlichen gleichen Teilbeträgen voraus zahlbare Rente von 123.500 RM.

Der Staat überläßt dem Haus Württemberg zu freiem Eigentum die in Anl. 1 verzeichneten, vormals zum Krongut gehörigen Kronjuwelen, Gegenstände in Silber und Vermeil, Weißzeugstücke und Gobelins.

Die nach dem 9. November 1918 dem Haus Württemberg aus dem vormaligen Krongut vorläufig überlassenen beweglichen Gegenstände (Hausrat verschiedener Art, Silber u.a.) verbleiben dem Haus Württemberg zu freiem Eigentum.

other objects transferred by this edict, or otherwise, from the House of Württemberg to state collections, namely the coin collection and the natural history collection, or any part of these collections,

compensation for the movable assets transferred without cost to the crown estate through the establishment of the crown endowment by the edict of King Wilhelm I of 20 February 1819 and other movable and immovable assets later transferred for free by kings Wilhelm I, Karl, and Wilhelm II, or by other members of the royal house, from their private property to the crown estate

the state assumes the following obligations to the House of Württemberg:

From the earnings of the Königsbau in the Schloßplatz in Stuttgart, built by King Wilhelm I between 1855 and 1860 and formerly part of the crown estate, the state shall pay a yearly stipend of 123,500 RM in equal and advanced monthly instalments from 1 April 1927.

The state transfers the crown jewels, silver and vermeil items, linens, and tapestries listed in appendix 1, which formerly belonged to the crown estate, as free property to the House of Württemberg.

The movable assets temporarily transferred to the House of Württemberg after 9 November 1918 (furniture of various kinds, silver, etc.) shall remain the free property of the House of Württemberg.

§3.

Die in §2 unter Ziff. 1 genannte jährliche Rente ist im vollen Betrag zu bezahlen, auch wenn der Ertrag des Königsbaus in einzelnen Jahren hiezu nicht ausreichen sollte.

Die Staatsregierung ist berechtigt, die Rente des Abs. 1 jederzeit nach vorangegangener vierteljährliche Kündigung ganz oder teilweise mit dem 20fachen Betrag von insgesamt 2.470.000 RM abzulösen. Doch ist die gesamte Ablösung bis spätestens 1. April 1937 zu bewirken. Teilweise Ablösung darf nur in Beträgen von mindestens 100.000 RM erfolgen. Mit jeder teilweisen Ablösung verringert sich die Rente um 5. v. H. des bezahlten Betrags.

§4.

Die in §2 unter a genannten Gegenstände gehen in das freie Eigentum des Staates über. Dem Staat verbleibt das freie Eigentum an sämtlichen beweglichen und unbeweglichen Gegenständen des vor-maligen Kronguts, die nicht in §2 unter Ziff. 2 und 3 genannt wird.

§5.

Die in §2 unter Ziff. 2 genannten Gobelins dürfen ohne Zustimmung des Kult-ministeriums weder außer Landes gebracht noch veräußert werden.

§6.

Der Staat überläßt dem Haus Württemberg die 1887 von König Wilhelm II. aus Vermächtnis der Prinzessin Marie von Württemberg, Gräfin Neipperg, ererbten, später dem

§3.

The annual stipend provided under §2(1) shall be paid out in full even when the earnings of the Königsbau in a given year are insufficient.

The state government is entitled at any time, following notice of one quarter, to pay out the stipend provided under (1) either completely or in part with the twenty-fold sum of 2,470,000 RM. This pay out shall occur in full by 1 April 1937 at the latest. Partial pay outs shall involve sums of 100,000 RM minimum. With each partial pay out, the stipend shall decrease by five percent of the sum paid out.

§4.

The objects listed under §2(a) are transferred to the free ownership of the state. The state retains free ownership over all movable and immovable assets of the former crown estate not mentioned under §2(2, 3).

§5.

The tapestries listed under §2(2) may not be removed from the state nor sold without the permission of the ministry of education and culture.

§6.

The state transfers to the House of Württemberg the jewellery and other items inherited in 1887 by King Wilhelm II from the bequest of Princess Marie of Württemberg,

Krongut einverleibten Schmuck- und sonstigen Gegenstände (Anl. 2).

§7.

Der zurzeit vom Haus Württemberg benützte Keller unter dem Alten Schloß in Stuttgart wird dem Hause auf 10 Jahren vom Inkrafttreten dieses Vertrags ab nach den Bestimmungen in Anl. 3 unentgeltlich überlassen.

§8.

Die Weiterbenützung der Grüfte unter dem Schloß in Ludwigsburg und unter dem Alten Schloß in Stuttgart und das Verfügungsrecht über die dort befindlichen Särge von Mitgliedern des Hauses Württembergs bleibt dem Haus vorbehalten.

§9.

Die Vereinbarung zwischen der Staatsregierung und dem Haus Württemberg über das Eigentumsrecht des Hauses an den Familiendokumenten und Überlassung derselben an das Staatsarchiv vom 24. August 1920 (Anl. 4) bleibt aufrecht erhalten.

§10.

Auf Lebenszeit der Herzogin Charlotte zu Württemberg bezahlt der Staat aus dem Ertrag des in §2 unter Ziff. 1 genannten Königsbaus vom 1. April 1926 ab eine jährliche, in monatliche Teilbeträgen voraus zahlbare Rente von 70 000 RM. Darin ist die im Staatshaushaltsplan für

Countess Neipperg, and later incorporated into the crown estate (appendix 2).

§7.

The cellar of the Altes Schloß in Stuttgart, currently used by the House of Württemberg, shall be transferred to the House, subject to the stipulations in appendix 3, without fee for a period of 10 years beginning with the commencement of this treaty.

§8.

The House of Württemberg reserves the right to future use of the crypts beneath the castle in Ludwigsburg and the Altes Schloß in Stuttgart and to the right of disposition over the coffins of members of the House therein found.

§9.

The agreement of 24 August 1920 between the state government and the House of Württemberg over the House's property rights to family documents, and their transfer to the state archive, remains in force (appendix 4).

§10.

For the lifetime of Duchess Charlotte of Württemberg, the state shall pay a yearly stipend, in advanced monthly instalments from 1 April 1926, of 70,000 RM taken from the earnings of the Königsbau referred to under §2(1). This shall include the stipend of 36,000

1926 und 1927 in Kap. 76 Titel 6 vorgesehene Rente von 36 000 RM inbegriffen; die schon bezahlten Beträge werden auf die Rente eingerechnet.

Die Rente des Abs. 1 ist im vollen Betrag zu bezahlen, auch wenn der Ertrag des Königsbaus in einzelnen Jahren hiezu nicht ausreichen sollte.

§11.

Das Abkommen der Württembergischen Regierung mit König Wilhelm II. vom 29. November 1918 (Anl. 5) bleibt unberührt, soweit dieser Vertrag nichts anderes bestimmt.

§12.

Weitere vermögensrechtliche Ansprüche, die in diesem Vertrag nicht genannt sind, werden das Haus Württemberg und seine einzelnen Mitglieder gegen den Staat nicht erheben. Ebenso wird der Staat in dieser Auseinandersetzungssache keine weiteren vermögensrechtlichen Ansprüche gegen das Haus Württemberg und seine einzelnen Mitglieder erheben.

§13.

Wenn bei Ausführung dieses Vertrags Streit entstehen und die Erledigung auf dem Wege des Übereinkommens nicht möglich sein sollte, entscheidet ein Schiedsgericht endgültig unter Ausschluß des Rechtswegs. Das Schiedsgericht besteht aus drei Mitgliedern, von denen der Staat und das Haus Württemberg je eines ernennen. Diese beiden Mitglieder wählen den Obmann; kommt eine Einigung unter ihnen nicht zustanden,

RM scheduled in the state budgets for 1926 and 1927 under chapter 76 title 6; the sums already paid shall be included in the calculation of the stipend.

The stipend provided under (1) shall be paid in full even when the earnings of the Königsbau in a given year are insufficient.

§11.

The agreement between the Württembergian government and King Wilhelm II of 29 November 1918 (appendix 5) remains unaffected, insofar as this treaty does not determine otherwise.

§12.

The House of Württemberg and its individual members shall not raise further property law claims against the state which are not mentioned in this treaty. Equally, the state shall not make any further property law claims in the property dispute against the House of Württemberg or its individual members.

§13.

Should conflict arise during the implementation of this treaty and resolution through an agreement not be possible, the final decision shall be made by an arbitration tribunal under exclusion of legal proceedings. The arbitration tribunal shall consist of three members, of whom the state and the House of Württemberg each names one. These two members shall elect the arbitrator; should they be unable to

wird der Obmann durch den Präsidenten
des Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart ernannt.

reach an agreement, the arbitrator shall
be appointed by the President of the
state appeals court in Stuttgart.

§14.

Dieser Vertrag tritt am 1. Juli 1927 in
Kraft. Mit der Ausführung wird vom
Württembergischen Staatsministerium die
Bauabteilung des Finanzministeriums,
vom Haus Württemberg die Herzogliche
Rentkammer in Stuttgart beauftragt.

§14.

This treaty comes into force on 1 July
1927. Its implementation is delegated
by the Württembergian government to
the buildings department of the finance
ministry and by the House of
Württemberg to the ducal treasury in
Stuttgart.

§15.

Der Staat behält die Zustimmung des
Landtags vor.

§15.

The state reserves the approval of the
legislature.

Doppelt ausgefertigt, Stuttgart, den 1. Juni
1927.

Completed in duplicate, Stuttgart, 1
June 1927

Für den Württemb. Staat:

For the Württembergian state:

Leopold Hegelmaier

Wilhelm Föll

Für das Haus Württemberg und seine
Mitglieder:

For the House of Württemberg and its
members:

Alfred Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg