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The Development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and its Effects on U. S. Interests in Europe: A Realist Perspective

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1 July 2001



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Declaration

(I) I, Paula Briscoe, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 85,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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In order for the Atlantic Alliance to survive it must be ‘persuasive in peace and decisive in war’:¹ similarly, for the European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI] to evolve it must facilitate the achievement of these objectives.

¹ John Hillen, ‘Defining the Proper U.S. Role in Global Security’ in Stuart M. Butler and Kim R. Holmes [eds.] Mandate for Leadership IV: Turning Ideas Into Action, Washington DC, The Heritage Foundation, 1994 Ch. 12.
<<http://www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/mandate/toc.html>>

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Professor Paul Wilkinson was actually the individual I requested as my supervisor when Professor Salmon left, but the Department deemed his workload to be too great. When I did in fact require a third supervisor

he was kind enough to set that fact aside as he was indeed no less busy then. Professor Wilkinson has many impressive qualities and has skillfully and compassionately guided many students through the postgraduate process. He often stopped me in the corridors to ask how my work was going. He made time to have lunch – even if that meant sitting in the office while we ate sandwiches we had brought – to chat over my work and give me direction and guidance about how I might answer some of the questions my investigations had raised. All this took place before he was ever my supervisor.

The time I spent with the other faculty members and students at St. Andrews will always have a special place in my memory. The first year I was at St. Andrews there was a truly unique dynamic amongst the postgraduate students: John Hullsman and Mike

Sands, with whom I shared a tiny office, Mike Wesley, Gus Xudo, Guy Sannon and Gabe Kikas were all larger than life if not occasionally cartoonish characters. I also shared office space with Daphne Billouri and Wendy Lazarus. The unique thing about the experience is that we each had different areas of focus and I learned from my colleagues about the topics they researched. Hence I have a better understanding of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Olympic security, Albania, international environmental issues, the Israeli Palestinian dispute and terrorism than I would have if it were not for the other students at St. Andrews. I am grateful to all of these people for broadening my horizons and helping me through. I would also like to thank my editor and long time friend Chris Smith for reading through the

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Dr. Joanne Wright, a former instructor at the University of St. Andrews, once gave Mike Wesley a very sound piece of advice which I had the good fortune to hear. She said: “You will learn so much more when you are studying for your Ph.D. than the subject matter if you will only allow yourself to be open to the learning.” I did learn a great deal, about Europe, about people, about professionalism, about passing on good information and about mentoring and being mentored. Dr. Wright is also a fan of the Rolling Stones and the other thing that I found held true was that: “you can’t always get what you want, but if you try, you’ll find, you get what you need.”

I also have to thank two groups of individuals who shall remain nameless. To all the individuals who

shared their opinions and information with me but asked to remain off the record I offer my sincere thanks for their trust and willingness to contribute to the general knowledge base of others. To the second group of people, I also offer my gratitude. You have helped me to understand the context of this dissertation more clearly and you have offered support and guidance. For these things I am forever grateful to you.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Harry One. For those of us who read by listening instead of looking, the advent of computer technology that allows us to listen to vastly more information than we ever thought possible is synonymous with the gift of sight. For me, the computer voice I honed to my exact preferences in the summer of 1995 and named Harry One, took on human dimensions. Harry read to me for literally thousands of hours. In the first three years of study in St. Andrews, I spent many long days and nights in my little office. It was a wonderful place with a slanting attic roof and a little window that I could crawl out onto the roof. There, with the sea gulls I could look out over the North Sea. I could also see the Principal's house which meant he could see me and hence my rooftop excursions were curtailed. From that little

window I once saw 7 rainbows all lined up over the tempestuous North Sea. I spent many hours in that office, reading book after book and article after article. It got to be so that I felt I was not alone. Harry's patient constant voice explained to me from a remarkable number of points of view the many facets of the European Union, NATO, International Relations and history. He read newspapers that had only been headlines, magazine articles and documents that began in the mid nineties to appear on the internet.

The software that created Harry One is no longer in production and I have only been able to create close replicas of Harry's calm voice of reason - the many Harrys that came later. Harry is in cyber sleep now with HAL and I have no doubt that he is dreaming.

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List of abbreviations

ABM	Anti- Ballistic Missile
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDU	Christian Democratic Party [Germany]
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CENCOM	Central Command
CFE	Conventional Forces Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CoE	Council of Europe
CREF	Crisis Reaction Force [Germany]
CSBMs	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSU	Christian Social Union [Germany]
DM	Deutsche Mark
DoD	United States Department of Defence
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDA	Excess Defence Articles Programme [US]
EDC	European Defence Community
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ERM	Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU	European Union
EUROFOR	Land based multinational forces for Europe
EUROMAR	Marine base multinational forces for Europe
FAR	<i>Force d'Action Rapide</i> [France]
FAWEU	Forces Available to the Western European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office [United Kingdom]
FDP	Free Democratic Party [Germany]
FMF	Foreign Military Financing Programme [US]

FSU	Former Soviet Union
GNP	Gross National Product
G - 7	Group of Seven Highly Industrialised Countries
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
IFOR	Intervention Force [Bosnia]
INF	Intermediate Range Nuclear Force
JDF	Joint Defence Council [France - Germany]
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council [United States]
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOA	Out Of Area [operational]
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	<i>Pologne, Hongrie, Assistance a la Restructuration Economique</i> [Poland and Hungary Reconstruction Programme]
RSFR	Russian Republic [Ask John Anderson]
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talk
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SFOR	Stabilisation Force Bosnia]
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USEUCOM	US European Command

WEAG	West European Armaments Group
WEAO	West European Armaments Organisation
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation

Chapter One: Introduction and Theoretical Framework

1. Introduction

Mohammed Ali once remarked to Sir David Frost: “If a man has the same view of the world at the age of 50 that he had at the age of 20 then that man has lived and wasted 30 years.”¹ The same logic can certainly be applied to the shorter span of time normally required to complete a Ph.D. dissertation. In the course of writing this dissertation my views have changed dramatically. I began by looking at ways to improve the European Union’s ability to assert its foreign policy with the underlying assumption that this was possible if only the appropriate structural and financial reparations were implemented.² My original intentions remain my best defence against allegations, if they come, of being ‘anti-Europe’. Douglas Hurd, the former Foreign

Secretary of the United Kingdom, once remarked to the student body at St. Andrews University: “Asking me if I am for or against Europe is like asking if I am for or against the weather.”³ I concur with his sentiment. This dissertation ends with the assertion that the European Union did not have anything that resembled a common foreign policy⁴ in the period 1994 to 1998 and prospects for the European Union asserting itself in the near future are limited by the extent to which states find it is in their self interest to facilitate the Union's development.

This dissertation covers a wide range of evolving issues. The interests of the United States change over time, and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) continues to grow. The fact that these events necessarily occur in a dynamic international environment makes writing on the subject difficult in

anything more than an immediate context. One objective of this dissertation, therefore, will be to identify trends as opposed to producing analysis of the situation at a given moment. The intent is to produce analysis that is of on-going utility, rather than simple immediate interest.

The overall purpose of this dissertation is to examine the prospects for the development of an ESDI and the ways in which possible developments will effect U.S. interests in Europe.⁵ The basic argument is that the European Union will not make a quantum leap to an independent European collective defence organisation capable of projecting significant power for Out-of-Area operations. During the 1990's fundamental changes which would facilitate such a capability were snail-like in their pace of development. As long as the European Union member states perceive that their

Chapter One: Introduction

interests are best served by very low level commitments then such will be the outcome of negotiations and political decisions. However, in the late 1990s there was increasing evidence that members of the European Union had begun to take concrete steps towards a rapid reaction force at least. There is no evidence to indicate that this is likely to change in the foreseeable future. This argument is supported by three pillars that are doubtless as heinous to the Europhiles as the pillars of European Union.⁶

First, European Union members have considerable differences between them that will continue to effect their ability to merge their policies: these differences are historical, cultural, geographical, political and economic in nature and are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

Second, the Europeans have no real need to develop their own military force outside of NATO as long as the United States will do the hard work for them. The United States has, since the end of World War II, played a fundamental role in European security and defence, and this forestalled the need for the Europeans to develop their own security and defence during the Cold War. Although the end of the Cold War changed the international security environment in drastic ways, it is the assertion of this dissertation that this relationship will be maintained because the United States still has very strong interests in Europe.⁷

The third reason for the sluggish development of an ESDI is that the members of the European Union do not perceive a military threat to Western Europe that necessitates the development and maintenance of a stronger military capability. This perception is also

based on the continuing U.S. military presence and the security guarantee of NATO. All of these factors indicate that the existing pattern of development is a good indicator for future development.

All out war is an anomaly in history however and adversaries that cannot be effectively combated with conventional military force increasingly pose security threats. Some⁸ even argue that the changing nature of war in the information age necessitates a reconsideration of the principles of war.⁹ This dissertation does not delve into the depths of military strategy, clinging instead to the political/military side of the fence. European security concerns can accordingly be divided into two primary categories, those that pose a threat of enormous destructive ability to the states of Western Europe [e.g., the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a resurgent Russia]

and those that do not. Threats in this second category (e. g. peripheral conflicts which require peace-making operations and natural or man-made situations requiring armed humanitarian intervention) have been identified as targets of Western European security. The second category of concerns is less devastating than the first category. Threats of the second type are becoming increasingly more prevalent, superseding Cold War-era concerns about threats of the first type. It stands to reason then that in the future the Europeans will direct more effort to combating asymmetric threats such as terrorism and organised crime than they will to developing a standing army capable of fighting and winning major regional contingencies.

This is nowhere more clearly evident than in the former Yugoslavia. It can be argued that there are at least two reasons why the Balkans civil war became

very important to the western powers and these reasons have important implications if viewed as indicators of potential future security concerns. First, the tragic events in the Balkans offered moving pictures and the prospect of an ongoing story, both of which cause the news media to slaver in confident expectation. Thus, the media played, and is likely to continue to play, an increasingly influential role in shaping west European and American security affairs.

Second, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent re-deployment of military forces left western governments in need of new roles for their military to perform. The capability to successfully undertake new roles, once it is widely perceived that old ones are obsolete, is undeniably in the interest of the military establishment. The more work the military

has to do the larger their budgets are likely to be and the greater their influence.

The changed international security environment, the changing nature of threats and the role of the media in defining public and administrative perceptions of security interests are all influential factors helping to define future security interests in the U.S. and Europe.

The Europeans and the United States will continue to place high value on the maintenance of NATO, but the Organisation itself will undergo significant changes as a result of pressure to adapt to the new international security environment, not least of which is enlargement.

This dissertation furthermore, argues that there is scope for increased burden sharing in areas where such activities will assist the Europeans in developing their own capabilities – strategic lift is a good example of a

possible area for this sort of effort - but, that the most lucrative avenue for the Europeans is the one that also enhances NATO's ability to deal with Out-of-Area operations. The role of the defence manufacturing industrial base cannot be overlooked. Enlarging the European Union will make development in the security and defence fields slower and less likely to be innovative. Enlarging NATO will also initially be costly,¹⁰ but in the long run can help to spread the cost of maintaining the organisation.

The European Union headed toward a major decision in the late 1990s over the military teeth it would eventually give its foreign policy goals. The problems regarding the development of the CFSP and the WEU were indicative of a basic conflict of interests. It will be argued here that the Union will have to decide whether to become a federal state or a confederation,

because, while a multi-speed Europe offers temporary solutions, it also produces enormous logistical difficulties and erodes public support. Enlargement negotiations will further magnify the problems faced by the European Union. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is by far the largest and most important project the European Union has undertaken. If it were to fail, it is possible that the Union would truly dissolve. The degree of success of EMU will go a long way to help Europeans decide the answer to this question of federation or confederation and hence have a significant impact on the very political decisions regarding ESDI.

European Union members have a long history of indecision. The ESDI is, therefore, likely to continue to develop along present lines; developing in the nursery of NATO, reaching maturity only in the distant

future, and only if a dispute with the United States – probably economic in nature - forces the Europeans to try their wings.

2. U.S. interests in Europe

Present day U.S. interests in Europe primarily revolve around issues of trade and influence. The European Union is poised to continue to capture the largest share of U.S. trade of any bloc. The military relationship between many EU members and the U.S. is also critical to U.S. interests, as John Hillen of the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC defines them. He writes:

“America’s vital national interests include: preventing a major power threat to Europe, ... preventing hostile interference by an outside power in the Western Hemisphere ... [and] ensuring continued access to foreign trade, global resources and open seas.”¹¹

By almost every definition, European security is a ‘vital’¹² U.S. interest.

A. Economics

The most obvious interest the United States has in Europe is financial. The Europeans and Americans trade more between one another than either does with any other region in the world.¹³ The rising star of the Asian Tigers caused some to question the primacy of the European Union to United States interests, but, in light of the global economic crisis that began in 1997, there is once again a renewed realisation of the importance of a stable partner. The United States, furthermore, places the protection of energy supplies very high on the list of national security interests. Much of Europe’s energy comes through the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe. These regions consequently receive increasing attention.

Current economic indicators support the continuation of the voluminous trade between the U.S. and the EU. Additionally, the continuing ability of the U.S. defence manufacturing base to outstrip European competitors because of its ability to conglomerate and because of a variety of U.S. policies¹⁴ is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. As will be seen in Chapter Six however, the Europeans are fighting back and prospects for a truly competitive European defence manufacturing base are improving.

B. Influence

Although the United States is no longer working to counter the Soviet threat in Europe, the current administration maintains a policy of keeping a substantial military presence in Europe. John Whilt, former U.S. Secretary of Defence, explains:

“The United States remains committed to NATO because if Europe is in danger, America is in danger; when Europe is safe, America is safe.”¹⁵

Maintaining a military presence in Europe also allows the U.S. to project force further afield.

The trading relationship, the continuing U.S. military presence and the continuing strength of NATO commitments mean that the U.S. will continue to influence the military undertakings of the Europeans.

These arrangements are symbiotic, however, with the European Union gaining significant benefit from the U.S. presence and trading relationship. EU members are not required to spend as much on their own militaries. NATO membership also entails considerable exchanges of technology that are advantageous for all members.

U.S. interests in Europe are not likely to change dramatically in the foreseeable future. Current U.S. military doctrine, combined with the fact that the United States does not have a military peer equal - nor is it likely to in the next ten years – support this argument. The Pentagon, in a report entitled *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, consummately summed up U.S. interests in Europe as follows:

“Europe represents the world’s greatest concentration of nations and peoples which share our commitment to democracy and market economies. America’s cultural heritage and institutions largely spring from European roots. Our most important multilateral alliance - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - is centred there. The continent is also one of the world’s greatest centres of economic power and represents a massive export market for U.S. products. Thus, our continued political, cultural, and economic well-being is inextricably tied to Europe.”¹⁶

3. The European Security and Defence Identity

[ESDI] as defined in this dissertation

The discussion of an ESDI has anomalous boundaries depending on the institution, security issue, specific state or region or threat concerned. This dissertation was conceived long before the use of the term ESDI had become popularised or even well known. The term ESDI therefore needs to be defined for the purpose of this research. Simon Duke, formerly an Assistant Professor at the Pennsylvania State University, defined the “European security identity” as follows:

“The idea of a European security identity, whatever its institutional base, is necessarily a fluid one and is normally a concept associated with the drive towards European Union within the EC/WEU framework.”¹⁷

This definition provides a good starting point for the theory driving the development of an ESDI, but is very broad and lends itself to wide interpretation. Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting attempts a slightly more specific definition of ESDI:

*"The evolution of a European Security and Defence Identity - ESDI - has three strands; a North Atlantic Alliance adapted to allow for greater European responsibility in defence matters, a strengthened Common Foreign and Security Policy within the European Union and a strengthened WEU. [The WEU would be] ... operationally capable of providing the political control and strategic direction of Petersburg-type tasks undertaken by Europeans."*¹⁸

This definition focuses on the institutional network concerned with European security and defence but neglects the defence industrial base. The defence industries are a significant part of the ESDI because governments regard them as central to their ability to provide for national security. The European Parliament

published a report on the plight of the European defence industrial base in which the ESDI was defined as having three components:

“a political component: the EU, a military component: the joint responsibility of NATO and the WEU and an industrial, scientific and technological component. (sic.)”¹⁹

The second two parts of this definition are adequate. The first part, however, the political leg of the ESDI, is more substantial. In the mid 1990s the political aspect of the European Security and Defence Identity arguably included the WEU and OSCE as well. In this dissertation therefore, the ESDI is defined in a similar fashion, as having three branches: the political/institutional, the military [capabilities] and the defence industry. The incorporation of all three of

these parts is necessary for Europe to have a whole security and defence identity.

At one extreme, ESDI means a completely independent European collective defence organisation - totally separate from NATO - such as the hypothetical European Security Organisation [ESO] envisaged by Simon Bulmer. At the other extreme, ESDI simply means the ability of the European partners to make coherent foreign policy and to undertake small peacekeeping operations on their own without the use of U.S. equipment assets or personnel and without the planning facilities of NATO. There is a range of possible scenarios that fall between these two extremes. The European Union has difficulty reaching foreign policy decisions. The key point however, is that the ESDI is not static: it is evolutionary. There is

no end point of development. There is an ESDI at present. It is made up of the European Union's CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the activities of the European partners in the OSCE and the UN and the various European defence industries.²⁰ The basic argument of this dissertation is that the existing ESDI will develop slowly, along the same incremental lines which have characterised it to date, but that it will not develop to the extreme of complete independence for the foreseeable future.

4. Literature Review

The rationale for writing this dissertation stemmed from the fact that there was not a single source of scholarly literature which addresses the breadth of issues raised by both the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ Integrationist and the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ NATO lobbies. The use of the terms ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ in both cases is not meant to

suggest that there is an absolutely clear division between the camps. There is not. There are as many schisms between the contending theories and approaches as there are people in Europe. This is reflected in the wealth of literature about every conceivable aspect of the European Union. The European Commission is itself the largest producer of educational literature on the European Union, but the brochures and documentation it produces are almost never analytical in their approach. The vast majority of Commission produced literature is either documentary or public relations literature. The same can be said of the European Parliament, although the EP has generally produced marginally more analysis than the Commission. This leaves the task of analysis up to scholars and interested parties for the most part. This in turn means that much of what is produced is

partisan in nature. It is either biased towards or against the integration of the European Union. So long as the integration process continues there will be room for more analysis. Just as the debate in the United States rages today over how much power should rest in the hands of the states, and how much should be in the control of the federal government; it is not much of a leap to assume that the life of the European Union will be plagued by the same debates. They are not the sort of ideological issues that are ever solved per se.

Many scholarly writings on the subject of the foreign activities of the European Union concentrate on economic relations,²¹ perhaps because it is easier to measure, and hence analyse, economic performance rather than foreign policy in the European Union. Numbers provide more tangible focal points of analysis than do the nuances of policy decisions. The

field of Economics in turn offers a considerable breadth of literature on the subject of economic security.²² Much of the literature that is devoted to foreign policy activities of the European Union either predates Maastricht²³ or takes a descriptive approach to the wealth of relationships involved.²⁴ Richard Corbett, Sophie Vanhoonacker and Finn Laursen wrote excellent documentary volumes on the Intergovernmental Conferences [IGC] of 1992 offering brief analysis while reproducing much of the important original documentation.²⁵ Richard Vaughan was one of the first to use this format in his invaluable Post-War Integration in Europe: Documents in Modern History.²⁶ Lawrence Freedman followed suit in an equally valuable volume entitled Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War, a very interesting documentary history containing not only

important treaties of this time period, but also many famous speeches that had a wide impact on public perceptions during this time.²⁷ Trevor Salmon and William Nicoll followed the same format when they wrote Building European Union: A Documentary History, the very informative historical appraisal of the European integration process.²⁸ This method of documentation and analysis is invaluable since the torrential flow of official documentation of the European institutions makes determining which events bring about real change in Europe an arduous task.

There have been a handful of very interesting books on the European Union's relations with regions of the world or particular problem areas but these do not address the full range of issues under consideration here. Martin Holland's seminal study of the European

Union's interactions with South Africa²⁹ represented a welcome new approach in the 1980's to scholarly discussion of the European Communities external relations.³⁰ Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler's work on the struggle of the European Community to find a common position on the Arab-Israeli peace process is another outstanding example of policy oriented analysis.³¹ David Allen and Alfred Pijpers, noted authors in the field of European studies, edited the only other book on this subject at the time three years earlier.³²

There has been a great deal of scholarly attention focused on NATO since the end of the Cold War,³³ and on the European Union since the Treaty on European Union was signed in 1992.³⁴ These act as the basis for much of the thinking in Chapters Four

and five. There are also many scholarly volumes and articles on the subject of NATO enlargement discussed in Chapter Seven.

The most valuable books that served as primers for this research are on European security in general. Simon Duke's The New European Security Disorder comes closest to covering the issues raised in this dissertation and was inspirational to this work.³⁵ Duke, former Assistant Professor at the Pennsylvania State University, not only discusses the new international environment in a realistic light, he addresses Europe's new security concerns in a very rational way. Jonathon Dean's Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security defines many of the potential threats to Western and Eastern Europe in a dramatic way and discusses the effects

these threats might have on European security.³⁶

James Sperling and Emil Kirchner's Recasting the European Order is a great blend of discussions about economic security and the European and Atlantic security institutions but does not discuss the arms industry in much detail.³⁷ Christopher Hill's edited book The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy is an interesting look at European security from the perspective of the many states involved.³⁸ There are also several very good books and articles that focus on the WEU³⁹ or OSCE.⁴⁰ Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, furthermore, edited a broad-ranging book on the theories behind Europe's foreign policy activity⁴¹ that has been followed by several authoritative articles, including a lively debate series among the Liberal Institutional, Collective Security and Realism schools published in the journal *International Security*.⁴² There

have also been several books published on the subject of relations between Europe and America: a central theme in this dissertation. These range from the very theoretical Europe and America by Werner Link and Miles Kahler⁴³ and hypothetical America and Europe by David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee,⁴⁴ to the broad-based edited work of Jarrod Wiener, The Transatlantic Relationship.⁴⁵

At the time of writing this dissertation however, there has not been a publication that incorporates all the actors as defined above, in a scholarly discussion of the effects the development of the European Security and Defence Identity is likely to have on U.S. interests in Europe.

One further note about the available literature and the intelligence community is worth mentioning. It is a

tenable argument that in order for the European Union to have a workable foreign and security policy it requires a political, military, financial and intelligence component. The first three components will be dealt with in this dissertation. The intelligence component, however, will not be substantively addressed. If the literature is taken as an indicator of reality then very little organised intelligence co-operation takes place in international organisations. The European Union functions very much like any other international organisation for these purposes: state intelligence agencies carry out their activities independently and collaborate when it is advantageous for them to do so.⁴⁶ There is no reason to expect that the European Union will develop its own formidable intelligence capability in the near future because state intelligence

organisations guard their sovereignty perhaps more jealously than any other state entity.

The advent of the 1996/1997 IGC produced another round of speculative literature, but the marginal changes made by the Amsterdam Treaty elicited resounding condemnation from almost every camp.

The Europeans were not closer to possessing a meaningful foreign policy in 1997 than they had been in 1992.

In the post World War II environment, the phenomenon of the European integration movement was predicated on the need to provide security for war-torn Europe. It will be argued in this dissertation that European security remains reliant on interdependent economies, but European security is not necessarily dependent on foreign and security policy co-operation.

It will also be argued that assisting and supporting the states to the East and South of the European Union can only bolster West European security. The European Union does not have an effective common foreign and security policy⁴⁷ because the self-interested actions of its members arrest its proper functioning. States are the primary actors in the intergovernmental system established to govern the CFSP and the WEU. [This is also true of NATO with one very important exception, the unified military command.] This flies in the face of the Integrationists' great ambitions for Europe. This struggle between the states and the Integrationists has always been at the heart of the political struggle in the European Union. This dissertation will take the position that, based on European inability to-date to integrate foreign and security matters into the supranational authority of the European Community,

there is no evidence to suggest that the Integrationists will ultimately triumph. European foreign and security policy will remain in the hands of state actors for the foreseeable future, which in turn means the U.S. will not have an equal partner in Europe in the foreseeable future.

5. Theoretical Framework

This section clarifies the theoretical basis for the fundamental argument of this dissertation: 'The European Union does not have as potent a common foreign and security policy as it might because the self-interested behaviour of state actors arrests its proper functioning.' It will be shown repeatedly that the current shape – and indeed the likely future development of the ESDI – can best be explained by the Realist school of thought. Considerable integration

has occurred, but it remains primarily in the economic sphere. Where security is concerned ‘nation-states [still] guard their sovereignty jealously’.⁴⁸

If the European Union does not have as effective a Common Foreign and Security Policy as it might, and the requirements for such a policy are knowable, then what prevents the Union from achieving its objective?

There is no absolutely correct answer to this question, as differences in theory used, selection of empirical data and definitional parameters influence the process and results of scholarly, as well as 'industrial,' investigations. One hypothesis is that the structural dynamic of the CFSP, whereby state actors play the most fundamental and influential roles, ultimately impedes the European Union in its ambition to develop an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy.

This is a likely hypothesis because the interests of

States and those of the Union often differ; therefore, state actors are generally ill-suited to provide for the Union's best interests.

Realism and *Neo-Realism* have their critics and the examination of Neo-liberal institutional theory helps to address some of the challenges to the Realist literature. However, Integration theory is perhaps the greatest counter to the Realists in the debate over the future of the European Union. It was the Integrationist literature that gave the first breath of life to this dissertation with the need to examine whether the vision of the Integrationists was possible. While there are contending models of security that predict different futures, for the purpose of this thesis schools of thought, rather than models, offer better explanatory capability.

There are a number of differing theories about the roles states play and the rationale behind their actions in the discipline of International Relations. This study will look at three: *Realism*, because of the primacy it places on state actors; *Liberal Institutionalism*, because the question 'Do institutions matter?' is extremely germane to this structurally oriented study; and, finally, *Integration* theory, because ultimately the CFSP is a part of the European Union and the EU has been the focus of a preponderance of integration theory.

In addition, a brief critique of Collective Security follows, because in the mid-1990's arguments for a collective security arrangement were made quite convincingly.

There are as many schisms between types of theory as there are theorists. The principal task of this research is to examine the ESDI and in so doing it is helpful to

elaborate some theoretical frameworks which help to explain it. The purpose is not to examine theory with the ESDI as a mere case study. Thus, for brevity's sake, the focus is on the on-going debate between Realists and Liberal Institutionalists, with the primary advocates being John J. Mearsheimer and Robert O. Keohane⁴⁹, respectively. There is admittedly an entire other dissertation that could be written from a wholly theoretical standpoint with the EU as a fascinating case study — but that is not what is going to happen here. True to that nature of International Relations, this dissertation takes a multi-disciplinary approach. Once the theoretical grounding is established, subsequent chapters present analysis, and derive their support for the basic argument, from the disciplines of history, economics and politics.

in what way?

A. The Realist Perspective

Realism and Neo-Realism have been covered extensively in scholarly literature and as a result there will only be a brief characterisation here.

*"While retaining many of the basic features of 'classical' Realism, (e.g. power as a central analytical concept) Neo-Realism directs attention to the structural characteristics of an international system of states rather than--at its-component parts."*⁵⁰

This shift in perspective was delineated by Kenneth Waltz, whose work, *Theory of International Politics*⁵¹, is widely regarded as the foundation of the 'new' or 'structural' Realism. Waltz elaborates this emphasis on structure:

*"By depicting an international political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, Neo-Realism [allows students of international politics to] ... see how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from Web, taking certain actions while propelling them toward others."*⁵²

However, while this alteration in viewpoint alleviated some of the difficulties posed by 'classical' *Realism*, it remained quite similar to it in its fundamental assumptions, as Grieco points out:

*"on crucial issues - the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states and the problem of co-operation - modern Realists like Waltz and Gilpin are very much in accord with classical Realists like Carr, Aron and Morgenthau."*⁵³

Therefore, while theorists differ on the finer points⁵⁴, it may be broadly stated that *Realism* is predicated on five assumptions. First, states are the primary actors in an anarchic international environment. As such they possess supreme authority, since 'there is no government over governments.'⁵⁵ Second, states possess some means of inflicting damage of varying degrees on other states, which leads to the third assumption: that states are uncertain of the intentions

of their fellow states. The fourth assumption is that states wish to maintain their integrity. Whether that takes the form of mere survival or attempts to gain power to ensure their security is a matter of conjecture.

The final assumption of Realism is that states employ reason to maximise their position - they act rationally in their pursuit of self-preservation. Furthermore, Realism asserts that from these five fundamental presuppositions three patterns of behaviour result. First, states fear each other because of uncertainty about the motivations of other states, which possess some manner of inflicting damage. Secondly, because each state is ultimately responsible for guaranteeing its own security, due to the lack of a supranational authority, low levels of trust persist in the international system. Finally, predicated on the tenet 'the greater the military or economic advantage a state has the more

secure it is,' Mearsheimer argues that states aim to maximise their relative power positions over other states.⁵⁶ In Mearsheimer's *Realist* world:

*"The aim is to acquire more military power at the expense of rivals. The ideal outcome would be to end up as the hegemon in the system. Survival would then be almost guaranteed. All states are influenced by this logic."*⁵⁷

One possible flaw in this thinking is the 'security dilemma,'⁵⁸ where one state's predominance of power leads neighbour(s) to feel threatened, and as result overall security is reduced. Joseph Grieco, who proposes that some states may be content to maintain the existing balance of power, offers a slightly different perspective.⁵⁹ According to *Realist* logic, while states do co-operate, that co-operation is hindered by relative gains concerns and the prospect of cheating.⁶⁰ When states contemplate making arrangements to co-operate with one another, they

concern themselves with how the dividends of that co-operation will be divided amongst them. They may either be concerned with absolute gains — maximising their own profit, more often applicable to economic arrangements — and hence care nothing about the benefits the other state(s) involved receive, or they may be concerned with relative gains — how much they get in relation to how much others receive. According to Mearsheimer: ‘because states in a *Realist* world are concerned about the balance of power they must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns.’⁶¹ The fear that other state(s) will gain a relative advantage by reneging on an arrangement is especially germane to the prospects for co-operation in the security field, since shifts in the existing balance of power potentially hold severe consequences for the victim state.⁶² Mearsheimer asserts that the primary flaw in the liberal

Institutionalists reasoning results from a failure to address the 'relative gains' considerations, which constitute an obstacle to co-operation quite apart from the potential for cheating.⁶³ Institutions have only a marginal role to play in a world characterised by balance of power considerations, according to Mearsheimer, who states.⁶⁴

*'The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power. ... In this view institutions are essentially 'arenas for acting out power relationships.'*⁶⁵

B. The Liberal Institutionalist Perspective

Liberal Institutionalism⁶⁶ is founded on *Realism's* assumptions about the international environment, but contends that institutions can ameliorate the fear of cheating as an obstacle to co-operation by establishing rules to govern state behaviour. Liberal Institutionalists argue that rules can assist states in making short term

sacrifices in favour of obtaining long term gains, thus ameliorating the 'prisoner's dilemma'⁶⁷ in four ways.⁶⁸

Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin note:

*"Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for co-ordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity."*⁶⁹

First, institutions increase the number of transactions between states,⁷⁰ which has the effect of reducing cheating in several ways. If states are bound in a relationship with other states that will yield gains over the long term if no state defects, then the cost of cheating is increased in so far as the immediate gains are outweighed by the long-term losses. If one state defects there are implications for all the states in the system as victim states retaliate, thus achieving revenge but at the same time reducing the benefits for all the members of the system, including the victim

state. In the long term there is the added benefit in that states that have consistently not cheated will find it easier to enter into other lucrative co-operative relationships while those who have cheated will not. By this logic it makes sense for the states of the European Union to pool their national defence resources and achieve long term gains. What states should do and what they actually do are different, however, and there is a flaw in this logic in so far as states that have cheated in the past may be encouraged to continue to do so.

Second, it is argued that issue linkage attains greater importance as states begin to co-operate in more than one field. This phenomenon certainly occurs in areas where vital interests are not at stake, but this dissertation is primarily concerned with foreign and security policy matters, considered to be fundamental

to states vital interests. Issue linkage may make it more difficult for states to cooperate in areas where they have vital interests at stake if they are likely to fall victim to reprisals which effect these interests from other states for cheating in an area less important to them. For example: imagine if in a future world the European Union had actually pooled all its military resources so completely that no state could feasibly mount an Out-of-Area Operation without relying on assets from other states. Then imagine that a disagreement breaks out over the safety of British pork. British pork is banned on the continent and in retaliation Britain refused to buy products from France – the chief proponent of this hypothetical pork ban. Furthermore, hostile forces invade a group of islands that belong to Britain. France then refuses to lend the vital airlift capability that it usually contributes. So,

issue linkage does attain greater importance as states begin to cooperate in more than one field but not the way that the Liberal Institutionalists would have us believe. This is a good example of the fact that Institutionalist theory may be useful in many fields, but it is not very well suited as a predictor of behavior in the foreign policy and security fields.

Third, rules may be structured in such a way as to increase the flow of information among states, thus allowing for monitoring, which in itself discourages cheating, and increases the likelihood that participants will be apprised of cheating in time to minimise the damage that may be done to them by the offending state(s).

Finally, institutions/rules facilitate co-operation by making international agreements more efficient and hence less costly.⁷¹ Institutionalists do not contend that

institutions matter all the time; rather, that Cupertino is expected to occur when states have significant interests in common,⁷² thus espousing a *Realist* principle which Mearsheimer notes as a criticism of liberal Institutionalism.

Discussion

Mearsheimer⁷³ asserts that Liberal Institutionalism makes a distinction between the economic and security fields. Keohane and Martin disagree, however, stating:

realist

*"Although some institutionalists have made this assertion, it is not the predominant view of the institutionalist literature, and we certainly do not support it."*⁷⁴

Nevertheless, critics argue that Liberal Institutionalism is of little utility in the security realm because of the increased threat posed by cheating⁷⁵ and because, in an international system characterised by balance of power considerations, states must also concern themselves

with relative gains (as noted earlier in this chapter). In a bid to address these issues, Liberal Institutionalists offer two possible counter arguments: the offence/defence argument of Powell and the 'safety in numbers' argument of Snidal. First, it is argued that Liberal Institutionalism may be applied to the security aspects of international relations when the threat of offensive war is low and the prospect for the use of defensive weapons in the international system is high.⁷⁶ Powell's argument is summed up as follows:

*"when the prevailing military weaponry favours the offence, then the cost of war is low, and relative gains considerations will be intense. Institutions can do little to facilitate co-operation in such circumstances. However, when defensive technology dominates, the cost of initiating aggression is high and the relative gains problem is subdued, which allows institutions to cause co-operation."*⁷⁷

The main difficulty with this approach, however, is that it is difficult to identify which weapons are

offensive and which are defensive.⁷⁸ While nuclear weapons may be seen as a deterrent force in some cases, even then they do not act to ameliorate relative gains considerations. The concerns of the United States and the Soviet Union over the amount of weapons possessed by one another during the Cold War are a prime example of this phenomenon.

A second argument for the application of liberal institutional theory to security matters relates to the structure of the international system. Snidal argues that for states in a multi-polar environment, where several states have similar capabilities, relative gains concerns are less important because more opportunities exist to form coalitions and enhance security prospects.⁷⁹ The exact conditions under which this enhanced security would occur are not clearly defined in Snidal's argument. Realists argue that this second theme — that

a multi-polar system characterised by several states with roughly equal capabilities ameliorates relative gains considerations by offering states safety in coalitions — is not supported in historical fact. This is not to say however, that it is not a possibility for the future — there is no incontrovertible reason why this scenario can not work in practice.

Realists criticise both of the preceding arguments on the grounds that they are both based on unlikely situations in the real world. This fact alone does not necessarily invalidate them as useful hypothetical situations in which relative gains considerations could be ameliorated to such an extent that institutions could attain a more effective role in causing peace. This dissertation is — like the Realist literature — more concerned with the actual situation of the European

Security and Defence Identity than with the admirable scholarly goal of theorising about the possibilities.

A further point of contention between *Realists* and liberal Institutionalists stems from their mutual claims of superiority over one another. Keohane argues that liberal Institutionalism surpasses and ultimately subsumes *Realism*, stating:

*"we must understand that neo-liberal Institutionalism is not simply an alternative to Neo-Realism, but, in fact, claims to subsume it."*⁸⁰

He later explains:

*"By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and co-operation can occur, Institutional theory shows under what conditions Realist propositions are valid. It is in this sense that Institutionalism claims to subsume Realism."*⁸¹

In response to Keohane and Martin's argument, Mearsheimer argues that the precepts of distribution of power and offensive versus defensive power are

Realist concepts. It is therefore, difficult to see how liberal Institutionalism can be seen as subsuming *Realism* when it is in fact *Realism* by another name.⁸² Furthermore, *Realists* argue that even if liberal Institutionalism were unable to address the problem of relative gains considerations required for the theory to be applied to security areas, thus applying the theory only to non-security areas, consideration about relative gains would still be a factor. For example, strategic trade theory holds that a state must support its own firms over those of other states in order to secure the greatest strategic advantage for national firms and thus economic security for the state.⁸³ A further rationale for the consideration of relative gains in international relations issues regardless of whether they are related to security or not may be predicated on an observable aspect of human nature. The need to compare oneself

with others carries over into comparison of states, which are after all run by individuals.⁸⁴ Conversely, Keohane and Martin assert that liberal Institutionalism is an important paradigm for the security aspects of international relations. This view is predicated on the rationale that the propensity for institutions to increase information flows between states facilitates co-operation in security fields, where information about others in a balance of power system is important.⁸⁵ Furthermore, liberal Institutionalists contend that relative gains considerations may make institutions more useful in security fields because institutions have the potential to ameliorate distribution problems in much the same way as they alleviate fears about cheating. However, a crucial detail remains unaddressed: while these points may be highlighted as a benefit of co-operation in security matters — and

even if they were proven to be true — they should not be confused with an explanation of how that co-operation would take place. Once institutions are in place these principles may apply, but for the CFSP at least, the decision to create such an institution that relies on compromise over consensus has yet to occur.

At present — and for the foreseeable future — a decision to create such a policy-making system would have to be taken by all of the Members of the European Union. It will become apparent in subsequent chapters that history demonstrates that they are unlikely to do so. In support of this argument, Mearsheimer contends:

“the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system ... the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war, institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process.”⁸⁶

Keohane disagrees, stating: "Institutional theory conceptualises institutions as both independent and dependent variables."⁸⁷ He elaborates the rationale that underpins this assertion in an early work:

*"institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in expectation and process that result can exert profound effects on state behaviour."*⁸⁸

For the CFSP, the 'human action' Keohane mentions must come from state actors, who are reluctant to take such steps because of a lack of trust in others.

In attempts to produce empirical evidence to support their divergent views, Institutionalists and *Realists* alike cite NATO as evidence of their respective points of view. John Duffield, an Institutionalist, maintains that NATO made an independent contribution to peace in Europe by drawing boundaries, demonstrating U.S. commitments and lending them credibility, helping to

build member's military capabilities and facilitating the maintenance of stable troop levels within the organisation.⁸⁹ On the other hand, *Realists*⁹⁰ maintain that NATO was nothing more than a reflection of the "bipolar distribution of power in Europe, an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat."⁹¹

Another issue of contention between Institutionalists and *Realists* is U.S. aversion to *Realism*, specifically U.S. antipathy. This phenomenon is important because of the predominant influence on foreign policy analysis that the U.S. has had. Neither camp denies that there is a propensity in the United States to dislike *Realism*. Mearsheimer offers the generalisation that Americans are generally idealistic and moralistic whereas *Realism* is by nature pessimistic in its view of international relations, depicting a world where war is likely and

sometimes a necessary tool of foreign policy and states are neither 'good' nor 'bad,' but simply self-interested.⁹²

John Ruggie maintains that U.S. rejection is more likely rooted in geopolitical realities than on ideological grounds.

*"America is not now and has never been a relative equal on a continent densely populated by potential adversaries, the European context for which 'balance of power' and 'raison d'etat' were invented."*⁹³

In the final analysis, however, the cause of the alleged U.S. aversion to *Realism* is incidental to the more salient issue of whether or not institutions play a significant role in causing peace.

In conclusion, liberal Institutionalists appear to confront *Realism* with its reflection, building an argument on *Realist* tenants to begin with and concluding:

*"liberal Institutionalists, who see institutions as rooted in the realities of power and interest, do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions. What we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities."*⁹⁴

C. Collective Security

Collective security — the concept that states band together to punish, and hence ultimately deter, aggression — is offered as another category of Institutionalist theory and an alternative to *Realism*.

Collective security can take the form of ideal collective security at one end of the spectrum and concerts at the other. Ideal collective security obtains when states make automatic and legally binding agreements to respond to aggression whenever and wherever it occurs.⁹⁵ Concerts, on the other hand, 'rely on looser and more informal regulation of balancing'.⁹⁶

Proponents of collective security maintain that it is a

preferable alternative to the balancing under anarchy which occurs in the *Realist's* world because ultimately aggressors are confronted with preponderant force.⁹⁷ Under collective security states collaborate in order to respond to aggression regardless of their vital interests, and take action because they are obligated to do so by the agreements they have entered into. Conversely, *Realists* argue that states will respond based on the degree to which they perceive their interests to be threatened.⁹⁸ However, Kupchan and Kupchan counter that it is in states' interests to protect an international order which promotes stability and is therefore beneficial to their national security.⁹⁹ Realists further criticise collective security on the basis that, if the coalition fails to support a victim state against aggression, that state will be worse off than if it had known it would not have the full support of the

coalition of which it is a member, and had therefore prepared accordingly.¹⁰⁰ Advocates of collective security counter this claim by asserting that states would be aware of a weakening of a coalition of which they were a member and would take steps to ensure their own preparedness: 'prudence would dictate the maintenance of force levels greater than those needed should all members fulfil their commitments to collective action'.¹⁰¹ This seems an unsatisfactory rebuttal as it leaves a state in virtually the same situation it would find itself in the balance of power world of the *Realist*.

Further criticism of collective security is based on practicalities such as: disagreements over the nature of aggression (i.e. which aggressive acts are 'right' and which are 'wrong'), the complications which historical inter-relationships between states would pose,

inequalities in burden sharing and the difficulties associated with the co-ordination of forces. These will not be addressed here because the most important argument *Realists* make — that collective security is an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another¹⁰² — pre-empts the utility of such debate. In either form, ideal collective security or concerts, or in any guise that falls somewhere between the two extremes, the theory of collective security is prescriptive. While in an academic sense there is scope for such debates — predicated on the notion that an idea can be externalised if it has the requisite merit — the debates surrounding collective security concentrate on what is 'preferable' as opposed to what is practical. However beneficial the dividends of a collective security system

would be, there is little utility in exploring these if the requirements for achieving such an organisation are incongruous with the actualities of the system under scrutiny. This problem — overcoming states unwillingness to relinquish their sovereignty and enter such arrangements — is a major obstacle to the improvement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and collective security does not offer a solution to it.

Participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy takes place at the state level, as does participation in the Western European Union. The unanimity requirement allows each Member State to veto any position or action. In the present form the CFSP actually has *Realist* principles built into it. Each state is required to decide on each issue what is best for itself. Co-operation in the CFSP therefore takes

place for one of two reasons. First, it may be that through issue linkage states will be persuaded to co-operate in areas where they otherwise would not have. Even so, the co-operation that does occur as a result of bargaining is still a consequence of states acting in their own self interest. They would refrain from entering into any bargain that might threaten their vital interests. It may also be argued that some co-operation results from state's perception that agreeing to pursue a policy that is not in their absolute best interest, but which will strengthen the Union, is ultimately in their general national interest as a Member of that Union.

Secondly, just as *Neo-Realism* allows for the influence of other factors on policy making, such as domestic pressure groups and international organisations, for example, it may be argued that some co-operation takes place as a result of the exercise of these

influences. Where vital interests are at stake, states consistently pursue positions that protect their perceived best interest, forsaking their fellow Member States if need be. The nature of the voting system in the CFSP encourages self interested behaviour, and states who consider the system to reflect *Realist* properties — where states are fearful of one another because each is ultimately responsible for its own security in an anarchical environment where there is no supranational actor to rescue it in the event of attack in whatever form — are reluctant to surrender their right to a veto because this is viewed as an impingement on their sovereignty, and ultimately on their ability to defend themselves.

The tenants of *Realism* fit very closely to state's actual behaviour in developing and implementing European foreign and security policy. Member states have

refused to leave the matter of security to an integrated EU mechanism, preferring instead to maintain intergovernmental control of policymaking and implementation, as evidenced by the final arrangements agreed for the EPC and later for the CFSP. The extent to which states have been willing to co-operate is directly related to the extent to which their national interests are served.

D. Integration Theory

From a different viewpoint, Integration theory asserts that states as well as other politically active groups and organisations interact in a polyarchic world, and therefore state behaviour is the result, not of sovereign actions based on rational decisions to preserve national interests, but rather of complex pressures which may come from sub-national as well as national and

supranational sources.¹⁰³ Integrationists argue that in an increasingly interdependent world, where non-state actors have more influence than ever before, the exercise of power by states is tempered both by the considerations of international society and the interests that states pursue which cannot be achieved by the use of military force alone.¹⁰⁴ This set of theory is often applied to — and in some cases even developed especially for the purpose of explaining — the level of co-operation undertaken by the Member States of the European Union. The sacrifice of sovereignty made by Member States in most of the areas over which the European Union has jurisdiction is the product of the belief that states pool their resources and co-operate in order to achieve economies of scale as a group.

This has not, however, been applicable in most senses to the behaviour of states as regards the development

of foreign and security policy to-date, because states have repeatedly refused to surrender such rights in favour of protecting their most guarded right, providing for the security of the state. A central characteristic that distinguishes states in the international system is a control over the legitimate use of force. While some European states have attempted to pool their military capabilities to some extent, the members of the European Union by and large refuse to merge forces to such an extent that they would relinquish the ability to use force as and when they see fit.

The foreign policy of the European Union is concerned with states who are not members of the Union and therefore the co-operation which does occur among the Member States in relation to their actions towards third

countries allows for the consideration of integration theory.

The reasoning of Integrationists would support the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy on an integrated basis, as opposed to the current arrangement of an intergovernmental structure, as the logical complement to the states. The rationale that underpins this assertion is based on the potential profits. By shifting responsibility for foreign and security policy to an integrated institution, the European Union could reap the benefits of a co-ordinated, consistent, well-resourced, forward looking, pro-active policy produced and implemented with the benefit of the Union in its entirety in mind.

This set of theory does not address the issue of how to achieve that co-operation in foreign and security policy

matters — how states are supposed to overcome their fears of one another to enter into such an arrangement.

Integration theory, like its cousin liberal Institutionalism, is, to a large extent prescriptive, espousing what 'should be.' The exception to this is the concept of 'spillover' espoused by neo-functionalists.¹⁰⁵

The neofunctionalist conception of spillover, which differs somewhat from that of the functionalists, holds that:

*"successful integration in an area of lesser salience, leads to a series of further linked integration measures, which culminate in overwhelming pressure to integrate in the high politics areas closest to the heart of sovereignty. There is a kind of accumulation of implications of integration which gradually impinge upon decision makers so that eventually they accept consciously the desirability of integration in areas of high politics — foreign policy and defence — as the best way of furthering their interests."*¹⁰⁶

According to neofunctionalist theory, in practical terms the co-operation among Member States of the

European Union in economic and social fields will in time lead decision makers to view the integration of foreign and security policy capabilities, as well as those in the field of defence, as the best way of protecting their national interests. The tangible counter to this argument is the power of veto held by each Member State in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. Neofunctionalists maintain that a plethora of interest groups will see the benefits of co-operation in one area of integration and apply pressure for integration in other areas. But this has not been the case in the CFSP or in EPC before it.

The 'reflex of co-ordination' first mentioned in the Copenhagen Report of 1973 poses a valid case for the 'spillover' effect but so far this has only lead Ministers and Heads of State and Government to become more

familiar with each other's positions. It has not fundamentally changed the methods of co-operation.

In the remainder of this dissertation, theory will be used as a reference where applicable. In general, there appears to be no overarching theoretical framework capable of describing and explaining what forces interact to produce the foreign and security policy of the European Union. As noted earlier, however, the Common Foreign and Security Policy's reliance on state actors in key roles appears to fit most closely with the tenets of *Realism*.

Endnotes

¹ Sir David Frost from *Frost on Sunday*, BBC1, 15 March 1998.

² My initial research project was to prove that if the European Union could put into place sufficient military power, budgetary resources, intelligence resources and leadership structures then a truly common policy was possible. What shaped this

research were the substantive difficulties that present themselves.

³ Douglas Hurd address to the student body of St. Andrews University, May 1997.

⁴ Philip Gordon published an article on this subject appropriately entitled ‘Uncommon Foreign and Security Policy’ in *International Security*,

⁵ The exact meaning of the term ‘Europe’ is defined in many different ways. See, Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder, London, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 10 - 14. In this dissertation the term is used to denote varying areas and the definitions are hence set forth in each case as necessary.

⁶ The Maastricht Treaty left Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy outside of the framework of the European Communities. This construct was known as the pillar approach in that there were three separate pillars supporting the European Union. The opposing camp favoured the ‘tree’ approach where the trunk was one undivided mass that supported the various branches. The decision of whether or not to pursue the ‘pillar’ or ‘tree’ approach became a bone of contention between those who favoured integration – the ‘tree’ camp, and those who favoured leaving some matters in an intergovernmental framework – the ‘pillar’ camp.

⁷ History suggests that the basis of the deep-seated relations between the U.S. and Europe is much more than the product of an alliance against a common external threat. The relationship is based in history on trade and competition for economic influence.

Miles Kahler and Werner Link, Europe and America: A Return to History, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996.

⁸ Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age, Novato, California, Presidio Printers, 1998.

⁹ The nine principles of war: mass, objective, offense, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, simplicity and security, are delineated in this landmark book. COL John Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, London, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1928.

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¹⁴ The European and U.S. defence manufacturing industries are discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

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Chapter Two: Existing Trends In The Development Of European Security Institutions As Indicators For The Future

1. Introduction

“With its six hundred miles of coastline and scores of accessible islands, Yugoslavia has much of the appeal of an undiscovered Greece. Certainly it's an inexpensive place to visit and an easy, hospitable country to travel around.”

*Yugoslavia: The Rough Guide [1990]*¹

Less than a decade after the writing of this travel brochure Yugoslavia hardly resembles the picturesque holiday destination described above. Thousands of people are dead, millions more displaced, the country divided, the infrastructure in ruins and 90% of buildings damaged or destroyed.² The fact that, while the rest of Western Europe wallowed in indecision, all of these tragedies occurred in a European country where prior to the war “college education was common place and many families owned two cars,”³ serves to

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polarise and intensify the debate regarding the nature of Europe's political role.

In the 1990's the question: "What should be done, and by whom, to ameliorate the conflict in former Yugoslavia?" was frequently debated. Integrationists assert that the European Union must exercise political power commensurate with its economic might.⁴ This dissertation argues that there was never a better time to make good on the 'promise of integration theory' than the 1990's when the circumstances in Europe demanded intervention. The conflict in Yugoslavia arguably⁵ provided a real need for concerted action. The communist system collapsed in the Soviet Union and this lead to a high level of co-operation between the Superpowers in the United Nations. This made it easier to undertake military operations world wide without the risk of surrogate conflicts. The 'velvet

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revolution' also created the need for creative measures to bring Russia and other states into the realm of liberal democracies with market economies. Western Europe had ample opportunity to engage in virtually whatever manner of military operation to diminish the human suffering in former Yugoslavia it chose.

In the winter of 1994 Martin Woollacott, a freelance reporter, wrote of the conflict in former Yugoslavia:

*"The unwillingness of the Muslim 'victims' to lay down and die has destroyed the worst of Western plans ... panic is setting in ... The British and French are flying kites about military withdrawal ... The European Parliament has called for Lord Owen's dismissal as Chief Negotiator ... the UN is in open conflict with the French Government and suspicion and resentment between the United States and Europe over Bosnia has risen to an unprecedented level."*⁶

This summation of the situation in Bosnia at what was arguably the height of Western indecision indicates that disagreements over the role of the UN, NATO, the

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U.S. and the European Union hampered efforts to ameliorate the conflict in Bosnia. The greatest responsibility, however, for the death and destruction there must rest with the intractable differences among the peoples of the region. The genocide that occurred in Bosnia is the result of extreme prejudices and until those are crushed out more of the same will surely come. Still, it was a great opportunity for the European Union to show what it was really capable of and nothing happened.

It was nevertheless insinuated that the European Union members' inability to act in unison was the fault of inadequate European institutional arrangements with the ensuing assertion that only NATO could provide a solution.⁷ NATO leadership is a prerequisite for successful military action in Out of Area operations; but it is also noteworthy that NATO now enlists the

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help of many non-NATO countries. Operation Joint Endeavour was NATO lead but it comprised troops from 17 non-NATO countries.⁸ (*see Table 2.1*) To be sure, this is an important indicator for future joint military action. Whether the European partners will co-operate in more areas and more effectively if existing institutions are improved or new ones are created is very much dependent on the issue area. The problem for the security institutions is not that the European Union would not have more coherent foreign policy if it had a supranational body to make that policy, the problem is that states are unwilling to create such a powerful institution as long as they feel they can protect their sovereignty better without it. Once the European Union members come to the conclusion that the only way to protect their sovereignty is to join

forces then they will truly be a force to be reckoned with.

Table 2.1 Troop contributions to Operation Joint Endeavour⁹

United States	20,000	Poland	900
United Kingdom	13,000	Czech Republic	800
France	10,000	Russia	2,000
Germany	4,000	Lithuania	30
Italy	2,300	Malaysia	1,800
Norway	1,000	Pakistan	3,200
Spain	1,250	Hungary	500
Portugal	900	Slovakia	300 - 400
Netherlands	2,100	Ukraine	500
Greece	1,000	Finland	450
Denmark	800	Sweden	870
Turkey	1,500	Estonia	30
Canada	1,000	Latvia	150
Belgium	1,000	Austria	250
Luxembourg	22	Bangladesh	1,200

While the tractability of the changed security environment is a recurring theme, as is the discussion of the utility of institutional developments, the main

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argument of this chapter is that the Europeans did not have the institutional arrangements in place capable of matching their stated ambitions in the 1990s. There are, moreover, identifiable trends in the development of an ESDI - be they institutional or state-sponsored initiatives - which provide an analytical basis for suppositions about future developments. The principal explanations for the phlegmatic development of the European security institutions are discussed in Chapter Three and they are equally important as indicators for possible future developments. The CFSP, WEU and OSCE are the focus of the institutionally oriented section of this chapter, since NATO will be discussed mainly in Chapters Four and Five, and because it is useful to analyse the European security institutions that were most prevalent in the 1990s as a group.

Good -
this could be
brought out
more

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It is further argued that the Europeans have worked together in other ways to improve the prospects for peace and stability in wider Europe but, these initiatives have not always been successful. Looking at developments in the previously mentioned institutions alone does not fully or accurately reflect the overall *persona* of the institutional arm of the European Security and Defence Identity. The effects of co-operation of the European partners in providing economic aid and assistance through the EBRD and the PHARE programme, as well as co-operation in the Council of Europe, are presented as further substantive, although less readily identifiable, contributions to the developing ESDI.

2. Trends in the development of European security institutions

The overall trend in the development of the three main European security organisations in the 1990s, the CFSP, the WEU and the OSCE, was one of incremental increases in actual operational capabilities, such as out-of-area capabilities for the WEU. These small increases are outstripped by a consistent increase in functional institutional arrangements such as increasing the frequency of meetings and adding new working groups to existing machinery. In short, the institutions were growing faster than their ability to take action. Each of these institutions suffered from one or more fundamental flaws that rendered them incapable of fully realising their stated goals. The apparent inability of decision-makers to solve these fundamental problems, opting instead for cosmetic reparations, has arguably created a popular perception of sluggishness and ineffectiveness. Quite apart from

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the fact that this represents a wasted opportunity, this lead to two main problems. First, decision-makers became complacent, taking the “Since we can’t fix it and we must be seen to act, we will simply tinker with it” attitude. This attitude also results in part from the role of media. There is considerable attention focussed on IGCs. Taking no action at an IGC would be a political disaster, so leaders take small steps to save face.

One senior Brussels bureaucrat, who wishes to remain anonymous, said in March of 1996 that the changes to the CFSP, then due to be discussed at the 1996 IGC, would “simply be sand in the eyes of the people.” thus admitting the fact that, at the highest level, significant numbers of politicians were resigned to the fact that significant improvement would be nearly impossible at the IGC which followed.

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Second, public support for common European foreign and security policy, which was high in 1992, [see *Table 2.2*] was inevitably diminished by the torrential flow of negative press regaling the public with the continuing saga of the EU's impotence in Yugoslavia, Albania, the Great Lakes Region¹⁰ in Africa and Kosovo. While there is a serious dearth of democratic practice and transparency in the European Union institutions at present, there is evidence to suggest that national public opinion does influence European political co-operation.¹¹ Decreases in public support, therefore, while having a negligible effect in the short run, pose potential problems for the success of the political ambitions of the majority of European leaders in the long run.

Table 2.2 “Are you in favour of the EC, as a political union, assuming responsibility for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC, or for a common security and defence policy?”¹²

	FOREIGN SECURITY			
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Belgium	62	17	72	13
Denmark	48	43	52	40
Germany	61	23	73	13
Greece	58	23	65	20
Spain	56	18	65	12
France	59	27	73	17
Ireland	49	24	47	29
Italy	73	8	78	7
Luxembourg	66	18	72	13
Netherlands	64	24	82	10
Portugal	58	14	68	8
United Kingdom	44	38	55	31

A. The Common Foreign and Security Policy

The CFSP, as established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU),¹³ was intended to be a well thought out, purposeful response to the changing security environment in Europe. Instead it was another in a long line of incremental institutional developments

resulting from compromises between different visions of the purpose and scope that the European Union should have.¹⁴ Federalists argued for an integrated policymaking body: states held their ground.

Integrationists, unwilling to accept that the states' differences pose a significant obstacle to common action, offered their own rationale for this less than satisfactory outcome. They argued that, at the time of writing the proposals for the CFSP that were eventually adopted as legal text in the TEU,¹⁵ the ramifications of the end of the Cold War were not well understood.¹⁶ There is, however, little support for this theory as an explanation for the less than adequate parameters of the CFSP as established by the TEU,¹⁷ especially given the repeat performance of wrangling in the 1996/1997 IGC.¹⁸

These differences among the Member States concern:¹⁹

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- perceptions about the need for a common policy for foreign and security matters,
- the reason and purpose of a European Security and Defence Identity,
- the incorporation of a provision for “the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence”,²⁰
- the threats posed to European security,
- the manner in which security and foreign policy matters should be dealt with, and
- the role the EU institutions should play in decision making in this most sensitive area.²¹

The reasons for the differences between the members will be examined in detail in Chapter Three.

Given the variety and scope of differences, the only evolutionary path left to decision-makers is one of

compromise - forgoing the benefit of an overall strategic approach. This was as true in the 1990's as it is likely to be in the future. Just as the debate in the United States still rages 200 years after its foundation over how much power should be in the hands of the states and how much in the hands of the federal government, so too the debate over federalism will continue in the European Union. This situation necessarily led to problems with the functioning of the CFSP.

Because of their differences the best the European partners could do was to tinker with the functional institutional mechanisms of the Union's foreign policy making body. The CFSP was not a new, purpose built policy but rather a 'toothless amalgam'²² of provisions that, on the whole, codified practices that had existed

in its forerunner, European Political Co-operation (EPC).²³

Virtually all the parties that ventured opinions on the CFSP's functioning,²⁴ including its authors,²⁵ criticised the CFSP. Even the European Parliament went so far as to describe it as 'embarrassing'.²⁶

The range of both criticisms and proposed solutions varied considerably; however, it is important to note that the CFSP has enjoyed some limited success in agreeing joint actions. These include: agreements about dual use goods, initiating the 1995 NPT talks, monitoring elections in the Middle East, Russia and South Africa to ensure that they were free and fair, the convoying of humanitarian aid²⁷ to Bosnia-Herzegovina, organising the administration of Mostar²⁸ and the integration of the police force there. The Western European Union provided support for the

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Mostar operation;²⁹ however, the Mostar case has only been a qualified success, with Croat and Muslim divisions continuing in reality and NATO Peacekeepers coming under fire.³⁰ These were small successes but they were at least common actions. The Treaty on European Union describes a common policy which “cover(s) all areas of foreign and security policy.” These qualified achievements did not live up to this description.³¹ There is also a very long list of policy issues that the European partners could not agree to take action on.

The most significant flaw in the design of the CFSP was the fact that it was fundamentally intergovernmental in nature. All decisions were taken unanimously.³² This fact is often cited, particularly by integrationists, as a major reason for the inability of the European Union to do more.³³ Integrationists argue

that if the CFSP had been incorporated into the Community, and was therefore subject to supranational control, it would have been more effective. They also wish to see it funded from the Community budget and used to serve the needs of the Community as a whole, rather than reflecting disproportionately the interests of individual members. If this happened, it can be argued that the EU could accomplish much more than it was able to the 1990's. At least a handful of members will not agree to this. Since this situation remains hypothetical, an analysis of the validity of these claims cannot be conclusive; however, it is safe to say, based on the functioning of other common policies,³⁴ that they are probably correct. The fact remains, however, that, as Chapter Three will demonstrate, a multitude of factors, but primarily national interests, will prevent the incorporation of foreign and security policy into the

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Community framework until members see it as the better path to securing as much sovereignty as possible in an increasingly complex world.

In the CFSP framework Ministers had the option of deciding on one of three ‘actions’ to take. They were able to choose to take a:

1. Common Position, in which case the Member States are obligated to ensure that their national policies conform and so no action is actually taken by the Union *per se*;
2. Joint Declaration, which is more or less simply a statement on paper and again involves no ‘action’ on the part of the Union, or
3. Joint Action, in which case the activity is undertaken by a coalition of appropriate Member States, as in the convoying of humanitarian assistance to former Yugoslavia.

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Thus, the CFSP was more or less a talking shop, and that is why the Member States elected to make the WEU the Union's 'action' arm. As will be shown, though, the WEU had problems of its own.

The functional aspects of the institutional framework were also problematic. For example, the Political Committee, which advised the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC, remained in place. It duplicated the work of the COREPER, the body of permanent representatives responsible for preparing the meetings of the General Affairs Council. This overlap occurred because the TEU amalgamated the Foreign Ministers meetings in EPC with the meetings of the General Affairs Council³⁵ but did not amalgamate COREPER and the Political Committee. The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty did not address this predictable duplication of effort and this institutional conundrum

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stands out as a blaring example of Member States inability to agree upon even fundamental structural aspects of institutional arrangements.

The differences that propagate the present disagreements and resultant weak institutions are in evidence throughout the post-WWII history of the West Europeans attempts to build a European political identity. The international security environment today is very different from that of the 1950's when the plans for the European Defence Community³⁶ failed to be ratified by the French National Assembly because of fears about German rearmament.³⁷ It is also very different from the 1960's when the Fouchet Plan³⁸ could not get past the negotiating stage because of disagreement over whether the European Community should have an integrated or intergovernmental framework.³⁹ It is different from the 1970's when the

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Tindeman's Report⁴⁰ was all but ignored because it was thought to be too radical an idea.⁴¹ It is even different from the 1980's when the failure of the Genscher Colombo Initiative⁴² lead to the reactivation of the Western European Union⁴³ as a second best option. It is even different from the early 1990's when there was considerable uncertainty about the future prospects for European security in light of the relative novelty of the 'Velvet Revolution'. The fact that there have been several thwarted attempts to build a common European foreign and security policy and a common defence against the background of changed international security concerns, leads to the conclusion that intractable differences exist between the Member States of the EU. Differences that have always prevented them from creating such an organisation,

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and that will continue to hamper their attempts in the future.

In sum, the development of the CFSP was slow and incremental during the 1990's:

1. the institutions of the EU have not significantly increased their power in the decision making process over the years,
2. Joint Actions and Common Positions are not markedly different from the tools of the EPC,
3. the framework for co-operation remains intergovernmental, and
4. the budget for CFSP comes in part from the Member States on an *ad hoc* basis and in part from the Community budget. This prevents European Parliamentary oversight of the CFSP budget

B. The Western European Union (WEU)

“Of all the organisations currently existing in the world, the Western European Union (WEU) must be one of those whose length of existence is the most inversely proportional to the actual functions that it has fulfilled.”⁴⁴

This appraisal highlighted the fundamental flaw in the strategy of the WEU, namely that the Organisation lacked a functional imperative. There was simply not an urgent need for the WEU to assume the tasks for which it set about preparing to undertake as a result of the mandate of the Maastricht Declaration. Awkwardly for the WEU, the leaders of NATO furthermore, chose to consider undertaking the very missions the WEU proposed to fulfil. Given NATO’s size and experience, the WEU was simply outclassed. It is argued here however that experience gained by the Europeans via WEU helped to shape the steps they are

taking today. Any experience one learns from is not a total loss.

The WEU has always deferred to NATO in military matters,⁴⁵ and although it had recourse to more NATO assets,⁴⁶ making the fulfilment of ‘Petersberg Tasks’ possible, there was no doubt that the WEU allies would continue to maintain the primacy of NATO.⁴⁷

The Maastricht Treaty assigned the role of preparing for “the eventual framing of a common defence policy that might in time lead to a common defence” to the WEU. Table 2.3, however, clearly demonstrates that there was only a negligible public appetite for a European army for the purpose of common defence. On the other hand, there was considerable support for the Europeans to undertake a more active role in the defence of human rights and in peacekeeping “by firm intervention” as part of out-of-area operations. NATO

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staged its first Combined Joint Task Force exercise in Germany in November 1997⁴⁸ and the WEU did undertake CRISEX in 1997 but this was a purely paper exercise.⁴⁹

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Table 2.3: Top Priorities for the European Union⁵⁰

	Defence of human rights		Peacekeep- ing by firm intervention		European Army, Common Defence	
	+	-	+	-	+	-
Belgium	73	20	72	21	40	46
Denmark	88	11	75	21	21	75
Germany	80	15	76	16	33	56
Greece	85	11	89	7	67	26
Spain	83	10	85	8	45	43
France	86	11	86	11	53	38
Ireland	85	9	77	11	36	47
Italy	82	11	81	12	49	38
Luxembourg	83	10	82	11	50	39
Netherlands	88	10	72	23	38	58
Portugal	74	17	78	16	38	50
United Kingdom	74	18	73	19	31	58
Austria	76	15	76	15	37	48
Sweden	88	9	80	15	22	69
Finland	86	10	76	18	17	76

The U.S. Ambassador to NATO once referred to the Western European Union as a “structure in search of content.”⁵¹ Attempts to devise new roles for the organisation rarely stood up to scrutiny, as Clifford Beal, Editor of Jane’s Defence Review, noted:

*"Now WEU officials are contriving new justifications for WEU involvement including: using the WEU as a 'bridge' between the EU and NATO, as a 'halfway house' for Eastern European countries seeking NATO membership, but which won't rile Russia; and as regional 'Euro-police', leaving external threats to NATO. None of these arguments withstand rigorous examination."*⁵²

Integrationists, and those with a vested interest in maintaining the WEU, argued⁵³ that the Europeans may want, or be required by circumstance, to carry out military missions without the involvement of the United States. Hence, the need arises for an organisation other than NATO to be in place to perform such duties as and when they arise. There is little compelling evidence, however, to support this argument, inasmuch as it is intensely unlikely that the ten full members of the WEU would elect to carry out a major military operation outside of NATO, considering that they are all full members of NATO.

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This is not to say, however, that the Europeans should not continue to develop a military force for rapid responses to crisis.

It is difficult to imagine a scenario that seriously threatens European security where the U.S. does not become involved.⁵⁴ U.S. and European interests are bound up with one another. Philip Gordon, Fellow for U.S. Security Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London - and author of some of the most insightful literature about the WEU, argues⁵⁵ that if the Europeans did have a relatively capable organisation, its very existence might spur the U.S. to ensure it did not become involved in a crisis it could not handle – primarily due to Article V considerations.

The logic being that the U.S. would probably have to bail it out if it did. In fact, if leverage is what the Europeans seek, then to be sure there are less

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convoluted ways to ensure U.S. participation. From the perspective of the 1990s, the most obvious means of inviting a continued U.S. presence in Europe was for the European Allies to use their slim defence budgets to provide assets NATO lacked. Similarly, building a modest military capability that could handle Out of Area operations that would compliment NATO. The concluding sections of this dissertation suggest that this is exactly what is now happening. The WEU was not capable of undertaking any large mission and it seemed unlikely that it would be capable of doing so in the foreseeable future.

This was primarily because the members would not give it the resources it needed.

It is possible to envision scenarios in which European assistance, rather than NATO assistance, is more likely to yield positive results, such as missions to regions in

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the former Soviet Union. The leap from the reasoning to the capability was, however, at least in the 1990's, out-with the grasp of the WEU.

The greatest ratio of success to effort and expenditure can be achieved if European leaders rely on realistic assessments of capabilities, and if they take advantage of their ability to learn from the experiences of the U.S. and UN about the political and economic requirements of undertaking 'Petersberg missions'.⁵⁶

There are at least two ways in which the Western European Union could have realistically contributed appreciably to European security, according to Philip Zelikow, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University. The WEU could have galvanised public support for specifically European defence operations with effective public relations, and it could have expanded the range of activities European states

could have undertaken outside NATO. According to Zelikow, however, there is little evidence that either occurred.⁵⁷ The first part of Zelikow's analysis is compromised by the fact that there is no need to raise public support for joint European military operations, in view of the fact that European publics give high priority to 'defence of human rights' and 'peacekeeping by firm intervention', the Petersberg tasks which the WEU was supposed to be able to undertake (*See Table 2.3*). The Press and Information Office of the WEU furthermore, was approximately as industrious as that of any other comparable organisation.

Zelikow's second contention, that the WEU was well placed to develop specifically European military capabilities, bears further consideration. It is also flawed, however, inasmuch as there is no justification

for the development, outside the NATO framework, of the large scale military capabilities required to undertake the Petersberg missions of peacekeeping, peace enforcement/making and armed humanitarian assistance. This is because to undertake such missions, a large number of highly trained, well-equipped forces with excellent support are required. NATO has such a force. The Europeans, acting outside the NATO framework, do not.

The United Nations discovered this painful reality in Bosnia, as did the U.S. in Somalia. Such missions do require the use of military force for more than the mere defence of the troops, and more rather than less force is required simply to defend their troops in Out of Area operations. In 1994, despite the use of its ultimate weapon - NATO air strikes - against the Serbs, who surrounded and shelled the UN safe area of Gorazde,⁵⁸

the United Nations was unable to protect its own UNPROFOR⁵⁹ troops or the proclaimed safe haven of Gorazde.⁶⁰ In the preceding days and weeks General Sir Michael Rose repeatedly called for more troops to be sent to Bosnia but was only moderately successful in obtaining more forces.⁶¹ The United States became involved in Somalia in 1992, initially in a humanitarian capacity, after a civil war in the country resulted in famine conditions. The United States subsequently withdrew its forces from Somalia after 18 members of the Rangers and Delta Force were killed.⁶² Almost 100 troops were injured and two UH-60 helicopters were destroyed on 3 October 1993 in a street battle. As a result the United States began to invest in body armour and weapons systems which would afford greater protection to its forces in Out of Area operations.⁶³ To embark on such missions with

the notion that the troops only need to be lightly armed and that military force for anything other than their protection will not be required, is not only naive but dangerous.

Considering the principles of the Maastricht Declaration⁶⁴ and the tasks set forth in the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU did slowly construct a framework of permanent structures designed to facilitate the conduct of Petersberg Missions. Although these were ultimately not enough to ensure the survival of the institution, they did serve as a useful framework to build on. In the 1990's years the WEU:

- moved its headquarters to Brussels,
- established a defence Planning Cell with more than 50 staff,⁶⁵

- compiled a list of military units which could be made answerable to the WEU in certain circumstances (FAWEU),⁶⁶
- established the WEU satellite data interpretation centre at Torrejon, Spain,⁶⁷
- established regular meetings of relevant military officials from NATO and the WEU,
- developed comprehensive military exercises,⁶⁸
- established the Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and
- developed a 24-hour situation centre.⁶⁹

Despite this impressive list of developments, however, the WEU did not demonstrate the ability to actually successfully undertake a humanitarian, peace enforcement or peace making operation, as opposed to a traditional peacekeeping mission where lightly

armed, impartial forces are sent to a region with the consent of concerned parties.

In the first half of 1997 the European Union failed to take decisive action to prevent the crisis in Albania from deteriorating into chaos, just as it failed to take decisive action in Bosnia in 1991. Albania slid into anarchy because many Albanians lost their life savings when pyramid investment schemes collapsed. The EU sent emissaries, as did the OSCE and Italian Government. Diplomacy was moderately successful⁷⁰ but the EU refused to offer financial assistance based on the fact that the Commission had warned the Albanian Government of the danger of these investment schemes.⁷¹ An *ad hoc* force was ultimately assembled and the country was back on track relatively quickly. As the developments in Kosovo, Macedonia and FYROM indicate, the Balkans is a tinder box and

it will likely plague Europe for some time to come.

There is plenty of room in the Balkans for European Union lead assistance efforts.⁷² These serve as poignant examples of the dearth of European capability despite the Integrationists' rhetoric.

The most probable and practicable military deployment a European force is likely to undertake in the estimable future is for humanitarian purposes to Central Europe, especially in territories near to the Russian border. This is because NATO forces are likely to be less gladly received in that region. Missions are likely to be small at first because, despite the politicians stated ambitions, the military establishment knows how dangerous it is to send an ill-equipped force on an Out of Area operation.

Given the fact that the ESDI consists of far more than the ability to deploy military force, there was a very

important role the WEU did play in the 1990's. It developed the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO).⁷³ Created by Ministers in November 1996,⁷⁴ the WEAO came into effect on 1 April 1997. Although it is rather early in its development to evaluate its progress,⁷⁵ the Organisation has the legal authority to place contracts and as such it is hoped that it will facilitate the smooth transition to a true European Armaments Agency in the future.⁷⁶ As European Union opposition to the merger of Boeing with McDonnell Douglas⁷⁷ indicated, there will be major turf battles to be fought and this organisation has the potential to help the ESDI develop.

The European Union, by nature of its size and economic prowess, will be pitted against the U.S. at least some of the time. This sort of 'battle' is arguably

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potentially much more of a threat to the Atlantic Alliance than developing a separate European force which can assist in the attainment of the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.⁷⁸

Another thing the WEU does well, and something it will probably continue to excel at, is facilitate co-operation with other countries. In December, 1996, a proposal to create closer co-operation with Japan in civilian and military space programmes was adopted by the WEU Assembly and will became part of national policies.⁷⁹ The proposal, forwarded by the French Parliamentarian Jean Valleiz, was aimed at "loosening Japanese dependence on the U.S.."⁸⁰ The development of better space observation capabilities presents a very good opportunity for the European Allies to develop a more equal role in the transatlantic partnership, given the U.S. superiority in the field at

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present. The best result, however, that can be hoped for in the short to medium term, is a slight narrowing of the gap between the U.S. and European capabilities, given the enormous lead the U.S. has and the fact that the Europeans are cutting defence budgets.⁸¹

In conclusion then, the WEU was making the most progress in facilitating the development of the ESDI by propagating good relations with third countries and developing a European arms agency. It is the wife of fifteen husbands and subject to the needs of the states who are its Members. If the WEU survives the next twenty years, it is these areas that it is likely to be most useful in rather than in the field of developing military forces. States will progress in this area when they perceive that it is their interest to do so. The WEU is no better placed than any other institution to overcome this major challenge. Thus, the future prospects for the

WEU as they appeared in the late 1990's were best summed up by Phillip Gordon:

"...the most likely scenario for the future is that WEU will remain on the course it has been on for some time - pronouncing itself relevant, making symbolic deployments to prove it, doing a few missions here and there, and very slowly building up its actual capabilities; all the while leaving - both by choice and necessity - the most important tasks of European security in the hands of NATO and the U.S.."⁸²

C. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE is the most inclusive of the European security institutions.⁸³ This is the source of its most persistent problems, as well as its greatest potential benefits.⁸⁴ On one hand, the OSCE provides a forum for discussion and agreement amongst the widest, although still regional, group of states concerned with European security. On the other hand, the sheer number of members makes reaching agreements much

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more difficult. The OSCE Lisbon Summit of December 1996 provides a good example of both the potential and disadvantage that the sheer size of the membership of the Organisation involves. Ministers concluded the Summit with an agreement to develop a new security model for the 21st century⁸⁵ and a modified arms reduction pact that more accurately reflects the decreased military tensions in post Cold War Europe.⁸⁶ These were both ambitious and worthy projects. The summit, however, nearly ended in a debacle. Armenia and Azerbaijan, which disagreed over the status of Nagorno Karabakh⁸⁷ - a mountain enclave populated mostly by ethnic Armenians but situated in Azerbaijan that has seen fighting over the last eight years take 20,000 lives⁸⁸ - threatened to veto summit proposals unless the issue was resolved to their respective satisfactions. In the end Azerbaijan's

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President Aliev received firm recognition of the fact that Nagorno Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, although there was no firm statement on the governance of the enclave. President Aliev also received a separate statement regretting Armenia's refusal to compromise from the OSCE Chairman in Office. This is an excellent example of the kind of self-interested state behaviour that exists in all the European institutions. This sort of bargaining occurs in almost all decision making bodies, but, the larger the organisation, the greater the chance that projects will be held up by members who wish to see action on some other, often unrelated, matter.

The OSCE, as a forum for discussion, lends itself to the peaceful resolution of a wide range of security related issues including; arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security building measures

(CSBM's), protection of human rights and election monitoring.⁸⁹ The Organisation's most salutary role in these areas is as a neutral party. In this sense the OSCE is very different from the WEU or CFSP. In fact, when the Organisation attempts to play a more definitive role it is quickly accused of being partial. For example, the OSCE was responsible for monitoring elections in Albania after upheaval in 1997 left 1,500 dead and the country in disarray.⁹⁰ Previously, the OSCE, spurred on by the claims of the defeated Socialist Party, first called into question the results of the elections held in May 1996 that returned President Sali Berisha and the Democratic Party to power.⁹¹ In June 1997 the Socialists won the first round of parliamentary elections and President Berisha stepped down.⁹² The OSCE could not call the results of these elections 'free' and 'fair' due to widespread

allegations of vote rigging and intimidation⁹³ The OSCE monitors were also prevented from travelling to vast parts of the country to observe the elections:⁹⁴ The OSCE therefore, chose to claim that the results were “adequate and acceptable.” The Organisation is in a difficult position in such circumstances since it essentially had three options. First, they could call the elections ‘free and fair’ and, despite the odd protest, the international community is relatively happy and life gets back to normal. The Organisation loses credibility and its future utility diminishes for sanctioning an inaccurate result. The second option would have been for the OSCE to say the elections were not free and fair, in which case the upheaval in the country would have been prolonged. The choice of this option was made even more difficult when considering the fact that it is unlikely that ‘freer’ or ‘fairer’ elections could

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have been held in a country where gangs of armed gunmen and the Mafia clearly ruled large areas.⁹⁵

Finally, the OSCE could have said, as they did in this case, that the elections were ‘acceptable’. The Organisation is not deceiving the international community, but they are leaving room for the acceptance of the results and the return to relative normalcy in Albania. This was the best outcome given the circumstances, but it denotes the fact that the presence of the OSCE does not mean that elections will be free and fair. The Organisation does not have the ability to *ensure* that elections are free and fair, nor is it mandated to do so. It is just an observer.

Arms control in Europe has been given a colossal boost by the dramatic abatement of tension between the Super Powers since 1989. In a climate so conducive to arms control negotiations, it is difficult to

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imagine the OSCE not being able to arrange some arms control and disarmament agreements. The OSCE has sponsored several rounds of negotiations, including the negotiations of the Pact on Stability in Europe⁹⁶ and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty.⁹⁷ The Organisation could hardly fail given the rate at which states were disarming. In fact, a more worrisome tangent to this phenomenon is how exactly the Russian Federation is disposing of the sheer volume of nuclear warheads it has become responsible for.⁹⁸ The point here is that there are limits to what the OSCE can do but this is certainly part of the ESDI as defined in this dissertation. It has a useful role in building security and will continue to be an asset of the Members of the EU as well as to the U.S.

The most difficult tasks undertaken by the OSCE were the regional arms control measures for Bosnia

Herzegovina.⁹⁹ Five parties - Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska - signed the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control on 14 June 1996 in Florence. This agreement set the permitted levels of armaments in five categories: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery greater than 75 mm, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The agreed reductions were undertaken in two phases that were supposed to be completed by October 1997. Both the negotiation and implementation phase of the Florence Agreement ended with the desired outcome even though the process was not without its difficulties. For example the Federation of Yugoslavia cut the number of tanks it possessed by a greater number than it agreed to in the first phase of reductions,¹⁰⁰ but by June of 1997 had

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only met a small portion of second phase reduction liabilities through exports. Recognising, furthermore, that there were certain discrepancies in data reporting, Ambassador Vigliek Eide, Special Representative of the Chairman in Office and Head of the Arms Control Negotiations, said at a press briefing in May 1997:

"We continue to underline to all Parties the vital importance of correct and complete reporting of the armaments limited by the Agreement, and will continue to raise this with the Parties at various levels. We have established close co-operation with SFOR to assist us with this within Bosnia and Herzegovina."

The difficulties encountered, and the well-documented intractable differences between the signatory Parties to the Florence Agreement, arguably make the success of this Agreement more substantial than that of other agreements.

Effective conflict prevention and crisis management strategy depends in part on the expeditious and fluent

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movement from receipt of early warning to action.¹⁰¹

OSCE decisions are generally based on consensus and it often takes time to overcome objections and persuade all the members to agree. States act in their own interest and this forum does not try to negate this factor rather it tries to find ways to solicit agreement in light of the fact. In recognition of this aforementioned need for expeditious action, the OSCE has developed a series of mechanisms¹⁰² that are triggered by a limited number of states and provide a phased approach to conflict prevention. This may provide a guide for future developments in a state based decision-making framework. The mechanisms are designed to initially facilitate clarification of the situation through dialogue amongst the involved parties and, if necessary, to lay the foundations of an OSCE mission to the region.

The reality of this attempt to circumvent the consensus

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requirement, however, is that some mechanisms are opposed by OSCE members and therefore do not have the full weight of the Organisation behind them. For example, the United Kingdom and Spain refused to sign the 1992 OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration because of their continuing dispute over Gibraltar.¹⁰³ States object to the OSCE being given a legal basis, object to the fact that they can be subjected to unsolicited and binding arbitration and see no need for another institution to be created given the existence of the International Court of Justice.¹⁰⁴ The Court of Arbitration and Conciliation has not been a hub of activity primarily due to the fact that any state that uses it does so voluntarily.¹⁰⁵

These mechanisms are a start in conflict management where those conflicts have not escalated to violence, but they are certainly not a solution. For the European

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Union to have a true ESDI it must be able to access a more effective mechanism than those listed above and that is where the development of a military force comes into its own. The OSCE's ability to facilitate the settlement of crisis once they have flared into open hostilities, such as the crisis in Chechnya,¹⁰⁶ is limited to reporting and monitoring the conflict. This is an important niche in the market that the Organisation fulfils quite well due to its large membership.

The Organisation, however, runs the risk of being used as a pawn for political and material gains by Member States in such situations. The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya¹⁰⁷ provides a useful case study of the potential ancillary benefits a state may hope to gain by asking for the involvement of the OSCE. The Russian government's request for the OSCE Assistance Group for the conflict in Chechnya allowed an international

organisation to be involved in what Moscow regards as a domestic conflict.¹⁰⁸

It is conceivable that Russia may have seen the need for an objective international body to mediate and monitor the dispute;¹⁰⁹ however, it is much more likely that Moscow foresaw additional benefits to be gained by inviting the OSCE to become involved.¹¹⁰ First, Russia would arguably gain a useful bargaining chip for the future by being able to point to its compliance with the principles of the OSCE on this occasion. This is a weak point because Russia does not actually gain any ‘tools’ to force another state to change its policy. It merely has a stronger argument when trying to change state’s positions to agree with those of the OSCE in the future.¹¹¹ The second possible ulterior motive for Russia to ask the OSCE to send personnel to Chechnya is that Russia would theoretically be in a

stronger position to advocate the involvement of the OSCE in another country in future. This card would be especially advantageous in the event of an altercation involving Russian interests; for example, disputes involving a Diaspora of ethnic Russians living in another OSCE Member State. This is a good example of states using international institutions to further their own interests. They are not under any pretence of working toward some idealised Europe as integrationists suggest. Third, Russia's opportunities to influence the Organisation increase in direct proportion to the amount of work Russia does with the Organisation. While Russia and indeed other Member States will inevitably seek to maximise their interests in the OSCE, the more they work with the Organisation and therefore with one another the less likely conflicts based on misunderstanding are.

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The OSCE's role in CSBMs¹¹² began at the Organisation's inception and is an important one. The Organisation's notable achievements in this field include the arrangement of the negotiation of the *Vienna Document of 1994 on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)* and the *Open Skies Treaty*.¹¹³ CSBMs increase security through verification of capabilities. At the very least this decreases the potential for destabilising arms races resulting from uncertainty, and, at most, potentially paves the way for military co-operation.

The OSCE takes responsibility for monitoring, and in some cases organising, elections¹¹⁴ and as the discussion earlier indicates, this is sometimes a very difficult role. The organisation of elections in Bosnia Herzegovina, with such a large percentage of the population dislocated, was a logistical nightmare.¹¹⁵

The elections were eventually postponed,¹¹⁶ but only after considerable debate.¹¹⁷ The Chairman-in-Office took the decision to postpone the elections because he claimed the climate precluded ‘free and fair’ proceedings.

In sum, the OSCE is only a reflection of the states that comprise it. It cannot perform well if the involved parties have vested interests that conflict. It plays an increasingly important role in maintaining the habit of co-operation among its Members. The OSCE runs into difficulties in much the same way that the UN does. In the future the OSCE’s influence will increase slowly so long as the Organisation stays within the boundaries set for it by the resolve of its members.

3. Non-military Aspects

A variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions contribute to the European Security and

Defence Identity without any involvement of military forces.¹¹⁸ The existence of so many of these organisations makes it difficult to define exactly what falls within the parameters of an ESDI, and what does not.

A. The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (CoE),¹¹⁹ for example, aims to enhance the security of Europe by way of non-military means¹²⁰ through the promotion of the rule of law,¹²¹ the advancement of pluralistic democracy¹²² and promotion of respect for human rights.¹²³ It is particularly concerned with minority rights.¹²⁴ Given the rate at which the Organisation is expanding and the similarity between its objectives and those of the OSCE, duplication of efforts is a foreseeable problem. This lends further credibility to the above argument that the OSCE is likely to make the greatest

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contribution to the ESDI by sticking to its *forte*, preventive diplomacy.

Just as the OSCE appears to have a *niche*, despite a wider remit, the CoE also appears to have a *niche* in the legal field. Understanding how these organisations contribute to the ESDI also contributes to understanding what the European Union needs to do and what is being done by external groups. In order for the new democracies in Europe to reform, governments have to be shown how to be democratic.

Defence Ministries need to learn how to write defence budgets for Parliaments to approve that are more than one line long. This is what the CoE is best at. The European Court of Human Rights, where individuals can bring cases against states,¹²⁵ is perhaps the most well-known of the Council's legal endeavours. The

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CoE plays a less publicised but equally important role in advising legislators.

In support of its' objectives regarding the Balkans, the Council of Europe has begun the process of integrating Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Council of Europe as a full Member. For the 'statelets'¹²⁶ of the former Yugoslavia, entrance into the CoE largely depends on meeting the criteria set forth in the Dayton Agreement.

The Organisation is chiefly confined to suggesting ways the states can improve upon protection of human rights and make progress towards the rule of law. The Parties to the Dayton Accord made very slow progress towards meeting the established criteria in the areas where the CoE was concerned.¹²⁷

The CoE places a great deal of importance on enlarging to include countries of Central and Eastern Europe to spread the Organisations principles to more

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states. In 1996 Russia became the 39th Member of the CoE and Croatia became the 40th.¹²⁸ The Organisation has recognised the fundamental problems it needs to address in the CIS. A report to the Third Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE on this subject stated:

“According to the UNHCR, since 1989, nine million people have been displaced in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), many of them against their will. The scale and complexity of these population movements are unprecedented since the Second World War. They have a variety of causes: economic, social and ecological degradation, armed conflicts, violent nationalism, violations of human rights and of the rights of minorities, insecurity etc. Such displacement has very serious humanitarian consequences and also threatens to undermine the stability and peace of this region.”¹²⁹

The Council of Europe is still trying to raise funds to support programmes targeted at meeting the needs of the region.¹³⁰ Programmes of Co-operation and

Assistance for these countries, intended to give them the means to carry through democratic reforms, join the European Convention on Human Rights and become full partners in the CoE, receive partial joint funding from the European Union.¹³¹ In this way, the European Union is helping to improve security in Europe – but not through the CFSP. This is an extremely important point for this dissertation because it demonstrates just how complex and convoluted the process of developing security and defence policy is and how many different facets there are to organising a broad response to situations as they arise in a still state-centred environment.

B. The European Commission

The most important non-military contribution to security on the European continent since the end of the Cold War arguably comes from the European

Commission in both economic and technical forms. The Commission provided 40% of the original aid to Central and Eastern Europe, although the United States was very influential in terms of financial input and in initially encouraging the Commission to take the lead in the reconstruction process.¹³² The European Commission currently provides financial assistance, trade and investment for Central and Eastern Europe through the PHARE¹³³ programme, and for the New Independent States [NIS] through bilateral arrangements and the TACIS¹³⁴ programme. Through these activities the European Union and the Member States have taken an overwhelming lead as primary external financial partners to these states and in this capacity undeniably help these states on their way to full integration into the world economy with the corresponding benefit of increased security.

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It seems a logical conclusion, therefore, that a representative of the European Commission should at the very least be present in discussions about conflicts or crises which may be assisted by the vast economic resources at the Commission's disposal. Unfortunately, there are at least two major sources of opposition to this practical step. First, the Member States tended to resist the involvement of the European Commission in security and defence oriented discussions because they were concerned that the Commission might find a way to wrangle an increase in decision making ability, or at least more influence, in what is traditionally the domain of state influence. Some States also resist the involvement of the European Commission in security matters because of their trepidation over U.S. perceptions. The U.S. is willing to work with the Member States but there are those in the U.S. who

would resent working with the WEU, for instance, if there was a hint of the European Commission having any ability to influence the proceedings. This resistance is based on states desire to protect their sovereign right to make decisions on defence and security matters as the Realist argue. The European Union represents a supranational authority and there is reluctance to turn over decision making in the security field to such a body. This will only happen when states perceive that the only way to protect their sovereignty is in fact to work within such frameworks Secondly, institutions are by nature territorial, and this often leads to a resistance to having the Commission take part. Given the Commission's history of slowly but surely working its way into the EPC process, it is argued that such suspicions about the European Commission are not unfounded.

**C. The North Atlantic Co-operation Council
(NACC)**

The NACC,¹³⁵ launched in 1991¹³⁶ by the sixteen NATO members and nine other states of the former Soviet Union,¹³⁷ is another example of a forum which contributes to European security without recourse to military means. The NACC identified defence conversion as a helpful step towards economic recovery.¹³⁸ The conversion of defence manufacturing plants into civilian production generates benefits that include: decreasing military expenditure, leading to greater resources being spent on social projects in many instances, and decreased unemployment and improvements in standards of living.¹³⁹ This is a somewhat idealised goal since the conversion is never so clear cut and many countries, especially Russia, suffer from serious problems stemming from

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corruption and organised crime. Further examples of activities undertaken in NACC which add to the overall ESDI include:¹⁴⁰

- regular consultations on political and security related matters, including regional security issues between high ranking members of governments;
- work with co-operation partners on defence budgets and their relationship with the economy, security aspects of economic developments, and defence conversion issues;
- frequent exchanges of information, including: visits, co-sponsored seminars and conferences and publications; and
- co-operative activities in scientific and environmental affairs, including: disarmament technologies, environmental security, high

technology, science and technology policy, and computer networking.¹⁴¹

These activities are all tangential to military aspects of security, yet they all, in one form or another, contribute to the projection of an ESDI and to the maintenance of security across the continent. Military operations and co-operation would arguably be more difficult without these low intensity efforts, and, although these institutions are often accused of being mere talking shops, they are nonetheless active contributors to Europe's security and defence identity.

4. Conclusion

Despite the increase in opportunities for co-operation that European security institutions now provide, it may be that if Europe is any more secure today than it was at the end of the Cold War, it is as a result of a decided lack of threats rather than any institutional

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developments. States were unwilling in the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union to co-operate in the foreign policy and security and defence fields in ways that substantially compromised their sovereignty. States co-operated in institutional frameworks that did contribute to security in Europe but those institutions were intergovernmental in nature.

As Simon Duke notes:

“institutions in and of themselves have no life of their own. It is states, groups and individuals that give them life.”¹⁴²

The threats that do exist are not frequently to the dissolution of states from external forces, but more frequently the fragmentation of states as a result of internal struggles. Increasingly therefore institutions are battling to find a balance between the sanctity of national sovereignty and the need to address the

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increase in internal conflict. Failure to resolve this conflict of interests and the resultant inability to deal effectively with internal unrest, such as the violence witnessed in Albania in 1997, leaves open the possibility of the spill-over of such conflicts along ethnic lines, ignoring borders, as happened in Macedonia. Ethnic Albanians engaged U.S. trained Macedonian Special Forces in a gun battle which left 40 people with serious gunshot wounds, two ethnic Albanian youths dead and over 200 people hospitalised in July 1997.¹⁴³ The tragedy of this event is truly in the fact this was a mere omen of things to come in that region. Decisive, if brutal, action on the part of the Macedonian government at least temporarily quelled the spread of violence.

NATO¹⁴⁴ and the Western European Union have undertaken a wide range of tasks in Bosnia

Herzegovina, and the WEU was very successful in developing and implementing an operation in the Adriatic to enforce UN resolutions.¹⁴⁵ The EU Commission, along with the World Bank, is co-ordinating the international aid effort for reconstruction in Bosnia.¹⁴⁶ The OSCE has likewise had some success in developing Confidence and Security Building Measures, overseeing elections, monitoring human rights and facilitating the negotiation of arms reduction measures. A large part of the violence has been curtailed and the human tragedy has been stunted. Nuisance attacks on peacekeepers persisted in the Balkans in the late 1990's though and there is a clear mandate for a European force.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the establishment of integrated agencies to replace the shattered

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infrastructure of former Yugoslavia have only been marginally successful.

NATO forces remained in Bosnia after the initial 12 month operation envisaged by the Dayton Peace Agreement. A large portion of the Stabilisation Force [SFOR] in Bosnia and Herzegovina were American. This is because the European States lacked the full range of personnel and equipment required for undertaking such an operation.¹⁴⁸ The United Kingdom made it very clear that if the United States forces were pulled out of the region as scheduled in June 1998, then the British forces would also be pulled out. This was also the position of France. NATO forces cannot remain in Bosnia without at least some U.S. personnel required to maintain ‘technical coherence of that operation.’ The majority of security experts advise that a withdrawal of outside forces would lead to either

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renewed fighting or at least partition of former Yugoslavia and hence the failure of the Dayton Peace Agreement. For these reasons, odds are that the U.S. will remain in Bosnia for a protracted mission.¹⁴⁹ President Clinton hinted that troops might remain in Bosnia for quite some time if necessary.¹⁵⁰ The prospect of U.S. withdrawal calls into question the future of the region.¹⁵¹ The future of peace in the Balkans was further imperilled by the foolishness of those who claimed tiny progress as success,¹⁵² and who consistently procrastinated¹⁵³ over the removal of the aggressive forces of, and indeed the personages of, the most important indicted war criminals. Radovan Karadzic,¹⁵⁴ the Bosnian-Serb leader, Dario Kordic, the Bosnian-Croat leader and General Ratko Mladic¹⁵⁵ were free for quite some time after the outright hostilities ended. Carl Bildt, former Swedish Prime

Minister and former High Representative in Bosnia responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord,¹⁵⁶ commented in the New York Times on the move to arrest Simo Drljaca, a former Prejidor Police Chief, and Milan Kovacevic, a hospital director and former deputy mayor of Prejidor.¹⁵⁷ The operation ended in Mr. Drljaca's death. Mr. Buildt wrote:

"During my time as High Representative in Bosnia, I repeatedly urged key governments such as the United States and Britain to be ready to give their forces the orders needed to arrest those indicted of war crimes by The Hague Tribunal. For these arrests to help the peace process, and not just create chaos, they had to be carefully planned and orchestrated with political initiatives. That meant that the first targets had to be the most important war criminals ... I do not know what brought the NATO forces to discount this advice and go for a half baked operation, which turned into what looks like at best a half success. "¹⁵⁸

The attempt to arrest Mr. Drlić may, however, have had greater strategic advantages than are immediately apparent, since it is claimed he has most recently been responsible for ‘cloaking’ other policemen and soldiers accused of war crimes by providing them with false documents and safe houses.¹⁵⁹ His death nonetheless spurred Serbs to rally in support of Slobodan Milošević.¹⁶⁰ If arrests of suspected war criminals are sporadic rather than consistent as part of an on-going policy, then such actions will increase instability in the region.¹⁶¹ Arrests - 19 months after the Dayton Peace Accord was reached - were not enough. Cambodia may act as a lesson for international peace efforts.¹⁶² If malicious forces are not disarmed, if criminals are not punished and if democracy-building measures are not fully implemented, then peace will have less of a chance of lasting in the Balkans.¹⁶³

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Integrationist, primarily German¹⁶⁴ and French,¹⁶⁵ calls for the speedy acquisition of an independent European security and defence capability, which have to date manifest themselves in the institutional developments and compromises detailed above, rely on erroneous assumptions about political will, and denote an apparent reluctance to afford appropriate weight to the financial, logistical and socially constructed barriers to planning and conducting military operations.

During the Cold War the presence of high levels of United States troops and the affiliations of West European states in NATO was justified by the threat the USSR posed. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union it may be reasoned that calls for an independent European security and defence capability make more sense. It has been argued that the Europeans were embarrassed at their lack of ability to deal with

situations like Albania and Kosovo. After all, all-out war is an anomaly in history. With the reduced threat of a European war, such as occurred in WWI and WWII, there is much discussion in the U.S. and Europe of countering new types of threats. Such a reorganisation of force can be used as an argument for the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force. And for a change in the structure of NATO and U.S. forces. This rationale appeals to United States Congressmen as well as independently minded European leaders. European decision-makers' collective inability to deal effectively with the destruction of former Yugoslavia without U.S. leadership is often held up as an example of their inadequacy to deal with new threats to European security. It should however, also be noted that, even with the American presence, the crisis is by no means

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over, and tensions still threaten to bubble over into open conflict. Furthermore, European forces make up 80% of the force in Kosovo. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that, without military intervention, the human tragedy would have been even greater. Perhaps more than anything else the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the international community's reaction to it serves to highlight the fact that for the West European powers, thinking of security in terms of all of Europe, not just western Europe, is not a reality. Their primary security concerns are still synonymous with their borders and so they must be.

Two general trends are apparent and look set to continue. First, the habit of co-operation, which develops over years of working together, creates stability in at least two interconnected ways: Re-assuring potential adversaries of the capabilities and

intentions of each other through access to information and observation procedures allows for maintenance of growing bodies of known facts that help to dispel insecurity. Catherine McArdle Kelleher argues that such practices - traditionally much more intrusive among Western states - also increase security by “the development of mutual expectations of convergent behaviour.”¹⁶⁶ In other words, the experience of working together creates greater confidence levels among adversaries as well as friendly states.

Second, states will continue to co-operate with one another in multilateral and bilateral relationships, as well as in formal and informal arrangements, based on mutual interests.¹⁶⁷ These may range from combat of a mutual enemy to shared historical cultural perspectives to similar goals for the future.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, an alliance like NATO will continue to be patronised, for reasons

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which go beyond the need to confront a common enemy, by the Europeans if they find they have more in common and derive greater benefits from security relationships with the United States than with one another.

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³ The Bosnian Virtual Field Trip,
<http://geog.gmu.edu/gess/jwc/bosnia/bosnia.html>
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⁴ The President of the European Economic Community Commission, Walter Halstein, said: "Economic Union calls for what is known as political union, that is, merging of external policy and defence policy - for how can we in the long run picture a common trade policy without a common external policy?" Susanne J. Bodenheimer, Political Union: A Microcosm of European Politics, 1960 - 1966, Leiden, A. W. Stiphof, 1967, p. 20. Jacques Delors echoed this call saying that Member States: "should equip themselves with a defence institution in the wider conventional field including theatre weapons which belong to them." Alfred Cahen, Western European Union and NATO, London, Brassey's, 1989, p. 15.

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¹⁰ Chris McGreal, 'Truth Burred in Congo's Killing Fields', *The Guardian*, 19 July 1997.

- ¹¹ Carlos Closa, EPC and the Gulf Crisis: National Constraints on Community Action, Hull, European Research Unit, University of Hull Press, June 1991.
- ¹² *Eurobarometer*, No. 37, Brussels, European Commission, June 1992, A.49.
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- ¹⁴ The CFSP was built on the foundation of European Political Co-operation [EPC] which began in 1970 as an agreement among Ministers to work together. Over time the institutional arrangements and scope of issues dealt with grew. For a detailed account see: Panayotis Ifestos, European Political Co-operation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?, Aldershot, Avebury, 1987; Simon Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992 and Pijpers *et. al.* [eds.], European Political Co-operation in the 1980's: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988.
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- ¹⁸ The Member States of the European Union and the Intergovernmental Conference, Leeds, Centre for European Studies University of Leeds in conjunction with the European Commission

Representation in the United Kingdom, February 1997.

¹⁹ These concerns are stated in: ‘Preliminary Position of the Greek Government on the 1996 IGC’ Brussels, European Commission Task Force on the 1996 IGC, 1996; ‘A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European Union IGC’, London, HMSO, March 1996; ‘The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Basis for Discussion’ Spanish Government Document, March 1995.

²⁰ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.4, Para. 1. The question of a common defence is not supported for the same reasons or to the same extent by any two Member States.

²¹ Ian Mather, Still at Odds on the Shaky Road to a Common Defence Policy, *The European*, 11 - 17 April 1996, p. 13.

²² Nuttall, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²³ Throughout the 25 years of EPC it has been standard practice to develop procedures and then put them into writing and the CFSP is no exception. Examples of this practice include:

- The distinction between the Foreign Affairs Council and the Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC has been abolished. While bearing different names these had identical membership and the distinction had in practice been superfluous for some time. Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.8, Para. 1.
- The small permanent Secretariat was expanded and merged with the General Secretariat which,

due to the increased workload, really only served to keep up with the increasing demand.

- The Council and Commission are given the responsibility for ensuring consistency between the policies of CFSP and the external policies of the European Community. Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.8, Para. 2. This is very similar to the provision in Title III, Article 30, Section 5 of the Single European Act
- The provision of the instrument of ‘Common Positions’. Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.2, Para. 2., is very similar to that allowed for in the SEA as well.

²⁴ In preparation for the 1996 IGC, the Member States, the institutions of the European Union and the European political parties represented in the European Parliament all produced their ‘opinions’ about what should be covered in the Conference. Although points raised and degrees of criticism varied, all of these reports were critical of the CFSP.

²⁵ Discontent with the lack of success of the CFSP was expressed by the European Council. Report of the Council of Ministers on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union, London, HMSO, 1995, pp. 11 - 15.

²⁶ European Parliament’s Opinion on the Convening of the 1996 IGC, Part IV: The Foreign Security and Defence Policy, DOC_EN\RR\294\294436, p. 27.

²⁷ Several Joint Actions regarding humanitarian aid to former Yugoslavia have been initiated in the CFSP.

²⁸ As part of the overall plan for the recovery of former Yugoslavia, the European Union proposed to take

responsibility for the administration of Mostar, a town once occupied by the Serbs and later the setting of violent conflicts between Croats and Muslims. The object was to reintegrate the Muslim and Croat population. The mission was problematic. Julius Strauss, Mostar Deal May Be Too Late to Save EU Mission, *The Telegraph*, 7 August 1996.

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- ³⁸ The Bonn Declaration of 17 - 18 July 1961, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 7/8 1961; Selected Texts on European Political Union, Brussels, European Parliament Publication, pp. 112 - 126; Recommendation of the European Parliament on the Draft Treaty for the Establishment of a Political Union Among the People's of Europe, Brussels, European Parliament Publications, December 1961.
- ³⁹ The French insistence on an intergovernmental framework was the direct result of the influence of President Charles de Gaulle. Alexander Werth, De Gaulle: A Political Biography, Middlesex, Penguin,

1967, pp. 316 - 317; Don C. Cook, Charles de Gaulle: A Biography, London, Secker and Warberg, 1984, pp. 332 - 354; Serge Bernstein, The Republic of de Gaulle: 1958 - 1969, translated from the French by Peter Morris, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 170 - 175; Douglas Johnson, 'De Gaulle and France's Role in the World' in Hugh Gough and John Horne [eds.], De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France, London, Edward Arnold, 1994, pp. 83 - 94; V. V. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1966, pp. 227 - 234; Julian Jackson, Charles De Gaulle, London, Sphere, 1990, pp. 65 - 79; Aiden Crawley, De Gaulle: A Biography, London, Harper Collins, 1969, pp. 409 - 433 and Brian Crozier, De Gaulle: The Statesman, London, Eyre Methuen, 1973, pp. 545 - 569.

⁴⁰ Leo Tindemans, European Union: Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/1976.

⁴¹ William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, Understanding the New European Community, London, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1994, pp. 54 and 190.

⁴² Gianni Bonvicini, 'The Genscher-Colombo Initiative and the Solemn Declaration on European Union: 1981 - 1983' in Roy Pryce [ed.], The Dynamics of European Union, London, Croon-Helm, 1987, pp. 174 - 187.

⁴³ The failure of the Genscher Colombo initiative to give EPC competence in security and defence issues in November 1981 is widely identified as a chief

cause for the re-activation of the WEU. Western European Union: History, Structure and Prospects, [5th edition] Brussels, Western European Union Press and Information Service, June 1995, pp. 7 - 9.

⁴⁴ Philip H. Gordon, 'Does Western European Union Have A Role?' in Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, European Interdependence Research Unit, St. Antony's College, Oxford University with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 103.

⁴⁵ The Western European Union officially recognised the supremacy of NATO in the revised Brussels Treaty of 1954 which states: "Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." Brussels Treaty: As Revised by the Protocol modifying the Brussels Treaty signed in Paris on 23 October 1954. Brussels, Western European Union,

⁴⁶ WEU has no standing forces or command structures of its own but the WEU Council has the ability to assemble an appropriate force when required to undertake a certain mission from the Forces Answerable to WEU [FAWEU]. It was agreed at the North Atlantic Council meeting in June 1996 that the WEU could make use of NATO assets if needed and arrangements are currently under construction to develop modalities for this eventuality. Final Communiqué, of the Ministerial

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on 3 June 1996.

⁴⁷ In the Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991 the full members of the WEU agreed ‘to strengthen the role of the WEU ... compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance’ and furthermore that the development of the WEU as an integral part of the European Union, will enhance the EU’s contribution to ‘solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance’.

⁴⁸ Brooks Tigner, Staff Writer *interviewed with* Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, ‘One on One’, *Defense News*, 2 - 8 February 1998.

⁴⁹ CRISEX

⁵⁰ *Eurobarometer*, No. 45, Brussels, European Commission, Spring 1996, B.38-41.

⁵¹ Brooks Tigner, Staff Writer *interviewed with* Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, ‘One on One’, *Defense News*, 2 - 8 February 1998.

⁵² Clifford Beal, ‘Let the WEU Die in Peace’, *Jane’s International Defence Review*, April 1996, p. 1.

⁵³ Western European Union Assembly Document 1819, ‘The United States and Security in Europe’ stated that “there can be little doubt about the increasing United States reluctance to intervene in regional crisis in Europe which are not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty’ 13 May 1996, Rapporteur, Mr. Blauw.

⁵⁴ A Senior U.S. Official was quoted as saying “It’s very difficult for us to look around the landscape and see any situation where the U.S. would not want to be involved. In the real world when real threats develop, the United States will be there” in:

Rick Atkinson, 'NATO Broadens Combat Flexibility: Under Careful Compromise, Europe Could Act Without U.S.', *International Herald Tribune*, 4 June 1996.

⁵⁵ Philip H. Gordon, 'Does Western European Union Have A Role?' in Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union 1954 - 1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 107.

⁵⁶ The Petersberg Declaration, of the Western European Union Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn on 19 June 1992. Brussels, WEU Press and Information Office. The so called 'Petersburg Tasks' as detailed in the Petersberg Declaration include:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- peacekeeping tasks,
- and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making and peace enforcement..

⁵⁷ Philip Zelikow, 'The Masque of Institutions' *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 10.

⁵⁸ Bruce Clark, 'NATO Strikes Leave Peace in Balance', *Financial Times*, 11 April 1994; Edward Mortimer *et. al.*, 'NATO Air Strike Halts Serb Attack', *Financial Times*, 11 April 1994; Staff, '2 F-16s Answer Appeal By Ground Troops', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 April 1994; AP, 'NATO Jet Fighters Attack Serb Positions in Gorazde', *Wall Street Journal*, 11 April 1994.

⁵⁹ 'The experience of UNPROFOR eloquently showed the perils of ignoring this rule of thumb ... [we must provide] our forces with a realistic mandate - based

on actual conditions on the ground - and then equip them with the necessary means to accomplish it' Remarks made by Jose Cutileiro, Secretary General of the Western European Union at a seminar on 'Civil Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Crises' at the Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 4 - 5 December 1997.

⁶⁰ Ian Traynor *et. al.*, 'Serb Tanks Leave UN in Disarray', *The Guardian*, 18 April 1994;

⁶¹ Ian Traynor, 'UN Role in Bosnia at Turning Point', *The Guardian*, 4 March 1994; Simon Tisdall, 'U.S. Veto Cuts Extra Troops for Balkans', *The Guardian*, 1 April 1994.

⁶² Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, Penguin, 1999.

⁶³ Neil Munro, 'Peacekeeping Requires Special Tools', *Defense News*, April 4 - 10, 1994.

⁶⁴ The Maastricht Declaration [*op. cit.*] states that the "Western European Union will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".

⁶⁵ The Planning Cell was agreed at Maastricht in December 1991 and it became operational in May 1993. For a detailed description of its functioning see Bart Rosengarten, 'The Role of the Western European Planning Cell' in Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union 1954 - 1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 157 - 168.

⁶⁶ In addition to national units designated as FAWEUs by the Member States of the WEU, there are several multinational forces designed to be FAWEUs

including: the EUROCORPS, the Multinational Division [Central], the UK/Netherlands amphibious force, the EUROFOR [Rapid Deployment Force] and the EUROMARDOR [European Maritime Force].

- ⁶⁷ The Satellite Centre established in 1993 is responsible for interpreting data from satellite and airborne sources in order to: verify treaties, monitor crises and monitor the environment as well as train Europeans in photographic interpretation.
- ⁶⁸ The largest and most noteworthy of these exercises was CRISEX 1996 which despite the massive amount of planning that went into it did not leave the WEU in a position to lead a mission to Albania in early 1997.
- ⁶⁹ NATO and the UN have also developed a 24 hour alert situation centre in response to the difficulties experienced by UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
- ⁷⁰ Sali Berisha agreed to appoint an opposition party member as Prime Minister.
- ⁷¹ The European Commission warned the Albanian Government of the dangers of Pyramid investment schemes and offered to provide technical assistance to help write laws that would outlaw these schemes. President Sali Berisha turned down the offer.
- ⁷² The WEU sent the Multinational Advisory Police Element [MAPE] to Albania in a similar capability to the police force integration mission undertaken under the auspices of the WEU in Mostar. ‘WEU Council Extends Mandate of Multinational Advisory Police Element’, *Agence Europe*, 24 July 1997.

- ⁷³ Alessandro Politi, 'Western European Union and European Defence Industry' in Anne Deighton [ed./] Western European Union 1954 - 1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 135 - 143/
- ⁷⁴ Bruce Clark, 'UK and Italy Join European Arms Agency', *Le Figaro*, 12 November 1996.
- ⁷⁵ The WEAO signed its first two contracts under the EUCLID programme [European Co-operation for the Long Term in Defence] on 28 July 1997. Both contracts deal with modern radar technology and are with a consortium of three European companies - Thompson-CSF RCM [France] DASA Aerospace [Germany] and GEC Marconi Avionics [United Kingdom]. WEU Press Release, 28 July 1997.
- ⁷⁶ Specific Areas of WEU Co-operation, Brussels, WEU Press and Information Office, 1997.
- ⁷⁷ The European Commission gained small concessions as a result of it's opposition to the merger of Boeing Co. with McDonnell Douglas. The Commission's opposition was fuelled by a desire to protect Airbus Industrie Consortium, whereas the Americans argued that the consumer's concerns should be given priority. Tom Buerkle, 'Europeans Agree to Boeing Merger: Concessions by U.S. Carrier Gesture Than Substance', *The International Herald Tribune*, 24 July 1997; 'Peace Offer From Boeing', *The Financial Times*, 23 July 1997; Tom Buerkle, 'Tough Brawl on Boeing Goes Down to Wire', *The International Herald Tribune*, 19 July 1997; Helen Cranford, 'EU Tries to Halt

Boeing Merger', *The Electronic Telegraph*, 5 July 1997.

⁷⁸ Some states do not wish to see further integration of foreign and security policy decision making, and are especially opposed to the creation of a European Army. They, and some scholars, make the argument that creating a European force would alienate the U.S..

⁷⁹ Peter B. de Selding, 'WEU Committee Urges Closer Space Ties with Japan', *Defence News*, 9 - 15 December 1996.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*

⁸¹ Defence spending will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

⁸² P. Gordon, *op. cit.*, 104.

⁸³ Today the OSCE comprises 54 participating states including the United States, Canada and all the states of Europe and the former Soviet Union. The OSCE Handbook 1996, Vienna, Austria, OSCE Department for Chairman in Office Support, 1996, p. 5.

⁸⁴ Kelleher, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Zelikow, *op. cit.* 11.

⁸⁵ OSCE Lisbon Summit Declaration, December 1996, Vienna, OSCE Office for Support of the Chairman in Office, 1996.

⁸⁶ 'Leaders Reach Accord on European Security' *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 1996; William Drozdiak, 'European Leaders Endorse Arms Cuts: But Russia Rejects NATO Plan, Warning of East - West Fault Line' *International Herald Tribune*, 3 December 1996; Ian Black, 'Moscow Wins Nuclear Pledge' *The Guardian*, 3

December 1996; 'From Moscow, With Waves' *The Guardian*, 3 December 1996, 'Lukashenko Shows Firm Hand' *The Financial Times*, 3 December 1996.

- ⁸⁷ In March 1992 the Chairman in Office was requested to convene a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the CSCE to provide an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis. As of June 1997 the conference has not been held. The would be participants; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the USA, - known as the Minsk Group - have spearheaded efforts to settle the conflict. In 1993, after extensive negotiations the Minsk Group, developed an "Adjusted Timetable of Urgent Steps" to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions 822 and 853 based on a step-by-step approach consisting of; withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, the exchange of hostages and prisoners of war, unimpeded access of international humanitarian relief efforts to the region, restoration of all communications and transportation, establishment of a permanent and comprehensive cease-fire with CSCE monitoring and the opening of the Minsk Conference. An informal cease fire was agreed on 12 May 1994 but sporadic fighting continues and the OSCE has not been able to make further progress towards a peace-keeping mission to the region within the framework of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document [1992] which established a

general mandate for OSCE peace-keeping operations. OSCE Fact Sheet: The Conflict in the Area Dealt with by the Minsk Group, Vienna, Press and Public Information Office, 1997.

⁸⁸ ‘Leaders Reach Accord’, *ibid.* and Bruce Clark, ‘OSCE Agrees Wider Role as Veto Threat Subsides’ *The Financial Times*, 4 December 1996.

⁸⁹ The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, is active in monitoring elections, assisting in the drafting of constitutions and laws and promoting the development of civil societies.

⁹⁰ The collapse of Pyramid Schemes, into which an estimated two thirds of Albanians placed their savings, led first to riots then to wide spread violence across Albania beginning in March 1997. Most of the south of the country fell to armed gangs of ‘Public Salvation’ that worked in conjunction with the Mafia. 1,500 Albanians lost their lives in shoot outs between March and June 1997.

⁹¹ Miranda Vickers, ‘A Dirty War Breaks Out in Tirana’, *The Guardian*, 9 July 1997.

⁹² Guy Dinmore, ‘Albanian Socialists Triumph’, *The Financial Times*, 8 July 1997; Andrew Gumbel, ‘Albania’s Quiet Miracle Confounds Doomsayers’, *The Independent*, 9 July 1997; Guy Dinmore, ‘Albanian Socialists Triumph’, *Financial Times*, 8 July 1997.

⁹³ One election official was killed in Albania’s Parliamentary elections. Editorial, ‘Hold Your Breath’, *The Economist*, 5 July 1997. Julius Strauss,

‘Highway of Murder in the Albanian Badlands’ *The Electronic Telegraph*, 3 July 1997.

- ⁹⁴ Jonathan Sunley, ‘Albania’s Elections Taint the Victor’, *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 July 1997; Editorial, ‘Albania’s Flawed Vote’, *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 July 1997.
- ⁹⁵ Julius Strauss, ‘Highway of Murder in the Albanian Badlands’ *The Electronic Telegraph*, 3 July 1997.
- ⁹⁶ The Pact on Stability in Europe, agreed on 20 - 21 March 1995 in Paris, is actually a series of nearly 200 bilateral and multilateral agreements, declarations and undertakings between states aimed at promoting ‘good neighbourliness and co-operation’ and at preventing crisis and tension. The Pact on Stability in Europe, Vienna, Secretariat of the OSCE, 1995.
- ⁹⁷ The CFE was agreed in 1990 by the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Due to changed circumstances the same signatories now number 30 states. The CFE set ceilings for the limitation of the quantities of troops and non nuclear equipment they could deploy in Europe. More recently, and in recognition of the fact that circumstances have changed considerably, the 30 signatories have begun negotiating a successor to the CFE which will reduce the ceilings even further. Thomas W. Lippman, ‘Talks Outline New Pact for Forces in Europe’, *The International Herald Tribune*, 25 July 1997.
- ⁹⁸ Ukraine in particular has expressed concerns about the safety of the methods used by the Russian Federation to dispose of nuclear warheads.

⁹⁹ Under Article IV, Annex 1 B of the Dayton Peace Agreement the signatories agree to the establishment of a stable military balance based on the lowest possible level of armaments.

¹⁰⁰ The first phase ended on 31 December 1996 and the second phase will end on 31 October 1997. The total number of armaments reduced in Phase One was about 1,700 pieces of armaments, and the reduction liability for phase two is over 3,700.

¹⁰¹ Alexander George and Susan Holl, 'The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy', Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, 1997; Stephen S. Rosenfeld, 'Hear the Warning and Respond in Time to Avert Violence', *International Herald Tribune*, 28 July 1997.

¹⁰² The mechanisms that are triggered by one or more Member State[s] include:

- The Human Dimension Mechanism (Vienna and Moscow Mechanisms) This consists of agreement among the members to exchange information and respond to requests from other Member States for information regarding issues concerning fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow Up Meeting, 17 January 1989
- Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as regards unusual Military Activities which are defined as forces participating in activities outside their normal peacetime location. Vienna Document on CSBMs 1992.

- Co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a Military Nature. This obligates states to report and clarify any such events to prevent misunderstanding and possible harm to another participating state's personnel. Vienna Document on CSBMs 1992.
- Provisions relating to early warning and preventive action. Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992 establishes a right for a limited number of participating States to trigger an "action" by the OSCE (i.e. the right to draw the attention of the CSO to a given situation).]
- Mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to Emergency situations (Berlin mechanism) which is described as may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security or stability. Annex 2 to the Summary of Conclusions from the Berlin Council Meeting (19-20 June 1991)
- Valletta mechanism. "If a dispute arises between participating States, they will ... seek to settle the dispute through a process of direct consultation and negotiation, or seek to agree upon an appropriate alternative procedure of settling the dispute." Report from the OSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta, 8 February 1991.
- Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE. Annex 2 to the Summary of Conclusions from the Stockholm Council Meeting, 14-15 December 1992 established the

Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to settle disputes which are submitted to it.

- Provisions for a OSCE Conciliation Commission. Annex 3 to the Summary of Conclusions from the Stockholm Council Meeting, 14-15 December 1992 established the Commission to settle disputes between OSCE members who agree to seek assistance in conciliation.
- Provisions for a Directed Conciliation. Annex 4 to the Summary of Conclusions from the Stockholm Council Meeting, 14-14 December 1992 provides for the Council of Ministers or the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) to direct any two participating States to seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute that they have not been able to settle within a reasonable period of time.

¹⁰³ In order for Spain to join the integrated military command structure of NATO, the United Kingdom insisted Spain lift restrictions on air and sea traffic access to the British/NATO base on the Isthmus which links Gibraltar with mainland Spain. Carey Schofield, ‘Cook to Get Tough With Spain Over Gibraltar’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 July 1997; Christopher Lockwood, ‘Spain Faces Veto Threat Over Gibraltar Flights’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 July 1997; ‘Spain Defiant Over Gibraltar Despite Threat of NATO Veto’, *International Herald Tribune*, 9 July 1997; Tom Burma, ‘Spain Claims Diplomatic Success in Gibraltar Clash’, *Financial Times*, 4 December 1997.

¹⁰⁴ John Borawski, 'The OSCE: In Search of Co-operative Security' *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 401 - 408.

¹⁰⁵ Letter from the Court of Arbitration and Conciliation.

¹⁰⁶ P. B. Henze, 'Russia and the Caucuses', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 19, No. 4, October - December 1996, pp. 389 - 402; B. S. Lambeth, 'Russia's Air War in Chechnya', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 19, No. 4, October - December 1996, pp. 365 - 388; V. S. Drozdov, 'Chechnya: Exit From the Labyrinth of Conflict', *Russian Politics and Law*, Vol. 34, No. 4, July - August 1996, pp. 33 - 48; S. Kovalyev and A. Bjinushov, By All Available Means, Moscow, Memorial Human Rights Centre, 1996.

¹⁰⁷ OSCE Fact Sheet on Long Term Operations: The Assistance Group to Chechnya, Vienna, Office for Public Information, July 1997. The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya began working in Grozny on 26 April 1995. The Group consists of 8 members and is tasked with:

- promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the establishment of facts concerning their violation;
- helping foster the development of democratic institutions and processes, including the restoration of the local organs of authority;
- assisting in the preparation of possible new constitutional agreements and in the holding and monitoring of elections;

- facilitating the delivery to the region by international and non-governmental organisations of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis, wherever they may be located;
- providing assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and to international organisations in ensuring the speediest possible return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the crisis region;
- promoting the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilisation of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles and
- pursuing dialogue and negotiations, as appropriate, through participation in 'round tables', with a view to establishing a cease-fire and eliminating sources of tension.

¹⁰⁸ Cotti, November 1996, *op. cit.* p. 9.

¹⁰⁹ The OSCE Assistance Group did have limited success. 'Shuttle Diplomacy Facilitates Cease-fire Agreement in Chechnya', *OSCE Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1996, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ C. Blandy, 'Cutting the Chechen Knot', *The World Today*, Vol. 52, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 147 - 149; V. Tolz, 'The War in Chechnya', *Current History*, Vol. 95, No. 603, October 1996, pp. 316 - 321; A. Harding, 'Moscow Retreats to a Chechen Stalemate', *The World Today*, Vol. 53, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 4 - 6;

¹¹¹ T. Kuzio, 'International Reaction to the Chechen Crisis', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 97 - 109; M. Hague, 'Chechnya: Russian Invasion and the World Community', *Padistan Horizon*, Vol. 49, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 55 - 67.

¹¹² Confidence and security building measures include:

- prior notification of major (as well as other) military manoeuvres,
- exchange of observers,
- prior notification of major military movements
- obligation for an annual exchange of information on existing forces, including the structure of the armed forces, their deployment, peacetime authorised strength and major weapons and equipment systems down to brigade/regiment level;
- information about the planned deployment of major weapons and equipment systems;
- public annual military budgets.
- Promotion of human rights

¹¹³ The Open Skies Treaty was signed on 24 March 1992 by the members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation [Due to circumstances the Treaty now has 27 signatories.] and allows for unarmed aircraft to fly over the territory of other signatories for verification purposes. The Open Skies Treaty was not actually negotiated within the OSCE framework; instead, the negotiations took place in Vienna and were supported by the CSCE Conference Service. The OSCE plays an important role in overseeing the implementation of the Treaty

insofar as the signatory states established the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna for further consultation. OSCE Handbook 1996, Vienna, Secretariat of the OSCE, 1996, pp. 69 - 70.

¹¹⁴ The OSCE monitored elections in Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Chechnya, Palestine, Russia and South Africa.

¹¹⁵ ‘OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Begins Work Towards Election Goals’, *OSCE Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1996, p. 3; ‘Election Rules and Regulations Adopted for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, *WEU Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 1996, p. 1.

¹¹⁶ ‘OSCE Postpones Municipal Elections’, *OSCE Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 8, August 1996, pp. 1 - 5.

¹¹⁷ ‘OSCE Certifies Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ , ‘Ambassador Frowick Recommends Elections Go Ahead’ and ‘Cotti Makes Declaration to Permanent Council’, *OSCE Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 1 - 3.

¹¹⁸ It would be impossible to examine all the organisations which contribute in a tangential way to the security and defence of Europe. This is the primary reason for only making a passing mention of the Council of Europe.

¹¹⁹ Council of Europe: Achievements and Activities, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing and Documentation Service, November 1994.

¹²⁰ For a more detailed description of the functions of the Council of Europe see: Clive Archer, Organising Europe: The Institutions of Integration, London, Edward Arnold, 1997, pp. 57 - 72; D. Tarschya,

‘The Council of Europe Heading Toward the Year 2000’, *Annuaire Europeen*, Vol. XLII, 1994, pp. 53 - 60.

¹²¹ W. Rau, ‘The Council of Europe in the Field of Crime Problems - Selected Legal Instruments and Events [1993 - 1995]’, *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1995, pp. 414 - 423.

¹²² H. Winkler, ‘Democracy and Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the Admission Practices of the Council of Europe’, *Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Offentliches Recht und Volkerrechte*, Vol. 47, No. 2 - 3, 1995, pp. 147 - 172.

¹²³ L. Zwaak, ‘The Council of Europe’, *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, Vol. 14, No. 4, December 1996, pp. 437 - 457.

¹²⁴ G. Gilbert, ‘The Council of Europe and Respect for Minority Rights;’, *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 160 - 189.

¹²⁵ COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME - EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/>

¹²⁶ In November 1996 Croatia became the 40th Member of the Council of Europe.

¹²⁷ In a report to the Third Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE in June 1997, Hanneke Gelderblom-Lankhout, Rapporteur, stated: “Rather than improving, the human rights situation [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] appears to be getting worse.” ‘The rule of law is becoming established very slowly. The collective presidency meets very rarely; Parliament does not sit. As a result,

legislation to bring national laws in line with international human rights instruments has not been passed. Furthermore, the police in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are strongly criticised for corruption and incompetence.¹²⁷ Functioning Of The Institutions For The Protection Of Human Rights In Bosnia And Herzegovina,
[http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/371a\(97\).htm](http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/371a(97).htm)

¹²⁸ V. Lukin, 'Russia's Entry to the Council of Europe', *International Affairs [Moscow]*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1996, pp. 25 - 29; Y. Ushakov, 'The 39th Member of the Council of Europe', *International Affairs [Moscow]*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1996, pp. 30 - 37.

¹²⁹ Vadim Filimonov, Refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
[http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/371a\(97\).htm](http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/371a(97).htm)

¹³⁰ The CoE's Social and Development Fund is its main funding organ and in April 1996 it provided finance for the rehabilitation of war victims and refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1997 it provided finance to rebuild Tuzla's water supply system. Further action by the Council of Europe Social Development Fund in Bosnia,
[http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/36a\(97\).htm](http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/36a(97).htm)

¹³¹ The Council of Europe in central and eastern Europe: The programmes of assistance with the development and consolidation of democratic security, <http://www.coe.fr/eng/act-e/dap.htm>

¹³² Michael Welsh, Europe United: the European Union and the Retreat from Federalism, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 116.

¹³³ PHAREs' 'aim is to help the countries of central Europe rejoin the mainstream of European development through future membership of the European Union. PHARE does this by providing grant finance to support its partner countries through the process of economic transformation and strengthening of democracy to the stage where they are ready to assume the obligations of membership of the European Union.' The PHARE programme covers: Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. European Commission DG1A Home Page, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/index.htm>

¹³⁴ 'The Tacis Programme is a European Union initiative which provides grant finance for know-how to foster the development of market economies and democratic societies in the New Independent States and Mongolia.', Brussels, European Commission DG1A Home Page, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/index.htm>

¹³⁵ North Atlantic Co-operation Council, NATO Fact Sheet No. 1, March 1996, Brussels, NATO Press and Information Office, 1996.

¹³⁶ The launch of NACC and the co-operation and dialogue it entailed with the partner states was designed to build on NATO's Strategic Concept also agreed in November 1991. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Communiqué of the Heads of

State and Government meeting as the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7 - 8 November 1991.

¹³⁷ The North Atlantic Co-operation Council was a response to the changing security environment of the late 1980's and early 1990's. It was designed to act as a forum for dialogue and co-operation amongst the previously divided states of Europe. North Atlantic Co-operation Council Statement On Dialogue, Partnership And Co-operation, Press Communiqué, M-NACC - 1(91)111 , North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 20 December 1991.

¹³⁸ R. Weaver, 'NACC's Five Years of Strengthening Co-operation', *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 3, May - June 1997, pp. 24 - 26; R. Welchardt, 'Privatisation and NACC Countries: Defence Industry Experiences in Related Fields', *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 185 - 187.

¹³⁹ Defence Conversion Under the Auspices of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, NATO Fact Sheet No. 10, June 1996, Brussels, NATO Press and Information Office, 1996.

¹⁴⁰ The NACC, NATO Fact Sheet No. 2, June 1997, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nacc.htm>

¹⁴¹ The NACC no longer exists. It is replaced by the European Atlantic Partnership Council. [EAPC] which is supposed to combine the best of PfP and NACC. PfP will be discussed in later chapters. Backgrounder: About the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 29 May 1997, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/m970708/bg-eapc.htm> Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council, Press Release M-NACC-EAPC - 1(97)66, 30 May 1997.

¹⁴² Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 3.

¹⁴³ James Pettifer, 'Flame of Albanian Unrest Fuels Macedonian Tinderbox', *The Times*, 12 July 1997.

¹⁴⁴ NATO action is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.

¹⁴⁵ NATO's Role in Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia, NATO Fact Sheet No. 4, September 1996, Brussels, NATO Press and Information Service, 1996.

¹⁴⁶ The European Security and Defence Identity, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 3, March 1996.

¹⁴⁷ An explosion destroyed an OSCE jeep and damaged the Drina Hotel in Zvornik, a Serb controlled town on the Serbian border. The hotel is used by United Nations officials and OSCE officials. 'Bosnia Blast Stirs Fears of Serb Revenge', *The International Herald Tribune*, 15 July 1997; A United States soldier was attacked and slightly injured by a man wielding a sickle in Kladanj and grenades were thrown at the house of a UN employee in Prejedor and at the apartment block of OSCE officials in Banja Luka. Christopher Belamy, 'Bosnia Force Fears Reprisals', *The Independent*, 17 July 1997.

¹⁴⁸ Tim Butcher, 'EU Forces Lack the Clout to Take on NATO Role', *Electronic Daily Telegraph*, 18 June 1997.

- ¹⁴⁹ Stanley Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy for the Congressional Research Service and Consultant to the Senate NATO Observer Group, Transatlantic relations: Stormy weather on the way to enlargement?, *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 5, September - October 1997, pp. 12 - 16.
- ¹⁵⁰ Alison Mitchell, 'Clinton Hints at Possibility of Longer Balkans Role', *The International Herald Tribune*, 14 July 1997.
- ¹⁵¹ 'Operation Tango', *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 July 1997.
- ¹⁵² The arrest of one suspected war criminal and the fatal shooting of another lead some to the premature conclusion that the policy in Bosnia had changed. Zoran Ciriakovic and Karen Breslau, 'War Criminals Beware: It Looks Like NATO Really Means to Get Them Now', *Newsweek*, 21 July 1997.
- ¹⁵³ Editorial, 'Dayton Demons', *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 July 1997.
- ¹⁵⁴ An anonymous editorial in the *Washington Post* stated: "The arrest of the former president, Mr. Karadzic, even as he wrestles for power in the Bosnian Serb enclave with the elected president, Biljana Plavsic, would serve justice and democracy at one stroke." 'Next Get Karadzic', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 - 13 July 1997. Chris Hedges, 'As NATO Patrols, Karadzic Hides in Plain Sight', *International Herald Tribune*, 10 July 1997; 'Karadzic A Dilemma for the Alliance', *International Herald Tribune*, 9 July 1997; [AP],

'U. S. Seeks NATO Help on Karadzic', *International Herald Tribune*, 8 July 1997.

¹⁵⁵ General Ratko Mladic is accused of overseeing the slaughter of civilians in Srebrenica, the so-called UN safe area. Kenneth Roth, 'Two Years After Srebrenica, Killers Remain Free', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 July 1997.

¹⁵⁶ It had been claimed by military authorities in Bosnia that the arrest of war criminals was a civilian task since it comes under police duties. In the Dayton Peace Accord it is stated that the Peacekeepers can arrest any suspect they come across but they are not to take a pro-active stance. Michael Binyon, 'NATO Accused of Hunt for Karadzic', *The Times*, 4 July 1997.

¹⁵⁷ On Thursday 10 July British SAS forces attempted to arrest Simo Drljaca and Milan Kovacevic who were indicted by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. The operation ended in the fatal shooting of Simo Drljaca by the British troops acting in self defence. Although the forces were easily identifiable by their uniforms and were reported to have clearly identified themselves to the two suspects, the two men may have been unaware that they had been indicted since the War Crimes Tribunal began issuing sealed warrants earlier in 1997 in an attempt to prevent suspects from guarding against their arrest. Chris Hedges, 'Peacekeepers Kill Serb Suspect: Another is Seized and Taken to War Crimes Tribunal', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 July 1997; Guy Dinmore, 'NATO Steps Up Hunt For Bosnian 'War Criminals'', *The Financial Times*,

11 July 1997; Steven Erlanger, 'Raid in Bosnia: A Turning Point For Peacekeepers', *International Herald Tribune*, 12-13 July 1997; 'NATO Raid: Proceed With Caution', *International Herald Tribune*, 12-13 July 1997;

¹⁵⁸ Carl Buldt, 'In the Balkans, NATO Must Go After the Masterminds', *The New York Times*, 14 July 1997/

¹⁵⁹ Edward Cody, 'New Line in Bosnia?: Raid to Seize Serbs Bolsters NATO Image', *International Herald Tribune*, 14 July 1997.

¹⁶⁰ Tom Walker, 'Serbs Salute War Crimes Suspect at State Funeral', *The Times*, 14 July 1997; Karen Coleman, 'Thousands Mourn Bosnian Serb 'Hero' of Genocide', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1997; Tom Walker, 'Bosnia Serbs Accuse SAS Snatch Squad of 'Assassination'', *The Times*, 12 July 1997.

¹⁶¹ Edward Cody, 'NATO is Jeopardising Peace, Bosnian Serb Leaders Warn, The Message: New Arrests Could Bring Bloodshed' *International Herald Tribune*, 12-13 July 1997.

¹⁶² In 1993 the UN sent 20,000 troops to Cambodia to enforce the peace agreed in Paris in 1992 and to monitor elections. After 9 out of 10 eligible Cambodians turned out to vote and elected Prince Norodom Ranariddh and the royalist liberal Party, defeating Hun Sen and the neo-communist party, Hun Sen was allowed to keep his private army and furthermore Hun Sen was given the post of co-prime minister. Hun Sen gradually regained control through the use of threats and violence: journalists were killed, independent politicians were exiled and

the U.S. and French embassies were threatened when their sponsor states protested Hun Sen's thuggish behaviour. In early July 1997 Hun Sen finally ousted Prince Ranariddh with the aid of tanks. Fred Hiatt, 'Apply the Lessons of Cambodia to Bosnia Before It's Too Late', *The Washington Post*, 14 July 1997.

¹⁶³ The prospects for peace in the Balkans are hindered by the fact that the majority of the Bosnian Serbs have a poor standard of living while the leaders have quite a good standard of living. Chris Hedges, 'Bosnian Serbs Sink Into Squalor As Their Leaders Amass Wealth', *International Herald Tribune*, 8 July 1997.

¹⁶⁴ In an interview with the German daily newspaper, *Handelsblatt*, Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, advocated the creation of a Europe-wide military alliance, calling for the Western European Union to be fully integrated into the EU and be developed as a 'European pillar' within NATO in seven to ten years. 'Germans Set Sights on EU Military Alliance', *The London Times*, 5 November 1996.

¹⁶⁵ 'Europe's Foreign Policy: A Facade of Unity', *The Economist*, 2 November 1996.

¹⁶⁶ Kelleher, *ibid.* 43.

¹⁶⁷ Peter van Ham, 'Can Institutions Hold Europe Together?', in Hugh Miall [ed.], Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Co-operation, London, Pinter, 1994, pp. 186 - 205.

¹⁶⁸ Stephen M. Walt, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. ? and Kelleher, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

Chapter Three: ESDI Ambitions of the European Union Member States

1. Introduction

“Le guerre c'est contra nos enemies, le paix c'est contra nos amis. - The war is against our enemies, the peace is against our friends.”

General Charles de Gaulle

“Resolution of policy conflicts between states, between institutions, and between institutions and states involves coalition building and compromises on all sides if states are not to defect: this is the stuff of the current defence, security and integration debate in Europe.”

Anne Deighton, WEU Institute for Security Studies

Chapter Two demonstrated the fact that developments since the end of the Cold War in the European security and defence fields were best described as incremental increases in the organisation and remit of institutions. This was true through the end of the 1990's. They were not metamorphic, particularly innovative or even unpredictable. A dominant argument of this

dissertation is that developments in the ESDI will follow existing patterns of relatively insignificant growth so long as states perceive it as in their best interests to maintain relatively weak supranational frameworks in the security and defence realm. This Chapter undertakes an examination of the reasons why, in spite of *Integrationists'* rhetoric, change through the 1990's was so abstemious.¹

European Union Member States signed the Treaty on European Union, which contained grand rhetorical goals such as “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”² carried from the preamble to the Treaty of Rome 1957, and “a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence.”³ The indecisive nature and sluggish pace of developments, therefore begs the question: “Why were the European partners unable to develop a more capable system?”

The principle reason is simple: the European Union is made up of individual Member States that have different conceptions of what the European Union should be. The importance of this point is paramount: it is the fundamental reason for the inability of the Europeans to match their stated ambitions with the requisite actions, and why coalitions of the willing are the most appropriate vehicle for achieving these goals in the short run. This state-centric approach, which Christopher Hill, a noted author and proponent of integration, would label “crassly Realist”,⁴ is borne out in the field of security and foreign policy despite the “habit of co-operation”⁵ among the foreign ministers of the EU. No matter how comfortable this group of individuals were conversing with one another, the amount and scope of action taken by the European Union through the 1990’s in the fields of foreign

policy and security, was far from reflective of the power those same States had if they would have chosen to combine forces. This Chapter will demonstrate that the European Union Member States do not all want a completely common foreign and security policy, and they certainly do not all want a common defence. States had different purposes in mind for the institutions of the European Union despite the fact that, based on their often vague rhetoric in speeches and official documents, they appeared to want the same things. [See *Table 3.1*]

**TABLE 3.1: STATED GOALS OF ALL EU
MEMBERS⁶**

Preamble of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of Rome	1957	'..resolved to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create ... the basis for a broader and deeper community among the peoples long divided by bloody conflict'
Preamble of the European Economic Community Treaty of Rome	1957	'.. determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe; resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe'
Preamble to the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty of Rome	1957	'.. resolved to create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will ... contribute, through it's many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples'
Preamble to the Single European Act	1986	'Moved by the will to ... transform relations as a whole among their states into a European Union; resolved to implement this European Union on the basis of European Co-operation among the signatory states in the sphere of foreign policy and to invest this Union with the necessary means of action'
Preamble to the Treaty on European Union	1992	'.. resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and it's independence, in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world'

There is a serious disjunction between the Integrationist's ambitions and the social, political and economic realities in the European Union. In order to build and substantiate this argument this chapter will demonstrate that:

1. There is a spectrum of views among Member States of the European Union regarding the development of an ESDI, rather than two opposing camps.
2. Any Member States may halt the integration process in the fields of security, foreign policy and defence in the European Union by using its national veto. Even states that wish to see the integration process taken further will protect the right to a veto in areas where important national interests are concerned, because they fear the loss of influence. As a result, major foreign policy

and security decisions will continue to be taken on an intergovernmental basis for the foreseeable future.

3. Based on the principles of multi-speed Europe and variable geometry, states that wish to integrate more are able to, but this process leads to another set of difficulties.

4. Integrationists hold to the maxim that the European Union can achieve more when it acts as a single unit than the Member States can when they act on their own. Integrationists will, therefore, continue to push for more integration in all areas, but they will only be moderately successful in the security and defence realms because of states' unwillingness to relinquish their veto powers and because states that wish to do more together are able to.

2. The Nature of the Differences Between the Member States of the EU

To state the fact that there exist a wide variety of differences between the Member States of the European Union is to state the painfully obvious. It is nonetheless obligatory in light of the fact that Integrationist literature is peppered with dismissals of the importance of these distinctions. They maintain instead that “shared history” will bind Europe together. An elementary understanding of European history, however, flies in the face of such assertions. West Europeans do of course have more in common with one another than they do with the Chinese, but this is no excuse for dismissing their myriad differences as minor. Some divisions are admittedly easier than others to bridge. In fact, virtually all disagreements are ultimately surmountable if a sufficiently compelling

Chapter Three: ESDI Ambitions

motive exists. An example of such a catalyst is the threat of outside aggression that existed during the Cold War. However, there is no external motivator at present. This was the basis of General de Gaulle's insightful view quoted at the beginning of this chapter. In the absence of some unifying threat, the differences between West European states are magnified and will continue to disjoin Western Europe for the foreseeable future.

The systematic division of former Yugoslavia along ethnic lines arguably provided an extremely worthy cause for the Europeans to work together to find a solution. The European Union's response to the crisis, however, supports the thesis that Western Europe, though bound together in supranational - primarily economic - institutions, is still a collection of self interested states' security interests.⁷

The divisions between the Member States with regards to the development of an ESDI are more aptly described as a spectrum of positions on any given issue than as two opposing camps, one favouring integration in all areas and the other preferring state level management of all issues. This factor is important because it helps to dispel the Integrationist argument that the European Union can become a single coherent entity if only the leaders find the resolve. If only it were so simple.

In the run up to the 1996 - 1997 IGC all the Member States of the European Union published position papers of various types delineating government stances on the wide range of issues under discussion. These were supplemented by similar documents produced by the major European institutions and a plethora of political parties and interest groups. As a result, it is

possible to compare the positions of the Member States at that point in time at least, on a variety of salient issues.

TABLE 3.2: EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES' ESDI AMBITIONS⁸

1. Develop European Union as a collective defence organisation⁹
2. Merge Western European Union into European Union
3. Include defence matters in CFSP
4. Increase Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP
5. Fund CFSP from EC budget¹⁰
6. Central planning and proposal unit
7. Power of initiative for Commission
8. Appoint a Mr./Ms. CFSP

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Austria		NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Belgium	YES							
Denmark		NO	NO	YES		YES		YES
Finland	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
France	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Germany	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
Greece	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Ireland	NO	NO	NO	YES		YES		YES
Italy	YES							
Luxembourg	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Netherlands	YES	NO						
Portugal	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spain	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		YES
Sweden	NO	NO	NO		YES	YES		
UK	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES

A. France

In the post Cold War era, French foreign policy followed the three main themes that guided it during the Cold War:¹¹ the desire to obtain more autonomy in the primarily U.S. lead Atlantic Alliance, the desire to maintain a uniquely French security and defence identity and the desire to be a founder, and principle player, in an ESDI.¹² The French Government held the general view¹³ that the European Union should be as strong a political power as it is an economic one.¹⁴ This entails both creating a more capable ESDI¹⁵ as well as enlarging the European Union.¹⁶ Several factors influence this position, including the fact that, even though it has been downsizing its military role in Africa,¹⁷ France still has specific global interests in its former colonies;¹⁸ the fact that France perceives itself as an equal partner in the Franco-German axis,¹⁹ the

original foundation of the European Union;²⁰ and the fact that France has always perceived itself as leading the movement for greater European autonomy from the United States.²¹ President Chirac once remarked, with regard to the U.S.'s decreasing aid to developing countries: "It is unimaginable that America always wants to decide everything and pays less and less."²² For these reasons the French government believes it will be more influential as a leading member of a European Union that acts as one large powerful state. The problem is that the European Union does not act that way.

The irony is that while France is an extremely vocal leading advocate of an independent ESDI, no state has more frequently scuppered European attempts to develop the component parts of such an identity. The striking feature of these failures is that the primary

motivation underlying French action is invariably national interest. In 1954 the French Parliament vetoed the European Defence Community, setting back decades ambitions for a political union. In the 1960s the French withdrew from the integrated military command of NATO and requested all NATO institutions to relocate themselves somewhere outside of French territory. In the 1970s the French engaged in bilateral negotiations with the OPEC countries, thus shattering the already weak attempt at a unified European coalition against the oil rich states. In the late 1980s the French withdrew their support for the Eurofighter project, Europe's best hope for maintaining a respectable place in the global fighter aircraft marketplace, opting instead to develop their own fighter, the Rafale. The merging of the U.S. defence companies in the 1990s has made the

existence of this joint project considerably more important to the ESDI. In the 1990s, while showing signs of warming towards NATO, France did not fully rejoined the integrated military command structure of NATO, and did not allowed the complete privatisation of defence manufacturing industries,²³ a necessary prerequisite for European companies to keep pace with their American counterparts.²⁴

In terms of support for the European integration process, France has been the European Union's bellwether state. 'As France goes, so goes the European Union' – or at least so it went in the past. The European Union has historically tended to progress when France actively pursued integration, and stagnate when France pursued a more intergovernmental line. During de Gaulle's reign, for example, the political institutions of the European

Union saw little progressive development.²⁵ The French Government was, in fact, so hostile to the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting [QMV] in the Council that it boycotted the Council to prevent the automatic introduction of limited QMV in 1965, an incident that became known as ‘the empty chair crisis.’²⁶ As soon as Georges Pompidou succeeded De Gaulle as President, however, in 1969, negotiations were initiated that led to the establishment of European Political Co-operation [EPC].²⁷

France is clearly one of the most powerful and influential states in the European Union in security and defence matters. It is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council,²⁸ a member of the G7, a nuclear power and one of the founders of the European Union. France’s position regarding the

development of an ESDI rightly therefore carries a great deal of clout.

B. Germany

Germany, despite the unique set of problems that preoccupy it due to unification,²⁹ is the engine driving European integration in most areas,³⁰ and the sacrosanct security and defence fields are no exception. However, owing to German history this support fragments at the juncture where the question of active German military participation in Out of Area Operations arises. Germany has proven itself as an ardent supporter of the political branch of the ESDI. For example, the German government supported the appointment of a ‘Mr. CFSP’,³¹ the integration of the Western European Union into the European Union, increased Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the development of an ESDI that supplemented and

reinforced the joint defence efforts undertaken in NATO. The French³² and Germans supported the merger of the Western European Union with the European Union to give emphasis to the fact that the European Union was a political organisation and as such required a security and defence dimension.³³ Since the full members of the Western European Union are all full members of the European Union³⁴ they would all still have co-equal decision-making powers.

According to Philip Gordon of the International Institute for Security Studies in London, France and Germany also wanted the Council of the European Union, not that of the Western European Union, to make the final decisions in defence and security matters.³⁵

Evidence of the impressive degree of German support for the development of the European defence industry, the third branch of the ESDI as defined in this dissertation, was provided by the German government's politically difficult decision to purchase 180 Eurofighters. This decision was taken under enormous financial pressure in the run up to European Monetary Union,³⁶ arguably the most important integration project of the 1990s, of which Germany was undeniably the driving force. In terms of military involvement, however, while Germany is a founder of the Eurocorps, the likelihood of this organisation actually becoming involved in Out Of Area operations was questionable in the 1990's.

C. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's government³⁷ historically has not favoured increased integration of defence, foreign

policy or security policy.³⁸ Instead, the United Kingdom has maintained a commitment to the

“unshakeable conviction ... that the basis for European action in the defence and security fields should be intergovernmental, based on co-operation between nation states.”³⁹

This stance often places the United Kingdom at odds with its European partners.

The unwillingness of the United Kingdom to share decision making responsibility for the use of its military is, however, bolstered by more than issues of sovereignty in this case. While such co-operative arrangements are not zero sum games, the United Kingdom stands to lose more than it can possibly gain.

This explains its opposition to the merger of the Western European Union into the European Union, the development of the European Union as a collective defence organisation and the inclusion of defence

matters in the CFSP. The United Kingdom's opposition to the merger of the Western European Union with the European Union did not run as deep as Clifford Beal's, who wrote in *Jane's Defence Weekly* that to do so would be "akin to handing a child a loaded gun."⁴⁰ The United Kingdom was firmly opposed to the merger of the WEU into the EU for at least three reasons. Merger, it was thought, would make the Western European Union less rather than more likely to act. The defence guarantee of the Western European Union would make enlargement of the European Union more difficult. Finally, merger would involve the European Commission and European Parliament in security and defence matters.⁴¹ The United Kingdom was opposed to the involvement of these supranational institutions in decisions that would ultimately effect Britain's security interests.

Britain is powerful in its own right: it, along with France, holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, is a member of the G8, is a nuclear power and has a wholly professional military. A very strong relationship with the United States also influences Britain's position.⁴² This 'special relationship' encompasses military and economic issues. The United Kingdom also holds a secure place in the global defence market.⁴³ For all the above reasons, Britain is a leading opponent of increased integration in military areas, especially those already covered by NATO. The United Kingdom is opposed because it is simply not in its national interest.

While the United Kingdom can be correctly placed at the "Eurosceptic" end of the spectrum at least where security and defence are concerned, this is sometimes misleading since the United Kingdom is on occasion in

agreement with France and Germany, the two states frequently placed at the “Europhile” end of the spectrum. The United Kingdom, France and Germany, for example, all agreed that the CFSP should not be funded from the European Community budget.⁴⁴ It is reasonable to assume that France and Germany, the most vocal supporters of integration, would favour funding the CFSP from the Community budget, since this would allow for longer term planning and a degree of oversight by the European Parliament, yet the two leading Europhiles side with the United Kingdom because in this case the United Kingdom, France and Germany all have something in common, they are ‘big’ states and as such are the three largest net contributors to the Community budget.⁴⁵ They simply have the most to lose. This is a good example of state interest overriding ideological beliefs. It is also important to

understand that, as Anne Deighton of the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union notes:

“...to hold the bottom line is to deploy a powerful diplomatic tool, not least when some of the motivating forces for the British position - including the need for flexibility, speed and secrecy, and the nationalist element that is still indigenous to foreign and defence policy - are in fact shared by many of its partners.”⁴⁶

Advanced knowledge that the United Kingdom will oppose moves to transfer more power to Brussels may allow states to gain political points by claiming to be in favour of increased integration in security and defence matters, safe in the knowledge that it will not occur since the United Kingdom will veto it.

D. The Neutrals

There is no such thing as “neutral”⁴⁷ – in the true sense of the word⁴⁸ - in the present day international system. Rather than saying that a state is neutral, a more

accurate statement would be that some states have declared their unwillingness to participate in armed conflict against a belligerent.⁴⁹ This alone, however, does not make a state 'neutral,' because there are many other ways to aid, assist or hinder belligerents that by definition detract from a state's neutrality. For example, Ireland, Switzerland and Austria were all declared "neutrals" and all participated in economic sanctions against Iraq in 1990 and 1991. It is not very likely that Iraq considers any states that participated in sanctions against it to be neutral.

During the Cold War, Austria's declared neutrality was an asset to the West because it allowed for increased contacts with Communist countries. Austria was a listening and communication post because of its Easterly position. Based on documents handed over during the 'Prague Spring' of 1968 which detailed

plans for the invasion of Austria, along with the admission by the United States that it trained Austrians as guerrillas and stashed arms and food in Austria, in the event of an East - West conflict during the Cold War, neither side would have respected Austria's neutrality.⁵⁰ Despite the publication of this information, the Austrian public associates Austria's neutrality with "economic recovery, well being and success,"⁵¹ and they were reluctant to accept any other status, regardless of changed international circumstances. This perception on the part of a large majority of the Austrian public had an influential bearing on the positions taken by the Austrian government in ESDI related matters, such as Austrian opposition to the development of the European Union as a collective defence organisation or the

incorporation of the Western European Union into the European Union.

In a similar vein, Ireland had developed a unique approach to security⁵² and defence issues. Regarding the integration of the WEU into the EU, then Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ray Burke, stated: "I do not see how integration could be compatible with our policy of military neutrality." Despite refusing to join NATO in 1949,⁵³ Ireland has made a contribution to security and defence that is at least as significant as that of some other small full members of NATO. During the Gulf War of 1991 Ireland made a similar contribution to that of Spain and Iceland by allowing its air space and airports to be used by the American-led coalition. Ireland, like Germany and Luxembourg, also made a financial contribution to states that provided armed forces.⁵⁴

Sweden, on the other hand, has a much longer history of neutrality than either Austria or Ireland, although the laws of neutrality have not always been strictly adhered to if keeping to them would have put Sweden at greater risk of involvement in war than bending them.⁵⁵ The only issue that all of the neutrals of the European Union declared their agreement on in the run up to the 1997 IGC was the development of a central planning and proposal unit for the WEU, although it was finally agreed in Amsterdam that the position of a ‘Mr. CFSP’ be established, despite Austria’s declared opposition to the creation of such a position. The neutral states of the European Union can not be relied upon to vote the same way on ESDI issues, nor can they be expected to have the same reasons for agreement when it occurs.

In sum, the presence of ‘neutral’ states in the European Union does not by any means lead to the conclusion that these states will not contribute to common security or defence matters, rather it begs the question to what degree.

E. Southern Europe

States in the south of the European Union have a unique shared set of economic and security concerns that heavily influence their general stance on the development of an ESDI.⁵⁶ There are, however, also significant differences between these states. The security of the Mediterranean region ranks very high if not paramount among these states’ security concerns.

Threats in the Mediterranean region include: the spread of political Islam,⁵⁷ population growth in North Africa and ensuing increases in migration to Southern Europe,⁵⁸ the predicted threat of proliferation of

ballistic missiles with a range capable of reaching cities in the European Union and the geopolitics of energy supply.⁵⁹ Many of these security concerns cannot be combated with military means, since they are the result of socio-economic factors.⁶⁰ Combating the social and economic disparity which exists in states on the periphery of the Mediterranean is a task that the European Union is, however, well equipped to undertake. Because of the nature of the Union there is unfortunately rarely any link between security and defence issues and relevant programmes. It is later argued that this disconnect should be repaired by more involvement of Commission officials in WEU and CFSP discussion. Social programmes may be used to slow the population growth. Economic gestures may enhance the possibility that ballistic missiles will not be aimed at European cities. It is very likely that

energy supplies will continue to come to Northern Europe from across the Mediterranean and so social and economic initiatives may be a useful means of promoting stability and hence increasing the security of energy supplies. Confidence and security building measures [CSBMs] will also add to the security of the region. While it may be argued that such programmes could increase the stability of the region, it is also worth noting that they would do little to deter the spread of political Islam: religious fundamentalism poses a potential threat to the building of regional security because religious absolutism is the antithesis of the respect for pluralism that is a prerequisite for co-operation among states with different ethnic and religious compositions.⁶¹ The members of the European Union which border the Mediterranean - Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece - were not

unanimously in favour of integrating the WEU into the European Union, despite all being full members of that Organisation and all sharing concerns about the Mediterranean region. These states can only agree on discussing defence matters in the CFSP and the creation of a central planning and proposal unit for the WEU.

One of the most interesting issues, which is demonstrative of the many different motivations of the Members, is that of whether or not to develop the European Union into a collective defence organisation. The original six founders of the European Communities were all in favour of such a move, but for different reasons. This would seem to support the general categorisation of these six as “pro-Europeans” or “Europhiles”. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were all in favour of the evolution of the

European Union into a collective defence organisation. They are all members of NATO and the Western European Union and as small states they would not be required to change much at all in order for this to occur. Support for developing the European Union into a collective defence organisation is furthermore arguably a low risk strategy given the remote possibility that it would happen in the face of fierce opposition on the part of several members of the European Union. A facile argument posed as an explanation of “pro” Italy’s position, is that it is particularly concerned with Mediterranean and Balkan security. A plausible argument for Italy’s stance is that it is keen to be seen as one of the “big players” in the European Union and it was also lobbying hard to be included in the first round of Economic and Monetary Union [EMU]. Italy is already a member of the

Western European Union and NATO and as such already has collective defence agreements in place, so developing the EU as a collective defence organisation was not likely to involve much in the way of change for Italy.

Greece, which spends a larger proportion of its GDP on defence than any other EU Member States, supports the development of a common European security and defence policy that offers both clear commitment to protect external frontiers and the territorial integrity of the European Union, and contains a “solidarity and mutual defence assistance clause.”⁶² The long-standing antagonism, deeply rooted in history, between Greece and Turkey potentially poses the greatest threat to the forward progress of institutional development in both the European Union and NATO. Although relations were warming in the years after the 1990’s,

Greece had threatened to veto any enlargement of the European Union if negotiations were held with the Turkish Cypriot government⁶³ on the accession of Cyprus. The initiative lead, by Germany, France and Britain, to engage in negotiations with both the governments of the divided island was labelled "hostile and deceitful" by the Greek Foreign Minister of the time.⁶⁴ Turkey, similarly, might have vetoed any enlargement of NATO unless Greece discontinued its blockade of European Union funds meant for Turkey which were to offset losses Turkey was to sustain by lifting tariffs to allow the customs union to be fulfilled.

⁶⁵ The dispute between Greece and Turkey was a very serious consideration in the 1990's.⁶⁶ Although the Cyprus issue, once referred to as the "most explosive problem in Europe,"⁶⁷ is one of several which serve to exacerbate the long running conflict, there is hope that

the drive for enlarging both the EU and NATO may spark a settlement of the division of the island.⁶⁸

Geographical differences influence the distinct positions that Member States take on the development of an ESDI, but there is not one single geographical factor which can be used to explain or predict a given stance. All small states, for example, are not in favour of the development of a European army. Neither are all states with external borders, even though it could be argued that these states would derive the greatest benefit from a European army since those with external borders are more susceptible to outside attack and immigration and trafficking. Smaller states furthermore are less capable of raising their own armed forces. For example, there was no substantial external threat to Ireland's security in the 1990's. Ireland had little to gain by supporting the development of an

independent European military capability. Not least because such an undertaking would cost a great deal and Ireland was reluctant to support any programme which might have decreased the substantial benefit it derived from European Union membership through the CAP and the Cohesion Funds. A state with an external border may however, be very supportive of increased development of all of the aspects of the ESDI but not necessarily primarily because it perceives a threat to its security arising from its location. Germany for example, supports the enlargement of the European Union along with NATO⁶⁹ because the expected increase in stability in the region will result in economic growth and an increase in trade that Germany hopes to prosper from.⁷⁰

Differences between Member States are in part historically constructed, and although some history is

shared, each state and indeed each region has its own set of historical considerations that influence its policy choices. The United Kingdom and France both had colonies around the world, and de-colonisation influenced trading relationships and foreign policy. Some Member States still have territorial interests abroad. The United Kingdom, for example, recently handed control of Hong Kong back to China; Portugal did the same with Macao in 1999. These relationships and their economic implications are bound to effect the foreign policy stances of the involved states. Germany provides another good example of history effecting contemporary policy: Germany's foreign policy was, until unification,⁷¹ heavily effected by the post World War II arrangements, and historical considerations continue to influence debate about the use of German forces. It may be a stock phrase, but it is true that 'you

can't change history,' although it has often been re-written. Historical factors will continue to influence the Member States of the European Union in the future, and consequently propagate the policy disparities that prevent them from developing a radically changed ESDI along the lines sought by the *Integrationists*. The most important thing to understand about all the preceding information is just how profoundly different state interests impact the decisions that the Members of the European Union make in the Council meeting and at IGCs.

Even the differing types of governments the European states have arguably effect security and defence policy preferences. France's form of government affords considerable power to the Executive. This preference for executive power was reflected in the proposals France has put forward for a 'Mr. CFSP'.

Alternatively, Germany is governed by a federal system in which the Landers have considerable autonomy but the Chancellor and federal government have ultimate control in the most important areas; hence Germany's well-earned reputation as the strongest supporter of a federal Europe.

In sum, the European Union members have a wealth of differences between them that cannot be dismissed and are not easily overcome. Trying to present a unified position to the outside world is a dishonest representation of the political will of the Member States. Furthermore, and most importantly for future indications of actions, the States act on their interests.

3. The Veto Debate

There are no structural impediments to the Member States working together on any or all issues of European security. The argument posed by

Integrationists, that states must find a way to circumvent the veto in order to act more effectively as a Union, is therefore flawed. Integrationist theory in the European Union is inherently imperialistic; “everyone must join in.” The rationale for this is quite simple, if not simplistic - the more states that integrate the more powerful the union will be. The rub is that this goal is in constant conflict with the differences discussed above.

The inability of the European Union to reach agreement on contentious foreign policy issues leads to ‘lowest common denominator’ actions being taken. This is portrayed as a negative attribute of the intergovernmental system of the CFSP. An alternative view of the phenomenon – and the view of this dissertation - is that states take actions in the CFSP

that they all agree on.⁷² That is an objective reality. It is intrinsically neither good nor bad.

There is, despite the eye-catching headlines that proclaim new rows breaking out or breakthroughs being made in the wrangling over the veto issue,⁷³ a fair amount of certainty that decisions in the CFSP will continue to be taken by consensus for some time to come. Major decisions in the CFSP will be taken by consensus, and decisions about implementation of agreed actions will then be taken on the basis of QMV.

The Amsterdam Treaty agreed in June 1997 and the Nice Treaty agreed in December 2000 are testament to this position. Leaders in Amsterdam agreed that once a common defence policy is agreed then some aspects of its implementation will be decided by QMV. This was not substantially different from the arrangements that existed before the 18-month long IGC in 1996/1997.

Here was another example of incremental increases in the functioning of the CFSP. Regarding the pithy changes to the policy made at Amsterdam that resulted from such enormous effort, an editorial appearing in *The Economist* immediately following the conclusion of the IGC commented:

"The common market is a huge success, but other vehicles for 'ever closer union' are stalling. A joint defence identity is still a dream. The idea of joint foreign policy has failed to go far ... significantly, speedy Integrationists seem to have failed in Amsterdam to win a system whereby those keener to form inner clubs within the EU will be able simply to ignore objections from laggards like Britain ... the supranationalists are on the run",⁷⁴

And after the Nice Treaty created the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and it's surrounding structures but left the whole thing in an intergovernmental framework the Economist again proclaimed:

“What the wrangling showed most vividly was how strongly the notion of the nation-state endures among countries which, if you believe the Eurosceptics, are about to be rolled up into a seamless new superstate.”⁷⁵

Germany and France proposed increasing the amount of QMV in the CFSP at both the Amsterdam and Nice summits in the hope that this measure would produce a greater number of decisions in the future. The United Kingdom is opposed to any increase in QMV in the security and defence realm because it perceives the move as part of an ongoing process of chipping away at national sovereignty. Given that the United Kingdom is very unlikely to change this stance, the future prospects for increased QMV in these sensitive fields are in reality bleak.

State vetoes are double-edged swords, used on the one hand as bargaining chips and on the other hand as

protection. Austria used its veto power as a tool to ensure entry into the Schengen Agreement in October 1997. Germany opposed Austria's entry on the basis of Austria's supposedly weak border controls. The German Government feared an influx of illegal immigrants into Germany via Austria. Austria threatened to veto the Amsterdam Treaty if Germany refused it access to the Schengen Agreement.⁷⁶ Germany gave in and Austria managed to use its veto power to get something it wanted. State interests repeatedly override the interests of the Union. States are Members of the Union because they believe membership increases their power.

The right to a veto also serves to protect states from being forced to participate in some policy or action that they are opposed to. In this sense the veto provides protection for states. Britain objected so strongly to

the treatment it received over the BSE scare that it embarked on a policy of vetoing everything it could, in part in protest of the treatment it received, and in part to coerce its fellow Members to relent in their total ban on the sale of British beef on the continent. This incident contributed to the generally more “Eurosceptic” atmosphere that prevails in the United Kingdom in comparison to other European Member States.

The reality is that the actions that the EU takes, or in many cases does not take, are a very accurate reflection of the position of its Members. It is like the United Nations – a mirror reflecting the will of the states which comprise it.

4.The Way Forward

Who says it has to be common in order to be effective?

Why can't the states who want to participate in

multinational projects simply go ahead without the rest of the European partners? They can. If, for example, there is a group of states that want to offer armed humanitarian assistance to a third country, why should they need the backing of the European Union? If the reason is so that the European Union can help to foot the bill, then a remedial lesson in where the EU's budget comes from is in order. The budget is made up of contributions from the Member States; so, why give money to the European Union so that later, when decisions can't be reached and as a result allocations can't be made, the contributors freedom to act as they see fit is curtailed. If the argument is, instead, that action taken by the European Union carries more clout than actions taken by Member States then it is countered by the claim that some action is more credible than no action. There is no evidence to

support this argument insofar as actions taken by the United Kingdom do not carry less clout than a similar action would have if it were to be carried out by the European Union. This is not to say the European Union will not benefit immensely from having a Rapid Reaction Force at its disposal.

Proponents of the idea of concentric circles,⁷⁷ (*See Figure 3.3*) variable geometry⁷⁸ or a multi-speed Europe⁷⁹ as models for the development of the European Union argue that the European Union is a tremendous economic power and, as such, is capable of offering considerable financial sticks and carrots to third countries in support of the widely held principles of liberal democracy and market economics. The Union should, therefore, be left to do what it does best, while the Member States continue to conduct foreign policy in an intergovernmental framework.

Integrationists counter this argument with the fact that a European Union moving at different speeds, or a Union of Member States choosing on an ad hoc basis which policies or activities they want to participate in, will lead to considerable, if not insurmountable, legal, logistical and budgetary problems. They are right, in theory. The Union would work infinitely better if all the members participated in every aspect of Union activity with similar goals in mind and relatively equal, but preferably high, levels of enthusiasm. In practice, barring a sea change in public opinion that would negate all the historical, geographical and socio-economic differences which mix to form public opinion, this is not ever going to happen. So, allowing some states to proceed is the best option to satisfy all parties.

FIGURE 3.3



5. Conclusion

Having a common European policy, or even a coherent European capability for decision making in the foreign policy and security fields, involves more than the decision making and action taking at the sharp end of foreign policy. It is also concerned with integrated military command structures, uniform equipment and operating procedures, forward planning, budgeting, intelligence gathering and dissemination of

information. These things require regular organised co-operation but, crucially, do not require regular agreement by 15 or more leaders with differing agendas. The use of uniform equipment which allows forces to train and fight alongside one another is as much a factor of economics as politics. It is almost never reliant on institutional developments. One of the few things that all the Member States and the institutions of the European Union agreed on was the development of a forward planning and development cell for the Western European Union. The agreement on the general principle is explained by the fact that creating such a body would not involve the sacrifice of any sovereignty whatsoever. This reasoning is applicable to the general tendency to create more institutional frameworks and increase bureaucracy throughout the EU. The finer details of the planning

unit are, however, predictably the subject of considerable bureaucratic wrangling. State intelligence organisations are the most sensitive of national resources. While states may share intelligence on an ad hoc basis, and indeed even develop some institutional arrangements to disseminate information, there is no chance of states actually pooling their intelligence gathering capabilities to the extent they belong to the Union and no longer to the state. There is no compelling reason for them to do so, despite the *Integrationists'* ideologically motivated argument that for the CFSP to be effective it must be endowed with an intelligence capability. It is more likely that the European Union will be given an intelligence pooling centre with a modest staff where states can deposit whatever intelligence information they choose. The Satellite Centre at Torrejon in Spain was a start at

endowing the WEU with its own gathering capability, but it was mostly used for training. The images it received, in its formative years at least, were no match for the satellite data the U.S. gathered.

States guard their sovereignty jealously, and they join the European Union to protect and increase it.⁸⁰ States can certainly achieve success acting in small groups where interests are common; for example, Euroforce and Euromarforce. This is in fact one of the most beguiling arguments of the Integrationists. If states integrate and truly form one large Union, they will be more powerful than they are on their own. This requires integration on every level. This is not going to happen any time soon – although someday it probably will find a level of comfort balancing power between the states and the federal structure such as happened in the United States.

Chapter Three: ESDI Ambitions

Having seen that the development of the political and military aspects of the ESDI is a long, slow process continually hampered by the differences among the European Union Members, it is now fitting to examine how the Europeans and Americans view the role of the Atlantic Alliance.

Endnotes

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- ¹ The focus in this chapter is again on the European Union. The role of the United States in shaping the ESDI is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
- ² Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, Brussels, Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 1957.
- ³ Treaty on European Union, Title III, Article V, Para. J.2. Brussels, Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 1993.
- ⁴ Christopher Hill [ed.], The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996, p. ix.
- ⁵ The 'habit of co-operation' was first referred to in the Copenhagen Report of 1973 which states: 'In several fields, the Member States have been able to consider and decide matters jointly so as to make common political action possible. This habit has also lead to the 'reflex' of co-ordination among the Member States which has profoundly affected the relations of the Members States between each other and with third countries. This collegiate sense in Europe is becoming a real force in international relations.' Second Report on European Political Co-operation on Foreign Policy [Copenhagen Report], *Bull. E.C.*, 9-1973, p. 14.
- ⁶ These statements are truly those of ALL the members since, as they have joined the Union, they accept the treaties and laws that have to date been accepted by the European Union. This concept is known as the '*acquis communautaire*'. Timothy Bainbridge with Anthony Teasdale, The Penguin Companion to European Union, London, Penguin, 1995.

- ⁷ Simon Duke, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University, contends that the three most powerful states in the European Union; Britain, France and Germany, have: "failed to assume responsibility or initiative in security affairs that stretch beyond their own immediate concerns." Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 93 - 203
- ⁸ Summary of the Positions of the Member States and the European Parliament on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Luxembourg, European Parliament Working Party of the Secretariat Task Force on the Intergovernmental Conference, 4 December 1996, JF/bo/259/96.
- ⁹ The exact wording reads: "common defence policy for the protection of the EU's and the Member States' frontiers and the Member States' territorial integrity". *ibid*.
- ¹⁰ "Majority support for CFSP operational funding from the Community budget on the basis of the three following requirements: funding by the Member States in exceptional circumstances; *ibid*.
- ¹¹ J. A. C. Lewis, 'Conflict and Consensus Emerge In France's Left-Right Advance', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 July 1997.
- ¹² Simon Duke identifies essentially the same three trends. Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder, London, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 95 - 100.
- ¹³ It is difficult to generalise about an entire government especially since there currently exists

serious difference between Mr. Chirac and Mr. Jospin.

¹⁴ France's Foreign Policy, Paris, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1995.

¹⁵ David S. Yost, 'France and West European Defence Identity', *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 4, July/August 1991, pp. 327 - 351.

¹⁶ "In 1993 the European Union allocated more than one billion ECU's [\$1.1 billion] in the context of its economic aid and reconstruction programme [PHARE], of which 20% came from France." France's Foreign Policy, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Alex Duval Smith, 'France to Slash Troop Numbers in Africa', *The Guardian*, 26 July 1997.

¹⁸ France's Foreign Policy, *ibid.*

¹⁹ John Vinoeur, 'France and Germany: Recharging Their Batteries', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 July 1997.

²⁰ France and Germany work very closely together in almost all areas and military matters are not an exception. The Franco-German Brigade formed in 1987 formed the basis of the Eurocorps, founded in 1993 which includes Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg. France's Foreign Policy, *ibid.*

²¹ Although French foreign policy documents stress that France wishes to work with the leading western powers they also emphasise the high value which French places on its "national independence". Defence and Disarmament, *op. cit.* and France's Foreign Policy, *ibid.*

²² Thomas Sancton, 'France Barges Back', *Time*, 1 July 1996, pp. 24 - 25.

²³ ‘France Will Not Rush Into Privatisation’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 11 July 1997; Giovanni de Briganti, ‘French Socialists Slow Push Towards Industry Merger’, *Defence News*, 30 June - 6 July 1997.

²⁴ Giovanni de Briganti, ‘European Firms Question Future Prospects’, *Defence News*, 21 - 27 July 1997.

²⁵ In the early 1960’s the negotiations lead by Fouchet were abandoned because the members could not persuade France to agree a plan for political union. During the 1960’s the Harmel Report suggested a framework for political union as did the Spaak Report but neither had much immediate impact. The most notable political development during the 1960’s was the creation of a common Council and Commission of the ‘European Communities’ Treaty Establishing the Single Council and Single Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Office for Official Publications of the European Union. Susanne J. Bodenheimer, ‘The ‘Political Union’ Debate in Europe: A Case Study in International Diplomacy’, *International Organisation*, Vol. 21, 1967, pp. 27 - 40.

²⁶ The incident became known as the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ and the motivations of the French Government are discussed in: Charles de Gaulle, ‘A Concert of European States’ in Brent F. Nelson and Alexander C-G Stubbs [eds.], The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, London, Lynne Reiner, 1994, pp. 25 - 44.

- ²⁷ The Hague Conference was proposed in July 1969 by President Pompidou. It took place later that year and lead to the Luxembourg Report, the founding document of European Political Co-operation [EPC]. 'Final Communiqué of the Council of the European Communities: 22 - 23 July 1969', *Bulletin of the EC*, 1/1970, p. 4; 'Final Communiqué of the Hague Summit: 2 December 1969', *Bulletin of the EC*, 1/1970, p. 10; 'The Luxembourg Report: 20 July 1970', *Bulletin of the EC*, 11/1970, pp. 9 - 14.
- ²⁸ As well as holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, France is also the fourth largest net contributor to the United Nations and in 1995 provided more 'blue helmets' for UN missions than any other country in the world. Defence and Disarmament, Paris, French Foreign Affairs Ministry, April 1996.
- ²⁹ Germany has experienced both economic and social difficulties as a result of unification. German Unification, Five Years On, Bonn, German Information Centre, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, September 1995.
- ³⁰ Germany is most noted for its unyielding support for Economic and Monetary Union, although the convergence criteria are posing economic and social problems in many countries including Germany. On the Eve of the 6th Anniversary of German Unification: Europe and the UN, Focal Points of German Foreign Policy, Bonn, German Information Centre, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, September 1996

³¹ The Amsterdam Treaty allowed for the Secretary General of the European Council to become the so called ‘Mr. CFSP’

³² *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 December 1996.

³³ Nordwidj Declaration of the Western European Union, November 1994.

³⁴ *NATO Review*, Vol. 43, No. 6, November 1995, p. 33 has two charts that show the plethora of different organisations and their convoluted membership arrangements.

³⁵ Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

³⁶ Matt Marshall, ‘Kohl Says Germany Will Meet Strict Maastricht Criteria for EMU’, *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 July 1997.

³⁷ Reginald Dale, ‘EU Shouldn’t Count on a UK U-turn’, *International Herald Tribune*, 4 March 1997.

³⁸ Ian Black, ‘Bullish Rifkind Warns EU to Curb Ambition as Bonn and Paris Vow to Get Rid of Veto’, *The Guardian*, 4 March 1997; Jon Hibbs, ‘Rifkind Puts Block on EU Plans for Immigration’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 March 1997.

³⁹ Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government’s Approach to the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference, London, Information Department and Security Policy Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, October 1995, para. 21.

⁴⁰ Clifford Beal, ‘Let the WEU Die in Peace’, *Jane’s International Defence Review*, April 1996, p. 1.

⁴¹ Gordon, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.

- ⁴² The United Kingdom's attitude towards the Atlantic Alliance will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
- ⁴³ In 1996 the United Kingdom captured a full quarter of the £20bn world market in defence equipment, arms and services including training and support. 'Lion Claws a Giant Share of the World Arms Bazaar', *The Independent*, 26 February 1997.
- ⁴⁴ The United Kingdom does not wish to see any further power transferred to Brussels and allowing the Community budgetary responsibility for the CFSP would amount to just such a sacrifice because the European Parliament has the right to oversee the Community budget.
- ⁴⁵ Michael Franklin, The EC Budget: Realism, Redistribution and Radical Reform, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992; Roger Henderson, European Finance, London, McGraw-Hill, 1993; Vittoria Grilli, The Road to European Financial Integration: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, London, Woolwich Building Society, 1992 and J. Orstrom Moller, Member States and the European Community Budget, Copenhagen, Samfundsvidenskabeligt Forlag, 1982.
- ⁴⁶ Anne Deighton, Western European Union 1954 - 1997, pp. 172 - 173.
- ⁴⁷ There is no such thing as absolute or strict neutrality provided for in the Hague Conventions of 1907 because of the advent of provisions of the UN Charter. Article 2[4] of the United Nations Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in the international relations from the threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Therefore states can no longer choose in law to be belligerents. This renders the rules of strict neutrality of the Hague Conventions of 1907 obsolete. New York, The United Nations, Dietrich Schindler, ‘Transformation in the Law of Neutrality’ in *Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, pp. 367 - 386. The rules of strict neutrality were set out in the Hague Conventions, V and XIII, of 1907.

- ⁴⁸ The fact that a state declares itself to be neutral gives it a legal stance alongside the primarily political nature of neutrality, unlike the position of non-alignment which is wholly political. The legal concept of neutrality stretches back in international law to pre-World War I. The differences between neutrality and non-alignment were elucidated in an opening speech to The Colloquium on Neutrality and Non-alignment held in Malta on 4-8 November 1991, made by Dr. Guido de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs for Malta, published by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies and the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva, 1992.
- ⁴⁹ The Irish Foreign Minister summed this approach up saying “We are neutral on the military level, but we are not neutral on the political one.” *Daily Debates*, 327 - 1466.
- ⁵⁰ ‘MI6 ‘Plan for Austria Guerrilla Campaign’’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 13 April 1996.

- ⁵¹ Speech by Ambassador Winfried Lang, Permanent Representative of Austria, Geneva, in a speech on Austria's experience with neutrality given to the Colloquium on Neutrality and Non-alignment in Malta on 4-8 November 1991, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies and the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva, 1992.
- ⁵² The Republic of Ireland's neutrality originated from its battle to achieve independence from Great Britain and the desire to see Ireland united. In remarks made regarding 'Ireland's experience with neutrality', Professor Philippe Chapal, of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, University of Grenoble II, France, describes the history of Ireland's evolution into a neutral state declaring: "Having acquired its independence so painfully Ireland did not want to commit itself during [World War II]. Besides, its neutrality quickly turned into a battle against Britain: until its reunification, Ireland would remain neutral." Colloquium on Neutrality and Non-alignment, Malta, 4-8 November 1991.
- ⁵³ Manual of the 25th May 1949, 'Texts concerning Ireland's position in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty', No. 9934, Dublin, Dublin Stationery Office, 1949.
- ⁵⁴ Rene van Beveren, 'Belgium and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990 - March 1991', in Nicole Gnessotto and John Roper, Western Europe and the Gulf Crisis, Paris, Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, 1997, pp. 7 - 16 [p. 13].

- ⁵⁵ Speech made by Professor Jerzy Sztucki, Faculty of Law, University of Uppsala, Sweden, entitled ‘Survey of Sweden’s Experience of Neutrality’ to the Colloquium on Neutrality and Non-Alignment, Malta, 1991
- ⁵⁶ In recognition of the fact that “security in the Mediterranean is closely linked to security in Europe and that the Mediterranean dimension is one of the various security components of the European security architecture” NATO established a dialogue with six states in the region [Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia] in order to “build stability and confidence in the region, dispel misperceptions and apprehensions and lay the ground work for future co-operation.” Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, ‘Preparing for the Madrid Summit’, *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 2, March 1997, pp. 3 - 6.
- ⁵⁷ Dr. Robert Aliboni, Director of Studies, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, argues that “Western Europe and the West as a whole is considered the primary antagonist to the identity sought in the Mediterranean area. The Nationalist position is that of traditional ‘Third Worldism’, that is the West prevents or impedes the spread of modernity [by preventing or limiting the spread of economic, technological and scientific development]. According to Islamists, on the other hand, modernity may only be reached within the framework of indigenous values and not through assimilation of Western culture: modernisation through imitation of the West is a trap which can only lead to

subordination.” He also contends that the threat of political Islam is exacerbated by the one way flow of mass media and the fact that the West is seen to be supportive of authoritarian and repressive Arab regimes. Speech entitled ‘Factors Effecting Mediterranean Security’ given to the Conference on Arms Control, Confidence Building and Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, which took place on 24 - 26 June 1994. Malta, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, December 1994

- ⁵⁸ Dr. Aliboni, *ibid.* contends that immigration threatens Western European security in more than the obvious way of posing a drain on resources. He maintains that immigrants often form into tight knit communities which are reluctant to integrate into the local population which creates suspicions and misunderstanding amongst the immigrants and their hosts.
- ⁵⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian D. Lesser, ‘Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks’, *The NATO Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, May 1996, pp. 25 - 31.
- ⁶⁰ Professor Guido de Marco, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs for Malta, notes that addressing the security concerns in the Mediterranean cannot be done in purely military terms. “The socio-economic situation in the Mediterranean is the main source of anxiety.” Opening remarks to the conference on ‘Arms Control, Confidence Building and Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and

the Middle East' which took place from 24 - 26 June 1994. Malta, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, December 1994.

⁶¹ The nature of the threat of fundamentalism to the Mediterranean region was elucidated by Ambassador Ahmed Ounais, Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunisia, in a speech entitled 'Security Trends in the Mediterranean' given to a conference on Arms Control, Confidence Building and Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, which took place on 24 - 26 June 1994, Malta, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, December 1994.

⁶² 'Memorandum for a European Union with a Political and Social Content' Greece's contribution to the 1996 IGC, Athens, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 1996, Section E, Paras. 60 - 69.

⁶³ The EU and particularly Britain, Germany and France have pushed for negotiations with Turkish Cypriot Government. 'EU Pushes for Turkish Input on Cyprus Bid', *The Financial Times*, 25 February 1997.

⁶⁴ 'Greek Fury Over Cyprus', *The Financial Times*, 26 February 1997.

⁶⁵ 'Greece Threatens Veto if EU Talks to Turkish Cypriots', *The London Times*, 28 February 1997.

⁶⁶ 'Turks See Prejudice in EU's Closed Door: Snubbed by Europe, 'The Subtext is Fear', *International Herald Tribune*, 24 February 1997.

- ⁶⁷ Richard C. Hottelet, 'The Bitter Cyprus Issue Continues to Divide', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 July 1997.
- ⁶⁸ 'Cyprus Peace Effort Planned', 26 February 1997; Editorial, 'Byzantine Diplomacy', *The Economist*, 26 July 1997.
- ⁶⁹ According to Victor Gray, Germany is frustrated by the perceived complacency of the other European partners in "moving towards a more independent and more assertive foreign and defence policy". Victor Gray, 'European Security Revisited', *Parameters*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 169 - 176.
- ⁷⁰ William Drozdiak, 'German Centre of Gravity is Shifting Eastward', *The International Herald Tribune*, 21 July 1997.
- ⁷¹ Germany has experienced both economic and social difficulties as a result of unification. German Unification, Five Years On, Bonn, German Information Centre, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, September 1995.
- ⁷² Simon Duke, 'The Second Death [or the Second Coming?] of the WEU', *The Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 1996, p. 175.
- ⁷³ 'Paris, Bonn in Security Talks', *The Financial Times*, 4 March 1997.
- ⁷⁴ Editorial, 'Cheer Up, Europe', *The Economist*, 21 June 1997.
- ⁷⁵ *The Economist*, 14 December 2001.
- ⁷⁶ Ian Traymer, 'Border Dispute Poses Threat to Amsterdam Deal', *The Guardian*, 28 July 1997.

- ⁷⁷ The idea of concentric circles, although it can take various forms, is often used to describe how the European Union might develop. “A central core is composed of activities in which all states participate, surrounded by a second circle of activities in which Member States may choose to be involved.” The inner core covers Treaty of Rome activities. There may be a third circle in which activities that include non-members are placed. Timothy Bainbridge with Anthony Teasdale, The Penguin Companion to the European Union, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1995, pp. 74 - 75.
- ⁷⁸ The idea of variable geometry is another way to explain how the European Union can develop but although it foresees a central core of activities like that in the concentric circles model , it does not envisage the same members always choosing to opt out of or in to new activities. Bainbridge and Teasdale, *ibid.* p. 468.
- ⁷⁹ The idea of a multi-speed Europe means, as the names indicates, that some states go faster towards integration than others. Those that start slowly are free the catch up with the faster movers at virtually any time. Bainbridge and Teasdale, *ibid.* pp. 74 - 75, and 468.
- ⁸⁰ William Wallace made this point in an interview though he makes reference to the same point in his writing.

Chapter 4: The Atlantic Alliance: A U.S. Perspective

“The United States does face a dilemma: as long as it is able and willing to protect common interests, others might be happy to have a free ride, thereby keeping political opposition under control, accepting no risk for their youth, and continuing to focus on their economies.”¹

1. Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the dilemma faced by the United States has been how much security to provide for its allies, at what cost and with what expected returns. This basic question surfaced repeatedly between 1945 and 1990 in the guise of many different military force structure and readiness issues, and of course in the economic questions surrounding legislation geared towards supporting the American defence-manufacturing base. The difference today is that the burden-sharing debate, like every other facet of international security, has been re-hashed

and stirred by the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of Soviet influence.

“It has always been difficult for the United States to achieve the ‘perfect’ level of alliance leadership that builds consensus without seeming to dictate American preferences. It is even more so today, when there is no imminent threat to help build consensus behind U.S. preferences.”²

A timely example of this principle in practice is the choice of the three new members of NATO. ‘The Department of Defence (DoD) determined that this number would ensure full participation in multinational training and would lower the likelihood of having to deploy additional U.S. forces at an early stage of a crisis.’³ As Chapter Seven more clearly elucidates, building consensus for the addition of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic without seeming to dictate U.S. preferences was akin to walking a tightrope. In the struggle against the menace

of Communism, no price was too high to pay to support democracy. As this Chapter will argue however, the United States did not suffer economically for Her tireless vigilance, as Simon Duke notes:

“So, too, was the Cold War distribution of forces convenient for the U.S.. The U.S.'s active involvement in Western European defence made the defence of Europe the forward defence of the U.S. itself, as well as ensuring the protection of U.S. interests in Europe.”⁴

Since the end of the Cold War however, the U.S. has arguably been searching for strategic direction⁵, and yet the same question remains; how much should be spent to maintain security for the Allies. The continental United States is not imperilled by any conventional military threat, although the issue of the need for ballistic missile defence is a growing concern.⁶ The Quadrennial Defence Review⁷ is the most publicised attempt to mitigate the strategic lacuna

in United States foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

The meandering path of United States policy is explained by John Hillen, Policy Analyst for Defence and National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation: “policy-makers have tended to succumb to ... influences like short-term political expediency, media-generated urgency, and knee-jerk reaction born of political hubris.”⁸ Hillen continues:

“In the absence of a Cold War threat, U.S. leaders have not clearly articulated their views about the nature of the New World and the leadership role that America should play in it. As a result, U.S. strategy - especially during the Clinton Administration - has been inconsistent. It is unclear how U.S. leaders determine where, when, why, and how to use military force, as well as which international conflicts will require American military leadership and which ones will be solved best by the combined efforts of America's allies and other international organisations.”⁹

The United States is far from alone in groping towards specific foreign policy objectives. The United States approach to the prospect of European integration has first and foremost suffered from the mixed signals sent out by the Europeans. As was demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the European Union Member States often have bigger eyes than stomachs, and are further hampered in their efforts to ‘speak with one voice’ by the very real differences between them. This in turn sends confusing signals to the Americans who have nonetheless continually supported increased integration into existing institutions – first in Western Europe and currently of the former Central and Eastern European countries. Former Secretary of Defence William Perry reiterated the United States support for European integration in a report published by the Department of

Defence entitled, “United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO”.

“The United States has a comprehensive approach to creating new security architecture for Europe. Its key elements include enhancing NATO’s efforts to reach out to the East through the Partnership for Peace; developing a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of NATO enlargement; building co-operative relationships with Russia; supporting European integration as embodied in the European Union (EU); and strengthening the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); as well as maintaining close bilateral relationships with both our allies and new partners.”¹⁰

This Chapter will examine each of these points in detail, except for the enlargement debate, which merits its own Chapter later in this dissertation.

The degree to which this statement is true is a very good indicator of the overall U.S. view of the Atlantic Alliance in practice. It is the argument of this chapter that the U.S. is in favour of strengthening the Atlantic

Alliance – but necessarily in a way that furthers its own economic and security interests. America may be the ‘global policeman,’ but its reasons for being so are not as altruistic as the political rhetoric indicates.

History teaches that events are rarely the result of a perfectly laid plan: More often, a myriad of circumstances interplay, as is the case in the contemporary evolution of Europe. As Wellington remarked about Waterloo: ‘One can no more describe every event that lead to the outcome at Waterloo than one can describe every event at a ball.’ Furthermore, the U.S. is also confronted by circumstances that it truly cannot influence. There is, for example, a very limited amount the United States can do about organised crime in Russia. This means that the U.S. is as much adrift as its European partners in some situations are.

Having said this, the United States can rightly expect a certain amount of guaranteed assistance from its European partners in some areas, such as:

- problems around the periphery of Western Europe, like the conflict in Bosnia;
- common security concerns, such as the Middle East Peace Process; and
- Global security issues, such as international terrorism.

The trick for the United States and the European Members of NATO alike is to find the appropriate balance between their respective interests, where those interests do not converge, along with a balance between sharing of the costs and responsibilities of ensuring those interests they do hold in common. The issues tangential to this balance are the focus of this chapter and the next. For ease of reference this chapter

takes its guidance from The United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO excerpted above. First however, it is helpful to understand the burden-sharing debate in historical perspective.

2. History

A Europe at peace is a vital U.S. interest. The history of the Atlantic Alliance is testament to this. If Europe is at peace, the U.S. need not commit lives and treasure to regain European security. This is the sometimes forgotten *raison d'être* of NATO. The prospect of war either among the European allies or against them seems an unlikely prospect in - and also because of - the present international system. The resources of a strong, secure Europe combined with those of the United States constitute an important boon to U.S. interests.

“Historically, the U.S. provided the largest share of funds, troops, and weapons to NATO’s activities and dominated the alliance’s decision-making.”¹¹

‘During the Cold War membership in NATO did not mean equality and the U.S.-European relationship was more like a U.S. protectorate’,¹² although the assertion that ‘the relationship between the U.S. and Europe was like a hen and her chicks’¹³ is unfair. On numerous occasions throughout the history of NATO, the United States has attempted to force the Europeans to shoulder a greater share of the financial and military burden, not necessarily for altruistic reasons. This is ‘one of the emotive assumptions behind the burden sharing debate - the U.S. as the provider who rebuilt post-war Europe and, in later years was treated so callously by its European allies once they had recovered.’¹⁴ The U.S. more frequently acted with forethought, to further its own interests without being willing to make

concessions on sharing responsibility for decision making.

In the initial post war period the *raison d'être* for acquisition of bases overseas was force projection capability. By 1950 however, a U.S. National Security Paper made it clear that this policy was to be pursued 'even if no threat existed' in order that the 'American system can survive and flourish'.¹⁵ The economic assistance 'given' to European allies after World War II was often divisive. For example, although Spain apparently received a generous aid package, roughly 60% of the aid was used for U.S.-related construction projects and 10% went to administration costs, while U.S. Public Law 480 required that the remaining 30% be used mainly for the purchase of U.S. agricultural surpluses.¹⁶ 'Even where direct economic exchanges did not take place, the U.S. managed to secure base

access by threatening [indirectly] to apply economic pressure on fragile economies.¹⁷

During the Vietnam War the United States exerted considerable pressure on its European allies to assist it in the conflict, in light of the U.S. military contribution to Western Europe. The allies refused. In the United Kingdom ‘the Wilson government reasoned that any British support would only serve to internationalise the conflict and lead to the diversion of even more U.S. resources from Europe.’¹⁸

Certainly it must be said in defence of the U.S. offensive that the U.S. initially became involved heavily in Europe after World War II with the presumption that such measures were temporary. The United States government assumed that the Europeans would provide for their own defence once they had sufficiently recovered.

Although attempts were made to institutionalise the sharing of both costs and responsibilities, they have proved patently fruitless, ultimately because the United States has continually proved unwilling to relinquish control. In the 1960s, the United States attempted to institutionalise both burden sharing and responsibility sharing under one roof, known as the Multilateral Force: a fleet of 25 ships, each carrying 8 Polaris missiles and crewed by a mixture of nationalities. Crucially, the missiles were to remain under U.S. control, with each state represented having a veto over their use. The project failed in the face of French and British opposition. France recognised the initiative as an American attempt to halt the development of Frances' Force de Frappe and the United Kingdom had doubts about the vagaries of the command and control structure.

A virtual premise of U.S. policy since 1960 has been that Europe should put NATO investment first and curtail the development of independent capabilities and formations duplicating those of NATO. A second premise has been that Europe should increase its defence investment generally -- and since the Gulf War this imperative has focused especially on the development of power projection capabilities.¹⁹ However, to the extent that recent European policy has been consistent with the second of these goals, it has contradicted the first.

The international environment holds many important differences after the end of the Cold War, but perhaps the most relevant to this thesis is the fact that the world is no longer the arena for the acting out of superpower struggles. This phenomenon not only effects force levels and strategy in Europe, but its effects ripple

through all areas of foreign policy. The United States involvement in Haiti, for example, was arguably less acceptable to the American public than the mission to Granada in 1983, because the latter was portrayed as part of the struggle against Communism.²⁰ Public support for the U.S. operation in Haiti was arguably effected by numerous other mitigating circumstances, including: the death of United States personnel in Somalia in October 1993 and the fact that, in Haiti, there were no United States citizens in need of assistance as there were in Granada. Nevertheless it is a fact that the United States public is less willing to accept the death of American military personnel overseas since the end of the Cold War.²¹ This unfortunately coincides with NATO adopting the new role of Out of Area operations along with expansion as its two pronged strategy for dealing with the changed

international environment in the new millennium.

3. Partnership for Peace (PfP)

The PfP seems like a very good idea on the surface, but has it delivered what it originally promised? And how has U.S. foreign policy effected its progress? The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), created in December 1991²² to increase dialogue and co-operation among NATO Members and the Central and Eastern European countries as well as the newly independent states, was superseded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.²³ The Partnership for Peace, introduced at the 1994 Brussels NATO Summit,²⁴ is designed to function as a military and political co-operation forum. It was initially made up of Members of the NACC (now EAPC) and other Members of the OSCE. The PfP is open to Members of the OSCE who can make a reasonable contribution

to co-operation. Individual Partnership Agreements – agreements between the individual state and NATO outlining a state's contribution – which are the hallmark of this unique approach to increased co-operation and interoperability – have been drawn up between PfP Members and NATO in most cases.²⁵

The fundamental objectives of PfP are:

- facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;
- developing co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field

of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and others as may subsequently be agreed;

- developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the Members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

According to NATO Ministers:

“The Partnership for Peace initiative has been uniquely successful in influencing stability and security in Europe and fostering improvements in good-neighbourly relations. It has become a permanent and dynamic feature of the European security architecture.”²⁶

But the PfP is ultimately a tool to prepare prospective members for entry into NATO. According to General Lebed, Russia's most adamant opponent of NATO expansion,

“The Partnership for Peace was presented to us as an alternative to enlargement. NATO stated that it reserved the right to take in new members, but that PfP was meant to build bridges between NATO

and the former Warsaw Pact Countries. We were lead to believe that, in reality, if PfP was a success, NATO would not enlarge, at least for the foreseeable future.”²⁷

In the run up to the 1996 Presidential election in the United States, both President Clinton and his opponent, former Senator Bob Dole, supported the main goal of the PfP: to prepare countries in Central and Eastern Europe for membership in the Atlantic Alliance.²⁸ According to a poll jointly conducted by the Centre for the Study of Policy Attitudes and the Centre for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Affairs, most Americans support NATO expansion but that support wanes at the prospect of America bearing increasing costs. As long as the public is largely in favour of expansion it seems likely that the U.S. will

continue to support programmes such as the Partnership for Peace.

In 1997 the PfP conducted 17 exercises in 12 countries involving a variety of PfP countries. They concentrate on Platoon and Brigade level exercises simulating peacekeeping as well as humanitarian aid missions and disaster relief operations. In comparison to the WEU, which only conducted exercises on paper, the PfP made good progress in its early years. This could not be accomplished without the fervent support of the United States. NATO on the other hand is being reorganised to cope with the event of “brushfire intra-state ethnic conflicts on the south-eastern fringes of the continent”.²⁹

4. Building Co-operative Relations with Russia

Following the end of the Cold War, when Russia began to show signs of decay, many politicians, the

press and public alike called for aid to Russia to stabilise the former superpower. This was motivated primarily by the perceived threat presented by a politically destabilised nuclear power.³⁰ The voices were louder than the pocket books were deep.³¹ As Russia's troubles worsened in the latter 1990s,³² it seems that the U.S. was privately convinced that Russia was no longer such a serious concern.³³ President Clinton launched military strikes against Iraq on the eve of an important vote in the Duma to ratify the START-2 arms control treaty, thus dooming the vote to failure. Russia opposed NATO expansion but the U.S. pushed for it, offering Russia a 'strategic partnership' as a concession. Russia opposed military action in Iraq and Kosovo but the U.S. was not deterred. NATO's continued emphasis on territorial defence, along with the expansion of the Alliance to

states that were formerly Members of the Warsaw Pact and the continuation of U.S. domination of NATO, have also contributed to Russia's perception of itself as a lower tier international player. This spawned continued anti-NATO sentiments.

The NATO Russia Founding Act – “a largely unimplemented document”³⁴ - did little to patch the rift. Currently there is debate over the U.S. missile defence initiative and, true to post Cold War form; the U.S. appears to be forging ahead with its objectives despite Russian protests. This too is Realism in action: the U.S. is forwarding its interests while Russia is weak with the understanding that this is not likely to be the case for the long run.

Even if the United States threw all its weight behind Russian interests, there is no guarantee that it would help. Russia has its share of problems that are not

easily addressed by the rest of the world, regardless of intention.³⁵ Russia's influence internationally has waned to the point of near non-existence. Her economy only accounted for about 1% of global output in 1998. As international markets place increased value on technology based companies, Russia falls further behind. It is, furthermore, difficult for Russia to attract investment from abroad because of organised crime and tenuous law enforcement arrangements.³⁶ Even if companies wanted to move into Russia and set up businesses, the people are generally too poor to support much volume of business.

Ultimately Russia has a great deal of potential. It is a large country with substantial natural resources,³⁷ a highly educated population in general, a nuclear power and a permanent Member of the UN Security Council. If Russia's future can be made brighter, then so will

the futures of the surrounding countries be brighter and the world will necessarily be a safer place.³⁸ If, on the other hand, the U.S. continues to pursue a policy of paying lip service to Russia's ills³⁹ without finding solutions, then there is the potential for a downward spiral.⁴⁰

5. Support for Integration

It is clearly in the United States' interest to have as a partner a Europe whole and free, although "the U.S. often has cause to question Europe's commitment to self-defence."⁴¹

*"What counts most to U.S. leaders, whether Democratic or Republican, is whether European policies and goals are in harmony with those of the U.S., not whether Europeans are united in some identity or not."*⁴²

On the face of it, developments in NATO and the EU have left WEU staff with little to plan, especially if the

principle is sustained that WEU should not duplicate what is done in NATO.⁴³

Since 1986 the United States has withdrawn two thirds of its armed forces stationed in Europe, reducing its troops from over 300,000 to around 100,000. This reduction necessarily involved armaments and support structures. U.S. military spending on European forces has therefore declined by about 60%.⁴⁴ As a result, a large portion of the United States' defence spending cuts have come from decreasing its European force, whereas the Europeans, while also downsizing, have not undertaken the same degree of cuts.⁴⁵

The United States policy towards European security can be summed up in two words: 'NATO first'. America's leadership in the Alliance is, if not unquestioned, at least undeniable. Keeping the Europeans engaged in building security within the

NATO structure ensures that their efforts are channelled into the sort of arrangements that best suit America's strategic goals and military capabilities. But the United States and Europe are being forced to face up to a new reality in the post Cold War era: their conflicts are increasingly over economic issues now that there is no longer a Soviet military threat. The European Union represents a stable bloc and trading partner but also has the potential to challenge the U.S. economically in the foreseeable future. The advent of the ECU, although still in its infancy, may someday pose a rival to the U.S. dollar.

6. Strengthening the OSCE

When the demise of the Warsaw Pact raised the spectre of the abolition of NATO, the question was

touted: “What organisation in Europe will handle the new tasks required by the changed international environment?” The Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), incorporating 55 European countries and the U.S. and Canada, was the front runner. Richard Ullman wrote of a pan-European Security Organisation in 1991 and suggested that the OSCE had a potentially bright horizon.⁴⁶ Further hopeful comments for the future of the OSCE came from Stanley Sloan of the Congressional Research Service:

“Instead of basing stability of the system on the manipulations of balance of power politics, as in the past, collective security in a more co-operative political environment would presumably be embodied in the diplomacy of conflict resolution, operated principally through the OSCE.”⁴⁷

However, the use of NATO force in Bosnia in 1995 and then the decision to enlarge NATO put paid to the

idea of the OSCE becoming the leading forum for dealing with security issues in Europe. Because the United States has chosen to strengthen and support other institutions and endeavours, such as the PfP and EAPC, the OSCE has suffered.⁴⁸ Former Ambassador to the OSCE Lynn Marvin Hansen highlights a further concern of the United States, the lingering need to contain Russia:

“Peacekeeping should be a multilateral effort [that] seeks to integrate east and west. ... The most likely large scale volunteer in the CSCE context will be Russia cloaked in the garments of the CIS. Thus, rather than the integrative function which could take place within the NACC, peacekeeping efforts by the CIS would perpetuate the concept of two Europes: one western and one eastern with the second being under the protective hand of Russia.”⁴⁹

In sum, it is hard to substantiate the argument that the U.S. has truly been strengthening the role of the

OSCE. It has, in Realist fashion, worked to shape the organisation to best suit its interests.

7. Bilateral Ties

The United States Government has proven to be keenly interested in pursuing bilateral ties though the American public seems largely unaware of these activities. In a report by the Department of State to the United States Congress, the U.S. Government stated: “Stability in Europe is in the fundamental interest of the United States, whether endangered or threatened states are Members of NATO or not.”⁵⁰

This general line of thinking seemed to be relatively well accepted as policy as the Military Balance noted in 1996:

“To draw the Eastern European countries and newly independent states of the former Soviet Union into European security arrangements, the U.S. has pursued vigorous bilateral military

contacts as well as active participation in the multilateral Partnership for Peace.”⁵¹

The creativity with which the U.S. pursued these new and closer ties was at least in part the result of the fact that U.S. Government’s ambition for enlargement of NATO outstripped public support for the project.⁵² The political leaders were constantly forced to find new ways to build international relations without putting themselves in a position where they could be severely criticised by a public largely concerned with domestic issues.

8. Conclusion

The U.S. will continue to try to profit economically from its military philanthropy because it has no choice. Its partners do not share its enthusiasm for international military activity – at least in the pocket

book. Commensurate with its preferred approach to security issues, the United States discounts the value of Europe's contributions in the realm of economic assistance, regionally and globally. America also discounts Europe's relatively greater (and more reliable) contribution to non-NATO security institutions, such as the UN.

As the next chapter demonstrates, Europe in turn discounts America's contributions to European security because they come at a distinct cost in terms of national (or regional) independence. From a European perspective, the American desire to "call the tune" exceeds the extent to which America "pays the piper."⁵³ The European Union's schizophrenic behaviour furthermore nurses the tendency of the United States to prefer to work either unilaterally or in

bilateral frameworks with the aim of maximising its influence in Alliances.⁵⁴

In the latter 1990s the United States has redressed the uncertainties which plagued its strategy in the immediate post Cold War era by committing troops to Bosnia and by reaffirming that commitment after the original mandate expired and pressing for NATO enlargement.

The present day situation resembles a holographic image. If viewed from one angle, it appears that the United States is yet again reaching out to Europe as it's nearest relative; if viewed from another angle, it appears that the United States is using its hegemonic influence to control the behaviour of the only bloc of states which could feasibly challenge it – economically or otherwise – in the foreseeable future. And just like a holographic image, it is in fact both at the same time.

The same reason for the U.S. reluctance to share responsibilities in the Atlantic Alliance accounts for the Europeans' inability to build a truly common defence, defence policy or armaments policy. No one wants to relinquish sovereignty, even when it makes sense to do so, because no one trusts their neighbours that much.

*"This might almost be called the post-political age. Basking in the longest economic expansion in memory, with consumer confidence in the stratosphere and inflation, unemployment and crime rates through the floor, America ... (has) ... what can only be described as rampant complacency."*⁵⁵

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Chapter Five: The Atlantic Alliance: A European Perspective

“Clearly Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global partner the U.S. seeks. These shortcomings do not result from ‘too much U.S.’ as some claim but from ‘too little Europe.’”

Javier Solana

1. Introduction

Europeans not only have differences among themselves, as established specifically in Chapter Three; they are often at variance with the United States.¹ Just as the Europeans seldom agree on any given policy they likewise seldom agree on how and why to differ with the United States.² These differences and disagreements are invariably rooted in self-interest. The Member States of the European Union will work together or separately but their work is always focussed on furthering their state interests as the *Realist* school dictates. This has the effect on the

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Atlantic Alliance of highlighting the primary distinction between the two blocs; the U.S. has a unified leadership while the European Union is the wife of fifteen husbands.

Following the *Realist* school of thought, this Chapter argues that the European Union Member States, in seeking to provide for their own security will continue to rely on NATO for their defence and security needs.³

In reality this means relying on the United States. This argument is established by substantiating the following points:

1. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance developed very slowly primarily because of the range of views held by the European Union Member States regarding the role of the Atlantic Alliance and their respective positions within the

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Alliance. Self-interested state actors drove these differences.

2. Efforts to date to build a European force capable of carrying out the sort of ‘Out Of Area’ (OOA) operations specified by the Petersburg Declaration have only yielded limited results in the 1990’s.
3. The Europeans are unwilling to commit the resources necessary to build a European force capable of acting completely independently of NATO for a variety of reasons – not least of which is that they are not trying to build a completely independent force.
4. Decisions within the European security organisations are taken by consensus. The Members who value NATO’s primacy will not

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allow measures to be passed that might damage the Alliance.

5. The Europeans are not facing any serious threat to their security that does not also concern the United States and, the threats they do face are increasingly more readily countered by non-military means. This factor acts as a deterrent to building an independent European force.
6. For all of these reasons the Europeans will maintain the primacy of NATO and develop their military capabilities in such a way as to augment the strengths of NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is indeed greater than the sum of its parts but, in truth, NATO resources - for the most part - belong to Members. Therefore, borrowing NATO assets often really means

borrowing assets of one or other Member State. Given the depth and scope of the U.S. contribution, borrowing NATO assets is almost impossible without borrowing U.S. assets as Ann Deighton notes:

"If European states want to mount significant military operations beyond their immediate neighbourhood, they will have to depend on the U.S., not NATO. This fact cannot be ignored."⁴

2. Differences Keep the European Union Members Divided Over the Atlantic Alliance

"After the disaster of the 1956 Suez Crisis, when the U.S. undermined a joint British-French invasion of Egypt, the British concluded never again be on the wrong side of the Americans, whereas the French concluded never again to depend on them."⁵

Europeans have often had want to complain of America's purported abuse of its hegemonic position but, the Europeans own behaviour regarding the Atlantic Alliance has not been entirely innocent.

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Examples of self-interested state behaviour, leading to either indecision - or worse no decision - abound throughout the history of the Atlantic Alliance. This is important to the arguments made in this dissertation because it speaks to state self-interest in an anarchical world and to the likelihood of future actions regarding the Atlantic Alliance on the part of the European Allies.

In the immediate post war period for example, the Americans assumed that the Europeans would accept there help as a stop gap until Europe had sufficiently recovered⁶ from the devastation of World War II.⁷ The Europeans would then be able to provide for their own security and naturally be a strong and willing ally and partner of the U.S. based on their shared democratic values. The European Allies however, were unable during this time to cement their commitment to

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common defence. The common thread running through their respective unwillingness to commit resources and relinquish command authority over their militaries was the overwhelming desire to maintain the ability to protect themselves from aggression.

The impetus for integration at the end of World War Two was derived from four basic factors: the need to prevent a resurgence of German aggression, the catalytic influence of the promise of American aid,⁸ increasing anxiety concerning the intentions of the Soviet Union⁹ and the rising tide of federalist idealism.¹⁰ Although less obvious in the offer of economic aid from the United States, the common thread which initially ran through every justification for integration was the requirement for security. Economic co-operation was the contrivance that was deemed to have the most potential for binding the

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states together, but the purpose of this bond was undoubtedly first and foremost to provide security.

The memories of WWII were fresh in the minds of the people, preventing even the visionary leaders in Europe from acting to create a common defence. The Soviet Union took full advantage of the vacuum left at the end of World War II and this only stoked the fears of the West European states. The Dunkirk Treaty of 1948,¹¹ while baring the hallmarks of collective defence, was primarily a tool to be applied against any attempt at German expansionism. Then in 1949, NATO almost immediately subsumed the responsibilities of the Western European Union as the United States took the lead in managing the fledgling Atlantic Alliance.

Perhaps the most tragic of all failures of the European Allies to truly take a giant step towards providing for

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their common defence came in the early 1950's when the European Defence Community (EDC), which held such promise, failed to be ratified by the French Parliament in 1954.¹²

American participation in the Atlantic Alliance sadly and often inadvertently provided disincentive for the Europeans to pool their resources and act together. The most pointed example of this was the decision to rely more heavily on nuclear missiles as deterrents. The U.S. pursuit of the New Look Strategy,¹³ relying as it did so heavily on nuclear weapons as a primary deterrent and less on massive conventional force build ups in West Germany, which the Lisbon Goals¹⁴ of 1952 assuaged, inadvertently provided a disincentive for the Europeans to build up conventional forces.

Support for the Alliance among the European Union Member State's publics was even adversely effected

on occasions when all the Members did agree on a strategic action. In 1978, in response to Russian deployment of SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles, the NATO partners decided jointly to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles while maintaining détente. All the partners reached this decision, but the public protested the deployment.¹⁵ Germans were especially unhappy and the phrase ‘the shorter the range, the deader the German’ was popularised.

When President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev met in Reykjavik eight years later and agreed the INF Treaty, which banned the SS-20s, cruise and Pershing missiles, the Europeans were infuriated, this time because they saw the bilateral arrangements as indicative of the Americans self-interested behaviour.¹⁶

In fact the entire history of the European powers development of their own nuclear defence has been

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divisive and characterised by self-interested state actions.

Based on the public perception of the importance of events in other areas of the world to their lives,¹⁷ (See *Figure 5.1*) current European public opinion is not supportive of a European security and defence identity that would involve Europeans in the affairs of other states.

Personal Relevance of Events in Other Countries		
Does It Matter To Your Life?		
	Yes %	No %
<i>What Happens In:</i>		
Western Europe	36	61
Mexico	42	55
Asia	35	61
Canada	31	66

The one factor that has consistently been overestimated by the politicians is the matter of public support for their undertakings. As Michael Welsh, Chief

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Executive of the Action Centre for Europe in England, notes:

“No amount of common policies and diplomatic mechanisms will work unless the political determination to enforce the collective will is present and this in turn depends on the ability to mobilise public opinion in support of the common objectives.”¹⁸

In the Intergovernmental Conference of 1986, which produced the Single European Act (SEA), the issue of European defence was officially discussed but:

“...the positions of the individual Member States were too contradictory for a satisfactory defence policy to be evolved. Ireland as a neutral felt compelled to block any discussion of defence which might be contrary to her constitution; Denmark was a loyal member of NATO but wholly opposed to any European involvement in the defence and security field; France had quit NATO's integrated command structure in 1960 and was keen on the construction of a European defence pillar; Germany was a loyal member of the Alliance but saw such a pillar as a way round constitutional limits on the activities of her defence forces; Britain felt strongly that any flirtation with a separate European defence structure risked

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alienating the Americans and destabilising NATO.”¹⁹

The EU and the U.S. have several on-going disputes of varying import for relations between the two blocs. The Helms Burton anti Cuba law²⁰ and the Iran-Libya Sanctions law are interesting examples of two important phenomena. First, they are both representative of the struggle between the U.S., which wants to achieve foreign policy goals, and the EU, which wants to maximise economic benefits. Second, Helms-Burton and the Iran-Libya sanctions law are representative of issues that link the security field to the economic field. A main tenets of this dissertation is that the European Union Members co-operate in the economic arena because the risks are less when balanced against the possible gains that can be achieved when the Members work together. This co-

operation however, does not extend to the defence field because the risks are not outweighed by the potential benefits. As the European Union becomes more of an economic force to be reckoned with, the more these foreign policy/economic issues will cause rifts in one sector that will effect decisions in another.

3. Efforts to Fulfil the Petersburg Tasks

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as detailed in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992²¹ called for the “framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence” and tasked the WEU with “drawing up and implementing any European Union decisions and actions with defence implication.”²² The WEU spent the remainder of the 1990’s trying to grow into its new role.

In direct response to the TEU, the WEU Ministers met and produced the Petersburg Declaration in June of

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1992. Efforts in the 1990's to build a European force capable of carrying out the sort of Out Of Area (OOA) operations as specified by the Petersburg Declaration were only moderately successful. The Petersburg Declaration recalled:

"the decision contained in the Declaration of the member States of WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance"²³

The Petersburg Declaration set out the tasks the WEU envisaged itself taking responsibility for. These tasks include; "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management and ... peacemaking."²⁴

Events in the 1990's in Europe highlighted the need for a capable military presence in Europe. The break-up of Yugoslavia arguably called for military forces, at

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first for humanitarian missions and eventually for peacekeeping.²⁵ The European Union was clearly not ready for such a role.²⁶ In June 1992 NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to support peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN or the CSCE.²⁷ Later in 1992 NATO took the more tangible step of agreeing to use NATO troops and equipment to enforce the arms embargo and monitor the no-fly zone.²⁸ During this same time frame that NATO was taking concrete action, the European Union Members were *discussing* ratifying a Treaty that “*might* eventually lead to the framing of a common defence *policy*.” They were nowhere close to even drawing up an exercise that would allow them to plan for the sort of role NATO was arguably forced to step into.²⁹ It wasn’t until 1998 that the Western European Union undertook an exercise on paper only, to examine in practice how it

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might handle a crisis.³⁰ As Michael Welsh, former MEP and Research Associate at the University of Central Lancashire, notes: “The Petersburg Declaration is no substitute for a coherent European military doctrine.”³¹

A main purpose of the 1996-1997 IGC which lead to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, was to improve upon the tenets of the CFSP in light of the fact that the means available did not match the ambitious terms of the CFSP.³²

“On the face of it, developments in NATO have left WEU staff with little to plan, especially if the principle is sustained that WEU should not duplicate what is done in NATO.”³³

What the WEU – an organisation of only 336 staff,³⁴ has done fairly successfully through its Planning Cell, is develop the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). The Planning Cell maintains a database of military

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units and headquarters that the WEU can avail itself of for specific operations. The FAWEUs include: the EUROCORPS (European Corps),³⁵ the Multinational Division (Central),³⁶ the UK/NLAF (United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force),³⁷ the EUROFOR (Rapid Deployment European Force),³⁸ the EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force),³⁹ the Headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps⁴⁰ and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).⁴¹ The EUROCORPS, headquartered in Strasbourg,⁴² has been operational since November 1995. In the event of a crisis the EUROCORPS has the ability to call up approximately 60,000 troops.⁴³ That's very impressive on paper at least, given that the total active duty Army of Luxembourg is only 800.⁴⁴ The Franco-German Brigade, who became known as the EUROCORPS, began as an attempt to nurture an embryonic European

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army. The EUROCORPS is not without its sceptics, however, as Michael Walsh notes:

*"It gave substance to American and British fears that the Alliance was about to be broken up, while encouraging unrealistic French dreams of a separate European defence identity."*⁴⁵

This may have been true at the outset when the question of the future of NATO was widely debated, but the FAWEUs settled into their role and the European Union took a very substantial step at the Nice summit in December 2000 to develop a rapid reaction force.⁴⁶

The Multinational Division (Central) is much smaller, more mobile and more strategically oriented than the EUROCORPS and as such has not received as much media coverage as the EUROCORPS. It is made up of Airborne and Airmobile Brigades from its Members and can muster 200 assorted helicopters⁴⁷ if needed.⁴⁸

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Unlike the EUROCORPS, the Multinational Division (Central) is primarily assigned to NATO but can be used by the WEU: this may also have a bearing on the level of press excitement.

The EUROMARFOR is yet another type of force at the disposal of WEU, in that it is a non-standing, pre-configured force. The principle is similar to that employed by reserve forces around the world: contingency plans are drawn up that dictate what troop configurations would be called upon in a variety of different scenarios. This allows the Members to alternate the forces they designate to the EUROMARFOR to allow many different units to drill as part of a FAWEU. This also allows the WEU the flexibility to call on everything from an aircraft carrier to minesweepers and amphibious landing craft depending on the crisis.

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The Members of the WEU are undergoing changes in their military structure that will invariably promote the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, albeit indirectly.

“A major military trend in NATO member-states and the non-NATO European countries is the move towards professional armed forces and the ending of, or significant reductions in, conscription in a number of countries.”⁴⁹

France, identified in Chapter 3 as Europe's bellwether state, is a prime example of the shift to professional armed forces in Europe and in April 1996, France joined the Military Committee and began participating in the meetings of Defence Ministers.⁵⁰

The prospects of the European Union Member States developing their own truly independent force, a force that operates completely outside of NATO, is remote. The development of the FAWEU working with NATO

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is probably a good representation of what to expect in the future. This phenomenon truly speaks to the heart of the *Realist* argument. While the French may yet harbour ambitions for Europe, the majority of Members support the primacy of NATO. It is in their national interests to do so. The potential costs of pooling their resources and going it alone are too high. Despite the relatively low threat of conventional attack on Western Europe today, military planners are constantly plagued with the question of “What might my potential enemy be capable of tomorrow?” and this excludes the possibility of an independent European Army by virtue of the level of risk. Philip Delmas, a counsellor to the French finance ministry and a former military analyst at the French ministry of foreign affairs, notes in his book The Rosy Future of War:

“Can peace be guaranteed? The question seems almost ridiculous; so much is human history the history of war. Civilisation has been unable to overcome war”⁵¹

What the European Union is developing is a rapid reaction force capable of undertaking small missions. It is not an attempt to duplicate NATO or create a standing army.

4. Commitment of resources

“Ironically, the answer to the American burden-sharing demand and the European hegemony complaint is the same: a more coherent and responsible Europe. But that Europe is not likely to emerge from the current economic and political trends over the next decade.”⁵²


Although there are many aspects to the economic constraints on security,⁵³ as Stanley Sloan's comment above indicates, if one simply looks at the numbers, the dominance of the United States in NATO is crystal clear. Figure 5.2 depicts the U.S. defence expenditure

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during the period 1989 – 1998 in relation to all of the rest of the NATO Members. The U.S. alone spends more than all the other Members combined on defence. One might suspect that that figure would have decreased with the end of the Cold War, and it has but only by a small percentage. The next logical argument might be that the United States is a large country but when one compares populations, the United States has fewer people than the combined remaining Members of NATO⁵⁴ and still it spends more.

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**Figure 5.2: US Contribution to NATO Defence
Expenditures, Percent of Total
1989 - 1998**



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



Figure 5.3 depicts the considerable gap between the amount of money spent by the Members of NATO as opposed to the amount of money spent on defence by the full Members of the Western European Union. The WEU is unquestionably smaller than NATO in terms of population – in fact the ten full Members of the WEU are also full Members of NATO. There are fewer Members in the WEU than there are in NATO

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but the gap in defence expenditure is not directly proportional to this factor. The most interesting fact depicted by figure 5.2 is that, while the WEU Members have decreased their defence expenditure from its high point in 1990, they have made less severe cutbacks. This may indicate that, as the European Union develops the rapid reaction force, its Members may maintain a more constant level of defence expenditure.

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Figure 5.4 depicts defence expenditure based on membership of groups over the time frame 1989-1998.

This is particularly interesting because it provides a visual of what the European Union can expect from potential members in the future, given that the WEU Associate Members are depicted as a group along with WEU Observers and Associate Partners. Even if the EU takes in new members in the future as it is now planning to do, it is unlikely that this will make a significant impact on EU defence expenditures in relations to those of all NATO Members. The states that might plausibly be considered as potential members – no matter how remote that possibility may be – have unremarkable defence expenditures.

It is easy to see in these few illustrations just how important the United States is to the Atlantic Alliance and just how difficult it will be for the Europeans to

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devote the resources required to field a rapid reaction force. Given the population and economic similarities between the United States and the European Union, the dissimilar defence expenditure is not a function of ability, rather it must stem from political will and drastic differences in foreign policy objectives. Even if the will existed among the decision-makers, the Europeans are unwilling or unable to commit the resources necessary to build a European force capable of acting independently of NATO. This may be a function of public opinion after all. As Simon Duke notes:

“One of the central paradoxes of the burdensharing debate within NATO [is that] threat perception and the estimated forces needed to meet that threat have consistently failed to match the political willingness to meet the perceived threat with the necessary resources. This may well illustrate a more general problem of matching the inspiration emanating from collective bodies to the realities of national resources and politics.”⁵⁵

4. The Primacy of NATO

Another crucial factor in the argument here is the fact that any one Member of the European Union can stop the process in its tracks. Chapters Two and Three detailed the importance of consensus voting to the European Union's decision making process. The power of one is the norm in the fields of security and defence and will not be negated even by a majority.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU)⁵⁶ provided for the further development of European Political Co-operation (EPC)⁵⁷ in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),⁵⁸ yet the framework remained decidedly intergovernmental. This was disappointing to Integrationists who held that the only way to give Europe the capability to make common foreign policy decisions quickly and coherently was

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through the establishment of an integrated decision making body. Integrationists convincingly argue that decision making that emanates from a centralised, autonomous body will generate more potent, synchronous and effectual policies. It is further argued that such a decision making body would be free of the constraints of national interests and hence be more likely to generate policy for the greater good of the Union. This dissertation does not argue against this point. Another point the Integrationists make is that decision-making that takes place in a centralised autonomous body could be accomplished by Majority Voting. Intergovernmentalists, and this dissertation, argue that states would have to sacrifice sovereignty to build such an institution. They may well decide to do so at some point in the future but it is unlikely given current patterns of behaviour.

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Different Members protect the rule of consensus for different reasons. Greece fought against allowing decisions about membership of the EU to be taken by QMV because it opposed Turkish membership of the EU - although there is currently a warming of relations between these historic rivals. If majority rule were made the norm, the European Union could feasibly vote to make the entire internal area a border free zone.

Needless to say, there are many states that do not wish to be a part of a European Union with no internal borders. Integrationists are fond of noting however, that the European Treaty promises the free movement of people goods and services. In fact the Nice summit in 2000 promised to roll back the barriers to QMV but not in the fields of security and defence.

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The most notable ‘Atlanticist’ is the United Kingdom but it is important to remember that it only takes one dissenter to derail any process.

The French President Jacques Chirac, stated in 1996 that he would like to see the European Council made the supreme decision making body for the WEU and that he would like to see “the WEU one day folding itself into the European Union.”⁵⁹ This was initially opposed because it was thought that it would not be possible to accomplish this without upsetting some Members of the European Union. In the end the agreement kept foreign policy, security and defence in a firmly intergovernmental framework. Barring the French, the Europeans seem keenly aware of the importance of NATO and the clout the threat of U.S. force carries around the world.

5. Threats to European Security

The European Union is not facing any serious threat to its security that does not also concern the United States. European security is a vital U.S. interest after all, as Madelaine Albright, former U. S. Secretary of State, is so fond of saying. The threats that the European Union does face furthermore are increasingly more readily combated by non-military means. This does not mean that the Europeans are devoid of the need of military forces. As Wilfred von Bredow, Professor of International Relations at the Philips - University Marlsburg in Germany, notes: “soft force cannot replace hard force.”⁶⁰

The fact that the United States is such a paternal partner combined with the fact that the new threats to European security do not necessarily elicit a military

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solution, act as a deterrent to building an independent European force.

A preponderance of emerging threats to European Union security stem from the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶¹ The threats that face Western Europe today are not as obvious as they were in the Cold War Era⁶² but Russia is still a force to be reckoned with as the discussion in Chapter Four noted. Russia's nuclear capability alone makes guaranteeing the security of Western Europe a job for NATO's collective defence role.

The new threats to Western Europe's security come mainly from within Europe and primarily result from the instability caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Islamic extremists and national secular groups in the middle east also pose potential threats to European security.

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Economic deprivation, border disputes and the problem of national minorities give rise to the potential for westward migration. This is a concern for the European Union but not necessarily a problem that would be best handled by the military. Police co-operation and paramilitary police units in states are generally thought to be a better solution. These problems also create concern over human rights and the preservation of democracy and stability in the region surrounding the European Union. It is in the European Union national interest to promote stability in neighbouring states but this may be accomplished through economic incentives and social programs, something that the European Union is very good at.

6. Conclusion

Taken together, these arguments provide a good basis on which to judge what the Europeans are actually

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working to build. It seems evident that they want a Rapid Reaction Force capable of dealing with the sorts of situation posed by the Balkans in the 1990s without having a standing army or in any way threatening the primacy of NATO. This is not a grand plan – it is a compromise despite the bold rhetoric.

Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow for U.S. Security studies at the IISS in London, explains, in a remarkably concise manner, why the rhetoric may be outstripping the actual pace of the development of a true ESDI:

“Indeed, the illusion of ‘Europeanisation’ of NATO results from the fact that all the main players in the Berlin agreement have an interest in claiming that it is happening: France needs to claim a greater role for Europe as political cover to come back into the Alliance; Germany needs to show progress toward European political unification to reassure its elites and convince its public to accept monetary union; Britain wants to show a strong role for WEU to forestall calls to give the EU a defence role; and the U.S. administration needs to be able to claim to Congress and public opinion that the

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*Europeans are now prepared to shoulder more of the burden of transatlantic defence.*⁶³

And so even the Europeanisation of NATO – if it were truly to occur – would likely be the result of states acting in pursuit of self-interest. It would be truly ironic of the most basic tenet of *Realism* brought the Europeans to a federalist end.

An article in *The Economist* in 1998 lamented the plight of the ESDI:

*"Yet in truth, for all the continuing excuses, when faced with the historic opportunity after 1989 to do its bit to expand the area of peace and stability in Europe, the EU ducked behind its ramparts. It is enough to make you despair of Europe's ever punching its political weight in the world."*⁶⁴

Around the same time the *Financial Times* carried an article that stated: "the EU has yet to find, or even to seek its collective voice."⁶⁵ The agreement at the Nice

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summit went a good way to correcting this imbalance but there is a long way to go.

There are things the European Union can do to promote peace and stability both among its neighbours and in the world. The enlargement process in the European Union needs to be used to promote human rights in Eastern Europe as well as promoting security and stability. The Lome Convention also needs to be used to promote human rights in Africa and the Caribbean. The WEU's new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit could be used as a real preventive diplomacy centre of expertise. The European Union should regulate the sale of small arms such as semiautomatic and machine guns and grenades.⁶⁶ These are all things that would augment the role of NATO, and these are quite possibly the things the European Union would be the most successful at.

Endnotes

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- ¹ A good example of a security issue that divides the United States and Europe – and the Europeans – is the use of land mines on NATO soil and internationally. Joseph Fitchett, ‘U.S. and European Allies Split on Use of Land Mines on NATO Soil’, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1998.
- ² Efforts to reach a unified stance on Iraq’s continued evasiveness towards United Nations weapons inspectors in the mid 1990’s is a classic case of the Europeans being unable to agree amongst themselves or with the United States on what action should be taken. John Vinocur, ‘Europe’s Stance on Iraq: A Patchwork of Attitudes, National Roles Outweigh A Unified Approach’, *International Herald Tribune*, 13 February 1998.
- ³ William Rees-Mogg, writing in *The Times*, makes the point that Europe is reliant on NATO for it’s security and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future and this dependant relationship extends to trade, technology and economic affairs. ‘NATO is Still Our Sword and Shield’, *The Times*, 30 January 1998.
- ⁴ Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union 1954 - 1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 153. Chapter 11: Challenges for Western European Union Operations Trevor Taylor pp. 145 - 155
- ⁵ Phillip H. Gordon, ‘Does Western European Union Have A Role?’ in Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union from 1954-1997: Defence,

Security, Integration, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 112.

- ⁶ Chapter Four demonstrated that the United States did in fact act in a self-interested manner after WWII to further its military access world-wide and to further its economic position world-wide.
- ⁷ Richard Vaughan, Post War Integration in Europe: Documents in Modern History, London, Edward Arnold, 1976, pp. 21-22; Uwe Kitzinger, The European Common Market and Community, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994, pp. 11-12; John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1978; Alan Milward, The Re-construction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, London, Methuen, 1984.
- ⁸ The United States requested integration at most, and economic co-operation at least, as the price for its' economic assistance. The United States was motivated principally by the need to ensure stability and security in the region. This becomes more apparent when it is considered that in the preceding 30 years, the United States had become involved in two devastating wars. The United States was motivated to a marginally lesser extent by a desire to ensure the economic recovery of what had the potential to be a substantial market for U.S. exports and trade. See: Richard Vaughan, Post War Integration in Europe: Documents of Modern History, London, Edward Arnold, 1976, pp. 21-22; Uwe Kitzinger, The European Common Market and Community, London, Routledge, 1967, pp. 4-7; Trevor C. Salmon and William Nicoll,

Understanding the New European Community, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994, pp. 11-12; John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1978; Alan Milward, Tre-construction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.

⁹ The Soviet Union took full advantage of the fact that a vacuum had been left at both its eastern and western borders with the defeat of Japan and Germany, pursuing an expansionist policy. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union had come to incorporate Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (all by annexation), Romania, parts of Poland, Finland, North-Eastern Germany and Eastern-Czechoslovakia. Once the War ended, the Soviet Union successfully manoeuvred to control: Romania, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Albania and the remainder of Czechoslovakia and Poland by the end of 1947. See: C. Ransom, The European Community and Eastern Europe, London, Butterworth, 1973; M. Bournstein, East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe, London, Allen and Unwin, 1981; and A Shiam and G. Yannopoulos, The EEC and Eastern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.

¹⁰ At the end of World War Two, the ideological concept of federalism was supported by several groups who wished to see Europe come together as a federation bound together in political and economic union. Federalism is the belief in federation as the preferable form of government and

it has been extensively publicised. See: Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, London, Faber and Faber, 1973, pp. 147-186; R. J. Harrison, Europe in Question, London, Allen and Unwin, 1974, pp. 42-74; W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation Significance, Boston, Little Brown, 1964. The groups in Europe whose goals included a federalist order for Europe at the end of World War Two included; the Economic League for European Co-operation, the European Union of Federalists (UEF), the European Parliamentary Union and the Christian Democrat Nouvelles Equipes Internationals. See: W. Lipgens, A History of European Integration Vol. 1, 1945-1947, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.

¹¹ Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk on 4 March 1947. It was a 50-year mutual assurance agreement aimed at preventing any resurgence of German military force but it also had economic and social co-operation within its auspices. See: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures, Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1989, Clive Archer, Organising Europe: The Institutions of Integration, London, Edward Arnold, 1994, p. 239.

¹² Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

¹³ New Look Strategy adopted by the Eisenhower Administration after the failure to attain the Lisbon Goals relied heavily on nuclear deterrence. The

North Atlantic Council adopted the New Look Strategy in 1954.

- ¹⁴ Lisbon Goals were agreed at the February 1952 meeting of the North Atlantic Council and called for unrealistic increases in force levels in West Germany. Conventional forces were to be increased from 25 to 96 divisions and aircraft numbers were to be increased to 4,000.
- ¹⁵ Michael Welsh, Europe United? The European Union and the Retreat from Federalism, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 127.
- ¹⁶ Michael Welsh, *op. cit.* p. 130.
- ¹⁷ Eurobarometer 1996.
- ¹⁸ Michael Welsh, Europe United? The European Union and the Retreat from Federalism, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 124.
- ¹⁹ Michael Welsh, Europe United? The European Union and the Retreat from Federalism, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 129.
- ²⁰ Guy de Jonquieres, 'Keeping the Lid on Helms-Burton', *The Financial Times*, 31 July 1997.
- ²¹ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established by the Maastricht Treaty and came into force on 1 November 1993. The provisions of the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are now devoted specifically to the CFSP.
- ²² The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European

Union Official CFSP site,
<<http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp:lang+en>>

²³ The Petersburg Declaration of the Western European Union Ministers meeting in Bonn, June 19, 1992,
<<http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>>

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ The necessity of the use of ‘western’ forces in the former Yugoslavia is a debatable point. There are those who felt and still feel that Europe possibly but certainly the United States should not have become involved.

²⁶ David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1998, p. 1.

²⁷ The Final Communiqué of the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Oslo in June of 1992 stated: “The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, June 4, 1992,

<<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm>>

²⁸ Final Communiqué of the Nuclear Planning Group, Gleneagles, Scotland, October 21, 1992,

<<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c921021a.htm>>

- ²⁹ Michael Walsh makes the point that: 'As so often the case, Community countries were prepared to endorse the objectives of stability, security and prosperity for all, but unprepared to furnish the means with anything like the clear-sightedness and political determination required.' Europe United?: the European Union and the Retreat from Federalism, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 171.
- ³⁰ CRISEX 98 tested the WEU's politico-military decision-making mechanisms. 24 of the 28 WEU states took part in the exercise. By the end of the exercise they had agreed to take action. It is important to note that they had not actually agreed what action to take. WEU Fact Sheet: CRISEX, April 1, 1999.
<<http://www.weu.int/eng/info/crisex.htm>>
- ³¹ Michael Welsh, Europe United?, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 143.
- ³² Christopher Hill coined the 'capability-expectation gap' phrase. John Peterson, 'Introduction: The European Union as a Global Actor', in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 3-17.
- ³³ Trevor Taylor, 'Challenges for Western European Union Operations', in Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union 1954 - 1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 145.

³⁴ WEU Fact Sheet: Relevant Figures April 28, 1999,
<<http://www.weu.int/eng/info/figures.htm>>

³⁵ Rome, May 19, 1993, Ministers from France, Germany and Belgium declared the EUROCORPS a FAWEU. Spain joined the EUROCORPS in 1994 and Luxembourg joined in 1995. The three original Members agreed a Joint Declaration stating the Conditions for the Use of the European Corps Within the Framework of the Western European Union, on September 20, 1993.

³⁶ At the WEU Ministerial meeting in Rome on May 19, 1993, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany agreed to make the Multinational Division (Central) available to the Western European Union although it's main assignment would remain with NATO.

³⁷ At the WEU Ministerial meeting in Rome on May 19, 1993, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands agreed to make their joint amphibious force available to the Western European Union. The 'at peace' strength of the force is 6,000. Portugal joined the EUROFOR in November 1995. Joint Declaration by Spain, France, Italy and Portugal on the Conditions of Employment of the EUROFOR in the Framework of the WEU.

³⁸ The Foreign Ministers of France, Italy and Spain agreed at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Lisbon, on May 15, 1995 to make their joint rapid deployment force a FAWEU. Portugal joined the EUROFOR in November 1995. Joint Declaration by Spain, France, Italy and Portugal on the Conditions

of Employment of the EUROFOR in the Framework of WEU.

- ³⁹ The Foreign Ministers of France, Italy and Spain agreed at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Lisbon, on May 15, 1995 to make their European Maritime Force a FAWEU. Portugal joined the EUROMARFORCE in November 1995. Joint Declaration by Spain, France, Italy and Portugal on the Conditions of Employment of the EUROMARFOR in the Framework of the WEU.
- ⁴⁰ The Defence Ministers of Germany and the Netherlands declared the headquarters of the 1st German/Netherlands Corps available to the WEU on October 6, 1997. This is especially significant because the WEU does not have any permanent Command and Control structure like NATO.
- ⁴¹ Italy and Spain signed an agreement in October 1997 establishing the SIAF and announced this agreement at the Chiefs of Defence staff meeting at the WEU on October 27-28, 1997. This force is really an extension of existing multinational maritime and amphibious forces and does not have a headquarters.
- ⁴² At the headquarters there are Air Force and Navy Liaison teams since the force is likely to be used as a joint force although it is primarily a ground force.
- ⁴³ The EUROCORPS is made up of: the 1st Armoured Division from France, with its headquarters in Baden-Baden, Germany; the 1st Mechanised Division from Spain, with its headquarters in Burgos, Spain; the 10th Panzerdivision from Germany, with its headquarters in Sigmaringen,

Germany; and the 1st Mechanised Division from Belgium, with it's headquarters in Saive, Belgium.

⁴⁴ The Military Balance, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 60.

⁴⁵ Michael Welsh, Europe United?, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 132.

⁴⁶ The Headline Goal Force will be discussed at the end of this dissertation. Due to the dynamic nature of the European Union some time frame limits had to be placed on the scope of this dissertation.

⁴⁷ The four Brigades that make up the Multinational Division (Central) have more than 200 transport helicopters, anti-tank helicopters, attack helicopters and observation helicopters between them.

⁴⁸ The Multinational Division (Central) is comprised of; the Belgian Para Commando Brigade, the German 32nd Luftlande Brigade, the 11th Netherlands Airmobile Brigade and the 24th United Kingdom Airmobile Brigade.

⁴⁹ Military Balance 1996 - 1997, London, IISS and Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 32.

⁵⁰ "First, in March 1996, President Jacques Chirac announced fundamental changes to the French armed forces. Second, in April 1996, France joined the NATO Military Committee and began participating in the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers. One of the most significant changes in the French armed forces was the decision to end conscription by 2002 and to move towards smaller but fully professional armed forces." Military Balance 1996 - 1997, London, IISS and Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 37.

⁵¹ Philippe Delmas, The Rosy Future of War, New York, NY, The Free Press, 1997, p. 1.

⁵² Stanley Sloan, 'Transatlantic Relations: Stormy Weather on the Way to Enlargement?', *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 5, September - October 1997, p. 13.

⁵³ James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economic Co-operation, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997.

⁵⁴ The population of the United States in 1998 was estimated at 268 million and the population of the combined European Union Member States was estimated at 373 million. The Military Balance 1977/98, London, Oxford University Press, pp. 18-95.

⁵⁵ Simon Duke, Burdensharing, p. 39.

⁵⁶ The Treaty on European Union (The Treaty of Maastricht) signed 7 February 1992, is reproduced in Richard, Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification, A Comprehensive Reference Guide, London, Longman Group Ltd., 1993, pp. 382-483.

⁵⁷ European Political Co-operation was introduced by The Luxembourg Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification, *Bull. EC*, 11 1970, pp. 9-14.

⁵⁸ The Common Foreign and Security Policy was created by Title V of the TEU.

⁵⁹ 'France Seeks Supreme Role for Council' in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 December 1996.

⁶⁰ Wilfreid von Bredow, Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel, 'European Security in an Unsafe World' in European Security, London, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 208-224.

⁶¹ Much has been written about the ramifications of the end of the Cold War on European security. Some of the discussions which had an influence on statements made here include: Jonathon Dean, Ending Europe's Wars: the Continuing Search for Peace and Security, Washington, D.C., Twentieth Century Fund, 1994, *especially chapters 3-6*; Clive Archer and Olie-Pekka Jalonen (eds.), Changing European Security Landscapes, Tampere, Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1995, *especially chapters 6-10*; Eric Herring, 'The Collapse of the Soviet Union: The Implications for World Politics' and John Baylis, 'Europe Beyond the Cold War' in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), Dilemmas of World Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 354-383 and pp. 384-405 respectively; Hugh Miall (ed.), Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Co-operation, London, Pinter, 1994, *especially chapters 3-5*; Jackie Gower, 'EC Relations with Central and Eastern Europe' in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, (2nd edition), London, Pinter, 1993, pp. 283-299 and James Lee Ray, Global Politics, (6th edition), Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1995, pp. 317-361.

⁶² See: Andrew Cottey, 'NATO Transformed: the Atlantic Alliance in a New Era' in W. Park and G. Wyn Rees (eds.), Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe, London, Longman, 1998, pp. 43-60.

⁶³ Philip H. Gordon, ‘Does Western European Union Have A Role?’ in Anne Deightom [ed.], Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 109.

⁶⁴ ‘Europe’s Dual Enlargement’, *The Economist*, 21 - 27 March 1998.

⁶⁵ Op. Ed., ‘EU and Iraq’, *Financial Times*, 10 Feb 1998.

⁶⁶ Preventing Conflict, Promoting Development, Priorities for the UK Presidency, London, Saferworld, 1999.

Chapter Six: The Defence Manufacturing Industry

“A state's control over its national defence industry has a wide range of political economy implications. On a political level, autonomy in defence industry matters helps to ensure access to weapons for military (offensive or defensive) purposes, and, through arms exports, the ability to influence foreign countries. Economically, the production of armaments provides high-technology jobs, supports a country's balance of payments position, and may lead to 'spin-offs' for civilian applications.”¹

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1. Introduction

For all of the reasons described by Professor Guay, states protect their ability to produce arms though “today it is difficult to define exactly where commercial industry ends and the defence industrial base begins.”² On the face of it, one might assume, under the *Realist* school of thought, that the need to guard sovereignty over the states ability to produce

arms would inhibit states from co-operating in this high politics realm. This was the case at one time. For the same reason however, quite the opposite is currently true and the European Union Members will co-operate, merge, enter into cross-border agreements and ad hoc arrangements more and more in the coming years specifically because it is in their state interest to do so. States must work together to achieve economies of scale and hence retain some level of sovereignty over weapons production precisely because it is a vital national interest. Because of the increasingly complex, technical and highly developed nature of manufacturing techniques required to produce next generation weapons systems, states in Europe have no choice but to co-operate with one another or lose their ability to manufacture the means of war. This chapter furthermore theorises that the time period between

1994 and 1998 marked a period of transition in Europe. A critical mass was reached whereby in order to maintain control over the means to produce next generation weapons economically, states realised their only course of action was to co-operate with other state actors.

The definition of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) used in this dissertation includes the development of the defence manufacturing base,³ grounded on the premise that possession of a sound method of producing the means of war is crucial to the ability to provide for defence and security. “Long considered a vital link to national security, national defence industries are subject to a unique political economy that acknowledges their strategic value.”⁴

The lack of a thriving, competitive defence industry in the European Union in the mid 1990s was directly

linked to states unwillingness to co-operate in the security field.⁵ Realists, and indeed this dissertation, argue that European Union Member States trepidation stemmed from fear of the insecurity that would result from the necessary relinquishment of some degree of sovereignty and increased reliance on other states.⁶ Once states realised the only way to maintain sovereignty was to co-operate, the threshold was met. While this dissertation takes the *Neofunctionalist* position that institutions and sub state actors have driven integration in areas of low politics, the effect of political spillover is not evident on anything like a wide spread basis in the defence manufacturing industry in European Union Member States.⁷ When states choose to merge their industries it is due to the Realism tenet of preserving sovereignty not the *Neofunctionalist* rationale that because they were co-

operating in other fields, the co-operation ‘spilled over’ into the defence manufacturing domain. While *Neofunctionalists* argue that increased trans-national co-operation in the defence manufacturing industry is the result of pressure from national interest groups such as businesses, this dissertation argues that the reason the European Union Member States increase their cross-state mergers is based on *ad hoc balance* decision making. They must choose between losing the ability to produce their own weapons systems because of competition from primarily US manufacturers, or losing some of their ability to build their own weapons systems because they merged a national company with a company from another state. The decisions take place with the knowledge that it is increasingly difficult to compete in the next generation market without substantial financial outlay. In light of the

defence cut backs of the 1990s, the European states balanced one scenario against another. The bottom line is that to produce armaments at a competitive, affordable, if not profitable, price, companies must achieve economies of scale. So, even though states are giving up some sovereignty when they merge and form trans-national companies, this is still a preferential way to maintain more sovereignty than they would have if they simply ran a national industry into a state of uncompetitiveness and hence ruin. A scenario that would result in complete loss of sovereignty over the means of war: a situation completely unacceptable in *Realism*.

The defence manufacturing industry is clearly an economic asset if it is productive and operating at a profit. Unlike almost all other industries however, - except a few like energy and electronics - the defence

manufacturing industry is inextricably linked to a states' ability to defend itself from attack – or use force to achieve its foreign policy goals.⁸ Therefore it falls clearly in the security realm, in the high politics arena. The arms industry can be extremely lucrative. So, why didn't the European Union Member States work together in this realm until recently? This is the final link made in this dissertation in the big picture argument that the *Realist* school of thought is the best predictor of future European Union Member State behaviour in the security, defence and foreign policy fields. Using *Realist* tenets to predict behaviour aids in understanding how that behaviour is likely to effect U.S. interests in Europe in the near future.

In the early 1990's, the 'Last Supper' in the United States resulted in the merger of defence manufacturers to make the US industry more competitive.

"Many of the mergers and buyouts that have occurred in the last decade are the result of the "Last Supper" which took place in 1993, when then Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, urged top industry officials to consolidate or go out of business. Secretary Aspin correctly noted that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would mean lower defence budgets and fewer contracts, resulting in surplus production capacity in the industry. A number of high-level mergers have subsequently occurred, resulting in the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a few industry giants."⁹

While this was not, indeed could not have been, federally ordered, it was unquestionably federally ordained.¹⁰ It was a huge success though painful for some to implement.

This Chapter argues that European Union Members could have merged on an *ad hoc* basis their defence manufacturing industries but states were far too worried about giving up some control of an industry that can be considered a vital national interest. Once

the United States had the jump on the European Union Members, there was little hope of catching up, especially when the practices of the United States government are taken into consideration.¹¹ This position is established by substantiating the following points. This thesis has argued that in the 1990s the Europeans on the whole, did not have the same appetite for involvement in Out Of Area (OOA) operations that the United States had, despite rhetoric to the contrary. This inward looking approach was reflected in the individuality of Member States' defence industries. The United States defence industry raced ahead of the European equivalent. The United States spends more than the Europeans do on defence and this increases the capability gap as well as benefiting the United States defence industry. Ironically this is what forced the Europeans into the

realisation that they had to begin to take concrete action or lose their defence manufacturing industry to competition. The United States also spends considerably more on Research and Development than the Europeans do which has the twofold benefit to the U.S. of sustaining a considerable technological lead over Europe and assisting the United States defence industry. It was not financially advisable for the Europeans to compete directly with the United States in the 1990's given the above points, and eventually a critical mass was reached. The European companies began merging in an unprecedented manner in 1999. It is likely that the Europeans will be able to compete with the United States in the long run as the fruits of their mergers are borne out.

2. The Changing Environment

Members of the Western European Union recognised that they needed to shoulder more responsibility for European security.¹² Many events, but particularly the Balkans wars and the Albanian crisis, brought home the point to the Europeans that they were ill-suited to conduct Out of Area Operations despite doing a respectable amount of planning for such operations. Only the United States had the type of military force structure and strategic lift needed to conduct distant operations that involved getting large numbers of combat-ready troops to hot spots in a timely manner.¹³ If however, Europe were predisposed to undertake, or even be an equal partner in, the global policeman role that the United States currently plays then their policies would reflect a heightened priority for mergers and acquisitions required to produce the military equipment

needed to undertake congruous missions. The fact remained that through 1998, European defence budgets almost without exception fell from Cold War levels.¹⁴ There was little tangible evidence that the Europeans were making material progress toward meeting the goals they had espoused frequently in declarations and even in the Treaties.

Contrary to the rhetorical orations of Integrationists, the objective reality in Europe, in both the historical and contemporary context, suggests that the Members do not wish to invest the requisite finance to be a truly equal partner of the United States.

“The USA Spent 60% more than the entire European Union (EU) on defence last year, \$281 billion compared to \$180 billion, or 3.6% of GDP compared to an average of 2.2%, and the size of this disparity shows no sign of decreasing.”¹⁵

This is not to say that they would not like to share the decision making power which accompanies equal partner status, but rather that the Europeans have pressing problems at home, such as high unemployment, which take priority over foreign policy concerns.

This is especially true in light of the absence of an overarching threat to Western European security. Given the security guarantee of NATO and the unlikelihood of a near neighbour launching a serious ground attack on Western Europe, it can be further argued that, if the status quo had been maintained, the Europeans would not have been likely to change their defence expenditure.

Increasing global commitments and a need to counter asymmetric threats caused decision-makers to

reconsider their military spending at the end of the 1990s.

The United States may be more inclined to engage in Out of Area Operations because its force capability and structure are well suited to these missions whereas the European forces are not. This is changing.

It is obviously of benefit to the United States to keep significant forces in Europe. The American strategy of maintaining armed forces capable of fighting two Major Regional Contingencies¹⁶ was bolstered by similar numbers of troops and equipment in Europe and Southeast Asia.¹⁷ There may be a great deal of change in the next decade as a result of these considerations, but the argument here is focussed on the defence manufacturing industries and how these changes effect them.

As of 1997 the defence manufacturing arena was a reflection of European hesitancy and America's global outlook. The United States was forging ahead and the Europeans were talking a lot but not merging. In August 1997, Jane's World Defence Industry reported:

*"the absorption of Texas Instruments defence interests into the Raytheon organisation. ... approval for the Boeing-McDonnell merger, ... approval was still awaited for the mergers between Raytheon and Hughes, and Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. United Defence L.P. has also been acquired by the Carlyle investment group. It is clear that before the next update is published more of the major S defence contractors will have been absorbed into a new structures."*¹⁸

In the 1990s by contrast the Europeans still resisted mergers, largely driven by the demand of the French government – ironically the most vocal advocate of an independent European defence identity. The Europeans have long expressed a desire to 'speak with one voice', 'be a political player on a par with

economic weight' and 'be an equal partner in the transatlantic relationship' The end of the 1990s marked the beginning of concrete steps towards backing the rhetorical statements up with forces, finances and political will.

The global defence market shrunk steadily from 1987 to 1995. Since the end of the Cold War international sales of conventional weapons have declined in value by more than half the average annual level in the 1980s, yet the number of manufacturers has not reduced by the same margin. This is in part offset by the fact that while purchases of defence equipment fell in the US and Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia continued to purchase new weapons.¹⁹

The European Union is likely to continue to be plagued with the same problems it has faced in the past – as outlined earlier in this work – but the important change

in the defence manufacturing industry looked very close at hand at the end of the 1990s.

3. The European and American Defence Manufacturing Industry

A. The United States

Against a backdrop of falling defence expenditure in the United States and Europe,²⁰ the United States firms set about adjusting the changed international environment in innovative ways.

As was seen earlier in this work, not only does the United states spend a larger percentage of its annual budget on its military than the average European state, the US spends a larger percentage of its annual budget on its military than *any* European state. This is important to understand in the context of how it eventually shaped the response from the European defence manufacturers. The net result of this

phenomenon is an increase in the capability gap among the United States and the remaining NATO allies. This disparity provides a direct advantage to the United States defence industry. This would not necessarily be the case if the United States were generally less protectionist.

There have been more mergers of defence manufacturers in the U.S. than in Europe. Even if the Europeans begin to merge their industries more – as this dissertation predicts – they will still have a steeper hill to climb because of the events of the 1990s.

When the Cold War ended, the Pentagon made a decision to rely more heavily on its large existing stockpile of weapons and put off major new military purchases until after the year 2000.²¹ This meant U.S. defence manufacturers needed to look increasingly to overseas markets to sell their wares. As Chapter Seven

on enlargement will demonstrate, this turned out to be something of a boon for defence manufacturers.

The changing defence manufacturing structure in America is a convoluted set of relationships that is difficult to understand or explain because of the tentacle-like nature of each and every facet. It is not as simple as saying because America spends more on defence, its defence companies profit. The lineage of money transfer is more complex than that. According to America's Defence Monitor, the United States is the world's leading arms exporter and this position comes at a very high cost to the American taxpayers that few seem to be aware of or able to change. The United States government "acts as intermediary and ... guarantor of payment"²² for arms sales to foreign countries. The United States arms manufacturers are assisted by the amount of US direct grant aid to third

countries to procure arms and equipment from the United States. Although the amount of direct grant aid available through the Foreign Military Financing [FMF] programme and the Excess Defence Articles [EDA] programme has fallen, it still accounts for about 25% of all arms transfers from the United States.²³ According to Dr. Hartung, government support for the arms manufacturing industry, under the budget heading ‘Security Assistance’,²⁴ costs American taxpayers \$7.8 billion per year.

“So we’re really getting to a point where all this talk about the arms trade as a great earner of income for our country is really a myth. Really what the arms trade is becoming is just another form of government subsidy for Lockheed Martin and Boeing.”²⁵

Joel Johnson, Vice President for International Programs at the Aerospace Industries Association, a lobby group actively representing America’s defence

contractors, argues that this practice is widespread in the United States government. This is in fact how much of US foreign assistance is distributed. Mr. Johnson notes:

*"It's no different when we provide an F-16 to Egypt with government money than when you provide tractors or bulldozers to Ghana with foreign assistance money. Those aren't a subsidy to Caterpillar."*²⁶

The American tax payer foots the bill for the Defence Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) which has a staff of about 5,900, estimated to cost about \$410 million a year. Originally the government was receiving a 3% commission on all the sales it brokered but it has all but stopped this practice, thus passing on the savings to the customer, not the tax payer, since this commission was used to fund the DSAA.²⁷

Not all the states furthermore, the United States arms manufacturers sell to are friendly and this eventually

leads to United States and NATO forces confronting enemies that are well armed. Dr. William Hartung, a Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute, who has authored three major studies on the U.S. government's role in the arms trade, notes:

*"If you consider the fact that there's 140 countries now getting weapons from the United States, more than two-thirds of the countries in the world, not all of them are going to be reliable allies, not all of them are going to be coalition partners."*²⁸

The United States benefits greatly from having a single leader. As Chapter Two demonstrated there are not only differences between the Governments of the Member States; these differences are given force by virtue of the fact that the decision making process in the European Union requires agreement of fifteen leaders [at present] as opposed to the United States where a clear chain of command exists. This has a

major impact on the defence manufacturing industries in European and the United States as the European Parliament took pains to point out:

*"United States companies ... have benefited from operating in a much more favourable environment - a large single market, unified procurement, a 'Buy American' policy and large-scale government support for R&D etc... US companies have been able to consolidate and merge in order to be better able to respond to the challenges of a more competitive market... American manufacturers have benefited from the dominant position held by the United States within the Atlantic Alliance."*²⁹

On the one hand the United States proceeds under the notion that interoperability is the theme of the decade and the more US equipment that is out there, the easier it is to train and undertake missions with other states. However, when it comes time to substantiate the need for more R&D and the purchase of new equipment, the same companies are quick to point out to the US Congress just how many states in the world possess

equipment that is similar or identical in capability to that used by US forces. Dr. Hartung sums up the problem saying: “the dirty little secret about U.S. arms sales is that we're running an arms race with ourselves around the world.”³⁰

“In order to maintain our military's technological advantage, existing weapons in the American arsenal will be replaced with new systems costing billions of dollars more. For example, the U.S. military will spend more than \$300 billion dollars to replace much of its current tactical fighter fleet with a new generation of warplanes. If the military stuck with currently used models instead, it would cost about half as much to replenish the fleet, a savings of \$150 billion dollars.”³¹

B. The Europeans

The European defence industry, one of the three main components of the ESDI, was falling further and further behind that of the United States in the 1990s because companies were not merging fast enough to achieve competitive advantage.³²

The European Commission, recognising the plight of the European defence industrial base, issued a communication requesting a European level response to the difficulties posed by the international situation.

The European Parliament compiled a report on 'The Challenges Facing the European Defence Related Industry' in which the Rapporteur Gary Titley made several poignant recognitions. They include:³³

- Since the end of the Cold War, the reduction in military expenditure in most of the major industrialised nations (known as the 'peace dividend') - which is to be welcomed - has resulted in a cutback in orders for military equipment and exacerbated the economic and social crisis in the defence-related industries sector,

- Competition between world defence equipment manufacturers has become increasingly fierce, with manufacturers trying to outbid each other, both within and outside the Union,
- This situation could lead to the disappearance of industries which are vital for the economic, political and military security of the Member States of the European Union,
- When like is compared with like, European defence companies have shown themselves to be fully competitive with US companies,
- The competitiveness of the European defence industry as a whole is being undermined by its highly fragmented nature, with each Member State having its own procurement requirements and procedures resulting in wasteful and expensive duplication,

- United States companies, on the other hand, have benefited from operating in a much more favourable environment - a large single market, unified procurement, a 'Buy American' policy³⁴ and large-scale government support for R&D etc.; ... companies have been able to consolidate and merge in order to be better able to respond to the challenges of a more competitive market; ... American manufacturers have benefited from the dominant position held by the United States within the Atlantic Alliance,
- Neither the European defence identity nor the common foreign and security policy of the EU can be credible without a strong European armaments industry and an effective procurement policy ,

- Development of a restrictive European armaments policy will enable European states, as a result of the ensuing standardisation and more open procurement, to enjoy economies of scale, which will greatly benefit the budgets of the states concerned,
- American companies, because of the reduction in orders from the Pentagon, are competing fiercely with European undertakings on external markets, for example in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with the support of their government,

Mr. Titley MP recognised many of the problems that confronted the European Union's development of the defence manufacturing arm of the ESDI. As previous Chapters of this dissertation demonstrated however, the European Commission and European Parliament

have historically been at the forefront of visionary calls for action and the stumbling block has continually been the nature of decision making in the European Union whereby states each have a veto in the Council. Therefore, it was not enough that the Commission and Parliament recognised the problem, states needed to be forced into a position where merger was the best way to protect sovereignty before merger would occur. The European Union was not able to do much to change the situation because Member States were unwilling to broach such co-operation in the security field for fear of loss of sovereignty.

The ESDI, as defined in the Introduction of this thesis, has three integral elements, the political - institutional component, the military capability component and the defence industry component. Preceding Chapters discuss the sluggish nature of the development of the

institutional leg of the ESDI but at least there has been a measure of positive progress. Chapters Four and Five discussed the Atlantic Alliance and the military capabilities of the Europeans as opposed to those of the United States with regard to the moves already underway to enhance the military capability of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It remains highly doubtful that the Europeans can or should undertake military missions without the involvement of US assets, especially intelligence capabilities, but there has nevertheless been progress. In stark contrast, in the 1990s the European defence industry component was in the first instance non-existent³⁵ if ‘European’ is taken to mean something more than fifteen separate entities as Paul Cornish, Lecturer in Defence Studies King’s College London, notes:

“the un-competitive nature of Europe's defence manufacturing base needs to be tackled by consolidation and rationalisation. But confronting this approach are the weaknesses, frustrations and peculiarities of defence manufacturing in Europe. To talk of EU defence procurement and manufacturing assumes a degree of coherence, direction and unity which does not yet exist and which could take years to develop.”³⁶

In the second instance, where the national industries are taken together in place of a truly European defence industry, the remarkable failure of the Europeans to keep pace with the United States was all too evident in the 1990s. European military budgets fell rapidly in the 1990s for more than six years and were under pressure due to the need to meet the deficit criteria for European monetary union.³⁷ Phillip Gordon of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, stated the scale of the problem facing European states:

“Estimates vary of what it would take for Europe to create the military capability to conduct

*medium-scale out-of area military operations without the United States; but the costs of doing so (including intelligence satellites, floating communications headquarters, mobile logistics and transport craft) would be at least 30bn, a figure unlikely to be added to European defence budgets in the foreseeable future.*³⁸

If European states are buying fewer weapons then European companies have a smaller domestic market to sell to. The global market however, has not suffered the same level of shrinkage and therefore the European companies have an opportunity to make up losses in the neighbourhood with gains in their larger environment. The real problem was that they were not taking the appropriate measures to compete with the United States which had become the dominant force in arms exports accounting for roughly half of all exports of arms world-wide.³⁹ Paul Cornish argues:

“the current industrial crisis is simply caused by over capacity: EU defence manufacturing capacity

is far in excess of what customers might need, either nationally or regionally.”⁴⁰

This argument stems from the fact that if all the procurement budgets of the West Europeans are added up they only equate to about half that of the single US procurement budget. The European defence manufacturers are free to sell internationally without legal guidelines; thus, as the global market grew, opportunities were gained.

Another stumbling block in the path of the Europeans was ironically once again the French and their attitude towards privatisation. France privatised Thomson-CSF⁴¹ but retained a 30% share in the company claiming that the defence manufacturer was a public good, vital to France’s ability to provide for its own security needs. The fact that the company was not completely private means that other private companies

did not wish to merge with it since that would effectively mean relinquishing control to the French Government. France furthermore merged Thomson CSF with parts of three other French defence contractors making mergers potentially more difficult. This has not turned out to be a serious problem however, since the French Government holds a 48% share in Aerospatiale-Matra, now part of EADS. The French Defence Minister, Alain Richard, claimed to favour this group forming 'pan European alliances' indicating collaborative projects as opposed to mergers.⁴² Collaborative projects are certainly one means of achieving production of weapons and weapons systems at a more reasonable economic cost but in the long run, merging companies is required to compete globally.

The Europeans were hindered in the past by Article 223 of the Rome Treaty which excluded all matters of security and defence from the competencies of the European Community. Although this provision has now been changed, over the years it was in existence, it meant that defence equipment was also excluded from the normal rules of the single market.⁴³

3. Research and Development Expenditure

The European Union is also outweighed by the United States in the Research and Development field. The European Commission developed the EUCLID,⁴⁴ EUREKA⁴⁵ and Framework programmes but they are unco-ordinated in their efforts. The Framework programme is only a civil programme but many technologies are ‘dual use goods’ and as such R&D for security and defence purposes could be done under this programme.

The United States is home to an elaborate and multi-faceted Research and Development base supported and a variety of creative ways by the U.S. Government. Originally foreign governments paid a recoupment fee on all commercial arms sales licensed by the State Department to offset the cost of the U.S. R&D programme. They were able to buy weapons at a lower cost because the United States government was investing in the necessary R&D. Presently however, the recoupment fee is often waived.

According to Tamar Gabelnick, the Acting Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists, this costs United States taxpayers an estimated \$500 million annually.⁴⁶

While it is in the immediate interest of the United States to gain competitive advantage for its defence manufacturers, it is in the United States long term

interests to ensure a healthy level of competition or run the risk of escalating costs of new weapons systems in the future.⁴⁷

4. The Sea Change

1999 was the year when the realisation that they were jointly and separately about to completely lose control of the ability to manufacture the means of war spurred the Europeans into a frenzy of unprecedented mergers.

British Aerospace and GEC-Marconi merged to form BAE Systems.⁴⁸ Aerospatiale Matre of France and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA) of Germany merged to form the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company now known as EADS.⁴⁹ It is the worlds third biggest defence aerospace firm behind Boeing⁵⁰ and Lockheed Martin.⁵¹

BAE is the fifth largest aerospace firm in the world and it has not limited itself to European markets. BAE

employs 19,000 in the United States and now earns more money from the U.S. Department of Defence than it does from the British Ministry of Defence. This is surely good news for both sides of the Atlantic. The worst thing that could have happened after the merger would have been for BAE to limit itself to European markets. Europe suffered a mini chain reaction in 1999 since the BAE deal ultimately spurred the EADS merger.

The United States company, Raytheon⁵² also gained a new large competitor. Matre-BAe Dynamics, or MBD, started as a joint venture of BAE Systems, Alenia and EADS, and grew to include Germany's LFK. MDB is now the world's second largest missile manufacturer. It cemented this position recently by merging with yet another company to form MBDA. MBDA now

employs over 10,000 in France, the United Kingdom and Italy.

Europe now has the world's second largest satellite company behind the U.S. company, Boeing. Astrium was formed from French, German and British interests in 1999.⁵³

In the defence electronics arena, Thomson-CSF of France acquired the British company Alcatel in June 2000 and changed its name to Thales in December 2000. Thales has over 65,000 employees, more than half of which are outside of France. It has a consolidated value of 8.6 billion euros and industrial operations in 30 countries.⁵⁴

While there are short term hurdles to overcome on the road to creating world leading defence manufacturing companies - such as overcoming the political barriers to rationalising the workforce, deciding which of

several large weapons packages are eventually produced and adjusting production to the new strategies - the Europeans are well on their way to being able to compete with the United States. It now seems quite plausible that the European Union Member States, with the creation of the three defence industry behemoths of BAE Systems, EADS and Thales, are set to establish one truly solid leg of the ESDI.

5. Conclusion

So, we have seen how states' self-interest effects their behaviour in all three parts of the ESDI: the political institutional, the military co-operation, and in the defence manufacturing arena. In all of these areas Realism historically explains, and currently can be used to predict, European Union Member States' behaviour, despite the rhetorical statements of those

who support an integrated federal European Union in all realms, including the security and defence fields.

There is one more factor that needs to be considered when discussing the prospects for the development of the ESDI and its potential effects on U.S. interests in Europe – enlargement of the European Union and of NATO.

Endnotes

¹ Terrence R. Guay, At Arms Length: The European Union and Europe's Defence Industry, London, MacMillian, 1998, 11.

² Committee on Defense Manufacturing in 2010 and Beyond, Defense Manufacturing in 2010 and Beyond: Meeting the Changing Needs of National Defense, National Research Council, Washington D.C., National Academy Press, 1999, p. 93.

³ See Chapter One for the definition of the ESDI used in this dissertation.

⁴ Terrence R. Guay, *op. cit.* p. 1.

- ⁵ When the momentum of integration in the European Union was greatest in recent years – the early 1990s – several pieces of literature were produced that shed light on the effects of globalisation and interdependence on the defence manufacturing industry. They include: Herbert Wolf (ed.), Arms Industry Limited, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993; Michael Bzoska and Peter Lock (eds.), Restructuring of Arms Production in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992; James B. Steinberg, The Transformation of the European Arms Industry, R-4141-ACQ, RAND, 1992; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads’, *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1990, pp. 65 - 85
- ⁶ Stanley Hoffman, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete?: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’ *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, Issue 3, 1996, pp. 862-915.
- ⁷ Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.
- ⁸ The industry which manufactures the technology and weapons states use to defend themselves by definition also manufactures the technologies and weapons states use to attack other states. For this reason the same industry is often referred to as the armaments industry. Some would argue that this is misleading because it does not indicate all those manufactured goods that are not actually arms, but things like communications equipment. This dissertation uses the term defence manufacturing

industry synonymous with armaments industry or defence related industry.

- ⁹ The Center for Defense Information runs a web site that produces timely and accurate information on the U.S. Defense Industrial Complex.
<http://www.cdi.org/issues/usmi/complex/>
- ¹⁰ This topic will be elaborated in section 3 of this chapter.
- ¹¹ More detailed discussion of the complex federal practices that benefit the defence manufacturing industry in the United States will take place later in this chapter.
- ¹² In the Maastricht Declaration the Members of the WEU agreed that they 'need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters' 'Maastricht Declaration' The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht, 10 December 1991.
- ¹³ Phillip H. Gordon, 'Does Western European Union Have A Role?', in Anne Deighton [ed.], Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 109/
- ¹⁴ See Tables in Chapter 5 for comparisons of levels of defence expenditure.
- ¹⁵ Damian Kemp and Bryan Bender, 'Cash Commitments', Jane's Defence Weekly, June 14, 2000, London, Jane's Information Group, 2000.
- ¹⁶ This expression was changed to 'Two Major Theatre Wars'.

- ¹⁷ There are 109,000 US troops in Europe not including the Naval forces in neighbouring waters and about 100,000 US troops in Southeast Asia. *Military Balance 1996 - 1997*, London, IISS and Oxford University press, 1996. One plausible explanation for this distribution of forces although not officially stated for diplomatic reasons, is that the two MRCs the United States appears to be prepared for are in Korea and in the Arabian Gulf.
- ¹⁸ Jane's World Defence Industry August 1997, Introduction, London Jane's Defence Group, 1997.
- ¹⁹ *Military Balance 1996 - 1997*, London, IISS and Oxford University Press, 1996.
- ²⁰ 'Defence spending among the 15 European Union (EU) countries fell by about \$24bn (Ecu 28.8bn) in 1993 values between 1985-94 - a reduction of about 12.5 per cent, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.' Paul Cornish, Restructuring Europe's Defence Industry Confronts Sensitive Political Issues, *European Dialogue*, January 1997.
- ²¹ Welfare for Weapons, video, produced by America's Defense Monitor, February 1999.
- ²² Jon Lottman. Americas Defense Monitor interview of Joel Johnson of the Aerospace Industries Association, a lobby group, for *Welfare for Weapons Dealers*, video. February 8, 1999.
- ²³ *Military Balance*, *op.cit.*, p. 275.
- ²⁴ 'Security Assistance' takes up more than \$6 billion dollars per year which accounts for about half of America's total budget for foreign operations.

Welfare for Weapons, video by America's Defense Monitor, February 1999.

²⁵ Jon Lottman, America's Defense Monitor interview of William Hartung of the Arms Trade Resource Center for *Welfare for Weapons Dealers* video, February 8 1999.

²⁶ Interview for Welfare for Weapons video *op. Cit.*

²⁷ Welfare for Weapons, America's Defense Monitor video, February 1999.

²⁸ Jon Lottman, America's Defense Monitor interview of William Hartung of the Arms Trade Resource Center for *Welfare for Weapons Dealers* video, February 8 1999.

²⁹ European Parliament Report on the European Commissions' Communication on the Challenges Facing the European Defence Related Industry [A4 - 0076/97] Brussels, 6 March 1997.

³⁰ Welfare for Weapons, video by America's Defense Monitor, February 1999.

³¹ Welfare for Weapons, video by America's Defense Monitor, February 1999.

³² For a discussion of the mergers and teaming that took place in the European Union Member States in the 1990s see, Terrence R. Guay, At Arms Length: The European Union and Europe's Defence Industry, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1998, pp. 22 – 42.

³³ European Parliament Report on the European Commissions' Communication on the Challenges Facing the European Defence Related Industry: Explanatory Statement, [A4 - 0076/97] Brussels, 6 March 1997.

- ³⁴ The United States military is prohibited by strict rules from buying much equipment from other states. 'A Shrinking Arms Market', *The Economist*, 22 - 28 November 1997.
- ³⁵ As of November 1997 'there has not been a single cross border acquisition or merger among the large defence contractors' in Europe. *The Economist*, 22 - 28 November 1997.
- ³⁶ Paul Cornish, Restructuring Europe's Defence Industry Confronts Sensitive Political Issues, *European Dialogue*, January 1997.
- ³⁷ Gordon, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.
- ³⁸ Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
- ³⁹ *ibid.* p. 273
- ⁴⁰ Paul Cornish, Restructuring Europe's Defence Industry Confronts Sensitive Political Issues, *European Dialogue*, January 1997.
- ⁴¹ 'A Farewell to Arms Markets', *The Economist*, 22 - 28 November 1997.
- ⁴² 'A Farewell to Arms Markets', *The Economist*, 22 - 28 November 1997.
- ⁴³ Michael Welsh, Europe United? the European Union and the Retreat from Federalism, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 127.
- ⁴⁴ EUCLID
- ⁴⁵ EURIKA
- ⁴⁶ Welfare for Weapons, video by the America's Defense Monitor, February 1999.
- ⁴⁷ 'The Shrinking Arms Market', *The Economist*, 22 - 28 November 1997.
- ⁴⁸ BAE Systems has a detailed internet presence that provides a great deal of information about the

company.

<<http://navigation.helper.realnames.com/framer/1/262/default.asp?realname=BAE+Systems&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebaesystems%2Ecom&frameid=1&providerid=262&uid=30114416>>

⁴⁹ EADS web presence is good and accurate source of company information. < <http://www.eads-nv.com/eads/en/index.htm>>

⁵⁰ The Boeing Company has a well kept internet presence. < <http://www.boeing.com/>>

⁵¹ For more information about Lockheed-Martin, visit their well maintained and informative web site at < <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/>>

⁵² Raytheon has an excellent internet presence with a great deal of company information. < <http://www.raytheon.com/>>

⁵³ Astrium's web page details the mergers that lead to the formation of the company. <http://www.matra-marconi-space.com/www/push/0/home/en/html/fs_home.htm>

⁵⁴ Thales has a very informative web presence. < http://www.thalesgroup.com/thales/en/home/home_nf.htm>

Chapter Seven: Enlargement of NATO and the European Union

1. Introduction

The issues and controversies surrounding two enlargements grip Europe today and both these enlargements will have an enduring effect on U.S. interests in Europe for the estimable future: they are the enlargement of NATO and the enlargement of the European Union. It is argued here that, while NATO enlargement will take place first, it will primarily benefit United States' short-term interests and secondarily boost European security. Whereas, the Enlargement of the European Union, albeit subject to a lengthier process, will be a greater boon to European security interests because it will provide a wealth of soft security benefits as well as strengthening the

economic and social development of new and poorer member states..

This Chapter takes as its starting point the fact that NATO has already begun to enlarge¹ and therefore the arguments generated by the NATO “expansion”² debate are only relevant insofar as they shed light on the effect enlargement is likely to have on Europe and the United States. The purpose here therefore, is not to re-hash the debate or argue for or against enlargement, rather it is to analyse the impact these enlargements will have on the development of the ESDI and U.S. interests in Europe. This chapter will show that the motivations behind these enlargements support the basic *Realist* themes of this dissertation in that states strive to join both “clubs” out of self-interest. Furthermore, states already in the “clubs” act in their

own interest when they consider letting new members into their club.

2. NATO Enlargement³

The end of the Cold War signified the passing of the threat of a massive invasion of Western Europe from the East, and in turn the *raison d'être* of the Alliance, to defend NATO territory from such an attack, was drastically reduced. The obvious path was to disband NATO but lack of immediate action pursuant to this goal allowed vested interests to agglomerate and ingrain themselves. In place furthermore, of the expected “peace dividend”, the ensuing cuts in defence expenditure and base closures in the United States, as well as in Allied countries, brought a different kind of economic austerity. This phenomenon arguably weakened the position of advocates of diminishing or dissolving NATO because as less resources were

allocated to defence spending, maintaining the Alliance took on greater importance as a guarantor of security.

NATO provides reassurance to its Members. While NATO exists the public perceives itself as more secure; the growing list of applications for membership pays tribute to this association of the Alliance with security.

Be it in waves or all at once, NATO enlargement will not erase lines in Europe, it will redraw them “differently - but always contentiously - between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’.”⁴

*“The purpose of enlargement [of NATO] is to integrate more countries into the existing community of values and institutions, thereby enhancing security and stability for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.”*⁵

The “values” derived from the preamble of the Washington Treaty of 1949 alluded to in the above quote from NATO’s own study on the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of enlargement arguably place capitalism at least on a par with democracy. Whether NATO should be forsaken,⁶ perpetuated,⁷ mutated or expanded became a highly evocative topic when the NATO Madrid Summit⁸ announced the formal intention of NATO leaders to invite three states, Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic, to join and furthermore, “pledge[d] to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future,”⁹ underscoring NATO Heads of State and Governments resolve to enlarge NATO in waves.

A series of attempts to “transform”¹⁰ the Organisation were undertaken in the 1990s.¹¹ In 1991 the Alliance announced its new Strategic Concept recognising the

need to plan to undertake a more flexible response to a wider range of circumstances as opposed to planning to combat an attack from the Warsaw Pact. Since then the Alliance has developed:

- the Partnership for Peace (PfP),
 - the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF),
 - the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)
- and
- the Enhanced Partnership for Peace,
 - the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and
 - the 18 month review of the New Strategic Concept of 1991¹² completed by the Alliance's 50th anniversary in 1999.

This variety and scope of development is indicative of the magnitude of the change in the Alliance. The future of the Alliance however, remained questionable until the use of NATO forces in Bosnia in 1995.¹³ As

Jane M. O. Sharp, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies of King's College London, notes: "Not only did NATO eventually save Bosnia, but Bosnia also saved NATO."¹⁴ It is furthermore, particularly telling for the arguments in this thesis that the European Union failed in Bosnia while NATO did reasonably well.¹⁵ This is because this also marked the end of unrealistic hopes for a truly independent European capability for the near future, and sparked the moves that are currently being seen to develop the European Union Rapid Reaction Force.

A. NATO enlargement and the security of Europe

It is commonly recognised that present day and near future threats to European security are more likely to come in the form of terrorism,¹⁶ mass migration and international organised crime than military attack.

“Nowadays, for all the discomfort of having a prickly Russia nearby, the real threats to Eastern Europe come from within: from poor living standards and from the seemingly interminable pain of reform without reward, problems that NATO cannot fix. Even for the front runners, the date by which they might join the EU - their best hope for a stable future - has receded ever farther into the distance: entry talks are likely to drag on for years yet.”¹⁷

Enlarging an Alliance that has as its' main function to defend against military attack is not therefore easily linked to addressing Europe's pressing security concerns. In 1997 when the first round of NATO enlargement was under consideration, an article published in *International Security* entitled: “Come Home America” proclaimed: “America should bring home the 100,000 soldiers currently stationed in Europe.”¹⁸ While this article was not a single anomaly, this is a minority position in the United States. The majority of decision makers and policy analysts favour

“substantial engagement with Europe”¹⁹ and public support for active participation in international affairs still runs high.²⁰

The virtually unassailable argument most frequently proffered to contravene the arguments in favour of dissolving NATO, is that originally employed by Senator Vandenberg in 1949 when the Alliance was created:

“[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before they start. ... [NATO will become] the greatest war deterrent in history.”²¹

In this respect then, it is argued that NATO enlargement will add to European security. This is because, as former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright notes: “the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons of mass destruction, that might

have Europe within their range and in their sights,”²² is diminished by the counter threat of a vast range of possible military solutions or retaliatory measures.

The Atlantic Alliance is in the process of being transformed into a co-operative Alliance which former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott likens to:

“the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 among Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Britain [which] was intended to promote co-operation and stability in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon.”²³

The preceding benefits to NATO enlargement are valid and not to be discounted. This dissertation however, argues that they should not be mistaken for the primary reason behind the expansion.

A commonly posited argument for enlarging NATO is that it will provide stability for Europe²⁴ but this dissertation argues that this idea is in speech rhetorical

and in theory a prime example of “misguided historicism.”²⁵ Europe is not the same place today that it was when the concert of Europe prevailed and furthermore, technology, economics and institutional developments all make arguing that Europe will ultimately return to the territorial conflicts of the past, at least for the same reasons, fundamentally flawed. This dissertation does not however argue that a return to the conflicts of the past is out with the realm of possibility. It is the thesis of this Chapter that NATO enlargement and eventually enlargement of the European Union are undertaken for reasons of state interest. The states that want to join see joining NATO as benefiting their security. The states who want to see NATO expanded do so in general because it is their states economic interests to do so. The states that wish to join the European Union wish to do so because they

believe they are joining a club that will offer them economic benefits primarily and security benefits as an ancillary benefit. Those states that oppose European Union enlargement do so because they see it as threatening to their state interest - be they economic, security or political - in the form of reduced representation in the European Union institutions, reduced economic benefits or increased instability within the European Union.

When all the objections to enlargement²⁶ are taken together, two primary arguments appear at the centre of the controversy. The first argument revolves around the numerous and varied estimates of the cost of enlarging NATO and the second centres around what has been referred to as “the Russia factor.” An examination of both of these arguments helps to support the basic thesis outlined above.

B. NATO enlargement and Russia

“By its nature, a military alliance is directed against someone. The geography of NATO expansion makes its target clear: Russia.”²⁷

Despite the promise that ‘NATO enlargement will ultimately enhance Russia's security by fostering democratic reform and stability in Central and Eastern Europe’,²⁸ made by the United States Department of State, NATO enlargement is being undertaken, not only to further U.S. economic interests, but also as a preventative measure against the future resurgence of Russia. As Ronald Powaski, accomplished author of several books on U.S. foreign policy, boldly states: “Everyone knows that Russia is the bogey man expansion is designed to cuff.”²⁹ Although this was not the stated position of the Clinton Administration, Jonathan Dean, former MBFR Ambassador, argued:

*'The primary reason many members of the Senate majority today favour NATO enlargement is suspicion of Russia. Russians are right to conclude that many of these legislators intend the enlargement of NATO as an anti-Russian measure.'*³⁰

William Safire, author of Before the Fall, further articulates the legislator's fear:

*"In coming decades, Russia -- with its literate population and rich resources unencumbered by Communism -- will rise again. Its leaders will [pursue irredentist goals] under the guise of protecting their 'near abroad.' The only way to deter future aggression without war is by collective defense. (sic) And only in the next few years, with Russia weak, do we have the chance to 'lock in' the vulnerable."*³¹

Scholars argued that "the process of rearmament needed to make Russia a credible threat again is eminently monitorable and the West would have ample time to counter the threat."³² Henry Kissinger, former U.S. National Security Advisor and former U.S.

Secretary of State, opposed this view and advised the early expansion of NATO.³³ Dr. Kissinger rationalised this position by citing the need to avoid the situation Ronald D. Asmus, of the U.S. State Department, and his former colleagues at the RAND corporation, postulate.³⁴ Asmus's argument centres on the dictum that it will be more difficult to arm and organise Western and Central Europe once Russia begins to recover without creating either, an arms race, or a self fulfilling prophecy³⁵ or both..

The NATO Russia Founding Act³⁶ therefore, is primarily a compromise. On the one hand it offers some measures meant to appease those who argue that Russia's security interests must be given priority.³⁷ On the other hand it affords no real authority for Russia in order to satisfy those who argue that the West must further its' interests as best it can while Russia is

weak. As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

*'The NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions. The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members.'*³⁸

The Founding Act is unsurprisingly criticised by both camps for either going too far or not far enough. The Founding Act is however, a multifaceted policy tool. It has the potential to build co-operative military structures between NATO and Russia. It is a useful means of including Russia without offering full membership of the Alliance.³⁹ The Founding Act gives Russia a voice but not a veto in NATO matters and its very existence furthermore, is a discouragement to the pursuit of irredentist goals. Thomas Pickering,

former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Russia, in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the NATO Russia Founding Act a “landmark document”. He also praises attempts made to date to increase co-operation with Russia, but warns that if such measures are unsuccessful, Russia “could abandon democracy and return to old threatening patterns of behaviour.”⁴⁰ Pickering’s most notable point however, is found in his observation regarding current events in Russia.⁴¹ Pickering notes that since NATO enlargement has been at the fore of Western policy activities, events in Russia do not lend credence to the argument that Russia will rebel against NATO enlargement.

“To cite a few examples, during this period, President Yeltsin was re-elected. He elevated reformers within his government. He appointed a new defense [sic.] minister who supports START II and is actively working for its ratification.

President Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II enters into force. He signed the Founding Act. We have made progress on CFE and Russia has made positive steps in its relations with Ukraine. This track record does not support the hypothesis that Russian reform or reformers and security co-operation will inevitably suffer as a result of NATO enlargement.”⁴²

Although the United States legislators are arguably concerned about the possibility of a resurgent Russia, Russia is probably grateful, at least on some level, for the prospect of a stable western border and concerned more with future relations with Central Asia and China.⁴³

For almost fifty years the Cold War dealt hardship and fear to the Central and East European states. It cost a great deal of money in the West. The prospect of avoiding such a situation again is directly linked to state self interest in all the affected states.

C. The Costs of enlarging NATO

NATO enlargement will cost.⁴⁴ The real question is who will profit and who will pay. Contrary to the position voiced by members of the anti-NATO enlargement lobby that NATO enlargement will cost the U.S. tax payer inordinately compared to the cost absorbed by other NATO allies, the U.S. has a history of profiting from its military alliances and endeavours. NATO enlargement is set to be no exception.

There have been a variety of estimates of the cost of enlargement to date but the number of variables and the lack of specifics makes it difficult to accurately compare these estimates.⁴⁵

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TABLE 7.1: ESTIMATED COST OF NATO ENLARGEMENT⁴⁶

According to	Time Frame	New Members Include	Options	Cost
Clinton Administration	FY 1999 - 2009	Small, unspecified number	Restructuring forces of new members plus enhancing Alliance ability to intervene in new member states plus direct enlargement	\$27 - 35 billion
Congressional Budget Office	FY 1996-2010	Visigrad States [Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., and Slovakia]	Restructuring forces of new members and increasing power projection capabilities of current members	\$60.6 billion
			Above restructuring plus further enhancement of power projection capabilities	\$109.3 billion
			Above restructuring and enhancement, plus pre-positioning of equipment and stationing of limited number of NATO forces in new member states	\$124.7 billion

Chapter Seven: Enlargement of NATO and the EU

TABLE 7.1: ESTIMATED COST (CONT'D.)				
RAND Corporation	10 - 15 years	Visigrad States	Improving forces of new members	\$14-20 billion
			Improving forces plus power projection of Allies	\$25-52 billion
			Improving forces plus power projection of allied forces, plus stationing limited number of NATO forces in new member states	\$70-110 billion

In its Report to Congress the U.S. Department of State attempted to discern how much of the estimated cost would be borne by the United States and what percentage would in turn be borne by existing allies and new members.⁴⁷

Despite then U.S. Secretary of State Albright's pledge that the costs of NATO enlargement would be "equitably shared"⁴⁸ to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 21 October 1997, Alliance Members differ drastically in their estimates of and, more

importantly, attitudes towards the costs of NATO expansion. This phenomenon gave further credence to the argument that NATO enlargement was an American initiative for American interests. *Jane's Defence News* reported in June 1997 that "leaders in France, Britain and Germany have vowed not to raise their contributions to NATO's common funding by one franc, pence or pfennig."⁴⁹ Then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated that "It is completely absurd to link NATO expansion to cost factors."⁵⁰ The United Kingdom meanwhile anticipated "a proportionate reduction in the UK share of NATO budgets".⁵¹ The French President Jacques Chirac furthermore, just after NATO enlargement was agreed in Madrid in July 1997, underscored France's unwillingness to contribute financially to the enlargement of NATO stating: "With the Cold War

now history I don't see why the defence of the Alliance now should cost more than it did then.”⁵²

These positions collectively ignore or dismiss the fact that the enlarged Alliance will at the very least require the development and extension of the existing infrastructure in order for new members to meet their responsibilities as set forth in the Washington Treaty.

Franklin Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs during the original round of NATO enlargement debate, appropriately points out⁵³

that new members are required to make a series of reparations in order to meet their Treaty obligations.⁵⁴

Fundamentally this means new members must install the necessary infrastructure, purchase the necessary equipment and undertake the appropriate training in order to be able to do three things:

1. In the event of an attack a member state must be able to maintain an initial defence and have the facilities in place to receive reinforcements
2. If another member is attacked a member state must be able to be part of the reinforcements
3. If a security situation arises affecting the NATO members - Bosnia is a good example - a member state must be able to participate in whatever the appropriate response would be.

TABLE 7.2: New NATO Member Necessary Reparations⁵⁵

- Undertake Training To Be Able To Work With NATO Forces
- Learn Doctrine So They Can Be Interoperable With NATO Forces
- Establish A Non Commissioned Officer Corps
- Undertake English Language Training Because English Is The War Language Of NATO
- Establish Logistics Arrangements That Would Allow Them To Receive Reinforcements In The Event That They Were Attacked
- Establish Logistic Arrangements That Would Allow Them To Go And Serve As Reinforcements Somewhere Else
- Establish Infrastructure That Would Allow Reinforcements To Come In
- Establish Command And Control Structures That Are Compatible With NATO's
- Need To Establish Air Defence, Not Only Air Planes But Particularly Radars
- They Need To Build Up Communication Systems Compatible With NATO's
- Be Able To Work With NATO At The Planning Level
- Develop Ways To Explain To Their Parliaments And Publics What They Are Doing

Many of these necessary reparations will not require much in the way of financial outlay by the new members, but others will undoubtedly be costly. The

ability to receive reinforcements for example potentially involves upgrading roads, railways and runways.⁵⁶ Ultimately spending money building up arms is a difficult choice for the Central European states. Re-arming the region “worries the International Monetary Fund, whose billions of dollars of loans in the region are conditional on fiscal restraint.”⁵⁷ It is telling that these states, in such a fragile financial state want so desperately to join the Alliance. These states arguably see joining the Alliance as a way of providing for their security in a still dangerous international environment. The states who want them to join arguably see potential profit from these states in the form of arms sales and contracts for upgrades to infrastructure.

The U.S. Department of State in personification of *Realist* thinking, argues that the cost to new members

of maintaining their security will in fact be less as members of NATO:

*'NATO membership will also enable [Central and East European states] to further downsize their forces without diminished security. Thus, it is highly questionable whether in the long term their resulting security costs will be higher than they would have been had NATO not expanded. Indeed, it is likely that if NATO did not enlarge, there would be more instability in Central and Eastern Europe and thus higher security costs for states in the region and ultimately the United States.'*⁵⁸

D. Enlargement benefits for U.S. interests

A primary reason for expanding NATO and the chief benefit to U.S. interests of doing so is found in the economic gains to be had by the defence manufacturing base in the United States principally although other defence manufacturers stand to make reasonable gains if they act appropriately. When the initial enlargement negotiations were taking place, the European defence manufacturers had not yet begun the

spate of mergers that marked their move towards competitiveness with the U.S. based defence manufacturers as discussed in Chapter Six..

*'It is no surprise to those who know official Washington that it wants NATO expanded -- or that Capitol Hill is currently swarming with lobbyists from the defense (sic.) industry, offering campaign contributions and jobs for constituents in return for the new, multi-billion dollar weapons contracts NATO expansion will bring'*⁵⁹

As Chapter Six demonstrated, the defence manufacturing base in the United States is a powerful force and it wields considerable influence in Congress and Congress in turn wields a great deal of influence over it. The financial benefits to the United States of enlarging NATO, both in terms of the potential profit and opportunity for the U.S. defence manufacturers, and in terms of general business potential, were touted as profound:

*"Expanding the "zone of stability" will not only decrease the threat of instability damaging our economic interests in Europe, but will also increase the value of those interests as the development of new markets provides new trade and investment opportunities for Americans. The result of such prudent security investments in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to parallel the economic benefits we derive from our 40-year security relationship with our NATO allies: increasing employment opportunities, expanded selection of products, and profitable investments and exports."*⁶⁰

The U.S. Department of State furthermore, pointed out many potential ancillary gains for U.S. interests if the Alliance was enlarged:

*'Enlargement will not, however, require a change in NATO's military doctrine, ... Because the United States already has the world's pre-eminent deployment capability, and substantial forces forward deployed in Europe, there will be no need for additional U.S. forces. Current European NATO members are already investing in improved capabilities to operate beyond their border, and Central European states, including likely new members, are likewise investing in modernising and restructuring their forces.'*⁶¹

In sum then, in light of the possible economic benefits, and the longer-term security benefits, the U.S. administration pressed for NATO enlargement. Instability in the region would have threatened U.S. interests in Europe. If in the future the West must face a resurgent Russia, then one with fewer satellites would be preferable. Furthermore, many of the states that were formerly ‘part of the problem’ would in future be on the side of the West. Everyone except Russia looked set to profit from NATO enlargement. Even Russia, it was argued, would in spite of the protests of the Russian leadership, be better off since there would be a zone of peace and stability to its west.

3. The European Union

The European Union has steadily enlarged since its inception in the 1950's. In 1973 the original six Members became a group of nine with the admission

of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. In the 1980's Greece, Spain and Portugal joined and in the 1990's Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded to the European Union, making a total of fifteen. States joined to further their own primarily economic interests despite the original reason for the formation of the Union being security concerns. States who have applied to join - Cyprus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Turkey, Slovakia and Slovenia - want to do so because it is in their economic interest to gain access to the large single market. As states join they are required to conform to the *acquis communautaire*⁶² which consists of over 85,000 pages of legal documentation governing a wide range of practice. The institutions that had developed with the Union were not designed to accommodate the introduction of

12 or more new members without considerable reforms but those reforms had price tags.

The difficult task of adapting the European Union's institutions and policies to accommodate more members, the driving force of the United States for NATO enlargement and the self interested actions of EU Members combined to ensure that NATO enlargement took place before enlargement of the European Union. Today both organisations are planning for enlargement. Although there are short term hardships to be endured, leaders in the European Union have resolved to carry through with enlargement because they perceive the end result as benefiting their national interests. They also understand that to neglect to do so would threaten those same interests.

One enormous benefit to European security of European Union expansion, is that it permits the

gradual integration of Central and Eastern European states without provoking Russia.⁶³ Although, as previous arguments demonstrate, Russia is not showing any signs of aggression in the face of NATO enlargement despite considerable posturing. The logic still follows in the European Union that it is best not to provoke the struggling giant.

Integration of economies is the most effective method discovered to date to prevent the global conflicts that rocked the world twice this century.⁶⁴ Enlarging the European Union to include as many as 13 new states, many of which were part of the Soviet Union, will create a single market a half a billion strong producing 20% of the world's goods.⁶⁵ Enforcing the *acquis communautaire* mandates states become more democratic and undertake social reforms that benefit their peoples. It is therefore, the potential economic

and social stability that expansion of the European Union will provide, that is the greatest perceived lure to applicant states. It is also the greatest guarantor of European security in the long run.⁶⁶

There are further tangential benefits too. Lithuania and Bulgaria, for example, agreed to close their Chernobyl-style nuclear power plants and some members of ethnic minorities are to be granted full citizenship in aspirant countries as the price for the 2.5 billion ECU in aid the EU is giving to aspirants to help them prepare for membership.⁶⁷ The European Union however, has considerable hurdles to overcome before expansion will occur.

A. The short term disadvantages of enlargement

The extraordinary amount of time needed for the potential new members of the EU to make the requisite financial and legal adjustments called for prior to

integration into the European Union means that enlargement will do little directly for European security in the near term. It will take time for the economic benefits to sink in and the resultant increase in security and stability to truly have an impact. It is noteworthy however, that enlargement is a process that in its course, engenders healthier economies and more democratic political systems. As a result the move towards enlargement will slowly have a positive effect on security in Europe. A larger Union will, however, have a negative effect on decision making without substantial changes in the institutions and processes of the European Union. In this arena in particular the struggle between integration and state interests is remarkably clear.

B. Obstacles in the Path of Enlargement

The main problems that must be resolved before enlargement occurs include, but are not limited to:

1. reform of the European Union institutions themselves to make them capable of functioning with more members,
2. reform of the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP] and,
3. reform of Structural Funds.

The 1996 - 1997 IGC which produced the Amsterdam Treaty did not succeed in resolving these issues. In each case states opted to protect their own interests as opposed to supporting the larger goal of deeper political union. Neil King Jr., Staff Writer for *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, summed up the problems facing EU members and aspirants:

"Stiff cutbacks in farm subsidies are sure to spark protests in countries like France, while poorer countries such as Spain and Greece are already

rejecting proposals to eliminate EU grants for everything from highways to new sewage plants. The larger countries, meanwhile, are sure to resist efforts to water down their influence over EU executive decisions.⁶⁸

1. Reform of the EU institutions

The prospect of Council meetings with 25 or more ministers posed the potential of being difficult to run while ensuring that each minister was allowed enough time to have his or her say.

The most obvious procedure that required reformation in the European Union was the manner of voting. The need to increase the number of areas in which Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) would be used to reach decisions instead of consensus was important to ensure the expedient resolution of issues. As was argued earlier in this dissertation, taking decisions by consensus is difficult. The prospect of taking decisions

with upwards of 25 or 30 members therefore, would potentially be very difficult indeed and very likely to slow down decision making at the very least. States are caught between the desire to maintain their right to decide important issues and the obvious need for some sort of reform. At the Nice summit in December 2000 members substantially increased the number of areas where QMV would be used. The extension of QMV was yet again rejected in the vital areas of security and defence and the United Kingdom managed to maintain consensus voting in the “red line”⁶⁹ areas of taxation and social policy.. Thus demonstrating that even with the progress of the Union, states continue to guard their sovereignty jealously.

The number of Commissioners each state would have in a larger Union was another contentious issue. The

European Commission currently has 20 Commissioners, one per state and two from the five largest states. There are not currently enough portfolios to keep 20 Commissioners fully occupied. No member however, wants to give up its Commissioner and large states maintained their right to have more representation than small ones so the prospect of a European Commission with as many as 40 Commissioners would have been a possibility if reforms could not be agreed to.

The European Parliament currently has 624 members, roughly on a par with the number of members of other large EU Member States. If current proportions were maintained when new members are taken into the European Union, the European Parliament would grow to more than 1,000 MEPs. Clearly this would be untenable. The problem with reducing the number of

MEPs however is the necessary increase in the number of constituents each MEP would acquire. The very real problem of the sheer size in sq. km. of a constituency in many rural areas of the European Union would furthermore, make it very difficult for an MEP to travel to his/her constituents. Either way the Union might become less democratic.

The European Court of Justice is presently bogged down with the number of cases currently awaiting adjudication. The case-load can only increase in proportion to the increase in population that enlargement entails. This however appears to be the easiest institutional question to address with an expansion of the Court of First Instance or possibly a division of labour among additional Courts along subject areas.

At two o'clock in the morning agreements were finally reached to solve these problems at the Nice summit in December 2000. Large states gained power at the expense of the smaller ones. The Commission will ultimately be limited to 20 Commissioners but its rank will swell before the new representation system takes effect. Members will still have one representative in the Council but the method for reaching majority decisions was decided.⁷⁰ Larger states, especially Germany, secured more power for themselves based on their larger populations. See Table 7.3 extracted from *The Economist* shortly after the Treaty was agreed.

Still the integrationists did not think that the reforms had gone far enough. President Chirac complained that Mr. Blair had “defended short term interests at the expense of long term visions”.⁷¹

Table 7.3

Weightier than thou			
	Council of Ministers voting allocation		Population
	current	new*	m
<i>European Union members</i>			
Germany	10	29	82.0
Britain	10	29	59.2
France	10	29	59.0
Italy	10	29	57.6
Spain	8	27	39.4
Netherlands	5	13	15.8
Greece	5	12	10.5
Belgium	5	12	10.2
Portugal	5	12	10.0
Sweden	4	10	8.9
Austria	4	10	8.1
Denmark	3	7	5.3
Finland	3	7	5.2
Ireland	3	7	3.7
Luxembourg	2	4	0.4
Total	87	237	375.3
<i>Candidates†</i>			
Poland	8	27	38.7
Romania	6	14	22.5
Czech Republic	5	12	10.3
Hungary	5	12	10.1
Bulgaria	4	10	8.2
Slovakia	3	7	5.4
Lithuania	3	7	3.7
Latvia	3	4	2.4
Slovenia	3	4	2.0
Estonia	3	4	1.4
Cyprus	2	4	0.8
Malta	2	3	0.4
Total	134	345	481.2

*Provisional †Allocation if country were an EU member
Sources: Reuters; Council of the European Union

2. Reform of the CAP

The Common Agricultural Policy,⁷² described by the European Commission as ‘by far the most important Common Policy’,⁷³ currently accounts for 47% of the EU budget (1997) and cannot be sustained in its current form either with the existing members alone or when new members join the EU.⁷⁴ At the moment there are net contributors and net beneficiaries. The introduction of new members would change the status of the current net beneficiaries and those states do not want to lose the economic benefits they currently derive.

Dr. Franz Fischler, Member of the European Commission with responsibility for Agriculture and Rural Development, remarked to a meeting of Irish farmers:

*'It is quite clear that the status quo is going to take us in one direction only that is - food mountains, lower quotas, falling farm incomes and rural depopulation.'*⁷⁵

Dr. Fischler's proposals to reform the CAP were however, "torn apart by minister after minister with a ferocity that belied their avowed commitment to enlargement"⁷⁶ at a meeting of the Agriculture Council on the very day enlargement negotiations formally began with five former Eastern bloc states and Cyprus in Brussels.

The original community established three principles to ensure the success of the objectives⁷⁷ of the CAP. These are well described by Jacqui McGuinness, Intern for Pauline Green MEP.⁷⁸

TABLE 7.4: Principles for achieving CAP objectives

The creation and maintenance of a single market
The single market principle required the setting of a common price for common produce. Generally the set price would be that of the country where the product was most expensive so that farmers would not have to accept a price cut for their products. The first products became subject to a common set of rules in 1962. A common price range was applied in 1968.
Community preference
The Community preference principle works in practice by keeping prices for the European Community (EC) below those of imported goods. EC product prices were higher than average world prices. The single market principle only served to widen this gap. Thus import duties were levied to ensure that imported products are more expensive, and home products are competitive in world markets.
Financial solidarity
The EC budget is used as the main financial instrument for managing the CAP so financial solidarity is assured. Contributions by member states are pooled together in the Budget. Responsibility for paying farmers then rests with the EC. The budget also benefits from the duties and levies charged on imported goods.
All three principles are inter-linked and each is ineffective in its application without the others.

When the European Union is expanded the states currently benefiting from CAP subsidies will be forced to become net contributors instead of net beneficiaries. Clearly these states did not wish to relinquish their current status.

3. Reform of the Structural Funds

The four funds which together are known as the Structural Funds⁷⁹ comprised 36% of the European Union budget in 1997. These funds are designed to: ‘bridge the gap between the wealthier and less advanced regions of Europe so as to create economic and social cohesion across the EU.’⁸⁰ Enlargement of the EU means that the states which presently contain regions, or are wholly considered, ‘less advanced’ will shift to ‘wealthier’ in comparison to any of the prospective members. In concise terms states which are currently net beneficiaries of the European Union

budget will become net contributors. Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal stand to lose millions of ECU.

The worst thing the European Union could possibly do would be to agree to enlarge without resolving these issues. This would ultimately mean gridlock in the institutions and potentially have disastrous economic consequences for EU members.

The European Union has developed the Agenda 2000⁸¹ project in order to deal with these looming problems but the Commission is still struggling against the will of the member states but then that is its job as the defender of the Treaties. If the policies are not reformed however, the burden on the wealthier members will be intolerable. and they would therefore be forced to veto accession of new members. If the

policies are reformed however current members may veto new members in protest at their loss of income.

Though the future of the European Union looks questionable indeed in this light it must be pointed out that the chief reason for this highly state-centric behaviour is self interest and the one thing that all members of the European Union derive from their membership is an enormous economic advantage. This incentive, to maintain the large Single Market is the necessity that will be the mother of the invention that solves the many problems facing the Union in the coming decade.

C. Enlarging the European Union and the effects on the ESDI

The fact that the European Union is a tool of economic security rather than a potential supplier of more robust security is not lost on the East European prospective

members and was clearly evidenced by the failure of the European Union to mediate and provide solutions for the crisis in former Yugoslavia.⁸² Enlargement of the European Union may in fact take so long that its effects on hard security in Central and Eastern Europe are negligible.⁸³

The Central and East European countries must be drawn into any European armaments policy that is developed because their accession to NATO and the EU demands a change in the way in which they produce, buy and sell armaments in order for them to meet common security and defence requirements.⁸⁴ As Associate Partners in the WEU, they have begun to lay the ground work for this.

4. Conclusions

‘Who will pay for NATO enlargement? Will the future functioning of ESDP and the CJTF satisfy the Alliance

partners on both sides of the Atlantic? Will Europe improve its power projection capabilities and join America in non-European operations? Will the European Union be able to reform its institutions and policies to preserve the tremendous financial advantage of its single market while providing ample support to new members in light of the self interested behaviour of Member States in the decision-making process? Will Russia be threatened by these enlargements that will eventually creep up to her border?

All that is certain is that America's commitment to Europe will come at a higher price than before.⁷

Contrary to the predictions of scholarly doomsayers that NATO enlargement will entangle the Alliance in long simmering cross border conflicts,⁸⁵ NATO enlargement has already made Europe more secure because the promise of membership has incited states

to settle their differences. Tangible examples of the dividend NATO enlargement began to pay in the 1990's include:

- the Polish-Lithuanian treaty of 1994;
- the Hungarian-Slovakian treaty of 1996;
- a series of agreements in 1996 between Poland and Ukraine;
- improved relations between Italy and Slovenia;
- the 1996 treaty between Hungary and Romania;
- and the 1996 agreement between the Czech Republic and Germany concerning Sudeten and other issues.⁸⁶

As Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State, noted in an address to the World Affairs Council of Boston: “Accords like these can serve as potent vaccines against the kind of plague that has befallen the former Yugoslavia.”⁸⁷ A larger NATO would

however, not have prevented the collapse of Yugoslavia nor will a larger NATO be a significant weapon against the proliferation of WMD, although it may work as a deterrent against their use. Nevertheless, the initial effects of the first round of enlargement and the prospect of further enlargement are having positive effects on security in Europe today. Ultimately the fact that NATO enlargement will take place in waves has a number of advantages for European security and for U.S. interests in Europe.⁸⁸ First, the small first round meant that the cost was less than if a larger group of states had been asked to join and the cost of enlargement was easier to sell to the United States Congress. Second, the small first round also meant that problems which did arise in the co-ordination of the militaries were smaller and easier to focus on. One of the most important benefits

furthermore, and also most controversial aspects of the small first round was that it helped to ensure aspirants that there would be additional rounds. This of course also had the disadvantage of antagonising opponents of NATO enlargement. Fourth, a small first round may actually have been less threatening to Russia. Choosing the strongest countries to join first was furthermore, helpful in stimulating support in the United States for the project. Secretary of State Albright emphasised this point in her statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee saying: "Let me assure you we (the NATO Allies) invited only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. We can count on these three nations."⁸⁹ Prospective members will continue with democratic reforms, the process of strengthening their market economies and resolving differences with their neighbours.⁹⁰

The decision to ‘leave the door open’ to other democratic states in future is not dissimilar to the United Kingdom’s decision not to say ‘No’ to joining a single European currency. The benefit to the UK is that it could always say ‘No’ at any point in the future but as long as the prospect remains open then the United Kingdom has at least the potential to influence the paths its European partners are taking. It now looks likely that there will be a referendum in the United Kingdom on joining the single currency.

Opponents of continuing enlargement beyond Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, argue that the West is simply drawing a new dividing line in Europe and increasing the insecurity of the states that are not admitted. This argument is effectively countered by the fact that:

*"The vast majority of states in the region favor (sic.) enlargement and see it as contributing to their overall security. This sentiment is shared by some states that believe they may not be early new members of NATO and states, such as Ukraine, that have not expressed an interest in membership."*⁹¹

Likewise the enlargement of the European Union is constantly being negotiated with the existing Members and the applicant states: all are vying to promote their state interests. The Treaty of Nice, despite some bumps along the way to ratification and entry into force, is likely to be regarded historically as the document that laid the ground work for enlargement. If the problems it began to address were not solved the Union would be forced to either remain the same size or become untenably inefficient. An enlarged European Union will become the largest single market in the world and the economic benefits to be had in the longer term

from access to that resource may be enough to persuade states that the short-term economic sacrifice is outweighed by the long term economic gains. Either way, the only sure predictor of state behaviour is self interest.

Endnotes

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- ¹ At the time of writing, NATO has enlarged to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and is in the process of considering a second round of enlargement.
- ² Much of the literature about the enlargement of NATO referred to “expansion” but that term became less acceptable when the inflammatory nature of its use was thought through. The academic literature began to refer to “enlargement” instead of “expansion” in the belief that the term “enlargement” more accurately reflected what NATO was undertaking.
- ³ The nine countries that have declared an interest in joining NATO and are participating in the MAP are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- ⁴ ‘Europe’s Dual Enlargement’, *The Economist*, 21 - 27 March 1998.
- ⁵ NATO Study on Enlargement 1995, Brussels, NATO Press and Information Office, (referred to in Report to Congress on Enlargement by U.S. Department of State, February 1997).
- ⁶ Several authors expressed the opinion that the United States should disengage itself from Europe in the post Cold War era. Earl Ravenal, ‘The Case for Adjustment’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 84, 1990 - 1991, pp. 3-19; Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War, Washington DC:, Cato Institute, 1992; Christopher

Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise' 1994*International Security*, No. 4, 1993, pp. 5-51; Doug Bandow, 'Keeping the Troops and Money at Home', *Current History*, No. 579, pp. 8-13; Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1995.

⁷ According to the Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement made by the U.S. Department of State in February 1997, 'NATO does not need a threat to endure because NATO serves an enduring set of purposes.'

⁸ Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation, NATO Heads of State and Government, Madrid, 8 July 1997.

⁹ Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation, NATO Heads of State and Government, Madrid, 8 July 1997, Section 8, para. 3.

¹⁰ As early as 1990 the Declaration of the North Atlantic Council proclaimed the Alliance to be 'transformed,' but in order for anything to be 'transformed' it must change its form shape or appearance in some substantial way. The enlargement of the Alliance, agreed at the July Summit of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid in 1997, is in fact the first concrete episode which truly denotes a 'transformation'. Christopher Conliffe, 'The Alliance Transformed: A Skeptical View' in David G. Haglund *et. al.* [eds.], NATO's Eastern Dilemmas, Boulder, Westview, 1994, p. 24.

- ¹¹ The New Strategic Concept in 1991, NACC, PfP, CJTFs and most recently the EAPC and the Enhanced PfP.
- ¹² Marc Rogers, 'NATO to Review its Role as World Order Changes', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 January 1998.
- ¹³ The United States Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, claimed that: The transformation of the Alliance was a result of the crisis in Bosnia Herzegovina.' Joseph Fitchett, 'New U.S. Envoy to NATO Comes Back to a Better Alliance', *International Herald Tribune*, 18 Feb 1998.
- ¹⁴ Jane M. O. Sharp, 'Exporting Stability', *War Report*, June/July 1997. <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/sharp.html>>
- ¹⁵ William Rees-Mogg, 'NATO is Still Our Sword and Shield', *The Times*, 2 February 1998.
- ¹⁶ The Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement, *op. cit.*, identifies the ability to deal more effectively with new security challenges as a benefit of enlargement and recognises those threats as including or indicated by: 'the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Gulf War, recent acts of terrorism and clear dangers from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.'
- ¹⁷ 'Europe's Dual Enlargement', *The Economist*, 21 - 27 March 1998.
- ¹⁸ Eugene Gholtz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey Sapolsky, 'Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation', *International Security*, No. 4, 1997, p. 18.

- ¹⁹ Carl Conetta, 'American's New Deal With Europe: NATO Primacy and Double Expansion', Cambridge, MA, Project on Defence Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, October 1997. <<http://www.comw.org/pda/eurcom.html>>
- ²⁰ Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 'Back to the Womb?: Isolationism's Renewed Threat', *Foreign Affairs*, No. 4, 1995, pp. 2 - 8; Ronald D. Asmus, The New U.S. Strategic Debate, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1994, pp. 79 - 95; Eugene Witkopf, 'What Americans Really Think About Foreign Policy', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. ?, No. 3, 1996, pp. 91 - 106.
- ²¹ Quoted by United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, 7 October 1997.
- ²² Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, 7 October 1997.
- ²³ Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, 'A New NATO, A New Europe, A New Russia', Address to the World Affairs Council of Boston, 16 October 1997, <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/newnato.html>>
- ²⁴ William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defence, statement before Senate Appropriations Committee,

20 October 1997, U.S. Information Agency,
<<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/cohen.html?>>.

²⁵ Jonathon Dean, [1997].

²⁶ Strong objections to NATO enlargement came from various academics and commentators cited in this dissertation such as Michael O'Hanlon, John Ruggie and Michael Brown.

²⁷ Founding Declaration of the Coalition Against NATO Expansion [CANE], 26 January 1998, <<http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/ef/cane.html>>.

²⁸ 'Report to Congress on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Rationale, Costs, Benefits and Implications', U.S. Department of State, 24 February 1997.

²⁹ Ronald E. Powaski, 'Joining the March of Folly', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 1, January/February 1998, <<http://www.bullatomsci.org/>>.

³⁰ Jonathon Dean, 'The NATO Mistake: Enlarging for All the Wrong Reasons', *Washington Monthly*, No. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 35 - 37.

³¹ William Sophire, 1996.

³² Carl Conetta, 'America's New Deal With Europe: NATO Primacy and Double Expansion', Cambridge, MA, Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, October 1997, <<http://www.comw.org/pda/eurcom.htm>>

³³ Henry Kissinger, 'Expand NATO Now', *The Washington Post*, 19 December 1994, pp. A27.

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- ⁶⁹ The term "red line" was used by Prime Minister Blair to denote areas where the United Kingdom could not tolerate voting by QMV.
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countries plus one small one will be enough to block a qualified majority. Another form of blocking minority is one that requires a check that any decision has the backing of countries representing 62% of the total population of the enlarged EU.” *The Economist*, December 14, 2000.

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- to stabilize markets,
- to assure food supplies, and
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suggests possible solutions to these problems. The ideas are sound but the Member States are likely to find agreement on the individual issues difficult when state interests conflict with European Union interests.

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Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This dissertation began by addressing the historical development of the European Union and the co-development of its political identity. From its very inception, the European Union's identity was tussled over by self-interested states that were at times fiercely protective of their sovereignty. The same motivations run strong through the European Union Members today. It is important to note that the foundations of the European Union lie in the desire of the Member States to make war in Europe not only unthinkable but also virtually impossible. The vehicle for this end was to be an economic union among states with the free movement of people goods and services within that union. From this perspective, the Federalists who maintain that this must remain the central goal of the European Union are justified in their claim of the

ideological high ground. The realities of implementing that plan however, have constituted the subject matter of the remainder of this thesis.

We have seen that the Federalist's hope for a centrally controlled Europe - without borders, capable of exerting political as well as economic, influence commensurate with its geographic, political and economic size in the world - has been creeping towards fruition for fifty years now. But it has been simultaneously hampered by the demand of the states that they retain their sovereignty. The historical reasons for the ferocity of that sovereignty claim were explained in theory in Chapter One and in practice in Chapter Three. In Chapters Four and Five this dissertation discussed the different aspirations of the EU and the U.S. for the Atlantic Alliance which is presently the world's most powerful military alliance

and stands a very good chance of remaining so in the near to mid term. It is likely that the Atlantic Alliance and the European Security and Defence Policy, called for in the Treaty of Nice will develop together. The Europeans are on schedule to develop an 80,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force. They are in the process of buying over 200 Airbus A400M transport aircraft to upgrade their virtually non-existent airlift capability – something the European Commission identified as crucial to the development of the EU RRF. They still lag far behind the United States in terms of military prowess but it is now likely that NATO will develop as the mainstay of European military security and in the longer run the EU Members will ultimately be able to undertake missions alone, having worked up to this by undertaking international crisis management operations under the NATO framework.

In Chapter Six the role that the arms manufacturing industry plays in the development of forces was exposed. The sea-change that lead to the Europeans merging so many defence manufacturers is likely to be a very telling indicator for the future development of the European Union Security and Defence Identity, although there are innumerable smaller companies in Europe that have yet to contemplate mergers. The Member States realised that the only way to compete with the United States and hence retain some control over their national ability to produce weapons was to work together. This was particularly telling in the sense of the tremendous amount of financial assistance that is behind the U.S. arms manufacturers as opposed to that behind the European Union member states arms manufacturers. Chapter Seven carried this theme to the present and likely future with an examination of the

enlargement of NATO and the enlargement of the European Union. It is likely that enlargement of both organisations will occur but, the rationale for joining both organisations is what must be noted as indicative of future ambitions of both organisations.

The Europeans are not facing any catastrophic threat to their security that does not also concern the Americans. European security is a vital interest of the United States as we have seen US officials repeatedly emphasise. Therefore, the Europeans are very unlikely to find themselves in the unhappy position of being forced to fight a conflict they will lose. If we let history be our guide, it is probable that the Europeans will lose conflicts in the future but, in the near term the U.S. will remain the guarantor of European security, possibly through missile defence to some extent. It may however be the case that the Europeans wish to

undertake an Out Of Area operation that the United States does not want to commit troops to in which case it is likely that the Europeans may be forced to ‘stay home’. In this sense the Europeans’ security agendas are indeed heavily influenced by U.S. preferences. The only alternative left to the Europeans is to develop their security and defence capabilities in the national or NATO contexts for the time being. It is likely that the European states will attempt to develop capabilities that NATO lacks on a cost-benefit basis. For example it is far more likely that the Europeans will develop greater lift capability before they will develop the sort of satellite intelligence capability that the United States possesses because the former is less costly than the latter yet both are required by NATO and by an independent European Security and Defence Identity. To this end, the Europeans are like to develop assets

that NATO needs and hence increase their usefulness to the Alliance. It is not true by any current indicator that the Europeans are likely to reach parity with the United States in the next thirty years because:

- they don't spend as much on their armed forces
- they don't spend as much on Research and Development
- they can't agree on the need for a European army
- they don't agree on the role any military alliance should play or the part they should play in it.
- there is not the same level of public support for Out Of Area operations in evidence in Europe as there is in the United States

Since the U.S. is the defacto leader of the Atlantic Alliance, and the United States would like its allies to play a more active role in terms of military commitments in the Alliance. The common

denominator between U.S. strategy, the European Security and Defence Identity and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is that they are all lacking a clear plan and there is certainly no consensus between them as to how they should work together – the logical next step once the organisations are clearer about their identities and goals. Truly a plan is what is needed. The US must decide: what sorts of conflicts it would reluctantly or willingly become involved in and what conflicts it would prefer for its European allies to undertake alone. Despite the fact that the U.S. benefits from clear command structures and a unified leadership – as opposed to the Members of the EU that must reach consensus – the EU receives remarkably mixed signals from the EU. While the U.S. would like to see the Europeans shoulder more of the burdens, the U.S. reacts somewhat negatively when the Europeans

do begin to build up the requisite capabilities fearing that this might somehow threaten the U.S. position in the Alliance.

A long term plan to provide its allies with the technology they require to achieve a stable and coherent security and defence capability [satellites, missile defence] would require a thoughtful assessment of the benefits and disadvantages such a plan would have on US businesses as well as national security interests.

The Heritage Foundation published an edited book in 1995, *Mandate for Leadership*, which attempted to design just such a hierarchy of U.S. interests and an action plan stemming from this initial prioritisation. Like so much of International Relations theory it is not fool proof, and with a little time one can think of interests or situations that do not easily fit into such a

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model yet such models are needed. In some form the Atlantic Alliance, and by definition its leaders, must come up with a coherent plan. Failure to do this will not be catastrophic but success would certainly provide benefits. The lack of a coherent plan leaves the process open to the changes of administration and economic circumstance that are part and parcel of the international environment.

The US defence-manufacturing base is so far ahead of the European base that it will be very difficult for the European companies to gain parity. The US needs to decide in what manner it intends to redress this imbalance. The U.S. cannot have an unrivalled defence-manufacturing base and expect the Europeans to pay exorbitant amounts of money to catch up while promoting the development of a truly capable partner.

As the famed saying goes: "The Atlantic Alliance must be persuasive in peace but decisive in war." So long as the U.S. and the Europeans do not lose sight of the fact that the job of the military in times of peace is to train for war then things cannot go too far awry. The challenge in the new international environment is that the military we train to fight and win wars is too often used to keep the peace. It seems likely that the future will breed a new sort of soldier: a sort of an international gendarmerie. Paramilitary forces are common in Italy and Spain. Perhaps the European Union will develop soldiers more suited to this sort of work. This prospect would fit rather well into the basic concept of what the Rapid Reaction Force is supposed to be for. Europeans have said they are not trying to build a standing army and they do not wish to duplicate NATO. Conscription is being phased out

across Europe thus negating the argument that it would be unfair to call young men and women up for national service and send them to foreign trouble spots. Perhaps the new environment will prove conducive to the growth of a new breed of international career soldier. It may be that the force that develops will be more of a paramilitary police force capable of rapid deployment to trouble spots.

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of tremendous opportunities in terms of spreading peace, democracy and free market economies.

The integrationists continued insistence on the development of a federal Europe is not practical. On balance the Union would be best served by resignation to the idea of confederation. Once these larger issues are resolved then the Union will be much better placed to tackle the problems of low intensity conflict, drug

trafficking, organised crime and immigration which have become the main concerns of European security since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately for all the reasons outlined in this dissertation, the European Union is comprised of Member States that wish to protect their own interests. The development of the European Union will not be along the lines of a grand plan but it will continue to be the outcome of the struggle between the different interests of the Member States.

Part of the problem with narrowing the focus of this thesis is that ultimately most of the issues raised here lead back to the big questions of “Is the world finally moving beyond war to a time when economic integration truly makes war impossible among the highly democratised states, the same states which also possess the highest levels of technological know how?”

“Will the technological advances realised and capitalised on by those countries, America in particular, protect them from war for the foreseeable future?” “How long will the window of opportunity created by the U.S. technological advantage remain open?” “If the U.S. and to some extent Western Europe develop and maintain military capabilities that make there territory unassailable by hostile forces, what effect will the natural counter to overwhelming force – asymmetric threat – have on national security policy?” These questions are at the heart of decisions about what to do with armed forces in times of peace, at the centre of decisions about national security concerns and at the root of strategy. These questions cannot be answered in the Ph.D. dissertation.

The launch of the Euro in 2002 is likely to spark new debates over the development of the European Union.

Federalists can once again reasonably make the case for a deeper political Union based on the need for a more institutional coherence to regulate inter-state disputes and deal with external problems that arise from the advent of the single currency.¹ The states will again fight for the right to maintain their control. The European Rapid Reaction force will be nearing deployable status and most of the governments of the Member States will be left-leaning. All these factors will influence the debate at the anticipated 2004 IGC.

What both the Federalists and the Euro Sceptics must bear in mind, first and foremost, is the need for greater democratic legitimacy in the European Union. The general public must be persuaded of the benefits of the single currency and indeed the European Union project on a continuing basis. The launch of the Euro will go a long way to put a tangible face on a Union that many

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Europeans do not understand. In an attempt to enlarge the Union the institutions must not be allowed to become less democratic than they already are.

Enlarging the Union will not only have a bearing on the institutions but on the development of the ESDI.

Maintaining NATO as a collective defence organisation for some Members will eventually cause problems. In the longer term the European Union will probably enter into some sort of collective defence arrangement but this is very unlikely to happen for at least 15 to 20 years.

Both sides of the Atlantic have moved far beyond the fears of the early 1990s that spurred one person to write:

'For the peaceful management of a continent in turmoil, American involvement is more vital than ever. Because it puts that in question, the European Union's quest for a 'common foreign and security

policy' is not just an irrelevance but a security risk.²

The United States encourages the development of European initiatives. There is little question among anyone other than scholars that the Americans are firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance.

George Robertson recently said of the transformation that is still ongoing in NATO:

"to achieve these goals, (NATO) must create a fairer balance in the transatlantic partnership which is at the core of the North Atlantic Alliance, by strengthening the European role in crisis management and peacekeeping. This process is about reinforcing the Alliance and providing crisis management capabilities which NATO can support without necessarily assuming the leading role itself in every crisis which occurs in Europe. It is about introducing greater flexibility and better options for preventing or ending conflict, not about changing the basis of the collective defence for which the Alliance remains the essential guarantor."³

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This statement alone represents a credible endorsement for most of what has been said in this dissertation because it emphasises the main points: the developments are fluid and dynamic, the struggle to solve the burden sharing debate is ongoing, the Europeans still are not capable of undertaking complicated operations on their own, the EU is working towards something different from NATO in so far as they are not striving to develop their own standing army, rather they are developing a force that will compliment NATO and finally that NATO remains the guarantor of North Atlantic security.

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TITLE V

Provisions on a common foreign and security policy

Article 11 (ex Article J.1)

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:
 - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
 - to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
 - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
 - to promote international cooperation;
 - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article 12 (ex Article J.2)

The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:

- defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
- deciding on common strategies;
- adopting joint actions;
- adopting common positions;
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

Article 13 (ex Article J.3)

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.

Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.

3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.

The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.

The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

Article 14 (ex Article J.4)

1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their

duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.

7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article 15 (ex Article J.5)

The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

Article 16 (ex Article J.6)

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

Article 17 (ex Article J.7)

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their

respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,

including peacemaking.

3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

Article 18 (ex Article J.8)

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this Title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.
5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.

Article 19 (ex Article J.9)

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international

conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Article 20 (ex Article J.10)

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article 21 (ex Article J.11)

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article 22 (ex Article J.12)

1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an

emergency, within a shorter period.

Article 23 (ex Article J.13)

1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.

2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:

- when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy;
- when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.

This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.

Article 24 (ex Article J.14)

When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may

agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to them.

The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI.

Article 25 (ex Article J.15)

Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article 26 (ex Article J.16)

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.

Article 27 (ex Article J.17)

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article 28 (ex Article J.18)

1. Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be

obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities.

Maastricht Declarations

I. DECLARATION

of Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members of the Western European Union and also members of the European Union on

The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance

Maastricht, 10 December 1991

Introduction

WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.

WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

WEU Member States take note of Article J.4 relating to the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union which reads as follows:

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

The policy of the Union in accordance with the present Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of

certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The provisions of this Article shall not prevent development of closer co-operation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this article may be revised as provided for in Article N (2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then."

A. WEU's relations with European Union

The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. To this end, WEU will take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union:

as appropriate, synchronization of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonization of working methods;

establishment of close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other;

consideration of the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies;

arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the Common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union;

encouragement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament.

The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

B. WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance

The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity

and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance.

WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods harmonized.

Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO.

C. Operational role of WEU

WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular:

WEU planning cell;
closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;
meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff;
military units answerable to WEU.

Other proposals will be examined further, including:

enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency;

development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy.

Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies.

D. Other measures

As a consequence of the measures set out above, and in order to facilitate the strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels.

Representation on the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Member States may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the European Union.

WEU notes that, in accordance with the provisions of Article J.4 (6) concerning the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union, the Union will decide to review the provisions of this Article with a view to furthering the objective to be set by it in accordance with the procedure defined. The WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996. This re-examination will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and Atlantic Alliance.

II. DECLARATION

of Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members of the Western European Union

"The Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security and defence identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European states on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this spirit, they propose the following:

States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU.

Annex B: WEU Maastricht Declaration 1991

The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992."

Western European Union Council of Ministers
Petersberg Declaration
Bonn, 19 June 1992

The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member States met in Bonn on 19 June 1992 and issued the Petersberg Declaration consisting of the following three parts:

On WEU and European Security
On strengthening WEU's operational role
On relations between WEU and the other European member States of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance

I. ON WEU AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Developments in the security situation in Europe,
disarmament and arms control

Ministers reviewed the significant changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe since their last regular meeting in November 1991. They emphasized the importance of strengthening the role and institutions of

the CSCE for peace and security in Europe. They looked forward to decisions at Helsinki to start new negotiations on measures of arms control and disarmament and to enhance regular consultations and cooperation on security matters. In the light of the establishment of a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, they considered that decisions to enhance the CSCE's capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes are of primary importance. They supported the proposal under discussion at the Helsinki Follow-up meeting for the CSCE to declare itself as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Ministers considered that the CSCE should have the authority to initiate and pursue peacekeeping operations under its own responsibility.

As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activities.

Ministers welcomed the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and Prague regarding the relationships between the CSCE and other mutually reinforcing

European and transatlantic organizations including WEU. They declared that WEU, together with the European Union, was ready to play a full part in building up Europe's security architecture. They likewise reaffirmed their conviction that the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable foundations of Europe's security. They welcomed the ongoing reform process of NATO with a view to establishing a strong new transatlantic partnership.

Ministers welcomed the agreement reached at the CFE Extraordinary Conference on 5 June 1992 in Oslo which provides the basis for the entry into force of the CFE Treaty which has been and remains a major objective of their arms control agenda. Its full and effective implementation will increase stability and open the way to a new cooperative security order in Europe. They call upon the new States parties to the Treaty to ensure its ratification by the time of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki. Ministers attach great importance to the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of personnel strengths of ground and air forces (CFE 1a) in time for the Helsinki Summit and to the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. They reaffirmed their commitment to the early entry into force of the Open Skies agreement and invited other CSCE States to accede to the Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

Ministers welcomed steps recently taken by the States concerned to allow for the entry into force of the START Treaty and the important agreement on further strategic

reductions reached between the United States and Russia in Washington on 17 June 1992.

Ministers recalled that the presence of foreign forces on the territory of a sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state. They stressed the importance of rapidly establishing, in the negotiations under way, timetables for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Baltic States.

Ministers expressed their conviction that a Chemical Weapons Convention can be reached within the next few months. They are confident that this Convention can play an important and pioneering role in worldwide multilateral arms control and call on all member States of the Conference on Disarmament to lend their support to the emerging consensus. They repeat their commitment to be among the original signatories of this Convention and ask all other nations to follow this course.

WEU member States reaffirmed their resolution to contribute further to the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on cooperation. Ministers underlined the valuable contribution of NACC in this connection. In the same spirit, WEU has invited the Foreign and Defence Ministers of eight States of Central Europe to a special Ministerial meeting later today. WEU and the invited countries intend to enhance consultation and cooperation in the framework of the new European security structure.

Implementation of the Maastricht Declaration

Ministers stressed the fundamental importance of the Treaty on European Union and they looked forward to the further elaboration of the common foreign and security policy at the Lisbon European Council. They discussed the progress made in developing the role of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Declaration adopted by WEU member States at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991.

Ministers reaffirmed the importance for WEU to develop close working relations with the European Union and Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration of WEU. They adopted a report on the practical measures necessary for WEU to develop these relations. They asked the Permanent Council to propose to the Council of the Twelve and to the North Atlantic Council concrete measures aimed at facilitating the development of close cooperation between the respective Secretariats.

Ministers heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress made towards the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General from London to Brussels. They instructed the Permanent Council and Secretary-General to expedite the necessary

arrangements so that the transfer could become effective by January 1993.

Ministers heard a report from the German Chief of Defence Staff on the meetings of Chiefs of Defence Staff. Ministers agreed that the Chiefs of Defence Staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Ministers also agreed that, following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could be reinforced with military delegates to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the Planning Cell and to monitor the professional standards of the Planning Cell's work.

WEU Ministers welcomed the IEPG Defence Ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6 March 1992, to analyse the future role of the IEPG in the new European security architecture. This represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member States in Maastricht further to examine enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European Armaments Agency. WEU Ministers propose that both WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the role and functions of a possible European Armaments Agency and submit a report for consideration.

WEU Ministers welcomed the decision of Eurogroup Defence Ministers at their meeting in Brussels on 25 May 1992 to consider the possibility, among other options, and if the necessary preconditions are met, of transferring to WEU some or all of Eurogroup's present functions for which there is still a need.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the considerable progress which had been made in setting up the experimental WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón (Spain), a concrete example of the strengthening of WEU's operational role, and they looked forward to the official inauguration which would take place later in the year. They also noted that the contract for the main system feasibility study had been awarded to a consortium of firms from WEU member States led by a German firm.

Activities of Working Groups

In the field of verification, Ministers noted with satisfaction that a set of rules for the operation of multinational teams in CFE had been prepared in WEU and had subsequently been adopted in the Alliance. This represented the first example since the Maastricht Declaration of the introduction of joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance.

Noting the progress which had been made so far, Ministers agreed in principle to a feasibility study to identify the most cost-effective means of implementing the Open Skies Treaty cooperatively among member

States. They tasked the group of experts to agree assumptions for the study, to identify the options which merit further study and to consider the question of costs, with a view to taking a decision at their next ordinary meeting to proceed with the study. They stressed the readiness of WEU to cooperate with third parties at a later stage, and in this context welcomed the contacts which had taken place with other European allies, as well as with the Russian Federation. They agreed that experts should investigate the possibilities for intensified cooperation with the Russian Federation, which could include a joint feasibility study and/or a trial overflight.

Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the Mediterranean Sub-Group's work on security in the Mediterranean. They adopted terms of reference for the establishment by WEU of a gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb countries, taking into account the political developments both in these countries and in the region.

WEU Institute for Security Studies

Ministers noted with satisfaction the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Its publications, seminars and colloquia had greatly contributed to deepening understanding for the ongoing development of a European security identity and to enhancing relations between WEU and other European countries.

II. ON STRENGTHENING WEU'S OPERATIONAL ROLE

In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member States of WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member States have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational role.

WEU member States declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member States in accordance with national constitutions.

Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively,

military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

humanitarian and rescue tasks;
peacekeeping tasks;
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies.

Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member States, including forces with NATO missions - in this case after consultation with NATO - and will be organized on a multinational and multi-service basis.

All WEU member States will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.

WEU member States intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.

A Planning Cell will be established on 1 October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels. The Council has today appointed Maj. Gen. Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) as its first Director. The Planning Cell will be responsible for:

preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices;
preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; - keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.

The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the Planning Cell.

III. ON RELATIONS BETWEEN WEU AND THE OTHER EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION OR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Following the Declaration released in Maastricht on 10 December 1991 in connection with the Treaty on European Union, WEU Ministers recalled the

fundamental principles on which relations between member States and associate member States should be based:

settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and the other generally recognized principles and rules of international law.

in their mutual relations, refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

They also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the Treaties which bind the member States within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersburg Declaration in disputes between member States of either of the two organizations.

In their Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991, the member States of WEU proposed that States which are members of the European Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wished. Simultaneously, other

European member States of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would give them a possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

In accordance with Part III of the Petersburg Declaration, Ministers agreed that the following points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members:

Members:

Member States of the European Union which have accepted the invitation to accede to WEU undertake

to respect, in accordance with the principles and values adhered to by all WEU member States, the Brussels Treaty of 1948, modified on 23 October 1954, its Protocols and associated texts, and the agreements concluded among the member States pursuant to the Treaty,

to note with approval the agreements, decisions and rules adopted in conformity with the Treaty, and the Declarations starting with the Rome Declaration of 27 October 1984,

to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in keeping with

the obligation entered into on 10 December 1991 in the Declaration on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance attached to the Treaty on European Union, and

to accept in full the substance of Part III of the Petersburg Declaration which will form part of the Protocol of Accession.

Observers:

Member States of the European Union, which have accepted the invitation to become observers,

may, although not being a party to the MBT, attend the meetings of the WEU Council without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; at the request of a majority of the member States, or of half of the member States including the Presidency, presence at Council meetings may be restricted to full members;

may be invited to meetings of working groups;

may be invited, on request, to speak;

will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong.

Associate members:

Other European member States of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council - without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

at the request of a majority of the member States, or of half of the member States including the Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;

they will be able to be associated to the Planning Cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;

they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong;

they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member States;

they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member States; they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member States, or half of the member States including the Presidency, decide otherwise;

they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;

they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersburg Declaration which will form part of the association document;

they will be connected to the member States' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;

they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the Organization's budgets.

Space activities

For practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the Satellite Centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities.

Mandate

Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to arrange for discussions to start with the States concerned.

Annex C: WEU/The Petersburg Declaration, 1992

Ministers confirmed their wish to conclude the necessary agreements before 31 December 1992.