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SOPHOCLES' TRACHINIAE, AN INTERPRETATION

by

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fulfilment of the requirements of
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ABSTRACT

The essay in two sections presents detailed discussion and overall interpretation: the Trachiniae is seen as a dramatic representation of the phenomenon and the fate and destiny of Heracles. The hallmark of this representation is subtlety and paradox; it is through 'over-involvement' (as some would say) with his heroine that the dramatist with telling obliqueness achieves a representation of the hero faithfully to Myth. This Heracles is essentially superhuman. His nature places his actions as it were beyond the pale of morality - what indeed we find in his self-concept when we encounter it. By the dramatist's sustaining this in appearance but undermining it in juxtaposition of the Herculean mode of being and conscientised, noble humanity (Deianira), a dialectic is instituted which takes Heracles' actions from the purely heroic (Herculean) into the human and ethical but past this again to their mythic roots. (The qualities that enable him to perform his characteristic feats - these are not more good works than merely an expression of his nature - are precisely those which bring him to ruin - these too are not more evil in him than 'natural'; cf. Winnington-Ingram). The justice of Zeus thus hidden from Heracles is suggested to us - and with it, if we believe that Zeus in his wisdom is behind all that we've witnessed, Heracles' actual ultimate destiny.

In its exploration of the dramaturgy the essay treats of small and large irony (the lyric irony - indeed, the dramatic technique - of Bacchylides is seen as possibly germinal); choral function and standing; the poetic

and symbolic genre of our play and the style appropriate thereto; the oracles; the original handling of myth; in this connection, the scene-significance; scene-juxtaposition and -connection; the unity of the themes.

The play is found to be technically remarkable in the wide means deployed in a unity of achievement of the basic aim.

DECLARATION

I, Menas Haralambous, hereby certify that this (*±34000 word*) dissertation has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

1 May, 1984.

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH

I was admitted as a candidate for the degree of M.Litt. in October 1982 under Resolution 1967 No. 9; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between October 1983 and May 1984.

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I hereby declare that the conditions of the Resolution
and Regulations for the degree of Master of Letters (M.Litt.)
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candidate Menas Haralambous.

Signature of Supervisor

1 May, 1984.

PREFACE

I wish to thank Mrs. E. M. Craik for all benefits of supervision and constructive and helpful criticism - particularly in two areas. In one the essay was much modified: she saved me from naively persuading myself that Sophocles meant us to take the archery contest for Iole's hand as implicit in the drama; she (understandably) raised an eyebrow at my unorthodox reading of the closing Hyllus - Heracles scene. Here I have not been saved but was assisted to critical review (i.e. entrenched perverseness).

One automatically incurs the debt of the critics one reads. One's own ideas are influenced by theirs or are shaped in opposition. I acknowledge my debt in both categories.

My thanks to library staff for their assistance.

The essay divides into two sections, roughly of analysis and synthesis. The second was written after acquaintance with 'secondary literature'; the first largely in conjunction with the commentaries only although this rule has been broken (particularly upon review).

Citation is from Easterling's text.

... the serious cheerfulness of Sophocles

Matthew Arnold, On the modern element in literature

The artist, like the God of creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails.

Joyce, A portrait of the artist

The presentation of Heracles is ambiguous, and no interpretation which sees the play in unambiguous terms will do justice to it.

P.E. Easterling.

SECTION A

This approach to the Tr. starts out from the simple observation that the first part when Heracles is not on stage has him as its subject.¹ The play affords various modes of contemplating H: he acts out his own drama; not on stage himself he is the preoccupation of those who are; we compare and contrast - H with others, and with himself as he appears to us through others. But contrast, variousness is almost the life-blood of the play. A particularly striking feature is in its presentation of various manifestations of Herculean being: the hero moving in the world of metamorphosing river gods, centaurs, beasts; the hero moving in the world of men and women. The mythological material in Tr. is not illustrative imagery but actual fabric. The play is complex. It may be thought of as having a bifunctional plot which (a) unfolds the *náθos* (b) unfolds the picture of H.

'Part 2', when H comes on, stands apart from the rest by virtue of some formal difference. It has no choral odes, the chorus having only two muted, abashed couplets - and the closing quartet. Its dialogue and solo material is of a direct and immediate nature. 'Part 1' abounded in speech with a narrative, reporting, reflective or historicizing tendency.²

The picture of H in 'Part 1' is constituted by (a) mythic representations in D's or chorus' reflections, (b) news of his recent history, (c) our apprehension of him in others' consciousness, (d) report of first hand observation. (a) is of relatively objective character, the events of mythology being historical data - and above subjective

interpretation. (b) (c) (d) introduce the subjective factor. Because throughout 'Part 1' we see H through other people we need to understand them to understand what he is to them. (Heracles will appear. When he does so, whatever he has appeared to us through others will come to the test. We will, like it or not, be comparing reality with expectation. Or so it might have been if he appeared his good self when he appears. But he does not. This further complicates things. It means, almost, that H as he is escapes our direct observation and of that H what we learn in the Tr. we learn indirectly. The H that we are given to observe is not himself but stricken, his condition critical...).

The Tr. lends itself to consideration as an evolving, or emerging, picture of Heracles. (This proposition concerns visualization, bringing to focus, as it were). The play leads up to the finale in which he finally appears.³ This stage is prepared for by Hyllus' first-hand observation of his father at Cenaeum. Before that was the complicated, mediated (for all that suddenly illuminating) view of Heracles given through messenger, Lichas, Deianira. The whole has a prelude at some apparent remoteness from the rest in which the mythic hero of the exploits of a time past figures in Deianira's meditation. I do not suppose the Tr. aims to give us this picture purely for its own sake. But whatever it is telling us about him - if anything - it will presumably tell over these representations and their development which I now, as a member of the audience, sit down to observe...

Under cover of the indirect media of 'Part 1' Sophocles has freedom to represent the phenomenon and probe the psyche of the hero. We are given Heracles of myth, splendid winner, and a brutally frank view of the

man. Mythic Heracles is seen by us only through Deianira and chorus; Heracles 'homo' in the reports of messenger and Lichas but also, and of course primarily, through his wife. In Deianira Heracles' mythic and human aspects find compatibility and unity, given their temporal distribution - their prominence at different points on the time-scale of Deianira's life. As young delicate beauty Deianira is wooed and won by Heracles: time of mythic Heracles. But he is much away from home, making for an anxious womanly Deianira of the time of our play: time of Heracles homo. This Deianira opens the play with dark reflections on past, present, future and where I said Heracles' different aspects find compatibility in Deianira this rather too-harmonious picture obscures an important factor of technique in the representation of the mythic hero: contrast. The achievement of Part 1 is to constitute its picture of Heracles - externals and interior - about the splendidly conveyed personality of Deianira. Sophocles will represent the inner man - mind, motives, actions - by bringing him into human scale through his interactions with human kind (Eurytus, Iole) as reflected in Deianira. But to represent him typically - the universally known hero of myth - he sets him off against Deianira as she remembers herself in youth. This is Deianira of the mentioned qualities, particularly of the *vννφειων ὄκνον*, antipolar in aesthetic and sensibility to Achelous and Achelous meets his match in Heracles. Heracles is paired with Achelous for Deianira's hand. She cannot bear to look on. This becoming delicacy reinforces the contrast. Deianira-on-her-own provides the key note for our play's heroine. Heracles is absent;⁴ the elements of Deianira's situation are her loneliness and anxiety. Her fate is as woman alone, if not quite to

catch at straws, to take help where she finds it; finally to take her destiny into her own hands.⁵ She takes a decision, slips - through ignorance - though acting fully consistently. In the early play Deianira distances herself from the heroic arena through *σκύος* and delicacy - to establish the contrast whereby Heracles is viewed. The first stasimon again sets off the heroic from the human in exactly the same way. Heracles grapples with Achelous; *α δ' εὐωνίς ἀβράτη λαυγεῖ πρέπειον ήστο, τὸν οὐ προσμένειος ακοίτων*⁶. Both instances, the stasimon and the prologue, are at a distance from the immediate action, separated from it in time and genre. The vehicle in the case of the prologue has been the heroine's introspection: she has reviewed her courting days and perceives that her fears of then were a harbinger of the anxieties of marriage to a husband whose heroism abroad entails absence from home...

Sophocles allows himself freedom of interpretation of Heracles' story in the interest of "dramatic truth." This aspect of the dramatic technique - his construction of the picture of Heracles in Deianira of which Heracles *τεραπόνειος* forms a part - is plainly evident. It has involved "reinterpretation of the tradition" in taking the hero's marriage to the Aetolian princess back in time to before the labours. There is more to this, however.

In the first episode Deianira discourses with the chorus, comparing carefree youth and the anxieties of a married life. This is not mere homily since, coming before the arrival of the messenger heralding news of Heracles, it prepares us for Deianira's encounter with this news in a direct way and at time present. Her soliloquy of the

prologue showed us Deianira with her thoughts. Come the first episode she will face in practice what it is for *αὐτὴν παρθένον γυνῆ* to face. This convergence of the action onto 'time present' is particularly effected through Deianira's description of the oracle whose message applies to the present time (173 ff.)-and time present is edged towards in the heroine's concluding fears and anxieties. The tension of this is relieved by the messenger arriving with good news.

The first episode, then, brings us on to contemporary Heracles through a review of his recent history of the last 15 months. This is 'phase two' of the portrayal of the hero, bringing him decidedly closer to Mensch than phase one could. Phase two in fact seems to be ushered in by the peripeteia. He says, "First of messengers I release you, my lady Deianira, from your anxiety." (180) She has been worried about Heracles' safety. From this moment she can know him safe - but unwittingly works towards his ruin.⁷ Phase two divides into two sub-phases or impressions, a sort of montage: (i) Lichas dispells Deianira's anxiety with a view of Hercules Victor. (ii) The other side of the coin. The comforting news, such as it is, gives us a certain picture of H to view:-

- i. Visited Eurytus; got himself insulted; got drunk; was bounced.
- ii. Treacherously killed Eurytus' son at Tiryns for revenge.
- iii. Disgraced by Zeus for this, was made a slave.
- iv. Stung by this disgrace (first glimmer of something honourable) took mercenaries to Oechalia to punish Eurytus as responsible for the evil that he put his way.

v. Killed Eurytus, sacked Oechalia, sent back prisoners.

Lichas: When he's done with thanking Zeus for victory
know that he will return.

Chorus: Present news and future prospect bright!

Deianira: How should I not rejoice at these happy tidings of
my husband's deeds...

What an amazing thing to say when there's nothing in this record that's not reprehensible! But then, what the news meant to Deianira was that Heracles was safe. If as well as safe, victorious too - well, that's an added bonus: witness these captives; Heracles sacrificing. Before going on to discuss another factor contributing to the overall good impression of the news we notice that Lichas' tidings, whatever their content, would seem to have immediate authority in confirming prevailing rumours about Heracles as reported by Hyllus (67 ff): bondage to a Lydian woman; war on Eurytus imminent or in progress. Also, that if credibility be a merit, Lichas' news appeared eminently credible, because unflattering. Well, almost, taking into account Lichas' rhetoric, the aforementioned factor. He had to avoid mentioning Iole. That meant diverting attention from Oechalia. (Deianira knew about Iphitus, of course, since that was the cause of their Trachinian exile.)⁸ Divert attention he accordingly does, as with perfect justification he might, by elaborating on the main new point - and the worst slur on Heracles' reputation - his demeaning bondage. Lichas addresses himself to the moral implications of this: a good smokescreen. He becomes a sort of olympian commissioner and enters some special pleading on Heracles' behalf: but for H resorting to guile when he killed Iphitus he would not have had to render account to Zeus. Lichas here has recourse to

theological principle to aid his purpose.

What might perhaps most strike a viewer of this impression of the *katharikos* is how subjective it seems. A bad picture made to appear good (heroic) for the victor by circumstance and manipulation. Not least among the circumstances is D of the moment, anxious wife of H. Her uncritical acceptance of the import of Lichas' news is quite in keeping with her part.

(Sophocles, as noted, has D married to H from before the labours. This, I believe, is the fundamental innovation of the play.⁹ A tradition,¹⁰ again, has an archery contest for Iole's hand with H, at the end of his labours and desiring marriage, competing. But Sophocles has him already married to D by this time - and consequently, as it would seem, no archery contest. [No wooing either, in that case, along the lines of the parallel tradition.] What Lichas says - as related by the messenger 359-60 - is to be taken as it stands in S's set-up: H asked Eurytus for his daughter as *ερυθρὸν λέχος* just like that! Yet Eurytus' insults (265 f) on the theme of archery seem to glance at this business of a contest. This seems to be vestigial - S's concession to, or adaptation of, a surely essential element of this phase of the myth. We are meant to take Eurytus' insults on the theme of archery as a Sophoclean, not a Lichan, touch).¹¹

Lichas' account of Heracles' visit to Eurytus, then, will be found to be part truth only - lacking mention of Iole with whom Heracles fell violently in love. Concerning Iphitus Lichas tells us that only because Heracles used guile did Zeus have cause to be angry with his son. This

must be special pleading because the given motives (insults, etc.) are not in proportion to Heracles' requital. And then far from accepting divinely-decreed punishment Heracles went on to swear to bring Eurytus to book (by enslavement of him and his family)¹² as the cause of his disgrace. A balancing of the books up to this point might suggest that Eurytus, not Heracles, was the one to whom further justice was due. This is how things would seem to stand on Lichas' account - on Heracles' own apparent motives - and we have not mentioned Iole who, once in the picture, would seem to be the real cause of Iphitus' death at Heracles' hands no less than of Eurytus' later. This however anticipates our 'impression B':

Tr. 351

Messenger: I heard this man say - and many others were present to witness - that for the sake of this girl Heracles overcame Eurytus and lofty-towered Oechalia, that Eros alone of gods wrought on him to do those deeds of arms - not his Lydian toils, his servitude to Omphale, nor the fate of Iphitus, hurled down to his death. Now he pushes Eros to one side and tells another story. For, indeed, when he was not able to prevail on her father to give him his daughter - to have her as his concubine in secret - he got up some petty complaint as a pretext and made war on the city of which she was a citizen and of which, he (Lichas) said, Eurytus was the ruler, killed the prince her father and sacked the city. And now you see he comes sending her to this house not without design, lady, nor as a slave. Do not expect that. It is not likely if he's burning with passion for her.

So I thought best, Madam to tell you all I heard from this man. I was not the only one who heard - many others did also who were assembled in the meeting place of the Trachinians. They too will refute him. It pains me to tell you what is unwelcome - but at least I have put the record straight.

This speech represents the messenger's revelation of what Lichas said in public. Because that was so at odds with what Lichas told Deianira the messenger resolved (369), as he says, to bring it to her notice. The question may arise, therefore, whether we can take the content of the speech as basically Lichas' words, what again the messenger claims (370), or whether parts of it represent the messenger's own contribution. How in particular are the underlined words to be taken: do they represent Lichas' own words or does the messenger here refer to Lichas' other version by way of pointing out the discrepancy? I take the first alternative, if it is that, as correct. The words of Lichas at other places make this clear: (a) 476; (b) 431 Messenger: "One who in your presence heard you say that the whole city was overcome by his desire of her; that it was not the Lydian woman sacked the city but the passion which this maid had kindled." The messenger's speech then is basically Lichas' words. In public Lichas did not merely say that Heracles captured Oechalia for Iole. He said that she was the cause and not the Lydian woman etc. Lichas here gives the inside story, the truth of the matter which lay behind the apparent circumstances. But it was Lichas himself who gave us (Deianira) the apparent circumstances. His words here (I am thinking of 431 f.) make him seem to take the apparent circumstances as generally known or indeed to expound these himself so as to be able to

refute them. As Lichas is supposed to be bringing news to a place which has received only some rumours he is perhaps best seen as involved in the second alternative and, unless this is merely an accident of narration, the manner of his representations makes him seem intent on showing up the merely apparent, pre-textual nature of the 'apparent circumstances.' Lichas is clearly bent on exposing these circumstances as a convenient fiction as far as Heracles' actual motives are concerned. Strange behaviour, I think, in a servant ...

If the form and manner of Lichas' words raise eyebrows, so does Lichas' behaviour. He tells Deianira (481) that it was to avoid paining her that he withheld from her the identity and significance of Iole. But this does not wash. He told the crowd about Iole. Did he not think news would reach Deianira? It was bound to and with compounded embarrassment to her. He behaved senselessly and carelessly. If he had discretion equal to his claim of sparing her feelings he would have been reticent with the crowd - or told them what he told her. But Lichas was anything but reticent¹³ as the pointed nature of his declarations about Heracles tells. One's impressions are of a Lichas playing to the gallery, regaling the crowd with the news of Iole - and this is probably the key to understanding him.

It seems then that in 351-365 Lichas for the benefit of the crowd takes it upon himself to expose his master. Lichas is washing Heracles' dirty linen in public. Heracles, if we believe Lichas, wants the world to believe that the reasons Lichas has exposed as pre-textual were his reasons for sacking Oechalia. Heracles also wants to believe them for there he is on Cape Cenaeum sacrificing to Zeus and he will want Zeus to believe them

as well - unless all he is thanking Zeus for (all hecatomb's worth) is granting him Iole. Too bad about Eurytus - and Oechalia. But Zeus objected to Iphitus being killed so flagrantly. That is explicitly stated by no less an authority than Lichas¹⁴ - why not Eurytus also, in whose case the *ὕβρις* consists not in being thrown from the walls while eye and mind, whatever their respective preoccupations, were not on Heracles but in being killed simply for refusing to give - or is it give up? - his daughter to Heracles?

Lichas' version to Deianira, corresponding to what would meet the eye of any observer of Heracles' recent history, invited below-the-surface inspection which, once undertaken, made all too evident Lichas' whitewashing. But if things looked nastier below the surface Iole's involvement puts all in even worse light.

The suspect side of Lichas - which Sophocles seems to have built into his characterization - arms one to a critical attitude even towards what he has to say to the Malian folk. We are meant to, and can, see through his version to Deianira. But it seems difficult to see past what he is telling us now - in particular concerning Iole's part in the sack of Oechalia. For Sophocles seems to have squashed (see p. 7) our temptation to suspect suppression by Lichas here, as well, of mention of the archery contest as mitigation in Heracles' sack of Oechalia for Iole's sake. Our Lichas seems too transparent to be true. That is what we feel. But we cast about in vain for something to give him the lie. Nor does it help (see above, p. 7f) to think that Lichas is being one-sided - that Heracles had some cause against Eurytus in the pretexts given.

This is perhaps the occasion to reflect that Sophocles shows two basic techniques, in this phase, of representing the hero: by explicit report (and reconstruction); and a method of suggestion by implicit contrast (or interrelation) of the heroic and the ordinary in terms of which the former is seen. We formed our picture of Heracles earlier by implicit contrast with the youthful Deianira. Now perky Lichas is set up in some manner of interrelation with unseen Heracles. The significance of this interrelation is latent. It lies dormant through the play's working out of the effects of Lichas' disclosures upon Deianira. It comes into the open with Hyllus' return home and description of his father's sacrifice at Cenaeum. Lichas' disclosures seemed to open up the human soul of Heracles. They laid bare motives and actions - even against the resistance of our prejudice. But this Heracles is not the same man surely as the one Hyllus shows, a serene, *εὐστέβων* Heracles whose thinking Sophocles has shown elsewhere: τοῦτο δὲ νοεῖθ', οὐαν! πορθῆτε γαῖαν, εὐσεβῶν τὰ πρὸς θεούς· λιώ ταῦτα πάντα δεῖτε· ἡγεῖται πατὴρ Ζεὺς (Ph. 1440 ff.). Lichas' latest angle on Heracles and Oechalia would seem to give these words (esp. 1442) a certain, shall we say, ironic twist. Not so for Heracles.

This is the contrast. Lichas and his disclosures are as nothing to him as he sacrifices in all piety to his father Zeus. Heracles is more than man, he is a force. He is Vitality. He is beyond good and evil.¹⁵ He is Zeus' son and his life on earth is transcendent. This shows in the peculiarity of his own human life which we contemplate and judge from a human point of view but forget that a Heracles is a law unto himself. This is why Lichas can expose him unflinchingly - though not with impunity.

At Cenaeum Heracles sacrifices to his father and his own son Hyllus is there to see him. Heracles is here in interrelation with deity and the view that Hyllus brings us seems to derive something from the third manifestation: not mythic hero nor *καρπόθυπον φῶθ' Ἡρακλῆα* but the demi-god. (The reflex of the blighted Heracles on first seeing Hyllus (797) is for his son to share his fate. This is the action of Heracles' subconscious sense of destiny, father extending to son his own father-decreed destiny. It were only part of the thing to read 'character' in this action, see also p. 81). Hyllus' picture of Heracles contrasts with the foregoing one with which we are meant to compare it: the highly mediated, vacillating, all too man-made view of the man worked out between Lichas, messenger and Deianira, "Ιχεω
φέπει | κέρηψι τε χαιρών καὶ στοτῆν Κατηύχετο . -

The simple certainty and sereness of the picture here is in contrast with the uncertainties and busy deviousness of our concept of hitherto. As Easterling notes, p.167, Hyllus' recall at 753-4 of Lichas' speech "is a reminder that Hyllus knows nothing of what has been revealed to Deianira: the truth about Iole, and H's real motives for war."¹⁶ Perhaps Hyllus' naivety colours his observation of Heracles. Or the overall impression given of him through Hyllus owes something to 'empathy': Hyllus' nature and circumstances render him more sensitive to record the scene's ambience (much as Lichas was well qualified to transmit a base view).

My 'impression' of Heracles derived from Hyllus' narrative is enhanced by Hyllus' point of view - his idolization of his father - and

linguistic features of the narrative. It is, I think, particularly in Hyllus' narrative that we are conscious of what seems to be a special feature of our play: its very substantial deployment of narrative passages as opposed to direct drama - with the descriptive features that go with this 'epic' medium. The solemnity and sincerity attached to the impression given here of H is conveyed by the objective ceremonial detail presented in a tone of matter-of-fact praiseworthiness: στερνῶν
δέργιων; κλεισῆν... πόλιν (a purely 'epic' touch?); νίκης ἄγων τροπαῖα
καὶ ακροθίνια ; the rearrangement in Hyllus' mouth of details previously given by Lichas:

Lichas' ἀκτή τις ἐστὶ Εὐβοίας, εὖθε δημόσιαι βωμοῦς τέλη
τὸ ἔγκαρπα κηναῖω Διού (237f.) and ... εὗται ἀγνά
θύματα ρέζη πατρώων Σηνί τῆς ἀλιώσεως (287f.)

become Hyllus' ἀκτή τις ἀρφίκλυτος Εὐβοίας ἄκρον
κηναῖον ἐστιν, εὖθα πατρώων Διού
βωμοῦς δημόσιαι τεμενίαν τε φυλάσσει (752f.)

The changes are a matter of style and effect. Hyllus presents things more descriptively and complimentary: epithet (*ἄκτη ἀρφίκλυτος*) sets off information (*ἄκρον κηναῖον*); Hyllus introduces reverence (*πατρώων Διού*) into the ceremonial detail where Lichas was more blandly informative or tongue-in-cheek: *τέλη τὸ ἔγκαρπα* is informative, *τεμενίαν τε φυλάσσει* is more emotive of piety and also descriptively resonant. Ceremonial detail: *πολυθύτους σφαγάς*; *κῆρυξ...οἰκέτος Λίχας* (cf. E.M. Craik, 99 f.); the fulsome hecatomb. Jebb's note on the reading *κατήγυχετο*, 764 helps me: "H. standing before the altar as he prays with uplifted hands to Zeus, is thrown into stronger relief

than if imagined merely in the brief act denoted by *καρηγέχερο*
(sprinkling of *χειρίψ*).

At all events the significance of Hyllus here as he relays the scene at Cenaeum is that through him we have for the first time an uncomplicated indirect view of contemporary Heracles. We are now at only one remove from a direct view. Before we try that, however, it remains to consider the doyen of implicit (interrelational) depictions: Heracles in Deianira.

As the play develops the picture of H, it unfolds the development of his fate. It is in Sophocles' Deianira that we observe the march of Heracles' fate. In Bacchylides' Meleager (Ode V) we can observe someone like H, whose meeting with H in Hades the poet with an eye for the tragically ironic has arranged¹⁷ and in whom H, as he hears Meleager tell his story, might see his own fate as in a mirror. Meleager was brought low from an unexpected and quite unlikely quarter, not by any commensurate foe but by a woman - his mother - wielding magical or supernatural power.¹⁸ But the irony is in the meeting, what's said and what transpires. And Heracles said it soon after seeing the conspicuous Meleager: *τίς ἀθανάτων ή προτῶν τοιοῦτον ἔρνος θρέψεν ἐν ποιᾳ χθονί; τίς δὲ ἔκτανεν; ή τάχα καλλίζωνος "Ηρα κείνον ἐφ' ἀντέρα πέριτει κεφαλῆ" (91 ff.)* Not far wrong - she kept it in the family.¹⁹ Heracles in Hades now identifies with his boar-slaying predecessor (168), someone so after his own heart that he would marry his sister, *φυὰν ἀλγκία*. Richly peripeteic. His own manly vitality which will not let him stop long in

commiseration or philosophizing (160 f.) urges him to this. Meleager affirms that he leaves behind *χλωραύχερα ἐν δώμασι Δαιάνειραν*, νῆσοι
ἐπὶ χρυσέας κύμηδος θελξιμπρότου and breaks off here.

Bacchylides provides a useful comparison and contrast in matters of intention and dramatic technique – particularly with respect to the irony of fate. In Bacchylides it is given to Meleager to reflect in himself the fate of Heracles and, to some extent, the personality (though Heracles is there in person to attend to both). The encounter of the two heroes is fraught with peripety and its fellow-travellers, tragedy and irony.²⁰ This ironic, fateful story Sophocles takes up, as it seems, where Bacchylides left off. Sophocles will not have H return from this labour to woo Deianira. He has him married to her from much earlier. And H's fate marches forward in Deianira, something, perhaps, like Meleager's diminishing in his mother's brand. Putting it like this in a simile naturally does not do justice to the intricacy of mechanism or agency of H's extinction in Sophocles – but if Heracles' fate is envisaged for the moment as the progressive burning of a brand with the brighter spurts of flame at periodic concentrations of resin, one of these concentrations is represented by the working of Deianira's jealousy most effectively represented in a context of a face-to-face of Deianira and Iole (Sophocles adjusting the legend so that Lichas' errand is to bring Iole, not fetch a robe) and most graphically by comparative reference to the experience of Deianira at Iole's age: a rich seam in the early working of the play.

What S and B have in common is their ironic vision of a Heracles who, in his indomitable drive, is undercut by a quite characteristic

initiative which works itself out in utterly unexpected, paradoxical and fateful pathways. The bold, characteristic initiative in B was to turn his thoughts to action - and that was to desire marriage with the sister of the mighty, tragic hero standing before him. In S bold initiative has another's sister as its goal. Its result is to introduce her, in quite offhand manner, to Deianira who is now H's wife and awaits him anxiously at Trachis. In Sophocles not Heracles meets his fate person to person but Deianira.

But D meets Iole twice. First she meets a girl with whom she ... identifies (as H, dare I say it, identified with Meleager!). H knew the man he was identifying with. But D just noticed this girl among the captives of her husband's victory, a girl with D's serious sensitivity, D's nobility in her looks. D met her anew when she knew at last whom she had met in her - not a stranger, an unfortunate victim of war which so dramatically, arbitrarily turns the free to slaves but someone whom she actually knows very intimately because her husband knows her intimately, had known her intimately even while D compassionately thought of her as just an unfortunate victim of war. Brutally put - but then it struck D brutally. (This is the actual force of Lichas' deception). Iole, then, was no captive but instead someone with so specific a fate that she and no-one else was the object of the victory that brought these captives here. It was not war that brought Iole sadly to Trachis, it was H's passion for her. *τὸ δὲ εἰδέναι τι σειρόν;*

Things happen so that D is uncompromisingly held in the information net. In great part the interest of the first episode is in its process of the truth concerning H's recent exploits. But the supreme

moment of interest comes with D's active involvement in the process. She is subjected to a sort of media-assault, in stages: welcome news brings her relief from anxiety; this is shattered by the messenger's revelation of Lichas' deception, the effect exacerbated by Lichas' shameless sensationalism. Finally in the passive stages of this process for D there is a cross-examination of Lichas (much on the defensive) putting to him - for D, and us - three propositions as of his own dissemination. These propositions, summing up the case against Heracles, (the captive that Lichas brought was Iole, Eurytus' daughter; she was to be, Lichas swore to it, Heracles' *δάκρυ*²¹; the city of Eurytus was sacked not by the Lydian woman etc. but for Iole's sake) poise the matter over our heads. Deianira brings it down to earth - her contribution long held back in the wings. This delayed participation increases the impact of her contribution, in effect the achievement of 'objective truth' at subjective cost. For she allows the hypothetical - the matter to-and-fro-ed between messenger and Lichas - to become real by volunteering to accept the hypothetical as actual. She steps into the breach so readily, in fact, that not only does she, for the sake of knowing the truth, accept the actuality of H's love from Iole, which is the point at issue, but also of Iole's for Heracles (447). Such at the moment is the expansive impulse of D's passion for the truth that she will see Iole in the same terms as herself - she raises her in her mind to the status of a competitor thus preparing the ground for jealousy. "It is not wise to oppose love, like a boxer facing up. Love rules the gods as he will, and me; why not another like me. So I am senseless indeed if I blame my husband... (441 ff.). D is initiating - or manifesting -

the basic mood of the play, love (successor to the opening mood of loneliness and anxiety which love, of course, underlies) and to my thinking we are now about at the heart of the play. But in D's rhesis love/passion sublimates as passion for truth, as we have seen.

It can be observed that D seems to accept Iole then has a change of heart. But this is an apparent effect only - or, at least, a natural one. (So also Waldock, 98). When she spoke acceptingly of Iole she - and messenger - had not yet obtained Lichas' admission of the significance of Iole and her words were, as it were, seeking this. D seems to embrace what, while not yet quite real, she never could in reality. Hence by some paradox (cf. n.18) she seems to promote of her own accord what must in the end do her harm. And in so doing she enters a state of mind to which she must inevitably react. While pressing Lichas for the truth - in this frame of mind - D can face the possibility of a competitor as, in her judgement, 'acceptable', natural - given her knowledge of the power of love and her knowledge of Heracles. Of course she cannot accept this in practice - but can come to that realization only once she actually knows the truth and confronts reality in practice. Of the artist's handling of dramatic action here and in the complementary rhesis after the stasimon two things can be said: it proceeds with much psychological naturalness; it has the character of a study in epistemological psychology: the will in contexts of theoretical and practical knowledge.

This milieu of the states of knowledge - and reality seems to be irony's natural setting. Or as D would have it, *τὸ δεῖδένα τὶ δεῖν;*

At 447 in the course of her 'hypothetical' rhesis she considers

Iole πειραίᾳ τοῦ μηδὲν αἰσχύνου μηδέ εὔοι κακοῦ τίνος.

These lines must put us in mind of the evil which Iole will occasion though not, just as D says, be responsible for. Not so much (in terms of mere activity, anyway) as D herself. And not so much again, of course, as Heracles, this time in terms of actuation itself.²²

If Deianira could have remained true (without doing vain battle with Cypris)²³ to the speculative wisdom that she wore when she essayed to have Lichas admit - if she had not fallen prey to her feelings once she knew the truth she would not have caused her husband's death and her suicide. It is here, in the human psyche, that Sophocles exposes the roots of tragedy: the tenuousness of the truth for humankind and the conditions that annul the resolves made upon it - v. 490 ff. I might quote Spinoza on this point - if it weren't so strong: Homines opinione magis quam vera ratione commoventur; et vera boni et mali cognitio animi commotiones excitat et saepe omni libidinis generi cedit; unde illud Poetae natum: Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor. (Ethics IV prop 17 schol.).

Heracles' fate marches on in Deianira - and Iole is Deianira's fate ...

Where D says (462 f.) οὐδὲ τὸν δῆμον εἴλι καὶ τὸν ἐντακτήν τῷ φιλεῖν... the subject of *ἐντακτήν* is surely H. She must mean: Even if H loves Iole a great deal - in view of the extraordinariness of this girl in relation to all his other loves, she being the only one he's 'brought home' - I bear no malice toward her (indeed, I pity her for what it's

done to her).²⁴ The extraordinariness of Iole has been marked by Sophocles in his own arrangement of the legend - for he has Lichas bring her to Trachis where tradition has Lichas' mission to fetch the robe. The Sophoclean face-to-face of D and I - I have suggested - is reminiscent of Bacchylides V where the fate of H is adumbrated in that of Meleager whom he meets in Hades. For so also does Sophocles have D meet her fate. - When she was courted by H and Achelous she feared that her looks would prove her loss. In her rhesis 436 ff. D feels for Iole in the same terms: her beauty has ruined her life (465) and the irony of the conjunction here (D's beauty brought her union in marriage with the best of men; Ares was a sort of best man at Iole's 'marriage' - in the euphemism Sophocles has applied to the rape of Iole: see p.32f) heightens the pathos of Iole's fate. It is not so much an adumbration of fate in Sophocles as comparison - and exchange of fates. Sophocles represents Iole here in a tragic reflection from D's - but this is only to mark a stage in the action which will effect a reversal of fates. Earlier on in the same rhesis D - remarkably - represents I as set on equal footing with herself by universal Eros. This attitude in D again heightens I's $\pi\alpha'\theta\sigma\varsigma$. Iole is a victim of Eros not a subject of his reign. This remarkable attitude in D is one of a succession of attitudes - the love-pot in which H's fate is brewed for him while he proceeds to the sacrifice at Cenaeum - beginning when D notices I among the captives without knowing her identity, p. 17 : the accidents of war in fact the intentions of her husband, not least in the case of the girl she singles out while wondering who she is, $\bar{\alpha}\nu\alpha\delta\phi\varsigma \eta \tau\kappa\omega\sigma\alpha$, but deciding she must be $\pi\alpha'\theta\sigma\varsigma$.

D's contemplation of I in the perspective of normal life is immediately pathetic in its irony. Sympathy, equality, identification - each with its own local irony picking out I's misfortune more sharply - all add up to the master irony of reversal: D's identifications with Iole are an identification with fate and tragedy - her own - and represent some of its stages.²⁵

These moments, then, are in line with the initiation of reversal with the messenger's arrival - and stage up irony past irony to the first stasimon which represents D's rubicon. She now comes to decision and action. The first stasimon, to change the metaphor, is the play's watershed, evident in the very different treatments of (attitudes in D towards) love in her two rheseis on either side of it. In the first rhesis she moved quite some way from herself. She comes back to herself with a vengeance in the second. Iole is all suspended until after the first stasimon when the whole thing is let fall to the ground. The effect of realization is conveyed to devastating effect in D's language:

κόφην γαρ, οἵπας δ' οὐκέτ', αὖτ' ἐζευγμένη,
παρεισδέδεγμαι, φόρτον ωτε ναυρίτος,
τιθεντὸν ἔρπότητα τῆς ἀγῆς φενός.²⁶

The first stasimon is about love: this effects continuity of matter and movement (mood and theme, if you will) on either side of the stasimon. But the attitude to love on either side is fundamentally different and the stasimon marks the essential break and discontinuity: the crisis. (The arrangement of rheseis about the first stasimon may perhaps be represented as love-in-abstract; concrete love; love-in-

reality; the play moves from abstract, across the stasimon and into reality). Relative to the rheseis the stasimon sets love in a different time and genre. So it acts as foil to them.

The circumstances of the present - the rape of Iole in war - receive as foil the athletic setting of the past duel of love. (Discussed on p. 48). The first line *νέγα τι σθένος ἀ κύπρις ἐκφέρεται νίκας ἀεὶ*, with equal reference to *νάχη* and *ἀγών* well assimilates the stasimon to the foregoing matter of the ravishing effects of love. We may be put in mind of the line *ῥέος δὲ θηρεύει Ζεὺς ἀγώνιος καλῶς* (26) - of Heracles' victory over Achelous for D. *Ζεὺς ἀγώνιος*²⁷ - a pregnant conjunction looking out for another apt context? This fluidness in the divine determination of the event is matched by a blurring of the distinction between bloody battle and contest of strength.²⁸

At the same time as, in the form of an intrusion into the genre and time-scale of the mainstream of events, the first stasimon marks a critical point in the plot it foresignals the launching into that stream, for the first time, of what has hitherto been thought distinct and separate: the mythic-fantastic element which D will shortly introduce in the form of the robe anointed with the philtre stored up since when, with H, she encountered Nessus. If the first stasimon marks a moment of a parting of ways it also looks forward to the Great Convention, the briefing concerning which the chorus receive in D's second rhesis - but itself takes place under Hyllus' eyes at Cenaeum, the play's split-present.

The anointed robe communicates between D in the present and H in the present. (The fact that they never meet suggests their world-apartness. There seems to be symbolic significance in their separateness in the play - an essential disparateness. A sense of this is most strongly conveyed in the mythological flash-backs of the contrast of D and fit-for-any-monster H, needing no further comment). But it is also to represent the meeting-fusion-of past and present, H's destiny comes full circle, on the way linking with the smaller arc representing the present (i.e. his recent past).

The robe is H's destiny - the destination of his fate marching on in D as it is the expression of D's fate represented by Iole. It is the play's ironies coming home to roost: ἀ δ' ἀνθίπολος κύρις ὄραυδος φαρεψά τῶνδ' ἐφάνη πράκτωρ.

H's destiny is bi-oracular.²⁹ One oracle explains the other - and links one vital element in his destiny with another. Discussion of this is reserved until p. 83).

The ironies that come home to roost then, are ironies which seem to converge from the present and from the past on Cenaeum. Establishing the link between past and present is he who linked the two banks of Evenus, the ferry-centaur. With a foot in two worlds - human and teratoid - Nessus holds the key, in the retributive eros that he wields, to man's and beast's requital (it being only natural for the basic ironies of past and present to have linking them a master-irony). Nessus' canniness confers on him a status among the play's mythological minor characters which Lichas' irrepressibility³⁰ gave him among human

ones. There is decidedly more of the human than the teratoid about his mind. Impressively well-informed he knows H and his arrow poison. He's got its constitution and properties by the book: shelf-life, reconstitutability, toxicity, mechanism of action. And knowing the hero well enough he can bank on D having recourse to the philtre some day.³¹

Iole comes with Lichas. Lichas goes with robe. The long 'take' bounded by these blandly related events comprises the first two episodes and stasima; it initiates the reversal in the messenger's arrival ('D knows him safe from this moment - but goes on to work his destruction') and accomplishes it in the Robe. It achieves a perhaps indeterminate but certainly startling picture of H's exploits of recently, giving an intimate picture of him in human aspect. This 'objective' picture processed in the subjectivity of D gives us a new and profound impression of the man - the more for his absence from stage. Absent from the scene H is pretty much all-present in D's consciousness. We derive a certain view of him in this way - by juxtaposition of the human side of H with a human.³² This long take is rich in dramatic interest: this centres on Iole, brought into prominence by the deception that Lichas undertakes as in the best interest of all parties. Iole revealed; the shock of the revelation, the effect of the deception; D's own involvement in the truth - process: these factors work on the heroine and bring her ineluctably to her fateful venture, as much set up for her by past circumstances as present. A concatenation of mental events - a natural reaction to an elevated, impossible stance - as she apprehends and adjusts to the significance and presence of Iole in her home brings her

to decision and action. Lichas' departure from Trachis is the natural destination of all this. He goes, pointing us to Heracles. The 2nd stasimon responsively anticipates the hero's return. This (Trachinian) stasimon is interlude-like. It suggests movements and anticipation by conjuring up the spirit of the locality and an air of its inhabitants, the Malian folk - glimpsed in the foregoing episodes. The 1st stasimon looked back. It was essentially D's ode. The second looks forward keenly anticipating Heracles. But both stasima give review with changed perspective. The Trachinian stasimon reviews freshly disclosed events. It is interesting to note how the chorus turn the clock of awareness back, past the progressive sophistication we've had on these events, to the first and primitive one, which they grasp as an ideal (cf. first stasimon): the hero-warrior returning with the trophies of prowess, Ares having been aroused to give him release from his days of toil. Oechalia and the rape of Iole thus glanced at the stasimon ends with hopes of H's return in the influence of D's centaurian spell. This ends the stasimon on the same note as our episode (Lichas off with robe) which the stasimon may be said to round off.

Epilogue: Deianira's story

D returns. She reveals what she has discovered about the true nature of the philtre. Hyllus returns and accuses her. She replies, 744: *μῶς εἴρας, ὦ ητοῦ; τοῦ μάρτυρος αὐθεύνων παθίοντι ἀγηλόν οὐρως ἔφεντος εἰγέαται νε φῆσ;* Deianira does not recognise herself in Hyllus' accusation. Could she have done such a thing? From whom can he have heard reports of these deeds which he says she's done?

- a) This is a quite genuine response in D. Hyllus so uncompromisingly

confronts her with intent that though aware now what she's done, in the absence of all intent the shock of ratification of the deed throws out all self-recognition in Hyllus' charge.

D not recognizing herself in this way is but confirmed by many an irony by which the poet has marked her progress to the present. Or, these ironies, symptomatic of innocence of intent or ignorance of the future (signifying unawareness of one's own agency in the service of Fate) corroborate the innocence of intent evinced by her final exchange with her son. Some of these ironies have been mentioned. Others are discussed after (b) which gives another angle on 744 ff.

(b) On the other hand Hyllus in his reply to D takes her at face value: "I know not from report but saw..." So another signification of 744 ff. is that D hopes against hope that there's some mistake after all and Hyllus has been misinformed... The context of the preceding events shows up the pathetic irony of this. For D in hopeless desperation now looks vainly beyond herself for some loophole: an indirect source for Hyllus' information, some mistaken or not-to-be-relied-on report. These conditions, we might well reflect, were such as waylaid her, influenced her, starting with the messenger's arrival. (Gellie well notes, p. 62: "When the messenger challenges Lichas' account, his evidence for the truth is not anything he knows of himself; he convicts Lichas of lying on the strength of something he had heard him saying earlier. This unsureness about communication is important for the play because it points up the isolation of the heroine. She is not only robbed of H's presence, she cannot even make reliable contact by report."

'Other Ironies'

- 472 f. (Lichas about to acknowledge his declaration en boutherei leimoni): ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φίλη δέοντων, ἔνει σε πανθάνε
 θυμήν προνοῦσαν θυητὰ κούκλαγγενόντα:
 ambivalence of θυητά , mortal matters affecting Heracles/
 merely human thoughts. It is with these words that Lichas opens
 his reply to D after her rhesis 436 ff - paraded in the foregoing as
 pretty fundamental to the tragic turn of the events of her hand. This
 rhesis D opened: μή, πρός σε τοῦ καὶ ἄκρον οἰταῖον νάρος!
 Διὸς καραυράπτοντος, ἐκκλέψυς λόγον - a resounding, momentous
 opening if ever was ... D's short concluding speech answering
 Lichas runs, 490 ff: ἀλλ᾽ ὡδὲ καὶ προνοῦσεν ὥστε ταῦτα δρᾶν,
 κούροις νόοσοι γ' ἐπακτίνες ἐξαρπύσεια,
 θεοῖσι δυσραχοῦντες. ἀλλ' εἰών στέγης
 χωρῶντες, ὡς λόγων τὸ ἐμοροτάς φέρεις,
 αἱ τὸντοι δώρων δῶρα χρὴ προσαρνόσαι,
 καὶ ταῦτα ἄγης· κερὸν γὰρ οὐ δικαῖα σε
 χωρεῖν, προσεκθόνθ' ὡδὲ οὐν πολλῷ σοτάω.

In 491-2 continuing in the σώφρεων vein of her foregoing rhesis
 (toleration of Iole) she determines to abide in this and not incur
 (further) ills of her own making. But her own rhesis 436 ff. belies
 these words as she speaks. She will wage unholy war with gods and
 raise up νόοσοι for Heracles. (This is not in conflict with
 Easterling's notice that νόοσοι recalls 445. The word is being
 exploited to full range). Verses 491-2 therefore, in this critical
 interlude stage up the messenger's initiating peripety.

Commentators point to her diction at 494 (προσάρπυσαν)

as indicating that 'the poet means us to understand that D has already conceived her fatal plan' (Kamerbeek; Jebb: 'D's choice of the word has been influenced by her secret thought, - already turned towards the philtre which she would apply to H. And at the same time the word is unconsciously ominous'). But isn't that the case - the word is unconsciously ominous and to understand in προσάρπυσαν thoughts turned towards the philtre is to make them consciously ominous and hence to play havoc with the characterization? To envisage her as already scheming means we are to understand D as expressing intentioned σωφροσύνη 490-3 and betraying rebellious intent in the very next breath.

- D faithfully reproduces Nessus' clever ambiguity: ὠτε πήτιν' εἰσιδῶντες στέργεται χυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ οὐδὲ πλέον (576, see Easterling's note).
- The chorus replying to D when she consults them on the Robe, 592: ἀντί εἰσένειται χρῆν δρῦσαν. This would pick up τὸ δὲ εἰσένειται τὸ δεῖνόν; - inter-communicating ironies developing the plot.
- At 600 D commits the robe to Lichas' care. In so doing she reveals an oath she made to send H a robe on hearing him safe, 610: οὐτω γὰρ ηὔγρην, εἴ τοι' αὐτὸν ἐσ δόμους | ιδοίμει
σωτέρτην κλύοιμε πανδίκων, | στέργεται χιτῶνι τῷ δὲ καὶ
γανέται θεοῖσι | δυτῆρα καὶ νῦν καὶ νῦν ἐν πεπτώματι.

The irony is well noticed in the commentaries. Of new interest is this mention of the vow: another item (cf. nn. 18 and 29) in the irony of fate. The remainder of the exchange between Lichas and D until Lichas

departs is, as one might expect, fairly ruffled with irony: the lines that can be taken in more than one way are 617: no end of endeavouring not to exceed the mandate of a messenger will prevent Lichas from exceeding it - except with the patronage of Hermes (ψυχοποιός) which Lichas assuringly avers: ἀλλ' εἰρεῖ Ἐρνοῦ τῆνδε παρένων τέχνην | βέβαον, οὐτὶ μὴ σφαλῶ ἐν σοί ποτε (620); 618-9 (χύριν): Lichas' task is really a thankless one at both ends; 625 (στεωνέρα): only so far as Lichas knows. But now the irony begins to wear thin: D: ἀλλ' οἵσθα πέν δή καὶ τὰ τῆς ξένης ὅρῶν | προσδέχηται αὐτῆν ως ἐδεξάμην φίλως. Lichas: ὥστε ἐκπλαγῆται τούρον ἡδονῇ κέαπ. D's deceptive remark is, no doubt, in line with the deception of Lichas (the tables are turned) in the matter of the robe - it's part of appearances. (In its extent, the deception of Lichas is an unconscious irony, uniform with the pattern - conforming to which is 596 f: πόνον παρ' ὑπὸν εὖ στρεψίνεσθαι. Ως σκότῳ καὶ αἰοχῇ πράσσεις, οὐτορ' αἰοχήνη πεσῆ. σκότῳ relative to Lichas - or any mediator between D and H; αἰοχῇ only because it is an attempt under the table to steal H's love by magic). But at the same time, in this D betrays a form of self-deception: she has not in practice measured up to the (impossible) ideal in φίλως. An apparent self-deception: she knows it, at least at sub-conscious level. A reminder then, more or less oblique, of what we already know - her vain strife ...

Irony serves plot - and characterization. The sharper the irony the clearer the light in which D's guiltlessness is seen.

A final passage, 581 ff: καὶ πετείανται τάδε. | κακάς
εἴ τόκρας μήτ' ἐμοραιήν τρέψειν | μήτ' ἐκράθοιν, τάς τε τοτρύπωσας
στυγῶ. | φίληροις δέ τέλος πιστεύεται κ.τ.λ.

Her point is May I not be thought a crafty user of magic.

(Commentators see her as dissociating herself from those who practice magic murderously. Therefore they assure us that D speaks these lines by way of disarming such as might think of her thus also. e.g.

Jebb: She wishes to assure them that she intends no harm to Heracles, and has no reason to fear evil. Rather she wishes not to be thought of as one who readily resorts to craft in general. She dissociates herself - in her own mind no less than in the chorus' presence - from this habit by putting forward as pressing (exceptional) her need of the moment - *τὴν διαφύλαξιν τὴν πάίδα* . It's more to the point that events will make D look like practising *κακίς τοῖης* than that she has in mind a particular *κακή τοῖην* e.g. *τὸ δελεφονῆσαι*: so the Scholiast whose gloss seems to call the tune in this.) Sophocles' psychological eye nurtures the irony: it does not require much acquaintance with psychological theory to notice that D is subconsciously reinforcing the trait she disavows - by transferring motivation to the contingent she promotes the free operation of the psychical bias itself. But (this will come as a relief) it is not the psychology but the irony that interests me.

What is particularly arresting here is the introduction of a class, a personified whole - *τὰς τολμώρας* - from which D dissociates herself. Without this the numerous instances of irony, drawn attention to as serving plot and characterization, lack a body. But now *τὰς τολμώρας* will be particularized later in the play - when H clytemnesterizes D. And in Tr's treatment of the oracle there is a sort of (cf.n.18) implicit Althaeization of D. This gathering together

in identity of the ironies (some of them, for instance 473, 610 ff, 620, 684) is perhaps to be thought of as a thematic extension of the irony that pervades the drama. Tentatively I will think of this extension and personalization of irony about, say, *τὰς τοπύρων* as 'internal' irony, having as its mark the paradox of identification: a phenomenon obtrudes its identity by way of drawing attention to what it is not. Hyllus promotes this same tendency (i) when, describing the first effects on H of the robe, he reports (769) that: 'there came a biting pain that racked his bones; then it was as if the poison of a murderous hateful viper began to devour him ...' Hyllus unconsciously identifies (a) the extrinsic source of the problem (b) the provenance of the active agent ('*Έχιδνη*' , mother of Hydra) (c) the masterminding viperish human nature behind it all. Easily imagined are D's feelings in view of what she had said about *κακὰς τόπνας* etc. (ii) when he declares, 817: *οὐκον γὰρ ἀλλως ὀνόματος τί δεῖ τρέψειν πυρφῶν, οἵτις πνεὺς ως τεκοῦσα δεῖ;*

A like or related phenomenon, perhaps, is the play's linguistic treatment of concubinage etc. on the level of marriage. That might also appear as internally ironic (or having an internally ironic aspect) with thematic application. (But the usage seems at the same time proleptically justified: Iole will marry Hyllus).³³ *γαπέω* denotes equally marry and 'sleep with' and in this differs from English marry. In Tr. the words are used thus, respectively, at 504 *〈τίνες〉 ἀνθρώποις κατέβαντο γάρνων* and 460 *τρεῖστας ἀνὴρ εἰς Ἡρακλῆς ἔγηνε δῆ.* The persons predicated in these instances are D and H. They represent straightforward usage and may serve as a standard. Elsewhere, as with

all occurrences of *vúrpha*, *gápos* is used of Iole, and the usage is ambiguous, imprecise. But 546, with reference to both D and Iole: *κοινωνοῦσα τὸν αὐτῶν γάρων* : sharing in the same marriage, sharing the same husband. The explicit juxtaposition here points out the ambiguity of usage. Other instances are less pointed but the same may be said in each case: the usage may serve to remind that what is said is what is not the case: 1138 Hyllus, *στέργητρα γὰς δοκοῦσα προσβαλεῖν σέθεν | ἀπήμπλαχτις*, *ὡς προσεῖδε τοὺς ἔνδον γάρους*. A straightforward euphemism in all probability. 842, chorus (3): *μεγάλαν προσφέρων δόροις βλέψαν* *νέαν αἰσθούσαν γάρων* - the adjective assisting the cause of ambiguity. 857, chorus (3): *ἴω κέλαινα λόγχα προπάχου δορός,* *ἃ τότε θοὰν νύρφαν ἄρας ἀτ' αἰματίς τάνδ' Οἰχαλίας αἰχρά.* *νύρφα* = young bride or marriageable maiden but here clearly the former. The other occurrence of *vúrpha* is clearer still, being involved in metaphorical application: the bride has begotten Retribution - 893, chorus: *ἔτεκ' ἔτεκε μεγάλαν ἀ νέφετος ἄδε νύρφα δόροισιν* *τοῖσδ' Ἐρινύν*. See also n.21.

And so to Heracles. Heracles, despite himself mostly, achieves a great deal when he appears. Let me start on the task by proposing, or continuing to propose, that he (a) (conveniently) takes over the task of characterizing himself (b) acts out, gives expression to, ironies thrown out in 'Part 1.' But he does so in the first of two phases through which he passes in his part of the play. (The two phases fall on either side of a dividing line represented by his learning the twin truths concerning himself, namely *ἥματε χρηστὰ πυρένη* (*Δηιάνειρα*)

and Νέορος πάλαι ἐζήτεισε ...) H's fate is to have met his end from his wife - as he sees it murderously waylaid by a Clytemnestra, woman single-handed, without even a dagger, where so many formidable opponents had had no success. The dramatist signals the essentially Meleagric in H's fate in 1062/3 and *βέβρυχα κλαῖνει τόδ' οὐδὲν εἰς ποτε | τόνδ' αὐτῷ φαίη πρόσθ' ιδεῖν δεδρακότα | ἀνὴρ ἀπέρακτος αἰὲν ἔσπορην κακοῖς* (1072 ff.). Heracles wept at Meleager's truly tragic fate: *μινύνθη δέ ποι ψυχὰ γλυκεῖα, γνῶν δ' ὄλιγοσθενέων· διαῖ· πύραυλον δὲ πνέων δάκρυσα τλάρων αγλαῖαν ἥζεν προτείπων. φασὶν ἀδειορόαρ Ἀρφιτρύωνος παῖδα ποῦνον δὴ τότε τέξεται πλέφαρον, ταλαπτενθέος ιτότρον οἰκτίροντα φυτός.* Sophocles has taken up the story where Bacchylides left off - and brought it back round again. By reference thereto H's fate, as he weeps for himself now, is tragically ironic - but in the whole Sophoclean context rather more ironic. His ignorance of what actually is entailed by his destruction by a woman (by women), of what love has gone into it, tilts things decidedly towards the ironic.

While he sees his wife as *Σολωμίς*³⁴, as a Clytemnestra, he cannot see reality for lese-majesty. The Heracles that we set eyes on was launched at Cenaeum. Notice the build-up to Heracles' misconception. At 772 ff. he calls Lichas up for an account of the fatal robe. Lichas knows only that it is D's, just as he received it from her. We well know what passes through H's mind now: "I sent back the captives, Iole among them. She's smelt a rat. Now I'm paying for it. She's doing me in." He dwells on D's treachery again in the same scene at 790 ff: *βοῦν... τὸν οἴνεως γάπον | οἵον καρακτήσαυτον ιυπαντῆν βιον . . .* /We

We know that the nosos that rages in him (he describes it once as ἀνοίκας ἄγρια ρόος, wild uncontrollable disease 1030)³⁵ is Nessus' tormenting goads (838 f.) = uncontrolled, hybristic desire = overmastering Herculean passion - passion so great that it overmasters H. The nosos epitomizes, represents in intense form, the essential situation in which the hero is found: sick and deluded he is unconscious of the magical, teratological basis of his state; of D's real motives; of the ethical basis of his pathological condition. The dramatist has manoeuvred him into this compromising situation to achieve a brilliant study of the hero in all his complex contradictoriness: the totality of his greatness and weakness. The culminating self-revelation comes at 1089 ff. Ὡς χέρες, χέρες... Discussion is developed on the basis of this passage at p. 82ff.

Again, passages like 1066 ff: δός ποι χεροῖν οὐν αὐτὸς ἐξ αἰκου λαζών | τὸς χείρα τὴν τεκοῦσαν, ως εἰδὼν οὐρα | εἰ τούπον ἄγεις πάθον ἢ κείνης ὅπων λαρυγγὸν εἴδος ἐν δίκῃ κακούπενεν powerfully reveal something of the essential H: utterly bent on obliterating evil, utterly unaware of his own evil. This is what it is to be a Heracles - and this is what we see he is in such passages which present the Herculean ethos in such an extreme and unprepossessing form, by virtue of the hero's being so out of phase with reality.³⁶ Interesting indeed to see what the hero's outlook on the world becomes when he is (by Hyllus) at length brought into phase with truth and reality. This is the great moment. A chance for H to show he's human after all. How utterly disappointing to find he behaves then not humanly at all but (if that were possible) more monstrously heroic than before.

Conscience, sentiment, feeling, compassion, etc. are no part of the Herculean make-up. To see the light of day for H is not to reflect or regret or atone but to move inexorably in time with his own spirit. The Herculean destiny, not Deianira, engages the Herculean mind. This is knowledge that Zeus has laid it down for him to die now. Die he accordingly does - and pretty heroically. Sophocles perfectly crystallizes that essential moment: H understands now and his only aim in mind is actively to fulfil what Zeus long ago decreed. And this sublime moment is captured by the mercurial rapidity with which the hero drops D from his thoughts and addresses himself to business. Bacchylides' Heracles comes to mind: *αλλ' οὐ γάρ τις ἔστιν ημέρης τάδε πυρονέντας, χρῆ κεῖνο δέγειν ὅτι καὶ πέπλης τετέντιν.* (v, 162).

Some Notes

"Cet Héracles - là n'est pas fait pour devenir un Immortel."

The entire validity and pertinence of Mazon's observation (p.7) about the manner of Sophocles' representation of the hero - his feet on earth (metaphorically speaking!) throughout gives its vital, paradoxical interest to this play about the earthly fortunes of a hero-god. The play is silent, as Easterling observes, about what was going to happen on Mt. Oeta. There is no indication. "No explanation is offered for these directions (the pyre) but H speaks with confident authority, and it is natural to assume that he is recalling the commands of Zeus." (Easterling p.9). Surely there is no ground for assuming so - and noting that do we not arrive at a better result: H's actions are determined entirely by his own impulses³⁷ - actions all of a piece with his other actions, no more than an extension of his this - worldly heroism - stimulating the

spectator to a meditation on the paradox of the co-extensiveness of the human-heroic part and the divine part - that it's one and the same H that he observes sacking Oechalia and taking his first (or is it last?) heavenward steps? (Sophocles, one notices, has avoided 'build-up' to H's self-chosen death by fire - in anything like Bacchylides'

Oιχαλίαν μηδὲ δαντροπέων, ode 16 - which might put this in the line of predestination). Mazon, then, hits the right note: 'Mais dès qu'il a compris que le coup vient des dieux, dès qu'il a pu saisir enfin le sens des oracles anciens, son ton change: il ne lui reste plus qu'à opposer aux cruautés du sort le silence qui convient aux hommes dignes de ce nom. Il mettra à ses levres « le bon crampion de fer qu'on scelle dans le marbre », et se fera porter vivant sur le bûcher. La scène ainsi conçue est tout le contraire d'une apothéose ... (p. 7) Quite right.

And considering how completely in his nosos H misconceives the sum total of the reality in which he is placed there would be not a little propriety (in irony at least) if his misconception then and now extends to how, in truth, he stands with regard to Olympus - to death or peace, in what these words may mean. But Mazon, I believe, does not receive this sense of the paradox of H's divinity in the paradox of his destiny. H's fate, like D's, ends with Cypris whose terrible blind power brings two such different personages to the same pass. If all rests with Zeus that is in Sophocles' pious acceptance: "un modeste, un prudent acte de foi" (p. 7).

To H when we see him, D is just an element of his story, an agent of the order of Hera,³⁸ Eurystheus - only worse (1048 ff.). H, in turn, we saw was something quite different for D. We saw him through her

continually, in terms of her own consciousness of him. We do not recognise D as we find her in H's awareness: we recognise only H, a not-so-noble savage. We also understood her in terms of her consciousness of H; her preoccupation with him very much part of her being a woman and a human person. She is present in his feelings only so long as he believes her responsible for the evil that's befallen him. She vanishes without trace once he sees the light concerning her. The break could not be cleaner: two worlds, a pretty deliberate divorce of dramatic assumptions. The effect of the technique (the real absence of D from the second part no less relevant to the phase of the drama than the apparent absence of H from the first) is to isolate two distinct states making for effective dramatic contrast and delineation. "She is dismissed from the end of the play, and although the presence of Hyllus keeps her in the audience's minds she is not 'vindicated.' " Just because she is not vindicated does the 'characterization' of H - as no mere human but heroic to the core - succeed and the drama have its moment.

Nosos - suffering obscuring all objective reality - gross delusion and infatuation - extreme frustration - painful stumbling on a 'truth', though without being aware - total incomprehension and disillusionment in a sense of the blindness of fate: H's rhesis is such a nightmare as he articulates himself through the nosos that we know in some way stands for eros; the whole significantly framed between doublets of the chorus pronounced at start and finish - like guardian angels supporting the wildly ailing hero: ὁ τλῆνος Ἐπτάς, πένθος οἴοι εἰσορῶ[ἔξουσαν ἀνδρὸς τοῦδέ γει σφαλήσεται. /The

The choral lower frame (2 startlingly sincere-sounding lines) provides the foil of objectivity - the actual heroic reality that H, in his every effort, finds slipping away from himself. This serves to sharpen the essential opposition of the irony and the face value of H's words.

Sophocles' Heracles is an interesting synthesis of the man of action before words and an effective communicator. At Cenaeum the hero's actions observed by Hyllus seemed to speak worlds. Here, speaking up for himself, he is arrestingly effective in communicating his heroic self over the anguish: προσνόλου πόνον | ἦν ἐκδιδαχθῆ
πάντων ἀγέτειν ὅτε | καὶ ζῶν κακούς γε καὶ θανῶν ἐτεισάρην.
The rhesis is masterly in its balance of ambivalence.

H, no less than D, must discover the truth about himself. He then leaps from total self-unawareness to a conception of his destiny that excludes all else. He passes through no ethical, subjective phase on the way. He would not be H if he did.³⁹

H, then, sets himself single-mindedly to do Zeus' will, ensnaring Hyllus his son for the purpose. Méautis notices this galvanization to action, p. 285: "Héraclès au milieu des souffrances, lorsqu'il poussait les cris de douleur que lui arrachait la tunique de Nessus, lorsqu'il n'était plus lui-même, avait imploré la mort, demandé à tous les Grecs (1014), demandé à son fils (1033) d'être tué par le glaive. Il avait appelé Hadès (1041 et 1085), imploré le foudre de Zeus (1086), maintenant qu'il voit clair dans son destin, que les douleurs, pour un instant, se sont relâchées, qu'il est de nouveau Héraclès il ordonne une mort qui soit digne de lui."

Human matters are what we think of as dramatically realizable in a fully tragic way - as Deianira's story is. Deianira has greater dramatic weight because she is more human, more susceptible of perception as a human - than Heracles. Heracles is more than human by lifestyle and genealogy. This approach is reflected in both 'parts' of the play. In the first, though not on stage we see a great deal of him but indirectly - and suitably, therefore, because of his sheer, massive indeterminacy. This again sets up a challenge for the dramatist when the hero appears in the flesh: or perhaps it is a lessened challenge, a mangled, cut down to size Heracles being more amenable to representation than the full edition. At all events, for the dramatist, how he handles it is no matter for an off-day because, in whatever condition Heracles makes an appearance that appearance is long-billed and momentous.

I am trying by this preamble to introduce the matter of the play's various approaches to Heracles. And they are most various, making for a rich, I would say, complete, play. Heracles' much anticipated entrance is appropriately an Odyssean one.⁴⁰ Appropriately because of that other hero's symbolic standing as a homecomer at long last, perhaps also by ironic conjunction in the matter of eloquence. Odysseus received an excellent mention in the Iliad for articulacy. Heracles, announcing himself à la Ulysse (Reinhardt's observation) *ώ Ζεῦ ποι γάς ἥκω; παρὰ τοῖς βροτῶν . . .* finishes up *ἀ δ' αὖ ψιλὸν βρύκει. φεῦ .* The rough-and-ready speech here is perhaps Sophocles' concession to a recognizable Herculean trait. Whatever the particular implication of the conjunction of these

two heros the conjunction is deflating, ironic. A significant introduction which, though lost sight of - in this aspect - as H works up to his rhesis, is confirmed by the dénouement that follows his announcement concerning the two oracles - when he engages Hyllus in the service of satisfactory conclusion of his destiny. For this section, unless my judgement fails, is handled near-comically. The irony here comes dangerously close to farce. This is relevant to the approach to Heracles: larger than tragedy, his nature can embrace comedy.

The dialogue at 1210-2 is not much of a departure from this:

Hy: And how could I be curing you by burning you?

H: Fair enough - let someone else burn me (in the cause of curing me). But just you see to it.

Hy: Well, alright. I don't mind lending a hand humping you.

If this exaggerates the effect it still proceeds by the same route as the original - by nonsense and non-sequitur. Hyllus backs down remarkably suddenly - Heracles craftily bulldozing him to it - on a technicality when the objection behind his protest about healing and burning is the moral one of jibbing at setting his dad alight - which must surely still stand whether he lights the pyre or merely assists in the preliminaries.

This dialogue is distinctly odd. It would be incongruous - inept - were it not set in an odd context, exploited to odd effect. For there is cruel humour, to start, in the intriguing situation wherein H elicits Hyllus' promise, in advance, to accomplish his bidding. (We seem to have here a bit of ringing of the changes on the theme, not a little evident in this play, of deception; cf. p. 85 f.). And the handling of the

dialogue is in character: Hyllus' youthful entanglement and desire to please nicely conveyed in *οὐ μὴ λάβω· δράω γέπ.* *εὐχοπαλ δ' ὄψις.* 1190; H's innocent preamble *οἴσθ' οὖν τὸν Οἴτης Ζηνὸς ψυστὸν πάγον*; and Hyllus' innocent reply *οἴδ', ως θυμέ γέπ ποτὶδα δὴ στραθεὶς ἔνω.* It's probably not possible to get closer to black comedy than that. There's more to come. 1216 H: But add one small boon to thy other large benefits. Hyllus: Be the boon never so large, it shall be granted. Having just agreed to stage-manage his father's immolation what larger *χάριν* could he conceivably be prepared to grant?! Heracles, by now with slightly jaded air plays his innocent card again: "You know Eurytus - I mean, his daughter?" Then one might notice that Hyllus jibs a lot more at marrying Iole than at sending H up in flames... Last on my list of comic touches: Heracles, encountering resistance to his reasonable requests: (thoughtfully? petulantly?) "You sound as though you will do nothing I say!" Or should I go on to observe that at 1230 Hyllus by accident or design introduces an element of parodying H's nosos: for his *οἴσται τὸ πεῖν ρεοῦνται θυμοῦσθαι κακόν* flies in the face of what is actually the case - the Heracles who has just spoken, far from ailing/raving is his old self again and in top form.

All this is not to deny other elements in the action, such as that 'The stage action brings out the solemnity of the moment: Heracles insists that Hyllus take a formal oath... Here the situation is more sombre: a dying father binding his son with a blind oath. The absolute obligation this imposes on Hyllus is the only force strong enough to overcome his revulsion at H's commands.' (Easterling 1180-90 n.)

But there is something on the boil here. Tr. is a play about the fate of its characters. The ending which less involves Hyllus than obtrudes him is so far of a piece with this. The force of what I am calling comedy (Heracles in extremis but nonetheless master of self and situation now) is to ensnare Hyllus in a manifestly cruel, grotesque destiny. The irony so characteristic of this play surfaces here to grim and grotesque effect.⁴¹ For Hyllus it is a travesty of destiny that he has the misfortune to come to appear as one who gave his parents their final graveward shove - and must then marry Iole, the girl who more than anyone, as he sees it, is responsible for their deaths.⁴² He cries out in horror (1233 ff.) at this stroke of fate that is the perfection of cruelty. The fates (his father mainly) have conspired to beset him with an avenging sickness (*ἐγ ἀναστόψων γέοτι*, 1235). This (nothing short of bizarre - and deliberately so) outcome has the effect of casting on the drama a luridly irrational afterglow - what Hyllus gives expression to in his famous epilogue: The gods beget children and are witness to such suffering. The effect of all this is clear. We can easily understand Hyllus' outburst against the gods' want of feeling, how it is a quite subjective and appropriate declaration in the mouth of a passionate young man in his situation. Hyllus sees the world's cruelty and he sees the gods in the same terms as he sees his father - or, rather, we the spectators make this link. The grotesque pattern of events, this scene emphasizes, is H's doing. The surface is grotesque - and I do not think but that the average spectator will now be put in mind of the unseen effects of this surface cruelty - Heraclidae, Heracles' everlasting Olympian rest, peace and marriage to Youth.

Zeus is in all this. Behind H's cruel dispensations there is unsuspected wisdom. Behind Zeus', wisdom proper.

It seems that I agree with Lloyd-Jones (127 f.): "Hyllus and the other survivors know nothing of the real purpose of the pyre; yet it is certain that Sophocles intends that the audience shall know it, for a poet who chose to recall the detail that not Hyllus but Philoctetes or his father Poeas lit the pyre certainly meant his hearers to remember all the rest. For the audience S has made it possible to transcend for a moment the limited view of happenings in the world normally possible to mortals and to see, for once, into the purposes of Zeus. In the Ph. this purpose is affected by the speech of the now divine H from the machine; in the Tr. a subtler method is employed.

"The conclusion of the Tr. affords a specially clear insight into the attitude to divine justice which a careful study of S reveals. The justice of the gods is not, in his view, easy for mortals to perceive ... Dike means not only 'justice' but 'the order of the universe,' and from the human point of view that order often seems to impose a natural rather than a moral law." Cf. Letters 193, 194.

But I do not agree with Easterling, p.6: "The son of Zeus who might be expected to receive special protection from his father, seems at the end to be as much a victim of his dispensations as any other human being; and the irony is pointed by the insistence on the relationship of father and son in the scene where H makes his dying demands of Hyllus."⁴³

Nor do I think Mrs. Easterling agrees with herself because if there is irony in the mortal fate of the son of Zeus then Hyllus' words are an adequate final assessment but she rightly denies this (p.8) and, on

p.10, goes on to observe that some significance should be attached to the manner of H's death, and that it fits into a larger scheme of things in which Zeus' will is mysteriously fulfilled.

A concluding oddity

Although the play stops short of revealing what happened on Oeta, Sophocles has not left us without a hint - appropriately enough, in irony.

1245 Hy: *αλλ' ἐκδιδαχθῶ δῆτα δυσσερεῖν πάτερ;*
H: *οὐ δυσσέρεια, τούρνον εἰ τέρψεις κέαρ.* Quite.

How could it be an impiety to comply with a god's wishes - even if not yet aware of his divinity?

More of the same, though more subtle:

1247 Hy: *πράσσειν ἀνωγας οὐν νε πανδίκως τάδε;*
H: *ἔγωγε· τούτων πάρτυρας καλῶ θεός.*
Hy: *τοιγὰρ ποήσω κούκ ἀπώσοραι, τὸ σὸν*
θεοῖσι δεικνὺς ἔχον. 1. Hyllus will have H's

own deed to show the gods when they judge him. 2. Hyllus will show H, in his own deed, to the gods ...

SECTION B

The effect of the opening of the prologue (D and Achelous) is to transport us into fairy-tale - and make us feel quite at home there. D comes across immediately as human and familiar - yet she relates to the fairy-tale world on terms of perfect intimacy so that we do not think of her as anything but part of it. It may seem peculiar to us to find this girl wooed by a river-god but we see at once that it was not strange to D - it was an awful reality. The prologue establishes basic assumptions of the play, the actual dramatic framework in which we are to contemplate the dramatically central event of D's use of the Nessus-charm in her present difficulty. (Bearing this in mind one sees that Bowra was wrong to relate this to 5th century law and society. That is to invoke alien and inappropriate standards. What help after all does 5th century Athens afford us in 'understanding' the situation D finds herself in in relation to Achelous?).

There is a paradox here: D, not H, is given the human touch - yet his recent history is designed in the play for scrutiny by ordinary human standards. Her mistake, ultimately, eludes the human, ethical frame because contaminated - irredeemably - by the alien fairy-tale world. Sophocles renders the fantastic familiar through the heroine. This, far from rendering the fantastic ethical, susceptible to normal ethics, tinges D's fetching human fallibility with innocence: fairy-tale innocence).⁴⁴

Another vitally important consequence of what is established in the prologue is to define the relationship with Heracles. It has been

remarked that even if the play allowed the protagonists to meet the relationship of so disparate a pair remains inconceivable. But if the relationship of a D and an Achelous is conceivable then the marriage of D and H is conceivable. No doubt this is a pointer to how we should approach it. It is on the one hand natural (D makes it that: she was infinitely relieved that H, not Achelous, won - the possibility of the other outcome was why she could not bear to watch. She comes to love H) and on the other fantastic: D married to the son of Zeus, a match for Achelous. The basic assumptions from the start provide for an ambivalent, dual - or complex - heroic ontology. The hero is not just any married man and no more. Through D we can understand H and also that we cannot understand him.

D has a foot in both worlds, life and fairy-tale. H however is unitary: he embodies both those worlds, familiar and unfamiliar. This makes him difficult to understand, a complex individual in whose psyche opposing forces dwell in uneasy equilibrium.

We have a glimpse of this complexity (a sort of split-image representation of the hero) in H's bout with Achelous described in the prologue. He is here first and foremost the typical hero coming into his own through superior prowess - and doing well (he saves D and wins the best of wives who much loves him). At the same time (or at least in retrospect from within the play) the bout is symbolic. As Easterling well puts it (BICS p.59) "she was wooed by the river-god Achelous, passion in its most violent, non-human form." The bout is symbolic as showing Heracles' action and achievement as stemming from such primitive passion (it is not as though he overcomes it in overcoming

Achelous). But this is muted, the symbol is latent because (this is important) the outcome was right - and so was the context. Winnington-Ingram, p. 89, has not given this its due, just remarks contra Gellie on p. 86 notwithstanding.

"Twice within the play we see him at grips with a lustful monster, himself actuated no less by the force of sexual desire. We see him wrestling with the monstrous river-god; we see him shooting down the Centaur who tried to rape his wife." He was not actuated by sexual desire when he shot down the centaur; similarly there is no notice of the co-lateral good result attendant on primitive impulse in the victory over the river-god: a result telling in favour of H as well as D. These distinctions are of considerable weight in interpretation. They in fact only come into definition when we connect scenes. (This idea is followed up in detail later in the essay - 73 ff; and cf. 54). The poet has gone out of his way to invite us to connect the scenes when he detailed the bout with Achelous in the 1st stasimon as an appendix to the scene of the destruction of Oechalia by passion for Iole. We are discreetly invited to assess Heracles' actions inter-contextually. That is, we consider his actions in the human environment against the foil of his actions in mythic context. The former are perhaps no more than an extension, in motivation, of the latter. But the effect, in terms of substance, of the transposition is revealing. We connect the rape of Iole with the winning of D. In each scene Eros is operative. The connection will bring out the quite tangible qualitative (ethical) difference in the results achieved in each case: the absolute injustice of Oechalia caught up in the madness of H's desire; D's happiness in

the wished-for result. Here are blame and blamelessness intermingled - one.

This then is the basic framework: a completely natural D - to whom the mythic-fantastic comes naturally. The play's assumptions from the start are shown as poetic and symbolic. If dramatic as well, then only on those terms.

What Sophocles does with H is to bring him from out of the mythic world where he is in his element and introduce him to the content of human interactions where the Herculean personality must inevitably loom very large indeed. He sweeps all before him driven on by his famous prowess. He must inevitably appear out of phase with established norms, in essence superman, not man. Bowra's contribution is to have given us the category, p.135 "He has no modesty, mercy or civic virtues. If something stands in his way, he removes it, at no matter what cost. He has not even the gentleness which the epic heroes show to their friends and families. He stands for something else than the ordinary ideals of manhood whether Homeric or Athenian. In him Sophocles seems to have created a kind of superman, a hero of a new sort who is outside ordinary rules and standards ..." p.136: "he possesses power to such a degree that he is not really a man but something above man. The result is strange and forbidding, and Aristotle saw some of its implications when he said that some men do not need society to live in, 'He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.' " But Bowra did not apply his perception consistently. He did not see how consistent Sophocles was in his conception. Bowra

allowed some conflation of the two incommensurable aretae, the Herculean and the human and came, especially in his well-known interpretation of the hero's motives in uniting his son with Iole, to impart avuncular, benevolent attributes to that outlandish Herculean arete.

However, misunderstanding the play seems married to conceiving H humanly, no more; thinking that D and H can be approached as on the same footing; assuming that 'sympathy' is the yardstick for the heroic and dramatic effectiveness of both protagonists alike. "This grim attitude is further accentuated by the character of H, who enters at the end. It would have been easy to let H, the great and generous, hear the whole story and forgive his wife... But Sophocles does not want us to have that much comfort. He presents us with a fantastically gross H, interested solely in himself, and unshaken by the faintest self-doubt or hesitancy in his passions. The long final scene is a planned cruelty in order that D, who has been alone throughout, may still be alone, and unloved." This last point would have some force but in the context of Whitman's⁴⁵ view of the play, it's an affecting bit of lunacy; "It is not enough to plead that any softening would be out of keeping with the situation or with the man; we do not require him to be tender, but to be human."⁴⁶ "... this puzzling play seems to be about D and H rather than about H and D;"⁴⁷

"In formal and thematic terms Tr. is thus an intricately unified play; why does it still present serious problems of interpretation? There are two main issues: the treatment of H and the meaning of the final scenes. It has often been noted that there is a striking difference in the

way D and H are handled. She has the advantage of being on stage much longer than he is, and she is given a high proportion of the poetry, which contributes to the impression of a deeply sympathetic character - noble, compassionate, modest - involved, moreover, in a morally interesting situation: she takes a fatal decision and is seen facing its consequences. As Hyllus says of her, 'she made a disastrous error, with the best of intentions' (1136), a perfect formula for a tragic heroine. But she is dismissed from the end of the play, and ... she is not 'vindicated': H does not take back his wish to punish her when he hears the truth about Nessus. He, by contrast, occupies the stage for only 300 lines, and although he is given some superb rhetoric he has nothing like D's poetic range, nothing to put him in the same class as Ajax or Philoctetes. He is shown to be egocentric, brutally callous, violent to an extreme degree - all this is stressed through the reactions of the sympathetic Hyllus. Finally he is in no position to take morally interesting decisions and there is nothing here to compare with the new depth of insight achieved by the H of Euripides' play. But after all he is the 'best of men', the monster-slayer, the son of Zeus: his special status has to be taken into account, and even if he is morally quite unlike the typically Sophoclean hero he is surely meant to command the audience's deep interest and at the end even their respect ..." The basic assumption underlying Easterling's review (p.6) is the essential comparability of the protagonists. D is morally more interesting (H is crude); decision, action lie with her rather than him. The fallacy arises with the circumstance of the play's focus on D presenting her with that

unquestionable immediacy and effectiveness (appeal).

To consider the question of action. The fact is that though H is absent we do not make his acquaintance but through impressions of vital and relentless activity. She takes morally interesting decisions, he doesn't. This is only seemingly true. Truer, I think, is that H's actions alone are initiating. They initiate his fate and they do so in ethics. He rapes Iole. The consequences follow. D's actions are ethically interesting but also they are no more than a part of those consequences. Perhaps the foregoing section showed how in all D's actions she is acted upon by circumstances. Her actions are as it were enclosed within the fateful landmarks of H's final phase: his activity around Oechalia and at the foothills of Oeta. Her agency is vital but whether in the scheme of things ethically weightier is a wide open question - and this is to consider them as on equal footing which, I am suggesting, is unsatisfactory to start with. The disproportionate attention in ethics (dramatic focus) in each protagonist - which is the same as the measure of their stage action - only serves to point up, by paradoxical inversion, their different relative status of Being.

The morality and conscience in D's actions stand in contrast with the lack - the sheer absence - of these qualities in H's actions not as one set of actions against another on equal terms but with the point that the actions are qualitatively different - belonging as it were to different species. Compared with D, H is less acting immorally than without morality as humans know it. The immorality of H is beyond judgement - not because it is somehow moral, but because it is so utterly Herculean.

It is the entailment of this essentially superhuman conceptualization of the hero - he behaves in a quite unselfconscious way as a law unto himself - that justice, consequence, accountability are all conspicuous in this play by their absence (as is, correspondingly, the will of Zeus).⁴⁸ Given the paradoxical assumptions of the play alluded to above we may well expect such conspicuous absence (a structural demand of the play) to be significant and deliberate: quite in the drama by virtue of being quite ostensibly out of it.

The interest of Tr., then, is its comparative representation of two disparate modes of activity and being yet on terms of equality before the ineluctability of fate. There is paradox throughout: D's hand in matters spotlighted and minutely dissected; the hero's agency presented blandly as datum, mere (heroic) activity - not as agency at all. A brazen reversal in ethics! These ideas are worked up in most of the remaining part of the essay.⁴⁹

Here is a preview of them (1. The superhuman ontology; 2. The paradoxical inconspicuity of Justice, the will of Zeus; 3. The interrelational method) - an attempt to ensnare these elusive paradoxes. The preview in fact trots out that much deployed model: an exploded view of the play's heart: Heracles destroys Oechalia. Zeus can only stand aside for Cypris must have her way. But Zeus is (a) not unaware (b) not unconcerned. If Zeus is in all these events his concern may perhaps be the moral welfare of his son - and his future. As his son has no conscience (this is what it is to be heroic and have strength, prowess and honour only as a conscience) Zeus must be his conscience. Deianira, after all, acted on the same principles as Heracles (though,

of course, with real qualitative difference) - love, passion, possessiveness, self-interest. But when she found she'd killed H through these forces her conscience did not find an excuse for her.

It did not say: "Love did this, a force much stronger than I. I am not responsible." No, she took the responsibility upon herself.

Why shouldn't Heracles? Because he has no conscience ...⁵⁰ (Here I take particular care to note that the concept of Zeus' 'conscienced concern' is purely imaginative - no more than a rationalization to which recourse is had by way of conveying a suggestion of the scenes - from which the state to which the suggestion corresponds is conspicuously withheld in the actual dramatic realization. It is this conspicuous absence which the spectator beholds; imaginative rationalization he of himself as it were denies as he supplies it. The spectator is interpreting the play in exactly the same spirit as (described on p.48f.) in the juxtaposed Heracles-Deianira, Heracles-Iole scenes).

Here then is justice as a desideratum but not as a datum of the play. Zeus' hand, mind are hidden. The play does not betray them as I have ventured to do in the sketch. Here also is the superhuman concept: a being operating high above and away from the closely observed workings of ordinary (or perhaps extraordinary) human commitment: decision, conscience, consequence - the moral panoply; the play works on this interrelational, connected view of the parallels, D and H; cf. n.32.

Reinhardt's point by point comparison of the Tr. with O.T. etc. assumes that the former is the same sort of play as the others. (By this comparative method he shows on page after page the undeveloped dramaturgy of our play - undeveloped by the 'dramatic' yardstick). This

approach does less than justice to the play - to its own special character. Tr is a poetic and symbolic work before purely dramatic. (See also p. 82). To the extent that R notices this it is only in disparagement. "Just as pathetic narrative forms a disproportionate part of the whole play, so already at the very beginning it monopolizes the prologue and gives it its character." "It is true that the fusion of saga material and tragedy of fate is not yet as masterly as in the O.T. . . . the realm of the marvellous and that of the psychological do not overlap completely . . ." (p. 37).

On p. 37 he observes: "The action falls into two parts, the first, longer section dealing with the downfall of D, and the shorter one at the end dealing with the downfall of H. Even though the downfalls of the two are closely linked in the traditional story, and in fact the fate of the woman finds a place in the saga only because it is bound up with that of the man, yet in the play their two fates are not intertwined in the course of the scenes; they are unfolded one after the other, without being connected with each other in any obvious way." They are not connected in any obvious way. But if the mode of viewing the play described in the foregoing sketch has any validity - any value in interpretation; if, in other words, the whole play is so constructed that its separate, alienated, parallel strands make for significant interrelation, suggestion - connection - by virtue of significant disparity in points of contact (cf. p. 48f. and n. 32) - then I venture to think that if Reinhardt, instead of opening up some other Sophocles at every page of the Tr. had made some of his comparisons inside the play itself he might have better illuminated the work.

Now I would wish to show (but do not think in the present scope I adequately can) that, in Tr., dramatic purpose and meaning are backed up, given scope by the dramatic means (genre) most appropriate to them. By genre I mean style in the broadest sense. The chief characteristics of the style are the narrative, story-telling genre⁵¹ and the organic choral odes. I would suggest that these two characteristics unite to produce a genre with the qualities of uniformness and interiorization requisite to the promotion and effective rendering of the dramatic aim. This can perhaps best be shown later in the essay (which is mainly concerned with outlining the dramatic aim - the scene-connections). See n.67.

Here, however, an outline may be attempted. In this section Eros has been noticed in two structural contexts. These 'contexts' are in each case not obvious or tangible. In the first (p. 48) Eros was found to be a common factor linking two scenes; in the second (p. 54) Eros was a common factor linking two persons - or rather, beings. Eros supplied the theme in terms of which their similar but different experience is to be viewed, connected, compared, contrasted. Clearly theme and structure are bound together intimately. A central, uniform theme (Eros) provides a matrix for the containment of the divergencies of structure.

The pattern of the play is to separate, isolate, but juxtapose H and D - let them interact. By this technique S achieves the representation of the essentially Herculean - a great misfit, too much for this world, etc. Part of the same aim of pin-pointing the essential and elaborating the manifestation is our other aspect of bipartition - the

interweaving, in Part 1, of elements very human with elements very primitive and out-of-this-world. Now, in these two structural modes (form and mood) there is a common deliberate antipathy, dissonance.

It is evident that in much of the play (Part 1) the poet has given himself the task of - certainly not harmonizing - but combining and keeping apart these currents in form and mood, of arranging their combinations and maintaining their dissonances. For this the poet employs a genre which is firstly, 'story-telling', secondly consistently uniform - with a certain pitch that is remote and therefore on the level of the imagination. In this uniform matrix he can arrange and control the dissonances and the suggestibility. Complementing this are the organic choral odes: their imagery is internal, not diversified. This, and related features of the songs, is well noticed by Burton (43 and 83): "Not only is the language of the speeches reflected in the lyrics but the atmosphere of the whole play has communicated itself to the songs..."; "Apart from the judgement towards the end of the paradox on the transience of joy and sorrow and the affirmation of Cypris' power at the beginning of the first stasimon, there is a complete absence in the odes of gnomic reflection, nor is any attempt made to range outside the play or its antecedents in order to extend the scope of thought and feeling by the use of moral or intellectual comment, as in some of the great songs of Antigone and O.T." Cf. n.3, ad fin.

D's anxious state of mind studied in the opening of the play centres on the oracular tablet left by Heracles before departing from Trachis. Before the messenger arrives the oracle crops up thrice, each

time with the effect of concentrating the preoccupation of the moment and giving it present immediacy. In her 'Euripidean prologue' D meditates aloud within herself as she surveys her past and, towards the end of her speech brings us up to the present by mentioning Trachis to which they came when Heracles slew Iphitus. She says that H is away now for 15 months and at the same time mentions the oracle, the two apparently linked in her consternation.

There follows the exchanges with the nurse and with Hyllus. These too lead up to the oracle. This leads to Hyllus setting out to find news of his father. This initiation of activity, something now being done, alleviates D's anxiety. The higher tone the chorus then sustain as they launch into their parodos.

The third reference to the oracle is the longest. This definitive mention defines the time that H has been gone as the critical time for fulfilment of the oracle. Its effect is to screw to a pitch D's foreboding before the messenger comes on to dispel her fears.

Now a consideration of the way it is variously formulated in the play reveals that D knows of the oracle only as interpreted⁵² to her by H. As interpreted it is such as to cause alarm (46 ff.).

D's first detailing of the oracle (76 ff.) rests on Hyllus' mention of Euboia at 74. She knows (79 ff.) - from H (cf. 155 ff.) - that depending on some trial or labour in Euboia H will either die or succeed to a peaceful life. The oracular message put thus spurs Hyllus on to look for his father, since he now knows him to be at the critical place where his fate is in the balance. Only because Hyllus has heard that

H is in Euboia and has now mentioned this to D does she have occasion to mention this aspect of the oracle. The mark of all D's knowledge is that it is not direct knowledge of the original oracle, but what H has told her in his own interpretation of it. The original oracle concerned the cessation of H's labours at a given time and place. H, before leaving D (see 155 f.) to go into servitude with Omphale - after which he intended to go on to Euboia where he had old scores to settle with Eurytus, not to mention other matters in mind - had thought best to interpret this oracle for his wife - since he himself had perceived its ambiguity: at Euboia, at the specified time he was to achieve release from his toils. That might mean (he saw) he would achieve peace at last (together with whatever else that he achieved in this last of his labours (159 and 170)) - or would cease from his labours in death. Knowing he would be away for more than a year on these projects and being the thoughtful, considerate husband that he was he had not left his wife in the dark about what the future might hold. It were best allowance was made for the worst outcome: let her be forewarned. He might not return. Therefore let arrangements be made concerning her dowry and his patrimony. He himself - he was after all son of Zeus - expected to do well. So he tells us himself (1171).

Viewed thus the oracle - in the attitude of each thereto - reflects the protagonists' several situations. H, confident that the oracle would fall out on the bright side maintained that confidence through to Cenaeum where it really shone out. Then the bombshell burst about his head. D, expecting the worst, was no more in tune with the irony of fate: least of all did she suspect that she was to feature as the agent

of the fate she dreaded might befall her husband: death or succession to peace. In both protagonists, then, the sure objective indications of the oracle amount subjectively to the most thoroughgoing ignorance of what is and what is to come; their different agencies in a mutual fate quite hidden from each of them in its own way.⁵³ H's agency is active, responsible - ethical. D's was merely passive, no more than motor. "Man is not a passive sacrifice to his destiny; he takes an active part. But the gods have so arranged it that every step which he takes in the hope of avoiding his fate brings him nearer to it."

Application of this observation of Lesky (284) to each protagonist serves to distinguish their different styles.

D's actions viewed thus against the oracle - her knowledge of it - correspond in effect to her opening words: her own pessimism ran on ahead of the proscription of the maxim of seeking to assess life's happiness or sorrow before death finally decided. Events are to mock that pessimism as hardly pessimistic enough - or rather, they will show it up as futile in anticipating the actual tendency of fate.

There is no inconsistency, therefore, with the later mention of the oracle by H (1164 ff.).⁵⁴ He did expect to achieve lasting peace on completion of his Euboian ordeal (1171). This was to be his release from toils as prophesied (1170 f.). But he had once been aware that release from toils could come through death, and of this he had forewarned D. The irony is that he allowed his current preoccupation - brought, as he thought at a time, to so successful an issue - to dislodge this possibility from mind. (This seems to be the significance of the oracular variants - it is not quite correct to say - as Easterling ad 683 - that H

misconstrued the oracle. It was a shade more unfortunate than that).

Thus D is found to formulate the oracle differently from H. He had transcribed the oracle proper at Dodona and interpreted it for D before leaving Trachis. He himself inclined to the view that his cessation from labours would be a good thing. He had the other oracle to influence that - for if he was not destined to die by the hand of anyone living it looked as though he was not destined to die at all.

When D, at 154 ff., 'briefs' the chorus on the oracle this need not necessarily be taken to mean that this is their first knowledge of it.⁵⁵ If (at 824 ff.) they knew - as an article of pan-hellenic knowledge - of the original oracle (that H would be allowed to complete his labours after 12 years)⁵⁶ then D's detailing of the oracle would come to them as interpretation, as indeed it is. (This would apply also to Hyllus' reaction to the oracle. He can be expected to know at least as much as the chorus. It is the new detail (*Euboia*) and the particular slant - the alternative formulation that bespeaks the character of interpretation - that reaches them now for the first time.

The 'unrealistic', 'artificial', 'undramatic' structural assumptions⁵⁷ of the play are well shown up in the parodos. The chorus behave as though they have been present from the start of the play: their song is by no means abstract or general but builds on the situation established so far and even gives it greater immediacy. Consider the strophe which colonizes on the optimism generated in the immediately preceding action. It has just been settled that Hyllus is to go out in hope of establishing contact with his father. As if taking their cue from this the chorus open

with an image of the sun to which, as it rises up in this new day and goes westwards, they appeal to reveal Heracles' whereabouts. Their image of daybreak, of night slain by the sunrise, immediately also reminds us of D's cares, now being lightened, which come to her in the sequence of night following night (29-30). In the antistrophe they echo in *ἀνφινεκῆ* a theme of the prologue (6 ff.). And they reproduce with great accuracy D's emotions of the prologue, her *κακὰν δύστρανον ἐλπίζουσαν αἰσαν* (110 f.).

Not a few critics have maintained that the consolation given in the parodos is to comfort D that present unhappiness will give way to future joy. In fact this is not explicitly sung by them (though, of course, cyclic imagery of alternation forms the basis of their song). What they say is (having sung in str. β of the ups and downs of Heracles in his life of toils) that Zeus gives no one a pain-free lot (126 ff.) and their follow-up in *'ἄλλ' ἐπὶ πῆμα καὶ χαρὰ μᾶσι κυκλοῦσι...* is a perfectly balanced statement: it is not as though it weights *χαρὰ* as against *πῆμα*. Their consolation is even-handed, philosophical. They are so far from unwarranted optimism that they go on in the epode to provide the not obviously comforting epi-consolation that as Zeus provides joy and sorrow by turns, it is he also (presumably) that has these passing on from life to life: not bright night sky nor calamity nor wealth remain. What consolation there is seems to reside in this: joy and sorrow both pass away in death - and are therefore not to be made too much of. The parodos seems less to hope to provide D with definite consolation in the hope of future happiness than to put her problem in the perspective

of mortality and the implications thereof for the protagonists. Her main fear, after all, is that H is due to die. The chorus's message (consolation?) seems to be: so far some god keeps H as he toils from death's door. Man's life of alternating joy and pain falls within the cycle of the generations. But Zeus cares for his children - and this is what he seems to be doing in H's case.

Their consolation does not, as some have found, betray its flaw but corresponds in spirit to the maxim with which D opened the play: death only can define the happiness or sorrow of a life. One must not - as D is doing and has done from her very first expression (that she knows without coming to Hades that her life is *ευστυχή τε καὶ βαρύν*) - outrun the wisdom of the saying laid down of old and seek pain, for whatever reason, for oneself. Such pain is not actually there; real pain is.

The chorus, then, are sobering, corrective of her excessive pessimism. They are in effect urging D to moderation, *σωφροσύνη*. Her excessive foreboding is - we see this in the interplay of the opening five lines of the play - irrational and to see D as actually supplying a corrective to the chorus is a strange and naive inversion of the dramatic ethic underlying the arrangements that occur between chorus and protagonists.

Such a reversing of the ethical flow between chorus and protagonist runs through Easterling's article in BICS. "D's own reaction to this knowledge (that this is the critical moment for fulfilment of the oracle) is to start from her sleep in fear that she may continue to be bereft of the best of all men (175-7). D's choice of words here again

acts as a corrective to the chorus; they had said that nothing remains for mortals (*μέντεν*), but to each in his turn comes joy and deprivation (*χαίρειν τε καὶ στρεπθεῖν*); her fear, she says, is that she must remain in a deprived state, *μέντεν λογεψημένην*, i.e. that the rhythm will not work for her." (p.60). The rhythm may well not work for her but that this can be seen as a corrective to the chorus rests on mistaking their essential message in the parodos. Again, p.60: "D's reaction to the parodos at once confirms any doubts we may have been feeling about the chorus' confidence in the rhythm of sorrow and joy: 'you have no experience of sorrows like mine etc.'" Here we see what the author takes to be the essential message of the chorus - but this is a misrepresentation of their import as a whole, arising from an undue emphasis of what is only a part of it (and a neglect of the modifications of context).

The argument is that since the chorus sing of joy and sorrow alternating, backing this up with imagery of cyclicity and alternation, their message essentially is that joy will come to D from her present unhappiness. The argument continues that in this the chorus is mistaken - that D is right to expect that in her case the natural cyclic rhythm is broken. The questioning of the chorus' credentials in this particular case has the effect in Easterling's paper of introducing a certain ethical relativism into judgement. This has far-reaching repercussions for her interpretation of the play. These are discussed elsewhere (the question being of central importance). But here I can show this tendency at work, p.60: "To return to the parodos, and to the chorus' claim that Zeus is always mindful of his children: we have no clear evidence yet that ought to make us feel uneasy about this claim

unless we know the story (though if we distrust the chorus' reassurance of D about the rhythm of sorrow and joy we may also be less willing to be convinced by these arguments about Zeus). The important point we need to recognize here is that they are taking the natural attitude to Heracles, echoing what Hyllus has already said (88-9), that as son of Zeus he has especial divine protection. Everybody, in fact, thinks that because Heracles has been repeatedly saved by his father in the past he is bound to be safe now. Kitto is surely right when he suggests that we are meant to ask ourselves as the play proceeds 'if Zeus is being unmindful of his son Heracles'." But we do not distrust the chorus and, respecting what they say about Zeus we will not, as Easterling seems to do here though not in so many words, look to see in events that H is left in the lurch by Zeus or that (as Hyllus will protest) Zeus turns a blind eye to his son's life and fortune.

Finally, before leaving Easterling's important article this time around: p.58 "D opens the play and introduces the first theme by quoting that old saying that one cannot learn thoroughly about a person's lot, whether it is good or evil, until he is dead. This piece of traditional moralizing could be utterly commonplace and without dramatic significance, but its position makes it very prominent indeed, and it is picked up and re-interpreted with characteristic Sophoclean irony as the play proceeds. It may conceivably therefore be a kind of clue to the way in which Sophocles wants us to look at the play; at least we may note here that it is not a moral assessment of human life, since the stress is not on the quality of a man's behaviour but on the nature of his lot ...

"Deianira at once offers a corrective to the old saying 'I am an exception' she says, 'my life ...'

"Here for the first time we meet D's fear (she was afraid to watch the Achelous contest), and we shall find it stressed again and again in association with her love. It makes us uneasy from the start; we see that D has had serious cause for anxiety and that she is perhaps right to reject the old saying as far as she herself is concerned." This is an exact inversion of the true ethical trend, as it were the play's opening ethical announcement - which is that D's very first verbal action in the play is to show herself hopelessly out of phase with the difficult demands of wisdom, objectivity. She runs far, far ahead of it no sooner than she has enunciated it. So it is true that not she calls into question the old saying but it her. Here from the start is a characteristically elusive Sophoclean complexity: the irony of H's downfall is that it was not done by a Clytemnestra but a Daianeira, not murder but a mistake, not active, scheming malice but the most captivating, tentative, passivity. And yet immediately the personality of D is shown as if in an ethical shade: as we meet her so do we know we have met a really human person, with will, fallibility. Her tale as it unfolds, the vicissitudes of her fortune, are all seen against that hard objective background of the saying opening the play - and if it appears more a stumbling block than a backdrop that is because it is so difficult - impossible - for the human nature and knowledge to measure up to the divine.

Many writers,⁵⁸ then, view the parodos in too simple terms: if she knows sorrow now she will have joy later. Less well noticed is

the essential correlation of the sort of 'comfort' being offered in ant.^β and the epode with the attitude to life conveyed by the saying to which D alludes in opening. Fundamental to this attitude is the view that life takes its course and that happiness is less a function of one's ability to control that course than understanding how things lie - and being, if not content, then patient. In the parodos the chorus are developing this idea so that, if it seems true that part of their consolation involves reminding D that present sorrow in one's life often gives way to future happiness (since life is joy and sorrow by turns), this can not be said to be more than a part of their main thesis which is that this cycle, like the alternation of life and death within which it occurs, is in the nature of things and by understanding that, instead of living by *κακῶν δύστραντες ἐπιζητοῦσαν αἰσθάνεται*, D will be more in harmony with the natural law of life - and, hopefully, to that extent less troubled. This line would seem, for purposes of consolation, counterproductive since it is to focus on what is D's particular anxiety - that H may die. The chorus seem to seek to avoid the 'ultimate consolation' of steeling her to H's coming death (since, if he has been kept from death up to now, and he is mortal, the cycle should prepare us to accept that his turn may have come) by reminding her that he especially is to be counted among the children of Zeus. As he escaped death in the past, so, if Zeus is mindful of his children, there is hope ...

So the chorus have a delicate undertaking in bringing comfort to D. As they show every sign of being up to the minute with what has been enacted before their appearance it offends no dramatic convention

to think that they are already aware of the crisis: H must either die or succeed to a blessed life. Their consolation is accordingly circumspect and rests on (a) consolation based on sober - and remarkably mature! (cf. p.88) - assessment of the vicissitudes of life and (b) hope, based on what we think of as good, genuine faith.

The chorus, comforting D, introduce/develop two connected themes: the cycle of joy and sorrow, mutability in people's fortunes;⁵⁹ and mortality - with particular reference to H. Discussion is followed up at p. 85 .

Lichas' drift, again

Lichas' pitch is basically that the disgrace of servitude to Omphale having so stung H, the retribution visited on the person ultimately to blame for that state of affairs was necessary and just. This pitch comes off well until about 260 ff. when Lichas goes into detail concerning Eurytus' responsibility.

1. Our first uneasiness with his account arises with the abruptness of the mention of Eurytus' inhospitable conduct. No explanation is given. The insults appear obtrusively unmotivated and unexplained.
2. Lichas shows that H slew Iphitus with good cause - only from his use of guile had H to render account to Zeus. This justifiability of the vengeance that H took on Iphitus is important to Lichas' pitch since, by extension, it justifies revenge on Eurytus. (Thus Lichas, when he comes round to the actual slaughter of Eurytus and sons, alludes to this, 281:

κεῖνος δ' οὐτεχθίστες ἐκ γηώσης κακῆς κ.τ.λ. / killing

Killing Iphitus, one might argue, settles the account with Eurytus - it more than balances the insults etc. But, returns Heracles, there's still to pay for the disgrace incurred in servitude. H is conscious of a deficit: it is not as though the Zeus-imposed penalty has any bearing on the feud between H and E (might argue Lichas and H). It derives from the extraneous matter of the methods used by H. That is, he considers himself to have given 'internal' account but the injustice or sting of the servitude and the originating circumstances remain over and for this Eurytus must give account.

Thus it is evident that Lichas' argument that only the use of guile was punishable is vital to the tendency of his pitch, namely that the servitude to Omphale meant that someone was to pay - and that the destruction of Oechalia was heroically correct.

What we may conclude is that Lichas has put in a bit of special pleading for H in the matter of his accountability to Zeus. We have only Lichas' word for the specification of the fault (in the treacherousness of the deed) and every sign of Lichas' tendentiousness. Zeus held H accountable for Iphitus' death: we know that through Lichas - but also over and above Lichas. H did not put himself up for sale until he got Zeus' indication that he was to do so. So in all probability H's accountability for Iphitus' death is not just in respect of use of guile. The important thing is that the vengeance itself was unjustified. It certainly was excessive as well as treacherous. It probably was simply unfair. The more we know, indeed, about the truth of the matter the less fair it looks and the less we find that we - unlike Lichas - can confidently state Zeus' precise view of the matter. H killed Iphitus not, surely,

without reference to the frustration by Eurytus of his designs on

Iole.⁶⁰ Too many factors enter for us to share Lichas' sanguinity in this matter of the exact definition of Zeus' justice. All we can say - and this is all we want to be able to say - is that Zeus acted, took a hand in the affairs of his son.

That is important. For if the will of Zeus in this play is mysterious it ought not to be because we have made it more mysterious than it already is. And that is what Easterling does in her BICS article. "So we may feel that Lichas' judgements are not to be trusted; this is important, because critics have a tendency to fasten upon the idea of Zeus *πράκτως* without stopping to notice that it is patently ironical."⁽⁶¹⁾ We know that Lichas' judgements are not to be trusted; we have stopped to notice that the idea of Zeus *πράκτως* is patently ironical; we have in fact defined in what that irony consists - namely, the colossal arrogance of a herald who defines (the word, I think, is confines) the operation of Zeus' law to suit his own and his master's convenience.⁶¹ The irony, therefore, makes Zeus not less *πράκτως* (this is what Easterling astonishingly argues) but more.

Do these matters have an importance in the play proportional to this scale of attention? Iphitus is not mentioned before Achelous, true. But at 38 ff. in her prologue D informs us that their Trachinian exile came about with the murder of that gentleman. And Lichas does rather bring him into prominence in the execution of his duties regarding him as he does as an instructive case for the interpretation of Divine Law.⁶² If, earlier, I showed (probably quite markedly) signs of interpretative wavering - induced by uncertainty as to just what Sophocles was doing

with the myth⁶³ - this may be thought to have brought its benefit if it helps to give an insight into Sophocles' intention and method. I think these are to construct, by careful selection and arrangement of mythic components, a scene in a significant way. The scene is constructed to 'house' its significance - the myth worked up with specificity, economy, deliberation.

It is fairly clear how Sophocles goes to work. What he has done with D in the myth has great dramatic consequence. Making her the wife of H from far back is a revolutionary adjustment of the myth. It smacks of purely dramatic inspiration - like Euripides' adjustment of the timing of H's madness - and its significance for the drama is incalculable: hers is the ethical human touch that is the indispensable foil to our conception of the hero; the central theme of eros is introduced in the intimate biography of which she is the subject. The two erotes - the two states of being - are juxtaposed. H's disintegration is an erotic matter: D helps us to understand this.

In line with this primary innovation - though less important for characterization⁶⁴ than for the presentation of the drama of fate - is the adjustment whereby Iole comes to Trachis with Lichas.

Sophocles' arrangements in the central section of intrigue - basically the focus of the operations of the hero in absentia - have the same distinguishing features: very specific effects are achieved by deployment of mythic details with freedom, deliberation, economy, tact. The details involving Eurytus and members of his household; and Heracles at Oechalia, at Tiryns, at Trachis, in Lydia and then again at

Oechalia are all handled so to build a self-contained unit of Herculean history - not so much historical as representative, 'spiritual' biography. Sophocles takes details of the traditions and arranges them to suit his dramatic purpose. Other versions of H's story, e.g. Apollodorus' would not knit these events as intimately as Sophocles or give them the same significance that he does. (For instance Apollodorus does not have H return at once and so single-mindedly from Omphale to Oechalia. He has him wander off on desultory campaigns. S however makes everything compact and interdependent; not only mares and Eurytus' hybris but also - especially - Iole herself has a bearing on the Iphitus - Heracles affair).

The Lichas-scene is concerned with the capture of Oechalia. It presents H and it presents Zeus. (It presents them in action, each in his own sphere - one might say, right - but with a point of contact. Too much is made by critics⁶⁵ of the fact that H only appears in the last quarter of the play. His absence does not lessen - it even promotes - ones impression of vigorous, relentless activity).

The subtlety of Sophocles' method throughout seems well foreshalled in the Lichas scene, in the way the scene trots out Zeus in its comfortable way and confidently disposes of him. The spectator may well remark this as significantly ironic. He might go on, accordingly, to notice in the Oechalia-scene a significant vacuum: he sees (hears of) H storming Oechalia in a great burst of energy that leaves Zeus in his dust. This dust-coated Zeus was left behind by all these events at Tiryns where he was tidying up his son's affairs. For this spectator the question may arise what Zeus will think of Oechalia. It may arise precisely by virtue of the fact that it noticeably does not arise in the drama at all.

He may, furthermore, find this so because the question what Zeus thought of the murder of Iphitus is in the drama - and noticeably, because, as mentioned, inversely, obliquely: something that needs to be unscrambled.

Two things, then, in the dramaturgy. (a) The scene: its significance dramatically housed, quite hidden. What we have is simply the dramatic event or action, tightly constructed and controlled. (b) Connection of scenes: suggestion. This is even less in evidence than 'significance.' It suggests itself only by being noticeably absent.

I continue this discussion by reference to the debate (on matters central to Trachiniae - criticism) between Kitto and Easterling (BICS).

"A little while ago, contemplating what H has done to Oechalia, remembering how Zeus had already punished him for the killing of Iphitus, and not forgetting the last verse of the first ode, we found ourselves wondering what Zeus might be thinking of this wanton destruction of a whole city. Does S not tell us? Twice (vv. 237-241, 287 f.) we were told that H was about to offer holy sacrifice to Zeus in return for his triumph. When D heard the news, and saw the wretched train of captives, she did not say: "What a glorious victory!" but something rather different. Hyllus begins his narrative by saying that H came to the place of sacrifice 'after sacking the city of Eurytus, bringing with him the trophies and first-fruits of his victory.' The scene is set. Now, it may or may not be true that S had heard of only one kind of magic venom, a kind that needs heat to make it effective: in either case it is the fact that it was the heat from the sacrificial fire that caused the venom to begin working

on H's flesh. Must this not be the god's reply to H's offering for an audience that presumably believed in Zeus? If not, then S created a terribly imaginative piece of drama - by accident." (Kitto, *Poiesis* 174/175).

"Now I think we are certainly intended to feel here that Lichas is making large claims for H's justification, and we ought also to be surprised that H sees fit to sacrifice to Zeus as though his behaviour has been everything that Zeus would desire. Perhaps the real point of all this stress on slavery is to make us begin to wonder if H the enslaver was not after all a slave himself. This I believe to be the real focus of dramatic interest, that we should have an uncomfortable suspicion as we listen to this speech that Lichas and H are disastrously mistaken in their assessment of the situation. I think this is more important than the moral significance of the sacking of Oechalia as a clinching act of hybris; admittedly S is deliberately painting H's behaviour in lurid colours - he is shown as violent, cruel and staggeringly self-centred - but I do not believe with Kitto that the audience 'having just been told in a passage otherwise unnecessary that Zeus has already punished H for one act of violence ... may well be asking itself in what spirit Zeus will receive H's thanks offering for his total destruction of a city.' I suggest that ... the emphasis is on the human action and suffering and not on the probable divine reaction." Easterling (BICS) 61.

Kitto finds a certain significance in the Lichas-scenes (slaying of Iphitus, destruction of Oechalia) - he connects them.⁶⁶ Easterling does not or, if she does, only negatively. This brings out the essential aspect of the dramaturgy (which has indeed, as Easterling says, its

emphases in the human action and suffering and not on the probable divine reaction): that the scene may suggest a signification (in conjunction with another/other) - but this is so far from explicit in the drama that, as we find, controversy may arise as to the dramatist's intention. What is not explicitly expressed is, in fact, what all this means to Zeus, Zeus' participation or non-participation: a great intangible in the play.

"A great deal of play is made by Sophocles with the idea that the sacrificer turns into a victim: it is the heat of the sacrificial fire that causes the robe to turn into a hideously torturing strait-jacket. Kitto sees in this powerful scene confirmation of his view that the play is concerned with the reactions of Zeus to the hybris of H: 'Must this not be the god's reply to H's offering, for an audience that presumably believed in Zeus?' I suggest that if this is to be the audience's inference a great deal of the play's irony and subtlety is lost: for H and for everyone else witnessing the incident it clearly is Zeus' answer (H says as much at 993-5: *ὦ Κηναιαὶ κρηπίς βωμῶν, | ιερῶν διὰ διῶν ἐτί πολι μετέω χάριν ἴνυσσω, ὦ Ζεῦ*), but the audience knows that H is being tortured because in response to his sending Iole home D sent him the robe, and that the robe in turn was poisoned because Nessus wished to revenge himself on H, and that Nessus had the poison because H had shot him with an arrow steeped in the venom of another of his victims, the Hydra of Lerna ... It seems to me that Zeus is behind the events on Cenaeum only in the sense implied in the last line of the play: *κούδὲν τούτων ἔτε νῆ Ζεύς,* which I would interpret (with Kitto) as an assertion that the universe is

orderly, not chaotic: you have to take the consequences for what you do, and Zeus has not neglected his son in allowing the natural laws to take their course." (Easterling 64.)

Collocation of the three passages quoted shows how the drama works for Kitto. Having followed the drama's imaginative pointers he connected Oechalia and Zeus (though the drama left them conspicuously unconnected). The Cenaeum scene served for Kitto only to strengthen the connection; and Easterling's piece shows how once again such inter-scenic resonances are left entirely to the imagination of the spectator.⁶⁷

Easterling continues (65): "Perhaps we ought to see what the chorus have to say about the events on Cenaeum (821 sq.). They do not say, 'Zeus is paying him out', but 'So this was the point of the oracle that there would be an end of the labours for H: of course, it meant death' ... The second antistrophe ends this ode significantly: 'We lament for H; a nosos is upon him more piteous than any suffering brought upon him by his enemies. Alas for the spear with which he sacked Oechalia! But Cypris, ministering in silence, has been plainly proved the doer of these deeds', *φαντὰ τῶνδ' ἐφάνη πράκτωρ*. Not content with a whole stasimon devoted to the power of love, S gives us this explicit verdict in favour of Cypris; not, of course, that this should be seen as excusing H's behaviour, but it is striking that the chorus emphatically do not react as Kitto thinks an audience should. They say not a word about Zeus, only Cypris, and the emphatic *φαντὰ τῶνδ' ἐφάνη πράκτωρ* ought to serve as a corrective, if we need one, to Lichas' remarks about Zeus being the *πράκτωρ* ."

The unsatisfactoriness of Easterling's synthesis is evident.

No-one would deny Cypris her part at the heart of the drama. But if Cypris limits Zeus' role in the way Easterling sees it what then is that rôle? Again she will allow that through Zeus you have to take the consequences of what you do but seems to set an interdict on political consequences. The natural laws that Zeus promotes in this case, and of which we are sensible in the consequences of our actions have at their heart the natural law of sex, Eros. All that Zeus does is in a colourless, un-moral way to ensure that such consequences occur. Zeus, in Easterling's concept, is a sort of docile handmaid to Cypris, cleaning up after her uncomplainingly. But the consequences of H's actions are pre-eminently political. If the play has a moral⁶⁸ it has to do with the tyranny of a blind, unrestrained private passion and the enormity of its public consequences which become evident to the once-opened eye. At bottom there is the powerful moral in the view given of a great individual whose strength could subdue all but himself. "He is like Oedipus, for as Oedipus is struck down, as if by a malignant fate, at the point where he was apparently supreme, namely his intelligence, so is H struck down in what was his great glory - his physical strength and endurance." Oedipus' strength was intelligence, as Kitto (Poiesis 175) points out. The intelligence that on its own solved the riddle outside had no inkling of the riddle within, concerning Oedipus' own life. H was like Oedipus - he crushed primitive forces without but was powerless against the same forces operating within himself. (I do not think the moral is the dramatic aim. The play's symbolic richness allows of such a moral alongside of the primary aim which is to represent

the destiny and personality faithfully to the whole hero - in a way that does full justice to the myth).

What is particularly surprising in Easterling's critique of Kitto is her finding loss of irony and subtlety in Zeus' reaction to H's hybris. Her point as against Kitto is that he sees divine reaction only to miss the erotic inevitability. If Kitto's concentration has caused him to neglect the fundamental erotic connection in the events, Easterling's criticism is so far justified (I leave this open). But her view of the play brings her to an even less desirable standpoint in her diminution of Zeus. The play itself underplays Zeus. (It shows forth Cypris, not Zeus) - but that is what is significant.

There is not a little irony in the suggestion (rather, the dramatist's pointed refusal to suggest openly) that Zeus' reply to H's magnificent sacrifice is to 'pay him out' in full consequence of his recent actions. This is to pay him out erotoco-politically.⁶⁹ The play works not, indeed, by presenting any of these dimensions of consequence as Zeus' work but a natural train of events following ineluctably on H's own initiatives and naturally to the given set of conditions. Zeus' presence hidden in all matters it is impossible to suspect Zeus hand in some matters without suspecting it in all.

The irony is sustained not least of all by the hero's complete and utter (I need to stress this) unconsciousness of the significance of what is happening to him (in all its dimensions) and why. It is not as if (I think Easterling almost infers this, though there is scope for misunderstanding her here) the H who exclaims $\hat{\omega}$ κηναία κρητίς βωβῶν, | ιερῶν οἴαν οἴων ἐμί νοι πενέτω χάριν ήγύον, $\hat{\omega}$ Ζεῦ

is anywhere near awareness that this might be from Zeus - his deserts for the sack of Oechalia and all. The point, no doubt, is that the hero is so struck by this bolt from the blue, so taken up with D's treachery that he is quite unconscious of the aptness of his apostrophe of Zeus at the moment. His appeal to Zeus simply attests his sense of innocent (heroic) self-righteousness.

Heracles continues in magnificent heroic savagery. The irony is in the beauty of the dramatic execution: Zeus' requirements are met, *κούδεν τρόπων οὐτε μῆν Ζεὺς*; H's heroic essence is respected, cherished to the nth. It is, after all, for mortals to be humbled, not heroes - certainly not heroes whose rightful place is Olympus; and here in its turn is what lies behind the pyre from which the least hint (almost) of an apotheosis is carefully eschewed: the irony (of the same configuration as before) that the H whose affairs are disposed of to such full account by Zeus is by this route bound for Olympus. For its full ironical complement, I would say, the play assumes the apotheosis on Oeta - and we may as justifiably accept this as in the drama as we accept Zeus' contemplation of Eurytus' fate as in the drama (which is to say, not at all, unless ...)

Once again the irony is sustained by ignorance - H's ignorance of what is to come, his unconsciousness of this aspect of his destiny (at the pass to which he has come as he gives his orders to Hyllus) being entirely of a piece with his unawareness of the necessity of Zeus' law on earth - that embraces even him, while earth-bound.

If it is evident the play works by ironical suggestion about what Zeus is actually doing in the play - how in his inscrutable way he is

being mindful of his son (at every step), then it is also clear how the dramatist achieves this by excluding Zeus from the drama, hiding Zeus' hand, hiding, on a like logic, the apotheosis. These are two planned invisibles, intangibles.

Consonant with them is the superhuman heroic personality, what critics notice as his violence, cruelty, self-centredness full stop. Which is quite in order except the full stop. This barbarity of H is just his heroic ethos operative in humanity. Such an ethos fitting him for his breathless fate fits him also for a place among the gods.

G. Murray (p.125) quotes the entry in Suidas on Heracles. He continues: "The paracharaxis is obvious. The primitive strong man is simply turned into a stoic saint. The label is kept and the content altered. But I think it is fairly clear that quite a different paracharaxis was at work on the H of the Tr.: a change nearer to the original, more rebellious, more subtle, and forming a deeper criticism of life. The late allegorist made straight for edification as the crow flies; he did not as a rule attempt to study the saga in itself. S studies the saga, tests it, and finds it evil, and shows how the false ideal which it represents really works in human life. The hero himself is left, his exploits are left; all the content, so to speak, is left as it was; but the stamp or superscription is shown not to fit. The *ἀριστος ἀρετῶν* of conventional tradition comes out as something monstrous, something which cannot be called 'good;' the son of Zeus is not above human standards, but below; a son, one might almost say, worthy of that inscrutable being who is responsible for all the misery and chaos of the world ..." For Murray the play ends with H below man, exposed. This however is not Sophocles'

purpose but an arrangement of the poet on the way to his aim which is not to leave H below man but to present the hero in himself and the reality (the saga as it "really works in human life") simultaneously. The important distinction is that it is not the poet's purpose merely to give expression to that reality. His aim is not paracharaxis but the contrary. He wished to represent the essential Heracles - and he did so by showing how, in his essence, he was totally at odds with convention - with normal, ethical, conscienced humanity. (Thus the hero, having accomplished his Oechalian exploit, sacrifices grandly at Cenaeum). Thus the hero is represented super-humanly: against the foil of D; as a law unto himself, heroically self-centred (e.g. his inconsiderately impassioned appeal to Hyllus to take him up even if it means sharing his fate; cf. p. 13 , with respect to Hyllus and Iole); as unthinking in the purest, most primal way - totally given over to prowess, conscious of that only (and the dramatist achieves this again, in part, by showing up to the utter unconsciousness of the subject, the hero's sexual prowess as a malady, an affliction that takes hold of him like a wild animal - so Easterling, BICS 67).

S then does not reduce the hero to sub-human - and leave him there. This observation, that the hero is represented whole rests on the impressions detailed - matter outside of the question of the apotheosis. If the apotheosis is seen as entailed by the play's dramatic logic then consonant with this is the way the hero is represented: integral H, in truth an enormous misfit here on earth may with perfect harmony - and irony that is not in fact irony - pass on to the theoi. This synthesis takes account of the ambiguous representation of Heracles: more god/beast than man.

Part II, in fact, perfectly realizes the ambiguous representation of the hero. (To the extent that this is what Part II pre-eminently achieves - a dramatic view of H acting out now before us the ambivalence of his being - it represents a magnificent culmination of the trend of the drama. Part II, perhaps, is the most 'dramatic' scene of the play.⁷⁰ So, it would be set in relief by being viewed against the long preceding section of fantasy-filled, poetic-artificial, narrative-styled drama. This section has a certain dream-like unreality lent by these elements. Even the very dramatic situation built around D has the vividness of a dream, from the strong impress of fate. The dramatic Deianira-scenes are underlaid with structural artificiality: (1) the Lichas-Messenger intrigue, in which Lichas' deception is pointed up as deception (see p. 8f.) by the elaborate balance and opposition of truth and half-truth; contributing to the artificiality are the strange antics of Lichas, the lengths he goes to in public to show up his master; even the messenger's zeal itself has to be reconciled with the fully invidious aspect of the tidings he heard from Lichas; (2) the balance of D's two rheses on love about the first stasimon; (3) the parodos, discussed p.61f.).

1089 ff.: ὦ χέπε, χέπε! . . . ὑψεις ἐκεῖνοι δὴ καθέστατε οἱ ποτε!
Νερέας ἔνοικον . . . βίᾳ κατειχάσασθε . . . διφαῦ τ' ἄρεικον ἵπποβάρνον
ορπαῖον! θηρῶν, οὐριοντὸν, ἄνοπον, ἵππεροχον βίᾳν . . .

As he dwells on some of the highlights of his grand career (and let us not begrudge him his due or minimise his heroic achievement, attested in the play)⁷¹ he is unconscious how perfectly, in the context of the play, his description of his victims fits himself. The association of H's nosos

with his eros is a function, once more, of imagination.⁷² Imagination responds to the lines just quoted and notices that the language the hero uses to describe his centaur victims unconsciously suits him down to the ground - the H that Eros made destroy Oechalia to have Iole. H's nosos comes to him from Nessus. Unconscious of the self-revelation in his sickness he is also unaware that what rages inside his blood now is, symbolically, Nessus' hybristic eros:⁷³ the eros that made Nessus attempt to violate D. That eros, we see now, was of the same quality that made H attack Oechalia for Iole. When N tried to rape D, H acted justly (which is to overstate the matter - he simply did what was right). The fact remains: the difference in H is plain. When he attacked Oechalia it escaped him that he was acting with no better motives, no better justice than Nessus. This then is why there are two (connected) oracles governing H's fate. The one needed the other for intelligibility. Or, rather, his fate, once its lines become clear, makes both oracles intelligible at once - and in their inter-connection.

H's fate is bi-oracular. One oracle related, cryptically, to Nessus, in the hero's past; the other apparently pointedly (76-7) to Oechalia, of present concern. These oracles combine to suggest their particular fateful movement: Evenus will overtake H (at Cenaeum, of which neither oracle contained a hint!) via Oechalia. Cenaeum, we thought, was significant as seeming to bring out, in various ways, the superman in H. He appears heroic, almost god-like through Hyllus as he sacrifices to Zeus - and shortly afterwards he is seen violent and raging as with characteristically superhuman strength he victimizes the unfortunate Lichas. At Evenus, on the other hand, H appeared in

typically mythic persona. Fully in his element, justly (as I claim) he destroys an evil force in the service of man - that is to say, his own wife. Now consider Oechalia. It was plainly seen that the hero is conceived humanly here, acting all too humanly as he succumbs to Iole and acts to possess her. Nessus' robe caught up with H unexpectedly because, coming when it came, it caught him out: Heracles this time had been acting with Nessus' hybris in wanton, violent rape - the violence however now spilling over politically: it destroys Eurytus, a whole city (as it destroyed Iphitus if he died for the same reason - because the hero could not have his way with the girl). The conclusion must be that that, simply, is the form hybris takes in the hero's case, corresponding to the simpler, sadder hybris of Ther Kentauros, for which he was properly punished. The erotic and the political are inextricably intertwined in society and 'properly punished' was Heracles, in his father's sight, grandly sacrificing.

One notices immediately (the inverted commas notwithstanding) that this conclusion is made explicit only with injury to the drama itself, the whole tendency of which is to submerge it in symbolism and suggestion well underneath the action.

It becomes easy then to go on to suppose that god-like H sacrificing at Cenaeum was not being god-like in vain; that in one instant the superb sacrificer was going to be sacrificed and in the same was, in fact, being given his first leg-up to a truly blessed life of immortality.

Tr. is a dialectical play. It suggests a level of meaning only to supercede it. (A little like Easterling superceding Kitto - with the proviso that only via Kitto Easterling).

The dialectic is determined by the nature of H evinced by the play, part man, part beast/god.

The events have ultimately no moral significance: the immorality of the son of Zeus is an artifact of a human view and a human situation. (cf. remarks p.48 et passim). If we see Oechalia destroyed through an overmastering passion and an intricately worked out Nemesis following that is no more than illusion: one staged by Zeus, a play to evince his power: terrible, just, wise.⁷⁴ For him it is but a mechanism for the translation of his son, conveniently sprung on a disgruntled centaur. This, actually, is the spirit of the drama. *οὐ αἰώνια νῦν εὐαισχύνεται οὐκέτε κατευνάζεται τε φλογίζεται*: the pyre put H to sleep (in death) as he blazed and night (sin or, to keep the metaphor, pathological eros) dying gave birth to the sun, H immortal. (cf. Segal, 108).

Having noticed earlier in this section the introduction, at the start of the play and in the parodos, of the two themes of mutability in life and mortality I should end this essay by tying in with the 'mother' theme of mutability in human fortune and the cycle of joy and sorrow (and the theme of mortality) the central theme of eros. The connection is clear. The different erotes of D and H each in their own way exist within, express the necessary scheme of mutability. Into the cycle of joy and sorrow men and women are launched by Eros, the cycle is the subjective expression, or experience, of the objective necessity of fate. The link, or bridge, between subjective and objective, between the impulse of Eros and the outcome is *δόξας*, deception. This had to be because of the

position at the nub of things of Nessus who was thwarted erotically but won through deceptively. He beguiled D, cast a spell over her mind (just as Iole's looks beguiled Heracles). Thus deception is at the heart of the action (since love, acting strongly, has the effect of beguiling): Lichas' deception acting on the heroine promotes her subsequent action; her deception of him in turn necessitated by her recourse to magic, the epitome of deception. The charm, as it were, infects H with self-deception - rather, delusion. His delusion in Deianira disguises and betrays the deceptiveness of Eros - its essential malignancy in him.

Mutability, eros, deception, magic constitute a thematic unity - with which 'late learning' sits uneasily. Late learning is not a theme because the play, unlike O.T., is not a quest for truth. "He makes his characters act on the basis of likelihood, while the fatal dice are loaded hopelessly and irrationally in favour of the most unlikely event. Thus, in the split between the hoped-for likelihood and the unknown, unlooked-for facts, the plot of the Tr. becomes a long and painful search for truth, whose final discovery brings overwhelming despair."⁷⁵ The plot of the Tr. is not a search for truth, not even with Deianira.⁷⁶ The emphasis is not on learning (late) but on acting (blind).

FOOTNOTES

1. Heracles is abbreviated H, Deianira D, though not with great consistency.
2. Part 1, as it were, eminently 'readable,' Part 2 challenging the actor. cf. Mazon 7f.
3. This development is reflected/aided in an aspect of the 'progression' of the choral odes. The chorus is constituted of girls of Trachis. Fittingly, the view which they most suitably transmit is the youthful Deianira's view of H, the mythic hero of her courtship, as in the 1st stasimon. To them he is also the hero of the labours, parodos str. β , 3rd stasimon str. α ; the conqueror of Oechalia 3rd stasimon ant. β ; and D's husband. They sympathetically reflect her mood - anxious longing, parodos ant α and hopes - her anticipation of his victorious homecoming, 2nd stasimon ant α . (But cf. 383, $\delta\lambda\omega\nu\tau\alpha \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ - a spontaneous and ambivalent outburst sympathetic with D's own thoughts of the moment no doubt, but for their inescapable condemnation of H more appropriate in the mouth of D than chorus). The chorus, in stasima at least, have no share in the H of D's inmost thoughts - when she discovers Iole. D must come to terms with her thoughts alone. As she does so the chorus in their 1st stasimon sing of the youthful, courting D. This is D at farthest remove from D of the present moment. The chorus show their sympathy and sensibility by turning to the past for refuge from the hard reality of the present.

The chorus is close to D and their contemplation of H is a function of this intimacy. But the progress of the play is such that the chorus must find this bond of sympathy and friendship severed by necessity of events. What is this to the picture of H?

The chorus sing their parodos to D in person. This would appropriately signal their friendship on their first appearance. (I examine this briefly on p.107).

All other odes are sung by chorus alone on stage. (During the 1st stasimon D has gone inside to fix the robe; during the second

she is discovering its insidiousness; during the third she kills herself. Only the fourth hides nothing). In the parodos they are responsibly sympathetic; in the 1st stasimon sympathetic indeed. In each case we see him in terms of her. (The voice of the chorus in the parodos is one of youthful optimism. Consider the bright, sunny opening and the optimism of the ending "who ever saw Zeus so unmindful of his children?" - with youthfulness goes a wise, sincere and straightforward piety. *τὸ γὰρ νέάζων ἐν τοιοῦτοις βόσκεται χιώφοιον αὐτοῦ, καὶ νῦν οὐ θάτπος θεοῦ οὐδὲ ὄψις ... κλονεῖ.* So D, from the close confines of her adult experience will address youth who emerge from the comparison (not without paradox) specially gifted and accordingly wise in spite of inexperience. The implications of the 'dual' standard in characterization implicit in this view of chorus in relation to heroine are considered in detail in Section B. (p. 61 ff.). The characterization of chorus is not naturalistic. They are identifiably 'youthful' but not with the conformability expected in a character: there is 'over-characterization' - they are given a reach beyond their nature).

In the second stasimon the chorus see H more or less in their own view and their identity is local: they apostrophise the inhabitants of the region of Oeta and the Malian Gulf and as members of these communities they happily look forward to the victorious return of Zeus' son by Alcmena, as does Deianira (ant. α). They have had no news of him for a twelvemonth and know how D. has fretted. When they go on in ant. β to wish him arrived they do so in their own right as youthful Trachinians looking forward to seeing him sacrificing by them. Their concluding hope is that he will be altogether his wife's by the efficacy of the charm.

In the third stasimon they transcend the limits of their community. They speak of an old prophecy predicting that after 12 years Heracles' labours would end (an ancient prophecy concerning the present time as coming 12 years after some unspecified time or event?). The mention of the 12 year period, unique to them, makes the chorus seem to speak from knowledge gained outside the action of the play - not confined to Trachinian circumstances involving Deianira and

Heracles but universal Greek knowledge. (See also p. 61).

In ant. α they relate this knowledge to what they have recently learned from Hyllus of Heracles' plight. They embark on reflections explanatory (as if to disabuse Hyllus in his absence) of Deianira's action (str. β). In ant. β they stand almost outside the play and take in the scene in a grand sweep. In this summing up they place the rape of Iole in its fateful position in the context of Heracles' exploits, aligning his life-story, his strengths and weaknesses, within the divine order (Cypria) and its determination of destiny, of which oracles can give an intimation. The stasimon is thus cyclical. The chorus come round to their starting point by interpreting Heracles' fate. This stasimon is thus the most inspired, visionary one that they sing. Their singing it at this particular moment after D has slipped quietly indoors, has doubtless something to do with it. Perhaps their inspiration comes from sensing the juddering of the unseen wheel of fate about to complete a revolution ... At all events their inspired perspective entails remoteness from the common lot of men - and Deianira.

The chorus then do not tell much anything new about Heracles. What develops is their own identity, their independence of view as the umbilical cord connecting them to Deianira is cut. They move - rather, drift of necessity - away from Deianira towards independence of relationship vis-a-vis Hercules, taking us along as fellow-passengers. They do not add much to the picture of Heracles but promote the travel of the play which is from subjective views of him towards objective.

The chorus project an ideal view of H. This is most purely realized in the first strophe of the parodos. In this way the chorus are discreetly but highly functional - since they will continually afford their pure, ideal view as foil to the debasement of the hero in the course of dramatic circulation.

The parodos, as I suggest, epitomizes this tendency - their splendidly sunny and elated concept of H (Alcmena's son whose whereabouts they appeal to the sun to reveal) emerging out of the context of dialogue in which we hear that H was lately Omphale's char.

Knox, reviewing Ronnet, states on p. 698: "When, to take one of Ronnet's problems, the chorus of young girls who have so far been sympathetic to D, weep for H as if they had never known his wife, they do so because S wants the audience to think now not of D's innocence but of the greatness of the dying hero and, quite clearly, he was not at all worried that the audience would concern itself with what had happened to the 'character' of the chorus." But Knox's implication here that the poet allows the chorus to act out of character ("he used whatever means or mode was appropriate to the dramatic situation," ad loc.) is mistaken. The chorus are consistently found to 'idealize' H: see essay, pp. 26 and 39 (in this they chime in with reality rather than illusion: we understand this fully at lines 1112/3; and see p. 39).

4. "and we had children whom he saw as a farmer might a remote field he has acquired - at sowing and then at harvest only." (31) As is well recognized, the point is his absence with but occasional appearances - a thematic simile. Also, D puts her own emotions in it: she identifies with the remote field the farmer has acquired. Her forceful expression of emotion is in the vein of her vigorous speech of 531 ff. (Curiously, both Jebb and Easterling fail to translate $\tau\alpha\rho\nu$, thus doing less than justice to the subjectivity of the simile: D herself feels neglected and lonely). cf. LSJ II i.c
 $\tau\alpha\rho\nu$ 'receive in marriage', e.g. $\xi\rho\nu\eta\rho\tau\rho\nu\rho$ $\tau\rho\rho$ $\gamma\rho\rho\tau\rho\rho$
 $\tau\alpha\rho\tau\rho$ X HG6.4.37.
5. D's ready reliance on others has subjective and objective manifestation. The latter in the general phenomenon of indirect information: rumour, then report processed from disingenuousness to inscrutability perhaps, yet forming the basis of her decision and action; the former in various ways: her dependence on the nurse's suggestion; the interrogation of Lichas at the chorus' suggestion and messenger's initiative, followed by D's own clinching contribution; her exit from the house to consult the chorus on her decision concerning the robe. Her tragic submission to Hyllus' impulsive condemnation is also in character.

6. But by the stasimon's position after the revelation of Iole's significance and before D's intimation to the chorus of her fateful treatment of the robe this detail representing D's delicate withdrawal from the arena reflects on her present situation of taking her destiny in her own hands and acting alone (and from afar) to remedy her plight. This significance is present, with its suggestion of a comparison of happier days with less happy ones by the contrast of the mythological and real-life situations in respect of the effect one's own actions might have upon the outcome.
7. "Für einen kurzen Augenblick darf Deianeira glauben das der *ἀλυτῆς βίος*, der Herakles für den Fall, das er die kritische Zeit überstehe, verheissen ist, für ihn, damit aber auch für sie, und das heisst: für das Haus, dem ihr Sorgen und Walten gilt, gesichert sei ... Das kurze Dank - und Jubellied, das darauf folgt, ist der einzige, ergreifende Ruhepunkt der Tragödie. Er wird ermöglicht durch die wohlbedachte Abspaltung der vorläufigen von der offiziellen Botschaft des Lichas. Mit diesem und den Madchen tritt das Unheil auf die Bühne, das D zuvor schon in unbestimmter Weise vorahnt. (Beck, 17).
8. 38 ff. In Apollodorus the cause of the Trachinian exile was H's unintentional homicide of Oeneus' cup-bearer. He was staying with his father-in-law. He then left Calydon and came to the Evenus and Nessus (thus found, in Sophocles, moved back to the mythic and away from the human phase of operations). In Sophocles H comes to Trachis from Tiryns.
9. So also Kranz 290, T. von Wilamowitz 100 f. But not so if Matthews p. 76 ff. is correct in referring to the banquet held by Eurytus fragment F 13 K in which (host bids guest?) *ἄντρα μέπον, μέπον γὰρ ἔχεις χλυκεροῖο πότοιο, | στείχε παρὰ μηστὴν ἀλοχον...*
10. Apollodorus II.6. init. There are two traditions. In the other, as Diodorus IV. 31. init., H simply woos Iole and is refused, Eurytus fearing a repetition of what befell Megara. Also the

Scholiast on Euripides' Hippolytus 545 in Schwarz's edn., with authorities adduced.

11. When developments inform one that Lichas' purpose was to cover-up Iole one might (as I confess I did) jump to the conclusion that this would account for (a) the mention of skill in archery in the quarrel between guest and host on the basis of there having been a contest which H won but got no joy of when E went back on his offer. This would give H some justification in attacking E - and create some problems for the interpretation of the play! (b) the unexplained abruptness of the mention of the quarrel: Lichas is skimming over what he cannot afford to go into; (c) H's motivation in coming to Oechalia. I was, in other words, able to give little due to the fact that H was already married on the supposition, perhaps, that he might have qualified for the archery contest by persuading the organizers that he intended to divorce D. This clearly won't do. (The original H, according to Apollodorus II.6.1., after his mad spell gave Megara to his nephew Iolaus; then, desiring marriage, went on to Oechalia).
12. In 255 διώροτεν . . . ξὸν μασὶ καὶ γυναικὶ δουλώτεν ἐπι there is an interesting use of ambiguity. Overtly H is simply taking an oath to enslave the man with his family. But the words are allowed to betray the hero's real purpose: μασὶ καὶ γυναικὶ = Iole (this is what he was thinking while taking - and formulating - his oath. cf. E.M. Craik, LCM 9.2. (Feb. 1984) 24-25 "An oblique reference to Iole - a vague yet ominous hint at the truth, well known to, and suppressed by, Lichas . . .")
13. When the messenger says (198) that Lichas οὐχ ἔκων, ἔκωδος δὲ ξύνετιν he is telling us about Lichas' reluctance to be held back any longer by an eagerly-listening crowd (a telling detail), not that he was reluctant to tell the crowd anything. The messenger means to assure Deianira of Lichas' imminent arrival. This is consistent with his complaisant nature, cf. 180, 374/5 etc.

14. 274 ff: Olympian lord Zeus our father, wroth on account of this deed of his had him sold into bondage nor put up with it that he killed this man alone of all guilefully ...
15. H is vitality embodied. For this quality he is venerated as a hero-god. (It is vitality as a law - and as such beyond good and evil - and justice).
16. *wore tektrōs*, 768, similarly reminds us of Hyllus' own circumstances. Hyllus here "unconsciously" recalls the sawdust simile 699 f. when D was discovering to her alarm the true powers of Nessus' philtre. It seems probable that the craftsman simile is designed for precisely that purpose. If so this might help us to interpret it correctly: "Sweat broke forth upon his flesh and his tunic clung to his torso, stuck fast like a craftsman's on every side." This seems better than "close-glued as if by a craftsman's hand." The simile is (a) graphic - serving visual conception (cf. Odyssey simile τ 232 f. *Ἐνόησα περὶ κροτίσιαν δέρα τε κροπύσοι λοπὸν κατὰ ιογατέοιο* - but this simile, by choice of the thing Odysseus is compared with also serves characterization), (b) recollective: not the craft of an artisan - still less the ancient equivalent of Bostik applied to both surfaces, H's back and his shirt, allow at least 15 min. to dry - but an image of the labouring craftsman himself will more put me in mind of the cutting of word at 700, the sawdust pile. The simile was correctly interpreted by C. Zijderveld p.175-6 who notes *cui versioni non modo nihil obstat sed etiam genitivum illum, in altera interpretatione satis molestum nunc optime in contextum quadrare neminem fugiet.*
17. cf. Apollodorus II.5.12. This meeting is not in Homer at Θ 367 ff. The scholiast on Iliad Φ 194 relates a version of the meeting in which Meleager asked H to marry D. It is not clear if this was in Pindar who, according to the scholiast, composed a poem containing H's duel with Achelous. cf. J.G. Frazer's note (p.256) on Apollodorus II.7.5.

18. Althaea's brand (*τὸν δῆν ποῖρ' ἐπέκνωεν τότε ζώας*
ὅποι <Μελέαγρω> ἔμεν) has its counterpart, almost, in Sophocles' Tr. in Heracles' oracle. Both as it were delimit life-span. Althaea knowing the brand's significance and power kindles it. This points up a feature of Tr. which one might tend to overlook: although it is Heracles who received and wrote down the oracle the play in its early part makes D the 'wielder' of it (at one point - 76 f. - she seems so versed in its interpretation as to be able to announce that its message connected H's fate with Euboea. cf. Kamerbeek 10). This tends to make D backhandedly into an Althaea. cf. n.29.
19. These lines - indeed, Bacchylides' conception of the meeting of H and Meleager in Hades - provide a wry comment on the mix-up in Homer (λ 601 ff.) where H does not quite know whether he is in Heaven or Hell and are entirely homeric in their prejudice that the latter is his proper place. For H, son of Zeus, unwittingly meeting his fate in Meleager - in Hades - thinks nothing, judging by his question, of finding a slain son of a god in Hades - and such was Meleager (Ares - so Apollodorus I.8.2.). The 5th Ode contains a poignant but merely suggested message in the mortal fate of H that it adumbrates in Meleager's; the Tr. of Sophocles remains quite true to the subtlety, preserves it (it takes over B's *χαλεπὸν θεῦν παραρρέψαν* νάον *ἄνδρεσσιν επιχθόνιοις* 94f.) but develops within it to an end-message that is not the same as B's.

The similarity in the movements of Bacchylides' fifteenth Ode and Tr. may go back to a single common epic source. On the other hand it may reflect a certain affinity between two poets working from the available Heracles traditions, an eye in them for the same sort of thing. It seems not unreasonable to think that S built on what he found in B (technique, inspiration, i.e. poetic vision, irony). This suggests itself particularly in the interactions that can be discerned in Ode 5 and Tr.

20. I would not want to submerge B in S. B's poem has an effect that is all its own - the effect of the intriguing personal encounter of a man with his fate. (Sophocles' story depends on separation and distance - H's fate worked out for him in his absence). B exploits this situation richly perhaps even in what he has left unsaid: Meleager, like H, had 'another woman' involved in his fate. So Apollodorus I. 8.2. Homer I 529 f. does not mention Atalanta but then his version - something it has in common with B's - is manifestly doctored to his own dramatic purpose.
21. When Lichas told the folk Iole was to be H's δάμα^τ he was being ironic - intentionally, and not in the usual, unconscious (Sophoclean) way. Lichas can consequently capitalise on this by making the messenger's assertion 427-8 look absurd. cf. Stanford 164: "The most noticeable feature of S's style with respect to our theme is his predilection for making his characters use unconscious rather than deliberate ambiguities. In this he is appealing to his audience through his characters more than in them."
22. "Unconscious 'ironic' ambiguity" - Stanford 164.
23. Her hamartia.
24. So she says but in this objective, 'realistic' vein in so confronting herself with the plain facts - Heracles is madly in love - she continues behind her back, as it were, the trend of her earlier tendency in this speech - the nurture of jealousy - but from the other direction, from H's side now, not Iole's.

D's pitying Iole here invites recall of the earlier moment of pity (307 ff.). Although she seems to continue in her noble feeling - as indeed she does, there being no malevolence - at the same time we are sensible in how different a position Deianira herself stands now. Her pity of earlier had all the magnanimity of her strong position then: blessed wife of the victorious - saved - hero. Her pity is still real now but we sense its fragility - it must be that her pity for Iole in this way is pity for herself, unconsciously, because there is not the elevation, distance of formerly but equality,

identification: D has put them both on the same footing. The true significance of this speech of sophrosyne is the actual weakness of the heroine as she makes her brave stand. (But cf. Beck, 18).

25. The sexual connotation of D's suicide by sword in H's bedroom are noted by R.P. Winnington-Ingram, p. 81, n. 28 and Easterling n. 915-6. D's last desire is death. But synergistic is the fact that Iole was taken with the sword. There are echoes of desire and destiny in that. *Ἐτεκ' ἔτεκε περάλαν ἡ νέορος ἀδε νύμφη σόροισι τοῖσθ' Ερινύες* - the chorus on hearing what D has done. Also, the active violence by which D kills herself recalls imagery associated with her hamartia of doing battle with the gods: *πύκτης ὄπως*.
26. 536 ff. - a not well-understood comparison. Jebb, for instance, has not interpreted this simile accurately - possibly from taking *παρεισδέεγματ* to imply 'among the rest' (so also Mazon and Kamerbeek). Easterling's correct translation of *παρ-* (at my side) still does not prevent her from taking the point of the simile, like Jebb and Campbell, to be the 'fatal' nature of the cargo ("S. does not explain what is wrong with the fatal cargo ... the important point is that Iole resembles something that looks harmless but turns out to be destructive.") The error arises from associating *φόρον* with *τωβητόν* (*ἐρπότηνα*) before, what is more basic, *ἐρπότηνα* itself - i.e. emphasizing the attributes of the cargo at the expense of the actual thing.

What the simile mainly conveys is the burdensome (oppressive) effect of a realization upon the mind, once one 'ships' it. Her realization that Heracles has enjoyed Iole (*ἴζευγμένην* - the root of the image, after all) completes, adds painful (*τωβητόν*) finality to, the saddling of her mind with the new, consolidated understanding of Iole's significance. "This girl now - but a maiden no longer, as I think - I take up, like a sailor cargo, pernicious goods to load my mind." /The

The imagery combines simile and metaphor. Primary in the image (though not in the syntax - the red herring?) is the mental burden - the oppressiveness in knowing. The loaded cargo now suggests (or perhaps was suggested by?!)^{επιτόληρα}, goods. She has received Iole as goods despatched and received, traded for a robe, and what she's received is cheapened (one of the connotations of ^{επιτόληρα} applied metaphorically to I) - a graphic if brutal way of conveying something of the history or process of coming to know that she is nothing like what D conceived at first.

Deianira seeing the light, her new mood of realism is conveyed in the string of venal, commercial images - ^{επιτόληρα}, ^{οἰκούρια}. ^{χρήσις} also lowers the tone to the ordinary level of commodities:

D's attitude is her rhesis after the stasimon is subjective. She relates to H now not with the detached 'realism' of anyone who but looks on with eyes open but as one whom H's actions affect personally. Her heart is involved now, not just her mind - and this moral phase calls up decision and action.

27. Zeus ^{ἀγώνιος} - not in Cook! cf. L.R. Farnell, Cults p.59, with note.
28. cf. just before (at 20) ὃς εἰς ἀγῶνα τῷδε συνηεώντι πάχης ἐκμέτατι μὲν. "Agonistic language is repeatedly used of the activities of Heracles" (Easterling 80n.) At 20 and 506, both chronicling the duel, the operative word is ^{ἀγών} (20: ^{ἀγῶνα} πάχης - trial of combat, Campbell; 506: ^{ἀεθλὸν} ^{ἀγώνων} - ordeal of the duel = ^{ἀγῶνας}, Kamerbeck). cf. Zeus ^{ἀγώνιος}. But at 20 πάχης usu. of armies; while a similar conflation, but in the other direction, found at 80 where the attack on Oechalia is spoken of as a labour, ^{ἀθλός} (bearing in mind the oracle concerned the completion of labours).

As Kamerbeek notes re Zeus ^{ἀγώνιος} according to the chorus (515) Aphrodite was the umpire. Zeus then referee with overriding voice?

29. D remembered Nessus' instruction conscientiously - like bronze-inscribed writings, 683. That must recall the oracular tablet. Easterling: "Dramatically it is linked with the real tablet mentioned earlier in the play; in each case the message is tragically misconstrued." The bronze tablet image links Nessus' philtre with the oracle; by reflecting the oracular tablet it underscores, with irony (her conscientious application), D's part in H's destiny.

682: ἀλλ᾽ ἐωψόμην

χαλκῆς ὅπως δύσοντον ἐκ δέλτου γραφήν.
καὶ ποι τάδε ἦν πρόφητα, καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἔδρων,
τὸ γάρνακον τοῦτ' ἄπυρον ἀκτίνος τ' ἀεὶ κ.τ.λ.

In particular 684 ('and such was prescribed me and such did I accomplish') invites taking inter-contextually: πρόφητα πατέται - D accomplished them. The irony here puts in a certain light an aspect of the oracle; or the irony is now seen to be reinforced by something we recollect about the oracle as D propounds it. The distinctive feature of the oracle in D's mouth (as opposed to H's) is its alternative formulation: either H is going to die or if, he comes through past time X, live on happily. In other words the way it turns out rests on D. cf. n.18.

30. re. Lichas' irrepressibility cf. 601 and 531-2 with 319; also Kamerbeek 319n.
31. A twofold destiny, two oracles, two beasts "collaborating" in H's destiny (v. ant a of 3rd stasimon) - how thoroughgoing is the symbolism meant to be? "His agony has two aspects: he is stung by excruciating pain and stuck fast in a grip he cannot escape. The first is seen as the doing of Nessus, the second as that of the Hydra which being a snake is easily imagined holding him in its grip ... This is a bold lyrical restatement of Hyllus' account in the preceding scene, its significance interpreted by the chorus in the light of what D has told them." (Easterling on ant a of stasimon 3). A 'bold interpretation' because of its rationalization of the respective functions, the division of labour, of Hydra and Nessus. Hyllus noticed two things, broadly: adhesion of the robe and signs

as of a poison devouring him. Can we take the chorus' aetiology for these signs farther back - to the two similes that D used to convey the effect of the philtre on her woollen applicator (does this imagery have a symbolic twist?). But her similes provide images respectively of corrosion and effervescence: both seem to parallel the action on H's body of Nessus' contribution - digestion of the flesh (sawdust) and hot irritation (bubbling) due to the former: *ἀπηγάνει τὸν αἰκίζεται φόρμα δολιόνυθα κέντρον ἐμίζεσσαντα*, where one might justifiably read some marring, mauling in *αἰκίζεται*, torments. It would seem, therefore, that in the two similes Sophocles wishes to mimic quite comprehensively the symptoms of the poison's action - part of the magical fantasticality of it all is that the philtre could adumbrate its effects thus in inanimate matter. In passing, one notices another fantastic detail - Nessus seems to control the lethality of the philtre where one might expect this to come from Hydra. (Nessus certainly dominates the chiastic figure in ant. 1, 3rd stasimon -- and all necessity, *ἀνάγκη*, derives from him). The effect of the imagery's delegation of increased authority on Nessus is, naturally, to emphasize his personal contribution in H's fate.

Hyllus' observations of his father in his unhappier phase at Cenaeum permit comparison of H in his furious agony (end of Lichas) and Polyphemus. D's two similes may owe something, may allude to Odyssey 9's double simile also drawing on the crafts. The similes correspond in that the first of each pair evokes a craftsman at work (but so does the second one in the Odyssey); the second of each pair involves phenomena which occur at the interface of nature (water/must) and applied human skills; but most of all in their co-operancy, illustrating various aspects of a process.

The fantasticality noticed goes hand in hand with its contrary - the humanization of D's venture with the anointed robe (humanization is what we pre-eminently link with Deianira). This is, I think, much to be noticed in the tentative openness of D towards the project. She consults the chorus on the wisdom of trying it. (She jibs at having to have recourse to magic. The only point here is that it offends her sense of delicacy). This is all very homely and intimate. Their

discussion seems to centre mainly on whether it will work. You can only try. cf. remarks on innocence and fallibility on p. 46; also n. 36.

32. The result, I think, is to emphasize the disparity of the protagonists in respect of what they have in common and also in what they are as if totally different beings. They have in common Eros. H overmasters all - but his passion for the girl overmasters him. D's love is also passionate (443 f.): she obeys this in bringing into play magic as a means of diverting H's desire from its natural path.

In each protagonist alike Eros manifests himself in his wonted way, which is to say, selfishly: love as possession. Ehrenberg points out this common denominator, in selfishness, in the two. What we need to keep in sight is the difference between them, within this Cypric framework. H's possessiveness is desire plain and simple and ruthless in achievement of its object. D's asserted itself in self-defence, self-preservation and must stand in contrast not quite (pace Ehrenberg) as bourgeois (see below), but of nobility by comparison in respect of motive and nature: its constancy (as Hyllus says, *χρήτα πωπένη*). Indeed, there is a paradox here - an enormity (to be viewed as against the enormity of the sack of Oechalia) in what is the root of D's tragedy: that she thought to tie a Heracles down.

"She acted but not in the defence of eternal laws (for instance, the sanctity of marriage) but for her own private happiness, for her undisturbed position as H's wife." Quite true, but that this should incur the absolute condemnation that it does in Ehrenberg arises from consideration of it absolutely, independently of the corresponding action in her spouse. This goes against the grain of the Trachiniae's comparative, interrelational method. Ehrenberg states (149, previous quote 151) that the alleged two principles of manhood and womanhood never come into conflict with each other. True again but this does not mean they (or what represents them) are not considered interrelatedly. Such interrelational considerations form a vital part of the play's structure: in the marked separation of the strands. / (I cannot

(I cannot keep myself from indicating a flaw in Ehrenberg's argument. In essence this is that S recasts the myth to enforce the moral that the self-centredness (individualism) of H entails death: real death, without regeneration on the pyre. On the way he argues, 156: "In the legend H did not die but was borne from the flames to the gods ... but is it possible to assume that without the slightest hint given by the poet every spectator would supply the story? It surely is not, and S makes it quite clear that he did not think of this form of the legend. The oracles had foretold H's death, and 'nothing else was meant but that I should die' (1172)." Ehrenberg overlooks that the oracle had not, in fact, foretold H's death. That is what he interpreted it might possibly mean (see p. 57 ff. of this essay). The oracle itself (1170, 821 ff.) foretold release from labours).

33. I do not understand Easterling's note to 1224. Surely H is telling Hyllus to marry (προσθεῖται δάμαρτα) Iole. cf. her introduction, p. 2.
34. The throwback to εὐωπίς serves to contrast the real D with the ogre in his mind.
35. The Heracles-scene is marked by such unconscious, Oedipodean irony, e.g.
 - (a) 1000 τίς γὰρ ἀοιδός, τίς ὁ χειροτέχνης ιατρός, ὃς τάνε' ἄταν
χωρὶς Ζηνὸς κατακηλήσει; ἀοιδός suggests enchantment, magic - H puts his finger on his problem. χειροτέχνης, again, brings to mind that peripatetic craftsman associated with glued shirts, corrosion, sawdust, etc.
 - (b) 1039 οὐδὲ πάτητες ἄθεος. Godless mother (kills godly father). He is in the dark concerning realities at both ends of the proposition.
 - (c) 1021 Hyllus: λαθίπονον δ' ὁδούναν οὖτ' ἔνδοτεν οὐτε θύρατεν
ἔστιν νοῦς ἐγανίσας βίοτον· τοιαῦτα νέψει Ζεύς.
The poet wishes us to recall the oracle as interpreted to D by H (see p. 57 ff.) He would either live ξαυπήγτω βίῳ (168) or die. At present he is in a limbo, neither dead nor enjoying carefree life. The effect is perhaps to suggest that H is tending to

one of these results, from out of his unforeseen pain.

(d) 1058 κού ταῦτα λόγχη πεδίας, οὐθ' ὁ γηγενής
στρατὸς Τιγάνων, οὐτὲ θῆρειος βίᾳ, οὐθ'. . . οὐθ'
ὅσην ἐγὼ γὰρ καθαίρων ἵκόμην ἔδρασε πω·

Wrong about λόγχη , θῆρειος βίᾳ , the evils abounding in the regions cleansed by the hero.

(e) 1050 ... ἡ δολῶπις Οἰνέως κόρη! καθῆγεν ἵποις τοῖς
Ἐρινύων ἑφαντὸν ἀμφίβληστρον, ὃ διόνυσος.

Where by Erinyes he means furies rather than avenging deities, the latter is closer to the truth, properly seen.

36. Interesting to compare the significance of H's relation to his son, as evinced here, with that of D's relation to the Trachinian maidens, particularly in her hesitation over sending the magic shirt. The significance of that scene is to play a gentle ethical light over the heroine, show up the delicacy and essential goodness of her nature (in the course of giving human naturalness to an essentially fairy-tale situation). H's behaviour in relation to Hyllus shows him in a quite different light. Also n.31 ad fin.

37. Adams p.130 distorts it: "Mention of Nessus brings instant understanding to the mind of Heracles... The theme of Zeus, long gathering momentum, rings through all that happens. Before our eyes the son of Zeus sheds his mortality, and with it all the thoughts and feelings of a mortal. The man becomes a demigod, endowed with a vision of what is yet to come, bestowed on him by supernatural insight or in the oracles of his father..."

His arrangements for dying are merely heroic - no more. The spirituality, confessionalism of Méautis cannot be upheld, p.289: "H meurt en homme, en héros, comme il convient. Il choisit la mort purificatrice du feu, puisqu'il sait qu'ainsi il sera débarrassé du feu de la luxure."

38. Another unconscious irony - she it was who became wroth at her husband's adultery.

39. Ethical, subjective: the human model - Deianira's case. We witnessed her ineffable ethicalness in her death. She would not compromise with evil. Ethicalness too in the gentlest blame accordable to her hamartia: seeing the well-reasoned way of moderation but being turned from it by memory and will - passion. Herculean 'personality' is nothing like this. It is on a quite different scale in respect of passion and death. Once more it is evident how artificial is the 'problem of the real hero of the play', the two protagonists setting up contrasts and oppositions (of the most fundamental kind, in terms of hero and human) in their affinities, throughout.
40. The ground was prepared for this at 779-82 where it has been observed (Radermacher) that H's destruction of Lichas is of a piece with Cyclops's treatment of Odysseus' comrades. See also n.31, 2nd paragraph. Kamerbeek, p.10, notes that Hyllus' mission to make inquiries about Heracles is reminiscent of Telemachus in the Odyssey (Webster's observation, p.165).
41. H's delusion in fearsome D could be funny if it were not so unfortunate. The stichomythia 1131-1133, merely as dialogue (if we could forget for a moment the tragic context of D's suicide) is on the way to tragicomedy. The comedy comes with the extremeness of H's self-delusion.
42. Critics have been deflected from the main issue - that the 'reason' H insists on Hyllus marrying Iole is to construct for the lad an unenviable fate (and the dramatic significance this has) - in debating H's motives. Waldock p.88/89 has made this transparent:
 "The chief question, I think, is not of H's motive in commanding this thing, but rather of S's motive in raising the issue at all. It would be strange if at such a late point in the play S were thinking of his hero's psychology (cf. Gellie 75, Ehrenberg 155), for we have passed beyond interests of that kind: the play has taken a larger sweep. And it is not as if we can have any

confidence that we know what the point really is ..."

Hyllus and Iole are well matched. They share in partnership with the Erinyes: Iole, having only to step into D's home, was avenged on H and this vengeance swept up D as well whom, secondarily, the Erinys punished, as it were, for killing H (interpretation of 893-5); Hyllus found himself aiding the fates in the matter of his mother's death (932:

*'ιδων δ' οὐ πάκις ὥρωζεν· εἴγνω γὰρ τάλας
τούργον καὶ δργήν ως ἐφάψειεν τόδε -*

Hyllus provided the catalytic *οργή*); finally he is to stage-manage his father's immolation. (Winnington-Ingram has an instructive note on the first point concerning Hyllus (212): both Hyllus and H see D as a Clytemnestra. Hyllus sees her as a Clytemnestra to be punished by an Erinys, not reflecting that Clytemnestra was punished ... by the matricide of a son).

43. cf. Webster 179.
44. "Obsessed by her love for H and her jealousy of Iole, she resorted to the supposed love-charm without due thought, assuredly one of the best instances of Aristotelian hamartia in Greek Tragedy." Isn't there perhaps even in such a fair view (Burton's, p. 64) a little more realism, morality than the situation might wish to call up? "It is characteristic of her innocent nature that she never thought of doubting the word of the dying centaur. He had professed to love her, and she took the gift of the charm to be a sign of his love and his wish to atone for his violence." Murray's observation (p. 119) of her innocence is on the right lines but his psychology does not quite ring true. Nessus said he was doing her a kindness because she was his last to ferry. But she will have believed him because in offering her a charm to forestall H in loving anyone else more than her he seemed to have appropriate credentials - representing to her (newly-married) mind the first occurrence of a third party coming between her and her husband. Such reasoning has the requisite fairy-tale quality of being at once natural and fantastic. cf. n. 31 ad fin and n. 36.

45. 119.
46. Jebb XXXVII
47. Johansen 259.
48. cf. Winnington-Ingram 89, "Justice is not a theme . . ."
49. Antidotal to the Easterling (quoted) I would suggest Letters (196): "All these perplexities disappear if we admit that S conceives H as a being apart, a magni Iovis incrementum, a future demi-god we are not to judge by normal human standards. The play judges him not at all, though it indicates that Zeus, in his own way, has already done so. Now the difficulty about characters like H is that, inmixed in the action, their very greatness, if it is to be dramatic and convincing, must reveal itself as tragic, that is, as purely human greatness. They will therefore be less daimonic than dynamic. The hero will have eclipsed the god. If on the other hand, our dominant impression is to be of his superhuman attributes, the hero must, so to speak, command rather than share the action from the background - a condition applying equally to a Prometheus and a Heracles. Euripides chooses the first alternative in his very human Mad Heracles (how should divinity shine through a raving lunatic?): Sophocles the second and more difficult in the Trachiniae.

Long before we see him for ourselves, H is sketched for us by D, the chorus and the lesser actors. He is Dorian and Homeric, an epic or, better, an episodic rather than strictly dramatic hero. A tremendous being of action, he receives oracles from his father Zeus, and from him only. He prays to no other god. Always conscious that his fate is in those omnipotent hands, he fears nothing and no one. Now a man of action, and of action only, tends to lack psychological and even dramatic distinction. His actions will vociferate his motives instead of themselves requiring the gradual illumination of motive and character . . .

Sophocles has eluded this difficulty in both halves of the Tr. H engrosses us in the first precisely because we do not see, but hear of him. The situation develops his epic features consistently with his demi-godhead . . ."

- 100.
50. Reinhardt, 52 f.: "... it would be idle to raise the question whether 'guilt' here implies no more than a causal relationship or to what extent it implies a sense of guilt involving intention or responsibility. It is no accident that no distinction is drawn between them ... The essence of the concept (of the daemon) lies in the secret of a unity which it represents between will and fate ... A hidden unity of cause and consciousness appears visibly at the end in D's identification with the alien when she is ready to die." Beneath this unity of will and fate, even propping it up, I fancy, is the ethical distinction that Reinhardt stops short of making (he is absolutely right in his observation that it is in Sophocles' purpose himself not to make the distinction): D's impulse to suicide more than anything sets cause and consciousness apart because of her steadfast refusal not to admit factors of consciousness (essentially, an innocent conscience) in mitigation of the simple fact that she has caused H's destruction.
51. "... the Tr. is dependent on the art of the story-teller in the same way as the Ajax is dependent on the epic." (Reinhardt 62).
52. So also Kranz 286 f.
53. Whitman 108: "The wealth of oracular material only emphasizes the impossibility of knowing the future."
54. But cf. Adams 131 note 13.
55. cf. Jebb ad 824 and Adams 125 f.
56. The chorus and Heracles give the original oracle. Yet a subtle difference in their respective formulations reflects what the oracle, as they know it, conveys to each of them. There is a subtle but discernible difference between coming to the end of, the $\alpha\omega\delta\chi\grave{a}v$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\bar{\nu}\pi\acute{o}v\omega v$ of the chorus, 825 and Heracles' being granted release from toils: $\lambda\acute{u}oiv \tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\bar{\nu}\thetaai$, 1171. The first conveys mainly termination; attention is focused on the labours, which now cease. But Heracles' formula emphasizes absolution - he will be stimulated to think on the lines of what it will mean to be released.

57. These are, I feel, insufficiently taken into account by Burton (44) in his arguments that D might have been expected to answer the chorus's opening question πόθεν νοῦ . . . ναίει and so probably appears on stage only at the end of the second strophe. As the whole forms a progressively developed message she is more likely present from the start.
58. See Kitto, Poiesis 163; Winnington-Ingram 330 and 331; Hoey 141; Webster 166.
59. Burton (48) well notices that "The words ἀλλὰ ζῆται μῆνα καὶ χαρὰ πάσαις κυκλοῦσσιν 'pain and joy circle for all men' and their echo in the epode χαίρει τε καὶ στέρεσθαι are appropriate not only to H's condition and his life of labours but also to the way in which the play depicts a series of changing states in D's mind: anxious fear in the prologue and in her speech after the parodos turns to joy when the messenger brings his news (180 ff.); in the central scene joy gives way to misgiving; the use of the love-charm suggests the renewal of hope; and finally comes despair . . ."
60. This, as Winnington-Ingram saw, p. 332 f., provides the missing explanation for the contumely suffered by H evidently as soon as he set foot in his host's house: the quarrel is connected with the hero's lustful demand for his host's daughter.
61. This bandying-about of the name of Zeus might be thought to be an accomplishment of the herald - not a matter touching Heracles. But it is important to notice that the yarn that Lichas spins to D "through a desire to avoid paining her" is not just tailor-made to that purpose. At the same time as suiting Lichas it also represents the official, Herculean outlook on events: (a) the sanction of H's own authority or open protestation of his mind and purpose are evident in expressions like ὡς φῆς' αὐτὸς (249), ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξέπλησεν, ὡς αὐτὸς ηὔγει (253), ὡσθ' ὄρκον αὐτῷ προσβαλὼν διώροσεν . . . (255), καὶ οὐχ' ἥχιωσε τοῦπος (258), τόνδε γὰρ περαίτεροι . . . ἔφασκε (261). /IE

It is in terms of Lichas' yarn that H is understood to present his case to the world and Lichas' lecture on Zeus is not more than a transmission of his master's view and concept. Not just Lichas but H too, we can be sure, maintains that *εἰ γὰρ ἐπφανῶς ἤνυστο, Ζεὺς τὸν οὐνέγχω ξὺν δίκῃ χειρουρένω* (278);

(b) The whole business en boutherei leimoni, especially formulations like 431 ff. (and see above p. 8 ff.) is meaningful only on the assumption that H's public view of matters stood as in his heralds disingenuous speech. This is what the herald showed up in public.

62. Iphitus even takes some apparently unwarranted prominence from the way in which Lichas goes into the circumstances of his death - as though D was unaware of them. This dramatically 'inauthentic' detail is perhaps a pointer to the integralness of Iphitus to the mythic story as fashioned by the poet, and see note 8.
63. Winnington-Ingram (Appendix B) considers the original audience better placed than us to decide. Epic sources currently familiar would have made things clearer. "One cannot help thinking that the lost sources may have linked the quarrel and the drunkenness with H's lustful demand for Iole." (p. 333). Possibly, but isn't this to make too little of what is surely a distinctive aspect of S's dramaturgy - his original (purposeful) use of mythic particulars?
64. Cf. Beck, who finds (14) that only through her encounter with Iole does Deianira stand out in nobility, forbearance, compassion. "Erst im Gefolge jener Neuerung kann sowohl der oiktos Deianeiras und damit ihre hochgesinnte Menschlichkeit wie ihr unbedingter Wille zur Klarheit über ihre Situation voll in Erscheinung treten." (p. 16) Also "aber sie (Iole) muss dasein, um D's Mitleid zu entzünden und ihr Schicksal, zuvor jedoch ihre grosse, schöne Selbstdarstellung auszulösen. (p. 16).
65. E.g. Knox n. 48, p. 172, "H, though certainly cast in the heroic mould, comes on late in the play and dying; there is no question of heroic resolve or action etc."

66. Easterling (62) correctly questions the significance that he reads in D's reaction on hearing the news of the destruction of Eurytus' city. She does not recoil in horror. Her reaction hardly pin-points the moral issues.

Indeed. Mainly it reveals something about D - namely her implicit faith in H. And when she takes the destruction of Oechalia in her stride - but at the same time shows all her personal compassion and forbearance, this being so characteristic - mightn't this itself serve, if only incidentally, to promote in the spectator a tendency to consider these events independently, to see them for what they are? Here again we find what is paramount for S: his business is drama, sustaining the dramatic illusion. Only so may he work.

67. Reinhardt 35: "The succession of situations in the Tr may be compared with archaic sentence-structure in which ideas are strung in a row, in which one phrase is set next to another without link or connection, whereas a work in the later style, the Electra... has no scene without its parallelisms, transitions, reverses and echoing of voices - in short, without a rhythm resembling that of a developed, syntactical period." This seems to be telling us something essential about the style of Tr. This, as I suggest, is its construction of scenes that house their significance and the subtle suggestion in the juxtaposition (connection) of scenes.

The style has already been noticed (56 ff.) as undramatic, narrative-based - that lends itself to reading rather than acting. Such a style must seem entirely appropriate to the dramatic method suggested as peculiar to our play. The narrative style conveys scenes to the imagination; promotes, through pictoriality, their imaginative suggestiveness. (Contrast Tr.'s poetic, remote, dreamlike style with that of the Tyrannus, which is truly dramatic, the dialogue engagement itself - a play in which the well-crafted logos is all and the dialogue sharp and committed. Each play has its own ethicality of style).

68. cf. Waldock 102: "But we do wrong to press for a point. No doubt every play should have its point, but the fact is that many plays lack one. What especial point can S make: that women are often tender and patient, men often roving and crude? Is that a point of particular value?"
69. Therefore, ethically.
70. On the other hand, Reinhardt (61) is right to draw attention to similarities with Part I: the monologue character of the scene, the narrative device (Heracles relates the oracles).
71. Galinsky 50: "Heracles' egomania, his most pronounced quality in the final part of the play, works against any sympathy one might have with him and strongly suggests the limitations of his achievements. It is H who tells of his labours and not the chorus as in Euripides' Herakles. Therefore his labours, which Euripides glorifies as labours in the Herakles are reduced to mere individual achievements in Sophocles' play." This is all wrong. It is not Sophocles' purpose to detract from the hero but to represent him in the full complexity of his stature. The technique is akin to cubism: different - incompatible - views of a subject represented simultaneously.
72. "The scene is full of irony; now that we see him before our eyes he is in the grip of a physical illness, a nosos, which we know to be the product of the nosos of passion." Easterling BICS p.67. cf. Galinsky 50 and Whitman 115-6. Also Segal: "The seething (in ἀναζέοντι θρονεώδεις ἀφρόι, 702 - D's simile) points ahead to the physical effects of the venom, described in the 3rd stasimon as the Centaur's deadly, treacherous seething spurs (φόνια δολιόπυθα κέντρη ἐπιζέσαντα, 839-40), but also suggests the inward emotional turbulence of passion." (p.109).
73. At 1030 he describes it as ἀνοίβατος λύγια νόος, wild uncontrollable affliction.

74. "Those who want to find a hero-worshipper in S must do it without much support from S, for in these two cases (H and Oedipus) at least it is the comparative littleness, not the greatness, of the hero that we are shown." Kitto, Poiesis 175.

The individual heroism of Oedipus in the Tyrannus is rather like the status of a figure set in a Chinese landscape: barely visible amid the sweep and grandeur of Nature. Oedipus has that sort of perspective. His individual heroism - his determination at first to act for the city's good and discover the truth about himself at whatever cost - relative to objective reality is of a similar proportion as the scale of that figure in its setting. What we appreciate on reading a play like the Tyrannus is not the heroism of the hero but a view of him relative to the whole within which he has his being, and of the objective understanding of which he himself tends slowly towards until, for a brief instant he has an inkling, if not an understanding, of his status in his setting. The Chinese figure too can hope for no more than that - a brief then passing intimation of his situation amid the scene as he plies his way, the full relative scale and majesty of which he has nothing like the same view as we do, thanks to the artist. The effect of reading the Tr. is something the same - but there are important differences. Oedipus' knowledge is fully human - it remains the profoundest ignorance. So does H's knowledge also remain - but this is a function of Heracles' extraordinary nature. Oedipus' ultimate ignorance tells us something about his world - our world. H's ultimate ignorance, which is in effect his total commitment to action, tells us everything about him, his special nature.

75. Whitman, 110.
76. What counted was that, for her, *τὸ εἰδέναι* was *δεῖν* - .
it was what knowing made her do.

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