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THE STOIC THEORY OF KATHEKON

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Declarations and statement of research

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, that the work of which it is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree in the University of St. Andrews or elsewhere.

I was admitted as a Research Student under Ordinance General No. 12 in October 1970 and was enrolled as a candidate for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy in Arts in June 1971. I have undertaken my research full-time and have been resident in St. Andrews throughout the whole period of the research, which was supervised by Prof. I.G.Kidd.

Certification

I certify that Mr. John Leigh Bracegirdle, B.A. has satisfied the required conditions of the Resolution of the University Court, 1969, No. 8, and of the relevant Regulations before presenting this thesis for examination.

Supervisor.

15th April, 1974.

Contents

Declarations	p.i.
Contents	p.ii.
Preface	p.iii.
<u>The Evidence</u>	
I. Kathekon in Cicero	p.1.
II. Kathekon in Plutarch	p.27.
III. Kathekon in Sextus Empiricus	p.44.
IV. Kathekon in Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus	p.55.
V. Panaetius and Kathekon	p.85.
VI. Hecato and Kathekon	p.118.
VII. Posidonius and Kathekon	p.133.
VIII. Seneca and Kathekon	p.140.
IX. Musonius and Kathekon	p.148.
X. Epictetus and Kathekon	p.163.
XI. Marcus Aurelius and Kathekon	p.189.
XII. Hierocles and Kathekon	p.206.
<u>Conclusions</u>	
I. The Range of Kathekon	p.216.
II. The Source of Kathekon	p.223.
III. The Criteria of Kathekon	p.234.
IV. The Practice of Kathekon	p.251.
V. The Distinction between Kathekon and Katorthoma	p.264.
<u>Notes</u>	p.282.
<u>Bibliography</u>	p.326.

Preface

The aim of this thesis has been to undertake a thorough examination of all the Stoic evidence for the theory of 'καθῆκον' in order to determine what this theory was and to see if there was any development in it from the beginning of the Stoa up to the time of Marcus Aurelius. This requires that the evidence be treated in a chronological order; there are, however, two reasons why this has to be modified. Firstly, it is impossible, because of the nature of the evidence, to compare the ideas of specific Stoics on this subject before we come to Panaetius, whose views on kathekon can be derived from Cicero's treatise De officiis. Secondly, the summaries of Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus and the criticisms of Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus are concerned, for the most part, with the views of the Stoa in general up to the time of Panaetius and his pupils Hecato and Posidonius. These works do give the views of specific philosophers on certain points of Stoic doctrine, but this is not so with the theory of kathekon, except for a very small number of short quotations in which the word 'καθῆκον' occurs. The works which deal with Stoicism in general are, therefore, dealt with before the views of philosophers from Panaetius onwards are discussed.

Cicero is dealt with first because he provides the earliest and most extensive exposition of the Stoic theory of kathekon from its beginnings up to his own time that we now possess, and is by far the most important source. Plutarch's works against the Stoa, the De Stoicorum repugnantibus and De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos, provide a number of important quotations, many of which are from Chrysippus; but his criticisms are directed against the early Stoa in general. These criticisms throw some light on the theory of kathekon, as do those of Sextus Empiricus in Adversus mathematicos XI. The summaries of Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus provide a good deal of

useful evidence, inspite of the fact that they are not argued expositions of Stoic ethics but consist of brief definitions and short explanations arranged loóselly under general headings, one of which is 'kathekon'. The material contained in these summaries seems to derive ultimately from evidence of the views of Stoics from Zeno to the time of Hecato and Posidonius, since no Stoic later that these is mentioned by name.

After the discussion of these general treatments of Stoic ethics, I have attempted to derive Panaetius' views about kathekon from Cicero's treatise De officiis. The views of his pupil Hecato can be seen to a certain extent in the De officiis and in Seneca's De beneficiis. A little light is thrown on Posidonius' views of kathekon in the De officiis and in Galen's De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis and Seneca's Epistles 94 and 95. After this there follows a treatment of the writings of Seneca, the record of Musonius' views in Stobaeus, the discourses of Epictetus as recorded by Arrian, the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, and the views of Hierocles as seen in the remains of the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις and in the passages contained in Stobaeus.

In the final section of the thesis, I have tried to provide some answers to the the problems which arise from the examination of the evidence and which have surrounded the Stoic theory of kathekon, and to see if the Stoic approach to the theory changed throughout its development.

I. KATHEKON IN CICERO

The De officiis

One of the most important pieces of evidence that Cicero provides is of course his treatise De officiis. It is quite clear from evidence in Cicero's letters¹ that the De officiis is a working of Panaetius' treatise Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος. Cicero, however, is not translating but adapting it in some way, and one thing which he admits to be doing is drawing on the works of other Stoics (1.6). In fact some passages of the De officiis suggest that he is following the Stoics (1.6; 1.22; 3.20), but elsewhere he admits to having followed Panaetius a great deal (2.60) and with some modification (3.7). At 3.7 he does not specify what the modifications are, but he may well be referring to the fact that he incorporates other Stoic material into his working of Panaetius' treatise. For these reasons the account of officia in the De officiis differs basically from the account in the De finibus (3.16-76) which claims to be an account of Stoic ethics going back to the founder, Zeno ("explicabo ... totam Zenonis Stoicorumque sententiam" 3.14). In the present chapter, therefore, I only wish to discuss a few passages of the De officiis which are clearly Stoic in general rather than specifically Panaetian. One of these Stoic passages is at 1.8 which immediately precedes Panaetius' threefold classification of the determining of conduct, the point where Cicero's treatment of Panaetius' treatise seems to begin. At 1.8 Cicero provides a definition of 'καθήκον', which Panaetius is said to have omitted (1.7); as "id quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit," but does not indicate what the word 'probabilis' means, whether only a probable as opposed to a true justification can be given, or whether a reasonable or sufficiently good justification is possible.² This type of kathekon Cicero calls 'medium officium' in distinction from a 'perfectum officium' or 'rectum'. Thus, while 'καθήκον' is that which has a probable or reasonable justification,

a 'κατόρθωμα' is a complete 'καθήκον', but again Cicero does not indicate in what the completion consists.

The distinction between 'media officia' and 'perfecta officia' is again taken up by Cicero at 3.14-15. Cicero makes clear that in the De officiis he is discussing the media officia and not the perfecta officia.³ Indeed, the word 'officia' on its own will refer to media officia, because the additional qualification 'media' is only used to distinguish them from 'recta' when these are referred to as complete officia. The media officia, Cicero says, are common and widely found, in that many people perform them through innate goodness or through progress in learning, whereas the perfecta officia are only attainable by the wise man. In the context this distinction is given as an explanation of the fact that moral goodness proper is only attainable by those who possess complete wisdom. Others can only possess 'similitudines honesti', semblances of moral goodness, which are also called 'secunda quaedam honesta', a kind of second-rate moral goods (3.15). The fact that the non-wise are capable of possessing second-rate moral goodness does not necessarily mean that the majority of them perform media officia. Even these are said to require a natural inclination to goodness or instruction in order to be performed.⁴ Second-rate moral goodness is changed into moral goodness proper by a process which changes an intermediate kathekon into a complete one. The qualification 'complete' is here explained as 'having all the numbers' ('omnes numeros habet'). What exactly this puzzling phrase means will be discussed later in connection with a fuller account of the phrase at De finibus 3.24, but it can be assumed from the present passage that the performance of a complete kathekon possessing all the numbers is directly correlated with the agent's possession of complete wisdom.

At 1.7 Cicero gives a classification of kathekonta which he claims every treatise on the subject follows. One part, he says, concerns the

supreme good and includes such questions as whether all *kathekonta* are complete and whether one *kathekon* is more important than another. These are theoretical questions concerning the relationship of *kathekonta* to *katorthomata* and of *kathekonta* to each other. The other part of a treatise on *kathekonta* concerns the laying down of rules of *kathekonta* which are concerned with practical living in all its aspects. The aim here seems clearly to be that of giving practical guidance about how to conduct oneself in particular situations. This assumes the possibility of making generalisations about what one ought to do, in a way that is quite distinct from saying what is morally good. Cicero remarks that the generalisations about *kathekonta* are of relevance to the supreme good, which is identical to moral goodness, but does not suggest in what way. He may be referring to the fact that *kathekonta* are derived from moral goodness ("tamen ex singulis [sc. each of the four virtues] certa officiorum genera nascuntur" 1.15), but this does raise the problem of what relevance the performance of *kathekonta* are to acting in accordance with moral goodness if they involve doing things which are not morally good. How does one make the transition from appropriate actions, *kathekonta*, to morally good actions, *katorthomata*?

The *Academica*

The first book of the second edition of Cicero's treatise *Academica* gives a brief summary of the philosophy of Zeno (1.35-42) for the purpose of showing what changes Zeno made in the philosophy of the Academy. This summary contains one sentence on the subject of *kathekon*:- "atque ut haec non tam rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam, recte facta sola in bonis ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis; officia autem et servata praetermissaque media putavit, ut dixi." The first clause, "ut... commutaverat", refers to the fact that Zeno has altered the terminology

which the Academy used rather than its doctrines. As outlined in sections 35-37, Zeno has restricted the term 'bona' to only one of the three classes outlined in sections 19-21 (bona 'animi', 'corporis', and 'vitae'), namely to goods of the mind. The other types of goods he has relegated to a class which he calls 'media', which are neither 'bona' nor 'mala'. Some of these media he has called 'secundum naturam', others 'naturae contraria', and in between these a class of 'interiecta et media'. The sentence which immediately precedes the above sentence contains some difficulties which are relevant to the problem of the relationship between the concepts of 'ἀγαθόν', 'προηγμένον', and 'ἀξίον'.⁵ But it seems clear that the comparison is meant to show that just as there are media between bona and mala, so there are media between recta facta and peccata, and these media are the performance and omission of officia. This, therefore, clearly shows that the performance and omission of officia are neither virtuous nor vicious. Whether the comparison is also designed to show that there are also media between officia and contra officia depends on the exact interpretation of the words. Kerferd⁶ has tried to show that the words "sic inter ... quaedam" make this point and only this point. Admittedly his interpretation that there are media quaedam both between recta facta and peccata and between officia and contra officia makes the word quaedam a little easier linguistically, and also enables one to keep 'et' in the phrase "officia autem et servata praetermissaque" because these would then make a new point, i.e. that the performance and omission of officia are also media. However this leaves a rather awkward "ut dixi"; a new point cannot be made if Cicero has said that he has already made it, and the only place he could have made it is in the words "sic inter ... quaedam". I therefore think that we must take the sentence to mean that Zeno has placed officia and contra officia between recta facta and peccata as a kind of intermediate class;⁷ the following words then explain this in terms of the bona/mala/media distinction alone and not also in terms of

the *secundum naturam/naturae contraria/media* distinction. Thus, Cicero explains that *recte facta* are included among *bona*, *peccata* among *mala*, and the observance and omission of *officia* among *media*. In this case, 'et' will have to remain problematic.

Rist⁸ makes a complaint against Cicero's reading of Stoic philosophy in this passage of the *Academica* because he states that the observance and omission of *officia* are both intermediate between virtuous and vicious actions. This he regards as a misrepresentation because it is clear from elsewhere that some *officia*, i.e. complete *officia* or *katorthomata*, are obviously not intermediate.⁹ Since Cicero is clearly aware of this in the *De officiis*, it would be odd if he were trying to misrepresent the Stoa in the *Academica*. The difficulty may lie in the meaning of the word 'media'. If at one end of a scale we place perfectly appropriate actions and at the other end the performance of vicious actions, the mere performance and omission of appropriate actions might seem to be intermediate between virtue and vice. When the performance of appropriate actions becomes complete, it will be placed at the end of the scale and cease to be intermediate. In such a situation the word 'officium' might well be used to refer only to those actions which are neither virtuous nor vicious, without the additional qualification of 'medium'. In those instances where one wants to point out the distinction between complete and intermediate actions, one can call them simply virtuous and appropriate. It is only in situations where the relationship between the two is being pointed out that the word 'media' need be used. Another possible way of explaining the use of 'media' with *officia* is that it is taken from the distinction between 'bona', 'mala', and 'media'. 'Media' are so-called because their possession makes no difference to virtue or vice.¹⁰ Now *officia* are concerned with the choice and rejection of *media*,¹¹ and for this reason might have been called 'media' themselves. In this case *officia* and *contra officia* would in themselves be neither good nor bad,

even though it would be possible to perform them virtuously or viciously.

The De finibus

The evidence which the De officiis (excluding the Panaetian parts) and the Academica give about the Stoic doctrine of *kathekon* is very brief but important in that it includes some basic statements about the relationship between 'κατὰ φύσιν' and 'κατὰ λόγον'. Because of their brevity they raise many problems which can only be discussed by using the evidence from elsewhere, especially the much more extensive account in the De finibus. The De finibus is by far the most thorough account of Stoic ethics that we possess for the period down to Cicero's time. As I pointed out earlier, it purports to be an account of the views of "Zeno and the Stoics". This makes it very difficult to attribute views to any particular philosopher, except in passages where Cicero points out differences of opinion among different members of the school. In the third book, which contains the account of their ethics, Cicero mentions the views of the school from as late as the time of Antipater of Tarsus (3.57).

The third book of the De finibus (16-76) gives two statements about *kathekonta* (20-25; 58-61).^{11a} The first passage contains at section 20 a description of the different stages through which human action must develop from the basic urge of self-preservation to the stage in which genuine goodness is present. These stages can be conveniently numbered from 1) to 5):-

1) primum est officium (id enim appello *κατὰ φύσιν*) ut se conservet in naturae statu,

2) deinceps [sc. est officium] ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint pellatque contraria;

3) qua inventa selectione, et item reiectione, sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio,

4) deinde ea [sc. selectio] perpetua,

5) tum [selectio] ad extremam constans consentaneaue naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi quid sit quod vere bonum possit dici.

caused/ The words that have caused the most difficulty here are "cum officio selectio". What exactly do these words mean and how does 'selectio' here differ from the 'selectio' of stage 2) referred to by "qua inventa selectione"? First, however, since the classification is said to depend on the principle that things which are in accordance with nature are to be chosen and their opposites rejected, it is necessary to examine sections 16-20 which establish this principle.

a/ Stage 1), which is the 'primum officium', clearly takes up the conclusion of section 16 that the basic principle ('principium') of action is derived from self-love. The Stoics, it is stated, believed that immediately upon birth a living creature feels an attachment to itself and an urge to preserve itself. Apart from this, it also has an affection for things that preserve its natural constitution and an antipathy to things that seem destructive of it. It is clear that this affection and antipathy are derived from the urge for self-preservation, which thus forms the 'principium' for action. Sections 17-18 describe the objects of the affection, things which are called 'principia naturalia', 'illa quae prima sunt ascita natura', 'propter se circiscenda' (17), 'propter se assumenda' (18), 'quasi prima elementa naturae' (19), 'principia naturae' (20). These designate basically two things: one, that they are the basic objects to which we direct our attention, and two, that we direct our attention to them for their own sake. As proof of the primary nature of these things it is pointed out that in the case of the limbs of the body no-one prefers to have them maimed even though they should be just as serviceable as when unmaimed. In contradiction to the Epicureans, the Stoics did not regard pleasure as a primary natural thing. We do not seek pleasure for its own sake but rather the preservation of our

natural constitution. Primary natural things also include 'καταλήψεις', acts of cognition, which is here demonstrated by the fact that children are said to take delight in finding out something even though they gain nothing by it. In the case of 'artes' we engage in them for their own sake partly because they contain acts of cognition and partly because they establish truths by methodical reasoning, nothing being more contrary to nature than assenting to falsehoods. Thus, the statement that self-preservation is the 'primum officium', the primary officium, seems to mean that the basic motivation in performing primary natural things is the urge for self-preservation.

Now, at section 20, having established the concept of primary natural things, the general principle is explained which forms the basis of the classification of action and which, as is stated, is derived from the concept of primary natural things.¹² This is that anything which is in accordance with nature or produces something that is in accordance with nature possesses value ('ἀξία') and on this account is worthy of choice ('selectio'), and the opposite to this has 'disvalue' (opposite of value)¹³. In this case, the concept of natural things extends the concept of primary natural things to include things that produce something else that is natural. Since the words for natural things ('secundum naturam') and the opposite ('contraria') are used in stage 2), it must be these which are there to be preserved and repelled, and since the concept of natural things is an extension of the concept of primary natural things, the latter must be included in stage 1) under the general term of self-preservation. In stage 2) the criterion of choice is that of value, which is attributed not only to natural things but things which are productive of natural things.

Madvig's¹⁴ explanation of stage 3) is that whereas in stage 2) selection was made by natural impulse (he refers to children's) instinctive inclination to acts of cognition at section 16), in stage 3) the agent

understands what is to be chosen and rejected, and makes decisions about how he is to act. This Madvig thinks is designated by the words "cum officio selectio", that is, a selection that is appropriate in that the agent can give a reasonable justification of it.¹⁵ As a result he is forced to take stage 3) as the first stage to which the term 'officium' should be applied. This makes nonsense of Cicero's language because he is forced to say that Cicero has inaccurately used the word 'officium' in stages 1) and 2). It also ignores the fact that in section 22 Cicero specifically says that all officia aim at ("referri ad") the acquisition of primary natural things ("principia naturae") and hence must be included in stages 1) and 2).

In fact, to understand what is meant in stages 3) to 5) we must look in the text after the classification, since what comes before it only explains stages 1) and 2). An alternative to the above way of taking the phrase "cum officio selectio" is "selection accompanied by officium". In this case stages 1) and 2) will refer to officium proper, whereas stage 3) will have a characteristic in addition to officium which is designated by the word 'selectio'. It might seem somewhat awkward linguistically to have 'selectio' referring both to the selection of natural things involved in officium and to the selection which is added to this:- "When this principle of selection and rejection has been discovered, next follows selection accompanied by officium." However, if we examine the following sections, there might be a reason for this apparent awkwardness.

Sections 21-22 point out a basic distinction between on the one hand an inclination to things which are in accordance with nature, which we saw was the basis of officium and derived from the urge of self-preservation, and on the other hand an inclination to "rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam", in which is contained the supreme good. In the latter case, it is morally good actions ('honeste facta')

which are regarded as desirable. Whereas in section 20 natural things are called 'sumenda', here morally good actions are 'expetenda', a term which is specifically said not to be applicable to primary natural things. Thus, on the one hand we have officia which aim at primary natural things, and on the other 'honesta actio' which does not derive from primary natural things but develops later. The transition from the one to the other is clearly brought about after the acquisition of intelligence and and of the capacity to form conceptions ('έννοια'), which enables one to see "the order and harmony that governs conduct". Now, quite clearly, this does not mean that the discernment of the order follows immediately upon the acquisition of intelligence. We must assume a gradual awareness of it and the development of a capacity to apply this to one's actions, which is only achieved when stage 5) is reached. Indeed, a gradual development is suggested by the changes in the character of 'selectio' from mere selection in stage 3) to perpetual selection in stage 4) and selection "ad extremum constans consentaneaue naturae" in stage 5). Now, since stage 2) is concerned with natural things and stage 3) assumes the ability to discern order to a certain extent in so far as the discovery of the principle of selection of natural things and rejection of unnatural things is a necessary preliminary to it, we must assume that the awareness of order begins between stages 2) and 3). This must develop in stage 3) until it is perpetual in stage 4), and in stage 5) completely consistent and in harmony with nature and therefore possessing fully developed the order which is described in section 21.

It is clear from other evidence in the De finibus that the selection in stage 5), in which the Stoic 'ὁμολογία' is exhibited is a selection of natural things. The point is made several times that the Stoic telos involves choice of natural things and rejection of unnatural things or that virtue exercises choice among natural things.¹⁶ Thus, if the selection in stages 3), 4) and 5) is a selection of natural things and rejection of

unnatural things, how does the selection differ from that in stage 2)? It is clear that "continual choice" and "choice completely consistent and in harmony with nature" are different, but if stage 3) is to be different from stage 2), then the discovery of selection and rejection must make the nature of the selection itself different. Firstly, in stage 2) itself the words 'selectio' and 'relectio' are not used, but 'teneat' and 'pellat'. These suggest that one's actions are directed purely and simply to obtaining natural things and avoiding unnatural things. But in stage 3), the words 'selectio' and 'relectio' are used to describe the principle of selection and rejection that is derived from stage 2). These suggest a more deliberate choice and rejection, as though the aim is not just to obtain natural things and avoid unnatural things but to choose and reject in accordance with a principle of action. That is, to choose something because it is natural comes in stage 3) but to obtain something that is natural on account of itself and not because it is natural is an officium. Choosing something natural on principle will be an officium in so far as it is aimed at something natural, but not merely an officium because it also is a case of selection of a natural thing on principle. Thus, stage 3), "qua inventa selectione et item relectione, sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio", should be interpreted as:- "When the principle of selection of natural things and rejection of unnatural things has been discovered, next follows selection [and rejection] of these things on principle in addition to officium". Similarly, stages 4) and 5) will also be officium in so far as they involve the choice of natural things, a point which is also shown by the use of the phrase 'perfectum officium' for a 'κἀτόρθωμα'. We move from an affection for natural things to esteem the order which is an essential part of morally good action ("multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat", 21; "est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia", 22). While at first we desire

to obtain natural things and hence perform officia, later we desire to put order into our conduct, but the conduct still consists of actions which aim at natural things. In stage 3) we will begin to put order into our conduct by applying the principle of selection of natural things and the rejection of unnatural things. In stage 4) we will succeed in always selecting and rejecting in accordance with this principle, And even after this it seems possible to advance a stage further. The difference between stage 4) and 5) is not at all obvious and this problem will be discussed later.

The details of the development through stages 3) to 5) are not elaborated at all, but the text rather concentrates on the difference between officium and morally good action which only emerges as such in stage 5) when selection is completely consistent and in harmony with nature. This difference is illustrated in section 22 by the analogy of aiming a spear or an arrow at a target. Here again the text causes some difficulty.¹⁷ The purpose of the illustration, as is stated, is to dispel the error of assuming that there are two ultimate goods. This false assumption is also clearly meant to derive from the fact 1) that officia are derived from the primary natural things and aim to acquire them and 2) that morally good action is more to be desired than the primary natural things. The two assumed ultimate goods, therefore, are the acquisition of primary natural things and morally good action. The illustration dispels this assumption by showing how these two aims can be combined in one action. That it is necessary to show this will be clear from the fact that morally good actions are also complete officia. The opening of section 23 is also based on the idea that morally good actions are officia when it says that "since all officia are based on primary natural things, so must wisdom itself". It is necessary to show that the essential characteristic of officia, aiming at natural things, is also a part of actions that are morally good.

The text is as follows:-

"ut enim si cui propositum sit collineare hastam aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut collineet: huic, in eiusmodi similitudine, omnia sint facienda, ut collineet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur, sed hoc quasi ultimum quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, no_L expetendum." Many difficulties have arisen from taking "ut si" as introducing the first part of a comparison. This led Madvig¹⁸ to emend 'sicut' to 'sic' to produce the comparison:- "Just as if someone should aim to hit a spear or arrow at a target, so we speak of the ultimate good". This comparison makes the ultimate good the aim to hit the target; 'hitting the target' must then be comparable to acquiring natural things. This cannot however be correct because Cicero has just said that all officia are aimed at acquiring natural things and that this is not the ultimate good (22). Madvig also had to delete "sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut collineet" because its 'sic' had nothing with which it was correlated. Schiche¹⁹ also deleted these words but retained 'sicut', making "huic ... omnia sint facienda ut collineet" the response to 'ut si'. This is open to the same objection as Madvig's interpretation because it makes the ultimate good the aim to acquire natural things. Pohlenz²⁰ however keeps these words, making 'sic' a response to 'sicut'. These clauses clearly go together because we have to supply words from the 'sicut'-clause to fill out the sense of the 'sic'-clause:- "Just as we speak of the ultimate end among goods, so his [sc. the archer's or spearsman's] ultimate end we would have to speak of as doing everything he can to hit the target". We should not supply 'propositum' with "sic illi facere..." because a distinction is being made between 'propositum' and 'ultimum': the archer's 'propositum' is to hit the target, but his 'ultimum' is to do everything to hit it. Since the 'sicut'-clause and the 'sic'-clause go together, there is no 'sic'-

clause to respond to "ut si". In this case "ut si" must not mean "just as if" but "if for example";²¹ that is, it merely introduces the illustration: "If, for example, someone should..." Cicero is thus saying that if we wanted to say what would be the 'ultimum' in the case of the archer or spearsman corresponding to the 'ultimum' in the case of goods, we would have to say that it was to do everything to hit the target or, since hitting the target is the archer's or spearsman's aim, to do everything to achieve this aim.

To turn to the rest of the sentence, most modern scholars emend the manuscripts' "sed" to "sit". This seems to be correct in so far as it preserves the balance between "ut omnia faciat..., hoc" and "illud autem ut feriat". Here Cicero is pointing out that the 'ultimum' which the Stoics call the highest good in the case of life is to do everything to achieve one's aim and this is 'expetendum' (a word used of morally good action at section 22), whereas the mere striking of the target is only 'seligendum' (a word used of selecting natural things at section 20). The implication of this is that officia aim at acquiring primary natural things corresponding to the archer's aim of hitting the target, and that morally good actions also aim at acquiring natural things, but in so far as (it) is the ultimate end does everything it can to achieve its aim of acquiring natural things. In the latter case, the doing of everything is more important than the actual acquisition of natural things. This is what is meant when it is stated at 3.39 that what is 'honestum' is of more value than the 'media' which it acquires. Also, the actual acquisition of the natural things at which morally good actions aim is not essential to their goodness, as is stated at 5.20 ("at vero facere omnia ut adipiscamur quae secundum naturam sint etiamsi ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt.")²²

Having pointed out the distinction between officium and morally good

action, Cicero in section 23 briefly comments on the fact that wisdom develops from the primary natural things. The word 'sapientia' is brought in here without explanation but he is clearly thinking of the discernment of harmony and order that governs conduct. It is this harmony, or 'ὁμολογία', in which the morally good consists. At section 21 Cicero said that the concept of the good was reached "collatione et ratione" but at section 33 he specifically says that it is "collatione rationis" from natural things that this concept is reached. Thus, when he says that the primary natural things introduce us to wisdom in the same way as a friend can introduce us to someone, this seems to be a reference to the fact that wisdom begins with the understanding of the principle of choice of natural things and rejection of unnatural things which we are able to abstract from the actions which result directly from the primary natural instincts.²³

The order which wisdom applies to moral action is compared to the particular part which is assigned to an actor or dancer (24). Just as the latter cannot play any part they like but only the part assigned to them, so life has to be conducted in a fixed way, which is termed "conveniens consentaneaue" (an adjectival form for 'ὁμολογία'). This way of life is said to be fixed in the same way as our limbs were clearly intended for a particular way of life. This means firstly that 'ὄρμη' or 'appetitus', is clearly designed for a particular mode of life, and refers to our instinctive attraction to the primary natural things (sections 16-17 frequently use the verb 'appetere'). In the same way reason and perfected reason²⁴ are designed for a particular way of life which is called 'conveniens'. Perhaps this is what Cicero was referring to in section 22 when he said that morally good action is 'secundum naturam', though not in the same way as primary natural things: that is, it conforms to the pattern of life for which reason was naturally intended. In fact this is suggested by the definition of the Stoic telos as "convenienter

congruenterque naturae vivere" (31). where Cicero explains it as "vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint eicientem". Conformity with nature consists in "applying knowledge of the things that occur by nature". Thus, the 'conveniens' life will be fixed in so far as the things that occur by nature are fixed.²⁵

Another point of comparison between wisdom and the arts of dancing and acting is made at section 24. Wisdom resembles them in that its end, which is the actual exercise of the art, is contained within itself. That is, wisdom is a 'practic' rather than a 'poietic' art. This is what we would expect, since the telos is described in the simile of the archer as being to do everything to achieve its aim where the achievement of the aim is not in itself essential to the telos; this point is made here by saying that wisdom is "in se tota conversa", totally self-contained.

However there is also a dissimilarity between wisdom and dancing or acting, that in the case of wisdom 'recte facta' involve all the parts of which it consists. 'Recte facta' in the sphere of conduct are here called 'κατορθώματα'. A 'κατορθώμα' contains "omnes numeros virtutis", all the factors of virtue. This is here clearly explained as meaning that it contains all the virtues because wisdom itself includes the other three cardinal virtues. Thus, any katorthoma, being the product of wisdom, contains all the factors of virtue in so far as it is done in accordance with all the virtues. This must be the sense of "omnes numeros" at De officiis 3.14 where it was clearly connected with wisdom in that it characterized the complete officia which the wise man performed.²⁶

Another explanation of the perfection of the wise man's actions is suggested at section 32 which recalls the analogy with the arts. In the case of artistic action, the artistic quality is considered by the Stoics to be subsequent to the action, or 'ἐπιγεννηματικόν'.²⁷ In the case of dancing or acting where the product of the art is the performance itself,

it is suggested that the artistic quality is not present until the artistic act is completed. The wise act on the contrary, which is complete in all its parts, the Stoics believed to be wise as soon as it is initiated ("susceptione prima"), its wisdom not being dependent on its completion ("non perfectione"). The distinction between initiation and completion in the case of 'recta', or 'κατορθώματα', is compared to a distinction among 'peccata', or 'ἁμαρτήματα', between those that are vicious 'in effectu', in their results, and those that are vicious 'etiam sine effectu', even when they have no results. In the case of betraying one's country, using violence to one's parents, or robbing a temple, the fault lies in the results of the completed action, whereas in the case of being afraid, grieving, or being lustful, a fault exists even when no such results ensue. The latter are essentially 'peccata' upon initiation just as 'recta' are, and do not depend upon the consequences to make them such. Interestingly these examples of 'peccata sine effectu' are all actions corresponding to Stoic 'πάθη', and it might well be that it is the factor of 'πάθη' which is most important in the cases where 'peccata' are opposed to 'recta' in distinction from officia and contra officia, as at De finibus 3.58 and Academica 1.37. This is a particularly important consideration in regard to the question of whether all actions 'πρὸς τὸ καθήκον' are 'ἁμαρτήματα' or whether there is a sense of 'ἁμαρτήματα' in which they are not included. In the present passage those 'peccata' which are so 'in effectu' look from the examples given to be what are elsewhere called 'τὰ πρὸς τὸ καθήκον' (especially at D.L.7.108), whereas those 'peccata' which are so 'etiam sine effectu' could refer to those which are elsewhere said to be 'πρὸς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον' as opposed to katorthomata which are 'κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον' (Stob. Ecl. II96,13f.). Thus, we could be dealing with two senses of 'ἁμαρτήματα', one referring as it were to 'ἁμαρτήματα' proper (i.e. opposed to katorthomata)²⁸ and one referring

to actions contrary to what is *kathekon*.²⁹ Stobaeus points out two such meanings at Eclogues II93,14:- "ἀμάρτυμά τε τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον ἢ ἐν ᾧ περιλέλειπται τι καθήκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζώου." Now, if *peccata in effectu* are actions 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον', this would mean that *kathekon* refers to the results of an action. It would be correct in terms of the results but not, like a *katorthoma*, from its inception. This suggests a possible interpretation of the definition of *kathekon*. Cicero gave it at De officiis 1.8 as "quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit". The reasonable account of why it is done will be in terms of the results. The account would have to consider the completed action; hence the perfect tense here ("factum sit") and at D.L.7.107 and Stob. Ecl. II85,13 ("ἤρραχθεν"). It would not consider the motives of the agent at all, whether he was well-intentioned or not, but make as it were an objective assessment of the action.

Another way in which the perfection of *katorthomata* is illustrated is by a comparison with the concept of 'εὐκαιρία', opportuneness, at sections 45f. The comparison is that "just as opportuneness is not increased by prolongation because opportune things are said already to possess their proper measure, so right conduct ('κατόρθωσις', the abstract noun from 'κατόρθωμα'), 'δμοιοσχία', and the good itself are not capable of increase." The Stoics are said to use the illustration of a shoe: if the merit of a shoe is to fit the foot, many shoes will not be better than one, so things which are measured by opportuneness will not be valued according to quantity or duration. The value of health, which is a natural thing of the kind at which officia aim, is determined according to duration, but the value of virtue is measured by opportuneness. This means that right conduct is not capable of increase because it is not possible for it to be more right. We cannot talk about degrees of rightness because right things like opportune things have already attained "their proper measure". At section 48 this fact is said to

preclude the Stoics from saying that one man can be wiser than another or that one man can 'peccare' ('ἁμαρτάνειν') or 'recte facere' ('κατὰρθόειν') more than another. And Cicero illustrates this fact with two well-known paradoxical examples. Just as the drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be near the surface than if he be at the bottom, or just as a puppy about to open its eyes is just as blind as one that is just born, so however far one has progressed towards the state of virtue one is just as unhappy ('in miseria', 'κακοδαίμων') as if one had made no progress. Happiness, being a description of the telos, is also incapable of varying in degree: one is only happy if one has reached the telos and, having reached it, cannot be more happy. But the corollary of this is also true that before reaching it one is equally unhappy however near to it one may be. In terms of katorthomata, these examples illustrate that it is only when we reach the telos and the state of virtue that our actions are called katorthomata and that katorthomata cannot refer to our actions en route however far we have progressed. The full implications of the illustration are not spelled out here, but clearly we are to assume that when the drowning man has surfaced or the puppy opened its eyes, their ability to breathe or see is not capable of increase. Similarly, the supreme good is not capable of becoming better or a katorthoma of becoming more right. Also, actions before the supreme good is achieved are all 'ἁμαρτήματα' and equally wrong.

Cicero here (3.48) briefly mentions that although virtues and vices do not vary in degree, the Stoics nevertheless believed that they "fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari". How exactly they are extended and diffused is not suggested here.³⁰

At sections 58-61 we have the second statement about officium. Section 58 begins by pointing out that the performance of officium is consistent with the doctrine that 'honestum' is the only good, because officium is included neither among goods nor among evils. This must

merely mean that officium, although not a good, can be performed because it is not an evil either.³¹ The fact that officium is neither good nor evil was pointed out in the Academica (1.37), where in this respect it was called an intermediate. In the present passage there are a number of demonstrations that an officium is an intermediate.

The first demonstration is based on two premisses: 1) that among indifferent things there is "aliquod probabile" and 2) that an officium is defined as "quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit". It runs as follows: 1) there is an element of reasonableness among indifferent things, which means that an account can be given of it and therefore that an account can be given of a reasonable action; now 2) an officium is that which is done in such a way that a reasonable account can be given of it; and this leads to the conclusion that an officium is a kind of intermediate which is neither good nor evil. This argument clearly rests on the identification of 'reasonable' in the definition of an officium and the element of 'reasonableness' in things neither good nor evil.³² Now, in sections 50-57, Cicero has just given an account of indifferent things. In this account however he does not use the word 'probabile' but a word which can bear the same meaning, 'aestimabile'. Thus in section 50 he classifies things that are of no importance to happiness as 1) 'aestimabilia', 2) 'contra' and 3) 'neutra'. Of those things that are valued, those that possess sufficient value to be preferred are called 'προηγμένα', while some do not possess sufficient value to be preferred. If 'probabile' in section 58 is to be identified with 'aestimabile', we must assume from Cicero's connection of this word with officium that officium has a reasonable account if it aims at one of the things which possess value, not just 'προηγμένα' but also things without sufficient value to be preferred. The word 'aestimabile' is also used at section 20 to describe the natural things at which officia aim. They are called such because they

possess "aliquod pondus dignum aestimatione, quam illi *ἀξιαν* vocant". This cannot mean "a certain amount of value" as opposed to too little value, but must mean that they possess something which gives them a right to value of any degree. Now, if officia aim at anything which is in accordance with nature (including things that are productive of something natural) and which therefore have value, there will not be a direct correlation between officia and '*προηγμένα*', since some officia (though only a small number) will not aim at '*προηγμένα*'. The 'probabilis' account of an officium will therefore be an account of its value in so far as it aims at something which is natural and has value rather than at '*προηγμένα*'. If this is a correct account of the Stoic doctrine it would avoid a situation in which any act which aims at a '*προηγμένον*' is an officium. Certain acts which are examples of aiming at, for example, wealth could involve something that is unnatural (betraying one's country, for instance) and which would be 'contra officium'. What has value in being natural or producing something natural is the criterion to be used when one is concerned with particular situations in which one must act. The criterion of '*προηγμένα*' refers rather to things in themselves. When one acts one does not merely consider whether one's action will produce a '*προηγμένον*' but whether it is in accordance with nature and therefore possesses value. The theory of '*προηγμένα*' gives only a general guide.

The next argument in section 58 is as follows: since things which are neither virtues nor vices contain an element which can be of use ("quiddam quod usui possit esse"), this should be preserved; now there is also a kind of action of this type, and it is such that reason requests us to do or produce one of them ("talis ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum"); but an action that is done by reason ("ratione actum") we call an officium; therefore, officium is neither good nor evil. This argument is based on two assumptions: 1) that

there is a type of action, neither good nor evil, in which reason requests us to do or produce an indifferent which is useful, and 2) that an officium is an action done by reason. To reach the conclusion of the argument Cicero interprets "ratione actum" as equal to "talis ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum", thus implying that an officium is performed because of the usefulness of the indifferent which it does or produces. The Latin words "talis ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum" are a paraphrase of the Greek words which are recorded at D.L.7.108 where kathekonta are said to be "ὅσα λόγος αἰρεῖ ποιεῖν". In Cicero's account we cannot attempt to take 'ratio' in the same sense as the phrase 'probabilis ratio' because this is a translation of 'εὐλόγος ἀπολογισμός (or ἀπολογία)' where the second word corresponds to 'ratio'. The relationship between the two phrases is one of the basic problems in the interpretation of the concept of kathekon. The account of which a kathekon is capable might be an account of why reason requests us to do it, in this case an account of the usefulness it possesses. But in the phrase 'λόγος αἰρεῖ' or 'ratio postulet' there is a problem of psychology. Does 'reason' refer to the reason of the agent such that anything which his reasoning faculty chooses to do is kathekon? In this case it would be possible to choose to do something that is not kathekon. Or does it refer to what an uncorrupted reasoning faculty, as in the case of the wise man,³³ would choose to do? In this case, the criterion of kathekon is external to the agent.

Very little is said in the De finibus about the element of usefulness in indifferent things except at 3.57 and 3.69-70. At 3.57 Cicero mentions a disagreement between, on the one hand, Chrysippus and Diogenes who thought that good repute had some usefulness but was not worth stretching out a finger for and, on the other hand, their successors who regarded it as worth having for its own sake and not on account of

its usefulness ('usus'). This seems to be a dispute about what type of 'προηγμένον' good repute was. Chrysippus and Diogenes thought that it was not preferred for its own sake although it did produce something useful, whereas the others thought it was preferred for its own sake. Here things that are useful are a subdivision of preferred things, the type that produce a certain result like wealth, as they are at section 69. But it is not clear why they are useful except for producing other things that are preferred for their own sake.³⁴ In the case of good repute, its usefulness must be that we obtain practical assistance from those who hold us in good repute. Now in the De officiis (1.7) one part of a treatise on officia was said to concern rules by which the "usus vitae", the practicalities of life, can be regulated, and the second book of this treatise deals with the things which are needed for practical living and which it calls 'commoda'.³⁵ Officia are concerned with supplying them, and therefore are like the class of preferred things which are useful for obtaining things that are preferred in themselves.

The usefulness of indifferents must be distinguished from the usefulness of good things, as it is at 3.69. The Stoic term for the benefit derived from good things is 'ὠφέλημα', for the harm derived from evil things 'βλάσμα', and these do not differ in degree; whereas the advantages derived from indifferents are called 'εὐχρηστίσματα', the disadvantages 'δυσχρηστίσματα', and these do differ in degree. Thus, since officia are indifferents they must vary in the degree of usefulness which they possess, whereas recte facta will not vary because they are goods. Cicero here also seems to be making a distinction between recte facta and peccata in themselves and the benefit and harm that results from them. Benefit and harm, he says, are common, but recte facta and peccata are not common. 'Common' is not explained here but probably refers to the fact that they affect all wise men equally.³⁶ They cannot

affect the non-wise because the latter are incapable of receiving the benefit deriving from good things.³⁷ In this case the recte facta and peccata themselves are probably not common because they affect only the agent himself as regards their goodness or badness.

The next argument at section 59 to prove that officium is an intermediate is as follows: 1) It is clear that the wise man does something in the sphere of intermediates; 2) therefore, when he does it he judges it to be officium; 3) and since his judgement about this never errs, officium will be included among intermediates. If this argument is not to be nonsensical, 2) must result from 1) not because doing an intermediate is identical with doing an officium (which is what the argument sets out to prove) but because when the wise man does anything at all he judges it to be an officium.³⁸ It rests not only on the stated premisses but also on the assumption that what the wise man does he judges to be officium (and it is in fact officium because his judgement never errs). Thus, the conclusion of the argument is based on the assumption that all the actions of the wise man are officia. This assumption is in fact made in the following argument, that a rectum, a wise man's action, is a complete officium. This argument deduces from this that there will also be an incomplete officium ('inchoatum officium'). In the case of restoring a trust justly, it is the just performance of the action that makes it a rectum or a complete officium; the mere performance of the action, restoring a trust, will therefore be an incomplete officium. We are clearly meant to conclude from this that restoring a trust without the element of justice is an intermediate thing. The word 'inchoatum' is, as Madvig points out,³⁹ used only as the contrary to 'perfectum'; since there is a complete officium, there must be such a thing as an incomplete officium. The distinction between a 'κατόρθωμα' and an 'inchoatum officium' is also made at 4.15 there the 'κατόρθωμα' is connected with Zeno's definition of the telos as "to live applying the

knowledge of those things that occur by nature", but 'inchoatum officium' with an interpretation of the telos as "to live performing all or most of the intermediate officia".⁴⁰ A 'κατόρθωμα', it is said, can only be achieved by the wise man, but an 'inchoatum officium' is occasionally performed by the fool. The second definition here is a kind of dilution of the first in that it makes the action of which the telos consists qualitatively the same as that of the fool. It does not have wisdom as the essential element as in the case of the first. Thus, the incompleteness of officia must consist in the fact that they are not done virtuously, that is, they are not good and therefore intermediate. As pointed out earlier, this might be an explanation of the term 'medium officium'.

Section 59 continues with another argument: 1) since some intermediates are to be chosen and others rejected, any action, whether performed or described, which involves this choice and rejection, is included under the term 'officium'; 2) therefore, because of the self-love which all men naturally possess, both foolish and wise will choose natural things and reject the contrary; 3) therefore, there will be a kind of officium common to both wise and non-wise, and therefore officia will deal with intermediates. This argument is somewhat confusedly expressed. Stage 1) deduces from the existence of intermediates which are worth choosing or rejecting that the term officium must include the actions which involve this choice or rejection. But stage 2) does not seem to follow from stage 1), but rather stage 3) is a conclusion from the first two as independent premisses; that is, the premiss 1) that officium includes the choice and rejection of intermediates, and the premiss 2) that both wise and non-wise choose natural things and reject unnatural things (where natural things and unnatural things are intermediates) result in the conclusion 3) that both wise and non-wise perform officia in the sphere of intermediates. Cicero called the inter-

mediate officium common in the De officiis (3.14) where it was not clear what common meant except "possessing a wide distribution". Here it clearly means "common to wise and non-wise" ("quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis", 59), in the sense that the choice and rejection of media by both wise and non-wise are officia. Having demonstrated that all officia are concerned with intermediates, Cicero in section 60 goes on to illustrate how this means that every deliberation about what to do is concerned with intermediates. He uses the well-known example of suicide. If one possesses more natural things than unnatural things, it is officium to remain in life; if one possess more unnatural things, it is officium to depart from life. Thus on occasion it is officium for the wise man to depart from life although he is happy, and for the fool to remain in life although he is miserable. The question is not decided by the possession of virtue or vice but by the possession of intermediates. This is so, it is explained, because natural and unnatural things come under the choice of the wise man and are as it were the 'material' of wisdom. Thus, when Cicero said that every deliberation about what to do concerned intermediates, this must include all the wise man's actions, such that the wise man cannot perform any action without it involving a choice or rejection of intermediates. Cicero gives some indication of how the wise man's choice differs from the foolish man's by referring again to the concept of 'ἐὐκρίπια' which he discussed in sections 45f. Happiness, he says, which is to live in harmony with nature, is a matter of opportuneness. In the case of suicide, it is often officium for the wise man to depart form life "si id opportune facere possit". Now, if all his actions involve choosing or rejection of intermediates, his action in committing suicide would be the opportune rejection of something unnatural and would differ from the action of the foolish man in the very opportuneness of the rejection; in fact, it would be the opportune performance of an officium.

II. KATHEKON IN PLUTARCH

There are two obvious points about the use of Plutarch as evidence for the Stoa, which must nevertheless be made.¹ Plutarch gives both verbatim quotations and paraphrases of its writings, in particular in his treatises De Stoicorum repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the verbatim quotations, only that they may not be relevant to the context in which they are set by Plutarch. Thus, it is necessary to take them on their own merits, remembering that they lack their original context, as well as to consider the context in which Plutarch sets them. Also, they are of limited value in so far as the majority of them are so short. As regards the paraphrases, it is necessary to be cautious in dealing with them because of the possibility of misrepresentation, and only to accept them on the basis of other supporting evidence. Plutarch's purpose is always polemical, and he draws upon arguments devised by the philosophical schools that opposed the Stoa. In the De Stoicorum repugnantiis Plutarch is concerned mainly with the early Stoa since his quotations are taken from the writings of Zeno, Cleanthes and, for the majority of them, Chrysippus. His arguments against the early Stoa are in many ways similar to those used by Cicero, but the reason why the De finibus is more valuable as evidence is that its third book sets out to present a fair picture of the doctrines of the Stoa.

Probably the most important piece of evidence which Plutarch provides about the concept of kathekon is the twenty-third chapter of the De communibus notitiis. The important part of this chapter is a quotation:- "πόθεν οὖν" φησὶν "ἀρεῶμαι; καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ἄλγην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;" Basically Plutarch sets out to criticise the Stoa for an ambivalence in their use of the term 'φύσις' or 'nature'. While on the one hand they make natural things ('τὰ κατὰ φύσιν') the source of kathekon but

only the material of virtue,^{1a} on the other hand they make nature an element of happiness when they define the telos as "to live in harmony with nature". It is the former idea that is referred to in the present context, nature as the source of kathekon and the material of virtue. In the phrase "τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν" the word "καὶ" serves to define "φύσις" in the specific sense of "τὸ κατὰ φύσιν". It is not specifically said here that virtue is in accordance with nature ('κατὰ φύσιν'), but at CN 9.1062C it is said to be "μάλιστα καὶ ἕκρως κατὰ φύσιν". This raises a very important problem about the relationship of kathekon to virtue. The theory that nature is the source of kathekon but not of virtue causes a gulf between the two which it is difficult to bridge. This is precisely the problem which Cicero was tackling at De finibus 3.22 by the illustration of hitting a spear or an arrow at a target. On the one hand natural things are choiceworthy ('seligendum' in Cicero, 'ἀγαπτόν' in Plutarch) in so far as they are the source of kathekon, but not desirable ('expetendum' in Cicero, 'ἐπιρρετόν' in Plutarch) in so far as they are not the source of virtue nor contribute to happiness. Cicero, it seems, tries to bridge the gap by saying that "to aim at the target" is choiceworthy but "to do everything to achieve this aim" is desirable. This argument makes use of the formulation of the telos given by Antipater of Tarsus. Plutarch does not accept this as a valid argument since, three chapters later (CN ch.26-7), he brings forward reasons for not accepting (see later).

We cannot always be sure that the quotations which Plutarch gives are directly apposite to the points he is trying to make. For if we look at the above quotation, it does seem to suggest a relationship between kathekon and virtue. It clearly states that the concept of natural things is needed to explain the source of kathekon. It is for this reason that Cicero criticizes Ariston and Herillus, that their rejection of the differentiation of indifferents into natural and

unnatural things leaves us no basis for choosing between things and hence does away with the theory of *kathekon*.² Secondly, their rejection of natural and unnatural things also does away with virtue because virtue has to exercise itself in choosing natural things and rejecting unnatural things.³ This is why in the quotation natural things are called the 'ὕλη', or material, of virtue. The quotation therefore seems primarily to be saying that the concept of natural things is necessary to explain *kathekon* and virtue, and in so saying suggests what is the relation between them, that is, that those things which are the source of *kathekon* are the material of virtue.

Now what is meant by saying that nature in the sense of natural things is the source of *kathekon*? What evidence does Plutarch give about natural impulses towards primary natural things, which formed the source of *kathekon* in Cicero's account? Chrysippus is quoted in the De Stoicorum repugnantiis (12.1038B) as saying in every physical and ethical treatise that at birth we are attracted ('οἰκειοῦσθαί') to ourselves, our limbs and our offspring (in so far as they need our assistance). The principle of 'οἰκείωσις' is here explained by Plutarch as being "αἴσθησις τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις", an idea that seems consistent with Stoic ideas, and at CN 23.1070A natural things are called by Plutarch 'οἰκεῖα' in distinction from 'ἀγαθά'. At CN 3.1060B also, we are said to be attracted towards natural things such as health, beauty and strength, and to be averse to unnatural things such as pain, disease and physical defects. Plutarch does not clearly connect the concept of *oikeiosis* with *kathekon*, but if natural things are called 'οἰκεῖα' and we are naturally attracted to them, and if natural things are the source of *kathekon*, we can conclude that *kathekon* is ultimately derived from natural instincts. This is suggested at CN 23.1070A where Plutarch points out both aspects of natural things, as 'οἰκεῖα' and as 'ἄρχαὶ τῶν καθήκόντων'.

The source of *kathekon* is thus clearly nature in the sense of natural things, and we must take 'natural things' to refer to those things which are derived from our natural attraction to ourselves. Virtue also has 'nature' as its source, but nature in the sense of universal nature. This is shown by quotations from a theological and a physical treatise of Chrysippus at SR 9.1035C which refer to the 'ἀρχή' of the virtues as 'Zeus', 'universal nature', or 'the arrangement of the universe'. This most likely refers to the fact that the *telos*, which consists of virtue, is 'ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ἴσῃ', where 'φύσις' refers to universal nature. The term 'universal nature' can include the natural things which are the source of *kathekon* because they will be part of the universal nature. Indeed, at CN 9.1062C virtue is said to be "μάλιστα καὶ ἀκριως κατὰ φύσιν", presumably because, being the constituent of the *telos*, it is the supremely natural thing; that is, it is in accordance with the nature or arrangement of the universe and not merely in accordance with the nature of man. That virtue is in accordance with the nature of man is also suggested at SR 17.1041E where Chrysippus is said to believe that the doctrine of goods and evils is most in keeping with the innate 'προλήψεις' or 'preconceptions'; that is, we are born with preconceptions of good and evil which can by education be developed into full concepts. This, I think, suggests that we have an attraction to what is good and that for this reason what is good must be in some sense natural ('κατὰ φύσιν'). Cicero, at De finibus 3.20f., refers to the idea that progress is made from an attraction to natural things to an attraction to what is good. The idea that good is the object of natural attraction is also clearly important for Posidonius, who calls it 'ἀπλῶς οἰκείον' in distinction from those things to which the irrational capacities are attracted.⁴ Also, the Stoics are credited with the view that 'οἰκείωσις' is the 'ἀρχή' of justice.⁵ This clearly cannot be 'ἀρχή' in the same sense

as nature is said to be the 'ἀρχή' of kathekon, but must mean that justice develops out of the natural attractions which we have for other people.⁶ As Cicero says at De finibus 3.23, we are introduced to wisdom by the primary natural attractions but later regard wisdom as the more important.

Plutarch does not anywhere provide a definition of kathekon including the phrase 'εὐλογος ἀπολογία (or ἀπολογισμός)'. He does however use 'εὐλογος' in two passages that discuss 'εὐλογος ἐξκωδύ', the 'reasonable' taking of one's own life on the criterion of a preponderance of unnatural things (CN 4.1060C, 24.1070B). Interestingly, in three places he also refers to it being kathekon to take one's life on the same criterion (SR 18.1042C; CN 11.1063Cf., 12.1064Ef.). In any given situation the question of whether it is kathekon to die or to remain in life is decided by whether one possesses a preponderance of natural or unnatural things. This is given as the view of Chrysippus at SR 18.1042C and CN 11.1063D. The question is not directly affected by whether one possesses virtue or vice, since in a quotation at SR 14.1039E Chrysippus says that virtue itself cannot keep one in life nor vice make one leave it. It means that if one has attained happiness, it may, however, be kathekon to take one's life, and if one possesses vice it may still be kathekon to stay in life (as is pointed out at SR 18.1042D; CN 11.1063C, 12.1064F). Oddly enough, there is no mention of it being kathekon for the 'φασλός' to commit suicide, only of it being kathekon for him to remain in life (v. esp. SR 14.1039E); it does not seem possible for the 'φασλός' to commit suicide when he has a preponderance of unnatural things. Examples are given at CN 11.1064A, that it would have been kathekon for Heraclitus and Pherecydes to lose their virtue and wisdom by committing suicide in order to rid themselves of their respective severe illnesses. In this case the illnesses are the reason for committing suicide, and the fact that they possess virtue

and wisdom cannot keep them in life. At CN 12.1064Ef. and SR 18.1042B Chrysippus is credited with the view that it is advantageous for the fool to carry on living even if he will never attain wisdom. "This means," Chrysippus says, "that in a sense 'κακὰ' precede 'τὰ ἀνὰ μέτρον' [viz. 'to carry on living foolishly', a 'κακόν', will take precedence over 'taking one's life', a 'μέτρον']; not that evils really take precedence, but reason, with which we ought to live even though we will never be wise." Plutarch wishes to conclude from this that Chrysippus is inconsistent and virtually saying that it is both *kathekon* and not *kathekon* for the fool to carry on living, on the ground that it is *kathekon* to live with reason and contrary to *kathekon* to live foolishly. This is to misrepresent Chrysippus because the criterion for the fool to remain in life is not his foolishness, because this is a 'κακόν', but a life in accordance with reason, which is a 'μέτρον', presumably a 'μέτρον κατὰ φύσιν', and hence is a reason for it being *kathekon* to remain in life. Now, the fact that at CN 4.1060C 'reasonable' committing of suicide is determined by the non-presence of natural things or the presence of unnatural things clearly shows that it is a matter of *kathekon*. The passage at CN 24.1070B seems on the face of it to be referring to a wise man throwing himself over a cliff. One aspect of the good is said to be that it is 'εὐτυχές', and the man who reasonably throws himself over a cliff is said to 'εὐτυχεῖν'. Hence this must be referring to a virtuous action, though only because it is performed by a wise man. The examples of 'τὸ φρονίμως τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι' and 'φρονίμη στρέβλωσις', where the words 'φρονίμως' and 'φρονίμη' make into virtuous actions what would otherwise not be such, might suggest that in the case of 'ὁ κατακρημνίζων ἑαυτὸν εὐλόγως' the addition of the word 'εὐλόγως' makes it into a virtuous action. However, this cannot be so, as is shown by the following sentence ("ἄξιόν δ' ἔχει"), which clearly shows that the virtue of the wise man is thrown away for the

sake of something that is not good, i.e. an indifferent. This factor makes it a *kathekon*, and not a virtuous action. However, suicide does seem to be in a peculiar situation, if it is determined by indifferents but only, as seems likely, *kathekon* for the virtuous man; that is, it is essentially *kathekontic* but only to be done by the virtuous man.

Another reason for suspecting that 'reasonably' throwing oneself over a cliff is essentially a *kathekon* are the words "αἰρεῖ λόγος". It is said here (CN 24.1070B) that "reason chooses" to throw away virtue for the sake of something that is not good. The words echo Cicero De finibus 3.58 and D.L. 7.108 where *kathekon* is said to be something which "reason chooses" to do. If the words in the present context are meant to echo the aspect of *kathekon* that it is what reason chooses to do, it is clear that this merely refers to its being chosen because it acquires something in accordance with nature or avoids something contrary to nature. Also, the present context might suggest that in any given case of a *kathekon* the agent's reasoning faculty chooses to do it; but this would only refer to the fact that the agent is a rational creature. Indeed, the capacity of 'ὄρμηξ', which we would expect to function in the case of all human action, is said at SR 11.1037F to be a form of 'λόγος'. 'ὄρμηξ', according to Chrysippus, is "τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν". It follows that any act that is done by impulse must also be done by reason. But if in the case of any action, both appropriate and inappropriate, reason can be said to choose it, this obviously cannot be the sense in which "λόγος αἰρεῖ" is meant in the definition of *kathekon*. In the latter case, 'λόγος' may well be a more objective criterion, perhaps what a rational creature would choose if uncorrupted (which would not be inappropriate things). But it must be admitted that the exact significance of the phrase 'λόγος αἰρεῖ' is very uncertain.

An explanation is suggested at De virtute morali 3.441C, where

'πάθος' is described as "depraved reason resulting from an evil and erroneous judgement." This seems to be slightly inaccurate since 'πάθος' is elsewhere defined as itself a depraved judgement.⁷ I suggest later that in this passage vice is seen as the disposition that produces such evil and erroneous judgements. However, 'πάθος' is also defined as "πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή", and the 'ἡγεμονικόν' is described in the present passage as acting irrationally whenever it is forced to act wrongly by an excessive impulse "παρὰ τὸν αἰρουντα λόγον". This seems to mean that it is pathos, or excessive impulse, that causes wrong actions, and that these actions are done 'παρὰ τὸν αἰρουντα λόγον'. Also, at Stobaeus Eclogues II88,8 pathos is said to be "ἀπειθὴ τῷ αἰρουντι λογῷ". In view of the association of the phrase 'λόγος αἰρεῖ' with kathekon, this could be an explanation of how pathos causes the performance of actions 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον', that if it were not for pathos reason would choose to do what is kathekon. This view of action suggests that moral progress depends on the removal of pathos. At Quomodo quis in virtute sentiat profectus 12.82F Zeno is credited with the view that progress has been made when the "φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν" element of the soul has been dispelled by reason. Such a person would not be prevented by pathos from doing the things which 'reason chooses'. He would be able to use his reasoning faculty to perform kathekonta. Thus, the phrase 'reason chooses' in connection with kathekonta could refer to the fact that kathekonta are such things as human reason chooses when free from the influence of pathos. This is suggested by the fact that 'κρτερία' and 'ἐγκράτεια' were, according to Plutarch at De virtute morali 9.449C, defined by Chrysippus as dispositions that follow 'ὁ αἰρῶν λόγος'.

The criterion of reasonable justification for a kathekon seems, on occasions when one is presented with two identical choices, not to be used. Plutarch states that Chrysippus in his περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν

examines what is *kathekon* for a judge in the case where two runners have finished a race at exactly the same time. Chrysippus is in favour of relying on a chance inclination ("ἢ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπίκλισις") on the part of the judge. This chance inclination, Chrysippus explains, is like when we are presented with two identical drachmae and incline to one rather than the other. And in evidence of this Plutarch also quotes from Chrysippus' περὶ καθήκοντος, which explains the principle: if after examining two drachmae no decision can be reached as to which is the better, and if we have to choose one of them, we should make a chance choice, even if we should choose the worse. This choice, however, is made "κατ' ἀγνώστον τινὰ λόγον", "for an unknown reason"; that is, there will be a reason for the choice, even though we will not be conscious of it. Now, according to Plutarch Chrysippus says in this treatise that the principle of 'chance inclination' is to be used in the case of things which are not worthy of much trouble or attention. In the case of two drachmae it is easy to see that it is not an important matter, but in the case of the race it is not so easy to throw it off as a slight matter. What the two examples have in common is that we are faced with alternatives, one of which has no detectable preference over the other. The reason chance inclination is to be resorted to, it seems, is that the only way of deciding what is *kathekon* is to determine the relative value of the alternatives and choose that with the higher value. But in the present case there is no distinguishable difference. In fact, if the difference is so slight or is undetectable, it does not matter which alternative we take, and it will not be worth taking too much trouble about the decision because it will be *kathekon* whatever one we take. The consideration of what is *kathekon* in a situation where there are conflicting alternatives does, it seems, depend on the consideration of the value of the alternatives. The significance of the seemingly trivial examples should thus

perhaps be seen in the fact that they illustrate situations in which the weighing up of the relative value of alternatives produces equal results. Plutarch gives no other evidence on this matter. As regards the value of things, the only place where he mentions it is at CN 26.1071B, where primary natural things are credited with 'ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία' as the material of virtue (see later). This must refer to the value of natural things which must be considered when deciding how to act.

The word 'εὐλογος' must not be confused with the word 'εὐλόγιστος' which occurs in definitions of the telos at CN 26.1070F-27.1072F. Firstly, Plutarch is here attacking a definition of the telos as 'εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογή' of natural or primary natural things. This formulation of the telos originates from Chrysippus' successor, Diogenes of Babylon,⁸ but at the end of Chapter 27 (1072F) Plutarch mentions the view that the arguments which he has put forward are directed against Antipater, Diogenes' pupil, who tried to defend his teacher's formulation of the telos. In favour of this is the fact that Plutarch alludes to a formulation of the telos which is elsewhere attributed to Antipater⁹ ("πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ παρ' αὐτὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν" 1071C), and also the fact that Plutarch refers to 'ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία', a phrase which Stobaeus says was introduced by Antipater.¹⁰ A fair impression of the view which Plutarch is criticizing can be deduced from the passage 1070F-1071B. There seems to be a distinction between 'σκοπὸς' and 'τέλος' where the 'σκοπὸς' consists of the primary natural things and the 'τέλος' of 'εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογή' of these.¹¹ This means that the telos is not the obtaining of primary natural things, but only the way in which we choose. The way we choose is specifically connected with wisdom by the phrase "τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκείνα φρονίμως" (1071B) (cf. "ἡ δ' εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογή καὶ λήψις αὐτῶν" at 1071A) and also "τῇ γὰρ ἐφέσει [sc. the aiming at such

things as health] ἢ Δία τὸ εὐλογίστως καὶ φρονίμως πρόσεσσι "(1071E). The important part of the telos is that the choice is done wisely; the natural things themselves and the obtaining of them are not the telos but are as it were "ἔλγ τις τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα". This of course is exactly the point that Cicero was making at De finibus 3.22, as is suggested by the reference to shooting ('τοξεύοντα') and hitting the target ('βραλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν') at 1071C. Just as Cicero said that striking the target was 'quasi seligendum', so Plutarch says that the obtaining of natural things has 'ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία'. According to Stobaeus in the passage where he refers to 'ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία',¹² it refers to the fact that natural things have value differing in their relationship with each other which affects the choice of them.¹³ It is not this value which makes the choice of them 'εὐλόγιστος', since the mere choosing of such things is not a criterion for wise action. One of Plutarch's arguments ("ἔπειτα πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν " 1072C) rests on the fact that natural things must have value "πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονεῖν"; this is not the case, as Plutarch himself indicates elsewhere, e.g. at CN 22.1069C where he describes the Stoic telos, 'ὁμολογία', as being "ἐκλογὴ καὶ τήρησις ἀνωφεκῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιαφορῶν".

What, then, does 'εὐλόγιστος' mean, if it is connected with wisdom? 'Εὐλογιστία' is a virtue subordinate to 'φρόνησις' at Stobaeus Eclogues II61,1(=SVF3,264) and in Andronicus (=SVF3,268), where it is defined as "ἐπιστήμη ἀνταναιρετικὴ καὶ συγκεφαλαιωτικὴ τῶν γινομένων καὶ ἀποτελουμένων", "knowledge that cancels out and takes stock of what takes place and is done". The terms here are those of accounting; it seems that 'εὐλογιστία' is that aspect of wisdom which considers the whole situation and weighs up all the factors involved before deciding what to do. Also it seems clear from Philo (=SVF3,512) that the wise man is 'εὐλόγιστος' as a result of a 'εὐλόγιστος' disposition; he is not, for instance, like the φαῦλος who can perform kathekonta, though

not as a result of a 'καθήκουσα ἔξις'. Hence, when Plutarch at CN 27.1072C uses the premiss that 'τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν' results from a disposition of 'εὐλογιστία' in order to demonstrate the circularity of the Stoic definition of the telos, he is probably using a genuine doctrine of the Stoa. Thus, the term 'εὐλόγιστος' is clearly distinguishable from 'εὐλογος', in that the former is connected with the acts of the wise man and the latter with kathekonta. The wise man's actions are 'εὐλόγιστος' from a 'εὐλόγιστος' disposition, but kathekonta can be performed even without a disposition for performing them.

The factor of a disposition by which the wise man is distinguished from the non-wise man is of critical importance for distinguishing 'κατορθώματα' from 'καθήκοντα'. Virtue, and vice also, according to the Stoics, are dispositions of the 'ἡγεμονικόν', the governing part of the soul, as Plutarch tells us at De virtute morali 3.441Bf. Virtue is "λόγον δμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον", consistent, firm and unchanging reason. Vice is here connected with the pathos; but it is not clear exactly how. 'Pathos' is depraved reason resulting from an evil and perverse judgement, and this causes us to act wrongly, because it is an excessive impulse ('πλεονάζουσα ὀρμηή') that forces us to act contrary to the convictions of reason ('ὁ ἀερίων λόγος'). Vice is probably the disposition that causes us to form perverse judgements and act contrary to the choice of reason. Virtue, at least 'καρτερία' and 'ἐγκράτεια', is defined by Chrysippus as a disposition that follows 'ὁ ἀερίων λόγος'.¹⁴ This compares well with the description at CN 8.1061E of the supreme good which is characterized as "τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσι καὶ βέβαιον", which is suggestive of a disposition enabling the wise man always to make the correct decisions. This disposition however is said not to be possessed by 'ὁ ἐπ' ἄκρον προκόπτων', who according to Stobaeus¹⁵ performs all kathekonta and does not attain a state of happiness until "ἀέ μέσαι πράξεις αὐταὶ προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον

καὶ ἐκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίων πῆξις τινα λάβωσι". The development of a fixed disposition to perform 'intermediate actions', or *kathekonta*, is thus one aspect in the change of the agent's state from a miserable to a happy state and, we must assume, in the change of his actions from *kathekonta* to *katorthomata*.¹⁶

Plutarch gives evidence of the Stoic view that goods and evils, including *katorthomata* and 'ἁμαρτήματα', are equal. All *katorthomata* are equal in degree of rightness;¹⁸ and anything that is not a *katorthoma* is a 'ἁμαρτήματι'¹⁹ and equally vicious.²⁰ But in Chapter 13 of the SR and chapter 6 of the CN Plutarch criticizes the Stoa for holding views about *katorthomata* and 'ἁμαρτήματα' in which they are not equal.

In Chapter 13 of the SR he starts by giving a quotation from the third book of Chrysippus' περὶ φύσεως (1038C) to the effect that the wise man can act in a lofty manner like Zeus because they are in no way exceeded by him; that is, the actions even of Zeus cannot be more right than those of the wise man, since there is no difference in degree of rightness. However, a difference is indicated when Chrysippus says in his περὶ Δίος (1038F) that not everything done in accordance with virtue is equally praiseworthy. He believed that one could not praise such actions as 'bravely holding a finger', 'chastely abstaining from an old woman who is on her deathbed', 'patiently hearing it said that three are not four', or 'bravely enduring the bite of an insect'. That the Stoics believed such trivial examples to be equal in respect of their rightness to such things as 'bravely dying for one's country' is shown at CN ch.6 ("ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀμφοτέρου κατορθοῦσιν" 1060F). There is a lacuna in the place where I have substituted the example of 'bravely dying for one's country', but the words "ἀλλὰ δὲ λαμπρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κ' ἐπιποθέουσιν" clearly suggest some such thing. It is said to be "αἰσχρὴν καὶ γέλωτος" to boast of the trivial examples, presumably because virtue is far from necessary for holding out a finger and the

like, even though they are *katorthomata* when performed by the wise man. The reason for not commending the trivial examples is purely because their content is not in itself commendable; that is, it is not in itself commendable to hold out the finger whether it is done virtuously or not. On the other hand it is in itself commendable to die bravely for one's country because to die for one's country is a commendable thing. What is interesting here is that to die for one's country is an example of what would be a *kathekon*, but holding out one's finger an example of something that would be neither *kathekon* nor contrary to *kathekon*.²¹ Perhaps, therefore, the reason for not commending 'bravely holding out a finger' is that to hold out the finger is neither '*καθῆκον*' nor '*παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον*', whereas 'bravely dying for one's country' is commendable because to die for one's country is a '*καθῆκον*'. Also, it would require some strength of will to die for one's country, whereas abstaining from an old woman is *kathekon* but does not require much strength of will. Thus, *katorthomata* can vary in degree of commendability but not in degree of rightness. This is perhaps why Chrysippus does not commend momentary wisdom.²² The time for which one would possess it would be so short that it would not be '*καθῆκον*' even to stretch out a finger for it; that is, it is not at all commendable in its content, stretching out a finger being neither *kathekon* nor contrary to *kathekon*, even though to obtain wisdom is in itself commendable.

An important point that Chapter 12 of the SR and Chapter 6 of the CN demonstrate is that when a wise man performs indifferent things, not only natural things and unnatural things but also completely indifferent things, his action is regarded as right action. This must mean that the wise man's virtue extends to every action that he performs, however insignificant it may be in terms of its content. All his actions must be in accordance with virtue and therefore '*κατ' ὀρθότητα*'. It is likely that it was the doctrine that a wise man's actions are all *katorthomata*

that led to the discussion of the trivial examples. Once the Stoics admitted that all his actions were *katorthomata* they would have to admit such *katorthomata* as 'prudently stretching out a finger', 'chastely abstaining from an old woman on her deathbed' and so on, because the wise man will clearly stretch out a finger, abstain from an old woman on her deathbed and so on.

As in the case of *katorthomata*, there seem to be differences in 'ἁμαρτήματα' also. The second book of Chrysippus' treatise περὶ φιλίας is quoted at SR 13.1039B to the effect that it is appropriate to pass entirely over some faults of friends, to lightly reprehend others, to reprehend yet others more severely, and to regard yet others as worthy of the dissolution of friendship. This most likely indicates differences in the content of the 'ἁμαρτήματα' or their effects on the relationship and not differences in the degree of vice involved.

'κατόρθωσις', 'right action', the generic term for 'κατόρθωμα', is distinguished from virtue at SR 19.1042F where Chrysippus' treatise περὶ τέλους is quoted to show that goods and evils are 'αἰσθητά', 'perceptible'. The quotation seems to distinguish clearly between 1) 'πάθη', or irrational emotions such as grief and fear, and rational emotions such as 'χαρά', or joy, 2) vicious actions such as theft and adultery, and right actions such as acts of beneficence ('εὐεργεσία'), and 3) vices such as folly and cowardice, and virtues such as wisdom and bravery. However it is possible that the emotions are to be included under vicious actions and right actions. The wording in Plutarch certainly suggests that 'χαρά' might be a kind of 'κατόρθωσις', and this is corroborated by a passage in Stobaeus²³ where both 'εὐεργετεῖν' and 'χαίρειν' are included under 'κατορθώματα' and both 'τὸ φοβεῖσθαι' and 'τὸ κλέπτειν' under 'ἁμαρτήματα'.

The 'εὐεργεσία' here, which are a type of 'κατόρθωσις', must be distinguished from the 'χάρτες' which the non-wise are capable of

bestowing. The difference is clearly shown in CN ch. 21. No 'φάσλος' is said to receive benefit ('ὠφελεῖσθαι') or to have benefactors ('εὐεργέται') because benefit is something which only the wise can bestow or receive. The 'φάσλος' can, however, it is said, receive (and presumably bestow) 'χάρις', "because 'χάρις' extends to intermediates". That is, the 'φάσλος' cannot receive a benefit because, being 'φάσλος', his actions will be 'ἀμαρτήματα' and hence cause him injury, 'βλάβημα', the opposite of benefit.²⁴ Not even the 'προκόπτων' can receive a benefit.²⁵ But the 'φάσλος' can derive advantage from a 'χάρις' because this is only a matter of the usefulness to be obtained from intermediates. This usefulness of intermediates is termed 'εὐχρηστία',²⁶ and 'εὐχρηστος' is an epithet applied to natural things in Chapter 23 of the CN (1070A) where natural things are said to be the 'ἀρχή' of kathekonta. Hence, 'χάρις', in so far as it concerns the usefulness of intermediates, comes in the sphere of kathekonta; hence its discussion in Cicero's De officiis.²⁷ The distinction between 'ὠφελεία' and 'εὐχρηστία' was also pointed out at Cicero De finibus 3.69, and explains the paradoxical statements that the 'φάσλος' has no need of anything, which means that he cannot derive from anything the benefit that is peculiar to goods.

It is clear that the wise man will derive both benefit from goods and usefulness from intermediates. At SR 30.1047F Chrysippus' treatise περὶ καθήκοντος is said to contain the statement that the wise man will somersault three times in order to receive a talent. This must be an example from a section of the treatise concerning the usefulness of intermediates, which kathekonta are concerned to preserve.²⁸ It is kathekon for even the wise man to do things for a mercenary end, that is to obtain the 'εὐχρηστία' that money provides. The means by which it is acquired, we must assume to have been regarded by Chrysippus as appropriate for the wise man, even if it would be regarded as contrary

to the dignity of the wise man by some less Cynical members of the Stoa.²⁹

III. KATHEKON IN SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

The bulk of what Sextus Empiricus tells us about the Stoic concept of kathekon and its relationship to virtue is contained in Adversus Mathematicos XI, which is directed against dogmatic ethicists, the Stoics in particular. Within this book, the section on the question of whether there is an art of life is especially helpful (168-215).

Sextus puts forward a series of arguments to show that there is no such art of life as the Stoics claimed. At 188f. he puts forward the point that every art is apprehended through its resultant effects, e.g. medicine through its medical results, harp-playing through performances on the harp, and so on. He sets out to show that the art of life has no such resultant effects.

Firstly, in the passage 189-196 he adduces examples of prescriptions of the early Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, about honouring one's parents, piety towards the dead, and the education of children. These examples are of a Cynical nature, quite contrary to conventional ideas of treating parents, the dead and children - intercourse with sisters and mothers, eating the flesh of the dead, sexual intercourse with all children alike, and so on - and Sextus concludes that the Stoics could not possibly mean these prescriptions to be implemented because they are forbidden by law, neither could they mean them not to be implemented because then their art of life would become redundant.

Setting aside the validity of this argument, is it legitimate to assume, as Sextus does, that the Stoics would mean by the 'art of life' the application of such prescriptions as are given here? 'Τέχνη' is a characteristic of wisdom and virtue, whereas practical prescriptions of such a specific kind one would expect to be examples of what is kathekon. Even though the wise man would indeed do such things, his wisdom would consist in something other than the performance of them.

The aim of the art of life is not to do such things but to what is good, which might involve doing some of them in an artistic way.

That these prescriptions concern the sphere of *kathekon* is suggested by the fact that 'honouring one's parents' is elsewhere cited as an example of a *kathekon*,¹ and that one of the quotations which Sextus gives about the burial of parents comes from Chrysippus' treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (194). When our parents die, Chrysippus says, we should regard the body in the same way as we regard hair or nails (that is, as something completely indifferent). But when the flesh of the body is useful, it will be used as food. This, Chrysippus says, is comparable to the situation where a limb was cut off and it was proper ('ἐπέβαλλε') to make use of it. [Another quotation to the same effect is given from his treatise περὶ δικαιοσύνης.] If it is of no use, no more attention will be paid to it than to hair or nail. We have seen elsewhere² that *kathekon* was concerned with preserving the element of usefulness in indifferent things. It should also be pointed out that if this is the case, the word 'ἐπέβαλλε' is used in the same context as 'καθήκε'.³

Secondly, Sextus points out that every 'τέχνη' has an 'ἴδιον ἔργον' which distinguishes it from other 'δικάσεις', and tries to show that wisdom does not have one. He starts from the concept of what is common ('κοινόν') to the possessors and the non-possessors of an art. In the case of the wise and the foolish that which is common will not be the 'ἴδιον ἔργον' of wisdom. This is reasonable enough, but then Sextus says that in fact every action done by the wise man is found to be common to the non-wise. If, for example, he says, we count 'honouring one's parents' or 'restoring a trust' and the like as actions of the wise man, we shall find non-virtuous men doing any of these things. Therefore, he concludes, no action is peculiar to the wise man, and therefore wisdom cannot be an art of life because it has no

artistic action peculiar to itself. It seems that Sextus is not correct here and is misrepresenting the Stoa. If we refer to, for example, Cicero De finibus 3.59, the difference between the wise and the non-wise in cases like restoring a trust is that the restoring a trust is a *kathekon* and hence accessible to the non-wise, but the peculiar function of the wise man is the just restoration of a trust. The word 'just' here clearly is an integral part of the action. The just restoration of a trust would be, to use Sextus' term, the '*ἴδιον ἔργον*' of a wise man, the possessor of the art of life. The restoration of a trust would be a *kathekon* and common to wise and non-wise, a point which Sextus realises. Now, it might be that when the wise man performs it, it takes on a peculiar quality of its own. But in fact, is it possible to discern an actual difference between the acts of restoring a trust performed respectively by a wise and a non-wise man? Does the wise man's wisdom alter what he does or does his act not differ from the non-wise man's in any way that is detectable from the outside, but only in so far as he knows that what he is doing is appropriate?

Sextus' interpretation of the position is that the latter is the case, because at 200 he makes the Stoics answer his criticism by saying that all the '*ἔργα*' are indeed common to all men, yet they are distinguished by proceeding from an artistic or a non-artistic disposition. This clearly implies that the wise man and the non-wise man perform the same type of actions which cannot be distinguished externally but only internally by the disposition of the agent. This clearly implies that there is no '*ἔργον*' peculiar to the wise man. But, as Sextus proceeds with his exposition of the Stoic answer, he produces an argument for the idea that there is an '*ἴδιον ἔργον*' of the wise man. This represents the view expressed in Cicero's account. The argument is that the function of the wise man is not 'to take care of his parents and, in general, to honour them' but 'to do this ἐπὶ

φρονήσεως'. Here 'ἀπὸ φρονήσεως' is an integral part of the action, as 'iuste' was of 'iuste depositum reddere' at Cicero De finibus 3.59. The art of the wise man is compared to that of the doctor who shares 'τὸ ὑγιαίνειν' with the layman but whose 'ἴδιον ἔργον' is 'τὸ ἰατρικῶς ὑγιαίνειν'. This comparison might help to explain the difference that the wise man's skill makes to his actions. It is obvious that although the activity of 'τὸ ὑγιαίνειν' is common to the doctor and the layman, the particular actions which they do will in fact be different. The layman, even though he might be acquainted with certain medical remedies, would not be able to apply them to their best effect. On the other hand the doctor's skill leads to a different 'ἴδιον ἔργον', i.e. 'τὸ ἰατρικῶς ὑγιαίνειν'. The same will be true of the wise man. Although the activity of honouring one's parents is common to the wise and the non-wise, the wise man's honouring of his parents will involve a different set of actions from the non-wise man's honouring of his parents precisely because his skill enables him to know how to achieve this in the best possible way. That is why his 'ἴδιον ἔργον' is "to do each of the things he does ἀπὸ ἀρίστης διαθέσεως". The non-wise man might manage to honour his parents but even if he does, we can assume that even if the circumstances are absolutely identical with those with which a wise man is faced the non-wise man would perform a different set of actions because he lacks the skill to achieve it in the most effective way. In this way we can distinguish between general rules of *kathekonta* and the particular actions which are examples of the general rules.

Sextus seems not to think that the Stoic position was such because the basis of his criticism up to 206 is that the idea of actions being common to the wise and the non-wise means that the actions of the two will not in actual fact be distinguishable. "The wise man will honour his parents, so will the non-wise man [although not on all occasions when it is appropriate]; therefore, the actions of the two

are indistinguishable." Sextus denies that the disposition of the wise man could have any detectable difference because the disposition is of itself 'non-apparent' ('ἀφανής'). However, if the implications of the comparison with the medical art are drawn, it is possible that the Stoics thought that there was a detectable difference in what the wise man did.

At 206 another answer to the problem of the difference between the action of the wise man and the non-wise man is introduced. It is introduced as the view of others, presumably other Stoics. Heintz,⁴ in discussing whether 'ΤΙΝΕΣ' should be inserted at 200 to correspond with 'ἄλλοι' at 206, suggests that the two answers given here probably derive from "innerstoische Kontroversen" which Sextus has represented as answers to sceptical arguments. It is however difficult to see how the two really controvert each other, because the second merely makes more capital than the first out of the analogy between wisdom as an art of life and the other arts. The peculiar characteristic of the artist is that he produces things in an orderly manner ("τό τε τεταγμένως τι ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι διαμαλίζειν " 207). The layman might produce an artistic product but only occasionally and not consistently. The artist of life, also, is said to be unvarying in his 'κατορθώματα', but the non-wise man is not so. There is an obvious difficulty about the terminology:- 'artistic product' and 'κατόρθωμα'. The argument implies that just as the layman sometimes produces an artistic product, so the non-wise man sometimes performs a 'κατόρθωμα'. This is of course not possible in the normal usage of 'κατόρθωμα', which is applied only to the wise man's actions. There are two possible approaches to this problem, since Sextus might be inaccurate in two ways. Firstly, the source might have wanted to say that the work of the layman resembles the work of a craftsman but not that it can really exhibit skill, and that the action of the non-wise man resembles that of the

wise man in so far as they are both 'καθήκοντα' but not that it can really be called a 'κατόρθωμα'. Secondly, the source might have wanted to say that the wise man is consistent in his 'καθήκοντα' and the foolish man not. When Tsekourakis⁵ tries to attribute the Stoic view here presented to Antipater, he implies that 'καθήκοντα' are meant. Antipater defined the telos as "πάν τὸ καθ'ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν συνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαράβατως πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν".⁶ The underlined words occur also in Clement's statement about Antipater's view of the telos.⁷ Tsekourakis connects these words with the reference to consistency in the present passage in Sextus. But Antipater's consistency is consistency in choosing natural things. Now, choosing natural things is the province of kathekonta; therefore, he must be talking about consistency in performing kathekonta. Thus, if Antipater's view is being represented here, 'κατόρθωματα' must stand in Sextus for 'καθήκοντα'. The danger of this view is that the wise man is only distinguished from the non-wise in that he always performs kathekonta. We would expect the Stoic position to be that the wise man's actions are 'κατόρθωματα', qualitatively different as well as being consistently performed. The difference seems to be removed in Antipater's definition of the telos. If Sextus is representing Antipater's answer to sceptical criticism, this requires the awkward use of 'κατόρθωματα' to refer to 'καθήκοντα'. Even if this were possible, it is difficult to see how it would help one to see the difference between a wise and a non-wise action; in fact, the argument of Antipater seems to be formulated in order to show their similarities. I therefore think the first possibility to be the more likely, that Sextus is being inaccurate in attributing 'κατόρθωματα' to non-wise men when he should really have said that they are inconsistent in performing 'καθήκοντα'.

Although Sextus does, as has been shown, deal with the important problem of the relationship between kathekon and katorthoma at

Adversus Mathematicos XI,188f., he does not use the word 'καθῆκον' but refers to it by the word 'κοινόν', which refers to the fact that a 'καθῆκον' is common to the wise and non-wise. Only once does he use the word 'κατόρθωμα', and then its use is far from clear. In fact this is the only instance of this word in a Stoic context in Sextus.⁸ In the case of 'καθῆκον', apart from the citation of Chrysippus' treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, there is only one instance of the use of 'καθῆκον' and that is in a Dogmatic and not specifically Stoic context. At Adversus Mathematicos XI,131 Sextus is criticising the Dogmatic schools because he thinks that those who pursue the goods and evils which they posit will suffer perturbation. He puts forward several possible things to say to this sufferer, one of which is "that it is 'καθῆκον' neither to pursue the good nor to avoid the evil" ("ὅτι καθῆκόν ἐστι μήτε τῷ κατὸν δῶκεν μήτε τὸ κακὸν φύγειν"). He is obviously thinking of natural goods and evils, not moral goods and evils because another possibility which he gives is to say that what the sufferer pursues possesses very little value (wealth, for example) and therefore that it is not 'οἰκείον' to pursue it but rather 'ἄρμόζει' (it is fitting) to pursue virtue which has greater value. The words 'οἰκείον' and 'ἄρμόζει' seem to be used in exactly the same way as 'καθῆκον'. They have 'ἄξιον' as their criterion, as 'καθῆκον' is seen to have elsewhere, but are, like 'καθῆκον', used to refer to types of behaviour that are appropriate in any Dogmatic philosophy. Sextus' criticism of Dogmaticism is that it is always harping on the choice and rejection of goods and evils and hence cannot get rid of perturbation caused by the failure to acquire them. In view of the identification of 'καθῆκον' with these other terms in this passage and the lack of any other definite use of 'καθῆκον' in a technical sense (except in the title of Chrysippus' treatise) suggests that 'καθῆκον' might have ceased to be a significantly Stoic term along with 'κατόρθωμα' and

come to be used as a general term for any approved conduct.⁹

In the only passages in which Sextus refers to Stoic virtuous actions, apart from the one unclear use of the term 'κατόρθωμα', he uses the phrase 'αἱ σπουδαῖαι πράξεις' or a similar phrase (Adv. Math. XI,22,26,46). That this phrase does refer to katorthomata is clear from XI,22f. where 'ἡ σπουδαία πράξις' is said to be "ἐνέργειά τις οὐσα κατ'ἀρετήν" and where it is identified with "τὸ καθ' ὅσον συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι" ("that of which benefit is an accidental result") as opposed to "τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι" ("that by which or from which benefit is gained"), which is applied to virtue alone because all benefit ultimately derives from virtue itself.¹⁰ Other similar phrases which Sextus uses are 'αἱ κατ'αὐτὰς [sc. ἀρετὰς] πράξεις' and 'τὰς ἐναρέτους πράξεις'. At XI,40 corresponding things are said about vicious actions. Here, too, he does not use the term 'ἀμαρτήματα' but 'φασύλη πράξις', where 'φασύλη' is the expected contrary of 'σπουδαία'. Here 'κακία' and 'φασύλη πράξις' are said to produce 'βλάβη' just as 'ἀρετή' and 'σπουδαία πράξις' were said to produce 'ὠφέλεια'. The term 'σπουδαία πράξις' also occurs in a tri-partite division of 'ἀγαθὰ' at XI,46 where both the virtues and 'σπουδαῖαι πράξεις' are included in the class 'ἀγαθὰ περὶ ψυχῆν'. Thus, the most common word for Stoic virtuous actions in Sextus is clearly 'σπουδαῖαι πράξεις'. This may be merely a phrase which Sextus himself adopts, because whereas there are passages in other Stoic authors where virtuous actions are referred to as actions in accordance with virtue ('κατ'ἀρετήν') the phrase 'σπουδαῖαι πράξεις' only occurs in Sextus.

The Stoic theory of indifferents is given some attention by Sextus (Adv. Math. XI,59-67), and although he does not directly relate it to the concept of kathekon, he discusses an important problem directly relevant to it. Usually, two senses of 'indifferent' are pointed out: 1) that which contributes neither to happiness nor unhappiness, yet can

be either preferred or rejected if it has sufficient value or disvalue respectively, e.g. health and disease, wealth and poverty, and 2) that which arouses neither 'ὀρέμῃ' nor 'ἀφορέμῃ' or is neither preferred nor rejected, e.g. the fact that the stars or the hairs on one's head are odd or even in number. Here, however, Sextus points out a third meaning of indifferent which we met in Plutarch (SR 23.1045D). In the case of two identical drachmae which have nothing to distinguish them, but one of which we have to choose, we do not have 'ὀρέμῃ' to one rather than to the other. Sextus makes this case into a third general class of indifferents.

These three classes are essentially assigned to things in themselves out of the context of the particular circumstances in which people have to act. For instance, to say that wealth is a preferred indifferent is to say firstly that it is not good or evil because it can be used well or ill, and secondly that it has sufficient value to be called preferred. There are however possible exceptions to such a general term, e.g. the pursuit of wealth might well conflict with doing what is good. This leads to the obvious criticism: "What use is the concept of preferred indifferents if there are exceptions to it?" This in fact seems to have led Ariston of Chios to reject the theory and say that things cannot be preferred in themselves ('φύσει προηγμένα') but only in accordance with circumstances (XI,65). He gives an example: "If healthy men had to serve under a tyrant and be destroyed but sick men were to be set free and avoid destruction, the wise man would choose sickness rather than health." In this case, health is not preferred and sickness rejected but exactly the opposite. Now it must be significant that in Ariston's example the man concerned is a wise man. It is easy to see that the wise man can know how to interpret the demands of particular circumstances. But what about the ordinary man who in normal

Stoic theory can only perform *kathekonta*? The Stoic defense against criticism of their theory of differentiation among indifferents is that it provides a basis for determining what is *kathekon*. Now, assuming that the Stoics would agree that the wise man would choose sickness instead of health in Ariston's example, what will the ordinary man do when faced with such a position? If he knows that health is preferred, he might choose this. Is this the appropriate thing to do? But he might also realise that to choose health now will lead to his destruction and therefore that sickness should be chosen. Will this be the appropriate thing to do? The fact that the wise man does it suggests that the latter is the appropriate thing to do. If it is, the theory of preferred indifferents is inadequate when it comes to particular situations. It can at best be only a guideline. When it comes to particular situations, it seems, as I have suggested earlier in the chapter on Cicero, that a concept like 'ἀξιόν' (value), which does enable differentiation of indifferents and forms the basis of the theory of preferred things, is also adaptable to circumstances. How 'ἀξιόν' works in particular situations is briefly explained in Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius.¹¹ In the above example, to know that health is preferred and sickness rejected will not help, but to apply the concept of value will, if it works in such a way that we calculate the value of the alternatives in their relation to the particular situation and see that sickness is in fact more valuable than health.

Another passage in Sextus (Adv. Math. VII,158) indirectly raises some important questions about *kathekon*. This passage concerns Arcesilaus' criticism of the Stoic criterion of truth. According to Arcesilaus, the wise man will suspend judgement about all things, but when it comes to making decisions for the purpose of living, he will make use of 'πίστις' (reasonable belief). This means that his criterion

for actions will be 'τὸ εὐλογον'. When a sceptical philosopher uses such a word, we naturally take it to mean 'reasonable' in the sense of probable; i.e. we cannot be certain that what we choose to do is absolutely right, or rather, to put it in Arcesilaus' terms, we will do the right thing if we do what we think is probably right. However, his definition of a katorthoma is exactly the same as the Stoic definition of a kathekon:- "ὅπερ πρᾶχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν".¹²

Here Arcesilaus is clearly denying that there is a criterion of truth as the Stoics believed and hence that it is not possible to perform a katorthoma in the Stoic sense of that word. The only thing possible is to perform a kathekon, which Arcesilaus implies is based on what is probable. Is Arcesilaus right to imply this? Or is he merely taking advantage of the ambiguity of the word 'εὐλογος'? The difference between a 'κατόρθωμα' and a 'καθεκόν' would seem to be that a 'κατόρθωμα' aims to do what is good, whereas a 'καθεκόν' aims to do what is in accordance with nature. Now, 'εὐλογος' applied to a kathekon could easily mean that it is not right but at least it is reasonable to perform it because it is in accordance with nature. In this sense, a kathekon has a quite definite justification, and there is no uncertainty as to whether a particular act is kathekon or not. If the idea of probability were applied as in Arcesilaus' interpretation, it would refer to an uncertainty whether it is right or not, and it is quite definite that a kathekon is not right; a kathekon in itself does not set out to be right in the same way as a katorthoma is right. Hence there cannot be uncertainty as to whether it is a katorthoma.

IV. KATHEKON IN DIOGENES LAERTIUS AND STOBAEUS

The summaries of Stoic moral philosophy in the second book of Stobaeus' Eclogues and the seventh book of Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Philosophers have the same importance as Cicero's De finibus in that they set out to give an account of the various departments of Stoic ethics. They have no polemical purpose like Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus, but they do suffer from a lack of continuous exposition since the statements made, apart from being very brief, are simply juxtaposed without any explanation. They do in fact exhibit very much the nature of summaries. In general Stobaeus does not attribute any particular view to particular Stoics; Diogenes, on the other hand, does often support his statements by naming specific works of particular Stoics (up to the time of Posidonius and Hecato) in which the statements are made. In Diogenes' section concerning *kathekonta*, however, he only mentions that the doctrine went back as far as Zeno. In this respect, therefore, their accounts of *kathekonta* are similar to Cicero's account in the De finibus.

Kathekonta are included in Diogenes Laertius' division of Stoic ethics at 7.84. It has been argued by Tsekourakis¹ that this really refers to virtuous actions, on the grounds that the term 'ἠθικά' refers only to the "sphere of virtue". He agrees that 'δρμή' and 'πράξεις', which are also included in the division, remind us of the "sphere of appropriateness", but points out that these can also refer to the sphere of virtue. Also, he argues that the word 'κατόρθωμα' does not occur in the division;² consequently, the word 'καθήκοντα' probably refers to virtuous actions. This, I think, confuses the issue. It can be agreed that 'κατόρθωματα' are a special kind of 'καθήκοντα', on the basis of the argument that if appropriateness is an assessment of the content of an action (i.e. that it aims at something in accordance

with nature), then this will be essential to any 'κατόρθωμα'. Also, the view that katorthomata are a subdivision of kathekonta is supported by the fact that they occur as such in Stobaeus' summary. The section 85.12-86.16 starts with the statement that the branch ('τόπος') of ethics concerning 'καθίκοντα' follows on from that concerning 'πρῶτα μέρη'. Here 'καθίκοντα' form a clearly distinct branch of ethics.³ It includes a definition of kathekon, distinguishes 'μέσα καθίκοντα' from 'τέλεια καθίκοντα' and relates them to each other. This is the only section that discusses 'κατορθώματα' among those sections which appear to follow recognizable branches of Stoic ethics. The rest of what Stobaeus says about 'κατορθώματα' appears in the passages from 93.14 onwards, which, as Wachsmuth points out, contain miscellaneous material with practically no order but principally containing statements about the 'σπουδαῖος'. Diogenes' section about kathekonta (7.107-110) gives a definition of kathekon and distinguishes different kinds of kathekonta but does not distinguish between intermediate and complete kathekonta. In fact the word 'κατόρθωμα' does not occur in Diogenes' summary of Stoic ethics at all; where virtuous actions are mentioned they are referred to as actions 'in accordance with' ('κατὰ') the virtues.⁴ This suggests, if anything, that katorthomata are not an integral part of the branch of ethics concerning 'καθίκοντα'.

There is, however, some uncertainty about the interpretation of Diogenes' division of Stoic ethics. Tsekourakis points out the proximity of 'καθίκοντα' to the division 'προτροπαὶ καὶ ἀποτροπαί' in support of his argument that 'καθίκοντα' refers only to katorthomata, since 'προτροπαὶ καὶ ἀποτροπαί' refer only to the virtuous man. But in fact, it is possible that the text should be read so as to take "περὶ τῶν καθιόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν" as referring not to two but only one division of Stoic ethics. This is the natural way to

take it. There is not much evidence for the meaning of 'προτροπαί' and 'ἀποτροπαί' in the Old Stoa, but they do occur several times in Epictetus,⁵ always with the same meaning, that of the philosopher inducing someone who errs to right his ways. At Discourses 3.23.33f. he discusses the protreptic style and says that it is "the ability to show the individual and the crowd the inconsistency in which they flounder and how they are paying attention to anything rather than what they want; for they want the things that conduce to happiness but look for them in the wrong place." The idea seems to be that of inducing people to progress and of doing this by means of example (the philosopher by his own example, 3.13.23; by mythical examples with a moral, Fl1 from the 'protreptic homilies' of Arrian). At 4.8.43 Epictetus talks of someone inducing him "ἐπι τὰ ἀκρεῖα ἔργα", a phrase which reminds one of kathekonta. Clearly, if one wants to induce someone to progress, one tries to induce him to do so by means of kathekonta, since it is through performing these that progress can be achieved. Thus, the division in Diogenes may well refer to the inducements of the philosopher to perform kathekonta and refrain from their opposite.

According to Diogenes (7.25, 7.107) it was Zeno who introduced the concept as a technical term and wrote a treatise on the subject, which is included in the list of his works at 7.4. All the major philosophers of the early Stoa seem to have written treatises on this subject.⁶ The word is used before Zeno's time to mean something that it is appropriate to do,⁷ but in this case the appropriateness is determined by the situation - one's position in society, obedience to laws, and the like - but in the case of the Stoa the word is used primarily for what is appropriate to the agent. The etymology given at 7.108 explains it as that which "comes down to or reaches one" ("κατὰ τινος ἤκειν"). This might well refer to one's position in society, one's relationships with others and the like, but these are

not the basic criteria of *kathekon*, which is something independent of customs, laws and societies, viz. the natural constitution of man ("ἐνέργημα δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον", 7.108).

Diogenes gives a definition of *kathekon* at 7.107 as "ὁ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν, οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ". Here "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ" seems as if it is an example of a "εὐλογος ἀπολογισμὸς". But we also have definitions at Stobaeus 85.14 as "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει" ⁸ and in Clement (=SVF3,293) as "ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῷ βίῳ". These clearly imply that "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ (or ἐν βίῳ)" is a definition of *kathekon*. The definition in Stobaeus clearly implies that 'τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ' is something which is capable of having a reasonable defence and not itself an example of a reasonable defence. Diogenes seems to be confused because 'τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ' would hardly be an example of something with a reasonable defence, if it is itself the definition of any *kathekon*. It is possible that he is using 'οἷον' to mean 'as it were'. Thus that which has a reasonable defence would be "as it were the consequent or conclusion in life" or "a kind of consequent or conclusion in life", indicating the use of a term from logic to refer to an action. This interpretation depends upon a specific interpretation of 'ἀκόλουθον'.

Firstly, 'τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ' must be applicable to plants and animals as well as man. Stobaeus explains this by saying that irrational creatures do things "ἀκολουθῶς τῇ ἐαυτῶν φύσει". This does not mean that what is *kathekon* for plants and animals is *kathekon* for man, because it is an action in keeping with natural constitution and man has a different natural constitution. In fact Stobaeus gives a slightly different definition which is applicable only to rational creatures - "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ" (85.17) - but there seems to be no special significance in the distinction between 'ζώη' and 'βίος'. The phrase 'ἐν

ζωῆ' or 'ἐν βίῳ' seems to indicate the sphere in which the consequence or conclusion takes place; that is, the appropriate action is in some way a consequence in the context of the life of a living organism. On this interpretation the consequence is as it were derived from premisses which are contained in the natural constitution of the organism. In the case of animals, they will act instinctively, but their acts will be seen as consequences of their natural constitution. In the case of man the situation is more complex because he possesses reason, but a *kathekon* for man is still a consequence of his natural constitution. In either case a *kathekon* is measured by 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' and 'τὰ παρὰ φύσιν', as Stobaeus states at 86.12. Any action that can be demonstrated to perform or achieve something that is in accordance with, or can be deduced from, the natural constitution of the agent is appropriate for that agent. If 'τὸ ἀκόλουθον' is that which is in accordance with the nature of the agent, it is clear that the phrase 'τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῆ' differs in meaning from the very similar wording of the *telos*, 'τὸ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ φύσει ζῆν', where 'φύσις' refers to a wider concept of nature, viz. universal nature.

Both Diogenes and Stobaeus contain short passages concerning suicide, which show how the principle of 'εὐλογος ἀπολογία' works, in exactly the same way as Plutarch. At D.L.7.130 the wise man is said to depart from life 'reasonably' and gives a few examples of when it is reasonable to do so. In the case of suffering intolerable pain, mutilation or incurable disease, it is *kathekon* for him to take his own life (cf. examples of Heraclitus and Pherecydes given in Plutarch CN 11.1064A) because of a preponderance of 'τὰ παρὰ φύσιν'. In the case of dying on behalf of one's country or friends, this must be done because it is in accordance with one's natural attractions to country and friends. Stobaeus, at 110.9, does not say that good men sometimes

depart from life 'εὐλόγως' but 'καθηκόντως'. He also says that life and death are measured "τοῖς καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον", which is put loosely for "τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν". That natural and unnatural things are intended here is clear from the fact that the possession of virtue is said not to keep one in life nor vice to make one leave it. It is anyway easy to see how 'τὰ καθήκοντα' could be put for 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' since the latter are criteria of the former.

Everything which is in accordance with nature has value. This point is made by Stobaeus at 83.10. Diogenes equates 'προηγεμένα' with the class of things which possess value (7.105). This is inaccurate because all the other evidence suggests that some things that possess value in very small amounts are not 'προηγεμένα'. Both authors give us a tri-partite division of 'ἀξία' which relates it to the telos and also helps us to see how it might relate to the performance of kathekonta. Firstly, things with the greatest value are goods ('ἀγαθά') and contribute to the consistent life ('ὁ ὁμολογούμενος βίος') (Stob.85.3; D.L.7.105). This is the value according to which, in the explanation of Diogenes [sc. the Stoic philosopher] (Stob.84.11), we say that something possesses "ἀξίωμα καὶ ἀξίαν"; 'ἀξίωμα' here seems to mean something like 'high esteem' (cf. Stob.83.12 where I think "Τ(ι)μῆν καθ' αὐτό" should be read as the second type of value given there). Secondly, value is also applicable to things which possess a "kind of intermediate capacity or usefulness contributing to the natural life ('ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βίος')" (D.L.7.105), e.g. wealth and health. This seems to be the same type of value which Stobaeus refers to by the term 'δόσις' (83.12; 84.4), since Diogenes the Stoic explains it as a "judgement about how natural something is or how useful it is to nature". This clearly refers to the element of usefulness in intermediates which gives them value as objects of kathekonta. Thirdly, there

is a type of value called 'ἀμοιβή τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ' (Stob.83.12; D.L.7.105). Diogenes Laertius explains it as the value which someone experienced in matters ('πράγματα') assigns, e.g. when it is said that wheat exchanges for $1\frac{1}{2}$ times the amount of barley.⁹ Stobaeus explains it as that value in accordance with which, given the circumstances ('πράγματα'), we choose A instead of B, e.g. health instead of disease, life instead of death, wealth instead of poverty. This seems at first sight merely to refer to the fact that health, life and wealth are 'προηγμένα' but disease, death and poverty 'ἄποπροηγμένα'; but what seems to be important is the factor of 'πράγματα'. It seems that to know what value is to be assigned to something in itself or how natural it is, as in the second type of value, is not enough when it comes to particular circumstances. In the third type of value we must be able to assess relative value in these circumstances. Although the implications of this are not spelled out here, this must mean that while health is normally to be preferred to disease it will on rare occasions not have more value. To assess this, we must need the experience which Diogenes Laertius mentions.

This brings up a difficult problem. What part does the experience needed to recognize relative value play in the performance of kathekonta? Is the non-wise man capable of making the 'equivalence of the expert' and recognizing exceptional circumstances which contradict the value assigned to things in themselves? Is this the prerogative of the wise man, or is he just infallible in making such equivalences? We are helped here by the fact that Antipater calls this type of value 'ἐκλεκτική' (Stob.83.13), a term which we met in Plutarch CN ch.26. In this passage, the wise choice of natural things is said to be the telos, whereas the natural things in themselves and the obtaining of them possess "ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία". This must refer to the fact that

natural things have value for choice in comparison with unnatural things. There is no suggestion of exceptional circumstances in Plutarch, but if, as Stobaeus suggests, the term did include such instances, the ability to discern them will not coincide with the wise choice of natural things. If the wise choice of natural things includes, as it must, the infallible discernment of such instances, then the experience which Diogenes Laertius speaks of must be something that it is necessary to acquire in order to take one on the road from mere pursuit of preferred things to the infallible discernment of equivalences which includes exceptional circumstances. Thus, it seems that if 'ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία' is concerned with determining the value of things in so far as we choose them in our actions, this must be the type of value that is apposite to the performance of kathekonta. In many cases, the ordinary man will be able to do what is appropriate because preferred things will be chosen in preference to rejected things, but in order to perform kathekonta in all instances, he will have to develop the ability to discern when these usual values do not apply, and this involves being able to balance the value of one thing against another in the context of a particular situation. The more he can do this, the more kathekonta he will perform.

At D.L.7.108 kathekonta are said to be a subdivision of actions which are done in accordance with impulse ('ὄρμη'); only those which are in keeping with the natural constitution are kathekonta. Some actions done in accordance with impulse are inappropriate. Now one aspect of natural things is that they stimulate impulse (Stob.80.8f.; 82.5; 82.20); so that appropriate actions must be done in accordance with the impulse aroused by natural things, and inappropriate actions be done in accordance with an impulse which is in some way aroused by unnatural things. Diogenes Laertius mentions the primary impulse of

self-preservation at 7.85f., which leads to the repulsion of harmful things and the attraction towards things akin to one. He lays stress on the fact that in rational creatures reason is a "τεχνίτης τῆς ὀρμῆς". Clearly this must refer to the stage after men acquire a reasoning faculty, and before this they must be motivated by primary natural instincts. What is *kathekon* for them in the pre-rational stage will be different from what is *kathekon* in the rational stage because the introduction of reason affects what is natural for them. Before they acquire reason, they can only be led to do what is *kathekon* through the impulse stimulated by primary natural things. At 7.110 the word "μέσοι" seems to refer to children who do not possess reason,¹⁰ and the example "children obeying their teachers" is thus a *kathekon* applicable to the pre-rational stage. The language indicates this - "καὶ ἐν μέσοις..."="even in the case of the intermediate...", viz. those who are neither 'φαιδρος' nor 'σπουδαῖος' because they do not yet possess reason.¹¹ That the earlier examples refer to the rational stage is shown by the fact that *kathekonta* are also said to be "ὅσα λόγος αἰρεῖ ποιεῖν" ("such as reason chooses to do"). This could hardly apply to the pre-rational stage because they would not be in keeping with the natural constitution at that stage. The phrase seems to imply that the *kathekonta* of which examples are given here are the sort of things that rational creatures naturally choose to do. It is appropriate for them to honour their parents, brothers and country and to associate with friends because reason chooses to do these and not their opposites. In the case of "picking up a twig" or "holding a pen or scraper", reason does not naturally choose or reject them in themselves, and hence they are neither appropriate nor inappropriate. These examples must be by their very nature general rules about what it is *kathekon* to do. Obviously some rational creatures will fail to perform

them when it is appropriate to do so, and also there will be conflicts and exceptions.

There seems to be no implication here about the question of whether the agent must deliberately subject his impulses to reason in order to perform *kathekonta*. Such an opposition of reason and impulse is not apposite here. All actions occur in accordance with impulse, and equally so all actions of rational creatures involve the use of reason. Reason can lead us to do appropriate or inappropriate actions. It is possible to do what is appropriate, as we might say, "on impulse" without subjecting the impulse to the scrutiny of reason. Equally so it is possible to subject one's impulses to the scrutiny of reason and yet be led to do what is inappropriate. The problem for the agent is surely twofold, getting his impulses right and knowing what is *kathekon*. Reason can help him to get his impulses right by deliberately directing them to what is *kathekon*; this is presumably why Diogenes Laertius calls reason a "craftsman of impulse" (7.86). But in this case impulse can be trained to be directed towards what is *kathekon* without the need for conscious direction by reason on every occasion.

The relation of reason and impulse in the performance of *kathekonta* is shown by a passage in Stobaeus (86.17f.) where impulse is said to be moved by "φαντασία δρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν". Since impulse is also defined here as "φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τε", the implication is that it is 'τὸ καθήκον' whose image in the soul automatically impels the soul towards itself. We are told elsewhere¹² that we are impelled to acquire what we are naturally attracted to, and this is a basic principle of behaviour right from the time of birth. But here is the only place in Stoic evidence, except in Epictetus,¹³ where an image of what is *kathekon* is said to impel us toward it. By 'kathekon' here must be meant 'what seems *kathekon*' to the person concerned.¹⁴ In the

pre-rational stage it is clear that what seems *kathekon* is the acquisition of the primary natural things which preserve one's own constitution. In the case of the rational stage, 'rational impulse' ('λογικὴ ὀρμή') is defined as "φορὰ διανοίας ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν". The word 'διάνοια' refers to the 'ἡγεμονικόν', the guiding principle in the soul,¹⁵ and this is here said to be directed towards "something involved in acting" which we presumably regard as *kathekon*. The thing to which we are directed must be an appropriate thing which can be achieved by action. This type of impulse is essentially directed towards an action which we regard as appropriate for us to do, whether we can do it or not. When it comes to actions which we can actually perform, 'practical impulse' ('πρακτικὴ ὀρμή') comes into play. A species of practical impulse, called 'ὄρουσις', is here defined as "φορὰ διανοίας ἐπὶ τι μέλλον", which is clearly directed to a possible future action that is likely to happen and which is regarded as appropriate. The distinction here is that which is pointed out at 88.1 where all impulses are said to be assents, but some to be practical and to comprise the moving force. It is the latter which refer to practical impulses in distinction from those impulses which are assents to appropriate actions.

The principle explained here is illustrated in the case of 'πάθος', the irrational emotions. A 'πάθος' is an excessive impulse involving an opinion that a good or an evil is present (88.8f.). This opinion is of such a kind that it is regarded as appropriate for one to be affected by it. At 90.14 grief ('λύπη') is defined as "συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ" and the cause of this is said to be "τὸ δοξάζειν πρόσφατον κακὸν παρσῆναι, ἐφ' ᾧ καθύκει (συστέλλεσθαι)". Here we have an image of a present evil, in the face of which we believe it to be appropriate to contract the soul. This belief is wrong and, as the Stoics thought, needs to be eradicated. If we apply this view of behaviour to the

problem of performing *kathekonta*, everything can be seen to depend on bringing about a situation in which the images that move impulse represent what is in actual fact *kathekon* rather than what the agent misguidedly believes to be so. The agent must alter his beliefs about what is good and evil, and needs instruction in this.¹⁶

The point was made earlier that the examples of *kathekonta* given at D.L.7.107 - honouring one's parents, brothers and country, and associating with friends - are essentially general rules independent of circumstances. Also, experience, it was suggested, is required to recognize an exception. At D.L.7.109 the distinction between *kathekonta* that are independent of circumstances ('τὰ ἄνευ περιστάσεως') and those that are dependent on circumstances ('τὰ περιστατικὰ') is pointed out. Thus, "looking after one's health and sense-organs" is appropriate as a general rule independently of circumstances, whereas exceptions to these such as "maiming oneself" are appropriate only in special circumstances. Another obvious example of the latter is the case of throwing away property which would probably be appropriate in the case of a storm at sea when, to prevent the ship sinking, cargo is jettisoned, an action that would usually be inappropriate.

A slightly different distinction is also pointed out at 7.109, between what is always *kathekon* and what is not always *kathekon*. "To live virtuously" is always *kathekon*; this must mean that no circumstances whatever can make it inappropriate and that at any time whatsoever it will be appropriate to live virtuously. On the contrary "questioning and answering" and "walking" are not always appropriate. The examples of the latter are similar to those of 'οὐδέτερον' (neither 'κτοροθύματα' nor 'ἁμαρτήματα') at Stobaeus 96.18f. Stobaeus clearly indicates that 'οὐδέτερον' can be done wisely or foolishly. Is, therefore, the 'always / not always' distinction a distinction between

'κατορθώματα' and 'οὐδέτερα'? In favour of this is that Diogenes' example of an always appropriate action - to live virtuously - is a katorthoma. But "questioning and answering" and "walking" are, in Diogenes, examples not of things neither virtuous nor vicious but of things not appropriate on every occasion. One might have expected under not-always-appropriate actions examples of things that are appropriate as general rules but not in every circumstance, but the actual examples appear to be not even appropriate as a general rule. Also, in the Stobaeus passage one might have expected under 'οὐδέτερα' examples not of things that are neither appropriate nor inappropriate but of things that are kathekonta as a general rule but neither 'κατορθώματα' nor 'ἐμαρτύματα'. In fact, I would like to suggest that this is in fact what the examples are. They have some similarity to the examples of intermediate kathekonta at Stobaeus 86.3:- "marrying, going on an embassy, and conversing". Here "conversing" in particular might seem to be neither appropriate nor inappropriate like "questioning and answering" and "walking", but in fact they are appropriate. In fact, it is quite natural for human beings to converse with their fellow men, for them to be inquisitive about others and ask them questions, and also to take exercise; it would be difficult to imagine human existence without such activities. Thus I think that the examples of not-always-appropriate actions are things that are normally appropriate because in accordance with human nature, but not always, because it is not appropriate to perform them on any particular occasion whatsoever. This suggests, also an explanation of why "living virtuously" is used as an example of an always appropriate action; that is, it is not possible to give an example of a kathekon which will always be kathekon and not at the same time be a katorthoma. It happens that only those kathekonta which are katorthomata are always kathekonta, because all

general rules of (intermediate) *kathekonta* are subject to exceptions.¹⁷

It was pointed earlier that Diogenes does not give an explanation of the Stoic concept of *'κατόρθωμα'*. On the contrary Stobaeus, whose summary of Stoic ethics is much later, contains many references to it which are of great help concerning this concept and its relationship to *'καθήκον'*.

After giving a definition of *kathekon* at 85.13, Stobaeus goes on to classify *kathekonta* into *'τέλεια καθήκοντα'* (or *'κατορθώματα'*) and *'μέσα καθήκοντα'*. When these two were contrasted in Cicero's De finibus (3.59), the example given of a perfect *kathekon* seemed merely to be a virtuous performance of the same action which was an example of an intermediate *kathekon*. We have also come across, especially in Plutarch, examples of *katorthomata* which are virtuous performances of completely indifferent things. Here however the examples do not contain these elements but are merely infinitives of verbs corresponding to the virtues, with the definite article added:- "*τὸ φρονεῖν*", "*τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν*". Similar examples occur at 96.20 (though without the definite article)¹⁸ which include another virtuous activity ("*σωφρονεῖν*"), actions corresponding to the rational emotions ("*χαίρειν*", "*εὐφραίνεσθαι*"), and an example referring to the benefit derived from *katorthomata* ("*εὐεργετεῖν*"), in addition to an example of the wise performance of an indifferent thing ("*φρονίμως περιπατεῖν*"). These examples show that the essential aspect of a *katorthoma* is that it is in accordance with virtue, in contrast with *'μέσα καθήκοντα'* which Stobaeus says are not in accordance with virtue. Examples of the latter are "marrying", "going on an embassy" and "conversing". Now since some of the examples of *katorthomata* do not contain elements that are in the examples of *kathekonta*, a relevant question is:- Since *katorthomata* are complete *kathekonta*, what is it that makes them *kathekonta*? Take "*τὸ φρονεῖν*" for instance:

its virtuousness must consist in its wisdom, but then there is no characteristic of it left which can be appropriate. This would be different in the case of "wise walking" where walking would seem to be an appropriate human activity. The problem exists also, to some extent, with examples such as "wisely picking up a twig" where picking up a twig is an activity that is neither appropriate nor inappropriate; but in this case we could say that this activity becomes appropriate on the particular occasion on which it is done wisely. This is not possible in the case of "τὸ φρονεῖν". I see two possible approaches to this. Firstly, we could say that acting wisely always needs material in order to become an action and that this material is appropriate. But this is inadequate because it seems to be implied in Stobaeus that acting wisely is itself a (perfect) *kathekon*. Secondly, we could say that acting wisely is appropriate not because it wisely does something appropriate but because wisdom itself is appropriate. Indeed, since wisdom is of supreme value for man, to act wisely must be a completely appropriate activity. Now, it must be true that the wise man always does something that is appropriate for him, in the sense that any particular wise action must include something that is appropriate in the same way as a *'μέτρον καθήκον'* is appropriate. Indeed it is possible that to say that it is completely appropriate means, at least partly, that it always guarantees the performance of something that is appropriate. However, just as marrying is in accordance with nature and appropriate for man in an intermediate sense, so acting wisely is in accordance with nature and appropriate for man in the sense that it is his supremely appropriate activity. Thus, acting wisely is not, most importantly, appropriate because it is the virtuous performance of an intermediate *kathekon*, but because virtue itself is appropriate.

Exactly what is meant by the supreme appropriateness of *katorthos*

mata can be ascertained by an examination of those passages in Stobaeus which describe their characteristics. Cicero (De finibus 3.24-5) explained katorthomata as actions containing "omnes numeros virtutis", "all the numbers of virtue". This clearly meant for Cicero that such actions performed by the wise man include not only wisdom but the other three cardinal virtues in addition. Stobaeus also mentions the explanation of a katorthoma as an action possessing "all the factors" (93.14). He does not say that it possesses all the factors of virtue but that it is a kathekon possessing all the factors. This shows a significant difference between kathekonta and katorthomata: whereas a kathekon might be seen as concerning the sphere of only one virtue, a katorthoma, even though it may be concerned principally with one of the virtues, takes all the other virtues into account. What this means is explained at 63.6. Here each virtue is attributed with a main characteristic, but each also in a secondary role performs the function of the other three. The main characteristic of wisdom is "to determine and perform what ought to be done (ὁ πολυτέρον)", but in a secondary role it will also be concerned with stability of impulses, maintaining a firm stand and giving each his due. This means that a wise action cannot be wise unless it also exhibits the characteristics of the other three virtues, that is unless it possesses all the factors of virtue. This will be true not only of a particular action, but every action that the wise man performs will be done in accordance with all the virtues, as is stated at 65.12. Every action will be perfect and will be a katorthoma (v. 99.7: "ἀεὶ κατ' ὁμοῦν [sc. τοῦς σπουδαίοις] ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὡς προτίθεται"). In the latter passage, the wise man is said to utilize all the experiences of life in such a way that every action he does is done wisely, temperately and so on. This suggests the idea that wisdom is an art of life, which occurred in the

above Ciceronian passage (De finibus 3.24-5) and was discussed by Sextus Empiricus. At Stobaeus 66.14f. the point that the wise man does everything well is mentioned. Wisdom is compared with the arts of flute-playing and lute-playing, and its artistic quality is said to be that it does everything "κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον" (a characteristic of *katorthomata* at 96.22) and "κατ'ἀρετήν". It is said to be an art "περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον", which I take to mean that it is an art which covers every action of life down to the most insignificant and not an art which exists throughout all one's life. This involves a consistency of action which connects all one's actions together. Such a quality is not possessed by intermediate *kathekonta*. Although there are rules of *kathekonta* which the non-wise man can apply to his actions, their appropriateness relates to them as separate actions and bears no relation to the appropriateness of any other of his actions.

Virtue and virtuous actions are included in the class of goods of the soul, which is subdivided into those which are 'διαθέσεις', 'ἔξεις' or 'neither *διαθέσεις* nor *ἔξεις*' (Stob. 70.21f.). Virtues are 'διαθέσεις' and distinguished from 'ἔξεις' such as divination ('μαντική') which is an 'ἐπιτήδευμα'.¹⁹ Virtuous actions are neither 'διαθέσεις' nor 'ἔξεις'. The text for the examples of the latter appears to be corrupt:- "οἷον φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης κτήσιν". 'φρόνησις' is not a virtuous activity but the name of a virtue. Unless 'φρόνησις' is used loosely for wise action, Wachsmuth is probably right in reading 'φρονίμευμα' on the basis of 97.9 where it is clearly used to refer to a wise action, or perhaps 'φρονεῖν' should be read on the basis of 96.20. Also, the "possession of moderation" cannot be an activity but ought to be the exercise of moderation, and thus Heine's "χρηστὴν" or Wachsmuth's "ἀσκησιν" gives the right sense. Although it is not stated here, virtuous actions must be those actions which result from the disposi-

tions of which the virtues consist. Now, in the same way as there can be dispositions which 'ἐξαθά περὶ ψυχῆν' and which result in the performance of katorthomata, so it seems that there can also be dispositions which result in the performance of kathekonta. Under the class of 'προηρημένα περὶ ψυχῆν' at 80.23f. is included "ἔξιν καθ' ἣν ἐπίμονοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τῶν καθυκόντων καὶ τέχναις ὅσαι δύνανται συνερθεῖν ἐπιπλεῶν πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον".²⁰ The fact that the disposition to perform kathekonta is here a preferred thing and not a good shows that persistency in performing kathekonta is not to be identified with virtue. The performance of kathekonta, however persistent, leads only to "ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βίος". This is shown by the other examples of 'προηρημένα περὶ ψυχῆν' given above. The arts here referred to which are capable of contributing to the natural life must be distinguished from the art of wisdom which leads to the consistent ('ὁμολεπούμενος') life.²¹ The difference between the performance of all kathekonta and virtue is pointed out in the well-known quotation from Chrysippus in Stobaeus' Florilegium 103.22 (=SVF3,510). Here Chrysippus says that the man "progressing to the top" performs all 'καθυκόντα' but that he does not acquire happiness until "αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὐταὶ προσλάβωσι τὸ βέλαιον καὶ ἔκτικόν καὶ ἰδίων πῆξιν τινὰ λάβωσι". This might suggest that when one has acquired a disposition to perform all kathekonta, then one has acquired happiness and virtue. Why, then, is a kathekontic disposition above said to be a 'προηρημένον'? The answer probably lies in the words 'διάθεσις' and 'ἔξις' which are sometimes kept distinct and sometimes used interchangeably.²² 'Διάθεσις' is used of a fixed and inconvertible disposition and 'ἔξις' rather of a tendency to do something which can be altered. It is most likely the change from 'ἔξις' to 'διάθεσις' that is referred to when intermediate actions, i.e. kathekonta, are said to acquire "a firm and dispositional ('ἔκτικόν') quality

and a kind of fixity"; "ἔκτικόν" in this case will, rather oddly, refer to 'διάθεσις'. It is difficult to see how all kathekonta could be performed without some kind of disposition to perform them, and it must be this disposition which is called a preferred thing. The disposition involved in happiness is of a firm and fixed quality and hence is a good.

The criterion of 'ὀρθὸς λόγος' is used to distinguish 'κατορθώματα' from 'ἁμαρτήματα' and 'ἄδέτερα' at Stobaeus 96.18. 'ὀρθὸς λόγος' is identical 'νόμος', the universal law that pervades the universe. At 96.10f. this is defined as "ὀρθὸς λόγος ... προστακτικὸν μὲν ὦν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὦν οὐ ποιητέον". At Plutarch SR 11.1037C a katorthoma was said to be a "νόμου πρόσταγμα" and a hamartema a "νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα". This must refer to the fact that a katorthoma is an action which is mandated by universal law, which is identical with 'ὀρθὸς λόγος'. Wisdom in the wise man performs the function of universal law, since at 63.6 it was said to be concerned with "ὁ ποιητέον" and the actions which it produces, i.e. katorthomata, are in accordance with universal law. In this way it can be seen that since universal law is identical with universal nature, katorthomata are in accordance with nature in a wider sense than are kathekonta, which are in accordance with human nature only.

There is no problem with the examples of katorthomata and hamartemata given at 96.18, with one exception. "φρονεῖν", "σωφρονεῖν", "δικαιοπραγεῖν", "ἀφραίνεῖν", "ἀκολασταίνεῖν" and "ἀδικεῖν" are activities corresponding to virtues and their respective vices. "χαίρειν" and "εὐφραίνεσθαι" are activities in accordance with rational emotions, and "λυπεῖσθαι" and "φοβεῖσθαι" with irrational emotions. "φρονίμως περιπατεῖν" is the wise performance of something essentially neither virtuous nor vicious. But why is "κλέπτειν" included under hamartemata?

It was suggested when discussing Cicero De finibus 3.32 that 'peccata' was used both for vicious actions proper and for actions contrary to what is appropriate. In the Ciceronian passage 'peccata in effectu', which I suggested were inappropriate actions, are distinguished from 'peccata sine effectu', which I suggested were vicious actions proper. The latter are in direct opposition to 'κατορθώματα' and are contrary to 'ἔρθ'ος λόγος'. But stealing would seem to be primarily a 'peccata in effectu', like Cicero's example of robbing a temple. It is possible that by 'κλέπτειν' is meant the tendency ('εὐκαταφορία') towards stealing mentioned at 93.1. Such a tendency is clearly a 'κακόν' as is shown at 71.8. An act of stealing is a "παρὰ φύσιν ἔργον" like an act of adultery or an insult; these could easily be actions 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' and not hamartemata in the proper sense of the word, but when they become tendencies and dispositions they become vicious.²³ Another approach to the problem is to take "κλέπτειν" as opposite of "εὐεργετεῖν", since the other items in the lists of katorthomata and amartemata seem to pair off with each other. This approach also leads to the conclusion that "κλέπτειν" is meant to include a fixed disposition to steal since "εὐεργετεῖν", being a katorthoma, must involve a fixed disposition to benefit. This seems to be the only way to avoid a problem which is of great importance for the concept of 'ἁμαρτήματα'. If the above does not hold true, we are in danger of making all inappropriate actions vicious. This danger is helped by the statement at 86.10 - "πάν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον ἐν λογικῷ γινόμενον ἁμαρτήματα" - which some have taken to mean that all inappropriate actions are vicious.²⁴ Also, at 86.8 'τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' seem to be opposed to 'τὰ κατορθώματα', a fact which helps this interpretation. If one wants to avoid the position where one has only three distinct categories of action - 1) 'κατορθώματα', 2) '(μέγα) καθήκοντα', and 3) 'τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' (= 'ἁμαρτήματα') - one

has to explain these passages. It is possible to explain the statement that all actions 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' are 'ἁμαρτήματα' by saying that 'ἁμαρτήματα' is used in the wider sense that Cicero uses it in the above passage and which is given as having two distinct meanings at 93.16 - "ἐν ᾧ παραλέλειπται τι καθήκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζώου " as opposed to "τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν λόγον ". The latter distinction clearly keeps the difference between 'ἁμαρτήματα' proper and 'τὸ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον '. The only real difficulty is the apparent opposition of 'τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' to 'κατορθώματα'. It is easy to see that just as some katorthomata are benefits and must necessarily be performed by the virtuous man, and some not, so some hamartemata are injuries and must necessarily be performed by the vicious man, and some not. If "τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον" are not meant to be hamartemata 'παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ' but actions which lack something appropriate, it is difficult to see how what is said about katorthomata here could be applied to them.²⁵

We saw, at Stobaeus Florilegium 103.22 (=SVF3,510), that the performance of all kathekonta by the progressor fell short of the telos because it had not acquired the absolute fixity of disposition which is necessary for the latter. This implies that the performance of kathekonta is in some way helpful to the man who is aiming at the telos even though kathekonta are of an essentially different nature from katorthomata. At Stobaeus 86.10f. we find a statement of the relationship between 'μέσα' and 'τέλεια' kathekonta:- "παρμετρῆσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθήκον (ἀ)διαφόροις τισί, κελουμένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ' εὐφύιαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστε (εἰ) μὴ λαμβάνο(ι)μεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθόμεθα ἀπεριπέστως, (μὴ) ἂν εὐδαίμονεῖν". This clearly states that the criteria of kathekonta are natural things and unnatural things, but the latter are said to "produce such 'εὐφύια' that unless we choose or reject them uninterruptedly we will not be happy". This

clearly implies that the uninterrupted choice and rejection of natural and unnatural things is a necessary preliminary to happiness. It is implied also by the definition of the telos at Stobaeus 46.5 as "that for the sake of which everything is done 'καθ' ἑκόντως' but itself for the sake of nothing else". But does it imply that the performance of all kathekonta is sufficient for happiness? This must depend to some extent on what definition is intended here and how we interpret it. Antipater uses the words 'διηνεκῶς' or 'διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαρξάτως' in his definition of the telos as the continual choice of natural things (Stob. 76.11). Archedemus defined the telos as the "performance of all kathekonta"; this obviously denies any difference between the performance of all kathekonta and the telos.²⁶ However, very much depends on how we understand such words as 'διηνεκῶς' and 'ἀπαρξάτως'. In the present passage in Stobaeus (86.10f.) 'ἀπερισπαστῶς' implies more than just continual choice of natural things but also that the agent cannot be distracted from this. This may well refer to the quality of fixed disposition which is characteristic of the virtuous man.

Perhaps some significance should be put on the word 'εὐφυῖα'. What is meant by saying that the indifferents which are the criteria of kathekonta produce 'εὐφυῖα'? Firstly, it must be meant that only natural things produce 'εὐφυῖα', unless we include the rejection of unnatural things in this. Secondly, it could mean that they produce a 'εὐφυῖα' for virtue. At Stobaeus 107.16 the wise man is said to be "εὐφυῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ φύσεως" and some wise men to be so "ἐκ κατὰσκευῆς". By the first is perhaps meant that he is well-adapted to virtue "as a result of nature"; that is, that before becoming wise he naturally chose natural things and rejected the opposite such that he was well fitted for acquiring virtue. The fact that he naturally chooses natural

things will constitute his 'εὐφύια'. Also, by a wise man who is "εὐφύιος ἐκ κατασκευῆς" must be meant a wise man who is well-fitted to virtue as a result of an acquired state; i.e. he has learnt to choose natural things and thereby become well-fitted to virtue. Thus, at 86.10f. it is likely that we are meant to take it that the choice and rejection of natural and unnatural things is not only a necessary preliminary but also produces a state that is well-fitted for the acquisition of virtue. Such a quality in natural and unnatural things is suggested by the statement at 62.7-14 that we have "ἀφορμὴ πρὸς τῆς φύσεως" towards the things with which the four virtues are concerned - discovery of kathekonta, stabilization of impulses, maintaining a firm stand, and giving each his due. The natural tendency to these things which we possess will, it must be assumed, if unimpeded produce in us a 'εὐφύια', a state which is well-fitted for the acquisition of the virtues themselves.

Apart from the value which intermediates are thus seen to have for the progressor towards virtue, Stobaeus indicates that intermediates alter the quality of katorthomata and hamartemata. At 106.21 he states the Stoic paradox that all hamartemata are equal ('ἴσα'), giving the explanation that they all derive from a single source, viz. vice, and that in every case the judgement of the agent is the same, presumably perverse and contrary to 'ὀρθὸς λόγος'. But, he goes on, they are not similar ('ὅμοια') but different in quality "regarding their external explanation, since the intermediates in respect of which the judgements are made differ". This does not mean merely that there are different intermediates involved in different hamartemata, but that their quality alters the quality of the hamartemata ("διάφορα κατὰ ποιότητα" 106.26). Any hamartema presumably involves the choice of something that is unnatural, and since unnatural things vary in their

amount of 'disvalue' ('ἀποξία'), hamartemata can be seen to vary in quality. The variation would be one of inappropriateness. Thus, all hamartemata will be equal in so far as the judgement involved is equally vicious but different in terms of the inappropriateness of the unnatural things with which the judgement is concerned. This point is illustrated by a comparison of hamartemata with falsehoods. Every falsehood ('ψεῦδος') is equally a falsehood; for example, "it is night" is as much a falsehood as "there is such a thing as a hippocentaur". But that which is false ('τὸ ψευδές') is not equally false, nor those who are deceived ('οἱ διεψευσμένοι') equally deceived. Similarly, it is not possible for vicious actions to vary in degree of viciousness because they all involve deception, but the content of hamartemata can vary in degree of unnaturalness or disvalue just as a false proposition can vary in the extent to which they are false and those who are deceived in the extent to which they are deceived.

Something similar also seems to be said about variations in good men at 113.24-114.3. Here some good men are said to be more protreptic, more persuasive, more acute in intelligence than others "κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπερικλεβνόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων συμβαινουσῶν". This phrase, translated literally, means "when expansions take place in accordance with the intermediates involved". According to D.L.7.101 'expansions' are not received by good things; among good things must be included the actions of good men. Porphyry (=SVF3,525) also attributes to the Stoa the view that the virtues do not admit of degree, but that 'τέχναι' and 'μέσα ποιότητες' do admit of expansion and contraction. In view of the fact that hamartemata were said to refer to differences in the 'μέσα' involved, it would seem to follow that the actions of the good man, while not admitting of expansion in so far as they are good, will admit of expansion in respect of their intermediate qualities. Thus, one

good man might be more effective in stimulating people to correct their ways than another good man because the material he uses to stimulate them might prove more effective; or one good man might be a little quicker in understanding the variation in intermediates than another, since 'ἀρχίνοια' is the ability to find what is appropriate on the spur of the moment (Stob. 61.2). These differences would not alter their degree of goodness.

The differences in hamartemata which are pointed out just before this passage at 113.18 are of a different nature. Those who are foolish are said to be equally foolish because they have the same disposition. But there is a difference between those hamartemata that stem from a "perverse and incurable disposition" ("ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσίατου διαθέσεως") and those which do not. Since both classes stem from a vicious disposition, the difference must be between those done from an incurable disposition and those done from a curable disposition. The latter state, we can assume, can be overcome and progress made; the agent in this case has a disposition to perform hamartemata but he might be able to perform katekonta and by that means start progressing towards virtue. The former, however, is a state of hardened vice with no possibility of progress.

I have discussed the connection between katekonta and katorthomata which is expressed in the idea that a katorthoma is a perfect katekon. At the same time I have tried to show that the Stoics wanted to keep the two distinct to the extent that even the ability to perform all katekonta is not identical with virtue. This is true even of such Stoics as Diogenes and Antipater. Only Archedemus' formulation of the telos as the performance of all katekonta clearly contradicts this. However, a passage in Stobaeus (59.4-62.14) which discusses the virtues and says that wisdom is concerned with katekonta might seem a problem in this

respect.

At 60.12f. the spheres of the four virtues are given and wisdom is said to be concerned with *kathekonta*, temperance with impulses, courage with standing firm and justice with distributions. It is made clear at 62.12 that all of these are meant to cooperate together to enable one to live consistently with nature (*ἄκολουθως τῇ φύσει*). Thus wisdom is concerned with finding what one ought to do, temperance with making sure that one's impulses enable one to do it, courage with making sure that one is able to carry it through, justice with making sure that one's actions deal fairly with other people. Now, only one of the definitions of the six virtues that are subordinate to wisdom contains a reference to *kathekon*, that of *ἀρχινοια* which is defined as *ἐπιστήμη εὐρετική τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παρὰχρήμα* (Stob. 61.2; D.L.7.93, reading *ἔξις* instead of *ἐπιστήμη*; Andronicus=SVF3,264-8). This implies that *kathekonta* are not essential to the definitions of the virtues even though they form the sphere of wisdom. It is easy to see how *kathekon* is related to these virtues; just as *ἀρχινοια* is knowledge that discovers what is *kathekon* on the spur of the moment, so *εὐβουλία* for instance, which is defined as knowledge of what to do and how to do it such that we will act in our own interests, will discover what is *kathekon* such that it is advantageous. Each of the virtues subordinate to wisdom is defined by the way in which it finds what is *kathekon*. The difference between sphere and definition is clearly seen at 66.4 where the virtue of *συμποτική* is said to be concerned with what is *kathekon* in a symposium and defined as knowledge of how one ought to conduct symposia. Also at 68.13 *τὸ εὐορτάζειν* is said to be peculiar to the good man. The virtue of the celebrant seems to be his piety (*εὐσεβεία*) but it also involves holding a ceremony which will act as an appropriate token (*καθῆκοῦσα ἐπιτημασία*).

The problem here is that wisdom is defined as "knowledge of what to do, what not to do and neither" (Stob. 59.4). This is put as "wisdom in 'ἐνεργητέα'" at Plutarch SR 7.1034C. All the four virtues are defined as wisdom in a particular sphere:- justice in 'ἀπονεμητέα', moderation in 'κίρητέα', courage in 'ὑπομενετέα', and wisdom [sc. as a particular virtue] in 'ἐνεργητέα' (SR 7.1034C in conjunction with De virtuti morali 441A). Wisdom is also defined in the above passage in Stobaeus as "knowledge of what are goods, evils and indifferents for the nature of a (rational) political creature", and as "knowledge of goods evils and indifferents" at D.L.7.92 ("ἐπιστήμη κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων"). It might be possible to equate 'καθήκοντα', 'τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' and 'neither καθήκον nor παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' with 'what to do, 'what not to do' and 'neither', but certainly not with 'goods', 'evils' and 'indifferents'. A kathekon is not a good; hence while wisdom does discover what is kathekon, it does something in addition to this which will stem from its knowledge of goods and make the actions it produces into perfect kathekonta. The kathekon which a wise man performs must be different from the kathekon which a non-virtuous man performs. According to Stobaeus' Florilegium 103.22 (=SVF3,510) it is suggested that the kathekonta which the wise man performs differ only from those of the progressor in the disposition which he possesses. If we use the 'what' and 'how' of modern Stoic criticism,²⁷ virtuous actions would seem to be a particular way of performing actions with the same content as kathekonta. That appropriateness is an objective assessment of the content of an action in so far as it achieves something natural is a reasonable assumption,²⁸ and in this respect it might be said to concern the 'what' of action. But wisdom also seems to be concerned with the 'what' of virtuous actions in distinction from moderation which is concerned with impulses to act, and so on. The content which

wisdom discovers must be superior to the content which a non-wise man who performs an intermediate kathekon chooses, because his wisdom consists in knowledge of goods, evils and indifferents. Since wisdom is also defined as knowledge of what to do, what not to do and what is neither to be done nor not to be done, it must involve knowing what constitutes a katorthoma or perfect kathekon. Thus, when wisdom is said to be concerned with kathekonta, we must take it to mean that the actual kathekonta that result from the exercise of wisdom are all perfect. This maintains the difference between the objective content of virtuous actions and of intermediate kathekonta.

The definitions of the virtues contain verbal adjectives in "-τέος". Such adjectives are said at Stobaeus 97.15f. to be 'κατηγορήματα', which are 'incorporeal' and 'παρακείμενα ζῳοῦς'. They are distinguished from adjectives in "-τός" which refer to the 'ζῳοῦς' themselves (and hence are corporeal and not categories). The adjectives in "-τέος" are applied to 'ὠφελήματα', which at 101.5f. are described as 'ὦν χρή' and which are given as a class of 'κατορθώματα ὦν χρή'. Examples of 'κατορθώματα ὦν χρή' which are 'ὠφελήματα' and categories are "τὸ φρονεῖν" and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" which we met as examples of katorthomata at 85.21 and 96.20. Now, if wisdom, as we have seen, is knowledge of what ought to be done ('ποιετέον') and the individual virtues are wisdom applied in different aspects of this - 'ἐνεργητέα', 'αἰρετέα', 'ἀπονεμητέα', and 'ὑπομενετέα' - what room is there for that class of katorthomata which are not included in the class of 'κατορθώματα ὦν χρή'? Also, why are some katorthomata incorporeal categories, although one would expect actions to be corporeal?

These questions have been discussed extensively by Tsekourakis²⁹ and I agree with practically all of his conclusions. Under 'κατορθώματα ὦν χρή' are included those which are necessary for the wise man's

'εὐδαιμονία'. We have already met the idea that a katorthoma in accordance with one virtue is done in accordance with the rest; so that those katorthomata which correspond to the four cardinal virtues are all included under 'ὡν χρεΐ'. Indeed I think it likely that 'ὡν χρεΐ' derives from the definitions of virtue and virtues as knowledge 'ὡν παλητέον' and similar phrases (cf. Galen=SVF3,256, where courage is defined as "ἐπιστήμη ὡν χρεΐ θαρρεῖν ἢ μὴ θαρρεῖν "³⁰). The verbal adjectives in "-τέος" in the definitions of virtue which are to be identified with 'ὡν χρεΐ' and which appear in the examples of katorthomata as "τὸ φρονεῖν " and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" represent the fact that it is necessary for a virtuous man to perform them. On the other hand, it is not necessary to perform some katorthomata because they are not essential to virtuous action. "Φρονίμως περιπατεῖν " for example is not necessary to virtuous action, because one can be virtuous without walking. A similar distinction is pointed out between necessary and non-necessary goods:- 'necessary' are those needed for 'εὐδαιμονία', and 'non-necessary' are, for example, "φρονίμη περιπατήσις" and "φρονίμη ἀπόκρισις ".³¹ Also, "χαίρειν" and "εὐφροσύνη" are non-necessary goods, and hence the examples of "χαίρειν" and "εὐφραίνεσθαι", which occur as examples of katorthomata at 96.21, are katorthomata which are not 'ὡν χρεΐ'.

The examples of katorthomata which are not 'ὡν χρεΐ' will be neither incorporeal categories nor 'ὠφελύματα'. How, then, will "τὸ φρονεῖν" which is incorporeal differ from "φρονίμη περιπατήσις" which is corporeal? At 97.15f. "τὸ φρονεῖν" and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" are like choices, wishes and impulses, all of which are categories. This means that we do not choose to possess them like we would choose to possess goods. Now, we cannot choose, wish or be impelled unless there is something which we choose, wish or are impelled towards; they need material to fill them

out. That which we wish for, or choose or are impelled towards is not an object but a proposition concerning an object. We saw this with impulse towards what is *kathekon*; in the case of an irrational emotion such as fear we are affected by the presentation of a present evil involving the belief that it is appropriate to contract the soul in face of it. Wisdom is a good, but we do not choose wisdom, which is corporeal, rather a proposition about it, viz. "acting wisely", which is incorporeal. "Acting wisely" cannot be a corporeal action because it needs material to fill it out and only becomes corporeal in cases such as "*φρονίμως περιπατεῖν*".

V. PANAETIUS AND KATHĒKON

Anyone who wishes to use Cicero's De Officiis as a source for Panaetius¹ must decide how far Panaetius' views can be extracted from it and how much has been contributed by Cicero. This problem is fully discussed by Van Straaten² who reviews the attitudes of previous scholars. Firstly, it is clear from Cicero's own statements³ that the third book of the De Officiis is Cicero's own work and is only valuable for what he says about Panaetius; and that the first and second books are a treatment of the three books of Panaetius' treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος. Also, Cicero has added prefaces and conclusions to the first and second books (1, 1-6, 152-161; 2, 1-8, 86-90). In addition to this, many of the illustrations that are employed must be Cicero's own, for reasons of dating⁴. Indeed it is the view of Schmekel⁵ and Van Straaten⁶ that all the examples of Roman history and colouring must be Cicero's own because Panaetius would have used Greek examples to illustrate his work. It is true, as Van Straaten points out, that Cicero wanted to make Greek writings accessible to the Romans and hence would have wanted to use Roman examples. But it is not unlikely that, because of his strong connections with prominent Romans, Panaetius used some Roman examples himself⁷. However, even if the latter were true, it would not be possible to determine the origin of any particular passage except of those whose date is too late to be attributed to Panaetius.

Is everything else then, apart from the prefaces, conclusions and some of the Roman examples Panaetian? The problem is that Cicero claims not to have translated Panaetius' treatise but to have "followed him in the main with some modification" (3,7). By "modification" might be meant that he has followed the general line of Panaetius' argumentation but altered some of the details according to his own views, other Stoic sources, or other non-Stoic sources. At 1,6, however, he claims that he is following chiefly Stoic sources, not specifically Panaetius, and that he will draw from Stoic sources as he thinks fit. Thus, we cannot escape the fact that

there might be a small number of non-Stoic elements and certainly some Stoic but non-Panaetian elements in the De officiis. Comparisons between passages in the de officiis and other Stoic evidence in Cicero, especially in the De finibus, have been made by P. Klohe⁸, but van Straaten rightly points out⁹ that Cicero was creating a new philosophical vocabulary and that sources putting forward similar views in Greek might appear more similar in Latin because of Cicero's more restricted choice of words. It cannot be shown by resemblances of passages in the two treatises that passages in the de officiis are non-Panaetian; it could equally show that passages in the De finibus are Panaetian. Also, Klohe and Schmekel regard certain uneven and inconsequential passages as being non-Panaetian, but as Pohlenz, Ibscher and Labowsky¹⁰ have shown, such unevenness could be due to the fact that Cicero has abridged the original. Thus for these three the major part is Panaetian except the Roman Passages, but Cicero has missed out a lot and added explanations of his own. Van Straaten agrees with them. However, this still leaves unexplained Cicero's statement at 1, 6 that he has used stoic sources and not specifically Panaetian sources. Certainty cannot be attained here, but it is possible that Cicero is referring to explanations which he adds in books I and II, for example, the explanation of "καθῆκον" and "κκτόρδωμ" at 1, 8, and the mention of Posidonius at 1, 59 or of Antipater of Tyre at 2, 86. Also, if we consider the de officiis as a whole, a large part of book III is taken from non-Panaetian Stoic sources, for example, from Hecato's treatise on kathekonta (3, 89-92, and probably 51-55), and from a source explaining the difference between intermediate and perfect kathekonta (3, 14f.). Thus, if we think of non-Panaetian Stoic passages as being contained mainly in book III, it is possible that the bulk of books I and II contain the general lines of argumentation of Panaetius' treatise with only a few Stoic additions (apart from Cicero's own explanations). The only obviously Stoic additions occur in the prefaces and conclusions, and it may well be that they are confined to these places. Another reason for supporting the view that Cicero

follows the general lines of Panaetius' treatise fairly closely is, as Van Straaten¹¹ points out, that only in the case of the De officiis does Cicero so formally announce his dependence on a particular source.

The places in which Cicero interposes his own views are often very clear. At 1, 10, for instance, he pauses to criticise Panaetius for not seeing that there are five, rather than three, questions to be asked in deliberating what to do, and this affects 2, 9 where Cicero talks of five principles of officium, where Panaetius would only have three. In some cases it is also clear that Cicero has abridged the original; for example, at 2, 16 where he mentions that Panaetius discussed at great length the fact that great things have been accomplished by men only through the co-operation of other men. Cicero himself regards this as unnecessary because it is obvious. Pohlenz¹² has tried to demonstrate that in book II Cicero has suppressed almost all of Panaetius' theoretical exposés on the 'utile'. It is, however, uncertain whether Panaetius would have given an extended explanation of this concept. He seems to start from the assumption that certain things are useful and should be aimed at, and goes on to show that it is mainly through the co-operation of others that they can be most effectively obtained. The relationship between the concept of 'utile' and of 'honestum' is developed quite clearly in the course of the argument. It would be quite plausible that Panaetius gave no definition of 'utile' at the beginning of book II since he gave no definition of kathekon at the beginning of book I¹³.

Clearly the bulk of the evidence for Panaetius' moral philosophy is contained in Cicero's De officiis. While this means that we are able to give a much fuller account of his moral philosophy than of the other areas of his philosophy where the evidence is very meagre, it does mean also that we must be very careful not to let our account be distorted by the fact that Cicero's De officiis contains only one aspect of his moral philosophy. Van Straaten has given a view of Panaetius' moral philosophy as a whole which is strongly influenced by what is said about officia in Cicero's

treatise, and the three changes of emphasis which he has seen in Panaetius' doctrine of telos - 1) concentration on human, rather than cosmic, nature, 2) shift from subjective to objective elements in human actions (i. e. "τὰ κατὰ φύσιν"), and 3) shift from the functions of knowing to the impulses of human nature - may well be due to the subject-matter of Cicero's treatise and not represent a change of emphasis in Panaetius' doctrine of the telos¹⁵. Cicero's treatise may well not contain much information about his view of the telos. There are indeed clear indications in the treatise that it concerns only officia. At 3, 14 Cicero states it explicitly: "haec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant", that is, it concerns 'intermediate' officia as opposed to 'perfect' officia, which are virtuous actions. He makes the point very clearly at 3, 15: "haec igitur officia de quibus his libris disserimus quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia." In this passage the difference between intermediate and perfect officia is clearly explained. Perfect officia are the peculiar property of the wise man; intermediate officia, on the other hand, are widespread, and many people perform them either through natural goodness or by progress in learning. Indeed this distinction between intermediate and perfect officia is made explicit by Cicero at the beginning of the treatise (1, 8) before he launches out on his exposition of the subject. This distinction, it is true, is not here said to be the belief specifically of Panaetius, nor even of the Stoics, but of "the Greeks", a phrase which suggests merely that Cicero is pointing out the distinction between the Greek terms 'καθῆκον' and 'κατόρθωμα'. The distinction would have no point here if it were not actually drawn from a Stoic source, and Cicero must regard it as being applicable to Panaetius also. Thus, the internal evidence of the De officiis clearly warns us not to regard the treatise as containing views on perfect officia, or virtuous actions. The treatise is not about virtuous actions but about the intermediate class of officia, which are characteristically not virtuous but, as Cicero here (1, 8) points

out using the definition which occurs in Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus, have a reasonable justification (*ratio probabilis*) of why they are done. There is no reason to believe from the evidence in the De officiis that Panaetius did not retain the distinction between *kathekonta* and *katorthomata*, it is quite likely that he concentrated more on *kathekonta* and tended not to be interested in *katorthomata* because they are only performed by the rarely existing wise man. This is suggested by a passage in Seneca's Epistles (Ep.116, 5=fr. 114). Thus, Van Straaten might be right to point out changes of emphasis in Panaetius' moral philosophy as a whole, but not in his doctrine of the *telos*. He probably goes too far when he says that Panaetius abandoned the rigorous principles of the Ancient Stoa because of practical considerations¹⁶.

Even though 3, 14-15 shows that the treatise is primarily about 'media officia' or 'secunda quaedam honesta', perfect officia are nevertheless discussed in book I, and the reason for doing so is made quite clear. In the introductory section of the treatise Cicero says that every treatise about officium has two parts, one dealing with the supreme good, the other with rules by which all the activities of life can be regulated (1, 7). Cicero says that he is going to discuss the second topic in the present treatise, while adding that the rules are affected by the supreme good. Thus, we must take him to mean that his main purpose is the practical one of giving rules for living, yet he will also show how the supreme good affects these rules and for this reason it is necessary to discuss the supreme good at least briefly. The first of three questions involved in determining conduct, according to Panaetius, is whether the proposed action is 'honestum' or 'turpe' (1, 9). Clearly, by 'honestum' he cannot mean 'honestum' in the sense which is peculiar to the wise man, but in the secondary sense which is applicable to the actions of mankind in general. Now, if we ask why this secondary sense of honesta is used here, it must be because primary honesta are the source of the honesta referred to here, as becomes clear later on (1, 15-17). This is so, even apart from the use

of virtue-vocabulary by Panaetius in a so-called popular sense, when putting Stoic philosophy into ordinary language (2, 35). Sections 15-17 give a description of the four virtues which are derived from the basic natural drives discussed in sections 11-14. That it is the virtues that are discussed in 15-17 is made clear at the beginning of section 18 : "ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus, primus ille...."; and at section 152 when all four virtues have been discussed : "sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis , satis expositum videtur." Sections 18-151 cover the four virtues, but the purpose of doing so has been clearly stated both in section 15, where Cicero says that definite types of officia are derived from each of the four virtues, and during the treatment of the four virtues. After the treatment of wisdom, Cicero remarks : "ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus" (1, 19). After the treatment of justice, he remarks that he has discussed how "honestum, ex quo aptum est officium" (1, 60) is derived from the basic principles inherent in human society. At section 152, also, he says that he has sufficiently explained how officia are derived from the divisions of 'honestas'. Thus, we can see that each of the four virtues is seen as the source of definite types of officia, and also that sections 18-151 describe the virtues primarily as sources of officia. For this reason it would seem quite easy to refer to officia as 'honestas'.

Now, in what sense are officia derived from honestas in sections 18-151? The first part (18-19) is concerned with wisdom. Wisdom is derived from our natural desire for learning and knowledge, and consists in the grasp of truth ("perspicientia veri sollertiaque", 15), and its peculiar province ('munus') is the search after and discovery of truth. In section 18 we are told to avoid two things, which seem to be examples of officia derived from wisdom :- 1) not to treat the unknown as known and rashly accept it (and to avoid this, we should devote time to the examination of the evidence), and 2) not to devote too much time to obscure, difficult or unnecessary matters. Activities such as those of astronomy,

mathematics, dialectics or civil law, which are concerned with the examination of truth, are valid activities, but they should not detract from active life. We should devote our mental activity to planning things that are morally good or conducive to a happy life. The same procedure is followed with the other virtues. At section 15 justice is said to consist in the preservation of human society, rendering each man his due and fulfilling contracts. At section 17 the province of justice is said to be the provision of things necessary for the practical life in so far as they are conducive to the preservation of human society. Sections 20-60 outline the officia that are derived from this need to preserve human society, for example, the maintenance of law and order, helping those in need, providing for one's own kin, loving one's country. Courage, at section 15, is said to consist in the greatness and strength of an exalted and invincible spirit. At section 17 its sphere is said to be the provision of things necessary for the practical life in so far as they are conducive to the increase of one's resources and the acquisition of advantages for oneself and one's kin, but especially in being superior to such things. At sections 60-92 the officia deriving from courage are outlined, for example, acquisition of glory, superiority to misfortunes, guarding against ambition, undergoing arduous tasks. And lastly, temperance and self-control is said at section 15 to consist in the orderliness and moderation of everything said or done. At section 17 its sphere is said to be the bringing of order and moderation into everyday actions. At sections 93-151 the officia deriving from temperance are outlined, for example, considerateness to others, doing what is proper for ourselves, selection of suitable career, choosing suitable occasions to do things.

Now, if we examine the relationship between the spheres of the virtues and the officia deriving from the virtues, it seems that the officia outlined are merely an elaboration of the spheres of the virtues from which they are derived. The sphere of wisdom is the discovery of truth

and the officia deriving from wisdom are merely activities in which truth is aimed at. The sphere of justice is the provision of things necessary for the preservation of human society, and the officia deriving from justice are merely activities conducive to preserving human society. Similarly with courage and temperance. This perhaps explains the puzzling language in 1, 15 : "quae quattuor [sc. honesta] quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium." This implies that 'indagatio atque inventio veri' is an example of a type of officia deriving from one of the four honesta (in this case, wisdom), but adds that this also is the peculiar province of wisdom, thus equating types of officia with provinces of virtues. This is in fact what is done in sections 18-151 where the spheres of virtues described in 15-17 are elaborated upon to provide general rules of conduct.

To connect officia with the province of virtue is not unparalleled in Stoic evidence. At Stobaeus, Eclogues II60, 9f. (=SVF 3,264), the four cardinal virtues and those virtues subsidiary to them are briefly outlined¹⁷. Here the spheres of the four virtues are given : "καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς. τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις." In principle this is similar to the De officiis. The province of wisdom here is 'καθήκοντα', and also, as in De officiis 1, 11-14, the virtues are derived from natural drives (Ecl. 1162, 9: "ἔχειν γὰρ ἀφορμὰς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος εὕρεσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑπομονάς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις.") The virtues subsidiary to wisdom are concerned with finding what is kathekon in different ways; 'ἄρχινοια', for instance, is knowledge that finds out what is kathekon on the spur of the moment¹⁸. It is quite clear here that if wisdom is concerned with finding the appropriate content of action, it should be possible to derive rules of appropriate

action from wisdom. This seems to be what happens in the De officiis when the provinces of the four virtues are used to provide rules of officia which serve as a practical guide to those who are not virtuous. It should be emphasised that it is only the provinces of the virtues that provide rules of officia, and not the characteristics of mind which have been seen in previous chapters to be essential to virtuous actions.

The procedure for discussing officia in the De officiis is an interesting one. First of all, honesta are derived from the basic natural drives¹⁹, and then officia from honesta. Why are officia, as well as honesta, not derived from the basic natural drives? At least, one would expect that in so far as the basic natural drives are the basis of human action, officia should be derivable from them directly. And also, according to Cicero's account the Stoics conceived of the performance of officia as an earlier stage in moral development than the performance of honesta. At De finibus 3, 20, he outlines the various stages of officia which lead from the primary officium up to full-blown virtue: 1) the primary officium of preserving oneself in one's natural state, 2) obtaining natural things and rejecting unnatural things, 3) conscious choice in addition to officium, 4) perpetual choice, 5) choice absolutely consistent with nature (which is virtue). One starts off in life doing things that are merely preservative of one's natural state. This develops into the choice of natural things, then to the choice of what is natural in accordance with a conscious principle, then to the perpetual choice of what is natural in accordance with a conscious principle. Finally, virtue arrives when one's choices are completely in harmony with nature. Thus, here officia are derived directly from basic natural drives; indeed the basic drive of self-preservation is called the primum officium (although it is of course developed and superseded in the later stages). Now, even though the De officiis gives an outline account of the basic natural drives, starting with the drive for self-preservation, there is no indication in the account that officia

develop out of them. The natural drives are merely outlined for the purpose of deriving *honesta* from them. The idea that the performance of *officia* is part of a moral development is not discussed here at all. The actions which Panaetius is concerned with under the term '*officia*' are always determined by what is *honestum*. At 1, 9 we are given Panaetius' threefold division for the determination of conduct, of which the first is whether the proposed course is '*honestum*' or '*turpe*', and the second is whether it is expedient, that is, conducive to comfort, command of resources and wealth with which to help oneself and those dear to one. Thus, Panaetius is concerned that we should do things that are expedient, but primarily that our actions should not conflict with what is *honestum*. Thus, one should always decide what it is *honestum* to do before doing what seems expedient (ideally of course these coincide). Thus, the stage of moral development with which we are concerned in the De officiis is that in which we make a conscious choice of what is natural in accordance with the rules of *officia* that are derived from the four virtues.

That this is what is meant by *officia* in the De officiis is shown by the definition of *officium* at 1, 101 as that "*cuius possit causam probabilem reddere.*" The meaning of '*causam probabilem*' here can be determined by the context. It is immediately preceded by the distinction between '*appetitus*' ('*ὄρμηξ*') and '*ratio*' as the two essential functions of minds. '*Appetitus*' impels us to do things, and reason tells us what we should do. Every action, it is said, should be free from rashness or carelessness, that is, we should think before we allow impulse to impel us to act²⁰. We should always consider whether we would be doing what is appropriate. Before we possess reason, impulse will, according to Stoic teaching, impel us to act in accordance with desire for self-preservation, as in the first stage of Cicero's account at De finibus 3. 20, and to obtain natural things and reject unnatural things, as in the second stage. The supervision of reason, however, enables us to manipulate impulse²¹. Now, if the aim of the De officiis

is the practical one of preventing ill-considered actions in which we do not think before we act, as is suggested at 1, 100, it will not be very important to describe how officia derive from basic natural drives; the important thing will be how to determine whether what we are proposing to do has a 'reasonable justification' and is therefore officium. We can do this by subjecting impulse to reason and deciding whether it is in accordance with what is honestum. The most important thing that a treatise on officium can do from a practical viewpoint is to give rules of officia, covering all aspects of life; and rules must be consciously applied by reason if they are to have any effect on conduct. Indeed this is the avowed purpose of Cicero in writing the De officiis (1, 7). That this was also important for Panaetius can reasonably be assumed, since Cicero is unlikely to have used Panaetius' treatise in preference to others on the same subject unless it had this strong practical bent.

It is stated at 1, 7 that the purpose of the rules of officia which are derivable from honesta is the regulation of everyday life in all its aspects: "praecepta, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit." Now, it is also stated as a belief of the Stoics at 3, 14 that 'media officia', those officia that are common and widespread, are performed by many people either 'ingenii bonitate', by natural goodness, or 'progressione discendi', by progress in learning. Thus, some people can perform media officia because they are naturally inclined to perform them or because they have learnt what they are. What one learns must be rules about officia which one can apply to particular situations. The man who possesses natural goodness will presumably recognize the rules of officia without having to learn them. This is borne out by 1, 13 which reads: "nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti." Here the mind 'well formed by nature' refers to the man who is naturally inclined to virtue. He will only obey someone who gives rules or teaches or commands justly for reasons of expediency. He does so because he recognizes that rules given in this way

are the correct ones, that is, in accordance with genuine expediency. Such a person is not aimed at in the De officiis, but the person who needs to learn what the rules are.

An area of Stoic teaching about which the De officiis gives us a lot of information is the application of general rules of officia to particular circumstances. Diogenes Laertius distinguishes between *kathekonta* which are 'ἀνευ περιστάσεως' and those which are 'περιστατικά'. An example of a *kathekon* that is independent of circumstances is 'caring for one's health and sense-organs', and of a *kathekon* that is dependent on circumstances is 'maiming oneself' or 'throwing away one's possessions'. Since 'maiming oneself' is obviously an exception to 'caring for one's sense-organs' because it is not normally conducive to health to maim oneself, we must take 'καθήκοντα ἀνευ περιστάσεως' to be *prima facie* general rules of *kathekonta*, and 'καθήκοντα περιστατικά' to be exceptions to general rules, which are *kathekon* only in special circumstances. Now, if general rules can be contradicted, they are of limited use for determining conduct unless they are supplemented by the capacity to deal with the circumstances under which they can be contradicted. Another passage where circumstances are given importance is Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos XI, 63f. (=SVF1, 361) where Ariston is credited with the view that those things usually called 'preferred' and 'rejected' are entirely indifferent and it is only in particular circumstances that they acquire any preference or rejection ("οὕτω γὰρ τοῖς μεταξύ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πράγμασιν οὐ φυσικῆ τις γίνεται ἑτέρων παρ' ἕτερα πρόκρισις, κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ μαλλον."). Ariston is well-known for the view that everything between virtue and vice is completely indifferent. Cicero chides him for this view at De officiis 1, 6²² because by holding this view he leaves us with no criteria of choice and rejection of things whereby we can find out what is officium. It seems that Ariston, because of the need to incorporate circumstances into a decision of how to act, rejected the Stoic view of 'preferred' and 'rejected' things in favour of the view that no general rules about the choice and

rejection of things in themselves can be made, but that every act must be judged entirely on its own merits.

At De officiis 1, 141 we are given three principles which must be upheld when we undertake any action and which include accommodation to circumstances. Firstly, and most importantly, we must not allow impulse to move us to action without first using reason to determine whether the action has a reasonable justification. Secondly, we must estimate the value of the object of the action to see whether it is worth the effort required to achieve it. Thirdly, we must observe moderation in external appearance and the dignity of our person. The first principle is a general one, that one should always think before acting and not act rashly. The second principle is that we must evaluate every proposed action to see whether it is worth performing. Here the circumstances of each case must be considered; that is, general rules of officia must be interpreted to fit the particular case, presumably either by determining which general rule fits it or whether it warrants an exception to a general rule which would normally be applicable in similar cases. The third principle is concerned with the idea of 'decorum', that which is appropriate for the agent concerned. This is the main concern of sections 93 to 151, which discuss those officia that derive from 'σωφροσύνη' and which contain the present three principles.

The classic example of the problem of exceptions to general moral rules is that of whether one ought always to fulfil a promise or whether there are special circumstances when one need not do so. This is discussed at 1, 31f., after the principles of officia required by justice have been given. The two principles are : 1) that no-one should harm another unless provoked by wrong-doing, and 2) that public property should be used in public interests, and private property for the owner's interest (1, 20). At section 31 Cicero says that we should be guided by these general principles but "ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper est idem." The fulfilling of promises should not be fulfilled if it should prove harmful to whomever you made it or if it should do more harm to yourself than benefit

to whomever you made it. For example, if you promised to be someone's advocate and failed to turn up in court because in the meantime your son had fallen dangerously ill, this would not be contrary to officium. In this case, the obligation to one's son outweighs the obligation incurred by the promise to be an advocate. Thus, one should follow the general rule except when something involving a greater obligation prevents one. Another example of a general rule required by justice which is contravened in particular circumstances is the idea that there are different degrees of human relationships within society which involve different degrees of officium; but in special cases these degrees can be altered (1, 53-60). The relationships of the individual with his country, his kin, his friends are outlined and at section 58 a comparison is made. The chief obligation lies with our country and our parents because we owe them most for their services to us; next come our children and our household who need our support, and finally our kinsmen. This refers to material assistance, but in terms of intimate relationships, friends are most important. These are general guidelines only and we must consider what is necessary in each case, thus on occasion going against the general rule. One would help a neighbour to gather in his harvest rather than a brother or a friend, but defend a kinsman or friend in court rather than a neighbour. Such questions as these must be considered "in omni officio, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus et addendo deducendoque videre, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo, quantum cuique debeatur, intellegas." This clearly states that in every case of officium, as in the examples just given, we should judge the relative claims that different people have on us. What we are asked to do is put in terms of accounting: "that we might become good calculators of officia and by adding and subtracting see what sum remains outstanding and from this find out how much is owed to each person." One's obligations to people are seen as entries in an account-book, and in order to determine the relative claims of each individual one merely compares the amounts owed to each. Of course, the difficulty lies in assessing the obligations, and

it is clearly stated here (1, 60) that it is by practice and experience that we come to be able to assess their value. A comparison is made here with doctors, generals and orators who need to practise in order to be successful at their respective skills, however much they may understand the rules of the skill ('artes praecepta'). In the same way, it is said, rules for preserving officium ('officii conservandi praecepta') can be given, and are given by Cicero in the evaluation of the merits of each case²³.

The third principle for determining conduct given at section 141, that a dignified exterior should be maintained, refers to taking account not of the circumstances of each particular case, but of the situation of the agent as such. There is a general propriety which is defined as "that which is consistent with man's natural superiority over animals" and which is applicable to virtue as a whole, and a subsidiary propriety (1, 96f.). The text suggests that the latter occurs in the case of each of the four virtues ("ad singulos partes honestatis" (96), "unoquoque genere" (98)), but the general gist of the passage is that it is displayed mainly in the sphere of moderation. It seems to refer to the external appearance or propriety of our behaviour which is seen by others, since the passage compares it to harmony and proportion in physical appearance. It is the subsidiary form of decorum which is given as the third principle of conduct at section 141.

The concept of 'decorum' is illustrated by the metaphor of 'personae', characters or parts to which man must conform. The essentially human nature of man by which he possesses reason and on which the general notion of propriety is based forms the first of the four 'personae' (1, 107). This first persona is the most embracing of the four, and it is this that provides the 'ratio inveniendi officii'; that is, it is our human nature that determines what are officia for us. In addition to this each man has a second persona, which is peculiar to himself, in so far as he has different natural endowments and capabilities from other people. At 1, 110 it is said that each man must hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, as long as they are

not vicious, in order that propriety may be preserved. Nevertheless universal nature ('universam naturam'), by which must be meant universal human nature and not cosmic nature since it is contrasted with 'propriam naturam' (it repeats the distinction made in 1, 107), must be preserved, even when individual capabilities are taken into account, but it seems that it is important to the idea of propriety that individual capabilities should be taken into account. Propriety, in so far as it is consistency in the course of one's life and its activities, cannot be achieved by imitating other people's peculiar capabilities (1, 111).

Thus, while the general principles of officia are derivable from human nature as a whole, what one actually does is affected by individual nature. Apart from these, there are two other personae which must be accounted for in determining conduct. The third persona is imposed by 'casus aliqui et tempus'. The possession of a powerful position, noble birth, wealth and the like are said to depend on chance and be controlled by circumstances. The fourth persona is the role which we deliberately choose, mainly referring to the choice of career. One's conduct must be determined by more than the fact that one is a human-being and an individual. The whole situation in which one finds oneself and the choice of a role in life are also determining factors. These four personae are of course interdependent because the choice of a role in life will depend upon natural abilities. An obvious example of officia determined by the situation in which one finds oneself is that of political status or political position. If one is a resident alien, one should keep strictly to one's own affairs and not take part in other people's affairs or in politics (1, 125). A citizen, also, should labour on behalf of his state (1, 124). Or a magistrate who represents the state should enforce the law and order and uphold its dignity (1, 124). The age of a person also is relevant to conduct; it is appropriate for young men to show respect for their elders and listen to their advice, to beware of sensual pleasures and to undergo physical and mental training (1, 122). Old men, on the other hand, should give advice,

beware of idleness, luxury and excess of sensual pleasures. These seem to be specific limitations which qualify the first persona which gives us the general decorum.

Now apart from these limitations to the general decorum there is the need for overall consistency in one's actions. This point is made at 1, 125 after the discussion of the four personae: "nihil est autem, quod tam deceat, quam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam." At 1, 98 the consistency of all our words and deeds is specifically connected with the subsidiary type of decorum that manifests itself in the individual virtue of moderation. The type of consistency meant here is that of the external appearance of our conduct, the way our conduct appears to others, as is shown by the fact that it is said to produce admiration in others. Thus we are asked to maintain a consistency in our conduct in those respects which can be seen by others. At 1, 126f. there is a discussion of decorum in external appearances, such things as that one should keep private the natural functions of the body and not talk about them (1, 126-7), that one should avoid the objectionable manners of the palaestra (1, 130). This concern for a decorous exterior is a factor of Panaetius' philosophy which is quite antipathetic to the Cynical tendencies of the early Stoa²⁴, who believed that the mention of things which are not immoral was not wrong, and this point is made specifically by Cicero at 1, 128.

The maintenance of a decorous exterior plays a large part, therefore, in the maintenance of consistency in conduct. The discussion of 'εὐταξία', which Cicero translates as 'modestia' and which is defined as "scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo collocandarum", "the science of putting every word and deed in its proper place", is concerned largely with this question. An example of what is meant is that of Sophocles who pointed out a handsome boy while discussing business with Pericles; this is censurable on this particular occasion, though it would not be so at a contest of athletics (1, 144). Other things such as singing in the streets are censured as being grossly inconsistent with 'humanitas' (1, 145). This

concern for external decorum, for which Cicero uses the word 'verecundia', is said even to be necessary for virtuous actions (1, 148 : "Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicenda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum"). Cicero may be exaggerating the concern for external decorum but it seems to represent a significant change of attitude in Panaetius' treatment of human conduct from that of the early Stoa. In this respect Panaetius' treatise seems to have been framed in a form usable by the conventional society of his day, since it does not outrage its sense of decorum as the earlier Cynical tendencies of the Stoa would have done.

A very striking aspect of the De officiis is the emphasis put on the acquisition of advantages. While the first book is concerned with the derivation of officia from the four virtues, the second book is concerned with the acquisition of the conveniences of life. The latter is clearly of great importance since the second of the three points about which, according to Panaetius, we should deliberate when determining how to act is whether or not a proposed action is conducive to "vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, as opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos." This is said to be a question of 'utilitas' (1, 9). The point is repeated at the beginning of book II, which is said to concern this question (2, 9). The two 'rationes officii persequendi' with which it deals (i.e. 'utilitas' and conflict of 'utilia', only the first of which derives from Panaetius) concern "commoda vitae, copias, opes, facultates." Thus, just as we ask whether a proposed action is 'honestum' or 'turpe', we also ask whether a proposed action is 'utile' or 'inutile'; that is, whether it will acquire for us the conveniences of life with which we can help ourselves and our friends. While we must make sure that our actions accord with what is 'honestum' (in order to decide this we apply the rules of officia derived from the four types of 'honestum' in book I), we must also make sure that they satisfy the criterion of usefulness in acquiring some convenience of life.

The word 'commoda' is a translation of the Greek word *εὐχρηστύματα*

(and 'commoditas' of 'εὐχρηστία'). We learn this from Cicero, De finibus 3, 20 where 'εὐχρηστήματα', or 'commoda', are distinguished from 'ὠφελήματα', or 'emolumenta'. 'ὠφελήματα' and their opposite 'βλάβήματα' are benefits and injuries in the moral sense, being goods and evils respectively.

'εὐχρηστήματα' and their opposite 'δυσχρηστήματα' are counted among 'praeposita' (one of Cicero's words for 'προηγμένα') and 'reiecta' (one of Cicero's words for 'ἀποπροηγμένα'). The distinction between good and preferred things is, of course, paramount to Stoic ethics because the acquisition of a large quantity of 'commoda' does not contribute to happiness. It is only the possession of good things that does this. Even though the Stoics gave some value to preferred things, they did not believe that wisdom plus wealth was more valuable than wisdom on its own. Thus, the benefits that are derived from the possession of good things are clearly distinct from the advantages derived from the possession of 'commoda'²⁵. It is the latter with which the De officiis is concerned. The question it sets out to answer is how we are to obtain the advantages of 'commoda'. The clear implication of it is that in our actions we should deliberately set out to secure our own interests and those of our friends by obtaining 'commoda'. The idea that officia aim at obtaining advantages is not so strongly put elsewhere as in the De officiis, even though at De finibus 3, 58 Cicero makes the statement that officia aim to preserve the usefulness in intermediates. This does not mean that we should make every effort to obtain them disregarding every other criterion. We must remember the first consideration in determining conduct, that it should be in accordance with what is 'honestum'. Indeed what the second book of the De officiis serves to show is that it is only expedient to obtain advantages by acting in accordance with 'honestum'.

The 'commoda' which are under discussion in the second book of the De officiis are clearly the Stoic 'εὐχρηστήματα' which are included among 'προηγμένα'. 'προηγμένα' are preferred because they are conducive to a natural life ('ὅ κατὰ φύσιν βίος'), being either natural ('κατὰ φύσιν')

themselves or useful for acquiring natural things. Among the latter is money, which is included under 'commoda' at 2, 11. However, in the De officiis the usefulness of 'commoda' in conducing to a natural life is not mentioned at all. There is a brief mention at 2, 11, that they are necessary for preserving human life ("ad vitam hominum tuendam"), and at 1, 11 we are told that nature has endowed every species with an instinct of avoiding harmful things and providing the necessities of life. The only other reason given for acquiring 'commoda' is the obvious one, that they are advantageous. By acquiring them we are able to further the interests of ourselves and our friends ("quibus et se possint iuvare et suos"). This reason is the one that is uppermost in the second book of the De officiis. Indeed it is a basic assumption that we should do what we can to acquire advantages.

It is possible that a longer discussion of the concepts of 'εὐχρηστύματα' and 'προηγμένα' occurred in Panaetius' treatise, explaining why they are to be acquired, and that Cicero has condensed it because he was only interested in the following advice about how to acquire them. However, it must be remembered that the Stoic theory of preferred things was so well-known as not to need repeating, in the same way as Panaetius omitted to give a definition of *kathekon* (y. 1, 7). Also, the purpose of book II is to tell us how to act in relation to preferred things, so that a discussion of the theory is not really necessary. Even so, we are left with the impression that money, influence, repute and the like are desirable because they further our interests rather than because they are constitutive of a natural life. This impression must, however, be balanced by passages such as 1, 17 where the virtue of 'magnitudo animi' is said to be concerned both with acquiring advantages and with being above them ("cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis"). The rules of officia which are derivable from this virtue (1, 61-92) will therefore be affected by the need to acquire advantages but also to act as though they are not of importance for happiness.

The purpose of the second book of the De officiis is to answer the question :- "How are we to acquire advantages?", and to give rules about how to proceed. Cicero tells us at 2, 86 that Panaetius' treatise contained a list of rules of expediency. Here he reports the claim of the Stoic philosopher, Antipater of Tyre, that Panaetius omitted two points in his 'praecepta utilitatum', how to look after health and money. These two things were standard examples of preferred things, and hence we might expect them to be dealt with by Panaetius. Cicero offers the excuse that these two points offer no difficulty. In the case of health it is a matter of what is good or bad for one's health and taking the advice of a skilled physician. In the case of money, how to acquire it and increase it, we are referred to bankers. In these cases therefore it is purely a matter of what is practically the most efficient method of achieving one's aims. If these were the only two points on which Panaetius did not give us guidance about expediency, Panaetius must have given us a fairly comprehensive list of rules about how to act in everyday life. This is what one would expect of a treatise about officia, one function of which, according to Cicero (1, 7), is to give rules "quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit."

At 2, 11 we are given a list of things which are required for the maintenance of life. We would therefore expect a full treatment of these to follow, but Cicero concentrates on topics concerning the relationship of man to his fellow human-beings, especially in the political and legal sphere. Therefore either Cicero has omitted to discuss some points which Panaetius discussed (the phrase "in his utilitatum praeceptis" at 2, 86 suggests that the preceding list was Panaetius' own) or Panaetius' treatment was also restricted to questions concerning human relationships, or at least concentrated on them. Cicero's point at 2, 86 that health and wealth present no difficulty might well be the explanation. Indeed, those expedients mentioned at 2, 11 which do not concern human relationships present no difficulty. The acquisition of gold and silver, and the utilization of

the benefits to be derived from "horses, oxen, other cattle, and bees" is a matter of obtaining the help of other men who are skilled in such matters. Thus, even in these cases we cannot do without the co-operation of our fellow-men. There is little that we can do without their co-operation; hence the importance of obtaining it.

Even if, in the case of caring for health and wealth, it is mainly a matter of what is the most efficient method, this does not mean that we can act contrary to what is *honestum* (in the secondary sense of the word). This point is made in the case of wealth at 2, 87 where Cicero says that we ought to acquire it only by means "a quibus abest turpitude". Cicero must be thinking of recognised legitimate ways of making money. In all cases we must apply the criterion of '*honestum*' and of expediency. This is the first point that is made in the discussion of expediency, that it cannot be divorced from the concept of '*honestum*' (2, 9-10). Anything that is expedient must be morally right and anything that is morally right must be expedient. Thus we are not meant to acquire whatever *commoda* of life we can in whatever way we can, but to do so within the dictates of what is morally right. In fact, there can never be an occasion on which it is genuinely expedient to acquire an advantage by an immoral act.

At 2, 11 the things that are needed for the maintenance of human life are divided into 1) inanimate things such as gold, silver, and the crops of the earth, and 2) animate things of which some are irrational such as horses, oxen, other cattle, and bees, and some rational, that is gods and men. At section 12f. it is pointed out that even the inanimate things are acquired through the co-operation of men. In a civilized society we must rely on the labours of our fellow-men to enable us to reap the benefits of inanimate things. Also, the benefits of animals are procured through the help of our fellow-men. And it is not merely the conveniences of life that are secured in this way but also the achievements of generals in war and of statesmen at home. At section 16 Cicero tells us that Panaetius discussed this question at great length, citing the achievements of

Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Alexander. Thus, the achievement of advantages for the state by enlisting the support of our fellow-men seems to have been an important theme in Panaetius' treatise. It is not only to achieve advantages for oneself that one should use one's fellow-men but also to gain advantages for others. Panaetius thus avoids a purely selfish aim of securing personal advantages by encouraging us to secure them for others as well. In effect, it is fellow-citizens that are concerned here much more than human-beings as a whole, as is shown by the examples given in book II. The gaining of advantages for others is most often the determining factor in how one uses other people. The criterion of 'honestum' in these cases is whether it serves the interests of our fellow-citizens, or at least does not contradict them.

Yet, however much we act in the interests of others, it seems that we always act in our own interests. As regards obtaining the benefits derivable from inanimate objects and animals, there is no problem because we can rely on industrial skills ('artes operosae', 2, 17); in these cases it is a matter of specialised knowledge about how to proceed. But when it comes to gaining the co-operation of men in order to obtain one's own advantages, we are said to need wisdom and virtue. It is stated not only that the way to get men ready to help in furthering one's interests is to use wisdom and virtue, but also that it is a peculiar function ('proprium') of virtue to do this. Indeed this is mentioned as one of three properties of virtue. The first property, perceiving what is true and real in any instance, its relations, consequences and causes, we met as a definition of wisdom in 1, 15 (v. also 1, 141). The second property, restraining the passions and keeping impulses obedient to reason, we met as necessary to any officium at 1, 101f. in the discussion of temperance. The third property is described as follows:- "iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea, quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si quid importetur nobis incommoda, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena

afficiamus, quantum aequitas humanitasque patitur." This has the attributes of justice in that it is concerned with how we treat other people in general, and specifically with punishing those who commit injustices against us. At 1, 17 the purpose of justice in providing and maintaining the things on which the practical business of life depends was to maintain the relationships of men to each other. But at 2, 18 this is turned round, so that we utilize our fellow-men in order to acquire our natural wants, even to acquire them in large quantities ("expleta cumulataque"). This quite clearly means that virtue aims to acquire as many *commoda* as possible and uses other people for this end. However, emphasis should be put on the words 'moderate et scienter' in the above passage (and also on the fact that punishment is to be meted out "quantum aequitas humanitasque patitur. "). We can use other people in order to gain advantages for ourselves, but we must treat them with moderation and wisdom. This is a requirement not to wrong those whom we utilize, and must be an application of the criterion of what is 'honestum'. Yet in the present passage virtue seems to be regarded as a means towards acquiring advantages. This is as if to say that we should act morally because to act immorally is not a successful means to the end of acquiring advantages.

If one wants to show that expediency and moral goodness coincide, one must demonstrate that it is expedient to act morally. This is perhaps the purpose of showing that the acquisition of *commoda* is most successful if our utilization of other people accords with moral goodness. This point is illustrated by an analysis of why people submit to the authority of others (2, 22f.). A list of reasons is given:- goodwill, the bestowal of favours, outstanding social position, hope that something useful will be obtained, promises and bribes. These range from genuine goodwill for someone through desire for personal gain to the fear of being compelled. At 2, 23 Cicero sums up the range of reasons by saying that love is the most suitable for gaining and maintaining influence, and fear the least suitable. This is illustrated by the example of Julius Caesar (which of

course must be Cicero's own example, and not Panaetius') who maintained his position through fear of the armed forces which he controlled. His assassination, and that of other tyrants, shows how such a policy leads to drastic repercussions, and in the long term tends to be much less effective than a policy of gaining the goodwill of people by treating them with genuine kindness ("quod cum perspicuum sit, benivolentiae vim magnam, metus imbecillam....", 2, 29). Clearly this illustrates the point that the most expedient method of gaining people's support is not to force them or entice them with bribes or gifts but, by the way in which one treats them, to merit their support which will then be freely given. In the following discussion of how to gain the goodwill of other people (2, 31f.), we find that it is by performing the officia of justice which have been set out in book I (2, 43). Thus, the expedient way of obtaining goodwill is by acting in accordance with the officia deriving from moral goodness. The identification of 'honestum' and 'utile' at 2, 9-10 is to be interpreted as meaning that it is always expedient to perform officia.

It will be useful to relate Panaetius' views on the relationship between 'honestum' and 'utile' to the earlier Stoic evidence on this point. We saw that the usefulness of good things was essentially different from the usefulness of preferred things. The benefits of good things are the contribution they make to the telos or consistent life, whereas the advantages of preferred things are the contribution they make to the natural life (a life that contains natural things without being absolutely consistent with nature). Thus, on the one hand, only good things are useful because only they can help one to attain the telos; but on the other hand, preferred things are useful from the point of view of the natural life which is within the range of most people (y. 3, 14-16).

From the evidence in the De officiis there is no reason to suppose that Panaetius diverged from this view. At 3, 11f. Cicero gives the Stoic view that whatever is morally good is expedient and whatever is not morally good is not expedient; and this view is attributed to Panaetius at 3, 34.

At 3, 12 Panaetius is said not to believe that virtue is expedient because it is productive of advantages ("efficiens utilitatis"); that is, we should not be virtuous because it brings advantages. He is also said to believe that anything which is apparently expedient but conflicts with the morally good cannot make life better, that is, be genuinely expedient. We must conclude from this that Panaetius believed that it is virtue which is genuinely expedient, and because it contributes to the telos. As Cicero says here, the Stoic telos is "to live in accordance with nature and to choose only those natural things which are not incompatible with virtue." Virtue is the only expedient thing, but we can obtain the advantages of natural things if these do not conflict with it.

The restriction of genuine usefulness to things that are morally good is clearly on line with the other Stoic evidence for the usefulness of good things. But this is not the way in which usefulness is regarded in book II of the De officiis. 'Commoda' are clearly not useful in the sense that they contribute to the telos, but because they are preferred and form part of a natural life. At 2, 11 they are said to be necessary to the preservation of life, and therefore they must be expedient in some sense. Cicero's comment at 2, 13 that part of the telos of the Stoics is "to choose those natural things that do not conflict with virtue" illustrates the way in which the concept of 'utile' works. Only good things are genuinely expedient but the acquisition of preferred things is expedient in a secondary sense when they do not conflict with good things. Thus, virtue becomes the controlling factor in what can be called expedient, so that in book II what is morally good is used as the criterion in determining ways of acquiring 'commoda' (e.g., the best way to acquire 'gloria' is by acting in accordance with justice). The only expedient way to acquire 'commoda' is by actions that are derived from moral goodness, that is, officia. To acquire 'commoda' by performing officia is expedient just because officia are derived from moral goodness.

In practice this means that we can do what we like to acquire 'commoda'

as long as we do not do anything that is 'contra officium' such as committing injustices to others. That this view of 'commoda' was held by Stoics before Panaetius is suggested by Cicero at 3, 42. Here he illustrates the point that we should consider our own interests as far as we can without injuring others, by quoting an example from Chrysippus. In a foot-race one should do all one can to win but never by fouling a competitor. Here 'winning' corresponds to gaining advantages for oneself. There is nothing reprehensible in seeking one's own advantage, only in committing injustices to others in order to obtain it.

So far it has been shown that we should do our best to obtain advantages for ourselves so long as we act in accordance with moral goodness. Indeed this has been shown to be the most expedient way to obtain them. Also, to act in accordance with moral goodness is identical with performing the officia deriving from it. Thus, 'officium' and 'utilitas' become identical, and the phrases 'praecepta utilitatis' and 'praecepta officii' bear practically the same meaning. For example, after discussing the most effective ways of establishing a good name ('gloria') at 2, 31-51, Cicero goes on to the next topic with the phrase:- "sed expositis adolescentium officiis, quae valeant ad gloriam adipiscendam." There are also a few references to officia in sections 31 to 51. At section 51, discussing forensic oratory as a means to 'gloria', he says that it is a 'praeceptum officii' never to bring a capital charge against someone who may be innocent because there is a danger of committing a crime oneself. This is a rule derivable from what is 'honestum' but the passage in which it occurs contains specific references to what is likely to be effective in bringing one gloria. Especially effective is said to be 'pleading in defence', and Cicero even quotes Panaetius as saying that an advocate can even maintain what is plausible rather than true. Also at 2, 43 it is said explicitly that the way to win genuine gloria is by performing the 'officia iustitiae'. Finally, after the end of the whole discussion, it is stated that what has been given is a list of 'praecepta utilitatum' (2, 86).

In the case of 'gloria' the point is forcefully made that true and longlasting gloria is not obtained by pretence, empty ostentation, hypocritical talk or the like, but only by showing that one has a genuine sense of justice (2, 42-3). One must in fact act justly and be seen to do so. There are three requirements for obtaining gloria:- 1) 'benevolentia', 2) 'fides', and 3) 'admiratio' (2, 31). 'Fides', confidence, is only placed in men who provide no suspicion of dishonesty and have practical wisdom (and the first is said to be the more important of the two since practical wisdom without honesty leads to distrust (2, 33-5)). 'Admiration' depends on the display of good qualities and talents such as freedom from vices, superiority to outward circumstances, and freedom from bribery (2, 36-8).²⁶ Thus, all three requirements for gloria are fulfilled by justice. Of course, we are not being asked to be just in the sense of performing 'perfecta officia' or 'κατορθώματα' which are peculiar to the wise man (v. 3, 13f.), but only 'media officia'. A reputation for justice must be based on the performance of 'media officia'.

All the examples in De officiis II revolve around the need to gain the co-operation of our fellow-men. The main concern is to have sufficient friends and a good name in order to further one's own position. At 2, 30-1 we are all said to need the friendship and affection of some people, but some to need more than others, depending on what their role in life is. Those who set out to achieve great things in the interests of the state need the co-operation and friendship of more people than the ordinary man in the street. Thus, the majority of book II is concerned with how to obtain influence with other people by performing kind services, giving money for public entertainments and buildings, the use of eloquence in the law-courts, public offices and the like. Gaining the co-operation of men by obtaining a good reputation with them is seen as the basic way of acquiring 'commoda', and this is achieved by acting in accordance with justice, since justice is the virtue that concerns relations between people.

The virtue of justice, and the officia derived from justice, is based

like the other virtues, on a natural drive (1, 11). In the case of justice, it is the natural feeling which we as human-beings have for other human-beings. Thus, the natural drive which we have to provide for ourselves is balanced by another natural drive to associate with other people. In the same way, the provision of advantages for ourselves is balanced by the need to consider other people and not to act contrary to their advantage. It is a failure to do this which forms Cicero's complaint against Panaetius' pupil, Hecato, who also wrote a treatise about officia (3, 89). In this treatise, Cicero claims that, in the case of a conflict between 'humanitas' and 'utilitas', Hecato tended towards 'utilitas'. Cicero, and Panaetius, do not take this view because they believe that nothing which conflicts with what is morally good is expedient, and it is not morally good to act to the disadvantage of others. To disregard the claims of 'humanitas' in favour of one's own interests is to act contrary to officium.

The criterion of 'humanitas' in deciding what is officium occurs several times in the De officiis. At 2, 17-18 where the point is made that the co-operation of men is obtained through wisdom and virtue, 'humanitas' is given as a criterion which must be observed in punishing those who have acted contrary to our interests. One of the three properties of virtue described here is the skill to treat considerately and wisely those with whom we are associated so that through their co-operation our natural wants may be supplied. When anyone does anything detrimental to the supply of these wants by wronging us, we are justified in having our revenge but only so far as 'aequitas humanitasque' will permit. The criterion is not merely what punishment would be most effective in rectifying the loss of advantages caused, which might lead to excessive or 'inhuman' actions, but what punishment we are justified in making on a fellow human-being. The words 'humanitas' and 'inhumanum' occur later in the context of the law-courts, and here it is specifically given as a criterion of officium. "Never to prefer a capital charge against someone who may be innocent" is given as a 'praeceptum officii' because it is 'inhumanum' to use the gift of eloquence

which has been bestowed for the benefit of men, for the destruction of good men. Bringing such a charge, if successfully carried out, might seem useful as a means of obtaining 'gloria' (forensic oratory is here being discussed as such), but it cannot be truly useful or officium because it conflicts with the criterion of 'humanitas'. Also at 2, 51 'humanitas' is given as the criterion for occasionally undertaking the defence of a guilty person provided that he is not wicked ('nefarius et impius'). This is presumably a case in which it does not seem useful in forwarding one's career (because one will fail in pleading the case), but it is in accordance with 'humanitas' and therefore not contrary to officium and not without some usefulness (it must have some usefulness in enhancing one's career if one is seen to be acting in accordance with 'humanitas' on occasion and not always undertaking cases with the aim of winning them). Thus, in Cicero's view, and in Panaetius' view also (if Cicero's examples are taken from Panaetius' treatise or at least illustrate points from it, and this is most likely the case considering the reference to Panaetius in 2, 51 and also the reference to human-nature and man's superiority to animals in possessing reason as the 'ratio inveniendi officii',²⁷), officium and expediency are measured as much by the interests of others as of ourselves. Hecato is criticised by Cicero (3, 89) for putting personal interests too high.

The appeal to 'humanitas' as a criterion for officium is an appeal to one's affinity to other human-beings. Certainly, the way that Cicero sees the problem at 3, 26 is that the main aim of all men should be to make the interests of the individual and of men as a whole identical. At 3, 31 he says that the good man will perform officium "utilitati consulens hominum et humanae societati." This is not given as Panaetius' view, but Cicero is trying to follow up what Panaetius' view would have been if he had written the projected book about the conflict between seeming expediency and moral goodness ("eius modi iudicatur credo res Panaetium persecutorum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus", 3, 33). The conflict is between apparent 'utilitas' as apparent personal advantage and 'honestas' as the advantage

of our fellow-men. Acting in the interests of our fellow-men is of course most often manifested in acting in the interests of the society to which we belong. We will expect, therefore, that the actions of a politician or lawyer will be justified because they serve the interests of the state. The discussion of the 'beneficia' which concern the state, in 2, 72-85, ends with the statement:- "haec genera officiorum sc services to the state qui persequentur, cum summa utilitate rei publicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam." Such services do, of course, bring popularity and favour, but in fact what makes them officia is that they are of use to the state. One is not just pursuing selfish ends in performing these services but also promoting the interests of one's state. In the discussion of liberality and the bestowal of kindnesses by gifts of money (2, 52-64) as opposed to that by personal services (2, 65-71), it is said that the expenditure of lavish sums of money, which was expected of an aedile, is better used for things such as walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, which are of use to the community rather than on things that are only conducive to furthering one's career and not useful in addition (2, 60). Since Cicero here specifically says that Panaetius criticised the building of theatres, colonnades and new temples, we are probably meant to take it that Panaetius criticised them because they were not of real use to the community. Thus, it is most likely that Panaetius advocated the provision of genuine advantages for one's state as both a justifiable and an expedient way of enhancing one's career.

While the De officiis is so obviously concerned with the conduct of political life in the context of Roman society and this may be due entirely to Cicero's adaptation or partly to this and partly to Panaetius' Roman connections, Panaetius' treatise certainly must have been concerned with interpreting Stoic moral philosophy in the context of contemporary society and producing advice about officia which would be of direct practical application. Panaetius' treatise is certainly the first Stoic treatise which we know to have interpreted Stoic philosophy in such a positively

practical and systematic way, but this may be due partly to lack of evidence. The theory of officia does seem to serve a double purpose: firstly, it produces practical advice in so far as officia aim at the acquisition of natural things ('τὰ κατὰ φύσιν'), which contain an element of usefulness; and secondly, it interprets the theory of virtue, in so far as the rules of officia are derived from the four cardinal virtues.

Panaetius is not concerned in this treatise to give a full description of virtue and virtuous actions. Virtuous actions are by definition appropriate and therefore what is said in this treatise will be relevant to them, but it must be remembered that virtuous actions have an essential difference. The mistake is to be avoided of noting that the De officiis is mainly concerned to tell us what things are appropriate, or to give us the appropriate content of human action, and then to assume that the 'mentality' of the agent is no longer of importance for Panaetius as it was for earlier Stoics. This is what is done by Van Straaten²⁸. It must be true that the 'mentality' of the agent is not of decisive importance in a treatise about kathekonta, but this does not mean that Panaetius did not regard it of decisive importance for the actions of the sage, 'κατορθώματα'.

The same kind of mistake was made by Tatakis²⁹. He realises that the De officiis is a practical treatise which supplies general rules derived from the doctrine of the virtues, and that the individual is left to apply these rules to his own situation³⁰. However, in discussing the question whether the De officiis gives "une morale de second degré" alongside that of the sage³¹, he concludes that Panaetius does not have two moralities but only a practical morality addressed to all men which will show him the way to virtue. It is true that the De officiis is a practical treatise and it is surely designed to help one progress towards virtue, but it does not describe the essential characteristics of a virtuous or perfectly appropriate action which surely comprehends more than practicalities.

Rist³², when discussing the innovations of Panaetius, points out that his treatise on kathekonta is addressed to aspirants to virtue, but he claims

that virtue is measured by what a man does as much as what he says. This does not mean, he says, that Panaetius has abolished the sage but that "absolute purity of motive" is not necessary to the possession of virtue. Now it is true that virtue-vocabulary is used in the De officiis to refer to non-sages, but this is surely only in the secondary sense in which someone who performs the officia deriving from the virtues can be said to act virtuously. This is purely a matter of terminology, which does not affect the basic difference between the virtuous actions of the sage and the actions of the aspirant to virtue.

VI. HECATO AND KATHEKON

The majority of the evidence for Hecato concerns his moral philosophy and this is contained in three authors. Firstly, Cicero in his De officiis quotes eight examples taken from the sixth book of Hecato's treatise περὶ καθήκοντος, which concern special situations in which there is some problem about what course of action is *kathekon* (De off. 3.89f.), and also one passage concerning the wise man's pursuit of personal advantages. Secondly, the seventh book of Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Philosophers contains several short quotations from his moral treatises, which often align him with other Stoics as an author of traditional Stoic doctrine. Thirdly, Seneca's treatise De beneficiis contains several references to Hecato, which are closely integrated in Seneca's argument. They may be derived from a treatise by Hecato on the subject of 'beneficia' or from his περὶ καθήκοντος.¹ The problem is to determine how much of the surrounding context is derived from Hecato. Even passages where Hecato is not mentioned at all may be taken from him, especially since his views are put forward in an approving way by Seneca, in contrast with the disparaging comments which he makes about Chrysippus' treatise on 'beneficia'.² This is the view of Fowler³ who thinks that there is nothing in Seneca's treatise that conflicts with Hecato's beliefs and that there are many signs that someone of Panaetius's school was used. To substantiate this he indicates correspondences between Seneca's De beneficiis and Cicero's De officiis. Of course, this does not enable us with certainty to regard any passage in Seneca's De beneficiis as belonging to Hecato if his name does not occur in it. It only tells us that Seneca was influenced by Cicero's treatise, and this is not surprising.

The fact that Hecato is quoted alongside other Stoics as holding traditional Stoic doctrines suggests that he did not have the reputa-

tion of his teacher Panaetius for Platonizing or Aristotelianizing.⁴ In Diogenes Laertius Panaetius is usually quoted where he diverges from traditional teaching, but the opposite is the case with Hecato. At 7.91 Hecato is quoted along with Chrysippus, Cleanthes and Posidonius as believing that the possessor of one virtue possesses them all; at 7.127 along with Zeno and Chrysippus as believing that virtue is sufficient for happiness; at 7.102 along with Apollodorus and Chrysippus for the theory of goods, evils and indifferents. It is, however, difficult to substantiate any real divergence in Hecato's thought from that of Panaetius except in the passages quoted in Cicero's De officiis. The statement at D.L.7.128, for example, that Panaetius regarded virtue as not self-sufficient but needing health, provisions and strength cannot be taken too seriously in face of the other evidence for Panaetius' views; it could for example easily be taken out of context from a passage which stated that virtue needed such things as a material basis for action. Fowler⁵ has tried to see a divergence in their doctrines about virtue. At D.L.7.92 Panaetius is said to divide virtue into theoretical and practical. This he explains by citing Cicero, De officiis 1.15f. where wisdom is said to concern the investigation of truth and the other three virtues to have the practical concern of controlling the affairs of everyday life. However, this division of virtue into theoretical and practical is of an entirely different kind from that into theoretical and non-theoretical attributed to Hecato at D.L.7.90. Here those virtues consisting of principles are termed theoretical and those, such as health and strength, which are attendant upon the theoretical virtues in the sense that health is attendant upon the theoretical virtue of moderation in the same way as strength is attendant upon the building of an arch, are non-theoretical and do not require the assent of the mind. These non-theoretical virtues are not virtues in the

true Stoic sense since they are said to occur even in 'φασίλοι', but are perfections of the human body just as the theoretical virtues are perfections of the human mind.⁶ The theoretical virtues mentioned here are what are normally called virtues, and these themselves can be both theoretical and practical. Indeed, at D.L.7.125 Hecato is cited as believing that the virtuous man is both a theoretician and a practitioner of what ought to be done ("τὸν γὰρ ἐνάριστον θεωρητικὸν τ'εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων"). Hecato believed, it seems, that virtue is concerned both with principles and with their application. This is a view which Chrysippus is also said to have held, that there are different types of principles for each virtue, viz. 'ἀρετέα' for wisdom, 'ὑπομενυτέα' for courage, 'ἐμμενυτέα' for temperance, and 'ἀπομενυτέα' for justice. Each virtue has its own proper sphere in which it applies principles. Now, it is clear from Cicero's De officiis that it was Panaetius' view that every virtue, not merely wisdom, was theoretical in the sense of consisting of principles since rules of officia are derived from each separate virtue. In traditional Stoic teaching wisdom is theoretical in the sense of determining what to do in every sphere of action, but all the individual virtues consist of principles.⁷ But it is not just courage, moderation and justice which are practical, since at Stobaeus Eclogues II63.11 wisdom is said to concern "τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν, ὃ πολυτέον". Wisdom seems to be both theoretical and practical in Panaetius, in that it involves both pursuit of truth and determination of what ought to be done (De off. 1.19: "omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur."). Thus, in this respect there seems to be no divergence between Panaetius' and Hecato's doctrines of virtue.

The passage at D.L.7.90 where Hecato calls health and strength

'ἀρεταί' suggests that on occasion he called 'ἀγαθά' things normally termed 'προηγμένα' in Stoic teaching. Thus, he might also have called 'ἀγαθά' those actions aimed at attaining them, i.e. kathekonta. This would be in the same way as the Stoics are said to do at Cicero, De officiis 3.15. If kathekonta were sometimes called a 'second-grade' moral goodness, the objects at which they aimed could also be called 'good' without suggesting that they were constitutive of genuine virtue. This, I take it, is the sense of 'ἀγαθά' at D.L.7.124 where it is said that the wise man will pray for goods from the gods. Since Hecato is said to have put forward this view in his περὶ παραδόξων, it is most likely that the statement is intended to be paradoxical. If so, it must mean that the wise man will pray for preferred things, the paradox being that preferred things do not contribute to happiness nor are they an essential part of virtue yet the wise man will pray for them because they have some value in being in accordance with nature. Also, since Posidonius is supposed to have put forward the same view in his περὶ καθυκόντων, it is more likely that 'ἀγαθά' refers to preferred things which are the objects of kathekonta and which everyone, including the wise man, will aim to acquire. If this is so, the word 'ἀγαθά' is here transferred from genuine goods to preferred things to signify the value which they possess as objects of kathekonta. The practice of occasionally using the word 'ἀγαθά' for preferred things does of course go back to Chrysippus, if we can believe the testimony of Plutarch,⁸ who says that Chrysippus permitted this so long as one understood the meaning of what one was saying.

Concerning Hecato's views about kathekon, Diogenes Laertius gives us no help, and we must rely on Cicero and Seneca. Both of these deal with a small area of the subject, but it is possible to extract some general points. A danger which must be guarded against is to restrict

the word 'καθήκον' which appears as 'officium' in Cicero and Seneca to the obligations between two people which arise out of their relationship to one another. Seneca's De beneficiis is of course concerned with the exchange of kindnesses between people, so that the officia with which he is concerned will be of this type. Also, the examples involving conflicts of officia at Cicero's De officiis 3.89f. are all concerned with the way in which we should relate the interests of others to our own. If, however, we examine the way in which the word 'officium' is used, it will be seen that it is not restricted to such relationships.

At De officiis 3.89 the word is used of the solution to the problem of whether the wise man should feed his slaves when grain is extremely expensive. 'Officium' here refers to what one ought to do in such a situation and not to the obligations that one has to feed one's slaves. It would of course be a general rule of officium that one ought to feed one's slaves, but this is a special case where the circumstances demand that one consider a contravention of this general rule. Thus, 'officium' can clearly refer to what ought to be done in a particular situation as well as to the general rules about obligations arising out of one's relationship to other people. The latter sense of 'officium' occurs at 3.90 where one's country is said to have priority over all other officia. In Seneca's De beneficiis (2.18.1) Hecato is quoted as saying that it is difficult to apply the rule for exchanging beneficia which the relationship between husband and wife demands. A relationship is also said to exist between father and son which entails that they do certain things for each other. The words "quodcumque ex duobus constat officium" suggest that what ought to be done as a result of the relationship of two people is called 'officium', and this is embodied in the rule ('regula') which must be applied to our actions. But these words also suggest that there are other kinds of officia

than those concerning the obligations between two people. In another passage of the De beneficiis (3.18.1) 'officium' is used exclusively of the obligations of a son, a wife, and others whose relationship to us require them to offer assistance. Here it is distinguished from 'beneficium', a kindness freely given without any obligation to give it, and 'ministerium', a service of a slave who, owing to his servile position, cannot put his master under any obligation to him. These are not distinctions which are accepted by Hecato but are used as the basis of a discussion. Immediately before these distinctions are given, Seneca says that Hecato has discussed the question of whether a slave can bestow a kindness ('beneficium') upon his master. Now, if, as seems likely, the following discussion of this question down to the end of chapter 22 is based on Hecato, it is clear that Hecato did not agree with the distinction because it is demonstrated at length that a slave can perform a 'beneficium' qua man outside of his 'ministeria' qua slave (cf. 3.18.2: "praeterea servum qui negat dare aliquando domino beneficium, ignarus est iuris humani; refert enim, cuius animi sit, qui praestat, non cuius status.") The phrase "servilis officii formula" at 3.21.2, referring to the rule of behaviour demanded by a slave's relationship to his master, does not use 'officium' in the sense given in the above triple division. Also, the restriction of the word 'beneficium' to a kindness freely given in contrast to one we are obliged to give, i.e. 'officium', goes against the evidence of 2.18.1 where 'officia' clearly cover both these meanings and of 1.3.8 where Seneca complains that Chrysippus' treatise on beneficia⁹, some of which Hecato transcribed, says very little "de ipso officio dandi, accipiendi, reddendique beneficii". What Seneca is complaining about here is that Chrysippus does not tell us when it is appropriate to give, receive and repay kindnesses. This depends on an emendation of the manuscripts

which have the absurd reading of "beneficio" instead of "officio". If this emendation is correct (it is most likely since the words are similar in formation), 'officium' refers to appropriate procedures for the giving, receiving and repaying of kindnesses. It is therefore a wider term than it is in the triple classification, and there is no reason to suppose that it should be restricted to the bestowing of benefits which we are obligated to bestow because of a relationship.

The evidence of Cicero's De officiis and Seneca's De beneficiis has been shown to indicate that officia cover a wider area than actions involving obligations to other people. There is a possible reference to officia not relating to other people at De officiis 3.63 where a passage is quoted from Hecato's περὶ κερδύκωντος to the effect that "sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris". The wise man is here said to take care of his own interests in order to benefit other people, his children, relatives, friends, and chiefly his state, but also for his own sake ("neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis" 3.63). The wording of the passage - "sapientis esse" - would naturally be taken as meaning that it is officium for the wise man to take care of his "res familiaris", especially since Cicero has just said that it is from Hecato's books about officium. Thus, it seems that for Hecato, as well as for Panaetius, officium includes the acquisition of the conveniences of life. They only disagree about the way in which we can acquire them. Hecato tells us not to act for profit only when the law expressly forbids it whereas Panaetius tells us not to exploit people even when the laws do not forbid it, on account of our natural affinity with our fellow-men.

It was pointed out that 'officium' can refer to what ought to be done in a particular case as well as to a general rule. At De beneficiis

2.18.2 Seneca gives us an indication about Hecato's views on the practical performance of officia. Here an officium involving two people is said to demand things equally of both, and we are told that Hecato regarded it as difficult to apply the rule for exchanging beneficia between husband and wife by which they are on equal terms. The following words seem to be the explanation of the difficulty and therefore probably derive from Hecato:- "omne enim honestum in arduo est, etiam quod vicinum honesto est; non enim tantum fieri debet, sed ratione fieri. hac duce per totam vitam eundum est, minima maximaque ex huius consilio gerenda; quomodo haec suaserit, dandum." These words I take to mean:- "For everything that is morally good is difficult to attain, but even what approaches the morally good [viz. secondary goods, or officia]; for the latter not only ought to be performed but ought to be performed in accordance with reason. Under the guidance of reason we should go through all our life, doing the smallest and the greatest things in accordance with her counsels. We should bestow kindnesses in the way that reason has advised us to." Here we have a stipulation that we must not only apply the rule for exchanging kindnesses by performing the officia that it entails, but in order to perform officia we must apply the rule in accordance with reason. Indeed, in everything we do, even the smallest things, we must apply our reason. This idea that it necessary to apply reason in order to perform officia is found at Cicero, De officiis 1.10lf. Here the functioning of the mind is divided into reason ('ratio' or 'λόγος') and impulse ('appetitus' or 'ἔρμη'). It is reason that teaches us what to do and what not to do, and we must not do anything on mere impulse without first considering it rationally. This is the explanation which is given of the definition of officium as that for which a "probabilis causa" can be given (a phrase which occurs as "probabilis ratio" at De finibus 3.58). Thus, to say

that an officium has a reasonable justification means that it involves a rational choice and is not done on mere impulse. This does not mean that the rational choice is a conscious one, since officia could be done from habit, but that it is rational in the sense that it is possible to give a rational justification for doing it. However, in the above passage Hecato must be referring to a deliberate effort to apply a rule to action in a rational way. To do this successfully, it is not enough to know the rule because "what approaches the morally good not only ought to be done but done in accordance with reason"; we are told to follow the guidance and counsel of reason, that is, we must make deliberate rational choices and find out in what way the rule can be applied to situations. It is this kind of conscious application of rules which was probably being referred to in the case of Panaetius at De officiis 1.101f.

What we do, therefore, when we follow the guidance of reason, it seems, is to evaluate the situation and determine a course of action which is in accordance with the rules of officia. The purpose of a treatise on beneficia is to give us rules for the exchange of beneficia, to whom we should give, when we should give, from whom we should accept, how we should repay, and so on. Such rules are given in Cicero's De officiis at 2.52f. A few examples of Hecato's which are illustrative of such rules survive in Seneca's De beneficiis. At 2.21.4 there is an example of someone refusing to accept money from a son for fear that the son should offend his miserly father. This illustrates that one should not accept a beneficium from someone who gives it to his own detriment. At 6.37.1 there is an example of someone in exile who did not wish disaster to fall upon his state so that it would have to recall him from exile. This illustrates that one should not wish disaster upon one's fellow-citizens in order to benefit oneself.

The question of what is officium in the case of a conflict between two rules of officium seems, from Cicero's evidence at 3.89f., to have been a point of disagreement between Hecato and his teacher, Panaetius. The sixth book of Hecato's treatise περὶ καθήκοντος is said to have been full of such questions as whether the good man should feed his slaves when, in time of famine, food is extremely expensive. According to Cicero's analysis, Hecato decided the question of officium in the final stage more by 'utilitas' than by 'humanitas' ("ad extremum utilitate, ut putat, officium dirigit magis quam humanitate" 3.89). In these cases the conflict is between the interests of the individual and of others, including those of the state, and between personal interests and what human nature requires. The question is also complicated by the fact that one should not do anything that contravenes the customs, laws and institutions of the state (3.63).

Hecato was not the first of the Stoics to deal with such cases. At 3.91 Cicero cites the opinions of Diogenes and Antipater on a question which Hecato discusses:- "If a wise man inadvertantly accepts counterfeit money, should he offer it in payment to someone else as genuine money?" This problem which concerns the ethics of selling goods to others, when the interests of the seller conflicts with the interests of the buyer and where the problem is whether our feeling for our fellow-men constrains the seller to reveal what is in the interests of the buyer, was, according to Cicero (3.91), of a type much discussed among Stoic philosophers. Cicero cites more examples of Diogenes' and Antipater's views on this problem at 3.51-55. These are preceded by the example of importing a cargo of grain to Rhodes in time of famine, where there is doubt in the importer's mind about whether to tell the Rhodians that more cargo is on its way or not to tell them and get a higher price for the cargo. Fowler includes this in his collection of the fragments of Hecato without giving reasons,

though it is most likely since it is a similar type of problem to that in 3.91 and since Hecato himself came from Rhodes and thus might well have used an illustration concerning the place.

In these cases, a good and wise seller is assumed (3.50, 3.92), so that there is no question of the seller doing anything which he believes to be immoral. Diogenes' view is that we are required to do no more than the laws require; that is, we can follow personal advantages so long as we do nothing illegal. This is the view of Hecato (3.63). On the other hand, Antipater's view is that we should consider the interests of our fellow-men, a policy to which inborn principles ('*principia naturae*', i.e. the primary natural instincts) lead us. Thus, we should make our own interests identical with those of the community (3.52,53). Diogenes's reply to this is that we do have natural bonds with our fellow-men but this must be balanced by the fact that each man has his own private property ("*sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cuiusque sit?*" 3.53). Diogenes thinks that one is not obliged to tell anyone anything that it would be to his advantage to know (3.55); the buyer must exercise his own judgement when buying something (3.55). This is the legal principle of '*Caveat emptor*'. Antipater takes the more positive view that one should do what is in accordance with human nature even when the law does not demand it. This latter is in accordance with the view of Panaetius who believed that human nature is the basic criterion for determining what is *officium* (*De off.*1.107).

In the examples from Hecato's *περὶ καὶ ὀφικόντος* at *De officiis* 3.89f. one side of the problem is often what human nature demands and the other what is demanded by utility. In the case of whether a good man should feed his slaves when food is extremely expensive, human nature requires him to feed his slaves, but utility demands that he does not. Clearly

the conflict is between *utilitas* as self-interest and *humanitas* as feeling for the interests of other human-beings. Cicero does not give Hecato's arguments, but he says that Hecato, after discussing both sides of the question, comes down in favour of *utilitas*. In the case of whether, in a storm at sea, one should throw overboard a high-priced horse or a worthless slave, *humanitas* requires us to save a fellow human-being but *utilitas* to save the horse because it is of more value to preserve our '*res familiaris*'. The solution is not given by Cicero. In the case of a ship that has sunk, a wise man should not take a plank from a foolish because it is unjust to take something that belongs to someone else, nor should the owner of the ship take the plank from the foolish man because, while the ship is at sea, it belongs to the passengers and not to the owner. This seems to be an example of the principle that one can act to one's own advantage so long as one does nothing contrary to justice. '*Utilitas*', however, does not always refer to self-interest in these examples from Hecato. In the case of a sinking ship when there are two wise men and only one plank available, the one who is most useful to the state should take it. In this case there seems to be a conflict of interests but it is possibly a case of *utilitas* prevailing over *humanitas* since the criterion of *humanitas* is disregarded; the solution is reached by a dispassionate appraisal of the relative value to be gained from the continued life of each one, either for themselves or for the state. The interests of the state are the deciding factor in determining whether a son should inform against his father. If the father is committing robbery, the son should remain loyal to his father and not inform against him because it is more in the interest of the state to have loyal sons than it is detrimental to the state for a father to commit robbery. However, if the father is committing treason, the son should contravene the rule that a son

should be loyal to a father because it is more in the interests of the state to prevent treason than it is detrimental for sons to be disloyal to fathers.

The interesting point about most of these examples is that Hecato maintains the requirements of justice, and yet, within these limitations, decides every officium on the criterion of utility. That course is officium from which is derived the greater advantage; in this respect the advantage of the state is greater than that of the individual. A problem arises with the two examples where Cicero suggests that Hecato countenanced the starving of slaves in time of high famine prices and the throwing of slaves overboard a ship in preference to a valuable horse. It is difficult to judge this matter when one does not know the situations in which Hecato might have countenanced such actions. Hecato does not seem to have denied that *humanitas* makes demands of us. Indeed Cicero states that he puts forward its claims in contrast with those of *utilitas*. Hecato's solutions are not given by Cicero but possible solutions have been suggested: that the wise man should feed himself in preference to his slaves because he is more useful to the state, and that he should preserve his valuable horse in preference to his worthless slaves (slaves being regarded as property) because the wealth of individuals is the wealth of the state (cf. 3.63). This is how Fowler¹⁰ makes these examples fit in with the idea that the advantage of the state is more important than individual advantage. This may well be the right approach, since it suggests that the interests of the state take priority over feelings for our fellow-men which naturally lead us to care for their interests. This fits in well with Cicero's main line of objection to Hecato, that he decides problems of conflict in officia by what is most advantageous rather than by what is in accordance with our natural affections for our fellow-men. For Cicero, and

Panaetius, the latter is the most important criterion and should in fact determine what is advantageous . Considerations of utility, even of the state, do not always lead to the right solution; it is certainly doubtful whether the starving or jettisoning of another human-being should be countenanced in an attempt to preserve the greater material value for the state. But in default of any real evidence, we should perhaps concentrate on the examples for which we do have solutions. In these it is clear that the conflict which Cicero depicts as being between utilitas and humanitas is really a conflict of interests, one's own and those of others, and that the practical solutions reached are based on obtaining the greatest advantage within the demands of justice. In most of the examples it is the interests of the state that weigh most heavily. The problem of selling faulty goods at 3.91-2 and 3.50 illustrates the point well. Here there is a conflict of interest between seller and buyer, but it is Hecato's idea of justice that Cicero disagrees with: Hecato thinks that we need only keep within the bounds of the law which does not require us to declare faults to potential buyers, but Cicero thinks that this involves deception and is therefore unjust. Cicero does not disagree with acting in the interests of the state because he himself exhorts us to make our own interests identical with those of the state; but he does seem to be pointing out the inadequacy of making utilitas a more important criterion for the practical question of deciding what is officium than humanitas. Hecato's examples do perhaps show how utility is intended to act in the determination of officia, but utility leads to an inadequate view of justice and a consequent failure to determine officia correctly. Hecato, like Diogenes, overlooks the claims of our non-legal obligations to other people which, in the view of Panaetius and Cicero, are certainly derived from justice. In the De officiis Cicero makes clear that

both he himself and Panaetius believed that the most advantageous way of dealing with other people was to perform those officia which are derived from justice. Hecato on the contrary seems to make advantage independent of justice. The view of Panaetius rather than of Hecato seems to have prevailed in the Stoa since the former's emphasis on the connection of officia with our obligations to our fellow-men became the predominant factor .

VII. POSIDONIUS AND KATHEKON

(EK refers to the collection of fragments of Posidonius by L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd¹.)

In the case of Panaetius' ethics, the bulk of the evidence is contained in one work, Cicero's treatise De officiis. The same is true of his pupil, Posidonius, for whom Galen's treatise De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, books IV and V, constitutes the major part of the evidence. Unfortunately, the main subject under discussion in this work is 'πάθη', or emotions. Galen's purpose is to support Plato against Chrysippus, by enlisting the help of Posidonius, from whose treatise περί παθῶν he liberally quotes. As Kidd² shows, Galen's treatise is of great value in determining Posidonius' doctrine of emotions, which was a key point in his ethics. Therefore, Galen's treatise might be expected to throw at least some light on his doctrine of kathekonta. However, of all the passages in Galen in which the words kathekon and katorthoma occur, only two are in passages which are attributable to Posidonius. These occur in an extended series of quotations from Posidonius³. The others occur in passages of criticism of Chrysippus, which may contain Galen's own views or views derived from Plato. Posidonius was clearly a Platonizer⁴, but the risk of exaggerating the Platonic influence is certainly great in a work which is meant as a defence of Plato.

Apart from Galen, the evidence for Posidonius' ethics is contained in Diogenes Laertius, Seneca, and Cicero⁵. From this it is clear that Posidonius wrote on the subject of kathekon. Diogenes gives two quotations from this work:- 1) that there is no link of justice between man and the other animals (7, 129=EK.F39), and 2) that the wise man when praying will ask for goods from the gods (7, 124=EK.F40). The latter view is attributed also to Hecato⁶, and 'goods' here probably refers to 'προηγμένα', the things at which kathekonta aim. Cicero also suggests that Posidonius not only wrote a treatise on the subject but also regarded it to be an important one. He is, however, ambivalent as to how deeply he went into the matter. In Ad

Attic.XVI.11.4 (EK.F41a), he says that Posidonius followed up the question of the apparent conflict between 'honestum' and 'utile' which Panaetius projected as a third part of his treatise on *kathekonta* but omitted to complete. In this letter Cicero has not seen Posidonius' treatise, because he says that he has sent for it and written to his friend Athenodorus Calvus for "τὰ κεφάλαια", but is still waiting for it. This summary of the main points seems to have reached Cicero because he says in Ad Attic.XVI.14,4 (EK.F41b) that he has received a "ὑπόμνημα". However, in De officiis 3, 7-10 (EK.F41c) he says that Posidonius has only treated Panaetius' third topic briefly "in some commentaries", even though he regarded it as one of the most necessary parts of philosophy (3, 8). Cicero also refers to a letter of Posidonius in which he writes of P. Rutilius Rufus, a pupil of Panaetius, who used to say that no-one would follow up what Panaetius had omitted on account of the excellence of what he actually wrote (3, 10). Posidonius did, according to Cicero, feel sufficiently qualified for the task, but it must remain uncertain how far he proceeded with it. There is certainly no trace of its being used in the third book of the De officiis. Here Cicero discusses examples of conflicts between *honestum* and *utile* in which *kathekon* is decided on the basis of the circumstances involved, but these ostensibly derive from Hecato's treatise on *kathekon*. If Cicero had had the treatise of Posidonius available for the third book⁷, he would surely have used it, since he says that it contained a section "περὶ τοῦ κατὰ περιστάσειν καθήκοντος". This refers to *kathekonta* which are only appropriate in special circumstances, and would certainly include the type of example that Hecato gives.

One of the basic questions which Posidonius discussed in his treatise περὶ παθῶν was the part that emotions played in evil conduct. Contrary to Chrysippus, who believed that emotions were depraved judgments, Posidonius believed that they arose from the two irrational capacities of the soul, that which seeks pleasure and that which seeks power, victory and the like. Posidonius did believe, like Chrysippus, that the soul was a unitary

substance⁸, but he introduced three capacities, or 'δυνάμεις', rather than parts. This difference in psychology led to a different view of evil conduct.

Posidonius emphasises the functions of the irrational capacities and the need for special forms of training to keep them quiet and make them listen to reason.⁹ The use of precepts taking the form of a command, which is to be obeyed rather than thought about, and various other forms of persuasion seems to have been particularly important¹⁰ for the training of the irrational capacities. The aim of making the irrational capacities listen to reason was clearly of paramount importance since he includes it in his interpretation of the telos ("κατὰ μηδέν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς"¹¹).

Posidonius criticized Chrysippus' theory of emotions as inadequate to explain what actually happened. Such a criticism is given at De plac. 370. 2-15M (EK.F164). Galen gives Chrysippus' position as being that an 'ἀρρώστημα', such as avarice or miserliness, does not arise through an irrational capacity but because judgment is carried away beyond what is appropriate and falsely regards certain things as being not merely goods but the greatest goods (F164, 1.1ff.). Posidonius replies to this by asking why wise men who think that all moral goods ("καλά") are the greatest and supreme goods are not moved emotionally ("ἐμπαθῶς") (F164, 1.12ff.).

This is certainly not the case, Posidonius continues, but it follows from the position that Chrysippus takes. Chrysippus' position is represented by Posidonius as follows:- "τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν κινεῖ τὸ νομίζειν καθήκον καὶ κατὰ ἄξιαν εἶναι παρόντων αὐτῶν ἢ παραχριστομένων (ἐμπαθῶς κινεῖσθαι) [add. De Lacy; ἐν πάθει κινεῖσθαι, Pohlenz] (καὶ) [del. Bake] μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπὸ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι ."

("The momentum of apparent goods and evils moves men to think that it is appropriate and in accordance with value (sc. the value of the circumstances involved), when these are present or at hand, [to be moved emotionally and] to admit no reason why they should be moved differently by them."). Chrysippus

thus believed that if one had an impression of something as good or evil one thought it appropriate to be affected by it. This position is presented quite clearly by Stobaeus (Ecl.II 90, 14), that the cause of an emotion is the opinion that a good or evil is present, by which it is appropriate ($\kappa\alpha\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon\iota$) to be affected. Now Posidonius shows that if this is applied to the wise man who regards moral goods as the greatest goods, one would have to say that he also experiences emotions, in the sense of ' $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ '; but this is not the case. Also progressors who believe that they are caused great harm by vice are not affected by fear and grief.

In fact, Posidonius points out in a later passage (De plac.373. 4 - 375. 3M=EK.F164, 1.86ff.) that it is possible to apply reason when under the influence of emotions, a thing that is impossible for Chrysippus, who believed that the force of one's impressions of good and evil prevents one from thinking that it is appropriate to do anything other than be moved by the impressions. Posidonius employs the example of Agamemnon who, while experiencing fear, is still able to deliberate with Nestor. "If Agamemnon," he says, "while his heart is shaking through fear, is there taking counsel, then those who are in the grips of emotions do not think that it is appropriate to admit no reason in accordance with the value of circumstances when they are moved emotionally." Here Posidonius argues that the person who experiences emotions is still able to think that it is appropriate to admit reason and consider what to do in accordance with the circumstances; for Posidonius this is an empirical fact which contradicts Chrysippus' position. The important question, as Posidonius says, is to ask why some people in such situations do apply reason, as Agamemnon did, while others do not.

The importance of this for Posidonius' theory of *kathekon* must be to alter the connection between emotions and *kathekon* which existed in Chrysippus' definition of the emotions. Posidonius cannot believe that emotions, which are the product of the irrational capacities, entail the judgment that it is appropriate to be moved by the impressions of goods or

evils. For Posidonius the emotions are not caused by, but themselves cause, impressions of good or evil, which can, depending on how one treats them, override the judgments of reason. For Posidonius therefore there are mistakes that result not only from the false impressions produced by the reasoning faculty but also from the false impressions produced by the irrational capacities; and it is the latter that result in an emotional state. However, whatever the source of the impressions that lead to misconduct, and it was this question which interested Posidonius most¹², there is no reason to suspect that Posidonius did not believe that they involve assent to things which are believed to be appropriate. According to Posidonius there are things that are akin ('οἰκεῖα') to the irrational capacities as well as what is truly akin ('ἐπὶ ὧς οἰκεῖα'), i.e. akin to the rational capacity¹³; and mistaken assumptions can result from regarding what is akin to the irrational capacities as truly akin. But whatever is regarded as akin ('οἰκεῖον') must surely produce an impression that it is appropriate to obtain it. Thus, when man succumbs to his irrational capacities and seeks pleasure or power and regards them as akin, he must surely assent to impressions that it is appropriate to obtain them.

Where does this leave 'προηγεμένα' in relation to kathekonta? Posidonius must reject pleasure and power as aims of kathekonta, but must he also reject things like wealth, health and strength? The latter must be akin to the irrational capacities, because the things akin to the rational capacity are "σοφία καὶ πᾶν ὄσον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν" (De plac. 452.9M=EK.F161). Does this mean that they are not to be aimed at? At D.L. 7, 105 and 128 health and wealth are said to have been included among goods by Posidonius. Kidd regards this as a misconception based on the fact that they were said to be oikeion to the irrational capacities¹⁴. Now it is true that, as Kidd points out, on the basis of Seneca's Epistle 87, 31-40 (EK.F170), Posidonius regarded wealth not as an evil but as inciting men to evil. In this way, obviously, it can have no place in the telos. Unlike the telos' definitions of Diogenes, Antistater or Panaetius, Posidonius' definition¹⁵ contains no

reference to the indifferents or 'τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν' nor to the 'ἰσορρομία' given to us by nature. He directly criticized Antipater¹⁶ for including them in his definition because it was tantamount to making pleasure or 'ἄσχεσία' (Epicurean terms) the end. Posidonius reintroduces the idea of universal nature into his own interpretation of 'ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει' as "contemplating the truth and order of the whole and promoting its interests as far as possible." This means that, to achieve the end of 'ὁμολογία', we must follow "that daemon within us which is of the same nature as that which orders the whole" (De plac.449.1M=EK.F187, 1.6f.).

Another possible explanation of the statement that wealth and health are goods is that it derives from statements about them as objects of *kathekonta*. Posidonius seems to have admired Panaetius' treatise on *kathekonta*¹⁷, in which the conveniences of life are treated as legitimate aims of *kathekonta* so long as one acquires them in accordance with the rules of *kathekonta* derived from the four virtues. The important point about *kathekonta* for Panaetius was that they should be in accordance with the virtues, and this facilitated the use of virtue-vocabulary to refer to them. In this sense, *kathekonta* would, in Posidonian terms, aim at things akin to the rational capacity; but they must also incorporate the acquisition of the necessary conveniences of life. That Posidonius recognised these two aspects of *kathekonta* would seem to follow from the fact that he discussed those *kathekonta* which are only appropriate in special circumstances where there is a conflict between 'honestum' and 'utile'. Posidonius might seem to us to differ from Panaetius in his emphasis on the way in which the quest for the conveniences of life can result in emotions and incite us to misconduct. This emphasis is made quite clear by Seneca's discussion of riches in Epistle 87, 31-40 (EK.F170), where he makes them the 'antecedent', rather than the 'efficient', cause of evil. The view of 'commoda' as things containing more advantage than disadvantage is here explained, but Posidonius seems to emphasise the disadvantageous side of riches, which, according to the general Stoic view,

can be used to either a good or bad purpose¹⁸. But we must remember the emphasis of the available evidence - *kathekonta* in the case of Panaetius, emotions in the case of Posidonius. The element of disadvantage probably only seems to be emphasised because it is relevant to the problem of emotions and evil conduct, and therefore there is no reason to suppose that Posidonius did not regard riches and like things as legitimate objects of appropriate actions. The mistake arises when one becomes emotionally attached to them.

VII. SENECA AND KATHEKON

Cicero translates the Stoic term 'καθῆκον' by the Latin word 'officium'. In Ad Atticum XVI 11.4 he specifically states this, in explanation of the title of his treatise De officiis which is based on Panaetius' treatise τὰ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος. In his summaries of Stoic ethics in the De finibus¹ and the Academica² it is therefore clear that the word 'officium' is intended to represent the Stoic term 'καθῆκον', as indeed is stated at De finibus 3.20. In Seneca's writings the position is by no means so clear. Seneca is not accustomed to giving the kind of exposition of Stoic ethics that Cicero gives and, because 'officium' is a very common word in Latin, we need good reasons for taking it in a technical sense.

Firstly, 'officium' can mean a service which someone performs for someone else. It is undoubtedly used in this sense in many of its occurrences in the De beneficiis,⁴ and in this sense means much the same as 'beneficium'. Closely connected with this is the sense of 'officium' to refer to the obligation which exists between two people or parties involved in the exchange of beneficia. In this sense, we might see the meaning of kathekon when it is used to refer to what it is kathekon for someone to do for someone else. At 2.18.1, for example,⁵ Seneca mentions an 'officium' that involves two parties. By this he means the kind of obligation that exists between father and son and between husband and wife. This obligation, he says, can be formulated into a rule to be applied to behaviour, which, if applied rationally, can lead us on the road to moral goodness ("quod vicinum honesto est" 2.18.1). This reminds one of the precepts of officia which are given in Cicero's De officiis,⁶ which, if applied, can help on to perform semblances of moral goodness ("similitudines honesti"). In fact, in the De beneficiis Seneca seems to be giving us rules of

officia which are to be applied to our activities of giving, receiving and repaying the kindnesses or services which form an important part of everyday life. This is suggested at 1.3.8 where Seneca complains that Chrysippus gives little advice about the 'officium' of giving, receiving and repaying beneficia; Seneca seems to give us this advice in the form of rules or precepts. In the passage at 3.18ff. he discusses the question of whether a slave can perform a 'beneficium' to his master, and in the course of his argument, at 3.21.2, he says that a 'beneficium' refers to what a slave does above and beyond the "formula servilis officii"; here 'officium' refers to that which a slave is obliged to do for his master, and this can be put into the form of a rule. The giver and receiver of benefits are in a special relationship to each other, for which rules of what is officium can be given: for example, at 6.22.1 the officium of the giver is said to be to forget that he has given (in the sense that he ought not to demand repayment) and the officium of the receiver to be to remember the benefit (in the sense that he should look for an opportunity to repay it). 'Officium' thus means, in cases like these, the obligation resulting from a special relationship.

Another sense of the word 'officium', similar to the sense of 'obligation', is the 'function' of someone or something: e.g. the 'officium' of the physician is to do everything he can to heal (7.14.3); the 'officium' of a dart is to hit the mark (2.31.3); the 'officium' of good citizens is to act in the interests of the state (6.37.3). In the case of the passage at 6.37.3 there is no reason to think that "bonorum civium officium" means anything but "the function of good citizens", even though it is elsewhere ⁸ said to be *kathekon* to honour one's country. Similarly, at 4.12.5 the 'officium' of the world to maintain the cyclic processes is compared with the 'officium' of man to bestow

benefits. This sense is very common in Seneca⁹ and is too general to be taken in a technical sense, except where there is good reason to suppose that a connection with the Stoic theory of *kathekon* is intended.

Apart from certain passages in the De beneficiis which are based on Hecato and have been discussed in the chapter on Hecato,¹⁰ the most important evidence which Seneca provides about *kathekon* is the discussion of precepts of *officia* and their relationship to the attainment of moral goodness in Epistles 94 and 95. That part of philosophy which, Seneca says, gives "*propria cuique personae praecepta nec in universum componit hominem*" (94.1), immediately reminds us of the rules of *officium* that are referred to in the De beneficiis, since they advise a husband how to treat his wife, a father his children, and a master his slave.⁹ This part of philosophy, unlike the other parts, is said not to stray "*extra utilitatem nostram*"; that is, its main aim is to give practical advice in very specific terms. Here we can compare what Cicero says about treatises on the subject of *officia* at De officiis 1.7: that, apart from the theoretical relationship of the *officia* to the supreme good, their main aim is to provide practical rules for use in everyday life. This part is termed 'paraenetic' (a transliteration of 'παραινετική') or 'praeceptiva' at 95.1. Now, contrasted with this is that part of philosophy which gives the doctrines which concern the supreme good ("*ipsa decreta philosophiae constitutionemque summi boni*" 94.2). The question to which Seneca addresses himself is the relative importance of the two parts in producing a good man.

Some people, it seems (94.1), thought that precepts alone are sufficient. An example of such a person is M. Brutus, whose treatise περὶ καθήκοντος Seneca criticizes at 94.45 for giving many detailed precepts for parents, children and brothers without also giving doctrines about the supreme good. On the other hand, Aristo is said to believe

that the preceptive part is of slight importance, on the grounds that anyone who has a thorough knowledge of the doctrines is equipped to deal with the whole of life and does not need specific instructions about how to treat his wife, his son, and so on. The third position is that of Cleanthes, who regarded the preceptive part as useful but as weak if not combined with a knowledge of the doctrines (94.4); it is this position for which Seneca argues.

In Seneca's exposition of Aristo's view (94.5-13), the difference between precepts and doctrines becomes clear. Precepts are in the form of imperatives - "sic amico utere, sic cive, sic socio" (94.11); they tell us how to treat specific people. Doctrines are in the form of propositions:- "aequitatem per se expetendam, nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede conduci" (94.11). The basic position is that the person who has false opinions about what is good and evil cannot follow precepts of officia, and it is by instruction in the doctrines (that fairness is desirable in itself, that we are not to be forced into it by fear nor hired to that end for pay) that false opinions are to be removed. When knowledge about good and evil has been acquired, precepts are superfluous because this knowledge enables one to determine what to do in specific cases.¹² Another argument against giving precepts is that one cannot expect to give precepts for all cases that might arise because this would be a tremendous task, whereas the doctrines can be applied to every situation.

Seneca, in his answer to Aristo (94.18ff.), does not dispute the basic difference between precepts and doctrines, but attempts to argue for the usefulness of precepts when used in conjunction with the doctrines. Precepts refresh the memory, and they treat matters with greater care than the doctrines which treat everything together. Even if it is the doctrines that help to remove errors such as avarice, luxury and lazy-

ness, we still need precepts to advise us what to do. Advice ('admonitio') is a kind of exhortation, which concentrates the memory(94.25); it does not necessarily teach us something we do not already know but can act as a behavioural reinforcement in cases where we do not practice what we know. Precepts help to arouse the "seeds of virtue" ("honestarum rerum semina" 94.29) in us, and are therefore useful in getting rid of vices. Seneca here makes clear the relationship of officia to the virtues. The doctrines give us the correct opinions about good and evil but do not necessarily tell us how to find the appropriate path in any situation ("ad inveniendam officiorum viam, quam admonitio demonstrat" 94.32). The practice of the virtues, it seems, involves the determination of what is officium, and it is precepts which can help us to do this ("et prudentia et iustitia officiis constat, officia praeceptis disponuntur" 94.33). As is said at 94.37, the purpose of precepts is to exhort one to what is officium ("praecepta ad officium adhortantur"). Precepts act like consolations ('consolationes'), warnings ('dissuasiones'), scoldings ('obiurgationes') and the like (94.39), and thereby help us to arrive at a perfect state of mind. Yet this does not mean that precepts alone are needed for making progress towards this state. Progress rests both on precepts and on doctrines; as Seneca says at 94.47, virtue depends upon learning strengthened by practice, so that both the doctrines of wisdom ('scita sapientiae') and the precepts are of help in this.

Epistle 95 sets out to show what part 'поправительный' plays in perfecting wisdom. Here too, the point is made that precepts must be used in conjunction with doctrines. Wisdom is the art of life and has, in common with many other arts, both doctrines and precepts; the different doctrines of the various schools of medicine are to be distinguished from the precepts which they give as advice. The precepts which philo-

sophy issues are said to be weak in their effect because they refer to specific parts of life, whereas the doctrines of philosophy concern the whole of life. We have seen that precepts exhort one to what is officium, but here it is said that someone who is equipped with complete reason (95.5) or who has command of the doctrines can "in quaque re omnes officiorum numeros exequi" (95.12)¹³ and in so doing act rightly. As 95.5 shows, the 'numbers' referred to are such things as :- when to do certain things, to what extent, with whom, how and why ("quando oporteat et in quantum et cum quo et quemadmodum et quare"). It seems that there are various aspects of officium which ought to be observed on any occasion and that in order to observe all of these on every occasion full knowledge of the doctrines is necessary.¹⁴ On the other hand, it seems, the person who does not have knowledge of the doctrines but only has precepts to follow cannot even set about applying the artistic principles to all his actions. He is like the layman who tries to effect a cure by following the precepts issued by the schools of medicine, as opposed to the doctor who has knowledge of their doctrines and can always act in accordance with them. Here we can compare the discussion in Sextus Empiricus Adversus mathematicos XI 200ff.,¹⁵ where the doctor's peculiar function was said to be "τὸ ἰατρικῶς ὑγιαίνειν", as opposed to the layman's "τὸ ὑγιαίνειν"; the layman might effect a cure but he will not act in accordance with all the doctrines of the medical art nor fulfil all the numbers of officia on every occasion.

At 95.34ff. Seneca repeats the point made in Epistle 94 that instruction in doctrines is needed to get rid of vices and that this process is helped by precepts. However, it must be true that if a full knowledge of the doctrines enables one to fulfil all numbers of officia on every occasion, instruction in the doctrines should help one to fulfil more of the numbers and therefore progress on the road to

the supreme good. This is in fact what Seneca shows. At 95.40 he makes the point that the precepts show one what to do but not how to do it ("deinde praestabunt tibi fortasse praecepta ut quod oportet faciat, non praestabunt ut quemadmodum oportet"). At 95.43-4 he shows that it is knowledge of the doctrines that tell us how to do what we ought to do. A 'doctrine' ('decretum'), he says, is a firm belief concerning the whole of life. A person who has such a belief implanted in his mind will do what is morally good. Seneca also makes clear that the function of the doctrines is to enable one to strive towards the supreme good. M. Brutus' treatise περὶ καθήκοντος gave detailed precepts, but these would not enable people to act as they ought because there was nothing to which they might refer their actions. Progress, it seems, is brought about by instruction in the doctrines, which enable one to fulfil more of the numbers of officia, as well as by precepts. The point is illustrated at 95.47ff. with the example of worshipping the gods: precepts can be given about the ceremonies involved, but progress cannot be made until one has conceived the right idea about the nature of god (e.g. that they control all things; that they bestow them for nothing). At 95.55ff. Seneca considers what virtue means and points that it is an upright state of mind ("habitus animi rectus") which results in an upright will and upright action ("recta actio"). The upright state of mind must be based on a knowledge of the laws of life as a whole in accordance with a standard of truth; this knowledge results in a fixed and unchanging judgement and can only be achieved by means of doctrines concerning what is good and evil, just and unjust, and so on. Seneca also makes clear that these doctrines concerning the nature of virtue are available only to those who are initiated into philosophy. The precepts on the other hand are said to be familiar to the uninitiated. However, Seneca does not mean that they

are not also essential to the adherent of philosophy who wishes to make progress.

There is one isolated passage in the De beneficiis (4.33) which is of importance concerning the question of whether an officium must be successful in achieving its object or not. Every officium, he says, procedes in accordance with reason ('ratio') rather than truth. This is dealt with in the chapter, The Practice of Kathekon.¹⁶

IX. MUSONIUS AND KATHEKON

Musonius was a much less known contemporary of Seneca but had a much greater influence on the Stoics who followed (Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius and Hierocles) than did Seneca. Musonius, unlike Seneca, was a teacher of Stoic philosophy, and indeed was the teacher of Epictetus, whose views will be seen to resemble those of Musonius in many ways. The writings that are preserved in Stobaeus and attributed to Musonius seem to resemble those of Epictetus in that they are probably the work of someone who attended Musonius' lectures. Many of them begin by stating a question which someone asks Musonius and continue by reporting his reply. Arrian did a similar thing when reporting Epictetus' lectures, many of which are given question-type headings. Musonius, like Epictetus, seems to have been interested in producing results by delivering lectures rather than by writing treatises. Epictetus¹ mentions that Musonius was very effective in making people realise their own faults; and Gellius² represents him as saying that the purpose of listening to a philosopher is not to praise him but to have one's mind cured of faults by his salubrious words. Stress seems to be laid here on the effect of the spoken word in helping one to make moral progress.

All the passages in Stobaeus and other references to Musonius have been collected by Hense.³ Among these quite extensive extracts there are only three occurrences of 'καθῆκον' and its cognates, all of which are in very brief fragments (F29,31,32). These three fragments seem to be rather like sayings attributed to Musonius, being very succinctly worded. Fragment 29, unfortunately, contains some rather suspect Greek and is quite different from the easily flowing style of the longer extracts preserved in Stobaeus; this suggests that it comes from a different source. It runs as follows:- "οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ πολλῶν συμφέροντι

ζῶντα⁴ καθυκόντως ἀποθανεῖν, μὴ ἐπὶ πλείονων ἀποθνησκόντα συμφέροντι." The phrases "ἐπὶ πολλῶν συμφέροντι" and "ἐπὶ πλείονων συμφέροντι" seem to mean "for the sake of many advantages" and "for the sake of more advantages"; this is rather questionable as Greek but it admits of no other interpretation. The fragment seems to be saying that he who lives for the sake of gaining many advantages cannot die appropriately unless he dies for the sake of more advantages. The point seems to be that for someone whose basic aim in life is to accrue benefits for himself cannot risk his life and die in a way that is appropriate for him (perhaps in helping his country or a friend) unless the advantages that his death brings are greater.⁵ The implication seems to be that this is a basically misguided approach to conduct, that the acquisition of advantages cannot be a criterion for *kathekonta*. Fragment 27 also seems to be an argument directed against someone whose main criterion is advantage. Musonius does connect advantage with appropriateness in F40 where he says that it is the function of nature to bind impulse to an image of what is appropriate ('*προσήκων*') and advantageous ('*ὠφέλιμος*'). This suggests that when we think something to be appropriate, we also regard it as advantageous. 'Advantageous' in this case may well refer to the advantageous nature of goods and not to the advantages ('*συμφέρον*') referred to above, but, as will be seen later, Musonius makes no distinction between performing appropriate actions and acting virtuously.

Fragment 31 makes a point similar to that made in Cicero's De officiis (2.23f.), that tyrants who rule by fear rather than by kindness do not live for long. Kindness is said to gain the goodwill of others by the performance of the *officia* that are derived from justice, and this is also said to be the expedient way of gaining their goodwill. Thus, in F31 a ruler is said to live longer if he defends what he does by saying "*καθ' ἡκεί μοι*" rather than "*ἔξουσί μοι*" ("it is in my power").

The latter represents rule by fear, the former rule in accordance with the *kathekonta* deriving from justice.

Fragment 32 advises against preaching 'τὰ καθήκοντα' to those who recognize that one performs 'τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα' oneself. This is clearly a general recommendation to do what one preaches. What is preached here must be precepts or general rules of what is appropriate in specific areas of conduct. If, for instance, one gives advice on the appropriate way of treating parents, one must be seen to act in accordance with this advice. The connection of *kathekon* with general rules for practical conduct was seen clearly in the case of Panaetius and Seneca.⁶

Thus, these three occurrences of 'καθήκον' and its cognates present no difficulty. However, in the larger extracts 'προσηκον' and its cognates occur quite extensively, as they do in Epictetus, though to the exclusion of 'καθήκον' and its cognates. This fact suggests a different source from that of the three short fragments. Some of the references to 'προσηκον' are clearly references to the doctrine of *kathekon*. It will be necessary to examine the references to 'προσηκον' in relation to earlier Stoic views of *kathekon*, and perhaps to suggest a reason why the word 'προσηκον' is used.

Some occurrences appear to have an ordinary non-technical sense, such as F6,p.23.14 which mentions instructions which are appropriate to each virtue, F14,p.75.16 where something is said to have an appropriate name, F1,p.1.7 where it is said to be appropriate not to look for many proofs of a thing,⁷ or F13,p.66.7 where it is said that if men think they are superior to women it is appropriate for them to be better [so. in their actual behaviour]. The last two instances might be consistent with more obviously technical usages referring to *kathekonta*, but they are too general in meaning for any conclusions to be drawn from them.

Musonius bases moral conduct on man's natural inclinations. In Fragment 2 (p.6.5f.) he claims that everyone says of himself that he is virtuous, and takes this as evidence of the fact that the human soul has a natural capacity for virtue, that there is a 'seed' of virtue in each man (p.7.20). This leads up to the statement at p.8.2 that "because it is appropriate for us to be completely good, some of us are deceived about ourselves being good, and others are ashamed to admit that we are not good." Here virtue itself is said to be appropriate, but this is definitely based on the fact that we have a natural inclination towards it, that it is in accordance with human nature.⁸ The four virtues are also said to be appropriate to human-beings in Fragment 4 (p.16.9; also F7, p.37.7), a fact that is used to show that women as well as men should be educated. The connection between natural inclination and appropriateness is illustrated in Fragment 1 (p.4.3) where the naturally gifted ("εὐφυής") and well-practised man accepts what is taught to him without the need for many proofs; he accepts it as "οἰκεῖα καὶ προσήκοντα αὐτῷ". The term 'οἰκεῖα' shows that what is taught is recognized as being in agreement with his natural inclination towards virtue and that it is for this reason that it is accepted as being appropriate for him. The connection is also clearly shown in Fragment 3 (p.9.9) where both men and women are said to have an "οἰκειώσις φύσει πρὸς ἀρετὴν" and the question is asked whether it is not as a result appropriate for women as well as men to live well. The implication is that anything for which we have an 'οἰκειώσις' is appropriate for us.

The criterion for deciding whether something is appropriate or not is for Musonius whether it is 'κατὰ φύσιν' or not. In Fragment 14, which discusses the problem of whether marriage is a hindrance to philosophy, it is stated (p.71.7) that the philosopher is a teacher of "τὰ

κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπων προσήκοντα and that marriage is 'κατὰ φύσιν' and hence appropriate. Musonius shows that since marriage is appropriate for human-beings, it must be appropriate for the philosopher. This clearly refers to the traditional Stoic doctrine of *kathekonta* which are determined by the criterion of being in accordance with human nature and which are the subject of philosophical instruction in practical matters. Now in Fragment 14 the reason for marriage being 'κατὰ φύσιν' is clearly that it is based on natural inclinations. Musonius mentions the fact that men have a natural desire to live in communities and be concerned with other people. At p.72.3 he asks the question whether it is appropriate for each man to help his neighbour, and compares human nature to that of bees which have a natural inclination to cooperate with one another. The virtue and vice of man he bases on the factor of cooperation and lack of it (p.73.4). This means that the interests of the city must be taken into consideration, and the home is a necessary part of the city and marriage of the home. In fact Musonius sees a necessary connection between marriage, home, city and the human race. Thus, marriage is seen to be 'κατὰ φύσιν' not just because it is an expression of the natural desire of man to live in communities but ultimately because of the basic desire to preserve the human race.

The criterion of 'κατὰ φύσιν' can be seen in other passages. In Fragment 11 the appropriate trade for the philosopher is discussed. Arguments given in favour of agriculture are that it produces an abundance of things necessary for life (p.58.1), that it provides opportunity for mental contemplation as well as exercise of the body (p.58.13f.). After listing the reasons, Musonius asks the question (p.59.4f.):— "How could it not be more 'κατὰ φύσιν' than other forms of subsistence? How could life in the country not be more 'ἀνδρικός' "

than sitting in the city, more healthy to live outside than to avoid the sun?" The word 'ἀνδρικός' here clearly means "in accordance with the nature of man", and the criteria for the appropriateness of agriculture are clearly things which in traditional Stoic terminology are 'κατὰ φύσιν' rather than 'ἀρετή'.⁹ In Fragment 18b the appropriate attitude to nourishment is discussed, and at p.102.7 it is said to be appropriate to eat in order to live and not in order to obtain pleasure. The latter aim is likened to the aim of animals. The point is summed up at the end of the passage by saying that health and strength are the aim of eating and that the eater should "ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κόσμου τε καὶ μέτρου τοῦ προσήκοντος". The order and measure that is to be imposed must, it is clear, be appropriate because it aims at health and strength, and life in general, which are in traditional terminology 'κατὰ φύσιν' and objects of kathekonta, and not at pleasure.

Musonius never mentions the wise man nor discusses the characteristics of his virtue in distinction from the actions of the non-wise man, who, as we have seen many times in earlier chapters, cannot perform virtuous actions, or katorthomata. Fragment 17 discusses the telos of man but seems to equate this with his appropriate function ('προσῆκον ἔργον'). In this passage Musonius says that the best maintenance of youth and old age is to live "ὁδῶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν" (p.89.1). Firstly, Musonius makes the point that he does not mean in this case that human nature is directed towards pleasure. The reason he gives is that if we take a horse for instance, it is inconceivable for it to achieve its telos by the pleasurable pursuit of eating, drinking and copulating without at the same time doing some of the things which are appropriate for a horse ("πράττων δὲ μηδὲν ὧν ἵππῳ προσήκει", p.89.7). This last phrase seems to be intended to mean the same as the phrase "πράττων δὲ μηδὲν ἀφ' ὧν ἀγαθοὶ νομίζονται εἶναι κύνες", which is used to make the

to identification because "to live $\delta\delta\omega\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu$ " in Fragment 14 seems to mean "to display the ' $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ ' to which one's own nature directs one," and ' $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ ' in this case is clearly identified with appropriate function. Musonius certainly means by ' $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ ' the four cardinal virtues because at p.90.4 he goes on to say that man is an imitation of god, and has virtues similar to god, and that we cannot conceive of anything better in gods than the four virtues. At p.90.13 man is said to be an imitation of god when he is ' $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu$ ' and exhibits the same virtuous qualities as god. Musonius seems to be thinking of an ideal that it is difficult to achieve, although he does not regard it as impossible to achieve "because we derive conceptions of these virtues from human nature when we come across men who are of the kind that I call divine and godlike" (p.90.17). Here he seems to be thinking of the four virtues as the telos for man. He has already said that the nature of each creature leads to its ' $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ ' (p.89.15), and he might be thinking of the idea that the impulses of human nature lead man on the path towards his telos which consists of the four virtues. This idea is not new in Stoicism,¹⁰ but it would be odd that he should use ' $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\kappa\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ ' to refer to the telos and describe the telos as ' $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu$ '. One would expect ' $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\kappa\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ ' to be used primarily of activities which are indeed ' $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu$ ' but not a part of man's telos. Musonius, however, uses ' $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\kappa\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ ' to refer to those functions which are determined by the telos.

An identification between appropriateness and virtue is implied in Fragment 18b concerning nourishment. At p.102.7 eating is said to be appropriate in order to stay live and not to obtain pleasure. The appropriate way to eat seems to involve the exercise of ' $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ ' because at p.100.9 we are advised to exercise ' $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ ' and eat " $\tau\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma$ ", and at the end of the passage health and strength

are said to be the aims of eating, and the eater should "ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κόσμου τε καὶ μέτρου τοῦ προσήκοντος". The order that we impose on eating and which results from the exercise of 'σωφροσύνη' is called appropriate. Now, it seems to be appropriate because it aims at health and strength. This is normal as an aim of a *kathekon* in Stoicism, but the appropriateness extends beyond this to include the order and harmony which seems to derive from the virtue of 'σωφροσύνη', because the harmony and order is itself called appropriate. In this way, an appropriate action seems to become a virtuous action.

There is no evidence to show that Musonius would have wanted to make a distinction between virtuous actions and appropriate actions. This will also be seen in the case of Epictetus' discourses. Pohlenz¹¹ makes the point about Musonius that for him *kathekon* is "sittliche Verhalten im einzelnen"; that is, *kathekonta* are individual manifestations of virtue. In view of the identification of virtue with appropriate function, I think that Pohlenz is probably right. There is no indication whatever that Musonius would have called the actions of the Stoic sage, whom he never mentions specifically, anything but appropriate. The fact the philosophy is said to teach one 'προσῆκοντα'¹² and not 'κατορθώματα' is an indication of this. For Musonius the word 'κατόρθωμα' seems to have become redundant. Epictetus uses the word 'κατόρθωμα' and its cognates occasionally but never with any distinction in meaning from 'καθήκον'. In the case of Epictetus, the lack of this distinction can be more confidently demonstrated than in the case of Musonius.

It has been mentioned that Musonius' approach to philosophy was a practical one. In Fragment 3 (p.12.11) and 14 (p.76.14) he makes the point that philosophy consists not only in learning what is appropriate but also in performing it. The philosopher is for Musonius a teacher

of appropriate actions (F14,p.71.7) but as a teacher Musonius seems to have been interested in more than just instructing his pupils in what is appropriate. According to Gellius (Noctes Atticae, V.1=F49), he regarded the philosopher as having the power to alter people's emotions in the same way as a doctor can cure diseases. The wholesome advice which he gives is said to bring "errorum atque vitiorum medicinas". The listener, Musonius says, should tremble, feel shame and repentance, even show altered facial expressions as a result of listening. What is meant is shown by Epictetus (3.23.29) who talks of the vividness with which Musonius put men's faults before their eyes. His aim seems thus to have been to alter people's feelings and convictions as well as giving them advice on what they ought to do.

This aspect of altering convictions should be kept quite distinct from the giving of advice about what is appropriate. To alter people's convictions and make them realise that their aspirations are wrongly directed and to direct them to the right things is a step preliminary to the performance of appropriate actions. This distinction will be seen much more clearly in the first and second of the three stages which Epictetus puts forward. For Epictetus, getting 'ὁρέξεις' right is preliminary to directing impulse to what is *kathekon*.¹³ The point can be illustrated in Fragment 1. Here Musonius contrasts those of bad character who need many proofs and much practice before they will agree to and follow what is right with those who are naturally gifted ('*ἑὺφυῆς*') and well-practised (p.4.3). The factor of practice is of course introduced here as well, but those of bad character are clearly portrayed as needing more proofs to persuade them to alter their convictions. The naturally gifted man presumably has correct convictions and hence he is said not to need many proofs before accepting what is told him by the philosopher as being "*οἰκεῖν καὶ προσήκοντα αὐτῷ*"; in

this case, it seems, there are no wrong convictions to be overcome, and he is thus in a position to accept advice about what is appropriate for him.

An important point that must be stressed is that this acceptance means that he will act in accordance with the advice. The acceptance of something as appropriate seems to involve a genuine conviction that it is applicable to oneself. At the end of the passage (p.5.15) Musonius himself stresses that the important thing is to follow up in life what one has accepted as being true for oneself. Here, I take it, he must be referring to the need for practice in addition to acceptance of what is appropriate. That acceptance of what is appropriate is distinct from practice is, I think, shown by Fragment 40 (a quotation from Musonius in Epictetus' περὶ φιλίας) which states that "the function of nature is above all to bind and harmonize impulse to the presentation ('φαντασία') of what is appropriate and beneficial". I take this to mean that it is a natural function of impulse to be directed towards what we regard as appropriate.¹⁴ This implies that if one accepts something as appropriate one will necessarily be impelled towards it. Practice is of course needed to some extent to produce appropriate actions from such an impulse. In this case, the aim of the philosopher must be to convince people of what is genuinely appropriate. The teaching of what is appropriate is essentially an intellectual matter,¹⁵ though depending on the removal of erroneous convictions that hinder intellectual acceptance. This is a very Socratic way of thinking about moral conduct because it assumes that, with practice, knowledge of what is appropriate will lead to appropriate action.

The examples of Musonius' advice about what is appropriate in specific areas are generally objective, of the type that is universally applicable. In Fragment 9, on the subject of "Exile is not an evil",

he tells us not to be worried about being parted from friends because those whom it is appropriate to take account of, our true friends, will not desert us (p.41.13). It is not appropriate to worry about losing those false friends who desert us in time of trouble. At p.51.8 he is very positive about what our attitude to exile should be. He asks rhetorically:- "If we are exiled justly, how is it right or appropriate to be angry with the just? If unjustly, the evil belongs to those who exiled us, not to ourselves." His views on marriage in Fragment 13 are also very positive. It should be a union in which two people live together and have everything in common. The production of children he regards as essential to complete it. Having described what marriage should be like, he says that this is how it is appropriate for it to be ("ἡ προσηύκει", p.68.12). Here Musonius is clearly giving very specific advice which is intended to be universally applicable.

Other advice is directed to people who play specific roles. In Fragment 3 he gives a list of 'προσηκόντα' for women, and he does not have any reservations about what a woman's role should be. The list is concerned mainly with running a household. Fragment 11 discusses what trade is 'προσηκων' for a philosopher, and comes up with the surprisingly positive statement that agriculture is appropriate for him. This idea may well be derived from Cicero's De officiis (1.151), which states that agriculture is the occupation most becoming a free man. This occurs in the discussion of officia that are derived from propriety. Significantly, Musonius mentions the fact that agriculture produces things necessary to sustain life, and gives this as a reason for its being "εὖν τῷ πρέποντι" (p.58.2). He asks how it could possibly not be "ἐλευθέρια . . . , καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθῶς πρέποντα" (p.58.8). The fragment also ends by saying that it is "τῷ φιλοσόφῳ πρῶτον πρῶτον" (p.63.6). Thus, for Musonius as well as for Panaetius, what is appropriate seems

to have been determined by the concept of 'τὸ πρέπον' when it is a question of the roles which one plays in society. In Fragment 4 philosophy is said to inquire into and practice "ἃ πρέπει καὶ ἃ προσήκει" (p.76.14); here the concept of 'πρέπον' seems to have been introduced alongside 'προσήκον' to show that being married is a role appropriate for the philosopher.

It is possible that the idea of performing a role is the main characteristic of 'προσήκον' in Musonius. We have already seen that he talks of people performing their appropriate functions. In Fragment 4 he talks of activities appropriate to human-beings, then to men and to women. Here he seems to talk of behaviour of the most general kind in terms of roles or functions. It is possible that this makes the use of the word 'προσήκον' instead of 'καθῆκον' more plausible, since it commonly has the connotations of propriety or being in keeping with one's position. It is however difficult to tell whether the exclusive use of 'προσήκον' in the longer extracts is merely a peculiarity of the source. It would be odd if Musonius did not often use the word 'καθῆκον' himself while lecturing. The use of 'καθῆκον' in the three small fragments suggests that he probably did. If we can judge by the practice of Arrian in this respect, who recorded the lectures of Musonius' pupil Epictetus, he probably used both words quite extensively.

In keeping with the universality of Musonius' advice about what is appropriate, we find little evidence of exceptions to the general rule. Fragment 16 is quite interesting in respect of Musonius' reply to someone who brings up a case in which it seems right to contravene the general rule that it is appropriate to obey one's father.¹⁶ The person in question is prohibited from doing philosophy by his father and asks whether he should obey his father in this matter. Musonius gets round this apparent difficulty by saying that the son should indeed do philo-

sophy but that this does not constitute disobedience to his father. At p.83.15f. the obedient man is defined as "he who listens to and willingly obeys someone who advises 'τὰ προσήκοντα'". The escape clause here is "who advises 'τὰ προσήκοντα'". One can still obey one's father by doing what is 'προσηκον' when he orders one to do what is not 'προσηκον'. Musonius argues that fathers wish us to do what is right even if they actually tell us to do something that is not right; hence when we disregard their bad advice, we are really doing what they wish us to do. The justification for this is probably to be seen in the implication that doing what is 'προσηκον' (in this case, doing philosophy) is tantamount to obeying Zeus, who is father of all (p.86.15f.). Thus, the general rule that it is 'προσηκον' to obey one's father is not here interpreted in practice on the criterion of what one's father tells us to do but on the criterion of obedience to Zeus who is universal law (p.86.19). In view of the description of 'κκτόρθωμα' elsewhere¹⁷ as a command of 'νόμος', Musonius does seem to be attributing to 'προσηκον' a characteristic that had been reserved for 'κκτόρθωμα'. In fact, he describes the command of Zeus here as being that man should be 'ἀγαθός', 'δίκαιος', 'χρηστός', 'εὐεργετικός', and so on; most of these words are usually closely associated with virtuous actions and hence would connect them with 'κκτόρθωμα'. Here Musonius is clearly connecting them with doing what is 'προσηκον'. In the present example Musonius in fact appeals to what is virtuous as a criterion for deciding what it is appropriate to do. This seems to rule out any practical distinction between 'κκτόρθωμα' and 'καθήκον'. Indicative of this is the common use of virtue-vocabulary and 'προσηκον' alongside each other without any apparent distinction in meaning. Examples in point are:- "προσηκον ἢ ὀρθόν" (F9, p.57.8), "ἂ προσήκει" = "τὰ καλά" (F16, p.84.19-85.5), and the general practice, pointed out earlier, of using virtue-vocabulary

when discussing the appropriate function of someone. This seems to foreshadow the situation in Epictetus, who gives clearer indications of the identity of the terms 'καθῆκον' and 'κκτόρθωμα'.

Another aspect of appropriateness that is emphasized in Epictetus is its basis in relationships. In Fragment 14 Musonius gives an explanation for the necessity of marriage. He begins with the natural desire of human-beings to live in communities. At p.72.3 he asks "εἰπέ μοι, πότῃ προσήκει ἕκαστον ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ πέλει;" and answers that it is appropriate because each man has a natural interest in his fellow-men. He emphasizes the need for cooperation among men, as Panaetius did,¹⁸ and states that marriage is the most necessary form of common action in human society. In Fragment 20 luxury is said to lead to hesitation to perform the appropriate labours on behalf of one's city, and in a situation where one ought to suffer for the sake of friends and relations, luxury will prevent one. Here appropriateness is clearly derived from the obligations of a man in a community - to his city, his friends, and his relations. This is not a new idea, since it is clearly important for Panaetius, but it is an idea that becomes systematically connected with the theory of kathekon in Epictetus.¹⁹

X. EPICTETUS AND KATHEKON

In the ethics of Epictetus, the concept of *kathekon* forms the second of three fields of study ('τόπου') (3.2). The purpose of this field is to make impulse ('δρμύ') conform with what is *kathekon*. The performance of *kathekon*, therefore, is quite distinct from obtaining the object of one's desire ('δρέξις'), which is the concern of the first field, and also from certainty in assent, which is the concern of the third field. In 3.2 it seems that the student of philosophy ("τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν" 3.2.1) is supposed to take these three stages in succession, since at 3.2.6ff. Epictetus criticizes philosophers who start with the third stage when the preliminary stages are not sorted out; this suggests that each stage is supposed to build on the previous one. In the first stage the student is said to learn always to obtain the object of his desire; he must do this because emotion ('πάθος') always follows upon the failure of desire to obtain its object or of aversion ('ἐκκλισις') to avoid its object (3.2.2f.). The reason for this failure, as is stated many times in Epictetus' discourses, is that we desire things which are not in our control.¹ The second stage must come after the first because if we desire the things not in our control and as a result experience 'πάθος', we are not in a position to listen to reason (3.2.3).² After he has eliminated emotions and put himself in a position to listen to reason, it seems that he can then move on to getting his 'δρμύ' right. What this involves is stated here (3.2.4): "maintaining natural and acquired relationships as a pious man (viz. to god), as a son, brother, father and citizen"; that is, doing the things that one's position as a human-being in the universe and in a community demands.³

The third stage is said to concern certainty in the first and second, and to be only applicable to "οἱ προκόπτοντες", the progressors,

those who already have desire and impulse more or less right (3.2.5ff.).

The subject-matter of this field is arguments involving equivocal premisses, making inferences by interrogation and the like, and only the "καλὸς καὶ ἀρετὴς" is said to be capable of not being deceived in such arguments (3.2.7). The distinction between the third and second fields thus seems to preserve something of the Stoic distinction between virtue which involves a secure disposition and *kathekonta*,⁴ in that Epictetus' second stage is concerned with getting one's actions to conform to what is *kathekon* and his third stage with the progressor's efforts to obtain the certainty of action that is characteristic of virtue and the activity of the sage.⁵

According to the Stoics, the primary motivation for action right from the moment of birth is a natural inclination ('*οἰκείωσις*') towards things that are conducive to self-preservation.⁶ Epictetus also believed (1.19.11-15) that every living being is created in such a way that it always acts for itself ("*αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα ποιεῖν*"); in fact, inclination towards itself ("*ἡ πρὸς αὐτὰ οἰκείωσις*") is the underlying principle of action at all stages. However, Epictetus makes clear that he is not meaning by this "self-love"; it escapes from being self-love because man is so constituted by nature that he cannot obtain his own goods without contributing to the common good (1.19.13 "*μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν, ἂν μὴ τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται*"). This idea enables Epictetus to say that there is only one source for all action, i.e. "*ἡ πρὸς αὐτὰ οἰκείωσις*". Also, it enables him to demonstrate the idea that the individual has control over himself only, and need pay no attention whatsoever to an external disadvantage such as a tyrant who threatens him. In other words, in Epictetus' view, moral errors result when we are inclined towards what seems to us to be advantageous but in fact is not because it does not contribute to the advantage that we

naturally desire. Epictetus here follows a general principle of human behaviour, stated in E31.3, that we naturally avoid "τὰ βλαβερὰ φαινόμενα" and pursue "τὰ ὠφέλιμα [sc. φαινόμενα] ". At 2.22.15ff. that to which every living creature is inclined ('ὡκείωται') is called "τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον", individual advantage, and Epictetus uses this principle to show that moral errors result from regarding the wrong things as advantageous. If "τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν ", i.e. one's own advantage, is seen to lie in the flesh or in externals, this is said to conflict with justice in our treatment of country, parents and friends. It is only by placing one's advantage in the moral purpose ('προαίρεσις ') that both one's own advantage and justice can be preserved. Epictetus sums it up in section 20: "εἰ τοίνυν ἐκεῖ ἐρμι ἐγὼ, ὅπου ἡ προαίρεσις, οὕτως μὲνως καὶ φίλος ἔσομαι ὄσος δεῖ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ". It is important here that to be a good father, son and so on is what every creature naturally desires, because Epictetus at section 16 specifically identifies "τὸ αὐτοῦ συμφέρον", which every creature loves, with "father, brother, kinsmen, country and god". Justice itself is thus seen to depend on the interests of the individual coinciding with the interests of country, son, father, friend and so on. The same point is also made at 1.22.9ff, where to regard externals as good and advantageous rather than the moral purpose is shown to lead to injustices to other people and, interestingly, to non-performance of "τὸ πρὸς Δία καθήκον" (1.22.15). This indicates that the performance of kathekonta is very closely connected with regarding the moral purpose as advantageous, and not externals.

Now, in the same way as we are all impelled towards what we regard as advantageous, so the evidence in Epictetus⁷ shows that we are impelled towards what we regard as kathekon. In fact advantage is often aligned with kathekon to refer to the same thing. This will not be surprising since, firstly, the interests of the individual have been shown to be

identical to those of one's country, father, son and so on, and secondly actions demanded by one's relationships to country, father and so on, are referred to as *kathekonta* (v.infra). For example, at 1.13.1ff., the point is made that the reason for impulse towards something is the feeling that it is advantageous for one.⁸ This idea is used as an explanation of why people commit crimes. Such people, Epictetus says, have wrong opinions about good and evil. The connection between impulse and what one believes to be good and evil seems to be as follows:- what one believes to be good, one believes to be advantageous (v.1.22.1); what one believes to be advantageous, one has a desire for; what one has a desire for, affects what one believes to be *kathekon*; and what one believes to be *kathekon*, one must necessarily be impelled towards. In this way, false beliefs about what is advantageous can be seen to be the cause of inappropriate actions. Epictetus is making an important point about criminal behaviour that it is wrong beliefs that are its cause, and we should therefore rather try to alter these beliefs than to have a desire for revenge.

Similarly, at 4.1.133ff. Epictetus gives an explanation of why students of philosophy do not follow up in practice the beliefs learnt in school, and do not immediately put out of their minds the suggestion that they should do such things as speak ignobly and faithlessly, flatter a tyrant, betray a friend in return for certain advantages. They were taught in school that such things are evil, but if they genuinely believed they were evil, they would not hesitate to refuse to do them. Indeed, even to consider them, Epictetus says, is to ask whether it is appropriate ('καθ' ἕκαστον'), when one can acquire the greatest goods [sc. doing what is good by refusing to flatter a tyrant or betray a friend in order to save one's life], to acquire the greatest evils [sc. doing what is evil by flattering a tyrant, betraying a friend in order to save one's

life]. The implication is that it is absurd for anyone to ask if it is *kathekon* to do what he genuinely believes to be evil, because we are all impelled to do what we think is good and advantageous; if he does consider the question, he must believe wrongly that it is advantageous to save his life by doing something evil.

The point made at 1.18.1ff. that people do what they think is *kathekon* is also made at E42 and 3.22.42f., both of which passages bring out the relationship of *kathekon* to the use of impressions ("χρήσις φαντασιῶν") which is a central theme in Epictetus' ethics. E42 tells us that when someone treats us badly or speaks ill of us we should remember that he is only following his own impressions ("τὸ ἑαυτοῦ φαινόμενον") and thinks that it is *kathekon* to do what he does. If his impression in this matter is false, it is he who receives the harm. The passage at 3.22.42ff. makes the point that, just as assent to impressions is under our control, so is our capacity to conceive impressions of what is appropriate and advantageous. Here it is said that whenever anyone desires or avoids, is impelled towards or away from something, prepares or proposes something, he must first have an impression that it is advantageous or appropriate ("μὴ λαβῶν φαντασίαν λυσιτελοῦς ἢ μὴ καθήκοντος" 3.22.43). Thus, it seems to be a characteristic of conduct in general that it is based on impressions of either *kathekon* or advantage.⁹

'φαντασία', or 'impression', can refer to opinions about the value of something, and it is the correct use of them which is the basic aim of ethics for Epictetus. It is brought out clearly in the first discourse of the first book that man's reasoning faculty has the ability to examine them and either accept or reject them. Good and evil are said to lie in the use of impressions (2.1.4). The 'παιδευμένος' is said always to get his 'φαντασία' right; that is, things that seem to him

to be so or not to be so always are so or not so. (1.27.2). 'δόγματα', beliefs or opinions, refer to the same things as 'φανεραία' that involve value judgements, in the sense that what appears ('φαίνεσθαι') to one to be so constitutes a belief. The identification is clear, for example, in E42. 'εὐρεια' is said to depend on getting rid of wrong 'δόγματα' about, for example, poverty, and of poverty itself. (3.17.9).

Thus, if we apply Epictetus' theory about the use of impressions to the question of kathekon, we can ask the question whether rightness of opinions, or right use of impressions, is necessary for the performance of a kathekon. At 1.28.2-5 an analogy is made between assent to impressions and impulse to actions. In the case of assent to impression, everyone assents to an impression that something is so but never to an impression that it is not so; that is, we assent to apparently true impressions and reject apparently false impressions. Whenever someone assents to a falsehood, it must appear to him to be true. In the sphere of actions, analogous to truth and falsehood, is "τὸ καθήκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ ἄσυμφρον, τὸ κατ'ἐμὲ καὶ οὐ κατ'ἐμὲ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὁμοία".

Thus, just as one assents to what one believes to be true, so one acts in accordance with what one believes is appropriate, advantageous, proper for one and the like. All these terms - 'καθήκον', 'συμφέρον', 'κατ'ἐμέ' and any similar to these - are clearly meant to indicate that one accepts the thing in question as a suitable object of one's own action. It is impossible to believe something to be true and not assent to it; so it is impossible to believe something to be appropriate, advantageous and the like and not act accordingly. It is, however, possible to be deceived about what is appropriate and advantageous, just as it is in the case of true and false impressions, and Epictetus uses the example of Medea in 1.28 to illustrate this point.¹⁰ She thinks vengeance on her husband through the murder of their children is more advantageous

to herself than saving the children's lives, but she is deceived. If you could show her clearly that she is deceived, i.e. such that she thinks it is not advantageous, she would not do it. The reason for this is that she can only follow what seems to her to be advantageous. This example is said to illustrate the point that "τὸ φαινόμενον" is the "μέτρον πάσης πράξεως" (1.28.10), in the sense that there is a direct correlation between right or wrong impressions and right or wrong actions. For 'advantageous' in the example of Medea the context quite clearly shows that we can substitute 'appropriate'. Medea must be deceived about what is kathekon, and hence do something that is not kathekon. She would need to be cured of her deception before she could do something that is kathekon. If she does not have correct beliefs about what is kathekon, she will be quite incapable of doing what is kathekon because there is a direct correlation between beliefs and actions. This is of course a very Socratic way of looking at conduct because it implies that if we know what is kathekon we will necessarily do it.¹¹

We have seen that people always act in accordance with their opinions of what is kathekon or advantageous for them. The purpose of the second field of philosophical study is to make their impulses conform with what is genuinely kathekon. At 2.17.15 it is said to concern impulses and "τὴν κατὰ ταύτας περὶ τὸ καθήκον φιλοτεχνίαν" ("the study of what is kathekon in the sphere of impulses"); that is, its purpose is to direct impulses to what is kathekon. Impulse itself can be called appropriate, as is shown by 2.8.29 where the 'νεῦρα' (sinews or strength) of a philosopher are said to include, amongst other things, a "δρμὴ καθήκουσα". What is meant by impulse being appropriate is made clear by other passages which explain the purpose of the second field. At 3.2.2 its purpose is said to be that one may act "τάξει, εὐλογίᾳ, μὴ ἀμελῶς", which suggests that our actions should exhibit some kind of

rationale and be consistent in some way with each other. Also at 3.12.13 the same point is made, but here it is amplified to : "εὐπειθῆς τῷ λόγῳ, μὴ παρὰ τὸ καιρὸν, μὴ παρὰ τόπον, μὴ παρὰ ἄλλαν ^{τινὰ} τακυτότην συμμετρικῶν".¹² Our actions should be, firstly, rational in the sense that impulse should be obedient to reason, and secondly, possess symmetry in the sense that there is a right time to act, a right place, and so on. 'Symmetry' suggests that our actions should be commensurate with the situation involved in each case. In order to bring about this symmetry, we need some principles which we can apply.

The most important principle mentioned in contexts discussing the second field is that of 'σχέσεις', or 'relationships'. Indeed at 4.4.16 the purpose of reading a treatise περὶ καθήκοντος is said to be that we should remember relationships and not act irrationally or contrary to them. This suggests that 'σχέσεις' is the primary principle on which the rationality and orderliness of *kathekonta* is based.¹³ At 3.2.4, as we saw earlier, the second field involves maintaining natural and acquired relationships "as a pious man, as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen". The maintenance of such relationships is mentioned as part of the philosopher's activity at 4.3.20 and 2.14.8, the latter of which adds "wife, neighbour, fellow-traveller, ruler, and subject". A 'σχέσις' is a relationship of one person to another, and hence all the names listed here imply such a relationship:- a pious man to god, a son to his father, a brother to his brother, and so on. When *kathekon* occurs in contexts concerning relationships, it is occasionally followed by the preposition 'πρός'. For example, at 1.22.15 we are told that if we regard externals as advantageous, we will not be able to perform "τὸ πρὸς τὸν Δία καθήκον", which clearly refers to what is *kathekon* in respect to one's relationship to god. This relationship will not be maintained if we regard externals as advantageous (rather than things that are in our control) and

complain to god when we do not acquire them. Also, at 2.17.31, the second field is said to concern the learning of what is *kathekon* 'πρός' gods, parents, brother, country and strangers. At 3.22.69ff. the "ἰδιωτικὰ καθήκοντα" involved in having a family are said to involve doing certain things for all one's wife's relations, one's wife herself, one's children, and numerous other trivial and time-consuming activities. Here Epictetus is trying to show that the Cynic cannot perform his divine task as a herald and messenger of the gods and have a family, because the *kathekonta* involved in the latter are too time-consuming. If he did have a family, it would be absolutely obligatory to perform these *kathekonta* because otherwise he would cease to be a good man. Thus, relationships impose upon us *kathekonta* whose performance is obligatory.

Some of these relationships are natural and some acquired ('ἐπί-θετος').¹⁴ 'Natural' relationships are presumably those which are accidents of birth, about which one has no choice. We cannot choose, for example, who to have as a father or brother. 'Acquired' relationships are presumably those which we acquire later, whether by choice or by circumstances, such as that of husband to wife, friend to friend, or fellow-travellers. The obligation involved is explained, at least for natural ones, at E30. This explains the principle that *kathekonta* are in general measured by relationships. This means that if you wish to determine what is *kathekon* in a situation involving anyone, you should examine the relationship that exists between yourself and this person. The phrase at the end of E30 - "οὕτως ἀπὸ τοῦ γείτονος τὸ καθήκον ἐρίσεις" - must mean "you will determine what is *kathekon* from the terms 'neighbour'," and not, as Oldfather,¹⁵ "you will determine what duty to expect of your neighbour,". E30 concerns not how one should expect others to behave towards oneself but how to

determine one's own obligations to others by first stating what their relationship is to oneself. For example, if the person in question is a father, it follows that it is *kathekon* to take care of him, to give way to him in all things, to tolerate him when he censures or strikes one. Even if he is a bad father and harms one, one must still do what one's relationship with him entails.¹⁶ One should consider not what he does to one but how one should act in order to keep one's moral purpose in accordance with nature; Epictetus is suggesting here that the only way to do this is to act in accordance with the relationships which one has, even when the other party involved in the relationship does not do the same but does one wrong. One's own concern, it seems, is merely to maintain one's own side of the relationship and leave the other party to do the same.¹⁷ This point is illustrated at E43 where every action is said to have two handles, and if a brother wrongs one, one should not take it by the handle of the wrong done but by the handle of his being a brother. This shows that if one is to keep doing what is *kathekon*, one must resolutely persist in doing what one's relationship demands and make no attempt to punish the wrongs done to one.

At 3.3.5ff. the importance of relationships (in preference to treating people in accordance with the harm they do one) is made clear by the fact that it can become a good when done by a right moral purpose ("ὁρθῆ ἠραρῆς"), which is itself given as the definition of 'good'. The preservation of relationships is not a good in itself; in fact the 'good' is said to be preferred by everyone to 'ὀφκειότης' (kinship). This refers to the good or apparent good to which every soul is attracted. A father is not a good and hence preserving the relationship with him is not a good in itself, even though we are naturally inclined to him. In fact, Epictetus says that we would neglect our relationships to father, son, brother and so on, but for the fact that the good consists in "τὸ

καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον", which itself consists in maintaining these relationships.¹⁸

In the passages dealing with relationships, terms such as 'pious man', 'son', 'father', and 'citizen' were used. These are terms of a special kind in that they imply relationships to others. A different way of saying that *kathekonta* are measured according to relationships (E30) is to say that they are derived from the 'ὀνόματα',¹⁹ or terms, that are applicable to one. The association of 'ὀνόματα' with 'σχέσεις' can be seen at 4.6.26 and 4.12.16. At 4.6.26 terms like 'men', 'sons', 'parents' are called "τὰ τῶν σχέσεων ὀνόματα". At 4.12.16 we are asked to remember who we are and what is our 'ὄνομα' and to try and direct *kathekonta* in accordance with the potentialities of relationships. This implies that the 'ὄνομα' which applies to us entails certain relationships and therefore that *kathekonta* are derivable from the 'ὄνομα'. Because of the 'ὄνομα' that applies to us there are potential situations in which we must know what is *kathekon* to do. Examples given of what we must know are:— what is the right time for song or play, in whose presence, what is out of place, how to prevent our companions despising us or we them: and as a general rule in social intercourse we are told to maintain our own character. These examples all concern keeping the content of one's actions in accordance with what is *kathekon*. That this is so is shown by the remark at 4.12.13 that if these principles are not observed, we suffer loss "οὐκ ἔξωθεν ποθεν, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας", "not from any external source, but from the very activity itself". This clearly shows that there is an element inherent in the activity itself which must be exhibited in order that it can be *kathekon*. This element seems to be an admixture of maintaining one's own character and adapting to the situation. At 3.12.13 the idea of 'symmetry' probably expresses much the same idea, that a *kathekon* is an action which exhibits

a harmonious relationship between the agent and the situations in which he acts. Both elements are essential to finding the right time ('καιρός') to do something.

Discourse 2.10, πῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνομμάτων τὰ καθήκοντα ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν;, sets out specifically to demonstrate the principle that *kathekonta* are derivable from the terms that apply to us. The first term examined, that of 'human-being', might at first sight appear to imply no relationship. The general considerations derived from 'human-being', that he possesses a moral purpose and a reasoning faculty that understands the divine administration of the universe and reasons upon the consequences of this, seem to be only a description of the nature of man. It is probable that we are supposed to regard the use of these capacities as general requirements of *kathekon* for man; indeed they lead up to the derivation of *kathekonta* from 'human-being' at section 4 in the very wide sense of 'citizen of the universe'. In this case, a human-being is a part of the whole universe, and hence must act in accordance with his relationship to the whole. This relationship is given very specific consequences by Epictetus for appropriate behaviour. If one knew what was going to happen, it would be *kathekon* to wish for this, even in the case of disease and death, because one would realise that this is all for the benefit of the whole. However, since a human-being is not capable of such foresight, it is *kathekon* "τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφροστέρων ἔχεσθαι" (2.10.6) because this is what man is born for. This principle is attributed to Chrysippus at 2.6.9 where it is put in a slightly different way: "τῶν εὐφροστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν". Whether this is genuine Chrysippus or not, I take it that Epictetus would endorse it. Since it is unclear to us what is going to happen, we must choose things that are more naturally adapted for choice in that they are designed to secure things in accordance with nature. Thus, it must

be a criterion of *kathekonta* that they are designed to achieve a natural end (even though our ignorance about what is going to happen makes it uncertain that the end will be achieved), and this criterion is derivable from the *'ὄνομα'* of 'human-being'. What is interesting in Epictetus is that he seems to regard this principle as a necessary second-best to what he regards as the ideal, viz. choosing those things which are in accordance with the whole universe. It is thus tempting to suggest that Epictetus is maintaining the Stoic distinction between acting in accordance with universal nature and *kathekonta* which aim at *'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν'*, but ruling out the former as humanly impossible. All we can do, it seems, is to try to do the former by means of the latter.²⁰

At 2.10.11 the general principle is enunciated that for any *'ὄνομα'* that is applicable to us there are *'ὀκεία ἔργα'*,²¹ actions appropriate to them.²² If we do not perform these actions, we are forgetting who we are and what *'ὄνομα'* is applicable to us. In fact, when we contravene them, we cease to be the person we should be. Man should be a social being (*'κοινωνικός'*),^{22a} but if he ceases to act as a social being he ceases to be a human-being and becomes a wild animal. He loses the qualities which are naturally applicable to man: for example, we are said to have a natural sense of self-respect (2.10.22), which the adulterer is said to destroy; a natural sense of loyalty, affection, helpfulness, respect for others (2.10.23). Human nature occurs as a criterion for *kathekon* at 3.7.24-28, where it is summed up in three terms - *'ἐλεύθερος'*, *'γενναῖος'* and *'αἰδέμων'*. This is given as an explanation of *"ὡς πεφύκαμεν"*, which is a criterion of *'πραγγομένα καθήκοντα'*. A list of *'πραγγομένα'* is given which begins with 'taking part in politics', 'marrying', 'producing children', 'revering god', 'caring for parents', all of which clearly involve relationships with other people and with god. But the list goes on to mention "desiring, avoiding, being impelled

towards and away from things, in accordance with our nature ('ὡς πεφύκαμεν'). The criterion for 'προηγούμενα' is clearly man's nature as a rational being, because they are specifically said not to concern his material substance.

The triple division of *kathekonta* given in the passage (3.7.24-28) seems to be an interpolation. It certainly interrupts the analogy between silver plate and man. Also, there is no other evidence in Epictetus for *kathekonta* "πρὸς τὸ εἶναι" and "πρὸς τὸ ποῶν εἶναι". Bonhöffer²³ suggests that the first concerns mere existence, and the second the choice of natural things that ensure physical well-being. However, in contexts concerning *kathekonta*, Epictetus so often, as we have seen,²⁴ warns us that concern for externals leads to contravention of the *kathekonta* demanded by relationships. It might be, however, that these contexts concern only 'προηγούμενα καθήκοντα', because I see no reason why Epictetus should have wished to deny that it is appropriate for man to care for his physical existence to some extent. He would not be concerned very much with this, but about the higher form of *kathekonta*, the performance of which is so often hindered by a concern for externals in preference to the demands of relationships.²⁵ Hence Epictetus gives frequent injunctions not to value externals. A case in point is 1.4.18f. where moral progress is said to consist among other things in withdrawing from externals and putting into practice 'τὰ προηγούμενα' whatever the material is with which one is dealing. If he is eating or bathing (which are concerns of physical existence), his aim is to do so as a 'πιστός' or 'αἰδέμωρ', i.e. in accordance with the natural characteristics of man which are given as criteria of 'προηγούμενα' at 3.7.24-43. Thus, even with ordinary concerns such as eating or bathing the overriding aim is to perform the 'προηγούμενα καθήκοντα'. If this is the case, there seems to be no need for *kathekonta* 'πρὸς τὸ εἶναι'

and 'πρὸς τὸ ποιά εἶναι'.

It has been seen²⁶ that the purpose of the second 'τόπος' is to produce orderly actions and that part of this is that each action should be commensurate with the situation (it should be done at the right time, in the right place, and so on). Also, in our relations with other people, our own character ("τὸ αὐτοῦ", 4.12.17) should be preserved.²⁷ At 1.2.7 "τὸ εὐλογον" is determined not only by the value of externals but also by what is in accordance with one's own character ('πρόσωπον'). The question of whether or not to hold a chamber-pot for someone can be decided by externals (we might have to do it as a slave, in order to obtain food or not be flogged), but I might also decide that it is not appropriate for me ("οὐ κατ' ἐμέ", 1.2.11) to do such a thing. Here, the individual comes into the determination of what it is reasonable to do. Thus, in order to determine what is reasonable, there are two aspects: on the one hand, the relationship to someone and one's own character, which are general principles applicable to all situations, and on the other the situation in which these general principles must be interpreted. Thus, since appropriate activity is reasonable, it too must conform with one's own character and relationships with others in the context of each situation concerned. In the example of holding a chamber-pot, the man who does it for the sake of food or of not being flogged is measuring it by externals. What is in accordance with one's own character is an additional consideration which depends on the opinion of the agent.

Now, in what sense does the value of externals affect one's choice of action? Are we meant to acquire those that possess value? This would seem not to be the case in view of the fact that Epictetus tells us many times to remove our desire from all things not in our control (and externals are not in our control). At 1.29.2f. externals are said to

be materials ('ὄλαι') for the moral purpose, in dealing with which it will attain its proper good or evil, and this good is said to be attained not by admiring the materials but by "upright judgements" ("ὀρθὰ δόγματα") about the materials. Similarly at 2.16.15ff. the truly noble and gifted man is seen as a man who is not concerned with obtaining anything but with his own activity ("οὐ τοῦ τυχεῖν τινος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὐτοῦ", 2.16.15); thus, when he is walking, he is concerned with his own action of walking, or when he is deliberating, he is concerned with his own deliberation, not with acquisition of that about which he is deliberating. Now, since it is not the acquisition of externals which is a criterion of what is 'εὐλογον', their value must affect it in some other way. Is it just the value of externals which is a criterion? This might be what is meant at 1.29.2 by the good consisting in "upright opinions" about externals.

In several places, Epictetus tells us that externals should be treated reasonably ("μὴ ἀλογίστως" 3.10.16; 1.29.29) or to use reason ("εὐλογιστεῖν" 2.23.35; 4.3.11; F2) in the sphere of externals. At 4.3.11 we are told to maintain our own good,²⁸ but in respect to all other things, such as 'σῶμα', 'κτησεις', 'ἐρχή', and 'φήμη' (4.3.10) we should be content to act reasonably ('εὐλογιστεῖν') "in accordance with what is given" ("κατὰ τὸ δεδομένον"). This last phrase suggests that one is supposed to treat only those externals which come into our path and to treat them reasonably.²⁹ At 2.23.34-5 we are told to learn what is the highest thing of all (viz. a right moral purpose³⁰) and to regard everything else as secondary ('πάρρητα'), but "without neglecting them as far as possible". This suggests that we should pay attention to secondary things if we can. In the case of the eyes, we must look after them, we are told, "for the sake of the highest thing" because the latter "will not be in accordance with nature unless it deals reas-

onably ('εὐλογιστεῖν) with the eyes and chooses some things instead of others". This suggests that 'dealing reasonably' means doing some things instead of others because they have more relative value.³¹ In the context, this refers to such things as that mentioned at 2.23.32, where Epictetus chides those who think there is no difference in beauty between Thersites and Achilles, or Helen and some ordinary woman. These people are said not to know the nature of each thing ("τῆν ἑκάστου φύσιν") and to be afraid that if they notice a superior beauty they will be carried away by it. Epictetus is thus insisting that one should be discriminating in the case of such things,³² but not be carried away emotionally in such a way that we desire to possess them. The emphasis is on dealing with the materials with which we are presented. In the passage at 1.29.2 Epictetus said that externals are the materials of the moral purpose which attains its good by having upright opinions about them. These opinions must involve judgements about their value. Epictetus is talking about one's attitude to a tyrant and to having one's hands tied, being beheaded, put in prison or sent into exile; these are things which one judges to have disvalue and be worthy of rejection, but must accept in the given situation if one is to remain master of oneself. The disvalue is taken into account even if the sufferings are willingly accepted.

The acceptance of whatever circumstances offer us is often expressed by the word 'ἀκολουθεῖν'. It is used for 'playing along with' the game of life at 4.7.31.³³ Examples of playing along with the game are given at 4.7.10f. When one goes to the door of someone's house and is shut out, one must accept this occurrence and act accordingly, viz. go away.

One must not insist on obtaining the object of going to the door because this means forcing one's way in, nor must one acquire dried figs by immoral means by grovelling, by upsetting someone, by being upset

oneself or by flattery, because these objects are said not to be of sufficient value to warrant such action. Thus, if the obtaining of externals involves doing something immoral we must, as it were, play the game and cease to aim at obtaining them.

We saw earlier that the circumstances of life are like the materials with which we play the game of life. The circumstances are, as it were, the hypotheses whose consequences we must enact. This comparison between life and the logic of hypotheses is made at 1.25.11-13. In logic, if we make the hypothesis that it is night, it does not follow that it is day, not does it follow that we should assume that it is (in fact) night. Thus, in life, if we make the assumption that you are unhappy ('δυστυχής'), it follows that you are unfortunate ('ἀτυχής') and that you are wretched ('κακοδαίμωνεῖς'), but not that you should assume that you are (in fact) wretched ('ἐν κακοῖς'). The point of this seems to be that we must treat external circumstances as hypotheses and draw conclusions from these for the purpose of acting, but we must remember that our action depends on a hypothesis, and if the hypothesis is no longer valid, we must change our action. The following example illustrates the point, and the point that in addition to the circumstances or hypotheses which we must accept, we must also preserve what is proper and consistent ("τὸ πρέπον καὶ κατάλληλον", 1.25.14). If someone has made smoke in the house, we must accept this as a hypothesis; if a moderate amount of smoke, we shall stay, but if too much, we shall leave. Here action depends upon the hypothesis that there is smoke in the house, but it is up to us to decide, on the basis of the hypothesis, what is the appropriate course of action for ourselves. As we saw earlier, what is appropriate for the individual agent must be combined with an appraisal of the situation. This is expressed here in different terms, that as well as the hypothesis of the circumstances in which we have to

act, the determination of conduct involves also the premiss of what is in accordance with one's character.

In this way, it becomes clear that the determination of conduct is a logical process, the drawing of conclusions from hypotheses. At the beginning of 1.26 Epictetus relates hypothetical arguments to moral conduct. It is a law of hypothesis, he says, to accept what is in accordance ('τὸ ἀκόλουθον') with the hypothesis, but more importantly it is a law of life to do what is in accordance ('τὸ ἀκόλουθον') with nature. This means that we must start from the circumstances as hypotheses ("ἐπὶ πασῆς ὕλης καὶ περιστάσεως", 1.26.2) and draw conclusions accordingly, but a much more important aim is to do what is in accordance with nature ("τὸ κατὰ φύσιν"). This means that the argument determining conduct must contain the premiss of what is in accordance with nature, and the conclusion of the argument will be a conclusion from this premiss as well as from the hypothesis of the circumstances ("ὅτι ἐν παντὶ στοχαστέον τοῦ μήτε τὸ ἀκόλουθον [sc. φύσει] ἡμῶς ἐκφυγεῖν μήτε παρὰ δέξασθαι τὸ μαχόμενον", 1.26.2). The fact that the determination of moral conduct involves such logical processes makes it necessary to learn the rules of logic before studying ethics,³⁵ and this point is made at 1.26.3.³⁶ Failure to study the rules of logic will lead to ignorance of what is the appropriate course of action ("οὐκ οἶδ' ἀμάρτανω, πάτερ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα τὸ ἐπίβηλλον ἑμαυτῷ καὶ προσήκον", 1.26.5). The phrase "τὸ ἐπίβηλλον ἑμαυτῷ καὶ προσήκον" in this passage must refer to the conclusion of the argument which a study of logic enables one to draw. This point is made clearer in 1.7 which gives a fuller discussion of the application of hypothetical arguments to the determination of moral conduct. The treatment of equivocal, hypothetical and similar arguments is said to be relevant to *kathekon* because in every matter we try to determine how the good man would find "τὴν διέξοδον καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τῆν

ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν" (1.7.1-2). This clearly shows that finding the appropriate course of action is like finding one's way through a logical argument.

First of all, we must have the ability to test ("δοκιμαστικὸν καὶ διακριτικόν", 1.7.8) what is true, false or uncertain, just as in the case of money it is necessary to have the capacity of testing ("δύναμις δοκιμαστική", 1.7.7) genuine and counterfeit coins. This refers to making a correct appraisal of the situation. In addition to this, we must know what is a consequence of what and how one thing follows as a consequence (ἰσχύουσαν) upon another or upon several things together (1.7.10). This capacity of following consequences is needed in order to acquit oneself intelligently in argument and not be misled by quibbling. Hence it is necessary to have a training in drawing valid inferences ("οἱ συνάγοντες λόγοι" 1.7.12). In the case of a logical quandary, like that mentioned at 1.7.13f. - the case where the inference validly drawn from acceptable premisses is in actual fact a falsehood - the question asked is:- "τί μοι καθήκει ποιεῖν;" (1.7.14), "what is the appropriate procedure for me?". The following sections show that the appropriate procedure is to follow only acceptable logical processes; that is, if we have granted a premiss, we must abide by the consequences of it, or if the premisses have changed meaning in the course of the argument, we need not accept the consequences. Hence it is necessary to be able to detect when premisses are modified, because if we do not we will not see the consequence (1.7.21). Failure to see the consequences is equivalent to acting "παρὰ τὸ καθήκον", "εἰ κῆ", and "συγκεχυμένως" (1.7.21). Thus, inappropriate procedure in logic is clearly failure to follow consequences. In the case of hypotheses also, it is necessary to learn when to grant them, and when one is granted whether one must always abide by it (1.7.22-4). It seems that only the wise man (ὁ

φρένιμος') is proof against all deceit and sophistic fallacy. He will take care not to act "εἰκῆ" or "ὡς ἔτυχεν" in argument (1.7.27), and for this he needs training. Thus, we must all try to perfect our own reasoning powers. In reply to a remark that logical errors of the type described are in quite a different category from such a thing as murdering one's father, Epictetus says that a logical error is the only possible error to make ("τί οὖν ἐποίησας; ὃ μόνον ἦν κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀμάρτημα, τοῦτο ἡμάρτημα", 1.7.31). The basic error is described as:- "τὸ εἰκῆ καὶ μάτην καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις ταῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν λόγῳ μηδ' ἀποδείξει μηδὲ σοφίσματι μηδ' ἀπλῶς βλέπειν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσει" (1.7.33).

This sums up the content of the discourse:- we must not make a haphazard use of impressions or fail to follow arguments, or simply fail to see what is consistent with our position. The basic point in logic is to see "τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν", a phrase which is clearly used for "τὸ καθήκον αὐτοῦ". Thus, to refer back to 1.7.1-2, the basic point in ethics is to do what is consistent with one's own position, and in order to do this a knowledge of logical procedures is vitally necessary.

In 2.10 the criterion for *kathekon* is that it be designed to achieve a natural end. Because we do not possess the foresight necessary to know what is going to happen, we can only choose what is naturally adapted for choice. Indeed, this is what a human-being is naturally designed to do ("ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δεγόμεν", 2.10.6). It is a consequence of his natural constitution. In effect, what Epictetus is doing in 2.10, when deriving *kathekonta* from the terms applicable to man, is to derive them from the natural constitution of man. Some designations are applicable to all men, but others vary from man to man; so that, to determine *kathekon* for a particular agent, we must examine his natural state and determine what designations are applicable to him. Those *kath-*

ekonta applicable to all men are derivable from human nature. Acting in accordance with the natural constitution of man ("ὡς πεφύκεμεν") is given at the end of the list of 'προηγούμενα καθήκοντα' at 3.7.26-28. This seems to be meant as the most general description of kathekonta and for this reason is put at the end of the list. In this passage, part of human nature is said to be the subordination of pleasure to the 'προηγούμενα' (3.7.23). This is not to disregard pleasure but to use it to encourage us and keep us performing "τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργα". This last phrase clearly refers to kathekonta as "acts in accordance with nature", and by 'nature' here is meant human nature.

Since kathekonta are in accordance with human nature, the aim of all kathekonta is to do what is consistent with it. Thus, at E30 the purpose of performing the actions demanded by relationships, by which kathekonta in general are said to be measured, is to keep one's moral purpose in accordance with nature. It is because our aim in life is to live in accordance with nature, that we must do what is in accordance with nature. This is why at 1.26.1 it is said to be a law of life to do "τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει". In any practical situation such as that given in 1.11 the appropriate thing to do is what is in accordance with nature. A father cannot bear to stay beside his daughter's sickbed and claims this is natural. Epictetus objects by saying that it is not natural and proceeds to show that it is contrary to parental affection and not reasonable ('εὐλόγιστον') to leave one's daughter when she is sick. In this discussion the general principle is enunciated that one should learn the criterion of "τὰ κατὰ φύσιν" and then apply this to every individual case (1.11.15). This is corroborated by 4.10.3 which states that in any problem about deciding what to do (giving one's assent to a course of action) one should apply the natural rule ("ὁ φυσικὸς κανὼν"). In the case of anything that happens, it is possible to treat it in accordance with nature (4.10.3). We should not worry about exter-

nals because it is not with these that moral action is concerned but only with things that are under our control, the so-called 'πρᾶξιμα'.

There is a sense of 'κατὰ φύσιν' in Epictetus referring to externals or non-'πρᾶξιμα', which must be distinguished from its above use. At E2.1 we are told to avoid only those things 'παρὰ φύσιν' which it is in our control to avoid. Any attempt to avoid disease, death or poverty is doomed to failure because these are at times destined for us (cf. 2.10.5); the implication is that these are 'παρὰ φύσιν' but not in our control. At 2.5.24ff. what is appropriate is contrasted with externals that are described as 'κατὰ φύσιν' and 'παρὰ φύσιν'. If the foot is regarded as detached from the body, it is natural ('κατὰ φύσιν') for it to be clean, but as part of the body it will sometimes be appropriate ('καθ' ἕξει') for it to step into mud, trample on thorns or be amputated. In the same way, it is natural for man as a thing detached to live to an old age, be rich and healthy, but as part of a whole it is sometimes appropriate to be ill, to run risks on a sea voyage, to be in need or die prematurely. Man is part of a state and of the universe, and it is inevitable that external 'unnatural' things should happen. We must accept that it is appropriate for us to undergo them, because it is the task of the ruler of the universe to decide what happens and ours to do what is appropriate in the circumstances given. Another example of a kathekon depending on circumstances is at 2.7.1ff. Here divination is said to lead to the neglect of many katekonta because a diviner can only see such unnatural things as death, danger or illness. There might be occasions when it is appropriate not to avoid them but risk our life and even die for the sake of a friend. Our aim is not to avoid unnatural occurrences but to do what every occurrence, be it natural or unnatural, demands of us. This is also true of E33.13 which describes the appropriate utilization of the situation ('τοῦ χρησθῆαι πρὸς τὸν κῆρον

τῷ ἐμπέσουντι ", E33.12) and where we are told, in circumstances where it is appropriate for us to visit the home of a powerful person, to accept that we have to do this and not be put off by the prospect that we will not find him in, be shut out, have the door slammed in our face or that he will pay no attention to us. To be affected by such considerations about externals, we are told, is the mark of a layman ("ἰδιωτικὸν γὰρ καὶ διαβεβλημμένον πρὸς τὰ ἑκτός ", E33.13). Thus, the prospect of external disadvantages are clearly not meant to affect the consideration of *kathekon*, because we are told that in cases where the performance of *kathekon* involves external disadvantages we must accept them ("κἂν σὺν τούτοις ἐλθεῖν καθήκει, ἐλθὼν φέρε τὰ γινόμενα ", E33.13).

The example of being shut out when it is appropriate to visit someone is further explained by 4.7.19ff., which deals with this subject and adds that we should accept whatever happens ("ἀλλ' ὡς εἰ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο θέλω τὸ γινόμενον ", 4.7.20). Here the speaker says that he goes to the door, even if he will be shut out "because I think it is appropriate to join in the game while it lasts" ("ὅτι καθήκειν ἐμαυτῷ δοκῶ μενούσης τῆς παιδιᾶς συμπαιζεῖν ", 4.7.19). The situation in question is a game ('παιδιά') because one plays along with it, doing what is appropriate to it, as long as one is able.³⁷ But if the rules of the game change, i.e. if one is shut out, what is appropriate changes and it is no longer appropriate to go in. The speaker definitely refuses to force his way in because nothing good is to be derived from doing so (4.7.21). Initially we followed the rules of the game by going to the door for the purpose of entering. This is all that is expected of us. If it happens that we are prevented from entering, then we must play along with this. The whole of discourse 4.7 concerns the idea that one's treatment of externals is like a game in which the playing of the game according to its rules is important but not the materials of the game.

At 4.7.5 the example of children playing with potsherds who vie with one another about the game but take no thought for the potsherds, is used to illustrate the fact that the man who is free from fear regards the materials of life as nothing but is glad to play with them ("τὰς μὲν ἕλκας περ' οὐδὲν ἢ πεποιημένους, τῆν παιδιὰν δὲ τὴν περὶ αὐτὰς καὶ ἀνεστροφὴν ἀσπάζηται", 4.7.5). This point is made at 2.5.15 where a ball-game is used as an illustration. Skilful players do not vie with each other about the ball as if it were good or bad but about throwing and catching it. Thus, in terms of life, externals are not good or bad, such that we should make it our aim to acquire or avoid them as if they were good or bad, but rather to use them according to the rules. At 4.7.28ff. in the case of a tyrant who gives orders to us, we should obey because this is part of the game,³⁸ but only in so far as we are ordered to do nothing improper ("τὴν παιδιὰν σώζων ἔρχομαι πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ὀπηρεῶ, μέχρις ἂν οὗτου μηδὲν ἀβέλτερον κελεύῃ μηδ' ἄρρηθμον", 4.7.30). If we are ordered to do something unseemly, we must cease to keep up the game, and even if by refusing our life is threatened, this must be accepted as part of the game ("ἀκολουθῶ ἐν παιδιᾷ", 4.7.31).

In the game of life, the keeping of the rules is thus what is meant by appropriateness. If riches and health, as in 2.5.24f., are materials and 'κατὰ φύσιν' in one sense of 'φύσις', the acquisition of these is not the aim of appropriate actions. The sense of natural in the context of *kathekonta* seems to be twofold. Firstly, natural for man as a part of the universe. This means that it is appropriate for him to accept whatever the ruler of the universe determines for him. This is the sense in which it is sometimes natural and appropriate to be ill, to run risks on a sea voyage, to be destitute or to die an early death. Secondly, it means natural for man as a rational creature. This is the sense in which it is natural and appropriate to maintain relationships and what

is in accordance with the character of the individual. Thus, both universal nature and human nature are included in the idea of *kathekon*. Epictetus in fact ceases to make a distinction between actions which are *kathekon* and those which are in accordance with universal nature.³⁹ Accordingly there is no distinction between the terms '*καθῆκον*' and '*κατόρθωμα*'. Epictetus only uses the word '*κατόρθωμα*' once at 2.26.5. Here he is pointing out that every '*ἁμίρτημα*' involves a logical contradiction, which prevents one from acting rightly ("*κατορθῶν*").⁴⁰ The man who errs is said to have a "*φαντασία κατορθώματος*", but this use of '*κατόρθωμα*' does not enable us to see a distinction between it and '*καθῆκον*' because the latter word is used in the same way.⁴¹ At 2.3.4 the proper handling of syllogisms is referred to by the verb '*κατορθῶν*', but at 1.7 this is identified with finding "*τὸ καθῆκον*", and both passages use the analogy of testing coins. At 1.28.30 the cause of '*κατορθῶν*' is given as using a standard of truth as in judging weights or the straightness of a line, but at 1.28.5 the standard of truth in the sphere of actions is said to be "*τὸ καθῆκον*". At 2.23.28 a man is said to become good when his moral purpose is set upright ("*κατορθώ-θεντος*"); and when his moral purpose is cared for, happiness is produced. The aim of man is thus to care for his moral purpose; but this is done by preserving relationships ("*τὸ δὲ προκειμένον ἐκείνο· εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπικελευθῆναι, τοὺς οἰκέλους ἀπαλλάξαι δέους, αὐτὸν τὰ τοῦ πόλιτος ποιεῖν, γῆμαι,*", 2.23.38⁴²). In none of these passages is it possible to see a distinction between '*καθῆκον*' and '*κατόρθωμα*'.

XI. MARCUS AURELIUS AND KATHEKON

The unusual nature of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius brings limitations in its use as evidence for his philosophical views. The individual chapters of the twelve books are intended to stand on their own and each to make a particular point, often in an epigrammatic way, rather than to form a continuous exposition. The twelve books do, in places, exhibit signs of design. Certain books follow specific themes, and the first book also follows a distinct plan in that each chapter lists the things for which Marcus has to thank particular people, ending with the gods. But even in the first book there is no necessary connection between the subject-matter of one chapter and the next. This means that, to all intents and purposes, any individual chapter must be taken on its own merits as evidence for Marcus' views¹.

Many of the chapters are very brief indeed. This is true of four out of the eight passages where the "καθῆκον" word-group occurs. I, 12 briefly states that he has learnt from Alexander the Platonist not to give present circumstances as an excuse for evading the "καθῆκοντα" demanded by relationships to those with whom he lives. This clearly shows that one type of kathekon concerns our relationships with those with whom we have to deal in our everyday living, but Marcus gives us no other information here, or indeed elsewhere, about the connection between kathekon and relationships. All we can assume here is that Marcus is following his teacher Epictetus, for whom relationships were a central concept in his doctrine of kathekon. Similarly, VI, 22 very briefly states that nothing distracts Marcus from performing his own kathekon, without saying what it is. XII, 17-18 compares doing kathekon with saying what is true, suggesting that there is some objective criterion for determining whether an impression of kathekon is to be acted upon. This passage is couched in terms of an analogy, and it is difficult to see how the test for truth by analysing into "cause, matter, relation and time within which it will be bound to have ceased" is to be explained in terms of kathekon (v. infra), unless we have recourse to a

passage in Epictetus which gives the same analogy between truth and *kathekon*². VI,26 makes a puzzling analogy between the letters of a word and the numbers of a *kathekon*. Marcus does not explain what the "numbers" of a *kathekon* really are, but only says that we should preserve them and not be distracted by difficulties caused by other people. On this idea of "numbers" of a *kathekon* Marcus can be supplemented by brief passages at Cicero, De finibus 4, 56 and Seneca, Epistles 95.5, 11. What is true of these four passages here mentioned is true of many other passages, including practically all the passages that mention *kathekonta*, that they need to be explained from other Stoic sources.

The two passages containing the analogies are the only two whose main point seems to be to say something about *kathekon*. The other passages only mention *kathekon* in passing while making a point about something else. In these cases the result is often that only vague connections are made by Marcus between *kathekon* and another concept, e.g. public benefit (VII,5), "ἡ εἰδός" (VI,22), and what is endurable by human nature (X,3). These connections can be explained to some extent by reference to other passages in Marcus, and in particular to passages containing phrases which seem to mean the same as *kathekon*. At V,1, 1-2 phrases like "τὸ ἴδιον", "τὸ καθ' αὐτάς", "τὰ ἀνθρωπικά" clearly refer to the concept of *kathekon*, especially because of the reference made to natural functions. The same is true of "τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου" at VII,33 and "τὰ ἀνθρώπου" at X,8, 4. "τὰ οἰκεῖα τῆ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ" (X,33, 1), "τὸ τῆ φύσεως σου οἰκεῖον" (XI,13), and "τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα" (V,20) all most likely refer to *kathekonta* since *kathekonta* are actions which are in keeping with human nature³. Also, the phrase "οἰκεῖα ἔργα" is used by Musonius and Epictetus in the sense of *kathekonta*. The phrase "τὸ πρέπον" at VI,2, "τὰ πρέποντα ἔργα" at VI,30, 1, and "πρέπον" at VII,13 also seem to refer to *kathekonta*⁴, because they imply activities that are fitting for a human-being, that is, in keeping with human nature. All of these passages refer to the general characteristic of *kathekon* as that which is in accordance with human nature, and contain useful information to

supplement the passages which mention *kathekon* by name. For example, XI,13 brings in the concept of public benefit in connection with "τὸ τῆ φύσει σου οἰκετὸν" and can be used to supplement VII,5 where public benefit is related to *kathekon*.

The most direct connection between *kathekon* and human nature is made at X,3. Marcus' view of action is essentially a fatalistic one: any occurrence that you are naturally equipped ("πέφυκας") to support, you ought to support, and anything that your nature cannot support, will destroy you quickly. Now, the way in which Marcus recommends us to support any occurrence that is naturally supportable is as follows: "μέμνησο μέντοι ὅτι πέφυκας φέρειν πᾶν, περὶ οὗ ἐπὶ τῆ ὑπολήψει ἔστι τῆ σῆ φορητὸν καὶ ἀνεκτὸν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι κατὰ φαντασίαν τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ καθήκειν σεαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

." Thus, anything of which one can form an impression as being advantageous or appropriate⁵, is supportable. Marcus' interpretation of the Stoic idea that *kathekon* is in keeping with natural constitution is in this case that it is *kathekon* to endure anything which is not physically destructive. This of course means that for all practical purposes absolutely every occurrence is to be accepted as appropriate up to the point at which, because of physical destruction, there is nothing left to be endured.

Marcus does of course take the natural constitution of the individual into account here because he says that it depends on the individual to make things bearable. Indeed he seems to be concerned mainly with the individual's ability to cope with the events of his life, a fact not surprising in a book of the nature of the Meditations, in which Marcus is mainly concerned with his own moral integrity. In X,3, he is really talking about the individual, since it is the individual "you" whom he addresses. Different individuals will vary in the degree to which they can physically and mentally cope with misfortunes. In VI,22 Marcus states that nothing can distract him from performing "τὸ ἑμαυτοῦ καθήκον", neither inanimate objects, irrational creatures nor errant human-beings; here he is concerned with the individual's ability not to be distracted from performing *kathekon*. At VII,5 Marcus

again mentions what is *kathekon* for an individual but does not say why it is *kathekon*. At IV,32, 2 he tells us to remember all those in the past who have been vainly distracted and have neglected to do "τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κτῆσκειν". The efforts of these men have been futile, but, Marcus suggests, this futility will not deject us if we stick to the general principle of occupying oneself with less important matters no more than is appropriate ("προσήκε"). Marcus seems to mean here that one will not act in a futile way even when dealing with relatively unimportant matters so long as one acts in a way which is appropriate; and "appropriate" here must mean "in accordance with one's own constitution". Thus, appropriate activity for an individual depends very much on his own individual nature and constitution.

All these passages just mentioned seem to concern the individual and *kathekon*, and it is easy to see how the individual must always be taken into account when deciding upon a course of action. But there are other passages which are clearly reminiscent of passages in Epictetus which discuss *kathekon*. At X,8, 4 Marcus reminds us of the "ὀνόματι" which Epictetus discusses in 2, 10. Here Epictetus shows how *kathekonta* can be derived from the various terms that are applicable to one, starting from one's position as a part of the universe, then as a human-being and then as an individual. Individual nature has already been discussed, and at X,8 Marcus mentions a number of terms, beginning with "ἀγαθός" and including words such as "σύμφρων" which he explains as "willing acceptance of the things assigned by universal nature", and "ὑπερφρων" which denotes superiority over things that are indifferent. These are terms connected with virtue. At section 4 of X,8 Marcus remarks that the gods wish all rational creatures to become like themselves, and he must be implying that man can do this by fulfilling the implications of the terms that are applicable to him. Also he says that if man becomes like god he is performing "τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ", "the function of a man", just like a fig-tree, dog or bee performs its peculiar functions. The idea of proper function is treated also at V,1,

where man's function is compared to that of other animals. Marcus asks the lazy person why he does not wish to perform "τὰ ἀνθρώπικα" or hasten to do "τὸ κατὰ τὴν σὴν φύσιν". These phrases are clearly reminiscent of kathekon and indicate that Marcus retains the idea which goes back at least to Musonius, that to do what is kathekon is to perform the proper function of man, by which is meant those actions derivable from man's peculiar virtue. The terms in X,8 from which "τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου" are derived are clearly virtuous qualities.

Epictetus 2,5, 24f. is clearly echoed at VI,33. Here Marcus says that pain in the hand or the foot is not contrary to nature ("παρὰ φύσιν") so long as they perform their specific functions ("τὰ τοῦ ποδός", "τὰ τῆς χειρός"), and concludes that for man qua man pain is not contrary to nature so long as he is doing the specific function of man ("τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου"). Clearly the function of a hand or a foot must be seen in its capacity as part of the whole body. Thus, even though Marcus does not mention it, we must assume what Epictetus makes explicit in the above passage, that man's function must be seen in his capacity as part of the whole, i.e. the universe. Now, this clearly means for Epictetus that man must accept whatever happens to him, including misfortunes which in themselves were regarded by the Stoics as being "παρὰ φύσιν". In X,8 Marcus interpreted one of the terms applicable to man as meaning that he must accept what is assigned by universal nature. Thus, if the terms determine kathekonta, then for Marcus as well as for Epictetus kathekon is connected with universal nature in the sense that it is kathekon to accept whatever happens, because it is assigned by universal nature, and act accordingly⁵. This position is made clear at X,33, 1, where in any material circumstances we are told to perform "τὰ οἰκεῖα τῆ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ". Indeed, Marcus suggests that one's attitude towards doing this is comparable to the sensualist's attitude towards luxury. One's reason should be able, as Marcus says in section 2, to "move through anything that opposes, as is its nature and will". This connection is also to be seen in XI,13 where one is urged to do "τὸ τῆ φύσει σου οἰκεῖον"

and accept "τὸ νῦν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων φύσει εὐκταρον", and in V,3 where the path of universal nature and of individual nature are said to coincide. Thus, if the phrases containing the word 'οὐκταρον' do refer to kathekon, then for Marcus as well as for Epictetus kathekon is concerned very much with the passive role of adapting to circumstances and accepting whatever is offered or happens as one of its criteria. The criterion of "what is in keeping with one's natural constitution" must be a constant criterion, always applicable in determining action, and the acceptance of the ordinances of universal nature a changing criterion depending on the particular circumstances.

Like Epictetus, Marcus discusses the concept of 'ὑπεξαίρεσις'⁶, or 'reservation', which refers to the state of mind in which, while aiming at something, one keeps in mind the possibility of having to change one's course of action in the face of an obstacle (VI,50). In V,20 Marcus mentions that the actions to which obstacles are presented are "τὰ οὐκτα ἔργα", by which again kathekonta must be meant. In essence, 'reservation' is a practical method of dealing with changing circumstances rather than a criterion of what is kathekon. The idea seems to be that if one has decided what it is kathekon to do, on the basis of both one's natural constitution and circumstances, but an obstacle presents itself before the kathekon is completed, then proper procedure is to reassess the kathekon in the light of the changed circumstances. The constant criterion of one's natural constitution remains the same. This seems to follow from the statement in V,20 that "the reasoning faculty adapts and alters every obstacle to suit its purpose ("τὸ προηγούμενον", which I take to refer to one of the "οὐκτα ἔργα"), and a hindrance to a given act or an obstacle to a given path becomes a help to them". Here, the obstacles are merely incorporated into the procedure for performing the "οὐκτα ἔργα", which remain constant. It is just the procedure that is altered.

It was pointed out that in X,8, where Marcus discusses various terms applicable to mankind, that if man fulfils the implications of the terms

he is performing the peculiar functions of man, "τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου". The terms mentioned, beginning with "ἀγαθός", refer to virtuous qualities. In the above passages also, which discuss 'reservation', the criterion of what is in keeping with one's natural constitution also refers to virtuous qualities. In VI,50, Marcus tells us to act in the face of opposition "whenever the rule of justice directs", and if force is used against us, to use it to produce another virtue in us (presumably courage). In VIII,32 Marcus says that no obstacle can prevent us from acting "justly, temperately and reasonably ("εὐλογίῳτως")." Here Marcus is clearly referring to a plan ("σύνθεσις") of life into which each individual action should fit; if an obstacle presents itself, we should produce a new action that accommodates the obstacle and yet fits into the plan. By the virtuous qualities here and the plan of life, Marcus must be referring to the "οἰκεία ἔργα" which remain constant. As he says in X,33, 1, in any circumstance whatever one should perform "τὰ οἰκεία τῆ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ". If this refers to kathekonta, Marcus must be equating the appropriate function of life with virtue in the clear sense of a plan of life. There is a plan consisting of quite definite and unalterable principles of what is appropriate for man. Any action must conform to these principles if it is to be appropriate, but it will also be "just, temperate and reasonable". This does not necessarily imply that the performance of these appropriate and virtuous acts is to be identified with the telos in the orthodox Stoic sense, but only that these appropriate acts are derived from the virtues and called virtuous in what Cicero called a secondary sense. In fact, there is a slight hint in III,4, 3-4 that such is the case. Here Marcus gives a sketch of a man who acts according to a purpose and is not concerned with other people except when bestowing advantages upon them, but is concerned only with his own work, which he does well ("καλά"). Interestingly, this man is said to keep to the opinion not of the majority of men but of those who live "in agreement with nature" ("ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει"), a phrase clearly reminiscent of the orthodox Stoic definition of the telos. There

is no suggestion that he is himself in possession of the telos, only that the principles which he employs are derived from such a person. The person who possesses the telos, viz. the sage, is an ideal on which we can model principles of *kathekonta*. This is precisely what Panaetius did when he derived rules of *kathekonta* from the spheres of the four virtues.

There is only one passage in Marcus connecting *kathekonta* with relationships ('σχέσεις'), which for Epictetus was an important criterion. In I,12 Marcus mentions that he has learnt rarely to evade "τὰ κατὰ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας σχέσεις καθήκοντα" by giving "present circumstances" as an excuse. Farquharson, in his commentary on this passage⁷, says that this phrase stands for the Stoic term 'τὰ καθήκοντα κατὰ περίστασιν'. This cannot, however, be the case because the *kathekonta* referred to must be independent of circumstances, since Marcus says that circumstances cannot be given as an excuse for not performing them. It would be true to say that someone's relationship to someone requires different actions in different circumstances, but the obligations which one has to those with whom one lives must be permanent obligations. The phrase 'καθήκοντα κατὰ περίστασιν' at D.L.,7, 109 refers to actions which are only appropriate in special circumstances, such as throwing away property, but the obligations resulting from relationships remain the same whatever the circumstances. These obligations are general principles of *kathekonta* which must be interpreted in the light of the circumstances concerned in deciding upon any particular action.

I,12 seems to refer only to *kathekonta* according to one kind of relationship. However, he does mention three relationships at VIII,27; and one of these is "πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας". The other two might therefore be regarded as forming two other types of *kathekonta*. They are 1) "πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον", and 2) "πρὸς τὴν θεῶν αἰτίαν, ἧς συμβαίνει πᾶσι πάντα." These are not explained in chapter 27, but Farquharson⁸ compares the three relationships with what is said in the previous chapter (VIII,26) about "τὰ ἴδια ἀνθρώπου". If this comparison is valid, the second relationship,

"to the divine cause", refers to the adaptation of actions to the universal nature and accepting what it ordains. In that case, the first relationship, "to the environment", probably refers to the way in which we perceive and react to the environment. Chapter 26 refers to "disdain of the movements of the senses" and "testing of plausible impressions". Probably what is being referred to here is the idea of right use of the impressions that arise in our mind, which Epictetus regarded as of primary importance. One should not allow impressions coming from external things to influence one's actions until they are tested by one's reasoning faculty; a person who is not proof against the influence of such impressions is a slave to externals and not a free agent. It is possible therefore that Marcus would have recognised *kathekonta* in accordance with one's relationship to the environment, involving procedures to deal with bodily sensations and test impressions, and to the divine cause, dealing with the acceptance of whatever happens. The latter, of course, has already been met with as a criterion of *kathekonta*. It is possible also that it includes performing the implications of the terms that are applicable to man, since it is by performing these that man becomes like the gods. As regards the testing of impressions, this will be seen to be an essential part of the determination and performance of *kathekonta*.

It was seen in X,3 that anything can be made bearable if one's judgment can produce an impression that it is either advantageous or appropriate for one to do it. The way in which "advantage" complements appropriateness will be seen later, but it is clear here that a necessary preliminary to doing something is to have an impression that it is appropriate, whether correct or not^{8a}. This idea has already been met in Epictetus and Stobaeus. Of course, impressions can be deceptive, but it is possible to test them. At XII, 17-18 Marcus compares the testing of appropriate actions with the testing of true statements, in the same way as Epictetus did at I,28, 5. In the practical field of *kathekonta* as well as in the speculative field, one tests a statement or proposed action, Marcus says, by examining

what it is that causes the impression that the statement is true or the proposed action appropriate. Analysis of the distinction between 1) cause, 2) matter, 3) relation ("ἀναφορά"), and 4) duration forms the mental process necessary before a statement should be considered true or an action appropriate. The aim here seems to be to provide some genuinely objective criteria. 1) and 2) involve the analysis of what causes the impression into cause and matter, the two basic components of all matter in Stoic physical theory⁹. 3) refers to the part played by an action in relation to an end. It must, as XII,20 says, not be random or without relation, i.e. it must connect with one's other actions in conformity with general principles. 4) probably refers to the consideration of how long a situation is likely to remain, so that changes can be made according to changing circumstances (y. earlier in this chapter).

It is difficult to see how these criteria could be applied without the use of logical argumentation, since this must be involved in the testing of a true statement. Marcus would thus probably have held the view of Epictetus that a kathekon is like the conclusion of a logical argument. This is a possible interpretation of the passages that discuss ἀριθμοί, or 'numbers', of kathekon. In III,1 Marcus mentions that if the intellect deteriorates, we become less precise in regard to the numbers of kathekonta, and in VI,26 the idea of numbers of kathekon is explained by an analogy with the letters of a word. Farquharson, in his note on III,1¹⁰, compares phrases in Cicero and Seneca, which refer to virtue or virtuous action possessing all its numbers. But the present passages, like Cicero De finibus 4, 56, and Seneca Epistles, 95.5, 11, do not refer to numbers of virtue but numbers of kathekon. We have seen that the idea of a virtuous action possessing all the numbers of virtue means that it is done in accordance with all the four virtues. But in VI,26 Marcus says that every kathekon consists of definite numbers ("πάν καθήκον ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τινῶν συμπληροῦται"), just as the word "Antoninus" consists of definite letters. The comparison is as follows: we should not be angry with those who do not know how to

spell "Antoninus" but calmly spell out its letters to them; so we should not be angry at those who are angry about what we do but spell out its numbers to them. It is difficult to see how 'spelling out its numbers' could mean anything other than demonstrating that what we have done is kathekon by explaining its various 'numbers', and we should not be deterred from preserving these 'numbers' by those who treat us with anger. The numbers must, then, in some sense form a justification of what we have done. It is possible that a particular kathekon is justified for several reasons. Cicero, at De finibus 4, 56, describes the changes made by Zeno over earlier philosophy, and says that he allowed some transgressions to be tolerable but others not at all tolerable "because some transgress more, and others fewer, numbers of kathekon". This does not mean that one sin is essentially greater and more serious than another, since the Stoics believed that all sin was equal in so far as it was sin, but it must mean that one sin can be inappropriate for more reasons than another because it transgresses more numbers of kathekon. Also, at Epistle 95.5, 11 Seneca uses 'numbers of officia' to refer to such things as when it is officium to do something, to what extent, with whom, how, and why. One may have received precepts of officia in the form of general rules, but these do not enable one to fulfil all the numbers of officia, when to apply the precepts and so on. In the performance of officia, one needs to have knowledge of the 'decreta' of philosophy if one is to fulfil all the numbers of officia on all occasions. This implies that for any officium, there is a whole range of justifications - it is officium to do it now because, to this extent because, with this person because, and so on. Thus, the passage in Marcus could mean that there are definite reasons for a kathekon which can be listed. Whether several different arguments leading to the same conclusion are meant, or several different stages in the same argument, does not really matter. The important point is that a kathekon is the conclusion that results, and that the premisses involved in the argument will include (apart from the particular circumstances) several principles

of kathekon which must be taken into account. Farquharson¹¹ may well be right in pointing out the connection of 'ἀριθμοί' with the Pythagorean view that numbers express ratios between two magnitudes and also physical proportions. The idea may thus be that the various reasons for a kathekon all contribute proportionally, in their combined relationship, rather than each one providing a separate justification, just as the letters of a word contribute to the word in their special position relative to each other rather than individually. In this case the various reasons would only be premisses in one argument, of which kathekon would be the conclusion. The situations in which one has to act and decide what is kathekon are not simple like rules of kathekonta which simplify conduct into types, but involve many different obligations, some of which might be difficult to reconcile. The aim in this case must be to find a course of action which provides a reconciliation between them. Thus, if one wishes to justify any particular kathekon, one has to show all the various obligations or general principles of kathekonta which are applicable to it and how they combine to form a justification of that particular kathekon. Such a justification must involve the type of logical argumentation which Epictetus discusses.

The objective nature of the justification of a kathekon is reflected in the conviction of the individual in performing his kathekon in face of any opposition. In V,3 we are told that we deserve any word or deed that is in accordance with nature (which I take to refer to kathekon), and that we should not be distracted by the censure of others but go along the "straight path" ("εὐθετεῖν [sc. δόξιν] "). Similarly, at VI,22 Marcus says that he is not distracted from doing what is kathekon by those who do not know the "path" ("δόξιν"). According to V,3 the "path" is that of individual nature and universal nature. In these passages the implication is that to perform kathekonta is to follow a definite path. Also, at VI,21 Marcus says that if anyone should convince him that a thought or act of his is mistaken, he is willing to alter them since he pursues the truth. Marcus

thus acts in the belief that the determination of *kathekonta* is as definite and objective as the search for truth.

The faculty that is engaged in determining what is true and appropriate is called "*νοῦς*" at III,16. Here sense-perceptions ("*αἰσθήσεις*") are assigned to the body, impulses ("*ὄρμαί*") to the soul and beliefs ("*δόγματα*") to "*νοῦς*". The last is said to be the guide for all people in the sphere of "*τὰ φαινόμενα καθήκοντα*". Animals are here said to possess the ability to form impressions (a form of '*αἰσθήσεις*') and impulses, but man is seen as having in addition the capacity to test his impressions of what is appropriate. Psychologically speaking, there is here a basic split between impression and impulse on the one hand and reason on the other. It is true that the good man is portrayed in this chapter as not disquieting the daemon in him with a mass of impressions; which implies that the mind can control its reaction to impressions. However, it does seem that the ordinary man has to maintain constant vigilance over his impressions and impulses in order to perform appropriate actions. This is the outcome of III,1, which contrasts the intellect ("*δύναμις*") with functions including the forming of impressions and impulses. If the intellect wanes, Marcus says, the others remain strong. Now one of the consequences of the waning of the intellect is the lack of precision in regard to the numbers of *kathekon*. This seems to mean that one will not be accurate in taking into account all the factors involved in deciding what is *kathekon*, because it requires what Marcus calls a "*λογισμὸς συγχευόμενος*", a trained judgment. Emphasis should probably be put on the fact that a trained judgment is necessary in order to be precise and accurate about *kathekonta*. Marcus is not saying that impulse cannot lead us to perform *kathekonta*, but only that constant mental vigilance is necessary if we want to make progress. He is probably not wishing to say that the ordinary man cannot perform *kathekonta*. Obviously, Marcus is very much concerned with the individual's efforts to make progress, and this of course requires intellectual effort. Indeed the main point of III,1 is to encourage us to make continual

intellectual effort to progress before the intellect deteriorates.

Intellect is involved not only in determining what is *kathekon* for one, but also in carrying it out. In VII,5 Marcus says that if one's "*δύναμις*" is not capable of carrying it out, one should either hand over to someone else who is capable, or enlist someone else's support. Marcus seems to be referring to one's intellectual ability to carry through a course of action which one has decided to be appropriate. This is purely a practical matter depending on individual limitations. He is merely asking us to do our best to achieve something appropriate either by ourselves or with the help of another.

In X,3 Marcus says that one can endure anything in respect of which one's judgment can produce an impression that it is advantageous or appropriate. Now, is advantage introduced here as an alternative to appropriateness, or do advantage and appropriateness always coincide?

In X,3 Marcus is thinking of adverse circumstances. If one can regard such circumstances as in fact advantageous to one, clearly one will be able to endure them. The same will be true if one can regard them as appropriate. Now, the type of advantage of which Marcus is thinking here must be individual advantage. As he says at VI,27, it would be absurd to forbid men to be impelled towards what seems suitable ("*οἰκεία*") and advantageous¹². This connects advantage with the principle of '*οἰκείωσις*' and makes it a basic principle of action that men should act to their own advantage, immediately from the moment of birth when they feel attracted to ('*οἰκείωσθε* ') their own constitution. There results from this attraction an attraction to what is regarded as advantageous. The problem, of course, is to regard as advantageous only what is genuinely akin to one's nature and therefore appropriate. At VI,44 individual advantage is interpreted in a much wider sphere than the individual. What is advantageous for each person, says Marcus, is what is in accordance with his own constitution and nature. He goes on to say that his own nature (like all other men's, presumably) is "*λογική*" and "*πολιτική*". His "*πόλις*" as an individual is Rome, and as a

human-being the universe; and what is beneficial to these are his own goods. I presume that his rational nature is here included in his citizenship of the universe¹³. From the context in VI,44 it is clear that by what is beneficial to the universe he means what god ordains for one, since god must ordain what is good for the universe. At X,20 and V,8, 4 he says specifically that whatever happens to one is for the good of the whole universe.

Now, by universal advantage he means something more than mere acceptance of what happens. Rather, at X,6, 2 he says that in his capacity as a part of the whole he has a natural affinity ("ἔχει οἰκείως ") to other human-beings; this means that it is in accordance with man's nature to do no unsocial act but always act for the common benefit¹⁴. While this means that he will do things beneficial to his city, he is clearly thinking of benefit to all mankind (something possible for a Roman Emperor). At VII,5 also, where Marcus discusses the limitations of the intellect in carrying out an appropriate action, he says that one should do as best one can to achieve what is of common advantage. Here, I think, he must be referring to universal advantage because he says that the intellect should be used as an instrument bestowed by universal nature. He must be thinking of man's rational nature as in VI,44. In fact, he says here that everything that is done must contribute to the common advantage. Thus, an action which might appear to be only to the advantage of oneself is in fact to the advantage of the universe because these are identical. Marcus is able to say at XI,13 that a man who does what is in keeping with his own nature ("τὸ τῆ φύσει σου οἰκεῖον ") and accepts what is at the moment ordained by universal nature is a man bent upon the realisation of the common benefit. Since the phrase "τὸ τῆ φύσει σου οἰκεῖον " refers, as I have argued before, to kathekon, it must be a characteristic of all kathekonta that they are conducive to both individual and common benefit. Such an argument, anyway, goes back at least to Panaetius, who argued quite strongly that the individual can only gain his own advantage by acting for the common good.

In only one passage in the Meditations is there a hint of the term 'κατόρθωμα' and of a possibility of a distinction between it and kathekon. This passage is important in that it connects actions called "κατορθώσεις" with a kind of telos. Reason and the rational "τέχνη" are said to be capacities, sufficient to themselves and their own actions, which "start from their appropriate source and proceed methodically to their proposed end" ("ὀρμῶνται μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς, ὁδεύουσι δὲ εἰς τὸ προκείμενον τέλος"). The actions themselves are said to be called "κατορθώσεις" because of the "rightness of their path" ("τὴν ὀρθότητά τῆς ὁδοῦ"). Now, the source of reason is described in IV,4, where rational creatures are said to be all citizens of the city of the universe and under a common law, and "τὸ νοεῖν καὶ λογικὸν καὶ νομικόν" is said to derive from this common government of all mankind. Thus, the appropriate source of reason in the above passage could refer to the fact that man qua rational being is naturally a part of the universe and thus required to conform to it. We have already seen that man's rational nature is a basis of kathekon and that kathekon aims to do what is in accordance with and for the benefit of universal nature.

However, in V,14 it is not the source of reason but its end which the word "κατορθώσεις" refers to, the fact that it proceeds methodically to its proposed end. The same thing is said at VIII,60 where "νοῦς" and an arrow are said to have in common the fact that they move straight towards their proposed end ("τὸ προκείμενον"). But at VI,26 Marcus tells us that every kathekon consists of numbers and that one must "methodically fulfil one's proposed end" ("περαινέειν ὁδῶ τὸ προκείμενον") by preserving these numbers and not being distracted by those who put difficulties in our way. Here the implication is that anyone who preserves the numbers and thus performs a kathekon is methodically fulfilling his proposed end. In fact, the proposed end is virtually identical with "τὸ καθήκον". The same implication is contained in VI,22 where Marcus says that he will not be distracted from the performance of his kathekon by someone who is ignorant

of the "path" ("ὁδός"); the connection between *kathekon* and the path is loosely put here, but it does seem that to perform *kathekon* is tantamount to following the path.

This identity of the performance of *kathekon* and the *telos* was seen in Musonius¹⁵, who described man's *telos* as "τὸ ζῆν ὁδῶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν", which he identified with man's appropriate function ("προσῆκον ἔργον"). This description of the *telos* contains the significant word "ὁδῶ", which in Marcus is connected with the performance of *kathekon*. But there is other evidence in Marcus for the importance of *kathekonta* in achieving the *telos*. At V,16 man's good is said to lie where his *telos* lies, and his good is said to be "κοινωνία", communion with his fellow men. This good is contrasted in V,15 with other so-called "goods" which "do not fall to the lot of man qua man", and which are not "complementary of the end" ("συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους"). This description of the *telos* seems to be also applicable to *kathekon* since the latter is concerned with maintaining the many relationships that result from the fact that 'κοινωνία' is man's good. An appropriate action therefore must be an action that is "complementary of the end". Such an action will be on the right path, and hence be entitled to the name 'κατόρθωσις'. Thus, there seems to be no distinction between an appropriate action and a right action. However, Marcus does not mean by 'right actions' the actions of the truly virtuous man or the sage who always performs right actions, because there is no indication that rightness of path in one action implies rightness of the path in all the other actions of the same agent.

XII. HIEROCLES AND KATHEKON

The evidence for Hierocles' philosophy is restricted to two distinct areas of his ethics. Firstly, the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις¹, which is contained in a fragmentary papyrus, discusses the fundamental principle of 'οἰκείωσις', by which man first becomes aware of himself as the first 'οἰκεῖον'. This principle of 'οἰκείωσις' is extended to include other people and external objects, but much of the discussion is missing in the papyrus. We have seen elsewhere, particularly in Cicero's De finibus, that the principle of 'οἰκείωσις' was important for the Stoa in explaining the source of kathekonta, and it might therefore seem odd that there is no allusion to the theory of kathekon in this papyrus, especially in view of the widespread belief in the orthodoxy of the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις.² However, the aim of this work seems to be only to describe the various different 'οἰκείωσεις' of man, and not to draw any conclusions about what is kathekon. The conclusions are, I think, drawn in the series of summaries and extracts preserved in Stobaeus³. These extracts are given titles such as "τίνα τρόπον θεῶν χρηστέον", "πῶς πατρίδι χρηστέον", "πῶς συγγενέσι χρηστέον", "περὶ γάμου", "οἰκονομικός", all of which give practical advice on their respective subjects. All these passages seem to be from the same original work because they often start by referring to other passages or discussions of other subjects which have been already discussed⁴. This work, to judge by the passages we have, seems to have been concerned mainly with giving practical advice about kathekonta, and not with explaining their source. However, in one passage concerning marriage there is a discussion of how kathekon is based on the natural constitution of man; and this, I think, enables us to see the way in which the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις was used as a basis for determining kathekonta.

In discussing the question of how to treat the gods, relatives, country, and the like, Hierocles is quite clearly describing what it is kathekon to do in terms of our relationship to them. These kathekonta are referred to, at p.51.22 as "τὸ πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα καθήκον" and at p.57.12 as

"τῶν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ [sc. parents] καθυκόντων", phrases clearly reminiscent of some used by Epictetus⁵, who so much emphasised the idea of *kathekon* being measured by relationships. The same is true of the passages on marriage or running a household, which discuss what is *kathekon* in the husband and wife situation. The passage about running a household (p. 62.21f.) is interesting in that it suggests a change in the role of husband and wife such that it might be *kathekon* in some cases for jobs customarily done by one partner to be done by the other. For instance, he suggests that some household jobs might be appropriate ('προσῆκειν') more to men than to women because they require bodily strength. Hierocles is thus not accepting the traditional roles of husband and wife, as Musonius seems to have done (F3), but reinterpreting their roles, apparently in accordance with a basic criterion of natural capacities. Running a household is a common task of the two partners in a marriage, and Hierocles interprets their respective contributions by their relative capacities.

The idea of natural capacity is important for Hierocles not only in determining what it is *kathekon* to do in the context of marriage, but also in demonstrating that marriage itself is *kathekon*. The word '*kathekon*' does usually occur in contexts where the aim is to advise about what it is appropriate to do in the case of given relationships, but in the case of marriage, Hierocles shows that the relationship of marriage is itself appropriate. The idea that marriage is *kathekon* has already been met with in Stobaeus, Musonius, and Epictetus, and seems to have been a standard example of a *kathekon*; but the passage in Hierocles from p. 52.22 to 53.12 is interesting in that it gives two quite distinct justifications of why it is appropriate to marry. The first reason is that marriage is '*προηγούμενον*' for the wise man and that we should imitate the wise man. '*προηγούμενον*' here seems to mean appropriate as a general rule because it is contrasted with '*κατὰ περίστασιν*', dependent upon circumstances⁶. Thus, marriage is appropriate as a general rule, unless circumstances prevent it. It is included under '*προηγούμενα*' at Epictetus' Discourses

3.7.24, where the word refers to the functions of human-beings performed in accordance with their nature as 'free', 'noble' and 'self-respecting' in contrast to the functions of mere physical existence. The 'προηγούμενα' are here compared to the 'τεχνή' of a silver plate in contrast to its material, silver, and at Discourses 1.4.20 they are clearly compared to the artistic principles of a runner or voice-trainer. Now the fact that marriage is appropriate as a general principle for the wise man, Hierocles says, means that it must be so "for us also", i.e. ordinary men. Thus, firstly, we find an appeal to the authority of the ideal wise man who by definition does what is appropriate⁷.

Secondly, we find an appeal to the force of nature which impels us towards marriage. This is clearly the more basic reason because nature is said to drive even the wise man towards marriage. For nature, Hierocles says, has not only made us 'συναγελαστικός' (gregarious) but also 'συνδυαστικός', inclined to live as couples and perform the shared activity of producing children and living a stable life. Hierocles continues by saying that nature is a just teacher in these matters for the reason that our choice of *kathekonta* ought to be in harmony with our natural constitution. Hierocles explains the principle that a *kathekon* is an action in accordance with natural constitution. This explanation closely follows other explanations of this principle in Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus⁸. Every living creature is said to follow its own natural constitution, including plants and animals. Plants follow what is determined for them, and do not have the power of calculation or choice among tested alternatives. Animals follow impressions that draw them towards what belongs to them ('τὰ οἰκεῖα') and desires that compel them to act. Man, however, has had reason bestowed upon him by nature in addition to these other things, with the ability to observe nature itself on their behalf ("μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸ πάντων αὐτὴν κατοφόμενοι τὴν φύσιν" p. 53.9). Man does have certain automatic processes like those that take place in plants, and also impressions that draw him to what belongs to him ('τὰ οἰκεῖα') and desires that compel

him to act; but in addition he has reason whose especial function is to control the impressions and desires. This idea has been met with in D.L. 7.86 (=SVF 3, 178) where reason is called a "τεχνίτης τῆς ὀρμῆς". Reason, it seems, can act like a craftsman because it has the ability to observe nature and, as Hierocles says, can, by aiming at nature "as at a bright and fixed target and choosing what is in harmony with it ('τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῇ'), make us do everything appropriately ('καθ' ἑκόντως')".

The phrases "bright and fixed target" and "what is in harmony with it" must refer to the natural drives such as gregariousness and the drive to live as couples. Hierocles is saying that man's natural form of behaviour is not just to follow impressions and desires, like animals, (and one would expect that the possession of reason would make man's impressions and desires different from those of animals, though this is not implied here by Hierocles), but in addition to observe his own natural drives and deliberately choose what is in harmony with them. It seems that Hierocles is suggesting that kathekonic action, though based on natural drives, results from deliberate choice; in fact he says that reason has the capacity to make us do everything appropriately by using nature as its target and choosing what is in harmony with it. One might ask why, if kathekonic action is based essentially on the natural drives, these drives will not produce kathekonta. The answer is perhaps to be seen in the description of man's nature. Hierocles is describing what man's nature is because this will show us what is appropriate for man. Now part of man's nature is that he has the capacity to choose what is in accordance with nature. Thus, we must conclude that Hierocles is saying that appropriate action in the case of man involves the choice of what is in accordance with nature. This factor of choice, however, cannot yield a criterion for deciding what is appropriate. It does not help one to say that a kathekon must be deliberately chosen; only the natural drives themselves can provide a criterion. The idea of deliberate choice must therefore be a characteristic only of performing kathekonta. Thus,

Hierocles is stressing that appropriate action involves the deliberate choice of what is natural because this is what man's natural constitution involves.

This analysis compares rather oddly with Cicero's account in De finibus 3, 20f. Here appropriate actions are clearly based on the natural drives. This happens before reason is developed. After reason is developed man can make a deliberate choice of such appropriate actions. The factor of deliberate choice, however, is something additional to what is appropriate; it is the beginning of the choice absolutely consistent with nature which is a characteristic of virtue. Hierocles is not talking about the telos at all (the target which he mentions only results in the performance of all *kathekonta* and not in the performance of virtuous actions). However he certainly stresses the importance of deliberate choice in performing *kathekonta*, and must therefore be referring to actions involving deliberate choice (as in Cicero's stages 3 and 4, though not the choice that is absolutely consistent with nature). In spite of this, we cannot assume that Hierocles believed deliberate choice to be necessary for performing any *kathekon*, only that it is necessary for performing all *kathekonta*.

In the passage on marriage the natural drive to live as couples was the basic criterion for choosing to marry. In a passage concerning the rearing of many children (p. 55.23) Hierocles justifies it by saying that it is a consequence of marriage but also that it is 'in accordance with nature', in other ways presumably than in accordance with the drive to live as couples. He discusses factors of cost which some people put forward as a reason for not having many children, but rejects them and concentrates on the idea that we produce children for others and not for ourselves. He says at p. 57.12, that "it is inconsistent to delight in life as if one has been brought into life '*καθυκόνητος*' by one's parents but to consider producing children oneself as an unworthy thing". He also mentions the benefits which children will bring to friends, relatives and country. The implication of this is that it is natural for human-beings

not to be selfish but to do things which benefit their fellows. In the same way as it was appropriate for our parents to produce us, so it is appropriate for us to produce children ourselves, because of the natural drive to benefit others.

In the passage on marriage two words occur which describe man in terms of his natural drives. These are 'συναγελαστικός' and 'συνδυσαστικός'. The first of these occurs in the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις (col.11, 14) and helps to demonstrate how the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις acts as a basis for the ethical advice in the passages of Stobaeus. Unfortunately there is no evidence in it for man's natural drive to live as couples but the gregarious drive is well described. Human-beings are said to be gregarious creatures that need other people. For this reason, it is said, we all live in cities, and there is no man who is not part of a city. Another sign of his natural gregariousness is that he easily makes friends when sitting beside others at the theatre or when taking part in an entertainment with others. At col.11, 20 Hierocles also seems to be referring to fraternisation of troops with the enemy (in spite of the fragmentary nature of the text at this point). Gregariousness of course goes beyond an affiliation to one's city to include all other men, but the description of man as part of a city is intended as a manifestation of his gregariousness and it is this which forms the basis of the passage in Stobaeus which discusses "τὸ πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα καθῆκον" (p. 51. 3-22). In this passage the idea that man is naturally part of a city is used to show that it is appropriate for him always to put the safety of his city before his own. Hierocles can show by this method that individual and common advantage are really identical, that what is advantageous for the citizen qua citizen is advantageous for the city ("τὸ τε τῷ πολίτῃ συμφέρον προσήκει καὶ τῇ πόλει, εἴαν γε ὡς πολίτῃ συμφέρον λαμβάνηται"). Hierocles concludes from this that we should on no occasion abandon our obligation ('καθῆκον') to our city. The basis of this conclusion is man's natural gregariousness.

The importance of the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις in its description of the

natural drives of man is that it gives a fairly detailed analysis of how they arise, using basic principles of behaviour. What is meant by man's natural gregariousness is that he recognizes other men as being 'οἰκεῖον', akin or belonging to himself. The ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις opens by saying that the argument about the 'πρῶτον οἰκεῖον', the first thing that belongs, is the best starting-point for the discussion of basic moral concepts. The reason for this becomes clear. The two things that distinguish living creatures from non-living creatures are 'αἰσθησις' (perception) and 'ὄρμηξ' (impulse) (col.1,31). It is perception that produces knowledge of the 'πρῶτον οἰκεῖον' (col.1,35). The heading of the introductory passage in which these statements occur is "εἰ αἰσθάνεται τὸ ζῶον ἑαυτοῦ" (Whether a living creature perceives itself). The important thing about perception in living creatures is that it begins with, and always involves, perception of itself. At col.1,51 the first thing that living creatures perceive is said to be their own limbs and the uses which they have (wings for flying, and so on). At col.2,3 they are said to perceive those things with which they are provided for self-defence. These weapons are described as 'οἰκεῖον' and 'συμφυές'. In the case of the deer, the onlooker might wonder at the size of the antlers and the thinness of the legs, but nature teaches the deer about its own capabilities ('τα καθ' ἑαυτῶν'), that its legs are for high-speed in running and for high leaps and its antlers for a different purpose. Hierocles thus puts emphasis on the natural recognition of the functions which nature intends the limbs to perform because this is evidence of the perception of self.

Perception in a living creature begins with perception of self but this remains in the perception of all other things including external objects. At col.6,1f. Hierocles says that perception of an external object entails perception of self ("τῇ δ' ἑτέρου τινὸς αἰσθίσει

συμπέφυκεν (ἢ) ἑαυτοῦ"). When we perceive something to be white, hot, sweet and so on, we perceive ourselves being whitened, made hot, sweetened and so on. The importance of perception of self in the perception of externals is demonstrated by the example of children who are deprived of external stimuli (col.7,5-15). If children are shut up in a dark house without any noise, they can perceive nothing and imagine that they are experiencing a destruction of themselves. This demonstrates that external stimuli are essential to life but also that perception of self is always present in perception of any kind. Hence we can see the significance of the opening statement that the principle of 'πρῶτον οἰκεῖον' is the best starting-point for ethics. Our own body is not only the first thing that we perceive but is the primary element in all perception because it is present when we perceive other things to be 'οἰκεῖον'.

There are in fact different types of 'οἰκείωσις', as is explained at col.9,1ff. It is difficult to put this explanation completely in context because most of columns 8,9 and 10 are not decipherable, but three kinds of 'οἰκείωσις' are clearly pointed out. That towards oneself is called 'ἐννοητική'. Secondly, he speaks of one towards relatives which seems to be called 'στεργτική'; an example of this which is given here is the affection we feel for our children ("στεργτικῶς μὲν κατὰ τοῦτο οἰκεύμεθα τοῖς τέκνοις"). Thirdly, that towards externals is called 'ἀρετική'. The example of 'στεργτική οἰκείωσις' does show, as Kerferd⁹ and Pembroke¹⁰ point out, that Hierocles must be thinking of adults as well as children when discussing 'οἰκείωσις'. Kerferd rightly compares these different 'οἰκείωσεις' with the circles of relationships which surround the individual and are described in the passage on how to treat relations (p.61.5-62.20). The centre of these circles is one's own 'δένδρον', a fact which indicates that the self is always the centre-point of the other relationships, which range from

the immediate family (second circle) through other relations (third and fourth circles) and fellow-citizens (seventh circle) to the whole human race (tenth circle). Kerferd¹¹ suggests that the recognition of these circles is based on the perception of them as 'οἶκετον' to oneself. In this way, the principle of 'οἰκειότης' can be seen to be relevant to the whole of human behaviour because it is the basis of our relationship and affection for other people even on the most general level of our relationship with all mankind.

Since 'οἰκειότης' is seen as the basis of all human behaviour, it must clearly be the basis of the advice about what is *kathekon* in the Stobaeus-passages. We have already seen how man's role as a citizen demands that he always perform his obligations ('καθῆκον') to it. The basis of this could therefore be seen to be the recognition of his kinship with his fellow-citizens. Hierocles is not suggesting that we naturally regard people in all the circles as 'οἶκετον' or that it is easy to do so. We should aim, he says, to bring the circles nearer to the centre, and even call people in one circle by the name of people in a nearer circle.

The purpose of bringing them nearer the centre must be to strengthen our attachment to them so that it will be easier to perform our obligations to them. The obligations probably consist of the performance of certain services depending upon the nature of the relationship. In the passage p.56.33-59.6 Hierocles discusses the treatment of parents. The only measure of our gratitude to our parents is said to be our continual desire to repay the benefits which they have bestowed upon us. Then he outlines an easy way of performing "τῶν ἐπ' αὐτοῦς καθηκόντων", our obligations to them, viz. to regard them as images of gods, gods of the hearth, benefactors, and so on. These *kathekonta* are clearly seen as being those things which we are obliged to do because of our relationship to our

parents, specifically those things which we must do in order to repay their good services to us. As he says at p.58.11, parents teach us what is appropriate for us ("τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς χεχρονότων") to do for them by first providing them for us (i.e. free nourishment and housing, and generally all things needed by the body). The benefits we should give extend also to benefits of the soul, viz. making them feel happy by living with them, going on walks with them, having meals with them and so on. Our parents will derive much happiness from the assistance of their children, and will derive the greatest benefit from the idea that they are being honoured by their own children whom they themselves love and think highly of. This relationship of children to parents occasions *kathekonta* not only to the parents but to their relatives, to those whom they love ('στεργεῖν') and to those who have benefitted them. This passage shows how the 'στεργτικὴ οἰκείωσις' functions in relation to *kathekonta*. At col.9,1ff. this 'οἰκείωσις' was illustrated by the love that we have for our children. Clearly this love functions in the other direction, from children to parents and to those who are connected to the parents by love, but wherever it exists it involves the performance of services which are appropriate to it.

I. THE RANGE OF KATHEKON

The basic purpose of a treatise on the subject of kathekon seems to have been to give practical advice which could be employed directly in all the situations with which people are confronted in everyday life. Most Stoics wrote on the subject; there is evidence for treatises by Zeno, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, Chrysippus, Panaetius, Hecato, Posidonius, and possibly Seneca, and the subject was lectured on by Musonius and Epictetus. All the treatises whose content we are acquainted with give practical advice in varying degrees of detail. Diogenes Laertius' lists of works are the only evidence that Zeno, Cleanthes and Sphaerus wrote treatises on kathekon,¹ but in the case of Chrysippus there are three quotations from it in Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus,² all of which concern practical matters: the burial of parents, choosing between identical drachmae, and somersaulting to obtain money. The De officiis of Cicero indicates that Panaetius' treatise concerned the practical issues of everyday life (even though the rules for these are derived from the four virtues). The same treatise also discusses the disagreements between Panaetius' predecessors, Diogenes and Antipater, about the procedures for selling merchandise, and introduces the views of Panaetius' pupil, Hecato, on this question, mentioning in addition several examples from his treatise on kathekon which concern practical conflicts in unusual situations. Posidonius' treatise is also mentioned as containing a section on kathekon in special circumstances. In the case of Seneca, apart from the evidence of the Formula honestae vitae of Bishop Martin von Bracara which is supposed to be based on a treatise by Seneca about officia, the discussion of the preceptive part of philosophy in Epistles 94 and 95 shows clearly that it gave practical rules of officia, in distinction from that part which gave instruction in the 'decreta' and concerned virtuous action. Although Musonius, Epictetus

and Marcus Aurelius seem to identify virtue and *kathekon*, there is evidence that practical matters are still the most important aspect. This is best shown by the strong emphasis on relationships and the practical commitments that relationships involve. Also, the basic examples of *kathekonta*, such as marrying, producing children, honouring parents, taking part in politics, continue to be given. Musonius discusses the practical commitments that result from the relationship of, for example, son to father and wife to husband. Finally, the passages of Hierocles that occur in Stobaeus all discuss what is *kathekon* in terms of various different relationships, including that to one's country and to God. Thus, throughout the evidence for *kathekonta* there is a common interest in giving practical guidance.

The practical guidance that is given ranges from very general statements about what it is appropriate to do to statements which are meant to be applied in very specific types of situation. One thing of course which it cannot do is tell one what to do in any particular situation; it can give general rules on how to apply the advice to particular situations but there must still remain a need to understand the factors involved in the situation with which one is faced at any one time. Thus, in the evidence we meet as *kathekonta* such things as marrying, producing children, honouring one's father, brother and country, consorting with friends, preserving one's property, questioning and answering, discoursing, walking, restoring a trust. These are very general classes of action, and for practical purposes they need to be made more explicit so that one knows exactly what they entail. Thus narrower classes of actions are given: for example, honouring one's father entails obeying one's father's orders, supporting him in his old age, giving him a burial, and so on. Also, some classes of *kathekon* are only *kathekon* in specific types of situation, for example, maiming oneself (for medical reasons), sacrificing one's

property (in a storm at sea), betraying one's father (if he commits treason), and not fulfilling a promise (if it would be to the detriment of the recipient). All such practical questions are dealt with in treatises or discussions about *kathekon*, which provide a body of rules, ranging from the most general to the most specific, on which one can draw when dealing with any practical situation.

In the practical advice of the later Stoics especially, a very important element is that of our relationships with other people. The preservation of these relationships is clearly important for Panaetius in view of his insistence on the need to gain the co-operation of other people in one's attempts to acquire the conveniences of life. Later on relationships seem to have become the predominant consideration in *kathekonta*. There is however no reason why this idea does not go back to the early Stoa. Most of the *kathekontic* activities involve relationships (marrying, honouring parents, brother and country, discoursing, restoring a trust, and so on) and indeed Chrysippus' treatise is known to have treated the relationship between children and parents. It would seem that *kathekontic* activities include activities other than those involving relationships, but it must be remembered that the later Stoics used a very wide sense of the word 'relationship' (*'σχεσις'*) which included one's relationship to God and the universe as well as to other people. This wide sense is in effect applicable to all the activities which we as human-beings, who are part of the universe, engage in. There is no evidence however that this wide sense of relationship goes back to the early Stoa. Most human activities do of course involve other people, and whereas walking, for instance, does not involve others, it would be a natural step to extend the concept of relationship to include a relationship with God. Whatever one does, presumably, including walking, will involve our relationship with God.

A relationship with God does, however, indicate that universal nature is perhaps becoming a consideration in the determination of what is *kathekon*; but universal nature is, in the evidence for the early Stoa, the distinguishing characteristic of virtuous action, as opposed to human nature in the case of *kathekonta*. An important thing that a treatise on *kathekonta* does not do is to tell us how to act virtuously, since virtue is not a characteristic of *kathekonta*. This is made clear by passages which define the difference between '*καθῆκον*' (or '*μέσον καθῆκον*') and '*κατόρθωμα*' (or '*τέλειον καθῆκον*'). The strongest evidence for this is of course Cicero's *De finibus*, *Academica* and *De officiis*, and Cicero is supported by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius.⁴ Examples of '*κατόρθωμα*' always contain an element of virtue:— justly restoring a trust, wisely honouring one's parents, wisely walking, bravely holding a finger, chastely abstaining from an old woman on her deathbed, and so on. The important point about these examples which makes them *katorthomata* is that whatever is done, however trivial, it is done virtuously: holding out a finger is absolutely indifferent in itself but when done bravely is a *katorthoma*. In Stobaeus there are examples which only contain the element of the virtue: acting wisely, acting temperately, acting justly, rejoicing, benefitting, being happy, all of which are activities in accordance with the *telos*, the virtues or the rational emotions that accompany them. These are of course only theoretical examples, since it would be impossible to find a particular example of a wise action that did not involve an intermediate as its material. The distinction is, in Stobaeus, Cicero, Plutarch and Sextus,⁵ clear-cut: any action which is done virtuously is a *katorthoma*, and any action which is not done virtuously, yet is justifiable because it is in accordance with human nature, is a *kathekon*. Elsewhere, however, this distinction seems to become blurred. This may be partly due to

the meagre evidence for katorthoma, but the confusion mainly occurs in the case of the later Stoics whose preoccupation was with practical matters and who tended to make extensive use of virtue-vocabulary in connection with intermediate kathekonta. This practice goes back at least to Chrysippus,⁶ but he insisted on keeping the distinction clear.

The question of why and how the later Stoics used virtue-vocabulary so much to refer to kathekonta is an important one. The answer to this may be seen, very broadly, in the connection between virtuous and appropriate actions. If one wants to give practical rules for conduct, one would expect these rules to be determined by what is in accordance with human nature, since this is what is said in the evidence to constitute the basic criterion for kathekon. Cicero, at *De finibus* 3.58, makes the point that to perform officia is not inconsistent with the doctrine of goods, but makes no direct connection between them. The Sceptical criticism directed against the Stoa, mainly by Carneades,⁷ saw a lack of connection between kathekonta and the telos, and this may well have led to lack of understanding of what the connection really was. Whether or not Panaetius was setting out to answer the criticism of Carneades, he does demonstrate very clearly the connection between human nature, virtue and kathekon.⁸ He starts with the four basic human drives, derives the four virtues from these, and then derives kathekonta from the virtues. Indeed Cicero says in the De officiis (1.7) that every treatise on officia concerns itself with the supreme good, and this is displayed in the case of Panaetius' treatise by the fact that officia are derived from the virtues. This does however bring up the problem of why Panaetius did not derive kathekonta directly from the natural drives. He does show the connection between kathekonta and virtue but how would he have distinguished between virtuous, or perfectly appropriate, actions and intermediate appropriate actions, if they are both derived from natural drives? It

has been noted that the De officiis does not discuss perfect officia, but only intermediate officia. It must be remembered that it is only rules of officia that are derived from the virtues. These rules tell one what kind of actions are appropriate, but it is quite another matter to perform them in a perfect way; nothing is said about this in the De officiis because this is not its concern. There is no reason therefore to assume that Panaetius did not maintain the distinction between perfect and intermediate officia.

Now apart from this distinction between perfect and intermediate, there must also be a connection since it is through performing intermediate officia that we can achieve or at least progress towards the supreme good. The most important problem in dealing with the evidence from Panaetius onwards is to determine how clearly the distinction and the connection was maintained. Panaetius' derivation of the virtues from natural human drives is important in this respect, because it must have contributed to a confusion of the distinction.

The concept of 'nature' is also of supreme importance in respect to this problem. The distinction between *kathekonta* and the supreme good was clearly based on a distinction between human nature and universal nature. Panaetius however derives virtue from natural drives. It is perhaps through the idea that virtue is in accordance with human nature that virtue becomes more closely associated with *kathekonta*. A striking case in point is Musonius,¹⁰ who concludes from the fact that virtue is in accordance with human nature that virtue is his appropriate activity ('*πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔργον*'), and thus bases his advice about appropriate actions on virtue. Epictetus also gives human nature as the basic criterion of *kathekonta*,¹¹ and by this he means man's virtuous nature. This is in effect no different from what Panaetius did when he derived appropriate actions from the virtues. Thus, even when Musonius and Epictetus do use virtue-vocabulary to

refer to *kathekonta* they may be doing nothing more than showing how they are derived from the virtues. In these authors there is admittedly no evidence of a distinction between *kathekonta* and *katorthomata*, but they do not attribute to *kathekonta* the qualities of complete consistency of all action which is implied in the term '*katorthoma*'. They still use the standard examples of *kathekonta*, marrying, obeying one's father, taking part in politics, and suchlike, all the things that are in accordance with human nature, but they seem to call them virtuous for this reason. The difference here may be just a matter of terminology, but they may also be attributing to *kathekonta* some, if not all, of the qualities that originally distinguished them from *katorthomata*. This problem will be discussed more fully later on.

II. THE SOURCE OF KATHEKON

The starting-point for an account of Stoic moral philosophy is clearly the theory of 'οἰκειώσις'. At the beginning of his ἡθικὴ στοιχείωσις Hierocles states that the theory of the 'πρωτων οἰκειων' is the best starting-point, and Cicero's account of Stoic ethics in the third book of the De finibus begins with it. In the De officiis also, it provides the starting-point, and the virtues are derived from it. In this treatise kathekonta are not derived directly from natural drives but from the virtues which are themselves derived from them.¹ Kathekonta are indirectly derived from the natural drives. Plutarch also states that nature is the source of kathekon, a view which he seems to attribute to Chrysippus,² and describes natural things as, inter alia, 'οἰκεῖα'. Cicero at De finibus 4.48 attributes to Zeno the view that nature is the source of kathekonta.

The theory of oikeiosis is important for kathekonta since it provides the basis for the doctrine of natural things ('τὰ κατὰ φύσιν'). A kathekon is an action which aims to acquire something that is natural. Cicero makes much of the idea that Ariston's insistence on the complete indifference of things neither good nor evil and his refusal to call some natural and preferred resulted in his inability to provide criteria for kathekonta.³ Cicero goes as far as to say that Ariston removed the basis of virtue itself. Thus, he clearly sees the theory of oikeiosis and natural things as essential to an account of Stoic ethics.

The concept of 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν' clearly acts as a criterion of kathekon, but in what sense is nature a source of kathekon? Does the criterion of 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν' have a psychological basis in human behaviour? A psychological basis is certainly intended by Musonius who used natural drives as a criterion of kathekon, especially the drive to live in communities,⁴ and by Hierocles who justifies kathekonta by

saying that nature drives us, even the wise man, to them. The practice of referring to *kathekonta* as *'οἰκεῖα ἔργα'*, followed by Musonius⁵ and Marcus Aurelius,⁶ seems to indicate their basis in the principle of *oikeiosis*. This is most clearly indicated at De finibus 3.20 where Cicero says that the first *kathekon* is to preserve oneself in one's natural state.

When we are born, the first *oikeion* is ourselves, our body and limbs, and primary natural things (*'τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν'*) are those things which are conducive to its preservation. The important point about primary natural things is that they produce instinctive behaviour, they automatically produce in us impulses to aim at them. And the movement of impulse is defined as an image of what is *kathekon* that moves us to act.⁷ Primary natural things thus produce action which involves regarding them as *kathekon* to obtain. This amounts to a psychological explanation of how *kathekonta* are performed, and it is easy to see how this works in the case of small children, as in the case of the instinctive behaviour of animals which is used to illustrate the theory of *kathekon* in Stobaeus.⁸ This psychological principle that action is preceded by having an impression of it as *kathekon* is common in Stoic writers.⁹

The theory of *oikeiosis* thus provides a psychological principle that is not just applicable to the early stages but which applies to all behaviour.¹⁰ For example, in the account of *kathekon* at De finibus 3.58f. Cicero tells us that all men, both wise and foolish, choose natural things and reject unnatural things because of self-love, and that the wise man, when he performs an action, judges it to be *kathekon*.¹¹ Thus, whenever anyone acts, we can assume that he either consciously regards what he does as *kathekon* or is moved automatically by an image of what is *kathekon*. Now, if *oikeiosis* is the basis of *kathekon*, we would assume that whenever anyone acts he regards the objects of his action as *oikeia*; indeed Hierocles' ἠθικὴ στοιχειώσις describes how all perception involves the recognition of things as *oikeia*. In discussing

Posidonius' theory of oikeia, I suggested¹² that oikeia, those that belong both to the rational capacities and to the irrational capacities, produce impressions that it is appropriate to aim at them. Things that are oikeia to the rational capacities, i.e. 'ἐπὶ οἰκείᾳ', are "wisdom and everything good and honourable". Thus, the theory of oikeiosis extends to an attraction towards what is morally good. Such an attraction is described by Cicero, Plutarch and Musonius.¹³

Musonius calls virtue itself appropriate;¹⁴ he uses the psychological evidence of an oikeiosis towards virtue to determine what is man's appropriate function. Plutarch and Cicero on the other hand keep the attraction towards virtue quite separate from the attraction towards primary natural things. They demonstrate that the attraction is present in both cases, since we are said to move from an attraction to primary natural things to an attraction to virtue, which we regard as supremely natural. Cicero, however, makes clear that an attraction to virtue is something that is not basic to kathekonta.^{14a} The basic characteristic of kathekonta is that it aims at natural things, and the desire to impose on our behaviour the order and harmony that is characteristic of virtue represents a stage further than mere katekonic activity (stage 3, 4 and 5 are forms of selection that are 'cum officio', 'in addition to kathekon'). Cicero's stage 3, however, does not contain actions that can be called katorthomata; these occur only in the fifth and final stage. Thus, actions in stages 3 and 4 would still have to be called 'kathekonta' even though they are really more than kathekonta. What stages 3 and 4 do have in common with kathekonta is the psychological principle that we aim at those things which we recognize to be oikeia to us. This seems to facilitate the transition from the position in Cicero and Plutarch to the position in Musonius; if we regard virtue as oikeion, it is easy to see how we will regard it as appropriate to be aimed at. To make such a move is to extend

the use of the word 'kathekon' beyond its connection with primary natural things to virtue which is the supremely natural thing. The important point about Musonius is that he seems to use oikeiōseis both to primary natural things and to virtue as the basis of katekonta. This is quite a natural thing to do on the basis of the psychological principle that it is kathekon to aim at those things which are regarded as oikeion; and both Musonius and Cicero accept it as a psychological fact that human-beings do have a natural attraction towards virtue.

In Musonius' account of kathekon there is no evidence of a conflict between an attraction to natural things and an attraction to virtue as conflicting claims in deciding what is kathekon. Cicero's account might seem to entail a conflict in the stages after an attraction to virtue develops. One would expect that the desire to acquire natural things, which lies behind katekonta, might conflict with the desire to act in accordance with virtue. However, Cicero clearly explains that the attraction to virtue is meant to supercede the attraction to natural things, and shows by the archer-simile how the two attractions work together in the case of the supreme good.^{14b} This explanation has obvious connections with Antipater's definition of the telos as "to do everything in one's power to acquire natural things". Here, the attraction to natural things is secondary to the attraction to virtue, in that although virtue aims to acquire natural things, their acquisition is not its essential characteristic. In the case of Posidonius on the other hand, a conflict is central to his psychological position, whereby some things are akin to the irrational capacities and some to the rational capacities, and errors result unless the attraction to the former is made to succumb to the attraction to the latter.^{14c} Such a conflict would also seem to be behind Panaetius' need to discuss the problem of conflicts between the claims of moral goodness and of expediency. An important aspect of Panaetius' treatise on

kathekonta is that he derives them from the virtues at the outset, and he insists that kathekonta must satisfy the claims both of virtue and of expediency (or the desire to acquire natural things). This can be seen as another attempt to demonstrate how the conflict can be reconciled. The essential way in which Panaetius brings about this reconciliation is to derive the virtues directly from the natural drives. Since the desire to acquire natural advantages must also be a basic natural drive, Panaetius has a strong psychological basis for his demonstration that the aims of virtue and expediency coincide.

The importance of what Panaetius does in this respect can perhaps be seen in terms of the Sceptical criticisms directed at the Stoa, especially by Carneades. One of these criticisms was that the aim for what is good had no relation to the basic natural drive towards natural things which was the source of kathekon, and that in fact the Stoics had two ends rather than one. The definitions of the telos put forward by Panaetius' immediate predecessors, Diogenes and Antipater, attempted to show that there were not two ends by incorporating the choice of natural things.¹⁵ Panaetius' treatise provides an answer to the Sceptical criticism, as it were from the other side, by bringing virtue in relation to the doctrine of kathekonta.^{15a} Seneca seems to follow Panaetius' position: that we have a natural attraction to virtue, that officia are derived from the virtues, and that we determine what is officium by the criteria both of what is morally good and of what is useful.¹⁶ However, after Seneca the way in which virtue affects the doctrine of kathekonta seems, from the evidence we have, to have become the main preoccupation. There is little evidence that the advantages of intermediates is a criterion of kathekon. Epictetus certainly warns us very often not to put any value on externals. He mentions the fact that everyone aims to gain his own advantage, but sees this advantage in one's moral purpose ('προαίρεσις'), in acting in accordance

with virtue. The natural attraction to virtue is emphasized by Musonius and Epictetus in connection with *kathekon* rather than an attraction to natural advantages. This position is clearly different from that in Cicero, where the latter attraction is central to the doctrine of *kathekon*.

Closely connected with the relationship between the attraction to virtue and the attraction to primary natural things is the question of the relationship between reason and impulse. In the Stoic accounts of the nature of man, man's distinction from animals is that he has the capacity of reason which can control impulse. Reason enables man to give or withhold assent to impressions and thereby create impulses to act in the form of imperatives.¹⁷ Reason is thus capable of stopping the natural process of impressions producing impulses, which exists in the case of animals and of children. Now, since reason is an additional factor in man's nature, does it affect what is *kathekon* for him, on the basis that *kathekon* for man is what is in accordance with his nature? Or is it virtue rather than *kathekon* that is affected by man's rational nature? Also, does the addition of reason merely affect the performance of *kathekonta*, since it makes it possible for man deliberately, rather than instinctively, to choose them? And must a *kathekon* be deliberately chosen in order to qualify to be a *kathekon*? These questions centre upon the interpretation of the phrase "ὅσα λόγος αἰεὶ ποιεῖν", which is given as a definition of *kathekon* by Diogenes (7.108) and by Cicero (De finibus 3.58).

In the passage from Diogenes Laertius (7.108) 'ἐνεργήματα καθ' ἑρμηνείαν' are subdivided into those which reason chooses, those that reason omits to choose, and those which reason neither chooses nor omits to choose. Thus, reason ('λόγος') is here a limiting factor in actions done in accordance with impulse ('ἑρμηνεία'). Clearly, in the case of all the actions that we do we must be impelled to do them, and

therefore it seems that we decide which are *kathekonta* by deciding which reason chooses. As many commentators point out, this definition of *kathekon* must refer only to human-beings, in distinction from the definitions which refer to natural constitution and are applicable to animals and plants as well. Reason is peculiar to human-beings, and it is natural for him to live in accordance with reason and control his impulse.¹⁸ What is meant by reason controlling impulse is that reason can assent to or reject impressions and thereby affect the actions to which we are impelled. Now in the chapter on Hierocles it was argued that reason gives or withholds assent according to what it believes is in accordance with human nature. Such beliefs are provided by the process of *oikeiosis* which makes them *oikeia* to us. In order that 'actions which reason chooses to do' should be *kathekonta*, we must assume that an uncorrupted reason is meant, which naturally chooses things that are *oikeia* to us as rational creatures, and in this way *kathekonta* will be in accordance with the nature of human-beings which is essentially rational. Now, it must not be assumed, as it is by Rieth,¹⁹ that what is *oikeion* to us in this context refers to virtue. It is true that we only come to a realisation of what virtue is after we acquire reason and that virtue is then regarded as *oikeion*, but reason's function in the performance of *kathekonta* is to choose things that are in accordance with human nature, not to bring about the harmony and consistency of all actions, in which virtue consists.

Some commentators believe that *kathekonta* concern the activities of man not as a rational being but as a living being.²⁰ Pohlenz says that they concern "unser animalisches Dasein",²¹ as opposed to the *telos* which reason indicates to us. He explains²² the phrase 'ὅσα λόγος ἀρετῆ ποιεῖν' by saying that it is necessary for reason to choose them because things that are natural are not always (i.e. not in certain circumstances) appropriate, but surely the things mentioned are chosen

because they are natural as a general rule for man and therefore appropriate. Pohlenz' approach seems to assume that man has a double nature, as a living creature like animals and as a rational creature, the first concerned with kathekon and the second with virtue. A case against this is Panaetius, who makes clear that man's rational nature involves a natural desire for knowledge and derives certain kathekonta from this which are peculiar to man's rational nature and which thus distinguish him from animals.²³ Also, the connection of reason with the performance of kathekonta should be fully appreciated because man does not act purely instinctively like animals, but when he acquires reason he quite naturally has control over his instinctive impulses (even though he might allow himself to be carried away by them). Also, it should be noted that it is 'ἔπος λόγος' which acts as a criterion of virtue, and this must refer to the perfection ('setting upright') of a process that exists beforehand in the performance of kathekonta under the control of 'λόγος'.

The two-sided approach to human nature tends to suggest that man has impulses resulting from his animal nature that conflict with what his reason tells him. Such a conflict seems to have been recognized by Posidonius, and both Panaetius and Hecato seem to have thought that impulse needs to be controlled by reason in order that kathekonta be performed. On the other hand some commentators believe that reason takes over the functions of impulse, that impulse is an expression of reason.²⁴ This approach lays stress on the psychological principle that it is reason that controls impulse when it assents to impressions. What is crucial here is the impressions themselves. Any conflict is between reason and strong impressions from which it might wish to withhold assent. This approach accommodates both the dual psychology of Posidonius (which in fact is based on the psychology of Zeno) and the mono-psychology of Chrysippus: in the latter case, inappropriate

action results from a wrong impression produced by reason, and in the former from a strong impression produced by the irrational capacities of the soul. In both cases it is the impressions that need to be dealt with.

Cicero's account at De finibus 3.20 suggests that deliberate choice of natural things is something which is additional to the basic requirement for *kathekon*, that they aim at natural things. Deliberate choice here seems to come into play after reason is acquired and man becomes aware of moral goodness. However, it is not implied that reason acts in conflict with basic instincts but only that reason takes over their function of directing us towards natural things. Also, he says²⁵ that impulse is designed for a particular mode of life in aiming at natural things, and reason for a life that is consistent; but these need not conflict if the consistency involved is a consistency in aiming at natural things (indeed virtue is itself said to be in accordance with nature). This will mean that for a rational creature reason is always involved in performing *kathekonta*. Thus, it will not be surprising that *kathekonta* are defined as actions which reason chooses to do. At De finibus 3.58 Cicero tells us that reason chooses to do them because of the element of usefulness in intermediates, that is, those intermediates that are in accordance with nature.

In the chapter on Plutarch²⁶ it was suggested that *pathe* are the main cause of inappropriate actions because they force reason to do, or rather assent to do, things that it would not otherwise do. Thus, *kathekonta* are actions which reason would naturally choose to do if free from the influence of *pathe*. In the chapter on Diogenes and Stobaeus²⁷ it was also suggested that, while as a general rule we can say that rational creatures naturally choose to do certain things, in practice reason leads us to do both appropriate and inappropriate actions. It has been suggested, too, that in the case of Panaetius and Hecato, who

insist on reason scrutinizing impulse in the sense of considering whether the things to which our impressions impel us are genuinely appropriate, this was perhaps due to the practical need of improving conduct and correcting inappropriate conduct. One of the basic needs is knowledge of what is appropriate, so that we know when to give our assent, and the other, emphasized by Posidonius, is to strengthen ourselves against the force of impressions which impel us to do what is inappropriate; in the latter case practice and experience is the main factor.

Both aspects are mentioned by Musonius,²⁸ but Epictetus emphasizes the first need, knowledge of what is appropriate.²⁹ In the first 'τόπος' of ethics Epictetus concentrates on getting one's desires directed to what is genuinely advantageous for one, so that in the second 'τόπος' he concentrates on knowing how to decide what is *kathekon*. In many passages he takes it for granted that if one knows what is *kathekon* one cannot avoid being impelled to do it. Marcus Aurelius also places very great emphasis on the intellect, while at the same time seeing a psychological split between the impulses of the soul and the beliefs of 'νοῦς'.³⁰ 'νοῦς' is the guide for anyone in scrutinizing his impressions of what is *kathekon*. If the intellect wanes, the functions of forming impressions and impulses still remain strong, and the result is less accuracy and precision in performing *kathekonta*. This suggests that constant mental vigilance over the functions of forming impressions and impulses is necessary if one is to be successful in performing *kathekonta*.

Throughout these accounts there is no strong indication that deliberate choice is a basic requirement for performing *kathekonta*,³¹ although it is clearly of immense importance in improving conduct or being accurate in the performance of *kathekonta*. It would seem to be theoretically possible to perform *kathekonta* without a deliberately

conscious scrutiny. Many of the actions that we perform in the course of everyday life must involve an automatic assent by reason to the impressions with which it is faced, and there is no reason to suppose that such actions, performed by the force of habit, are not kathekon.

III. THE CRITERIA OF KATHEKON

In the discussion of the range of *kathekonta*¹ the generally practical nature of the doctrine of *kathekonta* was pointed out. The aim of treatises about *kathekonta* is to give rules ranging from the very general to those which apply to very specific situations. The origin of these rules has also been seen² to be the primary natural instincts with which living creatures are equipped at birth and in accordance with which they feel primary natural things as akin to themselves and are impelled towards them. This theory of *oikeiosis* provides a psychological principle which applies to all behaviour. Even when reason develops in man and an attraction towards the good arises, this principle still applies. Now, the doctrine of attraction towards natural things not only explains the psychological basis of human behaviour but also provides a criterion for the general rules of *kathekonta*. When Plutarch, at CN 23.1069E, quotes the question (probably from Chrysippus):- "Where am I to start (*ἀρξομαι*)? And what can I take as the source (*ἀρχή*) of *kathekon* and the material of virtue, if I take away nature and what is natural (*τὸ κατὰ φύσιν*)?", he is thinking not only of the way in which the concept of what is natural is based on instinctual behaviour but also that it provides a criterion for deciding what is *kathekon*. In other words the criterion of *kathekon* has a psychological basis in the origins of human behaviour.

The definition of *kathekon* in Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Clement contain the word *ἀκόλουθεν*, consequence or conclusion. Diogenes seems to imply that this refers to the fact that a *kathekon* is "akin to the natural constitution", and Stobaeus refers to the fact that animals act in consequence of their own nature (*ἀκόλουθως τῆ ἐκωτῶν φύσει*), where he must mean instinctual behaviour. In the case

of adult human-beings we have seen³ that his natural constitution involves the ability to use reason to control impulses; man does not do everything instinctively but rather is naturally able to choose what is in accordance with his nature. The fact, however, that he is able to make deliberate choices does not provide a criterion of what is *kathekon*, but it does mean that what is natural for him is different from (though it still includes) what is natural for children; the difference is made linguistically by the use of "τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν" for children and simply "τὰ κατὰ φύσιν" for adults.⁴ The latter are not centred on the body and its preservation but on all those things that it is natural for a rational creature to aim at. In fact, practically all the rules of *kath-ekonta* given in the evidence are applicable to adults and not to children.⁵

The definitions of *kathekon* mentioned above seem to refer to the performance of *kath-ekonta* since they include the word "πρ-χθέν" (a *kath-ekon* is "the consequent in life, which when performed has a reasonable justification"⁶). If these definitions do refer to actions which have been performed and not to general rules of *kath-ekonta*, they must therefore not be definitions of general rules but definitions of particular acts in which general rules are applied to particular circumstances. This must mean that *kathekon* is used in two different ways: firstly, for general rules (e.g. it is *kathekon* to marry, to honour one's parents, and so on) and secondly, for particular acts. However, while the definitions of *kathekon* refer to particular acts, they do show that the general rules involved are based on the natural constitution of the agent. The consequent or conclusion (ἰκόλουθον) referred to in them is in part derived from natural constitution (in addition to appraisal of circumstances). It will therefore be convenient to discuss the criteria for general rules before dealing fully, in the following chapter, with the application of general rules to particular circumstances. As will be seen in the following chapter, the reasonable defence of a particular

kathekon is a logical conclusion from various premisses, only some of which are general rules.

In the De finibus⁷ Cicero makes clear that the concept of 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' ('secundum naturam') is based on that of the primary natural things. The connection between the two concepts is made by the use of the concept of 'value' ('ἄξιον'), since anything that is in accordance with the primary natural impulses or produces something that is so, has value (thus, wealth, for example, would be 'κατὰ φύσιν' not in itself but because it is useful in producing food, shelter and the like). Cicero seems to emphasize the fact that kathekonta aim to obtain 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' in contrast to the morally good things by saying that all kathekonta are means to the end of obtaining primary natural things. In speaking of primary natural things here, and not merely of natural things, he indicates that the concept of 'natural things' is really an extension of the concept of 'primary natural things'.^{7a} What Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus⁸ tell us about value is very useful in supplementing Cicero's account, since they make clear the distinction between value assigned to things in themselves and value assigned to things in particular circumstances. This distinction has a bearing on the criteria for the general rules of kathekonta and particular kathekonta. On the one hand value is said to be assigned to those things which have "an intermediate capacity or usefulness in contributing to the natural life ('ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βίος')", e.g. wealth and health. Thus, it will be appropriate to look after one's health and preserve one's wealth (v. D.L.7.109). On the other hand relative value is assigned to things in particular circumstances. This requires experience of circumstances, and means that while one usually chooses health instead of disease, it might in particular circumstances be more valuable to choose disease rather than health. Thus, it can be seen that if one

can assign value to things in themselves one can say that as a general rule it is appropriate to obtain them (keeping open the possibility that in particular circumstances their value may be outweighed by other things).

There is very convincing evidence for the connection of the value of 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' with the reasonable ('εὐλογος') justification which a kathekon is said to have in the definitions which Cicero, Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius give.⁹ Cicero sees the connection clearly at De finibus 3.58 in the first of his arguments which demonstrate that a kathekon is an intermediate.¹⁰ This first argument rests on two premisses, both of which contain the word 'probabilis':- 1) that a kathekon has a 'probabilis' justification (where 'probabilis' is a translation of 'εὐλογος'), and 2) that there is 'aliquid probabile' in indifferent things. In the chapter on Cicero I argued that this must mean that kathekonta aim at those intermediates which have value and are 'κατὰ φύσιν'.^{10a} Since the reasonable justification refers to particular actions, there is not a direct correlation between kathekonta and those intermediates which are preferred ('προηγμένα'); that is, any particular action which aims at a preferred thing is not necessarily a kathekon. Only general rules of kathekonta can be connected with preferred things. It is the relative value assigned to intermediates in particular circumstances which must be concerned in the reasonable justification of a particular kathekon.

This passage in Cicero's De finibus is the most important clue to the connection of a reasonable justification with the value of intermediates, but there are other passages which do connect 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' with the reasonableness of kathekonta. Firstly, there are those passages that are concerned with 'εὐλογος ἐξαρτητή'.¹¹ Even though suicide only seems to be justifiable for the wise man, it is said to be kathekon for

him; and the wise man commits suicide reasonably when he possesses a preponderance of 'τὰ παρὰ φύσιν' and remains in life reasonably when he possesses a preponderance of 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν'.^{11a} Stobaeus even uses¹² the word 'καθηκόντως' instead of 'εὐλόγως', and gives kathekonta and their opposites as criteria of life and death instead of 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' and 'τὰ παρὰ φύσιν'. Thus, what the wise man does is to weigh up the value of intermediates and if those with disvalue outweigh those with value it will be kathekon to commit suicide because this action has a reasonable justification. Also, Epictetus, in the second chapter of the first book of Discourses, puts forward the general principle that man does what he feels is reasonable ('εὐλόγος'). He gives two general criteria of what is reasonable:- 1) the value of externals, and 2) what is in keeping with our own character. On the basis of the first criterion, that of the value of externals, everyone would choose what has the greatest value, but the second criterion depends on what the individual believes to be worthy of himself (as Epictetus says, some people will hold a chamber-pot for another, but others quite definitely would not). Both of these are necessary in determining what is reasonable. Epictetus puts more emphasis on the individual character, which acts as a deciding criterion of whether or not one accepts the course which involves the greatest external value. It is indeed important for Epictetus that we do not desire to obtain externals but only act on the basis of value judgements about them, since the criterion of doing what is in accordance with one's character greatly affects what one actually decides to do.¹³ The question of individual character will be dealt with later in this chapter, but it can be seen now that value judgements about externals are a primary ingredient in the reasonableness of any action. If one is considering the relationship between 'εὐλόγος' and 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν', both the criteria mentioned by Epictetus here are relevant to a kathekon

being 'κατὰ φύσιν'. To do what is in accordance with one's individual character is in a sense to do what is 'κατὰ φύσιν', as is to do what is in accordance with human nature. Epictetus elsewhere (see later in this chapter) uses 'κατὰ φύσιν' to refer to human nature as criterion of *kathekon*. The conclusion must therefore be that the value that constitutes the reasonableness of a *kathekon* is not just in externals but in human nature and individual character.

A passage in Cicero's De officiis (1.101) which mentions that a *kathekon* has a "probabilis causa" does not seem to connect 'probabilis' with the value of intermediates but with the fact that a *kathekon* must be a rational act in which impulse obeys the command of reason. The emphasis, in this passage, on the control of impulse by reason is not surprising since it occurs in a section which derives principles of *kathekonta* from the virtue of moderation.¹⁴ However, it is also not surprising that the control of impulse by reason should be in general applicable to *kathekonta*, since man is by nature a rational animal. The fact that *kathekonta* are in general actions which reason chooses to do is put elsewhere by the phrase "ἕνα λόγος εἰρεῖ ποιεῖν" (D.L.7.103) and "talis ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum [sc. *mediorum*]" (Cic. De fin. 3.58). Cicero, in the De officiis, may well be connecting the general definition of "ἕνα λόγος εἰρεῖ ποιεῖν" with the definition of particular *kathekonta* as having a reasonable justification; that is, a justification is reasonable if it is based on the kind of things that "reason chooses to do". I have argued¹⁵ that "ἕνα λόγος εἰρεῖ ποιεῖν" refers to *kathekonta* as actions that are in accordance with the nature of a rational animal, such that an uncorrupted rational animal, free from the influence of *pathe*, would choose them. For instance, "honouring one's parents" is the kind of thing that a rational creature chooses to do, and it must be one of the

principles which form part of the reasonable justification of any *kathekon*. Thus, the justification is (in part) reasonable because it is based on the criterion of what is in accordance with the nature of a rational creature. Indeed, a little later in the De officiis (1.107) Cicero says that human nature is the basic method of determining *kathekonta*.

The concept of 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' is clearly most important as a criterion of *kathekonta*, since it occurs in discussions of *kathekonta* throughout the Stoic evidence. We have already seen that Cicero and Plutarch give 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' as the determining criteria of *kathekonta*. Stobaeus also indicates this at Eclogues II 86.10. Panaetius¹⁶ regarded human nature as the source for general principles of *kathekonta* (De off. 1.107). Panaetius is not really concerned with advising us what things it is *kathekon* to acquire (he assumes that human-beings have an instinct to acquire things that are advantageous) but with how it is *kathekon* to acquire them.¹⁷ The method of acquiring them is determined by human nature, an important characteristic of which is that human-beings have an affinity to each other and act in the interests of each other. Panaetius tells how to act in consequence of this natural affinity. He does the same comprehensively with all the natural drives by deriving the virtues from them and then detailing the spheres of these virtues to produce general rules of *kathekonta*.

Musonius¹⁸ does very much the same as Panaetius: he mentions, for example, that marriage is 'κατὰ φύσιν' and based on natural inclinations and therefore appropriate. However, when Musonius mentions human nature in connection with appropriate action, he seems to mean man's virtuous nature; indeed he uses 'κατὰ φύσιν' to refer to the *telos*. The lack of distinction between appropriateness and virtue in Musonius and Epictetus has already been pointed out, but it seems to be the concept

of virtue that is brought into line with *kathekon* rather than the other way round. Musonius¹⁹ still uses examples such as health and strength as objects of appropriate actions, but it is the restraint in eating that results from moderation (*'σωφροσύνη'*) which is called appropriate (cf. *De off.* 1.106). The tendency in Musonius is therefore to call the exercise of the virtues appropriate, because this is in accordance with human nature, as well as to call the acquisition of things such as health and strength appropriate. Musonius certainly does not, as Cicero does, see *kathekonta* as aiming at primary natural things in contrast to good things, but rather sees good things and things in accordance with nature as identical. The virtues are seen as *'κατὰ φύσιν'* because we have a natural inclination to them and *kathekonta* as *'κατὰ φύσιν'* because they involve the exercise of the virtues. Yet Musonius does not suggest that the performer of *kathekonta* possesses the sage's incontestable disposition, rather that he acts virtuously in the secondary sense of Panaetius whereby virtue is ascribed to those who carry out the *kathekonta* derived from the four cardinal virtues.

Epictetus also says²⁰ that it is *kathekon* to aim at what is *'κατὰ φύσιν'*. By this he does not mean universal nature, because we are said not to know what is going to happen and therefore to aim at what is *'κατὰ φύσιν'*. For example, man is said to have a natural sense of loyalty, affection, helpfulness, respect for others. Human nature is summed up at 3.7.24-28 as *"ἐλεύθερος, γενναῖος, αἰδέμενος"*; here it is a criterion of general rules of *kathekonta* (*'προηγούμενα καθήκοντα'*), including "marrying", "producing children", and "caring for parents". Bonhöffer²¹ suggests that these refer to the very essence and true nature of man, that they are the highest activity of moral will. However, they are what one would expect as examples of *kathekonta*; the important point is that Epictetus seems to say²² that to act totally in accordance

with universal nature is impossible because man cannot forecast events; virtue is connected solely with human nature and how it deals with events in spite of an ability to know what will happen. Epictetus²³ does encourage us to accommodate our actions to changing circumstances, but it is human nature that remains the determining criterion. External things of course, which are in a sense called 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν', are not to be deliberately sought after. All we should do is to keep our moral purpose ('προαίρεσις') in accordance with nature (viz. human nature). The reasoning seems to be that so-called unnatural things (i.e. externals) happen very often and we have no control over them, and that we should concentrate on those natural things which are in our control because they concern our moral purpose.

Marcus Aurelius²⁴ follows Epictetus very closely in deriving kathekonta from the terms that are applicable to man (e.g. "σὺμφρων", and "ὑπερφρων"). These terms are clearly descriptive of man's virtue. It is the performance of the functions of man's nature that is important for kathekonta, not the avoidance of such 'unnatural' things as pain, since the latter may be necessary in performing one's function as part of the universe.

Hierocles²⁵ again emphasizes the origin of kathekonta in the basic instincts of human nature. He views human nature in terms of natural drives such as gregariousness or the drive towards living with a partner and producing children, and it is clearly these that he is referring to when he speaks of kathekonta being in accordance with natural constitution. This is given as a more basic principle for determining kathekonta than the appeal to the authority of the wise man. It is indeed a general principle of kathekon for the ordinary man to marry because it is so for the wise man, but even the wise man experiences a natural drive towards marriage. Hierocles draws consequences from the drive to live with a

partner, i.e. that we should rear many children in spite of the cost of it. Another natural drive from which it is concluded that the rearing of many children is 'κατὰ φύσιν' is the drive to benefit others. An example of kathekonta resulting from man's gregariousness is that he should always act in the interests of his state. Throughout, his advice about what is kathekon is substantiated basically by an appeal to a particular natural drive.

The treatment of kathekonta throughout all the evidence clearly reveals the fact that general rules of kathekonta are based on a view of human nature. The distinction between kathekonta and katorthomata in the Old Stoa is usually seen in terms of 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' and 'ἀγαθὰ': kathekonta aim to acquire the former, katorthomata the latter.²⁶ 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' concern human nature²⁷ whereas goods concern universal nature. This distinction remains even if, as Kidd,²⁸ one sees the performance of kathekonta in the course of progress gradually converging with universal nature. The distinction is based very much on the dichotomy between attraction towards primary natural things and towards goods, but from Panaetius onwards this dichotomy ceases to exist. Panaetius seems to see all natural drives as directed towards the virtues, and in the Stoics after Panaetius it becomes a general principle that when kathekonta are derived from human nature the virtues are included as well as the primary natural instincts. The stress on these two aspects does of course vary. Musonius seems to stress both the origin of kathekonta in natural drives and the importance of exercising the virtues, whereas Hierocles stresses the natural drives most. Epictetus also stresses very much the importance for kathekonta of exercising the human virtues, deliberately advising us not to go out of our way to acquire external natural things which our primary natural instincts might lead us to aim at but which are not in our control.

The preceding discussion of human nature as a criterion of *kathekonta* has shown that we must take statements that *kathekonta* aim at 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' in a very wide sense. Treatises about *kathekonta* are concerned with the practicalities of life, but their concern is not confined to showing how to obtain 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' in the sense of how to gain the advantages of life, but how to deal with all the practicalities of life in a way that is consistent with human nature. Of course, dealing with the practicalities of life does include the acquisition of advantages for oneself and others, but this is not the only consideration. There was indeed some variation among individual Stoics in the treatment of this question of advantages.

The Stoic attitude to advantages in Cicero, Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus²⁹ is that *kathekonta* aim to derive usefulness from intermediates. *Kathekonta* are actions which are neither good nor bad but which do or produce something that is useful. Usefulness seems to refer to things that are necessary for the maintenance of everyday life. Panaetius³⁰ makes the acquisition of advantages a basic criterion of *kathekonta* alongside the criterion that *kathekonta* should be in accordance with what is morally good ('*honestum*'); one should act in a way that is both '*honestum*' and '*utile*'. In the second book of the De officiis it is practically taken for granted that human beings need to acquire advantages for themselves and their friends; what is discussed is the most expedient way of acquiring them. It is argued at some length that the most expedient way is to follow the rules of *officia* that have been derived from the virtues in the first book, i.e. that '*honestum*' and '*utile*' coincide. Great emphasis is put on the need to cooperate with others in our acquisition of advantages, and this introduces the question of how to treat other people. This last question aroused a dispute between Diogenes and Antipater,³¹ the former believing that one should

only refrain from acting against the interests of others when the law expressly forbade it, the latter that one should not knowingly act contrary to the interests of others even when the law did not forbid it. The same disagreement existed between Hecato and Panaetius.³² For Diogenes and Hecato the question of what is advantageous did conflict with what is 'honestum' (in this case, fulfilling the *kathekonta* that are derived from justice and acting in accordance with the interests of others), but for Antipater and Panaetius the latter determined the former. Panaetius' view seems to have prevailed. His pupil, Posidonius, is said by Cicero to have admired Panaetius' work in this field and to have written on the subject of the conflict between advantage and moral goodness.³³ Seneca³⁴ seems to have followed Panaetius' position. Musonius,³⁵ Epictetus³⁶ and Marcus Aurelius³⁷ greatly play down the obtaining of advantages as a criterion of *kathekonta*. Indeed the tendency is towards the view that they militate against the performance of *kathekonta*, and to concentrate on the idea that the advantageous approach is to act in accordance with the virtues. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius still regard the desire for advantages as basic to human behaviour. Epictetus insists that advantage be placed not in externals but in one's own moral purpose. Marcus Aurelius places advantage in what is in accordance with man's nature as a rational and social animal; this means that he must do what is in the interests of his city and of the universe. For Marcus and for Hierocles³⁸ the idea of social responsibility and that it is advantageous for oneself to act in the common interest is of crucial importance for deciding what is *kathekon*, and this idea has its roots in Panaetius. The acquisition of the necessary conveniences of life have, however, become of very minor importance for *kathekonta* in Epictetus and Marcus.

In conjunction with this emphasis on social responsibility is an

emphasis on one's relationships to others as a criterion of *kathekonta*. It was pointed out in the chapter on the range of *kathekonta*³⁹ that, although the first clear evidence of relationships as criteria of *kathekonta* is in Panaetius, relationships do figure very highly in the examples of *kathekonta* that are given as traditional Stoic doctrine (Diogenes, Stobaeus, etc.). To say that one measures *kathekonta* in accordance with relationships need mean no more than that one acts in accordance with general rules of *kathekonta* such as honouring one's father, brother and country, restoring a trust and so on, all of which involve relationships. However, by the time of Epictetus it has become very important as a formal criterion of *kathekonta*.

In Cicero's De officiis the question of relationships is introduced in the section which outlines those *officia* that are derived from justice.⁴⁰ This is to be expected since justice is the virtue which concerns the way in which we treat other people (1.50-60). The general principle is that the different degrees of relationship, ranging from the relationship to our fellow-men down to the close relationship between husband and wife, involve different degrees of obligations. For instance, the obligation resulting from our relationship to our fellow-men is that everyone should have a right to those things which nature has produced for the common use of man; the obligation resulting from our relationship to our country is that we should not hesitate to render it a service by dying on its behalf; and obligations to members of one's family are to give them support and protection. At 1.59 it is clear that these obligations are general criteria which one brings to bear upon any situation, and the difficulty in practice is to weigh up conflicting obligations resulting from different relationships.

These obligations are for Panaetius only derived from justice and not the other three virtues. However, they are of great significance

in the second book of the De officiis. This book concerns the method of acquiring advantages, and hence such obligations will be of importance because the acquisition of advantages for oneself can very easily conflict with the advantage of others.⁴¹ In the discussion of the conflict of 'honestum' and 'utile' the main problem is how to reconcile one's own interests with a just treatment of others.⁴² One's obligations to others entail that one should not be selfish but act in their interests. The obligations of relationships are very important for the whole questions of kindnesses (beneficia, χάριτες) because they are the basic criteria in determining how to give, receive and repay kindnesses. The significance of beneficia is shown most strikingly by the great detail in which Seneca treated them. Seneca gives several references to Hecato's treatise on the subject and in one reference (De beneficiis 2.18.2⁴³) shows that the exchange of beneficia is based on a rule which is determined by the relationship concerned (the relationships of husband and wife and of father and son are mentioned). This is exactly how beneficia are treated in the second book of the De officiis, since they are based on the rules of officia derived from justice in the first book.

Obligations to others do, however, seem to be central to that section of philosophy which deals with precepts of officia. In Epistle 94 where Seneca discusses the relationship of this section with the section which gives 'decreta' about moral goodness, the examples of precepts are how a husband should treat a wife, a father his children, and a master his slaves (Ep. 94.1). These examples suggest that the precepts centred on how to treat other people, but there is no reason to suppose that they were all of such a nature. When we come to Epictetus, however, the obligations of relationships do seem to apply to all kathekonta. The descriptions of the second 'τόπος', which con-

cerns *kathekon*, are very significant in this respect. This 'τόπος' is said to concern impulses and aversions ('ὄρμησί' and 'ἀφορμησί', 3.2.2), or more specifically, orderly and rational actions free from rashness. The most basic and all-embracing criterion for orderly and rational action is clearly the maintenance of relationships,⁴⁴ both those with which we are born and those that we acquire throughout life. At E30 the general principle is given that what is *kathekon* in any situation can be discovered by an examination of the relationships between oneself and the person with whom one is dealing. For instance, if one's brother wrongs one, one should not return the wrong but act in accordance with one's relationship to him and pass over the injury incurred. But the concept of relationship extends beyond relationships with other people. Our relationship with god is said to imply that we do not regard externals as good or evil, only those things in our control, that we accept everything that happens because god ordains it for us. All the terms ('ὀνόματα') that apply to man imply relationship of some kind, and from them it is possible to derive all the *kathekonta* that are applicable to man.⁴⁵ Thus, if in any particular situation one can say that a particular term applies to one, then one must perform the *kathekonta* that are entailed by it. Discourse 2.10 sets out specifically to demonstrate how *kathekonta* are derived from the terms applicable to man. The widest term is of course 'human-being', and this implies a relationship with god. Human-beings are all citizens of the universe, and this implies that one should act as part of the universe. Because human-beings cannot know beforehand what is going to happen, it is *kathekon* for them to choose what is more naturally adapted for choice. Thus, this general principle of *kathekon* is derived from one's relationship with god. In Hierocles the advice given about *kathekon* extends to one's relationship with god.⁴⁶ Marcus Aurelius,⁴⁷ who quite clearly distin-

guishes three types of relationship: 1) in the normal sense, to those with whom one lives, 2) to the divine cause and 3) to the environment. The first must include all human-beings, since in a sense we live with all human-beings. The second refers to our relationship with god, and the third to the way in which we react to our environment. I have argued⁴⁸ that Marcus is referring to the right use of impressions, which was central to Epictetus' ethics, i.e. the general principle that impressions coming from external things should not be allowed to affect one's actions without first being tested by one's reasoning faculty. Thus, in Marcus' Meditations we can see that the term 'ῥαχέσις' has come to be used in reference to everything external to man.

We have seen that Epictetus believed that the individual's character should be taken into account in determining what is 'εὐλογον'.⁴⁹ Although a particular course of action might be judged 'εὐλογον' because of the value of the externals it involves, it may still be reasonable not to do it if it is contrary to one's own character (1.2.5-11). By individual character he means what an individual is prepared to accept as being in accordance with his own sense of dignity. The point is made clear at 1.25.14f.⁵⁰ where it is said to be up to the individual to decide on the basis of circumstances what is the appropriate course for himself. The example of smoke in the house is given: an individual will leave a smoke-filled house which he is visiting at the point at which the level becomes too much for himself to accept. At 4.12.17, after mentioning relationships with others as a principle of conduct, he adds that in social intercourse one should maintain one's own character. It seems, therefore, that individual character is a quite distinct criterion from human nature in general. This is in accordance with the De officiis (1.107)⁵¹ where Panaetius distinguishes general human nature from individual capacities; it is stressed that the indiv-

idual must hold on to his own particular endowments, so long as these do not conflict with the criterion of general human nature. In spite of what Epictetus says in Discourse 1.2, there is little evidence of the effect of the individual's character on kathekonta elsewhere. At E29.5 Epictetus does use it to warn people who are wanting to take up philosophy that before taking it up they must examine their own character to see if they personally are prepared to accept all the hardships that it involves. Marcus Aurelius⁵² stresses the individual a great deal but usually in the sense that the individual should make every effort to do what is kathekon for him. He does mention individual constitution, but gives no explanation of how it functions as a criterion. Thus, the evidence of how individual considerations function as a criterion of kathekonta is restricted to Panaetius and Epictetus; indeed there is no evidence that they were a criterion of kathekonta before the time of Panaetius. For Panaetius it is a matter of the individual's natural endowments and capabilities, that one should devote oneself to activities for which one has a natural bent and keep away as much as possible from activities for which one has no natural bent. This does seem to be connected with the Epictetus passage where conduct is determined by principles which one accepts as valid for oneself; for at 1.112, for example, the austerity which Cato practised, it is said, made suicide valid for him whereas it was not valid for the others who were in the same position of defeat but whose mode of life was less severe. The emphasis on individual qualities in Panaetius and Epictetus for the determination of kathekonta is indeed outstanding in the Stoic evidence, which puts so much emphasis on prescribing rules.

IV. THE PRACTICE OF KATHEKON

Both Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus give the definition of kathekon as "that which when done has a reasonable defence (εὐλογον ἀπολογισμὸν, D.L.7.107; εὐλογον ἀπολογίαν, Stob. Ecl. II 35,14)". This is also the definition of kathekon given by Cicero, who uses the phrase 'probabilis ratio' for reasonable defense, both in the De officiis (1.3) and in the De finibus (3.58). This definition begins the accounts in all these cases. Since it is a primary definition in Cicero's account, it is reasonable to assume that it goes back to the early Stoa. Diogenes Laertius attributes the introduction of the concept of 'kathekon', immediately after giving the definition, to the founder of the Stoa. Also, Sextus Empiricus' discussion, at Adversus Mathematicos 7.153, of Arcesilaus' criticism of the Stoic criterion of truth suggests that the definition goes back to the time of Zeno. Arcesilaus believed that certainty of knowledge is impossible and that for the purpose of living the wise man uses the criterion of 'τὸ εὐλογον'. Arcesilaus defines a virtuous action ('κατόρθωμα) as "that which has a reasonable defence (εὐλογον ἀπολογίαν)". Arcesilaus' activity as a philosopher did overlap with that of Zeno, and it is therefore quite likely that Arcesilaus, for polemical reasons, took Zeno's definition of a kathekon and said that this was in fact the definition of a katorthoma. It is unlikely that Zeno (or a later Stoic) took a definition of katorthoma from Arcesilaus and used it to define a kathekon, since the passage in Sextus is clearly meant as a polemic against the Stoics.¹

A great deal of controversy has arisen over the meaning of 'εὐλογος', which is ambiguous, as is Cicero's translation 'probabilis'. It can mean either probable and uncertain or reasonable and having good grounds. Arcesilaus certainly used it to mean probable, since he believed that nothing could be known for certain; but he could have been (deliberately)

misrepresenting the Stoic definition of *kathekon*. On the other hand, if the Stoics did not wish 'εὐλογος' to mean probable, it seems somewhat odd to have used such an ambiguous word. Scholars have pointed out various ways in which probability or reasonableness can be seen as an attribute of *kathekonta*. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive: for example, it could be reasonable in that it aims at something that is natural and at the same time probable in that the achievement of its aim is not certain. It is possible to accept both of these as characteristics of *kathekonta*, but the real question lies in determining which is the significant characteristic referred to in the definition by the word 'εὐλογος'. In deciding this question, one must also consider the phrase "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ἰσῳῃ (or βίῳ)", which is closely associated with it in Diogenes and Stobaeus. This phrase is indeed given on its own as the definition of *kathekon* by Clement, a fact which points to its importance in defining a *kathekon*. Cicero, however, does not use it in conjunction with reasonable defence. "Τὸ ἀκόλουθον" is clearly connected with natural constitution, as was seen in the last chapter. Even if Cicero does not use the phrase, he certainly demonstrates the connection of *kathekon* with natural constitution. In interpreting the phrase 'reasonable defence', it is necessary to keep in mind that to have a reasonable defence is in some sense to be a consequence of natural constitution.

First of all, it will be helpful to outline the various interpretations of the phrase 'εὐλογος ἀπολογία'. The common denominator among those who take 'εὐλογος' to mean probable is that a *kathekon* involves in some way uncertainty of knowledge. They disagree, however, about where the uncertainty lies. Rist³ and Hirzel⁴ see it as uncertainty about the results of an action; when we set out to do something, we cannot be sure that we will succeed. Grumach⁵ sees uncertainty about

success as an uncertainty about what fate has determined for us; we choose what is in accordance with our nature but we cannot be sure that this is in accordance with what fate has determined for us. Bréhier⁶ and Goldschmidt⁷ see the uncertainty to be in the value of *kathekonta* themselves; they are only probably valuable because in some situations they should not be done. Among those who take *εὐλογος* 'to mean "supported by good reasons", the largest group is those who take *kathekonta* to be determined by god, universal reason, universal law, universal nature, fate. This view is taken by Bonhöffer,⁸ Dyroff,⁹ and Pohlenz.¹⁰ Kilb¹¹ sees *kathekonta* as well-founded because of the value of intermediates, Tsekourakis¹² and Kerferd¹³ because they are consequences of human nature. A third approach is to take *εὐλογος* 'to mean probable in one sense and reasonable in another. Christensen¹⁴ believes that the sceptical criterion of probability was used for *kathekonta*, but that this is a justification "on good grounds", based on judgements of the value of objects and on logical and physical feasibility. Nebel¹⁵ regards *kathekon* as 'probably' what fate has determined for us but 'reasonable' in so far as *kathekon* aims at what is natural; this is basically the same position as that of Grumach except that the latter regards the choice of natural things as a sign of probability rather than of reasonableness.

The interpretations of the word as 'probable' are really compatible with each other as descriptions of *kathekonta*. Rist's and Hirzel's view that *εὐλογος* 'refers to uncertainty about the results of an action is in any case implausible because one would hardly justify an action by the uncertainty of its outcome; however, it must be true that when we set out to do an action there is the possibility that we will be unsuccessful, owing to some unforeseen occurrence. This can be expressed in another way by saying that whatever is going to happen is determined by fate and that because we cannot forecast it our actions are liable to failure. The view of Bréhier and Goldschmidt that the value of *kathekonta* in themselves is uncertain is compatible with the

above views. To say that "to marry" is a *kathekon* does not mean that it is *kathekon* to marry on any occasion. To choose to marry has only a probable defense because circumstances may require one not to marry. In all these interpretations there is uncertainty concerning circumstances or events.

In determining the validity of these interpretations of 'reasonable defence' as a defence resting on uncertain knowledge, it will be helpful to examine the phrase "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ (or βίῳ)", since the word 'ἀκόλουθον', consequence or conclusion, suggests a connection with logic. Can any sense be made of saying that a conclusion has a justification that is probable rather than having the full validity of truth? The difficulty here is that there is practically no evidence for the meaning of 'εὐλογος' in Stoic logic. We rely mainly on one passage in Diogenes Laertius which states that a 'εὐλογος' proposition is one which "has more chances of being true than not" ("τὸ πλείονας ἀφορμὰς ἔχον εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι", 7.76) such as "I shall be alive tomorrow". In support of this, there is an anecdote about the Stoic, Sphaerus of Bosphorus, reported by both Diogenes and Athenaeus,¹⁶ in which the 'καταληπτικὴ φαντασία' which is a true representation of reality is contrasted with 'τὸ εὐλογον' which might turn out to be false. Sphaerus was deceived by some waxen pomegranates (or, in Athenaeus, birds) but claimed that he assented not to the proposition that they were pomegranates but that it was reasonable ('εὐλογον') for them to be pomegranates. In view of this, Watson¹⁷ takes the 'εὐλογος' proposition as the guide in life for the ordinary man. Perfect knowledge, he says, is knowledge of all truths so linked as to form one integral truth; but it is an ideal, and hence we must be realistic and follow what is 'εὐλογον'. Watson seems to connect *kathekon* and 'εὐλογον' with a scale of values, as opposed to the perfect knowledge of all truth; it is this that makes

the difference between *kathekon* and *katorthoma*. The defence for a *kathekon* is, it seems, 'probable' rather than 'true' because it is based on a calculation of value in indifferents rather than on perfect knowledge. Thus, we can say that an action is *kathekon* if we can point to its value, but this means that it is only probably, not certainly, what would have been done in the light of perfect knowledge. To say that a *kathekon* has a 'εὐλογος' defence is not to say that it is probably appropriate but probably right, in the same way as a 'εὐλογος' proposition is probably true, because it aims at what is valuable in indifferents rather than at what is good. This seems to be how Christensen interprets the 'εὐλογος' defence. "Such a justification would be based on one or more value judgements, plus perhaps some judgements of, say, physical feasibility or logical compatibility."¹⁸ The value judgements are seen by Christensen as constituting good grounds. Such judgements evaluate objects as constitutive to perfection, but they are not based on the perfect knowledge of the sage, whose actions are perfect.

The clearest example of 'εὐλογος' referring to value in indifferents is in the case of 'εὐλογος ἐξουσιή'. It was argued in the last chapter¹⁹ that 'εὐλογος' does refer to the basis of *kathekonta* in 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν', by which is meant not simply externals which are in accordance with nature but any thing or action which is in accordance with human nature. But what is also important is that a 'εὐλογος' defence refers to a particular situation; a *kathekon* has a reasonable defence because it is a conclusion inferred not simply from general criteria of what is in accordance with human nature but, most importantly, from the interpretation of general criteria in particular circumstances.

It was pointed out in the last chapter that there is a type of value which refers to intermediates as objects of action. Intermediates have value attributed to themselves and are in this sense called

'preferred' but in particular situations one cannot say that preferred things are necessarily to be aimed at. Instead we must examine the relative value of the intermediates involved. This type of value was called 'ἐκλεκτικὴ ζῆσις' by Antipater, and experience seems to be needed in order to calculate it.²¹ This is important because for example health is in itself preferred but in a particular situation disease might have more value. For this reason, Aristo seems to have believed that things are not preferred in themselves but only in particular circumstances.²² In the De officiis (1.141) the evaluation of the circumstances is given as one of three principles which must be observed in any action.²³ At 1.53-60 general principles of *kathekonta* in our dealings with other people are given, but also examples when these should be contravened. The simile of accounting is used, that we should calculate *kathekon* by adding up the amount owed to each person and thereby seeing who has the prior claim upon us at any particular time. It seems that experience in discerning value in particular situations is not necessary to perform *kathekonta* because the general principles do apply to the majority of situations, but if one aims to make moral progress and to perform *kathekonta* on every occasion, such experience is absolutely essential. In any situation where several different claims are made one must be able to assess their relative merit. 'Value' is the important criterion in the application of general rules because it determines what is to be done when general rules conflict with each other. To take an example from Hecato:²⁴ if one's father has committed treason, one must follow the rule of honouring one's country by reporting him to the authorities rather than the rule of honouring one's father by not reporting, because it is of greater value to prevent treason than to honour one's father. If, however, one's father has robbed a temple, it is of greater value not to report him. An important consequence of

choosing that course of action which has the greatest value must be that there is only one course of action which is appropriate, unless there are several which possess the same value. Examples of equal value which are given in Plutarch,^{24a} even if rather trivial, do illustrate the point. In the case where two runners finish a race at exactly the same time, there is no difference in value between giving the victory to one rather than the other, and therefore both courses of action will be *kathekon*. The same is true if one has to choose between two identical drachmae.

That part of the definition which refers to "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ (or βίῳ)" is very important in determining the significance of a 'εὐλογος' defense because it shows that a *kathekon* is a conclusion which has a 'εὐλογος' defence. The indication in Diogenes and Stobaeus²⁵ is that the conclusion is a conclusion from human nature, but Epictetus shows clearly that a *kathekon* is a conclusion based both on general criteria and on circumstances. This indicates that the 'εὐλογος' defense which the conclusion possesses involves the application of general criteria in particular circumstances.

Epictetus²⁶ clearly demonstrates the relation between logic and *kathekon*. The circumstances with which we are faced in any situation are regarded as hypotheses. This is important because the argument in which the appropriate conclusion is drawn is said to be a hypothetical one. The circumstances are not to be accepted in any sense as necessary or permanent, because as soon as the circumstances change, the conclusion changes. The other, more important, premisses of these hypothetical arguments are those concerned with what is 'κατὰ φύσιν'. The conclusion ('ἀκόλουθον') is clearly a conclusion both from the hypotheses of circumstances and from what is in accordance with nature. Because of the importance of hypothetical arguments in determining *kathekon*, which is a conclusion in life ('τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ (or βίῳ)'), the person who

wishes to perform kathekonta must be equipped with an ability to understand logical processes.²⁷ Man, being a rational animal, does have an ability to understand logical processes and follow the inferences which they involve, which shows that every human-being has the ability to determine kathekonta to some extent. In 1.7 Epictetus declares that in every matter we should try to determine the appropriate solution which the good man would find, and this is done by the meticulous use of logical processes. Firstly, we must make a correct appraisal of the situation, so that we obtain the correct hypotheses. Secondly, the importance of an ability to make inferences (ἰσχυρολογία) is stressed. Inappropriate action results from a failure either to realise that hypotheses have changed or to draw from these hypotheses inferences consistent with one's own position as a human-being and an individual; in fact Epictetus stresses that all moral errors involve a logical error. Now, if the conclusion referred to in the definition of kathekon rests on circumstances and on what is in accordance with nature, it would seem right to assume that these are the reasons why it has a reasonable defence. This leads to the view that ἐλόγος 'does not simply refer to the fact that kathekonta are based on what is κατὰ φύσιν' but to the fact that it is based on what is natural in particular circumstances.

It was argued in the chapter on Marcus Aurelius²⁸ that the phrase "numbers of kathekon", which occurs in Cicero, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, refers to the different elements of the argument which provides a justification for kathekon. These numbers seem to refer not only to the different general principles which are introduced as premisses but also to the circumstances. The justification, it seems, has to show reasons why a particular action is kathekon at this moment of time, to this extent, with this person, and so on. The importance of the comparison of numbers

of kathekon with the letters of a word is that the different general principles that are introduced into the argument are not justifications of a particular kathekon each in their own right but only in combination with each other.

In view of the role that logic plays in the determination of kathekonta it is clear that their justification is objective in the sense that very definite reasons can be given for performing them. No sense, therefore, can be made of saying that a kathekon has a justification which is 'probable' because it is uncertain that the justification is valid or not. The conclusion must be drawn by valid means of inference from the premisses. This still leaves the basic uncertainty which was pointed out by Watson and Christensen, that kathekonta do not rest on the perfect knowledge of the sage. The sage is completely at one with the universe and is fully acquainted with its workings, but the non-sage has to act in accordance with general principles of what is in accordance with nature and try to interpret events and circumstances in accordance with these. The non-sage is thus likely to be thwarted by events because he lacks perfect knowledge; that is, the premisses of his arguments are by their very nature uncertain because they do not completely correspond with the workings of the universe. His argumentation may be flawless but he can still be thwarted by events.

It was pointed out earlier²⁹ that several modern scholars have seen 'επιλογος' to refer to uncertainty of knowledge. What has been said about the role of logic in kathekonta provides a good basis for assessing these views. The view of Grumach and Nebel that kathekon is uncertain because of our uncertainty about what fate has determined for us seems to refer to the basic position of the non-sage who lacks perfect knowledge. The defence of a kathekon does not have the certainty of an action performed by the sage who is completely at one with fate; this

seems to be the basic position underlying the concept of 'τὸ εὐλογον'. The translation of 'εὐλογον' as 'uncertain' is, however, a little misleading unless one also keeps in mind that 'εὐλογον' refers to a reasonable or rational justification based on valid argumentation. De Lacy³⁰ has clearly pointed out this aspect of rationality and has stressed that 'εὐλογον' does not mean 'probable', that probability has no place in Stoic logic or ethics. 'Εὐλογον' is infact the opposite of 'ἄλογον', irrational. I agree that there is no probability involved in the drawing of inferences, but there is still, I think, a case for maintaining that 'εὐλογον' implies rationality rather than absolute truth based on the perfect knowledge of the sage, on the lines that Seneca points out in the De beneficiis, where he makes a distinction between reason ('ratio') and truth ('veritas').³¹

The view of Rist and Hirzel that when we set out to do something we cannot be sure of success and that this is why a kathekon has a probable defence also refers to the non-sage's lack of perfect knowledge which means that he cannot always tell when events will thwart him. The hypothetical nature of some of the premisses involved in the arguments justifying a kathekon means in practical terms that if the hypotheses change (i.e. if circumstances change) the conclusion is no longer valid and one fails to act in an appropriate manner. Also, the view of Bréhier and Goldschmidt that the uncertainty lies in the general principles of kathekonta which are only probably valuable because in some situations they should not be done could relate to the fact that the non-sage cannot forecast events and hence has to work from general principles of what is in accordance with nature. These principles are part of the rational approach to determining kathekon but they do not guarantee that one will act in accordance with universal nature.

Those scholars (Bonhöffer, Dyroff, and Pohlenz) who take 'εὐλογος'

to refer to the fact that *kathekonta* are determined by god, universal reason, universal law, universal nature, or fate seem therefore to be on the wrong track. It is indeed true that general principles of *kathekonta* are derived from the virtues, that universal nature and the like are used as criteria in determining what is *kathekon*, but there still remains the uncertainty about what universal nature and the like have determined for us. The reasonableness of particular *kathekonta* is, as we have seen, determined both by general criteria of what is in accordance with nature and by circumstances, and does not refer to their being ordered by universal nature. When Kilb sees *kathekon* as well-founded because of the value of intermediates, he is on the right track if the value of intermediates is taken to refer, as it is by Tsekourakis and Kerferd, to anything that is in accordance with human nature, and also if it is the value of intermediates in particular circumstances that is referred to.

An important question that arises from the practice of *kathekonta* is whether they must achieve their object or not. We have seen that a *kathekon* aims to do or obtain something that is *'κατὰ φύσιν'*. If we look at any particular action, does it have to be successful in its aim in order to qualify for being a *kathekon*, or does the aiming at something *'κατὰ φύσιν'* make it a *kathekon*? This problem results from the fact that the agent may be thwarted by circumstances in carrying out his action successfully. As we have seen, Rist and Hirzel regard *'εὐλογον'* as referring to the probable effectiveness of a *kathekon*. While I do not believe this to be the basic meaning of *'εὐλογον'*, it is a consequence of the fact that a *'εὐλογος'* defence is based on hypothetical premisses which may change and cause the agent to be unsuccessful. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius³² do lay stress on the doctrine of *'ὑπεξάρσῃς'* ('reservation'), by which one must always keep in mind that

one may have to make a reassessment of what is *kathekon* because circumstances change. In a sense the above question is unreal, since a *kathekon* is set in the contest of time;³³ the appropriate procedure is only appropriate at the particular point of time at which it is initiated, because at the next moment circumstances may have changed and it may no longer be appropriate to aim at the same thing. Rist, who thinks that 'εὐλόγον' refers to the probable effectiveness of a *kathekon*, nevertheless believes that a *kathekon* need not achieve its object.³⁴ He gives the example of someone setting sail in calm weather and being thwarted by a storm; he puts it quite well by saying that "our actions are appropriate when we set out". A passage in Seneca's De beneficiis (4.33), which Rist quotes, deals with the matter very clearly. Seneca makes the point that if we wait to do only what is assured of success, life will come to a halt. Every *kathekon*, he says, proceeds on the path of probable truth ('veri similitudo') to which we are led by reason rather than truth. He gives as examples sowing, sailing, serving in the army, marrying, producing children; we do not know whether we will reap a harvest, reach a port, be victorious, have a chaste wife or dutiful children, but we still do them when there is a probable chance of success. Seneca's approach here suggests that we act appropriately when we set out on a course that is likely to succeed, and there is no hint that the appropriateness is invalidated by failure. The problem only seems real if one thinks in terms of a *kathekon* which is thought of as *kathekon* because it achieves a certain external object which is 'κατὰ φύσιν'; for if it fails to achieve it, one is forced to say that the action was inappropriate. Grumach³⁵ seems to view *kathekon* in this way. There is, however, no indication that a *kathekon* is measured by the acquisition of an external object that is 'κατὰ φύσιν'; rather the significant point is to aim to do something that is 'κατὰ φύσιν'. It

is necessary in this respect to keep the general principle distinct from the particular kathekon; it is true that general rules of kathekon are measured by the fact that they achieve something that is 'κατὰ φύσιν',³⁶ but this does not necessarily mean that any particular kathekon that fails to achieve its aim is inappropriate. Surely, one would not say that an act of sowing seed was inappropriate because bad weather caused it to fail, or that the conception of a particular child was inappropriate because it turned out to be undutiful. In terms of the simile of the archer or spearsman aiming at a target, which occurs in Cicero and Plutarch and seems to originate from Antipater,³⁷ the telos is to do everything in one's power to aim at the target. It might seem that to hit the target is kathekon but this is not a necessary inference; one need only assume from Cicero and Plutarch that a kathekon aims to hit the target, that is, that an action is kathekon if it aims at (but does not necessarily achieve because of unforeseen circumstances) what is in accordance with nature. Thus, if we look at a particular act of sowing seed and we can say that the seed was sown in the correct soil, in suitable weather conditions and so on, one could say that the action was appropriate even if a later freak occurrence destroyed the crop before it could be harvested. The action does aim at the target, even if it does not hit it.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN KATHEKON AND KATORTHOMA

In the chapter on the Range of Kathekon¹ it was pointed out that from the evidence in Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius the main difference between examples of katekonta and examples of katorthomata is that the latter contain an element of virtue. While actions such as "restoring a trust" or "honouring one's parents" are examples of katekonta, "justly restoring a trust" and "wisely honouring one's parents" are examples of katorthomata. Yet it is not just katekonta which, when done virtuously, become katorthomata since even actions as trivial as holding out a finger, which are in themselves neither katekon nor contrary to katekon, become katorthomata when done virtuously. The implication seems to be that it is the virtuous performance of the actions that makes them katorthomata and not, as it were, their content. Indeed, this is borne out by such examples as "τὸ φρονεῖν", "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", "τὸ χεῖραίρειν", "τὸ εὐεργετεῖν", which are activities in accordance with the telos, the virtues or the rational emotions that accompany them. These must be classes of actions and not examples of particular actions because they lack content; it would be impossible to point to an example of a particular wise action without saying what it is that is done wisely. This is one reason why we find examples such as "wisely honouring one's parents" or "justly restoring a trust", where honouring one's parents or restoring a trust are not in themselves virtuous but must be included when pointing to a particular katorthoma. An important consequence of this is that, if one wants to decide whether a particular example of honouring of parents is a katorthoma or merely katekon, one cannot point to its content because this is common to both. We have already seen what it is that would make it a katekon - having a 'εὐλόγος ἀπολογία'. What is it, therefore, that would make it a katorthoma? It is clear that both are in a sense kath-

ekon since one is termed a 'μέσον καθήκον' and the other a 'τέλειον καθήκον'. The distinction which we are trying to discover here is that between 'intermediate' and 'complete'.

In determining the difference between 'intermediate' and 'complete' it must be worthwhile to consider the usual differences between intermediates and goods. The word 'τέλειος' has obvious connections with the telos, and it may be used to refer to katorthomata because they are constituents of the telos. They are actions in accordance with virtue ('κατ'ἀρετήν')² and 'to live κατ'ἀρετήν' is identical with the telos. On the other hand, intermediate kathekonta may be so-called because they are not constituents of the telos but are intermediates ('μέσα'). 'Intermediates' are those things which are neither good nor evil in themselves but which can be used in a good or evil way. Cicero, at De finibus 3.58ff., gives a list of arguments to demonstrate that kathekonta are intermediates, and at Academica 1.37 makes the point that the performance and neglect of kathekonta is to be placed neither among goods nor among evils.³ This would seem to be a rather obvious point, that to call an action intermediate is to say that its performance is not in itself virtuous nor its neglect in itself vicious.

The passages which refer to complete and intermediate kathekonta seem to bear this out. At De officiis 3.14-15 Cicero makes the point that complete kathekonta are only performable by the wise man whereas intermediate kathekonta are attainable by the non-wise. The difference between the examples given at Stobaeus, Eclogues II 85,18ff. is explained there as being that complete kathekonta are actions 'κατ'ἀρετήν' and intermediate kathekonta are not actions of this kind. Cicero's distinction between 'perfectum officium' and 'inchoatum officium' seems to refer to the same distinction.⁴ At De finibus 3.59 a 'perfectum officium' is said to be the action of the sage. Indeed, 'complete kathekon'.

seems to be the primary concept because the concept of 'incomplete kathekon' is deduced from it: from the fact that "justly restoring a trust" is an action of the sage and a perfect kathekon, it can be deduced that "restoring a trust" is an incomplete kathekon. The reason for its incompleteness is the lack of virtue and wisdom in the agent. It seems therefore that the distinction between complete and intermediate kathekonta refers to whether they are or are not actions resulting from the possession of virtue: "justly restoring a trust" results from the possession of virtue, whereas "restoring a trust" can be performed by the non-wise and is therefore intermediate because it deals with intermediates and not with goods. In a sense, as Cicero De finibus 3.59 shows, both wise and non-wise deal with intermediates, because all actions deal with their choice and rejection. Stobaeus' examples of intermediate kathekonta - "marrying", "going on an embassy", "conversing" - are of course common to wise and non-wise. In themselves they are such that they can be done either virtuously or viciously, in which case they become either perfect kathekonta (or katorthomata) or 'ἁμαρτήματα'.

The fact that intermediate kathekonta are connected with intermediates is indeed accepted by the majority of scholars.⁵ However, Rist, in a recent work,⁶ has explained the term by saying that it has some of the qualities of 'ἁμαρτήματα' - it is in fact vicious - and of katorthomata - it looks the same as katorthomata in terms of its content. In accordance with this Rist sees particular actions as divided into 1) katorthomata (or complete kathekonta), 2) intermediate kathekonta (which are also 'ἁμαρτήματα'), and 3) actions contrary to what is kathekon (which are also 'ἁμαρτήματα'), but in fact when talking of intermediate kathekonta, one is not talking of them as actions that occupy a middle position in such a triple classification of actions but of actions that are intermediate because they are determined by an examination

of the intermediates involved (v. chapter on the Criteria of Kathekon), in distinction from those that are derived from what is good, i.e. virtue in the agent, or from what is evil, i.e. vice in the agent. In the case of complete kathekonta the intermediates are indeed used as material (e.g. "wisely honouring one's parents", "justly restoring a trust") but the intermediates are not the source of complete kathekonta; whereas the intermediates (or rather those intermediates that are 'κατὰ φύσιν') are the source of intermediate kathekonta (cf. Plut. CN 23.1069E where 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν' is called the source ('ἀρχή') of kathekon but the material ('ἔργον') of virtue). Both deal with intermediates but intermediate kathekonta are determined by the relative value in intermediates, whereas complete kathekonta by what has supreme value, i.e. the good.

The difficulty in Rist's interpretation is whether he distinguishes clearly between classes of actions and particular actions. It is easy to see that "honouring one's parents" and the like are intermediates, that "acting wisely" and the like are goods, and that "acting foolishly" and the like are evils. In actual fact, in accordance with the Stoic paradox that everything that is not good is evil and that everyone who is not a sage is a fool, every particular action that is not a katorthoma must be a 'ἁμαρτήματα' (cf. Stob. Ecl. II 99,3ff.). A consequence of this position is that acts both of honouring one's parents and of dishonouring them will be 'ἁμαρτήματα' because the agent is a fool and in a state of vice. This must be so in spite of the fact that there is a class of actions that is neither virtuous nor vicious (v. Stob. Ecl. II 97,3). Thus, Rist's triple classification will be true of particular actions, though not of classes of actions. I would not agree with Rist⁷ that actions 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' are inappropriate in terms both of content and of intention; this may be true of particular actions (because all actions other than the sage's are vicious) but not of classes of

actions. Actions 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' surely do not refer to vice, just as 'μίσθα καθήκοντα' do not refer to virtue.⁸

There is a problem about the usage of the word 'ἁμαρτήματα' relating to the Stoic paradox that everyone who is not a sage is a fool and hence performs 'ἁμαρτήματα'. Is there a sense of 'ἁμαρτήματα' which does not cover all particular actions other than those that are katorthomata? Is there, for example, a distinction between the actions of a person who commits a crime due to a temporary lapse and those of a persistent criminal? It is only distinctions in classes of actions that seem to be intended in Cicero's distinction between a 'peccatum in effectu' and a 'peccatum sine effectu',⁹ and in the distinction in Stobaeus between a 'ἁμαρτήματα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον' and a 'ἁμαρτήματα ἐν ἑ παραλέλειπται τι καθήκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζώου'.¹⁰ In actual fact, in spite of these theoretical distinctions, the action of the one-time offender would seem to be just as vicious as the action of the persistent criminal, because all 'ἁμαρτήματα' are regarded as 'equal' ('ἴσα') because they are equally vicious and contrary to 'ὀρθὸς λόγος'.¹¹ One can only differentiate them in terms of the disvalue of the intermediates involved and thus show that they are not 'similar' ('ὅμοια'). Thus, if the degree of crime committed in the single act of the one-time offender were the same as that in a criminal act of the persistent offender, then, it seems, the two actions would also exhibit a similar degree of inappropriateness in addition to being equally vicious. The only evidence that any distinction was made between two such actions is a passage in Stobaeus (Eccl. II 113,18), which distinguishes 'ἁμαρτήματα' that result from a perverse and incurable disposition and those which do not. This passage maintains the view that all fools have an 'equal' disposition and that all 'ἁμαρτήματα' are 'equal', yet it also claims that, while being equal, the dispositions are not all permanently fixed. Here we seem to have a distinction between the incurable criminal who always acts 'παρὰ τὸ καθήκον' and the one who is

capable of performing *kathekonta* but performs some actions '*παρὰ τὸ καθήκον*'. However, if one is giving a classification of particular acts there are no terms to distinguish the difference. We only have the basic distinction between *katorthomata* (or complete *kathekonta*) and '*ἁμαρτήματα*', the latter being subdivided into intermediate *kathekonta* and actions contrary to what is *kathekon*. There is a term to refer to actions resulting from a fixed disposition to perform *kathekonta* (i.e. *katorthoma*), but no distinctive term to refer to actions resulting from a fixed disposition to perform inappropriate actions, even though such a disposition seems to exist.

Since the possession of virtue by the agent is of prime importance in the distinction between *kathekonta* and *katorthomata*, an examination of the effect that the possession of virtue on the agent's actions will be helpful in elucidating the distinction.

In the chapter on the Source of *Kathekon*¹² it was pointed out that the theory of *oikeiosis* provides the source of both *kathekon* and moral goodness. An attraction towards the primary natural things, which is present from the moment of birth provides the source of *kathekon*, but later on there develops an attraction towards the order and harmony of which virtue consists. This latter attraction, which arises on the development of reason, supercedes the former attraction, but although this affects our actions, they are not entitled to be called '*katorthomata*' until the complete order and harmony of actions is achieved. *Katorthomata* are actions which are performed at the end of a process of development which begins with primary natural instincts and ends with the performance of actions that are completely consistent. Before the final stage is reached and while the order and harmony is being developed, the agent's actions only qualify to be called *kathekonta*. The distinction between the two attractions is, in Cicero's account, quite clear and clearly separates the source of *kathekon* from the source of

katorthoma, but from Musonius onwards, when the distinction between the terms disappears, there is a corresponding lack of distinction between the two attractions; in fact, all oikeiōseis provide the basis for kathekon, including the oikeiosis towards virtue. This does not, however, mean that a kathekon becomes an action in which the complete order and harmony of which Cicero speaks is displayed; such an action, being only performed by the sage, is somewhat of an ideal, and relatively unimportant for the practical pedagogical interests of Musonius. The difficulty is of course lack of evidence since Musonius makes no mention of such an action. Ordering of one's actions in accordance with principles which are given by the philosopher is stressed in reference to kathekonta, but actions resulting from such an ordering would not, even on the basis of the orthodox distinction, be termed 'katorthoma' unless they displayed complete consistency. Yet, the fact that katorthoma is used interchangeably¹³ with kathekon by Epictetus suggests that 'katorthoma' was no longer associated with the actions of the sage. Epictetus¹⁴ seems to distinguish kathekon in the second topos from the progressor's efforts to achieve certainty characteristic of the sage¹⁵ in the third topos, yet he does not distinguish kathekon from katorthoma.¹⁶ The basis of the orthodox distinction seems to remain to a certain extent, but without the distinction of the terms themselves.

In the chapter on the Source of Kathekon¹⁷ the difference between the role of 'λόγος' in kathekon and in katorthoma was pointed out, that in the performance of kathekon man's reasoning faculty naturally has control over impulse but that in the performance of katorthoma this process reaches a state of perfection since it is 'εὖθεός λόγος' that is the criterion of katorthoma. The difference between kathekon and katorthoma is not that between animal and rational nature¹⁸ because kathekon is itself derived from man's nature as a rational animal; the important

distinction is that a katorthoma is an action in accordance with 'ὀρθὸς λόγος'. This is important because katorthoma is thereby connected with universal nature. Plutarch¹⁹ shows us the difference between kathekon and katorthoma in that the source of kathekon is nature in the sense of 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν'²⁰ and the source of the virtues is 'Zeus', 'universal nature', or 'the arrangement of the universe'. In the chapter on Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus²¹ it was shown that 'ὀρθὸς λόγος' is identical to 'νόμος', the universal law that pervades the universe; a katorthoma is therefore an action commanded by universal law. As Stobaeus Eclogues II 96,10ff. shows, the sage (who is here called 'ἄσπετος') is said to be 'νόμιμος' in that he is a man who follows the universal law and does what it commands. Just as universal law is said to be "ὀρθὸς λόγος commanding what to do and forbidding what not to do" ("προστακτικὸν μὲν ἔν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ἔν οὐ ποιητέον", Ecl. II 96,10), so the sage's reasoning faculty must be said to be 'ὀρθός' since it is able to issue commands that are consistent with universal law.²² It is only the sage who is able to be cognizant of the commands of universal law. The non-sage, as we have seen, must follow what he sees to be in accordance with human nature; he does of course have to follow and take into account the circumstances that universal nature, under the guise of fate, destines for him (as for everyone, including the sage), but this is quite a different matter from knowing what is in accordance with universal law. The position of the non-sage, as was seen in the chapter on the Practice of Kathekon,²³ involves a kind of uncertainty of knowledge in that he has to act in accordance with the criterion of 'ἐξ ἁλοῦτος ἀπελοφία' rather than in accordance with the perfect knowledge of the sage who, as we now see, is able to enact the commands of universal law and perform katorthomata. What did the Stoics envisage as the peculiar characteristics of the sage's knowledge?

The completeness of *kathekonta*, which makes them *katorthomata*, we have seen to be connected with the agent's possession of virtue. To call an action a complete *kathekon*, according to Cicero,²⁴ is to say that it possesses "all the numbers of virtue", that is, that each of the four cardinal virtues is involved in the performance of that action. It is in fact clear from the evidence that the sage exhibits all the virtues in everything he does.²⁵ The Stoics regarded wisdom as a skill ('*τέχνη*') and the sage as a technician who employs his skill in everything he does. This is an important distinction of the sage from the non-sage, who might sometimes perform actions resembling those of the sage but who lacks skill and does not act consistently.²⁶ In Stobaeus the sage is compared to the flute-player and lyre-player who do everything well in accordance with the art of flute-playing and lyre-playing; the doctrine that the sage does everything well is said to be that he performs everything "in accordance with '*ὀρθὸς λόγος*' and as it were in accordance with virtue which is a '*τέχνη*' that covers the whole of life".²⁷ In Cicero the order which wisdom applies to virtuous actions is compared to the part which an actor or dancer is assigned to play;²⁸ the full implications of this are not drawn but it must be that, just as the actor and dancer use their artistic skills to realise the part assigned to them, so the wise man uses his skill of wisdom to realise the ideal of an ordered and consistent life. Sextus Empiricus discusses the Stoic idea of wisdom as a '*τέχνη βίου*' and brings up the question of how to distinguish between the actions of the wise man and the actions of the non-wise man who is a layman.²⁹ Sextus takes the view that there cannot be such a thing as a '*τέχνη βίου*' because there is no action peculiar to the wise man, that any action which the wise man performs is also performed by the non-wise man. One answer to this criticism which Sextus gives is that all actions are common but that they are distinguished

by whether they proceed from an artistic or a non-artistic disposition. This view implies that the actions of the wise and the non-wise look the same externally and can only be distinguished by the disposition of the agent. Now, if the disposition of the agent is important, one can surely only judge its effects from the outside by looking at a number of actions of the same agent and see if he persistently acts in the same way. This must be true of the second answer to Sextus' criticism which is that the wise man's peculiar function is not "to take care of parents" but "to do this wisely (*ἀπὸ φρονήσεως*)". The wise man's skill is compared to that of the doctor and, as I have argued,³⁰ this must mean that, in taking care of his parents or healing, the wise man or the doctor will perform a different set of actions from the non-wise man or the layman. This means that, in order to determine whether a particular action is a *katorthoma*, one has to see if it contains an element of skill, i.e. wisdom, and this would seem to be difficult without examining the expertise of the agent. This expertise could only be examined externally through other actions of the agent, because it is only in this way that an artistic disposition could become apparent. Sextus argues that the disposition cannot become apparent, but the analogy with medical skill must show that it can become apparent, since one can judge whether someone is a doctor by examining not just a particular example of a cure which he has effected but a number of examples which indicate that a skill is possessed by the person concerned. A third Stoic answer which Sextus gives, that the artist produces things in an orderly and consistent manner without variation whereas the layman only occasionally produces an artistic product, also bears this out. I have argued³¹ that this should be interpreted to mean that the non-wise man occasionally produces a *kathekon* whereas the wise man always produces a *kathekon*; but the artistic product of the non-wise man is a *kathekon* and different from

the artistic product of the wise man, which is a katorthoma, because it does not exhibit the consistent ability of the wise man. It seems, therefore, that one needs evidence of a consistent ability to perform kathekonta before one can say that a particular action is a katorthoma.³² This, however, is practically a difficult proposition.

There is a difficulty in the idea that one can detect a katorthoma by examining all the other actions of an agent because, according to a quotation from Chrysippus in Stobaeus (=SVE 3,510), the progressor ('προκόπτων') who performs all kathekonta is not happy (i.e. does not attain the telos) until his actions acquire a fixed dispositional quality. Thus, if one saw that all the actions of someone were kathekonta, one could not say that they were katorthomata. One has therefore to do more than just go through his actions one by one and see if they are all kathekonta. How does one detect the fixed dispositional quality needed to perform katorthomata, and how does this differ from the disposition ('ἕξις') to perform kathekonta? The disposition to perform kathekonta is a 'προηγμένον' and not a good,³³ so that the persistent performance of kathekonta is not a sign of a sage. The fixed disposition which Chrysippus says is acquired by intermediate actions when the progressor becomes happy may apply to a certainty in applying principles which it is necessary to learn in order to attain the telos and act in accordance with universal law or 'ὀρθὸς λόγος'. These principles are not precepts of kathekonta but are doctrines ('decreta' or 'δόγματα') that instruct in the nature of virtue.³⁴ His learning of these principles help him to perform all kathekonta but only result in the performance of katorthomata when he has a full grasp of these principles and their application. It seems that the progressor cannot perform katorthomata until he has developed an infallible capacity to apply these principles correctly. Is there any evidence for the nature of this capacity?

In Plutarch³⁵ there is evidence to support the above quotation from Chrysippus (Stob.=SVE 3,510). in that virtue is said to be 'λόγος' that is consistent, firm and unchanging, and the supreme good is said to be that which is firm and unchanging in its judgements. This implies that virtue is a disposition always able to make the correct decisions.

Virtue is defined as knowledge ('ἐπιστήμη'), and in the formulation of the telos introduced by Diogenes, the reference to 'εὐλόγιστος', choice of natural things is a reference to the virtue of 'εὐλογιστικά', which is specifically a virtue subordinate to wisdom ('φρόνησις').³⁶ 'εὐλογιστικά' is a disposition and is defined as "knowledge that cancels out and takes stock of what takes place and is done". The wise man is clearly seen to be able to apply this knowledge in every action. As was pointed out earlier in the present chapter, Epictetus³⁷ seems to keep the topos concerning kathekon distinct from that which is concerned with the progressor's efforts to achieve certainty. Such people have already got their desires and impulses more or less right, and are aiming to achieve certainty in these matters so that they are not misled by any sense-impression ('φαντασία') at all. It is not possible to be free from deception until one's desires are directed to what is good and one's impulses to what is kathekon.³⁸ The kind of deception that is envisaged is deception in arguments involving equivocal premisses, arguments that draw conclusions by interrogation, and hypothetical arguments (Discourses 3.2.6). The 'καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός', Epictetus says, is able to be free from deception in such arguments. In Discourse 1.7 Epictetus discusses such arguments, shows their connection with kathekon and tells us that in every matter we should aim to find out the appropriate ('καθήκουσαν') solution which the 'καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός' would arrive at. Here he clearly means the sage since he also refers to the same person as 'ὁ σπουδαῖος'. Thus, the position in Epictetus seems to be

that once one has got desires and impulses right one can set about acquiring infallibility in the logical argumentation which is described in 1.7. The sage is put forward at 1.7.25ff. as the person who is proof against deceit. The difference between the sage and the non-sage is thus that the latter, although capable of arriving at some appropriate conclusions, is not always capable of doing so. This preserves one of the distinctions between *katorthoma* and *kathekon* in the early Stoa, even if it does not preserve the distinction between the terms themselves.

Epictetus, as we have seen, divides his teaching about infallibility in logical argumentation in the third *topos* from his teaching about general rules of *kathekon* in the second *topos*. It seems that, after learning the general rules of *kathekon*, one needs to learn how to apply these rules in particular situations and is given principles on which to do this. The difference between these two spheres seems to be the same as the difference between the two spheres which Seneca discusses in Epistles 94 and 95.³⁹ A distinction is made between giving 'praecepta' of *kathekonta* such as "live thus with your father, thus with your wife", which are instructions about specific types of actions, and giving the 'decreta' of philosophy such as that fair play is desirable in itself, that one should not be forced into it by fear not hired to that end for money, which are principles of justice and instruct for the whole of life. The question that Seneca is interested in is the part that both of these play in producing a good man. Aristo's view is that only the 'decreta' are necessary because they help to remove false opinions, because they instruct for the whole of life and hence make instruction for specific types of actions unnecessary. The precepts are indeed derived from justice and can therefore be learned when learning the 'decreta'. Seneca, however, defends the use of precepts used in conjunction with 'decreta'. The precepts tell us specifically what is *kathekon* and act

as commands or exhortations to perform them, and also, the performance of officia strengthen our judgement about goods and evils and help us to reject the opinions of the masses. Yet, in addition to precepts we need principles that can be applied on every occasion if we are to fulfil all the numbers of officia in each case. The theoretic 'decreta' fill this need. Thus, a teaching in the principles of virtue helps us to perform officia. The suggestion is not that the decreta are necessary to perform officia but that they do help us to perform officia more often and to reach the situation of the sage who fulfils all the numbers on every occasion. It is therefore an application of the decreta in every situation that produces morally good action. As Seneca says at Epistles 95.44ff., a 'decretum' is an implanted conviction concerning the whole of life, and morally good actions result from such a conviction. Knowledge of decreta is therefore essential for making progress towards the summum bonum, because they are the principles by which we can bring our actions to imitate the summum bonum. Precepts of officia, on the other hand, only tell us what to do, not how to do it.

Seneca's treatment of precepts and decreta in Epistle 95 clearly shows that the precepts of katekonta instruct us in what specific types of actions it is appropriate to perform whereas the decreta instruct us in principles about how to organize the whole of our actions in accordance with the virtues. Seneca, as we have seen, sees the difference between the two as being that precepts tell us what we ought to do and decreta how to do what we ought to do ("deinde praestabunt tibi fortasse praecepta ut quod oportet faciat, non praestabunt ut quemadmodum oportet" Ep. 95.40). This difference has been echoed by modern scholars.⁴⁰ The difference might seem to be that which was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, that in examples of katorthomata the virtuous performance of something is the significant characteristic, whereas the 'something',

(that is, its content) is not significant. Examples of *kathekonta*, on the other hand, tell us what kinds of things are appropriate contents of actions. However, one ought to be clear about the implications of this difference, since Seneca clearly does not mean that in any situation the *praecepta of officia* indicate the content of action or tell us what we ought to do, while the *decreta* tell us how to do it. The distinction is very much a theoretical one, because in practice Seneca sees the *decreta* as general principles which enable us to determine what to do on every occasion. In fact he sees the precepts as being of limited use in determining what to do unless supplemented by the *decreta*. The precepts can tell us in general terms what to do but not how to apply them and determine what to do in any particular situation. The precepts act mainly as reinforcements to the performance of *officia* in conjunction with *decreta* which give us principles for their application.

Now, if one took the position of the wise man who would not need the behavioural reinforcements that precepts provide, it seems that he would determine what to do and how to do it purely on the basis of his knowledge of the *decreta*. Since *decreta* are principles derived from the virtues, it must be knowledge of what is good that determines both what to do and how to do it. This is the conclusion that was reached in the chapter on Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus.⁴¹ There it was argued that a *katorthoma* is not a complete *kathekon* because it is a wise performance of something that is appropriate in the sense that an intermediate *kathekon* is appropriate, but because acting wisely is the supremely appropriate activity for man. This is important because, when wisdom is said to be concerned with *kathekonta*, it is complete *kathekonta* that are intended. Wisdom is defined as knowledge of what to do ('ὅ τι ποιητέον'), what not to do and what is neither of these. By these three categories is meant what is good, evil and indifferent; hence to know 'ὅ τι ποιητέον'.

is not to know what to do in the sense that precepts of *kathekonta* tell one what to do, but to know what is the content of virtuous actions. The content of virtuous actions is different from the content of (intermediate) *kathekonta* and must be determined by knowledge of the *decreta*. The virtues are defined as knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) in the different spheres of activity (i.e. *ἐνεργητέα* (wisdom), *ἀπονομιτέα* (justice), *αἰσθητέα* (moderation), *ὑπομενετέα* (courage))⁴² and *ἐπιστήμη* is defined as unerring comprehension (*καταλήψις ἀσφαλής*).⁴³ The knowledge of the wise man which results in *katorthomata* must therefore be a knowledge which is unerringly able to apply the *decreta* and determine what to do solely on their basis. A knowledge purely of the precepts would not enable him to determine what to do.⁴⁴

If this conclusion is correct, the relation between *katorthomata* and *kathekon* is not as simple as that between the How and the What. The rules of *kathekonta* tell us what the contents of actions should be, but they are only generalisations of the content of virtuous actions. As Goldschmidt puts it,⁴⁵ *kathekonta* are an intermediate morality which "n'en garde que le contenu matériel (sc. de la morale parfaite), incapable de saisir l'esprit créateur de tous les contenus". To make the contents of perfect morality into rules about specific types of actions (as, for example, is done in Cicero's *De officiis*) is to make the value of preferred things absolute when it is really relative. The rules do not "grasp the creative spirit of perfect morality" because perfect morality does not function on the basis of the type of rule of *kathekon* which is derived from it. For example, at Cicero, *De finibus* 3.59 the incomplete *officium* "to restore a trust" is derived from the complete *officium* "justly to restore a trust". It would be misleading to say that the content of intermediate and complete morality is the same, because "to restore a trust" is not genuinely the content of perfect morality;

in the example of complete officium the element "restore a trust" is only included because the element "justly" is included. The sage does not always restore a trust but only as a general rule. "To restore a trust" is given as an intermediate kathekon because the sage as a general rule does restore a trust. Hierocles does this with marriage,⁴⁶ when he says that marriage is kathekon for the ordinary man because it is kathekon as a general rule for the sage. The difference between the sage and the non-sage seems to be that the sage knows for certain when an exception to the general rule applies, or rather he does not think of it in these terms because he does not use such general rules but decides what to do entirely in accordance with his knowledge of the decreta. The non-sage, on the other hand, uses the general rules of kathekon and is assisted in carrying them out by instruction in the decreta; he does in fact need both precepts and decreta to make much progress in performing kathekonta. The important point is that it is misleading to say that kathekonta refers to the content of all actions⁴⁷ because kathekonta are generalisations extrapolated from the actions of the sage and cannot truly represent their content.

It will be clear from what has been said that when the progressor performs more kathekonta as a result of instruction in the decreta, his actions will not be called katorthomata even though they are affected by the knowledge (not of course knowledge in the sense of 'ἐπιστήμη' as described above) of virtue which the instruction gives him. The fact that instruction about virtue is helpful to the progressor can be seen in the way in which Musonius, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius bring the principles of virtue to bear upon their treatment of kathekonta. Musonius and Epictetus do give the precepts of kathekonta which give specific instruction about what to do, but they also make fulfilment of man's virtuous qualities essential to the performance of kathekonta.

For Musonius,⁴⁸ kathekonta seem to be regarded as individual manifestations of virtue, but he is clearly not thinking of actions that only the sage could perform. In one passage he supports the contravention of the rule that a son should obey his father by saying that in the particular case concerned the son would be obeying Zeus, who is the universal law. Universal law was in the early Stoa clearly a criterion of katorthoma, yet there is no indication that the person who performed this action would be a sage. It seems that a principle concerning virtue is being used to justify a kathekon performed by a non-sage. For Epictetus,⁴⁹ kathekonta do not aim to obtain specific things, but rather the important thing in performing kathekonta is to have correct judgements about the materials with which we deal. For the performance of kathekonta Epictetus stresses the need to acquire the logical expertise that reaches perfection in the sage.⁵⁰ For Marcus Aurelius⁵¹ the performance of kathekonta seems to be complementary of the telos; a kathekon is "on the right path" if it manifests one of the virtuous qualities that apply to man and in this sense he does use the term 'κατόρθωσις', but he does not mean by 'κατόρθωσις' actions of the sage who would always be on the right path. The general implication of this treatment of kathekonta is that any particular kathekon must be a manifestation of a virtuous aspect of man's nature, or in other words a kathekon can only be performed if it is in accordance with one of the decreta concerning virtue.

I. Cicero

1. Ad Att.XIII,8 = van Straaten fr.34.
2. In the discussion of the meaning of 'probabilis' and its Greek equivalent 'εὐλογος' the translation 'reasonable' is used without prejudice to the final interpretation of the word; the word 'reasonable' in English contains some of the ambiguities of the word 'εὐλογος' in the same way as 'probabilis' in Latin.
3. De off.3.14: "haec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant".
4. Presumably we are to suppose that an 'ingenii bonitas' (3.14) and a 'virtutis indoles' (3.16), though apparently couched in terms of virtue, lead, initially at least, to the performance of 'καθίκαντα' and not of 'κατορθώματα'.
5. These have been discussed by G.B.Kerferd in his article Cicero and Stoic ethics, in Cicero and Virgil, Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt, p.60-74.
6. op. cit.
7. I do not wish to deny that there are 'media' between officia and contra officia which are neither officia nor contra officia, but only that it is not contained in the present sentence.
8. Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, p.97.
9. v. Cic. De off.1.8; 3.14-15; and also Stob. Ecl. II 86,11; 93,14.
10. De fin.4.71.
11. De fin.3.20; 3.59.
- 11a. There is a problem about the sources of the third book of the De finibus. As far as can be judged from the internal evidence, it is an account of Stoic ethics up to the time of Antipater. Zeno, Chrysippus and Diogenes are mentioned by name, and the views of Diogenes'

successors are referred to at 3.57. Antipater should probably be included here, and he certainly seems to be referred to at 3.22 (v. p.12ff.). Hirzel, R., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophische Schriften, vol.II, Leipzig 1882, p.567-619, discusses this question; he notes that the account follows a plan and argues that it is based on a single source and that this source is probably a work by Hecato. However, as far as the sections on kathekon are concerned, no specific names are mentioned or any references to a difference of opinion between different Stoic philosophers; therefore, on the available evidence the account of kathekon can only be taken to be an account of the doctrine as it stood at the time at least of Antipater, if not later. Of course, in the case of Panaetius, whose views Cicero might have taken into account when composing the De finibus, we can compare the account in the De officiis which is based specifically on Panaetius' treatise about kathekon.

12. v Cic. De fin.4.48 where the Stoa is criticized for making the supreme good independent of nature and yet seeking the "principium agendi, id est officii" from nature. This clearly suggests that officium is derived from the natural instincts rather than from the concept of what is 'good'.

13. 'inaestimabile' is Cicero's translation of 'ἀνεξιχνία' which refers not to lack of value but a positive disvalue such that unnatural things are worthy of rejection (v. 'reicienda' in the following sentence).

14. M. Tulli Ciceronis de finibus bonorum et malorum libri quinque, Copenhagen 1876, p.372.

15. This presupposes an interpretation of the definition of officium which is by no means certain. Is it necessary that the agent be able to give the justification?

16. De fin.3.12; 2.34; 4.46; 5.20; etc.

17. This passage has been discussed quite fully by M. Soreth,

Die zweite Telosformel des Antipater von Tarsos, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 50(1968), p.52-7.

18. op. cit., p.379.

19. De finibus bonorum et malorum, Leipzig 1915.

20. Pohlenz, M., Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker, Hermes 74(1939), p.24.

21. v. Lewis & Short, A Latin Dictionary, 'ut' II.A.2.c(β).

22. The illustration of hitting a target with an arrow is important in interpreting the formulation of the telos by Antipater as:-
 "πάν τὸ κατ' ἄριστον ποιεῖν διηκεῶς καὶ ἀπαρβαύτως πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν" (Stob. Ecl. II 76,13). Here too it is 'doing everything one can' which is the important part of the formulation.

v. Soreth, op. cit., and Plutarch's criticism of the formulation at CN 26.

23. Perhaps this is what is meant at Acad.2.131: "honeste vivere quod ducatur a conciliatione rerum, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum". The word 'conciliatio' is a translation of 'οἰκείωσις', which denotes the natural attraction that we feel towards primary natural things.

24. It is not clear what distinction is to be made between the life that is designed for reason on the one hand and perfected reason on the other, unless he means simply that perfected reason is able to realise the life that is designed for reason.

25. This formulation of the telos is ascribed to Zeno at De fin. 4.14 but to Chrysippus at D.L.7.87 and Stob. Ecl. II 76,3 and to the Stoics at Cic. De fin.2.34.

26. v. also D.L.7.100 and Stob. Ecl. II 93,14. The use of 'numeri' or 'ἀριθμοί' in contexts of the wisdom of the sage is probably different from their use to refer to aspects of kathekon, as e.g. at Cic. De fin.4.56 and Marcus Aurelius, Med.III.1; VI.26.

27. Pleasure is called an 'ἐπιχένημα' at D.L.7.36. The Stoics maintained that the first impulse of an animal was not towards pleasure because pleasure only existed after the needs of nature had been satisfied. It is compared to the thriving condition of animals or the bloom of plants.

28. A case in point in Cicero would be Paradoxa Stoicorum 20, where peccata are said to be measured not "rerum eventu" but "vitiis hominum". The situation in which peccata are performed might vary in importance, but the fault involved is in every case the same in degree, just as the virtue of a katorthoma is in every case the same in degree.

29. Two meanings, that is, in addition to a sense of 'ἐμάρτυμα' to refer to anything that is not a katorthoma. This is used specifically to demonstrate that anyone who falls short of the supreme good is equally vicious (v.p.18-19).

30. Sen. Ep.74.28 suggests that it is a matter of the areas in which the agent is in a position to exercise his virtue. He is making the point that virtue can operate however restricted or extensive one's means are. cf. ch. on D.L. & Stob. p.77-9.

31. 'contra officium' is not put alongside 'officium' as being neither good nor evil because it is not consistent to perform 'contra officium'. When Cicero in sections 58-9 says that officium is a 'medium' which is neither a good nor a bad, this does not mean that 'contra officium' is not also a medium which is in itself neither good nor bad. For this reason, I disagree with Rist, op. cit., p.97ff.

32. The origin of Cicero's identification may be the use of 'εὐλόγιστος' in reference to choice of intermediates. v. Plut. CN 26-7 where Plutarch criticizes the definition of the telos as "εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογή of natural things", where the choice might appear to be 'reason-

able' because it preserves the element of reasonableness in natural things. However, the Greek word for 'reasonable' in the definition of *kathekon* is 'εὐλογος', not 'εὐλόγιστος'. There must be a difference in the meaning of these two words if the *telos* is to consist in more than the performance of *kathekonta*. 'εὐλόγιστος' is to be connected with the virtue 'εὐλογιστική' which is subordinate to 'φρόνησις' (v. ch. on Plutarch, p.36-8).

33. The wise man's perfected reason is to be compared with the universal reason or the universal law which are facets of god. cf. Nat. Deorum 1.40 where, according to Chrysippus, Zeus is identified with an eternal law which is "quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum".

34. cf. the distinction at 3.20 between that which is "ipsum secundum naturam" and that which "tale quid efficiat".

35. 'commoda' are briefly referred to at De fin.5.90 alongside the words 'sumenda', 'eligenda' and 'praeposita' (= 'προηγμένα') in contrast with virtue. Here it clearly refers to one aspect of indifferents.

36. v. Plut CN 22.1068F; 33.1076A.

37. cf. e.g. Plut. CN 21.

38. In this case, the word 'igitur' is a little inaccurate.

39. op. cit., p.445.

40. The definition of the *telos* here attributed to Zeno is usually attributed to Chrysippus (SVEF3,4 & 12). Much of what is regarded as orthodox Stoicism goes back only to Chrysippus, who did much to consolidate the work of Zeno, and not to Zeno himself. The Stoic Archedemus is credited with the other definition of the *telos* which is given here (v. D.L.7.88; Stob. Ecl. II 75,11).

II. Plutarch

1. The question of the relationship between Plutarch and the Stoa is discussed in great detail by Babut, D., Plutarque et le Stoicisme, Paris 1969. The question of the sources of the SR and the CN is discussed by Pohlenz, M., Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker, Hermes 74 (1939), p.17-33, and Sandbach, F.H., Plutarch on the Stoics, CQ 34 (1940), p.20-25.

1a. For the relationship of the term 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν' to the telos, v. Kidd, I.G., Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.;50-172.

2. Cic. De off.1.6. cf. SVF1,364-9.

3. Cic. De fin.2.43; 3.12; etc.

4. v. chapter on Posidonius, p.133ff.

5. Porphyry, De abstinentia 3.18 = SVF1,197

6. cf. esp. Cic. De off.1.15 for the idea that the four virtues are derived from four basic natural drives.

7. De virt. mor.7.447A; cf. SVF3,456ff.

8. v. SVF3,Diog.44-6. cf. Long, A.A., Carneades and the Stoic telos, Phronesis XII (1967), p.29-90.

9. Stob. Ecl. II 76,13.

10. Stob. Ecl. II 83,13.

11. cf. Stob. Ecl. II 77,1-5, where unfortunately the text has a lacuna.

12. Stob. Ecl. II 83,13.

13. For further discussion of 'ἐκλεκτικὴ εὐδαιμονία', v. chapter on Stobaeus p.61f.

14. Plut. De virt. mor.9.449C.

15. Stob. Florileg.103,22 = SVF3,510.

16. cf. Quomodo quis in virtute sentiat profectus 75C: "ἐκ τῆς ἐνι μάλιστα φαυλότητος εἰς οὐκ ἔχουσαν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς διάθεσιν

μεταβαλῶν εἰ σοφός", and CN 1063A.

17. Stob. Ecl. II 97,5.
18. SR 13.1038C.
19. Quomodo quis in virtute sentiat profectus 75C; 75F; De audi-
endis poetis 25C; CN 10.1063A.
20. SR 13.1038C; De virt. mor.10449D.
21. v. D.L.7.108-9.
22. SR 26.1046D.
23. Stob. Ecl. II 96,18.
24. v. SR 16.1041D.
25. CN 21.1068D.
26. SR 12.1038A. A trivial example of 'εὐχρηστία' is that of
bugs in waking us up, from Chrysippus' περὶ φύσεως (SR 21.1044D).
27. 1.42ff. cf. also Seneca's treatise De beneficiis.
28. cf. Cic. De fin.3.58.
29. v. Cic. De off.1.126ff, which derives from Panaetius. Cicero's
remarks at De off.3.93 on the question of whether it is proper for the
wise man to dance publicly in the forum may well reflect the view of
Panaetius.

III. Sextus Empiricus

1. D.L.7.103.
2. Cic. De fin.3.58.
3. For 'ἐπιβάλλει' cf. Plut. SR 18.1042C & CN 12.1064E-F, where it is used in connection with 'καθῆκον' and 'εὐλογος ἐπιβολή'. 'τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα' is used in the context of virtue at Plut. SR 7.1034D, where it seems to be aligned with 'τὰ ἐμμενετέα' in the case of 'ἐγκράτεια' and with 'τὰ συμμενετέα' in the case of 'ἀνδρεία'. For the problem of relating such phrases with kathekonta, v. ch. on Diogenes and Stobaeus, p.81ff.
4. Heintz, W., Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Halle 1932, p.260.
5. Tsekourakis, D., Studies in the terminology of early Stoic ethics, London 1971, p.87ff.
6. Stob. Ecl. II 76.11.
7. Clement = SVF1, Ant.58.
8. Except Adv. Math.VII,158, where Arcesilaus' definition of 'κατόρθωμα' is given. v. p.53f.
9. The difficulty of distinguishing 'καθῆκον' and 'κατόρθωμα' is quite apparent in the case of Epictetus (v. Epictetus, p.188), where they appear to have the same sense; this does not necessarily mean that there was any change in the concepts for which these terms stood. As early as Seneca (v. Seneca, p.140) the term 'καθῆκον'/'officium' is used in a very general sense, and it is often difficult to say that a particular occurrence of the word is technical.
10. 'ὠφέλεια' is applied to goods in distinction from 'εὐχρηστικά' which is applied to natural things. The former is accessible only to the virtuous and wise man. v. Plut. SR 12.1038A; CN 20.1063A.
11. Stob. Ecl. II 83,10ff; D.L.7.105.
12. This helps us to emend the definitions in Stobaeus, which

has 'παρχθέν' instead of 'πρχθέν', and in Diogenes Laertius, which has 'προρχθέν'.

IV. Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus

1. Tsekourakis, D., Studies in the terminology of early Stoic ethics, London 1971, p.10-11. There is much confusion surrounding the interpretation of Diogenes' divisions of Stoic ethics in regard to other evidence about the divisions. cf. Zeller, E., Die Philosophie der Griechen, Leipzig 1909, vol.III.1, p.120, n.1; Dyroff, A., Die Ethik der alten Stoa, Berlin 1897, p.1-15; Giusta, A., I Dosso-graphi di Etica.
2. In fact the word 'κατόρθωμα' does not occur in Diogenes' Laertius' account of Stoic ethics at all. Virtuous actions are referred to by the phrase 'πράξεις κατ' ἀρετῆν', as in Sextus Empiricus.
3. 'καθῆκον' forms a branch of ethics in Epictetus also (v. Epictetus, p.163).
4. e.g. 7.95-6.
5. 2.26.4; 3.6.9; 3.13.22; 3.16.7; 3.23.33f.; 4.8.42; Fl1.
We do have evidence of works entitled προτρεπτικά by Chrysippus, Ariston, Cleanthes and Posidonius, but 'προτρέπειν' and its cognates seem to occur mostly in Stobaeus.
6. Cleanthes (D.L.7.184); Sphaerus (D.L.7.177); Chrysippus (quoted at SE, Adv. Math. XI,194; Plut. SR 23.1045E; paraphrased at Plut. SR 30.1047F).
7. v. Tsekourakis, op. cit., p.72; Kilb, Ethische Grundbegriffe der alten Stoa, Freiburg 1939, p.43ff.
8. It is generally agreed that the readings 'προαχθεῖν' in D.L. and 'παραχθεῖν' in Stob. should be changed to 'πραχθεῖν' on the basis of SE, Adv. Math., VII,158 and of Cicero, De finibus, 3.58 and De officiis, 1.8, which use the word 'factum'.
9. Reading Arnim's 'ἡμετέρους' for 'σὺν ἡμετέροις'.
10. 'μέσοις' is usually taken to be neuter, but the sense of this -

"in intermediates also there is something kathekon" - is odd. It cannot be contrasted with "ἄλλο μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ'ἀρετὴν ζῆν" because this is followed by its own contrasting examples of intermediates (viz. "τὸ ἐρωτᾶν").

11. cf. Philo = SVF3,519.

12. Cic., De fin., 3.16.

13. 3.22.42; cf. E42; 1.18.1-3; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, X.3.

14. In Epictetus 1.18.1-3 the second sphere of ethics, which concerns "ὁρμᾶς καὶ ἀφορμᾶς καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθήκον" (3.2.1), shows the close connection between 'ὁρμή' and 'καθήκον'. We have to get rid of wrong notions about what is kathekon because it is impossible not to be impelled towards what one believes to be kathekon.

15. v. Stob. Ecl. II 65,2; Plut. De virt. mor. 3.441c (=SVF1,202).

16. I do not wish to suggest that the Stoics thought that instruction in kathekonta was the sole answer to the problem. Pathe are essentially 'excessive' and 'disobedient to reason' and therefore something more than mere instruction in what is kathekon is needed. One has really got to clear away the excessiveness of pathe by practice before much progress can be made. This is why Seneca, especially, puts so much emphasis on this point. Posidonius, also, distinguished between errors caused by ignorance of what is kathekon and errors caused by the emotional pull. cf. Kidd, I.G., Posidonius on Emotions, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.207-8.

17. I would disagree with Tsekourakis, op. cit., p.162, where he assumes, from the fact that the example of an always appropriate action is a katorthoma, that the examples of not always appropriate actions are also katorthomata. "Wise walking" is an example of a katorthoma but "walking" is an example of something that is sometimes kathekon and sometimes not, but not sometimes a katorthoma.

18. The corresponding examples of 'ἀμαρτήματα' do have the article. I take it that the same is meant with or without the article.
19. For 'ἐπιτήδευμα' v. Stob. Ecl. II 67,5ff.
20. cf. D.L.7.105: "μέσσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρεῖαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον." This describes a type of value possessed by 'πρωχρήματα', which applies to the disposition to perform kathekonta.
21. For the difference, v. D.L.7.105.
22. A clear example is Philo (=SVF3,512) where "ἔκ τῶν ἐξέως καὶ διαθέσεως εὐλογίστου" is used of the actions of the wise man.
23. 'κλοπή' and 'μοιχεία' seem to be vicious at Plut. SR 19.1042F.
24. cf. Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, p.97ff.
25. v. p.82-4 for a full discussion of this passage.
26. cf. Long, A.A., Carneades and the Stoic telos, Phronesis 12,1(1967), p.86-9.
27. v. especially Nebel, G., Der Begriff des KATHEKON in der alten Stoa, Hermes 70(1935), p.439-60.
28. An anecdote at D.L.7.171 suggests this. Here Cleanthes says that Arcesilaus disagrees with kathekon in what he says, but in his actual deeds he upholds it. That is, whatever Arcesilaus says is kathekon and whatever he thinks he is doing, he is in fact doing what is kathekon.
29. op. cit., p.156-83.
30. That class of 'ἀμαρτήματα' which are 'ἴσως οὐ χρή' (v. Stob. Ecl. II 101,10) would thus derive from the fact that the definition of 'φρόνησις' includes knowledge of 'what not to do' ('ἴσως οὐ ποιητέον'). 'ἀμαρτήματα' are contrary to 'ὀρθὸς λόγος' which at 96,10ff. is said to be "ἀπαγορευτικὸν ἴσως οὐ ποιητέον".
31. Stob. Ecl. II 77,6; D.L.7.98.

V. Panaetius

1. Van Straaten, M., Panétius, sa vie et ses écrits, Amsterdam 1946. The fragments from this book were published separately as Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta in two further editions, 1952 and 1962. References to Van Straaten's collection of the fragments are only given for passages other than those in Cicero's De officiis.
 2. op. cit., p.276ff.
 3. De off.3.7; Ad Att.XVI.11.4(=fr.34).
 4. e.g. 2.84; 2.27-9.
 5. Schmekel, A., Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, Berlin 1892, p.29.
 6. op. cit., p.277.
 7. This view is supported by Pohlenz in Antikes Führertum, Leipzig and Berlin 1934, *passim*.
 8. Klohe, P., De Ciceronis librorum de officiis fontibus, diss. Greifswald 1889.
 9. op. cit., p.279ff.
 10. Pohlenz, M., op.cit.; Ibscher, G., Der Begriff des Sittlichen in der Pflichtenlehre des Panaitios, diss. Munich 1934; Labowsky, L., Die Ethik des Panaitios, Leipzig 1934.
 11. op. cit., p.281-2.
 12. op. cit.
 13. v. De off.1.7.
 14. op. cit., p.192ff.
 15. cf. Kidd, I.G., Stoic Intermediate and the End for Man, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.150-172 (and in CQ V(1955), p.181-194).
 16. op. cit., ch.3, section 1.
 17. cf. ch. on Diogenes and Stobaeus, p.79-82.

18. The difference in Stobaeus, however, is that *kathekonta* are connected only with wisdom, and not with the other three virtues. But in so far as the other three are defined in terms of knowledge (justice as "knowledge in 'ἀπονεμητέα'", moderation as "knowledge in 'αἰρετέα'", courage as "knowledge in 'ὀπρμενετέα'"), they must be occupied in determining certain areas of conduct; for instance, justice is concerned with 'ἀπονεμήσεις', with giving each man his due. The *kathekon* that we ought to fulfil promises must be derivable in some sense from justice, if justice is the knowledge of how to give each man his due. One should also bear in mind that each virtue does in a secondary way perform the functions of the other three virtues (v. Stob. Ecl. II 63,6ff.), so that justice will be concerned with *kathekonta* in the secondary sense.

19. cf. Panaetius' definition of the *telos* in Clement (=fr.96):-
 "τὸ ἴην κατὰ τὰς δεδομένους ἡμῶν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς".

20. This does not mean that impulse is irrational and that Panaetius held a dual psychology. It is a matter of two functions of mind. At 1.132 they are called 'motus' and described alongside each other without any suggestion of opposition between rational and irrational parts of the mind. In the early Stoa, 'πάθη' are called 'ἄρρηκτοὶ ἀλογοί', i.e. they are not subjected to the demands of reason, and hence for the early Stoa as well as for Panaetius, *pathe* should be submitted to reason. (v. Van Straaten, op. cit., p.105ff.).

21. v. especially D.L.7.36.

22. cf. also SVF1,362ff.

23. cf. ch. on Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus, p.60-62, where relative value is discussed and the importance in assessing it is pointed out.

24. v.especially SE Adv. Math. XI,190. Philippson, R., Das

Sittlichschöne bei Panaitios, Philologus 85(1930), p.357-413, tries to show how the concept of 'ἡρέπην' was of supreme importance for Panaetius because it marks a great change from the early Stoa. He also points out correlations between Panaetius and Aristotle and tries to show the connection of Aristotle's idea of the mean with Panaetius' theory of 'ἡρέπην' and thus to give an explanation of the charge that Panaetius was influenced by Aristotle.

25. v. also Plut. SR 12.1038A; CN 23.1070A; CN 4.1060C. The discussion of different kinds of 'ἡρέπην' in D.L.7.105 and Stob. Ecl. II 83,10ff. also shows that intermediates contribute something advantageous to the natural life ('ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βίος') as opposed to the consistent life ('ὁ ὁμολογούμενος βίος').

26. At 1.17 superiority to outward circumstances was said to be a characteristic of 'magnitudo animi', but as Cicero says at 2.38:- "nemo iustus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, timet aut qui ea, quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit".

27. cf. 1.107.

28. op. cit., p.197.

29. Tatakis, B.N., Panétius de Rhodes, Paris 1921, p.155-216.

30. op. cit., p.188f.

31. op. cit., p.156ff.

32. Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, ch,10, p.173-200.

VI. Hecato

1. The fact that beneficia are treated by Panaetius in his περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος as adapted by Cicero in the De officiis (1.42ff.) indicates that they may be from Hecato's περὶ καθήκοντος.
2. De benef.1.3.8; 1.4.1; 1.4.4f.
3. Fowler, H.N., Panaetii et Hecatonis librorum fragmenta, diss. Bonn 1887, p.24f.
4. cf. Van Straaten fr.55ff.
5. op. cit., p.19f.
6. The idea that health is a virtue resulting from 'σωφροσύνη', especially if it occurs in 'φύσις', is an odd one. It does not occur elsewhere, and there seems to be no other evidence for it. It is possible that health in different senses is meant, as at Stob. Ecl. II 62,15ff. where health of the soul, which is a result of practice and consists in a good admixture of the 'δύματα' in the soul, is distinguished from the health of the body. Here, health is both a virtue and a preferred thing, but the two senses are quite distinct. Philippson, R., Das Sittlichschöne bei Panaitios, Philologus 85(1930), p.365ff.(esp. p.374f.), takes health in two different senses here, but regards both as health of the soul.
7. v. ch. on D.L. and Stob., p.80ff.
8. SR 30.1048A.
9. This is referred to by Philodemus=SVF2,1081.
10. op. cit., p.23.

VII. Posidonius

1. Edelstein, L. & Kidd, I.G., Posidonius, vol.I, The Fragments, Cambridge 1972.
2. Kidd, I.G., Posidonius on Emotions, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.200-215.
3. De plac.370.2Mff. and 374.11Mff. (EK.F168). The other passages - 359.8Mff.; 362.3Mff.; 376.15Mff. - are not in EK, since they are not attributable to Posidonius.
4. v. EK.T95-99. In his article, op. cit., p.201, Kidd warns against making Posidonius more of a Platonist than he really was.
5. For a brief résumé of all the evidence for Posidonius' ethics (as for the rest of Posidonius' philosophy) v. Edelstein, L., The Philosophical System of Posidonius, AJPh 57(1936), p.305-316.
6. p.121.
7. The only indication that Cicero used material from Posidonius' treatment of kathekon is at De off.1.159 where Cicero says that, on the question of whether the interests of the community should always be placed before moderation and temperance, Posidonius answered in the negative, because some things are so disgraceful that a wise man would not do them even to save his country. This occurs in Cicero's appendix to the first book of the De officiis in which he discusses conflict between two 'honesta'.
8. De plac.501M(EK.F146); v. also Kidd, op. cit., p.202.
9. De plac.369-376M(EK.F164); Seneca Ep.95,65-7(EK.F176); v. also Kidd, op. cit., p.205-6.
10. Seneca Ep.94,38(EK.F178); 95,65-7(EK.F176).
11. Clement, Strom. II p.129.1-5(EK.F186); v. also De plac.445-448M(EK.F31); 448-456M(EK.F187).
12. In his discussion of De plac.370Mff., K. Reinhardt,

Poseidonius, Munich 1921, p.273-290, points out that Posidonius' disagreement with Chrysippus was concerned with the source of impressions in people affected by emotions, that they were not judgements of reason which carried these people away by their force ('μέγεθος'), but that they were judgements having their source in the rational capacities.

13. v. De plac.399.14-400.10M(EK.F158); 438.12-439.9M(EK.F160); 452.3-10M(EK.F161).

14. op. cit., p.208.

15. Clement, Strom. II .29.1-5(EK.F186); D.L.7.87(EK.F185); De plac.448.15-449.8M(EK.F187).

16. De plac.450.5Mff.(EK.F187).

17. Cic. De off.3.7-10(EK.F41c); and v. earlier in this chapter (p.134).

18. v. D.L.7.103. There is no need to go as far as L. Edelstein (article op. cit., p.309) who says that Posidonius regarded riches not as indifferents which can be used in a good or a bad way, but as both positively good and positively bad.

VIII. Seneca

1. De fin.3.20ff.; 3.58ff.
2. Academica 1.37.
3. There is a treatise by Bishop Martin of Bracara called Formula honestae vitae, which is supposed to be based on a treatise by Seneca on the subject of officia (v. Haase's ed. of Seneca's works, vol.III, p.468). Grimal, for example, includes it as a work of Seneca (Grimal, P., Sénèque, Paris 1948, p.38), but it is doubtful that there was such a treatise, and the internal evidence of Bishop Martin's work gives no indication that it is based on Seneca or even that it is of any relevance to the Stoic doctrine of kathekonta. cf. Bickel, E., Die Schrift des Martin von Bracara Formula honestae vitae, Rh.M. 60 (1905), p.505-551.
4. 1.1.8; 1.2.5; 5.20.4; 6.4.2; 6.25.3; 6.42.1; cf. also Ep. 81.6; 81.25.
5. cf. chapter on Hecato, p.124ff.
6. De off.3.13-14.
7. emend. Gertz - mss. beneficio. v. chapter on Hecato, p.
8. D.L.7.109.
9. cf. Ep.19.5; 20.2; 22.3; 93.4; 101.3; etc. Dialogues, De otio 2.2.; De const. sap.19.3.
10. Hecato, p.122ff.
11. cf. Examples of kathekonta at D.L.7.108, which concern the treatment of other people. In general, examples of kathekonta involve the obligations resulting from relationships. v. Range of Kathekon, p.
12. cf. the fact that precepts of officia are derived from the virtues in Cicero's De officiis.
13. cf. Marcus Aurelius, p.198-200.
14. A possible example in Seneca of an officium which results

from such a knowledge of the decreta is at Ep.71.28 where the happy man whose virtue is complete is said to perform a "honestum officium" when he accepts with courage things which others would regard with fear. Such an officium seems to result from knowing the doctrines concerning the virtue of courage.

15. v. Sextus Empiricus, p.46.
16. Practice of Kathekon, p.262.

IX. Musonius

1. Discourses 3.23.29 = Musonius, fr.48 (v. n.3).
2. Noctes Atticae V.1 = Musonius, fr.49.
3. C. Musonii Rufi Reliquae, ed. O. Hense, Leipzig 1905.
4. codd. "σύμμερον τῷ ζῶντι / ζῶντα", tacite corr. Gesner.
5. The proper approach to death is stated in fr.28 where "καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν" seems to be identical to "καθικόντως ἀποθανεῖν" in fr.29.
6. v. chapters on Panaetius (p.89) and Seneca (p.142).
7. This might however refer to appropriate procedure in logic as the way to determining what it is appropriate to do. cf. Epictetus, Discourses 1.7 which makes such a connection quite explicit (v. chapter on Epictetus, p.181ff).
8. At D.L.7.109 "to live virtuously" is said to be appropriate.
9. That mental contemplation is natural in this sense is shown at Cic. De off. 1.13 where men are said to have a desire for discovering the truth about things. cf. also De fin. 3.17-18.
10. cf. esp. Cic. De off. 1.15; Stob. Ecl. II 62,9.
11. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa, Göttingen 1959, vol.I, p.302.
12. v. esp. 71.7; also 12.11.
13. v. chapter on Epictetus, p.163ff.
14. For this idea v. chapters on Stobaeus (p.64f) and Epictetus (p.165ff).
15. cf. Posidonius, for whom kathekon was constituted in obedience to reason. v. Kidd, I.G., Posidonius on Emotions, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.208.
16. This rule is stated also in Epictetus (E.30).
17. Plut. SR 11.1037C; cf. Philo = SVF 3,519.
18. Cic. De off. 2.12ff.
19. v. esp. E.30.

X. Epictetus

1. cf. 1.1 and esp. 1.4 which places progress in not desiring things which are not a matter of free choice.
2. This will be shown later (p.169-170) to be a necessary prerequisite for performing kathekonta.
3. What this means in detail will become clear later on. It should be pointed out that the distinction between 'ὄρεξις' and 'ὄρμηξ' seems to be an original element in Epictetus (cf. Bonhöffer, A., Epictet und die Stoa, Stuttgart 1890, p.22; Oldfather, W.A., Epictetus, The Discourses, London 1966, Intro. p.xxi). The use of the terminology may be new, but the ideas are not. In the chapter on Musonius (p.157) there was an indication that emotions associated with wrong beliefs must be removed before teaching about kathekonta could be effective. Also, Posidonius' theory of 'ὄρεκτά' is designed, it seems, to make the same point:- the 'ὄρεκτά' of the irrational capacities cause 'πάθη' and an inability to listen to reason, and 'πάθη' must therefore be cajoled away by varying means of persuasion (v. Kidd, I.G., Posidonius on Emotions, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.206); kathekonta on the other hand are constituted in obedience to reason (v. Kidd, op. cit., p.208) and hence are to be associated with a stage after 'πάθη' have been suppressed, when the agent is free from the influence of what is 'οἰκείον' to the irrational capacities (power, pleasure, success, etc.) and acts according to what is 'ἀπλῶς οἰκείον', akin to man in an absolute sense (wisdom, good, etc.). This agent has his 'ὄρέξεις' right because he does not desire things which are not in his control, and is in a position to listen to reason and do what is kathekon.
4. v. esp. Stob. Florileg. 103.22 = SVF3,510.
5. The evidence for kathekon in Epictetus is consistent with this, since it does not connect the performance of kathekonta with a secure

disposition but concerns 1) general rules about what is *kathekon* (2.10.5; 3.7.25; 3.22.69; 4.4.17; 4.12.16), 2) criteria for applying them (1.7; E33.13; 4.7.19ff.), and 3) the general principle that everyone acts in accordance with what they think is *kathekon* (1.18.1-3; 3.22.42; E42). In addition to the word '*καθῆκον*', there are also clear instances of '*προσῆκον*' in the same sense (e.g. 2.14.19). This of course follows the practice of the Musonian passages in Stobaeus. Also the preposition '*κατά*' + a pronoun is used in contexts concerning *kathekon* in a sense indistinguishable from it (1.7.33; 1.28.5); here the origin of the word '*καθῆκον*' seems to be indicated (cf. D.L.7108: "*ἄπο τοῦ κατὰ τινος ἕκειν προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης* ").

6. D.L.7.85; Plut. SR 1038B; Cic.De fin.3.16.

7. 1.18.2; F6=Stob. III 20,60. cf. 3.22.42.

8. Here desire ('*ὄρεξις*') seems to be connected specifically with advantage, and impulse ('*ὄρμη*') with *kathekon* in accordance with the distinction between the first and second '*τόποι*'; but Epictetus is trying to show that a feeling of advantage is the cause of impulse. It seems impossible to show this without identifying advantage with *kathekon*. In 3.22.42 there is another possible fusion of the two concepts, when he says that it is impossible, i.e., to desire ('*ὀρέσθαι*') or be impelled ('*ὄρμᾶν*') without first conceiving an impression of advantage or *kathekon*. It does seem possible that Epictetus keeps the connection of '*ὄρεξις*' with advantage and '*ὄρμη*' with '*καθῆκον*' theoretically distinct, but when explaining action he does tend to talk about advantage and *kathekon* as though they were the same. After all, desire for what is advantageous must always affect one's idea of what is appropriate.

9. In this case, there seems to be no clear distinction between *kathekon* and advantage, as pointed out in n.8, except that *kathekon* refers more specifically to conduct; but this may well be due to the

context here. Epictetus is making the point that we ourselves have the power to give or withhold assent to impressions, and this of course is equally applicable to impressions of what is advantageous and what is appropriate. In certain contexts like the present one it is not necessary for Epictetus to make clear distinction between advantage, which relates specifically to 'ὄρεξις', and *kathekon*, which relates specifically to 'ἔργον', because, as 1.18.1 pointed out, both concepts play a part in the creation of impulse towards something. This may be the reason why advantage and *kathekon* so often appear together. cf. 1.28.5 which gives "τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀσύνφορον" in a list of things within the sphere of action which correspond with truth in the sphere of assent. "τὸ καθήκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον" and "τὸ κατ'ἐμὲ καὶ οὐ κατ'ἐμὲ" also occur in this list, but we cannot assume that they mean the same.

10. The example of Medea is used to illustrate a point connected with the first 'τόπος' at 2.17.19ff. Her problem is seen as being that she desires things (keeping her husband, living with him at any cost, staying in Corinth) which, if she did not desire, she would not be in the predicament that she is. But this passage does not discuss the problem in relation to the second 'τόπος'.

11. This approach was noted in the case of Musonius. v. p.158.

12. For 'ἔπειθος' and 'σύμμετρον' cf. Posidonius, ΕΚ.F31,14; Cic. De off. 1.101-103. For the idea of appropriate measure cf. Musonius, F18b, esp. p.105.7f.: "κόσμου τε καὶ μέτρου τοῦ προσήκουτος".

13. cf. E30. The primary importance of relationships in *kathekonta* is probably the reason why Kenakis, J., Epictetus, The Hague 1969, p.70, renders the word 'καθήκον' as 'social responsiveness'; but it is difficult to use this phrase for all occurrences of 'καθήκον', and is also a little odd when used for one's relationship to god.

14. 2.14.8; 3.2.4; 4.8.20.

15. W.A.Oldfather, Epictetus, Loeb Classical Library, 1928, vol.II,

p.511.

16. This relationship is a natural one, and this fact is here indicated when Epictetus says that one is naturally inclined ("ὠκεῖώθης ") towards one's father (v.p.164).

17. What the other party does to one is an external and hence of no importance to one. As we saw earlier (p.165), external advantages and disadvantages are of no concern for one's own genuine advantage, whereas, as we see here, the maintenance of one's own part of a relationship is.

18. cf p.165, where one's own advantage was seen to be identical with the advantage of one's father, brother, country, etc.

19. This is a Stoic term for proper names and is defined at D.L.7.53 as "a part of speech indicating a peculiar quality", but in Epictetus it seems to carry the meaning of 'προσηγορία', class name, which is defined at D.L.7.53 as "a part of speech indicating a common quality" (v. 4.8.6; 4.8.9; 3.1.27).

20. At 4.12.19, after giving the principle for the performance of kathekonta, he makes clear that it is impossible to be free from faults; all we can do is be continually intent upon avoiding them. The fact that he regards acting in accordance with universal nature as humanly impossible, is a possible reason why Epictetus ceases to make the distinction between 'κατόρθωμα' and 'καθήκον' (v. p.187-3). Also, we must remember that Epictetus seems to restrict natural things which kathekonta aim at; he is not thinking of kathekonta aiming at 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' in the sense of externals (v. p.183ff.) but he is thinking primarily of kathekonta in the sense of fulfilling the implications of the 'ὀνόματα' that are naturally applicable to man. In a sense he is talking in a similar way to Musonius who used 'προσηκον' to refer to the appropriate function, 'ἔργον' or 'τέλος' of man (v. p.153f.).

21. cf. Musonius, p.4.3, where 'οἰκεῖα' is coupled with 'προσῆκόντα'; Marcus Aur. Med. V.20 and elsewhere; D.L.7.108.

22. cf. 4.10.3: "ταῖς σχέσεσι τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀποδιδούς ".

22a. Marcus Aurelius emphasizes the fact that man is 'κοινωνικός' (v. p.205 ; and Med.V.16; X.31; VIII.12; etc.). cf. Cic. De off.2.12ff., where the mutual cooperation of men is very important in determining rules of kathekonta for acquiring the conveniences of life (v. Panaetius, p.105ff.)

23. Bonhöffer, A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, Stuttgart 1894, p.204.

24. v. p.165.

25. cf. Fronto's letter to Marcus Aurelius (=SVF 3,514), in which he points out three similar divisions of kathekonta. Here the first two are said to be done for the sake of the third, and points out that it is officium for the wise man to take food not for the reason of gratification but because it is necessary to sustain a life of wisdom.

26. v. p.169f.

27. v. p.173. It is not clear here whether "τὸ αὐτοῦ" means the character of an individual or human character in general. It is most likely that Epictetus is referring to the need to take oneself as an individual into account as well as accommodating one's actions to others. Both of these would seem to be part of human character. A clear example of the relationship of orderly action to human nature as well as to the individual's character is 1.6.15, where Epictetus says that rational creatures will not attain their end unless they act "κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ ἐκείνου φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ". The contrast with animals shows that he is talking in terms of human nature as a whole, but he also mentions individual nature as necessary.

28. This refers back to 4.3.3: "πανταχοῦ διασώσεις τὸ σαυτοῦ

πρόσωπον οἷον ἔχειν σε δεῖ". Maintaining one's own character is part of acting reasonably.

29. cf. 4.7.24 where it is said that we can accept those externals which come our way and have sufficient value as long as we do not do anything immoral to obtain them.

30. v. 2.23.27.

31. cf. 2.23.24 where things are given value in relation to others; for example an ox has more use ('χρεία') than an ass, a slave than a dog. This is what is meant by assigning value to each thing ("τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδωσιν", 2.23.23).

32. cf. 2.23.6 where Epictetus describes man's faculty which uses the gifts of god as "τὸ χρητόμενον αὐτοῖς [sc. sight, hearing, life and things conducive to life], τὸ δοκιμάσον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστου κοχιοῦμενον".

33. v. infra p.186f. for the view of life as a game. There are various words used to express the circumstances which we must accept:- "τὰ γινόμενα" (4.7.20); "τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως" (1.17.17); "ὁ θεός" (3.26.29; 4.7.20); "ἡ διοίκησις τοῦ θεοῦ" (4.10.4). 'God', 'the guidance of god' and 'the will of nature' mean the same as 'whatever happens' because, as 4.7.20 shows, "to follow god" means "wishing for what god wishes to happen" and, because god determines everything that happens, "wishing for whatever happens".

34. 1.25.17. The ultimate way out of being compelled is death by one's own hand (1.25.20).

35. P. De Lacy, The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus, CP XXVIII, 1943, p.112-115, demonstrates the point that in the first book of the discourses Arrian has planned "a progressive exposition of ethical theory, collecting and organizing his material in terms of the principles of logic" (p.113).

36. The passage "τῆς θεωρίας ἵππου ῥῶτον" refers to logic.

37. In fact life itself is a game; v. 2.16.36, where it is suggested that we all have the ability to stop playing the game by taking our own life.

38. v. also 1.5.27ff.

39. He does not however regard 'καθῆκον' as exclusive to the sage, as 'κατ'ῥησιν' was in the early Stoa. Such actions seem to be impossible (v.p.174-5), and actions of the sage are referred to as 'καθῆκον' (cf. esp. 1.7 and v. p.181-3).

40. v. 1.18.1-3; 3.28.42; E42. cf. Bonhöffer, A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, Stuttgart 1894, p.199-200.

XI. Marcus Aurelius

1. The question of the connection between the chapters of the Meditations is discussed by Farquharson, A.S.L., The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, Oxford 1944, intro. p.lxvii-lxxiv.
2. Discourses 1.23.5.
3. cf. esp. D.L.7.107:- "ἐν ἐργημᾷ δὲ αὐτὸ [sc.καθηκόν] εἶναι τὰς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκείον".
4. cf. Musonius, who connected 'τὸ πρέπον' with appropriate function (v. ch. on Musonius p.159f), and Panaetius' views as expressed in Cicero De off. 1.93-151.
5. v. later (p.202f) for the identification of advantage and kathekon.
6. cf. IV.1; V.20; VI.50; VIII.41; XI.37; and also VIII.32 and Stob. Ecl. II 115,5.
7. op. cit., vol.II, p.456.
8. op. cit., vol.I, p.370; vol.II, p.764.
- 8a. v. VI.27; III.16.
9. cf. IV.21.
10. op. cit., vol.II, p.543-4.
11. op. cit., vol.II, p.544.
12. cf. Epictetus, Discourses 1.19.10-15; 2.22.15.
13. cf. e.g., II.16(end).
14. cf. III.4.4; VII.55; VII.12; IX.1; IX.31; IX.42-4.
15. Musonius, FXVII, p.88-9H.

XII. Hierocles

1. Hierocles' Ethische Elementarlehre (Papyrus Berlin 9780), ed. H. von Arnim, Berliner Klassikertexte, Heft iv, Berlin 1906.

2. v. Pembroke, S.G., Oikeiosis, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.118; von Arnim, op. cit., p.xv-xxxvi; Praechter, K., Philosophie des Altertums, Berlin 1957, vol.I¹⁴, p.499.

3. All the passages are collected together in von Arnim's edition of the ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις. The identity of the Hierocles of these passages with the Stoic Hierocles was established by Praechter, K., Hierocles der Stoiker, Leipzig 1901. The work from which these passages come is usually regarded as being the φιλοσοφούμενα mentioned by Suidas. Reference to the passages will be given by page and line reference of von Arnim's edition.

4. e.g., p.50.20; 55.22; 56.34; 61.7.

5. Discourses 1.22.15; 2.17.31.

6. Epictetus Discourses 3.14.7, where some actions are said to be done 'προηγουμένως', others 'κατὰ περίστασιν', and so on. 'προηγουμένα' seems to mean general principles at Discourses 1.4.20.

7. It is of course only in the case of general rules that it is possible to appeal to the authority of the wise man in order to find out what is appropriate as a general rule for the ordinary man. In the case of suicide, for instance, this is only appropriate for the wise man in special circumstances and is therefore not appropriate for the ordinary man. Another example of the appeal to the authority of the wise man is at Cic. De fin.3.59. Also, the derivation of kath-ekonta from the virtues is comparable to this (v. Cic. De off.1.).

8. v. D.L.7.107; 7.85-6; Stob. Ecl. II 85,13ff.

9. Kerferd, G.B., The Search for Personal Identity in Stoic Thought, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, vol.55 no.1(1972), p.194.

10. op. cit., p.126.

11. op. cit. In this article Kerferd is concerned to show that when we regard others as 'οἰκέτεσ' to ourselves, we are in fact identifying with them; the process of seeking out relationships with other people is in fact the same process as seeking for a personal identity.

I. Range of Kathekon

1. D.L.7.4; 7.175; 7.178.
2. Plut. SR 23.1045E; 30.1047F; SE Adv. math. XI194.
3. SE Adv. math. XI194. The discussion of the burial of parents is presumably an example of how to 'honour one's parents', which is an example of a kathekon.
4. Diogenes Laertius does not discuss katorthomata, but his discussion of kathekonta compares very closely with that in Stobaeus. It is clear that human nature and 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' are the basic criterion of kathekonta, and not universal nature.
5. Sextus does not use the terms 'κατὸρ ὅμια' and 'καθῆκον' in making this distinction, but he makes the point very clearly (v. p.46f.).
6. Plut. SR 30.1048A.
7. v. Long, A.A., Carneades and the Stoic telos, Phronesis XII no.1 (1967), p.59-90.
8. p.93-4.
9. Some modern scholars do not believe that Panaetius maintained the distinction between kathekonta and katorthomata in the way that the early Stoa did. For the discussion of this question, v. p.
10. v. p.153-4.
11. Discourses 3.7.28.

II. Source of Kathekon

1. v. p.93ff.
2. v. p.27ff.
3. v. SVF 1,363-5, 368-9.
4. v. p.151f.; 162.
5. v. p.151.
6. v. p.190.
7. Stob. Ecl. II86,7f.
8. v. p.58
9. For discussions of these, v. p.24(Cicero); p.64(D.L. and Stob.); p.135f.(Posidonius); p.153 (Musonius); p.165ff.(Epictetus); p.201 (Marc. Aur.).
10. cf. Pembroke, S.G., Oikeiosis, in Problems in Stoicism, p.114-149. Pembroke shows clearly how oikeiosis applies to conduct at all levels, but does not discuss its relation to kathekon. cf. also Kerferd, G.B., The Search for Personal Identity in Stoic Thought, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, vol.55 no.1 (1972), p.177-196.
11. v. p.24
12. v. p.137
13. cf. also D.L.7.89; Stob. Ecl. II65,7; Galen De placitis 439.1M; Seneca De benef.4.17.2.
14. v. p.151. 14a. v. p.7ff. 14b. v. p.12ff. 14c. v. p.137.
15. cf. Long, A.A., Carneades and the Stoic telos, Phronesis XII no.1 (1967). Long also discusses Archedemus' formulation of the telos as "to live performing all kathekonta". Archedemus' date is a little uncertain, but his formulation seems to be facing the same criticism as those of Diogenes and Antipater.
- 15a. v. p.93ff.
16. v. De benef. 4.17.2 (attraction to virtue); Ep. 94.33; 120.11; De tranq. an. 4.4-8 (officia derived from the virtues); Ep. 7.28; De benef. 4.11.5 (the good and the useful as criteria of officia).
17. v. Long, A.A., The Stoic Concept of Evil, PQ vol.18 no.73

(Oct. 1968), p.337f.

18. D.L.7.86; Hierocles p.53.2-12(von Arnim).
19. Rieth, O., Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Ethik, Berlin 1933, p.102.
20. Tsekourakis, D., Studies in the terminology of early Stoic ethics, London 1971, p.30; Nebel, G., Der Begriff des KΑΘΗΚΟΝ in der alten Stoa, Hermes 70 (1935), p.444.
21. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa, Göttingen 1964, vol.I p.129 (cf. also p.119 and 186).
22. op. cit. p.131.
23. Cic. De off. 1.11f.; cf. also De fin. 3.17-18.
24. Bonhöffer, A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, Stuttgart 1894, p.250; Pembroke, S.G., Oikeiosis, in Problems in Stoicism, p.116f.; Wiersma, W., Τέλος und ΚΑΘΗΚΟΝ in der alten Stoa, Mnemosyne 1937, p.222.
25. v. p.15f.
26. v. p.33f.
27. v. p.63f.
28. v. p.156ff.
29. v. p.164ff.
30. v. p.201f.
31. This will be very important if the criterion for a kathekon is entirely objective. If one can examine an action and see that it is aimed at something that is natural, it will not matter whether it is deliberately chosen or not. (see the following section on the criteria of kathekon).

III. Definition of Kathekon

1. Range of Kathekon, p. 216f.
2. Source of Kathekon, p. 223f.
3. Source of Kathekon, p. 228ff.
4. cf. Kidd, I.G., The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the Summum Bonum, CQ ns5 (1955), p.181-94.
5. D.L.7.110 gives a possible example of a kathekon for children.
6. v. D.L. & Stob. footnote 8.
7. De fin. 3.16f.; v. Cicero p.7ff.
- 7a. Plut. CN 26, where the Stoic telos is described as "εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογή" of "τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν".
8. D.L. & Stob. p.60ff.
9. The connection of 'εὐλόγος' with 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν' is made in several accounts of kathekonta. Kathekonta are said to be well-founded or reasonable because they aim at 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν'; cf. Kilb, Ethische Grundbegriffe, Freiburg 1939, p.51f. and Nebel, G., Der Begriff des KATHOKON in der alten Stoa, Hermes 70 (1935), p.448-9. The connection is also made by some authors who take 'εὐλόγος' to mean probable, that kathekonta have a probable justification because they aim at 'τὰ κατὰ φύσιν'; cf. Grumach, E., Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa, Berlin 1966, p.40 & p.78. v. also next chapter p.254ff.
10. Cicero p.19ff.
- 10a. Cicero p.20
11. Plutarch p.31ff; D.L. & Stob. p.59f; Cicero p.26.
- 11a. There is a problem here, because virtue seems to be the significant criterion; that is, the wise man would seem to commit suicide reasonably because only he, possessing virtue, can determine when to do it. This is so despite the fact that his possession of virtue is not a criterion for staying in life. cf. Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, p.238ff.
12. Ecl. II 110,9f.
13. Epictetus p.177ff.
14. v. also Panaetius p.94f., where I suggest also that the emphasis on the need for reason to control impulse is a result of Panaetius' purpose of making the reader make moral progress, which can presumably only be achieved by conscious application by reason of the rules of kathekonta which are given in his treatise. These considerations seem to apply to Hecato (v. Hecato p.125f).

15. Plutarch p.33ff; D.L. & Stob. p. 63f.
16. Panaetius p.99f.
17. Panaetius p.103f.
18. Musonius p.151 ff.
19. Musonius p.155f.
20. Epictetus p.174f.
21. Bonhöffer, A.A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, Stuttgart 1894, p.207.
22. Epictetus p.174.
23. Epictetus p.185 ff.
24. Marcus Aurelius p.192f.
25. Hierocles p.207f. & p.210ff.
26. cf. e.g. Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, p.99; Goldschmidt, V., Le Système Stoicien, Paris 1953, p.138; Bréhier, E., Chrysippe, Paris 1910, p.233; Grumach, E., Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa, Berlin 1966, p.30. It has been suggested that the word 'εὐλογος' in the definition of a kathekon refers to the fact that kathekonta are based on human nature and are reasonable for this reason; cf. Tsekourakis, D., Studies in the Terminology of early Stoic Ethics, London 1971, p.40f.; Kerferd, G.B., Cicero and Stoic Ethics in Cicero and Virgil, Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt, p.60-74. v. also next chapter p.252f.
27. Goldschmidt (op. cit. p.125-131) brings out well the point that when we aim to do what is 'κατὰ φύσιν', we are not primarily aiming at objects which are 'κατὰ φύσιν' but doing what is in accordance with our nature. To think in terms of objects at which kathekonta aim and which are 'κατὰ φύσιν' is misleading. It is man's relation to objects which is important.
28. Kidd, I.G., The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the

Summum Bonum, CQ ns5 (1955), p.194.

29. Cicero p.21ff.; Plutarch p.41f.; Sextus Empiricus p.44f.
30. Panaetius p.102ff.
31. v. chapter on Hecato p.127f.
32. Panaetius p.112f.
33. Posidonius p.133f.
34. Seneca p.144
35. Musonius p.148f.
36. Epictetus p.164f.
37. Marcus Aurelius p.189ff.
38. Hierocles p.211.
39. Range of Kathekon p.218.
40. Panaetius p.97ff.
41. Panaetius p.106ff.
42. Panaetius p.113ff.
43. Hecato p.124ff.
44. Epictetus p.170ff.
45. Epictetus p.173ff.
46. p.48.1-50.17 (von Arnim).
47. Marcus Aurelius p.193f, p.196f.
48. Marcus Aurelius p.196f.
49. p.233.
50. Epictetus p.180f.
51. Panaetius p.99f.
52. Marcus Aurelius p.191f.

IV. Practice of Kathekon

1. Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge 1969, p.110-111, also comes to the conclusion that Arcesilaus took the phrase from Zeno's teaching about kathekonta.
2. Clement, Al. Paedog. I 13 = SVF3,293.
3. Rist, op. cit. p.108f.
4. Hirzel, R., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften, Leipzig 1882, vol. II p. 55.
5. Grumach, E., Physis und Agathon, Berlin 1966, p.40 & 78.
6. Bréhier, E., Chrysippe, Paris 1910, p.230.
7. Goldschmidt, V., Le Système Stoicien. Paris 1953, p.139.
8. Bonhöffer, A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, Stuttgart 1894, p.193-8.
9. Dyroff, A., Die Ethik der alten Stoa, Berlin 1897, p.140f.
10. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa, Göttingen 1959, vol. I p.130f.
11. Kilb, Ethische Grundbegriffe, Freiburg 1939, p.51f.
12. Tsekourakis, D. Studies in the terminology of early Stoic ethics, London 1971, p.40-49.
13. Kerferd, G.B., Cicero and Stoic Ethics, in Cicero and Virgil. Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt, p.60-74.
14. Christensen, J., An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy, Munksgaard 1962, p.61 & 73.
15. Nebel, G., Der Begriff des KATHKON in der alten Stoa, Hermes 70 (1935), p.443-9.
16. D.L.7.177; Athenaeus = SVF1,624-5.
17. Watson, G., The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, Belfast 1966, p.54 & 64.
18. Christensen, op. cit., p.73.
19. Criteria of Kathekon, p.237ff.

20. Criteria of Kathekon, p.234f.
21. D.L. & Stob., p.61f.
22. cf. Sextus Empiricus, p.52.
23. Panaetius, p.97f.
24. De officiis 3.90; v. Hecato, p.129f.
- 24a. Plutarch, p.34ff.
25. D.L. & Stob., p.58f.
26. Epictetus, p.179-183.
27. Long, A.A., Language and Thought in Stoicism, in Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.95-6, shows that man's aim in the sphere of ethics is to effect a correspondence between his own actions and the rational course of events that exists in the physical universe. This shows the connection of physics to ethics, and also the part that logic plays in effecting the correspondence. De Lacy's article, The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus, Cl. Phil. XXXVIII (April 1943), p.112-125, sets out to demonstrate how Epictetus consistently applies the principles of logic to the exposition of ethics.
28. Marcus Aurelius, p.198ff.
29. p.252f.
30. De Lacy, op.cit., p.114 n.19.
31. Seneca, De beneficiis 4.33.
32. Epictetus, p.185ff; Marcus Aurelius, p.194.
33. cf. Goldschmidt, V., Le Système Stoicien, Paris 1953, p.155f.
34. Rist, op.cit., p.108.
35. Grumach, E., Physis und Agathon, Berlin 1966, p.30 & 40.
36. cf. Cicero, p.17, where 'peccata in effectu' are discussed.

These seem to be actions contrary to what is kathekon. Their fault lies in the results of the actions (betraying one's country, doing violence to one's parents, robbing a temple) as opposed to those peccata

which are characterised by pathe.

37. Cicero, p.12ff.; Plutarch, p.36f.

V. Distinction between Kathekon and Katorthoma

1. Range of Kathekon, p.219.
2. v. Stob. Ecl. II 85,20; Plut. SR 13.1038E-F.
3. Cicero, p.3-6.
4. Cicero, p.24f. cf. the phrase 'μέγα(ρ)α πράξεις' at Stob. =SVF3,510, where it refers to the actions of the progressor who performs all kathekonta but has not yet reached the position of happiness.
5. e.g. Van Straaten, M., Panétius, Amsterdam 1946, p.147-8, 196; Nebel, G., Der Begriff des KATHKON in der alten Stoa, Hermes 70 (1935), p.450-4; Kilb, Ethische Grundbegriffe, Freiburg 1939, p.54; Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa, Göttingen 1959, vol. II, p.130.
6. Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, p.97ff.
7. op. cit., p. 97. cf. also Pohlenz, op. cit., p.130; Bonhöffer, A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, p.209ff. Nebel, G., op.cit., p.451, makes 'τὰ πρὸς τὸ καθήκον' identical to 'ἐμμετρήματα' because inappropriate actions cannot be a content of the sage's actions. This view is based only on an unclear statement at Stob. Ecl. II 86,10, and there is some evidence against it (Philo=SVF3,513; Plut. SR 47,1055F=SVF2,994; SR 47.1057A=SVF3,177).
8. Tsekourakis, D., Studies in the terminology of early Stoic ethics, London 1971, p.24ff., makes the same point against Rist.
9. Cicero, p.17f.
10. D.L. & Stob., p.74f.
11. D.L. & Stob., p.77f.
12. Source of Kathekon, p.224ff.
13. cf. Musonius, p.151.
14. Epictetus, p.163f.
15. v. later in present chapter p.275ff.
16. Epictetus, p.188.

17. Source of Kathekon, p.229f.
18. v. Pohlenz, op cit., p.129.
19. Plutarch, p.27ff.
20. Criteria of Kathekon, passim.
21. D.L. & Stob., p.73.
22. cf. Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.103, where the sage is described as one who sees what policies and actions follow from the conjuncture of man's life with cosmic events. cf. also Pohlenz, op. cit., p.128 where a katorthoma is described as an action "die aus fester weltanschaulicher Erkenntnis rein im Hinblick auf die sittliche Bestimmung des Menschen vollbracht wird". cf. also Christensen, J., An Essay in the Unity of Stoic Philosophy, Munksgaard 1962, p.68.
23. Practice of Kathekon, p.254f.; 259ff.
24. Cicero, p.2; 16.
25. v. Sextus Empiricus, p.48f; D.L. & Stob., p.82f.
26. Sextus Empiricus, p.48f. There are of course important differences between wisdom as a skill and the other skills with which it is compared, v. Cicero, p.16ff.
27. D.L. & Stob., p.70f.
28. Cicero, p.15f.
29. Sextus Empiricus, p.45ff.
30. Sextus Empiricus, p.46f.
31. Sextus Empiricus, p.48f.
32. Long, A.A., Hellenistic Philosophy, London 1974 , p.206, suggests that a sage might be detected in someone who, i.a., normally performs kathekonta (looking after his health, his family, etc.) but is seen to submit voluntarily to torture or even to take his life. I take the point that a sage must be detected by looking at the whole range of someone's actions, but I do not think that the performance of exceptions

to general rules of *kathekonta*, even in combination with the fact that he normally performs *kathekonta*, indicates a sage. Such a person may only have made a great deal of progress, such that he normally performs *kathekonta*, but still be capable of making a mistake.

33. D.L. & Stob., p.72.
34. Seneca, p.142ff; v. also later in present chapter, p.276ff.
35. Plutarch, p.38f.
36. Plutarch, p.37f.
37. Epictetus, p.163f; cf. also p.182f.
38. Epictetus, p.163; Musonius, p.156f.
39. Seneca, p.142ff.
40. cf. Zeller, E., Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, tr. O.J.Reichel, London 1892, p.264-5,288; Bréhier, E., Chrysippe, Paris 1910, p.231; Nebel, G., op. cit., p.442-3; Grumach, E., Physis und Agathon, Berlin 1966, p.78; Pohlenz, op. cit., p.130; Kidd, I.G., Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man, in Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, p.155-7.
41. D.L. & Stob., p.68f.; 81f.
42. Plut. SR 7.1034C; De virt. mor.441A. cf. D.L. & Stob., p.81.
43. v. SVF1,68.
44. Kidd, I.G., op. cit., p.164ff., rightly argues, on the basis of Seneca's Epistles 94 and 95, that the sage does not need precepts at all, but acts in accordance with his internal *logos*. It is the progressors who find precepts useful. Indeed it is only progressors who need the *decreta* as external rules, since the sage acts in accordance with the internal promptings of his own *logos* which is '*ᾠρθός*' (cf. Long, A.A., The Stoic concept of evil, PQ 12(1968), p.342). The sage knows the *decreta* in the sense that he does not have to follow them as external rules.
45. Goldschmidt, V., Le Système Stoicien, Paris 1953, p.137.

46. Hierocles, p.52.22ff. v. Hierocles, p.207.
47. cf. Wiersma, W., Τέλος und Καθῆκον in der alten Stoa, Mnemosyne s.3.5(1937), p.255. cf. also n.40 of the present chapter.
48. Musonius, p.153ff.
49. Epictetus, p.177ff.
50. Epictetus, p.180ff.
51. Marcus Aurelius, p.204f.

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