


# The Impact of Counter-narratives on Inclusive Identity and Reconciliation Support in the Context of Anti-Communist Sentiment in Indonesia

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of

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at the University of St Andrews

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## ABSTRACT

Psychologists have argued that counter-narratives play an important role in reconciliation processes. However, limited experimental evidence exists to explain the conditions of when counter-narratives are most effective. This thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature in the context of Indonesia's past persecution of communists. Using insights from the political solidarity model (Subasic et al., 2008) and the theory of inclusive victimhood consciousness (Vollhardt, 2013) as a framework, I argue that co-victimization counter-narratives would be more effective in promoting reconciliation. In addition, I reason that a co-victimization counter-narrative would affect reconciliation by increasing participants' sense of inclusive identity with ex-communists. Accordingly, I conducted four online experiments collecting data from a total of 1,620 Indonesian participants. In study 1, I found that the co-victimization counter-narrative was more effective in promoting reconciliation compared to the control group and that its effect on reconciliation was mediated by inclusive identity. In study 2, I identified political Islam as moderating the influence of the counter-narratives on inclusive identity such that the co-victimization counter-narrative was not effective among participants who highly endorsed political Islam. Study 3 attempted to use norms as a way to increase the strength of the counter-narrative. I found that, as expected, a group relevant norm manipulation showed no additive effect on co-victimization. However, through exploratory analysis, I also found that pairing the counter-narratives with the norm manipulations had significant effects depending on political Islam endorsement levels and perceived descriptive and injunctive norms. Study 4 explored the role of threat in affecting resistance to counter-narratives. The main finding was that manipulations of low threat allowed the counter-narrative to affect inclusive identity among participants who reported low endorsement of political Islam while manipulations of high threat

produced an effect of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity among participants who reported high endorsement of political Islam.

**Keywords: counter-narrative, reconciliation, inclusive identity, communists**

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## CHAPTER 1

### GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Psychologists have highlighted the significant role of narratives in reconciliation (Auerbach, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Kelman, 2008). However, there is limited experimental evidence on what psychological mechanisms and conditions facilitate reconciliation. In addition, findings on the effectiveness of using narratives to facilitate reconciliation are inconsistent. Some research that has exposed groups to a counter-narrative has found positive effects (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004) on intergroup relations, while other research has shown that exposure to counter-narratives increases identification with the in-group (Hammack, 2006). Therefore, further research is needed to respond to the questions of how counter-narratives affect reconciliation and when they are effective.

This paper aims to fill this gap in psychology literature. Using an experimental design, the current research is conducted against the backdrop of the Indonesian anti-communist purge in 1965. This specific context has received limited attention in existing social psychology literature despite the magnitude of the killings and their implications for Indonesian society (McGregor, Melvin, & Pohlman, 2018). The event continues to resonate in the collective memory of Indonesians, and a number of victim organizations have struggled for decades to advocate for justice (McGregor et al., 2018). As I write this paper, the process of reconciliation is still in progress, thereby providing an opportunity to understand a society undergoing social change based around its tragic past.

This chapter begins by introducing the costs of conflict on society, highlighting the increased intensity of negative perceptions and feelings towards an outgroup. I then introduce the

concept of reconciliation and discuss the precursors and barriers to reconciliation. Following this discussion, I present different psychological models of reconciliation and their limitations, investigating the potential of using narratives to support reconciliation. I then discuss the political solidarity model, which provides the basis for the main hypotheses of the study, and finally I present an overview of the paper.

### **The social, economic, and psychological costs of conflict**

Violent conflicts incur large costs to society. The Syrian conflict that began in 2011 claimed the lives of 470,000 people (World Bank Group, 2017). Conflicts in the past have claimed millions of lives, including the Tutsis in Rwanda (Kanyangara et al., 2007), Jews in Poland (Pohl, 2004), Armenians in Turkey (Jorgensen, 2003), and communists in Indonesia (McGregor et al., 2018). In addition to the large number of fatalities, the impacts of conflict also create problems of famine, sexual violence, displacement, and a surge of refugees to neighbouring countries (World Bank Group, 2018). The war in Syria, for example, has resulted in approximately 5.5 million refugees and in turn affected countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon, which must manage the millions of refugees entering their borders. In terms of economic cost, countries dealing with violent conflict tend to spend a larger percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on containing violence (*The Economic Value of Peace 2018*, 2018). Iraq, for example, contributed 51% of its GDP to manage violent conflict, whereas Syria has increased its spending to 68%. This spending is mostly comprised of military expenditure, but includes as well expenses for police, judicial systems, and incarceration (*The Economic Value of Peace 2018*, 2018).

Conflicts also often mean profound psychological costs to all members of society, regardless of whether individuals are actively engaged in the conflict. Conflict creates a

heightened sense of distrust among conflicting parties, which often compete in claiming that they have suffered more than the other (Noor et al., 2008). Victims in particular may develop a view that the world is threatening (Staub & Pearlman, 2006), develop extremely negative perceptions of the perpetrator, and have an impaired self-identity characterized by a sense of powerlessness (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Staub & Pearlman, 2006). Perpetrators cling to negative portrayals of victims in order to justify their violent actions (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).

The emergence of extremely negative representations of an adversary is among the defining characteristics of conflict, which has become a stubborn barrier to peace (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). These negative beliefs, in addition to serving as a mechanism to cope and make sense of the conflict, may also be driven by motivations to preserve a positive moral identity, particularly among perpetrators of violence (Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).

One key belief that emerges in conflict is the de-legitimization of the opponent. By delegitimizing the opponent, a party involved in conflict categorizes members of the opposing party as sub-human (Bar-Tal, 1990). Outgroup members may be categorized under negative non-human categories such as animals or Satan. However, parties can also use negative political labels to attack opponents, such as labelling specific groups as Nazis or communists. In Rwanda, for example, a politician referred to members of the Tutsi ethnic minority as cockroaches (O'Grady, 2016). Other subtler forms of dehumanization exist, such as infra-humanization. When engaging in infra-humanization, people view outgroups as unable to express uniquely human emotions such as love, guilt, and humiliation. People may express this form of dehumanization when reminded of their group's involvement in past atrocities (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). For example, when British participants were reminded that their settlement

in Australia led to the sharp decline of the Australian Aborigine population, they were more likely to determine that Aborigines were less capable of expressing human emotions compared to participants who were not reminded of their past.

To summarize, conflict has devastating consequences that are not limited to the parties that are fighting. For example, the conflict in Syria has affected neighbouring countries and involved many countries and international organizations in managing the conflict. However, even when conflicts cease, there is still potential for conflict to erupt once again. As the World Bank Report (2018) suggests, the presence of inequality, distrust of government, corruption, and sharp polarization in society may lead to future conflict. Therefore, it is in the interest of all societies to strive for peaceful relations by managing factors that may trigger conflict eruption. Peaceful relations should address the psychological impacts of conflict, including the negative dehumanization of adversaries and the deep-rooted hatred that fuels a cycle of violence that can last for generations. Therefore, efforts to create sustained peace should address the issue of developing reconciliation between groups who have engaged in conflict.

### **The nature of reconciliation**

Nadler and Shnabel (2015) argue that reconciliation is an outcome that involves change in the structural, relational, and identity aspects of a community. The structural aspect emphasizes the creation of equality between groups. This aspect is particularly important when a specific group is marginalized due to historical injustice. For example, in the context of reconciliation with indigenous Australians, reconciliation involves support for political action to reduce inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians (Subašić & Reynolds, 2009). Some of the structural outcomes that may result from reconciliation include policies concerning land rights and compensation for indigenous Australians.

The second aspect is change to relations between conflicting groups, which emphasizes building trust and positive relations with outgroups. This conceptualization aligns with other reconciliation definitions, which have emphasized a changed psychological orientation that allows former adversaries to view one another as humans worthy of building a relationship (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003; Staub, 2006). Some indicators of reconciliation are based on relational outcomes includes respectful interaction with the other community (Barlow et al., 2015), perceptions of outgroups as human beings (Shnabel et al., 2009), and spending more time with other community members (Tam et al., 2007). The final aspect of reconciliation related to identity was proposed by Kelman (2008), who describes the process of reconciliation as involving self-identity transformation. This transformation is commenced by parties acknowledging the legitimacy of the other's narrative of the conflict or through the development of a common identity that transcends the groups' differences.

In contrast to being defined as an outcome, reconciliation has also been conceptualized as a process (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015; Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004), though scholars have differed in how they conceptualize reconciliation as a process. Bar-Tal & Bennink, (2004) describe the social processes that occur when groups work to reconcile with former adversaries, suggesting that psychological changes begin from a minority and progress to achieve a large influence as they persistently advocate their goals to society. National-level actors must also participate in the reconciliation process to use their influence and promote reconciliation in society. In contrast to this conceptualization, Nadler and Shnabel (2015) view the process as psychological mechanisms that occur within an individual to facilitate the willingness to reconcile. Under this conceptualization, reconciliation is achieved through the management of psychological barriers, which include distrust of outgroups and threats to identity. On the other hand, instrumental

reconciliation focuses on building trust among conflicting parties and socioemotional reconciliation focuses on restoring self-worth, which involves perpetrators' acknowledgment of the injustice committed.

The definitions provided highlight that reconciliation can be conceptualized as both an outcome and a process. As an outcome, reconciliation implies change in structural, relational, and identity aspects. Change in structural aspects includes changes to laws or policies that limit or neglect the rights of a marginalized or stigmatized group. Change in relational aspects includes changes to how groups view and interact with one another following conflict. Finally, change to the identity aspect refers to acknowledgment of an adversary's narrative and the ability to develop a common identity. Reconciliation as a process highlights the process in which communities engage to create peaceful relations with former adversaries. However, this term can also refer to the management of distrust and identity threat to increase willingness to reconcile.

Having discussed the nature of reconciliation, further discussion must address the factors that facilitate reconciliation. I highlight factors that facilitate reconciliation, including forgiveness and apologies, positive emotions, and the development of a common identity.

### **Factors facilitating reconciliation**

#### *Forgiveness and apology*

Forgiveness has been determined to be a significant precursor to reconciliation (Noor et al., 2008). By forgiving, groups abandon negative feelings and thoughts that fuel retaliatory actions against the adversary (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Research in the Northern Ireland conflict between Protestants and Catholics has shown that forgiveness is positively associated with a willingness to reconcile (Noor et al., 2008). Several factors predict intergroup forgiveness,

such as endorsement of a common identity and higher empathy and trust to the outgroup (Noor et al., 2008). Closely related to forgiveness is apology, which refers to the act of asking for forgiveness (Bargal & Sivan, 2004). Apologies can be made by governments as a formal attempt to assume responsibility for the harm that it inflicted upon a group (Blatz et al., 2009). Research has shown that apologies made by a representative of a perpetrator group increases willingness to reconcile as it restores these groups' moral image (Barlow et al., 2015).

Although forgiveness and apologies appear to hold potential for reconciliation, psychologists have criticized the approaches due to their inability to address problems of systematic discrimination as a result of past injustice (Hornsey & Wohl, 2013; Wohl et al., 2011). Empirical research has offered discouraging findings associated with apologies and forgiveness (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). Across a range of cross-sectional and longitudinal research, apologies from a perpetrator did not produce a significantly higher willingness to forgive. Furthermore, participants were suspicious of the apologies and suspected that they were for self-serving in-group motives (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012) found that groups may be reluctant to forgive due to infra-humanization. In a series of studies, when an outgroup expressed secondary human emotions (repulsion or dejection), they were less willing to forgive compared to when the outgroup expressed primary emotions (rage and sadness) (Wohl et al., 2012). These studies also found that when outgroups made statements expressing secondary emotions, there was a higher distrust toward outgroups.

### *Emotions*

Research has shown that specific types of emotion, such as empathy, sympathy, guilt, shame, and anger (at the in-group) allows for forgiveness or positive intergroup relations. The

research has also found that empathy is positively associated with forgiveness (Noor et al., 2008; Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, 2015), whereas a lack of empathy is associated with negative attitudes towards historically disadvantaged groups (Pedersen et al., 2004). Furthermore, group-based sympathy predicts policies that facilitate equal opportunities for African Americans (Iyer et al., 2003) and the willingness to engage in protests to support a disadvantaged group (Saab et al., 2015).

One emotion that received considerable academic attention is guilt. Research has found that among perpetrators, higher guilt was associated with a greater willingness to pay compensation to victimized groups (Figueriredo, Valentim, & Doosje, 2011; Iyer et al., 2003; Peetz & Gunn, 2010). However, guilt also has limitations. When participants' personal identity became salient, and they were presented with information that highlighted the ill treatment of a marginalized group, participants expressed higher collective guilt but less support for reconciliation (Halloran, 2007). Furthermore, when guilt was used as a predictor for political action together with anger, the effect of guilt diminished (Leach et al., 2006). The study found that a perceived non-indigenous advantage was associated with both guilt and anger for injustice towards indigenous Australians. Though guilt did predict the goal of giving compensation to indigenous Australians, it did not predict the willingness to take political action to support indigenous Australians (Leach et al., 2006).

In addition to guilt, other emotions such as anger, shame, and hope also promote positive intergroup relations. Anger is positively associated with confronting parties responsible for the Iraq war and giving compensation to Iraqi victims (Iyer et al., 2007). Allpress et al. (2014) found that shame due to moral transgression predicts support for apologies and compensation to

victims. However, when people experience shame due to a compromised in-group image, shame predicts avoidance. Shame was also found to be related to support for withdrawal of troops in Iraq due to the damaged image from Iraqis (Iyer et al., 2007). Finally, hope, which involves higher order thinking about future outcomes, was found to be a predictor of conciliatory actions with Palestinians (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, 2015).

### *Social identity*

Research has found that adopting a common national identity is positively associated with increasing the willingness to forgive an outgroup (Noor et al., 2008). Consistent with this finding, identification with an Australian identity has also been shown to be positively associated with support for reconciliation when presented with the unfavourable portrayal of Australia's treatment of Aborigines. Other research has found that negative feelings about membership to a social group can lead to a higher willingness to support reconciliatory actions. For example, negative feelings about being a non-indigenous Australian has been associated with perceptions that inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians is illegitimate. This perception in turn increases willingness to support social change favouring greater equality for indigenous Australians (Subašić & Reynolds, 2009). The study also found that higher perceptions of intergroup inequality negatively affects Australian identity, which leads to higher intentions to support apologies and land rights.

I have discussed some of the factors that facilitate reconciliation. Existing research has identified that forgiveness and apologies are important precursors of reconciliation, though they do have limitations because they do not address problems rooted in structural inequality. In addition, groups can become suspicious of apologies. A range of emotions also have an

important role; for example, empathy, sympathy, and anger, guilt, and hope have both found to be associated with positive intergroup orientations. However, guilt has limitations because people are likely to avoid the experience of this emotion, making it a weaker predictor of reconciliation in comparison to anger and sympathy. Furthermore, social identity can facilitate reconciliation, particularly when people can identify with a common identity that supersedes intergroup differences. Another element of social identity is negative feelings about in-group membership due to past transgressions. This negative feelings about a social identity can lead to further support to help a marginalized group. Promoting these reconciliatory facilitating factors is a challenge in itself, and another challenge is to promote these factors in the presence of psychological barriers that obstruct reconciliation and perpetuate conflict. The following section discusses these barriers.

### **Factors inhibiting reconciliation**

#### *Victimization and distrust*

One of the major barriers of reconciliation is the perception of in-group victimization. Nadler and Shnabel (2008) suggest that this victim status acts as an emotional barrier to reconciliation. Being a victim impairs a person's sense of power, and obtaining vengeance serves as a way to empower victims in conflict. However, in conflict, distinguishing between the victim and perpetrator is not always straightforward (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) because both groups compete in claiming who has suffered the most, a phenomenon referred to as competitive victimhood (Noor et al, 2008). Competitive victimhood posits that the in-group's suffering has been due to unjust actions by the perpetrator. Research has shown that competitive victimhood has been negatively associated with a willingness to forgive the enemy (Noor et al., 2008). This

negative association may be attributed to the fact that competitive victimhood reduces empathy and trust toward outgroups.

Outgroup distrust has also been proposed as a barrier for reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). In particular, in conflicts, distrust is based on the incompatibility of values and goals central to the party's identities (Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006). Distrust can be particularly detrimental in conflict situations because it discourages both parties from cooperating to develop a solution (Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006). Distrust also leads to poor communication because both parties assume that the other party is cheating (Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006). Parties develop extremely negative emotions towards the opponent and suspect that the opponent intends to harm the in-group. Existing research has shown that, even when Palestinian representative expressed empathy for the suffering of Israelis, it had a positive impact on willingness to reconcile only among Israelis with higher trust of Palestinians and no effect among Israelis with low trust (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006).

### *Negative emotions*

Conflict provides a negative emotional climate that evokes negative beliefs and emotions that lead to defensive and aggressive behaviour (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). One of these emotions is fear, which is activated unconsciously in the presence of danger. Due to the automaticity of fear, it is more likely to override hope, which involves higher cognitive processing (Bar-Tal, 2001). Fear creates mistrust and the de-legitimization of an adversary, therefore contributing to the perpetuation of conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). Another emotion that has been negatively associated with reconciliation is hatred. Halperin et al., (2011) found that hatred towards outgroups interacted with anger in affecting peace-supporting compromises. More specifically,

intense hatred toward the Palestinians when reading an anger-inciting text resulted in reduced willingness to support peaceful compromise.

### *Social identity*

Research on past historical injustice has highlighted the role that social identity plays in supporting reconciliatory attitudes. In a study investigating the role of social identification and collective guilt, Dutch participants were instructed to read a passage on the topic of the Dutch treatment of Indonesians in the colonial past (Doosje et al., 1998). One group of participants was presented with a positive portrayal of history, whereas another read a negative portrayal of history, and a final group read an ambiguous (both positive and negative aspects of history) portrayal of history. The study found that, among participants reading the ambiguous passage, there was a significant difference between high identifiers and low identifiers in terms of willingness to give compensation to Indonesians. Low identifiers were more willing to give compensation to Indonesians. Similar findings were found in the Chilean and Northern Ireland context, in that identification with the in-group was negatively related with a willingness to forgive (Noor, et al., 2008). This study also found that political identity moderated the association between empathy and trust and forgiveness; stronger associations were found among right-wing supporters compared to left-wing supporters.

### *Dehumanization and infra-humanization*

Dehumanization refers to perceiving a person or group as lacking humanness (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Dehumanization has psychological implications in that it arouses the perception of a threat, fear, and mistrust towards an outgroup (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2006). Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) found that the dehumanization of Palestinians was associated with a lack of

openness to the adversary's narrative of the conflict. The study also found that right-wing political supporters were more likely to hold these beliefs compared to left-wing supporters. A subtler form of dehumanization exists, being characterized by the inability of outgroups to feel emotions that are uniquely human, such as love, guilt, humiliation. This form of dehumanization, known as infra-humanization, occurs specifically when an in-group is reminded of their engagement in past atrocities (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). For example, when British participants were reminded of their presence as contributors to the declining Aborigine population in Australia, they were more likely to determine that Aborigines were less capable of expressing human emotions compared to participants not reminded of their past.

The current literature review has shown the key barriers of reconciliation are victimization, distrust, in-group identification, negative emotions, and dehumanization. Existing research shows that both parties at conflict tend to strive to claim victimhood and accuse the other of being a perpetrator. Competition for victimhood obstructs reconciliation because it creates distrust and decreases empathy toward outgroups. Furthermore, the presence of fear and hatred contribute to fuelling conflict. Fear that originates from the appraisal of threat leads to the further dehumanization of adversaries. While social identity can facilitate reconciliation, it can also impede it. Furthermore, while common identity facilitates reconciliation identification, in some cases, identification with a national identity may impede reconciliation, particularly when the violence involves a different nation. Based on the review of the factors that promote and impede reconciliation, it is important to address the issue of managing these factors to promote reconciliation. This review leads to the discussion of the different psychological models to achieve reconciliation.

## **Psychological models of reconciliation**

Researchers have offered insight into how reconciliation can be achieved, though means to achieving reconciliation differs among authors. A number of authors have focused on meeting the emotional needs of perpetrators and victims, while others have argued for the need to confront perpetuating beliefs surrounding conflict. Existing research has highlighted the importance of contact, while others have emphasized the role of emotions. The goal of this section is to review empirical research on reconciliation based on the psychological models proposed. The section concludes by highlighting the limitations of the models and proposing the utility of a narrative approach to address these limitations.

### *Needs based model of reconciliation*

One of the prominent models of reconciliation is the needs based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). This model is built on the notion that removing threats to basic psychological needs is key in ending conflict. Conflict damages perpetrators' moral identity and impairs the victims' sense of power. These threats to identity create different motivations among perpetrators and victims, with victims seeking empowerment and perpetrators seeking acceptance from the moral community (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). This model suggests that willingness to reconcile depends on each party's willingness to acknowledge the adversary's emotional needs. When perpetrators acknowledge past injustice and asks forgiveness, the victim obtains a higher position of power because the moral identity of the perpetrator largely depends on the victims' willingness to forgive the perpetrator (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).

Initial empirical research aimed at testing the basic premise of the theory used a fictional scenario (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). The results suggest that victims did report a higher deprived sense of power, whereas perpetrators had a higher impaired moral image. Victims also expressed

a stronger need for power (than acceptance), while perpetrators expressed a greater need for social acceptance (than empowerment). Study 2, which used the same fictional scenario, provided evidence that satisfaction with the victims' need for empowerment and perpetrators' need for social acceptance was able to predict a greater willingness to reconcile. Support for this model extends to context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Holocaust. For example, Arabs (victims) were more willing to reconcile following a message of empowerment from Jews (perpetrator) relative to an acceptance message, whereas Jews had a greater willingness to reconcile following a message of acceptance from the victimized group's representatives (i.e. Arabs) rather than an empowerment message (Shnabel et al., 2009). In Study 2, where Jews were framed as the victims in the context of the Holocaust (Shnabel et al., 2009), Jewish participants had were more willing to reconcile following a message of empowerment from a German representative than a message of acceptance. German participants, on the other hand, were more willing to reconcile following a message of acceptance from a Jewish representative compared to a message of empowerment.

Other research found that people can experience both the roles of perpetrator and victim simultaneously (Simantov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). The authors refer to individuals who experience both roles as perpetrators and victims as "duals." In both game simulation settings and real conflict settings, the research has found that the experience of being a victim and perpetrator motivates participants to restore both power and positive moral identity. Duals were found to have higher levels of vengefulness compared to perpetrators. In terms of prosocial behaviour, perpetrators showed higher helpfulness than both victims and duals. The authors suggest that the reason for which victims and duals displayed higher vengefulness compared to perpetrators was because it compensated for their deprived sense of power.

### *Reconciliation Orientation Model*

It is common for groups in conflict to claim that they are primary victims of a conflict. One model that acknowledges the notion that groups in conflict are competing for victimhood status is the reconciliation orientation model (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). A central construct derived from this model is competitive victimhood, which refers to “each group’s effort to claim that it has suffered more than the outgroup” (Noor, Brown & Prentice, 2008). The basic idea of this model is that competitive victimhood reduces the willingness to forgive an outgroup, which the authors argue to be an important precursor to reconciliation. Competitive victimhood reduces the willingness to forgive because it increases identification with an in-group while reducing trust and empathy towards an outgroup (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008).

Research has repeatedly shown that competitive victimhood is a key obstacle to reconciliation (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor et al., 2017). One study determined how to reduce competitive victimhood by assigning a common identity (Shnabel et al., 2013). This research, which integrated ideas on collective victimhood and the socioemotional needs of perpetrators and victims, found that a common victim identity may reduce competitive victimhood by reducing moral defensiveness. In contrast, a common perpetrator identity reduces competitive victimhood by increasing one’s sense of agency.

### *Intergroup contact approach to reconciliation*

Another approach to reconciliation follows the contact paradigm. Hewstone et al. (2008) argue that contact may promote reconciliation by increasing a number of the precursors of reconciliation such as trust and forgiveness. Hewstone et al. (2008) also suggest that interventions promoting positive intergroup contact between communities should aim to reduce

threat and anxiety and promote empathy, perspective taking, and positive emotions. Reducing threat is particularly important among individuals who strongly identify with their groups, whereas reducing anxiety is particularly important among people who weakly identify with their groups.

Tam et al. (2007) found that contact with the outgroup reduced the in-group's anger towards the outgroup and enhanced positive perceptions. Positive attitudes towards an outgroup in turn predicted forgiveness. Although contact reduced anger and increased positive attitudes, it was not able to reduce the infra-humanization of the outgroup. Both anger and infra-humanization were found to be negative predictors of forgiveness. Furthermore, a correlational study using a representative sample found that contact with outgroup friends was positively associated with forgiveness of the outgroup (Hewstone et al., 2006). Forgiveness was also positively predicted by outgroup trust, perspective taking, and positive attitudes, whereas in-group identification among Protestants was a negative predictor of forgiveness. Another study conducted among Catholics directly harmed by the Northern Ireland conflict, found that, the more deeply hurt that individuals were by the conflict, the less likely they were to forgive Protestants (McLernon et al., 2004). One study distinguished between contact with friends of the other community and contact in general, while also testing the severity of the impact of the conflict as a moderator of forgiveness (Voci et al., 2015). The study, which involved randomly selected adults from Northern Ireland, showed that contact with friends was positively associated with forgiveness, though its effect was larger among participants deeply affected by the conflict compared to those less affected by the violence. In contrast, general contact was positively associated with forgiveness among participants not significantly affected by the conflict, while there was no association when participants were deeply affected by the conflict.

Because trust is damaged in conflict, re-establishing trust is key in reconciliation. Trust was found to be an important factor in facilitating reconciliation (Tam et al., 2009). In this study, the researchers tested whether contact predicted positive outcomes (spend time, talk with, find out more about them) or negative behavioural outcomes (oppose, confront, argue with an outgroup) through their effect on trust. The study found that contact increased trust towards an outgroup, which, in turn, increased positive behavioural outcomes while reducing negative behavioural outcomes. The second study found that trust was distinct from liking, as well as being a more accurate predictor of positive behavioural outcomes than positive attitudes. Therefore, trust may not imply liking but is important for positive intergroup relations between conflicting groups. A more recent study using similar outcome variables (positive and negative behavioural outcomes) found that contact in terms of cross-group friendship led to an increase in outgroup trust and positive intergroup emotions, which then increased positive behavioural outcomes and reduced negative behavioural outcomes (Kenworthy et al., 2015). These studies also found that negative emotions of contempt predicted negative behavioural outcomes of confrontation, whereas anxiety was associated with avoidance. Although the majority of studies using intergroup contact were conducted in Northern Ireland, the same approach has also been employed in diverse cultural contexts (Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013).

A number of interventions have been used based on a contact approach in the Israeli-Palestinian context (Maoz, 2011). To investigate interventions to facilitate reconciliation, Maoz (2011) conducted a review of intervention models on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over a span of 20 years. Four models were evaluated, namely the coexistence model, joint projects model, the confrontational model, and the narrative story telling model. The review found that models that only focused on contact without addressing issues about the conflict were less effective. The

preferred model to address conflict-related issues involved using story telling. By telling personal stories of what parents and grandparents experienced at the time of the conflict, participants were able to increase their understanding and acceptance of the perspective of the outgroup.

### *The emotion regulation model*

The emotion regulation model of reconciliation (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016) integrates ideas from the process model of group-based emotion (Goldenberg et al., 2016) and applies it in an intergroup reconciliation context. One of the central propositions in the process model of group-based emotions is that people regulate their group-based emotions to fulfil particular group-relevant goals (Goldenberg et al., 2016). Based on Čehajić-Clancy et al.'s (2016) model, interventions should indirectly target the appraisals of an object to induce emotional responses that support reconciliation. Halperin, (2008) suggests that outgroup hatred prevents groups from engaging in contact with one another. Regulation of hatred can be achieved changing beliefs about outgroup moral variability or malleability of an outgroup. Therefore, the emphasis is not directly changing the emotion “hate”, but instead changing the appraisals that lead to hate. Beliefs that groups are malleable are positively associated with greater willingness for outgroup contact, which is mediated by lowering intergroup anxiety (Halperin et al., 2012). Anger can be reduced by increasing perceived outgroup variability or the idea that not all outgroups are bad.

Furthermore, a number of positive emotions have been suggested to facilitate reconciliation. Hope can be induced by shaping beliefs around the malleability of a conflict or world events. For example, Cohen-Chen et al. (2014), using a correlational study among Jewish Israelis, found that beliefs that conflicts are malleable increased hope, which, in turn, increased

support for concessions related to territorial borders and compensation for Palestinians. A second study manipulated malleable beliefs on conflict and the results resembled those of the correlational study, specifically that beliefs about conflict malleability increased hope and increased support for concessions.

The models of reconciliation have highlighted the factors that facilitate and impede reconciliation. The research has emphasized the importance of attending to perpetrators' and victims' socio-emotional needs, promoting contact and indirectly targeting emotions. However, there are limitations in the aforementioned psychological models of reconciliation, which are addressed in the following section.

### **Limitations of psychological models of reconciliation**

Existing literature on reconciliation has provided insights into the barriers and facilitating factors of reconciliation. However, these models are not without limitations. The following sections discuss the limitations of the discussed models of reconciliation. One limitation common among psychological models of reconciliation is the focus on individual processes. This particular limitation has been acknowledged by the creators of the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) but has also been used to criticize the contact approach (Dixon et al., 2005) and the emotion regulation approach (Klar & Branscombe, 2016). The issue with an individual-focused approach to reconciliation is that interventions targeting individual attitudes do not necessarily translate to social change. When the source of discrimination is on an institutional level, individual-level interventions will not tackle the core origins of intergroup inequality (Dixon et al., 2005). Therefore, reconciliation models must address structural factors and social realities (Vollhardt & Twali, 2016). As existing research has demonstrated, increasing positive

attitudes toward a powerful group may deter minority groups from engaging in social action that challenge inequality (Saguy et al., 2009).

An individual approach to reconciliation also ignores the role of leaders (Klar & Branscombe, 2016); leaders initiate their own moves that may contradict popular opinion (Klar & Branscombe, 2016). Bargal and Sivan (2004) suggest that political leaders are major actors in initiating the reconciliation process in their societies. Leaders are effective at communicating reconciliatory messages because they may utilize their personality resources (charisma) and their high position (legitimate power) to mobilize legitimacy among followers within society (Bargal & Sivan, 2004). Research in Rwanda has demonstrated how leaders have advocated for the use of a national Rwandan identity and eliminated the use of ethnic identity as a means of facilitating reconciliation processes between the Hutus and Tutsis (Moss, 2014).

Another weakness in the reconciliation models is the lack of attention paid to addressing the power imbalance between groups (Vollhardt & Twali, 2016; Klar & Branscombe, 2016). These psychologists argue that, in conflict settings, there exists asymmetrical power relations with remaining inequalities and grievances that have not been addressed. Under these circumstances, interventions targeted at developing favourable attitudes preserves inequality and may inadvertently endorse a status quo that favours the powerful group (Klar & Branscombe, 2016). According to Rouhana (2004), power relations are the most important factor in determining a group's willingness to engage in reconciliation. The powerful group has more to lose in reconciliation because it may jeopardize their moral image in society. On the other hand, the group with less power, although willing to reconcile, does not have the power to impose reconciliation (Rouhana, 2004). In analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel, as the

powerful group, lacks a positive incentive for substantive change because it may harm Israel's positive image, both domestically and internationally (Rouhana, 2004).

Another critique is concerned with the dichotomy between perpetrator and victims, which is apparent in models such as the needs-based model of reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). The authors of this model acknowledge that, in many conflicts, it is not clear who the victims and perpetrators are, making model would not be suitable. Worchel and Countant (2008) also argue that any attempt to distinguish between victims and perpetrator groups may intensify intergroup hostility since both groups believe that they are the victims. However, some authors have argued the need to distinguish between the psychological process that affect perpetrators and victims. In a critique of the emotion regulation model, Vollhardt and Twali (2016) suggest that the model would benefit from explaining whether the emotion regulation process to achieve reconciliation that is identical for perpetrators and victims.

Finally, Worchel and Courant (2008) explain how a number of social psychology theories are limited in explaining conflict because they do not emphasize history. It has been argued that conflict is rooted in conflicting interpretations of history; therefore, promoting peaceful coexistence must address the problem of history. History is important in conflict resolution because it plays a key role in the formation of social identity, particularly among groups engaged in conflict (Auerbach, 2009). According to Worchel and Courant (2008), "history not only defines the group, but it is also the heart of conflict." Psychologists have argued that the discussion of historic truths is important in reconciliation particularly regarding truth about wrong doing and which parties should take responsibility (Rouhana, 2004). These actions are

important because they recognize the suffering of the victims and may prevent future violence from occurring.

In acknowledgement of the critiques, I suggest focusing on narratives as a potential avenue for intergroup reconciliation. Focusing on narratives addresses a number of the limitations based on the psychological models reviewed above. Firstly, narratives address historical aspects of the conflict considering that they contain interpretations about past events. On the other hand, in intractable conflicts, conflicting parties have divergent historical narratives related to territorial rights and victimization (Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Rouhana, 2004), and post-conflict settings may be marked with past narratives that deny responsibility for mass killings (Bilali, 2013; Heryanto, 2006). Psychologists have argued that addressing national narratives is key in moving towards reconciliation (Auerbach, 2009). Auerbach (2009) argues that it is important for both parties to acknowledge one another's narrative and develop a narrative of the past that respects both needs of the conflicting parties. This new narrative, which contains a more accurate account of the events, should become the basis of forming new attitudes towards an adversary that can strengthen integration. Furthermore, Kelman (2008) suggests that acknowledging the narrative of the adversary is key in the identity transformation process that is needed in reconciliation.

Secondly, reconciliation-emphasizing narratives also address the issues of power in reconciliation. In contexts where mass killings have occurred in the past, it is usually in the best interests of powerful authorities to deny responsibility through national narratives that blame the victims of the killing (Bilali, 2013; Heryanto, 2006). Groups that rely on those narratives for their positive group image may be reluctant to embrace alternative narratives due to the cost to

their moral image (Rouhana, 2004). Consequently, by using a counter-narrative as an intervention in this study, I confront the master narratives central to the identity of the power structure. While conflict narratives emphasize de-legitimization of an outgroup and glorification of in-groups, peace-oriented narratives focus on the humanity of past adversaries and acknowledge the in-group's responsibility in the violence (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). The new narrative must also be disseminated socially through education, media, and government information centers to ensure that psychological changes occur on a social level (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Because counter-narratives may be resisted by people who endorse the conflict narrative, it is important to understand the conditions and mechanisms that lead to the resistance to or acceptance of counter-narratives. Some authors have determined some of the conditions that allow counter-narratives to have an effect on reconciliation, such as seeking third-party support (Adelman et al., 2016). I intend to further explore additional mechanisms and conditions that can facilitate adherence to a counter-narrative.

Reconciliation focusing on narratives addresses the limitations of reconciliation models with an individual-level focus. Narratives are shared beliefs about past events and social groups (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). The social nature of narratives is somewhat due to the wide dissemination of narratives through education, movies, novels, academic research, and political speeches, which makes them a key medium for the socialization of ideas, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings. Furthermore, leaders who play instrumental roles in reconciliation processes often use narratives to mobilize support for a cause (Bargal & Sivan, 2004). This use of narratives has been documented in research, showing how politicians or activists use narratives to support a political goal (Witteborn, 2007). Therefore a narrative approach to reconciliation must go beyond the treatment of changing individual attitudes and include the treatment of social

beliefs that are central to the collective identity and ideals of a society. The following section elaborates on the conceptualization of narratives in conflict and reviews literature on narratives and reconciliation.

### **Addressing narratives to support reconciliation processes**

Authors of reconciliation have diverged in the discussion of how to most effectively achieve reconciliation, though there has been consensus among authors that one of the barriers of reconciliation is the inability of adversaries to acknowledge the other party's narrative of the conflict (Kelman, 2008; Auerbach, 2009; Bar-Tal, 2014; Worchel & Coutant, 2008). Adversaries of conflict often dispute who initiated the conflict, who the perpetrators and victims were, and who should take responsibility for the violence. These disputing claims are prevalent in intractable conflicts between Israeli Jews and Palestinians (Bar-Tal, 2000).

Psychological research on narratives have varied in conceptualization. Some psychologists have focused on the content of the narratives and how they sustain conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). These narratives, which are also referred to as "ethos of conflict" (Bar-tal et al., 2012), contain beliefs about in-groups and outgroups, as well as collective memories about the conflict. Bar-Tal et al. (2014) suggest that there are eight beliefs that constitute the conflict narrative, namely justification of the conflict, threat to the in-group, de-legitimization of the outgroup, a glorified image of the in-group, in-group as sole victims, patriotism, unity, and beliefs about peace. Auerbach (2009) focused on national narratives and stories of national heroes and iconic events in a nation's history, which are passed down through generations and central to collective identity (Auerbach, 2009). Other psychologists have conceptualized narratives as a general framework for interacting with the social environment (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Under this framework, narrative is viewed as an "organization of thought" that

may become the basis for personal and collective identity. One of the central suggestions of this framework is narrative engagement; although individuals are exposed to collective narratives of nationhood, ethnicity, gender etc., internalization of these narratives is an active process of negotiation between the individual and the collective. Similar to Bar-Tal et al., (2014), the content of the narratives includes perceptions of social groups, as well as collective memory of past events. Therefore, although conceptualization of narratives may vary among psychologists, all views suggest that narratives are central to collective identity and guide how individuals perceive the in-group and outgroup.

Empirical work on conflict narratives has shown antecedents that may facilitate adherence to conflict supporting narratives. In general, higher ratings in variables such as right-wing political orientation, authoritarian personalities, religiosity, in-group glorification, positive attitudes towards war were positive predictors of conflict-supporting narratives (Bar-tal et al., 2012; Bilali, 2013; Halperin & Bar-tal, 2011). Although these antecedent variables predicted conflict narratives, different antecedents also predicted different conflict narratives. Halperin & Bar-Tal (2011) found that Israelis with higher endorsement of a right-wing political orientation were more likely to adhere to narratives of Palestinian de-legitimization and Israeli victimization. While the research has focused on two conflict narratives (outgroup de-legitimization and in-group victimization), Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, and Zafran (2012) investigated endorsement of “ethos of conflict”, which contains the contents of the eight conflict narratives (outgroup de-legitimization, in-group victimization, justification of in-group goals, patriotism, unity, peace, threat). The study found that conflict narrative was predicted by higher right-wing authoritarianism and an overall right-wing political orientation. In contrast, Bilali (2013) investigated agreement with conflict narratives related to violence against Armenians in 1916.

The author found that Turkish participants' agreement with narratives blaming Armenians for the violence was predicted by in-group glorification, positive attitudes towards war, and in-group threat. In addition to revealing the predictors of conflict narratives, existing research has suggested conflict narratives as mediating the effect of social psychological antecedents on reconciliatory outcomes (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Bar-Tal et al., 2012). For example, adherence to conflict narratives mediated the effect of right-wing political orientation and right-wing authoritarianism on support for compromise with Palestinians (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). Similarly, Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) found that general world views affected Israelis' willingness to be exposed to the Palestinian narrative and was mediated by conflict narratives. The results suggest that higher endorsement of conflict narratives reduced their willingness to understand the narrative of the outgroup.

A number of interventions have been proposed to mitigate the in-group's resistance to the outgroup's narrative (Hameiri et al., 2018; Hameiri et al., 2014; Nasie et al., 2014). One intervention involved making individuals aware of their cognitive bias (naïve realism) (Nasie et al., 2014). More specifically, individuals were made aware that humans have a natural tendency to view the world in a unilateral manner and are, as a consequence, likely to reject information contrary to their own world views. Consistent with the authors' predictions, individuals aware of their cognitive bias was valuable in increasing openness to an adversary's narrative (relative to a control group), particularly among right-wing supporters (Study 1) and those who strongly endorsed conflict narratives (Study 2). The effect was not found among those who weakly supported conflict narratives or left-wing supporters. Another approach was proposed by Hameiri et al. (2014), which involved using paradoxical thinking to increase openness to alternative narratives. Paradoxical thinking is defined as a method of changing attitudes by

presenting information consistent with an in-group's narrative but exaggerated to an extent that it creates the tendency to re-evaluate a person's current beliefs (Hameiri et al., 2014). An example of this intervention is a video that presented Israelis as moral, and that their morality depended on the continuation of conflict. Another video mentioned that conflict was needed to allow the Israeli army to be the strongest army in the world. The results showed that the paradoxical thinking intervention increased doubt towards conflict supporting narratives (Israeli exclusive victimhood) and reduced perceptions that Palestinians were primarily responsible for the conflict, thereby increasing the willingness to make compromises. Another study examined the psychological mechanisms that was underlying the effects of the intervention (Hameiri et al., 2018) and found that paradoxical thinking was effective in increasing doubt in conflict-related beliefs (unfreezing), which increased willingness to be exposed to the Palestinian perspective on the conflict. The effects were shown to be more prominent among participants less supportive of peace. The findings showed that unfreezing was predicted by the psychological mechanisms of identity threat. Associating absurd content with an individual's social identity may threaten the positive value of the said identity. To reduce this threat to identity, individuals may moderate their own attitudes and be more open to alternative narratives (Hameiri et al, 2018).

While these interventions aimed to achieve greater reception of an adversary's narrative, other interventions have examined the effect of direct exposure to these narratives. For example, Israeli Jews should listen to the narrative of Palestinians and vice versa directly through meetings or the presentation of a counter-narrative under experimental settings. Bar-On & Kassem, (2004) had participants tell oral histories of their parents and grandparents during conflict in the past. Based on the analyses of participants' journals and final papers, the researchers found that being exposed to the stories of the other group allowed them to listen to and identify with the outgroup.

Hammack (2006) investigated exposure to counter-narratives in co-existence programmes between Israeli and Palestinians and found that the meetings allowed participants to acknowledge the perspective of the other, particularly in the short term. However in the longer term, it was more common for participants to increase identification with the in-group.

Hammack (2006) suggests that contact with the outgroup increases awareness of cultural differences that enhance in-group identification and solidarity. Exposure to a counter-narrative was also conducted using an experimental paradigm. Adelman et al. (2016) conducted an experimental study to investigate whether narratives containing information on inclusive victimhood (mutual Israeli-Palestinian suffering due to conflict) can reduce competitive victimhood. This study found that an inclusive victimhood narrative was only able to reduce competitive victimhood when individuals were less concerned with gaining third-party support for the Israeli cause. Among individuals with low concern for third-party support, mediational tests showed that the inclusive victimhood narrative reduced support for aggressive policies by reducing competitive victimhood.

The research highlights that conflict narratives cannot be easily dismantled by psychological interventions. One key barrier is the association between social identity and conflict narratives. Exaggerated positive perceptions of the in-group (self-glorification) have found to be related with narratives of outgroup blame (Bilali, 2013). Furthermore, exposure to an adversary's narrative may actually lead to greater identification with the in-group (Hammack, 2006). Furthermore, right-wing political orientations are positively associated with conflict narratives (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) provide explanations of how social identity can become a barrier to the reception of a counter-narrative. In intractable conflict, narratives serve important individual and collective functions in that they meet social needs,

particularly in providing moral justification for violence and maintaining a group's positive social identity (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). As a consequence, new information is framed with reference to the conflict supporting narrative and therefore it becomes difficult to accept a counter-narrative which sharply contradicts the conflict narrative. As a consequence, conflict narratives remain unchallenged and conflict-perpetuating attitudes remain dominant (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Therefore, conflict narratives, while serving in-group needs, also sharpen intergroup boundaries between adversaries. However, the evidence suggests that conflict narratives can be challenged and people can be changed to be more receptive of counter-narratives. Social identity itself is flexible, and its salience depends largely on social context. Therefore, counter-narratives may provide a social context that plays a role in restructuring intergroup boundaries. How this process occurs is discussed further in the following section.

### **Counter-narratives promoting an inclusive identity to support reconciliation**

Existing literature has determined how social identity can facilitate reconciliation. For example, Noor et al. (2008) found that identifying with a national identity (Chilean or Northern Ireland) can increase individuals' willingness to forgive adversaries. Research such as this study are anchored in social identity models of intergroup behaviour in reducing intergroup bias. Social identity approaches have suggested methods to reduce intergroup bias, emphasizing either reducing salience of category, maintaining the salience of category distinctions, or increasing the complexity of social categorizations (Hewstone et al., 2002). Social identity theory posits that group behaviour occurs when social identity is more salient than personal identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1998). The salience of social identity depends on the context, the flexible nature of which has allowed researchers to investigate circumstances that shape the salience of specific social identities (Gaertner et al., 1989; Hogg & Abrams, 1998). One study found that people can re-

categorize their social identity, which would lead to distinct intergroup behaviours. In this research, re-categorization from a two group identity to a single superordinate identity reduced bias and increased positive attitudes (Gaertner et al., 1989).

Drawing from the social identity models, Subasic et al. (2008) proposes a theoretical framework to create social political change, which I argue is necessary for reconciliation. This model elaborates on the psychological changes in self-categorization that lead to the redefinition of the authority as an outgroup and the minority as an ingroup. According to this model, social change involves identity contestation between an authority (those in power), the majority (the people at large), and minorities (marginalized groups). Challenges to the authority are likely to take place when marginalized groups are perceived to share the norms and values with the majority. Conversely, when the authorities' actions to marginalize a minority are perceived as legitimate or when a minority is not viewed as sharing the same values and norms, solidarity between the majority and the marginalized group does not emerge.

An approach proposed by Vollhardt (2013) highlights the re-categorization of a common identity based on mutual victimization. Vollhardt (2013) distinguishes between exclusive and inclusive victimhood. Inclusive victimhood is defined as the "subjective interpretation of the ingroup's collective victimization that includes the perception of similarities between the ingroup's and other groups' experiences" (p. 148). Exclusive victimhood, on the other hand refers to the focus of the ingroup's specific victimization and its interpretation as unique and distinct from those of other groups. Whereas exclusive victimhood has been associated with negative intergroup outcomes such as less willingness to forgive an adversary (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008), inclusive victimhood has been associated with a range of positive outcomes such as advocacy of

disadvantaged groups, assistance for victim groups, reconciliation, and the prevention of genocide (Vollhardt, 2015).

By integrating insights from both the political solidarity model (Subasic et al., 2008) and inclusive victimhood (Vollhardt, 2013) I argue that counter-narratives that promote solidarity with a marginalized group on the basis of mutual victimization will be effective in promoting reconciliation. In addition to testing this hypothesis, this paper also aims to test relevant psychological mechanisms and conditions under which the co-victimization counter-narrative will be effective in promoting reconciliation. How I attempt to achieve this goal is described in the thesis outline as follows.

### **Thesis outline**

This section outlines the chapters of this paper. Chapter 2 presents the specific context of this research, namely the Indonesian anti-communist purge. The chapter focuses on the role of national narratives, which have a lasting effect on Indonesian attitudes toward communists. The process of reconciliation in Indonesia is also discussed by highlighting phases of its initiation, progress, stagnation, drawbacks, and current state in Indonesian political society.

Chapter 3 tests the model that I propose in this paper. Based on the political solidarity model (Subasic et al., 2008) and research on inclusive victimization (Vollhardt, 2013, 2015), I test the effect of presenting the co-victimization counter-narrative on solidarity with ex-communists. I also hypothesize that a co-victimization counter-narrative would be more effective in facilitating reconciliation with ex-communists compared to a counter-narrative, which only mentions communists as exclusive victims. I propose that the effect of the counter-narrative on reconciliation with ex-communists is mediated by higher inclusive identity ratings. An additional

goal of this chapter is to identify variables that moderate the effects of counter-narrative on inclusive identity. In the second study, I attempt to replicate the findings of the first study and test the moderating role of political Islam in the relationship between counter-narrative and inclusive identity.

Chapter 4 investigates the role of norms in reconciliation with ex-communists. The study tests whether a counter-narrative with norm manipulation would be able to enhance support for reconciliation with ex-communists. I modify narrative manipulation to include information on norms and test whether this manipulation is able to increase solidarity with ex-communists. Based on social identity models of normative influence, I test whether presenting a norm manipulation that suggests reconciliation with communists as normative is effective in reconciliation.

Chapter 5 tests the relationship between the perceived communist threat and the reception of a narrative. The first study tests perceived communist threat as moderating the effect of narrative on inclusive identity. The second study investigates whether the effect of narrative on inclusive identity and reconciliatory items are contingent with manipulation of high or low perceptions of a communist threat. I also investigate whether the effects of perceived threat on counter-narrative is moderated by the endorsement of political Islam.

## CHAPTER 2:

### CONFRONTING INDONESIA'S DARK PAST

On the morning of October 1, 1965, a group referring to themselves as the “30 September Movement” murdered six military generals (including the military commander) and dumped their bodies in a well (Roosa, 2006). The group then announced on national radio that their aim was to protect the president from right wing army generals who, the group alleged, had been planning a coup of their own. The group’s attempted coup collapsed quickly after the military initiated a counter-attack. This attack took place during a period of economic and political uncertainty marked by intensely antagonistic relations between communists and the army, nationalists, and Islamist groups (Cribb, 2001). Indeed, when news of the coup broke, the army quickly declared that the communists were the masterminds behind it (Cribb, 2001). The events of that day sparked a new era for Indonesia under a new leader and paved the way for systematic killings of communist party members and sympathizers (Cribb, 2001). In addition to the killings, around half a million people were detained for suspected links to the coup (Kroef, 1976). Although these political prisoners were eventually released, upon their release they had to sign a declaration that they would not demand compensation (Dibley, 1999). The government at the time (1966-1998) then went on to restrict many of their rights (Pohlman, 2004), and stigmatization was widespread. These ex-political prisoners were prohibited from working in strategic job posts, voting, and running for office; could not receive pensions from former employers; and were not allowed to obtain a passport or travel overseas (Dibley, 1999).

Although much of what happened on that day remains a mystery to historians (Roosa, 2006), the narrative built surrounding it has played a key role in the killings of and subsequent

discrimination against communists and communist sympathizers. This narrative suggests that the communists were behind the coup and had plans to replace the Indonesian ideology of Pancasila with communism (Heryanto, 2006). The nation has since overthrown a 32-year dictatorship and survived a severe financial crisis in 1997, and it continues to steadily reform its institutions. Nonetheless, the official narrative of 1965 continues to occupy a place in the collective memory of Indonesians.

This chapter focuses on the historical context of the thesis. It is organized around the themes that inform the research questions presented in the succeeding chapters. The first section explains the origins of anti-communism by elaborating on the socio-cultural and political landscape which led to anti-communist attitudes. The second section elaborates on the official master-narrative of the 1965 event and how this master-narrative has provided a framework for Indonesians' current attitudes towards communists. The third section describes the changing attitudes, norms, and laws concerning the 1965 event. The fourth section discusses the perceived communist threat in contemporary Indonesia, and the conclusion follows.

### **The root of anti-communism in Indonesia and the 1965 killings**

As Indonesia was approaching Independence from the Dutch, three competing visions emerged of what Indonesia would become. These distinct streams of thought were represented by three groups, namely the developmentalists (consisting of army personnel and nationalists), the Islamists, and the communists (Cribb, 2001). While the Islamists and communists envisioned Indonesia as adhering to their ideological positions, the developmentalists were far more concerned with controlling Dutch resources and managing those resources for the welfare of Indonesians (Cribb, 2001). Antagonism between the Islamists and the communists was particularly intense due to cultural, social, and ideological factors (Cribb, 2001). In Java,

although 90% of Indonesians were Muslims, two identities were present within this Muslim identity. Some Muslims adhered to an orthodox form of Islam referred to as *santri* while others were less committed to Islamic teachings and integrated many traditional rituals into their belief systems. This latter group of Muslims were known as *kejawen*. The Islamist stream appealed to the *santri*, who were generally more educated, while the *kejawen* were mostly drawn to the communist party (Cribb, 2001). One important source of ideological conflict between the Islamists and the communists relates to the role of religion in social life (Cribb, 2001). While the Islamists embraced religion as a source of authority over social life, the communists rejected this idea (Cribb, 2001).

Another of the major events that intensified antagonism between Islamists and communists was the Madiun Affair in 1948 (McGregor, 2009). This armed conflict began with an attack on the Madiun local government conducted by the Indonesian Socialist Youth, an organization affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party. The Indonesian armed forces were able to crush this movement by killing its leaders. However, as the communists retreated, they killed many teachers, officials, and religious leaders who were members of the Islamic party Masyumi (McGregor, 2009). The killing of Islamic leaders in the Madiun Affair particularly strengthened the notion that the communists were enemies of Islam, and this reasoning has since been used by different political leaders at multiple points in Indonesia's history to remind Muslims of the cruelty and danger of communists (Fealy & McGregor, 2010; McGregor, 2009).

In addition to the antagonism between the Islamists and the communists, the army also developed an antagonistic relationship with the communists. In contrast to the ideological conflicts with the Islamists, the rivalry between the communists and the military was political

(Feith, 1964). Since its formation in 1945, the Indonesian army has played a significant role in politics (Feith, 1964). However, in 1962 the president appointed General Yani, whose policies reduced military influence while allowing the president and the Indonesian Communist Party to gain greater influence (Feith, 1964). The Communist Party was particularly favoured by the president since they supported many of the controversial political and economic policies of Indonesia's first president in the 1960s (Feith, 1964). The army was particularly anxious at the Communist Party's growing influence and radicalism (Simpson, 2008). One example of the Communist Party's radical actions was a campaign from 1964 to 1965 known as *aksi sepihak* (unilateral action) (Mortimer, 1969). In this campaign, the Communist Party mobilized poor peasants to assert their rights towards land owners, who were mostly Islamists. Communists organized petitions, demonstrations, forced seizures of land, and refusals to pay a certain percentage of crops to land owners (Mortimer, 1969). This campaign stimulated bitter opposition among Islamists as well as the military and nationalists who felt that the communist movement was a direct threat to their economic status (Mortimer, 1969).

In 1965, politics became sharply polarized between the Indonesian Communist Party and its opponents (Mortimer, 1969). The antagonism intensified especially after the failed coup initiated by the 30 September Movement (Cribb, 2001). The coup attempt appeared to have been driven by communists since the generals who were murdered were anti-communist, but to this day historians are uncertain who masterminded the attempt and what motives were behind it (Cribb, 2001; Roosa, 2006). Regardless of who was actually responsible, at the time most Indonesians and outside observers also assumed it was the Indonesian Communist Party (Cribb, 2001). This event triggered an anti-communist purge which would last from 1965 to 1966 and lead to the killings of around 500,000 Indonesian civilians (Cribb, 2001).

The first report of killings occurred in Aceh, Sumatra in early October 1965; the violence soon spread to the island of Java and Bali (Cribb, 2001). Although civilian militias engaged in the killings, scholars have argued that the killings were the product of systematic planning and coordination by the military (Melvin, 2017). The military was involved in providing weapons, equipment, and military training to youth organizations in Central and East Java (Cribb, 2001). The civilian groups engaged in the killing consisted of organizations like “Banser”, from Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization; the Nationalist Party; and Protestant and Catholic student groups. While Banser carried out killings mostly in East Java, the nationalists operated in Bali; the Protestant and Catholic student groups operated in East Nusa Tenggara (McGregor et al., 2018b). The military played an active role in coordinating all these groups as they carried out the killings (McGregor et al., 2018).

The killings were a pivotal event in Indonesia’s political history in part because they gave rise to a military regime which justified its establishment using the 1965 coup attempt as a pretext (McGregor et al., 2018). This military regime, known as the “New Order”, was led by Major General Soeharto, the very person who had coordinated the counter-attack against the “30 September Movement” as well as the campaign to eliminate the communists (Roosa, 2006). This regime would rule Indonesia for three decades, and one of its notable legacies was the creation of a master-narrative which would dictate how Indonesians view the events of 1965 for decades to come (Heryanto, 1999; Miller, 2018). This master-narrative was a key characteristic of the New Order and instilled the doctrine of anti-communism in the minds of Indonesia’s next generation.

## **“Treason of the 30 September Movement” as a master-narrative: The communist threat, Pancasila, and national identity**

Indonesia’s official history and political discourse since 1966 has relied on the master-narrative of the 1965 events, specifically the conceptualization of the 30 September Movement as treason (Heryanto, 2006). One of the key elements in the narrative is the assumed culpability of the Indonesian Communist Party in planning and orchestrating the coup on 30 September 1965. This element became the primary justification for the discrimination towards and execution of communists, communist sympathizers and alleged communists. The firm grasp of this narrative on Indonesian minds is due to the past governments’ systematic and comprehensive control of the public’s memory of the 1965 events. Cultural tools like films, novels, textbooks, monuments, museums, commemorative rituals, and national holidays were instrumental in pursuing this control, especially in portraying the communists as the ultimate threat to the nation (Heryanto, 2006; Roosa, 2006). For instance, the book *The Coup Attempt of the 30 September Movement in Indonesia*, published in 1968 by Nugroho Notokusanto and Ismail Saleh, was used as an academic basis for justifying the official accounts while challenging alternative accounts circulating in foreign media; this book, however, represents only the Army’s account of the events (Heryanto, 2006). Furthermore, ten days after the murder of the military officers, a story from the Army’s news outlet reported that the bodies of the generals had been tortured (Wieringa, 2011). Stories also circulated via media that the women of the communist organization “*Gerwani*” had tortured the generals and danced naked around them (Wieringa, 2003).

Such depictions of the communists as evil were represented in the film *Treason of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party*, a film released in 1984 which served as an

important cultural tool to influence Indonesians' attitudes about the events of 1965 (Heryanto, 2006). The state television network broadcasted the film each year on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September accompanied with a national ritual of raising flags on half-mast to commemorate the military's victory over the communists and the deaths of the generals (Heryanto, 2006). A survey conducted in 2000 by *Tempo* magazine showed that 90% of Indonesian secondary school students in three large cities gained knowledge of the 1965 events from this movie (cited in Heryanto, 2006). Other sources of knowledge identified in the survey included teachers and school text books (97% of participants). Only 15% learnt about the event through historical sources. The survey also found that most participants adhered to the official narrative, with 78% stating that they agreed that the Indonesian Communist Party members had abducted the generals, and 71% stating that the chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party had masterminded the 30 September attack (Heryanto, 2006).

Scholars have highlighted the limitations and even fabrications in the official narrative. For example, the depiction of communists torturing the generals as shown in the aforementioned film has been shown to be false according to forensic evidence on the murdered bodies (Anderson, 1987). Criticism of the official narrative has led to the emergence of alternative narratives of the 30 September Movement. Roosa (2006) summarized these different narratives, which mainly diverge on who was primarily responsible for the murders. For example, in contrast to the official narrative, which claims that the Communist Party was primarily responsible, one version argues that the coup was plotted by junior military officers who wanted to eliminate the decadent and pro-Western senior military officers in the country. Another version argues that the alleged hero of the event, Soeharto, was actually complicit, especially considering his close ties with the main actors of the 30 September Movement. Yet another

contrasting version suggests that the 30 September Movement was a joint movement involving both junior military officers and the Indonesian Communist Party. However, this version argues that the Communist Party played only a marginal role in the event and that the military's role was dominant.

Since the 1970s, these counter-narratives have appeared in publications (see Roosa, 2006 for review). However, the domestic discussion concerning the 1965 events was carefully controlled during the New Order regime, and therefore most Indonesians during the New Order adhered to the official accounts of 1965 (Zurbuchen, 2002). In fact, the New Order regime used the discourse of the communist threat as a way to preserve its legitimate rule for 32 years (Heryanto, 1999). Even in the face of criticism from scholars regarding the Communist Party's culpability in the 1965 events, the Soeharto regime worked to keep fears of the communist threat alive in ways which aligned with the current circumstances. The regime's extensive and vigorous anti-communist campaign often recklessly victimized innocent non-Communists and even anti-communists. In 1993, for example, a music album of a young rock singer was confiscated by the State Attorney's office. The album was confiscated due to its cover, which displayed a man wearing a necklace with a hammer and sickle on it. Police officers and officials of the State Attorney's office then roamed the streets of many cities to hunt down the Communist audio cassettes. Those responsible for the production and circulation of the album were also summoned and interrogated. As a result, music shops and radio stations either hid the album away or pretended it had never existed. This instance is just one example of how the state instilled fear of communists. Another example was the detainment of a meatball vendor for writing "PKI Madiun Bangkit" on the wall of his house, which is a message suggesting that the Indonesian Communist Party in the Madiun region will revive. The man said that he had written the phrase out of pure

amusement and had no actual intentions to revive or support the revival of the Indonesian Communist Party. Nonetheless, the man was ordered to submit weekly reports after his release, and his wife and eight other meatball vendors were also arrested and interrogated because of their association with the meatball vendor (Heryanto, 1999).

The anti-communist atmosphere was further reinforced with annual commemorations of the 1965 tragedy, most notably “Hari Kesaktian Pancasila”, which was initiated by Soeharto (McGregor, 2002). This commemoration honoured the heroes of 1965 who died and also those who successfully saved the nation’s ideology, Pancasila, from the threat of communists.

Pancasila is central to Indonesian identity and consists of five key principles, namely the belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice (McGregor, 2002). The Pancasila concept, which was first introduced by Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno, became a tool for the authoritarian Soeharto regime to suppress opposition (McGregor, 2002). The manipulation of Pancasila and Hari Kesaktian Pancasila is shown in the changes in tone of the Soeharto government towards both the ideology and the national ritual. Namely, in the initial years of its celebration, the goal of the commemoration was simply to remind Indonesians of the communist treason committed in 1965 (McGregor, 2002). In the mid and late 1970s, however, Soeharto began to place more emphasis on Pancasila as an ideology and a way of life. This emphasis on Pancasila was intended to degrade communism and other ideologies which could oppose the regime, for example, Western liberalism and political Islam. In this period, the New Order introduced the Pancasila upgrading course, which was required for civil servants, religious leaders, and students. In 1985, the government went even further, imposing regulations which required all political and social organizations to make the Pancasila the sole basis of their organization. Pancasila thus became the prescribed set of guiding principles for the press, the

law, the economy, industrial relations, and morality. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Islamists expressed strong opposition to the regime, the commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila served as a tool of suppression. For example, officials could use this celebration to remind Indonesians of the history of Islamic opposition to Pancasila. In the 1990s, another change occurred in the way Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was celebrated. This shift was partly due to the New Order's effort to garner support from different political groups due to changes in the political climate. In this period, the regime was seeking in particular support from Islamic organizations, and as a result, celebrations of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila incorporated some Islamic features. While it continued to promote the communist threat in general, after 1995, the regime framed the event around the threat specifically to Pancasila's first principle, namely the existence of a single and supreme God; the dominant threat thus became atheism, from which the military had saved the nation in 1965. This statement was made even though there was no basis to claim that there was an increase in atheism. In 1998, the Soeharto regime fell. The following era, which spanned the 2000s, became known as the Reform. During the Reform, even though communicating the official narrative of the 1965 events during Hari Kesaktian Pancasila became less important, the government strove to maintain the commemoration.

The Reform era led not only to changes in Hari Kesaktian Pancasila but also to increases in freedom of expression, which allowed more discussion concerning the 1965 events (Zurbuchen, 2002; Miller, 2018). The media was particularly active in criticizing the New Order government, with newspapers and weeklies publishing interviews with witnesses of the 1965 events who had previously been silenced (Zurbuchen, 2002). Within two years of Soeharto's resignation, many accounts which challenged the official narrative were widely available (Zurbuchen, 2002). The Reform era was also marked by a shift in attitudes that gave momentum

to a range of government- and non-government-led initiatives which facilitated reconciliation with Indonesia's ex-communists.

### **Moving towards reconciliation in the Reform era**

The Reform era was marked by shifting public attitudes toward the 1965 event and subsequent actions taken by successive presidents to address the 1965 tragedy (Wahyuningroem, 2013; Zurbuchen, 2002). Wahyuningroem (2013) summarized the efforts from Indonesian presidents to address the 1965 tragedy as follows. Following the fall of the dictator Soeharto, the acting president B.J. Habibie released political prisoners and returned the right to vote to ex-political prisoners. The next elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, issued a law facilitating the return of Indonesians abroad who had been previously unable to return to Indonesia due to their affiliation with communism. The issue of whether or not to offer an apology was discussed in the period of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2011; however, this programme was met with intense protests by many factions in society, which eventually led to its demise.

During elections, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's predecessor, Joko Widodo, (Jokowi) raised optimism that the 1965 tragedy might be addressed since addressing past human rights issues was among one of the aims he promoted in his campaign (McGregor et al., 2018). His ability to deliver on his promises was initially limited, since he won the election by only a slim margin and faced intense opposition from his opponents throughout his presidency (McGregor et al., 2018). However, increasing domestic and international pressure on the Jokowi administration compelled him to deliver on his promises (McGregor et al., 2018). One of the programmes which signified his commitment to addressing the 1965 events was the organization of a symposium gathering survivors, scholars, human rights activists, and members of the Indonesian military to discuss their grievances and interpretations of the 1965 events (Kwok, 2016). Although human

rights activists criticized the symposium for focusing on non-judicial measures like reconciliation, some observers viewed this event as significant considering that it was the first national forum for parties in conflict to exchange views (Heryanto, 2016).

As mentioned above, the government's support for reconciliation under president Joko Widodo would not have been possible without the persistent pressure from non-government organizations (NGOs) that tirelessly campaigned for the rights of the victims of the 1965 killings. The work of NGOs in raising the issue of the 1965 killings began in the 1980s and garnered increasing support in the 1990s (Zurbuchen, 2002). Two important products of the work of local NGOs were the drafting of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) law and the class action to demand the restoration of victims' rights, including restoration of good name; the elimination of policies that endorse stigmatization of ex-political prisoners; and the provision of compensation (Wahyuningroem, 2013). Furthermore, interviews with hundreds of victims and witnesses by the National Commission of Human Rights concluded that mass human rights violations occurred in 1965, mostly towards people alleged to be Indonesian Communist Party members (*National Commission on Human Rights Statement about the Investigation of Severe Human Rights Violation in 1965-1966*, 2012). At the international level, a group of local researchers, activists, and 1965 victims in Indonesia and Europe organized the International People's Tribunal for the 1965 crimes against humanity; the tribunal was held in the Netherlands in November 2015 (Santoso, 2015). The tribunal pressed charges against the state of Indonesia and called for "the commission of crimes against humanity and violations of customary international law provisions" (*1965 Tribunal Hearings: The Indictment*, 2015). In the city of Solo (on Java), victim groups and activists held some large events that gained wide public attention (Wahyuningroem, 2018). The first event was a commemoration of the 30 September

Movement. This event gathered together members from local government, parliament, local figures, and leaders of Muslim organizations.

Religious organizations have also played an instrumental role in the reconciliation process. The Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is a notable example; despite their active role in the killings of communists, a faction of this organization has also played key roles in facilitating reconciliation (Fealy & McGregor, 2010; McGregor, 2009). One of the major figures who shaped the views of the organization was Abdurrahman Wahid, chairman of NU and also former president of the Indonesian Republic. Wahid was the first person to offer an apology to the victims on behalf of the Nadhlatul Ulama Organization, and he went as far as proposing to lift the ban on communism, a move that was met with opposition from influential members of the organization (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). The divergent positions on how the organization should be involved in the issue reflected generational differences (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). The elder members of NU tended to support the role of NU in eliminating communists, because doing so was regarded as a measure of self-defence in response to the perceived offensive actions of the Indonesian Communist Party (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). In contrast, the younger members of the organization considered it necessary to confront the past. In 2000, NU activists founded the organization Syarikat. This organization aimed to change the image of the NU concerning the 1965 violence and to express sympathy for victims by creating programmes to help political prisoners and lobby parliament on behalf of victims seeking justice. The efforts of Syarikat did not go unnoticed; the director of Syarikat, Mohammad Imam Aziz, received a peace award from the Jeju Peace Institute in Korea (Rulistia, 2015). Upon accepting the award, he stated, “The 1965 violence was a huge tragedy.

And the most urgent thing to do is, I think, to restore the humanity that was long lost along with this tragedy.”

In addition to changes in attitudes, changes in the laws related to communists have also emerged. Before explaining what laws have changed, it is necessary to discuss the law banning the Indonesian Communist Party, which remains in effect to this day (“Ketetapan *MPRS Nomor XXV/MPRS/1966 Tahun 1966* [People's Consultative Assembly Law No.25 Year 1966],” 1966). In its opening statement, the law mentions some of the ideological and historical reasons why the Indonesian Communist Party is banned. Essentially, this law instructs the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party and all affiliated organizations and bans the party from the whole republic of Indonesia (Article 1). The second article explains that “all activities dissemination and developing the teachings of communism/Marxism-Leninism in all forms and manifestations and all use of tools and media to disseminate this philosophy or teaching is banned.” The third article makes an exemption for universities to study communism and Marxism-Leninism, but this study must be conducted to secure the nation’s Pancasila ideology and follow further legal requirements. Another law has further clarified on what grounds civilians can be arrested. Law No. 27 year 1999 prohibits people from distributing or developing ideas in a written or verbal form or via any other media if the ideas are related to communism, Marxism, or Leninism, with perpetrators facing a sentence of up to 12 years in prison (“*Undang-Undang Nomor 27 Tahun 1999* [Law No.27 Year 1999],” 1999). It was this law that became the basis for the detainment of a man selling clothes featuring a hammer and sickle (Sutari, 2016). In addition to these laws, there are 12 laws which explicitly mention exclusion of former Communist Party members or any individuals with involvement in the 30 September coup attempt (Effendi, 2006). These laws

prohibit former Communist Party members from entering numerous civil state positions and from being elected as a member of parliament.

One of the legal instruments that provided hope for human rights activists was Indonesian Law No. 27 Year 2004 about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 27 Tahun 2004 tentang Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi [Law No.27 Year 2004 about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission]*, 2004). This law was signed by former President Megawati Soekarno Putri and detailed the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. One of the main roles of the commission was to receive reports from victims and perpetrators and investigate the occurrence of severe human rights violations (Article 6). The commission was also meant to provide guidance on how to request amnesty from the president and on delivery of compensation and rehabilitative actions, both of which were to be funded by the national budget. Despite the promise that the law implied, its enactment was slow, and 2 years later, the constitutional court announced that the law was no longer valid on the grounds of being unconstitutional. Human rights lawyers have criticized the court for making a decision beyond what was requested and even suggested this decision devastated efforts to solve past injustices (“*Putusan MK tentang UU KKR Dianggap Ultra Petita [Constitutional Court's Decision Considered Ultra Petita]*,” 2006).

Persistent efforts by human rights organizations have continued even in the face of such major drawbacks. A truth and reconciliation bill is still in the process of being drafted (Evanty & Pohlman, 2018). However, in contrast with the 2004 bill, this draft does not mention any measures to provide amnesty or mechanisms to prosecute perpetrators. Initiatives at the local level have made more encouraging progress (Wahyuningroem, 2018). In the city of Palu, the

mayor offered an apology on behalf of the city of Palu to all victims of the 1965 tragedy in Palu and the Central Sulawesi province. This act was followed by mayoral decree No.25 2013, which became the basis for the Palu administration to conduct research to identify what forms of reparations were needed for survivors and their families.

In summary, there has been progress in addressing the 1965 tragedy. Movements to support reconciliation by the government and non-government organizations have gained momentum since the fall of the military dictator Soeharto in 1998. The post-Soeharto era, known as the Reform era, was marked by several initiatives by state and non-state actors to support reconciliation. As a result of this movement, laws restricting the rights of former communists have been abolished while laws to restore basic rights like voting have been enacted. This wave of progress, however, has not gone unchallenged. For example, the law on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was judged as unconstitutional just 2 years after its formulation. Talks of government apologies to victims have also attracted intense protests and opposition from government officials and social organizations. What is common among the parties that oppose reconciliation are the beliefs that they hold concerning communists. These groups continue to believe that communism constitutes a real threat to the nation (Miller, 2018). Indeed psychologists have argued that social beliefs which portray an outgroup as threatening are common in conflict situations and that these beliefs are stubborn barriers to reconciliation (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). These beliefs are not easy to counter considering that they lay the foundation of a group's positive social identity, which means challenging these beliefs may equate to an affront to that social identity (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). The importance of the perceived communist threat and its implications to reconciliation are discussed in the following section.

## **Current beliefs about the communist threat in Indonesian society**

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2016, a national symposium was organized entitled “Saving Pancasila from the Threatening Revival of the Indonesian Communist Party and Other Ideologies” (Artharini, 2016). The chairman of this 2-day national symposium, retired military general Kiki Syahnakri, was supported by 49 religious and youth organizations (Artharini, 2016). The speakers included former vice president and former Armed Forces Commander Try Sutrisno as well as influential religious leaders, for example, head of the Islamic Defence Front Rizieq Shihab and Cholil Ridwan from the Indonesian Ulama Council. The main message delivered in this symposium was that Indonesians had to stay cautious of the communist threat. Try Sutrisno mentioned that events like the International Peoples Tribunal on 1965 held in Den Haag as well as the national symposium organized by the government gave some fresh air to communists. Rizieq Shihab elaborated on the existing threats of communists in current Indonesian society, noting 20 instances indicating that communists were gaining strength (Jakartanicus, 2016). Among these 20 instances were movements in society to support an apology to communists and efforts to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; both, he argued, were evidence that communists are slowly gaining influence in Indonesian society.

This symposium made evident that promotion of beliefs related with the communist threat are associated with specific social groups. Namely, religious and army-affiliated groups appear to be associated with this belief. Representatives of religious organizations and leading army-affiliated figures have been most active in promoting belief in the communist threat (Miller, 2018). Hard-line religious organizations like the Islamic Defence Front have, for example, gained a reputation since closing a series of activities that they suspected of promoting communism (Miller, 2018). Following the 2-day symposium, the Islamic Defence Front and its

supporters held a demonstration repeating the message that the Indonesian Communist Party must be rejected (“Menyoal ‘spanduk Liberal=PKI’ dalam demo antikomunis-Answering the issue of the Liberal = PKI Banner in the anticommunist demonstration,” 2016). In the period 2015-2016, hard-line religious groups were active in intimidating and closing down discussion events aimed at addressing the 1965 tragedy (Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network, 2018). Most recently, the Islamic Defence Wing organization disrupted the anniversary of the People’s Democratic Party (Briantika, 2019). Police advised the event’s committee to close the event because a social organization was coming to disrupt the event; the committee did as the police advised. When members of the Islamic Defence Wing arrived, they burnt the flags of the party and yelled that the People’s Democratic Party is an illegal party similar to the Indonesian Communist Party, a claim which is false according to the chairman of the party, Agus Jabo Priyani (Briantika, 2019).

Promotion of the communist threat by the military can be observed through military education programmes. For example, one of the lecture materials delivered to students of the Indonesian Armed Forces is “Analysis of the Neo-Communist Threat.” The neo-communist threat contrasts with the past communist threat, according to the material, in that neo-communists support pluralism and diversity (“*Analisa Ancaman Komunis Gaya Baru di Indonesia* [Analyses of the Neo-Communist Threat in Indonesia],” n.d.). This same material also mentions that a specific communist party is not necessary to promote neo-communism, as individuals tied to communism can infiltrate any party and encourage socialism and communism in that party’s underlying ideology. The document makes an analysis of the neo-communist threat and concludes that the neo-communist threat is high. To counter the neo-communist threat,

it recommends review of any laws that are disadvantageous to the military and intelligence gathering.

One military figure who was among those active in promoting anti-communism was a former Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Gatot Nurmantyo. In 2017, as the Commander of the Armed Forces, he gave a military order for military personnel at all regional levels to organize a screening of the movie *Treason of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party*, which was to be attended by the people in the community (Haryanto, 2017). He stated that screening of the film was necessary for Indonesians to learn about the nation's history. In 2018, although no longer serving as military commander, he became the centre of controversy when he challenged the military commander to instruct the army to organize screenings of the film as he had done ("*Gatot: KSAD Pulang Kampung Saja Kalau Takut Gelar Nobar [Gatot: The Head of the Armed Forces Should Return to His Village if Afraid of Organizing a Film Screening]*" 2018). The former general was criticized for his statement, and ultimately the order was not issued by the military commander; however, this did not stop politicians from independently organizing screenings of the movie to commemorate the event of 30 September 1965 (Bere, 2018).

Current beliefs about the communist threat are supported by two psychological studies that have been conducted in this context. These studies show that communists in Indonesia are viewed as threatening, remain negatively stigmatized, and tend to be associated with negative characteristics (Putra et al., 2018, 2019). In the first study, Putra, Holtz, Pitaloka, Kronberger, and Arbiyah (2018) conducted two experiments. The initial experiment evaluated 110 participants' level of support for a person allegedly running for president. The results showed

that support for the candidate significantly dropped when participants learned that the candidate had family ties with the Indonesian Communist Party. In the next experiment, 130 participants were asked to evaluate a prestigious primary school student. Consistent with the previous results, the extent that participants were proud of the student's achievements significantly dropped when they learned that the student had family ties with the Indonesian Communist Party relative to a control group. In the second study, Putra, Wagner, Rufaedah, and Holtz (2019) investigated 23 Indonesian Muslims' opinions about the Indonesian Communist Party. The respondents consisted of religious clerics, public figures, and regular Muslims. A majority of the participants (82.61%) viewed Indonesian Communist Party members as presenting a real danger to Indonesians, due to their cruel and sadistic characteristics.

The elaborations above portray Indonesian society to be undergoing a process of social change. While the official narrative of the events of 1965 remains present, attitudes towards communism have significantly shifted. Laws have been changed to accommodate the basic rights of people who were previously labelled as communists. However, a backlash has emerged in response to these social changes. Namely, the increasing activity of reconciliatory initiatives has sparked a new wave of anti-communism, which continues to target victim groups and regular Indonesians who engage in discussion of the 1965 events. Therefore, mitigating resistance to reconciliation is an important task in the reconciliation process.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to outline the historical context of the study. The first section has described how an official narrative was constructed as a framework to make sense of the events that occurred on 30 September 1965. Efforts at reconciliation have made progress, but not

without setbacks. Attitudes among Indonesians have changed, and anti-communist laws have been revoked. However, many questions concerning the official narrative and Indonesians' adherence to it are yet to be explored. Given the importance of narratives in reconciliation and the marginal support for reconciliation in the context of the study, it is important to understand the best way to present a counter-narrative to the general public so that it may be accepted. Seeking the best approaches is the goal of the subsequent chapter, which aims to test the effectiveness of a counter-narrative to support reconciliatory attitudes.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE IMPACT OF COUNTER-NARRATIVES ON INCLUSIVE IDENTITY AND SOLIDARITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INDONESIA'S ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE

Between mid-October 1965 and mid-January 1966, the Indonesian army carried out a process of eliminating the Indonesian Communist Party. In this process, hundreds of thousands of communists were killed, and millions were detained as political prisoners. In the United States on January 1966, three scholars from Cornell University, namely Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, and Frederick Bunnell, produced a 162-page text entitled *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Anderson, 1996). This text was initially circulated among a small circle of academicians and two American government officials. However, on March 1966, without the consent of the authors, a columnist published a piece in *The Washington Times* citing the work. This column drew more public attention to the work, and the news reached the Indonesian military. On 1971, the paper was published in an academic journal. However, in that same year, Benedict Anderson was blacklisted from entering Indonesia unless he made a public disavowal of the Cornell paper and agreed to the army's claims about the coup (Anderson, 1996). This paper was the first counter-narrative that emerged to directly challenge the official narratives of the Indonesian government. The analyses conclude that the masterminds of the 30<sup>th</sup> September movement were from the military and that the Indonesian Communist Party had no responsibility for the coup (Roosa, 2006). This paper was particularly detrimental to the Indonesian Army because it invalidated subsequent policies to eliminate the Indonesian Communist Party.

The army's response to the emergence of a counter-narrative illustrates how groups are motivated to maintain the dominance of their narrative surrounding a pivotal political event (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). This motivation is understandable because narratives serve group functions in times of conflict to anticipate threats from an outgroup and maintain a positive group image (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Maintaining a positive image is particularly important when groups are involved in violent acts, as narratives serve to legitimize the violence towards the enemy (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). The Indonesian military's efforts to make their narrative of 1965 dominant is clear from the actions of its leaders. Gatot Nurmantyo, who was serving as Indonesia's military commander, gave formal instruction to hold national screenings of the film *Treason of 30<sup>th</sup> September and the Indonesian Communist Party* in 2017 (Riady, 2017). Even though he was no longer the military commander in 2018, Nurmantyo insisted that the military hold screenings of the film (Putri, 2018).

Despite the dominance of the military's narrative of 1965 until now, counter-narratives have increasingly become part of public discussion since the fall of Soeharto, which is important in the reconciliation process (Zurbuchen, 2002; Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Bar-Tal et al. (2014) argue that reconciliation requires communities to weaken adherence to narratives that promote intergroup conflict and introduce narratives that support peace and reconciliation. In this process, communities change beliefs, and as a result, the specific groups responsible for violence may be presented in a less positive manner (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Non-government organizations and the media have been particularly instrumental in changing beliefs and criticizing official narratives, as well as advocating for policies to respond to the grievances of ex-communists (Zurbuchen, 2002; Wahyuningroem, 2013). Although counter-narratives play a significant role in facilitating reconciliation (Auerbach, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Kelman, 2008), much needs to be

understood about the conditions and mechanisms that permit counter-narratives to effectively promote reconciliation.

Due to this research gap, the goal of this chapter is to conduct an empirical test that determines the effectiveness of counter-narratives on reconciliation. I aim to investigate the psychological mechanisms and conditions that would make the counter-narrative most effective. I also aim to investigate the factors that moderate the effects of counter-narratives on reconciliation actions. In investigating the effectiveness of the counter-narratives, I draw on social identity models of political action (Subasic et al., 2008) and suggest that counter-narratives that emphasize a common identity would be most effective in promoting reconciliation. This argument is made based on the premise that conflicts create adverse intergroup relations that sharpen boundaries between groups. These relations are exacerbated by conflict supporting narratives, which continue to sustain negative perceptions of an outgroup. Therefore, I argue that counter-narratives that restructure intergroup boundaries would more effectively facilitate reconciliation with former adversaries.

To achieve this goal, I divide this chapter into a number of sections. First, I highlight the role of narratives in conflict and conflict resolution. This section elaborates on how narratives play an important psychological role in conflict and serve personal and social functions. This section also discusses how narratives can be used to facilitate reconciliation, particularly in how it can be used to mobilize social action. The second section elaborates on inclusive identity and its role in facilitating reconciliation actions. As the basis of inclusive identity, I review existing literature on inclusive identity based on mutual victimization, which I argue to be most suitable for supporting reconciliation in an Indonesian context. Following these elaborations, I outline my

hypothesis and present the findings. The chapter consists of two empirical studies. The first study tests the effectiveness of counter-narratives on inclusive identity and reconciliation actions. This study also tests the indirect effect of inclusive identity on reconciliation. In the second study, I test the role of political Islam in moderating the effect of counter-narratives on inclusive identity and reconciliation. The final section includes discussion and conclusions based on the findings.

### **The role of narratives in intergroup conflict and conflict resolution**

Individuals caught in the midst of conflict use narratives to understand the nature of the conflict and anticipate future threats from enemies (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Conflicts are prolonged because both groups have divergent narratives related to who is the principal victim of the conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Noor et al., 2008). Research has found that openness to opponent narratives is negatively correlated with general right-wing political orientation, authoritarian personalities, and entity theories of group malleability, which are mediated by conflict narratives of outgroup de-legitimization and collective victimhood (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). When conflicts cease and become historical events, narratives may be utilized by authorities to justify oppression, exclusion, and violence towards a group, allowing said group to evade responsibility (Bilali, 2013; Heryanto, 2006). Official Turkish narratives related to violence towards Armenians in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century are characterized by a denial of responsibility and outgroup blame (Bilali, 2013). These narratives result in reluctance to support reparative actions to victims of violence and are associated with a glorified perception of the in-group and perceived threat to the in-group (Bilali, 2013).

Given the importance of narratives in justifying and maintaining conflict, scholars have argued that narratives may be equally as important in peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Narratives are key in reconciliation processes because they play a role in altering beliefs about

other groups of individuals (Kelman, 2008). Research using a qualitative approach to investigate the Jewish-Palestinian conflict has demonstrated increased acknowledgement of an outgroup's perspective of the conflict as a function of exposure to the outgroup's narrative. The findings suggest that Jews and Arabs have been able to increase their understanding of other groups when hearing personal narratives of tragedies experienced by their parents or grandparents (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004). In addition, in the context of Jewish-Arab co-existence programmes, research has shown that exposure to the narrative of an outgroup facilitates understanding of its suffering (Hammack, 2006). The positive effects of learning about the outgroup's narrative even carry over to programme facilitators, who are able to become more understanding of Palestinians' suffering and perspectives of the conflict (Ron & Maoz, 2013).

While exposure to an outgroup's narratives may benefit positive interpersonal relations between members of conflicting groups, the major force of the narratives lies in their role in mobilizing political and social transformation (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). These functions are important because sustained intergroup reconciliation must be supported by institutional, social, and political change, in addition to individual-level psychological change (Staub, 2006). In Wittborn (2007), Palestinians used personal narratives of conflict as a way to garner support for the Palestinian cause in a public gathering organized by activists. Through personal stories of resistance against Israeli forces and regional dislocation, rhetorical language was used as a means of drawing sympathy and political support from the audience (Witteborn, 2007). This strategy became significant because the event also allowed the audience to enact their solidarity by signing a petition to halt economic support for Israel.

One of the major obstacles of the use of narratives for positive social change is the dominance of conflict supporting narratives that delegitimizes an adversary (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). By delegitimizing an opponent, individuals are able to deny the humanity of an outgroup by affording them negative labels (Bar-Tal, 1990). In Rwanda, for example, Tutsis were labelled cockroaches in public political rallies (O'Grady, 2016), and Jews were labelled as parasites by Nazi supporters (Steizinger, 2018). By labelling groups as subhuman and threatening a specific in-group, acts of violence can be justified and perceived as a virtue rather than moral transgression (Reicher et al., 2008). Replacing these conflict narratives with peace-endorsing beliefs is often complex. Authorities in power strive to maintain dominance of the conflict narrative by disseminating the said narrative through mass media, ceremonies, films, and books (Bar-Tal et al., 2014) because these narratives become a source of positive social identity for groups (Bilali & Ross, 2012). Groups in power are inclined to construct historical memories that align with a favourable image of the group by preventing the remembrance of shameful events or fabricating the narrative of an event to portray the in-group more positively (Bilali & Ross, 2012). Other efforts to maintain the supremacy of the conflict-supporting narrative include controlling access to alternative information, censorship, and punishing people or institutions that disseminate counter-narratives (Bar-Tal et al., 2014).

Understanding how counter-narratives may be employed for social change in the face of these obstacles remains a topic that requires further investigation. Research on the positive effects of narratives have largely used the qualitative approach, which limits generalizability because only a small number of participants were part of the studies (Hammack, 2006). Existing quantitative studies on narratives have been mostly correlational in nature (Bilali, 2013; Halperin & Bar-tal, 2011), thereby limiting inferences of causation, particularly with in terms of the

causative effects of narratives on positive outcomes. One exception is the research conducted by Adelman et al (2016). This experimental study among Jewish participants (Study 1) found that the effect of counter-narratives (related with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) on reducing support for aggressive policies was mediated by the reduction in competitive victimhood. The study also included an important moderator as concern for third-party support. It was found that, when Jewish Israeli participants had low concern for third-party support, the indirect effects of competitive victimhood on reduced support aggressive policies were significant, while the indirect effects of competitive victimhood were insignificant among participants with high concern for third-party support. The same pattern of results was found in the context of the United States drone war in Pakistan (Adelman et al., 2016), in that the counter-narrative's effect on reducing support for aggressive policies against Pakistan was mediated by a reduction in competitive victimhood. Another study explained how creating awareness of psychological biases could affect people's openness toward an adversary's narrative (Nasie et al., 2014). The key finding of the study was the moderating role of political identity (left wing versus right wing), the endorsement of a conflict-oriented ideology, and tendencies to protect in-group history in the relationship between bias awareness and openness to counter-narratives.

Narratives play an important role in conflict and conflict resolution. Narratives may facilitate political transformations that endorse positive sustainable changes. However, research on the psychological mechanisms responsible for producing the positive effects of counter-narratives are limited. In addition, research that compares the effectiveness of different kinds of counter-narratives is also limited. I attempt to address this research gap by investigating the causal effects of counter-narratives on positive intergroup outcomes, as well as the psychological processes that mediate the effect. I suggest that, because conflict narratives create sharp

boundaries between adversaries, re-categorization of the in-group and outgroup in regards to creating an inclusive identity is needed. Narratives play a role in this re-categorization process by making salient a common identity that will, in turn, increase support for political actions that foster solidarity.

### **Inclusive identity as a predictor of political solidarity**

A significant amount of work has demonstrated that positive intergroup relations can be produced by embracing a common, superordinate identity inclusive of both the in-group and outgroup. For example, the common group identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993) posits that, when a common identity is made salient, this new identity will become the basis for subsequent social judgement. Former outgroup members who are then considered in-group members enjoy the benefits of in-group bias, resulting in increased positive attitudes and a reduction in negative attitudes (Gaertner et al., 1993). Research situated in social identity has further highlighted the instrumental role of inclusive self-categorization in motivating action aimed at social and political transformation in contexts marked by injustice and inequality (Subasic et al., 2008). The political solidarity model (Subasic et al., 2008) describes social change as involving identity contestation between an authority (those in power), the majority (the people at large), and minorities (marginalized groups). Challenges to authority are only likely to take place when marginalized groups are perceived to share the norms and values of the majority. Conversely, when the authorities' actions to marginalize an outgroup are perceived as legitimate or when an outgroup is not viewed as sharing the same values and norms, solidarity between the majority and the marginalized group does not emerge.

Subašić, Schmitt, and Reynolds, (2011) found that participants made to feel a shared sense of victimization with exploited company workers showed higher ratings of shared identity

compared to participants in the control group (no common victimization manipulation). These participants were also more willing to express their solidarity with workers to advocate for improved work conditions and support government regulation to increase protection for workers. Additional evidence based on the theory of inclusive victimhood (Vollhardt, 2013) has shown the importance of inclusive identities in the context of the conflict of Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Using a correlational approach, Vollhardt and Bilali (2014) found that higher ratings of inclusive identity based on mutual suffering was associated with a higher willingness to stop ill treatment of an outgroup, as well as support for political leaders favouring a multi-ethnic society as opposed to an exclusive ethnic society. Similarly, Reicher et al. (2006) found how mobilizing support for the protection of Bulgarian Jews in the midst of the Holocaust was made possible with support from leaders, arguing that Bulgarian Jews were categorized under a national superordinate identity (inclusion category) as opposed to an ethnic identity.

Other works in existing reconciliation literature have illustrated the importance of a common identity in fostering forgiving attitudes among former adversaries in conflict. For example, identification with an inclusive national identity has been positively associated with forgiveness toward an outgroup, whereas identification with an in-group has been negatively associated with forgiveness (Noor et al., 2008). Furthermore, in the context of the Jewish-Arab conflict, inducing an inclusive identity based on mutual suffering increased forgiveness, which was mediated by reducing beliefs on competitive victimhood (Shnabel et al., 2013). Jewish participants were more likely to forgive Germans when the Holocaust was framed in terms of violence against humans rather than violence carried out by Germans against Jews (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Framing the events in terms of an inclusive identity (humans as opposed to

race) allowed Jewish participants to assign less collective guilt to Germans, which, in turn, increased their willingness to forgive. The findings were also replicated in a study examining native Canadians' willingness to forgive white Canadians (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).

These studies provide compelling support that an inclusive identity primarily based on victimhood may promote positive intergroup relations. While existing research has demonstrated how measured and induced inclusive identity served as an important antecedent in predicting reconciliation (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013; Noor et al., 2008; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014) and collective action to support marginalized groups (Subasic, Schmitt & Reynolds, 2011), less is known about the relationship between counter-narratives as a means of enhancing inclusive identity. I propose that counter-narratives may promote reconciliation and that the effect of counter-narrative on reconciliation actions is mediated by increasing inclusive identity based around common victimhood. This test is the first that integrates research on narratives and common identity models in reconciliation literature.

### **Current study: The impact of counter-narratives on inclusive identity and reconciliation**

The first goal of this study is to provide evidence that counter-narratives increase support for reconciliation. I hypothesize that exposure to counter-narratives significantly increases support for inclusive identity and reconciliation compared to the control group that has not read a counter-narrative (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis is based on research that has found that exposure to counter-narratives is associated with positive attitudes towards an outgroup (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004). In addition, I specifically hypothesize which counter-narratives would be more effective and predict that co-victimization counter-narratives (counter-narratives based on common victimhood identity) are more effective in increasing support for reconciliation compared to a counter-narrative that views communists as exclusive victims (Hypothesis 1a).

This hypothesis is based on research that has suggested that support for actions to help a marginalized outgroup are facilitated when there is a common identity shared between a person and the marginalized group and research (Subasic et al., 2008; Subašić et al., 2011). This hypothesis is also supported by research that has found that an identity based on shared victimization may promote positive intergroup relations (Vollhardt, 2013; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014).

The second goal of this research is to establish whether counter-narratives affect support for reconciliation through means of inclusive identity. Existing research has shown that exposure to information, which included a manipulation of shared victimhood, produced higher support for collective action for exploited employees compared to participants receiving information that did not include the shared victimhood manipulation (Subašić et al., 2011). This research found that the effects of the shared victimhood manipulation was mediated by increased ratings of inclusive identity. Therefore, I believe that the effect of the co-victimization counter-narrative on support for reconciliation will operate through inclusive identity (Hypothesis 2).

The third goal of this research is to explore the factors that result in opposition to the counter-narrative tested in Study 2. The political solidarity model also posits that solidarity between the majority of Indonesians and ex-communists do not emerge when individuals believe that the actions of the past authorities are legitimate or if the norms and values of the marginalized group are perceived to contrast those of the majority group. Individuals strongly endorsing the increasing Islamic influence in politics have rallied to show that their values are incompatible with communists and supported past government actions to eliminate communists. Therefore, I expect that endorsement of political Islam moderates the relationship between

counter-narratives and ratings of inclusive identity. More specifically, I predict that the co-victimization counter-narrative is more effective among participants with low endorsement of political Islam compared to participants with higher endorsements of political Islam. Therefore, the counter-narrative would produce higher ratings of inclusive identity and reconciliation compared to the control group among participants with lower endorsement of political Islam, though these effects are absent among participants who endorse political Islam (Hypothesis 3).

## **Study 1**

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

All participants were recruited with a snowball sampling approach. This approach was used due to the sensitive nature of the topic. It is important to note that promoting communism in Indonesia is against the law, meaning that participants may be reluctant to take part in a survey that encourages reconciliation with communists because it may be perceived as promoting communism. Secondly, the snowball technique was chosen due to practical and financial issues. At the time of the research, I could not find a local survey company that would be able to conduct online surveys and deliver payments to participants. I contacted international survey companies, but their rates were too high. Therefore, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, as well as practical and financial constraints, I decided to use the snowball technique. Using this technique allowed me to collect sufficient data with the available resources.

I shared a survey link using the WhatsApp to student research assistants at an Indonesian university. The research assistants then passed the link to friends, relatives, and other connections within their social network. The initial sample consisted of 344 participants, but I then excluded participants under 18 years old, who had incorrectly answered the attention check

questions, and had unusual responses patterns (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Five participants were below 18 years, 120 participants incorrectly answered the manipulation check, and three participants had unusual response patterns. Among those who incorrectly answered the attention check questions, most were communist victims. This exclusion meant that there were significantly less communist victims ( $N = 23$ ) compared to co-victimization ( $N = 82$ ) and the control condition ( $N = 121$ ). The final sample consisted of 223 participants (59.6% female, 40.4% male; age:  $M = 21$ ,  $SD = 4.27$ , range: 18-53). In terms of occupation, 81.1% of participants were students, 10.7 % state or private company employees, and 8.2% other occupations. In terms of education, 52.5% had completed senior high school, 39.4% had undergraduate degrees, 3.2% were post graduates, 2.7% had a diploma, and 0.5% had completed junior high school. In terms of religion, 81.9% were Muslim, 11.8% Christian or Catholic, 1.4% Hindu, 1.8% from other religions, and 3.2% did not want to answer this question. In terms of ethnicity, 69.1% were Javanese, 6.8% Sundanese, 5.3% Batak, 2.9% Chinese, and 15.9% from other ethnicities. In terms of political stance, 49.5% were pro-government, 29.3% from the opposition, 17.1% none, and 4.1% refused to answer.

## **Procedure**

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, namely co-victimization, communist victim, and no-information control. Prior to completing the assigned tasks, participants read a participant information sheet that detailed the general aspects of the research. Participants then completed questionnaires on background information and worked on the main assignment of the experiment. This assignment involved reading an article written by the researchers and structured as a commentary on the events of 1965. The goal of the commentary was to inform the reader of the true victims of the 1965 tragedy. One group of participants read

an article arguing that the communists were the true victims (communist victim), whereas another group read an article concluding that the communists and Indonesians in general were victims (co-victimization) (see Appendix for experiment materials). The co-victimization article had the identical content to the communist victim article but included an additional paragraph explaining how Indonesians were also victims of the 1965 tragedy. Following the reading task, participants answered the attention check questions. Participants in the control group were not assigned a reading task. Having completed this task, participants completed questionnaires on the dependent variables and were then directed to the debriefing page of the study.

### **Attention Check**

To assess the degree to which the participants were paying attention to the manipulation, they were asked to answer four multiple-choice questions (five questions for co-victimization) related to the text that they read. A sample question was as follows:

Who was the main victim of the 1965 tragedy?

### **Measures**

All of the materials in this research were created in English and then translated into Indonesian by a professional translator. Translations were crosschecked by a translator and the researcher to ensure that the material was readable and accurate. Additional measures were used but not reported here because of word limitations. The measures are explained below in order of presentation in the survey.

*Inclusive identity.* I used the inclusive identity scale developed by Subasic et al. (2011). This four-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) measured

participants' perception of the outgroup as belonging to a common in-group ( $\alpha = .77$ ). A sample item of this scale is as follows:

I feel that the ex-political prisoners of 1965 and I have something in common in that we are both victims of the 1965 tragedy.

*Reconciliation.* My operationalization of reconciliation follows the definition of reconciliation from Nadler and Shnabel (2015), who view reconciliation as change to structural, relational, and identity outcomes. Using this definition, I created items suited to the Indonesian context. In terms of structural outcomes, the items are based on the desired outcomes advocated by NGOs, advocacy groups, and the government in proposing a solution to the tragedy of 1965 (National Commission on Human Rights Statement about the Investigation of Severe Human Rights Violation in 1965-1966, 2012; Wahyuningroem, 2013). These outcomes include support for policies that allow ex-communists to have their reputations restored, receive compensation, and eliminate policies endorsing stigmatization. Furthermore, the National Commission of Human Rights Report lists recommendations for further investigation of perpetrators, and former presidents have suggested offering formal apologies and revising history books concerning the events of 1965. I included items measuring collective action because they indicate changed relational outcomes with a stigmatized group (Subasic et al., 2011). With this data, I produced a total of 16 items and added three items from the collective action intentions scale developed by Subasic et al (2011). I submitted these 19 items to principal component analyses using Varimax rotation. The solution explained 66.59% of the variance among items loading on four factors, namely reparation, equality and social integration (reversed items), prosecution, and collective action intentions. I used these four aspects of reconciliation in subsequent analyses.

*Reparation.* Using a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”), participants indicated their level of support for eight reparative actions, including items of public apology, revision of 1965 official narratives, ex-communist rehabilitation of reputation, and compensation ( $\alpha = .89$ ) (see Appendix for list of scales). A sample item is to what extent the participant supports “apology from the government to family members of Communist Party members”

*Equality and social integration.* Participants indicated on a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) whether they supported equal rights and social inclusion for ex-communists ( $\alpha = .85$ ). An example of this scale is “former members of the Indonesian Communist Party should be treated equally as any other Indonesian citizen.”

*Prosecution.* On a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”), participants indicated the extent to which they supported prosecution of perpetrators engaged in the murder and torture of communists ( $\alpha = .89$ ). A sample item from this scale is, “prosecute military personnel that were involved in the torture of Indonesian Communist Party members and sympathizers.”

*Collective action intentions.* Participants rated on a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which they supported collective action to support communist victims ( $\alpha = .79$ ). An example of this scale is, “to what extent are you willing to help organize a rally to support victims of the 1965 tragedy to have their good name restored.”

## **Results**

Before testing the main hypotheses, I analysed patterns of missing values across the dataset. I included all composite variables (inclusive identity, reparation, collective action

intentions, equality and social integration, prosecution) and background variables (age, ethnicity, gender, religion, occupation, education, political coalition). Across the psychological variables, the percentage of missing values ranged from 0.4% - 10.2%. Inclusive identity had the lowest proportion of missing values (0.4%), whereas collective action (6.6%), and equality (7.1%) had the highest. To analyse patterns of the missing values, I used Little's MCAR test and found that missing values were missing completely at random ( $\chi = 92.58, df = 91, p = .434$ ). I further conducted correlational analyses on the psychological variables, correlating missing values with background variables. I aimed to test whether missing items were related to specific backgrounds (religion, education, gender, political preference, occupation). I found no correlation between the missingness in psychological variables with the background variables. It should be noted that the scales with most missing values (7%), namely equality and collective action, were positioned close to the end of the questionnaire. I checked for participants with at least one missing value for the five outcome variables and found that survey completion ranged from 67% - 88%, further suggesting that survey dropout may be the reason for missing values. Based on these results, I proceeded with the analyses using EM imputation for missing values.

### **Effects of counter-narrative on outcome variables**

The following analyses test the hypothesis that counter-narratives would increase inclusive identity compared to participants not reading the counter-narrative (Hypothesis 1a). The means, standard deviations, and F-values of condition comparisons are presented in Table 1. In partial support of the hypothesis, there was a main effect of counter-narratives on inclusive identity, though no effects were found for the other reconciliation actions. I then tested whether the co-victimization and communist victim conditions were significantly different (Hypothesis 1b). Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni corrections show that relative to the control group,

there was higher inclusive identity ratings for participants reading a communist victim counter-narrative ( $p = .034$ ) and co-victimization ( $p = .001$ ). In contrast to the hypothesis, I did not find any significant differences between the communist victim counter-narrative and co-victimization counter-narrative ( $p = 1.00$ ). I repeated these analyses but included participants who incorrectly answered the attention check questions and gave extreme responses. I found that the results were similar in that there was only a significant effect of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity (see Appendix 1 for results without filters). This finding indicates that although participants incorrectly answered the attention check questions, the counter-narrative still had a significant impact on their perceptions of inclusive identity with ex-communists.

**Table 1.** Means and standard deviation of outcome variables

Variable	Control n = 118		Communist-Victim n = 23		Co-Victimization n = 82		F(2,220)	p	$\eta^2$
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Inclusive identity	3.34	1.55	4.21	1.18	4.12	1.49	8.03	0.00	0.07
Reparation	5.08	1.42	5.18	1.41	5.26	1.36	0.38	0.68	0.00
Equality and social integration	5.84	1.17	6.38	0.72	5.90	0.98	2.51	0.08	0.02
Prosecution	4.29	1.71	4.55	1.74	4.55	1.43	0.69	0.51	0.01
Collective action intentions	4.45	1.39	4.50	1.43	4.34	1.51	0.19	0.82	0.00

### **Mediational tests of counter-narratives on reconciliation via inclusive identity**

Before conducting the mediational tests, I analysed the correlations among variables. The results are presented in Table 2. These results show that inclusive identity was positively related with all of the employed reconciliation variables.

**Table 2.** Correlation among main variables

	1	2	3	4
1. Inclusive identity				
2. Reparation	.54***			
3. Equality and social integration	.30***	.39***		
4. Prosecution	.31***	.57***	0.07	
5. Collective action intentions	.51***	.66***	.32***	.46***

Note. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

To test the mediational hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), I used Process Macro Version 3 (Hayes, 2018). Counter-narrative served as a multi-categorical independent variable (control, co-victimization, communist victim), inclusive identity as the mediator, and equality, and social integration, reparation, prosecution, and collective action intentions were the dependent variables. Mediation Model 4 of PROCESS with 95% confidence intervals using 5000 bootstrap samples was used. In this analysis, I aimed to test whether the counter-narrative affected reconciliation through inclusive identity (see Table 3). Consistent with the hypothesis, there was inclusive identity had a significant indirect effect on reparation, equality and social integration, prosecution, and collective action intentions. I repeated this analysis with participants who incorrectly answered the attention check questions and those who had extreme responses; the results were similar such that all indirect effects of inclusive identity were significant (see Appendix 1 for a table of the results). The results show that counter-narratives affect reconciliation by increasing inclusive identity with ex-communists. However, I did not find any differences between the co-victimization and communist victim conditions. This issue may be related to the manipulation, considering that many participants from the communist victim condition incorrectly answered the attention check questions. Therefore, Study 2 refines the manipulation and investigates variables that may resist adherence to the counter-narrative.

**Table 3.** Indirect effects of counter-narrative on outcomes through inclusive identity

Dependent variable	Condition			
	Co-victimization		Communist Victim	
	Effect	95%CI	Effect	95%CI
Reparation	0.39	[.18,.63]	0.44	[.16,.79]
Equality and social integration	0.16	[.06,.29]	0.18	[.06,.33]
Prosecution	0.25	[.09,.45]	0.28	[.09,.54]
Collective action intentions	0.4	[.17,.64]	0.45	[.17,.77]

## Study 2

The first two goals of this research programme were to establish that counter-narratives affect solidarity and that inclusive identity mediates the relationship between counter-narrative and reconciliation. The first study found evidence to support the hypothesis that counter-narratives affected reconciliation through an inclusive identity with ex-communists. The third goal of this research project was to identify the psychological variables that made people resist a counter-narrative. Chapter 2 demonstrated that specific Islamic groups who strongly endorses increased Islamic political influence in Indonesia have shown to be particularly resistant to reconciliation initiatives with communists (Miller, 2018; Priyandita, 2016). Therefore, I include perceived measures of political Islam as a moderator. Furthermore, given that the manipulation of co-victimization was unsuccessful in Study 1, I revised the experimental manipulation by using the term “Indonesians” as opposed to “Indonesians in general and ex-communists.” In addition to making the answer more distinct compared to the communist victim condition, this change also implied that the communists were inclusively categorized as Indonesians rather than being as a distinct group.

## Methods

### Participants

Participants were recruited using the same recruitment scheme as that of Study 1. Participants with unusual responses on multiple variables or that had incorrectly answered the attention check questions were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, a total of 349 participants were included in the analyses. Of these participants, 59.5% were female, 38.4% male, 0.3% of other genders, and 1.7% were unwilling to answer. In terms of age,  $M = 20.67$ ,  $SD = 2.92$ , range = 18-45. In terms of occupation, 89.4% were students, 3.2% worked at state or private company employees, 3.7% had other occupations, 3.7% were unwilling to answer. In terms of education, 72.6% had completed senior high school, 19.9% undergraduate, 2.9% post graduate, 1.4% diploma, 0.9% junior high school, and 2.3% were unwilling to answer. In terms of religion, 79.9% were Muslim, 13.8% Christian or Catholic, 0.9% Hindu, 0.6% Buddhist, 1.1% other religions, and 3.7% were unwilling to answer. In terms of ethnicity, 69.6% were Javanese, 5.4% Sundanese, 2.0% Batak, 3.7% Chinese, 14.3% other ethnicity, and 4.9% were unwilling to answer. In terms of political orientation, 47.8% were pro-government, 40.2% were from the opposition, 5.4% had no political preference, and 6.7% were unwilling to answer.

### Attention check

For the co-victimization, in the answer to the question as to who was victim of the 1965 tragedy is “Indonesians”, whereas the answer for the communist condition is the same as in Study 1.

### Measures

Most of the measures used in the second study were identical, though the following adjustments were made for the following measures.

*Inclusive identity scale.* I changed the term “ex-political prisoners” to the general term “victims of the 1965 tragedy ( $\alpha = .81$ ).” This change was made to ensure that the items were aligned with co-victimization manipulation. The goal of the co-victimization manipulation was to induce a sense of shared victimhood. By using the term “victims of the 1965 tragedy” as opposed to “ex-communists”, I aimed to maintain the salience of the common victim identity with the questionnaire. An example item is as follows: *I feel that the victims of the 1965 tragedy and I have something in common in that we are both victims of the 1965 tragedy.*

*Reparation.* All items are the same as Study 1 ( $\alpha = .88$ ).

*Equality and social integration.* I added one item: “I support all laws that prohibit ex-communist party members from entering civil service officers ( $\alpha = .88$ ).”

*Prosecution.* I deleted one item because the content was similar to that of another item. Therefore, two items were used for this scale ( $r = .88$ ).

*Collective action intentions.* I added one item to, “To what extent are you willing to sign a petition to prosecute murderers of the victims of the 1965 tragedy” ( $\alpha = .83$ ) (adapted from Subasic et al., 2011).

*Support for Political Islam* (Fleischmann et al., 2011). This was a four-item scale that investigated peoples’ attitudes toward the political role of religion ( $\alpha = .66$ ). Due to low reliability, I conducted a factor analysis using Varimax rotation and found that the four items loaded on two factors, namely religion as a private matter and political representation, explained 85.01% of the variance. I separately verified the reliability for the two items on political representation ( $r = .65$ ) and the two items focused on private religion ( $r = .77$ ). I continued to use the two item format in subsequent analyses. A sample item from this scale is, “Islam should be

the ultimate authority in political matters.” For religion as a private matter, one of the items is “For me, religion is primarily a private matter.”

## **Results**

Prior to the main analyses, I checked for patterns in the missing data. The percentage of missing values ranged from 6-7.2%. Although no missing data was found for inclusive identity, missing data was found for reparative action (6%), equality (6.9%), prosecution (6%), and collective action intention (6.9%). The pattern of missing data does not confirm that it is completely at random as suggested by the results of Little’s MCAR test, which approached significance ( $\chi = 29.91$ ,  $df = 19$ ,  $p = .05$ ). I followed up this analysis by correlating missingness with background variables to determine whether there were systematic associations between missingness and these variables. The results show that missingness was significantly correlated with gender and political coalition and not correlated with employment, education, religion, and political Islam. Missingness was positively correlated with gender ( $r = .12$ ,  $p = .02$ ) negatively correlated with political coalition ( $r = -.13$ ,  $p = .04$ ). However both of these correlations are negligible. Similar to Study 1, the highest percentages of missingness are the scales located near the end of the questionnaire. Because missingness was not systematic, I proceeded to impute missing values with the EM imputation method.

### **Attention check**

The refinements made to the attention check resulted in more accurate responses compared to those in Study 1, indicated by a total of 92.3% participants who correctly answered all attention check questions. Only 6.9% of participants incorrectly answered one question from the attention check and 0.8% incorrectly answered two questions.

## Main effects of manipulation on inclusive identity and reconciliation

For the first analysis, I tested the main effects of counter-narrative on inclusive identity and reconciliation (See Table 4).

**Table 4.** Main effects of manipulation on outcome variables

Variable	Control n = 133		Communist Victim n = 112		Co-Victimization n = 104		F(2,346)	p	$\eta^2$
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Inclusive identity	3.52	1.26	3.47	1.24	3.82	1.29	2.49	0.08	0.01
Reparation	5.16	1.07	5.48	1.20	5.43	1.18	2.80	0.06	0.02
Equality and social integration	5.64	1.25	5.84	1.02	5.79	1.09	1.04	0.36	0.01
Prosecution	4.84	1.65	5.01	1.61	4.88	1.64	0.37	0.69	0.00
Collective action intentions	4.79	1.22	4.57	1.29	4.51	1.24	1.82	0.16	0.01

Consistent with Study 1, I found that the counter-narrative had an effect on inclusive identity,  $p = .08^1$ . However, pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni corrections showed no difference between co-victimization and communist victim conditions ( $p = .13$ ) or the control condition ( $p = .21$ ). The results also show that the effect of counter-narrative on support for reparation approached significance. Similarly, there were no significant differences between co-victimization and the control group ( $p = .21$ ) or the communist victim condition ( $p = 1.00$ ). Because the counter-narrative did not have a significant effect on inclusive identity, I did not continue with mediation tests.

Correlational analyses of the main variables showed that inclusive identity positively correlated to support for reparation, prosecution, collective action intentions, and religion

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<sup>1</sup> A significant main effect was found when including participants who incorrectly answered the attention check questions and had extreme responses,  $F(2, 376) = 4.17$ ,  $p = .02$ . The Post-Hoc tests using Bonferroni corrections showed that there was a significant difference between the co-victimization and communist victim conditions ( $p = .02$ ) and a difference approaching significance between the co-victimization and control ( $p = .08$ )

perceived as a private matter (see Table 5). Contrastingly, inclusive identity was negatively associated with political Islam and did not correlate with equality or social integration.

**Table 5.** Correlation of measured variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Inclusive identity									
2. Reparation	.34***								
3. Equality and social integration	0.08	.36***							
4. Prosecution	.18**	.54***	.12*						
5. Collective action intentions	.40***	.49**	.14**	.48***					
6. Political Islam	-.14*	-.25***	-.37***	-.10	-.11				
7. Religion as a private matter	0.19***	.20***	0.03	.14*	.21***	-.16**			


Note. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

### **Political Islam as a moderator between counter-narrative’s effects on inclusive identity**

This section tested the hypothesis that endorsement of political Islam moderated the relationship between the counter-narrative and inclusive identity. For this test, I only included participants who had completed the political Islam scale and selected Islam as their religion. I tested moderation using Process Model 1 (Hayes, 2018) with a 95% confidence interval and 5000 bootstrapping samples. Categorization of low and high endorsement of political Islam was based on  $\pm 1$  standard deviation from the mean.

The general model with counter-narratives and political Islam as predictors explained 9.4% of the variance in inclusive identity;  $R^2 = .094$ ,  $F(5, 285) = 5.93$ ,  $p = .00$ . Furthermore, I found a significant interaction between counter-narratives and the endorsement of political Islam in predicting inclusive identity. The interaction was found to significantly contribute to the explained variance of inclusive identity,  $R^2 \text{ change} = .04$ ,  $F(2, 273) = 5.79$ ,  $p = .00$ . Co-victimization had a significant on counter-narrative relative to the control condition among participants with low endorsement of political Islam, leading them to have higher inclusive

identity ( $M = 3.92$ ) compared to the control group ( $M = 3.36$ ),  $t(273) = 2.31$ ,  $p = .02$  (see Figure 1). No significant differences emerged for participants reading the communist victim counter-narrative ( $M = 3.77$ ) compared to the control condition ( $M = 3.36$ ),  $t(273) = 1.64$ ,  $p = .10$ . There were no significant differences in inclusive identity between co-victimization ( $M = 3.92$ ) and communist victim counter-narratives ( $M = 3.78$ ) among participants who did not endorse political Islam.



**Figure 1.** Counter-narrative interacting with political Islam in affecting inclusive identity

Among participants with high endorsement of political Islam a different pattern emerged. Participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative showed no significant difference in inclusive identity ( $M = 3.57$ ) relative to the control group ( $M = 3.58$ );  $t(273) = -.04$ ,  $p = .97$ . In contrast, participants reading the communist victim counter-narrative reported a significantly lower inclusive identity ( $M = 2.86$ ) compared to controls ( $M = 3.58$ );  $t(273) = -3.14$ ,  $p = .002$ . Similarly, the communist victim counter-narrative ( $M = 2.87$ ) had a lower inclusive identity compared to the co-victimization counter-narrative ( $M = 3.57$ );  $t(273) = -2.48$ ,  $p = .014$ .

Overall, the moderation analyses show that the co-victimization counter-narrative significantly affected inclusive identity, particularly among participants with low endorsement of political Islam. Higher inclusive identity was reported among participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative compared to the control participants. Among participants with high endorsement of political Islam, co-victimization did not have any significant effect on inclusive identity. The communist victim counter-narrative did not significantly affect inclusive identity among participants with low endorsement of political Islam and actually decreased inclusive identity among participants with high endorsement of political Islam. The analyses show that presenting a communist victim counter-narrative leads to significantly lower inclusive identity compared to the control and co-victimization conditions.

### **The indirect effects of inclusive identity being moderated by political Islam**

As an extension of the previous analyses, I tested to determine whether the effects of counter-narrative on the outcome variables through inclusive identity were moderated by political Islam. I tested this hypothesis using moderated mediation Model 7 of the process macro (Hayes, 2018). The results show that among participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative, the indirect effect of inclusive identity on reconciliation varied based on the extent to which they endorsed political Islam (see Table 6). Moderated mediation had a significant effect on reparation, prosecution, and collective action intentions. For these outcome variables, the indirect effect was significant among participants with low endorsements of political Islam but not for those who strongly endorsed political Islam. The index of moderated mediation was not significant for the co-victimization group. Contrasting results were found for the communist victim group to reflect that indirect effect was not significant for participants with low endorsements of political Islam. However, there was a negative indirect effect among

participants with high endorsements of political Islam qualified by a significant index of moderated mediation. In equality, the results showed that the mediational effect of co-victimization and communist victim on equality through inclusive identity did not vary based on high or low levels of political Islam. This conclusion is indicated by the non-significant index of moderated mediation for the co-victimization or communist victim conditions.

**Table 6.** Tests of moderated mediation as a function of counter-narratives and political Islam

Dependent variable	Moderator	Condition			
		Co-victimization		Communist Victim	
	Political Islam	Effect	95%CI	Effect	95%CI
Reparation	-1SD	0.16	[.01,.32]	0.12	[-.03,.28]
	+1SD	-0.00	[-.16,.32]	-0.21	[-.36,-.08]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.09	[-.21,.04]	-0.18
Equality and social integration	-1SD	0.05	[-.02,.15]	0.04	[-.02,.12]
	+1SD	0	[-.06,.07]	-0.07	[-.17,.02]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.03	[-.09,.02]	-0.06
Prosecution	-1SD	0.13	[.00,.30]	0.09	[-.02,.26]
	+1SD	0	[-.15,.14]	-0.17	[-.34,-.04]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.07	[-.20,.03]	-0.14
Collective action intentions	-1SD	0.24	[.02,.49]	0.18	[-.04,.43]
	+1SD	0	[-.26,.25]	-0.31	[-.52,-.13]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.13	[-.33,.06]	-0.27

I determined a consistent pattern among the variable support for reparation, prosecution, and collective action intentions. All of the analyses showed the indirect effects of inclusive identity for the co-victimization counter-narrative among participants with low endorsements of political Islam, while the indirect effect was absent among high endorsers of political Islam. In contrast, participants reading the communist victim counter-narrative showed the negative indirect effect of inclusive identity on the high endorsement of political Islam, while no indirect effects were found for participants with low endorsements of political Islam.

## Discussion

There is a consensus among scholars that narratives play an important role in reconciliation (Auerbach, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Kelman, 2008). However, few experimental studies have existed causal effects of narratives on the psychological process because most studies have been correlational in nature (Bilali, 2013; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, et al., 2008) or used the narrative as an outcome or mediating variable (Nasie et al., 2014). The present study aims to fill in this gap in a historical conflict that resulted in the murdering of 500,000-1,000,000 people, a context that has spurred increasing interest among scholars (McGregor et al., 2018).

The current study found that counter-narratives with messages of shared victimhood affect reconciliation created a heightened sense of inclusive identity between victims and the general public (Study 1 and 2). However, the effects of the counter-narrative were contingent on the political ideology of the participants. Strong endorsement of political Islam was shown to moderate the association between counter-narrative on inclusive identity. Individuals with lower endorsements of political Islam, reading the co-victimization counter-narrative, showed higher inclusive identity compared to the control participants. Resistance was seen among participants with strong endorsements of political Islam reading the communist victim counter-narrative. In this group, inclusive identity was significantly lower compared to the control group and the co-victimization counter-narrative. It is possible that this finding is due to the political Islam scale being positioned in the early section of the questionnaire (following background information on participants' religion). This positioning may have made salient political Islam identity, which led to more extreme responses to resisting reconciliation with ex-communists, which may be more consistent with normative attitudes among high identifiers of political Islam.

The study supports suggestions from the political solidarity model of social change (Subasic et al., 2008). A counter-narrative with messages of shared victimhood has become the basis of an inclusive identity that bridged solidarity among victim groups and the majority to challenge parties in positions of power. In addition, the resistance from specific Islamic groups aligns with the theory because these groups did not share the norms and values of the victimized groups and may have perceived communist killings as a necessary means to saving the nation from communism.

### **The shared victimhood counter-narrative as a preferable option for reconciliation**

The results of the current study support suggestions that narratives are an essential component in the process of reconciling adversaries after conflict (Auerbach, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Kelman, 2008). Furthermore, this research corroborates the findings of studies concerning the beneficial effects of shared victimhood on intergroup relations (Adelman et al., 2016; Noor et al., 2012; Subašić et al., 2011; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014; Vollhardt, 2013). Co-victimization is particularly effective in this context because reconciliation in the context of Indonesia's tragedy involves a collective struggle to unite victims and the general population to confront the authorities. The context of Indonesia's 1965 tragedy is epitomized by a social struggle to create change on the level of policy. Victim groups and activists have been advocating for their rights for decades, but the government has yet to establish the required legal mechanisms for truth telling, reparation, or formal apologies (Evanty & Pohlman, 2018). Therefore, a meaningful inclusive identity that would bind victims and members of the general public was necessary to push authorities to draft necessary laws and policies that favour reconciliation with ex-communists.

Framing the counter-narrative by emphasizing shared victimhood is also more beneficial compared to the counter-narrative explicitly mentioning communists as the sole victim. As shown in Study 2, participants in this group showed less willingness to identify with victims, particularly among participants who strongly endorsed political Islam and those with a high perceived communist threat. This finding is consistent with the social and political dynamics in Indonesia, whereby Islamist groups vocally oppose initiatives to reconciliation with former communists (Miller, 2018; Priyandita, 2016). This finding is also consistent with the moderated mediation, which showed that, among participants with high political Islam reading the communist victim narrative, the counter-narrative had a negative indirect effect on reparation in the form of lower rates of inclusive identity.

### **Limitations and future research**

One of the significant limitations of this research is the manipulation i.e. the co-victimization counter-narrative. I argue that participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative would feel increased solidarity due to feelings of a common victimhood. This counter-narrative consists of five paragraphs and a total of 450 words; the fourth paragraph explains how the communists and Indonesians were both victims of the 1965 tragedy. Due to the structure of the manipulation, it becomes difficult to ascertain which section or paragraph of the text had the most significant effect on changing perceptions toward communists. However, it must be noted that the structure of the manipulation was designed in consideration of participants' awareness of the 1965 tragedy.

The majority of the participants were students, and I anticipated varying degrees of awareness and knowledge of 1965 tragedy. Therefore, it was important to create a manipulation

that introduced the topic and also gave a rationale to the notion that both communists and Indonesians were victims. Accordingly, the first paragraph introduces the topic. The second paragraph questions official narratives and provides a critique of the long-held belief that communists were the mastermind of the 1965 tragedy. This questioning is necessary to lay the rationale behind the notion that the communists were the actual victims of the 1965 event. Having argued that the communists were victims, the following paragraph proceeds to suggest that Indonesians and communists share common victimization. The final paragraph concludes that the communists and Indonesians in general were the victims. Therefore, considering the nature of the study, which relates to a historical event and a counter-narrative that may not be readily accessible to the participants, I believe that it was necessary to use this structure to present the counter-narrative.

Another factor that may have led to the ineffectiveness of the text is the participants' perception of the voice the text represents. Hornsey and Fielding (2017), for example, state that persuasion is more possible when messages are presented by in-group sources and when the target behaviour is normative of the group. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the participants viewed the manipulations as representing the views of an in-group or an outgroup. Therefore, I aimed present the research in general and the manipulation in particular as representing the voice of a researcher interested in investigating the 1965 tragedy. I presented this information in the first section of the survey on the participant information sheet. I state that this study was being conducted as part of my PhD Thesis in the School of Psychology and Neuroscience. Furthermore, concerning the manipulation, in the body of the text, I cited views from academics both from Indonesia and the West. For example, in explaining critiques of the official account of the events, I cited Indonesian historian Asvi Warman Adam together with

Western scholars such as Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey to present the research as accommodating the voice of both local and international voices concerning the 1965 event.

Another limitation of the study concerns its limited ability to generalize findings to all Indonesians because most of the participants were students with unique characteristics of their own (Sears et al., 1986). Statistical generalization was also limited because random sampling was not employed when recruiting participants (Polit & Beck, 2010). However, the inability to conduct rigorous and representative sampling was due to practical and financial constraints. The snowball sampling technique was the most appropriate choice for this study since it allowed for the rapid collection of data with minimum costs. This sampling method was also chosen due to the somewhat sensitive nature of the study, which was evidenced by the anonymous comments delivered by participants in the online questionnaire. Because this study was the first investigating Indonesian's intentions to reconcile with communists, I was unsure as to how participants would respond to the questionnaire. A number of participants referenced the sensitive nature of the questionnaire:

“Some of the questions are too sensitive.”

“The research that you are doing is very risky.”

“This research is very interesting because it deals with parts of our nation's history that is very sensitive.”

“This research is provocative. I hope you are safe and that your research goes well, peace.”

“Any further investigation for the 1965 tragedy will receive opposition from many groups, including hard-line Islamists and the military.”

Therefore, in consideration of the practical and the sensitive nature of the study, the snowball sampling technique was deemed appropriate. The sensitive nature of the research may also have different effects on different age groups. Historical events are much more salient in the long-term memory of people aged 12-25 years because, during this phase, an individual undergoes many critical life events (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997). People who lived during this period may also prefer to avoid discussing the topic due to the negative feelings that it arouses (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997). Therefore, future studies should test these hypotheses.

Another limitation concerns the effect sizes of the counter-narratives on reconciliation. For example, the main effect of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity (Study 1  $\eta^2 = .01$ ; Study 2:  $\eta^2 = .07$ ) and reparation (Study 1  $\eta^2 = .00$ ; Study 2  $\eta^2 = .02$ ) were small. These statistics suggest that the proportion of variance that accounted for inclusive identity and reparation as coming from the counter-narrative were both below 10%. Such small effect sizes raise questions about whether the findings reported here have substantive or practical significance. However, Fritz et al., (2012) argue that it is common to obtain small effect sizes in experimental research since many factors are responsible for the variations in the dependent variables not examined in the study. Other researchers have suggested that the extent to which an effect is meaningful may vary across different research areas; small effect sizes can be impressive, particularly when occurring under unlikely circumstances (Kelley & Preacher, 2012; Prentice & Miller, 1992). Taking these points into consideration, political context in Indonesia may have prevented the production of a large effect of the counter-narrative on reconciliation. As explained in Chapter 2,

the anti-communist narrative plays a significant role in Indonesian national identity and acts of promoting communism may lead to arrests by the police. Anti-communist beliefs have also been instilled in the minds of Indonesians through educational, political, and cultural institutions. Therefore, given the Indonesian political context, I believe that the small effect is significant.

In line with the political context of the study, political Islam was found to be a key moderator on the effects of counter-narrative on reconciliation. Therefore, it may be worth testing an intervention using a normative approach. Existing research has shown that norms play a significant role in behaviours (Cialdini et al., 1991), as well as on facilitating forgiveness and collective action intentions (Stathi, Husnu, & Pendleton, 2017; Smith & Louis, 2008). The effects of these norms on behaviour have also been suggested to be influenced by social identity (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Therefore, interventions that focus on inducing normative behaviours of Muslims may increase inclusive identity and reconciliation among Muslims, particularly those with strong endorsement of political Islam. Accordingly, the next chapter further explores the role of norms in supporting reconciliation with communists.

### **Summary of findings**

The goals of the current study are threefold. The first goal is to understand the impacts of counter-narratives with messages of shared victimhood on increasing solidarity (inclusive identity). The second goal is to test a model on how counter-narratives, shared identity, and support for reconciliation are related. The third goal is to identify factors that may resist acceptance of counter-narratives. Study 1 was conducted to test the first two goals and found that counter-narratives containing information on shared victimhood had an impact on the inclusive identity of the participants; higher inclusive identity (compared to a control) was reported among

participants reading a counter-narrative. The findings are consistent with those of previous studies on fictional scenarios that posited that shared victimhood can increase solidarity (Subašić et al., 2011) and support literature that has demonstrated beneficial effects of shared victimhood in facilitating positive intergroup relations in conflict and post-conflict contexts (Adelman et al., 2016; Noor et al., 2012; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014).

Study 2 replicated the finding that the co-victimization affected reconciliation by increasing inclusive identity. Furthermore, political Islam was identified as a moderator that influenced the impact of counter-narratives on inclusive identity. Analyses of moderated mediation found that co-victimization affected reconciliation in inclusive identity, particularly among participants with low political Islam endorsement. This mediation was not found among participants with higher political Islam endorsement. The communist victim counter-narrative had adverse effects, particularly among participants with high political Islam positions. Among this subgroup, the communist victim counter-narrative led to a lower inclusive identity.

## CHAPTER 4

### USING SOCIAL NORMS TO FACILITATE RECONCILIATION

In Chapter 2, I explained how it is normative for Indonesians to hold negative attitudes toward communists, which is reflected in national laws and annual commemorations (Fakhri, 2017; Heryanto, 2006). This negativity is most apparent in laws that remain in effect to prohibit political parties from adopting communist ideologies or laws prohibiting the promotion of communism or communist activities (Wahyuningroem, 2018). Said negativity is also apparent in how leaders commemorate the events of 1965 (Fakhri, 2017). The president, for example, mentions three key messages when commemorating the events of 1965, an event referred to as *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila* (The Pancasila Sanctity Day) held on 1<sup>st</sup> October. During this event, the president reinstates his firm adherence to laws that prohibit the Indonesian Communist Party and calls upon Indonesians to not allow communism to develop (Fakhri, 2017). These examples indicate how holding negative sentiments to communists remains normative in Indonesia, a norm that makes reconciliation processes difficult (Bar-Tal et al., 2014).

However, norms can be used to facilitate reconciliation. In a study examining attitudes related with World War 2, British adults were more willing to forgive Germans for violence in World War 2 when they endorsed norms favouring contact with Germans (Stathi et al., 2017). The researchers found that these norms predicted forgiveness by reducing intergroup anxiety and enhancing the idea of a common identity. A second study was conducted in the context of the Greek Cyprus conflict. This study, in addition to replicating the patterns of the first study, also identified the psychological mechanisms that predicted support for reparation policies. Similarly, the study found that in-group contact norms predicted support for reparation policies by reducing

intergroup anxiety and threats while enhancing shared identity. Another study found how an intervention in the form of a radio broadcast was able to change prescriptive norms related to intergroup relations and trauma (intermarriage, trust to outgroup, open dissent, talking about trauma) (Paluck, 2014). The results show that participants listening to the reconciliation radio broadcast had more favourable attitudes towards norms of intermarriage with an outgroup member who was a former adversary in the conflict.

Accordingly, in this chapter, I aim to promote reconciliation by using social norms as a means of changing attitudes toward communists. In Chapter 3, I achieved this aim by presenting a co-victimization counter-narrative effective in increasing inclusive identity with ex-communists. I also found that the co-victimization counter-narrative was most effective among participants with low endorsement of political Islam and did not have any significant effect on participants with higher endorsements of political Islam. A possible reason for which the counter-narrative was ineffective for this subgroup was because it was not normative for these participants to support reconciliation with ex-communists. As discussed in Chapter 2, the conflict between Islamic groups and communists had begun even before Indonesia gained independence (Cribb, 2001). The conflict between these groups in the past was tied to ideological, cultural, and economic disputes. One important source of conflict in the past was ideological since Muslims perceived the communists as atheists (Cribb, 2001). Although there have been changes in the views related to 1965, research has shown that Muslims continue to hold on to beliefs that communists hold norms that are against religion (Putra et al., 2019; Miller, 2018).

Psychology research has shown how social norms can be employed to change attitudes and behaviours. However, there are different reasons for which social norms contribute to

attitude or behaviour change. Some theories have argued that people conform to norms because they want to receive the social benefits of conforming to what others are doing (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Other theorists have argued that social norms may influence attitudes and behaviours because people have inaccurate perceptions of social norms; therefore, social norm interventions aim to target these inaccurate perceptions (Miller & Prentice, 2016). Finally, there is the social identity account of normative influence, which suggests that people conform to the attitudes and behaviours with the group with which they internalize the attitudes and behaviours normative of the group (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Because resistance to the counter-narrative may be due to incompatibility with Islamic group norms, I use the social identity approach to formulate the hypotheses of the study. Using this theoretical perspective, I argue that presenting a counter-narrative with an additional Islamic norm manipulation may increase the counter-narratives' effectiveness in promoting reconciliation with ex-communists.

Before outlining the hypotheses, the subsequent sections in this chapter review existing literature on the role of social norms as tools of social influence. I first explain the definition of social norms before reviewing the different perspectives on social norms and how they influence attitudes and behaviours. I then discuss the role of social norms in influencing attitudes and behaviours by focusing on the social identity approach. Following this discussion, I outline the hypothesis and present the findings and the discussion.

### **Social norms and their association with attitudes and behaviours**

Cialdini and Trost (1998) define norms as rules and standards that guide and constrain behaviour. A number of authors have distinguished norms that exist on a collective level from those that operate on an individual level (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). On one hand, individuals' understandings or interpretation of these norms are perceived norms. On a collective level,

norms serve as behavioural standards that provide a guide of how group members should act. Another distinction concerning social norms is the conceptual distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini et al., 1991). Descriptive norms provide information on a behaviour, whereas injunctive norms represent a group's norms that may entail social rewards or punishments.

Correlational research that has distinguished between descriptive and injunctive norms has shown that descriptive norms interact with injunctive norms to predict behaviours. Correlational research on energy conservation behaviour has found that the relationship between descriptive norms and behaviour was strongest in individuals with high injunctive norms (Gockeritz et al., 2010). Among individuals with low injunctive norms, the relationship was also positive but weaker. Similar patterns have been found in correlational research on drinking behaviours, in that descriptive norms were more strongly associated with drinking among those with higher injunctive norms, whereas a weaker positive association was found among participants with low perceived injunctive norms (Lee et al., 2007).

Despite the existence of different conceptualizations, norms have a pervasive effect on human judgment and behaviour and aid in reducing prejudice and promoting positive behaviours such as efficient energy consumption and the moderate consumption of alcohol (Miller & Prentice, 2016; van Kleef, Gelfand, & Jetten, 2019). The following section reviews the literature on social norms and its role in affecting attitudes and behaviours.

### **Using social norms to exert influence on attitudes and behaviours**

Sherif (1936) conducted one of the classic studies investigating norms. In this experiment, participants sat in a dark room and were asked to focus on a point of light. By

staring at the light in a dark place, participants perceived it as moving. In reality, the light did not move and was instead subject to an illusion defined as the auto-kinetic effect. Participants were then asked to estimate the distance of the movement in a number of trials. Using this scenario, participants made estimations individually and further estimates in the presence of the other participants. The results show that, when participants were alone, their estimates were influenced by estimates made by their own personal estimates in previous sessions. However, when estimates were made in a group, the estimates closely resembled those of the group. Sherif (1936) interpreted these findings to demonstrate the formation of social norms in that they serve as a frame of reference when making judgments about an ambiguous stimulus.

Another classical study, conducted by Asch (1951), had eight confederates match the length of a line with one of three unequal lines; each member announced his judgment publicly. The confederates were instructed by the experimenter to intentionally make errors when matching the lines. The participant in the experiment was asked to match the lines following announcements from the eight confederates that intentionally made incorrect judgments. The researcher aimed to investigate whether the participant would succumb to the majority and follow incorrect judgments or retain independence and make correct judgments. The study found that most of the participants made correct judgments and resisted the majority's influence, though a third of participants mostly followed the judgments of the majority. Asch (1951) explains that yielding to the majority depends on the clarity of the stimulus, presence of group opposition, and the size of the opposition.

Drawing on the findings of Asch (1951), Deutsch and Gerard (1955) hypothesized that social conformity would be higher when participants were performing the tasks in the Asch

experiments in an intergroup context. In this study, the researchers used the term *social normative influence*, which is defined as the “influence to conform with the positive expectations of another” (p. 629). By positive expectations, the authors suggest that individuals experience positive feelings when conforming and negative feelings of alienation when not conforming. This research found that individuals were more likely to make errors of judgment that conformed with others’ judgment when conducting the tasks in the context of a group task as opposed to an individual task. While Deutsch and Gerard (1955) theorize that individuals are motivated to conform to others to receive social benefits, other researchers have focused on using social norms to prevent risky behaviours and promote pro-environmental behaviour. The rationale for using the norms strategy is based on the idea that individuals make inaccurate judgements of what others consider normative. Therefore, the goal of a norms intervention is to correct perceptions of these norms, which leads to the re-evaluation of attitudes and may lead to a change in behaviour (Miller & Prentice, 2016). In the case of risky behaviours (excessive drinking and sexual behaviours), interventions target biased perceptions of peers’ attitudes towards the risky behaviour (Miller & Prentice, 2016). One approach for this intervention is social norms marketing (SNM), which disseminates factual message that documents high incidence of desirable behaviour to all or members of a group (Miller & Prentice, 2016).

As well as preventing risky behaviours, social norms have also been used to promote pro-environmental behaviours. In this line of research, making injunctive norms salient (relative to descriptive norms) was more beneficial in promoting pro-environmental behaviours. Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno (1991) conducted a study on littering and conclude that both descriptive norms and injunctive norms had an effect on preventing littering. However, the experiments showed that activating injunctive norms was most likely to produce the most beneficial effects in

preventing littering behaviour. In another study, Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, and Griskevicius (2007) found that information containing descriptive norms could reduce energy consumption, particularly among participants with high baseline energy consumption. However, when participants' energy use was below public average, descriptive norms may actually have adverse effects and lead to increased energy consumption. However, when the descriptive information was paired with an injunctive norm manipulation, the negative effects were buffered such that participants with low energy use did not consume more energy.

The research reviewed introduced how social norms can be used to influence attitudes and behaviours. Inducing social norms can be effective when promoting pro-environmental behaviours and preventing undesirable behaviours such as excessive alcohol consumption and littering. One limitation of these studies is that they do not consider the effect of social identity. Psychologists have suggested that the definition of normative behaviours depends on the specific group (Louis, 2014). For example, some groups may view violence, drug consumption, and shoplifting as normative (Amiot, Sansfacon, & Louis, 2013), whereas other groups view exercise as normative (Terry & Hogg, 1996). Taking these points into consideration, the following section reviews the social identity model of normative influence.

### **Social identity models of normative influence**

The social identity model of social influence criticizes models of theories that tend to view the individual perception as more valid and normal than perceptions influenced by the group (Turner et al., 1987). The social identity model thus presents a theory of social influence grounded on self-categorization theory. One of the key processes that precede the internalization of norms is depersonalization (Turner et al., 1987), which is defined as follows:

The process of self-stereotyping, whereby people come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others. And, that depersonalization of self-perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena (social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, cooperation and altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective action, shared norms and social influence processes, etc. (p. 50)

As a result of depersonalization, individuals make judgments based on membership to an in-group and not as an individual. Once these individuals begin to define themselves within a specific category, they learn specific behaviours and attitudes that are normative or desirable and those that are distinct from the attitudes and behaviours of other social identities. Having learnt what constitutes normative attitudes and behaviours, individuals assign the norms to themselves and their behaviour to align with the normative behaviours of the group (Turner et al., 1987). A sub-theory derived from the basic process of depersonalization is the theory of referent informational influence (Turner et al., 1987), which aims to explain social influence. This theory provides an explanation as to why people tend to agree with others when making judgments about a particular stimulus. The theory holds that individuals tend to agree with the responses of ingroup members and disagree with those of outgroup members. This dynamic occurs because, when a social identity is salient, depersonalization occurs and the response of ingroup members becomes an exemplar of normative behaviour that leads the individual to align their behaviour with in-group norms.

However, the extent to which people would align their behaviours and attitudes with the ingroup norms depends on the extent to which they consider social identity an important

component of the self (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Consistent with this theorizing, research from White et al. (2009) found that participants who strongly identified with their group had higher intentions to recycle when recycling was central to their group's norms. Other tests have found that, among individuals with high group identification, there was a positive association between group norms and intention to engage in regular exercise and sun-protective behaviours, while the relationship was not found among individuals low group identification (Terry & Hogg, 1996). In addition to identification with the group, the internalization of group norms increases alignment between group norms and personal attitudes and behaviours. Amiot, Sansfaçon, and Louis, (2013) found that people were more intrinsically motivated to support harmful behaviours (fighting, consuming drugs, cheating, and shoplifting) when it aligned with their group norms.

When group norms endorse undesirable behaviours (fighting or outgroup derogation), individuals may experience conflict between personal and group norms. When participants experience a conflict between group and personal norms, they may use compartmentalization (Amiot et al., 2017), which involves individuals attributing their own discriminatory or harmful behaviours as a result of situational demands and not reflecting personal norms. However, when individuals are personally invested in an issue, conflict between personal and group norms may lead to increased motivation to support the issue. For example, when people who have positive attitudes toward pro-environmental behaviours experienced norm conflict between personal norms and group norms, there was a higher perceived effectiveness of pro-environmental actions, which mediated behavioural intentions to engage in pro-environmental activity (McDonald et al., 2013).

Research employing the social identity model has also integrated the conceptual distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms (Smith & Louis, 2008). Researchers have highlighted the importance of these distinctions because norms possess both descriptive and injunctive properties (Smith & Louis, 2008; Hogg & Reid, 2006). Hogg & Reid (2006) suggest that ingroup prototypes describe and also prescribe group behaviours. Furthermore they suggest that the prescriptive force of the prototype is likely to be stronger when an in-group is important to the person or under threat (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Smith and Louis (2008) suggest that social identity approaches to the study of norms have tended to ignore the distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms; in their empirical treatment of norms, the distinctions were not made (Smith & Louis, 2008).

Smith and Louis (2008) found important interactions between descriptive and injunctive groups norms on collective action intentions. The authors compared willingness to act among participants in a non-supportive injunctive norm condition and supportive injunctive norm condition, then testing to determine whether the magnitude of these differences was contingent on supportive or non-supportive descriptive norms. The study found that there was higher willingness to act when injunctive norms were supportive compared to when the norms were not supportive. However, the differences were more significant when descriptive norms were non-supportive compared to when they were supportive. The authors suggest that, when a group favours a particular action (injunctive norm) but group members do not take any action (descriptive norm), the individual's motivation would be boosted because they may feel more obliged to engage with the action. However, the results have not been replicated in other contexts. For example, in research about energy conservation behaviour, Smith et al. (2012) found that, when participants were exposed to a supportive descriptive norm, a supportive

injunctive norm led to higher intentions to conserve energy than a non-supportive injunctive norm. However, when the descriptive norm was non-supportive, a supportive injunctive norm did not have an effect. This finding was replicated on a non-Western sample, in which the alignment of injunctive and descriptive norms produced the most willingness to engage in energy conservation behaviour. On the other hand, when descriptive norms were unsupportive, no differences were significant between supportive and unsupportive injunctive norms (Smith et al., 2012).

Overall, existing research has found that norms have a significant effect on attitudes and behaviours and that the strength of the relationship depends on group-related factors such as identification and alignment between group and personal norms. Attitudes or behaviours that are normative to the group would be followed by its members if they feel that the group is important to them. Furthermore, when individuals experience conflicting personal and group norms, the individual may be more motivated to engage in the behaviour relevant to their personal norms. However, this motivation is produced when the behaviour in question does not align with personal norms.

### **Current study: Using norms to increase the counter-narratives' effectiveness in promoting reconciliation with ex-communists**

The principle objective of this chapter is to determine whether adding a norms manipulation to the counter-narrative would increase its effectiveness in promoting reconciliation. In pursuing this goal, I use social norms and the counter-narrative to increase effectiveness in supporting reconciliation. The strategy of using social norms is based on findings from Chapter 2, which show that the counter-narrative is ineffective among participants with high endorsements of political Islam. It is possible that resistance to the counter-narrative is

due to beliefs among participants in this subgroup, in which reconciling with communists is counter-normative. The tension between Muslims and communists has roots in the past and continues to be relevant to Indonesia's political discourse (Fealy & McGregor, 2010; Miller, 2018). Furthermore, the extent to which norms can be used to influence people depends to the extent to which they identify with the norms of a specific group (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Therefore, in this study, I present a norms manipulation, which contains information that reconciling with ex-communists is normative to the Islamic identity.

In order to achieve this goal, the current study randomly assigns participants into one of four conditions (see Table 7). The first condition is the control condition, where the participants complete the questionnaires without reading the counter-narrative. The second condition is the co-victimization counter-narrative. This counter-narrative is identical to the material used in Chapter 3. For the third and fourth condition, I use the co-victimization counter-narrative with an additional norms manipulation. The norms manipulation consists of the Islamic norms manipulation and the non-Islamic norms manipulation. The Islamic norms manipulation contains information on the active role that the Islamic organization has played in reconciling with communists. The non-Islamic norm manipulation is identical to the Islamic norm manipulation, though I changed the names of people and organizations with an Islamic tone to ones that are neutral (details of the manipulation are explained in the methods section).

**Table 7.** Experimental conditions in current study

<b>Condition 1 (Control)</b>	<b>Condition 2</b>	<b>Condition 3</b>	<b>Condition 4</b>
No manipulation	Co-victimization	Co-victimization +	Co-victimization +
		Non-Islamic norms	Islamic norms

Based on the above elaborations, I hypothesize that counter-narratives would have a significant effect on inclusive identity and reconciliation. This hypothesis is based on the studies in Chapter 3, which found that co-victimization had an effect on inclusive identity in Studies 1 and 2 (effect approaching significance). The co-victimization counter-narrative also had a significant effect on supporting equality and social integration (study 1) and support for reparation (Study 2) but did not impact support for prosecution or collective action intentions. Therefore, I predict that all co-victimization counter-narratives with and without norms manipulation (all counter-narratives) would have a significant effect on inclusive identity, support for reparation, and equality and social integration (**Hypothesis 1**).

The second hypothesis is based on the social identity approach to norms (Turner et al., 1987; Hogg & Reid, 2006), which suggests that people are subject the influence of others when they identify with an in-group. Through depersonalization, the in-group norms become part of the self, with which personal norms align. Based on this reasoning, I predict that, compared to the co-victimization counter-narrative, there would be higher ratings of inclusive identity and reconciliation (reparation and equality and social integration) among participants reading the co-victimization counter + norms manipulation (**Hypothesis 2**).

In consideration of the social identity of the participants, I predict that the co-victimization counter-narrative + Islamic norm manipulation would be higher than the co-

victimization counter-narrative + non-Islamic norm manipulation (**Hypothesis 3**). Most of the participants are Muslim, and most Indonesian Muslims consider religion an important aspect of their life (*The Age Gap in Religion around the World*, 2018). Therefore, Muslim participants should view the attitudes and behaviour of the Islamic organization as more normative and having stronger influence on attitudes compared to non-Islamic norm manipulation.

Finally, I predict that political Islam has a moderating effect in that it would interact with counter-narratives to affect inclusive identity. I predict that the most significant effects of the counter-narrative would be among participants with low endorsement of political Islam reading the co-victimization counter-narrative + Islamic norms (**Hypothesis 4**). I also predict that, among participants with high endorsement of political Islam, there would be an effect of the co-victimization + Islamic norm while the co-victimization + non-Islamic norms. Furthermore, the co-victimization counter-narrative alone will not have an effect on inclusive identity or reconciliation.

## **Study 1**

### **Methods**

#### **Participants**

Participants were recruited using a snowballing technique via the WhatsApp mobile application. These participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, namely control, co-victimization, co-victimization + non-Islamic norms, and co-victimization + Islamic norms. Participants who did not allow the researcher to analyse their data following their reading of the debriefing form (N = 12) were excluded from the research. Seven participants had extremely unusual scores (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and 101 participants failed to answer the manipulation check questions. Finally, because the main aim of this study is to investigate norms

related with an Islamic identity, I filtered out non-Muslim participants, which led to a final sample of 343 participants. Of these participants, 65.3% were female, 32.9% were male, 0.3% were of gender, and 1.5% chose not to answer. In terms of age,  $M = 21.57$ ,  $SD = 5.49$ , range: 18-68). In terms of occupation, 84.3% were students, 8.7% worked at state or private company employees, 4.7% had other occupations, and 2.3% refused to answer. In terms of education: 63% had completed senior high school, 26.2% undergraduate degree, 7.6% post graduate, 1.2% diploma, and 2% refused to answer. In terms of ethnicity, 73.7% were Javanese, 5.6% Sundanese, 1.2% Batak, 1.2%, and 15.2% were of other ethnicities. In terms of political orientation, 38.8% were pro-government, 38.1% were from the opposition, 10.8% expressed no political preference, and 12.2% refused to answer.

## **Experimental materials**

### **Co-victimization counter-narrative**

The content of the co-victimization counter-narrative is identical to that in Chapter 3. I did not include the communist victim counter-narrative in this study because its effects were counter-productive to reconciliation, particularly among high political Islam endorsers.

### **Norms manipulation**

The norms manipulation consisted of the Islamic norms manipulation and the non-Islamic norm manipulation (see Appendix). The Islamic norms manipulation explains the work of a Muslim Non-Government Organization named *Syarikat*, which has been active in organizing programmes promoting reconciliation with the victims of the 1965 tragedy. These programmes include meetings with political prisoners and religious figures, film production, and dissemination of magazines documenting the suffering experienced by these political prisoners. It also mentions the director of the *Syarikat*, Imam Muhammad Aziz, who won an international

award recognizing his work on human rights. In this Islamic norms manipulation, there was specific reference to the Islamic identity. For example, the name of the organization and the director were Islamic. The non-Islamic norms manipulation contained identical information, though all of the words with an Islamic tone were changed to a non-Islamic one. For example, the organization's name Syarikat was replaced with *Peduli* (Care) and the name of the director of the organizations was changed to Aditya Heryawan rather than Imam Muhammad Aziz.

### **Attention check**

The attention check was identical to that of Study 2, though there was an additional item asking about the organization involved in advocacy for the victims in the pro-reconciliation norm conditions. Only participants who answered all of the attention check questions correctly were included in the analyses.

### **Manipulation check**

I used the distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms. Although social identity does not make distinctions between these two norms, some researchers have demonstrated the benefits of integrating this paradigm, which shows that they may interact with one another to affect attitudes and behaviour (Smith & Louis, 2008).

*Descriptive norms.* Participants rated on a two-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) to determine the extent to which Muslims support reconciliation with the victims of the 1965 tragedy ( $r = .74$ ).

*Injunctive norms.* Participants rated on a two-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which Muslims should support reconciliation with victims of the 1965 tragedy ( $r = .83$ ).

## Measures

*Inclusive identity.* I used the inclusive identity scale developed by Subašić, Schmitt, and Reynolds (2011), a four-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) that measured the degree to which participants perceived communists as belonging to a common in-group ( $\alpha = .79$ ).

*Reparation.* Using a seven-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) participants measured their support for reparative action, including items of public apology, revision of the 1965 official narratives, ex-communist rehabilitation of reputation, and compensation ( $\alpha = .86$ ).

*Equality and social integration.* Participants indicated on a six-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) whether they supported equal rights and social inclusion to ex-communists ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

*Prosecution.* On a three-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”), participants indicated the extent to which they supported prosecution of perpetrators engaged in the murder and torture of communists ( $\alpha = .85$ ).

*Collective action intentions.* Participants rated on a four-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which they supported collective action to support communist victims ( $\alpha = .82$ ).

## Results

Prior to the analyses, I conducted a missing value analysis. I included the background variables of age, gender, occupation, ethnicity, education, religion, and political preference. The following outcome variables were included: inclusive identity; reparation; equality; prosecution; collective action intentions; injunctive norms; and descriptive norms. Missing values were found for the background variable age (0.7%), ethnicity (0.2%), political coalition (60.1%), as well as outcome variables reparation (5.4%), inclusive identity (2.2%), equality (7.2%), prosecution (5.4%), collective action intentions (7.4%), injunctive norms (7.7%), and descriptive norms (7.7%). For the outcome variables, a higher percentage of missing values corresponded to the position of the scales. Scales presented later in the questionnaire showed higher rates of missing values. I tested whether the missing values were missing completely at random using Little's MCAR test, the results of which suggest that patterns of missing values were completely at random ( $\text{Chi-square} = 42.23$ ,  $\text{df} = 38$ ,  $p = .29$ ). I followed up this analysis by imputing missing values using the expectation-maximization method for the outcome variable reparation, equality, prosecution, collective action intentions, injunctive norms, and descriptive norms.

### Manipulation check

I predicted that the non-Islamic and Islamic norm counter-narrative would increase ratings of descriptive and injunctive norms. However, I did not find that counter-narratives had a significant effect on descriptive norms ( $F(3, 400) = 0.07$ ,  $p = .98$  or injunctive norms  $F(3, 400) = 0.39$ ,  $p = .76$ ). Compared to the control condition ( $M = 4.25$ ) there was no difference in perceived descriptive norms compared to co-victimization ( $M = 4.33$ ), co-victimization + non-Islamic norm ( $M = 4.27$ ) or co-victimization + Islamic norm counter-narrative ( $M = 4.28$ ). For injunctive norms, compared to the control group ( $M = 4.75$ ), there was no difference compared

in co-victimization ( $M = 4.93$ ), co-victimization + non-Islamic norms ( $M = 4.83$ ), or co-victimization + Islamic norms ( $M = 4.91$ ).

### Effects of counter-narratives on reconciliation

**Table 8.** Main effects of counter-narratives on reconciliation

Variable	Control n = 119		Covic n = 92		Covic+NonIslam n = 67		Covic+Islam n = 65		F(3,339)	p	$\eta^2$
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Inclusive identity	3.59	1.26	3.74	1.04	3.70	1.15	3.86	1.19	1.29	0.50	0.01
Reparation	4.75	1.24	5.15	1.09	5.03	1.34	4.94	1.34	2.82	0.13	0.02
Equality and social integration	5.31	1.33	5.28	1.41	5.58	1.18	5.29	1.46	0.39	0.50	0.01
Prosecution	4.98	1.49	5.32	1.31	4.99	1.64	5.08	1.44	0.39	0.35	0.01
Collective action intention	4.59	1.28	4.70	1.21	4.65	1.39	4.64	1.34	0.82	0.95	0.00

Note.

*Covic = Covictimization*

An analysis of the main effects showed that there was no significant effect in inclusive identity or any of the reconciliation actions (see Table 8). To test the main hypothesis of this study, I conducted a contrast analysis to make specific group comparisons. In the first contrast, I compared all counter-narratives (co-victimization, co-victimization + non-Islam, co-victimization + Islam) with the control group. In the second contrast, I compared the co-victimization counter-narrative with the co-victimization + norms manipulation (Non-Islamic + Islamic norms) without including a control group. In this contrast, the Islamic and non-Islamic norms were merged. The final contrast compared the co-victimization + non-Islamic norm with the co-victimization + Islamic norm without including the control and co-victimization counter-narrative.

For the first contrast, when comparing all counter-narratives compared to the control group, I found that there was only a significant effect for reparation but no significant effect for inclusive identity, equality and social integration, prosecution, and collective action intentions (see Table 9). When comparing the co-victimization counter-narrative with the co-victimization

+ norms (Contrast 2), I did not find a significant effect for inclusive identity, reparation, equality, prosecution, or collective action intentions. Similarly, when comparing between the co-victimization + non-Islamic and co-victimization + Islamic norm counter-narrative (Contrast 3), I did not find a significant difference for inclusive identity, reparation, equality and social integration, prosecution, or collective action intentions.

**Table 9.** Contrast tests on inclusive identity and reconciliation

Variables	Contrast		Value of contrast	SE	t (339)	p
	Group 1	Group 2				
Inclusive identity	Counter-narratives	control	.53	.40	1.312	.190
	Covic	Covic + norms	.05	.16	.289	.773
	Non-Islamic norms	Islamic norms	-.16	.20	-.785	.433
Reparation	Counter-narratives	control	1.05	.39	2.69	.040
	Covic	Covic + norms	-.11	.16	-0.72	.349
	Non-Islamic norms	Islamic norms	.10	.19	0.52	.704
Equality and social integration	Counter-narratives	control	.21	.46	.455	.649
	Covic	Covic + norms	.15	.18	.813	.417
	Non-Islamic norms	Islamic norms	.29	.24	1.232	.219
Prosecution	Counter-narratives	control	.46	.50	.925	.356
	Covic	Covic + norms	-.29	.20	-1.444	.150
	Non-Islamic norms	Islamic norms	-.08	.26	-.328	.743
Collective action intentions	Counter-narratives	control	.17	.44	.385	.701
	Covic	Covic + norms	-.07	.18	-.394	.694
	Non-Islamic norms	Islamic norms	.03	.23	.145	.885

### The moderating effect of political Islam on counter-narratives

In this section, I conducted a moderation analysis with political Islam as a moderator to test Hypothesis 4. Prior to the analysis, I presented the results of the correlation analysis, which show that inclusive identity positively correlated with support for reparation, prosecution, collective action intentions, injunctive norms, and descriptive norms (see Table 10). Injunctive norms were positively associated with reparation, equality and social integration, prosecution, and collective action intentions. Descriptive norms were positively associated with reparation, prosecution, and collective action intentions.

**Table 10.** Correlation among measured variables


	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Inclusive identity							
2. Reparation	.34**						
3. Equality and social integration	0.09	.41**					
4. Prosecution	.27**	.53**	0.05				
5. Collective action intentions	0.41**	.58**	.11*	.64**			
6. Injunctive norms	.44**	.49**	.12*	.50**	.59**		
7. Descriptive norms	.28**	.29**	-.09	.34**	.47**	.58**	
8. Political Islam	0.01	-.18**	-.33**	-.12*	-.12	-.01	.14*

Note. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

Subsequently, for the moderation analyses, I used Model 1 of process using 5000 bootstrap samples and 95 percent confidence intervals. This analysis tested the effect of the experimental conditions (X) as a multi-categorical independent variable with the seven outcome variables (Y) and political Islam as the moderator (M). When investigating interactions, I drew comparisons based on the contrast tests in the previous section, namely all counter-narratives versus control, co-victimization versus co-victimization + norms (non-Islamic + Islamic norms), co-victimization + non-Islamic vs. co-victimization + Islamic norms. The analysis shows that there was an interaction between counter-narratives and political Islam for reparation, which approached conventional levels of statistical significance ( $F = 2.51, p = .06$ ). The model without the interaction term explained 7.2% of the variance in reparation ( $R^2 = .072, F(7,333) = 3.69, p = .001$ ), while inclusion of the interaction resulted in a  $R^2$  change of .021 ( $F(3,333) = 2.51$ ). However, the  $R^2$  change was only significant on .10 alpha level ( $p = .06$ ).

The analysis also shows that there was an interaction with descriptive norms ( $F = 2.94, p = .03$ ). The model without the interaction explained 4.6% of the variance in descriptive norms ( $R^2 = .046, F(7,333) = 2.29, p = .03$ ). The inclusion of the interaction increased the explained proportion of variance by 2.5%, a change that was statistically significant ( $R^2$  change = .025,  $F(3,$

333) = 2.94,  $p = .03$ ). Similarly, there was an interaction with injunctive norms ( $F = 2.38, p = .07$ ). The model without the interaction explained 2.2%, though the model was not significant ( $R^2 = .022, F(7, 333) = 1.09, p = .37$ ). Inclusion of the interaction resulted in an increased  $R^2 = .02$ , though this figure was only significant at the .10 alpha level,  $p = .07$ . No interactions were found for inclusive identity ( $F(7, 333) = 1.12, p = .34$ ), equality and social integration ( $F(7, 333) = .77, p = .51$ ), prosecution ( $F(7, 333) = 1.96, p = .12$ ), or collective action intentions  $F(7, 333) = 1.14, p = .33$ ).



**Figure 2.** Interaction between counter-narratives and political Islam on support for reparation

I probed the interaction for reparation and found that, among participants low in political Islam, all counter-narratives had a significant effect ( $M = 5.36$ ) on reparation when compared to the control condition ( $M = 4.91$ ),  $b = .46, SE = .20, t = 2.28, p = .02$  [LLCI = .06, ULCI = .85] (see Figure 2). There was no significant differences between co-victimization counter-narrative ( $M = 5.33$ ) and combined norm counter-narratives ( $M = 5.38$ ) ( $b = .05, SE = .24, t = .21, p = .83$ )


[LLCI = -.41, ULCI = .51] or between non-Islamic norm counter-narrative ( $M = 5.12$ ) and the Islamic norm counter-narrative ( $M = 5.64$ ), ( $b = .52$ ,  $SE = .32$ ,  $t = 1.64$ ,  $p = .10$ ) [LLCI = -.11, ULCI = 1.15].

Among participants with high political Islam, I found no significant difference between the control group with the co-victimization counter-narrative ( $b = .37$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = 1.49$ ,  $p = .137$ ) [LLCI = -.12, ULCI = .866], non-Islamic norm counter-narrative ( $b = .38$ ,  $SE = .27$ ,  $t = 1.42$ ,  $p = .158$ ) [LLCI = -.147, ULCI = .903], and Islamic norm counter-narrative ( $b = -.16$ ,  $SE = .26$ ,  $t = -.588$ ,  $p = .557$ ) [LLCI = -.67, ULCI = .365]. A comparison between the co-victimization counter-narrative ( $M = 4.95$ ), as well as the combined norms counter-narrative ( $M = 4.69$ ) found no significant differences ( $b = -.26$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $t = -1.13$ ,  $p = .26$ ) [LLCI = -.72, ULCI = .19]. However, there was a difference approaching significance between the two norm conditions in that the Islamic norm counter-narrative had lower support for reparation ( $M = 4.43$ ) compared to the non-Islamic norm counter-narrative ( $M = 4.96$ ) ( $b = -.53$ ,  $SE = .29$ ,  $t = -1.87$ ,  $p = .06$ ) [LLCI = -1.09, ULCI = .03].

I then probed the interaction for descriptive norms (see Figure 3). The results show that the counter-narratives had an effect approaching significance among participants with low endorsements of political Islam, and there were higher descriptive norms among participants reading the counter-narratives ( $M = 4.30$ ) compared to the control ( $M = 3.89$ ) ( $b = .41$ ,  $SE = .22$ ,  $t = 1.88$ ,  $p = .06$ ) [LLCI = -.02, ULCI = .84]. There was no significant effect when comparing the co-victimization ( $M = 4.19$ ) with co-victimization + norms ( $M = 4.35$ ) ( $b = .16$ ,  $SE = .26$ ,  $t = .62$ ,  $p = .53$ ) [LLCI = -.34, ULCI = .66]. There was an effect approaching significance between the co-victimization + non-Islam condition ( $M = 4.06$ ) and the co-victimization + Islam condition ( $M = 4.65$ ) ( $b = .58$ ,  $SE = .35$ ,  $t = 1.69$ ,  $p = .09$ ) [LLCI = -.09, ULCI = 1.27].

Re-analyses including multivariate outliers and incorrect attention check responses offered similar results. The effect of the counter-narratives compared to the control was approaching significance ( $b = .44$ ,  $SE = .24$ ,  $t = 1.86$ ,  $p = .06$ ) [LLCI =  $-.03$ , ULCI =  $.91$ ]. There was no significant effect comparing co-victimization ( $b = .29$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = 1.20$ ,  $p = .23$ ) [LLCI =  $-.19$ , ULCI =  $.79$ ]. In this analysis, there was no significant difference between the co-victimization + non-Islamic norm and the co-victimization + Islam norm ( $b = .44$ ,  $SE = .31$ ,  $t = 1.45$ ,  $p = .15$ ) [LLCI =  $-.16$ , ULCI =  $1.05$ ].

Among participants with high political Islam, there was a negative effect approaching significance when comparing all counter-narratives ( $M = 4.41$ ) with the control condition ( $M = 4.78$ ) ( $b = -.38$ ,  $SE = .22$ ,  $t = -1.68$ ,  $p = .09$ ) [LLCI =  $-.82$ , ULCI =  $.07$ ]. There was no significant effect between co-victimization ( $M = 4.51$ ) and co-victimization + norms ( $M = 4.47$ ) ( $b = -.16$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = -.62$ ,  $p = .54$ ) [LLCI =  $-.65$ , ULCI =  $.34$ ] or between co-victimization + non-Islam ( $M = 4.43$ ) and co-victimization + Islam ( $M = 4.28$ ) ( $b = -.15$ ,  $SE = .31$ ,  $t = -.49$ ,  $p = .63$ ) [LLCI =  $-.76$ , ULCI =  $.46$ ]. Re-analyses without filters offered identical results, in which the effect of the counter-narratives compared with the control was approaching significance ( $b = -.45$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = -1.79$ ,  $p = .08$ ) [LLCI =  $-.94$ , ULCI =  $.05$ ]. There was also no effect between co-victimization and co-victimization + norms counter-narratives ( $b = -.19$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = -1.78$ ,  $p = .43$ ) [LLCI =  $-.69$ , ULCI =  $.29$ ] or between co-victimization + non-Islamic norms and co-victimization + Islamic norms ( $b = .47$ ,  $SE = .29$ ,  $t = -1.64$ ,  $p = .10$ ) [LLCI =  $-1.04$ , ULCI =  $.09$ ].




**Figure 3.** Descriptive norms as a function of counter-narratives (with and without norm manipulations) and political Islam

I then probed the interaction for injunctive norms (see Figure 4). The results show that counter-narratives had an effect approaching significance among participants with low endorsement of political Islam, in that there were higher injunctive norms among participants reading the counter-narratives ( $M = 4.97$ ) compared to the control ( $M = 4.56$ ) ( $b = .42$ ,  $SE = .22$ ,  $t = 1.89$ ,  $p = .06$ ) [LLCI =  $-.02$ , ULCI =  $.85$ ]. There was no significant effect when comparing co-victimization ( $M = 4.93$ ) with co-victimization + norms ( $M = 5.00$ ) ( $b = .07$ ,  $SE = .26$ ,  $t = .28$ ,  $p = .78$ ) [LLCI =  $-.44$ , ULCI =  $.58$ ] or between co-victimization + non-Islam ( $M = 4.79$ ) and co-victimization + Islam ( $M = 5.19$ ) ( $b = .39$ ,  $SE = .35$ ,  $t = 1.13$ ,  $p = .26$ ) [LLCI =  $-.29$ , ULCI =  $1.09$ ]. Re-analyses including filters found no significant effects when comparing the counter-narratives with the control ( $b = .35$ ,  $SE = .24$ ,  $t = 1.45$ ,  $p = .15$ ) [LLCI =  $-.12$ , ULCI =  $.82$ ]. There was also no effect when comparing co-victimization with co-victimization + norms ( $b = .15$ ,  $SE$

= .25,  $t = .61$ ,  $p = .54$ ) [LLCI = -.34, ULCI = .65] or comparing co-victimization + non-Islamic norms with co-victimization + Islamic norms ( $b = -.01$ ,  $SE = .31$ ,  $t = -.03$ ,  $p = .97$ ) [LLCI = -.62, ULCI = .59].

Among participants with high political Islam, there was no significant effect when comparing all counter-narratives ( $M = 4.70$ ) with the control condition ( $M = 5.07$ ) ( $b = -.38$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $t = -1.65$ ,  $p = .10$ ) [LLCI = -.83, ULCI = .07]. There was also no significant effect between co-victimization ( $M = 4.82$ ) and co-victimization + norms ( $M = 4.64$ ) ( $b = -.18$ ,  $SE = .26$ ,  $t = -.72$ ,  $p = .47$ ) [LLCI = -.69, ULCI = .32] or between co-victimization + non-Islam ( $M = 4.67$ ) and co-victimization + Islam ( $M = 4.59$ ) ( $b = -.08$ ,  $SE = .32$ ,  $t = -.24$ ,  $p = .81$ ) [LLCI = -.69, ULCI = .55]. Re-analyses without filters found that there was an effect approaching significance when comparing all counter-narratives with the control ( $b = -.46$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = -1.84$ ,  $p = .07$ ) [LLCI = -.95, ULCI = .03]. Other comparisons were similar to previous analyses and showed no significant effects when comparing co-victimization with co-victimization + norms ( $b = -.29$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = -1.13$ ,  $p = .26$ ) [LLCI = -.78, ULCI = .21] or between co-victimization + non-Islamic norms and co-victimization + Islamic norms ( $b = -.27$ ,  $SE = .29$ ,  $t = -.94$ ,  $p = .35$ ) [LLCI = -.84, ULCI = .29].



**Figure 4.** Injunctive norms as a function of the interaction between co-victimization counter-narrative and political Islam

Contrary to my predictions (Hypothesis 4), there was no interaction between political Islam and co-victimization counter-narratives in inclusive identity. However, I found that co-victimization counter-narratives affect support for reparation. The direction of the effect was partially expected, in that co-victimization + Islam norms showed the highest support for reparation. However, among participants with high political Islam endorsements, the co-victimization + Islam condition showed lower support for reparation compared to the co-victimization + non-Islamic norm condition, indicating that Islamic norm manipulation may have counterproductive effects among high political Islam endorsers.

In addition, descriptive and injunctive norms appeared to be affected by the interaction between counter-narratives and political Islam. However, all of the effects were approaching significance. Perceived descriptive norms was higher among participants in the combined counter-narrative condition compared to controls. Furthermore, the co-victimization + Islam

condition was higher compared to co-victimization + non-Islam. Among participants with high political Islam endorsement, combined counter-narratives had a negative effect on perceived descriptive norms compared to the controls. A similar pattern was found for injunctive norm; among participants with low political Islam, there were higher perceived injunctive norms among participants in the combined counter-narrative condition. No other effects were found for injunctive norms. These findings indicate that the experimental manipulations had different effects depending on participants' levels of political Islam endorsement. Participants with low political Islam were more affected than participants with high political Islam.

### **Discussion**

The key aim of this study was to examine the effectiveness of adding norms to the counter-narrative to promote reconciliation with ex-communists. The predictions made in this chapter were grounded in theories on the social identity theory of norms, which suggest that people conform to group norms to the extent to which they identify with the group (Hogg & Reid, 2005). Four hypotheses guide the analyses in this study. Firstly, I predicted that all counter-narratives would be effective in increasing inclusive identity and reconciliation (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, I predicted that adding norms to the counter-narrative would produce higher ratings of inclusive identity and reconciliation compared to co-victimization counter-narrative alone (Hypothesis 2). Thirdly, I predicted that the co-victimization counter-narrative + Islamic norms manipulation would produce higher inclusive identity and reconciliation compared to co-victimization + non-Islamic norms (Hypothesis 3). Finally, I predicted an interaction between counter-narratives and political Islam, in that the most significant effects would be among participants with low endorsements of political Islam reading the co-victimization + Islamic norms. I also predicted that, among participants with high political Islam

endorsements, ratings of inclusive identity and reconciliation would be affected by co-victimization + Islamic norms, whereas other counter-narratives would not have an effect.

Partial support was found for Hypothesis 1, in that the combined counter-narratives affected inclusive identity and reparation. While the effect was significant for reparation, it was approaching significance for inclusive identity. No significant effects were found for equality, prosecution, and collective action intentions. Hypothesis 2 was not supported in that I did not find any significant effects when comparing co-victimization counter-narratives with co-victimization + norms manipulation. There was also no significant effect for inclusive identity and reconciliation when comparing co-victimization + non-Islamic norms and the co-victimization + Islamic norms. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. In addition, Hypothesis 4 was partially supported by the data, which suggests that counter-narratives interacted with political Islam. The direction of the results was supported among participants with low endorsements of political Islam. Within this sub-group, the combined counter-narratives had a positive effect on reparation compared to control conditions. However, there was no significant differences between co-victimization counter-narratives and the co-victimization + norms or between the co-victimization + non-Islamic norms and the co-victimization + Islamic norms counter-narratives. In contrast, the results among participants with high endorsements of political Islam were unexpected. Among participants with high political Islam endorsement, the co-victimization + Islamic norms were lower compared to the co-victimization + non-Islamic norms, with an effect approaching significance. Therefore, the Islamic norm manipulation appeared to have adverse effects on reparation among participants with high political Islam endorsements, which was contrary to our expectations.

### **The lack of a main effect for the co-victimization counter-narrative**

In contrast with Studies 1 and 2 in Chapter 3, in the current study, I did not find a main effect of the co-victimization counter-narrative on inclusive identity. One of the reasons for this finding may be due to the use of the word “victim” (unlike ex-communists as I did in Study 1) in the dependent measures, which may have caused confusion regarding who was being considered victim. This point was also mentioned in the feedback from research participants, who state that victim can mean either the communists who were massacred or to the people killed by the communists, including the six generals murdered as a result of the 30<sup>th</sup> September movement. It is reasonable to think that these individuals may be victims, particularly in intractable conflicts or post-conflict settings, where groups both try to persuade local and international communities that one group is the true victim, while the other acts as a perpetrator (Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Groups compete for the status of victimhood (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008) because it is regarded as morally superior (Noor et al., 2012). Therefore, participants in the control group may perceive the victims to be victims of communist aggression rather than the communists as the victims. In the next study, I will attempt use the term “ex-communist” again to ensure that participants understand the target group as the central object of inquiry.

### **Limitations and future research**

One limitation of this study is that the norms manipulation was added to a counter-narrative, being inserted into the final paragraph of the counter-narrative. As a consequence, it is difficult to be certain of how much attention was afforded to norms manipulation or the counter-narrative. This use is different to other research, which has employed a more direct, precise method of manipulating norms by having participants read statistics on what percentage of

students conduct or approve of a behaviour (Amiot et al., 2013, 2017; McDonald et al., 2013). Therefore, future research may use a factorial design, in which exposure to norms is presented before participants read the counter-narrative to then examine how norms interact with reception to the counter-narrative.

Secondly, the limited effectiveness of using Islamic norms to target participants with high political Islam suggest that another approach should be employed, particularly among those with low perceived social norms. One of the reasons for which these participants were not influenced by the norms approach may possibly be due to the social beliefs that they hold regarding communists. Psychologists have suggested that conflicting supporting social beliefs may become stubborn barriers to openness to counter-narratives (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). One such belief that may hinder participants' openness to counter-narratives is the belief that communists are threatening. This perception is supported by national narratives and educational institutions in Indonesia, and it is understandable that participants view the communist threat as a valid belief to which they must adhere. Therefore, in Chapter 5, I aim to manipulate perceptions of threat by presenting information that either validates or invalidates the notion that communists are threatening and tests whether this perception can increase reception of the counter-narrative.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESISTANCE TO COUNTER-NARRATIVES AS A FUNCTION OF THREAT

*We need to intensify promotion of the danger of the Neo-Communist! Don't let the Neo-Communist revive and grow stronger because they will replace Pancasila with communism like China, and they will massacre Muslims!* (Taken from tweet posted on 30 September 2018)

This tweet was posted in relation to the events of 30<sup>th</sup> September 1965, includes information about the communist threat, and suggests a call of action to intensify promotion of the danger of the neo-communist. The tweet describes the kind of threat that neo-communists present to Indonesia and explains that neo-communists intend to replace the national ideology of Pancasila with communism. Pancasila itself is based on five principles that have become the basis of the country's philosophy. These five principles include belief in a God, human civility and fairness, national unity, and deliberation to achieve consensus and social justice (Sherif et al., 1961). Among the five principles, it is perceived that communism is particularly threatening to the first principles of the belief in God because communists are equated with atheists who do not believe in God (Putra et al., 2019). The second message relates to a threat to the religious identity of Muslims, stating that the communists will massacre Muslims. This tweet captures the key issues in this chapter, namely the content of the communist threat, as well as its relation to national and religious social identity, all of which are grounded in historical context.

In the field of social psychology, threat occupies a key role in explaining attitudes and behaviours across diverse intergroup contexts. Threat to a person's religious, political, sexual, ethnic, sports identity may lead to defensive and offensive behaviours targeted at both the in-

group and outgroup (Branscombe et al., 1999). This statement is particularly true among those whose group identity occupies a central component of their personal identity. Furthermore, an outgroup's ability to threaten the distribution of economic and political resources or damage cultural norms has been found to be an important factor in explaining prejudice toward immigrants and marginalized groups (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). In societies experiencing intractable conflict, beliefs about a threatening outgroup serve important functions in fostering solidarity between in-group members but can also become an obstacle to the reconciliation processes (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Perceptions of a threat tend to make people support aggressive policies that perpetuate conflict (Huddy et al., 2005; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; 2009).

The aim of this chapter is to explore the role of threat in conflict and reconciliation processes, particularly in terms of the violence in Indonesia in 1965. Some of the specific goals include testing whether challenging beliefs of the communist threat would allow the counter-narrative to be more effective, particularly among participants with high political Islam endorsement. I attempt to achieve goal by examining two datasets. The first study uses data from Chapter 3 and focuses on the moderating effect of perceived communist threat. In this study, perceived communist threat was measured using a scale adapted to the Indonesian context. Study 2 experimentally manipulated perceived threat and investigated its interactions with political Islam to affect inclusive identity and reconciliation. Before testing the hypothesis, I reviewed literature on threat beginning with a discussion on the role of threat in intergroup relations. I then proceed to discuss threat in the context of conflict. Following this discussion, I outline the hypotheses and introduce the empirical studies used for the chapter.

## **Threat and negative perceptions of an outgroup**

In the context of intergroup relations, intergroup threats occur when one group's actions, beliefs, or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or wellbeing of another group (Riek et al., 2006). According to Stephan et al., (2009) an intergroup threat is experienced when members of one group perceive that another group is in the position to cause them harm. Threat related to physical harm or a loss of resources is referred to as a realistic threat, whereas a threat to the integrity or validity of the in-group's meaning system is referred to as a symbolic threat (Stephan et al., 2009).

One of the early theories on threat is the realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1987). This theory posits that threat emerges in the presence of intergroup conflict. This conflict is characterized by intergroup competition to acquire available but limited resources. As a result, each group perceives the competitive outgroup as a realistic threat. This theory proposes that a higher threat leads to higher hostility towards the source of the threat. The findings of Sherif et al. (1961) support this theory. In this study, two groups were formed in the context of a summer camp and competed for prizes. In order to win these prizes, the teams competed in a range of competitions, such as baseball, tug of war, touch football, tent pitching, and treasure hunt. Consistent with the researchers' predictions, engagement in this competitive context led to increased hostility between the two groups. These hostilities included verbal attacks such as name calling, as well as physical attacks such as fighting and raids of the opposition's cabins. Application of the realistic group conflict theory has also been extended to issues of racism and immigration (Bobo, 1983; Esses et al., 1998). Bobo (1983) argues that white Americans view black Americans as a realistic threat in that they may take away the values and practices that are highly regarded by the white community. Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong

(1998) argues that members of a host nation hold negative attitudes toward immigrants because they perceive that immigrants are competing for available economic resources, such as jobs, in a country.

An alternative approach to explaining intergroup threat is the symbolic racism theory, which highlights threats to cherished in-group values (Kinder & Sears, 1981). In the context of racism in the United States, Kinder and Sears (1981) argue that racist attitudes do not come from perceptions that black Americans are taking away valued resources from white Americans. However, the authors view that the negative attitude are attributed to symbolic racism, a concept defined as “resistance to change in racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate traditional American values such as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline” (p. 416). One value that Kinder and Sears (1981) argue to be threatened by black Americans is related to work ethic, specifically that people are rewarded based on the merits of their work. The authors argue that symbolic racism is evident when evaluating attitudes related to policies favouring black Americans. In a test comparing realistic group theory and symbolic racism theory, Kinder and Sears (1981) found that symbolic racism had stronger positive correlation and explained greater variance when voting for a conservative white candidate compared to a real racial threat.

Some researchers have proposed an integrative approach to the investigation of prejudice by integrating realistic and symbolic threat within an integrated framework (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) supported the study of threat using an integrative approach rather than distinguishing between different types of threat. Studies on threat using the integrated threat theory approach have found that economic and cultural threats are related to

prejudice between Mexicans and Americans (Stephan, Diaz-loving, & Duran, 2000), prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands (González et al., 2008), negative relations between Muslims and Hindus in India (Tausch et al., 2009), black and white Americans (Stephan et al., 2002), people with AIDS (Berrenberg et al., 2002), Germans and Italian/Turkish immigrants (Rohmann et al., 2006), and men and women (Stephan et al., 2000) .

According to the integrate threat theory, four threats predict prejudice, namely realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes (Stephan et al., 1998; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). Evaluation of the theory has reconsidered the position of negative stereotypes as a threat (Stephan et al., 2002). For example, tests using structural equation modelling demonstrate that a model with three threats (realistic, symbolic, and intergroup anxiety) more appropriately fit the data. Furthermore, the model also shows that the relationship between numerous antecedent variables (intergroup contact, identification with the in-group, perceived intergroup contact, inequality, and negative stereotypes) on negative attitudes towards black and white Americans were mediated by the three threats. Further reconceptualization of the theory suggests that the experience of threat can occur on a group level and an individual level (Stephan et al., 2009). Essentially, realistic and symbolic threats served as the two basic category of threats, though they can be experienced at either the group or individual level. This reconceptualization has also adjusted the role of negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety, both of which are considered as threats in earlier models of the theory. Negative stereotypes have come to be understood as an antecedent variable predicting threats, while intergroup anxiety has been understood as a subtype of threat focusing on personal anxiety when interacting with individuals from different groups (Stephan et al., 2009). The theory suggests that perceived

threats are the proximal predictors of prejudice and that the effects of numerous antecedent variables on negative outgroup attitudes are mediated by perceived threats.

Evidence to support the role of threats on predicting prejudice has come from a range of correlational research. Among American participants, perceived threat in terms of intergroup anxiety and negative stereotyping were related with negative attitudes towards Mexicans (Stephan et al., 2000). A study among Dutch participants found that perceived threats to Dutch cultural norms and values was positively related to prejudice to Muslims (González et al., 2008). Among Hindu Indians, a high status group in India, threats to cultural norms and values predicted prejudice toward Muslims (Tausch et al., 2009). On the other hand, among Indian Muslims, perceived threats to economic and political resources predicted prejudice towards Hindu Indians. Among black and white Americans, realistic and symbolic threats, as well as intergroup anxiety, were positively associated with negative racial attitudes (Stephan et al., 2002). Research has also shown that realistic, symbolic, and intergroup anxiety predicted prejudicial attitudes toward people suffering from AIDS, while negative stereotypes were a more accurate predictor of prejudice towards individuals with cancer (Berrenberg et al., 2002). McLaren (2003) found that that greater support for immigrant expulsion was positively associated with economic threat, which included items that immigrants abuse social services, education quality suffers from too many children from minority groups, and immigration increases unemployment.

Experimental evidence linking threats and prejudice comes from the classical Robber Caves Experiment, in which a competitive context increased negative outgroup attitudes and behaviours (Sherif et al., 1961). Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong (1998) conducted another

experiment by manipulating perceptions that employment opportunities were scarce and that skilled immigrants were able to compete for these jobs. The results show that participants who were induced with feelings of economic threat describe the outgroup less favourably. The threat led to weaker support for immigration to Canada and support for programmes that may improve the immigrants' ability to enter the Canadian workforce. Another study replicated this finding and found that the experimental manipulation of economic threat by immigrants reduced the willingness to support immigrant empowerment programmes compared to a control group (Jackson & Esses, 2000). Furthermore, priming participants to read an article that emphasized both realistic and symbolic threat produced more negative attitudes towards an immigrant group relative to the control group (Stephan et al., 2005). The experimental effects were not found when only realistic or symbolic threats were used. The study also found that, when negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety were manipulated, higher negative attitudes were found among participants in the high negative stereotype or high anxiety group compared to controls. Another study that primed American participants about troubling economic times (economic threat) found that these issues led participants to rate higher prejudice to competitive and threatening outgroups (Asian Americans) compared to participants from a neutral condition or global warming threats (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011).

In contrast, while a number of studies have shown how threat leads to negative outgroup attitudes, others have demonstrated how threat affects individuals' social categorization abilities. Miller, Maner, and Becker (2010) argue that threat causes self-protective responses, which affect the social categorization of an unfamiliar person. Accordingly, when threat cues are present, individuals tend to categorize an unfamiliar target person as an outgroup member rather than an in-group member. A series of experiments has supported their hypothesis; for example,

in one study, participants made more accurate responses when categorizing an angry black male as black compared to categorizations of happy black males, angry white males, and happy white males. This study also found individual-level factors that affected outgroup categorization. For example, inducing fear (relative to controls) to participants with high beliefs of a dangerous world rated angry faces as blacker. Participants with low beliefs of a dangerous world were not affected by threat manipulation. Furthermore, the final study found that the effects even extended to non-racial groups. Using the minimum group paradigm, in which participants were randomly assigned with a novel group (over-estimators vs under-estimators), participants with high beliefs of a dangerous world categorized masculinized voices (relative to unaltered voices) as outgroup members.

This review has shown that, although different approaches have been pursued in the study of threat, the general findings suggest that higher perceptions of threatening outgroup leads to a higher negative evaluation of that outgroup. This reasoning has been supported by correlational and experimental evidence. Correlational research has shown that threat contributes to intergroup tension in the context of immigration, racial, gender, and sexuality issues. While experimental research has shown that, in addition to producing intergroup hostility, threat can also influence the social categorization of other individuals. Specifically, in conflict situations, perceptions of a threatening outgroup may become an important tool in mobilizing in-group solidarity and acting as a barrier in reconciliation processes, a topic that I discuss in the following section.

### **Perceived outgroup threat as prolonging conflict**

In conflict situations, narratives of a threatening outgroup are commonly used by each party to support their goals (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Bar-Tal et al. (2014) analysed conflict-supporting narratives and found that both realistic and symbolic threats served as core themes in

these narratives. For example, in the context of the Balkan Holocaust, Serbs portrayed themselves as a vulnerable group threatened by the Islamic Albanians and Catholic Croats (MacDonald, 2002). Hammack (2009) explains how Israeli youths construct their identity based on personal narratives that frame Palestinians as an imminent threat to Jews. Furthermore, preceding the genocide on the Tutsi ethnic group, Rwandan academicians used historical narratives to present the Tutsi minority as a potential economic threat to the majority Hutu (Buckley-Zistel, 2009).

In Indonesia, although past antagonism between communists and Muslims related with realistic threats has concerned securing economic and political resources (Cribb, 2001; Mortimer, 1969) (Cribb, 2001; Mortimer, 1969), much of the present communist threat is symbolic (Putra et al, 2019). Communists are perceived to threaten the religious characteristics of Indonesia by intending to transform Indonesia into an atheist state (Putra et al., 2019). Due to this perception of threat, it is unsurprising that some Islamic organizations have been active in resisting reconciliation when interrupting events that discuss violence against communists and communist sympathizers (Fealy & McGregor, 2010; Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network, 2018). Islamic organizations such as the Islamic Defence Front have, on numerous occasions, interrupted discussions and film screenings related with the 1965 event that portray communists as victims (Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network, 2018). In addition, Fealy and McGregor (2010) state that influential members of Indonesia's largest Muslim organization *Nadhlatul Ulama* have opposed the efforts of survivor organizations to restore civil rights and opposed the drafting of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law to examine the events of 1965-1966.

Putra et al. (2019) recently interviewed religious leaders about their perceptions of the communist threat. This study found that communists were perceived by these leaders as cruel, savage, and evil, making the violence targeting the communists in the past necessary.

A number of Islamic organizations resist reconciliation with ex-communists because of their involvement in the elimination of communists in 1965 (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). Many take pride in their execution of the communists, with some claiming that it was the Muslims who were most courageous to confront the communists, the enemies of religion (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). Tense relations between Islamic organizations and communists can be traced back to 1945-1949, when Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, the *Nadhlatul Ulama* (NU) viewed communists as a political and physical threat to Muslims. In 1948, the communists aimed to take over the local government in killing Muslim party leaders and supporters, which reinforced the notion that communists were enemies of Islam. In 1965, following the failed coup that alleged communists as the masterminds, NU leaders endorsed the use of violence to eliminate communists. In particular regions such as East Java, *Ansor* (branch of the NU) played a major role in the killings, while in Central Java, there was a combination of nationalist and Islamic groups engaged in violence. In executing violence, the NU, together with the military, engaged in compiling a list of the communists, apprehending them, and executing them. In other districts, the military carried out roundups and trials, and the members of NU conducted the killings. Therefore, historical tensions between Islamic organizations and communists have been passed down to generations, making efforts of reconciliation difficult to achieve.

Psychological accounts have shown that perceived threats tend to prolong conflict because they leads individuals to support policies that sustain conflict (Gordon & Arian, 2001;

Huddy et al., 2005; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; 2009). Gordon and Arian (2001) analysed survey data among Jewish Israelis' support for the Palestinian state. The researchers found that, in 1986, despite Jewish Israelis perceiving Palestinians as highly threatening, 80% were opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state. However, as perceptions of threat declined from 1986 to 1999, more Jewish Israelis supported the establishment of a Palestinian state. In addition to this finding, Maoz and McCauley (2009) found that higher perceived threat was positively associated to support for aggressive policies towards Palestinians (Maoz & McCauley, 2009). In one study of a representative sample of Jewish Israelis, higher perceived Palestinian threat was positively associated to policies to remove Palestinians from Israel, as well as policies to support concrete coercive acts (Maoz & McCauley, 2008). In the context of United States' anti-terrorism policy, a higher perceived terrorist threat among Americans was positively associated with support for military interventions and overseas involvement (Huddy et al., 2005). A higher terrorist threat was also related to support policies to extra scrutiny targeting Arabs intending to apply for visas or who had just entered the United States. In contrast to supporting aggressive policies, a perceived threat may also sustain conflict because it results in less willingness to make compromises with an outgroup. Maoz and McCauley (2005), for example, found that higher threat beliefs among Jewish Israelis was negatively associated with a willingness to make a compromise with Palestinians on the issue of Israeli settlement.

This section has discussed how threat tends to exacerbate conflict and prevent reconciliation between groups in conflict. When perceptions of a threat are high, individuals tend to focus on actions that manage the threat, translating these actions into support for aggressive policies that target the source of threat. This pattern has been found mostly in correlational research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States' war on terror. In addition,

threat perceptions sustain conflict because groups with high threat perceptions are less willing to support compromise with an outgroup, a necessary step in reconciliation. Taking these findings into consideration alongside those of other studies, it may be argued that the lack of effectiveness of the co-victimization counter-narrative, specifically among participants with high endorsement of political Islam, may be due to the strongly held beliefs of the communist threat. This threat belief may lead participants to support policies that continue to marginalize communists and reject any form of compromise. However, there has been debate on whether the communists constitute an actual threat in Indonesia, which opens the potential to dismantle this belief to make people more receptive to information supporting reconciliation. This area is further discussed in the following section.

### **Current study: Reducing threat beliefs and increasing openness to counter-narratives in the Indonesian context**

Although the perception of the communist threat remains in Indonesia, there is potential to change these beliefs. There is strong interest in discussing the events of 1965 and making new interpretations of what occurred (McGregor, Melvin, & Pohlman, 2018). According to Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011), the rigidity of conflict-supporting beliefs are especially heightened in intractable conflicts or when the context is threatening. The situation in Indonesia is in sharp contrast with contexts experiencing ongoing protracted conflict. Even when there are instances of violence, the perpetrators are state authorities or community members committing violence against minority groups (2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia, 2018). None of those events of violence provide evidence that the communists are a real security threat. If anything, social organizations that promote reconciliation with ex-communists are those who have been subject to intimidation by security apparatus and social organizations (Southeast Asia

Freedom of Expression Network, 2018). Given the current circumstances in Indonesia, I believe that there is a large potential to disable threat beliefs toward the communists, which may make participants more receptive to counter-narratives.

Subsequently, in this section, I present my hypotheses based on a review of the threat literature, as well as findings stated in previous chapters. Before testing the effects of threat, I aim to replicate the effect of counter-narratives on reconciliation. Evidence from the two studies in Chapter 3 suggests that counter-narratives have positive effects on reconciliation. More specifically, the co-victimization counter-narrative had a significant effect on inclusive identity (Study 1) and reparation (Chapter 3 (Study 2), Chapter 4) but did not have a significant effect on prosecution or collective action intentions (Chapter 3 (Study 2), Chapter 4 (Study 1)). Consistent with these findings, I expect that counter-narratives will have a significant effect on inclusive identity and support for reparation (**Hypothesis 1**).

The second hypothesis concerns the effect of threat on inclusive identity. This relationship is supported by research that has suggested that threat affects social categorization processes (Miller et al., 2010). This research found that threat cues lead to a tendency to categorize targets as outgroup members. It is possible that communist' threat beliefs prevent participants from categorizing ex-communists into an inclusive identity as a means of self-protection from danger. Therefore, when threat beliefs are debunked, there may be greater flexibility to include ex-communists within an inclusive identity. Secondly, because high threat leads to less support for compromise (Maoz & McCauley, 2005), I also expect that lowering threat may support policies that support reconciliation. Therefore, I hypothesize that there should be a main effect of threat on inclusive identity and reparation such in that there would be higher

inclusive identity and support for reparation among participants in the low threat condition **(Hypothesis 2)**.

My third hypothesis predicts that threat moderates the effect of counter-narratives on inclusive identity. The rationale for this hypothesis is based on Miller et al. (2010), who suggest that threat cues can lead to self-protective behaviours, which lead to tendencies to associate threat cues with an outgroup. Therefore, inducing participants with beliefs of high communist threat would prevent them from developing an inclusive identity with ex-communists. Therefore, by inducing participants with perceptions that the communists are unthreatening, I predict that they would be more willing to embrace an inclusive identity with ex-communists. Therefore, I hypothesize that threat would moderate the effect of counter-narratives on inclusive identity in that it would lead to higher inclusive identity among participants in the low threat condition but not have an impact among participants in the high threat condition **(Hypothesis 3)**.

The fourth hypothesis makes predictions based on the interaction of political Islam endorsement and counter-narratives. Previous studies have found that political Islam moderated the effect of counter-narratives (Chapter 3 (Study 2)) on inclusive identity. In addition, there is support from the literature that anti-communism is associated with Indonesians who strongly identify with Islamic identity (Miller, 2018). Therefore, I predict that the counter-narrative would have an effect on inclusive identity in that it would be higher among participants with low political Islam but not have an effect among participants with high political Islam endorsement **(Hypothesis 4)**.

The fifth hypothesis predicts a three-way interaction between counter-narratives, threat, and political Islam, in that the strongest effect of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity

would be among participants in the low threat condition with a low endorsement of political Islam (**Hypothesis 5**). The counter-narrative would also have an effect on participants in the low threat condition with a high endorsement of political Islam. I also predict that the counter-narrative would not affect inclusive identity among participants in the high threat condition for both low and high political Islam.

The final hypothesis builds from the three-way interaction concerning the indirect effect of inclusive identity. Previous studies have found the counter-narrative affects reconciliation through the indirect effects of inclusive identity (Chapter 3 (Studies 1 and 2)). Therefore, I predict the strongest indirect effect of inclusive identity in predicting support for reparation and collective action intentions will be among participants with low threat and low political Islam (**Hypothesis 6**). I also predict that there will be an indirect effect among participants in the low threat and high political Islam, though I do not expect indirect effects among participants with high threat for both low and high political Islam.

### **Data from Study 2 (Chapter 3)**

This section discusses the methods and results that are relevant to threat. Thorough explanation of the methods and results of study 2 can be found in Chapter 3. Because tests of main effects of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity and reparation (Hypothesis 1) were discussed Chapter 3, I do not report those results in this section. The interactive effects of counter-narratives and political Islam are also not discussed because they were covered in Chapter 3. Therefore, this section begins with reports concerning the interactive effect of counter-narrative and threat on inclusive identity and reconciliation. More specifically, the section tests the hypothesis that counter-narratives interact with threat to affect inclusive identity (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore,

this section also tests a novel hypothesis based on a threat literature review, namely a three-way interaction between counter-narrative, political Islam, and perceived threat (Hypothesis 5).

## Methods

### Measures

*Perceived communist threat.* Two items measured the extent to which participants believed that communists posed a threat to Indonesia (“I am certain that the communists continue to be the largest threat to Indonesia”) ( $r = .64$ ).

## Results

### Correlation

The analyses shows that threat was positively correlated to political Islam and negatively correlated to support for reparation, equality and social integration, prosecution, and collective action intentions (see Table 11). Threat was not correlated to inclusive identity.

**Table 11.** Correlation between measured variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1 Threat						
2 Political Islam	.41***					
3 Inclusive identity	-.09	-.14*				
4 Reparation	-.31***	-.24***	.35***			
5 Equality and social integration	-.51***	-.37***	0.08	.34***		
6 Prosecution	-.14**	-.10	.18**	.55***	.13*	
7 Collective action intentions	-.16**	-.11	.40***	.51***	.14*	.48***


Note. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

Table 11 shows that perceived communist threat is negatively related to reparation, equality and social integration, prosecution, and collective action intentions. Furthermore, perceived threat is unrelated to inclusive identity.

### **Threat moderating the effect of counter-narrative on inclusive identity**

There was no evidence that counter-narrative had an effect on perceived communist threat,  $F(2, 346) = 1.57, p = .211$ ; therefore, I treated this variable as moderator. Moderation analyses were conducted using the Process macro (Hayes, 2018) with 5000 bootstrap samples. The model without the moderator showed that the independent variables explained 4% of the variance of inclusive identity ( $R^2 = .04, F(5, 343) = 2.84, p = .02$ ). The interaction between threat and counter-narrative explained an additional 1.7% variance of inclusive identity ( $R^2$  change = .017,  $F(2, 343) = 3.04, p = .05$ ). However, the interaction was significant at the .10 alpha level.

I probed the interaction of inclusive identity, and consistent with Hypothesis 3, I found that, among participants with low perceived communist threat who read the co-victimization counter-narrative, there was significantly higher inclusive identity ( $M = 4.01$ ) compared to the control group ( $M = 3.44$ ),  $t(343) = 2.42, p = .02$  (see Figure 5). There was no significant difference between the co-victimization ( $M = 4.01$ ) and communist victim counter-narrative ( $M = 3.75$ ),  $t(343) = -.26, p = .28, CI[-.73, .21]$ . Participants with high perceived communist threat who read the co-victimization counter-narrative showed similar ratings in inclusive identity ( $M = 3.64$ ) to the control group ( $M = 3.59$ ),  $t(343) = .24, p = .81$ , but there was a significant negative effect compared to communist victims ( $M = 3.12$ ),  $t(343) = -2.11, p = .04, CI[-1.02, -.04]$ .



**Figure 5.** Inclusive identity as a function of the interaction between counter-narrative and threat manipulation

### **Threat moderating the indirect effects of inclusive identity on reconciliation**

In this section, I test whether the effects of counter-narrative on reconciliatory outcomes through inclusive identity is moderated by perceived communist threat. In terms of reparation, I found that, among participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative, the indirect effect of inclusive identity was different depending on levels of perceived communist threat. Specifically, a positive indirect effect was significant among participants with low perceived threat, but not among those who had higher perceived threat (see Table 12 below). However, the index of the moderated mediation was not significant. There was also no significant indirect effect of inclusive identity for participants reading the communist victim counter-narrative.

**Table 12.** Indirect effect of inclusive identity as moderated by perceived communist threat

Dependent variable	Moderator	Condition			
		Co-victimization		Communist Victim	
	Threat	Effect	95%CI	Effect	95%CI
Reparation	-1SD	0.18	[.01,.36]	0.09	[-.05,.23]
	+1SD	0.02	[-.12,.17]	-0.15	[-.32,.00]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.05	[-.12,.02]	-0.07
Equality and social integration	-1SD	0.04	[-.02,.13]	0.02	[-.02,.08]
	+1SD	0	[-.04,.05]	-0.04	[-.12,.01]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.01	[-.04,.01]	-0.02
Prosecution	-1SD	0.13	[.01,.32]	0.07	[-.04,.20]
	+1SD	0.01	[-.10,.12]	-0.11	[-.27,.00]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.04	[-.11,.01]	-0.05
Collective action intentions	-1SD	0.23	[.02,.46]	0.12	[-.06,.31]
	+1SD	0.02	[-.16,.21]	-0.19	[-.42,-.00]
	Index of moderated mediation		-0.06	[-.15,.02]	-0.09

For equality and social integration, the results suggest that the indirect effect of inclusive identity was not dependent on high or low levels of perceived threat. This finding is clear through the non-significant index of moderated mediation for the co-victimization group. For prosecution, I found that, among participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative, there was a significant positive indirect effect among participants with low perceived threat but not among those with higher perceived threat. However, the index of the moderated mediation was insignificant.

In terms of collective action intentions, I found that, among participants reading the co-victimization counter-narrative, there was a significant positive indirect effect among participants with low perceived threat but not among those with a high perceived threat. However, the index of the moderated mediation was not significant. For participants reading the communist victim counter-narrative, inclusive identity had a significant negative indirect effect among participants with high political Islam endorsements, which was qualified by a significant index of moderate mediation. Finally, I tested the three-way interaction between counter-

narrative, threat, and political Islam. The overall model without the interaction explained 11.7% of the variance of inclusive identity ( $R^2 = .12$ ,  $F(11, 282) = 3.39$ ,  $p = .000$ ). However contrary to Hypothesis 5, no significant three-way interaction was found ( $R^2 = .00$ ,  $F(2,282) = .35$ ,  $p = .71$ ).

From the series of analyses, there is evidence for moderated mediation across most reconciliation variables (reparation, prosecution, and collective action intentions), in that inclusive identity had a positive indirect effect among participants who believe that communists are not threatening. In contrast, the indirect effect of inclusive identity was not significant among participants with higher perceived communist threat. However, the interpretation of the moderated mediation must be conducted with caution considering that the index of the moderated mediation was mostly non-significant. I also did not find evidence of a three-way interaction between threat and political Islam as I had predicted. Despite the weak evidence for moderated mediation and the absent three-way interaction, the analysis suggests that perceived communist threat interacts with counter-narrative to affect inclusive identity. These findings suggest that beliefs of a threatening outgroup indeed hampers reconciliation (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). The current study is limited because it relies on participants' perceptions of threat. Therefore, conclusions concerning the causal effect of threat cannot be made. The following study aims to test the causal effect on threat by experimentally manipulating communist threat.

## **Study 1**

### **Methods**

#### **Participants**

Participants were recruited through a WhatsApp link to my social networks and then assigned to one of four conditions, namely low threat, no counter-narrative; low threat and counter-narrative; high threat no counter-narrative; and high threat and counter-narrative. The screening process,

which involved excluding multivariate outliers, participants under 18, participants not consenting data usage, and those who incorrectly answered the manipulation check questions, resulted in 502 participants from 18-57 (mean age= 20.41). I adjusted extreme scores so they fell into the score range (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This sample was comprised of 179 male (35.8%) and 309 female (61.8%) participants with 1 (0.2%) participant expressed another gender and 11 unwilling to answer (2.2%). 408 participants were students (81.6%), 45 were employees from in private or state-owned enterprises (9%), 26 had other occupations (5.2%), and 21 were unwilling to answer (4.2%). In terms of educational background, 375 were senior high school graduates (75%), 84 were undergraduates (16.8%), 15 had postgraduate education (3%), 15 had a diploma (3%), 2 had completed junior high school (0.6%), 1 had completed elementary school (0.2%) and 8 (2%) participants were unwilling to answer this question. In terms of religion, 437 participants were Muslim (87.2%), 47 were Christian or Catholic (9.4%), 8 were Hindu (1.6%), 1 was Buddhist (0.2%), 1 was from another religion (0.2%) and 7 (1.4%) were unwilling to answer this question. In terms of ethnicity, 398 identified as Javanese (79.6%), 29 as Sundanese (5.8%), 10 as Chinese (2%), 9 as Batak (1.8%), 42 with other ethnicities (8.2%), and 12 were unwilling to answer this question. (2.4%). Concerning presidential preferences, 224 supported Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin (44.9%), 127 supported Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno (25.5%), 105 were unwilling to answer this question (20.8%), and 43 chose neither candidate (8.7%).

### **Research design**

The current study used a 2 x 2 factorial between-subject design with perceived threat (low vs. high threat) as the first independent variable and counter-narratives (no counter-narrative vs. co-victimization counter-narrative) as the second independent variable. Upon

completion of these tasks, participants were directed to complete the scales on outcome variables.

## **Materials**

*Threat manipulation.* Threat manipulation consisted of a slide containing information on the perceived threat posed by communists (see Appendix). The slide consisted of two pieces of information, statistical information, and descriptive information. For statistical information, a line graph was presented of trends of increasing communist activity in Indonesia (high threat) or trends in the declining number of communist activities (low threat condition) (see Appendix for full materials). The descriptive information explains the statistical information in endorsing the argument that the communist threat is high or low. A key religious leader warned to be cautious of communists (high threat) or that the communist threat was politicized to benefit politicians (low threat).

*Counter-narrative.* In this study, I use the co-victimization counter-narrative and not communist victim counter-narrative. The counter-narrative manipulation in the current study was almost identical to the co-victimization counter-narrative used in previous studies in this paper.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Some adjustments in wording have been made specifically in the final sentence of the first paragraph (changes are italicized) “Several reports convincingly confirm that the victims of the 1965 tragedy were *all Indonesian people including nationalist, religious, and communist groups.*” The final sentence of the final paragraph was also changed to “based on the emerging evidence it has now become clear that *regardless of whether you followed a communist, nationalist, or religious group, all Indonesians are true victims.*”

## Measures

*Inclusive identity.* I used the inclusive identity scale developed by Subašić et al. (2011). This four-item, seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”) measured the degree to which participants perceived the outgroup as belonging to a common in-group ( $\alpha = .80$ ).

*Reparation.* Using a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”), participants indicated level of support for eight reparative actions, including items of public apology, revision of the 1965 official narratives, ex-communist rehabilitation of reputation, and compensation ( $\alpha = .88$ ).

*Support for political Islam* (Fleischmann et al., 2011). I continued to use the two items measuring the extent to which participants support Islamic influence in political affairs ( $r = .63$ ) A sample item from this scale is “Islam should be the ultimate authority in political matters.”

*Threat.* Threat was measured using the symbolic threat scale and a perceived communist threat scale adapted to the context of the study (sample item “Indonesian norms and values are threatened by the presence of communists”). Before initiating reliability analysis, I verified the structure of the scale. Factor analyses using varimax rotation found that the threat items loaded on one dimension, which explained 64.31% of the variance. Therefore, I treated the threat items as one dimension in subsequent analyses. Reliability analyses of the threat items showed high levels of reliability ( $\alpha = .88$ ).

## Results

Missing values analyses were conducted prior to the main analyses. I included the following background variables in the analyses: age; gender; occupation; ethnicity; education; religion; and presidential choice. For the outcome variables, I included the composite variables

inclusive identity, reparation, and collective action intentions. I found missing values for reparation (2.9%), and collective action intentions (3.1%). For the background variables, I found missing values for gender (0.4%), occupation (0.4%), ethnicity (0.4%), education (0.4%), religion (0.2%), and presidential choice (0.6%). An analysis of the missing patterns using Little's MCAR test showed that the missing values appeared to be completely missing at random ( $\chi^2 = 18.86, df = 49, p = .17$ ). I conducted further analyses to illustrate the nature of the missing values. I first checked whether missing values were correlated with any of the background variables by coding participants who had a missing response for a variable as 1 and 0 for complete response. I used a Pearson correlation to determine whether there was a systematic linear relationship between missing items and background variables (age, gender, occupation, ethnicity, education, presidential choice, religion, political Islam). In this analysis, I found that the missing items on collective action did not correlate with any background variables. There was a small correlation between missing items on reparation with education, and missing items were related to lower educational backgrounds ( $r = .09, p = .04$ ).

I then determined whether the missing values were related to survey completion rates. It should be noted that the order presentation of the scales started with inclusive identity, which was followed by reparation and collective action intentions. For scale reparation and collective action intentions, participants with missing values had completion rates from 80-100%. I found that six participants with 80-81% completion rates had missing items on reparation and collective action intentions. For (four) participants with completion rates of 84%, I found that the missing items were reparation and collective action, which were at the end of the questionnaire. Due to the nature of the missing data, as well as the low proportion of missing data (below 5%), I used the expectation-maximization algorithm to impute missing values, which is preferred over

list-wise or pairwise deletion methods, which are discouraged due to the biases that the methods create (Dong & Peng, 2013; Schafer & Graham, 2002).

### Threat manipulation check

I verified whether threat manipulation had an effect on participants by determining the means of the threat between high and low threat conditions. I found a significant difference between threat ratings between participants in the high threat condition ( $M = 5.13$ ) compared to those in the low threat condition ( $(M = 4.66)$ ,  $F(1, 500) = 13.64$ ,  $p = .000$ ). This finding suggests that the threat manipulation is successful.

### Correlation among variables

**Table 13.** Correlations among measured variables

	1	2	3	4
1 Political Islam				
2 Threat	.29***			
3 Inclusive identity	-.15**	-.43***		
4 Repair	-.12*	-.39***	.44***	
5 Collective action intentions	-.06	-.10*	.21***	.46***

*Note.* \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

The results show that inclusive identity positively correlated with support for reparation and collective action intentions. Endorsement of political Islam was negatively correlated with inclusive identity and support for reparation but positively associated with perceived threat.

### Main effects of counter-narrative and threat on inclusive identity and reconciliation

I conducted a 2 x 2 factorial MANOVA with counter-narratives and threat as the independent variable, while inclusive identity and reconciliation (reparation and collective action intention) were dependent variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the counter-narrative had an

effect approaching significance on inclusive identity  $F(3,498) = 3.82, p = .05$ . Pairwise tests using Bonferroni correction showed that higher inclusive identity was present among participants who read a counter-narrative ( $M = 2.71$ ) compared to participants who did not read the counter-narrative ( $M = 2.49$ ) ( $SE = .11, p = .05$ ). Counter-narrative also had a significant effect on reparation,  $F(3,498) = 4.52, p = .03$ , in that more support for reparation was found among participants who read the counter-narrative ( $M = 4.06$ ) compared to participants who did not read the counter-narrative ( $M = 3.76$ ),  $SE = .14, p = .03$ . In contrast, the counter-narrative did not have a significant effect on collective action intentions  $F(3,498) = 2.59, p = .11$ . These findings support Hypothesis 1 and provide evidence of the benefits of using counter-narratives to promote reconciliation by facilitating a common identity with and supporting reparation for ex-communists.

Threat had an effect approaching significance on inclusive identity ( $F(3,498) = 3.26, p = .07$ ). A pairwise correction using Bonferroni tests showed that higher inclusive identity was found among participants in the low threat condition ( $M = 2.71$ ) compared to the high threat condition ( $M = 2.51$ ) ( $SE = .11, p = .07$ ). This finding supports Hypothesis 2, which suggests that threat cues are associated with social categorization (Miller et al., 2011). In this case, challenging beliefs of a communist threat leads to greater willingness to embrace a common identity with ex-communists. No significant main effects of threat was found on reparation ( $F(3,498) = .61, p = .43$ ) or collective action intention ( $F(3,498) = 1.19, p = .28$ ).

I found that the interaction between threat and counter-narrative was significant for reparation ( $F(3,498) = 4.10, p = .04, \eta^2 = .01$ ) and not significant for inclusive identity ( $F(3,498) = .11, p = .74$ ) or collective action intentions ( $F(3,498) = .35, p = .55$ ). This finding was

somewhat inconsistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the interaction would affect inclusive identity. I probed the interaction for reparation and found that counter-narratives had a significant effect on reparation among participants in the low threat condition and significant effects of the counter-narrative in the high threat condition (see Table 14).

**Table 14.** Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors of Inclusive Identity and Reconciliation

			<i>M</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>F</i> (1,498)	<i>p</i>	$\eta^2$
Inclusive Identity	Low threat	No Narrative	2.62	0.10	1.31	0.25	0.00
		Narrative	2.80	0.12			
	High Threat	No Narrative	2.38	0.11	2.62	0.11	
		Narrative	2.63	0.11			
Reparation	Low threat	No Narrative	3.67	0.13	8.58	0.00	0.02
		Narrative	4.26	0.15			
	High Threat	No Narrative	3.85	0.14	0.01	0.94	
		Narrative	3.86	0.15			
Collective action intentions	Low threat	No Narrative	4.15	0.12	2.42	0.12	0.01
		Narrative	4.43	0.13			
	High Threat	No Narrative	4.09	0.12	0.52	0.47	
		Narrative	4.21	0.13			


### Interaction between counter-narrative and political Islam

I conducted this test to replicate the findings from Study 2 (Chapter 3), which show that political Islam interacted with the counter-narrative to affect inclusive identity. Inconsistent with findings in Study 2, I found no interaction between counter-narrative and political Islam in affecting inclusive identity. The model without the interaction term was significant ( $R^2 = .04$ ,  $F(3,431) = 5.28$ ,  $p = .00$ .) The model including the interaction did not increase the explained variance in inclusive identity ( $R^2$ change = .00,  $F(1,431) = .12$ ,  $p = .91$ ).

I tested Hypothesis 5, which predicts that the interactive effects of the counter-narrative and threat on inclusive identity and reconciliation are dependent on levels of political Islam endorsement. I tested this hypothesis using Model 3 of Process with 5000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2018). The model without the inclusion of the three-way interaction explained 5.8% of the variance in inclusive identity ( $R^2 = .06$ ,  $F(7,427) = 3.89$ ,  $p = .00$ ). The model including the interaction explained an additional 1.9% of the explained variance of inclusive identity ( $R^2$ change = .019,  $F(1,427) = 8.59$ ,  $p = .00$ ).

Probing this analysis, the interaction between threat and counter-narrative was significant among participants with high endorsement of political Islam ( $b = -.84$ ,  $F(1, 427) = 6.81$ ,  $p = .009$ ) but insignificant among participants with low endorsements of political Islam,  $b = .50$ ,  $F(1, 427) = 2.43$ ,  $p = .12$ . Therefore, I probed the interaction among participants with high endorsement of political Islam. Within this subgroup, I found that counter-narrative had a significant effect among participants in the high threat condition ( $b = .58$ ,  $SE = .21$ ,  $t = 2.70$ ,  $p = .01$ ,  $CI[.16, .99]$ ), in that there was higher inclusive identity among participants reading the counter-narrative ( $M = 2.38$ ) compared to those who did not read the counter-narrative ( $M = 1.79$ ) (see Figure 6). Among participants in the low threat condition, counter-narrative did not have a significant effect on inclusive identity ( $b = -.26$ ,  $SE = .24$ ,  $t = -1.09$ ,  $p = .28$ ,  $CI[-.73, .21]$ ) with no significant differences between participants reading the counter-narrative ( $M = 2.28$ ) and those who had not read the counter-narrative ( $M = 2.54$ ). Although the two-way interaction between threat and counter-narrative was not significant among participants with low endorsement of political Islam, I probed the interaction to determine if the results were consistent with my initial predictions. The direction of the results supported the hypothesis; among participants with low endorsements of political Islam, counter-narrative had a significant effect


( $b = .54$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $t = 2.36$ ,  $p = .02$ ,  $CI[.09, .99]$ ), in that higher inclusive identity was reported among participants who read counter-narrative ( $M = 2.90$ ) compared to those who did not read the counter-narrative ( $M = 2.36$ ). In contrast, counter-narratives had no significant effect among participants with low political Islam endorsements and high threat ( $b = .04$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $t = .17$ ,  $p = .86$ ,  $CI[-.41, .48]$ ). Therefore, my predictions were partially supported. Hypothesis 5 was supported in that there was a significant three-way interaction between counter-narrative, threat and political Islam. However, contrary to my predictions, the strongest effects of the counter-narratives was found among participants with high political Islam and high threat instead of among participants with low endorsements of political Islam and low threat. Partially consistent with the hypothesis was the significant effect of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity among participants with low political Islam endorsements and low threat.



**Figure 6.** Inclusive identity as a function of three-way interaction between counter-narratives, threat and political Islam

## Effect of counter-narrative on reparation and collective action intention through inclusive identity

Following the existing findings on the three-way interaction, I tested whether the indirect effect of inclusive identity was conditional to the interactions among counter-narrative, threat, and political Islam. To test this relationship, I performed model 11 of process (Hayes, 2018) with the counter-narrative as the independent variable (X), reparation and collective action intention as the dependent variable (Y), inclusive identity as the mediator (M), and threat (W) and political Islam (Z) as moderators.



**Figure 7.** Conceptual model of moderated mediation

I found that, among participants in the low threat condition who weakly endorsed political Islam, the counter-narrative affected support for reparation by increasing inclusive identity ( $b = .29$ ,  $SE = .13$ ,  $CI[.04, .57]$ ). This indirect effect was not found among participants who strongly endorsed political Islam ( $b = -.14$ ,  $SE = .14$ ,  $CI[-.40, .12]$ ). In contrast, among participants in the high threat condition who weakly endorsed political Islam, inclusive identity did not have an indirect effect ( $b = .02$ ,  $SE = .13$ ,  $CI[-.23, .28]$ ). Inclusive identity, however, did have an indirect effect among participants with high endorsements of political Islam ( $b = .31$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $CI[.09, .54]$ ). These findings were qualified by a significant index of moderated mediation

(IMM = -.39, SE = .15, CI[-.69, -.11]). Furthermore, the significance of the index of moderated mediation was conditional on levels of political Islam endorsement, in that moderated mediation was significant among high endorsement of political Islam (IMM = -.45, SE = .18, CI[-.79, -.11]) but not among participants who had low levels of political Islam endorsement (IMM = .27, SE = .19, CI[-.09, .65]).

A similar pattern was found for collective action intentions. Among participants in the low threat condition who weakly endorsed political Islam, inclusive identity had a significant indirect effect ( $b = .12$ , SE = .06, CI[.02, .26]) but this finding was not true for high endorsers of political Islam ( $b = -.06$ , SE = .06, CI[-.18, .05]). Among participants in the high threat condition, inclusive identity had a significant indirect effect among strong endorsers of political Islam ( $b = .12$ , SE = .06, CI[.03, .24]) but not among participants with low endorsements of political Islam ( $b = .01$ , SE = .05, CI[-.10, .11]). This finding was qualified by a significant index of moderated mediation (IMM = -.16, SE = .07, CI[-.32, -.03]). Furthermore, the index of moderated mediation was conditional on endorsement levels of political Islam, in that the index of moderated mediation was significant among high endorsers of political Islam (IMM = -.18, SE = .09, CI[-.37, -.03]) but not for weak endorsers of political Islam (IMM = .11, SE = .08, CI[-.03, .29]). Overall, the results partly support the hypotheses. Firstly, consistent with Hypothesis 6, inclusive identity had an indirect effect among participants with low political Islam in the low threat condition. However, I did not expect the indirect effect of inclusive identity among participants with high threat and high political Islam. The implications of the findings are discussed as follows.

## Discussion

Certain social beliefs can function as barriers to reconciliation. One of these beliefs concerns the threat to the security of an in-group (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). In the Indonesian context, beliefs concerning the threat of communism constitute a belief that hinders reconciliation efforts. This institutionalized social belief has survived despite many countries having abandoned the perceived communist threat in place of terrorism, climate change, and cyber-security (Coats, 2018). The aim of the current research follows from previous findings in seeking a method to ameliorate resistance to counter-narratives, specifically among participants with high levels of political Islam endorsement.

Overall, there was mixed support for the hypotheses in this research. The first hypothesis was supported in that counter-narrative had a main effect on inclusive identity (approaching significance) and reparation. The direction of the effects was also consistent with the predictions, in that the counter-narrative produced higher inclusive identity and support for reparation compared to participants who had not read the counter-narrative. In addition to supporting Hypothesis 1, it also showed how counter-narratives consistently affected inclusive identity and support for reparation across different samples (Chapter 3 (Studies 1 and 2), Chapter 4), which supports findings on the benefits of using co-victimization counter-narratives to promote reconciliation (Adelman et al., 2016). Hypothesis 2 was partially supported considering that the threat manipulation affected inclusive identity (approaching significance), though it did not affect support for reparation. The effect of threat manipulation was also in the expected direction, in that higher inclusive identity was reported among participants in the low threat condition and not observed in the high threat condition. This finding is consistent with research that suggests that threat leads people to maintaining social category boundaries as a means of self-protection

(Miller et al., 2010). When threat is weakened, the tendency for outgroup categorization disappears, thereby allowing participants to include ex-communists as part of a common identity.

On the interactive effects of counter-narrative and threat (Hypothesis 3), there was mixed support. Data from Chapter 3 showed an interaction approaching significance for inclusive identity, though this interaction was not found in this chapter. However, the interaction was significant for reparation in that higher support for reparation was found among participants who had read the counter-narrative compared to participants who had not read the counter-narrative. Considering the interactive effect of the counter-narrative and political Islam (Hypothesis 4), there are conflicting results between the studies in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. In Chapter 3, the counter-narrative interacted with political Islam to affect inclusive identity, which was not found in Chapter 5. The results show that the counter-narrative had an effect on inclusive identity among participants with low political Islam endorsements, which was not significant among participants with high endorsements of political Islam. Finally, tests of the three-way interaction between counter-narrative, threat, and political Islam appeared to affect inclusive identity (Hypothesis 5), though this finding was not obtained in the study in Chapter 3. However, the direction of the results were different to the hypotheses. I predicted that the strongest effects of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity would be among participants with low political Islam endorsement and low threat. The tests, however, demonstrate that the counter-narrative had an effect among this subgroup. However, contrary to my expectations, the counter-narrative also had a significant effect among participants with high political Islam endorsement and high threat. Finally, tests of the indirect effect of inclusive identity as a function of the three-way interaction partially supported my predictions (Hypothesis 6). The indirect effect of inclusive identity on reparation and collective action intentions was significant among participants with low political

Islam endorsements and low threat to affect. However, contrary to my predictions, the indirect effect of inclusive identity was also significant among participants with high political Islam endorsements and high threat.

The evidence supports the effectiveness of counter-narratives in promoting reconciliation, as well as the effect of counter-narratives on reconciliation by increasing inclusive identity with ex-communists. This study also emphasizes counter-narratives' interactions with threat and political Islam. The study found how presenting communists as threatening is particularly beneficial among participants with high political Islam endorsements. More specifically, the counter-narrative significantly impacted inclusive identity among participants with high political Islam endorsements induced with high threat. Further discussion of this finding is as follows.

### **Threat narratives as a safeguard to threat identity among participants with high endorsement of political Islam**

Participants with high endorsements of political Islam responded to the counter-narrative when induced with high threat levels because it may relate to protection of self-identity. One theory that elaborates on the process in which people respond to threatening information is self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). According to self-affirmation theory, individuals are motivated to protect self-worth; when self-worth is under threat, individuals engage in defensive responses as a way to restore their self-worth. The research has found that threats are not limited to the individual. Instead, when social identity is under threat than similar defensive responses may occur (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). The findings of previous studies suggest that participants with high endorsements of political Islam are particularly resistant to counter-narratives that explicitly support communists (Study 2). The findings suggest that the anti-

communist narrative appears to occupy an important place in the social identity of political Islam endorsers. This representation is reasonable because the anti-communist narrative justifies the involvement of Islamic organizations in the killings of communists in 1965 (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). Therefore, challenging the anti-communist narrative may jeopardize the moral identity of participants with high political Islam endorsements (Branscombe et al., 1999). One of the most clear examples of defensive behaviour is recorded in Study 2, in which participants with high political Islam gave significantly lower ratings of inclusive identity compared to control participants when presented with a counter-narrative explicitly referring to communists as victims.

Resistance towards threatening information can be partly explained with self-affirmation theory. One of the primary premises of the theory is that people are motivated to protect self-integrity, particularly when it is under attack (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Self-affirmation theory asserts that, when people experience threat to a self-integrity, they restore said self-integrity by considering important values irrelevant to the threat. This consideration allows people to maintain self-worth, allowing them to respond to threatening information more openly. Research on self-affirmation proceeds by having participants engage in self-affirmation and then evaluating a report. Researchers have observed whether participants' openness to the report can be attributed to self-affirmation. In the studies, self-affirmation is confirmed by having participants spend 10-15 minutes writing an essay about something that is important to them. Cohen et al. (2007) found that, when Americans who identified as patriots were self-affirmed, they expressed more positive attitudes towards a report critical to their identity compared to patriots who were not self-affirmed. This study also found that pro-choice participants who engaged in self-affirmation were willing to make more concessions to a Republican confederate

when negotiating. Self-affirmation led to increased openness to the counter-narrative because of reduced preoccupation with the threat to identity, led to a broadening of perspectives when processing certain information (Sherman, 2013).

Despite the participants with high political Islam showing more openness towards threatening information, I cannot ascertain whether this openness was because of self-affirmation. When people engage in self-affirmation, they aspects of themselves unrelated to the threat (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). This focus may mean emphasizing values that are important to the individual, such as family values, religion, and positive self-enhancing thoughts in terms of sensitive issues such as safe sex, smoking, alcohol, abortion, or other issues that may induce threat. In self-affirmation studies, individuals consider these values through writing exercises, whereas the participants in this study were presented with the information. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether this information led participants engage in self-affirmation.

Another way of understanding the findings is through the management of root attitudes that may motivate resistance to threatening information (Hornsey & Fielding, 2017). Attitude roots refer to underlying fears, ideologies, worldviews, vested interests, and identity needs that sustain and motivate attitudes (Hornsey & Fielding, 2017). It is proposed that individuals reject efforts of persuasion to protect these root attitudes. Therefore, it is less effective to persuade those who adhere to particular 'root attitudes' by directly attacking their core attitudes as it leads to resistance. In this study, presenting participants with communist threat information may validate their social beliefs, making them more open to the counter-narrative.

An example of this method was used in relation with pro-environmental attitudes between liberal and conservative participants (Feinberg & Willer, 2013). Feinberg and Willer

(2013) found that framing a pro-environmental message that aligned with the moral dimensions of liberal and conservative participants led to higher support for pro-environmental actions. Whereas liberals were more likely to be persuaded by messages that emphasized morality in terms of harm and care toward the environment, conservatives were persuaded by messages that focused on morality dimensions of purity/sanctity. It was found that conservative participants who viewed information with messages of purity/sanctity showed higher support for pro-environmental legislation compared to conservative participants in the control group or participants who viewed information through a harm/care morality dimension. Liberals, in contrast, did not differ in levels of support for pro-environmental legislation based on whether they had read a neutral, harm/care, or purity/sanctity moral message.

### **Counter-narratives effect on reconciliation and the mediating effects of inclusive identity**

Although not all of the hypotheses were supported, this study provides further evidence to support the idea that counter-narratives affect reconciliation by increasing inclusive identity. This study offered a model that was appropriate for participants with low and high endorsements of political Islam. In this study, I found that the significance of the mediation model was contingent upon level of political Islam endorsement and threat. While the mediation model with low threat was significant among participants with low endorsements of political Islam, in contrast, a high threat condition produced a significant mediational effect of inclusive identity among participants with high endorsements of political Islam. Therefore, the findings support the political solidarity model (Subasic et al., 2008), in which inclusive identity between majority groups and victims are important in supporting actions that challenge authorities to accommodate the rights of victim groups. The findings also support psychology research and theory, which

highlights the importance of adopting a common identity approach to facilitate reconciliation between groups in conflict (Gaertner et al., 1993; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008).

### **Limitations and directions for future research**

The major limitation of this study is that the findings were unable to empirically explain why the counter-narrative had a significant effect among participants with high political Islam endorsements in the high threat condition. The self-affirmation theory suggests that this finding may be due to the increased openness to arguments, which is contrary to participants' position due to the amelioration of identity threat. However, unless I measured variables such as openness to counter-narrative, I cannot be certain of the mechanisms that operated in this study. Therefore, future research should include measures of openness to counter-narrative to more accurately understand the mechanisms at work. Furthermore, in order to ascertain the patterns of the results, replication is needed. Because the effect sizes in general are small, I cannot rule out the possibility that the results were due to sampling error or statistical artefacts. One of the practical implications of this study is the importance of considering the characteristics of the audience when attempting to promote specific messages. This study suggests that aligning messages with the world view of specific groups may increase openness to the message, particularly when messages may have negative implications for social identity.

## CHAPTER 6

### GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Conflicts incur significant economic and psychological costs to society, and their impacts may affect surrounding communities and countries (World Bank Group, 2018). Conflicts also have psychological consequences that cause communities to preserve feelings of distrust and hold negative perceptions of an outgroup, even after the conflict ends (Noor et al., 2008). These negative perceptions may polarize society and, coupled with other factors such as structural inequality, generate the conditions for future breakouts of conflict (World Bank Group, 2018). Preventing future conflicts and the devastation that accompanies conflicts entails discussion of reconciliation.

In promoting reconciliation, a number of scholars have highlighted the key role of using counter-narratives (Auerbach, 2009; Kelman, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2014). This approach recognizes that groups in conflict may hold varying beliefs about who initiated the conflict and the real victims. These beliefs are important in each group's social identity; negating one's narratives may be perceived as an attack to a group's social identity (Bar-Tal et al. 2014). Therefore, psychologists have argued that reconciliation requires both parties to respect the narrative of the other even if they do not agree with it (Kelman, 2008). Auerbach (2009) argues that a narrative-focused reconciliation process involves a number of stages. The first stage is acquaintance with the outgroup's narrative. Successive stages progress from acquaintance to respect of an outgroup's narrative, acknowledgment of in-group's responsibility, and the construction of a new narrative that accommodates the interests of both parties.

Although psychologists have emphasized the importance of using counter-narratives to promote reconciliation, there has been limited research to explain the conditions and mechanisms that determine how counter-narratives can be used most effectively. This research is particularly important given the mixed findings on the effectiveness of counter-narratives, with some showing beneficial results (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004) and others showing limited effects (Hammack, 2009). Furthermore, most of the research on counter-narratives is either correlational (Bilali, 2013; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011) or qualitative (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Hammack, 2009), with only a few experimental studies (Adelman et al., 2016). It is also more common for research on counter-narratives to be conducted on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, research in a different cultural context may provide additional insights into how counter-narratives can most effectively be utilized. The research presented here is conducted in the context of Indonesia's past persecution of communists. One of the barriers to reconciliation in Indonesia has been the national narrative regarding the 1965 tragedy, which legitimizes anti-communist sentiment until today. Therefore, challenging the national narrative is an important stage of the reconciliation process in which counter-narratives play a role. This paper investigated when counter-narratives are most effective and the psychological processes involved. This chapter summarizes findings from the four experiments that collected data from 1,620 participants.

### **Key findings and contribution of thesis**

*Co-victimization counter-narratives as a tool to promote reconciliation and the mediating role of inclusive identity*

The primary aim of this paper was to investigate relevant psychological mechanisms, as well as the conditions that increase the counter-narratives' effectiveness in promoting reconciliation. In this study, reconciliation consists of a range of outcomes that include support

for reparation, equality, and social integration with ex-communists, the prosecution of perpetrators, and collective action intentions to support victims. I first tested whether a counter-narrative that promoted an inclusive identity of mutual victimhood could more effectively promote inclusive identity compared to a control group and a narrative based on exclusive communist victimhood. The first study found that the co-victimization and communist victim counter-narrative increased inclusive identity compared to the control group. However, no differences were found between the co-victimization and the communist victim counter-narrative. I then revised the manipulation to make the salience of a common identity more pronounced in the co-victimization counter-narrative. Revising the manipulation led to a significant difference between the co-victimization counter-narrative and the communist victim counter-narrative in the second study in Chapter 3.

Furthermore, this thesis found that a co-victimization counter-narrative affects reconciliation, either directly or indirectly, through inclusive identity. The co-victimization counter-narrative only had a direct effect on support for reparation (approaching significance for Study 2 (Chapter 2) and significant for Study in Chapters 3 and 4). Among the other reconciliation variables (equality and social integration, prosecution, collective action intentions), the effect of co-victimization counter-narrative operated indirectly through inclusive identity. This finding was supported in Study 1, though, in subsequent studies, the indirect effect of inclusive identity was moderated by political Islam endorsement. This finding was also obtained in Study 2 (Chapter 3), where the indirect effect of inclusive identity was significant among participants with low endorsements of political Islam. This result was also found in the threat experiment (Chapter 5) among participants with low endorsements of political Islam exposed to low threat manipulation. This indirect effect was also significant among participants

with high endorsements of political Islam who had received the high threat manipulation.

However, in this study in Chapter 4, I did not find that inclusive identity had indirect effects.

The findings support the political solidarity model, which highlights the importance of an inclusive identity to support social change (Subasic et al., 2008). This theory also supports the notion that enhancing inclusive identity is important in challenging policies that legitimize the marginalization of specific communities. This research also supports a theory that posits that collective victimhood may not necessarily be negative in intergroup relations. Research, for example, has shown that beliefs of collective victimhood tend to sustain conflict (Bar-Tal, check again), while others have stated that it can promote positive intergroup relations (Vollhardt, 2012). In these studies, the positive effects of collective victimhood depend on the level of construal. The adverse effects of collective victimhood are likely to occur when groups view the in-group as exclusive victims of a conflict. However, when group members construe that they are victims on a more abstract level based on humanity or national identity (as opposed to ethnic identity or religion), positive intergroup relations may be promoted. The findings support the reasoning of Vollhardt (2012), who argues that the co-victimization counter-narrative is more effective in increasing inclusive identity and supporting reparation for ex-communists. On the other hand, a counter-narrative that focused exclusively on communist victimhood hindered inclusive identity among participants who strongly endorsed political Islam.

Another contribution of this study is the identification of an additional moderator between counter-narrative and reconciliation. Adelman et al. (2016) identified that co-victimization counter-narratives had a limited impact when Jewish participants were concerned with obtaining support from third parties to support Israeli. The current study identifies political

Islam as a significant moderator in the relationship between counter-narratives and reconciliation. This findings are in line with research emphasizing strong in-group identification as a negative predictor of reconciliation (Noor et al., 2008; Bilali, 2013). The findings suggest that participants with high political Islam were particularly resistant to both counter-narratives. Though the co-victimization counter-narrative did not have a significant effect, the communist victim counter-narrative reduced inclusive identity with ex-communists. Given the resistance to the counter-narrative from participants with high political Islam endorsements, it is necessary to investigate the ways in which co-victimization counter-narratives can be improved to affect participants regardless of political Islam endorsement. I argue that a co-victimization counter-narrative paired with a norms manipulation may increase the effectiveness of the counter-narrative, particularly among participants with high endorsements of political Islam. This question is discussed in the next section, which constitutes a key contribution of the thesis.

*Adding norms to increase co-victimization counter-narratives to promote reconciliation*

According to the social identity approach to norms, individuals follow the norms of a particular group because they internalize attitudes and behaviours prototypical of the group that are shared among its members (Hogg & Reid, 2006). I adopted this approach in Study 3 to test whether pairing the co-victimization narrative with a norms manipulation would make it more effective in promoting reconciliation. Using the norms manipulation was particularly important to target participants with high political Islam endorsements. I reasoned that resistance to the co-victimization counter-narrative was due to perceptions that the counter-narrative went against the norms of the group. Therefore, I created a norms manipulation that contained information on an Islamic organization actively engaged in reconciling with ex-communists. The goal of this

manipulation was to present reconciling with communists as normative to Islamic groups, which would make participants with high political Islam more receptive to the co-victimization counter-narrative.

I conducted contrast tests to determine whether the norms manipulation had any other effect on the co-victimization counter-narrative. The first contrast tested the effect of the variations in the co-victimization counter-narrative (with and without norms manipulation) on reconciliation. The second contrast tested differences between the co-victimization counter-narrative and the co-victimization + norms manipulation (non-Islamic and Islamic norms manipulation). The final contrast tested differences between the co-victimization counter-narrative with non-Islamic and Islamic norms manipulation. The results do not support the hypothesis that norms manipulation had an additional effect on reconciliation. The contrasts showed, however, that the combined counter-narrative had an effect approaching significance for inclusive identity and the effect was significant for reparation. Tests of contrasts of the additional effects of the norms manipulation compared with the co-victimization counter-narrative alone or when comparing between the non-Islamic and Islamic norms manipulation offered significant results. Furthermore, consistent with previous literature, combined counter-narratives were more effective among participants with low endorsements of political Islam and ineffective among participants with high political Islam endorsements.

#### *The role of threat in resistance to counter-narratives*

Psychologists have found that intergroup threat can emerge as a result of competition for scarce resources or a threat to the values of the in-group (LeVine & Campbell, 1987; Kinder & Sears, 1988; Stephan & Stephan, 1998). The theories have posited that higher threat leads to

higher negative attitudes towards the source of the threat. In conflict, beliefs of a threatening outgroup serve important personal functions to make sense of a conflict and increase in-group solidarity (Bar-Tal et al, 2014). These threat beliefs may become particularly negative in reconciliation because they prevent individuals from thinking openly to understand an adversary's perspective of the conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Guided by these theories, I hypothesized that threat moderated the effect of counter-narratives such that individuals who perceived a low communist threat would be affected by the counter-narrative compared to participants with high perceptions of a low threat. Both correlational and experimental evidence supports the propositions of the threat theories such that the counter-narrative had an impact on inclusive identity (effect approaching significance in experimentally induced threat).

When considering the three-way interaction between counter-narrative, threat, and political Islam, the relationship between threat and reconciliation was more complex. Contrary to my predictions, participants with high endorsements of political Islam responded to the high threat manipulation, which resulted in a significant effect of the counter-narrative on ratings of inclusive identity with ex-communists, whereas the counter-narrative had no effect on the low threat condition. The findings support conceptualizations of threat as a social belief that may be important to specific social identities. Some of the evidence coincides with this finding. For example, correlational analyses in both studies showed that perceived communist threat was associated with higher endorsements of political Islam (Study 1:  $r = .41$ ; Study 2:  $r = .29$ ). Hornsey and Fielding (2017) argue that attitudes may be based on particular worldviews or ideologies. Attempts to undermine or falsify these attitudes may lead people to resist and protect their worldviews. Therefore, the authors suggest that persuading particular groups should avoid attacking core beliefs and that messages be tailored to meet a group's social identity needs. In

this study, it may be argued that presenting low threat presented an attack to the core worldview, which led to resistance. On the other hand, presenting communists as a high threat made participants more open to the counter-narrative. This finding highlights the importance of accommodating to the social identity needs of groups when presenting a counter-narrative promoting reconciliation. Because reconciliation may have a negative impact to the moral identity of groups (Branscombe et al, 1999; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), there needs to be particular sensitivity when attempting to change beliefs that promote reconciliation.

### **Limitations, future directions, and practical recommendations**

The goal of the paper was to test the mechanisms and conditions that facilitate counter-narratives' effectiveness in promoting reconciliation with Indonesian ex-communists. The results show that counter-narratives that emphasize mutual victimhood (co-victimization) are more effective in increasing inclusive identity compared to counter-narratives based on exclusive communist victimhood. Furthermore, co-victimization counter-narratives affect reconciliation through the indirect effects of inclusive identity. However, the indirect effect of inclusive identity is contingent on identification with political Islam. While the indirect effect was significant among participants with low endorsements of political Islam, it was not the case among participants with high endorsement of political Islam. To confront resistance to the counter-narrative among participants with high endorsements of political Islam, I investigated the potential influential role of social norms. The results of the analyses suggest that participants with high endorsements of political Islam who view reconciliation with communists as normative respond to a co-victimization with a non-Islamic norm or a co-victimization counter-narrative without a norms manipulation, while no effect was found for a co-victimization counter-narrative with an Islamic norms manipulation. On the other hand, co-victimization

counter-narratives did not affect participants with high political Islam endorsements who did not view reconciliation with ex-communists as normative. The final experiment aimed to examine the role of threat, the results of which show that inducing low threat increased the effectiveness of the counter-narrative in promoting reconciliation among participants with low endorsements of political Islam. In contrast, inducing high threat increased the effectiveness of the counter-narratives in reconciliation among participants with high endorsements of political Islam.

These findings must be interpreted in light of the limitations of this research. One of the limitations concerns the manipulation that seeks to shift attitudes by presenting a counter-narrative containing information on shared victimization. However, information about shared victimization was presented at the end of the manipulation text; this additional paragraph was only added for the co-victimization condition. The preceding paragraphs provided explanations about the conflict and a critique of the official account of the 1965 events. Therefore, there is a degree of uncertainty as to which aspects of the text were most effective in promoting reconciliation attitudes. Hence, in acknowledgment of this limitation, future research should provide a clearer test of shared victimization with more precise manipulation of shared victimization. Future research may present a manipulation that directly highlights shared victimization between Indonesians and the ex-communists without including information that criticizes the official accounts of the 1965 events.

Similar issues of manipulation also apply to the empirical study in Chapter 3, which concerns the manipulation of norms. In the studies, norms were integrated with the co-victimization narrative. As a result, the effect of the co-victimization counter-narrative may have affected participants' responses to the norms manipulation. To disentangle the effects of norms

and the co-victimization counter-narrative, future studies may present the norms that followed the presentation of the counter-narratives. The design may adopt the model of Smith and Louis (2008), in which both supportive and unsupportive descriptive and injunctive norms were manipulated to observe how they affected reconciliation.

The limitations of the manipulation may have affected its ability to influence attitudes towards reconciliation. These limitations are reflected in findings with significance levels slightly above the conventional .05 alpha level, as well as the small effects of the manipulation on the dependent variables. Regarding the effect of the counter-narrative on inclusive identity, most of the studies had main effects with significance levels above .05 (Chapter 3 (Study 2)  $p = .08$ , Chapter 4 (Study 1)  $p = .50$ ). Effect sizes were also small for example in Study 1 in Chapter 1, in which the counter-narrative explained 7% of the variance in inclusive identity ( $\eta^2 = .07$ ), In Study 2 of Chapter 1 and Study 1 of Chapter 3, only 1% of the variance was explained in inclusive identity. Similar patterns were found for moderation analyses. For example, the model including the interaction between counter-narrative and political Islam explained 13.4% of the variance (Study 2) but only 9.3% in Chapter 3,  $p = .06$ . In the study of threat, the model including the three-way interaction between counter-narrative, political Islam, and threat explained 7.7% of the variance in inclusive identity. What these results show is that counter-narratives only account for a small proportion of the variance in inclusive identity. Therefore, other variables should be considered when promoting reconciliation with Indonesian ex-communists.

The exploration of other variables is particularly relevant in Chapter 5, where there remains uncertainty as to what led participants with high political Islam endorsements to be affected by counter-narratives when induced with high threat. I hypothesize that this finding may

be due to the protection from identity threat, which leads to increasing openness to the counter-narrative, as suggested by self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Future research should include measures of openness following the presentation of the counter-narrative to provide evidence as to why the high threat levels led to higher receptiveness to the counter-narrative.

Another limitation concerns the recruiting methods, specifically snowball sampling. Most of the participants in the study were university students, and only a small number of individuals from older generational cohorts participated. Due to this sampling strategy, I cannot make generalizations beyond the sample of the study. Future research should, therefore, acquire participants from a representative sample consisting of members of the general population. Future research may explore the responses from older individuals because their proximity to the events may have more significant effects on their psychological state. These individuals have also been subject to more intense forms of government propaganda related to the demonization of communists. For example the film *Treason of the 30<sup>th</sup> September Movement*, which has been criticized as blatant government propaganda, was no longer compulsory viewing in 1998, meaning that the events may have lesser relevance to younger Indonesians.

Despite the limitations of the paper, I believe that it provides valuable insights into how counter-narratives can promote reconciliation. Because reconciliation research on the Indonesian tragedy of 1965 has been afforded limited attention in psychology, the topic must still be explored. My findings demonstrated that presenting shared victimization counter-narratives has the potential to promote reconciliation. Because counter-narratives have had limited effects due to small effect sizes, the power of the official narratives has been instilled in the minds of

Indonesians. This finding resonates with the suggestion of Bar-Tal et al., (2014), who mention that the emergence of counter-narratives is met with opposition, particularly from parties who support the dominant or official narrative. Given the specific circumstances in Indonesian, whereby laws still prohibit communism and efforts to uphold the official narratives are strong, the fact that counter-narratives had an effect, even a small one, is notable.

The findings of this research provide practical recommendations, particularly for parties concerned with reconciliation, including both government and non-government institutions. Efforts to present counter-narratives have often been met with protests from social organizations against steps to correct the past. Among the social organizations against reconciliation, Islamic organizations have been particularly active in these protests. The current research highlights means of presenting a counter-narrative that lead to less resistance from participants with strong political Islam endorsements. Firstly, there are concerns with the issue of victims. This thesis recommends using the inclusive term “Indonesians” as opposed to “ex-communists” as victims. Using the term “ex-communists” has led to resistance, which is indicated by lower ratings of inclusive identity. Therefore, when presenting information about the 500,000 people killed, I recommend stating that 500,000 Indonesians were killed as opposed to 500,000 communists. This language change is beneficial because the official narrative does not explicitly mention that there were any killings following the 30<sup>th</sup> September coup (Roosa, 2016). Therefore, information highlighting the killings is important and must be treated care to avoid angry protests that lead to rejection.

## Conclusion

This thesis constitutes a preliminary analysis of the effect of shared victimization counter-narratives on reconciliation in the Indonesian tragedy of 1965. The findings suggest that shared-victimization counter-narratives do have an effect on reconciliation in terms of support for reparative actions, prosecution, equality and social integration, and collective action intentions. However, the effects are mostly indirect in that shared victimization counter-narratives' effects on reconciliation work by enhancing inclusive identity with ex-communists. The effect of counter-narratives on inclusive identity is contingent on political Islam and perceived communist threat. Though the indirect effects of inclusive identity was present among participants with low political Islam and low perceived threat, this indirect effect was not evident among participants with high political Islam endorsements or high threat. I followed up this study with an investigation of norms in order to determine whether including norms in the counter-narrative would enhance its effectiveness, particularly especially among participants with high political Islam. Contrary to expectations, norms did not appear to increase the effectiveness of counter-narratives. Finally, this paper also highlights the role of threats and how it interacts with counter-narratives and political Islam. Consistent with expectations, I found an indirect effect of inclusive identity among participants with low threat levels. However, I also found that the indirect effect also appeared among participants with high threat levels and political Islam. Interpretation of the results should be carried out with caution due to the limitations of this study, which include results with marginal significance levels, small effect sizes, and the use of snowball sampling to recruit participants. Future studies should aim to replicate findings and identify additional factors that promote reconciliation among Indonesian ex-communists.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX 1**

Study 1 Experimental Materials and Questionnaire

## Communist Victim Condition

# The True Victims of the 1965 tragedy

The 30 September movement is one of Indonesia's most significant events in the country's national history. The event was marked by the murder of seven military figures which the government accused the Indonesian Communist Party as being the mastermind. Recently Indonesians have been asking who the true victims of the event were. Recent analyses of declassified documents, witness and victim testimonies related to the 1965 tragedy has now made it possible to answer this question. Several reports convincingly confirm that the victims of the 1965 tragedy were the people affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party.



(Headline translation "National Human Rights Commission: The Massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party was a Severe Human Rights Violations")

Numerous scholars question the validity of the government's claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the attempted coup. Asvi Warman Adam, a historian from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences stated "***The claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the September movement as written in the official government's white book and taught in schools must be reevaluated.***" Experts on Indonesian studies, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey from Cornell University argued that the 30 September movement must have been initiated by the military, not the Indonesian Communist Party. This is because the movement was a military operation involving few civilians. They elaborated that junior officers within the army wanted to overthrow senior officers that were perceived to be excessively pro-western and decadent. Furthermore, Dutch sociologist, W.F. Wertheim, argued that the Indonesian Communist Party was framed. His conclusions are based on his research that Suharto was close friends to the main actors of the movement and was not abducted like the other generals.

Based on these recent analyses, it is unfortunate that members and sympathizers of the Indonesian communist party had to be punished for something they were not responsible for. Around 500,000 party members and sympathizers were executed. Not only were members executed but many members and sympathizers were then detained and became political prisoners for an extended period of time. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission reported in 2012 that many of these prisoners were subject to torture, slavery and rape.



(Translation “The 1965/1966 events were severe human rights violations)

The 1965 tragedy has remained a significant event in Indonesia but who were the actual winners and victims? Clearly Soeharto’s new order regime triumphed because it allowed for their 32 year authoritarian rule. With regard to the victims, it has now become clear that the Indonesian Communist Party were the true victims.

### **Bibliography**

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### **Attention Check Questions**

1. Based on the text, who were the actual victims of the 1965 tragedy?
  - a. Members of the Indonesian Communist Party
  - b. President Soekarno
  - c. Indonesians as well as the people affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party
  - d. General Soeharto
  
2. Around how many Indonesian Communist Party members and sympathizers were executed at the 1965 tragedy?
  - a. 100,000
  - b. 300,000
  - c. 500,000
  - d. 1,000,000

3. Which organization made a report confirming that the Indonesian Communist Party was a victim of mass human rights violation?
  - a. Indonesian Police
  - b. National Commission of Human Rights
  - c. Organization for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS-Local NGO for human rights)
  - d. Truth and Reconciliation Council
  
4. According to Indonesian history experts Ben Anderson and Robert Cribb, who was most responsible for the 30 September event?
  - a. Indonesian Communist Party
  - b. President Soekarno
  - c. Central Intelligence Agency
  - d. Military personnel

## Co-victimization condition

# The True Victims of the 1965 tragedy

The 30 September movement is one of Indonesia's most significant events in the country's national history. The event was marked by the murder of seven military figures which the government accused the Indonesian Communist Party as being the mastermind. Recently Indonesians have been asking who the true victims of the event were. Recent analyses of declassified documents, witness and victim testimonies related to the 1965 tragedy has now made it possible to answer this question. Several reports convincingly confirm that the victims of the 1965 tragedy were the people affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian people in general.



(Headline translation "National Human Rights Commission: The Massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party was a Severe Human Rights Violations")

Numerous scholars question the validity of the government's claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the attempted coup. Asvi Warman Adam, a historian from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences stated ***"The claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the September movement as written in the official government's white book and taught in schools must be reevaluated."*** Experts on Indonesian studies, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey from Cornell University argued that the 30 September movement must have been initiated by the military, not the Indonesian Communist Party. This is because the movement was a military operation involving few civilians. They elaborated that junior officers within the army wanted to overthrow senior officers that were perceived to be excessively pro-western and decadent. Furthermore, Dutch sociologist, W.F. Wertheim, argued that the Indonesian Communist Party was framed. His conclusions are based on his research that Suharto was close friends to the main actors of the movement and was not abducted like the other generals.

Based on these recent analyses, it is unfortunate that members and sympathizers of the Indonesian communist party had to be punished for something they were not responsible for. Around 500,000 party members and sympathizers were executed. Not only were members executed but many members and sympathizers were then detained and became political prisoners for an extended period of time. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission reported in 2012 that many of these prisoners were subject to torture, slavery and rape.



(Translation “The 1965/1966 events were severe human rights violations).

Many Indonesians are not aware, but are also victims of the 1965 tragedy. Indonesians do not have a clear understanding of what occurred in 1965 and the government prevents this from happening. Following the tragedy, Indonesians were obliged to watch the “Treason of the PKI” This movie, as described by a tempo journalist, mainly delivered lies and New Order government propaganda. To this day Indonesians have to fear being assaulted for publicly discussing issues related with the 1965 tragedy or organizing screenings of movies and reading books that are contrary to the government’s version of the event.



(Headline translation “Mob attacks the screening of the film “Looks of Silence” in UGM University”)

The 1965 tragedy has remained a significant event in Indonesia but who were the actual winners and victims? Clearly Soeharto’s new order regime and family triumphed because it allowed for their 32 year authoritarian rule. With regard to the victims, it has now become clear that the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian people in general were and are the true victims.

### **Bibliography**

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### **Attention Check Questions**

1. Based on the text, who were the actual victims of the 1965 tragedy?
  - a. Members of the Indonesian Communist Party
  - b. President Soekarno
  - c. Indonesians as well as all people affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party
  - d. Soeharto
  
2. Around how many Indonesian Communist Party members and sympathizers were executed at the 1965 tragedy?
  - a. 100,000
  - b. 300,000
  - c. 500,000
  - d. 1,000,000
  
3. Which organization made a report confirming that the Indonesian Communist Party was a victim of mass human rights violation?
  - a. Indonesian Police
  - b. National Commission of Human Rights
  - c. Organization for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS-Local NGO for human rights)
  - d. Truth and Reconciliation Council
  
4. According to Indonesian history experts Ben Anderson and Robert Cribb, who was most responsible for the 30 September event?
  - a. Indonesian Communist Party
  - b. President Soekarno
  - c. Central Intelligence Agency
  - d. Military personnel
  
5. Which University was attacked for screening the film Looks of Silence
  - a. Universitas Gadjah Mada
  - b. Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta
  - c. Universitas Atmajaya
  - d. Universitas Islam Indonesia

# Questionnaire

## Background Information

This part of the questionnaire asks some questions about your background. If you do not want to answer a specific question you can leave the space empty.

1. Age :
2. Gender :
3. Occupation :
4. Ethnicity :
5. Religion:
  - a. Islam
  - b. Christian/Catholic
  - c. Hindu
  - d. Buddha
  - e. ConfucianismOther: \_\_\_\_\_ f. Prefer not to say
6. Highest level of education:
  - a. Elementary School
  - b. Junior High School
  - c. Senior High School
  - d. Diploma
  - e. Undergraduate
  - f. Postgraduate
  - g. Prefer not to say
7. What party did you choose in the Indonesian general election?
8. Which political coalition did you support in the 2014 Indonesian election?
  - a. The Red and White Coalition
  - b. The Great Indonesian Coalition
  - c. Prefer not to say

## Inclusive identity scale

This part of the questionnaire asks about your perceptions about your social identity. From a scale of 1 to 7 (1= absolutely not, 7 =strongly agree), please indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the statements below.

1. I feel that I and the ex-political prisoners of the 1965 tragedy have something in common, in that we are both victims of the 1965 tragedy?  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. With all that has happened in the 1965 tragedy, I currently feel that I share the same values and beliefs of the 1965 victims.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. With regard to how the government has treated the victims of the 1965 tragedy, I can easily see them as being an Indonesian.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. To what extent do you feel solidarity for the victims of the 1965 tragedy?  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## Reconciliation

Please indicate the degree to which you support the following actions related with the 1965 event (1=absolutely not, 7= absolutely support).

## Reparation

1. Apology from the government to the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. Apology from the government to family members of Communist party members.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. Rehabilitation of the good name of ex political prisoners and their family members.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. Giving monetary compensation to ex-political prisoners of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
5. Include alternative explanations of what happened in September 30 movement in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
6. Include testimonies of former Indonesia Communist Party political prisoners in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
7. Create a museum of the 1965 tragedy based on findings from historians and the national human rights commission.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## Prosecution of perpetrators

8. Push the general attorney to further investigate human rights violation related to the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
9. Prosecute military personnel that were involved in the killings of communist party members and sympathizers.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
10. Prosecute military personnel that were involved in the torture of communist party members and sympathizers.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## Equality and social integration

With regard to the 1965 incident, please indicate the degree that the statements below represent your own feelings / opinions.

1. Former members of the Indonesian Communist Party should be treated equally as any other Indonesian citizen.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. If I knew a person was the son or daughter of an Indonesian Communist Member, I would definitely not befriend them. (R)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. I support employers' decision to deny job applications from ex-Communist party members. (R)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. University admissions offices should not reject a prospective students' application simply because their father was a former member of the Indonesian Communist Party.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

5. It was a big mistake for the government to give former communist party members a right to vote (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

6. If I knew that a family in my neighborhood was somewhat affiliated with the Indonesian communist party, I would hope that they moved (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### **Collective action intentions**

1. To what extent are you willing to join a protest to demand the government to reevaluate school text books regarding the 1965 tragedy?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. To what extent are you willing to give a donation to organizations that work with the victims of the 1965 tragedy?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. How willing are you to help organize a rally to support victims of the 1965 tragedy to have their good name restored.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

**Table 15.** Main effects of counter-narrative on dependent variables without participant exclusion

Variable	Control n = 118		Communist-Victim n = 114		Co-Victimization n = 112		F(2,341)	p	$\eta^2$
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Inclusive identity	3.34	1.55	3.93	1.44	3.99	1.45	6.88	0.00	0.04
Reparation	5.08	1.42	5.33	1.34	5.29	1.29	1.12	0.33	0.01
Equality and social integration	5.84	1.17	6.00	1.07	5.88	1.13	0.64	0.53	0.00
Prosecution	4.29	1.71	4.56	1.77	4.70	1.53	1.78	0.17	0.01
Collective action intentions	4.45	1.39	4.51	1.39	4.43	1.46	0.08	0.92	0.00

**Table 16.** Tests of indirect effects of inclusive identity without participation exclusion

Dependent variable	Condition			
	Co-victimization		Communist Victim	
	Effect	95%CI	Effect	95%CI
Reparation	0.36	[.17,.57]	0.30	[.11,.57]
Equality and social integration	0.15	[.05,.26]	0.13	[.05,.26]
Prosecution	0.26	[.11,.45]	0.22	[.07,.40]
Collective action intentions	0.32	[.11,.53]	0.28	[.09,.48]

## **APPENDIX 2**

### Study 2 Experimental Materials and Questionnaire

# The True Victims of the 1965 Tragedy

The 30 September movement is one of the most significant events in Indonesia's national history. The event, which the government said was master-minded by the Communist Party, was marked by the murder of seven military figures. In response, around 500,000 communist party members and sympathizers were executed and many were detained and became political prisoners for an extended period of time. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission reported in 2012 that many of these prisoners were subject to torture, slavery and rape.

Recently, Indonesians have been asking who the true victims of the event were. Recent analyses of declassified documents, witness - and victim testimonies have now made it possible to answer this question. Several reports convincingly confirm that the **victims of the 1965 tragedy were the people affiliated with the Communist Party.**



(Headline translation "National Human Rights Commission: The Massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party was a Severe Human Rights Violations")

Numerous scholars question the validity of the government's claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the attempted coup. Asvi Warman Adam, a historian from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences stated ***"The claim that the Communist Party was the mastermind of the September movement as written in the official government's white book and taught in schools must be reevaluated."*** Experts on Indonesian studies, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey from Cornell University argued that the 30 September movement was initiated by the military, not the Communist Party. In fact, the movement was primarily a military operation with no involvement from civilians. They suggested that junior officers within the army wanted to overthrow senior officers that were perceived to be corrupt. Further evidence for this was provided by W.F. Wertheim, a Dutch sociologist, who highlighted that Suharto was, unlike the other generals, not abducted during the events. He also demonstrated that Suharto had close ties to the main actors of the movement. Like Anderson and McVey, Wertheim concluded that the Communist Party was framed and falsely accused of initiating the coup.



(Translation “The 1965/1966 events were severe human rights violations”)

People associated with the Communist party continue to be victims to this day. Witnesses and victims of the 1965 event continue to receive intimidation and threats from military officers especially when discussing their experiences of the 1965 event. Furthermore, from 2015-2016, there have been 38 instances of intimidation and disruption of meetings, discussions, and movie screenings related with the 1965 tragedy. The intimidation and disruption occurred in various provinces and was perpetrated by police or members of social organizations.

Thus, the 1965 tragedy remains one of the most significant events in the history of Indonesia. It was the beginning of Soeharto’s new order regime and their 32-year authoritarian rule. But who were the actual victims? Based on the emerging evidence it has now become clear that the **members and sympathizers of the Communist Party were the true victims.**

#### **Bibliography**

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**Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet)**

**<http://id.safenetvoice.org/pelanggaranekspresi/>**

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### Attention Check Questions

1. The final paragraph of the text mentions that the actual victims of the 1965 tragedy were...
  - a. Members and sympathizers of the Communist Party
  - b. Benedict Anderson
  - c. Major General Soeharto
  - d. The Indonesian people
  
2. Around how many Communist Party members and sympathizers were executed at the 1965 tragedy?
  - e. 100,000
  - f. 300,000
  - g. 500,000
  - h. 1,000,000

## Co-victimization

# The True Victims of the 1965 Tragedy

The 30 September movement is one of the most significant events in Indonesia's national history. The event, which the government said was master-minded by the Indonesian Communist Party, was marked by the murder of seven military figures. In response, around 500,000 **Indonesians** were executed and many were detained and became political prisoners for an extended period of time. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission reported in 2012 that many of these prisoners were subject to torture, slavery and rape. Recently Indonesians have been asking who the true victims of the event were. Recent analyses of declassified documents, witness and victim testimonies related to the 1965 tragedy has now made it possible to answer this question. **Several reports convincingly confirm that the victims of the 1965 tragedy were the Indonesian people.**



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(Translation “The 1965/1966 events were severe human rights violations).

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#### **Attention Check Questions**

1. The final paragraph of the text mentions that the actual victims of the 1965 tragedy were...
  - a. The Indonesian people
  - b. Benedict Anderson
  - c. Major General Soeharto
  - d. Members and sympathizers of the Communist Party
2. Around how many Indonesians were executed at the 1965 tragedy?
  - e. 100,000
  - f. 300,000
  - g. 500,000

h. 1,000,000

## Questionnaire Study 2

### Background Information

This part of the questionnaire asks some questions about your background. If you do not want to answer a specific question you can leave the space empty.

1. Age :
2. Gender :
3. Occupation :
4. Ethnicity :
5. Religion:  
b. Islam      b. Christian/Catholic      c. Hindu      d. Buddha      e. Confucianism  
Other: \_\_\_\_\_ f. Prefer not to say
6. Highest level of education:  
e. Elementary School   b. Junior High School   c. Senior High School   d. Diploma  
e. Undergraduate      f. Postgraduate      g. Prefer not to say
7. Which political coalition did you support in the 2014 Indonesian election?  
d. The Red and White Coalition  
e. The Great Indonesian Coalition  
f. Prefer not to say

### Political Islam (Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011)

The following questions concern your views on the relations between religion and politics. Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. Religion is a private matter between the believer and God (R).
2. Islam should be represented in politics and society
3. Islam should be the ultimate authority in political matters
4. For me, religion is primarily a private matter (R).

### **Inclusive identity Scale**

This part of the questionnaire asks about your perceptions about who you are. From a scale of 1 to 7 (1= absolutely not, 7 =strongly agree), please indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the statements below.

1. I have a lot in common with the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. I currently feel that I share the same values and beliefs of the 1965 victims.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. With regard to how the government has treated the victims of the 1965 tragedy, I can easily see them as being Indonesian.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. I feel solidarity with the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### **Reconciliation**

Please indicate the degree to which you support the following actions related with the 1965 event (1=absolutely oppose, 7= absolutely support).

### **Reparation**

1. Apology from the government to the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. Apology from the government to family members of the people affected.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. Rehabilitation of the good name of ex political prisoners and their family members.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. Giving monetary compensation to ex-political prisoners of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
5. Include alternative explanations of what happened in September 30 movement in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
6. Include testimonies of former Indonesia Communist Party political prisoners in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
7. Create a museum of the 1965 tragedy based on findings from historians and the national human rights commission.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Prosecution of perpetrators

1. Push the general attorney to further investigate human rights violation related to the 1965 tragedy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Prosecute military personnel that were engaged in the killings.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Prosecute military personnel who were engaged in the torture of prisoners.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Equal opportunity and social integration

With regard to the 1965 incident, please indicate the degree that the statements below represent your own feelings / opinions (1=absolutely disagree, 7= absolutely agree).

1. I support employers' decision to deny job applications from ex-Communist party members. (R)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. University admissions offices should not reject a prospective students' application simply because their father was a former member of the Indonesian Communist Party.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. It was a big mistake for the government to give former communist party members a right to vote (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. I support all laws that prohibit ex-communist party members from entering the civil service offices (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

5. Former members of the Indonesian Communist Party should be treated equally as any other Indonesian citizen.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Social integration

6. If I knew a person was the son or daughter of an Indonesian Communist Member, I would definitely not befriend them. (R)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

7. If I knew that a family in my neighborhood was somewhat affiliated with the Indonesian communist party, I would hope that they moved (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Collective action intentions

1. To what extent are you willing to join a protest to demand the government to reevaluate school text books regarding the 1965 tragedy?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. To what extent are you willing to give a donation to organizations that work with the victims of the 1965 tragedy?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. How willing are you to help organize a rally to support victims of the 1965 tragedy to have their good name restored.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. How willing are you to sign a petition to convict perpetrators of 1965 mass killings of Indonesian communist members and sympathizers.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### **Perceived Communist threat**

With regard to the 1965 incident, please indicate the degree that the statements below represent your own feelings / opinions (1=absolutely disagree, 7= absolutely agree).

1. Efforts to reevaluate the past regarding 1965 is evidence that the communists are coming back to control Indonesia.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. I believe that communists continue to be one of the most significant threats to Indonesia.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## **APPENDIX 3**

### **Study 3 Experimental Materials and Questionnaire**

### **Non- Islamic Norm Manipulation**

*Note: The norms manipulation was integrated with the co-victimization counter-narrative and placed at the final paragraph of the counter-narrative.*

Despite the dark side 1965 there are those people and organizations that are committed to human rights and have strived to advocate justice for victims of 1965. One organization prominent for its role in advocating and defending the rights of 1965 victims is **Peduli (Care), an Indonesian organization** devoted in issues of reconciliation of the 1965 tragedy. Their programs include organizing goodwill meetings between community members, religious figures, and university students with ex-political prisoners. This organization also produced both fictional and documentary films, and magazines that document the suffering of ex-political prisoners. As acknowledgement of **Peduli's** work, **Aditya Hermawan, Peduli's** director, was honored with the Jeju 4.3 Peace Award, a prize awarded by the South Korean based "Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation." This achievement should make us proud as Indonesians.

### **Islamic Norm Manipulation**

Despite the dark side 1965 there are those people and organizations that are committed to human rights and have strived to advocate justice for victims of 1965. One organization prominent for its role in advocating and defending the rights of 1965 victims is **Syarikat, a religious Muslim organization** devoted in issues of reconciliation of the 1965 tragedy. Their programs include organizing goodwill meetings between community members, religious figures, and university students with ex-political prisoners. This organization also produced both fictional and documentary films, and magazines that document the suffering of ex-political prisoners. As acknowledgement of **Syarikat's** work, **Mohammad Imam Aziz, Syarikat's** director, was honored with the Jeju 4.3 Peace Award, a prize awarded by the South Korean based "Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation." This achievement should not only make us proud as Indonesians but also as Muslims.

### **Attention Check Questions**

#### **Questions**

1. The final paragraph of the text mentions that the actual victims of the 1965 tragedy were...
  - a. The Indonesian people
  - f. Benedict Anderson
  - g. Major General Soeharto
  - h. Members and sympathizers of the Communist Party
2. Around how many Indonesians were executed at the 1965 tragedy?
  - i. 100,000
  - j. 300,000
  - k. 500,000
  - l. 1,000,000
3. What was the name of the organization that was active in carrying out reconciliation initiatives to 1965 victims?
  - a. Syarikat
  - b. Yayasan Sahabat Anak
  - c. KONTRAS
  - d. KOMNAS HAM

## Questionnaire

*Background variables are the same as study 2*

### **Inclusive identity Scale**

This part of the questionnaire asks about your perceptions about who you are. From a scale of 1 to 7 (1= absolutely not, 7 =strongly agree), please indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the statements below.

1. I have a lot in common with the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. I currently feel that I share the same values and beliefs of the 1965 victims.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. With regard to how the government has treated the victims of the 1965 tragedy, I can easily see them as being Indonesian.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. I feel solidarity with the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### **Reconciliation**

Please indicate the degree to which you support the following actions related with the 1965 event (1=absolutely oppose, 7= absolutely support).

### **Reparation**

1. Apology from the government to the victims of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. Apology from the government to family members of the people affected.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. Rehabilitation of the good name of ex political prisoners and their family members.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. Giving monetary compensation to ex-political prisoners of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
5. Include alternative explanations of what happened in September 30 movement in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
6. Include testimonies of former Indonesia Communist Party political prisoners in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
7. Create a museum of the 1965 tragedy based on findings from historians and the national human rights commission.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Prosecution of perpetrators

1. Push the general attorney to further investigate human rights violation related to the 1965 tragedy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Prosecute military personnel that were engaged in the killings.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Prosecute military personnel who were engaged in the torture of prisoners.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Equal opportunity and social integration

With regard to the 1965 incident, please indicate the degree that the statements below represent your own feelings / opinions (1=absolutely disagree, 7= absolutely agree).

1. I support employers' decision to deny job applications from ex-Communist party members. (R)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. University admissions offices should not reject a prospective students' application simply because their father was a former member of the Indonesian Communist Party.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. It was a big mistake for the government to give former communist party members a right to vote (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. I support all laws that prohibit ex-communist party members from entering the civil service offices (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

5. If I knew a person was the son or daughter of an Indonesian Communist Member, I would definitely not befriend them. (R)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

6. If I knew that a family in my neighborhood was somewhat affiliated with the Indonesian communist party, I would hope that they moved (R).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Collective action intentions

1. To what extent are you willing to join a protest to demand the government to reevaluate school text books regarding the 1965 tragedy?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. To what extent are you willing to give a donation to organizations that work with the victims of the 1965 tragedy?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. How willing are you to help organize a rally to support victims of the 1965 tragedy to have their good name restored.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. How willing are you to sign a petition to convict perpetrators of 1965 mass killings of Indonesian communist members and sympathizers.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Norms manipulation check

Please indicate the degree that the statements below represent your own feelings / opinions (1=absolutely disagree, 7= absolutely agree)

### Injunctive norms

1. Muslims should support reconciliation with the victims of the 1965 tragedy

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Muslims should engage in actions of rehabilitating the good name of 1965 victims

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Descriptive norms

1. Muslims are generally in favor of reconciling with the 1965 victims

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Muslims generally support giving compensation to victims of the 1965 tragedy


1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## **APPENDIX 4**

### Study 4 Experimental Material and Questionnaire

## Low Threat Manipulation


### Is there a communist threat?



- The figure on the left shows that communist countries have dropped from 22 in 1922 to 5 countries in 1992. Since 1992 there has been no additional communist state (Source: National Armed Forces Doctrine, Education, and Training Command, 2017).
- A national survey showed that 86.8% of Indonesians do not believe of a communist revival (Source: Saiful Mujani Research Institute, 2017).
- Prominent religious leaders like Syafi Maarif and Said Aqil Siraj have stated that the issue of communism is simply used by politicians to gain political benefits (Source: Republika, 2017)

## High Threat Manipulation

### Is there a communist threat?



- The figure on the left shows the rise of events suspected of promoting communism based on media and NGO reports (Source: Kompas, 2014; Safenetvoice, 2018; Tempo, 2013). These events include pro-communist film screenings, discussions and group meetings.
- The National Armed Forces concluded from their analyses that there is a high communist threat in Indonesia especially with the rising power of China, the largest communist state in the world (Source: National Armed Forces Doctrine, Education, and Training Command, 2017).
- Prominent religious figures like Tengku Zulkarnain and Habieb Rizieq call on Indonesians to be cautious toward the communist threat (Source: news.detik, 2017)

## Co-victimization

# The True Victims of the 1965 Tragedy

The 30 September movement is one of the most significant events in Indonesia's national history. The event, which the government said was master-minded by the Indonesian Communist Party, was marked by the murder of seven military figures. In response, around 500,000 **Indonesians** were executed and many were detained and became political prisoners for an extended period of time. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission reported in 2012 that many of these prisoners were subject to torture, slavery and rape. Recently Indonesians have been asking who the true victims of the event were. Recent analyses of declassified documents, witness and victim testimonies related to the 1965 tragedy has now made it possible to answer this question. **Several reports convincingly confirm that the victims of the 1965 tragedy were all Indonesian people including nationalist groups, religious groups and communist groups.**



(Headline translation "National Human Rights Commission: The Massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party was a Severe Human Rights Violations")

Numerous scholars question the validity of the government's claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the attempted coup. Asvi Warman Adam, a historian from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences stated ***"The claim that the Indonesian Communist Party was the mastermind of the September movement as written in the official government's white book and taught in schools must be reevaluated."*** Experts on Indonesian studies, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey from Cornell University argued that the 30 September movement was initiated by the military, not the Indonesian Communist Party. In fact, the movement was primarily a military operation with no involvement from civilians. They suggested that junior officers within the army wanted to overthrow senior officers that were perceived to be corrupt. Further evidence for this was provided by W.F. Wertheim, a Dutch sociologist, who highlighted that Suharto was, unlike the other generals, not abducted during the events. He also demonstrated that Suharto had close ties to the main actors of the movement. Like Anderson and McVey, Wertheim concluded that the Indonesians linked to the Communist Party was framed and falsely accused of initiating the coup.



(Translation “The 1965/1966 events were severe human rights violations).

Indonesians continue to be victims to this day. Witnesses and victims of the 1965 event continue to receive intimidation and threats from military officers especially when discussing their experiences of the 1965 event. Furthermore, from 2015-2016, there have been 38 instances of intimidation and disruption of meetings, discussions, and movie screenings related with the 1965 tragedy. The intimidation and disruption occurred in various provinces and were perpetrated by police or members of social organizations.

Thus, the 1965 tragedy remains one of the most significant events in the history of Indonesia. It was the beginning of Soeharto’s new order regime and their 32-year authoritarian rule. But who were the actual victims? Based on the emerging evidence it has now become clear that regardless of whether you followed communist, nationalist, or religious groups, all **Indonesians are the true victims**.

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**National Commission on Human Rights. 2012. Statement from the National Commission of Human Rights concerning the Investigation of Severe Human Rights Violations in the 1965-1966 event.a, J. 2006. Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia. University of Wisconsin Press.**

#### **Attention Check Questions**

4. The final paragraph of the text mentions that the actual victims of the 1965 tragedy were...
  - a. The Indonesian people
  - c. Benedict Anderson
  - d. Major General Soeharto
  - e. Members and sympathizers of the Communist Party
5. Around how many Indonesians were executed at the 1965 tragedy?
  - a. 100,000
  - b. 300,000
  - c. 500,000

d. 1,000,000

## Questionnaire

### Background Information

This part of the questionnaire asks some questions about your background. If you do not want to answer a specific question you can leave the space empty.

1. Age \_\_\_\_\_ :
2. Gender  
a. Male b. Female c. Other (specify if you wish: \_\_\_\_\_) d. Prefer Not to Say
3. Occupation  
a. Student b. Employee c. Other: \_\_\_\_\_ d. Prefer not to answer
4. Ethnicity \_\_\_\_\_ :  
a. Javanese b. Sundanese c. Batak d. Chinese e. others: \_\_\_\_\_ f. prefer not to answer
5. Religion:  
f. Islam b. Christian/Catholic c. Hindu d. Buddhist e. Confucianism  
Other: \_\_\_\_\_ f. Prefer not to say

### Political Islam

The following questions concern your views on the relations between religion and politics. Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

5. Religion is a private matter between the believer and God (R).
  6. Islam should be represented in politics and society
  7. Islam should be the ultimate authority in political matters
  8. For me, religion is primarily a private matter (R).
6. Highest level of education:  
g. Elementary School b. Junior High School c. Senior High School d. Diploma  
e. Undergraduate f. Postgraduate g. Prefer not to say

### Political Preference

7. Which presidential candidate below do you support for the 2019 elections?  
a. Joko Widodo – Ma'ruf Amin  
b. Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno  
c. None  
d. Prefer not to say

### Threat manipulation check

Symbolic threat (Adapted from Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, Poppe, 2008)

Using a 5 point scale please indicate your agreement with the following statements

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. Communism presents no threat to the Indonesian identity (R)
2. Indonesian norms and values are threatened by the presence of communists
3. Communists are a threat to Indonesian culture

### Perceived Communist threat

With regard to the 1965 incident, please indicate the degree that the statements below represent your own feelings / opinions (1=absolutely disagree, 7= absolutely agree).

1. Efforts to reevaluate the past regarding 1965 is evidence that the communists are coming back to control Indonesia.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. I believe that communists continue to be one of the most significant threats to Indonesia.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. The idea that communists presents a threat to Indonesia is simply not true (R).  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

### Inclusive Identity Scale

This part of the questionnaire asks about your perceptions about who you are. From a scale of 1 to 7 (1= absolutely not, 7 =strongly agree), please indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the statements below.

1. I have a lot in common with the ex-communists of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. I currently feel that I share the same values and beliefs of the 1965 ex-communists.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. I can easily see ex-communist belonging to an Indonesian identity as any other group.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. I feel solidarity with the ex-communists of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## Reconciliation

Please indicate the degree to which you support the following actions related with the 1965 event (1=absolutely oppose, 7= absolutely support).

## Reparation

1. Apology from the government to ex-communists of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. Apology from the government to family members of ex-communists.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. Rehabilitation of the good name of ex-communists and their family members.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. Giving monetary compensation to ex-communist political prisoners of the 1965 tragedy.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
5. Include alternative explanations of what happened in September 30 movement in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
6. Include testimonies of former Indonesia Communist Party political prisoners in school text books.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
7. Create a museum of the 1965 tragedy based on findings from historians and the national human rights commission.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## Collective action intentions

**Some local organizations have been actively promoting justice for ex-communist victims who have been mistreated as a result of the 1965 tragedy. Based on this description to what extent are you willing to...**

1. Join a protest to demand the government to reevaluate school text books regarding the 1965 tragedy?  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2. Give a donation to organizations that work with the ex-communists of the 1965 tragedy?  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. Help organize a rally to support victims of the 1965 tragedy to have their good name restored.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---
4. Sign a petition to convict perpetrators of 1965 mass killings of Indonesian communist members and sympathizers.  

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## **APPENDIX 5**

### Ethical Approval



University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

09 May 2016

Dear Haidar

Thank you for submitting your ethical application which was considered at the School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee meetings on 24<sup>th</sup> March and 5<sup>th</sup> May 2016; the following documents have been reviewed:

1. Ethical Application Form
2. Advertisement
3. Participant Information Sheet
4. Consent Form
5. Debriefing Form
6. Questionnaires and Experimental Conditions
7. Data Management Plan

The School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee has been delegated to act on behalf of the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) and has granted this application ethical approval. The particulars relating to the approved project are as follows -

<b>Approval Code:</b>	PS12071	<b>Approved on:</b>	05/05/2016	<b>Approval Expiry:</b>	05/05/2021
<b>Project Title:</b>	Attitudes toward an Indonesian historical event				
<b>Researcher:</b>	Haidar Buldan Thontowi				
<b>Supervisor:</b>	Dr Nicole Tausch				

Approval is awarded for five years. Projects which have not commenced within two years of approval must be re-submitted for review by your School Ethics Committee. If you are unable to complete your research within the five year approval period, you are required to write to your School Ethics Committee Convener to request a discretionary extension of no greater than 6 months or to re-apply if directed to do so, and you should inform your School Ethics Committee when your project reaches completion.

If you make any changes to the project outlined in your approved ethical application form, you should inform your supervisor and seek advice on the ethical implications of those changes from the School Ethics Convener who may advise you to complete and submit an ethical amendment form for review.

Any adverse incident which occurs during the course of conducting your research must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee who will advise you on the appropriate action to be taken.

Approval is given on the understanding that you conduct your research as outlined in your application and in compliance with UTREC Guidelines and Policies (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/guidelinespolicies/>). You are also advised to ensure that you procure and handle your research data within the provisions of the Data Provision Act 1998 and in accordance with any conditions of funding incumbent upon you.

Yours sincerely

Convener of the School Ethics Committee

cc Dr Nicole Tausch (Supervisor)



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University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

08 March 2017

Dear Haidar

Thank you for submitting your amendment application which comprised the following documents:

1. Ethical Amendment Application Form
2. Advertisement
3. Participant Information Sheet
4. Participant Debriefing Form
5. Questionnaire

The School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee is delegated to act on behalf of the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) and has approved this ethical amendment application. The particulars of this approval are as follows –

<b>Original Approval Code:</b>	PS12071	<b>Approved on:</b>	05/05/2016
<b>Amendment Approval Date:</b>	07/03/2017	<b>Approval Expiry Date:</b>	05/05/2021
<b>Project Title:</b>	Attitudes toward an Indonesian historical event		
<b>Researcher:</b>	Haidar Buldan Thontowi		
<b>Supervisor:</b>	Dr Nicole Tuasch		

Ethical amendment approval does not extend the originally granted approval period of five years, rather it validates the changes you have made to the originally approved ethical application. If you are unable to complete your research within the original five year validation period, you are required to write to your School Ethics Committee Convener to request a discretionary extension of no greater than 6 months or to re-apply if directed to do so, and you should inform your School Ethics Committee when your project reaches completion.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that you adhere to the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>).

Yours sincerely

Convener of the School Ethics Committee

cc: Dr Nicole Tuasch (Supervisor)

---

School of Psychology & Neuroscience, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP  
Email: [psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk](mailto:psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk) Tel: 01334 462071

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University of  
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1413

University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

11 December 2017

Dear Haider

Thank you for submitting your amendment application which comprised the following documents:

1. Ethical Amendment Application Form
2. Participant Debriefing Form
3. Questionnaire
4. Experimental Manipulation

The School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee is delegated to act on behalf of the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) and has approved this ethical amendment application. The particulars of this approval are as follows –

<b>Original Approval Code:</b>	PS12071	<b>Approved on:</b>	05/05/2016
<b>Amendment Approval Date:</b>	08/12/2017	<b>Approval Expiry Date:</b>	05/05/2021
<b>Project Title:</b>	Attitudes toward an Indonesian historical event		
<b>Researcher:</b>	Haider Buldan Thontowi		
<b>Supervisor:</b>	Dr Nicole Tausch		

Ethical amendment approval does not extend the originally granted approval period of five years, rather it validates the changes you have made to the originally approved ethical application. If you are unable to complete your research within the original five year validation period, you are required to write to your School Ethics Committee Convener to request a discretionary extension of no greater than 6 months or to re-apply if directed to do so, and you should inform your School Ethics Committee when your project reaches completion.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that you adhere to the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>).

Yours sincerely

Convener of the School Ethics Committee

cc: Dr Nicole Tausch (Supervisor)



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St Andrews | 1413 |

University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

09 November 2018

Dear Haider

Thank you for submitting your amendment application which comprised the following documents:

1. Ethical Amendment Application Form
2. Whatsapp Message Advertisement
3. Participant Information Sheet
4. Questionnaires
5. Threat Manipulations
6. Participant Debriefing Form

The School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee is delegated to act on behalf of the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) and has approved this ethical amendment application. The particulars of this approval are as follows –

<b>Original Approval Code:</b>	PS12071	<b>Approved on:</b>	05/05/2016
<b>Amendment Approval Date:</b>	01/11/2018	<b>Approval Expiry Date:</b>	05/05/2021
<b>Project Title:</b>	Attitudes towards and Indonesian historical event		
<b>Researcher:</b>	Haider Buldan Thontowi		
<b>Supervisor:</b>	Dr Nicole Tausch		

Ethical amendment approval does not extend the originally granted approval period of five years, rather it validates the changes you have made to the originally approved ethical application. If you are unable to complete your research within the original five year validation period, you are required to write to your School Ethics Committee Convener to request a discretionary extension of no greater than 6 months or to re-apply if directed to do so, and you should inform your School Ethics Committee when your project reaches completion.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that you adhere to the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/msd/ja/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>).

Yours sincerely

Convener of the School Ethics Committee

cc Dr Nicole Tausch (Supervisor)

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