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# **Ethnos and Koinon**

## Studies in Ancient Greek Ethnicity and Federalism

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# INTEGRATION AND COERCION: NON-BOIOTIANS IN THE HELLENISTIC BOIOTIAN LEAGUE

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One of the key topics in the history of Boiotian federalism has been the ethnogenesis of the *Boiotoi*. Much attention has been devoted recently to how the disparate groups that came to be labeled with this ethnonym managed to overcome their differences and unite in collective action during the Archaic and Classical periods.<sup>1</sup> Little attention has been devoted, however, to the role of ethnicity in later Boiotian history. The Boiotian *koinon* of the Hellenistic period was never nearly as powerful as its neighbours, the Achaian and Aitolian federal states. Nonetheless, it impressively managed to maintain its autonomy throughout the third and early second centuries BCE, warding off the predatory advances of these expanding *koina*. Indeed, it even at times managed to expand its borders through the absorption of non-Boiotian *poleis*. In this paper I will address the integration of these ethnically-different communities into the Boiotian *koinon* and how they were treated within this federal state. In particular, I will focus on the Boiotians' apparent willingness to resort to intimidation and coercion to retain member *poleis* and how this fits into our broader understanding of Boiotian history.

While the Boiotian *koinon* had annexed some ethnic non-Boiotian populations already in the Classical period, such as the Lokrian *polis* of Larymna,<sup>2</sup> this federal state only began to absorb ethnically non-Boiotian cities in earnest in the Hellenistic period. The first such *polis* to be integrated into the *koinon* was Oropos, which had a complex relationship with the Boiotians. This *polis* changed between being a member of the Boiotian *koinon*, being attached to Athens, and being independent nine times from the later fifth century BCE until it once again entered the ranks of the Boiotians shortly after 287 BCE, this time remaining a member of the federal state until 171 BCE.<sup>3</sup> We next find a string of annexations in the 280s and 270s BCE, following the conclusion of the most intense decades of conflict between the *Diadochoi* in Greece. The Galatian invasion of Greece, Pyrrhos' campaign in the Peloponnese, and the weakness of Makedonia allowed the Boiotians, like the Aitolians, to expand their control in central Greece. Indeed, as Scholten has noted, the success of the Aitolians in actively absorbing ethnic non-Aitolians into their *koinon* in the early third century BCE likely provided a model for the newly reconstituted

1 Kühr 2006; Larson 2007; Kowalzig 2007, 328–391.

2 Paus. 9.23.7.

3 For a good summary of the shifting political orientation of Oropos, see Morpurgo-Davies 1993, 274f; Knoepfler 2002; and n.38 below.

Boiotian *koinon*.<sup>4</sup> Thus, in 272 BCE the Opountian Lokrians to the northwest appear to have joined the Boiotian *koinon*.<sup>5</sup> We do not know whether this movement was coerced or voluntary, but it seems likely that the Opountians willingly joined the Boiotians to shield themselves from the turbulence of this period.<sup>6</sup> Opous certainly belonged to the Boiotian *koinon* until 245 BCE, when it may have been ceded to the Aitolians.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, this *polis* was a member of the *koinon* again in 237/6 BCE, only to fall under Makedonian control shortly after 228 BCE<sup>8</sup> and at some point in the later third century BCE rejoin the Boiotians once again.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Lokrian Larymna, which had been annexed in the fourth century BCE, was again controlled by the *koinon* in 227 BCE,<sup>10</sup> while the smaller neighbouring *polis* of Halai was a member in the later third century BCE, though it is likely that this city joined together with Opous.<sup>11</sup>

Across the straights of the Euripos to the east, the Euboian cities of Chalkis and Eretria also appear to have joined the Boiotian *koinon* in the 280s or early 270s BCE. The date of Chalkis' annexation is linked closely to an inscribed list of *aphedriateuontes*, Boiotian religious representatives, which includes a Chalkidian,<sup>12</sup> now shown by Knoepfler to date to the 280s or 270s BCE,<sup>13</sup> regardless of when it joined the *koinon*, however, Chalkis had left by 271/0 BCE.<sup>14</sup> Knoepfler has also convincingly demonstrated that Eretria joined the Boiotians in the aftermath of Demetrios Poliorketes' defeat and capture in 286 BCE.<sup>15</sup> The preamble of a decree of 278/7 BCE recorded by Diogenes Laertios makes clear, however, that by that date this *polis* was no longer a member of the Boiotian *koinon*.<sup>16</sup> Thus, both Chalkis and Eretria likely joined the Boiotians in the 280s, but both left to join the reformed Euboian *koinon* again in the 270s BCE.

4 Scholten 2000, 69.

5 Moreno Hernandez and Pascual Valderrama 2013, 516f; the date is disputed without further explanation in Étienne and Knoepfler 1976, 331 n.246.

6 Scholten 2000, 69.

7 Klaffenbach 1926, 83; Le Bohec 1993, 162f.

8 Étienne and Knoepfler 1976, 332–334.

9 Étienne and Knoepfler 1976, 288–292. The assertion that Opous belonged once again to the Boiotian *koinon* in the later 190s BCE, made by Feyel based on his dating of *SEG* 1.101 (1942, 61–68), has been refuted by Étienne and Knoepfler in the above pages.

10 Polyb. 20.5.8. Larymna was still considered Boiotian by Strabo 9.2.13.

11 Goldman 1915, n.3–4, with the archonships of Philon and Nikon dated to the period from 208–204 BCE by Étienne and Knoepfler 1976, 306, with the chart on 350; cf. Roesch 1965, 66f. The small settlement of Boumelita, between Larymna in the west and Halai in the east, almost certainly also followed its neighbours into the *koinon*, though we have no evidence testifying to the status of this community during the duration of the *koinon*'s existence (Roesch 1965, 67f).

12 *IG* VII.2724b.

13 Knoepfler 2014, 73–83 has suggested that the Chalkidians may have joined the Boiotian *koinon* twice, once for a period after Demetrios' Poliorketes defeat in 286 BCE and a second time in the later 270s BCE.

14 Knoepfler 1992, 450f, n.75; Knoepfler 1995, 147f; Knoepfler 1998, 207f.

15 *IG* XII.9.192; Knoepfler 1998, 202–204.

16 Diog. Laert. 2.142; Knoepfler 2014, 82–85.

Finally, Megara, as well as its two previously dependent communities of Pagai and Aigosthena, also joined the Boiotian *koinon*, though again the date of this *polis*' integration is uncertain. Polybios states that the Megarians, who had joined the Achaian *koinon* in 243 BCE, joined the Achaian *koinon* after Corinth was occupied by Kleomenes III in 224 BCE, and we know that the Megarians left the Boiotian *koinon* and were re-integrated into the Achaian *koinon* sometime thereafter.<sup>17</sup> The details of the secession of Megara and its dependent neighbours from the ranks of the Boiotians will be discussed below. Chronologically, all that we know about this *polis*' withdrawal from the Boiotian federal state is that Philopoimen was in power when it occurred;<sup>18</sup> both 206/5 and 192/1 BCE are possible dates for this event,<sup>19</sup> but, following Polybios most closely, I have accepted the latter date.<sup>20</sup>

Thus at various times from the later fourth century BCE until the dissolution of the Boiotian *koinon* in 171 BCE, the inhabitants of six ethnically non-Boiotian *pol-eis* and their dependent communities in total were integrated into its ranks (Larymna, Opous, Halai, Chalkis, Eretria, Megara), and one *polis* (Oropos) whose ethnic identity was, as we will see, ambiguous. Unfortunately, in the case of most of these cities we often only have just enough evidence to prove that they indeed were members of the *koinon* at some time, but not enough to illuminate the process of integration that they experienced. We do, however, know a little about how the Boiotians treated new members. Documents issued by Halai, Eretria, Chalkis, and Megara while members of the federal state make clear that they were allowed to preserve their internal institutional structures, onto which a new federal framework was superimposed.<sup>21</sup> This latter development, however, by necessity seems to have involved the dissolution of local supra-*polis* structures, since the annexation of Opountian Lokris involved the dissolution of the Lokrian *koinon* that had been centred previously on Opous.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, after joining the Boiotians Megara was forced to make Aigosthena and Pagai, two *komai* previously subject to it, independent members of the *koinon*.<sup>23</sup> Thus, it appears that the Hellenistic Boiotian *koinon* followed the contemporary Achaian federal habit of breaking up power structures in newly integrated communities in order to prevent any single new member from having too much influence.<sup>24</sup> This is in contrast to the Aitolian federal state, which appears to have absorbed into its ranks the Phokian and Dorian *koina* as well as, for a short period of time after 245 BCE, the Boiotian federal state itself into its ranks while still preserving their federal structures.<sup>25</sup>

17 Polyb. 20.6.9; Plut. *Arat.* 43–44; *Cleom.* 19.

18 Polyb. 20.6.9–12; Plut. *Phil.* 12.3; Paus. 8.50.4.

19 Beloch 1927, 434; Aymard 1938, 14f, n.7; Feysel 1942, 30f.

20 Étienne and Knoepfler 1976, 266, n.3; 328, n.238.

21 Roesch 1965, 67, n.2.

22 Moreno Hernandez and Pascual Valderrama 2013, 519f.

23 Étienne and Knoepfler 1976, 329f; Legon 1981, 32f.

24 Mackil 2013, 362f.

25 Scholten 2000, 73.

Beyond such administrative treatment, we can glimpse the complex ethnic negotiations that could be found in the Hellenistic Boiotian *koinon* from a contemporary source: Herakleides Kritikos. In his itinerary through central Greece, likely dating to sometime in the third quarter of the third century BCE,<sup>26</sup> this author states about the Oropians that “denying that they are Boiotians, they are Athenian Boiotians” (ἀρνούμενοι τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς Ἀθηναῖοι εἰσι Βοιωτοί).<sup>27</sup> This rather enigmatic statement is paralleled later when the author states of the Plataians that they “have nothing else to say than that they are colonists of the Athenians and that the battle between the Greeks and the Persians took place there. They are Athenian Boiotians” (Οἱ δὲ πολῖται οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσι λεγεῖν ἢ ὅτι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν ἀποικοὶ καὶ ὅτι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ Περσῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Εἰσι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτοί).<sup>28</sup> These twin statements are of interest for the light they shed on the dialogues of integration that must have been current in the third century *koinon*. By stating that the Oropians denied being purely Boiotian, Herakleides makes clear that the prevailing claim among many of their fellow federal citizens must have been that the Oropians were indeed fully Boiotian. This was no doubt an artefact of the incessant movement of this *polis* between Athens and the Boiotians in the centuries prior. The assertion of a hybrid identity in this case seems to have been viewed as problematic by the primary members of the *koinon*, and, given Oropos’ history, this claim likely evoked wariness over the loyalty of the Oropians to the federal state. In the case of the Plataians, on the other hand, we find no similar declaration of the contentiousness of their hybrid ethnic identity; there was perhaps too much well-known history between the Plataians, the other members of the Boiotian *koinon*, and the Athenians for such a claim to be denied.

By bringing this scarce and disparate evidence together, we may draw a few conclusions about the expansion of the Hellenistic Boiotian *koinon*. First, this federal state rarely appears to have pursued an aggressive policy of expansion; rather, its absorption of neighbouring non-Boiotian *poleis* was opportunistic and largely dependent on extraneous political circumstances. Second, when it did integrate new members into its ranks, the *koinon* pursued a policy of dividing up consolidated power structures to ensure that no one member could hold disproportionate influence. Third, this expansion at least in some cases led to contentious negotiations of ethnic identity within this federal state. Finally, the shifting conditions of the Hellenistic period also often led newly-integrated cities to secede or be detached from the *koinon*, sometimes repeatedly. Consequently, the Boiotian *koinon* had much less success retaining new members than did its Aitolian and Achaian counterparts. These conclusions suggest that the core members of the Boiotian *koinon* would likely have regarded new members with suspicion, a view borne out, as we will see, by other evidence.

26 For a discussion of the difficulties of dating this source, see Arenz 2006, 49–83 and the discussion in McNerney’s biographical essay in *BNJ* 369A.

27 Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F 1.7.

28 Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F 1.11.

Our single best source of information on the history of Hellenistic Boiotia is Polybios' well-known digression on the degeneracy of its inhabitants.<sup>29</sup> In this excursus, he states that:<sup>30</sup>

τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν εἰς τοσαύτην παραγεγόνει καχεξίαν ὥστε σχεδὸν εἴκοσι καὶ πέντ' ἐτῶν τὸ δίκαιον μὴ διεξήχθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς μήτε περὶ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν συμβολαίων μήτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς παραγγέλλοντες τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ δὲ στρατείας κοινὰς, ἐξέκοπτον ἅει τὴν δικαιοδοσίαν: ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ μισθοδοσίας ἐποίουν ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν τοῖς ἀπόροις τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

The affairs of the Boiotians had fallen into such disorder that for almost 25 years justice was not administered among them either in private cases or public suits. Some magistrates were engaged in dispatching garrisons, others national expeditions, and thus they continually put off their juridical duties. Some of the generals also dispensed pay to the needy from the public treasury.

This quarter of a century has traditionally been thought to fall between the years 217, marking the end of the Social War, and 192/1 BCE, when the Boiotians allied with Antiochos III.<sup>31</sup> Müller has recently asserted that we should read this section as a largely literary construct, a product of Polybios' bias against the Boiotians.<sup>32</sup> As she notes, however, while Polybios' portrait of Boiotian decline into decadence is filled with literary tropes, we can be certain that it was constructed around a "diplomatic/military basis of the narrative."<sup>33</sup> It is with these political and military events that I am concerned.

In order to understand Polybios' comments, we must place them in the context of the history of Boiotia and the broader Greek world in the later third and early second centuries BCE. In our literary sources we hear of no major Boiotian military operations in the period after the end of the Kleomenic War in 222 BCE. The *koinon* remained neutral during the Social War as well as the First Makedonian War, emerging unscathed from both conflicts.<sup>34</sup> In essence, during almost the entire period covered by Polybios' account, the Boiotian *koinon* successfully pursued a policy of neutrality. How, thus, can we explain Polybios' assertion that for a quarter of a century the Boiotians had been continually sending out *phourai* and *koinai strateiai*? Some light can be shed on the former by an inscription of an agreement between Orchomenos and Chaironeia that specifies how cavalry from both *poleis* were regularly to be deployed.<sup>35</sup>

This document dates to around 285 BCE and specifies that the cavalry of these cities were to patrol for six to 11 days at a time around Thebes and Oropos.<sup>36</sup> Only

29 Müller 2013, 267.

30 Polyb. 20.6.1–2 (translation by the author).

31 Walbank 1979, 72.

32 Müller 2013.

33 Müller 2013, 270.

34 Polyb. 2.65.3; Feyel 1942, 130f, 170–180.

35 SEG 28.461.

36 On the general dating of this document see Knoepfler 2014, 69–71, though I disagree with Knoepfler's assertion that the patrols outside of Boiotia must have been in central Euboia, and thus cannot accept his more specific dating of 286–285 BCE (Knoepfler 2014, 85f).

a couple of years earlier, both of these *poleis* had been re-integrated into the *koinon*, the former after being destroyed and rebuilt,<sup>37</sup> the latter after experiencing a period of Athenian rule and then independence.<sup>38</sup> The patrols around Oropos certainly make sense from a strategic perspective, as this city marked one of the main routes of entry from Attika into Boiotia.<sup>39</sup> The importance of cavalry patrols for the security of the *koinon* is made clear in another passage of Polybios narrating how in 227 BCE a rumour spread among the Boiotians that “Antigonos [Doson] intended to ravage their country” (μέλλει κατατρέχειν τὴν χώραν Ἀντίγονος), prompting the federal hipparch to patrol “with all the Boiotian cavalry” (πάντας τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἰππεῖς) around Larymna in the northwest “in order to guard the country” (χάριν τοῦ παραφυλάττειν τὴν χώραν).<sup>40</sup> The patrols around Thebes outlined in this inscription do not appear to have served a strategic purpose, however; Thebes lay, of course, in the heart of Boiotia, about as far from the borders of the *koinon* as a member could be. It thus seems that while these patrols in some cases were intended to protect Boiotia from external attack, they also served the purpose of intimidating members.

As for the *koinai strateiai*, an anecdote in a later part of Polybios’ digression sheds light on what the historian seems to have had in mind with this phrase. After outlining the degeneracy of the Boiotians, Polybios narrates the episode of Megara’s secession from the Boiotian *koinon*. As he notes, the Megarians had previously left the Achaian *koinon* in 224 BCE and joined the Boiotians “with the consent of the Achaians” (μετὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν γνώμης). He goes on:<sup>41</sup>

βραχὺ δὲ πρὸ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων καιρῶν δυσαρεστήσαντες τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτὶς ἀπένευσαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ διοργισθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ καταφρονεῖσθαι δοκεῖν ἐξῆλθον ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεγαρεῖς πανδημεὶ σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις. οὐδένα δὲ ποιουμένων λόγον τῶν Μεγαρέων τῆς παρουσίας αὐτῶν, οὕτω θυμωθέντες πολιορκεῖν ἐπεβάλλοντο καὶ προσβολὰς ποιεῖσθαι τῇ πόλει. πανικοῦ δ’ ἐμπεσόντος αὐτοῖς καὶ φήμης ὅτι πάρεστιν Φιλοποίμη τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔχων, ἀπολιπόντες πρὸς τῷ τείχει τὰς κλίμακας ἔφυγον προτροπάδην εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν.

But shortly before the time of which we are now speaking [192/1 BCE], becoming dissatisfied with the Boiotian constitution, they [the Megarians] again joined the Achaians. The Boiotians, incensed at what they considered being treated with contempt, sallied out with their full force under arms against the Megarians. When the Megarians did not take any account of their presence, they [the Boiotians], being enraged, determined to besiege and make assaults on their city. But when a panic overtook them after a report spread that Philopoimen was at hand with a force of Achaians, they left their scaling ladders against the walls and fled back hastily to their own country.

What is of interest here is not so much that the Boiotians responded to the secession of a member of the *koinon* with violence, since this was the normal response in, for instance, the contemporary Achaian *koinon* as well,<sup>42</sup> but rather *how* the federal

37 Roesch 1982, 417–439; Knoepfler 2001b.

38 Gauthier 1987–1989, 194; Knoepfler 2001a, 371–387.

39 Fachard and Pirisino 2015, 139f, fig. 13.1.

40 Polyb. 20.5.8.

41 Polyb. 20.6.9 (translation by the author).

42 Mackil 2013, 366–370.

government responded. As Polybios makes clear, the Megarians first decided to secede, and the Boiotian federal magistrates then responded by sending an entire levy of troops (πανδημειὸν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις). They only attacked, however, when the Megarians would not converse with them, implying that the full federal army was sent out initially more as an intimidation tactic than as an actual assault force. What is unusual here, it seems, is not so much that the Boiotians sent an army to Megara because it wished to secede, but that they ended up actually besieging that *polis* and withdrawing out of fear of an Achaian counterattack.

Between this episode and the patrols outlined in the cavalry agreement between Orchomenos and Chaironeia, I believe we can find an explanation for Polybios' reference to the regular dispatching of *phourai* and *strateiai koinai* between roughly 217 and 192 BCE. These domestic troop deployments were doubtless sometimes intended to protect the borders of the *koinon*, but serious external threats requiring calling up the entire cavalry or army appear to have been relatively rare during the period discussed by Polybios.<sup>43</sup> As such, it seems likely that at least some of those *strateiai koinai* were a means of intimidating member *poleis* suspected of wavering loyalty when the *phourai* patrolling around their territories, like the Orchomenian and Chaironeian cavalry around Thebes and Oropos, failed to keep them in line. Chief among these must have been those ethnically non-Boiotian cities integrated into the *koinon* relatively recently, like Megara or Opous, as well as those *poleis* with longer but more storied relations, like Plataiai and Oropos.

The question remains of how the Boiotian *koinon* managed to fund such regular military activity. The Orchomenos–Chaironeia cavalry agreement outlines that cavalrymen were to receive road pay (ἐφόδιον) while patrolling,<sup>44</sup> and it was standard practice by the third century BCE for all troops when called up to receive both wages for service and money to cover minor expenses.<sup>45</sup> Numismatics can shed light on this question. After the destruction of Thebes in 335 BCE, the Boiotian federal government ceased striking coinage on a significant scale.<sup>46</sup> The *koinon* appears, based on the irregularity of its issues, to have followed in broad strokes the standard monetary policy of the time, drawing primarily on the existing body of coinage in circulation and only topping up the supply when it was felt necessary.<sup>47</sup> By the latter half of the third century BCE, large amounts of silver and bronze coinage were circulating in Boiotia,<sup>48</sup> but hoards from Boiotia and neighbouring regions of this period often include little or no local Boiotian coinage.<sup>49</sup> In the last decades

43 We hear of no Boiotian involvement in any major military operations beyond the *koinon*'s borders during the latter half of the third century save for supporting Antigonos Dason at the battle of Sellasia in 222 BCE with 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry, almost certainly standing contingents and not levied troops (Polyb. 2.65.3; Feysel 1942, 131).

44 *SEG* 28.461, ll. 26–29.

45 Pritchett 1974, 1–33; Chaniotis 2005, 116.

46 Martin 1985, 169.

47 See on monetary policy in the Hellenistic world, Bresson 2005, 45–50.

48 Grandjean 2006, 209.

49 See for Boiotia *IGCH* 163, 193, 223; for Euboeia *IGCH* 175, 189, 221 (only *IGCH* 205 includes a substantial quantity of Boiotian coinage); and for Phokis *IGCH* 195.

of the third century and the early second century BCE for the first time in the Hellenistic period we find significant amounts of new coinage issued by the Boiotian federal government.<sup>50</sup> Dominant among these are bronze coins featuring the wreathed head of Demeter or Persephone on the obverse and a standing Poseidon with one foot raised on the reverse; these were overstruck rather sloppily on Makedonian bronzes featuring the beardless head of Herakles on the obverse and a naked rider holding a wreath on the reverse.<sup>51</sup> This overstriking of a bronze coinage *en masse* marks a major fiscal shift that must have been stimulated by some transition in the state's finances.

This prompts the question of, firstly, why the federal government issued so much coinage so hastily, and, secondly, how it obtained so much Antigonid bronze coinage to overstrike in the first place. To address the second question first, Antigonid coinage may have reached Boiotia in two ways. The first is that one or more kings donated this cash to the *koinon*. We have literary evidence for Hellenistic kings doing just that,<sup>52</sup> most notably Ptolemy V in 186/5 BCE giving 200 talents of bronze coin to the Achaian *koinon*.<sup>53</sup> In the particular case of the Boiotian *koinon*, Polybios tells us that Antigonos Doson and Philip V were “always supporting financially” (χορηγοῦντες... αἰεὶ) the pro-Makedonian faction at Thebes.<sup>54</sup> The other possibility is that this Makedonian coinage was paid to Makedonian troops garrisoned in Boiotia.<sup>55</sup> At any rate, the Boiotian Demeter/Poseidon type overstrikes were already in circulation around or shortly by the late third century BCE<sup>56</sup> and came to dominate circulation in Boiotia down to around 175 BCE.<sup>57</sup>

The overstriking of large quantities of foreign coin indicates a desire either to put a large amount of cash into circulation quickly at low cost or to replace a significant quantity of an unpopular coin type.<sup>58</sup> The former was probably the most important factor driving the desire to overstrike the Makedonian coinage in large quantities, and the likeliest stimulus for such mass striking was military activity.<sup>59</sup> An inscription known as the *apologia* of Pompidas helps to illuminate the monetary

50 Hackens 1969, 710f.

51 Head 1884, f 41, no.81–89, Pl. VI.8; Hackens 1969, 725–728; Vlachogianni 2000, 107, 108, Classical Numismatic Group 2006, 29, 30, no.100–109. In Boiotian hoards of the first half of the second century BCE, these coins comprise the majority of all types. For instance, in the Lake Kopais 1908 hoard, of 1549 bronze coins, 1449 were of this type (*IGCH* 229) while a hoard uncovered in Thebes in 1997 contained 457 coins, of which 427 were of this type (Vlachogianni 2000, 103).

52 Vlachogianni 2000, 110f.

53 Polyb. 22.9.3 and 24.6.3. Cf. Polyb. 5.89.2.

54 Polyb. 20.5.13.

55 Psoma 2009, 21f.

56 The only hoard including Demeter/Poseidon bronzes that possible predates the 2nd c. BC is *IGCH* 169, whose date is unclear (Vlachogianni 2000, 108, n.41)

57 Vlachogianni 2000, 111f.

58 Le Rider 1975, 52f.

59 Howgego 1990, 7–9, though cf. the balanced perspective on the relationship between coinage and military activity from the perspective of the contemporary Achaian *koinon* in Grandjean 2000.

situation in early second century BCE Boiotia and how it relates to military activity.<sup>60</sup> This inscription, dated probably to around 170 BCE by Grandjean,<sup>61</sup> is the *apologia*, or account, of a Theban *hipparchos* named Pompidas enumerating money he received from the city, the sale of some horses, pay for his troops, and other minor expenses. This is a civic, not a federal, document, and one that dates to shortly after the dissolution of the *koinon* in 171 BCE, but the administration of the army prior to this time was largely carried out at the *polis* level, and so this inscription very likely sheds light on the administration of military pay under the *koinon* of the later 3<sup>rd</sup> or early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE as well.<sup>62</sup>

In Pompidas' *apologia*, the sums discussed are reckoned in silver and bronze drachmas, mentioned interchangeably as if equivalent in value.<sup>63</sup> The Theban cavalrymen were only paid in silver, however, while the purchase of horses and other minor transactions were conducted in bronze drachmas,<sup>64</sup> which have been identified plausibly with the overstruck Demeter/Poseidon bronzes.<sup>65</sup> Interestingly, Pompidas states in his account that he had to buy 110 silver drachmas from a money-changer to cover his expenses, a transaction which cost him 137 drachmas 3 obols in bronze.<sup>66</sup> It therefore appears from this inscription that citizen troops were paid in silver, which was common practice in the Greek world due to the universally recognized value of silver coinage, while bronze was generally reserved for everyday transactions.<sup>67</sup> Outside of public pay, silver, it seems, could only be obtained at a premium at this time in Boiotia.<sup>68</sup>

The best explanation for the proliferation of bronze coinage in late third and early second century BCE Boiotia and the economic situation attested in the Pompidas inscription is that the Boiotian federal government was actively withdrawing silver coinage from widespread circulation and replacing it with bronze coinage. Warren posited that just such a situation has been discerned in the Achaian *koinon* in the second quarter of the second century BCE, at which time that federal state similarly struck a large quantity of bronze coinage of one denomination.<sup>69</sup> Kroll has suggested that this bronze coinage was issued *en masse* by the Achaians to address military needs; he proposed that it was not produced in order to pay troops directly, however, but to extract silver from the economy and hold it in federal coffers in

60 IG VII.2426.

61 Grandjean 1995, 4f.

62 On the relationship between the Boiotian federal government and its member *poleis* with regards to military matters, see Feyel 1942, 187–218; Roesch 1965, 109–122, 176–179; Étienne and Roesch 1978, 366–374; Roesch 1982, 316–319.

63 Grandjean 1995, 7f; Sosin 2002, 337.

64 IG VII.2426, ll. 2–6.

65 Vlachogianni 2000, 109.

66 IG VII.2426, ll. 16–18.

67 Grandjean 2000, 316f; Sosin 2002, 335–337.

68 Sosin 2002, 338.

69 Warren 2007, 156–158.

order to meet any military needs that might have arisen.<sup>70</sup> To do this, the government must have mandated that all tax payments be made in silver. Just such a situation is likely reflected in the large quantity of Boiotian bronze overstrikes known from late third and second century BCE contexts.

Let us now return to the Boiotian digression of Polybios and integrate this economic evidence into our analysis of it. As we have seen, in the period extending from roughly 217 to 192 BCE the Achaian historian tells us firstly that Antigonos Doson and Philip V were continually sending money to the pro-Makedonian faction at Thebes.<sup>71</sup> He next tells us that during this period the boiotarchs, the chief federal magistrates of the *koinon*, were constantly deploying the army on guard duty and national campaigns. As we have seen, however, there is little indication of external military activity during this time, and the *koinon* appears to have remained neutral during the Social War as well as the First Makedonian War and its aftermath. I propose that Boiotian magistrates hastily overstruck the large quantity of Makedonian bronze coins of the Herakles/rider type that had entered the *koinon* under Philip V and his predecessors to put them into circulation and consequently withdraw silver into the federal treasury. The continuous need for silver to pay troops during the period discussed by Polybios meant that the overstruck coins remained current and widespread in Boiotia during this period. Thus, the support of the Antigonids likely allowed the Boiotians to pursue a policy of using the federal army to intimidate members who might have been considering secession to remain in the *koinon* at a time of increasingly violent large-scale conflicts throughout much of Greece.

Now that we have examined the Boiotian *koinon*'s treatment of ethnically non-Boiotian or hybrid Boiotian communities, particularly in the last decades of the third century and first decade of the second century BCE, let us place this activity into the broader context of Boiotian history. I suggest that two factors shaped the Hellenistic *koinon*'s treatment of newly-integrated ethnically non-Boiotian *poleis*. The first was the relative lack of success the *koinon* experienced in retaining new members. After the initial expansion of the 280s and 270s BCE, which brought in Oropos, Chalkis, Eretria, and Opous, the Euboian cities quickly withdrew, while the *poleis* of Opountian Lokris were also lost later in the century, only to be regained and then lost again. In these circumstances, and with the expanding Achaian and Aitolian *koina* often threatening to annex their territory, the Boiotians must have been eager to ensure the retention of every *polis* integrated into their federal state.

The second factor was the Boiotian history of resolving domestic conflicts with military force. Despite their successes in unifying the politically, economically, and ritually, the Boiotians were notorious for their violent conflicts with one another,<sup>72</sup> most pithily encapsulated in Perikles' famous comparison of them to "holm-oaks who are beaten down by each other" (τούς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ' αὐτῶν

70 Kroll 2009.

71 Polyb. 20.5.13.

72 On the relationship between cooperation and coercion in the development of Boiotian federalism, see Mackil 2014.

κατακόπτεσθαι).<sup>73</sup> Internal conflict is of course something that all federal states must face, but the Boiotians had a particularly long and fierce history of inter-*polis* violence about which we are relatively well informed. From Thebes' attempt to compel Plataiai to contribute to the *Boiotoi* in the late sixth century BCE onwards,<sup>74</sup> the Boiotians had often resorted to coercion and violence to compel unity in their ranks, a tendency most brutally showcased in the fourth century BCE when the hegemonic Thebans attacked numerous *poleis* opposed to them.<sup>75</sup>

In conclusion, I wish to contextualize this aspect of the history of the Hellenistic Boiotian *koinon* by considering briefly the famous Theban response to the Plataian appeal to the Spartans in 427 BCE. The Plataians' withdrawal from the *koinon* sometime before 431 BCE is the first detailed record of the secession of a *polis* from a Greek federal state. The Theban speaker, arguing to the Spartans that the Plataian withdrawal was not legitimate, opens by asserting that the Plataians "refused to acknowledge our leadership, as was first arranged, and, separating themselves from the other Boiotians, deserted *ta patria*" (οὐκ ἤξιον οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια).<sup>76</sup> In the lengthy speech that follows, Thucydides has the Theban assert that his city was compelled to return the Plataians to the Boiotians "so that Plataiai might be an enemy of none and at peace with all alike" (ἐχθροῦς οὐδενὶ καθιστάντες, ἅπασιν δ' ὁμοίως ἐνσπόνδους).<sup>77</sup> As he relates it:<sup>78</sup>

οὔτε γὰρ ἠδικήσαμεν οὐδένα, προείπομέν τε τὸν βουλούμενον κατὰ τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια πολιτεύειν ἰέναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἄσμενοι χωρήσαντες καὶ ζῦμβασιν ποιησάμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσυχάζετε, ὕστερον δὲ κατανοήσαντες ἡμᾶς ὀλίγους ὄντας, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐδοκοῦμέν τι ἀνεπιεικέστερον πρῶξαι οὐ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ὑμῶν ἐσελθόντες, τὰ μὲν ὁμοῖα οὐκ ἀνταπέδοτε ἡμῖν, μήτε νεωτερίσαι ἔργῳ λόγῳις τε πείθειν ὥστε ἐξελεῖν, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ζῦμβασιν...

We did no harm to anyone, but invited those who wished to live under *ta patria*<sup>79</sup> of the Boiotians to come over to us; and you, coming over gladly and making an agreement [with us], at first remained tranquil, until later you became aware that we were few. Now if we seemed to do something rather unreasonable by entering [your city] without the consent of the majority, at any rate you did not repay us in kind by refraining from violence and persuading us to retire by negotiation, but rather attacked us in violation of our agreement...

This, the Theban states, justified assaulting the city and forcing it to comply with Theban directives. We might imagine just such a speech being delivered by a Boiotian general to the Megarians over two centuries later. The *koinon* and the world

73 Arist. *Rhet.* 1407a 4–6; Cf. Plut. *Per.* 33.4.

74 Hdt. 6.108.1–5.

75 Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.63, 6.3.1, 5; Diod. Sic. 15.46.6, 51.3, 79.3–6; Isocr. 6.27, 14; Dem. 16.4, 25, 28; Plut. *Pel.* 25.7.

76 Thuc. 3.61.2.

77 Thuc. 3.65.3.

78 Thuc. 3.66.1–2 (translation by the author).

79 I have left *ta patria* untranslated here and below in order to preserve the ambiguity of the term. For the valence of this word in this context, see Mackil 2013, 40f.

around it had changed significantly in the years between 427 and 192 BCE, but the rhetoric of integration, obligation, and compulsion had likely changed little.

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