


**MODES OF MOBILISATION:
SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN SOMALILAND, SOMALIA
AND AFGHANISTAN**

Karl Sandstrom

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews**



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
Modes of Mobilisation

-Socio-political dynamics in Somaliland, Somalia and Afghanistan-



Submitted 8 November, 2010
Karl Sandstrom
University of St Andrews
Supervisor: Professor Oliver Richmond

**Thesis Submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In the School of International Relations
At the University of St. Andrews**



**Karl Sandstrom
8 November 2010**

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Abstract

This thesis provides a framework for viewing socio-political contexts and how these relate to interventionist projects. The framework draws on and combines strands from international relations and sociological perspectives of social interaction. The central question becomes how intervention and existing social contexts interact to produce unintended outcomes. It applies the analysis to two separate wider contexts: Afghanistan and Somalia, with a particular focus on the self-declared independent Somaliland as an internally generated and controlled transformational process. Unlike abstract directions of theoretical development the framework seeks to provide a platform that sets aside ideological assumptions and from which interventionist projects can be observed and evaluated based on literature, field observations and interviews.

Drawing on such diverse influences as fourth generation peace and conflict studies, Morphogenetics, and social forces theory, the framework explores conditions and interest formations to capture instances of local agency that are part of a continuity of local realities. It views social interaction without imposing Universalist value assumptions, but also without resorting to relativism or raising so many caveats that it becomes impractical. It exposes the agency of local interest formations hidden beneath the discourses of ideologically framed conflicts. These social agents are often dismissed as passive victims to be brought under the influence of for example the state, but are in reality able to subvert, co-opt, constrain or facilitate the forces that are dependent on them for social influence. In the end, it is the modes of mobilisation that emerge as the most crucial factor for understanding the relevant social dynamics.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my supervisors Professor Oliver Richmond and Professor Andy Williams for their support during this process. I would also like to thank family, friends, and colleagues who have helped me in different ways. In the 'Western' cities I went to for research the reception ranged from having requests for meetings or interviews ignored to extremely accommodating and welcoming. I appreciate greatly the honesty and frankness shown even when some felt their work was being questioned. I owe the Academy of Peace and Development in Hargeisa, Somaliland a debt of gratitude for the assistance, hospitality, and the fantastic friendliness they showed a first time researcher in the Horn of Africa. It was also highly encouraging to see the eagerness and willingness to engage and to make a difference among so many people and evidenced by organisations such as SONYO and Nagaad. In Afghanistan I was very well received by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan who helped me adjust and adapt to realistic expectations from an early stage, long before I finally came to Kabul. I also owe a debt of gratitude to all the Afghans, Somalis, practitioners and academics who took the time to listen to and support or take a stand against my sometimes badly misguided hypotheses. I learned a lot, I hope enough for the purposes here.

There is a need to make one special mentioning. I met with the female Afghan journalist Hamida Osman and her husband over tea in Kabul in November 2009. Ms. Osman is under threat from armed opposition groups and is occasionally threatened by state representatives as well. I suggested she remain anonymous in this research, a suggestion strongly supported by her husband, but she refused arguing that 'they' have won if she must hide. To her courage.

This thesis is dedicated to the Somalis, the Afghans, and all the international workers who are earnestly trying to change quite harsh environments into something better. It is my hope that the framework here can contribute to making some of the less informed efforts more sustainable, less confrontational, and in the end, more than a discursive or statistical 'success.'

Abbreviations

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ASAP	Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program
AU	African Union
BNA	Basic Needs Approach
CAF	Conflict Analysis Framework
CPR	Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit
DFID	Department for International Development
DNH	Do No Harm
EU	European Union
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU/UIC	Islamic Courts Union/Union of Islamic Courts
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPBS	Integrated Peace Building Strategies
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RBA	Rights-Based Approach
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security and Safety
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
USA (US)	United States of America (United States)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UK	United Kingdom
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Introduction

This thesis springs from the perception of certain aspects being askew in the way international interventions engage with different social contexts, even when based on the best of intentions. Throughout the research this perception was enhanced by conversations with practitioners, policy developers, and most importantly, people on the recipient end of interventionist projects. It gradually became clear that the problems themselves were largely recognised and that insightful questions were often being asked, but that the implemented ‘answers’ were often framed in the same perspectives and assumptions that raised the questions in the first place. This thesis does not seek to provide ‘solutions’ to the problems of individual projects or programmes because there are experienced practitioners far better suited to do so. What it does however seek to do is to provide an alternative lens through which to view the production of outcomes in the meeting between social context and outside interventions. This facilitates a perspective outside the narrow understanding provided by notions of Universalist values and ‘simple’ solutions that in the end may well serve to complicate and prolong the very tasks they were supposed to address. Effective engagement requires contextual understanding in order to interpret and ascribe meaning to events,¹ but this is of course impossible if no effort is devoted to it. The use of prescribed meanings, blanket solutions, recycled models and the discrepancy between discourse and practice supports the view articulated by Mosse that ‘development’ is merely re-framed in order to strengthen its own legitimacy.²

This thesis adds to a growing body of literature examining issues relating to peace, conflict and the notion of the liberal peace.³ It provides an alternative platform for viewing social environments, in particular active- and post-conflict areas. The focus of the discussion is primarily on aspects of contemporary international peacebuilding and all that this entails in the shape of state-building, aid, development and other externally generated strategies.

The framework is largely aligned with what Richmond has called a ‘critical fourth generation’ of peace and conflict theory;⁴ but while it shares the concern over ‘representation and sovereignty’ and how to ‘sensitise’ to the local,⁵ it is not so much

focused on developing a shared notion of peace. It can instead be described as going in the same direction but on a parallel track. The focus on the interaction between internal factors and external influences also contributes to the understanding of 'hybrid political orders' and how they shape peace- and state-building as pursued by for example Boege et al.⁶ When not romanticising the view, hidden agency and resistance become more visible.⁷

It is necessary for social analysis to employ a framework that conceptualises social interaction without imposing either a Universalist assumption of values and opinions or raising so many caveats that it becomes impractical.⁸ The strategies and perspectives applied today largely fail to achieve this and the literature, while often critically astute, often falls short of addressing the problems in a constructive way. This thesis seeks to address that gap by providing a perspective influenced by international relations and sociology that recognises the agency of both internal and external agents and actors and their influence on the largely unintended outcomes of social interaction.

Observing social contexts

Any type of social analysis requires some degree of generalisation in order to become graspable. The framework developed here has a degree of generalisation built into it that can be compounded by a careless entry of data for the analysis of a specific context. It is however felt that when applied properly the nature of the framework forces the analysis to engage with a specific context level and take into account issues that are often side-lined or simply wished away. Every social setting is specific in terms of conditions and generalisation therefore has to be restricted to mechanical dynamics rather than subjective and contextual values. As Boege et al point out; the objective should be to comprehend what 'truly constitutes political order in those regions of apparent fragility.'⁹ The weakness of most international interventions is not so much that they fail to understand that there are a variety of ideas and values in the world, but that they reject or misunderstand any deviation from their own perspectives as abnormal with the norm being defined by what 'we' are as opposed to the 'Other.'

There has been much written on the subject of engaging with societies, especially in the 'Global South' and societies in conflict,¹⁰ but the challenge is to develop a framework that allows a view of both the situational logics facing local social agents and actors as well as interventionists. 'The local' is used here to signify the locally recognised dynamics as they are understood in locally shared images rather than in external perceptions based on elite encounters with 'right-think' and 'right-speak' agents and actors. Social context can be understood at multiple levels and each society consists of a number of different social contexts. Depending on the location of a social agent in a particular set of circumstances, different institutions are actuated to produce situational logics that guide, but do not force, agential responses to the situation. An existing social context can thus be understood as for example a village, an area, a country, or a region and the level of analysis provides the level of specificity. A country-wide analysis cannot provide a sufficient understanding of the dynamics in a valley any more than a village-specific analysis can provide knowledge of all the social categories in a country. People in geographical proximity may live in completely different social worlds¹¹ just as people separated by great distances can share 'mental maps' and images. Thus, the local socio-political dynamics must be understood in order to mitigate potential unintended but avoidable negative outcomes. When undertaking a socially wider project, there must thus be a macro-level analysis but also multiple localised contextual analyses. The more heterogeneous a society is, the bigger the need for multiple level analyses.

The concept of intervention may invoke images of invasion or 'humanitarian interventions' but its usage here is distinctly wider. It refers to any type of externally generated project into an existing local context¹² at any level that represents, in that specific interaction, 'the local.'¹³ The basic mechanics are assumed to be the same at all levels in the sense that at the point of intervention there is an existing specific pattern of local structures, social interaction and dominance, institutions, and distribution of resources that are affected. Less overtly violent projects can also have deep effects on a social context; for instance a new well may generate violent confrontations in an environment where water is a scarce resource. For the purposes

of this framework such projects are also considered interventionist as they are generated outside of and introduced into a social context. Thus, any intervention, at any level, offsets the conditions and interaction of that particular context to some degree whether benign or confrontational in nature. While the framework can provide a better understanding of the dynamics facing the local agents and actors as well as the interventionist project, the interaction between the project and the local context is going to produce largely unintentional outcomes.

Seen in the framework here hybridisation is an uncontrollable outcome of interaction between different ideational and structural features. It is the emergent properties of the interaction of two different systems, voluntarily or through imposition. Rather than being eliminated by development strategies for example, many 'traditional cultures' survive through a transformative engagement with the external influences of 'modernity.'¹⁴ This engagement may lead to hybridised models developing more or less consciously. The nature of the interaction however means that there is no element of reliable prediction involved and a range of possible outcomes.

The Question Unfolds

This project started with the notion of the 'traditional' as a viable route to peacebuilding and local governance development. A rather simplistic and 'unproblematic' understanding of local dynamics facilitated a perceived route to a 'solution' for intra-social conflicts in particular in 'developing' countries. The position could however not withstand deeper scrutiny and issues soon arose. It became obvious, especially during the field research, that the local social dynamics were nowhere near as static and coherent as had been assumed. What was needed was instead a framework that would put context-specific factors in relation to each other and facilitate an understanding of how social dynamics worked locally to constrain or encourage certain responses. The constant presence of international forces such as aid, development, or even jihadists also needed to be included as the pressure and influence exerted by them changed the conditions of social interaction. It gradually

became clear that ‘the local’ had a considerable potential agency in relation to externally generated projects, even when perceived as weak and disadvantaged by comparison. The pressures of the encounter therefore operated in both directions and all these factors had to be understood before proceeding to any type of solution studies. The direction and subject of the research had thus dramatically changed into an attempt to answer the question of *how social contexts form and how they interact with interventionist projects to produce unintended outcomes*.

The Framework

The framework developed here focuses on the formation of social interest groups and social forces, as well as their interaction in a social context to produce outcomes. It holds that any externally generated project is subject to these logics¹⁵ while also changing them and that intervention needs to be seen in relation to this. The framework provides a platform for viewing social dynamics differently from the highly generalised and idealised images of the state and social order present in the liberal state-centric notions of peacebuilding¹⁶ and other ideological agendas.¹⁷ The interaction between external and local offers opportunities for mutual co-optation¹⁸ but also levels of hybridisation as the meeting local and external transforms the outcomes in their meeting.¹⁹ With this in mind the thesis explores and combines aspects of Migdal’s perspective on state-society relations and social forces; frames it in the morphogenetic framework of Archer; and fills it with influences from fourth generation peace and conflict studies. It is then applied to the cases as a method of gleaning the local realities of Afghanistan and Somalia, in the spaces where ‘local populations live and develop political strategies in their local environment, towards the state and towards international modes of order.’²⁰

There is a distinct echo in this thesis of Migdal’s assertion that in order to ‘glean the patterns of domination’ one must focus on the struggles and accommodations in society’s multiple arenas.²¹ It also shares a social constructionist view of our knowledge of the world being generated in human relationships (interaction) and brought into being by historically (antecedent emergent properties) and ‘culturally’

(here referred to as 'ideational') situated social processes.²² It is an examination of the perceptual answers to questions such as 'Who and what is present?', 'Who and what matters?', and 'What elements make a difference?' in the specific context at hand shaped by interaction, historical and 'cultural' norms.²³ It seeks to understand what social factors and institutions are actuated by social agents and actors to shape the situational logic of the context-specific strategic environment. It also acknowledges that social realities, or more precisely the meanings attached and attributed to them, are ontologically subjective and multiple.²⁴ It is thus necessary to examine the narratives involved and how the contextual situational logic is produced, understood, explained and disseminated within and through them.²⁵ For example, investigating the influence and situational logics generated by religious affiliations requires a historical and socio-political 'mapping' of the context but being observations and interpretations by the researcher, it can only hold so much validity. It becomes paramount to allow respondent feed back into the interpretation in order to correct the original assumptions or categorisations if need be. The more complex understanding of the different influences, and the demands they make on the agents and actors, provides a better opportunity to accurately contextualise behaviour and responses made by involved parties. The focus is thus at least in part on the *'arenas of domination and opposition where various social forces engage one another over material and symbolic issues.'*²⁶ The framework can be said to focus on three broad levels allowing for a holistic approach while also examining particular aspects more individually. The division is for analytical purposes only and does not suggest completely separate and atomistic features.

a) Socio-structural and ideational components:

All social phenomena involve historicity to at the very least some degree²⁷ and are related to the structural and ideational conditions of a specific context. The material and ideational spheres hold significance as they generate institutions through their internal and external relationships and are the consequence of previous and the pre-condition for future action.²⁸ Similarly to ideational features such as ideology, the distribution of power, resources, or other factors of a structural material nature may

for example trigger social conflicts. In this research, actualisation and relative importance have been given meaning through a combination of interviews and literature. This precaution is in recognition of the interpretive layering of signification as texts and artefacts may have been created with 'becoming history' in mind.²⁹

b) Institutions:

Institutions are to be understood as the outcome of interaction between material and ideational conditions and are actualised by social agents as subjectively relevant features. The institutional structures of the state generate situational logics for agents and actors in society but the state at the same time consists of multiple sites of competition and contestation (for example different ministries) and is thereby reconstituted by the agents and actors (their roles and options changed). The formal institutions of the state become agent-specific resources with which to compete for social control against informal or alternative institutions³⁰ (for example religious councils). Assigning a level of importance without corresponding textual and oral support would be a severe mistake. While influences on situational logics in social interaction can partly be traced in literature of mainly an anthropological and historic nature, it is through interviews and cross-referencing respondent typologies that a more accurate and contemporary picture can be revealed, an imprint of situational logics guiding agents and actors in the *current* situation. The interaction between formal and informal institutions and to what extent they can guide local power-holding agents and actors is crucial for stability.³¹ The resulting situational logics do not exert a pneumatic, forcing pressure, but merely options. One choice may thus be more beneficial to that agent or actor, at that moment, in that situation and is thus dependent on subjective judgements conditioned by the social context.

c) Agents and actors:

Social agents are understood here as collectivities that can be non-interested social agents; primary agents that have an interest in a particular matter; and corporate agents that are able to organise, mobilise, and articulate an interest. This can be a kinship-group³², a political party, unions, neighbourhood watch groups and so on. The interaction between institutions and agents produce roles with vested interests

attached, that are filled by actors who are interchangeable individuals. Roles can in some instances be utilised by corporate interest groups in order to attain a specific goal such as patrimonial access to resources.

To move to understand the complex web of agential and institutional interaction requires a multifaceted approach recognising the multiple identities an individual belongs to. Having multiple identities also means potentially being part of multiple corporate or social agents and also has implications, for example for role-bearers. The social context determines what identities a mobilised individual *can* act in the interest of while the mobilised individual determines which he or she *will* act in the interest of. In Afghanistan a local commander may present a challenge to the state when unaffiliated, but may also be its strongest competitor for social control even when allied with it as a public servant.³³ The framework is also concerned with how the infusion of resources and influences from external sources affect the options available to agents and actors.³⁴ As Escobar has suggested this focus provides an opportunity to examine externally introduced dominant social discourses and their relation to the cultural meanings and practises they upset or modify.³⁵ It is through interaction that agents and actors initiate or quell the propensity for change and mediation occurs locally in the situational context where the situated agents and actors exist. External discourse often speaks of those perceived as 'marginalised' by the situational logic such as gender inequities.³⁶ At the same time however it is often marginalising the entire context as irrelevant or plain 'wrong' to be replaced by external solutions. Interventionist projects present agents and actors with a new situational logic due to the change in structural and ideational balance to which they must choose a response. The unpredictable nature of interaction however provides no pre-knowledge of what that outcome will be because agents and actors will choose their responses based on subjective or collectively produced understandings of the situation.

Data Collection – Methods, Ethics and Sequence

The purpose and circumstances of the research made some methods more appropriate than others and generated a number of issues that had to be addressed.

The initial issue was the positionality of the researcher and the research was fully overt throughout. The situations in the sites of research are of such a nature that a misrepresentation of intent would not only risk corrupting the data, alienating respondents, and give the researcher a 'bad name', but could also create misconceptions about the true role and nature of the researcher and the research. This risk is exacerbated in Afghanistan by a close relationship between some social scientists and military programmes represented externally as 'social research.'³⁷ The nature of the investigation is not of such a sensitive character that covert research was deemed necessary or desirable. There was a balance to be struck to maintain distance while also being sensitive to the small-scale interpretive context in which narratives were formed.³⁸

While it may be beneficial to engage in a long-term befriending manner, the time constraints and the nature of the research did require some distance to be maintained. This could possibly be described as the 'familiar stranger' and was employed as part of the impression management³⁹ of the researcher. A balance also had to be struck between the positive effects of being facilitated and assisted by one or more organisations and not being associated as part of that same organisation and sharing a specific agenda. It was judged that in both Afghanistan and Somaliland, the perception of belonging to a specific organisation prejudices the respondents and thus affects the data collected and the nature of respondent reactions through the assumptions they brought to the interview.

Methods employed

The research focused on data acquisition through a number of means intended to generate both direct and background data.

-*Observation* of interaction in the shape of discourse and interrelationships both locally and externally, for example vis-à-vis funders. This entailed observation of how institutions and organisations interacted with each other and with the local populations. Points of interest involved among other things decision rights, modes of

influence in both directions, setting of the agenda, and defining problems and solutions. Primarily though, the focus was on discursive actualisation by respondents.

- *Investigation* into documents and produced materials by organisations and institutions that provided insights into what image of the social reality is being produced and enacted, in effect how local agents, actors, and their situational logics were represented in institutional culture. The understanding of historical or descriptive texts as socially produced narratives rather than an absolute truth is crucial, and it is only in comparison with the subjective narratives of the respondents that such texts are given their full meanings. Particular attention was given to literature produced locally and by persons situated in the context.

- *Interviews* of a semi-structured nature with the questions following a general topic-guide⁴⁰ consistent with the specific context but largely open-ended in order to allow for as much self-reflection as possible. The semi-structured interviews were employed as a means to control the topics of discussion but allow for an individual narrative to develop based on personal reflections. This allowed for probing responses through follow-up questions and brief discussions to penetrate dubious statements and potential 'parroting' of party-lines⁴¹ something that proved increasingly important. By engaging with people in the environment of interest it became possible to let observation and engagement complement what people claimed that 'they believe and do.'⁴²

Structured interviews were considered much too blunt a tool and it was felt that using focus groups would potentially produce a situation where group dynamics and respondent concerns with the perceptions of others would corrupt the data collection process. Improvised group discussions did however become part of the methodology when no other solution was available.

A further consideration was that of the interview as both a topic and a resource. While the open-ended interview may be considered a source there is also the possibility of it turning into a topic,⁴³ a narrative created in a perceived need to defend or justify the respondent's own actions, or to make the answers fit what the researcher is perceived to be after. This was a fully understood issue going into the

research and responses have been viewed with an eye to this potential problem as well. It turned out to be a constant problem with answers tailored to an assumed agenda of the researcher in a defensive or accommodating fashion.

Case selection

There are both multiple similarities and differences between the chosen cases. Somaliland is a small country that is not recognised and with a relatively small population that has gone through internally controlled peace processes. It has also undergone a political transformation and successfully held several elections. Somalia by contrast is by contrast still subject to a range of conflicts and an internationally supported government tries to consolidate its power while insurgent groups 'control' over 60% of the territory. Somalia has a relatively small population and like Somaliland the social divisions are along kinship segments rather than ethnicity or sectarianism. Afghanistan is ethnically and religiously more complex while also incorporating kinship and other solidarity structures in different sub-national groups. The differences are many but the most significant one is the nature of the Somaliland transformation and the relative absence of externally driven change. In Somalia and Afghanistan, by contrast, the external involvement and manipulation has been substantial. The similarities are at a generalised level also quite numerous but the most important one is that all three cases are characterised by a weak influence from the state and extremely strong and capable social interest groups and networks at a local level.

The cases were picked primarily for the reason of being some of the most complex and protracted social conflicts that have repeatedly posed a challenge to outside interventions but also managed to remain largely outside the absolute control of the state or any other social force whether domestic or external in origin. Somaliland was at the outset supposed to be the shining example of indigenous peace- and statebuilding, a powerful argument for relying on the traditional while Afghanistan was supposed to be the negative example of an externally controlled process gone awry. The research made it clear that this was incorrect to some extent in both cases. There are some periods of relative control in Afghanistan, Somalia, and now Somaliland, but

in all these cases the multiple local realities of society have existed either autonomously or in direct confrontation with larger social forces seeking to dominate the physical and mental space in which society exists. The complex relationship within and between local interest groups, social forces and external influences issued by these environments were simply the most interesting and challenging cases available. As it turned out they did in the end provide excellent examples of the dynamics addressed by the framework and a fantastic opportunity to view them in a different way than what has become the norm.

Source material

There is extensive literature on Afghanistan and Somalia/Somaliland, but it seems to exist largely in three distinctly different segments. The first is the historic literature that focuses on lost empires and mainly on conflict. The second is the anthropological that focuses more on observable conditions and interpretation. The third is what could possibly best be termed 'policy literature' and concerns reports and strategies for engagement by international interests mainly in pursuit of ideologically generated ideals.

The available literature presents several potential problems of which the dominant is that of interpretation. The source and data selection as well as its interpretation in this thesis is dependent on interpretations and accounts of others, thus gradually removing it from the actual local contexts. In addition there was a language barrier as the researcher did not speak Somali, Dari, or Pashto which exposes the research to the representations presented by gatekeepers and interpreters. The aim has been to mitigate this in two ways:

a) Informed choice and cross-referencing of literature: A particular focus has been placed on anthropological and historical literature to provide a background understanding of social structures and ideational influences in the respective contexts. This has then been compared and examined against contemporary narratives in literature and media. By cross-referencing the literature and comparing it to current and historic events the more fanciful accounts of the cases, both historical and

contemporary, could be eliminated. The lines of investigation have departed from this part of the research but have also been allowed to develop through interaction during the fieldwork.

b) The fieldwork for this thesis, undertaken in periods between July and November 2009, served to reduce the distance between the research and the researched. The researcher received assistance from organisations in both Somaliland and Afghanistan and in effect these organisations acted as gatekeepers for entry into the research. This was particularly true in Somaliland where the Academy for Peace and Development provided office space, transport and some contacts. In Afghanistan the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan provided advice, accommodation, and some contacts. The limited amount of time available and the conditions under which the research was undertaken did not allow for long-term observational study. Despite this the fieldwork has been invaluable as it served to adjust, complement, and sometimes contradict the often quite 'box-shaped' pieces of knowledge that had been gained through the literature. It provided the researcher with an opportunity to observe, experience, and compare narratives directly and engage them not from behind a desk far away but in the immediate realities being discussed. The research was also allowed to change along the way in order to adapt to the local reality as it was found. This has been considered acceptable if not beneficial and in line with the notion of the research process being a *'constant interaction between problem formulation, data collection and data analysis.'*⁴⁴

Respondent typologies:

There are three main typologies of respondents engaged with in this research. Each interview was semi-structured in nature and typically lasted between sixty and ninety minutes.

1) *Local social- and corporate agents and actors.* This refers to individuals with a potential or articulated interest in the on-going process and mainly engaged with the modes of mobilisation and actuation present in the respective contexts, but also subjective perceptions of enablers and constraints of a material or ideational nature.

While access was relatively easy there were ethical concerns connected to engaging with this category as interaction could trigger negative consequences for the respondent in terms of for example criminal violence. This was observed in a sometimes slightly overprotective way that complicated interaction with local population in particular in Afghanistan and in relation to formal interviews. It is however felt that this was compensated through informal interaction that provided additional depth to the background.

2) *External agents and actors situated locally.* This refers to organisations and individuals physically present in these countries and how they perceive their own role as well as the role of the 'local.' This predominantly entails expatriate staff in international organisations and agencies, but also to some extent national staff.

3) *External agents and actors situated externally.* This category consisted of organisational headquarters and donors situated outside of the countries in question yet influencing the interaction going on in those societies. It allowed for a comparison with how external agents and actors situated in the respective countries perceive and engage with locally situated agents and actors. This category became mainly focused on the Afghan engagement as an outcome of the responses to interview requests.

The lines of enquiry were adapted to each of these typologies in order to achieve a higher degree of 'benevolent' penetration of the common discourse. By asking a respondent about not only their own but also the other typologies a cross-reference of perceptions and understandings was held to be possible. This type of feedback was then allowed to influence a continuing development of the lines of enquiry to expand somewhat to incorporate new factors. It was thus a living investigation that evolved with knowledge acquired locally through interaction with direct sources in a dynamic and self-reflective feed-back.

Not all interviews have been used and conversations outside the interview format have only been referred to in a few instances. The interviews used are listed in the source material but are all anonymous as per the ethical discussion below and they break down in a number of categories. In total there were sixteen international aid and development workers interviewed from different parts of the world. There were also

two international diplomats, one intelligence official, one military officer, two international analysts, and four journalists of whom two were Somali, one was Afghan, and one was from a 'Western' country. In Somaliland three Somaliland politicians were also interviewed, as was one Somaliland businessman and four Somali NGO workers. In Afghanistan four Afghan state workers and one former Taliban official also contributed to this research bringing the total number of interviews used to thirty-nine. Of these nine were situated outside of the contexts while sixteen were in Afghanistan, and fourteen in Somaliland. While the social distribution is reflected in the categorisations, the gender distribution largely reflects the male-dominated face of the societies investigated. Out of a total of thirty-nine interviews referenced here, thirty-two are with male respondents and seven with women. The distribution of female respondents is relatively evenly distributed between the three research environments. With this said there are several interviews with women that, together with additional interviews with male respondents, have not been used as reference material but form part of the background understanding. In terms of age distribution all respondents were adults. The youngest was in their early twenties and the oldest in their seventies. The majority of respondents were between twenty-five and fifty.

Ethical considerations

A particular note has to be made on the ethical aspects⁴⁵ of the interviews as the three general areas where they were undertaken offer a number of different challenges. The researcher's status was completely overt and each participant was issued a participant information sheet in the relevant language that detailed the project, the data storage and processing. They were also provided with contact information in case they wanted to later retract their statements. Because of the intention to reflect personal perceptions and opinions rather than an official position or narrative, the interviews departed from a point of total anonymity regardless of the position or location of the respondent. In the end all statements were made anonymous in order to reduce the possibility of particular statements being linked to specific persons by exclusion. A conscious decision has been made to err on the safe

side and all respondents were given the opportunity to withdraw or change their statements before July 2010. One respondent expressed such a wish and has been removed completely from the research. The project was fully approved by the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) at the University of St Andrews.

Thesis outline

The first chapter examines the historical background of international peacebuilding and its associated concepts. During the research it became apparent that the framework applied to any type of intervention and that by separating the 'external' and the 'local', any type of conscious action from the former into the latter constitutes an intervention. However, keeping the focus on international peacebuilding addresses the full range of means between aid and armed force, an increasingly blurred space for peacebuilders and military forces.⁴⁶ It thus takes centre stage and the literature review examines the concepts that appear at the heart of current interventions whether at village or state levels, often making them into political enterprises rather than the apolitical aid projects they are often portrayed as.

Having examined the foundations of current strategies the focus in the second chapter shifts to constructing an alternative framework for viewing a social narrative. Archer's *Morphogenetic* theory provides an understanding of how the properties of social interaction and interest group formation emerge from material and ideational preconditions. The interaction between these social interest groups is then considered as networks of groups forming social forces and viewed through the lens of Migdal's theory on state and society relations. Both of these theories are however found wanting and are amended in the construction of the framework. The emerging framework considers the historic and contemporary conditions in order to form an understanding of interest group dynamics and, detached from the international state-centric obsession, instead focuses on understanding the socially established modes of mobilisation. Social forces in terms of the state, insurgency, social or ethnic groups are explored as networks that have internally diverse agendas, grievances, and

motivations. Social interaction is complex and often unpredictable making comprehensive mapping unrealistic as the possibilities are endless. One can however glean these instances in social time and while they may have one interpretation as single snapshots of 'the local', they can provide more insights when seen together with a multitude of similar snapshots.

The third chapter is focused on the social dynamics of Somalia with a particular focus on Somaliland in the north-west. The unrecognised Republic of Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and has fashioned a peace that has largely held since 1997. There have been several elections and the people of Somaliland have overcome internal friction through reliance on traditional social structures. However, while displaying most of the trappings of a 'modern' state, politics largely tend to play out locally even within the theatre of the central state institutions. The chapter examines instances of how the social interest formation and solidarity groups played a role in the peace processes of the 1990's and indications of change within the traditional framework, specifically in terms of gender relations. Examples from both Somaliland and South Somalia are drawn upon to illustrate the modes of mobilisation and local agency at a sub-national level in relation to external influences.

Chapter four engages with the complex social environment of Afghanistan. Drawing on anthropological and historical studies as well as contemporary commentary and interviews a pattern emerges of even the Afghan state in its many manifestations throughout history as being external to Afghan society. While social networks will draw on local frictions in order to gain social 'mass', the local agendas and conflicts will likewise draw on the 'higher order' issues in order to affect the balance within their own spheres of interest. Entering into this social context is a multitude of international actors with a lacking understanding of the dynamics and with their own distinct agendas. The chapter examines both national and international interventionist projects into the highly localised social contexts.

The fifth and concluding chapter provides a final discussion of the cases and the implications of the research. The central contention is that by viewing social contexts through the lens of the suggested framework it is possible to understand the dynamics

behind socio-political interaction and how intervention changes its conditions. By inserting resources and offsetting balances without taking into account an understanding of the social or political dynamics, the externally generated project not only transforms the social context but also makes itself subject to the situational logics produced in local actuation by social agents and actors. This is particularly true in relation to opportunistic groups who understand both how to play according to the local structural and ideational conditions, as well as how and what discourse to employ in reference to 'external' agents. In an existing social context the externally generated interventionist project is the 'Other.' This thesis provides a framework through which to view and recognise this relationship.

Chapter One: Strategies and Literature

This chapter consists of two parts intended to provide an overview of the foundational thoughts underlining international interventions.¹ The purpose is to form an understanding of the assumptions and perspectives that have been established over the years and that penetrate strategy at all levels. The focus has been placed mainly on international 'peacebuilding' as this field incorporates means ranging from diplomatic talks to armed force, via aid and development. The first part examines the principles and values on which international peace-interventions operate. Portrayed as 'universal'² they have a protected and almost untouchable position of centrality. The second part is formed around these central themes and examines available literature and perspectives expressed in either support or critique of the employed concepts, and what these are missing.

Part I – Strategies and Practise

The strategies employed today are the logical conclusion of their theoretical roots and the associated social imagery. There are a number of assumptions about the supposedly 'peaceful nature' of a liberal market democracy, the Wilsonian understanding of the international system, and the understanding of conflict as predominantly caused by social injustice or failure by the state to provide within a preconceived role. These assumptions lead to the understanding of peace not only as the eradication of such issues, but as a fulfilment of ideologically pre-determined and defined needs. Reconstruction efforts of 'failed states' are often geared towards hasty political and economic reform that may have destabilizing effects³ on already unstable societies. Among the problems is a high level of focus on the working functions of a distinctly centralised though not necessarily big, state;⁴ the focus on the individual; the presumption of liberal democracy as a universally effective system of governance; and as a result the failure of most to relate to the socio-political dynamics, even when trying. Government agencies and NGOs often seek to foster and develop ill-defined concepts such as 'civil society' with no real consideration of what their local meaning is. The result is often a cluster of local elites who are discursively adhering to the

agenda. The generated organisations may be skilled at writing grant proposals but often lack sustainability⁵ and sometimes interest when resources run out. Despite the discursive contradictions of contemporary strategies, it is clear that 'the West' engages with 'the rest' in a relatively uncompromising way where adaptation and conformity is expected to be on the end of the recipient society, not in the planning and implementation of interventionist projects. The reconstruction of crumbled systems is continuously sought, the more or less forced recreation of single political entities often based on a post-colonial bunching of people with few shared ideas of community.⁶ This state-building increasingly appear to be vain attempts to recreate states in the image of the 'Western' liberal democracy or as 'colonial mimicry': a reformation of the 'Other' as a subject that is becoming almost the same but not quite⁷ and thus remaining in a position of 'inferiority.' The assumption of universalism is projected further by 'Western'-supported organisations promoting a Eurocentric agenda⁸ or as Ignatieff puts it as he compares the spread of the liberal peace to imperial aspirations: '[...] *what is Empire but the desire to imprint our values, civilization and achievements on the souls, bodies, and institutions of another people?*'⁹

Intervention to build a peace

John Paul Lederach defines peacebuilding to '*be understood as a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes.*'¹⁰ In the context of international peacebuilding however, the 'needed' stages and approaches are often conceptually predefined in a setting external to and disconnected from the 'target' society. The model for post-Cold War peacebuilding can largely be traced to the surprisingly quick¹¹ post-World War II reconstruction of Europe and Asia and the social remodelling of the defeated Axis powers. On the ruins of the defeated, something new was to be constructed that would safeguard against a future regeneration of conflict. This would be designed in line with an international open economy founded on the principles of liberal capitalism, but also equated with democratic forms of government.¹² The 1942 Atlantic charter defined the principles on which the post-war

world would be built on as freedom, democracy, and a prosperous economy based on free exchange.¹³ These principles are still strongly present in international strategies of peacebuilding.

International peacebuilding and its associated functions are predominantly performed by states or organisations originating in 'the West.' This is arguably a result of the economic and power dominance by this select minority of nations and it has implications for strategy, goals, and measurements of success. There is seemingly a developing consensus amongst academics, policymakers in liberal states, institutional- and NGO actors¹⁴ that conflict resolution demands a certain form of governance imposed by force if necessary. This consensus becomes even more obvious when dealing with peacebuilding in so called 'failed states', where the (re-)construction of a centralised government is seen as a necessity by international interventionist projects. This is based on a set of assumptions on how to establish a sustainable peace by shifting violent political competition to political non-violent competition.¹⁵ It is multi-arena and multi-level intervention that, like international development policy, is largely characterised by a convergence of ideas of neo-liberal reform, democratisation, and poverty reduction¹⁶ as well as a focus on the individual as the primary social component. While a gradual construction of a central polity with delayed elections could possibly serve to facilitate change,¹⁷ the short timeframes of benchmarks of 'success' generate tumultuous effects.¹⁸ The assumption that it is the type of system that matters rather than the level of internal stability is not without its challengers,¹⁹ but a large number of international interventions in the post-Cold War era are governed by a 'Wilsonian approach.'²⁰ International peacebuilding is torn between two versions of liberalism: One with the state as the vehicle of security and regulation; and one with a more emancipatory perspective. The two strands combine to make the venture overall unstable.²¹ These interventions have a tendency to turn into social engineering as a result of being disconnected from an informed understanding of the local context. But they also fail to relate past and present interventionist actions to the development of the conflict and social environment.²²

The United Nations and peacebuilding

The term 'peacebuilding' was defined by the UN in 1992 as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict',²³ a definition that has been criticised on the grounds of being too wide and lacking priorities.²⁴ In response to this, the UN Peacebuilding Commission is an attempt to develop a co-ordinated strategy for peacebuilding efforts to create 'foundations for sustainable peace and development.' Human rights and gender issues are complemented by economic reconstruction and rehabilitation as major issues to be addressed through a series of risk reduction strategies.²⁵ Boutros-Ghali once stressed that peacebuilding demands time and sensitivity and that '[t]he United Nations is[...] reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new state institutions',²⁶ but this is a position that has arguably changed since. Examples include the UN administration of the province of Kosovo between 1999 and 2008, the democratisation attempts in Afghanistan post 2001, the political role of the UN in Somalia, and several peacebuilding missions in Africa. A very recent example is the UN strategy for 2010 to 2013 to support the government controlled Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).²⁷ The ANDS is framed in a language heavily saturated in the 'universals' of the liberal peace, a saturation further exacerbated by the UN's support-strategy which focuses on three core issues: good governance, peace and stability including institution building; sustainable livelihoods including a focus on youth employment; and 'basic social services' such as education, health, water and sanitation while 'building on the significant progress made.'²⁸ There is also a group of 'cross-cutting issues' defined as: gender; human rights; mine action; anti-corruption and border management; and counter-narcotics.²⁹ The strategy is thus largely a recycling of generic ideas that are part and parcel of the typical aid and development strategies. It does mention 'customised local solutions' but this does not appear to be 'customisation' equated with adapting goals to work with local perceptions and value sets. The 'customisation' is instead an adaptation of implementation strategies to the local security situation. By

contrast, those trying to build strategies based on understanding complex local dynamics seem to have a small voice and few ears listening to them.³⁰

Another body involved in the social reform side of peacebuilding is the World Bank. Though expressing an interest and seeking measures to understand the complexities of conflict- and post-conflict societies, the favoured 'solutions' are usually the same reductionist generalisations of social complexities that can be found in other aid and development strategies. The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of the UN and the World Bank resulted in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that was allegedly 'highly participatory, reaching all parts of the country' and developed in 'extensive consultation' with Somali as well as regional and international bodies.³¹ Considering strategies employed in other countries, it comes as no surprise that the three core priorities of the programme are: peace, security, and 'good governance'; 'basic social services'; and infrastructure coupled with what could best be described as private sector development.³² The report encourages not building from scratch but 'capitalizing' on existing social structures.³³ The substantial ideological baggage integrated into the RDP means this should more likely be understood as 'use' rather than 'be informed by and cooperate with.'

It is obvious that institutional peacebuilding lacks a solid platform from which to understand social dynamics separated from ideological and normative objectives. Even the terminology of 'good governance' implies both a promise of local control as well as conditionality,³⁴ while aiming to transform 'dysfunctional' state bureaucracies into efficient state providers.³⁵ The 'Responsibility to Protect' as it was conceptualised in 2009³⁶ is an example which, as has been observed, clearly internationalises rather than contextualises strategy, failing to engage with local social realities.³⁷ Peacebuilding has been turned into a 'system of governance' instead of pursuing reconciliatory goals in the local context.³⁸ The road to peace and reconciliation has become inseparable from the transformation of a society into a specific state format and a specific set of values.

An important discursive term to achieve this is 'local ownership' which is used to justify and legitimise externally constructed and imposed strategies and priorities. The term 'local ownership' can be seen as a tool that absolves donors from having to

consider the consequences of their interventions.³⁹ It is mainly 'lip-service'⁴⁰ and by instilling a 'partnership' mentality self-regulation is presumably generated as a method of governance.⁴¹ The 'local' wants the strategy because some of the 'locals' have been trained, or 'capacity-built,' to implement the strategy. The lack of perspective also enables the recycling of non-working strategies in ever new arenas of intervention as the implementation of ideological normative narratives and 'adjusted' reporting obscures what happens in the local contexts when strategy meets reality.

Non-Governmental Organizations

The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation increased dramatically during the 1980's⁴² and has continued to proliferate. The presence of NGOs in conflict and crisis areas is extensive. Both local and international NGOs have emerged as vital actors and agents engaged primarily in the long-term tasks of prevention and peacebuilding. These tasks are generally intended to contribute to the construction of neo-liberal democratic entities, thus raising questions about the NGO roles, objectives and relationships to states and other organisations⁴³ as well as that of coordination.⁴⁴ There are a number of issues that arise surrounding the role and involvement of NGOs in relation to their funding situation:

Conditional aid and scarcity of funds: Money is a source of competition in the NGO community. There is only so much available, and there are often conditions tied to it.⁴⁵ Even an organisation that is reasonably apolitical and non-religious may well find itself having to choose⁴⁶ between lying, not performing its mission, or conforming to demands made by major donor/-s in order to gain funds in the intense and unregulated⁴⁷ competition for it.⁴⁸ Donor pressure for quick results is likely to be 'unrealistically high' at an early stage when the media focus is still on a particular case,⁴⁹ and the externally supplied resources more often than not subject the NGOs, especially local and small organisations, to some degree of control by funders.⁵⁰

The *ad hoc nature of the relationship between donor and NGO* is also a problem as structural, focal, or managerial changes in the donor organisation may lead to disruptions in the NGO programmes. A de-prioritization of the NGO or instructions to

change focus in order to retain the funding,⁵¹ are potentially highly disruptive features in particular in long-term projects.

The *language of generating funding* has led to a situation where project proposal-writing has become an all-important skill, effectively excluding local initiatives where the language, the experience, or lack of knowledge of how to secure funding creates disadvantages.⁵² It has been suggested that organizations that originate in 'developing' nations should empower themselves by rejecting funding that conflicts with its mission.⁵³ During the research at least one local NGO was encountered that had mobilised efficient resistance and developed their own locally adapted strategy to which the long-term donor partners agreed. Without the type of relationship with major donors that this organisation enjoyed however, such acts can be futile and may lead to a loss of funding. The competitive nature of aid and development does not encourage confrontational or non-conforming behaviour on the part of the implementing parties. When donor interests shift to 'development' rather than aid, the agenda also seems to contain more ideological direction and a closer relationship with the state. This has many potential implications, not the least in intra-state conflicts where it means aligning with one side of the conflict.⁵⁴

Another very serious critique raised is that NGOs agreeing with the 'crusading' aspects of a liberal peace agenda may help to legitimate 'the use of force for the end of reproducing the liberal order.'⁵⁵ The on-going trend of primarily government aid agencies and International Organisations (IOs) but gradually also NGOs and businesses being incorporated into a securitisation discourse where aid and development delivery becomes a military mode of engagement, is likely to exacerbate this. It is certainly conceivable that implementing partners who are not strategically fully in agreement may see their funding diverted to groups who will act according to donor wishes and by extension also donor interests.

The issue of donors

Another issue surrounding externally generated projects is the influence of donors. While it is true that policy planners are not actually in control of a particular project,⁵⁶

and that agency at all levels alters it and therein disputes the instrumentalist notion of the all-powerful policy framework,⁵⁷ the influence of policy and donors, either explicitly or implicitly, cannot be dismissed. Throughout this research there were indications and statements⁵⁸ that conformity to donor policy outputs were part of project design and goals. Just as Mosse describes local communities becoming 'appropriate clients',⁵⁹ organisations also present a self-image as 'appropriate implementers' in order to get funding.⁶⁰ Subordinate actors will create spaces that are autonomous from policy models but also work to preserve those same models out of self-interest.⁶¹ While it may be understandable that donors want to have a say because it is their money,⁶² this should not mean that their 'say' does not have to reflect a local reality. The tools used to measure 'success' seem designed to convince a 'home audience', rather than to actually achieve sustainable and lasting results in the social context. There appears to be a bigger concern for demonstrable outputs than sustainable outcomes, making Anderson's call for aid workers to question whether their aid creates exacerbated tensions⁶³ important but often unheeded.

Civilian-Military operations

State building has become an intricate part of 'peace interventions' backed by international coalitions of military might. In some areas the more overt aspects of military force and objectives are completely non-existent and in others they are increasingly blurred, for example in Afghanistan where development engineers speak in terms of 'counter-insurgency.'⁶⁴ The penetration of military discourse into the aid and development world is arguably a relatively new phenomenon, whereas the reverse has been the case for some time resulting in 'development projects' as part of military strategy.⁶⁵ Using military resources to enforce a normative agenda dubbed 'universal' by some is nothing new, however since the 1990's liberal state- and peacebuilding has increasingly crept into the military agenda. In the post-9/11 world of increased securitisation the global war on terror is fought with no defined battle-space or territorial limitations. This increasing blend of civilian and military objectives apparently does not contradict the upholding of international norms. Instead it has

added legitimacy to military endeavours as it seemingly makes the forcible transformation of 'undesirable' social orders acceptable in the name of 'universal' rights and needs reflected in strategies such as 'human security.' The resulting discourse lays the foundation for 'humanitarian' military interventions, armed aid and development strategies, and increasingly the security perspectives of predominantly 'Western' governments.

There is a developing stress between international aid agencies and the military as the agendas grow increasingly integrated in counter insurgency frameworks. While for example civilian projects are increasingly being asked to support a military agenda the military weight given to aid and development is an illusion. 'Development' and 'aid' in a military context refers to 'quick impact' projects of limited-sustainability designed to buy local support through immediate and visible results. This misses the fact that the local environments in which interventionist projects are undertaken are continuous and dynamic contexts that extend beyond the project time in both directions. While Mosse has observed how the success of a project is determined throughout its interactions,⁶⁶ it is argued here that this constitutes a temporally compartmentalised and project-centric perspective that is common in international engagements into social contexts. The questions asked subsequently relate mostly to efficiency that covers reform implementation, sequencing speed, avoiding corruption, and how to co-opt local elites.⁶⁷ Projects become lopsided and mono-directional in nature, doing things 'at', rather than 'with' local people.⁶⁸ They thus aim to satisfy the political needs of development agencies long before they meet the needs of the local communities.⁶⁹ Such a distinction is not lost on the recipient end.⁷⁰

Part II – Literature Review

This part of the chapter examines literature relevant to the central tenets of intervention strategies. The nature of the subject addressed here necessitates a rather cruel and possibly unfair limitation on the body of literature included. The amount of literature available on the subjects of the state, social interaction, peace, conflict, political theory, international relations, humanitarianism, development, aid, and so on *ad infinitum*, would require several volumes in their own right for a full review and account. Focus has instead been placed on literature that is central both in favour and critiquing a specific subject for different reasons. Relevance has been determined largely based on its centrality to the core of theories on the subject, specific points made, or proximity in time that represent recent developments. Though somewhat shallow and brief considering the several fields covered, the aim is to provide an overview of perspectives on the mechanisms behind social order and disorder, and how to address these issues. It identifies and highlights the central tenets of international interventionist strategies related to peacebuilding, understood to incorporate for example utilitarianism, and universalism.¹

Peacebuilding as an applied strategy concerns itself increasingly with the overall formation of the state in which the sustainable peace is to be constructed² at all levels. However, it also engages in changing many aspects of the value bases present in the societies concerned. While there is some discursive movement towards a more open-minded and inclusive attitude, it is quite obvious that strategies generally originate from a highly state centric position with the model and values of the 'Western' liberal democracy as the benchmark to achieve. Even when identifying sub-state issues like land disputes as conflict generators,³ the focus remains on the same 'universal' constructs of problems and solutions. A distinct formula has developed that contains numerous goals for the transformations of societies, and the UN system alone has continued to generate a 'specification of international norms for states' while assuming that there is broad acceptance for its plans and goals.⁴ In reality however, this is often a case of discussions focusing on catch-phrases rather than concrete outcomes.⁵ Reconstruction efforts are geared towards hasty political and economic

reform that may instead have destabilizing effects on states and societies. The high level of focus on the working functions of a distinctly centralised state⁶ and a presumption of a 'Western' liberal democracy as a universally effective system of governance according to many scholars and practitioners are among the existing problems. As Richmond has observed, attention has been diverted away from 'local contexts, communities and agencies.'⁷

The approaches discussed here aim to change two types of overarching conditions: *Format* in the sense of constructing a specific type of state structure to control and regulate a specific territory and population; and *substance* in the sense of norms and values derived from international declarations that 'should', according to this view, guide the social system. While state agencies tend to focus on the functions of the state as a vehicle to deliver pre-determined functions, international organisations often step in to *de facto* replicate and perform such functions if the local state cannot. Though not absolute and with notable exceptions, the general impression is that through the mechanisms inherent in the donor-client relationship, a system is created which perpetuates and works towards changing the format and substance of a target society. The intention of this system seems to be, in spite of its own discourse of adaptation, to create an externally defined vision of social interaction. These attempts are largely supported by a body of literature reproducing the assumption of primacy of that vision.

Format – The State as the vehicle of social order and delivery

The international system is exclusively geared towards states. Right or wrong, this is how the system works in terms of international representation and the rights and duties of states. There can be no question that in the current international system there is an inherent expectation that the state is the guarantor of a territory. There is little flexibility in this systemic demand by the international community for a number of reasons. A territory is not only an internal boundary but also an external reference as neighbouring states define their territory in relation to the borders of their neighbours. Thus, the social arrangements of the territory in question can be different,

and possibly even cross over into the neighbouring country via nomadic movements or kinship affiliations. If a state lacks clearly defined borders it carries implications for the capacity of its neighbours to exert authority, collect taxes, and draw the lines of responsibilities. In other words, there is a compounding pressure in the international system that a territory be organised as a state with a specific set of responsibilities even if these formal functions, defined by that same system, have disintegrated or function poorly. Unlike the historic norm during the European state formation, the annexation of neighbouring territories is rarely accepted in the contemporary international climate and it is less likely that a weaker (militarily or otherwise) state will be swallowed by a stronger neighbour. Thus the internal conditions of a territory are of less relevance to the maintenance of borders. This external demand for juridical representation thus makes statehood a pre-requisite for any strategy decision, but the external demands on the state also goes beyond representing and controlling a territory.

The functions of the state


The functions of the state are central to many interventionist strategies and international perspectives, expressed in terms of the functions prescribed for it. The performance of these functions is also used as a benchmark for measuring whether it is a 'failed' state or not.⁸ Security, representation and welfare⁹ are prevalent in literature and strategy as core functions of the state with little variation other than in detail. This follows closely Tilly's definition of the 'super-state' as a strongly consolidated entity with a high capacity for coercion and resource extraction from the population in the shape of taxation, conscription, and censuses, and police systems.¹⁰ An example of a more detailed definition of when a state has 'failed' lists six defining conditions¹¹: 1) lost control of the borders; 2) cannot protect citizens from organized violence and is sometimes predatory itself; 3) cannot prevent the growth of organized crime, 4) has weak or failed institutions; 5) fails to provide adequate healthcare, education, and other social services; and 6) has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

International interventionist strategies and mainstream literature tends to focus on a highly centralized government and how to make that 1) function, and 2) legitimate in relation to the population. Governance is created and legitimacy sought afterwards even though most communities already have their own socio-political systems whether the state is functioning or not. These seem to be assumed to either simply not exist or to be misguided at best.

A state has two modes of legitimacy: the juridical external recognition by the international system, and the empirical internal recognition of society. If the state has juridical legitimacy it should also ideally have empirical sovereignty. Some states, occasionally referred to *quasi-states*, have juridical sovereignty only and are not able to actually control or defend their territory.¹² There is little consensus on what constitutes legitimacy but the two most commonly proposed means to achieve it is mobilisation popular support based on nationalism and creating democracy¹³ through elections.

Early European state formations were shaped by external pressure in the form of aggressive neighbours which made defending the borders and consolidating the state necessary. The state's ability to project power across territory and meet the threat determined where the border was eventually drawn; weak or failing powers were likely to be absorbed by a neighbour. Under such a model there are three major issues to overcome: the cost of expanding the domestic power infrastructure; the nature of the natural boundaries; and the design of the state system.¹⁴ Now, the pressure from the international community is generally not of the same kind and does not generate the same need for border protection.

Intervention in the form of a nakedly aggressive conquest in order to gain territory is highly uncommon and by far overshadowed by smaller interventions aimed at



Consolidation through external pressure and internal projection

Figure 1

specific goals, resources, or for humanitarian purposes. A more raid-like style of warfare rather than conquest, these tend to be limited in time, scope, and do not include the incorporation of the target territories into the invading party's claims. The change in the international pressure is obvious for example in Europe where the EU has opened its internal borders. In many other parts of the world there is also a lack of external territorial threats¹⁵ and international pressure instead serves to preserve the current borders even when there is no state capacity to uphold them.

International pressure today does not so much threaten the integrity of borders, but rather strives to freeze them in place. Border consolidation is very much decided by the globally more powerful states rather than in the local regional context as shown in Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and other examples. However, borders remain important as their protection is a part of maintaining stability in many regions. This takes on immediate importance where neighbouring states are actively inciting or serving as a staging ground for insurgent groups, international criminal networks or terrorists. In such situations, the security interests of other more powerful states serve to exert an additional pressure to maintain border integrity.

'State failure'

'State failure' supposedly results in the evaporation of cohesion between state and society¹⁶ but the external application of the label is often guided by the subsequent policy responses it warrants. A fragile state is seen as engendering conflict and further state deterioration.¹⁷ The label of 'failed' can be withheld when other interests preclude its usage despite conditions more or less identical to another state that has been declared 'failed.' It is thus a tool of exclusion and dominance that works by denying the juridical sovereignty needed for accessing international loans and support. The difference in application or not may be business opportunities or the posing of a perceived security threat. The label is withheld until such a point where it poses a challenge to the interests of more powerful states. Declaring a state 'failed' unlocks a range of policy alternatives¹⁸ for intervention and pressure to further the interventionist policies.

The usefulness of the concept of 'state failure' has been questioned with reference to flawed assumptions of state uniformity and as a label that is 'inherently political, and based primarily on 'Western' perceptions of security and interests.'¹⁹ The focus on central government is problematic for several reasons because it raises contentious issues related to assumptions of format and substance in an environment where a central government may not necessarily be an immediate priority. It also reflects the erroneous assumption that the absence of a central government equals an absence of governance.²⁰ This type of discourse has for example been very much present in relation to international representations of Somalia since 1991.

The Weberian categories of governance typologies often used are ideals and should not be confused with a norm²¹ yet nevertheless are treated as such. The literature on state failure is therefore generally based on a negative logic of what is missing in the polities that do not fulfil and conform to the Westphalian state and a Weberian social order ideal. It is presumed that a state that cannot provide political goods, as defined by an international consensus, 'loses its legitimacy within society.'²² It cannot effectively control its territory and may even completely lose control over parts of it with official power restricted to the capital or major cities. If the state 'fails', it is expected to become characterized by enduring, though not necessarily high, levels of violence with roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal enmities.²³ However, this expectation is based on two assumptions: a) that the state is the sole provider of political goods and social stability and; b) that political goods and local priorities can be independently defined from outside the local reality. The counter-argument is that a closer examination of non-state social agents may indicate what the priorities are locally as opposed to externally defined 'universal' constructs.

The 'state system' assumes predominance of the state in social control mechanisms,²⁴ but there is also an alternative narrative that the state is part of and challenged in a web-like system of social organizations with varying degrees of autonomy, rather than at the top of a centralized pyramid structure.²⁵ While it is true, as argued by some, that a classification of 'universal' responsibilities of a state does facilitate easy comparison between different countries of absolute performance,²⁶ the

social conditions underlining state formation risk being lost in the translation when using 'typology tools'²⁷ to determine 'state health.' The level of generalisation and over-simplification of social interaction required to make such tools useful is predicated on expectations generated in the international system rather than how the population relates themselves to the state. The simplified tools generate any number of lists with a set of factors usually covering a spread of functions such as: external and internal security; rule of law; political opportunity and participation; healthcare, education, infrastructure, economical opportunity, a 'flowering civil society', and regulation of environmental commons.²⁸

While state collapse can be viewed as the breakdown of state-oriented good governance, law and order, and societal collapse can be viewed as the breakdown of social coherence,²⁹ one does not necessitate the other. This is especially true considering that societies viewed as a singular territorially defined unit, usually contain multiple social orders. The assumption that these orders would collapse because of the state system failing does not hold. The state is better viewed as the attempted subordination of people's own inclinations of social behaviour, or that which is sought by other 'social organizations.'³⁰ There is also often a connection between low internal legitimacy and high external dependence,³¹ a relationship exemplified by the practise of propping up certain regimes in furtherance of international political objectives that relieves the state of the necessity of wide domestic support. Such relationships have long been very obvious in the cases of both Afghanistan and Somalia.

While the state does hold a potentially unique position for international negotiations or making peace between different segments of society,³² it has in reality a less than clear-cut position or role. International acceptance does not necessarily mean domestic representation or legitimacy and the state is often a party to, or subject to, domestic conflicts and competition between groups. By including, for example, the provision of 'political goods' by alternative sources, a more accurate analysis of what is already in place can emerge.³³ The attitude towards the state from such alternative sources of political goods is also a determinant of the state's survival capacities. The state may well be dependent on non-state sources of influence and

power to survive, but as long as its existence is not challenged, it can also persist relatively intact in a reduced role. In its extreme it could be an organic federalist system of a reduced state reliant on localised sources of power for authority projection and support only loosely held together and nominally controlled at the centre. It is however obviously important to actors in the international system that the state takes on a shape and functions that are easily recognisable and 'universally defined.'

The contemporary response to 'failed' or 'weak' states seems to be the installation of externally constructed systems and government, for example from a Diaspora, pushed by powerful international actors. When these local allied interest groups have little credibility,³⁴ the lack of actual legitimacy is plastered over by hastily convened elections that may or may not lead to the need to intervene in the election process in order to prevent the 'wrong' political figures to be elected by popular vote. This can be done for example by selectively postponing elections in 'unreliable' areas or by actively intervening to make people vote for a specific candidate, all paradoxically claimed to be done in order to further the interests of democracy. When an effort is made to actually include at least some semblance of local societal modes of legitimacy, these are placed under conditions that are contradictory to, or just not legitimate to, the local power-structures. In parts of Africa the holding of multi-party elections, usually equated with 'democratisation,' has come about through outside pressure while in reality a set of democratic institutions become subject to the situational logics of local political structures, for example patrimonialism, rather than the often proclaimed other way around.³⁵ While the institutional system may shift, the pathologies that created the incentives for state recession and de-formalisation in the first place remain intact.³⁶ It is also not the case of a breakdown in social order but rather that even while ideologies, regimes, and order changes, societies and established patterns of social and political interaction continue to function.

Because consolidation of national borders is not strictly necessary, the empirical legitimacy of local social agents and actors is enough to control a piece of territory and consolidate control to a sufficient degree to develop a functioning polity. 'Warlordism' can in some cases be viewed as a 'sample of adaptive social innovation to conditions of

intense economic globalization.³⁷ When the state does not exist or lack authority and legitimacy, other formats of localised governance such as 'warlord' fiefdoms and other socially produced power structures rise to replace it locally. This can sometimes be utilised by the state to expand its control. One such example is when the state relies on traditional structures to project authority and supplement legitimacy gained through elections with traditional leadership support.³⁸ When the state does not provide security and other basic services, people turn elsewhere for basic modes of protection.³⁹

There is however also definitions of state failure that are largely disconnected from a political description and more focused on function. According to such a perspective, when the state no longer receives any support or demands from the population, it also loses its right to command and exercise control over the people. There no longer is a working relationship between the state and the society and thus the notion of being a citizen of that state becomes meaningless,⁴⁰ undermining or destroying the legitimacy of the state. The question arising from this perspective is whether an externally imposed state format and substance would generate support and demands in the first place, and thus whether it can have legitimacy, if a society does not expect, want or understand the format.

Substance - The 'Right Values' equal State Rights

The expectation of what role the state should fill found in the academic literature is also heavily reflected in the development of theories on how to approach, understand, and 'fix' societies. There is a clear notion that the state is what is holding off 'destructive forces' such as identity mobilisation and other sub-state social divisions. While an absence of the state does not automatically mean anarchy some observers see it as leading to a reversion to ethnic nationalism as the 'residual, viable identity.'⁴¹

In *An Agenda for Peace* the responsibility of the individual's security is squarely placed with the state⁴² thus also demanding a certain form of internal representation and responsibility. This perspective is continued in for example the 'rights-based' and 'human security' approaches to aid and development but has become a prescriptive

tool by powerful states than an emancipatory discourse.⁴³ The format as well as the contents are thus prescribed and can be made to serve as justification for interventions into non-conforming states. The viability of such interventions is directly related to how powerful the interventionists and the target state are, resulting in a highly relativistic application of these norms.

In order to stave off this threat to the 'universal order', the agendas of 'development', 'aid', 'reconstruction', and 'stabilisation' are often linked in with the notion of what the state 'should' provide. When a state does not, international agencies and organisations step in to provide what they have defined as to be lacking. This is often along the very lines outlined in state performance and failure, but also grounded in notions of what drives conflicts and 'universal' values and needs. These goods are defined by externally generated priorities and delivered through the tools of aid, development, state-building, and military objectives. They constitute the moral core and justification of international interventionist projects, particularly in peacebuilding.

When 'grass-roots' social interaction is discussed it is usually in the sense of forming a 'civil society' to balance and pressure the central government to conform to the 'universal' standards expected of it by those imposing the structure in the first place. This artificially created 'civil society' is thus assumed to represent the 'universal values' embedded in the interventionist strategies. There is however reason to assume that social conflict and other problems affect civil society groups as well.⁴⁴ The new civil society is supposed to replace local expressions that do not 'fit' the model and are seen by some to be 'non-governmental actors hostile to fundamental values and interests of the international society such as peace, stability, rule of law, freedom and democracy.'⁴⁵

Debates for and against interventions tend to polarize into Universalist or culture relativistic arguments. The reality of implementation however seems to land somewhere in between as failed compromises rather than pragmatic adjustments and adaptations. The point of departure is the format of the state, but within that frame the needs, wants, and priorities are based on a number of assumptions of

'Westernised' perspectives claimed to be 'universal' and strengthened by their integration into the UN system.⁴⁶ Even the most casual observer can recognise that in the international system the states that do not conform to the views of the more powerful will be judged to be outside of the 'norm.'

In order to understand the approaches of intervention it is also necessary to grasp the ways in which conflict, peace, rights, and needs are understood and employed. The way we understand conflict varies wildly and ranges from the purely statistical, such as the PIOOM scale,⁴⁷ to more complex notions of an injustice-free existence. First generation conflict analysis was focused on international conflict causes originating in contest over scarce resources and maximisation of gain that can be negotiated and settled with elite representatives of a state. Second generation peace-making, *conflict resolution*, aims predominantly to reach long-term solutions to the issues central to the conflict and thus create the pre-requisite for a sustainable peace.⁴⁸ This more complex approach to peace-making necessitates a more intricate analysis and understanding of conflict and its mechanisms. In particular, it has been the emerging civil and intra-state conflicts that have necessitated the use of a new analytical framework. The perceived changes in warfare required a deeper understanding of if not 'new wars',⁴⁹ then a new understanding of old ones that better fit the context of sub-state forms of organisation. Yet the understanding and analysis was largely guided by the same 'universals,' and the debate surrounding 'universal human needs,' and their relevance to the process of conflict resolution, became a large part of this second generation peacebuilding.

Human Needs

Abraham Maslow's theory of needs hierarchy has been utilized in political analysis since the 1950's⁵⁰ and keeps reappearing in revised forms. Maslow argued for a holistic approach to the understanding of human motivation and the psyche, that it is the environment that fulfils the needs of the individual.⁵¹ Maslow differentiated between 'healthy', self-actualizing people and those driven by the gratification of basic needs,⁵² for example hunger. While basic needs are primary drives, at the other end of

the scale are self-actualization needs that allow an individual to release him- or herself from the ego-centric deficit-motivated strategy of coping. A basic notion linking needs theory to peacebuilding is that the environment can facilitate the pursuit of needs located higher in the hierarchy.⁵³ This suggests that creating conditions for needs fulfilment would in theory be conducive for peace, but it also triggers the question of what needs and how; can human needs really be universally defined or are they subjective?

The Basic Needs Approach (BNA) debate in the mid-1970s was adopted by a number of international organisations in more or less modified versions⁵⁴ and still carries some influence. Two schools of BNA theory emerged with one seeing needs as universal, quantifiable, and measurable; and the second considering needs to be historically relative and that they should be seen in context of specific social systems. The pursuit of needs satisfaction would be undertaken by any disposable means and sometimes at any price.⁵⁵

The attempt to impose some sort of integration scheme over a given territory by coercion or socialization is potentially counter-productive as any individual whose needs are not subjectively fulfilled will express deviant behaviour.⁵⁶ This is however not the attitude present in peacebuilding which instead seems more aligned with the conscious attempts to expand a list of human needs to include for example human rights.⁵⁷ This line of thought argues for a more normative approach with the inclusion of basic human 'liberty needs' as necessities,⁵⁸ thus reflecting a specific value system defined as 'universals' in some societies and political systems.⁵⁹

Some critiques of the human needs debate for example consider it to be overly focused on a 'Western' individualistic perspective.⁶⁰ According to this view, traditional and deeper 'cultural' meanings are being replaced by 'ideal human society' that emphasizes individuals.⁶¹ Johan Galtung offers an alternative typology of human needs divided into actor- (security and freedom), and structure- (welfare and identity) dependent factors.⁶² This view is in turn contested by those who claim that needs are less specifically cultural 'than some behavioural scientists would have us believe.'⁶³

The notion of 'universal' human needs and their definition is obvious in contemporary strategies such as 'human security' and 'rights-based approaches' that focus on the individual and how the state can facilitate needs-fulfilment, explicitly defining the state as 'ultimately responsible' for the fulfilment of, for example, human rights requirements.⁶⁴ However, the conceptualisation of human security as a derivative of a liberal peace, and the 'universal needs' associated with it, dispossesses the local of the agency to assume its own political identity.⁶⁵ Needs-theory easily takes on a vertical division of labour where either 'the West' or the central authority is trying to shape the periphery by beaming 'Western'-defined needs-structures in all directions as 'universal norms'⁶⁶ or even as objective facts.

The tendency within human needs theory is to stretch the meaning of needs into something that more closely resembles an ideological vehicle for 'Western' values and organisation. 'The West' 'finds itself in the role of remaking states to meet the needs of people';⁶⁷ while that may be true on the surface of things, the 'needs' are ideologically pre-defined and the interpretations imposed on the 'Other.' As Richmond has argued, the definition of basic needs posits them as inexhaustible and the assumption that their denial results in a backlash disconnects aspects of conflicts from the environment in which the actors are located.⁶⁸ In addition to this there is also the simple consideration that the effects of needs fulfilment can be conflict promoting themselves. In the local socio-political dynamics, the pursuit of security for one can generate insecurities for others.⁶⁹

International interventionist strategies tend to prioritise 'needs' that are based on a specific set of assumptions and perspectives rather than locally defined priorities. However, the viability of lofty norm enforcement in a post- or active conflict environment is slight at the very best. A good example of how need-priorities change is the post-9/11 responses where liberal values were suddenly, and willingly, replaced by a massive securitisation after the sudden and substantial deprivation of perceived security. This allowed for social measures to be introduced that would have been unacceptable just months before. It is hardly a stretch to assume that war-zone priorities will be more similar to this than to an 'ideal' vision of peace and democracy.

The logics of social agents in such an environment are likely to be focused on coping⁷⁰ and forging strategies of survival.

Maslow argued that 'good choosers' can better determine what is 'right' for 'bad choosers' than they can for themselves, and that only the judgements of 'healthy human beings' can tell us what is good for the human species in the long run.⁷¹ The assumption of one's own level of 'civilization' as higher than another, and the subsequent assumption of the invalid grounds for the systems of belief and values of the 'Other' is however arrogant at best. While the actual fulfilment of basic needs may be environmentally generated, the perception of fulfilment is mainly an internal process and subjectively determined. The 'definition creep' that has afflicted the human needs debate has rendered it largely useless as a concept. The concept of 'human needs' has gradually become an ideological tool intended to reflect 'universal' normative values and judgements of a specific category. This category of self-perceived 'good choosers' largely exists outside the subjective sphere of conflict and post-conflict settings where priorities of deficits and fulfilment are actually determined. By understanding needs as pre-defined universal values and solutions, 'human needs' has become a discourse of justification for intervention rather than a practical discussion that is possible to operationalize.

The Liberal Peace

The general international consensus of the liberal democratic peace not only covers aspects of Galtung's negative peace (the absence of overt violence) and positive peace (the removal of root/structural causes and oppression),⁷² but extends further by providing a set model for how this is to be achieved. In discussions on peace the concept quickly slips into a 'universal and/or idealistic form,' and the spreading of democracy has seemingly become an acceptable strategy for 'Western' states to attempt to end conflicts.⁷³ The notion that democratic liberal states are more peaceful than others has thus led to a strategy of spreading a 'liberal peace,' be that by influence, coercion or intervention. This view carries the deeper implication that '[...] actors involved in conflict are somehow inferior, deluded, or obsessed by violence,

identity claims, power, territory or resources,' and that contemporary peacebuilding reflects a view of conflict zones as *terra incognita* where measures can be superimposed without any deeper concern for the outcome.⁷⁴ The interventionists cast themselves as 'good choosers,' justified to determine what is 'right.'

There are also those who consider the timeframe too narrow, but still agree with the overarching strategy of the universally formulated peace template.⁷⁵ Michael Ignatieff has discussed the subject of a hegemonic liberal peace stating that: '*[t]he humanitarian empire is the new face of an old figure: the Democratic Free World, the Christian West. It is held together by common elements of rhetoric and self-belief: The idea, if not the practise, of Democracy; the idea, if not the practise, of Human Rights; the idea, if not the practise, of equality before the law.*'⁷⁶ Ignatieff points to something crucial in this argument. It is not necessarily the case that the state and society as envisioned in the policies and strategies of intervention actually exist in reality. The format and substance being imposed are thus perhaps ideals in the heads of policy makers, a wishful self-portrait of how 'the West' would like to be seen. This raises questions about the potential for success of ideals that have yet to be fully realised by its proponents when implemented in conflict environments. While supportive of a benign 'Empire Lite', Ignatieff warns that there is no reason at all why this new type of imperialism would not suffer the same failure and discredit as its predecessors have done.⁷⁷

The World Bank and other major actors in the development 'industry' lend their support to a particular capitalist-friendly and neo-liberal vision determined by the programmes of major donors. There are a host of specific priorities within these frameworks: economic growth, poverty reduction, reform of trade regimes, reduction of international debt, decentralisation, democratisation, social development, environmental issues, and with the later additions of good governance, privatisation, and economic transition.⁷⁸ Modern development theory has been normative and instrumental from the beginning. Theorists also allowed themselves to have subjective views on what development ought to be about, meaning that the definitions have

shifted wildly. In addition to this there is an assumption of controllability of the development process, normally by the state.⁷⁹

The perspective of development levels being primary conflict generators has come under much critique as the units of measurement are determined externally by actors situated in different ideational, material, and social settings. During the 1980's there were external challenges to the development theories that had evolved during the 1960's and 70's. The challenges were issued in part by academic mono-disciplinary trends and political neo-conservatism that reduced the 'development problem' in highly simplistic ways, and in part by 'third world' academics who questioned the relevance of 'Western' development research.⁸⁰ Yet development theory misses out on several aspects of the societies in which it engages. For example, by defining 'work' as paid employment, contributions by women in societies where gender-divisions of labour have them performing mainly domestic tasks are excluded from the agenda.⁸¹ The development discourse 'achieved a hegemonic representation' where it constructed and re-produced 'the poor and underdeveloped' as pre-constituted subjects, erasing their complexity and diversity.⁸²

The concept of development itself views everyday social life as a technical problem to be handled by professionals seeking to make societies fit pre-defined models of modernity rather than development being processes rooted in the local history and traditions.⁸³ Counter-models exist such as Bjorn Hettne's concept of '*Another Development*' that envisions development as oriented towards both material and non-material needs; endogenous with deep roots in society; relying on its own natural and cultural environment; ecologically sound; and containing self-management and the participation of all.⁸⁴ This is however not a model that is present in implementation.

Another alternative perspective that has a focus on welfare structures is also being advanced as a reaction to the market-based liberal democratic agenda that is promoted by most current development projects. This alternative focuses on the construction of welfare as a way to establish social security and a facilitating environment for peacebuilding. Hettne argues that the creation and use of a welfare fund makes a legitimate, consolidated and integrated nation state possible. He defines

three common basic elements for any nation building project: 1) exclusive military/political control over territory; 2) the defence of this territory; 3) the creation of welfare and political legitimacy. This obviously also makes a welfare-oriented development strategy inseparable from a state-building strategy,⁸⁵ and requires a state-centric orientation. Oliver Richmond makes a very similar point in regards to welfare and peace-making by arguing that adjusting the current neo-liberal development strategies to focus more on creating a welfare society rather than a liberal market may produce a stable liberal polity.⁸⁶

Human Security and Rights-based Approaches

‘Third generation peacebuilding’ is aimed at large scale and multi-dimensional peace creation developing out of conflict management. It argues for the containment of the conflict by stabilising the structures of a state and conflict resolution, a focus on removing violence and injustice mainly for individuals.⁸⁷ These are more complex operations that imply integrated multi-dimensional and multi-level attempts to rebuild failed states in terms of social, practical and normative aspects⁸⁸ but give the social and economic relations of human beings equality with or primacy over those of the state.⁸⁹ It also represents a shift in security focus from the state to the individual while also broadening it beyond military issues⁹⁰ and defining security as the absence of both direct and structural violence.⁹¹ In the post-Cold War environment order is largely defined in international discourse through human security and democratisation⁹² although the post-9/11 securitisation offers a strong challenge. ‘Human security’ is linked in with perspectives on human needs⁹³ and gained attention as a concept in 1994 through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).⁹⁴ It is supposed to constitute an approach to development practises that makes achievement of human rights central or even ‘the scaffolding of development policy,’⁹⁵ but its contents vary and it is alternatively defined as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from fear, wants and indignity.’⁹⁶ While some would say that the human security perspective focuses on the socio-political conditions under which people live,⁹⁷ the focus still seems to be less on understanding these conditions and more on how they do not conform to the pre-

defined format. It thus hints at social engineering for the purpose of creating a society that meets the normative values discursively defined by the international debate of needs and development⁹⁸ rather than locally produced and framed understandings. The 'Rights-Based Approach' (RBA) is the concerted effort of trying to promote human rights through development delivery⁹⁹ often supplemented by additional 'universal' norms and values. The marginalised, kinship, community, and localised agency, are recognised rhetorically at best.¹⁰⁰ For example the local image of modern womanhood in many parts of the world is often nothing like the language of liberation in 'the West'¹⁰¹ and thus conflicts with the norm set by those financing and defining the broader development agenda. Locally generated changes in gender relations and the sites of resistance created by local women are thus often overlooked or disregarded in favour of quantifiable project goals.

A number of mechanisms are used for norm transmission within interventions, including proxy-governance by deep control of state structures; conditionality on aid, loans, and projects; 'expert advice' and embedded experts; as well as the shaping of agreements to reflect the dictated norms.¹⁰² The latter can be easily observed through a comparison of the Afghan and Kosovo constitutions, and the Somali 'transitional charter', all of which include gender quotas and free market provisions. A key issue is thus who defines the core values of the individuals that are being secured¹⁰³ and how benchmarks are set. The notions of human security and rights-based approaches are still very strong within the international aid and development system. This is obvious in the country strategies put out for Somalia from the UN and the World Bank, and it is obvious in most of the discourse utilised in other interventions as well. The Afghanistan strategy of the UN is a showcase of how many times in a single set of documents that the words 'gender' and 'human rights' can be used. It recognises the difficulties involved in spreading the 'Millennium Development Goals' but provides little actual guidance on exactly how the terminology of 'universal' rights and freedoms is defined in the Afghan context or how it supposed to be achieved in the multiple Afghan social realities.¹⁰⁴

State Obsession

The notions of the 'state' as an objectively universal format and what substance it should contain leads to strategies that are disconnected from a very specific local reality of crucial social structures.¹⁰⁵ As Ignatieff has noted: '[w]hen traumatized peoples fail to play out our script of reconciliation, we tend to blame them, rather than our own wishful thinking.'¹⁰⁶ The 'script' instead should be negotiated and written in the local context rather than generated externally and applied, a social contract developed by the parties to the contract rather than an outside third party implementing a process to renegotiate the terms of interaction on which legitimate governance can be based.¹⁰⁷ After all, if legitimacy is the popular belief and acceptance of the political system and the authority's right to rule¹⁰⁸ and issue commands, then it is also inherently a highly internal process. Yet international peacebuilding largely has only Weber's 'rational-legal' entity of impersonal bureaucracy¹⁰⁹ in mind when seeking to shape a socio-political context. The Weberian state is an *Ideal*¹¹⁰ that raises critiques about ethno-centrism as it hardly exists outside of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),¹¹¹ but also raises questions about actual achievability. The pre-dominance of the state in the international system and how it is understood discourages the exploration of alternatives even though the usefulness of the state in some settings, especially as a vehicle of peace, is debatable.¹¹² Few states have the absolute control envisioned in Weber's ideal and more importantly, societies do not necessarily break down when the state does not function well enough to satisfy these expectations. With the decline of the central state, society has a tendency to continue functioning on many levels.

The state can instead be seen as an entity with two types of boundaries: the territorial and the social.¹¹³ While international interventionists affect territorial boundaries as they define the state against other states, the social boundaries are primarily the domain of social interest groups and require their cooperation in order to change. A state that is disconnected from its society does have boundaries against the social, but the social can also shut the state out behind boundaries of its own. What are needed in the aftermath of civil war are then not so much quick elections as

political stability and effective administration¹¹⁴ through socially legitimate authority structures. In Somaliland the pattern of 'political goods' and social services being supplied by communities, international aid organisations, Islamic charities, the Diaspora, and businessmen¹¹⁵ continues as a result of the weak state. By necessity and adaptation delivery it is a highly deregulated and decentralised system that could never be matched by the state and its lack of resources. While not unproblematic, Somaliland society maintains a peace, gaining stability from social interest formations rather than the state.

There are alternatives to a central state that can be worth exploring for stability in the context of a 'failed state' and while 'warlords' and local power holders can be seen as non-state actors with localised empirical sovereignty¹¹⁶ they are not the only possible alternatives. The critical factor is internal legitimacy, and it is therefore of utmost importance that there is a local support for whatever the suggested format, as well as a plan of sustainability.

Donors, foreign states, or international organisations telling participants what they should want or coercing them does not constitute a local negotiation. Nor will the enforced format remain unchanged in the interaction with the local realities. Using 'armies of trainers' to 'educate' a population in what to think and do¹¹⁷ does not erase the existing social contexts and meanings. It only frames 'localised' to mean 'conforming the local'¹¹⁸ rather than conforming to the local.

As shown by the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Somalia, this is a regional problem and not only for states. Dispersed and displaced groups with affiliations across the borders or social organisations in competition with the state for social control are also affected indifferent ways by the state obsession. Social and territorial boundaries do not necessarily align and the actual effect of state lines as boundaries encompassing a people connected by shared meaning may vary considerably.¹¹⁹ This is for example is clear in the case of the Pashtun peoples along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The transformation of Somaliland is also a showcase for the perception of negative and positive influences from Diaspora groups who served to both mitigate and exacerbate conflict during the 1990's. Being externally situated but having vested

interests allows such groups to be more 'purist' and absolute in their positions¹²⁰ as they are removed from the immediate social pressure and suffering. It is therefore potentially somewhat counter-productive when Diaspora members are brought in as 'technical experts' to validate an external agenda over the views expressed by the locally situated population.

The delivery of 'political goods' seems largely geared towards two sets of goals: 1) to provide 'legitimacy' and generate support for a state-system by giving people what it is they 'need' and 'want' as defined by the notion that interests are universal and that any deviation from internationally defined priorities is the agenda of 'spoilers'; and 2) to serve as a vehicle for norm diffusion thus also telling people what it is they 'need' and 'want', as a way to convey norms of 'acceptable' and 'civilised' behaviour into 'less developed' social settings.¹²¹ This constitutes a '*Pax Liberalis*' of sorts which, like its Roman predecessor, sees itself as spreading 'civilising norms' to the 'barbaric fringes' based on a notion of superiority.

The two strands of format and substance are also obvious in inter-state relations. There is a selective policy of recognising whoever is in control of the capital as the legitimate ruler rather than those in charge of some, most, or all of the territory around it. Anything else would be considered yielding to secessionist demands and the strict structure of the format is generally respected. An exception to this occurs when powerful external agents establish or support an alternative social force in order to eventually install it through force or manipulation of election processes or other mechanisms of power such as resource access.

The strand of substance thus also has to be acknowledged as a subjective and selective factor. It is applied to coincide with the interests of the intervening power. Thus a 'valuable ally' today, can easily be transformed into a 'despicable dictator' tomorrow depending on the discourse actualised. International interests determine whether a security- or humanitarian discourse is employed and who is considered the 'legitimate' ruler in the eyes of the international community. In the end however, fickle as the substance support may be, the format does not change.

The policies relating to state sovereignty are also maintained out of fear of destabilising countries where secessionist demands are raised and by extension the entire international state system. For example countries such as Spain and the UK have separatist movements in their territory which could be encouraged by setting precedents elsewhere.

At the point of intervention however, the target country has already been determined to be lacking in some respect, the appropriate discourse chosen, and either 'regime change' or support of an existing regime decided upon. This also applies in peacebuilding operations where institution building, 'capacity building', and a strengthening of the internationally preferred format of the state have become central. The international system of institutions and organisations is thus not only assuming and pursuing the format of the state as the means to govern and control territory but increasingly also as the vehicle to build peace.¹²²

The failing view of 'the local'

While it perhaps is not always the case, there appears to be a reliance on limited and fairly narrowly defined groups that conform to certain values and aspects of an interventionist project. The motives and sincerity of these 'good performers' rarely seem to be seriously questioned with reference to the 'universal' nature they supposedly represent. As dependence on these groups grows, the issues expand in two different directions: 1) there is a propensity for the 'externals' to extrapolate the response by an exclusive group with which they engage, for example locally employed staff or local elites, to represent the views of 'society.' A common version of this is that the capital of a country, and its educated urbanised elites, is seen to represent the entire country even in the face of obvious discrepancies.

This problem is exacerbated in environments where the situational logic revolves around survival and where the 'external' lacks communicative skills such as speaking the local language(s) or having even basic contextual social understanding. External agents and actors increasingly become reliant on a small group of people who have those skills without knowing what interests these people represent or how they relate

to the local dynamics; 2) the local interest groups that have gained the trust or cooperation of the external agents are increasingly able to manipulate and control them and the project in order to fulfil their own agendas. This has been the case in both Somalia and Afghanistan with local groups adopting the language of counter terrorism, universal human rights, and similar political and ideological concepts embedded in many of the international projects. The assertion is of course not that this is always the case but that it does happen and that it is facilitated by an over-belief in the 'universalism' of one's own views.

The peacebuilding process can be divided into two parts, namely preventing a relapse into war and creating a self-sustaining peace,¹²³ but there are issues with the scope of both when applied. For example, the cost of consolidating the authority of the state, the 'vehicle of peace,' over territory is one not easily met. This is especially true especially in countries with little governmental resources, vast expanses of land, low population density, and geographical features that create isolation between power-centres and the hinterland. Any aspirations to promote peace through a new set of institutions need to be based on whether there is access to sufficient means to perform the defined duties and tasks.¹²⁴ Failure to do so only creates a new set of problems.

Peacebuilding and development strategies often seem to share the view of the local population as largely a passive mass of victims without agency,¹²⁵ a situation exacerbated by such approaches as 'human security' as it is understood and employed today by many development actors. The population is to be brought under the influence of a specific social force such as the state in rejection of the 'non-modern.' In an environment where political and social concerns are formed and pursued on a highly local basis, the assumption of higher order mobilisation needs relevant qualifiers and specific conditions.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to explore the assumptions and positions underlining international peacebuilding strategies and the literature supporting it. In the course of

this examination it was found that the state was central to the perspectives in interventionist strategies.¹²⁶ These strategies focus on both format and substance, thus making conformity to externally generated theories a priority.

Perceptions of conflict and peace are largely tied in with the notion of the state, and there are notions of 'universal' rights and needs¹²⁷ to be delivered by the state underpinning much of the arguments and research literature relating to peace and conflict. Rights-based approaches, needs assessments, population-centric strategies, human security and other components are generally employed as vehicles of value transmission rather than originating from local social conditions. It is an external normative perspective of what is needed or wanted rather than a perspective being formed on the priorities of the local interest groups and socio-political dynamics. The Council for Foreign Relations stated in 1942 that '*Americans are inclined to believe that the period at the end of the war will provide a tabula rasa on which can be written the terms of a democratic new order.*'¹²⁸ It seems that the notion of *tabula rasa* is still in effect today in international peacebuilding¹²⁹ though in no way is it confined to Americans. In the case that an existing social context is acknowledged there is an expectation of being able to change or overwrite what is there, to transform it into something 'better' and more 'developed.' This largely translates as 'more like us.' This has become part of an attitude of big and small 'Western' actors engaged in different types of projects around the world.¹³⁰ As Mosse has observed first hand, even when the local is acknowledged the system works to identify willing sources of legitimisation that changes the local discourse to fit the model design rather than the other way around.¹³¹ The interventionist perspective is also often 'taught' to local agents and actors, only to then be allowed to retroactively 'confirm' that it was correct from the start.¹³² This is most easily achieved by enlisting local elites that have adopted the preferred values or at least the discourse. The 'local' is clearly seen as a problem to be overcome by changing its composition and script.

The human needs debate initially offers a window of opportunity to escape the focus on the state as a pre-requisite for peace, but the politicised co-opting of its meaning into the liberal peace discourse has confused needs with values to such an

extent that the only way to fulfil human needs as they are understood in the language of conflict resolution is through a liberal democratic state. The focus on the individual inherent in the Universalist position of liberal interventionism ignores the fact that while needs are subjectively defined they are also socially scripted and shaped by the social context. To acknowledge this social script is not to deny the importance of needs in social practises but it does reject any universal understanding and definition of them.¹³³ It would perhaps be more useful to see needs as produced in social practises and focus attention on the contexts in which they are produced rather than trying to produce a pre-determined set.

Socio-political dynamics in the local are far from always playing out at a state level and the assumption that they are or can be made to be is presumptuous at best. While often well intended, the mere fact that the current strategies fail to adequately identify at what level relevant politics are taking place makes them ill fitted for any sort of sustainable results. The analysis underlying strategy often simply does not match the engagement level. Interest formation and legitimacy are too complicated to be framed in a generic terminology deriving from a normative wishful thinking of 'universal' values. Effective strategy requires an understanding of the particular meanings and priorities of a particular local reality at a relevant level of engagement. The strategies and mainstream literature informing it today rests on theoretical underpinnings that make large assumptions about the motivations, interests and priorities of people in general, resulting in sweeping, highly diffuse, and subjectively defined conceptualisations with little usefulness. Assumptions of universal values and applicability produce certain logics of action for the international organisations and actors engaging in other societies. Drawing on these assumptions, the overarching strategies may be logical but they are based on erroneous premises. When confronted with reality they find themselves largely disconnected from the local conditions produced in a physical, social and historical context which, through subjective-collective actualisation by social agents and actors, has produced particular institutions and situational logics.

The discussed relationships illustrate an international system where donor pressure and ideological assumptions condition organisational behaviour into certain types of programming that is largely self-referential, even while referring to local capacities. Within this system there are projects and organisations that are working hard to align with local realities and to achieve sustainable results. But these organisations are exceptions to the rule and even then often subject to donor pressures.

The state-centrism prevalent in international strategies and perspectives today produces a perceived mono-directionality of influence when in reality it is more likely that a social force such as a state or an insurgency becomes subverted or co-opted as a means to affect local conflicts and power relationships. An acknowledgement of this would however mean that the population was capable of pursuing a non-state agenda, a direct violation of the 'universally' accepted format and substance of the state. It simply does not conform to the pre-defined assumptions of universality or of passive victims, and thus has to be explained away as a minority of 'spoilers.' The subsequent co-optation or subversion is more than likely to result in a dysfunctional state since its resources and functions are devoted to an array of unaligned sub-state agendas. 'Spoilers' can be re-defined simply as opposing or not conforming to the state-wide ambitions of an interventionist or collaborating partner. They are violating the subjective vision imposed on them with their own subjective priorities. Regardless of the agenda, this clash between different interests will produce unintended outcomes.

The major weakness of strategies and supporting literature are the large assumptions of social drives and subjectivities. This has implications for how social mobilisation occurs, social interests are formed, and how institutions and roles are legitimised. In terms of the concept of 'the Vote' it can easily be argued that it is not the vote that legitimises the institution, but that the vote generally is an already legitimised way of filling already legitimised roles in already legitimised institutions. If you create socially new institutions, roles, and means of legitimisation, there is a clash with the socially actuated systems in place. This type of obvious social engineering necessitates the existing assumption of a 'universality' of the prescribed format that will automatically 'fall into place' once enforced.

In reality, the meeting of two systems is likely to produce unintended outcomes through a number of interactions. While intended to simplify and make engagement easier, these assumptions become constraints rather than enablers as they preclude any agency and capacity to mobilise in pursuit of alternative formats among the target population. The debate produces constraints for itself as it is held within the normal frames of reference in terms of relativism or liberal peace where the latter has seemingly become self-referential dogma. While it does not hinder the raising of questions, and questions there are, the answers are restricted in that they 'must' reflect a certain set of assumptions. It is thus like an ideological house of mirrors where there is the possibility of an infinite number of reflections. While there sometimes are different levels of distortion they in the end reflect the same things and will inevitably become reflections of reflections: the recycling of old images.

By remaining within the house of mirrors the debate obstructs the view of the relationships that are relevant. Even the critics are constrained by the fact that they are reflecting off and deconstructing the images found in the mirrors, but provide few constructive alternatives for how to view the relationship between social mobilisation and the effects of interventionist projects. It is crucial to grasp what is already present as legitimate and established models of social interaction, but also at what levels interests are pursued and how it relates to an interventionist project. This requires a framework that provides an alternative platform from which to observe how social dynamics are enacted to produce outcomes without pre-supposing formats or contents through 'universal' models. In the end, and as Ignatieff has warned, *'whatever people want to do, they do not want to be forced by us.'*¹³⁴

Chapter Two: Towards a framework for viewing socio-political dynamics

In any social analysis it is necessary to include material, ideational, and institutional aspects of social change.¹ The challenge is to provide a simplified but sufficiently comprehensive model of human interaction to facilitate the explanation of observable events and allow us to ‘meaningfully unpack the complexities of real life.’² The framework developed here suggests that a viable middle-road between theory and practice aiming to understand socio-political dynamics and their relationship to interventions requires two components in order to be successful: Firstly the conceptualisation of social interaction in an applicable, and for analytical purposes, segmented system that allows for an investigation of the subject of intervention, the ‘Other.’ This investigation should span through time and across an array of factors with a partial analytical separation in order to provide a ‘map’ of a society. The terminology of ‘mapping’ employed is to be understood here in the meaning of charting unknown areas to avoid hidden dangers as opposed to a colonial understanding of mapping to subjugate. It is about understanding the ‘strategic terrain,’ not dominating it. The purpose of the framework is to engage with the ‘Other’, rather than to change it dramatically or frame it in an external ideological language. A useful perspective is Migdal’s argument on seeing the social terrain as a mental map with a set of boundaries and virtual checkpoints, responsive to the pressures of specific situations.³ Secondly, while a framework of social interaction can provide a mechanical understanding of the relative influence and power of structure and agency in the formation of interest groups, it says nothing about how relevant knowledge is acquired, where and how values form, nor provide context-specific understanding of agents, structures or actuated institutions. These are subjectivities that require localised knowledge and understanding.

This chapter is comprised of two parts and establishes the theoretical perspective from which the two cases of Somalia/Somaliland and Afghanistan will be examined. The first part discusses a series of premises derived from the theories used in order to establish the theoretical foundations for this chapter. The second part is the development of the framework that will be applied in relation to interaction and

intervention in a social context. The underlying notion is that contemporary strands of strategy and literature tend to take one of four directions: overly ideological: based on wishful thinking of the normative as objective facts; unconstructively critical: seeking only to tear down but presenting no constructive alternative; generalising, over-simplifying, and technical: reducing complex social interaction to easily graspable models that fits nicely with strategy thinking but lacks in reality; or simply too 'fluffy': rejecting analytical separations and prioritising of factors, thus becoming impractical and inapplicable. The framework established here serves to strike a balance between applicability on one hand, and acknowledgement of the complexities of social interaction and the unpredictability of outcomes on the other. To do so it focuses on the formation of interests, the mobilisation of interest groups, and the production of outcomes in the complexities of social interaction.

Part I

There are many debates in studies of peace and conflict that are specifically related to different ideational or material goods⁴ and many of them have at the very least some merit. Social contexts can be seen as consisting of shared definitions whose sources can be found in structures, 'cultural patterns' and institutions⁵ but this understanding in itself is not enough. Without proper contextualising, any singled out and generalised factor of social interaction produces simplistic and static renditions of an entire social conflict spectrum. Its contribution to wider understanding is diminished by an analytical isolation and atomistic perspective of causality. Employed instead in a framework that examines and explains their influence in relation to other factors and agents they can be properly contextualised and their relative importance in a specific situation explored.

By selecting a factor without examining its actual and locally determined social relevance, there is a risk of imbuing it with a false value and an importance that does not correspond to the contextual reality. For instance, when examining gender relations in patriarchal societies there appears to be a notion that women are not part of the society in which they live and that they mobilise only in a capacity of being

women. This image of the 'woman' seemingly disconnects her from any social interest group such as the family, and makes her devoid of shared social expectations. Their roles are often constructed in an external ideological image that reduces the woman to a passive victim. This ignores viable options for the promotion of 'female emancipation',⁶ but also dismisses the sites of resistance and methods of coping developed by women in response to the context. Importantly in conflict contexts, it also underestimates the capacity of women to act in favour of war and division⁷ based on the notion of women as more peaceful than men. This heritage from Essentialist Feminism⁸ obscures reality and leads to easily subverted strategies of engagement.

The position taken here is that interests and strategies are shaped in the interaction between subjective perceptions, social conditions and pressures. Interests are pursued as part of one or several mobilised socially defined groups and normally within socially defined boundaries. It is therefore crucial to understand how interests and social boundaries are formed and to what degree they are shared.

This framework is an attempt to make sense of and contextualise social influences internally as well as in relation to intervention. By employing the framework it is possible to understand how institutions, interests, agents and actors form and relate in the contextual environment. It allows for an examination of what available 'spaces and options' are produced in the interaction between institutions and social agents and thus what responses are incentivised within a specific context. Two main theoretical influences are used as points of departure to explain how the social environment and interest groups are formed and interact. Margret Archer's Morphogenetic theory provides a base for the understanding of interest group formation, situational logics, and how existing conditions and institutions affect social agents and actors. Joel S. Migdal's theories on the competition between social forces provide a way to relate these interest groups to each other and their interaction. Neither theory is held to sufficiently explain the mechanisms involved and will therefore be developed further in order to provide the needed functions. Combining and exploring these theories to understand interest formation and social interaction, a series of underlying premises emerge.

Social Interest Formation and Interaction

We are all born into on-going social contexts *'constrained to speak its language, take up our place in prior distribution of resources, be sanctioned by its laws, and confront its organisations.'*⁹ Emergent properties are the unintended outcomes of ideas, actions, and interactions, that is to say that they have in part been socially constructed by previous generations and exist as analytically separate entities that can potentially be actuated by current social agents and individual actors. The circumstances that each new generation has to confront are not of their own making. They define the parameters of what can be made of it and how social agents can reconstitute themselves and society in the process.

This is at odds with the typical liberal view that the individual is prior to society, society is created by individuals, and society exists to serve individual purposes.¹⁰ Constraints and enablers originate in emerging properties of society through shared images and expectations produced prior to current agents. The social space as it exists in any given society is an unintended consequence as it is dependent on human intentionality but never conforms fully to the original intentions. The different social agents and factors interact to produce an outcome that exerts its influence on the next sequence of interaction. This social dynamic constitutes a negotiation and re-negotiation that ultimately produces change or preserves the system.

The structural and ideational environment is shaped prior to, but also mediated by, current social agents. Schmitt and Schröder have argued that groups follow 'cultural models' of appropriate action and that they in the context of war follow codes of legitimisation of which historicity is the most important one.¹¹ The assumption of structure preceding agency for analytical purposes is a necessary assertion in order to understand the process of change and transformation over time. It should however in no way be taken to indicate determinism or that structures are constant and unchangeable, or indeed produced by something other than people. However, while social integration always takes place in the here and now, system integration is

antecedent to it.¹² Thus ‘the local’ includes social conditions, structures and practises that have been developed by previous generations and generated established institutions that can be actuated in social interaction.

‘The social’ in its entirety can be seen as two spheres that produce emergent properties through the internal relationships of their parts. In Archer’s terminology they are ‘social structures’ and ‘cultural systems’ that exert parallel influence on, but are also ontologically independent of, the people present here




Figure 2

and now.¹³ Thus it is for example that the symbols, rituals, and meanings of a religion are often produced in the past and may subsequently exist in their own right without the active knowledge or observance of current actors, but with the potential of being actuated.

‘Social structures’ concerns aspects such as societal distribution of resources, governance, or social divisions, while ‘cultural systems’ concerns ideational goods such as beliefs, theories, and ideology. This clear division between structural and ideational conditions is useful. A similar mode of thought is employed for example by Schmidt and Schröder in relation to violence as a means to attain materially or ‘culturally’ defined goals.¹⁴ The perspective also aligns with that of social and ‘cultural’ capital complementing material conditions,¹⁵ and that both material and cognitive factors should be included¹⁶ in analysis. Henceforth, the use of the term *structural* implies the structural sphere including resource conditions. The ‘cultural sphere’ however will be referred to as the *ideational* as it is employed to mean ideas, political ideologies, religions, and other similar influences. To use the term ‘culture’ draws it unnecessarily into the veritable quagmire of misdirection generated in the debate on definitions and importance of ‘culture’ as a concept.¹⁷

Structural and ideational conditions influence the social arena and the responses made available to agents and actors. A particular social environment produces specific dynamics and is therefore crucial for any useful analysis. Within social frameworks, institutionalised norms and values emerge over time through actuation and

internalisation, determining for example what warrants conflict and what solutions are acceptable.¹⁸ The use of the ideational here and the feed-back between agential interaction and institutional development, allows for the discursive social construction of a set of beliefs and their institutionalisation through actuation and systemic evolution. History matters as it provides us with clues about what constraining or enabling conditions have been and may still have bearing on social interaction.

Structural and ideational institutions are generated in the interaction between the two spheres and the actualisation of different parts by people. The structural and ideational resource distribution determines the potential bargaining power, or ‘life chances’ of social agents. It is assumed and expected that there is interpenetration between the structural and ideational spheres but in order to distinguish and analyse differently formed conditions it becomes necessary




Figure 3

to make a separation.¹⁹ In central conflationist theories the constituent parts cannot be examined separately because ‘culture’ becomes an all-embracing phenomenon in which all facets of signification are intertwined with every feature of social practise.²⁰

The interaction between the structural and ideational spheres produces social institutions within the constraints placed by the existing conditions. To become relevant these institutions have to be actuated by social agents able to mobilise for their interests. The purpose of examining the structural and ideational institutions is to look at what conditions exist for agents before examining what they can do within the parameters²¹ to reconstitute themselves and the environment through interaction. It is important to stress that there is not a uniform distribution of ideational goods in a society. Signals and meanings are independently processed and interpreted in direct relation to distributive patterns.²² This is explored in the case chapters in terms of actuated institutions and roles.

Roles and interest groups are formed in response to context-specific conditions generated in the structural and ideational institutional interaction and they have their own vested interests. The social environment is a derivative of experiences, learned or passed on by contemporaries and ancestors. Any individual can at once reflect multiple identities and potential interest groups such as professional association, religious belonging, or kinship and family.²³ Which identity is actuated in a particular instance and thus the basis of interest formation²⁴ is dependent on context and situational logic. It is in the interaction between these formal and informal guideposts and their respective




Figure 4

proponents that societies are given their structure and individual character²⁵ whether as a diverse aggregate of multiple groups or as a small identity group.

There can however be no clear isolation to individual needs as groups have needs as well,²⁶ and social interests are pursued as part of a mobilised interest group. It is necessary to contextualise social agents and actors in order to understand the available responses and possibilities presented to them. If we omit reference to structural and ideational conditions, we imbue an actor or agent with the ability to 'will' an outcome regardless of its circumstances.²⁷

There are two categories of active interest groups that are separated analytically from the rest of the population. The first are the organised groups, *corporate agents*, who are able to formulate and mobilise to attain specific goals relating to their interests (for example political parties, religious groups, criminal gangs). This largely corresponds to the ethnographic term 'corporate descent group'²⁸ expressed for example in kinship terms.²⁹

Using Migdal's understanding of social interaction, 'corporate agents' as used here correspond to his 'social organisations.' The 'state in society'-approach focuses on the interaction between social groupings and in relation to those they are trying to control or influence.³⁰ These are formal and informal organisations that are the units through

which people have structured and regularised interactions with others. They have a variety of sanctions and rewards to induce conformity to the rules and norms of the collectivity. The individual pursues social change through collectivities and relate to other individuals against a backdrop of social agent membership.

Primary agents have non-articulated interests but have not been actively mobilised in their pursuit. They can however potentially be recruited or mobilised as corporate agents. An example of this was the initial mobilisation of local support by the Taliban in Afghanistan (corporate agent) was facilitated by the elimination of local militia commanders as a service to the communities,³¹ mobilising primary agents by satisfying their interests.

The aggregate effect of primary agents can also constrain and influence corporate agents and actors, such as to conform to popular opinion and expectations or follow social expectations and patterns in their situational logic.

Social actors in turn emerge through a process in which social agents condition, but not determine, who will occupy certain roles. Any attempt at conceptualising the actor needs to be completed by reference to their properties as social agents in order to reach an adequate conception of their social identity. For example, while a person in a governmental position may seem to be appropriating funds for personal enrichment, as a member of a solidarity-group these actions may be in the context of a social corporate agent. It may thus be a means to access resources and acquire patrimonial means to secure political legitimacy³² and continued access and representation for the group, rather than simple theft for personal gain.

Social agents and actors respond to constraints and opportunities produced by multiple sets of rules³³ in turn generated by a number of identity solidarities. It is not a hydraulic pressure being exerted but a series of rewards and sanctions depending on the response,³⁴ that incentivises certain actions or not. Migdal describes the process in terms of survival strategies and argues that these strategies are severely constrained by available resources (here: material conditions), ideas (here: ideational gods), and organisational means (here: corporate agent capacity). Social control rests on the ability to deliver key components for them.³⁵ The manipulation of ideational resources

such as identity for alternative reasons is obvious in some conflicts. Identity- or other types of 'in-groups' represent vested interest groups aggregated for the purpose of accessing resources of a material or ideational type. There is a degree of agential interpretative freedom but an agent opposing rewarding options risks harming its vested interests. Conversely, supporting a source of experiences that are frustrating a 'project' is to invite further impediment.

Agents and actors are not used inter-changeably and are not reducible to each other. Nor are they the same as 'human beings' employed as a general description of a social category that has no particular interests to be innovative about at a particular time. An actor has only got those interests that come with the role while social agents are collectivities sharing interests that are external to roles but can be realised through them. An individual can be part of multiple social agents at the same time³⁶ which is linked to identity and at risk of being utilized as ideological resources, for example in exclusivist politics.³⁷ The alliances that develop have varying access to structural resources (especially wealth and power) and ideational resources (for example social legitimacy), and this affects the outcome of their strategic action. Put another way, not every agent or actor can affect society in major ways or mobilise enough resources and power to influence outcomes.

For the purposes here, social forces are defined primarily as networks of interest groups. It is rare that an interest group becomes large enough to constitute a social force in its own right and more common that alliances form where different interest groups with a range of diverse interest align in the pursuit of an overarching and often loosely defined goal.

Social corporate agents and actors are constrained or enabled by the situational logic generated in interaction with the actuated institutions of their structural and ideational environment. When subjectively actualised, institutions produce situational logics that constrain or enable responses. The institutional environment conditions viable options but the actor or agents are not forced to respond in a specific way; they must however make sense of the situation for themselves within the socially available

possibilities.³⁸ The situational logic for an individual is in part shaped by expectations of social conformity among its peers and thus social conventions and penalties also serve to gradually shape interpretation and lived experiences.

The individual is contextually not free to interpret at will but is subject to the socially generated expectations of both its own and other peer-groups. It is important to understand that this framework refers to social interests and while an individual can pursue for example economic gain individually, social interests and change are pursued either as part of a social agent collectivity, or as a socially defined actor. Societies




Figure 5

contain a web of rule-generating functions³⁹ where several sets of rules and codes can be enacted at any one time by different, and sometimes the same, social agents. There is no single code but multiple formal and informal sets that guide behaviour and are promoted by different groups.⁴⁰

Any given society will have a number of different interest groups whose access to material and ideational resources create separate institutions of for example social rules or religion and thus their own identities. This can be class belonging, religious sectarianism, and other factors such as mechanisms for dealing with conflicts or having ‘capacities for peace.’⁴¹ Some institutions are actuated on a society-wide basis while other concepts such as ethnicity, religious beliefs or geographical proximity are actuated only in a limited social context. The decision to actuate an institution is subjective and arguably not possible to force.

The specific relationship of emergent properties to the particular project of a particular agent, in a particular subjectively understood position, and at a particular time, determines whether the conditional influence is a constraint or an enablement.⁴² There are interests built into all social positions and while motivations like altruism are

fully possible, it carries a price in relation to the interests of the position.⁴³ The Israeli reprisal attacks against Egypt in the 1950-60s are an example of a clash of completely different situational logics. While the Israeli logic stated that the harder the reprisal, the bigger the deterrence, the Egyptian situational logic was that the disproportionate attacks humiliated and shamed them into supporting further attacks against Israel in order to regain lost honour and erase the shame. The power projection and power reception between the respective elites became a feed-back loop for the production of violence.⁴⁴

The mediations of institutional influences feed back into institutions as well as roles and agential constitution. An example would be a person with an authority claim and local political recognition in a specific area⁴⁵ where a *de facto* governing role is created by legitimacy being awarded locally for services rendered and an ability to project authority within the context of shared interests. This role is imbued with meaning by the actor filling it but is also dependent on its supporters and thus constraining the options available to the actor. It can transform into a centrally sanctioned role such as a governor if a structurally superior authority source accepts the claim as well, but this would in turn also change the vested interests of the role. In lieu of willing support coercive force can be a substitute which shapes the role and its possibilities and dependencies in yet another way. The socially produced meaning of the role is thus reconstituted through changing conditions facing the agents that give it meaning socially. Threats to the vested interests of a role provide incentives for negative situational logics and opposition.

In the formal state it might also be the case that individual parts of the state apparatus respond more to their social context than to the rest of the state organisation,⁴⁶ leading to local mediation or adaptation of central decisions by locally situated employees or representatives.⁴⁷ Inhibiting pressures may also be generated in for example situations where the authority of the state is locally outweighed by the authority of non-state groups.

The same is arguably true for organisations that rely on staff placed far from the centre and being pressured from one direction by the demands of the employer, and

from the other the demands of the local community. The situation in deprived areas of 'Western' cities often generates situational logic that is miles apart from that of a middle-class suburb and the same is true for the role of the underpaid and outnumbered officials in areas controlled by drug gangs. Situational logics change dramatically, for example when a group threatens the children of a role-bearer. The subjective question becomes whether the role can be maintained and at what cost. Less obvious inhibitors can be produced by for example kinship ties or ethnic sympathies. Does the police officer report a crime committed by a family member? Does the politician hire his or her spouse despite no relevant competence? Does the warrior fight for the concept of the nation or for the interests of those he knows?

People have multiple collective identities that are actualised depending on the circumstances,⁴⁸ it may be helpful to conceptualise identity as divided between a personal self and a larger social self that is reflected in successively expanding identity circles or collectivities. Drawing on P.W. Preston, family, union, clan, religious group, ethnicity, and nationality are examples of different potential groups to which the individual can belong. These multiple identities are dependent on locale, networks, and memory.⁴⁹

Locale concerns the concentric circles of identity in which the individual situates him or herself and at what level the respondent puts the most importance. The notion of identity is reflected in the framework in terms of 'modes of mobilisation', non-static and changeable factors dependent on subjective actuation by individuals as part of collective social agents.

Networks refer to the way in which the different identities interact, at what level, and at what time. A prime example of this is when members of the same family who are living in different communities or who practice different religions produce diverging identities in addition to their shared kinship. The question becomes which identity commands the most loyalty at a given time and to what extent it affects the alignment of the individual when multiple and sometimes contradictory demands are made on him or her.⁵⁰

The Role of Memory as used here refers largely to relevant subjective and socially shared understandings of history. It focuses on the perception of identity in relation to the preceding structural and ideational features of the context that is 'collective memory', traditions, codes, and knowledge, thus referring to the emergent properties that produce social pressures and expectations. These different selves are subject to obligations and responsibilities as well as rights and privileges that are socially defined.⁵¹ Thus in some societies social constraints and enablers emphasise the individual and in other the collective. In the latter case submission to the group's rules supports not only the collectivity but also the individual whose identity rests on the continued existence of the group.⁵² It is reasonable to assume that this may be exacerbated in environments where the very survival of the individual is dependent on one or multiple groups⁵³ but should not be understood as a singular identity or a lack of diversity and interaction.⁵⁴ In an individualistic society the social and physical repercussions of certain responses are less overt than in societies where a measure of survival concerns is always present, especially when tied in with a group membership. It may thus seemingly be the case that the available responses (diversity options) are fewer when in reality it is more about the constraints and severity of the disincentives produced in the social context. However this does not mean that a 'conducive environment' will automatically produce a response that conforms to a specific ideological value-set.

An additional point to remember regarding the interaction of ideational and material interest groups is the possible development of dependencies. If an ideational group aligns itself with a structural power group in order to safeguard its activities it also potentially becomes associated with, and dependent on, that group. It is thus subject to the promotion of the interests of the power group for its own continued 'survival' as an ideational agent.⁵⁵ The power group can in turn seek legitimacy from the ideational corporate agent. This is arguably the case where the practise of structural subjugation of one group is justified with the help of, for example, religious claims. Similarly, an ideationally based corporate agent can seek legitimacy through material redistribution such as has been the case of Saudi-funded Islamist groups in

Pakistan providing for the poor.⁵⁶ This has its own implications for state-centric interventions where the alignment with the interventionist agenda by a local social agent may for example give juridical legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, but where actual empirical legitimacy is lost by the association. A structural, material, and ideational dependency may thus develop which makes the continued survival of the interest group conditional on continued external support.

All agents and actors in a specific context are subject to the locally produced logic including external forces, even as they change the conditions of the context. Any externally generated injection of directed and intentional influence or resources changes the dynamics and by extension the situational logics. Its interaction with the pre-existing conditions, the locally actuated institutions, and the subjective interest- and social formations is a political act, if not in intention, then at the very least in impact. The exact outcome of this interaction is largely unintended, unpredictable, and thus uncontrollable.

The final outcome will always be unintended in varying degrees, never quite conforming to a singular intention as it is the result of social interaction. Focus should thus be on interaction and outcomes of interaction between structural and ideational institutions, agents/actors, and actuated reinterpretations/redefinitions. Structural and ideational change or stability relies on social agents and their interaction. The results of this interaction are passed on to subsequent generations as new conditioning influences. But it is also important to recognise that in the process of structural and ideational transformation, agents are also responsible for the simultaneous transformation of agency itself.⁵⁷ Through their strategic interaction, corporate agents shape the environment for everyone. This occurs as an unintended consequence of corporate interaction in response to situational logics such as conflict or not, and compromise or co-optation. Primary agents inhabit this context but by responding they also reconstitute the environment that corporate agents are trying to control⁵⁸ by releasing a stream of aggregate pressures. An example of this is the formation of social movements or protest in response to strategic pressure exercised by corporate agents.

Thus in response to the civil war in Somaliland many women, having been primary rather than corporate agents in the conflict for structural reasons, played an integral part in the peace protests between 1992 and 1995.⁵⁹ The pressure on the social environment caused by corporate agents in conflict triggered an aggregate pressure from primary agents that changed the strategic environment for the corporate agents and shaped the alternatives available to them.

Summary

Social interaction is complex, highly contextual and unpredictable. Outcomes are seen here as uncontrollable and rarely conforming to the wishes of the instigators. This perspective is shared by for example normative institutionalism that considers the destabilisation of instituted norms and values a way to open the gate for competing formats that conform to no one's specific intent.⁶⁰ In the context of a society, ideas and structural conditions interact to form institutions. These provide situational logics for actors/agents who mediate, actualise and feed-back through action and interaction, thereby reconstituting their relationship as well as the institutions. This leads either to change or maintenance of the *status quo* but as emerging properties, not in accordance with any single design. In the context of international interventions there is an additional influx of resources, ideas, and structures, brought into this interaction. This alters the conditions of the societal process, in effect the collision of two systems. The outcome is not predictable or fully controllable by any party to it, but it is a reasonable assumption that the higher the level of confrontation and discrepancy the lower the chances of a positive situational logic. A direct challenge to the balances and vested interests shaped by emerging properties and social interaction is a challenge to whole systems of perceptions and beliefs. Such a challenge facilitates a number of possible routes of temporary mobilisation of diverse interests groups into wider social forces sharing only a rejection of the non-conforming external pressure.

includes the history of specific societal institutions and ideas such as religion, legitimised political structures, bureaucracy, ideology, and more, providing a way to see how these have been mediated, developed and legitimised through social interaction. Was it tumultuous and according to logics of resistance or elimination? Is change readily accepted or rejected? What type or specific agents have traditionally had the most influence on institutional, actor, and agential mediation? How have these factors been affected by conflict and crisis? How spread is the validity of different influences and what is the level of fragmentation?

While there are no pneumatic and deciding pressures exerted which in turn means that any given choice may break any perceived pattern, it is argued here that by looking at the historic background it is possible to see where structural and ideational influences and institutions come from in the specific context. It is also possible to understand their influence over the formation of situational logics in a temporal sense as social norms and shared images take time to form and break down. With this said there is of course no guarantee that an influence has retained its historical influence and value in a social context but it at least provides insights on how the options of agents and actors are likely to form. Historical social mapping is however useful as a contextual backdrop for the analysis of the 'now' as it exposes trajectories and changes in social modes of interaction over time. It also concerns the distribution of resources in a more general way, that is to say the structural distribution of how much there is available in a given society.

While Archer's framework was found to be useful it also has two potential weaknesses relating to its applicability: 1) if applied at a too wide level it easily assumes a monolithic view of society with over-generalisations of shared interests and images resulting in the reproduction of erroneous assumptions of social interaction; and 2) the temporal perspective does not adequately address the issue of intervention or other sudden massive displacement of the social conditions for the production and performance of social institutions and interaction. It is thus judged here that social analysis based on the factors above provides a sufficient understanding of social context in terms of shared perceptions and diversity of interests and goals, but there is

also a need to further develop the framework in order to understand how externally generated intervention affects the conditions of a social context to produce unintended outcomes.

Part II

The problem of lacking contextual understanding was reflected upon by respondents in all categories during this research. For a state-centric approach to peacebuilding or other interventions, this has severe implications on whether it is viable or if the circumstances make it directly counter-productive, producing a zero-sum game for a range of armed interest groups. The focus of this framework is thus on the engagement with the subjective 'Other' and in particular in terms of the interaction between the local context and outside intervention. A realistic engagement with local ideational and structural conditions is seen as a necessity.

The strategies and debates surrounding interventionist projects such as contemporary international peacebuilding indicate a discrepancy between ideologically driven strategies defined and imposed from the outside on the one hand, and locally existing and legitimised value-bases and social structures on the other. While this has clearly been understood on some level⁶² it fails to impact sufficiently in strategy and practice. There is a discursive and practical understanding of social interaction that is predicated mainly on a Eurocentric state- and social order. This is perpetuated through international institutions, not as normative goals but as universal facts. Efforts in community-level peacebuilding can sometimes include a 'training' element where the 'right' value definitions are disseminated⁶³ and where the subjects are conditioned into a specific type of social control structure. It generally seeks to incorporate communities into a state structure as it manifests itself in donor countries.

An alternative approach with the same focus is to find already existing reformist elites discursively conforming to desirable values and to cultivate and intervene 'on their behalf'⁶⁴ as representatives of the entire population. It becomes a case of discursively advocating adaptation to local conditions but in strategy and intent trying to conform local conditions to an externally produced world view directly or by proxy.

This framework instead focuses on an analysis of on social interaction to provide an alternative point of view and point of departure.

Migdal's concept of social forces in competition is found here to be particularly relevant as a perspective of understanding the socio-political dynamics between social interest groups and forces, in particular in relation to the state. It is however argued that the model is not sufficient to explain the complexities of social interaction. The presence of multiple social orders and high levels of fragmentation requires an understanding of interest groups at a more localised level and how their situational logics, their constraints and enablers, are formed and actuated. Archer's Morphogenetic framework provides a basis for this but needs further expansion in respect to the implications of intervention and what data is incorporated as well as how it is obtained. The view of social factors as subjectively formed and actuated represents the third major influence which is subjectivities of the 'local.' In this respect, the framework is heavily influenced by a sociological perspective and 'fourth generation' peace and conflict studies. The subjective actualisation of structural and ideational institutions not only produces the situational logic of the local context but also the situational logic facing external intervention. A lack of understanding or interest in regard to these factors sometimes generates counter-productive and directly conflict-generating measures.

Modes of mobilisation - Social Forces and Social Agents

A precondition of social mobilisation is the existence of shared institutions. These are systems of rules within which people deal with one another and tend to change incrementally.⁶⁵ In the context of for example externally driven democratisation processes, the problem of which normative set will win out has largely been wished away by assuming that 'modern Western values' would triumph in the end.⁶⁶ By contextualising externally generated values and resources in the existing social order it is possible to explore how it potentially changes the situation and what situational logics the introduced changes are likely to produce in the long and the short term. It thus becomes a case of examining and understanding viability in relation to the local

reality instead of envisioning a *tabula rasa*⁶⁷ that can be freely overwritten, or conversely expecting and assuming rejection by 'the local.'

As an example Taliban commanders in some areas of Afghanistan have allowed the re-opening of previously closed girls' schools after local re-negotiations of the curriculum to go back to five hours of religious schooling per week rather than two.⁶⁸ This indicates a willingness to accept social change in response to aggregate social pressure from the local communities, but to do it on certain conditions that make it more acceptable to the corporate agent in the prevailing situational logic.

Social institutions are systems of rules within which people deal with one another and tend to change incrementally.⁶⁹ In the context of for example externally driven democratisation processes, the problem of which normative set will win out has largely been wished away by assuming that 'modern Western values' would triumph in the end.⁷⁰ By contextualising externally generated values and resources in the existing social order it is possible to explore how it potentially changes the situation and what situational logics the introduced changes are likely to produce in the long and the short term. It thus becomes a case of examining and understanding viability in relation to the local reality instead of envisioning a *tabula rasa*⁷¹ that can be freely overwritten, or conversely expecting and assuming rejection by 'the local.'

There is however multiple social institutions actuated in any given society. In pluralistic and socially fragmented societies the diversity is likely to be even bigger. The research underlining this framework focused on social interaction in (post-) conflict environments and specifically on the formation of interest groups and social forces and their interaction. It is easy to perceive the agency of the individual as lost here but this is erroneous for two reasons:

Firstly, the individual is present as part of a social agent but is not analytically interesting unless occupying a role. If a project is of such a nature that it affects the local interest formations and dynamics an individual is most likely either part of a primary social agent (resting interest) or a corporate agent (mobilised interest group) and thus part of the framework. As an individual it is of course perfectly possible to act in contradiction to the interest group at any time, but per definition that also means

that they are mobilised by another interest or demobilised in relation to the interest dynamics assessed. Interest groups are not static and nor are the views held by individuals but what is examined here is the formation of, and dynamics between, interest groups affecting social changes. Individuals deciding to remove themselves from an issue are no longer part of the analysis. In the context of wide-spread social conflict however, few individuals are likely to be detached completely from the multitude of interests that exist in any given social environment. The main limitation to understanding the context becomes the question asked rather than the answers available. 'Are you interested in peace?' is likely to generate one answer but can mean anything as could 'would you like clean water?' Actual interest formation begins to surface at questions such as 'what would it mean to you if we built a well on your neighbour's land'? By asking limited or the 'wrong' question, a superficial and largely irrelevant understanding becomes the foundations of strategy.

Secondly, the individual is also represented in the framework as actors occupying roles given meaning socially. This can be any type of leader or function that requires a shared notion of responsibilities and expectations. An actor can make choices that do not conform to the 'script' of the role in the shape of its vested interests, but in doing so also stands to lose the role or change the meaning of it. If no longer fulfilling the socially generated meaning, the actor is no longer occupying the role and is thus largely irrelevant in the immediate analysis.

Social agents

Many societies in the world have some sort of base-line solidarity group in existence. It may not have an impact on daily life but remains in waiting to be actuated by social corporate agents or actors in order to mobilise support. It can be kinship, ideology, or any other notion of shared collectivity under which people are willing to be organised. In many parts of the Balkans, Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, conflicts in recent years have displayed with emphasis that when the state loses its authority and control, networks along socially defined lines that maintain social coherence at localised levels will remain and possibly be exploited as mobilisers. This

gives rise to multiple social orders subject to their own internal competition for influence as well as competition between different interest groups and social forces. Such solidarity groups will sometimes share structural, ideational and institutional




Figure 7

Society organizes into socially generated and defined units. This may be ethnic, tribal, clan, geographical, or similar factors. The solidarity groups will vary in size and while in some cases focused on one area they will in some cases be dispersed. Areas of overlap are potential areas of friction and may be geographical or colliding interests such as for example smuggling routes. National borders are of less concern than social boundaries. There will be social forces/interest groups vying for influence within these communities and some sort of balance will be reached. Any type of intervention, ranging from military invasion to for example building a well, affects this internal relationship and thus the situational logic.

features and in other cases the discrepancies will be very large.

Conflict can in this context be viewed in a number of ways including societal disintegration resulting from a 'post-colonial bunching of people against their will' that leads to separate political entities with few shared ideas of community.⁷² When the 'undergirding structure of shared reality' collapses or fails to materialise, anomie and possibly conflict ensues at the contested fringes of social unity. With the breakdown of a larger unifying system, the smaller components of the system establish a relationship where their interests are competing against one another.

At the centre of conflict is a fundamental clash of images involving the imposition of one's own 'reality' on the 'Other.'⁷³ It is however not necessarily an exclusionist clash between two systems. It can also be viewed as an intersection between them where certain ways of perceiving each other are produced and re-enacted. The representations of social differences are changed or new ones generated,⁷⁴ for better or worse. The result of a fragmentation and lack of cohesion at a central or common

level nevertheless lays the foundations for narrow localised socio-political agendas with restricted ambitions beyond the immediate local context.⁷⁵ While a state will normally claim authority over a territory, a solidarity group will primarily claim authority over persons.⁷⁶

This type of pattern is evident in both cases examined here. In the case of Somaliland, local conflicts around resources are the main generators of instability but have not caused any major conflict at the national level since 1997 despite different sub-state interest groups dominating the national political scene. In South Somalia the Islamist groups as well as those opposing them are largely drawn from geographically and kin-wise close groups. In Afghanistan the fragmentation and years of displacement and conflict have created a situation where local conflicts feed both off and on the larger conflict between the government/ISAF and multiple insurgency networks. In all three areas, it is primarily the solidarity group that forms the basis of organisation and the interests of that group that dictates immediate strategies and priorities. This generates different strategies (situational responses) within what on the surface appears to be common ideological groups.

Locally based Taliban commanders and their fighters protect government projects in some areas while they will attack them⁷⁷ in others. Commanders in some areas have also allowed the re-opening of previously closed girls' schools after local re-negotiations of the curriculum to go back to five hours of religious schooling per week rather than two.⁷⁸ This indicates a willingness to accept some social change in response to aggregate social pressure from the local communities, but to do it on certain conditions that make it more acceptable to the corporate agent in the prevailing situational logic. There is however also other groups within the Taliban network who violently reject the education of women. Different sub-divisions of the insurgency social force network have different local agendas but may still be mobilised in pursuit of a shared but loosely defined goal. The local mobilisation for local issues is nothing new and has been commented on throughout history.⁷⁹

Concepts such as 'civil society' also take on a different meaning in such contexts, as it is in effect multiple social forces that address the state but are separate from it.⁸⁰ In

Afghanistan for example the interpretative space, the social differences, and the uncoordinated influences from international institutions has according to some observers created a confusion surrounding the definition of the role and the composition of 'civil society.'⁸¹ With social forces and interest groups formed around solidarity groups rather than occupational or ideological factors, 'civil society' may exist but under very different conditions than in for example Europe.

Social forces

It is tempting to view social forces in very simplistic terms. The notion of the state as a unitary force vying for influence in competition with other unitary forces makes it much easier to engage and to make simpler plans. A basic assumption of state-centric peacebuilding is that as long as the state increases its influence over a passive population it will eventually 'win.' There are however additional considerations to be made since social forces, including the state, are usually comprised of several different interest groups and thus subject to internal fragmentation and friction.⁸² The interaction between these forces and locally relevant institutions produces enablers and constraints for all parties at all levels. This applies to the state, to insurgencies, and any other type of major social movement or local interest groups. Groups or alliances with a wider interest agenda that span larger areas constitute an influence on a larger scale than strictly localised interest groups and therefore need to be taken into separate account. This is especially true when engaging in liberal style state- or peacebuilding as it affects the viability and legitimacy of the state and its institutions that it has given such a central position in these strategies.

The separation into different social forces necessitates a case-specific understanding of their consistency and durability. Some social forces are nothing more than temporary alliances between smaller interest groups that come together to maximise their impact and influence on a specific issue but that will come apart over time or another issue. Others are more monolithic and exercise well established and consistent control over their sphere of influence for an extended period of time. There are rarely absolute boundaries between the influences of different social forces and it

is not necessarily a case of the population being stuck between competing sides.⁸³ It can instead be seen as local interest groups actualising the structural and ideational characteristics of a social force to gain its support. This perspective crucially acknowledges the agency of the local and its capacity for mobilisation in favour of locally defined interests. As much as it may disappoint the ideologists, the notion of universalism of values takes on a limited or even irrelevant role in such an environment. The meeting between different social forces trigger the situational logic of the local agents and actors but it is their responses that determine whether for example rejection, conflict, co-optation or hybridisation occurs.

A social force can gain 'social mass' through size, capacities, resources, influence, and so forth. This framework makes a distinction between interest groups and social forces where the latter is regarded as clusters or networks of relatively aligned interest groups. The network of interest groups aligned in an alliance and loosely sharing the same end goal generates an aggregate sum of social, economic, and 'cultural' capital⁸⁴ that can be put at the disposal of the mobilising agent or actor at the heart of the social force. The agent is thus able to pursue an agenda of wider social change by virtue of its own social support and capacities originating in the diverse support base. The networks that become social forces can be the outcome of a large number of very diverse transactions of capital, be it of an economic, social, or human nature. The multiple solidarity- and interest- groups available in any given society provide ample opportunities for mobilisation and the success is often determined by the skills of the social agent or actor forming the wider social agenda to maintain loyalty and legitimacy.

For the purposes here social forces are thus understood as interest groups, networks, or even networks of networks that have acquired enough 'social mass' to instigate and force significant social change or exercise significant influence. By examining the constituent and localised parts of a social force it is possible to begin excavating the multiple interests within and thus to examine the range and scope of their interests and motivations. This in turn reveals the localised dynamics and how these relate to the social force network and alliance formations. If engaging with them

it is necessary to understand the motivations behind each social force and their components as well as at what level of 'competition' their aspirations exist. Discussions in terms of national ambitions or loyalties with a locally oriented interest group are largely irrelevant. A more important question is what relationship in the local context triggered the social force actuation and alignment. Having investigated the multiple levels of social interaction and interests a context emerges that has its own social pressures, expectations and thus situational logics. This constitutes the social environment into which an interventionist project enters and where the outcomes of the interaction are forged.

Some of the questions facing any potential social mobilisation are: who can use it, for what purposes, and to what degree of sustainability. Can just anyone mobilise a particular group with for example narratives of 'the Nation,' or is this privilege reserved for an authority recognised by the particular interest groups? In fragmented societies, what does this mean in terms of aspirations and geographical coverage of mobilisation? Can these interest group authority figures be permanently mobilised for a specific wider social agenda, or do they choose their responses on a local-referential basis conforming to the vested interests of themselves in their role and of the collectivity they represent? If representation and mobilisation is local and 'the Nation' is not a sustainable mode of mobilisation that facilitates reconciliation and unity between interest groups, is it then really nationalism or an empty discourse produced in response to the perceived expectations of an external source of resources?

Debiel and Lambach have argued in relation to statebuilding that: '*[l]ocal state-building takes place in hybrid political and societal orders where rival actors of different origin reproduce their power and influence, perform governance functions, or undermine state-building and post-war reconstruction efforts. Their spaces and options for action are shaped by formal and informal institutions, but also through the construction of social realities and the sources of legitimacy that derive from shared mental models.*'⁸⁵ The shared image of the nation as a concept given meaning socially is thus necessary in order to mobilise on a platform of nationalism, a problem shared by political ideologies, ethnic sectarianism, ethnic, and other discourses. Authority

figures are given legitimacy by their capacity to command and control a particular interest group that they represent. They decide, alone or in collective decision formats, on what grounds to allow mobilisation in response to situational pressures. In the process of mobilisation the interests and motivations of mobilised groups can vary wildly and shift with the interest group and its designated actors. Under such circumstances a factor such as ideology is not necessarily a sustainable mobiliser but an instrument that can be used for temporary mobilisation to pursue other goals dressed in the correct discourse. It in no way signals loyalty to a particular cause but allows for a fully pragmatic switching of allegiances in response to perceived changes to the subjective local structural and ideational conditions.

Modes of mobilisation: The state and other social forces

The perspective employed here views the state as only one of several possible social forces trying to exercise a degree of control over a given territory in competition with other forces. Crucially however, interest groups in the population also exert their influence in the opposite direction and thus subject the intentions, agendas, and resources of social forces to pressures in pursuit of their own localised interests. 'Hearts and minds', provision of political goods, and so on, are all sound-bites in the struggle to create a capacity for the state or any other social force to assert dominance. In cases such as Afghanistan the level of fragmentation has reduced the internal coherence of the apparent social forces and in such a pluralistic environment it is more viable to talk about interest groups within social forces rather than social forces themselves. This carries with it the necessity to focus on a lower level of interaction to understand the context within which agents and actors operate and relate their decisions. The reduced level of focus opens for a better understanding of the network formations that become social forces through aggregation.

The state in post-conflict and conflict environments subjected to international intervention is not necessarily one social force vying for control but a network of different groups constituting a created rather than generated state apparatus. Groups within the state can be in competition for control and influence over its different parts

be it a ministry, the armed forces or a provincial appointment.⁸⁶ The state is under such circumstances nominally vying for influence in society but much of the energy is put into asserting control over the state itself (political competition based on representation of support networks) or over attractive parts of the state apparatus (patrimonial competition for resource access). The population may be the prize to be won through influence but the state and any social force formations challenging it have to compete both with established local power structures and an internal fragmentation at the same time. While this internal competition is most often represented as simple corruption, it may be necessary to look at whether there is a state entity at all or a congregation of patrimonial networks intersecting in a constructed and imagined state apparatus. This could be indicative of a socially shared and legitimised image of the role of the state that effectively precludes any externally constructed ideal.

For the purposes here two generalised types of social forces dynamics will be discussed. They are not absolutes but can be viewed as different elements of internal and external relations between a social force and wider society. It should be noted that one or all aspects of social force influence may be present at any time in a society, for example co-existing in geographical separation. In the one extreme the social force is seen as external to society and a resource platform to be accessed and manipulated in the pursuit of locally defined and limited interests and aspirations. The access to the social force or parts of it becomes the end game with resources and power directed back to the local context. In the other extreme a social force is seen as the vehicle for social change or influence, and becomes the site of intense internal competition for control. The capacities of the social force are then directed to this internal competition as well as competition with other social forces. In most cases however the truth falls somewhere in between these formats or be one or both.

Social forces as 'external' to a local context

It could be argued that there is a point when the state no longer is a means to gain wider social control and has become an instrument to instead affect local politics. The

social force, usually the state, is seen as far away physically and psychologically and has lost most or all of its loyalty, influence and support to more narrowly defined solidarity groups.⁸⁷ The same is also true for non-state forces with a wider social agenda. While they, just like the state, may have an explicit goal of domination, the network sub-components such as interest groups vying for internal influence, may treat this as secondary to a local agenda. The aspirations of the interest groups within the social force are in such cases geared towards local politics rather than that of the wider social force. Examples include politicians forcing the location of development projects to their constituencies and feeding patrimonial networks or using the military access of the state or insurgency groups to settle local scores. The 'greater good' in the sense of a bureaucrat working detached from society for the good of all of society does not enter into the equation to any real or substantial degree. In an environment where political and social concerns are formed and pursued on a local basis the assumption of higher order mobilisation is highly questionable. The co-optation or subversion resulting from the meeting of completely different agendas is more than likely to result in a dysfunctional state when its resources are devoted to an array of sub-state aspirations unaligned and disconnected from a society-wide programme.

Influence and co-optation can work in both directions between the social force networks and the solidarity groups. While the former will seek to influence and mobilise the latter, the decision to choose a side will be based on local collective-subjective priorities and concerns. A superimposed state framework that does not relate to legitimised models of power is highly likely to become seen as external to society and subject to local competition. It becomes a shared notion and expectation of sub-state social forces and their solidarity- and support networks that state resources can be appropriated for their own ends. The intents and purposes of the state construct are subverted for use in other agendas for example expressed in patrimonialism.

In heavily fragmented societies it could also be argued that it is the case of local politics being acted out in the national or regional framework. There are strongmen and patrimonial networks competing for influence within the state but the political aim

is not necessarily linked to the state as a social force. The motivation can be local political or even personal issues and while the resources of the state are invited into a local context by some, the authority of the state is kept out.⁸⁸ This type of relationship between society and state occurs when the social influence of the state locally is low or non-existent, but it is possible for the local competing interests to change their local relationships by accessing the state or other social forces as a context-external resource platform.

Social forces as a site of competition

Apart from social forces being treated as resource bases external to the social context there is also the case of them as means to an end, a tool for the purpose of exerting pressure on other social forces on a society-wide scale. In this type of situation the ambitions and agenda of the competing interest groups are for access and control over the means of power and the social force as a vehicle of domination becomes the focal point of a struggle. Control of for example the state does not however constitute control of society or even legitimacy within it. Institutional control merely provides another set of options for the agents and actors concerned and, by extension, changed situational logics for all interest groups. The surface dynamics that exist when a social force becomes a site of competition are quite the same as it is between parties and social groups in any system.

When social organisation occurs along strong identity lines and with strong stakeholders involved, political competition is a very intense process. The perceived stakes are often associated with survival and security discourses and the outcome thus takes on a completely different importance than the often more mundane issues of more affluent environments. The perception and prospect of domination by a competing group produces a security lens through which every action is viewed. The formalised means of political competition are thus incentivised towards ensuring domination and access for one's own solidarity group or social force network through the structures of power, but also to neutralise the influence and power of other groups. Political competition ranges from using measures such as gender quotas to increase interest

group representation, via manipulation and voter fraud, to direct violence and mobilisation.

While the idea of limited representation at the state level is not unique to this type of environment, the directionality of the state is. In many state polities there is an expected balance between the interests of local constituencies and the 'good of all.' In environments of high social competition and interest groups, the struggle between competing survival strategies easily centres on directing the state resources to the protection and benefit of the immediate solidarity-group through repression of others, rather than the 'good of all.' The fragmented nature of social control in such circumstances denies wider sustainable mobilisation.⁸⁹ Support for the central state can be bought but can conversely also be just as easily lost to opposition or a competing social force. The support of the central state can also make local interest groups dependent on it for survival; but, while this may be true in a situation where the only major social force is the state, it is not true where multiple strong social forces are present. Thus if support runs out, or if your local rivals also find their own backers, there may be other sources to be explored like an insurgency network or even other states. In Afghanistan competing local shuras have been known to align themselves with the central government or the insurgency respectively or sometimes even both at the same time.

The meeting of 'the local' and external intervention

It does not matter where an interventionist projects occurs, it will be operating in the social and political environment provided by locally existing circumstances and conditions. A major international intervention into all tiers of society, both military and civilian, off-sets the situational logic for all but in different ways. It is important to understand both the local context and how the different interest groups relate to and affect the outcomes of this. Archer discusses the aspects of situational responses by social agents, but the nature of international intervention forces sudden and substantial changes in the basic elements of institutional and interest formation. It also potentially introduces external social forces with their own designs of domination over

local interests and interest groups in pursuit of a 'national' agenda, for example in terms of 'state-building.'

Internalising external social influences

Social systems are in varying degrees open to outside influence, and thus not socially atomistic, because they are peopled. Constituting 'parts' exist independently but are realised by social agents who mediate the effect and shape they have.⁹⁰ The discrepancies between what goods are available and actualised for the production and reproduction of situational logics creates problems when attempting to introduce sudden and extensive change from the outside. Intended to provide in some way within the target environment, but based on situational logics belonging to a completely different environment, interventionist project implementation will often adjust only where the situation offers obvious resistance such as violence or threats, thus shaping the situational logic of the project in a specific direction. In addition, adjustment often consists of abandoning a set of norms or goals rather than mediating them with locally held perceptions and values.

The assumptions of 'universality' absolve the interventionist from having to engage with the local reality as values and 'solutions' can supposedly be freely transposed and imposed. This however separates the project from what the locally produced situational logics allow local agents to do and results in a disconnect that reduces its relevance and viability. It becomes subject to the local reality as a confrontational external influence and a challenge to 'the local.' Silence (non-opposition) or discursive adaptation (usually by accommodating elites) is taken as evidence of acceptance and sustainability. In reality however modes of resistance are employed more or less overtly to pursue interests under the situational logics produced by the change in conditions, altering the intended outcomes of the intervention. If a function or value is not internalised there is no sustainability and when the external influence and pressure is removed it will disappear or remain in a locally shaped and defined format as an unintended outcome.

The non-atomistic nature of societies means that both internal and external influences come together through actualisation by agents to shape how a society develops. However, the influence exerted by interventions through aid, coercion or force represents a completely different type of influence as it is introduced rather than socially actuated. A social context is thus presented with a *de facto* change in conditions rather than initiating it through normal social mechanisms. New material conditions are introduced from the outside that can change the patterns of dominance and balance in a society in a brief span of time but rarely the underlying modes of mobilisation and interest formations. Ideational goods introduced in a short time frame and actualised by an interest group or social force will also affect the interrelations between different social agents as well as the structures and roles present but just like changes to the material conditions it will be subject to the existing social dynamics. Whatever the nature and the scope of an interventionist project, the local interest groups have to adapt and re-adjust to the changes in conditions. The position taken here is that the more drastic the change in terms of social incongruence and time allowed, the more likely it is to generate tumultuous expressions of adjustment.

The outcomes of intervention are just like any social change: unpredictable and there will be the unintended consequence of social interactions. In a relatively homogenous society it is perhaps easier to make more sweeping assumptions than in a context like Afghanistan where a lack of sustainable social cohesion at a country-wide level and a substantial weakening of traditional social institutions and structures in some areas have resulted in a fragmented web of multiple and very different social orders. Though usually less substantial, interventions into narrowly defined contexts follow the same logic; so the building of a well or the location of an irrigation canal may generate new conflicts between local interest groups as has been the case in Somalia,⁹¹ as well as in Afghanistan.⁹²

External influences that align with the interests of particular groups are inherently conducive to change since the alignment upsets the balance or undermines the distribution of resources, although not necessarily in line with the original intentions.

Thus it may for instance be profitable for certain groups with access to exploit any connection with distributors of foreign aid⁹³ or military support which opens possibilities for that group that is not available to others. The situational logic of the rival agents and actors is changed in accordance with this change in resource distribution.

Regardless of the intentions behind an intervention, the influx of new resources will change the situational logic for the social agents involved. While there may certainly be social agents trying to implement a fair and effective distribution of aid, there will also be social agents trying to do the opposite: to monopolise and control the new resources in accordance with more narrowly defined interests. The prospect of this seems likely to increase in an environment dominated for a long time by the logics of survival. With the introduction of external resources into a conflict situation, food aid can also be turned into a weapon by taking control of it and its distribution. It can serve to purchase support, create personal riches, and also to punish non-conforming social interest groups.⁹⁴ The symmetry of a social conflict can be altered by providing support for one faction or the other but if one side receives support, other local interest groups may feel compelled to turn to other sources in order to be able to maintain their influence.

There is also a substantial risk that the sudden injection of externally cultivated subjective understandings will produce rejection and opposition as it competes with locally held beliefs. There is a difference between for example long-term soft social influence as opposed to trying to set up a new political system based on externally framed values in a couple of years. The less time that is given for an existing social system to internalise external influences, the less likely it is to merge positively. By not understanding a particular social context it becomes very easy to alienate people even on a simple issue that in reality is a shared concern. Ideational goods are in a high degree dependent on their actualisation by agents. This means that values and norms need to be legitimised and internalised in order to gain any hold in a society, a process that is generally incremental and slow.⁹⁵ Over the long term this is normal influence, but radical ideational change such as forced liberalisation over the short term is likely

to have tumultuous effects⁹⁶ or at the very least meet with a certain level of resistance and co-optation.

Situational logics

The situational logics facing social agents and actors are generated within the constraints of material conditions and ideational and structural institutions. The actuated institutions shape the situational logics, but the situational logics also shape what institutions can be actuated. This is affected by outside influences in a number of ways ranging from a long-term soft influence to a sudden and huge impact such as an invasion or massive aid influx. The social reality that has been generated by 'the local' is thus altered in unexpected ways by an external influence offering new avenues for change. Yet external forces, while altering the situational logics, are also simultaneously subject to the context into which they intervene. Existing conditions and the external influx interact to produce new situational logics. In strongly pluralistic societies, the picture is further complicated by the presence of a multitude of ideational and thus institutional varieties, creating not only a conflict over present institutions but also between institutions and ideas. This reduces the degree of possible generalisations to a very local and narrowly defined level.

Intervention may offset, destabilize, or even repress social structural and ideational conditions, but while material conditions can be off-set easily, structural and ideational goods are socially shared and produced, thus taking time to change. An example of this would be the sustainability of sub-clans in Somalia as the primary unit of solidarity and interest formation after the long and intense repressive 'reforms' of Siyaad Barre. It is more likely that pre-existing conditions will remain and exert their own influence on the externally produced and introduced ideational and material conditions, than it is likely that they will be completely replaced by external projects. Even when the outcomes of a project are 'positive' it is likely an unintentional effect as expectations of implementers and recipients are tied in with their own agendas rather than with a programme design⁹⁷ and dependent on social actualisation, internalisation, and interaction.

Interventionist strategies work on primarily two different levels referred to here as the 'benign' and the 'confrontational.' The benign refers to the type of external projects that have no intention of affecting local stability but, usually out of ignorance and naiveté, do so with varying effects. However well-meaning the intentions of a particular project are, a negative outcome is largely the result of a refusal, un-interest, or incapacity to perform a contextually relevant consequence analysis. Thus as mentioned, while building a new well may seem harmless and benign it may spark local rivalry and violence depending on its location and exclusivity. Also, as has been the case in Somalia, it may change the nomadic patterns and thus lead to the long-term erosion of grazing land, land encroachment, and increased conflict propensity between still nomadic groups and those that decided to settle in a previously communal area. In Afghanistan the well-intended Helmand Valley Project reduced productivity by 50 per cent per annum for the duration of 13 years due to flooding of the farmland. 7000 nomads were also encouraged to settle on what turned out to be useless land around Lashkar Gah.⁹⁸ The examples of such unintended but contextually predictable outcomes is very long.

In addition to the benign there are the cases of directly confrontational projects. Included in this is everything that actively seeks to change or transform the social environment militarily or by economic and other means. In the case of both Somalia and Afghanistan this has been employed as an active strategy with the state and other social forces seeking to use local struggles to gain representation and allies for their agendas. In Somalia, Barre for example sought to mobilise some clans against predominantly the Isaaq in the North. The United States has similarly allied itself with specific groups in both Somalia and Afghanistan who understand how to employ the counter terrorism and counter insurgency discourses to their benefit. In Afghanistan the current government, just like every ruler or government since before Ahmad Shah Durrani, has sought to enlist the help of some groups against others. The outcome in many of these cases has been that local rivals have sought out the support of social forces in opposition in order to reset the local balance of power and dominance off-set by outside intervention. The possibility of co-optation at all levels by all aspects of

interest groups, not just designated 'spoilers', is facilitated by the view of target populations as passive victims⁹⁹ and seems to be largely overlooked by 'externals' of all types whether military or civilian. Based on the framework the sequence of peacebuilding intervention changing local context conditions can be described as a chain of:

- a) an influx of external resources changing the distribution, access-routes, and mobilisation potential for social agents leading to;
- b) the formation of new corporate agents from the primary agents, and the reconstitution and adjusting of existing corporate agents and relationships;
- c) the actuation of new or reconstitution of old structural and ideational institutions (actually or discursively) in order to meet the demands of the external providers of resources (for example democratisation¹⁰⁰) that will be;
- d) generating roles that allow for the access of these resources or pursuit of interests (democratic reform, economic gain, control of the state) which;
- e) become a new focus of competition between agents and actors, often in social force networks, with vested interests or the intention of attaining access to these resources¹⁰¹ for locally defined objectives, leading to;
- f) a likely morphogenesis to an *unintended format* of social structures and ideational conditions such as dysfunctional democratic institutions running on patrimonial principles.

This summary account of a potential chain of interaction and evolution of a social system is of course a simplified 'ideal' for demonstrative purposes. In reality, the reaction of vested interest groups will range between being eliminated and replaced by something new or seeking to eliminate the outside influences. Any and all responses are possible and while based on the situational logic in their own context, it does not necessarily have to be in line with it. With that said it is the situational logic and choices of the agent/actor that is of interest, not what the outside observer perceives to be the 'rational choice.' Popular groups have been known to organise around the principle of maintaining their difference in the context of 'existing constraints' in order to not be swept away by the forces of 'modernisation.'¹⁰² This

type of self-aware resistance to outside influence is likely to increase the more there is a perceived confrontation with local ideational and material interests threatened by the outside influences.

Subversion and co-optation

Just short of open resistance is co-optation and subversion¹⁰³ which can be framed in terms of a response to a demand from an international order for conversions to 'fashionable notions' of liberalisation, pluralism, democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, and structural adjustments, all in order to secure foreign aid.¹⁰⁴

No society is fully homogenous in its ideas and opinions and there is always the possibility of finding people who will in word or action correspond to the ideals held by an outside agent. This can be done by for example 'producing' them over time in the context of a project and thus validating it, or by empowering and validating local actors if they acknowledge the 'superiority' of imported knowledge technology and 'modern' lifestyles.¹⁰⁵ While it may be the case that specific social agents believe in the ideological positions they claim, it may well also be a means of gaining support. There are a number of problems related to this and it raises the question how contextual knowledge and understanding is generated when the views and priorities of the general local population should matter more than the views of small and select elites.¹⁰⁶ Strategy based on an over-estimated level of representation will not only be misdirected and disconnected from reality but is likely to serve one specific group or network of groups that have learned how to discursively access the offered resources and support. It should be stressed that the use of terminology such as 'subversion' and 'co-optation' is not employed here in a strictly negative sense. A 'spoiler' is only an agent or an actor that frustrates the interests of one or more interest groups. It is a subjective label that indicates dissent but dismisses its validity and thus ignores what it potentially means for outcomes. The terminology as used here refers to the frustration of the intents of the interventionist project, usually to the benefit of a social agent or actor and possibly though not necessarily at the expense of others.

The increasingly important role of the state in international peacebuilding is a direct example of a potential avenue of subversion. Outside agent(s) build institutions and 'local capacity' in a pattern modelled on an ideal state. A number of ministerial functions are set up and allocated funds to perform to externally generated and defined expectations and benchmarks, 'assisted' by deeply embedded international technical 'experts.' The situational logics presented to the social agents in such a case thus relate to *de facto* created institutions that represent avenues of access to resources and/or power. While these may of course represent an opportunity for the disenfranchised to change social structures in their favour, it can also be a means by which the elites can preserve the status quo. By (mis-) representing values and expectations attached to the resources it becomes possible to access them.¹⁰⁷ The new set of institutions has changed the conditions but not the priorities or modes of mobilisation of the social agents involved.

The result is basically *pseudo-institutions* that are there in name but fill no real or alternatively a changed function from its intended role. It may be the case, as Chabal and Daloz have argued, that some states have never been properly institutionalised and separated from society,¹⁰⁸ but this assumes conformity to the externally defined plan and format on the part of the local societies. Per definition, it denies the agency and the capacity for self-evolutionary moves towards a self-defined format of local structures and institutions. Viewing it from the perspective taken here it is rather the case that the institutions introduced to these societies are not in touch with the prevailing material and ideational conditions. The situational logics assumed in the intended functions of for example state institutions are discarded for situational responses generated by the actual contextual demands. The institutions are there in name but not in their externally presumed functions and have been co-opted by certain interest groups. In this process they have been given a new meaning in their local context as either external to society or sites of competition, or both. They may thus be technically working but under the contextual redefinition given to them by for example patrimonial networks, having been captured by social forces¹⁰⁹ or interest groups. Public employment is exploited as a private resource¹¹⁰ and as part of a socially

tolerated form of power, accepted and expected by all agents engaging in contest for the resources.

Social struggles are however not simply about who controls the state; they take place in multiple arenas of domination in which parts of the state may be a single social force in its own right in a field of, at times, conflicting social forces¹¹¹ or even competing locally with interest groups. The situation of 'weak states' is an obvious illustration where a central state is incapable of projecting authority across its territory but aspects of the state may have considerable local dominance.

It is very easy for an interventionist party to become just another interest group in competition over ideas or power either directly or through proxies, and the external agent and its proxy are thus perceived as stake-holding competitors in the local context. The retribution killings and ethnic cleansings perpetrated by returning Kosovar Albanians against Kosovar Serbs and Romani in the wake of military NATO intervention¹¹² seemed to take the intervening forces completely by surprise as the internationally perceived agenda of the Kosovar Albanians was a discourse of victimisation and wanting to return without repression. While this was undoubtedly true for a vast majority of the repressed Kosovars, there was a demonstrably more sinister agenda shared by some. This example displays with exceptional clarity the potentially fickle nature of perceived bonds when it comes to intervention alliances but also how a skilled social agent can manipulate external resources in order to influence the internal dynamics and situational logics of a conflict. Similar manipulation has occurred for example in relation to American support to individual power-holders in Afghanistan where previously ousted warlords have been re-instated and gradually gained independence from their pay-masters to expand their control in illicit and legit markets.

There is no guarantee that social agents and actors will accept new institutions and they may simply be the sphere where a small and exclusive elite of intellectuals share or pretend to share particular values while a majority of the population finds no legitimacy in the new system for a variety of reasons. This is best described as the result of discrepancies between value-sets where the elite represent radical reform of

some sort that lacks support from the wider population. The nature of the ideology in question is of less importance as a reform that clashes with socially shared notions and values is likely to meet with resistance. In Bosnia the democratisation process effectively turned into two separate states when it became impossible to reconcile the two major entities into one state, arguably legitimising and serving the interests of those pursuing ethnically separate enclaves. In Afghanistan, domestic reform steps taken by Afghan rulers throughout history in a Kabul increasingly detached from the demands and expectations of general society, have repeatedly met with violent resistance.¹¹³

Conclusions

This chapter has provided a lens through which to examine social interest formations. It has outlined how interests and situational logics form in social contexts and how they interact with external interventionist projects to produce unintended outcomes. In order to understand the social context we need to focus on a number of factors such as ideational and material conditions, actuated roles and institutions, and modes of mobilisation for social agents and social forces. This allows us to not only understand how it relates to intervention but also at what level the relevant social interactions that determine outcomes take place.

When stepping away from the assumptions of the strategies and literature in Chapter one it becomes possible to open an alternative route to understanding the social dynamics of interest groups, social forces, and interventionist projects. By reducing all social agents, actors, and social forces to subjects of very similar situational logics, the focus is shifted from how to overcome the challenges to one social force, such as the state, in order to conform the rest, to understanding how the situational logics develop that are facing all agents and actors. Because of the meeting of diverse and shifting interests, this interaction will produce largely unintended outcomes. In the end, the difference between social agents and social forces is one of potential and of aspirations. A social agent is an interest group with limited capacities

for impact and aspirations. A social force has wider aspirations and has acquired sufficient social mass to pursue them.

We now turn our attention to the cases of Somaliland, Somalia, and Afghanistan in order to examine their social composition through this lens. The cases are intended to provide illustrative examples of the different local dynamics present in these societies and are not context analyses in the specific sense employed in this thesis. They are rather a mix between wide descriptive accounts of the actuated ideational and material conditions, and a series of snapshots of social interaction seen in relation to the factors identified in the framework as relevant.

Chapter Three – Somalia and Somaliland: In the Shade of the Meeting Tree

There is a Somali saying that translates as: *The prolonged presence of peacemakers in your camp is a curse*. This seems increasingly and uncannily true in relation to the international effort to bring peace and democracy to Somalia. It does not however mean that the lack of peaceful progress in the South or the recent political deadlock in Somaliland are solely attributable to either the Somalis or the international community, but that these unintended outcomes are the result of the interaction between the different influences and interests they represent. Part of the problem is an internationally repeated perception of Somalia as a general state of anarchy when in fact it is the site of multiple social orders maintaining different aspects of governance,¹ and where a wide array of localised interests are represented. The external resources have, in general terms, not been distributed in relation to this but have rather tried to forge a zero-sum end-state out of a series of misperceptions. Another part of the problem is that Somalia is an environment that has conditioned survival strategies for so long that the pattern is established, internalised, and not easily changed. It subjects external influences rather than conforms to them.

This said there are also indications of some change taking place within the established situational logics driven by Somalis and on Somali conditions at a relevant level. This chapter discusses aspects of Somali social context formation but focuses mainly on the self-declared republic of Somaliland in the north-western part of Somalia.² Somaliland has managed to transform from civil war between sub-clans into a multi-party democracy with a high degree of peace, largely on its own. Though there are residual problems, the difference in comparison with the South is striking. This chapter aims to provide an understanding of how interest groups are formed, how mobilisation occurs, how situational logics are shaped in the Somali context, and how it mediates external pressure.

Actuated institutions and roles

Situational logics develop in response to the conditions and influences provided by the environment and institutional actuation. Somalia largely consists of strong interest

groups formed by a long history of war, displacement, and natural disasters. A tradition of nomadic lifestyle and increased fragmentation in combination with a scarcity of resources has generated logics of survival that resonate in all levels of politics. There are a number of factors in Somali society that exert a strong influence over the social and political environment. These serve to shape and form the situational logics facing all social actors and agents, and while many could be pointed to, a few factors stand out as having exceptional influence in Somali social interaction.

Guurti and shir

The two most important roles in the Somali context are the elders, especially when actualised as a *guurti*, and religious representatives such as *sheikhs*. *Guurti* is a cross-clan gathering of elders for deliberations and fills an important role in Somali socio-political dynamics. The role of an elder is inherited³ and traditionally the intended heir would be trained for the role from an early age.

Immediately after the Somali National Movement's (SNM) victory in the North in 1991, and during the subsequent relapses into conflict, the *guurti* acted as *ad hoc* local governments. They administered justice, mediated in disputes, managed militias, raised revenue and dealt with the international organisations active in their respective areas.⁴ The role of a clan elder is not the same as a chief. The structure is more horizontal than hierarchical, a relationship mainly expressed through the internal clan *shir* (councils) where all adult males can speak on economic and political affairs.⁵ The elder-system is stronger when the state is weak⁶ but while there are levels of authority within it, these are more functions of representation and negotiation than direct authority.⁷ This notion of not giving too much power to one man is explicitly present in Somali social metaphors indicating that if you do he will gather camels (mounted fighters) and go looking for more.⁸

Religion

Religion is an all-present feature but not necessarily as a political cause. Religion is a 'veil lightly worn'⁹ in both Somalia and Somaliland though adherence to religious codes

and lifestyle choices is socially expected. The widely shared institutions produced in the context of religion in Somalia are a moderate *shariica* (sharia) and Islamic codes of conduct that are deeply embedded within society.¹⁰ These are partly challenged in the South by more hard-line interpretations and influences. Most Somali respondents interviewed during the research brought up religion as a primary source of identity, but Islam has never been a sustainable political mobiliser in Somalia particularly not in Somaliland. The religious authority is important and *shariica*¹¹ is not just a moral code or an influence on the judicial system. It can rather be seen as one of three actual judicial principles that are in practise in Somaliland today, the other two being secular law and *xeer*. The role of the religious man is thus potentially highly political if actuated by the parties to a conflict. *Shariica* is a constant influence and is constantly actuated by lawmakers, elders, and other agents and actors in Somaliland,¹² and has a central role in the Islamist courts in the South.

Social codes and practises

There are several frameworks of law and governance that have been introduced by the governments of Somalia and Somaliland respectively. The weak nature of their implementation capacities however means that that they are easily rivalled and even surpassed by socially established and legitimised institutions. Foremost among these is the *xeer* which refers to the customary unwritten legal framework that regulates the reciprocal behaviour between clans of a specific area dependent on the deliberations of elders.¹³ In the absence of centralised institutions, *xeer* has been part of a system where kinship and collective social institutions has aided in preserving relative order by defining collective rights and responsibilities.¹⁴ It is largely responsive with almost no pro-active capacity but is based on a commitment to transparency and good faith.¹⁵ *Xeer* is a dynamic concept, evolving through interpretation and adaptation, but the civil war in the 1990s presented situations beyond its capacity. Apart from the rejection of clan authority and impunity by some militias, there simply was no precedent for the scale of crimes and violations of social norms perpetrated in the war.¹⁶

The war with its mass displacements and refugee camps added additional stress to the pastoral environment and traditional social support structures as it is the clan that provides in times of hardship.¹⁷ Settlement patterns both in the rural and urban areas largely follow sub-clan or sub-sub-clan lines,¹⁸ and by extension so too does resource distribution, access, and control. This is the case in both Hargeisa¹⁹ and for example Mogadishu, where there is a social status division between pastoralist and craftsmen, geographical between different parts of the city, and a separation between different lineages.²⁰ Consequently conflict, security, and social expectations are generated at this level as well. Returning refugees and other Diaspora groups create pressure on the territorial possession of the sub-clan and social friction. For example a major stress-point and source of conflict is the higher levels of permanent settlements which have included the almost unchecked proliferation of waterholes. With the establishment of permanent water supplies the seasonal rotation that allowed the grazing land to recover is removed. As increasing numbers settle down and more land traditionally seen as communal is encroached upon conflicts increase. Any state attempt to regulate the proliferation both of waterholes and conflict is hampered by the lack of capacity by the formal judicial system. Instead, conflicts are often settled by or in cooperation with local authority figures like elders,²¹ or through religious arbitration.

Land-based conflicts concerning grazing and water access rights are the main conflict generators and a point of competition between the traditional nomadic structures and the often illegal privatization of grazing lands and water.²² The exclusivity of the illegal land-enclosure will often be defended by force and can cause wider inter-clan conflict to erupt. One respondent suggested that as a result, the spirit of cooperation and collective responsibility previously present is increasingly being replaced by individualism, greed, mistrust, and competition.²³ Though the move towards individual interests is seen as a positive by some, there is also concern what will happen if the influence of the elders weakens further.²⁴ Traditionally, interests are pursued as clan interests in a reciprocal relationship²⁵ to avoid conflict and facilitate distributive patterns. Land used to be divided among the clan by the *diya*-group but is now increasingly 'hegemonised by those with money.'²⁶

The increased focus on individual ownership has generated conflicts within clans and families.²⁷ Deeds are sold for land that traditionally comes under the control of a specific sub-clan. Such deeds will often not be recognised locally and the state does not have the capacity to enforce them.²⁸ There is a fear of such conflicts gaining momentum and spreading through the clan structures, widening beyond the localised rural nature it originates in and into the population centres.²⁹ That said, in comparison with the situation during the civil war however, local conflicts in both Somaliland and Somalia tend to be relatively short, geographically restricted, and with low costs in lives and damage to property,³⁰ mainly thanks to traditional social institutions and roles.

Modes of Mobilisation

The social network structures in Somalia generally do not conform to a Northern European understanding of social and political interaction. The sub-clan is the predominant social format and traced through the male lineage,³¹ and while other types of alliances appear these are often temporary and influenced by sub-clan affiliation or, for example, inter-marriage. Alliance building tends to be a response to the immediate circumstances³² and is fragile in nature.

Clans

Political and social actuation and mobilisation predominantly occur along the lines of the sub-clans and the institutional logic plays out in the social interaction between these interest groups. It has sometimes been claimed that the sub-clans have lost their importance³³ but even a cursory examination of for example settlement patterns and local conflict resolution casts shadows of doubt over this. Political allegiance and identity start with the immediate family, then the immediate lineage, and then the clan family.³⁴ This pattern of mobilisation has been evident in the resurgence of violence in Somaliland during the 1990s³⁵ and continues to have a political role today. This does however not stop a social agent or actor from refusing to actuate these

institutions by conscious choice. Such a decision however also carries socially generated consequences.

In Somaliland the residual authority of traditional institutions and structures have been able to constrain conflict and negotiate peace. They also supplement the state in the periphery without challenging it to any larger degree at the centre. This may well be related to the incapacity of the state to issue a realistic and sustainable authority claim to challenge the local authorities, therein reducing the necessity of confrontation. The relapses into war between 1991 and 1997 were often tied to the ambitions of the state colliding with locally formed interests; so as long as that does not happen, the need for demarcation is not really there. In the South the image is more complex but the social structures of clan are utilised by all to mobilise interest group formations and by extension generate social forces through network formations.

Religion

The strict adherence to Islamic rules is easily observed in the everyday life³⁶ but this does not equate to mobilisation in pursuit of a shared, religiously defined, interest. There is little deep political and radical Islamism in Somaliland and even the Southern Islamist networks are comprised of multiple interest groups with diverse interests and modes of mobilisation.³⁷ Their popularity and following is more the result of a series of responses to the social situation than a coherent ideological conviction. Foreign extreme Islamist elements including *Wahhabi* groups are trying to exert ideational pressure in for example Hargeisa³⁸ and several madrasas funded by external money have been established. The Somaliland state is seeking ways to control them³⁹ but it is unclear how successful this actually is. The pragmatic and fickle approach to alliances, the clannism, and the ability to draw outsiders into local feuds have generated an environment where the situational logics are shifting constantly. These situational logics have previously presented disincentives for example for international jihadist groups to establish themselves permanently.⁴⁰

The *shariica* courts of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in South Somalia maintained an enforcement capacity and enjoyed popular support in 2006 because of their ability to

create an element of security.⁴¹ Though their Islamist agenda gave the *sheikhs* a greater power than is traditionally the case, the ICU drew their cohesion and mobilisation capacity largely from their *Hawiye* kinship ties.⁴² The foundations of each individual court in the network were most often a coalition of clan elders, intellectuals, businessmen, and *sheikhs*.⁴³ The pastoral tradition of Somalia has imbued society with a pragmatic outlook on situational logics as a matter of survival.⁴⁴ Ideology thus takes on a subdued role in politics and in social mobilisation.

Political ideology

There are three political parties in Somaliland but in reality parliamentary politics can be said to largely reflect the shifts in interests and alliances between the three largest sub-clans of the *Isaaq* clan-family. There are only three parties allowed in an attempt to limit the number of parties rather than let party politics reflect the extremely pluralistic nature of society through candidate proliferation. As a result, no party is allowed that is based on clannism or religious ideology,⁴⁵ but there is nevertheless a distinct element of clan affiliation at least among party supporters that sometimes lead to physical confrontation when clan and politics mix in the streets.⁴⁶ The original intention of having a new party vetting process to determine which three were the biggest with every election has gradually been discarded. Instead, the same three parties are now asserting themselves in the role as the only ones allowed.⁴⁷ Neighbouring Puntland has recently decided to adopt a similar party system in an attempt to force broader political coalitions between the sub-clans⁴⁸ on which governance rests.

The Somaliland House of Representatives is an elected body consisting of representatives coming from these three allowed parties⁴⁹ while the upper House of Guurti has 82 voting members who are nominated from different clans for a six-year term.⁵⁰ They are chosen by their clans which supposedly strengthen the ties between local clan politics and national politics. The explicit intention to link local and national politics however also makes it increasingly difficult to separate the two when pursuing any type of 'the good of all' agenda. Members of the house are to consult with

‘traditional heads of the communities’ when advising the government,⁵¹ thus providing a direct link to, but also for, localised interests. While this contributes to the domination of socio-political orders over the state, it is arguably also a reflection of a locally held perception of how politics should play out.

There is at least discursively an on-going project of formal decentralization of the Somaliland state but there has been little progress despite widespread support.⁵² This is in part because of an unclear definition of what the term will mean in the specific context. Yet this process is considered important because of the historical experience with the highly centralized Mogadishu regime of Barre, as well as in respect to local socio-political structures. Potential issues that could cause conflict include taxation and equity, both of which are subject to clan-politics and risk being exacerbated by a serious decentralization of government. The balancing of clan interests at both the local and the national level is perceived as an obstacle to deepening the democratisation transition,⁵³ but given the degree of clan-related politics at the state centre and the explicit linking of the upper house with traditional society, this concern seems somewhat redundant. The question is rather whether a decentralisation would not reduce the national implications of localised interests and politics.

Modes of mobilisation: Social Agents

The quintessential interest group within the sub-clan is the *diya*-paying group. The concept of *diya* can be translated as blood-payment that traditionally was made in livestock or goods but with changing settlement patterns and urbanisation can now also be made in cash.⁵⁴ The *diya* group can consist of clans, sub-clans, or sub-sub clans⁵⁵ depending on the size of the particular group. There is a point at which the group is too large to be a viable political unit and the *diya*-group is politically very significant. *Diya* is a particularly important social institution in the absence of a capable state as the *diya*-group provides both insurance and security. It is important to note however that since clan strength is a factor in *diya*, equality before the law is also subject to the relative strength of the parties involved and the mediators. There are also no insurance companies in Somalia and should someone accidentally cause harm

to property or someone else, the principle of *diya* provides the foundation for settling the issue. In order to be able to meet such a payment the individual is dependent on the *diya*-paying group whose members are bound to assume collective responsibility. The socially mobilised individual is thus presented with a situational logic shaped by the context which provides a strong incentive to maintain the connection to the social agent rather than act independently even on smaller issues.

Within the immediate framework of the *diya*-group there is no room for individual interests⁵⁶ and pursuing them produces conflicts and dissent within the group. This weakness can provide incitements for other social agents to move against the interests of the *diya*-group which discourages but does not prevent internal dissent. Similarly the *diya*-group provides social benefits such as economic support if livestock dies, or the starting capital of a newly married couple.⁵⁷ Membership in the *diya*-group carries obligations and protection but also accountability and policing where none is available.

An example of the *diya* principle in effect was the clan-based *deydey* groups that established themselves as local governments in the wake of the civil war. These groups largely preyed on other clans⁵⁸ and enjoyed an uneasy support from their own *diya*-groups as they also functioned as a protective militia.⁵⁹ As the banditry grew worse, the *diya* function turned the *deydey* into a liability and it thus came to a point where they had to be stopped in order to protect the interests of the respective clans. At the 1993 Borame Conference, the *deydey*'s political power was replaced by nominated local authorities⁶⁰ and their military capacity was countered by their own elders. Where there was non-compliance it sometimes turned into such extreme measures as the *deydey* leader being eliminated to protect the clan.⁶¹ To a degree the proliferation of responsibility of security in clan-specific areas after 1991⁶² may have set the stage for the *deydey*, but the same principles of collective responsibility also rectified this.

Social agents: cross-clan alliances

There are examples of cross-clan alliances in Somalia and Somaliland but they are not sustainable social mobilisation of unity as much as they are alliances of strength to address specific issues in line with specific interests. Businessmen have for example

shown a capacity for temporary cross-cutting alliances to influence the political or security situation in favour of economic stability. In Somaliland they contributed to the costs of peace processes⁶³ and provided channels of communication between warring clans.⁶⁴ In the South they have among other things hired militiamen for protection but also as a bid to demobilise the non-governmental militias.⁶⁵ In 1999 leading Mogadishu businessmen decided to stop paying taxes to warlords and instead support the *shariica* courts which has been described as ‘a watershed moment’⁶⁶ in terms of social order.

The Diaspora and other social interest groups of Somaliland took on a significant supportive role in the shape of aid and investments in the peace processes of the 1990s. When neither the government or opposition parties in the violence of 1995 were interested in coming to the negotiating table, the Diaspora initiated a Peace Committee for Somaliland which would be disbanded as soon as the parties committed to dialogue.⁶⁷

Concepts such as ‘civil society’ that have a prominent role in international discourse are also interesting in relation to modes of mobilisation in Somalia, if primarily because in the Somali context they are so different from external expectations. The concept as such is completely imported and local NGO’s have according to some observers generally been ‘clan-based, have incompletely understood the concept of civil society’ and mainly pursued income-generation for themselves.⁶⁸ While this breaks with the internationally pursued concept of civil society, it is also arguably the direct outcome of discrepancies between different models of organisation and social accountability held by local and international agents and actors. It does not however mean that society is not providing a check on the state, but it is less to keep it ‘in line’ than to assert a level of autonomy towards it.

Social agents: Bahawen – Women as a sixth clan?

Another type of alliance that has displayed capacity for mobilisation and influence is that of women. Women are the majority in the Somaliland electorate at 55%⁶⁹ and there are now a larger number of female-headed households. The gender-related division of labour in Somali society is reinforced by a machismo honour-code⁷⁰ but

there are an increased number of female breadwinners.⁷¹ The exclusion of women from the decision-making process is recognised as a problem in the Somaliland constitution and there is an active discussion of the subject. Respondents of both genders indicated a conviction that women need to be included⁷² in the political process but that it requires a context-specific approach and discussion. It was argued that it needs to be framed in a *Quranic* and traditional framework within which the debate on gender roles can be held.⁷³ One (male) respondent described the exclusion of women from the decision making process as ‘a contribution to retardation’ but also saw the ‘Western’ strategies as incompatible with local society.⁷⁴ Barre’s ‘Scientific Socialism’ also employed the gender discourse which led to the association of gender issues with oppression and opposition to the traditional.⁷⁵ The word gender thus has locally held connotations that provoke suspicion and wariness.

There is also a conceptual issue in international strategies that see women as separate from society or at the very least as a common group with permanent shared interests and, in the context of ‘development’, as victims.⁷⁶ This perspective completely ignores women as part of society sharing not only its norms and traditions, but also often the interests of their own solidarity groups.⁷⁷ The role of women in Somali society is complex and Somali women have a dual allegiance through their ties to the clans of both their father and their husband. This has made it possible for them to act as messengers between clans in times of conflict and to exert a dual pressure,⁷⁸ but conversely also makes them subject to suspicion of possible treachery.⁷⁹ The role of women is tied in with sometimes contradictory clan interests.⁸⁰

Women in pastoral societies should be contextualised as actors inhabiting roles with certain socially defined and generated functions and interests whose strategies are channelled by ‘*cultural values, resources, and choices available in the social system.*’⁸¹ There are conflicting images of the woman as a peacemaker with an active and strong capacity to influence,⁸² and the woman as socialised into a silence⁸³ and invisibility in important decisions. That these discussions are present in Somaliland suggest an increased reflection on the issues in Somali gender relations. Though women may seem completely without power there are in fact examples of them

creating their own sites of resistance and influencing aspects of conflict. Among the more prominent is their role in reversing the approval of UNOSOM deployment and the 1992 Sheekh conference where women who were excluded from the proceedings hung microphones through the windows to hear what was said and stood outside the conference until all issues had been addressed.⁸⁴ By listening in they were able to ensure that all the issues on the agenda had been discussed and also physically hindered delegates to leave as long as outstanding issues remained.

The wider socio-economic structures of Somaliland are however changing as well and with it the overall situational logics produced for women. There is an increasing practise of the men working a fewer number of hours per day, partly due to the widespread practise of chewing *qaad*. A late morning start of work is followed by the after lunch chewing sessions during the hot hours of the day. This has forced women to take a larger role in bringing income to the household.

While it is an added burden as the women also take care of the household duties, it is slowly beginning to yield an increased influence and general acceptance of women in business and politics.⁸⁵ Despite the majority of voters being women there were only two females in the House of Representatives in 2009. The respondents that addressed this explained it in part with reference to a traditional socialisation into believing that women are not good enough. There is however now also a female representative in the House of Elders, the *guurti*, which indicates a step in gender relations. The office of elder is traditionally all male without exception but the female elder was chosen to represent her husband's sub-clan after he was killed in the October 2008 bombings in Hargeisa.

According to some observers, women mobilise cross-clan and there is a shared notion of being the 'clan of women'⁸⁶ within which they can create their own political space spanning across societal fault-lines when needed. While women in Somaliland and Somalia can and have mobilised as a cross-clan group⁸⁷ it does not automatically follow that it is possible to treat 'womanhood' as a permanent primary interest group or 'sixth clan'⁸⁸ detached from the deeper social context.⁸⁹ Though women have long played a 'vital role in facilitating communication, mobilizing resources, and applying

informal pressure⁹⁰ this has occurred within the existing structures not in contradiction to them. In the realities of the scarce resources, and the post-conflict context, 'womanhood' does not provide protection or food.

Women have nevertheless shown that they can, at least temporarily, mobilise from a position as primary agents to form corporate agents and pursue specific interests. A 2001 report prepared for USAID indicated that women have been unable to mobilise as an interest group.⁹¹ This seems to be an overstatement considering the role women played during the 1990s peace conferences, but it is true in the sense of sustainable cross-clan mobilisation. To mobilise women within a *diya*-group would however be something completely different and substantially more sustainable.

Women are part of society and society is formed around the sub-clan. Change happens in that context and as Somali women are showing, and the conflict parties showed in the 1990s, change not impossible to pursue. While it is possible from a 'Westernised' perspective to focus on structural inequalities and injustices in gender relations in Somaliland, there are indications of a changing social, political and economic environment that perhaps should enjoy greater attention as a possible process of hybridisation. The current circumstances of Somaliland society are driving a gender emancipation of sorts⁹² that appears to have its own logic and legitimacy within the local context and appears to be seen as compatible with traditional society.⁹³

Modes of mobilisation: social forces

Social mobilisation into social force network formations is sometimes dressed in a language of religion or 'counter-terrorism.' Regardless of the 'cause' support is most easily gained through kin-ship ties or by dealing with a sub-clan collectively in patronage patterns. Depending on the scale and geographical spread of the conflict or interest friction, increasing levels of identity mobilisation can be employed with varying efficiency. Islam has never been a sustainable political rallying point in Somalia but has been successfully used to mobilise against non-Muslim and external threats.⁹⁴

Instead, clan affiliation is the not the sole but most prevalent factor in the formation of the Islamist groups, the government support groups and other social agent formations.

Despite the pluralistic nature of the interest formations it is possible to mobilise larger cross-clan interest groups. If framed correctly there may be social cohesion on some issues for temporary alliances. The perception of an alliance of a cluster of interest groups generates counter-alliances in response. Such is the case of the Islamist and Sufi in the South and such was the case for the *Hawiye*, *Darod*, and *Isaaq*, during the 1990s.⁹⁵ These are formations of convenience and when the external threat recedes it is likely that division along sub-clan lines will resurface as it did among the *Isaaq* in the North after the SNM victory in 1991.⁹⁶

While religion serves as a conflict generator or justifier in terms of for example the Sufi sects being targeted by Islamist-affiliated groups, the actual mobilisation occurs along clan lines. This is in part because of the relative ease of garnering support within these structures thanks to socially shared expectations and obligations, but also because of the geographical patterns of the sub-clans. Because of the tendency to live in proximity to kin the factors of clan and location become intertwined. As they come under attack, an incentive presents itself to band together in a temporary alliance in order to produce a stronger resistance to a common threat.

The different levels of identity are readily used for wider mobilisation in response to perceived outside threats but these are not hard alliances⁹⁷ compared to the *diya*-group. The *Isaaq* clan-family united against Barre but is dominated by three different such clan factions who are in open competition with each other. Judging by history, there is no reason to expect such an alliance to hold beyond the immediate threat. The fluid nature of alliances also means shifting situational logics in the interaction between different social agents and collective accountability relationships requires a keen understanding of the on-going interaction and the evolving dynamics with other social agents. If a member of a *diya*-group has perpetrated a perceived offense against another group, the entire group of the offending party becomes potential targets for retribution.

Social forces: The Somali and Somaliland background

Colonial rule resulted in structural differences between the North and the South of Somalia. In the north-west the British pursued a policy of indirect rule 'light' by incorporating elders and framing them in a new hierarchical relationship in their communities.⁹⁸ This practise politicised and awarded external authority to elders, thus undermining its traditionally more egalitarian relationship to the community. It changed the vested interests of the role so that it no longer corresponded to its socially defined boundaries by introducing individualistic notions of power and hierarchical relationships. The role of the elder was however socially imbued with a more a representative role⁹⁹ and the external intervention thus changed this relationship.

While the British interests in Somalia were not linked to control of territory¹⁰⁰ and population, the Italians pursued a policy of social engineering in the South.¹⁰¹ In order to do so the traditional structures had to be broken down¹⁰² while they at the same time had to provide extensive 'indirect rule' representation to administer the territory.¹⁰³ The differences in social stability and coherence between the South and the North can possibly be traced to these different approaches to some degree. There are however different perceptions of how the respective policies of indirect rule changed the political role of clan elders¹⁰⁴ that represented traditional authority.¹⁰⁵ Regardless, the introduction of a hierarchical relationship was certainly a change to the traditional consensus system of localised governance.¹⁰⁶

The initial integration of Somaliland with Southern Somalia in 1960 was under the umbrella of a 'western'-style democracy that proved poorly adapted to the clan-based nature of Somali politics.¹⁰⁷ While the discourse may have been nationalistic, the overriding principle of social organisation and support was still the clan.¹⁰⁸ Widespread corruption and failure to meet the expectations of different sub-state interest groups bred deep discontent. In 1969 the Somali state was seized by General Siyaad Barre who maintained power with the help of superpower backing in a highly centralized and authoritarian system. While there was a clear mismatch between a Weberian state

system and a kinship-based society,¹⁰⁹ the system introduced under colonial rule was often referred to in interviews with politicians and intellectuals during this research.¹¹⁰

Traditional social structures were further challenged when, under a banner of ‘Scientific Socialism’, Barre introduced massive literacy campaigns, gender equality drives, self-help schemes, and social development projects. His vision demanded the dismantling of traditional clan-based organisation, informal economic networks, and the socio-political order that many Somalis were dependent on. It was a case of deep social engineering where culture, religion, and social structures were targeted for reform or denounced outright. However clan-politics were being played out behind the scenes¹¹¹ displaying its resilience. Even the professed enemy of the clan-system Barre increasingly had to rely on clan support to maintain power. Clannism was re-employed to fuel old animosities¹¹² and divide opposition. In the North this increasingly turned into a confrontation with the sub-clans of the *Isaaq* clan-family when neighbouring Northern clans were mobilised against them.¹¹³ Clan identity thus resurfaced¹¹⁴ as the main channel of political and economic security after a period of active repression. Those disadvantaged by Barre’s increasingly patronage-based policies turned to the informal economy,¹¹⁵ further weakening the state. Eventually wide-spread civil war broke out leading to the defeat of the Barre forces and the trajectories of the North and the South of Somalia became separated again.

Social forces: the Somaliland state

In 1991 the Somali National Movement (SNM) had won the war in the North and the Somali state structures had completely broken down. The north-western former protectorate of Somaliland declared itself independent.¹¹⁶ In the subsequent peace conferences, Somaliland adopted the *beel*-system,¹¹⁷ a conscious hybridization between ‘Western’ democratic institutions and traditional society.¹¹⁸ Instead of declaring war on traditional clan structures, the newly formed state tried to incorporate and fuse them with an imported format.

The role of the elders and *guurti* is important as they are credited with much of the conflict reconciliation concerning thefts, killings, and land disputes in all regions of

Somaliland¹¹⁹ in lieu of effective state control. At the core of the *beel*-system was clan representation but the nomination process, highly susceptible to manipulation and power-sharing along interest lines, was a problem between and within all clan-groups. Problems included the unequal distribution of resources in the country and while pastoralists constitute a majority in the population, the urban representatives dominated the parliament.¹²⁰ These are issues that have yet to be fully resolved.¹²¹ In response to a lack of educated and trained professionals under the clan appointment system, the country adopted a new constitution through referendum in 2001, the public vote confirming a move towards a more mixed system with an appointed House of Elders and an elected House of Representatives. The attempt to hybridise traditional institutions and a 'Western'-style state structure appears grounded in recognition of the influence and power of the traditional structures coupled with a rejection of the policies introduced by Barre.

President Egal stated in 1999 that some principles of the international community had to be accepted in order for Somaliland to gain recognition as an independent state.¹²² In order to be recognised internationally, the elite of the aspiring state thus perceived a need to respond to a new situational logic. The new country had to adapt to externally expected international standards¹²³ starting with a unified national state structure.

While Somaliland's efforts have not achieved its goal of international recognition, it is clear that the political direction and transformation of Somaliland has occurred in response to a situational logic based on the perception and interpretation of international demands and internal interests. The attempt to develop a hybridised version of the state¹²⁴ has met with varying degrees of success, displaying the influence of internal pressures on the process. Kibble and Walls have made the observation that the Somaliland constitutional 'project' has endured because it marries the perceived polarities such as those between traditional and 'modern' society.¹²⁵ Though influences of international norms regarding human rights, gender issues, and so forth are present in the constitution, and actively discussed, it is important to remember that its explicit foundations are tradition and *shariica*.¹²⁶ The

full hybridisation of these influences, especially the legal strands, is an on-going project.

It may be tempting to assume that it is the influences of the traditional structures that are causing problems but considering the neighbouring, and non-secessionist, Puntland (north-east Somalia) this is not necessarily the case. Puntland is a purely based on clan structures but has managed to change its political representation several times. The system is explicitly 'tradition based' with elders electing 66 representatives rather than using a popular vote.¹²⁷ While this has not been without problems,¹²⁸ Puntland remains intact as a political entity and has made moves towards a less autocratic style of governance. The clan system as a social organisational form is thus an ever present potential source of friction but also serves to constrain wider violence¹²⁹ and disunity. Menkhaus has argued that it serves as a 'midwife to emerging political orders'¹³⁰ and thus, while in a process filled with friction, in the end it is also key to increased stability. In the case of Somaliland and arguably in other Somali-dominated areas, it is precisely the institutions generated in the structures and social interaction of the clan-system that have provided the foundations for developing a peace and wider inclusive social framework. Conversely they are however also the base for the mobilisation of rival interests and exclusivist structures. In Somaliland the balance has largely been maintained between wide and narrow interests, while the situation is very different in Somalia.

Social forces: the state as external to society

All politics may be local, but this is especially the case in fragmented and war-torn societies. The Somali context is one of extremely localised politics that, while accepting and actualising some external influences, is able to subvert and co-opt attempts at social re-programming to produce an outcome that conforms to none of the original intentions. In this context the modern state is testing to what extent it can assert social dominance, but if pushed too far the social system may at some point hit back¹³¹ as it has done before. Examining the institutions, situational logics, and the formation of social forces and interest groups in the Somali context it is apparent that the

political focus of society is not primarily a society-wide engagement. Politics are local and intimately linked to the interest group with which the agents and actors are associated. In such a context even the state is itself external as it is intervening into an existing socio-political context of daily life in which it has no regular or accepted role.

The state of the Somaliland state

The Somaliland experience is particularly interesting for several reasons. The transformation from intensive war to relatively stable peace and wider political order has been a process that has managed to maintain internal legitimacy, to demobilise a large number of armed militias, and to counter and resolve outbursts of violence through traditional channels and structures. It has been a process to which the participants have largely stuck through the years resulting in a relatively stable but resource deprived popular democracy. There is a belief that stability will prevail as a result of the pride felt over the peace and the role of the elders,¹³² in addition to an ever-present 'esprit of reconciliation'¹³³ among the Somaliland sub-clans.

Since 2005 Somaliland has been able to exhibit most of the attributes associated with a democratic state.¹³⁴ From a 'Western' perspective it may lack in different ways such as wider female representation,¹³⁵ but on the whole it is an interesting example of what appears to be successful societal transformation without the 'costly and ineffective'¹³⁶ involvement of the international community. There is now a rising concern that the increasing outside assistance and involvement is creating a hand-out mentality of aid dependency.¹³⁷

The Somaliland state is in the Westphalian understanding weak. It has a clearly limited capacity and influence as a result of politics being intimately linked with clan.¹³⁸ As society is dominated by the sub-clan alliances,¹³⁹ there seems to be an expectation that this is how politics are to be conducted at this stage though there is also discontent with the *status quo*.¹⁴⁰ One respondent likened political support building to constructing a mobile phone tower in which case you need to distribute shares to the sub-clan in *de facto* control of the land. Political support is secured in much the same way (which explains the large cabinet)¹⁴¹ in a pattern that resembles that of the Somali

post-colonial state.¹⁴² Sub-clan representatives are appointed without an office as concessions by the President in a bid to build support¹⁴³ by forging and managing a network of interest groups. While political competition does occur through elections in Somaliland, the perception is that it is largely a continuation of localised politics in a wider format with higher stakes. Control of the state apparatus is an end in itself, not a means to pursue a wider social agenda.

The weakness of the Somaliland state institutions is evident in conflict settlement where traditional societal functions and religious leaders largely fulfil the role of the courts. Somali NGOs such as the Academy for Peace and Development have suggested that utilising the traditional structures in relation to land-issues and similar legal concerns may be a way of taking the pressure off the already weak central institutions. Traditional social institutions would *'ensure the accessibility of effective dispute resolution mechanisms, synchronized with the norms, customs and language of the disputants.'*¹⁴⁴ The state would thus voluntarily surrender aspects of its own role and dominance to social orders that it has been unable to replace or effectively control. The legitimacy of the state institutions appears to be based mainly on a shared wish for it to succeed on some level rather than actual capacity and their real influence. The state was described by one respondent as the 'child of the people' that is shown the tolerance for mistakes and behaviour that a parent would show its child.¹⁴⁵

Politics are largely formed around clan principles and the coherence of the state and its institutions thus stand and fall with the willingness of the sub-clans to participate. Somaliland cannot afford to disregard traditional society as it is what provides cohesion and social control, and the interest groups of informal society are very much stronger than the state even in the urban areas. While it could be possible for the state and the market to provide alternatives to the functions performed by the sub-clan today in due time, it is something that should be viewed with a long timeframe. The clan as protector, insurance, social net, provider, and source of identity is not something that can be replaced easily.

The Somaliland state, regardless of under whose control it is, does not constitute a well-defined social force in its own right vying for influence over society in competition

with other social forces. It seems to have become instrumental solely to gain international recognition rather than working for the people.¹⁴⁶ There appears to be no real national plan beyond peace and recognition¹⁴⁷ as an independent state which suggests that the aspirations are not really about taking the country in a specific ideological direction. The only unifying factors seem to be the wish for a maintained peace¹⁴⁸ as expressed through the willingness of social institutions and actors to support the state even when it falters. The Somaliland state is certainly by the people but it is questionable to what extent it is actually for them.

The state of the Somali state

In the South, the state itself is even less of a site of competition for wider social influence. Access to the competition is restricted to selected elites of representatives vying for influence in an external process and format, backed by international forces and resources. It is also doubtful whether it could be said that there are any national politics in the South considering that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is trying just to keep the small areas they control from falling to the opposition. It is possible to make the argument that both states as well as the insurgency and defence alliances in the South are continuations of local political interaction mobilised by groups with a society-wide aspiration set. The different Islamist groups, the Sufi groups, the state, and individual interest groups all mobilise predominantly based on socially established patterns to become, or become part of, social forces. When these social forces clash it is a meeting between the society-wide agendas of a few supported by a multitude of local sub-interests with limited and local aspirations. Both in Somalia and Somaliland incentives are considered locally and trust is in short supply because of long fragmentation and war between interest groups. Any social solidarity group is therefore likely to be attempting to secure their own collectively defined interests rather than a society-wide gain. The exceptions, namely social agents with society-wide aspiration and agendas, can use this to accumulate social mass.

The conflict between the TFG and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 is easily translated into clan terms. The TFG was led by Abdillahi Yusuf, like Barre a *Darod* clan

member and from the Puntland area, whereas the ICU was predominantly *Hawiye* and given cohesion precisely through the kinship ties.¹⁴⁹ The language of security allowed the TFG to label the *Hawiye* population of Mogadishu as Islamists and terrorists in the name of the so called 'global war on terror.' While links to Islamist extremist groups should not be underestimated, overstating an Islamic ideological base or links to *Al Qaeda* can also alienate many Somalis of a more moderate nature,¹⁵⁰ not from the social force they are accused of belonging to, but from the element labelling them. It becomes a form of solidarity unification against a perceived outside enemy where alignment is likely to occur along established and known patterns.

The now dominant former part of the ICU, Al Shabaab, has displayed a capacity to recruit wider and to act politically rational by 'Western' standards but has no real incentive to talk to the international community. A good example is their distinction between political and humanitarian UN where the former, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS), and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), were designated enemies of Islam in a press release on July 20 2009.¹⁵¹ In the subsequent raids on the UN compounds in Baidoa only these three organisations were targeted, indicating a thinking organisation with motives beyond economy or indiscriminate targeting. It suggests a capacity to understand the necessity of the humanitarian aid for popular support, and the organisational command and control to enforce this. However, while it may appear on the surface to be a comprehensive organisation with wide aspirations and ideological drive, its strength is actually generated by the provision of stability and through traditional modes of mobilisation.

Al Shabaab and the Sufi areas of Southern Somalia also provide excellent examples of offensive and defensive network alliances. The Sufi *Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa* mobilised across sub-clan divisions in order to resist Al Shabaab attacks. The organisation represents a collection of sub-clans with a Sufi interpretation of Islam that have been denounced and targeted as heretics by Al Shabaab. They signed a treaty of cooperation with the government on June 21 2009, arguably as a way of gaining additional support and protection by expanding their social force alliance.

Geographically close social agents were thus provided with a strong incentive to temporarily unite in response to an external physical threat. In order to further improve its capacities to resist the social force of the insurgent networks, it aligned with the state and tentatively joined that social force.

The Islamist brotherhood Al-Ittihad decided in the mid-1990s that Somalia was 'not ready' for Islamic rule and initiated a long-term education plan to overcome clannism. The movement itself however also suffered from a low level of coordination and members would stay within their own clan areas. This pitted them against other clans and the interests of their own sub-clans as well as causing friction when outsiders came into leadership.¹⁵² Al Ittihad was thus as a social movement also fully subject to the established modes of mobilisation.

Social forces as sites of competition

With a society that is stronger than the state, local politics will dominate national politics as is largely the case in Somaliland. Several of the Somaliland respondents reflected on the political situation in Somaliland as one where the current leaders have lost sight of the vision and are pursuing their own narrow interests. The image of the politicians in the shade under the meeting tree could thus increasingly be replaced by an image of everyone reaching up for the fruits. Somaliland announced its independence in 1991¹⁵³ and has since then been developing its own state structure and institutions with little outside help though the international assistance has increased in recent years. It is a multi-party democracy under development; and it is the fact that it has been an internal process of transformation rather than an externally applied one that is of main interest.

While it has not resolved all issues, the success in comparison to for example South Somalia is very distinct.¹⁵⁴ The international relative indifference towards the situation has had the effect of allowing Somaliland to resolve its problems without developing dependence on foreign assistance¹⁵⁵ and allowed the local political and reconciliation processes to take their course without being controlled by outside agendas.¹⁵⁶ Recent Somaliland social history is very much influenced by colonization, failed post-

independence democratisation, and 21 years of military dictatorship. The Somaliland state is not a sovereign entity in the eyes of the international community, but nor is it *de facto* so internally. The state is fully subject to local conflicts and frictions, dominated by the interplay between the most powerful sub-clans and temporary alliances.

The main reasons that politics remain a non-violent competition are the shared pride over the peace and the desire for international recognition. No one wants to be seen to break the peace even though this is not guaranteed to be an indefinite arrangement. Unlike the South however, Somaliland has addressed much of its reconciliation issues. Suggestions have been made for a similar set-up in the Southern processes that would support intra-clan governance and respond to the critical need of reconstituting governance at several levels, including traditional clan-levels.¹⁵⁷ The Somaliland state formation is something of a curiosity in that it has managed to hold as a number of relatively coherent alliances between various sub-clans from different clan-families; however it remains questionable if there is a genuine society-wide agenda and what the outcome of the hybridisation will really be.

The meeting of the local and external

Somalia has long been subject to involvement and interventions from its neighbours and from global colonial powers. The country as it geographically looks today is the direct outcome of decisions made by colonial powers. Another inheritance from colonial rule is the structural differences between the North and the South or, possibly, between Mogadishu and the rest of the territories. There is cause to question to what extent the social engineering was successful beyond Mogadishu but the different approaches did produce separate institutional and agential conditions, and thus different social situational logics. There are different perceptions of to what extent the respective policies of indirect rule changed the political role of the elders they employed and what the outcomes of this were,¹⁵⁸ but in both the North and the South the introduction of a hierarchical relationship was certainly a change to the traditional consensus system of localised governance.¹⁵⁹ Seen through the perspective here it is

entirely possible that while the vested interests of the role of elders changed through colonial practises, the main institutions and logics did not necessarily follow. The more massive social engineering project in the South affected institutions, agents and actors at all levels of society thus producing a more substantial change but that does not mean it completely replaced established patterns; meanwhile the less vigorous British attempts to introduce social changes in the North met with such resistance that they remained attempts.¹⁶⁰

The Somali context is intensely political and while colonial practises may have laid the ground for the complex situation today, Somali society has actuated and internalised some of these influences and moved on. The structural and ideational conditions available for institution generation are thus very different from prior to and immediately after colonisation. Constant interaction at a sub-state level through trade, war, and marriage has developed a keen and very real political skill at highly localised levels. The external influences have an impact on Somali society but the outcomes are rarely the intended. Foreign extremist groups find much like the UN and other international organisations that their projects based on ideological positions are subverted and co-opted into local agendas through fickle alliances and discursive adaptation. The difficulties are exacerbated by the residual effects on the ideational and material conditions from previous experiences of foreign influence such as the interventions in the 1990s, the invasion of the South by Ethiopia in 2006, American bombings, and Islamist attacks and threats that all contribute to shaping the situational logics today. The current international engagement seems supportive of the local structures discursively but in the implementation on the ground, another picture emerges that correlates to the liberal peace agenda discussed above. This has obviously also been picked up on by the Somaliland population resulting in a less than flattering image of the internationals, their motives, and their sincerity.¹⁶¹

The externally generated and controlled peace agendas have been manipulated from the start, not only by the Somali representatives involved, but by international interests as well. International discourses of 'universal' values and counter-terrorism have been adopted locally to affect the resource distribution in local issues. Even the

social mass of supposedly international Jihadist groups such as Al Shabaab is more linked to established modes of mobilisation than any global Caliphate or aspirations of destroying 'the West.'

Because of the prevailing conditions and situational logics, any interventionist project in Somaliland or Somalia becomes a resource base that can be accessed by groups with means of control in pursuit of local interests. This has to be considered quite normal in an environment largely shaped by survival strategies focused on the immediate interest group. At the same time regional international parties compete for influence in Somalia but there seems to be a demarcation line between regional powers vying for influence over the government and movements vying for influence over the population, reflecting perhaps the different ideological aspirations and modes of control. While local Somali interest groups are hi-jacking ideological projects for their own purposes, there may also be a risk that ideology slowly hi-jacks the Somali conflicts. As these influences become entrenched positions in a mix of old animosities and new ideological discourse over time the conflict spectrum will be further complicated. If that happens, local and larger conflicts will most likely increasingly feed into each other and the problems become increasingly irreconcilable.

There is currently substantial international involvement in Somalia where the World Bank and the UN have developed a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). According to the programme they bring a mix of 'capacity, neutrality, credibility and technical expertise.'¹⁶² This is a bold claim to make, especially for the UN as it has a negative history in Somalia with for example the July 1993 killing of up to 73 elders at a claimed peace meeting in Mogadishu. While the number may be disputed,¹⁶³ it is the locally held perceptions that matter and though carried out by US forces, the bombing was referred to in the North 16 years later as a UN action. This indicates a shared negative history through which all current interaction is filtered. The UN has also taken a political stance in the South which rhymes very badly with self-proclaimed neutrality. The UN operations in the South in the 1990s generated much negative shared history, affecting the UN's credibility and trust in Somalia today. The involvement of then UN Secretary General, but former Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister, Boutros Boutros-

Ghali was further complicating matters as it was seen as a direct continuation of Egyptian interests in Somalia.¹⁶⁴

In addition to this the deployment of an international fleet to stop piracy while illegal fishing fleets from several nations are emptying the Somali waters¹⁶⁵ also adds to the anger. It would seem that any project initiated by the UN is starting from a distinctly less optimistic point than the RDP indicates the case to be. One international respondent explained that certain UN agencies lacked credibility to such an extent that the connection to the UN had to be expressed in a reduced profile in project implementation. The organisation's logo could simply not be displayed on projects anymore.¹⁶⁶ The RDP specifically mentions the resilience and social organisation capacity of Somali society and advocates for a rule of law *'drawing on the strengths of the existing traditional, sharia and secular systems.'*¹⁶⁷ In reality the programmes seem more driven by assumptions and political agendas along ideological lines than a serious attempt to understand and build on local existing structures. One international who did feel that adaptation was necessary bluntly admitted to projecting one image for the donors while doing something very different on the ground in order to be able to get anything done at all.¹⁶⁸ Implementing organisations also seemed to be subject to political pressure to pursue certain objectives and prioritise not so much the actual situation but what is perceived as politically important in the donor countries. A Somali respondent working closely with internationals noted that *'ideas about the local needs are often donor driven and lack connection with the local realities'*¹⁶⁹ while an international worker described how projects corresponding to donor-driven value-bases were prioritised in selection for implementation.¹⁷⁰

Some of these projects also seem to lack realistic time-scales and how thoroughly they are thought through, stopping short of analysing potentially negative outcomes to the situational logic where they are implemented. The outcome of some international projects in Somaliland risk developing further the stress put on society and producing negative situational logics in the interaction with the local conditions. One Somali respondent observed that *'[w]hen the international community gets involved there are conditions and demands that cause friction.'*¹⁷¹

A common perception advanced by respondents was of most support going to the South and little ending up in Somaliland. Much of the humanitarian aid destined for other areas, such as Puntland and Ethiopia, is unloaded in Somaliland which exacerbates this impression. This information then spreads, reinforcing the opinion voiced by several respondents that the money intended for Somaliland ends up in the pockets of the international organisations.¹⁷² This produces a range of situational logics in response to a perceived discrepancy in terms of interests. It generates resentment and hostility that can eventually be manipulated by social agents to gain social mass and provoke violent responses to the foreign presence.

The clash between locally shaped and internationally produced logics are so great that there are concerns that social mapping and capacity analysis were done at a minimum level and that projects were failing because donors insisted on imposing their will.¹⁷³ This discrepancy between donor-driven projects and the on-the-ground reality has generated a perception among some that 'the West', as an accumulated system with different social dynamics, is interrupting the hybridisation process of Somaliland,¹⁷⁴ and that the internationals are there to corrupt their values and society.¹⁷⁵

How situational logics are seen and approached

A few examples have been chosen to illustrate how internal conditions and external intervention interact to produce unintended outcomes in contrast with how local agents and actors choose to engage with the context. The first concerns the Somaliland peace process compared with the UN self-perception as being an impartial broker of peace. The second focuses on how the proliferation of watering holes has affected the local conditions and how local NGOs work with the issue of gender equity. The final example is a focus on co-optation and subversion in the space of interaction.

Building peace the Somali way – the situational logics of reconciliation

The north-western clans in what today *de facto* constitutes Somaliland were engaged on different sides during the civil war which left a considerable amount of

tension and mistrust. The peace processes of the 1990s are a source of deep pride in Somaliland and represent a very strong situational influence where no one really wants to be seen as the one who broke the peace. The level of reconciliation displayed is impressive and the continued legitimacy of traditional structures rendered the weakness of the state in a Westphalian understanding of little importance. The 1991 Grand Conference of traditional elders in Burco did not settle all grievances but did manage to terminate active hostilities and create a common political framework that endorsed reconciliation, independence and a two-year transitional government with representation from clans outside the largest of the clan-families, the Isaaq.¹⁷⁶

The peace did not last long and in 1992 fighting broke out quite possibly in response to the initiative by the government to disarm the militias and create a new national army,¹⁷⁷ combined with transferring control of local revenue bases to government control.¹⁷⁸ The government was trying to assert itself against local interests of the various social agents. At the subsequent Burao peace conference it was instead agreed that all clans would be responsible for security in their own areas.¹⁷⁹ The clan militias were a source of security in relation to other sub-clans but also had revenue schemes that benefitted their solidarity groups. The localised nature of benefits and the composition of the militias quickly cemented the nature of the conflict along clan lines.¹⁸⁰ In 1993 it was estimated that there were 50,000 armed militia-men that needed to be demobilised with ports and airports being particular points of contention.

The SNM vision for the newly proclaimed Somaliland had been a rejection of the inherited central state model and an open acknowledgement of the clan system as the root of political stability, social cohesion, and economic activity.¹⁸¹ In their two years of government they however failed to consolidate and establish any significant control and function. There were public protests against the outbreaks of violence in 1992, organized and carried out largely by women and as a result elders from all regions convened to mediate¹⁸² in a *guurti* that managed to negotiate a ceasefire. This facilitated the 1993 Grand Borame Conference which lasted for five months and involved 150 voting elders and an estimated 2,000 participants.

The peace negotiations were undertaken within the framework of the established clan structures and on a highly localised basis conformed to locally legitimate formats and addressed locally defined issues. Framed as an inter-clan struggle rather than a nationwide bi-party contest, the deadlock became manageable and resulted in a number of local peace discussions,¹⁸³ facilitating a large reconciliatory conference and subsequently starting a process of adaptation to international norms. The conference also agreed on a peaceful transfer of power from the interim SNM government to the civilian *Beel* system.¹⁸⁴ However, new fighting erupted in 1994 in a series of smaller localised conflicts also referred to as the 'Brothers' War.'¹⁸⁵

Until 1996, there was little progress in the various peace talks and it was only after five months of deliberations in Hargeisa that a peace agreement was reached. This included a provisional constitution and a decision to move towards a multi-party democracy after a transition period that ended in 2001¹⁸⁶ with a referendum that would formally approve the constitution and a move from the *Beel*-system to a multi-party democracy.¹⁸⁷ While the peace conferences did not resolve all conflicts, the breaches of the peace have been very local, limited in scope, and usually break out among sub-sub clan groups in accordance with old stress-lines. Some have raised the question whether Somaliland's relative success is based on the dominance of one clan family, the *Isaaq*, but this is not a correct image of the clan-family dynamic. The fact is that there are deep rifts between the *Isaaq* sub-clans and that they compete for power and resources.¹⁸⁸ The outbursts into violence between *Isaaq* sub-clans in the 1990s actually contributed to the willingness and trust of the minority clans¹⁸⁹ as it reduced the fears of Somaliland being an *Isaaq* project.

The Somaliland peace conferences are an example of how social pressures influence political developments and conflict. The situational logics facing the socially defined actors were dynamically shaped and influenced both inside and outside of the conferences. The latter was made possible by an aggregate social pressure being able to form in proximity to and direct response to issues being addressed. A major factor affecting the process of reconciliation is the traditional financing of peace conferences where one clan or group of clans will pay for the costs involved and host the

conference. On occasion, for example in Borame in 1993,¹⁹⁰ this has meant hundreds of people turning up and having to be fed which puts a strain on the economy and resources of the host clan. Through the tradition of reciprocation it is understood that the next meeting will be hosted by the opponents and there is thus an economic incentive that generates a situational logic in favour of progress and a strong disincentive for unnecessarily prolonging the conferences.¹⁹¹ Nevertheless, the principle of consensus means that these conferences will often take a long time, sometimes months.¹⁹²

Another factor that was mentioned in interviews was the proximity pressure. Peace conferences are open to all men and, at least in Somaliland, increasingly to women. This means that an aggregate social pressure is generated as large numbers of people will travel to the conferences to make their voices heard. Local conflicts and grievances between sub-clans that threatened coherence and stability were identified¹⁹³ and addressed individually under an explicit prohibition of discussing national issues. By gradually solving local differences it was possible to eventually hold larger conferences that were not derailed by interests and animosities generated in the local spaces of socio-political interaction.

An important foundation of the reconciliation which was employed in each of the Somaliland peace processes was the principle of *xalaydhalay*.¹⁹⁴ This is a concept of forgiveness which is used when the costs and reparations are deemed incalculable¹⁹⁵ or so massive that reparations become unrealistic. Instead of seeking compensation and perpetuating the conflict, an agreement is made to forfeit all claims between the parties to the conflict in the interest of reaching a peace.

UN peace brokering

The Somali approach to peace and reconciliation reflects the pragmatic norms present in much of Somali society.¹⁹⁶ The strategies of the UN as an external peacemaker on the other hand are interesting as a contrast in attitude, approach, and contextual anchoring. In Somaliland the elders initially decided to allow UN troops during the early 1990s intervention, but they were pressured and swayed to change

this decision by women who had mobilised in opposition. The policies and operations in the South under UN flag are likely to have strengthened the resolve of the North that it would be better to deal with their problems without foreign intervention. The view of the external peacemaker as a party to the conflict is reflected in a discussion about the possible UN presence where an elder reportedly asked what clan UNOSOM represented.¹⁹⁷ This illustrates that politics are indeed not only local but directly tied in with the socio-political frames of reference of the population.

It is worth reflecting on the Somali peace-negotiation factors in relation to the international conferences arranged to address the conflict in the South. Apart from crucial parties to the conflict not being invited, the conferences have been held outside of Somalia, at the expense of the international community and away from the social pressure of proximity and participation or presence. The traditional incentives for closure and agreements have thus been removed, effectively eliminating the facilitating mechanisms built into Somali peace-making, displayed in the Somaliland peace negotiations. It seems there has been an assumption on the part of the international community that there is a common interest in an objective peace and that this could be sought in an externally created and controlled environment. This assumption largely ignores the historical and regional context shaping the social influences and reflects a common over-estimation by outsiders of to what extent local political actors 'own the conflict' and share the external perceptions of 'peace.'¹⁹⁸

The tradition of consensus decisions within Somali culture makes for very long negotiations but by holding them locally and being open to all interested a social pressure is accumulated that affects the delegates. By contrast of course, by removing selected delegates from their accountability groups and placing them in a luxurious environment with all expenses paid you remove several of the central situational incentives to resolution.

Focusing on a state level agreement rather than low level conflict resolution leaves the interest groups intact and antagonistic, primed to assert locally defined interests under a wider umbrella negotiation. The international interests have chosen to by-pass the local conflicts and negotiate a state solution in line with the near obsession with

format and substance. What happens is that the state and the external resources becomes a prize to compete for under zero-sum conditions, rather than a means to govern.

Building conflict - changing the situational logics by constructing wells

The proliferation of mechanical wells and underground water deposits created to counter the water shortage has reduced nomadic movements which in turn has increased grazing land deterioration. The practise began under colonial administration¹⁹⁹ but continues today in accordance with international strategies for aid and development. Already scarce resources are thus made scarcer in an attempt to counter the shortage of another resource, suggesting perhaps a limited consequence analysis. The propensity for geographical cluster settlements of sub-clans means that a new well also constitutes a shift in local power relationships. Despite this, projects addressing the illegal encroachment of land are often rejected favour of projects corresponding to a liberal value agenda²⁰⁰ although land-based conflicts are now the primary source of social conflict in Somaliland.²⁰¹ According to conversations with international aid and development workers in the course of this research, land conflicts are seen as too complicated to deal with.

Somali NGOs and the issue of gender

Somali NGOs in Somaliland are working within the social conditions to affect them not by confrontation, but by contribution. There is for example a Somali-run training programme to teach young women to vocalise their issues in order to break the socialisation into silence.²⁰² This approach stretches over a three year cycle aiming to let Somali women define issues relevant to them and eventually to discuss possible solutions to them.

There is also a project with female 'peace councils' that meet and debate parallel to the all-male traditional *shir*, a project that has been well received according to the female Somali organisation that designed and implemented it. A point was made of approaching the elders first to make sure there were no misunderstandings of the

purpose and role of these councils, indicating the importance socially accorded to traditional structures. They have gradually gained a voice in clan affairs primarily as a parallel structure being consulted or sometimes invited to participate, thus overcoming a participatory obstacle gradually and by proven value rather than through legislation and workshops. Despite the funding running out, the councils remained active and similar projects were being considered in 2009.²⁰³ A female researcher reported a similar relationship with her own sub-clan that increasingly consulted her on issues facing the solidarity group.²⁰⁴ These accounts seem to indicate a changing set of social conditions and situational logics on the issue of gender relations. Yet it is a change that is taking place in ways and spaces of interaction relevant to the perspective of Somali women themselves rather than a 'universal' agenda. It uses the local conditions as a platform rather than seeking to eliminate the existing social structures and replace them completely.

Unintended outcomes of interventions

The external involvement on all sides in the South also provides opportunities for Somali communities there to engage international resources in what in reality are usually local conflicts.²⁰⁵ Thus Jihadist volunteers, American strike fighters, Ethiopian troops, and other outside influences can be manipulated to play a role in local conflicts by employing the relevant discourse. One practise to discredit rivals is for example to spread rumours that they are 'fundamentalists'²⁰⁶ and thus making them targets in the 'global war on terror.' Somalia was invaded by Ethiopia in 2006 in a limited intervention with international backing in support of the TFG. The intervention ended two years later with the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops; the leader of the ICU, Mr Ahmed, being selected president of the internationally recognised and supported government; and the Islamists of the Al Shabaab militia taking over the temporary capital of Baidoa while the parliament and government was in Djibouti. In 2010 Uganda was targeted by Al Shabaab in retaliation for its troop presence in the AU forces in the South²⁰⁷ where the AU 'peacekeeping' troops are also actively involved in the fighting²⁰⁸ between the Darod and Hawiye respectively dominated sides.

The international position has been to generate peace and prosperity from the top-down and from the outside, manifested in a succession of internationally backed and failing governments with no empirical legitimacy and close to no territorial control. The discrepancies between the local reality and outside programmes also provide opportunities for misuse in other ways. For example the UNOSOM demobilisation projects in South Somalia in the early 1990s were used by militia leaders to pay for housing and food for their fighters²⁰⁹ thus sustaining their fighting capabilities. Situational outcomes are thus largely unrelated to specific projects and more to how local agents actualise and use the resources projects represent.

The same problem is faced by international Islamist groups trying to establish a presence and influence in Somalia. The Somali brand and application of Islam is distinctly in conflict with a more political international Jihad, and external involvement is frowned upon while also generating expectations of local benefits in exchange for acceptance.²¹⁰ Given these problems, and the ever potent presence of the sub-clan and the *diya* group, the social mass of the Islamists does not seem to be connected to ideological fervour as much as to established social modes of mobilisation.

The balances and arrangements created between social interest groups are easily off-set in unintended ways by outside intervention. A new power relationship that will require settlement; an enclosure on communal lands creates new frictions that will need resolution; and an outright invasion or threat against a clan, and thus geographical area, generates a defensive logic of alliance-building. This has been the pattern in the violence in the South of Somalia and in the relapses into conflict suffered by Somaliland in the 1990s. Political interests and aspirations seemingly follow the same pattern today and the notion of even the pre-1991 Somali state as exercising any meaningful everyday authority beyond repression in the rural areas of Somalia is contested.²¹¹

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to explain how interest groups and social forces form in the Somali and Somaliland contexts, and how this relates to the outcomes of

interventionist projects. The complex and largely opportunistic nature of Somali social interaction provides some aspects of possible generalisations, but the shifting nature of alliances means that the relevant social dynamics are dependent on a subjective local context that often includes geographically distant solidarity members, for example the Diaspora. The same opportunism also means that actuation is extremely subjective on a case to case basis. The Somali case presents clear examples of the challenging of, and resisting against, social forces by local interest groups. In the South there are multiple social forces making violent authority claims in the local contexts while in Somaliland the process has largely been peaceful since 1997. In both cases however, local interest groups are able to assert a relative degree of independence reflected in their strength in relation to the social force capacities.

The strong orientation towards the immediate solidarity groups has meant that the alliances entered into as different social forces are largely fickle and temporary in nature presenting a tableau of possible options awaiting actuation by different interest groups. It also means that the social forces themselves are, through the accumulation of diverse motives and interests, largely external to the immediate local context. The established modes of mobilisation provide routes around this issue as the social divisions along clan and sub-clan lines have conditioned and incentivised certain patterns of alignment. These are however not absolutes, nor should they be considered sustainable and stable foundations of peace as evidenced by the example of the competition within the *Isaaq* in Somaliland.

The internationally controlled peace processes in the South are clear examples of the discrepancies between interventionist assumption and Somali situational logics in that they have completely detached negotiations from where accountability and social pressure is accumulated, as well as failed to address locally relevant issues before addressing large ideological and social force concerns. The Somaliland peace processes were by contrast largely successful in stopping overt violence and promoting a level of reconciliation thanks to the locally accumulated social pressure that shaped the immediate situational logics for the involved representatives.

Somaliland has displayed a relatively high level of success despite meagre resources and a decidedly weak state structure. Factors such as the small population size, territorial size, and the polarization against the South may have contributed but predominantly, social functions have been able to control outbreaks of violence. In the Somali and Somaliland contexts the *diya*-group is the constant unit of social organisation actuated in the local social dynamics. Occasional wider mobilisation will seemingly occur but usually in temporary alliances of convenience, able to gain social mass by drawing on local conflicts but conversely also drawn into local conflicts by interest groups. Instances of actual and widespread social change are not that common in the Somali context and the Somaliland transformation constitutes the clearest example. When President Egal declared that Somaliland would have to adopt some international norms it was as an instrument to gain recognition internationally. However, because of changing social conditions some of these changes are being realised slowly and incrementally. A notable case is the role of women who are gaining increased recognition on the political scene. This is at least in part due to the work of Somaliland organisations that apply cautious and consensus-dependent strategies of change in relation to existing structures of power. While not surrendering to them, they acknowledge and work alongside them to display what contributions can be made, thus allowing time for changing dynamics to be internalised as part of shared interests. The institutions that develop and are actuated locally are directly related to the structural and ideational conditions. Somaliland has made an attempt to hybridise internally legitimate structures with externally generated formats in order to meet internal as well as external demands.

The case of Somaliland also has particular interest because it allows the removal of completely external sources as the actual drivers for reform. The decision to transform the social context was made at a social force level but also approved by referendum and carefully addressed through multiple localised negotiations. Yet many of the issues facing Somali and international social forces are still present in Somaliland indicating that the interaction between social force aspirations and relevant social contexts produce unintended outcomes even when intentionally being hybridised.

In light of this chapter it is possible to see that the capacities and aspirations of social forces in Somalia and Somaliland are intimately linked with the acceptance and actuation by local interest groups. Rather than relying on abstract ideological constructs to attract support, social mass is acquired through established modes of mobilisation and along existing social dividers. Social force projects are external to these contexts even when local interests are expressed through them. In such cases a social force controlled and directed by narrow interests will provoke defensive alliances in response for protection and for competition in favour of alternative and conflicting agendas. The outcomes of interventionist projects are ultimately decided at a highly localised level where relevant social interaction occurs, unlikely to conform fully to either the interventionist agenda or local interests. In the end, the relevant decisions are made in the shade of the meeting tree.

Chapter Four – Afghanistan: In the Shadows of Mountains

The case of Afghanistan, in some respects, offers an even more diverse and complex picture than Somalia. There a number of groups with separate social constructs and images shaping their institutions and structures. The inter-relations of these groups are regulated in a 'complex fabric of interlaced social and local categories'¹ that are subjectively actuated. While sharing some traits through years of mutual influence, some of the differences are substantial. There is also division and diversity within various ethnic or other groups, based in part on geographical location and access to resources. This results in the formation of interest groups along a wide variety of identities, interests, and allegiances. War, natural disaster, and government policies have forced population displacements in the past which continue to generate conflict where groups have been resettled and in areas where refugees are returning.²

To further add to the complexity, there are also issues of religious diversity and integration between the predominantly *Sunni* population and the *Shia* minority. Given this diversity and the multiple levels of social organisation there is reason to give some serious thought to the idea that there is 'no such thing as an Afghan',³ and that it is predominantly in the Diaspora that *Afghanistan* melts into one homeland.⁴ Years of war have cultivated an opportunistic mobilisation of identities and a corresponding selective disregard for them. Aspects of Afghan ideational and structural factors and the institutions they create will however be discussed in order to illustrate how these factors influence and shape the situational logic facing different groups. The process of understanding where socio-political power and influence is situated is thus a complex task with a highly localised applicability. The Afghan experiences of external interventions have a long life; in the South of the country the shared memories of two 19th Century wars means the British are still described in derogatory terms⁵ and that the current conflict is framed as simply picking up where the previous left off. This chapter will not attempt to detail a specific social picture of Afghanistan simply because there are so many. What it will do is to relate the aspects identified in the framework, to Afghan socio-political interaction today as well as in history.

Actuated institutions and roles

Afghanistan is a patriarchal and patrilineal society⁶ and for all the peoples of Afghanistan kinship has been an essential means to mobilise political and economic resources.⁷ Though the international interests in Afghanistan and Afghan government officials like to advertise a range of claimed social changes, there is cause to view much of it with scepticism. Traditional values and religion play an important role in the worldviews of Afghans⁸ even though the social patterns have changed to some degree over time and through decades of large-scale conflict. What were previously relatively stable modes of organisation in terms of identity and stratification⁹ have now been further diversified and become more fluid. Strategies of survival are forged out of a number of sources such as ownership of land, flocks, and cash; seniority; family connections; political and economic relationships with outside forces; and Islamic piety and charisma. These factors are defined and distributed by the social relations established through for example kinship and religion.¹⁰ Established modes of engagement are echoed in the example of the practice of ministers replacing staff with their own solidarity networks on appointment.¹¹

Shuras and jirgas

Traditionally, local leadership was exercised by the elites of *khans* or by *maliks* - the village and tribe headmen¹² in councils. Two terms with slightly different origins are used here to describe this council of power-holders within a solidarity group: *jirga* and *shura*. They have similar functions¹³ though a shura has permanent members and a jirga is traditionally convened *ad hoc* in response to a specific issue.¹⁴ The shura is also more hierarchical than the more egalitarian jirgas, but the terms are increasingly used interchangeably.¹⁵ A jirga can also be called at the national level (Loya Jirga), and an institutionalised Loya Jirga has been the highest representative body of the Afghan state since the 1920s.¹⁶

The prevalent form of village politics in was and is centred on competition between leaders¹⁷ who use kinship ties and wealth to cultivate followings. A leader and his influence were and are defined in competition with other leaders and local rivalries are

continued even when belonging to the same political party.¹⁸ Following the gradual shift in power relations since 1978, the traditional khan has given way to a new generation of power-holders who rely more on coercive capacity to maintain their power.¹⁹ The commanders who emerged during the jihad and the civil war were able to develop an autonomous economic and social base but they soon fell into the same patterns of behaviour as the khans before them.²⁰ In addition, many local communities also saw the jihad as an opportunity to expand their local autonomy.²¹

In the wake of the fall of the Taliban regime, many of these commanders regained control in their local areas but their power is often better understood as having influence over one or a number of shuras rather than having direct administrative functions. It should be remembered, however, that there are individuals and groups that have become so independently strong that they are able to act with impunity in relation to shared norms and laws²² when local groups are not able to challenge them directly. Under normal circumstances, local councils will settle and mediate in disputes as well as organize economic cooperation, such as water sharing or land use.²³ In rural areas where the government's reach is weak, councils also perform a vital function as the 'first line' of justice.²⁴ Estimates vary but they generally tend to hold that between 80²⁵ and 90 per cent of what would otherwise be court cases are instead handled locally by jirgas or shuras²⁶ in a pattern remarkably similar to that of Somaliland. It thus largely replaces the official justice system which is generally considered to be corrupt or at best ineffective.²⁷ From a state-centric perspective, it may be problematic to have other systems that are filling in for the state. The fact is, however, that if the government does not have the capacity to deliver a functioning judicial system, social order requires some form of alternative structure.

Religion

Around 99 per cent of the Afghan population are Muslim,²⁸ of which around 80-85 per cent is Hanafi Sunni and the remaining is Shia.²⁹ Islam constitutes a source of values and ethics, and it is through this framework 'that the peasant tries to understand the foreign visitor.'³⁰ While other influences such as secular law and for

example *pashtunwali* may be used as the source of legal and social codes in some circumstances, *sharia* is ever-present in slightly different forms as moral and legal guidelines that exist independently of the state and transcends divisions between identity groups.³¹ Ahmed Rashid claims that few Muslims observe the rituals of religion with such piety as Afghans.³² While this may be unfair to other Muslims, the presence of religion is clear in daily life and makes it a potentially powerful mobiliser. The thorough penetration of everyday life is central to the ideological perspective of Islamism which seeks to address all parts of life in order to protect Islam from outside influences.³³

The most common religious leader is the mullah who traditionally belonged to the village rather than a nation-wide body of clergy. Among the eastern Pashtun, who largely resisted the expansion of Islamist influence, the mullahs have more been seen as an occupational group than as part of the tribe. The role of the mullah contains vested interests that were traditionally supposed to be detached from earthly political competition and the mullah represented a congregation, not necessarily a particular interest group. In this context the role as teacher and prayer leader is respected but interference in local politics carries the risk of being shunned.³⁴

Traditionally, it has been the case that the mullahs would have no authority beyond the social boundary of their congregation,³⁵ but the role of the mullah varies. Among communities aligned with Islamist groups the mullah takes on a more political role. This has put some of the Taliban mullahs and commanders on a collision course with community elders. Not only are they younger, they also represent a competing interest backed by an alternative source of authority³⁶ that challenges that of the elders. While the Taliban has had a strong support base amongst the village mullahs, the conflict between Sufism and the Taliban brand of jihadist Islamism has led to pockets of resistance among Sufist mullahs in Paktia and Khost provinces where the clergy was still hostile to the Taliban in 2006.³⁷ The role of religion is complex in Afghanistan and the associated roles and institutions are simultaneously part of, shaping, and subject to the local environment.

Social codes and practices

Pashtunwali is a collection of local tribal codes but has a number of primary themes such as hospitality, bravery, revenge, asylum, and honour.³⁸ There is plenty of debate about the importance of honour in Afghan society and conduct. Some observers accord it a great deal of importance and penetration of Afghan social behaviour. The accuracy of this can certainly be disputed on a number of grounds such as the observable reduced importance of traditional values over decades of war and displacement. In addition the notion of collective honour has always been stronger in some areas and defined in different ways between different groups. It is highly debatable to what extent codes such as the *pashtunwali* are actuated on a regular basis today and the adherence to a traditional tribal identity varies across territory and depending on situation. In addition, it's sometimes localised and always dynamic nature means it should be understood as an idealised concept rather than an absolute.³⁹ With this said it is also the case that every Pashtun 'knows his tribe',⁴⁰ meaning that he can identify and potentially be mobilised along his lineage.

The notion of 'honour' is a much referred to part of Pashtunwali. Much of the discussion around this tends to treat it as an objective and collectively agreed notion. In reality it is highly subjective in content, meaning, and actuation. The interesting part is whether honour is referred to at all in a specific context and thus potentially actuated as a mobiliser by members of different social groups. Traditionally honour has been linked to defence and control of *namus*, consisting of 'woman, gold, and land.'⁴¹ The concept of *badla* demands retribution against the offender or his immediate solidarity group.⁴² At least elements of this notion of honour are actuated in social interaction through discursive reference. In the end honour does exist socially, ready to be subjectively actuated either as an absolute or as a convenient justification.

Modes of Mobilisation

Afghan society, like any other, consists of a number of social categories to which an individual may belong simultaneously, and sometimes despite inherent contradictions depending on the context.⁴³ A few of these modes of mobilisation will be highlighted

here in order to indicate the depth of complexity. As Jabri has pointed out the Taliban are usually framed as ‘the’ force to be reckoned with while *‘the rest of the Afghan population is reduced to a depoliticised bio-political mass in need of rescue, and hence denied political agency.’*⁴⁴ This diversity calls the notion of a meaningful ‘Afghan’ identity, understood as a solidarity function for sustainable intra-social unity and mobilisation, into question. Interests and solidarity groups are framed in terms of kinship, occupational, geographical or similar nature and occurs in different formats depending of the location and context examined.

Ethnic and tribal groups

There are five major ethnic groups in Afghanistan; the Pashtun (45 per cent); the Tajik (25 per cent); the Uzbek (10 per cent); the Hazara (10 per cent); the Aimaq (10 per cent), and an additional number of smaller groups.⁴⁵ These *ethnic identities* can, depending on the situation, be used as higher order mobilisers as exemplified by the forced population moves by Abdur Rahman and his mobilisation of Ghilzai Pashtun against the Hazara. Some Islamist groups have also been known to use ethnicity as a factor in mobilisation.⁴⁶ The largest ethnic group, the Pashtun tribes, are predominantly in the south and the east. While the tribe remains a factor in mobilisation, its’ comparative weight as a political mobiliser varies. There are however examples where even large solidarity groups have been faced with situational logics produced in the feedback between social institutions, and the interaction of social agents and actors.

The Mangal tribe provide one such example of repeated coherent mobilisation among the Pashtun that is most likely an outcome of the material and ideational conditions in their immediate environment resulting in socially shared and established mechanisms of interaction: in 1959 a resource conflict over trees led to an exodus of 3-4000 Mangal Pashtun to Pakistan after an Army officer intending to mediate was shot by a Mangal tribesman. In order to escape state retribution against the tribe, the Mangal left Afghanistan but returned in 1960 following a general amnesty.⁴⁷ The social implications of that one hot produced a situational logic facing the Mangal as a social

agent rather than an individual with a rifle. They have also acted as a largely coherent political unit in the current conflict. In 2003 they implemented a self-initiated opium cultivation ban and organised a defence against the Taliban but with little to no recognition from Kabul and the international forces.⁴⁸ After apparently false intelligence was provided to NATO forces, several night-raids were executed against a group of elders and as a result the Mangal turned from pro-government to pro-insurgents.⁴⁹

While traditional divisions may sometimes become obsolete, they are often still present implicitly and influence how alliances will form.⁵⁰ In the North there were massacres in both directions between Pashtuns and other groups that took on a distinctly ethnic quality prior to and after the beginning of the 2001 intervention. Retaliatory attacks were exchanged and after the Taliban were driven away there were pogroms against the isolated Pashtun communities.⁵¹ Ethnicity is usable as a mobiliser but requires an external coherent threat to produce meaningful internal coherence. Like the clan families or sub-clans in Somalia, the level of unity is unlikely to be sustainable when the specific threat recedes or possibly even while it remains.

The term qawm⁵² will be employed here meaning an interest group with a solidarity aspect and is thus seen as a building block for social forces mobilisation. Qawm is at the core of social organisation and denotes any communal solidarity group based on for example kinship, religious group, residence, or occupation.⁵³ All meaningful social activity within the qawm is regulated by a shura or jirga,⁵⁴ but because its power relies on moral pressure, the developing culture of impunity can weaken its influence.⁵⁵ In a larger population centre each qawm has its own mosque and elders tied in with the neighbourhood it controls.⁵⁶ In relation to public elections it is often the case that voting is decided not on an individual basis but by the local strongman or through communal discussion within the qawm. Such deliberations within solidarity groups can go through several rounds.⁵⁷

Some translate qawm as 'tribe' but this is not how it is used here. The term 'tribe' is better reserved for qawms that are strong on traditional customs,⁵⁸ and a 'tribe' is most often not a corporate or political unit⁵⁹ in its own right because it becomes too

large. The qawm comes under the influence of socially shared norms and rules as villagers 'oscillate' between the local power-holders and the mosque,⁶⁰ or external alternative sources of power enhancement. As in so much of Afghan society there is variation in different areas when it comes to the principle of the qawm. In particular the Shiite Hazaras are socially more geared towards a more individualistic basis of organisation.⁶¹ Among the Farsiwan and Tajik groups there are no tribal structures and the qawm is an association based on residence or place of birth whereas the Aimaq groups have various tribal identities.⁶² In times of crisis such as the jihads of 1928 and 1979, these more narrow groupings were superseded by transcending ideological mobilisation, but will still make themselves known throughout the wider political organisation⁶³ or social force. The immediate security of the Afghans during the many years of war has been dependant on local networks and assistance.⁶⁴

Religion

Islam has been used alone as a mobiliser but has also bled together with the party politics of the mujahidin predominantly in Peshawar during the 1980s. Even the PDPA leader, Najibullah, would often invoke Islam in his public speeches despite representing a distinctly atheist ideology. His government also provided funds for mosques, religious schooling, and paid the salaries for 16,000 mullahs.⁶⁵

Even secular power holders stress the importance of Sharia and Islam over tradition⁶⁶ but this does not mean that Islam is a sustainable source of mobilisation over local interest formations under normal circumstances. Outside of normal circumstances however, there is greater potential for such mobilisation, and the Soviet-Afghan war and the following internal conflict resulted in massive population displacement.⁶⁷ In the refugee camps in Pakistan the Islamist groups found a recruitment pool of youth at least partially disconnected from the social control and structure of traditional structures and authority.⁶⁸

The uprooting and separation from the Afghan social context created new potential patterns of mobilisation and social organisation among the refugees.⁶⁹ Ethnicity and tribe still however played a role, exemplified by people tending to organise themselves

around these factors in the camps⁷⁰ to the extent possible. While party affiliation may have determined which camp a family went to, the extended family was not dissolved by the camp. Yet traditional authority lost some of its grip to the Islamists influence. The bond of socialisation having been broken, the environment shapes the logic of actuation differently for those that stand alone and without protection in a violent and often unforgiving environment. There is no doubt that the umbrellas of religion and party politics as social force network mobilisers increasingly blended and, with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, gained importance. Their components however, were still the more narrow interest groups something that is still evident in how politics are played out in Afghanistan.

Political parties

The role of political ideology in forming actual polities in Afghanistan is contested. Barnett Rubin suggests that ideology has been but a *'thin veneer on a traditional political culture of clan and kinship that the bearers of ideology could never be divorced from'* and that all support mobilization follows this pattern.⁷¹ Though ideological projects have been introduced under the banners of Nationalism, Marxism, or Fundamentalism mixed with Islamism, the persistence of communal groups as the basis of mobilisation and interest formation is displayed by the forms they have taken.⁷² The mujahidin was a multi-platform resistance that mainly consisted of four types of networks: ulema, Sufi pirs, khans, and Islamists.⁷³ The primarily political parties, mainly Islamists, were organised in three main patterns: multiple loosely structured parties opening local fronts; a dominant party seeking to absorb ideologically unconvinced persons (Jamiat); and Hizb-i Islami which was a relatively homogenous party.⁷⁴ Around Kandahar the resistance was mainly based on the tribal network of the Durrani tribe.⁷⁵

During the jihad against the Soviet Union a typical mujahidin group would consist of a commander and a small group of men linked by a local social network. While this could sometimes be through a madrasa, it was more often through qawm affiliation and a patron-client relationship.⁷⁶ Qawm, rather than ethnicity, was usually enough to

also explain politics and feuds within the resistance according to Olivier Roy.⁷⁷ In the beginning of the resistance, most fighters lived at home and fought to force out the government and Soviet elements from their 'space of solidarity', in effect the area within which the specific qawm was given social meaning. The eventual need for outside weapons and support drove local commanders to seek affiliation with externally based leaders⁷⁸ and political parties that had a wider power base and social impact. The commanders would usually belong to a political party but most fighters owed their allegiance to their commander based on social networks.⁷⁹

Wholesale incorporation of already mobilised social interest groups also spilled over into selective distribution of resources and inter-qawm feuds.⁸⁰ The major exception was Hikmatyar's largely Pashtun⁸¹ Hizb-i Islami (HiG) where party loyalty to at least some degree superseded loyalty to local commanders. Hikmatyar built a highly secretive and centralised organisation recruiting largely from educated urban Pashtuns⁸² but a number of traditionally organised fronts also fell under the umbrella of HiG. The party was around 75 per cent Pashtun but Tajik and Uzbek fronts affiliated themselves with it in order to obtain weapons and to differentiate themselves from their local rivals.⁸³ In the South, party affiliation was also largely based on which party would provide the necessary weapons and resources.⁸⁴

The re-traditionalising of the mujahidin after Soviet withdrawal resulted in a series of political games along traditional lines intended to enhance local standing rather than pursue national aspirations,⁸⁵ with notable exceptions, as the major parties fought over Kabul. However, the victory of the mujahidin as well as later the Taliban was framed as a victory of Islam giving the mullahs increased influence and possibly laying the foundation for their continued support.⁸⁶ Yet even the current insurgency has been argued to be largely comprised of 'disenfranchised compatriots' related more to 'tribe' than ideology.⁸⁷

In the case of the new political parties, research in late 2008 has shown that while their leaders see liberal principles as an 'important part' of Afghanistan's political future, none see the current conditions as a sufficient foundation for their introduction.⁸⁸ Political parties of both religious and secular nature have been present

and many were the outcome of the educational shift experienced during the 'New Democracy.' The core leadership for all sides in the war leading up to the Soviet invasion, the resistance, and the subsequent civil war, were all drawn from the generation entering the educational system at that time including Najibullah, Hekmatyar, and Massoud.⁸⁹ The state-level political game today has taken two distinctly different directions. One is the small segment of Afghan liberals in the executive backed by the international effort, and the other is the national assembly which, prone to special interest politics and manipulation, represent a '[...] stronghold of dissent, Afghan style [...].'⁹⁰ There are a number of parties and groups involved either on the government or the insurgency side and political parties still follow a client/patron relationship pattern.⁹¹ The nature of mobilisation means that support-bases are negotiated with local authority figures and incorporate entire social interest groups. While this may seem an easier model than attracting individuals, it also makes party and other social forces more exposed to the potential fallouts of dissent. There is a vast difference between losing the support of an individual or that of an entire interest group or block of interest groups. Keeping key actors under social control, happy or intimidated, becomes essential.

Modes of mobilisation: social agents

The many years of war and confrontation has generated a large number of localised conflicts that have a separate life from, but are strategically intertwined with, the ideologically generated 'umbrella' conflict between the state and the insurgency. The network character of these two latter social forces means that while acquiring support from the local they are simultaneously affecting and being co-opted into these local conflicts. Thus when one group aligns with the government or the international forces their local rivals are likely to seek support from the opposing side and vice versa.

Every Afghan is linked to the past through lineage but also has a conscious belonging to a larger identity set.⁹² The Afghan population is divided among a number of fault-lines and different strata of identity, among them ethnicity, language, sectarian, tribe, and spatial distribution. The social system is built on communal

loyalties that focus on the local rather than wider inclusive groups.⁹³ While there is a conscious identity of being Afghan this does not support internal unity and peace as evidenced by the internal struggles raging even when mobilised against an external enemy.

It is important to note that while the modes of mobilisation discussed here are active there is also violence and interest mobilisation occurring within qawms and other interest formations, all the way down to intra-family feuds.⁹⁴ One underlying cause is land disputes that erupt in part because of the weak government authority,⁹⁵ while another source of fighting is old animosities.⁹⁶ When faced with an outside threat groups tend to unite on a pragmatic basis but temporarily and to a limited extent.⁹⁷ The decision of a qawm to support a particular side at a particular time does not follow any strict 'tribal logic'⁹⁸ and is instead a pragmatic decision in response to the logic at the time. The situation and logic are distinctly different for the young fighters recruited in the madrasas of Pakistan.

While it can certainly be said that government and insurgency alike make use of local conflicts to mobilise support, the agency of the qawm in question remains largely unexplored. It is suggested here that the qawms are just as apt at using the discourse of the insurgency, the government or the coalition in order to affect local conflict. One example of local agency of the 'situated' as opposed to the 'external', is that local Taliban fighters in areas such as Uruzgan, Helmand and Zabul 're-tribalised' control from heavy-handed external fighters in 2008.⁹⁹

The informal institutions are strong in parts of Afghan society and have a capacity to adapt themselves but more importantly to co-opt and subvert external imposition. The idea of gender quotas was for example picked up on quickly and subverted by the politically active Afghans in order to build bigger power blocks for themselves.¹⁰⁰ When the UN produced a media campaign to present the work they were doing, the unprepared Afghan participants responded with terminology and language straight out of the UN brochures.¹⁰¹

Language issues, Eurocentric notions of interaction and motivation, as well as a failure to understand the hidden power relationships were mentioned as factors

making international agendas susceptible to manipulation by Afghan interest groups pursuing their own agendas.¹⁰² This is not to say that this is something negative in itself, but simply points out that the intentions of the local can clash with the intentions of the external as donors also tend to stick to their own individual agendas and priorities regardless of the local context.¹⁰³ The results are unintended and arguably often dysfunctional products of uncontrollable situational logics. The agency of social agents to form and pursue interests in accordance with their own subjective priorities should not be underestimated or arrogantly dismissed in favour of notions of objective 'universality.'

Women as social agents

Women cannot participate in the public life of the mosque or the village councils but have other ways of participating in both politics and religion.¹⁰⁴ The control by men over women is exercised primarily through the practises of *purdah* (physical segregation from all but the closest family males¹⁰⁵) and *chadri* (veiling). The extent of these practises varies between different groups and between rural and urban areas. It should be noted that conditions of thirty years of war in addition to normal social change have created variations in this with particular discrepancies in for example Kabul. The possibilities for women to participate are changing slowly but primarily in terms of the state guided by its own situational logic produced by its dependency on external resources. Female parliamentarians who have been too outspoken have been threatened by colleagues and the constitutionally guaranteed quota is being actively ignored.¹⁰⁶ The combination of the role as a woman and other roles with potential power has produced threats and violence against such women. Journalist Hamida Osman receives threats on a regular basis by night from a Pakistani telephone number but has also been threatened by law enforcement personnel when asking 'too many questions' about attacks in Kabul.¹⁰⁷ The role of a journalist in the Afghan environment carries its own constraints as does the role of women. A female journalist must negotiate sets of constraints attached to each role and arguably a third set produced by the combination. While change may be happening in terms of gender roles through

constitutional mandate, breaking the social mould as a woman carries risks, exacerbated by asking pointed questions. This particular situational logic is likely to condition silence and conformity, and currently precludes women as social power holders outside of the state structures and to a certain degree, even within them. This is not to say women are without social influence but that their influence at this point in time has to find or establish alternative routes than the formal structures of power.

Modes of mobilisation: social forces

The pattern of Afghan social force mobilisation has been to rely on 'buying' or otherwise securing dependency networks in return for support. This patronage pattern has expressed itself as a historically consistent strategy of co-opting maliks¹⁰⁸ and commanders. At the same time, local power-holders have tried to co-opt for example state resources to achieve their own localised agendas ranging from authority to survival and security. The vast new resources made available as a result of the war against the Soviet Union destabilised relations between the qawms and in order to access these, local power holders would sometimes join the enemy of their enemy¹⁰⁹ in a purely pragmatic logic that was not seen as treachery.¹¹⁰ If their local rival joined one side, a group would join the other in order to accommodate the new structural asymmetry.

This system of patronage runs through Afghan society at all levels and establishes networks of reciprocal obligation.¹¹¹ The local khan system was mainly a traditional patronage with increased access to the state system¹¹² on the one hand, but based on a local authority claim¹¹³ on the other. The mode of operation and positioning has arguably been continued under the rule of commanders and other local power holders. Depending on how resources and power are used the relationship with the local population could be described as an 'asymmetrical reciprocity'.¹¹⁴

A useful model to illustrate the relationship between the communities and commanders is Giustozzi's model with the commander at the centre with a number of 'vassals' under him. One rung below the vassals is the vavassors (district leaders) who in turn control the village leaders.¹¹⁵ Through this network of influence villages are

likely to come under a coercive influence and have to respond to the situation in accordance with the logic presenting itself. However, the qawm is a social network whereas the village is a territory. A commander cannot take over the qawm in the same sense as the physical village. Power is instead dependent on keeping the network components under his influence either by providing advantages or through coercion. The qawm on the other hand can penetrate social force networks at all levels by choosing actuation in accordance with the situational logics.¹¹⁶

Social forces: the state as external to society

Afghan history contains a number of reform attempts originating in Kabul. The conditions under which they were made and the social responses hold interesting clues to social interest formation and situational logics in Afghanistan where 'modernization' has been a state driven project from the start.¹¹⁷ There are some attempts at wide-ranging social reforms that stand out and that have remarkable similarities with the discourse employed in the international effort today. A brief historic review of the reforms shows a pattern of state-society interaction that places the state as firmly separated from society rather than a part of it.

Abdur Rahman Khan, dubbed the 'Iron Amir',¹¹⁸ came to power in 1880. His 20 year rule has been described as 'internal imperialism'¹¹⁹ as he gradually sought to spread the influence of the state beyond Kabul. However, while he sought to increase the control, penetration and efficiency of the state, he did not seek wider social reform.¹²⁰ Despite this, between 1881 and 1896 there was not a single year without often multiple uprisings. The longest single rebellion lasted between 1888 and 1896 in Badakhshan province.¹²¹ Abdur Rahman responded with mass executions and deportations¹²² and in order to break down the tribal and feudal system that provided the support foundations for his enemies he forced migrations of predominantly the Ghilzai Pashtuns to the North.¹²³ The resulting scattered population patterns of these groups are still present¹²⁴ and are a source of enduring local conflicts.¹²⁵ By removing the tribal Pashtuns from their support areas and placing them in an environment made hostile by land encroachments and ethnic friction, their immediate concern became

unity along a Pashtun identity rather than revolting against Kabul. He thus managed to create enclaves of allies within the non-Pashtun areas.¹²⁶ Abdur Rahman also mobilised the Ghilzai against the Shiite Hazara who were plundered, enslaved and displaced,¹²⁷ and appointed loyal governors who were given free reigns as long as they sent conscripts and taxes back to Kabul. By drawing new provincial boundaries traditional tribal groups were split up and any sign of discontent was immediately put down. A provincial government system was also established that partially eroded tribal power.¹²⁸ He did however not manage completely and while opposing its usage, also manipulated social segmentation¹²⁹ to widen support bases. His real power rested on the Army and with its support and under its protection land was sold and resold with no regard for traditional communal ownership.¹³⁰ At his death in 1901 he had achieved a high degree of indirect control over most of the country,¹³¹ but under the rule of his son, Habibullah Khan, the mullahs regained much of their influence that had been repressed.¹³²

Following Habibullah's murder in 1919, Amanullah Khan rose to power guided by a Mahmud Tarzi, a catalyst for modernization influences.¹³³ Tarzi, a critic of both international imperialism and domestic lack of progressiveness, became popular with a 'tiny class' of Afghan intellectuals.¹³⁴ The obstacle of progress was determined to be the alienation and illiteracy of the 'peasants.'¹³⁵ Amanullah initiated a series of reforms: raising the civil service salaries to counter corruption; removing the veil requirement for women; opening co-educational schools; starting an education programme for the nomadic tribes; and he tried to force all people in Kabul to wear 'Western'-styled clothing whether visiting or living there.¹³⁶ He also came into conflict with the border tribes who lived by smuggling as he tried to impose and collect a customs duty.¹³⁷ Under his reign a new urbanised social group developed that was separated from the qawms of 'Afghanistan proper.'¹³⁸ This urban political space was influenced by 'Western' values that were 'more imagined than real' and as the political centre moved away from the rest of society it generated a conceptual 'traditional society' as a pole of opposition.¹³⁹ Tribal elites also started sending their sons to Kabul for education¹⁴⁰ as a way of accessing the resources of the state. From 1924 and

onwards the consensus between state and society was broken as it had relied on mutual indifference.¹⁴¹ Nadir Shah became king in 1929 after having marched on Kabul twice but been forced to give up because of his Army broke up in internal blood-feuds.¹⁴² He did not depend directly on the khans for a power base but under his rule they were granted extensive autonomy.¹⁴³ Renouncing Amanullah's reforms, his own were cut short by his assassination in 1933.¹⁴⁴ The period between 1949 and 1952 has been described as a failed democratic experiment under Prime Minister Shah Mahmud. A free press initiative led to increasingly harsh verbal attacks on the government and on Islam, finally triggering a crack-down that did not in fact provoke society-wide protests.¹⁴⁵ The demands and expectations raised during this period gave voice to a small minority of educated and urbanised reform-minded elites but did not resonate with the general population. The mullahs and maliks were more responsive to the local concerns of their respective qawms than agendas formulated among a few in Kabul.¹⁴⁶

In 1953 Daoud Khan took over as Prime Minister and held that post until 1963.¹⁴⁷ Daoud was a Pashtun nationalist,¹⁴⁸ which brought him into confrontation with Pakistan over the 'Pashtunistan' issue, but was also pursuing large-scale state-planned economic development supported largely by the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁹ In 1959 on the second day of *Jeshn* (Independence week), the wives and daughters of the officials on the podium appeared unveiled before the crowds, echoing reforms similar to those that had brought Amanullah down 30 years before and openly challenging the tradition of gender separation. Daoud had prepared the confrontation with conservative elements well. He had a staff of advisors who were religious scholars with 'Western' legal education who went over every suggested reform to examine if it violated Islam. While previous small steps of introducing women into some work spaces had met with little to no complaints, the official unveiling met with angry opposition. Daoud replied that if the complaining mullahs could point to where in the Quran *purdah* was advocated, he would reinstate the rule in his family.¹⁵⁰ During the period 1965 to 1973 there were increasing clashes between Islamist and leftist radicals leading to a temporary closing of Kabul University in 1971.¹⁵¹ The modern education

system had produced an elite separated from their kin-groups and from most of Afghan society.¹⁵² Daoud mistakenly believed that his foreign-trained security forces were now strong enough for him to challenge the tribes and the religious establishment,¹⁵³ an experiment ended by the coup in 1978.

The so called Saur Revolution had grown out of discontent on both sides of the political spectrum. Foreign funded state-building had begun to erode the traditional patterns of social control¹⁵⁴ and produced resentment. Religious traditionalists were also opposed to the modernization programmes and the centralization of authority threatening autonomy in the provinces. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on its part was unhappy with an increased distancing from the Soviet Union which weakened its position.¹⁵⁵ Subsequent to the revolution, the Khalqi faction of the PDPA tried to destroy all potential challengers for social control.¹⁵⁶ They introduced sweeping reforms aimed at agrarian reform, literacy, and strengthening of the state machine.¹⁵⁷ Repressive responses to dissent led to the disappearance of an estimated 50-100,000 people.¹⁵⁸ Kabul largely relied on co-opted local representatives¹⁵⁹ outside of the administrative centres and the PDPA reforms, operating along lines of traditional in-fighting,¹⁶⁰ forced the qawms to choose between leaders they shared much with locally or leaders who represented an alien ideology.¹⁶¹

The Parcham faction of the PDPA elite developed a client network across clan and ethnic boundaries while the Khalqi faction of the party had tribal and clan networks as a support base.¹⁶² The Communist regime had from the beginning managed to gain support from Pashtun groups through the tribal structures but was thus also pushing other social groups into opposition.¹⁶³ The uprisings were as much against the increased state penetration as it was against Marxism.¹⁶⁴ Organisationally local revolts would spread in a solidarity group pattern and end where the influence of that group ended¹⁶⁵ in response to local government actions.¹⁶⁶ Resistance first erupted in Nuristan¹⁶⁷ and the government used pre-existing grievances to mobilise a part tribal counter-militia.¹⁶⁸ By 1979 the resistance had generated larger insurrections that were crushed¹⁶⁹ but the unstable situation eventually led to the Soviet invasion¹⁷⁰ and a range of Sovietisation programmes. After 1981 around 75 per cent of Afghanistan was

effectively under the control of the resistance except when directly challenged¹⁷¹ at which time they would temporarily cede an area and wait until the Soviet army left it again. By 1989 all Soviet troops had left in an orderly retreat¹⁷² and in 1992 the country entered a phase of intense civil war between rivaling factions nationally, and multiple contests for dominance at local levels. This state of insecurity allowed the social force network of the Taliban to successfully contest for control of the state apparatus and gain wide support from the population. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the Nabibullah regime held but withdrew to the population centres to secure supply routes and concentrate on a defensive war.¹⁷³ They were given a two year warning prior to the Soviet withdrawal in order to prepare their defences without Soviet assistance¹⁷⁴ and came to rely largely on local networks of power and coercion.

The government used militias to project authority into the rural areas and in 1991 the militias of Nadiri (Hazara) and Dostum (Uzbek) were deployed to the South to fight the Pashtun Hekmatyar and the HiG.¹⁷⁵ All of these commanders relied on established modes of mobilisation. Hekmatyar has been known to recruit along both ethnic and pan-Islamic lines,¹⁷⁶ and Dostum's alliance networks were strengthened through an exploitation of local rivalries.¹⁷⁷ Exploiting already existing rivalries, the Andarabi militia of Juma Khan was used to disrupt the supply routes of Massoud and the Jamiat-i Islami.¹⁷⁸ The Andarabi were first allied with Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami (HiG) who shared the same interest¹⁷⁹ but opposed the government. By not attacking the government and occasionally attacking Massoud, the Andarabi managed to balance their role and maintain local independence.¹⁸⁰ As long as Soviet assistance kept Kabul functioning, the centre held but as it dissolved the remaining components of Afghanistan turned out to be a number of 'hyper-armed networks of power.'¹⁸¹ When the Taliban started to emerge in 1994 Kabul was controlled by the largely Tajik Rabbani government and the rest of the country subject to an array of larger and smaller warlords and shuras.¹⁸²

In the post-2001 administrative system a tendency of local competition developed among government affiliates,¹⁸³ an obvious repetition of a historical pattern. It was the case during the jihad against the Soviet invasion and during the war preceding the

Taliban rise to power. When Karzai was installed to lead the country he chose to co-opt strongmen and warlords into central government and sub-national administrative units.¹⁸⁴ The Karzai government has little authority outside of Kabul and is limited by various power-holders, held back by special interests and a lack of capacity.¹⁸⁵ Establishing a good relationship with the government or the Americans has been a road for aspirants appointed to official positions in provinces where local support has been weak,¹⁸⁶ thus reinforcing the patronage dependency. Karzai employed this system with great efficiency in 2009¹⁸⁷ aiming to accommodate allied local interest groups.¹⁸⁸ Patrimonial expectations on the state, seen as an outside resource,¹⁸⁹ is thus a prominent mode of mobilisation for wider social support. This has been replicated time and again by social forces as well as in more narrow social spheres and interest formations. These alliances are highly unreliable¹⁹⁰ but the practise itself will take a long time to change.¹⁹¹

The internally and externally driven attempts to reform the country socially have generally met with resistance and revolt. Seen through the framework employed here these reforms have been externally driven by interest groups (Kabul elites) trying to mobilise and consolidate into a social force. They have been constructed outside of, and imposed on, the local political realities, most often by a state elite disconnected ideologically from society. Opposition to reform is strong among conservative tribal, regional ethno-linguistic, and religious leaders while at the same time many 'Western'-educated, urbanised Afghans have tended to underestimate this regional leadership and its strength.¹⁹² True to this, the current discourse largely mimics the reform attempts by Afghan rulers in history. The state is in the Afghan context largely an outsider intervening in local political dynamics, patterns and conflicts. These dynamics also reflect back on the state and old practises of nepotism, bribery, and kick-backs have made themselves felt across the board¹⁹³ as the state has long been subject to the patronage support of the qawm.¹⁹⁴ The pattern of Afghan state power has been that when it loses its outside revenue, it loses control and regional power-centres emerge to challenge it locally¹⁹⁵ if it was ever present there.

Social forces: the insurgency as external to society

The insurgency in Afghanistan is not reducible to the popularly used term 'the Taliban'.¹⁹⁶ Instead it is rather a network of networks at the core of which is the Kandahari Taliban and the leadership shura under mullah Omar. The reasons for joining the insurgency vary and it is not always clear-cut how strong the alliances and affiliations are. Conflict and local competition has been known to erupt¹⁹⁷ far from any ideological unity or shared purpose solidarity. The Taliban first became known in 1994 by going into confrontation with Hekmatyar's forces from HiG and then warlords around Kandahar.¹⁹⁸ Having taken Kandahar they were soon rapidly expanding through volunteers joining the movement. As they grew in numerical strength and social mass their ambitions expanded to become a national agenda,¹⁹⁹ and they gradually began challenging the established order of large and small warlords, commanders, and traditional leaders, gaining increased popularity by providing law and security.²⁰⁰ It is at this point that the movement found its momentum as a social force expanding on the back of social agent alliances, networks formed through fulfilment of subjective and locally defined interests. An early and continuing strategy directly linked to this was the exploitation of local conflicts. The Taliban are generally well informed and have been able to use these conflicts to spread their influence,²⁰¹ sometimes welcomed by elders seeking their support against rivals.²⁰² The integration of local causes into the wider insurgency remains a strategy,²⁰³ as does the practise of marrying into powerful families for mutual protection.²⁰⁴ They thus emulate the patronage strategy employed by the government; supporting the impression that social force mobilisation in Afghanistan occurs in relation to existing and pre-mobilised interest groups rather than individual recruitment strategies. It is not so much the actual movement growing through these strategies as the network of allied groups expanding which is a significant difference. By gradually attaching social interest groups to their movement through political brokering, the interest group has been able to gain social mass and become a social force but is conversely also dependent on being able to maintain its influence over the networked groups.

It is also not the case of the Taliban being a Pashtun movement though this is a quite common way to portray it. An erroneous notion of a stereotyped Taliban movement with the international community focusing on one particular ethnic group plays into the hands of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.²⁰⁵ The Taliban have been known to recruit from other groups than the Pashtuns and multiple ethnic groups have been involved in the movement from early on. There are even indications that Shiite groups are now re-establishing links with the Sunni Taliban.²⁰⁶ Support for the movement has also been reported among marginalised Tajik groups in Bamiyan and Hazaras have been recruited in Ghazni. There is a pattern of groups marginalised locally joining the Taliban²⁰⁷ that is further facilitated by actions by the international coalition forces, the Afghan government and its local representatives.

In some areas where multiple shuras have been in competition with each other, the government and international forces siding with one shura has generated a logic for the others to seek support from the insurgency. By extension, local conflicts thus fuel the wider ideological social force contest²⁰⁸ but the Taliban, the government, and the international forces also act as enablers in the local context. The situational logic shaped by changing local conditions and outside pressures incentivises the interest groups to seek alliances on the outside.

Conversely the insurgency is also largely external to society in the sense of strategic goals and agendas. In the early days the Taliban explicitly denounced any aspirations for power and ruled by a multi-headed consensus leadership but this gradually turned into an introvert and centralized leadership that failed to understand the variety and substantial differences between different parts of the country.²⁰⁹ Like the governments before and after them the ideologically based Taliban made sweeping assumptions that gradually detached them from Afghan society, necessitating repressive control in lieu of active support. The Taliban codified and extended the practises of a rural support base into urban settings²¹⁰ where attitudes were more influenced by external values.²¹¹

The village mullah and the ulema was the heart of the Taliban movement in its early days and it grew out of a pre-established network of madrasas.²¹² This does however

not to suggest that the cause of the conflict in Afghanistan is a clear cut rural-urban asymmetry grievance. While the Taliban were and are a rural based movement, it also opposes many of the rural traditional institutions, such as pashtunwali.²¹³ From 2003 onwards the Taliban expanded their recruitment outside of the madrasas through for example kinship mobilisation. The recruits were thus coming mainly from the clergy and from the enlisting of local community support.²¹⁴

There are seven main structures of the insurgency: the Islamic Movement of the Taliban; the Haqqani and Mansur networks; the Tora Bora Jihad Front; the HIG under Hekmatyar; small Salafi groups; and local commanders.²¹⁵ There are also other groups who seem to have entered the Jihad quite autonomously,²¹⁶ as well as signs of open discord between some of the networks.²¹⁷ The insurgency coalition can be described as a 'fragmented series of shifting tactical alliances of convenience.'²¹⁸ It has been said that the Taliban by 2006 was a 'complex opposition alliance' consisting of ideologically driven madrasa students (the core); a second ring of genuine jihadists provided by village mullahs and driven largely by Xenophobia (also core); communities and opportunists (the largest group); and an outer ring of mercenary elements.²¹⁹ The groups at these different levels have actuated different institutions, have mobilised on different grounds, and thus face very different situational logics. In an incident in 2006 in Uruzgan, local farmers reportedly took part in an ambush orchestrated by the Taliban purely for the fight itself.²²⁰

There is enormous potential for local leaders and their followers to join any network²²¹ depending on the incentives and disincentives for a particular response at a specific time. Organisationally 'core' fighters spend around one fifth to half of their time in a frontline environment. Local recruits on the other hand are mobilised only when operations are in their area²²² and tend to avoid behaviour that can spark long enduring blood-feuds²²³ of a qawm nature. The Haqqani network initially recruited based on tribal affiliations, later expanded during the jihad, and is now built on a combination of tribal and ideological loyalties.²²⁴ Haqqani was able to maintain a relatively high level of violence in areas populated by his Zadran tribe by relying on kinship ties and established madrasa networks²²⁵ but has gradually expanded by co-

opting local commanders. It is also the most ethnically diverse group and seems to be the one most accepting of foreign volunteers.²²⁶

Because of the different situational logics, it is useful to distinguish between 'external' and 'situated', in reference to the local environment in which the subject is based or operational. While the Taliban have, in some areas, targeted state-run schools and forced their closing, they have taken care to not oppose education as such. They have instead focused their discursive opposition on things like mixed gender classes, unveiled girls in school and the new curricula. They have also targeted schools funded by or readily identified with the government. When the British left Musa Qala the Taliban did not object to the re-opening of a school and instead declared in 2007 that they would be opening schools of their own, first for boys and gradually for girls.²²⁷ Several local insurgency groups have displayed a capacity to change their attitudes to girls' schooling and even female employment²²⁸ in response to popular demands from local constituencies. These local populations are primary agents in their context and necessary for the mobilised corporate agent, in this case local Taliban groups, that in turn responds to the aggregate pressure generated. Insurgency groups in Loya Paktia have for example approved the training of midwives that would be allowed to work with a male family member travelling with them.²²⁹ A former Taliban interviewed for this research spoke in appreciative terms of a 'Western' NGO that was, according to the respondent, running twice as many clinics in the country as the Ministry of Health.²³⁰ An Afghan official excitedly explained that a Taliban commander in the Herat area had issued a 'letter of protection' stating that the Islamic Emirate would not 'create problems' for the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) projects in the area.²³¹ Another official claimed that the Taliban in Helmand had issued letters of protection for all NSP projects except schools and roads and that they monitored, and held accountable, the contractors.²³² These are all suggestions that the Taliban either centrally or locally understand the importance of responding to the local population. The social forces injecting themselves into the local context are thus subject to the local situational logics in the shape of aggregate social pressures from primary and corporate agents. The *Layeha* or rulebook of the Taliban contains rules of conduct²³³

that clearly reflect an understanding of the necessity of regulated interaction. On the other hand there is also the interpretation that the Taliban's success in getting support is less about them conforming to population demands, and more about them being fast, ruthless, and efficient,²³⁴ particularly in relation to sharia courts. In either case it is dependent on localised social agents.

Social forces: the state and the insurgency as sites of competition

The state, from Kabul down to the district level, appears largely disconnected from society now, as it has in history. At the national level it is discursively pursuing a liberal reform agenda sponsored by international resources. Like preceding reform attempts it is largely separated from the local realities in which a majority of the population tries to survive and through which they form their understanding of what is happening. The Afghan state has largely existed in the social periphery trying to move itself to the centre, but at the district level there are often clear problems with exercising any sustainable and meaningful 'state power' in the communities. The state instead relies on local power brokers to provide that influence. Historically, shifts in power generally lacked a wide popular base and the development of new state institutions and a new education system generated a Bourgeoisie that owed its existence to the state but was not readily accepted by society²³⁵ outside of Kabul. Edicts and laws imposed on the local from the outside have tended to be met with resistance and sometimes violence. Legitimacy is complicated in Afghan politics and most political conflicts at the national level have originated in attempts by elites with foreign support to gain control of the centre and the country.²³⁶ The state has historically tried to use Nationalism, Islam, and Tribalism as modes of mobilisation in order to gain legitimacy and achieve a wider, sustained support.²³⁷ The current attempt is instead centred on a 'Western' liberal agenda coupled with references in part to the three prior modes. While the central government did to some extent manage to increase its levels of control in the hinterland through a provincial and sub-provincial bureaucratic system prior to 1978, it rarely extended far beyond the 'few paved roads.'²³⁸ At the end of the first Anglo-Afghan war the British installed the puppet regime of Shah Shuja and the Soviets did

the same with Karmal in 1979 and Najibullah in 1986. Whatever their previous standing in tribal and local politics, their external imposition by force meant immediate discrediting²³⁹ and the lines of demarcation between the state and society were essentially only blurred in Kabul.²⁴⁰

The Communist regime eliminated the political elite in order to replace it with a form of government and ideology that was alien to Afghanistan.²⁴¹ The pacification strategy was aimed at neutralising the rural areas and often relied on exploiting conflicts within and between qawms. It thus returned to the manipulation of social segmentation in order to establish influence,²⁴² emulating the historical patterns of state-society interaction. The government was represented, and still often is, in administrative centres that are physically separated from the villages and the spaces where communities gather such as the mosque. Outpost-like, they are the primary sites of contest and interaction between state and society²⁴³ relevant only when actuated by social agents.

The insurgency can be broken down into two main categories: the 'core' and the 'local.' While the 'core' is ideologically trained and motivated with socially wide aspirations, the 'local' are recruited locally and fight predominantly for locally defined interests.²⁴⁴ This has produced a high degree of interpenetration between the local and the larger conflicts.²⁴⁵ While the Taliban are pursuing national agendas, their affiliate groups pursue localised goals through local operations²⁴⁶ contributing to an accumulated strategic effect. However, over time even an externally recruited and ideologically motivated fighter is increasingly drawn into, and subject to, the local situational logics. In order to avoid the development of a local power base the Taliban have kept their commanders and shadow governors on rotation.²⁴⁷ This practise is however not shared by the more static Haqqani and Mansur networks²⁴⁸ that also have more locally constrained aspirations. Given the occasional in-fighting it could be tempting to view the insurgency as a site of power struggles, but the internal fighting is rather about asserting control and independence within the network. The fight is to retain a status and level of control, not for control over the insurgency itself. Thus the

insurgency is not really a site of competition for control as much as it is a struggle for internal autonomy.

The meeting of two externals: the state as a proxy for external interests

The current government and parliament structures of Afghanistan show signs of trying to adapt a largely external set of institutions to the historical, religious, and social contexts of the country. While the levels of efficiency could be discussed at length, a more important note is that it is an implicit acknowledgement by both the government and the external backers that the assumed 'universality' of the system is challenged locally. Signs of an urge to find legitimacy have been there from the start with the international convening of 'jirgas' to legitimise a process that was externally driven. There are however also clear signs that the international influence runs deep and it would be astonishingly arrogant to think that this went unnoticed. Apart from the very obvious manipulation, a confrontational style between Karzai and the international backers continues to create headlines and commentary, not the least in relation to the alleged voter fraud during the 2009 presidential election.²⁴⁹ Seen through a lens of interest formation and patterns of social force mobilisation in Afghanistan throughout history, the 'fraud' however seems logical. This is not to suggest that it is 'fair' or 'just,' but that election 'fraud' is set in relation to rules that were written for modes of mobilisation currently not internalised in Afghanistan. They can of course become socially internalised and legitimised eventually but they are not there now.

Corruption of an externally generated system in terms of vote buying or -rigging through the support of specific community power holders, bares remarkable similarities to established forms of social force mobilisation. Because these practices occur within a different institutional system that does not recognise these methods as legitimate, they are indeed corrupting the integrity of the latter, but it does so by following a situational logic that is socially generated. Likewise, disadvantaged groups are able to challenge the status quo through the new system and for example gain seats in parliament. This does however not necessarily indicate social acceptance of

this change in established power relationships and patterns of dominance. There is also no guarantee that issues arising from this will not result in overt violence.

In Afghanistan the political reality is not formed at the national level but in the villages and the valleys of the country. It is there it is decided who joins what network for how long and for what reasons, and the small conflicts at these local levels feed into the larger one²⁵⁰ facing the country. In the South the associates and allies of Karzai have for example systematically driven rivals over to the Taliban by marginalising them.²⁵¹ There is also an obvious external expectation and pressure on Afghanistan to conform to a model rather than to form a system of its own. The situational logic of the dependency relationship thus puts the Afghan government in a position where the majority of the domestic support base mobilise and form interests based on socially shared and legitimised principles, but the external sources of security and authority demand a different mode of mobilisation and legitimisation. The interaction between the two sets of interests and institutions produces unintended outcomes on both sides of that divide. The interaction is a point of stasis or change but in a social context such a point can span generations. The similarities between the Afghan constitution, the Somali proto-constitution or 'transitional federal charter', and the Kosovo constitution are clear indicators that the international 'guidance' was very influential when all were written²⁵² and that conformity to external expectations is demanded regardless of the conditions for it and the likelihood of a positive outcome.

The security forces and social logics

The social situational logics and geographical challenges of Afghanistan run through the state project and are exemplified in the situation surrounding the security forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) faces a number of issues relating to ethnicity and the memories of atrocities committed between factions. In the South, the large presence of Tajik officers has created problems; exemplified by the 2005 reported refusal of Tajik commanders in Kandahar (Pashtun heartland) to speak Pashto.²⁵³ The Afghan National Police (ANP) on its part has an abysmal reputation for corruption and

inefficiency and may at this point be doing more damage to the relationship with the population than helping it.

One response to the lacking reach and capacity of the Afghan security forces has been the multiple attempts at forming local pro-government militias in a strange echo of recent times and distant history alike. It seems that this type of plan seeks to replicate the modes of social force mobilisation that are prevalent in Afghanistan in an attempt to extend government reach. The various Local Defence Initiatives (LDIs) works on the principle that by giving employment and responsibility to villagers they will no longer support or tolerate insurgents.²⁵⁴ The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is the latest in this line of strategies and seeks to formalise the relationship more.

A potentially crucial problem related to the *arbaki*-style²⁵⁵ militias is the removal of their traditional mobilisation basis. Instead of being an honour and social expectation, the payment scheme of these groups relates their formation directly to the provision of funds, something that has proven itself to be highly unreliable.²⁵⁶ When the funding stops, one is left with a number of armed and trained individuals whose 'human security' has become reliant on state supplied resources that they are no longer getting. This was the situation after the fall of the Communist government and it is the situation in Iraq with the 'Awakening' movement.²⁵⁷ Also, there have been several occasions of local jihadi commanders, and presumably non-jihadist local interest groups, subverting for example the Auxiliary Police programme (ANAP) for resource access²⁵⁸ and local government and non-government power-holders getting their own militias set up and legitimised as part of programmes.

While the militia strategy may make sense in a short-term military perspective, the logics guiding the choices of the international forces and the Afghan government operate based on conditions and assumptions substantially separate from the logics guiding a community in a rural part of Afghanistan.²⁵⁹ Inherent in these initiatives is that they are hard to do without 'picking sides,' something that has become the case in several areas.²⁶⁰ It opens these strategies to co-optation and subversion for local purposes further exacerbated by over-generalisations,²⁶¹ misunderstandings,²⁶² and over-romanticising of singular, and in the wider Afghan social context, largely

irrelevant social features.²⁶³ One example is the practice of external forces 'assisting' the local partner group in solving 'local problems'²⁶⁴ in order to gain trust. The strategy of choosing sides locally has already been used by the Taliban. It has occasionally generated substantial problems for them as the reverse side of that strategy is that other local rivals are antagonised.²⁶⁵

The modern centralised state has been an artificial construct in Afghanistan and reform programmes have been met with revolt in most cases. The only relatively successful reforms have been the repressive regime of Abdur Rahman and the very careful and slow reforms under Daoud in the 1950s and 1960s.²⁶⁶ Wider political power has traditionally been sought mainly by two groups: the notables within the social structures who sought to preserve the social order as it stood, and the intelligentsia who sought social reforms or revolution. This arguably now also includes religious actors. For most others the objective has been to insert their qawm influence into the state structures at a level corresponding to their own perceived importance²⁶⁷ in a fully pragmatic approach to the prevailing situational logics.

The Meeting of the Local and External

Some of the military aspects of the intervention in Afghanistan have in many cases strengthened the connection between the Taliban and the local interest groups²⁶⁸ and irrevocably become part of the local situational logics. Examples include practices such as the CIA buying the support of local commanders²⁶⁹ that began in 2001. This is arguably self-defeating in the longer term as it exacerbates the insecurity for local social agents in the rural areas²⁷⁰ thus generating clear incentives to support the Taliban even for the ideologically unconvinced. It has empowered some local power-holders at the expense of others and the communities themselves.²⁷¹ Even groups who have previously supported of the government are reacting in increasingly negative ways.²⁷² Operations based on bad intelligence and resulting in deaths or imprisonment²⁷³ also feed the insurgency²⁷⁴ and have led even former left-wingers to move closer to the armed opposition on purely anti-American grounds.²⁷⁵

As the conflict has progressed, people disgruntled and displaced by government and coalition actions have become yet another pool of potential recruits for the insurgency. For example, the Afghan term *majburi Taliban* means ‘forced Taliban’ and indicates insurgents that have joined out of necessity of circumstances or because their families were killed in airstrikes or raids. Yet such support can sometimes be the outcome of something as simple as low-level misunderstandings or erroneous assumptions, like employing an interpreter who is antagonistic towards the groups in the area of operation.²⁷⁶ ‘Bad tips’ are frequently used as a weapon by local interest groups to get the different social forces to target local rivals.²⁷⁷ There are also examples of government officials trying to use international forces to eliminate local rivals in business ventures²⁷⁸ and interpreters inserting or withholding information to produce ‘useful’ intelligence. The perception of corrupt and inefficient governance and justice system is then capitalised on by the Taliban who have appointed shadow governors and run sharia courts²⁷⁹ to offer ‘alternative’ options.

The ebbs and flows of local support work the other way as well and the organisation of the Afghan insurgency is in reality multi-faceted with different levels and degrees of separation. It is a network of interest groups of varying sizes, some of them also networks in their own right, but the movement has been able to maintain relative cohesiveness²⁸⁰ through relative autonomy. It is not unheard of that local commanders, have been replaced with Kandahari core fighters when they have been ‘too soft’ on the population²⁸¹ but external fighters have conversely also been excluded from some areas by local groups when they have been too hard. In some parts of Paktia province, local insurgency commanders have for example reportedly asked Arab volunteers to leave in order to not alienate the population,²⁸² and in 2009 in Uruzgan province ‘external’ fighters were not allowed in some areas at all by local decision.²⁸³ To discount Afghan popular political agency is a severe mistake.

‘Development’ and ‘Modernisation’ – Reform from the Outside

From the mid-1900s the international involvement increasingly took on the shape of aid and development projects as the superpowers competed for influence. One such

example is the Helmand Valley Project between 1946 and 1953, consisting of two dams and an extensive canal system. Aiming to 'reclaim' arid land it was fraught with resistance among the peasant population and 'bureaucratic folderol',²⁸⁴ but it also suffered from its own weaknesses in planning. No plans were made to prepare the local population for how to deal with the sudden increase in water levels and access. The resulting water-logging of fields remained 19 years after the project's dedication and agricultural production dropped to 50 per cent for that time. Also part of the project was a settlement plan aimed at creating communities on the newly created farming lands. After completing a cluster of purpose-built villages outside Lashkar Gah and the settling 7,000 nomads, it was discovered that the land was not fit for agriculture due to high salt levels and an unsustainable layer of topsoil.²⁸⁵

The reforms of the post-1978 Communist regime were in turn based on large ideological assumptions and immediately generated resistance.²⁸⁶ The reforms were ill conceived and implemented,²⁸⁷ sometimes taught in rural qawms by outsiders, often under forms that were humiliating to elders²⁸⁸ and thus ended up alienating them. The literacy campaign was largely political indoctrination portraying European and urban lifestyles in a positive light,²⁸⁹ but it was the gender issues that would spark revolt.²⁹⁰ There was little actual opposition to teaching females but men teaching girls and mixed gender classes were too much.²⁹¹ The reforms were ideologically framed rather than pragmatic and increased the level of state incursion into the village²⁹² thus issuing a direct challenge. The current post-conflict programmes in Afghanistan have so many similarities with the 'modernisation' projects around the 1950s²⁹³ and the Communist programmes that followed, that they must seem like strange repetitions from a local perspective. The actuation of their meaning is in part the result of collective memories of the past, a past of failures and negative consequences, leaving little room to wonder at local scepticism towards these programmes.

The ANDS

The current manifestation of country-wide development is found in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), formally launched at the International

Conference in Support of Afghanistan in Paris on June 12, 2008.²⁹⁴ The ANDS is on the surface a relatively adapted strategy stressing, for example the role of Islamic principles, culture and lifestyle as well as equity in access to resources as ‘overriding considerations’ that are ‘critically important to any intervention.’²⁹⁵ The ANDS was also developed on a multi-level platform of ‘local consultations’²⁹⁶ but nevertheless soon slips into the language and perspectives of international interventionist projects elsewhere. It focuses on the state as a vehicle for the delivery of political goods,²⁹⁷ supplemented by a private sector,²⁹⁸ to meet goals set by conditions of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.²⁹⁹ It also envisions the state as being in competition with other forces for influence over ‘the population,’³⁰⁰ therein reducing the latter yet again to a mass lacking agency and interests. Viewing the benchmark goals of the ANDS it comes across as an over-optimistic carbon copy of similar strategies with short timeframes, emphasising for example gender and security reform and a focus on the central state and government. The level of Afghan ‘ownership’ of the strategy can certainly be called into question considering that it was written in English (later translated into Dari and Pashto) by international ‘experts’³⁰¹ and seems to serve the interests not of all Afghans as much as those politically favoured by the international interventionist project.³⁰² As Tadjbakhsh has asserted, the ANDS and the development plans before it serve to promote a liberal peace agenda,³⁰³ not one based on local context and priorities.

The NSP

‘Western’ style democracy is only meaningful if society identifies with the state and the political entities move beyond ‘political theatre.’³⁰⁴ One attempt to do so in Afghanistan is the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), representing a ‘citizen-based approach to state-building.’³⁰⁵ This programme is modelled on a number of international projects as a way to generate participatory ownership, increased solidarity between society and state, and to facilitate peaceful interaction.³⁰⁶ Falling under the control of the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) it is sponsored by international agencies and works with implementing partners from

international NGO's and companies.³⁰⁷ Central to the NSP are the Community Development Councils (CDC) that are the local representative body of the communities in charge of overseeing the allocated money and determining what it will be used for. The NSP is present in around 70 per cent of the country and 22,000 CDCs have overseen 49,000 projects with a claimed success-rate of around 95 per cent.³⁰⁸ The NSP is also an attempt to align and coordinate international assistance within an Afghan context rather than being externally driven and managed.³⁰⁹

While it has shown some success and is presented as such by international donors and implementing partners³¹⁰ as well as Afghans,³¹¹ there is also critique raised, though hesitantly, in response to problems within the programme.³¹² Some community representatives support the NSP projects while also claiming that the projects had generated conflict in their communities and that it had 'brought confusion to the people.'³¹³ Such critique concerns for example lack of sustainability,³¹⁴ fraudulent road projects and well projects, and allegations of corruption.³¹⁵ The problems raised by the community were described as things of the past that had been solved³¹⁶ but it seems this perception is not shared everywhere. The issues, and the denial of them as problems, have implications for the situational logics relating to support and success of the NSP. If discontent is left unattended it may well turn into resentment.

This is in direct contrast with the official discourse of how the programme has 'recreated ownership and contributed to reconciliation and trust between fragmented groups.'³¹⁷ The NSP has social audit mechanisms to counter fraud and according to one official, money is never touched by anyone else than the CDC's.³¹⁸ But another community observation was that the money allocated was in some places split between the five strongest families locally who could then use it for their own projects.³¹⁹

Despite the problems, at the time of the research there had developed a 'consensus' to make the CDC's the official village councils,³²⁰ thus also bringing them into direct competition with existing shuras in some places where the two did not overlap. Though some see this as 'structures of accountability and participation [...]

emerging from the bottom up,³²¹ it is not unlikely that such a move can create a similar problems as have previous attempts to 'choose sides.' The move is not coming from a community-anchored decision but a decision in Kabul to 'upgrade' the CDCs based on the positive reports of the overwhelming success of the programme. That reporting however contains cause for some doubts. It remains to be seen what the outcome will be if the CDCs directly challenge local power holders.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the aspects of the multiple social realities of Afghanistan. The complexities of the case are evident in the available modes of mobilisation as both historic and contemporary evidence suggests that interests are generally defined and produced locally rather than at a society-wide aspiration level. This reflects a political dynamic that is predominantly local as well. There are currently two major social forces in the shape of the government side and the insurgency; but they are both expressions of ideological and state-centric social forces in a context of multiple and localised interest groups that understand how to access social forces in order to meet local subjective needs. Both are dependent on a range of political networks and parties that in turn themselves are generally comprised of multiple interest groups. The social forces acquire social mass not through tantalising socio-political programmes, but through socially established modes of mobilisation. This separates the larger social forces from their respective and shifting support bases by layers of locally determined motives. Ideological decisions and actions at the centre thus have relatively little impact at the local level unless actuated locally by choice or imposed by force.

There seems to be little reason to diverge from the observations made in the mid-1980s that the Afghan state was external to society and a resource base for local interest groups accessing material and authority resources.³²² Removal of the 'higher order' ideological conflict will most likely not bring peace because local conflicts will continue to bring insecurity to the population.³²³ The priority of local conditions was the case during Alexander, Abdur Rahman, the PDPA, the Soviet occupation, and it is

the case today. The state and the insurgency share the feature that their influence and support is based on networks of networks³²⁴ joined loosely together in more or less fickle alliances. Much of the motivation for local interest groups to join either or both sides can be found in local grievances and conditions producing situational logics that confront the local *qawms* daily.

As foreign troops, workers, government representatives, or 'external' and 'situated' insurgents operate in these contexts they are subject to the situational logics even as they change them through fighting or building a well. The presence of a lingerie shop on a corner in Kabul and of 'Afghan Fried Chicken' (with armed guards)³²⁵ indicates that external influences are internalised or at least capitalised on, but Kabul is only Kabul. 'Afghanistan proper' as Dupree called it, is a multitude of local realities of which almost none correspond to the Kabuli situation. It is a fallacy to make broad assumptions about motivation and drives in the Afghan context, let alone frame it as 'just' a part of a global war on terror or extremism precisely because of this diversity.³²⁶

Apart from the often cited regional and national issues there are a multitude of localised conflict reasons. Local confrontations over resources, religion, or ethnicity³²⁷ arguably generate a more immediate insecurity for Afghans though they also feed into and off the larger conflict agendas. The fragmented and diverse nature of Afghanistan means that change, much like politics, is a highly local and highly subjective matter.

The large and complex international intervention in turn means that it inevitably intersects with Afghan society at multiple levels and produce small, largely unintended, but accumulated outcomes across the board. These spread through the social networks and are actuated as justification or mobilisers by social actors and agents with wider aspirations. The social engineering inherent in the intervention relies on notions of legitimacy and representation that simply do not correspond with a wider Afghan social reality. Using the state as a conduit it becomes one external force using another external force to attempt to reach into the relevant social space. The massive introduction of resources and influences, combined with both military and civilian interaction in the villages, has produced temporary changes in the local

situational logic but it is doubtful if it has produced any changes in the interest formations and modes of mobilisation. It appears that the pattern for social force mobilisation throughout history and in the contemporary conflict has been of patrimonial networking in order to gain social mass.

The relevant socio-political level is that of the *qawm* as employed here, which handles all its issues including the vast majority of legal concerns through the actuated institutions of the shura or the Jirga. The state is mainly external to society and the ideological projects of the different social forces play a reduced part in the choice of who to side with. The decision is instead pragmatic in response to the situational logics formed at a highly localised level. The agency of the interest group to align or shift alignment in accordance with subjectively pragmatic decisions is central to Afghan social force mobilisation. It is necessary for a social force to constantly maintain its support network through the means and capacities at their disposal. As the social forces seek to use local conflicts to expand their own influence, they simultaneously change the local situational logic for the involved parties, incentivising rivalling groups to seek alternative support elsewhere. At the same time local groups are quite adept at adopting the discourse of social forces in order to advance their own position and standing in relation to their rivals. Thus local and higher order conflicts feed into each other to continue the spiral of violence.

As in Somalia, Afghan interests form locally and are shaped by situational logics generated by subjectively actuated institutions and roles. In the interaction with outside intervention from various social forces the outcomes will generally be unintended. The pattern of social interest formation in Afghanistan is like a fine mosaic that requires a very fine brush. Attempts to use the broad brush of Nationalism, Communism, and Islamism have failed and the current roller of liberalism has provoked a similar response as its predecessor. While the language of interaction in Afghanistan has changed and while discursive adaptation for resource access³²⁸ may form a perception of Afghan politics taking place on a national scale, it largely takes place locally and in the shadows of mountains.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

The objective of this thesis was to answer the question of *how social contexts form and how they interact with interventionist projects to produce unintended outcomes*. It has done so by exploring examples of sustainable mobilisation in the multiple social realities of Somalia, Somaliland, and Afghanistan, and how the dynamics between these interest groups and social forces have been shaped by the ideational and material conditions. It has sought to explain how local social agents and external interventionist projects interact to produce unintended outcomes guided by the situational logics available at a given time, in the relevant context.

Chapter one examined the central tenets and underlying assumptions of international strategies of peacebuilding. The cross-cutting nature of the international peacebuilding task as it is currently employed was held to mean that these strategies largely reflect the assumptions present in military projects as well as ‘pure’ development or aid projects. The argument was made that the strategies commonly employed today are based on assumptions of the primacy of the state and of the universal nature of a set of values, translating into a focus on both the format and the content of the state. It was found that the current strategies were insufficient to perform as intended because they were based on assumptions and generalisations created in social contexts external to the social realities in which they were applied. Because they were external they were defined as interventionist projects entering into an already existing social context and subject to, while also changing, the conditions and situational logics of that context. In order to understand social contexts and how intervention related to them, an alternative perspective was needed that was not dependent on notions of the state or ‘universal’ values, and which sought to combine theoretical strands sensitive to the local, with an analytical structure that facilitates applicability.

Chapter two introduced such an alternative framework for the analysis of social interest formation and interaction with interventionist projects. It was based on two main theories and multiple additional influences to provide a foundation for a context-specific understanding of relevant social interaction. In order to provide a mechanical

framework for separating and making sense of the data the Morphogenetic model was adopted. This allowed for the structuring of how social logics and interest groups form over time in response to material, ideational, and institutional conditions that precede them but also dynamically evolve through social interaction. Margret Archer's Morphogenetic theory provided a framework for understanding the formation of interest groups but needed the contextualising of them as components of social forces and in relation to interventionist projects. Migdal's 'State in Society' perspective of social force interaction was employed in order to understand the social dynamics among interest groups and social forces. However, it was argued that 'social forces' should be defined as formations with the capacity to have society-wide effects by having acquired enough 'social mass.' Thus the state can be such a force if it has enough support and power but is not necessarily so, and an insurgency is similarly able to make a wide impact or not depending on its own 'social mass.' The 'norm' was found here to be a network of networks able to mobilise under a common cause on a less than permanent basis, in less than stable alliances. The notion of social forces vying for influence is useful but needs to be clearly detached from the state-centrism its language conveys. Though Migdal's conceptualisation of state and society relations and competition provide the arena of this competition we also have to include the 'reverse' agency of the individual interest groups in relation to social forces including the state. The relevant agency is thus found to be situated at a lower level of interaction than the social force vs. state framework. The population is simply not a passive mass of disinterested victims without agency as pointed out by Jabri.¹ It is instead for example able to generate multiple sites of resistance and co-optation within the boundaries set by the material, structural and ideational conditions.

A particular focus was put on the modes of mobilisation for social forces and interest groups, and the formation of situational logics facing them. It was argued that social agents were interest groups mobilised to pursue a shared social interest. In order to gain enough social mass to pursue wider aspirations, groups so inclined needed to attract more members or enter into social alliance networks. The state, insurgencies, and similar entities were considered social forces that interacted with the

social interest groups. Depending on social composition the social forces could be perceived as external to society or as a site of competition for control over the social force and by extension a wider social context. The actuation of different institutions and social structures were considered subjective in nature while determining the available situational logics it is also dependent on the same logic. The agent, or indeed individual, is not free to choose at will but constrained to socially available and viable options.

Chapter three examined the conditions in Somalia and Somaliland. It was found that in both cases the most crucial social unit was the *diya*-group which provided physical and social security through informal *xeer* agreements. The role of elders and the institutions of *guurti*, *xeer*, and *sharia* provided social mediation and order under 'normal' circumstances, but that massive disruptions such as war necessitated functions of forgiveness such as *xalaydahay*. Colonial powers had come and gone, the repressive social engineering of Said Barre had been successfully resisted, and foreign interventions endured. Through all this the sub-clan and the *diya*-group had remained the most meaningful level of social mobilisation and interaction. In the case of Somalia it was argued that the government as well as the insurgency group and the Sufi defensive alliance were all predominantly mobilised on these foundations rather than ideological convictions. International Jihadist and liberal forces were accessed and used in order to continue local issues at a different level. The discrepancies between Somali situational logics and international strategy were found to be obvious in the failed peace processes held physically away from all the factors incentivising progress and resolution in the Somali context.

The Somaliland transitional process was held to be of significant importance by comparison because of the high level of internal control as opposed to international intervention. This provided an opportunity to examine social change driven by internal initiative and given indications of popular approval through a referendum. While Somaliland exhibits remarkable success in terms of brokering and maintaining the peace as well as moving to free elections, its hybrid format has not produced the outcomes declared in its intentions. The *diya*-group is still the most relevant level of

social interaction and mobilisation largely occurs along the established lines despite a three party rule intended to break that cycle. In the end, Somaliland is definitely 'by' its people but has some way to go before it becomes also 'for' it. The external format of the central state is weak in the Somaliland context but supplemented by traditional roles and institutions where it has no capacity. This however also means that the state is fully subject to the active participation of sub-state entities in a supporting role. It also carries with it that the state is seen as external to society and an arena for the continuation of sub-state friction rather than a social force in its own right. In both Somalia and Somaliland the state was thus held to be mainly external to society and subject to socio-political interaction at the relevant level rather than the other way around.

Chapter four examined the case of Afghanistan. While there are many differences between the Afghan and Somali environments, certain elements are shared. Among the more important are the prevailing states of conflict and the pluralistic nature of society. In the Afghan environment it was found that modes of mobilisation were mainly focused on a narrowly defined interest group herein referred to as a *qawm*. The importance of the *qawm* as a political unit guided by a shura is apparent when looking into the modes of mobilisation for social forces in the country.

Afghanistan is a diverse country on many levels that calls the notion of a meaningful 'Afghan' identity, understood as a solidarity function, into question. Interest and solidarity groups are framed in terms of kinship, occupational, geographical or similar natures and occur in different formats depending of the location and context examined. The many years of war and confrontation have generated a large number of localised conflicts that have a separate life from, but are strategically intertwined with, the 'umbrella' conflict between the state and the insurgency. The state and the insurgency, both external to society, constitute state-centric, ideological projects that seek to draw on local interests to increase their social mass. They both rely on networks of networks of social agents where the vast majority of network component groups, never really leave the area defined by their social boundaries to fight. Instead,

local interests were held to be the main motivation behind aligning with either side of the conflict or in some cases with both.

The network character of these two larger social forces means that while acquiring support from the local they are simultaneously affecting and being co-opted into these local conflicts. Thus when one group aligns with the government or the international forces their local rivals are likely to seek support from the opposing side and vice versa. The symbiotic relationship is subject to the agency and active decisions of the *qawm* and it is at this level that relevant social interaction and mobilisation happens. The complex nature of the international intervention at all levels meant that accumulated unintended outcomes were produced simultaneously and actuated as shared memories. It has been relatively easy to manipulate either side into taking action on the behalf of one's own interest group. Thus airstrikes, night-raids, and 'renditions' are strategies on one side, and improvised explosive devices, assassinations, and executions are on the other, in what in reality are frequently expressions of locally generated issues.

Afghanistan is a highly conservative country. The wide reform attempts by various Afghan rulers provided some interesting perspectives on the implementation of change in this context, but also displays that the central state has throughout history been external to the local contexts of 'Afghanistan proper.'² The two comparatively successful attempts at social reform were those of Abdur Rahman and Daoud respectively, though the highly repressive nature of the former may not make his the most positive of examples. The careful approach of Daoud seems to be the most successful historically but like most of the reforms thus far have had little lasting effect on social interaction.

What it means

While the positionality and subjectivities of the analyst cannot be completely removed an effort must be made to reduce their impact and employ a measure of reflection.³ This hopefully allows for a sufficient contextualisation of strategy to facilitate local mediation, re-negotiation, and internalisation without imposing major

social engineering projects in order to make a society conform to externally generated and defined concepts by coercion. There has been a tendency, supported by different activist organisations, to promote the power of normative 'universals' of benign behaviour through abruptly changing systems of shared knowledge and meaning within a social interest-group. Apart from coming very close to a very self-centred notion of definitional ownership, this simplistic notion of the role of the social environment and agency must be predicated on a nearly total freedom for the individual to make decisions without repercussions in the social sphere. It thus overlooks the interplay between situational constraints and social interests.

The theory development of this thesis has sought to add a perspective on social interaction and conflict that is a middle-road between abstract theory and concrete practicality. Norms and ideology are aspirations, not facts of the day upon which strategy can be constructed and the basis of engagement should be a critical and reflecting analysis. Strategy can work towards certain ideal goals but never assume that they exist or that they are objectively 'universal.' The presented framework focuses on understanding the existing social context as it stands and not how a particular group wants it to be. It however also acknowledges both the complexities of social dynamics on the one hand, and the need to make some generalisations in the interest of applicability on the other.

By shedding the central assumptions of international relations theory and combining it with a sociological perspective it becomes possible to explore the location of actual agency and relevant socio-political interaction in social contexts. At the heart of the analysis the actuated modes of mobilisation emerge as key to understanding at what level and to what aspirations relevant socio-political action take place. They provide significant indications of how interests form and are pursued, as well as how social mass is acquired. Crucially, the patterns on display in the cases are significantly different from those of the established range of different 'Western'-style democracies in terms of both social organisation and political coherence.

In all three locales engaged in this thesis, interests form at highly localised levels. They are generally pursued as limited aspirations relating to the socially defined

boundaries of the agent. Temporary wider alliances occur but usually as a general alignment, as a means to pursue a short-term objective, or as a defensive alliance. When the interest or threat subsides, these social forces are likely to break down along the original social fissure lines. Social forces may seem more sustainable on the surface but are in these environments networks of networks of interest groups. These groups have a range of reasons for their alignment and while some may commit fully to one 'side' many can shift alignment on a locally subjective pragmatic basis.

Solidarity factors, shared identities, geographical proximity, or external threats all serve to provide potential bases of permanent or temporary mobilisation. Such decisions will however be made by relevant social agents in line with the emergent situational logics deriving from the subjectively actuated structural and ideational institutional conditions. In environments like Somalia and Afghanistan this means examining dynamics at a highly localised level because while the social force networks must rely on the support of local groups their presence also constitutes an intervention into the specific social context and off-sets the local balances for good or bad.

The localised nature of incentives also means that the agency of the social interest group predominantly plays out at this level. Population-centric approaches, human security, rights-based approaches, and other strategies do not in fact depart from the local socio-political dynamics in these environments. They depart from an idealised and largely self-constructed image of the 'human being', how things 'should be' and how people 'should behave' according to specific ideological lenses. This allows peacebuilders and other interventionists to hold a (post-) conflict society to standards most 'Western' nations have problems conforming to and to make demands in the name of 'universal' ideas. The state and society as envisioned in many of these strategies does not in fact exist outside of the idealised images actuated by international interventionists. 'Local' is confused to incorporate highly differing social realities and the state is treated as the vehicle to reach the population. This understanding of social interaction is in stark contrast to the realities of many places and arguably sets up a foundation for failure.

In the cases examined local strategies have included co-optation of externally designed projects in order to pursue locally defined agendas and struggles. This seems to largely be facilitated by situated agents focusing on local interest formations and local issues while external interventionist projects refer to largely altruistic and utilitarian ideological notions of 'universal' political or religious values. Through simple adoption of the discourses associated with liberalism, Islamist jihad, and other political agendas, the 'external' can be accessed as a resource base in order to gain an advantage in the local context. It is as Vayrynen notes, that when employing a needs discourse in a conflict resolution setting there is a risk that the participants adopt the language of needs theory in order to justify their actions but that this happens is in itself not proof of these needs.⁴ Any planning disconnected from knowledge of the local realities is likely to be a) more easily subverted and/or co-opted due to failing to connect or gain legitimacy and; b) more likely to be viewed as confrontational by the 'local' even if considered benign from the perspective of the 'external.' In order to gain access to the support or resources needed, discourse adaptation serves as a powerful tool, be it militant Islamism, liberal values, democratisation, or something else. Thus while local aspiration groups feed into the capacities of the social force networks by seemingly aligning with their agendas they will also detract from their capacities by actually pursuing their own.

With this said these modes of mobilisation and the pragmatic responses to situational logics are of course not exclusive. There are groups and individuals who mobilise on alternative grounds, who throw in their lot with one social force and remain true to it, for example on a purely ideological or idealistic basis. The question thus becomes one of relevance to the shaping of situational logics and sustainable social mobilisation to affect social change. While these, what we might call 'free agents', are present in all three case studies, their potential impact is arguably limited. The greatest potential is in Somaliland but they are at the present very constrained there as well by the prevailing conditions. These are the people who consider themselves above or outside of the dominant system and who argue the progressive nature of their position. They are often the cultural or intellectual elite but while their

voices may be articulate and heard by external actors, their actual social weight is usually light.

It could be possible to make the argument for seeing the ideological core of the Taliban in this light, but they are mobilised as an interest group of limited size and are like the government, as discussed, dependent on the network mobilisation of other interest groups to gain social mass. Because social interaction is dynamically changing, as per the framework, the actors and agents may well accumulate enough social mass to become a factor in the future. But like normative 'universals' it is not something that should constitute a *de facto* foundation in the present. Change takes time and has to be internalised.

In Somaliland the overt violence was overcome by incremental localised peace negotiations between relevant parties through legitimate formats. Yet Somaliland has some way to go before the interest formations and modes of mobilisation are likely to change to reflect the intentions expressed in the constitution and the referendum. In Somalia old animosities at local or higher levels have remained and are now present in the mix between sub-clan interests, clan family loyalties, political ideology, and religion. The international intervention entered this context as an established party to the conflict, a heritage of the 1990s, and furthermore on the side of one of the social forces involved.

In Afghanistan local interest groups are increasingly subject to predatory or repressive actors able to assert their roles through social force backing either from the state, the coalition, or the insurgency. They are able to forge *de facto* roles as local commanders or officials that are imposed on the local communities. The situational logics produced contain disincentives that have immediate implications for survival. The more complex an intervention is the more points of interaction producing individual outcomes there will be with potential and uncontrollable knock on effects. The mode of engagement also affects the outcomes and by engaging through from the top down, intentions are filtered through interaction at every network level before reaching the relevant socio-political context where actual decisions of actuation are made. This is further exacerbated when discourse, associations, meanings, and

language are not shared. The message passes through layers of interests distorted in small ways until breaking through completely reshaped even before interaction even begins with the relevant parties. This carries both positive and negative potential aspects from the interventionist project's point of view as it may subvert intentions but may also adapt them to a more suitable format. It will nevertheless produce unintended outcomes. Direct engagement with the relevant socio-political context produces other challenges. The format of engagement itself may overlook local dynamics, producing unintended outcomes of insecurity or resentment.

A social agent's decision to align occurs in response to the situational logics produced in interaction with subjectively actuated institutions and the conditions of the immediate environment. It is mainly at this level that relevant social outcomes are generated in the examined cases. 'Relevant' is to be understood as relevant to a majority of the social agents and actors, not to the aspirations of the interventionist project, although the former obviously has implications for the latter. Abstract ideological aspirations as well as practical projects are thus considered on their merit in the immediate local context, not in the sense of a 'greater good' or ideological alignment. This does not mean that it would not be possible to introduce ideological priorities, but that the conditions and situational logics do not incentivise their choice over immediate, local concerns. An environment of long-standing social conflict, survival needs, and strong interests often linked to violence narrows the focus of socio-political interaction. The subjective nature of perceptions and the limited socio-political aspirations involved at this level means that incentives and disincentives are judged locally. The localised focus also excludes social forces from the normal decision making, therein making them external to the relevant socio-political context. This has implications for conflict as well as for building peace.

There is a distinct discrepancy between the format and contents of state-centric interventionism, and local priorities in conflict environments. Both Afghanistan and Somalia are examples where externally driven peacebuilding through state-building is clearly out of touch with the conditions as they stand. Even Somaliland, an internally initiated and driven process of transformation, remains under the influence of local

priorities though arguably at least has popular support and some momentum. Somaliland is also the one of the three that has managed to build an actual peace by addressing local issues first through socially established and legitimate formats. It has thus realised that before issues of state can be resolved, conflicts have to be addressed at the level where politics actually play out.

It is thus also not possible to generically determine what are peace-conducive actors or actions outside of the specific context. Objectively speaking, a social agent that has strong potential repressive capacities locally may for example constrain the behaviour of others and enforce a negative peace without resorting to force or threats because the distribution of resources shapes the possible responses. It may of course also be perceived as a challenge to other social agents and encourage a violent competition. Precisely because of the unpredictable agency of the local social agents, peace as well as conflict becomes about specific conditions at a specific time. The opportunistic nature of much of the social logic in Somalia and Afghanistan means that all social agents can be conduits of peace or conflict at the same time. What then are stabilising factors? The perspective presented here leads to the conclusion that just like destructive tendencies peaceful social behaviour has to be sought primarily at a local level. The reconciliation of social forces means very little if local interest groups are really fighting over local matters instead of wider ideological agendas. The local antagonism and violence remains in place to seek new justifiers and social force alliances. A highly localised style of peacebuilding would take time, be very expensive, and extremely complicated. There is however no evidence in history that peacebuilding and state-building were ever supposed to be quick, cheap, and simple. That is be worth bearing in mind.

Possible weaknesses and critiques

A possible critique of this framework is its reductionist nature but it should be remembered that the objective was not to generate a fully comprehensive account of social interaction. It brings together three theoretical positions in order to provide a *sufficiently* comprehensive narrative that emerges from the local context but framed in

such a way as to allow for applicability. While it is acknowledged that this is not ideal it is argued that it is necessary for the intended purposes.

A second possible critique is that this framework lends itself to instrumentalism and justification of intervention by acknowledging its existence without rejecting it completely. While this is a possibility it also requires a conscious falsification of the data or misunderstanding of the framework in order to avoid a repetition of the same failures that are already being repeated. By using subjectively pre-defined values the analysis can be swayed to reflect a specific narrative and the systemic demand for operational rules results in an 'imposed technology.'⁵ There is however also a risk of local agents anticipating and complying with external expectations through a self-representation guided by perceptions of what demands are legitimate. The actively sought 'local knowledge' is thus newly produced through project activities, making the project contextually adapted⁶ on paper, but disconnected from the local social realities. These risks should be reflected upon in data accumulation. True to the framework actors can choose to ignore the disincentives of failure in order to pursue an ideological view of the world in terms of universals or similar. It is however hoped that someone may find it a helpful and useful perspective in order to avoid negative outcomes and achieve lasting results. However it should also be considered that the perspective here suggests that social engineering requires a degree of actual acceptance on the recipient end. Outcomes of unaccepted transformative projects are more likely to become unintended hybrids, recognisable in name only and dysfunctional when compared to the functions originally intended by their instigators.

While the focus on context-sensitive adaptation may be perceived on the surface as a repetition of the principle to 'do no harm' (DNH), it is not. The perspective developed here shares many of the positions of DNH but despite the insights and recommendations made in 1999 little has changed and it is likely that the same will happen to literature that becomes abstracted beyond usefulness. Where DNH is largely a practical set of advice with little theoretical foundation, other current theoretical developments threaten to become theoretical points with little practical

applicability. Applicability requires the capacity to utilise both theory and practical lessons while also mediating between them.

No society is atomistic and that all interaction at all levels introduces change to some degree. 'Harm' in the sense of changing or affecting the existing social context is thus per definition always done whether by satellite TV, seemingly benign aid and development projects, or invasion. Aid, as Anderson argues, becomes part of the context and risks feeding into and exacerbating conflict.⁷ It can of course also provide positive impact or be intended as non-political, but is never 'neutral' in its outcomes.⁸ A weakness of DNH that this thesis seeks to rectify is the lack of anchoring to local perceptions in the suggested framework. The analysing aid worker is expected to take some arguments at face value, primarily 'justice'-based ones, and question others, effectively making it an aid-based strategy for social engineering. DNH offers no way for the analysis to contextualise and understand how local dynamics develop and how they relate to the external project. The purpose of this work is to provide a framework for understanding this and how they are changed by, but also change, the outcome of interventionist projects even when these explicitly intend to 'do no harm.'

Yet another possible critique concerns generalisation and extrapolation. The case analyses presented herein cannot be extrapolated as 'ready-made' to any other context and the cases contain a multitude of social 'realities' that all generate their own local context within each case. In this sense the framework is weak but does not on the other hand seek to be a generalised tool. What it aims to do is to argue and provide a platform from which to approach context-specific analysis where the level, scope, and location of a particular project determine the level of analysis. It thus generalises the perspective of the approach but not at what level relevant social interaction occurs or how that social interaction looks.

The responses of the local in relation to external actors and agents are expressed in different ways relating to the context and thus the analysis must also adapt. While the social analysis and strategies are never fully transferable between social contexts it is possible to use the same framework of analysis across social differences. The point is that it needs to be responsive to local subjectivities over 'universals,' to let the 'local'

speak rather than ascribe solutions, and not 'speak at' on behalf of externally defined priorities.

The issues pertaining to sources and language mentioned in the introduction should be commented on here. It is felt that the mechanisms for controlling the negative effects of being reliant on secondary sources and interpretations have been largely successful. The primary method of validating this has been by observing reporting and research on the respective cases as well as discussing aspects of it on return visits to Afghanistan.

What does it add?

The framework developed here is an original way of approaching these issues as it breaks with the ideologically-driven assumptions and prescribed measures, but without raising a flag of relativism or becoming so abstract it loses touch with the ground realities. Any intervention into a socio-political context is a political act per definition, even if it does not intend to be. Off-setting the social balance of the context is unavoidable and these balances must therefore be understood. This is not in order to completely avoid affecting them as that is impossible, but rather to understand the dynamics and potential outcomes of the interaction. The simple assertion is that the larger the discrepancies are, the more tumultuous the outcomes are likely to become. The framework blends perspectives from international relations with sociological understandings of socio-political interaction to facilitate context understanding while raising a warning that grasping the dynamics of a context does not mean controlling the outcome of one's interaction with it. It is thus a bridge between the sociological preoccupation with social interaction and the international relations focus on interventions based on Universalist assumptions, realist motives, and idealist justifications. In doing so it adds to the understanding of the local conditions and instances of hybridisation, real or perceived, in the social contexts of the cases. It also raises issues with the optimistic accounts of outside influence, romanticisation of the local,⁹ and the images of a passive population of victims.

The framework furthermore seeks to add a separation of how interest groups and social forces are understood. By defining a social force as having enough 'social mass' to affect society-wide change it becomes possible to differentiate the accumulative interest groups and their separate goals and agendas rather than seeing them as one unit. Thus insurgencies, states, and international coalitions in Afghanistan and Somalia are all social forces, consisting of interest groups that do not necessarily share the same strategy or agenda other than in very loose terms. These groups inhabit social realities largely separate from each other and the ideological discourse of social forces. The act of analytical separation is an attempt to force analysis to acknowledge and engage with the multiple layers of interests present.

While drawing on and seeking to contribute in small ways to critical fourth generation peace studies, this work stands on its own. It moves in the same direction but on a parallel track aiming to provide a constructive rather than deconstructive framework. By combining international relations and sociology it becomes possible to acknowledge the reality of intervention without necessarily judging intent, but also to perhaps avoid the worst of the unintended outcomes based on ignorance and arrogance. It also allows us to break free from the damaging effects of adopting the assumption inherent in the central supporting literature of strategy today. Academics and policymakers may debate the moral justifications of intervention or not, but it is meanwhile happening at various levels in all societies. In the societies focused on here this is particularly true and has immediate effects on the lives of a great number of people. The framework thus avoids the question of justification and is perhaps more relevant for practical applications than moral arguments.

If we accept the premises of this framework to be true then we also accept that the strategies of the addressed interventions contain assumptions that are incorrect and impacting the three environments in a number of negative ways, not by intention but from being out of sync with the operational environments. The inherent discrepancies between intent and reality, and thus in relation to the situational logics facing social agents and actors, place focus on factors far removed from the relevant levels of socio-political interaction. The resulting outcomes further reinforce negative situational

logics and can easily become a mutually supporting feed-back loop of violence. The economic cost in the case of Afghanistan may be carried by international donors, but the absolute brunt of the human cost is as usual paid by the weakest and disenfranchised as they shape their survival strategies around situational logics generated in the interaction of stronger interests and social forces. Interventions need to adapt in pace and in level of engagement to the relevant and legitimised shared social images. This does not preclude advocating changes to social systems, but strategy cannot be built on wishful thinking and people cannot be forced to think in specific ways. Trying to do so is potentially damaging to everyone involved and counter-productive to the intended outcomes because it encourages rejection of its inherently confrontational style of engagement.

And this is the final contribution aspired to by this framework: to provide a platform from which to observe and compare our own approaches to the actual context, a meeting ground where the ideologically laden wishes of donors and other interventionist forces can be mediated by practitioners with their intimate knowledge of the field and their personal experiences with the challenges of interventions. Perhaps even a space where starry-eyed idealism and idealised Realism can meet with the bitter grind of the cynical scepticism of experience, and together build constructive options.

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Interviews

For reasons explained in the introduction the interviews have been made anonymous. The below listed interview dates and categories are the interviews drawn upon in this thesis with several additional left out for different reasons. In addition to these formal interview the research has been informed by observations and informal conversations.

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Somaliland Journalist 1* (23 July 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Somaliland Politician 1* (25 July 2009).

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Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Somaliland Politician 2* (6 August 2009).

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Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Intelligence Official* (10 September 2009).

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Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Senior Military Officer* (11 September 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Worker 3* (15 September 2009).

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Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Afghan State Worker 1* (27 October 2009).

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Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Worker 8* (6 November 2009).

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Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Analyst 2* (17 November 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Afghan State Worker 2* (17 November 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Afghan State Worker 3* (21 November 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *Afghan State Worker 4* (21 November 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Diplomat 2* (21 November 2009).

Interview by Karl Sandstrom. *International Worker 12* (21 November 2009).

Introduction

¹ Hammersley, Martin. *What's wrong with Ethnography?* (London: Routledge, 1992), 23

² Mosse, David. *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice*. (Ann Arbour: Pluto Press, 2005), 1

³ The concept and meaning of the liberal peace as an interventionist project is being explored by a number of academics, most recently in for example in *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Development and Approaches*, edited by Oliver P. Richmond. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

⁴ Richmond, Oliver P. "A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory." In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Development and Approaches* by Oliver P. Richmond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 26

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Boege, Volker, et al. "Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders." *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (2009): 612

⁷ Richmond, "Resistance," 669

⁸ I owe this particular formulation of this idea to Roger MacGinty of the University of St Andrews.

⁹ See Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 602

¹⁰ There is of course a wealth of sociological, anthropological, conflict, development, modernisation, and similar literature on this subject. See for example Duffield, Mark. *Development, Security, and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, or Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. "Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding." In *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, by Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk. (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), and many more.

¹¹ Hammersley, *What's Wrong*, 44

¹² This interpretation of the term 'intervention' is in line with for example David Mosse who uses it to describe an agricultural project, see Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 37; and Oliver P. Richmond who uses it to describe the whole range of liberal peace engagement, see Richmond, "Genealogy", 23

¹³ Mosse, David. "Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid." In *The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development*, by David Mosse and David Lewis. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 13

¹⁴ Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and the Unmaking of the Third World*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 219

¹⁵ See for example Anderson, Mary B. *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 40

¹⁶ Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 600

¹⁷ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 117

¹⁸ Richmond, "Genealogy," 29

¹⁹ Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "Human Security and the Legitimization of Peacebuilding." In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*, by Oliver P. Richmond. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 132

²⁰ Richmond, Oliver P. "Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, May 2010: 670

²¹ Migdal, Joel S. *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 100

²² Gergen, Kenneth J. and Gergen, Mary M., 2007, *Social Construction and Research Methodology*, 462 in Outhwaite, William and Turner, Stephen P. (ed). *The Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology*. (London: Sage, 2007), 461-478

²³ Creswell, John W. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, (London: Sage, 2007), 21

²⁴ Creswell, *Qualitative inquiry*, 17

²⁵ Tonkiss, Fran, 1998, "Analysing Discourse", 251, in Seale, Clive (ed), *Researching Society and Culture*, Sage Publications, 245-260

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- ²⁶ Migdal, *State in Society*, 2001, 107
- ²⁷ Hall, John R. "Historicity and Socio-Historical Research", 82, in Outhwaite, William and Turner, Stephen P. (ed). *The Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology*, (London: Sage, 2007), 82-99
- ²⁸ Schwinn, Thomas. "Individual and Collective Action", 311 in Outhwaite, William and Turner, Stephen P. (ed), 2007, *The Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology*. (London: Sage, 2007), 302-315
- ²⁹ Hall, "Historicity", 84-5
- ³⁰ See for example the discussion of *majles* in Azoy, G. Whitney. *Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 27-8
- ³¹ Debiel, Tobias, Glassner, Rainer, Schetter Conrad, and Terlinden, Ulf, 2009, "Local Statebuilding in Afghanistan and Somaliland", 43, in *Peace Review*, 21:1, 38-44
- ³² David Schneider has questioned the use of the term 'kinship' as a privileged form of organization (see Schneider, David M. *A Critique of the Study of Kinship* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984)) but the term is employed here to denote the socially constructed bond of obligation and rights that focuses on kinship within Somali and Afghan societies. While the term itself may be questioned and replaced by something else, the widespread principle of organization around kin and clan within these societies is undeniable. A counter-view to that of Schneider is for example Imi Amadume (2005, "Family and Culture in Africa", 361 in Essed et al. (ed), *A Companion to Gender Studies*, Blackwell, 357-369) where she asserts that while kinship may not be a prevalent principle of organization in the 'Western Metropolis', 'in Africa, everyone has a kin and is guided by kinship morality.'
- ³³ Rubin, Barnett R. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. 2. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 43
- ³⁴ Debiel, Tobias and Lambach, Daniel, 2009, "How State-Building Strategies Miss Local Realities", 22-3 in *Peace Review*, 21:1, 22-28
- ³⁵ Escobar, Arturo, "Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World", 438 in *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), 428-443
- ³⁶ See for example Larson Anna, *Mainstream: Promoting Gender Equality in Afghanistan*, 2008 (Nov), Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Issues Paper Series, 7; Kippen, Grant, 2008 (Nov), *Elections in 2009 and 2010: Technical and Contextual Challenges to Building Democracy in Afghanistan*, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper Series, 18; or Dreze, Jean, 2000, "Militarism, Development, and Democracy", 1175 in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 35, No. 14 (Apr. 1-7, 2000), 1171-1183
- ³⁷ See for example the US Army 'Human Terrain System' (<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>)
- ³⁸ Tonkiss, "Analysing Discourse", 250
- ³⁹ Walsh, David. "Doing Ethnography", 225, in Seale, Clive (ed). *Researching Society and Culture*. (London: Sage, 1998) 226
- ⁴⁰ Seale, Clive. "Qualitative Interviewing", 206, in Seale, Clive (ed). *Researching Society and Culture*. (London: Sage, 1998)
- ⁴¹ Thomas, Jim. *Doing Critical Ethnography*. (London: Sage, 1993), 40-41
- ⁴² Hammersley, *What's Wrong*, 11
- ⁴³ Seale "Qualitative interviewing", 215
- ⁴⁴ Walsh, "Doing Ethnography", 221
- ⁴⁵ This is not a full account of the ethical considerations made in the process of this research. The project underwent substantial scrutiny by the Ethics board of the University of St Andrews prior to approval.
- ⁴⁶ See for example the debate on 'humanitarian space'

Chapter One: Strategy and Literature

- ¹ The term 'intervention' is used in this thesis to describe any type of externally generated military or civilian project into an existing social context.
- ² See for example Richmond, Oliver P. *The Transformation of Peace*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 4
- ³ Paris, Roland. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 44

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- ⁴ For example stressed in Interview with International Worker 2, September 11, 2009, identity withheld, but also reflected on by a number of other respondents
- ⁵ Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development." *Third World Quarterly* (Taylor & Francis Group) 22, no. 1 (February 2001): 18
- ⁶ Schultz, Richard H. "State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis, 77." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541 (1995): 75-88
- ⁷ Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 122
- ⁸ Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. "The Problematics of Liberal Democracy and Democratic Process: Lessons for Deconstructing and Building African Democracies." In *Liberal Democracy and its Critics in Africa*, by Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, 1-25. (UNISA Press, 2005), 20
- ⁹ Ignatieff, Michael. *Empire Lite: Nationbuilding in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. (Vintage, 2003), 42
- ¹⁰ Quoted in Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 187
- ¹¹ Sutcliffe, Anthony. *An Economic and Social History of Western Europe since 1945*. (London: Longman Publishing Group, 1996), 1
- ¹² Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe 1947-1952*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26
- ¹³ Sutcliffe, *Western Europe*, 7
- ¹⁴ Richmond, *Transformation*, 14
- ¹⁵ Paris, *At War's End*, 5-6
- ¹⁶ Mosse, "Global Governance", 1
- ¹⁷ Clawson, Patrick. "What's Next after Saddam." In *Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq*, by Michael Knights. (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 247-254
- ¹⁸ Paris, *At War's End*, 44
- ¹⁹ See for example Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and War." In *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, by Richard K. Betts. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 2002), 335
- ²⁰ Paris, *At war's end*, 151
- ²¹ Richmond, "Genealogy," 15
- ²² Berdal, Mats. *Building Peace after war*. (London: Routledge, 2009), 19
- ²³ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*. (New York: United Nations, 1992)
- ²⁴ See for example Berdal, *Building Peace*, 18-19
- ²⁵ UN Peacebuilding Commission. *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its First Session*. United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 2007), 4-6
- ²⁶ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. Position Paper, (New York: United Nations, 1995), 5
- ²⁷ United Nations. *United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2010-2013: Weathering the Storm: Peace Income and Health for all Afghans*, (United Nations, 2009)
- ²⁸ United Nations, "Development Assistance", 4
- ²⁹ *Ibid.* 16
- ³⁰ This was obvious in observations and interviews during the research.
- ³¹ United Nations and the World Bank. *Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme - Deepening Peace and Reducing Conflict, Volume I, Draft*. (New York: United Nations and World Bank Coordination Secretariat: Joint Needs Assessment, 2008), v
- ³² United Nations and the World Bank, "Somali RDP", 24
- ³³ *Ibid.* 8
- ³⁴ Mosse, "Global Governance," 22
- ³⁵ Gerhard, Anders. "Good Governance as Technology: Towards an Ethnography of the Bretton Woods Institutions." In *The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development*, by David Mosse and David Lewis. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 37

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- ³⁶ Ki-Moon, Ban. "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General." 12 January 2009. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4989924d2.html> (accessed October 27, 2010)
- ³⁷ Richmond, "Resistance," 666
- ³⁸ Richmond, "Genealogy," 24-25
- ³⁹ Mosse, "Global Governance," 8
- ⁴⁰ Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 611
- ⁴¹ Gould, Jeremy. "Timing, Scale, and Style: Capacity as Governmentality in Tanzania." In *The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development*, by David Mosse and David Lewis. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 65
- ⁴² Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 37
- ⁴³ Richmond, Oliver P. "Introduction." In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 1
- ⁴⁴ For example Kumak, Chetan. "Conclusion." In *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, by Elisabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumak and Karin Wermester. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 208; or Abiew, Francis Kofi. "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations." In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond. (London: Frank Cass), 2003, 29.
- ⁴⁵ Evans-Kent, Bronwyn, and Roland Bleiker. "Peace Beyond the State? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 107
- ⁴⁶ This was discussed with several IO, NGO, and Government agency representatives in all fieldwork sites. The suggested solutions to this problem ranged between resistance (telling the donors off), compliance (for example technocratic implementation of a value-set), and subversive behaviour (simply doing one thing and lying to the donors in order to be able to work at all).
- ⁴⁷ Aggestam, Karin. "Conflict Prevention: Old Wine in New Bottles." In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 18
- ⁴⁸ Evans-Kent and Bleiker, *Peace Beyond*, 107
- ⁴⁹ This view is supported by a number of interviews. See also Mckechnie, Alastair J. "Building Capacity in Post-Conflict Countries." *The World Bank: Social Development Notes*. no. 14. (Washington D.C.: The World Bank: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, December 2003), 1
- ⁵⁰ Hudock, Ann C. *NGOs and Civil Society*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 2
- ⁵¹ Evans-Kent and Bleiker, *Peace Beyond*, 107
- ⁵² This is another issue that was discussed with NGO representatives who acknowledged that there are issues involved, and with international representatives who acknowledged that projects that did not 'tick the boxes' were de-prioritised in the selection process.
- ⁵³ Hudock, *NGOs*, 110
- ⁵⁴ This is based on interviews and personal observation of how some organisations slowly shift from service delivery to ideologically guided development agendas under donor pressure.
- ⁵⁵ Richmond, Oliver P. "The Dilemmas of Subcontracting the Liberal Peace." In *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding*, by Oliver P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005), 32
- ⁵⁶ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 3-4
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 6
- ⁵⁸ Multiple interviews in multiple fieldwork sites
- ⁵⁹ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 94
- ⁶⁰ This was expressed in interviews as 'ticking the boxes' or selecting local projects that conformed to donor value-expectations rather than local realities.
- ⁶¹ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 10
- ⁶² This position was asserted in interviews with international aid and development workers as well as international diplomats.
- ⁶³ Anderson, *Do No Harm*, 68
- ⁶⁴ Observations during a meeting

⁶⁵ This practice has evolved from military protection of aid as in the Somali operations in the early 1990's, to the full employment of aid and development delivery by military units in Afghanistan through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and QIPs.

⁶⁶ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 9

⁶⁷ Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "Conflicted Outcomes and Values: (Neo)Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan." *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (November 2009): 648

⁶⁸ See for example Anderson, *Do No Harm*, 135

⁶⁹ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 22

⁷⁰ There were multiple displeased comments made by Somalis and Afghans along these lines during this research both in interview and conversation.

¹ Tadjbakhsh, "Conflicted Outcomes", 636

² Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 599

³ See for example United Nations and World Bank, *RDP*, 5

⁴ Migdal, Joel S. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 12-14

⁵ Paris and Sisk, "Introduction," 3

⁶ For example stressed in interview with International Worker 2, September 11, 2009, identity withheld, but also reflected on by a number of other respondents

⁷ Richmond, "Resistance," 667

⁸ Carment, David. "Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy." *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2003): 409-410

⁹ Milliken, Jennifer, and Keith Krause. "State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons, and Strategies." In *State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction*, by Jennifer Milliken. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), 4

¹⁰ Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 25

¹¹ Jenne, Erin K. "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State." In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, by Robert I. Rotberg. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 221-222

¹² Clapham, Christopher. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 15

¹³ Milliken and Krause, "State Reconstruction," 10

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¹⁶ Langford, Tonya. "Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention." *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (1999): 62

¹⁷ Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 599

¹⁸ Boas, Morten, and Kathleen M. Jennings. "'Failed States' and 'State Failure': Threats or Opportunities?" *Globalizations* 4, no. 4 (2007): 478

¹⁹ Boas and Jennings, "Failed States", 476

²⁰ Berdal, *Building Peace*, 121-124

²¹ Migdal, *State in Society*, 14

²² Rotberg, Robert I. "The New Nature of Nation State Failure." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 85-96 loses its legitimacy within society

²³ Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators." In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, by Robert I. Rotberg. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), 5

²⁴ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 40

²⁵ *Ibid.* 37

²⁶ See for example Carment, *Assessing State Failure*, 410

²⁷ For an example see Jenne, *Sri Lanka*, 222

²⁸ Rotberg, Robert I. "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair." In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, by Robert I. Rotberg. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2

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- ³² Migdal, *State in Society*, 56
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- ³⁵ Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. *Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning*. (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006), 29
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- ⁵⁵ Burton, John W. *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987), 15-6
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- ⁵⁷ Bay, Christian. "Taking the Universality of Human Needs Seriously." In *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, by John W. Burton. (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1990), 235
- ⁵⁸ Bay, Christian. "Human Needs as Human Rights." In *The Power of Human Needs in World Society*, by Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), for example 92
- ⁵⁹ Burton, John W. "Human Needs vs. Societal Needs." In *The Power of Human Needs in World Society*, by Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 39-40
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- ⁶² Galtung, Johan. "International Development in Human Perspective." 307-308. In *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, by John W. Burton. (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1990), 301-335
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- ⁶⁸ Richmond, *Maintaining Order*, 131
- ⁶⁹ Mitchell, Christopher. "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution." In *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, by John W. Burton. (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1990), 156
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- ⁷³ Richmond, *Transformation*, 4
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 6
- ⁷⁵ Paris, *At War's End*, 8
- ⁷⁶ Ignatieff, *Empire Lite*, 17
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- ⁹³ Cockell, "Human Security", 17
- ⁹⁴ see for example Edwards and Forstman, "Humanising Non-Citizens", 21
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- ⁹⁷ Cockell, *Human Security*, 17
- ⁹⁸ Richmond, Oliver P. *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 137
- ⁹⁹ O'Flaherty, Michael. "Towards Integration of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body Recommendations: The Rights-Based Approach Model." In *Economic, Social and Culutral Rights in Action*, by Mashood A. Baderin and Robert McCorquodale, 27-44. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 33
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- ¹⁰⁵ Schetter, Conrad, Rainer Glassner, and Masood Karokhail. "Beyond Warlordism: The Local Security Architecture in Afghanistan." *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 2007: 149
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- ¹¹⁸ Mosse, "Global Governance," 15
- ¹¹⁹ Migdal, *State in Society*, 26
- ¹²⁰ Anderson, *Do No Harm*, 18
- ¹²¹ Paris, Roland. "Echoes of the the Mission Civilisatrice: Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era." In *The United Nations and Human Security*, by Edward Newman and Oliver P. Richmond. (New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, 2001), 101
- ¹²² Paris and Sisk, "Introduction," 14
- ¹²³ Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 188
- ¹²⁴ See for example Edelstein, David M. "Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding." In *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, by Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, 81-103. (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 90-96
- ¹²⁵ Jabri, "War, government, politics", 56
- ¹²⁶ See for example Tadjbakhsh, "Human Security", 123 on the prescriptive nature
- ¹²⁷ Richmond, *Transformation*, 44
- ¹²⁸ Sutcliffe, *Western Europe*, 7
- ¹²⁹ See for example Duffield, *Development*, 96

¹³⁰ See for example Bauck, Petter, and Arne Strand. *Strengthening Nordic Development Coordination in and with Afghanistan*. Discussion paper, (Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Nordic Development Coordination in and with Afghanistan, 2009).

¹³¹ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 19

¹³² Jabri, "War, government, politics", 42

¹³³ Vayrynen, Tarja. *Culture and International Conflict Resolution*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 109

¹³⁴ Ignatieff, *Empire Lite*, 43

Chapter Two: A Theory Development

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² Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 2006, *Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning*, C. Hurst & Co., London, 27

³ Migdal, Joel S. "Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints: Struggles to Construct and Maintain State and Social Boundaries." In *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practises*, by Joel S. Migdal. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11

⁴ See for example Richards, Paul, 1996; Kaldor, *New Wars*; Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. 4. New York: Longman, 2003; Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*

⁵ Vayrynen, *Culture*, 126

⁶ This was commented on by respondents in both Somaliland and Afghanistan. A useful illustration is when a Provincial Reconstruction Team in a conservative and violent area of Afghanistan advertised for a masseur and was criticised by a Western gender expert for not advertising for women as well. (Private conversation with an international worker in Afghanistan)

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¹² Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 183

¹³ *Ibid.* 145

¹⁴ Schröder and Schmidt, "Introduction," 15

¹⁵ Crossley, Nick. "Social Classes." In *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, by Michael Grenfell, 87-100. (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), 88-89

¹⁶ Avruch, *Conflict Resolution*, 58

¹⁷ See for example Poore, Stuart. "Strategic Culture." In *NeoRealism vs. Strategic Culture*, by John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 47-48; or Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 172

¹⁸ Vayrynen, *Culture*, 3-4

¹⁹ Archer, Margaret. *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 304

²⁰ *Ibid.* 77

²¹ Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 244

²² Avruch, *Conflict Resolution*, 18

²³ *Ibid.* 5, Avruch refers to 'cultures' while this has here been replaced with the term identity-groups.

²⁴ Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 42

²⁵ Migdal, *State in Society*, 12

²⁶ Galtung, *International Development*, 323-4

²⁷ Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 199

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- ²⁸ As used by Stone, Linda. *Kinship and Gender: An Introduction*. 2. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 67
- ²⁹ See for example Grenfell, Michael. "Interest." In *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, by Michael Grenfell. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008, 157
- ³⁰ Migdal, *State in Society*, 23
- ³¹ Giustozzi, Antonio. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007*. (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 2007), 54-5
- ³² Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. *Africa Works*. (Oxford: International Africa Institute/James Currey, 1999), 37
- ³³ Migdal, *State in Society*, 190
- ³⁴ Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 209
- ³⁵ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 27
- ³⁶ Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 228-9
- ³⁷ Avruch, *Conflict Resolution*, 16
- ³⁸ Schwinn, Thomas. "Individual and Collective Agency." In *The Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology*, by William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Turner. (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2007), 302-303
- ³⁹ Migdal, *State in Society*, 36
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 11
- ⁴¹ Anderson, *Do No Harm*, 24
- ⁴² Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 198
- ⁴³ *Ibid.* 203-6
- ⁴⁴ Avruch, *Conflict Resolution*, 54-5
- ⁴⁵ See for example the khan in Azoy, *Buzkashi*, 30-1
- ⁴⁶ Migdal, *State in Society*, 100
- ⁴⁷ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 247
- ⁴⁸ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 27
- ⁴⁹ Preston, Peter Wallace. *Political/Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era*. (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 37
- ⁵⁰ Migdal, "Mental maps", 11
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- ⁵² Migdal, *State in Society*, 256
- ⁵³ This point was made by several respondents in Somaliland where the sub-clan is considered you insurance, security, and social safety-net that you ignore at your own peril.
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- ⁵⁵ Zeuner, Lilli. "(Review) Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach and Culture and Agency: the Place of Culture in Social Theory." *Acta Sociologica* 42, no. 1 (1999): 81
- ⁵⁶ Ignatieff, *Empire Lite*, 9
- ⁵⁷ Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 247
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 260
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- ⁶¹ Richmond, "Resistance," 670
- ⁶² See for example Department For International Development (DFID). *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*. (London: DFID, 2005) as one of many examples
- ⁶³ Jabri, "War, government, politics", 42
- ⁶⁴ Duffield, *Development*, 167
- ⁶⁵ Migdal, *State in Society*, 215
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 5
- ⁶⁷ Duffield, *Development*, 96

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- ⁶⁸ Several references to this were made during field research in Afghanistan by both government and NGO representatives.
- ⁶⁹ Migdal, *State in Society*, 215
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 5
- ⁷¹ Duffield, *Development*, 96
- ⁷² Schultz, "State Disintegration," 77
- ⁷³ Vayrynen, *Culture*, 117-8
- ⁷⁴ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 49
- ⁷⁵ Lederach, John Paul. *Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 12-15
- ⁷⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 10
- ⁷⁷ Interview with Afghan state worker 3, November 21, 2009
- ⁷⁸ Several references to this were made during field research in Afghanistan by both government and NGO representatives.
- ⁷⁹ For an excellent account, please see Kalyvas, Stathis N. "The Ontology of Political violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars." In *Perspectives on Politics*, 1:3 (2003), 475-494
- ⁸⁰ Migdal, *State in Society*, 132-3
- ⁸¹ See for example Winter, Elisabeth. *Civil Society Development in Afghanistan*. (London: London School of Economics, 2010), 18
- ⁸² Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 606
- ⁸³ Logan, Carolyn. "Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2009: 103-104
- ⁸⁴ The usage of the term 'capital' here is influenced by Bourdieu's theories as discussed in Moore, Robert. "Capital." In *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, by Michael Grenfell, 101-118. (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008)
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- ⁸⁶ Migdal, *State in Society*, 100
- ⁸⁷ Boege, et al., *Hybrid Political Orders*, 606
- ⁸⁸ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 255-256
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 257
- ⁹⁰ Archer, *The Morphogenetic Approach*, 195-6
- ⁹¹ See for example Schwoebel, Mary Hope. *Case Study Seven: Impact Evaluation of the War-torn Societies Project: Somaliland*. Greater Horn of Africa Peacebuilding Project, (Washington DC: Management Systems International (MSI), 2001), 10
- ⁹² See for example Flynn, Michael T., Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 20
- ⁹³ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, XIX
- ⁹⁴ See for example Schultz, Richard, and Andrea Dew. *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 76
- ⁹⁵ Logan, "Selected Chiefs", 108
- ⁹⁶ Paris, *At War's End*, 44
- ⁹⁷ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 238
- ⁹⁸ Dupree, Louis. *Afghanistan*. 3. (Karachi: Oxford Pakistan Paperbacks, 1997), 500-503
- ⁹⁹ Jabri, "War, government, politics", 51 and 56
- ¹⁰⁰ See for example Kasfir, Nelson. "The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique." In *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa*, by Nelson Kasfir. (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 1
- ¹⁰¹ See for example Chabal, Patrick. "The African Crisis: Context and Interpretation." In *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, by Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger. (London: Zed Books, 1996), 46
- ¹⁰² Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 225-6
- ¹⁰³ See for example Richmond, "Resistance," 690-691

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- ¹⁰⁴ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 36
¹⁰⁵ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 19
¹⁰⁶ Logan, *Selected Chiefs*, 109
¹⁰⁷ See for example Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 23
¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 2
¹⁰⁹ Brown, et al. *Challenging Statebuilding*, 103-104
¹¹⁰ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 7
¹¹¹ Migdal, *State in Society*, 100
¹¹² See for example Edelstein, *Foreign militaries*, 87
¹¹³ This will be further explored in the Afghan case chapter.

Chapter Three: Somalia and Somaliland – In the Shade of the Meeting Tree

- ¹ Menkhaus, Ken. "Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia." *Conflict, Security, and Development* (Routledge) 4, no. 2 (August 2004): 153
- ² The fieldwork for this chapter was undertaken exclusively in Somaliland in 2009.
- ³ Interview with Somaliland Journalist 2, August 3, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁴ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 86
- ⁵ Hesse, Brian J. "Lessons in Successful Somali Governance." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (Routledge) 28, no. 1 (January 2010): 71
- ⁶ Interview with Somaliland Politician 1, July 25, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁷ Walls, Michael, 2009. "The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland", 374. In *African Affairs* (Oxford University Press) 108, no. 432 (July 2009): 371-389.
- ⁸ This was related to the researcher in conversation during fieldwork.
- ⁹ Menkhaus, Ken. "Political Islam in Somalia." *Middle East Policy* (Middle East Policy Council) IX, no. 1 (March 2002): 111
- ¹⁰ Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 116
- ¹¹ Shariica is the Somali spelling of Sharia, the Islamic system of law
- ¹² The reference to the importance of Islam and *Shariica* was constantly present in interviews.
- ¹³ Academy for Peace and Development (APD). *Peace in Somaliland - An indigenous approach to state-building*. (Hargeisa: The Search for Peace: Somali Programme, 2009), 11.
- ¹⁴ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 16-7
- ¹⁵ Walls, "The Emergence", 375
- ¹⁶ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 19
- ¹⁷ Interview with Somaliland NGO Worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁸ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 6-7
- ¹⁹ This was evident both through interviews and observation during the research
- ²⁰ Lewis, Ioan M. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*. (London: Hurst Publishers, 2008), 9-10
- ²¹ Academy for Peace and Development (APD). *No more 'Grass Grown by the Spear': Addressing Land-based Conflicts in Somaliland*. (Hargeisa: APD/INEF, 2007), 9.
- ²² APD, *No More Grass*, 15.
- ²³ Gaani, Maxamed Xaban. "Regulating the Livestock Economy of Somaliland." In *Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities*, by War-torn Societies Project (WSP) International. (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 211
- ²⁴ For example in Interview with Somaliland Politician 3, August 6, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁵ Interview with Somaliland Businessman 1, August 8, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁶ Interview with Somaliland Politician 1, July 25, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁷ APD, *No More Grass*, 16
- ²⁸ Interview with Somaliland NGO Worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁹ APD, *No More Grass*, 9
- ³⁰ Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles," 156
- ³¹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 27-28
- ³² Walls, "The Emergence", 376-377

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- ³³ This claim has for example been made to the researcher by some internationals and Somalis.
- ³⁴ Schultz and Dew, *Contemporary Combat*, 59
- ³⁵ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 15
- ³⁶ The researcher was informed by a female store clerk in a very apologetic way that she did not wish to risk touching an infidel too close to prayer, thus forcing her to wash again, and would therefore place the merchandise on the counter rather than handing it over.
- ³⁷ See discussion on modes of mobilisation later in this chapter.
- ³⁸ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 181
- ³⁹ Interview with Somaliland Politician 1, July 25, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁴⁰ Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 121-2
- ⁴¹ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 181
- ⁴² Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 86
- ⁴³ Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles," 155
- ⁴⁴ Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 111
- ⁴⁵ Hesse, "Somali Governance", 74
- ⁴⁶ During the research period in Hargeisa a political campaign in Burao led to a rise in tension between the two stronger local sub-clans. While it did not lead to violence, it displayed that party-political support locally was at least partially oriented along sub-clan lines.
- ⁴⁷ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁴⁸ Hesse, "Somali Governance", 81
- ⁴⁹ The three party limit was imposed in order to counter a too large party number going down to sub-sub-clan level. It was never intended to be the same three parties over and over again but that has been the effect. Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁵⁰ An English version of the Somaliland Constitution is available at http://www.somalilandforum.com/somaliland/constitution/revised_constitution.htm#Index
- ⁵¹ Jimcaale, Cabdiraxmaan. "Consolidation and decentralization of Government Institutions", 75. In *Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities*, by War-torn Societies Project (WSP) International. (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005) 49-121
- ⁵² *Ibid.* 87
- ⁵³ *Ibid.* 97
- ⁵⁴ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 7
- ⁵⁵ Hesse, "Somali Governance", 72
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 73
- ⁵⁷ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁵⁸ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 10
- ⁵⁹ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 88
- ⁶⁰ Jimcaale, "Government Institutions", 90-1
- ⁶¹ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 88
- ⁶² Walls, "The Emergence", 386
- ⁶³ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 94
- ⁶⁴ Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles," 155-156
- ⁶⁵ Abdulle, Jabril Ibrahim. "Civil Society in the Absence of a Somali State." In *Somalia: Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building*, by Heinrich Böll Stiftung. (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008), 79.
- ⁶⁶ Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles," 159
- ⁶⁷ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 128
- ⁶⁸ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 15
- ⁶⁹ Kinyanjui, Mary Dr. *The Second Assessment of the Socio-Economic Status of Women in Somaliland*. (Hargeisa: Nagaad Umbrella Organisation, 2008), 28
- ⁷⁰ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 13
- ⁷¹ Nagaad Umbrella Organization, 2007, *Women's Political Participation in Somaliland: An Evaluation of the 2005 Parliamentary Elections*, Nagaad Umbrella Organization, 8
- ⁷² For example Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld or Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld

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- ⁷³ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁷⁴ Interview with Somaliland Politician 1, July 25, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁷⁵ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁷⁶ This perspective is a continuation of the image of ‘Woman’ found in much modernization and development literature. For further discussions on this see for example Chowdry, Geeta. “Engendering Development? Women in Development (WID) in International Development Regimes.” In *Feminism/Postmodernism/Development*, by Jane L. Parpart and Marianne H. Marchand, 26-41. (Oxon: Routledge, 1995)
- ⁷⁷ Logan, *Selected Chiefs*, 116
- ⁷⁸ Walls, “The Emergence”, 377
- ⁷⁹ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁸⁰ Academy for Peace and Development. *Women’s Rights in Islam*. (Hargeisa: UNICEF, 2002).
- ⁸¹ Hodgson, Dorothy L. “Gender, Culture and the Myth of the Patriarchal Pastoralist.” In *Rethinking Pastoralism in Africa*, by Dorothy L. Hodgson, 1-28. (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 3-4
- ⁸² At the Borame peace conference in 1993 there were five female observers who were only allowed to listen in but also managed to vocalise their concerns in writing which was read out to the delegates. There are numerous accounts of how women protested and influenced the different peace processes during the 1990s.
- ⁸³ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 3, July 30, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁸⁴ APD, *Peace in Somaliland*, 18
- ⁸⁵ A woman the researcher met with was routinely consulted by the elders of her sub-clan on a range of issues. Identity withheld.
- ⁸⁶ For example Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁸⁷ The *Sheekh* conference and the following peace conferences in Somaliland in the 1990s are clear examples of this where women asserted an increasing participation in the negotiations and created exacerbated social pressure through public protests.
- ⁸⁸ The concept of the ‘Sixth clan’ was referred to as *Bahawen* in Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁸⁹ For example Life and Peace Institute; ABF; the Nordic Africa Institute. *Somalia: A Nation Without a State*. Seminar report, Stockholm: Life and Peace Institute; ABF; the Nordic Africa Institute, 2007
- ⁹⁰ Walls, “The Emergence”, 377
- ⁹¹ Schwoebel, “Somaliland,” 15
- ⁹² Interview with Somaliland Journalist 2, August 3, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁹³ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 3, July 30, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁹⁴ Menkhaus, “Political Islam,” 110
- ⁹⁵ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 77
- ⁹⁶ Walls, “The Emergence”, 381
- ⁹⁷ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 77
- ⁹⁸ Jimcaale, “Government Institutions”, 51-52
- ⁹⁹ Walls, “The Emergence”, 383
- ¹⁰⁰ Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland*. London: Progressio, 2008, 25.
- ¹⁰¹ Lewis, 2008, 31.
- ¹⁰² Bradbury, 2008, 28-29.
- ¹⁰³ Lewis, 2008, 20.
- ¹⁰⁴ ‘Elders’ is used here as a term indicating a person whose age and experience gives a potential ‘wisdom’ claim if recognised as such by the social group. Traditional Somali authority structures are egalitarian among males and based on consensus. Some ‘elders’ are however held in deeper esteem and can represent the sub-clan in relation to other groups. A hereditary function has meant that some were trained to be ‘elders’ from a young age but in some areas the hereditary function remains though war and other factors have resulted in young and untrained ‘elders.’ In combination with a colonial and later part domestic transformation of the role into a state-representative with an authority claim it has generated ambiguities in the functions of the role.
- ¹⁰⁵ See for example Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*; and Jimcaale, “Government Institutions.”

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- ¹⁰⁶ Jimcaale “Government Institutions”, 52.
- ¹⁰⁷ WSP International, *Rebuilding Somaliland*, 10
- ¹⁰⁸ Jimcaale, “Government Institutions”, 54
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 50
- ¹¹⁰ Multiple interviews in Hargeisa July and August 2009
- ¹¹¹ WSP International, *Rebuilding Somaliland*, 11
- ¹¹² Hesse, “Somali Governance”, 72
- ¹¹³ Walls, “The Emergence”, 377
- ¹¹⁴ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 76
- ¹¹⁵ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 45
- ¹¹⁶ Jimcaale, “Government Institutions”, 60
- ¹¹⁷ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 99
- ¹¹⁸ See for example Jimcaale, “Government Institutions”, 64
- ¹¹⁹ Jimcaale, “Government Institutions”, 76
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.* 83-4
- ¹²¹ Several respondents referred to these issues in interview
- ¹²² Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 218
- ¹²³ As stated by President Egal in 1999, see Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 218
- ¹²⁴ There was an open reflection in interviews and political discourse that Somaliland needs to forge its own future by merging locally held beliefs and shared traditions with international influences and norms.
- ¹²⁵ Kibble, Steve, and Walls Michael. “Tradition and Modernity in Somaliland - Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State.” 2010, 12
- ¹²⁶ Interview with Somaliland Politician 1, July 25, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹²⁷ Hesse, “Somali Governance”, 77
- ¹²⁸ See for example Hesse, “Somali Governance”, 75-81 or Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 100-108
- ¹²⁹ United Nations and World Bank, 2008, 4
- ¹³⁰ Menkhaus, “Vicious Circles,” 152
- ¹³¹ Comment made in Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld.
- ¹³² Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹³³ Interview with Somaliland Journalist 1, July 23, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹³⁴ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 218
- ¹³⁵ Jimcaale, “Government Institutions”, 74
- ¹³⁶ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 1
- ¹³⁷ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹³⁸ Respondents ranged between stating that all politics are clan related to saying that they are not always separated. The only voice saying clan had nothing to do with politics was a member of parliament.
- ¹³⁹ Several respondents expressed this view stating that clan is the most important part of Somaliland society.
- ¹⁴⁰ Several respondents reflected on the need for change in how politics were conducted and for what purposes.
- ¹⁴¹ Interview with Somaliland NGO Worker 4, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁴² Kibble and Walls, “Tradition and Modernity”, 9
- ¹⁴³ During a coffee break in Hargeisa the researcher came across one such person who described this practise. It was also confirmed by other Somalilanders encountered during the research.
- ¹⁴⁴ APD, *No More Grass*, 20
- ¹⁴⁵ Interview with Somaliland Journalist 1, July 23, 2009, identity withheld.
- ¹⁴⁶ Kibble and Walls, Tradition and Modernity”, 5
- ¹⁴⁷ The issue of recognition was very much present among political actors as well as ordinary Somalilanders with few exceptions.
- ¹⁴⁸ This impression was very strong throughout the research and is also shared by for example Kibble and Walls, “Tradition and Modernity”, 1

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- ¹⁴⁹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 85
- ¹⁵⁰ Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 110
- ¹⁵¹ Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen, "Directive" (Mogadishu: 20 July, 2009)
- ¹⁵² Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 114
- ¹⁵³ Henceforth the territory and state structures claimed by Somaliland will be referred to by that name.
- ¹⁵⁴ Hesse, "Somali Governance", 372
- ¹⁵⁵ WSP International. *Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities*. (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 21
- ¹⁵⁶ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 93
- ¹⁵⁷ Ameen, Jan. "Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace." In *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, by Elisabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 77
- ¹⁵⁸ See for example Jimcaale, "Government Institutions", 49-121
- ¹⁵⁹ Jimcaale, "Government Institutions", 52
- ¹⁶⁰ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 30
- ¹⁶¹ Several respondents spoke very negatively about the intent and methods of the international community, even when supportive in general of the proclaimed goals and the international presence.
- ¹⁶² UN and World Bank, *Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme – Deepening Peace and Reducing Conflict*, Volume I, Draft, January 2008, iv
- ¹⁶³ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) counted 54 dead while Admiral Howe at the time saying less than 20, see Schultz and Dew, *Contemporary Combat*, 84
- ¹⁶⁴ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 93
- ¹⁶⁵ Reuters/IRIN. "Somalia: Fishermen Appeal for Help over Foreign Fishing Ships." *Illegal-Fishing.Info*. 09 March 2006. http://www.illegal-fishing.info/item_single.php?item=news&item_id=145&approach_id=12 (accessed October 18, 2010).
- ¹⁶⁶ Interview with International Worker 16, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁶⁷ United Nations and World Bank, *RDP*, xii
- ¹⁶⁸ Interview with International Worker 15, August 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁶⁹ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁷⁰ Interview with International Worker 13, August 8, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁷¹ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 2, July 29, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁷² This opinion was advanced by several respondents both as a personal comment and as a critical comment of a popularly held belief.
- ¹⁷³ Interview with International Worker 13, August 8, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁷⁴ Interview with Somaliland Politician 1, July 25, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁷⁵ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁷⁶ WSP International, *Rebuilding Somaliland*, 14-5
- ¹⁷⁷ Jimcaale, "Government Institutions", 61
- ¹⁷⁸ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 3
- ¹⁷⁹ Walls, "The Emergence", 383
- ¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 381
- ¹⁸¹ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 63
- ¹⁸² Jimcaale, "Government Institutions", 62
- ¹⁸³ Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 122
- ¹⁸⁴ The *Beel*-system is further discussed in the section addressing institutions
- ¹⁸⁵ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁸⁶ WSP International, *Rebuilding Somaliland*, 16
- ¹⁸⁷ Jimcaale, "Government Institutions", 68 and 71
- ¹⁸⁸ Hesse, "Somali Governance", 73
- ¹⁸⁹ Walls, "The Emergence", 382
- ¹⁹⁰ See for example APD, *Peace in Somaliland*, 19, or Walls, *Building Peace*, 384
- ¹⁹¹ Walls, "The Emergence", 386-387
- ¹⁹² Examples include the 1991 April to June Burao conference and the January to May 1993 Borame conference.

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- ¹⁹³ For a detailed account of several such conferences see APD, *Peace in Somaliland*
- ¹⁹⁴ The term means 'he was born yesterday' and refers to wiping clean past grievances.
- ¹⁹⁵ Walls, "The Emergence", 382
- ¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* 386
- ¹⁹⁷ APD, *Peace in Somaliland*, 73
- ¹⁹⁸ Small, Michael. "Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies." In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, by Rob McRae and Don Hubert. (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 83
- ¹⁹⁹ Schwoebel, "Somaliland," 10
- ²⁰⁰ Interview with International Worker 13, August 8, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁰¹ APD, *No More Grass*, 9
- ²⁰² Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 3, July 30, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁰³ Interview with Somaliland NGO worker 1, July 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁰⁴ Female researcher in conversation, identity withheld
- ²⁰⁵ Menkhaus, Ken. "Political Islam," 121
- ²⁰⁶ Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 114
- ²⁰⁷ See for example Rice, Xan. "Somali militants say they carried out deadly Uganda World Cup blasts." *The Guardian*. 12 July 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-bombs-blasts-world-cup> (accessed October 18, 2010)
- ²⁰⁸ Reuters. "AU peacekeepers gaining ground in Somali capital." *Times Live*. 7 October 2010. <http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/article694706.ece/AU-peacekeepers-gaining-ground-in-Somali-capital> (accessed October 18, 2010)
- ²⁰⁹ Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles," 161
- ²¹⁰ Menkhaus, "Political Islam," 120
- ²¹¹ See for example Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles," 156

Chapter Four: Afghanistan – In the Shadows of Mountains

- ¹ Glatzer, Bernt. "War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Significance and Relativity of Local and Social Boundaries." *Weld des Islams* 41, no. 3 (2001): 397
- ² Schetter, Conrad and Glassner, Rainer. "Neither Functioning, nor Failing of the State! Seeing Violence in Afghanistan from Local Perspectives." Originally in *From Fragile State to Functioning State: Pathways to Democratic Transformation in Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, and Afghanistan*, by Sabine Collmer, 137-156. Berlin: LIT/Transaction Press, 2009 (version retrieved from the website of Arbeitsgemeinschaft Afghanistan (<http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/>), page sequence: 137-156), 150-151
- ³ Rasanayagam, Angelo. *Afghanistan: A Modern History*. 2. (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2007), xvi
- ⁴ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 3
- ⁵ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 164
- ⁶ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 181
- ⁷ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 22
- ⁸ Tadjbakhsh, "Conflicted Outcomes," 645
- ⁹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 26
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.* 41
- ¹¹ Suhrke, Astri. "Reconstruction as Modernisation: the 'post-conflict' project in Afghanistan." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (October 2007): 1302
- ¹² Goodson, Larry. *Afghanistan's Endless War*. (Washington DC: University of Washington Press, 2001), 17-8
- ¹³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 42
- ¹⁴ Glatzer, Bernt. "The Pashtun Tribal System." In *Concept of Tribal Society*, by G Pfeffer and D.K. Behere. (New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002), 8
- ¹⁵ Ruttig, Thomas. *How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan's largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology*. (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010), 9
- ¹⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 42

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- ¹⁷ Roy, Olivier. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 (1990)), 11
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.* 117
- ¹⁹ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 17
- ²⁰ Giustozzi, Antonio. *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan*. (London: Hurts & Co. Ltd, 2009), 34
- ²¹ Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud*, 43
- ²² Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 8
- ²³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 42
- ²⁴ This was suggested in several interviews with both internationals and Afghans.
- ²⁵ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 9
- ²⁶ Interview with International Analyst 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld.
- ²⁷ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 111
- ²⁸ *Ibid.* 38
- ²⁹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 30
- ³⁰ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 39
- ³¹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 29
- ³² Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*. 2. (London: Pan Books, 2001), 82
- ³³ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 50
- ³⁴ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 39
- ³⁵ Azoy, *Buzkashi*, 29
- ³⁶ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 49
- ³⁷ *Ibid.* 45
- ³⁸ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 15-6
- ³⁹ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 2
- ⁴⁰ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 12
- ⁴¹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 24
- ⁴² Personal conversation with a group of Pashtun men. *Badla* is the act of revenge whereas the term *badal*, sometimes used in the literature to describe this (see for example Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 28), is the reciprocal exchange of for example women to cement a peace.
- ⁴³ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 6
- ⁴⁴ Jabri, "War, government, politics", 56
- ⁴⁵ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 16
- ⁴⁶ See for example Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 160
- ⁴⁷ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 534-535
- ⁴⁸ Ruttig, Thomas. "Loya Paktia's Insurgency (I): The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity." In *Decoding the New Taliban*, by Antonio Giustozzi, 57-88. (London: Herst Publishers Ltd, 2009), 86
- ⁴⁹ Interview with International Worker 10, November 16, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁵⁰ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 8-9
- ⁵¹ Rashid, Ahmed. *Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being lost in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia*. (London: Allen Lang, Penguin Group, 2008), 94
- ⁵² For an interesting modelling of qawm formation and dynamics see Geller, Armando, and Scott Moss. "Growing Qawm: An evidence-driven declarative model of Afghan power structures." *Advances in Complex Systems* (World Scientific Publishing Company) 11, no. 2 (2008): 321. It is however held here that the model the authors present is but one representation out of many possible of how a qawm can be structured.
- ⁵³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 25
- ⁵⁴ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 19
- ⁵⁵ Interview with International Analyst 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁵⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 42
- ⁵⁷ Bijlert, *How to Win*, 13
- ⁵⁸ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 1990, 12
- ⁵⁹ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 8

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- ⁶⁰ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 28
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.* 142
- ⁶² Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 30
- ⁶³ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 11
- ⁶⁴ Interview with International Analyst 1, November 16, 2009, identity withheld.
- ⁶⁵ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 165-166
- ⁶⁶ Improvised focus group discussion with a district shura
- ⁶⁷ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 2
- ⁶⁸ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 40
- ⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 1
- ⁷⁰ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 12
- ⁷¹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 9
- ⁷² Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 9
- ⁷³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 202
- ⁷⁴ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 120
- ⁷⁵ Rashid, *Taliban*, 18
- ⁷⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 188
- ⁷⁷ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 224
- ⁷⁸ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 190
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 202
- ⁸⁰ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 157
- ⁸¹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 213
- ⁸² Rashid, *Taliban*, 19
- ⁸³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 215
- ⁸⁴ Rashid, *Taliban*, 19
- ⁸⁵ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 216
- ⁸⁶ Interview with International Worker 11, November 16, 2009, identity withheld
- ⁸⁷ Interview with International Diplomat 2, November 21, 2009, identity withheld.
- ⁸⁸ Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "International Peacemaking in Tajikistan and Afghanistan Compared: Lessons Learned and Unlearned." *Les Études du CERI* (CERI/Sciences Po), no. 143 (April 2008), 37
- ⁸⁹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 76-77
- ⁹⁰ Tadjbakhsh, "International Peacemaking," 37
- ⁹¹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 227
- ⁹² Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 12
- ⁹³ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 12
- ⁹⁴ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 17
- ⁹⁵ See for example <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/14/AR2010081402121.html>
- ⁹⁶ Osman, Hamida, in interview November 15, 2009
- ⁹⁷ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 17
- ⁹⁸ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 47
- ⁹⁹ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 14
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview with International Worker 5, September 30, 2009, identity withheld and International Worker 8, November 6, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁰¹ Interview with International Worker 7, November 3, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁰² Interview with Afghan State Worker 1, October 27, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁰³ Fange, *The State*, 3 This perception was confirmed repeatedly during the research
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 24-5
- ¹⁰⁵ Azoy, *Buzkashi*, 34
- ¹⁰⁶ See for example Anand Gopal, "Women lawmakers battle warlords", *Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS)*. 9 March 2009. <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46028> (Accessed May 25 2011)
- ¹⁰⁷ Osman, Hamida, Afghan journalist, in interview November 15, 2009
- ¹⁰⁸ Azoy, *Buzkashi*, 28

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- ¹⁰⁹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 143
¹¹⁰ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 13
¹¹¹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 41-2
¹¹² Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 15
¹¹³ Azoy, *Buzkashi*, 30-1
¹¹⁴ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 43
¹¹⁵ Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud*, 108-9
¹¹⁶ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 25-6
¹¹⁷ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 15
¹¹⁸ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 11
¹¹⁹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 417
¹²⁰ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 15
¹²¹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 418-9
¹²² Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 11
¹²³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 419
¹²⁴ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 9
¹²⁵ See for example Devlin, Lawrence, et al. *Conflict Analysis: Kunduz City, Kunduz Province*. (Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), 2009), 5-7
¹²⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 50
¹²⁷ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 11
¹²⁸ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 35
¹²⁹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 50
¹³⁰ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 420-1
¹³¹ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 34-5
¹³² *Ibid.* 430
¹³³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 437
¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 439
¹³⁵ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 16
¹³⁶ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 451-52
¹³⁷ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 55
¹³⁸ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 14
¹³⁹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 16
¹⁴⁰ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 9
¹⁴¹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 16
¹⁴² Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 458
¹⁴³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 62
¹⁴⁴ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 463
¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 494-7
¹⁴⁶ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 26
¹⁴⁷ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 499
¹⁴⁸ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 74
¹⁴⁹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 507
¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 530-2
¹⁵¹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 59
¹⁵² Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 76
¹⁵³ *Ibid.* 71
¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 75
¹⁵⁵ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 55
¹⁵⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 115
¹⁵⁷ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 84
¹⁵⁸ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 78
¹⁵⁹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 19
¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 91

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- ¹⁶¹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 118
- ¹⁶² Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 93
- ¹⁶³ *Ibid.* 99
- ¹⁶⁴ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 10
- ¹⁶⁵ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 78
- ¹⁶⁶ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 106
- ¹⁶⁷ This was a localised and spontaneous revolt that was followed by the full war.
- ¹⁶⁸ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 99-100
- ¹⁶⁹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 79-80
- ¹⁷⁰ Larson, Anna. *Toward an Afghan Democracy? Exploring Perceptions of Democratisation in Afghanistan*. (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2009), 7
- ¹⁷¹ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 60
- ¹⁷² *Ibid.* 125
- ¹⁷³ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 125
- ¹⁷⁴ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 146
- ¹⁷⁵ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 160
- ¹⁷⁶ Glatzer, "War and Boundaries", 13
- ¹⁷⁷ Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud*, 123
- ¹⁷⁸ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 158
- ¹⁷⁹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 129
- ¹⁸⁰ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 158
- ¹⁸¹ *Ibid.* 264
- ¹⁸² Rashid, *Taliban*, 21
- ¹⁸³ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 20-1
- ¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 16
- ¹⁸⁵ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 237-238
- ¹⁸⁶ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 18-9
- ¹⁸⁷ Bijlert, Martine van. *How to Win an Afghan Election: Perceptions and Practises*. (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2009), 9
- ¹⁸⁸ See for example Porter, Gareth. "Karzai and warlords mount massive vote fraud scheme", *Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS)*. 19 August 2009. <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48142> (accessed October 5, 2010)
- ¹⁸⁹ Interview with International Worker 10, November 11, 2009, identity withheld
- ¹⁹⁰ Bijlert, *How to Win*, 11
- ¹⁹¹ For example Osman, Hamida, Afghan journalist, in interview November 15, 2009
- ¹⁹² Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 755
- ¹⁹³ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 239
- ¹⁹⁴ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 14
- ¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 46
- ¹⁹⁶ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 1
- ¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 12
- ¹⁹⁸ Rashid, *Taliban*, 27-8
- ¹⁹⁹ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 5
- ²⁰⁰ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 111
- ²⁰¹ Giustozzi, Antonio, and Christopher Reuter. *The Northern Front: The Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns*. Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010
- ²⁰² Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 49
- ²⁰³ *Ibid.* 85
- ²⁰⁴ Interview with International Worker 11, November 16, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁰⁵ Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Sippi. "Northern Exposure for the Taliban." In *Decoding the New Taliban*, by Antonio Giustozzi, (London: Herst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 2009), 264
- ²⁰⁶ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 13
- ²⁰⁷ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 48

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- ²⁰⁸ Interview with International Worker 10, November 11, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁰⁹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 95
- ²¹⁰ Interview with Former Taliban Official, November 16, 2009, identity withheld
- ²¹¹ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, xvii
- ²¹² Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 177
- ²¹³ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 12-3
- ²¹⁴ *Ibid.* 40
- ²¹⁵ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 10
- ²¹⁶ *Ibid.* 83
- ²¹⁷ See for example Roggio, Bill, 2010, *Taliban, HiG Infighting Leads to Split in Afghan Insurgency in the North*, the Long War Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/taliban_hig_infighti.php
- ²¹⁸ Kilcullen, David. "Taliban and Counter-Insurgency in Kunar." In *Decoding the New Taliban*, by Antonio Giustozzi. (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 231
- ²¹⁹ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 42
- ²²⁰ Kilcullen, "Taliban", 235
- ²²¹ Giustozzi, Antonio. "Conclusions." In *Decoding the New Taliban*, by Antonio Giustozzi. (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 2009), 300
- ²²² Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 33-4
- ²²³ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 12
- ²²⁴ Ruttig, *Loya Paktia*, 72
- ²²⁵ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 53
- ²²⁶ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 11
- ²²⁷ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 103-4
- ²²⁸ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 20
- ²²⁹ Private conversation with a reporter. He had just interviewed girls from that area who were being trained with the explicit consent of the Taliban.
- ²³⁰ Interview with Former Taliban Official, November 16, 2009, identity withheld
- ²³¹ Interview with Afghan State Worker 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld
- ²³² Interview with Afghan State Worker 3, November 21, 2009, identity withheld
- ²³³ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 84
- ²³⁴ Interview with International Worker 9, November 9, 2009, identity withheld
- ²³⁵ *Ibid.* 14
- ²³⁶ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 9
- ²³⁷ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 14
- ²³⁸ Azoy, *Buzkashi*, 24-5
- ²³⁹ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 33
- ²⁴⁰ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 10
- ²⁴¹ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 97
- ²⁴² Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 143
- ²⁴³ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 21-2
- ²⁴⁴ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 33
- ²⁴⁵ Interview with International Diplomat, November 21, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁴⁶ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 10-11
- ²⁴⁷ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 91-92
- ²⁴⁸ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 11
- ²⁴⁹ See for example Bijlert, Martine van. *Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections*. (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2009), 3
- ²⁵⁰ Interview with International Analyst 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld
- ²⁵¹ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 55
- ²⁵² See for example article 27 of the STC defining a 'free enterprise' economy, article ten of the Afghan constitution defining a 'free market', and article 119.1 of the Kosovo constitution or the gender quota articles that seem somewhat optimistic for both Afghan and Somali lawmakers to address while still at

war. The STC can be found at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_127637.pdf, the Afghan constitution is available at http://www.president.gov.af/sroot_eng.aspx?id=68, and the Kosovo constitution at <http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,254>

²⁵³ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 187

²⁵⁴ Lefèvre, Mathieu. *Local Defence in Afghanistan: A review of government-backed initiatives*. (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010), 1

²⁵⁵ Arbaki is a qawm-based militia

²⁵⁶ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 10

²⁵⁷ See for example <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8899122.stm>

²⁵⁸ Lefèvre, *Local Defence*, 7

²⁵⁹ See for example Gant, Jim. *One Tribe at the Time: A strategy for Success in Afghanistan*. (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Import, 2009), which describes such a programme in which Major Gant of the United States Army Special Forces was involved. Major Gants report echoes of ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ and generalises substantially based on personal engagement with a specific small group of people. The solutions make more sense in short term military goals in a localised context than long term stability building.

²⁶⁰ Lefèvre, *Local Defence*, 21

²⁶¹ Gant, *One Tribe*, 10, makes the claim that all Afghans belong to a tribe.

²⁶² *Ibid.* 39 discusses that the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ‘tribes’ should be supported.

²⁶³ *Ibid.* 24, discussion of honour as a component of interaction.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 17 explains that in order to gain trust the team let themselves get drawn into a local dispute in which they assisted militarily on the side of the chosen partner.

²⁶⁵ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 119

²⁶⁶ Fange, Anders. *The State of the Afghan State*. (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010), 1

²⁶⁷ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 24

²⁶⁸ Schetter and Glassner, “Neither functioning,” 143

²⁶⁹ Interview with International Journalist 1, September 2009, identity withheld

²⁷⁰ Rashid, *Descent*, 131

²⁷¹ Suhrke, Astri. “The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan.” In *The Dilemmas of State Building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, by Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk. (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 239

²⁷² Ruttig, Thomas. *The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors, and Approaches to ‘Talks.’* (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2009), 8

²⁷³ The examples are many but one that stands out is the night-raid by US Special Forces against a compound in the Gardez area in February 2010 resulting in the deaths of two men and three women, two of whom were pregnant. The men turned out to be the owner of the compound who was also the local Afghan intelligence commander and former police chief, and his brother the district prosecutor. ISAF claimed the raid was based on ‘reliable intelligence’ and initially denied the raid, then denied having killed the women but eventually apologised for all killed and retracted the parts of the story that indicated they had been fired upon and that the women were found bound, gagged, and stabbed to death in a back room. One quite comprehensive account of this incident can be found at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7060395.ece>

²⁷⁴ Interview with International Worker 10, November 16, 2009, identity withheld

²⁷⁵ Ruttig, “How Tribal”, 15

²⁷⁶ Interview with International Worker 11, November 16, 2009

²⁷⁷ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 6-7

²⁷⁸ Interview with International Worker 10, November 16, 2009, identity withheld

²⁷⁹ Ruttig, *The Other Side*, 16

²⁸⁰ Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 82

²⁸¹ *Ibid.* 12

²⁸² Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, 131

²⁸³ Ruttig, “How Tribal”, 13

²⁸⁴ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 482-83

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- ²⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 500-503
- ²⁸⁶ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 76-7
- ²⁸⁷ Rubin, *Fragmentation*, 118
- ²⁸⁸ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 94
- ²⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 93
- ²⁹⁰ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 76-7
- ²⁹¹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 94
- ²⁹² Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 95
- ²⁹³ Suhrke, "Reconstruction", 1293
- ²⁹⁴ Sherman, Jake. "The Afghan National Development Strategy: The Right Plan at the Wrong time?" *Journal of Security Sector Management* (Cranfield Security Sector Management Team) 7, no. 1 (February 2009): 1
- ²⁹⁵ ANDS, 22
- ²⁹⁶ Shah, Sayed Mohammed. *Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Formulation Process: Influencing Factors and Challenges*. Discussion Paper, (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2009), 26
- ²⁹⁷ ANDS, 54
- ²⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 39 and 134
- ²⁹⁹ Shah, *ANDS Challenges*, 26
- ³⁰⁰ ANDS, 54
- ³⁰¹ Shah, *ANDS Challenges*, 27
- ³⁰² Sherman, Jake, 2009, 9
- ³⁰³ Tadjbakhsh, "Conflicted Outcomes," 642
- ³⁰⁴ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 25
- ³⁰⁵ Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7
- ³⁰⁶ Interview with Afghan State Worker 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld
- ³⁰⁷ National Solidarity Programme information package obtained at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, November 2009.
- ³⁰⁸ Interview with Afghan State Worker 3, November 21, 2009, identity withheld
- ³⁰⁹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 95
- ³¹⁰ There was a mix of responses and though they were mainly positive in their descriptions, there were also voices describing the programme as a 'fad' that will die out and a 'myth.'
- ³¹¹ This was a recurring pattern when engaging with implementing partners, donors, and Afghan state officials.
- ³¹² During the November 18, 2009, meeting with a district shura everyone in the room exclaimed how fantastic the NSP was until one person stood up and criticised it. At that point everyone seemed to have at least one negative story to tell.
- ³¹³ District shura meeting November 18, 2009
- ³¹⁴ District shura meeting November 18, 2009, discussing diesel generators where the generators were paid for by the NSP but the villagers had not understood they would have to pay for the diesel and the maintenance. This was further commented on in interview with Afghan State Worker 3, November 21, 2009, identity withheld, who claimed that the problem of sustainability was known and that diesel generators were no longer approved as NSP projects.
- ³¹⁵ District shura meeting November 18, 2009, discussing a road project where the thin single layer of gravel out of three projected had turned into mud within a few weeks; a 'well' that turned out to be a hole in the ground filled with fresh water from a tanker by the contractor; and allegations that as much as 60 per cent of the money allocated was stolen or misappropriated.
- ³¹⁶ Interview with Afghan State Worker 3, November 21, 2009, identity withheld
- ³¹⁷ Interview with Afghan State Worker 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld
- ³¹⁸ Interview with Afghan State Worker 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld
- ³¹⁹ Interview with International Diplomat 2, November 21, 2009, identity withheld

³²⁰ Interview with Afghan State Worker 2, November 17, 2009, identity withheld and Afghan State Worker 3, November 21, 2009, identity withheld

³²¹ Suhrke, "Tight Embrace," 247

³²² Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, 24

³²³ For example interview with International Worker 11, November 16, 2009, identity withheld, or interview with International Analyst 1, November 16, 2009, identity withheld

³²⁴ Ruttig, *How Tribal*, 1

³²⁵ Both encountered during fieldwork

³²⁶ See for example Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 41

³²⁷ Stanekzai, Mohammad Masoom, 2008, *Thwarting Afghanistan's Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach towards Peace and Reconciliation*, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), November, 6-7

³²⁸ This practise was commented on for example in interview with International Worker 5, September 30, 2009, identity withheld.

Conclusions

¹ Jabri, "War, government, politics", .51 and 56

² Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan*, 14

³ Thomas, *Critical Ethnography*, 47

⁴ Vayrynen, *Culture*, 109

⁵ Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 144

⁶ *Ibid.* 93-95

⁷ Anderson, *Do No Harm*, 23 and 145

⁸ Berdal, *Building Peace*, 39

⁹ Richmond, *Romanticisation*, 7