


GOVERNMENT RESETTLEMENT AS PARTICIPATORY
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPLORING THE ROLE
OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE LOWER SHIRE REGION OF MALAWI

Hebe Nicholson

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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
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CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE
LOWER SHIRE REGION OF MALAWI

Hebe Nicholson



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

at the University of St Andrews

March 2020

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ABSTRACT

There has been debate over how environmental change will influence migration. This PhD explores one aspect of this: the impact of flooding on migration patterns and the subsequent move by government actors to govern these migration patterns through resettlement in Malawi. This research suggests that this move to govern migration reflects a broader shift in the discourse of seeing migration as a positive opportunity and as adaptation to environmental change. It focuses on the Lower Shire region of Malawi, an area particularly impacted by flooding, and especially reflects on the participatory nature of the resettlement process, as this is highlighted by influential international guidelines as being necessary for the resettlement to be adaptive rather than mal-adaptive. To this end the research focuses on the knowledges involved and the varying power dynamics. Fieldwork occurred between August and November 2017 and consisted of 48 Interviews and six focus group discussions with three communities in the Lower Shire that had three different attitudes (unwilling, undecided, and resettled) towards resettlement. As well as 21 interviews with stakeholders in government and NGOs involved in these communities and in the resettlement process at a national and district level. The data showed that flooding related movements already occur in the communities but, due to the increasing severity of flooding, there is a growing desire by those in government and NGOs to initiate their own resettlement. However, official resettlement due to flooding is novel in Malawi, and there is confusion over what it entails and who is involved. This appears to lead to a disconnect between *Resettlement*, established by the government and *resettlement*, movements initiated by those in vulnerable communities. The data suggests that a key reason this disconnect develops is due to the different perceptions of knowledge. It appears that there is a subtly pervasive disregard of community knowledge and this can reduce the community agency within the resettlement process and prevent it from being participatory. However, the data also highlighted the intriguing ways the communities themselves can re-appropriate resettlement to indicate their needs in the process, illustrating the fluidity of knowledge and power within the resettlement process in Malawi.

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KEYWORDS

Resettlement, Climate Change, Participatory, Flooding, Local Knowledge, Technocratic Knowledge, Malawi

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACPC	Area Civil Protection Committee
CBRLDP	Community Based Rural Land Development Programme
COP	Conference of the Parties
DCPC	District Civil Protection Committee
DoDMA	Department of Disaster Management Affairs
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
MFERP	Malawi Flood Emergency Recovery Project
NAPA	National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
TA	Traditional Authority
TEK	Traditional Ecological Knowledge
UN	United Nations
VCPC	Village Civil Protection Committee

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

There is ever increasing interest and alarm over climate change on global, national and local scales (IPCC., 2014b, Falkner, 2016, Brown, 2019, Glenza et al., 2019). Climate change will disproportionately impact those in poorer countries who have contributed least to the greenhouse gas emissions suggested to cause current climate change (McKinnon, 2012, IPCC., 2014b, Fazey et al., 2009). The inequality of emissions and impact reinforces the fact that climate change is a global responsibility (McKinnon, 2012, IPCC., 2014b).

There is a well-established body of research on how to combat, mitigate and adapt to climate change (IPCC., 2014b, Adger et al., 2003, Fazey et al., 2009). Migration has increasingly been seen as one form of adaptation to climate change (Black et al., 2011b) and there has been growing interest by governments and international organisations to become involved in this movement. Yet there is currently little research on the governance of environmental migration (Draper and McKinnon, 2018, Arnall, 2018), and in this research I focus on one specific facet of this: resettlement as a way to manage flooding. Resettlement of communities that are vulnerable to flooding (flooding-vulnerable communities) requires governments, civil society and community members to work together. These actors have different understandings and priorities associated with resettlement. This research is interested in understanding how these actors determine the resettlement process and why, and what insights this provides for future interest in environmental migration governance. It focuses on the Lower Shire Region of Malawi, an area where the Malawian government is interested in using resettlement schemes to manage the impact of increasingly severe flooding on vulnerable communities.

I structure this introduction as follows, first, in section 1.2, I set out the relevant background for the research. I outline the literature on environmental migration governance, as well as providing some context for Malawi and its suitability as a research site for this work. Next, in section 1.3, I explain the specific research focus and value. Thirdly, in section 1.4, I

set out the research aims and questions and, finally, in section 1.5, the chapter will conclude by presenting the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Research Background

1.2.1 The Governance of Environmental Migration

The increasing interest on climate change from the 1980s has led to growing research on the impact that potential environmental change has on migration patterns (Black et al., 2011a, Morrissey and House, 2009, Piguet, 2013, Tadjell et al., 2018, Piguet et al., 2018). In this research I view environmental change as the local and immediate consequence of climate change as well as other factors, such as land management (Fazey et al., 2009). The interest in environmental migration has evolved from predictions of large numbers of environmental migrants (Myers, 2005), to a more nuanced understanding: the environment is now seen by academics as just one of many drivers that influence migration decisions in a multitude of ways (Black et al., 2011a). There has subsequently been a shift within the literature to view migration as an adaptation strategy to manage environmental change (Black et al., 2011b, Foresight, 2011, McLeman and Smit, 2006). This allows migration to be seen more positively in academia and policy. It is now seen, by the academic and international communities, as part of the strategy to manage the impacts of climate and environmental change (IPCC., 2019, IPCC., 2014a, McNamara et al., 2018).

There is interest from many governments, particularly in places where environmental change is more pronounced, to 'manage' these movements related to environmental change, most notably through resettlement schemes, which involve the moving of vulnerable communities to safer areas, either permanently, seasonally or temporarily (Arnall, 2014, Draper and McKinnon, 2018, Johnson, 2012). This has been seen in discussions over resettlement on a large scale, such as the entire populations of some small island states like Tuvalu and Kiribati, in the Pacific, due to sea level rise (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012, McNamara et al., 2018, Mortreux et al., 2018). However, my research is focused on the resettlement of inland communities undergoing significant environmental change. According to Draper and McKinnon (2018), this is a particularly understudied area, and has high relevance as many

people live in inland places vulnerable to severe environmental change (IPCC., 2019). The external involvement of government within a movement, through resettlement activities, is often controversial (Stal, 2011, Dun, 2011, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). There can be a lack of appreciation by government of the importance of an individual's sense of home, and all this entails (Campbell, 2010, McNamara et al., 2018).

There is potential for multiple priorities to be involved in government resettlement. This makes it challenging for governments to facilitate, but also makes it an interesting area of study. This is especially due to the novelty of government resettlement to manage environmental change (Draper and McKinnon, 2018, Arnall, 2018). Previously, resettlement has mainly been associated with large development projects, like the Three Gorges Dam in China (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015) and slum clearances, often where there has been little choice for those undertaking the resettlement (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015, Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2010). However, the guidelines set out by international organisations, suggest that resettlement as adaptation to climate change, which resettlement due to flooding fits within, aims at being proactive, voluntary and participatory (Tadgell et al., 2018, Arnall, 2018). This approach is difficult to implement with the technocratic stance of most government resettlement schemes (Arnall, 2018, Wilmsen and Webber, 2015) and the multiple understandings and priorities involved in the resettlement process. In this research, I examine how participatory the resettlement process is in Malawi. At points, I use a governmentality approach to unpick the motivations for different understandings and to explore which understandings are dominant. This is useful because it highlights if the resettlement is being organised chiefly as a form of adaptation to increasingly severe flooding, or whether it is being used to fulfil other government objectives (Arnall, 2018).

I focus on flooding, which can be viewed as both slow and fast onset environmental change. It is fast onset environmental change in that a single flood event can occur quickly. It is also slow onset environmental change, as an area can repeatedly be affected by increasingly severe flooding, making it gradually harder to inhabit. As I will explore in the literature review, the type of environmental change has different forms of movement associated with it. Permanent moves are usually associated with slow onset environmental change and temporary moves are associated with fast onset environmental change (Gray and Mueller,

2012). This provides potential for multiple perspectives on what type of resettlement should occur in response to flooding. This ambiguity means that flooding provides a pertinent backdrop to explore the participatory nature of the resettlement process: how different understandings and knowledges work together, particularly as there is no clear approach and some negotiation of understandings is required. In the next section I will set out the context and relevance of Malawi as a place to study this topic.

1.2.3 The Malawian Context

Malawi is experiencing, and is predicted to continue experiencing, increasing environmental change (Suckall et al., 2015). Droughts and floods have always been part of the Malawian climate (MetMalawi, 2016). However, their occurrence is becoming more severe and the seasonal timings are increasingly unpredictable (IPCC., 2014a). This is especially negative for agriculture, which 85% of the population of Malawi rely on for their income (World Bank, 2016). Recently there has been severe flooding in Malawi: Cyclone Idai in March 2019 devastated Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The greatest impact of the cyclone was in Mozambique, but Malawi still had 86,980 people displaced due to the cyclone (DoDMA, 2019). Of even greater impact were the January 2015 floods, which displaced 230,000 people and killed 106 (Chonghaile, 2015). According to the 2015 post disaster needs assessment report, the total cost of the disaster and immediate recovery work came to US\$335 million, and the longer term reconstruction needs were estimated at US\$494 million (Government of Malawi, 2015a). Additionally, there was a severe drought in 2016 due to a strong El Niño, which resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency by the Malawian government (Aljazeera, 2016). Data collection for this thesis was conducted in the autumn of 2017, in between the 2015 flooding and the 2019 cyclone. The 2015 floods were much discussed by the participants. There was also nervous speculation about future climatic events.

Thus, the recent events suggest that flooding in Malawi has become increasingly severe. This has caused more and more people to move due to flooding. The government has become increasingly interested in managing these movements through resettlement schemes and is now in the process of drafting a resettlement policy to guide this approach.

The policy is first of its kind in Malawi and is expected to be finalised by the end of 2020. This fits in with the shift to view migration as adaptation to climate change outlined above (McLeman and Smit, 2006). The recent involvement of governments in the management of flood-related migration, coupled with the growing international interest in governing environmental migration, makes it an apposite time to be studying this issue.

The governance situation and structure within Malawi also provides an excellent context to explore how different actors and scales work together in the decision-making process. Since 2002 Malawi has been undergoing a process of government decentralisation, although there is speculation as to its likely success in Malawi (Jagero et al., 2014). Decentralisation refers to the delegation of responsibility and resources from the central to local government (the district council) for them to manage as they see fit. Many district councils still rely heavily on the national government for funds, with few revenue generation activities at the district level (Jagero et al., 2014). Thus, the decentralisation process is still occurring and the different layers of responsibility and power are still being determined. Moreover, the local government includes both the district council and customary forms of governance, with TA (traditional authority) chiefs and village heads. All of these actors are involved in the resettlement process, providing a suitable backdrop to explore how different understandings work together within resettlement.

To further explore the process of resettlement, I focus on three communities with three different attitudes towards it. The community at Jombo resettlement site have resettled after the severe flooding in 2015. The community at village Mwalija have the opportunity to resettle, and assistance promised for that resettlement, but are undecided whether they want to resettle. Finally, there are those at TA Nyachikadza, which the government very much wants to resettle, and which are unwilling to resettle. These three communities give an insight into the varied understandings and knowledges involved in resettlement.

1.3 Research Focus and Value

My research explores the participatory nature of the resettlement process by examining the role of different understandings and knowledges within it. In order for resettlement to fit with the existing guidelines on resettlement as climate change adaptation, outlined by various international organisations, it needs to be voluntary and participatory (Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013). For resettlement to be participatory it needs to involve those in the flooding-vulnerable communities, to produce a resettlement process that services the needs of the communities whilst also adhering to the capabilities, resources and desires of those in government. This can be challenging (Arnall et al., 2019). I argue that a focus on understandings and knowledges involved in the resettlement process allows this research to appreciate how participatory it is, as it shows whose understandings are considered and prioritised, and why. This also helps to expose the motivations and influences in the resettlement process and to assess whether it is really assisting the vulnerable populations. This is especially important in Malawi due to the powerful presence of development organisations and ‘development’s’ reputation for prioritising Western knowledge (Escobar, 2011). Vulnerable communities often have their own strategies to manage flooding, many of which involve periodically moving out of the vulnerable area, independent of government involvement. Within the research I highlight whether the government is using resettlement as a method to better control their population, as other research has found in a Chinese context (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019).

This research is focused on the increasing interest in the governance of environmental migration, as a method for vulnerable communities to adapt to a changing climate. Therefore, this research is expected to make contributions to literatures on climate change adaptation (Tacoli, 2009) and the governance of migration and resettlement (Johnson, 2012, Mortreux et al., 2018), particularly participation in a development context (Arnall, 2018, Tadgell et al., 2018). It is especially valuable at this time when there is much discussion about climate change and its impact, and growing public fear around the climate ‘crisis’ (Brown, 2019, Glenza et al., 2019). There is an impetus to govern climate migration from international development actors, such as the World Bank, but it is unclear how and if this should proceed.

I focus on one example where this is happening: flood-related resettlement in Malawi. I explore how the resettlement process is occurring and whether it is participatory, and, thus, a process that will enable vulnerable populations to better adapt to climate change.

1.4 Research Aim and Questions

The aim and research questions are set out below with the rationale behind them in italics. These rationales are expanded in the Methodology chapter.

Aim

1. To explore the extent of the participation of relevant actors within the resettlement process in Malawi. *Resettlement is an emotive issue, involving multiple priorities from the different actors involved. Thus, this aim will enable my research to examine how different knowledges are allowed for in the resettlement process. It will illustrate whether the resettlement is adaptive to climate change, as international guidelines on resettlement suggest it is necessary for it to be participatory to be adaptive.*

Research questions

1. How and why is flooding in Malawi seen as an increasing threat? *This will illustrate how flooding is viewed in Malawi, and whether it is problematised and why. It will open up discussion on existing strategies to managing flooding, particularly the movements related to flooding already occurring in the communities.*
2. How and why is resettlement used as a technique by government and NGOs to manage the population and flooding in Malawi? *This allows for analysis of the governance approach to resettlement, what the varied understandings of resettlement are amongst government and NGOs, how these understandings are incorporated into activities and what influences the formation of the understandings.*
3. What role do flood vulnerable communities have in the government strategy of resettlement? *This focuses specifically on the vulnerable communities, who are often perceived as least vocal in the resettlement scenario. It provides a platform to explore how they view and react to government resettlement.*

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

In the following, I provide a brief map of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I set out the relevant literature. I explore the development of the environmental migration literature to illustrate the genesis of the view that migration can be adaptation to environmental change. I also highlight how there is still much room for debate and varied perspectives. I introduce literatures on governance and resettlement and explore further the relevance of a focus on knowledge to current debates and the necessity for, but also the potential contradictions within, participation. In Chapter 3, I outline the methodology used to conduct the research and provide detail on the communities studied and the participants interviewed. Turning to the empirical findings, in Chapter 4 I explore results that illustrate the problematisation of flooding in Malawi and the legitimising of government control. In Chapter 5 I examine the government approach to resettlement, focusing on the key influences on this approach and the methods and structure that have underpinned its development. In Chapter 6 I set out the community response to government resettlement, highlighting how communities attempt to be heard. Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude by presenting the conceptual and empirical contributions of my research, as well as relevant policy recommendations. I summarise the answers to the research questions and suggest avenues for future research.

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND GOVERNANCE LITERATURES FOR THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE SCHOLARSHIP

2.1 Introduction

Scholars have long recognised that the environment plays a role in migration patterns (Piguet, 2013). However, the way environmental migration is being discussed within certain literatures and policy is evolving. New understandings around environmental migration and its role in adapting to climate change are being developed and utilised, particularly with regards to a rising interest in the governance of environmental migration and the way in which governments can advocate for, and actively try to persuade, communities to resettle. However, there is as yet little consensus on how the process of governing environmental migration, such as through a resettlement project, should take place, if at all. In this research I explore the various knowledges to understand how different groups work together in the resettlement process in Malawi, to particularly see how participatory it is. This will ultimately give greater insight into the use of migration in environmental policy and international development (Barnett and Campbell, 2010), specifically how to ensure that resettlement can be inclusive of different knowledges and therefore be voluntary and participatory, which is essential for resettlement to be adaptive (Arnall, 2018, Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et al., 2018).

In this literature review, I first, in section 2.2, outline the broader context of environmental migration in academic literature. In section 2.3, I explore literature on governance, as it is the governance environmental migration that this research is interested in. Finally, due to my particular focus on knowledge production, in section 2.4, I examine literatures on different knowledges and participation.

Throughout the research the terms *understanding* and *knowledge* are used to represent either the process of something being known, or what is known (cf. Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). I use understanding because, as I will set out below, much of the literature on knowledge places categories or boundaries on how something is known, which can be

unrealistic (cf. Raymond et al., 2010b). Alternatively, referring to understandings enables a broader perspective on what influences how something is known, as the term 'understanding' has more fluid connotations and is often used when discussing an individual and not a group of people, making it more personal and subjective. However, knowledge is used widely in the literature and in order to draw on that literature I also use the term knowledge. With regard to the use of other terminology pertinent to the topic, while acknowledging their limitations, the terms Global North and the West are used to refer to those areas that are perceived as the 'more developed' regions of the globe.

2.2 Environmental Migration

Below, I provide context on how environmental migration governance has developed in migration studies. Following the dominant view in the literature (Black et al., 2011a), I view environmental migration as migration that is predominantly driven by environmental factors, but these do not need to be the only factors influencing the migration decision. In what follows, I illustrate the debate that led to this understanding of environmental migration and the problems it causes for its empirical study. Whilst some of these literatures are not directly relevant for the Results chapters, understanding their development is needed to appreciate how resettlement, as a governance response to environmental migration, came to be viewed as a strategy of adaptation to climate change.

2.2.1 The Evolution of Environmental Migration Research

Whilst environmental change has always affected people's migration, it is only in the last 40 years that there has been a resurgence of interest in this issue in the academic and policy arena (Piguet, 2013). The effect of environmental change on migration was discussed within 19th century Geography (Ravenstein, 1891). However, it disappeared in the literature from the 20th century due to a combination of factors: the backlash against environmental determinism (Livingstone, 1993); the belief that humans could conquer nature (Hinchcliffe, 2011); and the increasing interest in the role of economics within migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985). Therefore, for roughly the first 70 years of the 20th century, the environment was not considered in migration theory and economics took a central role (Piguet, 2013).

Environmental migration re-entered academic consciousness as part of the conservation movement of the 1970s (Brown, 1976). This resurgent interest in environmental migration occurs in a post 1973 oil-crisis era where there were concerns over resource scarcity and there were other such neo-Malthusian writings, such as *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al., 1972) and *The Population Bomb* (Ehrlich et al., 1971). These writings suggested that there would be severe impacts due to overpopulation, such as mass famine. There has subsequently been some criticism that these writings were too dramatic in their predictions, yet they sparked the initial concern over environmental migration (Bardi, 2011). Thus, this early re-initiation of environmental migration was in an era before major concern over climate change, where over-population was seen as the key threat, particularly in so-called developing countries. This is different to current understandings, where climate change, and the human actions which cause it, are seen as central to the issue. However, the interest in environmental migrants, or refugees, as they were discussed by many at this stage, began in earnest after El-Hinnawi's (1985) UNEP paper, when anthropogenic climate change science was becoming more established (Hansen et al., 1981).

El-Hinnawi (1985) and Jacobson (1988) set out the guidelines for much of the further study into environmental migration (Morrissey and House, 2009). El-Hinnawi (1985: 4) is one of the first to set out a formal definition of an environmental refugee:

“... those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/ or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affect the quality of their life. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition it is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it temporarily or permanently unsuitable to support human life.”

In this definition it is clear that he is referring to forced forms of migration, which, as will be explored in the next section, is not what all current research on environmental migration suggests (Black et al., 2011b). However, El-Hinnawi also acknowledges that it is a heterogeneous process, involving multiple typologies (El-Hinnawi, 1985). This is an influential

foundation for the subsequent developments in environmental migration research, which also stress the multi-causal nature of environmental migration (Black et al., 2011a).

Jacobson (1988), writing for the Worldwatch Institute, attempts to turn El-Hinnawi's (1985) theorising into empirical evidence, illustrating one impact of this viewpoint. Jacobson is the first to introduce empirical evidence into this arena and start the desire to audit this phenomenon. The empirical evidence given is based on the number of people situated within an area undergoing environmental degradation. The types of models Jacobson (1988) uses are termed 'common sense' models (Black, 2001), as they are based on the premise that all those in a vulnerable area will be impacted and will move out. Jacobson focuses on recent events (the Chernobyl disaster, the 1988 flooding in Bangladesh and the 1982-84 droughts in sub-Saharan Africa for example) to suggest there were ten million environmental migrants at the time of writing (Jacobson, 1988). Thus, initially the empirical evidence was based on current situations that potentially involved environmental migrants. However, the growing credence given to climate change, and its potential impact, put a greater emphasis on estimates and predictions of climate change and subsequent literature on environmental migration focused on this (c.f. Myers, 2005).

Norman Myers (1993; 1997; 2002; 2005) fuses both the climate change discourse and the previous Malthusian logic to set out several current estimates and predictions. He uses predictions of climate change and population growth to suggest that large numbers of resource-stressed populations will be forced to move. He predicts there will be as many as 200 million environmental refugees when 'global warming takes hold' (Myers, 2005: 1). There were others that also predicted large amounts of migration, including Stern (2007), who also suggested there would be 200 million by 2050. Similar to Jacobson (1988), these large estimates are based solely on common sense models (the numbers of those living in risk prone areas) and not on empirical analysis (Black, 2001). They assume migration is the only response to environmental change and have been critiqued for this simplistic view and the inadequate evidence on which it is based (Findlay, 2011, Gemenne, 2011, Piguet, 2010, Black, 2001). As previously suggested, they were primarily generated by those like Jacobson (1988) pushing for greater attention to conservation, with the emphasis on raising concern and awareness over the environment. They have thus been critiqued by migration scholars as

being too one-dimensional in suggesting that environmental change is the sole driver to migration (Bilsborrow, 1992). A polarised debate surrounding environmental migration consequently emerged.

Suhrke (1994) outlines two separate schools in the environmental migration debate. Those, like Myers (2005), who propose vast predictions are maximalists and those, like Black et al. (2011a), who provide a more complex understanding are minimalist (Suhrke, 1994). The maximalist school's focus on prediction fits with the crisis rhetoric surrounding popular debates over climate change and migration. As mentioned, they are interested in raising awareness about the impact of climate change and a key method they use is to suggest large numbers of people will be forced to migrate because of it (Morrissey and House, 2009). This polarised debate in the scholarship was prevalent in the 1990s, but, in the current scholarship, the 'minimalist' perspective is dominant and the maximalist perspective is mainly taken up by those who are wary of international migration, such as far-right nationalist political groups. This is especially the case in a post 2015 'migration crisis' era, which has included calls for tighter borders (Morrissey and House, 2009).

The minimalists counter the maximalist perspective to stress how a multitude of factors, such as economic, political, or social, work together in different ways to influence migration and the environment is only one of these factors (Black, 2001, Black et al., 2011a, Findlay, 2011). I expand on this in Figure 2.1 below. The two different schools of thought, prevalent in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to a call for greater empirical evidence, to solidify opinion (Suhrke, 1994). However, environmental change is difficult to quantify and proxies of it can be misleading (Suhrke, 1994). The next subsection will explore further the current understandings of environmental migration and the empirical studies that have informed these understandings.

2.2.2 Current State of Environmental Migration Research – Migration as Adaptation

The multi-causal nature of migration has become key in environmental migration research. Black et al. (2011a) notably illustrate this with their diagram (Figure 2.1), which sets out the five main drivers that influence migration decisions: environmental, political,

demographic, social and economic. This diagram is part of a framework they develop to bring the environment back into the study of migration, as well as incorporating the factors developed in previous migration theories, such as the economic, political and social. They highlight how often these factors have been viewed in isolation and stress that it is vital to explore how these aspects work together to influence migration to make progress in this area of study (Black et al., 2011a). This better appreciates the complexity of reality and is a useful grounding for subsequent research. However, it is very difficult to incorporate this complexity within research, due to the multitude of factors that need to be considered, ranging from social networks to rainfall patterns. Furthermore, this approach only incorporates movers and stayers in the analysis and does not include the multidimensional or circular forms of migration that may also occur (Safra de Campos, 2015). Thus, whilst the multi-causal nature of migration is influential in discussion of environmental migration, it is difficult to measure empirically.




Figure 2. 1 A conceptual framework for the drivers of migration taken from Black et al. 2011a P.S5

The UK government’s landmark Foresight report (2011), of which Black et al.’s (2011a) paper, discussed above, is a synthesis, questions whether migration has to be portrayed in a negative light. They suggest it could be viewed as adaptation and that the lack of ability to migrate, or the occurrence of a ‘trapped’ population, may actually be more problematic than

the migration. The emphasis on migration as adaptation, the acknowledgement of trapped populations and the selectivity of the opportunity to migrate, whilst historically recognised (Ravenstein, 1885), were influential developments within the study of environmental migration. The fact that it was a government report also illustrates the start of government interest in this area.

In environmental migration research, trapped populations are often portrayed as the most vulnerable part of the population who are unable to move due to lack of resources (Foresight, 2011, Findlay, 2011). It is sometimes referred to as the 'immobility paradox', where those who most need to move to improve their livelihoods are unable to due to the lack of resources or a desire to remain in place (Findlay, 2011). They can enter into a cycle of deprivation where the more the environment negatively impacts them, the less likely they are to move (Findlay, 2011). It is this part of the population that the Foresight report (2011) advocates should receive greater support and research. The idea of being 'trapped' suggests a lack of agency of the migrant. It does not consider those who do not move out of choice. Nevertheless, it is an emotive way of framing the situation, and can be seen as a reason why assistance is required with resettlement. The idea of trapped population has been taken further in research exploring environmental non-migration: those people who reside in areas vulnerable to environmental change but stay through choice or lack of it (Mallick and Siddiqui, 2015). This definition makes environmental non-migration more inclusive than 'trapped populations'.

Environmental migration as adaptation is another important and recent development in the environmental migration literature. This development is important because it has introduced a more positive perspective on migration in the face of climate change (Black et al., 2011b). The idea of migration as adaptation was initiated by Mcleman and Smit (2006). They illustrated how migration had been used as a way to adapt to environmental hardship during the 1930s dustbowl in America (McLeman and Smit, 2006). It has subsequently been taken up by several scholars in this area (Mortreux and Barnett, 2009, Tacoli, 2009). However, there remains a tension within the use of migration as adaptation, between the positive contribution of migration as a way to adapt and the negative concern that migration reflects a failure of a system to adapt, as a population needs to move away from an area due to their

lack of ability to adapt to change (Warner, 2010, Felli and Castree, 2012). Both of these perspectives influence the governance approach to environmental migration, as will be explored further in the governance section.

The perspective of whether migration is either a positive adaptation or a failure to adapt often depends on the type of environmental change. If the environmental change is fast onset, migration it is more likely to be seen as positive adaptation, as there are seen to be fewer options. In contrast, if the change is more slow onset then the migration may be recognised as a failure to adapt (Warner, 2010). As outlined in the Introduction chapter, flooding incorporates both fast onset and slow onset environmental change. The occurrence of a flood is fast onset, but the gradual increasing severity of flooding in an area is slow onset environmental change. Currently, however, much of the research attributes permanent moves with slow-onset environmental change, like drought leading to crop-failure, and temporary moves with flooding and other occurrences of fast-onset environmental change (Gray and Mueller, 2012). This may be because the experience of flooding up to date has been as a fast onset phenomenon and not much attention has been paid to its gradual increasing severity, which may make places uninhabitable in the future (Stal, 2011). My research nuances this relationship to show the impact that the mixture of fast and slow onset environmental change has on how resettlement is perceived and managed.

The fact that flooding is viewed as both fast and slow onset environmental change makes the governance of flooding particularly interesting to examine. Following the argument above, this suggests that movements related to flooding incorporate both a positive and negative perspective on migration as adaptation, potentially complicating the motivations for government involvement. The perspective of migration caused by flooding as adaptive is a bottom up governance approach. However, there is critique of this: some suggest it produces too neoliberal an agenda. For example, Baldwin (2014) suggests that the framing of migration as a form of adaptation is part of a neoliberal logic. The notion of adaptation puts pressure on the individual to move in times of environmental stress in order to find more appropriate work (Baldwin, 2014). The current popularity within academia to promote environmental migration as adaptation (Black et al., 2011a) is influencing government policy and NGO programmes. Bee et al. (2015) reiterates this by suggesting that the shift in climate policy

towards climate governance indicates a neoliberal agenda, as responsibility for the climate is transferred to non-state actors and the individual. Thus, the desire by the Malawian government for flooding-vulnerable communities to resettle, could be seen to represent this shift. This research will explore this possibility.

A final emerging issue within current environmental migration research, touched on at the start of this section, is the uneven geography of research. There is critique that environmental migration is researched by Western academics and is mainly focused on environmental migration occurring in the Global South (Piguet et al., 2018). Through reviewing several hundred papers Piguet et al. (2018) are able to compare the geography of research on environmental migration and climate science research. They show that both are predominantly undertaken by Western researchers and that environmental migration research is focused on the Global South, whereas climate science research is focused on the Global North. This illustrates the hegemony that the West has over understandings of climate change and its impacts. Piguet et al. (2018) suggest that it reiterates the post-colonial control that the West wishes to maintain over the Global South, particularly through the opportunity to securitise the issue of environmental migrants. It highlights the importance of unpacking the knowledge involved within environmental migration governance. For example, this research argues that the creation of discourse on migration as adaptation to environmental change outlined above, has led to growing interest in governing environmental migration (UNHCR, 2014). There are several implications over governing migration, which will be explored in the governance section. However, first I will explore the literature on resettlement, as the specific form of environmental migration governance that is also discussed as climate change adaptation (Arnall, 2018).

2.2.3 Resettlement

The focus on migration as adaptation has led to a growing interest in resettlement as a way to manage and adapt to climate change, particularly in the Global South (Tadgell et al., 2018, Johnson, 2012, Arnall, 2018, Draper and McKinnon, 2018). This research views resettlement as the movement of a community out of their previous home area to create a new home area either permanently or temporarily, as part of an established annual routine.

Resettlement is not a new concept, particularly within development and the resettlement associated with the installation of large development projects, such as dams (Arnall, 2018). Moreover, there is a long history of nomadic societies, and communities that move regularly as a way of life, without any form of external involvement (Khazanov, 1994). However, the use of government resettlement to adapt to climate change is novel (Tadgell et al., 2018, Arnall, 2018). Thus, there is sparse literature on it and consequently confusion over the best approach for governments to take, or if it should be used at all (Draper and McKinnon, 2018). This research will add further literature to this area.

Much of the existing advice on resettlement comes from international organisation guidelines, or experience from previous forced resettlement related either with development or post disaster response (Tadgell et al., 2018). However, as Tadgell et al. (2018) set out in their review of the existing literature on climate related resettlement, climate resettlement endeavours to be voluntary and *proactive*. However, as will be explored below, this is not always the case. Similar to the opposing views on migration as adaptation outlined above (Warner, 2010), there are critiques on resettlement as adaptation. For example, Miller and Dun (2019) have queried whether resettlement is adaptive or constitutes 'loss and damage'. This research views loss and damage as the 'negative effects of climate variability and climate change that people have not been able to cope with or adapt to' (Warner and Van der Geest, 2013: 369). In their research exploring resettlement in Vietnam, Miller and Dun (2019) suggest that most resettlement contains some form of loss and damage, and that, if not properly managed, can lead to greater vulnerability than before the move. This sentiment was echoed in Wimsen and Rogers (2019) research exploring resettlement in China. Similarly, McNamara et al. (2018) draw on their research in Alaska and Kiribati to suggest that resettlement can be adaptive but can also involve loss and damage, if mismanaged. In this research I view resettlement as attempting to be adaptation to climate change, as the government aims to reduce the vulnerability of the resettling population, a key criteria for adaptation (Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et al., 2018). However, I also acknowledge, from the previous research discussed here, that there is a potential for the resettlement to be maladaptive in Malawi and my research partly examines whether that is the case through its focus on participation. According to Miller and Dun (2019) and McNamara et al. (2018) resettlement needs to be completely voluntary to be adaptive, I will explore the complications

involved with making resettlement voluntary throughout this research by exploring the participation involved.

Additionally, there is confusion over the terms used. Some relevant stakeholders use resettlement, planned relocation and displacement interchangeably (McAdam and Ferris, 2015). These terms can have different connotations, with resettlement and planned relocation suggesting a more permanent move than displacement, and planned relocation suggesting a more proactive approach than the other two. In this research, resettlement is used, as this is associated with the re-establishment of communities rather than just their movement (McAdam and Ferris, 2015). However, in my data, resettlement also encompasses behaviour that could be defined as relocation and displacement, as this was how it was spoken about by participants. This will be discussed further in the Methodology.

In a recent paper exploring the critical geographies of resettlement, Rogers and Wilmsen (2019) highlight how much of the literature on resettlement is focused on what resettlement entails, in terms of compensation provided and reconstruction of livelihoods. However, they suggest that to make the literature on resettlement more critical, more focus should be on examining the *how* and *why* behind the resettlement process (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). They call on a political economy and Foucauldian lens to do this, indicating that a Foucauldian lens, with its emphasis on government techniques, will help uncover the *how* of resettlement and a political economy lens will help uncover the logic of resettlement, the *why* (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). They particularly use the example of resettlement in China to illustrate how the Chinese government utilises resettlement as a tool to facilitate easier management of their citizens (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). Indeed, they highlight how China is developing a method of academy, 'resettlement science', in which they aim to develop the 'perfect' form of resettlement (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019: 10). They critique the idea of obtaining the perfect resettlement, as they suggest that all resettlement recreates power dynamics that have a multitude of consequences, intended and unintended (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). Whilst, Rogers and Wilmsen (2019) focus on all forms of resettlement and not just resettlement as adaptation to climate change, they have also focused more specifically on resettlement as a way to manage climatic hazards in China (Wilmsen and Rogers, 2019). In this paper they emphasise the potential for resettlement to increase

vulnerability and be used to promote other developmental agendas of the government (Wilmsen and Rogers, 2019). This, as well as their call for greater emphasis on the how and why of resettlement (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019), is influential for this research, in which I examine these issues by focusing on the different knowledges involved, and which, if any, knowledge takes precedence.

The remaining review of resettlement will focus further on the areas of tension and consensus currently present within the discourse on resettlement as climate change adaptation. First, the key guidelines associated with this form of resettlement are set out. This is focusing on the 'what' of resettlement, as outlined by Rogers and Wilmsen (2019). Next the literature and empirical studies on resettlement as a way to manage flooding specifically is explored.

2.3.3.1 Resettlement Guidelines

There are four international organisations that have developed guidelines for resettlement as a response to climate change. These guidelines aim to be useful for governments, particularly in developing countries where resettlement is most likely to be used (Johnson, 2012). Thus, the guidelines provide a good basis on which to review resettlement. The use of these guidelines by governments around the world reiterates the issue raised by Piguet et al. (2018) of the uneven geography of environmental migration research, as these guidelines are all made by institutions with their bases in the Global North, and they are chiefly focusing on resettlement situations in the Global South, emphasising the global scale involved in resettlement decisions. The implications of this will be discussed in the Results.

The key guidelines and principles are most notably set out by: the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR, Displacement Solutions and the World Bank (Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013). A summary of each of these guidelines can be seen in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2. 1 Summary of resettlement guidelines

Name of Organisation	Guideline Title and Year of Release	Guideline Summary
Norwegian Refugee Council	Nansen Principles (2011)	10 principles focused on inclusive preparation and planning for relocation, with a particular interest in multi-scalar collaboration (international institutions and law, national governments and local/customary governance.
UNHCR	Planned Relocation, Disasters, and Climate Change: Consolidating good practices and preparing for the future (2014)	Focus on unified understanding of planned relocation. Recognition of the internal nature of most planned relocation but emphasis on the sharing of guidance between states and organisations.
Displacement Solutions	The peninsula principles: on climate displacement within states (2013)	18 principles with much focus on the rights of displaced: their right to stay in the vulnerable area and, as climate change is a global issue, their right for assistance if desired. Again, there is emphasis on global collaboration.
World Bank	Populations at risk of disaster: A resettlement guide (2011)	These guidelines highlight the need for resettlement and then provide detailed practical information on how to undertake resettlement, little post-resettlement advice.

i. Information for this table extracted from: (Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013)

Doberstein and Tadjell (2015) reviewed these guidelines and suggested that they were too general to be helpful for specific cases. They argued that contextual, area specific research is needed to ensure the success of resettlement (Doberstein and Tadjell, 2015). This is because resettlement is recognised as being personal to those involved and thus it is

difficult to provide broad guidance (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015, Tadgell et al., 2018). There are, however, some key principles common in the guidelines. I elaborate on these below.

Firstly, resettlement should only be used as a last resort for adaptation to climate change (IPCC., 2014a). This is because of the upheaval that it involves. Several authors have commented on the negative impacts associated with resettlement, particularly development-induced resettlement (Cernea, 1997, Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2010, Wilmsen and Webber, 2015). These negative impacts include: food insecurity, marginalisation, loss of access to common land, community dispersal and higher morbidity. These impacts potentially prevent a sustainable livelihood from being achievable (Arnall, 2018, Cernea, 1997). Additionally, as mentioned previously, there is still the general view that leaving an area constitutes a failure to adapt in that area (Tadgell et al., 2018). These views are consistent with the view that resettlement can cause increased vulnerability and constitute loss and damage, rather than adaptation (Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et al., 2018).

Consequently, there is debate in academia and policy over whether resettlement should be permanent or not. Some scholars believe that abandonment of an area should be avoided (Displacement Solutions, 2013). Displacement Solutions (2013) suggest this could be done through enabling access to the previous area or factoring in a return scheme to ensure temporary resettlement. However, others suggest that if resettlement is a last resort, and the aim is to move vulnerable people out of harm, they should not attempt to return to the vulnerable area (Johnson, 2012). Tadgell et al. (2018) propose that the question should not be about whether resettlement is permanent but *how* it could be permanent, with emphases on the post-resettlement phase. In answer to this, they advocate for sufficient 'push' and 'pull' factors to be in place to ensure the resettlement is successful (Tadgell et al., 2018). This illustrates the variety of understandings of what constitutes resettlement. This research will attempt to untangle these understandings for the case of Malawi by researching three communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement.

Additionally, the guidelines indicate that resettlement as a form of adaptation should be proactive to climate change (Mycoo and Chadwick, 2012, Correa et al., 2011, UNHCR, 2014). The benefit of the resettlement being proactive, is that a population is moved out of a

vulnerable area before the danger arises, potentially saving lives and saving the costs of interim shelter (Arnall, 2014, Correa et al., 2011). However, this means that the potentially vulnerable population have to be identified beforehand (UNHCR, 2014), which brings in the issue over who decides who is vulnerable, and what counts as vulnerability. I will discuss this later. Moreover, the vulnerable population have to be adequately informed of the potential danger in order to be willing to move (Barnett and Campbell, 2010, Ferris, 2012). This can be difficult, as, being proactive, the critical point has yet to happen. Barnett and Campbell's (2010) work, examining vulnerability in the small island developing states in the South Pacific, outlines how communication is further complicated by the different levels of power and governance involved, particularly when determining vulnerability. These issues are apparent in the resettlement process in Malawi, where there is a potential conflict between government planned resettlement and the organic forms of movement that happen within communities in preparation, and as a response to, flooding. The establishment of official resettlement, whilst ensuring maximum safety of a vulnerable population, is time consuming and involves extensive negotiation with communities. Many community members appear to prefer less reliable, organic forms of resettlement. This will be elaborated on in the Results.

The current literature and guidelines on resettlement highlight the influence of those in government in determining the resettlement. Arnall (2018) examines the existing guidelines to suggest three key aspects of resettlement: last resort, voluntary and developmental. However, he draws on previous examples of resettlement to show how the desire for resettlement to be developmental can lead to government exertion of control (Arnall, 2018). Arnall (2018) echoes Rogers and Wilmsen (2019) and Wilmsen and Rogers (2019) to suggest that resettlement schemes could be framed as resettlement as adaptation to climate change but may also include a broader developmental agenda that could additionally allow a population to be more controllable, either for developmental or political purposes. He illustrates how governments can use climate change to legitimise their desire for resettlement (Arnall, 2018). This raises questions about the voluntary nature of government resettlement schemes, as it implies there may be hidden agendas within the resettlement process that those who are undertaking the resettlement are not aware of.

There is recognition in all the guidelines that in order for resettlement to be voluntary and successful it is essential that it is participatory (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). Participatory approaches are explored in the knowledge section below. Throughout the resettlement literature, whilst there is agreement that participation is needed, there is much diversity over what participation entails. This confusion is present in the resettlement process in Malawi, as will be illustrated in the Results. It is evident that some governments use coercion in order to facilitate participation, with unfulfilled promises of funding, or the cutting off of assistance if communities do not cooperate (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007, Dun, 2011). This fits with much of the governmentality literature highlighting how a state seeks to produce a certain type of citizen through coercion, so that they subconsciously behave in the interest of the state (Dean, 1999). This also coincides with some of the critiques of participation outlined below (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

However, some recognise that the most successful resettlement occurs when it is community led (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Tadgell et al., 2018, Miller and Dun, 2019, McNamara et al., 2018). Wilmsen and Wang (2015) examine two resettlement projects in China, one perceived as voluntary (the Poverty Alleviation Resettlement project) and one perceived as involuntary (the Three Gorges Dam project). They suggest that whether resettlement is perceived as voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant, what is important is if it is people centred (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). Tadgell et al. (2018) take this further to suggest that, in order for adequate participation to occur, people need to feel confident that they will receive adequate compensation and livelihood protection with their move, and that the enormity of their movement is respected. Indeed, Draper and McKinnon (2018) suggest there needs to be more research at the community level, as most environmentally induced resettlement occurs at this scale. Arnall et al. (2019) do exactly this in their research exploring 'claims-making' from below in climate displacement and resettlement. They show how, through the process of naming, blaming, claiming, and framing, communities are able to have agency within climate displacement. They particularly focus on 'claims-making' through community involvement in protests and activism, as opposed to the traditional participatory approaches, which they view as being part of a top-down technocratic approach to resettlement, and not being inclusive of community perspectives (Arnall et al., 2019). This

research will provide further understanding on the community involvement, agency and participation within the resettlement process in Malawi.

Despite their insights, the examination of guidelines and principles is useful only up to a point (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). Whilst this research will examine where the resettlement discussed in Malawi is situated within this broader, international context, it is also beneficial to review specific analysis of previous flooding resettlement situations. Previous research has highlighted the diversity of approaches thus far to resettlement (Mortreux et al., 2018). Mortreux et al.'s (2018) study into government action and inaction in three localities in West Bengal, India, illuminates the multiple factors that influence government involvement beyond the principles and guidelines discussed here. They suggest that the diversity of responses is due to the perceived risks of resettlement by the government and a lack of government accountability for vulnerable areas (Mortreux et al., 2018). This reinforces the need for specific examples, which this research will provide by exploring the rationale behind the three different attitudes in the three different communities under study. Some specific examples from the literature will be explored in more detail in the Resettlement for Flooding subsection below.

2.3.3.2 Resettlement for Flooding

Stal (2011) and Dun (2011) have examined the resettlement of communities by government in response to flood events in Vietnam and Mozambique. They highlight how these resettlements were meant to be permanent moves but were unsuccessful (Stal, 2011, Dun, 2011). Stal (2011) examines the reactive resettlement process away from areas around the Zambezi River in Mozambique after the severe floods of 2001 and 2007. He used semi-structured interviews with experts and resettled populations and found that after the 2001 flood communities were often resettled to areas where there were water scarcity issues and so subsequently moved back to the low-lying flood-prone areas (Stal, 2011). However, after the 2007 floods the resettlement programme, which involved experts from government and international experts from IOM and other UN organisations, focused on choosing better locations for resettlement and providing better incentives, mainly in the form of brick houses (Stal, 2011). This study found that most people who were resettled after the 2007 floods were

happier with their new home and the new lifestyle it incorporated. This lifestyle included living in flood-safe areas but growing crops in low-lying areas, which introduces a new form of migration not used widely in Mozambique previously (Stal, 2011). This approach addresses the need to have adequate compensation and livelihood protection within resettlement processes, as stressed by Tadgell et al. (2018), as well as the need for flexible governance.

By contrast, Dun (2011) shows how the resettlement programme installed by the government in Vietnam drove households into debt. She used semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with migrants and non-migrants to study the resettlement of communities along the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. The resettlement process was encouraged and paraded as the government helping communities. Nevertheless, it required households to buy the land on which they would be resettled, which many could not afford (Dun, 2011). However, unlike in Mozambique, this resettlement programme was not instigated because of the increasing severity of floods, rather it was a proactive approach to resettlement, and part of the government's strategy to better live with floods (Dun, 2011). This approach could be why a payment was required from the migrant as part of the resettlement because the government saw the resettlement as a choice and not a necessity. This illustrates some of the implications of the difference between forced and voluntary migration discussed above. It shows how flooding can potentially incorporate both. Thus, if governance is proactive and taking the 'learning to live with floods' approach, then the migration is potentially more precautionary and seen as voluntary. This could lead the migration to involve financial costs for the migrant. Whereas, if governance is reactionary, then migration due to flooding is more likely to be perceived as forced migration and therefore less likely to involve costs for the migrant.

However, previous literature highlights that, even when there is no monetary cost attached to the migration, there are other implications of forced migrations. Stal (2011) suggests that whilst the communities along the Zambezi do not have a cost associated with their migration, they do depend on humanitarian assistance during flooding, which is an issue that Dun (2011) did not encounter in Vietnam. Indeed, forced resettlement is likely to produce communities that are less satisfied and adjusted to their new environment overall, and therefore likely to be dependent on external assistance for longer (Roizblatt and Pilowsky, 1996). This research aims to assess how much dependency the communities along the Shire

River have on humanitarian assistance during flooding. Interestingly, the Dun (2011) study was done as part of the EACH-FOR project, which was a European led study into environmental migration, with several papers, including Dun's (2011), published in 2011. This illustrates the dominance of Western knowledge within environmental migration literature and reiterates the importance of exploring the genealogy of how resettlement is understood.

Additionally, these previous studies on resettlement due to flooding, do not explore how knowledge on resettlement is produced within the resettlement process. Through studying three communities with three different attitudes to resettlement, I illustrate the different ways in which knowledge on resettlement can be produced and managed on a small scale. I will use these findings to explore the participatory nature of resettlement in Malawi. This will add further understanding of the resettlement process and how it is taken up as a government strategy for climate change adaptation, as called for by scholars such as Arnall (2018), who highlight how resettlement can be labelled by governments as for climate change adaptation whilst also being used to fulfil other government agendas, such as stronger population control.

2.3 The Determinants of Environmental Migration Governance

This research is interested in how environmental migration is governed. I specifically focus on migration due to flooding and the interest in resettlement as a governance tool to manage increasingly severe flooding. In the first section of this review, I established how there has been a shift in the environmental migration literature to view environmental migration as adaptation and how this has led to increasing interest in its governance through processes such as resettlement. In this section, I will provide further context on what influences the governance of environmental migration. I highlight the place of environmental migration governance within broader climate change governance. Following this, I set out issues around the practicalities of governing environmental migration. Here, there is a particular focus on the difficulty of deciding who is vulnerable, who is responsible for environmental migrants and whether the migration is seen as forced or voluntary. In the final subsection I explore the techniques of government, as set out by Foucault and his theory of governmentality, and the existing use of this theory in exploring climate governance.

2.3.1 The Evolution of Environmental Migration Governance

The policy interest in governing environmental migration is relatively recent, growing in the last ten years. This growth in interest corresponds with the growing appreciation and discussion of climate change, and its potential impacts, that is present in much academic literature and now in policy globally (IPCC., 2014a). This has changed the discourse around environmental migration to make it more of a government concern and responsibility, as it is now situated within climate change responses. This subsection will set out this progression by highlighting how it is situated within the broader climate change governance literature, how this influences its policy framing, and the subsequent influence of this on the governance of environmental migration.

2.3.1.1 Climate Change Governance

The most influential aspect of climate change governance of relevance to this research is the role of international agreements, most prominently, the 2016 Paris Agreement. This has the potential to influence the process of resettlement in Malawi as shall be explored below.

The Paris Agreement came out of COP-21 (the conference of the parties) in 2015 and enabled a 'naming and shaming' approach to climate governance (Falkner, 2016). The subsequent COP meetings have not yielded any relevant agreement to supersede the Paris Agreement. Signatories of the Paris Agreement publicly set their own, individual, non-binding targets, which are available to be shared and compared against the targets of other countries (Falkner, 2016). This approach aims to install a more collaborative global effort to combatting climate change (Falkner, 2016). Climate change adaptation has become a big part of this effort. The Paris Agreement called for more climate adaptation funding (UN, 2015). Thus, increasingly, to access large international funding opportunities, such as from the World Bank or UN subsidiaries, countries have to include climate change adaptation in government documentation and often produce a National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) (Weiler et al., 2018). Malawi produced their own NAPA in 2006 (Government of Malawi, 2006) and it is referenced to in the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy as clarifying the impact of Climate change on disasters (Government of Malawi, 2015b). Whilst Warner (2010)

highlights that migration is not yet normally part of a country's NAPA, and it is not part of Malawi's, the introduction of climate change adaptation into the plans, coupled with the growing interest in migration as adaptation to environmental change, highlighted in the section above, could suggest this is not far away. This highlights the influence of global trends and external funding bodies on determining the focus of government, potentially onto resettlement (Weiler et al., 2018). The resettlement guidelines highlighted above illustrated that they were a response to the need to adapt to climate change (UNHCR, 2014, Tadgell et al., 2018). Thus, the international influence that comes from the Paris Agreement and its ramifications on available funding highlights the potential different scales involved in the governance of resettlement.

Indeed, it is not just the international scale that is considered, but national and local scales as well. In their review on environmental governance Ali-khan and Mulvihill (2008) highlight how environmental governance has had increasing influence from civil society. They suggest this inclusive approach to tackling an issue has previously not occurred as successfully (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008). It is only due to the pervasiveness and the supposedly apolitical nature of the environment and climate change that there is a greater openness to, and influence from, civil society. This illustrates variety within a national and local scale.

However, there is also literature that highlights how civil society can be an extension to government (Choudry, 2010). This is referred to as NGOization, which is the process where there is an upsurge in NGOs due to an increase in funding for NGOs from government, or international organisations, for projects designed by government and or international organisations (Choudry, 2010). Moreover, because civil society is often viewed as holding the government accountable, there is less effort in making civil society itself accountable (Choudry, 2010). Therefore, scholars such as Choudry (2010) argue that, through the NGOization process, civil society becomes an unaccountable arm of the government or international organisation. Townsend et al. (2002) highlight how NGOization has been particularly detrimental to the African continent, as it acts as an extension of imperialism and a gate keeper to determining knowledge, as I discuss further in the indigenous knowledge subsection. This is particularly evident in discussion of land reforms within Africa, which have been critiqued as being subject to the influence of international organisations but promoted

at the national and local scale despite the fact that some suggest they do not adequately protect the rights of smallholders in many contexts (Boone, 2007).

At a broader scale, Himley (2008) reviews environmental governance literature to suggest that the involvement of large international organisations, such as the World Bank, in environmental governance can lead to the neoliberalisation of environmental governance, outsourcing it to the responsibility of the communities involved. He indicates that this neoliberalisation is a power burdened process, creating new forms of 'ecogovernmentality' (Himley, 2008: 446). Ecogovernmentality will be explored further in the governmentality section.

Thus, this research incorporates many scales: there is a meta scale of the role of broader ideologies, predominantly Western neoliberalism; there is an international and national scale through the involvement of NGOs, both national and international, and government policy; and there is a local scale with the examination of the role of local understandings, which I will set out further in the indigenous knowledge subsection. However, these local understandings are not limited to the local scale. Indeed, it is very interesting to explore how these scales work together. The process of knowledge production and mobilisation requires that knowledge jumps scales, the Western neoliberalism appears in local understanding of resettlement and vice versa. Moreover there is a time scale with the incorporation of memory and the impact of past events on how people prepare and react for potential future events (Hall and Endfield, 2016). Through their exploration of memory of extreme winters in Cumbria, England, Hall and Endfield (2016) illustrate how memory of extreme weather events, and its impact on future actions, is incredibly subjective and often related to other circumstances happening at the same time as the extreme weather event. Thus, memory can impact how people prepare for future weather events in unpredictable ways, adding an additional dimension behind how people may understand the resettlement process. Through the exploration of scale, I will be able to unpick further the process of knowledge production. Central, in knowledge being able to jump scales, is how it is framed and by whom. In the next subsection, I outline the multiple framings of environmental migration and their implications for governance.

2.3.1.2 Frames in Public Discourse

In the previous discussion, I highlight how the interest and understanding of climate change and environmental migration has developed with time, and how this has affected government objectives. There are now several viewpoints on environmental migration, as can be seen in Table 2.2 (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). These viewpoints are often associated with a particular agenda or concern that the viewer wants to address. Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015: 106) examine this further by looking at how environmental migrants are framed. Frames are viewed as the organisation of ideas on an issue to promote a certain viewpoint, or agenda (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) suggest that the frames in which migrants are placed act as 'filters of sense-making' and these categories can influence policy decisions, as suggested in Table 2.2 below (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015: 106). They take a qualitative approach to analyse the language used around environmental migration, and establish four frames: migrants as victims, security threats, adaptive agents and political subjects. The actors involved in these frames and their time dimension can be seen in Table 2.2, which gives an indication of where the power may lie in each frame. In reality there is much crossover between frames and the timespan with which they are allocated. Despite this, it is useful to categorise discourses on environmental migration in this way, to better appreciate how the migrants are being perceived and why.

The way in which environmental migration is discussed suggests a lot about the perceived agency of the migrant (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). This research views agency as 'having the ability to act and be agents of their own development' (Eversole, 2011: 51), as I explore further in the next subsection. The perceived agency of the migrant highlights how much influence and power they have over the migration decision. Ransan-cooper et al. (2015) suggest that resettlement frames the migrants as political subjects, thus giving the migrants agency within the decision. However, this research will show that governed resettlement fits better in the cross-over between migrants as adaptive and migrants as political subjects, as during the resettlement process under study, government, NGOs and community members work together. This reflects the fact that the agency of the different actors in the migration decision is a complex matter. Exploring the rationale behind the three different attitudes towards resettlement and focusing on the role of different knowledges within this process

will enable this research to better appreciate how government, NGOs and community members work together.

Table 2. 2 Frames and actors involved in environmental migration suggested by Ranson-Cooper et al. (2015: 108). Colour coded by timeframe, key included.

Frames (signifies policy recommendation)	Victims (international protection & compensation for those affected)	Security threats (border protection & military preparedness)	Adaptive agents (labour migration, upskilling & remittances)	Political subjects (multi-scalar & constant bottom up participation in policy design & initiatives)
Type of Actor				
Academia/ Research	Myers; Bogardi	Reuveny; Myers	Black; Warner	Morrissey; Marino
Think-tanks	New Economics Foundation (UK)	Council on Foreign Relations (USA)	Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU)	--
Political leaders	AOSIS; Nansen Initiative	John Kerry (USA, Secretary of State)	Anote Tong (Kiribati, President)	--
Government agencies	--	Department of State (USA)	Foresight (UK Government Office for Science)	--
International environmental organisations	Friends of the Earth; Earth Policy Institute	IPCC	--	--
International humanitarian or development organisations	Christian Aid; GermanWatch	--	IOM	Displacement Solutions
Media	Time Magazine (USA)	CBSNews (USA)	--	--
National/Sub-national NGOs	--	--	--	Tulele Peisa (PNG); Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition (USA);

Key:

1980s to Present	1990s to Present	2000s to Present	2010s to Present	Academia	Policy	Other
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Ranson-Cooper et al. (2015: 106) suggest that greater reflexivity about the ‘overarching, macro-cultural frames’ can help to illuminate assumptions about migrants and the

migration. However, their analysis focused on analysing texts (academic, grey literature and policy) about environmental migration. In this research, I will elaborate on this and unpack how NGOs and government produce understandings of environmental migration and how the migrants themselves understand environmental migration, and resettlement in particular. From this, it will be clear whether there is a clarity in understandings between those in government and those in communities and if not, why this might be, and whether it might be affected by an ulterior government agenda.

2.3.2 Environmental Migration Governance in Practice: Vulnerability and Responsibility

The type of environmental migration that is most liable to be governed involves potential migrants that are seen to be particularly vulnerable to environmental change and for which the governing body, whether that be government, international organisation, or NGO, feel responsible for (Gemenne et al., 2018). Therefore, to fully appreciate the process of governing environmental migration, there needs to be an understanding of who is seen to be responsible for the vulnerable population and who those responsible see to be vulnerable to environmental change. I explore these issues in the following subsections.

2.3.2.1 *Vulnerability and Resilience*

There is much discussion in the climate change and natural disaster literatures on the vulnerability and resilience of populations (Blaikie et al., 2014, Mwale et al., 2015, Brouwer et al., 2007). Vulnerability to flooding fits broadly into literature on vulnerability to climate change more generally and is discussed in that context here. As mentioned, exploring discussions over vulnerability is important when examining governance of environmental migration, as who is 'governed' is determined by who is seen to be vulnerable to environmental change.

The first distinction that many authors make about vulnerability to environmental change is that it is not directly linked to poverty (Adger et al., 2003, Brouwer et al., 2007, Khandker, 2007, Adger, 2006). Khandker (2007) uses his research in Bangladesh to highlight the importance of social welfare systems in determining vulnerability. Indeed, Brouwer et al.

(2007) go further to suggest vulnerability is a mixture of social, economic, environmental, cultural and institutional structures. Furthermore, vulnerability has also been split into socioeconomic and biophysical forms (Mwale et al., 2015). Mwale et al. (2015) have particularly looked at the connection between these two aspects specifically in relation to flooding in the Lower Shire region of Malawi, where this research is also conducted. Their research attempted to quantify vulnerability and provide a usable index for Sub-Saharan Africa (Mwale et al., 2015).

Some scholars split vulnerability into three components. According to Adger et al. (2003: 181) vulnerability of a community to environmental change 'is determined by its exposure, by its physical setting, and by its ability and opportunity to adapt to change'. Pelling (1999: 250) puts it more succinctly to suggest that vulnerability is dependent on exposure, resilience and resistance. Thomalla et al. (2006) suggest it is exposure, sensitivity and resilience. However, all papers are essentially stating that vulnerability depends on whether a community is in an area where an environmental change will occur: its exposure to it; and how well a community is able to cope with or prevent that change: its resilience and resistance/sensitivity. This provides an interesting backdrop on which to examine flooding and the management of migration caused by flooding, as it suggests that in order to be less vulnerable to flooding, if exposed to it, a community needs to improve their resilience and resistance. It also highlights the subjective nature of vulnerability, as these components may be viewed differently by actors. In this research, I show how these components work in the context of flooding along the Shire River in Malawi and I explore the role of external assistance provided to communities in determining vulnerability. Of particular interest to this research is whether vulnerability is similarly understood by those governing the resettlement and those potentially undertaking the resettlement.

These three components of vulnerability also link into the move to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) present in much natural hazard literature, including flooding (Manda, 2014, Thomalla et al., 2006). DRR is focused on the governance of disasters, or rather reducing the potential damage of disasters (Paton and Johnston, 2006, Paton et al., 2000). Thomalla et al. (2006) suggest that the attention on DRR has been born out of the shift away from response and recovery to awareness and preparedness that the assessment of vulnerability can provide

(Thomalla et al., 2006, Manda, 2014). However, Thomalla et al. (2006) also suggest that there is yet to be a true appreciation of vulnerability and much is underestimated, which leads to the development of inadequate DRR policies. Indeed, Manda (2014) links this to strong local governance. He highlights the importance of strong local governance in DRR by highlighting how the poor local governance in Karonga, Malawi, makes DRR policies ineffective (Manda, 2014). Manda (2014) suggests that some of these issues are associated with the decentralisation process occurring in Malawi. This indicates the importance given in the literature to government and NGOs in determining successful responses to flooding.

Additionally, present in the literature on vulnerability and relevant to this research is the idea of individual entitlement to assistance. In their research exploring climate change adaptation in the developing world, Adger et al. (2003) stress that the entitlement of individuals or groups to call on assistance is a crucial component in determining vulnerability, for, if a community or individual is able to call on assistance readily and to receive it readily, then their vulnerability is lower. This makes up part of the resilience component. However, Pelling (1999) goes further to suggest that this entitlement stems from the product of socio-economic and political structures, which determine an agent's ability to compete for resources and right for the assistance they want. These ideas place agency on an individual whilst also recognising that this agency may be influenced by external factors, such as resource availability and communication networks (Pelling, 1999, Sen, 1981, Blaikie et al., 2014). This is interesting for the resettlement situation in Malawi as the government is often offering assistance with this process, for example by identifying and negotiating a new place to settle and starting to construct amenities there. However, this may not be the assistance that the communities desire. They may not want to resettle to the new place identified by the government, for example. Therefore, being able to determine the type of assistance received is important.

Thus, agency and vulnerability are connected. In this research, I draw on Eversole's (2011: 51) definition of agency as one 'having the ability to act and be agents of their own development'. In this way, agency is often seen as synonymous with choice (Mainwaring, 2016). However, this research goes beyond examining choice to look at how much different actors are involved in determining their situation (Mainwaring, 2016, Harvey, 2002). How

much actors can reflect on their situation and act because of that (Bakewell, 2010). Moreover, I explore not just individual agency but community agency. By community agency I refer to the local relationships that facilitate collective action and from this, the adaptive capacity of a community (Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). Low agency is often associated with high vulnerability (Brown and Westaway, 2011). Sometimes, low agency can be attributed to a population simply because they are perceived to be vulnerable, even if there is a lack of empirical evidence of vulnerability (Anderson, 2008). This has significant implications on how that population interacts with other actors, which is relevant to my research and also discussed in other work (Li, 2007, Scott, 2008).

The interplay of several elements with regards to vulnerability is discussed in the work of Scott (2008) and Li (2007). In Scott's (2008) seminal work, *Weapons of the Weak*, he highlights how rural communities in Malaysia are able, through everyday activities, to slightly resist the hegemony being placed upon them. He highlights the potential agency and power of those perceived as 'vulnerable', indicating the importance of understanding the perspectives involved, which the next section on knowledge will explore further (Scott, 2008). Similarly, Li's (2007) work, *The Will to Improve*, takes a governmentality approach to examine 'expert' involvement in development in Indonesia. She shows how previous colonial and prejudiced views can still be subtly part of the development agenda of 'improving' the country, and how development for the 'vulnerable' can unknowingly be development for the 'elite', which again links into the discussion over different knowledges used and prioritised (Li, 2007). This research will take a similar approach to that of Li (2007) and Scott (2008) and focus on understanding the nuanced array of knowledges involved in the resettlement situation in the Lower Shire.

2.3.2.2 Responsibility

If a population is vulnerable to environmental change such as flooding, then the issue of who is responsible for that vulnerable population arises (Dun, 2011). There is a climate justice argument that those responsible for increasing the severity of climate change should be the ones who bear the burden of adapting and assistance (Sovacool and Linnér, 2016). This suggests, for example, that those causing deforestation to occur upstream should be

responsible for assisting those affected by the flooding downstream. However, Sovacool and Linnér (2016) recognise that, if this argument is followed through, it may not be the people cutting down the trees that are responsible, but rather the system that leads them to deforestation: the demand for timber for fuel for example. This implies a need to have a broad perspective when examining responsibility for vulnerable populations and brings in questions over the appropriate governance approach to increasing flooding severity (Sovacool and Linnér, 2016).

There has been much debate over whether environmental change leads to voluntary or involuntary migrants. This has implications for the responsibility attached to the migration and how it is taken up in policy and governed. Normally, in forced migration the settlement process is seen to be the responsibility of a governing state or humanitarian agencies, whereas in voluntary migration the process is seen to be the responsibility of the migrant (Castles and Miller, 2009). As power tends to be affected by perceptions of responsibility, examining responsibility provides insights into who has power in determining the process of the migration.

The multicausal nature of migration makes it difficult to ascertain the environment as the driver of forced migration. Instead, Hugo (1996) puts a great emphasis on choice to suggest that 'refugee-hood' depends on the amount of choice and coercion that is involved in the decision. For him, the difference between voluntary and forced migration can be seen as a continuum of choice (Hugo, 1996). Suhrke (1994) also examines the level of choice, proposing that, if the migration is pre-emptive, then the person is a voluntary migrant, whereas, if it happens because they can no longer sustain their livelihood, then they are a forced migrant. This is particularly interesting for the case of migration due to flooding because, as has been established, flooding can be both a fast onset event, during the flood itself, and a slow onset event due to the gradually increasing severity. Therefore, depending on one's perspective, resettlement due to flooding could be either forced or voluntary migration, which could influence the amount of external involvement in the move.

2.3.3 Governmentality: A Tool for Understanding Resettlement Governance

Governmentality is a key framework through which governance practices are analysed. It was first developed by Foucault and refers to unpicking the processes of power in a state (Walters, 2012, Foucault et al., 2007). However, the analysing process can be expanded to explore the power dynamics in global governance issues, such as with climate change (Rutherford, 2007, Goldman, 2004). This led to the rise of scholarship on green governmentality (Rutherford, 2007) or ecogovernmentality (Goldman, 2004), particularly relevant to this research. Before I expand on green governmentality and ecogovernmentality I will provide a brief overview of governmentality.

Initially, Foucault developed governmentality to understand how ideas became normalised, the genealogy of government and who controlled the dominant understandings (Walters, 2012). This is relevant to this research on resettlement, because currently resettlement due to flooding is a concept which is in the process of becoming normalised in Malawi. Previously, the Malawian government did not consider resettlement as a flood management strategy. Thus, I find a governmentality approach useful at points in this research to unpack the genealogy of the current understanding, and the implications of this.

Scholars suggest that there are four key foci of governmentality that can be used to analyse a regime of government, and that this regime can be at a variety of scales, ranging from the local to the international (Rutherford, 2007). These four foci are: the production of forms of knowledge, how something comes to be understood as true or normal; the production of visible spaces, the formation of the space which requires governing; the production of different subjects or subjectivities, ensuring that citizens behave in the way desired; and the particular techniques and technologies used to manage the population, the audits undertaken (Dean, 1999, Death, 2013). The analysis of these foci works to enlighten the overall form of governance. This research uses these foci to establish the research question and the analysis process, particularly to establish the role of different knowledges, why these knowledges are given these roles and by whom. This connects to the first focus of governmentality and the other foci help explain the agenda behind the governance and the reasons for why certain knowledges take precedence (Death, 2013).

A governmentality approach has been widely used in the academic analysis of development. For example, Watts (2003) suggests that the use of governmentality in development studies helps to uncover the mechanisms behind the production of subjects and often incorporates a Marxist outlook, as it is highlighting the potential power of the marginalised. This is especially the case when it is examining whether the discourse is being discussed and taken up in such a way as to perpetuate the hegemony of the Global North (Watts, 2003). The work of Tania Murray Li (2007), discussed previously, also follows a similar governmentality approach. Thus, in the context of this research, it helps to explore how much development ideologies involved in environmental migration could spread the ulterior motives of those in power.

As mentioned, a governmentality approach is often used to look more specifically at climate change governance. In a chapter exploring the uptake and eventual dominance of 'green' practices in the World Bank, Goldman (2004) highlights how the green movement, which has connotations of crossing borders, uniting the world and being bigger than politics, can still be used to promote a Western hegemony, as it still involves the funding of certain projects that can be designed to fit the World Bank agenda. This suggests that 'environmentally' friendly approaches have become normalised to the extent that they are potentially under less critique (Goldman, 2004). Similar to the role of NGOs in the discussions of NGOization above, environment related development projects are often viewed as apolitical and less accountable. Rutherford (2007) highlights how governmentality is a suitable approach for analysing the interaction between humans and nature as it allows for the study of multiple scales. This review has already highlighted the scalar nature of this research. Rutherford highlights the bottom up nature to governmentality and how resistance to dominance should not be viewed as separate but as part of the dominant power (Rutherford, 2007).

Interestingly, there has been recent research by Enroth (2014) that highlights a shift in the focus of governing. Enroth (2014) reviews literature from the 1990s to the present, to suggest that there has been shift away from focusing on governing a society or a population, to governing problems. He indicates this is a global phenomenon with many problems, such as climate change, viewed on a global scale requiring a global governance approach (Enroth,

2014). He calls for a more flexible way of examining governance that is open to the current changes in governance approach (Enroth, 2014). I aim to do this by exploring how government and NGOs work together to produce the governance approach to resettlement, representing the inclusive nature of environmental governance (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008), and unpicking the agendas behind this approach. The research on NGOization is particularly relevant here, as it implies that NGOs have the potential to be a less accountable extension of the government (Choudry, 2010), suggesting that their relationship may be one way, with the government determining the actions of NGOs. I found some evidence that NGOs involved in resettlement were heavily influenced by government, as I set out in the methodology.

Thus, I use the governmentality approach at points in this research as a way of opening up potential deeper reasons behind why environmental migration may be understood in a certain way by different actors. It can help to illuminate and provide reasons for actors' agendas and why certain understandings may take precedence. This will be important when trying to explore how certain knowledges are being used within resettlement. I now explore debates around knowledge.

2.4 Allowing for Different Understandings in Resettlement

In this research, I study three communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement: resettled, undecided and unwilling to resettle. Government resettlement is novel in Malawi and it is unsurprising that there are multiple perspectives involved. Indeed, the novelty of resettlement means it is currently in a negotiation phase to determine a dominant understanding and a key part of this research is exploring the reason behind these varied opinions on resettlement. As I show in the Results, there is a difference in understandings between those in the flooding-vulnerable communities and those in the government and NGOs. Often these different understandings of resettlement are associated with different forms of knowledge, chiefly indigenous or local knowledge and Western, scientific or technocratic knowledge. These three forms of knowledge (Western, scientific and technocratic) are put together here as they are seen as complementary in this context. I will explore these categories further below before outlining the literature around participatory approaches. Participatory approaches attempt to bridge the gap between different

knowledges and have been much discussed in development geographies, particularly as part of the post-development critique. They are recognised as imperative for resettlement to be adaptive (Displacement Solutions, 2013) and in this research, I explore the government use of a participatory approach to unify opinions on resettlement and form a common understanding of resettlement.

Scholars have become increasingly interested in the role of knowledge in disaster management (Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 2015). Weichselgartner and Pigeon (2015) highlight how they view knowledge as the information available on a situation, but that there may be different ways in which that information can be received, or in which something can be known. However, scholars in disaster management have highlighted that increasing knowledge of disasters does not necessarily equate to less damage from disasters, as not everyone may have equal access to the increased knowledge (Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 2015). Instead, Weichselgartner and Pigeon (2015) call for greater attention into how knowledge on disaster management is collected and distributed amongst different actors, to ensure there is equal understanding, which is evenly distributed. Their research is focused on a French context, but a similar scenario could apply in Malawi. The novelty of resettlement as adaptation means there is an emphasis on researching how knowledge is gained and formed in this process and my research explores whether this knowledge is equally understood and distributed.

Before discussing knowledge, it is useful to set out briefly what I mean by development, as much of the review below is related to debates within development literatures. Within this research, I refer to development as the attempt by government and civil society to improve the quality of life of areas viewed as having some level of poverty (Li, 2007). By civil society, I am referring to NGOs and any collaborative activity that is supposedly not driven by the market or by government. However, in the data, as will be set out in the Methodology, the NGOs studied are mainly in-country offices of international NGOs, with one organisation connected to the World Bank. I make this evident in the Results.

Whilst development may occur spontaneously, in this research I view development as being reliant on government and donor funding. Because Malawi is heavily aid-dependent,

the development approach is highly influenced by large funding bodies, such as international organisations or development banks. The definition I use is purposefully broad, as development is often perceived differently depending on the actor involved. Ideally development is meant to be altruistic, but there has been much research that highlights how it can impose an ideology or practices without adequate consideration of their contextual suitability but with the belief that it will improve 'vulnerable' lives (Li, 2007, Scott, 2008, Ferguson, 1994, Briggs and Sharp, 2004). This has been critiqued for establishing a dichotomy between those in need, and those able to help, with those in need often seen as incapable of 'improvement' without external assistance, which implies a lack of agency and power over their situation (Li, 2007, Escobar, 2011). Much of these critiques are labelled 'post-development' and focus on the importance of participation and inclusion of the voices of the 'vulnerable' within development (Escobar, 2011). Ultimately, the development literature highlights the importance of appreciating how actors and a situation are perceived and understood, and the genealogy to these understandings. This is a key reason for exploring further the nature of knowledge and its production.

2.4.1 Indigenous/Local Knowledges

Indigenous knowledges, known by some as local knowledges (Pearce, 2018, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019), have traditionally been posed as belonging to communities in the Global South that have an alternative outlook to the perspective of the Global North (Akena, 2012). However, today they are recognised to be more nuanced (Sillitoe and Marzano, 2009) and less confined by scale (Schulz et al., 2019). In their paper exploring their attempt to integrate indigenous knowledge with science, Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011: 997) suggest that indigenous knowledge 'represents a dynamic information base that has supported most rural communities by adapting to constantly changing and varying climates'. However, whilst there may currently be an attempt to work with indigenous knowledge, this was not always the case. In the brief review below, I set out the change in perception of indigenous knowledge to enable an appreciation of how it might be viewed today by those in government and civil society, such as those involved in managed resettlement in the Lower Shire. As mentioned in section 2.1, I prefer using the term 'understanding' rather than knowledge, to allow for the

fluidity involved. However, due to the prevalence of the term 'knowledge' in the literature, I use the term here, to allow for the contributions made by this literature.

At the outset of postcolonial development around the 1960s, indigenous knowledge was labelled by development practitioners and scholars as 'traditional' knowledge and was often seen as backward (Pearce, 2018). It was viewed by the West as a barrier to development (Akena, 2012). The increasing focus on environment from the 1960s onwards led to interest in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) (Pearce, 2018). There was subsequently growing interest from the scientific community on what light this form of knowledge could shed on environmental issues (Pearce, 2018). The term TEK is still in use today but often comes under criticism as the word 'traditional' can be seen to imply that indigenous knowledge is inferior to 'current' Western scientific knowledge (Pearce, 2018). Some suggest that it exoticizes this form of knowledge, turning it into data that scientific research can extract with little collaboration of the holders of the knowledge (Pearce, 2018). Thus, there was a shift from viewing this form of knowledge as inferior to exploiting it for the use of the Western scientific community (Akena, 2012). More positively, from as early as the 1970s in some situations, there has been a turn away from privileging Western scientific knowledge, and towards incorporating local understandings (Briggs, 2005). It is important to remember the previous perspectives on indigenous knowledge when exploring how actors treat community knowledge and understandings today, such as in the Lower Shire Region, as my Results suggests that some of the previous perceptions still pervade. Indeed, scholars such as Escobar (2011) have illustrated how a disdain for indigenous knowledge can still persevere despite current trends to view it more positively.

Briggs (2013) outlines three key defining aspects of indigenous knowledge: location specificity; combination with scientific knowledge; and co-option for neo-liberalism. These aspects have been challenged, but still provide a useful grounding in the concept of indigenous knowledge and are outlined below.

Briggs first aspect suggests that indigenous knowledge is context and location specific. According to Briggs (2013) indigenous knowledge gained from one area may not fit a similar

issue somewhere else. It connects to another related aspect, which is for resettlement: place attachment. Place attachment refers to a connection to a place (Raymond et al., 2010a). Through their study in rural Australia, Raymond et al. (2010a) highlight how attachment to a place is dependent on how much one identifies with a place, depends on a place, connects with the nature in the place, and the importance of social ties made within the place. In this way a location can be very important to people that live and work within it (Raymond et al., 2010a).

Shulz et al. (2019) take Brigg's notion of locations specificity further to illustrate how indigenous knowledge may be formed in a specific location but is not necessarily confined by scale. Through their exploration of indigenous definitions of ecosystems present in the peatlands and wetlands of the Peruvian amazon, Shulz et al. (2019) highlight how knowledge is relational. It can be seen as location specific when compared to another community's ecosystem definitions for example. Yet, they also highlight how much of the indigenous classifications are similar to the existing scientific classifications. Therefore, once the boundary of the knowledge category is removed, it is possible for knowledge to jump scales. Thus, with proper study, the indigenous knowledge can work with the scientific, or vice versa, to be merge knowledges. This means that it is not necessarily location specific but can be part of exploring other scenarios as well.

Briggs' (2013) second aspect of indigenous knowledge looks at similar issues to Shulz et al. (2019), but from a different perspective. He suggests there is a desire in much development practice to combine indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge (Briggs, 2013). He recognises that this is to make it more relatable to other circumstances and actors. However, Briggs (2013) does not draw the conclusions that Shulz et al. (2019) do, about what impact, if done respectfully, the combination of indigenous and scientific knowledge can have on the scalar properties of knowledge. Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011) attempted to combine knowledges in their research incorporating indigenous knowledge into weather forecasting in Malawi. They researched a community in Southern Malawi that had a strong reliance on indigenous knowledge to forecast the weather, but which the researchers suggest was becoming increasingly difficult due to the increasing volatility of rainfall patterns (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011). They found that this community was reluctant to listen to the

government forecasts, which are based on conventional scientific forecasting methods, because those forecasts fail to recognise the potential value of their indigenous methods of prediction (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011). Thus, their research called for greater inclusion of indigenous knowledge (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011). Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011) were researching in Mulanje, an area close to the Lower Shire in Malawi. Thus, their research could suggest that this region may not be open to incorporating different understandings in developmental approaches, due to the belief by those in communities that their knowledge was not adequately respected. This is similar to the findings of Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019), as described in the next paragraph, and to the findings of this research, as described in my Results.

Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2018; 2019) highlight how local knowledges are not adequately considered in disaster management in the Lower Shire Region of Malawi and how this is consequently causing difficulties. Their 2019 study called for further identification and documentation of local understandings for disaster management in this region, very similar to the work of Shulz et al. (2019). Whilst this research is not producing a classification of local understandings, it does hope to explore and document them further through the focus on how knowledges work together in the resettlement process in Malawi. The different attitudes to resettlement of the three communities in my research suggest that there is some tension between the knowledges involved.

When scientific knowledge is viewed as superior, the mingling of indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge can incorporate unequal power relations. Briggs (2013) highlights how, when combining knowledges is attempted, the scientific knowledge can be seen as necessary to validate the indigenous knowledge, implying that indigenous knowledge is inadequate on its own. In this aspect, Western scholarship views scientific knowledge as determining the legitimacy of the indigenous knowledge (Spivak, 1988). It suggests that indigenous knowledges can still be seen to be more elusive and to hold less weight in policy decisions (Briggs, 2013, Pearce, 2018). In Spivak's 1988 seminal work 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in which she conducts a historiography on subaltern experiences in South Asia, she suggests that when Western science attempt to translates non-Western understanding into Western scientific data, it constitutes 'epistemic violence', because the meaning behind the

understanding is lost in the translation. This reiterates the need for respectful inclusion of different knowledges, called for by Shulz et al. (2019) and Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019). Participatory approaches are often suggested as a way to do this, I review literature on these later.

Indigenous knowledges are increasingly recognised as important for climate change on the global scale. This occurred in 2015, in COP21 (the conference of the parties) in Paris, where they became part of the discussion of future options and were included in the documentation (Pearce, 2018). However, Pierce (2018) highlights that whilst indigenous knowledges were recognized in COP21, key discussions in COP22 and COP23 about how to operationalize them still struggled to produce any firm strategies, suggesting there may be difficulties in attempting to combine indigenous and scientific knowledges in policy, potentially because there is still a prejudice towards scientific knowledges on the international climate change network.

The third aspect that Briggs (2013) discusses is the co-option of indigenous knowledge into neoliberalism. Indigenous knowledges are associated with being untouched by neoliberalism. However, neoliberalism is at the centre of two key Western international development organisations, the World Bank and the IMF, whose projects focus on furthering a global free market economy (Briggs and Sharp, 2004). Indeed, Briggs and Sharp (2004) suggest that a key reason why the World Bank has incorporated indigenous knowledges is due to the potential greater capital returns over scientific knowledge it can provide, linking back to the extractive use of indigenous knowledge referred to earlier. This also emphasises the capitalist focus of the World Bank.

Ferguson's seminal 1994 work exploring development in Lesotho highlighted how the use of indigenous knowledge by international organisations, such as the IMF, may not be part of a desire to reduce poverty, but a desire to feed into a capitalist system, which requires a poorer, less powerful group to exploit. Other scholars have also proclaimed a fear that indigenous knowledge is being professionalised and commoditised to fulfil capitalist objectives and not to fulfil the needs of the local people (Laurie et al., 2009, Briggs and Sharp, 2004). This shows the potential for more local understandings to be manipulated to fulfil neoliberal agendas. I shall consider the potential manipulation of local knowledge to fulfil

certain agendas in the resettlement process. Similar to the discussion of scale earlier, this discussion illustrates that indigenous knowledge can itself become part of technocratic knowledge, highlighting how these forms of knowledge are not mutually exclusive. There can in fact be a form of hybrid knowledges that incorporates many forms of knowledge (Akena, 2012). This can also be seen through the professionalisation of indigenous knowledge (Laurie et al., 2009).

Laurie et al. (2009) discuss the professionalisation of indigenous knowledge in social movements in the Andes. In their discussion they highlight how indigenous communities can themselves professionalise indigenous knowledge in a culturally appropriate way, in order to give them greater agency and control in the development arena. This process makes the indigenous communities the experts in their own development and puts them in a governing position (Dean, 1999), which is similar to the 'claims-making' from below that Arnall et al. (2019) identified, and advocated for, in climate displacement and resettlement scenarios. Drawing on findings from this research, it could be said that community members are able to re-appropriate their knowledge. This is seen to be different to participatory approaches, which are often viewed as initiated by exterior development experts (Kapoor, 2005). This reiterates the idea that to perceive these different forms of knowledge as separate is misleading (Raymond et al., 2010b). Indeed, many scholars have outlined how categorizing knowledge reinforces imaginary binaries (Agrawal, 1995, Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004). Scholars, such as Raymond et al. (2010b), recognise that most knowledge is hybrid, a fluid mixture of several contextual factors that determine one's perception. However, important to this study, which is focusing on how various actors and their subsequent understandings work together to determine the resettlement process, is how different actors' knowledge is perceived by the other actors involved. This impacts the communication between the actors, as will be highlighted in the Results. These perceptions of different actors' knowledge often categorises or reifies knowledge and, thus, it is important to explore the scholarship around these knowledge categories.

Indeed, focusing on a particular knowledge category, such as indigenous knowledge, carries a danger of drawing stereotypes based on the knowledge categories. In his work exploring the decolonising of knowledge related to territory in Latin America, Halvorsen

(2019) indicates the importance of eradicating previous colonial understandings to allow space for current local understandings. To do this he calls for a platform for local activists and scholars to spread their knowledge (Halvorsen, 2019). Territory is a particularly interesting subject, when considering the decolonisation of knowledge, as acquiring territory or indeed owning land in this manner has very strong Western colonial connotations. Halvorsen (2019) illustrates how, despite these connotations, through the incorporation of local scholars' perspectives on territory, it can be appropriated to mean something different.

Thus, similar to the discussion of the professionalisation and the perception of knowledge, there is debate about the (re)appropriation of indigenous knowledge. Van Damme and Neluvhalani (2004) examine the re-appropriation of indigenous knowledge in education systems in the Global South. They suggest that a prevalence of 'scientific' knowledge, spread at the time of colonisation, still persists in much of the education systems of the Global South, with indigenous knowledge seen as inferior (Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004). They indicate that knowledge is shifting, and education systems should represent that (Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004). They suggest that the increasing recognition of the importance of local knowledge on the global arena is causing it to gradually be re-appropriated by some education systems. The process of re-appropriation is present in this research through the community re-appropriation of the resettlement process, as will be set out in the Results. It reiterates the fluid and subjective nature of knowledge (Haig-Brown, 2010, Agrawal, 1995, Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004, Laurie et al., 2009, Briggs and Sharp, 2004).

2.4.2 Technocratic Knowledges

Technocratic knowledges are often associated with the act of governing and are of increasing interest to political geographers (Kuus, 2016). Technocratic knowledge refers to the use of scientific, 'rational' knowledge and is most commonly discussed with reference to its use in policy and governance (Kuus, 2016). Timothy Mitchell (2002) sets out how, in Egypt, this form of knowledge historically developed through the 20th century by a mixture of colonialism, poverty, development and democracy. Traditionally technocratic knowledges are supposedly used to produce more democratic states (Bangura, 2004, Mitchell, 2002). In this

research technocratic knowledges are referred to in conjunction with Western and scientific knowledges. This is because these knowledges are associated with government and NGOs, which are involved in governing, hence the technocratic focus, but are also associated with Western and scientific knowledges used by international donors and, hence, in development projects.

Western scientific knowledge prioritises a rational scientific approach to knowledge. This is seen to be thorough the examination of data to deduce the best approach for a state to take (Agrawal, 1995, Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Akena, 2012). The connection between scientific knowledge and its use by the state highlights the interconnection between scientific and technocratic knowledges. The aim of the scientific endeavour is to produce knowledge for the public good (Agrawal, 1995). Indigenous knowledge can be seen by scholars to represent a knowledge that is in 'harmony' with nature, which has been seen to be of use to scientists for the information it can provide, often without consideration of the accuracy of this assumption (Agrawal, 1995). This reiterates the previous discussion outlining how scientific knowledge can be extractive of certain aspects from indigenous knowledge (Agrawal, 1995).

The democratic aim of technocratic knowledges suggested by Bangura (2004) and Mitchell (2002) is debated. Some argue that in modern capital societies, financial investors have the highest control, and thus technocrats who work in government and policy-making are often connected to these economic institutions and are subsequently insulated from public scrutiny, making the process less democratic (Bangura, 2004). This concern is relevant for the previous discussion about potential NGOization, particularly for NGOs working for government or international organisations and not independently (Choudry, 2010). It highlights how understandings and knowledges of different actors are interconnected and cannot be viewed separately. It also ties into discussion over the neoliberalisation of environment and indigenous knowledge, in order to further a potential global free market (Himley, 2008, Briggs and Sharp, 2004).

This democratic dilemma can also be seen in the discussion over statistics, as set out by Foucault et al. (2007), but also more specifically for this research in discussions over the

use of environmental and migration statistics. Building on the previous governmentality section, Foucault et al. (2007) suggest that those in government desire greater knowledge about a population in order to best know how to manipulate it to behave in a way that they believe will be the most beneficial for the state as a whole. Whilst the intention of those in governance may be for the good of the population, this attitude takes away choice from the population. The recent interest in governing environmental migration could fit with the Foucauldian idea of the state noticing movements happening independently and wanting to control them to have greater knowledge and control of the population (Walters, 2012, Foucault et al., 2007, Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019).

One such technique, that the government and NGOs use to influence community understandings, and that was found in my research, is sensitisation. In the context of this research, sensitisation refers to the spreading of knowledge on an issue or subject, such as providing weather forecasts or advice on how to respond to flooding. However, there is no apparent literature discussing its use in this context, despite the term being used prolifically by participants in my research. The term appears to have originated in immunology (Cooke and Veer, 1916), where it often refers to the production of antibodies that produce an allergic reaction (Janeway et al., 2001). Sensitisation is also used in psychology (Cautela, 1967) to discuss the continual presence of a stimulus for a certain reaction to get the respondent more accustomed to it. This process of sensitisation seems to have been used to eradicate undesirable behavioural traits (Cautela, 1967) and also in the exploration of mental disorders such as psychosis (Myin-Germeys et al., 2005). It is the psychological use of sensitisation which fits most with the findings of this research, which suggest that sensitisation was used for the continual provision of knowledge by those in government and NGOs to those in communities, as an attempt to produce a different reaction to flooding than was occurring. This is discussed indirectly in development anthropology by authors such as Jakimow (2013) who highlights how the conceptualisation of development can impact practices without proper contextualisation and end up 'spoiling the situation'. This can be seen in the prevalence of an audit culture.

Scholars highlight how the rise in influence of technocratic knowledges has led to an audit culture within governance (Kuus, 2016, Townsend et al., 2002, Townsend et al., 2004).

They suggest that the increasing necessity to audit, and quantifiably measure performance, means that projects and policies are designed in ways that can be measured, regardless of whether this is the most appropriate (Kuus, 2016, Townsend et al., 2002, Townsend et al., 2004). It is implied that the focus on measurement has perpetrated thinking in such a way that aspects of society are now understood only in measurable terms (Kuus, 2016). Kuus (2016) explores how this has impacted governance in the EU, whereas Townsend et al. (2002) illustrate how this impacts the work of NGOs in Ghana, India, Mexico and Europe. This research aims to explore how these technocratic knowledges influence understandings of environmental migration, looking particularly at the case of resettlement due to flooding. Following on from Townsend et al. (2002), it is possible that they could influence the understandings of those in government and NGOs, who need to report back to funding bodies that usually operate on a technocratic level. This research will then expand this to explore how the incorporation of technocratic understanding in this way may affect the involvement of local understandings within the resettlement process, and how technocrats attempt to include local understandings through participatory approaches.

2.4.3 Bridging the Gap? Participatory Approaches

The previous sections have highlighted that resettlement as a way to manage flooding is born out of the move to view migration as adaptation to climate change. Thus, it has become in the interest of the global development community and individual states to manage environmental migration through projects like resettlement (Arnall, 2018). Resettlement therefore fits partly in a development rationale. Participatory approaches to development are based on the idea that those who are the subject of the development project should be involved with the project design in order for the outcomes to be truly helpful to them (Chambers, 1994). It is also used within research projects involving different actors (Kesby, 2000). However, relevant in this research is its use in development projects, such as resettlement as a way to manage flooding. Prior to exploring the nuances involved in a participatory approach, such as the present approach to resettlement by the Malawian government, it is important to provide some background for this research on how participatory approaches came to be central in development practice.

Development was critiqued by post development theorists as having an agenda to reproduce a hegemony without allowing for other varieties of development or including marginalised perspectives (Escobar, 2011, McKinnon, 2007, Ferguson, 1994). Escobar (2011) suggests that an interest in homogenising society, which can be dated back to colonial times, has led to a perceived hierarchy in the levels of quality of life. From this, a notion of 'development' arose, which set out a developed, advanced world in the Global North and an underdeveloped, less progressive world in the Global South (Escobar, 2011). The Western institutions of the World Bank and the IMF can be seen to represent and reinforce this through their programmes that seek to make countries part of a global free market, the preferred doctrine of the West. As stated, these initial development initiatives tended to favour technocratic Western knowledge over local knowledge. It is therefore suggested by some that development projects help to perpetuate a Western outlook on the approach to life and convert countries to this outlook (Escobar, 2011).

A participatory approach is meant to prevent domination of one world view, and include an empowering element for marginalised and or vulnerable populations (Kindon et al., 2007). The participants decide the terms of success and what they want the outcome of the development project to be. It has been heralded as particularly important in development, as it is meant to give agency to marginal populations and ensure sustainable outcomes (Kindon et al., 2007). However, participatory approaches are criticised for still including power dynamics, as the development project is still initiated by the researcher, government or NGO, who often favour a Western perspective (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Kapoor, 2005, Jakimow, 2013, Scott-Villiers, 2011). They were effectively critiqued in Cooke and Kothari's (2001) book, titled *Participation: The New Tyranny?* where they highlighted how participatory approaches can actually be more controlling of marginalised populations than before. In particular, they highlight how participation can empower participants despite the development project being subtly directed by the government, without the knowledge of the participants, making it potentially quite manipulative (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). It may also fit into Briggs' (2013) third aspect of indigenous knowledge and be a way of converting indigenous knowledge into a Western outlook. This is part of what this research wants to establish: do the participatory approaches to resettlement taken by the NGOs and government in Malawi allow for the incorporation or dominion of local knowledge?

There is also literature which highlights the potential of participatory approaches. Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (2008) wrote a follow up book, entitled *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation*, where they illustrate how participation can be a useful, positive and empowering development approach. They particularly highlight how a participatory approach to development can facilitate more participatory and inclusive forms of government, allowing for sustained benefits of increased inclusivity (Hickey and Mohan, 2008). They show that governments are often changing their ideas about what they think vulnerable populations need and how greater participation allows for these changes to be genuinely helpful and transformative (Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Mohan, 2007).

Thus, it has long been recognised that there are many levels of participation available. Before participation became relevant in international development it was discussed in urban planning (Arnstein, 1969, Cornwall, 2002, Kamruzzaman, 2020, White, 1996). A seminal paper from this period was Arnstein's (1969) *A Ladder of Citizen Participation* in which she highlights eight 'ladder rungs' of participation, see Figure 2.2. These levels of participation range from non-participation to tokenistic to citizenship power (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein (1969) well recognises the oversimplification that this ladder can suggest: it implies a homogenous group of powerful and powerless pitted against each other, with eight discreet levels of participation. She highlights that in actuality there may be many blurred levels and blurred groups of people. However, relevant to Arnstein (1969) and to my research, is that whilst the groups of powerful and powerless may be blurry they are often perceived as homogenous by the other, and it is the impact of this which is it important when exploring participation (Scott-Villiers, 2011). This came out strongly in my research, as I will demonstrate in my Results. Arnstein (1969) work is dated and looking at a planning context in America, yet it still has relevance to development studies today. Kamruzzaman (2020) illustrates how often in development the level of participation can be lower down Arnstein's (1969) ladder, as participation has not been fully incorporated into a countries governance structure and its implementation is centred on pleasing donors. He indicates that if participation is to be empowering it needs to be a political agenda with effort coming from above and below (Kamruzzaman, 2020). Kesby (2007) also focused on the potential political nature of participation by highlighting one particular aspect that participatory approaches can facilitate: resistance.




Figure 2. 2 A ladder of the different levels of participation, taken from Arnstein (1969: 217)

Kesby (2007) recognizes the role of resistance within participatory approaches. He suggests that resistance to power can itself bring power and can be a way to reverse the traditional power dynamics of development if the right platform is available. However, for this to occur, the intricate relationship between power and empowerment within the development project needs to be constantly reflected on throughout the process (Kesby, 2007). An example of where a marginalised population has been empowered is the professionalisation of indigenous knowledge by indigenous communities outlined by Laurie et al. (2009), which was discussed above. This is a form of resistance to the state. My research

explored the possible resistance to resettlement promoted by government and I expand on this in the Results.

2.5 Conclusion

In this review I have attempted to illustrate the complex nature of environmental migration and the consequent difficulties involved in measuring it and determining a process for governing it. I set out the shift towards viewing migration as adaptation to environmental change and the subsequent increasing interest on governing environmental migration, such as through resettlement projects. Also apparent is the potential for environmental migration literature to be used to support a variety of potentially contrary agendas, which reinforces confusion over what is understood as environmental migration and how it is best governed. In this research, I explore how different understandings are used in the governance of environmental migration by focusing particularly on resettlement due to flooding in Malawi and three communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement. I concentrate on the participatory nature of the resettlement. Flooding resettlement is seen as an example of environmental migration governance, yet there is little research exploring how participation works in this form of governance. Resettlement encompasses the nexus between the incorporation of different understandings and governance. This scrutiny of the incorporation of different knowledges enables me to explore the motivations and participatory nature of the resettlement process in the Malawian context. This will contribute to the growing discussion on the governance of environmental migration and the development of appropriate policy. I therefore aim to have both a theoretical and practical contribution.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the research strategy and method used to examine resettlement as a government strategy to manage flooding in Malawi. I explain the data collection, analysis and interpretation procedures. The structure of this chapter is as follows: after a short introduction I set out, in section 3.2, the research strategy, highlighting the methodology and data used to answer each research question. Then, in section 3.3, I outline the context of Malawi and the specific field areas studied. Next, in section 3.4, I explain the process of primary data collection. In section 3.5 I outline the secondary data analysis. Finally, in section 3.6, I discuss the field experiences, exploring some of the challenges and insights within the fieldwork process.

In the literature review in Chapter 2, I highlighted how research has explored the impact of environmental change on migration patterns in recent years, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Most studies illustrate the non-linear, multifaceted nature of migration and have conceptualised the environment as one of many drivers (Suhrke, 1994, Tacoli, 2009, Black et al., 2011a). As a result of these studies, a better appreciation of the complex entanglement of drivers involved in (im)mobility now exists.

However, there is little research on how environmental migration is governed through the process of resettlement and there are even fewer studies exploring the knowledge production and participation involved in this process. This is important due to the influence knowledge has on practice. The process of knowledge production, and the spreading of knowledge, potentially to ensure its dominance, is important to explore, as it illustrates the varying degrees to which voices are heard, respected and included. The dominant knowledge highlights where the power lies within the resettlement process. Therefore, in this research, I hope to bring another dimension to the debate on environmental migration and its governance, by focusing on knowledge to explore further how participation works in this scenario. To do this, I use a qualitative approach to incorporate the many voices and ways of knowing involved.

3.2 Research Rationale

In the introduction I set out the aim and the research questions. The literature review in Chapter 2 provided context for these. This section will explain further the rationale behind the research questions and aim.

3.2.1 Aim – To Explore the Extent of the Participation of the Relevant Actors Within the Resettlement Process in Malawi.

The literature suggests that in order for resettlement to be adaptive it needs to be, among other things, participatory. There is sparse literature highlighting how participation works within resettlement. I argue that, as resettlement is dealing with notions of home, which are highly emotive, it is likely that there will be multiple priorities and understanding involved. Therefore, a participatory approach to resettlement is very important but also potentially challenging. In this research, I hope to give a further insight into how exactly participation can, or cannot, work in a resettlement scenario. I do this by first questioning the motives for resettlement, in question 1, to assess whether there is an agenda behind the government resettlement process, as found in the literature (Arnall, 2018); and then, in the following two questions, exploring the resettlement process from the government and community angle.

3.2.2 Research Question 1 – How and Why is Flooding in Malawi Seen as an Increasing Threat?

I formed this question because it is necessary to establish the flooding context in Malawi in order to understand the motivations behind the proposed resettlement. In particular, it is important to ascertain whether flooding is being problematised by those in government and NGOs in Malawi. To do this I explore the flooding trends in Malawi, to illustrate how interest in resettlement is being legitimised. Thus, in this question I seek to establish the situation that has led to the growing interest in resettlement in Malawi. As part of this I establish what current flooding related movements occur independent of government involvement, and how government mandated resettlement differs from this. As I established in the literature review, there is increasing awareness of the potential benefits

of managing environmental migration by those in positions of governance (Warner, 2010). The external interest and involvement in this process is new (Dun, 2011) and can be seen in the interest in resettlement in Malawi. However, due to its novelty there is not much research on how this external involvement starts to occur. Thus, this question is an attempt to address this.

Additionally, to provide context for the governance of resettlement, in this question, I also examine who is seen to be responsible for flooding. Resettlement is caused by flooding, however the same actors seen as responsible for the increasingly severe flooding are not always seen as responsible for the resettlement. This can accentuate differences and hierarchies between actors, particularly between those within the community and those in NGOs and government. I establish this to also provide context for the other research questions.

3.2.3 Research Question 2 – How and Why is Resettlement Used as a Technique by Government and NGOs to Manage the Population and Flooding in Malawi?

In this question I explore the practicalities of the government process of resettlement. Due to the novelty of governing environmental migration, it is important I analyse this process in detail, who is involved in it and why. I do this to assess the motivations behind government resettlement: whether the government involvement is truly to assist the vulnerable people impacted by the increasingly severe flooding, or whether it is for other government objectives (Arnall, 2018), such as better control of the population. I wish to determine whether the external involvement in this process is beneficial to the vulnerable populations and whether it could be participatory, as if resettlement was being used to fulfil an ulterior motive than protection from flooding, it is likely there would be little room for community voices.

In this question I examine the existing disaster management structure, to illustrate how resettlement is currently managed. I also seek to explore further the varied understandings of resettlement, how these impact government decisions and what they suggest about government motivations. Additionally, I examine the hopes for the upcoming resettlement policy to assess what methods are currently being used, and are proposed, to

manage flooding and resettlement. Within this, I question the external influences on the policy to highlight if there may be other hidden agendas involved. I take this further to explore what these methods imply about how different actors are viewed in this process. I do this to further evaluate whether resettlement is participatory and helpful for the most vulnerable population.

3.2.4 Question 3 – What Role do Flood-Vulnerable Communities Have in the Government Strategy of Resettlement?

In the final research question, I am interested in highlighting what the process of resettlement illustrates about the relationship between those in vulnerable communities and those in government and the NGOs, particularly how community members make their voices heard. I examine these relationships to give a further insight into the power dynamics of those involved in resettlement and the impact they have on the participatory nature of the resettlement. I particularly focus on the community response to resettlement. I examine the actual and perceived community agency within resettlement processes and the implications of these. This focus enables me to evaluate the community participation in the resettlement process, who has been involved in it and why. This is part of broadly exploring the top down and bottom up approaches of resettlement.

3.3 Study Area

Malawi is a relatively small but densely populated country. It has an area of 118,480km² and a population of 18,143,345 in 2018, with a population density of 192.441, according to the World Bank (2018) data records. The age dependency ratio is 87%, with 43.9% of the population younger than 15 and the life expectancy at birth in 2017 was 63.3 (The World Bank, 2018a). It has a current GDP per capita of 285,168 MKW (roughly \$387), with 70.3% of the population living on less than \$1.90 per day (The World Bank, 2018a). It is therefore, a relatively poor country. As touched on in the introduction, I chose Malawi as the area of research due to the significant environmental changes it is undergoing and the interest from the Malawian government to manage these changes through resettlement. It was also chosen due to the strong research links between Malawi and Scotland. These were

present either through previous connections with the University of St Andrews, or through participants, particularly those in government and civil society, being aware of the University of St Andrews, which slightly eased the facilitation of the research.

In the following four subsections I briefly set out an overall government and migration context for Malawi before providing more detailed information on the previous use of resettlement and flood mitigation approaches. Finally, I explain the flooding experience of the specific study sites.

3.3.1 Migration and Governance Context for Malawi

Malawi's historical mobility patterns provide an intriguing backdrop for this research. Settlements were not traditionally nomadic, unlike in much of Western Africa (McCracken, 2012). This was due to the suitability of the climate for agriculture (McCracken, 2012). Therefore, internal mobility and the role of the environment within this is relatively new in Malawian culture. During the colonial period (1891-1964), the British tea and tobacco industry concentrated itself in the south, where the most fertile land was seen to be, and populations focused their movements to this area (Potts, 2006, Lewin et al., 2012). However, subsequently the south has become densely populated (Potts, 2006). Research using both weather data from a local weather station and indigenous knowledge has illustrate how the environment in the Southern region has become harsher, with the maximum annual temperature increasing by around 1°C between 1971-2007, and an increasing variety in rainfall during this period (Kalanda-Joshua et al., 2011, Nkomwa et al., 2014). There has been growing outmigration to regions in the centre and the north, where more land and labour is available and the weather is less extreme (Potts, 2006, Lewin et al., 2012). The map in Figure 3.3 below shows the districts and geography of Malawi, with the three field areas marked. Lilongwe has been the capital since 1974, the previous capital was Zomba. Blantyre is the second largest city and the city closest to the communities under study.

Malawi had a significant corruption scandal in 2012 that significantly impacted the way that aid is now being delivered to the country. Prior to the scandal aid was delivered directly to government for them to use as they saw fit. Aid was withdrawn immediately after

the scandal. Aid resumed soon after, but in a different way (The BBC, 2014). Aid was no longer delivered directly to government but to projects which donors decided on with government. This is the current form of aid in Malawi. Therefore, donors potentially have significant control in how the country is run.

However, currently, it appears that there is much communication between government and NGOs or international organisations and donors providing funding. From my discussions with stakeholders involved in these organisations it appeared that government would suggest areas they thought needed attention or assistance and they would work with the relevant NGO or international organisation, or mixture of these, to assess what kind of assistance each actor should provide. This links into the discussion over NGOization in Chapter 2 (Choudry, 2010), as it highlights how the NGOs can be an extension of the government. The large international organisations and donors provide much of the funding and technical expertise used in Malawi, and since the corruption scandal of 2012 have influence on how the funding and technical expertise are utilised. Thus, there is much collaboration between NGOs, international organisations and government. Within my research all but one of the NGOs are part of in-country offices of international NGOs, with the other one being directly linked to the World Bank. This leads me to assume in my research that the NGOs and government have a similar mentality with regards to development procedures. Therefore, I make little distinction between NGOs and government viewpoints, except where they obviously occur in the data, particularly related to the NGO connected to the World Bank, and then I explore this fully in the Results. I illustrate this further in the outlining of the NGOs interviewed in section 3.4.3.

Moreover, Malawi's government is also impacted by an ongoing decentralisation process. The country is split up into 28 districts, which are governed by district councils, local forms of governance. These district councils are being given more power in determining how they spend their allocated funds. Decentralisation is common in African countries because many governments and influencers of government in Africa have viewed decentralisation as a way to promote more democratic governance (Ottemoeller et al., 2004). However, there is also literature illustrating how decentralisation is a difficult transformation (Ottemoeller et

al., 2004). Manda (2014) suggests that decentralisation in Malawi has led to weak disaster management. I will elaborate on the implications of this in the following Results chapters.

The local governance has a particular make up. Within each district there are several traditional authorities (TA), the exact number varying per district. These TAs have a customary form of leadership in the TA chief. Each TA is made up of several villages, which are led by village heads, another form of customary governance. Therefore, there are many levels to the governance structures in Malawi, which makes it a particularly interesting place to examine how the different levels of government work together to manage environmental migration through the process of resettlement. Moreover, there is also the existing NGO and external donor community. Thus, I take a multi-scalar approach to analysing Malawian governance, ranging from the village heads to the international organisations such as the World Bank.

3.3.2 Land Reform and the World Bank Resettlement programme 2004-2011

A new land law was implemented in Malawi in 2016 (Sharp et al., 2018). It is yet to be taken up fully throughout the country, but as a pilot of the new land law, between 2004 and 2011, there was a national resettlement project, sponsored by the World Bank, called the Community Based Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP) (World Bank, 2013). It was suggested by one official in national government to be the largest resettlement project to occur in Malawi. The project was to assess the impact of introducing a willing buyer-seller model to land transactions by giving the recipients in the land poor areas of Thyolo and Mulanje a grant to buy and settle in more land rich areas in Machinga and Mangochi (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). Participants were meant to resettle with 20-30 other households and form what the project called a 'trust' in the new area (World Bank, 2013, Sharp et al., 2018). They then elected a trust representative to negotiate the buying of the land of the area, for which they obtained a group title deed for the trust. The representative allocated out two hectare plots for each households, and individuals were able to obtain individual title deeds when they had a certain income, which Sharp et al. (2018) suggested rarely happened. Whilst being discussed as a textbook example of resettlement by the World Bank (Tchale, 2014), the pilot illuminated difficulties with implementing participatory resettlement in Malawi (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018), which I will highlight below.

Despite it being unrelated to flooding, two of those in government and NGOs drew on this resettlement project as a key example of the complicated nature of resettlement.

The CBRLDP required participation from members of the project, but studies suggest that it failed to appreciate community dynamics and so was not able to be participatory (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). The project aimed to be voluntary. Indeed, the voluntary nature was particularly spearheaded by the World Bank to highlight a better way of undertaking land reforms (Sharp et al., 2018). A central part of this was the greater participation of the communities involved. However, as much of the communication about this was done with community leaders and the elected trust representatives, meaning it did not include all of the community and did not achieve the participation required (Sharp et al., 2018). Chinsinga (2008) suggest the community power dynamics enabled corruption and nepotism of who was able to benefit from the project, and throwbacks of cash, all of which were unintended in the project design (Chinsinga, 2008). This meant that the project was unable to follow through on certain aspects, such as providing amenities (Chinsinga, 2008). Ultimately, around 15% of participants returned and many more were unhappy, stating miscommunication about their resettlement area, infertility of the land, lack of other opportunities besides farming, hostility from the surrounding area, and misunderstanding over the title deeds as the main reasons (Sharp et al., 2018). Many of these issues are also relevant in my research, as will become clear in the Results.

3.3.3 Flood Mitigation Approaches in the Lower Shire Region



*Figure 3. 1 A meeting hut in Nsanje where HAZARD was scraped out on the wall
Photo taken during fieldwork in September 2017.*

The Lower Shire Region of Malawi is the most flood prone area of Malawi, with the relevant District Councils estimating that, in addition to specific flooding events, annually 100 households in Chikwawa and 500 in Nsanje are significantly impact by flooding (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018, Chikwawa District Council, 2014, Nsanje District Council, 2015). This was made evident in my fieldwork through the graffiti in a meeting hut in Nsanje, illustrated in Figure 3.1, where HAZARD was scraped out on the wall. One of the only legible words on the wall, which suggests to me the prevalence of hazards, such as flooding. The earliest recorded severe flood event in the Lower Shire was in 1942, with more recent events occurring in 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2012, 2015 and 2019 (Lumumba Mijoni and Izadkhah Yasamin, 2009, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018). There has consequently been much focus on how best to mitigate the impact of flooding in this region.

In reality flood mitigation touches on many government sectors and many policies are relevant. For example, Mwale et al. (2015) draw on the high levels of poverty in the Lower Shire region to highlight how vulnerability to flooding in this region is most related to socio-economic factors. Thus, general development policies are also related to flood mitigation in this area. Additionally, a holistic approach to flood mitigation is not just necessary in terms of the government sectors it crosses, but also the geographical area considered in the flood

mitigation. For example, the flooding in the Lower Shire is not solely due to the actions of those in the region but also those in other districts. The issue of deforestation in the upper lands of Mulanje district, which in turn impacts the water retention of the soil and leads to greater runoff and increased flooding, shows this clearly (Lumumba Mijoni and Izadkhah Yasamin, 2009). The most specific policy related to flood mitigation is the National Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy.

The Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) have 6 policy priority areas, as set out in the National DRM Policy. These are:

1. Mainstreaming disaster risk management into sustainable development.
2. Establishment of a comprehensive system for disaster risk identification, assessment and monitoring.
3. Development and strengthening of a people-centred early warning system.
4. Promotion of a culture of safety, and adoption of resilience-enhancing interventions
5. Reduction of underlying risks.
6. Strengthening preparedness capacity and recovery (Government of Malawi, 2015b).

This policy follows on the Disaster Relief Act of 1991, which is currently under renewal, and which focuses mainly on relief, rather than preparedness (Chiusiwa, 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018). The recent severe flooding, of which the 2015 was the most significant trigger, indicated a need for focus on mitigation and preparedness for disasters, which the 2015 DRM Policy aims at fulfilling (Government of Malawi, 2015b). DoDMA is in charge of coordinating disaster management at a national level, but as Malawi has a decentralised government system, there is the potential for variation in disaster management for different areas (Government of Malawi, 2015b). Disaster Risk Management Plans and Contingency Plans are created at the village, area and district level, with the idea being that the village plans inform the area plans, which in turn inform the plans at the district level (Government of Malawi, 2015b). However, the lack of government funding for disaster management means that it is difficult to do these plans every year, with most available contingency plan for Chikwawa and Nsanje coming from the 2014/2015 season (Chiusiwa, 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018).

The severe flooding of 2015 highlighted specific areas of focus for disaster risk management. For example, a key area of government focus nationally has been on improving

the early warning system (EWS) in Malawi, as many ignored the warnings prior to the 2015 flooding (Mwale et al., 2015). Whilst EWS are specifically mentioned in policy priority 3, they are also relevant for policy priority 2,4,5 and 6. This improvement in EWS has included awareness raising of the official Met office forecasts, the implementation of river gauges throughout the Lower Shire, and a greater attempt to incorporate indigenous knowledge within EWS (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019, Mwale et al., 2015). Also, particularly since 2015, there has been growing interest in resettlement, especially as a way to address policy priority number 5, reduction of underlying risks, as resettlement is viewed as taking people out of the vulnerable area. I explore the exact motivations for the government interest in resettlement in the Results.

3.3.4 Field Sites



*Figure 3. 2 Two views of the Lower Shire Region from the M1.
Photo taken during fieldwork in September 2017.*





Figure 3. 3 Map of Malawi with districts and field site location.
 Taken from http://www.d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=36&lang=en 3



- ↑ N
- The area expanded in the maps below
- Roads
- █ National borders

Figure 3. 4 Satellite map of the Lower Shire Region where the sites are located
 Taken from Google maps

The field sites are situated within the two southern districts of Malawi, Chikwawa and Nsanje. They make up the Lower Shire region of Malawi, two photos of which can be seen in Figure 3.2. These photos show the start of the Lower Shire Region taken from the escarpment on the way down from Blantyre going from around 400 metres above sea level to 90 metres in Chikwawa and down to 60 metres in Nsanje (Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015). The field site locations can be seen in Figure 3.3 and 3.4 above. I chose to focus the research in Chikwawa and Nsanje districts as I was informed by the literature (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018)

and by a DoDMA official that they are the areas most impacted by flooding in Malawi. They are exceptionally poor, in 2012 (the most recent data publicly available) around 80% of those living in these districts live below the poverty line, much higher than the country average of 50.7% (National Statistics Office, 2012). Much of this poverty is due to the reliance on subsistence agriculture in these areas, which is becoming tougher to maintain due to the hotter dry seasons and more unpredictable rainy seasons, according to the district council officials in Chikwawa and Nsanje. Due to the research being focused on government resettlement, all sites were identified by both national and local government disaster officers as areas of interest for resettlement. As mentioned in the introduction, I chose these sites to portray three different perspectives on resettlement: undecided, resettled and unwilling. The resettled and unwilling community were outlined to me by the national government DoDMA official and the undecided community was identified by the local government disaster officer at Chikwawa.

The three case studies provide an in-depth view of the knowledge involved in each of these contexts. I shall explain them in more detail below. Two (Jombo resettlement site and village Mwalija) are villages, or part of them, and one is a traditional authority (TA). These are different scales: a village contains around 250 households on average and a TA consists of around 1000 households. There is much debate in the literature over what constitutes a community (Rogers et al., 2013), within the research I view community as being place and culture based. This is similar to other studies analysing resettlement processes, where community refers to the people from the geographical area who will be resettling. In this research, I loosely use community as synonymous to a village customary in Malawi: around 250 households within a similar location and with a leader, the village head. I also use the term 'community' to represent TA Nyachikadza more generally, when I am discussing it as a community that is unwilling to resettle, for example. However, in the more detailed analysis I appreciate further its difference in scale. Moreover, the difference in scale between TA Nyachikadza and the other two communities studied, whilst important to remember, was not seen as an issue for the fieldwork or findings. Indeed, it allowed for some variety in rural perspectives, including both village and TA contexts.




Figure 3. 5 Area 1 - satellite map of the area surrounding Village Mwalija, indicating the cultivation lands, interview meeting point, the temporary resettling area in 2015 and background information.
 Taken from Google maps




Figure 3. 6 Village Mwalija participants. Photo taken during one fieldwork visit in October 2017

As can be seen in Figure 3.5, Village Mwalija is located close to the Shire river and also close to a large nature reserve, which is a popular safari location for tourists. Some of the participants can be seen in Figure 3.6. They have two areas of farming, as can be seen in Figure 3.5, one area is close to and reliant on the river and one is closer to the main road, roughly an hour's walk away, which can still be impacted by flooding. There is no data from the Department of Surveys on the extent of the 2015 flooding in this area (there is for the other two) but the interviews suggest that the community was impacted varyingly by the severe flooding in 2015, and the two different areas of cultivation accentuated this, as property was more spread out. The district council identified this community to me as a community that has the opportunity to resettle. This is through the assistance of an NGO, called Bongo, which has allocated an area of land for the resettlement and drilled a borehole there. The NGO also promised to help with the construction of 160 houses in the resettled area for the most vulnerable in the community. However, the community has not yet resettled, and it appears that not all in the community are in favour of this resettlement. Thus, this community shows the negotiation phase of resettlement.



1km

Figure 3. 7 Area 2 - satellite map of the area surrounding Jombo, indicating the cultivation lands, 2015 flood extent, background information and area 2a. Taken from Google maps.



200m

Figure 3. 8 Area 2a - satellite map of the area surrounding Jombo resettlement area, indicating where interviews took place and the area of temporary shelter after the 2015 floods. Taken from Google maps.



*Figure 3. 9 Jombo Resettlement site participants.
Photo taken during one fieldwork visit in October 2017*

Jombo resettlement site hosts a community that resettled from the flooding-vulnerable area of Champanda after the severe flooding of 2015. They still use this previous area for cultivation. This can be seen set out in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, which show the area allocated to the resettling community on the outskirts on the village, the distance this is from their area of cultivation, the extent of the 2015 flooding (everything up to the white line was underwater) and the area where they temporarily resettled after the severe flooding in 2015 (Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015). Some of the participants can be seen in Figure 3.9. The village of Jombo was not impacted by the severe flooding in 2015. The resettled community organised the resettlement themselves: through negotiating with the district council and area chiefs they were able to find an area of land where they were able to resettle, shown as area 2a in Figure 3.7. The land was seen as unusable by the host community, who admittedly gave it for resettlement for the two new boreholes that were drilled by the district council to aid with the resettlement, and for the increasing aid into the area that the resettlement generated. The site is close to the main road, which is desirable, and also to a large sugar plantation, Illovo, which provides additional labour opportunities. However, the resettled community face hostility from the host community, particularly over aid and

leadership, as I will expand on in the Results. Despite the difficulties faced in this resettlement, those in government suggested to me that this community illustrates an example of successful resettlement, particularly because they initiated the resettlement process themselves. Thus, this community illustrates a resettled community and the intricacies involved in the resettlement and post-resettlement process.




Figure 3. 10 Area 3 - satellite map of the area surrounding TA Nyachikadza and TA Ndamera indicating the land suitable for cultivation, rough flood extent from the 2015 flooding and background information. Taken from Google maps.




Figure 3. 11 Area 3a - satellite map of the area surrounding TA Ndamera indicating the meeting point for interviews and the land suitable for cultivation. Taken from Google maps.



Figure 3. 12 TA Nyachikadza participants. Photo taken during one fieldwork visit in October 2017

TA Nyachikadza is located in the marshland close to the main river in Malawi, the Shire River. The marshland is often surrounded by water, making it an island. This area is a traditional authority, which means it is significantly larger than the other communities studied: each TA contains around four villages. It can be seen in Figure 3.10 in relation to TA Ndamera, where residents go in times of flooding and to access government and NGO services, and which can be seen more clearly in Figure 3.11. Figure 3.10 also demarcates roughly the boundary of the flood extent from the 2015 flooding (Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015), which indicates how TA Nyachikadza was impacted but TA Ndamera was not. Three of the participants from this area can be seen in Figure 3.12. TA Nyachikadza has frequent flooding and is subsequently a very fertile area. In 2012 the government declared this area as not fit for habitation, due to the potential risk of flooding to the area. Thus, there are no government or NGO facilities, or services. It is commonly known by government and NGO officials, as well as community members, as a 'no-go zone'. There are no schools past the age of eight and no health facilities. To access these facilities, residents need to cross a river inhabited by crocodiles and hippos and travel several kilometres, most often by foot to TA Ndamera. Yet, most of the residents of Nyachikadza do not want to resettle, as I will explore further in the Results. Thus, this community illustrates a situation of a community unwilling to resettle.



Figure 3. 13 Photo of the Shire River in Nsanje. Taken during fieldwork in October 2017.

Additionally, due to this TA being located on an island, I was not able to visit the island itself, because the river crossing can be dangerous. A photo of the river further upstream in Nsanje can be seen in Figure 3.13. The river is large and inhabited by crocodiles and hippos, which makes it unpredictable. The local government officials were not comfortable arranging a boat for me to use. Therefore, I conducted all my interviews with this community in the neighbouring TA, TA Ndamera, on the mainland, as can be seen in Figure 3.11. I am aware that this may have caused selective sampling and impacted the discussion in the analysis. I try to allow for the potential bias this could create by being aware of the position of these community members when considering the implications of their interview data.

3.4 Primary Data Collection – Fieldwork Strategy and Interview Process

The fieldwork was conducted during two visits to Malawi. The first was a preparatory visit of 3 weeks in May 2017. In this trip, I spoke to key stakeholders in NGOs and government and established the focus of the research: on flooding related movements. After, I returned to St Andrews for two months to reassess the methodology and then returned to Malawi for 4 months (August 2017 – November 2017) to conduct the main data collection and focus further on resettlement.

This research consisted of 69 interviews and six focus groups with members of the three communities studied and with stakeholders in NGOs and Government who were involved in these communities. All those interviewed were Malawian nationals. In this section I first set out the ethical procedure for the fieldwork in section 3.4.1. Next I outline the interview process for first the community interviews in section 3.4.2 and then the government and NGO interviews in 3.4.3. Finally, I explain how the interview data was analysed through the coding process in section 3.4.4.

3.4.1 Ethical Issues

The first step of the fieldwork was considering the ethical implications involved. This was formalised through the obtaining of ethical approval both from the university of St Andrews and from the government of Malawi. The ethical approval letters are presented in

Appendix 1 and 2. The preparation of two ethical applications focused my mind on potential ethical issues. The key issues that arose were related to conducting research in another culture: specifically, the use of a translator and attempting to represent the voices of the marginalised as a Western academic. Moreover, there were issues related to protecting confidentiality, which was impossible to ensure for those in government and NGOs.

The University of St Andrew's ethical application particularly enabled me to think through issues related to participant confidentiality. This cannot be guaranteed for those in government and NGOs because, in order to give context to their quotes, I need to provide some information about their position. Most simply, within the analysis, I state whether the quote is from a government official, NGO employee or community member. However, occasionally it is necessary for more information to be provided, for example, which community they are working with. Additionally, within this chapter I set out exactly which NGOs I interviewed. This is necessary to further understand the context and potential positioning of participants, yet it provides further ways to reduce anonymity. Thus, to ensure as much anonymity as possible, pseudonyms are used for all participants. This makes it likely for those in the communities to stay anonymous, but still cannot guarantee it for those in NGOs and government, whose position may jeopardise their anonymity. This was explained to the participants beforehand and is set out in the participant information sheet and consent form, which were available in English and the local language, Chichewa. These can be seen in Appendix 3.

The ethical application procedure for the University of St Andrews involved stating any potential ethical risk, confidentiality was discussed at length, and included all official documentation (participant consent forms and information sheets, which can be seen in Appendix 3). It was processed and passed by the university before the first trip to Malawi. An update was processed before the second trip to Malawi.

The process of undertaking a national ethical application is particularly common when medical research is being conducted and increasingly common for social science research. It enables the country to ensure their citizens are being fairly considered in the research and that the research is relevant and useful to the country.

The national ethical application to the government of Malawi involved a similar procedure to that of the University of St Andrews, but with slight differences that highlight the international nature of the research. It included a research proposal, translated official documentation and the payment of a processing fee (150 US\$) and a research fee, which was 10% of the cost of the research. The application was processed on arrival to Malawi. It was straightforward and took one week to process. The difference between the two applications is the addition of translated documents and the payment of fees. This highlights two potential ethical issues of doing research in another culture: translation and potentially extractive research (Sidaway, 1992). I discuss both these aspects further in section 3.6 exploring the field experiences.

Additionally, there was a danger that the research would cause some distress to the participants as it was asking them to relive particularly traumatising moments, when they had encountered severe flooding. However, whilst the previous experience of community members was important to gauge for context, it was not the focus of the interview. The focus was to establish how they understood and viewed the resettlement process present in their community. Therefore, when considering the ethical implications, I thought that if questions around experience of flooding proved too distressing, I could move the interview swiftly on to further questions and minimise the distress. I discuss further how this happened in practice in the following section.

3.4.2 Community Interviews and Focus Groups

Within each community, I conducted 16 interviews, eight with men and eight with women. Additionally, I conducted two focus groups in each community, one with eight women and one with eight men. I chose participants opportunistically: the local disaster officer contacted their contact within the community, this could be the village head or somebody on a village level committee, this contact would then pass this information onto whoever they could and whoever chose to attend was a participant. I provided lunch money of 2000 Malawi Kwacha (approximately £2) to all participants from the communities.

I conducted the focus groups first, lasting for around one hour, to assess if any changes needed to be made to the interview schedule, to see if any questions did not gain traction, or were inappropriate, and to get some background information before the one on one interviews commenced. There was around one week between the focus group discussions and the commencement of the interviews within each community. For each community, I made no changes to the interview schedule post focus groups. The unwilling and undecided communities had similar interview schedules and the resettled community had a slightly different interview schedule. They can be seen in Appendix 4 but briefly contained themes surrounding:

- Experience of flooding and flooding related movements.
- Experience of government led resettlement.
- Relationship with the government and NGO community.

The interviews were semi-structured interviews and were purposefully open, to let aspects of importance develop naturally and without prompting, meaning even small similarities between interviews were significant. Therefore, there was flexibility with the questions on the schedule.

In each community I conducted the interviews with the help of a translator. The translator was a local government official who was well acquainted with the research and the communities under study. In total, three translators were used on separate occasions. I discuss the issues associated with using a translator in the field experience section later in the chapter.

For each community the interviews took place in various public areas, such as under a tree or within a meeting hut in the communities. These can be seen in Figures 3.5, 3.8 and 3.11. For those at Jombo and village Mwalija, the interviews occurred at their community. However, as mentioned, for those from Nyachikadza the interviews were required to occur in the neighbouring mainland TA, TA Ndamera. This meant that I was only able to interview Nyachikadza residents who were over in TA Ndamera. I am aware that this may have caused some bias in the interview, as I only interviewed community members of TA Nyachikadza that are mobile and use movement as a way to manage flooding. However, as I was unable to visit

Nyachikadza itself, this is the best primary data available and I endeavoured in the questions to ask about the community as a whole and not just the participant's personal experience.

I visited each community five times for around four to five hours each time. First to make initial introductions and conduct the focus group discussion and then another four times to conduct the interviews. Each time I was accompanied by a district council official, which is likely to have influenced my data, as I expand on the field experiences section. The district council official, as mentioned, arranged the interviews by calling their contact the previous day to inform them I would be coming and to organise eight female and eight male volunteers for me. The district council contact was told the topic of my research and that I would be providing 2000 MKW lunch allowance to participants. I was informed that they would find participants that would most fit the topic and most needed the extra money. Whilst, I was not directly involved in the recruitment and cannot be sure this was the criteria used for selection, I was assured that this selection process was regularly used for much of the communication, particularly involving NGOs, with village members. The district council official also acted as the translator for the interviews.

I conducted the interviews in the morning and each day would consist of four interviews, allowing for 16 interviews to be conducted in each community. The four days were often spread over two weeks but occasionally occurred all in one week. As mentioned, I interviewed an equal number of men and women. For sensitivity reasons, exact ages were not asked, but there appeared to be a mixture of ages from late teens/early twenties to elderly participants, with most participants middle age with established families. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes to an hour depending on how talkative the participant was. Some participants got slightly distressed in the interviews whilst reliving previous traumatic flooding experiences. As touched on in the previous section, for the most part when this occurred, I moved swiftly on to the next question, to avoid dwelling on the distress. However, there were a couple of incidences where the participants actively wanted to share that traumatic experience and in these cases I let them talk for as long as they wanted.

3.4.3 Government and NGO Interviews

Additionally, I undertook 21 interviews with stakeholders in NGOs and government who were involved in these communities. As mentioned, these actors were viewed as being part of the same governance structure and so I asked the same questions to those in NGOs as I did to those in government. These interviews took place at government and NGO offices, as well as in informal settings such as hotel lobbies and restaurants. All these interviews lasted around one hour and were conducted in English with no translator required. The interview schedule can be seen in Appendix 5. It briefly covered:

- Their role in government or the NGO, their view of flooding in Malawi and resettlement.
- Their relationship to the relevant communities and to resettlement.
- What methods they use in resettlement and to communicate with communities.

Similar to the community interviews these were semi-structured interviews with an aim at keeping things open, to let aspects of importance to the respondent come out naturally. Thus, as with the community interviews, this meant that I viewed even a small amount of agreement between participants as worthy of mention, as it came about without prompting. Whilst I followed the questions set out, I did not hesitate to pursue any relevant tangents that arose.

10 of the 21 government and NGO interviews were with government officials. Two of these officials were at the national level. One was at DoDMA, who acted as the gate keeper for the data collection. He was a contact passed on from a colleague at the University of St Andrews and was contacted prior to arrival in Malawi. I interviewed the DoDMA employee twice, once at the beginning of the data collection process and once at the end, to get their opinion on initial thoughts from the data collection. They facilitated the contact with the local government disaster officers in Chikwawa and Nsanje, who in turn facilitated the interviews with the local communities and relevant NGO officials involved in them and the process of resettlement in the area. The DoDMA official also enabled the interview with their colleague in the Ministry of Land and Housing in the national government. The Ministry of Land and Housing is formulating the resettlement policy and provided useful practical information on this process. The DoDMA official also outlined the resettled community at Jombo

resettlement site and the unwilling community at TA Nyachikadza. Village Mwalija was identified by the Chikwawa Disaster officer. Only one of the government participants was female, illustrating the immense gender disparity in this sector.

11 of the 21 government and NGOs interviewed were from civil society, two from the same organisation: The Red Cross, the rest from different NGOs. These civil society interviewees were found through the suggestion of those in national and local government, as NGOs or individuals that were directly involved in either these communities or resettlement more broadly. The details were either obtained by a government official or through going to relevant offices. Similar to the government participants, only two of the NGO participants were female, reiterating the gender disparity apparent in this sector. Table 3.1 below sets out the NGOs who had employees that I interviewed. For each NGO their activities and outreach are set out. This information is obtained from the respective NGO or project websites or from information obtained in the interviews. This provides some information on the types of NGOs that were part of the research. It illustrates their priorities and gives an insight into the narrative they produce. This is important to consider when examining the knowledges involved in the resettlement process, as it highlights what may be influencing the NGOs knowledge agenda.

Much of the activities present highlight the focus on general development priorities, with a particular emphasis on flooding, and disaster risk reduction. These development priorities are echoed by the government. This may be because all these NGOs were identified to me by government officials as NGOs working on resettlement or related issues with these communities or in this region more generally. Thus, they are likely to be aligned with government priorities. This reiterates the NGOization occurring with the NGOs I encountered (Choudry, 2010), how they have similar mandates as the government and how these actors work closely together. As previously mentioned, this is the reason why NGOs and government are mostly spoken about collectively in this research. My research cannot comment on how civil society as a sector works in Malawi, as, due to my methodology and opportunistic participant selection, the NGOs encountered are connected to the government. This means that not all of my Results may be relevant at a national level, as they do not allow for a variety in civil society. However, other research suggests that my Results are likely to be relevant for

similar scenarios where resettlement is closely controlled by the government (Arnall, 2018, Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). Moreover, my interviews with community members suggest that the NGOs interviewed were the main NGOs involved in their communities, and indeed that no national or local NGOs were involved in their communities. Thus, for the purpose of examining the resettlement process in these communities, interviewing these NGOs is sufficient, especially with adequate reflection.

Table 3.1 illustrates how all but one of the NGOs (boNGO) are International NGOs (INGOs) with international headquarters, and boNGO has sister organisations in other countries, thus there is an international influence on the activities of the NGOs. However, all the employees interviewed were Malawian. All but two of the officials interviewed in NGOs and government were not local to the Lower Shire Region. The two officials that were from this region were the health officer in Chikwawa and the Goal employee in Nsanje. However, it seemed more common for Government officers and NGO employees to move where there jobs took them. Therefore, most of the participants from NGOs and government did themselves live a resettled life, not residing in their area of origin. This may have impacted their view of resettlement in this research, as all but one participant from these sectors were favourable to resettlement.

Table 3. 1 List of NGOs in the research, their activities and outreach.

NGO	Activities	Outreach (national / international)
CARE Malawi	Focuses particularly on women, projects focus on food security, agriculture, health, education, and social and economic empowerment.	International, headquarters in America.
Goal Malawi	Focuses particularly on building resilient communities, projects focus on emergency response, water and sanitation, community health and nutrition, climate change adaptation and climate smart agriculture, alternative livelihoods and disaster risk reduction.	International, headquarters in Ireland.
Concern Worldwide	Projects focus on emergency response, livelihoods, healthcare, nutrition, and education programmes.	International, headquarters in the UK.
CADECOM (Catholic development commission in Malawi)	Focuses particularly on empowerment, projects focus on disaster risk reduction, food security, and water and sanitation.	Malawi, but part of Caritas, which is a confederation of 160 members inspired by the catholic faith, headquarters in Rome.
EAM (Evangelical Association of Malawi)	Key focus on evangelism and spreading the word of God. Also have projects on advocacy, education, gender equality, child rights, crisis response, food security, livelihood, health and family planning.	Malawi, but part of larger Association of Evangelicals for Africa (AEA), with its headquarters in Nairobi, which is part of the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), with its headquarters in the USA.
World Vision	Focuses particularly on children and families, projects focused on food and security resilience, health and nutrition, literacy and water, sanitation and hygiene.	International, headquarters in the UK and USA.
Red Cross	Focus is on providing relief and aid to people affected by conflict and disasters. Technically not an NGO but a society, independent but part of the government. For the sake of this research it is grouped with the NGOs.	International, headquarters in Switzerland.
boNGO Worldwide (based on Need-driven Grassroot Ownership)	Particular focus on education and community-based development.	National, with sister organisations in the Czech Republic, Switzerland and USA.
Habitat for Humanity	Particular focus on housing, with projects focused on providing shelter for vulnerable populations, water, sanitation and hygiene, and disaster risk reduction.	International, headquarters in Slovakia and South Africa.
MFERP (Malawi Flood Emergency Recovery Project – funded by the World Bank)	Particular focus on flooding – reduction and adaptation, with projects in agriculture, irrigation, food security, water and sanitation, and disaster risk reduction.	National but funding from international organisation (The World Bank) with headquarters in USA.

Sources for each NGO respectively: <https://www.care.org/country/malawi> <https://www.goalglobal.org/countries/malawi> <https://www.concern.net/where-we-work/malawi> <http://www.ecmmw.org/new/commissions/cadecom/> <https://www.eamalawi.org/> <https://www.wvi.org/malawi> <https://www.redcross.mw/> <http://bongoworldwide.org/> <https://www.habitat.org/where-we-build/malawi> www.mferp.mw

3.4.4 Coding and Analysis

Soon after I conducted each interview, I transcribed it. No more than three days elapsed between the interview and the transcription. This was to ensure that I recorded any relevant side notes as well. On return to the UK I uploaded all interviews into NVivo and thematically coded and analysed the interviews. Following established social research methods, the coding process occurred inductively (Bryman, 2012). I established a set of codes before the coding started and then added more as the coding process progressed. The coding tree can be seen in Appendix 6.

I established the initial codes based on notes and impressions from the interview and transcribing process. These were key themes that stuck out from this process. As I went through the transcripts these themes were developed further, several sub-codes were added, and new codes were established. Ultimately, there were three major themes: pro-resettlement, anti-resettlement and relationships. Within the pro and anti-resettlement sections there were several sub-codes related to reasons for this view, government and NGO view, community view, and particularly forms of resettlement being discussed. Within the relationships code, there were several sub-codes related to the different actors (NGO/government or community), mistrust and international influences. These themes and their relationship to the literature provided the basis for which the research questions were developed, and the Result chapters were structured.

Within the text I have noted the pseudonym, year and either the name of the community the participant belongs to, or whether the participant was from and NGO or government background. I note these in brackets before the quote. I separate the pseudonym and quote from the text to allow it to stand out. All the pseudonyms used are names that I encountered in Malawi. Thus, while they may appear a strange mix, they are consistent with Malawian names. As mentioned, most of the community interviews were translated, meaning the respondents were referred to in the third person. However, for clarity, I have presented all interview quotes in the first person. I have edited the quotes somewhat but have left in repeated words and long sentences to give a flavour of the conversation at the times. I attempt to contextualise the quotes by, when possible, illustrating how representative the

view is within the interviews by either stating the number of interviewees, or the proportion of interviewees, who were in agreement of the aspect under discussion. However, it is important to note here, that due to my interview schedule being purposefully open to allow for diversity in opinion to arise, a seemingly low proportion in agreement does not equate a low agreement or significance. Where there are disagreements to a statement, I acknowledge them, otherwise the low representation just means it was not commented on by the other respondents. This means that I view even a small number of respondents' agreement as significant, as this agreement was formed naturally, without prompting or specific questioning. Many factors were mentioned in the interviews and I could not address all of them within this thesis, therefore I focus only on those that came out most strongly from the interviews and observations. In terms of the total number of quotes used by each sector, I quote from community members 58 times, and government and NGO officials 59 times, with 25 of those quotes coming from government and 34 from NGO officials. This suggests I include similar amounts of community perspectives and government and NGO perspectives.

3.5 Secondary Data Analysis

This research also incorporates a small amount of secondary data analysis. Whilst in Malawi, I obtained secondary disaster data from DoDMA. This disaster data provided information about flooding events going back to the 1970s. It came in MS Excel spreadsheets reporting on all disasters within this time frame. There is data from 1970 – 2014, there is another spread sheet for 2015 and then for 2016-17. As could be expected, the reporting of the data changes over time, which brings in questions over consistency and reliability. Overall, more information is provided as the time progresses. For the flood events occurring in the 2016-17 spread sheet, the exact date of occurrence, the area where the flood occurred, the number of households effected and how, type of assistance provided and by who, and other general notes are provided. This illustrates the growing interest from the government into the impacts of flooding. The purpose of this data in the research is not for using it as an accurate representation of how flooding has increased in the area, as it is not accurate to show this in detail, rather I use it to highlight the growing attention placed on flooding by the government.

Indeed, due to the inconsistency in the data I use only the simplest factors that it provides throughout: year and number of households effected by the flooding. From this I constructed a graph to show the perceived trend in flooding impact since the 1970s until 2015. I set out the Results for this in Chapter 4.

3.6 Field Experiences: Challenges and Insights

This research is cross-cultural research and, as it has for researchers before me, conducting research in an unfamiliar culture brought up several challenges. The key challenges with cross-cultural research are associated with language, general customs and interpretations, and the perceived difference felt in race, status and, occasionally, gender, between the researcher and the participants. Taking inspiration from previous scholars' experience with this, this section shall elaborate on each in turn and also highlight more specific practical challenges.

The use of a translator is necessary when conducting research within an unknown language. However, it requires a certain amount of control and trust to be given over to the translator. This is particularly the case in this research, which is focused on knowledge and where language use is important. Language and the way a sentence is formed inform on how something is understood and to get this translated means that some of that information on knowledge formation is lost (Derrida and Kamuf, 1991). This leads to the danger of misrepresentation (Spivak and Harasym, 1990) and can accentuate the power imbalance between researcher and researched, as the researcher is one step further away from the researched and without the possibility of direct communication (Smith, 1996).

Throughout this research I have tried to appreciate the translation process within the data. All the translators used were local government officials: two male translator were used at TA Nyachikadza and one female translator was used for village Mwalija and Jombo resettlement site. Therefore, all the interviews have a governance lens to them as they have all passed through somebody involved in local governance, either directly, through interviews with those in government and NGOs, or indirectly through the use of a translator. Thus, I have tried to contextualise the data twice, as recommended by Frenk (1995) and Bassnett and

Lefevre (1990), by reflecting on how the proximity of government and me, as a white, Western, female researcher, may be influencing responses. This is to better allow for the data passing through two cultures. This has particularly enabled me to appreciate why, in community interviews particular terms may be used, such as 'relief items' which was often used to lump together the many things the community felt they needed. These terms were part of the government vocabulary, and once I became more familiar it was easier to navigate what they may mean for the community.

Moreover, I became aware that certain words did not translate directly into English or vice versa. For example, several Chichewa words are used to make up the word 'livelihood' crudely translating in English to 'ways to earn money', which is roughly what livelihood means. However, in this translation, the focus is solely on money, which is not all of what livelihood entails, as it is also related to *how* one lives. Another example arose around areas of cultivation, most community members interviewed referred to 'dambo' when talking about the land they cultivated. However, this also translates to 'river' in English, yet they were using it to refer to the cultivation land close to the river. They used a different word, 'munda', when referring to their areas of cultivation in the upper lands. Therefore, it is clear that there is a distinction in the different areas of farmland, which is not accounted for in English. These are two examples of nuances that can be lost in translation that I became aware of. They are important concepts, especially in my research exploring how communities live with floods, how they view the resettlement process and how it impacts their sense of identity. My awareness came through paying attention to the words used in the interviews with the community members and discussions with the government translator in the car to and from the communities. This was particularly the case with 'dambo' which I heard discussed a lot in the interviews, signifying its importance. I became curious as to what it meant and discussed this further with the translator. My focus on knowledge, means that I pay great attention to language within the interviews. However, the use of a translator and my limited knowledge of Chichewa means that some of the nuance of the language and therefore the knowledge is lost.

I have tried to incorporate into my consideration of community interviews how the involvement of a local government official may have impacted on the interview, attempting

to read between the lines of what is translated. Sometimes, this is obvious, for example, when a statement started with a placating sentiment towards the local government, it was clear that the participant might feel uncomfortable about what they were about to say or had just said. Other times, the nuances were incredibly subtle, and I only detected it from also keeping a close eye on the translator. There was particularly one translator where this was an evident problem. The translator was senior in the local government and this impacted the respondents. This impacted four interviews with those in TA Nyachikadza. Two of these participants made reference to the translator's position in government and seemed to answer questions related to their relationship with government and NGOs with the translator and his position in mind. Due to the impact the senior local government translator was having on the respondents, I used another translator in the subsequent interviews and have been particularly careful to reflect on the government influence on the four interviews where this translator was used. As mentioned, it is likely that there are nuances I missed, and whilst it would have been illuminating and insightful to be able to learn the language and get a sense of what participants from the communities were really trying to say, this was beyond the scope of my research.

With this sensitivity to the government translator, the difference in understandings between those in government and those in communities, came through. Some community members, even with the translation, made very poetical metaphors about their connection to land and community. This enabled me to appreciate aspects of their language and their understandings of their world. Participants made these connections without prompting, which also enabled me to get a sense of where resettlement and the issues surrounding it sat within Malawian government and development more generally. Thus, translation did not prevent the diversity of opinions from being apparent.

Additionally, the lack of knowledge of certain customs can accentuate the 'outsider' persona of the researcher (Herod, 1999). This is particularly prevalent in cross-cultural research, which can amplify differences felt between researcher and researched, due to the existing difference in culture and often language, even before the power dynamics of researcher/researched are considered (Sidaway, 1992). In the 1990s there was much influential research done in geography, and feminist geography in particular, about the power

dynamics involved in research, especially between the researcher and the researched (England, 1994, Haraway, 1988, Katz, 1994, Kobayashi, 2003, Rose, 1997). This work recognized the influence that researchers can unknowingly have in determining their research, especially if they were unaware of their power (Haraway, 1988). Drawing on the literature on the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 2010b), outlined in Chapter 2, I view that my research will inevitably be influenced by my perspective of the world, as well as the perspectives that my participants had of the world and of me. As a result, much scholarship addressed the importance of appreciating context in research, particularly in order to attempt readdressing potential power imbalances between researcher and researched (Haraway, 1988, Katz, 1994, Kobayashi, 2003, Rose, 1997, Hopkins, 2007). Hopkins (2007) highlighted that people have different positionalities depending on the context and it is subsequently difficult to determine one's positionality until after the fieldwork. Thus, constant reflection is required throughout the research process.

During the fieldwork, general customs and practices were referred to, that I, as the researcher, had no local knowledge of. For example, what a funeral entailed or how to respectfully shake someone's hand. Some of these customs I could pick up quickly, and there was often someone available to ask for a further explanation. Whilst, as mentioned above, this accentuated the difference felt by me as the researcher, it also directly impacted my interviews. Most of these confrontations with unknown customs occurred during community interviews, and though I could ask for a full explanation post interview, it was difficult to procure during the interview. This meant that I learnt for future interviews but could not take the point further in specific interviews.

Moreover, the power dynamics in this research were further complicated by the previous colonial history of Malawi and my positionality within this. I was a white, British, female researcher, who had come from the former colonial power to ask questions. It is difficult to know how much this impacted participants' response to me. If anything, it aided the research. My whiteness appeared to give me more power and respect than a Malawian woman of my age would most likely receive in this situation. This privilege was presumably a legacy of the colonial era, and whilst I did not want to perpetuate colonialism, there was little on a personal level I could do to address this apart from being very respectful and appreciative

of the people who were involved in the research. Thus, my white and Western position was always there in every interaction. This may have eased the facilitation of some of my research, but its presence made me uncomfortable, which may have had a knock-on effect on the naturalness and ease of my participants.

The literature suggests that cross-cultural research at its worst can cause misrepresentation, and extractive findings (Sidaway, 1992). I have tried to avoid this by incorporating reflexivity in my research (Haraway, 1988, Nast, 1994, Rose, 1997). I have reflected at every stage of the interview process on what the impact of cross-cultural relations may be having on my research. It impacted my interview schedule, it is a key reason why I conducted focus group discussion before entering into one on one interviews with community members, to allow me to get a better appreciation of the community before I embarked on individual interviews. It effected how I behaved and interacted within the interviews with community members in particular, being watchful of the words used and the dynamics between the translator and the participant. Finally, it impacted my analysis of the interview data, I reflected on the potential reasons why an individual may be focusing on a certain aspect and this is evident in my Results. At its best cross-cultural research can provide innovative results due to the new perspectives it can foster (Smith, 1996). It can enable the researcher to see things blind to those from that culture, as well as enable them to view their own culture differently (Smith, 1996). Thus, it can create areas of betweenness, which can potentially challenge hegemonic ideas (Smith, 1996) and break down perceived barriers between 'us' and 'them' or researcher and researched (Sidaway, 1992). Indeed, there is a lot of potential with cross-cultural research when there is awareness of the possible pitfalls.

Most of the participants showed an insightful overview of the whole Malawian situation. Therefore, all discussions, especially those with NGO and government employees, due to the lack of language barriers, often left me with much to ponder, particularly as my knowledge of Malawi started with my PhD process and there was much to learn in a short time.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter highlights how this research was developed and carried out. It is based on interview data with varying actors involved in three different resettlement situations. This variety of situations and actors involved provides the diversity and nuance needed to adequately answer the research questions. It includes multiple perspectives and priorities of understandings. However, research examining multiple understandings and within another culture brings challenges that have limited this research. Drawing on other research that encounters these issues, I hope that with awareness and reflexivity throughout the research, these limitations will not hinder my findings.

The next three chapters will set out the results and discussion. They are ordered roughly in answer to each research questions. The first, looking at the changing perception of flooding focuses on question 1. The second, exploring the governance of resettlement, answers question 2. And the third, looking at the community response, speaks to question 3.

4. THE 'PROBLEM' OF FLOODING

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I illustrate how flooding has been problematised in Malawi, to the extent that it is now a government issue. The literature (Lumumba Mijoni and Izadkhah Yasamin, 2009, Mwale et al., 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019) along with government statistical data and interview data suggest that flooding is becoming more severe in Malawi. This is leading to the legitimisation of government involvement. Legitimisation of government involvement in resettlement is commented on in the literature as an example of how governments can work to justifiably formalise their control of a population (Arnall, 2018). Thus, in this chapter I explore the legitimisation of government involvement to gain further insights into the motives behind resettlement. Additionally, I illuminate in this chapter the flooding situation for each community under study, and their flooding related movements that occur without mention of government resettlement. Finally, I explore the perceived responsibility for the increasing severity of flooding. Flooding is the reason for resettlement and this section nuances the legitimisation of government intervention, highlighted in the first section of the chapter. It shows how government can formulate reasons to get involved in managed resettlement despite not feeling responsible for the causes of it: the increasing flooding. It also provides context for further exploration of the relationship between those in flooding-vulnerable communities and government. This relationship highlights the perspectives involved and the importance of exploring the different knowledges in the resettlement process. Overall, the chapter provides context for the future chapters and helps to answer the first research question – How and why is flooding in Malawi seen as an increasing threat? This will provide the grounding to look further at the resettlement process in Malawi.

I structure this chapter as follows: section 4.2 outlines the trend in flooding with the help of secondary quantitative data and government interview data. Section 4.3 explores the flooding related movement context for each community. Finally, section 4.4 examines who, or what, is seen as responsible for the increasingly severe flooding.

4.2 The Changing Severity of Flooding

In this section I provide context on the flooding situation in Malawi using two forms of data: secondary data provided from the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) and interview data. First, I will provide a brief overview of the trend of flooding in Malawi, as set out by the government data. Next, I analyse how flooding is discussed by those in government. This will illustrate the change in importance attached to flooding, which the subsequent interest in resettlement has grown out of. Increasing flooding severity is explicitly suggested by 12 of the 21 government and NGO officials interviewed, as a reason for their increasing interest. However, it is only referred to by two of the community interviews, who draw more on specific flooding events and their impacts rather than trend, 40 out of 48 community interviews discussed specific events. Moreover, 46 out of the total 69 participants interviewed specifically stated that 2015 was the worst flooding in living memory. This indicates that it may be the specific event of the severe 2015 flooding rather than a gradual increase in severity over time that led to a greater interest in flooding and, consequently, resettlement. Thus, in this section, I am not analysing whether or not flooding is becoming more severe in Malawi, rather I am interested in how the government justifies their interest in flooding and resettlement. A particularly important part of this is their use of recorded data.

DoDMA have compiled disaster occurrence and impact data from 1970-2017. This data shows the severity of flooding increasing, particularly that the floods of the past 20 years have impacted more households than ever previously recorded in Malawi. This can be seen from Figure 4.1 below.




Figure 4. 1 Number of households impacted by flooding per year, 1970-2017. Created through MS Excel, using the flooding data provided by DoDMA

The graph shows that from the mid-1990s there have been several flood events that have impacted more than 50,000 households, something that had not previously been reported. The largest disruptive event in this time frame was in 2015, which impacted 220,117 households, according to the DoDMA data. The data suggests that the number of households impacted are increasing with time. Most of the recordings prior to 1995 are barely visible on the graph because they are so small in comparison to the later recordings. Prior to the 1996 event, no event reportedly impacted more than 2,000 households. However, also during this earlier period there are fewer recordings. Between 1970 and 1996 there are 16 unreported years. This could be because no flood event occurred, or that the impact of a flood event was not recorded. This suggests the data may not be reliable. However, after 1995, it is only 2009 and 2013 that are without a recorded flooding event, which implies that flooding either dramatically increased or was increasingly acknowledged and reported. Despite the potential inaccuracy of this data, it does suggest that flooding was increasingly recognised as important

by government. The graph does not include data on the 2019 flooding, but DoDMA's Post Disaster Needs Assessment (2019) suggested it impacted around 195,000 households.

The graph suggests that the biggest flooding event prior to 2015 was 1997. This is corroborated by 11 of the 48 community interviews. 11 community members specifically spoke of the 1997 flooding event, for example Jombo community member, Michael, explains:

Michael (Jombo, 2017): 'I remember the 1997 flooding, and the 2015 flooding, but for me the 1997 [flood] was worse because the level of water was higher, but for the 2015 [flood] the houses on the higher land were safe, but in 1997 all houses were destroyed.'

This is Michael's experience of the flooding. Two thirds of community members interviewed suggested that the flooding of 2015 was worse, as can be seen in this quote by Matthew:

Matthew (Jombo, 2017): 'I remember that in 1997 there was flooding but the rains were coming slowly each and every day. So, it took some time for the situation to go back to normal. And during that time, we moved to another area in the upper lands but in Champanda [their previous area]. But the 2015 flooding came much faster, property was lost, so that is when we decided to move from within Champanda to another area.'

Matthew and Michael come from the same community, but Matthew suggests that the 2015 flooding was more devastating than the 1997 flooding, chiefly due to the speed of the flooding. Whereas, Michael suggests more damage was caused in 1997. Michael's perspective was the minority, of the 48 community interviews, 40 mentioned the 2015 flooding, and 30 suggested that it was the worst flooding event they had experience, with only Michael specifically stating that another flooding event was significantly worse. Whilst there appears to be a majority of opinion that the 2015 flooding was the worse, the fact that this is not universal illustrates a key aspect of flooding: that it impacts people differently and thus there are multiple perspectives involved in one flooding event, even within the same community. It is important to establish this at the beginning of the analysis because the implications of different understandings of the same event run through all the Results chapters. This indicates the importance of a wide variety of data and viewpoints on flooding. It also echoes what Hall and Endfield (2016) found in their study exploring how extreme weather events are remembered. They suggest that often memory of events is related to personal events

occurring at the same time, which can impact the significance placed on an event (Hall and Endfield, 2016). This highlights the subjectivity of memory (Hall and Endfield, 2016).

DoDMA government official, Mtafu, reiterates the prevalence of flooding in Malawi and his perceived impact of the previous severe flooding in 2015:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'Flooding is one of the common hazards or disasters in the country. We have been having flash floods or localised floods for some time and recently we had the massive floods in 2015. Those floods effected 1.1 million people and we had 106 deaths, and we still have some figures that we are still quoting that are still missing. And there was a lot of displacement.'

Here Mtafu illustrates how flooding has always caused disasters in Malawi. However, his focus on the 'massive floods' of 2015 implies that this severity of flooding is new for Malawi. This is suggested in the breakdown of the interview day and in the DoDMA data explored above, which fits with Mtafu's figures. He suggests 1.1 million people are impacted. The data suggests 220,117 households are impacted, each household in these calculations contains roughly 5 people, therefore the data and Mtafu both suggest 1.1 million people are impacted. This, unsurprisingly, implies that the government viewpoint is coming from the DoDMA data set out in the graph above, which indicates a vast increase in impact of flooding from the 1990s, as explained above. This is also corroborated by the 2015 flood post disaster needs assessment report (Government of Malawi, 2015a). The government data used to create the graph was volunteered to me by the government official after the interview to illustrate the increase in flooding impact he was discussing, which suggests that he viewed it as a form of legitimising his statements.

As previously mentioned, 12 of the 21 participants in government and NGOs believe that the prevalence overall of flooding is increasing and three of these stated that it is also increasing in areas which were previously considered as not vulnerable to flooding. Therefore, there is seen to be a growing national vulnerability to flooding. Thus, the main government perspective is that the increasing severity of flooding has led to increasing attention to the issue, as illustrated by DoDMA official, Mtafu:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'We are seeing more, in terms of the numbers, in terms of the frequency as well as the numbers being affected and the like. A number of years ago, even before I joined the department, maybe Nsanje and Chikwawa [were seen as flooding impacted areas], but now you talk of almost everywhere ... the occurrence of the disaster... we are coming at this point to say, maybe it [resettlement] is something we should go for.'

Mtafu indicates that there is a greater awareness and discussion over flooding than previously and refers to it as 'the disaster'. This suggests flooding is having an increasing impact on livelihoods in Malawi. He also highlights how this greater awareness is leading to discussion over new ways of managing it that were not previously thought of, and how resettlement is one of these ways. Mtafu's discussion of flooding shows how the focus of government has shifted from society and policy to focusing on problems, particularly global problems, as was set out by Enroth (2014). The discussion also highlights the importance of extreme weather events on impacting knowledge formation of flooding. This reiterates the work of Hall and Endfield (2016) on memory and extreme events, particularly how even after many years people can still be influenced by the memory of extreme weather. It suggests one reason why the government data provided by DoDMA starts with sparse amount of varying data with five columns in excel from the 1970s and evolves to 20 columns in the 2010s. Significant previous flooding events have heightened government interest in flooding, which has led to greater effort put into recording data around flooding. This data is drawn on by government when discussing their interest in flooding and its management, to legitimize it.

In this brief section I have set out how the trend in flooding by government and community members in Malawi is viewed and discussed. I have focused mostly on the government perspective on the severity of flooding, as it is the change in this, and the subsequent move to consider resettlement, that is of particular interest to this research. The data and interviews suggest that there has been severe flooding in recent years. More and more people are seen as being impacted by flooding, which is of interest and importance to the government. This has problematised the issue of flooding and given the government of Malawi greater legitimacy to consider further strategies to manage flooding, such as resettlement. Through a governmentality lens, the problematisation of flooding is part of the knowledge formulation of a subject and the production of a visible space for the government

to control, through resettlement (Dean, 1999). However, from this data the motivation of government within the resettlement is not yet clear and I will come back to this later on in the Results. The novelty of resettlement as a government strategy highlighted here, means it is currently in the 'negotiation' phase, which makes it a particularly interesting time to investigate this process.

4.3 The Impact of Increasing Flood Severity on the Vulnerable Communities' Mobility Patterns




Figure 4. 2 Maps showing location of each site, formed from Google maps




Figure 4. 3 Maps showing the situation at each site, formed from google maps

In this section I show how flooding is currently impacting the movements of those in the communities under study. I highlight how movements are already occurring and accepted in all these communities. These communities and their movements between flooding safe and flooding-vulnerable areas, as well as the area for government proposed resettlement, can be seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. These figures build on the maps presented in the previous chapter. There is evident overlap of the government resettlement and the flood safe area for the community at Jombo resettlement site. This highlights the potential relevance of these movements to the flooding safe area for the discussions on government resettlement in the following chapters. For two of the communities studied, TA Nyachikadza and village Mwalija, government resettlement has not yet occurred but is pushed for to varying degrees by government and NGOs. Thus, I illustrate the informal moves undertaken by communities to highlight what is not seen as sufficient by the government and NGOs.

Each community provides a different context. As mentioned, those at village Mwalija have formal resettlement advocated to them by a specific NGO, boNGO, a small education focused NGO, for more information see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. This community particularly illustrates the nuances within community decision making, as I will elaborate on in Chapter 6. Those at TA Nyachikadza have resettlement forcefully advocated to them by the government and illustrate the strength and importance of place attached identity. The community at Jombo, have resettled but flooding still influences their movements, as I will illustrate in this section. The flooding related movements at Jombo provide an interesting contrast with those at TA Nyachikadza, as in some senses they are very similar but are viewed as opposites by the government. This specific contrast, along with this section more generally, provides the foundations for exploring the perceived difference between *Resettlement* advocated for by government and NGOs and *resettlement* already occurring and understood in the vulnerable communities studied. Table 4.1 summarising these differences is available at the end of the section.

In this section I also illustrate the differences in the type of movements discussed by community members between communities, and sometimes within each community. Thus, I highlight how movements related to flooding can occur in many different ways. They may appear similar yet have different meanings to those undertaking the movement. I therefore

reiterate the multiple understandings that may be present within the resettlement process. The variety of movements is echoed in other environmental migration research (Findlay, 2011, Piguet, 2010, Morrissey and House, 2009, Gill, 2010, Gemenne, 2011) and reiterates how the environment works with many other drivers to determine the migration decision. The differences in movement were mainly in distance travelled, preparation, and time spent in the area where they move to. In what follows, I will go through each community in turn and discuss the forms of movement occurring, their similarities and differences, and the potential reasons for this. I will discuss, where relevant, how different communities receive and process information about flooding, including indigenous knowledges on flooding, and how this influences their subsequent movements.

As mentioned, Figure 4.2 and 4.3 build on the maps in Chapter 3, to show the location of each community in the Lower Shire region. It classifies which areas are vulnerable to flooding and which are seen as the flooding safe areas by the government and the communities, and how sometimes these differ. The diagram also highlights the key flooding movement pathway for each community. Village Mwalija (Mwalija), Champanda and Jombo Resettlement Area (Jombo) are specific communities, whereas TA Nyachikadza and TA Ndamera are whole traditional authorities, comprising of many communities, as explained in Chapter 3.

4.3.1 Nyachikadza

The interviews I conducted with those in Nyachikadza show that movement to the upper land during periods of flooding was a common, accepted practice in their community. The movement was usually to TA Ndamera, as shown in Figure 4.3. Whilst three of those interviewed from Nyachikadza have their sole house in Ndamera, and three have their sole house in Nyachikadza, the remaining two thirds of Nyachikadza participants interviewed have two forms of settlement to facilitate the movement between the areas, as discussed by longstanding Nyachikadza resident, Isaac:

Isaac (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'We have a multiple number of people that live here [Ndamera, upper land] then afterwards they are going there [Nyachikadza] for farming. But they have here, like this house [points to a nearby house] this one is coming from

Nyachikadza but they have decided to build their house here, but right now the man is there [Nyachikadza] doing farming but during floods they move to the upper land.'

Isaac suggests it is an accepted occurrence for members of his community to live between two settlements: one in Nyachikadza and one in the upper lands. Nyachikadza is for farming and the upper land is for security from flooding. He implies that this movement does not impact their role in the community. Isaac particularly says that they 'live' in the upper land and are only in Nyachikadza for 'farming', which places more permanency on their upper land residence. However, later, Isaac proclaims this is only 'during floods', which implies that most of the year they are based in Nyachikadza. Despite residing between two places, the identity of being from Nyachikadza, and not Ndamera, is very important for some residents. This can be seen in Chris's quote below.

The amount of time spent in two separate areas has implications on one's place attachment (Raymond et al., 2010a): what leads one to identify to one area over another, who is involved in altering a person's connection to a place and its subsequent impact on their identity? Three quarters of those I interviewed from Nyachikadza explicitly illustrated a strong sense of identity attached to Nyachikadza over the upper land. Nyachikadza resident, Chris describes this connection:

Chris (Nyachikadza, 2017): '[Nyachikadza is] our motherland, all the resources, all our needs, they are there.'

His use of the word 'motherland' highlights the immense connection that many fellow community members feel to this area, it is part of their family. The metaphor of family is used by other flooding-vulnerable community members in later quotes. It implies a permanency to the connection. Additionally, as suggested by Chris, the provision that the land gives the community through its fertility, building on the gendered reference of it as a 'Mother', also provides a strong sense of community for many of the residents. Yosef elaborates:

Yosef (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'I don't want to lose the status of being a person from Nyachikadza because there my parents own good land for cultivation'.

The area of Nyachikadza is competitively and desirably fertile, so much so that Yosef suggests its fertility provides a certain 'status' to its residence, has even been suggested to cause tensions, as I will elaborate on further below. Indeed, the fertility of the land in Nyachikadza was also commented on in informal conversations with the government translator, which suggested to me that the area was renowned for this.

My interviews with those from Nyachikadza suggested that the time spent in the upper land varied from weeks to months every year. As mentioned, there were three interviewed that were permanently based in TA Ndamera, despite identifying Nyachikadza as their home. These participants stated they would go to their cultivation area in Nyachikadza every day. The remaining 13 interviewed suggested they came to Nyachikadza for the period of flooding, which can range from weeks to months. Three specifically moved prior to the flooding, but most did not specify. Local Nyachikadza resident, Peter, explains his household's routine:

Peter (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'So early January is when the area floods so that is when we evacuate from Nyachikadza and come to the upper lands and it depends on the magnitude of the floods. Sometime mid-January we go back, sometime late January we go back to do the cultivation.'

The way Peter discusses it, using 'sometime' to describe the different scenarios, indicates that it can vary annually and that this is an established routine for their community. Indeed, the use of two settlements implies that this movement is a customary annual pattern. Every rainy season people move to the upper area, but the timing of this is not set. The flexibility of the timing suggests that people move based on when they expect flooding, highlighting the organic, unregimented nature of the move. Peter's laissez-faire attitude towards the movement is exemplary of how it was discussed by almost two thirds of the Nyachikadza residents. The organic forms of movement suggested link to the different discussions of resettlement highlighted in the literature, particularly with the suggestion by Displacement Solutions (2013), an international organisation focusing on resettlement as climate change adaptation, that temporary resettlement is the best option. However, as already highlighted in the literature and as I will expand on in Chapter 5, there is much debate about whether resettlement should be temporary or permanent. Peter's comment also highlights the

importance of local early warning systems, in order to know when to move. These were discussed in the interviews with those from Nyachikadza.

Local methods to forecast floods were more favoured by the Nyachikadza participants than those from the other communities, who did not directly refer to them. However, of the 16 Nyachikadza participants, seven highlighted indigenous forecasting methods as the key way they predicted flooding. Of the remaining 16 interviewed from Nyachikadza, seven suggested flooding information came from the radio or the village civil protection committee, and two did not comment. An example of indigenous prediction methods are highlighted by Yosef:

Yosef (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'We use indigenous early warning signs. Firstly, there are some white birds, I don't know what you call them, they love to be around water. So, when we see those birds migrating from those waters to the upper land, there are those big baobab trees, the birds migrate there and build nests in that tree, we know that this year we will have flooding there. Secondly, is the abundance of ants. We know that the water level now is coming up, so those ants are running away from that water.'

The fact that Yosef, does not know the proper name for the birds but just recognises them through their actions, highlights the importance of experience over official nomenclature. It suggests that there may be local ways of categorising these early warning signals, such as those found by Schulz et al. (2019). This indicates the significance placed on local knowledge over scientific, technocratic understandings (Schulz et al., 2019), which also came out from informal conversations with the government translator who commented on some of the difficulties in spreading Met office forecasts, especially for the 2015 flooding. Additionally, Yosef provides insights of the on the ground environment. In this instance, Yosef illustrates to us the importance of animals in their daily lives. The fact that he mentions multiple local methods of predicting floods suggests that community members are very aware of flooding. It signifies the abundance of local knowledge on this issue in this region, and the commonality of flooding. Moreover, this community could favour local forecasting methods due to the 'no-go zone' in this area and the lack of communication with government, encouraging them to be more independent.

However, whilst several participants use indigenous early warning systems, not all follow them as meticulously. Indeed, some prefer to wait until they see the water coming, as indicated by Sofia:

Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'There is no where I get warning information, I don't know. What happens is I just see the water coming and the water normally comes, little by little. And I am able to put the reed as a gauge.'

Sofia illustrates the normality of this procedure, there does not appear to be any anxiety or fear involved, which is different to other communities. Sofia suggests that she is confident with this method of prediction. Official metal and wooden gauges have been installed by various NGOs to assist with the prediction of floods. They enable communities to be aware of the level of the river, which incorporates technocratic knowledge. However, the fact that here Sofia is referring to the use of a reed and her sight to judge the water level, rather than a pre-installed gauge with water measurements already listed, suggests that this is a more local form of prediction. The crossover of different forms of knowledge in this prediction method illustrates the fluidity of knowledge, it is always evolving, learning from the current context. This is similar to the findings of Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019) who explore the use of local knowledge in the flood risk management cycle in the Lower Shire region of Malawi. They highlight the dynamism of local knowledge, particularly with its interaction with scientific early warning systems (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). They stress that local knowledge and its possessors are active in its formation (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). However, they take this further to emphasise that just because someone has the knowledge does not mean they act on it (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). These findings fit with one of the priorities of the 2015 DRM policy, outlined in Chapter 3, illustrating how the government view this as an area that needed improvement in 2015 (Government of Malawi, 2015b).

As mentioned, two Nyachikadza residents I interviewed indicated how they face hostility from those in the upper land due to them being from Nyachikadza. Peter highlights this:

Peter (Nyachikadza, 2017): "my house here in TA Ndamera, when we are in our house people can be drunk and throw stones at us and say 'Nchowa's [derogatory name for

someone from Nyachikadza] go away'. So that is why we think we are not safe in TA Ndamera".

Here Peter highlights how being the 'migrant' in the upper area makes them marginalised. The fact that there is a derogatory word particularly for someone from Nyachikadza suggests that it is not merely someone being new to the area that leads to hostility, but that they are specifically from Nyachikadza. I was made aware in informal discussion with district government officials at Nsanje District Council that those in Ndamera had a reputation of being jealous of the fertility of land in Nyachikadza and that this accentuated negative feelings between the two areas. Ley's (1995), research suggests that how one is perceived in the host area as a migrant impacts identity formation. Belonging is crucial in resettlement, as discussed further in the following chapters. This situation highlighted by Peter above illustrates that hostility develops from organic movements, which suggests that without proper management it could likely also develop in resettlement induced moves, which may impact the wellbeing of those resettling as well as the overall success of the resettlement. This can be seen at Jombo resettlement area.

4.3.2 Jombo Resettlement Area

The flooding related movements at Jombo are the reverse of those at Nyachikadza. Flooding impacted their movements most dramatically through their decision to permanently resettle in 2015. This was a permanent movement from their previous homes at Champanda, to their new area at Jombo, initiated by them due to the severe flooding of 2015, and supported by government and NGOs where possible. Since the resettlement some community members have to travel several kilometres to do their cultivation on the land where they were previously settled. It means that instead of migrating to the upper land only in times of flooding, as with those at Nyachikadza, they stay permanently in the upper land and move to the lowland to do their cultivation. This situation, illustrated in Figure 4.3, provides slightly different rhythms of movement. It is unclear whether this would count as permanent resettlement for some of the understandings of resettlement outlined in the literature review (Johnson, 2012), as there still is a movement to the previous vulnerable area,

which Johnson (2012) advocates against. Although most interviewed from the community identified with having permanently resettled to Jombo.

Those at Jombo spend much of their time at Champanda. The exact pattern of how often people go there and how long they spend there, varies individually. Alfred explains his movements:

Alfred (Jombo, 2017): 'I go there [Champanda] twice a week but I do not stay the night'.

Whereas, Daphne and her husband go to Champanda twice a month. Daphne explains how this works:

Daphne (Jombo, 2017): 'we go to Champanda, we go for one week and then stay here for two weeks and then go for one week'.

These are just two examples of variation in routine, but each participants was slightly different. Some variation is due to opportunities that arise. For example, Eric's situation:

Eric (Jombo, 2017): 'I can stay there for 3 nights and then come back. But when I am not maybe finding piecework I can stay there for a week or so'.

Here, Eric highlights the impact of the availability of work on people's movements. This reiterates that the movements are based on cultivation in the previous area of settlement.

There is some variation around family circumstance. Seven respondents stated that family had influence over their movements one way or another and two of these particularly stated that due to their children they spent more continuous time spent at Jombo with regular visits to Champanda, as there is a school very close to Jombo. Local government officials at the district council, along with participants at Jombo highlight how the school was central in the resettlement, providing a temporary form as shelter as well as being a key attractions of the resettlement. For some households, like Eric's, it impacts his households' movements:

Eric (Jombo, 2017): '[I go to Champanda] twice a week ... My wife and children stay here, and the children go to jombo school'

Here Eric highlights the other factors and amenities that can influence the movement, such as education. However, if like Daphne above, there are no children and only a two-person household, then there is greater flexibility to spend longer amounts of time in Champanda.

The movement to their area of cultivation is complicated by the length of the journey. This can vary between two to six hours depending on when and where exactly they are going. In the evening it can take longer due to the heat and the labour they have just undertaken. Daphne and her husband, and Edward explain their routines:

Daphne (Jombo, 2017): 'we leave at four am and we arrive at nine or ten am'.

Edward (Jombo, 2017): 'I start at six am and reach there at eight am. When returning I start at one pm and reach here at six, seven pm. It is a lot longer coming back because of the sun.'

There is variation between the two quotes, but in both the journey appears to be long and sometimes a struggle. The process of permanently resettling has left the resettled community further away from their area of cultivation. This distance impacts the resettled community's daily lives and creates different patterns of movement from before the resettlement. However, despite this apparent hardship most interviewed were happy to be permanently resettled out of their previous area. A key reason for this that came out from the interviews, was the fear of flooding and trauma attached to the previous area.

Prevalent in the resettled community at Jombo is a great fear of flooding. This came out of the focus group discussions as well as being specifically stated in six of the 16 Jombo interviews, three of which mentioned it several times. This fear seems to have been caused by the devastating 2015 flood. Fairness explains how the 2015 flooding impacted her:

Fairness (Jombo, 2017): 'I have been experiencing flooding each and every year. But usually what would happen is the water would come and then the water would go. But in 2015 the water came, and it was the worst flooding. So, we were afraid that we might be staying at Champanda and the water might come in the night hours when we are sleeping and all of us will be swept away by the water. At Champanda we didn't have a canoe and we saw all our property being lost in the water. So, we thought each and every time we are losing our property, we might lose our life in future.'

The trauma of water coming during 'the night hours' was present in three quarters of the Jombo interviews as well as the focus group discussions, with respondents highlighting how they lost everything during these floods and some going further to give detailed descriptions of their rescue from the flooding. The impression from the interviews was that many in this resettled community watched their possessions washed away from them as they awaited rescue. It appears that this tortuous experience has stayed with them and still influences their decisions today. Indeed, half of the respondents expressed the sense of security they feel in their resettled site, as exemplified in Daphne's quote:

Daphne (Jombo, 2017): 'we are happy we are here because we are protected from flooding'.

There has been research on the impact of a severe event on people's behaviour (Paton et al., 2000, Paton and Johnston, 2006, Hall and Endfield, 2016). Often however, the effect of this event wears off with time. This was suggested to me by my translator on one journey back from Jombo resettlement site, she was convinced that one of the respondents in particular would permanently move back to Champanda. It is arguable then, that with time, some of those at Jombo may return to Champanda, if it is mainly the fear of flooding that is keeping them at Jombo.

The contrast of the movement of the resettled community at Jombo, with that of the unwilling to resettle community at Nyachikadza is interesting. From the outside, the movement appears quite similar. Both move between two areas in order to undertake cultivation and avoid flooding. However, they spend varying times in the different places, with more continuous movement occurring at Jombo than at Nyachikadza. They also have very different attitudes towards the movement. Many at Jombo are driven by a fear of flooding, whilst those at Nyachikadza have little fear of flooding but a great attachment to their area. Additionally, the movements are seen very differently by the government, which uses the resettlement at Jombo as an exemplar of resettlement, and those at Nyachikadza as an example of those who are resisting resettlement, stigmatising them by declaring the area a no-go zone in order to persuade them to resettle.

However, in both the communities discussed so far, the key motivation for the movements is to enable the communities to continue to undergo their cultivation in the most fertile areas. Much migration research focuses on economic causes as the key driver in migration (Boyle et al., 1998). Here, economic reasons are prevalent in the drivers of migration. However, they seem to be inhibiting the government desired migration: the economic reasons, particularly associated with cultivation, appear to be preventing full permanent resettlement with no interaction with their previous area. If the environment allowed them to be full time in the fertile area, they would be. However, the land would not be as fertile if there were no floods. These contradictions highlight the complexities involved in determining the different drivers and causes of migration, and which migration is seen as desirable by whom and why (Black et al., 2011a). Village Mwalija provides a different perspective.

4.3.3 Village Mwalija

At the time of interviews in 2017, village Mwalija was less impacted by flooding than the other two communities under study. Flooding did not impact this community annually and did not affect the community homogeneously. This led to a variety of subsequent flooding related movements and views on flooding and resettlement. This is why in Figure 4.3 there is an area which is estimated, based on interviews, as the area in which people move. Whilst there is a set place, the 'new place' as shown in Figure 4.3, for their potential resettlement, and there was a particular place they went during the 2015 flooding, as shown in Figure 3.5, there is no routine place where they relocate to at times of flooding, as with those at TA Nyachikadza.

There is a variety of flooding related movements occurring in this community. I illustrate these below. This variety could be due to the diversity of impact felt from flooding as well as the diversity of everyday movements that occur in this community. Half the respondents from village Mwalija rely on two areas for cultivation, one in the upper land and one in the marsh land. This has always occurred and is not due to the increasing severity of flooding. They live relatively close to both areas of cultivation. Justin discusses his farming situation:

Justin (Mwalija, 2017): 'it is 30 minutes, this side to dambo [marsh] land where I cross the Shire river and the other side it takes me two hours, from four in the morning to six o'clock. While this side is from six to half six'.

There is quite a difference in distance between the two areas of farming ranging from 30 minutes to two hours, but for some, such as Gina, it is equidistant:

Gina (Mwalija, 2017): '[it is] almost 30 minutes, six to six thirty and the same to the upper side, almost 30 minutes walking'.

It is clear that in this community, residents' cultivated land may be quite spread out, which leads to the varied impact from flooding on this community.

Flooding impacts the residence of village Mwalija differently. For many their crops are washed away but there appears to be a lot of variation as to whether residents' houses are affected. Arnold explains his experience:

Arnold (Mwalija, 2017): 'some houses do collapse but I have never been affected in that way, but my field is near Shire River, so it gets flooded and my crops get washed away whenever the area floods where my field is'.

However, some do not even get their crops impacted. Dorothy explains the flooding impact on her:

Dorothy (Mwalija, 2017): 'mostly it is the displacement. For my maize fields they are intact when there is flooding, even the livestock and the house. So, we relocate'.

Despite the fact that her house and fields are unaffected by flooding, Dorothy still relocates. A sense of community is apparent in the interviews with the residents of Mwalija, with 11 of the 16 respondents referring to some aspect of the community impacting the resettlement. If there is going to be a relocation due to flooding, most participate, and they go as a whole community.

The sense of community means that if there is a decision to evacuate others will follow even if they are not impacted or do not want to. Six respondents refer, similarly to Dina below, to the influence of the community as a whole on the decision to move and five refer

specifically to the influence of the village head. Dina highlights her situation in times of flooding:

Dina (Mwalija, 2017): 'I can go because it would be like the whole village, community, or group of people are moving, but it won't be what I wish'.

Whilst it is clear this movement is not what Dina wishes, she still follows her community. This suggests a sense of community cohesion, or potentially peer pressure. In this context, village Mwalija makes a particularly interesting community to study further the community process of decision making and community agency, as will be made evident in Chapter 6.

Additionally, flooding can impact the freedom of movement for those in the community. Three community members commented on the inhibiting nature that flooding in the area places on their livelihood by preventing them from moving. Sonia highlights the constraining impact of flooding on her movements:

Sonia (Mwalija, 2017): '[flooding] affects our travelling. My husband has to go and do some casual labour, but we are surrounded by water because the rivers that surround them become flooded, so it becomes difficult for us to travel'.

Here Sonia illustrates how they can potentially become trapped due to the flooding. This suggests that they may be experiencing a form of the immobility paradox (Findlay, 2011), outlined in the literature review, where people want to move but are unable to do so. It is usually referring to the lack of resources as the inhibitor of the movement (Findlay, 2011), but in this case it appears to be the flooding. It may instead relate better to the literature on environmental non-mobility (Mallick and Siddiqui, 2015). The potential to be trapped by the flooding can be very dangerous and problematic, resulting in temporary relocation.

During severe flooding there is often a short evacuation period. It is not as extreme as with the previous two communities: half the respondents highlighted how they relocate a mile or two away from their area, and stay between a few hours to a few days, as in Sonia's situation for example:

Sonia (Mwalija, 2017): 'When we relocate from that area to the new one, we stay just one day. We may come [to the evacuation area] but we still go there just to check what the situation is like and, if we feel like it is going down, I go back to my home.'

In this situation, flooding is discussed less seriously than the previous examples in the other two communities. Sonia does not show as much fear over the impact that flooding could have on her livelihood. Indeed, she suggests they can move to and from the evacuation area and their home, indicating the way is passable and there is little fear in the movement. However, two respondents did suggest more serious relocation periods of a month, which emphasises the potential variety in this community, as touched on earlier. The lower severity of this community was also implied by the local government officials in the district council, when discussing the road to Mwalija, it was made clear that this area does not experience as severe flooding. Moreover, on the 2015 flooding extent maps provided by the Department of Surveys (Malawi Department of Surveys, 2015) this area was not included on the map, suggesting it did not undergo severe flooding. Building on the previous discussion on the behavioural impact of one event at Jombo, and the supporting literature (Paton et al., 2000, Paton and Johnston, 2006), the lack of fear of flooding implies that they have little experience of flooding disastrously impacting livelihoods.

However, this lack of fear of flooding is not felt universally in the community. Indeed, seven of the 16 respondents suggested some form of fear of flooding, as exemplified by Gina, who illustrates how the 2015 floods caused her to be more aware of flood forecasting:

Gina (Mwalija, 2017): in the past, like in 2015, I did nothing, I knew that the area would receive heavy rains, but I just stayed to see what would happen but after that incident I now know the importance of getting prepared for the rains. Like when we get the messages we can go and relocate.'

Gina implies that prior to the 2015 floods she had not had experience of severe flooding, but that this event did impact her enough to make her want to be 'prepared for the rains', and that part of this preparedness included relocating. This illustrates the impact that one event can have on behavioural patterns (Hall and Endfield, 2016). However, compared to the rest of those from Mwalija interviewed, Gina was a rarity.

Half of the community members from Mwalija interviewed either do not seek any information of flooding, or receive, but do not act on, flooding forecasts from the Met Office heard through the radio or other official channels. For example, Agnes explains:

Agnes (Mwalija, 2017): 'I get information through radio that maybe the area will flood, but I don't do anything I just wait to see what happens'.

This resonates with the discussion over indigenous and technocratic knowledge in the Nyachikadza section (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). It also links in with the discussion of the attention on early warning systems in the 2015 DRM policy. Indeed, the government seem aware that community members may not know what action to take after hearing the forecasts, and state this as a specific example within the government policy (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 7). In the case of Mwalija, three of the 16 respondents highlight how the lack of authority placed on official forecasts is connected to a belief that it will not affect them. Indeed, Dina reiterates this:

Dina (Mwalija, 2017): 'I don't even know the flooding forecast for this year, whenever the water comes, we just see. But I am happy living an unworried life about flooding'.

She reinforces the fact that flooding is not an issue for everyone in the community. Indeed, she later reiterates this:

Dina (Mwalija, 2017): 'it is not the whole area which is flooded'.

This suggests that the varying levels of flooding makes them less cautious of the phenomenon than in other areas. Yet, most will still follow others if they evacuate.

One NGO official from the MFERP, noted that the form of evacuation present at village Mwalija could be the start of a more permanent resettlement process. This is important when considering how these existing forms of flooding related movements can impact more official forms of resettlement, or how they are seen by those in government and NGOs. International organisation worker William illustrates how he sees this:

William (NGO, 2017): 'So, what we are promoting in this case is mainly the identification of possible sites, sites for possible evacuation. These sites may be considered later by the

government as resettlement sites. So, it is up to the government to reconsider some of these sites that we are identifying as resettlement sites. So, we are not facilitating the actual resettlement, but we are facilitating identification of something like this, safe havens ... where maybe people settle.'

Here, William highlights how identifying a safe area can be the start of resettling more permanently to this area. It portrays it as a gradual process. This is something that has long been recognised in the literature as how much migration gradually occurs, a temporary move paving the way for a permanent relocation (Boyle et al., 1998, Ravenstein, 1885, Bell and Ward, 2000). It attempts to merge the community movement with the government's idea of resettlement. It also brings in issues around definitions discussed briefly previously and in the literature review. Here William refers to resettlement and evacuation, which have different connotations. In Chapter 5 I will explore further what is meant by resettlement. Additionally, it is interesting that in William's opinion it is important that the government is involved in the process to make it happen. The quote implies William believes the responsibility for the resettlement lies with the government. I will develop the topic of responsibility in the section below and in the following chapters.

The movements in each community illustrated in this section highlight the extensive variability involved. Flooding impacts each community's movements in numerous ways depending on a multitude of factors. This reiterates what Šakić Trogrlić et al. (2019) found in their research on local knowledge and disaster management in the Lower Shire Region. They highlighted that the impact of disasters was influenced by the social and political contexts, as well as the unequal access to local knowledge and resources (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). My research also suggests that the severity of flooding is different for each community, as is expected. However, movements in all communities are impacted in one form or another by flooding. These forms of movement are organic and occur irrespective of NGO or government involvement. They are therefore viewed as being separate to formal resettlement or are *resettlement* rather than *Resettlement*, where *resettlement* refers to the organic form of movements that occur without external involvement from government and civil society and *Resettlement* is the official change of residence desired by government and many interviewed in civil society. A summary of these movements is set out in Table 4.1 below, which compares the *resettlement* and *Resettlement* situation in each community.

Table 4. 1 Summary of the difference between government/NGO desired Resettlement and community flooding related movements (resettlement)

Community	Resettlement	resettlement
Jombo Resettlement Site	This community has already undertaken Resettlement: they have permanently moved to a safer area upland. This move was initiated by them but assisted by government.	This community still cultivates in their previous area, this means regular trips, sometimes lasting several days, to the previous area, which is vulnerable to floods.
Village Mwalija	This community is currently negotiation Resettlement with the assistance of an NGO. An area of land within the same TA and with a drilled borehole has been allocated to them. Yet, still they hesitate.	resettlement occurs at times of flooding, but it is not routine: there is no set place they go to at times of flooding, and they are always checking on when they will return. It is spoken about as often only requiring a move away for a few hours.
TA Nyachikadza	The government very much wants this community to Resettle, but they are unwilling. The government has declared it as unfit for human habitation and made the area a 'no-go zone' but still the community do not want to Resettle.	This community speaks of annual moves up to TA Ndamera at times of flooding. It appears to be an established coping mechanism for residents of TA Nyachikadza but is not recognised by the government.

Table 4.1 illustrates the variability and flexibility within the *resettlement* movements, which could suggest that it may be difficult to impose a more rigid traditional form of government *Resettlement* in their place. However, as has briefly been touched on in the quote from William, and as the next chapter will illustrate, this separation is indistinct. Many of these flooding related movements constitute in one way or another an aspect of *Resettlement*. Thus, the distinction for *Resettlement* is the external involvement and management of the movement. This is what constitutes *Resettlement* and is of interest for this research. The comparison between *Resettlement* and *resettlement* is useful to show the similarities and confusion in the definition of *resettlement*, however, from now on the *resettlement* referred to in the thesis is *Resettlement*. Following a governmentality rationale (Dean, 1999) the rise in people moving could be a reason why government wants to manage these movements, to ensure control of their increasingly mobile population. To explore the rationale behind *resettlement* further, the responsibility for the increasing severity of

flooding is explored, as this provides context for who is seen as being responsible for resettlement.

4.4 Increasing Severity of Flooding: Attributing Blame and Responsibility?

In this section, I explore the perceived responsibility for the increasingly severe flooding in Malawi. This opens up discussions over the responsibility for resettlement, as it is due to the flooding. In this section, I want to establish how there is a difference between who is seen to be responsible for causing the problem of flooding, and who is seen to be responsible for solving the problem of flooding. This difference is important to appreciate the relationship between the actors involved.

The responsibility for the increasingly severe flooding was mostly discussed by those in NGOs and government. There are some comments from community members, but much of the interview data I discuss in this section is from NGO and government workers. I believe this could be because those in NGOs and government view themselves as having to manage the consequences of flooding and therefore, there may be an emphasis on understanding the causes of the flooding in order to suggest solutions. This reiterates what Enroth (2014) suggested, that governance is now focused less on society and more on global problems, as I highlighted in the first section of this chapter by illustrating how government was problematising flooding and legitimising their intervention. The process of finding 'solutions' to flooding, also connects with discussions of technocratic knowledge and audit culture, as the 'solutions' need to be measurable (Kuus, 2016). This perspective is part of NGOization discussed in the literature review and did not seem apparent in the communities. Most community members focus on their response to, and method of prediction of flooding, as well as its impact, rather than why the flooding may be getting more severe. This may be due to the interview schedule but may also in part be due to different priorities and context within the communities, which have always lived with flooding and thus focus on dealing with its everyday impacts. Therefore, in this section, I focus on the government and NGO perspective of responsibility to flooding.

Moreover, I introduce the difference between community members' perspective and the perspective of those in government and NGOs. I will explore the reasons for this difference below and in subsequent sections. It may in part be due to differing priorities, as suggested above, it may also be due to the materials available to them. Community members often do not have access to data that highlights the increasing flooding severity and may rely on institutional memory. Thus, they may be less aware that government data suggests flooding is becoming more severe, as flooding events have always occurred. If the government data is not visible, for example in a graph like Figure 4.1, then the trend suggested there may not be obvious. This shows how knowledge on flooding may be formed, and the apparatus involved in this. It is part of the explanation as to why there may be a disconnect between *Resettlement* and *resettlement*, as will become apparent throughout the Results.

In what follows, I explore the four key interconnected perceived reasons for flooding as suggested by the research participants. These are centred around deforestation and overpopulation. The environment runs through these reasons, but in various different guises due to the varying attitudes towards it.

4.4.1 Deforestation

Deforestation was discussed by half the respondents from government and NGOs as a key driver of flooding, particularly in relation to climate change. I will discuss further the implications of its relation to climate change in the climate change section below. Deforestation is a prominent issue in Malawi, so much so that the government has publicly declared it will protect existing forest and reforest 500,000 hectares of degraded woodland by 2030 (Chimenya, 2019). There was much focus in the interviews, on the physical process and implications of deforestation. This is present in a third of the interviews that discussed deforestation and means that there is no specific group or actor who is seen as responsible for the deforestation practices that are occurring. For example, William discusses how he views the increasing deforestation as a key cause of flooding.

William (NGO, 2017): 'If you look at the 70s to now, the landscape has changed. Most of the areas that were forests then are mainly cultivated or they are now built, so that means, the way we are collecting rainfall is different to how we were collecting it in the

past. So, in the past maybe it [rain] was falling to the ground, most of it and was obstructed by the vegetation and all that. This time it is like we are physically collecting it and directing it into our water channels, and our water channels have become small, because of these construction dynamics, or cultivation dynamics. So, the water channels have become small and as a result we are experiencing these floods.'

William focuses on the impacts to the physical running of the water and how this has affected the flooding regime. It is interesting that he does not specifically say deforestation, which would envision the act of cutting down a tree, but instead, discusses it in a more abstract way by focusing on the change in the landscape. Thus, the change of landscape is discussed as responsible for the increased flooding, but there is little detail into why the landscape has changed. Construction or cultivation dynamics are referred to, but more as a general societal aspect and not towards a specific group of people. Similar to the other three respondents that took an equally neutral view, William suggests that it is the environment that has caused the increasing flooding, but really that it is the societal impact that has led to this and created this 'landscape'. This type of view is straightforward, stating the situation. Others, however, take a more analytical approach, which does involve an element of blame and responsibility.

A third of NGO and government respondents that discuss deforestation imply that it was the people in the communities vulnerable to flooding that were responsible for the deforestation, and subsequently the worsening flooding. Anthony's opinion, for example:

Anthony (NGO, 2017): 'I think you could more or less connect it [increasing severity in flooding] to climate change and things like that, and the people that live in those areas as well, they are cutting down trees, they are staying just near the riverbeds and all that.'

Anthony highlights that climate change is important, but he does not elaborate, which makes it a broad, inconclusive statement. However, he does elaborate on those involved in increasing flooding severity by identifying 'the people that live in those areas ... they are cutting down trees', and that they place themselves in positions of danger by 'staying just near the riverbeds'. The fact that this is the point he particularises on suggests that he views the people vulnerable to flooding as partly responsible for this fact. However, one respondent takes this further to produce a more cynical view.

The complications of aid within deforestation was also brought into the responsibility dynamics of flooding by one participants, Arthur:

Arthur (NGO, 2017): 'For us to curb flooding, I think we need to ensure that the communities within those areas, are truly involved. The interventions that we do, saying we want to plant trees, we want to do river embankment and whatever, we have to ensure that the community is involved, but the challenge is that projects of such nature come with incentives to the same community. We are trying to protect them from the effects of flooding and then we bring incentives. So, what happens is, some communities, may even not nurture those kind of projects, because they know if they nurture those projects NGOs will not come back to give them another incentive. So, they would rather not take care of that, till next year, they also come again. It is like every year, trees are planted, every year river embankments are done, but the following year those are actually not there.'

Here Arthur is blaming the people in the communities receiving assistance for causing the flooding, through their manipulation of environmental management projects. He is suggesting that community members need to take some responsibility for the success of development projects. This implies that the Lower Shire may have a problem with aid dependency, something which other scholars have identified stakeholders as suggesting (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018). The fact that Arthur focuses on the necessity of incorporating the communities suggests that he believes they are currently undertaking harmful cultivation practices. The use of 'protect' sets up a dynamic between those in the NGOs and those in the communities by suggesting they need the assistance of the NGOs. This actually reinforces the dependency scenario, which he is suggesting the communities should resist. It is the first clear inclination that those who see themselves in positions as responsible for solving the problem of flooding (the NGOs and government) view those as responsible for causing the problem (community members) as potentially purposefully dependent on them.

Malawi depends heavily on receiving aid (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018) but this aid does not necessarily instate the problematic power dynamics suggested by some critics of development (Escobar, 2011). In a post-development context, there is growing awareness of the potential damage of power dynamics within aid (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Kapoor, 2005). Yet, in the quote above, Arthur seems to be suggesting they do not understand the situation, by implying that they use these projects to obtain the 'incentives' and only see them in this

way, not for their intended purpose. Arthur's focus on involving the community implies that he puts the responsibility for ensuring the understanding of the purpose of the project mainly onto the implementer and not those in the community. This sets up another dynamic, as it implies that the communities themselves do not have the capacity to have adequate knowledge about it on their own. If the communities are viewed as having little capacity within the situation, it could suggest that they have little agency in the process, which hinders their ability to take responsibility for it, as Arthur is advocating for.

The difference between those in NGOs and government doing the assisting, and those in vulnerable communities requiring assistance is exacerbated by the perspective that those in the vulnerable communities are responsible for causing the issue that requires assistance. This reiterates the disconnect in understandings between those in government and NGOs and those in flooding-vulnerable communities suggested in the earlier section. I explore the implications of this in the ensuing Results chapters. Relevant further to this current discussion, is the appreciation, apparent in the remaining third of respondents that discuss deforestation, that it is not only those directly impacted by flooding that need to be part of the solution, but rather the whole watershed. This creates a more interconnected perspective on the responsibility of flooding.

Four NGO and government workers interviewed highlighted how the drivers of flooding include not only those who were immediately impacted by the flooding but also other indirect actors. Eliyasi illustrates this well:

Eliyasi (NGO, 2017): 'So, for me there should be stakeholders from not just Nsanje but even districts surrounding Nsanje and Thyolo, Mulanje, Blantyre, where you have actually trees being cut, a lot of erosion coming in you know, even in the hills there.'

Eliyasi spreads the responsibility, not just concentrating on the people who are impacted but also highlighting how those further upland are influential in increasing the severity of flooding. The fact that it is 'even in the hills' implies that this may not be a well appreciated viewpoint. However, he was not the only interviewee to discuss the interconnected nature of flooding, Keith also reiterates this.

Keith (Government, 2017): 'You know most of the upland areas have been greatly deforested. That is why we are coming in to join hands with our colleagues from the Department of Forestry to link up with the neighbouring districts. Maybe to work on afforestation programmes. Because even if you look at most of the rivers coming down, there is a lot of siltation, and as a result the riverbed is very shallow. So, the time the catchment area up there receives a lot of water, the water just comes in and spreads all over, hence the issue of flooding. So, the issue of partnership with neighbouring district as a long-term issue to do with deforestation is important.'

Keith echoes that collaboration with those upland is necessary to reduce flooding. He also focuses on the physical aspects that cause flooding, as in William's previous quote. Similar to William, his focus on the impact of areas being deforested in general takes the responsibility away from specific individuals or groups. However, he goes further than William by highlighting the partnership with neighbouring districts to combat deforestation. This again spreads the responsibility. The spreading of responsibility could be a result of decentralisation (Jagero et al., 2014), and the neoliberalising of climate change (Bee et al., 2015) and environmental governance (Himley, 2008). According to Jagero et al. (2014) central to decentralisation is the spreading of responsibility out to the district councils. This could be a reason, why Keith, a local government official has a viewpoint that implies the spreading of responsibility. However, following the concerns raised by Himley (2008) and Bee et al (2015) around the neoliberalisation, they would suggest that this spreading of responsibility takes the responsibility away from the national government, which have the most power to alter the situation.

Additionally, it is interesting that Keith, like half the other NGO and government workers interviewed, suggests that the management of the environment is of key importance to reducing the severity of flooding. Indeed, many suggest the mistreatment of the environment, through acts such as deforestation, is a key driver of flooding. However, this viewpoint can put the control of flooding onto those who manage the environment, and not on the environment itself. As Keith is a local government disaster officer, part of his job is to manage the environment, which makes this perspective unsurprising. However, this perspective does make the environment dependent on others' actions and in no way autonomous. Scholars have illustrated that some cultures view the environment differently, as having its own form of agency (Cruikshank, 2007, Berkes, 2012). Instead Keith's perspective

appears to be focused on the impact that humans have on the environment, such as deforestation leading to decreased water retention in the soil and subsequently greater flooding, and not on the diverse way the environment can act. There is a more nuanced understanding of the societal drivers of deforestation in the discussions of charcoal burning.

4.4.2 Charcoal Burning

Burning wood to form charcoal is frequent within Malawi and is referred to as 'charcoal burning'. Charcoal burning is illegal in Malawi, yet in 2017 97% of Malawians rely on firewood or charcoal for fuel or heating (Government of Malawi, 2017). It is such an issue that there is a National Charcoal Strategy put in place in 2017 (Government of Malawi, 2017). One reason it is so significant is because it is recognised as a key reason for deforestation (Government of Malawi, 2017). Charcoal burning was only mentioned by three of the 21 government and NGO interviewees, however, the line of argument that charcoal burning highlights adds further nuance to the dynamics of responsibility involved in flooding.

The issue of charcoal burning illustrates an example of the 'cycle of deprivation' discussed in the literature review (Findlay, 2011). The three respondents that discuss charcoal burning cite poverty as the main reason for charcoal burning, which requires wood and, thus, deforestation occurs. Deforestation perpetuates environmental degradation and flooding, which accentuates poverty. This is also set out in the National Charcoal Strategy (Government of Malawi, 2017). Keith and Eliyasi elaborate:

Keith (Government, 2017): '[it is a] cyclical process, looking at issues of poverty, people cut down trees as one way of burning charcoal, so they can sell and get a little something'.

Eliyasi (NGO, 2017): 'people cut trees to sell for charcoal because of poverty'.

Both of these simplify the situation: people cut trees to burn charcoal to sell because they're poor. Under this reasoning, the responsibility for deforestation still lies with those undertaking the deforestation: the poor.

However, NGO worker, Kenneth, elaborates further into the structures behind charcoal burning:

Kenneth (NGO, 2017): 'People [are] cutting trees, they are burning charcoal just because there is a high demand of charcoal, here in Malawi. I think electricity is a problem, we may have black out for the whole day and people with no electricity cannot live hungry, so they buy charcoal. So, it means if there is a high demand for charcoal, people will continue making charcoal.'

Kenneth's focus on the interconnected nature of the situation, going so far as to mention the electricity shortage and the need to have something to cook on, indicates how aspects such as the national infrastructure are also an important factor in deforestation. This is also recognised in the National Charcoal Strategy, which has seven cross-cutting pillars of focus (Government of Malawi, 2017). The interconnectivity highlighted here means the responsibility and reasons for deforestation, and consequently flooding, cannot easily be placed on one thing. Rural populations do cut trees, and many do this to burn charcoal to sell, but the reason they do this is not simply because they are poor and they need money. There is a demand for it because people often need a power source. This echoes the results of Sovacool and Linnér (2016) who recognise that deforestation can be the result of a higher system of demand in a country.

An additional, somewhat connected, reason for flooding that was cited in the interviews is overpopulation and population pressure. This connects to the fears of overpopulation influential in the 1970s in initiating the environmental movement (Meadows et al., 1972).

4.4.3 Overpopulation

Overpopulation is a contested issue in development discourse (Escobar, 2011). Often discussed as a key inhibitor to development, yet, from a traditional Western perspective, it is also seen as a signifier that a country is going through a 'modernisation process' (Kirk, 1996). However, much current discussion about overpopulation is suggested to be an oversimplification that is often used as a 'scapegoat' to distract from systemic issues (Fletcher et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the population of Malawi has increased at a significant rate,

doubling in the past 30 years from around 9 million in 1988 to 18 million in 2018 (The World Bank, 2018b). It had an annual growth rate in 2018 of 2.6% compared to the UK's 0.6% for the same year (The World Bank, 2018b). Thus, it is unsurprising that eight of the 21 NGO and government officials interviewed showed significant concern about overpopulation and cited it as a key driver in practices that increased flood vulnerability. However, there are differences in the way this concern was expressed.

Overpopulation is discussed by all those who mention it, as a reason for the increase in other drivers of flooding, such as deforestation. Kenneth illustrates this:

Kenneth (NGO, 2017): 'Increased population has some other results, for instance, now people are cutting down trees in order to have some areas to settle, just because they need somewhere to settle. At the same time there are some areas where we are building, initially people knew these are flood prone areas, just because of population pressure they are still building in these areas. So even though we say maybe people, in the future, they will be moving out of flood prone areas, just because population is increasing, people don't have areas to construct their houses, so instead of maybe people moving from flood prone areas to safe areas they will be moving from safe areas to flood prone places just because they have that pressure, they don't have somewhere to construct.'

Kenneth highlights how the mere settlement of people in their 'overpopulated' country can increase severity and vulnerability to flooding. Again, the focus is on society's impact on the environment with little discussion or agency given to the environment. However, the way in which Kenneth discusses this situation, outlining how people may move into vulnerable areas 'just because they have that pressure' implies he does not view them as responsible for this, they have no choice. Nor does he view Malawi's population as a whole responsible for it. Similar to when the physical aspects of deforestation are discussed it is stated as just the situation, without blame attached. Four other respondents discussed overpopulation in this way. Anthony for example, shows a comparable sentiment:

Anthony (NGO, 2017): 'I think another thing you should consider is that the population is growing, because in the end it is all about the numbers, so how many were affected and all that. So, might be same magnitude of flooding, but more people affected. At same time, more people means more people encroaching on forest reserves and living near the rivers and all that.'

Again, the situation is discussed in a straightforward manner, saying that ‘it is all about the numbers’ not necessarily the individual specific practices. As mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, the numbers do illustrate a growing population but Anthony and Kenneth place the responsibility for this, and its consequences with regards to flooding, on the population as a whole. However, not all discussions about overpopulation were equally blameless.

There were three other NGO and government participants that discussed population growth in a more accusatory manner, implying responsibility on the growing population. For example, Daniel:

Daniel (Government, 2017): ‘However, because of the population growth, much of the land, or the areas which were forested, the trees have been cut down and some have been turned into cultivation lands, so that has increased the volume of flooding that is affecting the downstream. That is becoming a big issue now.’

Much of what Daniel is saying here is the same as the previous two quotes. However, he more clearly connects population growth to the disruption of lands that causes flooding. Whereas the other two quotes focus on situations that appear out of the vulnerable populations’ control, here Daniel is directly blaming population growth, particularly in vulnerable areas, for the degradation of areas and increased flooding. Since the start of this research in 2016, the population of Malawi has grown by around 1 million, with an annual population growth in 2018 of 2.6% (The World Bank, 2018b). The fact that Daniel highlights how this ‘is becoming a big issue now’ reiterates the impact of the growing population. He thus places responsibility for increasing flooding severity on this growing population. This could be because Daniel is the local government Health officer, and so is more directly involved in family planning within the population.

Thus, there are a variety of perspectives on responsibility. When blame is ascribed it is mostly to the flooding-vulnerable communities, suggesting a neoliberal outlook, as it is the individual’s responsibility (Himley, 2008, Bee et al., 2015), but it is not always attributed. Despite the variety in perspectives, all involved highlighted an interesting viewpoint towards climate change.

4.4.4 Climate Change

Eight of 21 government and NGO officials discuss climate change as contributing to flooding. However, as can be seen in some of the previous quotes in this section, climate change is often discussed as a driver of increasingly severe flooding in an abstract way. Two of the respondent elaborate and mention a specific aspect of climate change, such as changing rainfall patterns. William's opinion for example:

William (NGO, 2017): 'with the change in climate, we will be experiencing a lot of climate variability in southern Africa and Malawi is one of the countries that will generally be affected by such variability, or climate change'.

This does give more detail into what climate change will entail, rather than simply stating 'climate change' as a reason. However, it is still vague, particularly as it discusses all of southern Africa. This could be partly due to the fact that William is an employee of the World Bank, which is a large international organisation and thus would take a broad perspective of climate change. Therefore, he could just be reflecting the general World Bank consensus.

However, similar vagueness can be observed in the discussion with community members. For example, a focus group discussion in Mwalija highlights the following:

Shadreck (focus group Mwalija 2017): 'Climate change is the cause of all this [increasing flooding] and I can foresee the situation getting worse and worse because we have not worked on improving the environment'.

Here Shadreck is explicitly blaming climate change for the increasing flooding and also linking it to the lack of focus on improving the environment. This suggests that Shadreck's view of climate change is centred on his interaction with the environment, his cultivation practices for example. He views it as their responsibility to improve the environment, and that this will combat climate change and the subsequent increase in flooding. This localised view of climate change was also present in three of the government and NGO interviews. It is slightly different from the Western scientific view on climate change (Arnall et al., 2014).

Much of the academic discourse and literature around climate change focuses on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They are a key driver of climate change (IPCC., 2014a), however, it is not discussed by any interviewee. Climate change is discussed as a reason for increasing flooding, but all the strategies to combat climate change and reduce flooding focus on very local methods: afforestation, resettlement, better housing infrastructure for example. This also was very apparent in informal discussions at the district council over some of the projects they had ongoing at the time of fieldwork, such as the Shire River Irrigation project, which has a large focus on afforestation to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Thus, for climate change, the perspective of those interviewed does not appear to go to a global level. This could be because much effort and discussion associated with climate change in Malawi is focused on mitigation and adaptation rather than prevention. Therefore, the concentration of climate change projects is mostly on a local level that does not necessarily provide a global perspective of the phenomenon. Moreover, the responses I received may also have been in relation to how I was perceived by the interviewees. They may have felt that I was more interested in specific actions of their respective NGO or government department, rather than overall perspectives on climate change. Nevertheless, this still suggests something about the dominant knowledge in place. It could highlight that the Western scientific knowledge, often seen as being hegemonic, may not pervade in the way expected, or, indeed, may not be as relevant. Climate change is discussed, but the understanding of climate change is more local than the Western scientific understanding. I believe this is due to the interaction that those in Malawi have with the concept of climate change.

A common scientific view of climate change, which is associated to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, may be less relevant in Malawi because the idea of a lifestyle that produces a significant amount of greenhouse gases is unattainable for the majority of the population, as is the luxury to worry about one's carbon footprint. This is interesting when discussing responsibility, as from a climate justice perspective this would seem an ample opportunity to blame the West for mass industrialisation and emission of GHGs (Chatterton et al., 2013). For example, in 2012 (the most recent World Bank data available) the UK's GHG emission is over 25 times that of Malawi's (The World Bank, 2012), to say nothing of the many previous years of burning fossil fuels. However, the Government of Malawi did produce in 2016 a National Climate Change Management Policy that does discuss Malawi's GHG emission (Government

of Malawi, 2016). Indeed, this policy fits with how climate change is discussed in large international organisations, such as the UN and World Bank. There is reference to key conventions and protocols such as the Kyoto protocol (Government of Malawi, 2016: v). In this way the government is ensuring that Malawi is part of the global conversation on climate change. However, this policy and this international outlook was not present in the interviews, bar one exception.

Climate justice was not part of the approach of any of the interviewees, apart from in a non-direct way. It is recognised by one respondent that development projects related to climate change will receive more funding. Anthony highlights this

Anthony (NGO, 2017): 'when I was working in habitat, they wanted to be linking this with climate change, so we can get more funding and intervene in that sense'.

This suggests that the donor or international aid community may incorporate climate justice, but actually some of those who climate justice is for: those most vulnerable to climate change, do not feel the same sentiment. It is ironic that the concept of climate justice is not relevant in this section. It raises questions as to whether the concept of climate justice is more for the 'emitters' and their consciences rather than the vulnerable people bearing the brunt of climate change. However, climate activists were not specifically consulted in this research and the participants may not have been taking this focus. This reiterates the (ir)relevance of certain forms of knowledge in certain contexts. However, again, the lack of climate justice arguments present in my data, may be due to how the interviewees responded to me. They may not have felt I was the right audience to voice these concerns, as I was a young female PhD student, without connection to the organizations integral in climate justice.

This section has highlighted the varying levels of perspectives on reasons and responsibility for flooding. This is linked to responsibility and reasons for resettlement, as flooding is the cause of resettlement. The section has mainly focused on who or what those in NGOs and government view as responsible for the increasingly severe flooding. These views highlight how there are different levels of responsibility. Some in NGOs and government view those most vulnerable to flooding as those most responsible. This sets up a source of difference between the NGO and government representative and the members of the

vulnerable community. It is possible that disrespect may develop if the NGO or government worker believes they are responsible to provide solutions for a problem caused by community members. I explore the implications of this on resettlement in the following Results chapters. There were also those who viewed rural communities more generally as responsible, or the various systems and poverty in Malawi as responsible, which is a slightly less personal perspective, but does generalise the characteristics of those in flooding-vulnerable communities and removes agency from the individual. I focus heavily in this section and in the following chapter on the government and NGO perspective on flooding and resettlement. However, in Chapter 6 I will show a community perspective to resettlement and illustrate the power of local practices.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter provides context on which I will develop the following Results chapters. It sets the scene of increasing concern over flooding occurring in Malawi. This is due to the trend of increasing severity of flooding, which has led to the problematisation of flooding by the government and caused flooding to be viewed as a growing threat. This provides the visible space for government involvement in this area (Dean, 1999), thus legitimising government resettlement. This helps to answer the first research question by outlining the perceived trend in flooding in Malawi, and the impact of this perceived trend on patterns of movement and the growing desire to manage the movement.

The flooding related movements illustrate a further incentive for government involvement as well as the disconnect between government and NGOs and flooding-vulnerable communities. The community flooding related movements incurred, or resettlement, are discussed as habitual, a routine part of each community's behaviour. This implies that they were present before the flooding started to increase in severity but are ever more important now. Consequently, there is a desire by government to manage these flooding movements, to maintain control of the population and to use movement as a flood management strategy, through the process of *Resettlement*. However, the great variety within the existing movements could make this challenging and the lack of appreciation of this by government also opens up discussion about the disconnect between those in

government and NGOs, and those in flooding-vulnerable communities. This introduces the difference between *resettlement* and *Resettlement*, a key contribution of my research.

The chapter finally explores the perceived dynamics of responsibility involved in the increasingly severe flooding. There are varied appreciations of responsibility, highlighting the multiple viewpoints involved. However, there is a view that those in flooding-vulnerable communities are responsible for the increasingly severe flooding, even though those in government and NGOs view themselves as responsible for providing solutions for this. This further reiterates the disconnect in understandings and difference between those in government and NGOs and those in flooding-vulnerable communities. It also acts to legitimise government involvement in managing the movement, as it suggests that government does not view those in the flooding-vulnerable communities as capable. Therefore, this provides context for exploring the responsibility involved in resettlement, important for examining the governance of resettlement. With these factors in mind, I now turn, in Chapter 5, to focus on the government procedure and understanding of resettlement.

5. RESETTLEMENT: A TOP-DOWN SOLUTION TO FLOODING?

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I set the context of the problematisation of flooding in Malawi, leading to a growing government interest in resettlement. In this chapter, I will examine further the government approach to resettlement and the stated motivations behind it. I focus on answering research question 2: exploring how and why resettlement is used as a technique by the government and NGOs to manage the population and flooding in Malawi, with particular interest on the understandings of, and motivations for, resettlement; the methods used; and the influences on the government approach.

My research suggests that the Malawian government is attempting to manage flooding related movements through resettlement programs. However, due to the literature outlining the potential for resettlement to have ulterior motives (Arnall, 2018, Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019), I am interested in exploring further the motivations for this approach. There is existing literature exploring the changing attitude towards environmental hazards governance that suggests a change of approach to flooding, with a shift in focus away from the physical hazard, flooding, towards the people that are potentially impacted (Butler and Pidgeon, 2011). Butler and Pidgeon (2011) take a governmentality approach and suggest that this change in flood management in the UK context is part of a change in governance, which aims to make the citizens govern themselves. This shifts the responsibility to the individual, forming a neoliberal outlook. However, it is unclear whether this change in governance style is echoed in governance in Malawi, especially when there is a perception that those in the communities have limited capabilities, as set out in the previous chapter. Thus, as I also suggested in the previous chapter, there are several potential rationales for government resettlement, some of which I will explore in this chapter.

The novelty of resettlement means there is confusion over what it entails. Currently there is no official policy on resettlement but there is a draft in progress, see section 5.4. In order to better understand the current government approach to resettlement, I outline in section 5.2 the multiple understandings of resettlement that exist in Malawi and explore who

holds which understanding and why. This provides some further context for the governance of resettlement, as it explores the various motivations behind the interest in resettlement in Malawi. In section 5.3 I set out the disaster governance structure into which the resettlement process falls. I analyse the current tensions within this structure and its difficulty in unifying understanding, to further highlight the disconnect, introduced in the previous chapter, between government and NGOs and flooding-vulnerable communities. Finally, in section 5.4, I examine the attempt to unify these multiple understanding through the upcoming resettlement policy. I consider the reasons why the policy is coveted, highlighting the external influences and their potential implications.

5.2 Understandings of Resettlement

There are many ways in which resettlement can be framed and understood. Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) highlight how framings are influential in determining how something is governed. Therefore, before I explore the current and proposed future ways of governing resettlement, I will first outline the multiple understandings of resettlement. These understandings of resettlement provide a gateway to exploring the different motivations behind resettlement. The literature I set out in Chapter 2, suggests that government interest in resettlement is born out of a positive view of environmental migration as an opportunity, which comes from the framing of migration as adaptation to environmental change (Foresight, 2011). This encourages governments to think more proactively about environmental migration and to get involved in managing it (Foresight, 2011). However, this is quite an abstract motivation for resettlement. Four more analysable motivations highlighted in the literature (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019) are:

1. To better control a population: the government notices a change in their populations movements and wants to control it, resonating with a governmentality perspective.
2. Altruistic: the chief concern is the safety of a vulnerable population.
3. Economic: the most efficient option is to resettle the population.
4. Subject forming: the government would prefer if a population behaved in certain way and resettles them to encourage this behaviour. This fits in with the governmentality reasoning (Dean, 1999).

In this section, I will explore further how these motivations play out for the resettlement due to flooding in Malawi by analysing the different framings of resettlement present in this research.

To this end, I suggest my own four key framings of resettlement that came out of my data and are specific to this research. These are:

1. Resettlement as a good way to manage flooding.
2. Resettlement as either a permanent or temporary movement.
3. Resettlement as unattainable.
4. Resettlement as unhelpful in reducing the effects of flooding.

Each framing represents a different understanding of resettlement that was frequently favoured by particular actors in my study. In this section, I will discuss each framing in turn, looking at who advocates which framing, why and what this suggests about the motivations behind resettlement. As this chapter is focused on governance, I mainly discuss NGO and government viewpoints. Thus, the type of resettlement being considered is managed Resettlement, and not the organic resettlement set out in Chapter 4. However, I do outline when community members show a specific view on the forms of resettlement discussed.

5.2.1 Pro Resettlement

Two thirds of NGO and government employees interviewed viewed resettlement positively. This framing was mostly discussed by those in NGOs and government, as these were the actors that could facilitate it. Two thirds of those interviewed from Jombo, the resettled community, spoke of resettlement favourably because they had undertaken it, thus their discussion of it was retrospective. The other two communities studied were more reticent to discuss it favourably, with only three respondents from Mwalija and none from Nyachikadza keen to resettle at the time of interview. This was chiefly because they either lacked the resources to facilitate the movement, or they did not want to move. Therefore, in this subsection I mainly analyse the opinions of those in government and NGOs. Their pro-resettlement viewpoint links to the growing desire for a resettlement policy, to be discussed in section 5.4.

There were multiple ways in which those in NGOs and government viewed resettlement as helpful. Often it was discussed in relation to other flood management strategies. Indeed, four of the 21 government and NGO respondents viewed resettlement as one strategy that should work with other strategies to reduce the impact of flooding. This is shown by local government employee, Irvine:

Irvine (Government, 2017): 'It [resettlement] is one of the best options I admit but maybe it can work better if other approaches are also used, zoning, maybe we try to zone some areas, try to put up some structures that can withstand water, try to do some other things. So, it is like a package.'

The idea of resettlement being one option in a 'package' is common in development policy. Using multiple strategies to reduce the intricate impact of an event, is part of the move in development to be holistic and incorporate the 'messiness' of society (Briggs, 2005, Escobar, 2011). Indeed, within the 2015 Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy, set out in the Methodology, there are six priorities that are meant to work together, complement each other and mainstream disaster risk management into all sectors of government (Government of Malawi, 2015b). Having several approaches in a development projects allows for certain aspects that one viewpoint may not have considered (Escobar, 2011). Therefore, if done properly, the use of multiple strategies is viewed as a more inclusive form of development, creating an environment for both top down and bottom up approaches (Escobar, 2011). Following the motivations analysis outlined earlier, the fact that Irvine's approach to resettlement corresponds with common development policy could suggest economic and more altruistic motivations for Irvine's advocacy for resettlement (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). This is particularly because development has traditionally been economic and is ideally altruistic, although post-development literature does question this (Escobar, 2011). It is interesting that Irvine *admits* to resettlement being a good option. This implies that there is some reluctance or resistance to viewing resettlement as such. He could also be referring to the lack of up-take of resettlement projects in Malawi.

Not everyone agreed that resettlement works best as a 'package'. Five other government and NGO officials, such as local government employee, Keith, believe that it is best on its own:

Keith (Government, 2017): 'Now the only solution is for resettlement. I look at it as the only solution. These others are saying we are going to construct these houses to withstand issues to do with disasters, those might be short term measures, but to me I look at resettlement as a permanent solution.'

For Keith, as for the four others, resettlement is seen as the final goal in managing flooding. The argument here is that if there is no one inhabiting the area vulnerable to flooding then no one can be impacted. This echoes the argument of Johnson (2012) that advocates for permanent resettlement and is also reiterated by NGO employee Arthur:

Arthur (NGO, 2017): 'I don't think we can report any death because no one can move from the upland and rush to the flooding area because he just wants to see the floods.'

It is a clear-cut perspective: no people, no impact. The abruptness of this approach does not fit with the messiness in development suggested above, but does resonate with the desire for action and a clear solution, that is found in some governance literature (Manda, 2014). This approach has more notable altruistic motivations (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019), as the focus is on moving people away from the danger. As mentioned, thus far, the concentration has been on a government perspective. However, some in the resettled community held pro-resettlement views.

Jombo community members interviewed produced more practical motivations for their agreement with resettlement. For example, Leila says:

Leila (Jombo, 2017): 'Resettling is a good idea because it is a way of protecting one's life, because over there when there is flooding you also have maybe snakes coming, crocodiles, which can attack people. Whilst here, when it is raining, it is safe.'

The immediate, everyday benefits of resettlement come out clearly from interviews with members of this community. This could be because they are the ones living the situation. Moreover, Leila is from the community that has already resettled, which could be why she is in favour of resettlement. As mentioned, most interviewed from the other two communities studied were less favourable towards resettlements, which I will discuss later. First, I explore the type of resettlement preferred, permanent or temporary.

5.2.2 Permanent or Temporary?

Similar to the distinction in the literature outlined in Chapter 2 (Tadgell et al., 2018), there is a distinction in the data between permanent and temporary resettlement. Permanent resettlement is where one moves out of an area of settlement to settle elsewhere, with no intention of returning, and temporary involves a return to settle in the previous area (Bell and Ward, 2000). Permanent resettlement is often referred to as resettlement, sometimes relocation. Whereas temporary resettlement can be referred to by a wider variety of terms: resettlement, relocation, displacement, shifting, and even evacuation. Deliberations over whether resettlement needs to be permanent or temporary occurs mostly when assessing how resettlement should be managed. This is mainly the concern of those involved in the 'management' of resettlement: those in NGOs and government. Therefore, it is their views that I draw on below.

Permanent resettlement is how resettlement has traditionally been discussed and is often the first connotation attached to resettlement. Four Government and NGO respondents interviewed, such as NGO employee Arthur, view resettlement as permanent:

Arthur (NGO, 2017): 'resettlement is actually, leaving everything where you were and then starting a new life in the other area'.

Arthur illustrates that he views resettlement as constituting a clear break from the previous area, which reiterates the view outlined above that there is no risk to a population if there is no population at all in a vulnerable area (Johnson, 2012). If government or NGOs are involved, resettlement can also be part of a desire to control a populations' movements as the governing organisation is involved in moving a community permanently out of an area. This illustrates significant control over their movements. As I highlighted in the previous chapter, temporary movements already appear to be used to manage flooding by the communities but are often not accepted as sufficient by the government. Amongst other things that I will explore later, the fertility of the vulnerable area makes it hard for the members of rural communities to consider leaving permanently.

Nevertheless, as with the greater flexibility and openness to change apparent in the recent development discourse (Kindon et al., 2007), there is a growing flexibility attached to resettlement. Temporary forms of resettlement are also being considered by those in governance. In fact, temporary resettlement was much more popular with respondents, with 12 of the 21 government and NGO participants stating temporary resettlement is a good solution, and two stating that both temporary and permanent is needed. The following discussion with Chikondi illustrates the move to consider temporary resettlement:

Hebe (Researcher, 2017): 'OK, but is the relocation that you are advocating for, is it a permanent resettlement? Or is it a temporary relocation for the flood season'.

Chikondi (NGO, 2017): 'It is both ways. There are some people that have settled in some areas that are very, very prone to disasters, which permanent relocation is ideal. And there are some who are located in areas whereby maybe the disasters can just be temporal, yeah, the floods can just be temporal, and those people are the ones that we advocate when they see the signs, the early signs. They can temporarily move to evacuation centres. So, it is both ways'.

Here, Chikondi is highlighting that the context may make certain types of moves more appropriate. However, there is still some need for her to draw a distinction between a permanent and temporary move, with those being most affected requiring a permanent move out of the vulnerable area. This suggests that the chief concern for Chikondi is the safety of the vulnerable community, indicating her motivations behind the use of resettlement are altruistic (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). It is also interesting here that relocation is the term she prefers to use. As mentioned, relocation is more associated with a temporary movement as it does not incorporate the creation of a new settlement implied by the term 'resettlement'. However, she uses it to mean both a permanent and temporary move. This highlights the potential confusions over definition, and how the connotations of a word may not be the same for all actors involved.

A more fluid perspective on the use of temporary and permanent resettlement is also apparent in the data. For example, NGO employee Samson:

Samson (NGO, 2017): 'Of course, yes, in terms of dwelling houses, they need to move. In terms of farming they can still go and farm, because if they move as individuals still the land will be there. They can move to where they have resettled, go to the marshes, do their farming activities, go back home. So that when floods come, these people are safe, they are not vulnerable to floods'.

Samson, like Chikondi, recognises that people need to move their 'dwelling' out of the vulnerable areas. Indeed, his use of 'of course' suggests this is very clear to him. However, he also allows for the need to return to the previous area to maintain a livelihood. It should be noted that the focus on the individual in this quote does not fit with the importance of community that is suggested in the community interviews, as I particularly highlighted when discussing the situation at village Mwalija in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, the need to return to the previous area, does coincide with the type of movement that many in the communities identify with and with the opinion of almost two thirds the government and NGO respondents. Indeed, the ability to still use the vulnerable land for cultivation is central to many residing in vulnerable communities studied, and occurs in the resettled community, Jombo. Samson, therefore, indicates an understanding of the priorities for those in communities, which suggests he appreciates their understandings in the resettlement process.

Indeed, temporary resettlement, with access to the vulnerable area for farming is recognised by the national government as being the best compromise. It allows for the concerns of the community and for the concerns of those in governance to be addressed, as expressed by National Government DoDMA employee, Mtafu:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'Yeah, I think that one [temporary resettlement] at least the reluctance would be lower, because you can say, ok I can still use this land while saying you should move upland just during the rainy season to save lives and property, but when the rains have gone maybe in March, you can come down and do your winter cropping because that is a critical thing for them to do and that is their livelihood. And maybe later you can say to move permanently away, but just to kind of maintain the buy in, to motivate them we can still be using this one, to say no you are still entitled to this land but just use it for the production of crops this and that, but invest in your permanent home, maybe upland or somewhere safe'.

Mtafu shows an appreciation for the community residents' routine and livelihood. By suggesting that temporary resettlement would mean the 'reluctance would be lower', he highlights the importance of the community members being on board with the movement. Indeed, Stal (2011) has illustrated that a similar approach worked in Mozambique after their severe flooding in 2007, and that lack of consideration of the needs of those in the vulnerable communities, was the reason why the attempted resettlement did not work in Mozambique in 2001.

Mtafu also suggests, however, that this temporary movement is a steppingstone to a more permanent move later, which he implies is his preference, but not the preference of the communities. This suggests that he thinks he knows what is best for the communities, the ramifications of which I will explore further in Chapter 6. Mtafu is part of national government, and therefore his opinion is influential. Indeed, this approach of initial temporary resettlement, as a way 'to maintain the buy in' to resettlement, appears to be growing in popularity and seems to be the future direction for resettlement in this area of Malawi. Such an approach indicates an appreciation for the concerns and understandings of those in the community. Although, whether this is just to facilitate the resettlement more easily with the hope of a permanent move later is unclear. If that is the case, it suggests a more manipulative motive for appreciating the concerns of the community. It echoes the work of Tadjell et al. (2018) who suggest that the focus should not be on whether resettlement is permanent, but rather *how* to make resettlement permanent. Here Mtafu is highlighting his position of authority and 'greater knowledge' by suggesting that temporary resettlement is the way in which to make resettlement permanent later. It does not necessarily fit with the idea that in order for resettlement to be successful it needs to be participatory (Tadjell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015), as it shows there is some coercion involved. This suggests a form of governmentality, with the coercion of citizens for subject formation (Dean, 1999). This implies a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, that I will elaborate on in the next section on government structure. There are also those who are less positive about any option of resettlement.

5.2.3 Resettlement as Unattainable

The process of resettlement involves many challenges, which leads some to feel it is unattainable for them or others. Most who speak of resettlement in this manner, are referring to the lack of resources that are required to undertake the resettlement. This framing is apparent in discussions with all actors involved. However, it occurs differently at the community level and the NGO and government level.

On a community level the unattainable nature of resettlement is often associated with individual and community level poverty, which is prevalent in this region of Malawi. Six of the community respondents spoke specifically of the need of more resources in order to resettle. Martha illustrates the predicament faced by many in her community:

Martha (Mwalija 2017): 'I am not sure about what will happen because we are still living at a flood prone area and we do not have resources or a way to get resources so we can move out of a flood prone area, so we are at risk. We are still clinging to the area, yet it is because we lack resources.'

Martha's focus is on the lack of resources. She implies that this is trapping her into a particular area. This echoes the immobility paradox discussed in the Chapter 2: those most vulnerable to climate change are the least able to move out of vulnerable areas (Findlay, 2011). The immobility paradox portrays populations as trapped by their lack of resources and allows little agency to these vulnerable populations. However, the lack of resources is not the only aspect that is preventing the resettlement for those at village Mwalija, as I illustrated in Chapter 4, with the flooding water inhibiting movement, and as I will develop further in Chapter 6. The immobility paradox also brings in understandings of the cycle of deprivation (Findlay, 2011) which comes out of some community interviews.

Resettlement is seen as unattainable by some in communities due to the cycle of deprivation they experience (Findlay, 2011). Linked to the idea of the immobility paradox, is

the idea that due to flooding, the resources required to move become harder and harder to obtain (Findlay, 2011). Jacob describes this succinctly:

Jacob (Mwalija 2017): 'we will still be suffering because even when we plant, our crops are washed away and we tried this year to do some replanting, to take use of the residual moisture, but we do not produce much, we didn't harvest much, which means we are still going backwards, which means we do not see ourselves as getting money, which we can use to buy the materials which can help us relocate or resettle somewhere, which means we will continue suffering'.

Jacob's continuous use of 'which means' highlights the interconnected nature of their poverty. The continual washing away of their crops makes it impossible for them to save and resettle. This was a point that only came out of discussions with those from Mwalija. This could be because they were deciding whether to move and accept the NGO assistance with this.

The lack of resources is also seen to make resettlement unattainable by those in the government and NGOs. However, it is not discussed in the same manner as for the immobility paradox. The lack of resources is focused at the government level, not the individual or community level. Four of the 21 government and NGO interviews mention this. The emphasis is on the dependency on donor aid and the implications this can bring. For example, local government disaster officer, Keith says:

Keith (Government 2017): 'It is a question of, you know, provision of social amenities. Because you know we are overstretched in terms of resources. So, if of course we tell those people, the issue is if we move up there, how are you going to provide education facilities, health facilities, even water supply. Yeah so those are the issue which we get as feedback, when are you going to give us these social amenities, so we can move. ... That is why I am saying we are constrained by financial resources.'

Keith's focus is on social amenities. He is acknowledging that the government is obliged to provide the social amenities required and make the resettlement successful. Indeed, Stal (2011) highlights how, in Mozambique, when resettlement was attempted after severe flooding in 2001, without adequate provision of social amenities, it did not work, and people

returned to their flood vulnerable area. Whereas, the resettlement after severe flooding in Mozambique in 2007 was more successful because of better understandings and provisions of what the communities required (Stal, 2011). Yet, Keith highlights how, in the case of Malawi, the government is often ill equipped to fulfil this obligation. When discussing this, however, the blame is not placed on him, as a local government employee, or, indeed, on the local government itself, rather, Keith talks of being 'constrained by financial resources'. At no point in the interview does he discuss what could help with this. It is as if there is some external factor that is in charge of supplying the financial resources. This infers that funds are not making their way through the decentralisation process, highlighted in the introduction (Jagero et al., 2014), or just that there is a lack of funds in government. Therefore, the chain of responsibility and the blame for these resources goes higher. This could suggest a dependency on donor aid, which was raised in the previous chapter's discussions of responsibility, and which other scholars have recognised as an issue in Malawi (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018). This reliance on external assistance also resonates with the findings of Manda (2014) about the lack of strength of government, particularly due to resources, and the detriment this can have on disaster risk reduction. Thus, the lack of government resources raise questions as to whether resettlement would even be helpful as a strategy to managing flooding.

5.2.4 Resettlement as Unhelpful

Finally, there is the view that resettlement is actively unhelpful in reducing the impact of flooding. Resettlement can be viewed as unhelpful if there are not enough resources available to make it successful, as discussed above. It can also be viewed as unhelpful due to the need to officially change the place of permanent residency, even if time is spent between two residences. The discussion of resettlement as unhelpful mainly occurs at the community level, as it is chiefly about the nuances involved within community identity. However, there are some at the NGO level that appreciate these nuances and discuss them also.

Some people in communities do not want to be labelled with the official status of being resettled. As Sophia suggests this is connected to the idea that resettlement is permanent and requires a formal change in residence, which entails complications.

Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'I don't entertain issues of resettlement, even if the government says it may be providing social amenities to that area which we should resettle. I am not interested because here [TA Ndamera] we only stay two to three months and then we go back. So, to me, Nyachikadza is my place, I don't want to resettle.'

It appears that Sofia believes that to resettle, a person has to be physically cut off from their current home area and due to this, their identity. Three quarters of respondents from Nyachikadza directly illustrated similar strong attachments to Nyachikadza. The fact that spending two to three months in the upper land is not viewed as a form of resettlement highlights the multiple perspective on resettlement, as this could be defined as a temporary form of resettlement (Johnson, 2012). However, the organic, informal nature of the movement prevents it from taking that label. This again sets up the difference between Resettlement and resettlement outlined in the Chapter 4.

Thus, what is of importance is the official movement and change of identity that is associated with Resettlement. Yosef reiterates this:

Yosef (Nyachikadza 2017): 'I don't want to lose the status that I am somebody from Nyachikadza, because when I come here people will be confusing that I am a person from Ndamera [the area in the upper land that they relocate to]'.

His Nyachikadza status is crucial to Yosef, the status is connected to access to his land and for many in Nyachikadza, land is their most prized possession. For Sofia and Yosef, as for the all those interviewed from Nyachikadza, resettlement means changing their status to belonging to the upper land. At least two thirds of those interviewed from Nyachikadza actively did not want to change their status. This is unsurprising as I was made aware by district government officials, such as my two translator and seven of the NGO and government officials

interviewed that this is the community that is publicly known to be unwilling to resettle. It reiterates statements from the previous chapter, which highlighted the importance of this community's attachment to place (Raymond et al., 2010a). However, as I also have established, moving to the upper land for two to three months, which many Nyachikadza residence undertake to avoid flooding, is considered by some in NGOs and government as a form of temporary resettlement. This again highlights the difference seen between official Resettlement, and informal community-led resettlement.

There is a mismatch of perceptions of resettlement and what it entails. One NGO employee, Anthony, argued that this miscommunication of what resettlement is may hinder its helpfulness. He highlighted how there may be challenges in changing people's perception of what resettlement is:

Anthony (NGO, 2017): 'It [resettlement] is viable, but at the same time we were looking at people that in terms of their economic status, having two houses is not as simple as it sounds, so OK, they can build a permanent house in the upper land and go down to the lower land for farming and the like but I think the problem with that, now the people giving away the land they don't see the need to, because you are giving away land to someone who will end up having two houses so I think, having another house, or another type of shelter where we are saying you should move. So, I think the way of maybe compromising I am talking about, is they can have that land where they have the housing and yeah, they can have even the farming land, but it shouldn't be a place where they have shelter there, a proper house there.'

Here, Anthony emphasises how obtaining land for a second house could be problematic. If resettlement is to occur with the help of the government and NGOs, it would most likely involve a negotiation for a second area of land. Yet there is limited land in Malawi, with most land belonging collectively to a community. It is therefore hard to argue the case for one community to give up some land for another community to use for their second homes. This is a practical consideration of how realistic resettlement is. Anthony was the only respondent to bring this up and this may be because many people do have two forms of housing, but this appears to have happened organically and gradually, with more and more acquiring two forms of shelter. This form of acquiring land for a second home has not been the product of

an organised resettlement established by the government, which suggests that currently, particularly when there is inadequate communication, resettlement is achieved more easily when independent of external involvement. It connects to the situation at Jombo where land was found for the community formally and they still face problems over this land two years on from the resettlement.

This section highlights how the notion of resettlement in Malawi currently is confused. There are many ways that resettlement can be seen as useful to managing flooding as well as a hindrance. Much of this is because resettlement is a relatively new approach to managing flooding. This was established in the previous chapter and is apparent in the fact that the official policy for resettlement is still under consideration and yet to be released. Six of the 21 government and NGO participants specifically comment on the novelty of resettlement, with four of these being the most influential national and local government officials interviewed. NGO worker Kenneth provides a relevant summary of the how the interest in disaster management evolved:

Kenneth (NGO, 2017): 'if you go back, in the early 1990s, the main issue was HIV and AIDS, from there, there was the issue of food security, but now I think the issue of disaster is one of the main priorities of the government and NGO community'.

Thus, it is only recently that there has been an interest in disasters and in resettlement in particular. Changing one's settlement, even just for a few months a year, is complicated and it is unsurprising that there are multiple views on the potential success and use of resettlement. There also appear to be a variety of motivations for resettlement, most appear to be altruistic in nature although there are more economic and population controlling motivations visible (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019, Arnall, 2018). The data suggests that those in national government perhaps have more of an agenda in trying to control the populations movements than those in NGOs, this is unsurprising as they are more directly involved in determining how to manage resettlement. Potentially highlighting a form of governmentality, as government may want to manage resettlement to ensure control over a population's movements (Death, 2013).

It is unsurprising that different actors view resettlement differently depending on their involvement with resettlement, whether they are managing or undertaking it. This highlights the importance of who is seen as a 'manager' and an 'undertaker'. Indeed, the very fact that two factions: manager and undertaker, come out is interesting in itself, as it signifies a hierarchy and difference in the process, which I suggested in the discussion of responsibility in the previous chapter. It connects to power dynamics present in development, with Western NGOs, particularly large organisations like the World Bank, viewed as more knowledgeable than those in vulnerable communities, potentially of those in government (Goldman, 2004, Ferguson, 1994, Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Escobar, 2011, Li, 2007). I explore this further in the next section, where I analyse how Malawi's government currently tries to unify the confusion over resettlement through their disaster governance structure, and the implications this involves.

5.3 Malawi's Disaster Governance Structure

As I established above and in the previous chapter, resettlement is increasingly seen as a way to manage flooding. However, whilst the resettlement policy is being developed, there is as yet no specific policy for resettlement. Instead it falls within flood management, which is part of disaster risk management in the official structure of the Malawian government (Government of Malawi, 2015b). In order to better understand the resettlement process in Malawi at the time of research, it is important to appreciate the structure into which its governance falls. The governance structure under discussion is part of broader disaster risk management and not specific to resettlement. This is significant when understanding the rationale behind it, as it is set up to manage all disaster related issues. Resettlement fits within three of the six priority areas of the DRM Policy. These are: the promotion of a culture of safety, and adoption of resilience-enhancing interventions; the reduction of underlying risks; and the strengthening preparedness capacity for effective response and recovery (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 5). The DRM Policy was directly referred to sparsely in the interviews, however, the relevance of the governance structure came out in over half of all the interviews. Throughout this section many of the quotes refer to the resettlement process, as this was the focus of the interviews, but the emphasis in this section is on what the data is suggesting about the structure of governance more specifically.

The structure shows how actors are positioned in terms of their official governance responsibility and importance. This highlights where power is allocated in determining the process of resettlement. Thus, in this section I explore the implications of the governance structure, as well as opening up the tension between official structure and practice, and the disconnect between actors. The tensions highlighted impacts people's trust of the government, which is explored in the final subsection and is influential in the next chapter.

5.3.1 Official Governance Structure of Disasters

The official governance structure of disasters was articulated in three quarters of the interviews with those in government and NGOs. It is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5.1. This diagram was shown unprompted in the interviews several times by government officials working on disaster management. It is freely available in the 2015 DRM Policy, available here: https://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/43755_malawidrmpolicy2015.pdf. The readiness and eagerness to show this diagram arguably illustrates the pride felt about the disaster management structure by government employees.

The structure is made up of several committees. The top part of Figure 5.1, up until the District Civil Protection Committee (DCPC), are the centralised committees that are based in the capital, Lilongwe. From the DCPC onwards are the local committees, dependent on the specific district, area (traditional authority, TA) and village. The TA and village level have customary leadership, whereas those at the district level are run by local government. The committee structure is part of facilitating the decentralisation process in Malawi, enabling the local government to have increasing influence in determining their district's priorities (Jagero et al., 2014). Many from the interviews highlight the importance of the local committees in facilitating communication and the full participation of those involved.

The linear set up of the diagram, suggests a hierarchy to the system. The cabinet is at the top. The technical sub-committees all appear on the same level, however, below them, from the district level downwards, the committees seem to be separated from the top by the technical sub-committees. This hierarchy can be seen in the way the structure is discussed by government. This hierarchy provides a basis for the perceived hierarchy to knowledge

discussed and explained further throughout the Results and visible in Figure 5.2. I purposefully place Figure 5.2, illustrating the perceived hierarchy of knowledge next to the committee structure to highlight how they may be connected. The key difference is that the disaster management structure has two-way arrows to suggest that communication flows both ways and participation is aimed for. This does come out from the interviews, as I explore below. Indeed, the committee structure does not appear to happen in practice exactly as it is set out in Figure 5.1. I will endeavour to show in the remainder of the Results how this is the case and the potential implications of this.




Figure 5. 1 Malawi's National Disaster Risk Management Institutional Structure. Source – Malawi's Disaster Risk Management Policy, 2015, P10 available: https://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/43755_malawidrpm2015.pdf




Figure 5. 2 Perceived hierarchy of knowledge in the resettlement process

i. Formed through my research analysis

The official structure of the governance of disasters is split between centralised aspects of governance and newly decentralised aspects of governance. Nearly half of the participants from government and NGOs commented on the importance or utility of the committee structure. A full description of the structure can be found in pages 10-11 of the 2015 DRM policy (Government of Malawi, 2015b), however in this section I am more interested in illustrating how the structure is viewed by the participants. Mtafu, a national DoDMA (Department of Disaster Management Affairs) government official, highlights well the central government stance on the structure:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'We have the national disaster risk management institutional structure. So, it is starting with cabinet, ministers and the like, then we have a committee made up of permanent secretaries, we call them principle secretaries here. Then below it we have a technical committee, then within it we have the technical sub-committees, some of these sub-committees are also functioning as clusters, you know like the UN, like the way we have clusters you know water, sanitation, hygiene, education and the like. ...

We have local structures, committees, so we have the village head, the village civil protection committee, the area civil protection committee, so these are the structures that are already there. So, they take up these issues [about disasters risk reduction] and they take them to the district council. Normally for us, we are at the central, the headquarters here [Lilongwe]. So, it is more like policy, guidance and the like. Because of the challenges of resources at that district council level, that is why maybe some cases, we are still handling some cases from this office, from the central, but ideally with the decentralisation that is happening we are supposed to, these councils are supposed to be fully equipped with resources to manage'

Mtafu's expansion of the diagram above highlights subtle clues in how he, in his position in DoDMA, central government, views this structure. Firstly, his acknowledgement that 'we call them principle secretaries here' implies that this structure is based on a more general structure, which is elaborated further when he refers to how their technical sub-committees are 'like the clusters in the UN'. It becomes clear that this is a structure taken from an external international organisation, the UN, suggesting an international influence. This is not that surprising as the development of the 2015 DRM policy was funded by UNDP (Government of Malawi, 2015b). It highlights the infiltration of Western, technocratic understandings into Malawian disaster management. Mtafu's reference to it also suggests that he is proud of it, and that it gives Malawi's structure greater legitimacy to me, the Western interviewer. This

highlights how the top form of knowledge in the perceived hierarchy of knowledge is sourced from large international organisations, such as the UN and the World Bank, as represented in Figure 5.2. However, it also shows how these technocratic forms of governance can mix with Malawian understandings through the decentralisation process and the attempt to incorporate village level views. This reiterates the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 2010b) as well as the different scales that knowledge can work through. I will nuance this further in Chapter 6.

Secondly, Mtafu highlights issues with the decentralised aspect of governance. Mtafu illustrates how this structure builds on customary structures '*already there*' showing how the government includes local forms of governance. However, despite this being the key part of the structure discussed in the interviews, it appears to be the aspect Mtafu is least happy with. It could suggest that he views those at the district level as inferior, reiterating the hierarchy suggested by the diagram in Figure 5.1 and set out in the hierarchy of knowledge in Figure 5.2. Or it may just be referring to the lack of resources available at this level, which was also commented on by the two local disaster officers interviewed. The different forms of governance, both central and local, present in the structure, highlight the potential for contrasting opinions on the process of resettlement. Moreover, the committee structure seems to allow for different opinions to be made in different committees, but it is unclear exactly how well these opinions are communicated to and received by the other committees.

Crucial to the success of this structure, therefore, is the flow of communication and the perceived accurate representation of those involved. The initial fabric (the disaster governance structure) of the resettlement process, with the inclusion of multiple committees of various actors, suggests that different knowledges are allowed for (Government of Malawi, 2015b). I will discuss whether and how this occurs in practice throughout the Results. The DRM 2015 policy sets out that the structure is designed to facilitate a chain of communication between those in the villages all the way to those in the cabinet (Government of Malawi, 2015b). It illustrates how participation is implicit in the resettlement process, despite no participants specifically stating it, participation is de rigour in development practices and is expected as the norm in a country reliant on donor aid (Mohan, 2007). The aim of this thesis is to explore how apparent participation is in the resettlement process understudy in Malawi.

This will be particularly relevant for the next chapter. However, despite what is suggested by the two way arrows in Figure 5.1, a quarter of the NGO and government respondents spoke of the flow of communication as one directional, top down. This is highlighted by local government disaster officer Keith:

Keith (Government, 2017): 'These structures [civil protection committees] tend to work hand in hand. So, we coordinate those structures and brief them and this time we have resources from department of disaster management affairs to go down and brief these structures about the weather pattern.'

Keith shows that the way he views the flow of information is from the top 'down' to the 'structures', to inform them about the upcoming weather patterns. This highlights the way he views the role of these structures: to allow for easier communication to those in the villages. It is a top-down measure. This suggests that the structure could be a technique of governance to ensure government control and management of the population, illustrating the fourth key foci of governmentality (population control) as set out by Dean (1999) and Death (2013) independently. However, there is little about the importance of hearing the views of those in the villages, which is significant given that Keith is a local government disaster officer, and so is in the middle of the chain of communication. It is also what other scholars have found as important in disaster management (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019). Keith should, technically, be perfectly poised for hearing the views of those in the villages and communicating them to the national government. Yet he does not suggest this. Whilst this was explicit in a quarter of the government and NGO interviews, there was only one direct contradiction to this, in which a national red cross officer highlighted how the process worked both ways. This is a key reason why there is only one direction in the perceived hierarchy of knowledge represented in Figure 5.2.

Despite the unidirectional flow of information, two of the 49 community members interviewed appear happy with how the committees work. Samuel, community member from Nyachikadza highlights how he views the role of the committees:

Samuel (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'We have a very good chain, from my side we receive a report from council directly, even my phone, the boss has my phone, not only phone, we have all information address and so on. If they hear some new message there, we have

the information. They try to sensitise us, and we take that information and give to VCPC [village civil protection committee] members. We have climate change, meteorological message, on the phone, not only me but all the members of the committee on the phone, on the office as well as council. Each and everything happening we must have the chain.'

Samuel shows how he uses the committees, in this case particularly the VCPC to spread early warning information to those who need it. Indeed, the effectiveness of this, through the use of technology, such as mobile phones, causes Samuel to proclaim it is a 'very good chain of communication'. Two other community members mentioned the use of phones in spreading information through the committee system. However, again there is a sense that the information is coming to them, and they are not providing information the other way. He refers to 'the boss', implying they are the authority in this situation. This perpetuates the difference in knowledge implied by the structure: those in government have the knowledge *needed* by those in the villages, as indicated in the perceived hierarchy of knowledge, Figure 5.2. This sets up a dependency on the government for the information, and the sharing of the information, perpetuating the top-down approach to governance. Therefore, whilst the structure may allow for different knowledges, it also accentuates the differences between them and appears to impose a hierarchy on them.

This perceived hierarchy of knowledge by those in government and NGOs, set out in Figure 5.2, suggests that large international organisations and donors are on top, due to their control of the funding. The government is below, followed by local government and smaller NGOs, which in this case incorporates country offices of international NGOs. The NGOs can be influenced directly by larger international organisations and donors, due to the funding possibilities they provide, therefore there is an arrow connecting the international organisations and donors to NGOs. The vulnerable communities are at the bottom. This corresponds to discussions in development over the power dynamics of those assisting the vulnerable communities (Escobar, 2011). The very fact that a community is seen as vulnerable means they are viewed as unable to deal with a situation on their own and require assistance (Li, 2007, Adger, 2006) linking in with the discussion in the responsibility section of the previous chapter. If the government or an NGO is able to provide that assistance, this can make them appear as more capable, putting them high up the hierarchy, see Figure 5.2. As Li's (2007) work highlighted this assistance is meant improve the community, with those

assisting in charge of the improvement. There is much discussion about this in the development literature (Goldman, 2004, Ferguson, 1994, Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Escobar, 2011, Li, 2007), which is mainly referring to international involvement. Yet, it is also relevant when discussing the government's involvement as well. It suggests that the government needs to provide the dominant narrative, a key aspect of governmentality (Death, 2013, Dean, 1999). As I will highlight further below and in Chapter 6, this hierarchy does not produce the inclusive atmosphere necessary in voluntary resettlement, advocated for in the resettlement guidelines (Wilmsen and Rogers, 2019).

Despite the suggested top down nature of the structure, the four key national (from DoDMA and the Ministry of Housing) and local (Disaster Officers) government employees suggest that the governance structure provides the representation required for successful resettlement. This is also apparent in the 2015 DRM policy's description of the committee structure, which emphasises how the many committees allows all sectors and stakeholders to be actively involved in the process (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 11). Local government disaster officer Charles, explains the levels of representation involved:

Charles (Government, 2017): 'We make sure that all the relevant community representatives should be part and parcel of the committee, like the business representatives, the community policy forum representative, umm youth representative, red cross volunteer, the primary school advisor in that particular community, agricultural development officer or extension worker, the health surveillance assistance ought to be part of that particular committee and even the water monitoring assistance, social welfare assistance, um there are many, there are many, normally they are part and parcel of the civil protection committee at tier level.'

Charles illustrates all the different representatives that make up the civil protection committee. He is thinking on the spot and the emphasis he places on the variety involved is evident. It suggests that at government level they feel they are, or at least they should be, widely representing the communities. Additionally, much of the discussion has been about the relationship between government and communities with little talk about NGO actors, yet Charles indicates that NGO workers are involved:

Charles (Government, 2017): 'most of the extension workers are part and parcel of such committees, ... and even the volunteers, the red cross volunteers, are also part and parcel of the committees'.

Extension workers here refers to anyone involved outside of government and the communities, he stresses that this includes volunteers. This is interesting because it implies it is unnecessary to be an official employee of an NGO for an opinion to be valued in this structure. The inclusion of NGOs within the committees was apparent in two NGO interviews. Yet, the governance structure is not commented on much by those in NGOs apart from the frustration some feel towards the inefficiency of government to fulfil their role and provide adequate guidance to NGOs, to be discussed later. There are also those in the communities that do feel less appreciative of the current structure.

A fifth of all the community members interviewed directly referred to the inadequate representation they felt in the governance structure, and half of these commented on the lack of appreciation of the power dynamics within communities. Apart from the two community members that praised the committee structure, the remaining community members commented on the use of committees in an indifferent manner, highlighting the lack of influence and reach these committees held in the communities. Jombo community member, Phillip explains how he felt about the committee structure:

Phillip (Focus Group, Jombo, 2017): 'Everything was left in the hands of the VCPC [village civil protection committee] where none here is a member. We had nobody to represent us at that forum'.

He is part of the resettled community at Jombo, which is meant to be integrated into a host community, but which they feel they have little representation in. The lack of representation felt by some raises questions into whose agenda is being followed, as they clearly feel it is not theirs. Nyachikadza resident, Kelvin explains how differing agendas within the structure foster problems:

Kelvin (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'We [the people of Nyachikadza] are able to communicate with the NGOs or the government through traditional leaders, so if government wants something or NGOs wants something they pass it through the traditional leaders, chiefs, community structures like committees within our community and pass the message to

the community and then the feedback goes the following way. ... That is not the best way to communicate because these chiefs do have more power in their communities, so they just take whatever they want. So, the best way is that there are some committees at the gvh [village] level, like civil protection committee, it would be proper if our issues relating disaster management would pass through the VCPC and the ACPC and the TA [area chief] just advises and is not a member.'

Kelvin illustrates how including chiefs in the committees is problematic. Interestingly, Kelvin does discuss feedback going 'the following way' along the chain of communication, which was not clear from many of the interviews, as discussed above. Although, the lack of focus on this could suggest he does not attach much importance to it. Kelvin's focus is that the chiefs in the committees have an agenda, which may not represent the rest of the community. This suggests there is mistrust of those in positions of power: that they may not use their power for the good of their subjects, but for the good of themselves. This resonates with the findings of Ferguson (1994) who suggested that the involvement of the IMF in Lesotho, was primarily to further the capitalist system, which may or may not assist the vulnerable population. This finding has been echoed in various ways in the literature several times since 1994 (Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Scott, 2008, Goldman, 2004). In this instance, the issue of mistrust highlights how there is a difference between what the official structure is meant to implement and what happens in practice. This is particularly due to the ambitious attempt to include multiple different actors and knowledges in the structure, despite a hierarchy of knowledge, which is not openly acknowledged or fully allowed for in the structure. I explore the mismatch and the mistrust further below.

5.3.2 Mismatch Between Official Structure and Practice

In the first subsection, I explored the parameters of the official governance structure of disaster management, and the use of committees at varying levels as a key governance technique. However, there appears to be a mismatch between what the official structure sets out to facilitate and what happens in practice. Much of this is associated with a feeling of ill-representation, discussed above, and lack of understanding between those in communities and those in government and NGOs. Much of the narrative that highlights this is centred on resettlement, as the questions were focused on this. However, in this section the purpose of

the quotes is to illuminate the mismatch between structure and practice and not to infer specifically about the resettlement process. This mismatch is mainly seen in the relationship between those in government and those in communities, but it also occurs between those in communities and NGOs. It reiterates the disconnect between these actors, suggested in the previous chapter.

The interviews suggested that there was a disconnect between those in government and those in the communities. Within each community there is one particular issue where confusion was presented. At Jombo, it was the issue of whether they belonged under their previous or current village head. This was mentioned by at least half those interviewed from Jombo and means that they can slip through the structure and not be represented by either village's civil protection committee. I explain this further in the next chapter. Those at village Mwalija illustrate how communication has broken down between them and the NGO that is meant to be assisting them. Protocol dictates that this NGO should go through the committee structure, but this does not appear to be working. I elaborate on that example in this section. Finally, in Nyachikadza there is the issue of the no-go zone and the government technically not recognising Nyachikadza excepts when it suits them, as I expand on below. Gloria synthesis a common sentiment to come out of all of these situations:

Gloria (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'they are failing to understand, government is failing to understand them, and they are failing to understand government'.

Interestingly Gloria puts the failing of understanding on both parties involved: the government and those in the communities, not allocating blame. Gloria's view does suggest however, that there is miscommunication occurring and that the governance structure is not working as planned. Gloria is from Nyachikadza, the community that opposes the government's persistent calls for them to resettle. Thus, it is unsurprising that this relationship comes across as discordant. In the next chapter, I will explore further how the Nyachikadza community resist government.

The particular relationship between those in government and those in TA Nyachikadza is complicated further by the contradicting behaviour expressed by the government. This is explained by Peter who is the only Nyachikadza interviewee to mention it:

Peter (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'it seems those NGOs whilst they do take on whatever the people of Nyachikadza want, they don't deliver. On top of that it seems that even government says that NGOs should not go that side to the people of Nyachikadza with social service for this side. It seems somehow tricky cos when it comes to election time that is when the government follows the people of Nyachikadza to Nyachikadza for their votes.'

Peter highlights that whilst the government declares that Nyachikadza is a no-go zone in terms of aid, when it comes to the elections, the government is willing to come to their area. This is not specifically with reference to the structure of disaster governance, however, it is related and does deliver a conflicting message to the people of Nyachikadza. The government involvement at election time suggests that the government are just engaging with them to further their own interests. Peter implies they are left feeling disrespectful to the government. Whilst no other interviewee mentioned this, I was made aware of it informally by an NGO employee in Nsanje after an interview, he was discussing the difficulties and hypocrisies of the no-go zone but did not want them officially recorded. Nyachikadza is not the only community to suggest an inharmonious relationship with external influencers.

Over a quarter of those interviewed at Village Mwalija exhibited frustration at waiting for Bongo to return. Two community members took this frustration further to suggest a lack of consultation with the community, particularly before the government and NGO decided the new place for resettlement, which led to funds being misspent. In an environment where funds are limited, misspending is particularly frustrating. Community member, Jacob, elaborates:

Jacob (Mwalija, 2017): 'Those NGOs that want to help here should also be coming here to ask for our views instead of maybe making their plans at a district level and then come here to drill the boreholes at this place and this place, but we would prefer those should be coming here and say where should we drill boreholes? So, the community here, the ACPC, DCPC, should be sitting down and making that decision.'

Jacob highlights the lack of respect that develops from undertaking a procedure without the consultation of the village members through the channels set out in the disaster governance structure. He shows his frustration by saying what the NGOs *should* do or what they, the community members, would *prefer* them to do. The fact that he has ideas of how NGOs should behave and the lack of consultation he feels they received prior to the procedure, again raises questions over how different knowledges are perceived and prioritised. Jacob's comments suggest that the views and knowledge of those in communities is not respected or seen as relevant in the disaster governance structure and consequently the resettlement process. This reiterates the hierarchy of knowledge, previously discussed, and how those in NGOs can be seen as more knowledgeable, the improvers (Li, 2007). However, the other side of this situation, seen from the NGO involved suggests the miscommunication is the fault of the community.

The NGO involved with village Mwalija suggests there is a high level of consultation with those in the community, which does not come out from the community interviews. This raises questions as to why there are contrasting opinions. Jake shows the NGO opinion on how the process of communication with village Mwalija works:

Jake (NGO, 2017): 'During all these forums we had the councillor, we had the TA, we had the chief of the village, and us despite we are here in Blantyre but there is an assembly [council], Chikwawa district assembly, which we are working with, and then the link between the community, and the assembly and us is [the disaster officer] and also maybe this is a long chain but there, there is a ward councillor and also a chief who had all this information to say once as a community you are ready about these issues a TA is there, we are waiting for you. ... and from there if the old councillor is not giving them readily information is to go to the assembly, the Chikwawa district assembly, to say this is our position, we are decided. OK, and then we take it [the resettlement opinion], because we didn't want to push, but now we wanted to give a platform for them to realise the dangers of the floods, that them themselves experienced and if this situation shall happen again, we shall be in a very big problem, with the climate change and all that.'

Jake is reiterating all the levels of communication available to those in the community and within the disaster governance structure. He is keen to point out the local level of communication, that of the ward councillor (village spokesperson), the TA (area chief), and

the district council. These points of contact between the NGO and the community appear to be those in leadership roles, which enables the power dynamics and ulterior agendas discussed earlier to be apparent. This calls into question the level of communication that occurs, as it is just with the key leaders, which is not addressing the issues with communication raised in the previous paragraphs. Jake is specifically referring to the community members letting his NGO know when they are ready to resettle. For according to the NGO, they were waiting on the community to let them know, and according to five of the 16 interviewed from the community they were waiting on the NGO to come and help them resettle. This suggests a miscommunication between the NGO and the community members and the disaster governance structure not working as planned.

Jake strongly advocates that the aim of the NGO is to let the community come to the decision themselves without interference. This shows a level of respect for local knowledge and understandings rare in other comments from local government officials and NGO employees. However, there is also a lack of acknowledgement of the agenda of key players involved. When so much power of communication is placed on a few key actors, such as the TA or ward councillor, it raises questions as to whether they may have reasons for disrupting the negotiations (Chiweza, 2007, Eggen, 2011). Indeed Eggen (2011) highlights how the parallel forms of indirect rule from chiefs and direct rule from the state has led to a dual state in Malawi, which is beneficial for those able to engage in both. However, it can also lead to a vacuum of governance particularly with regards to civil rights for vulnerable populations (Eggen, 2011). The complicated interplay of different knowledges is ill allowed for by the structure, and the problems this can bring, can also be seen by comments made by government officials.

There was a suggestion by a third of those in government and NGOs that the clash of different knowledges, scientific and local, can cause problems with the governing structures and led to mistrust. This was discussed in regard to early warning systems, as well as views on resettlement, particularly community's reticence to resettle. Local government disaster officer, Charles illustrates this at length:

Charles (Government, 2017): 'something that I may specifically put forward to you, these communities have got their own indigenous knowledge, and their institutional memory was something like against what had been forecasted by Met [Meteorological Office of Malawi]. In the sense that, when Met had forecasted ... that possible from November, December, January, we would receive maybe too much rainfall in the high region which may cause flooding in the low-lying areas, the communities thought it otherwise, according to their institutional memory to say, no, in Chikwawa, normally floods occur maybe March, not normally December, January as being put forward by the department of metrological services, so maybe it will be business as usual, they will lie again to us.

Because initially the challenges we were experiencing, it was about even getting accurate information from the department of meteorological services, they would say tomorrow it will rain heavily, please carry the umbrellas, and the opposite would happen. So even the issue of trust, by the communities was not there but I would say since 2012,13,14 they have improved, whatever they happen to issue out as a weather bulleting, or a season forecast, it really happens as it has been forecasted.'

Charles shows how there can be a clash between local knowledge structures and the scientific knowledge. He explains how previous inaccurate reporting led to mistrust in the scientific information from the meteorological department and how this coupled with the information being contra to local knowledge led to people not adhering to the early warning forecasting for the severe 2015 floods. This highlights how for the governance structure to work there needs to be a degree of trust in all levels of the structure (Manda, 2014). Whilst it is possible to put an official structure in place, it cannot achieve its goals when there is a lack of trust, belief, or respect at any stage of the structure. This goes both ways and is not just a lack of trust, belief, or respect of government but also of those in NGOs and in communities. This is not always apparent. Kalanda-Joshua et al. (2011) found that the rural population in Mulanje, Malawi, were sceptical of the official forecasts because they did not include indigenous techniques of forecasting, indicating that they found a lack of trust at both the government level, with the lack of inclusion of indigenous methods, and at the community level, of the scientific forecasts. Indeed, the way that Charles juxtaposes the information from the Met Office with the 'indigenous' knowledge, suggests that he views them as producing different results, with the Met Office information ultimately being the one that should be viewed. Thus, he clearly distinguishes and prioritises knowledge, reiterating the perceived hierarchy to knowledge in this process.

5.3.3 Mistrust of the Governance Structure

The mistrust apparent in the data is mainly from the community members towards the government. There is a belief that the government disaster structure is in place to enable the government to fulfil their own agendas. This was discussed in relation to prospective resettlement and it is therefore only apparent within communities that have yet to resettle: Nyachikadza and Mwalija. Six respondents from these two communities spoke of specific suspicions. The key element of suspicion is over land. There is suspicion that the government wants to take their land and profit from it themselves, due to its fertility. Sofia sets this out clearly:

Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'I am pessimistic of why the government wants us to relocate. I have some sense that the government wants to use our land for some other use. I do not know what, but I think government wants to use our area, because of maybe its fertility.'

Sofia highlights a vague mistrust of the government's motives. She cannot specify her mistrust, which implies an overall disconnect with the government. It is clear she does not feel the government is on her side, that their priorities are not aligned. It also highlights the importance that some community members place on their land. The importance of land in many African societies has been extensively studied, especially with regard to ongoing land reforms (Boone, 2007). The land is the community's livelihood and it is unsurprising there is protectiveness over it.

The importance of land comes out strongly from 14 of the 49 community interviews. Shadreck, in the focus group discussions at Mwalija also shows an example of the kind of protectiveness discussed:

Shadreck (Focus Group, Mwalija, 2017): 'sometimes we feel that if organizations are telling us to move then they have got an interest on our land. Sometimes this is the reason the communities opt for shifting [temporary relocating for a short time] during rainy season rather than resettling'.

The protectiveness suggests that these communities have more of a connection to the land itself than to the government, which raises questions over feelings of identity and nationality. This quote also raises again the importance of definitions and perceptions of resettlement discussed above. Shadreck suggests there is a difference between shifting and resettling, particularly in terms of the permanency attached to it. Chiefly, this quote shows that these community members feel a strong connection to the land they inhabit, again reiterating the attachment to place apparent (Raymond et al., 2010a). Their connection to the land takes priority in their decisions, particularly over government advice. This could be due to the parallel forms of governance occurring with different priorities, or at least miscommunicated priorities and motivations for resettlement (Eggen, 2011). The customary forms of governance at the local level, in which the land is paramount, overrides the state government and could contribute to a disregard and disconnect to the state level of governance. It suggests that the current structure, or perceived knowledge hierarchy (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2), do not allow for proper communication between actors.

The connection to land can breed mistrust not only with the government but also with neighbours and multinational companies. This was apparent in four of interviews from Mwalija and Nyachikadza. Frances elaborates:

Frances (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'there are rumours that if government locates us to upper-lands. It wants this area to cultivate sugar cane. So, with that rumour people are resisting to relocate. So, for others that are willing to relocate, it is challenging for them to find a piece of land in TA Ndamera [neighbouring area] because people do take into account that these people have no-where to go so they charge a big price to acquire that land. So, if government could acquire that big land to say that whoever wants should only go there and build his house then people would change their mind and go to that place. But looking at Nyachikadza area no one should tamper with that land because it is our own land and if we move to the upland our cultivation would always be done in the low area. The land, which is here should be owned by us, no one should come there.'

Here Frances puts great emphasis on how they should be the only ones to have control over their land, reiterating this sentiment three times at the end of her statement. She not only highlights how the community suspects their neighbours to take advantage of their situation and charge more for land, implying that trust is community specific; but also, she highlights

how they suspect the government of collaborating with multinational companies to allow this area to be cultivated by sugar cane.

The involvement of sugarcane companies also comes out from interviews with those from other communities. For example, Gina from Mwalija:

Gina (Mwalija, 2017): 'We wonder if we move, this land should be used for farming cultivation and we think that organisations like Illovo for sugar plantations, that is we fear, that Illovo will come and grab this land without discussing with us and start planting sugar cane.'

There is a growing Illovo sugar plantation in the same district as village Mwalija and the neighbouring district to TA Nyachikadza. Illovo is the largest African sugar company, founded in South Africa, with plantations in six African countries, and two within Malawi (Illovo, 2019). There are many stories of Illovo buying up land in this area. However, what Gina is suggesting is the 'grabbing' of land with no prior consultation. There thus is little trust in the system to manage land. There is currently ongoing land reform in Malawi, with the land law recently changed in 2016 to enable greater privatisation of land (The Government of Malawi, 2016). Again, this highlights the percolation of Western capitalist land understandings of property into local concepts of land. As established in Chapter 3, the largest national resettlement project in Malawi, the Community Based Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP), was set up between 2004 – 2011 by the World Bank, as a way to test how these concepts could work in Malawi (World Bank, 2013, Sharp et al., 2018). However, through an informal discussion during fieldwork in 2017 with the Senior Coordinator at LandNet, a leading charity trying to establish the Land Reforms, it became clear that whilst the Land Reforms may have been passed in 2016 there had not yet been imposed effectively and had not impacted the Lower Shire Region at the time of research. Yet, the turmoil and uncertainty of this situation can be seen in these quotes, there is a feeling of insecurity of community members' positions with regards to resettling and ownership of their land, and a mistrust of what the government's position and motivations really are. There is a real concern with the power dynamics involved as well as miscommunication occurring between NGOs and community members and government, as seen in previous quotes.

In this section, I set out the ideal, official structure of governing disasters, where the governance of resettlement sits. This is meant to allow for the inclusion of all actors, yet it still perpetuates disparities between knowledge systems. This perceived knowledge hierarchy (see Figure 5.2) and its implications is a recurring theme throughout this research. Thus, there is a difference between the ideal disaster governance structure and current governance practice with regards to resettlement. This impacts community members' trust and sense of identity. In this section I focused on the current government technique of managing resettlement: the disaster governance structure and its multiple levels of committees. Next, I will explore the proposed and desired government technique: a resettlement policy.

5.4 Desire for a Resettlement Policy

The Results thus far have illustrated how resettlement is a relatively new government strategy to manage flooding in Malawi. The previous section highlighted how resettlement is not well incorporated into the current government structure of decision making. This is particularly due to the multiple viewpoints on how resettlement should occur, if at all, as outlined in section 5.2. As discussed, officially classifying flooding related movement as resettlement may cause complications, particularly with contested understandings of land ownership and place attachment. Mtafu, a national government DoDMA employee, highlights some of the problems the government face:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'we have been promoting resettlement, but what has been the challenge is that it is not well entrenched'.

Here he emphasises the government's support of the phenomenon but that the lack of experience, how it is 'not well entrenched', makes it hard to implement. This was particularly evident in four key government interviews, with the two national government employees in DoDMA and the Ministry of Land and Housing, and with the two district disaster officers interviewed. However, it also came out of interviews with NGOs, particularly through their frustration with government implementation of resettlement, as will be expanded on below. A change in a governance approach to a problem takes time to establish, especially if a change

in mind-set is required (Bee et al., 2015). Bee et al. (2015) highlight how many government approaches are manifested in everyday practice, which means that changing an outlook involves changing the everyday practices as well. In this section, I delve further into the desire to combat these complications through the implementation of a resettlement policy. There is currently no policy on resettlement.

The policy is a top-down tool in the resettlement process. It is being developed by the Ministry for Land and Housing and is about all forms of resettlement, not just those relating to flooding, but also development induced resettlement. It is as of yet not finalised and there is no clear date for finalisation but it is expected to occur in 2020. Nevertheless, my interview analysis suggests that the policy will help with the resettlement process, of flooding-vulnerable communities in particular, in a three-fold manner:

1. It will make it clear what resettlement is and what the procedures around it are for those in government and NGOs, for those in the communities resettling, and for those in the new host communities.
2. It will standardise and unify the approach to resettlement.
3. It will give more power to those in government and NGOs to implement it.

I will explore in detail each of these aspects in this section. I will also examine the international influence on the resettlement policy, to highlight the other factors involved within resettlement and suggest reasons why this might be the case.

The discussion about the resettlement policy did not occur at the community member level. This was due to two main factors: one there was little knowledge of the government and NGO structure of resettlement shown by community members and, secondly, because of this, no specific questions about a resettlement policy were asked. There were comments about how community members wished to be consulted more in the resettlement process, which I have touched on in the previous section and shall discuss further in the next chapter. Therefore, as the policy is only discussed by those involved in governing the resettlement, those in government and NGOs, it is only their views that are present in this section. This

reiterates that the policy is a top-down measure of governing resettlement. I will explore the implications of this further in this section.

5.4.1 Policy to Clarify What Resettlement Entails

In order for resettlement to be successfully facilitated within a decentralised government system, where district council are meant to have responsibility to facilitate aspects like resettlement (Jagero et al., 2014), there needs to be a shared understanding across the government, NGOs and the communities of what resettlement entails. As I established in the section above, this is not currently the case. Indeed, priority six of the 2015 DRM policy states that there has previously been problems in coordinating responses, clarity in understanding would aid with this (Government of Malawi, 2015b). A resettlement policy was suggested by a quarter of the government and NGOs interviewee, particularly those involved in developing the policy (those in DoDMA and the Ministry of Land and Housing, as well as MFERP) among others, to provide this clarity for the resettlement process specifically, as shown by national government worker, Mtafu:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'yeah that [resettlement policy] will really assist because as of now ... there are some guidelines here and there but in terms of matters of resettlement there is nothing saying this is what will be done. It is a bit tricky. So, the finalization of this policy will deal with a lot of those issues.'

Mtafu reiterates that, currently, people do not know the best way forward for resettlement, there is no point of reference. The policy is set to be the point of reference required to give those in government and NGOs the confidence needed to undertake successful resettlement projects. Thus, this time period, when the policy is being determined and decisions about resettlement are being made, is particularly interesting to study.

The desire for a policy on resettlement to provide 'guidelines' suggests that there is a wish to spread the responsibility, linking in with discussions of responsibility in the previous chapter. This came out of four of the 21 government and NGO interviews. A policy that

incorporates many organisations takes the responsibility away from an individual organisation or people that are directly involved. Due to the intricate nature of resettlement, with the potential of many viewpoints on how it should occur, as illustrated above, it is unsurprising that there is a desire for guidance on how to facilitate resettlement. This is slightly different to the shared responsibility discussed in the previous chapter, which was discussing responsibility post an event: flooding, whereas this is responsibility prior to an event: resettlement. William, who is in charge of MFERP, which is funded by the World Bank and is helping to fund the work on the resettlement policy, suggests that the policy will be based on international organisation guidelines:

William (NGO, 2017): 'that influence [World Bank guidelines] is there, in the sense that you don't want to reinvent the wheel'.

The use of international organisation guidelines as a template for the country's policy highlights the reliance on international aid, as often a country needs to adhere to the guidelines to receive funding (Weiler et al., 2018). Indeed, the influence of international organisations guidelines perpetuates the current type of development practice, particularly as many international organisations, particularly the World Bank, have their foundations in Western ideologies (Briggs and Sharp, 2004). William's opinion on this is influential, as his organisation is funded by the World Bank, and is involved in funding the resettlement policy. I was made aware of this by an employee of the Ministry of Land and Housing. This could perpetuate the hegemony of Western understandings within the resettlement process (Escobar, 2011, Sillitoe and Marzano, 2009). Through his analysis of the World bank involvement in the Mekong River Basin, Goldman (2004) highlights how dependency on a large international organisations, such as the World Bank, can perpetuate Western capitalist expansion without the knowledge of the vulnerable communities involved, making the dependency imperial in nature. Ferguson (1994) found a similar scenario in his studies into the IMF's involvement in Lesotho. Moreover, the previous experience of the World Bank's involvement in resettlement in Malawi, with the CBRDLP, highlighted how there were significant aspects not fully considered, chiefly community power dynamics and land interactions (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). The potential influence of large organisations, like the World Bank, is a key reason why they are placed at the top of the

perceived hierarchy of knowledge in Figure 5.2. However, William implies that the guidelines are not prevalent to perpetuate Western hegemony, rather they are important because they portray the best option, they are 'the wheel'. I explore the international influence further in a later subsection.

Despite the assistance of international organisation guidelines, it is proving problematic to establish what the policy will entail. When discussing the policy, three NGO workers displayed frustration at its delayed arrival. Anthony, an NGO worker, described the process as '*dragging*' and '*taking too long*,' which meant the NGO opted to use their funding for other projects and not resettlement. Daniel, who works in the national government ministry drafting the policy, suggests the following reasons for why it is taking so long:

Daniel (Government, 2017): 'it [the policy] is not yet finalised because the issues of resettlement they are so broad. Some of the things they are issues of maybe compensation, and also the willingness of the people to move from one area to another, and at the same time the acceptance of the people that are already in the proposed area where people are to resettle, yeah, are the people willing to accept new people coming in.'

Daniel illustrates how some aspects are hard for a policy to broach. 'Willingness' and 'acceptance' are traits that come differently for people. In order to achieve willingness and acceptance often incentives are used. This reiterates the importance of place and home, as Daniel is outlining the difficulty of moving people from where they feel they belong, and how this can be hard to quantify in terms of compensation. NGO worker, Thomas, suggests an answer to this:

Thomas (NGO, 2017): 'give them [the vulnerable communities] the best offer that they cannot refuse'.

The policy would aim to provide the guidelines on compensation to give a unified approach for all the players needed and make it a fair system. This attitude was key in the World Bank's CBRLDP, with the resettlement package designed attractively to highlight the buyer seller model of land, which is central to land privatisation. However, critique of this project illustrates how the resettlement process was too complicated for the compensation to work

effectively: the manner in which land ownership was obtained was confusing, with first group deeds being allocated to a trust, and individual's only able to buy their deeds when they reached a certain income, which was not clear from the get go (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). Additionally, the setup of the trust meant that there was room for corruption and nepotism to develop, which meant that not every participant benefited equally (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). Thus, compensation can be hard to manage. Daniel's quote also highlights the importance of incorporating the potential host community as well, which can often be forgotten. I discuss this in more detail in the Chapter 6.

5.4.2 Policy to Provide a Unified Approach

A quarter of those interviewed from government and NGOs suggested the policy provided a way of unifying government and NGO approaches to resettlement and flooding, precisely because it clarifies what it entails. This again links into the frustration displaced in the 2015 DRM policy about the previous lack of united response that needed to be addressed in disaster management more broadly (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 8). The resettlement policy is hoped to provide those involved in resettlement with the same mandate to work on, as can be seen in the quote by NGO worker, Arthur:

Arthur (NGO, 2017): 'We really need to make sure that all the players are involved, we do the same thing, we can really control it. And again, government policies really play a role, because the government is there to ensure that things are going in the right direction, so, at times maybe the government leaves the responsibility to the NGOs to do it, but in that sense of firm regulation environment, I don't think they understand. Because NGOs they come in an area within a space of time they leave. The government is still there. So, if the government is not enforcing whatever has been built by the NGOs all the things are lost in the process.'

Arthur highlights how in the current procedure of development projects, when an NGO moves out of an area without a policy, much of the benefit of that project is 'lost', as there is no agreed direction for future projects. A policy with guidelines on how to approach resettlement enables the implementer to change many times but ensures the end result is the same. Arthur lays the responsibility of enabling this unified approach on the government.

Not only this, he suggests that currently the government do not 'understand' their role in creating a long-lasting change. This reiterates the structure, present in my research, of reliance of NGOs on government guidance, as highlighted in the methodology, and the NGOization process apparent, where NGOs become a less accountable extension of the government (Choudry, 2010). However, it also highlights some tensions within this NGOization process, as Arthur is suggesting that not all NGOs are happy with the capability of the government. This reiterates that whilst NGOization was present in this research, it may not be universal in Malawi. The mistrust in the government's ability also comes out from community interviews. Arthur's comment illustrates one of the few occasions in the research where there is a distinction drawn between the NGOs and the government because it is discussing a failure in the structure. This is also a reason why there is a separate arrow in Figure 5.2 connecting smaller NGOs with large international organisations, as they do have the possibility to be influenced directly by them and not the government.

A unified approach should incorporate the views of those in communities as well as NGOs and government. Much of the discussion in this section has focused on the governance angle. The implementation of a policy was mainly discussed by those in government and NGOs, as it is those that it directly involves. However, in order for it to be representative and not merely a top down measure, it should integrate the views of those in the communities undergoing resettlement. Indeed, the CBRLDP, discussed above, suggests that the vision for the resettlement needs to be understood at all levels, especially within communities, otherwise there is a risk the potential benefits are not realised (Chinsinga, 2008, Sharp et al., 2018). Other scholars have highlighted how community involvement is vital to successful resettlement, where communities stay resettled (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). This inclusivity is not apparent in the interviews with NGOs and government. The discussed benefits to the communities of the policy inversely is suggested by four of the government and NGO interviewees to come from them having to resettle, with little option to dispute the process, as those in positions of authority will now have more legitimacy in dictating the movement. For example, Mtafu highlights the power the policy will give to the government:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): '[the policy will enable us] to reach out to people and say they should move based on these tools [provided by the policy]'.

Here, Mtafu suggests that the government will have the information to provide to the communities, again reinforcing the perceived hierarchy of knowledge outlined above. This reiterates the portrayal of the government as more knowledgeable, which, whilst meant to be helpful, also places the power with the government. The policy enables them to control the knowledge on resettlement and also when and how they inform people of this knowledge. Thus, I argue that the policy will be a technique which the government uses to manage their population and determine how the process of resettlement is understood and known, placing them high on the knowledge hierarchy (Figure 5.2). In this way it indicates a form of governmentality by the government, as it is a technique of population control (Death, 2013, Dean, 1999). I will elaborate further on the implications of this on participation in Chapter 6.

5.4.3 Policy to Provide Power to Those in Government and NGOs

In the previous chapter, I set out how government was legitimising their involvement in resettlement, the policy would be the ultimate outcome of this. By giving greater legitimacy to the government approach to resettlement, it has the potential to take power away from those in communities in the resettlement process. The potential power the policy awarded to government was commented on by a quarter of the government and NGO interviewees. Indeed, NGO worker Roland highlights how it will give more power to those in government:

Roland (NGO, 2017): 'The policy would help because the policy gives you power to act, so we have a minister of land and housing, mandated to manage issues of resettlements in the absence of the policy they cannot take anybody to task because legally they cannot do that, yeah so, I think a policy is indeed an item or an element that is missing in the whole process.'

Here Roland explicitly states that the key benefit of the policy is the power it enables. It is interesting that whilst resettlement is presented as a unified approach by those in government and NGOs, the government is still the one viewed as having the power of

controlling it, not any of the NGOs also crucial in implementing it. This reiterates the process of NGOization, as the government is viewed as controlling the direction of the NGOs (Choudry, 2010). The fact that Roland focuses on the benefit of ‘taking anybody to task’ implies that sometimes NGOs, or local government do not provide sufficient services, and there is a need for there to be a leader in the resettlement processes: the national government.

The policy provides greater power to those in government to actually facilitate resettlement. Once there is a unified approach, decisions can be made more easily. As illustrated by local government disaster officer, Keith:

Keith (Government, 2017): ‘I think once the document has been finalised by the ministry of land then I think we will be having a backing so that even the local leaders can be sensitised to say this is something that can be giving a legal document to say if these are going to settle’.

Keith highlights that once they have everyone’s backing, they can get a ‘legal document’ to enforce the resettlement. The focus on the legality that the policy provides is present in the last two quotes and reiterates the power involved in the policy. The lack of legal frameworks is also something which the existing 2015 DRM Policy is trying to address in its first policy priority, mainstreaming disaster risk management into sustainable development, indicating the perceived (and actual) importance of legal frameworks in effective implementation (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 5). The policy, when discussing priority five, also displays frustration at the previous ‘laxity of enforcement’ in policies and frameworks focused on disaster risk reduction, thus there seems to be a definite desire for greater power in implementation (Government of Malawi, 2015b: 5). Reference to the law also highlights the difference between the government and those in communities, as the type of law being referred to is inaccessible to many of the vulnerable population, particularly the illiterate. In 2015 the literacy rate in Malawi was 62% (The World Bank, 2015). It also resonates with the notion of an audit culture (Kuus, 2016), as it requires something legitimate and accountable. The use of the word ‘sensitised’ implies that they will be informing the community that the best option is to resettle and not consulting them. I discuss sensitisation further in the next

chapter. Ultimately, the control over someone's settlement is a significant form of power and responsibility to possess. For many their home is an extension of themselves, thus, to take away someone's right to their home, where they feel they belong and have a strong place attachment, can be similar to stripping part of their identity (Roizblatt and Pilowsky, 1996, Raymond et al., 2010a).

5.4.4 The International Influence on the Resettlement Policy

In Chapter 2, I stated that there has been shift in academia to view environmental migration as adaptation (McLeman and Smit, 2006). This has been symptomatic of a global shift in viewing migration as an adaptive strategy. Indeed, implementing resettlement as a way to manage flooding is an offshoot of this, as it constitutes resettlement as adaptation to climate change (Arnall, 2018). As mentioned, international guidelines are used in the creation of the new policy. In this subsection, I will take this further to analyse specifically how the international arena may influence resettlement policy in Malawi and why this is important. The perceived hierarchy of knowledge set out in Figure 5.2, suggests that large international organisations and donors are at the top of this hierarchy, with potentially the largest influence on the resettlement process. I shall highlight below how this is likely to occur in this top-down measure of a resettlement policy.

The World Bank exclusively funds the Malawi Floods Emergency Recovery Project (MFERP). This project was set up after the severe flooding of 2015, and is based in the capital, Lilongwe, working closely with the government to combat flooding. It is an important programme that holds influence over the government, particularly in its funding of the resettlement policy. William, an employee of the organisation, illustrates the importance of the government to adhere to World Bank guidelines if the World Bank is to be involved in resettlement:

William (NGO, 2017): 'we are not necessarily tackling resettlement, because with regard to the principles of the World Bank, if we are facilitating resettlement then it requires a lot of other policies that need to be taken into consideration. For instance, social and environmental safeguard policies, have to be seriously considered.'

Here William is implying that currently resettlement processes in Malawi do not consider all their implications, and therefore cannot be supported by the World Bank. In order for them to obtain World Bank's substantial assistance, they need to adhere to their protocol. Therefore, the power of the World Bank guidelines to dictate what can be done, in terms of flooding management, is significant. Moreover, the only significant resettlement experience to occur in Malawi, the CBRLDP, was funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2013) and was referred to in three government and NGO interviews. A key reason for the influence of this organisation is because of the relatively large amount of funding associated with it (Weiler et al., 2018, Goldman, 2004). This is a further reason why international organisations are placed at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge in Figure 5.2. However, there are also ways around the strict conditions connected to the World Bank's influence.

The interview with William suggested that international guidelines are not as all pervasive as initially suggested, there is some contextual flexibility. For example, William goes on to say:

William (NGO, 2017): 'we establish possible evacuation sites ... [that may be] considered later by government as resettlement sites. So, it is up to government to reconsider some of these sites that we are identifying as resettlement sites'.

Therefore, William illustrates that he can be unofficially part of the process even if it does not fit with the World Bank guidelines. However, he and his organisation cannot be responsible for it. Indeed, he is very keen to point out that they are '*not facilitating the actual resettlement*' (William, NGO, 2017). Therefore, the role of international organisations such as the World Bank on the ground, with local employees, is more nuanced than initially perceived. Local employees may have an allegiance to the international organisation for which they work but they may also be better acquainted with how their country facilitates situations and how best to manipulate the guidelines for this. This illustrates the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 2010b), as it shows how the international system is taken up and moulded by the local context, meaning the knowledge is neither 'Western' or 'Local' but rather Malawian, a mix of influences present in the Malawian resettlement context. This also highlights how knowledge

can mix and jump scales, similar to what Shulz et al. (2019) found with their categorization of indigenous knowledge, however the jumping of scales suggested in this quote is from a top-down perspective.

Additionally, as mentioned, the use of international organisations' guidelines or experience may be favourable to national government, as they shift responsibility further up the command chain to the international organisation (Escobar, 2011). The use of international guidelines also fits into the idea of an audit culture: everything measured and practices occurring for the sake of a criteria required to be fulfilled (Kuus, 2016). Research into audit culture suggests that it enables a certain amount of shirking responsibility (Kuus, 2016). This is counter to the supposed neoliberal society in some ways: the onus is not on the individual (Castree, 2010). However, the responsibility is also not directly on the state either. Therefore, setting up a general policy that is shaped by international organizations guidelines takes away the responsibility from the state and places it on an abstract actor that it is impossible to hold accountable. This is a critique that has been made about development practices (Escobar, 2011). It is almost the next level up from NGOization, instead it could be governmentalization: where governments act at the behest of international organizations, taking accountability and responsibility off themselves. It also echoes Enroth's (2014) idea that the focus of government has shifted from society to solving global problems.

There is a similar rationale for the use of international experience, which was important in three interviews with government and NGO officials. Indeed, the use of policy, guidelines and international experience are discussed as part of building capacity of the government, as can be seen when Mtafu discusses how district councils will facilitate resettlement:

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'We will need a lot of capacity for the councils to do that. Capacity not just in terms of resources but tools to do that, like the policies and the guidelines and learning how other countries like Mozambique are doing and the like.'

Here Mtafu describes guidelines and international influence, such as the experiences from Mozambique, as tools that give district councils greater capacity and confidence to undertake resettlement projects. Part of this greater capacity and confidence may come from the fact that learning from past experiences takes away some responsibility from the district council and allocates it to the past experience. Therefore, giving them greater conviction in implementing such an approach.

This section highlights the desired implementation of the policy, which is proposed as addressing the many complications to resettlement through its clear unified approach. The policy is still being finalised and is set to come out in 2020. However, the discussion on the policy highlights the potential to create a growing dichotomy between those in government and NGOs and those in the vulnerable communities, as the way it is discussed represents top down, technocratic knowledge, with little space for community participation. As I will show in the following chapter, and as much existing literature illustrates, participation is essential for successful resettlement (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015) and communities can still manage to make their needs known. This section also shows the role of international organisations in determining the policy (Goldman, 2004), and the potential agendas they might have, which may not fully appreciate the dynamics of those in the vulnerable communities. Therefore, whilst the implementation of the policy may make the process of resettlement easier to enforce, it may not ensure its success, as, from the discussion, it appears to be inaccessible for those in the communities. This implies they would have little to no involvement in the resettlement process. Thus, there appears to be a disconnect in what the entire process of resettlement requires: initiating resettlement is a start but ensuring its success is more complicated, as I will show in the next chapter.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored how the government plans to use resettlement as a strategy to manage increasing flooding severity. The chapter helps to answer research question 2, asking how and why government resettlement is used to manage flooding. I did this by first setting out the context of the multiple perspectives on the usefulness and success

of resettlement, which perspectives currently seem most dominant and the motivations behind them. Next, I showed the governance structure, which is the process that resettlement fits into, and highlighted its current tensions and cracks. I illustrated that the current approach is not a sufficient way to manage the multiple understandings. Finally, I explored the proposed way to unify all these perspectives: the use of a resettlement policy that provides ultimate power to the government. I examined the motivations behind the desire for the resettlement policy, showing potential implications and the role of the international community within it. The culmination of these sections implies that the government process of resettlement is currently in flux, with multiple spaces for different levels of involvement from various actors, and ultimately room for it still to evolve, making it particularly interesting to study. The chapter suggests that a top down approach to the resettlement process is currently favoured by government and NGOs due to the ease in facilitation this provides, suggested by interviewees to be currently difficult. The suggested push internationally for climate change adaptation strategies, implies that resettlement may be taken up in other countries that are reliant on donor funding, and may follow a similar approach. In the next chapter, I will illustrate the community response to government resettlement and how this can disrupt the perceived knowledge hierarchy set out in this chapter.

6. COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I illustrated how the government is attempting to initiate and establish the resettlement process. In this chapter, I explore further the community involvement in this by examining the varied levels of community agency in the resettlement process. This provides context for considering the role of those resettling in the resettlement. I illustrate the diversity of decision making processes that are present in these communities, but that are often not fully considered by those managing the resettlement. In this chapter, I will explore whether the diverse forms of agency present in the communities are incorporated into the process through participatory techniques on the part of government and NGOs, analysing the levels of participation apparent (Arnstein, 1969). I will outline how communities re-appropriate resettlement to illustrate their own needs from the process. I aim to go deeper into the nuances of how resettlement is practiced, to show the often under acknowledged role of the 'vulnerable' populations. I purposefully put vulnerable in quotations here, as I will highlight how these populations may not be as vulnerable as the government perceptions suggest. I will show how there is push back towards the government understanding of resettlement so that it includes and appreciates community understandings, the re-appropriation. The chapter thus helps to answer research question 3, which is concerned with the role of flooding-vulnerable communities in the government strategy of resettlement.

I first analyse, in section 6.2, the nuances of community agency present in each community. Next, in section 6.3, I build on discussions of governance structure in the previous chapter to assess how participatory the participatory methods really are. Finally, in section 6.4, I highlight how 'vulnerable' communities have re-appropriated resettlement to fit their needs. I will explain the term 're-appropriated' later, as it will enable a focus on the contradictions of the resettlement process.

6.2 Nuance within Community Agency

In the literature review I established that agency referred to one 'having the ability to act and be agents of their own development' (Eversole, 2011: 51) and community agency, referred to the forming of local relationships that increase the capacity for collective action and adaptive capacity of the community (Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). Often agency can be attributed to, or taken away from, actors without evidence or consultation (Anderson, 2008). This has the potential to portray actors incorrectly to a wider audience, which can have broader ramifications. In the Results thus far, I have illustrated how community members are often perceived as vulnerable populations. This is particularly apparent from the government and NGO perspective. As I set out in the literature review, vulnerability is linked to having little agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011). Thus, in this section I will focus on exploring the presence of community agency in each community, to illustrate the levels of vulnerability from a community perspective, as high community agency suggests high adaptive capacity and low vulnerability. However, most literature on community agency, is focused on a Western perspective (Eversole, 2011, Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). In this section, I go a step further than the existing literature on community agency to suggest there is variance within the types of community agency present. The variability of agency could also indicate a fluidity of knowledge outlined in the literature review (Raymond et al., 2010b).

One way in which I will outline community agency is through exploring the decision making process in each community (Brown and Westaway, 2011). All the communities I study illustrate a hierarchy of decision making. Those at Village Mwalija and TA Nyachikadza are negotiating resettlement, where the government and NGOs are in favour of resettlement. Those at Jombo have resettled and are attempting to integrate into a host community, where tensions are visible. At a time where the policy on resettlement is being drawn up, the experience of how resettlement is communicated in these communities is influential in determining the future approach to resettlement. In the following, I concentrate on two aspects of community agency. The first aspect is the influence that the community as a whole can have on the resettlement decision, the collective community agency. Nyachikadza is the

key focus here. The second aspect delves deeper into this and explores the multiple voices within each community, their role in the decision, and how this is viewed by the other actors involved. I split this into two parts that I term: hierarchical agency, which focuses on village Mwalija, and segregated agency, which focuses on Jombo resettlement site

6.2.1 Collective Community Agency at Nyachikadza

I argue that collective community agency facilitates the collective community action discussed by Brown and Westaway (2011). Through their review of several papers Brown and Westaway (2011) do not differentiate between the different types of community agency, suggesting that all community agency produces collective action, but, with the help of my interview data, I will illustrate how collective community agency differs and can be nuanced into other forms of community agency, specifically hierarchical and segregated community agency, which I outline below.

Collective community agency is particularly evident in the community at Nyachikadza. As established, those residing at Nyachikadza are reluctant to resettle. This reluctance is born, in part, from their unwillingness to leave Nyachikadza, present in three quarters of the interviews of those from Nyachikadza, with only one exception, as I have illustrated throughout the Results thus far. However, one aspect which I have yet to discuss, but that is present in three interviews, is the reluctance to resettle born from more practical reasons: their inability to resettle without the assistance of the government in the process. The government is failing to provide the form of resettlement that they will accept. Nyachikadza community member, Kelvin, highlights this:

Kelvin (Nyachikadza, 2017) 'It is only government who should try to provide that land to us, because we have tried our best to provide good discussions with the people of Ndamera but nothing has materialised'.

Here Kelvin highlights the need for the government to aid an appropriate resettlement scheme. He particularly speaks of the need for assistance in negotiating an area of suitable land to resettle. It is difficult because the land needs to be near to Nyachikadza for them to still cultivate there, but the surrounding area is highly populated. The quote suggests that

Kelvin views the government as having more power in influencing the other potential host communities involved. Thus, Kelvin's statement suggests a mutually co-dependent relationship: the government are dependent on the community members to go along with a resettlement scheme and the community members are dependent on the government for their assistance in producing an adequate resettlement solution that allows for them to still cultivate in Nyachikadza, and still allows them to be known as people from Nyachikadza. However, currently, neither side is delivering this.

Although the reasons for reluctance to resettle in this community may be slightly different, such as Kelvin's focus on the lack of land available, there is an agreed collective action: the reluctance to resettle, which is found in three quarters of the interviews with those from Nyachikadza, with only one exception, who had more permanent house in Nyachikadza. It is possible that further variety is present within the community and was not identified in the research. However, dissention was identified in the other two communities, suggesting that Nyachikadza is different. Moreover, the reputation of residents from Nyachikadza being unwilling to resettle was strong and came out from informal conversation with the two translators used in this community, as well as in the interviews with NGO and government employees who were involved with Nyachikadza, which totalled seven. The collective action of reluctance to resettlement found in the Nyachikadza interviews suggests a cohesive form of community agency within the resettlement process. This is the most straightforward form of community agency observed in the data.

Collective community agency is more complicated in the other two communities. As I highlighted in Chapter 4, individuals at village Mwalija will do something they do not necessarily wish to do if it is the desire of the whole community, producing collective community agency but not through mutual agreement. Additionally, at Jombo there was a sense that decisions over their resettlement were made at a community level and the community took priority in this decision. So much so that they refused initial offers of resettlement that required them to resettle separately. Thus, this shows collective community agency. However, they are technically now part of another community, but they seem unsure of their place within it and do not seem to identify with it, complicating their collective community agency. This will be expanded on below. Similarly, at village Mwalija

there was more to decisions than following the views of others in the community, as I outline in the following subsection.

6.2.2 Hierarchical Community Agency at Mwalija

Interviews from those at village Mwalija also implied a collective community agency. Although, with further discussion this is not as simple as first impressions suggest. Arnold highlights how he views the involvement of the community in the resettlement decision:

Arnold (Mwalija, 2017): 'I think of resettling but not as my family only but if the whole community is moving then it is when we can resettle'.

This implies that he is not able to determine his own development, and therefore does not have individual agency in the decision, instead he waits for community approval in order to move. The community decision outlined here could also mean community members move when they do not want to. 11 of the 16 Mwalija interviewees referred to the importance of community within the resettlement decision. For example, earlier, in chapter 4, I noted that Dina would move if the whole community moved but it *'would not be what I wish'* (Mwalija 2017). This further illustrates the potential lack of individual agency. This is complicated further by the role of the village head in the decision-making process at village Mwalija.

The data suggests a hierarchy to the decision-making process, with the village head being central. There is suspicion attached to moving before the village head does, which was mentioned by five of the 16 Mwalija interviewees. For example, Dorothy highlights this when discussing what influences her move:

Dorothy (Mwalija, 2017): 'I cannot move if this village head does not move first. Because according to traditional beliefs, if one gets there before the village head and the village head does not give them blessings that you can move and that person just moves, that person can meet several calamities like diseases, death, misfortunes etc. so I don't want to experience that.'

The power of the village head in decision making is clear in all the communities but especially in Mwalija, where they are deciding whether to resettle. Unfortunately, I was only able to interview one village head in the research, at Jombo. The village heads in TA Nyachikadza, and the village head for village Mwalija were unavailable. Therefore, I rely on the testimony of the villagers, like Dorothy. Dorothy declares her submission to the village head's decision and her loyalty to follow him. In this way Dorothy allows the village head to determine her development. In other words, she gives the agency to determine much of her life to the village head. Not all in Mwalija took this strong a view and two interviewees still view the option for them to move as an individual decision. They still believe that they control their life decisions. Therefore, there are varying degrees of agency present.

The agency of the village head in determining the resettlement decision at village Mwalija is even recognized by those in the district council (local government). As illustrated by local government disaster officer Charles:

Charles (Government, 2017): "Unfortunately people were not willing to resettle and they were alluding to the fact that traditionally I think they were saying it is actually the village headman Mwalija who is supposed to start the resettlement and people could follow him there, because they were saying 'if I happen to go there and resettle when my chief is here it would appear as if I am possibly doing the opposite way. The chief should be the first one to resettle and we would be following him.' So, actually village headman Mwalija did not resettle, was not championing the whole essence of resettlement, so people never followed, and they never moved to that other safer area, regardless that partners were even willing to construct some start up housing facilities and even the drilling of the borehole itself."

This is the perspective of a government official and not straight from a community member, but it does corroborate the previous quote. Charles illustrates the key point: the power that a village head may have in determining a community member's role in resettlement, despite many in the community proclaiming they would like to move. It illustrates collective community action, in that the whole community is not moving, but this appears to be because they are following one member of the community: the village head, and not because they collectively do not want to resettle. The fact that a government official comments on this, indicates that the hierarchy in decision making is appreciated by local government.

However, it is suggested that the village head may not be best situated to represent the community. This comes out of five of the 16 Mwalija interviews, which were pro-resettlement. For example, community member, Benjamin highlights the amount of people who wanted to resettle:

Benjamin (Mwalija, 2017) 'A lot of people were for that decision that we go and resettle. Estimating almost that 60 something were for that and 30 something were against it'.

This implies that they took a vote to gauge the community views, but following Charles' view, the village head is proving a significant impediment for this move. This resonates with the potential ulterior motives of those in power, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Data from village Mwalija expands on this to examine the ulterior motives of why some community members may want to move. From two of the Mwalija interviews it is suggested that some may be in favour of resettlement to avoid paying fines for a new scheme in operation in the village. This is explained by Arnold:

Arnold (Mwalija, 2017): 'Those that are ready [to resettle], are ready because they know that there will be a scheme in this village. There are rules for everyone who has got livestock, that if the livestock are found in this field in this scheme, they will be punished. So, there are people who have got livestock who are fearing that. That might have an impact on them. There are those who are willing, they can move even now. While the others who are not willing to move it is a larger number than those who are willing to move now.'

Arnold is suggesting that it is the fear of a fine that is motivating people to resettle rather than the fear of flooding. This not only gives an insight into the internal governance of a village on a local level, but also shows how these immediate, everyday factors impact community members' motivations. Arnold also implies that there are more who are against resettling than for, which is the opposite of what Benjamin is claiming in the paragraph above. This contradiction reiterates the diversity of views within this community, and, whilst the lack of resettlement may be due to the village head not moving, it could also be due to divided opinion within the community. This would suggest that the community provides a collective community agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011) but by chiefly following one key figure: the village head. Therefore, I label this hierarchical community agency.

6.2.3 Segregated Community Agency at Jombo

The situation of the community at Jombo illustrates how it is not just the resettling community that is involved in the process, but also the host community as well. Two thirds of those interviewed at Jombo identified hostilities with the host community. Alfred explains how the host community can influence the success of the resettlement:

Alfred (Jombo, 2017): 'The relationship [with the host community] is not good because the village head is dividing these people. He gave us land, but he also wants to take it back. When relief items come, instead of leaving us to distribute it among ourselves, he takes a committee and takes control, and mostly the items go to them and few go to our village.'

Alfred communicates the hostility between the two communities that are meant to be united. Indeed, two thirds of the interviews with those at Jombo suggest they are two separate communities and have not integrated, which makes it hard for either to live harmoniously, especially when relief items are involved. Four other interviewees echoed the problems around delivering relief aid.

The difficulties between the host and resettled communities at Jombo has a particular impact on leadership within the community, expressed by three quarters of the Jombo interviewees. For example, community member Anna:

Anna (Jombo, 2017): 'Sometimes fights exist between our community and the host. ... It is the issue of leadership ... I keep on wondering whether we have a leader or not in the form of the village head. So, I am waiting for the time when government will come to tell us we are under Jombo or the one we are coming from [Champanda]. At the moment I do not feel I know whom I am under. So, I hope that will be clarified in the future because right now we are like orphaned children.'

Anna highlights how the lack of a leader impacts their sense of identity and well-being as a community, as well as causing fights. It is also interesting that she puts the responsibility to solve this issue on the government. The imagery of '*orphaned children*' is particularly powerful in reiterating the importance of customary leadership, and the dependency of those within the community on the government to assist with multiple problems including that of leadership. This emphasises the interplay between the two forms of governance and the

precedence of the government leadership over the customary, as it suggests the government has greater authority (Eggen, 2011). Yet, it also emphasises the need for the government to engage with the customary forms of governance to resolve issues, such as those faced at Jombo, and facilitate a successful resettlement. This reiterates the need, outlined by other scholars, for participation in resettlement (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015), which I will explore further in the next section of this chapter.

This section has illustrated the varied forms of community agency present in each community: collective, hierarchical and segregated, adding nuance to the existing notion of community agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011, Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). The variety of agency reiterates how every resettlement process is context specific (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). It indicates that including and appreciating the different forms of agency and opinions within the resettlement process may be challenging. A suggested way to combat these challenges is through a participatory approach (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). As I established in Chapter 5, currently the resettlement process does aim to be participatory and inclusive through the governance structure. However, I also illustrated in Chapter 5 how this structure did not always work, and how the government was looking to exhibit more control through the upcoming resettlement policy. I take this further in the next section, which assesses how participatory the resettlement process is.

6.3 'Participatory' Approaches: A Tool for Dialogue or Monologue?

The literature on resettlement, as well as the interview data, suggest that those in communities need to be consulted throughout the resettlement process (Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Stal, 2011), especially if it is to be voluntary (Arnall, 2018). This has been referred to directly and also indirectly, through the role communities play in the resettlement process highlighted above, and through the official structure of committees previously discussed. However, as has been apparent in the discussions over the official structure and the community agency there appears to be an underlying bias that runs through these perspectives, which can also be seen in the way participatory approaches are discussed. This section will explore this further by first examining how participation is discussed directly before focusing in on the implications of 'sensitisation'.

6.3.1 Discussion of Participation

There is an attempt by those in government to include local knowledge in the resettlement process. This can be seen in the way the committee structure is developed but also through how community participation is discussed, and it is that which I focus on here. Around half of NGO and Government respondents discussed the importance of considering local knowledge. National government DoDMA official Mtafu highlights how they try to work with the communities to focus on where the relief and evacuation centres are best placed.

Mtafu (Government, 2017): 'So even as a department we have the flood emergency recovery project, besides from identifying the hazard, ... it is a community perspective on what risks are there and what disasters they are prone to, why are they prone to those, like vulnerability assessment, why are they prone to this, is it because of social factors, is it physical factors and economic and also the capacities and also to say which areas can be used as evacuation points and the like.'

Here Mtafu is referring to the flood emergency recovery project, MFERP, discussed in the previous chapter. Mtafu suggests that crucial in this project is the information that the community provides about the flooding in their area through community mapping. Mtafu's discussion seems to suggest a mix of perspectives: he is keen to gain information from the community, but is framing it in a scientific manner, such as his referral to 'like vulnerability assessment'. An increasing attention to vulnerability assessments is mentioned as a strategy in the 2015 Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy (Government of Malawi, 2015b) indicating the unsurprising influence of the policy on government perspectives. He is turning the local knowledge into something that can be useful to his department, making it jump scale to become national knowledge. This is similar, but not quite the same as the professionalisation of knowledge discussed in the literature review (Laurie et al., 2009). In this case the professionalisation is occurring in a top down manner, with the government initiating it, which is different to the findings of Laurie et al. (2009) who illustrated how indigenous communities in the Andes professionalised their knowledge. Thus, it could be suggesting a more extractive form of participation (Agrawal, 1995). Nevertheless, the quote reiterates the fluidity of knowledge (Raymond et al., 2010b). Indeed, Mtafu's quote suggests that defining knowledge as either 'scientific' or 'local' may not be representative of the situation. However,

it appears that when more detail into who is consulted is discussed, a different level of participation is portrayed.

There appears to be a limit on who is able to participate by those in NGOs and government. Just over a third of NGO or government workers suggest that it is mainly local leaders who are consulted in the resettlement process, as they are viewed as having the most influence in the resettlement decision of the communities. I discussed this previously with regards to the government structure and committee makeup, where a fifth of community members illustrated dissatisfaction with representation within this. The preference for local leaders can also be seen in broader discussions over participation, as made evident by NGO employee Samson:

Samson (NGO, 2017): 'Local leaders who are managing communities in the marshes, maybe with the government they need to sit and discuss further before the issues are taken to the community members themselves. So, it is like a step, government or responsible officers go to the local leaders have a special talk with the local leaders. Then what will be included in that particular meeting that should be taken to the communities.'

Samson himself refers to it as a stepped process, which came out of six other interview with government and NGOs. This indicates that the step with the local leaders comes before the last step in the process, which is the consultation of community members. This reiterates the perceived hierarchy of knowledge and its control highlighted in Chapter 5 and implies that community members are not viewed as important in the decision-making process, as they are at the bottom of the ladder in terms of consultation. They are informed of the outcome, but not part of determining it. Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation is relevant here, as Samson indicates that what is occurring through this stepped process is either non-participation of those at the 'lowest' level, or tokenistic participation on Arnstein's (1969) ladder scale. It similarly echoes the second form of tyranny outlined by Cooke and Kothari (2001), outlining how participation can actually be a way of reinforcing local power dynamics instead of moving past them. Indeed, NGO worker Jake suggested that there is too much of a difference between those in the NGOs and those at the community level, and that this intermediary step with local leaders is needed for a project to successfully occur, and for meaning to be successfully communicated between the different 'steps', as I will outline below.

The perceived difference in levels of understanding by many in government and NGOs means that some NGOs believe they cannot communicate directly with community members but have to go through ‘middle men’ in the form of local leaders. This was implied in half the government and NGO interviews. Building on earlier comments in the previous chapter about how representative local leaders are of community members, this raises questions about whether this is really participation, as is evident in NGO worker, Jake’s comment below. Jake is working in the NGO involved in persuading village Mwalija to resettle. He is therefore focused on effective communication.

Jake (NGO, 2017): ‘We felt the traditional authority [area chief] and other gurus that understands more of cultural beliefs can take them [the community members] on their own, and from that platform they can be advised to say ok, if we don’t move and cling to our traditional culture and say our parents have been there for so long, then we are ready to suffer again. Then we should take the responsibility if anything happens to us then I think we should take the responsibility of that. So maybe the technical people from the grassroots who can take this is probably the TA and other gurus that can understand much better the issue of traditional beliefs.’

It interesting that Jake here refers to ‘taking the community members on’, which implies he views it in the manner of a conflict. Jake appears to view these local leaders and ‘gurus’ as ‘technical people’ who will be able to understand more than the average community member but also be able to understand the cultural beliefs, which he openly admits is difficult for many NGO workers. However, if these ‘technical people’ are not listened to by the community then Jake does not believe that the community deserves any external assistance, the impact of the flood is their responsibility. It is apparent that there is a hierarchy to the views Jake discussed, that his views are the ones with more sense for the community and the important thing is to make them understand this. This reiterates the perceived hierarchy of knowledge presented in Chapter 5. Therefore, the approach is not to include the community views, but rather to make them more easily take on the NGO perception, which touches on the issue of sensitisation, discussed further below. This does not coincide with what transformative and empowering participatory approaches are designed for (Kesby, 2005, Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Kamruzzaman, 2020), as set out in the literature review.

A further example of the difficulty with participation is illustrated by the issue of a dyke in Nyachikadza. Almost half of the Nyachikadza community members interviewed demonstrated a desire for the government to build a dyke to manage the flooding, instead of resettlement. The government know of this desire but believe resettlement is a better solution. Chris expresses the community desire well:

Chris (Nyachikadza 2017): 'The best way to manage flooding, us as citizens of TA Nyachikadza, what we want actually is the government through donor funding is to assist us to construct a dyke, all the way from Nsanje Boma [town centre] to Nyachikadza, it is a distance of 40 something km. If they will do that maybe we shall have permanent villages, what we were doing in the past. Staying there forever, rather than having a house here [Ndamera] and going there for farming. It really troubles us a lot, we just do stay here and go there for farming. It is somehow not good at all, but it is our appeal to the government. If they have resources through some donors to assist us to construct a permanent dyke.'

Chris illustrates that he is aware that the government would be unable to achieve this without donor funding. He also shows awareness of what would be required to construct a dyke. This indicates an appreciation for a process which could be considered 'technical' and thus, if the view of Jake in the previous quote is followed, outside the understanding of those in the vulnerable communities. Moreover, Chris highlights how the temporary form of movement that so many have suggested is their own local way of managing flooding, is difficult for them. He indicates that it is tough to be between two places, without a permanent home. This gives an insight onto the personal toll that being split between two homes can have. However, the government takes a different view.

Whilst many in government do attempt to provide platforms to hear community views, it does not mean that they will act on them. This can be seen with the government's response to the issue of the dyke, explained by government employee Hector:

Hector (Government, 2017): 'We also involved them [Nyachikadza community] in a process called deliberative polling process. Yeah where they process interventions, various alternatives, which the government can implement for them not to relocate. They [Nyachikadza community] proposed a dyke, they proposed improved early warning system. They provide more structural mitigation works, building dykes, banks whatsoever, dredging the river but those alternatives some are expensive like

constructing a dyke. They were mentioning of constructing a dyke almost 14 kilometres, 20 kilometres, 30 kilometres, which is expensive. Yeah so, relocation as of now is the only best alternative, because once they relocate, government will be able to provide them with services there, but they will still have that freedom of going back and do their farming.'

Hector highlights how the government is providing platforms to hear community views, through the polling process. The government decided that the community suggestion are unattainable due to expense, which is understandable. However, what these two quote from a community member and government official illustrate is inadequate communication. They are both aware of the others opinions but yet there is not full understanding. The community show awareness that the dyke may be expensive and require donor funding, but it is the government's responsibility to explain that this is a severely unlikely scenario so the community can fully appreciate their options. When I discussed the idea of dyke informally with officials at Nsanje district council, there first response was to laugh, indicating that they do not take the views of the community seriously. This suggests that the government is facilitating consultative participation as defined by Agarwal (2001). Whereby, opinions are heard without it necessarily impacting decisions (Agarwal, 2001). This implies that they are undertaking tokenistic participation, as set out by Arnstein's (1969) ladder. The emphasis on cost reiterates the lack of resources available to local government. It indicates a difference in the motivations for resettlement from those in government and those in communities: it suggests government may have a focus on the most resource efficient solution, and communities may be concerned with what is best for their livelihood. Thus, there is an aim to be participatory, and to allow community members to have varied forms of agency within the decision. However, the outcome of this participation does not appear to be communicated, as community members don't appear to appreciate the difficulty in building a dyke. If this is not communicated then community members may not appreciate that they have been listened to and resentment may develop, inhibiting further effective communication. The focus on efficiency resonates with the critique that the rise in interest in participation by large development organisations was driven by a desire to make processes more efficient and not necessarily to empower marginal populations (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Kamruzzaman, 2020). Many in NGOs and government suggest that sensitisation is the best way to convince communities to move, or to move on the government's terms. The aim of sensitisation is to

close the gap between the government and NGO perspective and the community perspective. I explore this further in the next subsection.

6.3.2 The Role of Sensitisation

Sensitisation is the spreading of information, flooding forecasts for example, and ideas on how to manage flooding, usually from government or NGOs to a vulnerable population. It was discussed by many interviewed as a key technique to combatting flooding. Sensitisation is often seen as synonymous to education, particularly with reference to flooding forecasts. In this way it fits on the third rung of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation: informing, indicating tokenistic participation. However, for others, it went deeper, to represent behavioural shifts, apparent when some NGO and government members encourage people to resettle, which potentially places it at the first rung of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation – manipulation, classified as non-participation. Sensitisation is a global development term but is directly discussed little in the literature (Jakimow, 2013). As mentioned in Chapter 2, it originated from immunology (Cooke and Veer, 1916, Janeway et al., 2001) and Psychology literatures (Cautela, 1967, Myin-Germeys et al., 2005). For this research it relates to discussions over risk awareness (Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 2015, Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2018), education (Van Damme and Neluvhalani, 2004) and resilience building (Mavhura et al., 2013). The way in which it is discussed by my interviewees, illuminates certain perspectives held by many interviewed in government and NGOs, on the perceived hierarchy of different knowledges, set out in the previous chapter. In this subsection, I highlight how sensitisation is discussed as information spreading. I will show how this can merge into manipulation of behavioural change (Arnall, 2018) and how the discussions on behavioural change show a prejudice of the knowledges involved in a process which is meant to involve the vulnerable communities.

The relevance of sensitisation within the resettlement process was discussed by over half the government and NGO interviewees. Three interviews suggested that sensitisation is a method through which local government and NGO officials inform communities of an upcoming flood warning. Thus, it becomes part of early warning systems, as mentioned above

this is more about informing and less about behavioural change. Rosalind explains how it is used in this way:

Rosalind (Government, 2017): 'We inform the people through the sensitisation, the community sensitisation, we actually go and sensitise them even before disaster comes, like the flooding disaster. We go about and sensitise people to relocate because like this year we are expecting the normal to above normal rainfall, so what it means is that we may have flooding, so we actually go in advance and sensitise those people.'

Rosalind's repetition of informing us that they go in advance and her use of the word 'actually' implies that this advanced sensitisation could be a new strategy, which would fit with the idea that resettling out of an area is a newly supported method by the government to manage flooding. Therefore, there is more than just information dissemination, there is advice on how to manage the flooding: through resettling. Anthony takes this further:

Anthony (NGO 2017): 'there is a need for sensitisation, proper sensitisation to highlight the advantages of them moving, why it is necessary that they should move as well'.

Anthony shows the progression from 'highlighting the advantages' of moving, to actually why they *have* to move. This shows a more forceful side of sensitisation, which is advocating for behavioural change. This came out of over a quarter of the government and NGO interviewees. It reiterates the idea that the NGO think they know best, which was a key part of the critique of participation, that it can subtly reinforce Western development ideals (Mohan, 2007). The use of sensitisation is discussed by the community members as well.

Six of the 49 community members mention sensitisation. The community members undergo sensitisation in a variety of ways. Alfred from Jombo community explains how this can work:

Alfred (Jombo 2017): 'while we were there at Champanda, [we got information] through the area telling us to move to upper areas because we would be expecting flooding. While here we get it from the DCs [district commissioners] office through community sensitisation meetings'.

Alfred shows the difference in access to sensitisation from the previous flood prone area, where he lived before resettling, and the resettled area. In the previous area the information

is spread less directly, through word of mouth, radios or mobile phone text networks. Whereas, at the resettled area they get the information directly through meetings with district council members, which are termed 'sensitisation meetings'. It indicates how sensitisation is linked to government.

Indeed, Roster from Mwalija highlights further the process of sensitisation for his community:

Roster (Mwalija, 2017): 'I get information through radios, and through radios we are told that those who are near Shire River should be alert to move because the rivers are going to flood so we will be affected. So, when I get that message, because here we are near Shire River, we keep observing Shire River and when we see that it might flood anytime, we gather together as a community, we hold sensitisation meeting where the village head takes the lead. Whereby people are told to get ready and to find a place where they can go to relocate.'

Roster shows us how sensitisation messages about flood forecasts and the need to move percolate through the community. This links back to how each community get their information on flooding, discussed in Chapter 4. Roster suggests there has been increased vigilance and the holding of their own sensitisation meetings on whether they should move, with the village head being central in the process, as discussed previously. This was suggested by one other community member from the same community. Therefore, sensitisation does not just refer solely to meetings between NGOs/local government and community members, it has also pervaded into the vocabulary of those in communities. This indicates another jump in scale from the international to the local and highlighting how in flux the knowledges of those in communities are (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019) and how labelling knowledge may provide too static an impression of the reality (Halvorsen, 2019). Alternatively, this use of sensitisation in this manner could be due to the government translation. Some NGO employees believe those in communities do not act quickly enough on the information passed onto them.

There appears to be a contradiction in how those in NGOs want the communities to act on sensitisation and how they view them as actually acting on sensitisation. This

frustration comes out clearly in almost a quarter of the government and NGO interviews. For example, Chikondi:

Chikondi (NGO, 2017): 'So, the sensitisation has been around how can they use the river gauges, how do they read that this level of the river gauge is making this sign. But the whole purpose of it, is for them to act first. And the action that we mainly talk about in terms of floods is relocating to the upper land. So, the relocation of the community to the upper land is not only when the disasters have occurred, but they need to relocate when the disasters have not occurred, which has been a bit of a challenge for the communities. Yeah, I think the communities have mainly only a reactive kind of response, whereby when they see that somebody has been affected [that] is when they move. They go maybe to the evacuation centre. Maybe when they see the waters have gone and then they come back to their original places, but then the message has been they should be able to read their land depending on the trend of disasters that has been occurring in the communities. They should be able to read their land and at least settle at a safer place. So that has been the message but then the response has been not that good.'

Chikondi highlights how the sensitisation her NGO is involved in is focused on making the communities better able to read their land through the introduction of river gauges. Chikondi believes that the knowledge her NGO is sharing can enable them to move before a flood occurs, even if it contradicts previous flood trends. It is an attempt to merge scientific and local knowledge, by placing a scientific measure, gauge, into a local early warning system, watching the river and using reeds as gauges, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. However, she implies it is not working, there is a reluctance for people to move. Indeed, her use of 'should' implies a responsibility on the community members to be proactive and a reprimand that they are not. The focus on proactive movement, resonates with the literature on pre-emptive resettlement, and its benefits, outlined in Chapter 2 (Tadgell et al., 2018). Tadgell et al. (2018) point out that proactive resettlement is also associated with voluntary resettlement, which is meant to provide more successful and permanent resettlement outcomes. This could be another reason why Chikondi is advocating for it.

The emphasis on the individual present in Chikondi's quote, also echoes the suggestion that there is an increasing neoliberalisation of development activities in environmental migration (Baldwin, 2014). This is the logic that the individual should be given

the tools so they are in charge of the process and thus, they are responsible for making sure it occurs successfully (Baldwin, 2014). This does give agency to community members. However, agency is only given if they comply with the neoliberal structure. The need to comply to a structure in order to obtain agency, raises questions as to whether agency is actually being obtained. It suggests that resettlement may be being used to manipulate behaviour to fit with a more controllable and economic population, as suggested by Arnall (2018). Yet, Chikondi states that the compliance does not appear to occur in practice.

Chikondi is not the only NGO employee to show frustration at the way community members respond to sensitisation. This was also present in three other interviews. For example, Kenneth highlights the difficulty in influencing people's behaviour:

Kenneth (NGO, 2017): 'We as a government, NGOs, we try to raise awareness that they have to move away from places that are flood prone areas. Some moved, but not everyone. Still there are some. You know, wherever you go in the communities, you can go with the same information but not everyone is going to be convinced. We have had innovators that after hearing that information, they may see sense in that information, they may move. But there are some, they are so reluctant, they are waiting maybe something terrible has to happen first before they move.'

Here, Kenneth puts the NGOs and government together as having the same mission of persuading people to move away at times of flooding, reiterating the NGOization process (Choudry, 2010). It suggests an 'us' versus 'them' scenario. Kenneth's use of 'innovators' to describe those that do move, highlights how they are praised as being proactive and taking the opportunity, fitting with the neoliberal ideology discussed above (Baldwin, 2014). Kenneth suggests that they need a disastrous event, like that of 2015, before they will consider a movement. As devastation incurred by the 2015 flooding is the very thing his NGO is trying to prevent, his frustration with that situation is paramount.

Two NGO workers viewed the behaviour of those in the community as contradictory: they agree to the sensitisation suggestions, but then act in the opposite way. Chikondi highlights this fully:

Chikondi (NGO, 2017): 'I think it is something to do with behaviour change. Because when you are doing the sensitisation you see positive, positive faces from the community, but the action is not there. ... When we are talking of relocating they are even talking of the need to relocate, but then you find that they are not very much willing to do that, because you find that maybe somebody's house got damaged by the previous floods, you find that if that person manages to get some little resources, he will choose to reconstruct right there, where the previous house was, despite maybe having some options to go to some upper land. So, on that one you can see that the reasons that they give of resources may not be very much valid, but maybe that willingness is not there, or the community is very much used to their old land, so they would still want to be there.'

Here Chikondi separates sensitisation and behavioural change. She highlights that even when ulterior land and resources are available community members choose to stay in the vulnerable location. Until the 2019 flooding, this was the situation at village Mwalija. Chikondi suggests that the community members do not give a 'valid' reason for their lack of willingness, which could imply that she puts the blame for the unsuccessful sensitisation on the community members. As with Kenneth, Chikondi shows frustration with the situation and the community members. There is a sense that she believes the community members are using their agency and power in the situation in the wrong way, indicating she views the community members as heedless. This highlights a side of development which some scholars have critiqued for suggesting that vulnerable populations are irresponsible, in that they have been given the knowledge and yet still act against it (Mohan, 2007). In actuality, this could highlight a lack of understanding behind community members behaviour, in Mwalija for example, the unwillingness to move is related to resources but also to community power dynamics and the influence of the village head, as I will elaborate on in the next section.

One NGO employee, Jake, went further to suggest that community members' traditional values need to change. Jake was the only interviewee to state this directly, yet I acknowledged in my field notes, a sense dissatisfaction with those in rural communities after 10 of the government and NGO interviews. Jake is an employee in the NGO which is attempting to persuade those at village Mwalija to resettle and suggests they are responsible for exacerbating their suffering:

Jake (NGO, 2017): 'To cling to the tradition and values, while suffering with this situation, or also to change their perception with the environment that we are in and the climate change and be a community that is going by what is happening currently. ... this resettlement should be a success. Not because bongo [the NGO] has come in, not because the government has come in, but first of all they should understand the issue at hand. And changing their perception for us we felt it was a challenge because it was coming from another level, then we devised to bring it down so that they can understand it from this level of the same people that they meet daily.'

Similar to the previous quotes, Jake suggests that communities need to be 'progressive' and go with what is 'happening currently', instead of 'clinging to traditions and values'. Jake implies the community needs 'to understand the issue at hand' and that this understanding corresponds with the NGO understanding. This suggests that he views the NGO perspective as the right way to view this situation and the community view as outdated. Again suggesting that the community is ignorant and/or irresponsible, a view which is critiqued in development discourse (Mohan, 2007). Thus, what Jake highlights here is the real danger with sensitisation: the suggestion that the community understanding is wrong, they need to take the perspective of the NGO, but they need to come to this 'on their own terms' so it becomes their perspective. Effectively this is wiping away their previous understanding and introducing the NGO view but making it seem like it is theirs. Thus, the process of sensitisation present here illustrates a classic conundrum in development discourse: the desire to empower and give agency to vulnerable populations but only if it coincides with the NGO and government view (Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Escobar, 2011, Mohan, 2007). Sensitisation can therefore act as a government technique of subject formation, which is part of a governmentality rationale outlined in the literature review (Dean, 1999). This places this form of sensitisation on the manipulative rung of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation, making it non-participation. It also reiterates the perceived hierarchy of knowledge held by the government, outlined in Chapter 5.

The quote illustrates how the community perspective is viewed as lesser than the NGO perspective. Jake highlights a great effort to make a change in mindset come from within, through the people 'they meet daily', yet it is clear that he views this knowledge as coming from a different level than that of the NGO. Indeed, he refers to 'bringing it down so that they can understand it from this level' which implies that he views them as on a lower level to

those in NGOs. Thus, the process of sensitisation here, reiterates the hierarchy between those in NGOs and government and those in the community. This is ironic as participatory approaches and sensitisation are meant to level this hierarchy, but in this instance appear to be reinforcing it, which is an established critique of participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), as set out in Chapter 2. It implies that those in NGOs and government view their knowledge as correct and part of their job is to impart it to others. This influences the way the knowledge is communicated, as if the organisation views their knowledge as correct they are less likely to listen to a different perspective. In analysing this, I am not commenting on whose knowledge is correct or not, but rather how the perception of others' knowledge influences communication. Scholars examining the empowering potential of participation have shown how high levels of participation come from conversations where understanding is shared in all directions, with no hierarchy placed upon them (Kamruzzaman, 2020). This would allow a flexibility and openness to welcome ulterior perspectives and a respect to adequately explain why this may not be possible, and it is these aspects which I argue the perceived hierarchy of knowledge is preventing and therefore inhibiting participation to move beyond being tokenistic.

This section on participation builds on the government structure section of the previous chapter to illustrate the various ways in which the community is part of the government approach to resettlement. It does this by analysing the attempts made by the government and NGOs to include the community members in the resettlement process. In this research, I am not passing judgement on whose knowledge is more important or correct, rather I am attempting to analyse the process and level of participation involved in the resettlement process. Important in this is understanding how actors are perceived, my research illustrates how there is heterogeneity within group understandings (see section 5.2 which shows the heterogeneity in government and NGO understandings of resettlement, and section 6.2, which indicates the variety in community agency present), however these group understandings can be homogenized by an outsider, which has important ramifications for the process and deepness of participation (Arnstein, 1969). The research suggests there is a desire to include community members points of view, but that this does not always follow through. Indeed, often, these methods which are meant to increase participation actually decrease diversity in opinion through imposing knowledge on a group without fully listening and

communicating with the group. If the group is listened to it appears the communication is not finished off to illustrate why certain views are not being acted on. This may lead to a unified opinion; however, it is unlikely to be one that has come from allowing all voices to be communicated with. This suggests that the level of participation present is, at best, tokenistic (Arnstein, 1969). Some of the discussion over sensitisation goes further to reiterate the perceived hierarchy of knowledge outlined in Chapter 5, as it indicates a presumption that knowledge flows unilaterally downward to communities. The next section will explore how communities actually start to re-appropriate the government form of resettlement to work for them.

6.4 Community Re-Appropriation of Resettlement

This section will illustrate how the communities under study contest the view of resettlement held by those in government and NGOs. They re-appropriate it to show how it should work for them. The word 're-appropriate' has specifically been chosen, as often 'to appropriate' has connotations of the West taking aspects of culture or knowledge from the Global South without permission or consultation, and sometimes using it for their own purposes in ways it was never intended (Briggs and Sharp, 2004, Halvorsen, 2019). Re-appropriate is purposely used here to illustrate how this formal process of resettlement is contrary to the custom in the communities but yet they can still use it to show what they need from resettlement. Thus, they are *re-appropriating* the term. In this way they are causing those in government and NGOs to question how best to undertake resettlement projects. This use of the term 're-appropriate' is also seen in Van Damme and Neluvhalani (2004) work exploring the increasing uptake of indigenous knowledge into education systems in the Global South. They illustrate how locals are re-appropriating out-dated, colonially influenced education systems to better suit their society.

The re-appropriation of resettlement in my research is most apparent at the community at Nyachikadza but is also present at village Mwalija and to some extent at Jombo resettlement site. In this section, I explore how the government and NGO view of resettlement is re-appropriated in each of these communities to illustrate what they need from the process and what this means for their role within it. Much of this re-appropriation

is about highlighting the issues each community has with Resettlement, as can be seen in Table 6.1. Thus, these issues form the basis for the re-appropriation and I shall explore them below.

Table 6. 1 Summary of the issues with Resettlement found in each community

Community	Issues with <i>Resettlement</i>
Jombo Resettlement Site	Integration into host community – They are still not accepted or feel at home in the host community.
Village Mwalija	Community decision making – The village head holds influence and the community feel inadequately consulted by the NGO involved.
TA Nyachikadza	Land – The fertility of the land in Nyachikadza and the lack of available land close by to Resettle to, which would enable them to still cultivate their fertile land.

The re-appropriation resonates with the ideas of community agency discussed above (Brown and Westaway, 2011), as it involves the communities making their voices heard in the determination of the structures being placed on them. When communities have collective agency, as at Nyachikadza, they most strongly re-appropriate resettlement. The other two communities, with their more diverse agency, illustrate further the nuance of resettlement, how it does not conform to expectation. This can be seen in their forms of re-appropriation. In this way re-appropriation is similar to the ‘claims-making’ from below suggested by Arnall et al. (2019) as a key way to ensure community participation in government resettlement. However, ‘claims-making’ is different in that the re-appropriation I discuss below, does not occur from any formal kind of protest or activism (Arnall et al., 2019) but more through the collective community agency discussed above. The notion of re-appropriation resonates better with the work of Scott (2008), *Weapons of the Weak*. Particularly his notion that the vulnerable poor can resist without forming a revolutionary party but through their everyday actions, which slightly oppose the hegemonic ideas placed upon them (Scott, 2008). However, Scott’s (2008) identified forms of resistance are more subtle than in my research, in which it occurs through refusing to resettle, or through failing to act out successful resettlement if resettled. In this way the communities are destabilising the government and NGO perceived hierarchy of knowledge set out in Chapter 5.

6.4.1 Re-Appropriation at Nyachikadza

Nyachikadza provides a key example of the strength of a community against a government strategy. As established, the government has declared TA Nyachikadza as not fit for human settlement and put in place a no-go zone, meaning there is no humanitarian assistance or government services. This community has a reputation of being reluctant to resettle, as was made evident to me informally by the two government translators I used with this community, as well as in seven of the government and NGO interviews. Indeed, this community is stigmatised by the government for their approach to resettlement. As touched on, this is an interesting contrast to those at Jombo resettlement site who are praised for their resettlement, despite that both communities involve movements driven by cultivation and flooding. However, unless the movement is mandated or approved by the government it appears to not be appreciated or supported by them. Instead of those at Nyachikadza being disheartened by this stigma and the lack of assistance they receive, three quarters of those interviewed from this community demonstrated a sense of pride to be from Nyachikadza, even to go so far as to rejoice in the autonomy this enabled, as shown by Aliva:

Aliva: 'In Nyachikadza, we do not depend on assistance, but in TA Ndamera we would depend on government and NGOs for each and every thing ... So, we are content, we have whatever we need.'

Aliva emphasises how the independence from assistance satisfies and fulfils their community. It raises questions over the notion of identity and sense of belonging, and the role that one's country, land and government have in this. In this case it highlights the land and community as the key priority.

Moreover, it is not just the freedom from dependency that appears to give those at Nyachikadza a sense of autonomy, there is also a deep connection with the land. There were three analogies that came out of the interviews to express this. Sofia highlights a stimulating example:

Sofia (Nyachikadza, 2017): 'I was born there so that's my place. Can you take a crocodile and put that crocodile in the upper land where there is no water? No. we are crocodiles and we live with the water'.

It is interesting that she compares them to a crocodile, a creature most would fear, yet which she believes most resembles them. It is evidence of their relationship and adaptation to this area that a creature an outsider would fear, they view as kin. It illustrates their local connection and communication with the constantly changing area they inhabit, tying in with the discussion of indigenous knowledge set out in Chapter 2 (Briggs, 2013). It also reiterates their independence from government and external involvement and assistance. However, they are very aware that the government wants them to move.

My research suggests that those from Nyachikadza may use their mobility as a bargaining tool in the resettlement process. I have illustrated that despite external pressure, Nyachikadza three quarters of residents interviewed strongly refuse to resettle away from their area. Nine of the 16 Nyachikadza respondents mentioned the importance of the fertility of the land at Nyachikadza as a key reason why they did not want to resettle, indicating the significance of having access to this land. Indeed, two respondents went further to suggest they would resettle if the right land was available for them to move to, as can be seen by Isaac:

Isaac (Nyachikadza, 2017): "The government of UDF [United Democratic Front] is the government that has come with the decision that it is a disaster area. So, from that time to this time they have not given us a place to go, they haven't given us land. They just say 'move from that area to the upper land, move from that area to the upper land' but they haven't, the government hasn't given us the land."

Isaac shows how they cannot move without the government providing them with a place to go, reiterating the responsibility of the government to facilitate resettlement, building on previous discussion, but also suggesting that they will refuse to move until this is fulfilled. The emphasis on the fertility of the land found in over half the Nyachikadza interviews, and the strong connection to Nyachikadza and reluctance to resettle found in three quarters of the interviews, illustrates how the people of Nyachikadza are making themselves part of the resettlement process by indicating the importance of land for them, and their reluctance to resettle. They are thus obtaining agency through failing to oblige with government wishes.

The case of Nyachikadza highlights how the government's current approach to resettlement is not welcomed by all who are vulnerable to flooding. It illuminates the areas where greater consideration and discussion is required. Chiefly, that of land. It also shows that no matter what pressure the government place on a community, short of destroying their home area and physically forcing people to move, they cannot make the people of Nyachikadza move out. This shows the power and conviction a vulnerable population can have, despite the harsh livelihoods they may face (Scott, 2008). Eight of the government and NGO interviewees recognised the importance of fertile land for communities. Additionally, in Chapter 5, I illustrated how government was aware of the need to move to more temporary resettlement to allow for the continuing use of land. However, the way that this was discussed also illustrated that the approach of temporary resettlement was used 'to maintain buy in' to resettlement, with the hope that it would turn into the government desired permanent resettlement (Mtafu, Government, 2017). This suggests the community views were potentially only considered to facilitate the government desired resettlement, suggesting that possibly they are only re-appropriating resettlement to some extent, and may still be being manipulated by government desires (Dean, 1999). A different aspect of re-appropriation can be seen by those in village Mwalija.

6.4.2 Re-Appropriation at Village Mwalija

Village Mwalija provides a slightly different re-appropriation than is evident at Nyachikadza. The community at Mwalija is not directly opposing government wishes by refusing resettlement. They are still deciding. However, what they are contesting is the hegemonic view that resources are the key necessity to resettlement. This follows the logic of the immobility paradox: those who are most vulnerable to environmental change will be the least able to move because they have too few resources and will subsequently be trapped in their vulnerable area (Foresight, 2011). As established, village Mwalija is being offered assistance with the resettlement: an NGO has committed to provide assistance to the most vulnerable households and a borehole has been drilled in the new place. These resources are important, and two interviewees from this community, who presumably would not be categorised as 'most vulnerable', expressed a desire to resettle but cited the lack of resources as the key constraint. However, as the interview analysis in sections 6.2 and 4.3 have shown,

there are other more influential impediments to their resettlement, chiefly the influence of the village head. This suggests that other cultural factors may be important in resettlement decisions. In particular, the role of customary leadership. The new place for resettling village Mwalija is within the same TA so no change in customary leadership is required. Yet, the village head still seems to be impeding the movement by not moving first, which appears to be crucial in the resettlement. This was demonstrated by almost a third of Mwalija interviewees, more than those who referred resources as the key inhibitor. It illustrates that the situation is more complicated than just enabling a resettlement which requires no change in leadership. Thus, village Mwalija re-appropriates the idea of resettlement to make it more than just resources, a key focus of the government and of resettlement literature (Stal, 2011, Tadgell et al., 2018). It highlights how there needs to also be greater attention to the community dynamics within the resettlement and a recognition of the potential hierarchical agency that can evolve from this (see section 6.2).

The NGO involved in the potential resettlement believed they were providing adequate resources by installing a borehole in the new site and assisting with the infrastructure for new houses. As shown by Jake:

Jake (NGO, 2017): 'We had a specific area that we wanted to support, that is rebuilding their life by contributing to their infrastructure in the first place we identified 65 families to start with, as an ongoing project. So, these 65 families were identified by all stakeholders. They were heavily hit by floods. Whereby all their infrastructures were demolished. And then they were living with the friends, within the very same area. ... then we roped in other stakeholders from the assembly [district council] level to put up boreholes in that area.'

There is a clear emphasis on infrastructure. However, it is not completely universal, it is only the most vulnerable who receive the most benefit of this project. This could be a reason why there is mixed feelings from those in the communities, as previously highlighted. Jake discusses the initial enthusiasm by those at village Mwalija for the project but the lack of follow through, with people being unwilling to commit to it.

Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the lack of participation involved in the planning of the resettlement at Mwalija is a key reason why two community residents are unwilling to commit. Jacob's view, is exemplary at highlighting this:

Jacob (Mwalija 2017): 'I suggest that those NGOs that want to help here should also be coming here to ask for our views, instead of maybe making their plans at a district level and then come here to drill the boreholes ... I would prefer those should be coming here and say where should we drill the boreholes?'

The lack of participation within the process means community members do not see it as being best for them. This implies that resources are not the only things required to move but also a willingness and investment in the resettlement process. It also reiterates the need for resettlement to be community led, emphasised earlier and in the literature (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Tadgell et al., 2018). However, Jake, employee of the NGO involved, suggests other factors for the unwillingness to move. The lack of follow through with the project, Jake attributes to 'fears' in the community of changes to chieftaincy and moving away from their ancestral land. Jake describes the situation now:

Jake (NGO, 2017): 'We said OK, can we give you another chance. Now it is you to call us, if you are ready to move after resolving all this, of your fears and all that'.

Jake's reference here to giving them another chance, implies they were at fault to not proceed with the resettlement initially. His tone and grouping together of 'fears and all that', suggests he does not appreciate or understand these issues. However, Jake acknowledges that it is hard for him to appreciate the viewpoint of those in communities and aims to be flexible to this.

The resistance of the people in the village Mwalija community to conform to the NGO view of resettlement has led to some changes to the resettlement proposal. Indeed, Jake suggests that the opinion of his NGO has changed from a permanent move to a more flexible form of resettlement:

Jake (NGO): 'Always I have been thinking, because they have not been contacting us ... You need to develop an approach of how can we move with this approach? How can we

understand each other with this approach? So that the permanent resettlement area is where their property and everything can be. And then this area is an area where they can still practice whatever, but during the rainy period we sensitise them and they go back to their permanent structures. Those are just kind of an office thing that I am trying to develop kind of, because maybe we cannot understand. And we cannot push, but we can at least balance up to solve the situation at hand, of which is flooding.'

Jake illustrates how the silence of the community on proceeding with the resettlement has acted as a form of communication. It has led him to think further on how he can change the approach to resettlement to make it more acceptable. He is aware that he may not fully understand their reasons and hence it is difficult to push the resettlement, but he can be flexible with how the resettlement process could take place to better allow for the current difficulties he is coming up against. It thus shows an adaptability in the governance of resettlement and, similar to what Scott (2008) found, how the resistance of the vulnerable can lead to change in the hegemony. This is particularly important for resettlement as it is still in the early stages of establishment, without a formal policy and thus more able to be influenced and altered.

However, I acknowledge that two in the community did refer to lack of resources as the hindrance to their resettlement and five did suggest that they were waiting on the NGO assistance, whilst the NGO said they were waiting to be called by the community. This has been mentioned previously however, it is relevant I restate in this section to highlight how the resistance may not be intentional. Alternatively, community members may cite lack of resources or lack of communication from the NGO in the interviews due to their perceived audience. They may believe that I, as a Western researcher could impact the resettlement situation in some way, either by providing more resources or reminding the NGO of their presence. I was made aware that they had discussed as a community what they should say to me in the interviews. If the discussion was intentionally manipulated to provide them with more attention and resources, then that in itself could be a form of manipulation of the system.

6.4.3 Re-Appropriation at Jombo

The re-appropriation of resettlement present in the resettled community at Jombo occurs in their integration with the host community. A key part of a successful resettlement is a smooth integration in the host area. However, the community at Jombo have been there for two years and still face problems of integrating with the host community, with hostilities mentioned by half of the Jombo respondents. Connected to this, is the uncertainty over who is there leader, coming out of almost three quarters of the respondents, which is felt in part due to their constant return and contact with their previous area, which all the respondents bar one, who worked at the Illovo sugar plantation, took part in. Their previous area is where their cultivation lands are situated. Therefore, it is unsurprising that they travel to this area frequently. However, it makes it harder for them to fully belong in their host area. Indeed, there is lack of willingness to integrate into the host community. This is where the government view of successful resettlement, suggested for those at Jombo resettlement site, is contested.

There is a deep connection felt to their previous area which inhibits those at Jombo resettlement site from conforming to the new community. This is apparent in over a quarter of the Jombo interviews and is illustrated by Henry:

Henry (Jombo, 2017): 'deep down in my heart I know I am under Champanda, where I came from, because that is where we are doing our farming and that land is controlled by farming'.

Henry's use of 'deep down', implies that this is where he feels he belongs. Additionally, his link to farming, reiterates the role that farming has in these communities in forming identity. As it is suggested that future resettlement should allow for return to the previous area for cultivation, it is likely that integration into a host area may continue to be difficult. This is particularly the case when allegiance is still held to the previous area. Indeed, Kenny highlights how strong this can be:

Kenny (Jombo, 2017): 'I am worried that I have grown up under Champanda, and Champanda, I regard him as my father, and I have come here and now I am under a new father who adopted me. I felt like Champanda loved me unlike this one. That is why

sometimes when items or food come to be distributed to this area, those from Lighton Jombo would prefer to write names from his village, and these ones [those resettled] become the last, most of the time a few people are taken as beneficiaries, whilst people are left.'

Kenny illustrates the deep relationship possible with village heads. He uses the metaphor of family, which has been used previously in section 6.2 to discuss the connection, or lack of it, with a village head for those at Jombo resettlement site. The role of the village head appears to impact their sense of belonging and identities, seen through the hostilities related to aid relief discussed previously. This could also highlight the imbalance that external intervention, such as relief aid, can cause to local systems.

The government appear aware of the need to include the host community in the resettlement process. This comes out from the DoDMA official interviews as well as local government official, Charles discusses the strategy of inclusion of the host community:

Charles (Government, 2017): 'The hosting community is also maybe interested, maybe interested in the maybe social support that is maybe being channelled to the internally displaced people who have maybe possibly been resettled or integrated in the existing villages. So, the approach now, has been that whenever we are bringing an intervention in that particular community we should also make sure that, even some members of the host community should also be benefitting, which is even making it very expensive because you can not only maybe think of the vulnerable households which were possibly affected by the floods, but even considering people who were not affected by floods, but maybe by the fact that they have allowed these people to be integrated to come in their community then that is even calling for more.'

The many 'maybes' used by Charles illustrate the multiple ways that the resettlement process can play out and influence those involved. However, Charles suggests that the government is aware that the involvement of a host community and the need for integration of one community into another has the potential to be problematic. The fact that he says 'the approach now' implies that this is new and could perhaps be due to the lessons learned from the Jombo resettlement. The hostilities with the host community at Jombo also came out of two NGO interviews, and was mentioned on the way to the site by the government translator, this suggests that it is quite well known, but this does not explain why initially this community

was suggested to me by a DoDMA government employee as a success story of resettlement. It is interesting that Charles' main focus in this is regarding resources and the more resources that including the host community requires, emphasising the strain on resources felt by his department.

The re-appropriation of resettlement at Jombo is light compared to that at Nyachikadza. It is not actually prohibiting the resettlement, just hindering its 'success'. However, the issue of integration into a host community and developing a new sense of belonging and identity is often not considered in the resettlement process, yet it is vital to its realisation. Government and NGO employees do seem to be increasingly aware of this: two of the NGO employees interviewed, as well as the two government officials discussed earlier, mention the role of host communities. It may have been ill considered previously because it is a 'post' resettlement dilemma, in that it is important long after the initial resettlement occurs. Tadgell et al. (2018) emphasise the importance of considering the post resettlement phase when facilitating resettlement. Thus, the experience of those at Jombo helps to reshape the notion of resettlement so that it is not just about the actual move, but also the life after.

In all three case studies the communities do insert their approaches onto resettlement and re-appropriate it for what it means to them. Each community shows their own stance on resettlement, simplistically these are: land at Nyachikadza; consideration of other factors than material resources, particularly to look further at leadership influences at village Mwalija; and life post the move at Jombo. Resettlement has yet to occur in the exact way predicted and initially planned by those in government and NGOs. However, in each case government and NGO workers seem to be responding to this. There appears to be a growing appreciation that can be seen throughout the Results for each of the issues illustrated here. This is encouraging for resettlement. It suggests that the voices of those who resettlement is supposedly for are audible and potentially able to destabilise the perceived knowledge hierarchy. However, it is still not clear whether they are truly being respected and viewed as equal to those from government and NGOs. There is suggestion they are just being listened to for the ease of facilitating resettlement. This reiterates questions of inclusivity and participation in resettlement, potentially highlighting the current pervasiveness of the

hierarchy of knowledge set out in Chapter 5, as this seems to influence how vulnerable populations are perceived. It suggests that managing resettlement as a form of adaptation to climate change, as promoted in the literature (Black et al., 2011b) is feasible when there is time to deliberate the best approach with all the actors involved and determine the best approach for voluntary resettlement. It is much harder when it is a reactive situation. This was the case at Jombo and potentially will be for many future situations, as many may prefer to hold off moving until they have no choice. The community re-appropriation also highlights the other factors, most notably around government control, that need to be constantly reviewed and reflected upon, in order to ensure fair resettlement.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the involvement of the vulnerable communities in the resettlement process. The research suggests that the resettlement process is constantly evolving and is context specific (Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). Indeed, each community studied shows different forms of community agency occurring within them (Brown and Westaway, 2011). This contests the use of a universal approach to resettlement, for which the policy I outlined in the previous chapter is an advocacy for. It is a warning against the dangers of an inflexible approach to resettlement, as communities may not accept it. I illustrate in this chapter the influence that community members can have through re-appropriation of resettlement, but which is not accessible to them through the current participation attempted by government and NGOs. Whilst NGOs and government officials do aim to include community members' opinions in the resettlement process, the engrained hierarchy of knowledge perceived by those in government and NGOs prevents a conversation from occurring. Community opinions do not seem to be fully respected or communicated with, suggesting that an outdated view of development is occurring where community views are seen as potentially lesser or ignorant (Mohan, 2007). However, the re-appropriation of resettlement illustrated by the vulnerable communities, and the fact that at least some in government and NGOs are taking on board these points suggests a hopeful future direction for resettlement. It illustrates the fluidity of knowledge. Although, it is not clear whether the viewpoints of those in the communities are being considered because they are hindering the resettlement process, and therefore government must address them to ensure successful

resettlement; or because they are genuinely respected by the government. Regardless of the reason why, they are being listened to and addressed. In this way community members make themselves part of resettlement and indicating that with appropriate reflection, accountability, and communication, it can be a feasible form of adaptation to climate change (Black et al., 2011b, Miller and Dun, 2019).

7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Introduction

The growing support for migration as adaptation to environmental change found in the literature (McLeman and Smit, 2006, Foresight, 2011, Black et al., 2011b, Arnall, 2018), and increasingly in governments and international organisations, has led to an increasing interest in governing environmental migration (Arnall, 2018). Due to the novelty of this interest, there is currently little research on the governance of environmental migration and, specifically, on the role of participation in that governance. This is the key gap in the literature that my research has contributed to. I explored this through focusing on one specific form of governed environmental migration, resettlement due to flooding in Malawi, and on three communities that had different attitudes towards resettlement: resettled, undecided and unwilling. Malawi is undergoing increasingly severe environmental change and its government and NGOs are questioning how best to manage these changes, with resettlement being a key flood management strategy. There is a resettlement policy in development but it has yet to be passed by parliament. Thus, government resettlement in the Lower Shire Region of Malawi has been an appropriate context in which to study the increasing interest in governing environmental migration, and how this process occurs in practice.

To explore the participatory nature of resettlement, my research focused on the knowledges and practices involved in the process. The focus on knowledges was particularly appropriate because environmental migration is context specific and personal. It involves moving out of a space, either permanently or temporarily, where people feel at home. Thus, there is the potential for many priorities to be involved in the movement, making it difficult for the process to be participatory, as all these multiple understandings need to be considered and communicated with. The issue of who has power and control in that decision-making process is further complicated by the varied and unpredictable impact that flooding can have, both on a personal level and more broadly. This research appreciated the dynamics of the knowledge production process of resettlement particularly through focusing on three communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement, which allowed for a clearer

view of the intricacies of the process. My research focused on using the following aim to answer three research questions outlined below:

Aim

To explore the extent of the participation of the relevant actors within the resettlement process in Malawi.

Research questions

1. How and why is flooding in Malawi seen as an increasing threat?
2. How and why is resettlement used as a technique by government and NGOs to manage the population and flooding in Malawi?
3. What role do flood-vulnerable communities have in the government strategy of resettlement?

Through focusing on this aim and answering these research questions, I develop significant contributions both conceptually, particularly furthering the theory of participation, and empirically, through exploring three communities at three different stages of the resettlement process. From these I also provide tentative policy recommendations for the upcoming resettlement policy in Malawi. I set out these contributions and recommendations below before expanding on the relevance, and answer to, each research questions, which ultimately led to these contributions. Finally, I set out a key potential area of further research: community-led resettlement.

7.2 Contributions and Recommendations

7.2.1 Conceptual Contributions

My research adds to the theory on participation, particularly to the literature of participation in development, and to theory on community agency, with emphasis on resistance to resettlement. As established in Chapter 2, the literature has illustrated how participation can be detrimental to development by subtly reinforcing power dynamics (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) but also can be transformative and empowering when actors are fully involved and deep participation, as set out by Arnstein (1969), can occur (Arnstein, 1969, Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Kamruzzaman, 2020). However, much of the literature recognises that it is not as simple as participation being either helpful or unhelpful, but rather there is a

scale of participation possible, ranging from participation being tyranny to participation being transformative and emancipatory (Kamruzzaman, 2020). The graded nature of participation is well established (cf. Arnstein, 1969) but the implications of this on the recent interest in resettlement as climate change adaptation have yet to be explored, and it is to this area in particular that my research contributes.

This research and the existing literature has illustrated how resettlement as climate change adaptation is difficult to navigate in a participatory manner for several reasons. Firstly, it is a novel form of climate change adaptation and there several ideas on how to approach it. This is evident in the vagueness of the existing international guidelines (Correa et al., 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014, Displacement Solutions, 2013) and also in section 5.2 of this thesis, which highlights the multiple understandings of resettlement found in this research. Secondly, there is a sense of urgency around climate change actions. The media and literature is overwhelmed with discussions of tipping points and temperature rises (Falkner, 2016, Arnall et al., 2014) and so there is a pressure for governments and international development to act quickly. Thirdly, the lack of unity in understanding what resettlement entails can lead to a desire for a top down approach to resettlement. This is visible in section 5.4 of this research, which discusses the desire for a resettlement policy. Indeed, the historical use of resettlement in development was top-down, and my research, along with the literature, shows that these connotations still persist today (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015). However, the community responses explored in this research illustrate how resettlement due to climate change is highly emotive and likely to yield strong responses from the participants, as illustrated in section 6.4, highlighting the community re-appropriation of resettlement. This is a key reason why, if resettlement is to be adaptive rather than maladaptive, it needs to be participatory to ensure the participants are onboard and that their lives will be improved by the process. Thus, resettlement as climate change adaptation highlights a contradictory aspect of participation. Participation is particularly necessary in uncertain, urgent and emotive processes, such as resettlement as climate change adaptation, yet this is also when it is most difficult to carry out effectively due to the combination of the complexity and urgency, meaning there is a strong desire by those actors who are able to be more powerful in the process to use this power to ensure the process occurs. Thus, whilst participation platforms may be apparent in these uncertain, urgent and emotive processes, a

significant effort is necessary to ensure the level of participation is more than non-participation or tokenistic, as set out by Arnstein (1969). My research adds further contributions related to what this significant effort may entail.

My research has illustrated that for participation to be effective, of a high level, it needs to be a conversation with all actors involved, where effort is made to ensure all sides are understood. It is not simply about listening to participants, but also communicating with them. This is similar to what several scholars have found in their exploration of the different levels or stages of participation (Arnstein, 1969, Cornwall, 2002, Kamruzzaman, 2020, White, 1996). Previous research has suggested reasons why participation may not be meaningful, such as it being motivated by efficiency rather than power sharing, or an insufficient structure to allow for participation (Kamruzzaman, 2020), or the perception of different actors involved (Scott-Villiers, 2011). My research adds additional contributions to the participation literature through exploring further the inhibiting nature of perceptions on participation. Similar to the findings of scholars before me (Scott-Villiers, 2011, Kamruzzaman, 2020, Arnstein, 1969), my research illustrates how groups, such as vulnerable communities, are not homogenous but contain much diversity, see section 6.2 and 6.4 as well as the following paragraph. However, it is the perception and treatment of them as a homogenous group that can be particularly problematic for participation (Scott-Villiers, 2011, Kamruzzaman, 2020, Arnstein, 1969). My research links the perception of different groups to a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, see section 5.2, to suggest that a lack of respect for different understandings, prevents participation from occurring. Whilst others have made reference to the inhibitive nature of perceptions (Scott-Villiers, 2011), this direct linking of a perceived hierarchy of knowledge to the effectiveness of participation is a novel contribution of my research. It adds another dimension to participation, as it is not just about the context of the process, as discussed in the paragraph above, but rather the mindset of the actors involved. Thus, I argued that the effort mentioned in the previous paragraph, as necessary to ensure the level of participation is greater than tokenistic, is related to facilitating respect and an equal perception of knowledge between the actors involved in a process, without this I claimed it is impossible to have more than tokenistic participation.

The contributions to concepts of community agency made in my research are evident primarily in the variety of agency displayed both between and within communities. The literature suggests that community agency refers to collective action formed through local relationships (Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010). However, my research highlights that because of the diversity of local relationships, collective action and therefore community agency can occur in a variety of ways, see sections 6.2 and 6.4. This indicates that vulnerable community members have much more individual agency than often allowed for in the literature (cf. Mwale et al., 2015), but also that this individual agency can come together in different ways to form community agency, and it is this which is novel in discussions of community agency: the exploring of the interaction between the individual and community agency, and how this can occur differently in different context. As touched on above, this has practical implications, as it highlights the necessity for an outsider to appreciate the context of each community and its members before embarking on something like participatory research, for example, as I elaborate on in the policy implications.

7.2.2 Empirical Contributions

This research explored three communities with three different attitudes towards resettlement, but also at three different stages of resettlement. Those at TA Nyachikadza had not yet embarked on the resettlement process in any way; those at Village Mwalija were at the start of the process, considering resettlement; and those at Jombo resettlement site had resettled. There is as yet no study which explores communities at different stages of resettlement as climate change adaptation within the same country and time frame. Studying the different stages of resettlement illustrated the different priorities apparent at each stage. For those at Nyachikadza it was the importance of land and their strong connection to Nyachikadza; for those at Village Mwalija it was the community decision making dynamics; and for those at Jombo resettlement site, it was the interaction with the host community. This gives an insight to what might be important for the government to consider at the different stages of resettlement and could be a useful approach to exploring the resettlement process in the future. Indeed, from this research I produce four policy recommendations.

7.2.3 Policy Recommendations

Malawi is in the process of developing a resettlement policy, the first of its kind in Malawi. Based on my research I produce four policy recommendations:

1. Build on existing community movements. My research illustrated that movement was used in every community as a way to manage flooding, as a form of temporary seasonal migration, but, whilst over half NGO and government interviewees recognised the potential in temporary seasonal resettlement, none made the connection to the existing community movements. This seems like a natural place to start.
2. Incorporate the host community from the beginning. The resettled community at Jombo illustrates how unresolved issues with the host community will pervade for years after the initial resettlement. Thus, the host community needs to be included from the beginning.
3. Appreciate community power dynamics. The process at village Mwalija highlighted the influence of the village head in the community decision making. However, the research also showed, in section 5.3.1, how village heads may have their own agendas. The complexity of communities highlighted in the theoretical contributions need to be allowed for in the resettlement policy.
4. Enter into a resettlement conversation with vulnerable community members. Building on the theoretical contributions, this is to allow for adequate participation to occur.

7.3 Research Question

7.3.1 How and Why is Flooding Seen as an Increasing Threat?

Previous research has illustrated the potential for hidden agendas behind resettlement, for it to be used as a method to gain greater control over the population and push it into a certain economy (Arnall, 2018, Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019, Wilmsen and Rogers, 2019). I was interested to see whether this was occurring in Malawi. It was not. Rather, my research showed how an illustrated increase in flooding was viewed as a significant enough

threat to legitimise government involvement in resettlement. This signified the legitimisation process that Arnall (2018) highlights as central in the use of resettlement as adaptation to climate change. Thus, I highlighted how the government produced a visible space for governance, which is consistent with the governmentality framework outlined by Dean (1999). However, in section 5.2, I took this further to question the motivations of government resettlement, exploring if there was an agenda behind the legitimization of government involvement or whether it was solely due to a desire to manage flooding effectively. Following the example of Rogers and Wilmsen's (2019) suggested motivations of resettlement, I queried whether resettlement in Malawi was advocated for due to altruism, to save vulnerable people; to gain more control over an increasingly mobile population; for improved economic efficiency; to form a certain type of citizen desirable to the government; or in response to pressure from the international community to invest in climate change adaptation. Whilst I found a mixture of these motivations to be apparent in my research, predominantly the motivations present were altruistic. Thus, I answered why flooding was seen as an increasing threat: because there was a belief in increasing flood and responses to this were driven primarily by a desire to assist those most vulnerable. This helped provide the context for exploring the resettlement process. Next, I summarize how flooding was seen as an increasing threat.

My research showed that the analysis of flooding data was one technique the government used to legitimise its involvement in resettlement. I described this data in Chapter 4, it highlighted the increasing severity of flooding, essentially presenting flooding as a national threat. This data made up part of the episteme of government, forming the government's knowledge base (Dean, 1999). In Chapter 4, I showed how the government relied on this data to illustrate the increasing flooding in Malawi. Data on weather metrics over time is commonly used to highlight climate change and the need for action (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2011) and so it was unsurprising that the government used this to justify their interest in flooding and resettlement. Furthermore, I highlighted how the use of such data was synonymous to technocratic forms of knowledge, indicating the presence of an audit culture (Kuus, 2016). This is common in national government, especially one with a reliance on donor aid. Thus, I concluded that there was little evidence that the government had a

hidden agenda behind the government interest in resettlement. This was important to establish before analysing the resettlement process in more detail.

7.3.2 How and Why is Resettlement Used as a Technique by Government and NGOs to Manage the Population and Flooding in Malawi?

In answering this research question, I developed two key connected points from my research: the difference and disconnect between those in government and NGOs, and those in the flooding-vulnerable communities; and the hierarchy of knowledge perceived by those in government and NGOs. These points are connected because the difference and disconnect is a key reason why the perceived hierarchy of knowledge pervades. The differences and perceived hierarchy were identified when exploring *why* resettlement was used as a technique by government. *How* resettlement is used as a technique by government and NGOs was less clear, but in many ways more straightforward. At the time of research there was no unified approach to government resettlement but there were hopes that this will be provided by the upcoming resettlement policy. This resettlement policy would be a top-down method of instigating and managing resettlement. As mentioned, much of the resettlement literature suggests that top-down policies do not adequately reflect the needs of those resettling and that resettlement works better when community led (Arnall et al., 2019, Tadgell et al., 2018). My Results showed that those in government and NGOs appeared somewhat aware of the need for participation, yet still it did not occur. Indeed, many government and NGO employees interviewed showed a desire for a resettlement policy that would enable more power to government to enforce resettlement, rather than being more open to community concerns. Therefore, this was significant for my key contributions, as it explored further why government resettlement in this region in Malawi is top down with little respect for community concerns.

Resettlement has connotations of being top-down and abrupt (Rogers and Wilmsen, 2019). The abrupt nature was favoured because flooding was seen as a significant threat, as illustrated above, and resettlement was viewed as removing the vulnerable population from danger. In section 5.3 and 5.4, my research illustrated that there were platforms for participation but a top down approach was favoured. I argued this was due to a perceived difference, which I illustrated in section 4.4, between those who the government and NGOs

viewed as responsible for causing the increasingly severe flooding – those in vulnerable communities, and those they viewed as responsible for managing the severe flooding – themselves. This difference was particularly evident in the difference between *Resettlement* and *resettlement* illustrated in Table 4.1. Moreover, I argued that this difference manifested itself in a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, see Figure 5.2.

My research highlighted how a perceived hierarchy of knowledge in the resettlement process developed when those interviewed in positions of power (government and NGOs) felt disconnected to the vulnerable populations, and viewed a problem, such as flooding, as significant enough to merit their involvement. This hierarchy of knowledge can be summarised diagrammatically, as indicated in Figure 5.2. The figure sets out how large international organisations and donors, such as the World Bank, are viewed by those in government and NGOs as at the top of the knowledge hierarchy and have strongest influence over funding and the direction of many development projects. They often work with national government and so these are second in the hierarchy, followed by the local government and smaller NGOs, which my research suggested to be under the instruction of the government. At the bottom of this hierarchy are the vulnerable populations for whom the resettlement process is supposedly for. Other scholars, such as Li (2007), Goldman (2001) and Ferguson (1994) have found similar situations within development projects. Indeed much of the work on participation within development has been concerned with levelling this hierarchy (Hickey and Mohan, 2008). Thus, important for developing my contributions was analysing how a hierarchy occurs in, and the subsequent implications it can have on, the evolving issue of managing the social impacts of climate change, which environmental migration governance, and resettlement due to flooding more specifically, fall into.

Sensitisation was a key method through which the government and NGOs attempted to level understanding. I showed how this was discussed by NGO and government employees interviewed, particularly when a community was not behaving in the desired way. As I set out in Chapter 2, there is little literature on sensitisation in development, although it fits with concerns about the hypocrisy of participation outlined in some critiques (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). I argued the focus was on ‘educating’ communities to the ‘correct’ way of behaving

that fitted with government and NGO understandings and that sensitisation was not participatory. Thus, I highlighted how the critiques directed at participatory approaches also applied to sensitisation. In particular, the critiques highlighting how participation, or in this case sensitisation, can perpetuate existing power dynamics, often without those of low power being aware it is happening (Kapoor, 2005). This was influential in the development of my conceptual contributions, as I showed how a system built on a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, gave little agency to those in communities who the resettlement was meant to benefit. This was particularly surprising when there has been much discussion in the literature on the importance of participation in development (Hickey and Mohan, 2008, Kindon et al., 2007, McKinnon, 2007, Mohan, 2007, Kesby, 2005) and resettlement more specifically (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015, Arnall, 2018) and when an aim at participation was implicit in the interviews.

7.3.3 What Role do Flood-Vulnerable Communities Have in the Government Strategy of Resettlement?

My research illustrated that the bulk of the power over the resettlement process decisions lay with large international organisations, government and to some extent, NGOs. However, the resettlement under research required the voluntary movement of a community out of their home to a new one for some period of time. It was consequently a highly emotive issue. Whilst the perceived hierarchy of knowledge within the process did not allow much agency to the communities, my research showed that the resettlement process was viewed as voluntary and the communities were not physically forced out of their homes. Therefore, community members found ways to exercise their agency and meet their needs within the resettlement process. In exploring this I developed my final conceptual contribution on community agency.

In two of the communities studied, official government or NGO resettlement was yet to take place. My research suggested that there were specific reasons for why this was the case, as seen in Table 6.1. I argued that these specific reasons illustrated that the communities did have some agency within the resettlement process, as they were able to highlight, if asked, their needs within the process. The resettled and host community exhibited their agency through the lack of integration of the resettled community into the host community,

which had persisted two years after the resettlement. The continuing separation of the resettled and host part of the community showed that adequate consideration of the host community is needed for successful resettlement to occur.

For each community, agency was expressed in different ways, highlighting the multiple systems in which a community can interact, as indicated in the conceptual contributions. My research outlined three forms of community agency: cohesive, hierarchical and segregated. As my conceptual contribution highlighted, these forms of community agency nuance the notion of community agency present in the literature (Eversole, 2011, Luloff and Bridger, 2003, Matarrita-Cascante et al., 2010, Brown and Westaway, 2011), reiterating the need for a context specific approach in resettlement and in the governance of environmental migration more generally. It also gave more nuance to the role of the community in the resettlement process. Often the literature clumps together vulnerable communities (Šakić Trogrlić et al., 2019), focusing on the inhibiting nature of the vulnerability. This prevents exploration into the ways in which vulnerable communities conduct their livelihoods whilst still being vulnerable (Scott, 2008), an interesting understudied aspect. Much policy research is focused on providing a solution (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, UNHCR, 2014), when a key contribution that this research illustrated is that much can be learnt from exploring the agency of the vulnerable community.

I illustrated that the reasons given for the lack of movement exhibited by the 'yet to resettle' communities, and the failure of the resettled community to fully integrate into the host community, highlighted each community's needs within the resettlement process. In this way they re-appropriate resettlement. The data suggested that this lack of movement, or lack of success in resettlement, was forcing the government and NGOs to listen to the concerns of those in communities and address them, but only with the conviction that this would ultimately serve the government's desired approach. Thus, I argued that they were able to listen and include the concerns of those in the communities because this was framed as a way of reaching the government's goals. It did not suggest that these concerns were being included because of a genuine appreciation of the community needs but rather because this facilitated resettlement. This was significant in forming my conceptual contributions, as it opens up an understudied aspect of resettlement and participation research more generally:

the importance of the perception and respect of the vulnerable population. Respect is subjective and difficult to analyse empirically. The implications of a lack of respect for the process of resettlement, or participation more broadly, is consequently hard to deduce. Scholars such as Arnall (2018) and Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) have highlighted the importance of how those resettling are framed in determining the process of the movement. Arnall (2018) goes further to link the development narratives to government perceptions of vulnerable populations. However, more research is needed to explore further the significance of perception and respect on the resettlement outcome.

7.4 Further Research: Producing a Framework for Community-Based Resettlement

Given the need for resettlement as climate change adaptation to be voluntary, and therefore participatory, it is important for research to focus further on communities' use of resettlement. In this research I have set out a rationale as to how and why governments may be getting increasingly interested in using resettlement as climate change adaptation, and what this process might look like from a government perspective. Much of the resettlement literature calls for adaptive resettlement to be community led (Arnall, 2018, Arnall et al., 2019, Miller and Dun, 2019, Tadgell et al., 2018, Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). However, there is sparse literature on how this should occur. Thus, future research could explore further how to make resettlement more community focused, as my research has highlighted that a prejudice against the capability and knowledge of vulnerable communities still pervades, despite extensive research arguing against this, and impacts the meaningfulness of participation. However, my research does not explore in detail how to respond to these findings.

Whilst high level participation was not evident in the process of resettlement present in this research, the potential benefit of high level participation, participation as conversation, was. Much of the literature discusses the hypothetical benefit of participation, how it can be empowering for the community (Kamruzzaman, 2020), how it can be level power dynamics (Kesby, 2007) but more research is needed to understand better how this works. In my research I illustrate how vulnerable community members use movement as a way to manage

flooding, see section 4.3. Over half of the government and NGO interviewees, however, did suggest that temporary seasonal resettlement would be appropriate way to manage flooding, see section 5.2. The temporary seasonal resettlement is very similar to the existing use of movement by rural community members, yet, only two government and NGO interviewees barely acknowledge this fact, and no interviewee suggests that the existing movements could be worked with and developed further into a more formal type of temporary resettlement. In theory, many of the challenges around implementing resettlement, such as land availability, acceptance of the host community, changing of chieftaincy, connection to land and acceptance of new areas; should be much lower if resettlement was built from existing movement, links and ties established in the community. Thus, it would be interesting to explore further how this could work.

Indeed, for many flooding-vulnerable communities, flooding is a not a new phenomenon. It is something they have been coping with for many years. Moving out of the path of an impending flood is a common strategy for vulnerable communities to manage flooding, as I found in my research. Therefore, I suggest that an interesting piece of future research could be to explore these movements further, examining exactly how communities use movement to manage flooding, gaining a database of this from several countries to see if there are any cross cuttings themes that could be used to produce a framework of community-based flooding movements. Moreover, it would be interesting to take this framework to relevant governments to see where government could assist with the movement, thereby ensuring it was community resettlement with the necessary government assistance, instead of government Resettlement, with limited community involvement. This would show respect to the community movements occurring already, which could help to solve the pervasive issue of participation that seems to plague government resettlement, and also help to explore whether improved respect of flooding-vulnerable communities within the resettlement process makes a difference, as advocated for earlier.

8. EPILOGUE

I returned to Malawi twice after my PhD fieldwork in August – November 2017. Once in September 2018 and in September – November 2019. The trip in 2018 was to assist with a pilot development project undertaking a Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review in three districts: Zomba, Dedza and Nkhata Bay. Whilst interesting and useful at providing extra context and knowledge for Malawi, it did not significantly impact my PhD findings. However, my trip in September 2019 was working with the same communities as in my PhD work and highlighted some interesting developments since my PhD research. I discuss this trip further below.

In September 2019 I, along with fellow researchers at the University of St Andrews, embarked on a scoping research project exploring the implications of Cyclone Idai on disaster management in Malawi. Cyclone Idai was a cyclone that occurred in March 2019 and impacted Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. We were aware that the nature of Cyclone Idai was unusual, as the weather system came on land, went back out to the Indian Ocean and then came back on land again. This doubling back of the weather system is uncommon erratic behaviour. Additionally, the cyclone had a severe impact on Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi, despite Zimbabwe and Malawi being landlocked countries. We wanted to see if all of this had an impact on how disasters were perceived and prepared for in Malawi. To this end I conducted fieldwork in Malawi between September and November 2019, working with the same or similar participants I had used for my PhD fieldwork, which also enabled me to follow up on some of my PhD findings. Overall, we found that government officials from DoDMA were reticent to acknowledge the increasing threat from cyclones, as they viewed them as comparatively low risk compared to other disasters, or from flooding related to monsoonal rains. However, we also found that two of the most severe flooding events in Malawi, in 2015 and 2019, were due to weather systems originating in the Indian Ocean and not from monsoonal flooding. I, along with many of my participants, were unaware that the 2015 flooding was due to a weather system from the Indian Ocean. Weather systems that form from the Indian Ocean are less predictable than monsoonal rains. Monsoonal rains are able to be part of the seasonal forecasts, whereas weather systems forming in the Indian Ocean are only able to be predicted a few days before they hit land. This requires a different

kind of early warning systems and preparedness. Also, these weather systems gain energy from the ocean, and start to lose it when they hit land. It is therefore uncommon that they impact Malawi, yet the two most severe flooding events were due to them. This, to us, suggested that it could be interesting to undertake further research exploring the impact of weather systems occurring in the Indian Ocean on Malawi.

Two other aspects of the scoping study were relevant for my PhD research. Firstly, there appeared to be an even greater focus by government on resettlement as a strategy to manage flooding than there had been in my previous fieldwork. Resettlement came up extensively without me asking about it, reiterating that it is of interest to government. Secondly, village Mwalija did resettle post flooding in March 2019. This suggests that a disaster may be required to push resettlement to occur, querying whether it is voluntary resettlement and potentially highlighting the current inadequate participation procedures. Despite this, national and local government appeared very proud of Mwalija's resettlement process. Local government officials showed me the site of the washed away village, we then drove some few minutes to the camp site, where the village camped for 3 months, and then to their resettlement site, which was the original new area that had been allocated to them previously and where the borehole had already been drilled. This route of devastated village, camp area, and resettlement site seemed to be well trodden by the government officials. I was made aware that they had taken an important UNICEF official along it only a month before. It suggested to me that the government wanted to show off this resettlement as a great achievement, which reminded of how they had spoken about Jombo resettlement site during my PhD visit.

However, similar with my experience with participants at Jombo during my PhD research, when discussing with the community members from village Mwalija, it was clear they were not completely happy with the resettlement. They highlighted how the flood waters had destroyed their houses and so they had no choice but to accept the new houses built for them by Red Cross. However, these are small, one room houses, with insufficient space for many households and they have caused several problems. Many believe they have been built in a way that make it difficult to expand. Therefore, there is discontent amongst the community members over how the resettlement has taken place. This reiterates

questions as to whether the resettlement for village Mwalija was voluntary, if they had no houses in which to live in their previous area. It reinforces the resource intensity of resettlement, which is recognised in the literature (Arnall, 2018), as Red Cross could only provide one room houses. Yet, it also highlights how the needs of the people are not adequately considered, as many community members suggested it was a real issue living in one room with other family and extended family members, couples and children altogether. It suggests that another area of interesting future research could be to explore the difference between post-disaster and pre-disaster resettlement, to establish the different needs and priorities in these scenarios.

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APPENDIX 1 – ETHICAL APPROVAL LETTER FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

21st August 2017
 Hebe Nicholson
 Geography and Geosciences

Ethics Reference No: <i>Please quote this ref on all correspondence</i>	GG13079
Project Title:	Knowledge Production of Migration and Environment in Malawi
Researchers Name(s):	Hebe Nicholson
Supervisor(s):	Professor Nina Laurie, Dr Nissa Finney & Dr David McCollum

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered by the Geography and Geosciences School Ethics Committee on the date specified below. The following documents were reviewed:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| 1. Ethical Application Form
2017 | 30 th June |
| 2. Participant Information Sheet
30 th June 2017 | |
| 3. Consent Form
2017 | 30 th June |

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Matt Southern
Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

UTREC School of Geography and Geosciences Convenor, Irvine Building, North
Street, St Andrews, KY16 9AL

Email: ggethics@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 463897

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APPENDIX 2 – ETHICAL APPROVAL LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAWI

REF.NO.NCST/RTT/2/6 8th September, 2017

Hebe Nicholson
C/O Dr Evance Mwachungu
University of Malawi
P.O Box 280
Zomba

Dear Hebe Nicholson,

RE: ETHICS AND REGULATORY APPROVAL AND PERMIT OF PROTOCOL P08/17/206 KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOBILITY IN MALAWI

Having satisfied all the ethical, scientific and regulatory requirements, procedures and guidelines for the conduct of research in the social sciences sector in Malawi, I am pleased to inform you that the above referred research study has officially been approved. You may now proceed with its implementation. Should there be any amendments to the approved protocol in the course of implementing it, you shall be required to seek approval of such amendments before implementation of the same.

This approval is valid for one year from the date of issuance of this letter. If the study goes beyond one year, an annual approval for continuation shall be required to be sought from the National Committee on Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and Humanities (NCRSH) in a format available at the Secretariat. Once the study is finished, you are required to furnish the Committee and the Commission with a final report of the study. The committee research to right to carry out compliance inspection of this approved protocol at any time as may be deemed by it. As such, you are expected to properly maintain all study documents including consent forms.

Wishing you a successful implementation of your study.

Yours Sincerely,

Martina Chimzimu

NCRSH ADMINISTRATOR
For: CHAIRMAN OF NCRSH

APPENDIX 3 – PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORMS, ENGLISH AND CHICHEWA



Participant Information Sheet (NGOs)

Project Title

Knowledge Production of Migration and Environment in Malawi

What is the study about?

We invite you to participate in a research project about the process of knowledge production of environmental migration in Malawi

This study is being conducted as part of my, Hebe Nicholson, PhD in the School of Geography and Sustainable Development.

Do I have to take Part?

This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part. It is up to you and you alone whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason.

What would I be required to do?

You will be asked to complete an interview that we anticipate will take between 30-60 minutes to complete.

Will my participation be Anonymous and Confidential?

Only the researcher(s), translator(s), transcriber(s) and supervisor(s) will have access to the data, which will be kept strictly confidential. Your permission will be sought in the Participant Consent form for the data you provide. Anonymity of the data cannot be guaranteed due to the role of the participant in the NGO, government, or community, which may be given away in the interview.

Storage and Destruction of Data Collected

The data we collect will initially be accessible by the researcher, translator, transcriber and supervisor involved in this study only, unless explicit consent for wider access is given by means of the consent form. Your data will be stored indefinitely in an anonymised format on a computer system. This research is funded by the ESRC, therefore to fit with their guidelines, after the completion of the study the anonymous data will be put on a public database for other researchers to access if required.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The results will be finalised by September 2020 and written up as part of my PhD

Are there any potential risks to taking part?

No

Questions

You will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to this project before giving completing a Consent Form.

Consent and Approval

This research proposal has been scrutinised and been granted Ethical Approval through the University ethical approval process.

What should I do if I have concerns about this study?

A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee is available at <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/>

Contact researcher directly

Contact Details

Researcher: Hebe Nicholson

Contact Details: hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk

Supervisor: Nina Laurie

Contact Details: gg@st-andrews.ac.uk



Participant Consent Form (NGOs) Identifiable / Attributable Data

Project Title

Knowledge Production of Environmental Mobility in Malawi

Researcher Name

Hebe Nicholson

Supervisors Names

Dr David McCollum and Prof Nina Laurie

The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research. We therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature confirms that you are happy to participate in the study.

What is Identifiable/Attributable Data?

‘Identifiable/Attributable data’ is data where the participant is identified, such as when a public figure gives an interview, or where consent is given by a participant for their name (including perhaps gender and address) to be used in the research outputs. The raw data will be held confidentially by the researcher(s) (and supervisors). The published research will clearly identify and attribute data collected to the participant.

Consent

The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let you understand what it entails. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free to withdraw at any stage.

Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research data.

- | | | |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| I have read and understood the information sheet. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| I have had my questions answered satisfactorily. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without having to give an explanation. | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |

I agree to being identified in this interview and any subsequent publications or use. If I do not want to be identified, I understand that although every effort will be made not to use my name, the answer I give may betray my identity Yes No

I understand that my raw data will be kept securely and will be accessible only to the researcher(s) (and translators, transcribers and supervisors). Yes No

I agree to my data (in line with conditions outlined above,) being kept by the researcher and being archived and used for further research projects / by other bona fide researchers. I understand that this may allow other researchers to de-code the data and identify me. Yes No

I agree to take part in the study

Part of my research involves taking tape recordings. These recordings will be kept secure and stored with no identifying factors i.e. consent forms and questionnaires.

Photographs and recorded data can be valuable resources for future studies therefore we ask for your additional consent to maintain data and images for this purpose.

I agree to being tape recorded Yes No

I agree for my tape recorded material to be published as part of this research Yes No

Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before you can participate in this research. If you decide at a later date that data should be destroyed we will honour your request in writing.

Name in Block Capitals _____

Signature _____

Date _____



Participant Information Sheet (Community)

Project Title

Knowledge Production of Migration and Environment in Malawi

What is the study about?

We invite you to participate in a research project about the process of knowledge production of environmental migration in Malawi

This study is being conducted as part of my, Hebe Nicholson, PhD in the School of Geography and Sustainable Development.

Do I have to take Part?

This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part. It is up to you and you alone whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason.

What would I be required to do?

You will be asked to complete an interview that we anticipate will take between 30-60 minutes to complete.

Will my participation be Anonymous and Confidential?

Only the researcher(s), translator(s), transcriber(s) and supervisor(s) will have access to the data, which will be kept strictly confidential. Your permission will be sought in the Participant Consent form for the data you provide. Anonymity of the data is guaranteed.

Storage and Destruction of Data Collected

The data we collect will initially be accessible by the researcher, translator, transcriber and supervisor involved in this study only, unless explicit consent for wider access is given by means of the consent form. Your data will be stored indefinitely in an anonymised format on a computer system. This research is funded by the ESRC, therefore to fit with their guidelines, after the completion of the study the anonymous data will be put on a public database for other researchers to access if required.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The results will be finalised by September 2020 and written up as part of my PhD

Are there any potential risks to taking part?

No

Questions

You will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to this project before giving completing a Consent Form.

Consent and Approval

This research proposal has been scrutinised and been granted Ethical Approval through the University ethical approval process.

What should I do if I have concerns about this study?

A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee is available at <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/>

Contact researcher directly

Contact Details

Researcher: Hebe Nicholson

Contact Details: hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk

Supervisor: Nina Laurie

Contact Details: gg@st-andrews.ac.uk



Participant Consent Form Coded Data (**Community**)

Project Title

Knowledge Production of Environmental Mobility in Malawi

Researcher(s) Name(s)

Hebe Nicholson

Supervisors Names

Dr David McCollum and Prof Nina Laurie

The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research. We therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature confirms that you are happy to participate in the study.

What is Coded Data?

The term 'Coded Data' refers to when data collected by the researcher is identifiable as belonging to a particular participant but is kept with personal identifiers removed. The researcher(s) retain a 'key' to the coded data which allows individual participants to be re-connected with their data at a later date. The uncoded data is kept confidential to the researcher(s) (and Supervisors). If consent is given to archive data (see consent section of form) the participant may be contacted in the future by the original researcher(s) or other researcher(s).

Consent

The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let you understand what it entails. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free to withdraw at any stage.

Material gathered during this research will be coded and kept confidentially by the researcher with only the researcher and supervisor having access. It will be securely stored indefinitely in anonymous format. This research is funded by the ESRC, therefore to fit with their guidelines, after the completion of the study the anonymous data will be put on a public database for other researchers to access if required.

Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research data.

I have read and understood the information sheet. Yes No

I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study. Yes No

I have had my questions answered satisfactorily. Yes No

I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without having to give an explanation. Yes No

I understand that my data will be confidential and that it will contain identifiable personal data but that will be stored with personal identifiers removed by the researcher and that only the researcher/supervisor will be able to decode this information as and when necessary. Yes No

I agree to my data (in line with conditions outlined above) being kept by the researcher and being archived and used for further research projects / by other bona fide researchers. I understand that this may allow other researchers to decode the data and identify me. Yes No

I have been made fully aware of the potential risks associated with this research and am satisfied with the information provided. Yes No

I agree to take part in the study Yes No

Part of my research involves taking photographic images and tape recordings. These images and recordings will be kept secure and stored with no identifying factors i.e. consent forms and questionnaires.

Photographs and recorded data can be valuable resources for future studies therefore we ask for your additional consent to maintain data and images for this purpose.

I agree to have my photo taken and to being tape recorded Yes No

I agree for my photo, tape recorded material to be published as part of this research Yes No

I agree for my photos, tape recorded material to be used in future studies Yes No

Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before you can participate in this research. If you decide at a later date that data should be destroyed we will honour your request in writing.

Name in Block Capitals _____

Signature _____

Date _____



University of
St Andrews

ZOFUNIKA KUDZIWA OTENGA NAWO MBALI (MABUNGWE OMWE SI A BOMA)

Mutu wa Kafukufuku

Kapangidwe ka Chidziwitso cha Nsamuko olingana ndi Chilengedwe ku Malawi

Kafukufukuyu ndi okhudza chani?

Tikukuitanirani kuti mutenge mbali mu kafukufuku amene akukhudza momwe ntchito yopanga chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe imakhallira ku Malawi.

Kafukufukuyu akuchitidwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro a Hebe Nicholson a ukachenjedwe wa PhD ku sukulu yoona za chilengedwe ndi chitukuko.

Kodi ndikuyenera nditenge nawo mbali?

Chipepala ichi chalembedwa kuti chikuthandizeni kupanga chiganizo ngati mungakonde kutenga nawo mbali kapena ayi. Zili kwa inuyo kupanga chisankho chimenechi. Ngati mungapange chiganizo chotenga mbali, ndinu omasuka kusiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi ina ili yonse ndipo simudzafunsidwa kuti mupereke chifukwa.

Ndidzayenera kupanga chani?

Tidzakufunsani kuti ticheze nanu ndipo tikuyembekeza kuti kucheza ku kudzatenga nthawi ya pakati pa mphindi makumi atatu ndi ola limodzi.

Kodi kutenga nawo mbali kwanga kudzakhala kwa chinsisi komanso kopanda maina?

Ndi opanga kafukufuku, omasulira, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang'anira kafukufukuyu okha amene adzakhale ndi mwayi ogwira zopezeka mkafukufukuyu. Pa zonse zopezeka mkafukufuku zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu, tidzapempha chilolezo chanu pogwiritsa ntchito fomu ya chilolezo cha otenga mbali. Sitingalonjeze kuti sipadzakhala kutchula maina a omwe anatenga nawo mbali chifukwa cha udindo wa otenga mbaliwo ku mabungwe omwe si a boma, ku boma kapenanso mu dera, zimene zingapezeke zatchulidwa mukucheza kwathu.

Kasungidwe ndi kaonongedwe ka zopezeka m'kafukufuku

Pachiyambi, zopezeka m'kafukufukuyu zidzagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi opanga kafukufukuyu, omasulira, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang'anira kafukufukuyu okha, pokhapokha ngati otenga mbali wapereka chilolezo kuti anthu enanso akhonza kugwiritsa ntchito zopezekazi. Zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu zidasungidwa mu njira yosaonetsera kuti ndi za ndani mu makina

a kompyuta. Kafukufukuyu akuchitika ndi thandizo lochokera ku ESRC, chotero molingana ndi ndondomeko zawo, kafukufukuyu akadzatha, tidzasiya zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mu malo amene opanga kafukufuku aliyense akhoza kuzipeza ngati angafunike kuti atero.

Zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mudzazichita chani?

Ntchito yonse ya zotsatira za m'kafukufukuyi idzatsirizidwa usanadutse mwezi wa Seputembala chaka cha 2020 ndipo zotsatirazi zidzalembedwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro anga a ukachenjede wa PhD.

Kodi pali chiopsezo china chili chonse kwa otenga mbali?

Ayi, palibe.

Mafunso

Mudzakhala ndi mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu musanapatsidwe kapena kulemba fomu ya chilolezo.

Chilolezo

Lingaliro la kafukufukuyu linazukutidwa bwino ndi kupatsidwa chilolezo kupyolera mu ndondomeko yoona za khalidwe loyenera lopangila kafukufuku la ku sukulu ya ukachenjede ya St Andrews.

Ndingatani ngati ndili ndi dandaulo ndi kafukufukuyu?

Tsatanetsatane la khalidwe loyenera la kafukufuku lomwe limayang'aniridwa ndi komiti yoona za khalidwe loyenera mu kuphunzitsa komanso kupanga kafukufuku ku sukulu ya ukachenjede ya St Andrews likupezeka pa:

<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/>

Mukhoza kumupeza opanga kafukufuku pogwiritsa ntchito kalata ya makina a kompyuta:

Dzina la opanga kafukufuku: Hebe Nicholson

Kupezeka pa: hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk

Dzina la Oyang'anira: Nina Laurie

Kupezeka pa: gg@st-andrews.ac.uk



University of
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FOMU YA CHILOLEZO KUCHOKA KWA OTENGA MBALI (MABUNGWE OMWE SI ABOMA)

Kuzindikirika kwa zopezeka m’kafukufuku

Mutu wa kafukufuku

Chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe ku Malawi

Dzina la opanga kafukufuku

Hebe Nicholson

Mayina a oyang’anira kafukufuku

Dr David McCollum, Prof Nina Laurie

Sukulu ya za ukachenjede ya St Andrews imasamala kwambiri za kuonetsetsa kuti kafukufuku wachitidwa mu khalidwe loyenelera. Chotero tikupempha kuti muganizire bwino mfundo zotsatirazi, musanasaine fomu iyi. Kusayina kwanu kutanthauza kuti ndinu osangalatsidwa kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu.

Kodi zopezeka m’kafukufuku zozindikirika ndi chani?

Zopezeka m’kafukufuku zozindikirika ndi zopezeka m’kafukufuku zomwe munthu yemwe anazipereka adzadziwidwa kapena kuzindikiridwa. Mwachitsanzo, tikacheza ndi munthu odziwika kwambiri kapena munthu otenga mbali akapeleka chilolezo kuti dzina lake (mwinanso kuphatikizapo komwe amapezeka kapena kunena kuti iwo ndi aakazi kapena aamuna), zidzagwiritsidwe ntchito mu zotsatira za kafukufukuyu. Opanga kafukufukuyu (ndi oyang’anira kafukufukuyu) adzasunga mwachinsisi zopezeka m’kafukufuku zonse zosazukutidwa. Zotsatira za mkafukufukuyu zomwe zidasindikizidwe zidzaonetsa bwino lomwe yemwe anapeleka zopezekazo.

Chilorezo

Cholinga cha chilolezochi ndi kuonetsetsa kuti otenga mbali apeleka chilolezo kuti atenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu, ndipo amvetsetsa zotsatira za kutenga mbali kwawo. Kusaina chilorezochi sikukutanthauza kuti inu ndinu okakamizika kupanga zinthu zomwe inuyo simukufuna ndipo muli omasuka kusiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi ina ili yonse.

Chonde yankhani mfundo zili munsimu, zokhudzana ndi katoleledwe komanso kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka zopezeka mukafukufukuyu.

Ndawerenga ndi kumvetsetsa zofunika kudziwa otenga mbali Eya Ayi

Ndapatsidwa mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu Eya Ayi

Ndakhutitsidwa ndi mayankho omwe ndapatsidwa Eya Ayi

Ndamvetsetsa kuti ndili ndi ufulu osiya kutenga mbali mu
Kafukufukuyu pa nthawi ina iliyonse opanda kupeleka chifukwa Eya Ayi

Ndavomeleza kuti nditha kutchulidwa dzina mu kucheza kwathu
ndi muzosindikiza zonse. Ngati sindikufuna kutchulidwa,
ndikumvetsa kuti ngakhale adzayesetse kusatchula dzina langa,
zomwe ndingakambe zikhoza kudzandiululitsa kuti ndine ndani Eya Ayi

Ndamvetsetsa kuti zomwe mutenge kwa ine zidzasungidwa
motetezedwa ndipo zidzagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi opanga kafukufuku
yekha (kuphatikizapo omasulila kafukufuku, olemba zoyankhulidwa
mu kafukufuku ndi oyang'anira kafukufukuyu) Eya Ayi

Ndavomereza kuti zomwe mutenge kwa ine m'kafukufukuyu,
(mogwirizana ndi mfundo zili pa mwambazi,) zidzasungidwe ndi
opanga kafukufuku ndi kuti zitha kusungidwa malo abwino
nkudzagwiritsidwa ntchito m'tsogolo mu akafukufuku ena.
Ndikuzindikira kuti opanga kafukufuku enawo atha kudzandizikira
kuti ndine ndani Eya Ayi

Ndikuvomereza kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu Eya Ayi

Kafukufukuyu akukhudzanso kujambula zomwe zikuyankhulidwa. Zojambulidwazo
zidasungidwa mosamalitsa ndinso mosalemba dzina kapena chizindikiro chilichonse
chosonyeza mwina wake yemwe anajambulidwa monga kalata ya chilolezoyi kapena pepala la
mafunsu. Zithunzi komanso mawu ojambulidwa ndizofunika kwambiri maka mu kafukufuku
wina amene angachitike mtsogolo. Choncho tikupempha kuti mutipatse chilolezo chosunga
zithunzi ndi mawu ojambulidwa pa chifukwa chimenechi.

Ndikuvomereza kuti zoyankhula zanga zijambulidwe Eya Ayi

Ndikuvomereza kuti mawu anga omwe ajambulidwa akhoza
kusindikizidwa monga mbali ya kafukufukuyu Eya Ayi

Kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu ndikosakakamiza ndipo ndikofunika kuti mupeleke
chilolezo chanu musanatenge nawo mbali mukafukufukuyu. Ngati mungapange chisankho pa
nthawi ina ili yonse kuti simukufunanso kutenga nawo mbali ndipo kuti zonse zomwe
mwatiuza zitaidwe, ife tidzapanga mwakufuna kwanu ngati mungatilembele za khumbo lanu.

Dzina lanu mu malembo akulu akulu _____

Siginecha yanu _____

Tsiku _____



ZOFUNIKA KUDZIWA OTENGA NAWO MBALI (KUMADERA)

Mutu wa Kafukufuku

Kapangidwe ka Chidziwitso cha Nsamuko olingana ndi Chilengedwe ku Malawi

Kafukufukuyu ndi okhudza chani?

Tikukuitanirani kuti mutenge mbali mu kafukufuku amene akukhudza momwe ntchito yopanga chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe imakhalira ku Malawi.

Kafukufukuyu akuchitidwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro a Hebe Nicholson, a ukachenjedwe wa PhD ku sukulu yoona za chilengedwe ndi chitukuko.

Kodi ndikuyenera nditenge nawo mbali?

Chipepala ichi chalembedwa kuti chikuthandizeni kupanga chiganizo ngati mungakonde kutenga nawo mbali kapena ayi. Zili kwa inuyo kupanga chisankho chimenechi. Ngati mungapange chiganizo chotenga mbali, ndinu omasuka kusiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi ina ili yonse, ndipo simudzafunsidwa kuti mupereke chifukwa.

Ndidzayenera kupanga chani?

Tidzakufunsani kuti ticheze nanu ndipo tikuyembekeza kuti kucheza ku kudzatenga nthawi ya pakati pa mphindi makumi atatu ndi ola limodzi.

Kodi kutenga nawo mbali kwanga kudzakhala kwa chinsisi komanso kopanda maina?

Ndi opanga kafukufuku, omasulira, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang'anira kafukufukuyu okha amene adzakhale ndi mwayi ogwira zopezeka mkafukufukuyu zomwe zidasungidwe mwa chinsisi. Pa zonse zopezeka mkafukufuku zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu, tidzapempha chilolezo chanu pogwiritsa ntchito fomu ya chilolezo cha otenga mbali. Tikukutsimikizirani kuti dzina lanu silidzatchulidwa.

Kasungidwe ndi kaonongedwe ka zopezeka m'kafukufuku

Pachiyambi, zopezeka m'kafukufukuyu zidzagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi opanga kafukufukuyu, omasulila zopezeka mkafukufuku, olemba zoyankhulidwa ndi oyang'anira kafukufukuyu okha, pokhapokha ngati otenga mbali wapereka chilolezo kuti anthu enanso akhonza kugwiritsa ntchito zopezekazi. Zomwe tidzatenge kwa inu zidasungidwa mu njira yosaonetsera kuti ndi za ndani mu makina a kompyuta. Kafukufukuyu akuchitika ndi thandizo lochokera ku ESRC,

chotero molingana ndi ndondomeko zawo, kafukufukuyu akadzatha, tidzasiya zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mu malo omwe opanga kafukufuku aliyense akhoza kuzipeza ngati angafunike kuti atero.

Zotsatira za kafukufukuyu mudzazichita chani?

Ntchito yokonza zotsatira za mkafukufukuyu idzatsirizidwa usanadutse mwezi wa Seputembala chaka cha 2020 ndipo zidzalembedwa ngati mbali imodzi ya maphunziro anga a ukachenjede wa PhD.

Kodi pali Chiopsezo china chili chonse kwa otenga mbali?

Ayi, palibe.

Mafunso

Muzakhala ndi mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu musanapatsidwe kapena kulemba fomu ya chilolezo.

Chilolezo

Lingaliro la kafukufukuyu linazukutidwa bwino ndi kupatsidwa chilolezo kupyolera mu ndondomeko yoona za khalidwe loyenera lopangila kafukufuku la ku sukulu ya ukachenjede ya St Andrews.

Ndingatani ngati ndili ndi dandaulo ndi kafukufukuyu?

Tsatanetsatane wa khalidwe loyenera la kafukufuku lomwe limayang'aniridwa ndi komiti yoona za khalidwe loyenera mu kuphunzitsa komanso kupanga kafukufuku ku sukulu ya ukachenjede ya St Andrews likupezeka pa:

<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/>

Mukhoza kumupeza opanga kafukufuku pogwiritsa ntchito kalata ya makina a kompyuta:

Dzina la opanga kafukufuku: Hebe Nicholson

Kupezeka pa: hn7@st-andrews.ac.uk

Dzina la Oyang'anira: Nina Laurie

Kupezeka pa: gg@st-andrews.ac.uk



University of
St Andrews

FOMU YA CHILOLEZO CHA OTENGA MBALI Zopezeka mkafukufuku zozimbaitidwa (m'madera)

Mutu wa Kafukufuku

Chidziwitso cha nsamuko obwera kamba ka chilengedwe ku Malawi

Dzina la opanga kafukufuku

Mayina a oyang'anira kafukufuku

Hebe Nicholson

Dr David McCollum, Prof Nina Laurie

Sukulu ya za ukachenjede ya St Andrews imasamala kwambiri za kuonetsetsa kuti kafukufuku wachitidwa mu khalidwe loyenelera. Chotero tikupempha kuti muganizire bwino mfundo zotsatirazi, musanasaine fomu iyi. Kusayina kwanu kutanthauza kuti ndinu osangalatsidwa kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu.

Zopezeka m'Kafukufuku Zozimbaitidwa ndi Chani?

Mawu akuti 'Zopezeka m'kafukufuku zozimbaitidwa' amanthauza zopezeka m'kafukufuku zomwe zimazindikirika kuti ndi za otenga mbali wakutiwakuti koma zimasungidwa zitachotsedwa china chili chonse chomwe chingazindikiritse mosavuta kuti mwini wake ndi ndani. Opanga kafukufuku amangopereka chizindikiro chimene amachidziwa ndi iwo chokuti chidzawathandize patsogolo kuzindikira kuti zopezeka m'kafukufuku zimenezo anazitenga kwa ndani. Zopezeka m'kafukufuku zosazimbaitsa zimasungidwa mwa chinsisi cha opanga kafukufuku (ndinso oyang'anira kafukufukufuyo). Ngati chilolezo chaperekedwa kuti zopezekazo zidasungidwe kwa nthawi (onani gawo la chilolezo), otenga nawo mbali akhoza kudzafunsidwanso mafunso ena patsogolo ndi opanga kafukufuku uno kapenanso opanga kafukufuku ena.

Chilolezo

Cholinga cha fomu iyi ndi kuonetsetsa kuti ndinu olola kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu komanso kukuthandizani kuti mumvetsetse kuti kafukufukuyu ndi wa chiyani kwenikweni. Kusaina fomu iyi sikukutanthauza kuti ndinu okakamizika kupanga zinthu zimene inu simungafune kupanga, ndipo muli ndi ufulu osiya kutenga nawo mbali pa nthawi ina ili yonse.

Zonse zopezeka mu kafukufuku uyu zidzapatsidwa zizindikiro zozizimbaitsa ndipo china chili chonse chozipangitsa kuzindikirika chidzachotsedwa. Kuphatikiza apo, opangakafukufukuyu adzazisunga zopezekazo mwa chinsinsi. Chotero ndi opanga kafukufuku yekha pamodzi ndi oyang'anira kafukufukuyu omwe adzakhale ndi mwayi ogwira zopezeka m'kafukufukuyu. Kafukufukuyu akuchitika ndi thandizo lochoka ku ESRC. Choncho, molingana ndi ndondomeko zawo, kafukufukuyu akadzatha, tidzasiya zotsatirazi mu malo amene opanga kafukufuku aliyense akhoza kuzipeza ngati angafunike kuti atero. Chonde yankhani mfundo zili munsimu zokhudzana ndi katoleledwe komanso kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka zopezeka mukafukufukuyu.

Ndawerenga ndi kumvetsetsa zofunika kudziwa otenga mbali. Eya Ayi

Ndapatsidwa mwayi ofunsa mafunso okhudzana ndi kafukufukuyu. Eya Ayi

Ndakhutitsidwa ndi mayankho omwe ndapatsidwa. Eya Ayi

Ndamvetsetsa kuti ndili ndi ufulu osiya kutenga mbali mu Kafukufukuyu pa nthawi ina iliyonse opanda kupeleka chifukwa. Eya Ayi

Ndamvetsetsa kuti zomwe zitengedwe kwa ine zidasungidwa mwa chinsisi ndipo kuti ngakhale zidzakhale ndi zozindikiritsa kuti ndi za ndani, pa nthawi yozisunga zozindikiritsa zonse zidzachotsedwa ndi opanga kafukufuku komanso ndi opanga kafukufuku yekha ndi oyang'anira kafukufuku amene adzathe kuzizindikira zopezekazo pa nthawi yomwe zidzafunike. Eya Ayi

Ndavomereza kuti zomwe mutenge kwa ine m'kafukufukuyu, (mogwirizana ndi mfundo zili pa mwambazi), zidasungidwe ndi opanga kafukufuku ndi kuti zitha kudzagwiritsidwa ntchito mtsogolo mu akafukufuku ena. Ndikuzindikira kuti opanga kafukufuku enawo akhoza kudzamasula kuzimbaitsa kuja ndikundizindikira kuti ndine ndani. Eya Ayi

Ndafotokozeredwa momveka bwino za ziopsezo zomwe zingakhalepo mu kafukufukuyu ndipo ndakhutitsidwa ndi zonse zomwe ndauzidwa Eya Ayi

Ndikuvomereza kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu Eya Ayi

Kafukufukuyu akukhudzanso kujambula zomwe zikuyankhulidwa ndi kujambula zithunzi. Zithunzi komanso mawu ojambulidwawa zidasungidwa motetezedwa komanso mopanda chizindikiro chilichonse monga fomu yachilolezo kapenanso pepala la mafunso

Zojambulidwazi zikhoza kukhala zofunika kwambiri mu akafukufuku ena a mtsogolo. Chotero tikupemphanso chilolezo kuti tizathe kusunga zopezeka m'kafukufuku komanso zojambulidwa pachifukwa chomwe tafotokozachi.

Ndikuvomereza kuti ineyo komanso zoyankhula zanga

zijambulidwe

Eya Ayi

Ndikuvomereza kuti mawu anga ojambulidwa komanso chithunzi changa, zidasindikidwe ngati mbali imodzi ya kafukufukuyu

Eya Ayi

Ndikuvomereza kuti chithunzi changa ndi mawu anga ojambulidwa, zidzagwiritsidwe ntchito mu akafukufuku ena amsogolo.

Eya Ayi

Kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu ndikosakakamiza ndipo ndikofunika kuti mupeleke chilolezo chanu musanatenge nawo mbali mukafukufukuyu. Ngati mungapange chisankho pa nthawi ina ili yonse kuti simukufunanso kutenga nawo mbali ndipo kuti zonse zomwe mwatiuza zitaidwe, ife tidzapanga mwakufuna kwanu ngati mungatilembele za khumbo lanu.

Dzina lanu mu malembo aakulu _____

Siginecha yanu _____

Tsiku _____

APPENDIX 4 – COMMUNITY INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

Interview Schedule for Resettled Community

- What is your name?
- Can you tell me your role in your household?
- How many are in your household?
- How many are in your community?
- What is your household's main form of income?
- Can you tell me how flooding affects your livelihood?
- How do you manage the effects of flooding? What do you think are the best ways to manage it?
- Can you tell me why your community resettled?
- Were you in favour of the resettlement?
- Can you tell me a bit more about the process involved in deciding to resettle? How did you decide where to resettle? How much involvement from government and NGOs was there? Were you happy with how the process went? Would you have changed anything?
- Why do you think the government and NGOs are in favour of resettlement?
- Can you tell me a bit more about your relationship with government and NGOs?
- How do you communicate with government and the NGOs involved in your community? Do you feel your voice is heard? How/Why?
- Would you change anything about your relationship with NGO or Government?
- Are you happy with your current situation? Would you change anything?
- How do you see the future for your community?

Interview Schedule for Undecided Community

- What is your name?
- Can you tell me your role in your household?
- How many are in your household?
- How many are in your community?
- What is your household's main form of income?
- Can you tell me how flooding affects your livelihood?
- How do you manage the effects of flooding? What do you think are the best ways to manage it?
- Would you ever consider resettlement as a way to cope with the flooding? Why?
- What would need to happen for you to consider resettlement?
- Would your opinion change if another flood event, such as that that occurred in 2015 were to happen?
- What is the long-term solution for increase severity of flooding?
- Why do you think the government and NGOs would like you to consider resettlement?
- Can you tell me a bit more about your relationship with government and NGOs?
- How do you communicate with government and the NGOs involved in your community? Do you feel your voice is heard? How/Why?
- Would you change anything about your relationship with NGO or Government?
- Are you happy with your current situation, would you change anything?
- How do you see the future for your community?

Interview Schedule for Unwilling Community

- What is your name?
- Can you tell me your role in your household?
- How many are in your household?
- How many are in your community?
- What is your household's role in the community?
- What is your household's main form of income?
- Can you tell me how flooding effects your livelihood?
- How do you manage the effects of flooding? What do you think are the best ways to manage it?
- Would you ever consider resettlement as a way to cope with the flooding? Why?
- What would need to happen for you to consider resettlement?
- Would your opinion change if another flood event, such as that that occurred in 2015 were to happen?
- What is the long term solution for increase severity of flooding?
- Why do you think the government and NGOs would like you to consider resettlement?
- Can you tell me a bit more about your relationship with government and NGOs?
- How do you communicate with government and the NGOs involved in your community? Do you feel your voice is heard? How/Why?
- Would you change anything about your relationship with NGO or Government?
- How do you see the future for your community?

APPENDIX 5 – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR NGO AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- What's your role in the NGO/Government?
- Can you tell me your involved with this community?
 - o How often do you see them?
 - o What aid do you give them?
 - o Do you view them as a high priority?
- What is your opinion on their resettlement situation?
 - o Are you happy for their resettlement?
 - o Do you think they should resettle?
- Why do you think a community may be unwilling to resettle?
- Do you think any incentives or conditions should be given alongside resettlement – like the promise of houses, schools etc?
- What problems do you think resettlement can bring?
 - o How do you find land?
 - o What about the host community? How do you integrate? Make sure they are adequately represented?
 - o What about previous leaders? Should they retain their leadership?
 - o How do you address these? How do you communicate information?
- What other ways do you advocate to manage flooding?
 - o How do you spread information about these?
 - o Can you tell me about the early warning system in place? I hear not all communities were aware of the 2015 flooding?
 - o What do you think of the idea of 'living with floods' concept?
 - o Where do you get your information from?
- What do you think is the way forward for this community?
- Any comments?

APPENDIX 6 – CODING TREE

Name	Files	References
Fieldwork Sites	1	1
Jombo	6	13
Mwalija	4	9
Nyachikadza	5	5
IK vs TK	0	0
Governance Structure	18	32
Participatory Governance Approach	11	20
Role of Government in Flooding	9	11
Mistrust	4	9
Recovery	2	3
Response	7	9
Indigenous Knowledge	23	34
Community Response to Flooding	24	33
Information Dissemination	34	46
Radio Station at Nyachikadza	2	2
International Influence	1	4
MFERP	4	4
Resettlement	8	10
Change People's Mindset	7	9
Solutions to Flooding	2	2
Community Mapping	2	2
Relationships	0	0
Early Warning System	15	24
Mistrust of EWS	5	7
Happy with Current Situation / What is Future	48	50
Miscommunication Between Governance and Communities	9	15
NGO and DC Assistance	12	18

Dependency Syndrome	18	22
Negative Opinion	10	16
No-Go Zone	26	46
Election Visits	2	2
Trapped Populations	0	0
Bongo	13	27
Physically Trapped	5	6
Vulnerability	1	2
Flooding Impact	5	5
2015 Event Impact	41	59
Fear of Flooding	16	23
Jombo	14	16
Livelihood depletion	2	2
Mwalija	11	15
Nyachikadza	9	14
Reason for Increasing Flooding	2	3
Brick Molding	1	1
Deforestation	5	6
Overpopulation	7	9
Rural-Urban Migration Impact	1	1
Trend in Flooding	39	48
Other	0	0
Armyworm Devastation	5	6
Climate Change	9	12
Interconnected Nature of Flooding	8	12
Fear of Influence	4	5
Health	6	10
Livestock Scheme	2	2
Living with Floods	1	1
Low Literacy	2	2
Malawi as an LEDC	1	1
Natural Resources	1	1
Malawi Culture	1	1
PDNA	1	3
Religion	1	2
Role of Small Businesses	4	4
Urban Flooding	1	2
Anti-resettlement	0	0

Attempted Resettlement	1	1
Challenges	8	10
Amenities	27	39
Analogies for Resistance to Resettlement	4	4
Ancestral Importance	12	13
Autonomy	5	9
Chieftancy	41	61
Ulterior Motive of GVH	3	6
Hostile Host Community	13	30
Livelihoods	29	44
Fertility	18	19
No Funds to Move	15	33
Sense of Belonging	5	10
Sense of Community	13	14
Take our Land	2	3
Worse Life	2	2
Different Ideas of Resettlement	1	1
Following	7	7
Forget	6	7
Housing and Infrastructure	10	28
Zoning	4	5
Lack of Government Power	7	9
Lack of Resources	10	16
Land	27	52
Not Worried about Flooding	2	5
Reforestation	13	17
Superstition	7	7
Technocratic Knowledge	16	23
World Bank Project	3	5
Pro-resettlement	0	0
Already Resettled	1	1
Change in Opinion of Flooding	10	11
Change in Opinion of Resettlement	12	12
Circle of Deprivation	9	14
Consider Resettlement	20	22

Importance of Policy	10	17
Multiple Strategies	4	6
Pro resettlement	34	44
Responsibility	17	24
Individual Resettlement	1	1
Sensitisation	13	21
Technical Solutions to Flooding	19	26
Housing Construction	3	6
Temporary Migration Strategy	51	88
Government Knowledge	7	7
Seasonal Migration	1	1
Using Previous Resettlement as an Example	7	8