



of 'international Calvinism' in its intellectual, commercial, and military forms. Jennifer McNutt provides intriguing analysis of different 'lives' and anti-lives of Calvin, including Bolsec's prurient demonology and Beza's hagiology. Gribben narrates the central role of Calvinism to the development of the Churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Kooi lays out how the Reformed Church came to dominate the ecclesial landscape of the Netherlands – not, by any means, a foregone conclusion. This segues nicely into Thianto's chapter on Calvinism in Asia which, while focused especially on Indonesia, says surprisingly little about Korea. Stanglin's essay on Calvin's legacy in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries focuses on the Arminian controversy and the growing identification of Calvin with absolute predestinarianism, though also, counter-intuitively, with modern notions of freedom. A second essay from Bruce Gordon, finally, brings the reception of Calvin up to the present day.

There is little to criticize here. Minor discrepancies of detail may strike the careful reader (Millet, for example, gives the date of Mathurin Cordier's installation at the Academy of Geneva as 1559 [p. 34], whereas Pak gives 1562 [p. 9]). Mostly, the overlap between chapters is positive: small enough to avoid redundancy yet significant enough to create the sense of a consistent and progressive whole, a rare achievement for edited volumes. The decision to opt for a larger number of shorter chapters – each is only seven to nine pages – is welcome, making the volume very useful as a series of succinct gateways into the relevant scholarship on each subtopic. Suggested further reading for each chapter and an extensive index (pp. 474–494) adds to this. Holder, finally, has gathered a veritable who's who list of major Calvin, Reformation, and early modern scholars to produce a collection of uniformly high quality – a rarity, again, for edited collections. The succinctness and clarity of the chapters will make it useful both to Calvin specialists and to students. That the most space is given to Calvin's religious contexts will make it quite valuable for those who have a primarily theological interest in the Reformer, while for the historical scholar of Calvin, this collection is indispensable.

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Self and the City in the Thought of Saint Augustine, Ben Holland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020 (ISBN 978-3-030-19332-4), vii + 162 pp., hb €72.79

Scholarship on Augustine is so vast and varied that one is tempted to paraphrase Isidore of Seville's famous quip on the sheer volume of

Augustine's intellectual production: 'the person who claims to have read all the books written on Augustine is a liar'. The bishop of Hippo remains almost an inexhaustible source of inspiration for theologians, political theologians, political theorists, international relations scholars, philosophers, linguists, even musicologists. At the same time, after the revival and flourishing of Augustine Studies post-1945, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make an original contribution to a field that has been dominated by luminaries of the likes of Henri-Irénée Marrou, Peter Brown, Robert Markus, John Milbank, Rowan Williams, Jean Elshtain, Oliver O'Donovan, Robert Dodaro, James Wetzel, and Eric Gregory, to name but a few. And yet, despite the challenge, this particularly well-written book by Ben Holland succeeds in bringing additional clarity to a well-trodden field, primarily by skillfully unpacking the different layers that make up what the author terms Augustine's 'anthropological analogy', that is, that between the self and the city.

As Holland admits, Augustine was not the first political thinker who proposed the analogy between the soul and the *civitas*. Famously, Plato made use of it in the *Republic* and the entire classical tradition up to the Stoics followed suit. Holland is, however, correct to point out that Augustine's elaborate conception of selfhood broke with the assumption of self-sufficiency that underpinned pagan accounts of virtue adding moral complexity and psychological depth to the analogy. Holland also reminds us that such an observation would only form half of the picture as Augustine's anthropological analogy inextricably weaved together theological, cosmological, social, and anthropological orders into a harmonious whole. This, as Holland argues, is not a vision of a homogenizing, difference-eradicating unity, but a hierarchical ordering holding the various parts of the soul and the world in 'proper tension' as an earthly reflection of the divine ordering in the immanent Trinity whose proper name is Love. This is the essence of Augustine's analogical thinking whereby the divine and the worldly (or, in theological parlance, uncreated and created nature) belong to different orders of 'being' with the latter only imperfectly participating in the glory of the former.

In Chapter 2, Holland foregrounds the scriptural/theological basis of analogical reasoning by first outlining the tenets of Augustine's ontology, so to speak. This is important as the received wisdom about political Augustinianism is that it is an inherently pessimistic doctrine. As the famous adage has it, we are forced to 'deal in darkness' in this world. Augustine, however, as any Christian theologian, starts from Genesis 1:31 or 'the goodness of all that is', as Holland puts it, in the context of the Christian doctrine of *creatio de* (rather than *ex*) *nihilo*. Creation lacks the perfection of the Creator, yet it remains good to the extent that it participates in God's creative activity. The Christian doctrine of the ontological priority of peace and unity (*tranquillitas ordinis*) saved Augustine from the Manichaean errors of his youth and helped him tackle the problem of evil. Holland

emphasizes that this all-goodness of creation is a hierarchical vision (Augustine was a late Roman, after all) of ordered unity where every bit in the universe has its place and weight (*pondus* is a favorite word in Augustine's vocabulary) in creation's completeness (*integritas*).

The following three chapters reconstruct the analogy between the three different versions of the self and civic society, that is, the fallen self and the earthly city; the repentant self and the pilgrim city; and the saved self and the heavenly city. In the earthly city, the sinful self suffers the consequences of its disobedience: evil enters the world through human pride (Adam's Luciferian sin) which, in itself, reflects the division of the soul and the emergence of a permanently fractured will animated by perverse self-exaltation. Holland wonderfully connects the disorder of the soul with the physical manifestation of the sin of pride on the human body (the swelling of the body parts as in the puffed-up chest or the tumescence of the sexual organs). Sin is experienced as a diremption between the physical, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of human beings and as enslavement of the will to disorderly desire. Holland, here, registers how Augustine's opposition to Pelagius and Cicero's Roman Stoicism derives from his rejection of the pagan ideal of perfect virtue as a form of desireless self-possession.

Although this was certainly Augustine's intention, Holland might be obscuring that Augustine was perhaps too quick to dismiss pagan virtue by attributing to Cicero and the Stoics ethical visions that were certainly present in Pelagius and Julius of Eclanum, but were by all accounts absent in the classical understanding of the will as an expression of nature as opposed to the controlling center of personhood (see Ian A. McFarland, *In Adam's Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin*, Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010). Augustine seems then to be projecting back to Cicero his disagreements with Pelagius while conceding Pelagius' deviation from the Aristotelian tradition of the will as an appetitive capacity (*ρᾶξις*) according to nature, a deviation that would have been incomprehensible to the Stoics. I would agree with Hanby (Michael Hanby, *Augustine and Modernity*, London and New York: Routledge 2003) that that does not exactly make Augustine a precursor of Descartes, as Taylor seems to think (Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), but it arguably caused a semantic displacement, with immeasurable consequences, away from the tradition that in the East was preserved through Maximus the Confessor's Christology in the context of the monothelite controversy.

The above does not detract from Augustine's formidable critique of pagan religion and of pagan philosophy, in the face of Varro in book VI of the *City of God*, both attacked for failing to acknowledge that the road to true piety, virtue, and justice passes through self-surrender to God's sacrificial love rather than chimerical self-sufficiency. The Roman generals who sought earthly glory, only to deliver civil wars, and the great founders

of earthly cities, like Remus and Romulus, whose example discloses fratricide as the founding event of political community, reveal the imbalance or self-conceit that drive human creative powers when they deviate from God's ordering love. Holland here reconstructs Augustine's story of the human quest for autarky as the consequence of self-division, reminding us the most valuable of Augustine's lessons, the tendency of vice to disguise as virtue. A pagan ethicist like Cicero is a dissembler, a pretender of virtue, and a performer of truth, ultimately a hypocrite. Holland does not mention it, but Augustine's counterexample here is Paul's converts: 'as deceivers, and yet true' (2 Corinthians 6:8).

Given its importance for Augustine's argument, it is not surprising that Holland makes Augustine's alternative conception of the will his entry point for his discussion of the pilgrim city (*civitas peregrina*). Holland argues, rather convincingly, that Augustine's refiguring of the will as driven by one's object of love contains the psychological depth, missing from pagan accounts of virtue, that may explain the mechanisms through which a moral agent may develop those 'attentions of the mind' that could tip (to continue with Augustine's weight metaphors) the soul towards loving God instead of self. Christian conversion, thus, in the *saeculum* is a process by which divine grace pulls the repentant soul towards 'unselfing', that is, unlearning the habits of sin, the addictions that keep us enslaved to the very ghosts that our pervert desires have created. In a sense, then, conversion may feel like an unnatural process to the extent that the convert wakes up from a deeply entrenched 'second nature': sin as the virtual reality we live in. The social and political implications of this process is the creation of a true *res publica* that raises up Cicero's definition of the commonwealth to its true dimension: a multitude of individuals with redirected desires forming the body of Christ. Holland leaves no doubt that by that, Augustine means the church as *res* (an *ekklesia* of bodies baptized in Christ) and *signum* (symbol of the things to come).

The final anthropological analogy of the saved (saints) and the heavenly city is appropriately modeled by Holland on a study of the mind of the saint in the intertwining relationship of whose memory, understanding, and will-love Augustine detects the imperfect analogue of the Trinitarian God (a *vestigium Trinitatis*, so to speak). In a magnificent twist, however, Holland shifts the attention to the body and the church as the embodiment of Christ, an eschatological community gathered around the sacrament of the Eucharist as an act of 're-membering of Christ's body, of the body of He through Whose mediation the saints have been saved' (p. 122). The heavenly city is, in essence, not some otherworldly mystical communion, but the *actual* body of Christ and the restoration of a virtuous harmony of redemption where every individual is accorded its proper place and honor. Augustine's universe remains hierarchical and, implicitly for Holland – as for Milbank who is his guide on this – calls for a reappraisal of the status of virtuous hierarchies in our theopolitical visions. The book closes with a short but illuminating

discussion of the various dispositions of the self in Augustine – distention, attention, extension, and intention – which represent the various directions that the self takes in its interaction with the objects of its desire, from the fragmented self of the fallen, through the self of the convert stretching in anticipation, to the appropriately transfigured self of the saved, enjoying, not eternal repose, but the ‘proper tension’ of their desires with their gaze fixed on the beatific vision.

The book is excellent in reconstructing an argument that is often taken for granted but has, actually, rarely been made with such clarity, precision, and attention to the interconnections between the theological, the psychological, the social, and the anthropological in Augustine. It is, of course, inspired by an interpretation that some, such as Herbert Deane, Janet Coleman, or Robert Markus, would have found questionable but, nevertheless, one that is closer to what Augustine would have perhaps recognized as his ‘intention’ (in the Augustinian sense of having been dictated by the object of his love). Namely, and especially when it comes to the *City of God*, not to write a treatise on political theory, moral psychology, or justice but, perhaps, as Rowan Williams has aptly argued (Rowan Williams, ‘Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God’, *Milltown Studies* 19/20 1987, pp. 55–72), to explain to his contemporaries what the nature and final end of public virtue is after the Truth has revealed itself to the world. If, in the process, Augustine forced us to recognize that he transformed and enriched a venerable tradition on the analogy between the self and civic society, Holland’s book should be commended for making this abundantly pellucid.

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Bound for Beatitude: A Thomistic Study in Eschatology and Ethics, Reinhard Hütter, The Catholic University of America Press, 2019 (ISBN 978-0-8132-3181-5), xvi + 496 pp., hb \$65

Reinhard Hütter’s *Bound for Beatitude* constitutes a stellar addition to the field of Thomistic ethics. Hütter devotes the bulk of his book to a discussion and defense of Thomas Aquinas’s account of the virtues – the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) as well as the moral virtues (prudence, justice, courage, and temperance). What sets Hütter’s work apart, however, is the way in which he situates these discussions within the context of Aquinas’s theology of beatitude. Aquinas’s writing on happiness, Hütter argues, is at the heart of the moral theology in the *Summa*