The years of transition from the League of Nations to the United Nations were accompanied by a creative surge of transnational idealism. The horrors of the Second World War and the possibility of global destruction at the hands of nuclear weapons generated enthusiastic calls for a world government that might significantly restrain the ability of independent political entities to wage war against each other and that could serve as a platform for legislation enforceable as world law.\(^1\) Drawing inspiration from a long history of political thought from Kant to Kang Youwei, almost all of these plans proposed variations on a federal system that preserved a layer of national, and indeed imperial, government, while dissolving forever the inviolability of sovereignty. Above nations and empires in the imagined new order would exist a global federal body that, depending on the scheme, would possess significant powers of taxation, a monopoly on military coercion—or at least sole possession of nuclear weapons—and powers of legislation that could both bind nations and empower individuals.

In her sweeping history of twentieth-century internationalism, Glenda Sluga considers various schemes for world federalism as part of the “apogee of internationalism” of the 1940s; the transitional period during which these plans occupied a space simultaneously with the development of ideas of world citizenship seeking to renegotiate the traditional subordination of the individual to the state. Even if a world federation did not call for the abolition of nation-states, in both these cases, Sluga argues, the goal of any eventual “world” solution would be called for in the name of people’s interests.\(^2\) These interests, in the name of the people, or which elevated the individual, would continue to emerge in the development of the United Nations charter and its affiliated institutions, but the new international body abandoned many of the ambitions of earlier federalist visions. Below, a closer look at two early postwar Japanese visions of world order from this key moment of transition between the League of Nations and the United Nations will show that the generic goals of peace and progress, or even democracy were not the only the only or even primary benefits of an supposedly inevitable global unity imagined for the people. World federalism was an opportunity, a strategic space, through which supporters could offer specific solutions to national, racial, or universally human challenges.

The scattered movements for world federalism did not lack influential voices of support, including prominent intellectuals such as Albert Camus, Albert Einstein, and Bertrand Russell, politicians such as Sir William Beveridge and Jawaharlal Nehru, U.S. presidential candidates Henry Wallace and Wendell Wilkie, and journalists such as Norman Cousins and Walter Cronkite.\(^3\) Gallup polls in 1946 and 1947 found a majority of Americans in favor of a global government that controlled all military force in the world.\(^4\) A declaration in support of world federalism issued in 1947 at Montreux, Switzerland was drafted by representatives from two-dozen countries and is quoted by supporters of the movement down to the present day.\(^5\) Elsewhere, more ambitious plans such as the world constitution drafted by professors at the University of Chicago in 1948 offered what Joseph Preston Baratta has called a ‘maximalist’ vision for world government with plans for a court, legislature, nine electoral colleges, and the subordination of the ownership of basic resources to the ‘common good.’\(^6\)

The movement for world federalism did not only find support among the victorious allies in 1945. In 1942 the Nationalist Chinese had offered to accept significant limits on national
sovereignty if it allowed for a strong and effective international organization. However, the most energetic and developed support for world federalism outside of Europe and the United States was to be found in the ashes of a defeated and occupied Japan. It was a country that understandably had no voice in the construction of the postwar order, but as the first and only target of the powerful nuclear weaponry that made its debut at the close of the war, it was perhaps the most natural place for creative proposals for a political reordering of the world that would prevent a final apocalyptic clash between nations.

If its recent defeat provided the most immediate support for the movement in Japan for world federalism, it also built on decades of debate over the failures of the existing international system. Japanese imperialists benefitted from the example of European empires from the earliest stages of its colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, but its leaders and intellectuals became increasingly comfortable with exploring creative new ways to order the world, and their own region in particular. The climax of these efforts was the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere announced in 1940, on the eve of Japan’s ill-fated conquests across Southeast Asia, but the most original theories and debates over how to structure the relationships between nations, empires, and human cultures took place among intellectuals in the popular journals of the 1920s and 1930s. A number of influential intellectuals in political thought, philosophy, and international law of this period who embraced visions of a regional federal order in Asia, usually with Japan as its benevolent leader, would later pivot to embrace world federalism after Japan’s defeat. They included Rōyama Masamichi, Sugimori Kōjirō, Tanikawa Tetsuzō, and future Supreme Court judge Yokota Kisaburō. Perhaps the most surprising addition to this list of supporters for a world government was the maverick general Ishiwara Kanji, who helped orchestrate Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 before falling out of favor when his strategic vision clashed with that of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki. For all these figures, world federalism was not simply the embrace of a new idea in the wake of a horrific war. Instead, each came to call for a powerful global government - often with very different conceptions of what that might constitute - as part of intellectual developments framed by the wider experience of empire and war.

Here we will consider the two most important leaders of the world federalist movement in occupied Japan, Ozaki Yukio (1858-1954) and Kagawa Toyohiko (1888-1960). Unlike the other figures mentioned above, Ozaki and Kagawa both went beyond simple expressions of support and publications on world federalism, instead helping to organize and lead the movement well into the postwar period. These two figures instantiate the considerable diversity of backgrounds and political outlooks that can be found among its supporters. Ozaki was a veteran politician and a powerful liberal voice for parliamentary government in the decades leading up to Japan’s defeat. Kagawa meanwhile was one of the most recognized Japanese figures abroad, equally renowned as a Christian evangelist and a socialist activist who carried out detailed studies of poverty in Kobe and Osaka. Ozaki operated predominantly within the halls of government and harbored a lifelong distrust for protests and strikes while Kagawa, fresh from divinity studies at Princeton University, returned to Japan in 1917 launched a career from the slums of Kobe. Within months he was a leader in the local labor movement, leading labor strikes and before long founding cooperative movements.

Ozaki and Kagawa also shared characteristics which fitted them for postwar campaigns for global government, and certainly made them better candidates than a military officer like Ishiwara or an intellectual like Rōyama, who was closely associated with Japan’s wartime vision for a united Asia. Ozaki and Kagawa both had an aversion, though one not always consistently maintained, to militarism. Both were remarkably early supporters of women’s
suffrage and democratic institutions; both benefitted from rich international connections; and finally, both exhibited an unusual combination of pragmatic and utopian tendencies. As we shall see, each of these figures exemplify the way in which world federalism was no simple fruit of defeat, but instead furthered long-held social and political ambitions – even as these were transformed and updated for a new postwar reality.

Ozaki Yukio and the Campaign for a new United States

By far the most enthusiastic, prolific, and somewhat repetitive voice supporting world federalism in the early postwar period was the politician Ozaki Yukio. Ozaki served in the Japanese Diet continuously from its first session in 1890 to 1952, and concurrently served as Tokyo’s mayor from 1903 to 1912. In the United States, he is best remembered for presiding over the 1912 gift from Tokyo city of 3,000 flowering cherry trees to Washington D.C., where most of them were planted along the Tidal Basin in West Potomac Park.\(^{11}\)

This veteran politician was a powerful and consistent supporter of parliamentary government against autocratic or imperial politics in the prewar period and he pressed for universal suffrage long before it was granted to men, in 1925, or to women after World War II. He is remembered for his boldness, exemplified in one of his most famous parliamentary speeches, given in February 1913, when he accused Japan’s oligarchic rulers of spouting patriotic discourse while they hid behind the imperial throne and deployed the emperor’s edicts like ‘missiles’ against their political foes.\(^{12}\) When parliamentary opposition to Japan’s foreign policy was all but extinguished in the 1930s, he opposed Japan’s participation in the Tripartite Pact and advocated neutrality in the event of the outbreak of war in Europe. He maintained his popularity despite a maverick status and a brief arrest on charges of lèse majesté in 1942 did not prevent him from winning reelection while awaiting trial.

There are, however, some chinks in the self-styled liberal crusader’s armor. Ozaki despised strikes as a disorderly approach to resolving labor and political issues, had nothing but distrust for class conflict and socialism, and opposed the introduction of some political and social liberties.\(^{13}\) He was particularly concerned with the purging of all manner of ‘immoral practices’ from gambling to frequenting of hostess bars, and supported strict government regulation.\(^{14}\) Especially for the first half of his career Ozaki was also an excellent example of an imperial democrat who saw no contradiction between his efforts on behalf of limited political reforms, and an expanding Japanese empire abroad. In 1929, Ozaki and other fellow ‘progressive’ politicians opposed the passing of the proposed Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) that renounced war as a means of resolving disputes. Opponents of the pact, including Ozaki, argued that since the pact was to be pronounced in the ‘names of their respective peoples,’ it was therefore a violation of national sovereignty embodied by the Emperor.\(^{15}\)

Still more troublingly, Ozaki was one of the earliest proponents of a full-scale invasion of China in the Meiji era, a position that he arrived at during the course of a visit to China as a journalist in 1884.\(^{16}\) In an early racialized expression of a kind of ‘Japanese Orientalism’ towards a perceived backward neighboring people, Ozaki came to the conclusion that the Chinese, in contrast with their ‘alert and observant’ Korean neighbors, were apathetic and corrupt, arrogant and ignorant of a world in transformation.\(^{17}\) In his detailed tract, Shina shobun an (A Proposal for Dealing with China), published a few months before Japan emerged victorious from the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), Ozaki justified his proposals for conquest, outlined the methods to achieve the goal, and sketched out the new geopolitical order that was to come.\(^ {18}\) A weak Qing dynasty was bound to fall, he argued, as external
crisis provoked internal rebellion, and rather than await this inevitability, Japan should act proactively, occupy the capital Beijing, and explore an alliance with a new China rejuvenated by Japanese help and guidance.

These views would not seem out of place in Japan throughout the first half of the twentieth century, especially among the generals and bureaucrats that led the country during its mainland conquests beginning in the 1930s but, if anything, Ozaki drifted away from the trend rather than towards it. His autobiography, published first in 1947 and then in an expanded version in 1955, the year after his death, reports that during a trip to the United States in 1919, he was impressed that, ‘Japan and China had reversed their positions’ in the course of thirty years. The Chinese had, he believed, lost their arrogance while the Japanese had not, and the Chinese he met impressed him with their quality products and English language abilities. Instead of reviving his old arguments of the 1890s when a full-scale conquest of China was attempted in 1937, Ozaki denounced what he saw as Japan’s foolhardy decision, in the context of potential negotiations for peace soon after the conflict began, to cease recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese regime as the adversarial party.

At the close of the war Ozaki was already approaching ninety years of age but seemed to have a new lease of life that he threw into support for world federalism both inside and outside of the Japanese Diet. For his efforts, the Japanese World Federalist Movement continues today to honor Ozaki as its founding father and first president (from 1948). He has nothing, however, to say of the movement in his autobiography, which covers events through 1950, despite many other mentions of his opposition to militarism, ‘narrow nationalism’ and support for world peace. The strongest hint provided there of his later support for a federal world government comes when he discusses his 1931 trip abroad. Lamenting the prevalence of international conflicts Ozaki recounts his thoughts at the time, if they are to be trusted in the context of a reflective autobiography, ‘If we can only manage to imbue the League of Nations with a large enough vision the world will be able in the future to overcome its present political and economic difficulties.’ We can also find Ozaki’s support for internationalism, albeit not yet in its more radical form, in a speech he gave in New York in the aftermath of Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, when a spirit of cooperation was more difficult to sustain. In one section of his speech Ozaki appealed, ‘Let us try to make all the nations of the world stand on a moral basis by accepting the authority of the International Court of Justice and by ceasing to teach narrow nationalism to their citizens.’

Whatever the reasons for leaving his world federalist activities out of the short post-1945 section of his autobiography, the scale of his commitment to the movement is not in doubt. Ozaki penned an array of articles on world federalism for a variety of publications, including Hitotsu no Sekai (One World), Jikyoku (Current Times), Jinrui Dōmei (Alliance of Humanity), and the world federation movement’s main journal Sekai Renpō (World Federation). In almost all of these articles he employed a similar series of arguments that invoked a moral imperative. Some postwar Japanese supporters of a strong world government, such as the Nichiren Buddhist general Ishiwara Kanji, tied their calls for a world government closely to a process of spiritual rebirth or transformation. Ozaki, however, avoided appeals to any specific religion or even any direct attribution of the sources of his ethical reasoning, even if there were, as we shall see, some Confucian undertones at work. Ozaki’s references to morality, which mirrored his prewar struggles against everything from corruption within parliament to the sinful behavior he found among decadent youth, were always connected to the man-made institutions that could facilitate its development and the
concrete obstacles that stood in its way. As we shall see, of the former, none were more important than the education of the citizenry, and of the latter, none more insidious than the Japanese language itself.

At its most basic, however, Ozaki felt that the world federation was the natural product of an evolution in mankind’s capacity to identify and show compassion for an ever growing community, beginning with the self, the family, one’s village, the nation, and the world, the achievement of which was the most important manifestation of human progress. This could easily be seen as a call to climb further up the hierarchy of relationships described in Confucian philosophy.

A Domestic Analogy for World Federalism
Glenda Sluga has noted that 1940s internationalist movements for world unity could mirror efforts for national unity, as with the example of Nehru’s support for world federalism. In Ozaki’s case, the success of Japan’s national unification would provide the model to follow. To those who suggested that making the transition from the anarchy of the nation-state system to a world federation would be difficult, Ozaki replied that, ‘it would not be difficult at all.’ It was no different, he argued, than the abolition of the han domains ruled by the local lords of the Tokugawa era (1603-1868) and their replacement with modern prefectures in 1871, a process known as the haihan chiken. Under relatively decentralized Tokugawa rule, Ozaki argued, relations between the han domains were more tense than between nation-states today. Before the Meiji period (1868-1912), he assured the reader, there was still no single Japanese identity, and strangers would greet each other with the question, ‘What han do you belong to?’ The formation of a world federation could thus be simply seen as a ‘second haihan chiken,’ easier to carry out than its historical predecessor because global travel times were a fraction of what they once were. The challenges of differing cultures were no greater than those found among the han of the Tokugawa era, and the differences of language across the world no more or less an insurmountable obstacle than the challenge of facilitating communication between someone with the language of Tohoku in the northeast of Japan and the language found in Kagoshima in the south.

Ozaki’s description of the ease of this proposed transition was typical of his lack of engagement with a complex 1940s landscape of contending theories on how a minimalist or maximalist world federation might realistically be created out of the ruins of the Second World War. Nor did it engage much with the very different vision of global order proposed by a revived Japanese Communist Party. Other Japanese intellectual supporters of world federalism more steeped in the history of law and international politics, including Yokota Kisaburō, Sugimori Kōjirō, and Rōyama Masamichi, spent more time debating the specifics. By contrast, all of Ozaki’s early postwar articles on world federalism are written in the casual and conversational style one might expect from a politician making a campaign stop - punctuating bold promises with amusing anecdotes and awkward metaphors. All the same, his proposal for a ‘second haihan chiken’ was a concrete Japanese version of what would come to be known, in theories of international politics, as the ‘domestic analogy’: arguments that apply the example of domestic society to the interactions between states and the operations of international law. Though he would use this ‘domestic analogy’ in much of his postwar work, readers would be quick to notice the lack of reference in Ozaki’s ‘second haihan chiken’ argument to the existing claim to monopoly of legitimate violence - even if not always perfectly sustained - by the Tokugawa regime over regional lords up until its collapse. Nor did he mention the unifying role of the Japanese emperor in the new regime that followed. Who would serve as the equivalent of the emperor in a new world federation?
Language and Education

More than any technical difficulties with the limitations on national sovereignty called for in world federalist schemes, Ozaki believed, ‘The most important thing for a world federation is to put an end to nationalism and ethno-nationalist (minzoku) education.’ In most articles this is described mainly in terms of the need to impart an international and global mindset, but occasionally Ozaki voices a deep criticism of the centrality of loyalty in moral education, a point that US occupation authorities would also emphasize in their education reforms for Japan. The obsession with teaching the virtues of loyalty was puzzling to Ozaki. In unflattering terms, he notes, ‘In my experience dogs are more loyal than humans,’ and no one needed to teach them its value. Whereas the limitless loyalty of dogs had been commonly and recently invoked in wartime as an example to be followed, here Ozaki assigned barbarism to that purported virtue in order to highlight the enlightened human’s ability to transcend it for the ‘advancement of culture.’ Somewhat ironically, Ozaki held that abandoning a pedagogical emphasis on loyalty - which had been justified on the basis of strengthening the bonds of an otherwise divided community - would enable a truly humanistic education in which compassion extended beyond the nation. Ozaki had little more to say on the details of how to accomplish an education in universal love. Instead, his most concrete policy proposal for facilitating the success of world federalism was tied to his support for radical language reform.

As one of Japan’s most famous and respected elder statesmen, Ozaki offered endorsement to younger politicians in the new democratic environment of occupation Japan in exchange for their commitment to a set of mostly vague principals. Candidates were forbidden to ‘beg voters’ for support, were to reform ‘bad habits such as drinking, smoking, and frequenting prostitutes’ and had to promise to ‘act in the interests of the nation.’ One demand, however, stood out:

5. I shall strive to abolish the use of kanji (Chinese characters) and improve the Japanese language.

The abolition of the use of Chinese characters could be achieved by limiting written Japanese to the use of one or both of the simple kana syllabaries that are used in conjunction with the more complex system of Chinese characters, in which each character might have multiple pronunciations. ‘If we get rid of kanji, the national language will naturally improve,’ he argues in one article, but instead of limiting Japanese to one or both of its syllabaries, he more often calls for the transition to full romanization and other radical changes of the Japanese language, arguing that,

Not only is this the fastest path to interact with the world, but the absolute nature of the nation and its establishment as the ultimate virtue is found within the national language. Japanese nationalistic thinking can be found clinging to it everywhere and, since only by getting rid of it can the Japanese become a people of the world (sekaijin), we must prepare for a future common world language by the reform of Japanese.

The teaching of a potential world language was to begin as soon as possible. English was one possibility, but Esperanto was also an option. Ozaki believed that, with the time saved from eliminating Chinese characters, a child could easily find time to learn both.
The centrality of language reform as the means for Japan to overcome its nationalism in order for it to take a leading role in a world federation was fairly original among political elites, but calls for the full romanization of Japanese, or even its abandonment altogether had been made by a number of Japanese leaders and intellectuals as early as the 1880s. The first minister of education in the Meiji era, Mori Arinori (1847-1889), called for romanization and, in 1873, proposed replacing Japanese with English.\textsuperscript{36} Additionally, around the same time Ozaki was writing about romanization and a new world language in the early postwar period, one of Japan’s most influential novelists, Shiga Naoya (1883-1971) called for the replacement of the Japanese language with French, despite his own limited proficiency in the latter language.\textsuperscript{37}

Ozaki’s consideration of Esperanto as an option for the new world language should be viewed against a background of renewed interest in the international language within Japan. While Esperanto never reached significant numbers of speakers, its popularity rode the waves of internationalist enthusiasm in Japan’s modern history. The language had its origins in the end of the nineteenth century, but its first real boom came in the aftermath of World War I. A 1920 League of Nations resolution declared a hope that it would be taught to children throughout the world and in the next few years many countries brought similar resolutions to the League.\textsuperscript{38} A 1922 issue of Kaizō, one of the most important Japanese intellectual journals of the day, adopted an Esperanto title for a time, and by 1928 Japan had the largest concentration of Esperantists outside of Europe, far ahead of the United States.\textsuperscript{39} Its supporters included both classic liberal internationalists and a more radical socialist wing.\textsuperscript{40} In wartime, however, the movement grew more nationalistic, and its publication Esperanto (La Revuo Orienta) ceased production altogether in 1944. The journal, along with its calls for global harmony, was revived after Japanese defeat, and its first postwar issue was released only a few weeks after the American occupation forces arrived, in October 1945. The Esperanto movement was flattered enough by the support of a figure as famous as Ozaki that they published an article discussing his proposed reforms and world federalist ambitions in November 1946.\textsuperscript{41}

*Legislating a World Federation*

Ozaki was a well-respected but ageing voice. None of his postwar articles on world federalism were published in the top circulating popular journals and magazines of a U.S. censored early postwar press. He did, however, attempt to bring his ideas into the Japanese Diet in a move that would begin a much longer history of world federalism as a legislative movement in Japan down to the present day.

This legislative movement in Japan echoed similar efforts elsewhere, most importantly in the United States. On 24 October, 1945, U.S. Senator Glen H. Taylor, democrat from Idaho, introduced Senate Resolution 183, which called for United States delegates to the United Nations to take such steps as were necessary to draft agreements for the establishment of a ‘world republic based upon democratic principles and universal suffrage,’ including the creation of an international police force. Many similar resolutions would follow in the years to come, calling for a reform of the United Nations into a more powerful federal and genuinely democratic body.\textsuperscript{42} Only a few weeks after Taylor submitted his first resolution and still only a few months into a long U.S. occupation, Ozaki Yukio submitted his own resolution on world federalism to the 89th extraordinary session of the Japanese diet in December, 1945. It arrived in the midst of other monumental legislation passed that month, including the abolition of the ministries of war and navy, the granting of suffrage to women, and the repeal of the wartime National General Mobilization Law—all of this well before a
new pacifist constitution for Japan, drafted by U.S. occupation authorities, was shown to legislators in 1946.

Ozaki’s, ‘A Draft Resolution on the Formation of a World Federation’ (Sekai renpō kensetsu ni kansuru ketsugi an), backed by a limited number of some thirty other supporters, called for all independent states to join a world federation. Among other things it requested Japan to, completely disarm or greatly reduce its arms, show remorse for its wartime conduct, carry out research on the establishment of a world language, ban alcohol, tobacco and other harmful substances, and eliminate Chinese characters from the Japanese language. Here we find all of Ozaki’s key positions, including his calls for moral and language reform. The resolution claimed that through a system of ‘one country, one vote’ (which differs from a number of other world federalist approaches to structuring a new global government) the Japanese empire would, before long, gain many votes of support, take on the heavy responsibility of leadership, and ultimately turn its ‘disaster into fortune.’ Ozaki’s optimism may seem baffling given the times, but it foreshadowed the way that Japan would use its reputation as a peace maker to explore a more active international political role regionally, but also begin to explore a more influential role within the United Nations.

Like U.S. Senator Taylor’s first 1945 resolution, this attempt has largely sunk into obscurity. At the time, however, an alternative to, or reformed version of, the United Nations attracted a surprising degree of interest in Japan, which had far more pressing domestic economic and political issues to worry about. The idea of a world federation would be brought up in 22 sessions of the Diet in its first decade of activity, some two thirds of the total number of sessions held during that period. In 1949, some two years after the formation of an ‘All-Party Parliamentary Group for World Government’ in the British parliament, a ‘World Federation Japanese Diet Committee’ (sekai renpō nihon kokkai iinkai) was established with over 100 members of the lower and upper houses of the Diet. Its first chair was Matsuoka Komakichi (1888–1958), a supporter of proletarian parties in the prewar period, postwar socialist party legislator, and both before and after Japan’s defeat, a central leader in the Japan Federation of Labor, the anti-communist wing of the Japanese labor movement.

The Japanese movement for world federalism found in Ozaki a well-liked leader with the people’s touch. Throughout Japan, his message could be distributed not only through his publications but also among members of the ‘gakudō societies’ named after the ‘elegant name’ (gagō) or pen name that Ozaki went by until the early postwar period. If his writings on world federalism lacked sophistication, he nevertheless led the movement to bring concrete legislation to support an alternative to the United Nations within the postwar Diet. He used the movement to press for a degree of internationalization in education that went beyond the aims of US occupation authorities, and he attempted to inject into the world federalist movement his enthusiasm for a radical new language policy that echoed the internationalist aspirations found in the aftermath of World War I while also representing a stunning rejection of his own native idiom. Above all, world federalism gave him a new platform for a somewhat contradictory liberalism that included a deeply interventionist moral paternalism.

Ozaki seems to have been willing to leave most of the details of how a world federation was to function to others, with one key exception. He stood apart from many other Japanese intellectuals in the movement in his explicit opposition to the creation of any intermediating regional layer within the world federation. Whereas other former pan-Asianists in Japan saw in world federalism an opportunity to incorporate their dashed wartime dreams of Asian unity
into a broader global order, and world federalists in Europe and the United States also contemplated regional sub-divisions, Ozaki saw in it only the potential for more violence.

I disagree with the view that East Asia should form a block as the first step towards a world state. If blocks are made out of East Asia, Europe, America and the like, before long there will be the possibility of confrontation between them. The world must make the jump to a single state and strive towards the creation of something along the lines of the United States. 47

Kagawa Toyohiko and the World as Cooperative

As founding president of the The League for the Establishment of a World Federation (Sekai renpō kensetsu dōmei, predecessor to the World Federation movement in Japan today) and a leading representative of an embattled strain of prewar liberal politics, Ozaki Yukio provided the Japanese world federalist movement with a grandfather-like leader entering his ninth decade of life. The vice-president of the league was Kagawa Toyohiko, a figure some thirty years younger who was equally respected within Japan and far more famous internationally as a voice for peace. Like Ozaki, Kagawa’s life was far from an unblemished record, and his wartime pronouncements, in particular, would haunt his legacy. Unlike the old parliamentarian, however, Kagawa left a lasting impact on not one but several distinct realms of activity. He was one of Japan’s most famous Christian evangelists, was known by others primarily for his early empirical studies of urban poverty and his labor activism and was also the leading Japanese proponent of guild socialism. Still others knew him predominantly as a Japanese pacifist promoting a “science of love.” 48 Finally, and perhaps most relevant to his leadership in the world federalist movement, Kagawa is remembered today both within Japan and around the world as one of the most important supporters of the cooperative movement. 49 Kagawa authored dozens of books, including a famous autobiographical novel, and was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1947 and 1948. For his international pacifist activism, he was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1954, 1955, and 1956. 50

Kagawa’s early reputation as a social activist was partly established on the basis of detailed studies of the slums of Kobe and Osaka. In these and much of his writings on poverty and social outcasts, he emphasized the relationship between poverty and morality, arguing for what Andrew Barshay has described as ‘a brand of optimistic evolutionism.’ 51 He became a leader in the industrialized Kansai region’s labor movement, and was arrested for his involvement in the Kobe dock strikes of 1921. In was in this early period Kagawa became deeply interested in a form of guild socialism influenced by the ideas of G. D. C. Cole. 52 While his views evolved over subsequent decades, his basic vision imagined the formation of a national and an ultimately global society organised around the coordination of federated unions, guilds, and cooperatives. This was a political vision, but one founded on an imaginative new economic and social order. 53

The 1921 arrest was the climax of Kagawa’s power in the labor movement. He was expelled from his leadership in the Kansai labor movement for his utopian idealism, and would then shift his efforts, successively, to developing rural peasant unions in 1922, founding Christian cooperatives, a political campaign for universal suffrage up to 1925, a National Anti-War League formed in 1928, and his most ambitious ‘Kingdom of God’ campaign of Christian evangelism and social reform. 54 From the 1930s until Japan’s defeat in 1945, Kagawa’s reputation continued to grow internationally in Christian circles and among pacifists.
Domestically, meanwhile, he struggled to find his footing in Japan’s increasingly militarized society and he failed to maintain a consistent anti-war message.

Kagawa’s most obviously pro-imperialist statements come after the outbreak of war with the United States but a number of historians, including Nunokawa Hiroshi, Liu Jiafeng, and Ōta Yūzō, have taken a critical look at Kagawa’s conduct dating back to Japan’s conquests in China. Ōta has surveyed the debate on Kagawa’s pacifism and finds him, ‘inclined towards it, but neither consistent nor resolute in it.’ After Japan’s invasion of northeast China and the establishment of its own Manchurian state, Kagawa can be found calling for a better Manchuria rather than condemning Japan’s occupation. In a dialogue with several visiting Chinese Christian students in 1933, Kagawa assures them that Japan won’t stay long in Manchuria because its climate was unsuitable, and, given China’s historical capacity to assimilate its invaders, it had nothing to fear from Japanese cultural imperialism. The picture is inconsistent, however, and Kagawa can be found elsewhere expressing deep shame at Japan’s conquests in China, as in the case of a prologue to a Chinese translation of his work published in 1934.

Given his long postwar career as a leader in the world federalist movement and his reputation as a peace activist, his wartime thinking is important to consider. In January 1939 Kagawa was asked about the Japanese perspective on the war in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi. Declaring himself a heretic in comparison to other Japanese with respect to the war, he asked Gandhi what he would do in his position. Gandhi reportedly replied, ‘I would declare my heresies and be shot,’ Kagawa replied that he did not lack conviction in his beliefs but that friends had urged him to desist. When Gandhi told him to ignore such friends, Kagawa changed the topic to discuss irrigation cooperatives. When Gandhi again pressed him, Kagawa again shifted the topic, asking Gandhi how he could reconcile his own belief in non-violence with an admiration for the Bhagavad Gita, which includes passages encouraging violence.

Kagawa would not take Gandhi’s advice to boldly declare his position, ‘against Japan and in so doing make Japan live through your death.’ Neither, however, did he take the advice of others to desist entirely. From 1940 on, he would have several encounters with Japan’s military police on suspicion of anti-war activity. In the spring of 1941, on the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Kagawa visited the United States, where he tried desperately to use his American contacts to find some way to avert war. However, once hostilities broke out with the United States, Kagawa would lend his influential voice to speak in favor of Japan’s war effort, urge the Chinese resistance to submit to Japan’s occupation, predict an inevitable American defeat, and accuse Americans of cannibalism. These wartime propaganda efforts reveal the challenges Kagawa faced in reconciling his longer record as an internationalist and a moral leader with his wartime efforts to stay relevant and adjust to political circumstances. It also makes it easier to understand the situational flexibility he could exhibit in the postwar period as made world federalism his cause.

With the American-led occupation after Japanese defeat, Kagawa wasted little time adjusting to a new postwar reality. One of the earliest postwar references he makes to a world government can be found in a speech given in Kobe city in October 1945, only a few weeks after Japan’s 15 August surrender. Kagawa described the San Francisco conference in April, 1945 as merely the first step in the creation of a genuine ‘world state’ (sekai kokka) that Japan could help build. He called for Japan to disarm completely and build a new peaceful nation on the basis of benevolence. For this to be possible, it was essential for Japan to retain
its emperor, whose fate at the time was anything but secure. From the history of Rome, to Lenin, Hitler, and Japan’s own Tōjō, Kagawa argued that moves to republican forms of government were often followed by another revolution resulting in a dictatorship. In phrases that would have pleased wartime propagandists, he claimed Japan was a nation made up of a single family, where ‘a form of communism’ prevailed in which the children were cared for by a parent-emperor. In 2,600 years of rule, the emperors, he claimed, ‘never made a cruel demand upon their people.’ On this basis only a disarmed Japan under a ‘monarchical democracy’ (kunshu minshushugi) could prevent militarism from taking hold again.\(^64\)

Far from being a spent force on the global stage, Japan’s rebirth would present it with an opportunity to be a world leader, an assertion echoing the confidence found in the text of Ozaki’s Diet resolution, submitted only four days before Kagawa spoke to his own audience in Kobe. Invoking two of the Japan’s wartime slogans that had symbolized its ambitions for regional and global dominance, Kagawa made a bold prediction.

If Japan disarms…it will perhaps shame the United States into abandoning its own weapons. Japan can lead the world, spark a moral movement, achieve the dream of a Greater East Asia (dai tōa), and bring all eight corners of the world under a single roof (hakkō ichiu).\(^65\)

This language, describing a regional and global order in terms better fit for wartime propaganda than an occupied Japan, was fortunate to have escaped the notice of the occupation Civil Censorship Detachment, perhaps only possible thanks to its publication in Kobe’s local newspaper. Instead of calling for world conquest by arms, however, Kagawa uses these slogans to predict the outcome of a moral struggle. Indeed, this was Gandhi’s answer to Kagawa’s challenge with regard to the language of violence in the Bhagavad Gita in their 1939 meeting. Gandhi had urged Kagawa to interpret the text as calling for a spiritual battle, rather than an actual violent war. This message calling for a redeployment of military metaphors in service of the spirit would find more receptive ears in a postwar cold war setting, especially a demilitarized Japan, where the spiritual and moral would be seen as just as, if not more, important than force of arms in winning support for the global struggle with Communism. World federalism would not be alone as a benefactor of this language, and postwar Japanese elites would also participate enthusiastically in the anti-Communist ‘Moral Re-armament’ movement.\(^66\)

Kagawa’s ability to wage this spiritual war on the many fronts of his prewar activities was made difficult in the first few years of the occupation. The American Bible Society asked the occupation authorities (known by the acronym SCAP, denoting Supreme Commander for Allied Powers) to allow Kagawa to travel to the United States to participate in the bible society’s meeting in New York. The Civil Information and Education Section of the occupation authorities conducted a background review on Kagawa, including an evaluation of his wartime conduct. The evaluation produced was mixed, finding a contradictory mix of quasi-bellicose utterances as well as calls for an end to the war. Although it appeared that approval might be obtained, the trip was eventually called off.\(^67\) The occupation authorities did not, however, get in the way of his world federalist efforts and, indeed eventually recognized in his efforts an anti-communist message that was increasingly welcome to an evolving American policy repertoire in Japan.

Kagawa would eventually begin a long tenure as vice-president - under Ozaki - of the newly founded League for the Establishment of a World Federation. But in the early postwar years
his calls for a federal world government were channeled through a new Association for World Peace (Kokusai heiwa kyōkai), founded in 1946 with funds from Prince Higashikuni Naruhikō, Japan’s first postwar prime minister and later honorary president of Japan’s World Federalist Movement. The new association immediately began publication of its main journal, Sekai kokka (The World State), with Kagawa prominently advertised as its editor. In the pages of this journal, world federalists contributed articles together with other pieces on pacifism and, as suggested by early covers including the Christian cross, many articles on aspects of Kagawa’s approaches to Christianity. In the first four years of the occupation, Kagawa went on to contribute at least 58 articles to Sekai kokka, not including editorials that may have been penned by him. These contributions make up a significant proportion of the 274 total articles by him found in the Gordon W. Prange archive of occupation period publications in Japan from 1945-1949. Indeed, a number of Kagawa’s writings in other journals of during these years also explored his ideas on world government.

The ‘world state’ and, with increasing frequency, the ‘world federation’ referred to by Kagawa in his early postwar works were not a completely new political ideology embraced by a disillusioned missionary for peace and benevolence. Much like Ozaki, Kagawa found in world federalism a promising vehicle for his own political and economic philosophy - one best developed in his theories of a society based on cooperatives or, as the title of one of his books referred to it, ‘brotherhood economics.’ Though by no means a Marxist-Leninist, as his consistent antagonism to class warfare demonstrates, Kagawa nevertheless entertained an evolutionary theory of social development in which, through a natural process, new emerging social orders transcended more chaotic and unjust predecessors.

The Cultural Evolution of Institutions
As with Ozaki’s description of a world federation as a new version of the Meiji abolition of the han domains in 1871, Kagawa too described the benefits of a move to global government through a domestic analogy. However, whereas Ozaki contrasted the tense, distant relations between the han territories of Japan’s Tokugawa era with the national unity achieved after the collapse of Tokugawa rule, Kagawa saw the Tokugawa political system itself as a model for a future world federation. In his interpretation, Japan’s warring states period of the sixteenth century, when the land was torn apart by violence, was replaced by centuries of rule under the Tokugawa during which there was not a single major war. Kagawa admitted that the polity still featured several hundred fully armed local lords - a problem only resolved with the true monopoly on violence achieved by the new Meiji state. Kagawa also had nothing to say about the highly stratified classes of the Tokugawa period, its institutions of oppression, or the many revolts in the period’s history.

The core of Kagawa’s argument for the possibility of a genuine federal world, however, was to be found in his theory of institutional evolution as a manifestation of world cultural development (bunka no hatten). Culture had an eternal quality (fumetsusei), he argued, and if we understand the evolution of social and political institutions as a form of culture, then the permanent progression of humanity was an obvious corollary. Thus for example Greece might fall, but Rome would inherit its wisdom. Rome might fall, but the Gauls would imitate it. Not pausing to consider the obvious objections to this progressive theory of culture as applied to the Europe of late antiquity, Kagawa offered some more recent examples of the inexorable cultural evolution of institutions to their natural global conclusion. Were Lloyd’s marine insurance and the Universal Postal Union not “humanitarian projects launched by the people of the world on the basis of a spirit of mutual aid and fraternity,” and a great success? There was no reason this success could not be reproduced in the form of global
disarmament, the abolition of war, and a diversion of the efforts once devoted to violence towards the common glory of humanity as a whole.

This theory of institutional evolution leading to a world federation was a variation of Kagawa’s philosophy of ‘world cooperatives’ as the means to eliminate war, something he was already calling for in the 1930s. His approach was not, however, without a distinct social Darwinist flavor that would have served just as well to justify a wartime empire as a new world federation built on peace and disarmament. In his account it was always the more organized society that would prosper, and the less organized society that would be defeated. Human society was, in this respect, similar to the fate of different ant species exhibiting different capacities for organization. Referring to the work of entomologist Caryl P. Haskins, mostly likely in his popular book comparing ant and human societies, Kagawa contrasted the initial success of the Ponerine ‘armed ants’ with their ultimate defeat at the hands of the superior organization of the Pheidole genus Myrmicine ants. While his message here was presumably one of the triumph of strong social networks over raw strength and violence, other readers of the 1939 Of Ants and Men might have pointed out to Kagawa that Haskins also contrasted the democratic features of ‘primitive’ Ponerine ant colonies with the ‘fascist or communist’ tendencies in the totalitarian colonies of the Myrmicine ants.

The Sex Problem

The social world of ants was not the only way in which the biological world and Kagawa’s social evolutionary perspective impacted his urgent appeals for a world state. For Kagawa, violence in the world was not primarily the result of the ‘narrow nationalism’ that Ozaki argued so strongly against, but instead was fundamentally an economic problem. At least as early as 1936 Kagawa saw overpopulation as a main determinant in the economic causes of war. In 1941, when Kagawa traveled to the United States to avert war, his proposed plan for peace was to convince the Americans to pressure the Dutch into surrendering New Guinea to the Japanese empire, not for the eventual oil resources that lay at the heart of Japan’s rapid conquest of southeast Asia in the following year, but so that Japan might have a place to send its excess population as a proposed sort of tropical lebenstraum. This proposal was made despite the fact that Japan was already struggling to find willing settlers to move to its new Manchurian utopian state.

Kagawa’s concerns about Japan’s inability to feed its large population continued with his postwar articles on world federalism, despite the fact that the collapse of its wartime economy and the destruction of its infrastructure were clearly more important than the total size of a population now depleted by the war. Emigration was not his only proposed solution. The stock of the human race would have to be improved through eugenics, which could be developed to “prevent the birth of people with bad genes and anti-social natures (han shakaisei).” For Kagawa eugenics should not only be used to eliminate problematic people. He also called for a comprehensive and global approach to the ‘sex problem’ (sei mondai) to proactively create a ‘superior and peaceful people.’ This was to be no Nazi plan of racial purification, but quite the opposite. Echoing a similar plan proposed by the Japan-based Indian world federalist Raja Mahendra Pratap in 1941, Kagawa embraced a program of systematic miscegenation, especially between blacks and whites and the various ‘races of Europe.’ After all, he pointed out, the ‘beauty of the Turks’ was the product of ‘racial mixing with the Tartars.’ Mixing races was the way to eliminate “the problem of the blacks” along with racial conflict. Unlike Pratap, however, Kagawa seems to have held back somewhat, noting that, ‘the mixing of European blood with the Mongol race is an issue worth giving further consideration and research.’
All of these proposals, along with his theory of an eternal peace through world cooperatives should be evaluated by the United Nations and UNESCO, argued Kagawa, in order to secure an eternal peace. Whereas a nuclear holocaust terrified so many other world federalists around the world and lent great urgency to their movement, Kagawa saw economic problems and a combination of overpopulation and racial strife as being of critical importance. Failure to resolve these issues would in his view lead to revolution and violent class warfare. Kagawa had long been an enemy of capitalism and had strong socialist tendencies, but ultimately, especially in the eyes of American occupation authorities, he was most useful as an anti-Communist. Indeed Kagawa leveled his critique more often against the temptations of Communism than against the nation-state system he was proposing to transcend. Whatever his calls for radical social and economic reforms, these would not ultimately bring about the required change. Instead, cooperatives brought individuals together for a common purpose in a way that no cold political system could. “It is a mistake to believe”, he noted, “as the materialist Communists do, in the creation of equality through the communal ownership of property. There is no power which can create equality in society other than love…there is nothing which can truly reform society other than love.” Kagawa’s anti-Communist tone won comment from the American censor detachment that reviewed his publications. Condemning the violence and war bred by Communism and class struggle in one typical passage, Kagawa directed readers to turn instead to the cooperative movement to liberate them from capitalist exploitation and a racialized society, leading to a peaceful world federation. The passage was circled and labeled, ‘Kagawa’s anti-com. opinion.’

Conclusion

Ozaki and Kagawa were the most active leaders in Japan’s early postwar world federalist movement. Neither were marginal figures and both commanded wide respect. Support for a world federation that remedied the faults of both the League of Nations and the United Nations was not, for either of these figures, an independent cause that each came to stand behind in the moment of defeat. Instead they sought to use world federalism as a new postwar platform for ideas that had evolved over the course of several decades. Their postwar views, like those of the many other, mostly establishment figures who supported world federalism in Japan, tell us more about the tortured process of reviving and transforming older ideas for a new postwar society. The calls for world federalism and the eclectic ideas that Kagawa and Ozaki added to them stood little chance of having any significant impact on the formation of a new postwar order. Both had been closer to the peak of their careers and influence after the First World War than following the Second. By 1945 their empire was in ruins, their homeland occupied by foreign armies, and any legitimacy that Japanese visions of world order might once have had lay crushed both on the battlefield and in the memories of the intense violence Japanese occupations wrought throughout the region.

The institutions that emerged from the negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and the San Francisco conference in 1945 enshrined the dominance of the great powers and placed minimal limits on national sovereignty. The powerful Allies that emerged triumphant at the end of World War II had little incentive to completely subject their interests to the unknowns of a new federal institution. Within a few years, the Cold War had compounded the already huge challenge to world federalists of finding a workable compromise between communist and capitalist visions of world order. Perhaps more importantly, however, world federalists, including Japanese leaders of the movement, failed to appreciate the primacy of other issues for the vast majority of the world’s population. Even if Ozaki appreciated the power of
language as an obstacle to global cooperation, and Kagawa went further than most in highlighting economic and demographic issues, neither spoke clearly or unambiguously about how a world federation itself was a solution for inequality, or the injustices of empire. Unsurprisingly, for those across the region who faced daily hardship, corruption, or continued colonial subjugation, Communist parties and national liberation movements offered the hope for a real domestic solution instead of the dream of a domestic analogy.


3 The views and roles of each of this figures can be in Baratta’s *The Politics of World Federation*. For more on the support for world federalism by Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, see Manu Bhagavan, *India and the Quest for One World: The Peacemakers* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

4 The question asked was, “Do you think the United Nations organization should be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the U.S.?” Data tabulated in Gregory G. Holyk, “The Polls—Trends U.S. Public Support for the United Nations,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (March 20, 2010): 168–89.


6 For more on the Chicago constitution, see *ibid.*, 315-330.


Ibid., 81.


Ibid., 328.

Ibid., 403.


Ozaki Autobiography, 376.

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Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 85.

Yukio Ozaki, “Dai ni no haihan chiken taru: sekai renpō kensetsu no konpon shisō” Hitotsu no Sekai (May 1, 1947), 10.

Ibid.


“Sotsuō sedan” Hitotsu no Sekai February, 1948, 4. On the reform of education and world federalism, see also the figure of Shimonaka Yasaburō, Mark Lincicome, Imperial Subjects as Global Citizens: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Education in Japan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 115-121.


Ibid., 426.

Yukio Ozaki and Yasuyama Minoru “Sekai renpō no kanōsei” Sekai Renpō August, 1948, 8.


Ibid., 109-110.

Akira Iriye Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 76.


See Hatsushiba Takemi Nihon esuperanto undō shi (Tokyo: Japana Esperanto-Instituto, 1998) and for the latter especially see Ōshima Yoshio Han taisei esuperanto undōshi (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1974). For a connection to pan-Asianism, see chapter three on Kita Ikki.

“Ozaki Yukio wo tou” Esuperanto (November, 1946), 1.

Joseph Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation, vol. 1, 155. Baratta offers the most comprehensive overview of these legislative efforts in the United States.


On Japan’s regional peace diplomacy efforts in this regard see Peng Er Lam, Japan’s Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role (London: Routledge, 2009).


More information on the Diet committee and its future chairs can be found at: Accessed June 10, 2014, http://www.wfmjapan.org/008/index.html. The roster is kept updated online. Accessed June 10, 2014, http://www.wfmjapan.org/008/member20131126.pdf. The World Federation Diet committee has since had a long history of pressing for world federalism or more limited reforms of the United Nations and, as of 2013, the committee continued to include 99 legislators of both upper and lower houses across the ruling and opposition parties, including several legislators from the Communist Party.

Yukio Ozaki, “Sekai kokka no mokuhyō,” 53. He makes the same argument in more detail in “Sekai renpō no kensetsu” Hitotsu no sekai (March, 1947), 11.


For more on guild socialism as a movement, see


Ōta, “Kagawa Toyohiko: A Pacifist?”, 197.

Nunokawa, “1930 nendai ni okeru Kagawa Toyohiko no heiwa undō”, 63.

Liu, “Kagawa Toyohiko to chūgoku”, 54-5.


For more on these peace efforts by Kagawa see Bo Tao, “The Peacemaking Efforts of a Reverse Missionary: Toyohiko Kagawa Before Pearly Harbor,” *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 37, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 171–76.


This term is not the same compound as a constitutional monarchy (*rikken kunshusei*), but Kagawa may not have intended a distinction.


The investigation into Kagawa is considered in detail in Brandon P. Seto, “Filling the Spiritual Vacuum: Douglas MacArthur, American Christianity and the Occupation of Japan” (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2010), 80-85.


The magazine was published by the International Peace Association or “kokusai heiwa kyōkai” In addition to the Christian tone of its contents, several issues from 1948 featured a cover that included a Christian cross hovering above the earth and several white doves which might as easily symbolize the Holy Spirit as they do international peace.


Ōta, “Kagawa Toyohiko: A Pacifist?”, 177.
79 On the colonization of Manchuria, see Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999), 352-398.
80 Toyohiko Kawgawa “Tōsō no sekai yori kōkyū heiwa no sekai e” *Sekai Kokka* vol 2 no. 3 (April, 1948), 1.
82 *Ibid.* Pratap’s elaborate scheme for creating a unified race is found in his newsletter, *World Federation* vol. 8 (December, 1941), 3.
83 Kagawa Toyohiko “Kanzen naru ai” *Sekai Kokka* vol. 2 no. 6 (August, September, 1946), 3.
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Jikyoku [Current Times] ZA01 J108
Jinrui Dōmei [League of Humanity] ZH02 J141
Kōbe Shinbun [Kobe Newspaper]
Kokka to Shūkyō [Nation and Religion] ZH06 K1523
Sekai Kokka [World Nation] ZA05 S773
Sekai Renpō [World Federation] ZA05 S779
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