


# **The printed rebellions of the princes: factional politics and pamphleteering in early modern France, 1614-1617**

Edwin Andrew Goi

A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD  
at the  
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## Abstract

This thesis examines the extensive political pamphleteering campaigns engendered by the rebellions of the princes in France between February 1614 and April 1617. Situated between the periods of rule of two larger-than-life figures of French history – Henri IV and Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal-duc de Richelieu – who continue to monopolise historical research, the pamphleteering campaigns and the rebellions which gave rise to them have received relatively little attention. Such scholarly neglect is unwarranted, for the printed pandemonium of 1614-1617 was comparable to that of the Wars of Religion and the *Frondes* in intensity, and the political characters and events in this period would set the stage for the dramatic factional struggles throughout Louis XIII's personal reign.

The thesis begins with an investigation into the underlying causes of the princely rebellions which will serve as an important reference point with which to contextualise and analyse the pamphlets. Chapter two reappraises the characteristics of the pamphleteering campaigns and discusses the often-overlooked question of why political persuasion was even necessary during the rebellions, and how it was compatible with the unique political and social structures of seventeenth-century France. Chapter three explores another unacknowledged aspect of French political pamphleteering; it demonstrates how the contemporary obsession with the law of *lèse-majesté* and the loss of aristocratic honour shaped the production, distribution and contents of certain types of pamphlets. Chapter four examines the princes' recourse to the timeless and cynical propaganda tactics of demagoguery and mockery, and reconsiders if their pamphlets reflect the true nature of their ideology and political agendas. Chapter five explores how the government and the loyalists responded to the princes' literature. It illuminates how they circumvented potential diplomatic backlashes, gave lie to the princes' accusations and played on noble psychology. Chapter five will then reveal, for the first time, how the loyalist pamphleteers used disinformation to nudge the political nation into eschewing the princes' rebellions.

In drawing together all these strands, the thesis will not only present a fresh and more nuanced understanding of the interdependence between politics, government and pamphleteering in 1614-1617, it will throw light on the ethos of the French great nobility and minister-favourites and the nature of princely rebellions. In the process, it elucidates the entangled relationship between power and the media as well as public and private interests in the politics of the era.





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Researching and writing this PhD thesis has been a particularly testing time for me. The process would have been even more difficult had it not been for my friends. My best

friend, David Ong, has been my most reliable source of support and advice for nigh on 17 years now. My other long-time chums, Andrew Cockburn, Richard Jackson, Drew Thomas and Marc Jaffré, have made my time in St Andrews most delightful. All five of them also held my hand through some of the most distressing periods of my life. I must extend special thanks to my friends and office mates, Jamie Cumby, Alexandra Hill and Nora Epstein, whose camaraderie and exuberance ensured that there was never a dull day at work. I would also like to thank Lucas and Katie Kriner, Aaron and Rebecca Lott, Becky Walker, Elisa Curth, John Condren, Shanti Graheli, Graeme Kemp, Ninal Lamal, Jan Hillgärtner, Panagiotis Georgakakis, Sandra Toffolo, Chelsea Reutcke, Sven Hermans, Arthur der Weduwen, Jessica Farrell-Jobst, Yasmin Vetter, Alex Chong, Hannah Briscoe, Mhairi Rutherford, Scott Schorr, Sarah Rindlisbacher, Andy Gwilt and Lucy Walti for adding colour to my postgraduate life with their friendship.

Last but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my family. Not a day goes by where I do not think about my late grandmother who showered so much affection (sometimes too much) on her *Petit Dauphin* and taught him to be a principled man. I am deeply touched by my beloved aunts and uncles who have always treated me like their own son. I am eternally grateful for the love and care of my mother who, thankfully, is everything Marie de Médicis was not. I owe everything that I have today to my father, Goi Chiew Weng, and my sister, Brenda Goi. Their selfless and seemingly limitless love, solicitude and patience have helped through some of the darkest days. My father, in particular, had expended his life savings so that I could receive the world-class liberal arts education that I wanted. It is only right that I dedicate this PhD thesis to these two towers of strength in my life.

Edwin Andrew Goi  
St Andrews, October 2018.



## Conventions

1. All dates have been given using the Gregorian calendar, with the New Year starting on 1 January.
2. The French version of place names and people have been retained when referring to French places and people. French titles have also been presented in their original form.
3. Quotations from French have been left in French.
4. Quotations have been presented in their original spelling, save for ‘v’s and ‘i’s which have been substituted where necessary with ‘u’s and ‘j’s to facilitate understanding. Similarly, abbreviations have been expanded to encourage fluidity of reading.





## Abbreviations

|                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
| <b>BnF</b>              | Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, France.  |
| <b>BM Lyon</b>          | Bibliothèque municipale de Lyon, Lyon, France.  |
| <b>AN</b>               | Archives nationales, Paris, France.   |
| <b>Andilly</b>          | Robert Arnauld d'Andilly, <i>Journal Inédit d'Arnauld d'Andilly (1614-1620)</i> , ed. Achille Halphen (Paris, 1857).  |
| <b>Bassompierre</b>     | François, maréchal de Bassompierre, <i>Journal de ma vie: Mémoires du maréchal de Bassompierre</i> , ed. M. de Chantérac, tomes I and II (Paris, 1870-1873).  |
| <b>Beauvais-Nangis</b>  | Nicolas de Brichanteau, marquis de Beauvais-Nangis, <i>Mémoires du marquis de Beauvais-Nangis et Journal du Procès du marquis de la Boulaye</i> , eds. Monmerqué and A. H. Taillandier (Paris, 1857).                         |
| <b>Estrées</b>          | François-Annibal, maréchal-duc d'Estrées, <i>Mémoires du maréchal d'Estrées sur la Régence de Marie de Médicis (1610-1616) et sur celle d'Anne d'Autriche (1643-1650)</i> , ed. Paul Bonnefon (Paris, 1905).                  |
| <b>Fontenay-Mareuil</b> | François du Val, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil, 'Mémoires de messire du Val, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil', in M. Petitot (ed.), <i>Collection Complète des Mémoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de France</i> , tome I (Paris, 1826). |
| <b>Molé</b>             | Mathieu Molé, <i>Mémoires de Mathieu Molé</i> , ed. Aimé Champollion-Figeac, tome I (Paris, 1860).  |
| <b>Pontchartrain</b>    | Paul Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, 'Mémoires de Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain' in M. Petitot (ed.), <i>Collection des Mémoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de France</i> , tomes XVI and XVII (Paris, 1822).                           |



- Richelieu** Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal-duc de Richelieu, *Mémoires du cardinal de Richelieu*, ed. Société de l'Histoire de France, tomes I and II (Paris, 1907-1909).
- Lettres de Richelieu** Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal-duc de Richelieu, *Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques et Papiers d'État du cardinal de Richelieu*, ed. M. Avenel, tome I (Paris, 1853).
- Lettres de Malherbe** François de Malherbe, *Œuvres de Malherbe*, ed. M. L. Lalanne, tome III (Paris, 1862).



## Introduction

In many respects, the four rebellions of the princes against the government of Marie de Médicis and her favourite, Concino Concini, between February 1614 and April 1617 were no more than a pale echo of their sixteenth-century predecessors. Although the protagonists bore the same names of Bourbon or Lorraine and the same titles of the prince de Condé or the duc de Mayenne, long gone were the days when the princes could field a formidable army and hold out in their fortified towns for years on end to force the crown's capitulation. In the rebellion of 1614, the forces of Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé numbered only around 4,000 infantry and 600 cavalry.<sup>1</sup> And in the rebellion of 1617, the tight cluster of fortified towns in the Île-de-France belonging to Henri de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne fell to the royal army in a matter of a couple of weeks.

But while the likes of Condé and Mayenne paled in comparison to their ancestors in terms of their military strength and resilience, they more than matched them in their use of political pamphlets. The rebellions of the princes of the seventeenth century, as with the malcontent and religious rebellions of the sixteenth century, were fought out on paper as well as in the field. During the rebellions of 1614-17, the princes and the government deluged cities and communities across France with more than 1,500 editions of printed pamphlets as they competed for the loyalty of specific institutions and individuals. What started out as series of pamphlet exchanges between the princes and the government invariably escalated into full-blown pamphlet wars which intensity was comparable with those of the Wars of Religion and the *Frondes*.<sup>2</sup> Political pamphleteering and persuasion, it seems, had become one of the definitive features of factional politics in early modern France.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> In 1589, unquestionably at the apex of the Catholic Ligue's opposition to and pamphleteering campaign against Henri III, 1,479 editions of polemical pamphlets were published; see Alexander Wilkinson, "Homicides Royaux": The Assassination of the Duc and Cardinal de Guise and the Radicalization of French Public Opinion', *French History* 18, pp. 135-136. As for the *Frondes*, there were over 5,000 editions published between 1648-53.

The printed pandemonium of the Wars of Religion, in particular, has attracted much attention from historians in the last five or six decades. Like scholars of the Lutheran Reformation who were interested in assessing or re-assessing the invention of the printing press as an agent of change, many historians of the Calvinist Reformation have attempted to examine the relationship between the maturing book trade, the spread of Protestantism and the outbreaks of religious conflicts in France. Eugénie Droz, Louis Desgraves, Robert Kingdon and Jean-François Gilmont, most notably, unveil the activity of the publishers and collate and analyse the publication of devotional literature and polemical pamphlets in Geneva, the nerve centre of Calvinism, and La Rochelle, the stronghold of the French Huguenots.<sup>3</sup> This disproportionate amount of attention dedicated to the Reformed press was subsequently redressed by Denis Pallier and his magisterial work on the Parisian press during the Wars of Catholic League, and more recently, by the scholars of the French Vernacular Book Project, directed by Andrew Pettegree at the University of St Andrews. Combining traditional textual examination with quantitative data analysis and modern bibliographic techniques, Pallier and the scholars at St Andrews establish the exact output of the French Catholic press between 1535 and 1600 and effectively debunk the persistent myth that the French Catholics were less proficient than the Huguenots at using the new media to defend or further their faith. These historians have found out that the French Catholics had not only out-published the Huguenots by a considerable margin, the Catholic pamphlets manifested the same literary and theological qualities as their Reformed counterparts and were equally adept at exploiting popular memory, beliefs and culture to maximise their effectiveness. The extent and expertise of Catholic pamphleteering, these historians conclude, contributed to the uncompromising and violent nature of the religious wars and the ultimate triumph of Catholicism over Calvinism in sixteenth-century France.<sup>4</sup> The printing press, these historians inadvertently suggest, had helped maintain rather alter the status quo.

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<sup>3</sup> Eugénie Droz, *Barthélemy Berton, 1563-1573* (Geneva, 1960); Idem, *La veuve Berton et Jean Portau, 1573-1589* (Geneva, 1960); Louis Desgraves, *Les Haultin, 1571-1623* (Geneva, 1960); Idem, *Éloi Gibier, Imprimeur à Orléans (1536-1588)* (Geneva, 1966); Robert Kingdon, 'The Flood Tide: Books from Geneva' in Robert Kingdon (ed.) *Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion* (Geneva, 1966), pp. 93-105; Idem, *Myths about the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, 1572-1576* (Cambridge, MA, 1988); Jean-François Gilmont, *Le Livre Réformé au XVIe Siècle* (Paris, 2005).

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Pettegree, Paul Nelles and Philip Conner, *The Sixteenth-century French Religious Book* (Aldershot, 2001); Andrew Pettegree, *The French Book and the European Book World* (Leiden, 2007); Denis Pallier, *Recherches sur l'Imprimerie à Paris pendant la Ligue, 1585-1594* (Geneva, 1975); Idem, 'Les Responses Catholiques' in Roger Chartier and Henri-Jean Martin (eds.), *Histoire de l'Édition Française, tome 2: Le livre triomphant* (Paris, 1982), pp. 457-471; Matthew Hall, 'Lyon Publishing in the Age of Catholic Revival, 1565-1600', (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2005); Philip John, 'Publishing in Paris, 1570-1590: A Bibliometric Analysis', (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2010); Graeme Kemp, 'Catholic Religious Controversy and the French Marketplace of Print, 1535-1572', (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2012); Luc Racaut, *Hatred in Print: Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identity during the French Wars of Religion* (Aldershot, 2002); Idem, 'Education

Albeit to a lesser degree, the pamphleteering phenomena of seventeenth-century France is also a well-trodden historiographical path. For this latter century, the existing studies are an offshoot of the undying obsession of generations of scholars with charting the ascent of absolutism. Sometimes with great subtlety, but often without, these studies describe how the French government manipulated and then monopolised the press – with its ‘bureau de presse’, censorship and patronage – to influence political discourse, silence its critics, enhance its image, inculcate notions of absolutism and *raison d'état*, and concomitantly strengthen the crown's authority. Needless to say, these studies concentrate their attention predominantly on the political press during *the ministériats* of Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal-duc de Richelieu (1624-42) and Jules-Raymond, cardinal de Mazarin (1642-61), both of whom were regarded by traditional historiography to be the principal architects of the centralised state and the absolute monarchy. The works of Gustave Fagniez, Orest Ranum, Howard Solomon and Christian Jouhaud, for example, investigate the careers of Richelieu's polemicists, historians and newsmen and analyse how the cardinal-duc used their publications to undermine his rivals, justify his objectionable policies as well as inculcate his controversial notions of *raison d'état* and royal absolutism. Meanwhile, Christian Jouhaud and Hubert Carrier, amongst others, study the pamphleteering excesses of the *Fronde*s, examining the uses and motifs of the *Mazarinades*, the clashes or absence of ideologies that they represented and the defensive responses of Mazarin. Carrier, remarkably, devotes thirty years of his career to uncovering the secretive production and distribution of the *Mazarinades*. He eventually manages to identify many anonymous writers and publishers and trace their connections to the *frondeurs*.<sup>5</sup>

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of the Laity and Advocacy of Violence in Print during the French Wars of Religion’, *History* 95 (2010), pp. 159-176.

<sup>5</sup> Jane McLeod, *Licensing Loyalty: Printers, Patrons, the State in Early Modern France* (University Park, PA, 2011); Gustave Fagniez, ‘Le Père Joseph et Richelieu’, *Revue des questions historique* 48 (1890), pp. 471-521; Idem, *Le Père Joseph et Richelieu, 1577-1638*, 2 vols (Paris, 1894); Idem, ‘L’Opinion publique et la polémique au temps de Richelieu, à propos d’une publication récente’, *Revue des questions historiques* 31 (1896), pp. 442-484; Idem, ‘L’Opinion publique et la press politique sous Louis XIII, 1624-1626’, *Revue d’histoire diplomatique* 14 (1900), pp. 352-401; Idem, ‘Fancan et Richelieu’, *Revue historique* 107 (1911), pp. 59-78 and 108 (1911), pp. 75-87; Maximin Deloche, *Autour de la Plume du Cardinal de Richelieu* (Paris, 1920); William Church, *Richelieu and the Reason of State* (Princeton, NJ, 1972); Howard Solomon, *Public Welfare, Science, and Propaganda in Seventeenth-century France: The Innovations of Théophraste Renaudot* (Princeton, 1972); Christian Bailly, *Théophraste Renaudot: Un homme d’influence au temps de Louis XIII et de la Fronde* (Paris, 1987); Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-century France* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980); Christian Jouhaud, *Richelieu et l’Écriture du Pouvoir: Autour de la journée des Dupes* (Paris, 2015); Hubert Carrier, *La Press de la Fronde, 1648-1653*, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1989-1991); Idem, *Les Muses guerrières: Les Mazarinades et la vie littéraire au milieu du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1996); Stéphane Haffemayer, ‘Mazarin, Information and Communication during the Fronde (1648-1653)’, *Media History* 22 (2016), pp. 386-400; Mark Bannister, ‘The Mediatization of Politics during the Fronde: Condé’s Bureau de Presse’, *Cahiers du dix-septième* 10 (2005), pp. 31-43; Idem, ‘Mazarinades, Manifestos and Mavericks: Political and Ideological Engagement during the Fronde’, *French History* 30 (2016), pp. 165-180.

Despite their intensity, the pamphleteering storms of 1614-17 have received relatively little scholarly treatment. This is no doubt an effect of the limited historical interest in the regency of Marie de Médicis and the *ministériat* of Concino Concini, the period from May 1610 to April 1617. The regent and her favourite had the misfortune of being sandwiched between and overshadowed by two larger-than-life figures: Henri IV and Richelieu; their period of supremacy lay between two iconic epochs of French history: the Wars of Religion and the ‘transformative’ reigns of the cardinal-ministers. The era should, however, receive more attention, for many significant political and religious issues persisted beyond the religious wars and became radicalised during the troubled regency of the queen mother and her minister-favourite. The chief protagonists and antagonists of the regency, as well as the bad blood that had arisen between them over these years, would subsequently play a crucial role in the dramatic power struggles throughout most of Louis XIII’s personal reign. Indeed, Richelieu undertook his political apprenticeship in the *ministériat* of Concini, when he was appointed *secrétaire d’État* by Concini in November 1616. Forced to witness the deposition of the queen mother and the brutal assassination of his patron on 24 April 1617, the future cardinal-duc gained some important lessons about the parallel value and threat of the princes and the concurrent usefulness and danger of the printing press.

So far, the works of Hélène Duccini and Jeffrey Sawyer remain the only comprehensive overviews of the political pamphlets printed during the princely rebellions of 1614-17.<sup>6</sup> While Duccini and Sawyer must be admired for their pioneering work in this field, and they provide much food for thought, their works are by no means the last word on the subject. For a start, Duccini and Sawyer determine the scale and nature of the pamphleteering phenomena by counting the relevant titles found in Parisian and American libraries.<sup>7</sup> In doing so, they unknowingly discount a number of provincial imprints and hence

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<sup>6</sup> The other existing works are either unrelated or extremely limited in scope. They focused the pamphlets related specifically to the *États généraux* of 1614, the Catholic and Protestant religious controversies, the anti-Concini pamphlets or the pamphlets celebrating Concini’s death. See: J. Michael Hayden, ‘The Uses of Political Pamphlets: The Estates General of 1614’, *French Historical Studies* 3 (1964), pp. 507-524; Roger Chartier and Denis Richet (eds.), *Représentation et vouloir politiques: autour des États-Généraux de 1614* (Paris, 1982); Louis Desgraves, *Répertoire des Ouvrages de Controverse entre Catholiques et Protestants en France, 1598-1685, 2 vols.* (Geneva, 1984); Christian Jouhaud, ‘Readability and Persuasion: Political Handbills’ in Roger Chartier (ed.), *The Culture of Print: Power and the Uses of Print in Early Modern Europe*, trans. by Lydia G. Cochrane (Oxford, 1989), pp. 235-260; Jean-François Dubost, ‘Rendre compte d’un assassinat politique: la mort du maréchal d’Ancre ou l’inversion dans l’ordre des raison’, *XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* 276 (2017), pp. 399-428.

<sup>7</sup> Hélène Duccini, ‘La Littérature pamphlétaire sous la Régence de Marie de Médicis’, 3 vols. (Thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Paris X, 1977); Idem, ‘Regard sur la littérature pamphlétaire en France au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle’, *Revue Historique* 260 (1978), pp. 313-339; Idem, *Faire Voir, Faire Croire: L’Opinion Publique sous Louis XIII*



the role of the provincial press in these conflicts, for many such works survive only in the French provincial libraries. Having said that, these earlier scholars should not be reproached for choosing such a methodology. The longstanding (and ongoing) absence of a national bibliography of early modern French books, combined with the unavailability of electronic database software and methods in the 1970s and 80s, have made the attempt to compile a comprehensive catalogue of the relevant pamphlets extremely difficult. In consequence, earlier scholars were forced to rely solely on the collections found in the Parisian and American libraries, which, till today, remain the largest known corpus of seventeenth-century French pamphlets.

Duccini and Sawyer's decision to count the number of titles rather than the number of editions was less defensible, however. It inevitably leads both scholars to underestimate significantly the extent of the pamphleteering phenomena and by extension misconstrue their characteristics, as many titles in this period were published in multiple editions: Condé's manifesto of February 1614, for example, was printed in thirteen editions and Marie de Médicis's official response, eighteen. The decision to count titles rather than editions also fails to account for the prevalence of variants. Variants are apparently similar editions of pamphlets with the same title page and textual layout which, upon closer bibliographic inspection, turn out to be different. By disregarding a great number of these variant editions, both scholars have therefore understated to a considerable extent the nature and scale of the pamphleteering campaigns.

There are also grounds for expanding upon and modifying the interpretations by Duccini and Sawyer. As with most scholars of political pamphleteering during the Wars of Religion and the *Frondes*, Duccini and Sawyer argue that political pamphlets were employed to damage or preserve reputation and to move the audience to identify with specific standpoints, because effective government depended on the goodwill of the governed. Both scholars conclude that the pervasiveness of political pamphlets bore witness to an emerging public sphere in sixteenth- or seventeenth-century France. Although such conclusions are undoubtedly reasonable, Duccini and Sawyer, like other scholars of early modern French political pamphleteering before and after them, do not explain how and why the consent of the public was imperative in a political system governed by hierarchy and ties of kinship and

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(Paris, 2003); Jeffrey Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, CA, 1990).

patronage; they also do not explain how and why a public sphere could exist within an absolute monarchy. Indeed, one could argue that public persuasion and debate were inherently unnecessary in a polity and society governed by an apparently absolute monarchy, hierarchy and ties of kinship and patronage. Reverence, obedience and service to the crown and princely grandees were supposed to be institutionalised; functions of obligations and customs, as opposed to rationalisation or conviction.

This means that the political pamphlets and their contents therefore need to be placed in context in a more profound and wide-ranging manner. While Duccini and Sawyer have skilfully summarised and presented the contents of the pamphlets upon which their conclusions were based, they do not examine the underlying mental structures of French society that determined how such pamphlets would be read. They do not show how political developments, shifting factional relations and private ambitions affected and altered the focus of the pamphlets. They also do not explain why the pamphleteers issued so many new titles even though they had no fresh arguments to advance. And more so than Sawyer, Duccini does not elucidate why the pamphleteers chose to evoke specific issues, themes and tropes instead of others; and why they considered what they had chosen to be most effective for eliciting a reaction from their audience at that particular point of time.

At times, this limited context and grounding leads Duccini and Sawyer to oversimplify and misinterpret the uses of some pamphlets. Sawyer, for example, assumes – and explicitly states – that Marie de Médicis did not actually intend to prosecute Condé and his adherents. The legalistic language and structure of the printed royal declarations as well as the prevalence of the term and concept of *lèse-majesté* within them, he argues, was a mere propaganda strategy on the crown's part. Its aim was to legitimise and propagate the idea of the king's sovereignty and use the law of *lèse-majesté* to refute the princes' protestations that the king was required to seek their advice, and their more radical claims that their armed solutions did not undermine the king's authority.<sup>8</sup> This is a narrow and partial explanation of the issue of legality, an issue that needs to be taken more seriously on its own terms. Both the primary and secondary sources have indicated that the French nobility of this period, *épée* and *robe* alike, were preoccupied with the preservation of their honour and dynastic standing and for this reason fearful of the law of *lèse-majesté*. This was because the crime of *lèse-majesté* was one of the most shameful offences a nobleman could commit, and its punishments

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<sup>8</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, pp. 116-122.

entailed the confiscation of all the titles, wealth and land upon which his dynastic standing was founded.<sup>9</sup> The nobility's fear was justified, for Marie de Médicis – contra Sawyer – had every intention of persecuting the rebels. One only had to look to the example of an unnamed member of the king's *gardes écossaises* and the baron d'Heurtevan in Normandie. In accordance with the stipulations of the royal declarations (of 24 November 1616, 17 January 1617 and 13 February 1617), both noblemen were executed on 27 February and 21 March 1617 respectively for the crime of *lèse-majesté*, having been found guilty of trying to raise troops for the malcontent *Condéen* princes.<sup>10</sup> Seen in the context of these events and contemporary noble culture and anxieties, it becomes clear that the printed royal declarations were meant to be legal decrees which had the full force of the law. Their persuasive value lay not in validating and indoctrinating the idea of the king's sovereignty, but in reminding the French nobility of the ruinous consequences of the crime of *lèse-majesté* and scaring them into shunning the princes' rebellions.

The limited exploration of context also seems to have encouraged Duccini and Sawyer to accept the contents of the pamphlets at face value. There is a strong assumption that the pamphlets accurately reflect the political ideologies and concerns of their respective sponsors, and there is a strong inclination to see the disagreements between the pamphlets as a manifestation of the irreconcilable ideological clash between the princes and the incumbent ministers. That they should do so is unsurprising. The works of both Duccini and Sawyer sit quite firmly within a statist interpretation of seventeenth-century France, even while a string of magisterial works by Anglo-American historians had been undermining this overarching historiographical model for nigh on 40 years now.<sup>11</sup> The statist interpretation is a resilient metanarrative which supposes that the early Bourbon monarchs and minister-favourites had intended to establish an absolute monarchy through a programme of political unification, modernisation and centralisation. It presumes that these individuals had worked to sweep away the remnants of medieval feudal society and its customary privileges, institutions and representative assemblies; that they had likewise contrived to limit the independence and strength of the *grands* and to transfer their control of the kingdom's administration to an increasingly confident breed of bourgeois lawyers and financiers.

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<sup>9</sup> See Chapter three.

<sup>10</sup> *Mercure François*, t.4(3), pp. 115, 163.

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of these works, see: Joseph Bergin, 'Three Faces of Richelieu: A Historiographical Essay', *French History* 23 (2009), pp. 517-536; William Beik, 'The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration', *Past & Present* 88 (2005), pp. 195-224; Elie Haddad, 'Noble Clienteles in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Historiographical Approach', *French History* 20 (2006), pp. 75-109.

The recent studies by Jean-François Dubost and Duccini herself attempt to rehabilitate the woeful historical reputations of Marie de Médicis of Concino Concini within this statist historical framework.<sup>12</sup> Dubost and Duccini impute the notoriety of the queen mother and her minister-favourite to the contemporary attitudes of misogyny and xenophobia which had since cast a long shadow over modern assessments. They conclude that Marie de Médicis and Concino Concini should be commended because they had made some important contributions to the budding Bourbon absolute monarchy: the queen mother had not only defused the tensions between France and Spain using the Habsburgs-Bourbon double marriages during her regency, she preserved her son's patrimony from the ambitions of the rapacious *grands*. She judiciously retained her late-husband's absolutist approach of relying on several *noblesse de robe* ministers in her royal councils and elevating loyal supporters to eminent positions to serve as a counterweight to the *grands* at court and in the provinces.<sup>13</sup> One of her loyal supporters was her minister-favourite. Concini's unyielding stance and military action against the malcontent princes in 1617, Dubost and Duccini surmise, was informed by his desire to maintain the crown's authority. Concini's fortification works in Picardie and Normandie and further development of a permanent royal army – with the establishment of the *vieux regiment de Normandie* – were influenced by his goal to extend royal authority to the provinces and allow the crown to respond swiftly to domestic and foreign threats.<sup>14</sup> Finally, Concini's attempts to depose the 'barbon' ministers of Henri IV and replace them with his *créatures* – Claude Barbin, Claude Mangot and Richelieu – were shaped by his intention to restructure the council around men who shared his absolutist aspirations. For these reasons, Dubost and Duccini conclude, Concini should be considered a '*homme d'état*', a worthy successor to Sully and predecessor of Richelieu. It is evident, they argue, that Richelieu had learnt and adopted Concini's methods of government when he became a minister-favourite in 1624.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Dubost and Duccini try to revise the conclusions of these following *statist* interpretations of the 1610s, while retaining their *statist* framework: Jules Michelet, *Histoire de France au XVIIe siècle, Henri IV et Richelieu* (Paris, 1857); Pierre Chevallier, *Louis XIII, roi cornélien* (Paris, 1979); Michel Carmona, *Marie de Médicis* (Paris, 1981); Simon Bertière, *Les deux régentes* (Paris, 1996); Philippe Delorme, *Marie de Médicis* (Paris, 1998).

<sup>13</sup> Jean-François Dubost, *Marie de Médicis: La reine dévoilée* (Paris, 2009).

<sup>14</sup> Concini had actually established the *vieux regiment de Normandie* as a measure to protect his life and position amidst the intensifying factional struggles. The *regiment* was established between late 1615 and early 1616, right after Concini had fallen out with most of the *Condéen* as well as the *Guisard* princes. See: Daniel Thomas, 'Family, Ambition and Service: The French Nobility and the Emergence of the Standing Army, c. 1589-1629', (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2010), pp. 102-107.

<sup>15</sup> Hélène Duccini, *Concini: Grandeur et misère du favori de Marie de Médicis* (Paris, 1991); Jean-François Dubost, 'Between Mignons and Principal Ministers: Concini, 1610-1617' in J.H. Elliott and L.W.B. Brockliss (eds.), *The World of the Favourite* (New Haven, CT, 1999), pp. 71-78.

According to this way of looking at things, the series of armed princely rebellions in the first half of the seventeenth century were therefore the *grands'* attempts to arrest the absolutist policies of the early Bourbon kings, regents and minister-favourites. The *grands*, it has been assumed, were implacably opposed to these absolutist policies and reforms because they undermined the feudal political system and traditions upon which the *grands'* autonomy, status, power and economic interests were grounded. The princely rebellions could therefore be said to embody the inevitable ideological collision between the feudalism, conservatism and self-interests of the *grands* and the modernism, progressive spirit and *raison d'état* of the likes of Marie de Médicis and Concini.

That Duccini and Sawyer should interpret the contents of the political pamphlets as mirrors of political beliefs and grievances is also reflected in recent – but still – statist reinterpretations of the *grands*. Somewhat at odds with the perspectives of Duccini and Sawyer, Jean-Marie Constant and Arlette Jouanna endeavour to rehabilitate the reputation of the *grands* by downplaying the feudalistic and self-interested aspects of their ideology and concerns. Constant deems the arch-rivals of Richelieu such as Gaston de France, duc d'Orléans, Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons and Henri-Coëffier de Ruzé d'Effiat, marquis de Cinq-Mars to be precocious proponents of nineteenth-century liberalism. Rather than their reactionary and self-seeking attitudes, it was their ideas of freedom of thought, speech and action and belief in a political system with inherent checks and balances which put them at odds with Richelieu, who was a champion of state censorship, surveillance and absolute power for the monarchy.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, Jouanna contends that the *grands* and their noble followers considered themselves to be the protectors of the body politic. They concomitantly believed that it was their duty to revolt when the body politic was endangered by manipulators of royal authority or by the king himself. The princely rebellions of the 1560s were attempts by Louis I de Bourbon, prince de Condé to free the French king and kingdom from the domination of foreigners such as the princes and cardinals of the House of Lorraine-Guise. The princely rebellions of the 1570s, 1610s, 1630s, 1640s and 1650s were the princes' attempts to preserve their traditional roles and the system of a mixed monarchy which, they were convinced, were still the best guarantees against the eventuality of tyranny.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Jean-Marie Constant, *Les conjurateurs: le premier libéralisme politique sous Richelieu* (Paris, 1987); idem, *Gaston d'Orléans: prince de la liberté* (Paris, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'état moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris, 1989).

Constant and Jouanna rely largely on the pamphlet literature produced during the princely rebellions for their reinterpretation of the *grands*. To a great extent, they base their notions of the *grands*' admirable intentions on the public-spirited nature of the princes' grievances and demands in this literature. Since their publication in 1987 and 1989 respectively, the works of Constant and Jouanna have inspired the next generation of revisionist historiography on noble rebellions. It is not uncommon for scholars, statist or otherwise, to following the lead of Constant and Jouanna in pointing to the contents of the princes' pamphlets as concrete evidence of the princes' political beliefs and aspirations.<sup>18</sup> Sawyer, for example, avers that the notable lack of anti-absolutist ideas and language in the rebel pamphlets of 1614-17 suggests that the malcontent princes were not opposed to the absolute monarchy. Rather, they were hostile to the idea of the government being controlled and manipulated by foreigners such as Marie de Médicis and Concini. They also saw themselves as representatives of the king's authority within their respective jurisdictions. Any affront to them was therefore an affront to the king.<sup>19</sup>

The works of Constant and Jouanna and others whom they have influenced are problematic because they prioritise theory over contextual facts. In their efforts to put a statist or positive spin on the princely rebellions, they have neglected to investigate the actual roots of the political conflicts: the personal feuds, factional tensions, unfulfilled personal ambitions and political manoeuvres. They have consequently ignored the glaring discrepancy between the pamphlets' rhetoric and the princes' actions, and accepted the rhetoric as an accurate representation of the princes' sincere intentions. At the same time, they have failed to consider the possibility that these pamphlets could be formulated to exploit the existing preoccupations, prejudices and grievances of the target audience. For all their analyses on the uses of the political pamphlets, these historians have overlooked the fact that these pamphlets were primarily instruments of political persuasion, which were by nature demagogic. While the pamphlets could have expressed political ideology and concerns, these historians have forgotten to ask to whom the ideology and concerns really belonged.

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<sup>18</sup> Domenico Menna, 'Protestations nobiliaires et mutations de la respublica: Concini et Longueville en Picardie de 1610 à 1617', *Séminaire de formation doctoral—Public/Privé, CURAPP-CNRS* (1995), pp. 23-46; Ariane Boltanski, 'Le pouvoir en partage. Les litiges entre le duc de Nevers et le gouvernement monarchique (1614-1617)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 46 (1999), pp. 117-145; Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 2010); Caroline Maillet-Rao, 'Mathieu de Morgues and Michel de Marillac: The Dévots and Absolutism', *French History* 25 (2011), pp. 279-297; Mark Bannister, 'Mazarinades, Manifestos and Mavericks: Political and Ideological Engagement during the Fronde', *French History* 30 (2016), pp. 165-180.

<sup>19</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, pp. 122-127, 129-131.

Christian Jouhaud's study of the *Mazarinades* is one of the two comprehensive surveys of early modern French political pamphleteering which consciously rejects the idea of pamphlets as expressions of ideology and ideological conflict. Unfortunately, Jouhaud's complete denial that the pamphlets reflect any forms of ideology or public opinion and his limited and selective use of sources limit the traction of his study. But Jouhaud's arguments are certainly worth reconsidering.<sup>20</sup> The *Frondes*, Jouhaud discerns correctly, were movements by several factions to control the regency government and judicial courts, not to overthrow them. The *Frondes* were therefore not confrontations between conflicting concepts of the polity and society. As such, the *Mazarinades* were not 'texts of opinions', but 'texts of actions'. The factions used these pamphlets to strike symbolic blows: to intimidate, deceive, anger, discredit and humiliate their rivals. This is why the attacks were often *ad hominem* and not issue-related. Rather than serving to persuade the audience of a certain ideology or standpoint, the *Mazarinades* were devised to manipulate the audience into a particular way of looking at an issue of which they were already convinced, thereby nudging them into undertaking specific actions. The *Mazarinades*, in other words, were designed to turn the psychology and socio-cultural upbringing of both their targets and audience to the factions' advantage.<sup>21</sup>

Tatiana Debaggi Baranova's recent study on political and religious pamphleteering during the French Wars of Religion, *À coup des libelles*, concurred with Jouhaud's methodology and conclusions. Like Jouhaud, Baranova asserts that it is impossible to understand the uses and meanings of these texts without first understanding the context in which they were composed. As such, she examines the political and religious events surrounding the publication of the *libelles* in question. Through her careful textual analysis, she demonstrates that the pamphleteers, when attempting to prove that certain individuals had committed crimes against the French king and state, constructed their arguments according to the rhetorical techniques laid down by Cicero and Quintilian. Through her painstaking investigation of a wide range of sources, Baranova identifies the most common arguments, accusations, anecdotes and facts adopted by the pamphleteers and demonstrate how they reappeared time after time in subsequent *libelles*, *mutatis mutandum*, over several decades. The pamphleteers, she discovers, were merely adapting and repackaging the same

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<sup>20</sup> J. Russell Major, 'Review: Christian Jouhaud: *Mazarinades: La Fronde des Mots*', *American Historical Review* 91 (1986), pp. 933-934.

<sup>21</sup> Christian Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: La Fronde des mots* (Paris, 1985).

messages to suit different situations and audiences. Baranova therefore argues that the *libelles* were never meant to present their originators' political policies, principles or philosophy. Rather, they were meant to advance a particular position to a particular audience at a particular moment. More specifically, they were meant to designate an enemy, build a case against him, destroy his reputation and in doing so, legitimise and garner support for one's armed actions against him.<sup>22</sup>



This thesis seeks to address the existing gap in the scholarship of early modern French political pamphleteering by investigating the pamphleteering frenzies which accompanied the rebellions of the princes between February 1614 and April 1617. It aims to situate the publication and content of the pamphlets in the context of the agendas of the chief protagonists and antagonists, as well as the political developments, factional relations, noble ethos and legal culture of the period. In doing so, the thesis will re-consider the production and dissemination of the political pamphlets in question and more importantly, their functions. It will re-examine the motivations behind the publication of manifestos, open letters, 'leaked' documents, official responses, edicts of pacification, news accounts and cascades of argumentative discourses. It will also throw light on the choice of targets, subject matters and motifs, and how they fit within the wider political objectives and persuasion strategies of the opposing factions.

To accomplish its aims, the thesis compiles a list of all the relevant editions (not just titles) published during the rebellions of 1614-17 using the data of the Universal Short Title Catalogue (USTC). The USTC is an extremely reliable starting point of investigation because it is a thorough survey of French editions found not only in the Parisian and American libraries, but also the British, German, Spanish, Italian and French provincial libraries. The members of the USTC team have carefully inspected the copy information of the pamphlets, gathered their bibliographic fingerprints and used modern database methods to identify previously unknown and variant editions, while avoiding the creation of duplicate editions (a process in which the author of this thesis was also involved). Assembling the corpus of editions using the data of the USTC therefore allows the thesis to determine much more

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<sup>22</sup> Tatiana Debaggi Baranova, *À coup des libelles: Une culture politique au temps des guerres de religion (1562-1598)* (Geneva, 2012).



accurately the scale and attributes of the period's pamphleteering campaigns. And with this corpus as its base, the thesis thereupon directs its attention to the most significant categories of pamphlets such as manifestos, official responses and argumentative discourses, as well as open letters, royal edicts and news accounts which have thus far received only cursory treatment from the likes of Duccini and Sawyer. The thesis also devotes more of its attention to analysing the contents of titles which had been published in multiple editions (two or more), as multiple editions suggest the titles' wider popularity and circulation.

In order to avoid the pitfalls of tunnel vision, the thesis chooses not to rely on the contents of the pamphlets alone. It complements its analyses of the pamphlets with its use of the wealth of contemporary memoirs, along with contemporary correspondence, notarial documents, records of the *Parlement* and *Prévôté de Paris*, printed commentaries and the *Mercur* *François*. To better contextualise the publication and subject matters of the pamphlets, the thesis will embrace a multi-disciplinary approach, integrating existing scholarship on the history of the French book with recent developments in the analysis of the political, social, legal and cultural history of seventeenth-century France.

The thesis will continue the common practice of calling these printed tracts in question 'pamphlets'. Even though Tatiana Debaggi Baranova is certainly right to argue that the terms 'libelles' or 'écrits diffamatoires' more faithfully reflect contemporary usage, it is debatable whether she is equally justified in arguing that such terms also more accurately reflect the shared, calumnious nature of all the tracts.<sup>23</sup> This is because not every tract was written and produced with the sole intention to vilify one's opponents. There were many news pamphlets, for instance, published during the conflicts of 1614-17 to recount and celebrate royal entries, weddings, victories, as well as the return of peace. The open letters and manifestos published in the same period by the malcontent princes, as one will see, had a legalistic purpose alongside a defamatory one. The edicts of pacification published by the crown and government, meanwhile, were more preoccupied with restoring the malcontent princes' good names than besmirching them. This thesis therefore prefers to use a more general and inclusive term, 'pamphlet', for it better encompasses the wide range of printed tracts in circulation during these conflicts.

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<sup>23</sup> Baranova, *À Coup des Libelles*, pp. 33-36.

Space constraints require that the political pamphleteering of the princely rebellions of 1614-17 remains as the exclusive focus of this work, with some attention given to the crisis of 1619-20. It will therefore not discuss the deluge of pamphlets produced during the *États généraux* of 1614 following the first rebellion, or those produced in the months following the assassination of Concino Concini, an event which ended the final rebellion. It will restrict its scope to France and will not evaluate commentaries of the events in France or the translations of French pamphlets printed in Germany, England, Italy and the United Provinces.

A thesis topic which explores early modern French political pamphleteering would inevitably have to engage with Jürgen Habermas's idea of the 'public sphere'. Habermas identifies a period of structural transformation in western Europe where private people – that is, people who did not hold office and were excluded from any share of public authority – began to discuss political matters publicly, freely, rationally and disinterestedly, much like the citizens of the ancient Greek city states. Such development, Habermas argues, first emerged in England, then in France and Germany, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was engendered by the rise of the modern, depersonalised state and urban, mercantile economy. It was also brought about by the proliferation and accessibility of newspapers, periodicals, journals and other printed literature; and the inception and popularity of coffeehouses, salons and other literary or intellectual clubs in towns. The private people in these towns gradually came together to form the public, whose all-important opinion and cooperation could compel governments to justify their legitimacy and undertakings regularly, or even make changes to their legislations and policies.<sup>24</sup>

While historians of early modern Europe have found Habermas's model useful as a starting point of research, they are almost unanimously critical of his teleological approach, idealistic understanding of English political and socio-economic culture, and narrow definition of what constituted public, rational and disinterested debate; all of which, they reasonably argue, have led him to wrongly underestimate and dismiss the existence of public spheres before the eighteenth century. As with the historians of the Dutch and English Reformations, Denis Pallier and the historians of the St Andrews French book project have

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<sup>24</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, 1989); Phil Withington, 'Public Discourse, Corporate Citizenship, and State Formation in Early Modern England', *American Historical Review* 112 (2007), pp. 1018-1021.

established that the high-stakes religious debates, political rivalries, socioeconomic grievances and dynastic crises associated with the French Wars of Religion made it necessary for various factions to persuade officeholders and non-officeholders alike of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Protestantism, or of Charles IX, Henri III or Henri IV. They made it vital for various factions to mobilise ‘the people’, and with it their capacity to threaten rebellions and disorders, in order to pressurise the crown into taking certain actions, such as revoking its controversial edicts of pacification; abandoning its favourites like the Gondis, the Guises or the Épernons; reforming the crown’s finances or excluding Henri de Navarre from succession.<sup>25</sup> In the process of doing so, as Peter Lake and Michael Questier have argued, these factions helped construct the public in three ways: “as an audience to convince, as a concept of legitimacy (whereby sectarian interest was re-described as public interests), and as an arbiter of truth”.<sup>26</sup>

Hélène Duccini, Jeffrey Sawyer and Hubert Carrier have pointed out that such heated public debates, petitions and news transmission recurred throughout the first half of the seventeenth-century at an intensity that was unprecedented, as the French crown and princely factions attempted to attain ideological victory and garner support for their war efforts in the civil conflicts of the 1610s, 1620s, 1640s and 1650s. Indeed, as early as the second half of the sixteenth century and the 1610s, the French crown and princely factions were already churning out argumentative discourses, rejoinders, private correspondence,

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<sup>25</sup> Denis Pallier, *Recherches sur l’Imprimerie à Paris pendant la Ligue, 1585-1594* (Geneva, 1975); Idem, ‘Les Responses Catholiques’ in Roger Chartier and Henri-Jean Martin (eds.), *Histoire de l’Édition Française, tome 2: Le livre triomphant* (Paris, 1982), pp. 457-471; Andrew Pettegree, Malcolm Walsby and Alexander Wilkinson (eds.), *French Vernacular Books: Books Published in the French Language before 1601* (Leiden, 2007); Andrew Pettegree, Paul Nelles and Philip Conner, *The Sixteenth-century French Religious Book* (Aldershot, 2001); Andrew Pettegree, *The French Book and the European Book World* (Leiden, 2007); Matthew Hall, ‘Lyon Publishing in the Age of Catholic Revival, 1565-1600’, (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2005); Philip John, ‘Publishing in Paris, 1570-1590: A Bibliometric Analysis’, (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2010); Graeme Kemp, ‘Catholic Religious Controversy and the French Marketplace of Print, 1535-1572’, (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2012); Luc Racaut, *Hatred in Print: Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identity during the French Wars of Religion* (Aldershot, 2002). For examples of the works on the Dutch and English Reformations, see Judith Pollman and Andrew Spicer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke* (Leiden, 2007); Peter Lake, *Bad Queen Bess?: Libels, Secret Histories, and the Politics of Publicity in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford, 2016); Peter Lake and Michael Questier, *The Antichrist’s Lend Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England* (New Haven, CT, 2002); Elizabeth Evenden and Thomas Freeman, ‘Print, Profit and Propaganda: the Elizabethan Privy Council and the 1579 edition of Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs”’, *English Historical Review* 119 (2004), pp. 1288-1307; Michael Graves, ‘Thomas Norton the Parliament Man’, *Historical Journal* 23 (1980), pp. 17-35; Idem, ‘The Management of the Elizabethan House of Commons: The Council’s Men of Business’, *Parliamentary History* 2 (1983), pp. 11-38; Joseph Black, ‘The Rhetoric of Reaction: The Martin Marprelate Tracts (1588-89), Anti-Martinism, and the Uses of Print in Early Modern England’, *Sixteenth Century Journal* 28 (1997), pp. 707-725.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Lake and Michael Questier, ‘Puritans, Papists and the ‘Public Sphere’ in Early Modern England: The Edmond Campion Affair in Context’, *Journal of Modern History* 72 (2000), pp. 589-590, as summarised in Withington, ‘Public Discourse’, p. 1021.

libels, edicts, ballads and news pamphlets at a rate and speed that was comparable to their Dutch and English counterparts between the 1640s and 1660s.<sup>27</sup> The pamphlet production of the *Fronde*s between 1648 and 1653 – more than 5,000 editions – also rivalled if not exceeded the pamphlet production of the British civil wars in the same period. Meanwhile, Diane Roussel, David Maland and Benedetta Craveri discovered that the lively discussions of news and politics between merchants, tradesmen, clerics and officeholders in the English coffeehouses, which Habermas identifies as a critical requisite and site for a public sphere, were already taking place in the French taverns and literary salons throughout the first half of the seventeenth century.<sup>28</sup> In other words, to adapt David Zaret’s argument against Habermas, it was across western Europe, especially in France, in the mid sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and not 1690s [England] that “contending elites [first] used the medium of print to appeal to a mass audience, and activist members of that audience invoked the authority of opinion to lobby those elites’.<sup>29</sup>

The aforementioned historians did concede, however, that the public spheres of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France, England and the United Provinces were neither constant or consistently growing, unlike that of the eighteenth century which Habermas describes. Rather, the size and nature of these public spheres were significantly determined

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<sup>27</sup> Hélène Duccini, ‘La Littérature pamphlétaire sous la Régence de Marie de Médicis’, 3 vols. (Thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Paris X, 1977); Idem, ‘Regard sur la littérature pamphlétaire en France au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle’, *Revue Historique* 260 (1978), pp. 313-339; Idem, *Faire Voir, Faire Croire: L’Opinion Publique sous Louis XIII* (Paris, 2003); Jeffrey Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, CA, 1990); Hubert Carrier, *La Press de la Fronde, 1648-1653*, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1989-1991). Examples of the works on Dutch and English pamphleteering between 1640s and 1660s are Michael Reinders, *Printed Pandemonium: Popular Print and Politics in the Netherlands, 1650-72* (Leiden, 2013); Helmer Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Public Sphere, 1639-1660* (Cambridge, 2015); Ann Hughes, *Gangraena* (Oxford, 2004); Alexandra Halasz, *The Marketplace of Print: Pamphlets and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1997); Joad Raymond, *Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2003); Idem, *The Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks, 1641-1649* (Oxford, 1996); Idem (ed.), *News, Newspapers and Society in Early Modern Britain* (London, 1999); Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News* (New Haven, CT, 2014). For a discussion of more relevant works, see Peter Lake and Steve Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England’, *Journal of British Studies* 45 (2006), pp. 276-277.

<sup>28</sup> Diane Roussel, ‘“Several Fanatics Who Talked Only of Killing Kings”: Conspirators and Regicides before the Parlement de Paris in the Wake of the Assassination of Henri IV, 1610’, *French History* 30 (2016), pp. 474-475; David Maland, *Culture and Society in Seventeenth-Century France* (London, 1970); Benedetta Craveri, *The Age of Conversation*, trans. Teresa Waugh (New York, 2018); Contra Habermas, Steve Pincus argues for the rise of the English coffeehouses and public sphere in the 1660s. Pincus also argues that the English coffeehouses were more socially inclusive than Habermas allowed. See Steve Pincus ‘Coffee Politicians Does Create’: Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture’, *Journal of Modern History* 67 (1995), pp. 807-834.

<sup>29</sup> David Zaret, *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-Modern England* (Princeton, NJ, 2000), pp. 6-7, 10. For more debates on the rise of the public sphere, see Lake and Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’; James V.H. Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, 2001); Massimo Rospocher, *Beyond the Public Sphere: Opinions, Publics, Spaces in Early Modern Europe* (Bologna, 2012).

by the ebb and flow of politics. Because they were ‘never assumed to be a normal or regular feature of political life’, but ‘represented emergency measures, resorted to, in extremity, by a variety of groups anxious to push their case with the prince and/or the people’, these public spheres were episodic. They were opened occasionally and opportunistically and could be shut down quickly without warning, depending on the political situation.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the aforementioned historians also admitted that the extensive pamphleteering campaigns seen in these public spheres were largely orchestrated by key members of the governments, the rival factions and their respective clients, rather than the private people – or the non-officeholders – to which Habermas attributed the origins of political debates and petitions in his public sphere.<sup>31</sup>

Considering that countless studies have already exhaustively and conclusively proven that the *Habermasian* public sphere, or rather limited versions of it, existed in western Europe long before the eighteenth century, this thesis will not set out to prove the existence of such a phenomenon in France in the 1610s again, although the arguments it develops will substantiate the relevant findings of the studies discussed and cited above.



As the princely rebellions of 1614-17 have never been properly examined by the existing secondary literature, the thesis will begin with a chapter that seeks to stand back and present the underlying causes of the conflicts. In doing so, it will demonstrate that the existing literature has been too quick to dismiss the rebellions as a manifestation of the princes’ inevitable reaction against an increasingly absolutist government, or their natural disdain for the ascendancy of foreigners like Marie de Médicis, and especially those of low social standing like Concini. It reveals, for the first time, how the contests for dynastic and political supremacy, the personal and factional feuds, as well as the unfulfilled aspirations, the improvident opportunism and the psychological baggage of contemporary noble culture all combined to trigger the political implosions. This relatively detailed study of the roots of the conflicts should subsequently allow us to juxtapose the rhetoric of the pamphlets with the intentions and actions of their originators.

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<sup>30</sup> Lake and Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, pp. 277, 289.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 273-274.

Having established the actual causes of the princely rebellions, chapter two discusses the often-overlooked question of why political pamphleteering was even necessary during the rebellions, and how it was compatible with the unique political and social structures of seventeenth-century France. With that, it explores the dissemination and intended audience of the pamphlets; it reconsiders the magnitude of the pamphleteering campaigns of 1614-17 and reappraises the pamphlets' print runs, authors, patrons, publishers and places of production. Chapter three then delves into the pamphlets' legal functions which historians have not heretofore acknowledged. It reveals how fear of the punishments of *lèse-majesté* and the predominant culture of honour informed the publication and distribution of certain types of pamphlets. It demonstrates how these pamphlets function as pre-emptory legal briefs and how their thrust was shaped by the protocols of aristocratic honour and prevailing legal principles and loopholes. Chapter three also analyses the deeper connections between the crime of *lèse-majesté* and honour and explores the promulgation of the crown's edicts of pacification which, it will illustrate, had more profound functions than scholars like Sawyer realised.<sup>32</sup>

Chapters four and five continue the reassessment of the intended uses and effects of the pamphlets. Chapter four scrutinises the contents of the rebel literature, comparing the allegations and demands within to the vocal complaints of the kingdom, and contrasting them with the known intentions and careers of the princes to date. As a result, it puts to rest the longstanding notion that the pamphlets evinced the sincerity of the princes' desires for reforms or the ideological differences between the princes and the government. On the contrary, it makes plain how the pamphlets represented deliberate attempts by the princes to garner sympathisers using the timeless tactics of political persuasion such as demagoguery and mockery. Chapter five then investigates how the government and the loyalists responded. It shows how the seeming absolutist language of punishing disobedient subjects was less a genuine expression of absolutism and more a tactic to avoid diplomatic backlash from Protestant powers. It discusses how the loyalist discourses brought to light the hollowness of the princes' promises, and how they competed with the princes' pamphlets to move the nobility by exploiting their psychology and upbringing. Finally, it exposes a salient aspect of the loyalist persuasion campaigns which historians have surprisingly overlooked: the strategic use of disinformation.

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<sup>32</sup> Sawyer believes that the edicts of pacification were predominantly printed to demobilise the public, see Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 37.

In examining all of these components, this thesis will not only present a fresh and more nuanced understanding of the interdependence between politics, government and pamphleteering in 1614-17, it will throw light on the ethos of the French great nobility and minister-favourites and the nature of princely rebellions. In doing so, it hopes to elucidate the entangled relationship between power and the media as well as public and private interests in the politics of the era.





## 1. The Roots of Rebellion and Public Conflict

On 14 May 1610, the scramble for power began as soon as Henri IV drew his last breath. Three of Henri's four most trusted ministers, *chancelier* Nicholas Brûlart, sieur de Sillery, *secrétaire d'État* Nicholas de Neufville, sieur de Villeroy and diplomat Pierre Jeannin sought to prolong their primacy by urging Marie de Médicis, queen mother of the eight-year-old Louis XIII, to assume control of the regency through a confirmation from the *Parlement de Paris*.<sup>1</sup> Jean-Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, duc d'Épernon, an outcast during Henri's reign, seized the opportunity to make his political comeback.<sup>2</sup> Épernon interrupted and threatened the *Parlement* in session to declare the regency immediately.<sup>3</sup> But the highest court of the kingdom had aspirations to a co-tutelage role in the new government and needed no intimidation. It duly declared the queen mother regent, conferring on her full power over the kingdom's affairs.<sup>4</sup> So to counteract the *Parlement's* pretensions and buttress the regency's constitutional legitimacy, Marie de Médicis and her supporters took Louis XIII to the *Parlement* the next day to convene a *Lit de Justice*, where he proclaimed his queen mother's appointment before an expanded congregation of the kingdom's political, religious and judicial dignitaries.<sup>5</sup>

Despite these measures, the declaration of Marie de Médicis's regency still reeked of a coup.<sup>6</sup> The parliamentary declaration and *Lit de Justice* of 14 and 15 May were not only legally questionable, they represented a rude break with French constitutional tradition.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the regency was declared hastily in the absence of the two highest-ranking *princes du sang*, Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé and Charles de Bourbon, comte de Soissons.

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<sup>1</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 55-57.

<sup>2</sup> *Bassompierre*, I, p. 276.

<sup>3</sup> Sarah Hanley, *The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France: Constitutional Ideology in Legend, Ritual, and Discourse* (Princeton, NJ, 1983), p. 232.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 232.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 233-243.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 243-251.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 251-253.

Yet, the princes' doubts over the regency's legitimacy did not escalate into any violent opposition. Marie bought out the interests of her rival claimants, a measure not uncommon in the succession disputes of this period, by giving Condé and Soissons lucrative pensions, properties and offices.<sup>8</sup>

Marie de Médicis remained neurotic about her regency's legitimacy and the princes' ambitions nonetheless. For from the very beginning, Marie was determined to exclude the *princes du sang* from her government. She retained and relied heavily on Henri IV's ministers. She also persisted with Henri's domestic and foreign policies. These measures allowed Marie to claim continuity with her husband's administration and affairs and in doing so, validate her own.<sup>9</sup> Although Marie did appoint the kingdom's princes, peers and cardinals to her regency council, she did so only to pay lip service to their claims to the guardianship of the realm during a royal minority. Marie reserved most of the consequential briefings, deliberations and decisions for the private meetings between her, her confidants and her ministers – Sillery, Villeroy and Jeannin.<sup>10</sup>

Marie de Médicis's insecurities subsequently predisposed her to partake in the factional wrangles between the *princes du sang* and other *grands* for political and dynastic ascendancy. While such an approach was a common strategy used by the ruling dynasties of this period to safeguard their supremacy, Marie lacked the political sagacity and brinkmanship of Henri IV and Louis XIV to choreograph and navigate these contests with any sustainable success.<sup>11</sup> There were three major factions at court at the start of the regency: the ministerial faction led by Sillery, Villeroy and Jeannin; the *Condéen* faction, by Condé and Charles de Lorraine, duc de Guise and his brothers; and the *Soissonais* faction, by Soissons, Épernon and the *grand écuyer de France*, Roger de Saint-Lary, duc de Bellegarde.<sup>12</sup> The comparable strength of these factions, combined with the fierce rivalries between Condé and

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<sup>8</sup> David Parrott, 'A 'prince souverain' and the French crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637' in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs, and H.M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 175-176; *Pontchartrain*, I, pp. 415, 419; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 92, 110-111; Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé pendant le XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1886), p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> J. Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 9-53.

<sup>10</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 111; *Estrées*, p. 6; *Richelieu*, I, p. 95; Guillaume Girard, *The History of the Life of the Duke of Espernon*, trans. Charles Cotton (London, 1670), p. 270

<sup>11</sup> Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV* (2nd ed. Harlow, 1995), pp. 226-232; Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701* (Cambridge, 2002).

<sup>12</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 9, 13; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 106-107.

Soissons as well as Guise and Épernon, ensured a rare period of political equilibrium. The three factions kept each other's ambitions and hubris in check.<sup>13</sup>

But it would not take long for Marie to upset this delicate balance. Motivated by her attachment to Marguerite de Lorraine, princesse de Conti and sister of the Guises, and also by her desire to weaken Condé and buttress her position with the Guises' ties to the ruling dynasties of Lorraine, England, Mantua and Ferrara, Marie drew the duc de Guise and his brothers away from Condé in August 1610 with enormous riches and the hand of Henriette-Catherine de Joyeuse, douairière duchesse de Montpensier.<sup>14</sup> The queen mother's action immediately provoked Soissons, who had thus far been an outspoken supporter of her government.<sup>15</sup> Soissons had hopes of marrying his son, Louis de Bourbon, duc d'Enghien to Marie de Bourbon, duchesse de Montpensier, the daughter of the douairière duchesse and the sole heiress of the Montpensiers' fortune. Marie de Médicis's latest agreement with Guise threatened to foil Soissons's plan. Soissons recognised that the queen mother had her own plans to marry one of her younger sons, Nicolas or Gaston de France, to the coveted heiress. As such, it was more probable that the douairière duchesse de Montpensier and Guise would choose Nicholas or Gaston over Enghien for their daughter. After all, it served their dynastic interests better to choose a *fils de France* over a *prince du sang*.<sup>16</sup>

But Soissons had one ace left to play: Concino Concini and his wife, Leonora Galigai. This Florentine couple came to France in November 1600 as part of Marie de Médicis's entourage. They helped the new queen through the trials and tribulations of Henri IV's infidelities, and in the process became her favourites.<sup>17</sup> Marie would not forget her debts of gratitude when she assumed the regency. She immediately opened the kingdom's purse-strings to purchase several prestigious offices for them. Overnight, Concini, the son of a recently-ennobled Florentine diplomat, became the marquis d'Ancre, the *premier gentilhomme de la chambre du roi*, the *lieutenant-général* of Picardie and the *gouverneur* of its fortified towns of Péronne, Montdidier, Roye and Amiens.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Pontchartrain, I, p. 419; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 112-113.

<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Spangler, 'Mother Knows Best: The Dowager Duchess of Guise, a Son's Ambitions, and the Regencies of Marie de Medici and Anne of Austria' in Jessica Munns, Penny Richards and Jonathan Spangler (eds.), *Aspiration, Representation and Memory: The Guise in Europe, 1506-1688* (Farnham, 2015), p. 132; *Estrées*, p. 9; *Lettres de Malherbe*, p. 184; Malherbe à Peiresc, 26 Jun 1610.

<sup>15</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 92, 119-120.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 119-120; *Estrées*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>17</sup> Galigai was also Marie's childhood companion.

<sup>18</sup> Pontchartrain, I, p. 422.

The Concinis were fully aware of their tenuous position at the French court. Their inferior and Florentine pedigree, they understood, did not sit well with the status-conscious and italophobic French courtiers. Their status and rewards as favourites had incurred the envy and hostility of powerful hopefuls such as Épernon. Their ascendancy was also entirely dependent on the favour of Marie de Médicis and therefore would not extend beyond her rule. With these in mind, the Concinis sought to prolong their eminence by trying even harder to acquire more offices, construct a provincial *place de sûreté* and procure employment in order to prove their political and military worth. Yet, such endeavours would only stoke up the flames of jealousy at court. Conscious that they were caught up in a vicious cycle, the Concinis had no choice but to seek powerful protectors.<sup>19</sup> Fortunately for them, there were many *grande*s looking to benefit from their sway over the queen mother. These *grande*s were more than willing to tolerate and protect the couple so long as they did their bidding.

Soissons was one such *grande*. Discerning that the Concinis could further his interests better than his current factional allies, Soissons turned on Bellegarde and Épernon. When Bellegarde and Concini quarrelled at the beginning of 1611 over their designated lodgings in the Louvre, Soissons sided with Concini.<sup>20</sup> Shortly after, Soissons also broke with Épernon over his decision to support Bellegarde in that dispute and his refusal to use his credit with the queen mother and the *douairière* duchesse de Montpensier to advocate the Enghien-Montpensier match.<sup>21</sup> And before the dust could settle in these disputes, a minor misunderstanding between the coachmen of Soissons and his half-brother, François de Bourbon, prince de Conti, transmogrified into a larger misunderstanding and near-armed conflict between Soissons and Guise, Conti's brother-in-law.<sup>22</sup> The incident subsequently drove Guise to align himself closely with Soissons's former associates, Bellegarde and Épernon, thereby giving birth to the *Guisard* faction.<sup>23</sup>

Concini seized the moment to court Soissons, who was now isolated. In return for Soissons's protection, Concini offered to bring Marie de Médicis round on the Enghien-

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<sup>19</sup> Épernon's secretary, Girard, also discerned Concini's awareness of the courtiers' jealousy and consequent desperation to seek powerful protectors: see Girard, *Epernon*, p. 281.

<sup>20</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 29; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 129-130n.

<sup>21</sup> *Pontchartrain*, I, pp. 432-433; *Richelieu*, I, p. 130.

<sup>22</sup> *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 286-288; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 131-133; *Pontchartrain*, I, pp. 433-438.

<sup>23</sup> Bassompierre mentioned that in December 1612, Guise and Épernon asked Bellegarde to return to court from Bourgogne to strengthen their faction against the *Condéens*; see *Bassompierre*, I, p. 312. Beauvais-Nangis and Pontchartrain also mentioned this faction; see *Beauvais-Nangis*, pp. 123-124; *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 17-18.

Montpensier match.<sup>24</sup> Concini also proposed a match between his son, Henri Concini, and one of Soissons's daughters as a way to cement the relationship.<sup>25</sup> The prince welcomed both proposals.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, he accepted the ministerial faction's offer to champion his desired match in exchange for his assistance to oust the insufferable *surintendant des finances*, Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, from government.<sup>27</sup> The entente between the ministerial faction and Soissons proved to be too much for Sully to bear. He was forced to resign on 26 January 1611.<sup>28</sup>

In the following months, however, Soissons came to realise that he had been used. The ministers did little to change Marie de Médicis's mind on the Enghien-Montpensier marriage. Rather, they were more preoccupied with the thought of a close union between an imposing *prince du sang* and the queen mother's favourite and how it would endanger their own standing in the government. The ministers worked to fan Marie's suspicions about the intentions of Soissons and Concini, and exhorted her to forestall their dynastic union.<sup>29</sup> Admittedly, Soissons and Concini's own actions played into the ministers' hands. To Marie's displeasure, Soissons tried to acquire the *domaine* of Alençon which was traditionally reserved for a *filz de France*, and Concini replaced the garrison at Amiens without her approval.<sup>30</sup> Soissons, as a result, fell further from the queen mother's good graces, while the ministers' stock rocketed. Towards the end of 1611, Soissons had no choice but to seek a reconciliation and alliance with his nephew Condé.<sup>31</sup>

The partnership between the two foremost *princes du sang* could not have come at a worse time for Marie de Médicis who, at the beginning of 1612, was in the final stages of concluding the double marriages with Spain. Conceived by Henri IV in 1608 as a way to establish a detente between France and Spain and to sunder the Spanish and Austrian branches of the Habsburgs, the plan was to have Louis XIII marry Anne of Austria, and Elisabeth de France marry the future Philip IV of Spain. By and large, Marie had the acquiescence of the political nation, despite concerns amongst the Catholic *politiques* and Huguenots that the marriages would threaten the kingdom's sovereignty during a royal

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<sup>24</sup> *Estrées*, p. 24-25, 33.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 47-49.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 122-123, 131.

<sup>28</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 39-40; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 139-140.

<sup>29</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 58-59; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 166-167, 169.

<sup>30</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 51-53, 60; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 167-168.

<sup>31</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 65-67; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 171-176, 199; *Pontchartrain*, I, p. 464, II, p. 2.

minority, its fragile religious settlement and its alliances with Protestant and northern Italian states. But Marie still needed the blessings of the *princes du sang* to ratify the treaty. Knowing that they had this upper hand, Condé and Soissons promptly left court in February 1612 to demonstrate their ‘formal opposition’ to the marriages. There was no question that their actions were a cynical attempt to protest the ministers’ supremacy and extort some concessions from the queen mother; for the two princes returned to court in June and appended their signatures to the marriage treaties as soon as Marie agreed to give them each a fortress within their provincial *gouvernements*.<sup>32</sup> And as luck would have it for the queen mother, Soissons died suddenly of a fever in November before he could cause her any more troubles with his marriage proposals and alliance with Condé.<sup>33</sup> The queen mother, it seemed, had emerged unscathed from the chain reaction which she had needlessly set off in August 1610 with her promotion of the Guise-Montpensier marriage.

### Great Expectations

Nevertheless, it soon became clear that Marie de Médicis’s troubles were far from over. Soissons’s death left Condé isolated and forced him to embrace the advances of other malcontents such as Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, maréchal-duc de Bouillon.<sup>34</sup> A celebrated Huguenot commander and staunch supporter of Henri IV during the Wars of the Catholic League, Bouillon was rewarded with a *maréchal’s* baton and a marriage with Charlotte de La Marck. He inherited from Charlotte the duchy of Bouillon and the sovereign principality of Sedan, a crucial fortified city which guarded the Meuse passage through the Ardennes into Champagne – the gateway of German mercenary troops and centuries later, modern armies into France.<sup>35</sup> Bouillon acquired even greater diplomatic significance after his second marriage to Elisabeth of Orange-Nassau, the daughter of William I of Orange-Nassau. This marriage, together with his status as a Huguenot sovereign prince, gave him extensive ties with the leaders of the United Provinces, Protestant Germany and England, where he served as Henri IV’s extraordinary ambassador in 1596. Yet, Bouillon was a yesterday’s man by May 1610. The maréchal-duc was accused of complicity in the Biron Conspiracy in 1602 and was subsequently forced into a long standoff with Henri IV. He capitulated four years later at the

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<sup>32</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 45, 72-74; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 192-194.

<sup>33</sup> *Estrées*, p. 85.

<sup>34</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 217.

<sup>35</sup> Simon Hodson, ‘Politics of the Frontier: Henri IV, the Maréchal-Duc de Bouillon and the Sovereignty of Sedan’, *French History* 19 (2005), pp. 417-418.

gunpoint of the royal army and was led back to Paris by Henri to endure four years of political irrelevance.<sup>36</sup>

Marie de Médicis's regency therefore promised Bouillon a new lease of life, as it did Épernon. Bouillon at first hoped to make his political comeback through the command of the Jülich campaign, but he was disappointed to learn that the queen mother had appointed Claude, maréchal de La Châtre in his stead.<sup>37</sup> Undeterred, Bouillon sought her favour by ingratiating himself with her favourite, selling Concini his prestigious office of *premier gentilhomme de la chambre du roi*.<sup>38</sup> In early 1611, Bouillon bid to become her principal aide on Huguenot matters. He volunteered to employ his personal standing to help her mediate the Huguenot General Assembly at Saumur in May 1611, a gathering sanctioned to nominate two deputy-generals who would represent Huguenot interests at court. Anticipating that the gathering would become a focal point for the discontents and radicals to voice their grievances and present their *cabiers*, Bouillon worked to augment the deputies' complaints and demands. His plan was to then moderate these complaints and demands at the assembly and in doing so, propitiate the queen mother.<sup>39</sup>

Things did not go according to Bouillon's plan, however. Bouillon had overestimated his own standing amongst the Huguenots and underestimated the strength of the radicals and their leader, Henri, duc de Rohan. Consequently, he could not stop the assembly's fusillade of grievances about the violations of the Edict of Nantes, or its demands for permanent provincial councils and the incorporation of Béarn into the French Huguenot church structure. Bouillon nevertheless worked tirelessly to attenuate the Assembly's *cabiers* using negotiations and the government's bribes. The queen mother, meanwhile, tried to appease the deputies with token redress, non-committal promises and feeble excuses.<sup>40</sup> Although Bouillon and Marie managed eventually to bring the proceedings to a close, the damage had already been done. The Assembly of Saumur radicalised the Huguenots further and Marie's stonewalling tactics nurtured a hornets' nest which her enemies could subsequently stir to raise the stakes in their political contests. Bouillon lost the esteem of his co-religionists. He had no one but himself to blame. He had roused the Huguenots'

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 413-439.

<sup>37</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 106.

<sup>38</sup> *Pontchartrain*, I, p. 422.

<sup>39</sup> James Valone, *Huguenot Politics: 1601-1622* (Lewiston, 1994), pp. 53-54; Jack Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638* (The Hague, 1966), p. 33.

<sup>40</sup> See Valone, *Huguenot Politics*, pp. 54-80 for the proceedings.

expectations only to back-peddle with his pro-government stance and bribes.<sup>41</sup> He had shamelessly and publicly proclaimed that there had not been any outright violations of the Edict of Nantes, and recommended that the Huguenots volunteer to surrender their existing *places de sûreté*.<sup>42</sup> Before long, he even served as Marie's extraordinary ambassador to England to assure James VI and I that the Spanish marriages would not have any diplomatic and religious ramifications, at home and abroad.<sup>43</sup>

Yet, Bouillon had nothing to show for all his sacrifices to Marie de Médicis except a *hôtel* in his name in the Faubourg Saint-Germain.<sup>44</sup> Bouillon desired more executive power, but he could not prevail upon Marie to grant him Sully's previous office of *surintendant des finances*. Bouillon also wanted to have a provincial *gouvernement*, the only missing thing on his *curriculum vitae*, but the ministers had reneged on their promises to help him obtain Sully's *gouvernement* of Poitou.<sup>45</sup> Unsurprisingly, Bouillon felt that he had been mistreated and duped by Marie and her ministers. He even swore publicly to seek revenge.<sup>46</sup> If loyal services to the current government were not sufficient to reverse one's fortunes, then perhaps a regime change was needed. It was at this juncture that Bouillon stepped up his efforts to encourage Condé to assert himself.<sup>47</sup>

Condé was a political minnow at the time of Henri IV's death. Despite being the *premier prince du sang*, and even though only two infants stood between him and the throne, Condé did not command political influence or social esteem worthy of his status. He held the *gouvernements* of Guyenne and a few fortified towns in Picardie and Berry, but these were no more than political sinecures during Henri's reign. Worse still, the prince had to endure persistent rumours of his bastardy as a posthumous child. Although Henri IV took the exceptional step to confirm Condé's legitimacy, he made few efforts to conceal his own disbelief. In November 1609, the late king dealt another devastating blow to the prince's honour when he attempted to cuckold him by seducing his wife, Charlotte-Marguerite de

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 68-70.

<sup>42</sup> Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, p. 35.

<sup>43</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 60; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 156-157.

<sup>45</sup> *Estrées*, p. 44. Despite his prestige, Bouillon did not hold the *gouvernement* of a province at this point.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 137, 157.

<sup>47</sup> Girard, *Espéron*, p. 284; *Richelieu*, I, p. 157; Hayden, *Estates General*, p. 55.



Montmorency. It was unsurprising, as Robin Briggs has suggested, that Condé was extremely sensitive and insecure, much like Marie de Médicis.<sup>48</sup>

Condé was keen to find his place in the sun. But because the *princes du sang* were only given priority of status by Henri III in 1576 and there had not been a royal minority since, he occupied what was effectively a new position of *premier prince du sang* in May 1610 for which there were no precedents to inform his expectations.<sup>49</sup> Although Condé's status improved overnight when Marie de Médicis bought off his claims to the regency government with lands, money and a seat in the regency council, it became painfully obvious as the emollient effects of these compensations wore off and the harsh realities of the political and dynastic contests set in, that the prince possessed only the emperor's new clothes. Condé found his influence in the regency council limited and his factional associates – the Guises – stolen by the queen mother. Marie even placed him under surveillance when he rightfully presided over the Estates of Guyenne as the province's *gouverneur*.<sup>50</sup> Marie's provocations and unwillingness to concede Condé rightful recognition and power eventually drove the prince into Bouillon's arms after Soissons's death. In the months that followed, Condé rebuilt his faction to include Bouillon, Concini (whom he inherited from Soissons) and other malcontents with unfulfilled ambitions, such as Henri de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne, Charles de Gonzague, duc de Nevers and Henri II d'Orléans, duc de Longueville.<sup>51</sup>

The beginning of 1613 promised to be a turning point for the rejuvenated *Condéen* faction. François-Alexandre de Lorraine, chevalier de Guise had killed Edme de Malain, baron de Luz in a duel. Luz had recently attached himself to Concini and defected from the *Guisard* to the *Condéen* faction on the tail of the favourite, disclosing some confidential information about the *Guisards* in the process.<sup>52</sup> His death was therefore punishment for his betrayal. Luz simultaneously had been Marie's close confidant. As such, the queen mother was livid with the chevalier de Guise and his brothers and factional allies, whom she believed were complicit in Luz's murder.<sup>53</sup> Marie ordered Sillery to arraign the chevalier in the *Parlement de Paris*; but the *chancelier* delayed execution of that order, out of fear that the

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<sup>48</sup> Robin Briggs, 'Noble Conspiracy and Revolt in France, 1610-60', *Seventeenth-Century French Studies* 12 (1990), p. 162.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162; Richard A. Jackson, 'Peers of France and Princes of the Blood', *French Historical Studies* 7 (1971), pp. 27-46.

<sup>50</sup> *Estrées*, p. 42; *Richelieu*, I, p. 144.

<sup>51</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 206-207; *Bassompierre*, I, 311; *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 17-18.

<sup>52</sup> *Bassompierre*, I, 311.

<sup>53</sup> *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 314-316; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 218-219.

downfall of the *Guisards* would usher in the rise of the *Condéens* and jeopardise the ministers. Marie did not take Sillery's inaction well, of course.<sup>54</sup> After her upbraiding of the *chancelier*, Marie secretly sent for Condé, Bouillon and Concini, and revealed to them her plans to confiscate the seals from Sillery and imprison Épernon.<sup>55</sup>

The plans that could have inaugurated the rise of the *Condéens* were in the end stillborn. Disagreements within the faction over Sillery's replacement delayed the *chancelier's* disgrace.<sup>56</sup> More pertinently, Condé overplayed his hand before he and his faction could secure Marie de Médicis's trust. The prince charged Concini to entreat the queen mother to grant him the *gouvernements* of Bordeaux and its fortress, Château-Trompette, in order that he could construct his stronghold in Guyenne.<sup>57</sup> The ministers recognised that such a request was premature and struck back hard. In the presence of Marie, they accused Concini of repeatedly conspiring to prejudice her authority.<sup>58</sup> They questioned the intentions behind Condé's request: Bordeaux and Château-Trompette were located in Guyenne, of which Condé was already the *gouverneur*. Guyenne, the ministers explained to Marie, was a region populated by the increasingly restive Huguenots and a traditional recruitment ground for the French armies.<sup>59</sup> Bordeaux, moreover, possessed a substantial harbour from which to request and receive foreign assistance.<sup>60</sup> The ministers then reminded Marie that, during his war with Henri III, her late husband once claimed that he could declare himself the duc de Guyenne if he could secure Bordeaux and Château-Trompette.<sup>61</sup>

The ministers' speculations about Condé's ambitions and allusions to the feudalistic autonomy of the medieval ducs de Guyenne struck a nerve with the insecure queen mother. Marie turned instinctively against Condé and his associates, even lashing out at Concini and Galigai as they came forward on separate occasions to plead the prince's cause.<sup>62</sup> Her unexpected response put the Concinis in a difficult situation. The *Condéen* princes had come to believe the couple had complete influence over the queen mother. Concomitantly, they would interpret their failure to obtain her approval of Condé's request as their lack of

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<sup>54</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 219-221.

<sup>55</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 87-88; *Richelieu*, I, p. 221.

<sup>56</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 221-22.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 222-223; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 19.

<sup>58</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 223.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 223-224; *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 317-318.

<sup>60</sup> Richelieu did not mention the 'recruitment ground' and 'harbour' reasons in his memoir; but most contemporaries understood that these were two key strategic significances of Guyenne and Bordeaux.

<sup>61</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 224.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 224; *Estrées*, p. 89; *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 318-320.

commitment to the faction. To prevent such suspicions from arising, the Concini's tried to offer Condé's favourite, Louis d'Aloigny, marquis de Rochefort, their *gouvernement* of Péronne. Unfortunately for them, Marie stubbornly refused to approve the handover.<sup>63</sup> And so in a fit of frustration, Concini denounced Marie as capricious and ungrateful in front of his followers, averring that he would never yield to her demand that he abandon his *Condéens* friends. These words reached Marie quickly and precipitated Concini's fall from grace.<sup>64</sup>

The last straw came when Marie de Médicis learned of Bouillon's latest ruse to trick the ministers into endorsing Concini's proposed gift to Rochefort.<sup>65</sup> Marie admitted to Claude de Bullion, Sillery's nephew, that she was indeed incensed with the *chancelier* and the ministers' handling of Luz's murder. But upon seeing how the *Condéens* had conspired to profit from the *chancelier*'s disgrace, she was now more determined than ever to ally herself closely with the ministers against the princes' ambitions.<sup>66</sup> Marie thereupon manifested her new attitude: she reconciled with the ministers as well as the *Guisards*. She then awarded the two *lieutenances du Roi* in Bourgogne that Luz had left behind to the clients of Bellegarde, knowing full well that Mayenne had requested those two offices for his clients in order to re-establish his father's stronghold in Bourgogne.<sup>67</sup> Marie's latter decision was designed to add insult to injury, for Bellegarde was the current *gouverneur* of Bourgogne and an associate of the *Guisard* faction which had slain Luz in the first place.

Villeroy, in the meantime, had a complementary plan of action. Hoping to weaken the *Condéen* faction and strengthen his own, he proposed a match between his grandson, Nicolas de Neufville, marquis de Villeroy, and Concini's daughter, Marie Concini.<sup>68</sup> Villeroy perceived that Marie de Médicis would be disposed to the match, as it would detach the Concini's from the *Condéen* princes and reduced the princes' leverage over her. Villeroy also believed that the match would restore the Concini's status as favourites. The ministers could then make use of the favourite's influence to strengthen their grip over Marie and her affairs.

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<sup>63</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 227; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 24.

<sup>64</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 228.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 229; *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 328-329.

<sup>66</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 229-230.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 226; *Beauvais-Nangis*, p. 124; *Estrées*, p. 89. Marie manifested her reconciliation with Épernon and Guise, and displeasure with Concini and Mayenne, see: *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 333-334, 336-337, 340; *Beauvais-Nangis*, p. 125; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 24.

<sup>68</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 91-93; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 235-237; *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 358-359.

Villeroy was right in both instances. Marie approved the match in September 1613 and made Concini, a military novice, a *maréchal de France* two months later.<sup>69</sup>

Little did Villeroy know, his plan to strengthen the ministerial faction ended up destroying it from within. The princes were relaxed about the Villeroy-Concini match because they were more opposed to Sillery than to Villeroy. Indeed, the match would only make the Concinis better intermediaries between the faction, Villeroy and Marie de Médicis. Besides, the Villeroy-Concini match dissolved before anyone had a chance to witness its political ramifications. Shortly after the marriage treaty was signed, Concini fell out with Villeroy when Villeroy obtained for his grandson-in-law, Jean de Souvré, marquis de Courtenvaux, a *survivance* to his father's office of *premier gentilhomme de la chambre du roi*. Concini and Bellegarde held the same office and were already taking turns to serve when Marie created a third office for Gilles de Souvré on the understanding that this third office would lapse with Gilles's death – an understanding that was shattered by the awarding of the *survivance* to Gilles's son, Courtenvaux. Concini's relationship with Villeroy worsened again when his confidant, Louis Dolé, accused Villeroy's son, Charles de Neufville, marquis d'Alincourt, of failing to honour his promise to obtain for Dolé the office of *contrôleur général des finances*.<sup>70</sup>

Villeroy's greatest miscalculation concerned Sillery. The *chancelier* believed the proposed alliance between a trusted minister and the favourites of Marie de Médicis would threaten his position.<sup>71</sup> His relationship with Villeroy deteriorated quickly thereafter, from close collaboration to open enmity.<sup>72</sup> The death of Madeleine de Neufville, granddaughter of Villeroy and wife of Sillery's son, Pierre Brûlart, vicomte de Puisieux, in late November 1613 severed the final bond of their historic political partnership.<sup>73</sup> Nonetheless, the disintegration of the ministerial faction was lost on the *Condéen* princes. Frustrated by their repeated failures to attain their political and dynastic objectives, Condé, Nevers, Mayenne, Longueville and Bouillon left court successively in January and February 1614 without taking leave. The long fuse of discontent had finally burned out. The princes now recourse to arms to try and force the matter.

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<sup>69</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 93, 99; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 30.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 100; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 224, 249-250; *Bassompierre*, I, p. 359; Marc Jaffré, *The Court of Louis XIII, 1610-1643* (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2017), p. 19.

<sup>71</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 237.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 256-257; *Estrées*, p. 100; *Bassompierre*, I, pp. 329-330.

<sup>73</sup> *Estrées*, p. 99; *Richelieu*, I, p. 257.

## Aux Armes

The rebellion of 1614 was a fiasco. The princes could not even scrape together a decent-sized army to mount a show of force.<sup>74</sup> Yet, with her council divided by factional interests, Marie de Médicis could not capitalise on the situation to defeat the princes once and for all. On the one hand, Villeroy and Jeannin advised her to launch a swift attack in order to deny the princes any more time to recruit domestic and foreign supporters.<sup>75</sup> The *Guisard* faction seconded this notion in the hope of seeing the last of their rivals. Guise also calculated that his command in the war would validate his bid to become the next *connétable*.<sup>76</sup>

On the other hand, Sillery and Concini were determined to oppose Villeroy after their respective falling-out. Believing that war would only strengthen Villeroy's hold over Marie de Médicis, the two men worked together to advise the queen mother to eschew arms and negotiate with the princes instead.<sup>77</sup> Concini's advice was motivated by other personal concerns. The favourite reckoned that war would elevate his enemies in the *Guisard* faction, such as Épernon and Bellegarde, as well as increase the influence of the princesse de Conti, Guise's sister, over the queen mother at Galigai's expense.<sup>78</sup> Concini calculated that his pacifist counsel could not only prevent all of these scenarios, it could also endear him more to the *Condéen* princes.

To Concini and Sillery's delight, their pacifist counsel won the day. Marie de Médicis sent a deputation to Condé and his associates to negotiate and conclude the Treaty of Sainte-Ménéhould in May 1614. The princes got what they wanted: Marie granted the princes more *bienfaits* and agreed to postpone the Spanish marriages. She also consented to the convocation of the *États généraux* in the coming fall. The princes' victory was short-lived, however. In the months following the rebellion, Marie and her ministers worked tirelessly to ensure that her clients and supporters would constitute a large majority of the deputies at the *États généraux*.<sup>79</sup> This meant that the princes' initial plan of riding on the assembly's support

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<sup>74</sup> Briggs, 'Noble Conspiracy', p. 161.

<sup>75</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 101-102; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 271-272.

<sup>76</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 272.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 272-273; Henri-August de Lomenie, comte de Brienne, 'Mémoires du comte de Brienne' in M. Petitot (ed.), *Collection des Mémoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de France*, tome XXXV (Paris, 1824), p. 309.

<sup>78</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 282-283.

<sup>79</sup> Hayden, *Estates General*, pp. 74-97.

and authority to assume control of Louis XIII's government could no longer work. Then on 2 October 1614, the princes were dealt the knockout blow. Louis XIII held a *Lit de Justice* to declare his majority. At the ceremony, the young king legally and unequivocally proclaimed his wish for his queen mother to continue her leadership of his government.<sup>80</sup>

Although the *États généraux* quickly took on a life of its own, Marie de Médicis's government managed to snuff out the contentious discussions about Gallican liberties and the crown's finances with the usual concoction of threats, palliatives and empty promises. It even managed to extract the deputies' endorsement of the Spanish marriages. All that it needed to do now was to bring the marriages to fruition. But this was easier said than done. After failing to co-opt the *États généraux* to wrest control of the government from Marie and her ministers, Condé and his associates had left court to start a new rebellion. They represented the rebellion as a movement to force the queen mother to institute the reforms proposed in the *cabiers* and also to postpone the Spanish marriages. This was no doubt a tactic to appeal to the many members of the political nation or even foreign leaders who were unsatisfied with the outcome of the *États généraux* or were still ambivalent about the Spanish marriages.<sup>81</sup>

Between June and August 1615, Marie de Médicis's ability to tackle the impending princely rebellion was once again delayed and impaired by the factional divisions within her council. Villeroy and Jeannin sensed the restive mood of the kingdom from the proceedings of the *États généraux*. Worried that an untimely conclusion of the marriages with Spain, France's greatest enemy, could tip the kingdom into rebellion, these two original architects of the Spanish marriages urged Marie to postpone them.<sup>82</sup> Future events would prove Villeroy and Jeannin right; but at the present moment, Marie did not welcome their warnings. She insisted that further postponements would compromise Louis XIII's (read: her own) honour, because it would appear as though the king had repudiated his diplomatic treaties and capitulated to his dissident subjects.<sup>83</sup> Villeroy was later berated by Marie for putting out feelers to the Spanish ambassador to discuss a two-year postponement without her knowledge.<sup>84</sup> Concini seized this opportunity to discredit Villeroy who, he recently believed, had sided with his rival in Picardie, the duc de Longueville, and not done enough to stop the

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 160-173.

<sup>82</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 91-93; *Richelieu*, I, p. 379

<sup>83</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 285.

<sup>84</sup> *Andilly*, pp. 17-18; *Estrées*, p. 110; *Richelieu*, I, p. 382.

deputies of the *États généraux* from attacking him and Galigai. Concini promptly proclaimed before Marie de Médicis and Villeroy that this was not the first time Villeroy had committed treason.<sup>85</sup> Concini and Galigai then joined Sillery and his brother, the French ambassador at Madrid, Noël Brûlart, commandeur de Sillery, in pandering to Marie's vain legacy project. As a joint attempt to leapfrog Villeroy, they encouraged Marie to proceed with the Spanish marriages.<sup>86</sup>

Accomplishing the royal marriages in 1615 was both a dangerous venture and a race against time. Traveling during a royal minority was particularly dangerous because of the ever-present risk of kidnap, for one's control of the regency government rested solely upon one's possession of the king's person. The Conspiracy of Amboise to seize François II in 1560 bore witness to this danger.<sup>87</sup> Aside from the risk of kidnapping, Marie de Médicis and her supporters had to worry about the forthcoming winter which would make travelling even more hazardous. To protect the lives of the royal family from the cold, the rainfall and the flooded roads and rivers that resulted, Marie and her supporters had to ensure that the court would reach the wedding venues, Bordeaux and Bayonne, before the start of winter.<sup>88</sup> Otherwise, they might be forced to postpone the proceedings till the following spring and concomitantly give the princes extra time to mobilise domestic sympathisers and seek foreign intervention.<sup>89</sup>

To avoid such an outcome, Marie de Médicis sent Villeroy to negotiate with Condé. She promised to introduce the reforms proposed in the *cahiers* of the *États généraux* as well as reward the prince with lucrative *bienfaits* in return for his company on the court's southbound journey.<sup>90</sup> When Villeroy failed to bring Condé round to the queen mother's offer, Sillery moved in to finish his rival off. He convinced Marie that Villeroy was colluding with Condé. Motivated by his own opposition to the Spanish marriages, the *secrétaire d'État* was intentionally drawing out his negotiations with Condé in order to delay the court's departure.<sup>91</sup> Marie, in response, recalled Villeroy and dispatched Paul Phélypeaux, sieur de

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<sup>85</sup> *Andilly*, p. 18.

<sup>86</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 379-381, 384.

<sup>87</sup> Jaffré, *Court of Louis XIII*, pp. 165-166. The government of the now-major Louis XIII was effectively a regency government, as he was only thirteen years old; Marie de Médicis still directed all affairs.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 172-178.

<sup>89</sup> Pontchartrain discussed the tight timetable: see *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 87.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 84-86.

<sup>91</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 380.

Pontchartrain to negotiate with the prince in his stead.<sup>92</sup> Still, Condé refused to budge. Marie then decided that enough was enough. She broke off negotiations on 29 July 1615 and made arrangements for the court to depart from Paris on 17 August. Meanwhile, Condé issued his manifesto.<sup>93</sup> The second rebellion had begun.

The first leg of the race to Bordeaux and Bayonne went badly for Marie de Médicis. Although the court reached Poitiers as early as 31 August, the bride, Elisabeth de France, fell ill, forcing the court to stop for nearly a month. As the two foremost objectives of the latest rebellion were to mount a show of force and to stall for time and stop the court from reaching Bordeaux and Bayonne before winter, Elisabeth's illness came as a great blessing for the malcontent princes. It allowed them more time to mobilise their armies. The princes could then use their armies to cut off the court's routes and seize the fortified towns that guarded the key overland passages, river crossings and communications and logistical outposts. Consequently, they could force the court into making time-consuming detours.<sup>94</sup> The queen mother and her advisers anticipated the princes' objectives and strategies. To foil their plan, Marie raised three royal armies: the first army, led by the duc de Guise, would escort the court to Bordeaux and Bayonne. The second army, led by Charles de Choiseul, marquis de Praslin, *lieutenant-général* of Champagne, would confront Mayenne and Luxembourg's levies and Bouillon's foreign mercenaries in that province, and prevent them from linking up with their associates' levies in the Île-de-France and Picardie. The third and largest army, commanded by Urbain de Laval, maréchal de Boisdauphin, would protect Paris. It would also play cat and mouse with the princes' armies in the Île-de-France and Picardie, so as to stop them from crossing the Loire, either to threaten the court or to reach Poitou, Saintonge and Aunis, where they could recruit or join forces with the Huguenots.<sup>95</sup> Meanwhile, Marie instructed François de Bonne, maréchal de Lesdiguières to conciliate the Huguenot General Assembly at Grenoble and dissuade them from declaring for Condé.<sup>96</sup>

Concino Concini, maréchal d'Ancre, was left out in the cold. Marie de Médicis and her advisers deemed the favourite unfit for any appointments due to his unpopularity. The deputies of the Third Estate at the *États généraux*, for instance, had recently identified Concini as the source of the government's financial imprudence and corruption. The inhabitants of

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<sup>92</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 88-89.

<sup>93</sup> Hayden, *Estates General*, p. 170; *Andilly*, pp. 107-108.

<sup>94</sup> Like Angoulême and Fronsac; see *Richelieu*, I, pp. 405, 409; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 110; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 314.

<sup>95</sup> *Estrées*, p. 125.

<sup>96</sup> For the proceedings: see Valone, *Huguenot Politics*, pp. 81-99.



Picardie detested Concini for his extensive fortification works, his garrisoning of foreign troops in his *gouvernements* of Amiens, Péronne, Montdidier and Roye, as well as his fiscal exactions to fund these works and troops. Concini, at the same time, had incurred the enmity of the *grands*. His attempts to construct his *place de sûreté* within Picardie offended the duc de Longueville, an associate of the *Condéen* faction and a nephew of the ducs de Nevers and de Mayenne and François d'Orléans, comte de Saint-Pol. Longueville saw Concini as a rival and an intruder, as Picardie was his *gouvernement* as well as his ancestral power base.<sup>97</sup> To assert his superiority in Picardie, Longueville set his sights on dispossessing Concini of his biggest and most prestigious *gouvernement*, Amiens. Longueville laboured to curry favour with the elites of Amiens with promises to demolish the city's citadel and dismiss its foreign garrisons.<sup>98</sup> He even drew Claude de Moy, sieur de Riberpré, the commandant of the citadel of Amiens and a client of Concini, into his service. In retaliation, Concini successfully lobbied Marie de Médicis to have Riberpré dismissed from his office. The favourite later instructed his henchmen to attack Riberpré on the streets of Paris. Concini's actions in turn prompted Longueville to advance to Amiens in June 1615, where he ordered his men to destroy the chains of the drawbridge which connected the city to its citadel. As Longueville believed that his authority as the *gouverneur* of Picardie extended to the cities and citadels within the province, he perceived the moat separating the citadel from the city as an insult to his authority. Symbolically, it constituted a demarcation between Concini's domain from his own. It represented a mark of Concini's independence as the *gouverneur* of the citadel of Amiens from the *gouverneur* of Picardie. Longueville therefore wanted to erase the demarcation and extend his authority to the city and citadel by having the drawbridge down permanently. But the young duc would not have his way in June 1615. Concini's men took up firing positions on the citadel and forced him to make an ignominious retreat.<sup>99</sup>

Longueville could nevertheless revel in his arch-nemesis's foolish act of political self-destruction the following month. When a quarrel-turned-brawl broke out in Amiens between a native merchant and an Italian soldier in the citadel, the soldier unsheathed his cutlass and wounded the merchant. The Amiénois, who were by this point fed up with the citadel's Italian garrisons, interceded for the merchant. They seized the soldier and handed him over

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<sup>97</sup> Longueville inherited the *gouvernement* of Picardie from his father, Henri I d'Orléans, in 1595.

<sup>98</sup> Domenico Menna and Anne Michaux, 'Protestations Nobiliaires et Mutations de la Respublica: Concini et Longueville en Picardie de 1610 à 1617', *Séminaire de formation doctoral—Public/Privé, CURAPP-CNRS* (1995), p. 30.

<sup>99</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 282-284; Hélène Duccini, *Concini: Grandeur et misère du favori de Médicis* (Paris, 1991), pp. 177-178.

to the city's *lieutenant-criminel*, who promptly sentenced the soldier to death, which was excessively harsh for the nature of his offence.<sup>100</sup> Concini was consequently convinced that Pierre de Prouville, the citadel's *sergent-major* and his client, had not done enough to protect his soldier from the rough justice of the Amiénois. He concluded that Prouville was more loyal to his townsmen than his patron, and was complicit in their act of defiance to their *gouverneur*. To punish Prouville for his betrayal, Concini sent an Italian by the name of Alphonse to assassinate him. He then arranged for the assassin to escape to the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>101</sup>

The Amiénois and Parisians alike reacted with indignation at the news of the assassination of Prouville and the escape of Alphonse. Overnight, Concini became a public enemy in the respective capitals of Picardie and the Île-de-France.<sup>102</sup> He had therefore become a political liability at a time when Marie de Médicis was deciding the three commanders who would lead the royal armies. Concini's actions and notoriety put Sillery in a very difficult position. In his search for an ally against Villeroy, the *chancelier* had not long ago promised the favourite a command of an army.<sup>103</sup> Because Concini did not have the prestige to command an army that escorted the court, nor the local knowledge and military experience to lead an army in Champagne against distinguished veterans like Bouillon, Sillery could only recommend Concini for the command of the army deployed in the Île-de-France and Picardie against greenhorns like Condé and Longueville.<sup>104</sup> However, Concini's notoriety in these two provinces made such an appointment inadvisable.<sup>105</sup> Concini's appointment, Sillery admitted to Marie de Médicis, would only incite the natives and towns in these provinces to declare for the princes. The *chancelier's* brother, the commandeur de Sillery, even warned the queen mother that Concini's appointment could potentially incite the Parisians to open their city gates for Condé.<sup>106</sup>

On the counsel of her advisers, Marie de Médicis decided in the end to appoint Guise, Praslin and Boisdauphin as the commanders of the three armies. Her decision paid off instantly.<sup>107</sup> Guise kept the Huguenot armies in Guyenne away from the royal court.

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<sup>100</sup> Duccini, *Concini*, pp. 178-179.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 385-387; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 287-288.

<sup>102</sup> Duccini, *Concini*, p. 180.

<sup>103</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 382, 397.

<sup>104</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 289-290; *Richelieu*, I, p. 397.

<sup>105</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 289-290; *Richelieu*, I, p. 397.

<sup>106</sup> *Estrées*, p. 120.

<sup>107</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 289-290; *Estrées*, p. 122.

Praslin and Boisdauphin picked off the rebel forces and recaptured a handful of fortified towns in Champagne, the Île-de-France and Picardie.<sup>108</sup> Although Boisdauphin's blunder allowed the rebel armies to sneak across the Loire in late October and early November 1615, and although the Huguenot General Assembly voted to join the rebellion in late-November, it was too late for Condé and his associates.<sup>109</sup> The court had already reached Bordeaux on 7 October. Elisabeth de France married the future Philip IV of Spain by proxy in Bayonne on 18 October, and Anne of Austria married Louis XIII in Bordeaux on 25 November.<sup>110</sup>

Marie de Médicis's choice of commanders turned out to have far-reaching implications on the political landscape. Concini's failure to obtain a command led him to accuse *chancelier* Sillery of deceiving him with false promises and then betraying him before the queen mother. Concini also swore publicly to kill the *commandeur* de Sillery if he saw him.<sup>111</sup> Concini's vexation was understandable. He wanted an opportunity to showcase his military virtues and merits to his growing list of detractors within and beyond the court, as well as acquire some military experience to justify his rank of *maréchal de France* and multiple appointments in the strategic province of Picardie. Concini's desperation to prove himself drove him to do the unthinkable. Using his personal regiments, Concini laid siege to and captured the *comté* of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis on 26 October 1615.<sup>112</sup> Concini had committed an unquestionably foolish act of political suicide, because Clermont-en-Beauvaisis belonged to Condé. Until now, Condé and Bouillon had refused to break with Concini despite his quarrels with Longueville and by extension, Nevers, Mayenne and Saint-Pol.<sup>113</sup> Concini's reckless decision to attack an integral part of Condé's apanage therefore threatened to destroy whatever goodwill he had left with Condé and the faction.

## Revolution

The Treaty of Loudun of 3 May 1616 marked the end of the second rebellion. It declared amnesty and compensated the *Condéen* and Huguenot princes generously. It agreed to Longueville's demand that Concini be dismissed as the *lieutenant-général* of Picardie and

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<sup>108</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 124-126.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127; *Andilly*, pp. 127-128.

<sup>110</sup> Hayden, *Estates General*, p. 171.

<sup>111</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 120-121.

<sup>112</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 322-323; *Andilly*, pp. 123-124.

<sup>113</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 116-118; *Andilly*, p. 152.

*gouverneur* of Amiens. The treaty also granted Condé a formidable power bloc – in Berry and Touraine – in the heart of France. It even contained a secret clause which appointed Condé as the president of the *Conseil des finances*. The prince's approval and signature were now needed for each of the government's major financial decisions.<sup>114</sup> In other words, Loudun had finally given Condé the executive and provincial powers befitting his status as the *premier prince du sang*.

The real governmental reorganisation, however, was already in motion before the prince even appended his name to the treaty. On 28 April 1616, Marie de Médicis ordered Sillery to surrender the king's seals. With the instrument of his powers as *chancelier* confiscated, Sillery's career was effectively over. Marie created and appointed Guillaume du Vair to the parallel office of the *Garde des sceaux*, who would perform the *chancelier's* duties of safeguarding the king's seals and sealing the king's *lettres patentes*.<sup>115</sup> Du Vair was the respected *premier président* of the *Parlement d'Aix-en-Provence*, but he was also a *créature* of the Concinis. Indeed, Sillery's downfall had the Concinis' fingerprints all over it. When Marie found out in early November at Bordeaux that Sillery had deliberately concealed from her the news that the princes' armies had crossed the Loire into Huguenot territory, Concini and Villeroy seized the opportunity to undermine the *chancelier*. They convinced the capricious queen mother that Sillery had a habit of concealing important matters of state from her. They then prevailed upon her that Sillery's dismissal was a great way to appease the *chancelier's* chief enemies – the malcontent princes and the *Parlement de Paris*.<sup>116</sup>

With Sillery gone, the Concinis turned their attention to Villeroy. Former enmities aside, the favourite blamed Villeroy for the loss of their *place du sûreté* and patronage networks in Picardie. Villeroy, the Concinis believed, was the person behind Marie de Médicis's decision at Loudun to concede Longueville's demand that Concini be dismissed as the *lieutenant-général* of Picardie and the *gouverneur* of Amiens.<sup>117</sup> As luck would have it for the Concinis, their plot to dislodge Villeroy struck a chord with the queen mother. Marie was initially reluctant to relinquish so much control of her government to Condé, but it was Villeroy who convinced her to agree to Condé's wish to be the president of the *Conseil des finances*. Villeroy assured Marie that the prince's appointment would be nominal at most, for

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<sup>114</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 143-144; *Estrées*, p. 131; *Bassompierre*, II, pp. 66-67.

<sup>115</sup> *Andilly*, p. 158.

<sup>116</sup> *Richelieu*, I, pp. 415-416; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 327.

<sup>117</sup> *Andilly*, pp. 150-151; *Estrées*, p. 132; *Richelieu*, I, pp. 12-13.

‘what does it matter to you to leave the pen to a person whose hands you held’.<sup>118</sup> It would soon become clear that Villeroy had severely underestimated Condé. To everybody’s astonishment, the prince attended the notoriously dry meetings of the *Conseil des finances* with a messianic zeal. He not only dominated the *Conseil’s* meetings, his diligence made him the focal point of policy-making and public and private supplications.<sup>119</sup> Exasperated that Villeroy’s advice had cost her so much power and influence, Marie demanded his resignation. She then appointed Claude Mangot as the new *secrétaire d’État* and even replaced the *contrôleur-général des finances* Jeannin with Claude Barbin. Both Mangot and Barbin were *créatures* of the Concini.<sup>120</sup>

Concini’s latest endeavour to control the royal council using his *créatures* only served to aggravate the resentment of the *Condéen* princes. The latter were already frustrated by their failure to avenge the favourite’s trespasses through the stipulations of the Treaty of Loudun. Marie de Médicis quickly compensated Concini for his losses with the *lieutenance-générale* of Normandie and the *gouvernements* of its fortified towns of Pont-de-l’Arche, Dieppe and Caen. Up until now, the *Condéen* princes were willing to condone the ascent of a lowborn and meritless foreigner like Concini and admit him into their faction. However, they did so on the condition that Concini would remain deferential to them and use his influence over the queen mother to advocate their interests. But Concini’s disputes with Longueville in Picardie and sneak attack on Condé’s Clermont-en-Beauvaisis in the most recent rebellion showed that he was not willing to be a pliant client. Concini’s move to pack and control the royal council with his *créatures* proved that he intended to establish himself as an independent and supreme political operator in France. The *Condéen* princes would not allow a lowborn foreigner to do that.

As it turned out, Concini’s penchant for political self-harm meant that the *Condéen* princes did not have to lift a finger to ruin him. On 19 June 1616, Concini ordered his men to attack a cobbler named Picard in the faubourg Saint-Germain of Paris.<sup>121</sup> This attack was meant to avenge an affront from Picard two months previously. In accordance with the orders of a recent royal ordinance, *sergent* Picard and his men had stopped Concini’s carriage and entourage at the Porte de Bussy and asked to inspect their passports. Concini and his

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<sup>118</sup> *Estrées*, p. 100; *Bassompierre*, II, pp. 69-71; *Richelieu*, II, p. 12; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 334.

<sup>119</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 336; *Richelieu*, II, pp. 40-41; *Andilly*, pp. 183-184; Joseph Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu* (New Haven, 1991), p. 139.

<sup>120</sup> *Andilly*, pp. 166-167, 173-175; Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 138.

<sup>121</sup> *Andilly*, p. 177.

men presumed that they would be let through on account of their eminent status and refused to comply. Their obdurate and belligerent stance soon prompted Picard and his men to draw their weapons. Seeing that the sentinels had the sympathies of the agitated passers-by, Concini and his men had no choice but to beat a humiliating retreat.<sup>122</sup>

Concini's attack on *sergent* Picard caused a public outcry and cemented his status as the most hated man in the capital.<sup>123</sup> Nearly 4,000 Parisians took up arms and marched to the Louvre to demand justice. Marie de Médicis was forced to dispatch the king's Swiss guards to keep peace and also Mangot and Robert Miron, *prévôt des marchands* of Paris, to appease the mob.<sup>124</sup> Two weeks later, the magistrates of the *Parlement de Paris* intervened to 'assist' with the trial of two of Picard's assailants and voted almost unanimously for a death sentence.<sup>125</sup> On the same afternoon of the trial, thousands of Parisians came to the Pont Saint-Michel to witness and ensure that the executions of the assailants were successfully carried out. Many even stayed and guarded the corpses from removal for another 24 hours.<sup>126</sup>

Bedevelled by hostility from all sides, Concini renewed his search for the alliance of the powerful. Concini supported Henri, duc de Montmorency's campaign to entreat Marie de Médicis to free his brother-in-law, Charles de Valois, comte d'Auvergne on 26 June 1616. The latter had been imprisoned indefinitely since 1605 for colluding with Catherine-Henriette de Balzac d'Entragues against Henri IV.<sup>127</sup> The *Condéen* and *Guisard* factions alike immediately construed the release of Auvergne as an act of provocation, because this meant that Nevers had to surrender his custody of Auvergne's prestigious office of *colonel général de la cavalerie légère*.<sup>128</sup> It also meant that Guise's younger brother, Claude de Lorraine, prince de Joinville, had to relinquish his custody of Auvergne's *gouvernement* of Auvergne.<sup>129</sup> At the same time, the queen mother and her favourite's act of goodwill threatened to entice the Montmorencys, the Guises' historic enemies, back into the political fray from which they had been absent since the beginning of the regency.<sup>130</sup> Yet, Concini did not seem to grasp the

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152; *Richelieu*, II, p. 33.

<sup>123</sup> *Richelieu*, II, p. 34; Jacques-Nompar de Caumont, maréchal-duc de La Force, *Mémoires Authentiques de Jacques Nompar de Caumont, duc de La Force, maréchal de France, et de ses deux fils, les marquis de Montpouillan et de Castelnaut*, ed. Marquis de la Grange (Paris, 1843), II, p. 448.

<sup>124</sup> *Andilly*, p. 177.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181; Duccini, *Concini*, p. 223.

<sup>127</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 336-337; *Richelieu*, II, pp. 19-20.

<sup>128</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 337.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337; *Estrées*, p. 85.

<sup>130</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 337.

implications of what he had just done. He called on Bouillon and Mayenne and proposed that they worked together to undermine their mutual enemies, Épernon and Bellegarde, who happened to be the Guises's allies.<sup>131</sup> Bouillon and Mayenne discerned immediately that Concini had gifted them a perfect opportunity to reconcile and unite with their rivals against a common enemy. The two princes informed the Guises of Concini's proposal. The Guises, as one would expect, responded by forming an entente with the *Condéens*.<sup>132</sup>

Despite having dug himself into an ever-deeper hole, Concini found an unexpected saviour in Condé. Now that he had obtained the executive and provincial powers that he had coveted, the prince had little appetite for his associates' vengeful intrigues. Condé decided to overlook Concini's offences and offer the favourite his protection, for he recognised that Concini's gratitude and cooperation would only improve his own leverage over Marie de Médicis and reinforce his dominance in a royal council staffed by Concini's *créatures*.<sup>133</sup> So at a banquet to entertain the extraordinary ambassador of England, James Hay, Earl of Carlisle, Condé expressly forbade his associates from attacking Concini when the latter turned up unexpectedly.<sup>134</sup> It was at the same banquet that Condé's associates and adherents, in a state of drunken stupor, were heard chanting 'barre à bas', a cry calling for the removal of the red bar which distinguished Condé's arms from the king's (see Fig. 1.11).<sup>135</sup> What they did not know at that time was that such chants gave their enemies the ammunition to impress upon the queen mother that Condé was about to seize the throne.

Condé's influence over his associates, even in their sober state, was not absolute. On 15 August 1616, Longueville and Mayenne took advantage of a misunderstanding between Concini's brother and the inhabitants of Péronne to seize one of Concini's remaining *gouvernements* in Picardie.<sup>136</sup> Longueville presented himself at Péronne and took control of the town and its citadel.<sup>137</sup> Marie de Médicis was consequently forced to send the royal army to Péronne to force Longueville's retreat.<sup>138</sup> Marie's appointment of Auvergne as the

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<sup>131</sup> *Estrées*, p. 135; *Richelieu*, II, p. 32.

<sup>132</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 135-136; *Richelieu*, II, pp. 32-33.

<sup>133</sup> *Estrées*, pp. 139-140; *Richelieu*, II, pp. 36-37.

<sup>134</sup> *Estrées*, p. 142; *Bassompierre*, II, p. 75.

<sup>135</sup> *Mémoires de Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 338; *Mémoires de Richelieu*, II, p. 67.

<sup>136</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 345-346; Duccini, *Concini*, pp. 225-226.

<sup>137</sup> *Richelieu*, II, pp. 45-48; *Andilly*, pp. 185-187.

<sup>138</sup> *Richelieu*, II, pp. 48-49; *Andilly*, p. 189.

commander of this army gave everyone the impression that it was Concini who had orchestrated this draconian response.<sup>139</sup>

Back in Paris, Condé was cracking under pressure. Worried that his persistent protection of Concini would stretch his associates' loyalties too far, the prince informed Concini on 16 August that he could no longer protect him.<sup>140</sup> Only days before, the favourite had to flee Paris under the cover of darkness after receiving warnings that Mayenne and Joinville, in one of the princes' many nocturnal meetings, had formulated plans to kidnap or assassinate him and Galigai.<sup>141</sup> This series of coincidental events – the alliance with the Guises, the 'barre à bas' chants, the late-night rendezvous, the seizure of Péronne and now Condé's retraction of his protection for Concini – led Marie de Médicis to believe the princes were planning a coup. Marie subsequently allowed herself to be further persuaded by Sully, who begrudged Condé for selling the Huguenots out at Loudun and for obtaining the presidency of the *Conseil des finances*, a role that he himself sought to reclaim.<sup>142</sup> Marie believed every word of Sully's warning that the princes were hatching a conspiracy to seize the throne and government, and that her children and her lives were in danger.<sup>143</sup> Her first instinctive response was to have Condé arrested on 1 September 1616.

## Counter-revolution

The news of Condé's arrest led to unrest in the capital. Convinced that Concini was the culprit behind Condé's arrest and rumoured assassination, the Parisians stormed and pillaged the favourite's residence.<sup>144</sup> Other enemies of Concini, namely Mayenne, Bouillon, Vendôme, Guise, Joinville and the cardinal de Guise, saw Condé's arrest as a punishment for the prince's previous trespasses against the crown and by extension, a violation of the Treaty of Loudun's clauses of amnesty and *oubliance*. They promptly fled Paris and took up arms for fear of their own arrest.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 348.

<sup>140</sup> *Richelieu*, II, pp. 62-63; *Andilly*, pp. 189-190.

<sup>141</sup> *Andilly*, pp. 189, 191; *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 158-159; Henri, duc de Rohan, *The Memoires of the Duke of Rohan*, trans. George Bridges (London, 1660), pp. 38-39; *Richelieu*, II, p. 53.

<sup>142</sup> *Andilly*, p. 207.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193; *Bassompierre*, II, pp. 78-79; *Andilly*, p. 193.

<sup>144</sup> *Andilly*, pp. 203-205; 'Mémoires de Brienne', p. 317.

<sup>145</sup> *Andilly*, pp. 201-202.



The third rebellion of the princes turned out to be anti-climactic and short-lived. Owing to Guise's mediation, Marie de Médicis and the princes swiftly reached a peace treaty on 6 October 1616.<sup>146</sup> In the agreement, Marie swore to observe the Treaty of Loudun to the letter. She agreed to restore the princes to their offices, increase their pensions and military retinues and publish two edicts to clear the princes' name: the first edict of 16 October clarified the ambiguous wording of the edict of 6 September which declared Condé guilty of *lèse-majesté*.<sup>147</sup> It proclaimed that the verdict of the edict of 6 September did not extend to Condé's associates. The second edict of 16 October declared that the edict of 6 September also did not extend to Longueville, as the duc had not intentionally acted against the crown in Péronne. Marie, in her subsequent private negotiations with Longueville, agreed to give the duc the *gouvernement* of Ham in Picardie and dismiss Concini from Péronne.<sup>148</sup> Longueville would not stir again.

In spite of all this, the peace treaty of 6 October was untenable. It did little to loosen Concini's stranglehold of the royal council or weaken his provincial power, the two main causes of the princes' resentment. More importantly, the treaty failed to account for the duc de Nevers's interests. Indeed, Marie had a history of neglecting and infringing upon Nevers's interests. Despite her profession of *oubliance* and goodwill in the Treaty of Sainte-Ménéhould, the queen mother did not hide her mistrust for Nevers. In June 1614, less than two months after the Treaty of Sainte-Ménéhould was ratified, Marie ordered Nevers's *lieutenant* to recruit new men for the company of *cavalerie légère* on her behalf, bypassing Nevers, who was the *colonel général de la cavalerie légère*, altogether.<sup>149</sup> Then in September 1615, Marie rewarded Nevers's decision to eschew his *Condéen* associates' rebellion by trampling on his rights as the *gouverneur* of Champagne to nominate or advise the crown on the appointments within the province. Marie ordered Praslin, the *lieutenant-général* of Champagne, to nominate a surrogate *gouverneur* for Châlons, whom she would then directly appoint using royal commissions.<sup>150</sup>

Even though Marie de Médicis showed little respect for Nevers's honour and authority as the *gouverneur* of Champagne and deprived him of crucial patronage opportunities, Nevers refused to declare for his associates' rebellion in 1615-16. Instead, he

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<sup>146</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 158; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 354-355, 359; *Bassompierre*, II, p. 94; *Richelieu*, II, p. 100.

<sup>147</sup> *Richelieu*, II, pp. 101-102.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 96-97; *Andilly*, p. 218; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 176.

<sup>149</sup> Ariane Boltanski, 'Le pouvoir en partage. Les litiges entre le duc de Nevers et le gouvernement monarchique (1614-1617)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 46 (1999), p. 123.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

offered and helped to mediate the Treaty of Loudun, for Nevers had bigger priorities in mind. As a cadet of the Gonzagas and the proprietor of the principality of Arches, Nevers was a sovereign prince and one who was especially keen to assert his sovereign status. Following the renaming of Arches as Charleville in his own honour and an ambitious architectural project to aggrandise his principality, Nevers looked to embark on a crusade as his next venture to assert his sovereign status.<sup>151</sup> Recognising that his paternal grandmother Margherita Paleologus had given him a blood link to the Byzantine emperors and therefore a sovereign claim over any potential re-conquests, Nevers created an international crusading order with the aim to drive the Ottomans out of south-eastern Europe and re-create the Kingdom of Jerusalem in Palestine.<sup>152</sup> Nevers, nevertheless, acknowledged that he could not shoulder a project of such a scale alone. He consequently enlisted the help of Père Joseph (later Richelieu's *eminence grise*) who would seek the assistance of the Pope, Philip III of Spain, Emperor Matthias and the German Catholic princes on his behalf.<sup>153</sup> Nevers calculated that two conditions must be met for his project to be successful: firstly, the factional tensions at the French court had to be defused so that the rivals of his *Condéen* associates would not persuade the queen mother not to endorse his crusading plans.<sup>154</sup> Secondly, the peace between Protestant Germany and the Emperor and between the United Provinces and Spain had to be maintained in order that Emperor Matthias, Philip III of Spain and the German Catholic princes could honour their financial and military commitments to the crusading project.<sup>155</sup> With these in mind, Nevers mediated the Treaty of Loudun which he believed, if enforced properly, would appease the *Condéen* princes, as well as reduce the diplomatic and religious tensions which had been gathering pace in Huguenot France and Protestant Europe due to the Spanish marriages.<sup>156</sup>

From Nevers's viewpoint, Marie de Médicis and Concini's continuing provocations of the *Condéen* princes and subsequent arrest of Condé threatened to undermine his grand strategy. At the time of Condé's arrest, Nevers was embarking on a diplomatic mission on Marie's behalf to assure Protestant Germany of the French crown's commitment to its religious and diplomatic arrangements despite the Spanish marriages.<sup>157</sup> Nevers immediately

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<sup>151</sup> Parrott, 'Prince souverain', pp. 154-161.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>157</sup> *Estrées*, p. 152.

retraced his steps to Charleville when he heard the news. From there, he protested that the arrest was a violation of the Treaty of Loudun's promises of amnesty and *oubliance*. The arrest of a staunch opponent of the Spanish marriages also contradicted the aim of his diplomatic mission. Nevers refused to return to court or continue his mission despite Marie's repeated orders.<sup>158</sup> However, he was not officially in rebellion either.

As such, Nevers was justified in his public complaints against the *gouverneur* of Reims in Champagne, Charles, marquis de La Vieuville, who refused the duchesse de Nevers entry into the city on 17 November 1616; though he was less justified in his retaliatory seizure of La Vieuville's *seigneurie* of Sy two days later.<sup>159</sup> For when Marie de Médicis instructed the kingdom's *gouverneurs* to refuse entry to the princes in rebellion, she did not specify whether Nevers was part of this band of dissidents.<sup>160</sup> More importantly, the crown's edict of pacification of 6 October had already proclaimed peace between the crown and the princes. Its edict of 16 October had also made clear that the charges laid against Condé would not extend to his associates. Marie de Médicis' initial order to the *gouverneurs* to refuse entry to the princes in rebellion therefore should have lapsed with these edicts. La Vieuville, in other words, did not have the right to refuse the duchesse de Nevers entry. That he chose to do so, Nevers had rightly discerned, was because of his personal feud with Nevers. La Vieuville never forgave Nevers for annexing his *gouvernements* of Mézières and its citadel (which were situated right next to Nevers's Charleville) through the Treaty of Sainte-Ménéhould in May 1614.<sup>161</sup>

Nevertheless, Marie de Médicis refused to render justice to Nevers or resolve the dispute in any satisfactory manner. Instead, she defended La Vieuville's action, claimed that he was only acting in the king's name and insisted that Nevers back down.<sup>162</sup> Needless to say, Nevers refused, as it would imply that he had conceded defeat. It would cause him to suffer a loss of honour and set a bad precedent for future disputes. Marie was thereupon resolved to use the royal army to force Nevers's compliance. When the new *garde des sceaux* Guillaume du Vair joined the disgraced Villeroy and Jeannin in cautioning Marie that such a measure was too excessive and recommending that she refer the case to the *Parlement de Paris*, Marie

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<sup>158</sup> Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, pp. 140-141.

<sup>159</sup> *Estrées*, p. 152; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 360; *Andilly*, p. 231.

<sup>160</sup> Boltanski, *pouvoir en partage*, p. 124.

<sup>161</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 246; *Richelieu*, I, p, 282. The comte de Brienne too saw it as a personal feud; see 'Mémoires de Brienne', pp. 318-319.

<sup>162</sup> Boltanski, *Pouvoir en partage*, p. 130.

and Concini suspected du Vair of harbouring sympathies for the princes and had him dismissed.<sup>163</sup> Mangot was given the seals and Armand-Jean du Plessis de Richelieu, bishop of Luçon, yet another *créature* of Concini, took over Mangot's duties as *secrétaire d'État*.<sup>164</sup> And so with the appointment of Richelieu, the dismissal of du Vair, the imprisonment of Condé, the newfound pliancy of the Guises and the absence or disgrace of the other *Condéen* and *Guisard* princes, Concini's control of the government was now absolute. He had become a minister-favourite in the mould of the Duke of Lerma in Spain.

The first task of Concini's new *ministériat* in December 1616 was to bring Nevers to heel. Such a policy did not represent a shift towards a more absolutist form of government as traditional historiography would have one believe.<sup>165</sup> Rather, it was the resolution of a queen mother who was fed up with the inefficacy of her previous conciliatory approaches. It was also the outcome of a council which was undivided by factionalism and committed to a minister-favourite whose own life and livelihood hinged on the total defeat of the princes. One could argue that it was Marie de Médicis and Concini who had instigated the fourth rebellion of the princes. Their decision to raise the royal armies against Nevers who was supposedly in rebellion became a self-fulfilling prophesy: it compelled Nevers and his allies, Mayenne, Bouillon, Vendôme and Cœuvres to mobilise their forces, confiscate royal finances and seize and garrison the crown's fortified towns in self-defence. The princes' reactions in turn confirmed the queen mother and her minister-favourite's initial assessment that the princes were in rebellion. When they then declared the princes guilty of *lèse-majesté*, the princes had no choice but to fight till the end.

The royal armies in Champagne, Nivernais and Île-de-France might have enjoyed an uninterrupted series of rapid and successful victories against the princes' strongholds; but for Marie de Médicis and Concini, their successes on the battlefield could not make up for their mounting losses on the political front. Even though the reasons for Condé's arrest were spelt out in the *lit de justice* and the published royal declaration of 6 September 1616, many found it difficult to believe that Condé was arrested for any reasons other than his refusal to protect

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<sup>163</sup> Du Vair was not pliant enough for Marie and Concini's liking; see: *Richelieu*, II, pp. 108-109; *Andilly*, pp. 169-173, 209-210 236; *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 189-191; Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 140.

<sup>164</sup> *Richelieu*, II, pp. 109-111; Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 140.

<sup>165</sup> Hélène Duccini, *Concini: Grandeur et misère du favori de Médicis* (Paris, 1991); Jean-François Dubost, 'Between Mignons and Principal Ministers: Concini, 1610-1617' in J.H. Elliott and L.W.B. Brockliss (eds.), *The World of the Favourite* (New Haven, CT, 1999), pp. 71-78.

Concini.<sup>166</sup> The papal nuncio, hardly a friend of the princes, reported in early 1617 that there was widespread feeling within the kingdom that the princes were not really guilty of the charges laid against them.<sup>167</sup> Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle, the founder of the French Oratory and a prominent beneficiary of Marie de Médicis's religious patronage, berated Concini before the queen mother. Bérulle admonished Concini for sacrificing the public peace and ruining the princes because of some personal disputes between them.<sup>168</sup> At this time, there were even rumours that the duc de Guise and other commanders of the royal armies did not want a military solution to the current crisis.<sup>169</sup>

As it became increasingly clear that there was a gaping disjuncture between the rhetoric of 'service to the king' and political reality, and as it became more and more difficult to avoid the conclusion that the war was waged by Concini and for Concini only, other malcontent parties began to form. The ducs de Bellegarde and d'Épernon, two of Concini's greatest enemies since 1611, foresaw that the *Condéen* faction's defeat would give Concini the latitude to settle his scores with them. Bellegarde and Épernon thereupon sought out other affected personnel such as Lesdiguières, Montmorency, Nicholas de Neufville, marquis d'Alincourt (Villeroy's son) and Antoine, maréchal de Roquelaure, and began discussing the possibility of forming a third party to seize Paris and wrest the king's person from Concini's clutches.<sup>170</sup> In the meantime, Bouillon was close to convincing the Huguenots and the Protestant states to join the war as the fourth and fifth parties of belligerents.<sup>171</sup> The *ministériel's* diplomatic missions to the United Provinces, Holy Roman Empire, England and Huguenot France failed to convince the kingdom's Protestant allies and subjects that the *ministériel's* arrest of Condé and war against Condé's associates were purely intended to punish these princes for their recidivistic disobedience. The Protestant leaders of Europe and France continued to interpret the *ministériel's* persecution of the main opponents of the Spanish marriages and signatories of the Treaty of Loudun, some of whom were their kin, as a symptom of its pro-Habsburg and militant Catholic stance; a manifestation of its intention to flout the Treaty of Loudun which promised religious peace and toleration.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> *Memoires of Rohan*, p. 39; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 194.

<sup>167</sup> Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 157.

<sup>168</sup> L'Abbé M. Houssaye, *Le Père de Bérulle et L'Oratoire de Jésus 1611-1625* (Paris, 1874), p. 174.

<sup>169</sup> Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 157.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157; *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 194, 214-215. On Épernon's worries, see Girard, *Epernon*, pp. 300-301, 306-307.

<sup>171</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 179-180; *Richelieu*, II, pp. 147-148; Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 151.

<sup>172</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 211; Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, p. 145.

In spite of it all, the final victory was on the horizon for Marie de Médicis and Concini by late April 1617. The royal armies had arrived at the princes' last stand at Mézières, Nevers and Soissons, when, out of nowhere, Louis delivered the *coup de théâtre*.<sup>173</sup> The king, now nearly sixteen years old, was infuriated by Marie and Concini's demeaning treatment and determination to exclude him from government.<sup>174</sup> Influenced by the murmurings of his companions and his own favourite, Charles d'Albert, sieur de Luynes, and egged on by them to seize rightful control of the government, the impressionable Louis XIII had Concini assassinated in the courtyard of the Louvre on 24 April 1617. And with that, Marie de Médicis's rule was over. Concini's ministerial revolution had been undone. Luynes's counter-revolution was just about to begin.

## Conclusion

The princely rebellions of 1614-17, contrary to what traditional historiography would have one believe, were not the inevitable result of a Manichean struggle between the progressive pioneers of absolutism and the conservative defenders of feudalism, nor were they the unavoidable consequences of a clash between the enlightened advocates of *raison d'état* and the reactionary champions of self-interest. Rather than ideological or policy differences, the princely rebellions of 1614-17 originated from the contests between the *Condéen* princes and Marie de Médicis and her ministers for political and dynastic advancement. The motivations of the contestants on all sides, as this chapter has demonstrated, were first and foremost self-seeking. On the one hand, princes like Condé, Bouillon and Mayenne hoped to establish or re-establish their political careers and relevance; Longueville, defend his ancestral stronghold in Picardie from an up-and-coming rival; and Nevers, assert his status as a sovereign prince and pursue territorial claims in the wider Mediterranean. On the other hand, Marie de Médicis worked to conserve her political supremacy, while her ministers contrived to maintain the conciliar roles and dominance which they had enjoyed under Henri IV. The contests between these individuals, at the same time, were fuelled or aggravated by their personal insecurities, psychological baggage, historic rivalries and shared noble culture. The culture's celebration of individualism, ambition, warfare, achievements and honour, the latter two of which were by nature relative and subjective, placed enormous pressures on these

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<sup>173</sup> *Richelieu*, II, pp. 152-156.

<sup>174</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 210, 217-219; A. Lloyd Moote, *Louis XIII, The Just* (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 90-92.


individuals to see every contest as zero-sum and to compete and progress at every opportunity, whatever the cost.<sup>175</sup>

Having said that, such political and dynastic contests were the bread and butter of the early modern French court. They would not necessarily have spilled over into armed rebellions had it not been for the princes' immoderate intentions to profit from a period of royal weakness, and the queen mother's lack of political competence and brinkmanship. Existing studies, as this chapter has shown, have overstated the role of Concini's ambition, rapid ascendancy, humble origins and Italian ancestry in instigating these conflicts. Far from wanting to tame *les grands*, Concini resolved to associate himself with them and emulate their ethos. And as envious and snobby as they might be, the *Soissonais* and *Condéen* princes were keen to court Concini's affection and affiliation. It has never been pointed out that Concini was at one point a fellow member and conspirator of the princely factions which opposed Marie de Médicis. Indeed, Concini's involvement had a big part to play in the exacerbation of factional politics and tensions in this period. Because his favour with the queen mother gave whichever faction with which he was affiliated an unfair advantage, the factions at court schemed and jostled for Concini's adherence. When this was combined with the obtuseness and recklessness of the favourite, the insensitivity of a female and foreign regent and the intemperate hopes of a group of ambitious princes, the stage was set for a political implosion.


It remains to be seen if the pamphlets of the princes and the government accurately reflected the real intentions and issues of their political struggles which had been uncovered in this chapter. But before turning to the questions of how and why this was or was not the case, it is important to address the oft-overlooked question of why political pamphlets and persuasion were even necessary in the French polity in the first place.

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<sup>175</sup> Briggs, 'Noble Conspiracy', p.174; Jonathan Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715* (Berkeley, CA, 1993); idem, *Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France: The Roban Family, 1550-1715* (University Park, PA, 2015); Kirsten Neuschel, *Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, NY, 1989).




**Fig. 1.1 Louis XIII  
as a boy.**



**Fig. 1.2 Marie de Médicis  
The Queen Mother and Regent**




**Fig. 1.3 Concino Concini,  
maréchal d'Ancre**




**Fig. 1.3 Leonora Galigai,  
maréchale d'Ancre**







**Fig. 1.4 Nicolas de Neufville,  
sieur de Villeroy,  
secrétaire d'État**




**Fig. 1.5 Nicholas Brûlart,  
sieur de Sillery  
chancelier de France**




**Fig. 1.6 Pierre Jeannin  
contrôleur-général des finances**




**Fig. 1.6 Armand-Jean du Plessis,  
Bishop of Luçon  
(later cardinal-duc de Richelieu)**




**Fig. 1.7** Henri II de Bourbon,  
prince de Condé




**Fig. 1.8** Charles de Bourbon,  
comte de Soissons




**Fig. 1.9** Charles de Gonzague,  
duc de Nevers




**Fig. 1.10** Henri de Lorraine,  
duc de Mayenne



**Fig. 1.10 Henri II d'Orléans,  
duc de Longueville**



**Fig. 1.10 Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne,  
maréchal-duc de Bouillon**



**Fig. 1.11 'Barre à Bas'**

At a banquet hosted by Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé for the extraordinary ambassador of England, James Hay, Earl of Carlisle, Condé's associates and adherents, in a state of drunken stupor, were heard chanting 'barre à bas'. They were calling for the removal of the bendlet coupe gule – or red bar – which differentiates Condé's arms (right) from that of the king (left). Needless to say, such chants fed Marie de Médicis's longstanding suspicion that Condé had plans to seize the throne.



## 2. Political Persuasion and the Press of Early Seventeenth-Century France: Fuelling Public Opinion in the 1610s

The objectives of the rebellions between 1614 and 1617 were essentially the same. The princes intended to mobilise armies and capture a series of fortified towns so as to constitute a show of force, in the hope of dragging Marie de Médicis to the negotiating table and coercing her to grant them political and monetary concessions in return for their demobilisation and obedience. The more men and fortified towns the princes could muster, the stronger their negotiating position would be. Needless to say, Marie de Médicis was determined to neutralise the threat of the princes' armies and more importantly, limit the number of fortified towns they could commandeer. These fortified towns, Marie understood, would not only act as recruitment centres and rallying points for the *noblesse d'épée* in the regions, they were inhabited by merchants, artisans and agricultural workers who could be pressed into service (and they often were), either as suppliers of the princes' armies, or as rank-and-file infantrymen in exchange for a bounty.<sup>1</sup> If located on the frontier or coast, these towns would give the princes unrestricted capabilities to recruit foreign mercenaries, communicate with foreign governments and give the latter's armies access into France. On their own, the towns contained deposits of tax revenues, provisions, transport equipment and munitions which the princes could requisition to feed and supply their armies. They provided suitable lodgings and guarded the overland or water routes, mountain passes and river crossings that were so crucial to military operations and the maintenance of supply and communication lines.<sup>2</sup> But the losses of fortified towns, Marie de Médicis correctly discerned, also had the simultaneous effects of weakening her hand while strengthening the princes'. It would impair her ability to raise, finance, supply and communicate with the royal armies and by extension, undermine her chances of suppressing a rebellion and her position at the negotiating table.

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<sup>1</sup> Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 2010), pp. 207, 211-213.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 207-216, 221, 236.

In the fall of 1615, the losses of fortified would also jeopardise the court's journey to Bordeaux and Bayonne and hence her plans to accomplish the Spanish marriages before her opponents had any more time to rally against the marriages. This was why Marie de Médicis was so appalled by the news that François d'Orléans, comte de Saint-Pol, uncle of Henri II d'Orléans, duc de Longueville, was on the verge of joining the *Condéen* rebellion; for Saint-Pol held the *gouvernements* of Fronsac and Caumont-sur-Garonne, the two towns which guarded the key crossings over the Dordogne river that the court must traverse to reach Bordeaux and Bayonne. The queen mother was equally horrified by the news that Henri de Nogaret de La Valette, duc de Candale, son of Jean-Louis, duc d'Épernon, had seized his father's château d'Angoulême for the Huguenots' cause, as Angoulême was a key pitstop for the court en route to Bordeaux.<sup>3</sup>

### **The Untold Need for Persuasion**

The onset of each rebellion was consequently characterised by a fierce contest between the princes and the government to secure the allegiances of the men who formed the backbone of their armies and who administered the fortified towns. To this end, each camp dispatched human agents and handwritten correspondence and commissioned printed pamphlets to communicate and negotiate with these men, collectively known as the political nation, with the hopes of persuading them to join their respective cause. But such initiatives, it seemed, were fundamentally inconsistent with the prescribed customs of a polity governed by an absolute monarchy and ties of patronage. Obedience and service to the crown or princely patrons were supposed to be institutionalised; functions of obligations, rather than rationalisation or conviction. It therefore begs the question why political persuasion and pamphlets were even necessary in the first place.

The answer could be inferred from the spate of revisionist works by Anglo-American political historians in recent decades. These scholars have found that, even at the height of the king or the *grands'* power, the French polity remained a system of social collaboration. The crown during Richelieu, Mazarin or Louis XIV's reign or the *grands* during the Wars of Religion or the *Frondes* could not obtain the cooperation of the political nation on the basis

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<sup>3</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 101, 105; *Fontenay-Marueil*, I, p. 314; *Richelieu*, I, p. 409.

of divinely-ordained authority, legislation or institutional regulations. Rather, the crown and the *grands* alike earned the political nation's obedience and service by providing for its members' dynastic ambitions, maintaining their social and economic dominance, and pandering to their self-importance.<sup>4</sup> The relationships between the members of the political nation and the crown or the *grands* were inherently personal and reciprocal. More than anything else, they were patron-and-client relationships. The early modern French polity, these scholars have demonstrated, was effectively a giant network of patronage ties stretching from the king to the *grands*, who played the role of the king's brokers, and to the middle- and lower-ranking noblemen and officeholders.<sup>5</sup>

Having said that, these Anglo-American scholars have also discovered that contrary to Roland Mousnier's influential notion of 'fidélité', patronage ties did not actually give the king or the *grands* complete control over their clients. Patronage networks, as Stuart Carroll has argued, were best understood as concentric circles, each representing a different strength of relationship. At the core of their network, the king and the *grands* were surrounded by their most trusted followers, that is, their closest companions, advisers, guards, servants and kinsmen. Because of their close proximity and sociability, the bonds between the king or the *grands* and these followers were particularly strong. The strength of these bonds was further reinforced by the many ties of kinship and friendship between the followers, and the historic service of the followers' *maison* in the patrons' personal councils and households.<sup>6</sup> Beyond

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<sup>4</sup> David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge, 2001); Alan James, *The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661* (London, 2004); Richard Bonney, *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624-1661* (Oxford, 1978); Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interests, 1661-1701* (Cambridge, 2002); William Beik, 'The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration', *Past & Present* 188 (2005), pp. 195-224; Idem, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (Cambridge, 1985); James Collins, *Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge, 1994); Albert Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673* (Pittsburgh, 1976); Albert Hamscher, *The Conseil Privé and the Parlements in the Age of Louis XIV: A Study in French Absolutism* (Philadelphia, 1987).

<sup>5</sup> Orest Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu 1635-1642* (Oxford, 1963); Roland Mousnier, 'Les concepts d'ordres, d'états, de fidélité et de monarchie absolue en France de la fin du XV<sup>e</sup> à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup>', *Revue Historique* 502 (1972), pp. 289-312; idem, 'Les fidélités et les clientèles en France aux XVI<sup>e</sup>, XVII<sup>e</sup> et XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles', *Histoire Sociale* 15 (1982), pp. 35-46; Daniel Dessert and Jean-Louis Journet, 'Le lobby Colbert. Un royaume, ou une affaire de famille?' *Annales ESC* (1975), pp. 1303-1336; Yves-Marie Bercé, 'Les conduites de fidélité: Des exemples aquitains' in Yves Durand (ed.), *Hommage à Roland Mousnier. Clientèles et fidélités en Europe à l'époque moderne* (1981), pp. 125-138; Laurent Bourquin, *Noblesse seconde et pouvoir en Champagne aux XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1994); J.H.M. Salmon, 'A Second Look at the Noblesse Seconde: The Key to Noble Clientage and Power in Early Modern France?', *French Historical Studies* 25 (2002), pp. 575-593; Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1987); Idem, *Patronage in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France* (Aldershot, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> Stuart Carroll, 'The Guise Affinity and Popular Protest during the Wars of Religion', *French History* 9 (1995), pp. 127-128; Joan Davis, 'Family Service and Family Strategies: The Household of Henri, duc de Montmorency, ca. 1590-1610', *Bulletin of the Society for Renaissance Studies* 3 (1985), pp. 27-43; Mark Greengrass, 'Noble Affinities

the core of followers, however, the patron-client relationship became much more dynamic and fluid. The bonds between patrons and their outer concentric circles of clients were less emotive and enduring, and more mercenary. Clients in these circles had more room for autonomy and self-interest. Sharon Kettering's seminal work in 1987 has demonstrated that clients were far more likely to flout or renounce their obligations when their interests diverged from the patron's, when they became disillusioned with the patron's recompense or when they prioritised their personal rivalries with the patron's other clients. These clients were far more likely to disregard or sever their ties with their patrons as they constantly evaluated the potential rewards promised by their patrons' ventures, assessed the likelihood of the ventures' success with each new development and ruminated on the probable ramifications on their lives and livelihoods should these ventures fail.<sup>7</sup>

Clients in the outer concentric circles of the patrons' networks were also more likely to face a dilemma of conflicting ties. It was common and acceptable for clients in the outer concentric circles to serve multiple patrons from opposing factions at once.<sup>8</sup> Besides, it was also common and acceptable for clients of different patrons to establish ties of dependency, kinship or friendship with one another, and for high-ranking patrons to establish direct ties with low-ranking clients, bypassing the middle-ranking brokers altogether.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, patronage networks were not neat, hierarchical and pyramidal chains, but interconnected chains of labyrinthine and conflicting. Unsurprisingly, the internal calculations that clients undertook when deciding whether to honour their obligations to their patrons became all the more pragmatic and cynical in a scenario where clients could choose between opposing patrons. The transition from a clientele network to a rebellious party therefore could not be taken for granted. This meant that the prince de Condé could not simply draw away the entire chains of clients under him when he decided to rebel in 1614. Some of Condé's clients were concurrently serving his arch-nemesis Marie de Médicis or her clients such as the duc

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in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de Montmorency, Constable of France', *European History Quarterly* 16 (1986), pp. 275-311.

<sup>7</sup> Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, pp. 22-39; Madeleine Foisil, 'Parentèles et fidélités autour du duc de Longueville, gouverneur de Normandie pendant la Fronde' in Durand (ed.), *Hommage à Roland Mousnier*, pp. 153-168; Richard Bonney, 'Cardinal Mazarin and the Great Nobility during the Fronde', *English Historical Review* 96 (1981), pp. 818-833; Katia Béguin, *Les princes de Condé. Rebelles, courtisans, mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> Robert Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven, CT, 1978); pp. 36-37; Mack Holt, 'Patterns of Clientèle and Economic Opportunity at Court during the Wars of Religion: The Household of François, Duke of Anjou', *French Historical Studies* 13 (1984), pp. 305-322; Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, p. 39; Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>9</sup> Stuart Carroll, *Noble Power during the Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy* (Cambridge, 1998); Idem, 'The Guise Affinity', pp. 125-151; Idem, 'The Revolt of Paris, 1588: Aristocratic Insurgency and the Mobilization of Popular Support', *French Historical Studies* 23 (2000), pp. 301-337.



de Guise. Some of Condé's clients also had patronage, kinship or friendship ties with the clients of the opposing camp or other overriding private interests. One such client was none other than Concino Concini. Concini was simultaneously the favourite of the queen mother, an ally of her client, *chancelier* Sillery, an enemy of her other client, *secrétaire d'État* Villeroy, as well as a client of Condé and a rival of Condé's ally, the duc de Longueville. In the light of these conflicting relationships, Concini's motivations for eschewing the prince's rebellion of 1614 appeared more complicated, yet paradoxically understandable.

For the crown and the *grands* alike, it was difficult enough to win their clients' support during a princely rebellion without the complications of securing the fortified towns that their clients administered. Obtaining the allegiance of a fortified town was not as straightforward as simply mobilising one's ties of patronage with its noble *gouverneur* or its bourgeois *maire*. The *gouverneur* and *maire* were but two of the town's multiple custodians. Municipal administration in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France was essentially a patchwork of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions. Each town was superintended by a *gouverneur* who was vaguely responsible for preserving the security, peace and well-being of the town's inhabitants and for enforcing the will of the royal council, the *Parlement* and the provincial *gouverneur*. A separate *gouverneur* would often but not always be appointed for the citadel within the town if it had one. Each town was also overseen by an *échevinage* (or *consulat* in the Midi, *jurade* in the southwest or *capitoulat* in Toulouse), the leader of which was the *maire* and the seat of power, the *hôtel de ville*. Its duties generally entailed policing, regulating commerce and organising the town's defence, taxation, commerce, public health and provisions as they saw fit or according to the decrees of the crown, the *Parlement* or the provincial *gouverneur*. Some towns concurrently hosted a judicial court in the form of a *bailliage*, *sénéchausée* or *siège présidial* which frequently argued that the maintenance of law and order fell within its remit rather than that of the *échevinage*. Some cities housed a provincial *Parlement* which were responsible for registering royal edicts and dispensing justice, and which oftentimes also claimed that the *échevinage*'s duties of enforcing royal decrees, organising defence, managing poor relief and enacting and supervising fiscal exactions were within its purview. In addition to a *bailliage* or a *Parlement*, some towns like Poitiers and Bordeaux were overseen by a resident or absentee bishop or archbishop who could not only adjudicate misdemeanour and disputes through his ecclesiastical court or issue ordinances to regulate the same civic matters mentioned above, he had the plentiful resources of the

Church at his disposal to ensure that things were done his way.<sup>10</sup> In many cases, this individual was also a younger son of an important noble family and therefore had a direct stake in the factional struggles at court.

As a result of their overlapping jurisdictions, the various administrators of the fortified towns controlled the same apparatus required to seize or secure a town. Depending on where their allegiance lay, these administrators each had the power to issue ordinances which would allow or forbid the malcontent princes and their adherents entry within the town walls. They likewise had the same power to prosecute or acquit the princes' sympathisers in their town. Yet at the same time, each of these administrators also possessed unique powers which meant that their mutual cooperation was necessary for the successful seizure or defence of a fortified town. A resident bishop, for instance, could issue a decree forbidding entry to the princes and ordering the town to guard against the princes' armies. To finance the reinforcement of the town's fortifications and secure its gates and walls, however, the bishop required the cooperation of the *échevinage* which could enact extraordinary taxes and summon the town's militia. To equip the militia, the bishop needed access to the arms kept in the town's citadel and therefore the blessings of the citadel's *gouverneur*. To stop the town's inhabitants from supplying or joining the princes' armies or worse, manufacturing a coup, the bishop required the cooperation of the town's *bailliage* to convict the princes' adherents according to the latest royal decrees. In other words, the bishop's support alone was not enough to guarantee the town's compliance. The crown needed each of the town's custodians to be loyal.

Securing the allegiance of a fortified town therefore meant simultaneously obtaining the allegiances of its multiple custodians. But this was easier said than done. Municipal governments in early modern France were more often than not characterised by infighting rather than concord. The overlaps between the authority of the municipal government's various constituents, engendered by the equivocal and elastic nature of their duties, not to mention the lack of any delineation of the boundaries of their spheres of influence, ensured that conflicts between the constituents for primacy or over matters of jurisdiction, competence and corporate honour were rife.<sup>11</sup> Poitiers in the 1610s, for example, was fraught


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<sup>10</sup> Philip Benedict, 'French cities from the sixteenth century to the Revolution: An overview' in Philip Benedict (ed.), *Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France* (London, 1992), pp. 19-21.

<sup>11</sup> For case studies, see: Frederick M. Irvine, 'From Renaissance City to Ancien Régime Capital: Montpellier, c.1500-c.1600' in *Ibid.*, pp. 105-133; Robert Schneider, 'Crown and Capitoulat: Municipal Government in Toulouse 1500-1789' in *Ibid.*, pp. 195-220; Philip Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1981);

with bitter contentions between its resident bishop Henri-Louis Chasteigner de la Rocheposay, its resident *gouverneur* Louis Gouffier, duc de Roannais and its *maire* Nicholas de Sainte-Marthe.<sup>12</sup>

At times, the *gouverneur* or the *lieutenant-général* of a province would also enter the fray by claiming that he had the highest jurisdiction over the towns or citadels within his province, particularly when the town or citadel had military, economic or symbolic significance. Between 1614 and 1615, for instance, the duc de Longueville sought to establish his primacy in Amiens by siding with the *hôtel de ville* in its quarrels with the *gouverneur* of the town and its fortress, Concini.<sup>13</sup> Amiens had both strategic and symbolic value to Longueville. It was not only heavily fortified, it was also the largest and most prosperous town in Longueville's *gouvernement* of Picardie. At the same time, it was the jewel of Concini's nascent empire within the province. Concini was the *lieutenant-général* of Picardie and was naturally regarded by Longueville as an intruder and rival.



**Fig. 2.1 Provincial and municipal government in early modern France:  
A patchwork of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions**

William Beik, 'Urban Factions and the Social Order during the Minority of Louis XIV', *French Historical Studies* 15 (1987), pp. 36-67; Idem, *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-century France: The Culture of Retribution* (Cambridge, 1997).

<sup>12</sup> Jeffrey Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, CA, 1990), pp. 73-80.

<sup>13</sup> See chapter one.

To make matters worse, the constituents of municipal governments were themselves not organic wholes. Rather, they were often riven by factions, generation gaps or rivalries between the town's dominant families and trades.<sup>14</sup> At the onset of his rebellion in August 1615, Condé could count the younger and more hot-headed magistrates in the *Parlement de Paris's chambre des enquêtes* amongst his supporters, but not the institution as a whole. The older and more influential *présidents and conseillers* held the *Parlement* firmly for Marie de Médicis for the duration of that rebellion. Internal divisions aside, the constituents of municipal governments were sometimes also undermined by the disenfranchised inhabitants from without or by the private interests of its members or its components from within.<sup>15</sup> It was not uncommon, for example, in this period for the town's militia, an arm of the *hôtel de ville* composed of the town's dwellers from across the social spectrum, to ignore the *mairé's* summons to put down insurrections. During the tax riots of 1626-27 in Troyes, at most only 220 of the notional 3,200 militiamen agreed to assemble. The rest shared the grievances of their riotous neighbours, colleagues and friends or feared their reprisals.<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately for the crown and the malcontent princes, a princely rebellion was one of those instances where it was most difficult to obtain the unanimous support of the multiple institutions and individuals which made up the governments of the fortified towns. Divisions between the higher authorities during political crises, as William Beik has demonstrated, had the tendency to intensify the rivalries between and within municipal institutions, as contradictory orders from the royal council and grandee *gouverneurs* caused confusion, polarised opinions and complicated the decision-making process. More importantly, municipal institutions or factions regularly co-opted political crises for a showdown with their rivals. Each of these institutions or factions would try and align themselves with one of the opposite sides at court, exchanging their support for the leadership, resources or executive powers of the malcontent or loyalist *grands*. For by tying themselves to natural figureheads and their local grievances to nationwide remonstrances, these municipal institutions or factions could legitimise coups designed to oust their rivals

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<sup>14</sup> William Beik, 'The Culture of Protest in Seventeenth-Century French Towns', *Social History* 15 (1990), pp. 1-23; Idem, *Urban Protest*, pp. 175-176, 183-187, 189-192; Sharon Kettering, *Judicial Politics and Urban Revolt in Seventeenth-Century France: The Parlement of Aix, 1629-1659* (Princeton, NJ, 1978).

<sup>15</sup> La Rochelle in the 1610s is a good example of the battles between the *hôtel de ville* and disenfranchised inhabitants, between old and new wealth, and between old inhabitants and immigrants; see: Kevin Robbins, 'The Social Mechanisms of Urban Rebellion: A Case Study of Leadership in the 1614 Revolt at La Rochelle', *French Historical Studies* 19 (1995), pp. 559-590.

<sup>16</sup> Beik, *Urban Protest*, pp. 79-89.

from offices or establish their supremacy in the towns' administration.<sup>17</sup> The Bishop of Poitiers, for example, used the rebellion of 1614 to seize control of the town. Aligning himself with Marie de Médicis and accusing his rivals, *gouverneur* Roannais and *maire* Sainte-Marthe, of colluding with Condé, the bishop obtained the royal council's blessings, wrested control of the militia corps from the *maire* and subsequently managed to expel both the *gouverneur* and *maire* from city.<sup>18</sup>

Taken together, one could argue, the system of social collaboration, the attributes of patronage networks and the nature of municipal administration made communication and persuasion imperative for the respective belligerents during princely rebellions. As the government, the loyalist *grands* and the malcontent princes competed for the service of their shared clients and laboured to secure the fortified towns without using force, they had to expound their positions and prevail upon these clients and towns that their interests would be better served, and their efforts better rewarded, by one patron or faction instead of the other. Opposing patrons and factions had to convince these clients and towns that their cause was more righteous and had a higher chance of success. They had to put reservations to rest and unite clients and municipal authorities with incompatible interests behind common purposes. With the clients and towns who had already committed, patrons and factions had to maintain morale, party unity, conviction in the cause and belief in ultimate victory. Their rivals, on the other hand, had to work to foment internal discords, sow doubts and encourage these clients' and towns' desertion, defection or capitulation. As one shall see in the next three chapters, the princes and the loyalists would devise their pamphlets specifically to these ends.

### **The Primary Audience**

Considering how critical the support of the members of the political nation who filled the ranks of armies and the offices of municipal administration was to the success of both the government and malcontent princes during a rebellion, it is not unreasonable to assume that the members of the political nation were the target audience of the pamphlets put out by both parties. These members included the *gouverneurs* and *lieutenant-généraux* of provinces,

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<sup>17</sup> For case studies, see: *Ibid.*, pp. 173-249.

<sup>18</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, pp. 73-80.

towns and citadels; the *grandees* and noblemen at court or across the kingdom; the noble officers and soldiers in the royal or *grandee* household regiments; the officeholders in the *parlements*, *chambres des comptes*, *cours des aides*, *bailliages*, *sénéchaussées*, *sièges présidials* and other sovereign, financial or judicial courts; the deputies of provincial estates and Huguenot general assemblies; the archbishops, bishops, priests and regular clergymen who provided administrative and spiritual leadership; and the *maires*, *échevins*, officials, militia captains and wealthy merchants who dominated and directed the *hôtels de ville*. One should also include foreign ambassadors and attachés and arguably university rectors and students whose involvement or inaction could sway the outcome of events.

Indeed, there is good evidence to suggest that these members of the political nation were indeed the pamphlets' target audience, not least in the texts themselves. As he signed off his manifestos of February 1614 and August 1615, Condé expressly named the individuals whom he hoped would consider the validity of his intentions and motions:

Je supplie tres-humblement vostre Majesté, de l'avis de plusieurs Princes, Ducs, Pairs, & Officiers de la Couronne, Cours Souveraines, Ecclesiastiques, & autres Seigneurs, tant presens qu'absens, qui ont veu & approuvé la presente supplication...<sup>19</sup>

Prions & extortons tous les Princes, Pairs de France; Officiers de la Couronne, seigneurs, Chevaliers, Gouverneurs, gentils-hommes & autres, de quelque qualité & condition qu'il soient, tous les Parlemens, tous les Ordres & Estats de ce Royaume, toutes les villes & communautez, & generally tous ceux qui se disent encores François, & qui ne sont encores jointcs à nous, de nous secourir & assister en une cause si juste. Requerrons & adjurons tous les Princes & Estats estrangers, tous les anciens alliez & confederez de cest estat, de nous y prester ayde, faveur & assistance...<sup>20</sup>

The ducs de Nevers, Bouillon, Mayenne and Vendôme did the same in their joint manifesto of March 1617:

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<sup>19</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince. A la Royne.* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), p. 10, BYU 944.03 A1 no.39, <<https://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/collection/FrenchPolPa/id/62213>>.

<sup>20</sup> *Manifeste et justification, des actions de Monsieur le Prince* (Sedan: Jean Janon, 1615), p. 38, BM Lyon Rés 315190.

Adjurons... Les autres Princes, Ducs, Paris & vrais Officiers de la Couronne qui ne sont encores joincts avec nous... Tous les Parlemens, & autres Cours souveraines, & principaux Officiers... Tous les Ordres & Estats du Royaume, le Clergé, la Noblesse & le peuple... Et nous esperons que recognoissans la justice & la necessité de nostre deffense, leur interest & leur debvoir, ils favoriseront nos juste armes, & porteront avec nous la main, l'esprit & le courage pour secourir nostre commune patrie...<sup>21</sup>

Nous prions tous Roys, Princes & Potentats, allies & confederés de ceste Couronne, de cognoistre de la justice de nostre cause, & par l'affection & interest commun qu'ils ont à la grandeur & conservation de la France, nous aider...<sup>22</sup>

Denonçons a toutes Provinces, Villes, Communautés, gens d'Eglise, de la Noblesse, Officiers de justice & des Finances, Capitaines de gens de guerre, bourgeois & tous autres de quelque qualité ou condition qu'ils soient, qu'ils ayent à se retirer promptement de la communication & societé dudict Mareschal d'Ancre & de ses adherens, pour servir le Roy & l'Estat avec nous...<sup>23</sup>

The special care that the malcontent princes took to deliver their pamphlets to certain individuals also gives clues to the pamphlets' primary audience. The future cardinal-duc de Richelieu and *conseiller d'État* Robert Arnauld d'Andilly both recorded in their memoirs that one day after Condé delivered his manifesto to Marie de Médicis on 21 February 1614, René de Cumont, sieur de Fiefbrun delivered packages each containing a written cover letter from the prince and a printed version of the prince's manifesto to the *Parlement de Paris* and the princes, *duc et pairs, officiers de la couronne*, cardinals and statesmen present in the capital.<sup>24</sup> *Sécretaire d'État* Paul Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain and François du Val, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil recounted in their own memoirs that other retainers of Condé had delivered similar packages to the dignitaries and *parlements* in the provinces.<sup>25</sup> This practice was repeated in the rebellion of 1615 and presumably in the rebellions of 1616 and 1617 as well. The *Mercure François*, the state-sponsored annals, reported that in August 1615

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<sup>21</sup> *Declaration et Protestation des Princes, Ducs, Pairs, Officiers de la Couronne... Contre la conjuration & tyrannie du Mareschal d'Ancre, & de ses adherens*. (S.l.: s.n., 1617), pp. 27-28, British Library 07761560, <[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=q4dmAAAACAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=q4dmAAAACAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false)>.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>24</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 277; *Andilly*, p. 8; *Mercure François*, t.3(3), p. 236.

<sup>25</sup> *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 38; *Fontenay-Mareuil*, I, p. 236.

Le sieur de Marcognet Gentil-homme de M. le Prince [de Condé] apporta ce Manifeste au Roy, avec une Lettre, dans laquelle il le supplioit de trouver bon, qu'il l'envoyast à toutes les Cours de Parlement, & autres corps notables du Royaume, & tous les Princes & Estats alliez de la Couronne de France, afin que chacun peust cognoistre à quoy tendoient ses actions. ... Il envoya aussi ce Manifeste à tous les Princes, Ducs, Pairs de France, & Officiers de la Couronne, avec chacun une Lettre presque de mesme teneur.<sup>26</sup>

Fontenay-Mareuil likewise observed that Condé 'envoya partout des copies [of his manifesto of August 1615], et principalement à l'assemblée des Huguenots tenus à Grenoble et aux Rochellois, les conviant de s'unir avec luy pour empescher les mariages'.<sup>27</sup>

The malcontent princes also made a special effort to deliver their pamphlets to *maires* and *échevins* of the kingdom's fortified towns. Having copied into his memoir Condé's printed response (of 14 October 1615) to the royal edict which declared the prince and his adherents guilty of *lèse-majesté*, the *procureur général* of the *Parlement de Paris*, Mathieu Molé, thereupon noted that he had received his copy of Condé's response from an *échevin* of Troyes.<sup>28</sup> Just a month before, Molé was informed by Pierre Ayrault, the *maire* of Angers, that

il se trouva un paquet au messager de Paris, qui arrive ce même jour toutes les semaines en cette ville; l'adresse duquel étoit faite: *Aux maire et échevins de cette ville*, lequel m'ayant été apporté et l'ayant ouvert en présence d'aucuns des échevins de cette ville, il ne s'y trouva aucune lettre, ains seulement deux copies de l'écrit imprimé que je vous envoie, qui je crois aura été envoyé par toutes les provinces...<sup>29</sup>

Ayrault's letter above revealed that in addition to relying on their henchmen, the princes were using the official postal service between Paris and the provincial towns to deliver

<sup>26</sup> *Mercurie François*, t.4(1), pp. 188-189.

<sup>27</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, I, p. 289.

<sup>28</sup> *Molé*, I, p. 102. There are currently no known surviving copies of Condé's open response of 14 October 1615, but Molé's memoir and an eighteenth-century *recueil* of documents relating to the troubles of the 1610s confirmed the existence of this pamphlet; see: *Ibid.*, pp. 99-102; *Recueil de pièces concernant l'histoire de Louis XIII. Depuis l'an 1610 jusqu'en l'année 1617*. (Paris: François Montalant, 1716), pp. 329-332.

<sup>29</sup> *Molé*, I, pp. 97n-98n.



pamphlets to their target audience. This meant that the princes' pamphlets would arrive at these towns alongside the government's directives!

Given that the government had to refute the princes' accusations, it was only natural that its pamphlets should target the individuals or institutions to whom or to which the princes had delivered their 'seditious' tracts. In other words, the government's pamphlets also targeted the members of the political nation. Marie de Médicis's correspondence in 1614 revealed that she had specifically dispatched printed copies of her response to Condé's manifesto to Jacques-Davy, cardinal du Perron and archbishop of Sens and the *échevins* of Castres.<sup>30</sup> The journal of Jean Louvet, a *clerc* in the *siège présidial* of Angers, recorded the constant streams of packages arriving in Angers during the rebellions of 1614-17 containing the government's written instructions and printed letters and edicts.<sup>31</sup> The printed edicts issued at the start of the rebellions of 1615, 1616 and 1617, it is important to note, contained more than just the government's pronouncements against the rebels. In sharp contrast to the run-of-the-mill decrees on administrative matters, these edicts incorporated detailed refutations of the princes' allegations and justificatory expositions of the government's retaliation.<sup>32</sup> They were intended to serve as the government's official response to the princes' open letters and manifestos. Richelieu's correspondence in 1617 revealed that printed copies of these edicts had also been enclosed within the royal council's letters to other members of the political nation such as Philippe de Béthune, extraordinary ambassador to the Italian states, Charles de Valois, comte d'Auvergne and commander of the royal army currently in the Île-de-France, and Charles de Blanchefort, marquis de Créqui and son-in-law of the *lieutenant-général* of Dauphiné, the *maréchal de Lesdiguières*.<sup>33</sup> The printed copies were

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<sup>30</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 59; BnF, Clairambault 364, fol. 54r: Lettre of Lestang [of Castres] to Marie de Médicis, 1 Apr. 1614.

<sup>31</sup> Jehan Louvet, *Journal ou récit véritable de tout ce qui est advenu digne de mémoire tant en la ville d'Angers, pays d'Anjou et autres lieux*, transcribed in *Revue de l'Anjou et de Maine et Loire* (Angers, 1855), t. I, p. 53, 55, 146, 149, 174, 179, 186.

<sup>32</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre le Prince de Condé, & ceux qui l'assistent*. (Lyon: Nicolas Jullieron, 1615), BnF F-46927(27); *Declaration de la volonté du Roy, sur la detention de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé en son Chasteau du Louvre*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1616), BnF F-46932(13); *Declaration du Roy, contre Monsieur le Duc de Nevers, & tous ceux qui l'assistent*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), BnF F-46934(1); *Declaration du Roy contre les Ducs de Vendosme, de Mayenne, Mareschal de Buillon, Marquis de Cauxres, le President le Jay, & tous ceux qui les assistent*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), BnF F-46934(8); *Declaration du Roy sur le subject des nouveaux remuements de son Royaume*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), BnF F-46934(16).

<sup>33</sup> *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CLXXIV, p. 264: Richelieu à Philippe de Béthune, 21 Jan. 1617; *Ibid.*, t.I, CCXV, p.320: Richelieu à comte d'Auvergne, 23 Feb. 1617; *Ibid.*, t.I, CCLXXX, p. 384: Richelieu à Charles II de Créqui, 12 Mar. 1617.

also sent to Méry de Vic, a deputy at the ongoing Huguenot provincial assembly at Figeac, and Pierre Brochard de Champigny, *intendant* of *Poitou*.<sup>34</sup>

Having said that, not every pamphlet printed during the rebellions was marked for ‘special delivery’. Pamphlets in the forms of anonymous discourses, satirical tracts, impudent verses, fawning panegyrics and news reports were more likely to be sold or handed out on the streets. However, that is not to say that manifestos, open letters and royal declarations were not peddled or given away as well. Considering that only one or two copies of these items of literature were delivered directly to their target audience, presumably with the expectation that they be read out before an assembly or be shared among the recipient’s colleagues and companions, those who wished to obtain their own copies for reference had to obtain them from the streets.

The locations where the anonymous discourses, satirical tracts, panegyrics, verses and news report were sold or given away suggest that their primary end-users were once again the members of the political nation. French publishers and booksellers in this period prudently established their workshops and boutiques near to their main clientele. In Paris, the mecca for French publishing and pamphleteering, the book trade was traditionally concentrated in the rue Saint-Jacques to facilitate the sale of books to the rectors, masters and students of the University of Paris situated just a stone’s throw away. Such individuals, however, bought many political pamphlets in addition to scholarly books. In fact, their custom was so frequent and lucrative that unlicensed publishers and booksellers, as the legal records had shown, chose time and time again to risk persecution and fines by erecting makeshift stalls within the university’s compounds to sell pamphlets.<sup>35</sup>

But the nucleus of the Parisian pamphlet trade was undoubtedly the Palais de Justice on the Île de la Cité. In the Palais courtyard, ten nominated colporteurs would ‘line up in the order of their nomination by the side of the *Grand-salle* and a tree known as the *May du Palais*, or by the side of the *Sainte-Chapelle* and the *Chancellerie*, alternating sides each week’ to sell

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, t.I, CCXXVI, p. 337: Richelieu à Mery de Vic, Mar. 1617; *Ibid.*, t.I, CCXLIII, p. 350: Richelieu à Pierre Brochard de Champigny, 7 Mar. 1617.

<sup>35</sup> *Factum, pour les Syndic & Gardes des Marchands Libraires, Imprimeurs & Relieurs de cette ville de Paris, Intimez, Contre Fleury Bourriquant, Nicolas Rousset, David Gilles, & consorts, Appelez.* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), pp. 1-2, BnF 4-FM-25042; *Recueil des statuts et réglemens des marchands libraires, imprimeurs, & relieurs de la ville de Paris* (Paris: François Julliot, 1620), p. 8, BnF F-13019.

almanacs, edicts and ordinances.<sup>36</sup> And in the *Grand-salle* of the Palais, or along the *galerie des merciers* and the *galerie des prisonniers* leading to the *Chancellerie* and the *Conciergerie* respectively, there would be many stalls selling both scholarly tomes and ephemeral pamphlets. A sizeable number of these bookstalls were actually the subsidiary stalls of the *imprimeurs* and *libraires* on rue Saint-Jacques and the temporary booths of fly-by-night vendors all looking for a slice of the action.<sup>37</sup> Not far from the Palais de Justice, many modest booksellers and *colporteurs* would also gather on the Pont Neuf, Pont Saint-Michel, Pont au Change, Pont Marchand and Pont Notre-Dame to sell or hand out pamphlets. This was especially true of the Pont Saint-Michel and Pont Neuf.<sup>38</sup>

The Parisian pamphlet trade and distribution, one could argue, centred on the Palais de Justice and the *ponts* connecting the Île de la Cité to the left and right banks because these were the places the pamphlets' intended customers and readers frequented. The Palais was not only located within walking distance of the *Louvre*, the *Châtelet* and the *Hôtel de Ville*, it was the seat of the *Parlement de Paris*, the *Chancellerie*, the *Chambre des comptes*, the *Cour des monnaies* and the *Cour des aides*. The Palais was consequently the administrative and judicial hub of Paris and France, a place where *conseillers d'État*, *secrétaires du roi* and *maîtres des requêtes* from the Louvre, members of the royal and grandee households, *présidents*, *procureurs*, *avocats* and *clercs* of the sovereign courts, and *prévôts* and *officiers* of the *Châtelet* and *Hôtel de Ville* congregated to exchange information and conduct business.<sup>39</sup> Every working day, the Pont au Change, Pont Marchand and Pont Notre-Dame provided officeholders in the Palais access to and from the *Châtelet* and *Hôtel de Ville*, as well as to and from their residences in the *quartier du Temple*. Indeed, the *quartier du Temple* housed nearly a quarter of the *secrétaires du roi* and members of the *Parlement*, *Chambre des comptes* and other sovereign courts.<sup>40</sup> Meanwhile, the right-half of the Pont Neuf allowed officeholders access to and from the Louvre, and to and from the *quartiers de Saint-Honoré*, *des Saints-Innocents* and *de Saint-Germain de l'Auxerrois*, which a decent number of them called home.<sup>41</sup> The left half of the Pont Neuf along with the Pont Saint-Michel connected the Palais to the *quartier de Saint-Séverin*, where 29% of the *parlementaires*, 40% of the capital's *avocats*, 14% of the members of *Chambres des*

<sup>36</sup> Tom Hamilton, *Pierre de L'Estoile and his World in the Wars of Religion* (Oxford, 2017), pp. 47-48.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 49; Henri-Jean Martin, *The French Book: Religion, Absolutism, and Readership, 1585-1715*, trans. Paul Saenger & Nadine Saenger (Baltimore, MD, 1996), p. 7.


<sup>38</sup> Henri-Jean Martin, *Livre, Pouvoirs et Société à Paris au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle* (Geneva, 1999), pp. 356-358.

<sup>39</sup> Hamilton, *Pierre de L'Estoile*, pp. 47-68.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Descimon, 'Paris on the eve of Saint Bartholomew: taxation, privilege and social geography' in Benedict (ed.), *Cities and Social Change*, p. 96.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95, 100.

*comptes* and 18% of the *notaires* in the *Châtelet* lived.<sup>42</sup> On certain days, the members of the *Parlement de Paris* and *Chambre des comptes* also had to traverse these two bridges to reach the *Couvent des Grand Augustins*, where their courts would assemble (see figs. 2.2 and 2.3).




**Fig. 2.2**  
**Pertinent places of**  
**the Parisian**  
**pamphlet trade**  
**(Merian Map of**  
**Paris, 1615)**

- |                      |                           |                                 |
|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Rue Saint-Jacques | 6. Pont Notre-Dame        | 11. Hôtel de Ville              |
| 2. Île de la Cité    | 7. Pont au Change         | 12. Châtelet                    |
| 3. Palais de Justice | 8. Pont Marchand          | 13. Cathédrale Notre-Dame       |
| 4. Pont Neuf         | 9. Château du Louvre      | 14. Couvent des Grand-Augustins |
| 5. Pont Saint-Michel | 10. Château des Tuileries |                                 |

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 93-96, 100.



**Fig. 2.3**  
**Quartiers of**  
**Paris in**  
**1614-17**

- |                                  |                             |                      |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Saint-Honoré                  | 7. Sepulcre                 | 13. Saint-Antoine    |
| 2. Saint-Eustache                | 8. Saint-Esprit             | 14. Notre-Dame       |
| 3. Saint-Jacques de l'Hôpital    | 9. Saint-Gervais            | 15. Sainte-Geneviève |
| 4. Saint-Germain de l'Auxerrois  | 10. Saint-Martin des Champs | 16. Saint-Séverin    |
| 5. Saints-Innocents              | 11. Temple                  |                      |
| 6. Saint-Jacques de la Boucherie | 12. Saint-Jean en Grève     |                      |

The situation in Paris was not unique. The booksellers and *colporteurs* in the provincial cities also concentrated around the cities' administrative and judicial centre. In Rouen and Grenoble, for example, the majority of the cities' booksellers and *colporteurs* congregated in the courtyards of the Palais de Justice, seats of the *Parlements* of Rouen and Grenoble and the *Chambres des comptes* of Normandie and of Dauphiné.<sup>43</sup> 'Publishing strategies', as Roger Chartier has argued, 'depend largely upon the extent and the character of the public that constitutes the bookmaker's potential clientele at any given moment in history. The decision to print a particular text and the choice of format and press run respond primarily to the prospective market—or at least to the publisher's idea, accurate or inaccurate, of that market.'<sup>44</sup> Such rational business calculation, one could argue, extends to the publishers or booksellers' places of operations. Publishers and booksellers marketed books and pamphlets within and around the compounds of the various Palais de Justice because the main consumers of books and pamphlets were the literate and politically-engaged officeholders

<sup>43</sup> Martin, *French Book*, pp. 60-68.

<sup>44</sup> Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France*, trans. By Lydia G. Cochrane (Princeton, NJ, 1987), p. 145.

working or gathering in these Palais. Going to where one's customers are and giving these customers what they want was the mantra of businesses back then as it is now.

### **The Secondary Audience**

There is, however, one more reason to believe that the predominant customers and readers of political pamphlets in the 1610s were the members of the political nation: a large majority of the non-members, that is, merchants, artisans and peasants, could neither read nor afford pamphlets. It would be wrong to correlate the peaks of pamphlet production in 1588-92, 1614-20 and 1648-53 with increasing literacy rates and larger reading population, for the sharp decline and later stagnation of the book trade in eighteenth-century France coincided with a period of unmistakable and considerable rise in the kingdom's literacy rates.<sup>45</sup> Even though scholars might have disagreed on the methods of determining literacy, their respective findings nevertheless concur that literacy rates in seventeenth-century France were extremely low. For a start, 85% of the kingdom's population lived in one of the 30,000 rural and remote villages with less than 2,000 inhabitants. At the end of the sixteenth century, literacy rates in the countryside still hovered between 1% (Bretagne and Provence) and 10% (Languedoc).<sup>46</sup> Outside the kingdom's northern, north-eastern and central provinces, French was not even the main language. The peasants of Bretagne read or spoke Breton, those of the Dauphiné and the Lyonnais, Arpitan, and those of southern Guyenne, Languedoc and Provence, Occitan. And nearly all of the political pamphlets in question were published in French.

Literacy rates in the cities and towns where the remaining 15% of the kingdom's population resided were considerably higher, though still relatively modest compared to the Low Countries and northern Italian states: around 30% for men and 18% for women.<sup>47</sup> Nonetheless, a large majority of town dwellers did have enough disposable income to purchase pamphlets. In this period, wage-earning artisans, agricultural workers, menial labourers, temporary workers, the unemployed and vagrants made up 70% to 85% of the household heads in large cities with sovereign courts.<sup>48</sup> This percentage was presumably

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<sup>45</sup> R. A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education 1500-1800* (2nd ed. Harlow, 2002), p. 126.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 147-150; Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (London, 1975), p. 195.

<sup>47</sup> Houston, *Literacy*, p. 150; Harvey J. Graff, *The Legacies of Literacy* (Bloomington, IN, 1987), p. 192.

<sup>48</sup> William Beik, *A Social and Cultural History of Early Modern France* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 127-128; Idem, *Urban Protest*, pp. 21-22; James R. Farr, *Hands of Honor: Artisans and Their World in Dijon, 1550-1650* (Ithaca, NY, 1988),

higher in the small- and medium-size commercial or agricultural towns. A master plasterer made an average of 12 *sous* a day; a painter, 10, a mason, 9; a cooper, 7; a shoemaker 6.5; and a tailor, 4.5. A carpenter, joiner or textile worker would not make more than 14 *sous* each day. And considering that the spouses and children (say, 2.5) would frequently contribute an additional 9 to 12 *sous* through their handiwork and temporary jobs, the average total household income of an artisan or labourer family of four or five members in seventeenth-century France was 13.5 to 26 *sous*.<sup>49</sup>

But during a period of moderate prices, such a family needed 6 *sous* per day just for bread. The remaining income had to be set aside for rent and heating fuel, not to mention tithes and *tailles*. If there were still some income left for some, it would often be used to buy wine and vegetables to enrich the family's diet (a pound of peas or broad beans cost 5 and 4 *sous* respectively), or essential household items such as linens, pewters and furniture.<sup>50</sup> It has been estimated that an average artisan or labourer family of four or five needed 20 *sous* a day for bare necessities like food, clothes, shoes and lodgings.<sup>51</sup> As such, a well-off French artisan or labourer family made just enough for provisions in an average year, and for mere subsistence in a bad one. Meanwhile, its lower-paid counterpart would scrape through in an average year and starve to death during a harvest failure and price inflation.<sup>52</sup> A pamphlet costing between three and ten *sous* in this period might be cheap for a royal officeholder, a clergyman or an *avocat*, it was nevertheless a luxury which 70% to 85% of a town or a city's population could ill-afford.<sup>53</sup> If the wealthier merchant or craftsman families ever had any money for books, existing studies have shown, they were more likely to invest it in devotional literature (such as the books of hours, bibles, prayer books or catechisms), schoolbooks for their children or reference books for their professions rather than ephemeral print.<sup>54</sup>

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pp. 77-81; Jonathan Dewald 'Social groups and cultural practices' in Mack Holt (ed.), *Renaissance and Reformation France* (Oxford, 2002), p. 43; Richard Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle: Lyon et ses marchands* (Paris, 1971), pp. 357-404.

<sup>49</sup> Farr, *Hands of Honor*, p. 106.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 104-121.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>52</sup> Beik, *Social and Cultural History*, p. 123.

<sup>53</sup> For the prices of pamphlets, see: Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 57; Hamilton, *Pierre de L'Estoile*, p. 168.

<sup>54</sup> Albert Labarre, *Le Livre dans la vie amiénois du seizième siècle. L'Enseignement des inventaires après décès 1503-1576* (Paris, 1971); Henri-Jean Martin and Micheline Lecocq, *Livres et lecteurs à Grenoble. Les Registres du libraire Nicholas (1645-1668)* (Geneva, 1977), I, pp. 137-265; Charter, *Cultural Uses of Print*, pp. 146-151.

However, this is not to say that the illiterate and humble town dwellers in the 1610s had no access to the contents of political pamphlets. Although they could not read or afford these pamphlets, they had the advantage of living in towns where physical and social structures ensured frequent contact between them and officeholding elites who could. Constrained by the limits of their protective walls, the inhabitants of early modern French cities were packed like sardines.<sup>55</sup> The elites and non-elites lived in the same buildings, streets and neighbourhoods because there was little room for social segregation. Many non-elites also tended to live close to their places of work or operate near their customers. This meant that servants habitually lived next to the *bôtels* of noblemen, clergymen and *parlementaires*; and apprentices and labourers, the workshops of wealthy merchants. Small shop-owners and artisans frequently set up their stalls and workshops close to the residence and workplace of the rich and distinguished.<sup>56</sup>

As neighbours, the elites and non-elites often mediated each other's quarrels and helped each other through the snags of life.<sup>57</sup> They attended the same parish churches and performed militia duties together. They shopped at the same marketplace, at the same stalls and workshops manned by the same shop-owners and artisans. They also rubbed shoulders in the workplace, as masters and servants and as employers and employees. Many elite inhabitants even routinely served as the godparents of non-elites' children.<sup>58</sup> In Dijon between 1578 and 1630, for instance, 38% of the winegrowers' children had a godfather or a godmother who was an *avocat* or a member of the *Parlement* of Dijon, the *Chambre des comptes* of Bourgogne or the *Hôtel de ville*, or their spouse.<sup>59</sup> This close proximity and mutual dependency between the elites and the non-elites gave both endless opportunities to interact with one another. Every social, commercial or professional interaction became a chance for the humbles and illiterates to learn about the latest newsworthy developments and individuals at court or in their town. It was a chance for them to extract some titbits about the numerous pamphlets which they had seen circulating around town.

The humble and illiterates of seventeenth-century France had the added privilege of living in a society which was still predominantly an oral culture. Information spread most commonly and rapidly by word of mouth. It circulated indiscriminately and unintentionally

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<sup>55</sup> Benedict, 'French cities', p. 12.

<sup>56</sup> Dewald 'Social groups', p. 43.

<sup>57</sup> Benedict, 'French cities', p. 17.

<sup>58</sup> Dewald 'Social groups', p. 43.

<sup>59</sup> Mack Holt, 'Popular and Elite Politics in Seventeenth-Century Dijon', *Historical Reflections* 27 (2001), p. 332.



in the cramped housing conditions and the crowded and narrow streets (measuring no more than 12-15 feet across) of early modern French towns. Besides, reading was done aloud and communally in this period. Elites and non-elites regularly had the habit of versifying news and gossips and singing them in public. Booksellers and *colporteurs* would advertise the news ballads and satirical verses in stock with an unabashed public performance. To inform oneself of the contents of the latest political pamphlets, one only had to go to the workshops, the marketplace and the courtyard of the Palais de Justice. Once at these places, one only had to listen in on the public readings, discussions and singings, or eavesdrop on the casual conversations struck up between people as they transacted business or socialised.<sup>60</sup>

Or alternatively, one could head to the inns and taverns where the townsmen and women, as well as travellers, of all social classes came to unwind and mingle after a hard day's work. Here, as alcohol loosened tongues, patrons would gossip about the notables at court or in town, exchange news and rumours, sing ballads and debate the political or religious issues of the day.<sup>61</sup> Following Henri IV's assassination in May 1610, for example, there was talk in taverns that 'the king had two wives and that they were not legitimate', 'that the children of the king were illegitimate' or 'that the prince of Condé had gone to Spain and that he would come back with fifty thousand men, claiming to be king'.<sup>62</sup> At these inns and taverns, patrons would also read out loud the pamphlets that some patrons had brought, or those that the tavern owners had placed on their counters as a way to augment the patrons' sociability, discussion and custom.<sup>63</sup>

But if the drunken revelries of inns and taverns were too much for one to bear, one could make a beeline for the public square before the *hôtel de ville* or one of the town's busiest junctions, where one could hear the public and spectacular pronouncements of the crown or the municipal government's decrees against the malcontent princes. During the rebellion of 1617, for instance, Joseph Guillaudeau, sieur de Beaupréau, an *avocat* in the *siège présidial* of La Rochelle, recorded in his journal that 'Le lundy 6<sup>e</sup> dudit mois [January] et an, la déclaration du roy par laquelle M. de Nevers est déclaré criminel de lèze-majesté a esté lue en pleine

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<sup>60</sup> Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News* (New Haven, CT, 2014), pp. 121-129.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>62</sup> Quoted in Diane Roussel, "Several Fanatics Who Talked Only of Killing Kings': Conspirators and Regicides before the Parlement de Paris in the Wake of the Assassination of Henri IV, 1610", *French History* 30 (2016), pp. 474-475.

<sup>63</sup> Pettegree, *Invention of News*, pp. 119, 131-133.

audience, ce requérant le procureur du roy'.<sup>64</sup> As mentioned above, these royal decrees against the princes contained a meticulous refutation of the princes' allegations and lengthy justification of the crown's reprisal. And following their public pronouncements, these decrees would be 'publiée et affichée' outside the *hôtel de ville* and 'par les quarfours' of the town.<sup>65</sup> Those who could not read could listen in on the impromptu reading parties congregating at these places.

It therefore begged the question why the government and the malcontent princes alike chose to target their pamphlets exclusively at the members of the political nation and not concurrently at the lower classes, when the latter had indirect access to the political discourse and could constitute a potent political force in the form of a popular riot or rebellion. There were two possible explanations: firstly, the government and the malcontent princes of the 1610s did not have the historians' benefit of hindsight to detect the political potential of early French artisans and labourers. On the contrary, they were products of their time, brought up to believe that the lower classes were incapable of independent and profound political thought, born to follow orders and had no business in knowing, discussing and interfering in public affairs. Particularly after the events of 1562-98, they had come to associate populist urban movements with 'Swiss-style' communalism and social radicalism which, they deemed, could undermine and overturn the traditional order.<sup>66</sup>

Secondly, the government and the princes probably deemed selective targeting to be the most efficient and effective method to secure the towns during a rebellion. Unlike their social inferiors, administrative and judicial elites possessed the keys to the town's gates and arsenals. They had the personal resources and direct control over a town's tax revenues which could be pledged to a cause. They already wielded certain powers to influence the actions of the masses, such as the ability to assemble the militia, enact laws and prosecute and punish non-sympathisers. At the same time, their extensive connections with other members of the town's elite, be it familial, friendship or political ties, meant that they could potentially convince other members of the municipal elite to join. Moreover, by virtue of their birth, office, reputation, wealth and patronage, these individuals were esteemed amongst the lower classes of their community. They were seen by the latter to be natural

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<sup>64</sup> 'Diaire de Joseph Guillaudeau sieur de Beaupréau (1584-1643)' in *Archives historiques de la Saintonge et de l'Aunis* XXXVIII (Paris, 1908), p. 141.

<sup>65</sup> Louvet, *Journal*, I, p. 155.

<sup>66</sup> Stuart Carroll, "'Nager entre deux eaux": The Princes and the Ambiguities of French Protestantism', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 44 (2013), pp. 1015-1020.

leaders, whose opinions they trusted and whose leadership they looked to inform their actions. Seen in this light, targeting one's pamphlets at the members of the political nation made sense, for the endorsement of these members entailed the widest possible support of their colleagues and the lower classes. When time was of the essence, there was no quicker way to control a town's defences and marshal its inhabitants than to win over these influential individuals.

### **Printed Pandemonium**

The number of pamphlets churned out by the presses of the princes and the government to win over the members of the political nation was truly astonishing. Using the Universal Short Title Catalogue's (USTC) comprehensive survey of the books published between the invention of the printing press and 1650, this study has counted at least 1,589 separate editions of pamphlets published during the four rebellions between 1614 and 1617, excluding the *États généraux*. 425 editions were published in the rebellion of February – May 1614; 886 editions, in the rebellion of August 1615 – May 1616; and 278 editions in the rebellions of September 1616 – April 1617. Another 277 editions would be published immediately after the assassination of Concini.<sup>67</sup> Needless to say, such numbers denote only the editions which have survived; there might well be several titles and editions which did not. But considering that a large majority of the known editions have survive in multiple copies, one can safely assume that the survival rate of the pamphlets in these conflicts were relatively high. One can therefore take these numbers to be a fairly accurate representation of the pamphleteering landscape in this period.

The print runs of these editions are more difficult to determine. The traditional estimate of 800 to 1,000 copies per edition seems more likely to be true of books like bibles, patristics writings, Latin and Greek classics, and legal, medical and religious treaties. To squeeze out a profit, a publisher of these decent-sized works had to spread his fixed expenses – rent, labour, text composition and woodcuts – over a large number of copies in order to reduce the cost per unit below a competitive sale price.<sup>68</sup> But the economics of ephemeral pamphlets was different. The fixed expenses for producing these works were

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<sup>67</sup> These were of c

<sup>68</sup> Martin, *French Book*, p. 3.

significantly lower, for these works were shorter and required less composition and press time. More importantly, as with the *mémoires judiciaires* and academic disputations, political pamphlets were frequently commissioned by, paid for by and delivered to a single customer, that was, a prince, a minister or one of their aides and sympathisers. And because his overheads and profits had already been guaranteed by this one customer, the publisher could afford to print the pamphlets in much lower quantities. The *mémoires judiciaires* and academic disputations in this period were commonly published in a few dozen copies.<sup>69</sup> When César de Plaix, an *avocat* in the *Parlement de Paris*, decided to publish his soon-to-be (in)famous tract, *Anticoton, ou Refutation de la Lettre declaratoire du pere Cotton*, in 1610 excusing the Jesuits of Henri IV's assassination, he ordered only 200 copies. And after Plaix had finished distributing the copies 'everywhere he went each day', he placed an order for another 400 copies.<sup>70</sup> In other words, Plaix published two editions of the *Anticoton* with an average of print run of 300 copies per edition.<sup>71</sup> It is therefore safer to assume that most of the pertinent pamphlets were produced in the region of 200 to 500 copies, while momentous tracts such as the princes' open letters and manifestos or the government's responses and edicts could be printed at closer to 800 to 1,000 copies as commonly assumed.

Regardless of their print run, almost every edition of the pamphlets published during the rebellions of 1614-17 was published in the vernacular to maximise its reach. Almost every edition of these pamphlets was also published in compact octavo format to provide its publisher, printer, seller and reader the benefits of lower costs, portability or concealability. These pamphlets varied by genre, however. One could categorise them according to their titles, contents and numerical significance into manifestos, open letters, edicts, panegyrics, verses and news reports. Pamphlets offering unsolicited *avis*, *avertissements*, *harangues*, *discours*, *plaintes*, *remonstrance* and *supplications* about some controversial issues or personnel could be classed as discourses. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these categories are inherently artificial and subjective and are imposed for the sole purposes of analysis and comparison. There were many pamphlets which did not fall neatly into these categories. Condé's manifesto of February 1614, for instance, was published in the form of an open letter to

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<sup>69</sup> Saskia Limbach, 'Advertising Medical Studies in Sixteenth-Century Basel: Function and Use of Academic Disputations' in Andrew Pettegree (ed.), *Broadsheets: Single-Sheet Publishing in the First Age of Print* (Leiden, 2017), p. 377.

<sup>70</sup> For the print run of Plaix's *Anticoton*, see Antoine Arnauld, *A Nosseigneurs de Parlement* (S.l.: s.n. 1615), pp. 1-2, BnF 8-LN-33960.

<sup>71</sup> César de Plaix, *Anticoton, ou Refutation de la Lettre declaratoire du pere Cotton* (S.l.: s.n., 1610), BnF 8-LD4-45. Due to its timely and inflammatory content, Plaix's tract became popular and was republished another 13 times that year.

Marie de Médicis. The government's official responses to the princes' manifestos in 1615, 1616 and 1617 were published in the form of a royal declaration, which one would normally associate with edicts. The so-called discourses also have sizeable chunks of panegyrics or satirical verses interwoven into them.

**Table 2.1: Rebellion of 1614: Genre of Pamphlets**

|  | <b>No. of editions</b> | <b>% of total</b> |
|--|------------------------|-------------------|
| Manifestos, official responses and open letters  | 110                    | 25.9%             |
| Argumentative and satirical discourses or verses | 215                    | 50.6%             |
| Edicts and ordinances                            | 53                     | 12.5%             |
| Celebratory tracts (of peace and royal entries)  | 47                     | 11.1%             |
| <b>Total</b>                                     | <b>425</b>             | <b>100%</b>       |

**Table 2.2: Rebellion of 1615: Genre of Pamphlets**

|   | <b>No. of editions</b> | <b>% of total</b> |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|
| Manifestos, official responses and open letters     | 160                    | 18.1%             |
| Argumentative discourses                            | 368                    | 41.5%             |
| Edicts and ordinances                               | 141                    | 15.9%             |
| News reports  | 160                    | 18.1%             |
| Celebratory tracts (of royal marriages and entries) | 57                     | 6.4%              |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>886</b>             | <b>100%</b>       |

**Table 2.3: Rebellions of 1616-17: Genre of Pamphlets**

|   | <b>No. of editions</b> | <b>% of total</b> |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|
| Manifestos, official responses and open letters | 67                     | 24.1%             |
| Argumentative discourses                        | 77                     | 27.7%             |
| Edicts and ordinances                           | 103                    | 37.1%             |
| News reports                                    | 31                     | 11.2%             |
| <b>Total</b>                                    | <b>278</b>             | <b>100%</b>       |

The pamphlets varied in length according to their genres. Princes' manifestos and official responses were often 16-32 pages long, and open letters, 8. Governmental edicts ranged from 8 to 32 pages, depending on its subject matter. Satirical verses tend to be 8 pages long; news reports, 8-12; and panegyrics, 16-24. Some discourses could be as long as 64 or even 80 pages, though a large majority of them hovered around 8-24 pages.

Classifying these pamphlets according to their political stance proves to be challenging. Since it is impossible to peruse every pamphlet within the time frame of doctoral research, one is forced to classify the pamphlets according to their titles. But in doing so, one still faces the difficulty of equivocal titles such as *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (1615), *Songe* (1616) or *Advis de Colin a Margot, ou Coq a l'Asne sur le Temps present* (1617). More worryingly, one risks being tricked by the ironic titles of some satirical pamphlets. To resolve and minimise such difficulties and risks, this study has taken care to examine every pamphlet with ambiguous or suspicious titles before classifying them. Having said that, the content of some pamphlets can itself be problematic. Some discourses, for example, were equally critical of the government's policies and the prince's recourse to arms to force their reversal. The edicts of pacification evinced the government's inability to discipline the rebellious princes and its humiliating capitulation to the princes' excessive demands, even though it was the government which published these documents. In such cases, on the basis of the discourses' opposition to the princes' rebellions and on the grounds that the government was obliged by the terms of their peace treaty with the princes to publish the edicts of pacification, this study would consider those discourses to be pro-government and those edicts, pro-princes.<sup>72</sup>

One must therefore bear in mind that the figures in Table 2.4 reflect these assumptions and are therefore informed estimates. They nonetheless help paint a clearer picture of the pamphleteering phenomena instigated by the rebellions of 1614-17. Laurent Bouchel, an *avocat* in the *Parlement de Paris*, was certainly not exaggerating when he noted in his journal in March 1614 that 'Plusieurs escrits, manifestes et libelles se publient tant de la part de la Royne Regente, que des Seigneurs retirez de la Cour'.<sup>73</sup> Pamphlets published by or in favour of Marie de Médicis and her government greatly outnumbered those published by or for the princes during the rebellion of 1614. This trend would continue into the rebellion of 1615-16 and of 1616-17. Still, the number of pro-princes pamphlets produced during each

<sup>72</sup> See chapter three for details of the princes' demands for the publication of edicts of pacification.

<sup>73</sup> BnF, Français 5528, fol. 50v: Journal historique de Laurent Bouchel, Mar. 1614.

rebellion was significant. It attested to the government's continuing inability to police the book trade. Owing to the limited size and resources of its law enforcement and censorship apparatus, the government could not protect itself from its detractors by clamping down on the writers, publishers, printers and vendors of seditious pamphlets. Nevertheless, one could argue that the impressive pamphlet output of Marie's government has still proven one thing: that the French crown had learnt its lessons from the Wars of Religion. The tragic example of Henri III had evidently taught the crown that it should never allow the damning pamphlets of its opponents to go unanswered. The Catholic press of the 1560s-70s and Henri IV's counter-Ligueur press in the 1580s-90s gave the crown examples of how it could overwhelm its detractors' pamphlets with its own, for the purpose of drowning out and swaying opinions which it could not silence.<sup>74</sup>

**Table 2.4: Political Stance of the Pamphlets**

|  | <b>Pro-Government</b> | <b>Pro-Princes</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| <b>First Rebellion</b><br>Feb. 1614 to May 1614              | 298<br>(70.1%)        | 127<br>(29.9%)     | <b>425</b>   |
| <b>Second Rebellion</b><br>Aug. 1615 to May 1616             | 615<br>(69.4%)        | 271<br>(30.6%)     | <b>886</b>   |
| <b>Third and Fourth Rebellions</b><br>Sep. 1616 to Apr. 1617 | 177<br>(63.7%)        | 101<br>(36.3%)     | <b>278</b>   |

The government's failure to crack down on seditious or unauthorised pamphlets should also in part be attributed to the anonymity of these pamphlets. 227 (53.4%), 421 (47.5%) and 94 (33.8%) of the pamphlets published in the rebellions of 1614, 1615-16 and 1616-17 respectively did not specify the name of their publisher. 185 (43.5%), 337 (38.0%) and 60 (21.6%) did not identify their place of publication. And even if they did, the given name and place of publication might not be real. Although 656 out of 1,589 pamphlets claimed to be printed in Paris, there are good reasons to believe that the actual number was lower. Early modern publishers were no strangers to using a fake place of publication to boost sales. During the Reformation, for example, German publishers would regularly appropriate the Wittenberg imprint as a way to make a killing out of Martin Luther's popularity. These publishers knew that customers would automatically perceive pamphlets

<sup>74</sup> Filippo de Vivo likewise argued that the government in Venice published extensively during political crises because it had to drown out opinions which it could not stop; see: Filippo de Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 228-232.

with Wittenberg imprints as more authentic and up-to-date, because Luther resided in and wrote from that city.<sup>75</sup> French publishers might have acted in a similar manner during the political upheavals of the 1610s. Those operating outside Paris could adopt the Parisian imprint to feign proximity to the source and the heat of the action – the Louvre. The Parisian imprint could also be used to fool the authorities into concentrating their attention and resources in Paris, and not its environs or the provinces, where some of the presses were really situated. Henri de Mesmes, the *lieutenant-civil* of the *Prévôté de Paris*, had to learn this the hard way. In his letter to Louis XIII on 18 September 1615, Henri meekly admitted that he had been sent on a wild goose chase:

Sire Je supplye treshumblement vostre Majesté me faire cet honneur de croire, que j'ay continuellement travaille, pour descouvrir quels sont les auteurs et imprimeurs de ces libelles, Mais quelque diligence que j'y aye peu apporter, je n'en ay peu descouvrir aucun, et je pense avoir advis certain qu'ilz sont imprimes hors d'icy, et puis qu'on les a porte en ceste ville pour en faire debit, voyant donq que je ne pouvois faire prendre les auteurs ou imprimeurs pour les condamner, comme j'ay faire par le passé, suivant la rigueur de vos ordonnances...<sup>76</sup>

Some publishers were not only claiming a fake place of publication, they were using fake names in their imprints. The 38 editions of pamphlets printed under the name of Jean Bourriquant in Paris between August 1615 and April 1617 were a hitherto unknown example. Although Jean and Fleury Bourriquant were definitely brothers and publishers in Paris, Jean did not print those 38 editions because he died in April or May 1614. Fleury could not have printed those pamphlets for Jean's son, Jean II, because no such person existed. Jean had no sons and was survived by three daughters, Geneviève, Madeleine and Nicole, and his wife, Geneviève Lefebvre.<sup>77</sup> There are therefore three possibilities: one, Jean and Fleury Bourriquant could have had another brother named Jean; two, Fleury Bourriquant and Jean's widow, Geneviève Lefebvre, had appropriated Jean's name and conceived this false imprint to publish seditious pamphlets; or three, one or several mischievous publishers had used a recently-deceased publisher's name to mask their identities and profit from the sale of illicit pamphlets.

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<sup>75</sup> Drew Thomas, *The Industry of Evangelism: Printing for the Reformation in Martin Luther's Wittenberg* (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2018), pp. 111-167.

<sup>76</sup> BnF, Dupuy 91, fol. 212r: Henri de Mesmes à Louis XIII, 18 Sep. 1615.

<sup>77</sup> AN, MC/ET/CIX/166, Inventaire 33, ff. 394r-397v: Inventaire après décès de Jean Bourriquant, vivant imprimeur à Paris, 31 May 1614.



The third possibility seems most likely, for it is difficult to see how the use of Jean's name could have provided Fleury and Geneviève sufficient cover. Given their close relationship to Jean, the use of Jean's name could only have directed the authorities' suspicions towards rather than away from Fleury and Geneviève. Furthermore, if Fleury really had a second brother also named Jean, why then did the production of this brother's printshop cease so suddenly after April 1617? The most probable answer is: this second brother did not exist. Production under 'Jean Bourriquant's' name ceased abruptly after April 1617 because Concini was dead, and Marie de Médicis, under house arrest. Printing pamphlets against the favourite or the queen mother's government was no longer a prohibited affair. On the contrary, it was very much encouraged as way to celebrate the change of regime, the beginning of Louis XIII's personal reign. The 277 editions of pamphlets published after 24 April 1617 gloating over Concini's death and lauding Louis XIII for his assassination, 71.8% of which were not anonymous, bore witness to the extent of these celebrations. Publishers stopped appropriating the late-Jean Bourriquant's name because there was simply no need to hide behind a false imprint anymore.

**Table 2.5: Claimed Place of Production**

|                                | First Rebellion<br>(Feb to May '14) |              | Second Rebellion<br>(Aug '15 to May '16) |              | Third and Fourth<br>Rebellions<br>(Sep '16 to Apr '17) |              |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|
|                                | Editions                            | %            | Editions                                 | %            | Editions   | %            |
| <b>Unknown</b>                 | <b>185</b>                          | <b>43.5%</b> | <b>337</b>                               | <b>38.0%</b> | <b>60</b>  | <b>21.6%</b> |
| <b>Paris</b>                   | <b>176</b>                          | <b>41.4%</b> | <b>370</b>                               | <b>41.8%</b> | <b>110</b>   | <b>39.6%</b> |
| <b>Lyon</b>                    | <b>17</b>                           | <b>4%</b>    | <b>39</b>                                | <b>4.4%</b>  | <b>24</b>  | <b>8.63%</b> |
| <b>Cities with a Parlement</b> | <b>28</b>                           | <b>6.59%</b> | <b>85</b>                                | <b>9.59%</b> | <b>52</b>  | <b>18.7%</b> |
| Aix-en-Provence                | -                                   | -            | 1  | 0.11%        | 7  | 2.25%        |
| Bordeaux                       | 14                                  | 3.3%         | 44                                       | 5.00%        | 12   | 4.32%        |
| Dijon                          | -                                   | -            | -  | -            | 2  | 0.72%        |
| Grenoble                       | -                                   | -            | 1  | 0.11%        | -  | -            |
| Pau                            | -                                   | -            | -  | -            | 2  | 0.72%        |
| Rennes                         | 2                                   | 0.47%        | 1  | 0.11%        | 2  | 0.72%        |
| Rouen                          | 9                                   | 2.11%        | 30                                       | 3.61%        | 24   | 8.63%        |
| Toulouse                       | 3                                   | 0.70%        | 8  | 0.90%        | 3  | 1.08%        |

|   |            |              |            |              |            |              |
|---|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|
| <b>Towns in or close to the Huguenot Region</b> | <b>9</b>   | <b>2.12%</b> | <b>34</b>  | <b>3.84%</b> | <b>19</b>  | <b>6.83%</b> |
| Agen  | -          | -            | -          | -            | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Angers  | 4          | 0.94%        | 2          | 0.23%        | 4          |              |
| Béziers   | 1          | 0.24%        | -          | -            | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Maillé  | -          | -            | -          | -            | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Montpellier                                     | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Nîmes   | 1          | 0.24%        | 3          | 0.34%        | -          | -            |
| Niort   | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | -          | -            |
| La Rochelle                                     | -          | -            | 5          | 0.56%        | -          | -            |
| Périgueux                                       | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        |            |              |
| Poitiers  | 2          | 0.47%        | 13         | 1.47%        | 9          | 3.24%        |
| Saint-Jean-d'Angély                             | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | -          | -            |
| Saintes   | -          | -            | -          | -            | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Saumur  | 1          | 0.24%        | 1          | 0.11%        | -          | -            |
| Sedan   | -          | -            | 6          | 0.68%        | 1          | 0.36%        |
|   |            |              |            |              |            |              |
| <b>Rest of the Towns</b>                        | <b>10</b>  | <b>2.35%</b> | <b>21</b>  | <b>2.37%</b> | <b>12</b>  | <b>4.32%</b> |
| Blois   | 1          | 0.24%        | -          | -            | -          | -            |
| Bourges   | 1          | 0.24%        | 1          | 0.11%        | -          | -            |
| Caen  | 2          | 0.47%        | 4          | 0.45%        | 2          | 0.72%        |
| Calais  | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | -          | -            |
| Fontenay-le-Comte                               | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | -          | -            |
| Limoges   | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Orléans   | -          | -            | 2          | 0.23%        | 1          | 0.36%        |
| Soissons  | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | 3          | 1.08%        |
| Tours   | 1          | 0.24%        | 2          | 0.23%        | -          | -            |
| Troyes  | 4          | 0.94%        | 6          | 0.68%        | 2          | 0.72%        |
| Reims   | 1          | 0.24%        | 1          | 0.11%        | 2          | 0.72%        |
| Vienne  | -          | -            | 1          | 0.11%        | 1          | 0.36%        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                    | <b>425</b> | <b>100%</b>  | <b>886</b> | <b>100%</b>  | <b>278</b> | <b>100%</b>  |

As with the publishers, an overwhelming number of the pamphleteers chose to remain anonymous. For the purpose of affecting objectivity, claiming the moral high ground or adding humour to their tracts, on top of concealing their identities, some pamphleteers would also adopt pseudonyms like Jacques Bonhomme (a term invented during the *Jacquerie* to denote a rebel peasant), Bon François or Maistre Guillaume (Henri IV's court jester) respectively. Needless to say, many publishers and pamphleteers alike chose to remain anonymous out of fear of the penalties which awaited those who had been caught. There were living examples: on 31 January 1614, Noel Leon Morgard was condemned to the galleys

for nine years for his recent almanac which prognosticated a civil war in France and the murders of a boy and his mother (read: Louis XIII and Marie de Médicis) by a man living in the Faubourg Saint-Germain (read: Condé, whose hôtel was situated there).<sup>78</sup> And in July 1614, Jean du Val, an *avocat* in the *Parlement de Paris*, was imprisoned in the *Châtelet* for ‘avoir este trouvé entre ses papiers quelque vers contre l’honneur de la Royné’. Du Val was so fearful of the punishments that lay ahead that he committed suicide in his cell.<sup>79</sup>

The publishers of political pamphlets were beset by the same risks of persecution. On 8 August 1615, *imprimeur* Jean Richer was fined 400 *livres* and banished from Paris and its environs for three years by the *Prévôte de Paris* for printing a *libelle* entitled *Remonstrance du clergé de France faite au Roy*.<sup>80</sup> Three months before, the *Prévôte* found *imprimeurs-libraires* or *imprimeurs-colporteurs* Thomas Ménard, Antoine du Brueil, Gillet le Veau, Antoine Champenois and Claude des Periers guilty of printing and selling *libelles diffamatoires*. It confiscated the stocks of these five publishers and ordered each of them to pay a fine of 80 *livres*. Ménard was eventually spared from the fine on the condition that he would snitch on the individual from whom he claimed to have bought the illicit pamphlets.<sup>81</sup> Ménard might indeed have told the truth, for according to *lieutenant civil* Henri de Mesmes’ investigation, the princes’ retainers had been showing up at the homes of *imprimeurs*, *libraires* and *colporteurs* and selling them stacks of pamphlets for next to nothing.<sup>82</sup>

As the case of Ménard has shown, the tentacles of the law did not spare those who were merely selling the pamphlets. The *Prévôte de Paris* sentenced Bernard Picard to be punished by whipping in July 1614 even though Picard’s father claimed that Georges Bellier, whose name could not be traced to any known editions and for whom Picard worked as an apprentice, was the one who had asked his son to sell some *libelles*.<sup>83</sup> Similarly in October 1615, *colporteur* Jacques Couette was sentenced to be whipped at the Pont Neuf for selling a pamphlet opposing the Spanish marriages, entitled *La Recontre de Henry le Grand au Roy, touchant le voyage d’Espagne*. During his interrogations, Couette pleaded ignorance about the contents of the tract and claimed that he had been given copies to sell on consignment by a

<sup>78</sup> *Mercuré François*, t.3(3), pp. 303-305.

<sup>79</sup> BnF, Français 5528, fol. 53r: Journal historique de Laurent Bouchel, Mar. 1614. Du Val stabbed himself several times with a penknife (canivet).

<sup>80</sup> BnF, Français 22087, fol. 243r: Sentence du Châtelet de Paris [sic: Prévôté de Paris], 8 August 1615.

<sup>81</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p.61.

<sup>82</sup> BnF, Dupuy 91, fol. 212r: Henri de Mesmes à Louis XIII, 18 Sep. 1615.

<sup>83</sup> AN, X/2A/189: Arrêt du Parlement de Paris, 29 Jul. 1614.

certain bookbinder named Henri Varin.<sup>84</sup> Again on 3 March 1616, the *Prévôté de Paris* confiscated the stocks of *colporteurs* Gilles Ménard, Jacques Bellay and Jacques la Croise and fined each of them 50 *livres* for peddling pamphlets ‘importans à la Religion & a l’Estat’.<sup>85</sup>

Some individuals would have suffered worse fates had the *Parlement de Paris* not overturned the *Prévôté de Paris*’s ruling upon appeal. On 12 July 1614, the *Prévôté* sentenced *imprimeurs-libraires* or *imprimeurs-colporteurs* Philippes Lenrillon, François d’Aufroy, François du Souhait and Antoine du Brueil to be stripped to the waist and whipped at the Pont Neuf. The first three publishers were presumably behind some of the anonymous pamphlets because their names could not be found on the imprints of any known editions. Du Brueil was by now a third-time offender, having been fined 80 and 12 *livres* on 14 and 27 May 1614 respectively for publishing and selling illicit pamphlets.<sup>86</sup> All four men appealed to the *Parlement* and had their sentences reduced on 29 July. Lenrillon and d’Aufroy subsequently received a public reprimand and warning; du Brueil, a fine of 20 *livres*, and du Souhait, banishment from Paris and its environs for nine years.<sup>87</sup> In August 1614, the *Parlement de Paris* once again mollified the *Prévôté de Paris*’s ruling on two publishers of *libelles diffamatoires* upon appeal. Originally condemned to death by hanging, Jean Millot was now sentenced to a fine of 400 *livres* and banishment from Paris and its environs for three years. Jehan Jonallin received a public reprimand and warning, rather than the original punishment of public whipping.<sup>88</sup> Jonallin was possibly another one of the culprits behind the anonymous pamphlets, for his name too could not be matched to any known editions’ imprints.

These examples were the exception rather than the rule, however. All in all, authorities found it difficult to identify individual writers amidst a sea of tracts written in a relatively identical style and using comparable tropes and rhetorical flourishes. They likewise found it difficult to identify the anonymous publishers through the unique characteristics of their pamphlets; for since the second half of the sixteenth century, publishers of ephemeral pamphlets increasingly bought their types, woodcut capitals and borders from wholesalers or second-hand from other publishers rather than make their own. Even the paper on which they printed their pamphlets were cheap, generic paper sourced from similar suppliers. The pamphlets that they produced naturally had very little distinguishing features. The title page

<sup>84</sup> AN, X/2A/193: Arrêt du Parlement de Paris, 5 Oct. 1615.

<sup>85</sup> BnF, Français 22115, fol 23r-24r: Sentence du Prévôt de Paris, 3 March 1616.

<sup>86</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p.61; BnF, Français 22087, fol. 209r: Sentence du Prévôt de Paris, 27 May 1614.

<sup>87</sup> BnF, Français 22087, fol. 224r-226v: Sentence du Parlement de Paris, 29 July 1614.

<sup>88</sup> AN, X/2A/193: Arrêt du Parlement de Paris, 20 Aug. 1615.

designs, textual layouts and type characteristics seemed to follow a handful of patterns: the title would be placed at the top centre of title page, and the imprint – the place and year of publication – at the bottom centre and in a smaller font. Publishers would sometimes accentuate the genre of the pamphlet using larger and/or capitalised fonts for words such as *lettre, manifeste, remonstrance, plaintes, discours, harangue, avis, advertisement* [sic], *apologie, récit véritable, response* [sic], *déclaration, lettres patentes* or *articles*. Publishers would also sometimes use larger and/or capitalised fonts to highlight the pamphlets' originators or targets such as *Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, Parlement de Paris, Roy* [sic], or *Royne Mère* [sic]. If a publisher chose not to remain anonymous, he would insert his name and the location of his business in the imprint. He would often also include his printer's device or alternatively, the woodcut of an Amazonian figure in the space between the pamphlet's title and imprint (See Figs. 3.1 and 5.1–5.22 for examples).

As a result of the homogeneity as well as anonymity of the large majority of the pamphlets, the conviction rates of pamphleteers and publishers remained low in this period. Magistrates like Henri de Mesmes and Nicholas de Verdun, *premier président* of the *Parlement de Paris*, could do nothing, except to reassure Louis XIII that they had put their best foot forward or swallow Marie de Médicis's public tongue-lashing that they had 'souffrez faire et vendre des libelles diffamatoires contre l'honneur du Roi et le mien sans en faire justice.'<sup>89</sup>

There was however a case to be made that anonymity was not merely a device adopted by the publishers and writers of the pro-princes pamphlets to evade the authorities' persecution and by those of the pro-government pamphlets to avoid the princes' rough justice.<sup>90</sup> Anonymity, one could argue, was a deliberate tactic used to lend some pamphlets an air of impartiality. The missing royal or princely publisher's device and imprint on the title pages of argumentative discourses meant that the audience could not ascertain that the discourses had been commissioned by the government or the malcontent princes. The exclusion of the pamphleteer's name made it difficult for anyone to trace his political affiliation. It consequently complicated or at least slowed down any efforts to discredit the pamphleteer's opinions as biased. It also allowed many partisan pamphleteers to

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<sup>89</sup> BNF, Dupuy 91, fol. 212r-212v: Lettre de Henri de Mesmes à Louis XIII, 18 Sep. 1615; *Molé*. t.1, p. 52.

<sup>90</sup> I have to thank Marc Jaffré for sharing with me the following points about the use of anonymity, which he discusses in his forthcoming article: Marc Jaffré, 'A Household Affair: Henri IV's Royal Printers, 1589-1595' in Alexander Wilkinson and Graeme Kemp (eds.), *Conflict and Controversy* (Leiden, forthcoming 2019).

precondition the audience's receptiveness to their discourses with prefatory disclaimers along the lines of this one:

S'il y a subject duquel il soit également malaisé & dangereux d'escrire, c'est des affaires des Princes & des Grandes... Or de se mettre mal à propos en hazard d'attirer sur soy la colere de personnes coustumieres de venger un traict de plume d'un coup d'espee, & d'effacer une tache d'anchre avec le sang de ceux qui en ont noircy le papier, j'estime que c'est à faire à un homme qui est plus capable de souffrir un affront que de retenir sa langue. C'est pourquoy j'avoy deliberé de m'abstenir entierement de telles matieres & d'esloigner mon style d'un pas si dangereux & glissant. Mais pressé tous les jours sans relasche par vous, de vous donner mon advis sur ce qui se passe aujourd'huy en ce Royaume, j'ay senty peu à peu forcer ma resolution par le pouvoir que vous avez sur moy, & le desir que j'ay il y à long-temps de vous tesmoigner l'affection que j'ay voüee à vostre service. Je respondray donc a vos deux demandes, le mieux qu'il me sera possible, & sans offencers personne, si je puis. Car je proteste que je n'en ay point l'intention.<sup>91</sup>

In the cases of published letters and treaties between France and Spain or between the crown and the malcontent princes, anonymity gave these pamphlets a varnish of credibility. The lack of a royal or princely publisher's device and imprint on the title pages created an impression that these published pieces of correspondence and documents were genuine leaks. The anonymity made an audience more likely to believe that the contents of these correspondence and documents were not formulated purposefully by the interested parties to address and appeal to their real target audience; that they had not been sanitised by the same parties to conceal discreditable intentions and remove unfavourable details.

### **The Wolves of Grub Street**

Court records, as the previous section has shown, are useful for identifying a handful of culprits responsible for writing and publishing the political pamphlets, even though the individuals identified were a tiny proportion of those involved and the titles for which they were responsible were regularly omitted from these records. Other sources could help fill in

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<sup>91</sup> *Resolution a la Paix et au Service du Roy* (Paris: Jean Laquehay, 1614), pp. 3-4, BnF 8-LB36-367(A).

some gaps, though by not much. In his letter to Jacques-Auguste de Thou in 1615, for example, Jeannin revealed that he was the target of a calumnious pamphlet written by a secretary of the duc de Bouillon.<sup>92</sup> Although Jeannin did not name names, his description of the anonymous pamphleteer matched the description of the known pamphleteers behind the pamphlets in question. More often than not, the writers of the political pamphlets in 1614-17 were very different from those of the eighteenth-century Grub Street.<sup>93</sup> These seventeenth-century pamphleteers had considerable training in law or theology. They had respectable and well-paid careers as *conseillers* or *secrétaires* at court or in the *grandees'* private councils; as bishops, priests or scholars in the Church or faculties of theology; or as lawyers or magistrates in the judicial and sovereign courts.

Marie de Médicis' official response to Condé's manifesto in 1614, for instance, was formulated by Villeroy, the *secrétaire d'État*; while Louis XIII's response to the princes' joint manifesto in 1617 was drafted by Richelieu, the Bishop of Luçon who replaced Villeroy as *secrétaire d'État* in November 1616.<sup>94</sup> Claude Jourdan, the man behind *L'Ordre, entrée et cérémonies observées par les habitans de Paris à l'heureux retour de Louys XIII* (1614) which saluted Louis XIII's return to the capital following the first rebellion, was a *huissier* in the *Chambre des comptes* of Paris.<sup>95</sup> The same Jourdan wrote *La justice aux pieds* (1614) to attack the kingdom's *Parlements* at the subsequent *États généraux*.<sup>96</sup> Claude d'Acreigne, who wrote the *Tombeau des malcontens, dédié aux bons et fidèles François* (1615) and *Récit véritable de la deffaitte des troupes de Monsieur le Prince par Monsieur le duc de Guise* (1616) to demonstrate and revel in the princes' lack of military success, was an *avocat* from Tulle in Bas-Limousin.<sup>97</sup> During the same rebellion of 1615-16, Jean Tournet, an *avocat* in the *Parlement de Paris*, wrote a Latin pamphlet, *Ludovici XIII, et Annae Austriacae, Epithalium* (1615) to show his approval of Habsburg-Bourbon

<sup>92</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 53. This pamphlet could be *Lettre au President Janin, par Monsieur de Bouillon* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), 8-LB36-457(B).

<sup>93</sup> Robert Darnton, 'The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France', *Past & Present* 51 (1971), pp. 81-115.

<sup>94</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, pp. 34-36; *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CCXIV, p. 316: Richelieu à Concino Concini, maréchal d'Ancre, 22 Feb. 1617.

<sup>95</sup> Jean Jourdan, *L'Ordre, entrée et cérémonies observées par les habitans de Paris à l'heureux retour de Louys XIII, Par me. C. Jourdan, Huissier des Comptes* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1614), BnF 8-LB-326.

<sup>96</sup> Idem, *La justice aux pieds des Parlemens de France* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1614), BnF 8-LB-238.

<sup>97</sup> Gustave Clément-Simon, *Curiosités de la Bibliographie Limousine* (Geneva, 1972), pp. 5-8; Claude d'Acreigne, *Tombeau des mal contens, dédiés aux bons et fidèles François* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BnF 8-LB-448; Idem, *Recit véritable de la deffaitte des troupes de Messieur le Prince par Messieur le duc de Guise, le septiesme de ce mois. Ensemble le départ du Roy, pour venir à Tours* (Paris: Sebastien Lescuyer, 1616), BM Lyon Rés 315192. Acreigne was also wrote *Strategème et valeureuse entreprise du marquis Spinola pour recognoistre les forteresses de la ville de Sedan* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315240 and *Conclusion de la dernière assemblée faicte par ceux de la religion prétendue réformée dans la ville de Montauban...* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315258.

matches.<sup>98</sup> François Garasse, a theologian at the Jesuit Collège de Sainte-Marthe in Poitiers, attempted to prove the popularity of the Spanish marriages in the kingdom with his *La royalle reception de leurs Majestez* (1615), which recounted the sequence and public reception of the royal entry and nuptial festivities in Bordeaux.<sup>99</sup> At court, Claude Vaure, a *chapelain* in the *chapelle royale*, and Ange Cappel, sieur du Luat, a *secrétaire de la chambre du roi*, also did their part to whip up support for the marriages by penning the *Discours anagrammatique sur l'anagramme espagnol de deux noms des très-illustres Majestez* and *Discours sur la prediction d'un mariage des plus merveilleux* (1615) respectively.<sup>100</sup>

The profiles of those writing on behalf of the princes are very similar to those of the loyalist pamphleteers. Jacques Gillot, author of the infamous *Le Caton François* (1614), was a *conseiller-clerc* in the *Parlement de Paris*.<sup>101</sup> Jean Bedé de La Goumandière, author of the *Discours d'Estat sur la protection des alliez* (1614) which criticised the Spanish marriages, was a Huguenot and an *avocat* in the same institution.<sup>102</sup> The author of *La Chemise Sanglante de Henry le Grand*, yet another pamphlet which denounced the Spanish marriages, was Pierre Périsset, a Huguenot minister in Aytré, Aunis.<sup>103</sup> The author of *La magicienne estrangere, tragedie* (1617) which attacked Concini's wife, Leonora Galigai, was Pierre Mathieu, the official royal historian from 1594 to 1610.<sup>104</sup> Mathieu subsequently penned the *Histoire d'Ælius Sejanus* (1617) and *Histoire des prosperitez malheureuses, d'une femme cathenoise, grand seneschalle de Naples*

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<sup>98</sup> AN, MC/ET/CXXII/1571, fol. 63: Bail par Thomas Nevot à Jean Tournet, 23 Jul. 1610; Jean Tournet, *Ludovici XIII, et Annae Austriacae, Epithalium* (Paris: s.n., 1616), BnF 8-BL-37275.

<sup>99</sup> François Garasse, *La royalle reception de leurs Majestez treschrestiennes en la ville de Bourdeaux, ou le siecle d'or ramené par les alliances de France et d'Espagne* (Bordeaux: Simon Millanges, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-589(A).

<sup>100</sup> Claude Vaure, *Discours anagrammatique sur l'anagramme espagnol de deux noms des très-illustres Majestez du Roy et de la Royne de France* (Paris: Claude Hulpeau, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-690; William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton, NJ, 1972), p. 43; Alexandre Cioranescu, *Le masque et le visage: Du baroque espagnol au classicisme français* (Geneva, 1983), p. 171; Ange Cappel, *Discours sur la prediction d'un mariage des plus merveilleux, avec la perseverance d'une dame jusqu'à l'accomplissement heureux* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BnF 8-H-7687(98); John H. M. Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt: Essays in the Intellectual and Social History of Early Modern France* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 64-67.

<sup>101</sup> Ingrid de Smet, *Thuanus: The Making of Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553-1617)* (Geneva, 2006), p. 79n; Jacques Gillot, *Le Caton François* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-364(F).

<sup>102</sup> AN, MC/ET/CXXII/1582, fol. 52: Quittance au receveur des consignations par Jean Bedé au nom et comme procureur de Marguerite Minager, 28 Nov. 1613; Jean Bedé de La Gourmandière, *Discours d'Estat sur la protection des alliez* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 4-LB36-469.

<sup>103</sup> *Mercure François*, t. 12(1), f. 606v; Pierre Périsset, *La chemise sanglante de Henry le Grand* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), 8-LB35-916(A).

<sup>104</sup> Pierre Mathieu, *La magicienne estrangere, tragedie* (Rouen: David Geoffroy & Jacques Besongne, 1617), BnF RES-YF-3917(1). On Mathieu, see: Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), p. 99; Pierre Matthieu, *La Guisade*, ed. Louis Lobbes (Geneva, 1990), p. 15.



(1617) to celebrate the favourites' dramatic deaths.<sup>105</sup> Before Mathieu became the royal historian, he was an *avocat* (in Lyon) like many of his fellow pamphleteers.<sup>106</sup>

Some pamphleteers wrote to attract the attention and patronage of the great. Others had already won their favour. They wrote as gestures of their gratitude or because they had been ordered to do so by their patrons. Indeed, the aforementioned Jacques Gillot was a friend and client of Jacques-Auguste de Thou, a *président* of the *Parlement de Paris*, who was in turn a friend and client of Condé.<sup>107</sup> Jean Bedé de La Gourmandière could also have some ties to the *Condéen* faction, as Gourmandière's daughter, Marie Bedé, later married Gédéon de Conquerant, sieur de Gondreville, a *gentilhomme ordinaire* and *écuyer* of the duc de Longueville.<sup>108</sup> Other identified pamphleteers included Charles Berault, who was a client and a *valet de la chambre* of Marie de Médicis, and the author behind the *Epithalame, chant royal sur les alliances de France et d'Espagne* (1615).<sup>109</sup> They also included the author of the loyalist tract, *Response au manifeste publié par les perturbateurs du repos de l'Etat* (1617), Nicolas Coeffeteau, a Dominican friar and the vicar-general of the congregation of France. Coeffeteau was a client of the queen mother, having received from her his sees of Lombez and Saintes.<sup>110</sup> During the rebellions, Marie de Médicis could likewise count on the quills of Guillaume Ribier, Elijah Montalto and Raoul Cailler, who wrote the *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (1614), the *Lettre d'Espagne présentée à la Roynne Regente* (1614) and the *Discours à la roynne mère sur la paix* (1616) respectively.<sup>111</sup> Ribier was the *lieutenant-général* of Blois, the *président* of the *siège présidial* of Blois and a nephew-in-law of Guillaume du Vair, the *premier président* of the *Parlement d'Aix* and a client of Leonora Galigai, who happened to be the queen mother's favourite.<sup>112</sup> Montalto was the notorious Jewish physician of Galigai at court; while Cailler was an *avocat* in

<sup>105</sup> Pierre Mathieu, *Histoire, d'Ælius Sejanus* (Paris: P. Breuneval, 1617), BnF J-23625; Idem, *Histoire des prosperitez malheureuses, d'une femme cathenoise, grand seneschalle de Naples* (Paris: veuve de Jean Regnoul, 1617), BnF 8-H-3236(2).

<sup>106</sup> Yann Lignereux, *Lyon et le Roi: de la 'Bonne Ville' à l'Absolutisme Municipal (1594-1654)* (Seysssel, 2003), pp. 60-61.

<sup>107</sup> Smet, *Thuanus*, p. 79n.

<sup>108</sup> AN, MC/ET/CXXII/1603, fol. 29: Mariage de Gédéon de Conquerant et de Marie Bede, 2 Sep. 1621.

<sup>109</sup> BnF, Français 7854, fol. 248r: Officiers des maisons des roys, reynes, enfans de France, et de quelques princes du sang – Henri II-Louis XIV; Charles Berault, *Epithalame, chant royal sur les alliances de France et d'Espagne* (Bordeaux: Ar. du Brel, 1615), BnF YE-15268.

<sup>110</sup> Charles Urbain, *Nicolas Coeffeteau* (Geneva, 1970), p. 84; Nicolas Coeffeteau, *Response au manifeste publié par les perturbateurs du repos de l'Etat* (Paris: Antoine Estienne, 1617), BM Lyon 315269.

<sup>111</sup> Guillaume Ribier, *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Durand, 1614), BM Lyon Rés 315088; Elijah Montalto, *Lettre d'Espagne présentée à la Roynne Regente* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1614), BnF FB-20374; Raoul Cailler, *Discours à la roynne mère sur la paix* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF YE-2177.

<sup>112</sup> *Le grand dictionnaire historique ou le mélange curieux de l'histoire sacrée et profane* (Paris: Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1725), t. 6, p. 104; *Recueil des portraits des hommes illustres, dont il est fait mention dans l'Histoire de France: Tome III, contenant les Regnes de Henri II, de Charles IX, de Henri III, de Henri IV, & une partie du Regne de Louis XIII* (Paris: Nyon l'aîné, 1781), p. 93.

the *Parlement de Paris* and a client of the cardinal du Perron, who was himself a client of the queen mother.<sup>113</sup>



As with the court records, other sources such as correspondence and memoirs seemed to turn up more previously-anonymous publishers than pamphleteers. One learns from the memoir of Mathieu de Molé, the *procureur général du Parlement de Paris*, that Melchior Claude Marcel, a publisher whose name could not be traced to the imprints of any known editions, was arraigned by the *Prévôté de Paris* during the rebellion of 1615-16 ‘pour raison de libelles diffamatoires contre l’honneur de plusieurs personnes’.<sup>114</sup> The *Mercure François* reported that some of the anonymous pamphlets attacking Marie de Médicis’s government had emanated from Jean Janon’s press in Bouillon’s principality of Sedan. Janon was responsible for publishing a pamphlet which justified Condé’s demand for the postponement of the Spanish marriages in 1614, possibly the *Discours sur les mariages de France et d’Espagne, contenant les raisons qui ont meu Monseigneur le Prince à en demander la surseance*, as well as the original edition of Condé’s manifesto of August 1615.<sup>115</sup> Without a doubt, Janon dared to take on these ventures because he enjoyed the patronage of Bouillon and (arguably) shelter from French laws due to Sedan’s independent status.

These other sources also revealed that some anonymous pamphlets had no imprints because they were published not by master printer-publishers, but by journeyman printers eager to make a quick buck during the conflicts. A *factum* of the *syndics et gardes des marchands libraires, imprimeurs et relieurs de Paris* used in a court hearing on 19 May 1616 revealed that many of the recent and unauthorised vendors of pamphlets within the University of Paris’s compounds were *compagnons imprimeurs*. And because they were mere *compagnons imprimeurs*, these men had no authorisation to print the pamphlets that they were selling either.<sup>116</sup> Some sources then revealed that some of the pamphlets had no imprints because they sprang from

<sup>113</sup> Brigitte Bedos-Razak, ‘Tolérance et raison d’État: le problème juif’ in Henry Méchoulan (ed.), *L’État baroque: Regards sur la pensée politique de la France du premier XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1985), pp. 259-260; Jean Brunel, ‘L’attitude de quelques poètes catholiques poitevins devant les événements de 1587-1558’, *Albineana, Cahiers d’Aubigné* 2 (1990), pp. 100-101.

<sup>114</sup> *Molé*, t.1, p. 107.

<sup>115</sup> *Mercure François*, t.3(3), p. 383, t.4(1), pp. 159-160; *Discours sur les mariages de France et d’Espagne, contenant les raisons qui ont meu Monseigneur le Prince à en demander la surseance* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-H-12815(3); *Manifeste et justification, des actions de Monsieur le Prince* (Sedan: Jean Janon, 1615), BM Lyon 315190.

<sup>116</sup> *Factum, pour les Syndic & Gardes des Marchands Libraires, Imprimeurs & Relieurs de cette ville de Paris, Intimez. Contre Fleury Bourriquant, Nicolas Rousset, David Gilles, & consorts, Appelez.* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF 4-FM-25042.

private presses. It was illegal to own and operate a private press in this period, but the powerful could ignore such regulations with impunity. A legal case cited in a reference book of statutes related to the book trade in Paris (published in 1620) revealed that François Loriot, a Jesuit priest, and several of his colleagues and students had been operating a secret press in the Jesuit Collège de Clermont.<sup>117</sup> Loriot and his accomplices were probably responsible for some of the militant ultramontane tracts during the *États généraux* and the princely rebellion which followed. According to the journal of Jean Héroard, Louis XIII's physician, the ultramontane cardinal du Perron owed a press in his *hôtel* in Paris. The young king even tried his hand at du Perron's press when he called at the cardinal's *hôtel* on 27 July 1615.<sup>118</sup> The cardinal was not an exception. Huguenot *grands* like Sully and Agrippa d'Aubigné also had unauthorised presses in their residences.<sup>119</sup> Agrippa d'Aubigné wrote two anonymous pamphlets against Concini in 1617, *Propos dorez sur l'autorité tyrannique de Co[n]cino Floretin, marquis d'Ancre* and *Le fidelle gaulois du roy*, and published them from his private press in his château in Maillé, operated by his household printer, Jean Moussat.<sup>120</sup> It is not preposterous to imagine that other *grands* like Condé and Nevers might also have invited printers to set up presses in their residences, especially during periods of intense pamphlet exchange such as a rebellion, in order that the printers could coordinate with the *grandee's* hacks and work freely without intrusion from the authorities. One knows for a fact that during the *Frondes*, the Grand Condé invited his printer, Nicolas Vivenay, to move his presses into the *Hôtel de Condé*, so that Vivenay could produce his manifestos and *mazarinades* beyond the reach of the *Prévôté de Paris*.<sup>121</sup>

The profiles of the previously-anonymous Melchoir Claude Marcel, Jean Janon and Jean Moussat matched those of the known publishers of political pamphlets in Paris between 1614 and 1617. As Table 2.6 shows, 11 out of the 15 most prolific Parisian publishers who had chosen to identify themselves in their pamphlets' imprints were specialists of pamphlet production rather than 'prestige publishers', that is, publishers who financed and published

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<sup>117</sup> *Recueil des statuts et réglemens des marchands libraires, imprimeurs, & relieurs de la ville de Paris Recueil des statuts et réglemens des marchands libraires, imprimeurs, & relieurs de la ville de Paris* (Paris: François Julliot, 1620), p. 7, BnF F-13019.

<sup>118</sup> *Journal de Jean Héroard sur l'enfance et la jeunesse de Louis XIII (1601-1628)*, eds. E. Soulié and E. de Barthélemy (Paris, 1868), t.2, p. 124.

<sup>119</sup> Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 58.

<sup>120</sup> *Recueil des statuts*, p. 62; Agrippa d'Aubigné, *Propos dorez sur l'autorité tyrannique de Cocino Floretin, marquis d'Ancre* (Maillé: Jean Moussat, 1617), BnF 8-H-12731; Idem, *Le fidelle gaulois du roy* (Maillé: s.n., 1617), BnF 8-H-7169(16).

<sup>121</sup> Mark Bannister, 'The Mediatization of Politics during the Fronde: Condé's Bureau de Presse', *Cahiers du XVII<sup>e</sup>* 10 (2005), p. 35.

big, expensive scholarly books. These ‘pamphlet specialists’ tend to operate intermittently with one or two presses and sold pamphlets out of their own workshops or peddled them in public spaces to eke out a living.<sup>122</sup> Some of them were newcomers to the book trade looking to profit from the political crises.

**Table 2.6: 15 most prolific producers of pamphlets in Paris during the rebellions of 1614-17.**

|                  | <b>Known Parisian Publishers</b> | <b>No. of Editions</b> |
|------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| <b>1</b>         | Antoine du Brueil                | 125                    |
| <b>2 &amp; 3</b> | Fédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer  | 72                     |
| <b>4</b>         | Pierre Chevalier                 | 33                     |
| <b>5</b>         | Jean Brunet                      | 30                     |
| <b>6</b>         | Abraham Saugrain                 | 18                     |
| <b>7</b>         | Sylvestre Moreau                 | 16                     |
| <b>8</b>         | Fleury Bourriquant               | 13                     |
| <b>9</b>         | Pierre Des Hayes                 | 13                     |
| <b>10</b>        | Melchoir Mondière                | 12                     |
| <b>11</b>        | Pierre Buray                     | 11                     |
| <b>12</b>        | Nicolas Alexandre                | 11                     |
| <b>13</b>        | Jean Millot                      | 10                     |
| <b>14</b>        | Widow of Jean Regnoul            | 10                     |
| <b>15</b>        | Gilbert Le Veau                  | 10                     |

Antoine du Brueil, the undisputed champion with 125 editions, for instance, started his career as an *imprimeur-colporteur* in 1588, publishing and peddling *Ligueur* pamphlets in Paris.<sup>123</sup> Towards the end of the religious war, du Brueil used his ill-gotten gains to scale the totem pole, becoming a master printer-publisher in 1596 and establishing his workshop in the heart of the Parisian book trade, the rue Saint-Jacques. Du Brueil concentrated his capital and operation on religious and literary works. However, these works were not the voluminous and beautiful folio or quarto editions that underpinned the prestige of the Estienne or Sonnius publishing dynasties, works with which many publishers aspired to be associated. Large books required huge initial capital investment by the publisher for type, paper and wages, costs that could only be recouped once the books had been sold. Yet, these costs could not be recouped quickly, for the city from which the publisher operated,

<sup>122</sup> Martin, *French Book*, p. 47; Henri-Jean Martin, *Print, Power and People in 17<sup>th</sup>-Century France*, trans. David Gerard (Metuchen, NJ, 1993), pp. 245-247.

<sup>123</sup> Jean-Dominique Mellot and Élisabeth Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs/libraires (vers 1500 – vers 1810)* (Paris, 2004), p. 206; Philippe Renouard, *Répertoire des Imprimeurs Parisiens, libraires et fondeurs de caractères en exercice à Paris au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Nogent-le-Roi, 1995), p. 129.

however large, would not normally have enough consumers to absorb the whole consignment. Publishers needed to tap on the pan-European market, which offered a larger pool of potential customers dispersed across many different cities in different countries. To access this market, however, publishers needed to have a sophisticated supply chain, international credit facilities and relationships with foreign booksellers. They also needed to have pockets that were deep enough to survive the slow and complex transfers of goods and money between them and the international booksellers. As such, the respectable business of big, scholarly books could only be undertaken by publishers with ample financial muscle, profound commercial knowledge and wide networks of international contacts.<sup>124</sup> Du Brueil, however, was not one of these publishers. 75 of 78 editions of religious and literary works that he produced between 1596 and 1613 were short books of 100-400 pages in the small octavo or duodecimo format.<sup>125</sup> Recognising that there was a lot more money to be made from the princely rebellions, du Brueil diverted all of his resources to the production of political pamphlets from 1614 onwards.

The ninth-placed Pierre des Hayes had a similar story.<sup>126</sup> Although he was a Calvinist by faith, des Hayes started out in 1588 by selling *Ligueur* pamphlets. And by 1594, one year after the capitulation of Paris to Henri IV, des Hayes had accumulated enough capital to produce a tome on sin, which counted over 750 pages in the octavo format.<sup>127</sup> The venture could not have been successful, for it would take des Hayes seven years to publish his next work, a c.780-page and octavo-format book on the sacrifice of Jesus Christ.<sup>128</sup> This new venture was probably a failure like the first one, as it would be another seven years before des Hayes would print again. He published a short *arrêt du conseil privé du roy* in 1608 and a short and small military treatise in 1612, before giving up his dreams of becoming a prestige publisher for good.<sup>129</sup> Des Hayes would concentrate exclusively on publishing pamphlets between 1614 and his retirement in the early 1620s.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Andrew Pettegree, *The Book in the Renaissance* (New Haven, CT, 2011), pp. 53-55.

<sup>125</sup> *USTC*: between 1596 and 1613, du Brueil printed 78 editions, 32 and 43 of which were in the 8° and 12° format.

<sup>126</sup> 13th-placed Jean Millot's background was the same as du Brueil and des Hayes; see: *USTC* and Mellot and Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs*, p. 403; Renouard, *Imprimeurs Parisiens*, pp. 320-321.

<sup>127</sup> *USTC* 67223.

<sup>128</sup> *USTC* 6000010.

<sup>129</sup> *USTC* 6000734, 6009137.

<sup>130</sup> Mellot and Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs*, p. 190; Renouard, *Imprimeurs Parisiens*, pp. 119-120; Des Hayes's son, Pierre II, would take over the business and print under the same name, Pierre des Hayes.

Unlike des Hayes, Melchior Mondière did not need a decade of commercial mishaps to learn that the business of big books was not as rosy as it looked. Mondière (10th-placed) established his business in 1613 and announced his arrival at the Parisian book trade by publishing a c.460-page and quarto-format medical treatise.<sup>131</sup> But within a year, Mondière threw out his original business plan and re-positioned himself as a publisher of political pamphlets. Mondière remained in the pamphlet business until the late 1620s, before trying his hands once more at longer works such as religious treatises and schoolbooks.<sup>132</sup>

As for the rest of the prolific publishers of political pamphlets in 1614-17, they were either veterans of the pamphlet trade or newcomers. Fleury Bourriquant (eighth-placed) started out as a publisher of pamphlets and small books, mostly of the political or religious nature, in 1598 and never strayed.<sup>133</sup> Sylvestre Moreau (seventh-placed) started publishing and selling pamphlets in 1596 at the Palais de Justice as one of the twelve licensed colporteurs. Although Moreau attained the admirable status of *imprimeur-ordinaire du Hôtel de Ville de Paris* in 1615, he chose to remain in his old trade.<sup>134</sup> Moreau had competition from some new kids on the block, such as Jean Brunet (fifth-placed) and Gilbert Le Veau (15th-placed), both of whom had only started their operations in 1614, no doubt to profit from the deteriorating political climate. Nicolas Alexandre (12th-placed) would do the same in 1615.<sup>135</sup>

Of the 15 individuals listed in Table 2.6, only Frédéric Morel, Pierre Mettayer, Pierre Chevalier and Abraham Saugrain could be considered prestige publishers. That Morel and Mettayer should come in second and third in terms of pamphlet production was unsurprising. Both men were obliged by their status as *imprimeurs du roi* to publish the crown's declarations against the malcontent princes at the start of the rebellions, its regulatory decrees during the rebellions, as well as its edicts of pacification after the rebellions. Indeed, 68 of Morel and Mettayer's 72 titles in this period were of one of these three varieties. The cases of fourth- and sixth-placed Chevalier and Saugrain were more peculiar. These two publishers had been producing lengthy works of religion, law, medicine,

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<sup>131</sup> USTC 6016098.

<sup>132</sup> USTC; Mellot and Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs*, pp. 93, 272;; Renouard, *Imprimeurs Parisiens*, pp. 50, 186, 323.

<sup>133</sup> USTC: between 1598 and 1613, Bourriquant produced 88 editions, 64, 13, 6 and 1 of which were respectively in the 8°, 12°, 16° and 24° format.

<sup>134</sup> Philippe Renouard, *Répertoire des Imprimeurs Parisiens, libraires, fondateurs de caractères et correcteurs d'imprimerie depuis l'introduction de l'Imprimerie à Paris (1470) jusqu'à la fin du seizième siècle* (Paris, 1965), p. 314.

<sup>135</sup> Mellot and Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs*, pp. 24, 107-108, 354; Renouard, *Imprimeurs Parisiens*, pp. 3, 61, 290.

agriculture, history, novels or drama since 1595 and 1598 respectively.<sup>136</sup> Both of them became *libraires-jurés de l'Université de Paris*. Saugrain also became the *libraire-ordinaire* of Queen Marguerite de Valois.<sup>137</sup> Chevalier and Saugrain's decision to participate in the pamphlet trade in 1614-17, one could speculate, was informed by their good business sense. As the production of pamphlets required little capital investment and were often commissioned by and delivered to a single customer, profits were more or less guaranteed and prompt. And even though the copies of some titles had to be sold individually to walk-in customers, the low prices and sensational contents of these copies meant that they would be sold relatively quickly. As such, publishing and selling pamphlets was a great way for prestige publishers like Chevalier and Saugrain to generate some much-needed cash flow to keep their operations running while they awaited their profits from their more impressive but lower turnover wares. It was no coincidence that a fair amount of prestige publishers in Europe had adopted such a business tactic since the invention of print.



In the provinces, the most prolific of the self-identified publishers of pamphlets differed from their Parisian counterparts. While the known publishers in Paris were predominantly 'pamphlet specialists', the known publishers in the provinces were prestige publishers, at least by provincial standards. They were the provincial equivalents of the Morels, Mettayers, Saugrains and Chevaliers.

**Table 2.7: The Most Prolific Known Publishers of Political Pamphlets in the Provinces, 1614-17.**

| Provincial Publishers                  | City            | No. of Editions |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|
| Simon Millanges                        | Bordeaux        | 48              |
| Nicolas Jullieron                      | Lyon            | 24              |
| Martin Le Mesgissier                   | Rouen           | 19              |
| Antoine Hernault                       | Angers          | 8               |
| Jean Poyet                             | Lyon/ Vienne    | 8               |
| Barthélémy Ancelin & Nicolas Jullieron | Lyon            | 7               |
| Jean Tholosan                          | Aix-en-Provence | 7               |
| David Geoffroy                         | Rouen           | 7               |

<sup>136</sup> To see a list of their works, search 'Saugrain' and 'Chevalier' in the USTC.

<sup>137</sup> Mellot and Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs*, pp. 137; Renouard, *Imprimeurs Parisiens*, pp. 34-35, 83.

Seven out of the top nine provincial publishers in Table 2.7 were *imprimeurs ordinaires du roi*, individuals whom the crown had appointed to publish its edicts and ordinances in their respective cities. Simon Millanges, the leading publisher with 48 titles, was the *imprimeur ordinaire du roi* of Bordeaux. Nicolas Jullieron and Barthélemy Ancelin were the *imprimeurs ordinaires du roi* of Lyon; Martin Le Mesgissier, of Rouen, Antoine Hernault, of Angers and Jean Tholosan, of Aix-en-Provence. Naturally, a large proportion of these seven publishers' output were royal decrees or royalist news and panegyrics concerning the Spanish marriages (75.2%).<sup>138</sup>

David Geoffroy and Jean Poyet were the only non-*imprimeurs du roi*. Geoffroy was nevertheless a prestige publisher. Since establishing his business in Rouen in 1610, Geoffroy had been undertaking ambitious projects, publishing a series of bibles, dictionaries, histories and medical treatises.<sup>139</sup> Poyet was more an archetype 'pamphlet specialist'. He started his publishing business at the turn of the seventeenth century, publishing four large editions of biblical commentaries in 1603. This ambitious venture was probably a failure, as one knows of no further publication by Poyet until four years later. In 1608, Poyet changed his business strategy to focus almost entirely on short pamphlets of sermons and news.

It is worth asking why the leading producers of pamphlets in Paris were different from their counterparts in the provinces in terms of their profile. Before answering this question, it is important to note that a comparison between the actual pamphleteering landscapes of Paris and provincial France is impossible because 49.1% of these pamphlets remained anonymous. Many of these anonymous pamphlets could well be produced by Parisian prestige publishers or provincial 'pamphlet specialists'. While these works remain anonymous, one could only compare the Parisian and provincial publishers who had chosen to identify themselves on their pamphlets. And because an overwhelming proportion of their output were loyalist in nature (80.7%, for obvious reasons), one is really comparing the self-identified Parisian and provincial publishers of loyalist pamphlets.

So why did the profiles of the known publishers of loyalist pamphlets differed between Paris and the provinces; and why were the output of the known Parisian publishers more diverse than that of the provincial ones, whose production were mostly limited to royal

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<sup>138</sup> Mellot and Queval, *Répertoire d'imprimeurs*, pp. 27, 148, 318, 350, 397, 403, 523.

<sup>139</sup> For a list of Geoffroy's publication, see USTC.



decrees and royalist panegyrics? The answer, one could speculate, was because the market for loyalist pamphlets were much larger and more necessary in Paris than in the provinces in this period. Paris had a larger reading public: as the location of the king's court and the kingdom's most important administrative and legal institutions, Paris had a significantly greater number of members of the political nation. Its population of around 250,000 inhabitants dwarfed Rouen's 75,000; Lyon's 58,000; Toulouse's 50,000; Bordeaux's 33,000; Poitiers's 15,000; and Rennes and Reims's 13,000.<sup>140</sup> Moreover, Paris was a contested area. The government and its supporters produced many more argumentative discourses, open letters, news reports and satirical tracts in and for the capital because there was a greater need to canvas support and muckrake opponents here. Paris in August 1615, September 1616 and January 1617 was a city which had been alienated by Concini's actions and Marie de Médicis' unsatisfactory responses to the Gallican question and the *cabiers* of the *État généraux*. There was a genuine worry amongst Marie's government that Paris would fall into the princes' hand.<sup>141</sup>

The government and its supporters' decision to print their pamphlets in the capital was probably at the same time shaped by their understanding that Parisian publishers and booksellers were the traditional suppliers of books and pamphlets to the towns in the Île-de-France, Picardie, Champagne, Nivernais, Berry, Touraine, Anjou, Maine, Poitou and Bretagne, which in 1614-17 fell within the *Condéen* princes' spheres of influence and were therefore also contested areas. So, rather going to the trouble of printing the same pamphlet in separate cities, printing one's pamphlet in Paris would simultaneously allow one to reach one's target audience in Paris and in towns across northern, central and eastern France. Such a rationale perhaps explained why the print centres in contested regions – Rennes, Reims, Poitiers and Angers – did not produce as many loyalist discourses, open letters and satirical tracts as one would expect. The expansive reach of the Parisian book trade, it seemed, had nullified the need to publish locally.

Poitiers, for example, only saw a small uptick in pamphlet production during the rebellions of 1615-16 and 1616-17, thirteen and nine editions respectively compared to only two in the rebellion of 1614, but these increases entailed mostly royal edicts, which was the natural outcome of Poitiers being in the heart of a region inhabited by many Huguenots,

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<sup>140</sup> Benedict, 'French cities', pp. 9-10.

<sup>141</sup> See chapter 1, pp. 16-18, 21-22, 24.

who were becoming increasingly restive in this period. In the fall of 1615, the town's publishers, Antoine Mesnier and Jean Marnef, as well as its *imprimeur ordinaire du roi*, Julien Thoreau, also benefitted from the fact that the travelling court had to stop at Poitiers for a month and wait for the slow recovery of the bride, Elisabeth de France, from her illness before it could continue its journey towards Bordeaux and Bayonne. And it was from Poitiers that the crown issued and published its first edict declaring Condé and his adherents guilty of *lèse-majesté*.<sup>142</sup>

Having said all that, the pamphlet output of cities well beyond the domain of the Parisian book trade remained limited and undiversified throughout this period. One could conjecture that this was primarily due to the fact that the print centres of Bordeaux, Aix, Lyon, Rouen and Toulouse, as well as the provinces in which they were situated – Guyenne, Provence, Lyonnais, Normandie and Languedoc – were never really in danger of declaring for the malcontent princes. An extensive persuasion campaign was unnecessary because the princes had very little influence or support in these regions in the first place.<sup>143</sup> Condé was the *gouverneur* of Guyenne in name only. The maréchal de Roquelaure, the *lieutenant-général* of Guyenne, and the cardinal de Sourdis, the archbishop of Bordeaux, secured the province and its capital city for Marie de Médicis. The duc de Guise, the duc de Montbazou and Concini also held their respective *gouvernement* and *lieutenance-généraux* of Provence, Normandie and Picardie firmly for their patron, the queen mother.<sup>144</sup> Lyonnais remained fiercely loyal to Marie and her government, thanks to the efforts of its *gouverneur*, the marquis d'Alincourt, Villeroy's son. And though a neutral party, the influential duc de Montmorency kept Languedoc in line throughout the conflicts. This lack of a combination of demographic, political and economic 'advantages' that Paris possessed, one could argue, therefore explained why the provincial market for loyalist pamphlets was dominated by the *imprimeurs du roi*. Unlike Paris, the provincial market was simply not big as well as necessary enough to attract and accommodate both the prestige publishers and 'pamphlet specialists', at least during this period in question. Rouen only outperformed the aforementioned cities slightly in terms of pamphlet production – most probably – because of its close proximity to the lucrative and strategically important Parisian market. Meanwhile, Bordeaux was a slightly more significant provincial centre of pamphlet production during the rebellion of 1615-16 because it was the venue of the royal marriages. The city's publishers, particularly Simon

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<sup>142</sup> Pontchartrain, II, pp. 100-103.

<sup>143</sup> J. Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 74-97.

<sup>144</sup> Marie de Médicis was the *gouverneur* of Normandie in this period.

Millanges, benefitted from the larger supply of and demand for accounts of royal entries, reports of the marriage proceedings and celebratory verses, anagrams and panegyrics.

## **Conclusion**

The necessity of political persuasion and pamphlets in the princely rebellions of seventeenth-century France has more often been assumed than explained. As the chapter has shown, the government and malcontent princes could rely neither on formal institutional procedures, legal statutes and theoretical notions of authority, nor on informal ties of patronage to mobilise their armies and secure fortified towns. Rather, the collaborative system of governance, interwoven networks of patronage and kinship ties, and overlapping structures of municipal administration required the government and malcontent princes to engage in a laborious process of negotiation in order to attain the cooperation of the kingdom's nobility, officeholders and institutions, which were frequently beset by conflicting affiliations and interests, as well as personal and corporate rivalries. The opposite factions had to reach out to these members of the political nation and convince them that their interests would be better served by one party instead of another. Through constant communication, they had to postulate common agendas and enemies under and against which individuals or institutions of incompatible concerns could unite. They had to maintain their adherents' morale and belief in the cause and victory.

Pamphlets played an important role in this process of communication and persuasion, alongside human agents and correspondence. During the princely rebellions of 1614-17, the conflicting parties flooded Paris and other contested cities with a total of 1,589 editions of manifestos, official responses, open letters, argumentative discourses, news reports, satirical verses and celebratory tracts. The government out-published the malcontent princes by a significant margin in every instance. More so than the existing studies on these pamphleteering phenomena, this chapter has determined that the pamphlets were written by the lawyers in the sovereign courts or the clergymen in the Church and universities; some of them had direct or indirect ties with the belligerents. Several tracts also emanated directly from the royal councils, from the pens of the crown or from the princes' close advisers, secretaries and household members.

And more so than the existing studies on this period, the chapter has quantified and ascertained that a majority of the political pamphlets which accompanied the princely rebellions were published anonymously or in Paris. Through its qualitative and quantitative analyses, it has pinpointed the leading Parisian and provincial publishers of the pamphlets and established the stark differences in their profiles and output. The chapter has even managed to uncover some of the previously-unknown culprits behind the anonymous pamphlets. It has demonstrated that the pamphlets were primarily intended to be read by the members of the political nation, as their contents, methods of dissemination and price points had made clear. The following three chapters will now tell the story of how the princes' pamphlets contrived to persuade these members of the political nation to lend assistance to the princes' rebellions, and how the government's pamphlets worked to ensure that they would not.

### 3. The Struggle over Legality and Honour

On 21 February 1614, Marie de Médicis received a letter which she knew would set France alight.<sup>1</sup> It was really a manifesto written in the form of a letter and in the name of the prince de Condé. The letter commenced with the prince's declaration that all of his 'affection a tousjours esté le service du Roy & bien de cest estat'. Up until now, he had concealed his longstanding dissatisfaction with the state of affairs so as not to instigate any dangerous movements during a period of royal minority. However, four years into the regency, his patience proved insufficient in preventing the proliferation of disorders within the regency government and its undertakings. Condé held several unnamed ministers responsible and accused them of conspiring to dominate the regency government and profit from the disorders. These ministers had excluded the princes from their rightful political roles and overturned Henri IV's foreign policy. They had also undermined the three estates and mismanaged the crown's finances. The only solution to these problems, Condé postulated, was to convoke the *États généraux*. As he ended his letter, the prince denounced the ministers for trying to demonise the malcontent princes as the enemies of public peace and exhorted the regent to raise the royal armies against them. Condé maintained that he and his associates had only left court to inform and entreat the regent peacefully and humbly to reform the kingdom's government and affairs. Condé implored the regent to dismiss the ministers' extremist counsel and beseeched her, once more, to recognise from his letter that his and his associates' actions were not informed by any self-interest or nefarious intentions against the crown. They were even willing to go as far as to pledge their pensions to advance the crown's interests as the *États généraux* saw fit.<sup>2</sup>

The following day, Condé's henchman, René de Cumont, sieur de Fiefbrun, delivered his packages to the *Parlement de Paris* and the *grands*, cardinals and prominent statesmen present in the capital. Meanwhile, Fiefbrun's counterparts delivered similar packages from

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<sup>1</sup> *Andilly*, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince. A la Royne*. (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BYU 944.03 A1 no.39., <<https://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/collection/FrenchPolPa/id/62213>>.

the prince to the provincial *parlementaires* and dignitaries.<sup>3</sup> Each of these packages contained a handwritten letter from Condé and a printed copy of his letter to Marie de Médicis. Having been forewarned by Marie of an impending princely rebellion, most recipients of the package grasped its significance immediately. They forwarded their packages to the regent unopened as a gesture of their allegiance.<sup>4</sup> But Condé was undeterred. He arranged for his letter to the regent to be printed and distributed throughout Paris and France. When the dust of the first rebellion finally settled three months later, the prince's letter had been published in thirteen editions.

Condé's decision to take his grievances public forced Marie de Médicis to issue an official and open response.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, Marie instructed some of her supporters like Jacques Davy, cardinal du Perron and François d'Escoubleau, cardinal de Sourdis to publish their own responses to the prince's letter.<sup>6</sup> The printed pandemonium which ensued saw both camps publishing as many as 110 editions of open letters, responses and counter-responses between February to May 1614. This was a ritual which would recur in the subsequent rebellions. The rebellions of August 1615 – May 1616 and September 1616 – April 1617 saw the malcontent princes publishing 95 and 53 editions of manifestos and open letters respectively; and the government, 65 and 14 editions of open responses. These types of literature would constitute almost one-fifth or one-quarter of the total pamphlet production in each of the rebellions.<sup>7</sup> The manifestos and letters varied in length and content, but their thrust was always the same as that of Condé's letter of February 1614: it was to drive home the point that the princes' intentions for their series of actions were ultimately just. The story of this chapter is to undercover why the princes would go to such great lengths to publicise and underscore their just intentions. It is a story of a battle over legality and honour, two essential and intertwined cultural features that pervaded the elite world in this period.

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<sup>3</sup> *Andilly*, p. 8; *Pontchartrain*, II, p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> *Fontenay-Mareuil*, p. 236.


<sup>5</sup> *Double de la réponse de la Roynne régente, mère du Roy, à la lettre écrite à sa Majesté par Monseigneur le prince...* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB-207(H).


<sup>6</sup> Jeffrey Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, CA, 1990), pp. 59-60; *Lettre de monseigneur le cardinal Du Perron à monseigneur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), BnF 8-LB36-215(C); *Response de Monsieur le cardinal de Sourdis à la lettre de monseigneur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), BnF 8-LB-218.

<sup>7</sup> Open letters constituted one-fifth of pamphlet production in the rebellion of 1615-16 rather than one-quarter in other rebellions because many celebratory pamphlets were published to commemorate the royal entries and marriages during that conflict. This increased the overall number of pamphlets and by extension, decreased the weightage of open letters.


**Table 3.1: Production of open letters and manifestos**

| <b>Rebellion</b>  | <b>Total pamphlet production</b> | <b>Letters &amp; Manifestos</b> | <b>% of total</b> | <i>The Princes'</i> | <i>The Government's</i> |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Feb 1614—May 1614 | <b>425</b>                       | <b>110</b>                      | <b>25.9 %</b>     | <i>57</i>           | <i>53</i>               |
| Aug 1615—May 1616 | <b>886</b>                       | <b>160</b>                      | <b>18.1 %</b>     | <i>95</i>           | <i>65</i>               |
| Sep 1616—Apr 1617 | <b>278</b>                       | <b>67</b>                       | <b>24.1 %</b>     | <i>53</i>           | <i>14</i>               |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>1,589</b>                     | <b>337</b>                      | <b>21.2 %</b>     | <i>205</i>          | <i>132</i>              |

**Fig. 3.1: Examples of the princely open letters and manifestos, 1614-17**







### **The Stumbling Block**

One of the most formidable problem that the malcontent princes had to contend with in their rebellions against Marie de Médicis and Concini was the law of *lèse-majesté*. The latter was conceived and consolidated in the political maelstroms of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to underpin the new idea of the French kings' divinely-ordained sovereignty, and to equip them with a more effective instrument to deter, delegitimise and punish rebellious baronial opponents. It was derived directly from the Roman law of *crimen laesae maiestatis*. It re-established the relationship between the French king and the barons as that of a sovereign

– much like the Roman Emperor – and his subjects, rather than that of a lord and his vassals. Concomitantly, the law of *lèse-majesté* redefined treason (in one historian's words) as 'an act or plot to diminish the greatness or security of the king's sovereign power', rather than 'an unwarranted breach of the sworn oath of loyalty by the king's vassal' as stated by the traditional customary laws.<sup>8</sup> According to the *commentaries Ad legem Juliam maiestatis* (Book 48 of the *Digest*) and *Lex Quisquis (Codex Theodosianus)*, the French law of *lèse-majesté* considered the acts of 'bearing arms against the state; raising troops or waging war without the authority of the king; communicating with a foreign enemy to the detriment of the state; attack on the king's councillors; and sedition' to be injurious to the king's majesty and therefore treasonous.<sup>9</sup>

The French law of *lèse-majesté* with which the princes had to contend also incorporated the codicils of the kingdom's mediæval magistrates and jurists. The works of Jean de Blanot, Jacques de Révigny and Guillaume Durand in the second half of the thirteenth century, for example, introduced and stressed the notion of *utilitas publica*. This was an attempt to address the perennial dilemma of a nobleman in choosing sides during a civil war, considering that he was bounded by conflicting oaths of fidelity, or centuries later, ties of patronage, to both his baron and his king.<sup>10</sup> Blanot, Révigny and Durand averred that the public good must always take precedence in such a scenario. The nobleman must obey his king over his baron 'because the king, to whom belongs the administration of the kingdom, summons them for the common good, indeed for the defence of the common country and of the crown.'<sup>11</sup> The jurists' notion of *utilitas publica* caught on. Over the next two centuries, one began to find in official documents indictments of treason on account of an accused's conduct against the public welfare.<sup>12</sup>

The law of *lèse-majesté* continued to evolve in the fourteenth century. Christine de Pisan and Honoré Bovet built on the works of Blanot, Révigny and Durand, articulating the implied notion of *tranquillitas regni* in the works of these three jurists. Pisan and Bovet argued that because the *raison d'être* of monarchical authority was to preserve peace and dispense justice, any transgression of public peace through wars or rebellions should be constituted as

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<sup>8</sup> S.H. Cuttler, *The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 5-10.

<sup>9</sup> I only describe the acts of treasons which were most pertinent to my study; for the full list of actions constituting treason in early modern France, see: Cuttler, *Law of Treason*, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p. 16.

an injury to the king's authority and be regarded as *lèse-majesté*.<sup>13</sup> In the fifteenth century, the law developed further in response to new political crises. The assassination of Louis, duc d'Orléans and the civil war between the Burgundians and Armagnacs prompted the emergence of Jean Petit's *Justification* and Jean de Terre-Vermeille's *Contra rebelles suorum regum*. These works added to the list of actions which would constitute *lèse-majesté*: the retention of *gendarmes* that pillage, murder and rape; the raising of taxes or appropriation of the royal treasury without the king's authorisation; the occupation of fortified places without a royal warrant; and the general usurpation of public authority.<sup>14</sup>

The relative effectiveness of the French law of *lèse-majesté* in deterring armed rebellions against the crown stemmed from its severe punishments. If one was found guilty, one would be executed unless one was of royal or princely blood. But for all alike, the crown would revoke all of one's titles and appointments. It would also confiscate and incorporate lands into the royal domain irrevocably.<sup>15</sup> In doing so, it would disinherit direct descendants or kin permanently.<sup>16</sup> The charge of *lèse-majesté* was therefore ruinous to more than just the guilty individual. In a period in which socio-political status and power were predicated predominantly upon the ownership of land and titles, it entailed the complete destruction of one's dynasty.<sup>17</sup>

## The Appeal

The malcontent princes were fully aware of the tremendous risks involved in their decisions to mount an armed challenge against the respective government of Marie de Médicis and Concini. A few months before the princes' departure from court in January 1614, the duc de Bouillon warned his *Condéen* associates in a private meeting that the act of leaving court was a grave matter which had to be considered thoroughly, for the regulations which proscribed such an act made it exceptionally dangerous; his *Condéen* associates must first ensure that one 'ne passât trop avant contre l'autorité et service de Leurs Majestés'.<sup>18</sup> And in early 1617,

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Again, I only include those actions relevant to this study; for the full list, see: *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>17</sup> Kathleen Parrow, 'Neither Treason nor Heresy: Use of Defense Arguments to Avoid Forfeiture during the French Wars of Religion', *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 22, pp. 708-709.

<sup>18</sup> *Richelieu*, I, p. 231.

Épernon's secretary noted that Épernon had decided not to act on his initial intention of taking up arms against Concini and his *ministériat* because 'he lacked a cause and even a pretext, and one rendered oneself criminal to do so without this'.<sup>19</sup>

The malcontent princes likewise recognised how the law and punishments of *lèse-majesté* struck fear into the hearts of the king's subjects, hence making it difficult to secure fortified towns and recruit men of any rank or profession for the rebellion. When the duc de Nevers sent the sieur de La Brosse-Raquin to persuade the marquis de Beauvais-Nangis to join the *Condéen* rebellion of 1614, Beauvais-Nangis responded by saying that he would gladly pledge his service to Nevers, but only if Nevers was not undertaking anything against the crown.<sup>20</sup> Beauvais-Nangis's concerns could still be heard two decades later. When asked by Gaston de France, duc d'Orléans to support his armed movement against Cardinal Richelieu in 1634, Henri de Campion, an insignificant nobleman from the Pays Chartrain, agreed to honour the prince's request, but only on the condition that the movement would not entail treason and abandonment of their obedience to Louis XIII.<sup>21</sup>

To assuage fear and enlist support for their armed movements, the malcontent princes would therefore work to impress upon the political nation that their armed movements would not amount to a repudiation of one's obedience to the king and incur the charge of *lèse-majesté*. To this end, the princes had several tricks up their sleeves. The first was to stop the proclamation and publication of any unfavourable royal decrees and parliamentary *arrêts* – condemning the malcontent princes and movement as treasonous – in the fortified towns. The idea was to conceal the crown's ruling and supporting evidence and uphold the myth that the rebellion fell within a grey area between legality and illegality. In doing so, the princes hoped to ensure that their existing and prospective supporters in those fortified towns would be less self-conscious and anxious about backing an unlawful movement. One knows for a fact that the duc de Mayenne went all out to make sure that the royal edict of 17 January 1617 which declared his associate and brother-in-law the duc de Nevers guilty of *lèse-majesté* was not promulgated in the fortified towns that he governed or recently commandeered. As Richelieu recounted in his memoirs:

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted in Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 2010), p. 202.

<sup>20</sup> *Beauvais-Nangis*, p. 130.

<sup>21</sup> Henri de Campion, *Mémoires de Henri de Campion*, ed. Marc Fumaroli (Paris, 1967), p. 47.

Ce déclaration fut vérifiée au Parlement le 17 janvier. Le duc de Mayenne, en ayant avis, fit défenses en tous les lieux qu'il tenoit qu'on eut à l'avoir, l'imprimer ni la vendre, et la fit ôter de violence des mains des officiers du Roi qui la devoient publier.<sup>22</sup>

In his letter to the *procureur général* of the *Parlement de Paris* Matthieu Molé, the *maire* of Angers Pierre Ayrault revealed an even more devious course of action which the malcontent princes had undertaken to tackle the political nation's fear for the law of *lèse-majesté*. Immediately after the *Parlement de Paris* had promulgated its *arrêt* of 22 September 1615 declaring the supporters of Condé – but not Condé himself – guilty of *lèse-majesté*, the princes forged and published a second parliamentary *arrêt* to try and delude the political nation into thinking that the first *arrêt* had thereupon been annulled. This forged *arrêt* claimed that

Aujourd'hui 22 September 1615 en la chambre des Vacations, aucuns de conseillers des chambres des Vacations, aucuns des conseillers des chambres des Enquêtes et Requêtes ont dit que, contre la délibération du dernier jour faite les chambres assemblées, il se publie un arrêt contraire à la vérité et qui apporte un scandale public, requèrent, attendant la Saint-Martin, y être pourvu.<sup>23</sup>

The princes inserted two printed copies of this forged *arrêt* into packages addressed 'Aux maire et échevins de cette ville' and sent the packages to each fortified town. To avoid any suspicions that the *arrêt* could be forged, the princes cleverly used the official courier service to mail these packages. The forged *arrêt* would therefore arrive at the fortified towns at the same time as the rest of the government's directives. It was unclear how many *maires* and *échevins* were ultimately fooled by the forged *arrêt* into disregarding the real parliamentary *arrêt* of 22 September or at least postponing its promulgation until further clarifications. But Pierre Ayrault for one saw through the princes' ruse and its purpose. In his letter to Molé, Ayrault wrote that the forged *arrêt* 'aura été envoyé par toutes les provinces pour tâcher, par cet artifice, de lever le respect et la crainte que l'on doit porter à l'arrêt de la Cour'.<sup>24</sup>

As for the portion of the political nation who had anticipated or been informed of the rulings of the royal decrees and parliamentary *arrêts*, the princes employed and presented

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<sup>22</sup> *Richelieu*, II, p. 142.

<sup>23</sup> *Molé*, I, pp. 97-98.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 98n.

several canny legal arguments in their open letters and manifestos to convince these individuals that their act of supporting the princes would in no way constitute the crime of *lèse-majesté*. At the same time, to better protect their adherents as well as themselves from prosecution, the princes also meant for these legal arguments to reach and convince the individuals responsible for hearing and adjudicating the cases of *lèse-majesté* of the same. This explained why at the start of each rebellion, the princes would always make a special effort to deliver the printed copies of their open letters and manifestos to the kingdom's *grandeues*, lay and ecclesiastical, within and without Paris. As peers of the realm, the princes could choose to invoke their privilege to be tried by their peers. This type of trial would normally take place in the Court of Peers (in the *Parlement de Paris*) and its body of judges would normally comprise of the king, the princes, the *ducs et pairs*, as well as some prelates and royal councillors handpicked by the king.<sup>25</sup> By sending their open letters and manifestos to these *grandeues* at the start of their rebellion, the *Condéen* princes were effectively trying to make a pre-emptory appeal to the Court of Peers, after or even before they had been declared guilty of *lèse-majesté*. Nevers's manifesto of 31 January 1617, issued in response to the edict of 17 January which pronounced him and his followers guilty of *lèse-majesté*, made clear such intention:

Sire, j'ay recogneu une marque singuliere de vostre equité & bien-vueillance envers moy, en ce qu'il vous plaist en faire surçoir (sic: surseoir) l'exécution [of the sentence of *lèse-majesté*], pour me donner moyen de deffendre mon innocence contre leurs calomnies, lesquelles j'ay desja cy devant descubertes à vostre Majesté par mes lettres du dixhuictiesme Decembre qui ont esté surprimez, afin qu'elles ne vinsent à vostre cognoissance, & je feray voir à vostre Majesté par des preuves irreprochables, la faulceté de toutes les occasions portees par ladite declaration [of 17 January 1617], sur lesquelles on pretend me rendre coupable, avec telle animosité, que mes pensees mesmes & intentions, ne sont pas exemptes de crimes, au jugement de ces esprits pationez (sic: passionée): Mais le tesmoignage de ma consciance me suffist pour le present, jusques à ce qu'il ait pleu à Dieu, qui en est seul Juge, vous donner plus de cognoissance de la verité, & de mon integrité: laquelle j'espere que vostre Majesté cognoistra clairement, à la confusion de la calomnie, lors qu'il luy plaira de me ouyr [through this manifesto], par ma bouche, qui est le plus grand honneur je sçaurois recevoir, d'avoir vostre Majesté pour Juge de mes actions, & de me pouvoir justifier

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<sup>25</sup> Cuttler, *Law of Treason*, pp. 114-115.

en sa presence, ou si elle l'a agreable en la Cour des Pairs, qui sont mes Juges naturels, à cause du rang & dignité, que par ma naissance, j'ay l'honneur de tenir en vostre Royaume...<sup>26</sup>

Here, Nevers's manifesto was using a rhetorical device which was customary of all the manifestos and open letters of the period in question: it appeared to address an eminent person or institution – Marie de Médicis, Louis XIII, a *parlement* or a grandee – when it was really addressing the wider political nation. Nevers's decision to appeal his case pre-emptively to the grandees was understandable. A trial by the Court of Peers was more likely to work in his favour, particularly when he was well-connected, and the incumbent government was extremely unpopular. In such a scenario, Nevers would probably command more of the sympathies of the grandee jurors than the prosecutor, that is, Concini's *ministériat*. It was precisely for the same reason Cardinal Richelieu refused the request of his rival, Henri, duc de Montmorency, to be tried by his peers in 1632. Richelieu recognised his own unpopularity with the foremost princes such as Orléans, Soissons, Vendôme and Guise, and discerned correctly that Montmorency had too many ties to other leading princes like Condé, Angoulême and Coligny. As such, there was no guarantee that these princes would cooperate in his *ministériat*'s attempt to convict Montmorency for his rebellion.

Montmorency was eventually tried and sentenced to death by the *Parlement de Toulouse*. His death bore witness to why it was equally important that the malcontent princes in 1614-17 made a special effort to deliver their printed letters and manifestos to the kingdom's *parlements*. As the highest courts of law and the courts of final appeal in France, the *parlements* could be called upon to hear the cases of *lèse-majesté*. Although often the French crown would bypass the *parlements* or the Court of Peers and summarily indict rebels using royal decrees issued directly from the king's councils, such decrees nevertheless required the formal registration of the *parlements* to come into effect. To send the *parlements* open letters and manifestos before and after the issuance of the king's decrees therefore was to appeal to the *parlements* to review and challenge these decrees, or at the very least delay their formal registration.

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<sup>26</sup> *Manifeste de Monsieur le Duc de Nevers. Sur la declaration contre luy faite sous le nom de Sa Majesté* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), pp. 3-4, BnF 8-LB36-927; *Coppie de la Lettre de Monsieur le Duc de Nevers, au Roy. Sur la Declaration contre luy faicte de la confiscation de ses biens* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), pp. 4-6.

What the malcontent princes were essentially trying to do here was to capitalise on the longstanding contests between the *parlements* and the royal councils on issues of juridical superiority, competence and boundary.<sup>27</sup> This was a classic legal tactic of this period. As with the kingdom's municipal administration, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century French legal structure was a patchwork of overlapping and competing jurisdictions in which various judicial courts, legal systems (Roman, customary and canon laws) and legal decrees (parlementary *arrêts*, royal declarations and municipal ordinances) operated alongside and often against each other.<sup>28</sup> More often than not, such a system allowed the defendants to delay or even escape the due process of law. The defendants could very easily hamper the pace of justice by appealing to a rival, an adjacent or a higher court, or by disputing the competence or partiality of a particular magistrate or court. In doing so, they could embroil their cases in the complex technical issues of the law or jurisdiction. They could also rely on the notorious punctiliousness of early modern legal procedures to bring their proceedings to a halt and delay the passing of sentences for several years and sometimes decades.<sup>29</sup> In the princes' case, they were looking to delay justice until the peace conferences, where they knew from historical precedents that the resultant royal edicts of pacification would usually revoke all previous indictments and formally absolve the parties involved from both the suspicions and the charges of *lèse-majesté*.

The princes' legal tactic to play off the rival courts of the *parlements* and the royal councils was therefore rooted in custom. It worked to a certain degree on 22 September 1615, as the *Parlement de Paris* refused to register the royal edict which declared Condé and his supporters guilty of *lèse-majesté*. The *Parlement* amended and registered the edict to indict Condé's supporters, but not Condé himself, on the basis that a conviction of such magnitude should be suspended until further deliberation. In its letter to the king, the *Parlement* explained that 'quand il s'agit de l'honneur d'un prince du sang, de procéder contre sa personne et sa postérité, nos pères nous ont appris tousjours de subsister et d'en remettre et différer les jours de la cognoissance.'<sup>30</sup>

The princes' decisions to use a printed aid in their legal appeals to the *grandees* and the *Parlements* were also rooted in custom. As the plaintiffs and defendants of this period

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<sup>27</sup> Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford, 2006), p. 190.

<sup>28</sup> Julie Hardwick, *Family Business: Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern France* (Oxford, 2009), p. 61.

<sup>29</sup> Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, p. 186. For examples, see: pp. 186-213.

<sup>30</sup> Molé, p. 97.



usually faced the judges alone without the accompaniment of their lawyers, the latter would draft legal briefs known as *factum* or *mémoire judiciaire* and present them to the judges on their clients' behalf.<sup>31</sup> Ranging from a few to a few hundred pages, the *factum* laid out an account of the case from the plaintiffs or defendants' point of view (*les faits*) and then a technical discussion (*les moyens*). They were consulted by the judges or read aloud in the courtroom to the judges before the final verdict would be passed.<sup>32</sup> Though originally handwritten, the *factum* was increasingly published from the sixteenth century onwards as a mean to inform friends, relatives and other interested parties of the details and progress of the case.<sup>33</sup> It was also published as weapon to combat the secretive nature of the judicial process. Its publication was seen as a way of ensuring equity and combatting clandestine corruption, intrigues and alterations of facts in the judges' chambers; dealings which many believed would be impossible if the case was fought out in the open.<sup>34</sup> According to the USTC, there are currently at least 114 known editions of *factums* published between 1551 and 1600. This number increased to a colossal 1,588 editions in 1601-50. One suspects however that there are a lot more editions of such documents left undiscovered and uncatalogued in the archives.

The manifesto was similar to the *factum* in more ways than one. It was drafted by men with legal training and experience, that is, the princes' secretaries and legal advisers. As with the *factum*, it was drafted for the purpose of laying out the facts and reasons for the princes' innocence which, as the princes had repeatedly argued in these documents, had thus far been deliberately concealed or misrepresented by their enemies at court. It was intended to be read and discussed by the magistrates in the *parlements* before they register any royal edicts which would convict the princes and their supporters of *lèse-majesté*. The manifesto was also intended to serve like a legal brief which would defend those rebels who were captured and arraigned by the courts of law, and which would be read and considered by the magistrates before they passed the sentence.

That the malcontent princes should be so preoccupied with the legal implications of their armed movement and so familiar with the legal options and devices that they had at hand to evade the dynastically ruinous charge of *lèse-majesté* was perhaps unsurprising. After

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<sup>31</sup> Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France* (Berkeley, CA, 1993), p. 35.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

all, early modern French *grandeues* considered the law to be a foremost instrument for dynastic preservation and advancement, and litigation as a way of life. At every point of their adult life, most French *grandeues* were beset by litigation over dynastic matters of tenancies, debts, disputed wills and marriage contracts; so much so that many of them decided to establish legal councils within their households and bought residences in Paris to improve their access to better legal counsel and courts. Many of them also laboured to cultivate good relationships with the magistrates in the *Parlements* and employed them in their households as *maîtres des requêtes*.<sup>35</sup>

### The Grounds of Appeal

Their constant exposure and profound experience with the law probably taught the malcontent princes and their predecessors that the charges of *lèse-majesté* laid against them by the king's council were by no means an open-and-shut case. There were viable grounds for appeal. The princes could firstly challenge the royal verdict and appeal to an adjacent court using the conventional and aforementioned method of disputing the competence or partiality of a particular magistrate or court. The malcontent princes in 1614-17 did exactly that. They pointed out repeatedly in their open letters and manifestos to the adjacent courts – the Court of Peers and the *parlements* – that the charges laid against them did not originate from the legitimate authority of Louis XIII. Rather, the charges originated from their enemies at court who had obviously appropriated the king's name to ruin them. Therefore, these charges could not by right be fair, lawful and enforceable.

In his open letter to Louis XIII in 1615, for example, the duc de Longueville claimed that his political rival Concini was bent on ruining him. Having failed previously to assassinate him in Amiens (allegedly), Concini formulated and disseminated a letter in the king's name to declare him guilty of *lèse-majesté*. Longueville argued that such a verdict could not possibly have emanated from the king, because the king had hitherto recognised the justness of his intentions and not reproached him for any matter.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Robert Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven, 1978), p. 177.

<sup>36</sup> *Lettre de monseigneur le duc de Longueville, au Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), p. 5, BM Lyon Rés 315179

Nevers appealed against the royal verdict in a similar fashion in 1617. The duc claimed in his manifesto of 31 January that it was not Louis XIII who sentenced him to *lèse-majesté*, but Concini who ‘faict servir vostre autorité (the king’s) de ma ruine (Nevers), abusant avec extreme mespris & audace insupportable du nom de vostre Majesté, pour exercer la violence de ses passions, aussi bien sur moy’.<sup>37</sup> For this reason, Nevers exhorted ‘Louis XIII’ to suspend the execution of the sentence and order a retrial, this time by an impartial jury:

cela me supplier treshumblement vostre Majesté de me donner les seuretés nécessaires, & pour ma personne, & pour mes maisons, & d’empescher par vostre autorité que ledit Mareschal d’Ancre, ny ses partisans puissent desormais prendre aucune cognoissance de ce qui me touche estans par trop suspects en cette cause, puisque notoirement ils n’ont aucun but que de ma ruyne, aussi bien que de vos autres fidelles sujets, & serviteurs, & affin que la justifice me soit rendues par des juges equitables, & non suspects ny passionnez, qu’il vous plaise appeller les Princes, Ducs, Pairs, & anciens officiers de vostre Couronne, & Conseiller d’estat, ... , au jugement desquels soit prés vostre personne, ou en ladicte Cour des Pairs, je me soubzmettray tousjours tres-vollontiers suivant les loix, & formes accoustumee, en vostre Royaume, pour faire voir mon innocence, & integrité de mes actions...<sup>38</sup>

In the same rebellion, Nevers’s associates appealed against their sentence using the same defence. Bouillon, Mayenne and Vendôme posited in their joint manifesto of February 1617 that their convictions of *lèse-majesté* were wilfully manufactured by a royal council dominated by their political enemies – Concini and his *créatures* – using the king’s name, so as to undermine the Treaty of Loudun which re-established justice in the kingdom and diminished Concini’s power, and to ruin those who opposed the favourite’s ambitions:

Et pour donner couleur à une si audacieuse entreprise, ils s’adviserent d’user de fausse accusations, & prenans pretexte de l’absence desdicts Princes & Seigneurs qui s’estoient retirés de Paris, ils firent aussi tost publier par leurs emissaires, qu’ils avoient eu dessein d’entreprendre contre la personne du Roy & de la Royne sa mere, & voulu persuader Monsieur le Prince de se joindre avec eux, pourquoy sa Majesté

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<sup>37</sup> *Manifeste de Monsieur le Duc de Nevers* (1617), pp. 3, 5.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

auroit esté conseillée de s'asseurer de sa personne. Et pour mieux faire recevoir ceste imposture & calomnie, ils envoyèrent de toutes parts des lettres sous le nom de sa Majesté dedans & dehors le Royaume, afin de la persuader aux subjects & aux estrangers, & surprendre les esprits foibles & susceptibles de leurs fausses impressions.<sup>39</sup>

The joint manifesto reiterated that the sentences of *lèse-majesté* which Bouillon, Mayenne and Vendôme had received could not have been delivered by Louis XIII, because the king was still an unknowing adolescent; moreover, he was currently held captive by Concini:

Et ceste legitime liberté a esté estouffée par violence, & leurs justes plaintes supprimées, afin qu'elles ne parvinssent aux oreilles de sa Majesté, laquelle, à cause de son aage, ne pouvant encores appercevoir les dangers, qui l'environnent, tout accès estant fermé à ceux qui l'en pourroient advertir, demeure captive sous la puissance de cest orgueilleux & insolent Estranger (Concini), qui ne luy laisse qu'une liberté imaginaire pour prison, & se sert audacieusement du nom auguste de sa Majesté & de son autorité Royale, pour declarer rebelles & criminels de leze Majesté tous ceux qui s'opposent à sa tyrannie & aux desseins...<sup>40</sup>

Apart from disputing the competence or partiality of the presiding magistrate or court, the malcontent princes would conventionally appeal against their sentences on the basis of the law itself. The Roman law which had pervaded the kingdom's customary laws since the twelfth century and formed the bedrock of its law of *lèse-majesté* offered a vital escape route. The princes could potentially evade the conviction of *lèse-majesté* if they could prove that the intentions behind their armed movements did not infract the obedience and service to which they owed the king. This was because the Roman law considered the intention of an accused to be of paramount importance. It drew distinctions between the degrees of intentionality. Intention in turn determined the extent of guilt and the severity of the penalty, with premeditated crimes warranting the severest penalties.<sup>41</sup> In other words, for

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<sup>39</sup> *Declaration et Protestation des Princes, Ducs, Pairs, Officiers de la Couronne... Contre la conjuration & tyrannie du Mareschal d'Ancre, & de ses adberens.* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), pp. 5-6, British Library 07761560, <[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=q4dmAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=q4dmAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false)>.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>41</sup> Paul Friedland, *Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment in France* (Oxford, 2012), p. 48.

an accused to be convicted, the Roman law required the prosecutor to prove beyond reasonable doubt the accused's intention to commit the crime.

This explains why the malcontent princes took great care to publicise and clarify the intentions behind their armed movements through the publication of open letters and manifestos. It accounts for the language and content of Condé's manifesto of February 1614 described at the beginning of this chapter, why the prince stated repeatedly and emphatically that his intentions were just. Indeed, the '*manifeste*' was defined as a public declaration of one's intentions in seventeenth-century France. The *Académie Française* in 1694 defined the *manifeste* 'as a public statement through which a person of great quality gives reason for his conduct in some affair of great consequence'.<sup>42</sup> A '*manifeste*' is not 'a public declaration of one's policies and aims' in the modern sense of the word.<sup>43</sup>

The same desire to prove intentions also informed the princes' decisions to formulate their *manifeste* in the format of a letter and to publish their open letters along with this *manifeste*. Magistrates in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France assessed an accused's intentions and guilt on the basis of the antecedent and concomitant facts (his reputation, language and comportment); the testimonies of the witnesses; and material evidence. Letters were considered to be one of the most important form of material evidence, as the magistrates believed that their contents were indicative of the correspondents' intent and often gave proof of conspiracy.<sup>44</sup> For this reason, it was not uncommon for the factums of this period to include excerpts of one's correspondence.

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
<sup>42</sup> *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, 1er ed.* (1694);

<sup>43</sup> *Oxford Dictionary of English* (online).

<sup>44</sup> Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, p. 196.

**Fig. 3.2: Example of a factum:**

*Factum relative à la collation du prieuré de la Charité, réclamée pour son fils par le duc de Nevers contre son cousin germain, le cardinal de Guise, 18 Octobre 1614* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 4-FM-6027. Note the inclusion of excerpts of previous letters written between Nevers and the cardinal de Guise on page 3 and 4.



The princes adopted two main lines of legal defences to disprove criminal intent. First, they tried to demonstrate that they had only taken up arms for the purpose of self-preservation, rather than rebellion against the crown. In doing so, they pleaded the precept of *'vim vi repellere licet'*, or 'force may repel force' in Roman law. Roman law had granted one the right to use force to defend against a violent attack on one's life or property because it believed that both the *ius naturale* (natural law) and the *ius gentium* (law of nations) allowed one

the right to self-defence.<sup>45</sup> Hence, the princes could technically argue that the acts which constituted *lèse-majesté*, such as leaving court and raising troops without the crown's authorisation, were blameless at law if they were undertaken with the intention of preserving one's lives and properties.

In the princely rebellions of 1614-17, several princes and their adherents developed this line of argument in their open letters and joint manifestoes. Henri-Marc de Gouffier, marquis de Bonnivet, for example, pleaded self-defence when he was charged with the crime of *lèse-majesté* in the autumn of 1615 for attempting to muster military and financial assistance for the princes in England. In his open letter to the king, Bonnivet argued that he had not communicated with a foreign enemy to the detriment of the state. Rather, he had only desired to discover the true cause of Henri IV's death, which promptly made him an enemy of those who had perpetrated the crime. They had attached a petard to his house in Amiens and sent two men to assassinate him. Therefore, to protect his own life, he was forced to seek refuge in England. The English, Bonnivet maintained, were not an enemy of France, but an ancient ally who were thereby interested in the real cause of Henri IV's death.<sup>46</sup>

In the rebellion of September 1616, the princes argued that they had only left court and raised troops without the king's permission because the recent summary imprisonment of Condé had given them a compelling reason to question the crown's intention to honour the Treaty of Loudun and guarantee their personal safety. In his open letter and later in his manifesto to the king, the duc de Guise sought the understanding of the king for his and his brothers' decision to flee Paris. The duc argued that, unless the basis of Condé's arrest was very clear, and the evidence of his guilt beyond doubt, it was difficult for him and his brothers to entrust the safety of their persons to the king's treaties and assurances, for there was no reason to believe that the extra-judicial procedures used against Condé would not be used against them.<sup>47</sup> Guise's line of defence was likewise used in the princes' joint manifesto of 7 September 1616 and again in their joint manifesto of 5 March 1617. Here, the princes argued that Concini, Galigai and their *créatures* had violated the public faith and contrived the unjustified detainment of Condé. The princes claimed the favourites and their *créatures* had

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<sup>45</sup> Kathleen Parrow, *From Defense to Resistance: Justification of Violence during the French Wars of Religion* (Philadelphia, 1993), pp. 15-16.

<sup>46</sup> *Lettre de Monsieur le Marquis de Bonnivet écrite au Roy*. (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-5, BM Lyon Rés 315255.

<sup>47</sup> *Lettre envoyée au Roy par monsieur le duc de Guyse. Sur l'arrest fait de la personne de monsieur le Prince* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), p. 4, BM Lyon Rés 315193; *Le manifeste et déclaration de monsieur le duc de Guyse, sur son absence, au Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), p. 6, BnF 8-LB-874.

plans to attack the persons of other princes, seize their lands and undertake malicious enterprises against them. The princes therefore had to stay away from the court and make military preparations to protect themselves from such oppression.<sup>48</sup>

Mayenne and Bouillon brought forward their own grounds of appeal before the joint manifesto of March 1617 was even published. In January 1617, Mayenne published his letter to the king in which he claimed that an assassin had recently been sent from Paris to Soissons to kill him, and other violent enterprises had also been attempted on his *places de sûreté*. Mayenne maintained that he was thereby compelled to continue his absence from court and his maintenance of arms for the sake of his own safety.<sup>49</sup> A month before, Bouillon also published his letter to the king in which he claimed that Ambrogio Spinola had attacked his principality of Sedan. Even though the Genoese military enterpriser was hired by Marie de Médicis to stop the princes from levying mercenaries in the Spanish Netherlands, Bouillon capitalised on Spinola's history as a military contractor of the Habsburgs to argue that Spinola and the Habsburgs were attempting to seize the vital fortress of Sedan on France's northeast border. Bouillon explained that his decision to fortify Sedan was motivated by his intentions to secure the king's frontier at Champagne, and more importantly, to conserve his principality. Self-defence, Bouillon insisted, was allowed by natural law:

Puisque les desseins que les estrangers ont projectté contre ceste place, continuent & m'obligent de pourvoir de bonne heure à ma seureté, il me reste, Sire, d'esclaircir à vostre Majesté ainsi qu'il luy plaist me commander par ses lettres, de ce que j'ay entendu, quand je l'ay supplié d'avoir agreable, qu'au besoin j'use des remedes & moins (sic: moyens) legitimes, que la nature permet à un chacun pour sa propre deffence & conservation, la Nature apprend à un chacun de conserver le sien, & l'oblige de le laisser à sa posterité.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> *Remonstrance envoyée au Roy, par Messieurs les Princes, Ducs & Pairs, & Officiers de la Couronne, sur la detention de Monseigneur le Prince* (Soissons: s.n., 1616), pp. 5-6, BM Lyon Rés 315208; *Declaration et protestation des Princes* (1617), p. 19.

<sup>49</sup> *Lettre de monsieur le duc de Mayenne, au Roy. Avec la response à icelle par Sa Majesté*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), pp. 2-3, BM Lyon 315349.

<sup>50</sup> *Lettres de monsieur le mareschal de Bouillon, au Roy & à la Royne mere, ensemblé la response du Roy, & la réplique dudit sieur duc de Bouillon* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), pp. 1-2, 4, 12-14, BnF 8-LB36-916(A).



The cunning of the legal defences of Mayenne and Bouillon was not lost on their opponents. In the royal declaration of February 1617 which he had drafted and published in response to the princes' open letters and manifesto, Richelieu underlined to the audience what Mayenne and Bouillon were trying to accomplish with their open letters and later joint manifesto:

ceux qui ont de bons desseins n'ont qu'à esperer aupres d'elle, & rien à craindre: & que partant dire qu'il n'y a point de seureté pres de sa personne [the king], c'est un pur pretexte dont ceux qui s'en sont volontairement retirez se veulent servir pour couvrir la prise de leurs armes, comme si elle estoit fondee sur la droict de nature qui oblige un chacun à se conserver & se deffendre.<sup>51</sup>

Alongside the legal justification of self-defence, the second and more prominent line of legal defence used by the princes to disprove criminal intent was to demonstrate and argue that their armed movement was solely intended to preserve the integrity of the crown and the well-being of the kingdom. Far from being a manifestation of the princes' public-spiritedness and *devoir de révolte* which Arlette Jouanna would have one believe and which chapter one has already called into question; and far from being an unimaginative and unsophisticated trope to justify every aristocratic rebellion against the crown, these claims reflected the princes' acute and nuanced understanding of the law.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, they demonstrated the princes' skilfulness at exploiting certain legal ambiguities brought about by the rise of the *mos gallicus*.

The *mos gallicus* was a humanist approach to the law which had begun in France and thereupon went on to become the mainstay of the kingdom's legal system and education by the early sixteenth century. The *mos gallicus* placed heavy emphasis on the role of the interpreter and the interpretation of the law. Developed by humanists, it naturally considered the linguistic context of the law to be of the utmost importance. It assumed that the law evolved with time and place like languages. In determining if an action had contravened the law, students and practitioners should not to adhere strictly to the contemporary meanings of the words and phrases of the written law; for the written law was not the law, but merely a

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<sup>51</sup> *Declaration du Roy sur le subject des nouveaux remuements de son Royaume* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), p. 14, BM Lyon Rés 315338.

<sup>52</sup> Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'état moderne (1559-1661)* (Paris, 1989).

medium to ‘make the sense of the law and the intention of the legislator visible’.<sup>53</sup> Students and practitioners should instead assess the historical context of the law to interpret the original meanings of the legislators’ choice of words and phrases. More importantly, they should interpret the original intentions of the legislators for laying down such a law, which, they could presume, would always be for the common good.<sup>54</sup> In other words, student and practitioners should determine if an action had contravened the original spirit of the law, rather than the current letter of the law.

The pervasiveness of the *mos gallicus* and its emphasis on interpreting and complying with the original spirit of the law incidentally provided a legal loophole which the princes could exploit. The princes could exonerate themselves from the crime of *lèse-majesté* by arguing that while their actions had contravened the letter of that law, the underlying intentions of their actions had conformed with the original intentions of the legislators and jurists who had formulated and refined that law. And considering that intention was of paramount importance in determining guilt in Roman law, they should not be deemed to have been guilty of the crime. It was no wonder the malcontent princes attempted to demonstrate and argue time after time in their open letters and manifestos that they had no intentions other than to preserve the integrity of the crown and the well-being of the kingdom.<sup>55</sup> The princes’ purpose was to make plain that the intentions of their armed movements corresponded directly with the original intentions of the law of *lèse-majesté*, which was none other than to protect the sovereignty of the king and the interest and peace of the commonwealth.

As it is impossible to dissect and analyse every letter and manifesto in detail in this study, this point shall be illustrated with a manifesto and several letters which were salient

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<sup>53</sup> Ian Maclean, *Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 87-88.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94, 97-98.

<sup>55</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince. A la Royne* (1614); *Lettre de Monsieur de Vendosme au Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-212(D); *Second lettre de Monsieur de Vendosme, au Roy* (Paris: Melchoir Mondière, 1614), BnF 8-LB-217(C); *Lettre de Monsieur de Vendosme a la Royne, sur son entree à Vannes le 15. Juin 1614* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), BnF 8-LB36-300(A); *Lettre de Monseigneur le duc de Longueville* (1615); *Lettre presentee au Roy par le sieur de Buisson, au nom, & par l’avis de ceux de la Religion reformee touchant le voyage du Roy.* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315253; *Lettre envoyee a Monsieur le Prince de Condé, par les Mairs & Eschevins de la Rochelle* (Paris: Pierre des Hayes, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315214; *Articles accordez entre Monseigneur le Prince, & les deputez de l’assemblee generale de Nismes, au nom de ceux de la Religion de ce Royaume, & pays & souveraineté de Bearn* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF LB36-706; *Le Herault d’Armes. A Monsieur le duc de Vendosme* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF 8-LB36-792(A); *Copie de la Lettre envoyee au Roy par Monsieur le Prince de Condé, pour la paix.* (Paris: Denys Langlois, 1616), BM Lyon Rés 315206; *Remonstrance envoyee au Roy... sur la detention de Monseigneur le Prince* (Soissons: s.n., 1616), BM Lyon Rés 315208; *Lettre de Monseigneur le Duc de Nevers au Roy, contre le calomnies qui ont esté publiees contre luy* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF 4-LB36-913; *Lettres de Monsieur le mareschal de Bouillon* (1616); *Declaration et Protestation des Princes* (1617).

and archetypal of their genre. In his manifesto of August 1615, published in at least 14 separate editions, Condé claimed that several ministers were seeking to profit from the kingdom's ruin. They sought to silence grievances and retard reforms by rigging the elections to the *États généraux* and influencing its deputies' *cabiers*.<sup>56</sup> They prevented the *Parlement de Paris* from summoning the Court of Peers to discuss and propose necessary solutions to the kingdom's problems following the unsuccessful *États généraux*.<sup>57</sup> And when the *Parlement* presented its *Remonstrances* on 22 May 1615, the ministers convinced the king and the queen mother to declare the *Remonstrances* seditious, and its authors, rebellious. They also had the king and the queen mother order the *Remonstrances* to be suppressed and erased from the registers of the court.<sup>58</sup> As such, the ministers had crushed the latest attempts at reforms once more. But this was not all. They then persuaded the king and the queen mother to conclude the Spanish marriages; an endeavour which had greatly undermined the kingdom's security, for it had alarmed and alienated its Huguenot population as well as its ancient allies.<sup>59</sup>

The princes, Condé argued, were compelled by their duty to the king and the kingdom to oppose the ministers and their machinations. He had tried on several occasions to counsel and warn the king and the queen mother, but his efforts were obstructed or misrepresented by the ministers as suspicious and odious.<sup>60</sup> He and his associates, Condé maintained, were consequently forced to conceive the latest armed movement. Rather than preconceived from the beginning, their armed movement was a last-ditch attempt to inform the king of the malfeasances and disorders in his affairs and to depose the ministers who had been instigating confusions, muffling grievances and obstructing reforms (the princes had always attempted to prove that the rebellions were not premeditated because premeditated crimes warranted the greatest degree of guilt and penalty in Roman law). The armed movement was therefore intended to safeguard the welfare of the kingdom, just like the law of *lèse-majesté*.

Condé insisted the princes' armed movement was also intended to conserve the king's life and sovereignty. He claimed that the ministers had exposed the king's life to

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<sup>56</sup> *Manifeste et justification, des actions de Monsieur le Prince* (Sedan: Jean Janon, 1615), pp. 4-6, 8-9, 15, BM Lyon Rés 315190.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-21.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

assassins' knives and undermined his sovereignty when they suppressed the First Article of the Third Estate and propagated the theory that the French crown was subordinated to another power (read: the pope).<sup>61</sup> They had undermined the king's sovereignty even further when they advanced the Spanish marriages which could lead to the domination of his affairs by Madrid. Besides the ministers, the queen mother's favourite, Concini, had also endangered the king's life when he introduced his Jewish magicians, poisoners, assassins and *créatures* into the royal households. At the same time, Concini had compromised the king's sovereignty when he arrogated the king's authority to raise taxes for his own gains. Moreover, he had usurped the king's role as the key arbiter and dispenser of pensions, benefices and *gouvernements*, and consequently redirected to himself the loyalty and service of the king's subjects.<sup>62</sup> The princes were therefore once again bound by their duty to oppose these contrivances. Their latest armed movement aimed to force the promulgation of the First Article of the Third Estate as the kingdom's fundamental law, the revocation of the Spanish marriages and the deposal of the ministers and Concini. In short, like the law of *lèse-majesté*, it intended to protect the king's life and suzerainty.

Condé then published his previous letters to the eminent ducs de Nevers and de Guise as supplementary materials to prove that his intentions had hitherto been constant, that the claims in his manifesto were not isolated and recently fabricated. In these letters, the prince explained to Nevers and Guise that his absence from court was caused by his longstanding discontentment with the disorders in the kingdom and its affairs, which the *État généraux*, the *Parlement de Paris* and the members of the public had echoed. Yet, the ministers continued to hold his discontentment and counsel in contempt. They also evaded the resolutions of the *États généraux*, ignored the *Remonstrances* of the *Parlement*, and suppressed the grievances and clamours of the people. Condé averred that he was concerned with impending ruin and divisions of the kingdom. He argued that his birth, virtue and interest in the conservation of the state obliged him to leave court to inform the king of his humble remonstrations, name the authors of the kingdom's ills, and propose remedies and punishments.<sup>63</sup> Condé therefore drove home the point that he and his associates could not reasonably be adjudged as guilty of *lèse-majesté*, for the intentions of their armed movement were just and conformed with the intentions of the law of *lèse-majesté*.

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-13.

<sup>63</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince, écrite à Monseigneur de Guise*. (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-5, BM Lyon Rés 315715; *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince, écrite à Monseigneur le duc de Nevers*. (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-5, BM Lyon Rés 315163.

## The Prosecutor's Ruling and Statements

The governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini were forced to counteract the princes' efforts to sidestep the charge of *lèse-majesté* and concomitantly, convince their clients and sympathisers to lend their support to the armed movements. The governments did so by publishing a great number of royal declarations and edicts in an attempt to set the record straight once and for all:

**Table 3.2: Production of Royal Declarations and Edicts**

| Rebellion         | Total Pamphlet production | General Declarations against the Princes and their Adherents | Specialised Edicts and Directives against the levy of troops and seizures of royal coffers, and etc. | % of total   |
|-------------------|---------------------------|--|--|--------------|
| Feb 1614—May 1614 | 425                       | 0  | 7  | 1.6%         |
| Aug 1615—May 1616 | 886                       | 52   | 18   | 7.9%         |
| Sep 1616—Apr 1617 | 278                       | 59   | 24   | 29.9%        |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>1,589</b>              | <b>111</b>   | <b>49</b>  | <b>10.1%</b> |

The royal declarations, proclaimed and published throughout the kingdom, made it unequivocally clear that the princes' armed movements constituted a rebellion against the crown and an offence against the peace and welfare of the state. They amounted to the crime of *lèse-majesté*. Any forms of support, in the present or in the future, for these movements would therefore be considered in the same light without exceptions and punished accordingly as stated in the declarations.

The royal declarations aimed to induce and renew fears of the crime of *lèse-majesté*, and prompt those who had declared for the princes' armed movements to renege; or those who were considering declaring for the princes, to reconsider. The declarations also aimed to facilitate conviction. They were designed specifically to rob these two groups of individuals of the pretext of service to the king and the state. Furthermore, they were devised to prevent any attempt to plead ignorance or mistaken belief about the nature and status of the armed movements.

The royal declaration of 13 February 1617 offers a typical example of its genre. This declaration proclaimed that because Bouillon, Mayenne, Vendôme, Cœuvres, and Le Jay had continued their association and collaboration with Nevers who had been declared guilty of treason, because they had seized the royal coffers, levied troops and fortified their fortresses without the king's permission, and because they had instigated the officers and *gouverneurs* of the king's cities and citadels to participate in their violence, their actions were detrimental to the king's authority and his subjects' welfare, and must be punished accordingly. The declaration hereby proclaimed these individuals to be guilty of *lèse-majesté*, their titles and appointments revoked and their lands reunited to the royal domain. The declaration also hereby proclaimed that any adherents of these individuals, current and future, would be pursued, convicted and punished for the same crime. However, these individuals and their current adherents had a grace period of 15 days to abandon their endeavours and return to obedience. The latter must return to their homes and present themselves before their local authority to renew their oaths of allegiance to the king and swear never to participate in such prejudicial enterprises again.<sup>64</sup> Then in March 1617, the government published a second declaration to remind the king's subjects of the severity of the crime and to demonstrate that, unlike the previous occasions, it now had every intention of enforcing its stipulations. This declaration proclaimed that since the princes had not returned to obedience within the stated grace period, the punishments of *lèse-majesté* would apply. The princes' *duchés-pairies*, *comtés*, *seigneuries* and lands would hereby be incorporated into the royal domain.<sup>65</sup>

The governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini used royal edicts to complement the royal declarations against the princes. These edicts prescribed the detailed guidelines that were absent in the general royal declarations to further ensure that no one could plead ignorance or mistaken belief. The *lettre patente du roy* of November 1616, for instance, specifically forbade all subjects from levying and assembling troops without a royal commission, or serving anyone who had not been appointed by a royal commission. Foreseeing that the princes would use forged documents to excuse their supporters or fool

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<sup>64</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre les Ducs de Vendosme, de Mayenne, Mareschal de Buillon, Marquis de Cœuvres, le President le Jay, & tous ceux qui les assistent.* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), pp. 5-12, BM Lyon Rés 315336. See also: *Declaration du Roy, contre Monsieur le Duc de Nevers, & tous ceux qui l'assistent.* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315333.

<sup>65</sup> *Declaration du Roy, pour le Réünion à so Domaine, & confiscation des biens des Duc de Nevers, de Vendosme, de Mayenne, Mareschal de Buillon, Marquis de Cœuvres, & President le Jay* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), pp. 4-6, BM Lyon Rés 315337.

the unsuspecting, the *lettre patente* specified that the royal commission must be signed by one of the *secrétaires d'État* and sealed by the great seal of France. It then spelt out the injunctions and directives once more, before warning all that some of the king's subjects (read: the princes) were currently recruiting men of war. It declared that the movement was conceived with wrongful intentions, in contempt of the king's authority and prejudicial to his service and public peace. Any failure to observe the injunctions stated would hereby amount to the crime of *lèse-majesté*.<sup>66</sup>

The governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini left nothing to chance. To address any possibility of uncertainty concerning the law of *lèse-majesté*, they published royal edicts to spell out the specific types of actions that would constitute a breach of that law. There were specific edicts to forbid the raising of troops within and beyond the kingdom without royal permission; participation in any armed movements; acts of hostilities towards the king's subjects; unauthorised seizure of the king's citadels and treasury; and unauthorised imprisonment of the king's officers.<sup>67</sup> There were even edicts to forbid the types of action which in the public mind would not normally or immediately be associated with the crime of *lèse-majesté*. A broadsheet that has survived, which was originally intended to be affixed to the busiest and most prominent places around towns to inform and remind the king's subjects of a specific law after its public declaration, conveyed the king's orders that all subjects were forbidden from lending any sums of money to, all notaries, from drawing up any monetary contracts and obligations for, and all merchants and blacksmiths, from selling any arms, ammunitions and merchandises to the adherents of Condé, Vendôme, Mayenne and Bouillon, on the pain of death and confiscation of property.<sup>68</sup> This was a draconian but far-sighted attempt to cut the rebels off from logistical support.

Whilst useful for deterrence, the emphatic proclamations of the royal declarations and edicts were not wholly sufficient. They did not invalidate the legal defence of self-preservation, or the defence that the spirit of the law had not been breached. These legal devices and ambiguities remained there for the determined to exploit. Therefore, to convict

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<sup>66</sup> *Lettres patentes du Roy, portant defenses à tous ses subjects...de porter les armes sinon sous la charge & conduite de ceux qui auront commission de sa Majesté.* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1616), pp. 3-5, BM Lyon Rés 315313.

<sup>67</sup> For example, see: *Arrest de la Cour des Aydes contre les Commissions de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, touchant, la levee des deniers du Roy.* (Lyon: Nicolas Jullieron, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315270; *Arrest de la Cour de Parlement, contre le Prince de Condé, & autres Princes, Seigneurs, & Gentils-hommes, qui sans permission du Roy, & contre son auctorité, depuis son absence ont pris les armes...* (Lyon: Nicolas Jullieron, 1615), pp. 3-5, BM Lyon Rés 315264.

<sup>68</sup> *Ordonnance du Roy portant défense de prester soit a rente, soit a Interest ou autrement aux adherence du Prince de Condé, Ducs de Vendosme, de Mayenne et de Bouillon* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF Z Fontanieu-160(12).

the princes and their adherents and to convince the Parlementaires and grandees to cooperate, the governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini had to unpick the princes' legal arguments one by one. They did so by responding to the princes' open letters with their own open replies, and parried the princes' manifestos with lengthier royal declarations which incorporated detailed justifications for their verdicts against the princes.

Against the legal defence of self-preservation, the governments' open letters to the princes and declarations pointed out to the public the improbability of the princes' claims. It was ludicrous and inconceivable to think, they argued, that an honourable king like Louis XIII would not abide by his edict of pacification which guaranteed the princes' personal safety, or that the latter should feel unsafe in his presence and court, under the aegis of his grace and justice.<sup>69</sup> The governments' open letters and declarations then tried to force the princes to reveal their hands. For instance, in 'the king's' public response to Mayenne's open letter in 1617, 'the king' offered to give Mayenne the benefit of the doubt. He was ready to believe that an assassination attempt had really been made against Mayenne, and attacks had been made on his *places de sûreté*. 'The king' promised to guarantee the safety of Mayenne's person and properties. He vowed to prosecute the assassin and his conspirators accordingly in the *Parlement de Paris*, and to defend Mayenne's *places de sûreté*. Mayenne should from here on feel safe to lay down his arms and return to court.<sup>70</sup> At a stroke, the king's open response had effectively robbed Mayenne of his pretext of self-defence. With his safety guaranteed personally by the king, the duc had to cease his armed endeavours and return to court or risk exposing his lies and pretexts.

The governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini were equally up to the task of picking apart the princes' other line of defence. In their open letters to the princes and declarations, they attempted to demonstrate that the princes' armed movements were never conceived to protect the person and sovereignty of the king, or the welfare and peace of his kingdom. These purported intentions were feigned; a veneer to hide the princes' real intentions—to advance their personal standing and interests. The intentions of the princes' armed movements therefore differed from the original intentions of the law of *lèse-majesté*. The princes, it followed, had contravened both the letter and the spirit of the law.

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<sup>69</sup> *Declaration du Roy sur le subject des nouveaux remuements...* (1617), pp. 4-5

<sup>70</sup> *Lettre de Monsieur le Duc de Mayenne au Roy, avec la response...* (1617), pp. 4-8.



In her public response to Condé's letter of February 1614 (written in truth by Villeroy), Marie de Médicis questioned if the prince's intentions were sincere.<sup>71</sup> Condé had claimed that he had only armed to force the convocation of the *États généraux* to address the disorders and confusions in the regency government's affairs, but Marie argued that such allegations against her regency were unfounded. She then systemically refuted each of the prince's accusations to demonstrate that, on the contrary, the kingdom had been in a better shape since she took over the reins. An *États généraux*, Marie implied, was not really necessary as the prince wanted everyone to believe. Hence, it was most probably a pretext; Condé's mean to other ends. In a similar fashion, Marie de Médicis questioned if Condé had really needed to take up arms to oppose several malfeasant ministers, for such individuals did not exist in her regency government. The ministers who had served her, Marie argued, had helped her preserved peace at home and in Europe. They had sustained the policies of Henri IV, administered her finances prudently, fostered a working relationship between her and the Huguenots, and honoured her commitments to the kingdom's ancient allies.<sup>72</sup> Condé could not reasonably have wanted, Marie implied, to depose ministers who had been loyal and dutiful. Thus, his decision to take up arms must be inspired by another agenda.

Marie – or Villeroy – peppered her public response with anecdotes and personal reflections to steer her readers towards a logical conclusion about the intentions of Condé and his associates. She wondered why the prince had to wait four years to inform her of the urgent matters that had troubled him, when he knew that she would have rectified them immediately had he done so.<sup>73</sup> Marie also wondered why the prince had to take up arms to address the disorders and confusions in the kingdom, when he knew that a civil war would only aggravate problems, presuming there were any.<sup>74</sup> Marie pointed out to her readers that for all his purported opposition to the Spanish marriages, Condé had in truth endorsed the marriages officially in 1612 as necessary and appropriate for the age and grandeur of the king. His associate, Bouillon, had even served as her extraordinary ambassador to England to reassure the English that the marriage would not lead to France's abandonment of her Protestant allies.<sup>75</sup> Marie beseeched her readers not to believe the princes' claims of service to

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<sup>71</sup> For Villeroy's authorship, see Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, pp. 34-36.

<sup>72</sup> *Double de la response de la royne regente*, pp. 5-20.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

the king and state, for it was clear that these were merely adopted to conceal their real intentions.<sup>76</sup>

Marie de Médicis too attempted to force Condé to expose his own lies. In the same public response, Marie challenged the prince to prove his noble intentions by returning to the court immediately and placing himself next to her and the king, where he could better inform them of the present situation and propose his solutions for reforms. And if the prince did not conduct himself accordingly, it would imply that he was not really serious about his claims of service to the king and the state. Cardinals du Perron and de Sourdis quickly backed up the regent's cunning tactic. In his own open letter to Condé, Sourdis advised the prince to cease his armed movement, for this remedy was worse for the kingdom than the ills it proposed to treat. He urged Condé to return to the side of the king and the regent, where he could conjoin himself to their sincere intentions to serve the glory of God and the interests and peace of the state.<sup>77</sup> Du Perron likewise maintained that Condé's solutions for the reformation of the state would be better executed if the prince could assist the regent in person. Du Perron was more forthright about the potential ramification of his challenge. If Condé chose not to return to court immediately, he warned, the prince's purported good intentions would thereupon be understood by all as pretexts.<sup>78</sup>

Marie de Médicis not only attempted to prove that Condé and his associates had broken both the letter and the spirit of the law, she also tried to demonstrate that their crime was preconceived and deliberate. Hence, according to the Roman law which distinguished between degrees of intentionality and allocate guilt and penalty proportionally, it was reasonable for the crown to pass the full sentence of *lèse-majesté* against the princes. During the rebellion of 1614, for instance, Marie published her letters to the *Parlement de Bretagne* and the maréchal de Lesdiguières where she suggested that the princes had conspired to rebel against the crown all along. The evidence, Marie hinted, lay in their deliberate attempts to deceive her in the weeks running up to the rebellion. The princes had manifested no signs of discontent. They told her that they were leaving court to visit their provincial homes and to hunt, and even promised to return to court at a moment's notice.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>77</sup> *Response de Monsieur le cardinal de Sourdis*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>78</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur de cardinal du Perron*, p. 6.

<sup>79</sup> *Lettre de la Royne au Parlement de Bretagne* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), p. 3, BnF 8-LB36-195(A); *Coppie de la lettre escrite à Monsieur Desdiguières par la Royne* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), p. 2, BnF 8-LB36-194.

The same could be said for the rebellion of 1615. Marie argued that she had already negotiated with the princes and conceded to their demands for reforms. The princes would have accepted her offers or continued the negotiations if they were sincere about their public concerns and demands. But they were not. They refused her offers and raised their demands to an unreasonable level in an attempt to ruin the negotiations. And when the negotiations were broken off, they claimed that they were now compelled to take up arms to press her for reforms because their previous peaceful and humble entreaties were ignored or refused. It was therefore clear, Marie insinuated, that rebellion was not the princes' last option, but their plan from the very beginning.

Marie de Médicis and her allies substantiated this theory in 'the king's' open letter to the *Parlement de Paris*, published in August 1615, on the eve of the court's departure to Bordeaux.<sup>80</sup> The open letter detailed the series of events which preceded Condé's rebellion to demonstrate to the public the prince's unyielding, deliberate and unjustified bids to oppose the queen mother's government. 'The king' revealed in this letter that he and his mother had asked Condé to accompany them on their journey to Bordeaux to conclude the Spanish marriages. They had dispatched to him the comtesse de Soissons, the duc de Nevers and Villeroy to inform him of their will and to learn of the reasons for his absence from court. Condé replied that he would like them to institute reforms to the kingdom's disorders and consider the *Parlement's Remonstrances* and other specific requests of his. So the king and the queen mother sent Villeroy to the prince for second time, this time to promise him that they would reform the royal councils as the prince wished. The latter acknowledged the promise. However, he maintained that he could not negotiate on other issues without first consulting his friends. A few days later, the king and the queen mother sent Villeroy to Condé for the third time to assure him of their goodwill. They revealed that they had given Villeroy even more powers to redress the prince's grievances. Then again a few days later, they dispatched Pontchartrain to Condé to inform him on the urgency of the matter and obtain his decision.

Despite all of the king and the queen mother's efforts to appease Condé, the prince still refused to accompany them to Bordeaux. Condé complained of the haste of the departure. In his opinion, the mere promise to reform the royal council was also inadequate. He would only agree to accompany them to Bordeaux after the reform had actually been put

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<sup>80</sup> I've written the king in inverted commas because Louis XIII did not actually this open letter to the *Parlement de Paris*.

in place.<sup>81</sup> It finally dawned upon him then, ‘the king’ explained, that the prince had no intention of negotiating or obtaining the reforms as he claimed. Instead, he was trying to exact unreasonable demands to cripple the negotiations, delay the voyage and ultimately, ruin the marriages. ‘The king’ learnt from Condé’s confidants that the prince’s obstinacy, as well as that of his associates, was in truth fuelled by their longstanding failure to obtain the satisfaction of their private interests from the king and the queen mother.<sup>82</sup> Condé and his associates, ‘the king’ implied, had therefore conspired from the outset to use arms to force the crown to accede to their self-interested demands.<sup>83</sup>

### The Honourable Rebellion

The princes’ preoccupation with the charges of *lèse-majesté* did not end with the start of the peace negotiations with the crown. They took great care to ensure that the resultant edicts of pacification would entail the crown’s public revocation of the charges of *lèse-majesté* laid against them and their supporters, and its public declaration of their uninterrupted innocence. The princes were keen to prevent the stigma of having rebelled against the crown and the loss of respect and admiration from their superiors, peers and subordinates. In other words, they were keen to prevent dishonour.

Honour in early modern France denoted political and social esteem. It was measured and conferred on the basis of one’s precedence in ancestry, rank, appointment and wealth. It was also conferred on the basis of one’s reputation for exceptional service to the crown, in peacetime through one’s political offices or in wartime through military leadership and performance. Likewise, it factored in one’s reputation for masculine virtues such as ambition, valour and loyalty to the king, patrons and friends; one’s reputation for maintaining dominance in one’s household and social relations; as well as one’s reputation for preserving

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<sup>81</sup> *Declaration de la volonte du roy adressee a nosseigneurs de sa Cour de Parlement* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-6, BnF F-46927(21). This letter was also published as: *Declaration du Roy faites a messieurs de la Court de Parlement. Sur son voyage.* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BnF F-46927(17).

<sup>82</sup> *Declaration de la volonte du roy...* (1615), pp. 6-7.

<sup>83</sup> In 1617, ‘the king’ once again attempted to demonstrate that the princes’ latest rebellion was premeditated. In ‘his’ open letter to Nevers, ‘the king’ chronicled how Nevers tried to challenge the crown as early as 1614. And after the Treaty of Sainte-Ménehould, Nevers feigned his loyalty to the crown. In 1615 and 1616, he tricked the king in granting him commissions to raise troops and appointing him as a mediator between the princes and the crown at Loudun. Nevers abused the king’s trust and used these means to advance the princes’ interests at his expense. His current rebellion was merely a continuation of his treachery. See: *Declaration du Roy, contre monsieur le duc de Nevers* (1617), pp. 3-5.

or advancing one's dynastic standing. Above all, it took into account one's reputation for being able to accomplish all these at a level expected of one's lineage and rank.<sup>84</sup>

Honour was conferred, as Louis de Chabans explained in 1615, not by an authority but by the 'common opinion'.<sup>85</sup> 'Honour is not in his hand who is honoured, but in the hearts and opinions of other men.'<sup>86</sup> Honour was concomitantly a highly unstable quality. It was continuously calibrated and re-calibrated as one's superiors, peers and subordinates scrutinised and evaluated each of one's actions and incidents.<sup>87</sup> The instability of honour was compounded by the relative and subjective nature of precedence and reputation: precedence of rank or office depended on its rarity and exclusivity. The absence of clear guidelines to determine the pecking order of ranks or offices left room for interpretation and dispute. Similarly, reputation was relative and subjective. To judge that one was excellent on the battlefield was to judge that one excelled over the others. Yet, many would differ in their opinions on what qualified as excellence, the degrees of excellence and the candidate most deserving of renown.<sup>88</sup>

Because honour was so predicated on the ever-changing 'common opinion', and its bases of precedence and reputation so relative and subjective to the same public whims, a nobleman was very self-conscious and felt the need to be constantly 'on show'. He was constantly trying to masquerade as some man of higher worth and repute.<sup>89</sup> He compared himself obsessively with others, and strove perpetually for opportunities and rewards in the form of political offices, military duties and better titles to distinguish, display and establish his virtues and service to the *maison* and the crown. He was forever courting the attention and esteem of his superiors, peers and subordinates, forever trying to cultivate and correct their opinion of his person and actions. He was likewise excessively sensitive to the behaviour and language of others, and was quick to take offence at any public remarks or

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<sup>84</sup> Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, pp. 49-59; Edmund H. Dickerman and Anita M. Walker, 'The Politics of Honour: Henri IV and the Duke of Bouillon, 1602-1606', *French History* 14 (2000), pp. 384-387; Arlette Jouanna, 'Recherches sur la notion d'honneur au xvi<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 15 (1968), pp. 597-623; Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 2010), pp. 151-185.

<sup>85</sup> Louis de Chabans, *Advis et moyens pour empêcher le desordre des Duels* (Paris: Denys Langlois, 1615), p. 9, BnF 8-J-5004; I use the translation from Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, p. 49.

<sup>86</sup> Quoted in Dickerman and Walker, 'The Politics of Honour', p. 386.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 385-387.

<sup>88</sup> Julian Pitt-Rivers, 'Honour and Social Status' in J.G. Peristiany (ed.), *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (London, 1965), p. 23.

<sup>89</sup> J.G. Peristiany, 'Introduction' in J.G. Peristiany (ed.), *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (London, 1965), p. 11; Gregory Hanlon, 'Les rituels de l'agression en Aquitaine au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Annales ESC* 40 (1985), p. 244.

gestures that remotely challenged or slighted his honour. A nobleman would thereupon spare no effort to defend or restore honour, even if it meant death or financial ruin, for honour left unrepaired would only lead to further dishonour.<sup>90</sup> Many were willing to resort to duelling and private wars to repair honour.

The nobleman considered honour to be so important that he was willing to die for it because honour was a social measure by which to assess his worth and determine his acceptance into the polity and society, his status within them, and his interaction with their members. In other words, honour was vital to his life and livelihood: there could be no self-respect independent of the respect of others; no status and rank beyond that which had been recognised by others. In early modern French society, the esteem of others was decisive in attracting and developing dynastic ties, and cultivating political and personal friendships. It was crucial for obtaining or dispensing patronage and for acquiring, maintaining and mobilising patrons or clients. In a period where informal, personal and mutually beneficial ties, rather than bureaucratic institutions and procedures, played the paramount role in the conduct of government and war, the esteem of others could not have been more important to the nobleman's ability to exercise his political or military appointments properly.<sup>91</sup> The extent of one's honour was the extent of one's socio-political power. As Cardinal Richelieu advised Louis XIII, 'he of whom one has a good opinion does more with his name alone than those who are not well thought of [can do] with armies'.<sup>92</sup>

The consequences of dishonour were therefore as serious as that of the charge of *lèse-majesté*. Both stripped one and one's descendants of the cornerstones of status and power. Both were considered to be worse than death itself: as the comte de La Rochefoucauld averred in 1537, 'better that [I] die than endure any affront and have my honour sullied'.<sup>93</sup> Hence, in assessing the purpose of the princes' open letters and manifestoes, it is important

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<sup>90</sup> Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, pp. 50-52, 54-56.

<sup>91</sup> On the relationship between personal ties and the process of government, see: David Parrott, 'Power and Patronage in the French Army, 1620-1659' in Charles Giry-Deloison and Roger Mettam (eds.), *Patronages et Clientélismes 1550-1750* (Lille, 1995), pp. 229-241; Alan James, *The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661* (Rochester, NY, 2004); Orest Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu, 1635-1659* (Oxford, 1963); Richard Bonney, *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661* (Oxford, 1978); Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1986); William Beik, 'The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration', *Past & Present* 188 (2005), pp. 195-224; Blaise de Monluc, *Military Memoirs: The Habsburg-Valois Wars and the French Wars of Religion*, ed. Ian Roy (Harlow, 1971), pp. 46-47. Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier* (London, 2003), pp. 137, 141-143, 144-145; Nicolas Faret, *L'Honnête Homme ou L'Art de Plaire à la Cour* (Geneva, 1970), pp. 13, 58-64.

<sup>92</sup> Quoted in Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 16.

<sup>93</sup> Quoted in Carroll, *Blood and Violence*, p. 49.

to consider the need to protect the honour of oneself and one's supporters alongside the need to protect them from the charge of *lèse-majesté*. After all, honour was measured on the basis of one's reputation for service and loyalty to one's king. Rebellion and betrayal of the king from whom one derived all offices, titles, wealth and lands was naturally considered to be downright dishonourable. Likewise, it is important to consider the role of honour in determining the pamphlet exchanges between conflicting sides. Given that honour left unrepaired would only lead to further dishonour, one side must pick up the gauntlet that the other side had thrown down publicly or risk being seen as admitting defeat or cowardice. One had to publish tract-by-tract or sometimes point-by-point responses to the allegations and insults put forward by the other side's pamphlets.

Because honour was determined solely by the 'common opinion', one could use pamphlets to persuade the political nation to adjudge one's actions differently. There was room to work with: according to the protocol of honour, an action might be potentially honourable or dishonourable, but until it was publicly recognised and appraised, it would remain as a 'proof of honour or dishonour' rather than a 'cause of honour or dishonour'.<sup>94</sup> It was only once the action was publicly recognised and appraised as praiseworthy or worthy of condemnation, that its actor was honoured or dishonoured.<sup>95</sup> The *Condéen* princes could therefore use their open letters and manifestoes to demonstrate that their actions were in truth honourable, before the 'common opinion' was formed. In doing so, they could preserve the honour of their own and their supporters. They could also reduce the remaining inhibitions and obtain the assistance of those who, for fear of dishonour, had thus far been reluctant to declare for them.

Fortunately for the princes, the tactics for demonstrating that rebellions were lawful as well as honourable were entirely compatible. They could be and were applied simultaneously in the princes' open letters and manifestoes. This was because contemporaries agreed unanimously that the honourable status of an action, like its legal status, was determined by one's intention rather than the mean or outcome; for intention, they believed, were indicative of true sentiment and character.<sup>96</sup> The centrality of intention in the assessment of honour therefore gave the princes another reason to underline repeatedly

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<sup>94</sup> Kirsten B. Neuschel, *Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, NY, 1989), pp. 76-77.

<sup>95</sup> Pitt-Rivers, 'Honour and Social Status', p. 37.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27; Faret, *L'Honnête Homme*, pp. 13, 36; Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, trans. by M.A. Screech (London, 2003), I.7, pp. 28-29, I.12, pp. 47-49.

in their open letters and manifestoes the true intentions of their series of armed actions against the governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini. The respective intentions to preserve one's life and the welfare of the king and kingdom were permissible by natural law and conformed to the spirit of the law of *lèse-majesté* respectively. But at the same time, they were widely considered to be honourable pursuits. Condé's open letter to Louis XIII in 1615 illustrated very well how the prince had intended for his manifesto to protect his honour, and sought to do so by presenting the underlying intentions of his actions:

Mais d'autant Sire, que ceux qui ont donné à V.M. (Vôtre Majesté) les conseils de rompre la conference & negociation de monsieur de Villeroy, quelle avoit auparavant trouvee bonne, & jugee necessaire pour son service, & qui ont tousjours prins plaisir de rendre toutes mes actions odieuses & suspectes à V.M. Quoy qu'il ne s'y puisse remarquer que fidelité & integrité pourroïent sur ces occurrences luy déguiser ce qui est de mes intentions, calomnier mes actions à l'endroit de V.M. & respandre leurs calomnies par tout vostre Royaume, mesmes par toute la Chrestienté. J'ay estimé estre obligé par l'interest que j'ay de garentir mon honneur, & ma reputation d'envoyer à V.M. la declaration par le sieur de Marcognet, & laquelle je supplie tres-humblement V.M. de voir par son œil equitable, mes actions & deportemens passez, leurs causes & leurs effects, & les mauvais & perilleux conseils des ennemis de vostre Estat... je supplie aussi tres-humblement trouver bon que j'envoie ladite declaration à toutes les Cours de Parlement & autres corps notables de vostres Royaume, & à tous Princes & Estats vos aliez & confederez afin que chacun puisse cognoistre à quoy tendent mes actions qui n'ont & n'auront jamais autre sujet que le bien de vostre Estat, & la conservation de vostre Couronne.<sup>97</sup>

The centrality of intention in the assessment of honour also explains why the government was particularly keen to stress in its own open letters and declarations that the princes' intentions were nothing more than a sham. This was to reinstate the dishonourable status of the princes and their actions, and thereby compel their honour-obsessed followers and partisans to withdraw their current service to the princes, or think twice about serving in their armed movements. But in the process of denying the princes' accusations that the ministers and Concini had intended on profiting from the kingdom's ruin, or refuting their

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<sup>97</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince envoyee au Roy & à la Reyne par le sieur de Marcognet. Au Roy.* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-4, BM Lyon Rés 315171.



allegations that the ministerial governments had mistreated the princes, miscarried justice and misgoverned affairs, the governments' open letters and declarations also protected the personal honour of those at the helm.



One only has to look to the example of Charles de Valois, comte d'Auvergne to understand why the princes were so insistent that the terms of peace entailed the king's public revocation of the charge of *lèse-majesté* laid against them and his declaration of their uninterrupted innocence. Auvergne, the bastard of Charles IX, was convicted of *lèse-majesté* in 1605 for conspiring with Catherine-Henriette de Balzac d'Entragues, marquise de Verneuil against Henri IV. His royal bloodline saved him from the scaffold, but he was imprisoned indefinitely and dishonoured nevertheless. And although he was released from prison by Marie de Médicis at the behest of the duc de Montmorency and Concini in 1616, Auvergne was never publicly absolved of the charge. As a result, his honour was not properly repaired and the prince experienced great difficulties in reintegrating himself into the polity; he did not help himself by associating with Concini. The stigma of the crime of *lèse-majesté* continued to haunt him. François du Val, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil, for one, expressed his disgust at Auvergne's appointment as the commander of the royal army which would confront Longueville at Péronne:

Le commandement de toutes ces troupes fust donné au comte d'Auvergne: grand changement à la vérité, et fort surprenant, qu'un homme qui avoit esté sy longtems prisonnier, et pour crime de leze-majesté, se vist en moins de quinze jours libre, et général d'armée. Mais c'est ainsy qu'en usent les favouris, qui songent plus à leurs interests qu'à la réputation de leurs maistres.<sup>98</sup>

François, sieur de Bassompierre wrote of the same revulsion that many had towards Auvergne's appointment to the *conseil de guerre* following his return from Péronne:

Je me levay lors et fis sinne (sic: signe) audit [maréchal] Saint Geran de me venir parler a la fenestre, et luy ayant dit que nous ne devions pas souffrir que le comte

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<sup>98</sup> *Mémoires de Fontenay-Mareuil*, I, p. 348.

d'Auvergne nous presidat, n'ayant pas esté remis en sa bonne fame et renommée depuis sa condamnation...<sup>99</sup>

Concerned with restoring their 'bonne fame et renommée' in the public opinion, the princes saw to it at the end of each rebellion that the government proclaimed in town squares and published the king's edicts of pacifications throughout the kingdom expressly to declare the previous royal edicts that had convicted the princes and their supporters of the crime of *lèse-majesté* to be null and void. The princes also ensured that these royal proclamations and edicts of pacification informed the public of the 'true' nature of the princes' past actions, that they were invariably just, and that the princes had hitherto been innocent. The matter was taken so seriously that the king was sometimes asked to promulgate and publish new edicts to redress any remote ambiguities concerning his vindication of the princes' actions in his existing declarations. For instance, in May 1617, following the death of Concini, Louis XIII had propagated a declaration which exonerated the princes from any charges brought against them in January and February 1617.<sup>100</sup> However, there remained confusions as to whether Nevers was included in the royal declaration of 6 September 1616 which indicted Condé and his princely allies of *lèse-majesté*, as well as the peace treaty of 6 October 1616 which absolved Condé's allies. And so, while Nevers and his followers were exonerated from the charges of *lèse-majesté* of January and February 1617 by the king's declaration of May 1617, it remained unclear whether they were properly exonerated from the charge of 6 September 1616, if it were directed at them at all. As a result, even though he did not name Nevers and his followers specifically, Louis XIII was obliged to publish another declaration in August 1617 to nullify the royal declaration of 6 September 1616 and offer them full absolution.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> *Mémoires de Bassompierre*, II, p. 95; for the whole saga, see: pp. 95-98.

<sup>100</sup> *Declaration du Roy, en faveur des Princes, Ducs, Pairs, Officiers de la Couronne, Seigneurs, Gentilshommes & autres qui s'estoient esloignez de sa Majesté*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315339.

<sup>101</sup> *Declaration du Roy, en consequence de ses lettres patentes du mois de May dernier...* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315340.

**Table 3.3: Production of Royal Edicts of Pacification**

| Rebellion           | Total Pamphlet production | Royal Edicts of Pacification | % of total  |
|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| Feb 1614—May 1614   | 425                       | 29                           | 6.8%        |
| Aug 1615—May 1616   | 886                       | 45                           | 5.1%        |
| Sep 1616—Apr 1617   | 278                       | 14                           | 5.0%        |
| After Concini Death | 277                       | 18                           | 6.5%        |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>1,866</b>              | <b>106</b>                   | <b>5.7%</b> |

The princes' fixation on restoring honour not only influenced the widespread publication of edicts of pacification following each rebellion, it shaped the content of the printed edicts. The printed versions of the Treaty of Sainte-Ménéhould of May 1614 devoted two articles out of a total of fourteen or fifteen articles, depending on the version, to underscoring the good intentions of the princes and their supporters, the determining factor in the cases of *lèse-majesté* and honour. The princes had Marie de Médicis make known to the public that:

12. Lettres patentes seront expédiées, & l'adresse d'icelle faite à tous les Parlemens pour les verifiser, par lesquelles sa majesté declarera avoir esté bien & deuément informée que lesdits Princes, & les autres Princes Officiers de la Couronne, Seigneurs, Gentilhommes, & toutes autres personnes de quelle qualité & condition qu'ils soyent, qui l'ont servy & assisté en ce mouvement, n'avoit eu aucune mauuaise intention contre son service...

13. Et pareillement sera escrit par sa Majesté aux Princes, Estats, & Republicues alliez de ceste Couronne, & personnes de qualitez envoyez expres vers eux pour leur faire entendre que elle a recogneu l'innocence & bonne intention desdicts Seigneurs Princes, & Officiers de la Couronne, & Seigneurs qui les ont assistez.<sup>102</sup>

Because the princes and their supporters, were formally charged with *lèse-majesté* in 1615, 1616 and 1617, the treaties were much more explicit in vindicating them of crime and

<sup>102</sup> *Articles accordez par le Sieur Duc de Ventadour... A Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, premier Prince du sang; tant en son nom que des autres Princes Officiers de la Couronne, & Seigneurs qui l'ont assisté, soient presens ou absens* (Lyon: s.n., 1614), pp. 9-10, BM Lyon Rés 315050. See also: *Articles de la paix* (Paris: Fédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1614), BnF LB36-277(A).

dishonour. The printed version of the Treaty of Loudun of May 1616, for example, contained 13 relevant articles out of a total of 54 which proclaimed all edicts, *lettres patentes* and declarations made previously against the princes and their followers to be null, and ordered that they be removed from the *Parlements*' registers; and that the stated parties be reinstated to their previous offices, titles, lands, pensions and possessions.<sup>103</sup> Article 19 even listed in over three-and-a-half pages offences tantamount to *lèse-majesté*, and categorically acquitted the princes and their supporters of each of these offences.<sup>104</sup> And to further prevent any stigma and protect the honour of the parties, several articles also ordered that the rebellion of 1615 would henceforth be forgotten, never to be mentioned in any disputes or pursued in any law courts on the pain of severe punishments.<sup>105</sup> Article 2 specifically saw the king 'deffendons à tous nos subjects de quelque estat & qualité qu'ils soyent, d'en renouveler la memoire, s'attaquer, injurier, ny provoquer l'un l'autre par reproche de ce qui s'est passé, en contester ou quereller, ny s'outrager, offenser de faict ou de parole'.<sup>106</sup>

The emphasis on the good intentions of the princes and their supporters, and by implication their irreproachability on the issues of *lèse-majesté* and dishonour was conspicuous in the edicts of pacifications of 1615, 1616 and 1617. Article 17 of the printed Treaty of Loudun highlighted the princes and their adherents' good intentions. Interestingly, it stated that the crown had come to understand the good intentions of the princes and their adherents from its reading of Condé's manifesto:

Et affin qu'il ne soit doubté de la droicte intention de nostre tres-cher cousin le Prince de Condé, & ceux qui se sont jointts avec luy, nous declarons que nous reputons & tenons nostredit Cousin le Prince de Condé, pour nostre bon parent subject & serviteur, comme aussi les autres..., pour nos bons & loyaux sujets & serviteurs... Et apres avoir entendu la Declaration à nous faicte par nostredit Cousin le Prince de Condé, nous croyons & estimons que ce qui a esté fait par luy & les susnommez, a esté à bonne fin & intention, & pour nostre service.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> *Edict du Roy pour la pacification des troubles de son Royaume*. (Lyon: Barthélemy Ancelin, 1616). See: Articles 1-2, 17, 19, 29-31 and 35-40, BM Lyon Rés 315309.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-16.

<sup>105</sup> See: *Ibid.*, Articles 1-2, 19 and 37

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The declaration of 6 October 1616 was published to make clear that the charge of *lèse-majesté* laid against Condé in the previous month did not extend to other princes and their supporters. Here, the central intent of the declaration to restore the princes' honour and underline their good intentions was candidly expressed:

Et neantmoins d'autant que par nos lettres patentes de Declaration sur l'arrest & detention de nostredit Cousin (Condé), à cause des terms generaux & particuliers, & des circonstances y mentionees, on pourroit autrement juger de leurs intentions, & mesmes que leur absence, & esloignement d'aupres nostre personne les pourroit avoir tiré en soupçon de choses alienes de leur debvoir & qualité, & de la fidelité qu'ils nous doiivent: A CES CAUSES desirants conserver entier leur honneur & reputation. SÇAVOIR faisons que de nostre propre mouvement, pleine puissance & autorité Royale...: Avons déclaré & declarons que par nostredite Declaration, ny par aucuns termes ou paroles generales ou speciales contenuës en icelle, nous n'avons entendu ny n'entendons comprendre lesdits Princes..., ou autre personnes de quelque qualité ou condition qu'ils soient, sorties de Paris le jour de l'arrest & detention de nostre Cousin, & depuis à l'occasion susdite, qui nous ont fait entendre la sincerité de leurs intentions, & resolution qu'ils ont tousjours eu de demeurer en nostre obeysance, lesquels nous tenons & recognoissons pour nos bons, fidels & affectionnez subjects & serviteurs, non consentants ny participants des faicts contenus en ladite Declaration...<sup>108</sup>

## Conclusion

Law and honour played a pivotal role alongside dynasticism in shaping political and social conduct in early modern France. These three forces, inextricably intertwined, had instigated and sustained bad blood and blood feuds between noble families which at times exacerbated or spilled over into civil conflicts. These three forces were also influential in determining the ways and nature in which the civil conflicts were fought out. To mobilise forces for their armed movements against the governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini, the *Condéen* princes found it necessary to address the persistent fear of dynastic ruin which would follow

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<sup>108</sup> *Lettres Patentes du Roy, sur sa Declaration du sixiesme Septembre mil six cens seize*. (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1616), pp. 4-5, BnF F-46932(18); the capitalised words are not mine, but are faithfully reproduced. This edict was also published as: *Declaration du Roy, sur l'innocence des Princes & autres retirez de la Cour* (S.l.: s.n. 1616), BnF F-46932(23).

from the charge of *lèse-majesté* and dishonour. Using pamphlets, they therefore ventured to persuade themselves and their adherents that their actions did not entail such legal and reputational liabilities and risks. Using pamphlets, they also attempted to convince the kingdom's judges of their innocence and enlist the wider public as their witnesses.

The princes utilised the same devices, protocols and sometimes language found in contemporary lawsuits and contests of honour. Like their litigious peers and subjects, they exploited the rivalries and overlapping jurisdictions between courts and abused the appeal process to delay the pace of justice. They published manifestoes to serve as traditional legal briefs, and their private correspondence, as conventional material evidence. Within these pamphlets lay classic legal defence tactics: the princes disputed the impartiality of the judges and played on the paramount requirement of Roman law, which in this period had pervaded the kingdom's customary laws, of verifying the accused's intentions before determining his guilt. By pleading self-defence and royal service, the princes sought to invoke the legal allowance for self-preservation and defer to the new emphasis on the original spirit of the law in the kingdom's courts. The princes had other motivation for publishing pamphlet literature and letters and reiterating their just intentions in them. Intention was the primary determinant of honour as it was of guilt. And because honour existed only in the hearts and opinions of other men, it had to be cultivated, defended and repaired before the public. This in turn explains why the princes were so insistent that the king's edicts of pacification be printed, distributed and proclaimed throughout the kingdom. In order for their good name and esteem to be restored, the princes had to be publicly absolved from the previously publicised charges of *lèse-majesté* which had been laid against them and had dishonoured them.

The princes' objectives and efforts were not lost on the governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini. They fought fire with fire as they attempted to sway the juridical and common opinion to their side. They published royal declarations and edicts to re-establish the princes' actions as unequivocally illegal and dishonourable acts of rebellion against the crown. And in accordance with the same rules of law and honour, they devoted great attention to disproving the purported intentions of the princes to establish guilt and dishonour. But in the process of doing so, the governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini also denied the princes' allegations of maladministration and corruption and protected their own reputation and legitimacy.

## 4. Princely Persuasion

Sieur D. C. was one of the many anonymous pamphleteers who had stoked the printed firestorm during the princely rebellion of 1615-16. He penned one of his tracts for the *contrôleur général des finances*, Pierre Jeannin, in the hope that it would vindicate the septuagenarian minister from recent accusations of financial mismanagement, and in turn secure Jeannin's patronage for himself. Sieur D.C. commenced his tract with a tirade. He averred that the 'perturbateurs du public repos' would spare neither means nor efforts to destroy the kingdom. And 'la plus facile voye qu'ils se soient imaginee pour y parvenir, ça esté de decrier l'administration par des libelles diffamatoires'. These tracts, written by heinous men who 'ne meritent pas moins que le feu' and 'contiennent autant de crimes capitaux que de parolles', were devised to deceive 'foibles esprits' into believing that matters had become so scandalous and desperate that they could justifiably throw off 'le joug de l'obeissance que nous devons à nostre Roy, auquel Dieu a donne le pouvoir nous commander'.<sup>1</sup>

Sieur D. C., like many pamphleteers who came before and after him, characterised readers who had believed the contents of seditious pamphlets and answered their calls to action as 'foibles esprits' or 'simples'. But such characterisation could be dismissed as tropes commonly deployed to discredit the coherence and trustworthiness of the pamphlets' contents. For the buyers and readers of these pamphlets, the previous chapters have shown, were in truth educated, worldly and respectable individuals of the noble or officeholding class. Their receptiveness and reaction to the contents of the pamphlets, this chapter will demonstrate, was not a consequence of their vacuity or gullibility, but a testament to the astute, opportunistic and crafty nature of the princes' pamphleteering strategies.

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<sup>1</sup> *Avertissement a la France touchant les libelles qu'on seme contre le gouvernement de l'Estat* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 4-5, 8-LB36-441.

## Princely Activism

In his manifesto of February 1614, the prince de Condé complained that Marie de Médicis had excluded him and his associates from her regency government and policy decisions, despite their status as the princes and peers of the realm. Rather than considering the princes' counsel, as well as that of the sovereign courts and eminent ecclesiastics, Marie allowed herself and her government to be dominated by a handful of ministers. These ministers, Condé claimed, were seeking to profit from the kingdom's ruin: they had led the queen mother away from the path that the late king had paved. They had reversed the latter's foreign policy and undermined the balance of power in Europe by pushing forward the double marriages with Spain before Louis XIII's majority. They had contemporaneously alarmed the Huguenots with these marital arrangements and provoked them further by resiling from aspects of the Edict of Nantes. Furthermore, the ministers had contrived to destroy the kingdom's three estates: they had stripped the Church of its splendour, and the clergymen of their conventional functions as royal ambassadors, household officers and councillors. They had subverted the traditional system of service and meritocracy when they ramped up venality, depriving the nobility and pricing them out of their traditional employment in royal households and armies, as well as their historic judicial and financial functions, leaving them destitute and indebted. They had likewise reinstated and increased the taxes which had been revoked shortly after the late king's assassination, and forced the *menu peuple* to bear the brunt of the government's fiscal exactions and terrorism. The only solution to these ministerial abuses, Condé proposed and demanded, was to convoke the *États généraux*.<sup>2</sup>

The publication and dissemination of manifestoes as well as anonymous discourses was a ritual that would be repeated during every princely rebellion between the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century and the *Frondes* in the mid-seventeenth century. Existing studies of these conflicts have traditionally taken the contents of these documents to be accurate representations of princely ideology and aspirations. Arlette Jouanna's seminal work, *Le Devoir de Révolte*, relies largely on them as evidence to argue that the princely rebellions between 1559 and 1661 were motivated not by private interests, but by public concerns; the princes and their noble followers considered themselves to be the protectors of the body

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<sup>2</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince. A la Royne.* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BYU 944.03 A1 no.39., <<https://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/collection/FrenchPolPa/id/62213>>.



politic; they saw it as their duty to rebel when the body politic was endangered by manipulators of royal authority or the king himself. The Conspiracy of Amboise in 1560, for example, was an attempt by Louis I de Bourbon, prince de Condé to free the French king and kingdom from the clutches of foreigners, namely, the princes and cardinals of the House of Lorraine-Guise. The rebellion of the Catholic League and the malcontent rebellions of the 1570s, 1610s, 1630s, 1640s and 1650s were the great nobles' endeavours to foil the crown's absolutist ambitions. They were their attempts to preserve their traditional roles and the flagging system of a mixed monarchy, which, they believed, was still the best insurance against tyranny. The rebellions' common demand for the convocation of the *États généraux*, Jouanna contends, points to the princes' attachment to the traditional concept of a mixed monarchy.<sup>3</sup>

Jouanna is not the only prominent scholar in the past two to three decades to have relied on the contents of printed manifestos and discourses to detect the ideological world of certain French historical figures or movements, or to rehabilitate their notorious reputations.<sup>4</sup> Jean-Marie Constant also tries to revise the reputations of some of the cardinal-duc de Richelieu's principal opponents, such as Gaston de France, duc d'Orléans; Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons; and Henri-Coëffier de Ruzé d'Effiat, marquis de Cinq-Mars. Constant, on the basis of these manifestoes and discourses, concludes that the aforementioned *grands* had conceived ideas that one would normally associate with nineteenth-century liberalism, such as freedoms of thought, speech and action, and a political system with inherent checks and balances, stopping just short of advocating for a separation of powers. Their precocious political ideology naturally put them at odds with Richelieu, who championed state censorship, surveillance and absolute power for the monarchy.<sup>5</sup>

Contemporary political insiders, on the other hand, would have been a little less trusting of this printed literature. In fact, they would have found the manifesto of February 1614 peculiar. For up until now, neither Condé nor his associates – the ducs de Bouillon, Mayenne, Nevers and Longueville – were known to have publicly expressed any interest in

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<sup>3</sup> Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'état moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris, 1989), pp. 119-179.

<sup>4</sup> Frederic Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries: The Political Thought of the French Catholic League* (Geneva, 1975); Mark Bannister, 'Mazarinades, Manifestos and Mavericks: Political and Ideological Engagement during the Fronde', *French History* 30 (2016), pp. 165-180.

<sup>5</sup> Jean-Marie Constant, *Les conjurateurs: le premier libéralisme politique sous Richelieu* (Paris, 1987); idem, *Gaston d'Orléans: prince de la liberté* (Paris, 2013).

the welfare of the kingdom's three estates. Nor were they known to have publicly manifested any forms of animosity towards Spain or the Spanish marriages. On the contrary, when Condé and his wife, Charlotte-Marguerite de Montmorency, escaped from Henri IV's court in November 1609, their first port of call was Brussels in the Spanish Netherlands. And even though Condé and his uncle, the comte de Soissons, left court in February 1612 when asked for their seals of approval to the Spanish marriages, their real intention was to blackmail the queen mother into making certain concessions. Both *princes du sang* returned to court and appended their names to the treaty in June 1612 as soon as their personal demands were met.<sup>6</sup> Two days later, Condé's ally, the duc de Mayenne, set off for Madrid to ratify the treaties as the queen mother's extraordinary ambassador.<sup>7</sup> And a few weeks before that, another ally, the Protestant maréchal-duc de Bouillon, had gone to London in the same capacity to reassure James VI and I that the Spanish marriages would not compromise Anglo-French relations or the French crown's protection of the Huguenots.<sup>8</sup>

Bouillon's expedition to London was another reason why the manifesto's explicit concern for the welfare of the Huguenots was rather unusual. Nevers, Mayenne, Longueville and even Condé were brought up as Catholics and were not known to have exhibited any recent sympathy for the Protestant cause. And despite his Protestant faith and relatives, Bouillon had for the past four years been more concerned with winning Marie de Médicis's favour. The maréchal-duc had positioned himself as her staunchest supporter at the Huguenot General Assembly of Saumur in 1612, where he helped the queen mother to mollify his co-religionists' complaints and demands. He distributed her bribes and shamelessly denied that there had been any contraventions of the Edicts of Nantes since Henri IV's death. Bouillon even had the audacity to suggest that his co-religionists surrender their hard-earned *places de sûreté* to the crown.<sup>9</sup>

Political insiders would have been able to discern fairly quickly from the manifesto of February 1614 that the malcontent princes had their fingers on the pulse of the kingdom and were moulding the document accordingly to appeal to a growing tide of grievances and demands for reform. Condé, Mayenne and Bouillon might not have serious qualms about the Spanish marriages, but they knew that many French Huguenots and Catholic *politiques* who

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<sup>6</sup> *Mémoires d'Estrées*, pp. 72-74; *Mémoires de Richelieu*, I, pp. 192-194.

<sup>7</sup> *Mémoires de Pontchartrain*, II, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> James Valone, *Huguenot Politics: 1601-1622* (Lewiston, NY, 1994), pp. 68-70; Jack Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638* (The Hague, 1966), p. 35.

had survived the Wars of the Catholic League did. They also knew that the likes of Venice, England and the Dutch Republic, whose diplomatic pressure or military subsidies could come in handy during the rebellion, were equally startled. For ‘in the old Europe’, as Frances Yates reminds us, ‘a royal wedding was a diplomatic event of the first importance, and royal wedding festivities were a statement of policy’.<sup>10</sup> To French and foreign observers alike, the Spanish marriages that the regency government had pushed for appeared to be a reversal of French foreign policy. They signalled a newfound Franco-Spanish alliance with strong overtones of imperialistic expansion and militant Catholicism.<sup>11</sup>

The complaints made by the manifesto of February 1614 matched, almost perfectly, those which had been swirling around the kingdom at the time of the rebellion and which would burst forth in the chambers of the Petit-Bourbon and in print during the meeting of the *États généraux* in October that year.<sup>12</sup> There, the First Estate took advantage of the opportunity to renew its protests that its eminent members had not held prominent household offices outside the royal chapel since the reign of François I.<sup>13</sup> And on the unspoken basis of their suspected loyalties to the new Bourbon monarchy and their ultramontanist tendencies, its eminent members had likewise been overlooked for royal ambassadorial and conciliar duties.<sup>14</sup> In the meantime, the Huguenot deputies used the platform to air the same grievances that they had been voicing since the last decade of Henri IV’s reign and at the General Assembly of Saumur: that the crown had not honoured its Edict of Nantes. In particular, it had halved its annual subsidies to the Huguenot Church and *places de sûreté* without justification and more importantly, failed to establish bi-confessional chambers – *chambres mi-parties* – in the judicial courts. As a result, the Edict could not be properly enforced in the provinces, infractions could not be raised nor redressed, and inter-confessional disputes could not be defused. Many Huguenots, the deputies claimed, were consequently unfairly dealt with by the courts or dismissed from their offices because of their faith.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Frances A. Yates, *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (London, 1972), p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> John H. Elliott, ‘The Political Context of the 1612-1615 Franco-Spanish Treaty’ in Margaret Gowen (ed.), *Dynastic Marriages 1612-1615: A Celebration of the Habsburg and Bourbon Union* (Farnham, 2013), pp. 5-13.

<sup>12</sup> J. Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (Cambridge, 1974); J. Michael Hayden, ‘The Uses of Political Pamphlets: The Example of 1614-15 in France’, *Canadian Journal of History* 21 (1986), pp. 143-165.

<sup>13</sup> Marc Jaffré, ‘The Court of Louis XIII, 1610-1643’, (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2017), p. 77.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France* (New Haven, CT, 2014), pp. 67-68.

<sup>15</sup> Mack Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* (2nd ed. Cambridge, 2005), p. 178; Bergin, *Politics of Religion*, p. 160; Valone, *Huguenot Politics*, p. 61.

Almost as though it was following the manifesto's lead, the Second Estate expressed its grievances against the buying and selling of offices and the *droit annuel*. But in truth, the first complaint was already conspicuous at the *États généraux* of 1560, 1576 and 1588; and the second complaint, ever since the *droit annuel* was introduced in December 1604. The latter, known also as the *paulette*, gave an officeholder the right to pass on his judicial or financial office to an heir of choice in exchange for an annual payment of one-sixtieth of the office's original purchase price. A royal edict in September 1611 even extended the *paulette* to cover some of the highest offices in the *Chambres des Comptes*, the *Cours des Aides*, the *Presidials* and the *Trésoriers de l'Épargne*.<sup>16</sup> Then, as in 1614, the Second Estate criticised the *paulette* and the buying and selling of offices for destroying the culture of service and merit: such a system, they believed, reduced the number of offices available for bestowal and increased the prices of offices to unaffordable levels. It allowed the *noblesse de robe* to buy their way into military and court offices, the historic domains of the *noblesse d'épée*, and at the same time tightened their grip on judicial and financial functions, which the *noblesse d'épée* believed were also its birth rights. The system consequently deprived the members of the Second Estate of their traditional employment and sources of income, leaving them impoverished and indebted. It represented a triumph of wealth over service and merit.<sup>17</sup>

In 1614, as in 1604, the judicial and financial officers in the Third Estate, the main beneficiaries of such a system, argued that such practices were necessary to cover some of the crown's expenses, which had spiralled since Henri IV's death. Unbudgeted expenses had risen from just under 5.5 million *livres* to 7.7 million. Expenses from gifts and pensions had nearly doubled, from an average of 3.4 million *livres* per annum to 6.5 million.<sup>18</sup> Most of these expenses, the Third Estate lamented, would have to be offset by increasing the *taille* and the *gabelle*, which burdens would fall disproportionately on its members. The Third Estate would also have to endure the oppressions of tax farmers who had colluded with several corrupt ministers to obtain favourable remissions and leases.<sup>19</sup>

To paraphrase Marie de Médicis' official response to Condé's manifesto, if the prince was really troubled by these abuses and if these abuses were indeed so pressing, why had he chosen to remain silent and not to bring them to her attention during the four years of her

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<sup>16</sup> Hayden, *Estates General*, pp. 116-117.

<sup>17</sup> Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1996), pp. 12-16.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Bonney, *The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France 1589-1661* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 76-77.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-82.

regency?<sup>20</sup> The answer, as Marie tried to imply, was that the prince's zeal was insincere. Condé's manifesto was merely co-opting existing and widely known grievances of the various segments of the crown's subjects. This masked the self-interested agendas of the prince and his associates and presented them as righteous and public-spirited activists. By echoing existing concerns and demands, it fashioned them as sympathisers and advocates, and their armed movement as a necessary campaign that would permit the reforms that the political nation and confessional bodies so desired. The manifesto, in other words, relied on demagoguery to canvas support for the princes' rebellion.

### Princely Absolutism and Gallicanism

Having said this, the manifesto's other notable complaint – that Marie de Médicis had excluded the princes from her regency government – and demand for the immediate convocation of the *États généraux* were very much Condé and his associates' own. But were these indeed representations of the princes' reactionary attitude towards an increasingly absolute monarchy and their yearning for a return to a mixed monarchy? If so, it is difficult to reconcile the nature of this complaint and demand with one of Condé and his associates' most prominent rebukes in their manifesto of August 1615, published just eighteen months after the first: that Marie de Médicis's ministers had endangered the lives of French kings and the sovereignty of the French kingdom when they propagated treatises endorsing ultramontanism and tyrannicide and suppressed the First Article of the Third Estate at the recent *États généraux*.<sup>21</sup> The First Article is as absolutist as they come. It asked Louis XIII to declare as a fundamental law of the kingdom that the French king is sovereign in his state, holding his crown from God alone; that there is no spiritual or temporal power on earth which has any authority over his kingdom, which could revoke his sacred nature, and which could absolve his subjects of the fidelity and obedience that they owe him, for whatever reason.<sup>22</sup>

As with their unexpected advocacy of the three estates' grievances, Condé and his associates' sudden embrace of absolutism and gallicanism was less a manifestation of their

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<sup>20</sup> *Double de la response de la Roynne régente, mère du Roy, à la lettre escrite à sa Majesté par Monseigneur le prince...* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), p. 6, BnF 8-LB-207(H).

<sup>21</sup> *Manifeste et justification, des actions de Monsieur le Prince* (Sedan: Jean Janon, 1615), pp. 9-10, BM Lyon Rés 315190.

<sup>22</sup> Hayden, *Estates General*, pp. 131-132.

newfound convictions and more a manifestation of their habitual opportunism. At the outset of the *États généraux*, Condé discerned correctly that he was unlikely to gain a favourable hearing amongst the deputies as an overwhelming majority of them were handpicked by Marie de Médicis.<sup>23</sup> The prince thereupon turned his attention to another assembly which had been known to demonstrate the same streak of autonomy and belligerence: the *Parlement de Paris*. Condé visited the *Parlement* and sat in on its sessions on a daily basis. He frequently invited its members back to his *hôtel* for feasts and ballets.<sup>24</sup> His efforts soon bore fruits. The *Parlement* started to involve itself in the prince's personal disputes with the queen mother. Its deputies also began to do his bidding at the *États généraux*.<sup>25</sup> But as Condé himself understood the nature of clientage described in chapter two, his budding relationship with the *Parlement de Paris* would not necessarily translate into its open support for his movement. There was after all a great difference between agitating at official forums and aiding an armed rebellion against the government. One would incur a stiff reprimand, and the other, the charge of *lèse-majesté*. Besides, the *Parlement de Paris* was hardly a united front. Like other institutions of early modern France, it was fissured by factional rivalries, generation gaps and conflicting private interests. To galvanise the *Parlement* into crossing the Rubicon to rebellion, Condé knew he had to evoke issues that were closest to its heart; issues that could unite its members and rouse them to fever pitch.

In August 1615, one of these issues was the First Article of the Third Estate. Gallicanism had always been a divisive topic in the French polity, but debates had become more heated in the previous three decades. As Joseph Bergin has noted, the papal exclusion of Henri de Navarre from the line of succession in 1585 and excommunication of Henri III in 1588 confirmed many *parlementaires*' suspicions that the Concordat of Bologna was indeed damaging to the French crown's autonomy. The anarchy of the Catholic League, with its strong affinity to the Papacy, gradually convinced them of the kingdom's need for a stronger and more autonomous monarchy. Their ventures to define the status and prerogatives of the French crown vis-à-vis Rome were given additional impetus with the repeated attempts on Henri IV's life, the increased visibility of ultramontane and pro-tyrannicide treatises, as well

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 74-97.

<sup>24</sup> *Mémoires de Fontenay-Mareuil*, pp. 265-267; *Journal d'Andilly*, pp. 12-13, 48-50; *Mémoires de Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 78-80

<sup>25</sup> Girard, *Espernon*, pp. 283-284; *Journal d'Andilly*, pp. 43-48; *Mémoires de Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 70-73; *Mémoires de Richelieu*, I, pp. 333-336.

as external developments like the Venetian Interdict.<sup>26</sup> But it was Henri IV's assassination that caused the greatest Gallican uproar. In the following months, books were banned and burned. *Parlementaires* published pamphlets defending and asserting Gallican liberties, the most infamous being Edmond Richer's *Libellus de ecclesiastica et politica potestae*. And when their campaign was thwarted by the First Estate's retaliation and the regency's foot-dragging, the *Parlementaires* seized the opportunity presented by the *États généraux* to settle the issue once and for all. On 15 December 1614, the deputies of the Third Estate of the Île-de-France and Paris, most of whom were members of the *Parlement de Paris*, shocked the kingdom with the aforementioned First Article of their *cahier*. The article raised a furor. Members of the First Estate rallied to condemn it and in the process drew the Second Estate, the Huguenots and even James VI and I into the fray. But to the *Parlementaires'* exasperation, the government tacitly ruled in favour of 'Gallican France's enemies' when it issued decrees to forbid further discussions on the matter and force the Third Estate of the Île-de-France and Paris to retract the article from their *cahier*.<sup>27</sup>

The *Parlement de Paris* was unwilling to throw in the towel, however. Unable to discuss the matter for the duration of the assembly, its deputies channelled their anger and frustration into pressurising the government for a detailed report of its spending during the regency, for financial reforms and for reduction of taxes.<sup>28</sup> The government, as usual, stonewalled these demands up until the assembly's closure. So on 28 March 1615, the *Parlement* assembled all of its chambers and passed a decree inviting the lay and ecclesiastical peers of the realm to form the Court of Peers, where they would discuss and propose solutions for the reformation of the state. When the government nipped this initiative in the bud, the *Parlement* drafted and presented its list of *Remonstrances* to Louis XIII. The *Remonstrances* of 22 May commenced with a proclamation of the *Parlement de Paris'*s right to summon the Court of Peers and a demand for the establishment of the First Article as a fundamental law of the kingdom.<sup>29</sup> Marie de Médicis and her government, however, stood firm. They issued a royal edict two days later ordering the annulment of the *parlementaire* decree of 28 March and the *Remonstrance* of 22 May. The edict, at the same time, maintained that the *Parlement's* role was exclusively judicial. It had no right to interfere in governmental

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<sup>26</sup> Bergin, *Politics of Religion*, pp. 66-73; Jonathan Powis, 'Gallican Liberties and the Politics of Later Sixteenth-Century France', *The Historical Journal* 26 (1983), pp. 515-530.

<sup>27</sup> Bergin, *Politics of Religion*, pp. 74-82.

<sup>28</sup> Hayden, *Estates General*, pp. 147-158.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

affairs unless the crown invited it to do so.<sup>30</sup> The edict naturally caused an outcry in the *Parlement*. In its members' eyes, the edict was tantamount to the crown's explicit denial of its historic and inalienable rights to summon the Court of Peers and present *remonstrances*.<sup>31</sup> If ever there was another issue besides Gallican liberties which could instantly rouse and unite members of the *Parlement*, it was their belief in parliamentary prerogatives.<sup>32</sup>

Ever the practitioners of realpolitik, Condé and his associates overhauled their manifesto of February 1614 to evoke these new controversies. The manifesto of August 1615 accused several ministers of wanting to profit from the kingdom's disorders and upheavals: it accused them of conspiring to endanger the French king's life and sovereignty with their arrangement of the Spanish marriages, propagation of regicide tracts and suppression of the First Article.<sup>33</sup> It also accused them of contriving to hinder reforms with their rigging of the *États généraux* and their denial of the *Parlement's* competence and ancient rights to counsel the king through the Court of Peers and remonstrances, as the ministers attempted to portray the *Parlement's* initiatives as acts of sedition and rebellion.<sup>34</sup> Overnight, the *Condéen* princes had become the champions of Gallican France and *parlementaire* privileges. And to foster the *Parlement's* objection to the princes' own enemies, the manifestos identified three of the evil ministers as *chancelier* Sillery, his brother and ambassador to Spain, the commandeur de Sillery, and his nephew and *conseiller d'État*, Claude de Bullion.<sup>35</sup>

The manifesto of August 1615 also named Concini and *conseiller d'État* Louis Dolé.<sup>36</sup> This marked the first official denunciation of the favourite by Condé and his associates.<sup>37</sup> As chapter one has shown, the conflict between the princes and the favourite was by no means inevitable. Concini was a member of Condé's faction from late 1612 and was in fact so nose-deep in its plots and manoeuvres that at one point he momentarily lost Marie de Médicis's favour. However, the relationship began to show signs of strain after late 1613, when Concini aligned himself more closely with Villeroy and later, Sillery, the faction's arch-

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<sup>30</sup> Bonney, *King's Debts*, p. 86.

<sup>31</sup> J. H. Shennan, *The Parlement of Paris* (Ithaca, NY, 1968), pp. 156-166, 244-246.

<sup>32</sup> These issues remained prevalent in the eighteenth century, see: Dale van Kley, *The Damians Affair and the Unraveling of the Ancien Regime, 1750-1770* (Princeton, NJ, 1984), p. 274; Julian Swann, 'Parlement, Politics and the Parti Janséniste: The Grand Conseil Affair, 1755-1756', *French History* 6 (1992), pp. 450-460.

<sup>33</sup> *Manifeste et justification* (1615), pp. 9-10, 21-26.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9, 15-20.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>37</sup> Neither the manifesto of February 1614 nor the open letters and anonymous discourses which accompanied it expressly named Concini.



nemesis. Yet its real curse was Concini's feud with Longueville, the faction's youngest associate, over Picardie. Nevertheless, even as the dispute escalated into armed clashes on the streets of Paris and Amiens and as Nevers and Mayenne sided with their nephew Longueville, Condé and Bouillon refused to break with Concini in August 1615. The favourite had political capital and was still valuable for liaison between Marie de Médicis, the ministers and the faction.<sup>38</sup> As Condé and Bouillon wrote to explain to their ally, the marquis de Cœuvres, and Concini's *créature*, Louis Dolé, the ultimate decision to attack Concini and Dolé in the manifesto was only taken at Longueville's insistence. Longueville was adamant that Concini and Dolé be named and excoriated if he were to lend his name to the document.<sup>39</sup>

Even though Condé and Bouillon would not admit this explicitly, attacking Concini in the manifesto of August 1615 made great sense in their efforts to recruit the *Parlement de Paris* into their rebellion. The *Parlementaires* had identified Concini and his wife Galigai at the *États généraux* as the main source of the government's prodigality and corruption. Their *Remonstrances* of 22 May criticised Marie de Médicis for granting excessive gifts and pensions to 'personnes inconnues et de nul mérite' and for allowing some avaricious persons who had 'la direction et maniement des affaires' to accept payments from tax farmers in return for favourable leases and remissions of rent.<sup>40</sup> In July 1615, the *Parlementaires* were given more reasons to hate Concini. The latter hired an Italian hitman to assassinate *sergent-major* Pierre de Prouville in Amiens and then arranged for the murderer to escape to the Spanish Netherlands. Although the heinous crime was committed within the *Parlement de Paris's* purview, the magistrates could not prosecute Concini or the assassin because of the former's standing with the queen mother.<sup>41</sup>

Needless to say, Condé and his associates capitalised on these developments. The manifesto of August 1615 promptly denounced the meritless Concini for extracting immoderate gifts worth in excess of six million *livres* from Marie de Médicis and asking her to impose heavier taxes on her subjects for his own benefit.<sup>42</sup> It broached the subject of the assassination of *sergent-major* Prouville in Amiens by Concini's lackeys and hitman respectively

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<sup>38</sup> See chapter one.

<sup>39</sup> *Mémoires d'Estrées*, pp. 116-118; *Journal d'Andilly*, p. 152.

<sup>40</sup> Bonney, *King's Debts*, p. 85.

<sup>41</sup> For details, see chapter 1. *Mémoires de Richelieu*, I, pp. 385-387; *Mémoires de Fontenay-Marcueil*, pp. 287-288; Hélène Duccini, *Concini: Grandeur et misère du favori de Marie de Médicis* (Paris, 1991), p. 180.

<sup>42</sup> *Manifeste et justification* (1615), pp. 11-12.

in broad daylight.<sup>43</sup> And in a further bid to win over the *Parlement de Paris*, the manifesto went on to evoke the rest of the *Remonstrances* of 22 May's foremost clauses. It criticised the queen mother's appointments of Concini to the kingdom's most important offices, arguing that such appointments were not only illegal, the man appointed had neither 'le merite, l'extraction, ny les services rendus a la France'.<sup>44</sup> It likewise condemned Concini for desiring the strategic *gouvernement* of Picardie of which he was already *lieutenant-général* and for using bribes, violent means and foreign garrisons to secure its capital, Amiens.<sup>45</sup> These condemnations obviously alluded to the *Remonstrances'* reminder that the queen mother should only appoint 'men of known loyalty' to strategic *gouvernements*, for appointing foreigners to these offices equated to handing the kingdom's keys to its enemies abroad. The *Remonstrances* later went on to demand that the queen mother launch an investigation into the new sects and *gens infâmes* such as the Anabaptists, Jews, magicians, and poisoners at court. And so the manifesto followed suit. It accused Concini of abusing his power and using pretexts to bring Jewish magicians, poison-makers and assassins to court, where he planned to use them against French *grandees* and noblemen.<sup>46</sup>

It is important to note that the *Remonstrances* of 22 May was itself echoing the prominent grievances of the Second and Third Estates, as the *Parlement de Paris* sought to obtain their support for its key agenda: to have the First Article passed. The *Remonstrances*, for instance, concurred with the *Chambre des comptes'* protests back in February 1611 that Marie de Medicis had spent some 650,000 *livres* on gifts for Concini.<sup>47</sup> It also reflected the complaint of the Third Estate at the *États généraux* that Galigai had been accepting *pots de vin* from the farmers of the *parties casuelles* and of the *cinq grosses fermes*.<sup>48</sup> Likewise, the *Remonstrances* evoked the Second Estate's primary complaint that its members had been deprived of their employment because the crown had chosen to employ foreigners and meritless non-noblemen.<sup>49</sup>

The *Parlement's Remonstrances* also did not hesitate to exploit the social and cultural prejudices of the Second and Third Estates in its efforts to enlist support for the First

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10; Bonney, *King's Debts*, p. 85.

<sup>45</sup> *Manifeste et justification* (1615), p. 12.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11; Bonney, *King's Debts*, p. 85.

<sup>47</sup> Marie purchased for Concini a *marquisat*, a household office, a *lieutenance-générale* and several *gouvernements*.

<sup>48</sup> *Mémoires de Pontchartrain*, I, p. 422; Bonney, *King's Debts*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>49</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, pp. 12-16.

Article. The overtones of its clauses played on the age-old stereotypes of Italians as ambitious and greedy parvenus, as usurious and corrupted financiers and tax farmers, and as practitioners of the Jewish customs of blood libels, nocturnal orgies and black magic (Jewish stereotypes were affixed on Italians due to their close association with banking). They also referenced the popular notions of Italians as Machiavellian poisoners and assassins. Such notions had become especially pervasive after the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre and with the black legend of Catherine de Médicis. There was however another reason for employing these stereotypes. It was to induce the audience to draw parallels between the governments of Marie and Catherine de Médicis, and likening the Concini with the Biragues or Gondis, in the hope that the audience would concomitantly envision the current state of affairs as a prelude to the civil conflicts, fiscal terrorism and destitution of the sixteenth century, which – many of them had believed – were the ramifications of an Italianate court.<sup>50</sup> The *Remonstrances*, in other words, were fearmongering.

Because the *Remonstrances* itself was a mirror of the Second and Third Estates' grievances and prejudices, the princes' manifesto of August 1615 effectively killed three birds with one stone: it appealed to the *Parlement de Paris*, the Second Estate and the rest of Third Estate at the same time. But in all fairness, the manifesto was not just a carbon copy of the *Remonstrances*. It made plainer that Marie de Médicis's acts of appointing Concini to certain offices contravened the kingdom's laws.<sup>51</sup> This was meant to remind the Second Estate of the ordinances of Charles VII and Louis XI and the edict (of May 1579) of Henri III. The first two specifically debarred foreigners from holding *gouvernements* of the kingdom's provinces or fortresses. The third stipulated that local offices such as the *baillis* and *sénéchaux* and court offices such as the *gentilhommes de la chambre*, *maîtres d'hôtel* and *écuyers d'écurie* be reserved exclusively for the *noblesse d'épée*, and that no one person could hold more than one office at a time.<sup>52</sup> With this reminder, the Second Estate should be able to see that Concini was the epitome of the queen mother's failure to uphold the crown's decrees which protected their interests. She had allowed him to hold the *lieutenance-générale* of Picardie and the *gouvernements* of its fortified towns of Amiens, Péronne, Montdidier and Roye despite his Florentine nationality. She had also allowed him to be the *maître d'hôtel* and *premier écuyer de la reine mère* and *premier gentilhomme de la chambre du roi* at the same time, even though he was only

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<sup>50</sup> Jean-François Dubost, *La France Italienne: XVIe-XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1997); Henry Heller, *Anti-Italianism in Sixteenth-Century France* (Toronto, 2003); Leonie Frieda, *Catherine de Medici* (London, 2004); Joanna Milstein, *The Gondis: Family Strategy and Survival in Early Modern France* (Farnham, 2014).

<sup>51</sup> *Manifeste et justification* (1615), p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, p. 12.

*noblesse de robe*. And to add insult to injury, she had even allowed him to be the sole arbiter and distributor of royal patronage, which he then used to reward his *créatures* and suborn the loyalties of the king's subjects.<sup>53</sup> Concini was therefore a walking indictment of an unjust system that discounted service and merit; one that the Second Estate had been complaining so much about.

The manifesto also went beyond the *Remonstrances* in milking its audiences' Italophobia. Its decision to implicate Concini in the Spanish marriages and the suppression of the First Article served to inflame the persistent public paranoia, especially after the assassination of Henri IV, that there was a wider conspiracy afoot between the king of Spain, the Pope, the Jesuits and several members of the French court to undermine the kingdom from within. Henri's mistress, Catherine-Henriette de Balzac d'Entragues, and the duc d'Épernon were hitherto the prime suspects, but it was not too difficult to inculcate Concini.<sup>54</sup> For since the sixteenth century, Frenchmen and women had come to see Italians as the minions and agents of the Papacy and the Habsburgs, primarily because Italians dominated in the papal curia and college of cardinals in this period, the king of Spain ruled Milan, Naples and Sicily, and the Austrian Emperor was suzerain of the principalities of northern Italy and the Tyrrhenian Sea.<sup>55</sup> The favourite therefore made an ideal scapegoat and a perfect focus for fearmongering.

### Princely Anti-Italianism

The *conjurations* of Concini became more or less the only subject matter of each of the princes' manifestoes in 1617.<sup>56</sup> The reasons were threefold. Firstly, any profound argument about the marital treaties with Spain, the First Article or the parlementaire privileges would amount to flogging a dead horse. The marriages had been accomplished in October 1615 and the relevant disputes between the *Parlement de Paris* and the government had already

<sup>53</sup> *Manifeste et justification* (1615), p. 13.

<sup>54</sup> Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV* (2nd ed. Harlow, 1995), pp. 252-253; David Buisseret, *Henry IV* (London, 1984), p. 176.

<sup>55</sup> Heller, *Anti-Italianism*, pp. 206-207.

<sup>56</sup> *Manifeste de Monsieur le Duc de Nevers. Sur la declaration contre luy faite sous le nom de Sa Majesté* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), BnF 8-LB36-927; *Manifeste des Ducs et Pairs, de France, de Vandosme, de Mayenne, Mareschal de Bouillon, Marquis de Coeuvre & le President le Jay, & c.* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), BnF 8-LB36-933; *Declaration et Protestation des Princes, Ducs, Pairs, Officiers de la Couronne... Contre la conjuration & tyrannie du Mareschal d'Ancre, & de ses adherens.* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), pp. 5-6, British Library 07761560; *L'Union des Princes* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), BnF 8-LB36-937(A).

petered out. Secondly, Concini had become even more unpopular amongst the political nation and the *menu peuple* alike, following his reshuffling of the royal councils and his henchmen's assault on *sergent* Picard, a Parisian sentinel, in June 1616. The now minister-favourite was also held responsible for the arrest of Condé. Thirdly and most importantly, the relationship between the *Condéen* princes and Concini had by now completely broken down. The princes were determined to overthrow Concini and his *ministériat*.

The premises in each of the latest manifestoes were not all new. Some had been rehashed from the manifestoes of February 1614 and August 1615. But old or new, each argument was given an anti-Italian spin. The *Declaration et Protestation des Princes*, for instance, conjured the enduring image of Italians as ambitious and greedy parvenus and devious assassins: it claimed that Concini was invariably hostile to the Peace of Loudun because he discerned that the treaty was 'si contraire au dessein de son ambition immoderee et avarice insatiable'. He thereupon contrived to violate 'la foy publique' and repeal the treaty by using disinformation and false charges to arrest Condé and persecute other princes like Nevers who had opposed his designs, 'jusques à employer le poison & le cousteau'.<sup>57</sup> A 'creature du Mareschal d'Ancre & executeur ordinaire de ses violences', the *Declaration* alleged, had recently confessed that he was hired to assassinate Mayenne in Soissons.<sup>58</sup> 'Car nul n'ignore que son but estant de s'accroistre & aggrandir, & de regner seul sous l'ombre du Roy, durant sa minorité, par la faveur de la Royne mere, & ne le pouvant faire par le repos & tranquillité, ains par la ruine & dissipation de l'Estat, son principal soing a esté d'y mettre le trouble & la confusion...'.<sup>59</sup> 'Ce sont les moyens', the *Declaration* went on, 'qu'il a tenus depuis la mort du feu Roy iusques à present, pour acheminer son ambition, & parvenir à ceste grandeur demesuree en laquelle il est eslevé maintenant': Concini abased the authority of the princes and restricted their access to the king. He established himself as the *gouverneur* of frontier provinces and towns. He usurped the king's power to confer offices and patronage, thereby robbing the former of his subjects' affection, rendering them servile to and dependent on him instead of their rightful monarch. 'Et afin de pouvoir faire toutes choses à sa fantaisie, & establir sa tyrannie au Conseil du Roy & pres de sa personne', Concini deposed Henri IV's *barbons* and Guillaume du Vair and replaced them with 'd'autres de sa faction, pensionnaires des estrangers, gens de basse & infame qualité, ignorans & mercenaires'. 'En somme il a usurpé sous le nom du Roy, ainsi qu'autresfois nos Maires du Palais, une autorité absolue

<sup>57</sup> *Declaration et Protestation des Princes* (1617), pp. 4-12.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

dans le Royaume, & ne laisse à sa Maiesté que le titre & l'image de la dignité royale, ayant tiré à soy la domination entiere de l'Estat...'.<sup>60</sup>

Concini, the *Declaration* therefore suggested, was so ambitious that he would not stop at being a minister-favourite. He wanted to be the king of France, and was willing to destroy anyone that stood in his way. He had used violence, bribery and false charges of *lèse-majesté* to silence the *cabiers* and *Remonstrances* of the *États généraux* and the sovereign courts respectively. He assaulted one of the principal officers of Paris, *sergent* Picard, and misappropriated the king's name to have one of the *présidents* of the *Parlement de Paris*, Nicolas Le Jay, kidnapped and imprisoned.<sup>61</sup>

Et le Roy & Monseigneur son frere ne sont pas en seureté entre ses mains, puis que luy & sa femme, par une impieté & curiosité punissable par les loix, se sont enquis de la duree de leur vie, qu'ils ont consulté des Magiciens sur le temps de leur mort, dont peut estre ils ont limité le terme par leurs enchantemens & sortileges, estant notoire qu'à ce dessein il entrenoit le medecin Montalte & l'Abbé de saint Mahay, ce monstre abominable, qui par l'horreur de sa mort a tesmoigné quel il estoit en sa vie.<sup>62</sup>

The stereotype of Italians as practitioners of Jewish occult arts and medicine reared its ugly head again.

And as though the repertoire of Italophobic tropes could not be completed without some mention of Italians being agents of the Pope or the Habsburgs, the *Declaration* gave readers its interpretation of the government's recent diplomatic dealings with France's neighbours and allies, seen through some thick anti-Italian lenses of course. Concini, the *Declaration* claimed, used the pretext of France's weakness to 'faire abandoner au dehors les anciens alliés & confederés de la Couronne'. Using his control of the government, he committed France to helping Spain further its expansionistic ambitions:

il semble que la France au lieu de les (the Protestant states) appuyer & fortifier de sa protection, vueille aujourd'huy, par un dessein commun, contribuer à leur

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

oppression, par les menées & pratiques qui se sont depuis quelque temps à leur preiudice, sous le nom du Roy, par des agens & ministres secrets, pour favoriser les desseins & entreprises de ceux, de qui l'aggrandissement & les armes sont iustement suspectes à toute la Chrestienté: ainsi qu'il se verifie par les memoires & lettres interceptes, dont Vincens Secretaire dudict Mareschal d'Ancre a esté trouvé saisi depuis peu de jours, revenant d'Allemagne et des Pais bas.<sup>63</sup>

It was for the same reason, the *Declaration* continued, that Concini removed the French government's historic protection of Bouillon's principality of Sedan, the traditional gateway into France for Spanish and Imperial troops. Concini and his créatures hoped to 'exposer Sedan au Marquis Spinola, ainsi qu'on a faict cy devant Aix[-la-Chapelle] & Wesel, & autres places de la succession du feu Duc de Cleves, qui ont esté usurpees sur l'Electeur de Brandebourg, l'un des anciens alliés de la Couronne...'. 'Ce sont des effects', the *Declaration* concluded, 'de l'estroite correspondance & des secrettes intelligences que le Mareschal d'Ancre & ses adherens ont dehors le Royaume, avec les estrangers, contre la grandeur & dignité de la France.'<sup>64</sup>

Be that as it may, it has never been properly pointed out by existing studies of the politics and pamphlets of the 1610s that the anti-Italian rhetoric of the manifestoes belied the *Condéen* princes' own profound Italian connections. Condé and his wife, for example, chose to escape to Milan in March 1610 after their brief stay in Brussels, so as to keep their distance from Henri IV who was about to set off for a campaign in Jülich. The prince would remain there until Henri's death. As for César de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme, Henri IV's illegitimate son, he had Henri de Gondi, duc de Retz, for his closest friend and comrade-in-arms in this period. He even had plans to marry his eldest son, Louis de Bourbon, duc de Mercœur to the latter's eldest daughter, Catherine de Gondi. Henri de Gondi was of course the son of Albert de Gondi, maréchal-duc de Retz, the Florentine banker and advisor of Catherine de Médicis.<sup>65</sup>

But Condé and Vendôme's connections to the Italian peninsula were not as direct as that of their factional ally, Charles de Gonzague, duc de Nevers. Charles de Nevers was a

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.

<sup>65</sup> Jean-Jacques Renault, 'La révolte du César de Vendôme en 1614', *Bulletin de la Société archéologique, scientifique et littéraire du Vendômois* (2007), pp. 3-6.

cadet of the house of Gonzaga, the current ruling dynasty of the Duchies of Mantua and Montferrato in northern Italy. His father, Louis de Gonzague-Nevers, came to France as late as 1549 to inherit the assets of his French great-grandmother, Anne d'Alençon. Louis's origins earned him the favour of Catherine de Médicis, who made him a part of her infamous Italian entourage at court and helped him marry the coveted heiress, Henriette de Cleves, from whom he would inherit the duchies of Nevers and Rethel.

Louis de Gonzague-Nevers married his first daughter to Henri I d'Orléans, duc de Longueville, father of the *Condéen* faction's youngest associate, Henri II d'Orléans, who in 1595 inherited the former's title. In other words, like his arch-nemesis Concini, Henri II de Longueville had a mother of Italian descent. His *Condéen* counterpart, Henri de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne, too had a mother of Italian descent. She was Henriette de Savoie, granddaughter of René de Savoie, the illegitimate son of Philip II, duke of Savoy. Henri de Mayenne's grandmother was also Italian, the famous Anna d'Este, second duchesse de Guise and daughter of Ercole II d'Este, duke of Ferrara. And following the death of her first husband, Anna d'Este married Jacques de Savoie, duc de Nemours, grandson of the same Philip II, duke of Savoy, thereby giving Mayenne an Italian step-grandfather. Henri de Mayenne himself took a wife of Italian extraction, Marie-Henriette de Gonzague, second daughter of Louis de Gonzague-Nevers. His younger sister, Catherine de Lorraine, married the aforementioned Charles de Nevers, and his elder sister, Renée de Lorraine, Mario II de Sforza, duke of Ognano, a cadet of the former ruling dynasty of Milan. These two marriages therefore added another two Italians brothers-in-law onto Henri de Mayenne's already Italianate family tree.

As they signed off on the manifestoes of 1615 and 1617, the likes of Charles de Nevers and Henri de Mayenne turned a blind eye to their own ancestries and the fact that their sixteenth-century predecessors had been the butt of the same anti-Italian and xenophobic insults that the manifestoes now hurled at Concini. They glossed over the fact that the manifestoes' demand for the debarring of foreigners from holding provincial *gouvernements* impugned their own status as foreign princes holding the *gouvernements* of Champagne, the Île-de-France and their fortified towns. Still, the greatest irony about these xenophobic innuendoes and supplications was that, for the originators of the manifestoes, the foreigner status was not meant to be concealed or condemned, but to be accentuated and celebrated. For proving one's descent from a foreign dynasty allowed one to claim the status



of *prince étranger* at court, a rank which gave its holders significantly greater political and economic privileges over the *ducs et pairs*.<sup>66</sup> As a matter of fact, it was Charles de Nevers's deliberate assertions and displays of his status as a foreign – and therefore independent – prince which caused the Mantuan Succession dispute to escalate into a fully-fledged war in 1628.<sup>67</sup> And it was the repeated failures to have the crown recognise their foreign status that drove the Huguenot Henri, duc de Rohan, Condé's temporary ally in the rebellion of 1615, and Frédéric-Maurice and Henri II de La Tour d'Auvergne, sons of Condé's associate, the maréchal-duc de Bouillon, to multiple rebellions during Louis XIII's personal reign and the *Frondes*.<sup>68</sup>

The manifestos' rhetoric against Italians and foreigners therefore epitomises the extent to which the *Condéen* princes were willing to overlook, shroud or even denigrate their own backgrounds and principles so as to speak to and for their audiences. It exemplifies the princes' intentions for their manifestoes to be simultaneously a propagandistic device that could help attract the interest and support of the various segments of the political nation in the shortest possible time. It demonstrates the princes' understanding that successful political persuasion, more often than not, calls for crude mimics, rather than radical ideas or penetrating insights. Effective political persuasion plays to its audience's existing prejudices, grievances and fears, and shifts its spotlight accordingly with the changing moods and preoccupations. Doing so builds rapport and fosters a false sense of solidarity between political leaders and their targeted demographics. At the same time, it instils within the latter a belief that the success of a political movement would bring about the desired ends. To criticise the princes and their manifestoes for 'the poor quality of their political thought' or for 'not rising to the challenge of rethinking their world', as Frederic Baumgartner and Mark Bannister have done, is therefore to miss the point about political persuasion.<sup>69</sup>

Condé and his associates' adherence to the timeless principle of political persuasion explains why the contents of their manifestoes often contradicted their own careers to date.

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<sup>66</sup> Jonathan Spangler, *The Society of Princes: The Lorraine-Guise and the Conservation of Power and Wealth in Seventeenth-Century France* (Farnham, 2009).

<sup>67</sup> David Parrott, 'The Mantuan Succession, 1627-31: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Europe', *English Historical Review* 112 (1997), pp. 20-65; Idem, 'A 'prince souverain' and the French crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637' in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs, and H.M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnbild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 149-187.

<sup>68</sup> Jonathan Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France: The Rohan Family, 1550-1715* (University Park, PA, 2015); Simon Hodson, 'Sovereigns as Subjects: The Princes of Sedans and Dukes of Bouillon in Early Modern France, c. 1450-1652' (DPhil dissertation, University of Oxford, 1999).

<sup>69</sup> Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries*, p. 108; Bannister, 'Mazarinades, Manifestos and Mavericks', p. 180.

It accounts for the overnight switch in the princes' attitudes towards certain issues from indifference to zeal, and the occasional self-contradictory nature of their public demands. It also accounts for why the thrusts of manifestoes issued just eighteen months apart were not only incompatible, they were at times outright contradictory. The princes were merely trying to adapt their manifestoes to the passions of their audience. They were trying to be different things to different people at different times. As their detractors had discerned and forewarned, the princes resembled the 'Chameleon', which 'prenant aujourd'huy une couleur & demain une autre' as it approaches different preys in different habitats, or the 'Hyene furieuse, qui contrefait la voix des hommes sur les chemins, devore à la fin ceux qui s'amuse à la escouter'.<sup>70</sup> During the princely rebellion of 1620, Gabriel Naudé, a hopeful client of Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes, likened the princes and their manifesto and pamphlets to

Basilics, lesqueles s'accomodant à nos passions comme le Polype & Cameleon font aux couleurs, ou les feus folets au mouvant de nostre corps, nous conduisent en fin dans des abismes de folles opinions & maximes eronees, nous faisant succer un iliade de malheurs parmi le laict de la curiosité, imitant en cela le Scorpion, lequel auparavant que picquer ceux qu'il trouve endormis, semble par ses embrassement les vouloir caresser, ou plutost au Crocodile qui contrefaisant la voix d'une personne affligee, fait tomber les passans dan les pieges qu'il leur dresse pour plus facilement les devorer.<sup>71</sup>

But the malcontent princes' attentiveness to the political nation's moods and needs, and their dexterity at exploiting such sentiments, one could argue, reveal the political savvy of *les grands* which has far too often been lost on traditional historiography; as with the fact that the manifestoes of *les grands* are less a mirror of their ideologies and aspirations, and more a mirror of the polity and society in which they operated.

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<sup>70</sup> *La Ligue renversee, ou response a la Ligue ressuscitee*. (S.l.: s.n., 1615), p. 2, BnF 8-LB36-712; *Discours sur l'injustice des plainctes qu'on fait contre le gouvernement de l'Etat* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), p. 5, BM Lyon Rés 315731. *Remonstrance aux Mal-Contens* (Paris: s.n., 1614), pp. 3-4, BM Lyon Rés 315082, warned of the same, though in less colourful language.

<sup>71</sup> Gabriel Naudé, *Le Marfore ou Discours contre les libelles* (Paris: Louis Boulenger, 1620), p. 4, BnF 8-LB36-1424.

## Old Wine in a New Bottle

Pierre Périsset might have had a long and tranquil career as the minister of the Huguenot parish of Aytré in Aunis had he known not to think aloud on certain issues. Although not a known follower of Condé or his allies, Périsset was nevertheless spurred by his own faith to endorse the princes' armed movement in late 1615 to, purportedly, foil the Spanish marriages. He felt compelled to pick up his pen and urge his fellow Huguenots and Frenchmen to do the same in a short and anonymous discourse. However, unlike other anonymous writers who abound in times like this, Périsset was unfortunate enough to get caught. The Synod, probably under pressure from the government, had him arraigned, sacked and excommunicated from his ministry for the crime of writing and publishing *libelles diffamatoires*. But Périsset's misfortune was far from over. After the Huguenot rebellion of 1625-26, he was arrested and punished once more in October 1626 for the same discourse, now more than ten years old, by the *lieutenant-général* of Castres, where he had relocated.<sup>72</sup>

The discourse that had brought Périsset a decade of troubles was *La Chemise Sanglante de Henry le Grand*. The discourse clearly captured the mood of the times, for it went through seven editions in 1615 alone. In it, Périsset spoke in the voice of Henri IV. He had 'Henri' castigate Louis XIII for his unbroken silence on the issues of his father's assassination and Concini's domination of the government. Despite having recently been declared a major and invested with full sovereign powers, Louis did nothing to seek vengeance and governmental reforms. Instead, he chose to persecute those who had assumed his mantle – Condé. Louis allowed the six conspirators responsible for his father's death to be so close to him and to desecrate his father's ashes, thereby emboldening them to plot new assassinations.<sup>73</sup> 'Henri' begged his 'cher fils' always to remember the bloodied shirt that he had died in and seek revenge by prosecuting the six ringleaders – *chancelier* Sillery, *commandeur* de Sillery, Bullion, Épernon, Concini and Dolé. 'Henri' revealed that Concini had plotted his assassination ever since he found out and planned to expel the Florentine for sowing discord between him and Marie de Médicis. 'Henri' also revealed that the Sillerys joined the cabal of assassins when he discovered and intended to dismiss the *chancelier* for taking bribes from Spain to promote the Spanish marriages.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Even though the pamphlet was not reissued in the rebellion of 1625-26, see: *Mercure François*, t. 12(1), ff. 606v-607v.

<sup>73</sup> *La chemise sanglante de Henry le Grand* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), 8-LB35-916(A), pp. 3-5.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7, 12.

Concini, ‘Henri’ continued, with the help of the Sillerys and Épernon, had been enriching himself by appropriating the crown’s finances and exploiting Louis XIII’s prepubescence to obtain *gouvernements*, pensions, *pots de vins*, gifts, equipment, followers and credit. He used his Judaeo-Spanish doctor, Montalto, to exacerbate Marie de Médicis’s illness. He tried to poison the king’s brother, Gaston d’Orléans, persecute Condé, assassinate Longueville and *sergent-major* Prouville, tyrannise Amiens and destroy Villeroy’s efforts to maintain peace between the princes and the crown. The king’s recent majority seemed to have given Concini even more freedom to enact his evil designs. The favourite isolated the king from his natural advisors and insisted upon his immaturity in order to trivialise and nullify his orders. The state of the kingdom had degenerated considerably following Concini’s ascendancy. During Henri IV’s reign, there were no assassinations, no complaints about the *tailles* and no oppression of the nobility. The royal coffers were not empty and there was no sale or corruption of justice. The king’s councils were staffed by good and loyal Frenchmen, rather than ‘pensionnaires Conchinolles Espagnols’. As he signed off, ‘Henri’ urged Louis XIII to seek not only justice against the murderers of his father, but to protect his cousin Condé in his current campaign to reform the kingdom’s government and affairs.<sup>75</sup>

The *Chemise Sanglante* was an exemplar of the hundreds of pro-princes discourses that had surfaced alongside the princes’ manifesto during the rebellion of 1615. Some of these discourses were sponsored by the princes; others were commissioned or written voluntarily, either by the princes’ aides or clients, by activists like Périsset acting out of their own political or religious conviction, or by savants looking to win the princes’ patronage. The nature of their contents varied. Some of them, such as the *Chemise Sanglante*, spoke about an assortment of topics. But some of them were specialised discourses like the *Discours sur les mariages de France et d’Espagne, contenant les raisons qui ont meu Monseigneur le Prince à en demander la surseance* (1614) and the *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (1615). The former touched on a specific issue affecting various constituents of the political nation, while the latter focused on specific issues concerning a specific demographic. Specialisation had its obvious advantage. It allowed one to elaborate and engage on the issues most relevant to one’s target audience, as well as use motifs and vocabulary that were most familiar to them. Specialisation concomitantly increased the chances of persuasion and conversion.

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<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-15.

But regardless of who the sponsors or writers were and what their underlying intentions might be; and regardless of who the target audience were or the scope of the contents, these pro-princes and predominantly anonymous discourses shared a common characteristic: they had little new to say, in relation to the manifestos or to each other. When one juxtaposes the *Chemise Sanglante* with the manifesto of August 1615, it becomes clear that the *Chemise Sanglante* was effectively a distilled and repackaged version of the manifesto, even though its author was not a hired pen. The *Chemise Sanglante*'s criticism of Louis XIII's refusal to condemn his father's assassins and take preventive measures to preclude future regicides harked back to the same topic of the crown's suppression of the First Article of the Third Estate. It parroted the manifesto's own reiterations of the grievances of the *États généraux*'s *cabiers* and the *Parlement de Paris*'s *Remonstrances*. It hurled very similar anti-Italian allegations against Concini. It likewise depicted Henri IV's assassination and the Spanish marriages as components of a wider conspiracy between Spain and certain members of the French court. Of the six ringleaders whom it had identified, five had already been named by the manifesto. It even adopted the manifesto's rhetorical style—appearing to speak to an eminent figure when it was really speaking to the political nation. In the discourse, the 'cher fils' to whom 'Henri IV' constantly called to denotes Henri's son, Louis XIII; but it also denotes every French officeholder and noble, for subjects in early modern Europe were often regarded and referred to as the king's children, both by the king and the subjects themselves.

Consider another archetype of the pamphlets in question, the *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (1615). As with the *Chemise Sanglante*, Henri IV's assassination was discussed as a roundabout way to evoke the topic's extremely contentious offshoot—the First Article, a key subject matter of the manifesto of August 1615. As with the *Chemise Sanglante* and the manifesto, it suggested that the assassination was an inside job:

Ceux qui sont les plus proches aujourd'huy, les mieux veus & venus de sa Majesté, tremblottent de crainte que je descouvre leur assassin couvert, leur parricide caché, seellé du grand sceau, & signé des premiere plumes: mais soustenu des plus relevez aux charges militaires.<sup>76</sup>

'Ceux qui sont les plus proches aujourd'huy, les mieux veus & venus de sa Majesté' is an obvious reference to the Concinis, Marie de Médicis's close companions and favourites,

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<sup>76</sup> *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), p. 4, BnF 8-H-6947(1).

while ‘seillé du grand sceau’ refers to Sillery, *chancelier* and keeper of the *Grand Sceau de France*. ‘Signé des premiere plumes’ alludes to the *conseillers d’États* Dolé and Bullion, and the ambassador of France to Spain, commandeur de Sillery. ‘Soustenu des plus relevez au charges militaires’ points to Épernon, who held the eminent military function of *colonel général de l’infanterie française*. The discourse therefore concurred with the manifesto, albeit in an indirect way, on at least five people held responsible for Henri’s death.

The *Lettre du Bon François* was a specialised pamphlet purportedly addressed to Monsieur le Prince [de Condé]. But this is a mere rhetorical device. It was in truth addressed to the French noblemen who shared and constantly sought to imitate the ethos of *les grands* such as Condé. Its contents were geared towards that segment of the political nation. Much like the manifesto, it brought up issues closest to the nobility’s heart: the matters of the crown’s complete disregard for service and merit in its distribution of patronage and offices, and of its appointments of non-nobles and foreigners to the traditional domains of the *noblesse d’épée*. Much like the manifesto, it indicated that Concini was the embodiment of current political discontents.<sup>77</sup>

*Le Protecteur des Princes* (1615), another specialised discourse and one that discussed a specific topic which affected several constituents of the political nation, also did little more than rehash the legal component of the princes’ manifesto described in the previous chapter. It posited a series of legal justifications indistinguishable from those found in the manifestos. The premises and logic of the justifications all led to the conclusion that the rebellion’s underlying intentions were just; that the princes and their supporters, current and future, did not deserve the sentence of *lèse-majesté* or the persecution of the royal armies. And in line with the manifesto, it adduced that the machinations of Marie de Médicis’ favourites and ministers, as well as her own gullibility to their deception, were the real factors behind the crown’s recent use of force. However, in a rare display of originality, it also cited the queen mother’s own longstanding delusions about Condé’s ambitions as another reason of significance.<sup>78</sup>

By comparison, the discourses written against the Spanish marriages in 1614 appeared to have departed more from the princes’ manifesto issued that year. But this was

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<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>78</sup> *Le Protecteur des Princes. Dedié a la Reyne* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315159.

because the manifesto of February 1614 was relatively reticent on that matter. The manifesto merely suggested that the marriages would greatly increase the Habsburgs' power vis-à-vis France and that Louis XIII and Elisabeth de France had not reached the lawful age to be married, without going into the details.<sup>79</sup> The manifesto of August 1615 was more communicative. It argued that the queen mother's evil ministers had advocated the marriages with Spain, because they sought to give Spain free rein to pursue its expansionistic policies, at the expense of the welfare of France's allies and friends. Since the ratification of the treaties, Spanish armies had already encroached on Savoy. They had also taken the cities of Aix-la-Chapelle and Wesel, and occupied many places in Jülich and Cleves. The Treaty of Xanten, which France had helped mediate to resolve the Jülich-Cleves crisis, had been brushed aside. As such, the marriage treaties had greatly undermined the welfare of France's historic allies and friends and damaged its reputation. The marriages would also compromise France's sovereignty and security. They would lead to the union of the kingdoms' royal councils. They would reveal France's secrets and intelligence to Spain. They would give Spain the pretext to interfere in France's affairs, and install its own people in the kingdom's most important offices and *gouvernements*. Besides, the manifesto of August 1615 added, Louis XIII was currently too young to consummate the marriage without any risks to his health.<sup>80</sup>

In juxtaposition with the manifesto of February 1614, discourses such as the *Discours sur les mariages de France et d'Espagne, contenant les raisons qui ont meu Monseigneur le Prince à en demander la surseance* offered a novel and detailed case against the Spanish marriages. Published six times over the course of the Rebellion of 1614, the *Discours sur les mariages* did more than just concur with the manifesto's rationale that Louis XIII was too young to be married. It offered explanations on why this was the case. It argued that natural, divine and civil laws had all forbidden marriages between prepubescents, as prepubescents were deemed incapable of giving consent. Without consent, marriages had no essence and therefore no legitimacy. The general consensus on the age of puberty, the discourse claimed, was fourteen years old. But Louis XIII and Anne of Austria were both only thirteen; Elisabeth de France, twelve; and Philip of Spain, nine. So as of now, they could not possibly enter into a lawful and legitimate marriage with each other. Although for diplomatic reasons similar arrangements were often made by kings for their prepubescent children, the discourse argued that these arrangements were established on the understanding that the marriages would be

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<sup>79</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince* (1614), pp. 5-6.

<sup>80</sup> *Manifeste et justification* (1615), pp. 22-25.

suspended until the parties' puberty. And on that occasion, the treaties would first be revisited and then enforced or annulled according to the parties' free consent.<sup>81</sup>

Condé had asked for the marriages to be postponed and reconsidered, the discourse continued, because he saw that the marriages were contracted by those 'qui ont toujours leurs esperances de bastir de nos ruines la Monarchie de l'Europe, de nous jeter en quelque tourmente, pour faire profit de nostre naufrage'. The prevailing justification that these marriages were not only useful but necessary to the present state of affairs, the discourse argued, was a travesty of the king and kingdom's power and their servants' loyalty. It implied that France, on whom the rest of Christendom relied, was itself reliant on Spain's protection and goodwill to maintain its peace and affairs. Had the audience considered Spain's progress in its goal of taking over France and Europe since the marriage treaty had been ratified – its encroachment on French Navarre and advancements against Venice and Mantua – they would have concluded that the marriages were prejudicial rather than useful to France's interests. In this light, the marriages appeared as a device to neutralise France as the customary check on Spain's ambitions.<sup>82</sup>

The *Discours sur les mariages* would appear less innovative once it was placed side by side with other anti-Spanish marriage discourses printed that year. Other discourses likewise played on the prejudices and sometimes justified paranoia of the French polity and society towards Spain, which had been nourished by the black legend of the Spanish inquisition, Spain's militant Catholicism and avowed bid for a universal monarchy, the history of rivalry between the two kingdoms and the living memory of Spain's interference in and deliberate exacerbation of the French civil conflicts during the 1580s and 90s. To appeal to members of the political nation who remained suspicious of Spain's agendas for initiating the marriages, the other anti-Spanish marriage discourses also argued that the marriages were Spain's cunning artifice to neutralise France as a counterbalance to its goal of subjugating Protestant Europe and attaining pan-European domination.

*L'Ambition de l'Espagnol* (1614), for instance, claims that the greatest ambition of Spain was to strip France of its rightful kings.<sup>83</sup> Meanwhile, *L'Anti-Espagnol* (1614) argues

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<sup>81</sup> *Discours sur les mariages de France et d'Espagne, contenant les raisons qui ont meu Monseigneur le Prince à en demander la surseance* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-H-12815(3), pp. 3-5.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-16.

<sup>83</sup> *L'Ambition de l'Espagnol, en son artifice par luy fait, en la solemnité de la vueille de la S. Iean Baptiste*. (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1614), BM Lyon Rés 315077.



that throughout history, Spain could not suffer the superiority of France and had always attempted to use treacheries and plots to supplant the latter. Knowing that it was only a matter of time before France recovered its health and military capability following its difficulties in the sixteenth century, Spain was now resorting to a new ruse to try and make itself the absolute master of France. It sent its ambassador to corrupt the French statesmen with bribes, and its preachers and confessors (read: the Jesuits) to persuade Marie de Médicis and her ministers to agree to the Spanish marriages. The marriages appeared as though they were mutual offers of an olive branch by the two kingdoms. But in truth, they amounted to the sale and transfer of the French crown to Spain. For firstly, the marriages would rob France of its ability to conduct independent foreign policy with Spain's rivals such as the Turks, the Dutch or the Portuguese. Secondly, *L'Anti-Espagnol* echoed the *Discours sur les mariages* in arguing that if these marriages were necessary for the preservation of peace and religion, then this implied that the French kingdom and Church needed the overlordship and protection of Spain. Such a justification would enable the Spanish king, for example, to use the pretext of wanting to protect the French Church to draw France into war (read: against the Huguenots of France and the Protestant powers of Europe), to command the French armies and to put forward his own candidates in French *gouvernements*, councils and benefices. This pretext of wanting to protect the French Church alone would allow the Spanish king to extend his control to the kingdom's entire administration. France would consequently become a constituent kingdom of Spain, just like Naples. Or it would become a protectorate of the Habsburg Emperor, Ferdinand. And when that happened, Spain would strip the French cities and citizens of their wealth and pledge the kingdom to the Genoese bankers as collateral. Readers must therefore recognise that the Spanish marriages would only sell France to Spain for nothing, and in return for nothing.<sup>84</sup>

The propagation of this idea that the Spanish marriages were a subterfuge of Spain to suborn France, to destroy France's ancient or Protestant allies and to achieve European supremacy continued into the next rebellion, both in the accompanying specialised discourses and, as one had seen from above, in the manifesto of August 1615. The *Cassandra François*, the pamphlet which Marie de Médicis reportedly read to a deputation from the *Parlement de Paris* after she had scolded them for their lack of effort in cracking down on *libelles diffamatoires*, insisted that France and Spain were inherently incompatible, like fire and

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<sup>84</sup> *Coppie de l'Anti-Espagnol, fait à Paris. Deffendu par ses rebelles de sa Maiesté.* (Lyon: Pierre Ferdelat, 1614), BM Lyon Rés 316254.

water.<sup>85</sup> The cockerel and the lion were destined to be lifelong enemies. Concomitantly, the marriages could not have been a sincere attempt by Spain to mend fences with France. They had to be a ploy to lull France into a false sense of security:

ce n'est point un lyon, c'est un rénard, qui est tousjours au guet pour attraper vostre coq: tenez vous donc sur vos gardes, & ce plutost quand il fera [sic: sera] doux; Ses promesses ne sont que vaines desloyautez; son visage riant ne cache que courroux; ce changement qu'il monstre tout a coup est un indice certain de quelque dangereux dessein. Car qu'à il affaire d'alliances si estroittes avec vous, sinon que par tels a pas il vous croit abuser? Ce n'est en luy que dissimulation, tousjours contraire de paroles aux effets, & est plus prest à faire l'un quand & [sic] il a promise l'autre... Et quoy, ne considerez vous point ses desseins? Non l'espoir du bien qu'on vous promet qu'il en viendra, vous offusque les yeux; & quel bien pensez-vous qu'il en doive reussir? Vostre seule ruine, apres le reste de l'Europe, est la fin de ceste alliance...<sup>86</sup>

Comparably, the pamphleteer behind *La Rencontre de Henry le Grand au Roy, touchant le voyage d'Espagne* (1615) had Henri IV warn his son, Louis XIII, that Spain

veut [t']engloutir sous le manteau d'un mariage: Alliance detestable qui te causera la mort, & la ruine entiere de tes pauvres sujets. Ne vois-tu que le iour de tes nopces est la veille assuree de ta perte? As-tu bien si peu de courage (si tu as jamais esté engendré de mes reins) de te vouloir allier à ceux qui sont les moteurs du parricide de ton pere?<sup>87</sup>

In correspondence to *L'Anti-Espagnol* and the manifesto of August 1615, *La Rencontre de Henry le Grand au Roy* claimed that traitors like chancelier Sillery and the commandeur de Sillery had received pensions and gifts from Spain to advocate the marriages. 'Henri IV' warned his son that the 'nopces seront sanglantes, voire plus que les miennes premieres (to Marguerite de Valois on 18 August 1572, seven days before St. Bartholomew's Day) n'ont esté'. They would herald the vassalisation of France, the massacre of Huguenots, the establishment of the Inquisition, the return of religious wars and the destruction of the alliances that his father had made with England, Denmark, Sweden, Savoy, Protestant

<sup>85</sup> *Journal d'Andilly*, p. 79.

<sup>86</sup> *Cassandre Francoise* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 4-5, BnF 8-LB36-426(A).

<sup>87</sup> *La Rencontre de Henry le Grand au Roy, touchant le voyage d'Espagne* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), p. 4, Rés 315233.

Germany, the Swiss Confederation and Genoa. France would be going to war with these great kingdoms and republics, instead of

cest escroüellé (scrofula, or the king's evil), que contre ce marrane, que contre le tyran Philippes, qui en fin se prevaudra de ton peu d'ambition & te couppans insensiblement l'herbe sous le pied, t'arrachera la Couronne de ton chef, la Couronne, dis-je, que tes ancestres ont si longuement gardée contre ce dragon des Pyrenées qui la guette.<sup>88</sup>

If these general or specialised discourses merely took their themes and arguments from the princes' manifestoes or from each other, and consequently had little new to contribute, it begs the question why so many editions of them were printed and reprinted during the rebellions. The first and foremost reason is this: it was of utmost importance that one created an impression that there was a chorus of numerous voices. As Andrew Pettegree has pointed out in his study on the culture of persuasion during the Reformation, it mattered greatly that a reformer, activist or leader would not be seen as a single lonely voice, but as part of a community or movement. Otherwise, it would allow the opponents of the reformer, activist or leader to claim that the latter was an isolated case, that his criticisms and demands were exceptional. The witnesses of other pamphleteers, who seemingly put forward the same criticisms and demands, gave the lie to such a charge.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, flooding the cities with scores of comparable discourses gave a movement, especially an understaffed one, an appearance of momentum. As Pettegree argues,

It was the superabundance, the cascade of titles, that created the impression of an overwhelming tide, an unstoppable movement of opinion... Pamphlets and their purchasers had together created the impression of irresistible force. This is why their publication was important even if they had nothing new to say, and why they were purchased by people who already knew that they agreed with what they contained. Their force lay in the power—or the appearance—of the collective, irresistible might.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-13, 16.

<sup>89</sup> Andrew Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 166-168.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

The impression of a chorus of numerous voices, I would argue, is itself also an important component of persuasion, particularly when one is trying to convert the undecided. It furnishes the latter with what social psychologists today call social proof. As renowned psychologist Robert Cialdini has explained, humans have a strong tendency to look to the behaviour or belief of a multitude of other people to guide their own, especially when they are faced with uncertainty or indecision about what constitutes correct behaviour or belief. One tends to view a behaviour or a belief as more correct, appropriate and appealing in a given situation to the degree that one sees others performing or espousing it, particularly if these ‘others’ are people very similar to one in age, social profession, nationality and etc. This tendency can be both conscious or subconscious. Humanity’s voluntary and involuntary reliance on social evidence to determine the correctness, appropriateness and appeal of a behaviour or belief accounts for why the audience often finds comedy programmes with canned laughter funnier than those without, even when they know that the producers have used laughter tracks. It sheds light on why the audience in concert halls claps deliberately as well as reflexively after they have heard the first claps. It explains why crowded restaurants and products with a ‘best-selling’ label generate even more interest and sales and are deemed almost automatically by consumers to be of better quality.<sup>91</sup>

The practice of filling the cities with a glut of comparable titles during an aristocratic armed movement, one could speculate, was undertaken precisely for the purpose of exploiting people’s inherent tendency to convince themselves of the wisdom of the crowd. The cascade of titles created an impression that there was a crowd of people expressing the same ideas and making the same criticisms and demands.<sup>92</sup> The ubiquity of these ideas or demands would constitute the social evidence for which the uncertain and undecided tend to look to guide their own stance. According to the principle of social proof, they would then tend to interpret, whether consciously or reflexively, the pervasiveness of these ideas as the proof of their legitimacy and merit. Their popularity, or at least their appearance of popularity, somehow made them more appealing.

And once the uncertain and undecided had embraced the ideas, the copious amount of analogous titles took on another purpose: reinforcement. Effective political persuasion calls for the repetition ad nauseam of a handful of concepts or arguments. Constant

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<sup>91</sup> Robert Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York, NY, 2007), pp. 114-166.

<sup>92</sup> Filippo de Vivo argued the same for Venice during the Interdict of 1606, see: Filippo de Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 229-232.

repetition embeds ideas and values in the minds of the audience. It normalised these ideas and values and helped the audience internalise them. Repetition in 1614-17 was therefore again not a symptom of the malcontents' inability to conceive high quality political thought or rise to the challenge of rethinking their world according to some scholars.<sup>93</sup> Rather, it was a conscious choice by the princes and their sympathisers to adhere to a classic principle of political persuasion.

### **The Deadliest Weapon**

In their respective works, Christian Jouhaud and Tatiana Debaggi Baranova have skilfully demonstrated how pamphlets in political or religious conflicts in early modern France were really meant to strike symbolic blows at their targets, construct a damning case against them and undermine their honour and reputation, for the ultimate purpose of gathering support for and justifying one's armed actions against them.<sup>94</sup> Jouhaud and Baranova, however, do not explain why the pamphleteers chose specifically to attack their targets' honour; more specifically, why undermining one's honour was seen as the best way to destroy one's political capital and career.

One could argue that the pamphleteers chose to take aim at their targets' honour for the same reason why the malcontent princes took great care to ensure that their manifestos and open letters underline the good intentions behind their armed actions and the crown's subsequent edicts of pacification, absolve them from charges of *lèse-majesté*: there were few possessions more important and coveted than honour in the court society of early modern France. As chapter three has described in greater detail, honour denoted political and social esteem and was conferred upon one by the 'common opinion' on the basis of one's social station, ancestry and reputation.<sup>95</sup> Honour was invaluable to a French nobleman or non-noble officeholder because there could be no respect independent of the respect of others in their circles and period. To be unknown and unrecognised was, in a way, not to be at all.<sup>96</sup> Honour was also paramount to these individuals' *maison* and career. The esteem of others was pivotal to attracting and developing dynastic ties and cultivating political and personal

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<sup>93</sup> Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries*, p. 108; Bannister, 'Mazarinades, Manifestos and Mavericks', p. 180.

<sup>94</sup> Christian Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: La Fronde des mots* (Paris, 1985); Tatiana Debaggi Baranova, *A coup des libelles: Une culture politique au temps des guerres de religion (1562-1598)* (Geneva, 2012).

<sup>95</sup> See chapter 3.

<sup>96</sup> Emily Butterworth, *Poisoned Words: Slander and Satire in Early Modern France* (London, 2006), p. 54.

friendships. It was crucial to obtaining royal and grandee patronage and for acquiring, maintaining and mobilising clients of one's own. And in a period where informal, personal and mutually beneficial ties, rather than bureaucratic institutions and procedures, played the most decisive role in the conduct of government and war, the esteem of others was most crucial to one's ability to enforce orders and mobilise clients as one ventured to exercise one's political or military appointments. The extent of one's honour was therefore the extent of one's political utility and power.

The importance and ramifications of honour were the reasons why courtiers and officeholders of early modern France feared slander so dearly; why slander was considered to be more despicable than larceny; why it was said to cut deeper than a sword.<sup>97</sup> For slander could rob and wound one's honour, one's most precious possession. As Marie de Gournay, a famous noblewoman and writer, once elucidated in 1626, a slanderer 'peut tronquer et priver son Prochain de l'honneur du monde, l'exposant aux outrages et aux risées vulgaires'. The outcome, Gournay concluded, was the victim's 'mort civile, ou plustost un civile damnation'.<sup>98</sup> Courtiers and officeholders, moreover, feared slander because they believed that it was incredibly difficult to exonerate and dissociate oneself from slanderous accusations beyond doubt. It was as Pierre Bernard, writer of a short treatise against calumnies published in 1615, said: wounds inflicted by slander would eventually heal, but the scars that they had left behind could never be effaced.<sup>99</sup> As such, honour which had been impugned by slander could never be fully repaired.

For the *Condéen* princes and their supporters, the enormous political, social and personal impacts of slander made libellous pamphlets the perfect weapon to traduce their enemies. Unsurprisingly, Concini being the easiest target bore the brunt of the princes' character assassination campaigns between 1615 and 1617. One of the commonest and simplest tactics of slander used by the pamphleteers is also one of the oldest tricks in the persuasion book: name-calling. The idea is to label a person, an action or an event with a distinctive sobriquet, phrase or slogan which could easily be learnt, remembered and repeated by the audience. Most importantly, the sobriquet, phrase or slogan must associate

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<sup>97</sup> Pierre Bernard, *Le Fleau de la Calomnie ou, Traicté contre les Mesdisants & Detracteurs de la Renommée du Prochain, & des Puissances Ecclesiastiques & Temporelles* (Lyon: Pierre Bernard, 1615), p. 2, BnF D-13704; Guy de La Brosse, *Traicté contre la mesdisance* (Paris: J. & C. Périer, 1624), pp. 114-115, BnF 8-R-7571.

<sup>98</sup> Marie de Gournay, 'De la mesdisance et qu'elle est principale cause des duels' in Marie de Gournay, *Œuvres Complètes*, ed. Jean-Claude Arnaud, 2 tomes (Paris, 2002), t. I, p. 716.

<sup>99</sup> Bernard, *Le Fleau de la Calomnie*, p. 53. I have paraphrased the saying here.

the person, action or event with certain attributes and symbols that the audience despised; so that when the label is invoked, the audience would automatically feel angry and disgusted, and choose uncritically to censure and repudiate the victim on the basis of those negative attributes and symbols rather than available evidence at hand.<sup>100</sup> The sobriquet that the pamphleteers had unanimously chosen for Concini was ‘*coyon*’, or coward. Concini’s *créatures* and actions were concomitantly called ‘*coyons*’ and ‘*coyonneries*’. The nomenclature was a clever one. The French populace in this period often stereotyped Italians as cowards.<sup>101</sup> And at court, French courtiers frequently accused rivals who lacked martial training or experience of cowardice, for military education and war were traditionally considered as the theatres for and evidence of courage. The sobriquet ‘*Coyon*’ therefore fitted Concini, an Italian courtier without any military background yet who had been elevated to the *maréchalat*, like a glove. Besides, the sobriquet was simple and catchy. It was also a particularly loaded and provocative term in the early modern French context, capable of inducing the readers and listeners’ contempt for and rejection of Concini and his *ministériat*.

The pamphleteers who were in favour of the princes simultaneously employed a more sophisticated kind of name-calling, which was to label an individual or an epoch as a modern-day equivalent or incarnation of an infamous classical, literary or historical figure or era. Their goal was to underscore their negative attributes. But at the same time, the hope was that readers or listeners, when contextualising and measuring their own statesmen or epoch against an iconic antecedent or construct, would superimpose these attributes onto their own statesmen or experience. The hope was also that readers or listeners would be tempted to extrapolate future developments from their knowledge of the past or the tales.

One pamphlet in 1615, for example, likened the current government and civil conflict to ‘*la ligue resuscitée*’. Such a label wished for readers and listeners to associate the court faction of the Sillerys and the Concinis with that of the *maison* of Guise and the Catholic League and the connotations of unrestrained ambitions, conspiracies and treason. It induced readers and listeners to equate the Spanish marriages with the League’s plans to install a Spanish *infanta* at the helm of France. But on the other hand, the label also hoped to prompt readers to identify Condé as the new Henri de Navarre, the present-day Bourbon

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<sup>100</sup> Leonard W. Doob, ‘Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda’, *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 14 (1950), pp. 435-437.

<sup>101</sup> Heller, *Anti-Italianism*, p. 133.

prince who protected France against the unholy alliance of a treacherous French faction and Spain.<sup>102</sup>

In the same year, another pamphleteer, possibly the former royal historian, Pierre Mathieu, styled Concini as ‘Sejanus François’.<sup>103</sup> The nomenclature was apt. The parallels between Concini and Lucius Ælius Sejanus (20 BC – 31 AD) should be immediately apparent, albeit imperfect in some aspects, to the classically-trained, or specifically, those who had studied Tacitus’ *Annals*. Both men were royal favourites: Sejanus was the favourite and closest advisor of Emperor Tiberius, while Concini was that of Marie de Médicis. Sejanus was of the equestrian class, the lower of the two upper classes of the Roman Republic, in the same way that Concini, son of a recently-ennobled diplomat, came from the *noblesse de robe*, the lower of the two noble classes in France. As such, both men did not really have the socio-political rank to justify their eminent status and appointments. Nevertheless, both men had become royal favourites and exerted significant influence over their masters through their respective capacity in the royal (or imperial) household. Sejanus was the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, an elite unit of the Roman army which served the bodyguard of the Emperor and the Imperial family; Concini was a *maître d’hôtel* and the *premier écuyer* in the queen mother’s household. When Sejanus became Tiberius’s favourite, the latter raised him to the rank of *praetor*, a rank not normally bestowed upon Romans of the equestrian class. The rank of *praetor* gave Sejanus the power to command an army, preside over judicial trials, and in the event of the *consuls’* absence, summon the senate and organise the defence of the city. When Concini became the regent and queen mother’s favourite, she raised him to the rank of *maréchal de France* and *lieutenant-général* of Picardie; a military rank and office not traditionally granted to the *noblesse de robe*. Concini’s new rank and office gave him the rights to command a French army, preside over military tribunals and organise the defence of the province of Picardie.

When the pamphleteer labelled Concini as ‘Sejanus François’, he did not merely wish for his audience to notice that Concini was very similar to Sejanus in terms of his profile and career to date. He wanted even more for his readers to extrapolate and believe that the similarities between these two men would continue into the future; that Concini would invariably follow the trajectory of Sejanus’s career. To give an example, the pamphleteer

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<sup>102</sup> *La ligue resuscitée* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BnF 8-LB36-711.

<sup>103</sup> One knows for a fact that Mathieu published a history of Sejanus in 1617 to compare him to Concini and to celebrate the latter’s death, see: Pierre Mathieu, *Histoire d’Ælius Seianus* (Paris: P. Breuneval, 1617), BnF J-23625.



would underline repeatedly in his tract that Concini was now using false charges of *lèse-majesté* to persecute and eliminate his princely rivals and their supporters, so that he could have a stranglehold on the kingdom.<sup>104</sup> The perspicacious audience would recognise that Sejanus had also used the charge of *crimen laesae maiestatis* as a way to purge opposing senators and equestrians and consolidate his power thereafter. But to secure his supremacy, Sejanus went on to seduce the wife of Drusus Julius Caesar, son and heir of his master, Emperor Tiberius, and plotted with her to engineer Drusus's death by poison in AD 23. Sejanus then manufactured charges of treason against the other two heirs, Nero Caesar and Drusus Caesar. Nero committed suicide before his execution and Drusus was imprisoned indefinitely. Still an adolescent, the third heir, Gaius Caesar, later Caligula, was effectively placed under house arrest at his grandmother's home. By associating Concini so closely with Sejanus and underscoring the similarities in their actions, the pamphleteer wished for his audience to infer that these were what Concini would do next: Concini would try to seduce the wife of Louis XIII and plot with her to poison the king. This could explain why he was such a staunch advocate of the marriage between Louis and the Spanish *infanta*. He was also after all an Italian and by implication a Hispanophile and Machiavellian poisoner. After which, he would use false charges of *lèse-majesté* to ruin Louis XIII's three heirs—Gaston d'Orléans, Condé and Louis de Soissons. In fact, as everyone could see from the manifesto of August 1615 and other pamphlets, Concini had already started doing that to Condé.

Besides name-calling, the pamphleteers relied heavily on mockery to mar Concini's honour. Mockery is a particularly powerful form of slander because it is first and foremost humorous. Humour entertains, and the prospect of entertainment often draws an audience. Humour also sticks; it lends itself to recollection and retelling. As a result, it tends to spread freely, quickly and indiscriminately. As Marie de Gournay herself acknowledged in 1626, humour 's'imprime plus ferme en l'oreille de l'escoutant, que le mot simplement detracteur: adjoustrons-y, que par mesme raison, il se fait ramentevoir plus souvent, et plus volontiers redire par tout, comme une gangrene ou contagion qui rampe'.<sup>105</sup> Humour is however more than a bait or a mnemonic. It strips away the target's gravitas and air of respectability. It also destroys the target's mystique, chips away his persona of invincibility and undermines his claims to moral high grounds, especially since humour tends to get more creative and savage with each retelling. Humour has the added advantage of undermining the target's position

<sup>104</sup> *Sejanus Francois, au Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 4, 8-10, 18-19, BnF 8-LB36-431(A).

<sup>105</sup> Gournay, 'De la mesdisance', t. I, p. 717.

while simultaneously strengthening one's own. It is often the case that laughing at one's opponents helps improve morale and reinforce belief in the cause and victory.<sup>106</sup> Another deadly characteristic of humour is that it is difficult to refute and suppress. In fact, it is frequently counter-productive to do any of those. The act of refutation or suppression implies that there is something worthwhile to refute or suppress. It manifests over-defensiveness, which could be interpreted as a symptom of guilt. Though at the same time, a target could not sit on his hands, for silence and inaction would imply his admittance to the veracity of the subject matters. It is truly a Catch-22 situation. However, what is no doubt the worst repercussion of the act of refutation or suppression is that it draws unwanted attention to the mockeries and reinforces the public's interest in them. The forbidden fruit is the sweetest.

The pamphleteers' mockeries of Concini came in all shapes and sizes, but in order to further enhance the dissemination and assimilation of these jibes, the choice of formats and motifs always conformed to what the audience were most comfortable and familiar with. Verse was therefore a popular choice. It was either used on its own or to interlace or bookend the prose. Early modern societies were predominantly oral cultures. People frequently versified or lyricised gossips and news, and recited or sang them in public spaces. People also obtained their regular dosage of gossips and news by going to public spaces and listening to these odes and ballads. The rhythm and rhymes of the verse, not to mention their figures of speech, made them enjoyable and more importantly, memorable.

*Le Pasquil Picard Coyonnesque* is a representative example of these anti-Concini verses.<sup>107</sup> In nine of its many lines, it repackaged one of the manifesto of August 1615's key allegations against the favourite into a teasing doggerel:

Ce conquerant & Monarque d'Idée  
void tous les jours sa fortune en fumée,  
assisté d'un tas de mors de faim,

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<sup>106</sup> J. Michael Waller, 'Ridicule as a Weapon', *The Institute of World Politics, Public Diplomacy White Paper 7* (2006), pp. 5-10.

<sup>107</sup> See also: *Le Cotret de Mars, avec le fagot, la fascine, et le gros bois, pour feu de joye à la France* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF YE-19159; *Advis de Colin à Margot, ou Coq à lasne sur le temps present* (S.l.: s.n., 1617), BnF YE-14604; *Le Grand Gueridon Italien et Espagnol, Venu Nouvellement en France. Aux Hypocrites du temps presents* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF YE-23491.

qu'il a choisi achepté de sa main.  
 Des thresors pris dedans la Bastille:  
 voyez donc qu'il a sa main habille,  
 a bien compter & par millions,  
 soudoyer un nombre des Coyons,  
 qui prenoient part en Picardie,  
 mais quoi? La Coyonnerie.<sup>108</sup>

Another pamphlet entitled simply *Songe* and published in 1616 relied on verse as well as parody to ridicule Concini. It poked fun at the favourite's persistent attempts to prove himself a worthy *maréchal de France* and imitate the manners and vocation of a true *noblesse d'épée*. But because of his inescapably humble upbringing, his ways of going about it were so uninformed, desperate and consequently comical that his person and actions inadvertently resembled a parody of the fashion and conduct of the *noblesse d'épée*:

Son bouclier estoit faict de carte,  
 Sa Cuirasse d'un cul de tarte,  
 Son Casque d'une peau d'oignon,  
 Sa Lance estoit d'une baguette.  
 Son gantellet d'un brayette,  
 Et sa Masse d'un champignon.

Il estoit faict en sentinelle,  
 Ses Brassars estoiet de Canelle,  
 Son Panache de deux harens,  
 Sa Viziere d'une raquette,  
 Son hausse col d'une etiquette,  
 Et sa devise, je me rends.

Ce n'estoit que Rodemantades,  
 Mais en effect les coyonnades,  
 Servoient de lustre a son bon heur,  
 C'estoit un Rolant dans les rues,

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<sup>108</sup> *Le pasquil picard coyonesque* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), p. 4, BnF 8-YE PIECE-5959.

Pour batailler contre les grues,  
Quand ce venoit au point d'honneur.<sup>109</sup>

Parody was of course the bread and butter of early modern carnivals and charivaris. The audience's familiarity with this genre made it a popular choice amongst pamphleteers of anti-Concini lampoons. So too was its close relative, the burlesque, which is 'a type of parody that ridicules some serious literary work either by treating its solemn subject in an undignified style or by applying its elevated style to a trivial subject'. It is commonly found in the classical Greek satyr plays and increasingly in contemporary literature and plays from the early sixteenth century onwards.<sup>110</sup> One amusing example of burlesque being employed against Concini was the *Extrait de l'inventaire qui c'est [sic: s'est] trouvé dans les coffres de monsieur le chevalier de Guise*, published in 1615. An *inventaire* was a commonplace notarial document which listed the immovable properties and possessions of a recently-deceased so as to facilitate their transferral to his heirs. This pamphlet purported to be an extract of the *inventaire* of François-Alexandre de Lorraine, chevalier de Guise (youngest brother of the Charles de Lorraine, duc de Guise) who died in June 1614. And amongst the many possessions left by the chevalier de Guise, the pamphlet claimed, was a political discourse written by a secretary of Concini showing why Concini's boasts were themselves strong evidence of his valour. There was also a treatise recounting the most marvellous flicks of the stylus and the plane (a woodworking tool) by Concini's ancestors at the court of the Grand Dukes of Florence.<sup>111</sup> Self-evidently, the discourse and treatise were being deliberately ironic in their exultation of the favourite's achievements and ancestors. The first was included to scoff at Concini's lack of military upbringing, experience and merit and his attempts to camouflage that with his posturing and swagger. The second was meant to deride his humble lineage, or more specifically, to underscore and sneer at his family's *noblesse de robe's* status and recent ennoblement.<sup>112</sup> The treatises' stress on the Concini's dependence on speech (boasts) and writing (styluses) was simultaneously a play on the contemporary association of speech and writing with the female sex, and actions with the male.<sup>113</sup> The goal was therefore to defame the men of the Concini family, to portray them as effeminate.

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<sup>109</sup> *Songe* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), pp. 6-8, BnF YE-33323.

<sup>110</sup> Chris Baldick, *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms* (4th ed. Oxford, 2015), pp. 46-47.

<sup>111</sup> *Extrait de l'inventaire qui c'est trouvé dans les coffres de monsieur le Chevallier de Guise par mademoiselle d'Antraige & mis en lumiere par monsieur de Bassompierre*. (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 5-6, 8, BM Lyon 315239.

<sup>112</sup> Concini's grandfather, Bartolomeo, was an ambassador of and his father a secretary of the Grand Dukes of Tuscany. The latter was subsequently ennobled for his family's services; see: Duccini, *Concini*, pp. 13-15.

<sup>113</sup> Michael Wintroub, 'Words, Deeds, and a Womanly King', *French Historical Studies* 28 (2005), pp. 402-404.

The pamphlet alleged that there was likewise a tragic poem of queen Fredegund composed and dedicated to the queen mother by Concini's wife, Galigai, in the *inventaire*. There was also a remonstrance presented by Galigai to Marie de Médicis which expressed her complaint that men with small penises were invariably ineffective in government and her corresponding advice that the likes of François, sieur de Bassompierre (the *colonel général des Suisses et Grisons*), be excluded henceforth.<sup>114</sup> Readers and listeners who knew their history of Merovingian France would be able to decipher the significance of Galigai's poem immediately. Fredegund was born into a relatively low ranking but rich family. As such, Chilperic I, compelled by the promise of a handsome dowry, cast aside his wife Galswintha to marry Fredegund. Galswintha died soon after, allegedly at Fredegund's hands. Fredegund later contrived to marry her daughter Rigunth, with whom she had a bad relationship, to Reccared, a Visigoth prince in Spain, despite the objections of the Frankish nobles. And following the mysterious assassination of Chilperic I in 584, Fredegund became the regent for her son, Clothar II, and went on to commit many acts of assassination and sadism until her death in 597. This fictitious poem of Fredegund was therefore meant as a swipe at Marie de Médicis and Galigai. The pamphleteer was suggesting that Marie, who, like Fredegund, was a daughter of a humbler but richer dynasty and chosen by the French king for the large dowry that she would bring, was inspired by the poem to model herself after the Merovingian queen. She was spurred on by the poem to murder Gabrielle d'Éstrees (presumably to facilitate her own marriage to Henri), assassinate Henri IV and marry her daughter to a Spanish prince despite the objections of the French grandees. And because this poem was written for her by Galigai, it was the latter who had encouraged the queen mother to commit these atrocities.

Equally facetious but admittedly more oblique, Galigai's remonstrance was likewise concocted to vilify Galigai. The fact that Galigai had the privilege to present a remonstrance, as well as the nature of the remonstrance itself, served to highlight her status as the *éminence grise* and the great sway that she held over Marie de Médicis's appointments. But there was more. The target of Galigai's axe, Bassompierre, was an experienced soldier who had campaigned in Savoy and Hungary, as well as a renowned womaniser at the court of Henri IV and Louis XIII. In fact, his prowess and success with the ladies, along with his penchant for gambling, were what endeared him to Henri, who treated him like a companion until his

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<sup>114</sup> *Extrait de l'inventaire* (1615), pp. 7, 12.

death.<sup>115</sup> But Galigai, the pamphlet implied, based her judgement and advice on the size of his penis, rather than his military achievements and, to put it crudely, what he had ‘done’ and ‘accomplished’ with that penis. It was therefore Galigai who had engendered the recent triumph of personal favour and emotion over merit and reason in the kingdom.

Then, as now it seems, sex and genitalia were a recurrent theme of scurrilous polemics. Scatology and demonology were the other two popular themes. In early modern Europe, smearing someone with excrement was a way to demean him and withdraw him from the realm of political or religious veneration. But the use of excrement also served to link him with the demonic, as popular superstitions considered the privy to be the haunt of demons.<sup>116</sup> Demons were in turn thought of in popular culture to be the perpetrators of sins and deceit and the harbingers of impiety, disorders and misfortunes. As the inversion of all that was Christian and godly, and all that was moral and just, they were believed to be the creators of the world turned upside-down, where socio-political hierarchy and norms were reversed, and order reduced to chaos. In other words, they symbolised everything an early modern political or religious leader wished not to be associated with.<sup>117</sup>

In an effort to maximise the reception and assimilation of his pamphlet, the pamphleteer of *La Trompette Françoise, ou Reveille-Matin aux Parisiens* (1616) used all three themes of sex, scatology and demonology. The pamphlet centred on the incident of the brutal assault of a Parisian sentinel, *sergent* Picard, by Concini’s men on 19 June 1616. This incident made Concini the capital’s number one enemy. Although some of the assailants were eventually tried and executed, many Parisians remained unappeased. They were convinced that the assailants had acted on Concini’s orders and were unhappy that the favourite had gotten off scot-free again. Not content with merely broaching this highly charged issue, the pamphleteer of *La Trompette Françoise* attempted to use taunts to whip the Parisians into declaring for the princes’ latest rebellion. These taunts were then interwoven with bawdy and scathing calumnies against Concini. The pamphlet claimed to be both a wake-up call (*Reveille-Matin*) and a clarion call (*Trompette Françoise*). It rebuked the Parisian *gouverneur, prévôt des marchands, échevins, parlementaires* and citizens for forsaking their duties and choosing to suffer in silence instead of rising up against the ringleader of the murder of one

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<sup>115</sup> Bassompierre frequently discussed his gambling triumphs and sexual conquests in his memoirs, see: *Mémoires de Bassompierre*, I and II.

<sup>116</sup> R. W. Scribner, *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 83-84.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84-189.

of its own. It accused them of being cowards who had sullied the honour and glory of the great city. Their silence and inaction were all the more shameful and unforgivable because that ringleader was a *bardachon* (a seventeenth-century Italian term for bugger) in his youth, whose anus was so rotten and defiled that he had to be admitted to a hospital in Florence. Today, this *bardachon* was a male prostitute. He had a manger over which he would bend to be buggered and off which he would also eat his bread. And at eight o'clock every morning and five every evening, he would visit the place de Florence and call on his 'regulars', who would pay him extra in verses if he had a rotten anus. This *bardachon* was at the same time a sorcerer and a magician who had used money and spells to bewitch his prosecutors. He was also a loyal servant of the devil. In fact, the devil had rewarded his service with an entourage from hell, consisting of desperate murderers, highwaymen and bankrupts.<sup>118</sup>

'What would become of Paris', the pamphlet continued its taunts, 'if it tolerated the shame which arose from the unavenged murder of one of its citizens?' 'Would it become the most belittled city under the sun?' 'What about you, Lyon? Would you have done the same if one of your own was murdered?' Perhaps one was wrong to blame Concini for the murder of Picard, the pamphlet conceded, because where he was from, it was perfectly natural to bear grudges and take revenge using poison and treachery. Yet, considering that everyone was aware of Concini and Galigai's other crime – sorcery – why were there still no proceedings against them? It was easy to identify a sorcerer, the pamphlet argued. The devil would brand the bodies of those who made a pact with him. He had branded Galigai in the backside. But the brand could not be seen because her backside was so black in the first place. Nevertheless, there could be no doubt that the Concinis practised sorcery. There was no other way they could have accumulated so many *biens* in so little time and with so little merit. Perhaps Concini did have some merit: he had a long *catze* (*cazzo*, Italian for penis). It was uncommon for Florentines to have such a long *catze*. However, because Concini was the love child of a woman who had sex with a Florentine mule while her husband, a carpenter, was at work, he was endowed with a donkey's penis. Concini thereon used his long *catze* as:

le coutelas, le rudache, la sallade, les armes à l'espreuve du mousquet, dont il se sert  
aux assaults, prises de villes, rencontres, combats, & le devant de sa chemise les  
drappeaux & les cornettes qu'il a gagnéz sur ses ennemys, grand Capitaine de prendre

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<sup>118</sup> *La Trompette Francoise, ou Reveille-Matin aux Parisiens, pour venger l'assassinat commis par le commandement du Marquis d'Ancre le 19 de Juin* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), pp. 4-6, BnF 8-LB36-856.

une telle fatigue & de nuict & de jour, il est aux alarmes; prest de prendre le mot du guet de son Lieutenant general pour aller en telle part qui luy sera commandé, ne refuse point la pointe pour monstrier sa valeur, se rend ennemy de soy-mesme pour bien combattre, pousse le cul & teste, jette Mars d'un costé, & Bellonne de l'autre, & s'emparant luy-mesme de la place singuliere, s'en rend paisible possesseur & jouyssant. Et que direz-vous d'un tel soldat, ne merite-il pas des appointemens & des recompences?<sup>119</sup>

Concini, the pamphlet resumed, thought of himself as a *maréchal de France*. In truth, he was the *maréchal de merde* (turd). If not for the musk and perfume that he and his wife wore (another stereotype of Italians), no one would dare approach them, because they stank and were infectious. His wife's stench was also caused by her kissing of the devil's ass at each of her witches' Sabbath. This was why she had to suck on a *dragée* (sugar-coated pill) constantly. It was to cover the reek in her mouth.<sup>120</sup> *La Trompette Francoise* signed off by exhorting the Parisians to rouse from their sleep and rally against the Concinis. It importuned the *Parlement de Paris* and Hôtel de Ville to preserve their authority and demonstrate their sense of justice. It implored them to do their duty to their king and their citizens and arraign and punish the Concinis accordingly.<sup>121</sup> And if these institutions persisted in not doing so, *La Trompette François* urged the Parisians to take matters into their own hands, to murder the Concinis and to punish their corpses according to the crimes which they had committed against Louis XIII and God.<sup>122</sup>

## Conclusion

In each of their rebellions between 1614 and 1617, the malcontent princes meticulously conceived and reformulated the contents of their manifestos to mirror and exploit the political nation's deep-seated prejudices, pre-existing grievances and shifting preoccupations. Day after day and night after night, the princes' aides and supporters churned out anonymous discourses and satirical tracts and verses to expound, reiterate and ram home the manifestos' arguments and accusations, with the hope to convert sceptics and reinforce the

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<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-16.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.



zeal of devotees and neophytes. At times, this literature supplemented the manifestos' arguments and accusations with new premises and quips. At times, they even presented the arguments and accusations in different variations, styles and formats. But all in all, the contents of these anonymous discourses and satirical tracts and verses seldom diverged too much from the manifestos and their own counterparts. Their seemingly new choices of information, argument, motif and presentation seldom divert from what their readers and listeners were already familiar with. This, one could argue, was a deliberate strategy on the part of the princes' pamphleteers. The latter intended for their audience to be swept up by the mirage of momentum and consensus created by the sheer number and near-homogeneity of the pamphlets. They hoped to trick others into falling for what seemed like the wisdom of the crowd, while at the same time rouse them to fever pitch. And if there were any remnants of deference and fear for one's political and social superiors left in their audience, the pamphleteers looked to shred these to bits by the crude and scurrilous name-calling and jibes of their satirical tracts and verses. In other words, the members of the political nation who had read the princes' pamphlets and answered the princes' calls to action in the rebellions of 1614-17 were not vacuous and credulous simpletons as loyalist pamphleteers like *Sieur D. C.* would have us believed. Rather, they were victims of an elaborate and astute pamphleteering campaign, a timeless masterclass in the art of political persuasion.



## 5. Loyalist Dissuasion

Armand-Jean du Plessis de Richelieu, Bishop of Luçon, was swamped by a great task before him between 15 and 18 February 1617, so much so that he could not even find time to write back to his benefactor, minister-favourite Concino Concini.<sup>1</sup> Richelieu had been ordered by the royal council to draft an official response to the open letters and manifestos of the princes in rebellion. These letters and manifestos were published as rejoinders to the royal decrees of 17 January and 13 February which had declared the ducs de Nevers, Bouillon, Mayenne and Vendôme guilty of *lèse-majesté*. The decision to entrust the new *secrétaire d'État* with the task was a considered one. It was informed by the council's understanding that the latest rebellion, as with the previous, had ramifications beyond France. Since 1 September 1616, the *Condéen* princes had been justifying their absence from court and mobilisation on the grounds of the prince de Condé's arrest. The princes considered the arrest to be a violation of the Treaty of Loudun between them, the Huguenots and the previous government after the rebellion of 1615-16, which saw the *Condéens* and the Huguenot princes taking up arms to oppose the Spanish marriages and demand for governmental reforms.

The Protestant leaders of Europe viewed the incident in the same light. Already alarmed by France's recent dynastic alliance with Spain, they regarded the new *ministériel's* arrest and imminent use of force against the foremost 'opponents' of the Spanish marriages, some of whom – Condé and Bouillon – were their kin, to be a breach of public faith. They interpreted such policies to be a symptom of the *ministériel's* alignment with the Habsburgs and the Counter-Reformation. They saw such policies as a harbinger of the *ministériel's* ultimate intent to retract the previous government's promises to the other signatories of Loudun, namely, the Huguenots and Protestant states.<sup>2</sup> Bouillon and the douairière princesse de Condé were particularly diligent in cultivating this line of thought. They would send letters and agents to the United Provinces, England, Protestant Germany and Huguenots

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<sup>1</sup> *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CCXIV, p. 316: Richelieu à Concino Concini, maréchal d'Ancre, 22 Feb. 1617.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, t.I, CLXII, p. 240: Louis XIII à Benjamin du Maurier, 1 Jan. 1617; *Ibid.*, t.I, CLXXIV, p. 246: Louis XIII à Gaspard Dauvet, sieur des Marets, 5 Jan. 1617; Joseph Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu* (New Haven, 1991), p. 151. England, for example, was a mediator and signatory of the treaty.

elsewhere in France to ensure that their scores of powerful relatives and friends in these places would not construe matters otherwise.<sup>3</sup>

Like many loyalists, Richelieu was keen to prevent the dire consequences which could arise from the rebels' open letters and manifestos. This literature, Richelieu believed, 'espandu mille bruicts parmy le peuple, pour descrier le gouvernement de l'Estat' and 'animer le peuple et rendre le serviteurs du roy odieux'.<sup>4</sup> In the Estates of Holland, apparently, 'ces mauvais bruicts ont préoccupé beaucoup d'esprits'.<sup>5</sup> Richelieu and other loyalists feared that these *bruicts* would eventually persuade the members of the political nation to be uncooperative with the *ministériat's* efforts to suppress the rebellion using the royal armies or courts of law. They were likewise worried that these *bruicts* would move some members of the political nation as well as some foreign states to throw their weight behind the rebellion. To impede the malcontent princes' ongoing efforts to invite foreign intervention and recruit foreign mercenaries, the *ministériat* had already dispatched several extraordinary ambassadors abroad in December 1616 to give an account of its actions against the princes.<sup>6</sup> But so far, the results had been mixed.<sup>7</sup>

Richelieu and other loyalists feared that the *bruicts* would also besmirch the *ministériat's* already-embattled reputation, thereby further diminishing its prestige and legitimacy, and emboldening more French subjects to repudiate their duty and obedience. Because the predominant culture of honour dictated that any challenges against one's precedence or reputation had to be redressed forthwith, the *ministériat* could not afford to remain silent. Doing so would be tantamount to admitting to the truthfulness of the princes' allegations, or conceding the *ministerial's* inability to defend itself. The result would be further forfeiture of its honour, the most important political and social currency of this period. The *ministériat* could not remain silent because this would also allow the rebels' pamphlets to monopolise political discourse. Unless the *ministériat* and its supporters worked to ensure they had a louder voice than the rebels, the uninterrupted momentum of these pamphlets could carry initially-reluctant sympathisers into the rebellion. The prevalence of these pamphlets would

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<sup>3</sup> *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CLXXII, pp. 241-242: Louis XIII à Benjamin du Maurier, 1 Jan. 1617; *Ibid.*, t.I, CLXXV, pp. 247-248: Louis XIII à Charles Cauchon, baron du Tour, 5 Jan. 1617; *Mémoires de Pontchartrain*, II, pp. 180, 211; *Mémoires de Richelieu*, II, pp. 118, 120-121.

<sup>4</sup> *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CLXXXIV, p. 264: Richelieu à Philippe de Béthune, 21 Jan. 1617; *Ibid.*, t.I, CCXXIII, pp. 330-331: Richelieu à Philippe de Béthune, 28 Feb. 1617.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, t.I, CCXXIV, pp. 332-333: Richelieu à Concino Concini, maréchal d'Ancre, fin Feb. 1617.

<sup>6</sup> *Mémoires de Richelieu*, II, p. 134.

<sup>7</sup> Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, pp. 145-151.

likewise constitute the wisdom of the crowd to which many sceptics and undecideds looked to determine the merit of a movement and concomitantly, their own response.

It was no wonder that Richelieu decided to defer his correspondence and concentrate on drafting the official reply to the princes' open letters and manifestos. The political situation and cultures of honour and persuasion, he understood, rendered it 'très important d'apporter un prompt remède a ce mal', 'de detromper ceux qui pourroient avoir receu quelque mauvaises impressions par leurs artifices, & faire voir à tout le monde que sous pretexte de leur conservation particuliere & du bien de ce Royaume, ils n'ont autre but que de chercher leur accroissement en sa ruine'.<sup>8</sup> This chapter tells the story of how Richelieu and other loyalist pamphleteers worked to prevail upon the members of the political nation to sympathise with the government's position and eschew the princes' rebellions.

### Royal Justifications

The fruit of Richelieu's toil, the *Declaration du Roy sur le subject des nouveaux remuements de son royaume*, was read out before the royal council on 20 February 1617, in the presence of Louis XIII, Marie de Médicis, the *grands*, the *présidents* of the sovereign courts and other courtiers. Richelieu reported with feigned modesty that his work was 'mal digérée comme venant d'une mauvaise main', but the council believed it contained enough material that 'pourront faire quelque effect parmi le peuple' and approved it. The adolescent king 'l'a voulue signer luy-mesme devant toute le monde'.<sup>9</sup>

Richelieu essentially intended for his *Declaration du Roy* and his extraordinary ambassadors to do the same. To allay the anxieties of France's Protestant allies, its Huguenots and its *politique* subjects, the *Declaration* and extraordinary ambassadors were to dispel the prevailing 'mauvaises impressions' that Condé and his associates had been persecuted by the French crown without any legitimate reasons, and they should

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<sup>8</sup> *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CCXXIV, pp. 330-331: Richelieu à Philippe de Béthune, 28 Feb. 1617; *Declaration du Roy sur le subject des nouveaux remuements de son royaume* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1617), pp. 3-4, BM Lyon Rés 315338.

<sup>9</sup> *Lettres de Richelieu*, t.I, CCXIV, pp. 316-317: Richelieu à Concino Concini, maréchal d'Ancre, 22 Feb. 1617.

faire cognoistre que c'est une pure calomnie, qui n'a autre fondement que la passion et l'imposture de nos ennemis, de dire que nous soyons tellement Romains et Espagnols que nous veuillons embrasser les intérests, ... au préjudice de nos anciennes alliances, et de nous-mesme, c'est-à-dire ou de ceux qui font profession de la religion prétendue réformée en France ou de tous autres qui, haïssent l'Espagne, font particulièrement estat d'estre bons François.<sup>10</sup>

The *Declaration* and extraordinary ambassadors were to convince these parties that the princes' premises for their absence from court and mobilisation, as well as their latest criticisms of the government, were but veneers to cover their self-interested and malevolent intentions. The official response and extraordinary ambassadors were to reassure these parties that the arrest of Condé and ongoing persecution of his associates were purely acts of retributive justice. They were not caused by a reversal in France's foreign and religious policies. Rather, they were motivated by the justifiable desire of Louis XIII to punish his disobedient subjects and fulfil his God-given duty of protecting his subjects and kingdom from harm.<sup>11</sup>

Although the princes' rebellion was directed at Concini and his *ministériat* rather than Louis XIII, Richelieu formulated his *Declaration du Roy* and ambassadorial directives to pit the princes against the king, the better to stigmatise the princes' movement as treasonous and indefensible, and to shroud the *ministériat's* retaliatory measures with a semblance of legitimacy and public-spiritedness. Richelieu's *Declaration* explained to its audience that Louis XIII had already expended every means and effort to accommodate the princes. In the past few months, he had promised Nevers a fair hearing for his actions in Champagne, and Mayenne an investigation into an assassination attempt. Louis had also expressed his wish to forgive any penitents and to welcome them back to his good graces with open arms. The malcontent princes, however, abused His Majesty's magnanimity. They maintained that 'on ne peut trouver seureté aupres du Roy'. They insisted on 'conditions impossibles' in exchange for their return to court and obedience. They resorted to arms to 'demander à son Roy justice à main armée'.<sup>12</sup> And 'pour colorer la desfiance qu'ils feignent avoir pour servir de couverture à leurs entreprises, ils mettent en avant qu'on a violé la foy publique en faisant arrester Monsieur le Prince de Condé', even though it was universally known that His

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, t.I, CLXVI, p. 210: Instructions d'Henri de Schomberg, 29 Dec. 1616.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, t.I, CLXVI, pp. 208-235.

<sup>12</sup> *Declaration du Roy sur le subject des nouveaux remuements* (1617), pp. 5-9.

Majesty was only punishing the prince for his ‘nouveau crime apres en avoir pardonné [ses] plusieurs’. At the same time,

de justifier leurs armes, pour faire croire qu’ils n’ont pas seulement devant les yeux ce qui touche leur particulier, mais en outre qu’ils sont meuz du bien public, ils mettent encore en jeu la restauration de l’Estat, & de là prennent occasion de descrier les affaires du Roy, & d’en presenter la face toute autre qu’elle n’est. Pour cet effect ils vomissent mille injures contre ceux qu’ils estiment puissants en la Cour aupres de sa Majesté, & descrient ses affaires...<sup>13</sup>

The princes’ insubordination knew no bounds, the *Declaration* contended. So far, they had seized the king’s fortified towns and arrogated his authority to punish the loyalist administrators of these towns. They had even confiscated his fiscal revenues and levied new taxes on his subjects without authorisation. Yet, the princes were barefaced enough to accuse certain ministers of ruining the king’s affairs and oppressing his subjects. They were outrageous enough to accuse these ministers of spreading lies and manufacturing false charges against them. It was self-evident, the *Declaration* argued, that the princes were the real perpetrators of disorders and cruelties.

It was hypocritical of the princes to criticise Concini, the *Declaration* continued, considering that some of them aspired to his position and shared his Italian extraction:

L’envie les faict parler & se plainte de l’avancement de ceux en la place desquels ils voudroient estre: ils leur imputent leur naissance, comme si estre estranger estoit une crime, & qu’on (Nevers and Mayenne) n’en n’eust [sic: eût] jamais veu d’avancez hors de leurs pais.<sup>14</sup>

It was also hypocritical of them to criticise Louis XIII and Marie de Médicis for showering *bienfaits* upon Concini, when in the same period, they had received more than five million *livres* worth of gifts from Their Majesties, the *Declaration* scoffed. Worst still, the princes demanded the reinstatement of *chancelier* Sillery, *secrétaire d’État* Villeroy, *surintendant des finances*

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-15.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

Jeannin and *garde des sceaux* Du Vair, even though it was they who had persistently called for the dismissals of these ministers during the previous rebellions.<sup>15</sup>

Apart from being hypocrites, Richelieu's *Declaration* argued, the princes were demagogues. They tried to persuade townsmen that Louis XIII was going to levy heavy taxes, that he 'veut y bastir des citadelles pour les tenir en subjection'. They worked tirelessly to unsettle the nobility with lies that Louis wished to abase them, that he had the 'dessein de changer l'ordre estably pour la seureté de leurs offices'. The princes 'mettent en jeu le Parlement sur le subject de ses remonstrances' and 's'efforcent de donner jalousie aux Catholiques des gratifications qu'on fait à ceux de la religion pretendue reformee'. They even 'passent aux pays estranges, publians que Sa Majesté mesprise ses anciennes alliances'. The princes claimed to desire peace; that it was Louis XIII who wanted war.<sup>16</sup> However,

qui peut dire que [Sa Majesté] desire la guerre, apres avoir veu qu'en peu de temps elle a fait trois traictez pour donner & conserver la paix à son peuple: apres avoir veu les sommes immenses avec lesquelles elle l'a rachepée plusieurs fois: apres avoir veu l'excessive clemence dont elle a usé envers ceux qui l'ont troublée, pour les faire rentrer en eux-mesmes & les ramener à leur devoir.<sup>17</sup>

If His Majesty's patience, clemency and generosity only served to embolden the princes in their disobedience, and if his edicts proved useless to discourage them from rebelling, then he who had exhausted all other means to bring them into line 'sera contrainte (quoy qu'à regret) de chastier ces perturbateurs de son Estat & punir leur rebellion', 'comme des peres, qui contraints de chastier leurs enfans'. Louis XIII's decision to use force against the princes, Richelieu's *Declaration* concluded, was necessary and just, for divine and natural laws ordered subjects to obey their kings, and kings to preserve their subjects' peace and well-being.<sup>18</sup>

Richelieu's line of reasoning was far from original. It was derived from the previous government's responses to the princes' open letters and manifestoes in August 1615 and of September 1616. These responses were shaped by the same intent to reassure France's

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-28.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31-36.



Protestant allies and its Huguenot and *politique* subjects of the government's commitment to its current foreign and religious policy; and consequently dissuade these parties from supporting the princes' cause.<sup>19</sup> To do so, the *Declarations du Roy* of August 1615 and September 1616 also tried to dismiss the rationalisations in the princes' open letters and manifestos as hypocritical and demagogic. As with Richelieu's *Declaration*, they promulgated the idea that the crown's legal and military measures against the princes were measures of last resort, undertaken only after every means of pacification had been exhausted, and motivated not by religious intolerance or diplomatic manoeuvres, but by the crown's sole desire to punish the recidivists and protect the innocent. As with Richelieu's *Declaration*, the seeming absolutist rhetoric of 'punishing disobedient subjects' espoused by the *Declaration du Roy* of August 1615 and September 1616 was more a tactic to avoid a diplomatic fallout and less an assertion of absolutist ideology.

The official response to the malcontent princes' second rebellion was the *Declaration du Roy, contre monsieur le Prince de Condé, & tous ceux qui l'assistent en la prinse des armes*.<sup>20</sup> Published in September 1615, this royal declaration was more than twice as long as the traditional decrees published to proclaim a new law or sentence. It laid out in much greater detail the crown's rationale for its decision to convict Condé and his adherents of *lèse-majesté* and raise its armies against them. It was clearly devised to confute the princes' open letters and manifesto issued a month ago.

Marie de Médicis, the *Declaration* of September 1615 maintained, had always acknowledged Condé's status and involved him in her affairs. But rather than repaying the queen mother's homage and generous 'dons & bien faits', Condé 'commença deslors de practiquer & tramer des factions & menées parmy tous nos subjects, tant Catholiques que de la religion pretenduë reformée'. A demagogue, the prince 'sonder les intentions des uns & des autres pour essayer de leur donner des impressions & subjects de mécontentemens qui de les portassent à quelque soulèvement en sa faveur; & contre nostre autorité'.<sup>21</sup> He left

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<sup>19</sup> *Declaration du Roy, sur l'arrest fait de la personne de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, & sur l'eslongnement des autres Princes...* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1616), BM Lyon Rés 315194. See also its variants: *Declaration de la volonté du Roy, sur la detention de Monseigneur de Prince de Condé en son Chasteau du Louvre...* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1616), BnF F-46932(13); *Pronunciatio necnon expostulatio regis, super detentione Domini Condae Principis...* (Paris: Frédéric Morel & Pierre Mettayer, 1616), F-46932(14).

<sup>20</sup> Also published as: *Lettres Patentes et Declaration du Roy contre Monsieur le Prince, & c. ...* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BnF F-46927(25).

<sup>21</sup> *Declaration du Roy, contre monsieur le Prince de Condé, & tous ceux qui l'assistent en la prinse des armes* (Poitiers: Julian Thoreau, 1615), pp. 3-4, BnF F-46927(29).

court at the beginning of 1614, ‘avec lesquels sous des considerations foibles & legeres, il s’y porta jusques à prendre ouvertement les armes, delivrer commissions, & se saisir d’aucunes de nos villes’. Even then, Marie de Médicis chose not to crush his rebellion, despite her military and financial superiority. Instead, she dispatched emissaries to Condé to hear out his grievances and win his obedience with her ‘douceur & clemence’. Discerning also that it was ‘plus expediant pour le bien & repos de nos subjects, d’oublier les fautes qu’il avoit en cela commise contre nous, & le contenter sur ce qui estoit de ses interests & avantages particuliers, que d’en venir à d’autre extremitez’, the queen mother resolved to accord Condé the Treaty of Saint-Ménéhould. The Treaty conceded to the prince’s demand for the convocation of an *États généraux*, even though the demand was clearly ‘quelque pretexte specieux’ to ‘couvrir ceste menée d’armes’.<sup>22</sup>

Still, Condé refused to see the error of his ways, the *Declaration* of September 1615 argued. As opposed to returning to court as he was required, the remorseless and ungrateful prince ‘despesché en Angleterre, Hollande, & autres lieux, pour en y desciant le gouvernement & conduite de nos affaires, essayer d’y former des associations & intelligences contre nostre autorité & service’. He thereupon ‘s’acheminer en nostre province de Poictou, où il suscita encores de nouvelles factions & menées’. At the *États généraux*, upon realising that he could not manipulate most of the deputies, he ‘travailla a semer une division entre le corps desdicts Estats, & nostre Cour de Parlement à Paris’. And following the closure of the *États généraux*, Condé tried to render Marie de Médicis and her government odious to their subjects by accusing them of having no real intention to respond to the *cabiers*. When that failed, he left court with other princes and nobleman. ‘Ceste derniere retraicte’, the *Declaration* surmised, ‘fait cognoistre plus clairement & ouvertement qu’auparavant, ses mauvaises intentions’.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, Marie de Médicis, compelled by her duty and desire to protect her subjects from the tribulations of war, insisted on pacifying Condé. The *Declaration* made clear that Marie had dispatched emissaries to the prince to ascertain his reasons for leaving court and cajole him to return, promising to do everything in her power to fix the kingdom’s affairs. Before she departed for Guyenne to accomplish the Spanish marriages, Marie sent more emissaries to the prince to beseech him to accompany the court on its voyage. But

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

Condé was ‘plustost porté à ses interests & demandes particulieres qu’à ce qui pouvoit conserve de bien public’. He published a manifesto to incite the crown’s subjects to sedition and rebellion. The manifesto, along with the open letters, claimed that Condé and his associates intended to oppose the Spanish marriages and campaign for reforms. ‘Qui est le pretexte specieux’, the *Declaration* averred, ‘duquel se sont ordinairement servis ceux qui ont voulu secouer le joug de l’obeissance’. Condé began to raise troops with unsanctioned commissions. He then seized the crown’s cities, fortresses and fiscal receipts. His garrisons and his armies committed all sorts of atrocities and left behind a trail of destruction. The prince’s reformation, it seemed, engendered more misery, ruin and desolation than it redressed. He left the queen mother, who wished only to ‘empescher que tous nos bon sujets ne soient surpris aux pratiques, pretextes & seductions dont use nostredict Cousin’, no choice but to declare him and his adherents guilty of *lèse-majesté*.<sup>24</sup>

### Loyalist Exposés

So necessary were repetition and the appearance of consensus to persuasion that the loyalist pamphleteers soon flooded Paris and other towns with a series of largely indistinguishable discourses. With an output of more than twice the size of the princes, the loyalist pamphleteers were determined to recapture and dominate the political discourse by drowning the rebel literature with their own. Recognising the grave threat which the princes’ pamphlets posed, especially their shrewd efforts to exploit the prevailing grievances, prejudices and paranoia of the political nation, the loyalist pamphleteers were bent on combating their chicaneries.

More explicitly and thoroughly than the official responses, many loyalist discourses tried to expose the hypocrisies and demagogueries in the princes’ pamphlets and warn their audience not to fall for them. To do so, the loyalist discourses would most commonly draw attention to the ludicrous mismatch between the princes’ rhetoric and actions. The *Discours veritables des affaires presentes, envoyé au Roy de la Grand’ Bretagne*, published during the rebellion of 1615-16, gave a particularly compelling account. As with many princely discourses, the pamphleteer pretended to address an eminent figure when he was really speaking to a section of the political nation. In this case, the pamphleteer was addressing the Huguenots, who

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

were James IV and I's co-religionists. To substantiate his observations, he also claimed to be 'un certain quidan' at court and for that reason, an informed insider. The pamphleteer admitted that when he first heard Condé had plans to reform the royal council, relieve the suffering of the people, elevate the status of the nobility, regulate the courts of justice and contain government spending, he was swept off his feet by the prince. He could not help but admire Condé profusely for his 'genereuse enterprise'. And when he learnt that Condé was demanding the convocation of the *États généraux*, he 'reboula l'applaudissement' and 'resplast sur luy mille sortes de benedictions'.<sup>25</sup> However, as time went on, as he had the chance to observe the prince's actions, he began to realise that the prince's rhetoric was 'rien qu'une exhalation qui abusoit les simples' and 'menaçoit la France des malheurs'. At the *États généraux*, for instance, he found out that Condé had

épousoit les deux parties contraires, faisant semblant d'assister la Noblesse qu'elle avoit d'abolir la venalité des offices, pendant qu'il visitoit d'ailleurs secrettement Messieurs de la Justice pour leur prester la main, & les faire opiniastres à la continuation de la Polette, & fomentoit leurs divisions pour troubler la concorde publique, & profiter de ces brouilleries.<sup>26</sup>

Still, the pamphleteer of the *Discours véritable* confessed that he refused to dismiss Condé as a demagogue. He somehow convinced himself that the prince was using 'en cela des maximes du temps & de la prudence mondaine, afin de s'entretenir des deux costez, pour en tirer apres plus aisément des affaires salutaires & desirables'.<sup>27</sup>

That was until subsequent events roused him from his state of denial. The pamphleteer soon discovered that Condé habitually espoused the conflicting demands of different confessional bodies and political institutions, so as to turn each of them against the government and advance his self-interests. Discerning that the Spanish marriages would increase Louis XIII's power and undermine his own ability to extort rewards from the crown, Condé 'jettoit tant de mesfiances & de soupçons dans les esprits de messieurs de la religion pretendue, leur faisant entendre qu'on vouloit les exterminer, & que leur ruine on avoit basti les premiers fondements de ceste alliance'. At the same time, he 'effrayoit mesme

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<sup>25</sup> *Discours véritables des affaires presentes, envoyé au Roy de la Grand' Bretagne, par un certain quidan de la Cour...* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), pp. 5-6, BnF 8-LB36-793.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

les Catholiques d'une terreur panique de l'Inquisition, la representant comme une fantosme & un espouventail à nos consciences. Il disoit que la France alloit ployer le col sous le joug & l'Empire de l'Espagnol'.

Condé's actions were grossly inconsistent with his rhetoric, the pamphleteer of the *Discours veritable* concluded. The prince professed that he wanted to rid the kingdom of Concini's evils; yet, he marched not to Picardie, but to Poitou. He besieged not Amiens where the favourite was stationed, but Château-Thierry and Épernay in Champagne. On the one hand, the prince avowed that he wished to reform the kingdom's finances. But on the other, he extorted an annual pension of 500,000 *livres*, the Hôtel de Gondi and 1,100,000 *écus* worth of gifts from Marie de Médicis. His rebellions forced the government to waste more money on raising armies and fortifying its fortresses. Condé was therefore 'la seule & la vraye cause des principales despenses du Royaume'. The pamphleteer of *Discours veritables* was left to lament the misfortunes of France and reproach himself for his credulity.<sup>28</sup> Having walked his audience through his own process of realisation, he hoped that they would too see the light soon.

Other discourses warning the political nation of the dissimilarities between the princes' rhetoric and their conduct to date included the *Response au Manifeste publié par les Perturbateurs du repos de l'Etat* (1617).<sup>29</sup> The latter joined Richelieu's *Declaration du Roy* of February 1617 in expressing bewilderment at the princes' demand for the dissolution of Concini's *ministériat* and the reinstatement of Henri IV's *barbons*. The *Response au Manifeste* pointed out the princes had been accusing the *barbons* of all sorts of crimes against the state and calling for their dismissal through the previous rebellions:

Mais ceux qui demandent qu'en les chassant, on restablisce en leurs places les anciens officiers, ne s'immoient-ils pas à la risée de tout le monde? Pensent-ils donc qu'on aye oublié ces reproches de Tyrannie et de dissipation d'Etat dont à leur premiers mouvemens ils ont chargé ces anciens Officiers, afin que les degrader? Pensent-ils

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 9-13.

<sup>29</sup> *Response au Manifeste publié par les Perturbateurs du repos de l'Etat* (Paris: Antoine Estienne, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315369. See also: *Ennuis des Paysans Champestres, adressez à la Royne Regente* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), p. 2, BnF SMITH LESOUEF S-5155; *La Phrenesie des Rebelles et Mal-contens. Decouverte par ses symptosme, et guarie par bons remedes* (Paris: Nicolas Alexandre, 1615), pp. 6-8, BM Lyon Rés 315293; *Remerciement des Poules: a monsieur le Bouillon* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-7, BnF 8-LB36-525; *L'Heureuse Trompette pour la Paix, adressée a Monseigneur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315173.

que leurs accusations soient effacées de la memoire des hommes, ou qu'on en ignore les auteurs? Ceux qui par une prodigieuse inconstance pressent aujourd'huy leur restablissement, ne sont-ce pas ceux mesme qui ont fait éclater ces cruelles plaintes contre'eux?

'Ce n'est donc point l'amour qu'ils portant aux anciens officiers qui leur fait faire ceste poursuite', the tract cautioned, 'mais ce sont de nouvelles couleurs qu'ils cherchent, afin de rendre leur faction plus plausible, & plus populaire'.<sup>30</sup>

The *Advertissement aux Francois sur les causes et consequences des troubles presens* (1615) also called the princes out on their double standards. It underlined and criticised the hypocrisy of their purported intention to depose an oppressor and murderer of the French nobility – Concini. While it was true that Concini had assaulted the sieur de Riberpré in Paris and assassinated *sergent-major* Prouville in Amiens, there was a similar incident which had taken place in the capital recently. It was the assault on Bertrand de Crugy, seigneur de Marcillac by Louis d'Aloigny, marquis de Rochefort, Condé's own favourite. Yet, instead of condemning and seeking to ruin Rochefort like he did Concini, Condé used his influence within the *Parlement de Paris* to ensure that the magistrates would not rule against the marquis.<sup>31</sup> One therefore had to wonder if Condé was really interested in preserving the kingdom's nobility and justice.

The *Franc et Libre Discours fait a Monsieur le Prince, sur les dernier poincts de sa declaration* (1615) piled on the attacks. It averred that the many inhumane and blasphemous exploits of Condé's armies in Champagne, Picardie, Bourgogne and Berry had sufficiently unmasked the prince's movement and gave lie to his reformist pretensions.<sup>32</sup> *Le Vieux Gaulois a Messieurs les Prince* (1614) argued that one did not frequently hear of men mutilating women after raping them, of tax collectors beating up those who could not pay, and of soldiers banishing the peasants from their homes until Condé's so-called reformation in Champagne. It was self-evident that Condé's actions had 'difforment un Estat plustost qu'ils ne le refforment'.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> *Response au Manifeste*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>31</sup> *Advertissement aux Francois sur les causes et consequences des troubles presens, et de l'intention du Manifeste de Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Claude Hulpeau, 1615), p. 7, BnF 8-LB36-493.

<sup>32</sup> *Franc et Libre Discours fait a Monsieur le Prince, sur les derniers poincts de sa Declaration* (Paris: Joseph Guerreau, 1615), pp. 4-5, BM Lyon Rés 315169.

<sup>33</sup> *Le Vieux Gaulois. A Messieurs les Princes* (Paris: Jean le Begue, 1614), p. 18, BM Lyon Rés 315076.

Turning to the princes' volte-face on the Spanish marriages, *Le Vieux Gaulois* then pointed out that Condé had previously appended his signature to the marriage treaty. Just two years ago,

Vous (Condé) avez ainsi tiré des presents & des augmentations de pensions pour publier l'utilité & la beauté du mariage: mais à ceste heure que l'on ne veut pas tout ce que vous voulez, vous descrivez le mesme mariage, & pour raison dites que si l'Espagnol met une fois le pied dans la France, qu'il s'en rendra petit à petit le maistre, que les estrangers auront les plus grandes charges, & que le Roy n'est pas en aage pour sçavoir ce qui luy est propre.<sup>34</sup>

*Le Vieux Gaulois* likewise pointed out that it was Mayenne who had ratified the marriage treaty in Madrid on Marie de Médicis's behalf. 'Vostre (Condé and Mayenne) consentment commun en ce mariage que vous reprouvez', it concluded, 'monstre que c'est plustost un pretexte qu'une raison'.<sup>35</sup>

The *Libre Harangue faict par Mathault en la presence de Monsieur le Prince* (1614), was equally keen to expose the skeletons in the princes' cupboard. It asked Condé sarcastically if he really wished to destroy the proposed alliance between France and Spain, 'estant obligé a l'une par la nature, & a l'autre par les bons offices, & le droit d'hospitalité que tu receus d'elle en ton exil volontaire, t'ayant servy d'honeste retraicte, & d'un abry contre les ardentés & violentes chaleurs d'une astre, & puissance souveraine'. It also questioned Mayenne's sincerity, seeing how Mayenne's father, as the leader of the Catholic League, owed Spain a great deal, and how Mayenne himself had previously been France's 'premier Ambassador' to Spain.<sup>36</sup>

Loyalist tracts like *Les Reproches de la France* (1615) therefore beseeched their audience not to fall for the *Condéen* princes' pretexts of 'bien public' or reformation. These pretexts 'a esté une ruse commune en tous siecles a ceux qui ont voulu se venger couvertement de leurs ennemys, ou establir leurs affaires particulieres dans la bien-vueillance populaire'. *Les Reproches* recounted that during the *Praguerie*, when the ducs de Bourgogne, de Bretagne and

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>36</sup> *Libre Harangue faict par Mathault en la presence de Monsieur le Prince en son Chasteau d'Amboise le seiziesme jour de Juin 1614* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), p. 12, BM Lyon Rés 315081.

d'Alençon and the comte de Vendôme sought to extort conciliar positions, *gouvernements*, lands and pensions from Charles VII, they also did so 'sous couleur de poursuivre le reglement de la justice & le soulagement du peuple'. Alluding to the *Condéen* princes' opposition to Concini, the discourse reminded its historically-minded audience that during the reign of Louis XI, 'ceux que le regret & dépit de se voir postposez à certaines personnes de peu eslevees aux premier rangs, unis sous la couverture au bien public pour la manutention de leurs dignitez'. Needless to say, 'apres avoir leurré le peuple du lustre de ceste autant vantee que souhaitee reformation, ils convertirent toutes ces belles & plausible promesses, en utiles & honorable appointmens'. *Les Reproches* cited the example of the War of the League of the Public Weal. Through this rebellion, the duc de Berry received from Louis XI the duchy of Normandy. The duc de Bourbon obtained money to defray his marital expenses and the duc de Bretagne managed to recover the *comté* of Montfort. The Duke of Lorraine and Calabria got the king's promise that he would help him recover the kingdom of Naples. The comte de Saint-Pol received the office of *connétable* and the comte de Dunois was restored to the offices and titles that he had lost during the previous reign. *Les Reproches* clarified that

Ce que nous rapportons particulièrement, non tant pour flestrir la memoire de ces grands Princes là d'aucun reproche, que pour instruire les peuples à n'ouvrir que soubz bonnes enseignes l'oreille aux promesses & semonces de ceux qui ayans la reformation publique en la bouche, n'ont le plus souvent rien moins en l'ame que le desir de la promouvoir de l'avancer.<sup>37</sup>

Even though the discourse did not name names, its allusion to the *Condéen* princes could not be more obvious. The ducs de Berry and de Bourbon brought to mind Condé, a Bourbon prince who aspired to the *gouvernement* of Berry.<sup>38</sup> The duc de Bretagne referred to Vendôme, the current *gouverneur* of Bretagne. The Duke of Lorraine and Calabria alluded to Mayenne, a cadet of the *maisons* of Lorraine and Guise, who had claims to the kingdom of Naples. The comtes de Saint-Pol and de Dunois reminded one of Longueville, whose family inherited these titles. Without a doubt, *Les Reproches* was insinuating that these princes were no different from their fifteenth-century counterparts. They were advancing their private interests under the banner of reformation or the common weal. If history had taught one

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<sup>37</sup> *Les Reproches de la France faict à Messieurs les Princes & autres perturbateurs de son repos* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), pp. 5-7, BM Lyon Rés 315188.

<sup>38</sup> Condé would obtain Berry through the Treaty of Loudun in May 1616.



anything, it was that the princes would always abandon their public concerns and supporters as soon as their personal demands were met.

The *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (1614) agreed. So often in the history of France, it explained, men had fallen for similar pretexts of ‘bien public’ and reformation and for similar figures, who disguised themselves as ‘les zelateurs du public, ont soupiré en apparence la peine & le mal du peuple, ont si bien imité la voix des pasteurs, comme l’Hyæne quand elle les veut devorer’. As with the *Condéen* princes, the princes of the League of the Public Weal

n’estoient pas contents de ce que le Roy ne les appelloit point, & ne se conseilloit à eux de la conduite des grands affaires du Royaume, mais se conseilloit & gouvernoit par gens qui n’estoient de leur condition. Ils demanderent l’assemblee des Estats comme le souverain remede contre les desordres, & le seul moyen de pacifier les troubles. Le Roy mesme se soubsmit à l’assemblee convoquee à Tours: Les plaintes estoient que la justice estoit mal administree, le peuple surchargé, mauvais ordre au gouvernement... Ceux qui en escrivent nous apprennent que ces Reformateurs qui n’avoient que la grandeur du Royaume & le soulagement du peuple à la bouche, convertirent le bien public en leur particulier, & qu’eux seuls en profiterent, que chacun capitula pour soy, & que le salut du peuple qui devoit aller devant toutes choses fust postposé aux interests privez...<sup>39</sup>

The *Discours sur la lettre* urged its audience to ‘croire neantmoins, que M. le Prince & ceux qui l’assistent sont emportez d’autres considerations que ces Princes du temps de Loys XI. & que le seul amour du bien de l’Estat les fait plaindre du gouvernement present’.<sup>40</sup> This was undoubtedly a rhetorical device to prompt the audience to believe what it said they should not. The *Discours* wished for them to extrapolate from the past the hidden agendas and subsequent manoeuvres of the *Condéen* princes. The pro-princes pamphleteers, it seemed, were not the only ones keen to exhort their audience to take lessons from history, the better to prevent it from repeating itself.

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<sup>39</sup> Guillaume Ribier, *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Durand, 1614), BM Lyon Rés 315088, pp. 10-11.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

## Loyalist Refutations

Besides directing their audience's attention to the contradictions between the princes' rhetoric and deeds, many loyalist discourses also scrutinised the princes' public complaints and demands. By disproving or invalidating these 'premises of rebellion', they intended to strip the princes' movement of its outward varnish of necessity and legitimacy. They hoped to assure the members of the political nation that things were not as bad as they thought they were; that the crown had done and would continue to do everything in its power to redress the kingdom's disorders and grievances.<sup>41</sup> There was no need for a recourse to arms just yet.

The crown's official responses set an example for the loyalist discourses. Marie de Médicis, for example, proclaimed at the start of her open response to Condé's manifesto of February 1614 that it had always been her intention to assemble the *États généraux* immediately after the declaration of Louis XIII's majority. In doing so, she had effectively invalidated and robbed Condé of one of the main pretexts of his rebellion: securing the convocation of the *États généraux*.<sup>42</sup> Marie went on to claim that the marriage treaties with Spain did not represent a reversal of the kingdom's foreign policy. The treaties were not ratified against the late king nor the princes' wishes, because it was Henri IV who had conceived the idea and initiated the negotiations. In June 1612, the two *princes du sang*, Soissons and Condé, had approved the marriages on the grounds that they were 'utile, bien proportionnée à l'aage, & à la grandeur du Roy'. The belief that the marriages would alienate the kingdom's ancient allies was unsubstantiated. Marie argued that she had already dispatched extraordinary ambassadors to the 'Princes, Potentats & alliez de ceste Couronne' to reassure them that the marriages were purely intended to strengthen the peace between France and Spain during this period of royal minority. She had also dispatched Condé's ally, Bouillon, to England to do the same. So far, all of France's allies had responded positively to the news and justifications. As of now, her government was arranging a similar dynastic match with England. Recently, it had also successfully intervened in the succession dispute in Mantua and Monferrato, one of France's allies in northern Italy. It was therefore clear that her government had not abandoned its foreign allies in the aftermath of its marriage treaties

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<sup>41</sup> For more examples, see: *Apologie pour Monsieur le Prince de Condé, sur son depart de la Cour* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-222(B); *Advertissement aux Provinces. Sur la Disposition presente des affaires* (Paris: Gilbert le Veau, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315265; *Discours sur l'Etat Present des affaires de France* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315280.

<sup>42</sup> *Double de la responce de la Royne régente, mère du Roy, à la lettre escrite à sa Majesté par Monseigneur le prince...* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), pp. 7-11, BnF 8-LB-207(H).

with Spain.<sup>43</sup> For these reasons, the political nation did not need to be alarmed. Its members did not need to support a rebellion which purported to maintain the late king's foreign policy and avert the diplomatic consequences of the Spanish marriages.

The loyalist discourses mirrored Marie de Médicis's response or even elaborated on its subject matters. The *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (1614), for instance, articulated her insinuation that the demand for the *États généraux* was not a legitimate reason for Condé and his adherents to rebel, because Marie had already promised the kingdom in her 'lettres publiques écrites aux Provinces' that she would convene that assembly upon the king's majority. As for the issue of the Spanish marriages, the *Discours* implored its audience not to believe the princes' fearmongering. They must not believe that the marriages were a conduit for Spain to encroach on France and ruin its affairs. They should instead see the marriages as necessary to rendering the newfound knot of amity between the two kingdoms 'd'un temperamment si inegal & disproportionné' firm and indissoluble. Marie and her ministers did not arrange the marriages on the presumption that France could not subsist on its own without Spain's help. Rather, they did so on the understanding that France would be fearsome and invincible once it was allied with another powerful kingdom.<sup>44</sup>

*Le Vieux Gaulois a Messieurs les Princes* (1614) also suggested that the marriages were imperative precisely because Spain was an ancient enemy of France. It cleverly argued that 'Si l'Espagnol & nous sommes contraires, avec qui faut-il chercher alliance qu'avec des contraires: il n'est point si nécessaire de s'allier avec des amis puisque desja l'alliance en est jurée'. Moreover,

Les Roys ne se peuvent marier qu'avec des Roys, & trouvant l'occasion d'obliger un Roy d'Espagne, qui desja nous faict la guerre par des pratiques intestines & cachés, il est bien plus à propos de s'allier avec luy qu'avec un Duc de Savoye qui pour se maintenir auroit mesme besoin de nous.<sup>45</sup>

*Le Vieux Gaulois* was effectively saying in a more diplomatic way that it was more expedient to ally with an equal power like Spain than an inferior one like Savoy, which was the malcontent princes' preference. It was more advantageous to reconcile with a devastating

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-11.

<sup>44</sup> Ribier, *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (1614), pp. 15-20.

<sup>45</sup> *Le Vieux Gaulois* (1614), p. 21.

nemesis than to acquire a parasitical dependent. The idea that the marriages would pave the way for Spain to usurp the sovereignty of the French king and kingdom and fill the French councils and *gouvernements* with Spaniards was preposterous, the tract added. Throughout history, French kings had married the daughters of the Emperors and the kings of England, Denmark, Sicily and Spain. Yet, none of them nor their daughters ever became the master of France. Nor did their native subjects dominate the kingdom's greatest offices and *gouvernements*.<sup>46</sup>

The discourses on the Spanish marriages published in the fall of 1615 deviated little from their counterparts produced in 1614 in their bid to dismiss the princes' fearmongering and assured the political nation that there was no cause for concern and rebellion. The *Discours sur l'Alliance faite par le Roy Tres-Chrestien, avec le Roy Catholique* (1615), for example, repeated the argument that the marriages were arranged to reinforce the recent peace and amity between France and Spain. It contended that the marriages were ideal for such a purpose, because

Entre tous les liens que la nature a inventez pour unir les affections des uns avec les autres, le mariage est un des plus forts & des plus indissolubles, c'est un nœud Gordien que la mort seule peut dissoudre, c'est un lenitif qui souvent addoucir des aigreurs qui ont duré une longue suite d'années, un temperamment d'ennemis irreconciliables fait souvent des vrais & loyaux amis, d'autant que de deux personnes, il n'en fait qu'une, & joint tellement l'interest d'une famille à l'autre, que tout commence à leur estre commun & qu'il ne peut rien arriver de bien ou de mal à l'une que l'autre ny participe & ne s'en ressent.

This was why even history's two greatest rivals, François I and Emperor Charles V, 'se reconcilient par le moyen des promesses de mariage de leurs enfans'. Before his untimely death, Francis I's third son, Charles II de Valois, duc d'Orléans was expected to marry either Charles V's daughter, Infanta Maria of Spain, or his niece, Archduchess Anna of Austria. Henri IV and Marie de Médicis were therefore making use of a time-honoured instrument of peace. They had conceived the marriages to prolong the Peace of Vervins and protect their successors and subjects 'non moins de la peur que du mal' of wars.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>47</sup> *Discours sur l'Alliance faite par le Roy Tres-Chrestien, avec le Roy Catholique* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 13-21, BnF 8-LB36-470.

The *Advertissement aux François sur les causes et consequences des troubles presens* (1615) concurred that previous French kings had married foreign queens or betrothed their daughters to foreign princes without causing any political fallout. Most recently, François II married Mary, queen of Scots and Charles IX, Elisabeth of Austria, daughter of Emperor Maximilian II. The princes' argument that Louis XIII and Elisabeth de France, thirteen and twelve years old respectively, were too young for marriage was also unconvincing. If one looked back at the history of France, one could see that Louis VIII married Blanche of Castille, daughter of King Alfonso VIII when he was thirteen years old and Blanche, twelve. Their marriage did not give birth to disasters, but to Saint-Louis. Saint-Louis himself betrothed his eldest son who was only eleven years old to Berengaria, daughter of King Alfonso X of Castile. He likewise married his second son and heir, Philip III, to Isabella, daughter of King James I of Aragon. Philip was only seventeen and Isabella, fourteen. Charles VIII married the thirteen-year-old Anne, duchesse de Bretagne. Yet,

pour tous ces mariages vous ne lirez point que les François se soient mis en armes contre leurs Roys, ny qu'ils ayent dit qu'en les accomplissans ils receuroient les mœurs conditions ou commandemens des nations d'où venoient les Roynes...<sup>48</sup>

'ce qui est une pure folie à quelques-uns & calomnie aux autres', the *Advertissement* concluded, 'qui ne mettent ces pieces en avant que pour leur servir de pretexte à leurs passions & mauvaises volonte?'<sup>49</sup>

### **The Pillar of France**

The loyalist pamphleteers, however, could not afford to limit themselves to exposing the impostures of the princes and the baselessness of their complaints and demands.

Throughout the rebellions of 1614-17, the malcontent princes and their pamphleteers had been trying to win over the mainstay of the princely and royal armies alike: the French nobility. As the previous chapter has shown, they had been targeting the nobility with literature that appealed to the nobility's unique concerns and aspirations. To overcome the

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<sup>48</sup> *Advertissement aux François* (1615), pp. 9-10.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

nobility's fear and reluctance to arm against the government, however, the princes and their pamphleteers had also issued specialised discourses which appealed specifically to noble values.

While this chapter is focused on loyalist pamphleteering, it is worth briefly considering the way the princes' pamphlets played upon noble values and insecurities. One such pamphlet, the *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (1615), for instance, argued that any failure to oppose the Spanish marriages and those responsible for them would amount to a dereliction of noble duties. It went as far as to equate any failure to oppose the Spanish marriages and those responsible for them with partaking in the destruction of the French crown and kingdom; a conduct so inconsistent with the nobility's *race*, *naissance* and therefore *qualités*:

Fait doncques Monseigneur fait bruire vostre nom, & esclatter vos armes. Contre ce monstre de Castille [Philip III], qui ouvre sa gueugle beante à vostre & nostre perte. Ne les laissez en paix manger nostre substance, & boire nostre sang. Sa grandeur gist en nostre misere & nostre liberté en sa ruyne. Voudriez-vous bien ceder à ces poltrons qui manient les affaires de ce Royaume? Bon Dieu vous laisserez vous bien glisser aux persuasions de ces malheureux Conseillers d'Estat [Concini, Bullion and Dolé]? Voudriez vous bien avec eux, estre marchant de nostre liberté? Seelleriez vous bien comme eux nostre perte (*chancelier* Sillery, who possessed the king's seals)? Signeriez vous bien comme eux la grandeur nostre plus grand enemy (commandeur de Sillery, France's ambassador to Spain)? Et voudriez vous bien estre Colonel de nostre Infanterie [Épernon], pour aller les armes basses au devant de nos adversaires, & leurs prester l'espaule contre nous? Vous estes de trop bonne race, pour vous accorder à ces meschancetez. Vous avez l'ame trop bien née, pour commettre ces vilenies.<sup>50</sup>

This appeal to the nobility's *race*, *naissance* and *qualités* was a clever tactic to rouse the nobility into action; because the French nobility constructed their class identity and based their social status and privileges on their natural duty to protect the king and kingdom from domestic and foreign enemies. At the *États généraux* of 1560, 1576 and 1614, the nobility urged the crown to reserve a larger share of offices exclusively for them, on the grounds that

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<sup>50</sup> *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), p. 11, BnF 8-H-6947(1).

their birth and upbringing inclined them to certain unique *qualités* – *générosité* and *courage* – which were most essential for royal service.<sup>51</sup> To accuse the nobility of failing to honour their natural duty and live up to their natural qualities, therefore, was to threaten them with the loss of their claims to their noble identity, status and privileges. This was no small matter, for the French nobility of this period were already exasperated by the fact that their identity, status and privileges had been devalued or diluted by a rampant venal system which allowed commoners to purchase noble rank. The French nobility of this period were also bitter that they could not secure employment in spite of their ideal *qualités*, because more and more commoners were buying their way into the nobility's functions.<sup>52</sup>

Earlier on in the discourse, the *Lettre du Bon François* even accused nobility who were reluctant to support the princes of failing to live up to their ancestors' history of royal service:

Et nous sommes François, & nous endurons ces tyrannies [of the evil ministers]: Ces beaux tiltres sont mort avec nos peres? Visitons les tombeaux de nos ayeuls nous y entendrons une voix qui nous dira, malheureux vous n'estes issus de nos reins, vous bastards, vous ne tenez rien du nostre? S'il estoit autrement, vous secoueriez le joug de la servitude qu'on vous prepare: au contraire vous y tendez le col, vous vous y apprestez & vous en esjouyssez. Ignorans, ne voyez vous que ces [Spanish] nopces sont des fillets que l'on vous tend: ne les endurez, sil vous voulez estre appelez nos enfans.<sup>53</sup>

Here, the *Lettre du Bon François* intended to taunt the nobility into action. It exploited the French nobility's belief that they inherited their superior virtues and inclinations from their predecessors, much like a thoroughbred.<sup>54</sup> To accuse a nobleman of failing to emulate his ancestors' record of merit and service was therefore to accuse him of being illegitimate, as the passage above had done more than suggest.<sup>55</sup> Such an accusation was a great insult to the

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<sup>51</sup> Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1996), pp. 21-49, 62-78. Contemporaries defined *générosité* as the willingness to bestow great services freely in return for disproportionately small or no favours, and *courage* as the willingness to scorn dangers in the service of another.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-17.

<sup>53</sup> *Lettre du Bon François* (1615), p. 9.

<sup>54</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, pp. 62-65.

<sup>55</sup> Jonathan Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715* (Berkeley, CA, 1993), pp. 100-101

honour of the nobleman and his parents. It was also an astute attempt at fearmongering. It played on the constant and overwhelming pressures that the noble family and society placed on its members to emulate their predecessors' accomplishments. Indeed, a nobleman's ability to acquire or preserve the all-important honour was predicated in part on his ability to replicate or surpass his ancestors' status and wealth, and his ancestors' reputation for royal service and virtues such as valour.<sup>56</sup>

The *Lettre du Bon François* went on to address the principal reason for many noblemen's reluctance to join the princes' rebellion: their fear of the charge of *lèse-majesté* in the event of their capture or the rebellion's failure. It promised them that the three princes whom they would follow – Condé, Bouillon and Mayenne – would never abandon them, suggesting that these princes would do everything in their power to intercede for their adherents on trial in the aftermath of their capture or defeat. The discourse claimed in addition that the *parlements* would not convict the princes' adherents because they had been looking to the princes' armed movement to save their king and kingdom. It then assured the nobility that the armed movement would not fail, as it would soon be receiving assistance from the Venetians, the Dutch, the Swiss and the English, who also looked to the princes to protect their kingdoms or religion from Spain.<sup>57</sup>

So how did the loyalist pamphleteers counteract discourses like *Lettre du Bon François*, which had so skilfully exploited their perceptiveness of French noble culture and psychology to the princes' advantage? The first countermeasure that the loyalist pamphleteers employed had already been discussed above: they argued that the princes' armed movements were not organised to protect the interests of the king and kingdom. The nobility's reluctance or refusal to join these movements, it followed, did not constitute their abandonment of their natural duty to serve the king and kingdom, or their failure to emulate their ancestors in doing so. Rather, the reverse was true.

*L'Ombre du feu Duc de Mayenne au Duc son fils* (1615) is a great example of such a countermeasure in action.<sup>58</sup> This loyalist discourse described an encounter between Henri de Mayenne and the spirit of his late-father Charles, the former leader of the Catholic League, as

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<sup>56</sup> See chapter 3.

<sup>57</sup> *Lettre du Bon François* (1615), p. 10.

<sup>58</sup> The pamphlet was also published under the title of *La Rencontre de feu Monsieur le Duc de Maienne au Duc son fils, sur son voyage de Poitou, avec monsieur le Prince* (Bordeaux: s.n., 1616), BnF 8-LB36-746.



he marched his army to Poitou to threaten the traveling court. The discourse's choice of protagonists was particularly shrewd. It gave an impression of a noble father lecturing his son. It also had the effect of a famous nobleman lecturing the hopeful noble followers of his son. The figure of Charles de Mayenne added credibility to the lecture, because as a noble father, Charles understood the dynastic and societal expectations that the nobility had to bear. As an experienced nobleman and former rebel, he had learnt and understood the true meaning of aristocratic honour and duty.

Charles de Mayenne explained that his spirit had returned to Earth to remind his son Henri of his duty to the crown and *maison*. Unlike his father who had taken up arms against his king to protect the Catholic religion, but who had also returned immediately to obedience once his king had renounced his heresy, Henri had no legitimate reasons for rebellion. The reformation that Henri and his *Condéen* allies spoke of was fraudulent,

une veille peau de brebis (female sheep), fourree de regnardise (craftiness), que tous les hargneux en un estat, ont pris pour guidon, & ont fait comme les empoisonneurs, que sur une boiste où est l'orpin & l'arsenic, mettent le tiltre du baume & de l'alchermes.<sup>59</sup>

Without a just cause, Henri de Mayenne had invariably repudiated his duty as a nobleman when he took up arms against his king. Henri had also inevitably failed in his duty as a son of his *maison* when he allied himself with the Protestant maréchal-duc de Bouillon and the Huguenots against the marriages between two proud Catholic dynasties, and not against these enemies of the faith. For in doing so, he had allied himself with the same people who had assassinated his grandfather, François de Guise, and besieged his father and his uncle, Henri de Guise, at Poitiers.<sup>60</sup> He had allied himself with the same people who had sacked the Catholic churches and taken up arms against their kings during a royal minority, and whose co-religionists had rebelled in the same manner in Germany, Switzerland, Holland and England.<sup>61</sup> By implication, those Catholic noblemen whose fathers had fought to defend Catholicism in the Wars of Religion and who now followed Henri into rebellion had done

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<sup>59</sup> *L'Ombre du feu Duc de Mayenne au Duc son fils* (Bordeaux: s.n., 1615), pp. 3-5, 9-10, BnF 8-LB36-745.

<sup>60</sup> The pamphleteer wrongly accused the Huguenots of assassinating Henri de Mayenne's grand-uncle instead of his grandfather. I have corrected it here.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

the same. Their participation in the rebellion constituted the real failure to live up to their noble duty and emulate their fathers.

Evidently, the loyalist pamphleteers were no less adept at exploiting noble culture and anxieties, as they sought to steer the French nobility towards the right course of action. As well as trying to win the nobility over to their own interpretation of noble duty, the definition of which was undoubtedly equivocal in times of civil and religious conflicts, the loyalist pamphleteers took pains to grapple with another common noble conundrum during a princely rebellion: whether to declare for one's king or one's princely benefactors. The *Discours sur la Lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (1614) evoked the theoretical idea of kingship to help the nobility to resolve this dilemma.<sup>62</sup> It argued that *princes du sang*

sont les membres honorables de l'Etat, & sur eux d'appuye & se soustient principalement le corps de la Monarchie: Mais ces membres ont tousjour leur rapport au chef, sans lequel ils ne peuvent subsister. Ces sont branches qui n'ont vie que du tronc. Ils sont comme la palme qui ne peut estre hors de son terroir naturel qu'elle en languisse, & si on la veut transplanter, elle ne produict aucun fruit. Bref la grandeur des Princes du sang n'est qu'une ombre, à bien parler, sans l'ayde & assistance du Souverain.<sup>63</sup>

In plainer terms, *princes du sang* like Condé were undoubtedly the overlords of their provincial *gouvernements* and military regiments, and the patrons of many noblemen of various ranks. But the princes' control over these jurisdictions were designated by the king. The appointments, promotions, pensions or benefices which they had secured for their clients also originated from the king. The king was the fountainhead of all authority and patronage in the kingdom. The princes were only representatives of the king's power and brokers of his liberality. French noblemen should therefore prioritise their loyalty to the king – their principal patron – over the princes.

Other loyalist discourses like *La Proposition faicte à la Noblesse François du party de Monsieur le Prince de Condé estant dans Chasteau-Thierry* (1615) were more pragmatic in their approach. *La Proposition* acknowledged and addressed the worldly ambitions and self-interests

<sup>62</sup> See also: *Lettre de Perroquet aux Enfans Perdus de France* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1614), BnF 8-LB36-242(B).

<sup>63</sup> *Discours sur la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (1614), pp. 6-8.

which had compelled many noblemen to pledge their lives and resources to the rebellions. It exhorted them to reconsider if their support for a malcontent movement would actually improve their chances of fulfilling these private ambitions and interests. It asked those who had served the princes in their previous rebellion (of 1614) if they ‘have since accrued more honour?’

Vous ou vos enfans en avez vous esté eslevez aux premieres grades de la Cour? Vos noms en sont ils plus illustres? Vos renommées plus memorables? Vos dignitez plus grandes? Vos credits plus favourisez? Vos esperances meilleures? Vos dessins avancez? Vos biens en sont ils augmentez? Vos debtes en sont elles acquitees? N’avez vous pas plustost empiré qu’amendé vostre condition?<sup>64</sup>

Predictably, the answer was they had not. *La Proposition* argued that had the noble followers of the princes reflected on their forebears’ experience in the Wars of Religion and their own experience in the rebellion of 1614, they would indubitably realise that they were chasing a pipe dream. As past experience had shown, the princes would always forget their followers’ loyalty and service the moment they had accomplished their own objectives, much less reward them:

Ces Princes que vous (the noblemen and their forebears) avez par le passé tant aimez, que vous avez suivys & couru si longuement leur fortune, ne vous ont ils pas abandonnez en faisant leur accord avec le Roy, hormis les abolitions qu’ils ont fait obtenir à quelques uns... ont ils eu soing de subvenir à tant de ruines que vous avez soufferttes en vos maisons, par quelques honnestes gratifications, lors que vous avez eu affaires d’eux pour appaiser vos querelles, dont vous n’estes que trop fournis, ou pour vos procez civils & criminels, ou quelques autres occasions ne vous ont ils pas delaissez ou froidement assistez: si vous avez quelquefois recherché leur appuy aupres du Roy pour quelque gouvernement, Capitainerie, Lieutenance ou autres bien faits, n’avez vous pas esté plus contens de l’accueil que sa Majesté vous a fait de sa franchise & liberté de parler a vous, de sa facilité a octroyer vos demandes que vous n’avez satisfacts d’eux, qui ne vous presentoient à elle que par maniere d’acquit.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> *La Proposition faite à la Noblesse François du party de Monsieur le Prince de Condé estant dans Chasteau-Thierry. Par un fidelle serviteur du Roy, par eux pris à rançon.* (Paris: Antoine du Brueil, 1615), pp. 4-5, BM Lyon Rés 315170.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

*La Proposition* argued that reassurances such as those of the *Lettre du Bon François à Monsieur le Prince* (1615) were misguided. Past experiences had shown that the princes would always abandon their followers in the event of their capture or defeat. They would not lift a finger to save their followers from the trials and punishments of *lèse-majesté*:

En fin Messieurs, tel support & amitié que vous avez eu cy devant desdits Prince, vous ne les devez pas esperer autres à l'advenir, pourveu qu'ils contentent leurs passions & qu'ils cherchent par vostre assistance leur fortune, ils n'ont aucun soing de ce qui pourra arriver en vostre particulier[.] ils vous caressent s'ils ont a vous employer, si vous les priez ils vous mescognoissent: ils n'ont point d'Ange pour ouvrir les portes lors que vous estes prisonniers pour l'amour d'eux: ils mettent vos testes sur un eschaffaut pour garantir les leur... Que le Roy face saisir vos fiefs, ils ne vous baillerons pas de leur bien en recompense du vostre perdu.<sup>66</sup>

*La Proposition*, in other words, was suggesting that in a dilemma of conflicting allegiances, a discerning nobleman would always choose the safer and more profitable option of honouring his loyalty to his king over his princely patrons.<sup>67</sup>

Another discourse in 1615 had a fictional *Capitaine Guillery* reproach the soldiers in the armies of the *Condéen* princes as a way to advise the French nobility against enlisting in the same. Guillery claimed to be well-qualified to counsel the noblemen because he used to be a soldier in the armies of the late Philippe-Emmanuel de Lorraine, duc de Mercœur. Guillery warned the noble soldiers not to make the same mistakes as he had: he told them that he used to fight for Mercœur in the Wars of the Catholic League, waged on the basis of similar pretexts such as religion or *bien public*. He had 'souffert une infinité de playes, passé & traversé dix mille dangers le residu de m'a meilleure fortune consisteroit en sa bonne affection', so that Mercœur could acquire the most glorious titles. But instead of rewarding him and his comrades for their devotion and service, instead of acknowledging them as 'gens de bien' and companions, Mercœur, as with so many other princely patrons, regarded and treated them as 'larrons', 'volleurs' and 'pendars' who deserved neither his favours nor affection. 'Me voyant frustré de mes esperances m'ayant delaissé', Guillery and some of his

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<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>67</sup> *Discours sur l'expres commandement, que sa Majesté à faict à tous les Gouverneurs des villes & Provinces de son Royaume, pendant son voyage en Guyenne* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), pp. 5-8, BM Lyon Rés 315267, also argued the same.

comrades therefore decided to leave Mercœur's service and retire to the countryside.<sup>68</sup> But despite having left Mercœur's service prematurely, and not having committed any pillage, murder or rape like the soldiers in the armies of the *Condéen* princes, they were nevertheless persecuted by the king's *prévôts* in La Rochelle, put on trial and subsequently condemned to be broken on a wheel, presumably for the crime of *lèse-majesté*. The king, Guillery predicted, would undoubtedly punish the soldiers in the *Condéen* armies even more severely.<sup>69</sup> Supporting the princes and their rebellions, Guillery implied, was therefore a dangerous yet thankless and profitless endeavour. One had all to lose and nothing to gain.

The *Harangue du Capitaine la Carbonnade* and *La Resolution d'un Soldat François* proffered the same warning in the autumn of 1615.<sup>70</sup> The latter purported to be the personal account of François de La Roche, a soldier who had chosen to leave Bouillon's service and enlist himself in the king's armies.<sup>71</sup> La Roche shared with his fellow noblemen how he came to 'defect': he claimed to have finally fathomed the *Condéen* princes' demagogic pretexts and so, decided that he 'ne veut jamais estre de ceux qu'on diroit peut estre avoir desir de se couvrir du specieux pretexte de conserver l'estat pour le mettre en ruine & en combustion'. He also had a chance to reflect on the histories of civil conflicts and factional machinations which his late father had told him during the cold winters, when he was a little boy. He remembered distinctly that one of the morals of these tales was 'il n'y a rien que les Souverains oublient si malaisement que la rebellion de leurs subjects, ny chose tant reputeée coupable de crime de leze Majesté, que de prendre & porter les armes au desadveu de son Roy'.<sup>72</sup> La Roche's recollection echoed the warning of *Les Reproches de la France* (1615), that kings often failed to forget their subjects' rebellions, that they 's'en souvenir a l'advenir, & se donner de gardes des auteurs'.<sup>73</sup> What both pamphlets were essentially saying was, even if the malcontent princes and their adherents were subsequently amnestied by the king's edict of pacification, and they often were, they would never regain the king's trust and their careers would stall, because kings could never forget and forgive their subjects' rebellion completely. Indeed, *Les Reproches* warned that Louis XIII 'tiendra compte pendant ses jeunes ans du bien qu'on luy à

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<sup>68</sup> *Reproches du Capitaine Guillery, faits aux Carabins, picoreurs & pillards de L'armee de Messieurs les Princes* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), pp. 4-5, BM Lyon Rés 315178.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-12, 14.

<sup>70</sup> *Harangue du Capitaine de la Carbonnade, faite aux soldats de Messieurs les Princes* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315242.

<sup>71</sup> *La Resolution d'un Soldat François, sorty de Sedan, pour le service du Roy. Présenté à Monsieur, en la place Royale* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BnF 8-LB36-475.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>73</sup> *Les Reproches de la France* (1615), p. 9.

fait, & des angoisses perturbations & fascheries, qu'on à fait patir à la Royne sa mere pendant le terme de sa Regence & jusques à present'.<sup>74</sup>

François de La Roche added that some of the princes' followers would not live to see the king's amnesty. He himself witnessed the capture of some of his comrades, who were promptly hung from the nearest tree. La Roche claimed that he had thereupon realised that his comrades' fate was divine punishment; that God disapproved of subjects taking up arms against their rightful kings. He had also discovered that notwithstanding his 'belle promesse', Bouillon, like other princely patrons, 'ne s'obligera de vous sauver la vie ny de vous retirer du gibet si une fois vous tombez entre les mains de Prevots'.<sup>75</sup> 'Ne suis pas si niais d'aller gagner une corde pour si peu de chose', La Roche was therefore resolved to leave Bouillon and offer his life and services to Louis XIII and Marie de Médicis, 'où j'ai creu qu'ils leurs seront fort agreables, & que jamais elle ne perdront le souvenir de la bonne volonté, obeissance & fidelité de leurs bon & naturel sujets'.<sup>76</sup> His fellow noblemen would be wise to heed his warning and follow his example.

The loyalist pamphleteers continued to fight fire with fire, parrying the fearmongering of the princes' pamphleteers with their own. Some of their discourses insinuated or even averred that the malcontent princes' followers would invariably be captured and punished, for their rebellion would most certainly fail. The *Remonstrance faicte en Berry, a Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (1615) and *Les Visions du Conte Pallatin* (1617), for instance, played on the prevalent early modern belief that the outcome of violence was determined by the justice of God.<sup>77</sup> Both discourses explained that God had expressly commanded subjects to obey the kings whom He had appointed. Their rebellions against their rightful kings therefore amounted to their disobedience against God, whose imminent wrath and punishments had been emphatically forewarned in Holy Scriptures according to the *Remonstrance faicte en Berry*, or portended by the latest sightings of constellations and comets according to *Les Visions du Conte Pallatin*.<sup>78</sup> As a manifestation of His disapproval, the *Remonstrance* postulated, God had also made clear to François III d'Orléans, comte de Saint-

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<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

<sup>75</sup> *La Resolution d'un Soldat.*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 15-16.

<sup>77</sup> Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford, 2006), p. 10.

<sup>78</sup> *Remonstrance faicte en Berry, a Monsieur le Prince de Condé, pour la deposition de ses armes.* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1615), pp. 3-6, BM Lyon Rés 315189; *Les Visions du Conte Pallatin, envoyez à Monsieur le Duc de Nevers* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1617), pp. 3-13, BnF 8-LB36-923.

Pol, Maurice of Nassau and the Huguenots at the outset of Condé's rebellion in August 1615 that the prince's justifications for rebelling were mere pretexts. This led Saint-Pol to abandon his alliance with Condé, and Maurice of Nassau and the Huguenots to refuse the prince's appeals for support. Needless to say, the rebellion's chances of success were significantly reduced as a result.<sup>79</sup>

During the princes' rebellion of 1614, the *Resolution a la paix et au service du Roy* analysed even more closely why the princes' movement was bound to be a debacle. The chief reason, it adduced, would be the princes' inability to procure enough domestic and foreign assistance. The discourse argued that the kingdom's First Estate would know better that God condemned all forms of rebellion by the people against their kings. The majority of the Second Estate would prioritise their obedience to the crown over their obligations to the princes, because they recognised that it was ultimately the crown to whom they owed their socio-political privileges and standing. The Third Estate had shown that they were in no mood to stir. So far, many towns had sent letters and deputies to Paris to declare their obedience to Louis XIII and Marie de Médicis, and assure Their Majesties that they would not allow the princes to garrison troops within their walls. The Third Estate had also learned from their experience of the Wars of Religion to be suspicious of the princes' pretexts for rebellions. Its members were more inclined to be patient in waiting for the crown, 'leur medecin ordinaire', to redress their grievances, than to have recourse to arms to force the matter. The same could be said for the Huguenots. Past experiences had taught them to eschew military solutions. Moreover, their satisfaction with the crown's protection of their freedom of conscience would trump their fear of the Spanish marriages. Finally, the French king's alliances with the foreign princes would be powerful and intimate enough to discourage their assistance of the princes' rebellion. Besides, the foreign princes would by nature of their own status as sovereigns be hostile towards all rebellions. They would be especially unwilling to shore up rebellions in neighbouring countries, for they 'a craindre que le mesme ne leur advienne quelque jour'.<sup>80</sup>

There were similar discourses during the rebellion of 1615-16 which warned their audience of the inevitability of the rebellion's failure and advised them not to board or remain on a sinking ship. The aforementioned *L'Ombre du feu Duc de Mayenne* (1615) had

<sup>79</sup> *Remonstrance faicte en Berry* (1615), pp. 9-10.

<sup>80</sup> *Resolution a la Paix et au Service du Roy* (Paris: Jean Laquehay, 1614), pp. 8-13, BnF 8-LB36-367(A).

Charles de Mayenne warn his son Henri that he did not have the necessary backing, elite and popular, as well as domestic and foreign, which his father had to make his *ligue* a success:

En fin comme la guerre a un commencement, elle doit avoir une fin, de la faire longue, & la nourrir autant que fist la ligue vous n'en avez pas les mammelles, six Parlements, toutes les bonnes villes, le Pape le Roy d'Espagne, & les peuples de France, qui avec moy avoient pour le juste blason & devise de leurs armes...<sup>81</sup>

The *Responce a la lettre d'un gentil-homme, sur les pretextes de la guerre* (1615) implored the aspiring adherents of the princes to banish from their heads all hopes that the rebellion would soon receive the assistance of foreign princes. It explained to a nobleman who wished 'à sçavoir s'il doit suivre le party de Monsieur le Prince' that the Estates of the United Provinces, the king of England and the princes of other states had already concluded that it was in their best interests not to intervene in the present affair. Foreseeing that they would one day require the protection and assistance of the French crown against more powerful enemies, they had chosen not to jeopardise their good relationships with the French crown.<sup>82</sup>

*Les terreurs paniques de ceux qui pensent que l'alliance d'Espagne doit mettre la guerre en France* (1615) argued that the eventuality of Huguenot's support for Condé was nevertheless no cause of celebration for the princes' supporters, or cause of panic for their opponents. For even if the 'two greatest factions in the kingdom' were to join forces, they were no Catholic League. The League had the help of Philip II of Spain, one of the greatest kings of his generation, and the blessings of the Pope, whose power and authority no one could doubt. It had a leader in Henri de Lorraine, duc de Guise, one of the bravest princes in Europe, and the support of all the clergymen, noblemen, *parlements* and *menu peuple*. It had an odious king against whom to rebel and a righteous cause: the protection of Catholicism. The present movement, on the other hand, had none of these. For a start, they did not have a just cause: the kingdom's population had readily transferred its love for Henri IV on to his heir, Louis XIII. The kingdom's population had also discerned that the malcontent princes and the Huguenots were only using the Spanish marriages and the king's ministers as excuses to stir and advance their self-interests. The present movement had nothing to do with preserving the state or religion. Besides, the king's subjects were not keen on another civil conflict. They

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<sup>81</sup> *L'Ombre du feu Duc de Mayenne* (1615), p. 9.

<sup>82</sup> *Responce a la lettre d'un gentil-homme, sur les pretextes de la guerre. Sur l'advise qu'il luy demande, à sçavoir s'il doit suivre le party de Monsieur le Prince* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), pp. 6-8, BnF 8-LB36-519.



had learnt from their experiences in the Wars of Religion that war was never the right medicine for the kingdom's illnesses.<sup>83</sup>

There were other reasons to temper one's optimism or concern for the outcome of the rebellion. The princes and the Huguenots, *Les terreurs paniques* pointed out (rightly), were a shadow of their sixteenth-century predecessors. The size of the Huguenots' armies and the extent of the princes' influence and resources had declined considerably since the Wars of Religion. At the same time, it was unclear if this alliance between the princes and the Huguenots was as sustainable as it once was. Condé, the discourse appraised (correctly once more), did not command the same respect and influence amongst the Huguenots as his grandfather and father. He also did not have the same reputation amongst the foreign rulers who were interested in the Protestant cause.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, as of now, the German Protestant princes were too preoccupied by their own quarrels with other German princes to involve themselves with Condé's. There were no indications that the king of England was willing to sacrifice his alliance with the French crown by helping Condé. Similarly, the States-General of the United Provinces, recognising that the survival of their new republic depended on French protection and assistance, knew better than to aid Condé and give the French king a good reason to join forces with Spain to destroy them. As such, it was inconceivable that Condé could raise large Protestant armies at will and with cheap foreign credit like his ancestors. Without the Huguenots, Condé had nothing with which to accomplish anything. Unlike the Catholic League, he had not received legates or bulls from the Pope, or gold and armies from the king of Spain. He did not have the resources of the duc de Guise, nor his credibility and popularity amongst the *menu peuple*, with which to challenge the crown. Nor did he have the support of the majority of the kingdom's clergymen, noblemen, *parlements* and towns. As a result, the prince and his associates would not be able to sustain their already-undersized armies for more than three months, that was assuming their armies did not suffer any losses in the event of engagement.<sup>85</sup>

More importantly, *Les terreurs paniques* resumed, how could Condé and his associates stop the Spanish marriages now that Louis XIII had arrived at Bordeaux? Were they going to prevent Anne of Austria from reaching Bordeaux? And how did they propose to overcome

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<sup>83</sup> *Les terreurs paniques de ceux qui pensent que l'alliance d'Espagne doit mettre la guerre en France* (Paris: Nicolas Alexandre, 1615), pp. 5-14, BnF 8-LB36-473.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 15-17.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 22, 25-26.

the royal armies put in the field to escort the king and the future queen? Contrary to the princes' forces, the royal armies were well-staffed, well-disciplined and well-paid and motivated by a just cause. Unlike the princes, the king had sufficient resources to replenish his regiments after each battle or defeat. He also had the added advantage of having more experienced commanders. Condé, Mayenne and Longueville had been brought up in a period of prolonged peace and were untested in warfare. Nevers and Vendôme, though more qualified, had already decided to pledge their support to the king. The final candidate, Bouillon, was undoubtedly an excellent commander, but he was currently cooped up in Sedan.<sup>86</sup> As with its counterparts, *Les terreurs paniques*' message was therefore clear: the rebellion stood no chance against the royal armies. The princes' followers, be it current or prospective, should desert or steer clear of a lost cause.

### Evidence and Testimony

The government of Marie de Médicis and Concini evidently, then, exerted itself to dissuade the political nation from supporting the princes' rebellions, and it worked hard to shore up the credibility of the arguments deployed. In each of the rebellions, the government ensured that the political nation was furnished with new information: tangible evidence that would substantiate the arguments put forward by the official responses and loyalist discourses. During the rebellion of 1614, for instance, the government leaked the two treaties between France and Spain which had been ratified in 1612. The first was the treaty for the marriage between Louis XIII and Anne of Austria, and the second, for the marriage between Elisabeth de France and Prince Philippe of Spain. They were printed in six and five editions respectively.

The government leaked the marriage treaties to expose the *Condéen* princes' hypocrisies. Mayenne's name featured prominently on title page of the treaty for the marriage of Louis XIII and Anne of Austria, hence confirming that the Lorraine prince had indeed played an indispensable role in its negotiation and ratification. Meanwhile, the concluding passage of both treaties invoked the names of Condé and Bouillon, thereby proving that these two princes had originally approved of the marriages. The contents of the marriage treaties revealed no arrangements which could compromise the sovereignty of the French

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 28-32.

crown or the safety of its Protestant subjects and allies. The treaties stated clearly that the double marriages were merely intended to perpetuate the peace established by the Peace of Vervins. They also specified that the marriages did not allow the future king and queen of Spain, as well as their descendants, to inherit the French throne or properties, and vice versa. The leaked treaties thus gave the lie to the claims put forward by Condé's manifesto of February 1614, while corroborating those made by Marie de Médicis's in her official response. They made clear for all to see that the Spanish marriages did not commit France to any religious and diplomatic direction or provide for Spanish interference in French affairs.<sup>87</sup>

In truth, the government's cunning was not manifested in the information which it leaked, but in the information which it allowed or even encouraged others to circulate. Despite its decrees against *libelles diffamatoires*, the government tolerated the publication of fictitious remonstrances of peasants and townsmen, many with false or no imprints.<sup>88</sup> This was because spurious remonstrances such as the *Plaintes des Paysans des Environs de la Ville de Sens* (1615) and the *Plaintes du peuple de Normandie* (1616) graphically described and complained of the impunities, oppressions and desecrations of the princes' armies in the provinces. With heart-rending cries, they begged the princes for mercy and beseeched them to stop their armed movement at once. These imaginary remonstrances functioned as testimonies. They constituted concrete evidence of the princes' malignance and cruelty, and consequently disproved their pretexts of 'reformation' and 'bien public'. In unison, they also gave an impression of the widespread disapproval for the prince's cause and actions across the kingdom. As such, these remonstrances could have an effect on the political nation's opinion towards the princes. They could be useful complements to the official responses and loyalist discourses.

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<sup>87</sup> *Articles et Conventions arrestees en France, le Mercredi 20...Sur le Mariage de Dom Philippe Prince d'Espagne, & Madame Elizabeth de France.* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BM Lyon Rés 315065; *Articles et Conventions arrestees en Espagne, le Mercredi 20 d'Aoust 1612...Sur le mariage du roy Louys XIII avec l'Infante, Dame Anne, Princesse d'Espagne* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-H-12756(43).

<sup>88</sup> *Plaintes des Paysans des Environs de la Ville de Sens. Addressées a Monseigneur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315164; *Plaintes du Peuple de Normandie, sur l'impunité d'aucuns soldats qui courent la campagne* (S.l.: s.n., 1616), BnF 8-LB36-780; *Plaidoyer Pour Les Laboureurs, Contre les Gens-d'armes* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1615), BnF 8-LB35-660(B); *Les exécrables impiétés commises en l'église d'Espoungny en Auxerrois...par quelques soldats de l'armée de Messieurs les Princes* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-619; *Exhortation aux soldats françois pour la paix* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF YE-30743; *Discours de M. Guillaume de Jacques Bonhomme Paysant, sur la défaite de 35. poulles & le cocq faite en un souper par 3 soldats* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-284; *Discours véritable du premier exploit d'armes fait en Guyenne en l'Abbaye de Saint Ferme, le 12 octobre 1615* (Bordeaux: Simon Millanges, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-594.

The same could be said of the cascade of pamphlets which extolled the virtues and successful conclusion of the Spanish marriages. They included well-wishes to the royal couples; obsequious panegyrics and epithalamiums; accounts of the exuberant reception that the queen mother, the king and his new queen had received in Bordeaux; and reports of public jubilations.<sup>89</sup> These pamphlets played the same role of testimonies. Their collective voice gave an impression of general approval for the Spanish marriages and by extension, the government responsible for their fruition. This impression not only constituted the important social proof through which to win further support for the marriages and the government, it effectively debunked the malcontent princes' claims that the marriages and the government were unpopular across the kingdom. In doing so, these celebratory pamphlets helped invalidate two of the princes' central justifications for rebelling in the fall of 1615.

What was more interesting was the government's readiness to condone the booming news industry during the rebellions of 1615-16 and 1617, despite its claims to a monopoly on news and its strict decrees against the dissemination of false rumours. Printed news was a sleepy industry in 1614 thanks to the uneventfulness of the princes' first rebellion, which featured neither battles nor sieges. With Marie de Médicis so bent on pacifying Condé and his associates, the scare was over in three months. The rebellions of 1615-16 and 1617, however, were different. Skirmishes between the royal and rebel armies broke out between October 1615 and January 1616 when the king's commanders tried to stop the rebels from threatening the court traveling to and from Bayonne and Bordeaux. At the same time, these commanders besieged several strategic towns in the Île-de-France, Picardie, Champagne and Guyenne to reverse the advance of the rebel armies towards Paris and Bordeaux, where the court was residing between 7 October and 17 December 1615.<sup>90</sup> Sieges were also the order of the day in the rebellion of 1617, as the *ministériat* sought to subjugate the malcontent princes by capturing their strongholds in the Île-de-France, the Maine, the Perche, the

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<sup>89</sup> For some examples, see: *Discours royal présenté au Roy, touchant les benedictions & le bonheur de son mariage* (Paris: Isaac Mesnier, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315226; *L'Épithalame royal de Louys XIII et Anne d'Autriche. Dédié à leurs Majestés* (Bordeaux: Pierre de la Court, 1615), BnF YE-21218; Charles Berault, *Épithalame, chant royal sur les alliances de France et d'Espagne* (Bordeaux: Ar. du Brel, 1615), BnF YE-15268; *L'Heureuse Arrivee du Roy dans Bourdeaux, et ce qui s'y est passé depuis* (Lyon: Nicolas Jullieron, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315272; *Les Magnificences faites en la ville de Bourdeaux à l'entrée du roi le mercredi 7 de ce mois* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-588; *La Royale et Magnifique entrée de la Reine dans la ville de Bourdeaux, le 26 de novembre 1615* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-679; *Le Bonheur de la France, ou les allégresses publiques des bons François. Par les augustes mariages...* (Paris: Claude Percheron, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-591; *Le Te Deum de la France pour l'heureux mariage du Roy avec la Serenissime Infante d'Espagne* (Paris: Nicolas Alexandre, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-3814; *Rejouyssance de la France sur l'heureux mariage du Roy et de l'infante d'Espagne* (Paris: Jean Brunet 1615), BnF 8-LB36-685.

<sup>90</sup> Marc Jaffré, *The Court of Louis XIII, 1610-1643* (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2017), p. 241.

Nivernais and Champagne one by one. All the while, the people of France anxiously awaited the outcome of events which could alter the course of their own lives and their kingdom's history. The *Mercure François* reported in the fall of 1615 that 'Les Parisiens comme font tous peuples en telles actions, découvrent diversement de ceste guerre: ... La frayeur de ceste guerre y saisit les plus assurez'.<sup>91</sup>

But this climate of fear and anxiety was exactly what simulated the growth of the printed news industry. The princes' rebellion of 1615-16 witnessed the publication of 51 editions of news pamphlets relating details of battles and sieges, while the rebellion of 1617 saw another 25. Nearly a third of these were produced by one individual, Anthoine du Brueil. More than a fifth of them were printed anonymously. It takes only a cursory glance at the titles and contents of these news accounts to understand why the government were so willing to relinquish temporarily its monopoly on news (through the *Mercure François*) or wink at the thriving business of a notorious *imprimeur-colporteur* who had been convicted thrice between May and July 1614 for pamphleteering: nearly all of the news pamphlets reported loyalist victories. Through the profit-making schemes of Du Brueil and his counterparts, the political nation in 1615-16 had access to pamphlets where they could learn of the chain of defeats suffered by the princes de Condé and de Tingry at the hands of the duc de Guise, the maréchal de Boisdauphin or the marquis de Praslin.<sup>92</sup> They could relive the recovery of Méry-sur-Seine from Condé by the loyalist marquises de La Vieuville and d'Andelot.<sup>93</sup> Through the financial pursuits of men like Du Brueil, the members of the political nation in 1617 also had access to pamphlets from which they could find out about the capture of the prince de Porcien, the duc de Nevers's second son, by the maréchal de Montigny at Clamecy in Nivernais; or follow the uninterrupted series of successful sieges by the duc de Guise and

<sup>91</sup> *Mercure François*, t. 4(1), p. 248.

<sup>92</sup> Claude d'Acceigne, *Recit véritable de la défaite des troupes de Monsieur le Prince par Monsieur le Duc de Guise...* (Paris: Sebastian Lescuyer, 1616); *La Prise et Défaite des troupes du prince de Tingry...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-736; *Lettre envoyée par Monsieur le Mareschal de Bois-Dauphin... Sur la défaite de l'Advangarde de Monsieur le Prince, faite par Monsieur de Praslin* (Paris: Sylvestre Moreau, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315181; *Défaite des troupes de Monsieur de Luxembourg, prince de Tingry. Par Monsieur le Mareschal de Boisdauphin...* (Paris: Fleury Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-615(A); *Recit Véritable de la Défaite des Troupes de Monsieur le Prince de Tingry, par Monsieur de Praslain...* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315259; *Les derniers propos tenus entre le prince de Tingry et Monsieur le Prince de Condé...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315212; *Les triomphes de l'armée du roi, sous la conduite de M. le maréchal de Bois-Dauphin* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-624; *La Fuite de l'armée de Messieurs les Prince...* (Paris: Jean Brunet, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-562; *La Défaite de troupes de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, faite entre Melle & S. Maixent...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315166; *Défaite des compagnies de Monsieur d'Armantir... par Monsieur le Marquis de La Vieville* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-622.

<sup>93</sup> *La reprise de la ville de Mery-sur-Seine sur Monsieur le Prince...* (Paris: Pierre des Hayes, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-723; *La prise et capitulation de la ville de Merry de Seyne...* (Paris: Abraham Saugrain, 1615), BnF RES-Z-3277(2).

the comte d'Auvergne, as the royal armies advanced towards the rebels' last stands at Soissons, Nevers, Mézières and Sedan.<sup>94</sup>

The news business of Du Brueil and his colleagues across France, however, would not be as viable had it not been for the self-interests of other individuals. It would not be unreasonable to believe that the king's commanders themselves had commissioned some of these news pamphlets or, at the very least, furnished the pamphleteers and publishers with the necessary materials. Such a practice was perfectly in line with the period's noble culture. The fragility of fortunes and constant contestations over status and honour at court forced *grandeess* to work ceaselessly to assert their socio-political eminence and court the all-important opinion of their superiors, peers and subordinates. To do so, these *grandeess* would use carefully formulated myths and narratives alongside the traditional means of military service, political manoeuvres, marriages and lawsuits to construct their dynastic identity and uphold their dynastic status and claims. Jonathan Dewald's latest work has demonstrated how Henri, duc de Rohan devised and propagated a new version of his family history in the 1620s to accentuate his family's genealogical connection to the fourth-century Conan Mériadeuc, so as to allow him and his descendants to claim the coveted rank of *princes étrangers*.<sup>95</sup>

Giora Sternberg's recent studies have likewise shown how French *grandeess* constructed and used narratives to assert their socio-political status and claims. In a polity where one's socio-political rank was not properly codified, court ceremonies became arenas for status disputes. The order of procession, the location of the participants' seats or even the length of their ceremonial robes became seen as status symbols which formally marked socio-political hierarchies and relations. The tremendous stakes which these ceremonies entailed compelled many *grandeess* to obtain illicit manuscript copies of the king's ceremonial registers and amass printed sources of ceremonial information, such as the complete set of

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<sup>94</sup> *La Prise et Reduction de la Ville et Place de Clamesy...ensemble la prise du Prince de Porcian fils du Duc de Nevers...par ledict sieur de Montigny...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315358; *La Prise du Chasteau de Richecourt, faite par Monsieur le Duc de Guise...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315360; *Discours Touchant La Prise des Villes et Chasteaux de Chasteau Porcian, & Pierre-fons. Par Messieurs le Duc de Guise, & Comte d'Auvergne.* (Paris: veuve de Jean Regnoul, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315341; *La Prinse du Chasteau de Rozois en Thirache, & de la ville de Chasteau-porcian, faite par Monseigneur le Duc de Guise...* (Paris: Estienne Perrin, 1617), BM Lyon Rés 315359; *Prise et reduction des ville et chasteau de Retheil en l'obeissance du Roy. Par Monseigneur le Duc de Guise...* (Paris: veuve de Jean Regnoul, 1617), BnF 8-LB36-970(A); *Discours sur le sujet du siege mis devant la ville de Rhetel, par Monsieur le Duc de Guise...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1617), BnF 8-LB36-969; *La Descente des Anglois, pour le secours des Princes, empeschez par le Marquis de Spinola* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1617), BnF 8-LB36-951.

<sup>95</sup> Jonathan Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France: The Rohan Family, 1550-1715* (University Park, PA, 2015), pp. 12-36.

the *Gazette de France* and Théodore Godefroy's *Cérémonial François*. Grandees like the Condés, Sternberg reveals, did not merely collect ceremonial paperwork, they commissioned and archived their own. They would even mobilise their patronage networks to influence and manipulate the recording of the royal ceremonial registers or the editorial process of the *Gazette*.<sup>96</sup>

The printed news reports of one's victorious battles and sieges could perform the same role as the printed or written ceremonial registers and family histories. They could memorialise and publicise the protagonist's virtues, accomplishments or eminence, and consequently further his personal and dynastic honour at court. They could serve as historical records which could be drawn on as evidence to fend off competitors and detractors during a dispute, and to press claims to certain decorations and appointments. They were therefore a useful addition to the arsenal of some noblemen who were looking to advance, maintain or restore their personal or dynastic standing at court. They were at the same time a useful way for pamphleteers to win the patronage of these noblemen.

In the fall of 1615, one such nobleman was Concino Concini. The favourite was keen to rehabilitate his reputation and esteem amongst his swelling ranks of critics at court, in the *Parlement de Paris* and on the streets of Paris and Amiens. So on 23 October 1615, Concini embarked on a mission that he thought would please and prove his worth to many. He laid siege, on his own accord, to the *comté* of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis belonging to the rebellious Condé. When the *comté* fell five days later, Concini promptly travelled to Paris to publicise his success, his contribution to the loyalist cause. As Malherbe recounted to his friend Peiresc,

Le sujet de son voyage étoit de venir voir Monseigneur [le *Prémier President du Parlement de Paris*, Nicolas de Verdun], et d'offrir comme il a fait à Messieurs de Paris, sa nouvelle conquête; ce qu'il fit en la préseance de M. de Liancourt, leur gouverneur, avec force belles paroles, remerciant Dieu d'avoir béni ses armes en une occasion où il y eût moyen de les servir.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Giora Sternberg, 'Manipulating Information in the Ancien Régime: Ceremonial Records, Aristocratic Strategies, and the Limits of the State Perspective', *Journal of Modern History* 85 (2013), pp. 241-250. See also: Idem, *Status Interaction during the Reign of Louis XIV* (Oxford, 2014).

<sup>97</sup> *Lettres de Malherbe*, p. 526: Malherbe à Peiresc, 6 Nov 1615.

The marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil confirmed in his memoir that Concini, ‘creust avoir fait chose sy agréable aux Paris’, ‘s’y en alla pour en recevoir des remerciements’.<sup>98</sup> *Conseiller d’État* Robert-Arnauld d’Andilly likewise wrote in his memoirs that ‘le Maréchal d’Ancre vint à Paris... Il envoya quérir Monsieur le Premier Président et Messieurs de la ville sur le sujet de savoir d’eux ce qu’ils (Concini and his lieutenants) vouloyent faire de Clermont’.<sup>99</sup>

It was hence no coincidence that three news pamphlets with headline titles along the lines of ‘La Prise de Clairmont en Beauvoisin, par Monsieur le Mareschal d’Ancre’, emerged in Paris during Concini’s visit. Circumstantial evidence has suggested that the favourite or his present or hopeful clients were probably responsible for their publication. The obsequious nature of the pamphlets’ contents points to the same conclusion: these new pamphlets broadcasted and underlined Concini’s martial skills and astute tactical awareness, his exceptional valour and leadership in the trenches, his extraordinary grace and clemency towards the vanquished, and his unwavering dedication and service to Louis XIII. One of them even likened Concini’s role and traits to Parmenion, the most trusted general of Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great.<sup>100</sup> These news pamphlets were undoubtedly intended to silence Concini’s critics, to dispel suspicions about his foreign birth and loyalty to the French crown and to debunk the allegations of his lack of military experience and achievements. And in doing so, they substantiated his claim or even his entitlement to his standing at court and his controversial appointments to the prestigious military offices of *maréchal de France*, *lieutenant-général* of Picardie and *gouverneur* of its fortified towns. Moreover, these new pamphlets were useful beyond Concini’s lifetime. They furnished his descendants with the ammunition to smother any fresh doubts about their *maison*’s honour.

With so many self-interested parties – patrons, pamphleteers and publishers – alike depending on the success of these news pamphlets, it was perhaps unsurprising that some of them were not exactly paragons of journalistic integrity. Indeed, the *Mercure François*, the state-sponsored annals, itself hinted that some of these news pamphlets had sensationalised the loyalist victories and could not be taken at face value. It pointed out that the Parisian news reports on Condé’s defeat by Guise outside Sainte-Foy-la-Grande on 7 January 1616

<sup>98</sup> *Mémoires de Fontenay-Mareuil*, t.1, pp. 322-323.

<sup>99</sup> *Journal d’Andilly*, pp. 123-124.

<sup>100</sup> *La Prise de Clairmont en Beauvoisin, par Monsieur le Mareschal d’Ancre* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-633; *La prinse des ville et chasteau de Clermont...* (Paris: Fleury Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon SJ IF 233/91, 11; *La réduction de la ville et chasteau de Clairmont en Beauvoisis en l’obéissance du roi, faite par le mareschal d’Ancre...* (Paris: Pierre des Hayes, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-632.



had quadrupled the scale of the casualties.<sup>101</sup> Truth be told, these Parisian news accounts of Condé's defeat were unembellished compared to the news pamphlet which recounted the defeat of the duc de Rohan at Béziers in Languedoc. On the night of 20 December 1615, the pamphlet claimed, the sentinels of Béziers discovered and notified the town's garrison that some of Rohan's soldiers were scaling the town's walls. The *capitaine* of the garrison thereupon ordered a dozen of his men to retrieve a camel from the Abbaye Saint-Aphrodise and lead it onto the top of the town's walls. This camel was originally intended to be used in the town's procession on Ascension Day to commemorate the arrival of its patron saint, Aphrodisius, from Africa. As it turned out, the *capitaine's* bizarre orders were all part of his ingenious plan to repel the stealthy invaders. The sight of this unusual creature petrified Rohan's soldiers. Many turned around and fled into the darkness, leaving behind their baggage and equipment. At this moment, the *capitaine* ordered his men to fire their muskets to scare off the rest of the soldiers, 'à la risée de ceux qui en servant sa Majesté & leur patrie gardent soigneusement leurs murailles'. 'Dieu par sa grace', the news pamphlet concluded, 'à détourné ce malheur à la honte des ennemis de la Couronne au bien & repos du public'.<sup>102</sup>

Unbeknownst to its unsuspecting audience, the pamphlet's account was all made up. In their pursuit of quick profits, the pamphleteer and the publisher had cooked up an outlandish story and passed it off as news, notwithstanding the risk that their little stunt could have undermined the news industry's credibility and profitability in the long run. Still, for all its claims to a monopoly on news and decrees against false rumours, the government was happy to leave the news industry unregulated for the time being. As with so many aspects of the early modern French polity, naked private interests had to be provided for and mobilised in order that public interests could be better served. The news pamphlets might have been published for a variety of self-interested reasons and their contents might have varied in terms of accuracy; but nevertheless, they complemented the existing official responses and loyalist discourses well. The details of the battles and sieges which these news pamphlets had imparted, along with the moral conclusions which they had drawn from the

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<sup>101</sup> *Mercure François*, t. 4(2), pp. 18-19. The *Mercure* mistook the battle's location to be Saint-Maixant; I have corrected it here. The pamphlets to which it referred were: *La Deffaite des Reïstres, & autres troupes de Monsieur le Prince de Condé. Faicte par Monseigneur le Duc de Guise, devant la ville de Sainte Foy...* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315165; *La defaite des carabins, et autres troupes de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, par Monseigneur le Duc de Guise* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1616), 8-LB36-759.

<sup>102</sup> *Le defaite des troupes du sieur de Rohan, envoyees pour l'entreprise faicte & decouverte sur la ville de Beziers en Languedoc...* (Paris: veuve de Jean Regnoul, 1616), BM Lyon Rés 315301.

events' outcomes, corroborated the arguments put forward by the existing official responses and loyalist discourses. They backed up more theoretical discussions with real-life examples.

A news pamphlet on the prince de Tingry's defeat by the marquis de Praslin in late October 1615, for instance, inadvertently confirmed the advice of loyalist discourses like *Les terreurs paniques* (1615), which counselled the French nobility not risk to their lives and livelihoods for the rebellious princes who lacked the essential military experience and expertise to lead them to victory. This news pamphlet analysed the battle and ascribed Tingry's defeat to his inexperience and imprudence in matters of warfare. Courage, it concluded, was but one of the necessary qualities of a good military leader.<sup>103</sup> Another news pamphlet on Tingry's premature retirement from the rebellion of 1615 following his series of defeats, concurred with the loyalist pamphlets' warning to the French nobility that they had all to lose and nothing to gain from partaking in princely rebellions, except the wrath of the French king and people. It revealed that Tingry had come to see that his participation in the rebellion had not and could not fulfil his ambitions and advance his fortunes. After having to learn this the hard way, the prince decided to leave the service of Condé.<sup>104</sup> The news pamphlets of 1617 likewise concurred with the counsel of the existing loyalist discourses. Two news pamphlets, for instance, moralised that the capitulations of the princes' strongholds of Clamecy in Nivernais, Château-Porcien in Champagne and Pierrefonds in the Île-de-France, were manifestations of divine justice. God, as the judge and decider of the outcome of violence, would always rule against those who had taken up arms against a king whom He himself had appointed.<sup>105</sup>

Most importantly, the deluge of news pamphlets, with their selective coverage, gave an impression of the unstoppable momentum and invincibility of the royal armies and a parallel impression of the futility and hopelessness of the rebellions. As such, they bolstered the morale of the soldiers in the loyalist armies, while simultaneously deflating the spirits of those in the princes' armies. They substantiated the loyalist discourses, warning the princes' sympathisers that they were fighting a lost cause. In doing so, these news pamphlets could potentially encourage desertions amongst the princes' armies and discourage further enlistments.

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<sup>103</sup> *Recit Veritable de la Deffaitte des Troupes* (1615).

<sup>104</sup> *Les Derniers Propos tenus entre le Prince de Tingry* (1615).

<sup>105</sup> *La Prise et Reduction de la Ville et Place de Clamecy* (1617); *Discours Touchant La Prise des Villes et Chasteaux de Chasteau Porcien, & Pierre-fons* (1617).

## Celebrity Endorsements

The same desire to nudge the political nation into abandoning or abstaining from the princes' rebellions compelled the government to turn a blind eye to what was arguably the most novel but also the most mischievous characteristic of the pamphleteering craze in the 1610s: forged letters. As has been seen in the previous chapters, publicised private correspondence was an essential feature of political pamphleteering in this period. The malcontent princes used open letters at the onset of each rebellion to clarify the intentions of their actions in the hope of garnering sympathisers and exonerating themselves from the charge of *lèse-majesté*. Their efforts in turn forced the queen mother and her supporters to issue open responses to refute the princes' accusations, give lie to their stated intentions, call their bluff or coerce them into returning to obedience.

In February 1614, the *Double de la Response de Messieurs du Parlement de Bordeaux* and *La Response a la Lettre de Monsieur le Prince, envoyee a Messieurs du Parlement de Bordeaux* hit the streets of Paris alongside other open responses to Condé's open letters, such as the *Double de la Response de la Royne Régente*, *Response de Monsieur le Cardinal de Sourdis* and *Lettre de Monseigneur le Cardinal du Perron*. That the *Parlement* of *Bordeaux* and the cardinals de *Sourdis* and du *Perron* should also choose to publicise their letter to Condé was perfectly understandable. As was known to all, the prince had at the start of his rebellion delivered to each of the kingdom's *grandees* and *Parlements* a package containing a handwritten cover letter and his manifesto. Publicising one's response, in which one refused the letter's invitation to join the armed movement and in which one denied the manifesto's stated intentions, therefore served to pre-empt any rumours or suspicions of one's sympathy and collaboration. It also acted as a special gesture to demonstrate one's loyalty and service to Marie de Médicis. Motive, however, was not the only common thing between these open responses. Even upon repeated inspections, these responses, be it their original and variant editions or their anonymous reprints, were indistinguishable from one another. Their titles, as described above, were two of a kind. Their print and paper quality were nearly identical. Their title page layouts were likewise comparable:




Fig. 5.1



Fig. 5.2

**Fig 5.1-5.2 Two editions of the Parlement de Bordeaux's open response to Condé in 1614**




Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

**Fig. 5.3-5.5 The open responses of the cardinals de Sourdis and du Perron to Condé in 1614**




Fig. 5.6

Fig. 5.7

Fig. 5.8




Fig. 5.9

Fig. 5.10

**Fig 5.6-5.10 The various editions of Marie de Médicis's open response to Condé in 1614.**

The subject matters and writing styles were also largely similar. Using the same tone and language, the open responses of the *Parlement* of Bordeaux and the cardinals de Sourdis and Du Perron all argued that Condé's accusations against the queen mother and her government were disproportionate and unfounded. They advised the prince to return to court at once, lest his intentions be misinterpreted by many to be malevolent and treasonous, and lest his actions exacerbate the kingdom's affairs.<sup>106</sup> The *Parlement* of Bordeaux, however, was more explicit than the cardinals de Sourdis and du Perron in its judgement of Condé's actions and its repudiation of the prince's clarion call. The *Parlement* expressly argued that the stated intentions of Condé were mere pretexts to attract the sympathies of the kingdom's estates and maintained that it would not 'approuver les actions & desseins qui semblent contraire a sondit (the crown's) service, quoy qu'ils procedent de la part des Princes de son Sang'.<sup>107</sup>

There was, however, one crucial difference between the open response of the *Parlement* of Bordeaux and those of Marie de Médicis and the cardinals de Sourdis and du Perron: the *Parlement* did not actually draft or authorise the response. It remains unclear whether the response's audience came to realise that it was forged; or how they learned of its inauthenticity; or how long they actually took to do so. But what is clear is that the *Mercur* *François*, in its subsequent synopsis of the printed literature which had surfaced during the rebellion, reported that the 'imprimee du Parlement de Bordeaux, fut declaree faulse'; and that the incident had scared all of the *parlements* into making an official, and presumably handwritten, response to Condé's letter.<sup>108</sup> What is also apparent is that Condé was incensed at the offensive response. There was consequently a hunt for the man audacious enough to appropriate a *parlement's* name to insult the prince. Many fingers pointed at Thomas Pelletier, one of the Catholic League's most daring and prolific pamphleteers. Pelletier was thereupon forced to publish an open letter to protect himself from the extrajudicial 'coups des batons' of Condé's henchmen. In the letter, Pelletier admitted that he had indeed published several offensive *libelles* in the past, but he was not the author of the tract in question, for its style

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<sup>106</sup> *Double de la Responce de Messieurs du Parlement de Bordeaux, a la lettre de Monsieur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), BnF 8-LB36-3436; *La Responce a la Lettre de Monsieur le Prince, Envoyee a Messieurs du Parlement de Bordeaux* (Paris: Jean de Bordeaux & Jean Millot, 1614), BnF 8-LB36-219(A); *Lettre de monseigneur le cardinal Du Perron à monseigneur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), BnF 8-LB36-215(C); *Responce de Monsieur le cardinal de Sourdis à la lettre de monseigneur le Prince* (Paris: Pierre Chevalier, 1614), BnF 8-LB-218.

<sup>107</sup> *Double de la Responce de Messieurs du Parlement de Bordeaux* (1614), pp. 3-5.

<sup>108</sup> 'Pour les Parlements, nul ne fit responce: car celle que l'on veu imprimee du Parlement de Bordeaux, fut declaree faulse', see: *Mercur* *François*, t.3(3), p. 329. I presume the *Parlements'* official responses to be handwritten because I could find no printed editions of them.

and humour differed greatly from his own. The nature of its insults also contradicted his personal convictions about the good intentions of the prince's movement; may God and the publishers of the tract – Jean de Bordeaux and Jean Millot – be his witnesses.<sup>109</sup>

Sneaky and insolent as it might be, the still-unknown loyalist pamphleteer's decision to appropriate the form of an open letter and the name of an eminent institution for his rejoinder to Condé's manifesto was ingenious. Firstly, the form and name lent his rejoinder authenticity. With so many open letters written to and from the kingdom's grandees and institutions and printed in similar styles circulating in Paris at the start of each princely rebellion, not many people would suspect immediately that an open letter from the *Parlement* of Bordeaux to the prince de Condé was actually a forgery. Secondly, the form and name attracted readership. Open letters often marked a grandee or an institution's decision to declare for or against a rebellion, or to persist in or renounce a rebellion. They frequently indicated the government's mood and signalled its policy of pacification or suppression. As such, open letters had much more political significance and the members of the political nation were much more likely to make an effort to acquire and read these letters over other political discourses. Thirdly, the name of the *Parlement* of Bordeaux endowed the contents of the rejoinder with an air of objectivity and authority. The members of the political nation were more likely to consider and allow themselves to be persuaded by the arguments made by a prominent institution far removed from the court in Paris, than by the partisan apoloias of the princes or the queen mother's aides, or worse, some sycophantic hacks. Fourthly and relatedly, the open letter ostensibly from the *Parlement* of Bordeaux rebuking the leader of a rebellion constituted a weighty endorsement for the loyalist cause. Like the seal of approval of certain lobby groups for specific presidential candidates, the endorsement attached the endorser's image or ideological associations to the endorsed. In the context of the 1610s, where the *Condéen* princes and the government both contended to be the true and just cause seeking to defeat the kingdom's malfeasants and advance the king's interests, the '*Parlement* of Bordeaux's' endorsement attached the *Parlement's* record for and association with justice and royal service to the loyalist cause. At the same time, its endorsement constituted a significant social proof to which the undecided or the uncritical looked to determine their own stance and response. For then, as now, the undecided and uncritical were often willing to trust and emulate an individual or institution implicitly on the basis of their prestige alone. One could expect to hear a contemporary version of the same absurd

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<sup>109</sup> Thomas Pelletier, *Lettre a Monseigneur le Prince de Condé* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-293.

rationale: that ‘if the government of Marie de Médicis was good enough for an institution as distinguished as the *Parlement* of Bordeaux, it was good enough for me’.

The publication of forged letters reached epidemic proportions in the fall of 1615. As a full-fledged conflict between the government and the *Condéen* and Huguenot leaders seemed and subsequently proved inevitable, unscrupulous loyalist pamphleteers cranked up their campaign of disinformation to inveigle the nobility and other members of the political nation not to partake in the rebellion. They churned out a total of 19 titles in at least 35 editions, compared to the four titles in eight editions in 1614.<sup>110</sup> There were letters ostensibly from James VI and I to Mayenne and letters from Prince Philip William of Orange, Maurice of Nassau and Charles-Emmanuel I, Duke of Savoy to Condé which, notwithstanding these individuals’ hostility to the Spanish marriages, urged the princes in an uncharacteristically discourteous language to desist from their movement.<sup>111</sup> There were letters with a similar gist and tone written to Condé by the Pope, or to Mayenne by his sister, Renée de Lorraine, even though her husband hailed from the House of Sforza which had lost its duchy of Milan to Spain.<sup>112</sup> Meanwhile, the letters to Condé from Philip III of Spain, Emperor Matthias, François d’Orléans, comte de Saint-Pol, the Knight Hospitallers and the city of La Rochelle originated conveniently from the press of the fictitious Jean Bourriquant.<sup>113</sup> Even King Safi of Persia, apparently, felt the need to write an open letter to the prince.<sup>114</sup> As the *Mercure François* recounted:

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<sup>110</sup> The other two forged letters that this chapter has not described in detail are *Lettre de Messieurs de Bordeaux, à Monseigneur le Prince* (Paris: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-220, a variant edition of the Parlement of Bordeaux’s letter, and *Lettre écrite à Monseigneur le Prince par le Sieur de Nervèze* (S.l.: s.n., 1614), BnF 8-LB36-216(A).

<sup>111</sup> *Lettre du Roy d’Angleterre envoyée à Monsieur le Duc de Mayenne* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-644; *Lettre du Prince d’Orange, en forme de remontrance...à Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-585(A); *Lettre Envoyée au Comte Maurice. Ensemble la response faite par ledict Comte Maurice audit sieur Prince* (Lyon: Nicolas Jullieron, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315183; *Advis Salutaire du Duc de Savoye à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315266.

<sup>112</sup> *Coppie de la Lettre de Nostre Saint Pere le Pape, envoyée à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé...* (S.l.: s.n., 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315211; *Lettre en Forme de Remonstrance de Madame la Duchesse de Strosse, envoyée à son frère, le duc de Mayenne* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-565; *La Seconde Lettre de Madame la Duchesse de Strosse, envoyée à son frère, le duc de Mayenne* (Paris: Anthoine du Brueil, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-643.

<sup>113</sup> *Lettre du Roi d’Espagne, envoyée à Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-647(A); *Lettre de l’Empereur envoyée à Monsieur le Prince de Condé...* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-578; *Lettre des Chevaliers de Malte envoyée à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé...* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315215; *Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Saint Paul, à Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Jean Bourriquant, 1615), BM Lyon Rés 315213; *La Responce des Maire, Gouverneur, et Pairs de la ville de la Rochelle...* (Bordeaux: s.n., 1615).

<sup>114</sup> *Lettre du grand Sophy de Perse escrite à Monsieur le Prince en langage persan* (Paris: Pierre des Hayes, 1615), BnF 8-LB36-513.



On faisoit escrire par imagination, le Pape, l'Empereur, le Sophie de Perse, le Roy de la Grand' Bretagne, le Duc de Lorraine, les Chevaliers de Malte, & le Prince d'Orange, tant à Monsieur le Prince qu'au Duc de Mayenne, pour les ramener au service du Roy: Et le tout pour entretenir les demandeurs de nouveautez.<sup>115</sup>

In the sea of open letters of comparable titles and title page designs at the outset of the rebellion, it was difficult to tell the real and the forged apart, unless one, by the off chance, was aware that the imprint of Jean Bourriquant was a smokescreen. There were likewise no straightforward ways to authenticate the letters and their contents, unless one was already familiar with the phraseology of grandee and diplomatic correspondence, or up to date with the kingdom's foreign policy developments, or was, on the rare occasion, privy to the secret negotiations between the princes and the Protestant and the anti-Habsburg states. Otherwise, it was, and still is, easy to be fooled into swallowing these letters whole, save perhaps the letter of King Safi.

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<sup>115</sup> *Mercure François*, t.4(1), p. 206.




Fig. 5.11




Fig. 5.12




Fig. 5.13




Fig. 5.14




Fig. 5.15



Fig. 5.16

**Figs 5.11-5.16 Examples of the forged open letters issued during the rebellion of 1615**




Fig. 5.17




Fig. 5.18




Fig. 5.19




Fig. 5.20




Fig. 5.21




Fig. 5.22

**Figs 5.17-5.22 Examples of the real open letters issued during the rebellion 1615:**

Note the general resemblance between the titles and title page designs of the real and the forged.

The sheer number of forged letters in circulation during the rebellion of 1615 bore witness to the government's unwillingness to deter and punish certain pamphleteers for the offences of appropriating the names of the great and of disseminating false information. And why should it? Consider the thrusts of these forged letters: the 'letter' of James VI and I informed his cousin Mayenne that he was opposed to the prince's rebellion and had

specifically prohibited his subjects from enlisting in the rebel armies.<sup>116</sup> The ‘letters’ of Prince Philip William of Orange and Maurice of Nassau informed Condé that the States-General of the United Provinces, in recognition of its tremendous debts of gratitude to the late Henri IV, had decided not to lend assistance to a rebellion against Henri’s successor.<sup>117</sup> Philip William also reprimanded his nephew by marriage, Condé, for allowing himself to be misled by some of his associates, as well as his own envy and unreason, into inventing ‘beaux pretextes, pour donner couleur à l’injustice de leur procedure’, and decrying the queen mother, her ministers and the kingdom’s affairs without any basis.<sup>118</sup> Meanwhile, the comte de Saint-Pol, uncle of Longueville and cousin of Condé, confessed in his ‘letter’ to Condé, that the atrocities of his cousin’s armies at Château-Thierry had made him realise that his cousin’s movement was indubitably a rebellion, one which was driven by certain unprofessed intentions and one which would exacerbate rather than reform the kingdom’s problems.<sup>119</sup> Renée de Lorraine ‘wrote’ to his brother Mayenne to warn him that his decision to ally with the Huguenots and lead the rebel armies against the French king had marred his reputation in Italy, as ‘les grands Princes & Potentats d’Italie, s’attrisent de vos resolutions’ and ‘on dit en Italie que c’est un grande deshonneur pour un Chef & principal heritier de la maison de Mayenne’.<sup>120</sup>

The thrusts of these forged letters, in other words, reinforced the government’s ongoing campaign of dissuasion. They provided first-hand evidence to substantiate the salient loyalist warning to the French nobility to eschew a rebellion that was bound to collapse because its princely perpetrators could not secure the crucial blessings of grandees like Saint-Pol, Protestant states like the England and the United Provinces, Catholic powers like the Pope, the Emperor or the king of Spain and finally, God Himself. But more importantly, these forged letters were the perfect endorsement for the loyalist position in the fall of 1615. For if even the close relatives of the *Condéen* princes were willing to go on the record to condemn the movement and question its intentions, then perhaps the rebuttals put forward by the official responses and loyalist discourses were not so partisan after all; perhaps they were justified in their denunciations of the princes’ movement as a rebellion and the princes’ purported intentions, as pretexts. And if even the United Provinces, England, Savoy and other Italian states, whose interests would be most well-served by the

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<sup>116</sup> *Lettre du Roy d’Angleterre* (1615), p. 3.

<sup>117</sup> *Lettre du Prince d’Orange* (1615), pp. 4-5; *Response fait par ledict Comte Maurice* (1615), p. 12.

<sup>118</sup> *Lettre du Prince d’Orange* (1615), pp. 7

<sup>119</sup> *Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Saint Paul* (1615), pp. 3-5.

<sup>120</sup> *La Seconde Lettre de Madame la Duchesse de Strosse* (1615), pp. 3-4.

non-accomplishment of the Spanish marriages, were unanimously unwilling to support a rebellion which professed aim was to stop the marriages, then perhaps the government and the loyalist pamphleteers were also justified in their argument that the respective goals of the marriages and the rebellion were not what the princes said they were. If these states were not perturbed by the Spanish marriages, perhaps the French Huguenots and *politiques* should have no cause for concern either.

## Conclusion

Marie de Médicis and Concini found themselves in an extremely difficult situation in 1614-17 with regards to their response to the malcontent princes' rebellions. Since these princes were connected by blood, marriage or religion to many eminent dynasties at home and abroad, such as the La Trémoilles, the Oranges, the Gonzagas and the Stuarts, the government's armed response against the princes could be seen by certain domestic factions and foreign states to be an indirect and unprovoked act of aggression against them. Equally worrying for the government was the fact that the princes and their supporters would not leave things to chance. At the outset of each rebellion, they would undertake an extensive campaign of persuasion involving printed pamphlets to cast the government's actions and intentions in the worst possible light.

With the government's ability to contain the rebellions, and its relationships with its subjects and foreign allies, not to mention its prestige and legitimacy at stake, the ministers and supporters of Marie de Médicis and Concini were forced to launch their own printed political persuasion campaign to justify the government's decision to levy troops against the malcontent princes, and to exhort the members of the political nation and foreign leaders to eschew the princes' rebellions. The official responses and loyalist discourses therefore worked together to question the basis of the princes' complaints and demands, highlight the inconsistency between their rhetoric and actions, and reveal the drastic measures to which the government had recourse to accommodate them. In doing so, they intended to expose the prince's hypocrisies and dismiss their grievances as pretexts. At the same time, they hoped to demonstrate the government's military actions against the princes were not informed by any controversial political or religious considerations, but solely by the

government's rightful duty to punish its disobedient subjects and protect the kingdom from the devastations of the rebel armies.

In many ways, the loyalists' tactics of persuasion were similar to those of the malcontents. The subject matters and arguments of the loyalist discourses were largely fashioned after the official responses, just like the contents of the rebel discourses were shaped by the princes' manifestos and open letters. Both relied on constant repetition and mutual reinforcement to drive home their message and create a facade of popularity and consensus. As with their counterparts in the princes' camp, the loyalist pamphleteers used history to associate the current rebellion and its protagonists with the negative attributes of the historical equivalents, and to encourage their audience to learn from the lessons of the past. They evoked deep-seated cultural beliefs and capitalised on prevailing anxieties to rouse their target audience into action. Knowing that few in their right mind would want to risk all in a lost cause, the malcontent and loyalist pamphleteers used their discourses to urge their audience to reassess the likelihood of certain outcomes and reconsider potential risks and rewards as they choose between patrons of opposite camps. But more so than their malcontent counterparts, the loyalist pamphleteers also had recourse to disinformation to this end. To bear witness the political isolation of the princes, the indefensibility of their intentions and actions and the hopelessness of their rebellions, they appropriated the names of eminent political institutions and figures to forge open letters denouncing the princes, as well as devising news reports to exaggerate the scale and inevitability of their defeats. The governments of Marie de Médicis and Concini chose to turn a blind eye to these shenanigans, no doubt on the understanding that in politics, untruths could be just as lethal as truths, if not more so.

## **Conclusion: Plus Ça Change**

In the early hours of 22 February 1619, a portly middle-aged woman emerged from a window of the Château de Blois and carefully made her way down a ladder onto the terrace sixty feet below, with four other men and a woman following closely behind her. This party had to descend a second ladder to get to the streets, but the stout woman complained that she was already too tired to go any further. Her companions thus had no choice but to improvise a method using a cloak to half-lower and half-slide her down the embankment. As soon as the party landed on the streets, they were spotted by some passing soldiers. Fortunately for them, the soldiers mistook the women as prostitutes and suspected little. The party thereupon scurried down the streets and across the bridge over the River Loire, boarded a carriage which had been prepared beforehand and bolted for Loches, where Jean-Louis de Nogaret de la Valette, duc d'Épernon and his entourage of 150 cavalymen had been waiting for them. Together, they would then make their way to the safety of Angoulême, Épernon's *gouvernement*.<sup>1</sup> And so in this dramatic fashion, Marie de Médicis escaped from Blois and launched the first of her two rebellions against Louis XIII which contemporaries would aptly term as the Wars of the Mother and Son.

The causes of Marie de Médicis's discontentment and rebellions in February 1619 and April 1620 were relatively straightforward: she had been given a taste of her own medicine by her son. The death of Concino Concini on 24 April 1617 did not change the essence of court politics. The queen mother was replaced as the head of government by her fifteen-year-old son who was every bit as insecure, capricious and politically inexperienced as she was. Louis XIII distrusted and excluded Marie de Médicis from his government and affairs in the same way the latter distrusted and excluded Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé from hers. And in the same way Marie placed Condé under constant surveillance and neglected to seek the prince's input on the Spanish marriages, Louis put Marie under close watch at Blois and chose not to consult Marie on important foreign policy matters such as

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<sup>1</sup> J. Russell Major, 'The Revolt of 1620: A Study of Ties of Fidelity', *French Historical Studies* 14 (1986), p. 391.

the marriage between her daughter Christine de France and Victor-Amadeus, Prince of Piedmont, son of Charles-Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy.<sup>2</sup>

The Treaty of Angoulême agreed between the king and the queen mother after her first rebellion in August 1619 was as much a palliative as the Treaty of Saint-Ménéhould agreed between the queen mother and Condé after his first rebellion in February 1614. Despite the treaties' generous awards of *bienfaits*, they failed to offer what the malcontents really wanted and felt they rightly deserved: an influential position in the government and an uncontested and formidable provincial stronghold. Notwithstanding the treaties' baroque promises of *oubliance* and goodwill, the malcontents and their associates continued to experience undue hostilities, irreverence and mistrust. In Marie de Médicis's case, the Treaty of Angoulême did not allow her to return to court, much less did it readmit her to the royal council. It forced her to exchange her *gouvernement* of Normandie for that of Anjou, which was less strategic and lucrative. Louis XIII also continued to alienate Marie and her associates. He did not consult Marie on his appointment of a governor for her favourite son, Gaston de France, duc d'Orléans. He excluded her from his negotiations with James VI and I over the marriage of her second daughter, Henriette-Marie de France and Charles, Prince of Wales. Shortly afterwards, the king's edict of October 1619 which absolved and freed Condé from imprisonment blamed the prince's incarceration on the abuse of power by the government in September 1616. It was effectively a public swipe at Marie's person and regime. The queen mother therefore demanded a second edict declaring her to be no less innocent than Condé, but her son could not bring himself to grant her that.<sup>3</sup>

The Wars of the Mother and Son, as with the rebellions of 1614-17, could in part be attributed to the pernicious presence of a minister-favourite. Like Concini before him, the minister-favourite of Louis XIII, Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes, was given a string of prestigious offices and titles, and free rein to reorganise the government and royal households around himself, his kin, allies and *créatures*, despite his modest pedigree and lack of military experience.<sup>4</sup> Marie de Médicis blamed Luynes for encouraging Louis XIII to seize power by assassinating Concini and banishing her from Paris. She suspected rightly that Luynes had been foiling her subsequent efforts to reconcile with her son and secure a return

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<sup>2</sup> Joseph Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu* (New Haven, CT, 1991), pp. 178-197.

<sup>3</sup> Bergin, *Rise of Richelieu*, pp. 197-203.

<sup>4</sup> Luynes was given all of Concini's offices, which allowed him to build an even more formidable power bloc in Normandie. Luynes was subsequently made a knight in the *Ordre du Saint-Esprit* and more shockingly, the *connétable de France*.



to court. However, while the clash between Marie and Luynes was inevitable, the relationship between the new minister-favourite and the other princes, like the relationship between Concini and the *Guisards* and *Condéens*, was by no means doomed from the start. The queen mother's first rebellion in February 1619, it is worth remembering, did not obtain the support of any grandee other than the duc d'Épernon.

Yet, by her second rebellion in April 1620, Marie de Médicis was joined by princes such as Soissons, Vendôme, Saint-Pol, Longueville, Mayenne, Retz, Roannais, Nemours, Montmorency, Épernon, La Trémoille, Rohan, La Force and Châtillon, ten out of fourteen of whom had rebelled against her at some point between 1614 and 1617. Politics indeed makes strange bedfellows. Although Luynes was not a bumbling and obtuse operator like his predecessor, his favour with the king and his increasingly obvious stranglehold on the government and patronage between August 1619 and April 1620 gave him and his allies and *créatures* the same unfair advantage in the never-ending cut-throat contest for political and dynastic advancement. Like Concini before him, Luynes's efforts to improve his family standing and acquire princely allies through appointments and marriages, as well as to construct a provincial *place de sûreté* befitting his recent grandee status, inevitably frustrated other princes' bid to do the same. His efforts invariably alarmed the rivals of his new allies and intruded upon established provincial spheres of influence. Luynes's resolution to free Condé and align himself closely with the prince who could serve as a counterweight to Marie de Médicis, for example, earned him the enmity of Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons, a *prince du sang* and one of Condé's arch-rivals. Due to the historic rivalry between the main and the Guéméné branches of the Rohan family, Luynes's decision to ally with Hercule de Rohan-Guéméné, duc de Montbazon also ruffled the feathers of the Huguenot Henri, duc de Rohan.<sup>5</sup> Luynes's goal to create a power bloc in north-western France drove him to force the duc de Mayenne to hand over his and his father's *gouvernement* of the Île-de-France (adjacent to Normandie where Luynes was now *gouverneur*) to Montbazon. Luynes's ambitions to create a power bloc in north-western France, as well as raise the standing of his brother Honoré d'Albert, sieur de Cadenet, led him to acquire for Cadenet the *lieutenance-générale* of Picardie (also adjacent to Normandie) and the *gouvernements* of several of its fortified towns.<sup>6</sup> Such a manoeuvre nettled the incumbent *gouverneur* of Picardie, the duc de

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<sup>5</sup> Luynes married Montbazon's daughter, Marie-Aimée de Rohan-Guéméné.

<sup>6</sup> For a full discussion of Luynes's efforts to improve his family, acquire allies and build a provincial power base, see: Sharon Kettering, *Power and Reputation at the Court of Louis XIII: The Career of Charles d'Albert, duc de Luynes (1578-1621)* (Manchester, 2008), pp. 99-108, 117-135, 143-161.

Longueville, who not too long ago had gone to some trouble to kick Concini out of his province.

Evidently, the tragic story of Concini did not seem to render Luynes more cautious in his ambitions or circumspect in his feuds with the members of the royal family and the *grands*. Nor did it seem to move Luynes's successors Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal-duc de Richelieu and Jules-Raymond, cardinal de Mazarin to do the same. That history kept repeating itself and princely rebellions kept breaking out for the same reasons between 1610 and 1661 has a lot to do with the period's noble culture. *Noblesse d'épée* like Luynes and Richelieu and *anoblis* like Concini and Mazarin were wired to worship ambition and self-interests, and to prioritise dynastic identity and interests before everything else, even their king, their kingdom or their religion. They were predisposed by a prevalent honour culture to see all status and achievement as relative and subjective, and all competition and conflict as intrinsically zero-sum. They were consequently under enormous and relentless pressures from their family, their society and themselves to compete and advance at every opportunity; to believe that life was a perpetual war in which one must either kill or be killed.<sup>7</sup>

That history kept repeating itself and princely rebellions kept breaking out for the same reasons between 1610 and 1616, to put it crudely, also has a lot to do with the fact that the regents and minister-favourites could not make an omelette without breaking some eggs. To reign supreme in the polity, regents and minister-favourites had to isolate and estrange the king from the likes of Marie de Médicis, Gaston d'Orléans, Louis de Soissons and the Grand Condé who, as the close relatives of the king, had a symbolic stake in his authority.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the questionable legitimacy and competence of the foreign female regents and the indisputable illegitimacy of the role of minister-favourites compelled the regents and minister-favourites alike to secure their positions through as much control as possible of the royal households, the king's councils, the provinces and the armies. This necessarily meant that they would try to fill the key offices in these domains with their kin, allies and *créatures*. In the process, they deprived many *grands* of their expected roles in the polity and created an environment in which it was impossible to win any recognition or reward unless one affiliated and ingratiated oneself with the regents or the minister-favourites. As such, those on the fringes of power and favour who subscribed to the same noble values and aspirations

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<sup>7</sup> Jonathan Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715* (Berkeley, CA, 1993), pp. 42-43.

<sup>8</sup> Marc Jaffré, *The Court of Louis XIII, 1610-1643* (PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2017), pp 91-105.

as the minister-favourites had no choice but to resort to conspiracies and armed rebellions to force their return to political relevance.

If the conflicts between the *grands* and the regent and minister-favourites was a recurrent theme in France in the first half of the seventeenth century, so was the extensive pamphleteering campaigns which accompanied these conflicts. This is unsurprising given that the French polity remained a system of social collaboration throughout this period. The crown and the *grands* could not rely on theoretical notions of authority, institutional procedures or legal statutes to mobilise fortified towns and men. Instead, the polity's overlapping structures of provincial, judicial, financial and military administration and interwoven networks of patronage and kinship, all of which were beset by conflicting affiliations and concerns, required the crown and the *grands* to unite competing institutions and individuals with competing interests behind common goals, and prevail upon these parties to essentially barter their cooperation. Politics, government and war in the seventeenth-century France, put simply, entailed a process of communication, negotiation and persuasion in which pamphlets had a natural and increasingly large part to play.

To cite but one example, the two Wars of the Mother and Son, which lasted no more than 12 months between them, generated 524 editions of political pamphlets alone. The Wars were bookended by the issuance of manifestos and exchange of open letters (129 editions), and the promulgation of the crown's edicts of pacification (28 editions). In her open letters and manifestos, Marie de Médicis claimed that her escape from Blois was necessary to protect her life which, she had reasons to conclude, was in grave danger.<sup>9</sup> Her subsequent armed movement, Marie made clear, sought to enjoin Louis XIII not to appoint a minister-favourite, considering the illegitimacy of their role and the adverse effects it had on the king's sovereignty. Her movement, Marie maintained, was conceived to exhort Louis to depose and punish Luynes who was an ambitious, avaricious and incompetent statesman. Luynes had abused the king's favour to appoint himself, his brothers and his *créatures* to prestigious *gouvernements* and military offices, even though none of them had the necessary experience, merit and social standing to warrant these positions. Luynes had also isolated Louis from his natural advisors and misappropriated his revenues. Luynes's misguided

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<sup>9</sup> *Coppie de la lettre de la royne mere escrite au roy* (Paris: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1174; *Seconde & dernière lettre de la royne mere, envoyée au roy. Envoyée d'Angoulesme le 10. de Mars. 1619.* (S.l.: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1186(A); *Lettres de la Royne Mere a Messieurs le Chancelier, le Garde des Sceaux, le President Jannin* (Angoulême: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1187.

counsel had led Louis to the brink of another war with the Huguenots. His foreign policy had reversed the kingdom's traditional alliances with the Protestant states and strengthened the Habsburgs' position in Europe at France's expense.<sup>10</sup>

Her armed movement, Marie de Médicis added, was also conceived to beseech Louis XIII to reform his kingdom and church and to relieve the longstanding sufferings of his three estates.<sup>11</sup> Marie asked the king to allow the observance of the decrees of the Council of Trent. She implored him to abolish the sale of offices and the *paulette* which had thus far deprived the nobility of their traditional employment, and to reserve the provincial *gouvernements* and royal household offices for those noblemen with proven merit and extraction. Marie entreated Louis to improve the crown's finances; to cut back on government expenditures, reduce the number and value of pensions and gifts he bestowed upon his favourite; and ensure that any gifts exceeding 3,000 *livres* would be first verified by the *Chambre des comptes*. Louis should likewise rectify the scourge of corruption by suppressing any redundant financial offices and forbidding his ministers and grandees from having any close ties with tax farmers and financiers. He should also reduce the fiscal burdens of his *menu peuple* and discontinue the established practice of taxing his First and Second Estates.<sup>12</sup>

As soon as Marie was done, her aides and supporters piled on the printed onslaught. Given that a multitude of similar voices and reinforcement was so important to persuasion, anonymous discourses like *Le Limosin* (1619) and *Véritez Chrestiennes, au Roy* (1620) echoed and drove home the queen mother's reasons for escaping and demands for reforms.<sup>13</sup> Satirical tracts and verses like *Le Comtadin Provençal* (1620) and *Le Tout en Tout de la Cour* (1620) reiterated and even magnified her denunciations of Luynes, as they looked to destroy the minister-favourite's honour, since honour was one of the most important aspects of socio-political capital and bases of power in this period.<sup>14</sup> Luynes became the butt of many

<sup>10</sup> *Manifeste, ou Raisons de la Roynne, Mere du Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), pp. 5, 8-9, 11-12, BnF 8-LB36-3481.

<sup>11</sup> *La troisieme lettre de la roynne mere envoyée au roy par monsieur de bethune le quatriesme d'Avril, mil six cents dix-neuf*. (Paris: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1221(B); *La quatriesme lettre de la roynne mere envoyee au Roy, sur la prise de l'Usarhe...* (Paris: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1231; *Lettre de la Roynne Mere, envoyee a Monsieur le Duc de Mayenne* (Paris: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1184(B).

<sup>12</sup> *Manifeste Envoyé au Roy, par la Roynne Mere de sa Majesté* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), pp. 7-13, BnF 8-LB36-1389.

<sup>13</sup> *Le Limosin* (S.l.: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1202; *Véritez Chrestiennes, au Roy, Tres-Chestien. L'Homme pervers met en avant noises; et celuy qui est rapporteur, separe les princes* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), BnF 8-LB-1390(B); *Lettre et Advis envoyé au Roy, par Monsieur le Marechal de Bouillon* (Sedan: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1183(B).

<sup>14</sup> *Le Comtadin Provençal* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), 8-LB36-1418(A); *Le Tout en Tout de la Cour* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), BnF YE-34005. See also: *Noel, ensemble le Pasquil des Chevaliers* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), BnF YE-28543; *L'Avant Courier du Guidon Francois. Avec le Qu'as-tu-veu de la Cour* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), BnF LB36-1413; *Requeste Presentee au Roy Pluton, contre les*

pejorative and scurrilous insults. Despite his *noblesse d'épée* birth and upbringing, the queen mother's pamphleteers accused him of having penniless, illiterate and immoral commoners for his parents and of being an uneducated lout who worked as a domestic servant, a birdkeeper, a footman and a porter in a brothel before he unexpectedly became a royal favourite.<sup>15</sup> They poked fun at his lack of experience in war and duels, claiming that his sword had once complained to the king that it had never been unsheathed and was abandoned in a corner to grow old, rusty and 'unhappy like women who fell under the yoke of impotent husbands'.<sup>16</sup> One pamphleteer relied on history to prompt his audience to superimpose certain attributes on Luynes, comparing Luynes to Concini and concluding that the former was a hundred times worse than the latter.<sup>17</sup> Another pamphleteer referenced the classics, likening Luynes and his two brothers to the three Furies who had tormented Orestes and driven him to kill his own mother.<sup>18</sup>

Some contemporary political insiders and informed readers, one suspects, must have detected the stench of hypocrisy and irony wafting from the pamphlets of Marie de Médicis and her supporters. There was no reason to believe that the queen mother's life was ever threatened by the deaths of the Concinis or her house arrest at the Château de Blois. There was also no cause to think that her disapproval of the minister-favourite, her criticisms of the kingdom's disorders and her demands for reforms, were informed by her genuine concerns for the *bien public*. After all, this was the same woman who had raised Concini to the status of minister-favourite and expended every means to protect him from his enemies. This was the same woman who had spent her entire period of rule denying the existence of the problems at which she was now pointing her finger, and stonewalling the demands for reforms for which she now clamoured. It was no doubt clear to some contemporary observers that Marie de Médicis was merely following the footsteps of previous malcontents. She was not presenting her ideological position; rather, she was endeavouring to muster the support of the political nation by playing to the existing preoccupations and prejudices of its various segments. At the same time, she was establishing the good intentions of her actions and appealing to the kingdom's peers and magistrates. In doing so, she hoped that they could acquit her and her adherents from the ruinous and dishonourable charge of *lèse-majesté* laid

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*Perturbateurs de l'Etat* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), BnF 8-LB36-3482; *Les Resveries de la Roynne* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), BnF YE-32043.

<sup>15</sup> Kettering, *Power and Reputation*, pp. 9, 221.

<sup>16</sup> *Plaintes de l'Espée de Monsieur le Connestable. Au Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), pp. 3-6, BnF YE-30189.

<sup>17</sup> *Le Jugement de Minos, contre les trois Geryons qui pillent la France* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), 8-LB36-1415(A).

<sup>18</sup> *Les Trois Harpies* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), pp. 3-4, BnF YE-34152.

against them by the royal council, on the basis that the Roman law allowed for self-defence and on the grounds that the intentions of their movement to protect the well-being of the king and kingdom were inherently just. Marie de Médicis was therefore taking advantage of a legal system marked by competing jurisdictions and which prioritised the goodness of one's intentions over the effects of one's actions, the spirit of the law over the wording of its statutes.

Whilst Marie de Médicis and her hacks had taken a page out of the *Condéen* princes' book, Louis XIII and his pamphleteers had taken a page out of hers. As with their counterparts in 1614-17, the official responses and loyalist discourses of 1619-20 combined to expose the malcontents' hypocrisies and unmask their public-spirited grievances and demands as pretexts. To do so, they had adopted a similar approach of questioning the justifications behind these grievances and demands. Marie should not have felt unsafe and cooped up at Blois, they contended, because Louis had placed her under his direct protection and granted her the freedom of movement around various royal residences. Marie should not have felt neglected or excluded from power by Louis, for the king had attended to her needs at the peace conference of Angoulême in 1619 and given her enormous monetary gifts and prestigious *gouvernements*.<sup>19</sup> Her public-minded complaints and demands were also unfounded. The royal finances and the condition of the three estates, the official responses and loyalist discourses argued, had improved greatly since Louis XIII and Luynes assumed power. Moreover, the three estates had taken comfort in the extended period of peace in France and in Europe, which was brought about by Louis and Luynes' skilful diplomacy with regards to the Huguenots and the now-raging conflicts within the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>20</sup> The queen mother's motivation for instituting an armed rebellion, it was implied, must therefore be driven by agendas other than reforms, as the grievances and desires for reforms she spoke of did not exist.

To expose the malcontents' hypocrisies and pretexts, the official responses and loyalist discourses also adopted the similar tactic of underscoring the great mismatch between the malcontents' rhetoric and actions to date. In his open letter to Marie de Médicis in April 1619, for instance, Louis XIII expressed his disbelief that she would have the

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<sup>19</sup> *Coppie de la lettre de la reyne mere* (1619), pp. 9-14; *Lettre du Roy a la Royne sa mere envoyee par les sieurs Ducs de Mombazon & de Bellegarde...* (Paris: s.n., 1620), pp. 3-6, BnF 8-LB36-1435.

<sup>20</sup> *L'Alliance Françoise, avec un Discours touchant l'Ordre du Roy* (S.l.: s.n., 1619), BnF LL14-5; *La Fulminante, contre les Calomnieux* (S.l.: s.n., 1620), pp. 10-13, BnF 8-LB36-1425(A); *Apologie pour Monseigneur de Luynes* (S.l.: s.n., 1619), pp. 12-13, BM Lyon Rés 315428.

audacity to castigate him for having a minister-favourite; Louis reminded his queen mother – and his political nation – that she used to have a minister-favourite in Concini, ‘a much-hated blustering braggart’. The king questioned the sincerity of his mother’s complaints about the disorders within his government and kingdom, revealing that the queen mother had only recently written to him to praise him for his excellent management of the state. Louis reminded Marie – and his audience - that her period of rule was quite frankly catastrophic; by implication, he was suggesting these disorders, if they existed at all, took root and were left unaddressed during her administration. Louis then argued that it was difficult to square Marie’s purported intentions to reform the kingdom with her current actions and those of her associates. Instead of strengthening the authority of his crown and security of his kingdom, they had thus far instigated a rebellion to challenge his authority. They had seized his fortified towns, appropriated his revenues, and imposed heavy and illegitimate taxes on his innocent subjects, thereby undermining their peace and welfare.<sup>21</sup>

Louis XIII and his supporters made sure there was concrete evidence to back up their defences and allegations. Like its predecessors in the rebellions of 1614-17, the government in 1619-20 turned a blind eye to or even encourage the publication of new reports and open letters, real or false. The ‘leaked’ letter of the Prince of Piedmont to Marie de Médicis and the false joint declaration of a handful of princes in 1619 testified to the good governance of Louis, detailing for instance how the Second Estate was benefitting from the king’s justice and meritocracy and the Third Estate, from the flourishing agriculture, trade and justice.<sup>22</sup> The news accounts which described the wonderful reception and assistance that Louis and Luynes had received from the townsmen and *parlements* on their march to Normandie and Anjou gave the lie to the queen mother’s claims that the current government was unpopular.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, the news reports of the successful siege of Caen and battle of Ponts-de-Cé reminded the French nobility not to stick their necks out for the queen mother’s rebellion, which was invariably a lost cause.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> *Response de la Main du Roy, a la quatriesme lettre de la Royne Mere* (Paris: Pierre Froment, 1619), BM Lyon Rés 315419; *The Humble Remonstrance a la Royne Mere du Roy, sur l’entretien & conservation de la paix, par tout le royaume de France* (Paris: Isaac Mesnier 1620), BnF 8-LB36-1461, argued along similar lines.

<sup>22</sup> *Lettres de la Royne Mere, a Monsieur le Prince de Piedmont et a Madame la Princesse...* (Loches: s.n., 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1179; *Declaration de Messieurs les Princes. Au Roy* (Paris: Isaac Mesnier, 1619), BnF 8-LB36-1276.

<sup>23</sup> *Recueil veritable de ce qui s’est fait et passé au voyage du Roy...* (Paris: Pierre Mettayer, 1620), BnF 8-LB36-1454; *L’Entreveue du Roy, et de la Royne sa mere, au Chasteau de Brissac, & du depuis à Tours*. (Lyon: Claude Armand, 1620), BM Lyon Rés 315459.

<sup>24</sup> *La Réduction de la Ville et Château de Caen sous l’obéissance du Roi, 17 Juillet 1620* (Paris: Isaac Mesnier, 1620), BnF 8-LB36-1436; *La Prise de la Ville du Pont de See, et la défaite des troupes qui étaient en icelle contre le service du roi...* (Paris: Isaac Mesnier, 1620), BnF 8-LB36-1447.

It therefore becomes clear that the contents of the pamphlets produced during the Wars of the Mother and Son differed little from those produced by the rebellions of the princes in 1614-17. This was only to be expected. As this study has shown, regardless of which factions they originated from, the political pamphlets were formulated using the language, motifs and formats with which their target audience were most familiar. They were devised to evoke the prevalent grievances and anxieties of the segments of the political nation they were addressing. In other words, so long as such techniques of persuasion and political persuasion stayed relevant and effective; and so long as the context – the political system, noble culture and religious and international issues – which gave rise to these grievances and anxieties remained fundamentally unchanged and unresolved, the nature of the power struggles at court and the pamphlet wars that they engendered would continue to follow a similar pattern. For these reasons, French factional politics and political pamphleteering between 1610 and 1661 were exactly as Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, maréchal-duc de Bouillon had described in the aftermath of Concini’s death: ‘la taverne est toujours la même, il n’y a que la bouchon de changé’.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Robin Briggs, ‘Noble Conspiracy and Revolt in France, 1610-60’, *Seventeenth-Century French Studies* 12 (1990), p. 163; *Richelieu*, II, p. 193. A ‘bouchon’ was a shop sign.



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