Forging diplomacy abroad and at home:
# French festival culture in a European context, 1572-1615

Bram van Leuveren

A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Archives</u>

BL   British Library, London.

Bod   Bodleian Library, Oxford.

BnF   Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.

- MS fr. : Manuscrits français.

- MS it. : Manuscrits italiens.

NA   Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

- SG (1576-1588): Archief van de Staten-Generaal, 1576-1588, toegangsnummer 1.01.01.

- SG (1576-1796): Archief van de Staten-Generaal, (1431) 1576-1796, toegangsnummer 1.01.02.

- JvO: Archief van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, 1586-1619, toegangsnummer 3.01.14.

- VD: Archief van de familie Van Dorp, (1414) 1503-1657 (1986), toegangsnummer 1.10.25.

<u>Printed primary sources</u>

Brieven VD   *Brieven en onuitgegeven stukken van Jonkheer Arend van Dorp, Hr. van Maasdam, enz.*, ed. by Johannes B. J. N. de van der Schueren, Werken Historisch Genootschap, Nieuwe Serie, 44, 50, 2 vols (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1887-1888).

Compleat   *The Compleat Ambassador: Or Two Treaties of the Intended Marriage of Qu. Elizabeth of Glorious Memory; Comprised in Letters of Negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham, Her Resident in France [...]*, ed. by Dudly Digges (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1655).

Corps   *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens [...]*, ed. by Jean du Mont, 8 vols (Amsterdam: P. Brunel and others;

The Hague: P. Husson and Charles Levier, 1726-1731), V (1728).

CSPF	*Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth. Preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office*, ed. by Allan James Crosby, 23 vols (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1863-1950).

- IX: *1569-1571* (1874), see also *British History Online* <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol9> [accessed 5 March 2019].
- X: *1572-1574* (1876), see also *British History Online* <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol10> [accessed 5 March 2019].
- XIX: *1584-1585* (1916), see also *British History Online* <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol19> [accessed 5 March 2019].

HMC Downshire	*Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, Preserved at Easthamptstead Park Berks*, Historical Manuscripts Commission, ed. by Allen B. Hinds and Edward K. Purnell, 5 vols (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924-1988), III: *Papers of William Trumbull the Elder, 1611-1612* (1938), ed. by Allen B. Hinds.
HMC Hatfield	*Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Salisbury, K.G. P.C. G.C.V.O. C.B. T.D. Preserved at Hatfield House Hertfordshire*, Historical Manuscripts Commission, ed. by Richard A. Roberts, Montague S. Giuseppi, and Geraint Dyfnallt Owen, 24 vols (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1883-1976).

- VIII: *1598* (1899), [ed. by Richard A. Roberts].

- XXI: *1609-1612* (1970), ed. by Montague S. Giuseppi.
- XXIII: *Addenda 1562-1606* (1973), Historical Manuscripts Commission, 9, ed. by Geraint Dyfnallt Owen.

L3 original   Alberico Gentili, *De Legationibus, Libri Tres* (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1585).

L3 trans.   Alberico Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, trans. by Gordon J. Laing, The Classics of International Law, 12, 2 vols (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), II.

Letters CdM   *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, ed. by Hector de La Ferrière, Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, 11 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1880-1943).
- II: *1563-1566* (1885).
- III: *1567-1570* (1887).
- IV: *1570-1574* (1891).

Original Letters   *Original Letters, Illustrative of English History; Including Numerous Royal Letters: From Autographs in the British Museum, and One or Two Other Collections*, ed. by Henry Ellis, 2nd Series, 4 vols (London: Harding and Lepard, 1827), III.

Secondary sources

Dynastic Marriages   *Dynastic Marriages 1612/1615: A Celebration of the Habsburg and Bourbon Unions*, ed. by Margaret M. McGowan, European Festival Studies 1450-1700 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; repr. London and New York: Routledge, 2016).

Palatine Wedding   *The Palatine Wedding of 1613: Protestant Alliance and Court Festival*, ed. by Sara Smart and Mara R. Wade, Wolfenbütteler Abhandlungen zur Renaissanceforschung, 29 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am much indebted to my supervisor, Dr Julia Prest, for providing sustained support throughout my PhD. Her insights and detailed comments on several drafts of this doctoral thesis were indispensable.

I would like to thank the School of Modern Languages of the University of St Andrews for awarding me with a 7th Century PhD Studentship and Money Matters of that same university for offering me an International Student Hardship Fund, without which this project would not have been possible.

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Finally, I am grateful to my examiners, Professor Ingrid De Smet and Dr Emma Herdman, for their helpful and thorough comments and suggestions.

ABSTRACT

This doctoral thesis is the first to examine the attempts of the late Valois and early Bourbon rulers of France to make strategic use of festival culture for maintaining national and international relations. It focuses on the period between the Anglo-French Treaty of Blois in 1572 and the Habsburg-Bourbon double marriage in 1615. This research starts from the premise that previous scholarship has given too much credence to royal accounts of festive and ceremonial events, as printed in official commemorative books, and has tended to ignore the conflicting responses of various other players (ambassadors, nobles, generals, scholars, students, and, occasionally, commoners) who attended these events and often advanced very different ambitions, goals, and interests. It seeks in particular to gain a fuller grasp of the reception of festival culture by comparing the intended effects of the ideas, tools, and strategies that French rulers employed with the actual effects they had on stakeholders. Its main concerns are thus twofold: first, the relationship, and frequent tension, between the theories and practices of using festivals and individual festivities for alleged diplomatic purposes, and second, the way in which both formal festivals and ad-hoc festivities functioned as sites where multiple domestic and foreign concerns intersected with or, more often, diverged from, as well as among, each other. The thesis adopts a comparative approach to the topic, analysing pairs of festivals alongside one another and comparing different accounts of those festivals. It draws extensively on a wide range of contemporary sources, many of them previously overlooked, including formal and informal eyewitness accounts, theoretical treatises, and memoirs written in French, English, Dutch, Italian, German, and Latin. What the thesis demonstrates is how both non-French and unofficial sources can help develop a more nuanced view of French festival culture and its diplomatic functioning in a wider European context.

PRELIMINARY NOTES

<u>Policy on the use of language</u>

This doctoral thesis cites from historical sources written in a range of European languages. Besides English, these languages include French, Dutch, Italian, German, and Latin. To make the present research accessible to as wide a readership as possible, English translations of foreign sources are used throughout the body of this thesis. All translations are the author's unless otherwise specified. However, to provide insight into the original texts and bring attention to the multilingual nature of early modern diplomatic culture, foreign quotations have been moved into the footnotes. Original texts consisting of forty or more words can be consulted in the appendix. This thesis follows MHRA rules for referencing throughout.

Furthermore, titles of early modern sources, many of which number well over forty words, are shortened in the footnotes. In the absence of MHRA guidelines on abbreviating long titles, the advice of the MLA is followed: titles of early modern printed books are shortened up to at least the first noun, unless they contain further necessary information. Thus, the anonymously compiled *Mellange de chansons tant des vievx avthevrs que des modernes, à cinq. six. sept. et hvict parties* (Collection of Songs of Both Old and New Composers, in Five, Six, Seven, and Eight Parts) (Paris: Adrian le Roy & Robert Ballard, 1572) is given as *Mellange de chansons [...]*, and Félix de La Mothe Le Vayer's *Legatvs, seu de legatione, legatorvmqve priuilegiis, officio ac munere libellvs. Ad titvlos de Legatione & Legatis in II. &c.* (The Legate, or a Pamphlet on the Embassy, and the Privileges, Office, and Duty of the Legates. To the Titles 'On the Embassy and Legates' in II et cetera) (Paris: Michel de Roigny, 1579) as *Legatvs [...]*.

The same principle has been followed for the titles of early modern manuscripts. However, titles of manuscripts will only be given when they were intended by their authors as self-contained memoirs, chronicles, (travel) diaries, or testaments of some length, rather than separate and (usually) shorter letters, reports, notes, or financial records. We have provided the location and date (if known) for all manuscripts. In the bibliography, the complete titles of all referenced early modern works are listed. These may be of interest to the scholar, insofar as they provide valuable information about the content and intended

readership of the source in question. Very long titles (two hundred words or more) will be shortened in the bibliography up to the first sentence.

Policy on the spelling of original quotations

The spelling of quotations will be that of the book, edition, or manuscript referred to. This means that also in quotations from early modern manuscripts or printed books the forms of the letters *i* and *j*, *u* and *v*, the ampersand, and superscript letters have not been normalised to modern usage, except for the long *s* (ſ or ƒ) to avoid obvious confusion with the letter *f*. It is thus hoped that the reader will gain a more accurate understanding of the original sources and their — often — idiosyncratic spelling.

The titles for early modern printed sources have been italicised throughout the thesis, whereas the titles of manuscripts and short treatises or pamphlets have been put between inverted commas.

Policy on the use of Old and New Style dates

Since the reform of the calendar by Pope Gregory XIII (1502-1585) in 1582, two systems of dating existed in Europe: the Old and New Style. England and the German Protestant states refused to implement the Gregorian or New Style calendar and thus continued to use the Julian or Old Style calendar. Catholic lands in Europe, including the predominantly Protestant Northern Netherlands, accepted Gregory's reform at the beginning of the seventeenth century. When discussing early seventeenth-century continental affairs involving England (see Chapter 5), the present thesis will provide both Old and New Style dates. Moreover, 1 January has been taken as the beginning of the calendar year.

Policy on the spelling of names and places of publication

The names and titles of French-born or Gallicised individuals are given according to French spelling: e.g. Catherine de Médicis, Henri III, or duc (duke) d'Anjou. The same applies to institutions or groups of people: e.g. *Parlement de Paris* (Parlement of Paris), *Ligue catholique* (Catholic League), or *Académie de Poésie et de Musique* (Academy of Poetry and Music). The names and titles of individuals born or naturalised in countries other than France are given according to the spelling of that particular country, e.g. Cosimo I de' Medici or Ferdinando I de' Medici, unless a more common form of spelling

exists in English: e.g. William of Orange, Maurice of Nassau, or Philip II. The same applies to institutions: e.g. the States General is used as the accepted English equivalent for the *Staten-Generaal*, the governing body of the Dutch Provinces.[1]

Finally, Latinised names of early modern authors and printers, as well as places of publication, are given in their accepted vernacular form, as listed by the Consortium of European Research Libraries in the *CERL Thesaurus*.[2] For example, 'Thomas Vautrollerius' is given as 'Thomas Vautrollier', the Huguenot bookseller and printer (died in 1587), and 'Londinium' as 'London'.

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[1] In this thesis, we will use the terms 'Dutch Provinces' (or 'Dutch States') in two definitions: one geographical, the other legislative. In the first, geographical, understanding of the word, the Dutch Provinces refer to the seventeen regions that had been united by the Habsburg Emperor Charles V (1500-1558) in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549: the Counties of Artois, Cambrai, Flanders, Hainaut, Holland, Namur, Tournaisis, and Zeeland; the Lordships of Groningen (including the *Ommelanden* or Surrounding Lands), Mechlin, Overijssel (including Drenthe), Utrecht, Friesland; and the Duchies of Brabant, Gelderland, Limburg, and Luxembourg. See Marjolein 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence: Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands, 1570-1680*, Modern Wars in Perspective (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 12-3.

In the second, legislative, understanding of the term, the Dutch Provinces refer to those regions that were directly represented in the States General. Between 1572 and 1615, the period under consideration in this thesis, the number of Provinces that send delegations to the assemblies of the States General varied widely. Particularly in the early 1580s, as we will see in Chapter 3 below, regions that previously attended the meetings of the States General were now indisposed. This was either because they had partly fallen into Spanish hands (e.g. the towns of Breda and Tournai were captured in 1581; Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres in 1584) or simply because they did not bother to show up, as long travel distances often proved major stumbling blocks (Overijssel serves as a case in point). A substantial number of Southern Provinces, moreover, had reconciled with the Spanish crown by the Union of Arras in January 1579 and were thus no longer represented in the States General. These Provinces included Artois, Cambrai, and Hainaut (Limburg, Luxembourg, and Namur were sympathetic towards the Union). For more on the changing organisation of the States General in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, see Theo H. P. M. Thomassen, *Instrumenten van de macht: De Staten-Generaal en hun archieven, 1576-1796* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2009), pp. 75-84.

In this thesis, we have sought to avoid using the term 'United Provinces' which commonly refers to the Northern Provinces that signed the Union of Utrecht between 1579 and 1580 in support of the Dutch rebellion against Spain. These Provinces included Friesland, Gelderland, Groningen (including *Ommelanden*), Holland, Utrecht, Overijssel (including Drenthe), and Zeeland (Brabant, Flanders, and Tournaisis were largely sympathetic towards the Union). We believe that the term 'United Provinces' misleadingly suggests a unity among the Dutch Provinces that was never actually achieved in terms of legislation, given the infrequent attendance of delegates at the assemblies of the States General, especially in the early 1580s. Mechlin, moreover, never signed or openly sympathised with the Union of Utrecht, but was nevertheless represented at the time in the States General (see Chapter 3 below). In this thesis, therefore, we have preferred to use the more general term 'Dutch Provinces'.

[2] See <https://data.cerl.org/thesaurus/_search> [accessed 5 March 2019].

INTRODUCTION

> For a prince should have two fears: one internal, concerning his subjects; the other external, concerning foreign powers.
>
> Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), in *Il Principe* (The Prince, 1532).[1]

When Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, visited the White House in January 2017, just days after Donald Trump's inauguration as President of the United States, she invited her controversial host for a state visit at Buckingham Palace the next year.[2] In Britain, the occasion sparked widespread opposition from lawmakers and the general public who called on the Prime Minister to withdraw the invitation in light of Trump's record of sexual and racial misconduct allegations.[3] They claimed that the president was unworthy of the official ceremony reserved for a full state reception at Buckingham Palace, which includes a procession down the Mall and a banquet hosted by the monarch, and that the event would cause embarrassment to Queen Elizabeth II. Despite the opposition, May refused to withdraw the invitation.[4] During a plenary debate at Westminster Hall in February 2017, Sir Alan Duncan, deputy foreign minister, who supported May's invitation, said that state visits were the government's 'most important diplomatic tool' that 'enable us to strengthen and influence those international relationships that are of the greatest strategic importance to this country'.[5]

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[1] 'Perche un Principe deue hauer due paure; una drento per conto de' sudditi; l'altra di fuori, per conto de potenti esterni' (*Il principe [...]* (Florence: Bernardo I Giunta, 1532), sig. 28ʳ; *The Prince*, ed. and trans. by Peter Bondanella, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; repr. 2008), p. 63).

[2] 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon. Theresa May MP, *PM Press Conference with US President Trump: 27 January 2017* (Prime Minister's Office, 27 January 2017), *GOV.UK* <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-press-conference-with-us-president-donald-trump-27-january-2017> [accessed 5 March 2019].

[3] Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, 'Theresa May Stands Firm on Donald Trump State Visit as Thousands Protest', *Guardian*, 31 January 2017, Section 'Trump travel ban' <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/30/theresa-may-donald-trump-state-visit-protests-uk-parliament> [accessed 5 March 2019].

[4] Ibid.

[5] Cited in Andrew Sparrow, 'MPs Debate Refusing Donald Trump a State Visit to Britain — Politics Live', *Guardian*, 20 February 2017, Section 'Politics' <https://www.theguardian.com/poli-

The prospect of mass protests outside Buckingham Palace, however, prompted May's government in late 2017 to reconsider the terms of Trump's visit to prevent either party from losing face. The solution was found in a diplomatic compromise. To meet the opponents of a state visit halfway, British ambassadors discussed plans to organise a 'working visit' instead. Besides lacking the official ceremony of a state reception, the trip would be hosted in a personal capacity, on behalf of Woody Johnson, Trump's ambassador to the United Kingdom, without the direct involvement of Buckingham Palace.[6] The working visit was finally held in July 2018.[7]

Debates on whether controversial political figures like Donald Trump should be granted an official reception and, if so, under what conditions, are by no means new. In early modern Europe, state visits of rebellious subjects and diplomats practising a religion different from the hosting court's were subject to similar deliberation. By the end of the sixteenth century, existing rules of precedence, which determined the hierarchy among European rulers and the degree of favour accorded to their delegates abroad, had become largely obsolete in the wake of the rapidly changing political landscape on the continent. The most authoritative of these rankings, promulgated by Pope Julius II (1443-1513) in 1504, had not been updated to address the diplomatic status of the political entities that emerged in the wake of the Protestant Reformations.[8] In the course of the sixteenth

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tics/blog/live/2017/feb/20/paul-nuttall-ukip-chairmen-quit-in-protest-over-paul-nuttalls-hillsborough-falsehoold-politics-live> [accessed 5 March 2019].

[6] Joe Murphy, 'Donald Trump Set to Come to the UK next Year — but It Won't Be the Formal State Visit He Was Promised', *Evening Standard*, 11 October 2017, Section 'News' <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/donald-trump-to-visit-uk-next-year-but-not-on-a-fullblown-state-visit-and-he-will-not-stay-with-the-a3655846.html> [accessed 5 March 2019].

[7] Pippa Crerar, 'Trump Set for Official UK Visit in July — Minus Pomp and Ceremony', *Guardian*, 25 April 2018, Section 'US politics' <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/25/donald-trump-set-for-official-uk-visit-in-july-minus-pomp-and-ceremony> [accessed 5 March 2019]. The working visit was initially scheduled for February 2018 during which Trump was supposed to open the new US embassy in the London district of Nine Elms. The trip was cancelled, however, due to the controversy surrounding a public spat between Trump and May over the former's retweets on Twitter of several anti-Muslim hate videos posted by a fringe far-right political party in Britain. During a joint press conference at Davos in January 2018, Trump and May continued to hint at the prospect of a state visit (see Alexandra Wilts, 'Donald Trump and Theresa May Dodge UK State Visit Question in Awkward Joint Press Conference: "We'll Talk about It"', *Independent*, 25 January 2018, Section 'UK politics' <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/donald-trump-theresa-may-davos-state-visit-question-press-conference-latest-a8177726.html> [accessed 5 March 2019]).

[8] Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995; repr. 2000), pp. 64–68; Niels F. May, 'Staged Sovereignty or Aristocratic Values? Diplomatic Ceremonial at the Westphalian Peace Negotiations (1643-1648)', in *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern Word c. 1410-1800*, ed. by Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings, Routledge Research in Early Modern History (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 80–94 (pp. 83–86); Ellen R. Welch, *A Theater of Diplomacy: International Relations and the Performing*

century, many regions and states that featured in Julius's ranking, such as England and the Lutheran domains in the Holy Roman Empire, abolished papal authority or witnessed subjects striving for independence, such as when the Dutch Provinces abjured their Habsburg overlord, Philip II of Spain, in 1581.[9] As a result of this widespread confusion over rules of precedence, rulers were required to improvise and experiment, to test different practices of diplomacy through trial and error, not unlike the efforts of the British government to facilitate Trump's state visit without offending any of the parties involved.[10]

Many of the diplomatic practices that inform the current debate about Trump's state visit, and the decisions that May's government has taken as a result, already resonated widely in the Europe of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, albeit under vastly different circumstances. This doctoral thesis will highlight three such practices: maintaining a balance of power among dissimilar actors, distributing hospitality among visiting associates or their delegates, and obtaining support from a wide variety of stakeholders. First, May's attempts at finding a common ground with domestic stakeholders was a technique regularly deployed by early modern rulers to protect their political authority. As the religious disputes that followed the Protestant Reformations dragged Europe into various surges of war for over a century,[11] the diplomatic compromise became a necessary instrument for rulers to maintain a balance of power among subjects divided

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Arts in Early Modern France, Haney Foundation Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), pp. 33–35.

[9] Julius II imagined the order of precedence among European rulers as follows: Holy Roman Emperor, King of Rome, King of France, King of Spain, King of Aragon, King of Portugal, King of England (disputed his place with Spain, Aragon, and Portugal), King of Sicily (contested his position with Portugal), King of Scotland and King of Hungary (disputed between themselves), King of Navarre, King of Cyprus, King of Bohemia, King of Poland, and King of Denmark. Julius's ranking is printed in Ernest Nys, 'Histoire du droit international: Le Règlement de rang du pape Jules II', *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, 25 (1893), 513–19 (pp. 515–16).

[10] Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne argue that issues of precedence had become 'so important […] that wars could be started, or fail to end because of it' (*Practice of Diplomacy*, p. 64).

[11] The religious conflicts in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe reached a peak during four main wars: the Schmalkaldic Wars (1546-1546), the French Wars of Religion (1562-1629), the Dutch Revolt (1572-1609), and the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). All religious hostilities are commonly believed to have been settled by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For a cross-continental perspective on general aspects of the religious conflicts, see Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009). For the role of religion in the wars and the negotiations that were conducted by various stakeholders to end them, see David J. B. Trim, 'Conflict, Religion, and Ideology', in *European Warfare 1350-1750*, ed. by Frank Tallett and David J. B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 278–99; Benjamin J. Kaplan, 'Negotiating Religious Difference in Early Modern Europe: Ecclesiastical, Political and Social Processes', in *Negotiating Religion: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives*, ed. by François Guesnet, Cécile Laborde, and Lois Lee (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 31–46.

by confessional and political difference.[12] They could extend limited toleration to religious minorities or grant exemptions to rebellious noblemen in exchange for their allegiance.[13] Catherine de Médicis, Queen Regent of France between 1560 and 1574, famously used this technique to keep the warring Catholics and Huguenots at the Valois court within the purview of the crown.[14]

Second, harking back to our modern example, the official ceremony that Trump would have received if invited for a state visit to London borrows — and, in fact, originates — from the hospitality culture that surrounded most receptions of foreign guests in early modern Europe.[15] Rulers typically received important associates, such as princes and their ambassadors, with a ceremonial entry into the city or town where they held court, after which they would be invited to dine in his or her presence.[16] The entry took the form of a carriage procession that served as an opportunity to reinforce, as well as display, friendly

[12] See Chapter 1, Section 2 for more on the concept of the balance of power.

[13] On religious toleration in early modern Europe, see Benjamin J. Kaplan, 'Coexistence, Conflict, and the Practice of Toleration', in *A Companion to the Reformation World*, ed. by R. Po-chia Hsia, Blackwell Companions to European History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 486–505; id., *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007; repr. 2009). For more on the power relations between European rulers and their nobles, see Jonathan Dewald, *The European Nobility, 1400-1800*, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; repr. 1999); *Contested Spaces of Nobility in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Matthew P. Romaniello and Charles Lipp (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011; repr. London and New York: Routledge, 2016).

[14] Robert J. Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion, 1559-1598*, Seminar Studies in History Series, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1996; original publ. 1989), p. 28; id., *Catherine de' Medici*, Profiles in Power (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 191–219; Denis Crouzet, *Le Haut Cœur de Catherine de Médicis: Une Raison politique aux temps de la Saint-Barthélemy*, Bibliothèque Albin Michel Histoire (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005), pp. 201–394; Leah L. Chang and Katherine Kong, 'Introduction', in *Portraits of the Queen Mother: Polemics, Panegyrics, Letters*, ed. and trans. by Leah L. Chang and Katherine Kong, The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe: The Toronto Series, 35 (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2015), pp. 1–62 (pp. 21–24). See Chapter 2 below for more on Catherine's negotiation efforts.

[15] Felicity Heal's *Hospitality in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) is the foundational study on hospitality culture in the early modern period. Recent contributions on the topic include: Catherine Fletcher, '"Furnished with Gentlemen": The Ambassador's House in Sixteenth-Century Italy', *Renaissance Studies*, 24.4 (2009), 518–35; Giulia Galastro, 'Wondrous Welcome: Materiality and the Senses in Diplomatic Hospitality in Sixteenth-Century Genoa', in *Practices of Diplomacy*, ed. by Sowerby and Hennings, pp. 97-113.

[16] For a Europe-wide approach to royal and princely entries, see *Spectacvlvm Evropævm: Theatre and Spectacle in Europe / Histoire du spectacle en Europe (1580-1750)*, ed. by Pierre Béhar and Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten zur Barockforschung, 31 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1999), section 'Entries and Festivals / Entrées et fêtes', pp. 663-79. Among the few books that devote attention to entries of ambassadors, see Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Bedford Historical Series, 18 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955; repr. 1970), pp. 37–39; Elisa Goudriaan, *The Cultural Importance of Florentine Patricians: Cultural Exchange, Brokerage Networks, and Social Representation in Early Modern Florence and Rome* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leiden, 2015), pp. 64–72, 84–85. Goudriaan's thesis analyses several entries of seventeenth-century patricians into Rome where they acted as diplomats to the Medici family.

relations between host and guest. In February 1594, for example, Henri IV (1553-1610) received an extraordinary Venetian embassy with a ceremonial entry into Paris. The impressive cavalcade, which featured one hundred gentlemen, eighty horses, and twenty-five mules, unequivocally demonstrated to the Parisian onlookers that the Venetian Republic decided to recognise Henri, a former Protestant who had converted to Catholicism the year before, as King of France.[17]

The third, and final, diplomatic practice that this research will address is rallying support for a new alliance or line of policy from as many domestic and foreign stakeholders as possible. Two tools of diplomacy can be used towards that end — what modern scholars of international relations have called 'public' and 'backchannel diplomacy'.[18] The state visit in present-day Britain and the ceremonial entry in early modern Europe serve as examples of public diplomacy: conspicuous and controlled forms of diplomatic communication aimed at promoting official policy to a large international audience, involving both the ruling elite and the urban population. Mass media can expand the outreach of pageantry even further. The commemorative books and pamphlets of the early modern period, which were often distributed in advance of an entry or festival and sent to courts across Europe, are the equivalent of the live recordings of the twenty-first century, which can be easily accessed via television, internet, and radio channels, enabling large international audiences to witness important state events.[19]

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[17] Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Henri IV* (Paris: Fayard, 1982), p. 603. See Chapter 4 for more on Henri IV's bid for power in the early years of his reign.

[18] See James Pamment, *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice*, Routledge New Diplomacy Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); *Secret Diplomacy: Concepts, Contexts and Cases*, ed. by Corneliu Bjola and Stuart Murray, Routledge New Diplomacy Studies (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016); James Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and the Digital Revolution*, Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Public diplomacy in early modern studies, by contrast, has only recently begun to receive more sustained attention. See Helmer Helmers, 'Public Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe', *Media History*, 22.3–4 (2016), 401–20; Mark Netzloff, 'Public Diplomacy and the Comedy of State: Chapman's *Monsieur D'Olice*', in *Authority and Diplomacy from Dante to Shakespeare*, ed. by Jason Powell and William T. Rossiter (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 185–97. The secret or backchannel nature of early modern diplomacy is commonly assumed (see Helmers, 'Public Diplomacy', p. 401; Netzloff, 'Public Diplomacy', p. 185).

[19] For more on the early modern genre of the commemorative or festival book, see Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 'The Early Modern Festival Book: Function and Form', in *Europa Triumphans: Court and Civic Festivals in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by J.R. Mulryne, Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, and Margaret Shewring, Modern Humanities Research Association, 15, 2 vols (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), I, 3–17; Thomas Rahn, *Festbeschreibung: Funktion und Topik einer Textsorte am Beispiel höfischer Hochzeiten in Deutschland (1568-1794)*, Frühe Neuzeit, 108 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2006); Benoît Bolduc, *La Fête imprimée: Spectacles et cérémonies politiques (1549-1662)*, Lire le XVIIe siècle, 39 / Théâtre, 5 (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016).

Backchannel diplomacy, by contrast, is often practised behind the scenes to win the support of stakeholders that, either because of their controversial reputation or the fragility of the negotiations in which they are involved, cannot be received in the open. May's decision to receive Trump in an informal setting, without the opulent ceremony of a state visit, serves as an example of this type of diplomacy. It resembles early modern attempts at sidestepping scandal over contentious guests. Receptions of Dutch ambassadors at European courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, were often kept low-key to prevent intervention from Spain and other Catholic powers. In February 1585, for example, Henri III of France (1551-1589) urged a special Dutch embassy, which had travelled to Paris to offer the king the crown of all the Provinces, to avoid interaction with the other ambassadors at court, so as to keep their presence as secret as possible. He only received the envoys in his private cabinet at the Louvre Palace.[20]

1. Topic and terminology

Although the state visit in contemporary Britain is often seen as the government's most important and effective tool for maintaining friendship with foreign leaders,[21] the Valois and Bourbon monarchies in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France had a far more extensive storehouse of ceremonies and festivities at their disposal to preserve and improve diplomatic relations. This storehouse included theatrical entertainments, such as ballets, masquerades, and tournaments, that brought together different media and performing arts into a single performance — or a series thereof —, including acting, dancing, music, poetry, pyrotechnics, horse riding, simulated fighting, theatrical machines, temporary architecture, and scattered decor. These entertainments were staged to honour important negotiation partners, similar to our modern example of Donald Trump, but also to celebrate major diplomatic achievements, such as peace treaties or marital alliances. Pageants, however, did not offer a 'purely decorative accoutrement' to diplomatic occasions.[22] They were consciously designed as independent tools for public diplomacy, meant to obtain widespread support for royal policies by having actual members

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[20] The challenges that the Dutch embassy posed to the ceremonial protocol of the late Valois court will be the focus of Chapter 3.
[21] Adam Smith, 'Donald Trump's State Visit Invitation "Humiliates the Queen"', *Metro*, 14 January 2018, section News <https://metro.co.uk/2018/01/14/theresa-mays-trump-state-visit-invitation-humiliates-the-queen-7228104/> [accessed 5 March 2019].
[22] Welch, *Theater of Diplomacy*, p. 209.

of the crown and their negotiation partners attend, and sometimes perform in, allegories that celebrated themes of love, peace, and harmony.[23]

This doctoral thesis is the first extensive study to examine how the late Valois and early Bourbon rulers made strategic use of festival culture for advancing both national and international relations. Its contribution to the field of early modern festival and diplomacy studies is twofold: first, to demonstrate how festivals and individual festivities operated as sites where domestic and foreign concerns intersected with or, more often, diverged from, as well as among, each other; second, to elucidate the relationship, and frequent tension, between the theories and practices of using festivals and individual festivities for diplomatic purposes. The present research focuses on the period between 1572 and 1615, when religious conflicts between Catholic and Huguenot subjects, and the looming threat of Habsburg encirclement forced the French crown to 'depend on diplomacy' as a means to preserve its authority and 'maintain a neutral position' between confessional and political extremes.[24]

The year 1572 witnessed a first step in that process: in June, a defensive-commerce pact, known as the Treaty of Blois, was ratified between France and England to counter the aggressive ambitions of Habsburg Spain; two months later, Marguerite de Valois (1553-1615), a Catholic Princess, was married to Henri de Navarre, a Huguenot Prince and the future convert Henri IV, in the hope that the interfaith union would bring about religious reconciliation within the entire kingdom. Both alliances, one European, the other domestic, were celebrated with stupendous festivals during one of the first occasions on which two French rulers — Queen Regent Catherine de Médicis and her son King Charles IX (1550-1574) — commissioned pageantry for specifically diplomatic ends.[25] Anglo-French relations were further improved at the court festival for a special English embassy in March 1585, which celebrated the investiture of King Henri III (1551-1589) with the Order of the Garter, the highest order of chivalry in England. According to Roy Strong,

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[23] Watanabe-O'Kelly, 'Early Modern Festival Book', pp. 15–16; Welch, *Theater of Diplomacy*, p. 4.

[24] De Lamar Jensen, 'French Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 5.2 (1974), 23–46 (p. 44).

[25] Ellen R. Welch discusses the Bayonne festivities of 1565 in the first chapter of *Theater of Diplomacy*, pp. 11-32, which, together with the Fontainebleau entertainments of 1564, mark the earliest attempts of Catherine and Charles to use festival culture for diplomatic ends.

the *fêtes* signalled the end of 'the brilliant artistic and intellectual resources of the Valois court'.[26]

During the early years of Henri IV's reign, between 1598 and 1600, domestic and foreign conflict had brought the French crown to the brink of impoverishment. Royal ceremonies and festivities, however, continued to serve an important role in promoting diplomatic relations with Catholic and Huguenot subjects on the one hand, and important European associates on the other, notably Spain, England, and the Dutch Republic. The year 1615, finally, marked the formal rapprochement between France and Spain which was cemented by an ambitious double marriage. The unions between the children of French Queen Regent Marie de Médicis (1575-1642) — Louis XIII (1601-1643) and Madame Élisabeth (1602-1644), the future Isabel de Bórbon — and the Spanish King Philip III (1578-1621) — the Infanta Dona Ana (1601-1666), the later Anne d'Autriche, and Felipe (1605-1665), Prince of Asturias, the future Philip IV — were celebrated in France with pompous festivals, all of which sought to drum up support for the unions among the French nobility and the local population.

Throughout this thesis, 'festival culture' will be used as an umbrella term that denotes both the festival as a single event and individual ceremonies and festivities, not part of a formal festival but organised on an ad-hoc basis to suit the needs of a particular occasion. Festivals were staged to commemorate official state events, such as engagements, weddings, peace treaties, investitures of kings, and visits from foreign dignitaries, and spread across several days, weeks, and sometimes even months. They featured three main types of event: ceremonies, pageants, and unscripted celebrations. Ceremonies were legal events that sought to implement the diplomatic agreements made between the crown and its negotiation partners. Pageants, by contrast, were theatrical events that represented the crown's vision on these agreements in performance, detailing how they *should* operate, often in a highly allegorical and symbolic fashion. Unscripted celebrations, finally, were generally non-rehearsed events, such as balls and banquets.[27] Festivals were given either at court (i.e. the ruler's residence or palace) or outside court, in a public square, a street, or in different locations throughout a town, a city, a region, or even throughout the entire kingdom. Court festivals were thus targeted at an international elite of monarchs, nobles,

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[26] 'Festivals for the Garter Embassy at the Court of Henri III', *Dance Research*, 1.2 (1983), 45-58 (p. 55).
[27] See Watanabe-O'Kelly, 'Early Modern Festival Book', pp. 15–16. This source does not mention unscripted festivities.

and diplomats, whereas civic festivals were targeted at a more diverse audience that, besides the traditional court elite, also regularly involved the urban population. Festivals were often held both within and outside court to reach as broad an audience as possible.

Diplomacy is of course an anachronistic term that only emerged in the late eighteenth century.[28] In late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe, diplomatic theorists and working envoys often referred to 'ambassadorship', 'embassy', or 'the office of the ambassador' instead. We will nonetheless use the word 'diplomacy' here to refer to processes of negotiation that already existed in the early modern period even before the term was coined. Rather than denoting the profession of a single actor (the ambassador), our understanding of diplomacy relates to broader practices of negotiation that involved or were executed by a range of individuals and institutions that could include, besides diplomatic agents, rulers, courtiers, statesmen, as well as non-governmental actors, such as poets, generals, or merchants. In these pages, then, early modern diplomacy will refer to the three key practices outlined above: first, negotiating cultural, political, or religious difference; second, distributing hospitality among foreign actors; and third, gaining support from both national and international stakeholders for policies. This broad understanding of early modern diplomacy follows recent definitions of the topic which shift from a focus on individual ambassadors to 'the complex, multifarious, and interconnected practices' in which diplomacy operated.[29]

2. State of the field

The only monograph to date specifically devoted to early modern diplomacy and (aspects of) festival culture is Ellen R. Welch's *A Theater of Diplomacy: International Relations and the Performing Arts in Early Modern France*, which appeared in 2017.[30] This study explores the 'long' seventeenth century, from the mid-1600s until the mid-1700s, a period marked by the increasing codification and international acceptance of the theories and

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[28] Christian Windler, 'Afterword: From Social Status to Sovereignty — Practices of Foreign Relations from the Renaissance to the *Sattelzeit*', in *Practices of Diplomacy*, ed. by Sowerby and Hennings, pp. 254–65 (p. 254). For a discussion of the use of the term 'diplomacy' in early modern studies, see Jan Hennings and Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Introduction: Practices of Diplomacy', in *Practices of Diplomacy*, ed. by Sowerby and Hennings, pp. 1–21 (p. 2).

[29] Hennings and Sowerby, 'Introduction', p. 2. For more on this shift of focus, see the individual essays in Jan Henning and Tracey Sowerby's volume *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c. 1410-1800*.

[30] *H-France* devoted a journal issue to Welch's book (see *H-France Forum*, 12.3 (2017), ed. by Hélène Bilis <https://www.h-france.net/forum/h-franceforumvol12.html> [accessed 5 March 2019]).

practices of diplomacy that had emerged in Europe since the fifteenth century.[31] By contrast, the forty-three year period covered in this thesis predates the formalisation of the diplomatic enterprise. It brings into view how France's statesmen and diplomatic corps improvised and experimented with different theories and practices of diplomacy. Although public life and courtly service in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France were highly codified, governed by overarching rules on hierarchy and politeness,[32] there were many differences of opinion among both the ruling elite and the European intelligentsia about the way in which an increasing number of dissimilar actors, including Catholics and Protestants, Dutch rebels and Spanish ambassadors, rivalling nobles and loyal subjects of the crown, should be received and treated at court, as well as accommodated in decrees of concord. The various solutions that French rulers and European theorists of diplomacy found to these and similar problems will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

In addition, Welch's focus in *A Theatre of Diplomacy* is limited to the international relations of the French monarchy. The crown's negotiations with national stakeholders and the important role that festival culture played in this are rarely considered and not discussed in relation to foreign diplomacy. The current study, conversely, highlights the interdependence of the domestic and international diplomacy of the French crown to arrive at a better understanding of how it used festival culture to influence the political agendas of stakeholders that moved both within and outside national borders. Finally, Welch's monograph is largely devoted to a single aspect of festival culture: the French *ballet de cour* or court ballet which, because of its artistic innovation, integrating dance, music, and poetry into a coherent multimedia performance, has received much scholarly

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[31] *Theater of Diplomacy*, p. 2. The first chapter of Welch's monograph (pp. 11–32) predates the 'long' seventeenth century as it focuses on the Bayonne entertainments of 1565, staged for a Franco-Spanish diplomatic congress. This chapter provides a good insight into Catherine de Médicis and Charles IX's early use of pageantry for diplomacy. It argues that by promoting certain modes of aristocratic behaviour (e.g. dance and horsemanship), dramatising Classical narratives, and celebrating Christian identity, the festivities sought to produce amity between the French and Spanish participants. Welch's second chapter (pp. 82–106) fast-forwards to the 1620s and 1630s.

[32] Marc H. Smith, 'Familiarité française et politesse italienne au XVIe siècle: Les Diplomates italiens juges des manières de la cour des Valois', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 102.3-4 (1988), 193-232. Well-known examples of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century manuals on courtly behaviour and ceremony include Baldassare Castiglione's *Il libro del cortegiano* (The Book of the Courtier) (Venice: Aldo Romano and Andrea d'Asola, 1528; not paginated) and Théodore Godefroy's *Le Cérémonial de France [...]* (The Ceremonial of France) (Paris: Abraham Pacard, 1619). For the English translation of Castiglione's work referred to in this thesis, see *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by Charles S. Singleton (New York: Anchor Books and Doubleday, 1959).

attention.[33] The present study, by contrast, focuses on the broader context of the festival, ranging from official ceremonies to other forms of court and civic spectacle, and examines how individual aspects of the event contributed — or aimed to contribute — to its wider diplomatic purpose. These pages thus also aim to do justice to the composite nature of court and civic festivals. As Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly and Pierre Béhar remind us, 'The ears and eyes of […] contemporaries absorbed all types of spectacle equally, as one phenomenon, within which various forms and genres, of greater or lesser distinctness and fluidity, manifested themselves'.[34] By studying the festival as a whole, we thus also hope to bring into focus the historical reception of early modern French pageantry.

Besides *Theater of Diplomacy*, several journal articles and book chapters have recently appeared that explore facets of early modern spectacle in a diplomatic context: theatrical genres (ballet and music),[35] individual pageants (ballet and opera),[36] festival occasions

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[33] The foundational studies on the *ballets de cour* of the late Valois and early Bourbon dynasty are Henry Prunières, *Le Ballet de cour en France avant Benserade et Lully, suivi du 'Ballet de la délivrance de Renaud'* (Paris: Henri Laurens, 1914); Frances A. Yates, *The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century*, Studies of the Warburg Institute, 15 (London: Warburg Institute, 1947), pp. 60–62, 236–74; ead., *The Valois Tapestries* (London: Warburg Institute, 1959; repr. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 51–72, 82–87; Margaret M. McGowan, *L'Art du ballet de cour en France, 1581-1643*, Le chœur des muses (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1963). For more recent contributions on early French ballets, see Mark Franko, *Dance as Text: Ideologies of the Baroque Body*, Oxford Studies in Dance Theory, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; original publ. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Emmanuèle Rüegger, 'Le Spectacle total à la Renaissance: genèse et premier apogée du ballet de cour' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Zurich, 1995); Marie-Claude Canova-Green, 'Le Ballet de cour en France', in *Spectacvlvm Evropævm*, ed. by Béhar and Watanabe-O'Kelly, pp. 485–512; Georgie Durosoir, *Les Ballets de la cour de France au XVIIe siècle, ou, Les Fantaisies et les splendeurs du Baroque*, Mélophiles, 15 (Geneva: Editions Papillon, 2004); Kate van Orden, *Music, Discipline, and Arms in Early Modern France* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 81–124.

[34] 'Introduction', in *Spectacvlvm Evropævm*, ed. by Béhar and Watanabe-O'Kelly, pp. vii–x (p. vii).

[35] For ballet, see Ellen R. Welch, 'Rethinking the Politics of Court Spectacle: Performance and Diplomacy under the Valois', in *French Renaissance and Baroque Drama: Text, Performance, Theory*, ed. by Michael Meere (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2015), pp. 101–16. Welch's book chapter presents the key arguments of her 2017 monograph. For music, see the following contributions to *Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present*, ed. by Rebekah Ahrendt, Mark Ferraguto, and Damien Mahiet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): Arne Spohr, 'Concealed Music in Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial', pp. 19–43; Giulia Giovani, 'Serenatas in the Service of Diplomacy in Baroque Venice', pp. 45–67; Ellen R. Welch, 'Constructing Universality in Early Modern French Treatises on Music and Dance', pp. 103–23; Frédéric Ramel, 'Perpetual Peace and the Idea of "Concert" in Eighteenth-Century Thought', pp. 125–45; Anne-Madeleine Goulet, 'The Princesse des Ursins, Loyal Subject of the King of France and Foreign Princess in Rome', pp. 191–207.

[36] For ballets, see Melinda J. Gough, 'Marie de Medici's 1605 *ballet de la reine*: New Evidence and Analysis', *Early Theatre*, 15.1 (2012), 109–44; Ewa Kociszewska, 'War and Seduction in Cybele's Garden: Contextualizing the *Ballet des Polonais*', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 65.3 (2012), 809–63; Sheila Barker and Tessa Gurney, 'House Left, House Right: A Florentine Account of Marie de Medici's 1615 *Ballet de Madame*', *The Court Historian*, 21.1 (2015), 137–65. For operas, see Katharina N. Piechocki, 'Sincerity, Sterility, Scandal: Eroticizing Diplomacy in Early Seventeenth-Century Opera Librettos at the French Embassy in Rome', in *Practices of Diplomacy*, ed. by Sowerby and Hennings, pp. 114–29.

(ceremonial receptions of foreign ambassadors),[37] and royal traditions of staging court entertainment (notably under Mary Queen of Scots and Elizabeth I of England).[38] Like Welch's monograph, these publications do not take into account the broader context of the festival. What is more, they rarely consider the specific uses of spectacle for diplomacy. The concept of diplomacy is often used as a mere synonym for politics in general and thus remains largely undefined.[39] Sarah Carpenter, for one, writes that 'court performance in the sixteenth century was widely recognised as one of the many languages of diplomacy' but does not expand on what these 'languages' entailed or how they related to the specific diplomatic 'language' of court entertainment.[40] By studying festival culture through the prism of our three practices of diplomacy — negotiating difference, distributing hospitality, and obtaining widespread support —, this thesis aims to provide a more rigorous understanding of how spectacle was used for diplomatic purposes.

Another academic publication that has shed light on the relationship between diplomacy and aspects of festival culture is *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power: The Making of Peace*, edited by Nathalie Rivère de Carles.[41] The multi-authored volume focuses on the diplomatic relevance of dramatic theatre in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although plays featured widely in festivals,[42] the book does not consider any celebratory occasions. The majority of contributions are devoted to close readings of dramatic texts. They examine how European playwrights, including William Shakespeare, Miguel de Cervantes, and Pierre Corneille, represented and reflected on the diplomatic thought of contemporary theorists or the diplomatic tactics and strategies that

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[37] Edward C. McGee, 'The English Entertainment for the French Ambassadors in 1564', *Early Theatre*, 14.1 (2011), 79–100; Galastro, 'Wondrous Welcome'.

[38] Sarah Carpenter, 'Performing Diplomacies: The 1560s Court Entertainments of Mary Queen of Scots', *The Scottish Historical Review*, 82.2 (2014), 194–225; Bella Mirabella, '"In the Sight of All": Queen Elizabeth and the Dance of Diplomacy', *Early Theatre*, 15.1 (2012), 65–89.

[39] Exceptions are Welch, 'Rethinking the Politics of Court Spectacle', *Theater of Diplomacy*; Galastro, 'Wondrous Welcome'; and Piechocki, 'Sincerity, Sterility, Scandal' which express a more nuanced and refined understanding of diplomacy in the context of early modern dance, hospitality, and opera culture respectively.

[40] Carpenter, 'Performing Diplomacies', p. 197.

[41] The edited volume is part of the Early Modern Literature in History series (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). See also Bram van Leuveren, review of *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power: The Making of Peace*, ed. by Nathalie Rivère de Carles, *Legatio*, 1 (2017), 163–64.

[42] For an overview of drama in early modern France and its wider festive context, see Pierre Béhar, 'La Tragédie et la comédie en France et leurs variantes', in *Spectacvlvm Evropævm*, ed. by Béhar and Watanabe-O'Kelly, pp. 161–96.

were used in actual negotiations over peace agreements.[43] These tactics and strategies are labelled as tools of 'soft power', a term coined in 1990 by the American political scientist Joseph Nye to denote the use of appeal and attraction, rather than coercion and aggression, in diplomatic interaction.[44]

Despite its originality as the first book dedicated solely to the diplomatic features of early modern drama, the text-centred approach of Rivère de Carles's volume offers little insight into how plays, and theatrical entertainments in general, were evaluated and appreciated as tools of soft power themselves. The current study will emphasise the way in which court and civic festivals operated within broader contexts or practices of diplomacy. It works on the assumption that early modern audiences did not experience dramatic plays, or any other form of entertainment, as isolated texts but as 'live' theatrical events that interacted with, and were tested against, the political agendas of the spectators present during the performance, as well as of those who read about the event in retrospect in diplomatic dispatches or other reports. This insight offers a corrective to a longer tradition of text-centred scholarship within diplomacy and festival studies to which *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power* also belongs.

Scholars have commonly privileged the textual aspect of diplomatic interaction. Lucien Bély and Timothy Hampton, whose indispensable work on diplomatic culture in early modern Europe features prominently in Rivère de Carles's collection of essays,[45] have been most influential in this regard. Bély, to begin with, has argued that early modern diplomacy was essentially concerned with 'the art of writing'.[46] He believes that a

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[43] Jane Newman, for one, demonstrates that Andreas Gryphius's tragedy *Catharina von Georgien* (1657) served to inform the population of the German Duchies of Silesia about the political implications of the Peace of Westphalia signed nine years earlier (in '"Mediating Amicably"? The Birth of the *Trauerspiel* Out of the Letter of Westphalia', pp. 69–89). Gryphius's play thus made up for the fact that Silesia, like other smaller polities in the Holy Roman Empire, was not formally represented at the grand diplomatic conferences of Münster and Osnabrück.

[44] 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), 153–71; *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

[45] In the first chapter of her volume, Rivère de Carles pays heed to Bély's view on early modern diplomacy as a form of writing and introduces Hampton's literary approach to the topic, which is followed in most of the collection's individual essays (see 'The Poetics of Diplomatic Appeasement in the Early Modern Era', pp. 1–23 (pp. 5–7); and above). The second chapter of the volume, moreover, is written by Hampton himself and focuses on the diplomatic truce as a dramatic device (see 'The Slumber of War: Diplomacy, Tragedy, and the Aesthetics of the Truce in Early Modern Europe', pp. 27–45).

[46] 'Peut-on parler d'une culture diplomatique à l'époque moderne?', in *Formes de la diplomatie (XVIᵉ-XXIᵉ siècle) / Forms of Diplomacy (16th-21st century)*, ed. by Nathalie Duclos and Nathalie Rivère de Carles (= *Caliban*, 54 (2015)), pp. 13–32 (p. 14). For a similar argument, see Lucien Bély, 'L'Écrivain diplomate des temps modernes, entre nécessité politique et practique culturelle', in *Écrivains et diplomates: L'Invention*

substantial part of diplomatic communication occurred in written correspondence between the ambassador and his government, and between the ambassador and his wider network of messengers and intelligence gatherers.[47] Bély even goes so far as to claim that diplomacy was 'all writing, all literature' insofar as the written text offered the ambassador a comprehensive storehouse of literary tropes and techniques 'to inform, convince, flatter, but also to engage' his addressee.[48] More influential still is the argument of Timothy Hampton that early modern diplomacy was 'deeply invested in the dynamics of writing, in the structuring of narrative, and in the development of scriptural authority'.[49] His monograph *Fictions of Embassy: Literature and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* examines the symbiotic relationship between diplomatic and literary practices. In it, Hampton shows how ambassadors and diplomatic theorists frequently employed 'tropes and conventions associated with fiction writing',[50] just as literary authors like Shakespeare, Michel de Montaigne, and Torquato Tasso were inspired by the 'stock figures, scenarios, and problems' of diplomacy.[51] He concludes that diplomacy and literature shared the same semiotic nature, as they were both centrally concerned with the production, exchange, and interpretation of meaning through (textual) signs.[52]

Recent scholarship, however, has brought into focus modes of diplomatic interaction other than written communication.[53] Although it is true that the written medium was an important, and arguably privileged, component of early modern diplomacy,[54] it was

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d'une tradition, XIXᵉ-XXIᵉ siècles, ed. by Laurence Badel and others (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012), pp. 31–42.

[47] 'Peut-on parler', pp. 13–14.

[48] Ibid., p. 14.

[49] *Fictions of Embassy: Literature and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 7. For a similar argument, see Timothy Hampton, 'The Diplomatic Moment: Representing Negotiation in Early Modern Europe', *Modern Language Quarterly*, 67.1 (2006), 81–102. Besides Rivère de Carles's *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power*, studies that follow, or are inspired by, Hampton's literary approach to early modern diplomacy include Joanna Craigwood, 'Sidney, Gentili, and the Poetics of Embassy', in *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, ed. by Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, Early Modern Literature in History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 82–100; *Formes de la diplomatie*, ed. by Rivère de Carles, pt 4, pp. 307–58; Piechocki, 'Sincerity, Sterility, Scandal'; Welch, *Theater of Diplomacy*, passim and especially pp. 7–8. For a brief evaluation of Hampton's work, see Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', *History Compass*, 14.9 (2016), 441–456 (pp. 447–48).

[50] *Fictions of Embassy*, p. 6.

[51] Ibid., p. 1.

[52] Ibid., p. 6.

[53] For an overview of this strand of research, see Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', pp. 445–47.

[54] Filippo de Vivo has nuanced the allegedly privileged status of written records within early modern practices of diplomacy: '[Diplomacy] was conducted primarily through the oral medium, as ambassadors,

certainly not the only instrument that ambassadors and, by extension, their governments deployed to shape interactions with other stakeholders. Isabella Lazzarini, among others, has drawn attention to the performative aspects of diplomatic communication. In her monograph on Italian diplomacy in the early Renaissance, she demonstrates that ambassadors used both verbal and non-verbal languages to advance their interests:

> Diplomacy is the realm of words: words can be spoken, declaimed, read, or written but also omitted in a significant silence. However, words, written, spoken, unsaid, and read, were not the only materials on which diplomats could count: they moved, acted, and reacted while negotiating, and their bodies had many resources to convey or conceal meaning and messages.[55]

Other historians of early modern diplomacy have examined modes of interaction that involved sensory and material aspects. They examine the cultural activities of ambassadors, such as brokering and collecting art, or explore the diplomatic significance of exchanging gifts, ranging from jewels, textiles, and paintings to exotic animals, food, and decors for theatrical entertainments.[56] Giulia Galastro, for instance, has recently shown that 'the economic, sensory and symbolic significance of carefully chosen objects communicated messages to visitors who might not share a spoken language with their hosts'.[57] The surge of interest in the non-verbal aspects of diplomatic communication emerged shortly after literary scholar John Watkins, in a 2008 article, encouraged historians to adopt a 'multidisciplinary' approach to early modern diplomacy.[58] Although court and civic festivals have not been considered part of this approach or, indeed, of any strand of research within diplomatic studies, Watkin's call inspires the present thesis to look at the interaction of different modes of diplomatic communication, both verbal and non-verbal.

Unlike diplomatic historians, festival scholars have always been keen to emphasise the multi-media aspects of early modern pageantry, as it is more obviously central to its very existence than diplomacy. The foundational scholarship of Jean Jacquot in the 1960s and

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sovereigns and ministers met face to face in personal encounters generally known as audiences and signed written agreements only after protracted discussions' (in 'Archives of Speech: Recording Diplomatic Negotiation in Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy', *European History Quarterly*, 46.3 (2016), 519–44 (p. 520)).

[55] *Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350-1520*, Oxford Studies in Medieval European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 189.

[56] For a survey of the field, see Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', pp. 446–47.

[57] 'Wondrous Welcome', p. 97.

[58] 'Towards a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38.1 (2008), 1–14 (p. 1). See Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', pp. 441, 447; Welch, *Theater of Diplomacy*, p. 10.

1970s serves as a case in point. His multi-authored collections *Les Fêtes de la Renaissance*[59] (Renaissance Festivities) and *Le Lieu théâtral à la Renaissance: Royaumont, 22-27 mars, 1963* (The Theatrical Place in the Renaissance: Royaumont, 22-27 March 1963), co-edited with Elie Konigson and Marcel Oddon,[60] introduced a wealth of interdisciplinary approaches to the various media and theatrical genres that featured at court and civic festivals across Europe in the period between roughly 1550 and 1630.[61] Similar to text-centred research on early modern diplomacy, however, historians of spectacle have traditionally interpreted the festival as a concrete 'text' or empirical object of study that can be analysed more or less independently from its pragmatic contexts. Official accounts of the festival, which provided the 'correct' interpretation of the theatrical action seen on stage, have therefore been privileged over scattered accounts of eyewitnesses which often only exist in manuscript form.

This means that one-sided attention has been given to the intended meanings of the festival, privileging the theoretical ideas and concepts that governed the spectacle rather than the actual reception of these ideas and concepts by spectators. Frances A. Yates, whose influence is still felt today, approached French ballets from a top-down perspective, not as they were staged in practice but as they were conceived in theory by the choreographers, musicians, and poets of the *Académie de Poésie et de Musique*. By the same token, Roy Strong examined pageantry as an expression of 'the idea of monarchy',[62] held together by 'the central theme' of 'universal harmony and order',[63] without taking into account how this political programme was interpreted by the court and urban audiences that attended the festivals.[64] Similarly, more recent publications, such as the two-volume collection *Europa Triumphans: Court and Civic Festivals in Early Modern Europe*, do

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[59] *Le chœur des muses*, 3 vols (Paris: Éditions du centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1956-1975). The volumes resulted from a series of international colloquia on the topic of European festivals which Jacquot organised in collaboration with various research centres, notably the Centre d'Études Supérieures de la Renaissance in Tours.

[60] Paris: Éditions du centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1964.

[61] For more recent publications on the multi-media nature of European festival culture, see *Multi-Media Compositions from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period*, ed. by Margriet Hoogvliet, Groningen Studies in Cultural Change, 9 (Leuven, Paris, and Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004); *Seventeenth-Century Ballet: A Multi-Art Spectacle, An International Interdisciplinary Symposium*, ed. by Barbara Grammeniati ([Bloomington, IN]: Xlibris, 2011).

[62] *Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals 1450-1650* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1973; repr. 1984), p. 65.

[63] Ibid., p. 61.

[64] See also Ellen R. Welch's critique of one-sided interpretations of court entertainments as reflections of the ruler's power or magnificence in *Theater of Diplomacy*, pp. 3–4.

not offer substantial reflection on how the official interpretation given in the printed *livret* (pamphlet), *recueil* (anthology of written accounts), *libretto* (text or lyrics for a musical performance), or *Festivalbeschreibung* (festival description) related to the disparate reactions of flesh-and-blood spectators.

Several historians have recently shifted the focus onto interactions between the production and reception sides of theatrical entertainment. Their research brings into focus the continuum, as well as the occasional asymmetry, between festival organisers and audiences of different cultural and politico-religious backgrounds. Julia Prest, for instance, has compared the theoretical principles that underpinned a French court ballet in 1572, which commented on, and partly re-enacted, the horrors of the Religious Wars in theatrical form, with the first-hand accounts of spectators that were part of a highly divided audience of Catholics and Huguenots.[65] Barbara Ravelhofer, furthermore, has devoted a book-length study to audiences' experiences of the early Stuart masque and 'the impact [that] these events had during performance'.[66] Similarly, Joseph Harris has read the dramatic theory of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 'against the grain, looking inward to the spectator rather than outward to the theatre'.[67] Ellen R. Welch, most recently, has brought diplomatic correspondence and memoirs to the discussion which she uses to highlight the occasional conflict and misunderstanding between foreign ambassadors and the creators of spectacle.[68] This thesis follows the lead of the aforementioned scholars by adopting a comparative approach to the complex role of festival culture in diplomatic relations.

3. Methodology and historical sources

The present thesis seeks to compare three main types of historical sources. First, prescriptive literature on diplomacy and festival culture written by humanist artists and scholars across Europe; second, royal accounts of festive and ceremonial events, published *avec privilege dv Roi* (with permission of the King) in official festival books and pamphlets

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[65] 'Performing Violence to End Violence: Theatrical Entertainments for the Marriage of Marguerite de Valois and Henri de Navarre', in *Gender, Agency and Violence: European Perspectives from Early Modern Times to the Present Day*, ed. by Ulrike Zitzlsperger (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 38–55.

[66] *The Early Stuart Masque. Dance, Costume, and Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 6.

[67] *Inventing the Spectator: Subjectivity and the Theatrical Experience in Early Modern France* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2014), p. 2.

[68] *Theater of Diplomacy*, passim and especially p. 7.

targeted at an international readership of diplomats, princes, and noblemen; and, third, unofficial accounts of festive and ceremonial occasions, such as diplomatic dispatches, chronicles, diaries, memoirs, or individually circulated pamphlets, written by both domestic and foreign invitees, as well as by local diarists or historians who did not attend these occasions in person but were nonetheless interested in recording the spectacle, and its overall reception, for posterity. By comparing these three types of historical sources, we hope to develop a more nuanced view of French festival culture and its diplomatic functioning in a wider European context. The benefits of comparing these sources are thus twofold.

First, humanist literature on diplomacy and festival culture provides us with a good understanding of how practices of negotiation, hospitality, and support-seeking were deemed important by intellectuals and statesmen across Europe. By reading their recommendations on these practices alongside accounts of actual festivals in France — both official and unofficial —, we gain a fuller grasp of how and why pageantry was understood to function diplomatically in a pan-European context. Second, eyewitness and other unofficial accounts of the festival help us shift the focus from traditional interpretations of royal spectacle as a one-dimensional expression of monarchical power to its complex role in facilitating multifaceted interactions between diplomatic players. By comparing official with unofficial, as well as domestic with foreign, accounts of the festival, we demonstrate that the public diplomacy of the late Valois and early Bourbon crown was not universally accepted, as has commonly been assumed, but was continuously tested and challenged by the diverging political agendas of French subjects and international visitors.

Our three main types of historical material were written in a range of European languages, including French, English, Dutch, Italian, German, and Latin. A substantial portion of these sources — many of them previously overlooked or little known — are held exclusively in archives in England, France, and the Netherlands. When reading these sources, it is important to bear in mind that they should not be taken at face value. French historians such as Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553-1617) and Simon Goulart (1543-1628), both of whom recorded the nuptial festival for the Valois-Navarre marriage in August 1572, frequently relied on gossip as a source of valuable information or described

events from a subjective point of view.[69] In other words, they had a different view of what documentary accuracy or scholarly rigour means today. De Thou and Goulart, for example, were keen to showcase their own connections with the French court and narrated historical episodes from a distinctly Protestant point of view.[70] Moreover, diplomats had good cause to lie or withhold information that could be intercepted by spies or potentially damage the reputation of their master or government. On other occasions, writers of festival accounts genuinely misunderstood what they saw or were misinformed about things they had not seen.

Throughout this thesis, we will be careful to emphasise the profession, as well as the cultural, religious, and political background, of the early modern authors under discussion. Rather than affording the modern scholar unmediated access to the historical episodes described, their diplomatic reports, chronicles, memories, and treatises functioned as yet another diplomatic agent in France's and Europe's wider political landscape where it interacted with other — often competing — accounts of the same event. As Ingrid A. R. De Smet reminds us, Jacques-Auguste de Thou should not be cast 'in the role of an "observer" or mere chronicler of the events of his time', because this would minimise 'his role as a participant or agent within them'.[71]

4. Outline of chapters

Chapter 1 outlines early modern theories on the aforementioned practices of diplomacy and brings them into dialogue with early modern ideas on festival culture. It retraces the shared humanist roots of these theories and ideas by examining them against the backdrop of irenic movements in France and Europe. The next four chapters discuss the historical discourses surrounding diplomacy and pageantry within the context of two or more festivals under the reign of the last three Valois rulers (Catherine de Médicis, Charles IX, and

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[69] Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Historiarum sui temporis libri CXXXVIII*, [ed. by Thomas Carte], 7 vols (London: Samuel Buckley, 1733); *Mémoires de l'estat de France, sous Charles Neufiesme [...]*, ed. by Simon Goulart, 3 vols (Middelburg [=Geneva]: Henrich Wolf [=Eustache Vignon], 1577). For the standard French translation of de Thou's *Historiarvm svi temporis*, see *Histoire universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou, depuis 1543 jusqu'en 1607*, [trans. by Charles le Beau], 16 vols (London: [n. pub.], 1734). Note, however, that the French edition contains several typos and translation mistakes.

[70] Barbara Diefendorf, for instance, argues that de Thou wrote 'an essentially Protestant version' of the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacres (*Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 171; see ibid., pp. 168-71, for a general discussion of the methodological challenges posed by the religious and political bias of Huguenot chronicles).

[71] *'Thuanus': The Making of Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553-1617)*, Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 2006), p. 17.

Henri III) and the first two Bourbon rulers (Henri IV and Marie de Médicis). By focussing on festivals, or episodes thereof, that have remained understudied by researchers of early modern diplomacy and spectacle, but which nonetheless sought to celebrate or were held at critical junctures in French and European history, this thesis aims to balance originality against significance.

Chapter 2 is the first study to compare two court festivals held around the time of the St Bartholomew's Day Massacres in Paris. The first festival was organised in honour of an extraordinary English embassy that visited France to ratify the Treaty of Blois, a defensive-commerce pact between France and England. The second festival was held for the controversial marriage of Marguerite de Valois, a Catholic princess, and Henri de Navarre, the titular head of the Huguenots. Our comparison highlights the interdependence of the two festivals as well as the different challenges that they posed to royal attempts at mediating between French noblemen and English ambassadors, on the one hand, and Catholic and Huguenot wedding guests on the other.

Chapter 3 compares the reception of a special Dutch and a special English embassy in light of the historical discussion on hospitality. It brings together dispatches and reported reactions of Dutch, English, Spanish, and Florentine ambassadors that have never been studied in detail before, and never alongside each other. The case study offers insight into an important episode in French history that witnessed the growing power of the *Ligue catholique* as well as the escalation of the Dutch Revolt against Spain. Chapter 4 focuses on the attempts of Henri IV to settle the domestic and international conflicts of the crown through a diplomacy that involved both secret negotiations via backchannels at court and grand celebrations in public spaces outside the king's residence. It offers a corrective to the assumption of both historical and modern theorists of diplomacy that entertainment, though effective in boosting the sovereignty of the prince, was of little use to the delicate business of preparing and negotiating peace treaties.

Chapter 5, finally, compares the court and civic festivities for two royal weddings, staged by the French and the English crown, by reviewing the diplomatic practices discussed in previous chapters. The Franco-Spanish double marriage of Louis XIII and his sister Élisabeth to the Spanish Infantas was celebrated in Paris (1612 and 1615), as well as in other cities throughout France, Spain, and the Habsburg-allied states on the Italian peninsula; the Anglo-German marriage of Princess Elizabeth Stuart (1596-1662) to

Frederick V of the Palatinate (1596-1632) was fêted in London and the Protestant states of the Holy Roman Empire (1613). Both weddings are commonly believed to have supported and implemented the marital diplomacy of the crown. This chapter, however, shows that the nuptial festivals obscured and even substantially altered the diplomatic intentions of a marriage contract.

CHAPTER 1

Between Humanist Idealism and Practical Advice:
Diplomacy and Festival Culture
in Early Modern France and Europe,
1572-1615

> The right of embassy is […] by reason of a certain divine providence, immutable, of universal application, and admitted and recognized even by barbarous people.
>
> Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), in *De Legationibus, Libri Tres* (1585).[1]

This chapter seeks to untangle the intricate web of beliefs, ideas, and theories that surrounded and informed the early modern practice of staging ceremonies and festivities for diplomatic ends. It will focus on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century texts by intellectuals who worked, lived, and travelled across Europe where they gained first-hand knowledge about this practice in their capacity as councillors, jurists, scholars, statesmen, dance masters, poets, painters, or composers — many of them combining their profession with a career in diplomacy or intelligence gathering.[2] For example, the first printed treatise on diplomacy in France was written by the polymath Étienne Dolet (1509-1546), a scholar, printer, and translator, *and* secretary to Jean de Langeac, French ambassador to the

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[1] '[Ius legationum] est […] diuina quadam prouidentia immutabile ius, & omnibus constitutum, gentibus etiam barbaris exceptum & manifestum' (L3 original, bk. 2, p. 40; L3 trans., p. 58).

[2] The bibliography on intelligence gathering in early modern Europe is vast. For a discussion of the available literature, see Christopher Storrs, 'Intelligence and the Formulation of Policy and Strategy in Early Modern Europe: The Spanish Monarchy in the Reign of Charles II (1665-1700)', *Intelligence and National Security*, 21.4 (2006), 493-519 (pp. 493-94); Ioanna Iordanou, 'What News on the Rialto? The Trade of Information and Early Modern Venice's Centralized Intelligence Organization', *Intelligence and National Security*, 31.3 (2016), 305-26 (pp. 305-07).

Republic of Venice from 1528 to 1529.[3] Published in 1541, 'De officio Legati, quem uulgo Ambassiatorem uocant' (On the Office of Legate, Commonly Called Ambassador) drew on Dolet's own experience as a member of Langeac's embassy. Court artists were often employed in diplomatic posts. Well known is the diplomatic career of the Flemish painter Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640) who, among other special missions, represented King Philip IV of Spain in peace talks between the English and Spanish crowns at the court of King Charles I of England (1600-1649) in 1629.[4] Similarly, the French poet Pierre de Ronsard (1524-1585) accompanied the ambassador Lazare de Baïf (1496-1547) as an apprentice at the age of sixteen to an international conference at Haguenau between May and August 1540. Although this was mostly to brush up his language skils, the special mission probably also served to prepare the young Ronsard for diplomatic or secretarial service.[5] Ronsard is believed to have written the poetry for *Le Paradis d'Amour* (The Paradise of Love),[6] a combat-ballet that will be discussed in Chapter 2, and which sought to promote the cross-confessional diplomacy of the French monarchy on the occasion of the interfaith wedding of Marguerite de Valois to Henri de Navarre in August 1572.

The texts that are under consideration in the present chapter were written in various genres and targeted at different audiences. They range from advice books for princes and ambassadors to dance manuals for members of the aristocracy, and from royal and diplomatic correspondence to diaries of individual collectors intended to be circulated within

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[3] 'De officio Legati […]', in *De officio Legati [...]* (Lyon: Étienne Dolet, 1541), pp. 7–22. For an English translation, see 'Étienne Dolet of Orleans, France: Book One, On the Office of Legate, Commonly Called Ambassador', trans. by James E. Dunlap, *The American Journal of International Law*, 27.1 (1933), 82–95 (p. 82). For a recent, annotated edition of Dolet's three books on diplomacy in both the original Latin and a French translation, see *De officio legati, De immunitate legatorum, De legationibus Ioannis Langiachi Episcopi Lemovicensis*, ed. and trans. by David Amherdt, Les classiques de la pensée politique, 23 (Geneva: Droz, 2010).

[4] Michael Auwers, 'Peter Paul Rubens: The Infanta and her Painter-Diplomat', in *Isabel Clara Eugenia: Female Sovereignty in the Courts of Madrid and Brussels*, ed. by Cordula van Wyhe (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Europa Hispánica; London: Paul Holberton, 2011), pp. 3-33; id., 'The Gift of Rubens: Rethinking the Concept of Gift-Giving in Early Modern Diplomacy', *European History Quarterly* 43.3 (2013), 421-41; *The Age of Rubens: Diplomacy, Dynastic Politics and the Visual Arts in Early Seventeenth-Century Europe*, ed. by Luc Duerloo and Malcolm Smuts (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015).

[5] Baïf sought to negotiate alliances with Imperial princes against the Habsburg Emperor Charles V (1500-1558). For a detailed discussion of his mission and journey to Haguenau, see Michel Dassonville, *Ronsard: Étude historique et littéraire*, Histoire des Idées et Critique Littéraire, 5 vols (Geneva: Droz, 1968-1990), I: *Les enfances Ronsard (1536-1545)*, pp. 135–48.

[6] Henry Prunières, 'Ronsard et les fêtes de cour', *Revue musicale*, 5.7 (1924), 27–44 (p. 41, n. 1).

intellectual circles.[7] Although texts published in France or written in the French vernacular will be discussed in closer detail, given that their authors (scholars, statesmen, dance masters) provide useful information about the diplomatic practices of the late Valois and early Bourbon dynasty, this chapter brings together sources that were written by authors living and working in different parts of Europe, including England, the Italian peninsula, and the Dutch Provinces. By doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that our main practices of diplomacy — negotiating difference, distributing hospitality, and gaining widespread support — were subject to frequent debate among an international community of intellectuals and statesmen (the so-called *Respublica Literarum* or Republic of Letters: see Section 1 below). The selected corpus of texts thus brings into view the wider European context in which the festival diplomacy of the French monarchy was used, implemented, received, and challenged by various international stakeholders.

Although early modern theories about diplomacy have been discussed in detail by Jean Jules Jusserand, Garrett Mattingly, and Betty Behrens, among others, they have never been systematically examined in relation to theories or aspects of ceremonies and pageants.[8] This chapter, then, offers the first attempt at discussing a wide range of historical sources in light of the intimate relationship between diplomacy and festival culture in France and Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. As seen in the introduction, Timothy Hampton adopts a similar approach to dramatic theatre by reading plays alongside diplomatic treatises.[9] He does not, however, refer to other prescriptive sources from the early modern period. Ellen R. Welch also discusses various diplomatic manuals in *A Theater of Diplomacy*, but her analysis of these texts is rather brief and

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[7] Ingrid A. R. De Smet notes that 'keeping a diary or notes of one's own travels or vicissitudes appears to have been a mark of social distinction — or aspiration —, and in some cases a form of respect for a family tradition' (in *'Thuanus'*, p. 216).

[8] J. J. Jusserand, 'The School for Ambassadors', *The American Historical Review*, 27.3 (1922), 426–64; Betty Behrens, 'Treatises on the Ambassador Written in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries', *English Historical Review*, 1936, 616–27; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 201–12; Joycelyne G. Russell, *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (London: Duckworth, 1986), pp. 3–20; Dante Fedele, *Naissance de la diplomatie moderne*, 2 vols (unpublished doctoral thesis, École Normale Supérieure de Lyon / Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, 2014), I: *L'Ambassadeur au croisement du droit, de l'ethique et de la politique*.

[9] See *Fictions of Embassy*.

serves primarily to introduce the topic of her second chapter which explores the theatrical dimension of early modern diplomacy.[10]

The present chapter is interested in two types of historical sources: texts that commented directly on the connection between diplomacy and festival culture, and texts that focussed on elements of either diplomacy or festival culture, without considering their mutual relationship. The second type of historical source is nonetheless examined here, because texts in this category often expressed ideas, concepts, or beliefs that were relevant to both celebratory practices and broader diplomatic processes. The speeches that royal chancellor Michel de L'Hospital (1507-1573), for example, gave to the magistrates of the *Parlement de Paris* in the early 1560s did not discuss any aspect of pageantry but provided a detailed insight into the kind of cross-confessional diplomacy that the late Valois rulers advanced towards Huguenots and which Catherine de Médicis sought to implement within the context of various court festivals.

How and to what extent the selected texts reflected on the relationship between diplomacy and festival culture largely depended on the profession as well as the political and religious background of their author. Festival organisers and artists, whether associated with the court or not, were obviously keen to demonstrate the diplomatic advantages of pageantry. The royal French *Académie de Poésie et de Musique*, whose members regularly contributed to court festivals of the late Valois crown, including Pierre de Ronsard, were deeply interested in the diplomatic effects of uniting poetry and music in performance. Their letters patent and statutes, issued by Charles IX on 10 November 1570, made a case for the use of songs and verses in regulating the behaviour of rivalling Catholics and Huguenots.[11] Thoinot Arbeau (1520-1595), a pseudonym for the French cleric Jehan Tabourot, emphasised the relevance of dance for diplomatic occasions at court, such as ceremonial receptions of foreign dignitaries, masquerades, and other court

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[10] pp. 35-39. Welch mainly cites from mid to late seventeenth-century treatises on dance and statecraft (see *Theater of Diplomacy*, pp. 5, 58, 60, 133, 160, 163, 203). Several of these manuals will be briefly discussed below.

[11] The documents have been printed as 'Letters Patent and Statutes of Baïf's Academy', in Yates, *The French Academies*, pp. 319–22.

entertainments.[12] His manual on social dancing for the aristocracy, which appeared in 1589, was partly intended to debunk Calvinist views on dance as a vain and immoral pastime.[13]

Diplomatic theorists, by contrast, wrote less explicitly on the relevance of festival culture for the office of the ambassador. Their comments on the topic were more incidental and related to elements of festival culture, notably formal practices of hospitality, that could be applied to various political contexts, and which, ultimately, could be codified in a set of rules. The festival as a whole clearly defied such rulemaking because it was inherently ephemeral (held on only one or at most a few occasions) and disparate (involving public ceremonies and theatrical entertainments that varied in style and content). Indeed, the first treatises to develop a fully-fledged theory on the relationship between diplomacy and festival culture only appeared in France during the second half of the seventeenth century. They were written by noted artists and courtiers of King Louis XIV (1638-1715), such as Guillaume Dumanoir (1615-1697),[14] head of the musicians' guild, Michel de Pure (1620-1680),[15] royal chaplain and advisor, and Claude-François Ménestrier (1631-1705),[16] Jesuit historian and director of several court *fêtes*, including the ballets for Louis XIV's visit to Lyon in 1658. The works of these theorists clearly supported Louis XIV's systematic and integrated use of festival culture for matters of statecraft. In late sixteenth-century Europe, however, this practice was still very new, mainly because, as we have seen in the Introduction, diplomacy was a relatively recent phenomenon that only started

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[12] *Orchesographie [...]* (Lengres: Jehan des Preyz, 1589), sig. 3ᵛ. For an English translation of Arbeau's dance manual, see Thoinot Arbeau, *Orchesography*, trans. by Mary Stewart Evans (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).

[13] Mary Stewart Evans cites two popular treatises that advocated these Calvinist views (in Arbeau, *Orchesography*, p. 208, n. d.). They are *Le blason des danses* (The Lampoon of Dances) (Beaujeu: Justinian et Philippes Garils, 1566), written by the Calvinist theologian and historian Guillaume Paradin (*c.* 1510-1590) and *Traité des danses [...]* (Treatise of Dances) ([Geneva]: François Estienne, 1579). Although the author of the latter work is commonly identified as Lambert Daneau (*c.* 1530-*c.* 1595), a Calvinist theologian and jurist, Olivier Fatio disputes the attribution (in *Méthode et Théologie: Lambert Daneau et les débuts de la scolastique réformée*, Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 147 (Geneva: Droz, 1976), pp. 102*-103*). His objection is based on the treatise's style of writing (more lively and less dependent on Latin constructions than Daneau's other French works) and ambigious printing request (which puts Daneau's authorship into question).

[14] [Guillaume Dumanoir], *Le mariage de la musique avec la danse (1664). Précédé d'une introduction historique et accompagné de notes et éclaircissements*, ed. by Jules Gallay (Paris: Librairie des bibliophiles, 1870).

[15] *Idee des Spectacles Anciens et Novveavx [...]* (Paris: Michel Brunet, 1668).

[16] *Des ballets anciens et modernes selon les règles du théâtre* (Paris: René Guignard, 1682).

to receive more systematic theoretical attention towards the end of the seventeenth century.[17]

Protestant theorists of diplomacy in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe often harboured suspicions towards the sensual effects of court festivities. The ambiguous attitude of Huguenot jurist and envoy Jean Hotman (1552-1636), Marquis (Marquess) de Villers-St-Paul, serves as a case in point. In *L'ambassadevr* (The Ambassador) from 1603, the first diplomatic manual written in the French vernacular, Hotman recognised the benefits of engaging with courtly pastimes for diplomatic lobbying, including banquets and festivities, but warned envoys not to become overwhelmed by flattery and splendour.[18] According to Hotman, these elements would only distract the ambassador from the actual goal of his mission which was to bring diplomatic negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. He especially recommended the envoy to abstain from drinking alchohol and playing games, as indulgence in these activities would reflect badly on the head of state that the ambassador was meant to represent and whose reputation he was bound to uphold at courts across Europe.[19]

Although varying in content, style, and tone, the texts discussed in this chapter have one important aspect in common: they provide a prescriptive model for matters of diplomacy, festival culture, or their mutual relationship. Whether offering practical advice to aspiring diplomats or idealising their power to achieve universal peace with or without the aid of ceremony and spectacle, our texts describe reality as it *should* be, not as it *actually* is. The present chapter discusses these prescriptive sources in four different sections. Section 1 examines the humanist roots of early modern thought on diplomacy and festival culture. It seeks to offers a better understanding of how both fields related to, and fed into, each other from the perspective of a shared — intellectual and philosophical — tradition. The next three sections will explore the historical beliefs, ideas, and theories that surrounded or underpinned the practices of diplomacy central to this thesis. They

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[17] The increase in output of diplomatic manuals by the late sixteenth century will be discussed in Section 1 below.

[18] *L'Ambassadevr* ([n. p.]: [n. pub.], 1603), pp. 34–35. For a contemporary, anonymously translated edition of Hotman's manual into English, see *The Ambassador* (London: V[alentine] S[immes] for James Shawe, 1603). Lucien Bély has written extensively on the genesis of Hotman's treatise and its relevance for contemporary practices of diplomacy: see 'La Polémique autour de *L'Ambassadeur* de Jean Hotman: Culture et diplomatie au temps de la Paix de Lyon', *Cahiers d'histoire*, 46.2 (2001), 327–54.

[19] *L'Ambassadevr*, p. 35. The complex relationship between diplomat and ruler will be discussed in Section 4 below.

constitute a springboard for Chapters 2, 3, and 4 in which theories of diplomacy and festival culture will be compared to practices of staging court and civic festivities for diplomatic ends.

Section 2 focuses on practices of negotiation, such as maintaining an equilibrium of power among, or engineering a compromise between, dissimilar stakeholders. Theorists first wrote about these practices in the sixteenth century when the word 'negotiation', besides denoting business transactions and interstate alliances, also began to refer to diplomatic processes. Section 3, then, concentrates on practices of hospitality, including organising festivals and festivities for the subjects and foreign visitors of esteemed rulers. Since the Aristotelian virtue of liberality and the Christian virtue of *caritas* (charity) were widely regarded by contemporaries as the most important traits of any honourable prince, practices of hospitality have received sustained theoretical attention since at least the late fifteenth century. Section 4, finally, focuses on practices of obtaining support from various diplomatic players, which could involve the use of pageantry or backchannel negotiations. Theoretical writings on these practices only surfaced during the sixteenth century when diplomacy became a popular subject of debate among European intellectuals.

1. The humanist roots of diplomacy and festival culture

The forty-three year period covered in this thesis, from 1572 to 1615, witnessed the emergence of a new literary genre: the conduct manual for working diplomats and, by extension, the ruling elite,[20] which provided a prescriptive framework for the moral, social, behavioural, as well as legal aspects of early modern diplomatic practices. Although several treatises on diplomacy already circulated in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, either in print or manuscript form,[21] the output of advice books for ambassadors increased

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[20] Étienne Dolet, for one, intended to write his diplomatic manual on 'the qualifications which a king, or other lesser prince, or any free people ought to look for in the man upon whom they intend to confer the office of the ambassador' ('Legati parteis […] quæ uel Rex, uel Princeps alius inferior, uel liber aliquis Populus in eo obseruare debet, cui Legati munus velit imponere'; 'De officio Legati', pp. 7–8; 'Étienne Dolet', trans. by Dunlap, p. 82).

[21] The manuscript 'Ambaxiatorum brevilogus' (Short Treatise on Ambassadors, 1436) by the French provost Bernard de Rosier is often cited as the first textbook in Western Europe solely dedicated to the office of the diplomat (see Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 28; Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), p. 23). Rosier's manual is printed in *De Legatis et Legationibus Tractatus Varii […]*, ed. by Vladimir E. Hrabar (Dorpat: E Typographeo Mattieseniano, 1906), pp. 3–28. Printed manuals on ambassadorship published in the late fifteenth century include *Super titulis: De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, De officio legati, et De officio iudicis ordinarii* (Regarding the Titles: On the Office and Authority of the Delegated Judge, On the Office of Legate, and On the Office of the Ordinary

substantially towards the end of the sixteenth century. Between 1566 and 1604, ten book-length manuals were published by theorists of French,[22] Italian,[23] German,[24] and Polish-Lithunian descent,[25] most of which were reprinted, and sometimes revised, until late into the seventeenth century.[26] The genre of the diplomatic manual was steeped in the humanist culture of the time. Theorists drew extensively on ancient Greek and Roman authors, including Aristotle (384-322 BC), Cicero (106-43 BC), Plutarch (45-127 AD), and Lucian (120-192 AD). They also encouraged ambassadors to adopt the moral virtues that these authors promoted and celebrated diplomacy as an instrument for international peace and unity. Achieving concord was the ultimate aim of the humanist *Respublica Litteraria*, a pan-European network of intellectuals that sought to exchange and debate knowledge beyond political and religious divisions. Latin, with its vast resource of literary tropes and figures, constituted the lingua franca of the humanist 'republic' and the majority of diplomatic manuals were written in this language.[27]

Most diplomatic theorists in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe were deeply pessimistic about their own times, as they witnessed the Religious Wars causing

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Judge) (Venice: Johannes de Colonia & Johannes Manthen, 1474) by the Sicilian lawyer Andrea Barbazza and *De Legato* (On the Legate) (Rome: Johann Hugo von Gengenbach, 1485) by the Salamancan canonist Gonzalo García de Villadiego. Two manuscripts on diplomacy circulated around the same time: 'Tractatus de legatis maxime principum' (Treatise Mostly on the Legates of Princes, *c.* 1446) by the Lombard lawyer Marino Garate da Lodi (in *De Legatis*, ed. by Hrabar, pp. 45–52), and 'De officio legati' (On the Office of Legate, *c.* 1490) by the Venetian scholar Ermolao Barbaro (in *Tractatus 'De coelibatu' et 'De officio legati'*, ed. by Vittore Branca, Nuova collezione di testi umanistici inediti o rari XIV, 14 (Florence: Olschki, 1969), pp. 157–67). Printed manuals on ambassadorship that appeared in the early sixteenth century include the aforementioned 'De officio Legati' (1541) by Étienne Dolet and *De legationibvs libri qvinque* (Five Books on Embassies, 1548) by the German scholar Conrad Braun (in *Opera tria [...]* (Mainz: Franz Behem, 1548), pp. 1–242).
[22] Pierre Ayrault, *Petri Aerodii ivdicis qvæstionvm Andivmqve dvcis libell. mag. I.C. Decretorvm lib. VI. Itemque liber singularis de Origine & auctoritate Rerum Iudicatarum* (Paris: Martin Lejeune, 1573); Félix de La Mothe Le Vayer, *Legatvs [...]* (Paris: Michel de Roigny, 1579); Vill[ers] H[otman], *L'ambassadevr*.
[23] Ottaviano Maggi, *De legato libri dvo* (Venice: [Ludovico Avanzi], 1566); Torquato Tasso, *Il Messaggiero dialogo del Signor Torqvato Tasso. Al Sereniss. Sign. Vincenzo Gonzaga Principe di Mantoua, & di Monferrato* (Venice: Bernardo Giunti, e fratelli, 1582); L3 original; Charles Paschal, *Legatvs* (Rouen: Raphael Parvival, 1598).
[24] Hermann Kirchner, *Legatus: Ejusq[ue], Jura, Dignitas. & Officium, Duobus libris explicata* (Marburg: Paulus Egenolph, 1604).
[25] Krysztof Warszewicki, *De legato et legatione, liber*, in *Turcicae quatuordecim [...]* (Kraków: Drukarnia Łazarzowa, 1595), pp. 242–313; Krysztof Warszewicki, *De legationibus adeundis loculentissima Oratio* (Lich: Wolfgang Ketzel, 1604).
[26] For bibliographical details of reprinted and revised editions of the diplomatic manuals written by these authors, see Fedele, *Naissance*, I, pp. 33, n. 62 (for Maggi); pp. 36–37, n. 73 (for Ayrault); p. 34, n. 64 (for Tasso); p. 37, n. 75 (for Le Vayer); p. 38, n. 77 (for Gentili); p. 42, n. 88 (for Hotman); p. 40, n. 81 (for Paschal); pp. 41–42, n. 85 (for Warszewicki); p. 46, n. 99 (for Kirchner).
[27] Ingrid A. R. De Smet, *Menippean Satire and the Republic of Letters, 1581-1655*, Travaux du Grand Siècle, 11 (Geneva: Droz, 1996), pp. 19–22; De Smet, *'Thuanus'*, p. 82; Fedele, *Naissance*, I, pp. 10–11.

a seemingly intractable rift between people and states across the continent. They believed that the growing formalisation and codification of diplomatic practices, to which their own publications had also sought to contribute, was a logical response to the violence of the ongoing wars. The Anglicised Italian jurist Alberico Gentili, frequently solicited for his legal advice on diplomatic matters,[28] observed in his *De Legationibus, Libri Tres* (Three Books on Embassies, 1585) the emergence of — what he called — the 'legato bellico' or 'embassy of war'.[29] According to Gentili, this type of delegation was charged with the mission to formally declare war on a foreign ruler. Charles Paschal (or Carlo Pasquali, 1547-1625), a Piedmontese lawyer who had been naturalised in France, described the office of the resident ambassador in his *Legatus* (The Legate, 1598) as 'an unhappy product of these unhappy times'.[30] In another manual entitled *Legatus* (1579), French jurist Félix de La Mothe Le Vayer (1547-1625) located the origins of diplomacy in a mystical past: 'Ambassadors became a necessity at the moment, or shortly after, Pandora planted the seeds of all evils on our earth, as on a fertile and well-cultivated farmland'.[31]

In *L'ambassadevr*, Jean Hotman speculated that in ancient Greece and Rome there would have been no need for his advice on the office of the legate: 'Because in the old times there was no punishment ordained for parricides, given that in those ages of innocence it could not be thought that a wickedness so monstrous could enter into the heart of any man'.[32] By invoking parricide, widely regarded by contemporaries as one of the most atrocious and deviant crimes imaginable,[33] Hotman attested to the violent degeneration of his own age and the alleged innocence of the classical world. He thus echoed the French

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[28] Along with Jean Hotman, Gentili was famously consulted by the English government about the treatment of Don Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador to England since January 1578, who had been implicated in the Throckmorton Plot against Queen Elizabeth (1583). Gentili strongly defended the rights of embassies which, according to him, should be universally recognised (see the epigraph to this chapter) and in January 1584 Mendoza was expelled from England without being tried in court. *De Legationibus, Libri Tres* evolved from a public dissertation that Gentili had written in 1584 as a response to the Mendoza case (see Ernest Nys, 'Introduction', in L3 trans., 11a-37a (pp. 22a, 25a)). From 1605 to 1608, Gentili served as the official attorney of the Spanish embassy (see ibid., p. 28a).

[29] L3 original, bk. 1, pp. 10–12; L3 trans., pp. 16–17.

[30] '[I]nfelicis huius aetatis infelix partus' (p. 447).

[31] 'Legatos tunc primùm aut non ita multo post institutos fuisse, cum Pandora malorum omnium semina in hunc mundum tanquam in feracem ac bene subactum agrum demisit' (sig. 1ᵛ).

[32] 'Car comme iadis il n'y auoit aucune punition ordonnee pour les parricides, d'autant qu'en ces siecles d'innocence l'on ne pouuoit penser que vne meschanceté si signalée peust tomber au cœur d'vn homme' (p. 1).

[33] Garthine Walker, 'Imagining the Unimaginable: Parricide in Early Modern England and Wales, c. 1600-c. 1760', *Journal of Family History*, 41.3 (2016), 271–93 (pp. 271–74).

philosopher, statesman, and occasional diplomat Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) who in the first posthumous edition of his *Essais* (Essays, 1595) had ridiculed the corrupted morals of late sixteenth-century Europe:

> It is good to be born in a very depraved time; for by comparison with others, you are considered virtuous for a cheap price. Anyone who is only a parricide and sacrilegious in our days is a good and honorable man […] And there was never time and place where a surer and greater reward was offered to princes for goodness and justice.[34]

Convinced of the depraved moral standards of their times, most diplomatic theorists envisaged the ambassador as the extreme opposite of Hotman's and Montaigne's parricide: a paragon of noble virtue who could set a worthy example for his fellow men. The quintessential diplomat should therefore be handsome, graceful, righteous, eloquent, well-educated, well-born, and skilled at various dances, sports, and martial arts. Our theorists, moreover, agreed that a combination of having a noble title, good looks, manners, flawless physique, and rhetorical skills helped the ambassador to fulfil his mission at court as smoothly and effectively as possible.[35] In order to become a respectable diplomat, then, one needed to become a reputed courtier first.[36] According to Gentili, Philip Sidney (1554-1586), the later poet who also travelled with the English embassy to Paris in June 1572 to attend the festival for the ratification of the Treaty of Blois, embodied all traits of the perfect ambassador. Gentili therefore dedicated *De Legationibus, Libri Tres* specifically to him.[37]

The way in which diplomatic theorists described the duties and the overall office of the ambassador was equally ambitious. This can already be observed in the first known definition of diplomacy, formulated by the French prelate Bernard de Rosier (1400-1475) in 1436, which regarded the ambassador as an indispensable servant of any ruler in

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[34] *Les Essais*, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien, and Catherine Magnien-Simonin, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 14 ([Paris]: Gallimard, 2007), bk. 2, 'De la presumption', p. 684-85 (see appendix); 'Essays', in *The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*, trans. by Donald M. Frame (London: Hamish Hamilton, [1958]), pp. 1–857 (p. 490).

[35] For a discussion of these and other ambassadorial requirements, see Jusserand, 'School for Ambassadors', pp. 433-39; Behrens, 'Treatises on the Ambassador', pp. 624-25; Gattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 211-22.

[36] Many of the noble traits associated with the diplomat were thus already recommended by Baldassare Castiglione in his conduct manual *Il libro del cortegiano*. See our discussion of Castiglione's views on hospitality in Section 3 below.

[37] See the dedicatory preface in L3 original, sig. ii^r-iv^r; L3 trans., pp. iii-vii.

solving domestic and foreign conflict, as well as in preserving general concord and virtuous behaviour among their subjects:

> [There are so many causes for sending an embassy:] for peace and justice; for friendship, for obtaining benevolence; for settling wars; for inspiring and strengthening truces; for withdrawing tyrants; for reconciling and leading back schismatics and rebels; for guiding benevolent subjects; for consoling the abandoned; for avoiding transgressions; for extirpating heresies; for restraining vices and implanting virtues; for encountering any hard, threatening necessities; for all and singular issues which tend to the good of the state of any kingdom, principality, ecclesiastic or secular authority, of each city, land, place or fatherland.[38]

Rosier's definition of diplomacy was thus clearly idealist in nature. Rather than focussing on the complex reality of conducting diplomacy, and the delicate balancing act this often involved between rival parties, Rosier championed the ambassador as he should ideally be, namely the bringer of peace, order, and virtue. Almost 150 years later, the Naples-based poet Torquato Tasso (1544-1595) still echoed the idealist sentiments of Rosier's definition. In his dialogue *Il Messaggiero* (The Messenger, 1582), Tasso maintained that 'the goal of embassy is peace',[39] whether the ambassador is 'sent for a simple demonstration of benevolence, of esteem, or to celebrate a marriage or the birth of children'.[40] Interestingly, Gentili openly disagreed with the poet's irenical interpretation of diplomacy in his *De Legationibus, Libri Tres*. After having noted that ambassadors can also be dispatched to solemnly declare war on a foreign state, Gentili argued that 'the view of Tasso is not tenable'.[41] For, the poet's view that 'every ambassador is a man of peace' did not correspond to the practical reality of conducting diplomacy which also involved duties and operations that did not straightforwardly facilitate concord but — indeed — could even prepare for conflict.[42]

Gentili's practical view of diplomacy had already been theorised by the Florentine statesman Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) in *Il Principe* (The Prince, 1532) from the perspective of the early modern ruler. In his mirror for princes, Machiavelli, whose diplomatic missions had taken him to France, Rome, and the County of Tirol, argued that the sovereign would be unwise to advance concord and religious piety at all times, as such

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[38] 'Ambaxiatorum brevilogus', pp. 6-7 (see appendix).
[39] '[I]l fine dell'Ambascieria è la pace' (sig. 29ᵛ).
[40] '[M]andati per vna semplice dimostratione di beneuolenza, e di stima; ò rallegrarsi di nozze, ò di nascimento di figliuoli' (sig. 30ʳ⁻ᵛ).
[41] 'Vera Tassi sententia esse non potest' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 11; L3 trans., p. 17).
[42] '[O]mnem legatum pacis verum esse' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 11; L3 trans., p. 17).

an irenical stance on governance could easily damage his authority and provoke foreign invasion: 'If he [the prince] had observed both peace and faith, he would have had either his reputation or his state taken away from him many times over'.[43] We can thus observe a debate among sixteenth-century scholars about the purposes of the diplomatic office and the larger moral and political responsibilities that it carried for matters of statecraft.

One of the most influential humanists who helped in shaping the pan-European discourse around diplomacy as an agent of international concord was the Dutchman Desiderius Erasmus (*c.* 1467-1536). His *Institvtio principis Christiani* (Education of a Christian Prince, 1516), an instruction manual for Archduke Charles, the future Habsburg Emperor Charles V, offers illustrative examples of that discourse.[44] Written in Cambridge in the spring of 1513, while the English celebrated Henry VIII and Emperor Maximilian I's victorious raid on France, the book underlines Erasmus's abhorrence of war and the disunity this created among states that once shared the same Catholic faith. 'Nowadays the Englishman generally hates the Frenchman', the humanist wrote bitterly to the young Charles, 'for no better reason than that he is French. The Scot, simply because he is a Scot, hates the Englishman […] Why do these ridiculous labels do more to separate us than the name of Christ, common to us all, can do to reconcile us?'[45]

Much to his dismay, Erasmus observed in this widespread recourse to hatred and violence a shift away from the *respublica Christiana*: an idealised conception of Latin Europe, dating back to the Carolingian period, in which the pope as *pater familias* stood at the helm of a community of Christian nations, united by their common faith.[46] According

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[43] 'Quando l'hauesse osseruata [pace e fede], gli harebbe piu uolte tolto lo stato, & la riputatione' (*Il Principe*, sig. 27ᵛ; *The Prince*, trans. by Bondanella, p. 62).

[44] Erasmus was appointed honorary councillor to Charles in 1514. He wrote the instruction manual in this capacity to eduate the archduke. See *Institvtio principis Christiani*, ed. by Otto Herding, in *Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, pt. 4, 7 vols (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company; Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 1974-2017), I, ed. by Otto Herding and Fritz Schalk, pp. 95-219. For an English translation of Erasmus's mirror for princes, see *The Education of a Christian Prince, with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria*, trans. by Neil M. Cheshire and Michael J. Heath, ed. by Lisa Jardine, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; repr. 2003).

[45] 'Nunc fere Gallum odit Anglus, non ob aliud, nisi quod Gallus est, Anglum Scotus, tantum quia Scotus est […] Cur haec stultissima nomina magis nos distrahunt, quam conglutinat omnibus commune Christi vocabulum?' (*Institvtio principis Christiani*, p. 218; *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. by Cheshire and Heath, p. 108).

[46] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 77–80. On the *respublica Christiana* in relation to early modern diplomacy, see Jusserand, 'School for Ambassadors', pp. 429–33; Hampton, *Fictions of Embassy*, p. 4.

to Erasmus and his humanist contemporaries, such as churchman Jacopo Sadoleto (1477-1547), good friend Thomas More (1478-1535), and jurist Andrea Alciato (1492-1550), the Christian commonwealth brought all believers in the true religion together in peace and harmony. If differences in this 'family of nations' ever threw a spanner in the works, they were put aside for the mutual love of Christ, whose pacifist intentions were protected by his vicar, the pope, on earth.[47] 'It used to be the task of preachers', Erasmus wrote in *Institvtio principis Christiani*, 'to root out all hostile feelings from the hearts of the common people'.[48] What he observed instead were priests who acted as 'firebrands of war' and, 'still more absurd', Christ was present 'in both camps, as if fighting against himself'.[49]

This realisation — of a house being divided against itself — would become more pertinent in the years following the manual's publication, when a growing dissatisfaction with the practices of the Roman curia, which Erasmus had brought to light himself in a number of books, gave way to the Protestant Reformations.[50] The innocent days of the *respublica Christiana*, though probably only existing in the humanist imagination of Erasmus and his followers, had been disturbed by a seemingly irresolvable schism between the old and the new church. Erasmus therefore advised the archduke to abstain from war altogether and reconcile his subjects by promoting the Christian virtues of love and peace.

Pan-European conceptions of diplomacy as an instrument of peace that could restore, if only temporarily, the utopian world of ancient Greece and Rome, or the allegedly

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[47] Jusserand, 'School for Ambassadors', p. 429. On the *respublica Christiana* in relation to the work and thought of Erasmus, see Otto Schottenloher, 'Erasmus und die "Respublica Christiana"', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 210 (1970), 295–323.

[48] 'Concionatorum partes errant dissidiorum affectus ex animis vulgi penitus reuellere' (*Institvtio Principis Christiani*, p. 218; *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. by Cheshire and Heath, p. 107).

[49] '[B]elli faces'; 'Quodque magis est absurdum, in vtrisque castris adest Christus velut ipse secum pugnans' (*Institvtio principis Christiani*, p. 218; *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. by Cheshire and Heath, p. 108).

[50] Besides the *Institvtio principis Christiani*, Erasmus wrote *Enchiridion militis Christiani* (Handbook of a Christian Knight, 1501) which inveighed against outward manifestations of the Christian religion and promoted belief as an inner form of experience, and *Encomium moriae* (In Praise of Folly, 1511), which offered, among others, a satirical critique of clerical corruption. The 1514 dialogue *Iulius exclusus e coelis* (Julius Excluded from Heaven, 1514), commonly attributed to Erasmus, ridiculed the rule of Julius II by letting Saint Peter deny him passage to heaven, after which the pope unsuccessfully threatened the gatekeeper with his army and papal bulls of excommunication. In 1516, Erasmus published a new edition of the Greek New Testament based on Lorenzo Valla's by then little known *Annotationes*. In this work, the humanist brought to light mistranslated and purportedly corrupted passages in the traditional Latin Vulgate text.

carefree days of the Christian commonwealth, were also invoked by the French court and civic spectacles under consideration in this research. Artists were keen to fuse classical and biblical imagery to convey messages of concord among international audiences that were often deeply divided by their cultural, religious, and political beliefs. Mercury, among others, was a recurring presence in the French *ballets de cour*. During the ballet's final *intermède* (interlude), the messenger god from Greek and Roman mythology sometimes descended from heavens as a *deus ex machina* to restore the troubled kingdom to its former *saison dorée* (golden season) of peace and harmony.[51] In Chapter 2, we will see how Mercury, accompanied by Cupid, came down from heavens in the combat-ballet *Le Paradis d'Amour*, given for the Valois-Navarre wedding in August 1572, to restore peace among fighting Catholics and Huguenots. Moreover, the Valois rulers of the late sixteenth century were frequently portrayed as biblical figures. The young Charles IX, for one, was commonly associated with the Kings of Judah. Just like these biblical kings, Charles ascended the French throne as a child, being only ten years old at his coronation in 1560. During Charles's entry into Toulouse in February 1565, a triumphal arch depicted Josiah, David, and Solomon, thus suggesting that the ruler, although of tender age, would be as wise and agile as the Kings of Judah in reconciling his rivalling subjects.[52]

Finally, the poets, musicians, and dance masters who contributed to French court and civic festivals were often confident that the performing arts, and music and poetry in particular, could function as diplomatic tools for diffusing and even resolving conflict among competing parties or inviduals. Once again, a suitably vague conception of Europe's classical past as a period of peace and happiness served as a popular source of reference. Pierre de Ronsard, for example, believed that by imitating the measured verses of the ancient Greeks his poetry would immediately transport the listener to 'a century happier and less tainted by the vices that reign in this last age of iron'.[53] The French poet Jean-

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[51] The *saison dorée* was a popular Renaissance topos, derived from Greek mythology, which provided an idealised picture of humanity in its pre-civilised condition. See Sara Mamone, *Firenze e Parigi: Due capitali dello spettacolo per una regina, Maria de' Medici* (Milan: Amilcare Pizzi, 1987), p. 27.

[52] Linda Briggs, '"*Concernant le service de leurs dictes Majestez et auctorité de leur justice*": Perceptions of Royal Power in the Entries of Charles IX and Catherine de Médicis (1564-1566)', in *Ceremonial Entries in Early Modern Europe: The Iconography of Power*, ed. by J. R. Mulryne, Maria Ines Aliverti, and Anna Maria Testaverde, European Festival Studies 1450-1700 (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 37-52 (pp. 43-47).

[53] '[U]n siècle plus heureux, et moins entaché des vices qui regnent en ce dernier age de fer' (in Julien Tiersot, 'Ronsard et la musique de son temps', *Sammelbände der Internationalen Musikgesellschaft*, 4.1 (1902), 70–142 (p. 84); trans. by Van Orden, in *Music, Discipline, and Arms*, p. 3). Tiersot's article reprints Ronsard's preface as it appeared in *Mellange de chansons [...]* (Paris: Adrian le Roy and Robert Ballard,

Antoine de Baïf (1532-1589), son of the ambassador Lazare de Baïf and co-founder of the royal *Académie de Poésie et de Musique*, of which Ronsard was a prominent member, aimed to recreate ancient Greek music for similar reasons.[54] He argued that by setting *musique mesurée* (measured music) to *vers mesurés* (measured verse) France could do away with 'the barbarism, the ignorance, and the enmity' of the present age,[55] and lead the listener to greater virtue. Just like Ronsard, Baïf believed that the desired effect of this juxtaposition was to increase the emotional impact of the auditory experience, as well as to engage the listener on a more intellectual level, attuning the mind to the numerical harmony of the all-encompassing universe.[56] The diplomatic use of festival arts by the *Académie*, as well as other artists and politicans relevant to spectacle culture in late six-teenth- and early seventeenth-century France, will be discussed further in the next section on negotiation.

2. Practices of negotiation

Early modern theorists of diplomacy understood the word 'negotiation' (*negotiatio* in Latin, *négociation* in French, and *negoziato* in Italian) in three different, though related, ways, all of which are still in use today. To begin with, negotiation was used to refer to mercantile trade. This conception of the term dates back to ancient Rome, around 700 BC, where negotiation, derived from the Latin *neg* ('no') and *otium* ('leisure'), denoted trans-actions between businessmen (*negotiator*), such as bankers and merchants, who unlike the patricians, did not have the privilege of leisure time.[57] The etymological origin of the

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1572), a revised edition of the *Livre de meslanges [...]* (Paris: Adrian le Roy and Robert Ballard, 1560), where it served as a dedication to Charles IX (see 'Ronsard', pp. 82–84). For the influence of Erasmus's thought on Ronsard's work, especially with regards to the *Institutio principis Christiani*, see Gwenda Echard, 'The Erasmian Ideal of Kingship, as Reflected in the Work of Ronsard and d'Aubigné', *Renaissance and Reformation / Renaissance et Réforme*, 5.1 (1981), 26–39.

[54] Baïf founded the *Académie* with the French composer Joachim Thibault de Courville (died in 1581) in November 1570.

[55] 'La barbarie, l'ignorance et l'envie ne se peuvent taire' ('The barbarism, the ignorance, and the enmity cannot be silenced'; cited as 'Letter from Baïf to Charles IX', in Yates, *The French Academies*, p. 323, n. 2). Although the phrase was eventually cancelled by Baïf in a letter that he wrote to Charles IX in November 1570, shortly after the *Académie*'s foundation, it clearly expresses the poet's frustration with the deplorable political climate in France and his desire to change that situation for the better through the production of measured music and verse.

[56] Daniel P. Walker, 'The Aims of Baïf's *Académie de Poésie et de Musique*', *Journal of Renaissance and Baroque Music*, 1.2 (1946), 91–100; Yates, *The French Academies*, pp. 14–27, 36–37; Edouard Frémy, *Origines de l'Académie française: L'Académie des derniers Valois, Académie de poésie et musique 1570-1576, Académie du palais 1576-1585, d'après des documents nouveaux et inédits* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1969).

[57] Pierre L. G. Goguelin, 'Le Concept de négociation', *Négociations*, 1.3 (2005), 149–70 (pp. 149–51).

term is significant as it highlights the historical connection between trade and diplomacy. Alberico Gentili, among others, wrote that 'it was after the separation of the nations, the foundation of kingdoms, the partition of dominions, and *the establishment of commerce* [*commerciis institutis*] that the institution of embassies arose'.[58]

As historians have recently demonstrated, governments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries benefited greatly from the commercial networks that merchants had established with foreign stakeholders. Existing trade relations were thus often used to forge international relations, while merchants were regularly employed to partake in diplomatic missions themselves.[59] More officially recognised ambassadors, in turn, occasionally engaged with mercantile business. This type of diplomacy is nowadays known as 'commercial diplomacy' and is aimed at supporting business relations between countries.[60] Early modern intellectuals were keenly aware of the political complications of combining trade and diplomacy. Pierre Ayrault, for one, was concerned about the conflicts of interest that would arise if envoys whose mission had been funded by public money engaged in commercial business. He therefore proposed to prohibit any form of trade for embassies that served the public interest.[61]

The other two definitions that early modern theorists of diplomacy ascribed to the word 'negotiation' were directly related to the office of the ambassador. Their usage only emerged over the course of the sixteenth century when diplomatic relations between European countries became increasingly institutionalised.[62] The first of these two definitions concerned interstate relations which theorists understood in broad terms. Gentili, for example, used the phrase 'legatio ad negotium' to refer to embassies concerned with the ratification of all sorts of treaties and agreements between foreign princes, conducted in

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[58] Our emphasis, 'Ut discretis gentibus, regnis conditis, dominijs distinctis, commerciis institutis, legationis extitisse nomen opinor' (L3 original, p. 37; L3 trans., p. 51).

[59] Diego Pirillo has studied the cross-confessional diplomacy of a Venetian mercantile family (see 'Venetian Merchants as Diplomatic Agents: Family Networks and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe', in *Early Modern Diplomacy,* ed. by Rivère de Carles, pp. 183–203). He argues that the less formal status of merchants allowed the republic of Venice 'to negotiate with more flexibility and without direct diplomatic involvement' (ibid., p. 196).

[60] Kostecki Michel and Naray Oliver, *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business*, Discussion Papers on Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2007); *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business: A Conceptual and Emperical Exploration*, ed. by Huub Ruël, Advanced Series in Management, 9 (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2012).

[61] 'All those who handle public money must be forbidden to trade' ('Omnibus qui pecuniam publicam tractant *prohibenda est negociatio*'; *Petri Aerodii ivdicis*, p. 114, italics in original).

[62] See Goguelin, 'Le Concept de négociation', p. 152.

the interest of either peace or war.[63] Jean Hotman, in a similar vein, used negotiation as a synonym for international relations. He stated that his manual *L'ambassadevr* was based on 'the examples drawn from my reading [about diplomacy] and my experience of the travels and negotiations [*negociations*] that I have made outside France [...] most of them with Ambassadors and in the service of his Majesty [Henri IV]'.[64] The third and final way in which theorists of diplomacy understood the term 'negotiation' concerned peer-to-peer interaction. Negotiation in this more narrowly defined sense referred to talks and discussions between ambassadors and foreign princes, as well as among diplomats themselves. We find an example of this use of the term in the letter of advice that Niccolò Machiavelli sent to his friend Raffaello Girolami in October 1522. In it, Machiavelli urged Girolami, soon-to-be-diplomat at the Imperial court of Charles V, not to dissimulate in the presence of the ruler: 'I know men who, through being clever and two-faced, have so completely lost the trust of a prince that they have never afterward been able to negotiate [*negoziare*] with him'.[65]

Negotiation was understood as a peaceful way of mediating between the different viewpoints of various stakeholders by relying on a broad repertoire of persuasive skills, ultimately with the aim to achieve a compromise or — what contemporaries called — a 'balance of power'. The concept of balance of power first emerged at the beginning of the sixteenth century in humanist circles on the Italian peninsula and quickly surfaced in the writings of leading political theorists in Europe, including Giovanni Botero (1544-1617), Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639), Scipione Ammirato (1531-1601), Philippe

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[63] '[The "legatio ad negotium"] is charged with peaceful relations as well as with war' ('Legatio ad negotium vel ad pacis est, vel ad belli' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 9; L3 trans., p. 14). Gentili identified two other embassies: 'the embassy of courtesy' ('aut officii') and 'the embassy of time' ('aut temporis'). The former embassy seeks to deliver compliments, congratulations, or condolences to foreign rulers (see L3 original, bk. 1, pp. 12–13; L3 trans., pp. 18–19); the latter embassy concerns the office of the resident diplomat who has been dispatched to a foreign court for a certain period of time (see L3 original, bk. 1, p. 9; L3 trans., p. 14). Gentili dedicated a separate chapter to the embassy of war (see L3 original, bk. 1, pp. 10–12; L3 trans., pp. 16–17).

[64] 'Les exemples tirez & de ma lecture & de mon experience propre par les voyages & negociations que i'ay faictes hors de France [...] la plus part auec des Ambassadeurs & pour le seruice de sa Maiesté' (*L'ambassadevr*, 'À monseignevr de Villeroy, conseiller du Roy en ses conseils d'Estat & priué, & premier Secretaire de ses Commandemens', not paginated).

[65] 'Io so di quelli che per essere uomini sagaci e doppi hanno in modo perduta la fede col principe, che non hanno mai potuto dipoi negoziare seco' ('Istruzione fatta per Niccolò Machiavelli a Raffaello Girolami, Quando ai 23 d'Ottobre partì per Spagna all'Imperatore', in *Opere di Niccolò Machiavelli: Cittadino e segretario fiorentino*, [ed. by Francesco Tassi], 8 vols ([Florence]: [n. pub.], 1813), IV, 177–82 (p. 178).; trans. by Allen Gilbert, in 'Advice to Raffaello Girolami When He Went as Ambassador to the Emperor', in *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, 2 vols (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1958; repr. 1989), I, 116–19 (p. 116)).

Duplessis-Mornay (1549-1623), and Francis Bacon (1561-1626). The term was generally used in an international context to denote attempts to preserve equal relationships between states and regions so that none would become powerful enough to dominate the others.[66]

Maintaining an equilibrium among dissimilar actors proved more than urgent in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe where the Wars of Religion had reinforced cultural, political, and religious difference to a large degree. Michel de L'Hospital was the primary advocator of a cross-confessional diplomacy in France. On 5 July 1560, he appeared before the *Parlement de Paris* to present his new approach to civil conflict. In his speech to the magistrates, L'Hospital observed how under the reign of the three previous kings (François I, Henri II, and François II) attempts to achieve unity of faith through prosecution had not been successful in eliminating a steadily growing number of zealous Protestants. Rather than protecting the stability of the realm, their aggressive policy towards heresy had driven the Huguenot minority to extremity. L'Hospital then compared the kings to physicians 'who have a notion of the maladies without recognising the causes thereof'.[67] François I, Henri II, and François II alternated between different remedies — from bitter to sweet, and from warm to cold — but did not truly understand how these measures would help them to cure the disease. According to L'Hospital, the only way to heal civil unrest was to acknowledge the confessional difference between Catholics and Huguenots as an inherent part of French society. This difference, then, should not be resolved through violence, as this would only further disintegrate the stability of the realm, but negotiated diplomatically, in dialogue with both Catholic and Huguenot parties, to protect the overall peace in the kingdom.

Catherine de Médicis, as is well known, vigorously supported her chancellor's ideas of a cross-confessional diplomacy. Together with L'Hospital, she was one of the driving forces behind the so-called *moyenneurs* (mediators) or *politiques*, a loosely associated

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[66] Klaus Malettke, 'L'"Équilibre" européen face à la "*monarchia universalis*": Les Réactions européennes aux ambitions hégémoniques à l'époque moderne', in *L'Invention de la diplomatie: Moyen Âge — Temps modernes*, ed. by Lucien Bély and Isabelle Richefort (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998), pp. 47–57.

[67] '[Q]ui souvent congnoissent les maladies sans congnoistre les causes d'icelles' (Loris Petris, *La Plume et la tribune: Michel de L'Hospital et des discours (1559-1562). Suivi de l'édition du 'De initiatione Sermo' (1559) et des 'Discours de Michel de L'Hospital' (1560-1562)*, Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance, 360 (Geneva: Droz, 2002), pp. 359–67 (p. 362)). The ruler as physician and the political crisis as illness were both widespread metaphors in the early modern period. For a discussion of the metaphors' use in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France, see Jacob Soll, 'Healing the Body Politic: French Royal Doctors, History, and the Birth of a Nation, 1560-1634', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 55.4 (2002), 1259–86.

group of humanists, theologians, and jurisprudents who advocated a diplomatic compromise between Catholics and Huguenots.[68] The group included, among other members, Bishop Jean de Monluc (1502-1579), theologian Claude d'Espence (1511-1571), jurist and historian François Baudouin (1520-1573), Cardinal Charles de Lorraine (1524-1574), and prelate Paul de Foix (1528-1584). Most members had served the French crown as diplomatic agents or ambassadors themselves, often on missions that required them to intervene in religious matters.[69] Their aim was summarised in the Latin motto 'nulli parti ex animo addicti', meaning 'from the heart he is not devoted to any part',[70] which indicated that the *moyenneurs* were committed to act as mediators — or 'diplomats' — between the opposing parties rather than as advocates of either side.

Interestingly, L'Hospital understood that diplomacy could never fully satisfy all parties involved, especially over a longer period of time. The intransigence of the stakeholders in both religious groups, not in the least of the *Parlement de Paris*, often unwilling to register the pacification decrees, constituted the main obstacle to royal efforts to reconcile Catholics and Huguenots. The ephemeral nature of diplomacy and of the political settlements to which, if successful, it led is one of the reasons why L'Hospital advised the government continuously to renegotiate its agreements with the opposing religions, in accordance with the political circumstances of a given moment. The cross-confessional diplomacy of the *moyenneurs* resulted in a number of pacification decrees, many of which were negotiated with the involvement of L'Hospital, most notably the Edict of Saint-

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[68] In the broad definition of Ingrid A. R. De Smet, *politique* was 'a shorthand for those who were tolerant of different religious views and who sought to steer an even keel, practically and politically, amid the factions and outbreaks of violence' (*'Thuanus'*, p. 58, n. 33).

[69] Jean de Monluc was an experienced diplomat whose moderate stance towards Protestantism had taken him on special missions to England (June 1560) and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (July 1572). Claude d'Espence was instrumental in preparing the French embassy to the Council of Trent at the consultation of Melun in 1544. As Théologien du Roi, he travelled to Bologna in October 1547, where the council was then held in session, to assist the French delegates, chief among whom was Michel de L'Hospital. François Baudouin helped to organise the Colloquy of Poissy in 1561 which sought to reconcile Catholics and Huguenots. Paul de Foix, finally, served as French ambassador to England between 1562 and 1564, to the Republic of Venice between 1567 and 1571, and to Rome between 1581 and 1584. In June 1572, Foix joined François de Montmorency on an embassy to London to celebrate the ratification of the Treaty of Blois (see Chapter 2, Section 2), and in late 1573, he led a mission to Rome to thank Pope Gregory XIII for having accepted the election of Henri III as King of the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. See Jacqueline Boucher, 'Foix, Paul de (1528-Rome, 1584)', in *Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion*, ed. by Arlette Jouanna and others, Bouquins collection ([Paris]: Robert Laffont, 1998), pp. 922-24.

[70] Mario Turchetti, *Concordia o tolleranza? François Bauduin (1520-1573) e i "Moyenneurs"*, Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance, 200 (Geneva: Droz, 1984), pp. 278–79; Petris, *La Plume et la tribune*, p. 39. The phrase is by the Flemish theologian George Cassander (1513-1566) and appeared in his famous irenical treatise *De officio pii ac pvblicae tranquillitatis uerè amantis uiri […]* (On the Duty of the Pious Man and True Lover of Public Peace) ([Basel]: [Johann Oporinus], 1561), p. 27.

Germain (January 1562). They were therefore pragmatic compromises between the French crown and the demands of its Catholic and Huguenot nobles. By trying to keep both sides friendly, the monarchy hoped to control the antagonistic forces at court.

Besides entering into formal negotiations with its Huguenot minority, the French crown employed a variety of artists — engineers, poets, musicians, choreographers, set designers — who had developed concrete tools to implement the new cross-confessional diplomacy of the government. Many of these artists were affiliated with the *Académie de Poésie et de Musique*. Besides Ronsard and the *Académie*'s founders, Baïf and Courville, they included the composer Claude Le Jeune (1528-1600) as well as the poets Jean Dorat (1508-1588), Pontus de Tyard (1521-1605), Rémy Belleau (1528-1577), and Philippe Desportes (1546-1606).[71] The famous castrato singer Estienne Le Roy (died in 1599) and the Lombard violinst and choreographer Balthazar de Beaujoyeulx (*c.* 1535-1587), who had been naturalised in France, were probably not formally attached to the *Académie* but regularly collaborated with its members.[72] As Frances A. Yates has shown, Baïf and Courville's institute 'belonged very much to the peace movement encouraged by the Treaty of Saint-Germain[-en-Laye]', the edict of pacification, signed in 1570, which awarded substantial privileges to the Huguenot subjects of the French crown and sparked the hope that overall peace for the kingdom was finally underway (see Chapter 2).[73] In that same 'year of peace',[74] the *Académie* was founded under the royal patronage of Charles IX. The fact that the king served as the official protector of the institute was highly significant, as it demonstrated that the moral and aesthetic programme of the *Académie* was considered relevant for the kingdom as a whole.[75]

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[71] Baïf, Belleau, Dorat, Ronsard, and Tyard were former members of the so-called Pléiade group which preceded the foundation of the *Académie de Poésie et de Musique* (Yates, *The French Academies*, pp. 14-19).

[72] Le Roy was especially known for his exquisite performance of Ronsard's poetry (see Yates, *French Academies*, p. 49; Jacqueline Boucher, 'Le Roy, Estienne (?-apr. 1599)', in *Histoire et dictionnaire*, ed. by Jouanna and others, pp. 1029–30). For Beaujoyeulx's collaborations with the *Académie*, and *Le Ballet comique de la Reine* (1581) in particular, see Prunières, *Le Ballet de cour en France*, pp. 78-79, 83-89; Yates, *The French Academies*, pp. 268-69; McGowan, *Dance in the Renaissance*, pp. 44-5; Franko, *Dance as Text*, pp. 31-50.

[73] *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London and Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 140.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Yates, *The French Academies*, p. 36. The *Académie* became less active after the death of Charles IX on 30 May 1574 and was revived under Henri III in early 1576 by the jurist and poet Guy du Faur de Pibrac (1529-1584). The institute was then called *Académie de Palais* and included at least one member of the old *Académie*, namely Desportes. The focus of the *Palais* had shifted from performing music and poetry to

As briefly discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Baïf and Courville sought to unite measured poetry and music in performance to maximise their soothing effects on the listener. To achieve the best possible result, they drew extensively on Pythagorean-Platonic thought, handed down in Italian translations of the Neoplatonist scholar Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), which presupposed a connection between the harmony of the universe and the inner world of the human soul.[76] Music and poetry, then, could attune the soul to the divine and harmonious movements of the celestial bodies, and, in doing so, purify the mind of evil or ignorant beliefs. Dance, as we will explain in more detail below, was believed to facilitate this process further, because the intricate steps and figures of performers were thought to reflect the heavenly constellation of the stars and planets.[77] By imitating the circular movements of the universe, both mind and body could be brought into divine harmony. The efficacy of the *Académie*'s activities for statecraft and, more specifically, for diplomacy, thus existed in the belief that dance, music, and poetry could overcome wordly difference and, ultimately, produce concord among rival princes or religious parties.[78]

It should be noted that the *Académie*'s ideas about the conciliatory effects of the performing arts were not new but were shared by many contemporaries. Among circles of artists and statesmen in France it was commonly believed that dance in particular was capable of taking the sting out of confrontations between festival participants, and make their encounters as frictionless as possible, both on-stage and off-stage. Catherine de Médici's correspondence with diplomats and relatives, for example, revealed her immense confidence in the efficacy of dance, and spectacle more broadly, for the promotion of peace and social cohesion. In August 1565, she famously wrote to Catherine de Clèves, duchesse (duchess) de Guise (1548-1633), about the balls that were held every evening at her château in Cognac:

> Everybody dances together. Huguenots, Papists and all, so smoothly that it is impossible to believe that they are as they are. If God willed that they were as wise elsewhere as they are here, we should at last be at rest.[79]

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rhetorical debate, for example on religious syncretism or the relevance of intellectual and moral virtues. See Frémy, *Origines de l'Académie française*, pp. 141-97; Yates, *The French Academies*, pp. 105-30.

[76] Ibid., pp. 248-49.

[77] Ibid., p. 61.

[78] See also Ellen R. Welch's analysis of the *Académie* (*A Theater of Diplomacy*, pp. 16-8).

[79] 'Et tout danse huguenos et papiste ensemble si bien, que je panse qu'i ne seriet au yl an son, set Dieu volet que l'on feult aussi sage alleur, nous serions en repos' (3 August 1565, Letters CdM, II, p. 315; trans.

Judging from this letter, it is clear that Catherine regarded dancing as a diplomatic tool to bring her subjects — especially the fighting Catholics and Huguenots, which had brought about the Religious Wars in France — into physical proximity with each other. She obviously hoped that the reinforcement of relationships between the participants would extend beyond the dance floor and prove beneficial to their everyday interaction.

Catherine's understanding of dance as a diplomatic tool by which she could unite her subject in peace and harmony, for example during balls, was backed up by dance masters across Europe, especially in Italy where the output of dance manuals was the highest on the continent.[80] Fabritio Caroso (*c.* 1526-1620), for one, asserted that 'in human converse and society it [dance] rouses the spirit to joy, and when we find ourselves oppressed by our troubles it relives and refreshes us, keeping away annoying or unpleasant thoughts'.[81] Writing around 1600, Caroso stood in a long tradition of *maestri di ballo* (dance masters), such as Domenico da Piacenza (1390-1470), Guglielmo Ebreo da Pesaro (1420-1484), and Antonio Cornazzano (1430-1484), who already in fifteenth-century Italy had theorised about the way in which dance brought harmony to body and soul. Their treatises show that dance in early modern Europe was not merely seen as a set of physical skills, but as an endeavour with profoundly spiritual origins. Guglielmo Ebreo da Pesaro wrote about these origins as follows:

> Dancing is nothing other than an action that shows outwardly the spiritual movements, which must agree with the measures and perfect concords of harmony. These descend into our intellect through our hearing and to the senses of the heart with delight. There, they produce sweet commotions, which, as if they were imprisoned against their nature, endeavour as much as possible to escape and to reveal themselves. This act draws to the outside this sweetness and melody and express them through our dancing body.[82]

by Edith Sichel, in *The Later Years of Catherine de' Medici* (Frome and London: Butler & Tanner, 1907), p. 56).

[80] In late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France, only two dance manuals were published: Thoinot Arbeau's manual *Orchesographie [...]* (Orchesography, 1588) and François de Lauze's treatise *Apologie de la Danse et la parfaicte methode de l'enseigner tant aux Caualiers qu'aux dames* (Apology for Dance and the Perfect Method to Teach It to Both Knights and Ladies) ([n. p.]: [n. pub.], 1623). These manuals gave practical advice on social dancing and thus differed from the French Calvinist treatises referred to on p. 46, n. 13 above, which attacked dancing as an immoral pastime. See *Courtly Dance of the Renaissance: A New Translation and Edition of the 'Nobiltà Di Dame' (1600)*, ed. and trans. by Julia Sutton (New York: Dover Publications, 1995), p. 23.

[81] '[N]elle conuersationi, & società hùmane [ballare] eccita glì animi alle allegrezze, & quando quelli si trouano oppressi da qualche perturbatione, gli solleua, e ristora, e gli tien lontani da ogni pensiero noioso, e dispiaceuole' (*Nobiltà di Dame* (Venice: Il Muschio, 1600), bk. 1, p. 1; *Courtly Dance*, trans. by Sutton, p. 87).

[82] Cited in Günter Berghaus, 'Neoplatonic and Pythagorean Notions of World Harmony and Unity and Their Influence on Renaissance Dance Theory', *Dance Research*, 10.2 (1992), 43–70 (p. 57) (see

Dance, in other words, was taken by the Italian dance masters and the circles of European intellectuals to which they belonged as being in accordance with measured and perfect harmonies, which brought about a pleasurable sensation through the intellect and emotions of the performer. Dance was not only believed to reflect the inner harmony of the soul, or what Da Pesaro called the 'sweet commotions', but also worked to induce that harmony. A seamless performance could thus harmonise both body and mind, visible from the outside and soothing the soul from the inside.

As we have seen in Catherine's letter to the Duchesse de Guise, dancing could be exploited for diplomatic purposes. By soothing people's minds, it was hoped to make the participants involved more receptive to each other's viewpoints. More specifically, dance was also believed to facilitate diplomatic communication. At first sight it seems that poetry, or any other textual component of the festival, was particularly suitable for this. Verbal language possesses the grammar and syntactic rules to articulate specific meanings, and thus to communicate political messages to a particular audience. Words, however, are tied to a specific cultural and linguistic context, and thus frequently created misunderstandings among embassies of different national backgrounds. Dance, by contrast, was often appreciated for its alleged ability to bring people together regardless of their cultural, religious or political makeup. Dance was thought to equal and even surpass the communicative power of verbal language: its non-verbal and — hence — universal language could be grasped by virtually anyone.

French dance master Thoinot Arbeau, for example, argued that dance could fulfil all three aims of the classical orator, as first formulated by Cicero in his dialogue *De Oratore* (On the Orator, 55 BC), namely *docere* (to instruct), *delectare* (to delight), and *movere* (to move).[83] As Arbeau put it, 'most of the authorities hold that dancing is a kind of mute rhetoric by which the orator, without uttering a word, can make himself understood by his movements and persuade the spectators that he is gallant and worthy to be acclaimed, admired and loved'.[84] To illustrate his point, Arbeau referred to Roscius Galenus, the most

appendix). We have followed Berghaus's translation of Pesaro but retained the simili regarding the imprisoned commotions in the original Italian (introduced by 'chome [come]', meaning 'as if') which Berghaus does not translate.

[83] See *De Oratore* 2.115, in *De Oratore: Books I-II*, ed by Jeffrey Henderson, trans. by Edward W. Sutton and Harris Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, 348, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1948; original publ. 1942), pp. 280-81.

[84] *Orchesographie*, sig. 5ᵛ (see appendix); *Orchesography*, trans. by Evans, p. 16.

celebrated actor of Rome in the first century BC, 'who proved to Cicero that, by this employment of gesture and dumb show he could move the spectators, in the judgment of the arbiters, as much or more than Cicero had been able to by his eloquent orations'.[85] Needless to say, Arbeau's account of the superior rhetorical qualities of dance was highly exaggerated and probably served more to defend his profession against Calvinist moralists, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, than to provide an accurate description of the effects of dance on spectators.

Arbeau's perception of dance as 'mute rhetoric' was nonetheless echoed by many early modern theories on dance and diplomacy. Well known was the image of the dancer as interpreter or 'mediator' between the monarch and visiting delegations of foreign deputies. One of the most popular anecdotes that helped shape the image of the dancer-interpreter was narrated by the Greek satirical writer Lucian in his dialogue 'De Saltatione' (The Dance, *c.* 100-200 AD). The text circulated widely across France in various Greek and Latin editions until its translation into French in 1583.[86] Arbeau referenced Lucian's dialogue twice.[87] The text tells the story of a 'barbarian' prince from Pontus in whose honour emperor Nero (37-68 AD) staged a pageant at his palace in Rome. Since the prince was unable to understand the Latin songs of the performance, he relied solely on the dancing of one of the performers who could convey meaning in movement only, without having to resort to verbal speech. When asked by Nero on his departure what gift he wished for most, the prince quickly answered that he would like to be given the dancer from the entertainment. He argued for his decision as follows:

> 'I have barbarian neighbours who do not speak the same language, and it is not easy to keep supplied with interpreters for them. If I am in want of one, therefore, this man will interpret everything for me by signs'. So deeply had he been impressed by that disclosure of the distinctness and lucidity of the mimicry of the dance.[88]

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[85] *Orchesographie*, sig. 5ᵛ (see appendix); *Orchesography*, trans. by Evans, pp. 16–7.

[86] 'De la danse', in Lucian, *Les Œuvres de Lucian de Samosate, philosophe excellent, non moins vtiles que plaisantes*, trans. by Filbert Bretin (Paris: Abel l'Angelier, 1583), bk. 1, 357-74.

[87] See *Orchesographie*, sig. 4ʳ, 6ʳ; *Orchesography*, trans. by Evans, pp. 14, 17.

[88] 'The Dance', in Lucian, *The Passing of Peregrinus [...]*, trans. by Austin M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, 302, 8 vols (London: William Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913-1967), V (1936), 209-89 (p. 269). For the relevant passage in Bretin's translation, see *De la danse*, pp. 368-69.

On these grounds, dance was seen by many as the lingua franca of diplomacy. Just as it was thought to support social cohesion and even peace among the international visitors of the court festival, so was it believed to transcend national and linguistic boundaries altogether. In this view, the allegedly transparent nature of dance mirrored the belief, shared by many early modern diplomatic theorists, that the official instructions for an ambassador's mission should be stated in a language as clear and as unambiguous as possible. In this way, there would be no doubt about the type of action, speech, and sometimes also behaviour that was expected from the diplomat while negotiating his master's cause.[89]

3. Practices of hospitality

In early modern Europe, festival culture was widely regarded and recommended as a token of favour, generosity, and hospitality that rulers could extend towards loyal subjects and foreign dignitaries in particular. In 1498, the Umbrian poet and humanist Giovanni Pontano (1426-1503), who served as advisor and military secretary to the Aragonese kings of Naples, advised princes and noblemen to receive guests not only in a liberal or generous way, for example by offering gifts, but also with splendour and magnificence, typically by organising lavish banquets and stupendous entertainments.[90] Pontano summarised his argument in a discussion on banquets:

> The splendid man will not only treat his own family well and lavishly but will hold table, as they say, for many of his fellow citizens and foreigners, and just as broth of the previous day does not go in silver plates so too a man of the first order does not eat humble cabbages. Therefore, just as his table ought to shine with gold and silver so too should it be splendid in its foods. And it must appear that he has prepared them not for himself but rather for the guests and those who have been invited to dinner.[91]

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[89] See Dolet, 'De officio Legati', p. 13; 'Étienne Dolet', trans. by Dunlap, p. 85: 'Now when I say explicit, I mean frank, clear, and entirely unambiguous orders, such as will not give rise to doubt when the ambassador finds it necessary to have recourse to them' ('Probe autem cum dico, mandata aperta, dilucida et minime ancipitia intelligi volo, quippe quae non in dubium veniant, cum iis uti legatus necesse habebit').

[90] See *De magnificentia*, in *Opera [...]* (Lyon: Barthélemy Trot, 1514), section 'De ludis publicis', not paginated. Pontano's *De magnificentia* (On Magnificence), as well as his four other treatises on social virtues, including *De liberalitate* (On Liberality)*, De beneficentia* (On Beneficence), *De splendore* (On Splendour), and *De conuiuentia* (On Conviviality), were originally published in 1498. The aforementioned books have been consulted in the 1514 edition of Pontano's collected works referenced above. For a modern annotated edition of Pontano's books on social virtues, in both the original Latin and an Italian translation, see Giovanni Pontano, *I libri delle virtù sociali*, ed. by Francesco Tateo, Europa delle Corti, 88 (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1999). Maria Teresa Ricci has written some insightful pages on Pontano's conception of liberality and magnificence: 'Liberalitas et magnificence chez Giovanni Pontano', *Le Verger* (2012), 1–14.

[91] *Opera, De splendore*, section 'De hortis ac uillis', not paginated.

Similarly, the Lombard courtier Baldassare Castiglione (1478-1529), who acted as resident ambassador of Pope Clement VII to Emperor Charles V,[92] wrote in 1528 that princes 'ought to offer magnificent banquets, festivals, games, public shows; and have a great many fine horses for use in war and for pleasure in time of peace, falcons, dogs, and all the other things that pertain to the pleasure of great lords and of the people'.[93] Castiglione believed that the ideal prince should '[have] a finer manner of showing his favour discreetly to his subjects and to strangers, and in varying measure according to their merits'.[94] Niccolò Machiavelli, writing in 1532, subscribed to the same view but stated more generally that 'if a prince wants to maintain his reputation for generosity among men, it is necessary for him not to neglect any possible means of sumptuous display'.[95] In the late sixteenth century, the French cleric and dancing master Thoinot Arbeau borrowed Pontano's, Castiglione's, and Machiavelli's argument to defend theatrical entertainment against the moralising critique of Calvinist theologians: 'Kings and princes are wont to command performances of dances and masquerades to salute, entertain and give joyous greeting to foreign nobles. We take part in such rejoicing to celebrate wedding days and in the rites of our religious festivals, in spite of the abhorrence of reformers'.[96]

The recommendation of festival culture for the distribution of hospitality was closely bound up with the Aristotelian virtue of generosity or liberality. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle had ranked liberality (ἐλευθεριότης) as first among the cardinal virtues: 'Of all virtuous people the liberal are perhaps the most beloved, because they are beneficial to others, and they are so in that they give'.[97] He explained that 'we praise a man as liberal […] in relation to giving and getting wealth, and especially in giving; wealth meaning all

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[92] Castiglione served as papal nuncio from 1524 until his death in 1529. Between 1513 and 1515, he was resident ambassador of the Duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria della Rovere, in Rome.

[93] '[C]onuiti magnifici, feste, giochi, spettacoli publici, hauer gran numero di caualli excellenti per utilità nella guerra, & per diletto nella pace: falconi: cani: e tutte l'altre cose, che s'appartengono ai piaceri de gran Signori, & dei populi' (*Il libro del cortegiano*, bk. 4; *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by Singleton, p. 320).

[94] '[B]ona maniera d'accarezzare, e i subditi, e i stranieri discretamente piu, & meno, secondo i meriti' (*Il libro del cortegiano*, bk. 4; *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by Singleton, p. 319).

[95] '[U]olersi mantenere infra li huomini il nome del liberale, è necessario non lasciar indietro alcuna qualità di suntuosità' (*Il principe*, sig. 24ʳ; *The Prince*, trans. by Bondanella, p. 54).

[96] *Orchesographie*, sig. 3ᵛ (see appendix); *Orchesography*, trans. by Evans, p. 13.

[97] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by Harris Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, 73, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1934; original publ. 1926), p. 189.

those things whose value is measured by money'.[98] Following Aristotle, early modern intellectuals widely championed liberality as one of the most important moral virtues that any prince should seek to adopt and practise. Pontano claimed that 'nothing is more undignified in a prince' than parsimony or a lack of generosity.[99] He praised his own master, Ferdinand I of Naples (1423-1494), as the model of the liberal ruler. Castiglione, too, insisted that princes 'ought to be very liberal and splendid'.[100] He believed that the ruler, by virtue of his near-divine nature, should 'give to everyone unstintingly because God, as the saying goes, is the treasurer of liberal princes'.[101]

In a little known passage from the *De Legationibus* that resonates particularly well with the topic of hospitality, Gentili gave three types of privileges that were accorded to visiting envoys in ancient Rome: *locus*, *lautia* and *munera*.[102] Gentili quoted the first type of privilege, *locus*, from Livy's *Ab urbe condita* (History of Rome, 27-9 BC), which he understood as 'a free residence and free seats at the games'.[103] By 'free' he did not mean without costs (lodging and entertainment were naturally catered for and sponsored by the state), but 'free' in the legal sense of the word: a property or place allocated to embassies for private and privileged use. Further on in his chapter, Gentili referred to the Romano-Jewish scholar Flavius Josephus (37-100 AD), who in the thirteenth book of the *Antiquitates Judaicae* (Antiquities of the Jews, 93 or 94 AD) wrote that 'at public games seats in the orchestra, the place of greatest honour, were given to ambassadors'.[104] Likewise, in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France, kings showed hospitality to foreign embassies by inviting them to spectacular theatrical entertainments of various sorts, the early modern equivalent of the Roman games. If their status was held in high esteem

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[98] Ibid., p. 191. Aristotle emphasised that wealth was 'a necessary condition of having the means to give' but should by no means become one's main focus, as liberality will then degenerate into prodigality (ibid., p. 193).

[99] 'Quid enim principe indignius' (*Opera*, *De liberalitate*, section 'De auaricia & auaris', not paginated).

[100] '[D]ouesse essere liberalissimo, & splendido' (*Il libro del cortegiano*, bk. 4; *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by Singleton, p. 320).

[101] [D]onar ad ogn'uno senza riseruo, perche Dio (come si dice) e Thesauro dei Principi liberali' (*Il libro del cortegiano*, bk. 4; *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by Singleton, p. 320).

[102] See L3 original, bk. 1., Chapter 16, 'De muneribus, alijsque hospitalibus, quæ Romani legatis Romam aduenientibus præstabant' ('The Gifts and Other Tokens of Hospitality Which the Romans Gave to Ambassadors Who Came to Rome'), pp. 28-9; L3 trans., p. 39.

[103] '[L]oci nomine ædes liberas accipio, libera loca' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 29; L3. trans., p. 39). For the relevant passage in Livy's *Ab urbe condita*, see *History of Rome: Books XXXV-XXXVII*, ed. by Jeffrey Henderson, trans. by Evan T. Sage, Loeb Classical Library, 14 vols (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1919-1959), X: *Books 35-37* (1935; repr. 1958), bk. 35, pp. 66-67.

[104] L3 original, bk. 1, p. 28; L3 trans., p. 39.

internationally or if their reception at court marked an important occasion, they were often awarded priority seats in the audience of a performance. Just like Josephus's diplomats, the heads of an embassy could be placed close to and sometimes even right next to members of the royal family. In February 1585, for example, the English ambassadors Edward Stafford and Henry Stanley, Earl of Derby shared a gallery with Catherine de Médicis and the king's wife, Louise de Lorraine (1553-1601), in the Great Hall of the Bishop's Palace, where Henri III had staged a ballet in their honour (see Chapter 3). Seat arrangement thus created hierarchies or — more precisely — precedence among visiting embassies.

Lautia, the second type of privilege awarded to Rome's visiting dignitaries, was first mentioned by Livy in his *Ab urbe condita* and subsequently referenced by Plutarch in his *Quaestiones Romanae* (Roman Questions, *c.* 100 AD). According to Gentili, *lautia* denoted the 'hospitality' awarded to ambassadors or,[105] more specifically, 'a supply (*copia*) of all things that were necessary' to support their stay at the host court or community.[106] Diplomats were provided on a regular basis by the so-called '*copiarii*' or suppliers. Horace (65-8 BC), in a short passage from the *Satirae* (Satires, *c.* 35 BC) narrating his journey with Octavian and Antony to the city of Brundisium, mentioned the supply of salt and firewood in particular.[107]

The third and final type of privilege mentioned by Gentili, that of *munera*, referred to the gifts that ambassadors and, occasionally, other members of their personnel received, ranging from golden chains and sums of money to knight's armour and silver vessels.[108] Our comparison in Chapter 3 between the reception of an English and a Dutch train at the Parisian court in 1585 — the former being celebrated with much pomp, the latter being kept painstakingly secret — shows how the diplomatic status of a country affected the extent to which they were offered hospitality. Given that the English government enjoyed full diplomatic recognition abroad, its representatives could confidently expect to receive

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[105] 'Xenia' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 29). 'Xenia' (ξένια) is the ancient Greek word for hospitality towards guests and strangers (L3 trans, p. 39, translates 'xenia' with the general 'perquisites').

[106] '[O]mnium rerum necessariarum copiam' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 29; L3 trans., p. 39).

[107] 'The little house close to the Campanian bridge put a roof above our heads, and the state-purveyors, as in duty bound, furnished fuel and salt' ('Proxima Campano ponti quæ villula, tectum / præbuit, et parochi [what Gentili called the *copiarii*] quæ debent ligna salemque'; *Satires* 1.5.45-46, in *'Satires', 'Epistles', 'Arts Poetica'*, ed. by Jeffrey Henderson, trans. by H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library, 194, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1929; original publ. 1926), pp. 1-245 (pp. 68-9)).

[108] L3 original, bk. 1, p. 29; L3 trans, p. 40.

all of the privileges outlined above, especially in 1585 when the French gave a festival in their honour.

More than welcoming foreigners alone, hospitality was also used to assure visitors of the generosity of their host. This was also repeated in the diplomatic manuals of the time. Jean Hotman, for example, wrote that the 'most essential virtue' of a prince was to be 'liberal', for it was his duty to 'represent his greatness among foreigners'.[109] This interpretation of hospitality reveals a subtle tension between extending generosity to honour guests on the one hand, and using a display of hospitality to emphasise one's *gloire* on the other hand.

A variant of this train of thought can be found in the France of the Religious Wars. Hospitality was a way to impress visitors and show the outside world that a country was economically prosperous and politically significant. In this context, diplomacy was not identified as an agent of peace and reconciliation, but rather as a tool for state building and the boosting of sovereignty. Court festivals, then, helped to protect and strengthen the agency of a country in diplomatic negotiations, even — or perhaps especially — in times of political insecurity. This line of reasoning was apparently so convincing that the French historian and biographer Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur (lord) de Brantôme (*c.* 1540-1614), invoked it to defend Catherine de Médici's use of festival culture against accusations that it would be too costly:

> I know that many in France criticize this expense [for court festivals] as unnecessary; but the Queen said that she did it to show foreigners that France was not as ruined and impoverished, on account of the past wars [the Religious Wars], as they judged.[110]

Hotman believed that this greatness should be displayed 'in view of the whole world' and thus ought to be mirrored by the prince's *corps diplomatique* whenever it was dispatched abroad.[111] This could be done through material signifiers such as fine clothing and a well-supplied kitchen, but especially through the kind of well-mannered behaviour that was normally expected of an ambassador.

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[109] '[L]a vertue la plus propre & plus essentielle d'vn Prince est d'estre liberal, celuy qui represente sa grandeur chez les estrangers' (*L'ambassadevr*, p. 23).

[110] Pierre Brantôme, *Recueil des dames, poésies et tombeaux*, ed. by Étienne Vaucheret (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53; trans. by Welch, in 'Rethinking', p. 103.

[111] '[À] la veue du monde' (*L'Ambassadevr*, p. 18).

For Alberico Gentili and his intellectual circle of diplomatic theorists, hospitality was an important tool for negotiating political power, insofar as it signified the extent to which governments of different states were able or willing to enter into bilateral negotiations and recognise each other's international status. Dispatching envoys as resident ambassadors abroad was one salient way in which a king could pay homage to the ruler of a particular country, a macroform of hospitality that extended beyond the borders of one's own realm. Gentili went so far as to claim that 'the chief reason why great sovereigns do not maintain resident embassies in the countries of minor princes is that they are under no obligation to pay the latter this kind of attention'.[112] When foreign ambassadors were received at court, all kinds of 'micro' hospitalities could be exchanged.

The legal conditions under which embassies were entitled to international recognition, and the kind of privileges that should thus be accorded to them, constituted one of the most discussed issues in literature on diplomacy, especially in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Whereas Dolet spoke more generally of ambassadors as being employed in the service of 'a king, or some lesser prince, or […] some independent people', Gentili was more discriminate, and insisted that only diplomats sent by 'princes and states that are subject to a greater power' should be recognised as such.[113] In a chapter from the second book of his *De Legationibus*, entitled '*Have Rebels the Right of Embassy?*', he invoked the widespread belief that by dethroning Philip II of Spain in 1581 the Dutch had defied the sacred monarchy, and were thus not entitled to any formal representation abroad: 'Rebels, […] that is persons who secede from those under whose authority they are, should not dare to send any embassies to those against whom they have revolted'.[114]

Gentili asserted that Philip II's recent peace talks with the Dutch rebels (probably referring to the negotiations that led to the Pacification of Ghent in November 1576 and the Perpetual Edict in February 1577 by which Spain was required to remove its troops from the Provinces) defied the principle that rulers should not enter into discussion with insubordinates.[115] He believed that the right of a king, even that of a tyrant, to rule over his

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[112] 'Nam quid summi principes apud minores quosdam non habent, nisi quia illi his genus istud quasi obsequij non debent?' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 12; L3 trans, p. 18).

[113] 'Omneis legatos qui vel regi, vel principi alii inferiori, vel populo uni alicui libero suam recte operam navare student' (Dolet, 'De officio Legati', p. 50; 'Étienne Dolet', trans. by Dunlap, p. 82).

[114] 'Qui ergo deficiunt, id est, qui ab his, quorum sub imperio sunt, desistunt, ij vllas legationes mittere ad illos non audeant, a quibus defecerunt' (L3 original, bk. 2, p. 53; L3 trans., p. 82).

[115] 'Atque recens est admodum quod cum Belgicis legatis rex egit Hispaniarum' ('An example of quite recent date is furnished by the Spanish king's action towards the Belgian ambassadors'; L3 original, bk. 2,

subjects was sacred and inviolable, and only those realms who respected this irrefutable right were entitled to diplomatic representation.[116] In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we will see how Henri III (in January-March 1585) departed from Gentili's widely accepted principle by receiving a special Dutch embassy at their respective courts in Paris. The ambassadors' visit posed significant challenges to the ceremonial protocol of the late Valois and early Bourbon kings, since their disputed diplomatc status did not entitle them to the full range of privileges and tokens of hospitality that an officially recognised embassy would have received.

4. Practices of obtaining widespread support

Advice books for diplomats and princes often display a deep awareness of the public nature of diplomacy, statecraft and court life at large. In the popular imagination of the early modern period, the diplomat was therefore regarded as the ultimate actor at court, a stand-in for his prince on a proverbial stage which served as a *mise en abyme* of the international tensions and alliances across Europe.[117] Alberico Gentili used the metaphor to exemplify the burden that came with representing one's lord in view of the whole world. He thus advised the ambassador to make a good first impression when visiting a foreign court: 'If we would hiss off the boards an actor who, when playing the role of king, comes on stage with a shabby retinue and in anything but royal attire, what is to be done to the ambassador, who is not merely taking part in a play for a few hours, but is actually invested with the personality of his sovereign?'[118] Similarly, Fabritio Caroso warned his readers that dancing at court was like playing a part in the theatre: 'Be careful not to push down on your sword hilt to such an extent that the tip points skyward, for if you do, you resemble a Spanish Captain playing his part in the Commedia, and you will be mocked at

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p. 53; L3 trans., p. 76). For background, see Liesbeth Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back: The Spanish Diplomatic Campaign to Undermine the International Status of the Dutch Republic, 1581-1609', in *The Act of Abjuration: Inspired and Inspirational* (The Hague: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), pp. 81–95; Jochen Frowein, 'Anerkennung von Staaten und Regierungen im Völkerrecht', *Der Staat*, 11, 1972, 145–59.

[116] On the relationship between king and tyrant: '[T]he rights of both may be regarded as equal. Each of them is master, and law perhaps is the basis of each one's sovereignty' ('[P]aria esse vtriusque iura videri possunt. Vterq[ue] dominus est. [sic] & iure forsitan vterque tenet principatum'; L3, bk. 2, p. 53; L3 trans., p. 82).

[117] Hampton, *Fictions of Embassy*, pp. 142–43, n. 6 (p. 211-12); see also Welch, *Theater of Diplomacy*, p. 104.

[118] 'Equidem si histrionem exsibilaremus, qui regis partes agens, sordido comitatu, nec ipse regaliter velatus, in scænam prodiret: quid huic siet legato, qui non breuissimi temporis fabulam agit, sed verè induit principalem personam' (L3 original, bk. 3, 151-52; L3 trans., p. 139).

and ridiculed, rather than appreciated by any onlookers'.[119] At first sight, the metaphor of the diplomat as actor merely seems to conform to the *theatrum mundi* idea, but also points to the aforementioned idea of pretending, playing, suggesting one thing but doing the opposite.

Most theorists of diplomacy agreed that an embassy only existed — that is, was entitled to formal recognition from the international community — by virtue of having been sent by an acknowledged head of state for a specific purpose. In the first book of *De Legationibus*, Gentili reminded his reader that this founding principle separated the ambassador ('legatus') from the messenger ('nuncius') who could plead his own case and not necessarily that of his superiors. The legal status of the diplomat was also demonstrated by the etymological root of the word 'legatus', as it was derived from 'legare', meaning 'to send'.[120] Gentili argued that definitions of ambassadorship should therefore be based on 'the method of sending', for the diplomat 'is one who has been sent not only by the state, but also in the name of the state, and as the representative of the state'.[121] Rather than mere individuals, then, ambassadors were regarded as representatives of their monarch, and — crucially — as extensions of his sight and hearing. This point was made explicit by the Florentine chronicler Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) who famously argued that the diplomat was 'the eye, and the ear of states'; [122] or, in the words of the modern historian Christian Wieland, his 'imago principis et umbra' ('the image and shadow of the prince').[123]

In the memoirs and dispatches sent to their government, ambassadors were trained to make the king feel as though he were present at important court occasions himself. It was their duty to transform the king from a reader into a spectator, much as Jean Dorat tried to do in his libretto for *Le Balet des Polonais* (The Polish Ballet) from 1573, remarking

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[119] '[A]uerta di non calar con la mano tanto la guardia d'essa, che la punta risguarda l'aria, che cosi facendo, parerebbe vn Capitano Spagnuolo, che recita in comedia, & più tosto sarebbe diluso, et beffeggiato, che gradito, dall'astanti' (*Nobiltà di Dame*, bk. 1, p. 66; *Courtly Dance*, trans. by Sutton, p. 135). Caroso refers here to the bragging and opportunistic 'Il Capitano' (The Captain), a stock character, usually a Spaniard, from the Italian *commedia dell'arte*.

[120] L3 original, bk. 1, p. 3; L3 trans., p. 5.

[121] 'Sumimus ex mittendi ratione. Vt legatus is sit qui non modò publicè, sed publico etiam nomine & publica indutus persona missus est' (L3 original, bk. 1, p. 4; L3 trans., p. 7).

[122] '[L']occhio, & l'orecchio de gli stati' (*La historia d'Italia* (Venice: Giorgio Angelieri, 1563), bk. 15, fol. 433ᵛ).

[123] 'Diplomaten als Spiegel ihren herren? Römische und florentinische Diplomatie zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift für historische forschung*, 31.3 (2004), 359–80 (p. 377).

at the end of his book: 'And now you are also a spectator, not merely a reader'.[124] All stimuli that pleased the ear and eye of the ambassador were thus worthy of description. The Florentine agent Luca degli Asini, for example, described in a lengthy report to Christine de Lorraine, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, how he was left almost speechless by the expensive costumes of the spectators who attended Marie de Médicis's *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve* (The Ballet of the Triumph of Minerva) in 1615: 'The beautiful appearance to the eye that all those gentlemen made together would have astounded everyone, and attempting to describe it would diminish the wonder of it all'.[125] Later on, degli Asini described how the dance and music in the ballet pleased him simultaneously: 'The music tranquilly entertained and delighted the ear while the diverse scenery and the beautiful dancing had the same effect on the eye' (see Chapter 5, Section 4).[126]

Interestingly enough, ambassadors rarely offered their own analyses of the festival's political content. It was commonly accepted that the king, though absent, should be the primary interpreter of the events that were experienced *on his behalf*.[127] Being the 'ear and eye' of one's ruler, then, brought great responsibility. Gentili insisted that it called for no less than 'the highest prudence', for it was the ambassador's task 'to discern cleverly the truth in every situation, and not to waver, err, or be deceived or ignorant'.[128] His written coverage of the unfolding embassy should therefore be faithful and descriptive, as if though allowing the monarch immediate access to the diplomatic world at the host court.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed early modern thought about the relationship between diplomacy and festival culture through the lens of our three diplomatic practices: negotiation, hospitality, and public performance. Section 1 demonstrated that this type of thought was

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[124] 'Et iam spectator, nec modo lector eris' (Jean Dorat, *Magnificentissimi spectaculi [...]* (Paris: F. Morel, 1573), sig. cir).

[125] Cited in Barker and Gurney, 'House Left, House Right', p. 156.

[126] Cited in ibid., p. 157.

[127] Welch, 'Rethinking', p. 103. Welch refers to Ellen M. McClure who, focussing on the France of Louis XIV, argues that a faithful description of state events was thought to give the sovereign the impression of having attended those events in real life (see *Sunspots and the Sun King: Sovereignty and Mediation in Seventeenth-Century France*, The Humanities Laboratory (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), p. 149).

[128] 'Summæ prudentiæ'; 'Prudentis enim est hominis acutissimè videre quid in re quaque verum sit, non labi, non errare, non decipi, non nescire' (L3 original, bk. 3, p. 121; L3 trans., p. 169).

steeped in the humanist, pan-European culture of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The majority of texts discussed in this chapter drew inspiration from ancient Greek and Roman sources, promoted the moral virtues that these sources examined (such as liberality and magnificence), and recommended diplomacy as an instrument to restore harmony and peace to Europe. Reinforced by the polymath culture of the time, which allowed people to switch between their artistic, diplomatic, and scholarly duties, ideas about diplomacy and festival culture spread easily across disciplines. Just as humanist intellectuals like Torquato Tasso and Jean Hotman celebrated the irenical powers of diplomacy, so were members and collaborators of the royal French *Académie de Poésie et de Musique* inspired by the humanist notion that dance, poetry, and music could bring harmony to body and soul, and thus ultimately heal interfaith conflict.

Section 2 explored historical conceptions of negotiation. Only in the course of the sixteenth century did the term 'negotiation' begin to refer to the talks and discussion held between stakeholders in the diplomatic process, which is the definition of the word that will be used in this thesis. Humanist circles in late sixteenth-century France, centred around royal chancellor Michel de L'Hospital and Queen Regent Catherine de Médicis, promoted negotiation to maintain a balance or equilibrium of power between the opposing interests of Catholics and Huguenots at the Valois court. The *Académie*'s confidence in the healing power of the performing arts underpinned Catherine's regular use of balls and ballets in stimulating amity and conviviality among the rivalling religions. Their fashionably humanist ideas about cross-confessional diplomacy stood in oppositional tension to the medieval notion of *un roi, une foi, une loi* that was still prevalent in late sixteenth-century France. The motto stressed the importance of maintaining the religious, as well as juridical and political, unification of the kingdom. The tension between the crown's interfaith negotiation and its desire to safeguard religious unity will be discussed in Chapter 2.

As observed in Section 3, the most widely acknowledged function of festival culture in the early modern period was to receive subjects and foreign visitors of the crown with hospitality. This could vary from large public displays, such as banquets, ceremonies, and theatrical entertainments, to various kinds of largesse awarded to guests during or on the final day of the festival. It was commonly believed that the degree of hospitality shown towards visiting delegates should match the international standing of their ruler. By the

end of the sixteenth century, diplomatic theorists such as Gentili debated the question whether the right of embassy should be extended to rebels, burglars, and outlaws and, if so, to what degree they should be entitled to a ruler's hospitality.

Most political commentators from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries agreed that hospitality should express the ruler's generosity or liberality, a moral virtue that was recommended by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*. By extending hospitality to domestic and foreign visitors, the ruler could demonstrate his respect and goodwill towards them, while also showing off his wealth and distinguished taste. Implied in theoretical discussions on the topic was the belief that receiving one's guests could never be entirely altruistic, as the Christian virtue of *caritas* dictated, but was aimed primarily at glorifying the figure of the ruler. The tension in practices of hospitality between the interests of the ruler and that of his visitors will be examined in Chapter 3.

Section 4, finally, examined historical ideas about diplomacy as a public performance. Most political commentators discussed in this section were deeply aware of the public nature of court life in which every aspect of one's appearance could become subject to close scrutiny by those witnessing or reading about it in retrospect. Baldassare Castiglione, for one, advised nobles to practise their dancing skills behind closed doors and not in public spaces at court, as possible missteps would only damage their social reputation. Niccolò Machiavelli understood that the essentially public character of court life could be exploited for diplomatic purposes. They recommended rulers and ambassadors to dissemble their true motives and use public occasions to perform different political personas so as to satisfy and win the support of negotiation partners with diverging interests and aspirations.

Artists and statesmen believed that pageantry, a controlled and conspicuous form of public performance, could be deployed to similar effects. Dance master Thoinot Arbeau, for one, regarded dance as an effective tool for public diplomacy, insofar as it could inform and persuade audiences through motion without having to resort to verbal language. Theorists of diplomacy, by contrast, hardly considered dancing, or any aspect of festival culture, as an independent tool for diplomatic communication. In their view, diplomacy was a largely secretive phenomenon and thus had little in common with the ostentatious nature of the festival. The tension between diplomacy as a secret or backchannel activity, and diplomacy as a public performance, will be explored in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2

Cross-Confessional Diplomacy at the
Parisian Court Festivals of Summer 1572:
Negotiating Difference between Catholics and Protestants

Mollify discord and enmity through marriage.

Motto by humanist poet Jean Passerat (1534-1602) expressing the conciliatory themes of the festival for the Valois-Navarre wedding in August 1572. It was inscribed on the commemorative medal that Passerat designed for the occasion.[1]

This chapter focuses on the reception of the cross-confessional diplomacy that Catherine de Médicis and her son Charles IX sought to promote and implement at two festivals in summer 1572 at their residential court in Paris. The first festival was organised in honour of an extraordinary English embassy that visited Paris between 8 and 20 June to ratify the Treaty of Blois, a defensive-commerce alliance between Catholic France and Protestant England against the dominance of Spain. The pact ended the historic rivalry between the two kingdoms.[2] The English embassy, headed by Edward Fiennes de Clinton (1512-1585), first Earl of Lincoln, was received with lavish banquets and theatrical entertainments organised by French nobles from both Catholic and Huguenot factions, ranging from light-hearted comedies to musical divertissements. The second festival was held in August for the controversial marriage of the Catholic Princess Marguerite de Valois, Catherine's youngest daughter, and Henri de Bourbon, Roi de Navarre, the nominal head

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[1] 'La discorde et l'inimitié assoupir par le mariage' ('Recueil de devises grecques, latines ou françaises, en vers et en prose', BnF, MS fr. 894, fols. 101ʳ-102ʳ (fol. 102ʳ).
[2] Susan Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 127; Glenn John Richardson, 'England and France in the Sixteenth Century', *History Compass*, 6.2 (2008), 510–28 (p. 518).

of the Huguenots. Inaugurated with the official wedding ceremony on 18 August, the festival boasted over the course of three consecutive days a banquet, a ball, a triumphal procession, a *course de bague* ('running at the ring'), and — constituting the climax of the celebrations — a splendid combat-ballet at the Louvre Palace which, according to Frances A. Yates, was the first pageant to which the *Académie de Poésie et de Musique* contributed songs and verses.[3] The aims of the cross-confessional diplomacy that under-pinned both festivals were twofold: to negotiate difference between Catholic and Protestant participants in various national groups, and to demonstrate to the international community that the French monarchy was still capable of uniting its Catholic and Hugue-not subjects in a common cause, despite their destructive religious passions.

The court festivals for the Treaty of Blois and the Valois-Navarre wedding took place at a critical juncture in the history of the French Religious Wars. On both sides of the Channel, their engineers regarded the events and the alliances they celebrated as the log-ical outcome of improving relations between Catholics and Huguenots on the one hand, and France and England on the other. The signing of the Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye two years earlier (8 August 1570) had granted France's Huguenot minority a substantial body of privileges, including liberty of conscience throughout the kingdom and free prac-tice of religion within three towns in every province.[4] According to Mack P. Holt and Robert J. Knecht, these gestures of toleration ultimately enabled Catherine to open mat-rimonial negotiations with Jeanne d'Albret (1528-1572), Henri's mother and a prominent Huguenot leader herself, as well as with Elizabeth I, a long-time protector of Huguenot interests. Catherine's talks with the English queen eventually resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty of Blois.[5] As Nancy Lyman Roelker has suggested, the Anglo-French and

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[3] *The French Academies*, p. 254. A mock siege led by Huguenot nobles on a temporarily constructed wooden fort defended by the king's brother, Henri, duc d'Anjou, was eventually cancelled. This was sup-posedly due to the bad health of one of the Huguenot participants, Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, but Julia Prest discusses the intriguing possibility that the latter feared the simulated battle would tip over into real violence (see 'Performing Violence', pp. 44–45, and our discussion of *Le Paradis d'Amour* in Section 3 below).

[4] On the broader diplomatic and political context of the edict, see James Westfall Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France, 1559-1576: The Hugenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909), pp. 416–18; Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, New Ap-proaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 69–70; Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion*, pp. 40–1; Arlette Jouanna, *La Saint-Barthélemy: Les Mystères d'un crime d'État, 24 août 1572*, Les journées qui ont fait la France (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), pp. 29–60.

[5] Holt, *The French Wars of Religion*, p. 76; Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion*, p. 42. The Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye reportedly included a secret clause that anticipated the marriage of Henri de Na-varre and Marguerite de Valois; see Ivan Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis* (Paris: Fayard, 1979), p. 263.

Valois-Navarre alliances constituted each other's counterpart — one international, the other domestic.[6]

Despite these favourable signs, which suggested that national and foreign peace for France was finally underway, summer 1572 would go down as one of the bleakest pages in the country's history. On 22 August, the Valois-Navarre festival was brought to a premature end owing to the failed assassination of Gaspard de Coligny (1519-1572), military leader of the Huguenots. The chaos following the attempted murder of Coligny gave way to the infamous Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacres two days later, on 24 August, during which at least 3,000 Huguenots were killed in Paris and an additional 7,000 were slain in the provinces over the next three weeks.[7] Owing to this sudden outburst of violence, an official *livret* or *recueil* for our two court festivals seems never to have been produced.[8] We will therefore rely primarily on sources written by participants in the events — English ambassadors, French and German students, Huguenot supporters —, as well as on accounts of the diplomatic negotiations that preceded the celebrations.[9]

This chapter focuses on how the organisers and participants of our two court festivals used various diplomatic strategies to negotiate cultural, political, and religious difference between French and English visitors on the one hand, and Catholic and Huguenot visitors on the other. It borrows from modern studies on international relations, particularly those associated with the English School of Hedley Bull, notably the insight that diplomatic culture is geared towards facilitating communication between actors that do not share the same cultural background.[10] Ambassadors work within a 'sparse' or 'thin' culture, as opposed to a 'thick' one, because they rely on a minimum set of criteria and tools for

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[6] *Queen of Navarre: Jeanne d'Albret, 1528-1572* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 357.

[7] Jouanna, *Saint-Barthélemy*, p. 10.

[8] Michel Jove published an anonymously written chronicle on the nuptial festivities and the ensuing massacre in Paris shortly after the events (*Discovrs dv triomphe des nopces dv Roy de Nauarre auec Madame Marguerite de France [...]* (Lyon: Michel Jove, 1572), Musée du château de Pau, B. P. 608-A). However, the account does not seem to have been officially commissioned by the French crown, for it lacks the customary dedicatory preface to the king and was printed 'at the sign of [the Society of] Jesus', as indicated on the title page. Since Jove was the house printer of the Jesuits in Lyon, it appears that the chronicle was targeted primarily at that community. By bringing accounts of the festival and the massacres together in the same book, the anonymous author suggested that both events were related and part of the same alleged strategy of the monarchy to eliminate Huguenot presence in France. Although disputed (see Section 3 below), this was the interpretation favoured — and supported — by the Jesuits.

[9] These sources will be introduced in Sections 1, 2, and 3 below.

[10] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; original publ. 1977), pp. 176-77, 304-05.

communication to make interaction possible.[11] Bull and, more recently, other scholars, have suggested that the shared culture of diplomacy is defined by form, namely ceremony and protocol, rather than substantive values.[12] In this social space, the ambassador becomes focussed primarily on recognising and managing difference, continuously aimed at '[holding] open the possibility of talk'.[13]

Modern scholars in international relations, however, largely explain difference in diplomatic interaction by referring to the different nationalities of ambassadors. Ole Jacob Sending, for instance, contends 'that what unites diplomats is simultaneously what separates them, namely the representation of different territorial units'.[14] This point is also reinforced by Ellen R. Welch in her recent book chapter on diplomacy and ballets at the late Valois court.[15] In it, she assumes that foreign diplomats usually did not resort to the same frame of reference as domestic audiences. French spectators, in other words, were more likely to share 'cultural and aesthetic codes', because they all submitted to the same royal authority, in contrast to foreign diplomats who were allied to different rulers.[16] According to Welch, the reactions of foreign diplomats were thus more varied and intricate, giving way to misunderstandings or interpretations that differed from the political messages conveyed by the spectacle. This chapter will show that the diplomatic culture at the Parisian festivals of summer 1572 was as much concerned with difference abroad as it was with difference at home.

This chapter is the first study to compare the festivals for the Treaty of Blois and the Valois-Navarre wedding taking on board their theatrical entertainments and official ceremonies, as well as the diplomatic negotiations that took place behind the scenes. The festivities for the Anglo-French pact have not been discussed in detail before, apart from

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[11] Paul Sharp, 'For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 1.1 (1999), 33–57 (pp. 34–35); Ole Jacob Sending, 'United by Difference: Diplomacy as a Thin Culture', *International Journal*, 66.3 (2011), 643–59.

[12] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 176-77, 304-05; Sasson Sofer, 'The Diplomat as a Stranger', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8.3 (1997), 179–86 (p. 185); Sending, 'United by Difference', pp. 647, 650; Jennifer Mitzen, 'From Representation to Governing: Diplomacy and the Constitution of International Public Power', in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. by Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 136 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 111–39 (pp. 116–20).

[13] Mark E. Warren, 'What Should and Should Not Be Said: Deliberating Sensitive Issues', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 37.2 (2006), 163–81 (p. 175).

[14] 'United by difference', p. 644.

[15] 'Rethinking', pp. 102-3.

[16] Ibid.

the edited and annotated edition of several English accounts of the festival that have appeared in Oxford University Press's collection of John Nichols's *The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth I* (1788-1823).[17] The Valois-Navarre festival, by contrast, has received considerable attention in various publications, most of which, however, focus on individual pageants, especially the combat-ballet known as *Le Paradis d'Amour*.[18] The present chapter will draw on this scholarship, while also expanding our understanding of the diplomatic significance of the festivals as a whole by citing extensively from surviving chronicles, diplomatic documents, and eyewitness accounts, both printed and written.

1. Diplomatic context

Anyone rambling through Paris during the hot summer months of 1572 was likely to enter streets that brimmed with hope mingled with intense anxiety. On 18 August, Marguerite de Valois would finally marry Henri de Navarre at the cathedral of Notre-Dame.[19] More than two years had passed since Catherine de Médicis first broached the match to the groom's mother, Jeanne d'Albret.[20] Their backchannel negotiations over the matrimonial project were complicated and protracted.[21] Jeanne was long opposed to the wedding.

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[17] '[The Ratification of the Treaty of Blois, 26 May-5 July 1572]', ed. by David Parrott and Faith Eales, in *John Nichols's 'The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth I': A New Edition of the Early Modern Sources*, ed. by Elizabeth Goldring and others, 5 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), II: *1572-1578*, 9–13.

[18] Pierre Champion, *Charles IX: La France et le contrôle de l'Espagne*, 2 vols (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1939), II, pp. 60–77; Jacqueline Boucher, *Deux épouses et reines à la fin du XVIe Siècle: Louise de Lorraine et Marguerite de France* (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 1995), pp. 12–29; Margaret M. McGowan, *Dance in the Renaissance: European Fashion, French Obsession* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 87–90; ead., 'Fêtes: Religious and Political Conflict Dramatised: The Role of Charles IX', in *Writers in Conflict in Sixteenth-Century France: Essays in Honour of Malcolm Quainton*, ed. by Elizabeth Vinestock and David Foster (Durham: Durham Modern Languages Series, 2008), pp. 215–38 (pp. 229-30); ead., 'Festivities for the Marriage of Henri de Navarre and Marguerite de Valois (1572): Aesthetic Triumphs and Political Exploitation', in *Court & Humour in the French Renaissance: Essays in Honour of Professor Pauline Smith*, ed. by Sarah Alyn Stacey (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 29–42; Van Orden, *Music, Discipline, and Arms*, pp. 107–10; Prest, 'Performing Violence', pp. 38–55.

[19] The secular ceremony of betrothal took place at the Louvre Palace on 17 August when the bridal couple signed the marriage contract. The ceremony was followed by a wedding supper and an evening ball. By French royal tradition, Marguerite was then escorted by her family and various nobles to the bishop's palace next to Notre-Dame where she spent the night. For an anonymous account of the *fiançailles*, see 'Discours des nopces du Roy de Nauarre & de la sœur du Roy', in *Mémoires*, ed. by Goulart, I, 353–57 (p. 353).

[20] As early as 3 June 1569, Henry Norris, the English ambassador to France, informed Queen Elizabeth I that Catherine wished to offer Jeanne 'Madame Margaret in marriage to the prince her son' (in CSPF, IX, p. 83).

[21] The matrimonial negotiations are most fully described in Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, pp. 354–83; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, pp. 139–40, 144–45, 146–51; Bernard Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret: Chronique (1528-1572)* (Anglet: Atlantica, 2002), pp. 419–501.

Being a devout Protestant, she feared that her son, notorious for his womanising, would easily fall prey to what she regarded as the lax morals and decadence of the French court.[22] However, Jeanne never refused to negotiate with Catherine. She realised that the marriage offered a unique opportunity to expand the influence of Henri, whose position as first prince du sang (prince of the blood) allowed him to ascend the throne of France if the Valois kings proved unable to produce a viable heir.[23] Moreover, the union would help to provide security for the House of Bourbon which had backed the Huguenot dissenters in the recent civil war.[24] Jeanne thus used her intransigence in matters of religion as a negotiation strategy to secure favourable conditions for Henri. On several occasions, she demanded Marguerite's conversion to Protestantism and — knowing that this was unattainable — continued to bargain over privileges for her son after having signed the marriage contract on 11 April 1572.[25] On her deathbed in June 1572, Jeanne expressed the wish that Henri be permitted 'free exercise of the true religion'.[26]

The overall reception of the signed marriage contract diverged widely, both within and outside France. Domestic supporters of the wedding included the humanist *moyenneurs* or *politiques*, especially those associated with the Montmorency family. This family, established in central France, counted moderate religionists from both sides among its members.[27] As seen in Chapter 1, the *moyenneurs* wished to reconcile the opposing religious

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[22] Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, p. 140. On 8 March 1572, Jeanne wrote to Henri that '[Marguerite] is beautiful and discreet and graceful but raised in the most accursed and corrupted company that ever was' ('[Marguerite] est belle et bien advisee et de bonne grace mais nourrie en la plus maudite et corrumpue compagnie qui fut jamais'). Cited in Junko Shimizu, *Conflict of Loyalties, Politics and Religion in the Career of Gaspard de Coligny: Admiral of France, 1519-1572* (Geneva: Droz, 1970), p. 151, n. 27.

[23] Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, p. 359; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, p. 147.

[24] Shimizu, *Conflict of Loyalties*, p. 151.

[25] The clauses of the marriage contract are printed in Simon Goulart's *Mémoires de l'estat de France* ('Articles du pour parler [pourparler] du mariage du Prince de Nauarre & de la sœur du Roy', I, pp. 285–90). They are concerned primarily with the inheritance of various lands and do not mention the difference of faith between the two partners. In Sections 2 and 3 below, we will read more about avoiding the thorny issue of religion and other — diplomatic — efforts of the French crown to prevent controversy over confessional difference. For the official marriage contract, see 'Contrat de mariage de Marguerite troisième fille du Roy Henry II avec Henry Roy de Navarre du VII jour d'Aoust 1572', Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France, MS Godefroy 301, fol. 75. It seems that the engagement ceremony was initially scheduled for 7 August (this is the date referred to in the official contract) but that it had to be postponed until 17 August due to the protracted negotiations and Jeanne's sudden death earlier that summer. See Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret*, p. 510; McGowan, *Dance in the Renaissance*, p. 87.

[26] '[L]a Vraye profission de la Vraye Religion'; in 'Coppie du Testament […], BnF, MS fr. 4507, fols. 143r-148r (fol. 144r). Jeanne is believed to have died from tuberculosis and an infection in the right breast. On the causes of her death, both real and imagined, see Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, pp. 391–92; Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret*, p. 508.

[27] Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, p. 354; James M. Osborn, *Young Philip Sidney, 1572-1577*, The Elizabethan Club Series, 5 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 56.

factions and end the civil wars by peaceful means. They hoped that the interfaith Valois-Navarre marriage could help to achieve this. Gaspard de Coligny and his magnates, though initially suspicious of Catherine's intentions, also became prominent supporters of the match. Coligny expected that the wedding would strengthen his position at court and open up the possibility of an armed intervention by France into the Provinces to support the Dutch Calvinists in their rebellion against Habsburg Spain.[28]

Domestic opposition to the match was mostly represented by the ultra-Catholic Guise family, headed by Charles (1524-1574), Cardinal de Lorraine and Henri (1550-1588), duc de Guise.[29] This family, whose properties lay in eastern France, was unwilling to see its political power at court diminish further. After the death of Catherine's husband, Henri II (1519-1559), the Guises quickly seized influence over the young King François II (1544-1560), husband to their kinswoman Mary Stuart of Scotland (1542-1587), but had increasingly lost power after the signing of the Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. They believed that the Valois-Navarre marriage would only strengthen the position of the Huguenots at court.[30]

The most important supporters of the marriage outside France were the Protestant Queen Elizabeth I of England and the Dutch Prince Louis of Nassau (1538-1574). Louis was the younger brother of William of Orange (1533-1584), leader of the Dutch Revolt, and served as a personal advisor to Jeanne during the negotiation process.[31] Both Elizabeth and Louis hoped that the union would boost Protestant influence in Europe and persuade France to join England and the Dutch Provinces in a defensive league against Spain.[32] International opposition to the union came from Catholic Spain and particularly

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[28] Shimizu, *Conflict of Loyalties*, p. 150; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, pp. 140, 143.

[29] As noted above, Jeanne d'Albret's attitude towards the marriage was more complex. Although she remained intransigent to the last, her obstinacy served as a negotiation strategy to expand Bourbon influence at court.

[30] Thompson, *The Wars of Religion*, pp. 416–18; Holt, *The French Wars of Religion*, pp. 69–70; Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion*, pp. 40–41; Jouanna, *Saint-Barthélemy*, pp. 29–60.

[31] Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, pp. 341, 369–79; Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 490–91. Nancy Roelker calls Nassau Jeanne's 'most valued adviser [during the marital negotiations] aside from her own retainers' (in *Queen of Navarre*, p. 341).

[32] Ibid., pp. 341–42, 379; Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 271–75; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, p. 142; Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret*, pp. 486–87. For Elizabeth, maintaining good relations with the Huguenot party at the Valois court became a central part of her foreign policy after the ardent Protestant Francis Walsingham was appointed English ambassador to France. On Walsingham's replacement of Henry Norris in August 1570, the queen handed him her instructions (see *Compleat*, pp. 1–5). In the words of her secretary and chief advisor, William Cecil, first Baron Burghley (1520-1598), Elizabeth asked Walsingham to report the following to the king and his Huguenot nobles (ibid., pp. 1-2):

the Holy See in Rome who regarded the match as nothing short of blasphemy. Pope Pius V (1504-1572) steadfastly refused to grant dispensation on account of Henri's religion and the consanguinity *à troisième degré* (within the third degree) that existed between Marguerite and the prince.[33] In February 1572, one month before Catherine and Jeanne entered the final stage of the marital negotiations, Pius sent his nephew Michele Bonelli (1541-1598), Cardinal Alessandrino, as a special envoy to Charles IX's court at Blois with the straightforward instruction 'to break off the marriage'.[34] The fact that Catherine's design for peace evoked such strong reactions from various European powers reveals the extent to which the proposed wedding, though being a domestic affair in the first place, was believed by contemporaries to affect international relations at large.

In correspondence with their allies and ambassadors abroad, Catherine and Charles were keen to represent the interfaith marriage as a necessary diplomatic instrument for peace and order, both within and outside France. Their justification of the union was thus clearly inspired by the conciliatory ideas of the *moyenneurs* for whom maintaining political stability was more important than protecting religious unification at all costs. In an attempt to rally the support of Catholic rulers, mother and son argued that the Roman Catholic Church actually stood to gain from the marriage. They suggested that national order would ultimately lead to the religious unification of France. When Catherine, for example, asked her cousin Cosimo I de' Medici (1519-1574), Grand Duke of Tuscany, to use his good relations with Pius V and support the dispensation, she insisted that 'nothing can make us hope more for the overall rise of our religion and the universal repose of our

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We desire that the Accord [the Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye] betwixt the King our good Brother [Charles IX], and the Prince of Navarre [Henri de Bourbon], Prince of Condé [Henri I], and the Admirall [Gaspard de Coligny], with the rest of the Company, being the Kings Subjects, might be made as favourable for the reasonable contentation and surety of the said Princes and their party, as may be possible to the maintenance and continuance of them in the liberty of their Consciences for the cause of Religion.

[33] Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, p. 358; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, pp. 147–48. Henri's Protestantism was obviously of greater concern to Rome than the prince's degree of kinship to Marguerite: in May 1570, Pius accepted the marriage of Philip II of Spain and his first cousin Anna of Austria, the eldest daughter of the king's uncle Maximilian II, Holy Roman Emperor, without much protestation. See Baptista Platina, *The Lives of the Popes: From the Time of Our Saviour Jesus Christ, to the Reign of Sixtus IV [...]*, trans. and continued by Paul Rycaut (London: printed for Christopher Wilkinson, 1685), p. 163.

[34] '[P]our [...] rompre ce mariage'; in [Henri Estienne], *Discovrs merveillevx [...]* ([Geneva]: [J. Rivery], 1575), p. 44. The phrasing is from a widely distributed polemical pamphlet that was published three years after the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacres by the Huguenot printer and scholar Henri Estienne (1528-1598). It fiercely criticised the influence of Catherine on domestic affairs and accused her of instigating the massacres. For discussions of Cardinal Alessandrino's visit to Blois, see Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 277–78; Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, pp. 366–67; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, p. 148; Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret*, pp. 474, 476.

kingdom than the marriage of my daughter and the prince of Navarre'.[35] Charles, instructing his resident ambassador in Rome to recommend the marriage to Pius, stated that only 'by means of reconciliation' and 'in friendship' could France extinguish its 'fire of troubles and division' and become 'the heart of Christendom' again.[36] Interestingly, he compared his sister's wedding to the mixed union of Clovis, once a pagan warrior-leader, and Clotilde of Burgundy, a Christian princess, in about 492-494 AD.[37] The implication of Charles's comparison was that Henri, just like Clovis, would eventually convert to the Catholic faith and recover the religious unification of the kingdom that Clovis, as first monarch of the Merovingian Franks, had implemented through his baptism in 496 AD.[38]

In letters to Protestant rulers, Catherine and Charles obviously avoided references to Catholicism and talked about the peace alliance between the French crown and the House of Bourbon in largely general terms. Writing to Queen Elizabeth in April 1572, for example, Catherine suggested that God — a general Christian God — had presided over the marital negotiations himself:

> God, who continues to extend his graces and blessings in this kingdom more and more, has brought about the confirmation and ratification of peace through the marriage concluded and decreed between my dear and beloved Marguerite, and our very dear and beloved King of Navarre.[39]

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[35] 'Car rien ne nous peult faire espérer l'augmentation entière de nostre religion et le repos universel de ce royaulme que le mariage de ma fille et du prince de Navarre' (8 October 1571, in Letters CdM, IV, p. 76). Catherine reiterated the argument when she retrospectively justified the marriage to Pius one day after the official wedding ceremony on 18 August 1572: '[Y]ou will judge this marriage necessary for the health and peace of the kingdom' ('[E]le juegera cet mariage aystre nécessaire pour le salut et le repos d'icelui [ce royaume]'; Letters CdM, IV, p. 110; *Portraits*, trans. by Chang and Kong, p. 89). For more on Cosimo's involvement in Catherine and Charles's efforts to obtain papal dispensation, see Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, p. 357; Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, p. 271; Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret*, pp. 437, 461.

[36] '[L]e feu des troubles et divisions [...] lequel [...] m'enseigne d'estendre et admortir par voye de reconciliation ès amityé comme ceste cy, [...], pour estre ce royaulme le cœur de la chretienté' (to François Rougier, sieur de Malras and baron de Ferrals, 31 July 1572, *Le Cabinet historique*, ed. by Louis Paris, II, *Part 1: Documents* (1856), p. 233). Rougier served the French crown in Rome from 1571 until his death in 1575.

[37] 'Clovis, a heathen King, married to a woman of the faith by permission or tolerance of the Church' ('C'est assavoir, un Clovis, Roy infidèlle, marié à une fidèlle par permission ou tolerance de l'Eglise'; ibid., p. 232).

[38] In other letters to Rougier, Charles explicitly referred to the likelihood of Henri's conversion to Catholicism (see Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, p. 358).

[39] 'Dieu continuant de plus en plus ses graces et bénédictions en ce royaulme y a apporté la confirmation et ratification du repos par le mariage conclu et arresté entre ma très chère et amée fille Marguerite et nostre très cher et amé filz le roy de Navarre' (22 April 1572, Letters CdM, IV, p. 98).

Themes of peace and order also recurred at the festival for the Valois-Navarre marriage. Catherine instructed the humanist poet Jean Passerat (1534-1602) to design the commemorative medals for the occasion without explicitly referring to either the Catholic or the Reformed faith. In this way, she undoubtedly hoped to win the support of both Catholic and Protestant visitors. The medals were distributed among bystanders after the official wedding ceremony on 18 August 1572. Passerat produced a little known manuscript, held at the Bibiliothèque nationale de France today, that contains the motto as well as a short description of each device.[40] All of his descriptions emphasise the conciliatory nature of the mixed union, referring to general themes of peace and harmony, as in the Latin phrase 'æquatæ stabunt lances' ('levelled scales will remain in place') or in the motto 'mollify discord and enmity through marriage'.[41] Passerat's manuscript is the only known source written by one of its organisers, and one which, moreover, provides a glimpse of Catherine's diplomatic programme behind the celebrations. The verbal and visual messages of the medals will be discussed in Section 3 below.

In addition to its role as a diplomatic instrument for peace and order, the impending marriage offered Catherine the opportunity to expand the dynastic influence of the house of Valois in France. The union held the attractive possibility that should Catherine's sons fail to beget a legitimate heir, the Valois dynasty would be preserved through the offspring of Henri with Marguerite, given his position as first prince du sang. What is more, the match would enable Catherine to keep the Huguenot party under control, while at the same time balancing the Guise and Montmorency families against each other to safeguard the power of the French crown.[42]

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, all of the stakeholders involved in the marital negotiations envisaged the Valois-Navarre union as the domestic counterpart of the Treaty of Blois. Negotiators on both sides of the Channel agreed that both alliances — between France and England on the one hand, and between the houses of Valois and Bourbon on the other — were particularly effective in holding together a Catholic-

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[40] 'Recueil de devises grecques, latines ou françaises, en vers et en prose' (BnF, MS fr. 894, fols. 101ʳ-102ʳ). Frances A. Yates mentions the manuscript in passing (see *Valois Tapestries*, p. 63). The document constitutes a rich source for the study of court festivals under the late Valois kings, as it includes sketches and descriptions by Passerat of a wide range of devices (and some portraits), all of which were probably given to spectators of various entertainments.

[41] 'La discorde et l'inimitié assoupir par le mariage' ('Recueil', fols. 101ᵛ, 102ʳ).

[42] Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion*, p. 28.

Protestant accord in Europe. They hoped that the ambitious scale of Catherine's diplomatic schemes, forging relations on both a domestic and an international level, would tempt neighbouring states to join the Anglo-French league. Such a pan-European network could at the same time counter the growing power of Spain. Philip II had been providing funds to the Catholic forces in the French Religious Wars and thus seriously endangered the wounded monarchy which, as Catherine well understood, could only be healed by peace and stability. Philip's involvement in the Ridolfi Plot of April 1571 had moreover revealed his readiness to conspire with Mary Stuart of Scotland and overthrow Elizabeth in an attempt to recover Catholicism in England. When faced with Spain's aggressive expansionism in the Dutch Provinces and its recent victory over the Turks in the Battle of Lepanto on 7 October 1571, both France and England were rocked into the realisation that Philip II had become one of the most powerful monarchs in Europe.[43]

The Treaty of Blois was a by-product of the failed negotiations over a marriage between Queen Elizabeth and Catherine's eldest son, Henri, duc d'Anjou, the future King Henri III. Talks about the potential marriage, which Catherine officially opened in October 1570, had floundered on the issue of religious difference. Anjou was a zealous Catholic and heavily under the sway of the Guise family. There was no way by which he could justify to his followers a marriage with a 'heretic bastard', as Catholic Europe called the English queen, owing to her Protestant faith and alleged status as illegitimate child of King Henry VIII.[44] In January 1572, when Anjou tried to sabotage his mother's plans with a series of absurdly unrealistic demands, talks came finally to an end.[45] Elizabeth, however, still recognised the possibility of negotiating a defensive and commercial pact with France. She would only agree to amity with France, however, if the terms and conditions

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[43] Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 22; Doran, *Monarchy & Matrimony*, p. 120; *Encyclopedia of Tudor England*, ed. by John A. Wagner and Susan Walters Schmid, 3 vols (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2012), I, p. 124.

[44] Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony*, pp. 13–21, see especially p. 13. On 25 February 1570, Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth on precisely these grounds.

[45] Catherine quickly proposed a new suit — that of her youngest son, Hercule-François, duc d'Alençon — and both parties continued to employ matrimony as a diplomatic tool (see ibid., pp. 130–53, especially p. 130). Studies on the failed Elizabeth-Anjou match include Hector de La Ferrière, *Les Projets de mariage de la reine Élisabeth*, Bibliothèque contemporaine (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), pp. 62–126; John E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I*, The Bedford Historical Series, 1 (London: Cape, 1938), pp. 220–36; Mary Dewar, *Sir Thomas Smith: A Tudor Intellectual in Office* (London: Athlone Press, 1964), pp. 129–48; Roelker, *Queen of Navarre*, pp. 327–83; Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 261–317; Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony*, pp. 99–129; Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici*, pp. 138–65; Berdou d'Aas, *Jeanne III d'Albret*, pp. 419–69; Jouanna, *Saint-Barthélemy*, pp. 61–98.

of the contract for the Valois-Navarre marriage were formally accepted by Jeanne d'Albret. This would offer the queen a sufficient guarantee of Catherine's commitment to protecting the civil rights of Navarre and his party.

The English diplomats in France who had been instructed by Elizabeth to negotiate the defensive-commerce treaty — Francis Walsingham (*c.* 1532-1590), the queen's resident ambassador in Paris, and Thomas Smith (1513-1577) — thus kept a close watch on the negotiations over the Valois-Navarre match.[46] We know from a letter sent by Jeanne to her personal councillor on 11 March 1572 that Catherine 'was pressured by the English ambassadors to grant it to me [fair treatment], having been charged by the Queen their Mistress [Elizabeth] to found the assurance of their negotiation and of the new league they are forming'.[47] Indeed, the so-called Treaty of Blois that resulted from the Anglo-French talks was only concluded by England on 19 April 1572, eight days after Jeanne had signed the contract for her son's marriage.[48] In a letter held at the British Library, Jeanne personally informed Elizabeth that she and Catherine had finally arrived at an agreement (on 4 April).[49] The letter provides evidence of the good diplomatic relations that existed between Elizabeth and France's Huguenot community, as well as of the significant influence that the English queen wielded over late sixteenth-century French politics in general:

> I [Jeanne] would not […], Madame [Elizabeth], lose time in informing you of the event [the marriage between Henri and Marguerite], so that I may rejoice with you, who have so wisely foreseen how greatly this alliance may lead, not only to the prosperity and peace of this realm, a thing which interests Your Majesty greatly, but may also extend its real benefits to neighbouring states.[50]

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[46] See Walsingham's letters to William Cecil (31 January 1572, CSPF, X, p. 15; 19 March 1572, ibid., p. 60; 29 March 1572, BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F. VI, fol. 1) and an anonymous report entitled 'Occurrents from France' (2 February 1572, CSPF, X, pp. 49–50 (p. 49)). CSPF also includes a copy of the marriage contract (ibid. p. 78). See Dewar, *Sir Thomas Smith*, pp. 129–48, for more on Smith and Walsingham's work on the Treaty of Blois.

[47] '[E]lle est pressée par les ambassad^{rs} d'Angleterre de me laccorder, ayans charge de la Royne leur Maistresse de fonder lasseurance de leur negociation et de la nouuelle ligue quils font' (BnF, MS fr. 2748, III, fols. 119^r-123^r (fol. 119^v)). The personal councillor to whom Jeanne sent this letter was Louis de Goulard, sieur de Beauvoir and *gouverneur* of Henri de Navarre.

[48] A number of original documents related to the drafting, signing, and ratification of the Treaty of Blois can be found in BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F. VI, including a copy of the edict itself (fols. 26^r-44^v).

[49] Cotton MS Vespasian F. VI, fol. 9 (5 April 1572).

[50] Ibid. (see appendix); *Queen of Navarre*, trans. by Roelker, p. 382.

2. The Festival for the Treaty of Blois, June 1572

The French court festival for the ratification of the Treaty of Blois took place in June 1572, two months before the Valois-Navarre wedding. On 8 June, the English delegation of the Earl of Lincoln was met just outside Paris by Charles IX's representative, Artus (1512-1582), maréchal (marshal) de Cossé.[51] Instead of receiving a solemn entry into the capital, as was customary for representatives of an internationally respected monarch like Elizabeth I, the ambassadors were conducted to St Denis 'where there was a good dinner prepared'.[52] The breach of protocol was probably necessitated by the tense atmosphere that existed in Paris between religionists on both sides, as an increasing number of foreign Protestants were arriving there for the impending wedding of Henri and Marguerite.[53] Since the entry would involve a long procession through the streets of the capital, the king could obviously not guarantee the safety of the Protestant English.[54] The direct cause for the change of plans, however, seems to have been the imminent death of Jeanne d'Albret. Thomas Smith reported that '[a]fter dinner [at St Denis] news was brought that the Queen of Navarre […] lay without hope of life in Paris, whom the Queen Mother [Catherine], the King, and all his brethren and sister had visited and departed from without any hope to see her again'.[55] A low-key reception may therefore have been considered more appropriate to the occasion than a pompous open-air celebration.[56] At the same time, it meant

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[51] Artus was the cousin of François de Montmorency who, together with Paul de Foix, headed the special embassy to England around the same time.

[52] Dispatch of Thomas Smith to William Cecil (7 June 1572, CSPF, X, p. 124).

[53] On 30 June, Charles issued a royal proclamation that expressly forbade the molestation of foreigners and followers of Henri de Navarre who had travelled to Paris that summer. One foreign traveller, the Tyrolian medical student Lucas Geizkofler, whose description of the nuptial festivities will be discussed in Section 3 below, was forced to change his lodgings with a Huguenot supporter (the printer and bookseller André Wechel, d. 1581) for lodgings with a Catholic priest (one M. Blandis) on account of the violent incidents. See Lucas Geizkofler, *Historia [...]*, in Manfred Linsbauer, 'Lucas Geizkofler und seine Autobiographie', 2 vols (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Vienna, 1978), I, pp. 164-373 (p. 202). For a French translation of Geizkofler's memoirs, see *Mémoires de Luc Geizkofler, Tyrolien (1550-1620)*, trans. by Edouard Fick (Geneva: Fick, 1892).

[54] On 15 June, the diplomats nonetheless joined the king in an open-air cavalcade to the Louvre Palace after they had ratified the Treaty of Blois at the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois (see our discussion below). The procession, however, was much shorter than a solemn entry into the capital would have been: the church was located opposite the Louvre.

[55] CSPF, X, p. 124. Nancy Roelker believes that the royal family's visit to Jeanne took place on 6 June (*Queen of Navarre*, p. 388). Jeanne passed away three days later, in the morning of 9 June.

[56] The mourning period that followed after Jeanne's death on 9 June lasted until 18 August, the day on which Henri and Marguerite officially married at Notre-Dame. In her memoirs, Marguerite wrote that on her wedding day 'the king of Navarre and his suite had exchanged their mourning for very rich and precious clothes' ('le Roy de Nauarre & sa trouppe y ayants laissé & changé le dueil en habits tres-riches & beaux'; *Les Memoires de la Roine Margverite* (Paris: Charles Chappellain, 1628), bk. 1, p. 48). Although Navarre, together with the royal brothers and Condé, indeed seems to have worn richly decorated attire on the day

a token of respect for the English who regarded Jeanne as an important representative of the Protestant faith in France.[57]

Over the next five days, the diplomats took time to recover from their long journey by sea.[58] On 11 June, they were visited by Claude Pinard (1525-1605), the secretary of state, at their lodgings in the Louvre Palace. When joined by maréchal de Cossé and the previous French ambassador to England, Jacques Bochetel, the English diplomats were informed that the ratification ceremony for the Treaty of Blois would take place at Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois on 18 June.[59] Saint-German was the parish church of the Catholic kings of France and located opposite the Louvre. Both French and English parties immediately began to discuss the conditions under which the Protestant English could participate in a ceremony that would take place in a Catholic church and which would be held — at least partly — according to Catholic rites and customs. Thomas Smith reported the parley in close detail, thus providing an interesting insight into the 'thin' culture of early modern diplomacy.[60] The ambassador pointed out the need for both English and French parties to agree on a minimum set of criteria, in order to eliminate friction and misunderstanding: '[to] seeke owt som precidentes that we might conferr them with ours, so that when we should com to the action ther might be no alteracion nor dowte fownde on neither partie'.[61]

As we have seen, confessional difference had been a constant source of conflict throughout Anglo-French talks about a friendly alliance, having ultimately rendered Catherine's drawn-out negotiations over the Anjou match fruitless. English dispatches held at the British Library moreover reveal that while drafting the Treaty of Blois both France and England were uncertain about the degree to which the document should refer

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of the wedding, Marguerite is probably wrong to assume that her husband's retinue had done the same. As discussed on p. 101 below, the other Huguenot nobles wore dark and sober clothes to mark their difference from the splendorous appearance of the Catholic guests. Marguerite's mistake, however, is understandable, given that she wrote her memoirs more than fifty years after the event. See also Jouanna, *La Saint-Barthélemy*, p. 94 and especially p. 325, n. 102.

[57] Queen Elizabeth had instructed Lincoln to visit Jeanne during his embassy in Paris and 'rejoyce that she hath so wisely and honourably considered of the marriage of the Prince her Son with the daughter of *France*'(*Compleat*, pp. 210–11; emphasis in original).

[58] Dispatch of Thomas Smith to William Cecil (8 June 1572, *Original Letters*, p. 12).

[59] Ibid. Jacques Bochetel, sieur de La Forest, was appointed resident ambassador to England from 1566 until 1568 after which he was succeeded by Betrand de Salignac de La Mothe Fénelon.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

to matters of religion at all.[62] This uncertainty particularly related to the question whether or not mutual aid should be provided in conflicts of faith. The negotiators finally decided to leave out the issue of religion from the treaty altogether to avoid controversy.[63]

It appears from Smith's account that the ratification ceremony at Saint-Germain, and the conditions under which the exercise of the Catholic and Protestant religion would be acceptable to both parties, had not been discussed prior to Lincoln's arrival. The conditions of diplomatic ceremonies were often reviewed and negotiated on the spot in order to adapt them to recent political developments or the specific demands of a visiting embassy.[64] In this particular instance, Walsingham and Pinard agreed that the actual ratification of the treaty would take place after Charles IX and his subjects had celebrated Mass, rather than at Mass itself as was common.[65] In the meantime, the English ambassadors had their own Protestant service in a side chapel and would only join the French for the ratification ceremony afterwards.[66] In Smith's words:

> [Y]t was agreed yt [the actual conclusion of the treaty] should be at the end of Even song, t'avoid all offence that might chaunce on either party, rather then at Masse, and that we should accompany the King to his seate, & ther leave him to such ceremonies as was used in ther Romish Even song, retyring ourselves into a by chapell prepared for the nones in the same church.[67]

Smith's account reveals that the agreement struck a fine, if somewhat uneasy, balance between honouring the Catholic religion of the French crown and its nobles on the one hand, and the Protestant faith of the English ambassadors on the other. By allowing Lincoln's embassy to retire into a side chapel, the issue of religious difference was carefully avoided: the English were to be free to practise their own religion and the French were

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[62] BL, Cotton Vesp. F. VI, fols. 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 25b.

[63] See 'Articles for a Treaty between England and France' (14 January 1572, CSPF, X, p. 16):
  In order to avoid the use of the word religion, it will be well to couch the article in such words as these 'whenever any potentate shall interfere with the King or Queen, the order, state, laws, ordinances, and edicts established by their authority in their realms, &c.
The treaty thus conveniently bypassed the actual importance that religion held for both countries by referring more generally to bodies of state. For the final draft of the Treaty of Blois, see BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F. VI, fols. 26ʳ-44ᵛ.

[64] More examples of this will be given in Chapter 3.

[65] The treaty itself was ratified by the oath of alliance which both Charles IX and Lincoln were supposed to take. The ceremony was traditionally carried out during Mass as Smith explained himself to William Cecil (*Original Letters*, p. 14).

[66] This side chapel might have been the chapelle de la Vierge, the oldest chapel in the church of Saint-Germain.

[67] Ibid., p. 12.

not troubled by the sight of the embassy's Protestant service. This situation, as Smith put it, '[would] avoid all offences that might arise'.[68] According to Smith, the chapel was 'richtly tapisserid' — in part to cover up the Catholic iconography underneath it — and 'hangid for the nones, where was also stooles & settes covered with cloth of gold preparid for my lord [Lincoln] & us'.[69] In the wake of Europe's Religious Wars, it had become increasingly common for resident ambassadors to establish a chapel in the residence of their host country (a so-called 'embassy chapel') to practise a religion that was illegal or otherwise unwanted there. To have a chapel in a Catholic church furnished specifically for that purpose was certainly uncommon but was nonetheless accepted in June 1572 owing to the diplomatic importance of the ratification ceremony.[70]

Although the English ambassadors were permitted their own private service, they were expected to accompany Charles IX 'to his seate' in the church's nave and, after the liturgy, to 'bring the King to the place wher the oth should be taken'.[71] 'This was then thought to be best', as Smith pointed out, 't'avoid all inconveniences, so that the Kinges pleasure were also that so it showld be done'.[72] The procedure subtly changed the position of the English diplomats at the Valois court for the duration of the ceremony, as it turned them from guests into hosts of the French king. The occasion thus allowed Charles IX to showcase his authority and ability to govern the realm in good Catholic faith. The diplomatic impact of this message was probably twofold. To begin with, it demonstrated to the English dignitaries that France was still a stronghold of Catholicism, despite the growing number of 'heretic' Protestants. By accompanying Charles to his seat, the ambassadors submitted to his authority and reinforced the idea that the Protestant service in the side chapel was permitted to them as a token of the king's good graces, rather than as a way of giving in to their demands. At the same time, the procedure demonstrated to the nobles, who were in the audience of the ceremony, that Charles was powerful and confident

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[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid., p. 16.

[70] For more on the early modern invention of the embassy chapel, see Mattingly, pp. 280–81; Benjamin J. Kaplan, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Devotion: Embassy Chapels and the Toleration of Religious Dissent in Early Modern Europe', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 6.4 (2002), 341–61.

[71] Smith to Cecil (*Original Letters*, p. 14. Smith mentioned that after Evensong his embassy was invited to enter the church's nave by 'one of our religion', namely the prominent nobleman Henri, Duc de Bullion (ibid., p. 16).

[72] Ibid., p. 14.

enough to allow for a Protestant liturgy in a Catholic church, albeit privately and in a separate space.

A similar message was extended to the urban populace who flocked to the church's portal and the crowded streets to catch a glimpse of the king and his foreign visitors as they left Saint-Germain after the ratification ceremony. Smith commented on the scene as follows: 'The king both in the church & in the way, many tymes staying as it were to looke on the people, & that the people showld loke on him & us, & rejoice the more fully with him'.[73] By looking at the Parisians and allowing them to look back in return, the relationship between monarch and subject was both enacted and reinforced. This reciprocal form of looking thus confirmed Charles's sovereign authority over his subjects. The public nature of the occasion was altogether unusual, as the recent Wars of Religion had prevented the French crown from organising events in the open.[74]

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During its stay in Paris, Lincoln's embassy was met with lavish banquets and entertainments, including musical divertissements, an Italian comedy, and acrobatic sketches, which had been organised by Catherine de Médicis's Italian players. Similar to the treaty being celebrated, the festivities avoided any reference to religion. Their primary goal was most likely to cast the diplomatic event in a pleasant atmosphere of amity, without giving rise to the controversy that had dominated much of the negotiations over the Anglo-French league. The French crown was therefore careful not to offend the English diplomats and received them with much generosity, to such an extent that it had made Smith feel like 'a young prince' or 'a Duke'.[75] On 13 June, five days after the arrival of the English ambassadors in Paris, the king cordially invited Lincoln's delegation for supper at the château de Madrid in the Bois de Boulogne just outside Paris. Since Madrid was a private residence, built by François I as a relay for the hunt, the invitation heightened the compliment paid to the English ambassadors. It was one thing for a foreign embassy to reside at the Louvre Palace, which was commonly used for that purpose, but quite another

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[73] Ibid., p. 17.

[74] The first truly public festival staged in Paris since the start of the wars in the mid-sixteenth century was the carousel for the Franco-Spanish double marriage in April 1612 (see Chapter 5). Most of the other ceremonies and festivities in summer 1572 were held behind closed doors.

[75] Smith in a letter to his wife, Lady Philippa (9 January 1572, cited in Dewar, *Sir Thomas Smith*, p. 133). Smith wrote the letter when he was at the French court in January 1572 to negotiate the Treaty of Blois.

thing to be invited to the king's private space. On 15 June, Smith reported that he and Lincoln enjoyed the honour of sharing a table ('served very magnifically') with the royal brothers Henri, duc d'Anjou, and François-Hercule (1555-1584), duc d'Alençon. He was excited to talk to 'gentlemen & tall men' which he had 'not sene here before accustomid'.[76]

On 18 June, after having returned from the ratification ceremony at Saint-Germain, the foreign visitors were treated to even more sumptuous hospitality. This time, dinner was served at 'the Queen Mother's building' in the Tuileries Garden, which appears to have been a *maison de plaisance* (pleasure palace), fashionably equipped with 'a pleasaunt fontayne or conduicte'.[77] Catherine's performers entertained the company throughout the evening with virginals on lutes and violins, which were said to be 'excellent', as well as a light-hearted Italian comedy featuring 'notable supersaltes & through hoopes'.[78] In the last scene of that pageant, the acrobats performed a human pyramid, which Smith described as follows: '[B]est of all [was] the Antiques [antics], of carrying men one uppon an other which som men call *labores Herculis*'.[79]

Before eating, Charles gave Lincoln a private tour through his mother's newly established gardens, a favourite pastime of French and Italian kings who sought to impress foreign guests with all sorts of artistic and hydraulic inventions.[80] Afterwards, Lincoln was even admitted to the bedroom of the ailing Catherine de Médicis, where he 'dyd her Maiesties Commendacions and delivered her Maiesties letters'.[81] Early modern rulers could use their illness for a variety of purposes, ranging from refusing hearings to tricking ambassadors into believing that they could take advantage of the situation.[82] By giving audience to Lincoln in such a vulnerable state Catherine could demonstrate that she was truly committed to peace with England. At the same time, the invitation was meant to flatter Lincoln and thus Elizabeth herself.

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[76] Smith to Cecil, *Original Letters*, p. 15.
[77] Ibid., p. 18.
[78] Ibid., pp. 19–20.
[79] Ibid., p. 20.
[80] Robert W. Berger and Thomas F. Hedin, *Diplomatic Tours in the Gardens of Versailles under Louis XIV* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
[81] Dispatch of Lincoln to William Cecil (18 June 1572, BL, Cotton MS Vesp. F. VI., fol. 91).
[82] For more on the ruler's use of illness in early modern diplomacy, see Pierre Nevejans, 'Le Corps souffrant et ses enjeux diplomatiques: La Maladie du prince face à la Renaissance', *Bulletin du Centre de recherche du château de Versailles*, 2016, *Articles et études* <http://crcv.revues.org/13693> [accessed on 5 March 2019].

Although the festival did not explicitly refer to matters of religion, it inevitably served as the backdrop to more informal — indeed, backchannel — talks between diplomats and statesmen, as well as among diplomats themselves. These talks were informal insofar as they were not part of an official ceremony but took place more or less spontaneously, for example over dinner or while attending a performance. It is obvious from Smith's account of the festival that many such informal talks were subject to scrutiny by those attending the event, which often revealed the tension that existed between Catholics and Protestants in both national groups. Smith, for instance, reported that after dinner on 18 June the king and his brother Anjou 'had long & very familiar, &, as apperid, pleasaunt talke' with the Huguenot admiral Coligny. Their conversation lasted uninterruptedly for 'almost an hower' which, as Smith pointed out, 'was very comfortable to som, &, as suspicious & displeasant to other'.[83] With 'other', the ambassador presumably referred to members of the Guise family, such as Henri, duc de Guise and his uncle duc d'Aumale, who had also been invited for supper.

As observed in Chapter 1, diplomacy was seen by many early modern theorists as a performance. Diplomats and statesmen knew that any form of interaction among them could be recorded, gossiped about at the courts of Europe, and ultimately determine their position on the world's stage. This made people increasingly aware of their performance in public, which could then be manipulated in such a way that it served one's own political interests. It is in this light that we should examine Charles and Anjou's discussion with Coligny. Their interaction was probably staged to demonstrate the king's readiness to accept Coligny into his inner circle, which at the same time suggested that the Guises no longer posed a serious threat to the Huguenot faction at court. This would undoubtedly have pleased the English ambassadors who had urged the French crown for a fairer treatment of the religious minority.

Coligny, too, would probably have been flattered by the royal attention. We know that, in the months prior to the festival for the Treaty of Blois, the admiral enjoyed a generally

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[83] Smith to Cecil, *Original Letters*, p. 18. The English ambassador Henry Middelmore similarly reported on a private conversation he had with Coligny, an old acquaintance of his, after supper at the admiral's house on June 10. They talked primarily about the current situation in Flanders and the recently proposed match of Alençon. The occasion seemed to have been kept private indeed, for it is not referenced in other contemporary sources on the festivities. Other members of the French court or Lincoln's embassy (save for Arthur Champernome) were not invited. See dispatch of Henry Middelmore to William Cecil (18 June 1572, BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F. VI, fol. 89).

favourable reception at court.[84] Catherine was acutely aware of the strong influence that Coligny exerted on Charles and of his unwanted attempt to lure Charles into a pan-Protestant war against Spain. By receiving Coligny with honours, the queen mother could keep the admiral under her wings, while at the same time obtaining his support for the Valois-Navarre wedding. The conspicuous presence of Coligny at the dinner in the Tuileries Gardens might have been arranged by Catherine herself in an attempt to achieve exactly that.[85]

3. The Festival for the Valois-Navarre marriage, August 1572

While the French crown had done much to avoid the thorny issue of religion during the celebrations for the Treaty of Blois, it allowed themes of concord and faith to dominate the festival programme for the Valois-Navarre wedding at large. Despite the controversy that this decision might have caused, it was also a logical one, insofar as the union between Marguerite, a Catholic princess, and Navarre, a Protestant prince, was underpinned by the humanist belief that peace could be achieved through an interreligious marriage. The Treaty of Blois, by contrast, was engineered as a defensive and commercial pact that deliberately left out any mention of faith. Since court festivals were usually designed to implement the policy of a newly engineered accord, it was perhaps only natural that themes of peace and religion took centre stage at the nuptial celebrations of August 1572.

As demonstrated in Section 1, that decision was controversial insofar as the cross-marriage was fiercely opposed by those who considered any kind of alliance between Catholic and Protestants abominable. Charles IX, for instance, had issued a royal proclamation that forbade the molestation of the foreigners and Protestants who would travel to Paris that summer; and had prohibited the bearing of arms within the city walls in another *brevet* (warrant), with the express demand not to use them in settling disputes of any kind.[86] Lucas Geizkofler (1550-1620), a Tyrolian medical student who had come to Paris to witness the wedding ceremony, reported in his memoirs that 'more than 1500' students from various German states, including Silesia and the Margravate of Meissen, had also

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[84] Nicola M. Sutherland, 'The Role of Coligny in the French Civil Wars', in *Actes du Colloque: L'amiral de Coligny et Son Temps (Paris, 24-28 Octobre 1972)* (Paris: Société de l'histoire du protestantisme français, 1974), pp. 323–39; Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, p. 19; Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion*, p. 43.

[85] On 16 June, the admiral had also been in charge of preparing 'a noble, magnificall, & sumptuous supper' at his private château (Smith to Cecil, *Original Letters*, pp. 18–9).

[86] The *brevets* were published on 30 June and 7 July respectively. See Geizkofler, *Historia*, p. 201.

travelled to the city for the same purpose.[87] Many of Geizkofler's travel companions, however, moved to Bourges or Orléans instead, possibly hoping to escape the summer heat or, more urgent, the tense atmosphere that existed between Catholics and Protestants in the French capital.[88]

According to the Venetian deputies to France, Giovanni Michiel (1516-1596) and Sigismondo di Cavalli (1530-1579), the king had decided not to invite any diplomats to the wedding ceremony: 'The ambassadors did not come, because [the French crown] knew that the [papal] nuncio would not come and, having doubts about the Spanish ambassador, preferred not to invite anyone'.[89] The remark of the Venetian diplomats thus seems to hint at the public disgrace that the conspicuous absence of the papal nuncio, Antonio Maria Salviati (1537-1602), and the Spanish ambassador, Diego de Zúñiga (1525-1577), both of whom had done everything in their power to oppose the marriage, would cast on the crown. However, Zúñiga offered a different interpretation of the events.[90] He reported to Philip II that he stayed away from the nuptial ceremony, but that the representatives of Ferrara (one 'Monsieur de Parades'), Florence (Giovanni Maria Petrucci, died in 1582), and Venice (Michiel and Cavalli) had nonetheless been present.[91] We know, indeed, that the Spanish king had ordered Zúñiga to feign illness if invited to the ceremony and the ensuing festivities.[92]

Margaret M. McGowan believes that no foreign ambassadors were invited to the nuptial festival, because Charles IX wished to avoid arguments with the papal nuncio and the

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[87] '[V]ber die 1500 Teütsche scholarn' ('more than 1500 German students'; *Historia*, p. 201).

[88] Ibid.

[89] 'Les ambassadeurs ne sont pas venus, car on savait que le nonce ne viendrait pas et ayant des doutes au sujet de l'ambassadeur espagnol, on a préféré n'inviter personne' (22 August 1572, cited in Champion, *Charles IX*, II, p. 75, n. 1).

[90] Arlette Jouanna has noted the doubts that still exist about the official attendances at the Valois-Navarre festival by magistrates and the diplomatic corps (*La Saint-Barthélemy*, p. 94).

[91] Ibid. If Zúñiga is right about this, we may surmise that Francis Walsingham, English ambassador to France, would also have attended the nuptial festival. According to Pierre Champion, Walsingham, together with the deputies of Ferrara, Florence, and Venice, had accepted the king's invitation to watch a tilting tournament, taking place in the courtyard of the Louvre on 21 August 1572, from behind a window (see also p. 106, n. 127 below). He states that some of the foreign ambassadors (possibly Zúñiga and Salviati) declined the invitation (*Charles IX*, II, p. 75). Champion does not discuss or provide further evidence for this point.

[92] 'If you are invited [to the Valois-Navarre festival], accept, but, a few days before, pretend to be indisposed; in no way does it suit you to attend this ceremony' (Si l'on vous y invite [to the Valois-Navarre festival], acceptez; mais, quelques jours auparavant, feignez d'être indisposé; d'aucune façon, il ne convient que vous assistiez à cette cérémonie'; 10 June 1572, cited in La Ferrière, *Saint-Barthélemy*, p. 90).

Spanish resident ambassador about the contentious marriage.[93] According to McGowan, the king's decision was motivated by the fear that inviting all European powers except Spain and Rome would definitely have offended Philip II and Pope Gregory XIII, and thus only increase the tension between France and those Catholic rulers. In this view, diplomatic involvement from Spain and Rome would only reinforce the religious and political differences that already existed between their subjects. Diplomacy, especially when conducted by foreign powers, could thus be perceived as detrimental to processes of reconciliation. Ambassadors, for instance, could spread unwanted rumours or communicate messages that opposed the diplomatic schemes of the crown; or heat up debates between people whose destructive religious passions ought to be soothed. Whether or not the French crown had invited foreign envoys to the nuptial festival, it is clear that Charles and his mother were careful not to stir any further controversy.

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The festival began on 18 August with the official wedding ceremony at Notre-Dame. Commoners flocked around a tapestried scaffold erected in front of the cathedral that enabled Navarre to participate in the nuptial blessing without actually having to enter the building himself. The construction served as a diplomatic solution to the problem of confessional difference. Although the Valois undoubtedly hoped that Navarre would convert to Catholicism, and thus comply with its religious practices, the Huguenot camp did not recognise a marriage performed according to Catholic rites, especially if this involved their nominal leader and first prince du sang. The problem was similar to the one posed by the ratification ceremony for the Treaty of Blois, but the political context was significantly different. Just like any other foreign embassy, Lincoln's delegation enjoyed diplomatic immunity, which meant that they were free to hold a Protestant service in a space assigned for that purpose without being persecuted. Their status as ambassadors moreover entailed that they did not have the same responsibilities towards the French crown as Navarre, who by marrying into the royal family largely committed himself to the customs and rituals of the monarchy. The politically sensitive nature of the marriage ceremony, which moreover took place in public and would thus be subject to close scrutiny,

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[93] *Dance in the Renaissance*, p. 87; 'Festivals', p. 30. For a similar argument, see Hector de La Ferrière, *La Saint-Barthélemy* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1892), p. 90.

prompted Jeanne d'Albret to negotiate the terms and condition of the occasion well in advance.

In the months preceding the nuptial festival, Jeanne was anxious to ensure the legality of the cross-marriage even if it was not celebrated before a Calvinist congregation but on a platform at the portal of Notre-Dame. At Mass, Navarre would be represented by Henri, duc d'Anjou. The Huguenot ministers in the *Parlement de Paris* had debated the issue and come to an agreement. Their statement is recorded in a manuscript that is currently owned by the Bibliothèque nationale.[94] The ministers would accept the unusual blessing on the following condition:

> That he [Navarre] leaves the cathedral before the commencement of the Roman service […] taking his departure in as conspicuous a manner as possible in the sight of all, that it may at once be proven that he appeared there with no intention of assisting at Mass, or at any other ceremony whatsoever.[95]

The response of the Huguenot ministers nicely underscores the performative character of early modern diplomacy. Rather than accompanying the king to Mass, as the English ambassadors did before retiring into a side chapel of Saint-Germain to perform their own private liturgy, it was in the interest of the ministers to showcase publicly Navarre's decision not to enter Notre-Dame. In this way, the Huguenot faction made clear that it was not selling out to the Catholic enemy. The beauty of the solution was that different parties could read their own political agenda into Navarre's absence from Mass, namely as either a personally motivated decision (on the grounds of conscience) or a mere diplomatic measure (meant to avoid offending the prince's Huguenot adversaries).[96] The eyewitness account of Lucas Geizkofler, who had bought window space to witness the marriage ceremony, suggests that this is precisely what happened. According to Geizkofler, Navarre 'refused to enter the cathedral of priests'.[97] His use of the word 'refuse' ('nit wolte geen'), rather than the more neutral phrase 'taking his departure', as the Huguenot ministers put

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[94] 'Aduis sur les ceremonies du Mariage de Monsieur le Prince de Nauarre et de Madame soeur du Roy en la convocation des Ministres' (BnF, MS Dupuy 591, fols. 41ʳ-42ᵛ).

[95] Ibid., fol. 42ᵛ; *Queen of Navarre*, trans. by Roelker, p. 381.

[96] As is well known, discussions about the sincerity of Navarre's actions — whether motivated by politics or personal considerations — resurfaced in July 1593 when he publicly converted to Catholicism (see also Chapter 4 below).

[97] '[D]er König von Nauarra in Pfäffische Thuem Kirchen nit wolte geen' (*Historia*, p. 207).

it, indicates that the student actually interpreted Navarre's leave-taking as a statement of faith.

According to an anonymous wedding guest, a Huguenot sympathiser whose account of the festival appeared in the memoirs of the Genevan pastor Simon Goulart, the king, his two brothers (Anjou and Alençon), Navarre, and Condé all wore the same pale yellow satin clothes, embroidered with silver and 'enriched with pearls and precious stones',[98] which Arletta Jouanna interprets as a sign of fraternity.[99] However, the other Catholic and Huguenot nobles present at the wedding ceremony were keen to display their mutual religious and cultural difference. Navarre's magnates wore sober and dark clothes while conspicuously walking up and down outside Notre-Dame for the whole duration of the ceremony.[100] Their plain clothes contrasted sharply with the richly decorated attires of the Catholic nobles. Our anonymous Huguenot eyewitness described the occasion as follows:

> The other Catholic princes and *seigneurs* [besides the king and his brothers] were dressed in different colours and fashions, with so much gold, silver and precious stones that nothing more [was needed]; but as to the *seigneurs* of the religion [Navarre's retinue], they were only dressed in ordinary clothes.[101]

Despite, or perhaps because of, the undercurrent of tension, medals were thrown to the populace waiting outside the church to remind them of the peaceful intentions of Catherine's diplomacy.[102] They were described by Jean Passerat in his aforementioned manuscript on the commemorative medals.[103] One medal bore on either side the names of the married couple and the telling inscription 'securitas pacis, constricta hoc discordia vincula' ('the guarantee of peace, ensured by this bond in discord').[104] Another medal

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[98] '[E]nrichie de perles & pierreries' ('Discours', p. 354).
[99] *La Saint-Barthélemy*, p. 94.
[100] Anonymous, 'Discours', p. 354; Geizkofler, *Historia*, p. 208.
[101] 'Les autres Princes & Seigneurs Catholiques estoyent vestus de diuerses couleurs & façons, auec tant d'or, d'argent & pierreries, que rien plus: mais quant aux Seigneurs de la Religion ils n'estoyent vestus que de leurs habits ordinaires' ('Discours', p. 354).
[102] Geizkofler, *Historia*, pp. 208-09. For more on the distribution of commemorative medals at royal weddings and other public events in sixteenth-century France, see Marie Veillon, 'Médailles des rois de France au seizième siècle: Représentation et imaginaire', *The Medal* 44 (2004), 13-25 (pp. 19-22); ead., *Médailles des rois de France au seizième siècle: Représentation et imaginaire* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2018), pp. 83-134.
[103] See 'Recueil'.
[104] MS fr. 894, fol. 102ʳ. Geizkofler also described this medal (see *Historia*, p. 209), but does not mention the other two jetons discussed above. A black-and-white image of the medal has been printed in Paul Delaroche, *Trésor de numismatique et de glyptique, médailles françaises*, 20 vols (Paris: Rittner et Goupil, 1831-1850), V: *Médailles françaises de Charles VII à Louis XVI* (1836).

represented a woman dressed in modest clothes bearing a serpent devouring its own tail on an altar covered in flames. The image of the tail-eating snake — the Ouroboros — dated back to the alchemical texts of the Ancient Greeks and Egyptians, and was in the early modern period popularly regarded as a symbol of eternity and self-recreation.[105] It was used to represent the ever-lasting peace that the marriage would bring to the kingdom, marking the dawning of a new era in the immediate aftermath of the devastating religious wars. The medal bore the explanatory phrase 'æterna quæ munda' ('what is beautiful is everlasting').[106] Writing in the mid-seventeenth century, the Catholic friar and historian Hilarian de Coste (1595-1661) associated the flame-covered altar with religious dissent in France and suggested that the snake's venom extinguished the fire.[107] De Coste mentioned yet another medal that is not described by Passerat and which supposedly contained strong Christian references. It portrayed a lamb holding a cross linked by the words 'vobis annuncio pacem' ('I proclaim peace for you').[108]

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We have seen that the blessing on 18 August, although organised to unite the opposing religions in holy matrimony, was used by Navarre's retinue to display their religious and cultural difference from the Catholic wedding guests. The celebrations organised later

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[105] MS fr. 894, fol 101ʳ. The use of this ancient symbol fitted especially well with the interest of the French court in alchemy, esotery and Italian Neo-Platonism. See Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke Exeter, *The Western Esoteric Traditions: A Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 33–70. For the use and the reception of the Ouroboros-symbol at the early modern European court more generally, see Nicholas Vernot, 'Un serpent dans le cœur: La Symbolique de l'ex-libris de Philippe II Chifflet, abbé de Balerne (1597-1657)', in *Autour des Chifflet: aux origines de l'érudition en Franche-Comté, XIVe - XVIIIe siècles*, ed. by Laurence Delobette and Paul Delsalle, Les Cahiers de la MSH Ledoux, 6 (Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007), pp. 63–87 (pp. 65–69).

[106] MS fr. 894, fol. 102ʳ.

[107] Hilarion de Coste, *Les Eloges et les vies des reynes, princesses, dames et damoiselles illvstres [...]* (Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, 1630), p. 437. Marie Veillon has noted that, inspired by the jetons of ancient Greece and Rome, commemorative medals in sixteenth-century France also regularly depicted personifications of peace setting fire to a war trophy, thus symbolising the end of a particular conflict ('Médailles', p. 17).

[108] Ingrid A. R. De Smet discusses the first two lines from a Greek poem by Jean Dorat that communicate a similar 'universal Christian message (i.e. a Christianity that transcends the division between Catholics and Protestants)' (see 'Livres, érudition et irénisme à l'époque des Guerres de religion: Autour de la Satyre ménippée', in *Between Scylla and Charybdis: Learned Letter Writers Navigating the Reefs of Religious and Political Controversy in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Jeanine De Landtsheer and Henk Nellen, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 185–201 (pp. 195–96)). These lines, which appeared on the back of the title page for Florent Chrestien's 1589 translation of Aristophanes's *Pax* (Peace) into Latin, read as follows: 'All Christians should remember Peace, / because Christ himself said: I am peace' ('Εἰρήνην δεῖ Χριστιανοῖς μεμενῆσθαι ἅπασιν, / εἰμι γὰρ Εἰρήνη κ' αὐτὸς ὁ Χριστὸς ἔφη').

that evening at the Palais de la Cité (Palace of the City), the seat of the *Parlement de Paris*, were specifically aimed at mingling Catholics and Protestants.[109] In the impressive *Grand-Salle* of the Palais, a royal dinner had been prepared for the invited wedding guests, among whom were also prominent representatives of the city of Paris, the *Parlement*, the *Chambre des Comptes* (Courts of Accounts), the *Cour des Aides* (Court of Aides), and the treasury.[110] Judging from Geizkofler's account, Navarre used the public occasion to please Charles IX in the sight of all.[111] While the king dined in the company of the bride, his brothers, and the spouse of Charles (1554-1611), duc de Mayenne, a distinguished member of the Guise family, Geizkofler observed how Navarre 'was at the table next to the king, standing, as if by deference he wished to honour him and serve him'.[112] What appears as a regular custom at the French court (paying respect to the king and his company over supper), takes on added meaning in the context of the controversial festival. Although Navarre's adherents had aimed to emphasise the difference between Huguenots and Catholics in front of Notre-Dame, the prince himself was keen to flatter Charles, probably in the hope to profit from his good graces and, by extension, from those of the powerful Catholic officials, magistrates, and nobles present in the room.

The royal dinner was followed by a triumphal procession in the same *Grand-Salle*.[113] Geizkofler noted that the procession was done 'in the ancient Roman fashion'.[114] Importantly, Catholics and Huguenots appeared side-by-side as mythological deities on eleven floats. Most of these carts were marine-themed, designed as seashells and drawn by fantastical sea monsters resembling both lions and fishes, but several chariots were formed like rocks or cliffs.[115] Geizkofler believed that at least one of these carts represented the Mount Parnassus from ancient Greek and Roman mythology, as it featured the

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[109] Geizkofler, *Historia*, p. 209; anonymous, 'Discours', pp. 354-55; de Thou, *Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 119. Jacques-Auguste de Thou reported that the wedding ceremony was first followed by a meal ('prandium') at the episcopal palace ('episcopales aedeis') which was located close to Notre-Dame (ibid., 118-19). Geizkofler noted that the *Parlement* had temporarily moved to the Augustinian Convent ('Augustiner Closter') on the king's orders (*Historia*, p. 209).

[110] Anonymous, 'Discours', pp. 354-55; De Thou, *Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 119. The *Chambre des Comptes* was primarily concerned with matters of public finance; the *Cour des Aides* dealt with ordinary and extraordinary finances.

[111] *Historia*, p. 209.

[112] '[Navarre] ist bey dem Tisch neben dem König gestanden, alß wann Er Jme ehrn halber auß diemuet aufwartete' (ibid.).

[113] In contrast to de Thou and Goulart's eyewitness, Geizkofler claimed that the royal dinner was held only after the triumphal procession had taken place (ibid.).

[114] '[N]ach altem Römischen gebrauch' (ibid.).

[115] Ibid.; anonymous, 'Discours', p. 355; de Thou, *Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 119.

nine Muses and a nobleman dressed as Apollo.[116] Goulart's Huguenot eyewitness, in particular, was keen to report on 'the mixture of those of the Religion with Catholics'.[117] He noted, for example, that one float was shared by the king's brothers, the Huguenot *princes du sang* (Navarre and Henri I, Prince de Condé, 1552-1588) and Henri, duc de Guise. Other cars in the procession were occupied by professional theatrical performers employed by the French crown, including the castrato singer Estienne Le Roy, and an ensemble of five musicians whose varied instruments 'produced a great melody'.[118] The final chariot, made of gold and mounted by a seahorse, featured Charles IX. Our primary sources vary in detail on the representation of the king. Goulart's eyewitness believed that Charles was presented as Neptune, 'with his trident in hand […] guiding the other gods his subjects',[119] while Geizkofler noted that the king impersonated Saturn, the ancient Roman god of cyclic renewal.[120]

In either case, the procession clearly portrayed Charles as the powerful monarch who could reconcile the opposing religions, aligned to different factions, in order to bring peace and harmony to France. It thus invoked the old Gallican motto of *un roi, une foi, une loi*. But instead of suggesting a unified Catholic front, the entertainment paired Catholics and Huguenots together, showing that both groups could be united under the centralised rule of the king despite their differences. The idea was similar to the diplomatic message of Charles's public tour through Paris in June 1572. On this occasion, the king was also eager to present himself as a hospitable and sovereign king who was generous towards his Protestant guests, as well as confident enough to respect and accommodate their confessional difference. During the customary ball following the pageant, however, the wedding guests were once again reminded of the difference between the rivalling

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[116] *Historia*, p. 209. Geizkofler does not mention the names of the nobleman and -women on this particular float. The chariots that were made to resemble rocks could possibly also have referred to La Rochelle, the military stronghold of the Huguenots, which the crown would successfully besiege in February 1573 ('rochelle' is the diminutive form in early modern French of 'roche', meaning 'rock'). In this view, the rock carts may have symbolised the king's wish to regain control in La Rochelle, following the conclusion of the Valois-Navarre marriage contract, but none of our eyewitnesses provide further evidence for this (Champion, *Charles* IX, II, p. 60).

[117] '[L]e meslange de ceux de la Religion auec les Catholiques' (anonymous, 'Discours', p. 355).

[118] '[R]endoyent une grande melodie' (ibid., p. 355).

[119] '[A]uec son trident en main […] guidant les autres dieux ses suiets' (anonymous, 'Discours', p. 355).

[120] *Historia*, p. 209. Denis Crouzet does not seem to perceive the various attributions as a difference of interpretation but takes Geizkofler's 'Saturn' as yet another disguise for Charles IX (see *La Nuit de la Saint-Barthélemy: Un Rêve perdu de la Renaissance*, Chroniques ([Paris:] Fayard, 1994), pp. 358-61, especially p. 360).

religions. Geizkofler reported that while the Catholics danced 'two or three times', the Protestants 'witnessed the dance without participating'.[121] In this way, they probably wished to emphasise that dancing was a profane pastime (as many of their co-religionists believed), although Geizkofler hastened to add that the steps were executed 'in all modesty and decency'.[122]

The highlight of the Valois-Navarre festival, a combat-ballet known as *Le Paradis d'Amour*, was given on 20 August in the *grande salle* of the Hôtel du Petit-Bourbon near the Louvre.[123] The pageant was organised by the Cardinal du Bourbon who had blessed the interfaith marriage two days earlier. Reminiscent of the biblical plays in medieval European theatre, scattered scenery depicted paradise on the far right of the room and hell on the far left. A flower and foliage garden, located either behind or below paradise, represented the Elysian Fields which, according to Greek mythology, bestowed immortality on heroic souls. Populated by twelve nymphs, the garden was mechanically turned by a gigantic heavenly wheel that hovered above it and which depicted the twelve signs of the zodiac, the seven planets, and numerous flaming stars. In hell, at the opposite end of the room, devils, spectres, and other grotesque creatures 'full of brimstone and fire' ran a diabolical wheel surrounded by bells.[124] Between paradise and hell ran the river Styx on which Charon, the ferryman of Hades from Greek mythology, paddled in his boat.[125] This strongly antagonistic setting, drawing on both classical and biblical imagery, constituted the backdrop of a simulated battle in which Charles IX and his brothers, Anjou and

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[121] '[M]an [hat] zwey od[er] dreymal […] getanzt, welchem tanz auch die Hugenothen zuegesehen, aber nit getanzt' (*Historia*, p. 209).

[122] '[G]ar zichtig vnd beschaidenlich' (ibid.). Our eyewitnesses reported that the following day, around 3 p.m., Anjou hosted a meal at the Hôtel d'Anjou, a residence near the Louvre (ibid., pp. 210-11; anonymous, 'Discours', p. 261; de Thou, *Historiarvm*, III, bk. 52, p. 119). Jacques-Auguste de Thou wrote that 'from [t]here, once [more] dances had been performed, people gathered in the early evening at the Louvre' ('unde choreis agitatis sub vesperam Luparam conceditur'; ibid.).

[123] Geizkofler, *Historia*, p. 211; anonymous, 'Discours', p. 261-62; de Thou, *Historiarvm*, III, bk. 52, p. 119. According to Margaret M. McGowan, *Le Paradis d'Amour* was the first occasion on which the *grande salle* of the Hôtel du Petit-Bourbon was used (*Dance in the Renaissance*, p. 88). Other ballets that were performed in the room include *Le Ballet comique de la Reine* (1581) and *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve* (1615), which will be discussed in Chapter 5, Section 4. For more on the *grande salle*, see Barker and Gurney, 'House Left, House Right', pp. 143–44, n. 28.

[124] '[S]ulphure et igne plenis' (de Thou, *Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 119). The phrase 'brimstone and fire' is a biblical expression that de Thou invokes here to illustrate the volcanic odour that issued from hell and its devilish creatures in particular.

[125] Only Goulart's eyewitness mentions the presence of Charon, but he does not refer to his actions in the ballet again ('Discours', p. 362).

Alençon, made up a united front of Catholic knights defending paradise against a squadron of 'mostly Protestants',[126] headed by Henri de Navarre.

Of all the theatrical entertainments organised for the Valois-Navarre wedding, this pageant was clearly the most explicit and overtly political in its representation of confessional difference. Whereas the triumphal procession of two days earlier had Catholic and Huguenot noblemen appear side by side on shared floats, suggesting reconciliation between them, the ballet immediately evoked the harsh reality of the recent civil wars by opposing the religionists in a starkly antagonistic setting. This was reinforced further by the crown's decision to have actual participants in these wars, aligned to the royal (Catholic) and Huguenot camp respectively, play a semi-theatrical version of themselves. *Le Paradis d'Amour* differed from the other pageants discussed so far, as it dramatised, rather than avoided, confessional difference.[127] 'Far from ignoring the conflict', as Julia Prest points out, 'our ballet drew its inspiration from it', just as the marriage that it celebrated 'owed its impulse and raison d'être to [religious difference]'.[128]

In the first part of the performance, Henri and his followers made assaults on paradise in single combat but lost each confrontation to the royal brothers who chased them into hell one by one 'where they were dragged along by the heretic spirits'.[129] After each assailant had been defeated, the messenger god Mercury, seated on a cockerel, one of his attributes and the symbol of France, and accompanied by Cupid, the god of love, descended from the heavens.[130] Both deities from classical mythology then began to dance and sing verses which Henry Prunières believes to have been written by Ronsard, member

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[126] '[F]ere Protestantes' (de Thou, *Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 119). Julia Prest rightly argues that '[e]ven if there were a small number of Catholics among the "chevalier[s] errans", the division is still highly suggestive of Protestant versus Catholic' (in 'Performing Violence', p. 52, n. 21).

[127] The same idea underpinned the *course de bague* or 'running at the ring' that took place in the courtyard of the Louvre the following day. The tilting ('hastiludium') was reported by Jacques-Auguste de Thou (*Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 120). He wrote that the staged tournament pitted a Catholic party, including the king, his brothers, and Henri, duc de Guise and his entourage, who were disguised as Amazons, against the Huguenot squadron of Navarre and his followers, who were dressed according to Ottoman fashion, wearing turbans and long golden robes. The political significance of the pageant has been discussed by Julia Prest ('Performing Violence', pp. 43-4) who notes that the decision to have Navarre and his retinue appear as Turks 'seems like a tactless choice' (ibid., p. 43), given that Muslims were perceived as infidels by the French. However, Prest rightly points out that the decision 'may have been an innocent one' (ibid.), as the French crown maintained good diplomatic relations with the Ottoman sultan at the time. Furthermore, Charles IX had occasionally performed the role of a Turk himself, for example in a mock naval battle in Marseille in 1564.

[128] Ibid., pp. 49–50.

[129] '[O]u ils estoyent trainez par ces diables' ('Discours', p. 362).

[130] Ibid., p. 362.

of the *Académie*.[131] They complimented the royal brothers on their victory. Following the departure of Mercury and Cupid, the Catholic knights entered the Elysian Fields to fetch the twelve nymphs. In the second part of the pageant, the chevaliers and the nymphs performed 'a very diverse ball' in the center of the hall.[132] The ball, which may have been choreographed by Balthazar de Beaujoyeulx,[133] included 'several circular motions [figures] by new skill'[134]. Only after the dancing, which lasted about one hour, did the royal brothers free the Huguenots from hell.[135] The spectacle ended with indiscriminate combat, accompanied with much smoke and fire, in which all of the participating knights, seemingly not aligned to any party, wielded lances.[136]

At first glance, the way in which the pageant approached the contentious topic of confessional difference seems downright tactless and undiplomatic towards the Protestant spectators in the hall. By representing Henri's party as the defeated enemy, destined to remain in hell for most of the performance, *Le Paradis d'Amour* was likely to antagonise especially its Protestant spectators. If we are to believe the account of Jacques-Auguste de Thou,[137] this is what seems to have happened, although we should consider the fact that his version of the event was written in retrospect and thus tainted by the horrors of the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacres. De Thou, who was a young law student in 1572, claimed to have overheard spectators who believed that the primary aim of the French crown in staging the ballet was to insult the Protestants.[138] What is more, Huguenot diplomat François de Montmorency (1530-1579) left court immediately after the

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[131] Prunières identifies 'Cartel contre l'amour' ('Cartel against love'), 'Autre cartel pour l'amour' ('Another cartel for love'), 'Pour le Roy habillé en Hercule, et Pluton traîné devant luy' ('For the King dressed as Hercules, and Pluto surrendered in front of him'), 'Dialogue pour une mascarade: Amour et Mercure' (Dialogue for a masquerade: Love and Mercury) and 'Monologue de Mercure aux Dames' (Monologue of Mercury to the Ladies') as the poems by Ronsard which may have been performed in *Le Paradis d'Amour*, but also admits the difficulty of ascertaining this. See 'Ronsard et les fêtes de cour', p. 41, n. 1. The aforementioned poems of Ronsard are printed in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. by Jean Céard, Daniel Ménager, and Michel Simonin, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 46, 2 vols ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1993), II, pp. 254–56, 256–59, 260, 262–63, 263.

[132] Anonymous, 'Discours', p. 363.

[133] Prunières, *Le Ballet de cour en France*, p. 71.

[134] '[V]arios gyros novo artificio reflexae' (de Thou, *Historiarum*, III, bk. 52, p. 119).

[135] Ibid.; anonymous, 'Discours', p. 363.

[136] The performance was put to a premature end due to smoke bombs setting fire to the theatrical machines in the hall (see ibid.; de Thou, *Historiarvm*, III, bk. 52, p. 119).

[137] Although de Thou's account of *Le Paradis d'Amour* is very detailed, it does not necessarily imply that he was present. However, De Thou was probably allowed inside Notre-Dame after the wedding ceremony and Mass on 18 August (see ibid., pp. 118-19).

[138] 'Yet others suspected that it portended something ominous' ('idque sinistri aliquid etiam alii portendere ominabantur'; ibid., p. 119).

performance, 'whether suspecting some evil', as de Thou speculated, 'or being indisposed by reason of the tossing of the sea'.[139] Montmorency had recently returned from London where he attended the English celebrations for the Treaty of Blois.

Rather than provoking outright protest from Protestant spectators, however, it appears that the ballet puzzled its audiences. De Thou noted that 'many have interpreted that spectacle in different ways'.[140] The confusion stemmed from mixed signals. Many staunch Protestants, both within and outside France, hoped that the Valois-Navarre marriage would entail the conversion of the French royal family to Calvinism. This hope was also expressed by Geizkofler who discussed the rumours that he heard in Paris about Charles IX's alleged conversion to the Reformed faith.[141] With these hopes in mind, Protestant spectators would certainly have been disappointed to see the king heading a Catholic squadron in a strongly antagonistic performance that depicted Huguenots as disloyal heretics, while celebrating Catholicism as the superior religion that would unite all French subjects to the crown. The diplomatic message of *Le Paradis d'Amour*, then, should not be sought in its staged conflict between Catholics and Huguenots, which inevitably resulted in the victory of the royal party, but rather in the ballet's ultimate solution to that conflict, represented by the *deus ex machina* of Mercury and Cupid.

The intervention of both gods suggested that peace between the rival parties could be achieved through shared loyalty to the French crown and, thus, to Roman Catholicism, the religion that French kings were bound to defend and uphold by their coronation oath.[142] Supported by the magical powers of the combined use of dance, music, and poetry, Navarre and his retinue were then freed from hell and re-admitted into the company of the king and his brothers.[143] The pageant thus suggested that Huguenots could be forgiven for their heretic sins if they accepted the king's Catholic faith. This type of practical settlement was typical of the cross-confessional diplomacy supported by Catherine de Médicis. Following the line of policy that had first been recommended to her by her former chancellor Michel de L'Hospital in the early 1560s, the queen mother did not aim to

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[139] '[S]ive mali praesagus, sive […] a maris jactatione nauseabundus' (ibid.).
[140] '[S]pectaculum illud multi aliter atq[ue] aliter interpretati sunt' (ibid.).
[141] *Historia*, p. 211.
[142] Yates, *Astraea*, pp. 121-26.
[143] The resumption of the conflict with indiscriminate fighting seems to have clouded this peaceful note, but since the knights do not appear to have been aligned to either a Catholic or a Huguenot party the wielding of lances may have been an innocent display of individual skill.

maintain equal relations between Catholic and Huguenot nobles, but rather sought to contain their political ambitions by preserving the authority of the French crown.[144]

4. Conclusion

The festivals organised for the Treaty of Blois and the Valois-Navarre wedding were clearly inspired by the humanist ideals of Catherine de Médicis's cross-confessional diplomacy. By encouraging Catholic and Huguenot nobles to prepare and participate in both festivals side-by-side, the French crown appealed to the *Académie*'s belief that the performing arts could heal conflict and bring the rivalling religions closer together. The Valois-Navarre festival, in particular, drew inspiration from the humanist ideal that discord, in this case between Catholics and Huguenots, could be dissolved through an interfaith marriage. Evidence for this is provided in a little known manuscript by the humanist poet Jean Passerat, the only known source written by one of the organisers of the nuptial celebrations.

By studying our two cases alongside each other, we have argued that the key strategy underlying the crown's cross-confessional diplomacy at both festivals was to negotiate difference between the English and French participants on the one hand, and the Catholic and Huguenot guests on the other. This difference was not definitively resolved through the arts, as the *Académie* liked to believe, but rather suspended for the duration of a particular ceremony or pageant. Sometimes clear agreements were made between the crown and the different religious groups about how participation in the festival would be acceptable for both sides. This held especially true for the festivals' ceremonies which were organised in a deliberately ambiguous way to accommodate the political agendas of both Catholics and Protestants.

Finally, this chapter has shown that the crown was careful not to offend foreign ambassadors and stir controversy among delegates. The festival for the Treaty of Blois thus circumvented the issue of religious difference altogether. The light-hearted celebrations, which included Italian comedies and musical *divertissements*, were mostly designed to produce an atmosphere of amity and create the impression that France had definitively recovered from its Religious Wars. The Valois-Navarre festival, by contrast, was more

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[144] This strategy will also be discussed in the context of Henri IV's attempts to reconcile his Catholic and Protestant allies in the period between 1598 and 1600 (see Chapter 4, Section 1, below).

overtly ideological in its attempts to support the reconciliation between Catholics and Huguenots, and between the French crown and its Huguenot nobles in particular. Although historical accounts disagree on whether or not Charles IX had invited foreign ambassadors to the nuptial celebrations, they offer insight into the various diplomatic excuses and tactics used to avoid confrontation, for fear of either losing face or provoking unwanted controversy.

CHAPTER 3

Diplomatic (In)Hospitality:
Dutch Provinces in Search of a King
at the Court of Henri III, 1584-1585

> Offering and accepting hospitality is, indeed, a risky business: for both hosts and guests, theirs is a relationship marked simultaneously by trust and mistrust of the other.
>
> Renée Jeffery, in 'The Wolf at the Door: Hospitality and the Outlaw in International Relations' (2013).[1]

This chapter shifts the focus to the reign of the last Valois king, Henri III, who ascended the French throne in 1574 after his brother's death from tuberculosis. Henri's reign was no less tangled and divided than Charles IX's. The new king was faced with the daunting task of attempting to unite Catholics and Huguenots with the French crown, producing a viable male heir of his own blood, and counterbalancing the growing power of the *Ligue catholique* — a Spanish-controlled faction of extremist Catholics that aimed to exclude Henri de Navarre from the throne after the premature death of the heir apparent, Hercule-François, duc d'Anjou, in June 1584.[2] Anjou's position as *prince et seigneur* (prince and lord) of the Dutch Provinces, to which he had been formally appointed by the States General in September 1580, allowed him little authority.[3] It nonetheless enabled William of

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[1] Published in *Hospitality and World Politics*, ed. by Gideon Baker, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 124–144 (p. 126).

[2] Hercule-François was created duc d'Anjou by the Edict of Beaulieu, known as the 'Peace of Monsieur', on 6 May 1576. He will hereafter be referred to as Anjou in keeping with contemporary practice.

[3] The title *prince et seigneur* of the Dutch Provinces had been bestowed upon Anjou in the Treaty of Plessis-lès-Tours which was signed between the duke and the States General on 19 September 1580. The treaty was ratified at Bordeaux on 23 January 1581. See Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 134-140; Frédéric Duquenne, *L'Entreprise du duc d'Anjou aux Pays-Bas de 1580 à 1584: Les Responsabilités d'un échec à partager* (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), pp. 65-82. Between 1578 and 1579, Anjou served as *défenseur de la liberté belgique contre la tyrannie des Espagnols et de leurs*

Orange, leader of the Dutch revolt against Philip II of Spain, to strengthen ties with France and start building an anti-Habsburg alliance in Europe, together with the help of Elizabeth I of England. (The complex diplomatic relations between Dutch, English, French, and Spanish powers during this period have been vividly summarised in a contemporary English cartoon; see *Figure 1* below). In July 1584, however, Orange was murdered by a fanatic Catholic, a direct result of Philip II's edict of 1580 that had declared the prince an outlaw.

NOT LONGE TIME SINCE I SAWE A COWE.
DID FLAVNDERS REPRESENTE
PON WHOSE BACKE KINGE PHILLIP RODE
AS BEING MALECONTNT.

THE QVEENE OF ENGLAND GIVING HAY
WHEARE ON THE COW DID FEEDE
AS ONE THAT WAS HER GREATEST HELPE.
IN HER DISTRESSE AND NEEDE.

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE MILKT THE CO
AND MADE HIS PVRSE THE PAYLE
THE COW DID SHYT IN MONSIEVRS HAND
WHILE HE DID HOLD HER TAYLE.

Figure 1. This anonymous English political cartoon (*c.* 1633-1639, a copy from a painting dating back to *c.* 1583-1584), known as 'The Dairy Cow', depicts the diplomatic relations in Europe on the eve of Anjou's and Orange's death in 1584 (oil on panel, h 52cm x 67cm). Philip II sits on the back of a dairy cow, representing the Dutch Provinces, while beating it with sticks and drawing blood with his spurs. The States General, standing behind the cow on the left, entreat Elizabeth I, who is feeding the animal on the extreme

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adhérants (defender of the liberty of the Low Countries against the tyranny of the Spaniards and their allies). The States General had already offered a similar position to Anjou in spring or summer 1576, but it appears to have been put on hold in light of the Pacification of Ghent (signed on 8 November 1576). According to Mack P. Holt, Anjou declined the offer himself, as he took little interest in Dutch affairs at the time, following his expanding political influence in France after having successfully negotiated the Edict of Beaulieu in May 1576 (see *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 73-4). For more on Anjou's enterprise in the Dutch Provinces, see *Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas (1576-1584)*, ed. by Pieter L. Müller and Alphonse Diegerick, Nieuwe Reeks, 61, 5 vols (Amsterdam and The Hague: Historische Genootschap, 1889-1899), V; Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 93-112; Duquenne, *L'Entreprise du duc d'Anjou*.

left, for aid. Orange milks the cow; Anjou holds its tail on the extreme right, receiving the scorn of all the other figures portrayed for his failed coup at Antwerp in January 1583. Public domain / Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

Now that the Dutch Provinces had lost Anjou and Orange as their military and political leaders, they were left vulnerable to the Spanish forces of the able governor-general Alessandro Farnese (1520-1589), Duke of Parma. It thus became necessary to seek for more substantial and permanent support. After long and intense negotiations, the States General sent in late December 1584 a special embassy on a secret mission to Paris, where it was instructed to offer Henri III the rule over all the Provinces. Importantly, this rule did not entail unconditional sovereignty, insofar as the authority of the States General was to be maintained.[4] The instructions for the embassy, therefore, contained a range of articles that carefully specified the affairs over which the legislative body of the Provinces wished to have a final say, including the exercise of the Protestant religion, the costs of the war against Spain, the garrisoning of towns, and foreign relations with England.[5] As Martin van Gelderen has shown, the kind of foreign rule favoured by the States General was one of 'bridled monarchy'.[6]

Each of the eight Provinces that were represented in the States General at the time (Brabant, Gelderland, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, and Mechlin)[7]

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[4] The head of the secret embassy, Aernt van Dorp (*c.* 1528-1600), noted that Henri III would only be accepted as ruler over the Provinces 'under certain conditions' ('onder zeker condicien'). See VD, 992, 3 sheets, not foliated; printed in Brieven VD, II, pp. 445-55 (the quotation is on p. 450). For more on the context in which Van Dorp made this statement, see pp. 120-22 below.

[5] NA, SG 1576-1588, 86D, 6 sheets, not foliated. Excerpts of the instructions are printed in *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609*, ed. by Nicolaas Japikse and Hermina H. P. Rijperman, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 43, 14 vols (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1915-1970), IV: *1583-1584* (1919), ed. by Nicolaas Japikse, p. 495-501. Japikse and Rijperman's volume series has also been made available online by the Huygens Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, together with *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal: Nieuwe Reeks, 1610-1670*, ed. by Arie Th. van Deursen and others, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, Grote Serie, 7 vols (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971-1994). See *Resources Huygens ING* <http://re-sources.huygens.knaw.nl/besluitenstatengeneraal1576-1630> [accessed 5 March 2019].

[6] *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590*, Ideas in Context (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 180. Van Gelderen writes that the negotiations of the States General with Anjou about his position as *défenseur* and *prince et seigneur* of the Dutch Provinces had carefully avoided the word 'sovereign' (ibid., pp. 179-80). In this chapter, we will therefore use the more neutal terms 'overlord' and 'rulership'.

[7] For more on the varying number of Provinces that send delegations to the assemblies of the States General in the early 1580s, see Thomassen, *Instrumenten van de macht*, pp. 75-80; p. 19, n. 1 above. Jan Wagenaar offers a compelling narrative of the organisation of the States General in the chaotic days after the death of William of Orange on 10 July 1584 (*Vaderlandsche Historie [...]*, 23 vols (Amsterdam: Isaak Tirion, 1749-1789), VIII: *Beginnende, met de aanstellinge van Prinse Maurits, tot Hoofd des Raads van Staate, in 't jaar 1584 [...]* (1753), pp. 3-9).

selected their most competent and respected men to join the embassy.[8] However, the intricate political situation within and outside France ultimately forced the king in late March 1585 to refuse their generous offer. Acceptance of rulership over the Provinces would not only entail a full-scale war with Spain, it would also spark the military aggression of the *Ligue catholique*, supported by Philip II and the Guise family.[9]

The reception of the Dutch envoys at the Parisian court in January 1585 constitutes the focus of this chapter, as well as the visit of an English embassy that travelled to the French capital one month later to invest Henri III with the Order of the Garter. Founded by Edward III in 1348, the Garter was the highest order of chivalry in England and served to reinforce bonds of loyalty between the monarch, his or her subjects, and foreign royals. The decision of the English to dispatch the Order to Henri at this point in time (the king had already been elected a Knight of the Garter on St George's Day 1575, following the ratification of the Treaty of Blois in July 1572) was motivated by the rapidly changing political scene in Europe, as the deaths of Anjou and Orange necessitated a reorientation of international relations. By holding the installation ceremony at this critical juncture,

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[8] The names of the deputies are given in Emanuel van Meteren, *Belgische ofte Nederlantsche historie [...]* (Delft: Jacob Cornelisz Vennecool, 1599), fol. 226.CCXXVI. Brabant was represented by Cornelis van Aarsens (1545-1627), registrar of the States General, Jan Hinckart (*c.* 1525-1585), Lord of Ohain and postmaster of Antwerp, and Richard VI van Merode (1550-1587), Lord of Oorschot. Gelderland appointed Gerhard Voeth (died in 1607), the Province's councillor, Elbert de Leeuw (1519/20-1598), the Province's chancellor, and Johan van Gent (*c.* 1530-1613), Lord of Ooijen. Flanders dispatched Noel Caron (*c.* 1550-1624), Lord of Schoonewal, who would serve as agent for the States General in England from 1591 to 1609, and as resident ambassador in that same country from 1609 to 1624.

Holland was represented by Aernt van Dorp (see p. 123 below), Zeeland by Jacob Valcke (died in 1603), the Province's Treasurer General, and Utrecht by Amelis van Amstel van Mynden tot Cronenburgh (1531-1593), councillor of the *Hoge Raad van Holland en Zeeland* (High Court of Holland and Zeeland), and Johan Rengers tot Arentshorst (died in 1646), the Province's deputy in the *Raad van State* (Council of State). Friesland sent Hessel van Aysma (1527-1592), President of the Court of Friesland, and Jelger van Feytsma (died in 1620), member of the *Gedeputeerde Staten* (Provincial-Executive) of Friesland.

Mechlin appointed Antoine de Lalaing (died in 1585), seigneur de La Mouillerie, and Quintijn Taffin, sieur de la Prée, who acted as treasurer of the Dutch embassy. Lieven Calvaert, finally, served as scribe to Van Dorp. Still little known, Calvaert was one of the first agents, possibly the first, for the Dutch Provinces in France (see *Biografisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden [...]*, ed. by Abraham J. van der Aa, continued by Karel J. R. van Harderwijk, 21 vols (Haarlem: J. J. van Brederode, 1852-1878), III (1858), pp. 34-5, s.v. 'Caluart (Livinus) Calabart of Calvart').

[9] In May 1585, soon after the failed mission in France, the States General send a special delegation to England to offer rulership to Elizabeth I. The queen also declined, as she did not wish to become embroiled in a conflict with Spain. However, fearing that Philip II would gain the upper hand in Europe, Elizabeth appointed her favourite, Robert Dudley (1532-1588), first Earl of Leicester, as governor-general of the Provinces. Between August 1585 and September 1587, the Dutch States thus served as a protectorate of England. See Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 219-30.

the English hoped to fortify their alliance with France and thus form a joint venture into the Provinces, so as to create a defensive front against the aggressive ambitions of Spain.[10]

Interestingly, the visit of the Dutch embassy overlapped with that of the English ambassadors. The reception of the latter was rapturous and included entertainments that, according to Roy Strong, 'provided the occasion for a last display of the brilliant artistic and intellectual resources of the Valois court'.[11] In one of these entertainments — a splendid ballet, known as 'the king's ballet' — Henri branded himself as a powerful monarch, as he performed a leading role in a complex and, according to the English diplomats, brilliantly executed dance.[12] The festivities were mostly held indoors, for there was a substantial risk that the Parisian mob, among which were a number of zealous Catholics, would violently disturb the reception of the Protestant English.[13] The Guises were absent altogether (they were either not invited or had not accepted the king's invitation). The festival nonetheless received considerable public attention, as can be gauged, for example, from the fact that it was also referenced by contemporaries in several non-diplomatic sources.[14] Even the Catholic representatives of the pope, Savoy, and Spain were invited to witness the festival's pompous celebration of Anglo-French relations. The reception of the Dutch emissaries, by contrast, was kept deliberately modest and hidden from the public eye. Although the Dutch reportedly attended Henri's investiture ceremony,[15] their visit was largely clandestine. The reason for this was the disputed diplomatic status of the

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[10] Roy Strong expands on the complexity of these Anglo-French relations against the backdrop of the visit of the English envoys (see 'Festivals').

[11] Strong, 'Festivals', p. 55.

[12] Bod, Tanner 78, fols. 36ʳ-38ᵛ (fols. 37ᵛ-38ʳ), draft of a letter by Henry Stanley, Earl of Derby, and Edward Stafford to Queen Elizabeth I.

[13] As Strong puts it, 'the fêtes took the form of private entertainments; banquets, mascarades, ballets and balls in contrast to open jousts, tilts and water spectacles' ('Festivals', p. 48). If events took place in the open, they were heavily guarded by the palace guards and carried out on a relatively modest scale, such as a stroll through the Tuileries Garden on February 14, after which the English ambassadors were offered twenty-six jennets, a valuable type of Spanish saddle horse (Bod, Tanner 78, fol. 36ʳ).

According to Jacques-Auguste de Thou, priests stirred up the Parisian crowds to protect the Catholic religion against Henri's attempt 'to make alliance with the heretics [the English]' ('cum Sectariis nova foedera […] iniri') who, 'meanwhile, despise the defenders of the religion of our ancestors' ('majorum religionis propugnatores interea sperni'; *Historiarum*, IV, bk. 81, p. 276). It is probably because of this alarming political situation that no *livret* or *recueil* has been produced for the festival.

[14] Ibid., pp. 315–316; Pierre de L'Estoile, *Journal de L'Estoile pour le règne de Henri III, 1574-1589*, ed. by L. R. Lefèvre, Mémoires du passé pour servir au temps present (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), pp. 373–374.

[15] The emissaries' presence at the ceremony is recorded by Giulio Busini, the Florentine ambassador to France, in a letter to Belisario Vinta, Secretary of State to Christine de Lorraine, the Grand Duchess of Tuscany (in *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane: Documents recueillis par Giuseppe Canestrini*, ed. by Abel Desjardins, 6 vols (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1859-1886), IV: *1574-1589* (1872), pp. 547-550 (p. 549)). See our discussion of Busini's report in Section 3 below.

States General, having deposed Philip II as feudal lord of the Provinces in July 1581, and the controversy surrounding the special mission to France, whose actual purpose was painstakingly kept secret.

The contested — and, in the opinion of Spain and their Catholic allies, unrecognised — diplomatic status of the Provinces did not entitle the Dutch ambassadors to receive the extent of ceremony reserved for fully accredited embassies.[16] Although the French did not treat the envoys as full-on rebels, given that the crown had traditionally maintained good diplomatic relations with the States General (see Chapter 2, Section 1) and had acknowledged the political necessity of bringing an end to the Spanish oppression of the Provinces (see Section 1 and 3 below),[17] they could not receive them as fully recognised ambassadors. A low-key reception would thus avoid unwanted attention from the impatient English diplomats, who urged joint action by both France and England in the Provinces, and the agitated deputies from the Catholic realms, who pressured Henri and his mother Catherine de Médicis to send the Dutch back into the arms of their legitimate ruler. Furthermore, spies acting on behalf of the absent Guises could thus be kept at bay.

At the same time that the king and, in the background, the queen mother sought to direct attention away from the Dutch visitors, they were heavily dependent on their presence at court. As we will argue, this was reflected in the way the ambassadors were treated. The power vacuum created by the deaths of Anjou and Orange forced Henri to make quickly an informed decision about the diplomats' offer of rulership over the Provinces. He clearly was in doubt, however, about which direction to take. While carefully observing the behaviour of the other foreign embassies at court, so as to assess the impact that his acceptance of the crown of the Provinces might have on the European stage, Henri tried to postpone his answer to the Dutch envoys as long as he could.[18] Since Henri obviously did not want the ambassadors to turn to another foreign lord in the meantime, he sporadically received them with generosity. By thus maintaining a delicately balanced

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[16] For more on the problematic diplomatic status of the Dutch Provinces in the period between 1581 and 1609, see Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back', pp. 81–95.

[17] According to an anonymous Dutch account of the envoys' reception at the French court, published in a late-seventeenth-century series of chronicles, Henri openly criticised the Spanish tyranny in the Provinces. See p. 133 below for our discussion of the — probably highly embellished — source.

[18] This strategy will be discussed in closer detail in Section 3, especially pp. 134-37. At this stage, Henri was probably also more hesitant to accept a foreign crown after his not so successful reign as king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between 1573 and 1575. See Pierre Champion, *Henri III, roi de Pologne* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1943).

position of being hospitable without being too hospitable, Henri managed to retain both the interest and the good intentions of the Dutch embassy.

Recent literature on hospitality in the field of anthropology, taking its cue from the philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and the anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers (1919-2001), shows that the concept of hospitality is founded upon ambivalence.[19] In different cultures and historical periods, hospitality involves acts of generosity that serve to welcome guests and make them feel at ease in unfamiliar surroundings. The trust, however, that both guest and host invest in each other to enter into a hospitable relationship renders them vulnerable to exploitation. Not only is the guest at the mercy of the host, who provides the necessary means for a living (food, a bed, etc.), but the host is also dependent on the loyalty of the guest whose alterity poses a threat to the safety and reputation of their community. Once accepted, hospitality makes the guest feel at home, but simultaneously functions to control and domesticate him. In that way, encounters of hospitality nearly always spring from mixed intentions, combining, as two anthropologists put it, 'altruism and selfishness, trust and suspicion, benevolence and malice'.[20]

This chapter seeks to explore the 'risks' that the special Dutch embassy involved for both the French hosts and their Dutch guests. More specifically, it will examine first, the challenges that the visit of the Dutch emissaries posed to the ceremonial protocol of the Valois court; second, the heated reactions that their presence in France evoked from the other foreign ambassadors; and third, the different opinions held by members of the States General vis-à-vis Henri's candidacy as lord of the Provinces. Instances of what we have coined 'diplomatic hospitality' — receiving or granting embassies with banquets, entertainments, private audiences, and other ceremonials — would please the Dutch ambassadors, while antagonising Spain. Occurrences of what we, by contrast, have called 'diplomatic inhospitality' — deliberate violations of ceremonial protocol, marked by a conspicuous lack of generosity — would reconfirm the widespread view of the Dutch as rebels

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[19] See Jacques Derrida, *De l'hospitalité : Anne Dufourmantelle invite Jacques Derrida à répondre* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1997); Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954); id., 'The Stranger, the Guest and the Hostile Host: Introduction to the Study of the Laws of Hospitality', ed. by J.-G. Peristiany, *Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology: Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change*, 1968, 13–30. For recent anthropological literature on hospitality, see *The Return to Hospitality : Strangers, Guests and Ambiguous Encounters*, ed. by Matei Candea and Giovanni Da Col (Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 2012), XVIII; *Hospitality and World Politics*, ed. by Gideon Baker, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
[20] Matei Candea and Giovanni Da Col, 'Return to Hospitality', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 18 (2012), 1-19 (p. 11).

and thus meet Spanish demands.[21] We will argue that discrepancies in the degree of hospitality shown towards the Dutch envoys were not part of a predesigned and fully-fledged diplomatic strategy, but were informed by the circumstances or context of a particular moment. Corresponding to the anthropological understanding of hospitality, we will show that the Dutch guests and their French hosts were mutually dependent on each other.

The first section of this chapter discusses the extensive negotiations of the States General over the conditions under which its members would accept Henri as ruler of the Provinces; the second section deals with the troublesome journey of the Dutch ambassadors to Paris, and compares it to the rapturous welcome of their English colleagues; the third section, finally, concentrates on the equally complicated stay of the Dutch at the Valois court. By bringing together dispatches and the reported reactions of Dutch, English, Spanish, and Florentine ambassadors that have never been studied in detail before, and never alongside one another, what follows will highlight the interdependence of their individual missions and the political events in Europe more broadly.[22]

1. Diplomatic context

The stakes of the special Dutch mission to France were high. Without a military or political leader at the helm, the international position of the Dutch States was more fragile than ever. To begin with, the Provinces were highly vulnerable to the threatening power of Philip II who continued to regard himself as the legitimate king of all the Provinces. He thus decided to ignore the Act of Abjuration altogether.[23] What is more, the international community widely disapproved of the Dutch rebellion against Spain which they considered an infraction of the sacred institution of the monarchy. The reputation that the Provinces had thus gained, namely that of antimonarchical rebels, entitled them to little if any legal and diplomatic rights abroad. Many no doubt hoped that the Dutch Revolt would reduce Habsburg aggression and influence in Europe but could not accept the radical idea of deposing a monarch.[24] At the opening of 1585, it was therefore even more

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[21] For some useful observations about the diplomatic status of the Dutch in relation to France and Spain, see Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back', p. 84.

[22] Roy Strong (in 'Festivals', p. 46) briefly mentions the mutual presence of the Dutch envoys at court but focuses exclusively on the proceedings of the English ambassadors.

[23] Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back', p. 85.

[24] King James VI of Scotland and I of England famously believed that the Dutch were common upstarts who defied the sacred monarchy; see Astrid Stilma, *A King Translated: The Writings of King James VI & I and Their Interpretation in the Low Countries, 1593–1603* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 138–39. When

urgent that the Dutch envoys convinced Henri III to be their overlord. The States General anticipated that the rule of a new king would help them to combat the Spanish forces and strengthen their legal and diplomatic position on the international stage.

The Provinces deemed Henri III a suitable candidate for various reasons. In the instructions for the Dutch embassy on 3 December 1584, the States General formulated the official justification for his candidacy as follows:

> And since, by the death of His Highness [Anjou], the Prince and Lord of these Provinces, they are left vacant and returned to the disposition of the said States [General], and since the King of Spain with his supporters has not stopped waging war against them and cruelly invading and oppressing them, they have found it both just and naturally right to take their refuge, and to throw themselves into the arms of His Majesty [Henri III] to be joined to the Kingdom of France, from which these Provinces, or the greater part of them, were originally split and separated.[25]

Henri's candidacy was thus supported primarily on the basis of dynastic continuity.[26] Since Anjou had acted as Prince and Lord of the Provinces, it was considered self-evident that the duke's rule would pass on to Henri, his older brother. Although left unstated in the official instructions for the Dutch ambassadors, the States General probably realised that Henri's status as King of France would enable them to advance their diplomatic interests better than Anjou's position as duke had ever been able to do. The kings of France ranked high in the European hierarchy of princes; their authority could thus boost the international standing of the maligned Provinces and expand their diplomatic influence abroad.[27] What is more, Henri's inherited title of *Roi Très Chrétien* (Most Christian King),

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exasperated with them for intervening with trade between Scotland and Spain in 1599, he reportedly called the Provinces a 'new erected republic, which consists only of rebels and rebellion' (cited in Malcolm Smuts, 'The Making of "Rex Pacificus": James VI and I and the Problem of Peace in an Age of Religious War', in *Royal Subjects: Essays on the Writings of James VI and I*, ed. by David Fischlin and Mark Fortier (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002), pp. 371–87 (p. 378)).

[25] NA, SG 1576-1588, 86D (instruction no. 4) (see appendix); see *Resolutiën*, ed. by Japikse, IV, p. 495. Nicolaas Japikse's suggested reading 'eselissées' should probably be 'esclichées' (ibid.). 'Esclischer' means 'to be dismembered' or 'entirely divided' and should be translated here as 'to be split from' (see *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongves*, ed. by Randle Cotgrave (London: Adam Islip, 1611)).

For Liesbeth Geevers's discussion of the instructions for the Dutch ambassadors, see 'The King Strikes Back', pp. 86–87.

[26] Liesbeth Geevers notes that the instructions never mention the Act of Abjuration and rightly suggests that '[p]erhaps the Dutch feared Henry III might be offended by it' (ibid., p. 87). In other words, the States General were acutely aware of their widespread reputation as rebels and did not want Henri to refuse the offer of sovereignty on account of their perceived disobedience as royal subjects.

[27] The papal order of precedence, promulgated under Julius II in 1504 and still carrying weight at Catholic courts of the late sixteenth century, ranked the king of France as fourth among the European rulers, after

which made him one of the most recognised authorities in Catholic Europe aside from the pope, could help to protect the Calvinist Dutch from anti-Reformist aggression.

The geographical location of the Dutch States served as another justification for the offer of rulership. Since the Burgundian dukes, a younger branch of the House of Valois, had ruled over the Provinces in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it seemed as though the Dutch would merely be returning to what the French could legitimately claim to be theirs.[28] In this way, the States General hoped that Henri could accept the crown of the Provinces in good conscience. An interesting document owned by the Nationaal Archief in The Hague, however, reveals that Henri's candidacy did not actually find unanimous support among members of the States General.[29] On 30 September 1584, Aernt van Dorp, who was appointed head of the special Dutch embassy to France, delivered a speech to the *Ridderschap en Edelen van Holland* (Knighthood and Nobility of Holland). The text for the speech, which Van Dorp seems to have delivered during the actual assembly and may have been intended for publication, lists all the misgivings of the opponents, followed by the envoy's rebuttal:[30]

> The Frenchman is unfaithful, deceitful and intolerable in his ruling; is, moreover, an enemy of the Reformed religion; he may have an understanding with the King of Spain, so as to keep his Huguenots under his control once he has handed us over [to Philip II]; idem the Queen of England [Elizabeth I] shall become an enemy of these lands [the Provinces] because of the alliance with the Frenchman, due to which commerce and the herring trade will perish.[31]

Many noblemen in the States General had not yet forgotten the horror of the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacres in August 1572. A persistent rumour had it that Henri, then duc d'Anjou, had been instrumental in arranging the deaths of Admiral Coligny and the other Huguenot leaders, which led to the carnage. What is more, the king's reputation as Catholic hardliner was not an encouraging prospect. In Chapter 2, Section 1, we

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the pope himself, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the king of Rome. See Introduction for our discussion of Julius's ranking.

[28] See Duke, 'Elusive Netherlands', pp. 23–24. Note that the States General deliberately ignored the fact that most of the Provinces participating in the Union of Utrecht traditionally belonged to the Holy Roman Empire (ibid.; Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back', pp. 86–87).

[29] VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, pp. 445-55.

[30] Brieven VD, II, pp. 444–45. Johannes B. J. N. de van der Schueren believes that the text for Van Dorp's speech had been written by someone else, but that the notes following the speech, which summarise the final decision of the *Ridderschap en Edelen van Holland* to elect Henri III as overlord of the Provinces, had been drafted by the envoy himself during the assembly (ibid.).

[31] VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, p. 447.

observed how Anglo-French negotiations over a possible match between Henri and the Protestant Queen Elizabeth foundered because of the intransigent behaviour of the former. Henri had openly called Elizabeth a heretic and, as the purportedly illegitimate daughter of Anne Boleyn, a bastard. It is noteworthy that Van Dorp, who strongly supported Henri's candidacy, remained silent about these controversial matters throughout his speech, thus using conflict avoidance as a diplomatic tool to rally the divided noblemen of the assembly to his cause.

Although Van Dorp was ready to acknowledge his misgivings, he believed the number of kings 'who for this age have behaved themselves well and modestly in their ruling' to be very low anyway.[32] During his reign, Henri was at least so wise as to avoid a 'new war' with the Huguenot community of La Rochelle and so tolerant as to cement an alliance with 'all cantons'.[33] In July 1582, the king had renewed the Treaty of Soleure with the Swiss cantons for the length of his dominion and eight years thereafter. The treaty continued his protection of Geneva and thus of the city's large number of Huguenot refugees.[34] Moreover, Van Dorp deemed those who suspected that France maintained secret contacts with Habsburg Spain to be wrong. As longstanding foes or 'anchiens [anciens] ennemis',[35] the kingdoms had always tried to outdo one another, either 'in private or public'.[36] In addition, Van Dorp did not believe that the English forces would pose a threat to the welfare of the Provinces. He predicted that, if Elizabeth took up arms, she would also be forced to declare war 'against our protector',[37] a prospect that Van Dorp deemed highly unattractive from the queen's point of view given the massive scale of such an undertaking.

In fact, Elizabeth was another popular candidate for the vacancy of ruler over the Provinces. She shared the same religion as the Dutch and was already supporting the States General in their revolt against Spain by sending gunpowder, weapons, and horses. The queen furthermore provided shelter to the Calvinist Dutch refugees who had fled from

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[32] '[D]ie voor dees tijt hen goit ende eenvoudlich gedragen hebben in heure regeringe' (VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, p. 450). Note the similarity with Montaigne's — sarcastic — commentary on the corrupted morals of late sixteenth-century Europe discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.

[33] '[N]ieuv oirloge; 'alle de Cantons' (VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, pp. 450, 451).

[34] Henri Fazy, *Genève: Le parti huguenot, et le traité de Soleure (1574 à 1579)* (Geneva: Henri Georg, 1883).

[35] VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, p. 452.

[36] '[B]edectelick oft opentlick' (ibid.).

[37] '[J]egens onsen protecteur' (VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, p. 453).

the tyranny of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo (1507-1582), Duke of Alva.[38] Van Dorp, however, foresaw serious problems with Elizabeth as head of state. Both her gender and advancing age (having turned fifty-one on 7 September) made her a particularly unsuitable candidate, for the queen would not be able to produce an heir and her death would only entail 'belligerence and [many] changes' in Europe.[39] Also Elizabeth's ongoing conflict with Mary Stuart of Scotland would complicate her reign in the Provinces. Openly declaring war on Spain, as she was required to do once ruler over the States, would worsen civil unrest in England, given that Philip II was a prominent supporter of Mary and her Catholic followers.

Van Dorp's speech to the *Ridderschap en Edelen van Holland* thus shed light on the various alternatives and opinions held by members of the States General vis-à-vis the rule over the Dutch Provinces. The speech also illustrates, from an essentially Dutch perspective, the controversy surrounding Henri III's candidacy and the ensuing mission to France. Although Van Dorp was confident that Henri would make a reliable overlord, there were many noblemen in the States General who mistrusted the king's intentions. How could these nobles know for certain that Henri, as future overlord of the Provinces, would not abuse the vulnerable position of his Dutch subjects and extradite them to Philip II? The memory of how easily Anjou, Henri's brother, had betrayed the trust of the Provinces by trying to lay siege to the city of Antwerp on 17 January 1583 was probably still fresh in their minds.[40]

To a certain degree, power relations between kings and subjects in early modern Europe were similar to those between hosts and guests. Monarchs were like hosts to their subjects, because, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Section 3, they were required to provide — or receive — them with generosity and kindness. They were, as Baldassare Castiglione put it, 'the public fountain that is used by all people'.[41] Subjects, on the other hand, were like guests to their rulers, insofar as they were obliged to follow their rule, as well as their

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[38] Sent by Philip II in 1567, Alva's rule as regent of the Provinces was notoriously harsh: he established the *Raad van Beroerten* (Council of Troubles) that punished heterodoxy by death and approved the execution of the prominent noblemen Lamoral, Count of Egmont and Philip de Montmorency, Count of Horn in June 1568.

[39] '[C]rijchsonrust ende veranderinge' (VD, 992; see Brieven VD, II, p. 447).

[40] For a discussion of the siege, known as the *furie française* (French fury), see Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 170–77.

[41] '[I]l fonte publico, delquale usi tutto'l popolo' (*Il libro del cortegiano*, bk. 4; *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. by Singleton, p. 295).

law and faith. The hospitality offered by the monarch to his subjects, and the loyalty that this presupposed on the latter's part, involved the acceptance of a certain degree of risk. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, both host (king) and guest (subject) must grant each other the benefit of the doubt and proceed on the basis that they will cause each other no harm.[42] The text for Van Dorp's speech in the Nationaal Archief, however, suggests that even for some members among the special embassy the risks of living under the same roof as the French king were simply too high.

Leonard Casembroot (died in 1604), a nobleman who was initially selected by the province of Holland to join Van Dorp's train, reportedly feigned illness so as to avoid participating in the mission. On 21 December 1584, shortly before the Dutch ambassadors would take their leave at the port town of Brill, he briefed Van Dorp about his absence. Regardless of whether his sickness was genuine or not, it is telling that Van Dorp considered it a sham: 'The illness of gentleman Casimbroot, which to the judgement of some is surely English' — that is, fake or pretended.[43] Van Dorp's wry remark suggests that Casembroot, and with him probably other members of the delegation, were strongly in favour of seeking refuge with Elizabeth rather than Henri.

Probably more appealing to the States General than his speech to the *Ridderschap en Edelen* was Van Dorp's profile as one of the kingpins of the uprising as well as his position as herald and closest favourite to the late William of Orange. As such, Van Dorp's biography neatly coincided with the early history of the Dutch Revolt. In summer 1568, the future envoy joined Orange on his first military campaign in Brabant. Thereafter, he regularly provided financial support to Orange and became part of his inner circle during the 1570s. As governor of Zierikzee and Zeeland Beoostenschelde, Van Dorp successfully defended the island of Schouwen (1575-1576) and participated in the peace talks with Philip II's representatives at Breda (1575). In 1578, he represented Orange in negotiations with Anjou and Don John of Austria (1545-1578), Philip II's illegitimate half-brother who then served as governor-general of the Provinces, about matters of military defence and the possibility of a Dutch-Spanish peace respectively.[44]

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[42] Harm in this context may take several forms, most obviously tyranny (of a ruler against his subjects) or rebellion (of subjects against their ruler).

[43] '[D]e ziecte vanden heer Casimbroot, die naer dimaginatie van eenige wel Ingels mochte wesen' (VD, 997; Brieven VD, II, p. 490).

[44] VD Brieven, I, pp. xiii-xlix, 246-54. The negotiations of the States General with Anjou resulted in the duke's instalment as *défenseur de la liberté belgique contre la tyrannie des Espagnols et de leurs adhérants*

By sending Van Dorp as one of Orange's favourites on a special mission to France, the States General likely wished to build upon the prince's contacts with the Valois family. Dutch-French contacts were already firmly established in the early 1570s. In July 1571, for example, Charles IX secretly discussed with Louis of Nassau, Orange's brother, the possibility of an armed intervention by France into the Provinces.[45] As noted in Chapter 2, Section 1, Louis also assisted Jeanne d'Albret in her negotiations with Catherine de Médicis over the Valois-Navarre marriage contract. Catherine had probably instructed Louis to convince Jeanne to accept the conditions of the contract.[46] Of profound influence on the Valois family was, of course, Orange's continued support of Anjou as titular ruler of the Provinces. It was largely on Orange's recommendation that the States General appointed Anjou as *défenseur de la liberté belgique contre la tyrannie des Espagnols et de leurs adhérants* in August 1578 and installed him as *prince et seigneur* of the Provinces in September 1580.[47] Even after the debacle of the *furie française* in January 1583, Orange urged the States General to honour their relations with Anjou, as a break with the duke would allow Philip II to gain the upper hand.[48]

With the appointment of Van Dorp as head of the embassy, then, the States General undoubtedly hoped to enjoy and safeguard the hospitality of Henri III and the queen mother. A letter in the Nationaal Archief, dated 10 December 1584, indicates that they were supported in this by Orange's son Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625), the future Prince of Orange.[49] In the document, the seventeen-year old urged Van Dorp to represent the interests of the House of Orange during his embassy in France:

> *Monsieur* Van Dorp. You have always been so affectionate in your service to the well-being of the late *Monseigneur* my Father of blessed memory that I do not doubt that you will continue to extend your good will to our entire house. I beseech you therefore, when you are in France,

on 13 August 1578 (see pp. 111-12, n. 3 above). The peace talks with Don John, however, proved eventually fruitless, because of the uncalculated behaviour of the Spanish governor-general and his premature death on 1 October 1578.

[45] Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 272-73.

[46] Hugues Daussy, *Les Huguenots et le roi: Le Combat politique de Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (1572-1600)* (Geneva: Droz, 2002), p. 60, n. 85.

[47] Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 73-5, 104, 128-29, 206-07; Duquenne, *L'Entreprise du duc d'Anjou*, pp. 41-3. For more on Anjou's Dutch titles, see pp. 111-12, n. 3 above.

[48] Yates, *The Valois Tapestries*, p. 113; Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 185-86, 199-200.

[49] VD, 995, one sheet, not foliated. This inventory number also includes another letter by Maurice — similar in content but addressed to the other deputies in Van Dorp's embassy. Both letters are printed in Brieven VD, II, 477–78, 478–79.

to hold my affairs and those of our house in such high esteem as that in which you hold the memory of my late said *Seigneur*.[50]

2. Travelling to Paris

Just as it proved difficult for the States General to arrive at a consensus surrounding the rule over the Provinces, so also was it troublesome for Van Dorp's train to reach the Parisian court on time. Although the deputies intended to take their leave around 18 December 1584, they were delayed by the Duke of Parma who had obstructed their plan to bring fourteen warships from Zeeland to the harbour of Brill. He reportedly threatened to use violence against the envoys — a wry reminder of the tumultuous backdrop of the Dutch embassy and the still ongoing war with Spain.[51] Worsening the situation even further, unfavourable winds forced the diplomats to postpone their departure until the next year, which caused annoyance on the part of Roch de Sorbiers (died in 1596), sieur des Pruneaux, the French agent who had earlier negotiated with the States General about the Dutch mission.[52]

The deputies hastened to send their apologies and on 3 January 1585 they finally set sail for Dieppe with a batch of warships delivered by the States General.[53] About a week later, however, headwinds forced them to land at Boulogne harbour.[54] From there, the envoys travelled to Abbeville and Clermont. Only there did the envoys receive letters from the king specifying the nature of their reception: he requested them not to enter Paris but to wait for fifteen days at Senlis instead, a town located forty kilometres to the north of the capital.[55] The ambassadors, for their part, dispatched letters to members of the Parisian court with whom they were on good terms, requesting them to act favourably on

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[50] VD, 995; see Brieven VD, II, pp. 477-78 (see appendix).

[51] NA, Staten-Generaal (1576-1588), inv. no. 86A; summarised in *Resolutiën*, ed. by Japikse, IV, p. 509. Over the course of Van Dorp's stay in France, Parma launched the spectacular siege of Antwerp (the city finally surrendered on 17 August 1585).

[52] See his letter to the States General in NA, SG (1576-1588), 86A, summarised in *Resolutiën*, ed. by Japikse, IV, p. 509. Pruneaux was appointed as agent to the States General in late March 1585 (Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back', p. 89). This was probably a recognition *a posteriori*, given that Pruneaux had served the late Anjou as his representative in meetings of the States General from 1578 until the duke's death in 1584 (Duquenne, *L'Entreprise du duc d'Anjou*, p. 29).

[53] Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, *P. C. Hoofts Nederlandsche historien*, ed. by Matthijs Siegenbeek, Adam Simons, and Johannes Pieter van Cappelle, 8 vols (Amsterdam: Johannes van der Hey en Zoon, 1820-1824), VI (1823), p. 261.

[54] This was presumably on 11 January (see Van Meteren, *Belgische ofte Nederlantsche historie*, fol. CCXXVI).

[55] Hooft, *Nederlandsche historien*, VI, p. 262.

their behalf. Their letters were addressed to Catherine de Médicis, Henri de Navarre, and Pierre de Melun (1550-1594), prince d'Épinoy.[56]

Having received no word about the welcome for most of their voyage to France, the king's instruction to the Dutch ambassadors to wait for another fifteen days at Senlis, so shortly before their arrival in the capital, was surely perceived as inhospitable. The envoys may have been particularly disappointed about the apparent inhospitality of the Valois given the longstanding diplomatic relations between the States General and the French crown, as seen in Section 1 above and Chapter 2, Section 1. The delay demonstrates that the reception of Van Dorp's train by the French was not pre-scripted but subject to last-minute changes, even more so than that of any other foreign embassy, owing to its contested diplomatic status. The letters of introduction sent to Catherine, Navarre, and Épinoy were therefore meant to 'negotiate' the hospitality that the Dutch ambassadors hoped to receive at the court in Paris. In an environment that was predominantly hostile to both Protestantism and rebellious subjects, acts of hospitality were certainly not a given but needed to be earned. The States General probably understood this as well, for their instructions to the envoys were mainly concerned with the specific conditions under which Henri was to be accepted as king of all the Provinces and lacked any guidance on the content or the way in which the deputies had to carry out public speeches and other ceremonial acts. Apparently, the ad-hoc diplomacy that the French advanced towards their Dutch visitors defied any attempt to devise on-site instructions.

It appears that Van Dorp had not immediately briefed the States General about his embassy's stay at Senlis, for only after his arrival in Paris, in mid-February,[57] did the envoy explain the reason for his delayed reception at the French court in a letter to the noblemen of the assembly.[58] In it, Van Dorp proposed the interpretation that the French had delayed the reception of his train to wait for the impending arrival of the English train, headed by Henry Stanley (1531-1593), Earl of Derby:

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[56] VD, 993; Brieven VD, II, pp. 460–64. Épinoy had accompanied Anjou in 1583 while travelling through France and belonged to one of the most important noble families of the Provinces. As governor of Mechlin and Tournaisis, he supported William of Orange in his war against Spain. The queen mother and her Protestant son-in-law were largely sympathetic to the cause of the rebelling Provinces.

[57] Van Dorp's first draft of the report is dated 15 February and a second, slightly altered one, dated one week later. Both are in NA, VD, 1001. The second draft is printed in Brieven VD, II, pp. 504-513. The footnotes in the latter source indicate the bits where the second draft deviates from the first one.

[58] Van Dorp's last letter to the States General before his embassy's wait in Senlis was sent from Abbeville on 20 January (see VD, 1001; Brieven VD, II, p. 505).

> The reason also why [I] have not informed you, Sirs, directly any sooner, is that [I] thought that under the pretext of respect [the French] wanted to save on the time [spent] waiting for the arrival of Mylord Derby, accompanied (as they said) by two hundred Noblemen. The latter [travelled] straight to Saint-Denis, and will be received here in the city [Paris] with much pomp the day after tomorrow [13 February]; if not, there remains the fear that this delay might have a very different meaning than would be appropriate for our common cause.[59]

The letter is rather hard to follow, owing to its rhetoric of diplomatic courtesy, but seems to suggest that Van Dorp was not aware of the exact reason of his embassy's delayed reception when he was first instructed by the king to wait at Senlis.[60] For this reason, Van Dorp may have decided to postpone briefing the States General about the proceedings of his embassy, for fear that the wait at Senlis would be interpreted by the assembly, not as a diplomatic necessity, but as a suspicious detour that would endanger the successful completion of the secret mission ('the fear that this delay might have a very different meaning than would be appropriate for our common cause').[61] The envoy thus offered his apologies to the members of the States General, all of whom were eagerly awaiting to hear the opinion of Henri III about their offer of rulership over the Provinces, for not having corresponded any sooner.

In the letter, Van Dorp also showed himself aware that his delayed reception was a direct consequence of the diplomatic practices of the French. The envoy observed how the royal family used diplomatic hospitality to direct public attention towards the reception of the English ambassadors. By receiving the latter 'with much pomp' and with much 'respect', it neglected the visit of his own embassy. Henri probably feared that the delayed arrival of the Dutch envoys at Boulogne harbour would unintentionally put their stay at court in the spotlight. Van Dorp's comments on his delayed reception seem to be substantiated by an undated English manuscript in the British Library. Narrating the journey of Derby's embassy to Paris, it reports that on 6 February Henri instructed the English diplomats to stay at Clermont for two more days and not to enter Paris until 13 February.[62] This leads us to conclude that the king wished to avoid a clash with the visit of Van Dorp's

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[59] Ibid., p. 506.

[60] According to Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, the reason for the delay was communicated to the Dutch envoys at the time by Pruneaux (*Nederlandsche historien*, VI, p. 262), but we have not been able to find further evidence for this in the archives.

[61] In Van Dorp's interpretation of the events, this belief may have been reinforced further by the unforeseen high costs of the embassy, all of which were to be covered by the States General (see pp. 129-30 below). In mid-February, however, Van Dorp could write to the States General with at least some good news, as his embassy had already been received by Henri for several private audiences (see section 3 below).

[62] BL, Cotton MS Caligula E. VII, fols. 241ʳ-248ᵛ (242ʳ).

train, which arrived in the capital on 11 February. The prolonged stay of both embassies at neighbouring towns, then, was clearly aimed at drawing public attention to the magnificent celebration of Anglo-French relations and keeping the simultaneous presence of the Dutch at court out of sight.

If we turn to the reception of Van Dorp's and Derby's embassies as they travelled to Paris, we observe a similar discrepancy in the distribution of diplomatic hospitality. It was customary for the Valois kings to welcome foreign ambassadors with lavish banquets and spectacles as soon as they set foot on French soil. In this way, they not only hoped to pay due respect to the status of a particular embassy, but also to showcase the prestige and significance of their international relations across the kingdom. On February 1, Derby's ships unexpectedly arrived at Calais instead of Boulogne owing to the still prevailing 'Contrary wynde'.[63] Even so, the deputies were generously received on the very same day by the town's governor, accompanied by a hefty two- or three-hundred gun salute. The following night, they dined with the governor at 'a burgeses [burgess'] house in the market place' and enjoyed after-supper music and dancing from local ladies and gentlemen.[64] In Amiens, four days later, the envoys were met by a distinguished nobleman from the French court, François Gouffier (died in 1594), seigneur de Crèvecœur, *grand seigneur de Picardie* (grand lord of Picardy), and an impressive number of '100. Gentlemen & best citizens'.[65] Their visit was once again marked by a three-hundred gun salute. In the evening, the English were served 'a great store of very large & good fresh water fish, & […] wine of diuers sorts'.[66] This pattern of gun salutes, eating, and feasting was repeated over the next eleven days until the envoys reached Paris on 13 February.

The generous reception of Derby's embassy on its travels to the capital stood in sharp contrast to the diplomatic inhospitality by which the Dutch ambassadors were met. In his dispatches Van Dorp made no mention of a personal welcome by a town's representative, let alone of canon fire or cortèges of noblemen to endow his embassy with the necessary grandeur. Instead, he reported that his embassy stayed at Boulogne's local staging post

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[63] Ibid., fol. 242ʳ.
[64] Ibid., fol. 241ᵛ.
[65] Edmund Howes, '[The King of France's Investiture with the Garter, 20 January-12 March 1585]', ed. by Faith Eales and David Parrott, in *John Nichols's 'The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth I'*, ed. by Goldring and others, III: *1579-1595*, pp. 211-21 (p. 215).
[66] Ibid.

until 13 January.[67] Detailed statements of food and travel expenses indicate that the French did not reimburse the Dutch for their expenditure on their way to Paris. Only their accommodation at Senlis and in the capital was payed for by the king. In the rue Saint-Denis in Paris, they were lodged in public inns.[68] The English deputies, by contrast, were given spacious and 'sumptuously furnished' rooms 'for them all of the Kings cost' at the Hôtel de Longueville, a royal château also known as the Hôtel d'Anjou.[69] Food and wine 'in as great plenty as could be desired' were brought to the English by the Swiss Guard.[70]

The unfunded travels of the Dutch ambassadors caused Van Dorp's chamberlain, Martin Lengelle, who had also served the late William of Orange, to raise concerns about the embassy's limited budget. On 16 January, when the envoys travelled through Abbeville, he urgently requested the States General 'the sum of four-hundred *livres tournois*' for sending a batch of 'hundred horses […] to the kingdom of France'.[71] Lengelle's request for money was apparently not incidental. According to the draft of a letter written by Van Dorp to the States General on 9 April, shortly after his return to the Dutch Provinces, the costs of the ultimately failed mission were much higher than anticipated. The States General called upon the ambassador to account for the train's exceeded expenditure, a demand that he did not take lightly and even construed as a downright offence on his part. Van Dorp's letter to the assembly reads like an apologia, in which he tried to convince the members of his invaluable service for the country, especially with respect to the mission to France: 'That we [Van Dorp and his party] under all conditions were to protect and promote the honour and justice of this land'.[72] The envoy moreover contended that his spending of the state's budget was perfectly in keeping with the ambitious nature of the

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[67] VD, 1008. Early modern staging posts enabled travellers to change horses and often housed rooms or an inn. The financial records of Van Dorp's embassy at the Nationaal Archief also mention the name of Boulogne's *maître de poste* (stable master): Nicollas du Karoy.

[68] VD, 1001; Brieven VD, II, p. 506.

[69] Howes, '[The King of France's Investiture with the Garter]', pp. 216. The early modern word 'hôtel' refers to a mansion, palace, or large house.

[70] Ibid., p. 217. See also BL, Cotton MS Caligula E. VII, fol. 242ᵛ. The Swiss Guard was instructed to guard the Hôtel heavily against intruders, especially the Parisian mob and members of the *Ligue catholique*.

[71] '[L]a somme de quatre cens livres tournois'; 'cent chevaulx […] au roiaulme de France' (VD, 1008; Brieven VD, II, p. 502).

[72] '[D]at wij slants eer ende gherechticheyt allenthalven zouden hebben te bewaeren ende voostaen' (VD, 1009; Brieven VD, II, p. 542).

mission, since he 'had more deputies in the legation than any other [envoy]').[73] What is more, his travels to Paris took place 'in the severest part of the winter'.[74]

Despite their costly and tedious journey, the Dutch ambassadors finally enjoyed an official reception at Senlis on 24 January, where they were welcomed by a prominent member of the king's household, François de la Fontaine (1566-1632), baron d'Oignon.[75] As *gentilhomme ordinaire de la Chambre du Roi* (ordinary gentleman of the King's Bedchamber), Oignon was assigned the task of overseeing the king's correspondence within and outside France, while also representing him in negotiations with foreign princes and dignitaries. According to the Dutch chronicler Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft (1581-1647), Oignon was accompanied by a small cortège of respectable noblemen that included Pruneaux, Colonel Guillaume de Rebours,[76] one 'Allein',[77] and the prince of Épinoy. Épinoy's presence at the official reception of the envoys suggests that he had accepted their 'call for hospitality' sent earlier that month.

The noblemen escorted Van Dorp's delegation until 9 February when Henri sent horses, coaches, and servants to bring them to Paris.[78] This hospitable gesture probably meant a great deal to the Dutch emissaries who well understood that being welcomed by a distinguished member of the king's household signified acceptance of sovereign status. Although they were commonly labelled as rebels, Henri's occasional hospitality gave them some agency to enter and navigate the diplomatic world at the Valois court, albeit only to a limited extent. In this way, the French could gain the trust and sympathy of the ambassadors, which they undoubtedly hoped to exploit in negotiations over the future of the Provinces. Conversely, their decision not to fund or accompany the travels of the Dutch with entertainment demonstrates that the French were continuously forced to adapt their diplomatic strategy to the changing political conditions. By alternately giving and

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[73] '[A]ls eenich andere […] meer gedeputeerdens inde legatie heeft gehadt' (VD, 1009; Brieven VD, II, p. 543).

[74] '[I]nt hartste vanden winter' (ibid.).

[75] Oignon was also appointed seigneur de Fontaines and Berthinval, gouverneur de Crêpy and Pont Sainte-Maixence.

[76] Seigneur de Bertrand-Fosse, de Châtillon, and de Prunelé. Rebours was advisor to the *Parlement de Paris* and president at the *cour des aides* (sovereign court concerned with public finances), and since 1597 councillor ordinary.

[77] This could be either Jacques de Renaud, seigneur d'Alein, d'Aurons, and de Lamanon, or his brother Guillaume, sieur d'Alleins. Both were sons of Nicolas de Renaud (1455-1527), sire d'Alleins and seigneur de Forcalquier.

[78] Hooft, *Nederlandse historien*, VI, p. 262.

denying hospitality, the French tried to win the sympathy of the Dutch, while avoiding provoking the Catholic envoys at court.

3. Received at court

Although the reception of Van Dorp's embassy was meagre compared to that of Derby's train, the ambassadors of the pope, Savoy, and Spain were quick to raise their voices. The Spanish ambassador to France, Bernardino de Mendoza (1540-1604), in particular, was shocked when he received word about the arrival of the Dutch envoys at Boulogne harbour, and probably even more so when he learned about their official reception at Senlis. Philip II had dispatched Mendoza to the Parisian court in April 1584, ostensibly to commiserate on the death of Anjou, but more particularly to find out about Henri's attitude to the power vacuum in the Dutch Provinces.[79] The English deputies, who took an equal interest in this matter, reported that he had demanded an audience with the king no less than three times after the embassy's arrival in Boulogne.[80] What was undoubtedly perceived by the Dutch envoys as an act of generosity was an offence for the Spanish diplomat. Edward Stafford (1552-1605), the English ambassador to France and a special member of Derby's embassy, described Mendoza's audience with Henri on 17 January as follows:[81]

> [Mendoza] desired the King to remember that these deputies [the Dutch] were 'rebels to his master [Philip II] and heretics to the church,' and therefore, considering his [Henri's] strait league with that King, he ought 'not only not to admit them to his presence nor to hear them, but also to deliver them and to send them to his master'.[82]

Rather than meeting Mendoza's concerns, however, or approving of his characterisation of the Dutch ambassadors as rebels, Henri replied, according to Stafford, in an unusually sharp manner:

> The King answered him in a great choler, that he was nobody's subject nor at commandment; that his realm was free for all comers, and his ears open to hear everybody; that as it was a common thing both for him [Henri] to hear any subject of his master's [Mendoza's master, i.e.

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[79] Valentín Vázquez de Prada, *Felipe II y Francia (1559-1598): Política, Religión y Razón de Estado*, HISTÓRICA (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2004), pp. 83–4.

[80] Edward Stafford to Francis Walsingham (2 January 1585, CSPF, XIX, p. 228).

[81] On 20 January 1585, Stafford was created Ambassador-Extraordinary to invest Henri with the Order of the Garter. See Howes, '[The King of France's Investiture]', p. 213, n. 34.

[82] Stafford to Walsingham (2 January 1584, CSPF, XIX, p. 228).

> Philip II] and to entertain diverse [visitors], and a more common thing for his master to enter-
> tain divers[e] [visitors] of his, so was it a liberty of all princes of Christendom to entertain and
> hear all comers as they thought good.[83]

As a sovereign, Henri considered it his right ('a liberty') to welcome to France 'all com-
ers' regardless of their diplomatic or sovereign status. In other words, it was 'a common
thing' to receive subjects of the Spanish king, just as it was to host any other foreign
deputies, including the Protestant Dutch who were regularly labelled as outlaws. Henri
thus invoked the widespread belief among early modern writers of mirrors for princes
that every virtuous ruler should receive foreign visitors, as well as loyal subjects, with
liberality or generosity. As shown in Chapter 1, Section 3, hospitality was generally rec-
ommended by these writers as an essential tool for the ruler to improve diplomatic rela-
tions with foreign powers, reinforce his international standing as a generous and wealthy
sovereign, and — more specifically — to safeguard the well-being of his own subjects.
By awarding hospitality, which Henri understood as giving attention ('to hear') or provid-
ing spectacle ('to entertain'), the early modern king could display the magnificence of his
court and show off his liberality in hosting visitors, however different in culture or reli-
gion.

It is worth noting that in Stafford's report of the scene Henri did not seem to make
much of an effort to please or even avoid provoking Mendoza, given that he answered the
Spanish envoy 'in a great choler'. The reason for this presumably lay in Mendoza's bad
reputation (Stafford ended his account by remarking that the ambassador was 'generally
hated of everybody').[84] In the mid- to late-sixteenth century, Philip II advanced what one
may call an 'aggressive diplomacy' towards Protestant realms, especially England, and
countries with substantial Protestant minorities, such as France. Dispatching strong per-
sonalities abroad as resident ambassadors, Philip thus attempted to frustrate the political
power of Protestant states.[85] In other words, Henri's unusually sharp reply to Mendoza
was probably acceptable for many of the other foreign embassies at court (though possibly

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[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Before residing in France, Mendoza had served as Spanish ambassador to England between 1578 and
1584, when he was forced to leave the country because of his involvement in the Throckmorton Plot. The
plot was one of the many Catholic conspiracies to overthrow Elizabeth I and replace her with Mary Queen
of Scots (see also p. 50, n. 28 above). During his residency in France, the envoy continued to support
Philip's aggressive ambitions by assisting the *Ligue catholique*. For more on this, see De Lamar Jensen,
Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League (Harvard University
Press, 1964).

not appreciated by the ambassadors of the pope and Savoy), given the envoy's notorious reputation as spy and conspirator.

According to a Dutch account of Mendoza's audience, anonymously written and printed in the first volume of Pieter Christiaenszoon Bor's series of chronicles on the Dutch Revolt, published in 1679, Henri even went so far as to acknowledge that 'he did not wish to hear and receive the deputies of the Low Countries as apostate rebels of their king, but as people who were burdened, oppressed, and overwhelmed with injustice, and so to examine their cause'.[86] Attractive as such a rehabilitation may have been to the nameless Dutch writer, who undoubtedly aimed to glorify the revolt of his fellow countrymen against Spain, it is unlikely that Henri openly refused to label the Dutch as rebels in the presence of Mendoza.[87] Although the king had probably considered the legitimacy of the Dutch offer of rulership in light of his deceased brother's position as *prince et seigneur* of the Provinces, openly condemning the Spanish for their 'injustice' would have forced him into a difficult situation with Philip II and other Catholic rulers.[88] This is especially true when we consider the public nature of the audience. Stafford's detailed account suggests that the envoy did not rely on hearsay but witnessed the event himself, possibly joined by other foreign diplomats.

With so many diplomats acting as witnesses behind the curtain, it seemed to have been impossible for Henri actually to 'entertain and hear *all comers* as [he] thought good'.[89] The power of the monarch to award strangers, even outlaws, with ceremony was thus strongly dependent on the presence or not of other envoys. Ambassadors determined the

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[86] '[H]y de gesanten van de Nederlanden niet als afvallige rebellen haers koninks: maer als overlaste/ verdrukte/ en met ongelijk overweldigde wilde horen en ontvangen/ ende hare sake examineren' (*Oorspronck, begin, en vervolgh der Nederlandsche oorlogen, beroerten, en borgerlyke oneenigheden [...]*, 4 vols (Amsterdam: Weduwe van Joannes van Someren, Abraham Wolfgangh, and Hendrick en Dirck Boom, 1679-1684), I, p. 525).

[87] The anonymous account is echoed in Van Meteren, *Belgische ofte Nederlantsche historie*, fol. CCXXVI; Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche Historie*, VIII, p. 57. Importantly, we should be careful not to take these accounts of Mendoza's audience with Henri at face value, but realise that the chronicles in which they appeared were published during the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic. The historical works of Pieter Christiaenszoon Bor, Emanuel van Meteren, and Jan Wagenaar should be seen as the first attempts to narrate the birth pangs and achievements of a young but proud nation. Glorifying one's past was a commonly accepted means to that end.

[88] See ibid.

[89] Our emphasis. The image of the diplomat acting as a witness behind the curtain calls to mind Act III, scene IV of William Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, in which Polonius hides behind an arras to find out the true cause of the title character's madness. Timothy Hampton (in *Fictions of Embassy*, pp. 138-62) has written some insightful pages on the way in which Shakespeare's play marks the shift from 'a kind of archaic violence' as a means to settle conflicts (embodied in the figure of the old Hamlet) to 'the more mediated world' of Renaissance diplomacy (represented by King Claudius and others).

extent to which the king could show his affection to visitors in public, because in the correspondence to their heads of state they played a decisive role in fashioning his image. Henri was therefore careful not to speak too favourably about the Dutch in front of all the other diplomats. Rather, he seemed to have resorted to his role of generous Christian king, powerful enough to receive all kinds of strangers.[90]

When Van Dorp's embassy finally arrived at court (on 11 February), the behaviour of the other ambassadors was not 'diplomatic' in any commonly accepted meaning of the term. Judging from the Dutch and English correspondence, there were a number of envoys who bullied and spied on the new visitors, sometimes by sending an actual spy to infiltrate Van Dorp's embassy. Reporting his first audience with the king to the States General, one day after his arrival, Van Dorp complained that he was already regularly hindered by the Catholic diplomats:

> I will not write in detail here what the ambassadors of the pope, Savoy, of Spain, with more others, have done to obstruct, first, the audience and, after that, the proceedings of this business, as your Noblemen can well imagine.[91]

Unfortunately, Van Dorp did not specify the manner in which these ambassadors hindered his doings at court, probably for fear that his letters were intercepted.

When trawling through non-Dutch chronicles and the correspondence of the foreign embassies that stayed in Paris between January and March 1585, it becomes apparent that other foreign diplomats at the Valois court were rather ill-informed about the political profiles of the Dutch ambassadors. This was especially true for the English deputies who wrote at length about the activities of Van Dorp's train. Whereas Maurice of Nassau (in his letter to Aernt van Dorp, quoted in Section 1) stressed the importance that the emissary held for him as herald to his late father and representative of the House of Orange,

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[90] In contrast to the anonymous Dutch account, Stafford's record of Henri's reply to Mendoza ends on a more diplomatic note:

> [The king answered Mendoza that] he had no cause to complain, for as he himself knew not, so he thought the ambassador less than he knew the propositions that they [Van Dorp's embassy] would make at their coming, which perchance might be for the good of the King his master and his estate (dispatch to Walsingham, 2 January 1584, CSPF, XIX, p. 228).

Although Henri probably did not know the exact content of these propositions yet (this was revealed and discussed in his subsequent audiences with the Dutch ambassadors), he was of course well aware that they were related to his candidacy as King of the Provinces. Henri's feigned ignorance, then, was meant to avoid a definite break with Philip II, while also keeping an open mind to the generous offer of the Dutch.

[91] VD, 1001; VD Brieven, p. 508 (see appendix).

Stafford did not seem to have heard of the envoy at all and referred to him as 'one Van Dorp'.[92] We can only guess at the cause of this ignorance, but, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter, Van Dorp was not particularly keen to negotiate with the English and it appears that he had tried to avoid collaboration with Elizabeth I as much as possible. At the same time, of course, the diplomatic network of the States General was largely clandestine and not officially recognised abroad. This would have made it difficult for Stafford and others to keep up to date with the exact composition of the special Dutch embassy, especially given the fact that its mission was kept deliberately secret.

Whatever the cause, the English diplomats made every effort to obtain information about the future of the Provinces. Trying to keep the actual purpose of the Dutch mission as secret as possible, however, Henri refused to involve Derby and Stafford into his negotiations with Van Dorp. The ambassadors certainly did not appreciate the king's refusal to 'make her Majesty [Elizabeth] partaker of his mind' and probably even considered this offensive. On 15 February, immediately after Henri's investiture with the Order of the Garter, both men urged Henri finally to enlighten them on the proposal of the Dutch 'in respect of the sender, the bringer, and the necessity of what was demanded'.[93] Three days earlier, Stafford had already sent an agent to spy on Van Dorp's delegation: Hermann Taffin (born in *c.* 1528), sieur de Torsay, the governor of the Florentine military leader Filippo di Piero Strozzi (1541-1582).[94] In his monthly reports to Francis Walsingham, Stafford encoded Torsay's name in cypher to protect the governor's identity.[95] Stafford's choice for Torsay was not unmotivated, for he was the brother of Van Dorp's treasurer: Quintijn Taffin, sieur de la Prée, who had been elected by the Lordship of Mechlin to join the special embassy to France.[96] Stafford's report of Torsay's meeting with the Dutch shortly before Van Dorp's audience with the king illustrates how wary they had become of the other envoys at court:

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[92] Stafford to Walsingham (12 February 1585, CSPF, XIX, p. 277). Other writers did not mention the Dutch envoys by name at all and referred — perhaps for lack of a better term or because they genuinely objected to the label 'rebels' — to the 'Belgian Legates' ('Legatos Belgicos'; de Thou, *Historiarum*, IV, bk. 81, p. 253) or 'deputies of Flanders' ('deputati di Fiandra'; Giulio Busini, in *Négociations diplomatiques*, ed. by Desjardins, IV, p. 501). Both Van Dorp and the States General used the term 'gedeputeerden' ('deputies').

[93] Derby and Stafford to Walsingham (23 February 1585, CSPF, XIX, p. 295).

[94] For more on Torsay, see Émile Picot, *Les Français italianisants au XVIe siècle*, 2 vols (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1906-1907), I, pp. 95-107.

[95] 'I would not in my general letter give the name of him that I have sent to the [Dutch] deputies, as he desired not to be named. It it [sic] *Torcy (Torse), Strossi's governor*' (12 February 1585, CSPF, XIX, p. 276; italics give the decoded cypher).

[96] See p. 114, n. 8 above.

I [Stafford] made this man [Torsay] go to salute them […] and tell them why I sent none [deputies] of my own, fearing they might be watched, but that I had a good will (and it was her Majesty's pleasure) to do them all the good I could. To which they answered but with reasonable cold thanks.

[…]

When he [Torsay] was gone, they made his brother [La Prée] swear whether he had revealed anything of their intentions; and also made one another swear solemnly that to no living creature they would disclose anything.[97]

If even close relatives of the Dutch envoys could spy on them for the other foreign embassies at court, it was important not to leak anything about their secret negotiations with the king. According to Stafford, they failed in doing so nonetheless: '[The Dutch] keep their articles very secret and are mistrustful of everybody, except of those whom they should not trust'.[98] He then went on to describe how 'one Calvert' (i.e. Lieven Calvaert, Van Dorp's scribe and agent of the States General in France) was looking for Pruneaux to show him the articles to be discussed during his master's audience with the king.[99] The man was apparently rather negligent in his search, for when he asked Henri de Navarre's court agents, Clervant and Chassincourt, about Pruneaux's whereabouts, he was called away by an agent of his own embassy ('one "at his heels"') to confess whether or not he had shown the articles to either of them.[100] For this reason, Henri instructed Pruneaux to keep a close watch on the Dutch envoys 'to see who comes to them and whither they go'.[101]

Since Henri could not receive Van Dorp's embassy with ceremonial protocol in public, he was forced to hold all interactions with the Dutch behind closed doors. His audience with Van Dorp on 13 February, for example, took place in this 'secreet cabinet' (private study).[102] Being invited to the cabinet was in fact considered a great privilege, given that the room was one of the king's private spaces. In his report to the States General on 15 February, Van Dorp specifically commented on the hospitality shown to him there by Henri: '[A]nd your Noblemen can be assured that this reply [the king's initially positive

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[97] Stafford to Walsingham (12 February 1585, CSPF, XIX, pp. 276-77).
[98] Stafford to Walsingham ([12 February 1585], CSPF, XIX, p. 274).
[99] For more on Calvaert, see *Biografisch Woordenboek*, s.v. 'Caluart', and p. 114, n. 8 above.
[100] Stafford to Walsingham ([12 February 1585], CSPF, XIX, p. 274). It is unclear why Stafford distrusted Navarre's court agents.
[101] Ibid.
[102] VD, 1001; Brieven VD, II, p. 507.

response to the offer of the diplomats] was accompanied by a happy and friendly countenance'.[103] At the same time, the Dutch envoys probably understood that an invitation to the king's cabinet came at the expense of the public recognition that they might otherwise have sought or appreciated.

Van Dorp expressed these mixed feelings in his letter to the States General: 'Even if all their propositions [the interference run by the papal nuncio and the other Catholic ambassadors at the French court] go up in smoke,[104] I cannot but notice that they treat us here as if we were close to their hearts, *though more in secret than in public*'.[105] Van Dorp was therefore keen to report that, after his audience with the king, he met Henri's wife, Louise de Lorraine, and the queen mother 'sufficiently public (but each separately)'.[106] In other words, Van Dorp's meetings with the royal family seem to have been just about civil enough so as not to have been offensive, while offering the Dutch envoys some form of public recognition. Although Van Dorp clearly appreciated publicly staged expressions of hospitality, it would be misguided to assume that his embassy made conscious, let alone consistent, efforts to boost the image of the States General in France and, by extension, Europe. Van Dorp's letters to the States General provide no evidence of deliberate attempts to claim recognition of the Provinces as a sovereign state, nor did the instructions of the States General to the Dutch ambassadors encourage or even refer to such attempts.[107] Rather, the diplomats appeared to have sought public recognition only to the extent that it allowed them the room or agency to negotiate their offer with Henri.

In 1585, France was not yet openly at war with Spain. Even if Henri would have preferred to treat the Dutch Provinces as a fully independent state and to receive Van Dorp's train with the full amount of ceremony, he could not actually do so, as it would have pushed him into a war with Philip II. The diplomatic agency of the States General in France (and elsewhere), then, simply proved too limited for Van Dorp's embassy to campaign actively for independence from Spain. As Jan Heringa and, more recently, Liesbeth

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[103] '[E]nde mach uwer E. wel verseeckeren, dat dees antwoorde verselschapt was met een blijde ende vriendelick gelaet' (VD, 1001; Brieven VD, II, p. 507).

[104] We discussed this interference on p. 134 above.

[105] 'Alsoe alle hen voortstel in roock vergaet, zoe en can ick noch anders nyet vermercken, dan dat men ons hier metter harten meent, *doch meer int secreet, dan int openbaer* (VD, inv. no. 1001; Brieven VD, II, p. 508, our italics).

[106] '[G]henouch int openbaer (maer elck apart)' (VD, 1001; Brieven VD, II, p. 507).

[107] The States General probably realised that foreign support was a necessary condition for receiving international recognition as an independent state. Van Dorp's special embassy to France, then, was precisely aimed at fulfilling this condition.

Geevers have shown, this changed during the 1590s when Philip's continued support of the *Ligue catholique* in France prompted Henri IV to declare war on Spain.[108] At this stage, the French were more willing to accept the independence of the Dutch Provinces, which in 1588, after having unsuccessfully offered rulership over their States to Henri III and, later, in May 1585, to Elizabeth I, wished to be recognised as a republic. Moreover, in 1596, Henri IV invited the Provinces (now the Dutch Republic) to join an alliance between France and England against Spain (the so-called Triple Alliance and Treaties of Greenwich). These international developments endowed the States General with more diplomatic agency abroad, thanks to which the Dutch could present themselves with greater confidence on the political stage.

While staying in Paris during winter 1585, however, Van Dorp's train could only marvel at the splendour that was staged in honour of a fully-fledged embassy like Derby's. Although the Dutch ambassadors made little to no reference to the spectacles given at the festival, they might have looked through the windows of 'la grande salle haute' of the Bishop's Palace and observed the preparations that were taking place there during the afternoon of 18 February for a ballet presented by the king later that evening.[109] They may have seen a number of Henri's best dancers (the performance featured twenty-four in total) practising *courantes* and *voltas* for the magnificent grand ball of the ballet, in which the most respectable noblemen at court took their ladies by the hand, thus 'making in all xxiiij couples that danced in that crowd at once' (see *Figure 2* below).[110] Perhaps even the king himself dropped by that afternoon and rehearsed with the dancers one of the ballet's most complex choreographies, which the English deputies in their report to Elizabeth I would describe as 'so strange a manner of dancing'.[111] While Henri appeared centre stage, wearing a mask and possibly instructing the other performers in his role as *chef*

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[108] Jan Heringa, *De eer en hoogheid van de staat: Over de plaats van der Verenigde Nederlanden in het diplomatieke leven van de zeventiende eeuw* (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1961), p. 233; Geevers, 'The King Strikes Back', pp. 89–90.

[109] This seemed to happen more frequently, judging from Balthazar de Beaujoyeulx's account of the preparations taken for his performance of *Le Balet comique de la Reine* on 15 October 1581. Beaujoyeulx described how during the day the doors of the 'grande salle de Bourbon' in Paris (meaning either the Louvre's Grande Salle or the Salle de Bourbon of the Petit Palais) were attentively guarded to keep out 'toute personne curieuse' ('all curious people') eager to catch a glimpse of the theatrical machines being installed for the ballet performance that night (*Le Balet Comique by Balthazar de Beaujoyeulx, 1581: A Facsimile*, Medieval & Renaissance Text & Studies, 6, ed. by Margaret M. McGowan (Binghamton and New York: Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), fol. 7ʳ).

[110] Bod, Tanner 78, fol. 38ʳ.

[111] Ibid.

d'orchestre, the dancers expressed 'all the letters both in the King and Queenes name'.[112] They were accompanied by various musicians who played a range of instruments (including the lute), which altogether produced, according to Derby's embassy, 'such a consort and harmony as nothing cold be devised more pleasant and delightfull'.[113]

Figure 2. Ball at the court of Henri III showing couples dancing the *volta* (anonymous, Musée des Beaux-Arts, Rennes).

Later that evening, Stafford and Derby were given priority seats at the upper end of the Bishop's hall next to Catherine and Louise de Lorraine. They even received a 'private' performance during the ballet when a group of musicians came up to the ambassadors and the two queens, and started singing in alternation, 'the refreyne of euery close being sung out by the whole company'.[114] The sharp contrast between the privileged position of Derby's embassy and the Dutch ambassadors who could have only participated in the festivities by looking through the hall's windows brings into view the importance that

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[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid. See Strong, 'Festivals', pp. 51–55, for a detailed analysis of the ballet.

theatrical entertainment bore for receiving foreign diplomats at the Valois court. Although the description of the performance by the English ambassadors was rather factual, and did not make reference to allegorical content, it becomes clear that the ballet involved an unequivocal celebration of the French crown. Just like Charles IX at the Valois-Navarre festival in 1572, Henri branded himself as a powerful monarch, while being surrounded by subjects who literally honoured his name (and Louise's) in dancing. Especially in times of civil unrest, it was important to convince representatives of foreign rulers that the Valois kings were sufficiently capable of maintaining political stability in their realm. Ballets, like the one staged in honour of the English diplomats, were instrumental in this, because as self-contained creations that had been prepared in advance, they enabled the French effectively to fashion and control their output of political messages.

At the same time, the performing arts served to create feelings of conviviality and harmony among members of the royal family, their subjects, and invited foreign ambassadors. Dancing in pairs, listening to measured music, having the privilege of watching or actually performing in a ballet together with the king and other royals or noblemen at court contributed to these feelings (the 'consort and harmony' referred to by the English deputies above). The reinforcement of bonds was crucial for establishing a strong diplomatic community built on a shared recognition of power relations between hosts, guests, and subjects. The position of the Dutch ambassador in this community was one of an outsider. Although the backrooms of the Louvre permitted the Dutch envoys a limited degree of diplomatic agency, they did not allow them full access to the community of foreign envoys at the Valois court.

Only Giulio Busini (born in 1530), the Florentine ambassador to France, recorded a public appearance of Van Dorp's embassy in a letter to Belisario Vinta (1542-1613), the Secretary of State to Christina di Lorena (1565-1637), the Grand Duchess of Tuscany.[115] According to Busini, the Dutch were invited to the king's investiture ceremony on 15 February together with the other foreign envoys. Their public presence, however, seemed to have supported a clear diplomatic strategy, for Busini noted that the king wished to evoke a reaction from Mendoza.[116] Although the Florentine diplomat provided no further

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[115] *Négociations diplomatiques*, ed. by Desjardins, IV, p. 549.
[116] '[C]he tutto sia fatto ad arte per vedere se l'ambasciatore di Spagna esce a cosa nessuna' ('It seems as though everything [inviting the Dutch to the king's investiture ceremony] was done on purpose, only to see if the Spanish ambassador would come outside for [react to] nothing in particular'; ibid.).

details, his account suggests that the French sometimes deliberately tested the boundaries of ceremonial protocol. By offering the Dutch a seat in the audience, they might not only have wanted to tease Mendoza but also have experimented with the idea of giving the Provinces more agency on the broader international stage, albeit of course under Henri's rule and supervision. The idea, however, was never put into practice. In late March 1585, after a series of long negotiations, Henri finally decided that he could not accept rulership over the Dutch Provinces. Already faced with the growing power of the *Ligue catholique*, he did not want to risk a war with Spain.

4. Conclusion

The visit of the special Dutch embassy to Paris serves as the perfect illustration of the anthropological understanding of hospitality discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The relationship between host and guest springs from mixed intentions insofar as the act of giving and receiving hospitality potentially exposes both parties to exploitation. The guest is at the host's mercy for providing him with shelter and food, while the host accepts the risk of allowing someone who is usually from outside his community to enter his personal space and make himself comfortable. Andrew Shryock drives the point home by quoting a proverbial wisdom of the Balga Bedouin in Jordan: 'The guest […] is prisoner of the host [while] [t]he host must fear the guest. When he stands [and leaves your house], he is a poet'.[117]

The guest, in other words, moves from being a recipient of the host's hospitality to the author of a (possibly fictionalised) account of that hospitality, as he shares experiences of his reception by the host with others, either in talking or writing. The Bedouin metaphor of the guest as poet reminds us of the power of the early modern ambassador to either make or break his host's reputation in the dispatches he would send to his government or other contacts in his correspondence network. Our discussion of Henri III's audience with Bernardino de Mendoza, for example, revealed that the presence at court of foreign ambassadors proved crucial for shaping the king's reputation as host. Depending on whose account of the audience you would accept, Henri was either a disloyal ally, unwilling to return the Dutch rebels into the hands of Philip II (Mendoza), a generous king, willing to

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[117] Andrew Shryock, 'Breaking Hospitality Apart: Bad Hosts, Bad Guests, and the Problem of Sovereignty', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 18 (2012), 20–33 (p. 23). The insertion '[and leaves your house]' is Shryock's.

receive all visitors at his court, regardless of their cultural or religious background (Edward Stafford), or a defender of the Dutch cause (anonymous Dutch writer cited by Pieter Christiaenszoon Bor).

Although the disputed diplomatic status of the States General did not enable Aernt van Dorp's embassy to actively influence Henri's international reputation as host, in contrast to, for example, the Earl of Derby's delegation, the king depended heavily on their presence at court, though for reasons that were beyond everyone's control. The sudden deaths of François, duc d'Anjou and William of Orange in 1584 called for urgent action in the Dutch Provinces. The only way that Henri could purchase time for considering and formulating an accurate response to the envoys' offer of rulership over their States was to keep Van Dorp's train in Paris as long as possible. This compelled him, however, to award the ambassadors some of the ceremonial protocol that was officially reserved for fully recognised embassies. Their generous reception at Senlis on 24 January 1585 and private audiences in the king's cabinet at the Louvre Palace serve as a case in point.

Instances of what we have labelled 'diplomatic hospitality' — welcoming embassies with banquets, spectacles, private audiences, and ceremonials of various sorts — thus functioned to seduce and tempt the Dutch envoys into awaiting the king's reply. In this way, Henri could prevent the diplomats from turning to another foreign ruler in the meantime (such as Elizabeth I, whose candidacy was supported by many noblemen in the States General). This seemed especially necessary when we consider that the king's candidacy as lord of the Provinces did not enjoy wide support from the Dutch side, as various members of the States General, and presumably even some of those among Van Dorp's own embassy, mistrusted Henri's intentions. They had not forgotten about his hard-line stance towards France's Huguenot communities and rumoured participation in the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacres of 1572.

At the same time, Henri's subtle crossings of the boundaries of ceremonial protocol made him susceptible to the aggression of the Catholic representatives at court, especially that of Mendoza. The Spanish ambassador was already shocked to find out that the king offered his hospitality to the Dutch ambassadors in the first place by allowing them to arrive at Boulogne harbour. Although Henri was quick to rebut the envoy's accusation by pointing out that as a Christian king it was his right to host all kinds of strangers, even the Protestant and rebellious Dutch, he was careful not to provoke Philip II and his Catholic

allies unnecessarily. By comparing the Dutch embassy to that of the English, we have identified a number of privileges Van Dorp's train was not entitled to, because of its inferior diplomatic status. These included travel reimbursements and the staging of entertainments in various provincial towns *en route* to Paris, a formal reception in the capital, lodgings in royal châteaux, banquets and spectacles organised on a daily basis, invitation to the king's ballet, and so on. I have called deliberate violations of these privileges instances of 'diplomatic inhospitality'.

When we look at the differences in the degree of hospitality shown by the French hosts towards their Dutch and English guests, it becomes apparent how blurred the line is between being 'hospitable' and 'inhospitable'. Henri's invitation of the ambassadors to his private cabinet, for example, may certainly be regarded as generous from one perspective, given the privilege it entailed for a barely recognised embassy like Van Dorp's. On the other hand, the invitation can just as well be interpreted as a mere pragmatic solution to the prying eyes at court. The king required the presence of the Dutch envoys for making an informed decision about the future of France and the Provinces, and one way of doing this discreetly was to negotiate behind closed doors. As the Dutch received in this way little to no public recognition, Henri's treatment of Van Dorp's train can hardly be called 'hospitable' per se. In other words, whether or not the French acted favourably towards their Dutch guests was chiefly motivated by the circumstances or context of a particular moment. This gave way to a diplomatic balancing act, in which Henri tried to mediate between the relentless demands of the English and especially the Catholic envoys, and the politically attractive propositions of the Dutch ambassadors.

CHAPTER 4

Public and Backchannel Diplomacy:
Performing Reconciliation at the Time of the
Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins, 1598-1600

> [P]eace in the first decades of the seventeenth century was never much better than an uneasy truce. Its diplomatic arrangements, like most of its political arrangements, were merely provisional, pending the resumption of the religious wars.
>
> Garrett Mattingly, in *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955).[1]

In Chapters 2 and 3, we have seen how the official ceremonies and theatrical entertainments of the late Valois dynasty served as independent tools for what modern scholars of international relations have labelled public diplomacy: a conspicuous and controlled form of diplomatic communication in which rulers and their team of artists sought to channel, influence, or manoeuvre between the different political agendas of an international community of diplomacy players. As we have seen, these ceremonies and spectacles served simultaneously as a backdrop for backchannel diplomacy: a peer-to-peer form of diplomatic interaction that, rather than being targeted at large audiences, involved or was witnessed by only a limited number of diplomatic actors. The obvious advantage of this type of diplomacy was that exchanges of classified information or negotiations over new or otherwise controversial lines of policy could be shielded from public view and thus protected from unwanted intervention. The secret negotiations between Henri III and the Dutch ambassadors at the festival for the Garter embassy in 1585 were for this reason held in the king's private cabinet at the Louvre. Other backchannel talks took place more in the open, such as the after-dinner conversation between Charles IX and Gaspard de

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[1] p. 207.

Coligny in the Tuileries Gardens at the festival for the Treaty of Blois in 1572. The disapproval of the Guises, who observed both men talking from a distance, suggests that more than facilitating secret talks alone backchannel diplomacy also functioned as a tool for exclusion and thus helped French rulers to regulate access to their person. By allowing certain actors the privilege of spending time in their proximity, and by refusing this privilege to others, monarchs could shape power relationships among diplomatic players as they saw fit.[2]

This chapter shifts the focus to the early days of Henri IV's reign — between 1598 and 1600 — and seeks to examine how the first Bourbon king made simultaneous use of public and backchannel diplomacy to steer an even keel between domestic and foreign stakeholders, and make them receptive to his various designs for reconciliation. By highlighting the diplomatic context of Henri's bid for power, we hope to contribute to recent scholarship on the Bourbon king by Michel De Waele, among others, which has brought into view the ruler's use of consensual reconciliation as a strategy for appeasing his opponents.[3] The focus of this chapter will be Henri's designs for the Edict of Nantes, a domestic accord between the king and the Huguenots' national assemblies, with the input of Catholic nobles;[4] the Peace of Vervins, an international pact between France and

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[2] For more on the complex relationship between access and power in the early modern period, see the excellent *The Key to Power? The Culture of Access in Princely Courts, 1400-1750*, ed. by Dries Raeymaekers and Sebastiaan Derks, Rulers & Elites, 8 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), especially Neil Murphy, 'The Court on the Move: Ceremonial Entries, Gift-Giving and Access to the Monarch in France, c.1440-c.1570', pp. 40–64; Jonathan Spangler, 'Holders of the Keys: The Grand Chamberlain, the Grand Equerry and Monopolies of Access at the Early Modern French Court', pp. 155–77.

[3] See Michel De Waele, *Réconcilier les Français: La Fin des troubles de religion (1589-1598)*, Les collections de la République des Lettres (Paris: Hermann, 2010; repr. 2015); *Lendemains de guerre civile: Réconciliations et restaurations en France sous Henri IV*, ed. by Michel De Waele, Les collections de la République des Lettres (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2011); Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars, c. 1560-1600*, Early Modern History: Society and Culture (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 2-3, 29, 47-9, 80, 144-5, 176; Marc W. S. Jaffré, 'The Royal Court and Civil War at the Founding of the Bourbon Dynasty, 1589-95', *French History*, 31.1 (2017), 20-38.

[4] All four enactments of the Edict of Nantes are transcribed and annotated in *L'Édit de Nantes*, ed. by Janine Garrisson (Biarritz: Atlantica, 1997). For a modern English translation of the decree, see 'The Edict of Nantes with Its Secret Articles and Brevets', in *The Edict of Nantes: Five Essays and a New Translation*, ed. by Richard L. Goodbar, trans. by Jotham Parsons (Bloomington, MN: The National Huguenot Society, 1998), pp. 41–68. This chapter will refer to both Garrisson's edition and Parsons' translation of the treaty (see Section 1 below). Bernard Barbiche and his team of scholars at the École nationale de chartes have also created an online edition of the Edict of Nantes and earlier decrees of pacification in France (see 'L'Édit de Nantes et ses antécédents (1562-1598)' <http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification/> [accessed 5 March 2019]). The original documents of the Edict of Nantes are now lost. However, a copy of the four enactments, dated 22 May 1599, is preserved in the Bibliothèque de Genève, MS fr. 413, fols. 1-40. The Archives Nationales in Paris hold a shortened version of the public edict reworked and promulgated by the

Habsburg Spain, intended to end the open warfare between both kingdoms;[5] and the French crown's reconciliation with the last standing leader of the *Ligue catholique*, Philippe Emmanuel (1558-1602), duc de Mercœur, which terminated organised Catholic opposition against the monarchy. These designs came to a fruitful conclusion in the spring of 1598: the Edict of Nantes was concluded in four enactments over the course of April and May, the Peace of Vervins was signed on 2 May, and various celebrations for Henri's rapprochement with Mercœur were planned in late March and early April, chief among which was the engagement ceremony of the duke's daughter Françoise de Lorraine (1592-1669) to César de Bourbon (1594-1665), the illegitimate son of the French king and his mistress Gabrielle d'Estrées (1573-1599), on 5 April.[6]

The first section of this chapter explains the wider diplomatic context of Henri IV's negotiations over the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins. The latter accord enabled the king to cement peace with Mercœur, as it required Spain to terminate support for the *Ligue catholique*. The second section discusses how Henri organised public ceremonies alongside secret negotiations over the Peace of Vervins. Special attention is devoted to the king's manoeuvring between the old Leaguers and his Protestant allies from England and the Dutch Republic who had travelled to Henri's court in Angers to find out more about the talks at Vervins. The English delegation was headed by Robert Cecil (1563-1612), Secretary of State to Queen Elizabeth I, and John Herbert (*c.* 1540-1617), Cecil's personal secretary; the Dutch embassy was led by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619), Land's Advocate of Holland and Pensionary of the Dutch Republic, and Justin of Nassau (1559-1631), the illegitimate son of the late William of Orange. Although mentioned by various scholars, neither embassy has ever been studied in detail before.[7]

Parlement de Paris on 25 February 1599 (J 943 nᵒ 2). For an extensive description of the edict's provenance and its different versions, see *L'Édit de Nantes*, ed. by Garrisson, pp. 99–102.

[5] The Peace of Vervins is transcribed and annotated in Bertrand Haan, 'La Dernière Paix catholique européenne: Édition et présentation du traité de Vervins (2 mai 1598)', in *La Paix de Vervins: 1598*, ed. by Claudine Vidal and Frédérique Pilleboue ([Laon]: Fédération des Sociétés d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de l'Aisne, [1998]), pp. 9–63 (pp. 16–38). The present chapter refers to this edition of the treaty. The original document is held at the Ministère des Affaires étrangères in Paris (Conservation des traités, traités multilatéraux, original). For more on the provenance of the treaty and its different versions, see Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', pp. 11–15. Note that the *Traicté des particuliers*, a supplementary document of the Peace of Vervins, was signed one week after the public edict, namely on 9 May 1598.

[6] The actual marriage took place on 7 July 1609 at the château de Fontaineblau.

[7] See A. E. Imhof, *Der Friede von Vervins 1598* (Aurau: Keller Verlag, 1966), pp. 225–26; Janine Garrisson, *L'Édit de Nantes: Chronique d'une paix attendue* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 92, 274; Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', pp. 16–38; Jean-Pierre Poussou, 'La Politique extérieure d'Elizabeth Iᵉʳᵉ et la paix de Vervins', in *Le Traité de Vervins*, ed. by Jean-François Labourdette, Jean-Pierre Poussou, and Marie-Catherine

The third section, finally, focuses on the public diplomacy that was promoted at the civic festivities in Florence and Avignon for Henri's marriage to Marie de Médicis in winter 1600. The festivals of which these celebrations were part constituted the first festive occasions under Henri's reign to be organised on such a grand and lavish scale.[8] They offered the king a platform to convince the Catholic nobility of France and the papacy in Rome that peace had now been definitively restored to his realm though the successful reconciliation with Spain and the former Leaguers. The nuptial celebrations thus sought to legitimise Henri's authority as *Roi Très Chrétien* and wipe out any memories of the king's past as Huguenot prince and leader. Marie's entry into Avignon, for example, was meant to strengthen Henri's diplomatic relations with Pope Clement VIII (1536-1605), as the local Jesuits of the papal enclave had staged a festive reconciliation between their community and the French crown.

This chapter will devote particular attention to the way in which the nuptial festivals of winter 1600 served to cover up the rivalries that continued to be fought out underneath the surface, as well as the backchannel negotiations that were meant to prevent them. For example, Henri was famously absent from the marriage ceremony in Florence and the ensuing festivities in France, as he defended the Marquisate of Saluzzo, a French enclave in the Piedmontese Alps, against Charles Emmanuel I (1562-1630), Duke of Savoy, who had claimed ownership of the principality since October 1588.[9] Similarly, organisors of the nuptial festivals in France tried to keep the king's diplomatic relations with Protestant powers, especially the Dutch Republic, painstakingly secret. Deputies from the States Generals were therefore not invited to any of the celebrations.[10]

Vignal, Collection du Centre Roland Mousnier (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2000), pp. 247–63 (pp. 259–60); Vincent J. Pitts, *Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 206. The Dutch embassy is discussed at greater length in Bert Knapen, *De man en zijn staat: Johan van Oldenbarnevelt 1547-1619* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2005), pp. 151–61; Henk J. M. Nellen, *Hugo Grotius: A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 1583-1645*, trans. by J. C. Grayson (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), pp. 44–51. The views of Knapen and Nellen will be discussed in Section 2 below.

[8] Mamone, *Firenze e Parigi*, pp. 22-3, 107-42, and passim.

[9] Marie was thus married by proxy. Her uncle, Grand Duke Ferdinando I de' Medici, stood in as a surrogate for Henri. See ibid., pp. 22-3. For more on the Franco-Savoyard conflict over Saluzzo and the papacy's diplomatic efforts to end it, see Betrand Haan, 'La Médiation pontificale entre la France et la Savoie de la paix de Vervins à la paix de Lyon (1598-1601)', *Cahiers René de Lucinge*, 34 (2000), 5–20; Mamone, *Firenze e Parigi*, p. 37-8; Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV*, pp. 239-41; and Section 3 below.

[10] See Section 3 below.

1. Diplomatic context

The three-year period under consideration in this chapter saw the French crown launch into an intense series of diplomatic negotiations. The recapture of the city of Amiens from Spanish forces on 24 September 1597, after a six-month siege, offered Henri the leverage, as well as the confidence, to negotiate peace agreements for his new kingdom on both an international and domestic level.[11] Henri's early reign had been troubled by a costly war with Spain and persisting opposition from the *Ligue catholique*. This group of ultra-Catholic nobles had garrisoned strategic towns in France, such as Marseille and Lyon, from where they offered military resistance to the crown. Although Henri had abjured his Protestant faith in July 1593 and was crowned King of France in February 1594, the Leaguers refused to recognise him as their *Roi Très Chrétien*. Huguenot nobles, by contrast, were afraid that Henri's conversion to the Catholic faith would worsen their position as second-class citizens and possibly lead to hard-line attacks on the Reformed community in France.

The Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins, then, kept both parties satisfied: the domestic accord gave the Huguenots sufficient reason to believe that Henri was committed to protect their existence in France, while the international alliance proved to wary Catholics that the Bourbon crown longed for friendship with Spain which — they undoubtedly hoped — would help to produce a Catholic front in Europe.[12] For this reason, the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins are still frequently cited in modern academic literature as the closing chapters of two of the most devastating conflicts of sixteenth-century Europe.[13] In this reading of the political history, the Edict of Nantes brought an effective end to the Religious Wars in France and offered the kingdom's Huguenot minority an unprecedented degree of freedom.[14] Some historians go so far as to argue that

[11] Michaël Wolfe, 'Prélude à la paix: Le Siège d'Amiens (1597) et ses conséquences militaires et diplomatiques', in *Le Traité de Vervins*, ed. by Labourdette, Poussou, and Vignal, pp. 61–79.

[12] Garrisson, *L'Édit de Nantes: Chronique d'une paix attendue*, pp. 349-52.

[13] Mack P. Holt, for example, writes that 'by signing the Peace of Vervins and the Edict of Nantes […] Henri IV laid the foundation of his reign and brought peace to his kingdom' (see 'La Paix de Vervins et l'Édit de Nantes: Une victoire des politiques', in *Le Traité de Vervins*, ed. by Labourdette, Poussou, and Vignal, pp. 297–310 (p. 297)). See also Jean-François Labourdette, 'L'Importance du traité de Vervins dans l'histoire de l'Europe', in *Le Traité de Vervins*, ed. by Labourdette, Poussou, and Vignal, pp. 15–26 (pp. 25–26). Michel De Waele cites the submission of the duc de Mercœur as the third closing chapter of France's conflicts (in *Réconcilier les Français*, pp. 5–6).

[14] Janine Garrisson states that the Edict of Nantes 'marked the end of the civil and religious unrest that […] lacerated the country' and implemented 'a breeze of tolerance, sweeping aside violent images of war between Catholics and Protestants' ('Introduction', in *L'Édit de Nantes*, pp. 9–24 (p. 9)). For a similar

the edict signalled an important — if not the first — step towards 'the secularization of the French state',[15] insofar as it put aside religious dogmatism and aimed for a political settlement between Catholics and Huguenots.[16]

Similarly, the Peace of Vervins is often believed to have marked a decisive turn away from the turbulent reign of the late Valois kings towards a period of order and stability under the rule of Henri IV.[17] Negotiated under the auspices of Pope Clement VIII, the Franco-Spanish accord has been canonised as 'the last Catholic European peace',[18] a final successful attempt on the part of the papacy to restore Christian unity in a Europe tormented by political and religious turmoil.[19] The reason usually given for this argument is that the accord terminated Spanish occupation of strategic cities on France's north-eastern frontier, including Calais, Toul, Metz, Verdun, and Amiens, and discontinued Philip II's lasting support of the anti-royalist *Ligue catholique* which was led by the Guise family.[20] According to this view, the treaty enabled Henri to improve the fortification lines along the borders of the kingdom, repair the damage that the Franco-Spanish war had done to

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argument, see Janine Garrisson's *L'Édit de Nantes: Chronique d'une paix attendue*, pp. 10–14; Réflexions sur l'Édit de Nantes', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français*, 145 (1999), 395–99.

[15] Gregory Champeaud, 'The Edict of Poitiers and the Treaty of Nérac, or Two Steps towards the Edict of Nantes', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 32.2 (2001), p. 320.

[16] This argument is most expressly advocated by Olivier Christin in *La Paix de religion: L'Autonomisation de la raison politique aux XVIe siècle*, Collection Liber (Paris: Seuil, 1997), pp. 21–45, especially pp. 207–12. Christin interprets the Edict of Nantes and preceding peace accords in sixteenth-century Europe as part of a growing 'autonomisation of political reason' which he understands as an attempt to dissociate religious influence from politics. For similar views, see Champeaud, 'The Edict of Poitiers and the Treaty of Nérac', p. 320; Didier Boisson and Hugues Daussy, *Les Protestants dans la France moderne*, Belin Sup Histoire (Paris: Belin, 2006), p. 144.

[17] Jean-François Labourdette writes that '[the Peace of Vervins] marked, perhaps as much as the Edict of Nantes, the end of forty years of civil war'; see 'L'importance du traité de Vervins', p. 26. Similarly, Sietske Barendrecht argues that the treaty brought 'order, consolidation, recovery, [and] progress' to France (*François van Aerssen: Diplomaat aan het Franse hof (1598-1613)* (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1965), p. 18). For related arguments, see Olivia Carpi-Mailly, 'La Paix de Vervins ou la fin des guerres de religion en Picardie', in *La Paix de Vervins*, ed. by Vidal and Pilleboue, pp. 99–118 (p. 99); Roger Baury, 'Célébration de la paix de Vervins et propagande royale', in *Le Traité de Vervins*, ed. by Labourdette, Poussou, and Vignal, pp. 347–72 (p. 347).

[18] Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', p. 9.

[19] In this view, the Franco-Spanish accord remained a touchstone for European diplomacy throughout the seventeenth century, only to be superseded by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which is commonly seen as a definitive break with the old papal dream of the *respublica Christiana* (see Peter Schröder, *Trust in Early Modern International Political Thought, 1598-1713*, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 59; Wolfe, 'Prélude à la paix', p. 61).

[20] Holt, 'La Paix de Vervins et l'Édit de Nantes', p. 297; Labourdette, 'L'Importance du traité de Vervins', pp. 25–26. Philip II had agreed to offer military and financial support to the Guises by the Treaty of Joinville which was signed in secret on 31 December 1584. The aim of his support was to prevent the potential succession of Henri de Navarre to the French throne. The conditions in the Peace of Vervins under which Spain was required to return its occupied cities to France are stipulated in Articles 10 to 16 of the treaty; see Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', pp. 20–21.

the national exchequer over the previous three years, and persuade the impoverished Leaguers to submit to his authority.

Although not entirely misguided, these views of the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins provide a rose-tinted interpretation of the impact that both accords had on seventeenth-century France and Europe. In other words, they did not constitute the watershed moment for concord and toleration that some modern historians like to believe. The Edict of Nantes, to begin with, did not produce equality between Catholics and Huguenots, nor did it pave the way for secularisation. As observed in our discussion of *Le Paradis d'Amour*, social equality and secularisation did not exist in early modern France and Europe. Contemporaries, whose lives were thoroughly influenced by matters of faith, would have found both concepts impossible to accept or even to imagine.[21] Mario Turchetti has convincingly shown that in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France 'Calvinist worship, even after the Edict of Nantes, never finally acquired an official, legally recognised status'.[22] He argues that the concessions awarded to Huguenots in the Edict of Nantes and other 'edicts of tolerance',[23] such as freedom of worship or the right to hold public offices, were 'always limited temporally and spatially', insofar as they applied 'to a certain region of the kingdom for a limited time'.[24] Turchetti explains that, as a result, the Edict of Nantes proved unsuccessful in ending France's civil wars.[25] Notably, it could not prevent

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[21] Gaspard Pagès, 'Les Paix de religion et l'édit de Nantes', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 5.25 (1936), 393–413 (p. 398); Mario Turchetti, 'Une question mal posée: La Qualification de "perpétuel et irrévocable" appliquée à l'Édit de Nantes (1598)', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français*, 139 (1993), 41–78 (p. 70); id., 'L'Arrière-plan politique de l'édit de Nantes, avec un aperçu de l'anonyme *De la concorde de l'Estat. Par l'observation des Edicts de Pacification* (1599)', in *Coexister dans l'intolérance: L'Édit de Nantes (1598)*, ed. by Michel Grandjean and Bernard Roussel, Histoire et société, 37 (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1998), pp. 93–114 (pp. 112–13); De Waele, *Réconcilier les Français*, p. 6.

[22] 'Religious Concord and Political Tolerance', *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 22.1 (1991), 15-25 (p. 18).

[23] Turchetti, '"Concorde ou tolérance?" de 1562 à 1598', *Revue Historique* 274.2 (1985), 341-55 (p. 341).

[24] 'Religious Concord', p. 18. Turchetti discusses this argument in two other publications: '"Concorde ou tolérance?"', pp. 343–44; 'Une question mal posée', p. 42.

[25] '[I]t would be inexact to say, as some historians have been wont to do, that the Edict of Nantes "closed a particular period of history", since it did nothing to put a stop to the series of civil wars' (see 'Religious Concord and Political Tolerance', p. 24, and 'Une question mal posée, p. 70, for similar criticism). Several historians have subscribed to Turchetti's reappraisal of the Edict of Nantes, including Richard A. Dees, 'Establishing Toleration', *Political Theory*, 27.5 (1999), 667–93 (see p. 669 and p. 689, n. 8); Béatrice Nicollier, 'Édit de Nantes et traité de Vervins: Une Simultanéité fortuite?', in *Coexister dans l'intolérance*, pp. 135–58 (p. 136, n. 2); De Waele, *Réconcilier les Français*, p. 6. Nicola M. Sutherland has also criticised traditional interpretations of the edict as a beacon of tolerance but she does not mention Turchetti (see 'The Crown, the Huguenots, and the Edict of Nantes', in *The Huguenot Connection: The Edict of Nantes, Its Revocation, and Early French Migration to South Carolina*, ed. by R. M. Golden, International Archives of the History of Ideas, 125 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), pp. 28–48 (especially pp. 31–33)).

the Huguenot rebellion that resurfaced after the regicide of Henri IV on 14 May 1610 — examples of which will be given in Chapter 5 — and which culminated under the reign of Louis XIII, in particular during the campaigns of 1621 and 1622, as well as the Siege of La Rochelle (August 1627 until October 1629).[26]

Similarly, the Peace of Vervins did not bring France's conflict with Spain to a definitive close, nor did it give way to a prolonged period of peace in Henri's new kingdom. Although the treaty ended open warfare between France and Spain, mutual hostilities continued to persist until well into the seventeenth century. In April 1598, for instance, Henri promised Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Justin of Nassau to support the Dutch Revolt against Spain with secret loans for a period of twelve years.[27] This monetary form of backchannel diplomacy — conducted behind the backs of Philip II and Clement VIII — allowed the king to keep his Protestant allies satisfied, as well as to maintain some influence over the militerary ambitions of the Habsburg crown, without having to resume war against Philip II himself. French hispanophobia, moreover, seriously hampered friendly relations with Spain.[28] As will be shown in Chapter 5, anti-Spanish sentiments rose to a fever pitch in the spring of 1612 when the Parisian celebrations for the Habsburg-Bourbon double marriage triggered opposition from the French nobility and local populace alike.[29]

Rather than heralding the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins as the capstones of Henri IV's designs for peace, then, this chapter argues that the accords should be seen in light of the king's diplomatic attempts to reduce domestic and foreign conflict, as well as to steer an even keel between Catholics and Protestants on the one hand, and the Spanish crown on the other. Both treaties were therefore chiefly intended as practical settlements.

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[26] Turchetti, 'Religious Concord', p. 24. Turchetti suggests that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by King Louis XIV in October 1685 was 'inevitable', because later versions of the treaty promulgated in the course of the seventeenth century applied the original articles in an increasingly restrictive manner (ibid.). Nicola M. Sutherland arrives at a similar conclusion in 'The Crown', p. 28.

[27] Henri's subsidies to the States General of the Dutch Provinces between 1598 and 1610 were considerable, sometimes more than two million *livres* per year. Exact numbers are given in David Buisseret, *Sully and the Growth of Centralized Government in France, 1598-1610* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968), p. 82. For Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's account of the king's promise, see 'Verbael van ons, Justinus van Nassau ende Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, van de besoigne gevallen in onse legatie aen de Co. Ma[t]. van Vrankrijck, gedaen in den jare XVC acht ende tnegentich. Overlegd 5 Juni 1598', in *Johan van Oldenbarnevelt: Bescheiden betreffende zijn staatkundig beleid en zijn familie*, ed. by Sikko P. Haak, Grote Serie, 80, 3 vols (The Hague: Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1934-1967), I: *1570-1601*, 407–63 (p. 443).

[28] Jules Mathorez, 'Notes sur les Espagnols en France depuis le XVIe siècle jusqu'au règne de Louis XIII', *Bulletin Hispanique*, 16.3 (1914), 337–71 (p. 349).

[29] Chantal Grell, 'The Fêtes of 1612-1615 in History and Historiography', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 215–26 (pp. 215–16).

The Peace of Vervins, for example, required Henri IV to break off his defensive alliances with England and the Dutch Republic in exchange for Philip II's restitution of conquered French lands.[30] The treaty also stipulated that both rulers should release their prisoners of war without either party having to pay ransom money.[31] The Edict of Nantes was even more obviously negotiated with the diverging interests of the contracted parties in mind and thus demands closer scrutiny here.[32]

The first enactment of the treaty, an undated public edict of ninety-two articles, probably signed on 13 April 1598, granted the Huguenots several privileges that had already been offered to them in the Edict of Poitiers (September 1577) and the Treaty of Nérac (February 1579). These included liberty of conscience (Article 6), freedom of worship (Article 7) — which had been extended to estates of Protestant landowners and various other *bailliages* or localities specified by royal administrators — and permission to hold public and royal offices (Article 27). In addition, full amnesty was granted for crimes committed during the civil wars since the death of Henri II on 10 July 1559 (Article 58). The public edict also made a number of concessions to Catholic parties, such as the *Ligue catholique*. Article 3, for example, declared that 'the Roman, Catholic, and Apostolic religion shall be reinstated and re-established in all places and parts of this our kingdom and the lands under our obedience where its exercise had been interrupted, that it may be peaceably and freely exercised without any disturbance and impediment'.[33] The article strictly forbade Protestant worship in these areas. Furthermore, Huguenots were required to pay the ecclesiastical tithe according to usual practice, just like Catholics (Article 25).

Although the general articles of the Edict of Nantes were negotiated via the backchannels of private assemblies to avoid unwanted intervention from ardent Catholics, they

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[30] Henri's withdrawal from the Treaties of Greenwich was expressly demanded by Clement VIII (see Richard B. Wernham, *The Return of the Armadas: The Last Years of the Elizabethan War against Spain, 1595-1603* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; repr. 2002), pp. 70–71; Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', p. 52; Agostino Borromeo, 'Clément VIII, la diplomatie pontificale et la paix de Vervins', in *Le Traité de Vervins*, ed. by Labourdette, Poussou, and Vignal, pp. 323–44 (pp. 335, 340–41); and Section 3 below). Henri's withdrawal from the treaties was not mentioned in the actual edict for the Peace of Vervins, probably because the king continued secretly to fund the Dutch Revolt and thus did not want to commit to the pope's demand on paper. Articles 10 to 16 of the Peace of Vervins focus on the restitution of seized lands (see Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', pp. 20–21).

[31] See Articles 19 and 20 in Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', pp. 20–21.

[32] The argument that the Edict of Nantes was the product of pragmatic compromise rather than religious tolerance was first advanced by Pagès, 'Les Paix de religion et l'édit de Nantes'. See also Nicola M. Sutherland, *The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 328–32, especially p. 332.

[33] *L'Édit de Nantes*, ed. by Garrisson, p. 29 (see appendix); 'Edict of Nantes', trans. by Parsons, p. 42.

needed to be officially registered by the French *parlements*, and thus led the crown into ten more months of diligent parley with the magistrates who were largely hostile towards the kingdom's Huguenot community.[34] To avoid yet another long phase of negotiation, Henri decided to enforce the most substantial privileges for the Huguenots in two royal *brevets*, which he issued under his privy seal on 3 and 30 April 1598 respectively. They enabled Henri to offer the Huguenots a minimal degree of military and political independence. According to Mark Greengrass, the *brevets* constituted 'the king's personal promises to the Huguenots rather than an act of state'.[35] In other words, Henri used backchannel diplomacy — a personal agreement between the French crown and the Huguent community without external involvement — to bypass the juridical bureaucracy of the *Parlement de Paris*. The first *brevet* assigned Protestant pastors an annual grant of 45,000 *écus* from the crown's revenue, which compensated for the fact that Huguenots were now required to pay the ecclesiastical tithe. The second *brevet* allowed Huguenot communities to keep all the places of refuge they held at the end of August 1597, which amounted to 150 cities, *bourgs*, and villages, for a period of eight years from the publication of the public edict in the *Parlement de Paris* (15 February 1599). Fifty-one of these places of refuge were marked as *places de sûreté* (military strongholds) and garrisoned at the crown's expense (180,000 *écus* per year).[36]

2. Catholic and Protestant allies, spring 1598

Over the course of March and April 1598, Henri IV was engrossed in affairs of both national and international importance. The king spent most of March in Brittany where he succeeded in bringing an end to the opposition of the *Ligue catholique*. Upon return to Angers, where he held court for most of April, Henri began to work towards a reconciliation with Mercœur. In the meantime, the king continued to prepare the terms of the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Vervins, while trying to keep visiting delegations from England and the Dutch Republic, who stayed in France until late April, informed about his

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[34] Henri's negotiations with the *parlements* are discussed in detail by Janine Garrisson, in *L'Édit de Nantes: Chronique d'une paix attendue*, pp. 324-49.

[35] *France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability*, Studies in Modern History, 2nd edn (London and New York: Longman, 1995; original publ. 1984), p. 105.

[36] The fourth enactment of the pacification, signed on 2 May 1598, consisted of fifty-seven articles *secrets ou particuliers* (secret or particular). They did not promulgate any new concessions, but covered exceptions and omissions in the public edict relating to, for instance, the so-called *bailliages* or places in which public worship was allowed, the establishment of Huguenot universities, and the training of Protestant pastors.

negotiations with the Habsburg crown. Henri's reception of Robert Cecil and John Herbert's delegation on the one hand, and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Justin of Nassau's embassy on the other, was a risky operation. Before talks about a Franco-Spanish accord had even began, Clement VIII warned that by no means would he accept the participation of Protestant states in negotiations carried out under his authority.[37] An all too public reception of embassies from so-called heretic states would thus seriously endanger Henri's relationship with the papacy and his success at securing peace with Spain, which was close to completion.[38] Therefore, entertainments, banquets, and other tokens of hospitality usually bestowed upon visiting delegations took place behind closed doors, and were kept to a minimum so as not to attract unwanted attention from papal or Spanish ambassadors. There may also have been other reasons for a low-key reception. The wars that Henri fought between 1587 and 1598 to make himself king of France had plundered the national treasury and thus left little room for lavish entertainments in the early years of his reign.[39] Moreover, a reticence towards luxury and frivolity on behalf of the Protestant, especially Calvinist, interlocutors, may have required the French to prepare for a more modest welcome.[40]

The Dutch and English ambassadors were aware that as representatives of Protestant states they could not participate in any of Henri's public ceremonies. In the preparatory notes for the English embassy, we read that this had to do with the precarious political position in which the king had found himself after having entered peace negotiations with Catholic Spain.[41] The anonymous author of the document explained that Henri's hands were tied: on the one hand, the king desired immediate peace with Spain, as was advised

[37] Letter of Alessandro de'Medici to Pietro Aldobrandini (27 July 1597, *Lettres du cardinal de Florence sur Henry IV et sur la France (1596-1598)*, ed. by Raymond Ritter (Paris: Grasset, 1955), pp. 164–65). Besides England and the Dutch Republic, Clement refused to negotiate with the Protestant states of the Holy Roman Empire, Scotland, and the Swiss cantons. For more on this, see Haan, 'La Dernière Paix', pp. 51–53.

[38] Henri had already received a final draft of the Peace of Vervins in late March 1598. He delayed his response to the draft by three weeks, however, to confer with the Dutch and English ambassadors (see ibid, pp. 16–38). Henri signed the peace after the Dutch envoys had left Angers for Paris. See François van Aerssen's letter to Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Justin of Nassau (NA, JvO 2026, 2 May 1598, one sheet).

[39] McGowan, *Dance in the Renaissance*, pp. 173-78, especially p. 174. The first grand public festivals given under Henri's reign were the celebrations for the king's marriage to Marie de Médicis (see section 3 below). However, Sara Mamone writes that no ceremonial entry had been staged for Marie's arrival in Paris on 9 February 1601 for a lack of finance (*Firenze e Parigi*, p. 138).

[40] See our discussion of Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's account of several festivities at Henri's court below.

[41] 19 January 1598 (o. s. 9), HMC Hatfield, VIII, pp. 7–9. The instructions for the English embassy to France are printed in HMC Hatfield, XXIII, pp. 11–20.

by his council and members of the parlements; on the other, he tried to defend his honour as an ally of England and the Dutch Republic to which the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Greenwich had committed him. The author predicted that Henri would use the visit of the English and the Dutch envoys as an opportunity to defend that very honour. He suggested that rather than genuinely reinforcing friendly relations, the king merely wished to save face by showing the ambassadors and, by extension, the international Protestant community, that he was a trustworthy ally:

> [I]t is thought by many, […] that he [Henri] will, at the length, suffer himself to be enforced to a peace without any regard of his allies by the importunacy of his realm and Councils, and so under that colour, and these ceremonious preambles and ambassages [embassies], give the world a kind of satisfaction and defend his own honour.[42]

To illustrate his point, the anonymous author invoked the same kind of mistrust that early seventeenth-century theorists of diplomacy, notably Jean Hotman, harboured towards hospitality and other forms of ceremonial niceties — or 'preambles' — as a means to distract, mislead, or even bribe ambassadors. In other words, he warned Cecil and Herbert that their reception at the French court, however honourable or magnificent, should not trick them into believing that Henri would actually cancel talks with Spain and reconfirm relations with his Protestant allies. The author's claim that the king's reception of the envoys 'give[s] the world a kind of satisfaction' brings into focus the idea of empty diplomacy, aimed at fobbing off difficult or otherwise unwanted guests. By awarding the diplomats the privilege of a court visit, Henri hoped to satisfy his Dutch and English allies, as well as other Protestant rulers, who would read about the event in correspondence with their resident ambassadors in France, without actually giving in to their demands.

The author's assessment of the king's diplomatic strategy towards the Protestant deputies seems to have been accurate. In early April, during his first audiences with the Dutch and English ambassadors in his private cabinet at Angers, Henri gave the impression that he spoke freely, as to good friends, apparently without any form of mediation or censorship, whether self-imposed or enforced by his councillors. The king was particularly familiar with Cecil whom he promised to answer 'truely and freely […] and not as hee

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[42] HMC Hatfield, VIII, pp. 8-9.

answered ordinarye ambassadors', because 'rhetoriques was for pendants'.[43] Moreover, he immediately granted the diplomat's request to talk in a space even more private than the king's own cabinet where Henri was surrounded by advisors and favourites who could overhear and possibly guide the conversation into unwanted directions: 'And soe suddainely [Henri] tooke me [Cecil] by the hand contrarie to myne expectation, saying hee would walke with mee downe into the garden *en qualitye de amy* [as friends]'.[44] By citing Henri's words in the original French, Cecil demonstrated to the recipients of his dispatch — the Lords of the Privy Council — that the king was genuinely committed to preserve friendship with Queen Elizabeth. At the same time, of course, the ambassador was proud to showcase that he enjoyed Henri's affection and personal attention. Thus avoiding the prying eyes of the other courtiers, Cecil and the king conversed for 'an hower and a halfe' about 'many pleasant and familliar discourses of his [Henri's] opinion of diverse of his subjects, and other particulars not fitt for paper'.[45] Cecil's desire to speak privately, then, highlights the inherently public nature of diplomacy, even when taking place via the backchannels of the king's private cabinet.

Cecil's request for a more private conversation was presumably motivated by the rather threatening presence of several knights of the Catholic *Ordre du Saint-Esprit*, including Mercœur, who accompanied Henri in his cabinet.[46] Although the presence of Mercœur might have been coincidental (both the king and the duke were busy preparing their reconciliation around the same time), it might have served the double-edged diplomacy of Henri. By allowing his audience for the English ambassadors to coincide with his reception of Mercœur, the king could demonstrate to both parties that his hands were tied. However, Henri's seemingly spontaneous decision to leave the cabinet and stroll with

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[43] Robert Cecil and John Herbert to the Lords of the Privy Council (2 April 1598 (o. s. 23 March), HMC Hatfield, XXIII, p. 42. The quotation is taken from the envoys' account of their first audience with the king on 31 March (o. s. 21).

[44] Ibid., p. 38.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid., p. 37. Founded by Henri III in 1578, the *Ordre du Saint-Esprit* was a chivalric order awarded to Catholic noblemen of high birth to draw them into closer allegiance with the crown. Henri IV frequently surrounded himself with knights of the Order to emphasise their endorsement of his royal authority and loyalty to the Catholic Church. During his audience with the English ambassadors, Henri was accompanied by one royalist, Albert de Gondi (1522-1602), comte de Retz, and three former Leaguers besides Mercœur: Jean-Louis de Nogaret de La Valette (1554-1642), duc d'Épernon, Charles I (1556-1605), duc d'Elbœuf and Jean de Beaumanoir (1551-1614), marquis de Lavardin and maréchal de France (see ibid.). The old Leaguers naturally supported France's negotiations with the Habsburgs and were hostile towards English participation at Vervins. Épernon had even been trying to secure a peace with Spain on his own terms while Henri fought his wars to become king of France.

Cecil through the castle's garden may have been an orchestrated attempt to suggest that he was still master in his own house and thus free to choose with whomever he conferred — even if this involved his Protestant associates.

Similarly, when Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau received their first audience, the king promised to negotiate 'roundly' (i.e. openly) and to suit his actions to his words, at least in appearance, and so he expressed his seemingly uncensored opinion about the peace negotiations at Vervins.[47] He confessed that if it was not for pressure from Rome he would have openly supported the Dutch Republic by continuing his war with Spain. After all, his forefathers had been enemies of the Habsburg crown 'with reason' and the many losses suffered by France in the conflict, such as the Spanish conquest of the Iberian part of the Kingdom of Navarre, had long begged for revenge.[48] In a travel diary, intended to be read by members of the States General upon the return of their embassy to the Republic, Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau summarised Henri's defence of his peace negotiations at Vervins as follows:

> [His Majesty] said that the pope had admonished him [Henri] to make peace […] and that his [Henri's] subjects pressed him to do so; that the poverty and the urgency [caused by the war] were high, and the illnesses in his kingdom many; that he was therefore compelled to take these peace arrangements [with Spain] into his own hands.[49]

In public ceremonies, Henri used a rhetoric of sincerity towards similar diplomatic ends, thus following Niccolò Machiavelli's recommendation in *Il Principe* that rulers should seek to win the support of different political stakeholders by pretending genuinely to support their cause.[50] Just as the king tried to convince his Protestant allies that he was

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[47] Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau, 'Verbael', p. 421.

[48] Ibid. Upper Navarre, South of the Pyrenees, was conquered by Ferdinand II of Aragon in 1512 and had remained subject to Franco-Spanish conflict and diplomacy ever since (see Joxerra Bustillo Kastrexana, *Guía de la conquista de Navarra en 12 enscenarios* (Donostia: Txertoa Argitaletxea, 2012); Gregorio Monreal and Roldan Jimeno, *Conquista e Incorporación de Navarra a Castilla* (Pamplona-Iruña: Pamiela, 2012)).

[49] Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau, 'Verbael', p. 421 (see appendix). Henri gave a similar explanation during his second audience with the Dutch ambassadors on 6 April (see ibid., p. 423-24).

[50] *Il Principe*, sig. 26ᵛ-27ᵛ; *The Prince*, trans. by Bondanella, pp. 60-2. Jon R. Snyder has analysed sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discourses on deception in his excellent monograph *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe* (Berkely and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2009). Snyder defines early modern dissimulation as 'safeguarding one's secrets by rendering them unreadable or invisible', typically '[t]hrough the disciplined use of reticence, taciturnity, diffidence, negligence, omission, ambiguity, irony, and tolerance (that is, pretending not to have seen or heard something)' (ibid., p. 6). According to Snyder, Machiavelli's *Il Principe* served 'as the starting-point for the discourse on political dissimulation' (ibid., p. 110). For more on Machiavelli's recommendation of dissimulation for matters of statecraft, see ibid., pp. 110-15, and Michel Senellart, 'Simuler et dissimuler: L'Art machiavélien d'être

a trustworthy negotiator by professing to speak freely or to engage in face-to-face conversation, so did he seek to win the support of his Catholic opponents by emphatically declaring his loyalty to the Roman Church. In the years following his conversion, for example, the king frequently attended Mass in Paris or the Provinces to demonstrate that his newfound devotion had not been feigned. The actual conversion ceremony at Saint-Denis on 25 July 1593 seemed to have involved a particularly dramatic performance from Henri in support of his change of heart. According to Jacques-Auguste de Thou:

> Again he [the Archbishop] asked him [Henri] if he wanted it [conversion to the Catholic faith] from his heart, and he answered that he wanted and wished it; afterwards, falling to his knees, the King protested in the presence of the best, greatest God that he wanted to live and die in the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, prepared to defend it against all, or to be prepared for the peril of his life, and, moreover, that he renounced all heresies that were contrary to the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church.[51]

Henri's dramatic oath-taking could not have offered a greater contrast with his leave-taking from Notre-Dame as the Protestant Navarre twenty-one years earlier, on 18 August 1572. As seen in Chapter 1, the Huguenot ministers of the *Parlement de Paris* had instructed Henri to leave the cathedral before the celebration of the nuptial Mass 'in as conspicuous a manner as possible in the sight of all' to publicly dissociate himself from the Catholic procedures at court.[52] Although Henri's performance in August 1572 and July 1593 served very different diplomatic ends — satisfying Huguenot demands on the one hand, and meeting Catholic and French monarchical requirements on the other — it demonstrates the importance that a rhetoric of sincerity carried for Henri's monitoring of different diplomatic relations at key stages in his political life.

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In spring 1598, Henri found himself in a diplomatically intricate situation; he was forced to manoeuvre between his Protestant allies from overseas and the newly befriended Catholics at his court in Angers without offending either party or giving rise to mutual confrontation. At the same time, Henri aimed to support his own cause and not give rise to

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secret à la Renaissance', in *Histoire et secret à la Renaissance: Études sur la representation de la vie publique, la mémoire et l'intimité dans l'Angleterre et l'Europe des XVIᵉ et XVIIᵉ siècles*, ed. by François Laroque (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1997), pp. 99-106.

[51] *Historiarum*, V, bk. 107, pp. 294-95 (see appendix).

[52] BnF, MS Dupuy 591, fol. 41ᵛ.

the suspicion that he was selling out to other stakeholders. Dutch and English sources —
the meticulously detailed travel diary by Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau, as well as the
weekly correspondence of Cecil and Herbert with Elizabeth I's Privy Council — suggest
that this proved especially complicated on occasions of public importance.[53] During their
stay in France until late April, the Protestant ambassadors played a peripheral role in two
such public events: Mercœur's staged reconciliation with the king on 30 March and the
engagement ceremony of the duke's daughter Françoise de Lorraine to César de Bourbon
on 5 April. The engagement was, of couse, arranged for diplomatic purposes only, given
that César (aged 4) and Françoise (aged 6) were but young children. On both occasions,
Henri tried to avoid provoking his new Catholic allies by keeping his Protestant guests
far removed from the public stage. Given that such a drastic decision was likely to offend
the Dutch and English ambassadors, whose aim was precisely to remind the king of his
duties as a contracted partner, Henri tried to convince the envoys of his good intentions
via backchannels at court.

While strolling through the castle gardens during their first audience in late March,
Henri confessed to Cecil that he had scheduled his public reconciliation with Mercœur
three days after the arrival of the English delegation — on 30 March — for fear that the
duke would be provoked by the reception of the Protestant ambassadors.[54] The reconcili-
ation had been staged as a public meeting near Angers. Mercœur rode on horseback to-
wards Henri to salute him and swear allegiance to the crown. The king received the duke
'with a great show of warmth' in return.[55] The occasion was celebrated with fireworks
afterwards.[56] By immediately putting his cards on the table during their first audience,

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[53] A fair copy of Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's diary is held at NA, SG (1576-1796) 8307, 25 sheets,
not foliated. Part of the collection under no. 8307 is also the original manuscript (fols. 135^r-176^r) and two
other copies of the account with multiple corrections. The fair copy is transcribed in *Johan van Oldenbar-
nevelt*, ed. by Haak, I, pp. 407–63, and we will cite from this source for convenience, given that the original
manuscript is not numbered. For a discussion of the 'Verbael' from the perspective of Van Oldenbarnevelt,
Nassau, and one of the members in their embassy, the later jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), see Knapen,
De man en zijn staat, pp. 155-162; Nellen, *Hugo Grotius*, pp. 44-51. For Cecil and Hebert's dispatches on
their journey into France, see HMC Hatfield, XXIII, pp. 10-74.
[54] 'Hee [Henri] told mee [Cecil] also that hee had putt off Mercuryes entry hither till our comeinge, whose
presence hee was sure did vex him' (Cecil and Herbert to the Privy Council, HMC Hatfield, XXIII, p. 41).
[55] '[A]vec beaucoup de caresses' (Pierre de L'Estoile, *Journal de L'Estoile pour le règne de Henri IV*, ed.
by Louis-Raymond Lefèvre, Mémoires du passé pour servir au temps present, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard,
1948-1958), I: *1589-1600*, p. 334).
[56] 'Circulaire pour la pacification de la Bretagne', in *Recueil des lettres missives de Henri IV,* ed. by M.
Berger de Xivrey, Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, 7 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Na-
tionale, 1843-1858), IV: *1593-1598* (1848), pp. 932-33; letter of Henri IV to Henri de Bourbon, duc de

Henri aimed to demonstrate that he was seriously committed to keeping Cecil and the other members of their embassy informed about his political decisions, which in turn — he undoubtedly hoped — would reflect well on him as an ally of England. Cecil assured Henri that his embassy was unlikely to provoke Mercœur: 'I answered that hee [the duke] needed not be offended with us, for wee were glad hee did soe well'.[57] In his correspondence with the Privy Council, however, Cecil admitted that 'true it is that all the people, when he [Mercœur] came in [into Angers], cryed out upon him, "*Voycy* [sic] *la queue de la ligue, vooycy* [sic] *le petit roy de Bretaigne*" [Here is the tail of the league, here is the little king of Brittany]'.[58]

The hostile reactions from bystanders, which probably included both commoners and noblemen, suggest that the political intentions of the public reconciliation were ambiguous at the very least. Although in theory staged to celebrate the peace between both men, in practice the event was — also — used as an excuse to champion Henri's cause at the expense of Mercœur. The pamphlet that announced the public meeting framed the occasion as both a peaceful reconciliation, 'without force or violence', and an obeisance, during which the duke was supposed 'to recognise our [the crown's] authority'.[59] Rather than prioritising one interpretation over the other, however, the king kept the political intent of the ceremony deliberately vague. Henri probably hoped that the event, being thus open to interpretation, would be appreciated by supporters of both the crown and the duke. That most bystanders nonetheless seemed to have ridiculed Mercœur suggests that Henri's diplomacy of maintaining an equilibrium among his subjects proved more complex on grand public occasions when spectatorial reception was often difficult to control. In contrast to backchannel meetings with ambassadors, public diplomacy involved a larger number of stakeholders, including, as in this particular case, commoners, whose behaviour was almost impossible to predict, as it usually did not comply with courtly etiquette.

The celebrations surrounding Mercœur's ritual obeisance continued on 5 April when in the evening the duke's daughter Françoise became engaged to the king's bastard son César. Van Oldenbarnevelt wrote in his travel diary that the governor of the king's castle

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Montmorency and Connétable de France (31 March 1598, *Recueil des lettres*, IV, ed. by Xivrey, pp. 941-42).

[57] Cecil and Herbert to the Privy Council, HMC Hatfield, XXIII, p. 41.

[58] Ibid.

[59] '[S]ans force ne violence'; 'à recognoistre nostre auctorité' (*Recueil*, ed. by Xivrey, IV, p. 932).

had organised a banquet for the gentlewomen of Angers prior to the 'sponsaliën' ('engagement ceremony').[60] The ambassador noted how in the precincts of the castle 'many women and gentlewomen [were] dancing with many gentlemen'.[61] The local population, in other words, was directly involved in celebrations of Henri's diplomatic achievements. In this way, Henri could demonstrate that he had finally regained control in the Provinces and that civil war had definitively made way for a festive spirit.

Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's travel diary reveals that the Dutch and English ambassadors were invited to the official engagement ceremony which was celebrated with a banquet and ball afterwards. Besides Henri and his mistress Gabrielle, the event was attended by the flower of the French nobility. Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau reported that the invitation was extended to them by the prominent Huguenot leader Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne (1555-1623), duc de Bouillon and maréchal de France.[62] As brother in law to Prince Maurice, son of the late William of Orange and stadtholder of the Provinces, Bouillon was well-disposed to the Dutch cause. He therefore served as a mediator between the king and the Dutch ambassadors during their mission in Angers. Cecil and Herbert did not report on the engagement ceremony, but Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's travel diary suggests that they had received a similar invitation to the occasion. Judging from the account of the Dutch ambassadors, however, it appears that Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau did not attend the ceremony and the ensuing celebrations after all:

> Neither the lord ambassador from England [Cecil] nor we [Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau] were there [at the engagement ceremony] but in another room; [after] the ceremony was done we entered the room where we found a large assembly of gentlemen and women, and namely also the duchess [Gabrielle d'Estrées] who was very big with child. We had supper that evening with the dukes of Épernon, d'Elbœuf, Bouillon, Prince Henry of Nassau and some other lords of the order [*Ordre du Saint-Esprit*] in a small room. After supper we came to where the king had dined; he said to us that he had not seen us at his table, but that he thought we were with the Duke of Bouillon and the other gentlemen; and while everyone was helping him get ready to dance [for the ensuing ball], we left for home and were escorted by some Swiss [guards].[63]

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[60] Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau, 'Verbael', p. 420. This information was given to Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau by Louise de Coligny (1555-1620), last spouse of William of Orange, whom they visited in Angers on 4 April. The governor of the château d'Angers was Pierre de Donadieu (c. 1560-1605), sieur de Puycharic.

[61] '[V]eel vrouwen ende joncvrouwen mit veele heeren danssende' (Ibid., p. 423).

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid. (see appendix).

What might have been the reason for the ultimate absence of the Dutch and English ambassadors from the engagement ceremony and the festivities given later that evening? Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau clearly kept the actual proceedings of that night intentionally vague so as not to draw too much attention to what was undoubtedly regarded as an awkward situation; or perhaps the diplomat simply did not wish to complain about what were by definition politically sensitive circumstances. Ben Knapen believes that the absence of the Dutch envoys from the ceremony — he does not mention Cecil and Herbert in this context — was an intentional decision made by the French.[64] Knapen notes that the inferior position of the States General on the international stage, combined with the non-noble origin of Van Oldenbarnevelt, was the actual reason why the Dutch embassy dined in a small room separate from the space where the engagement ceremony and the main banquet took place. He points out the apparent humiliation of the experience: 'as if they [the Dutch legates] were waggoneers of high placed guests who also needed to eat'.[65] That Henri had nonetheless enquired about the diplomats' whereabouts after dinner had finished was according to Knapen a mere formality to soften the blow.[66] Henk Nellen, by contrast, argues that it was the personal decision of both the Dutch and the English ambassadors to remain absent from the ceremony.[67] Nellen writes that the Catholic rituals of the ceremony and the perceived loose morals of the French court — César being elevated to noble status, while Gabrielle would soon give birth to another illegitimate child — likely offended the Calvinist diplomats which, in turn, prompted them to retreat in a separate room.[68]

Neither Knapen's nor Nellen's interpretation of Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's account gives a satisfactory explanation for the absence of the Protestant ambassadors from the ceremony. First, Knapen's argument that their absence was motivated by the disputed authority of the States General does not account for the fact that the English ambassadors dined in the same small room as the Dutch who could thus have been admitted to the engagement ceremony. Second, the diplomats' experiences in the separate room were certainly not downright humiliating. As Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau emphasised in

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[64] *De man en zijn staat*, p. 158.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Nellen, *Hugo Grotius*, p. 48.
[68] Ibid.

their account of the occasion cited above, the Dutch and English dignitaries enjoyed the company of high-profile noblemen who had direct access to the king, especially Épernon and d'Elbœuf, and could thus actively help the Protestants to support their cause.[69] Épernon was moreover involved in negotiations over the Peace of Vervins and was present during all of the king's conferences with the Dutch and English ambassadors.[70] Third, if the envoys had indeed decided to refuse the invitation or accept it under certain conditions, this should not be explained on the basis of the Catholic rites and lax morals of the French court alone. Although it is true that Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's account draws specific attention to Gabrielle's pregnancy, it seems more likely that the ambassadors wished to avoid confrontation with the old Leaguers, among whom was of course Mercœur, by having supper in a separate room. The separate room thus offered a form of backchannel diplomacy.

Finally, Knapen and Nellen overlook the fact that far from being ignored, the Dutch and English ambassadors were in fact personally invited to the wedding. This leads us to conclude that Henri had actually anticipated — and hoped — that the diplomats would remain absent from the ceremony altogether. By nonetheless pretending to have welcomed the ambassadors to the occasion, Henri could at least express his wish to receive them publically. Dining in a separate room with powerful stakeholders in the negotiations at Vervins should thus not be seen as an undiplomatic measure, but rather as a successful example of backchannel diplomacy, aimed at avoiding public intervention from other parties.

Although received favourably via the backchannels at court, the Dutch and English ambassadors could ultimately not prevent the Franco-Spanish rapprochement. François van Aerssen (1572-1641), the new agent of the States General in France, was quick to discover that on 2 May 1598 — the same day on which he reported the news to Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau — the Peace of Vervins had been signed.[71] Henri had

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[69] Épernon and d'Elbœuf were members of the *Ordre du Saint-Esprit* and thus regularly accompanied the king.

[70] Épernon is frequently referred to as an important source of contact in both Cecil and Herbert's correspondence and Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau's travel diary. Shortly before the English ambassadors left court in Nantes on 15 April, for example, they were visited by Épernon for a last-minute audience, after which the duke held conference with the Dutch envoys (see HMC Hatfield, XXIII, p. 73).

[71] NA, JvO 2026, 2 May 1598. Van Aerssen had been formally presented to Henri IV as an agent of the Provinces on 26 April 1598 (Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau, 'Verbael', p. 444; Barendrecht, *François van Aerssen*, pp. 26-7). The States General installed Van Aerssen as resident ambassador to France on 18 September 1609 to honour his involvement in the negotiations over the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain which

intentionally delayed the signing of the accord until after the Dutch and English delegations had left court, probably for fear that the Protestant ambassadors would reinforce tensions at court even further.[72]

3. Staging reconciliation, winter 1600

Whereas in spring 1598 Henri could still receive his Dutch and English allies behind the backs of Rome and Spain, he could not afford any such manoeuvring two years later when the papacy closely monitored the public celebrations for his marriage to Marie de Médicis in Italy and France. The French Secretary of State, Nicolas de Neufville (1543-1617), seigneur de Villeroy, understood that public events could either make or break the king's authority, especially under the politically sensitive circumstances of this particular marriage. He therefore expressly forbade the States General of the Dutch Provinces to send a representative to congratulate Henri on his marriage. Villeroy's heated talk with François van Aerssen about this matter was reported by Ralph Winwood (*c.* 1563-1617), secretary to Henry Neville, English ambassador in France.[73] Particularly sensitive phrases in Winwood's report were sent in cypher (they are in italics below) to prevent interceptors, especially those from Spain and the papal states, from learning about Henri's secret relations with the Dutch Republic and his efforts to conceal those relations from Rome in particular. We may usefully consider cypher to be a linguistic form of backchannel diplomacy:

> The *States Agent* is returned to this [the French] Court; but Monsieur *Villeroy* hath given him such a wellcom, as might have made him fall into a Relapse; for after a feaw Dayes that he had been here, *he wishes him to forbear, and to retire himself; told him that his Presence would be displeasing to the Cardinall [Pietro Aldobrandini, the papal nuncio], and so might breed Disgrace to the King; for just Exception might be taken, that the French King* should have about him *an Agent of the States*, but thus far mildly. But when he told him, that *the States* did purpose to send an *Ambassador* to *congratulate* the *Marriage*; then he began to Storme, asking whether he thought that the King wold receave one of that quallity from *the Rebells* of *the King of* Spayne; and assured him, that yf they send any such, *the King shall be enforced so to declare them*, and to forbid *his Subjects* all *Commerce* with them.[74]

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had been ratified on 9 April 1609 (ibid., p. 229). For more on the Twelve Years' Truce, see Chapter 5, Section 1.

[72] The English embassy left court — which was then held in Nantes — on 15 April, the Dutch delegation on the 26th.

[73] Ralph Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I [...]*, ed. by Edmund Sawyer, 3 vols (London: T. Ward, 1725), I, p. 278.

[74] Ibid.

Van Aerssen replied to Villeroy that France had nonetheless regarded the Dutch Republic as an ally in several treaties, but that he was '*willing to distinguish times*' and acknowledge the impossibility of receiving a representative from the Provinces under the watchful eye of Rome and Spain.[75] Interestingly, Winwood suggested that the States General had probably anticipated Villeroy's response, as not offering to congratulate the king on his marriage would be considered even more undiplomatic: 'Not to *send,* were to shew little respect; and yf they do, they doubt whether he [Van Aerssen] shall be receaved'.[76] By assuming that their request would be rejected anyway, the States General could at least demonstrate that they had had the intention of congratulating Henri.

Although Henri's recent alliances with Spain and the towns of the *Ligue catholique* had ended open warfare both within and outside France, the threat of resurging violence, combined with persisting doubts about Henri's legitimacy, necessitated ongoing promotion of the king's authority as eldest son of the Catholic Church. Since the marriage celebrations in France were the first in Henri's reign to be executed on such a large public scale, they offered a rare opportunity for the king to showcase his reconciliation with France's Jesuit community. The Jesuits had been expelled from northern and central France on 29 December 1594 owing to their refusal to submit to Henri whom the papacy had excommunicated nine years earlier, on 9 September 1585.[77] Their expulsion was directly motivated by the charges brought against a former student of the Jesuit College in Paris, called Jean Châtel, who had attempted to murder Henri three days before the eviction was administered.

By winter 1600, it was clear to most Jesuits that Henri would sanction their return to France only if they made obeisance to the crown.[78] Marie's triumphal entry into Avignon on 11 November, which had been organised by the town's Jesuit College, aimed at fulfilling that condition by expressing unconditional support for the king.[79] Across the city, seven arches were erected to celebrate the peace that Henri was believed to have brought

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Pitts, *Henri IV*, p. 192; Sutherland, *The Huguenot Struggle*, p. 550.

[78] Eric W. Nelson, *The King, the Jesuits and the French Church, 1594-1615* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, 1998), pp. 73-80. The return of the Jesuits to France was promulgated by the Edict of Rouen in 1603.

[79] For a discussion of the entry in light of Jesuit ideology, see Margaret M. McGowan, 'Les Jésuites à Avignon: Les Fêtes au service de la propagande politique et religieuse', in *Les Fêtes de la Renaissance*, ed. by Jacquot and Koningson, III, pp. 153-171.

to France after decades of civil war. Each of the arches compared the king's moral virtues and sounding victories to the seven labours of Hercules, sustained by numerous references to the history of Avignon and the dynastic lineages of the Houses of France and Florence.[80] The official account of the entry, attributed to André Valladier (1565-1638), a Jesuit professor of rhetoric in Avignon, included a dedication to the king which assured him that the villagers were 'very obliging, and very faithful to your Majesty, and dedicated to your crown, as much as your most natural, and faithful subjects'.[81] For both Henri and the Jesuits, the entry thus served as a diplomatic tool to express their wish for reconciliation. Avignon constituted the ideal setting for a first public encounter between the parties. As papal enclave in south-eastern France, the city had been an important place of refuge for the Society of Jesus during its expulsion from the northern and central regions of the kingdom.[82]

The dominant presence of the Society of Jesus at the wedding celebrations in France should furthermore be explained in light of papal intervention in Henri's domestic politics. Pope Clement VIII actively supported the cause of the Jesuits and had even imposed their return to France as a primary condition for Henri's absolution five years earlier. By allowing the Society to contribute substantially to the wedding celebrations in France, Henri thus also hoped to keep Clement friendly. Pressure from Rome thus allowed the Jesuits at Avignon the relative autonomy to advance their own cause and present themselves as faithful subjects of the French crown. With Valladier as chronicler of Marie's entry, the Society was moreover able to control and publicise its own narrative of the festive proceedings. Two months earlier, during the entry of the papal nuncio, Cardinal Pietro Aldobrandini (1571-1621), into Florence, Grand Duke Ferdinando I de' Medici (1549-1609) was keen to satisfy the papacy in much the same way as Henri attempted to do at Avignon. Although lower in ecclesiastical rank, the Tuscan Jesuits occupied the same place as the regular clergy in the cavalcade that accompanied Aldobrandini's embassy to the Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore for the official wedding ceremony. The cardinal's secretary, Giovanni Battista Agucchi (1570-1632), noted with satisfaction in his travel diary, which he addressed to his brother in Rome, Cardinal Girolamo Agucchi

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[80] [André Valladier], *Labyrinthe royal de l'Hercvle gavlois triomphant [...]* (Avignon: Jaques Bramereau, 1600). The overall design of the entry is introduced on sig. 1-2 of the *livret*.

[81] 'La ville d'Auignon tresobligee, & tresfidele à vostre Maiesté, obeyssante, & voüée à vostre couronne, à l'esgal de voz plus naturels, & fideles subiects' (ibid., sig. †1ʳ).

[82] McGowan, 'Les jésuites', pp. 154-55.

(1555-1605), that 'among the regular clergy, the Jesuit fathers did not want to stay behind as usual'.[83]

The newly engineered alliance between France and Florence had given an immense boost to the diplomatic status of the papacy. This was reflected in the appointment of Aldobrandini as head of a special embassy that accompanied Marie on a four-month journey from Florence, her birthplace, to Marseille, from where she would travel to Henri's court in Paris. Aldobrandini's own chronicle of the voyage, drafted around 1604 in his position as Archbishop of Ravenna, to which he had been recently appointed, drew on diplomatic documents that the cardinal had written or compiled himself during the embassy.[84] The chronicle, an unpublished manuscript held at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, sought to record Aldobrandini's own involvement in the diplomatic proceedings of the journey for posterity. Interestingly, the document reveals that after having reached Marseille the cardinal travelled straight to Lyon to negotiate over the terms of the peace treaty between Henri IV and Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy. The so-called Peace of Lyon, which Aldobrandini concluded the following year, on 17 January 1601, required Henri to relinquish the Marquisate of Saluzzo to Emmanuel. In return, the king acquired various Savoyard lands on the west bank of the Rhône, namely Bugey, Bresse, Gex, and Valromey.[85] Aldobrandini's chronicle thus clearly shows that the papacy regarded Marie's voyage into France as part of a larger diplomatic operation which was aimed at renewing the alliances between Catholic nations and, ultimately, restoring papal authority in Europe. That the cardinal narrated the nuptial proceedings and his work on the Peace

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[83] '[F]ra li regolari non volevano contro il loro istituto rimanere dietro i padri gesuiti' ('Diario del viaggio del Card. Pietro Aldobrandini […]', Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles, Festival Collection, MS 521655, fol. 36ʳ). Giovanni replaced his ailing brother as secretary to Aldobrandini, whose entry into Florence on 5 October 1600 marked the start of three months of festivities. For more on Giovanni Battista Agucchi and his 'Diario', see Jean-François Chauvard, '"Come se fosse stato il Papa medesimo": La legazione del cardinal Pietro Aldobrandini (1600-1601) e la sua rievocazione', in *Casa Savoia e curia romana dal Cinquecenta al Risorgimento*, ed. by Jean-François Chauvard, Andrea Merlotti, and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Rome: École française de Rome, 2015), pp. 195-229 (pp. 223-28).

[84] 'Relatione in forma d'historia del negotiato del card. Aldobrandino sopra la pace del marchesato di Saluzzo', BnF, MS it. 673. See Chauvard, '"Come se fosse stato il Papa medesimo"', pp. 221-23, for more on the genesis and political purposes of the 'Relatione'.

[85] Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV*, pp. 239–41. For more on the intervention of Clement VIII in the Peace of Vervins and Lyon, see Armand Louant, 'L'Intervention de Clément VIII dans le traité de Vervins', *Bulletin de l'institut historique belge de Rome*, 12 (1932), 127–86; Borromeo, 'Clément VIII'; Haan, 'La Médiation pontificale'.

of Lyon in the same chronicle furthermore demonstrates that he considered both events to be intertwined.[86]

Although the official account of the Florentine celebrations devotes much attention to Aldobrandini's reception and the diplomatic achievements of Clement VIII at large, it remained understandably silent about the backchannel diplomacy that coincided with or followed shortly upon the Florentine wedding.[87] The Casa Buonarroti in Florence holds the correspondence between Grand Duke Ferdinando and Michelangelo Buonarroti the Younger (1568-1646), a Florentine poet and librettist who had been commissioned to write the festival's official account.[88] The correspondence provides a unique insight into the editorial decisions being made, as it shows what information Ferdinando wished to communicate to the international readers of the account and what details about the festival he wanted to conceal from public attention. In one of his letters, the grand duke addressed Aldobrandini's ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Henri IV and the Duke of Savoy: 'I have spoken, as I have been ordered [by Pope Clement VIII], of the departure of Cardinal Aldobrandini, which I thought it would have been preferable to conceal, in order not to show that the Cardinal is going to France for very important matters'.[89] In other words, Buonarroti was instructed not to refer to the Clement's backchannel diplomacy for fear that public attention might affect it unfavourably. At the same time, the cardinal's reception was narrated in the same way that Clement hoped the world would remember the festival at large: a celebration of Catholic Europe, free from underhand conspiracy and negotiation.

Whereas Clement and Ferdinando used the public diplomacy of the nuptial festival in Florence to guarantee a successful outcome of Aldobrandini's secret mission to settle the Franco-Savoyard conflict over Saluzzo, Henri IV himself had commissioned lavish

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[86] Sara Mamone rightly shows that Aldobrandini fulfilled a double role as diplomat, serving the interests of both the Medici and the royal French family, as he blessed and presided over the marriage between Henri and Marie in Florence, and of his uncle, Pope Clement VIII (*Firenze e Parigi*, p. 37).

[87] Cf. Agucchi, 'Diario', fols. 28ʳ-30ʳ. Sara Mamone describes Aldobrandini's reception and the ensuing procession to the Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore in *Firenze e Parigi*, pp. 37–39. For the official account of the Florentine celebrations, see Michelangelo Buonarroti, *Descrizione delle felicissime nozze della cristianissima maestà di madama Maria Medici regina di Francia e di Navarra* (Florence: Giorgio Marescotti, 1600).

[88] Archivio Buonarroti, MS 88. For a discussion of the correspondence, see Mamone, *Firenze e Parigi*, pp. 57-9.

[89] 'Ho detto, come che mi hanno ordinato, della partenza del Cardinale Aldobrandini *il che aveva creduto che fosse stato ben tacere* per non venire a dimostrare che andando il Cardinale in Francia per negozi importantissimi' (MS 88, fol. 222ʳ).

festivities at his court in Paris several months earlier to avoid productive backchannel negotiations about that conflict altogether. In January and February 1600, the king used entertainment to distract Charles Emmanuel, who visited the French capital hoping to gain full possession of Saluzzo.[90] Instead of giving in to the duke's demands, however, Henri tried to distract him from his negotiation with excessive amounts of pomp and personal attention. Not only did the king invite Emmanuel to a number of ballets and pageants (probably designed as light-hearted entertainments rather than political allegories),[91] but he also took him on personal tours through the Parisian quarter of Saint Germain to show 'this beautiful castle and the wonderful houses'.[92] The duke left Paris in good spirits, probably under the impression that his generous reception meant that he was only one step away from securing full possession of Saluzzo. Writing about early modern relations between Europe and the Indian subcontinent, Audrey Truschke has recently called this type of misunderstanding 'deceptive familiarity'.[93] The concept refers to miscommunication between negotiating parties based on the false belief that they share each other's ideas and assumptions. Henri's strategy of exploiting this belief to fob off his guest seems to have worked well, albeit temporarily. In autumn 1600, Emmanuel skipped the diplomatic negotiation phase altogether and challenged Henri, whose wife Marie was getting married by proxy in Florence, to another war, which would be fought out in Bresse and Savoy, to determine the legal ownership of Saluzzo.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has offered a corrective to the assumption of historical theorists of diplomacy that entertainment, though effective in boosting the sovereignty of the prince, was of little use to the delicate business of preparing and negotiating peace treaties. Diplomacy, as recommended by humanist scholars, should take place via backchannels and not allow

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[90] The duke's visit is reported by the Parisian diarist Pierre de L'Estoile (1546-1611) in *Journal de L'Estoile pour le règne de Henri IV*, I, pp. 588–93.

[91] L'Estoile wrote that in January 1600 'banquets and ballets were given in Paris, and more than was customary, because of the arrival of the Duke of Savoy, to whom the king was very glad to show the grandeur and magnificence of his city of Paris' ('se firent force festins et ballets à Paris, et plus qu'on avait accoutumé, à cause de la venue du duc de Savoie, auquel le roi était bien aise de faire montre de la grandeur et magnificence de sa ville de Paris'; ibid., p. 591). See also McGowan, *Dance in the Renaissance*, p. 177.

[92] '[C]e magnifique château et les belles maisons' (L'Estoile, *Journal de L'Estoile pour le règne de Henri IV*, I, p. 589).

[93] Audrey Truschke, 'Deceptive Familiarity: European Perceptions of Access at the Mughal Court', in *The Key to Power?*, pp. 65–99.

for distractions in the form of public celebrations. We proposed the view that Henri IV's diplomatic strategy to settle domestic and foreign conflicts in the early years of his reign involved a combined use of backchannels and public occasions. Henri's backchannel diplomacy consisted of secret negotiations with foreign allies, such as England and the Dutch Republic, or domestic opponents, such as the remaining leaders of the *Ligue catholique*. These negotiations were held in the king's private cabinet or secluded garden to avoid prying eyes. Access was restricted to a small group of advisors and favourites. Alongside backchannel negotiations, Henri sought to rally Catholic and Huguenot opponents to his cause by organising ceremonies and entertainments that involved the entire court elite and sometimes even the urban population. We have labelled this use of ceremony and entertainment as public diplomacy to highlight the function that festival culture could fulfil as an independent tool for mediation and negotiation.

Our argument was demonstrated in the context of three case studies. The first case study brought into sharp relief the tension between backchannel and public diplomacy, as Henri's secret reception of Dutch and English ambassadors in spring 1598 coincided with celebrations for the crown's reconciliation with the duc de Mercœur, the last remaining leader of the *Ligue catholique*. For the engagement ceremony of Mercœur's daughter to Henri's love child César, the ambassadors were brought into a separate room to avoid provoking the king's Catholic opponents who attended the wedding ceremony in the neighbouring hall. The second case study examined how the festivities in Avignon, organised for Henri's marriage to Marie de Médicis two years later, in November 1600, functioned as a form of public diplomacy for both the king and his former Catholic opponents, France's Jesuit community, to express their wish for reconciliation.

The third case study, finally, brought into relief how festival culture could be used by our diplomatic stakeholders to either protect or frustrate controversial backchannel negotiations. In early 1600, Henri managed to flatter Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, by staging banquets and ballets in his honour, without actually giving in to his rival's political demands. Conversely, Ferdinando I de' Medici and Pope Clement VIII hoped that the Florentine celebrations for Henri's wedding in October 1600 would divert unwanted attention away from the secret negotiations that the papal nuncio, Pietro Aldobrandini, conducted between the French king and the Duke of Savoy.

CHAPTER 5

Diplomacy after a Regicide:

Celebrating 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' Marriages,

1612-1615

> I see that you organise firework displays and spend the nights in ballets and dances, in the hope of achieving these marriages: Ha, what do you expect to do! Bring about accord between two people who are enemies in everything? Fire and water will meet and blend before the Frenchman becomes compatible with the Spaniard.
>
> Anonymous supporter of Henri II de Bourbon (1588-1646), third prince de Condé, about the Habsburg-Bourbon double marriage, in *Cassandre françoise* (French Cassandra, 1615).[1]

This chapter starts with the observation that the Franco-Spanish and Anglo-German marriages were intended as dynastic unions aimed at restoring the balance of power in Europe after the regicide of Henri IV in May 1610. Although Anglo-French relations at the time of the marriages have been studied,[2] a systematic comparison between the Habsburg-Bourbon and Stuart-Palatine festivals has never been carried out. Our emphasis is on the diplomatic position of the French crown as it manoeuvred between Catholic and Huguenot factions on a domestic level, and between Catholic and Protestant rulers on an

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[1] Newberry Library, Chicago, Special Collections, Case F 39 .326 1615di2, p. 4 (see appendix). No publisher or date is mentioned on the pamphlet's title page. The English translation, which we slightly modified here to follow the original French more closely, is in John H. Elliott, 'The Political Context of the 1612-1615 Franco-Spanish Treaty', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 5–18 (p. 18).

[2] Simon L. Adams, 'The Road to La Rochelle: English Foreign Policy and the Huguenots, 1610-1629', in *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London* (London: The Huguenot Society of London, 1976, XXII: *1970-1976*, pp. 414-29; W. Brown Patterson, 'James I and the Huguenot Synod of Tonneins of 1614', *The Harvard Theologival Review*, 65 (1972), 241-70; J. Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 48-49, 63-64.

international level. As always, France's diplomacy abroad strongly depended on its diplomacy at home, and vice versa. We will argue that through the collaboration of divergent negotiating groups, and the mediation of festival accounts that gave an ideologically coloured interpretation of the proceedings, the marriages attempted, and were sometimes intentionally exploited, to accommodate the political agendas of a variety of stakeholders from Catholic and Protestant communities across Europe. Marie de Médicis used the French festivities for the Habsburg-Bourbon union to suggest to both domestic and international audiences that the crown had finally succeeded in winning the support of its nobles. Her diplomatic strategy of bringing both loyal and mutinous nobles together in exercises of horsemanship and military discipline, as in the Parisian carousel of April 1612 (Section 2), or in social dancing between couples, as in the ball following *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve* of March 1615 (Section 4), was strongly reminiscent of Catherine de Médicis's efforts to appease rivalling factions through entertainment.

For the carousel, Marie had instructed noblemen to prepare entries into the Place Royale which offered them a platform for showcasing chivalric pride. The pageant inspired the publication of a defamatory chapbook, written in support of Condé, first prince du sang, which invoked the early-modern stereotype of theatrical entertainment as a vain pastime that was merely intended to distract noblemen from domestic troubles. The Valois practice of using entertainment for diplomatic purposes also resonated at the English celebrations for the Stuart-Palatine marriage (Section 3). James VI/I had organised a court masque on the evening of the wedding day (o.s. 14 February 1613) that not only in content, being an allegory of the transformation of chaos into harmony through marriage, but also in terms of aesthetics, with dancers disguised as stars, recalled the cosmological setting of Catherine's *ballets de cour*. The king's design for peace, as supported by the masque, was challenged by the Calvinist supporters of Prince Henry, James's son. French and German supporters of the prince published accounts of the English festivities that intentionally obscured the original diplomatic intentions of the Anglo-German marriage by couching the festival in a rhetoric of militant Protestantism.

1. Diplomatic context

In the afternoon of 14 May 1610, Henri IV ordered a coach to take him to the Arsenal, where he had planned to confer with Maximilien de Béthune (1560-1641), duc de Sully,

his chief finance minister.[3] As he rumbled out of the Louvre into the crowded streets of Paris, the king reportedly drew back the leather curtains of his carriage to inspect the preparations for the impending ceremonial entry of Marie de Médicis.[4] The brothers Francine, former hydraulic engineers and garden designers to Ferdinando I de' Medici, had been assigned to decorate the streets with triumphal arches and other temporary monuments to celebrate Marie's coronation as Queen of France.[5] The festive mood did not last long, however. Around 4 p.m., Henri entered the rue de la Ferronnerie, but became stuck in congestion. François Ravaillac (1578-1610), a Catholic fanatic who, as Mark Greengrass puts it, 'found it impossible to forget the recent past',[6] pulled out a short knife and stabbed the king three times. The royal coach drove straight to the Louvre, but the king died shortly afterwards.[7]

Marie suddenly found herself regent to a minor king, her eight year-old son Louis XIII, and faced with the difficult task of winning the support of her subjects for helping France to recover from the civil unrest that the regicide brought in its wake.[8] Being a woman and a foreigner, Marie was generally perceived by her opponents as a weak and incompetent ruler.[9] The so-called Malcontents, a loosely associated group of high-born nobles who had been successfully controlled by Henri IV, now hoped to exploit the queen mother's

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[3] Both men had agreed to discuss the final preparations for the king's campaign to the lower Rhine where his army would support the Protestant claimants in the succession conflict over the Imperial provinces of Jülich, Kleves, and Berg. See Roland Mousnier, *L'Assassinat d'Henri IV, 14 mai 1610*, Trente journées qui ont fait la France ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1964), p. 1; Alison Deborah Anderson, *On the Verge of War: International Relations and the Jülich-Kleve Succession Crises (1609-1614)*, Studies in Central European Histories (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 1999), p. 98; and our discussion of the succession crisis below.

[4] The entry was scheduled for 16 May.

[5] Marie's coronation had taken place the previous day at the Basilique de Saint-Denis. Thomas (1571-1651) and Alexandre Francine (died in 1648) entered the service of the French monarchy in 1598. Thomas, who was appointed *ingenieur de Sa Majesté* (engineer of His Majesty), also designed the theatrical machinery and scene changes for a number of court and civic entertainments, including *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve* in 1615 and — possibly — the equestrian carousel that was held at the Place Royale in Paris three years earlier (McGowan, *L'art du ballet de cour*, pp. 87, 89–92; Marina Longo, 'Tommaso Francini, ingegnere, scenografo, "honorable homme" fiorentino alla corte di Francia (1598-1651)', *Teatro e Storia*, 24.17 (2002), 377–426 (pp. 389, 391)). Both pageants will be discussed in Sections 2 and 4 below.

[6] *France in the Age of Henri IV*, p. 251.

[7] The episode is described in detail by Roland Mousnier, in *L'assassinat*, pp. 1–6.

[8] The *Parlement de Paris* declared Marie *Régente de France* within hours of the regicide (see Katherine Crawford, *Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 65–72). Marie's regency ended on 2 October 1614 when Louis was declared legally sovereign at a *lit de justice*.

[9] Jean-François Dubost's revisionist monograph on the queen mother offers a comprehensive analysis of the French opposition to her regency government and highlights the misogynistic and xenophobic sentiments that fuelled it (see *Marie de Médicis: La Reine dévoilée*, Biographie Payot (Paris: Payot, 2009)). Chantal Grell follows a similar approach but specifically focuses on the theatrical entertainments that Marie organised for the Franco-Spanish marriages (see 'Fêtes of 1612-1615', pp. 215–26).

fragile position and expand their influence at court.[10] They were headed by the rebellious Henri II de Bourbon (1588-1646), third prince de Condé, whose status as first prince du sang would allow him to succeed to the French throne if Louis XIII and his brother Gaston (1608-1660), duc d'Orléans, died without viable offspring.[11] The Huguenots, by contrast, feared that the steady rise of pro-Habsburg Catholics at court, such as the duc d'Épernon, who had helped negotiate the Peace of Vervins, and especially Concino Concini (*c.* 1575-1617), an ambitious Florentine nobleman who had accompanied Marie on her journey to France, indicated the monarchy's wavering support for their minority, as well as a strengthening of ties with Spain and Rome.[12]

In the months following the regicide, the queen mother was anxious to avert the outbreak of a new civil war by trying to keep both the rebel princes and the Huguenots satisfied. Just like her predecessor and kinswoman Catherine de Médicis and, to a similar degree, Henri IV, Marie used diplomatic compromise, rather than militarily coercion, as a tool to rally the support of her restless subjects. In exchange for their loyalty, she

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[10] Nicolas Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy: Dreams of Union and Aristocratic Turmoil (1610-1615)', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 19–38 (p. 23). Note that the Malcontents under Henri IV, Marie de Médicis, and Louis XIII in the early seventeenth century were distinct from the Malcontents under Henri III in the mid-1570s. The latter group of moderate Catholics and Protestants was headed by Hercule-François (then known as the duc d'Alençon), Henri I, Prince de Condé, Henri de Navarre, and Henri I de Montmorency. They opposed the royal favouritism and the presence of foreign councillors at Henri III's court and demanded greater power for the French nobility.

[11] Among Condé's magnates were the other two *princes du sang*: Charles de Bourbon (1566-1612), comte de Soissons, and François de Bourbon (1588-1614), prince de Conti. They were first cousins of Henri IV and sons of the prominent Huguenot leader and general Louis (1530-1569), first prince de Condé. Other Malcontents included Henri de Lorraine (1578-1621), duc de Mayenne, son of Charles, former military leader of the *Ligue catholique*; and Henri II d'Orléans (1595-1663), duc de Longueville, who became godson of Henri IV upon the death of his father Henri (1568-1595), a military officer and Grand chambellan de France (Grand Chamberlain of France). Three *grands*, both initial supporters of Marie's regency, aligned themselves with Condé in late 1613, as they believed that their loyalty had not been sufficiently rewarded: Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, maréchal de Bouillon, the Huguenot leader who had mediated between Henri IV and the Dutch ambassadors during the latter's stay at Angers in 1598; Henri IV's love child César de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme and Étampes; and Charles III de Gonzaga (1580-1637), duc de Nevers and Rethel, whose military career had begun with the defence of Cambrai against Spanish troops in August-October 1595. For more on the opposition of Condé and his adversaries to Marie's regency, see Caroline Bitsch, *Vie et carrière d'Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé, 1588-1646: Exemple de comportement et d'idées politiques au début du XVIIe siècle*, Bibliothèque d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 27 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008), pp. 119–68.

[12] Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy', pp. 21–24. Concini was greatly envied by the other nobles at court and by Condé in particular. After having joined Marie on her voyage to France in 1601, Concini quickly seized influence over the princess by marrying her favourite and lady-in-waiting, Léonora Dori (1571-1617), called 'Galigaï'. The regicide of Henri IV offered Concini the opportunity to further his ambitions. With the help of Léonora, he purchased the Marquisate of Ancre, the rank of *Premier Gentilhomme de la Chambre du Roi* (First Gentleman of the King's Bedchamber), and several other honours. In 1613, Marie appointed Concini to the powerful position of maréchal de France. Both he and his wife served as chief advisors to the queen mother until their death in 1617. On Concini's rise to power, see Hélène Duccini, *Concini: Grandeur et misère du favori de Marie de Médicis* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1991).

increased the pensions of the aristocratic Malcontents and distributed a number of gifts and positions among them.[13] Likewise, Marie hoped to obtain the backing of the Huguenots by promising them she would observe the articles of the Edict of Nantes. On 22 May, she published a declaration on behalf of Louis XIII confirming the ten-year old decree in its entirety, because 'it had achieved a sure repose between his [Henri IV's] subjects'.[14] Marie thus sought to assure the Huguenots of the good intentions of the regency government and demonstrated that it was willing to continue the moderately tolerant policies of her husband:

> Although this edict is perpetual and irrevocable, and thereby need not be confirmed by a new declaration, so that our subjects may be assured of our benevolence, let us say and ordain that the said edict of Nantes, in all its items and articles, shall be maintained and inviolably protected. [15]

The reaffirmation of a supposedly irrevocable edict was in itself not new. After all, previous treaties of concord, such as the Edict of Longjumeau (23 March 1568) and the Edict of Union (16 July 1588), were also explicitly labelled 'perpetual and irrevocable'.[16] The latter phrase nonetheless demands further explanation here, for why reissue an accord that was already intended to be universally valid? As Mario Turchetti has shown, the phrase was included in the original Edict of Nantes, as well as in subsequent renewals, to convince the Huguenot community that, despite fierce opposition from the French *parlements*, it would always be the crown's genuine intention to observe the articles of the Edict of Nantes.[17] By stressing its 'perpetual and irrevocable' nature, then, Marie also tried to cover up for the fact that the controversial accord was everything but universally

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[13] J. Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 10-11, 17–18; Bitsch, *Vie et carrière d'Henri II de Bourbon*, pp. 121–22; Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy', p. 23. However, most benefits were awarded to government officials and members of the lower nobility. Marie thus distributed an average of forty-one gifts a year until 1614. See Hayden, *France and the Estates General*, p. 13, n. 11.

[14] '[M]is un repos assuré entre ses sujets' (cited in M. Ch. Weiss, *Histoire des réfugiés protestants de France depuis la révocation de l'édit de Nantes jusqu'à nos jours*, 2 vols (Paris: Charpentier; Geneva: Cherbuliez; London: Jeffs, 1853), I, p. 4). Marie confirmed the edict again in 1612, 1614, and twice in 1615 (see Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV*, p. 257).

[15] Cited in Weiss, *Histoire des réfugiés protestants*, I, p. 4 (see appendix).

[16] Turchetti, 'Religious Concord and Political Tolerance', p. 23.

[17] 'Une question mal posée', pp. 61, 64–66. Turchetti's article also discusses contemporary interpretations of the slogan.

accepted and thus continuously subject to negotiation with magistrates in the *parlements*.[18]

Besides seeking to improve France's domestic situation, the queen regent worked to safeguard the kingdom's position in Europe and prevent its fragile political climate from disrupting the international balance of power. On 20 June, Marie confirmed two treaties in her son's name that Henri IV had signed with the Dutch Republic to facilitate the truce between the Calvinist rebels and the Habsburg rulers of Spain and the Southern Netherlands.[19] The ceasefire had been ratified in Antwerp on 9 April 1609 and would become known as the Twelve Years' Truce, given that it was set to expire on 9 April 1621.[20] In contrast to Henri, who professed support for the rapprochement but secretly tried to sabotage the negotiations in the hope that a resumption of the Dutch-Spanish conflict would drain the financial resources of the Habsburg crown, Marie was eager to preserve the armistice between the belligerent parties.[21] It meant, however temporarily, the end of Spain's aggressive expansionism in Europe and, hence, of the military and financial support that France had been providing to the Dutch rebels since the early 1570s in order to combat Habsburg encirclement.[22] The ceasefire thus enabled Marie to focus on settling affairs at home, rather than fighting a costly war abroad, and opened up the opportunity to improve France's relations with Spain.[23]

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[18] In practice, the expression 'perpetual and irrevocable' simply indicated that the treaty could be revoked only by another registered decree (see Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV*, p. 102).

[19] Both treaties were confirmed by one declaration (see *Corps*, pt. 1, 138–41). The States General of the Dutch Provinces signed the declaration on 31 May (see ibid., p. 141).

[20] Existing literature on the negotiations over the truce is extensive, but see John Lothrop Motley, *History of the United Netherlands: From the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years' Truce—1609*, 4 vols (London: John Murray, 1860-1867), IV: *1600-1609*, pp. 432–528; Petrus J. Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche volk*, 3rd edn (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1923-1926), II [1924], pp. 346–64; Willem J. M. van Eysinga, *De wording van het Twaalfjarig Bestand van 9 april 1609*, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, 66:3 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1959); Luc Duerloo, *Dynasty and Piety: Archduke Albert (1598-1621) and Habsburg Political Culture in an Age of Religious Wars* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 202–33; *El arte de la prudencia: La Tregua de los Doce Años en la Europa de los pacificadores*, ed. by Bernardo J. García García, Manuel Herrero Sánchez, and Alain Hugón, Leo Belgicus, 10 (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2012).

[21] Van Eysinga, *De wording van het Twaalfjarig Bestand*, pp. 95-155; Jean-François Dubost, 'La reina de la paz: Conservación, concordia y arte de la diplomacia bajo la regencia de Maria de Médicis (1610-1614)', in *El arte de la prudencia*, ed. by García García, Herrero Sánchez, and Hugón, pp. 321–44 (pp. 326, 344); Duerloo, *Dynasty and Piety*, pp. 224–25. On Louis XIII's opposition to a renewal of the truce in 1621, see Kevin Dekoster, 'Entre Huguenots et Valteline: La France, les Archiducs et la fin de la Trêve de Douze Ans, 1619-21', *European Review of History / Revue européenne d'histoire*, 2017, 1–20.

[22] Dubost, 'La reina de la paz', p. 326.

[23] Ibid.

The first of the two accords that Marie renewed in support of the Dutch-Spanish truce had been signed on 23 January 1608. The original treaty, a so-called *ligue générale*, was intended to commit both France and the Dutch Republic to intensive negotiations over a cessation of the latter's conflict with Spain.[24] In its renewed form, the accord required the Provinces to continue to observe the ceasefire.[25] It also stipulated mutual aid in the event of war: France agreed to assist the States General with 10,000 soldiers, while the latter promised to send 5,000 auxiliary troops, either by land or sea.[26] The second renewed treaty, a so-called *ligue garantie*, had been signed on 17 June 1609 with the participation of England.[27] The accord forbade the Dutch Provinces to negotiate or conclude any alliance with the Habsburg rulers during the twelve-year period of the truce without the explicit knowledge or consent of France and England.[28] As stipulated in the *ligue générale* of 1608, the treaty obliged France to deliver military assistance to the States General if the ceasefire would be violated by the Habsburg crown.[29]

In addition to confirming existing alliances, Marie signed a new defensive and commerce treaty with England.[30] It had been prepared by Henri IV to counter the Habsburg powers that continued to encircle France, but the king's premature death had left the task incomplete.[31] The preface to the treaty, which was ratified in London on 29 August 1610, reads as follows:

> [A]nd these said Kings [of France and England] have judged that nothing can be more salutary and beneficial, not only to their kingdoms, but also to the Christian Republic, than to reinstate

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[24] Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, IV, pp. 432–33; Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche volk*, II, p. 351; Duerloo, *Dynasty and Piety*, pp. 225–26.

[25] *Corps*, pt. 1, p. 138.

[26] Ibid., pp. 139–40.

[27] Together with France, England served as a mediator in the preparations for the ceasefire. See Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, IV, pp. 432–528; Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche volk*, II, pp. 346–64; Van Eysinga, *De wording van het Twaalfjarig Bestand*, pp. 101, 95-155; Duerloo, *Dynasty and Piety*, pp. 222–33. See also Richard S. Christen, 'England's role in negotiations leading to the Twelve Year Truce, 1607-1609' (unpublished master's thesis, University of Montana, 1980).

[28] *Corps*, pt. 1, p. 141.

[29] Ibid. See Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, IV, p. 526; Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche volk*, II, pp. 395–96.

[30] *Corps*, pt. 1, pp. 149–53.

[31] Sutherland, 'The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European politics', *The English Historical Review*, 107.424 (1992), 587-625 (pp. 601-02). The accord was completed by Antoine Le Fèvre de La Boderie (1555-1615) who served as French ambassador to England from 1606 to 1611. For his work on the treaty, see *Ambassades de Monsieur de La Boderie en Angleterre: Sous le regne d'Henri IV. & la minorité de Louis XIII. depuis les années 1606. jusqu'en 1611*, [ed. by Paul Denis Burtin], 5 vols ([Paris]: [Paul Denis Burtin], 1750), I, pp. xxviii–xxxii.

and bring to a successful conclusion this Treaty of Alliance, and confirmation of mutual friend-ship, interrupted by this unfortunate death.[32]

The accord committed France and England to mutual defence in times of war. The military support that both kingdoms agreed to offer consisted of 6,000 heavily armed soldiers on land and eight sizeable vessels at sea, each fully equipped for maritime warfare and capable of accommodating a total number of 1,200 men.[33] The treaty furthermore protected the rights of merchants trading in both countries.[34] Marie signed the treaty to minimise English intervention in French politics and keep James VI/I satisfied without committing to an anti-Habsburg alliance. James VI of Scotland and I of England actively tried to persuade Marie to continue her husband's military intervention in the Holy Roman Empire.[35] Henri had openly supported the Protestant claimants in the succession crisis over the strategically important duchies of Jülich, Kleve, and Berg, which began in March 1609 after the death of the childless Catholic Duke Johann Wilhelm. Henri feared that the Habsburg Archduke Leopold V (1586-1632) would usurp the disputed territories, as they were in dangerous proximity to France's eastern border and straddled Spain's main land route between its possessions in northern Italy and the Southern Netherlands. To tip the balance in favour of the Protestant claimants, Henri had planned to march on the lower Rhine on the day that he was assassinated.[36]

Marie undoubtedly felt compelled to convince James of France's good intentions, and to ensure friendly relations with the Huguenot community in England as well as elsewhere in Europe. Just like his predecessor, Queen Elizabeth I, James was committed to protecting the interests of the Huguenot minority in France, many of whom occupied important positions at the Stuart court, and considered it his duty to help resolve religious disunity among the Protestant states in Europe.[37] Owing to an elaborate network of Huguenot diplomats, statesmen, and scholars, James's irenical ideas on Protestant unity were widely

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[32] *Corps*, pt. 1, p. 149 (see appendix).

[33] Ibid., p. 150. For details on infantry, see Articles 8 and 12, and Articles 10 and 14 for more on naval defence.

[34] Ibid., pp. 150–51 (Articles 19 to 42).

[35] W. B. Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 156.

[36] Mousnier, *L'assassinat*, p. 1; Anderson, *On the Verge of War*, p. 98.

[37] Patterson, 'James I'; Hayden, *France and the Estates General*, p. 48; Adams, 'The Road to La Rochelle', pp. 418–20, 428–29.

supported by co-religionists across the continent.[38] After Henri IV's death, the need to satisfy James became even more pressing, as the regicide had given rise to the rumour that it was part of an international Catholic conspiracy. Marie's pro-Spanish inclinations, having favoured marriage proposals from Spain before 1610, moreover sparked Protestant fears that France would come under Habsburg and papal influence.[39]

As seen in Chapters 2 and 4, matrimony was generally regarded by contemporaries as the capstone of any major diplomatic agreement. Rulers were therefore anxious to negotiate the most advantageous match for their children, often by offering tempting marriage proposals to multiple heads of state. During the two years following the regicide, Marie also used matrimony as a diplomatic bait. In July 1610, she began to explore the possibility of a Franco-Spanish marriage alliance, consisting of a double suit between Louis XIII and the Infanta Ana, and between Madame Élisabeth and Prince Felipe.[40] Just like César de Bourbon and Françoise de Lorraine twelve years earlier (see Chapter 4, Section 2), the future spouses were but young children whose marriages were exclusively intended to serve the diplomatic aims of the French and Spanish crown respectively.[41] At the same time that Marie talked to Spain, she dangled before James VI/I the prospect of a match between her second daughter, Christine Marie (1606-1663), and the English heir apparent, Henry Frederick (1594-1612), Prince of Wales.[42]

The queen regent, however, eventually decided to press ahead with the Franco-Spanish double marriage. Similar to the defensive treaty with England, designs for a matrimonial union with Spain had already been proposed by Henri IV as a means to substantiate the Peace of Vervins.[43] Marie wished to extend this line of policy to further stabilise France's relationship with the Habsburg crown and put a definite end to the mutual hostility that,

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[38] Part of that network were the renowned classical scholar Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614), who helped spread James's ideas on the continent from 1610 until his death, pastor Pierre Du Moulin (1568-1658), with whom the king frequently corresponded about theological issues, and statesman Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (1549-1623), whose aim it was to bring France's Huguenot minority into closer contact with Protestant communities abroad. See Patterson, 'James I'.

[39] Adams, 'The Road to La Rochelle', p. 416.

[40] Elliott, 'The Political Context', p. 10.

[41] In 1610, Louis was 9 years old, Élisabeth 8, Ana 9, and Felipe 5.

[42] Hayden, *France and the Estates General*, pp. 47–49; Elliott, 'The Political Context', p. 11. When Henry Frederick unexpectedly died in November 1612, his younger brother, Prince Charles, the future King Charles I of England, quickly replaced him as a prospective husband for Christine Marie.

[43] Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, IV, pp. 454–56, 464–67; François-Tommy Perrens, *Les Mariages espagnols sous le règne de Henri IV et la régence de Marie de Médicis (1602-1615)*, Études sur le règne de Henri IV et la régence de Marie de Médicis (Paris: Didier et cie, 1869), p. 40; Hayden, *France and the Estates General*, p. 47; Duerloo, *Dynasty and Piety*, pp. 229–30.

as noted in Chapter 4, continued to pose a threat to the overall peace in Europe.[44] Without the knowledge of James VI/I, the French Secretary of State, Villeroy, and the Spanish ambassador to France, Don (Lord) Iñigo de Cardenas, signed a preliminary treaty for the double marriage alliance on 30 April 1611.[45] Portraits of the brides and grooms were exchanged over the next few weeks. When James found out about the secret marriage treaty in June 1611, Protestant suspicions of a wider Catholic plot to augment the power of the Habsburgs seemed to be confirmed.[46] In response to the Franco-Spanish marriage treaty, James agreed to negotiate a match between his daughter, Princess Elizabeth, and the head of the Protestant Union, Frederick V, Elector Palatine or *Pfalzgraf* (Palsgrave) of the Rhine.

This match had already been brokered by the Governor of the Upper Palatinate (*Oberpfalz*), Prince Christian von Anhalt-Bernburg (1568-1630), in the period between 1603 and 1606. Anhalt was the chairman of the military council of the Protestant Union, a coalition of radical German Protestant states that was founded in 1608 to repudiate Habsburg control in the Empire.[47] As a key figure in uniting the forces of Protestantism, Anhalt was committed to bringing England into closer relations with members of the Union and particularly with Frederick V of the Palatinate, whom the prince served as chief advisor.[48] James, however, had always been reluctant to associate the Stuart crown with the Protestant militancy of the Union.[49] He liked to think of himself as a *Rex pacificus* in the tradition of late Renaissance humanism. Rather than taking up arms, James preferred the use of words and diplomatic interaction, styling himself as a mediator of religious conflict and a promotor of international concord.[50] Part of this self-fashioned political image was

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[44] Dubost, 'La reina de la paz', p. 324.

[45] The treaty was negotiated with the help of Cosimo II de' Medici (1690-1621), Grand Duke of Tuscany. See *Corps*, pt. 2, pp. 165–66.

[46] Adams, 'The Road to La Rochelle', p. 416.

[47] Besides the Palatinate, the Union counted Ansbach, Kulmbach, Baden-Durlach and Württemberg among its member states. In 1609, they were joined by Brandenburg and Hesse-Kassel, as well as Pfalz-Zweibrücken.

[48] Sara Smart and Mara R. Wade, 'The Palatine Wedding of 1613: Protestant Alliance and Court Festival. An Introduction', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 13–60 (pp. 40–43).

[49] Patterson, 'James I', pp. 243–45; Smart and Wade, 'Palatine Wedding', pp. 42–43.

[50] *James I by His Contemporaries: An Account of His Career and Character as Seen by Some of His Contemporaries*, ed. by Robert Ashton (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 203–27; Roy Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance* ([London]: Thames and Hudson, 1986), p. 72; Malcolm Smuts, 'The Making of "Rex Pacificus": James VI and I and the Problem of Peace in an Age of Religious War', in *Royal Subjects: Essays on the Writings of James VI and I*, ed. by David Fischlin and Mark Fortier (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002), pp. 371–87.

the peace concluded with Spain at the beginning of the king's reign in August 1604, which ended the open warfare between the two kingdoms.

The Franco-Spanish marriage treaty of April 1611, however, was the game changer that forced James to reconsider his design for peace. To prevent England from isolating itself in Europe and playing second fiddle to Catholic influence, he agreed to the Palatine suit on 20 May 1612. The match came with a defensive agreement between England and the Protestant Union, which had been signed nearly two months earlier, on 28 March. Known as the Treaty of Wesel, it committed both sides to mutual aid in the Jülich succession crisis for the duration of six years — 'either by Sea or by Land'.[51]

In sum, the assassination of Henri IV in May 1610 had put into effect a series of international, as well as domestic, agreements that — far from being diplomatic breakthroughs — built upon existing accords and negotiations that dated back to the early seventeenth century. The formal conclusion of the marital alliances, however, had unintentionally stoked a stark confessional divide in Europe, with France and England as the new frontier states of international Catholicism and Protestantism. Historians often label the marriages as 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' respectively, but fail to mention that Marie and James never intended them to be outright statements of religious policy.[52] Rather than dynastic alliances, the marriages were perceived as commitments to either the Catholic or the Protestant camp. In France, the Jesuit community and devout members of the *Ligue catholique* (notably de Guise and Épernon), who called themselves 'bons Français' (good

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[51] '[S]oit par Mer soit par Terre' (*Corps*, pt. 2, p. 637).

[52] See Margaret M. McGowan, '"Les Triomphes de Jason": A Myth Renewed in 1613', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 463–78. The edited volume in which McGowan's chapter appears, although otherwise excellent, seems to interpret the 'Protestant Alliance' from its title as both a religious and a dynastic union, but often fails to clarify the distinction between the two. Only Nadine Akkerman, drawing on the work of David Norbrook and Kevin Curran, explicitly distinguishes between the two types of unions (in '*Semper Eadem:* Elizabeth Stuart and the Legacy of Queen Elizabeth I', pp. 145-68). She rightly argues that the Stuart-Palatine wedding was never intended by James VI/I as a religious alliance, meaning a radical expression of (Protestant) faith, but as a dynastically advantageous union that would help the king to stabilise relations between quarrelling Catholic and Protestant factions at the English court and contain the military ambitions of the Protestant Union. The latter, as noted above, was headed by the groom, the Elector Palatine, himself (ibid., 146-49). 'Rather than inciting a religious conflict', as Akkerman points out, 'James wanted the match to secure domestic, and also continental, harmony' (ibid., p. 146). For Norbrook's and Curran's work on the marriage, see David Norbrook, '"The Masque of Truth": Court Entertainments and International Protestant Politics in the Early Stuart Period', *The Seventeenth Century*, 1.2 (1986), 81–110; Kevin Curran, 'James I and Fictional Authority at the Palatine Wedding Celebrations', *Renaissance Studies*, 20.1 (2006), 51–67.

To our knowledge, Frances A. Yates is the first historian to point out that '[i]t was not fully realized at the time that this view of the alliance [as a religious union] was not that of James himself' (*The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 7).

Frenchmen) — regarded France's union with Spain as the finishing touch to a Catholic power bloc, a process that, according to them, had begun at the Peace of Vervins in May 1598.[53] Similar pan-Catholic sentiments were shared by Habsburg supporters across the Holy Roman Empire and the Italian peninsula, notably in Rome. The papacy hoped that the double marriage would give renewed impetus to the extermination of heresy and unite all Christendom in a crusade against the Ottoman Turks.

The Malcontents, who were in favour of a limited monarchy, likewise framed the marital alliance with Spain as a 'Catholic' league. They were worried that Marie's apparent commitment to the pan-Catholic cause would reduce their influence at court and give way to Spanish intervention in France's domestic affairs. They were supported in this by the anti-Habsburg *politiques* who believed that the union would create unnecessary religious and political tension, abroad as well as at home. The country's Huguenot minority rather feared that the double marriage signalled the end of the crown's relatively tolerant politics towards Protestants. Despite Marie's declaration of May 1610 confirming the Edict of Nantes, they were not convinced of the peaceful intentions of the regency government. Their concerns were shared by Huguenot communities across Europe, especially by ultra-Calvinist parties in England. The court of James's son, Prince Henry Frederick, had become the focus of radical Protestant hopes in Europe. The prince enthusiastically backed the marriage of his sister to the Elector Palatine. He, and the Protestant European network that supported him, considered the union a watershed moment in the development of a Protestant bloc that would be powerful enough to compete with the supposedly Catholic imperium headed by France and Spain.

Meanwhile, the Franco-Spanish and Anglo-German marriages were celebrated with pomp across Europe. The engagement of Louis XIII and his sisters to the Spanish Infantas was celebrated in Paris as early as April 1612 with a magnificent carousel at the Place Royale.[54] Owing to a series of Huguenot uprisings, however, the nuptial celebrations were delayed until the end of 1615.[55] Preceding and following the exchange of the two brides

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[53] Elliott, 'The Political Context', p. 13; Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy', p. 26.
[54] André Stegmann, 'La Fête parisienne à la Place Royale en avril 1612', in *Fêtes de la Renaissance*, ed. by Jacquot and Koningson, III, 373–92; Van Orden, *Music, Discipline, and Arms*, pp. 266–67; Marie Baudière, 'The *Carrousel* of 1612 and the Festival Book', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 83–93; Monique Chatenet, 'The *Carrousel* on the Place Royale: Production, Costumes and Décor', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 95–113; Paulette Choné, 'The Dazzle of Chivalric Devices: *Carrousel* on the Place Royale', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 155–63.
[55] For more on this delay, see Elliott, 'The Political Context', pp. 12–14.

on the Bidasoa River dividing France from Spain in early November 1615, elaborate festivals were given in Bordeaux and Burgos.[56] They included triumphal entries, balls, mock battles, illuminations, and firework displays. On the Italian peninsula, Habsburg-allied cities such as Naples and Rome celebrated the double marriage with a foot tournament and a triumphal entry for the French extraordinary ambassador.[57] Determined to press ahead with the festival preparations so as to offer a speedy response to the Franco-Spanish marriage treaty, James scheduled the celebrations for the Stuart-Palatine match relatively soon after his signing of the marriage contract in May 1612. The festivities began in February 1613 in London. They included both public entertainments, such as a firework drama and a mock naval battle on the Thames, and a series of private court masques held at Whitehall Palace.[58] In April 1613, Princess Elizabeth and Count Frederick set sail to their new home in Heidelberg. They were fêted at the Protestant courts along their way, including the Dutch Republic and the small states along the Rhine, until they arrived at Heidelberg in early June.[59]

Artists, writers, and statesmen of different religious and political backgrounds were keen to leave their mark on the festivals organised for the weddings, as they offered a platform to communicate their views and ambitions to the wider international community. Since each contributor was keen to serve his own agenda or that of his master, the entertainments often displayed slightly — and sometimes distinctly — different political views on the marital alliance. This disparity can be gauged from an examination of the English and the French accounts that were produced for the wedding celebrations. They were targeted at different political audiences in Europe: the general public in England and Scotland, and the French-speaking Protestant community respectively.

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[56] Ibid., pp. 5–6; David Sánchez Cano, 'Festivities during Elizabeth of Bourbon's Journey to Madrid', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 39–55; Canova-Green, 'Ambivalent Fictions', in *Dynastic Marriages*.

[57] Maria Inès Aliverti, 'Celebrations in Naples and Other Italian Cities', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 57–82.

[58] Norbrook, 'The Masque of Truth'; Curran, 'James I'; Iain McClure, 'The Sea-Fight on the Thames: Performing the Ideology of a Pan-Protestant Crusade on the Eve of the Palatine Marriage', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 267–88; Anne Daye, '"Graced with Measures": Dance as an International Language in the Masques of 1613', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 289–318; Marika Keblusek, 'Celebrating a Union: The Festive Entry of Friedrich, Elector Palatine, and Princess Elizabeth in the Netherlands', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 391–409; Margret Lemberg, 'Hessen-Kassel and the Journey up the Rhine of the Princess Palatine Elizabeth in April and May 1613', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 411–26.

[59] Marika Keblusek, 'Celebrating a Union: The Festive Entry of Friedrich, Elector Palatine, and Princess Elizabeth in the Netherlands', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 391–409; Margret Lemberg, 'Hessen-Kassel and the Journey up the Rhine of the Princess Palatine Elizabeth in April and May 1613', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 411–26.

2. Winning support for the Franco-Spanish marriages in Paris, 1612

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the double engagement of Louis and Élisabeth to Philip III's children was celebrated with an equestrian carousel on the Place Royale in Paris, now the Place des Vosges, between 5 and 7 April 1612. The carousel is widely regarded by scholars today as one of the most sumptuous and artistically successful entertainments in the history of French festival culture, not least because the event continued to be commemorated in print, as well as imitated and emulated in performance, throughout the seventeenth century, both within and outside France.[60] Similar to the mixed reception of *Le Paradis d'Amour* in 1572, however, we may surmise that audiences of the carousel in 1612, which included the international court elite and the Parisian populace, were divided over the politics that underpinned the spectacle. Not only was the pageant intended to drum up support for largely unpopular marriages, it also clearly resulted from an intimate collaboration between Marie and the crown's most loyal noblemen who, either because of their powerful position at court or pro-Habsburg inclinations, were disliked by both the Malcontents and the Huguenots. These faithful nobles had helped establish the regency government by swearing the oath of allegiance. They included Charles de Lorraine (1571-1640), fourth duc de Guise, his brother Claude (1578-1657), prince de Joinville, Charles III de Gonzague (1580-1637), duc de Nevers and Rethel, and the duc d'Epernon, one of the chief negotiators of the Peace of Vervins, as well as close friends of the late Henri IV: François de Bassompierre (1579-1646), maréchal de France, André de Vivonne (died in 1616), seigneur de la Châtaigneraie, and Henri I de Montmorency (1534-1614), comte (count) de Damville and connétable (constable) de France.

   We know that the carousel resulted from a collaboration between Marie and her most loyal supporters thanks to François de Bassompierre's account of the preparations for the pageant.[61] In it, the marshal specified the tasks that Marie assigned to him and the other noblemen who helped organise the carousel: '[The queen mother] commanded M. de

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[60] Stegmann, 'La Fête parisienne', p. 373; Marie Baudière, 'La Fortune gravée et imprimée du carrousel de 1612', in *Chroniques de l'éphémère: Le Livre de fête dans la collection Jacques Doucet*, ed. by Dominique Morelon, Les catalogues d'exposition de l'INHA (Paris: Institut national d'histoire de l'art, 2010), pp. 1–8 (p. 1); Baudière, 'The *Carrousel* of 1612'; Chatenet, 'The *Carrousel* on the Place Royale', pp. 112–13.

[61] 'Mémoires du maréchal de Bassompierre', in *Nouvelle collection des mémoires pour servir a l'histoire de France, depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe [...]*, ed. by M. M. Michaud and [Jean J. F.] Poujoulat, 2nd series, 32 vols (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1836-1839), VI: *Bassompierre, d'Estrées, de Pontis* (1837), 1-368 (p. 78).

Guise, M. de Nevers, and myself to be *tenants* [defendants],[62] and gave us the camp [tournament ground], believing that, since she was committing this affair into our hands, we would spare no effort to make it [the equestrian spectacle] perfectly, as indeed it was'.[63] The other defendants, not mentioned by Bassompierre but listed in the first official account of the carousel, were Joinville, Nevers, and la Châtaigneraie.[64] According to Bassompierre, '[the queen mother] instructed M. the Connétable [Montmorency] and four Maréchaux de France to give the necessary orders to open our camp and to be the judges of the tournament. She commanded M. d'Épernon to crowd out the barricades with a thousand musketeers from the regiment of the [king's] guard and five hundred Swiss [soldiers]'.[65]

Although resented by Marie's opponents, the commoners in the audience of the carousel may well have appreciated the participation of at least one of the pageant's organisers. Charles de Lorraine, fourth duc de Guise, enjoyed considerable popularity among the populace of Paris who had enthusiastically backed the armed opposition of his notorious father Henri against the monarchy and the Huguenots in the 1580s. Marie probably realised that the public appeal of Henri's son could be exploited for diplomatic purposes. Her diplomatic programme for France, aimed at creating peace and stability, required more than the backing of the traditional court society alone. Support from the urban population was just as crucial for preserving the authority of the monarchy and keeping the peace. After all, there was a significant risk that Henri IV's assassination — committed by a civilian not directly associated with the court — would lead to the same kind of civil uproar and anarchy seen in 1588 and 1599 after the elimination of Henri de Guise.[66]

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[62] Randle Cotgrave's French-English dictionary defined the French word 'tenant', among other definitions, as 'a defendant in a Just [joust], or Tournament; any one that withstands another, or holds, & makes good a place against him' (see *A Dictionarie*).

[63] 'Elle commanda à M. de Guise, M. de Nevers et à moi d'être tenans, et nous donna le camp, croyant bien que, puisqu'elle commettoit cette affaire entre nos mains, nous n'épargnerions rien pour la rendre parfaite, comme elle le fut aussi' ('Mémoires', p. 78).

[64] Honoré Laugier de Porchères, *Le camp de la Place Royale ov Relation de ce qvi sy est passé les cinquiesme, sixiesme, & septiesme iour d'Auril, mil six cens douze, pour la publication des Mariages du Roy, & de Madame, auec L'infante, & le Prince d'Espagne [...]* (Paris: Jean Micard and Toussaint du Bray, 1612), p. 2.

[65] '[Marie] ordonna à M. le connétable et à quatre maréchaux de France de donner l'ordre nécessaire de nous ouvrir le camp, et d'être les juges du tournoi. Elle commanda à M. d'Épernon de horder les barrières avec mille mousquetaires du régiment des gardes et cinq cents Suisses' ('Mémoires', p. 78).

[66] Rouland Mousnier discusses the regicide in a broader socio-political context and shows that a number of national and international stakeholders were sympathetic to the Catholic extremism of François Ravaillac (in *L'assassinat*, pp. 20–43).

Rather than following the lead of his father, who, as we saw in Chapter 2, strongly opposed the conciliatory diplomacy that underpinned the Valois-Navarre wedding, Charles had become the face of a similar kind of diplomacy. That diplomacy, however, was now aimed at uniting the crown with all of its nobles (regardless of their religion) and common subjects. Marie thus used the central presence of Charles to suggest to the whole of France and Europe that the kingdom's recent troubles could be put aside.

The Place Royale constituted a large public square covering more than a hectare in size. Its construction had begun in 1605 under Henri IV as part of his extensive building programme. Inaugurated with the equestrian carousel in April 1612, it was intended to replace the nearby rue Saint-Antoine as a place for the staging of public entertainments.[67] The Place Royale was designed so that it could accommodate the various target audiences of Marie's diplomacy, which reportedly numbered up to 200,000 people.[68] The royal family, aristocracy, local populace, and diplomatic community of Paris all gathered together in the same space, thus reinforcing the idea that, however different their opinions and beliefs, they were united, if only for the duration of the performance, in a common celebration of the crown's diplomatic achievements. Although united in spirit, spectators were clearly ranked according to their social standing so as to remind them of their position in society and the authority of their superiors. The court and royal elite were seated on comfortable tribunes at the west end of the Place Royale. Sustained by three Doric arcades, the *Pavillon Royal* (Royal Pavilion) housed the royal family: Marie, Louis, Élisabeth, Christine, and their entourage. The pavilion was flanked by tribunes for the judges of the carousel and the foreign ambassadors.[69] Common visitors, by contrast, were asked to stand on the pavement surrounding the central tournament area or in the nearby street. Additional wooden galleries were built to accommodate the remaining spectators, probably from the respectable middle class, while others managed to secure window space in the houses surrounding the Place Royale.

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[67] The rue Saint-Antoine had been used by the Valois kings for the staging of most of their public tournaments. See Monique Chatenet, 'The *Carrousel* on the Place Royale: Production, Costumes and Décor', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 95–113 (p. 96).

[68] François de Rosset, *Le Romant des Chevalliers de la Gloire [...]* (Paris: Pierre Bertaud, 1612), p. 50; Bassompierre, 'Mémoires', pp. 78–79.

[69] Rosset, *Le Romant*, p. 50.

Interestingly, a single tribune had been erected for Marguerite de Valois, the first spouse of Henri IV, who had been married to the king until 1599.[70] Although no longer a member of the royal family, Marguerite still carried the title of queen and remained on good terms with Marie, as well as with the late Henri during his lifetime, until her death in 1615. She presided over her own court at the Hôtel des Augustins on the west bank of the Seine which had become an important centre for education and the arts.[71] By putting Marguerite in the spotlight, Marie could demonstrate to the spectators that the regency government continued to maintain close ties with the previous regime, but also that the previous regime — in the person of Marguerite — approved of the policies of the new rulers. This idea was further reinforced by the joint appearance of Henri IV's coat of arms and the fleur-de-lis, the traditional symbol of the French monarchy, on the dormers that extended each of the three arcades of the *Pavillon Royal*.[72]

The ambitious three-day carousel was clearly designed to flatter Marie and Louis. In this way, the noblemen who contributed to the spectacle undoubtedly hoped to further their own influence at court. The conceit of the pageant was to bring together respected noblemen in exercises of horsemanship and military discipline, and was thus in line with Marie's wider diplomatic aim of diffusing political tension among the aristocracy. The strategy was reminiscent of Catherine de Médicis's efforts to appease rival noblemen through entertainment, but also tied in with more recent equestrian traditions. Rather than a hard-fought contest, the seventeenth-century mock battle was a social game that required each participant to display noble conduct and self-control. Its main purpose was to encourage a form of aristocratic behaviour that would inspire obedience towards the crown and replace violence from the battlefield with refined elegance.[73] The carousel of April 1612 combined some of the most respected traditions in early modern chivalry and equestrianism into a unified whole, ranging from a horse ballet and running at the quintain to elaborate processions of mounted noblemen saluting the future king. The overarching narrative of the spectacle was derived from Arthurian legend. It revolved around the

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Margriet Hoogvliet, 'The Balet de La Reyne (1609) and the Politics of Vertu: Media and Political Communication', in *Selling and Rejecting Politics in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Martin Gosman and Joop W. Koopmans (Leuven (etc.): Peeters, 2007), pp. 71–91 (p. 72).

[72] Porchères, *Le camp de la Place Royale*, p. 32; de Rosset, *Le Romant*, p. 40.

[73] Sydney Anglo, 'The Barriers: From Combat to Dance (Almost)', *Dance Research*, 25.2 (2007), 91–106. For more on the pre-history of the seventeenth-century mock battle, see Sydney Anglo, *The Martial Arts of Renaissance Europe* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 7–39.

adventures of the five *Chevaliers de la Gloire* (Knights of Glory) who had been summoned from all parts of the world to defend the *Palais de la Félicité* (Palace of Bliss) against various squadrons of assailants.

The palace, which symbolised the marital happiness of the bridal couples, was a temporary building facing the royal pavilion on the north side of the square. According to the fiction of the performance, it had been erected by Henri IV, thus suggesting that the deceased king would have approved of the double marriage and that his legacy would live on through the marital alliance.[74] Not surprisingly, the *Chevaliers de la Gloire* who defended the palace — and thus the continuity of the French monarchy — were all supporters of Marie's regency or had been favourites of Henri IV. Among them were some of the noblemen who had organised the carousel in close collaboration with Marie, namely Charles de Lorraine, fourth duc de Guise, and his brother Claude, prince de Joinville, Charles III de Gonzaga, duc de Nevers and Rethel,[75] André de Vivonne, seigneur de La Béraudière and La Châtaigneraie, and François de Bassompierre.

The contrast between the defenders and the assailants of the palace was not as ideologically stark as in for example *Le Paradis d'Amour*. The attacking noblemen were drawn from various factions at court and did not necessarily oppose Marie's regency. Moreover, the actual combat, which took the form of running at the quintain, was postponed until the last day of the carousel (7 April) and was overshadowed by the elaborate processions of the chevaliers held during the previous two days.[76] On 5 April, two out of four squadrons — called the *Chevaliers du Soleil* (Knights of the Sun) and the *Chevaliers du Lis* (Knights of the Lily) respectively — were headed by the prominent Malcontent François de Bourbon (1588-1614), prince de Conti and second *prince du sang*, and Henri IV's illegitimate son César de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme and d'Étampes. The last

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[74] François de Rosset, *L'Histoire dv Palais de la Felicité [...]* (Paris: François Huby, 1616), p. 34. Honoré Laugier de Porchères (1572-1653), author of the first official account of the carousel, noted that the Place Royale was the ultimate embodiment of Henri's legacy: 'But either he [Henri] wanted to live on within [the Place Royale]; or for [the Place Royale] to live eternally through him' ('Mais soit qu'il ait voulu reuiure plus particulierement en elle; ou qu'elle doiue viure eternellement par luy'; *Le camp de la Place Royale*, p. 27).

[75] In November 1613, however, Nevers would join the party of the prince de Condé as he believed that his support for the regency government had not been sufficiently rewarded. In 1614, he participated in the revolt of the Malcontents against the crown. See David Parrott, 'A Prince Souverain and the French Crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637', in *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton*, ed. by Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs, and H. M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 149–87 (pp. 164–66).

[76] Van Orden, *Music, Discipline, and Arms*, p. 267.

assailant of that day was Henri I de Montmorency, who, as we have noted above, had been a loyal servant of Henri IV. On 6 April, there appeared beside Roman conquerors and nymphs of the mythological goddess Diana a cartel of so-called *Chevaliers de la Fidelité* (Knights of Fidelity) who had been faithful supporters of the monarchy. They included Philippe-Emmanuel de Gondi (1580-1662), général des galères (general of the galleys), François V de la Rochefoucauld (1588-1650), maréchal de camp (major-general), and the French resident ambassador to Spain, Henri de Bauffremont (1578-1622), marquis de Sennecey, among others.

Rather than pitting supporters of Marie's regency against those who opposed it, the carousel attempted to unite all noblemen through a celebration of the French crown and the marriages that were supposed to protect its interests abroad and at home. The long processions on the first two days of the spectacle moreover allowed the *grands* to showcase their own chivalric pride by carrying personal devices and bringing along an impressive entourage of squires, footmen, and automated machines featuring rocks or mountains. On 6 April, the *Chevaliers de la Fidelité* took this form of self-promotion one step further by displaying their equestrian skills in an approximately fifteen-minute long horse ballet. Styled as a mini-combat, the ballet ended with the reconciliation of all participants. The carousel thus tried to achieve what *Le Paradis d'Amour* was unable to realise because of its stark antagonistic setup: drumming up support for a controversial marital alliance among divided nobles, while at the same time allowing these nobles the opportunity to display their own power and prestige.

The main thrust of the spectacle does not seem to have been accepted by all spectators. We know that Prince Henry Frederick, in a manuscript now held at the British Library,[77] had instructed his secret agent in Paris, who signed letters to James's son under the pseudonym of 'Forboyst', to attend the carousel and send him a report. The prince looked almost exclusively to Catholic Europe for artistic inspiration. France had always been a focus of interest. Three of Henry's closest friends — Robert Devereux, third Earl of Essex (1591-1646), John Harington, second Baron Harington of Exton (1592-1614), and William Cecil, Lord Cranborne, later second Earl of Salisbury (1591-1668) — had visited the

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[77] BL, Dispatch of 'Forboyst' to Adam Newton, first Baronet (8 April 1612), Harleian MS 7015, fols. 263ʳ-264ʳ (263ʳ). Newton (died in 1630) was the tutor of Henry Frederick from 1600 to 1610. The collection of Forboyst's letters comprises Harleian MS 7015 fols. 240-384 and runs from February 1612 to the prince's death in November of that same year.

court of Henri IV in the aftermath of the French civil wars and reported to the prince in detail on court entertainments and architectural innovations.[78] During his own stay in Paris, from February 1610 until the king's assassination in May, Henry closely followed the court's everyday use of pageantry, as can be gauged from the prince's travel journals.[79]

Aware of the king's interest in French festivals, Forboyst described the carousel in close detail and devoted particular attention to the equestrian aspects of the performance.[80] Although the agent did not agree with the political content of the pageant, he was keen to admit that the visual splendour and skilled horsemanship of the participants had given many 'great pleasure'.[81] More importantly, the carousel was the first major public event to celebrate the Franco-Spanish double marriage and as the head of one of the most influential Calvinist courts in Europe the prince was keen to receive any information regarding the marital alliance that he considered a threat to the international Protestant community. Forboyst explicitly mentioned that many people in the audience shared anti-Spanish sentiments and were thus unappreciative of the spectacle. As a secret agent, Forboyst probably stood among the commoners on the pavement surrounding the square and would therefore have gained a good understanding of popular opinion on the double marriage. Although biased, being in the service of an ultra-Calvinist prince, the agent was probably right: his observation about the anti-Spanish sentiments of the Parisian population seems to be corroborated by several other incidents that took place in the capital.

On 8 September 1610, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa (1587-1634), third Duke of Feria, made his solemn entry into Paris as extraordinary ambassador to Philip III of Spain. He was sent to propose officially the double marriage to Marie. The Parisians had eagerly flocked together to catch a glimpse of the ambassador and his impressive entourage of two hundred courtiers and servants. Rather than paying due respect, however, they burst into laughter at seeing the Spaniards riding mules, repeatedly crying 'aux asnes' ('on mules').[82] The mule had since medieval times been the preferred Spanish mode of transportation. This not only had a practical reason — the animals were more suitable than

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[78] Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales*, pp. 45–46.
[79] HMC Hatfield, XXI, pp. 104-12, 237-49. *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury*, ed. by M. S. Giuseppi (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), XXI: 1609-1612, pp. 104–12, 237–49.
[80] Horsemanship was one of the prince's major obsessions. For more on this, see Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales*, pp. 63–66.
[81] Harleian MS 7015, fol. 263ʳ.
[82] Jean Beaulieu to William Trumbull (29 July 1612, HMC Downshire, p. 340).

horses to Spain's mountainous roads — but in the case of royal and ambassadorial entries also carried a deeper spiritual and political meaning. Queens and queen consorts of the Iberian Peninsula often rode a mule during ceremonial entries, a white one in particular, as this signified purity.[83] The mule was also a common mount for members of the international clergy, and especially appropriate for peace missions, as the animal was associated with Jesus's triumphal entry into Jerusalem.[84] The horse, by contrast, was strictly reserved for war-related activities. It is clear that the incident had damaged the reputation of both Feria and Philip III, for two years later — four months after the carousel — all necessary precautions were taken to prevent a similar situation from happening.

On 13 August 1612, Spanish extraordinary ambassador Ruy III Gomez de Silva Mendoza y la Cerda, Duke of Pastrana, entered the capital to ask for Élisabeth's hand in marriage on behalf of King Philip. Jean Beaulieu, secretary to Thomas Edmondes (died in 1639), English ambassador to Paris, reported that 'to avoid the insolence of the Parisians crying *aux asnes* as they did before Feria, he [Pastrana] requests that 250 horses may be sent about 5 or 6 leagues'.[85] This was on top of the five hundred mules that Pastrana was nonetheless planning to bring with him from Spain. Thanks to a proclamation that had been issued by the crown to forbid insulting the Spaniards, the populace was according to Beaulieu 'more continent than was expected, although many at sight of the meaner sort raggedly clothed upon their mules could not forbear laughing'.[86]

The 'foreignness' of the Spaniards was apparently not only perceived by commoners, but also by at least one member from the diplomatic community in Paris. During Feria's entry in 1610, the Florentine ambassador Andrea Cioli (1573-1641), who would later become Secretary of State to Grand Duke Cosimo II, described how the Spanish wore enormous, heavily starched ruffs, appearing 'like dwarfs, almost like Negroes and very ugly'.[87] The reasons for Cioli's hostile reaction are unclear. Perhaps his description of the

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[83] Examples include Elizabeth of Aragon (1271-1336), Queen Consort of Portugal, Eleanor of Portugal (1328-1348), Queen of Aragon, and Queen Isabella I of Castile (1451-1504). Well known is also the example of Catherine of Aragon (1485-1536), Queen of England from 1509 until 1533, who rode side-saddle on a mule during her first entry into London on 12 November 1501. We would like to thank Laura Fernández-Gonzalez for bringing the connection between mules and queenship on the Iberian Peninsula to our attention.

[84] Cardinal Pietro Aldobrandini, for one, entered Florence in October 1600 on a mule (Aldobrandini, 'Relatione', fol. 30ʳ).

[85] Beaulieu to Trumbull (29 July 1612, HMC Downshire, p. 340).

[86] Beaulieu to Trumbull (4 August 1612, in ibid., p. 345).

[87] Cited in Michel Carmona, *Marie de Médicis* (Paris: Fayard, 1981), p. 229, from a dispatch of 12 September 1610.

embassy's penurious appearance, similar to the one given by Beaulieu above, can be explained on the basis of Spain's poor financial resources. A substantial part of these resources had after all been drained during the kingdom's war with the Northern Netherlands, which had only recently been ceased by the truce of 9 April 1609. Indeed, the Spanish embassy seems to have had serious financial problems during its 1610 stay in Paris. Apparently this occasionally led to theft and robbery, for Beaulieu reported in early September that 'the meaner Spaniards are said to have stolen a number of things from the house where they were lodged'.[88] The festivities for the double marriage may have communicated diplomatic messages of peace and harmony to a diverse audience, it inevitably complicated France's ongoing negotiations with Spain, which naturally required tact and discretion. This was especially true since the historical enmity between the two kingdoms had only recently ended. The incidents of 1610 and 1612 may well have been caused by anti-Spanish sentiments which, as we have seen, were widespread among the spectators of the carousel. At the same time, the incidents testified more generally to perceptions of national and cultural difference. This would have been particularly reinforced by the carousel of April 1612 in which horsemanship, perceived by many as quintessentially French (as well as Italian), took centre stage.[89] Commemorative accounts had moreover inspired emulation of the spectacle's equestrianism and thus further boosted France's international standing.[90] Early modern Europe regarded the horse by definition as a powerful animal, as it was key to a well-fought battle, but being able to control it to such an extent that it could dance a ballet or perform complex jumps added to the prestige of any country and nobleman in particular. For many Parisians the contrast between French horse control and Spanish mule riding was therefore striking.

3. Celebrating the Anglo-German wedding in London, 1613

Just as the carousel of April 1612 was not masterminded by Marie de Médicis, but the product of a collaboration between noblemen drawn from different factions, so also were the celebrations for the Stuart-Palatine festival in London not exclusively organised by

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[88] Beaulieu to Trumbull (9 September 1612, HMC Downshire, p. 365).

[89] For more on the French and Italian origins of horsemanship, especially of the *ballet de cheveaux*, see Patrice Franchet d'Espèrey, 'The Ballet d'Antoine de Pluvinel and The Maneige Royal', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 115–36; Iain Fenlon, 'Competition and Emulation: Music and Dance for the Celebrations in Paris, 1612-1615', in *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 137–53 (p. 145).

[90] Fenlon, 'Competition and Emulation'.

King James's court. In fact, the only entertainment that was directly commissioned by the king was Thomas Campion's *The Lords' Masque*, performed in the Banqueting Hall at Whitehall Palace on the evening of the wedding day (14 February 1613; n. s. 24).[91] The masque fashioned James as the mythological god Jupiter capable of transforming chaos — represented by 'poetic fury' — into order through marriage. It strongly recalled the cosmological setting of Catherine de Médicis's *ballets de cour* which, as we saw in Chapter 1, attempted to communicate similar messages of harmony and concord. In those ballets, cosmic forces were often invoked to come to the aid of the monarchy. *The Lords' Masque* seemed to have borrowed this idea when at the beginning of the pageant the masquer lords, disguised as stars, descended from heavens to celebrate the Stuart-Palatine marriage in a choral dance. The concept might have been broached by the masque's set designer, Inigo Jones (1573-1652), who during his travels though France in 1609 is known to have studied Catherine de Médicis's festival art.[92]

James's monarchical statement on the marriage, defined by peace and harmony, was to be complemented by two other masques: one by Prince Henry Frederick (16 February 1613; n. s. 26) and the other by Princess Elizabeth (scheduled performance date unknown). On 6 November 1612 (n. s. 16), however, Henry died suddenly from typhoid fever. The two complementary masques were cancelled in turn: Henry's because of reasons that will be explained below, and Elizabeth's because she might not have felt sufficiently empowered to stage her own masque next to that of her father.[93] Although there is no surviving trace of Elizabeth's masque, we have a detailed script of Henry's masque, unearthed by David Norbrook in a French account of the Stuart-Palatine festival.[94] The prince's entertainment, dubbed by Norbrook *The Masque of Truth*, celebrated all the aspects Henry's ultra-Calvinist court was known for: anti-Habsburg, anti-Catholic,

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[91] Thomas Campion, *Lords' Masque*, in *English Masques*, ed. by Herbert Arthur Evans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898), pp. 72–87. For more on the reception condition of *The Lords' Masque*, see Curran, 'James I', pp. 60–67.

[92] For more on Jones's visit to France, see Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales*, pp. 111–12.

[93] Akkerman, '*Semper Eadem*', pp. 148–49.

[94] Norbrook, 'The Masque of Truth'; see also Curran, 'James I', pp. 57–59. The French account, which will be discussed in closer detail below, is D[avid] Jocquet, *Les Triomphes, entrees, ceremonies, et avltres Magnificences, faites en Angleterre, & au Palatinat, pour le Mariage & Reception, de Monseigneur le Prince Frideric V. Comte Palatin dv Rhin [...] Et de Madame Elisabeth, Fille vniqve et Princesse de la Grande Bretagne [...]* (Heidelberg: Gotthardt Vögelin, 1613). Norbrook surmises that Elizabeth's masque would have advanced a Protestant zeal similar to that of her brother's entertainment (p. 91). See also Akkerman, '*Semper Eadem*'.

supportive of England's colonial enterprise in the New World, and striving to regain supremacy at sea.[95]

Interestingly, the masque seems to have taken its cue from one of the most spectacular entries of the Parisian carousel, namely that of the duc de Montmorency as Perseus. As we have seen in the previous section, Henry had gained first-hand knowledge about the spectacle through the account of his secret agent. Montmorency's entry featured a long procession of people drawn from various parts of the world, including Poland, India, China, Persia, the Ottoman Empire, as well as France and Spain, each of whom solemnly paid their respects to Marie and Louis. They were preceded by a group of trumpeters dressed in red sashes inscribed with Perseus's monogram: one celestial and one terrestrial globe, joined by the motto 'even more', which was given in Spanish ('avn mas').[96] In Henry's *The Masque of Truth*, the classical mythology of the carousel was swapped for outright Protestant militancy. Whereas in Montmorency's entry the celebration of France's union with Spain was set against the backdrop of a distant mythological past, the prince's masque was set in a present-day apocalyptic Europe. A large terrestrial globe was to be placed in the centre of the stage through which princes and princesses from across the world — similar to those in the 1612 entry — would enter and honour the bridal couple in a common celebration of the Protestant faith. The globe was to be held by a figure called Althea, meaning 'according to truth', who read from the Bible.

The traditional explanation given for the cancellation of *The Masque of Truth* is that soon after Henry's death his court at St James's Palace was dissolved.[97] It seems more likely, however, that James deemed the overt ideology of the pageant 'undiplomatic' and thus unfit for an audience chiefly made up of foreign ambassadors. After all, Henry had been involved in the organisation of the public entertainments for the festival too, which included a firework drama and a mock naval battle on the Thames, staged on 11 (n.s. 21) and 13 (n. s. 23) February respectively. None of these entertainments was cancelled despite their militaristic, though admittedly less apocalyptic, nature. James was notorious for having censored entertainments if they ran the risk of giving offence to diplomats or

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[95] Roy Strong's *Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance* from 1986 remains an authoritative work on the prince. For a more recent, revisionist study, see *Prince Henry Revived: Image and Exemplarity in Early Modern England*, ed. by Timothy Wilks (Southampton: Southampton Solent University Press and Paul Holberton Publishing, 2007).

[96] Porchères, *Le camp de la Place Royale*, pp. 169–79.

[97] Curran, 'James I', p. 57; Akkerman, '*Semper Eadem*', p. 149.

other dignitaries. This was especially the case with the Spanish ambassadors in London, as anti-Spanish sentiments were prevalent in many English plays at the time and shared by a large part of the English society, similar to the situation in Paris. Playwrights were therefore often obliged to conceal political messages or soften the anti-Spanish tone of their works.[98] It seems likely that James used Henry's death as a pretext for cancelling the masque, so as to avoid conflict with the remaining members of his son's household.

Why did James decide to call off *The Masque of Truth* and not the public celebrations for the marriage? The king had always been suspicious of Henry's militant festivals, not least because of their open-air character.[99] Ben Johnson's the *Barriers*, for example, was originally intended to be staged in the tiltyard of Whitehall Palace, an area that attracted crowds from the capital as well as abroad.[100] Under pressure from the king, however, they were eventually moved indoors and performed in Whitehall's Banqueting House on 6 (n. s. 16) January 1610. The *Barriers* were similar in content to *The Masque of Truth* and the first entertainments to boost Henry's martial persona.[101] Organised as mock battles, they imagined England at the forefront of a pan-Protestant war against Catholic Europe and drew heavily from Elizabethan chivalry. James probably feared that open-air performances of the pageants would have unsettled the local population and provoked the international community, which might have construed their militant conceit as a declaration of war. It might thus have been with jealousy that Henry read Forboyst's account of the French carousel where it was expressly stated that the spectacle had attracted 'a great number of people', despite the mixed responses from the audience.[102]

The reason why James decided not to cancel the public celebrations for the Stuart-Palatine festival probably had to do with the immense political influence that the prince had obtained since his performance of the *Barriers* in January 1610. Many Protestants in England and on the continent feared that with Henry's death the festival would be called off too — a remarkable response which testifies to the importance that the prince held for

[98] A well-known example is Ben Johnson's *The Fortunate Isles* (1625). See Jaroslav Miller, 'The Henrician Legend Revived: The Palatine Couple and Its Public Image in Early Stuart England', *European Review of History / Revue européenne d'histoire*, 11.3 (2004), 305–31 (pp. 313–14).

[99] Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales*, p. 141; Norbrook, 'The Masque of Truth', p. 91; Curran, 'James I', pp. 51–52. King James generally disliked appearing in public (see Ashton, *James I by His Contemporaries*, pp. 63–64).

[100] J. F. Merritt, *The Social World of Early Modern Westminster: Abbey, Court and Community, 1525-1640* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 161.

[101] Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales*, p. 141.

[102] BL, Harleian MS 7015, fol. 263r.

the Anglo-German marriage and the Jacobean establishment at large, even after his death. Similar to Marie de Médicis's government in France, James's authority was far from supreme, as it was repeatedly challenged by competing powers in the king's own house. Although Henry's court had been dissolved by February 1613, many Calvinist puritans and supporters of the bridal couple held prominent positions at court.[103] These parties would certainly have backed the public entertainments of the festival, for it could win both the international elite and the local populace for their Protestant agenda. In this tense political climate, James was forced to submit to the demands of his competitors and thus consented to staging the public entertainments.

An interesting French account of the festivities in London and the couple's ensuing journey to Heidelberg brings into focus how the nuptial celebrations, rather than subscribing to James's diplomatic messages of harmony and concord, as communicated in *The Lords' Masque*, could be used to support the radical Calvinist cause. The account was written by David Jocquet, a Huguenot exile from Metz, and published in summer 1613 by Gotthardt Vögelin, a printer of pamphlets and school books, in Heidelberg. Jocquet's booklet was clearly targeted at French-speaking Protestant communities in Europe and thus invoked the memory of the late Prince Henry Frederick throughout. David Norbrook has suggested that Jocquet, about whose life is very little known, may have been introduced to English court circles by David Home, a Scottish minister of a Protestant church in Metz who had acted as an intermediary between Huguenot exiles and the Stuart crown. Alternatively, Jocquet could have been admitted to the English court on the recommendation of the French poet Jean de Schelandre (1585-1635), a staunch supporter of Henry Frederick's, who had married a woman from Metz in 1611.[104] In either case, Jocquet seems to have been part of an Anglo-French network of Calvinist artists, intellectuals, and diplomatic agents who had looked up to the late Henry Frederick as their beacon of hope for a pan-Protestant alliance in Europe.

Jocquet divided his account of the nuptial proceedings into three parts. The first part was a verse description of the journey of Count Frederick to England, the ensuing festivities in London, and the triumphal voyage of the bride and groom to their home residence

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[103] They included the diplomat and poet Henry Wotton (1568-1639), Sir Dudley Carleton (1573-1632), the English ambassador at The Hague, the diplomats Thomas Roe (1581-1644) and John Harrison, and later Sir Francis Nethersole (1587-1659), Princess Elizabeth's secretary. See Miller, 'The Henrician Legend Revived', p. 318.
[104] 'The Masque of Truth', p. 85.

in Heidelberg. The second part consisted of a more detailed narration of the wedding celebrations in London and included a description of *The Masque of Truth* which, as we saw above, had not in fact been performed, in contrast to the other festivies at the nuptial festival described by Jocquet. The third part, finally, contained a prose description of the *fêtes* given for the couple's arrival in Heidelberg, including several tournaments. It is the first part of Jocquet's booklet, entitled 'The Voyage and the Triumphs of Jason', referring to the journey of the Elector Palatine, first to the Stuart court and then (together with Princess Elizabeth) to Heidelberg, that concerns us here.[105] Interestingly, Jocquet's verse description of the nuptial proceedings seeks to associate the wedding and the ensuing festivities with the radical Calvinist cause, insofar as it interprets key events, such as the arrival of Frederick in England and a mock naval battle given on the Thames, through the lens of popular Protestant ideas, beliefs, and hopes. In this way, Jocquet clearly, and possibly consciously, subverted the conciliatory messages that James had promoted in *The Lords' Masque* and which underpinned the king's domestic and foreign diplomacy at large.

Jocquet began his verse narration of the Stuart-Palatine wedding by pointing out how the sudden death of Prince Henry Frederick in November 1612 had tragically disturbed the happiness that surrounded the arrival of the Elector Palatine in England:[106]

> But during that joy, oh good Lord, what misfortune!
> The inescapable Fate pierced the heart
> Of the best-born Prince of all England,
> And it has brought his Spring Days to an end,
> Suddenly tearing away the hope that his Virtue
> Would hold for the English, if he still had lived.[107]

Jocquet suggested that this 'Virtue' did not disappear with Henry's death, but in fact lived on through the figure of the German count. Many supporters of the bridal couple would have agreed with Jocquet. They hoped that Frederick would replace the late prince and become the new focus of their radical Protestant hopes.[108] Jocquet, however, invoked

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[105] 'Le Voyage et les Trivmphes de Iason', sig. A1ʳ-[D4ᵛ].
[106] Frederick arrived at Gravesend on 16 (n. s. 26) October 1612.
[107] *Les Triomphes*, sig. B1ʳ (see appendix).
[108] The propaganda campaign of identifying Prince Henry with Frederick V of the Palatinate became known as the 'Palatine myth'. For more on this, see Miller, 'The Henrician Legend Revived'; Jaroslav Miller, 'Between Nationalism and European Pan-Protestantism: Palatine Propaganda in Jacobean England and the Holy Roman Empire', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 61–81.

James himself to spell out this wish — a deliberate misrepresentation of the king's actual diplomatic intentions.[109] As we have seen before, James did not wish England to become a frontier state for the militant Protestantism that Frederick and his supporters advocated. Jocquet's fictional monologue for James read as follows:

> If God took my eldest son from me,
> Here at the same time His favour gave me
> A great Prince for a Son-in-law, & thus His grace
> By removing one, replaces another:
> Wounding one hand, healing the other.
> So this wise King consoled his Spirit.[110]

In other words, God took away the king's son, but gave back a formidable son-in-law, the latter substituting the former. Now that Protestant Europe had a new leader at its helm, happiness returned to the English court and preparations for the impending festival could begin: 'Everyone worked to render him [Count Frederick] service / With every artifice [spectacle] that they could invent'.[111]

Jocquet further undermined James's design for peace — and, hence, his royal authority — by offering strongly ideologically coloured interpretations of the public entertainments at the festival. This held particularly true for the mock naval battle on the Thames. We know that the spectacle was organised by someone associated with Henry's court: the architect and set designer Constantino (also Constantini) de' Servi (1554-1622) who had formerly acted as the prince's agent in Florence.[112] The staged battle pitted the English fleet against that of the Ottoman Turks. Whereas the English festival account, written by John Taylor (1578-1653), interpreted the entertainment as a combat against heresy at large, Jocquet seems to have interpolated a parallel — and, again, possibly fictional — narrative.[113] The Huguenot writer claimed that before the unsurprising defeat of the Turkish squadron by the English there was a Spanish fleet, which is not mentioned by Taylor. Rather than being overthrown by the English, however, the Spanish were defeated by the

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[109] Jaroslav Miller argues that it is 'beyond dispute' that James himself was the initiator or even a supporter of the Palatine myth (in 'The Henrician Legend Revived', p. 318).

[110] *Les Triomphes*, sig. B1ʳ (see appendix).

[111] Chacun met en avant, pour luy rendre service / Tout ce que l'on sçauroit inventer d'artifice' (ibid.).

[112] Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales*, p. 95.

[113] John Taylor, 'Heavens Blessing and Earths Joy', in *The Progresses, Processions, and Magnificent Festivities of King James the First, His Royal Consort, Family, and Court [...]*, ed. by John Nichols, 3 vols (London: J. B. Nichols, 1828), II, 527–32.

Turks. Only after that did the English fleet come to their rescue and destroy the Turkish ships:

> The Turkish Galley
> Here defeated the Spaniard, but the English Admiral,
> Coming to their [the Spaniard's] rescue with fifteen pinnaces,
> Remained victorious and took their [the Turkish] galleons.[114]

Whether or not Jocquet's account of the simulated combat should be considered reliable, it is clear that the Huguenot writer sought to exaggerate the rivalry between Protestant and Habsburg powers. By having the Spanish navy destroyed by the infidel Turk, Jocquet ridiculed the aggressive ambitions of the Habsburg crown, which still liked to pride itself on the famous defeat of the Turkish fleet at Lepanto in 1571.[115] Habsburg humiliation is complete when we read that the English free the Spanish prisoners from the Turks. Only after the English rescue operation did the Basha, the chief commander of the Ottoman army, surrender himself to King James and Count Frederick.[116] The last few lines of Jocquet's poem describe the surrender of the Basha and his forced conversion to (Protestant) Christianity, thus leaving no doubt that the English were superior to both the Muslim Turks and the Catholic Spaniards:

> The Basha, an abashed prisoner,
> Will surrender himself to the King and his Son-in-law,
> Who will grant him grace on condition that his faith
> Will tell him that CHRIST is his God and his King.[117]

The Spanish ambassador in London, Don Alonso de Velasco (died in 1632), seems to have anticipated the anti-Habsburg undertones of the spectacle, for he used illness as an excuse to remain absent from the event altogether. The French ambassador, Samuel Spifame (died in 1632), sieur de Buisseaux, reported (somewhat triumphantly) how his colleague 'even [had] to find his way into someone's house to watch the opening

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[114] 'Le Galere Turquois / Y deffit l'Espagnol, mais L'Admiral Anglois / Leur venant au secours avecq quinze pinasses, / Resta victorieux & prit leurs galeaces' (*Les Triomphes*, sig. B1ᵛ-B2ʳ).

[115] McClure, 'Sea-Fight on the Thames', p. 268.

[116] Basha ('Bascha' in the original French) is derived from the Turkish 'baş', meaning 'head', 'chief', or 'leader'. See also *A Dictionarie*, ed. by Cotgrave.

[117] '[L]e Bascha se va rendre / Tout confus prisonnier au Roy & à son Gendre: / Qui luy donnent sa grace à charge, que sa foy / Luy dira que le CHRIST est son Dieu & son Roy' (Jocquet, *Les Triomphes*, sig. B2ʳ; see also ibid., sig. E2ᵛ-E3ʳ).

festivities on the water as a private citizen who had not been invited to the solemnities on the water'.[118]

4. Celebrating the Franco-Spanish marriages in Paris, 1615

On 22 March 1615, Marie de Médicis organised an evening-long ballet in the *grande salle* of the Hôtel du Petit-Bourbon in Paris, entitled *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve*,[119] to mark the leave-taking of Madame Élisabeth from the capital in mid-August later that year. The princess and her elder brother Louis XIII would be married by proxy in Bordeaux on 18 October 1615. At the opening of the ballet, a cloud machine brought forth the metaphorical clouds that had been cast over the troubled kingdom since the assassination of Henri IV. Night, personified by court lutenist and composer Henri Le Bailley (died in 1637), stood on top of the machine reciting poetry by Estienne Durand (1590-1618), poète ordinaire of Marie de Médicis. He solemnly declared that the efforts of the queen mother (the 'Grand Soleil' or 'Great Sun') to restore peace and harmony to France had ultimately forced him to accept his defeat:

> For your beauty that shines on me,
> Changing my shadows into light
> Makes me lose myself and cease to be Night.[120]

Night and his clouds then made way for the triumphal entrance of Élisabeth in the lead role as the mythological goddess Minerva, destined to save France through a marriage with the Spanish Prince Felipe.[121]

We may surmise that the ballet's celebration of Marie's diplomatic efforts was not appreciated by all spectators in the audience, as was the case with the carousel in April

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[118] '[P]uisque trois jours durant il s'estoit laissé veoir par la ville, et mesme s'estoit comme personne privée et sans estre prié aux apparas néantmoins, trouvé en une maison pour veoir la première resjoyssance qui se fit sur l'eaue' (cited in Marie-Claude Canova-Green, '"Particularitez des Resjoyssances Publiques et Cérémonyes du Mariage de la Princesse": An Ambassadorial Account of the Palatine Wedding', in *Palatine Wedding*, pp. 353–69 (p. 359)).

[119] The spectacle is also known as *Le Ballet de Madame* (The Ballet of Madame).

[120] 'Car vostre beauté qui me luit, / Changeant mes ombres en lumiere / Me fait perdre moy-mesme & cesser d'estre Nuict' ('Description dv Ballet de Madame sœvr aisnée dv Roy', in *Ballets pour Louis XIII: Danse et politique à la cour de France (1610-1643)*, ed. by Marie-Claude Canova-Green, Collection de rééditions de textes rares du XVIIe siècle, 30, 2 vols (Toulouse: Société de Littératures Classiques, 2010-2012), I, 27–64 (p. 34)).

[121] On the political significance of Élisabeth's role as Minerva and the minor role of Louis XIII as an androgynous African tribe member, see Barker and Gurney, 'House Left, House Right', p. 151.

1612. Among the dissatisfied spectators were the aristocratic Malcontents, the anti-Habsburg *politiques*, and the Huguenot nobles. Several Malcontents had moreover left court in early 1614, including Condé, the duc de Mayenne (1578-1621), the duc de Longueville (1595-1663), and the duc de Vendôme.[122] It is significant that Marie had nonetheless invited these aristocratic conspirators to *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve*, having deliberately kept them away from recent Estates General.[123] Her ballet was intended primarily to attract the nobles to court and bring them back into the folds of the French monarchy. Marie even went so far as to put at least two prominent rebels in the spotlight. In the *grand ballet* that followed after the performance, Marie had Condé and Élisabeth lead the dance; the third couple to join them was Vendôme and one 'comtesse de Soissons', who might have been the wife of Longueville, Louise de Bourbon (1603-1637).[124]

The queen regent well understood that her ballet offered a unique opportunity to suggest to an international audience of ambassadors and statesmen that her work on the Franco-Spanish union had finally paid off and restored the harmony between the crown and its nobles. The foreign diplomats who had been invited to the spectacle, in turn, were eager to defend the honour of their princes on such a grand public occasion. A lengthy account of the event, written by one of the envoys present in the room, the Florentine agent Luca degli Asini (cited in Chapter 1, Section 4), included rich details on the extent to which diplomats were prepared to snatch the superior seat in the audience so as to uphold the international standing of their rulers.[125] Sheila Barker and Tessa Gurney have shown that by boasting about the reputation of their princes or distracting each other while taking the higher seat the ambassadors employed 'the same adroitness' that was demonstrated in the dancing of the ballet.[126]

Marie's diplomatic strategy of pairing the malcontent princes in couple dancing reminds us even more strongly of Catherine de Médicis's efforts to appease rival noblemen through entertainment. The carousel did so through horsemanship, but *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve* harked back to one of Catherine's most important diplomatic

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[122] Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy', pp. 29–30.
[123] Ibid., p. 32.
[124] The *grand ballet*, which took the form of processional dancing ('alla sfilata'), is described in a recently discovered dispatch by a Florentine ambassador who was present in the audience. The dispatch is analysed, transcribed, and translated into English by Sheila Barker and Tessa Gurney, in 'House Left, House Right'. The *grand ballet* is not mentioned in the pageant's official *livret* (see *Description*).
[125] See Barker and Gurney, 'House Left, House Right'.
[126] Ibid., p. 149.

instruments, namely dancing. Rather than departing from the French monarchical tradition, as has traditionally been thought, Marie's use of pair-dancing demonstrates once again how dependent she was on the diplomatic and festive traditions of her predecessors.

Shortly after the performance of *Le Ballet du Triomphe de Minerve*, a defamatory chapbook entitled *Cassandre françoise* was published in support of Condé's interests.[127] The anonymous writer of the pamphlet offered a critique of the perceived obsession of the French court with dancing and feasting, similar to the backlash that the late Valois kings had received, particularly among Calvinist circles.[128] In the chapbook, the poetical voice of a French Cassandra expressed disbelief at the indulgence of her fellow countrymen for the ballets, dances, and firework displays that had been organised for the Habsburg-Bourbon alliance. Not only were they oblivious to the immense turmoil that the murder of 'Henry the Great' had brought to the country,[129] they also could not understand that France and Spain were by definition irreconcilable; and festivals or *fêtes* could not change anything about that. But just like the Cassandra from Greek mythology, the French Cassandra is not believed by those around her despite the goddess's accurate prophecy. The political message of the pamphlet was clear: the nuptial festivals did not function as diplomatic agents of change, but rather served to cloak and distract Frenchmen from the civil unrest that had been tormenting the country. At the same time, Condé himself was well aware how important festivals were for advertising one's own political agenda, for he often organised ballets at court to compete with those of Marie and convince other *grands* (great nobles) to join his rebellious party.[130]

It is interesting to note that the French Cassandra addressed her monologue to all people in the kingdom. Indeed, in 1615 the pamphlet was distributed on a wide scale, going through at least four different editions that same year.[131] 'Frenchmen, what are you doing?' we read at the opening of the work, as the goddess demands an explanation for the

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[127] Elliott, 'The Political Context', p. 18. Full reference to the chapbook is given on p. 171, n. 1 above.

[128] *Cassandre françoise*, p. 4.

[129] 'Henry le Grand' (ibid.).

[130] Nanie Bridgman, 'L'Aristocratie et le ballet de cour', *Cahiers de l'Association Internationale des études françaises*, 1957, 9–21. Over the summer of 1615, Condé and his magnates would take up arms, mobilising their troops in many of the Huguenot-ruled territories that Élisabeth, Louis XIII, Marie, and their entourage would cross on their progress to Bordeaux (see Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy', pp. 34–35).

[131] Roméo Arbour, *L'Ère baroque en France: Répertoire chronologique des éditions de textes littéraires*, Histoire des idées et critique littéraire, 229, 4 vols (Geneva: Droz, 1977-1985), IV: *Supplément, 1585-1643*, p. 261. The term 'edition' refers here to the number of impressions (or prints) struck from the same matrix.

ignorant behaviour of her countrymen.[132] The anonymous supporter of Condé made such a broad appeal on purpose. As we have seen in Section 2, Marie targeted her diplomatic programme for France at an audience that extended from the court to the local populace. The public character of the carousel was hitherto unseen in a France that had only recently recovered from its civil wars. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, diplomatic achievements were usually celebrated indoors for fear that agitated Catholics and Huguenots, the Parisian mob, or otherwise unwanted visitors would disturb the proceedings. At the height of the Religious Wars, foreign ambassadors were given a private tour in the Jardin des Tuileries (Tuileries Garden) at the most; triumphal entries and royal parades through the city were relatively scarce. Marie's decision to break with this tradition at the nuptial festivals of 1612 and 1615 suggests how important it had become for the French crown to win all subjects for its diplomatic ambitions, and convince them that in spite of aristocratic opposition the marriage alliance with Spain would bring peace and harmony to the country.

5. Conclusion

The assassination of Henri IV on 14 May 1610 accelerated a series of marital negotiations between France and Spain that dated back to the early reign of the Bourbon king. Before the regicide these negotiations were hardly subject to controversy: talking about marriages was still a far cry from actually signing a marriage contract. When the contract for a Franco-Spanish double marriage was finally signed on 30 April 1611, however, it generated a significant international response that changed diplomatic relations in Europe. England clearly felt threatened by a marriage alliance that many European Protestants, as well as their Roman enemies, considered a Catholic ploy to exterminate heresy. On 20 May 1612, King James VI/I consented to a marriage between his daughter, Princess Elizabeth Stuart, and the Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate in an effort to counter the Franco-Spanish double marriage. The opulent festivals that were staged for the two marital alliances bring into sharp relief how the competing diplomacies and political agendas from both Catholic and Protestant communities in Europe helped shape the public image of the marriages.

In this chapter, we have seen that the festivals for the Franco-Spanish and Anglo-German marriages were not singlehandedly organised by the crown and thus did not

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[132] 'François, que faictes-vous?' (*Cassandre françoise*, p. 1).

communicate a uniform statement of policy. The authority of both Marie de Médicis and King James was challenged by competing noblemen, factions, and even separate courts, as run by for example James's son, the ultra-Calvinist Prince Henry Frederick. Although those who fiercely opposed the marriages remained either absent or took up arms (such as Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé and his magnates), most competitors were keen to participate in the festival preparations. Their primary aim was to augment their influence at court or to exploit the marital alliances for their own political gain. The image that emerges from the various nuptial celebrations is therefore not one of thematic coherence, but one of political disparity and competition — against the crown but also among courtiers themselves.

In previous chapters, we observed that festivals were crucial for advertising and implementing marital diplomacy. This chapter, however, has attempted to show that festivals could obscure or even significantly alter the original diplomatic intentions of a marriage contract. Both the Franco-Spanish and Anglo-German marriages were intended as dynastic unions aimed at restoring the balance of power in Europe after the regicide of May 1610. Through the collaboration of competing factions, however, and the mediation of festival accounts that gave an ideologically coloured interpretation of the proceedings, the marriages came to serve the political agenda of a variety of actors. As a result, the festivals did not merely celebrate the weddings as dynastic alliances but also — and perhaps primarily — as religious accords dividing Europe into a Catholic and a Protestant camp. Although the marriages were meant to strengthen the authority of both Marie and James, as well as of their Spanish and German allies, it appeared that they were still not masters in their own house.

CONCLUSION

> This beast, sprouted from various shapes of living creatures, / Teaches that the acts of humans and customs are various. / If someone mollifies it in a way the nature, emotions, and condition of each creature can bear, / Then he must be a good, and mild, wise and flexible man. / How tough a governor's office is!
>
> Dutch poet Cornelis Kiliaan (1528-1607) on the difficulty of ruling. Latin verse printed on the 1578 engraving by Pieter van der Borcht the Elder (1530-1611), titled 'Typvs præfectvræ' (see Figure 3).[1]

Whether being pressured by the Spanish ambassador, opposed by the mutinous Princes of the Blood, or called on for military help by the States General of the Dutch Provinces, the late Valois and early Bourbon rulers consistently tried to approach their intricate domestic and foreign relations with diplomatic deftness. This deftness consisted in their ability to recognise and manage difference between the various diplomats, nobles, princes, and statesmen who frequented or resided at the French court, without allowing this difference to destabilise the balance of power among them. The Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam holds a late sixteenth-century engraving by Pieter van der Borcht the Elder, entitled 'Typvs præfectvræ' (Image of Statecraft, see Figure 3), that brings the advantage of this diplomatic strategy for governance into sharp focus. Set against the backdrop of an undefined town, the engraving depicts a vigorous unicorn bearing the heads of numerous other, non-mythological animals, including a dog, an elephant, a lion, a peacock, and a snake. The unicorn is collared and chained by a group of five men on the right: three religious leaders (the pope, a bishop, and a prelate) and two secular rulers (the Holy

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[1] See appendix.

Roman Emperor and an unknown king).[2] A Latin verse at the bottom of the engraving, written by the Dutch poet Cornelis Kiliaan and translated in the epigraph of this conclusion, clarifies the allegory portrayed.

Figure 3. 'Typvs præfectvræ', currently known as 'Allegory on the Difficulty of Ruling', by Pieter van der Borcht the Elder (etching, h 210mm x w 298mm). Printed by Philips Galle in Antwerp, 1578. Public domain / Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

Both word and image can be interpreted as a mirror for princes: they reminded the ruling elite, and anyone else who could afford to buy the engraving, of the best possible way to govern a body politic (the unicorn) inhabited or traversed by individuals — probably of different nationalities, given the international group of rulers on the right — whose 'acts […] and customs are various' (the animal heads). The various 'acts' and 'customs' in Kiliaan's verse undoubtedly referred to the diverging religious and political attitudes

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[2] Pope Gregory XIII, standing in the middle, wears the papal tiara with three crowns. The Habsburg Emperor Rudolf II (1552-1612), standing on the extreme right, wears the Imperial crown and holds the sceptre and *globus cruciger* ('the orb and cross').

that the Protestant Reformations had brought in their wake over the course of the sixteenth century and which continued to pose a threat to the political stability of entire states and regions in Europe, notably France, until a century later. Interestingly, the artists of our engraving did not recommend that rulers impose authority on their subjects and foreign visitors, a piece of advice that was often given in this context, but rather to employ diplomatic deftness as a central approach to statecraft. The diverse state, as Kiliaan suggested, was like 'a living creature' that could only be governed or tamed if rulers respected its evolving 'nature, mood, and condition' and coordinated their actions accordingly. To manoeuvre between domestic and foreign interests, then, rulers were forced to continuously seek for a balance of power among diplomatic players without allowing any of them to gain the upper hand.

As observed throughout this doctoral thesis, diplomatic compromise was at the crux of the domestic and foreign policy conducted by the French monarchy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Compromising dissimilar interests and ambitions in terms of religion and politics was first recommended by Michel de L'Hospital in the early 1560s as a peaceful and viable alternative to the violent persecution of Huguenots embraced by previous Valois kings, especially Henri II.[3] The strategy soon became identified with the irenical beliefs of the French *moyenneurs* or *politiques* for whom keeping a political equilibrium among opposing Catholics and Protestants was more important than preserving the confessional unification of the kingdom.[4] We have shown that, within the context of secret negotiations (backchannel diplomacy) and festive and ceremonial occasions (public diplomacy), the Valois and Bourbon rulers opted for a balance of power to obtain the support of stakeholders whose cultural, national, political, and religious backgrounds were often fundamentally different.

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, for example, the Valois-Navarre marriage in August 1572 was carefully negotiated between Catherine de Médicis and Jeanne d'Albret, as well as selectively promoted to international associates, to ensure that both Catholic and Huguenot camps would agree to the controversial interfaith union. The nuptial festival in Paris sought to extend this line of policy in a threefold way. First, the official wedding ceremony at Notre-Dame was meticulously prepared to satisfy the requirements of both

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[3] Notably in speeches delivered to the magistrates of the *Parlement de Paris*; see Chapter 1, Section 2.

[4] Arlette Jouanna notes that the term '*politique*' came into use from 1568 onwards ('Politiques', in *Histoire et dictionnaire*, ed. by Jouanna and others, pp. 1210–13 (p. 1211)).

confessional groups. A tapestried scaffold erected in front of the cathedral gave in to the demands of Huguenot ministers who did not want Henri de Navarre to enter the building and participate in Mass, while also meeting the royal prerequisite of holding the blessing in front of a Catholic congregation. Second, general messages of peace and harmony, inscribed on commemorative coins and communicated in the triumphal procession at the Louvre, celebrated the transcendence of religious division and thus appealed to the Erasmian ideal of a united Christian front. The combat-ballet *Le Paradis d'Amour*, finally, suggested that peace between the rivalling factions could be achieved through a shared commitment to the French crown and — by extension — to the Roman Catholic faith. Although the pageant inevitably disappointed and even antagonised Huguenot spectators by its unapologetically Catholic point of view, its aim to resolve religious difference peacefully was clearly intended to be diplomatic.

The celebrations for the Valois-Navarre marriage remind us that royal diplomacy in early modern France was never aimed at creating equal relationships between dissimilar actors — e.g. in the form of religious coexistence — but rather at containing, channelling, and shaping their diverging ambitions and interests. Legal compromises, conciliatory themes, but also bold artistic visions of a Catholic France, as broadcast in *Le Paradis d'Amour*, could help to steer that even keel and, when used tactfully at different stages of the festival, 'pull in' — or, rather, 'pull out' — the right kind of diplomatic player or negotiation group. The diplomatic strategies of the crown, then, were virtually always multi-edged, insofar as they used different means, served different purposes, and benefited or disadvantaged different stakeholders. According to Lucien Bély, the multi-purpose nature of diplomacy is precisely what makes it defy rigorous definition, because all means and tools can help facilitate the negotiation process and steer it in useful directions.[5]

Other cases studied in this thesis also demonstrated that diplomacy involved methods and techniques that did not always straightforwardly support friendly relations with stakeholders but rather helped to facilitate the crown's intricate negotiations with dissimilar stakeholders. Chapter 3, for instance, discussed Henri III's 'push-pull' technique: a precarious sort of balancing act that required the king to continuously extend and deny

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[5] *L'Art de la paix en Europe: Naissance de la diplomatie moderne XVIe - XVIIIe siècle*, Le Nœud Gordien (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), p. 15.

hospitality to different negotiation groups, thus either pulling them 'in' or pushing them 'out'. By doing so, Henri hoped to facilitate negotiation and maintain a dialogue with all his Dutch, English, papal, and Spanish associates without having to definitively commit to their demands and interests. To use the words of political scientist Mark Warren, '[diplomacy held] open the possibility to talk',[6] but – we should add — also offered rulers the opportunity to withhold that very possibility when political circumstances demanded a change of tactic or policy.

The degree to which the French crown could allow itself to be inhospitable towards its associates or take the risk of boldly defending its own controversial policy obviously depended on the political context of the diplomatic occasion. The festival for the Treaty of Blois in July 1572, for example, remained entirely silent about the contentious issues of religious difference that had complicated negotiations over the accord between France and England. A series of light-hearted comedies, musical divertissements, and lavish banquets were chiefly intended to produce amity between the former foes. In May 1598, Henri IV was careful not to offend his anti-Habsburg associates, England and the Dutch Republic, who travelled to the French court to interrogate the king about his peace talks with Spain. The king flattered visiting delegations of Dutch and English ambassadors with his personal attention and, sporadically, gave in to their demands. During an audience with Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Justin of Nassau in April 1598, for example, Henri promised to provide secret financial support for the Dutch Revolt against Spain.

The focus of the present thesis was twofold. First, it sought to examine the relationship, and regular tension, between the theories and practices of using festival culture for alleged diplomatic ends. Second, it analysed the complex way in which both ceremonial and festive events operated as sites where the ambitions, interests, and goals of various domestic and foreign groups intersected with, or diverged from, each other, just as the political agendas of individuals in both domestic and foreign groups overlapped or differed from one another. By reading French sources alongside English, Dutch, Italian, and German accounts of the festival, and testing prescriptive literature on diplomacy and pageantry, as well as royal accounts of the festival against scattered accounts of diplomatic players, we have demonstrated that late Valois and early Bourbon festivals played a crucial role in facilitating multifaceted interactions with diplomatic players from across Europe.

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[6] 'What Should and Should Not Be Said', p. 175. Cited in the introduction of Chapter 2.

Royal diplomacy in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France was therefore not a one-way street, solely aimed at boosting sovereign power, but a continuous interaction between the crown and its domestic and foreign stakeholders, as well as among these stakeholders themselves.

Reports from the Huguenot ministers in the *Parlement de Paris*, for instance, reveal that the nuptial blessing of the Valois-Navarre couple at the Notre-Dame staged Henri de Navarre's absence from Mass in such a way that it could be interpreted either as an expression of his conscience or as a neutral diplomatic measure to meet the demands of the prince's adversaries. The memoirs of the Tyrolian medical student Lucas Geizkofler suggest that this is exactly what happened. The public reconciliation between Henri IV and the duc de Mercœur at Angers on 30 March 1598 was governed by similarly ambiguous intentions. Although ostensibly designed to herald the end of civil war, the correspondence of the English diplomats Robert Cecil and John Herbert brings to light that the ceremony was also intended — and interpreted by spectators — as a celebration of the king's victory over the duke and the *Ligue catholique*.

It is hoped that the insights, offered by this comparative approach, into the broader political contexts in which festivals, ceremonies, and pageants operated will stimulate researchers of early modern diplomacy and festival culture to pursue further research in this area. Three directions of research may be of particular interest in this regard: first, the diplomatic functions of pageants organised by actors other than kings and regents, such as nobles or local authorities; second, the use of ceremonies and *fêtes* on diplomatic journeys of the French crown to befriended states;[7] and, third, the way in which national traditions of using festival culture for diplomatic ends operated within a broader European context. We hope that the present thesis has aimed to demonstrate the latter point for the diplomatic significance of French festival culture.

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[7] François, duc d'Alençon, for one, journeyed through the Southern Netherlands between 1582 and 1583. Local authorities received him with numerous 'blijde intochten' ('joyous entries') and other forms of civic spectacle. Following her failed coup against Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642), Marie de Médicis travelled to the Northern Netherlands in 1638, which served as the occasion for a grand ceremonial entry into Amsterdam, among other festivities. Similar honours were bestowed on the princess when she moved to England later that year.

APPENDIX

<u>Historical sources referred to in Chapter 1</u>

❖ Michel de Montaigne on the depraved morals of late sixteenth-century Europe (*Les Essais*, bk. 2, p. 684-85):

'Il fait bon naistre en un siecle fort depravé: car par comparaison d'autruy, vous estes estimé vertueux à bon marché. Qui n'est que parricide en nos jours et sacrilege, il est homme de bien et d'honneur [...] Et ne fut jamais temps et lieu, où il y eust pour les princes loyer plus certain et plus grand, proposé à la bonté, et à la justice'.

❖ Bernard de Rosier on the causes of sending ambassadors ('Ambaxiatorum brevilogus', pp. 6-7):

'[Tot autem sunt cause mittendi ambaxiatam] ad pacem et iusticiam; ad amiciciam; ad captandum benenolenciam [sic]; ad sedandum bella, ad inihendum [sic] et firmandum treugas; ad retrahendum tyrannos; ad reconciliandum et redducendum scismaticos et rebelles; ad beniuolos subditos dirigendum; ad consolandum desolatos; ad vitandum scandala; ad extirpandum hereses; ad compestenda [sic] vicia et ad inserendas virtutes; ad quibuslibet arduis necessitatibus imminentibus occurendum; ad omnia et singula que ad bonum reipublice cuiuslibet regni, principatus, potestatis ecclesiastice vel mundane, cuiusque ciuitatis, terre, loci vel patrie tendunt.'

❖ Guglielmo Ebreo da Pesaro on the spiritual origins of dancing (cited in Berghaus, 'Neoplatonic and Pythagorean Notions', p. 57):

'Danzare non e altro che una actione demostratiua di fuori di mouimenti spiritali li quali si hanno a concordare colle misurate et perfette consonanze dessa armonia: che per lo nostro audito alle parti intellectiue & a i sensi cordiali con diletto descende: doue poi si genera certi dolci commouimenti: i quali chome [come] contra sua natura rinchiusi si

sforzano quanto possano di uscire fuori: & farsi in atto manifesti. Il qual atto da essa dolcezza & melodia tirato alle parti exteriori colla prop[ri]a persona danzando'.

❖ Thoinot Arbeau on dance as a form of 'mute rhetoric' (*Orchesographie*, sig. 5ᵛ):

'Tous les doctes tiennent que la dance est vne espece de Rhetorique muette, par laquelle l'Orateur peult par ses mouuements, sans parler vn seul mot, se faire entendre, & persuader aux spectateurs, quil est gaillard digne d'estre loué, aymé, & chery'.

❖ Thoinot Arbeau on Cicero and the dance performance of Roscius Galenus (*Orchesographie*, sig. 5ᵛ):

'Comme aussi Roscius le faisoit bien paroistre à Ciceron, quant il adjançoit ses gestes & actions muettes de telle façon, qu'au iugement de ceulx qui en estoient arbitres, il mouuoit aultant ou plus les spectateurs, que Ciceron eut peu faire par ses elocutions oratoires'.

❖ Giovanni Pontano on banquets and splendour (*Opera*, De *splendore*, section 'De hortis ac uillis', not paginated):

'Idem familiam suam non solum bene & laute pascet, sed multos ut dici solet ciues peregrinosq[ue] participes quadræ suæ habebit, atque, ut argenteas lances ius hesternum dedecet, sic quottidianam brassicam principis uiri olla recusat. Itaq[ue] ut mensa eius argento & auro, sic splendescere epulis debet. Quas quidem conuiuis, & iis, qui ad coenam adhibiti fuerint potius q[uam] sibi parasse appareat'.

❖ Thoinot Arbeau on royal and princely usage of dances and masquerades (*Orchesographie*, sig. 3ᵛ):

'Les roys & princes, commandent dances & mascarades, pour festoier, recepuoir, & faire recueuil ioyeux, aux seigneurs estrangiers. Nous practiquons telles resiouissances aux iours de la celebration des nopces, & ez solemnités des festes de nostre Eglise, encor que les reformez abhorrent telles choses'.

Historical sources referred to in Chapter 2

❖ Jeanne d'Albret to Queen Elizabeth I about the conclusion of the Valois-Navarre marriage (BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F. VI, fol. 9):

'Je n'ay voullu faillir, Madame, vous en advertir et m'en resjouir avecq vous comme avecq celle qui fait et a sagement préveu combien ceste alliance peult servir non simplement au bien et repos de ce royaulme auquel vous estes sy affectyonnée, mays que cest heur estandra ses branches jusques aus voysins'.

Historical sources referred to in Chapter 3

❖ The official justification given by the States General for the candidacy of Henri III as King of the Dutch Provinces (NA, SG 1576-1588, 86D, instruction no. 4; see *Resolutiën*, ed. by Japikse, IV, p. 495):

'Et comme par le trespaz de Son Alteze, Prince et Seigneur des dictes Provinces, icelles sont vaccantes et retournees en la disposition des dictz Estatz et que le Roy d'Espaigne avec ses adherens ne cesse de continuer la guerre et les cruellement invahir et oppresser, ont trouve convenir selon Justice et Droict de nature de prendre leur refuze, et se jecter entre les bras de Sa M^te pour estre joinctz au Royaulme de France, dont originellement lesdictes Provinces ou la pluspart d'icelles sont este eslichées et separees'.

❖ Extract from Aernt van Dorp's advice to the *Ridderschap en Edelen van Holland* (VD 992, see Brieven VD, II, p. 447):

'Den Fransman is ontrou, bedriechlick ende in zijn regeringe onverdrachlick; is oick viant vande gereformeerde religie; hij mach verstant hebben met den Coninck van Spaignen, om, ons overgelevert hebbende, zijne Hugenoten beter tot zijnen wil te mogen crigen; item de Coninginne van Ingelant zal, overmits daccord metten Fransman, viant werdden van dese landen, waerdeur coop- ende harinckvaert te nyette zoude ghaen'.

❖ Extract from Maurice of Nassau's letter to Aernt van Dorp (VD 995, see Brieven VD, II, pp. 477-78):

'Monsieur van Dorp. Vous avez esté tousjours tellement affectionné au bien et service de feu Monseigneur mon Père de tres heureuse memoire, que je ne puis doubter de la continuation de vostre bonne volonté envers toute nostre maison, qui me faict vous prier, lorsque vous serez en France, d'avoir mes affaires et celles de nostre maison en telle recommandation, que vous scavez la mémoire de feu mondit Seigneur est recommandable'.

❖ Aernt van Dorp on his delayed reception in Paris (VD 1001, see Brieven VD, II, p. 506):

D'oorsaecke, waeromme oick uwer Ed. tselve nyet eer verwitticht en hebbe, is geweest vuyt meninge dat men onder tdexel van devotie den tijt heeft willen winnen, binnen welcken hier vuyt Ingelandt verwacht is de bijcompste van mylord Dherby, verselschapt (zoomen zeyt) van twe hondert Edelmannen. Denselven is rechtevoort tot Sint Denys, ende zal overmorgen hier te stede zeer statelijck ontfangen worden; ende anders ist naegelaeten vuyt vrese, off dit vuytstel anders hadde mogen geduydet worden, dan onse gemeene saecke wel oirbaer waer'.

❖ Aernt van Dorp on being hindered by Catholic diplomats (VD 1001, see Brieven VD, II, p. 508):

'Ick en sal hier nyet besunders schrijven, wat dambassadeurs vanden Paus, Savoyen, van Spaengien, met meer andere, al gedaen hebben, eerst om daudientie ende daernaer om den voortganck van desen handel te verhinderen, ghemerekt uwer E. dat selffs wel connen bedencken'.

Historical sources referred to in Chapter 4

❖ Extract from Article 3 of the Edict of Nantes about the Catholic religion (*L'Édit de Nantes*, ed. by Garrisson, p. 29):

'Ordonnons que la religion catholique, apostolique et romaine sera remise et rétablie en tous les lieux et endroits de cettuy notre royaume et païs de notre obeisance où l'exercice d'icelle a été intermis pour y être paisiblementn et librement exercée sans aucun trouble ou empêchement'.

❖ Henri IV on being pressured by Pope Clement VIII to make peace with Spain (Van Oldenbarnevelt and Nassau, 'Verbael', p. 421):

'[Syne Ma[t].] seyde dat den Paus hem tot vreede hadde vermaent […] ende dat hy van syne ondersaeten daertoe seer werde gesolliciteert, dat de armoede ende noot seer groot was, ende die siecten in sijn rijck veel; dat hy daeromme die handelinge van vreede nootelick hadde moeten by de hant nemen'.

❖ Jacques-Auguste de Thou on Henri IV's conversion ceremony at Saint-Denis (*Historiarum*, v, bk. 107, pp. 294-95):

'Rursusque interpellasset eum, an id ex animo vellet, et ille se velle et optare diceret; mox in genua procumbens Rex coram Deo optimo maximo protestatus est, velle se in religione Catholica apostolica Romana vivere ac mori, eam contra omneis tutari vel vitae periculo paratum, ac ultro cunctis haeresibus ecclesiae Catholicae apostilicae Romanae contrariis renunciare'.

❖ Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Justin of Nassau on their absence from the engagement ceremony for Françoise de Lorraine and César de Bourbon ('Verbael', p. 423):

'Den heere ambassadeur van Engelandt, noch wy, en waeren daer niet by, maer in eene ander camer; die ceremoniën gedaen sijnde, quamen wy in de camer, daer wy eene groote vergaederinge van heeren ende vrouwen vonden, ende namentlick mede de hartochinne, die seer groot van kinde was. Wy aten dien avont mitten Hartogen van Espernon, Elbeuf, Bouillon, Prince Heyndrick van Nassou ende noch eenige heeren van de ordre, in een cleyn camerken. Nae den eeten wy kommende ter plaetse daer den Conick gegeten hadde, seyde hy ons aen sijn taefel niet gesien te hebben, maer dat hy dochte, dat wy by den Hartoge van Bouillon ende anderen heeren waren geweest; ende soo hem voorts een yegelick ten danse prepareerden, gingen wy naer huys ende wereden geconduyseert by eenige Switsers'.

Historical sources referred to in Chapter 5

❖ Anonymous supporter of Condé about the Habsburg-Bourbon double marriage (*Cassandre françoise*, p. 4):

'[I]e vois […] vous faites des feux de ioye, vous passez les nuicts en ballets & en dances, en esperance de ces pretendus mariages: Hé que pensez vous faire! accorder deux peuples du tout ennemis? plustost l'eau & le feu se mesleroient ensemble, & meslez produiroient leurs effects, que le François peust compastir auec l'Espagnol'.

❖ Extract from the renewal of the Edict of Nantes (cited in Weiss, *Histoire des réfugiés protestants*, I, p. 4):

'Encore que cet édit soit perpétuel et irrevocable, et par ce moyen n'ait besoin d'être confirmé par nouvelle declaration, néanmois, afin que nosdits sujets soient assurés de notre bienveillance, savoir faisons, disons et ordonnons que ledit édit de Nantes, en tous ses points et articles, sera entretenu et gardé inviolablement'.

❖ Extract from France's commerce-defensive treaty with England, 29 August 1610 (*Corps*, pt. 1, p. 149):

'& pour ce lesdits Rois aient jugé rien ne pouvoir estre plus salutaire & profitable, non seulement à leurs Roiaumes, mais aussi à la Republique Chrétienne, que de reintegrer & mener à bonne fin ce Traité d'Alliance & confirmation d'amitié mutuelle & interrompu par cette malheureuse mort'.

❖ David Jocquet on the sudden death of Prince Henry Frederick in November 1612 (*Les Triomphes*, sig. B1ʳ):

'Mais durant ceste joye, o bon Dieu quel malheur!
La Parque inexorable alla percer le cœur
Du Prince le mieux né qu'eust oncques l'Angleterre,
Et luy tranche ses jours Durant sa Prime-Vere,
Arrachant tout d'un coup l'espoir que sa Vertu
Promettoit aux Anglois, s'il eust encor vescu'.

❖ David Jocquet's fictional dialogue for King James VI/I (*Les Triomphes*, sig. B1ʳ):

'Si l'Eternel m'a pris mon fils aisné,
Voicy qu'en mesme instant sa faveur m'a donné
Vng grand Prince pour Gendre; & par ainsy sa grace
En m'en retirant l'un, d'un aultre le remplace:
Me blessant d'une main, de l'autre il me guerit.
Ainsi ce sage Roy consoloit son Esprit'.

Historical source referred to in Conclusion

❖ Cornelis Kiliaan on the difficulty of ruling (printed on the 1578 engraving by
Pieter van der Borcht the Elder, entitled 'Typvs præfectvræ'):

'Conflata ex varijs animantum hæc bellua formis, / Acta hominum, et mores esse docet
varios. / Si quis huic faciat; cuiusque vt fert animantis / Natura, affectus, conditioque;
satis: / Is bonus, & mitis, sapiens, agilis, sit oportet. / O præfecturæ difficile officium!'

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