ERROR AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS IN THE PENTATEUCH AND MARK’S GOSPEL: A BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF KNOWING FROM FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS

Andrew M. Johnson

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. Andrews

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ERROR AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS IN THE PENTATEUCH AND MARK’S GOSPEL:
A BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF KNOWING FROM FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS

A THESIS SUBMITTED BY

ANDREW M. JOHNSON

TO THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ST ANDREWS, SCOTLAND

APRIL 2011
I, Andrew M. Johnson hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 86,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date 30 Nov 2010 signature of candidate

I was admitted as a research student in January, 2009 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in June, 2010; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2009 and 2010.

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I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will consider the possibility of an epistemological process described in the narratives and teaching of the Pentateuch and the Gospel of Mark. The specific nature of this epistemological process will be explored upon the priorities constrained by the texts themselves. While the epistemological objectives are not always perspicuous to the reader of the canon, error is more clearly diagnosed in these narratives. This thesis then investigates the epistemological process by looking primarily at where characters of the narratives 'get it wrong' according to the narrative's diagnosis.

Primacy appears to be given in these texts to heeding the authenticated and authoritative voice first, and then enacting the authoritative guidance in order to see what is being shown; in order 'to know'. Errors occur along the same boundaries. Failure to heed the authoritative voice creates a first order of error, while failure to enact the guidance yields a second order of error. We begin at the fore of the canon working through these Pentateuchal texts as they are presented to the reader.

In the first chapter, the necessity of this current study will be defended. As well, we will survey various attempts at describing a 'biblical epistemology' and their deficiencies and/or methodological shortcomings.

Chapter 2 will advance the case that Genesis 2-3 actually yields sufficient epistemological categories which resemble the rest of the Pentateuchal descriptions of error in more than superficial ways. Genesis 2 is analyzed as paradigmatic for proper epistemological process while Genesis 3 is paradigmatic of error. It is upon the boundary of the authenticated voice that error is assessed in the Garden of Eden. These patterns of error are lexically and conceptually reverberated in the stories of the patriarchs and Joseph.

Chapter 3 then looks at how these features discovered in Genesis are interwoven in the reader's mind as they come to the stories regarding Moses' prophetic authentication, Pharaoh's errors, and eventually Israel's own errors. The errors of Balak with Balaam in Numbers are considered as further reason to believe that this epistemological process is not reserved for Israel.

Chapter 4 explores the unique connections between Israel's Deuteronomic reflections and the creation narratives of Genesis.

The fifth chapter leaps to the Gospel of Mark to discern whether or not any of these patterns from the Pentateuch remain in the Gospel narrative.

In the final chapter, the fruit of our theological reading is brought forward to interact with current epistemological theories (mostly in analytic philosophy). These contemporary epistemologies are found wanting to describe anything like what we found in the scriptures. Implications are then drawn for theological prolegomena and praxis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must first acknowledge my wife and children, as they have borne the brunt of this thesis in walking over 2,000 miles each in St Andrews, in the rain, up hill, both ways. Their willingness to participate in this process with me will always create a tender spot in my heart. As well, I cannot forget the support of my father's family, Ken and Lannie, and mother, Patricia, who have never ceased to encourage me. Beyond that, my father's genuine concern to help us discern the prudence of pursuing a Ph.D. was especially appreciated.

Our family thanks those people who were dear to us and enjoined their families with ours while we sojourned as aliens in Scotland (in no particular order):
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- Cameron and Pearl Harrison,
- Bunny (Elizabeth) Slack,
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As for the thesis itself, it is difficult to put into words the appreciation that I feel for Professor Alan Torrance. His charity, kindness, wisdom, and sound guidance have saved me from myself and allowed me to be a better thinker. It was upon my very first encounter with Professor Torrance that I said to myself, 'I want to study with this man and no one else!' He has only exceeded his well-deserved renown, and I am profoundly honored to be his student.

I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Nathan MacDonald for volunteering to join on as a co-supervisor. His keen understanding and appraisal has been invaluable in improving my thinking about the topic of this thesis. As well, I am indebted to Dr. Kelly Iverson for his expert comments on my Mark chapter. Thanks goes to my office-mates Somer Salomon, who offered helpful comments on large sections of this thesis, and Mary Stevens, who helped me to think through many big-picture issues while I 'knuckled down' on the thesis. I am particularly thankful to my step-mother, Lannie Johnson, for her editorial wisdom and willingness to read over the entire thesis so scrupulously.

Finally, I want to thank Dr. Esther Meek (Geneva College), who I credit with opening all the horizons in my epistemological thinking and giving me the 'mental furniture' within which I could navigate the thorny problems of epistemology. Her friendship and collegial spirit toward me have always been overly generous. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Michael Williams (Covenant Theological Seminary) who mentored a much-rougher version of me through seminary and challenged me to write this thesis.
DEDICATION

Although I am tempted to write *Soli Deo Gloria* in the footer of each page of this thesis (as J.S. Bach was purported to do with his cantatas), I am fearful that *Deus* might quibble with my interpretations of his texts. But, it should be acknowledged that this is my intention.

As much as one can 'dedicate' a written work to anyone other than God, I dedicate this work to my wife, Stephanie Marie Johnson, who has been my constant prophetic voice in life. Not many will understand the sacrifices that she has made in being that voice to me.

1 Proverbs 31:26.
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I. CAN ANCIENT TEXTS REVEAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS?

To know in the ancient world is always to be able as well.¹

Part of the problem with espousing the existence of a particular epistemological process in ancient texts is defining the term 'epistemology' itself. A theory of knowledge requires that we speak about what it means 'to know' and yet the only use of 'know' in these first chapters of the Tanak are out of sorts with most analytic epistemological models. The first instances of 'know' are found in the opening chapters of Genesis in prominent positions: 'knowledge of good and evil', the man 'knew that he was naked', and 'the man knew his wife'. None of these clarify what we mean when we say 'knowledge' in a modern context.²

But even if we have clarified the term, how can we guarantee a robust discussion of

² Many comments about ancient epistemologies do not help to disentangle the definition either. E.g., 'To know in the ancient world is always to be able as well.' Von Rad, *Genesis*, 86.
epistemology *emic* to the biblical texts? Some skepticism about the plausibility of an *emic* epistemology of scripture will always remain. And we recognize here that our conversation (and interlocutors) will necessarily bring concepts *etic* to these texts, epistemological concerns of more recent interest.³ Our concern then is to read these texts of the Pentateuch and Mark's Gospel with the goal of seeing whether or not they have concerns about epistemological matters. And if the do evince such concerns, then what factors direct and shape the epistemological orientation of the text?

Further, we will be sensitive to the fact that epistemic matters in these texts may appear radically different from the manner in which current theories of knowledge shape the discussion. And so, we will tend to privilege the biblical texts in their canonical form, analyzing current epistemological theories in light of the understanding of knowledge evinced in the narratives of scripture, not vice versa.⁴ It might even be the case that the Hebrew and Greek texts will not be reconcilable to what we generally mean by 'epistemology' today. Perhaps, current and ancient epistemologies are ultimately incommensurable. That discussion will be shelved until the final chapter.

Concerning the narratives, we will not claim here to have definitive readings under an epistemological context. In other words, none of these narratives are *only* concerned with knowledge. Even in the primeval stories of Genesis where a 'tree of knowledge of good and evil' is at the literary center, there are patent complexities and multiple narratival trajectories. And for this study, we will focus on one of those trajectories: knowing. Reading these stories for what they have to tell us about knowing, how it might work properly, and how the people in these stories erred in their prospective knowing. At times, we will argue that knowledge is a centralizing feature of the narrative at hand (e.g., the knowledge plot of Exodus 1-14). But always, we are reading for epistemological features where admittedly, many other things are going on in any given story.

It should also be noted that many of the exegetical observations in this thesis have already been noticed by biblical scholars. The task of this current work has been to organize those observations, showing how they point toward an epistemological sensitivity in these texts. In order to proceed, we will assume that the Pentateuch and Mark's Gospel have a sense of epistemological consciousness operative in them and that they will present that sensibility in a way discernible to the reader.⁵ The question then becomes: How rigorous and uniform of an epistemological process can we discern in various texts? Or more controversially, is there only one epistemological presumed in these texts?

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³ I am appreciative to Dr. Nathan MacDonald for suggesting the *emic/etic* construction in this discussion.
⁴ Anthony Thiselton anticipates this concern: ‘Can such an ambitious agenda [the totalizing claims of the bible] rest on anything more than pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean innocence?’ *Thiselton on Hermeneutics: The Collected Works and New Essays of Anthony Thiselton* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 643.
Difficulties will be immediately encountered. The consistency of epistemic vocabulary varies, even in the early texts. For instance, the breadth of connotations concerning knowledge from a tree, knowledge of nakedness, and knowledge qua sexual intimacy in the first four chapters of the Pentateuch require that our methodology not be limited to a word study of יד or γνωσίς. Epistemological process then must be discerned through a literary reading that will sometimes involve the common terms for knowledge, but sometimes not. In other words, focusing our attention on the various manifestation of 'know' will not render the entire picture of epistemology and that has been the shortfall of some earlier treatments of a so-called biblical epistemology.

Further, focusing current epistemological models onto the texts does not render the entire picture either. Concerning epistemology in the Pentateuch and Mark, affirming the modern notion of propositions such as 'S knows P' (i.e., 'Subject knows Proposition') at certain points is not entirely alien to the narratives. For example, YHWH wants for Abraham to 'know for sure' that his promises to him will come true (Gen 15). But, it is how 'S' knows anything at all that we seek to explore here and especially when characters of the stories know erroneously. We want to describe both what characters came to know, but even more, how they erred in the epistemological process per the narrative.

Why study error? The problem with deriving epistemology from ancient texts is that the object of knowledge itself is often ambiguous or obscured to the reader. The Pentateuch places much emphasis on knowing as seeing something that never quite equates to a proposition, although it can be expressed sometimes in a propositional sentence. For instance, Adam comes to know that the woman is his proper mate and states the matter propositionally, 'This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh ….' But it was the man's ability to see that this was his mate that is constitutive of his knowledge and we are interested in how that seeing is honed.

Even more so, the object of knowing is often God himself and thus what is meant to be known still lies outside the perspective of the reader (e.g., Exod 29:46). What could it possibly mean, after all, that Israel could know YHWH as her God, or that the man and the woman knew that they were naked?

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5 Both in content and rhetoric, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that the canonical form of these texts reveal a patterned concern with epistemology as a plot of the narratives. We will not investigate the possibility of 'hidden' epistemology behind these texts (although inferences are necessary at times). Rather, we will pursue as much as is possible what appears to be an intentional effort to evince epistemological process.

6 See critiques of recent studies in OT epistemologies below.

7 Among other matters, Robert Robinson argues that narrative analysis can restore perspicuity to biblical theology providing some of the corrective historical, literary, and theological tension. 'Narrative Theology and Biblical Theology' in The Promise and Practice of Biblical Theology. Ed. John Reumann (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1991), 137-41.

8 Gen 3:23.

9 Gen 3:7.
These could mean many things, none of which would be entirely patent to us. But these epistemic objectives are generally ascribed to knowing-in-relationship rather than the analytical formulation in current fashion: 'knowing that'. Relational knowledge is not the popular parlance in current epistemology. Even where 'knowing that' is stated in the biblical texts, it is often stated in terms that are explicitly covenantal or resemble covenantal relationship. For instance, when God states 'know for sure that (דָּבָר) your offspring will be sojourners …,' (Gen 15:13) he speaks within what appears to be a covenantal ceremony. YHWH appears to bind Himself, possibly unto death, with Abram's descendants and the texts expects the reader to see the covenant ceremony as the justification for YHWH's declaration 'know for sure'. Similarly, to know that one is naked, in the sense that Genesis 2 juxtaposes it against Genesis 3, is to say that one is related to one's body in a different way than one was before. This seems to be an ultimate epistemological concern of the narrative, not on the periphery of the texts. Again, the problem is precisely this: the scriptures tend to focus exclusively on knowing in relationship, in contractum, rather than knowledge as an object.

Where the nominal form is used, knowledge still generally reflects knowing-in-relationship. In the vein of Thomas Nagel's clever argument for what it is like to be a bat, the Pentateuch and Mark appear most concerned that people know what it's like to be an obeyer of YHWH or Jesus respectively. Knowing appears as a skill, figuring out to whom one should listen, where one should look, and how one should understand what is being said. Even if one figures out to whom one should listen, skilled 'looking' and 'understanding' has equal weight in knowing and avoiding error. Jesus hounds his learned peers on this point in his Sermon on the Mount (Mat. 5-7). Merely knowing to whom they should listen (i.e., the Mosaic Law) does not bring them to understand what was meant to be known (i.e., the principles behind the Mosaic Law). Because knowing is relationally bound, the product of the epistemological process will not always be propositions whose veridicality we can justify. The object of knowledge is not always clear, but error is patent at many points in scripture. Thus, we will study in this thesis the constituent factors where characters of the narratives get it wrong.

This thesis must then do two things in reference to the academic discipline of epistemology.

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10 Attempts in analytic philosophy at reducing 'know how' to 'know that' remain unpersuasive given the nature of knowledge in these texts. See Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, 'Knowing How' The Journal of Philosophy vol. 98, no. 8 (2001): 411-444.
11 Meredith Kline, By Oath Consigned: A Reinterpretation of the Covenant Signs of Circumcision and Baptism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1975), 17-21.
12 Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like To Be A Bat?' in The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books, 1982).
First, it must consider if there are some current epistemological models that can help to explain what we find in the Pentateuch and Mark's Gospel. Epistemological theories *etic* to these texts can be proposed for similitude to what is in these narratives. But, the *emic* epistemological language and descriptions of these texts will be allowed to ultimately shape the conversation. In doing this, we are exhibiting submission to these texts as possibly authoritative in what proper human and theological epistemology ought to be. Second, we must be sensitive about how to reconcile the epistemology of these texts with current epistemological theory, especially those which operate under the banner of current Reformed or Roman Catholic thinking, to name just two. We will return to these in the last chapter.

In what Thomas Kuhn would eventually call 'incommensurability', Polanyi describes the insoluble gap between two epistemological systems: 'The two conflicting systems of thought are separated by a logical gap, in the same sense as a problem is separated from the discovery which solves the problem.' 13 This is the difficulty set before us here, whether or not the epistemological process of the scriptures is commensurate with something like Polanyi's broad scientific epistemology or Plantinga's narrower Reformed Epistemology, for instance. Further, we must determine whether or not the incommensurability between narrow and broad epistemologies is due to the necessity of a logical gap or whether they can be adapted to fit one another.

For Christian theology, perhaps the answer to this question comes from the scriptures themselves. If the texts weigh-in decisively on the side of broad or narrow epistemology, then of what concern are the other epistemologies? The necessity of a broad epistemological process will become apparent as we progress through the texts themselves. For now we must address the question: Can these ancient texts reveal an epistemological process?

**A. No: The Problem of the Hebrew Mind**

Can ancient and diverse texts reveal a rigorous epistemological process? Let us first deal with those who answer in the negative. Michael Carasik defends the notion that we can derive epistemologies from the Hebrew Bible against a definitive line of scholarship that posits an incommensurate epistemology between pre-Greek and post-Greek humanity. The goal of Carasik's study, which we will follow here, is not to show how the characters of these narratives 'thought', but

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rather to show 'biblical thinking about thinking'. Carasik's work represents a mode of scholarship that bears moderate resemblance to this current study, but diverges in cardinal respects to be discussed below.

1. Pedersen, Boman, and Jaynes.

Did ancient Israelites think like we do today? The 'No' camp on this question has been verbose in the twentieth century. Carasik begins his work by having to reject a slew of theories postulated in the last century regarding the possible differences between the Hebrew/ancient and Greek/modern mind. Wielding Barr's critique, Carasik rejects Johannes Pederson's idea of two minds. In brief, Pederson posits that the Israelites, like other ancient cultures, had no embedded construct for thinking and therefore, had no language to discuss a construct they did not hold. Instead, the Israelite mind could only address things perceived:

The Israelite does not occupy himself with empty nor with sharply defined space images. His logic is not the logic of abstraction, but of immediate perception. It is characteristic that the problems treated in the Old Testament are problems pertaining, not to thought, but to life, and that what they seek are not logical results.

For Pederson, the Hebrew mind is marked by the complete fusion of concepts so that a man can only conceive of action and outcome as a unity. For the Israelite, 'there is no such thing as "good intentions" because, 'The intention or will is identical with the totality of the soul which creates action."

For the Israelite—as for primitive peoples generally—the mental processes are not successive, but united in one, because the soul is always a unit, acting in one. But no more are the action and its result to be distinguished from each other or from the mental activities; they are implied in the actual mental process.

In a similar comparative study, Thorlief Boman develops the contrast between Israelite and Greek thinking using the dynamic/stative dichotomy. Where Israelites could only think in terms of dynamic action, Greeks harnessed the ability to think of bodies and properties as stative concepts now domesticated by their minds. His examination looks particularly at elements such as the verbs that describe inner mental states qua movement (e.g., קלח, שינה, etc.). In making the case, Boman argues that Hebrew thought was fundamentally psychological while Greek thought was logical. Logical, in this

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17 Pedersen, *Israel*, vol. 1, 132.
18 Pedersen, *Israel*, vol. 1, 124.
sense, consists of the ability to place 'ourselves objectively and impersonally outside the matter and ask what is the strict truth about it ....'\textsuperscript{20} As for the psychological Hebrew mind, 'In our psychic life, thinking and understanding are inseparable.' And, 'when we would understand a matter psychologically, we familiarize ourselves with it and through sympathetic pursuit of its development we try to grasp it as a necessity.'\textsuperscript{21}

James Barr's appraisal of these various mental expositions is unfavorable. He groups the two-mind proposals by the following properties: 1) Contrasts Greek thinking as static and Hebrew as dynamic, 2) contrasts Greek thinking as abstract and Hebrew as concrete, and 3) contrasts the Greek conception of man as a duality and Hebrew as unitary being. All of this is based upon the nature of language used in extant texts.

Barr's basic rejoinder aims at the faulty claim of two mentalities as expressed by the languages of the people represented. If Hebrew is the 'verb' mentality and Greek the 'noun', is that dichotomy reflective of their mentality \textit{per se} or the nature of the extant texts? Barr argues for the latter, pointing out the phenomenological aspect of the extant texts: 'the typical vehicle of Hebrew thinking is the historical narrative or the future prediction, both forms of literature in which the verb is likely to be of great significance ....'\textsuperscript{22} His second major critique points to the vague nature of the comparison itself. Boman et al., have constructed a theory of mentality that includes their own European mentality and Indo-European language group as the contrast to the Hebrew mentality and Semitic language group. This creates an ineffectual comparison to which Barr raises one implication. '[I]f the Greek language can be somehow correlated with certain abstract or static features of Greek thought, how is (say) the Albanian language, which is also Indo-European, related with these features?'\textsuperscript{23} In short, the two minds analysis is not self-reflected on the analysts themselves, and therefore, it is incomplete.

Later, Julian Jaynes would provide the evolutionary fuel for this discussion in his \textit{The Origin of Consciousness in The Breakdown of The Bicameral Mind} (1976).\textsuperscript{24} The basic premise focuses on the two parts of early man's brain (i.e., bicameral) where one side fires off commands to the other side and it obeys. This work in and of itself enters biblical criticism right at the level of bicameral functions, so that the right side of the bicameral brain is the center of processing voices. Bringing this analysis to the

\textsuperscript{20} Boman, \textit{Hebrew Thought}, 193.  
\textsuperscript{21} Boman, \textit{Hebrew Thought}, 193.  
\textsuperscript{22} Barr, \textit{Semantics}, 15.  
\textsuperscript{23} Barr, \textit{Semantics}, 18.  
\textsuperscript{24} Julian Jaynes, \textit{The Origin of Consciousness in The Breakdown of The Bicameral Mind} (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto, 1976).
Hebrew text, Jaynes argues that the Tanak offers the reader a history of the developing mind. It begins by being guided by hallucinogenic voices from divine beings (e.g., Exod 3). And because the early human bicameral mind operates by voice, it does what it is told by the other side of the brain. Only when consciousness arises in humans does the visual command guide humanity and seeing then becomes metaphorical for knowing. Where we find the ancient person of scripture hearing God, then we are reading about the bicameral human. When humankind reaches consciousness, then we read about people seeing what is going on. We cannot review the inherent problems of such a position here, other than to say that one must accept much more than merely the concept of a bicameral mind in order to bear fruit from such an analysis.  

This description, speculative as it might be, parlays into another ongoing discussion about the primacy of the aural over the visual and vice versa. Walter Ong and Susan Niditch represent some attempts to posit that oral mentality and literate mentality are different modes, but counterfactuals to these abound. Carasik makes the effort throughout his text to show why this is so. 

Indeed, the basic question needs to be taken up by the current thesis: Did ancient Israelites, as described in the Tanak and New Testament, think and therefore know like we do? Moreover, do we share any mentality with ancient peoples so that our constructs and language can map onto theirs in any productive way? An affirmative answer is required sine qua non to do any theological analysis of ancient texts. After this, we must then go along with Barr and Carasik to affirm that the language of scripture refers to the same epistemological constructs we have today mutatis mutandis.

If we do share mentality communicated by language, then how does one go about translating the language of scripture into the common epistemological referents we share today? That is exactly what this current thesis hopes to accomplish. Carasik prescribes the study of lexical use within narratives in order to gain acceptable overlapping language and constructs. For instance, when we say 'He thought X,' we grasp that this would be stated differently by some biblical authors. Some would have understood the heart (לב) to be the center of thoughts and intent. In looking at those narratives, we do not expect to see language about thinking, but rather the actions of one's heart. Through building up matrices of the use of specific language with reference to what we call mentality (i.e.,


epistemology), we can then come to know what the scripture writers intended to portray. Carasik is not suggesting that this would be a method for finding hidden beliefs about mentality, but that it becomes the framework to justify any conclusions we may draw from the texts.

Presuming that 1) we share epistemological constructs with ancient Israelites, 2) those constructs can be accessed through disparate linguistic depiction, and 3) we can justify our findings based upon the patterned use of this language, what do we then find? Carasik draws broad conclusions from specific areas of the Tanak. Briefly, his analysis reveals:

One basic framework underlies almost every biblical reference to the mind: a positive evaluation of thought whose origin is in the divine realm and a negative evaluation of thoughts which originate in the human mind without impetus from the divine.

Avoiding a review of his entire work, we can focus on the points of interest as Carasik looks at the Hebrew canon in this manner. As well, we must highlight some shortcomings of his analysis. It is worth noting that Carasik begins with a study of 'know' (יֶרֶשׁ). In linking knowing to intimacy (e.g., Gen 4:1 and other such rare occurrences) he gives us impetus to think about knowledge relationally, both in its social aspect and in the way a person physically comes closer to knowing something analogically. But in dealing with knowledge, he frames the discussion around his idea of sensory input, or what he calls 'the receptive mind'. So Carasik pursues how the writers used the language of the senses to convey thinking and knowing. The senses most frequently employed in the canon to depict thinking are hearing and seeing.

Again, fighting the idea that one sense or another has primacy for the type of mind operative in different histories, Carasik rejects the primacy of hearing over seeing. Hearing is often taken to be the mode of wisdom. In fact, he makes the argument that knowing is more closely associated with seeing, citing that the two form a 'standard hendiadys' with a dozen instances existing in the Tanak. With one major exception, general support for this position will follow below in my exposition of some of these hendiadyses.

Although his critique of the two-mind theory is correct in my estimation, it must be argued that his analysis of seeing and hearing lacks in two ways. First, while his examination is thorough and well constructed, it rarely engages with the Pentateuch. Most examples are drawn from the prophets and

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29 Carasik reveals that what he means by mentality is actually something like knowing, thinking, and remembering. *Theologies*, 11.
31 Carasik, *Theologies*, 20. There are four instances out of 174 in the Pentateuch where יֶרֶשׁ is employed to mean 'sexual intimacy'. Although this is rare, sexual intimacy is part of the semantic range of the term.
psalms when some superior examples could be taken from the Torah. This lends itself to the second problem which is failing to provide an epistemological structure. It is not his stated goal to outline an epistemology, but his study falls short if it does not state the working epistemological model upon which all these suppositions hang.

For instance, his second chapter on sensory language proficiently grasps the ineffectiveness of two-mind approaches initially deconstructed in his introduction. However, in displaying the use of these sensory terms for the purpose of showing their coherence, Carasik does not fully engage with how these terms work together to provide one epistemological picture. His hesitance is most likely based on his view that the Tanak offers a plurality of epistemologies, hence the 'Theologies' found in the title of his book.

Where the current analysis will diverge from Carasik is exactly this point. Beyond a plurality of authors and disparate settings, there appears an intent on unity of epistemological construct that is picked up in diverse stories and teaching. Carasik does not work his way through the story of Tanak canonically and he sees no theology of the mind. This study will continue by taking Carasik's method of looking for disparate language with overlapping constructs between the texts and within the Pentateuch and Mark. Some of this language will remain intact throughout the Pentateuch (e.g., שמע כֹּל) and some will be appropriated and modified into novel contexts. Of consequence to this thesis is that the underlying epistemological process remains the referent of all these linguistic variations between the narratives.33

Further, this thesis maintains that hearing and then seeing are often portrayed as knowing in the biblical texts. In this portrayal, hearing and seeing are in a particular relationship that derives from their description of a specific epistemological process at work in these texts. In brief, the texts advocate that to whom one listens (i.e., one's prophetic guide) determines what one can see. In seeing what is being shown by the prophetic guide, one can then know what is meant to be known. This relationship between seeing and hearing, while consonant with Carasik's study, never comes to fruition in his work because he maintains a plurality of epistemologies being described by the biblical texts. Therefore, Carasik often concludes that hearing and seeing act as hendiadys for 'witnessing'. Without the presupposition of multiple epistemologies, we are free to pursue the possibility of a unified epistemological process in these texts.

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33 It will be shown that the 'listen to the voice' pattern is not a signal that we have reverted back to the 'Hebrew mind'. The first 'voice' to be noticeably heeded in Genesis is the voice of the woman, not an invisible god making audible commands to be followed by a bicamerally-minded man.
2. Errors of Methodology in Biblical Theology

We have agreed in large part with Barr's critique of the Hebrew mind and Carasik's critique that extends to the bicameral version of the two-mind problem. Although Carasik comes up short at points, we can appreciate his methodological awareness of the constructs that lay behind the sentences and narratives. However, in seeking to find constructs behind language, how do we guard against the error of *looking down the lexical microscope only to find that we are using the text as a mirror to reflect ourselves back at us.* This dilemma is a blended allusion to what Crossan calls a, 'cheap gibe that the historical Jesus researchers are simply looking down a deep well and seeing their own reflections from below,' with the observation of Edward Hoskyns, 'You look down your critical microscope at the New Testament text with a view to describing the religious life of the first-century Christians, and you find that God is looking back at you through the microscope and declaring you to be a sinner.'

Crossan considers it 'cheap' to recite this critique because it is rarely if ever self-leveled. Thus, that is what we must now do. Barr seeks to guide biblical theology in the proper use of linguistics by the *via negativa.* He takes up the debate between T.F. Torrance and A.G. Hebert on the theological meaning of 'faith' and 'truth' in the scriptures. Barr pursues the problematic insistence by both theologians that there is a 'fundamental meaning' of a Hebrew word root (e.g., הָרֵאשׁ). Their debate then proceeds by arguing for this fundamental meaning, and according to Barr, commits several hermeneutical fallacies in the process.

The fundamental problem for Barr is that word formation is being neglected by both parties. This is symptomatic of the myopia concentrated on what he later terms the 'lexical stock' of scripture. Focusing on individual terms and their meaning leads to a theologizing from this 'lexical stock' scattered across the canon. But how can one guarantee that they are cohering a pattern inherent to the scripture itself?

It follows that the attempt to read off a theological structure or pattern from a survey of the lexical stock in general … is a misguided one, and one which if carried out only leads to a

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34 John Dominic Crossan, et al., *The Jesus Controversy.* (London, UK: Continuum, 1999), 2. The 'deep well' analogy is most likely referencing Tyrrell's statement, echoing Alfred Loisy: 'The Christ that Harnack sees, looking back through nineteen centuries of Catholic darkness, is only the reflection of a liberal Protestant face seen at the bottom of a deep well.' George Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Crossroads* (London, UK: Longmans, 1909), 44; Alfred Firmin Loisy, *L'évangile et l'église* (Ottawa, Canada: Chez l'auteur, 1903).


distortion of the linguistic material in the interests of the theological pattern.\textsuperscript{37}

Barr continues to indict the substantive dearth of this methodological pursuit of patterns via lexicography:

The attempt in much recent biblical theology to demonstrate the existence of a biblical lexical stock of words or 'concepts' (in this case what we may call 'word-concepts' and not 'sentence-concepts') which are semantically distinctive, that is to say, which have a semantic distinctiveness of the faith and theology of the Bible, is in principle a failure.\textsuperscript{38}

With Barr's cutting critique of biblical theology in hand, how does one proceed in using language to build a case for theology? Barr's reply is to think in terms of sentences. This analytical move is meant to raise the biblical theologian above the rudimentary denotation of word roots and to place of theological meaning in realm of a sentences:

The theological statement can be restated in another language, even though the mechanisms are not the same in the new language and even though the words used in the new language may have certain other significance elsewhere which the original words did not have ...\textsuperscript{39}

Wanting to be sensitive to Barr's critique, this analysis must proceed with an affinity to sentences bearing theological meaning within larger contexts, both narratival and rhetorical.\textsuperscript{40} This means that support for a theological position cannot be asserted solely based on individual terms (e.g., שִׁמְחָה, רָאָה, etc.). Rather, support must be demonstrated from the linguistic context from which those terms gain their meaning. It might be further argued that the larger narrative structures often bear the ultimate theological meaning, as pithy truisms do not occur in a narratival vacuum. The conflict, narratival tension, characters, and plot movement toward resolution all can play on the words and meaning to such a degree that the story becomes the ultimate context for the lexical stock, thereby nullifying the notion of 'lexical stock' itself.\textsuperscript{41}

**B. Yes: Methodological Considerations**

Taking on board all the precautions of such a study, we can still affirm the methodology. We

\textsuperscript{37} Barr, *Semantics*, 264.
\textsuperscript{38} Barr, *Semantics*, 269.
\textsuperscript{39} Barr, *Semantics*, 265-6.
\textsuperscript{40} Although we cannot argue for it here, legal and ceremonial teaching/practice of the Pentateuch does fit into the epistemological process that we discern in these narratives. The legal codes often act as maxims in the Polanyian sense where they have no propositional content in se, but only become coherent when one is in the act of committing the prescribed epistemological process. Polanyi, *PK*, 31-2. The matter of maximic language in knowing will be explored more fully in the final chapter.
\textsuperscript{41} Something similar has been argued in the Narrative Approach to Paul where the *dianoia* (i.e., interpretive framework) applied to the Tanak and Gospel narratives constrain the rhetorical meaning of the Paul's letters. Bruce W. Longenecker, “The Narrative Approach to Paul: an Early Retrospective,” *Currents in Biblical Research*, vol. 1.1, 94-103.
will briefly consider the very first narrative of the Pentateuch as an example of how this methodology could proceed. After the creation of the man, the paradise narrative of Genesis (2:4b-3:24) centers around two quests for knowledge and the subsequent stumbling to that end. This rather uncontroversial point becomes less patent when surveying most of the literature on this literary unit. In three major commentaries on Genesis (Speiser, von Rad, and Westermann) and their interlocutors, we find little room for questions such as, 'What were the man and woman meant to know and how?' This is not a shortcoming of these analyses per se, but rather a methodological difference. For the purpose of discerning the possibility of an epistemological trajectory in the canon, we will look at these first stories and ask the question, 'Do they betray an inherent interest in or explicit description of epistemology?'

If we answer 'yes', then what methodology will yield a convincing epistemic description from the text that is not forced, contrived, or tenuous to the point of ambivalence? Regarding Genesis 2-3, it is necessary first to demonstrate what knowing appears as before the Fall, although the error of Genesis 3 helps to clarify the instance of knowing in Genesis 2. Despite the fact that this primeval history spans from Genesis 1-4 as one story, we will concentrate specifically on 2:5-3:24. These two sections will be read as one story that exhibits literary interdependence between the two chaptered sequences. If there is one narrative arc, then the problem of chapter three must be resolved in light of chapter two. It is hoped that this reading of Genesis will not only be offered as an alternative, but can be maintained as a reading that sheds more light on the narrative's plot and its resolution.

An approach that could maximize this end is a kind of 'methodological pluralism', examining the text through narrative, rhetoric, and form analyses both diachronically within the Pentateuch and synchronically within the individual texts. This strategy will allow us to look at the parts and their relation to the whole. In the next chapter, we will examine the story in the second and third chapters of Genesis in order to see what is meant to be known and what went wrong. In considering the

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42 See especially: Speiser, Genesis; Westermann, Genesis I-11; Von Rad, Genesis; Cassuto, Genesis; Waltke, Genesis; Delitzsch, Genesis; Gunkel, Genesis; Moberly, From Eden to Golgotha; Wenham, Genesis 1-15.
43 Lexical links and the narrative structure give us reason to include Gen 4 as part of one long story (e.g., compare Gen 3:16d and 4:7b). But our examination hopes to show why Gen 2-3 must be read together, at the very least, when considering the error of Gen 3, despite whatever happens in the ensuing events of Gen 4.
44 I first ran across this term 'methodological pluralism' in Nathan MacDonald, Deuteronomy and the Meaning of 'Monotheism'. Forschungen zum Alten Testament 2 Reihe (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1.
45 Desmond Alexander notes the tendency of literary criticisms to bring an 'a-historical' ambivalence to the Pentateuch and questions whether it is appropriate for this specific set of canonical texts. For the purpose of this thesis, the literary features of the final form will guide, but not blind. From Paradise to the Promised Land: An Introduction to the Main Themes of the Pentateuch (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1995), 4.
elements of these narratives, we will sometimes employ the tools from Michael Polanyi's scientific epistemology among others, especially those aspects which develop a somatic and phenomenological view of knowing.

It is hoped that both through this kind of interactive analysis between the texts and recent epistemological models, richer and more comprehensive insights regarding knowledge in the Pentateuch might emerge. The objection arises that several epistemologies might parallel the several sources of the Pentateuch. We cannot argue here for an absolutely native view of epistemology from across disparate sources of the Pentateuch. Our more modest goal is to consider what epistemological motifs develop for the reader of the canon, especially the Marcan author as a reader of the canon.

II. PRIOR TREATMENTS AND METHODOLOGY

While works on epistemology interacting heavily with biblical texts are scarce, they are not entirely absent. In recent years, there are several treatments that deal explicitly with the epistemological content of major portions of the Christian scriptures. Below, we will survey those recent treatments. Then, before we move on to our proposed methodology, we will assess a strictly theological/philosophical treatment of biblical epistemology in Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments. In light of these epistemological examinations, types of error will be fleshed out as not all errors are interesting for our purposes.

A. Previous Treatments of 'Biblical Epistemology'

Of these works, we must show here both their strengths and shortcomings in setting out an epistemological description in agreement with scripture. Our critique will focus on two poles: 1) analyses that do not evince fidelity in representing the scriptures and 2) analyses that approach the scripture with a methodology too narrow to generalize to the whole.

1. Shlomo Biderman: Scripture and Knowledge

In terms of fidelity to the scriptures, Shlomo Biderman's Scripture and Knowledge is a conceptual analysis with a distant relationship to the Christian scriptures. Its stated goal is to assess knowledge in relation to scripture as a religious concept, not the scriptures of Judaism or Christianity per se. Hence, Biderman is free to draw upon the scriptures of several religions in order to make the thesis resonate more widely. The weakness of this study is intentional, not internal to the work itself.
However, the strengths of the study are that it reveals an awareness of modern epistemology while highlighting the inability of that epistemological theory to capture what occurs in the concept of religious scripture.

The twin peaks of this study for our purposes are first, Biderman's assertion that propositional and non-propositional knowledge are 'entangled', and second, the role of authority in knowing. First, Biderman takes the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge to be somewhat normative throughout. This epistemology, which we will discuss further in the last chapter, assesses knowledge to be some machination of justified true beliefs. Biderman reveals his basic assumptions as:

1) religion is a worldview of ideas and practices;
2) within religion scripture functions to give knowledge and guarantee its certainty; and
3) the language of scripture does not reduce to propositional or non-propositional uses.  

Eschewing the problems inherent to these three assumptions alone, we can direct attention to positive aspects of the work. Biderman claims that the problem for religious epistemology is that, 'Propositional and non-propositional knowledge are entangled in religion, without any well-defined lines of demarcation.' Due to this problem of muddied entanglement, a problem for analytic epistemological accounts, justification must limit itself to an appeal to authority because current accounts of justification cannot respond to the entanglement of propositional and non-propositional knowledge.

I refer to the complicated dialectical relations between the everyday, standard knowledge we gain of the world and the knowledge that scripture is perceived to give. To be treated as knowledge, scripture must justify its knowledge-claims. In its need for justification scripture is fundamentally similar to ordinary beliefs about the world. However, the entanglement between propositional knowledge and non-propositional knowledge that characterizes scripture makes the process of the justification of religious knowledge all the more problematic, especially since the justification is usually found within scripture itself.

This peak of Biderman's thesis recognizes the reality of entanglement as a core problem of epistemological description within religions. The normative concepts and the language of analytic epistemology do not tend to address this entanglement with rigor. This leads to the second peak of the study: authority. Overstepping the textual evidence in favor of a less cluttered thesis, Biderman claims that every proposition of scripture is an appeal to authority.

For Biderman, authority is when one declares the validity of evidence. His discussion

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47 Biderman, 103.
48 Biderman appears to be (inadvertently?) pitting a general propositional knowledge against a special non-propositional knowledge. Scripture, 95-6.
49 Biderman, Scripture, 103.
presumes authority without ever assessing how one gains authority. In this sense, he seems to conflate the issues of authentication and authority.

Relying on authority for justification seems inevitable, because of the entanglement of propositional and non-propositional that rules out the use of standard epistemological justifications. Justification by authority is an indirect procedure in which scripture is taken to include the evidence for the truth of its knowledge-claims. The result is that the declaration of the authority of scripture amounts to declaring the validity of the evidence it provides.\(^{50}\)

We can agree that epistemology requires authoritative guidance, as is the case in scientific epistemology. But this is exactly where Biderman divides with this thesis. He describes two epistemologies, scriptural and normal, special and general. Normal epistemology is something like justified true belief. However, scriptural epistemology for him requires a 'distinct and focused authority'. Scriptural authority cannot be causal or exerted, but only an internal relationship which manifests in obedience. Biderman's view of authority is basically amenable to what we will find described in the Pentateuch and Gospel narratives. However, we will make the grander claim that it should not be in juxtaposition to normal (i.e., non-religious) epistemology, but seen as entirely commensurate. Loosely stated, we could roughly agree with many of Biderman's assertions if he were willing to extend them to epistemology in general.

2. Meir Malul: *Knowledge, Control and Sex*

In a similar way, Meir Malul's work *Knowledge, Control and Sex* attempts an analysis critically distant from the texts themselves. Malul admits that this will not be a textual analysis, but relies very heavily on cultural anthropology throughout and this has been the common critique of the work.\(^{51}\) In appropriating an anthropological approach, he also affirms the Hebrew/Greek dichotomy of Boman.\(^{52}\)

As the title of the work states, Malul believes that all biblical (re Tanak) epistemology is driven by sex and control. In some ways, this thesis will affirm Malul's work. For instance, error will be seen along the lines of characters seeking to control the outworking of God's promises. In their attempt at control, they come to know things that they probably did not want to know (e.g., what it is like to be exiled from the Garden of Eden). Also, Malul points out what has been invoked by the Rabbis and

\(^{50}\) Biderman, *Scripture*, 103.

\(^{51}\) 'By the end of the book, I was disappointed that Malul's work had not yielded a greater cache of insights into Biblical epistemology .... In short, the value of this book lies in the processes, described so carefully by Malul ....' Ziony Zevit, Review: *Knowledge, Control and Sex: Studies in Biblical Thought, Culture and Worldview* by Meir Malul. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* vol. 123, no. 3. (2003): 670-672.

others, namely that knowledge has always been somehow connotatively entangled with sexual intimacy. So in these respects, Malul has put biblical epistemology back into the human body, which has added some counter-Enlightenment ballast to his argument.

The problematic aspect to this work is Malul's singular focus that reduces all knowing down to just these impulses and outcomes. This somatic/sexual recognition is the sort of detail upon which Malul focuses his entire anthropological analysis of biblical epistemology. Douglas Yoder provides pithy summary and critique when he says, 'It comes as no surprise given his starting point that one of Malul's signal conclusions is that a "central pillar of biblical epistemology" is "carnal knowledge." It would come as a surprise to the Tanak.'

3. Annette Schellenburg: Erkenntnis als Problem

Schellenburg's text Erkenntnis als Problem is a substantial treatment of the word ידע in the Tanak. Within it, she explores both the scholarship concerning knowledge in the OT and the 'problem' of knowledge in selected sections of the narratives. Her methodology puts her in pursuit of the limits (die Grenzen) and the sources (die Quellen) of knowledge in the Tanak. Due to this focus on limits and sources, her thesis concentrates on the epistemology of Qohelet. Her analysis differs from the above in that she is very concerned to represent what is present within the texts and refrains from reconciling what a biblical epistemology might look like in relation to current theories.

For our purposes, Schellenberg's work is a commendable exercise, but methodologically incommensurate with the current thesis. Working from Qohelet, she then takes knowledge to be fundamentally problematic for humans as it puts them in oppositional relationship to God. Withholding a discussion of the nature of knowledge itself, she posits that the new knowledge in the garden is what caused distance between humanity and God, but that the new knowledge was good. Hence, eating of the tree was bittersweet, a gain and a loss. It was the gain of knowledge, but this upper hand is followed by the disjunct in relationship with God, embodied in the Edenic exile. There was then a sacrifice of

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53 Barth offers a corrective understanding that the Fall proliferates 'primarily in the perversion of their mutual relationship, namely their sexual relationship,' but he continues on to say that the 'grandeur of sin cannot be merely equated to sexual corruption.' CD, III/1, 285-6.

54 Douglas Yoder, Tanakh Epistemology: A Philosophical Reading of an Ancient Semitic Text. Dissertation: Thesis (Ph. D.), Claremont, Calif.: Claremont Graduate University, 2007. See also fn 31 in this thesis for the rarity of 'knowledge' as 'carnal knowledge'.

55 Annette Schellenberg, Erkenntnis als Problem: Qohelet und die alttestamentliche Diskussion um das menschliche Erkennen. Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis (OBO) no. 188 (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Reprecht, 2002).

56 Her discussion is all despite the fact that there is no prima facie reason to see Qohelet as a text that should guide our reading of the OT writ large.
nearness in favor of knowledge.

We will show below that this is not the case and only through a prerequisite belief in knowledge qua problematic can one read her interpretation more broadly. We can agree with Schellenberg that knowledge appears to be a problem, but the persistent questions that Schellenberg does not answer are two-fold. What kind of knowing occurred before the Fall; i.e., Was it problematic before Genesis 3? And, was the *error* of Genesis 3 mere knowledge-producing egalitarian states of being or was the error itself the epistemological process that produced this knowledge?

4. Douglas Yoder: *Tanak Epistemology*

Yoder's 2007 doctoral dissertation *Tanak Epistemology* is the most comprehensive work on the exploration of a 'native epistemology' in the OT texts. At over 200,000 words in length, it is both broad and engaged in all the requisite fields for what he is attempting. After a thorough assessment and critique of Western philosophy's inability to access the ancient philosophy native to Semitic texts, Yoder begins his pursuit of 'native epistemology' in full.

Although this work is highly insightful and one that must be considered within the topic as a whole, two weaknesses emerge that beget further problems. First, the work is too broad and too large. It is unwieldy as a thesis and requires the reader to mentally organize much of the seemingly disparate movement between texts and topics. Second and more importantly, his central methodology on how to pursue the goal of an epistemology 'native' to the Tanak is unconvincing, even if the fruit of his work is of great worth. He begins in the text of Daniel which is superficially perplexing as Daniel is not generally regarded as a centralizing text in the Hebrew canon. Yoder justifies his methodology by the observation that Daniel 2 has the highest concentration of the root יד in the Tanak. On the statistical merits alone, Yoder proceeds: "The text [Daniel 2] may be read instead as a sophisticated presentation of epistemology: of what knowledge is, of how one arrives at it, and the nature of its relation to the exercise of power."

The justification for this approach reveals a general disposition toward the text that is carried throughout. While his reading of the Daniel passage is commendable and largely consistent to the present work in its essential exegesis, it is not clear how this creates or supports a view of epistemology writ large in the Tanak. He then moves on to explore several features of lexicography that will be explored in this thesis as well; particularly, the relationship of hearing, seeing and knowing in the

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57 Yoder, *Tanak Epistemology*.
58 Yoder, *Tanak Epistemology*, 94.
Tanak. But because of its breadth and desire to connect it to a current epistemological conversation, he is limited to speaking of hearing and seeing without nuanced relationship to each other. In his astute reading of Exodus 2 and the Balaam narratives (Num 22-24), he opts to reduce seeing and hearing to an evidential role. The same goes for his discussion of how the phrase 'hearing YHWH', flattened in translation to 'obedience', does not capture the fullness of what is meant. This thesis agrees with the latter point, but will provide the exegetical support to show how these terms are used in a particular arrangement to achieve precise epistemological ends. Again, because of the exhaustive task of his thesis, Yoder is generally set to roving through texts and evaluating how these terms are used within those disparate texts. But his method for selecting which texts receive attention and gain priority in interpretation is never fully justified. Yoder continues on to a substantial account of the epistemology of Qohelet as an 'epistemico-sapiential critique' of Western and Enlightenment thought. Again, Qohelet is a point of focus because of the statistical frequency of הָדֹר.

In a wider sense, Schellenberg and Yoder allow us to resolve the problem of methodology. If we agree that Biderman and Malul are working too far afield from the texts, the resolution cannot be to merely turn to the texts. The question is begged: To which texts should we turn? Not all texts are equally viable to describe epistemological process as some portions of scripture become the lens through which to view the others. Just as Schellenberg uses Qohelet and Yoder employs Daniel and Qohelet (among others), we must make a case for a starting point.

Our starting point will be the start of the canonical story of Israel in Genesis 2-3. We should note that word frequency is not a determining factor here, although frequency can sometimes be an appropriate lens to apply to texts. The reason for beginning in Genesis 2-3 will be demonstrated by looking at how different parts of the Pentateuch resemble the creation narrative in the unfolding story of the canon of Israel. The same is true for the Gospels' relationship to the NT. This will have to be demonstrated in our exegesis, but the question of error in epistemological process must take into account the errors that loom large in the text. It is difficult to think of an error more blatantly efficacious, at least in the history of Christian theology, than that of Genesis 3. As we proceed forward

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59 I hesitate to claim Yoder's work as lacking nuance because his study is erudite. But eventually, we will claim that the way one reads the relationship between hearing, seeing and knowing becomes determinative for what epistemological process is being described in the text.
60 Yoder, Tanak Epistemology, 238-54.
61 Yoder, Tanak Epistemology, 282f.
in the Pentateuch from Genesis 3, we will see that the language and narrative structure can be observed over and again by the reader of Israel's canon. The questions posed in this investigation are two-fold: 1) Is there a paradigm for knowing and error, and 2) how broadly can the lens of a paradigmatic error be observed in other texts of the Tanak?

While we admire and build upon the biblical work of Schellenberg and Yoder, to discern an epistemological process described in the texts we will first seek the possibility of a central epistemological process that allows us to discern other descriptions of knowing and error in the Tanak and beyond.

B. Focused Epistemological Treatments

There are other extant works on epistemology of the biblical texts mostly covering a genre or class of texts. For example, Michael Fox's essays on epistemology in the wisdom literature are especially helpful. Ryan O'Dowd's *The Wisdom of Torah* is incisive in its analysis of the epistemological content of Deuteronomy and its connectives with wisdom literature. As well, other texts in evangelical scholarship have sought to rework extant theological epistemologies. Frame's clearly written tome, *The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God*, considers itself to be a Van Tillian counter-ballast regarding Reformed Epistemology. Frame's astute awareness of the twentieth century epistemological landscape aids in this perspicacious account. Although it is both theologically and scripturally sensitive, as well as largely in line with this current work, it is not derivative of a biblical analysis. Other works such as Rosalind Selby's *The Comical Doctrine* go further to attempt an epistemology of NT hermeneutics. The introductory chapters display a masterful synthesis over the fields of epistemology and hermeneutics, which leads her to aver Polanyi as the most sensible epistemology commensurable to NT studies. Her final chapter is mostly exegesis of the Transfiguration of Mark's Gospel to illustrate her method. But Selby's 'epistemology of NT hermeneutics' rests more in


the contemporary hermeneutical conversations than it relies upon what is at work in the narratives themselves. So Selby's work, like Frame's, is more externally funded by recent scholarly conversations rather than biblically shaped.68

The 2007 collection of essays in *The Bible and Epistemology* reveals both an intensifying interest in the topic by biblical scholars and the need for a theological model of epistemology that can span these disparate texts of Christian scripture:

The unaccountable void to which we refer lies in the world of biblical studies. If one seeks to discover what the Bible reveals about matters epistemological it would be natural to think we could turn for an answer to biblical scholars. But amazingly, there has been very little work done by biblical scholars .... The aim of this volume is to begin to fill in this conspicuous and perilous hole in Christian reflection.69

The reason we cannot simply plaster over this 'perilous hole' by patching together all the current work of biblical scholarship on epistemology is two-fold.70 Primarily, there is a lack of common language and constructs that would allow one to translate the findings of the various authors. There would need to be a consortium of sorts to address the inevitable issues that would surface. Douglas Yoder reminds us that many portrayals of epistemology from biblical scholars can tend to suffer from, 'the lack of a theoretical background in philosophy that would enable cross-disciplinary investigation to be carried out at a level of deeper meta-epistemic significance.'71 Secondarily, there needs to be a means to adjudicate between conflicting epistemological accounts. For example, Stephen Moore72 posits a significantly different epistemology from Luke's gospel than Thomas Stegman.73 The details of the differences are not as important as the fact that conflicting accounts require us to have some criteria by which to judge their fidelity to the text under examination. We do not have to espouse which is right or wrong, but we must have some means for saying one understanding is better than the others. If we can discern an epistemological process that is begun in Genesis and resonates through the Gospels, then we might be able to develop basic criteria from those literary findings in order to discriminate between more and less viable accounts of so-called biblical epistemology.

68 The same general comments apply to other theological treatments (some commensurable with this thesis), but without exegetical warrant: Horton, 'Covenantal Epistemology'; Feenstra, 'Epistemic Parity'; Winquist, 'Epistemology of Darkness'; Dahms, 'Trinitarian Epistemology'; Treier, *Virtue*; Gunton, 'Knowledge and Culture'.


C. Kierkegaard as Paradigmatic for Theological Approaches to Error

We have argued that the above approaches have methodological limitations, either too aloof from the texts of scripture or wedded to assumptions that do not allow the texts to shape the epistemological models. We have yet to discuss theological approaches, and our main concern with theological investigation will mirror our concerns about the methods discussed so far: starting points and fidelity to the texts. A theological analysis of knowing and error can be accurate to the sacred texts on which it relies without having demonstrated that fidelity by means of exegesis. We may be able to agree with the conclusions of the analysis, but still differ on what constitutes evidence for those conclusions. But the same problem arises, without the exegetical analysis of scripture to sustain a particular view of biblical epistemology, how can we adjudicate between conflicting theologies? Or, how do we judge theological error in a singular instance?

So far, we have been using the term 'error' as if it is uniform. But there are different sorts of error and these need to be differentiated. Further, our definition of error relies in its entirety on the presumption of epistemological goals operative in the Pentateuch and Mark. If a stated goal is to know what it is like to be a pietistic practitioner of Israel's religion, then that goal will dictate a particular definition of error. Or if the goal is to be learners of truth, per Kierkegaard, then a different view of error might emerge.

Now we will consider Murray Rae's claim that Kierkegaard's epistemology is one with close affinity to the Christian canon. For Kierkegaard, the epistemic goal is to be 'released from the bondage of untruth' and 'to learn the Truth'. This is not 'a matter of assenting to a series of propositions but of existing "before God"'. Through the gift of faith from God alone, we are transformed through metanoia (i.e., penitent change) by the revelation of the Truth of Christ.

Rae associates this process of metanoia with a transformation similar to Kuhn's paradigm shift. He suggests that 'learning Christ' is not just learning principles or maxims, rather, it is transformative and incommensurate with the former way of existing. Unlike the concept of gestalt, one cannot flip back and forth between one's past and transformed relationship with the object of knowledge. Instead, because one is epistemically transformed when they learn Christ, one can only see through the new

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75 Rae, 213.
lenses of transformation.⁷⁶

What is the problem in our epistemology according to Kierkegaard? We are not merely mistaken, but much for the worse, we exist in error. It is our being that exists in the bondage of untruthfulness and error which needs reclamation.

The teacher is then the god himself, who, in acting as an occasion, prompts the learner to be reminded that he is untruth and is that through his own fault. But this state – to be untruth and to be that through one's own fault, what can we call it? Let us call it sin.⁷⁷

Through Rae's assessment of Kierkegaard, we find an epistemological structure that is amenable to what we will demonstrate from the scriptures. There are unmistakable signals in the texts that self-deception and hasty desire intrudes or overcomes what the characters are meant to know and upon which they are to subsequently act.⁷⁸ The notion that knowing is a transformational act surely fits the epistles' descriptions of what happens in Christian conversion. But the problematic feature of Kierkegaard's epistemology is that it only describes the movement from untruthfulness (error) to truth (God) through repentance (metanoia). While this description is helpful, it does not appear to account for the entirety of error and knowing encountered in the Christian canon, most notably: Genesis 2-3.

One question emerges from the scriptures that challenges Kierkegaard: If knowing is situated within our being in untruth, then what can be said about knowing in Genesis 2? This thesis will argue that a basic account of epistemology free from sin and error exists in Genesis 2. How does Kierkegaard account for the first couple moving from existence in truthfulness to existence in error? If we understand Kierkegaard to claim that conversion recoups our epistemic faculties, then we can sufficiently address the Fall and what was lost after humanity entered into sin. We lost the proper use of our faculties and the proper relationship to 'the god',⁷⁹ if holiness is the ultimate distinction between the god and man as Kierkegaard claims.⁸⁰ However, regarding Genesis 2-3, Fragments lacks the discussion to substantiate how humanity transformed from truthfulness to error, to move between what Ricoeur calls: the 'supralapsarian state of innocence and an infralapsarian state of peccability'.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Rae, 118-39.
⁷⁸ E.g., Saul's fear of the people in 1 Sam. 15:24.
⁷⁹ 'The god' is Kierkegaard's terminology.
⁸⁰ ‘But if this god is to be absolutely different from a human being, this can have its basis not in that which man owes to the god (for to that extent they are akin) but in that which he owes to himself or in that which he himself has committed. What, then, is the difference? Indeed, what else but sin, since the difference, the absolute difference, must have been caused by the individual himself.’ Kierkegaard, Fragments, 46-7.
Without this accommodation, the most significant epistemic error in the whole of scripture is essentially annexed. This annex creates a further ambiguity, for it is not clear is whether Kierkegaard adequately creates space in his argument for differentiating sinfulness writ large from a particular sin. In Kierkegaard, because error is ultimately rooted existentially, he does not fruitfully discuss how a particular sin causes error beyond sinfulness (existing in error).

Kierkegaard's work gives us reason to believe that the general concern of theology might need to be our relation to our 'being in error' rather than a mere mental mistake. In this sense, we can agree in principle with Kierkegaard's conclusions. But for this thesis, we need to show how these texts arrive at similar conclusions. His theological attempt at describing error and knowledge in existential terms appears largely successful, but because we cannot inspect his exposition of particular texts from scripture, we cannot affirm his conclusions as entirely commensurate with the present work. On these grounds, simple adaptation of a theological approach is insufficient if those approaches do not provide some theological exegesis.

D. Errors of Interest

There is no methodological path that can avoid positing an initial epistemology that may need realignment by what we find in the texts. Thus, let us offer this terse and provisional epistemological framework before we proceed: The epistemological process for which this thesis will argue affirms that knowing requires committed yielding to authoritative guides that can help dispose one to participate in the act of knowing (e.g., learning language, golf swings, the history of the Britons, etc.). The errors of interest, then, are the ones where knowers are equipped and disposed to know, yet they do not because of a failure to either acknowledge the authenticated authority and/or participate in the process prescribed by that authority.

1. Errors of Learning or Unintentional Mistakes

This thesis is intent to focus on the kinds of error which are linked to a particular sin, but not necessarily sinfulness. We will disregard errors of flat ignorance, but instead aim at those requiring a disposition to know. Illustratively, it would not be an interesting study to look at the myriad linguistic mistakes that children make in acquiring language, anymore than it would be in examining the kinesthetic mistakes of an adult learning to drive a golf ball. These types of error are teleological in that they tend toward future knowing, they have the potential of being self-correcting. For instance, a child's misuse of language, such as my daughter's penchant for saying 'him' instead of 'his', vectors toward eventually knowing 'what it is to use language precisely'. This epistemological stumbling is essential to
know anything and is not considered an error proper. This is why we often bracket these errors with colloquialisms such as 'rookie mistake'.

2. The Spurious Notion of Ignorance as 'Needing More Information'

As well, there is a category of error that may or may not be a legitimate error, but one that must be considered nonetheless. It is the error of ignorance due to sinfulness (i.e., the so-called noetic effects of the Fall: finitude, broken mental mechanisms, etc.). This supposes a situation where someone attempts to know something, but all that hinders them is a supposed lack of information. For instance, the error of the post-resurrection disciples in denying the apostolic office of Saul is a significant error. The author reveals to the reader both the veridicality of Paul's claim to apostleship and the ignorance of the disciples (Acts 9:26-31). It appears that if the brothers in Jerusalem only had more information, then they too, along with the reader, could know that 'Saul the persecutor' is now 'Paul the apostle'.

The question is whether or not this is an error on the disciples' part or on Paul's part or whether there is any error at all. We must argue that this is not an error on the basis that information is not what resolved the conflict internal to that story. Rather, it was testimony which resolved the conflict and this testimony evinces a whole other epistemological framework that cannot be based on a modern notion of information. To show this, we must clearly distinguish between what is meant by information over and against testimony. The idea that the disciples simply needed more information connotes that these autonomous rational agents were as a court, weighing the possibility that it could be true that 'Saul is now an apostle', a datum-centric view of the scene. But it was not the case that the apostles merely needed more evidence. Even though we can and do speak conventionally this way, there is something more than brute evidence being presented here.

To resolve what was deficient, we turn to the narrative itself where we see the different phases of their epistemic assent. The apostles began in fear of Saul and did not believe (9:26). What disposed them to go from not believing (μὴ πιστεύειν) to learning (ἐπιγνώσκειν), and by implication, believing that 'Paul is an apostle'? If we assert that the apostles needed more 'information', then we might misconstrue the situation. It begins with their willingness not to hear 'information', but to hear the testimony of Barnabas. Claiming that they needed more information is akin to claiming that maps direct people to where they need to go. This manner of speaking may correspond to our experience as

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82 This whole scenario is meant to reveal the problem of an ahistorical, contextless, and modernist term like 'information'.
long as we acknowledge that the cartographer actually guided us via the map. Testimony of the cartographer undergirds the 'information' on a map.\(^{83}\)

In order to know whether or not Paul is an apostle, the apostles of Jerusalem must acknowledge Barnabas as an authoritative guide. They must not only hear Barnabas, but entertain the possibility that Jesus' good news may be more inclusive and transformative than they had previously expected, even including people such as Saul the persecutor. In yielding to Barnabas' testimony, they must participate in the larger trajectory which we could call: 'knowing the kingdom of God'. And the apostles must integrate these novel events into that trajectory, despite their ability to gauge them fully. The possibility of knowing the expansive nature of the kingdom of God required commitment on their part at a level that is certainly heightened considering the apostle in question (i.e., Saul the persecutor).

The point here is that these apostles were disposed to know certain things about the kingdom of God and its expansiveness (re Acts 1:6-11). But the apostles were not disposed to discern that Saul could become Paul under that same kingdom of God rubric. Only in their commitment to know through Barnabas could these indiscernible particularities of Saul's life become focused and resonant with the grander trajectory of knowing the expansiveness of the kingdom of God (cf. Mark 4:30-34).

It appears to be an error on the disciples' part only if we remove the story from its larger epistemological context. But if we plot this account in a larger trajectory which we could title 'disciples coming to know that the kingdom of God expands to all humanity', then we see this episode as one instance toward disposing the disciples to know the kingdom of God. In like kind, we could include episodes such as Peter and the Gentiles (Acts 10) and the apostolic council (Acts 15) among others.

This thesis will not argue that the apostles were wrong or mistaken in the sense of error, but that the epistemological process, because it is fundamentally social, lends itself to tentativeness in knowing. Something similar could be said of Thomas Didymus (John 20) or even the scientific enterprise writ large. The author and reader are the only ones disposed to assess this situation as an error on the part of the disciples and then only from within a constrained view of this particular passage. However, this scene reveals the disciples were not meant to know this novel particularity (i.e., Saul was now an apostle) outside of their submission to Barnabas' testimony.\(^{84}\) Given the volatile nature of Palestine in

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\(^{83}\) Kevin Vanhoozer makes this same point in his essay on how to interpret theodrama. 'Lost in Interpretation? Truth, Scripture and Hermeneutics'. Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society vol. 48, no. 1 (2005): 89-114.

\(^{84}\) We will not engage the current philosophical debate between reductive and non-reductive accounts of testimony. For a survey of that work, see footnote 79 of the final chapter of this thesis. For an apt summary of testimony, see John Lamont, 'A Conception of Faith in the Greek Fathers' in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology. Eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University, 2009).
those days, to invite Saul into the apostolic circle without Barnabas' testimony would have been far more than an error, it could have been calamitous. Importantly, the apostles' previous knowledge under Jesus did not dispose them to see such things as Saul the persecutor becoming Paul the proponent. It required an authoritative guide by means of Barnabas' testimony.

3. Errors of Interest

The errors of interest then, are not stumblings on a learning curve or being wrong when someone is faithfully following the epistemological process (i.e., the disciples with Saul). Rather, we are considering those errors where persons or communities have the apparatus in place that would dispose them to know, but fail in some particularity that ends in error.

III. THE PROPOSED RESPONSE OF THIS THESIS

The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate from theological reading of the Pentateuch and Mark's Gospel that the particular manner of describing epistemological error in these texts is concerned with the relationship between hearing (游戏装备 / ἀκούω), seeing (مشاهدة / βλέπω), and knowing (عِرَي / ἐπιστευώ / συνωνιμί), and specifically in this order. As we proceed, Genesis 2-3 will be examined for the possibility that it chronicles an epistemological process. There exists an initial question of whether or not epistemology is already present within or imposed onto Genesis 2-3. Two answers are required. First, we hope to show that we are working from within the emic lexical patterns and narratival tensions of the texts. Second, asking etic philosophical questions of a text is not methodologically out of sorts with exegetical practice, but it does run the risk of asking the wrong questions of the text. So we must proceed with an awareness of the types of questions we are asking of the text and its ability to answer.

However, it will also be immediately noticed that we are not asking questions that map directly

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85 This list of terms is not exhaustive, but is given here to show the general focus of the exegesis. We will examine the relationship between these terms more closely in the chapter on Mark's Gospel.

86 For instance, it is difficult for the exegete to ask simple questions such as 'What is at stake in this story?' and circumscribe the question to a non-philosophical category. Merely asking what is at stake presupposes an ethical realm within which causal connectives of the narrative can reconcile and evince. So exegesis does not shy from asking philosophical questions, but is careful to ask philosophically relevant questions.

87 Some have even argued for the increase in philosophical questioning of texts in order to avoid the death of biblical theology itself. However, the concern for this thesis is to avoid inappropriate questions of the texts, not necessarily to avoid the 'death of biblical theology' itself. Christine Helmer, 'Biblical Theology: Bridge over Many Waters'. *Currents in Biblical Research* vol. 3, no. 2 (2005): 169.
onto the traditional discussion of epistemology in the philosophical literature. We will offer a critique of contemporary epistemological models in the final chapter, but we should advise our reliance on a cluster of philosophers at the fore (i.e., Marjorie Grene, Thomas Kuhn, Charles Taylor, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi). Michael Polanyi’s epistemological categories will be most readily employed for examining these texts and the reason for this is manifold. First, his epistemology is scientific and so it has a broader appeal than strictly analytic modes of epistemology. Second, Polanyi accredits the body as central to the task of epistemology. This helps us to account for the many instances of knowing that go well beyond articulable propositions (e.g., 'know that I am YHWH your God'). Third, knowing does not appear to be constrained by discrete epistemic events, but a process through which one acquires the knack or skill of knowing. Within this epistemological process, discrete statements of knowledge can be formulated and confessed. Some like to call these statements 'sentential propositions', but we will avoid such concepts due to problems which we will explore in the final chapter.

From that analysis of Genesis 2-3, it appears that the epistemological description from the garden story creates reverberations for the reader who continues into Exodus, Numbers and Deuteronomy. We hope to demonstrate, 'diachronically and synchronically', that Brueggemann (among others) has perhaps overlooked some of these intertextual links when he maintains that Genesis 2-3 is an 'exceedingly marginal text' without 'clear substantive references' in the remainder of the OT. The instantiation of Genesis 2-3 as a resonating text in the Pentateuch is evinced by showing how much other Pentateuchal texts share the themes and lexical connections with it. If 'myth is kept alive by its uses and reuses, as it moves from context to context and serves different cultural or individual needs', then the question becomes: Why and how is the story of Genesis 2-3 'kept alive' in the mind of those reading the Pentateuch?

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88 For an argument that Genesis 1-4 is the introduction to the theology of the OT, see: Toews, 'Genesis 1-4', 38-52; Dumbrell, 'Genesis 2:1-17', 65. For a summary of how Genesis is employed in 'canonical' OT theologies, see: Schultz, 'What is "Canonical"'.
89 This bears some superficial similarity with aggadah in the sense that Michael Fishbane defines it. Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1985), 291.
A. Discerning Resemblances between Texts

Because this thesis is intent on tracing a single construct through variegated texts, we must be especially concerned to notice how later texts (in canonical order) resonate with earlier texts. We will be following the Pentateuch and then Mark as a reader of the canon, observing how these stories unfold before the reader, and building up to the climax of interconnections in Deuteronomy. Then, we will examine how Mark employs the Deuteronomic descriptions of error, even preferring the Deuteronomic language of the Sinai narrative over the Exodus version in its allusions at the Transfiguration.

At times, similarity between texts is unmistakable (cf. Deut 29:3 [MT]; Isa 6:9-10). But many instances fall into the realm of echo-like intertextual links. How do we discern the rhetoric when we believe we have found these similarities? The proposed methodology for analyzing similarities between passages is three parts. First, we will consider lexical connections that can offer some initial and/or sustained resemblance between texts. Pursuant to lexical connections, we will have a special interest in certain motifs and structured connection of terms. Second, we are focusing our attention on texts whose aim is to expose error, either in its narrative form or the rhetoric of its paranesis. Therefore, careful attention will be paid as to how individual passages and texts expound the epistemological goals, what constituent factors play into error based on those goals, and what is the preventative or corrective action that could preclude the error. In this second layer of examination, we will assess how comparable and dissimilar different accounts of error might be. Third, this thesis will continue to consider the crucial factors in knowing and error and whether or not those are homogenous throughout these texts in the canon.

An example would help to demonstrate intertextual connections that may create theological questions. In chapter four, we will argue that Deuteronomy's list of items forbidden to be made into idols goes beyond mere lexical correspondence (Deut 4:15-19). The list appears to reflect the things created in Genesis 1. Further, the lexical connections are unique between Genesis 1 and Deuteronomy 4. But it is the rhetorical role of their mention in Deuteronomy 4, without any direct mention of

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93 By 'intertextual', we do not intend to enter the formal world of Kristeva's and Bahktin's intertextuality. We only mean that there are conceptual and lexical links between these texts that indicate intentional authorial connections.

94 Despite the fact that we are not appropriating Fishbane's work here, our criteria are roughly in the order of his analysis of aggadah and halakah. His three criteria for assessing the strength of inner-biblical exegesis are: 1) introduction by 'technical formulae', 2) comparing parallel texts, and 3) text-critical judgment regarding the re-employment, reorganization and transposition of the parallel terms. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 291. This also bears resemblance to what Hollander is prescribing in his use of 'metalepsis'. There is a depth to the interconnection that requires the reader to 'transume' unstated material from one referent to the other. John Hollander, *The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1981), 133-50.

95 Though they are not identical, see MacDonald, *Deuteronomy*, 197.
creation, that signals a possible rhetorical link to the creation account in Genesis.

The conspicuity of the created items of Genesis 1 found in Deuteronomy 4 leads some commentators to surmise that the creation event (Gen 1) is intended to be reflective of the rhetoric of forbidding idolatry (Deut 4). We might even argue that Deuteronomy 4 is a rhetorical allusion à la metalepsis, meaning that the notion of worship to YHWH, an idea absent in Genesis 1, is transumed by the reader to YHWH's role as Creator, an unstated notion in Deuteronomy 4.96 This understanding, of course, presumes that those who read/heard Deuteronomy 4 had 'ears to hear the echoes and construe their significance' from Genesis 1.97

B. Theological Reading of Story

Employing the methodological pluralism described above, the pattern of epistemological process emerges: What one can 'see' and then 'know/understand' is dependent on to whom one 'listens'. The focus of the texts then centers upon ensuring that Israel is 'listening to the voice of' the authenticated authority. The reasons for limiting this study to the Pentateuch and Mark are two-fold. First is the issue of constraint. In the effort to maintain a coherent thesis that manages to do minimally faithful exegesis of the texts, primary texts must be given priority, especially if they might be the lens through which to view other texts in the Tanak and NT. Second, the Pentateuch and Gospel stories are central narratives of Israel's and the NT church's canons respectively. And while the narratives are not properly theology or epistemology, as Barr contends, they are the 'raw material for theology'.98

Because our focus is upon the possibility of a consonant epistemological process from the Pentateuch to Mark's Gospel, we will read the Pentateuch in a way that is consistent with a Markan author and audience. In this sense, we are assuming some type of canonical reading, but for the purpose of seeing how Mark might be utilizing Pentateuchal themes. We are therefore approaching the text at the level of its literary form, noticing the canonical movement that sets these stories in a particular order. This narratival inertia is what we will follow here as a literary reader of the Pentateuch and Mark.

Certainly the mode of this thesis strikes us as a biblical theology of sorts, and that it is. But we

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96 This transumption or conversion of the prior material in a 'metalepsis' is what ultimately renders the depth of the allusion amongst the new material. Hollander, *Figure*, 115-6. Richard Hays defines 'metalepsis': ‘When a literary echo links the text in which it occurs to an earlier text, the figurative effect of the echo can lie in the unstated or suppressed (transumed) points of resonance between the two texts.’ *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (London, UK: Yale University, 1989), 20.


must clarify what we are and are not attempting. First, we want to avoid rigid modes of biblical theology. We are not endeavoring to see epistemological process as necessarily bound to just one approach: salvation-history, promise-fulfillment, typology, or covenant theology. This study does share some affinity with the minority covenantal approach to biblical theology inasmuch as the garden story is read as covenantal and at least one goal of covenant aims at knowing. But even then, we want to show a mere continuity of rhetoric and narrative retelling, the story of error told in Genesis 2-3 is re-told to the reader over and again. Methodologically, we recognize that 'The possibility of biblical theology remains, even for its own practitioners, a very precarious thing ….' Hence, this study is guided by Watson's call to lower the 'lines of demarcation' between biblical studies and systematic theology and the warning of F.F. Bruce:

This is not to say that the tracing of patterns is illegitimate, but that it should not be pressed beyond the plain sense of the biblical narrative and language. It is better to think of recurring patterns of divine action and human response … all the more so because such recurring patterns were recognized by the biblical authors themselves, in both Testaments.

In short, due to the resemblance of Genesis 2-3, both in the theology and narratives of Israel's canon, we will work from the beginning of the Pentateuch forward. But we are not bound to a particular school of biblical theology. In this manner, we will follow this epistemological process

99 E.g., Von Rad, OTT; Vos, Biblical Theology; Ladd, Theology of the New Testament.
100 E.g., Childs, 'Prophecy and Fulfillment'; Murphy, 'Relationship Between the Testaments'; Westermann, The Old Testament; Zimmerli, 'Promise and Fulfillment'.
101 E.g., Eichrodt, 'Typological Exegesis'; Goppelt, Typos. For evaluations of typological approaches, see: Eichrodt, 'Is Typological Exegesis an Appropriate Method?'; Von Rad, 'Typological Interpretation'.
102 E.g., Horton, God of Promise; Van Til, Covenant Theology; Kline, Kingdom Prologue; Robertson, Christ of the Covenants.
104 This approach is commensurate with Nicholas Perrin's solution to the polarities of traditional biblical theologies and Bakhtin's social matrix of language meaning at the nexus of external reality. If biblical unity can be resolved, then disparate texts can speak univocally, even if approximately, of similar constructs. 'Dialogic Conceptions of Language and the Problem of Biblical Unity' in The Practice and Promise of Biblical Theology. ed. John Reumann (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1991); M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas, 1981), 252-4. This 'dialogic nature of language' allows us to be co-readers of the biblical texts just as first century Palestinian Jews saw themselves as co-readers of the Tanak. See also, Craig Bartholomew, 'Story and Biblical Theology' in Out of Egypt: Biblical Theology and Biblical Interpretation. The Scripture and Hermeneutics Series. eds. Craig Bartholomew et al. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2004).
105 Even so, F. F. Bruce spares the theme of 'prophet' from his major themes continuous from the OT to the NT. This is That: The New Testament Development of Some Old Testament Themes (Exeter, UK: Paternoster, 1968), 14.
through the narratives rather than make theological statements about individual passages (re Yoder, Schellenberg, etc.).

**C. Nascent Constructs Unfold**

Moving into the narratives, we admit that the matter of relationship between texts and testaments is more complex than 'the New Testament be hidden in the Old and the Old be made manifest in the New.' But what is the nature of that complexity? Epistemological process appears nascent in the primeval texts of Genesis and to unfold further into Israel's canon. The language of epistemological process and error then appears in the mouths of two prophets of significance for Christian theology: Isaiah and Jesus. Isaiah 6:9-10 reflects the language of Deuteronomy 29:4 (29:3 MT) in describing Isaiah's calling:

> Go, and say to this people: "Keep on hearing, but do not understand; keep on seeing, but do not perceive." Make the heart of this people dull, and their ears heavy, and blind their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and turn and be healed.

In Mark, the Deuteronomic and Isaianic epistemological trajectories become the key for Jesus' parabolic teaching (e.g., Matt 13:10-17, Mark 4:12, Luke 8:10). Theological error is assessed in the Gospels based upon to whom one listens. Jesus is the prophetic voice *par excellence* and authentication of his prophetic authority runs parallel to Mosaic authentication. Of particular interest is the dilemma as to whether or not the scriptures portray a divide between a 'general' and a 'special' epistemology or only a unitary epistemological process for all humanity. This thesis will end on the latter, proposing that the epistemological process is unitary, although the authority and the authentication of the prophetic voice can still be by special means.

One generally finds introductions in works of an interdisciplinary nature to contain a brief history of epistemology or proposals about contrasting the Hebraic frame of mind with the Greek/Enlightenment modes of reasoning. However, we will stave off that conversation until the last chapter as it is not introductory to this work. Instead, because this thesis presumes to be a work of theology, then the fruit of our exegesis should be applied to the theological enterprise.

In the final chapter, we will look at the problem of the epistemological process portrayed in

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108 As R.R. Reno warns: 'Drawing theological conclusions is not the same as offering theological exegesis.' *Biblical Theology and Theological Exegesis* in *Out of Egypt: Biblical Theology and Biblical Interpretation*. The Scripture and Hermeneutics Series. eds. Craig Bartholomew et al. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2004), 393.

109 *Documents of the II Vatican Council*, 'Dei Verbum', IV, 16.

110 We are using the terms 'general' and 'special' similarly to their employment regarding revelation in theological prolegomena.
these texts and their commensurability with modern epistemological theory. In the end, broad epistemological accounts, such as Polanyi's scientific epistemology, are found to make more points of contact than narrower and propositionally reductionistic epistemologies. Because of the nature of epistemological process discovered in the scriptures, theological implications are then drawn for the prolegomena of theology itself. Against the current of theological descriptivism,\textsuperscript{111} the epistemological process of the Pentateuch and Mark appears to require some level of prescriptivism in order to understand the content of these texts, even if only to place the reality of God as the centrality of the texts.\textsuperscript{112}

\textbf{D. What about Leviticus and the other Gospels?}

What will be demonstrated with repetition is that error occurs when Israel does not listen to the authenticated prophetic voice and therefore, does not see what is being shown to her. It is fair to summarize the initial story of Israel as founded in Abraham, grounded in Exodus and Numbers, and then finally, propounded to the future generations in Deuteronomy. It is in these initial peaks of the historical narrative that we find the concentration of language concerning knowing and error: Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.

Leviticus is noticeably absent from the list above, and if we consider the content of Leviticus, the reason becomes apparent. We will look at the narratives and rhetoric in order to discern a common epistemological thrust concerning error. In Leviticus, we have a text composed mostly of legal and ritual code (i.e., prophetic commandment).\textsuperscript{113} Because the majority of Leviticus has a latent jussive and cohortative bent to it, we do not expect to see the same language describing error. The text assumes obedience, not error. Notwithstanding the fact that Leviticus has much to add to the larger conversation about error (e.g., Lev 10), unfortunately, we cannot survey it here.

In the NT, our focus will turn to Mark's incorporation of the Pentateuch among the Synoptics for three reasons: First, Mark's Gospel is the most terse among the Gospels. Regardless of which source relationship one accepts,\textsuperscript{114} we will show that it still maintains a robust exegetical relationship with the Pentateuch regarding epistemological process and error. If we can make our case, so to speak, with

\textsuperscript{111} E.g., Stendall, 'Biblical Theology'.

\textsuperscript{112} For OT theology requiring prescriptive understanding of the texts, see: Fishbane, \textit{Garments}, 35; Bornemann, 'Toward a Biblical Theology'. For NT theology as prescriptive, see Selby, \textit{Comical Doctrine}, 246-48.

\textsuperscript{113} Sans the narratives of Lev 8-9, the error of Nadab and Abihu which bears interesting connections to our thesis to which we cannot cover here (Lev 10), and the covenant of Lev 26.

\textsuperscript{114} E.g., The Farrer-Goulder Hypothesis or the Two Source Hypothesis. See: Farrer, 'Dispensing with Q'; Streeter, \textit{The Four Gospels}.
Mark's Gospel, then we might have a minimally sufficient argument to begin the possibility of a unified epistemological process in the Protestant Christian canon. Second, Mark contains a section of narrative (e.g., Mark 4-9) conspicuously aimed at showing the disciples' epistemological process to the reader. Although scholarly debate abounds regarding how one should understand that process, the disciples' epistemic progress is discernible in this text. Third, Mark's Gospel appears to employ Deuteronomic allusions specifically relevant to the disciples' epistemological process. These make Mark a good candidate for a primary point of exploration into the NT narratives.

The perspicuity of the disciples' epistemic struggle in Mark is most likely the reason for the abundance of scholarship. Rikki E. Watts observes that the literature solely interacting with connections between Isa 6:9-10 and Mark 4:12 'is immense'. *Isaiah's new Exodus and Mark*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament.; 2. Reihe, 88. (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 184 n.1.

Mark is clearly not the only text that makes connections to our thesis. One tantalizing and prominent epistemological *eureka* of Luke's Gospel is when the disciples walk with the resurrected Jesus on the road to Emmaus. Their discovery of Jesus, the hidden identity eventually revealed in the breaking of bread, is an unmistakable allusion to the error in the garden, Genesis 3:7 (cf. Gen 3:7 [LXX] and Luke 24:31 ‘and their eyes were opened and they knew').
I. INTRODUCTION

Indeed, here sapiential motifs—such as knowing good and evil, the serpent's cunning, the rivers—and vocabulary (עַדְיָן) are clearly present.¹

The purpose of this analysis is to assess the viability of a theological reading of Genesis 2-3 in light of knowing and error.² The thrust of this examination will focus on the patent error of Genesis 3. But in order to assess what went wrong in Genesis 3, we must first look at the possibility of proper knowing in Genesis 2, where man comes to know God's commandments and woman as his fit mate. We will argue that Genesis 2 gives us a sufficient epistemological model (the genus) that is clarified by the problems of Genesis 3 (the differentia).

For our purposes, 'knowing' will not mean flat propositional knowing, but a process that leads one to know something which can then be articulated. So we will not argue, for instance, that the man knows proposition $P$, a belief to which he can justify the veridicality. Rather, we shall agree that he has come to know something about his relatedness to reality which is revealed to the reader in the man's

¹ The 'sapiential' nature of Treier's comment will become more clear as we consider the epistemological process, not knowledge as a product. Treier, Virtue, 36.
² The Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia will be the primary referent of Hebrew text in the received form of the MT.
declarative statement: 'At last, bone of my bones ….' Under examination, we will suggest that epistemology is a process that leads the man to see what is being shown to him by an authoritative guide. This epistemology will not focus as much on a product termed 'knowledge' as it centers on the process that will inevitably end in knowing. We will demonstrate that there appears to be an epistemological process being described in Genesis 2 with the possibility of it being normative throughout the Pentateuch. At the very least, the narrative's description of epistemological process appears sufficient to explore its conventionality beyond Genesis 2-3. It will be suggested that the epistemological process of Genesis 2 has six aspects: sociological, prophetic, differentiated, embodied, participatory/revelatory, and sacramental. It will be further argued that this epistemology is not a special epistemology, but is a general epistemological model true of all human knowing, scientific or otherwise.

In the appraisal of the Paradise narrative, one aspect will come to the foreground as centrally significant: the prophetic voice. God indicts the man alone with the words, 'because you listened to the voice of your wife …' (רבי שלמה אשナー). These words must be understood in the general motif of which they take part in the Tanak. Pursuing the 'listen to the voice' (שמעת קולה) motif, we will find that the terms and concepts are present at several occasions in Genesis. These occasions focus on a Patriarch listening to the voice of a woman with negative outcomes. Other types of error will play upon the different aspects of knowing, but the failure to listen to the correct voice (i.e., the authenticated prophetic voice) is the definitive error upon which all others are contingent in the Genesis 2-3 story. In other words, what one can know depends in large part upon (if not entirely) to which voice one is listening.

A. Epistemological Process in Genesis 2

Any description of a proper epistemology beginning in Genesis 2, before the serpent of Genesis 3, will be necessarily truncated. The text does not explore the garden community beyond the bare creation and forming of humans, animals, and social structure. Given the terse nature of Genesis 2, we can only arrive at knowing as a basic construct that becomes florid in light of the events of chapter three. What was object of the man's knowledge? The reader cannot answer this question with absolute

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3 The שמע קולו motif is simply described as different forms of the phrase שמעת קולו and with an objective preposition introducing, e.g., שמעת קולו, שמעת בקולו, etc.

4 Treier offers this précis of Gen 2-3: 'bearing God's image means obeying and discovering, not deciding good and evil for oneself.' *Virtue*, 47.
precision. It might be something like the man knowing his relationship to creatures/creation. Or maybe, the man knowing a subsistence life in a collective of humans and YHWH Elohim. But due to the error of Genesis 3 and the taciturn depiction of life before that error, the epistemological end or ends are obfuscated to us. However, the epistemological process is not entirely obscured to the reader and it is here that we need to explain how the man is meant to know. While these two epistemological goals can be observed in the narrative, they are murky and amorphous at best. Our goal is not to discern the content of man's knowledge; our goal is to accurately describe the process by which that knowledge comes about.

i. The Man's Epistemological Process

What is plain from the story is that God 'forms' the man, God puts the man into the garden that he himself planted and then, sets the man to work naming the animals. Much is often made of the man's naming as dominion, which it surely calls to mind the commands of 1:28. However, perhaps there is an epistemological thrust to this narrative as well, and that thrust could be evinced by this naming sequence. God maintains that solitary man is 'not good' and that a helper must be made for him. The narrative demonstrates this 'not goodness' in the tension between the man realizing that he needs a mate and realizing that he is not meant to be alone. The process to bring about this realization is of specific interest to this thesis. God presents the man with animals, which the man names. The summary to that naming sequence is found in 2:20b: 'But for the man he did not find a helper fit for him.' Or as Cassuto effectively argues, 'but (antithetic Waw) as far as man was concerned, he did not find a creature worthy to be his helper and to be deemed his counterpart …, and hence to be called by a name ….'

This sequence indicates that the act of naming animals was not merely a display of the man acting as potentate, but rather it is evidence of a man who is able to articulate his realization after he participates in a process of naming animalia presented to him in contiguity. This process culminates in the presentation of the woman. Hence the 'at last' in the man's proclamation reveals that he now knows something similar to which YHWH Elohim knew when he previously said, 'It is not good for

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5 The term 'God' here is meant to represent the names בָּרָא in Gen 2-3, but not the generic term מֹסֶר found in Gen 3:1-5.

6 O'Dowd maintains that man's participation in הביאו reveals his special position in creation, Wisdom, 12-15.

7 Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis (Jerusalem, Israel: Magnes, The Hebrew University, 1961), 133.
man to be alone.'

In what appears to be the first epistemological act, the text gives the impression that God leads the man through the process of coming to know something and the man articulates that 'something' in *its discovery*. But what was the man meant to know: a proposition? The proposition that she is 'bone of my bones' comes at a point of discovery, not to be confused with the thing discovered. In other words, it seems that because he *now knows* his proper mate via the process, he could then propositionally articulate something about what he now knows.\(^8\) Knowledge appears antecedent to his utterance. His articulation gives the reader clues about what he now knows, upon which the narrator then rhetorically acts to stitch together the story with a marital maxim (2:24-25). It appears that the man was meant to discover that this *bone and flesh* woman matched up to him somehow.

Interestingly, if the problem is the man's isolation and ignorance of a proper mate, then God uses the *difference* to instruct what his mate *is not* in order to reveal who his mate *is*. But why use the *differentia* rather than the *genus*? Can the elements of the narrative help to plot out the motives of God? The conflict that drives this narrative forward is this tension between man's actual aloneness and God's declaration that his aloneness is not good. Man comes to know both the solitary problem *and* God's solution through participation within the same process. The solitary problem is twofold: man is alone, and there are no other creatures suitable for him. God's remedy is not only woman, but wife and family (2:24-25). What was God doing in this scene of presenting animals to the man? Several commentators have seen a process of discovery in this sequence.\(^9\) If so, then this naming process has at least one *telos*: to have man discover who is his proper mate. There could be a simultaneous trajectory of the man taking dominion by naming the animals or expressing creaturely freedom. Although one does not exclude the others, the narrative's focus is on the man's discovery that woman is his only proper mate. If correct, this first instance of human epistemology requires a committed action that is led by YHWH Elohim himself and is submitted to by the man.

An objection may be posed that the explicit epistemological language is noticeably absent in 2:18-22. The commands were concerned with 'knowledge of good and evil', and yet, we do not see any of that 'knowledge' language (e.g., יד, ידוע) in this section. We would argue that the prohibition itself (2:17) involves 'sapiential motifs', and those motifs frame this particular act of coming to know. Stated otherwise, the man is commanded about the possibility of knowledge of good and evil, and then, we

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\(^8\) This articulation after the fact seems similar to Polanyi's claim that knowledge is antecedent to articulation: 'We grope for words to tell what we know and our words hang together by these roots.' Polanyi, *PK*, 102.

see the woman desiring knowledge which ends in error. In between the account of divine commands about knowledge and the account of the woman's quest for knowledge, there seems to be a proper epistemological process that offers a stark contrast to Genesis 3. Next, we will pursue an analysis of that first epistemological process and its constituent aspects. Following that, the remainder of this chapter will then focus on the error of Genesis 3.

ii. Six Questions Regarding Epistemological Process in Genesis 2

Considering this brief narrative of the man's creation, the commandments concerning food and the discovery of his 'built' mate, the complexity of his epistemological process can now be examined. Specifically, what appears to be a basic narrative about humanity reveals more than a few layers of social, anthropological, and epistemological interaction. We must now answer six questions that strike us as being central to understanding the narrative of Genesis 2:15-25 for epistemic features:

1) Is YHWH Elohim guiding the man in an epistemological process? If so, to what end?
2) What role is the man to play in this process?
3) What does naming the animals have to do with discovering the woman?
4) Through what instrumental means does the man know his proper mate?
5) Is the man's knowledge instantaneous?
6) What do eating and marriage have to do with knowing?

1) Is YHWH Elohim guiding the man? If so, to what end?

Here, God appears to lead the man to know his proper mate. The man does not sit back and reasoning within the counsel of his mind toward the woman. There is no hint of an autonomous epistemological agent and that notion is quickly eschewed in the curses of the next episode. How does God draw out this realization in man? We should be careful to be mindful of Kierkegaard's critique regarding Platonic epistemology, where the notion of maieusis places the teacher as the midwife of the pupil's knowledge. Platonic emphasis on reincarnate formal knowledge being birthed by the student is opposed to what we will argue for below as 'prophet-like inducement' of proper knowledge. Here we mean that God can coach the man to see what is already before him, as a physician could coach one to see the crucial particularities in the otherwise duo-tone flummox of an X-ray. Man cannot 'discover' autonomously.

Even if the man's naming of animals is 'man acting as autonomous agent', this description would neglect the thrust of the narrative. God declares the incomplete nature of man's situation. God then presents the animals as the only subject of נָבַש ('to bring'). God orchestrates these contiguous

10 Kierkegaard, Fragments, 9-25; See also: Rae, 213-36.
presentations including the final presentation of the creature 'built' from the man's side whom he calls (וָאָסִי) 'woman', a name whose etymology derives from their somatic affinity. The man does not act or discover independently of YHWH Elohim. Rather, the man seems to see who his proper mate is when guided by YHWH Elohim. In this scenario, the man's epistemological process appears to be social, requiring more than one person in order to know.

2) What role is the man to play in this process?

The social aspect reveals more complexity than the mere plurality of persons in the garden. As YHWH Elohim is the authoritative guide to the man in this sequence, it appears that the man is meant to be an authoritative voice to the woman. This term, 'authoritative guide', simply means to account for one's yielding to the authority of a person in the role of a 'knower who can guide one to know'. This does not mean that we must ordain the man as a prophet, although we will see significant affinities between the man's authoritative role and that of later prophets. But for now, we observe that the man is privy to YHWH Elohim's counsel in ways that the woman is not. Further, we must answer how the man's privy plays out in the whole story of Genesis 2-3. Eventually, when the office of prophet is fulfilled in Moses, this authoritative guide aspect takes on a new mode. But for these basic purposes at this point in the narrative, we will restrict ourselves to say that epistemological guidance is 'prophetic-like' and does not require the title 'prophet'. It does require that we understand this guidance to be some type of authority that is given by means of privy, meant to communicate to others.

R.P. Gordon discerns five elements of Israelite prophecy that resonate with the general notion of a prophet in the Ancient Near East: 1) prophet amongst a private divine council, 2) public tests of authenticity, 3) commitment to his message, 4) commitment to the recipients in intercession, and 5) use of symbolism. We would like to build upon Gordon's categories to frame this discussion of Genesis 2-3 and beyond. For now, we observe that four of the five aspects are functionally present in describing the

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11 Ricoeur sees this social aspect mirrored in Gen 3 where man's new knowledge is socially bound. *Symbolism of Evil*, 234-5.

12 Some prophets refused the title (e.g., Amos 7:14) and some prophetic functions were seen as non-prophetic (e.g., the parables and poetic prose of Ezek 33:32). R.P. Gordon, 'Where Have All the Prophets Gone? The "Disappearing" Israelite Prophet Against the Background of Ancient Near Eastern Prophecy', *Bulletin for Biblical Research* vol. 5 (1995): 67-86. See also Thomas W. Overholt, 'Prophecy: The Problem of Cross-cultural Comparison'. *Semeia* vol. 21 (1981): 55-78.

13 The man similarly relates to the woman the commandments of God that he heard. This is commensurate with Moberly's overarching concept of prophet where he focuses upon Paul's statement, 'the word of God that you heard from us [1 Thess 2:13].' Or, 'Thus, the nāvī is in essence one who speaks for God.' *Prophecy and Discernment*. Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2006), 2, 4.
This might mean that YHWH Elohim's role in the man's knowing and the man's role in the woman's knowledge of her community is 'prophet-like', for lack of a better term.

We want to be fully cognizant here that when we use the terms 'prophetic' or 'prophet-like', we are not referring to the sociological or political role of a prophet in the history of Israel. We only mean to draw upon three conceptual aspects of Israelite prophecy that might or might not overlap with the socio-political role: authority, authentication, and the fiducial binding of the prophet when they are in the mode of guiding Israel to know something YHWH intends for them to know. Later in the exodus, these features of epistemological process will be strictly bound into the roles of The Prophet, but we are not arguing for Adam as a type of prophet. So what do we see as analogous between the man of Genesis 2 and the prophetic role identified by Gordon?

First, Gordon notes that the authority of Israel's prophet is generally gained in private. The matter concerns the motivation to act as prophet, and here Gordon identifies the common feature of 'prophet-in-council'. The man of Genesis 2 similarly lives in direct community with YHWH Elohim, even being depicted as cooperating with YHWH Elohim's attempt to instruct him about his aloneness and not-goodness. Specifically, the prophet's authority, per Gordon, derives from being one who sits in the divine council. This resembles the man and YHWH in Genesis 2. The man, as part of his natural life, has private access to the divine council (if a council is involved) in ways in which we do not see the woman participating. Hence, he is authoritative, at least in the matter of what can be eaten.

Second, Israelite prophets have public tests of authenticity. Gordon observes that the prophet's authority comes from participating in the divine council. But this is a largely private experience (sans the Mt. Sinai episode which could serve serve both private and public ends) and so there must be a public test of authenticity. Public foretelling emerges as part of the authentication process. It acts as a public sign that authenticates the privately-gained authority. This strikes us as the most significant distinction between Gordon's criteria and what we observe in Genesis. With the man and woman,

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14 Sans the case of prophet as intercessor. This fifth aspect is the only one that Gordon says is not necessarily an attributive mark of a prophet, but something that we often find the prophets doing. This aspect is notably absent in the man. Gordon, 85.

15 Though the man amongst YHWH Elohim's council in Gen 2 is noticeably different than the 'angelic host' of 1 Kgs 22 or Isa 6.


17 Deut 13 and 18 presume the prior authentication of Moses as The Prophet and consider subsequent prophets who might have deviated from Moses' teaching.
matters of authentication become complicated for the reader as the case has been effectively made that the serpent's words are ultimately authenticated as authoritative. Indeed, the story as a whole reveals that the man's authority alone is vindicated with recourse to the man's forth-telling; not foretelling. The commandments given to the man in private to be forth-told trump the serpent's interpretation (i.e., foretelling), which is only found out post hoc. (3:14-19).

Third, prophets are fiducially bound to both the message communicated and its recipients. And it is along these two boundaries that YHWH Elohim will fault the man. In this, Gordon means there are no passive prophetic bystanders. Hence, where Isaiah walked naked in order to symbolically demonstrate Judah's fate, he was also bound to that same fate (Isa 20). Where the man of Genesis 2 communicated the penalty of death to the woman, he was also bound to that same penalty.

Finally, in arguing for the particular milieu of Israelite prophets, Gordon is mindful that the use of symbolism often becomes the mode of prophetic communication. With the man in Genesis 2, we have the divine communication in terms of sacramental symbolism: the one and only tree of knowledge of good and evil. It is symbolic in that the fruit does not appear to impart knowledge, but that it represents a facet of humanity's relationship to the garden, themselves, each other, and YHWH Elohim. We could also affix to Gordon's analysis that prophetic language is sacramental as well, of which the notion of symbolism inheres. The tree is symbolic of nothing outside of their actions in reference to the tree. As a result, their avoidance of the tree is an action that reveals their disposition to YHWH Elohim. So too, eating the fruit of prohibition reveals a different disposition. As with all of Israel's prophets, symbolism and sacramental actions become the parlance of the prophetic voice.

Now, we will discuss if the man is the authoritative guide in any way analogous to Gordon's view of prophecy. In short, is the man prophet-like in guiding the woman to know the garden community? To do this, we will take Gordon's five aspects and condense them to three. Considering what we observe in Genesis 2, these are the three prophet-like features that we observe specifically in the man's relationship to the woman: 1) private authority, 2) public authentication, and 3) fiducial

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19 Fiducial binding is relevant where the recipients are Israelites (e.g., sans Jonah, Obad, etc.). Eichrodt explores this prophetic binding by considering the reverse. He notices that canonical prophets had no fiducial ties to anything apart from their divine message. They had no allegiance to a particular political persuasion. 'It is in their own submission to the existential demands of God that they are made free from all human ties.' Eichrodt, TOT, vol. 1, 343.
20 We will address what we mean by 'sacramental' below.
21 E.g., Levitical law of Moses, Joshua's instruction at Jericho, Isaiah's nakedness, Jeremiah's purchase of land, etc.
binding through commitment to the symbolic message and its recipients.

**Private Authority**

First, asserting that the notion of authority is present in Genesis 2 simply means that one of the parties in the epistemological process has insight where another does not. A structure exists to the social dimension where knowledge is authoritatively communicated. It must be induced from an authoritative source to others, in the first case from God to man. Man is given the commands about the tree of knowledge of good and evil before woman is 'built' (2:15-17). God, as the creator passes his authoritative instruction to the man. The man then assumes the role of authority in this particular aspect. Much like Moses, the man's prior proximity to YHWH Elohim appears to act as the basis for his authority.

In Genesis 2, the reader presumes that the man must act to guide the woman to know things about creation and God, not merely recite commands to her. This becomes the very point of ambiguity for the reader in Genesis 3 where we are forced to ask whether the woman has misunderstood the commands, the man has corrupted them, or the woman has added to the commands herself? That debate cannot be dealt with here, but the case will be made that one's understanding of the 'authoritative voice' need not be contingent on understanding how the man passed the commands to the woman. In the end, that sequence, which is obscured to the reader, is mitigated by YHWH Elohim's indictment of the man for violating the command given to him while he was still alone.

But if we restrict ourselves to the narrative at hand, the man is coming to know something, and YHWH Elohim is the authoritative guide in his process of coming to know by presenting the animals

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22 'Sacramental' overlaps here with the notion of 'symbolic'.
23 We have pared down Gordon's five elements of Israelite prophecy to just three by subsuming symbolism, sacramentalism, and intercession into the fiducial aspect of the prophet's binding to the message and the people.
24 In the literature on epistemology of trust, the distinction is made between 'fundamental' and 'derivative' authority where the former is a 'blind' epistemic right and the latter is based upon one's reasons to believe in the authority of another. Richard Foley, 'Egoism in Epistemology' in Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. ed. Frederick F. Schmitt (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). We are not arguing for a fundamental authority, but that there are reasons to view one's authority derivatively based on their authentication. Alvin I. Goldman, Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2002), 139-63.
26 The term 'built' is meant to reflect the Hebrew: זוחל.
27 'Moses' prophetic role is explicitly based upon his proximity to God, his standing in the divine presence.' Moberly, Prophecy, 9. See also: Eichrodt, TOT, vol. 1, 344.
28 For a summary of the different rabbinic attempts to fill the void of narrative, see: Gary A. Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 78-9.
and eventually the woman. The importance of these socio-epistemological roles must be maintained in order to make the narrative coherent to some extent. For unless we see God as someone guiding the man through the process of coming to know, then God's actions might appear haphazard. In other words, the man's 'at last' (המשה) makes sense of YHWH Elohim's 'not good' (לא טוב) only if the man's 'naming' (חרא) and 'not finding' (לא מצא) are directed by God for a specific epistemological effect: man knowing woman qua proper mate. So Barth says: 'The whole story aims at this exclamation [At last!].'

This discussion of prophet-like authority should not be taken as an indication that we have now reverted to a special epistemology against a general epistemology. In all cultures, religious, professional, scientific, or otherwise, what we are calling 'prophet-like authority' recognizes that beyond the plurality of opinions, there are authoritative guides. These are generally recognized as gradations where ability to discern can range from common to connoisseur. But even beyond authority, guides must be authenticated as well.

**Public Authentication**

Authentication is taking someone who can authoritatively guide others and officially recognizing their authority to do that work. It may well be that my eight-year-old son knows best how to defuse land mines or direct air traffic over London Heathrow airspace. Certainly, in training for such crucial tasks, we want those who are both *authoritative* and *authenticated* to guide us. Nevertheless, these terms need not be spiritualized or specialized to religious epistemological contexts.

Authentication simply means that trust must be furnished in the act of knowing, which will ultimately be expressed in the fiduciary aspect of prophet-like inducement (see below).

It is difficult to see directly where the man is authenticated as the authoritative voice of the woman in chapter two before she violated the commandment. The rabbis struggled with this as well and their struggle might indicate that they took the man's authority to be the case. In the Jewish pseudopigrapha, *Life of Adam and Eve*, Satan is said to exhibit the view that preexistence should demand preeminence, saying: 'I am prior to that creature. Before he was made, I had already been made. He ought to worship me.' But apart from pseudopigraphal commentary, we cannot answer the question as to why the woman ought to trust the man without importing our own social construction

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29 Barth, *CD*, III/1, 291.


into the narrative. On one reading, we could question, 'Why wouldn't she trust the man?' But without any method for adjudication, we could equally ask, 'Why should she trust the man?'

However, the strongest evidence of the man's authentication comes after their violation of the commandments. The authentication of the man as the authoritative voice is presumed in the discourse of YHWH Elohim, specifically in the indictment of man (3:17). Only the man is sought out in the masculine singular (3:9, יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהִים). Once found, God speaks to the man alone, in the masculine singular (3:11). And God recollects the broken commandment, referenced only in the masculine singular (3:17b). The prophet-like authentication of the man's authority appears as the understood social structure prior to what happens in Genesis 3. This presumed authentication is borne out publicly in the final scene where the man's privy to divine counsel (e.g., 'Do not eat …') becomes the measure of judgement for all involved (3:17b).

**Fiducial Binding**

We have discovered here that the man's role appears to be something like an authoritative voice to the woman, just as YHWH Elohim authoritatively guides the man to know the woman. This prophet-like inducement means that knowing is coached by an authoritative and authenticated guide. But a fiduciary relationship between the two must also exist. By 'fiduciary' we mean that the authoritative voice must be committed to the knower and the knower must be submitted to the prophet-like voice in order to know what is meant to be known. It is not unreasonable to think that if the man or God had given up his commitment to the process in Genesis 2, then knowing would not have occurred or would have been contorted and/or diminished. Just as if we wanted to learn to see a collapsed lung on an X-ray, we must submit to both an authority (someone who has insight) and an authenticated authority at that (so that we do not get duped). Both parties must commit to the act of coming to know. The failure on fiduciary grounds of either party becomes destructive to the act of knowing itself.

No doubt the question has been raised in our minds as to why we are using the formal distinction of 'prophet' here in Genesis 2-3. The problem with maintaining only the categories of authority, authentication, and fiducial bond is broached by the serpent. The serpent has some form of authority discernible as the reader proceeds. As Moberly has pointed out, everything the serpent says

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33 Although I am borrowing this concept of the 'fiduciary dimension' from Polanyi, my use is somewhat broader. For him, 'fiduciary' generally refers to the commitment to the act of knowing itself, not always the external voice to which one submits in order to know. PK, passim.
comes to fruition. The question posed by the text is not about the serpent's authority, but his authenticity: Who has the right to speak on behalf of YHWH Elohim? When stated this way, theologians have generally recognized that only prophets speak on behalf of YHWH Elohim. While we do not want to import the entire construct of the Israelite prophet into this analysis of the man's role, we do recognize that his role seems analogous to prophecy. But even more, the man's authority needs to be differentiated from the authority which the serpent shares. We will explore this further below in seeking to discover the error of Genesis 3.

Lastly, we remember that Gordon's description of Israelite prophets included speaking and acting symbolically. In Genesis 2, the goal of the authoritative guidance is beyond some objective knowledge to which the woman must mentally assent. The guidance is an act in which she must participate, eating the fruit of providence and not the fruit of prohibition. After finding this epistemological process to be social, we asked: What role does the man play in this social process? On the grounds of private authority, public authentication, and fiducial binding of the man to the sacramentally symbolic commands of YHWH Elohim and the woman, we would offer that the man is meant to act authoritatively in the scenes of Genesis 2-3, and it is on account of his prophet-like role that he receives indictment from YHWH Elohim (3:17).

3) What does naming the animals have to do with discovery of the woman?

Intriguingly, the epistemological process begins with what is not meant to be man's companionship. The animals, as insufficient mates, seem to offer insight by the difference rather than the thing itself. The process strikes us as a via negativa of sorts. The man recognizes his proper mate by being presented with animals that are not fit mates (אשת חיה). It seems to suggest that if the order were reversed, man might not have been able to recognize the woman as his mate. Or at the least, her fittedness would not have been so obvious. But this need not be the normative case since his exclamation focuses on the flesh-and-bone likeness and not her dissimilarities from all other creatures.

This via negativa then might lend credence to increase the narrative's tension more than argue for a fundamental reality about the man's epistemic process. Because it is fundamental to this particular story of knowing, we should be aware of the basic principle of differentiation operative in the epistemological process. Further, it might be suggestive of a differential relationship that inheres to

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35 'Thus, the nāvi 'is in essence one who speaks for God.' Moberly, Prophecy, 2, 4.
knowledge of good and evil.  

4) Through what instrumental means does the man know his proper mate?

The act of knowing demonstrated in the second chapter of Genesis appears to claim that embodied humans can know things about each other without propositional analysis. Thus if we ask, 'How does the man know this creature is his suitable mate,' the answer from the story is something other than a proposition, a maxim, or Kantian synthetic a priori (e.g., the shortest distance between two points is a line). The man's exclamation appears to derive only from a somatic sense of appropriateness. This could lead to all kinds of speculation about sexuality, but the story itself conveys the instantaneous nature of realization out of a repetitious cycle ( Heb. חֵסֵכְךָ) of naming (2:23). It is as if naming the animals primed him to know woman at sight. This knowledge of the fittedness of woman is both discoverable and revealed without an articulated propositional analysis. It is the man's own body that knows the reason for the exclamation 'At last!'

The knower is embodied. But knowing is not just access to the body's sensory experience. In exploring Merleau-Ponty's argument from the body, Charles Taylor concludes:

On this view [re embodiment being more than access to our senses], our perception of the world as that of an embodied agent is not a contingent fact we might discover empirically; rather our sense of ourselves as embodied agents is constitutive of our experience.

If our understanding of ourself and the world is 'constitutive of our experience' as suggested by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi, Marjorie Grene, et al., then space, time, and perspectival situatedness are fundamental to the man's knowing.

Further, these are not impeding factors to knowledge. The text does not portray the man's ignorance as sinful and finitude is not an obstruction to knowing. There is no sense in the text that the man's historically-situated existence is a limitation nor is it contrasted to God's infinite nature as is so often supposed in the history of onto-theologizing. The man's perspective and ability are not looked

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36 We notice that it is not 'knowledge of good or evil'.

37 This somatic sense of knowing is reified in the third and rare use of the verb 'know' in Genesis to mean sexual intimacy (4:1).

38 This somatic/sexual recognition is the sort of detail upon which Malul focuses an anthropological analysis of biblical epistemology in general.


down upon or accommodated as a weakness, but appear to be accommodated as the creatureliness that God has already declared 'exceedingly good' (שֶׁהֱדוֹן מָזוֹד of 1:31).

The suspicion that humanity's ignorance is a fundamental weakness or problematic imports an unnecessary and negative connotation that is anachronistic to the story before the Fall. Contrary to analyses that see the tree-knowledge as liberating, such as Stordalen's, violating the garden commandment does not have, 'a positive function in removing human ignorance … the insight that one should not appear naked before YHWH Elohim.' Importantly for the current argument, this creatureliness appears to be at the center of man's dependence on God to know his environs and other creatures. It is the disposition of their fiduciary relationship. This 'not knowing' is what puts man and God in a fiduciary relationship so that man cannot know without commitment to trust God, and God must commit to helping the man know. Man's embodiment appears central to his relationship with both YHWH Elohim and the woman, and his knowledge thereof.

5) Is the man's knowledge instantaneous?

Above, we claimed that the man's realization of his proper mate shows signs of being instantaneous. But is the realization (a 'eureka moment') the same as instantaneous knowledge? The Qur'an describes this moment differently. It says that Allah took Adam aside after the creation and revealed to him the essence of all being. In one fell swoop, Adam received knowledge, which serves as the basis to assign him to be the arch-prophet of Islam. This may seem to be a peculiar variant of the Hebrew account of creation, but Calvin also wonders about the source of Adam's knowledge in Genesis 2. 'It is demanded when Adam derived this knowledge [i.e., Bone of my bones] …' To which, Calvin concludes that the 'whole course of affairs' was either secretly or verbally revealed to the man.

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41 Schellenberg, 240-53.
42 Contra Stordalen, Olson argues that the serpent actually kept the humans ignorant by mixing 'truth and falsehood'. Olson, 'Truth and the Torah', 18-19. Stordalen's and Savran's analyses on Eden are generally unsatisfying because they start with conceptual similarities between texts and do not make necessary lexical connections. For instance, they both provide a parallel analysis of Gen 3 and Num 22 because both texts contain the rare event of a talking animal. Even though they sometimes come to similar and rough conclusions about the Eden narrative as the current thesis, the underlying reasons are divergent. T. Stordalen, *Echoes of Eden: Genesis 2-3 and Symbolism of the Eden Garden in Biblical Hebrew Literature*, Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 25 (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2000), 229; George W. D. Savran, 'Beastly Speech: Intertextuality, Balaam's Ass and the Garden of Eden.' *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* vol. 64 (1994): 33-55.
44 Qur'an, Surah 2:30-35.
45 Calvin, *Genesis*, vol. 1, 134-5.
But in Genesis 2, man comes to know by enacting a process, through *indwelled* participation. By this, we mean that if something can be known in Genesis 2, it appears to be divulged in an act. Because this act of knowing is a process, it is inherently bound in space and time, which are inextricable features of creaturely knowing. Participation\(^{46}\) in the act of knowing tends toward moments of 'revelation', 'eureka', or 'aha'.\(^{47}\) Perhaps it would have been a different story entirely if the discovery of woman was not the climax of the naming sequence. Enacting the process appears to create an expectation that something will be revealed. It involves a longing for a settlement which means that knowing involves conflict that seeks resolution. The process of disclosure has a beginning, tension, climax and an end, even if the end of knowing is not a *terminus in se*, but a doorway to further disclosures. Because embodiment is inherently entangled with discovery, knowing is therefore revelatory. Accordingly, that discovery happens here through enacting YHWH Elohim's process, which we will explore in detail below.

More than merely being embodied, the act of knowing itself involves the man's indwelled participation.\(^{48}\) Knowing has an analogical facet *due to its embodiment* so that man can know that he is both *on a path to knowing his proper mate* and *knows his proper mate via his body*.\(^{49}\) These two aspects, participating in the act of knowing and knowing via one's body, focus respectively on *awareness of the process* (i.e., the man is aware that he is on the way to knowing his proper mate) and *embodying the process* (i.e., the man must bodily participate in naming and evaluating the animals in order to 'see' his proper mate). The process by which he will come to know is a rite of passage of sorts,

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\(^{46}\) By 'indwelling', we mean something akin to 'participation'. But we are wary of the latter term due to its ubiquity in current theological discussions. While this thesis may bounce between these two terms, 'indwell' allows us to shape the meaning more than 'participate'.

\(^{47}\) Although they are not mutually exclusive, we are not arguing for knowing as divine revelation, but simply that knowing is a 'revelatory' process.

\(^{48}\) Polanyi, *PK*. I am indebted to Esther Meek for her reading of Polanyi's indwelled sensibility and placing it at the center of his epistemology in her thesis. "'Recalled to Life': Contact with Reality'. *Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society* vol. 26, no. 3 (1999-2000): 72-83.

\(^{49}\) The choice of preposition here is never ideal. If we say that one knows *with* or *through* their body, the body then becomes a mere instrument and we have unintentionally reverted to some sort of Platonic dualism. This might be similar to the tension Buber is articulating, 'Those who experience do not participate in the world. For the experience is "in them" and not between them and the world.' Martin Buber, *I and Thou*. trans. Walter Kaufmann (Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1970), 56. What we want to affirm is that the body is part and parcel of the act of knowing in the Pentateuch which is why notions like Brain-In-Vat (BIV) arguments are not applicable here. For a brief summary of the basic BIV argument see Michael Huemer, 'Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument' in *Epistemology*. ed. Michael Huemer (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2002). If forced to chose from current epistemological work, one could commend Nagel's notion that the 'what-its-like' feature of reality is known *through/with/as* an embodied being. Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like To Be A Bat?' in *The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul* (Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books, 1982), 391-402.
having what Van Leeuwen calls: 'liminal' features.\textsuperscript{50}

First, awareness that one is on a \textit{path to knowing} speaks to the non-stative nature of knowledge: that it is ripe with hope and expectation that must come to fruition in some recognizable way. This awareness of epistemological location within a process renders confidence that one is moving towards the epistemic goal.\textsuperscript{51} To help understand the notion of 'epistemological location', we can turn to analogical reasoning. The epistemological process depicted as a journey is a form of analogical reasoning itself meant to explain the nexus between awareness of location in the process and embodying the process itself. In analogical reasoning one rationalizes from within a construct they could only gain through an embodied experience.\textsuperscript{52} For example, the only reason we can understand the meaning of a phrase like 'career path' is because we have physically vectored our bodies down a path from Point A to Point B. The physical experience becomes our way of understanding the relatedness between events.\textsuperscript{53} Additionally, Polanyi deems the awareness that we are on our way toward knowing to be 'tacit awareness', where one is conscious of the process that is inherently embodied. One's focus shifts from the subsidiary (the immediate particularities of animals presented to the man) toward the focal (the sequential expectation that wants to find a proper mate).\textsuperscript{54} This movement from the subsidiary to the focal is ultimately realized in a point of illumination ('at last, bone of my bones'; see figure below).\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{50} Van Leeuwen (and O'Dowd) are describing something similar with the 'liminal rhetoric' of wisdom. Roughly, 'liminality' means to express an embodied process where the limits and thresholds that a text appeals to create the tensions reflected in that process. See also Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, 'Liminality and Worldview in Proverbs 1-9'. \textit{Semeia} no. 50 (1990): 111-144; O'Dowd, 168-72.

\textsuperscript{51} Awareness of one's epistemic 'location' in coming to know something is discussed by Michael Polanyi, \textit{The Tacit Dimension} (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, 2009).

\textsuperscript{52} For more on this, see: Mark Johnson, 'Some Constraints on Embodied Analogical Understanding' in \textit{Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, and Philosophy}. Synthese Library vol. 197. ed. D.H. Helman. 1st edition (New York, N.Y.: Springer, 1988), 28-33; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, \textit{Metaphors We Live By} (Chicago, Ill.: University Of Chicago, 1980); Also, Polanyi deems the awareness to be 'tacit awareness' where the awareness process is inherently embodied. Polanyi, \textit{PK}, 69-124 passim.

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. Johnson, 'Some Constraints', 28-33.

\textsuperscript{54} Polanyi, 'Tacit Inference'.

\textsuperscript{55} Polanyi, \textit{PK}, 63.
Looked at conversely, if the man never found a proper mate, then the story would have to go in a different direction. The reader's awareness that man must come to know his proper mate is situated in the necessity of resolving the central conflict of the narrative. The point is that the account in Genesis 2 not only suggests that man comes to know woman qua proper mate, but that he is also aware that this knowing is a quest and he embodies that quest.

Second, 'embodying a quest' is just another way of saying that he enacts the process of knowing itself by participation. Because man appears to know through his body and is aware of the movement from not knowing toward knowing, we say that knowledge is revelatory. This term simply acknowledges that a situated creature comes to know through space and time. It makes knowing a fundamentally historical function. It also acknowledges that man was in ignorance about his situation and his relatedness to others before the error of Genesis 3. Ignorance and error are not equivalent matters for this story and that is why errors of flat ignorance are not interesting for our purposes (e.g., stumbling while learning language). Looking at Genesis 2-3 through the lens of 'knowing as disclosure' demonstrates that man must commit to know in fiduciary relationship with an authenticated prophetic guide. Through enacting this epistemological process, what is hidden becomes revealed. Or more specifically, what was known by YHWH Elohim is made known to the man.

Is the man's knowledge instantaneous? We are prepared to say, 'No.' Because man participates in a quest to know through space, time, relationship, and his body, we will argue that Genesis 2 portrays knowing as historically-disclosed, not instantaneous.

6) What do eating and marriage have to do with knowing?

The difference between knowing about and knowing will become stark in the narratives of

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56 See 'indwelling' in Meek, *LTK*, 90-95.
Exodus. But the decided difference between knowing about and knowing in Genesis 2 is that proper knowing seems to be revealed in sacramental commissioning where one acts in accordance with what one knows. For the man, because he now knows his proper mate, the narrator makes the rhetorical move to matrimony as the sacramental implication of this knowledge. Knowing woman as a proper mate (2:23) looks as though it is sacramentally exercised through leaving family and cleaving to his mate (2:24). The narrative indicates a direct relationship between the humanity's knowledge and their sacramental actions, even though the appendage of marital terms at the end of this sequence strikes the reader unexpectedly.

By 'sacramental' we mean nothing more than has been traditionally construed in the Reformed and Roman Catholic traditions where embodied actions are mediated through outward visible signs that are united to the thing signified. Calvin explains that the role of sacramental action in the garden is epistemic (i.e., it acknowledges something). However, epistemic does not mean that it is merely 'symbolic' because it relates humanity with YHWH Elohim by some sort of union:

[Re 2:9] He intended, therefore, that man, as often as he tasted the fruit of that tree, should remember whence he received his life, in order that he might acknowledge that he lives not by his own power, but by the kindness of God alone; and that life is not (as they commonly speak) an intrinsic good, but proceeds from God.

In a similar route, Barth treats the sacramental nature of humanity's participation: 'As the tree of life was to mediate life to man as a reward for obedience by its enjoyment, so the tree of knowledge was to give man a right use of freedom by its avoidance.' And, 'The tree of life is the symbol and sacrament of the eternal life promised to the perfectly obedient man and accruing to him as a reward.'

The term 'sacramental' captures the inevitable human action that symbolically represents knowledge. For instance, because a person has the skill that enables one to know: '2 + 2 = 4', they can sacramentally exercise that skill by adding two pieces of pie to the two that they already have in order to reach a total of four. This trite and provisional example becomes less parochial when one considers

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57 The general features of a 'sacramental' view across Christian theology is that God must author the action, the action must refer to the relationship between humanity and God, and the sacramental action must acknowledge some aspect of that relationship. All three aspects appear present in the garden episode. For a post-Vatican II exploration of the relationship between symbol and sacrament, see Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. IV, 241f; The Church and the Sacraments. For an example of contemporary Reformed treatment of sacraments, see Louis Berkof, Systematic Theology, 616f.


59 Barth, CD, III/1, 285.

60 Barth, CD, IV/1, 59.

61 Notice that we did not say, 'Because I know that "2 + 2 = 4" ...,' rather it is due to the adeptness of knowing.
the possibility that all human activity is *embedded in and expressive of* our skilled knowing.\(^{62}\) In order to know good and evil, whatever that may mean, the man and woman must commission that quest by eating the fruit of prohibition. This notion of the physical commissioning of knowledge is not alien to the epistemological process, but inherent in the semantic range of 'know' (יְדַע).\(^{63}\) To 'know' one's wife comes to fullness in a sacramental act, to be sexually intimate with her (Gen 4:1).

The notion that knowledge (and acknowledgement) not only requires indwelled participation, but is also symbolically acted out is neither novel nor without problems. For it immediately brings about questions as to how the act and the knowledge correspond. How is it that matrimony is the *sequitur* of knowing that the man is no longer alone and woman is his proper mate? How is it that eating fruit has anything to do with 'knowledge of good and evil'?\(^{64}\) If knowing is embodied and comes to fruition in sacramental acts, then the reader must consider both facets in order to correctly assess what is meant to be known. Stated otherwise, the sacramental act is either arbitrary, or it reveals a layer of sophistication beyond the simple relationship between the knower, the known, and the prophet-like voice who guides the knower.\(^{65}\)

One could imagine that God could have put a red and green buttons in the middle of the garden with the instruction to push the red button to reject YHWH Elohim's authority. However, the sacramental act of eating fruit does not appear arbitrary, but it is enmeshed in the whole act of creation and care for YHWH Elohim's creatures up to this point in the story.\(^{66}\) In short: we do not believe that the narrative presents it as coincidental that the command to 'surely eat from every tree' is controverted by the eating of the one and only forbidden tree.

Our argument is that knowing has physicality and is ultimately expressed in humanity's actions. Indeed, we cannot ever confidently assess another's knowledge until we see it expressed in actions.

\(^{62}\) Polanyi, *PK*, 49-68.

\(^{63}\) Carasik reminds us that in a very few instances, יְדַע contains within it the idea, via its sexual connotation, of 'coming closer to'. *Theologies*, 20.


\(^{66}\) Kenneth Stone sees both sexuality and food bound into the creation narrative, not accidental to it. *Practicing Safer Texts*, 27.
How could one be confident of a surgeon's knowledge without the actual act of surgery? The same applies to the theoretical physicist whose calculi must eventually come to physical expression or we doubt them as authentic incidences of skilled knowing. Throughout the Pentateuch and Gospel of Mark, we will see that the knowledge urged to the reader as normative and proper is the kind upon which one must act. Additionally, as in the garden, sacramental action exhibits either proper participation in the epistemological process or error.

B. Summary of Six Epistemological Questions

To sum up, we have attempted to span the epistemological elements of the man's knowing recounted in Genesis 2-3. Drawing upon the conflict and resolution of the narrative itself, we have given particular attention to word and deed structure. God declares, then acts. Man responds to God's actions, participates, and then is able to declare what he now knows. This modest summary yields six aspects of epistemological process, which reflect the answers to the questions we posed above. The six aspects of epistemological process discovered are: 1) social, 2) prophet-like guidance (private authority, public authentication, and fiduciary binding), 3) differentiated, 4) embodied, 5) enacted/revelatory (indwelled participation in knowing and awareness of knowing), and 6) sacramentally commissioned.

Having briefly looked at what knowing might be apart from violating YHWH Elohim's commandment, we can now consider the case of the error of Genesis 3. Again, we are not looking at cases of ignorance where someone was merely unaware of particularities to the contrary, but we will discuss those stories that reveal a person disposed to know who their prophetic voice is and yet still commits error. In this instance, it might not matter whether we believe the man or the woman bastardized the commands of YHWH Elohim, because the story indicates that the error was committed based on the issue of the serpent's authentication.

II. WHAT IS THE ERROR OF GENESIS 3?

If we have appropriately sketched out a view of knowing before Genesis 3, then error must violate one or more of these six aspects of knowing. This first error in Genesis 3, often called 'rebellion', is unique in that it comes in the midst of an otherwise undisturbed epistemic disposition. Or at least, the text gives no indication of anything other than a trustworthy state of living and knowing in the garden. Because the actions of the woman and man are centered around a desire for knowledge, we

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must look carefully at the attendant circumstances to their folly, if it is indeed folly.

In short, the woman coming to know good and evil follows the same epistemological trajectory as the man coming to know the woman qua fit mate in chapter two. The attempt at knowing in Genesis 3 impinges upon several aspects of epistemological process, but the concern of YHWH Elohim centers upon prophetic authority and authentication.

The error of the woman could be mistakenly summed up as a push for autonomy. But this examination hopes to show that the push for autonomy is not offered as a primary motivation in the narrative. There are five approaches that will unveil the error as one of prophetic induction in which the woman fails to listen to man, her authenticated authority. First, we will examine in the story four empirical indications of error: structural, lexical, rhetorical, and sacramental. Second, the man is found guilty of listening to the wrong prophet. Third, the man fails to act as the prophetic voice. Fourth, the narrative indicates the woman's error in discerning the authenticated authority. And finally, the story emphasizes humanity's failure to enact the prophetic message.

**A. The Error within the Narrative Structure**

First, the narrative of Genesis 3 itself evinces four indications concerning the nature and source of error: a) the story's structure, b) the lexical contrasts, c) the rhetoric of the 'listen to the voice' motif, and d) sacramental actions. What is the object of knowledge in reference to good and evil? The story does not dwell on knowledge as an object. Instead, it offers indications of the nature of the error in only one instance: Genesis 3:17. For von Rad, however, the phrase 'is not at all used only in the moral sense, not even especially in the moral sense.' Even though he admits to the sexual and relational nature of knowing in the meaning of יד, von Rad ends up espousing what later became a generally

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68 Treier believes that autonomy is the problem in his analysis of Gen 2-3. He does not, however, treat the inherent difficulty with that assertion, namely, that the man and woman submitted to the serpent's purview of the situation. This cannot be distilled down to autonomy if submission is integral to the act. This thesis generally agrees with Treier's analysis if he means that autonomy is the goal, but not the process. *Virtue*, 36-40.

69 For instance of an analysis that does focus on the content knowledge of good and evil, Schellenberg finds that the Gen 2-3 narrative deals mainly with knowledge of good and evil that makes man like god. In turn, this disparity must be balanced, after the Fall, by the negative outcome that these new knowers can no longer be near god. Hence, Schellenberg's choice to center her analysis on the content of knowledge of good and evil ends up detracting from the narratival thrust of Gen 2-3, 240-53; For a recent and astute treatment of 'knowledge of good and evil' without any recourse to the broader epistemological structure, see: Rik Peels, 'The Effects of Sin upon Human Moral Cognition'. *Journal of Reformed Theology* vol. 4 (2010): 50-6.

70 Von Rad, *Genesis*, 79.
accepted interpretation of 'knowledge of good and evil': 'omniscience in the widest sense of the word.'

Moberly finds agreement with Barr and others when he argues that the text itself provides the meaning, namely 'moral autonomy': 'one decides right and wrong for oneself rather than in obedience to divine Torah.'

Barth recognizes both the moral agency of the term while holding onto the sexually laden context, but he does not allow that the grandeur of sin can be merely equated to sexual corruption.

Methodologically, Clark argues that prevailing views of the content of the knowledge of good and evil, specifically von Rad's, do not have to frame the discussion. Westermann most clearly shifts the understanding away from knowledge as strictly objective toward knowledge as a skill, even if an ethical skill:

The expression "to know good and evil" is to be understood as a whole. It would be misleading to divide it into a verb "to know" with an object "good and evil." It is a whole and as such describes a particular way of knowing. This way of knowing is not a knowledge of some thing, of an object, as it is very often explained; it is rather a functional knowledge. "Good and evil" does not mean something that is good or evil in itself, but what is good or evil for humans, i.e., what is useful or harmful. "If "the knowledge" is functional and concerned with mastering one's existence, then the meaning of "good and evil" is explained. There is no question of an isolated object which is good or evil in itself.

Following Clark's methodological lead, whatever 'knowledge of good and evil' might mean, we must not restrict our work to the prior explanations in order to make sense of the narrative. Further, per Westermann, we are not constrained to working out knowledge as an object rather than a skill, disposition, or adeptness. The narrative does not require us to define knowledge in terms of objective content or skill because knowledge does not resolve the narratival tension. The tension of the plot resolves by listening to a prophetic voice, specifically the serpent's voice. Thus, we will not center our analysis on the content of the knowledge of good and evil, because the narrative appears to be ambiguous about its content.

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71 The sexual connotation of 'know' (יְדַא), 'is right in so far as the verb יָד' ("to know") never signifies purely intellectual knowing, but rather an "experiencing," a "becoming acquainted with" ….' Von Rad, Genesis, 79.

72 Moberly, 'Serpent', 23-24; In his recent book, Moberly chooses to reflect more upon the 'heart of the interpretation of this narrative' (re YHWH's authority) instead of the content of knowledge. Moberly, Genesis, 70-8; Barr believes that 'the power of rational and especially ethical discrimination is meant.' The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality (London, UK: S.C.M., 1992), 62.

73 Barth, CD, III/1, 285-6.

74 '[T]here has been in my experience a tendency for students to accept uncritically the statement that the basic meaning of knowledge of good and evil is "omniscience."' Malcolm Clark, 'A Legal Background to the Yahwist's Use of "Good and Evil" in Genesis 2-3', Journal of Biblical Literature vol. 88 (1969): 266-78.

75 Claus Westermann, Genesis: An Introduction (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1992), 241.

76 Von Rad hints at this too where he says, 'To know in the ancient world is always to be able as well.' Genesis, 86.

77 Moberly, Genesis, 78.
Structure

Particular emphases within the narrative offer guidance. We assume that the woman is disposed to know creation and creatures as her mate does. Faithful obedience to humanity's nature (1:26), their directives (1:28), and their prohibitions (2:17) appears requisite in order to know the created order and function within it.

The error can only occur along certain boundaries within that relationship. As the story unfolds in chapter three, it is immediately apparent as to which boundary receives scrutiny. In the opening lines, the serpent is granted status by the narrator as 'more crafty' than all the animals (עַדְרֵיהּ).78 The serpent speaks a question that cuts to the center of the garden community: the conditionals of their relationship with reference to Elohim, not YHWH Elohim.79 In asking the woman, 'Did God say …,' the serpent must be understood to be asking, 'What do you believe God said per what the man told you?' She replies by offering the commandment given to the man as her own with modifications. As many modern commentators rightly point out, we should be cautious in asserting motives solely based upon the modified wording of the woman's response. However, the woman unmistakably revises the conditional prohibition given to the man: 'neither shall you touch it, lest you die.' This raises the question for the reader as to where the communicative act through the man broke down. Due to the narratival silence surrounding the transmission of the commandment, it is difficult to surmise where this modified version is to be sourced. Ancient commentators were not hesitant to fill the gap with different versions of how this command appears in this form in the mouth of the woman. One solution in the Rabbinic material is to have the man, unsure of the woman's ability to keep the command, append this halakic command to the original: 'neither shall you touch it!'80

Gary Anderson believes that the modification is at the heart of understanding this story. ‘Did Adam misinform her, or did she willfully alter the wording? The answers to these questions are

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78 The 'craftiness' (עַדְרֵיהּ) of the serpent is surely a word play on 'nakedness' (אָדָם), which connects the actions of Gen 2-3 more closely. See Rudman, 'A Little Knowledge', 461-66; As Barth notes: 'the nakedness of the first human pair in the garden before and after the fall' is an unmistakable point of continuity, but 'nakedness' does not capture the extent of the affair. CD, III/1, 285-6.
79 It has been widely noted that the woman's appropriation of 'Elohim' (אֱלֹהִים) instead of the prior moniker 'YHWH Elohim' (יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים) is indicative of the serpent's rhetorical sway on the woman (3:3). This absence of the full name is noticeable where is the full name has been used both before and after this passage in Gen 2-4.
80 The Fathers of Rabbi Nathan in Anderson, Genesis, 78. See also Nathan MacDonald where he argues for Eve's halakic addition as commensurate with Levitical code, if the fruit is regarded as sanctum. 'Food and Diet in the Priestly Material of the Pentateuch' in Theology on the Menu: Asceticism, Meat and Christian Diet. Eds. David Grumett and Rachel Muers (London, UK: Routledge, 2010), 24.
absolutely necessary in order to determine who is to blame for the fall.\(^81\) As we will show, the story itself reveals who is to blame without any reference to Anderson's questions. The story intimates that one way or another the woman entered the conversation with the serpent with a confusion about the arrangement between God, humanity, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

The serpent then flatly contradicts the command known to the woman with an infinitive absolute appropriately rendered, 'You will not *surely die* (לֹא תמוֹת תֹּתָכ). His reasoning continues, but on a different course that bears no justificatory resemblance to the woman's contradiction of God's command. The serpent's refutation of the consequence of death is based on an analysis of epistemological disparity between the humans and God. It is important to note that if the serpent meant to be persuasive, then it was not along the deductive rhetoric of persuasion. The ensuing discourse does not logically follow the initial refutation about their deaths in any discernible way. In fact, the only way the serpent's words can hold persuasion is if they are taken in blind trust, having no way to authenticate them besides eating the fruit. The narrative sequence is then terse, bluntly informing us that 'she saw that the tree was good', its fruit was 'desirable for wisdom', and she 'took', 'ate', and 'gave to her husband'. Moberly notes that phenomenologically, what the serpent said, appears to be true. Her eyes were opened (3:7), she did know good and evil (3:7, 22), and she did not immediately die.\(^82\)

**Lexical Contrast**

The terms employed and juxtaposed also offer indications of error. The subject of the action verbs shift appreciably from YHWH Elohim to the woman. In the first three chapters, YHWH Elohim is the only subject of the verb 'to see' (ראה) used eight times up until the woman 'saw the tree was good for food' (3:6).\(^83\) More importantly, God specifically 'saw that it was good' seven times in reference to what he had created in chapter one. But it was not merely 'seeing' that was occurring here.

Considering the role of prophetic authority in the epistemological process, the woman did not see 'that the tree was good for food, … a delight to the eyes, … was to be desired to make one wise' until she listened to the authority of the serpent. It was in *listening* that she saw and it was through the serpent's hermeneutical lens that she saw. In other words, it is not clear from the narrative that any of this was self-evident to the man or woman before the serpent arrives on scene. She saw something in


\(^82\) Moberly, 'Serpent '.

\(^83\) Cf. Gen 1:4,10,12,18,21,25, 31, and 2:19.
those trees which she might not have been able to see without the prophetic voice of the serpent intruding. Further, YHWH Elohim is the implied or direct subject of the verb 'take' (לֵךְ) in chapters two and three, until we see the woman 'took of its fruit and ate' (3:6). Where God is seen as the one taking, it is now the woman. We will discuss the sacramental implications of this below. Indeed, these two chapters have the highest concentration of the use of ראתה and ראת with God as the subject in the entire Tanak.

Rhetoric

After the garden violation, YHWH Elohim indicts the man alone with the words, 'because you listened to the voice of your wife …' (וַיִּשְׁמַע לָהֶם אֲשֶׁר). The rhetoric of this phrase is used in three other narratives within Genesis. These incidences focus on a Patriarch listening to the voice of a woman with specifically negative outcomes. This motif, which will be explored further, evidences that listening to a voice other than God's (or an authenticated authoritative voice) will not end well in the narrative.

Sacramental Actions

Humanity's deeds act as the indication to the reader that error has been commissioned. Punctiliar action is at the center of the story: taking, eating, giving (נתן, אֲסִילֵה, לֵךְ). Even so, we must be careful not to put undue focus on the actions as these must be situated within the narrative. 'Taking' is only done by God at this point. Genesis 2-3 contains six of the 32 occasions in the Tanak where God is the implied or direct subject of the verbal form 'take' (לֵךְ). The fact that woman 'takes' is in contraposition to God's actions (3:6). Later, the possibility of man taking from the tree of life was deemed a negative action by God (3:22). Taking was not the action that led to sin, but it provokes the reader to ask why she is now taking, and will this be a good or bad thing? Essentially, the action serves to heighten the narrative tension around the immediate story of concern, namely, 'What will come of this act of taking?'

Likewise, 'eating' occurs 21 times in this literary unit with four instances in the commands of

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84 E.g., God 'takes' and puts man in the garden (2:15), God 'takes' the rib (2:21), and then there are four references to man being 'taken' from the ground and woman being 'taken' from man (2:22, 23; 3:19, 23).

85 This lexical connection is explored by Dominic Rudman, 'A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Crossing Forbidden Boundaries in Gen 3-4' in Studies in the book of Genesis (Leuven, Belgium: University. Uitgeverij Peeters. 2001), 465.
chapter two (re 2:16-17) and 17 occurrences in chapter three (passim). Notwithstanding, the story itself demands that 'eating' not be taken as an action likened to sin. Rather, both taking and eating act metaphorically (i.e., sacramentally) to reveal what is happening in the humanity's commitments to YHWH Elohim throughout this pericope.

This is to say, the progression of the verbs in the story indicate a movement only in the woman's interior relation to her mate and their God. This interior movement gives way to sacramental acts. She listens to the serpent. Because she listened, she saw the fruit, she desired wisdom, she took, she ate, and she gave. These sacramental acts appear to consummate the error, however, outward indications cannot be confused with the error itself, as fever should not be confused with viral infection. Indeed, God does not accept these actions as exculpatory when the man himself simultaneously accuses both God and woman by saying, 'The woman whom you [YHWH Elohim] gave … she gave … and I ate' (3:12). The action verbs demonstrate sacramental signs that point to internal relationships gone awry, like all sacramental actions. Here in Genesis 3, the narratival structure, terms, rhetoric and sacraments suggest that humanity is acting in contraposition to YHWH Elohim's actions in creation.

B. The Error as Listening to the Wrong Person

Second, these four indications draw out the question latent in the error: 'Who should the woman trust?' The story gives no reason to believe that she should trust anyone other than YHWH Elohim and the man as both are faithful to evince trust. Biddle's read of Genesis 3 may stretch into a psycho-analysis beyond the text, but it highlights the centrality of trust:

Thus, the serpent insinuated that the God who had created them, who had planted the rich and luxuriant garden to provide for them, and who walked with them daily had intentionally and deceptively withheld from them the best gift of all. Adam and Eve disobeyed God because, in their mistrust, they feared that God might not have provided the best …. Key for the story of human sin, however, is the fact that Eve extended the serpent's logic on her own, enumerating only the potential benefits to be gained from the forbidden fruit: it appeared to be nourishing, it was aesthetically pleasing, and it promised to make her and her husband wise like the very deity.

Outside of some breach, we see no reason for her to shift her trust from the authoritative and authenticated prophetic voice of Adam to the unauthenticated prophetic voice of the serpent, despite

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86 Theologians have long struggled with the statements of Paul in Rom 5 and 1 Tim 2 concerning who to blame. The problem is parsed along the lines of 'all have sinned in Adam' or 'the woman was deceived' respectively. I will show here that the focus of the text itself is ultimately Adam's failure, which lends modest support to Anderson's conclusion that Rom 5 has primacy in interpreting 1 Tim 2. Anderson, Genesis, 99-116.

the possibility that the serpent may be authoritative. But that is what she does (3:13, יהוה אלהים) in what we can only assume is a blind hope for knowing something in the future that is better than her knowledge in the now. In this sense, the error is found in ambition, an eschatological hope of something more or different, both of which are ironically achieved.

Moberly has recently written that the central point of Genesis 3 is one concerned with authentication, what does one do when a different voice conflicts with YHWH Elohim's commands:

At the heart of the interpretation of this narrative lies a decision about the weight to be given to the discrepancy between what God says about the forbidden fruit, "when you eat of it you will die" (2:17), and what the snake says—"you will not die" (3:4).

As well, Moberly intimates that 'seeing' is a function of listening and embodying a purview of the reality that had not been considered before:

When the woman looks again at the prohibited tree, seeing it with fresh eyes in the light of the serpent's words, all she can see is that everything about it looks desirable; so why should there be a problem with it?

Examining the man's role lends credence to the view that the failure to recognize and participate in the message of the authorized and authenticated prophet leads to error. The woman blunders by shifting her trust to a non-authenticated voice, someone to whom the narrative yields no reason for trusting. Faithfulness to the message and life according to her authenticated prophet in Adam has done her no harm, so far as the reader knows.

This, however, raises another problem that will have to be discussed in regards to the formal prophets of Israel: namely, that a true prophet should be judged by whether the prophet's words come to pass (Deut 18:15-22). Up to this point, we have asserted rather casually that the man represents a type of prophetic voice. Deuteronomy's measure of a true prophet's veracity is seemingly met when the serpent's words seem to map faithfully onto what ensues the Fall. Humanity is seemingly like God and they do not die. Yet we still see that the man and woman should not recognize the serpent's words as reputedly prophetic. The point is that the authentication of a prophet cannot be based merely on the accuracy of their prophecy. Although the serpent's words were faithful to reality in abstraction, they are not authenticated.

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88 The only hint that God indicts the woman comes from his questions about her actions, 'What is this you have done?' The 'doing' implicates her trust of an unauthenticated voice whose authority is negligible given its lack of authentication.

89 So Ricoeur finds that error is something like an improperly contextualized knowledge: 'The concept of original sin is false knowledge ...' And, 'The defeat of knowledge is the other side of working toward the recovery of meaning.' "Original Sin": A Study in Meaning in The Conflict of Interpretations. ed. Don Hide (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1974), 270.

90 Moberly, Genesis, 78.

91 Moberly, Genesis, 80.

92 Moberly, 'Serpent.'
*not the full reality* in the actual sense in which they must now be lived out by the man and woman.\(^93\) As Barr observes:

The tree of knowledge is characterized several times in precisely this way, as the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that good and evil are the products of its fruit is made plain not only by the declarations of the snake beforehand but also by those of the deity himself afterwards (Genesis 3.22).\(^94\)

In other words, the serpent's statements are arguably true propositions that do not find satisfaction in the lived-out truth of the matter.

Concerning the woman's conversation with the serpent, we do find skepticism as an appropriate response to unauthenticated prophetic voices. What would a faithful response to the serpent have looked like? It is difficult not to backfill the story at this point, but from the above, it appears that the only recourse the woman had was either to ignore or to engage the serpent's arguments. If she engages, then skepticism toward the serpent as authenticated, not authoritative, is appropriate. How could she know the quality of the serpent's authority apart from participating in the serpent's interpretation of the garden community? Only his authentication, not his authority, can be questioned. **YHWH** Elohim queries the man and woman upon the violation: 'Who told you …?' Stated otherwise, 'On whose authority did you see that you were naked?' **YHWH** Elohim's question centers on authentication, not authority.

The man's role in this affair also offers indications of the same error although he was acting as the authenticated prophet. The story provides some signs of error when it switches abruptly to the man's participation. We find out that this seemingly isolated conversation is actually attended by the man. The text simply states that, 'she also gave some [fruit] to her husband who was with her, and he ate' (3:6). But the strongest indicators of error are again in the chastisement of the man later in the chapter, regardless that he was with her or not. God first asks the woman, 'What is this you have done?' As the victim of deceit, she blames the serpent. After rebuking and cursing the serpent for having 'done this', he addresses the woman, and then finally the man. But God's discourse to the man is unique in that God explicitly says why the man is being cursed. The serpent's curse is because he has 'done this'. But to the man he says, 'Because you have listened to the voice of your wife and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, "You shall not eat of it," cursed is the ground …' (3:17).

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\(^{93}\) Moberly, 'Serpent'.

The concern is not about the action of eating, but rather about Adam shifting his trust away from YHWH Elohim to his wife. Further, the language is explicit that God is concerned about who received the commands. Again when God comes into the garden, he is only calling for the man in second person masculine singular. When God chastises Adam, he recalls specifically that he commanded only the man, again using second person masculine singular to reference the command.

In short order, the admonishment of God to the man is centered on shifting his trust to the woman who was not the authenticated nor authoritative prophetic voice. He says, 'Because you listened to the voice of your wife and have eaten ….' Both actions, listening and eating, indict the woman for stepping into the place of God's commands to the man. Apparently, being the authenticated voice does not ensure faithfulness, as we will also see in future prophets.\(^\text{95}\) We will soon return to the motif of 'listening to the voice' in order to affirm its centrality in this narrative.

C. The Error as a Failure of an Authority

Third, besides indications of the woman's error and the man's error of listening to the woman in error, there are also indications of prophetic failure to which we have already alluded. In the first place, God looks for man and after sorting out 'what he now knows', God responds with a peculiar question for modern ears: 'Who told you that you were naked?' He does not ask 'how do you know,' but rather presumes that someone was involved; that a different voice had been heeded. In other words, it is not that the prophetic voice has been compromised through Adam's corruption, rather that another voice is being heard.

God's question indicates to the reader that there was only one authenticated and authoritative voice in the garden, which was the man. In the case of violation, God assumes an unauthenticated voice has intruded. Again, God does not talk to the woman and only acknowledges her error as a thing she has done, reversing the words נומא and השם with which he chastised the serpent (3:13,14).

As well, God never acknowledges the woman's misstatement of the command as he singularly focuses on the man's violation of the original commandment. All things considered, the narrative reads as if it does not matter whether the woman has misconstrued, added, altered, or received a modified form of God's commandment to the man. It only concerns itself with the man's indiscretion in listening to the woman who is listening to the serpent. It should be noted here that the other emphasis is the future relationship between descendants of the woman and serpent. If this analysis is correct, that

\(^\text{95}\) A facile example is the story about the 'man of God' in 1 Kgs 13.
relationship could mean that the 'enmity' occurs along the same lines in the future as it does in the Paradise narrative: strife between two prophetic voices.

God's discrete concern is the man's failure to be the prophetic voice, his '(mis)direction'. Man's failure to be the prophetic voice forces the question not dealt with directly in the text, which is, 'If man was with woman and failed by listening to her, what should he have done?' The man is the only one in that triad who could actually recall the command of God and who understood that the woman corrupted the command in her retelling, whether the onus of corruption was on her or not. The failure for which God chastens him might be the failure to speak. It was not enough for him to know the true command, but he must also reject what is false and speak what he knows. Instead, the prophetic voice is inverted so that the woman is listening with desire to an unauthenticated prophet. Even worse, the authenticated prophet who should be acting as an authoritative guide is listening to the woman who is listening to the serpent.

It is in this understanding against the background of a proper epistemology in Genesis 2 that the error of Genesis 3 becomes stark. God's upbraid of the man appears necessary and the relative silence toward both the serpent and the woman is made coherent within the narrative. The serpent and the woman, while problematic, were not God's immediate concern.

If this is an accurate read, then the error cannot be the desire or search for autonomy apart from God or man, although these elements play their role in the totality of actions. Rather, the error is the shift from faithfulness to the voice of God through the authoritative, authenticated, fiducially bound prophet to the voice of the serpent. In later Pentateuchal language, these positions are articulated as faithfulness and faithlessness, where faithfulness is both mutual and fiduciary between humans and God.

D. The Error as Failure to Discern the Authenticated Voice

Fourth, it was claimed above that the epistemology described in Genesis 2 has these aspects: 1) social, 2) prophetically-induced, 3) differentiated, 4) embodied, 5) participatory/revelatory, and 6) sacramental. Thus far, we have only focused on knowing as being prophetically-induced. 'Prophetically-induced' means that knowing is not only social, but there is a structure to that social dimension as well. Structure includes authoritative guides, which are necessary to the epistemological

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97 E.g., Gen 24:27, Exod 34:6, Num 12:7, Deut 28:1, etc.
process, and which must be authenticated and fiducially-bound to the process as well.

Here in Genesis 3, we see that knowing still maintains all six aspects. It is social in that the entire scenario is grounded in the interaction between the participants. It is differentiated in that evil can be distinguished from good only after one knows the referents of the terms and clarify which is which.\textsuperscript{98} Humanity's knowledge is not a stative epistemology, but it is the ability to say what they previously did not know in terms of what they have come to know. In other words, they can now say: 'We were afraid because we were naked'; an articulation (like all affirmations of knowing) that happens because they now know.

It is embodied in that humanity's newly acquired knowledge is directly referenced to their relationship with their bodies. Their embodied knowledge is stated bluntly and without comment other than its juxtaposition to their nakedness at the end of chapter two: 'Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked' (וַיּוָדַעְתָּם).\textsuperscript{99} This knowledge caused some sort of disjunct so that they saw themselves in a way that made them react somatically. They cringed, exclusively an epistemological action of an embodied person. Although, being disembodied would not have prevented the error, it is revelatory in that they can only see themselves and creation in relation to their embodied experience. Humanity cannot come to know this knowledge of good and evil until they actually eat the fruit of prohibition. They do not seem to have access to it apart from breaking the fiducial bond between YHWH Elohim and themselves. Because they are creatures, they must be in a fiduciary relationship with their creator in order to keep the commands. It is participatory/revelatory in that the man and woman come to know something that they could not know apart from undergoing the process of shifting their trust to the serpent and enacting his words. We have already discussed the way in which eating the fruit acts as a sacrament in their knowledge. Even though we could imagine that the emphasis might be placed on the woman's decision to take and eat as the error, this thesis will maintain that taking and eating act only as the outward sacramental signs of the interior error.\textsuperscript{100}

All six aspects of epistemological process are exhibited in the error of Genesis 3, but it is only in the woman's failure to discern the man as prophet that we find explicit narratival warrant of the fact that she has committed an error. Even though her error is not indicted by God directly, clarity concerning her participation in the error is required in order to discern exactly how the man's error

\textsuperscript{98} Deut 1:39 describes children who have no 'knowledge of good and evil' as people who will obey YHWH, specifically contrasting them against those who 'would not listen, but rebelled against the command of YHWH …' (Deut 1:43).
\textsuperscript{99} Compare Gen 2:25 and 3:7.
\textsuperscript{100} These very actions, taking and eating (λάβετε and φάγετε respectively, in the LXX and NT), are sacramentally reversed in the ordinance of Christian communion. Compare the Septuagint's Gen 3:6 with Matt 26:26.
manifests itself. She follows the wrong prophetic voice, and her 'knowledge' proceeds from her submission to the serpent. *Who* one puts into place as their authoritative voice becomes the threshold as to *what* can be known.

E. The Error as Failure to Enact

Fifth, the failure to enact the message leads the woman to know something which in actuality, she did not want to know. *Knowing about* the commandments is not equivalent to *knowing* by indwelling the commandments. The woman *knew about* the commands and even had extralegal apparatus in place to protect her (i.e., '…neither shall you touch it, lest you die.'), if one reads her addendum as an intentional *halakah*. But *knowing* appears to be something else, something that requires committed participation beyond acquaintance.

Again, what proviso could prevent such an error? We might speculatively assume there was also something to be known through enacting the commands of God. Faithfully living out the prophetic message, eating from all the trees, and not eating from that one tree would have avoided *the* error. Even so, *knowing* does not merely aim at avoiding error. Unfortunately, the first couple's epistemological process accomplished by faithfulness is obfuscated to the reader by the events of chapter three. We can only offer vague notions about what she could have known, such as: knowing what it is like to live in direct community with YHWH Elohim and man. It does not seem like too large a leap to say that God intended them to know through the faithful garden community, but not by rejecting the authoritative and authenticated voice.

This qualification about what could be known through enacting the YHWH Elohim's injunctions prepares us for what we see in the rest of the Tanak. As with Genesis 2-3, we cannot always suggest in depth what exactly is meant to be known through faithful participation in the prophets' messages, but the ramifications point toward tendencies in knowing. This trajectory itself follows the epistemology of Genesis chapter two where the teleological arc of knowing is charted by differentiation, the *via negativa*. We cannot always say what knowing is meant to be, but we can often identify what it is not.

III. THE שמה קהָל MOTIF

It has been demonstrated that the only explicatory phrase in the indictments of Genesis 3 is that the man 'listened to the voice' of his wife. This particular phrase 'listen to the voice' of has a strong pedigree in the Pentateuch and beyond. The use of שמע with a leading preposition ( אלהי, ב, ל, ר, ו) and
most regularly expresses obedience to someone. This lends credence to the notion that the man at creation acts as a sort of prophet-like voice to the woman. If the indictment were reversed, instead of the man listening to his wife's voice, the woman would have listened to God's voice through the man. The wider use of the קָנָה motif could support this. However, there are only a handful of instances of this motif found in the book of Genesis.

This phrase 'listen to the voice of' has both the prophetic and indwelled aspect in mind. It is often translated as 'obey' in English translations because it is conflating the idea of acknowledging someone as having authority and then enacting their authoritative instructions. We will have to distinguish this flattening of authentication and indwelling in the Exodus narrative as each of these will end in distinct errors. But for now, we can consider the motif in Genesis as indicative of a more general error: neither listening to nor indwelling YHWH's commands.

Again, the few uses of the motif we find in Genesis are negative as was seen in the garden. Generally, listening to a voice other than God's will not end well in the narrative. The moral silence of the narrator forces us to rely on a consequentialist reading, where we consider the setting in the larger narrative and the end result of humanity's actions. There are four stories in Genesis in which this motif is found: the man and woman (3:17), Abram and Sarai (16:2; 21:12), Jacob and Rebekah (27:8, 13, 43), and Joseph with Potiphar's wife (39:10).

We have already discussed the first instance (Gen 3:17), and we find the next instance where Abram and Sarai are waiting for the promised fulfillment of progeny (Gen 16). God initially pulls Abram outside (Gen 15) to illustrate his explicit promises about the future of Abram's progeny and land. Like the garden sequence, Abram's privy is gained privately. Conceptually, God is affirming something like to 'It is not good for Abram and Sarai to be alone (i.e., without progeny).' God is willing to affirm and assure Abram to the point of cutting a covenant to that effect, possibly even swearing a self-maledictory oath.

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101 See: קָנָה in NIDOTTE. MacDonald discusses this distinction between the use of קָנָה as we are investigating here with an object 'introduced by' a preposition against the well known use of קָנָה in The Shema. Deuteronomy, 62 n. 20.

102 There is one use in Gen 4:23 by Lamech speaking to his wives, but this diverges conceptually from the pattern.

103 Kline argues that this ceremony must be taken as a self-maledictory oath (e.g., 'Cross my heart and hope to die ....). Whatever the veracity of Kline's claim, the narrative of Gen 15 states plainly that this ceremony is meant to be an epistemological process: 'Know for certain (יִדְעָה) that …' (15:13). Kline, 17-21. Although adding many nuances and caveats and not addressing the epistemological issue, Hasel concludes that at the least, 'Yahweh binds himself in a promise to the patriarch.' The Meaning of the Animal Rite in Genesis 15'. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament. Vol. 19 (1981): 69.
A. Abram and Sarai

Sarai's barrenness is the theme of the ensuing discourse that immediately follows in the narrative tempo. It begins with the narrator's comment, 'Sarai … had borne him no children.' Sarai's solution to her childlessness runs in flat contradiction to the promises and belief given from God to Abram in the adjacent and prior passage (15:1-21). She offers her servant and the narrator notes, 'And Abram listened to the voice of Sarai' (16:2). The question we must now put to the text is whether Abram should have listened to Sarai. The general rule that man should not 'listen to the voice of a woman' cannot be supported here as God himself later commands Abram to listen to the voice of Sarai in her anger toward Hagar (21:12). Further, the story emphasizes the error along the boundaries of authority and authentication, not gender. Indeed, we will see women who correctly act as the authoritative and authenticated voice of God to their male leaders.  

In this instance, what does the trajectory of the narrative intimate concerning Sarai's solution? God has already given Abram the plan for his progeny and Sarai has given her plan as well. Considering Abram's failure to contradict Sarai's plan with God's promise and Sarai's later reaction to the promised child (i.e., that it was laughable), indicates that she might not have known of the promises given to Abram.  

Calvin astutely draws our attention to the fact that Sarai acts upon the divine promise and not necessarily her raw maternal desire. She is seeking to actualize the promise by prolepsis. So he says, 'Sarai, therefore, does not desire offspring (as is usual) from a merely natural impulse; but she yields her conjugal rights to another, through a wish to obtain that benediction, which she knew was divinely promised:'  

Like the woman of the garden before her, Sarai appears to act in her desire. She desires to make a promised reality become a present reality. 

More than thematically, the passages in Genesis 3 and 16 are bound together by their use of language. In Genesis 3:6, the woman 'took' the fruit and 'gave' it 'to her husband'. These actions together were the referent of the indictment that the man 'listened to the voice of your wife.' In Genesis 16:3, Sarai 'took' Hagar and 'gave' her to 'her husband' because Abram 'listened to the voice of' his wife. Here, we find the two lexical connections: the שמהlekhol motif and the actions of נוח ו mListiq. As well, the dative structure of action moving from the wife toward the husband: אשה (he with mappiq, see

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104 E.g., Judges, where the שמהlekhol motif is again incorporated into the meta-analysis of chapter two (2:2). However, we soon find in chapter four that God is using the authorized and authenticated voice of a woman (Deborah) to guide a man (Barak).


106 Calvin, Genesis, vol. 1, 247.
The parallel between the two passages implies that for both the man and Abram, 'listening to the voice' of their wives is fundamentally negative. Abram's sacramental commission of error is 'to know' Hagar and that is the direct outworking of him 'listening to the voice of Sarai'. This immediately creates strife between Hagar and Sarai to the point of abuse and ultimately the desire to murder (21:8-21). From a consequentialist reading, 'listening to the voice' of Sarai must be read as Abram listening to the wrong voice.

Wenham notes this parallel to the account of the Fall in which the sacramental commissioning was Abram's act of 'going in to the offered Hagar.' Berg also sees this as a direct parallel saying, 'This leads to the conclusion. By employing quite similar formulations and an identical sequence of events in Gen 3:6b and 16:3-4a, the author makes it clear that for him both narratives describe comparable events, that they are both accounts of a fall.'

If Berg is correct and this is meant to be a retelling of Genesis chapter three, then the intensification of epistemological language in the prior chapter (15:6, 8, 13) and sacramental commissioning (15:9-21) could also mirror the proper epistemological process of man in Genesis chapter two (i.e., Gen 15 is to 16 what Gen 2 is to 3). Without laying out an entire exegetical argument here, it seems fair to say that Abram's 'belief' in YHWH's promise of children (15:6) and disbelief in the promise of the land (15:8) are rectified through a process guided by YHWH. The purpose of that epistemological process is to evince Abram's 'sure knowledge' (יודע ודעת) as its end goal (15:13). This process retains sacramental connections through the animals which Abram takes (ל.relu), but centers

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<td>'תֹּקָה' 6</td>
<td>'תֹּקָה' 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>'to her husband'</td>
<td>'לָאָשָׁה' 6</td>
<td>(directive ending) 'לָאָשָׁה' 3</td>
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upon the promise of land which YHWH gives (נהר). Here again, the narrative of Genesis 15 yields some insight, however limited, into how knowing is supposed to function properly, which is then violated by listening to the wrong voice (Gen 16).

**B. Jacob and Rebekah**

The story of Jacob and Rebekah employs the next instance in which the שמע קהל phrase tracks alongside the plot to deceive Isaac. This time, the motif is part of the discourse itself and the ensuing action demonstrates 'listening to the voice' of his mother. First, she hears Isaac's instructions to Esau and the blessing he will receive (27:5). She then speaks to Jacob saying, 'Listen to my voice as I command you' (27:8).

Again we see minor lexical connections where she commands Jacob to take לֶאֶשֶׁת לְכֹלָה two goats and then we see her give לֶאֶשֶׁת לְכֹלָה the prepared food to Jacob for the sacramental commissioning of their deception. These lexical connections are not as closely related to the parallel between Genesis 3 and 16, but do exist as the actions of the story. This time, we see Jacob flinch. He questions the feasibility of this plan (27:11-12). We should note the next appearances of שמע קהל as necessarily contrasting one another. The first is meant to reassure Jacob where she says, 'Let your curse be on me, my son; only obey my voice …' (27:13). The repetition is meant to focus Jacob's attention on Rebekah's plan. However, the next instance where Esau has discovered their co-opting deceit and vows to kill Jacob contrasts the prior use of שמע קהל. Rebekah uses the emphatic imperative to save Jacob's life: 'my son, listen to my voice. Arise and flee …' (27:43).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genesis 3</th>
<th>Genesis 16</th>
<th>Genesis 27</th>
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<tr>
<td>'listen to the voice'</td>
<td>שמעת לְכֹלָה 17</td>
<td>שמעת…לְכֹלָה 2</td>
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<td>'and took'</td>
<td>ונָחָה 6</td>
<td>ונָחָה 3</td>
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<td>'and gave'</td>
<td>ונָחָה 6</td>
<td>וַחָה 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>'to her husband'</td>
<td>לֶאֶשֶׁת (dir. ending) 3</td>
<td>אִשָּׁה</td>
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Here too, listening to the voice of his mother can only be assessed consequentially. The larger narrative of Genesis reveals the poverty of Jacob's choice to listen. When Jacob finally meets his

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111 Gen 27:9 Here it is Jacob as the subject of 'take', not Rebekah.
112 Gen 27:17.
brother, he repents by extraordinary means revealing Jacob's own disposition toward this incident (Gen 32-33). Because God will directly speak to Jacob (28:10-22), we are forced to consider here whether or not Jacob should listen to his mother's voice even when there is no competing authenticated prophetic voice. In other words, on what grounds could Jacob have eschewed his mother's counsel?

Modest skepticism toward Rebekah's plan might have helped Jacob, the same disposition the woman could have taken toward the serpent. Probing Rebekah's directions with simple questions or even stopping to evaluate the possible outcomes would have brought more light to the situation. In fact, Jacob is hesitant but listens nonetheless.

Calvin takes this opportunity in his commentary to observe Rebekah's proleptic epistemology. He suggests that in this deception, Rebekah has in mind YHWH's prior promise to her (25:22-23): '…the older shall serve the younger.' In her haste to make this happen, she facilitates the shift of power away from Esau and onto Jacob. This is reminiscent of Sarai's proleptic haste in Genesis 16. Calvin associates Rebekah's folly with an earnest epistemological purview of history. Because she trusts YHWH's promise, she knows that Jacob will eventually rule over his brother. So her actions are merely missteps toward events that will actualize nonetheless. Concerning Rebekah's mindset, Calvin says:

This is to be carefully observed, in order that we may understand that a pure and distinct knowledge does not always so illuminate the minds of the pious as to cause them to be governed, in all their actions, by the Holy Spirit, but that the little light which shows them their path is enveloped in various clouds of ignorance and error; so that while they hold a right course, and are tending towards the goal, they yet occasionally slide.113

Calvin is careful to comment that Rebekah is at odds with her own knowledge due to YHWH's promise. The scene does not turn on Jacob's awareness of authentication or the authority of that promise to Rebekah. The problem, per Calvin, is that Rebekah was navigating by the 'little light … enveloped in various clouds of ignorance and error.' Rebekah's erroneous 'slide' was due to her leap towards the conclusion: the older serving the younger. As with the woman in the garden and Sarai, the plan fails. Calvin's exposition reveals that Rebekah should have been skeptical of her own voice in this matter. It is worth saying that in Calvin's analysis, we already see many aspects of the epistemological process espoused in the first two chapters of Genesis. Calvin points out that this process is vectored toward an end, it is uncertain, it requires submission to some guide outside of ourselves (i.e., it is properly governed by the Holy Spirit), and it involves illumination which is revelation from hiddenness and error.

We would suggest that Rebekah's proleptic actions stem from her desire for them to actualize,

113 Calvin, *Genesis*, vol. 1, 85.
like the woman and Sarai before her. In these instances, desires that are projected into the best possible future outworking of their schemes function much in the same way to the serpent's propositions in Genesis 3. Indeed, this is the content of God's stern warning of Cain in Genesis 4. He compares Cain's malcontent with something waiting to spring and pounce upon him. Notably, the precautionary directive is for Cain to rule over it ( Heb: מָשָׁל), just as the woman will be ruled by her husband (or desire) because of her sin.\textsuperscript{114} The resolution to these desires is that they must be either ruled over or commissioned in full. The implication of Cain's narrative is that his failure to 'do well' meant he failed to rule over his sin. This in turn means that failure to rule over one's sin will result in its commissioning (e.g., eating the fruit, murder, and deception respectively).

As Biddle points out, the temptation to act is deliberated with the slightest gloss over the consequences without seeing the unanticipated outcomes.\textsuperscript{115} Jacob's folly is then listening to the voice of a person (in the Genesis motif) who is driven by her blinded desire; so it is with the man, Abram, and Potiphar in this particular motif (see below).

It is less plain as to what could or should have been done by Jacob in this instance. Unlike the man and Abram, we do not know that Jacob has an alternate prophetic voice to whom he should be listening. But a few indicators of error loom large in the story. First, Rebekah's plan is deceitful and the narrative finds its resolve in the futility of that deceit (27:41). Second, the plan is a human action to fulfill a divine promise without the explicit call to the action from YHWH. Third, a man who is deceitfully cunning in his relationships toward his brother and father (25:29-34) is skeptical about a similarly cunning plan to deceive them. The motif is widened here in this story, but not altogether absent.

\textbf{C. Joseph and Potiphar's Wife}

Finally in Genesis, the motif takes a slightly positive turn in Joseph. The ישמע קוהל motif thus far has had a negative effect with the man, Abram, and Jacob; all of whom are 'listening to the voice' of a woman. But in Joseph, we have someone who does not listen to the voice of a women attempting to lure him into capital acts of adultery.\textsuperscript{116} This is a stark contrast to the other instances in Genesis. Where the others are single events, Joseph is being pursued 'day after day' (יומם ים) with the result that 'he

\textsuperscript{114} Compare Gen 3:16c and 4:7b.
\textsuperscript{115} Biddle, Missing the Mark, 12-13.
would not listen to her' (גַּלְגְּלֵ֫ה שָׁמִים אַלְדוֹת). Up front, it must be admitted that this instance departs most radically from the motif throughout the Tanak. While both terms, 'listen' and 'voice', play significant parts in the drama, they are not in the sequence previously observed. In most occasions in the Tanak, 'listen' is linked to 'voice' with one of the following prepositions: ב, ל, א. However, this specific phrasing is not present in Genesis 39, though the terms and the construct are present.

There are two reasons for including this passage in this analysis. First, the specific context is Joseph being tempted by a woman, and the narratival tension centers on whether or not he will 'listen to her'. After the temptation of Joseph, the story is negative about the outcome in which Potiphar 'listened to the words his wife spoke to him' (39:19). Here and elsewhere in the Pentateuch, 'listening to the voice' and 'listening to the words of' can act synonymously in instances of similar employment. More remarkably, we have the first instance in Genesis where a man definitively would not listen to a woman who was motivated by desire. Immediately contrasting this Joseph's denial of the wife, Potiphar does listen to the words of his wife and takes action against the righteous figure.

The second reason for including this passage is theologically motivated. In the history of establishing prophets, Joseph is the first figure who stands out as a public prophet. While Abraham, Isaac and Jacob all heard from God through visitors, visions, and dreams, these messages had to do with their own mission and family. God did not reveal to them matters that were for the public domain. Joseph hears from God regarding the future of others external to the Abrahamic covenant and the children of Jacob. He is able to hear from God concerning the dreams of others and specifically accredits this knowledge to God and not to himself. Even more, Joseph is publicly authenticated before Pharaoh as having privately-gained authority. Joseph's authoritative instructions are indwelled

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117 Gen 39:10.
118 The phrase 'listen to the words of' and 'listen to the voice of' are sometimes used interchangeably in the Pentateuch. For instance, Deut 13 specifically pertains to which prophets Israel should listen. The Israelites are cautioned in verse 2, 'You shall not listen to the words of that prophet …' (דָּבָר שָׁמִים אַל תְּשִּׁמְעֵהוּ). Despite specific rhetorical effects intended in Deuteronomy, we have warrant for considering the equivalence of the phrases here.
119 Gordon, 'Prophets', 67-86.
120 One might object that the revelation of God's plans for Sodom and Gomorrah were of a public nature (Gen 18). But I would counter that the insight only concerns Abram in relation to his family who are living in Sodom and Gomorrah, not the towns themselves. If Abram went into Sodom and proclaimed its destruction, then the objection would hold. Although Abraham is later called a prophet by YHWH, it is only in a private revelation to Abimelech (Gen 20:7). For the nature of Abraham's authoritative and persuasive force in Genesis 18, see Nathan MacDonald, 'Listening to Abraham—Listening to Yhwh: Divine Justice and Mercy in Genesis 18:16-33'. Catholic Biblical Quarterly vol. 66 (2004): 25-43.
121 Joseph begins his interpretation of Pharaoh's dreams by averring that God has revealed the future to Pharaoh in the dreams and their meaning through Joseph: 'The dreams of Pharaoh are one; God has revealed to Pharaoh what he is about to do.'
by the people of Egypt in order for them to see the provision of YHWH on their behalf during times of famine. For these reasons, Joseph acts as both an anti-Adam and a proto-Moses.122

With reference to Potiphar, there is not an alternate prophetic voice, authoritative and authenticated to Joseph. Rather, Joseph is the prophetic voice and reasons out loud against the wife of Potiphar. She spoke to him day after day, but Joseph's reasoning reverses the order of the motif. Where Potiphar's wife wants to give herself to him, he refuses on those same grounds because of the fact that Potiphar has 'given' (יִתְנוּ) everything he has under Joseph's hand, except his wife.

So far, we have seen that listening to the voice of a woman driven by desire is the sign of error. In Joseph, we have someone who clearly sees the error of listening to Potiphar's wife and refuses to enact that folly. In Joseph, we now have the possibility of the genus to our differentia: knowing something about God's ends in a specific situation, free from explicit error.123 But Genesis is also quick to demonstrate that avoiding this type of error does not guarantee any favor in life. This is exactly how the story betrays Joseph's knowledge of God's teleological goal in his famous dictum: 'you meant it for evil against me, but God meant it for good' (50:20). What was the end that was 'meant for good'? The story finally divulges that it was to save the lives of both Egyptians and their neighbors, including the family of Joseph (50:20). In Joseph's pithy articulation, the story reveals that his early faithfulness to YHWH (39:3-10) yields this unique knowledge that could only have come about through the process of faithfulness to YHWH.

Joseph stands out in the narrative as one of the few persons in Genesis who gets it right.124 Although we only have the peaks of Joseph's life in this narrative, the troughs are assumed to be continuations of the same sort of moral fortitude. Once more, if this epistemological process is consonant from Genesis 2, then Joseph's knowledge must align with that which the narrative is concerned and is ultimately articulated in his succinct theodicy (50:20). This proposition is not knowledge per se, but something that can be said because Joseph knows its veridicality through a socially-enmeshed, prophetically-induced, embodied, indwelled, and revelatory process of knowing.

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122 I first heard this idea of Joseph as the 'anti-Adam' and 'proto-Moses' postulated by Stephen Chapman in his paper for the Genesis and Christian Theology Conference, 'Food, Famine and the Nations', University of St Andrews, Scotland (July 2009).

123 The phrase 'free from error' should not in any way be thought of in terms of something similar to Descartes' 'clear and distinct ideas'. Here, 'free from error' is only meant to describe knowing without the explicit error of listening to a non-authoritative and unauthenticated voice.

Just as the man's knowledge is exclaimed appropriately in the words, 'At last, bone of my bones …,' so too is Joseph's knowledge gestured at by him saying: 'What you meant for evil, God meant for good.'

IV. SUMMARY

The argument presented here is not intended to be complete apart from the motif's function within the rest of the Pentateuch and New Testament. The second half of this analysis was meant to flesh out the narrative's perspective on the grievous error of Genesis chapter three. In order to assess that error, it was necessary to contrast it with a proper epistemology in chapter two. Consequently, the intense focus in the narrative on the man's role and responsibility and the singular indictment of man in the garden led us to explore the broader use of this phrase: 'listen to the voice of'.

The basic point derived is that to understand Genesis 2-3, we must understand the use of that particular phrase in the entirety of Genesis. The use of this construct is certainly not mechanical, but gives us sufficient impetus to make some assertions about the relational roles in the garden and the implications for the interpretation of error in epistemological process.

From this point on in the Pentateuch, errors due to not listening to the authoritative and authenticated prophetic voice have profound consequences (e.g., Pharaoh and the plagues). Discerning the authoritative and authenticated prophet seems to have priority in the epistemological process, for it is determinative for knowing in general, and particularly, within the Pentateuch. Specifically, the question that we will explore next is: Does what one can know depend on to whom one listens? Knowing and error are then centrally connected to the prophetic office and voice. Against the background of a proper epistemology in Genesis 2, this understanding of the error in Genesis 3 becomes stark. The serpent and woman, while problematic, were not the immediate object of YHWH's concern.

If this is an accurate read, then the error cannot be the desire for autonomy apart from God or man, although these elements play a role in the totality of actions. Rather, the error is the shift away from faithfulness to the voice of God, through the man, to the voice of the serpent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Like the garden narrative, the story of the exodus evinces more than a tangential relationship to the problem of knowledge. The authoritative voice is established for an entire nation, and error is solely determinative by how Israel listens to the voice of Moses and participates in his guidance. Continuing on a necessarily grander scale, the epistemological process widens to include entire nations and a seemingly egregious means of authenticating the prophet's voice. How can we survey the vast stories of this text? The core narrative of Exodus 1-14 is one concerned with epistemological process: who knows whom and by what means. If the epistemological process is uniform in the Pentateuch and 'knowing' acts as one of the narratival tensions in the story of the exodus, then we expect to see the resolution of the narrative's conflict upon the boundaries of that process. As in Genesis 2-3, coming to know will require embodied persons, the Israelites, who are meant to know YHWH through authenticated guidance. To do this, the Israelites must listen to the authoritative voice authenticated to them and enact the prophet's guidance in order to see what is being shown to them. Additionally, the six aspects of the epistemological process, which have been previously summarized (i.e., social, prophetic, differentiated, embodied, participatory/revelatory, and sacramental), gave reasons to prioritize the prophetic aspect above the others.
As well, the terms 'hear', 'see', and 'know' appear to be the parlance of the epistemological process. The usage persists and strengthens in Exodus, but now we find this trio of common terms (hear, see, know) amassing repeatedly where the epistemological process is being described in the stories. The pedestrian value of these terms in the Hebrew Bible should not assuage us from their technical employment in particular texts concerned with epistemological process. Just as 'taste' and 'see' appear banal in the broad spectrum of Hebrew vocabulary, when put together ('“(שומם)') and directed toward a knowledge of YHWH (e.g Psalm 34:9 MT), we recognize the possible significance of this lexical arrangement as it is employed in the Psalms and elsewhere. Similarly, 'see', hear', and 'know' will be considered where they occasion an episode of epistemological process.

Error appears to occur upon the boundary of listening to the voice of the prophet and/or participating in the prophet's instruction. In Exodus, we will now have to clarify two different orders of error. The first order of error results from not listening to the voice of the prophet. This forces us to question how Moses is authenticated as authoritatively speaking for YHWH. But even then, the authentication of Moses itself begs the question about how signs can be used to authenticate a prophet at all. The second order of error is the failure to enact the instructions of the prophet. We will offer that error of the first order can be illustrated by Pharaoh's rejection of Moses and the second order by Israel's violation of Moses' commands.

Finally, we must turn to specific and prominent stories of error in order to determine if the epistemological process remains consistent from Genesis through Exodus and which order of error is being described. For this analysis, we will look specifically at the Pharaoh's epistemological process (Exod 1-14), the incident with the manna and quail (Exod 16), and the infamous acts with the golden calf (Exod 32). In the end, we shall argue that the epistemological process described in Exodus remains commensurate with Genesis while expanding to clarify that knowing and error do not operate as opposite poles. Rather, the epistemological process is the same for those who properly know and those who end in error. The type of error committed dictates the type of knowledge gained, its clarity and fidelity to the reality meant to be grasped. Finally, we will take a brief look into Numbers where we treat the Balak-Balaam episode in detail to demonstrate that even outside of Israel, the same epistemological process is at work.

Looking forward to Exodus, we have previously noticed that the trend of men listening to unauthenticated voices has been portrayed negatively. But this cycle seems to have been broken by Joseph, who did not listen to a woman's desire-fueled requests. Joseph seems to be the first publicly
prophet-like figure of the Tanak. This leads into the opening problem of the Exodus narrative that must be resolved as the story takes its course (1:8): 'Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who did not know Joseph' (לך דיב תַּמָּך). Again we see that the arc of Exodus' story centers upon an epistemological crux: movement from not knowing to knowing.

II. THE KNOWLEDGE PLOT IN EXODUS

From the beginning, the historical setting of Exodus is stated in epistemological terms and acts as the narratival conflict to be resolved (Exod 1:8-22). Because a new Pharaoh does not know the descendants of Joseph, the too-numerous Hebrews are conscripted for slave labor. It is the reversal of the situation of Joseph at the end of Genesis. Where YHWH conscripted Egypt through the prophetic knowledge of Joseph in order to protect the Egyptians and Israelites from famine, now Pharaoh does not know Joseph's descendants and protects his own interest by enslaving these same people.

These problems concerning Pharaoh's knowledge and the enslavement of Israel will be reversed through Moses: Pharaoh will know Joseph's descendants by means of their relationship to YHWH and the Hebrew slaves will be liberated. Fretheim adds that Exodus' plot resonates with the primeval creation themes in Genesis:

The culprit this time is not a serpent or a brother-killing Cain or the sons of God but "a new king over Egypt." … The focus is thus placed on him, not simply as a historical figure, but as a symbol for the anticreation forces of death which take on the God of life. The narrator's concern is with this king's response to God's extraordinary creative activity. This is a life-and-death struggle in which the future of the creation is at stake.¹

No one will disagree that liberation of the Israelites is a definitive arc of the exodus story, but what role does 'knowing' play? Asked otherwise: 'Liberated to do what?' Fretheim suggests that two 'leading theological issues' in Exodus are a 'theology of creation' and 'the knowledge of God'.² To the first point, he argues that Pharaoh is 'anticreational' in parallel with the narratives of Genesis 3-6.³ To the second issue: 'The book of Exodus is concerned in a major way with the knowledge of Yahweh.'⁴ Fretheim observes the irony of Pharaoh setting the question:

Who is Yahweh [that I should listen to his voice]? (5:2). The pursuit of this question is primarily undertaken by God: "that you may know that I am Yahweh." The object of this divine quest includes Pharaoh and the Egyptians … as well as Israel. … Hence the identity of Yahweh, not very clear at the beginning of the narrative, achieves a depth and clarity as the narrative

² 'A creation theology is also built into the structure of the book, seen not least in the parallels between Exodus and Genesis 1-9.' Fretheim, Exodus, 12-16.
³ Fretheim, Exodus, 106-7.
⁴ Fretheim, Exodus, 14.
progresses through divine speech and action as well as human alertness and boldness.\(^5\)

In Exodus, the plight of the Hebrew people in Egypt is the conflict that must come to resolution in a narrative that is intertwined with the epistemological process of two nations. The resolution comes through Moses acting as the authenticated and authoritative guide fiducially bound both to the Israelites and YHWH's promises. Merely considering the repetition of 'know' (יִדְיָה) in Exodus reveals a conscientious effort to frame YHWH's actions not only in terms of liberation, but in terms of knowledge. Briefly, it is worth demonstrating that the concern of YHWH's actions can be seen by looking at ידיה with either the Israelites, YHWH, or Egypt as the object of the verb 'know':

**Israelites as Object**

1:8 Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who did not know Joseph.
3:7 Then YHWH said, 'I have surely seen the affliction of my people ... I know their sufferings ...'

**YHWH as Object**

5:2 But Pharaoh said, 'Who is YHWH, that I should obey his voice ...? I do not know YHWH ...'
6:3 I appeared to Abraham ... but by my name ... I did not make myself known to them [patriarchs].
6:7 I will take you to be my people, ... and you [Israel] shall know that I am YHWH your God.
7:5 The Egyptians shall know that I am YHWH, when I ... bring out the people of Israel from among them.
7:17 By this you [Pharaoh] shall know that I am YHWH: ... the Nile, and it shall turn into blood.
8:10 Moses said, '... so that you [Pharaoh] may know that there is no one like YHWH our God.'\(^6\)
8:22 that you [Pharaoh] may know that I am YHWH in the midst of the earth.
9:14 so that you [Pharaoh] may know that there is none like me [YHWH] in all the earth.
9:29 Moses said to him, '... so that you [Pharaoh] may know that the earth is YHWH's.'
10:2 tell in the hearing of your son ... that you [Israel] may know that I am YHWH.\(^7\)
11:7 that you [Pharaoh] may know that YHWH makes a distinction between Egypt and Israel.
14:4 and the Egyptians shall know that I am YHWH.
14:18 And the Egyptians shall know that I am YHWH when I have gotten glory over Pharaoh, ...

**Egypt as Object**

9:30 I know that you [Pharaoh and Egypt] do not yet fear YHWH God.

Considering *who will know what through whom* in the first half of Exodus, there seems to be an almost rhythmic employment of ידיה. This rhythm forces us to look for the possibility of epistemological process as a resolution to the opening dilemma: 'there arose a new king over Egypt, who did not know Joseph' (1:8).

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7 This instance is noted to be discernible paradigmatic of the 'recognition formula' where YHWH is the object of knowledge, the so-called erkenntnisinhalt. Similarly: Exod 6:7; 7:17; 9:14; 14:4, 18; 16:12; 29:46. Vervenne, 'Phraseology.'
A. Seeing and Hearing Developing Exodus' Epistemological Process

Before moving into the specific texts, we must note the language that appears to formalize around epistemological process: 'listening' and 'seeing' with the consequence of 'knowing'. YHWH himself 'listened to their [Hebrew slaves] groaning', 'saw' and 'knew' (2:24-25). Conversely, because Pharaoh's heart was hardened, he would not listen, saw what he wanted to see, and knew things he didn't actually want to know (e.g., YHWH was Israel's god and fought on her behalf against Egypt). This language is not mere 'lexical stock', but contextually provides the construct that persists into Deutonomy, Isaiah, and beyond to describe a particular relationship: 'listening' in order to 'see' which ends in 'knowing'.

Similar to Genesis 2, YHWH asserts his own knowledge with the intent to bring the Egyptians and Israelites to different purviews of the same declared knowledge. YHWH promises liberation, but by saying, 'I will take you to be my people, and I will be your God, and you shall know that I am YHWH your God, who has brought you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians' (6:7). Liberation is stated in epistemological terms of how the Israelites are to understand their freedom and not a brute discourse on emancipation. Israel's future knowledge, knowing that YHWH is her God, is effected through a process by which they must listen to the authenticated guidance of Moses and enact his directions in order to 'see' what YHWH already sees, namely, the Israelite's coming freedom to 'serve me [YHWH] in the wilderness.' If we skip to the closing of this epistemological quest in Exodus 14, we find a summary of the epistemological process, again in the language of 'seeing'. Exodus 14:30-31 concludes:

Thus YHWH saved Israel that day from the hand of the Egyptians, and Israel saw the Egyptians dead on the seashore. Israel saw the great power that YHWH used against the Egyptians, so the people feared YHWH, and they believed in YHWH and in his servant Moses.

The seeing and believing are the fruit of listening to the voice of YHWH through Moses and enacting his guidance until they reached the far shores of the Red Sea. The goal reiterated over and again is that

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8. We are not attempting to identify words or grouping upon which we can derive some fundamental reading. Rather, we are noticing a pattern of word usage that occasions particular narratives of epistemological error. For concerns about the former, see Barr's concerns: "Faith" and "Truth" in Semantics.

9. The promise of Exod 6:6 ('I will bring you out ….') is now described by the present participle after the mention of the epistemological goal of 6:7 (you shall know … who has brought you out ….').

10. Exod 7:16.


12. It will be demonstrated below that the patterned employment of שמעתי哈利 continues, especially in reference to the pre-eminent errors of Exodus: Pharaoh's obduracy, the manna narrative, and the golden calf narrative.
Israel 'shall know that I am YHWH your God'. So Vervenne concludes: "Revelation of glory" and "knowledge/recognition of YHWH" constitute the very point of the Sea Narrative which is ultimately a portrayal of the realisation of these motifs.\textsuperscript{13} If this is correct, then our previous question, 'Liberated to do what,' is answered, 'Israel is liberated to know YHWH as her God.'\textsuperscript{14}

At the end of the Red Sea narrative, the effect of this process is that Israel 'saw', 'feared' and 'believed in YHWH and his servant Moses.' If this whole epistemological process is being guided by YHWH through Moses, then this drives two questions: 1) How was Moses publicly authenticated? 2) What process did the Israelites have to enact in order to see what YHWH wanted them to see, to know what YHWH had previously declared? '[Y]ou shall know that I am YHWH your God, who has brought you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians' (6:7).

\textbf{B. The Problem of Authenticating Moses}

To the question of Moses' validation regarding Israel, authentication appears to be the center hub upon which the entire first half of Exodus turns. The form of the Hebrew text cited above (14:30-31) reflects the emphasis. Just looking at the verbs, the sequence essentially reads: 'Israel saw', 'Israel saw', 'the people feared', and 'they believed'. The move from 'seeing' to 'fearing' is alliterative with the consequence of 'believing'. For any contiguous reading of the Pentateuch up to this juncture, it is striking that the Israelites came to a point where their belief could be stated in such equalities: they 'believed \textit{in YHWH} and \textit{in Moses} his servant.'\textsuperscript{16}

But how do we get from Moses as an estranged Hebrew to an entire people-group believing 'in

\textsuperscript{13} Vervenne, 'Phraseology', 486-7.
\textsuperscript{14} Eslinger argues against a triumphalist reading of Exod 1-15 in favor of an epistemological trajectory in the narrative: 'The well-being of Israel and its Egyptian partner is clearly subordinate to Yahweh's overarching goal: 'that ye may know how that I am the LORD' (Exod 10.2).' Lyle Eslinger, 'Freedom or Knowledge? Perspective and Purpose in the Exodus Narrative (Exodus 1-15)' \textit{Journal for the Study of the Old Testament} vol. 52 (1991): 43-60. However, we recognize that YHWH appears to entangle the goals of worship with knowledge where the liberation is directed toward knowledge, but the furlough is so that Israel may 'hold a feast to me [YHWH] in the wilderness (5:1)'.
\textsuperscript{15} Compare 14:13-14.
\textsuperscript{16} It is worth noting that there is a prepositional prefix (\textit{in}) affixed to both the name 'YHWH' and 'Moses'. Hence, it is rendered, '\textit{in YHWH} and \textit{in his servant Moses}'.

YHWH and in his servant Moses'? Indeed, Moses' authentication sequence begins very early in the narrative and includes the errors of Pharaoh and the Israelites later in the story. We have offered the possibility that the narrative conflict in the first part of Exodus is set on the problem of Israel in its enslaved circumstance. But upon her liberation, the problem immediately shifts to Israel listening to the voice of Moses for the remainder of Exodus' narrative portions. The story itself devotes much attention to privately establishing the relationship between YHWH and Moses and then the public authentication of Moses before Israel and Egypt. This public authentication is punctuated by the 'you shall know' statements cited above.17

Because error is consistently ascribed to those who did not listen to the voice of the authenticated prophet, we will need to examine both the authority-giving sequence, which occurs in private, and how that private authority will be made publicly accessible to Israel. Also, the errors of Pharaoh and Israel later at Sinai must be addressed in separate treatments.

1. Private Authority

Although the narrative itself does not make a public/private distinction, tension builds for the reader around the authority of Moses established privately and whether or not it will be publicly acknowledged. The scene of the burning bush serves as part of the prophetic authentication process. YHWH's dialogue with Moses is the private authority that will be publicly authenticated before the Israelites and then the Egyptians. The death of Joseph in the introduction of Exodus leaves a political lacuna, who will speak for the sons of Israel now? Joseph's passing is then rhetorically connected to Israel's enslaved state (2:8-14). In this malaise of uncertainty, YHWH raises up a prophet who will only protect Israel, not Egypt. As we have argued in Genesis, authoritative guidance requires the establishment of authority. It appears that Moses' authority begins with privy to YHWH's knowledge regarding Israel's present situation: 'I have surely seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt and have heard their cry because of their taskmasters. I know their sufferings' (3:7).

This thesis has suggested that knowing is fundamentally connected to what one can see due to whom they are listening to. It would be an anthropomorphic leap to import that entire construct of knowing into this single statement of YHWH. However, this epistemological framework will be borne out as we follow this language throughout the Pentateuch. For now, this language (hearing, seeing,
knowing) is sufficient to suggest that these terms may have a specific relationship to one another. Noticing this tendency, Houtman puts these same terms in a tightened relationship based on their patterned occurrence a few verses prior to 3:7 (re 2:24-25):

The verbs יד and שמע, ראה, שמע occurring in 3:7 were earlier used in the order ראה, שמע, יד in 2:24, 25 with God as subject. The use of this variety of verbs serves to bring out that God is in every way familiar with Israel’s plight and that no aspect of it has escaped his attention.\(^\text{18}\)

Having acknowledged Israel’s present situation in this private scene with Moses, YHWH then addresses the future goal of taking the Israelites out of Egypt and toward the Promised Land (3:10) and attends to how he will accomplish this through Moses. The efficacy of YHWH's plan is clearly Moses' chief concern (3:11-4:17). YHWH is sending Moses to Pharaoh with signs (e.g., staff/serpent, leprous hand, etc.) that will publicly authenticate the authority that is being furnished in this sequence. But for Moses, YHWH also gives a personal sign of his intentions, which is serving YHWH on this same mountain where the prior authority is now being meted out (3:12).

In this scene, we have both the private authority of Moses established to the reader, but also a relationship between 'hearing', 'seeing', and 'knowing' is portended. Indeed, this tripartite interrelation will take on a particular form for knowing in error in the Pentateuch and beyond. But here, the relationship between these three terms is not yet clarified. We cannot answer if YHWH 'saw' because he 'heard' or vice versa, but we will be able to give clearer answers when the Israelites fail to listen and, therefore, do not see.

### 2. Public Authentication

Moses notices the sociological complexity of what is being demanded by his public authentication. He redirects YHWH from the problem of convincing Pharaoh to the problem of convincing the Israelites themselves (3:13-22). This redirection signals the reader that the problem of private authority being publicly authenticated is discernible to Moses, and YHWH's accommodation affirms that it might be a legitimate concern. Israel trusting YHWH through Moses is not demanded as an irrational nor blind epistemic leap.

YHWH's first solution is to have Moses publicly tell the Israelites about his private encounter by divulging both the revealed name (i.e., 'YHWH') and the eventual goal of this furlough (i.e., the 'land of milk and honey'). YHWH's evaluation of how Israel will receive this news is set in the שמע כולה.

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language reminiscent to the reader of Genesis: 'And they [Hebrew elders] will listen to your voice' (3:18, יִשְׂמַּעְתָּם לֵעָלִּין). The apparent goal of this encounter with Moses is to help the elders of Israel, Pharaoh, and ultimately, Israel herself to believe that both Moses' private authority derives from YHWH and that Israel must believe that YHWH is her God. But Moses' rejoinder clearly displays his lack of confidence in YHWH's plan. YHWH capitulates and offers a means of public authentication that is satisfying to Moses (4:1-17).

The two signs are offered specifically to convince and they are meant to build upon each other. 'If they will not believe ... or not listen to your voice,' (4:1, 9) then Moses is to perform the third sign (i.e., turning the Nile to blood). When Moses returns to Egypt and performs the signs for the elders, confession marks Israel's response that authenticates Moses and publicly acknowledges YHWH as the one who has privately underwritten his authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exodus 3:7</th>
<th>Exodus 4:31</th>
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<tr>
<td>יִנְמֵר יְהוָה</td>
<td>וַיִּמְסֹסֶנָה בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל&lt;br&gt;רָאָה רָאַיהּ אֲחָדָה עַל אֲחָדָה בְּמֵיתֹת&lt;br&gt;אֶרֶם מֵדָעָה שְׁמַעְתָּה מִמְּנָה נְגַעְיָה</td>
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In form, the confession also appears to close the pericope that began with YHWH 'seeing', 'hearing', and 'knowing' the suffering of Israel (3:7). 'And the people believed; and when they heard that YHWH had visited the people of Israel and that he had seen their affliction, they bowed their heads and worshipped' (4:31). This confession should not be confused with knowledge of YHWH because Israel winced and waned on the veracity of this confession time and again. However, this confession should serve to mark the reason that Israel listens to the voice of Moses as a prophet because the narrative offers no other reasons. Moreover, from chapter 14, we know that ultimately, Israel does believe (יִשְׂמַּעְתָּם לֵעָלִּין) 'in YHWH and in Moses' after they 'saw the great power that YHWH used against the Egyptians' (14:31).

To sum up, the reader is privy to Moses' privately gained authority to speak and act publicly on behalf of YHWH. However, YHWH must publicly authenticate Moses so that Israel will listen to his voice. This authentication begins with the the signs given to Moses which evince a confession of trust from elders of Israel. Nevertheless, Exodus later reveals that the confession is not the fullness of knowing that is intended.
3. The Goal of Knowledge in Exodus

At this instance, a nuance can be discerned with regards to what was encountered in Genesis. Knowledge is not stative or factitive. Neither knowing good and evil nor knowing YHWH as your God are epistemic goals that can be exhausted by one event or punctiliar moment. Knowing something as important as 'that YHWH is their god', whatever conceptual structure that may entail, corresponds to previously noted aims of epistemological process. The late Sinai wanderers could affirm 'YHWH is our god' with a different depth than the young Israelites of pre-conquest Joshua. Indeed, is not this difference in depths of experience the focus of much of Deuteronomy?19

The exact objective of the epistemological process cannot always be explored in detail, but it is worth mentioning that Israel's knowledge was not evinced by a mere confession. Rather, the objective appears discoverable by enacting the epistemological process beyond the confession, which would be perilous at times. Participation meant that Israel had to allow Moses to speak to Pharaoh on her behalf and then enact the process by leaving Egypt with him. Knowing God as her god is a risky endeavor, to say the least. Many Israelites, including Moses himself, thought that performing these actions would ultimately be their doom (e.g., 5:22; 6:9; 14:11-12). In this sense, knowing cannot be fundamentally stative, even if one comes to distinct points of illumination.20 As will be demonstrated below, epistemological process must be reified in new participation of the prophetic guidance beyond particular instances called 'knowledge' or 'confessions of faith'. Knowing YHWH appears to mean something along the lines of being able to recognize his prophet and his actions in the world, similar to the way an oncologist can recognize novel instances of cancer. It is skilled knowing. The Israelites who would not listen to Moses after the first round of reprisals (6:9) would eventually find their liberty from Egypt by enacting what they had previously affirmed in their confession ('And the people believed ….', 4:31).

Because knowing is portrayed as risky, requiring one to enact the prophetic instructions before seeing the outcomes, it necessarily involves historical situatedness and cannot be exhausted by confession. Knowing, in Exodus, can be only tentatively affirmed. But even this is problematic as all affirmations can be rooted in knowing and/or ignorance. Therefore, affirmations in and of themselves

19 Ryan O'Dowd, 'Memory on the Boundary: Epistemology in Deuteronomy' in The Bible and Epistemology. eds. Mary Healey and Robin Parry (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2007), 3-22.
20 I am using 'illumination' in the way Polanyi describes it to mean not just a teleological end of knowing, but a specific point where knowing coheres particularities in a moment of understanding. Polanyi metaphorically depicts this: "Illumination" is the the leap by which the logical gap is crossed. It is the plunge by which we gain a foothold at another shore of reality.' PK, 123. Likewise, Meek makes Polanyi's 'illumination' more grasable as the 'Oh! I see it!' moment. Longing to Know, 46-50.
are indistinguishable in their superficial details from proper epistemological objectives. We will encounter this dichotomy between confession and knowing throughout our study.

4. The Role of Evidence in the Authentication of Moses

Moses has received his authority and been authenticated to the Israelites. In this authentication, the question of evidence is raised. There appears to be a direct connection between Israel seeing the signs produced by Moses and the effect of 'seeing' due to their listening to the voice of an authenticated prophet. Stated otherwise, because Israel acknowledged the authentication which they saw, they can listen to Moses and 'see' what YHWH is showing them. Of particular interest, the authentication process itself appears to result from direct observation. But where one's gaze is directed (i.e., where the prophet guides one to look) determines what one 'sees'. In short, one must listen to Moses in order to see the signs that give one reasons to listen to Moses in order to see that YHWH is Israel's God. This problem of circularity will be addressed below.

Despite this problem, the contrast of reactions to the plagues as evidence illustrates the priority of the prophetic voice strikingly. The plagues were meant to show Pharaoh evidence of YHWH's power. Exodus says that YHWH kills the livestock of Egypt, 'in order to show (הָלַךְ) you [Pharaoh] My power …' (9:16b). Yet, the narrative focuses in on Pharaoh's myopia. Instead of seeing YHWH's power, Exodus says, 'But when Pharaoh saw (ראה) that the rain and the hail and the thunder had ceased, he sinned yet again and hardened his heart, he and his servants' (9:34).

The very process of authentication cannot be seen by Pharaoh himself. In other words, one could say that Moses means to help Pharaoh connect the dots concerning YHWH in order to see that YHWH is not just some god about whom Pharaoh can know things. Instead, Pharaoh needs to know that he is in a relationship with YHWH by means of these Israelites and therefore must participate in the instructions of the authenticated prophet in order to see who is YHWH and what is the nature of their relationship.

Due to his refusal to listen to the voice of Moses, Pharaoh cannot discern how these events are all related, he does not see the dots connecting. The pattern does not cohere for him and hence, the things he comes to know about YHWH are not in proper perspective or context. Pharaoh can only see YHWH as an outside oppressor who is destroying Egypt. Consequently, his myopia is focused on the

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21 E.g., Deut 7:18; Remembrance of historical instances of seeing is then invoked as the basis for indwelling future prophetic instruction in Deuteronomy and beyond.
hail *ceasing*, not the hail itself as a symbol of something grander.

If this is an accurate depiction of first-order error, then something quite different should be observed in the narrative for those who listen to the voice of the authenticated prophet. When Moses returns from his private counsel with YHWH, Exodus specifically mentions, '… and [Moses] did the signs in the sight (lit.: 'before its eyes') of the people. And the people believed …' (4:30b-31a). Stated otherwise, 'Seeing, they believed.' But that is not the last time that YHWH seeks to evince belief by *seeing* through the voice of the authenticated prophet. Before crossing the Red Sea and *seeing* the Egyptians pursue them ('Israel lifted up their eyes, and behold', 14:10), YHWH invokes their *seeing* in order to know. After the destruction of Pharaoh et al., the text portrays Israel's reaction to what she has just seen (14:13-4) in reverse order to the prophet's declaration about what Israel would see (14:30-1).

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<tr>
<th>Exodus 14:13-4</th>
<th>Exodus 14:30-1</th>
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<td>And Moses said to the people, <em>Fear</em> not, stand firm, and <em>see</em> the salvation of YHWH, which <em>he will work</em> for you today. For the Egyptians whom you <em>see</em> today, you shall never <em>see</em> again.</td>
<td>Thus YHWH saved Israel that day from the hand of the Egyptians, and Israel <em>saw</em> the Egyptians dead on the seashore. Israel <em>saw</em> the great power that YHWH <em>worked</em> against the Egyptians, so the people <em>feared</em> YHWH,</td>
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The effect of their seeing is unmistakable. Because they listened to the voice of Moses and enacted his instructions, they were able to see these events in relation to YHWH's actions. As a result, their seeing contributed to their belief in both YHWH and Moses as his prophet.

5. The Conundrum of Seeing the Evidence for Authentication

This all raises a circular argument previously noted. If one can only have insight by listening to the voice of an authenticated prophet and participating in their instruction, then how is authentication itself efficacious? With regards to Moses and the elders of Israel, the means of authentication in this text are an Israelite witnessing a sign and simultaneously having the prophetic voice interpret what the Israelite is 'seeing' (4:29-31). Stated otherwise, if Moses with his privately gained authority, had not ever mumbled a word about YHWH who sent him, then Moses' signs, which were meant to authenticate him, would have little effect. The signs themselves are not self-interpreting *in se*.

This is the conundrum:

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22 Re 14:13 'fear not', 'he will work', and 'see' compared to 'Israel saw', 'YHWH worked', and 'Israel feared YHWH' in vv 30-31.
The process of authentication requires provisional trust in the prophetic guide in order to understand the means of authentication. Indeed, the authentication process is the very thing meant to instill the trust required in order to understand the means.

If we asked an Israelite why they believe Moses is the prophet, we expect that they would say it was because they had seen the signs (re staff-to-snake, water-to-blood). But if we pushed them to justify how a staff turning into a snake is evidence that 'Moses is YHWH's prophet', they would be forced to say, 'Because Moses said that the staff-snake miracle was evidence that "Moses is YHWH's prophet."'

If we are to claim the signs and wonders as evidence of YHWH's work through Moses, then there has to be something else added into the equation. That 'something' must be that YHWH allows some to see the signs as evidence and others not to see, notwithstanding the mechanism to disallow sight. This issue appears boldly stated in the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, but it also appears in the theology of Deuteronomy, Isaiah, and Mark which will be examined in the coming chapters. For now, we must face what seems to be a paradoxical story of a prophet authenticated either by naivete or by YHWH himself allowing people to enter the epistemological process in order that they might see what the prophet is showing them.

III. ORDERS OF ERROR IN THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS

The thesis so far advocates that one epistemological process contains two distinct ends: Israel knowing YHWH as her god and Egypt knowing about YHWH who is Israel's god. We have emphasized that both end in some kind of knowledge. As previously stated, it appears that knowing and error are not at two opposite poles on a continuum where one can either know or be in error. With Pharaoh in Exodus, for instance, we have a case of error in the initial step of listening to the authenticated prophet, that ends in a knowledge distinct from what the Israelites knew. So what can we say about the knowledge gained through error where the authenticated authority is rejected?

To reassert prior discussion, if the proper epistemological process is listening to the authenticated authority and enacting his instruction in order to see what he is showing us (i.e., to come to know), then error can occur in either of these phases. Failure to acknowledge the authenticated prophet is a first-order error since it has priority in knowing. The second order error is when one acknowledges the authenticated prophet, but does not indwell the prophetic instruction to the degree required.

In Exodus, Pharaoh's obduracy illustrates that an error of the first order does not necessarily

23 Re Deut 29:3-4; Isa 6:9-10.
lead to an error of the second order. In the first half of Exodus, the knowledge of YHWH qua Israel's god is internal to that communal fabric for Israel. Pharaoh and Egypt will know about YHWH external to that community, because Pharaoh would not acknowledge Moses as prophet, nor YHWH as god.

The concern for Israel appears to be that they would know YHWH within that covenantal fabric, where one party is fiducially-bound to the other.\(^{24}\) The error divides knowing YHWH from knowing about YHWH.\(^{25}\) The desire to know YHWH appears to reverse of the error of Genesis 3. In the garden, the desire to know about good and evil was mistaken for knowing good and evil exactly upon this frontier. Judging by their surprise, the man and the woman of Genesis 3 appear to believe that they would know about good and evil as a matter external to them rather than know good and evil within a fiducially binding relationship to their new knowledge. Eschewing for the moment the possibility of divine causation in the hardening of Pharaoh's heart,\(^{26}\) Exodus suggests that rejection of the authenticated prophet will terminably bind one into error. Thus, one can never actually know X, but only know about X.\(^{27}\)

This problem, how one discerns the voice to whom they should listen, will be taken up in full in the next phase of this thesis.\(^{28}\) For now, we observe the text's concern to recognize the difference between those who know about YHWH versus those who know YHWH. For Pharaoh, the shift of trust is decidedly back onto himself and away from Moses. Pharaoh does not argue theologically that the Egyptian gods (e.g., Ra, Horus, et al.) are the legitimate gods to whom he should listen. The narrative indicates only that Pharaoh's heart is the center of the multiple decisions to refuse YHWH's authority through Moses.

\(^{24}\) Cf. Exodus 2:4; 6:4-5.

\(^{25}\) The difference could be pictured as coming to know things about one's spouse versus knowing one's spouse in fiducially binding ways.

\(^{26}\) Discussion of YHWH hardening Pharaoh's heart might focus on two facets in Christian theology. First, the verb 'harden' is in the hiphil imperfect with YHWH as the subject and Pharaoh's heart as the object (Ex. 7:3). This indicates causation. But second, the actual mechanism may be more nuanced than direct causation. The mirror image of this in the Gospel narratives is the disciples of Jesus (Mk. 6:52; 8:17), the Jewish leaders (Mk. 3:5), and the crowds following him (paraphrase of Is. 6:10 in John 12:40) all being described as having 'hardened hearts'. Lexically, the phrase 'hardened heart' is not formulaic and several verbs (בָּשֵׁב, קֵרֶב, כְּרֶב) are conflated to the one Septuagintal rendition that is repeated from the LXX into the NT as 'harden heart' (i.e., σκληρονομος καρδία). We will later argue that the hardened hearts of Jesus' disciples also entail the circumcision of hearts prescribed in the covenant renewal of Deuteronomy 29-30.

\(^{27}\) This confusion between knowing and knowing about is replete in the history of philosophy and the sciences. Where atomistic tendencies in reductionisms and positivisms of all sorts seek to know via knowing about par excellence. Likewise, many tropes in post-modern thought seek to know about without ever clarifying what authenticates one authoritative voice over another. Taylor offers a similar critique of epistemology as disengaged, atomized and founded in 'instrumental reason', see 'Overcoming Epistemology', 1-19.

\(^{28}\) See chapter on Deuteronomy in this thesis.
In this instance, Pharaoh errs by not listening to an authenticated voice where it could be argued that authentication was plentiful. Pharaoh and Egypt would come to know dreadful things about YHWH and Israel due to his first-order error. But insofar as Israel listens to Moses as the authenticated prophet of YHWH and enacts his instruction, she comes to know YHWH as her god. Importantly, Pharaoh's error is of the first order: rejecting the authenticated prophet. His knowledge then corresponds to his rejection of Moses as prophet. The error of the second order, not enacting the commands of the prophet, ensues Pharaoh's prior error of rejecting Moses and YHWH. To reiterate, Pharaoh listens to someone, either his courtiers or himself. Pharaoh does not reject Moses' voice from a neutral epistemic position. Rather, he chooses instead to rely upon his own voice (or his magicians' voices) in the matter.

A. First-Order Error: Pharaoh

The matter remains that Egypt and her king do come to know that YHWH is god. Error is most clearly seen within Pharaoh's epistemological process. Strangely, YHWH states at the outset that Pharaoh is not going to listen to Moses. Pharaoh's initial reaction to Moses' demand draws upon the language of prophetic authentication: 'Who is YHWH, that I should listen to his voice (שמים כל) and let Israel go? I do not know (ידעין YHWH') (5:2). Seven subsequent declarative statements follow, which are directed to Pharaoh saying, 'you [Pharaoh] shall know that I am YHWH ...'

The question being posed appears to surround what Pharaoh is meant to know by rejecting Moses' authority. After all, his actions lead him to some kind of knowledge. We have assumed that Pharaoh errs because he does not listen to the voice of YHWH through Moses. Israel's own epistemological process conversely relates to Pharaoh insofar as she listens to the voice of Moses. As we return to the repetition of 'you shall know' statements, two different epistemological objectives appear to be operating here.

For Israel, the story opens with YHWH declaring what is not good: Israel's enslavement (2:25). In the same pattern of the man coming to know woman as his proper mate (Genesis 2), God leads Israel

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29 Summarizing Polanyi's epistemology, Hart makes this point lucid about doubt, which functions as rejection of a prophetic voice: 'every expression of doubt is at one and the same time a statement of faith in something else. … Thus every doubt has a fiduciary structure and is rooted in a set of faith commitments which for so long as they support the doubt, cannot themselves be doubted.' Trevor Hart, *Faith Thinking: The Dynamics of Christian Theology* (Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock, 2005), 57-58.


to know YHWH qua her god through Moses. The objective is stated and restated for Israel: 'you [Israel] shall know that I am YHWH your god' (6:7). The possessive pronominal suffix 'your' in the second person plural patently distinguishes Israel from Pharaoh. Israel's knowledge of YHWH as her god was specifically built upon trusting Moses as her authenticated prophet.

For Pharaoh, the text indicates that his epistemological condition represents Egypt as a whole. Every 'you shall know' statement after Moses' first encounter with Pharaoh is directed at Pharaoh and/or the Egyptians.32 YHWH states that by his actions, Pharaoh will know:

that I am YHWH (7:5; 7:17; 14:4)
there is no one like YHWH (8:10; 9:14)
the earth is YHWH's (9:29)
I am YHWH in the midst of the earth (8:22)
that YHWH makes a distinction between Egypt and Israel (11:7)

Furthermore, to the Egyptians who survive Pharaoh, they would know that, 'I have gotten glory over Pharaoh' (14:18). Egypt's knowledge of YHWH qua Israel's god that survived beyond Pharaoh's folly was specifically built upon Pharaoh's persistent first-order errors. Certain qualitative differences make all the difference between how Israel knew YHWH as her god internally and how Egypt knew YHWH as Israel's god externally. This then is our strongest argument against a clean epistemological binary of 'knowledge versus error', since the text demonstrates that both Israel and Egypt enacted the epistemological process to the very end. Israel knew by means of listening to her authenticated prophet and Egypt knew by refusing to listen, an error of the first order.

B. Second-Order Errors: Israel

1. Manna and Quail

Coming out of Egypt there is one pressing logistical problem that increases the narrative tension: the need for water and food. Instigated by the people's grumbling, the bitter waters of Marah are sweetened by Moses (15:22-27). The ensuing instruction contains the first of the 'listen diligently to the voice' statements in the strongly-worded infinitive absolute ("Listen diligently to the voice of the LORD"). This first 'listen diligently' is followed by the commands: to do right, to give ear to his commandments, keep all his statutes which reminds the reader of garden language again (15:26).33 YHWH then tells Moses that he

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32 Sans one Deutronomically proleptic passage in 10:2.
33 Although he takes it to be Deutonomistic, Mettinger sees a parallel between the garden narrative and Exodus 15:26. 'We recognize the Deutronomistic phrase for obedience to the law, "listening to the voice of the LORD," and we also note the variation in the preposition, … , with exactly the same preposition as in Gen 3:17.' Tryvve Mettinger, The Eden Narrative: a Literary and Religio-historical Study of Genesis 2-3 (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 53-54.
will send miraculous food testing whether or not they had *diligently listened* (16:4). The instructions for reaping the food are given in stages as they come to the Sabbath. Later, the final regulation about double-gathering the food is given (16:22-26).

Of particular interest, the stated purpose in this whole affair is that Israel, 'shall know that I am YHWH your god' (16:12). This trajectory of events depends upon the Israelites *listening diligently* (שומע השמע) to the voice of Moses and *doing* (עשָה) exactly as YHWH has commanded. But we should notice what lies at the core of the story. YHWH listens to the grumbling of the Israelites, and his reaction is noticeably reflective of the garden narrative, which we could paraphrase: *eat your fill, but only under certain conditions.*

YHWH gives bread for them to *take* and *eat* (16:16). They are to *see* this action as a way of *knowing* YHWH as their god (16:5b, 12, 29). In contrast, the woman *saw* the fruit that could make her *like* god (นมלון), *takes* it, *eats* it, and *gives* it to the man. In the garden error, their eyes are opened to *see* and they *know* their wrong doing. Here in Exodus 16, the Israelites are encouraged to *take* (לָקָה) and *eat* (אכלה) all that YHWH gives (昉) by *listening diligently to the voice* (שמיע תשמיע לָקָה) of Moses who makes them *know* (ידע) that they are in an obligatory relationship with YHWH *as their god* (יהוה אלוהם).

Whether or not this is meant to be a reverse image of Genesis 3, one aspect is plainly repeated in their error. Knowing is directly related to 'listening diligently to the voice of YHWH' (15:26) and hence, living out Moses' prescriptions. This relation is clarified when the narrator later laments the only conflict addressed in the story, 'But they did not listen to Moses …' (16:20).

It strikes the reader that YHWH expects Israel to *see* something by means of Moses and the manna provided. On the contrary, Moses and manna are not enough to connect the dots for some of the people: 'When the people of Israel saw it they said … "What is it?"' (16:15). Once more, the stated purpose of this sequence was so that Israel 'shall know' (16:12c). Because 'they did not listen to Moses' when they went in search of manna on the Sabbath, they did not see what YHWH wanted them to know. Although they saw the manna, they did not see the grander reality: knowing YHWH as their god meant relationship with conditions (i.e., covenant). In turn, YHWH's response here aims at their failure to see.

We encounter the reciprocal nature of YHWH's response where he invites Israel to *see* their error.

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34 Although Fretheim explains the manna and quail as entirely natural phenomena, he still ascribes the entire event's purpose to the 'so that they shall know' clauses of 16:6, 12. Fretheim, *Exodus*, 182-3.

35 Exod 16:9-21.
(16:28-29).

Because they failed to listen, they failed to see (ראֲדוּ) what YHWH showed them which was sacramentally enacted by keeping (שָׁמַר) his commands. They must now reciprocally keep (שָׁמַר) an omer of manna for their descendants to see (ראֲדוּ). The closing report operates symmetrically, noting YHWH's command that the manna be kept (שָׁמַר) as testimony. So Fretheim concludes: 'The idealized and unwarranted memories of Pharaoh's food (v. 3) are to be replaced with the genuine memories of the bread from God (vv. 32-34)—an inclusio for the chapter as a whole.'

As was the case with Moses' signs of authentication, the mere event of manna falling does not appear sufficient to know what YHWH wants them to know. Rather, this reality of manna must be interpreted to them by the voice of Moses. The point is this: Brute seeing is not believing as there is no self-interpreted seeing in these texts. Although the Israelites listened to the voice of Moses, avoiding an error of the first order, they failed to perform his instructions to the degree required, an error of the second order. Just like the one tree in the garden, the plagues, and now the manna, seeing only becomes knowing when one listens to the voice of the authenticated prophet and participates properly in his instruction in order to see what is being shown. How else could the woman know which tree is of interest? How else could the Pharaoh understand the plagues beyond his own magicians' interpretations? How else could Israel understand the significance of flaky dew on the ground?

2. The Mosaic Covenant

Going into the account at Mount Sinai, a few more instances of the שְׁמַעְתָּן קֶลֶל command emerge. We remember that immediately after the Red Sea crossing and the Song of Moses, the first instance of שְׁמַעְתָּן קֶלֶל in an infinitive absolute (15:26) appears in the Tanak:

> If you will diligently listen (שְׁמַעְתָּן קֶלֶל) to the voice of YHWH your god and do that which is right in his eyes, and give ear to his commandments and keep all his statutes, I will put none of the diseases on you that I put on the Egyptians, for I am the Lord, your healer.

Recalling that the return to this mountain personally signifies to Moses that YHWH has now

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36 Exod 16:28, 31-36.
39 Compare 32:35.
accomplished his promises, we recognize that it is meant to be a sign to Moses that YHWH would accomplish the long term goal of Canaan (3:12). Presumably, this is meant to act as another 'tick of the box' for Moses' epistemic confidence in YHWH. Now Moses calls the elders of Israel for a second time to review what has happened. Delivering YHWH's message, we see Moses speak the second infinitive absolute of שמעה כליה to the elders, invoking their seeing as reason to obey (19:4-5):

You yourselves have seen what I did (ראהתי אשר עשתה) to the Egyptians, and how I bore you on eagles' wings and brought you to myself. Now therefore, if you will diligently listen to my voice (שמעת תשמעת בקולי) and keep my covenant, you shall be my treasured possession among all peoples, for all the earth is mine;

From this point forward in this passage, the employment becomes a word play. On the one hand, it is the 'sound' (קול) of YHWH's voice 'heard' (שמעה) from the fire on Mount Sinai. And on the other hand, it is the pattern noticed thus far. Error becomes definitively entangled with Moses' instruction at this point where YHWH forewarns about his descent onto the mountain. He says that the very purpose of the thunder, lightening, and smoke is so that the people may 'hear [שמע] when I speak with you [Moses] and may also believe you forever' (אמנטו ליעל). This, then, makes sense of their mortified reticence to hear YHWH with their plea: 'You [Moses] speak to us and we will listen, but do not let God speak to us, lest we die' (20:19).

Stated otherwise, in the Mosaic covenant episode, listening to Moses becomes absolutized as the test of either proper knowing or error. After this scene, the giving of the Decalogue is sandwiched neatly between the command to 'diligently listen to my voice' (19:5) and Israel's plea: 'Speak to us and we will listen' (19:19).

3. The Golden Calf

Upon the heels of Israel's submission to Moses before he goes up on Mount Sinai (Exod 20-31), the error of the Golden Calf appears without warning. The reader now understands that the Israelites have every reason to fear YHWH and believe Moses according to what they had seen (i.e., 14:31). And yet, at the end of the Sinai law-giving sequence, Moses goes up on the mountain and we read the people's request of Aaron to 'make for us gods (אלהים)' on account of the fact that 'we do not know what has become of him [Moses]' (32:1). Then Aaron took gold that the people gave and made a golden calf saying: 'These are your gods ( אלהים), O Israel, who brought you up out of the land of
Egypt' (32:4).

This error is sacramentally transformed through Aaron's proclamation of a feast the next day. The feast is to YHWH, a confusion in the story which might be resolved if the reader considers YHWH and the golden calf to be the referents of these, in Aaron's statement: 'these are your gods'. The Israelites offered burnt and peace offerings with the narrator's note that, 'the people sat down to eat and drink and rose up to play'. The error is so gross that Moses later calls it a 'great sin'. It begs comparison to Genesis 3, because both are monumental errors within their own narratives. Whether or not these two stories are meant to be connected, both errors share lexical and narratival connections that remain between them.

In a nine page exegetical examination of Exodus 32, Barth himself attaches significance to the error of Genesis 3 acting as the background of the Golden Calf narrative:

Here in Ex. 32 the tradition of Israel speaks from direct knowledge. Here is the setting of the view of man in relation to God which is attested in Gen 3, being there projected backwards and referred to the beginning of all peoples. … No wonder that the contours and colours of Gen 3 seem to be mild compared with what we find here. Here it comes home with a vengeance. It is not a matter now of Adam in a distant paradise in the distant past. It is the Israelite himself now liberated out of Egypt, brought into the wilderness, sustained in it, brought back into the land of his fathers, a member of the covenant people elected and called and infinitely preferred and therefore infinitely responsible and committed before all other peoples.

In his discourse to man in the garden and Moses at Sinai, YHWH draws attention to their errors in parallel terms; that 'which I commanded you/them.' Both errors are sacramentally commissioned by eating. Both errors involve complicit parties, the man and Aaron respectively, each of whom were commissioned to act as the authoritative voice. The gold was a gift to the Israelite's, given as a part of their liberation (3:21-22). But the gold was to be used as an offering to make the elements of the sacramental worship in the Tabernacle (Exod 25). Further, they have already been directly commanded not to make gods from the gold they took from Egypt (20:23). Like the limitless fruit in the garden, what YHWH intended for their copious good was now their instrument to sacramentally disobey him.

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40 In their repentance, Moses sacramentally reciprocates their deed by making them consume the crushed idol (32:20).
41 Many commentators see the plural pronoun 'these' in 32:24 as a redacted indictment against the statues at Dan and Bethel. Aaron's words are mimeographed in the voice of Jeroboam saying, 'Behold your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt' (1 Kings 12:28b). E.g., Noth, Exodus, 246. However, Davies notes that the plural pronoun is supported where the 'great sin' (32:21) refers to the already pluralized 'gods' (32:23). Davies, Exodus, 230.
43 Barth, CD, IV/1, 427.
44 Compare the indictment of man in Gen 3:17 'the tree which I commanded you' (הָֽאֶשֶׁר אֶתְּוָהָלָּךְ) and 'the way which I commanded you' in Exodus 32:8 (הָֽאֶשֶׁר אֶתְּוָהָלָּךְ).
Upon confrontation, Moses asked Aaron alone the question that is reminiscent of YHWH's question to Eve, 'What did this people do …?' Aaron's answer to Moses also shares the rhetoric of the man's blame shifting and the woman's victimhood: 'So they gave it to me, and I threw it [gold] into the fire, and out came this calf' (32:24). Finally, the failure to listen to the voice of the authenticated prophet led eventually to death which is symbolically represented by a sword in both accounts (cf. Gen 2:24; Exod 32:27).

Was the error of the people failing to listen to an authenticated prophet? Is not Aaron the prophet of Moses? No matter how we construe the relationship between Moses and Aaron, as was seen in Genesis 3, the prophetic voice is not exempt from being responsible to the commandments of YHWH. Aaron is fiducially-bound to the people and the message. Even so, the error is two-fold, the people failing to enact the commands of Moses and Aaron failing to correct the people. The man in the garden and Aaron at the base of Mount Sinai fail as the authoritative voice. Worse, their failures are due to listening to the unauthenticated voices of the woman and the people. In this sense, the error reverberates with Genesis 3 most closely, as well as the discourse between Moses and Aaron. Like YHWH in the garden, Moses goes to Aaron alone for answers. Aaron's blame shifting is not exculpatory, but like the man's excuses in the garden, it is disregarded as consequences are meted out.

The relationship between Moses and Aaron remains prophetic in this sense: that Aaron was not to be a mere mouthpiece, but was someone in the ilk of the sons of Levi. The only laudable actions in the narrative are also the most horrific. The sons of Levi are commended as those who 'did according to the words of Moses' (32:28). This failure of Aaron seems to be a breach of fiducial binding: the prophetic voice must also enact the commandments they proclaim. As man was meant to participate and proclaim the commandments in the garden, Aaron was expected to know YHWH and enact what he had personally witnessed in God's commandments (19:24-25). The people could not be exculpated as they had personally affirmed the commandment, 'You shall have no other gods before me' (20:2-3).

If all the actions of YHWH up to this point were meant for Israel to know YHWH as her god, then the people's worship of the golden calf flatly frustrates all of YHWH's efforts. Israel's request for a

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46 Cf. YHWH's question of Eve. Genesis 3:13: 'מה טוב عشرת?'


48 Again, the 'man of god' in 1 Kings 13 shows this most clearly.

49 Davies also notices this pattern of listening to the wrong voice as consonant with Genesis 3 in his comment: 'The people under the wrong leader worshipped the wrong God at the wrong altar with the right confession and sacrifice but in a sexual orgy. The serpent in the garden (Gen 3), the sin at Sinai (Ex. 32), and Satan at the Last Supper (John 13:27) are three illustrations of how sin rears its head amid sacred occasions.' Henton Davies, Exodus: Introduction and Commentary. Torch Bible Commentaries (London: S.C.M., 1967), 231.
god at Sinai reflects a deep misunderstanding about the connection between Moses and YHWH. Possibly, the people thought that YHWH was so entangled in the person of Moses that because they did not 'know what had become of him [Moses],' they did not know what had become of their relationship with YHWH as well. Israel's failure could be based on this misunderstanding alone. However, the language of the Israelites' *sight* qua understanding is important to grasping the *sight* qua error.

Two senses of the word ראה (to see) can be discerned in this literary unit. In the first verse, ראה takes the meaning of 'insight' (32:1) as opposed to the flat witnessing of something with one's eyes (e.g., 32:19). The delay of Moses caused them to see something they had not seen before, specifically the possibility that they might be abandoned. Comparably, this sense of 'see' is used with Aaron (32:5) and YHWH (32:9) where 'seeing' means there is an understanding of how this particularity fits into a grander whole.

It seems that the narrative wants to say that the people's 'seeing' was in error, where YHWH's 'seeing' is not. How do we differentiate the two? The language of *seeing* acts as shorthand for more robust descriptions of the affair. Where 32:1 says that, 'the people saw that Moses delayed,' we understand that to mean something such as, 'The people believed that Moses was not coming back and believed Moses was their access to YHWH who brought them out of Egypt. And without YHWH or some god like him, their situation is dire.' Israel's sight is not a brute witnessing of an event, but an interpretation of the significance of Moses' absence. The grander narrative guides the reader around Israel's myopia. However, the question can be asked: Is this kind of myopia coherent or warranted within the narrative? The story itself necessitates that we answer in the negative.

The stated reasoning behind the signs and wonders done in Egypt was that, 'you [Israel] shall know that I am YHWH your God' (6:7, 10:2). The Israelites could know nothing about YHWH apart from Moses, the one person with whom YHWH goes to great lengths to authenticate to Israel through the folly of Egypt. The only way to come out of Egypt is to listen to the voice of Moses and cooperate with his instruction. As well, the only way to know *who* brought them out of Egypt is to listen to the voice of Moses. In short, the opening sentence indicates to the reader that some Israelites thought they knew something ('the people saw') that went against what YHWH had meant for them to know through Moses. Much like the woman in the garden, they have no reason not to listen to the voice of YHWH.

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50 Olson explores this problem of Moses' absence in Deutonomy's rhetoric. Dennis T. Olson, *Deuteronomy and the Death of Moses: A Theological Reading*. Overtures to Biblical Theology. eds. Walter Brueggemann et al. (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1994).
through the authoritative voice, since the very reason they are waiting impatiently at the base of this mountain is because listening to the voice of Moses has thus far kept them alive and out of Egypt.

We observe that Israel does not reject the prophet's voice in toto as evidenced by their actions from within the covenant. They seek Aaron to mediate as a priest, which makes Israel partially complicit with YHWH's covenant as understood through Moses. Israel does not reject Moses qua prophet, but fails to enact the covenant being made on her behalf. What's more, the diagnosis from within the text is plain. Israel erred by making the calf, 'man as the creator Dei', enacting only part of Moses' covenant while simultaneously performing what seemed right in her own eyes. Accordingly, it is upon this aspect of their error that her punishment proceeds reciprocally (32:35).

Israel's error here is one of the second order: not enacting the authoritative instruction. This then leads to self-guided frameworks developing (e.g., believing that Moses' departure required a new divine accommodation), which creates parallel and erroneous epistemological processes. Because the Israelites now have a skewed understanding that goes beyond categories of 'incorrectness', their situation becomes more precarious. Resolution did not involve an adjustment of their knowledge as it appears difficult to 'undo' their erroneous knowledge. Indeed, in Exodus 32, the people's error is ultimately resolved through extermination (32:28).

Even so, this error cannot be confused with ignorance or partial knowing. The Israelites' out-of-sorts interpretation fails to enact the prophetic counsel specifically authenticated for their guidance. In place of that authenticated voice, they commission their error through a self-trusting interpretation. This misguided interpretation is eventually sacramentally commissioned by 'making' the calf and 'eating/drinking' in offering to the god it symbolizes.

How does Israel get from crossing the Red Sea by Moses' guidance to bowing down to a self-made idol? The answer can only come through her rejection of some of YHWH's commands through Moses. But more precariously, the Israelites foisted their own interpretative 'seeing' onto their present reality, a pattern to be repeated often in the story of Israel. This is an error of the second order, failing to participate in Moses' injunctions. We have already observed these two epistemological movements,

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51 Barth, _CD_, IV/1, 432.
52 Although Noth is fairly sure of the immoral nature of this ambiguous saying, ('Rose up to play doubtlessly refers to sexual orgies (see Gen 26:8) …' Noth, _Exodus_, 248), MacDonald (and 1 Cor 10:7) is skeptical of this reading in light of Judg 9:7, 1 Sam 30:16, and Gen 26:8 itself. Nathan MacDonald, 'Recasting the Golden Calf: The Imaginative Potential of the Old Testament's Portrayal of Idolatry' in _Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity_. Ed. Stephen C. Barton (London, UK: T & T Clark, 2007), 36.
53 'The earnestness of the people in the prosecution of their error is again set forth;' Calvin, _Four Last Books of Moses_, vol. 3, 253.
rejecting the prophet and fallacious interpretations of current situations that are driven by fear or desire. We saw it in the desire of the woman in the garden toward a romantic view of wisdom, Sarai's hope for children through Hagar, and Rebekah's desire to make the 'older serve the younger'. This pattern of error helps to explain why the Israelites can find no safe harbor in partial understanding or plain ignorance. Error is not a matter of what they misunderstood, but rather what they did according to their self-authenticated interpretation of their present reality (32:21a).

C. Summary of Exodus

Regarding Exodus, we have attempted to demonstrate that the same epistemological process in Genesis is presumed and built upon for the reader of the Exodus narratives. The central concern is still authenticating the authoritative voice of YHWH, and error is assessed according to how the characters respond to that authentication and authority.

We then looked at the different orders of error based on the problems of authentication and authority. The first-order error was that of Pharaoh. Because he rejects Moses as the prophetic voice of YHWH, he and Egypt only know about YHWH external to the covenant.54 But even after recognizing the authentication of Moses, Israel is guilty of errors of the second order: failure to enact the authoritative instructions of Moses. This was made most clear in the manna and quail error of Exodus 16.

Exodus tells and retells about various errors in contiguity with the description in the garden narrative. Listening to the wrong voice, as in the garden error, always ends in error. Exodus reveals that error is not opposite to knowledge, but it is knowledge contorted or 'out of sorts' with what is meant to be known by God's guidance. The theology of creation woven throughout and the anticreational errors of Egypt that reflect Genesis 3 (per Fretheim) give us reason to sustain this thesis beyond Exodus and into Numbers and Deuteronomy.

IV. NUMBERS

The trend of first and second-order errors discernibly continues into Numbers. We cannot profitably explore all of those narratives here, but we can point the reader toward several texts of interest. In the rebellion of Miriam and Aaron against Moses (12:1-16), the matter of YHWH's special relationship with Moses is at stake. Specifically, to whom does YHWH speak? That question is answered to the satisfaction of all three, as Miriam and Aaron are revealed to be guilty of a first-order

54 Compare with the Pharaoh of Genesis who listens to Joseph's prophetic voice, enacts his guidance, and shares in the covenant provision that comes to Egypt and Canaan (Gen 41:37-57).
error. Moses is not the only prophet, but he is the only prophet authenticated to Miriam and Aaron.\textsuperscript{55}

Similarly, Korah leads a significant number of Israelites to doubt the special holiness of Moses concerning his ability to be near YHWH. Authentication is at stake here, as Korah and the renowned elders question Moses' authority.\textsuperscript{56} And again, YHWH answers Korah's claim decisively by consuming Korah and those who joined him. On the other hand, it is in the errors of Balaam and Balak that we find the most interesting connections back to the Edenic language and concepts of error.

In order to show the lexical and conceptual continuity of error and epistemological process outside of Israel, we will explore the story of Balaam. We have previously claimed that there does not appear to be two epistemologies at work in these texts: general and special. But further, we want to argue that this epistemology is not parochial either: Israelite and non-Israelite. This epistemological process extends to those outside of Israel, and Numbers 22-24 strikes us as being significant evidence of this claim.

A. 'Seeing' with Balaam and Balak

The next time we encounter the confluence of the terms 'see', 'hear', and 'know' is toward the end of this 40-year wandering. YHWH confronts Israel's potential enemy, Balak, through the prophet Balaam.\textsuperscript{57} Most intriguing about this account is that Balaam acts as a prophetic voice for YHWH. We must now investigate how a non-Israelite leads another non-Israelite through the epistemological process. What sort of knowledge is the goal of this process, and how are YHWH's plans for Israel revealed to those outside of Israel? Even more, how is Balaam authenticated, and to what end does he use his authority?

After Numbers 24, over a dozen references to Balaam litter the Protestant canon, and none of them are strictly positive.\textsuperscript{58} At the very best, the reference to how YHWH used even a pagan sorcerer to bless Israel is neutral (Josh 24:9-10). Yet Balaam is observed listening to YHWH and refuses to curse Israel for Balak, even when it suits his own interests. Further, Balaam's oracles affirm YHWH as God and Israel as his special people. So why are these rather orthodox statements in defense of Israel


\textsuperscript{57} Wherever Balaam comes from, Noth is persuaded that it is not Moab. Noth, \textit{Numbers}, 174.

viewed so negatively in the scope of the canon? In short, 'hearers of YHWH' like Balaam, who are not definitively authenticated by YHWH to Israel, cannot be guaranteed to correctly guide the non-Israelites they seek to influence. Balaam does not enact the life required by Israel's God and cannot, therefore, come to knowledge of YHWH as his God, internal to the covenant. Indeed, the indictments of Balaam in the scriptures focus most often on the fact that he misleads Israel away from the life in which YHWH requires her to participate (i.e., sacramental worship of other gods).

Turning to Numbers 22, this story between Balak and Balaam also plays off the verb רואש (to see). The central conflict of the narrative begins when Balak 'saw all that Israel had done to the Amorites' (Num 22:2). The fear instilled in Balak by what he saw the Israelis do to the Amorites becomes Balak's motivation to curse Israel against all of Balaam's signals to the opposite. In a more basic sense, the story wants to evince Balak's 'seeing' as the error, because it is keen to make the reader aware that YHWH, not Israel, had defeated the Amorites. This was demonstrated in no uncertain terms in one of a few reversals of the שמות כהלך motif. YHWH 'listened to the voice of Israel' when they vowed to destroy Canaanite cities in acts of herem warfare (21:3). Like Pharaoh's myopia, when Balak saw Israel's victories (22:1), he did not see YHWH who empowered those victories.

Balak, because of what he saw, sought refuge in Balaam's curses. Balaam's authority had been authenticated to him by means unknown to the reader, but was definitively in place by the time of this scene. As Balaam responds to Balak's summons, the juxtaposition of sight becomes painfully poignant; painful for the donkey and poignant for Balaam. In anger, God sends an angel to confront Balaam as his 'adversary' (22:22). Moberly summarizes: 'The obvious, and humorous, concern of the story at this stage, however, is to do with ability to see God and the things of God, here in the form of the angel of YHWH.'

This sequence is abbreviated as follows:

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59 Lohr is also puzzled by both the negative impression of Balaam in the scholarship (e.g., Coats) and the overly positive estimations (e.g., Margaliot). The apparent bent of the Balaam narrative is generally positive: 'Had Balaam been an Israelite prophet, and had later tradition not vilified him as being greedy, it is difficult to imagine deriving a reading of Balaam as being avaricious, from the story itself.' Joel N. Lohr, Chosen and Unchosen: Conception of Election in the Pentateuch and Jewish-Christian Interpretation. Siphrut: Literature and Theology of the Hebrew Scriptures. Eds. Stephan B. Chapman et al. (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 203.

60 Cf. 1 Kings 17:22. Levine notes the rarity of YHWH's 'obedience' to human supplication and this precise form of the שמות כהלך construction as well, Numbers 21-36, 85.

61 Re Numbers 22:19.

62 Moberly, Prophecy and Discernment, 144.
'The angel of YHWH took his stand …' (22:22).
'And Balaam struck the donkey …' (22:23).
The angel’s discourse with Balaam makes it plain that 'seeing' and 'knowing' are interconnected beyond mere sensory input where he says, 'The donkey saw me …' (22:33). Balaam responds to his lack of sight by saying, 'for I did not know …' (22:34). In other words, the donkey knew something that Balaam did not know. Noth notes: 'the episode of the ass is a masterpiece of ancient Israelite narrative art. At the heart of it lies the idea that an unprejudiced animal can see things to which a man in his wilfulness is blind ….'

The apparent reason behind this confrontation is to make Balaam more like the donkey (i.e., one that sees). As YHWH opened the mouth of the beast, the angel also impresses upon Balaam that he too must, 'speak only the word that I tell you.' Balaam himself later affirms this charge when he declares to Balak, 'The word God puts in my mouth, that must I speak' (22:38). Indeed, the narrator reports of Balaam's first oracle, 'And YHWH put a word in Balaam's mouth …' (23:5).

The language of 'seeing' as insight continues in the story. After the first oracle which championed Israel, Balak did not believe Balaam could see what was going on (23:13). So Balak took the prophet to see Israel from a different vantage. Possibly, Balak thought, 'If only Balaam could get his eyes on the situation, the curse could be more properly invoked.' So Balaam can now see Israel and Balak asked him the fated question, 'What has YHWH spoken?' The answer forms the second oracle which begins with, 'Rise Balak and listen, give ear to me O son of Zippor' (23:17b, 18).

Unhappy with the second oracle, Balak again tries to get Balaam a better vantage of the situation by getting him to an 'overlook' where he can 'gaze' (יָדַע) down upon Israel. Balaam 'saw' that blessing Israel pleased YHWH (24:1-2), which must now be understood to mark a parallel between Balak and Balaam. As Balaam could not 'see' the angel of YHWH, so he struck his donkey who could 'see'. Balaam is now like the donkey being struck over and again by Balak, taken to different vantages so that Balaam could 'see' what Balak wanted him to see. As well, with each repetition, both the donkey and Balaam attempt to indicate what they are 'seeing' against the futility of their masters' anger (cf. 22:27, 24:10, יָדַע). 'Seeing' here means something like insight into a present reality that transcends

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63 Noth, Numbers, 178.
the current view and connects it to a broader reality.

Balaam's 'seeing' in his oracles should not then be understood in sensory terms, but in terms of 'insight'. As Balaam is described 'lifting up his eyes and saw Israel …' (24:2), his oracle begin with seeing and hearing:

The oracle of Balaam the son of Beor,  
the oracle of the man whose eye is opened,  
the oracle of him who hears the words of God,  
who sees the vision of the Almighty,  
falling down with his eyes uncovered ….

Noth observes the continuity of terms with the experience of the prophet. While his description may be guilty of indulging the scene, he picks up on the private experience that plays some role in public authentication (or perhaps here, re-authentication):

There Balaam is depicted as 'falling down', I.e. In an ecstatic condition, robbed of the normal control of his own body, and 'having his eyes uncovered', I.e. Seeing with the inner eye what is hidden from normal sight. All the predicates attributed to Balaam … have to do with the secret experiences of Balaam the ecstatic. It is a question of a 'hearing', a 'knowing' and a 'seeing' of divine origin.

Balaam's final oracle confirms his resistance to contradict what YHWH has told him. The oracle begins with a summary of the epistemological journey he himself has just traveled. But here, the story could be tersely stated: Balaam came to see as his donkey could see. In doing so, he was confronted by YHWH's commands. In submitting to the plan of YHWH, he became like the donkey to Balak, who desperately wanted Balaam to see things from a particular vantage driven by his own fear.

Because Balaam now sees, he hears the word of YHWH and therefore 'knows the knowledge of the Most High' (24:15-16). But Balaam's divinely enabled sight causes him to call Balak to 'listen' to his prophetic voice (23:18).

B. The Errors of Balak and Balaam

Now we must turn to the question of error by Balak and Balaam. First, Balak's error appears to fit the pattern appropriately. Balak, like others previously noticed, is driven by fear or desire toward an end that does not listen to the voice of an authenticated prophet. Balak errs in the second order. While he acknowledges the authentication of Balaam on pragmatic grounds, he does not acknowledge the

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64 Num 24:3b-4.  
65 Noth, Numbers, 190.  
66 Eichrodt posits that this ability to see is the defining feature of Israelite prophets: 'The menacing irruption of a divine reality unperceived by their contemporaries ….', TOT, vol. 1, 344.
message of the prophet and enact it. Mimicking the language of blessing and curse from Genesis 12, Balak displays confidence in Balaam on the grounds of past performance: 'for I know that he whom you bless is blessed, and he whom you curse is cursed' (22:6).67

This is tricky, because thus far we have been talking mostly about the mistakes of those in covenantal relationship with YHWH. But here, we have a ruler outside of Israel talking to a prophet outside the Israelite community, but Balak's refusal to listen to YHWH is not of interest. In one sense, we could ask, 'Why does it matter what happens between these two?' It matters for this thesis precisely because Balak refuses to listen to Balaam. When it comes to authenticating mechanisms, it is difficult to imagine why Balaam not only refuses to curse Israel, but does the exact opposite. His reluctance flies in the face of his own financial interests, and therefore, appears to the reader as deriving from somewhere other than Balaam himself. This narrative quickly moves away from any notion of Balaam as merely committing an opportunistic transactional curse to Balaam as one submitting to the direction of YHWH (22:7-14). Then, oracle after oracle reveals Balak attempting to have Balaam 'see' and Balaam submitting to YHWH in order to truly 'see'. But at the end of the day, no matter what Balak said to him or where he took Balaam to see the problem of Israel, Balaam is resolved that these attempts to persuade did not matter: 'If Balak should give (נותן) me his house full of silver and gold, I would not be able to go beyond the word of the Lord, to do either good or evil (לשהות טוב ורע) of my own will. What the Lord speaks, that will I speak' (24:13). Lapsley and Moberly have suggested that this statement is the high rhetoric of negotiation, but even if this is correct, the sentiment remains and Balaam fulfills these words within the story.68

Although this language of 'to do good or evil' reminds us of the tree in the garden, it cannot be urged too forcefully into the mold. However, the framework of the garden error appears consonant with Balak's error here. The emphasis of Balaam's retort (24:13) contradicts the error of the Fall, whether or not it is meant to be a direct reversal of it. Where the woman gives and the man eats, Balaam would not be swayed to 'good or evil' by any amount of things given. Balaam frames his own use of prophetic insight clearly in terms of doing good or evil (24:13-16). This insight is contrasted with Balaam's own

67 The role of blessing those who bless and cursing those who curse is generally assigned to YHWH.
68 Cf. R.W.L. Moberly, 'On learning to be a true prophet: the story of Balaam and his ass.' in New heaven and New Earth--Prophecy and the Millennium (Leiden, UK: E J Brill, 1999), 1-17; Jacqueline E. Lapsley, "'Am I able to say just anything?" Learning Faithful Exegesis from Balaam.' Interpretation vol. 60, no. 1 (January 2006): 22-31; Moberly argues more recently that Balaam is essentially a bad prophet turned good. Without addressing Balaam's prior motivations (i.e., greed), we can agree with Moberly's overarching interpretation: 'What was a deadly error when undertaken in self-seeking greed becomes a fruitful course to pursue if done in obedience to God.' Prophecy and Discernment, 146.
doing of evil against the angel of YHWH (22:34).

Indeed, others have observed particular parallels between Genesis 3 and Balaam's story. Specifically, Stordalen and Savran have both made the connection based on conceptual grounds that do not necessarily connect the texts lexically. Based upon the these two accounts being the only stories in the Tanak with talking animals, Stordalen's and Savran's analyses tend toward comparing the roles of the animals rather than the narrative's place in the larger Pentateuchal framework. Savran pays particular attention to the continuity of the 'critical role' played by רָמַסְי and מַלְאֵך in both stories. As well, Stordalen connects the speech of both animals on account of the shared themes of shrewdness, reverence (the serpent's self-reverent wisdom and the ass's reverence of Elohim), and judgment (the element of the sword operating as a divine instrument of judgement).

Neither scholar offers a narratival analysis of the two stories. Both agree that the most significant similitude is the blessing and curse motif followed by the treatment of the third oracle as garden reversal language. Stordalen himself points out that the third oracle is known in scholarship to be comparable to the blessing of Isaac in Genesis 27:27-29. We have already argued from Genesis that the error language in the Fall (i.e., the שִׁמְךָ כִּלְכַל motif) is the condition upon which that blessing was deceitfully gained in Genesis 27. This is to say, that by connecting the third oracle to Genesis 3 and 27, Savran and Stordalen want to make a case on the one hand for Balaam's prophecies as reversals of Genesis 3. However, they connect the language of Balaam's prophecies to a deceitfully gained blessing in Genesis 27. The echoes would then be simultaneously Edenic (Gen 3) and dubious (Gen 27).

While we could agree with many of the affinities that Stordalen and Savran connect, we hesitate to endorse their analyses, because they begin with the more superficial features of both texts. Stordalen considers these particulars and connects them by 'semantic field' and 'biblical texture' structures, all of which stretch to the point of being tenuous. For instance, even though plants, gardens, rivers, blessings, curses, and talking animals are not insignificant features of these two stories, are they the thrust of the central narrative in both texts? If one takes their analyses as final, then Balaam's story must be read as ultimately some type of reversal of the Fall. Whereas, we are suggesting here and below that this is no reversal, but a continuation of the sort of error described in the Fall. Again, Balak errors on account of failing to enact the guidance of Balaam's prophetic voice.

Also, Balaam's resoluteness to speak only the words of YHWH and nothing beyond them strikes us as a rhetorical exaggeration in the narrative that retrospectively critiques the woman's role in

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Genesis 3:6. The woman reveals the problem of the prophetic voice, either her own failure to listen or the prophetic failure to speak, when she goes beyond the commandment of YHWH. Her misunderstanding of God's commands, whatever its source, portends the further problems that come to fruition in her actions. In Numbers 22-24, Balaam's statement of unswerving devotion both doubly indicts Balak and authenticates Balaam as a prophetic voice. Of the former, the curses that Balak intends to purchase are effectively reversed upon himself and his plans. So if he believes that Balaam has any connection to a transcendent deity, then that deity is spelling out the futility of Balak's actions. The third oracle flatly demonstrates this reversal of cursing where it ends by reciting Balak's words back to himself: 'Blessed are those who bless you [Israel], and cursed are those who curse you [Israel]' (24:9b). Above that, the second oracle is directed at Balak's inability or unwillingness to 'listen to' what is the problem of consequence. The second oracle begins by calling Balak, 'Rise Balak and listen (.listen ...)' (23:18).

With regard to authenticating Balaam, if he intended to accumulate wealth from Balak, then the content of his oracles remove any distinguishable motivation for profiting from this prophecy. The only motivation provided by the narrative itself is Balaam's encounter with the angel of YHWH. Balaam demonstrates this incentive over and again with each oracle and this, along with prophecy known to Balak prior to this account, acts as the vehicle for authenticating his messages. However, the effect is lost on Balak.

Does this authentication fit the pattern discussed so far? It is difficult to find definitive authentication from YHWH himself. The strongest indications are that Balaam is familiar with YHWH prior to this incident (22:8), he is known for that relationship with YHWH (22:6), and he is therefore authenticated within that Moabite community. The narrative does not support a strong argument for his authentication by YHWH. But in Balak's view, Balaam is a person worth hiring. The other negative canonical references to Balaam make that point tenuous as to whether or not he is a formal prophet.

The story of Balaam, his reaction to Balak's emissaries, and his blindness to the angel of YHWH only give subtle hints of error to which later texts refer. But those hints must be present in order to make sense of those later critiques and the anger of YHWH stirred within Balaam's commission story. Within the opening scene, Balaam immediately defers to YHWH when approached by the men of Balak. And later YHWH comes to Balaam in the night to warn him saying, 'go with them, but only do what I tell you.' This use of 'only do' (ственный ...) reveals the stringency of YHWH's command to Balaam.
Upon rising the next day, Balaam saddles up and leaves, which is grounds for violation of the command according to the narrator. In other words, YHWH saying 'only do' that which I tell you, appears to mean, 'Don't even saddle up and leave without hearing from me first.' The evidence of this 'extreme adherence interpretation' is that after Balaam is confronted by the angel of YHWH, his demeanor changes notably. Balaam clearly understands the restriction on his movements and speech that are now under the direction of YHWH (22:38; 23:8, 12, 20, 26; 24:9, 12-13). So the one who later hears from YHWH (24:4,16) is not yet listening closely to YHWH before the confrontation on the donkey. This acts as an initial indicator of Balaam's error.

The second indicator of error has already been discussed: Balaam's inability to see the angel of YHWH on the road. Balaam's lack of sight plays off the sword employed as a symbol of judgment. Here, after the third refusal by the donkey, Balaam not only strikes the donkey but adds, 'I wish I had a sword in my hand, for then I would kill you.' The angel, who is noted to have 'his drawn sword in his hand' (22:31), picks up this language summarizing Balaam's peril, 'surely just now I would have killed you and let her [the donkey] live' (22:33). In the end, Balaam's death is recorded alongside the kings of Midian upon which Israel took YHWH's vengeance. Appended to the end of the kings who were slain reads, 'And they also killed Balaam the son of Beor with the sword' (31:8b). As with the garden (Gen 3:24), the worshippers of the golden calf (Exod 31:27), and now with Balaam, the sword strikes the reader as being the finality of YHWH's judgement upon these errors.

Finally, the references to Balaam can only hint at the larger error not explicitly stated in the story of Numbers 22-24. The fourth oracle concludes with the simple comment that Balaam and Balak each returned home. The ensuing scene of Israelites worshipping Baal at Peor is attributed directly to the influence of Balaam by the narrator of Numbers (31:16; 'Behold these, on Balaam's advice, caused the people of Israel to act treacherously against YHWH in the incident of Peor.'). But in Numbers 24, the reader only knows that 'Balaam rose and went back to his place,' with the next scene describing the whoring of Israel to Baal. The reader must infer that this diachronic error of Balaam in his life is the return to a normal life of blessing and cursing for profit. While the reader is able to peek into this one moment where Balaam definitively obeys YHWH and acts as his prophetic voice, the larger narrative implicates Balaam for not continuing in his faithfulness to YHWH after he returns home.

Hence, Balaam failed historically by failing to enact the very life demanded by the god for whom he was advocating in his oracles. Even considering the orthodoxy of his oracles, the rest of the
canon only views them as instrumental in instructing Israel about YHWH's care for them\textsuperscript{70} or about Balaam's penchant for whoring his blessings and curses.\textsuperscript{71} Therefore, Balaam fulfills the role of instrumental prophetic voice who does not embody the message placed in his own mouth.

This instrumental use of a person qua prophet is distinct from what we see in the rest of scripture where the prophet not only delivers the message, but cooperates with it as well. We might even argue that Balaam does effectually enact these oracles by also refusing to enact them. In failing to submit and join the Israelites that he blesses, he becomes part of the judged nations with whom he does join. This longitudinal error of 'failing to join Israel' violates the aspect of prophetic inducement along the lines of fiducial binding. It can be differentiated by the story of Rahab, who 'heard of' the same exodus effected by YHWH and pleads for favor within the covenant people (Josh 2:11-14). Balaam's fate gives us yet another reason to understand that listening to the voice of an authenticated prophet is not sufficient to avoid error for the prophet or the intended recipients of that message.

V. Conclusions

In this chapter, we have sought to establish that error in light of the formalized prophetic voice is multifaceted. 'Error' does not reside on a continuum at the opposite pole of 'knowing', but rather different sorts of error involve the formation of different knowledge. First-order error is rejecting the authentication of a prophet. Knowledge that proceeds from this error is misdirected and/or myopic, Pharaoh sees the 'ceasing hail' rather than the god whom sent it and caused it to cease. This knowledge is out of sorts with the grander reality because it is unguided.

Second-order error acknowledges the authenticated prophet, yet fails to enact his injunctions meant to produce truer sight of the grander reality. Israel errs in the second order where they collected manna outside of the commanded boundaries and worshipped YHWH in tandem with a golden calf. The very process meant for producing truer insight is hijacked and contorted. The knowledge that ensues is equally myopic because it is self-guided or guided by the wrong prophetic voice. It is out of sorts with the grander reality that the Israelites were meant to see, even if we cannot specify the exact nature of their epistemological goals.

Finally, we saw that this epistemological process was not unique to Israel, but equally commends and condemns outsiders based on their acknowledgement of YHWH and their participation in his commands. Listening and seeing held the same patterned relationship in Numbers 22-24 as they

\textsuperscript{70} Cf. Deut 23:5; Josh 24:9-10; Neh 13:2; Mic 6:5.

do elsewhere: one must listen to the prophetic voice and perform those commands in order to see what is being shown.
CHAPTER FOUR

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS IN DEUTERONOMY

I. INTRODUCTION

Deuteronomy is not a narrative in the sense that Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers are narratives. Rather, many sections of Deuteronomy serve as a theological reflection upon Israel's narratives with a covenantal story inherent to the whole, an *aggadah*. But whether the whole text is fundamentally legal code, teaching, or both, Deuteronomy calls upon Israel's past errors in order to teach the youth of Israel about how to know YHWH as her God. As Olson discerns, the crisis for Israel is not just the coming death of Moses, but the possibility of the death of knowing YHWH through Moses. If Moses as YHWH's prophet is the central urgency of Deuteronomic instruction, then what role does the reiteration and memory of Israel's past errors play in their future knowing of YHWH?

Deuteronomy opens by describing in detail the fulcrum points of Israel's errors up to its current

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1 Or, at least these texts are formed by core narratives.
2 Aggadic exegesis can be inner-biblical when it involves 'the rewriting or correcting of specific blocks of received historical traditum.' Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 381. Noth suggests something similar of Deuteronomy with his discussion of 're-presenting' earlier biblical material. "Re-presentation" of the OT.
4 Olson, *Deuteronomy and the Death of Moses*, 1-5.
5 Because of its use of 'remember' to *actualize* future behavior, O'Dowd calls Deuteronomy, 'the book of memory par excellence.' *Memory on the Boundary*, 3.
wanderings. So we expect to find error described in similar language of prior accounts and we do at three junctures: the introduction (Deut 1), the injunction to obey (Deut 4), and the covenant renewal (Deut 28-30) which reifies the language of Deuteronomy 7:12-14, 8:1 and 11:26-32. But when considering the epistemological process as a whole, Deuteronomy is fundamentally hopeful, though not afraid to be explicitly dire about error. Toward the end, there is a covenant renewal that explains Israel's errors up to that point; the errors they would fall back into in the future and the promise of resolution through the circumcision of their hearts.

We will proceed by examining observations concerning epistemological process in light of its major features. First, we propose to draw attention to the ways in which Deuteronomy shares unique connections with the primeval narratives of Genesis. Second, we must clarify the varied and rhetorical use of 'listen' in the book to include the employment noticed thus far. Third, we will examine the points in Deuteronomy where 'see', 'hear', and 'know' come into a prioritized epistemological relationship as they did in Exodus. Finally, we will consider how the authentication of future prophets is founded in Moses and prior errors.

II. CONNECTING ISRAEL TO THE GARDEN

In The Eden Narrative, Tryggve Mettinger makes a peculiar observation spring-boarding from Paul Ricoeur:

Ricoeur was on the right track when he said that "the Deuteronomic idea of a radical choice imposed by the prophetic summons portends the evolution of the Adamic myth." Of course, he never noticed that the Eden Narrative has linguistic features that reveal its close ties with Deuteronomistic theology.6

This is peculiar for two reasons. First, Mettinger is one of the few to draw explicit attention to the 'linguistic features' which uniquely marry these two texts. Second, it is odd that he should make such a parallel without finishing the thought. If Deuteronomistic thought sprang from a 'prophetic summons', then upon which facet of the Eden narrative does Deuteronomistic thought develop for the reader of the canon? We have already answered this question in the previous work on Genesis 2-3, but as Mettinger and Ricouer have noticed, this resemblance is uniquely tied to Genesis 1-3. In its Pentateuchal context, Deuteronomy appears to evoke the primeval history of error and the possibility of recapturing some aspect of that life and fruitfulness meant for the garden.

Regarding the first eleven chapters, Deuteronomy makes connecting comments between this

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6 Mettinger, The Eden Narrative, 52, n. 34; Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations.
generation and the Abrahamic covenant.\(^7\) The promise of a nation is coming to fruition and now the land promised to Abraham is in sight. Israel sent spies to inspect this land, and Moses deemed this plan \'was good in my eyes\' (1:23). By recounting this particular story, in effect, Deuteronomy opens its teaching with a national error. Briefly, the spies affirmed that this was a good land that YHWH was giving to them. The Israelites only listened to the details concerning the towering Anakim and the walled cities they would encounter. Hence, they refused to go. Toews paraphrases Israel's options this way: 'If Israel listens, they will enjoy the goodness of the Lord; but if they do not listen, the Lord will de-create all he has done …\(^8\)

A. Deuteronomy 1 and Genesis 2-3

Even here in the opening chapters, conceptual connections tie Genesis 2-3 and Deuteronomy 1 together. Both the garden narrative and Deuteronomy's retelling of history are set among YHWH's people with the promises of abundance of land and its fruitfulness.\(^9\) Both lands were given by YHWH to his people with conditions of obedience. Both involved rebellions where the people refused to believe the commands of YHWH. Lohfink posits that both texts are accounts of 'original sin', humanity's and Israel's respectively.\(^10\) Perhaps the lexical similarities between the woman and the spies 'taking fruit' plays into his suggestion.\(^11\) Finally, both end with an ambiguously negative attitudes toward the rebels' 'knowledge of good and evil'.\(^12\)

Paul Barker concludes:

In Deuteronomy, the two generations are distinguished by knowledge of good and evil. Lack of trust distinguished those excluded from the land from those allowed to enter. … [Jacobs] argues that the Deuteronomist has given particular content to this expression … that "good and evil" are

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\(^7\) Although Lohfink makes the connection more explicitly to the 'original sin' (see below). Cf. Gen 12:1-3; 15:5; Deut 1:8, 10. Christensen argues for Deuteronomy as a 'didactic poem' with chapters 1-3 being 'A Look Backwards' and 4-11 called 'The Great Peroration'. Duane L. Christensen, 'Form and Structure in Deuteronomy 1-11' in Das Deuteronomium: Entstehung, Gestalt und Botschaft. Ed. Norbert Lohfink. Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium LXVIII (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University, 1985), 137. O'Dowd prefers a rhetorical structure in his epistemological approach that suggests two historical/paratopic panels (1-11 and 27-34) frame the teaching of the Torah (12-26). Wisdom of Torah, 53. There also exists a preference for a form division approach that posits the structure as four speeches (1:1, 4:44, 28:69, 33:1 MT). However one divides the book, our argument for emphasis and repetition of epistemological themes remains.


\(^10\) Or at least as far as the Yahwist is concerned. Norbert Lohfink, Theology of the Pentateuch: Themes of the Priestly Narrative and Deuteronomy. trans. Linda M. Maloney (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1994), 96.


\(^12\) Dumbrell finds the links to Eden so pervasive through covenantal lens that he entitles Deuteronomy 26 'Eden recaptured', Covenant and Creation: An Old Testament Covenantal Theology (Exeter, UK: Paternoster, 1984), 120.
defined in Deuteronomy by action responding to the commandments ....\textsuperscript{13}

Knowledge of good and evil distinguishes Israelites who have not obeyed from the intended recipients of Deuteronomy, those youths yet to be tested. While these cannot be taken to be plainly intentional marks, the parallels beg questions about intentionality, at the very least.

Distinct lexical connections occur here as well. Because of their rebellion, this group was called an 'evil generation' (1:35). God then pronounces the newly revealed plan, which is for their own children to go up in their stead. Specifically, the children are described as those 'who today have no knowledge of good and evil' (1:39). The direct coupling of good and evil in this lexical relationship (i.e., תָּשַׁבַּח אָרֶץ) is only found in five places in the Tanak.\textsuperscript{14} In Genesis 2-3, it is used four times to describe the 'tree of knowledge of good and evil'. Here in Deuteronomy 1:39, it is used once to describe the future children of Israel. Further, it is not just 'good and evil' as an abstraction, but all five instances also refer to an epistemological relationship to 'good and evil'.

This subtle yet important connection must be noticed as Deuteronomic language appears to resemble garden language for rhetorical effect. As Barker notes this rhetoric is not peculiar or colloquial, but functions in the overarching rhetoric of the text, 'The connection between 1:39 and 30:15-20, the rhetorical climax of the book, poses the key question: what will this generation choose?'\textsuperscript{15} Other instances of this exclusive similitude of garden language between Genesis and Deuteronomy will be discussed below. But we observe now that language about the first error in Genesis comes in the opening of Deuteronomy, which acts to prime the pump for further usage of this imagery for the reader of the canon. As with the story in Genesis 2-3, the garden imagery used throughout Deuteronomy highlights either faithfulness in knowing YHWH or faithlessness in error.

Barker looks at passages such as the above (1:39) and suggests that this could be an 'intended or possible' allusion to Genesis 2-3.\textsuperscript{16} W. Malcolm Clark observes, 'the formulation of "good and evil phrase" [Deut 1:39] is closest to that in Gen 2f.'\textsuperscript{17} Barker, referencing Clark, continues 'One cannot fail to notice that as Adam and Eve failed and lost their right to their place with God, so did the earlier

\textsuperscript{14} Other couplings of 'good and evil' occur, but even those are rare. However, 'knowledge' (ידע), and not 'discernment between' (ראים וצוהフラים), in relation to 'good and evil' is unique to the two passages under examination here. Cf. 2 Sam 14:17, 19:36; 1 Kgs 3:9; Isa 7:16.
\textsuperscript{15} Barker, \textit{The Triumph of Grace}, 29 n. 144.
\textsuperscript{16} Barker, \textit{The Triumph of Grace}, 29.
\textsuperscript{17} Clark, 'A Legal Background', 274.
Several commentators have made these connections between Genesis 2-3 and Deuteronomy (so Brueggemann, Carpenter, Clark, Plöger, and Rose), but most importantly, Deuteronomy noticeably reverberates with Edenic language in its opening chapter alongside stories about and warnings against error. Even more, Edenic terms distinguish between those staying in the wilderness and those continuing into Canaan; those who have failed to obey and those who have yet to obey.

Ryan P. O'Dowd's work, *The Wisdom of Torah*, is devoted to the exploration of epistemological trends in the text of Deuteronomy. He evaluates the Edenic language conflated with Exodus reflection when he introduces the epistemology of Deuteronomy:

The laws for the land in Deuteronomy reflect god’s primordial intention for humanity (all nations) to live before him in a re-created garden. In other words, there is momentum behind this universal divine purpose which fuels the developing narrative as it continues from Exodus to Deuteronomy, and this Pentateuchal agenda lies at the heart of our epistemological investigation. Deuteronomy’s efforts to establish continuity lie in its interest in developing the primeval and patriarchal "story" of Israel in the world.

**B. Deuteronomy 4 and Genesis 1**

When we arrive at Deuteronomy 4, the mood changes from historical retelling to Moses' call for obedience. The mood of the fourth chapter is instructive. But here too, we find that the themes and lexicography of the creation account seem to resonate with the mode of YHWH's instruction. Creation acts as the grounds which fund an appeal to enact Moses' guidance. Here and as we discuss below, we can see the strong themes from the primeval history of Genesis reverberating in Moses' call to obey.

Canonically read, the rhetoric of this teaching in Deuteronomy 4 moves to a past event in order to give instruction for the future. Admonishing against idolatry, Deuteronomy lists a cavalcade of animals and celestial bodies that were forbidden to be recreated 'in the likeness' as idols. This prohibition comes on the basis that Israel, at the foot of Mount Sinai, 'heard his voice', yet 'saw no form' (4:15). Therefore, *not clinging* to YHWH (4:15-24) is sacramentally acted out by fashioning an image from any part of creation in order to worship it. The terms used to describe the created things

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throughout both texts are 'kind' (לְמַנְדָּה) in Genesis 1 and 'likeness' (תַּמְנָדָה) here in Deuteronomy 4. Moreover, the list of created things in Deuteronomy 4 comes across as stunningly coincidental to Genesis 1. Of specific interest, the creatures/objects on the list that were forbidden to be remade in their created 'likeness' (תַּמְנָדָה) resemble most directly the creation account:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object Name</th>
<th>Genesis 1</th>
<th>Deuteronomy 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male/Female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beast</td>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winged birds</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creeping thing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish/Sea</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stars</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The list in Deuteronomy so closely resembles the creation list of Genesis 1 that it appears to form a prescription, describing these created things as, 'things that YHWH your God has allotted to all the peoples under the whole heaven' (4:19). These creatures/objects were created and therefore, they should not be confused with the creator. The reason they should not is because these created things are not the same as the God who rescued them from Egypt (4:20).

But there is some discussion as to how this list is related to Genesis 1. Although he is critical of the neglect for the dissimilarities between Genesis 1 and Deuteronomy 4, MacDonald sums the debate on the relationship between the two:

There is a clear logic to the order found in Genesis and in the Decalogue; what then is the logic of Deuteronomy 4? The order may, perhaps, be explained by the reference to the earth (לָאָרְץ/בָּאָרָם) which both opens and closes the list. All the animals that are listed belong to the earthly sphere. … Thus, the two reasons for the Israelites to "take care of themselves" are lest they give incorrect worship to anything on earth or in heaven. Because the use of these specific creatures/objects uniquely reflects the creation account of

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21 Whether or not these terms would have been lexically-connected in an ancient reader's mind, the notion of 'similitude' is intended with items listed in both Gen 1 and Deut 4.
23 It is only here in Deuteronomy 4 where we see a special and direct appeal to creation.
25 MacDonald notes that Fishbane is uncritical of the distinct differences between the list of Gen 1 and Deut 4. *Deuteronomy*, 197.
Genesis 1,²⁶ Fishbane concludes, 'Here [Deut 4:16ff] there is an explicit aggadic adaptation of Gen 1 for the purposes of an exhortation against idolatry.'²⁷ Hence, the injunction not to make idols has a two-fold rationale based on: what they have witnessed (or more accurately, what their parents have witnessed) and the order of creation that ultimately reflects the creator not the creature. Or as MacDonald frames it, the logic of this list is to avoid the error of 'incorrect worship'. How does one know what being is correct to worship? One must consider what one has seen (an imageless voice) and what one knows of their creator (maker of these created things).

After Moses expounds the penalties for making idols in the likeness of created things he directly appeals to the theophany when YHWH spoke from the fire (4:33), which only compares to the creation event itself (4:32). This comparison to the creation event is the only direct appeal of its kind in Deuteronomy, but we will suggest that it causes the reader to consider other similar appeals throughout. Deuteronomy offers this conclusion, 'To you it was shown that you might know (דרשה) that YHWH is God; there is no other besides him' (4:35), and then repeats, 'Know (יודע) therefore today … that YHWH is God in heaven above and on the earth beneath; there is no other' (4:39). MacDonald takes these two knowledge expressions (technically: Erkenntnisaussagen) to be constitutive of the 'Shema's relational claim on Israel.'²⁸ Knowledge comes through relationship, experience, and as we have previously argued, prophetic interpretation.

Here in chapter four, we have a call to hear, to remember, to forbid idols that image creation, and we have an appeal to knowledge based on what Israel has seen. Because of this theme that flourishes throughout Deuteronomy, O'Dowd concludes, 'Israel's epistemology is grounded in the ontological and ethical nexus of the creation myth,'²⁹ and:

Significantly, 4:32-39 appeals to both senses where Israel’s "seeing" signs and "hearing" testimony of God's works testify to his uniqueness. In verses 32-34, Israel is led to conclude that no such acts as the Horeb revelation or the Egypt deliverance have occurred since creation.³⁰

Although these texts are primarily cited as proof of Israel's monotheism, MacDonald argues that these references only support a view for YHWH's categorical uniqueness, something which Israel is clearly meant to know from the context of this passage.³¹ Whether monotheistic uniqueness or not,
knowing in submission to YHWH as a god in control of creation and human history appears to be part of Deuteronomy's pre-corrective to future errors.

In Deuteronomy 4, we have the unique coupling of the creation narrative fused with Israel's experience at Horeb. This creational background evokes an appeal for Israel to submit to YHWH in order to know the fruitfulness intended for them. But more than a general creation milieu, the Eden connections also persist as we progress through the text. Although we are restricting our study to a canonical reading, Eckart Otto has discerned conceptual and lexical trends between Deuteronomy and Genesis 2-3 along the lines of the Priestly source. Noting the connections between Deuteronomy 4:25-27 and the end of the covenant renewal in 30:15-20, Otto makes the point that, in all three accounts, remaining in the land is contingent on obedience:

Wie in der Paradieserzählung in Gen 2-3 die Gabe der mênúhâh im Gottesgarten mit der Verbotspromulgation verbunden wird und das Verbleiben im Garten an den Gehorsam gegen Gottes Gebot gebunden wird, so werden im Deuteronomium durch die dtr und nachdtr Schichten der Pentateuchredaktion hindurch Landgabe, Gebotsgehorsam und Verbleib im Kulturland miteinander verknüpft.

And:

Fragen wir nach dem Schnittpunkt von dtr und spätweisheitlichem Denken, wie wir ihn in der Paradieserzählung in Gen 2-3 vorfinden so sind wir auf Dtn 4 gewiesen [e.g., Deut 4:6-8] … Dtn 4 verbindet aber nicht nur weisheitliches mit deuteronomistischem Denken, sondern setzt auch, wie u. a. Dtn 4,16b-18 zeigt Priesterschrift voraus. Das gilt nun auch für Gen 2,4b-3,24.

We will encounter again what Otto and others have observed, the blessings and commands that bind the front and back of Deuteronomy together as they resemble garden blessing and command. It is in the covenantal promises (both blessings and curses) that we see most clearly the connection to error between Deuteronomy and the garden.

C. Deuteronomy 28-30 and Genesis 2-3

As soon as we come out of the legal curses of Deuteronomy 27 and into 28:1, the condition of obedience confronts the reader: 'if you diligently listen to the voice of YHWH your

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32 Hermann Spieckermann has also noticed the 'affinities' between the Priestly tradition and Gen 2-3. 'Ambivalenzen' in Gottes Liebe zu Israel. (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr-Siebeck, 2004), 49-61.
34 Otto, 'Die Paradieserzählung', 183.
35 Cf. Gen 1:28 with Deut 7:13 וּבָאָרְךָ וּרְבֶםָךְ פֶּרְיָ וּיְבָרְךָ פֶּרְיָ וּיְבָרְךָ. וּבָאָרְךָ וּרְבֶםָךְ פֶּרְיָ וּיְבָרְךָ.
God' (אָֽמַּ֥ם שֵׁמוֹת תַּחַת בְּכוֹל). The motif appears again in 28:2, and Deuteronomy evinces similarity with the garden language of blessing (ברא), fruitfulness (פרים), and multiplicity (רב). Linking the covenant to the patriarchs as well, there appears a reversal of the Abrahamic covenant at stake in their disobedience. Abram's descendants were to be as numerous as the stars (re Gen 15:5; Deut 1:10). But Deuteronomy 28:62 threatens, 'Whereas you were once numerous as the stars, you shall be left few in number because you did not listen to the voice of YHWH your God.' In summary to these curses, the covenant that begins in Deuteronomy 29 (to which we will return). The renewal of the covenant sets out the dichotomous proposal in language comparable to that of Genesis 2-3, which is stated most explicitly later in the next chapter (30:15-20): life and death, blessing and curse.

Looking back at the creation account in Genesis, we are supposing that humanity was meant to keep the garden (Gen 2:15), to image God's dominion (Gen 1:28), to be fruitful (Gen 1:28), and to live provisionally under the minimal commandments concerning the trees in the center (Gen 2:16-27). The narratival tension in Genesis 3:22 after the Fall reflects humanity's ability to take from the 'tree of life' against the threat of death (Gen 2:17). The concern is life over death. Obedience brings life and fruitful multiplication to rule and keep the earth. Disobedience means not listening to YHWH with the consequence affecting relationships between man and himself (Gen 3:7), the woman (Gen 3:16b), his offspring (Gen 3:16a), the earth (Gen 3:17c-19) and YHWH (Gen 3:23).

At the end of the covenant renewal of Deuteronomy 30, we find Moses setting up a dichotomy parallel to that of Genesis 2-3. Listening to the voice of Moses divides between good and evil, life and death that was seeded earlier (Deut 11). 'Good and evil' have already been raised in unique relationship to the garden in Deuteronomy 1:39. Good, in this polarity, is associated with life, blessing, and multiplication (30:16c) by enacting the instructions, 'loving YHWH your God, walking in his ways, and keeping his commandments …' (30:16b). The call to enact is summarized in the phrase 'listen to

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36 See below for the specific significance of this unique phrasing of the שם כולם motif compared to Genesis 3:17.
37 [Re Deut 28:1] We recognize the Deuteronomistic phrase for obedience to the law, "listening to the voice of the LORD," and we also note the variation in the preposition, šāma' lēqōl yhwh, with exactly the same preposition as in Gen 3:17.' Mettinger, The Eden narrative, 54.
38 Cf. 7:12-4; 28:3-6, 11. These terms will be discussed further below.
40 Moberly suggests that Deut 30:15-20 might act as a hermeneutical window into Gen 2-3. The Theology of the Book of Genesis, 84.
the commandment of YHWH your God' (30:16a). Evil is associated with hearts turned away, not
listening, being drawn away to other gods, 'surely perishing' and short life in the land (30:18a).

Finally, calling upon the heavens and earth (cf. 4:26; 30:19) as witness, this unit closes with the
exhortation to 'choose life' (בחיים), which is effectively encapsulated: '[by] listening to his voice
and clinging to him' (30:20). This unusual arrangement of 'heavens and earth' as the direct object (אדנים)
only occurs six times in the Pentateuch. Once in Genesis 1:1 as the direct object of
YHWH's creation, which is then cited twice in Exodus to refer to the creation event (Exod 20:11;
31:17). Whether or not it reverberates with the entire creation account, it is used three times here in
Deuteronomy as a 'witness' against Israel (4:26, 30:19, 31:28).

In short, the early Deuteronomic teaching (1-11) binds the front and back of Deuteronomy
together with the later covenant renewal (27-30) entangling the errors of Israel. Injunctions at the fore
of the book are reflected in the covenants at the tail. Additionally, the language used to connect
Deuteronomy as one text also shows signs of collaboration with Genesis 1-3. More broadly, for the
reader of the canon, the garden themes and terms that appear in Deuteronomy evoke a sense of Israel's
primeval history of error and the possibility of recapturing some aspect of that life and abundance
meant for the garden in their new and promised land.

III. THREE DIFFERENT USES OF שמע

The powerful voices of self, false prophets, family members, and even whole towns may join in a
chaotic cacophony of competing voices to tempt Israel to follow other gods. But to this discordant
chorus, Deuteronomy directs the reader to the one overriding voice who will tolerate no rival:
"obey [שמא] the voice of the L ORD your God" (13:18).42

No small amount of work has focused attention on The Shema of Deuteronomy and its
centrality in the Jewish confession. Be that as it may, our focus on the use of שמע will not be centered
on that renowned passage. Instead, three definitive rhetorical uses of שמע in Deuteronomy deal
explicitly with error. First, the שמע קרל motif pleads with Israel to listen in order to avoid error and live
in blessing. Second, the shift from 'listening to the voice' to 'listening to the commandments' prepares
Israel for the death of Moses and the new prophet to come. Third, the call to remember when Israel

41 On Genesis 2-3 and its 'Deuteronomistic Affinities': 'The Eden Narrative speaks of a radical choice, a choice between
obedience and disobedience to the divine commandment. This reminds us of passages in Deuteronomy [re 11:26-28;
42 Olson, Deuteronomy, 70.
'heard the voice of YHWH' means to remind them of God's continuity with them and his indulgent favor toward them (i.e., Deut 8).

Alongside the garden-like language of Deuteronomy, the terms of indictment originally seen against the man in the garden (Gen 3:17) are employed throughout as well. There are over 80 occurrences of 'listen/hear' (שמעת) in Deuteronomy, and 39 of those connote 'obedience'. Besides The Shema, the general injunction to 'listen to the voice of YHWH your God' (e.g., 8:20) is used 15 times throughout the book. However, that usage does tend to congregate most densely in Deuteronomy 28 and 30 where we find the blessings/curses and covenant injunctions respectively (see chart below). We now move to the covenant blessings and curses to see how this 'listen' parlance culminates in Deuteronomy.

A. The Motif: Listen to my voice as I command you . . .

We begin by looking at the blessings and curses of Deuteronomy 28. At stake is Israel's ability to listen, which allows her to keep the commandments and do them. If they listen to Moses and keep the commands, then the land and blessing will 'overtake them' (28:2). Specifically, they are to be given the land because they have listened to the voice of YHWH their God. Hence, God will cause everything their hands touch to be 'fruitful and multiply' (28:4-6, 11-12). The injunction to 'listen to the voice of YHWH your God' is repeated twice. The first instance (28:1) is the infinitive absolute to 'diligently listen' previously noted in our discussion in this chapter. Secondly, there is a plea at the end

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44 This chart is meant to illustrate instances of שמע קולך connected by a preposition with YHWH being the intended 'voice' being referenced and the connotation of obedience. We are excluding here both instances where YHWH listens to Israel's collective voice (e.g., Deut 1:34) and instances generally translated 'heard the sound/voice' (e.g., Deut 4:12).
of the blessing segment to 'listen to the commandments of YHWH your God' (28:13).

This covenant results in an Edenic vision of the land sworn to their fathers which takes on this *Midas* feature. Everything they touch is blessed with fruitfulness so long as they 'listen'. Deuteronomy portrays this *Midas* feature throughout. The 'blessing of fruitfulness' (ברוך פרם)\(^{45}\) will be given to their wombs, the fruit of the ground (אום), and the fruit of their cattle (cf. 7:13; 28:4).\(^{46}\) Conceptually, fruitfulness of their wombs, the ground, and their livestock has more than a tinge of Edenic overlap.\(^{47}\) This is contrasted by the inversion of these blessings that follow.

The curses begin with a reversal of 'fruitfulness', warning: 'if you will not listen to the voice of YHWH your God ….' The imprecations ensue and are notably more extenuated than the blessings, punctuated with the phrase, 'because you did not listen to the voice of YHWH your God' (28:45, 62).

The indictment of the man (Gen 3:17) is elicited for the reader in the background of these foresworn incriminations of Deuteronomy 28. Of all eleven instances where 'listening to the voice of' is in direct connection with 'what was commanded', two are in Genesis and the other nine are in Deuteronomy. The first instance is when God indicts the man: 'Because you listened to the voice of your wife and ate of the tree which I commanded you …' (Gen 3:17). The second is when Rebekah deceives Isaac through Jacob, 'Now therefore, my son, listen to my voice as I command you' (Gen 27:8). The first instance comes from the error in the garden and the second has been shown to follow negatively in the motif within Genesis. The rest of the instances are found here in Deuteronomy, most densely in

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\(^{45}\) The blessings of Deuteronomy foreshadowed in chapter eight (vv. 1-10) are now described in terms of Edenic blessing of fruitfulness. All instances of 'fruit' in the Pentateuch: Gen 1:11, 12, 29; 3:2, 3, 6; 4:3; 30:2, Exod 10:15, Lev 19:23, 24, 25, 40; 25:19; 26:4, 20; 27:30; Num 13:20, 26, 27; Deut 1:25; 7:13; 26:2, 10; 28:4, 11, 18, 33, 42, 51, 53; 30:9.

\(^{46}\) This particular phrase, 'fruitfulness of the ground', is found in varying formulations, but only sparsely throughout the Tanak. Of its 14 appearances, 'fruit of the ground' occurs once in Genesis 4:3 to refer to Cain's offering and 10 times in Deuteronomy to refer to the blessing of obeying YHWH as the Israelites possess the land. See Gen 4:3, Deut 7:13; 26:2, 10; 28:4, 11, 18, 33, 42, 51; 30:9, Ps 105:35, Jer 7:20, and Mal 3:11.

\(^{47}\) Carmichael terms the 'language of expansiveness'. Calum Carmichael, *The Laws of Deuteronomy* (London, UK: Cornell University, 1974), 34-5. Our supposition concerning Deuteronomy's similar employment of Edenic 'fruitfulness' language may be challenged by examples such as Deut 8. There, the abundance of Canaan is described without any clear lexical or conceptual tie to Genesis 1-3. However, it appears that the rhetoric of Deut 8 is primarily concerned with Israel's provision in contrast to the wilderness, a land where 'you will lack nothing' (8:9). Specifically, it appears concerned with the gracious provision these things that are presumably already existing in the land (e.g., 8:7-8; 'pools of water', 'vines and fig trees', 'olive oil and honey', etc.). So Lohfink concludes: 'they must know that what they may then experience—projected as a utopia by the text of Deut 8:7—will always be nothing else but the miracle in the wilderness, accomplished by YHWH and not by themselves …' *Theology of the Pentateuch*, 83-5. The Edenic language we have noted, on the other hand, has to do specifically with the 'fruitfulness' (פרם) of their wombs, the soil, and everything else, things that do not yet exist in the land.
Deuteronomy 28 and 30.  

The curses reverse Eden and follow the same trajectory as those of Genesis 3. Everything that would be 'fruitful' under Israel's obedience now becomes frustrated and cursed in her disobedience (Deut 28:15f). Specifically, 'YHWH will send on you curses, confusion, and frustration in all that you undertake to do, until you are destroyed and perish quickly on account of the evil of your deeds.' They will perish until they are, 'few in number because you did not listen to the voice of YHWH your God'.  

Again, we see that Deuteronomy shares a unique collection of phrases that connect it to the error of the garden.

Despite the curses and the assurance that Israel will likely have to endure (i.e., 30:1), YHWH still holds out a carrot to trade for their stick. The carrot is life and abundance, while the stick is the reversal of Eden into egregious depths. They do not have to pursue the road of obduracy. Still, the carrot only actualizes if they will 'listen to his voice'. Deuteronomy 30 sets the stage for these two possibilities, carrot and stick, that will culminate in 30:15-20. It opens with the prospect of 'when … [you] listen to his voice', prosperity and circumcision of the heart will occur. Then it is repeated three more times as contingent upon them 'listening to the voice' of God (30:8, 10, 20).

Nevertheless, it is the summary of Deuteronomy 30 that again explicitly returns to garden language: life and good, death and evil, blessing and curse (30:15-20). Although the use of contrasting patterns is not unique to this passage (cf. 11:26-32), given the mixture of garden similitude up to this point, the comparison cannot be avoided.

In short, the שמח קהל motif has been employed regularly to warn Israel to submit to her prophet, and hence, her God. This usage is expected, even though it has also been used to describe their past and future errors in language similar to the error in the garden. These connections to Genesis 1-3 are not a superficial or bare use of a 'lexical stock', but appear to be conceptually connected to the rhetoric of admonition against error itself.

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50 This is noticed also by Mettinger where he considers the language of Gen 2-3 to be 'Deuteronomistic' in reference to Deut 11:26-8 and 30:15-20 as a parallel 'test of obedience'. Although he believes that 'The whole central passage, 3:1-7 turns on the divine commandment …,' Mettinger stops short. Unfortunately, he takes the parallel phrase (shmash kal) to be mere 'obedience' rather than exploring to whom one is being obedient and how that command is mediated in both Genesis and Deuteronomy. The Eden Narrative, 48-56.
B. Listen to These Words/Commandments

There are other uses of שמיעת that fit the construct of obedience in order to avoid error. However, these instances appear to operate toward a different rhetorical effect. The two other employments of שמיעת are first, the move from 'voice' as the direct object to 'torah' as the direct object. Second, and more prominently, שמיעת is used to prompt Israel to recall when they heard the voice of God 'out of the midst of the fire'.

Because our thesis is so heavily vested in prophetic authority, work on the blending of YHWH's words with Moses' particularly interests us. O'Dowd and others maintain that there is a steady progression throughout Deuteronomy that creates an intentional blur between the words of YHWH and of Moses. While some see the primacy of the fixed commandments over the oral transmission through Moses, Polzin believes the whole rhetorical effect of Deuteronomy is bent on blending the authority of Moses with that of YHWH. As well, O'Dowd argues that the progression of the book is from 'ordinance and statute' obedience to 'book and writings' reverence. This move is seen most clearly in the provisions for future kings where the kings are to be the 'arch torah readers', because they have hand written a copy of the ordinances and statutes for themselves.

There are, of course, differing opinions about the rhetorical intention behind the Moses/YHWH relationship and how they are meant to be perceived. Olson tends toward equating Moses with YHWH. MacDonald differs slightly, preferring Moses primarily as mediator. Even so, we need not maintain equivalence of the two in order to affirm 'intentional blur', because the rhetoric of Deuteronomy focuses on listening and obeying whatever is spoken by the mediator. This obedience is founded in the

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52 Polzin, among others, also takes this view. 'Deuteronomy' in The Literary Guide to the Bible, 92-101. See also Sherwood, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, 228-229. O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 29f.
53 Olson, Deuteronomy, 46.
54 'As a result of this wordplay, Deuteronomy gradually achieves a blending effect between Moses' words and Yahweh's words. … Deuteronomy 1:1-5 makes an emphatic point of ascribing this book (these "words") to Moses. Yet at the same time, the narrator is careful to qualify Moses' teaching as they express Yahweh's authoritative command (1:3).' O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 29.
55 O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 83.
56 O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 77f.
57 Olson, Deuteronomy, 35.
58 MacDonald ultimately leans toward Moses qua mediator: 'Olson's suggestion that Moses may have been equated with a god is suggestive, but cannot be supported from elsewhere in Deuteronomy for there is nowhere any suggestion that the Israelites made such an equation. It may be more pertinent to observe that after the Horeb revelation it is Moses who bears the heavenly words until they are delivered to Israel. That is, he is the one who mediates the presence of YHWH, because he is the one who was given the "statues and ordinances" (v. 14) which he is now delivering (v. 5).’ MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 198.
authentication of Moses which is not once-for-all, but continues as Moses is re-authenticated over and again after the exodus.

It is worth pointing out that several key injunctions already noted above play between 'listen to the voice of YHWH your God' and 'listen to these words' or 'listen to these commandments'. The call to 'listen to the commandments' is hinted at in 4:10, but made explicit in 11:27. These are repeated in the covenant directive of 30:16-17 where 'obeying the commandments' (30:16) is juxtaposed against 'not listening' (30:17).

The authentication of prophets presses this use of שמע (i.e., 'listen to the words') into service. The first teaching concerning a prophet or dreamer who attempts to lead Israel away from YHWH occurs in Deuteronomy 13: Israel 'shall not listen to the words of that prophet or dreamer' (13:3). The second teaching on prophets concerns the 'new prophet' like Moses who will be raised up: אֱלֹיוֹ שָׁמֵעֲךָ ('To him you shall listen', 18:15).

Deuteronomy 18 emphasizes YHWH's action to speak through this new prophet, differing from instruction in Deuteronomy 13: 'And whoever will not listen to my words that he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him' (18:20). Why is the emphasis shifted to trusting the prophet and listening to the words, not the voice here in Deuteronomy 18? Like Moses (Exod 4:15-16) and Balaam (Num 22:38), Deuteronomy comments that YHWH will 'put my words in his mouth …' (18:18). Although the new prophet will be raised up and YHWH's words put in his mouth, the contrast between presumptuous prophet-speak and the words of YHWH themselves in a prophet's mouth must be discerned by the hearer. This is ultimately an issue of prophetic authentication in order to avoid error of the first order: to which prophetic counsel one should listen.

The shift in listening is signalled to the reader with the movement from the 'voice of YHWH' as the direct object to the 'commands/words' as direct objects of 'listening'. The movement continues in the resolution of the crisis of Moses' impending death: a new prophet.\(^{59}\) Avoiding error means listening and re-listening to the voice of Moses and now the words of the law. It not only means listening to Moses 'today', but also remembering these words and commandments given on this occasion\(^{60}\) and listening to the words of the new prophet in light of these words and commandments.

\(^{59}\) Olson, *Deuteronomy*, 84-86.

\(^{60}\) See O'Dowd for the significance of 'today' (היום) in the rhetoric of Deuteronomy. *The Wisdom of Torah*, 32f.
C. Did any people ever hear the voice …

The first use of שמע (hear) fits the general motif of obedience noticed thus far in the Pentateuch. The second type of usage shifts from 'listening to the voice' toward 'listening to words/commandments'. Briefly, the third use is similar in form to the motif (شعן קול), however it refers back to one historical incident meant to shape Israel's theology: YHWH speaking from the fire at Horeb. In arguing a case against the idolizing of the image of YHWH, Moses chides, 'Did any people ever hear the voice of a god speaking out of the midst of the fire, as you have heard, and still live' (4:33)? This specific utilization of שמע קול appears only in chapters four and five within Deuteronomy a total of six times.61 The text states that the intended effect of them hearing YHWH's voice is so that they would know that YHWH is uniquely God (4:39) and that Moses is his prophet (5:23-27).62 In binding Israel to Moses, they are also bound to the commands of YHWH which will endure beyond Moses and become the rule upon which they are to interpret new prophets like Moses.

While all three uses of שמע still focus on prophetic authority, they get at it from different directions. The general שמע קול motif pleads with Israel to listen in order to avoid error and to live in Eden-like blessing. The shift from listening to the voice to listening to the commandments prepares Israel for the death of Moses and the new prophets to come. Moreover, the call to remember when Israel 'heard the voice of YHWH' is meant to remind them of God's continuity with them and his indulgent favor toward them (Deut 8).

IV. SEEING, HEARING, KNOWING, AND ERROR

The trouble with man is, not that he cannot hear and see, but that he will not. Sin has stopped his ears and blinded his eyes. The ears are still present and the eyes are present—man is whole and intact. Only, since the incursion of sin into his experience, man chooses to listen to other voices than God's [re Gen 3:9-11].63

We must now address the relationship between seeing, hearing, and knowing. There are at two passages in Deuteronomy that play out seeing, hearing, and knowing in a structured relationship: the initial mandate to obey (4:1-6, 33-36) and the opening of the covenant renewal (29:1-4).

61 Cf. instances of hear and voice where it is not in the sense of obedience, rather an experience: Deut 4:33, 36; 5:23, 24, 25, 26.
62 This is not an argument for monotheism, rather it also serves as the phenomenological basis for proscribing the image of god's made into idols (4:15).
Patrick Miller discerns a 'seeing motif' as epistemological in the opening chapter of Deuteronomy (re 1:19, 30, 31 contrasted to 1:28):

The critical question of the unit is, What do you see? … In other words, they "saw" the might of the enemy and did not "see" all the demonstrations of the power of God. … This seeing language parallels the belief language and is, in fact, a kind of faith language; the story really is dealing with the contrast between eyes of faith and eyes of disbelief. … Because the people did not really "see" the Lord’s power—that is, trust that the Lord was with them and could give them victory over their enemies—they shall not "see" the good land (v. 35). 64

Seeing, according to Miller, offers a way to express listening in obedience. So then, seeing with the 'eyes of faith' is really just another way to say one is listening to the proper authority and can therefore see that which they are being shown. It is in this sense that Israel can be called to listen and then see according to what they have been told, like the woman who saw the fruit was desirable 'to make one wise' only after listening to the voice of the serpent. The importance of this rhetorical move will become apparent as the basis for the commands of Deuteronomy 4.

A. Seeing in Order to Know

Deuteronomy 4 presents us with a turn from indicative history to imperative instruction: 'And now O Israel, listen to the statutes …' (4:1). It then follows an appeal to what Israel's 'eyes have seen' with the comment that those who have 'clung to YHWH your God are all alive today' (4:3-4). 65 As previously noted, after some portending of blessings and curses, we arrive at the epistemological crux of this unit. Particularly, 'To you it was shown, that you might know ("#") that YHWH is God; there is no other besides him' (4:35). Setting aside the issue of monotheism, we may ask, 'What was shown to Israel and how does the showing function in her epistemological process?'

Going back to the rhetorical beginning of this passage (4:32), we see that the creation of heaven and earth is again invoked as the comparative exemplar to the things which they have seen. Specifically, they have heard the voice of God, seen the fire, and seen the signs and wonders. These experiences are abridged as the 'great deeds of terror' all of which were done 'before your eyes' (4:33-34). How do all of these visible demonstrations make any sense to the Israelites? This thesis will continue to argue that these 'seeings' are only coherent to the Israelites if there is a voice to whom Israel listens and that prophetic voice can make these particularities coherent. Mere 'seeing', as in witnessing, is not equivalent to knowing or believing as will be demonstrated below. 66

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64 Miller, Deuteronomy, 35-36.
65 MacDonald, Deuteronomy; 194.
66 O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 93-94.
Geller posits that universal wisdom in the ancient world is captured metaphorically by *seeing*.
It prioritizes *seeing* as the confirmation of what one has heard by way of 'seeing it for themselves'.
Deuteronomy 4 reverses this logic, ironically using wisdom language, to say that because Israel has seen (in wisdom rhetoric), they must now listen to these commands, teach them to their children, etc. Geller understands that listening now has the priority, and this thesis wants to build upon his proposal. We want to amend Geller's insight by adding that the call for Israel to remember what they *saw* requires a prior submission to listen to the voice of Moses 'in order to see' those 'great deeds of terror'. The prior submission to Moses as prophet, presumed by Israel's ability to see, is captured in the 'listen to his voice' statements. Listening to Moses enables Israel to see the significance of the pillar of fire and the voice they heard for themselves. Exodus gives us clear impetus to argue that merely seeing the Mosaic signs, as Pharaoh also witnessed them, is insufficient as a basis for further appeals to understand what one saw. Even in their remembrance, Israel's youth must listen to Moses in order to understand what their parents saw. Listening to Moses, now enscripturated in the text of Deuteronomy, enables Israel to see in the future as they grow distant to those acts their parents once saw and understood through Moses in their national past.

When Deuteronomy says, 'Know therefore today that YHWH is God,' it is presuming upon not only that which Israel has seen, but how what they saw had been authoritatively interpreted to them by 'listening to the voice of' their prophet Moses. Therefore, listening to the voice of Moses necessitates epistemological priority over seeing. In this instance, 4:36 adds that they not only 'heard his [YHWH's] voice' and 'saw his great fire', but also 'heard his words'. As a result, the words and commandments given by Moses interpreted what they saw. In short, because they are *listening to the voice* of Moses and *saw* the fire and heard God's voice, we can expect them to *know* that YHWH is their God.

Seeing the fire and hearing the voice could act as a hendiadys, generically meaning 'to witness an event'. But we have argued that seeing must be interpreted by a prophetic voice and therefore listening has priority in the epistemological process. This is why we had to distinguish 'hearing the voice of YHWH' (4:33) as merely witnessing an event from 'listening to the voice of YHWH' (4:30) as the epistemological submission toward a prophetic authority. Accordingly, because they listened, they saw what was being shown and knew YHWH their God is unlike any other.

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67 Geller, *Sacred Enigmas*, 50. Schellenberg also highlights 'seeing' as preeminent in Qohelet and Job over hearing, which she takes to mean that immediate experience overrides traditional wisdom. *Erkenntnis als Problem*, 181-5.
69 Geller does incorporate the concept of teacher/pupil from the wisdom tradition to show that it is being rhetorically employed in the sense of 'listening to a teacher'. But that is as far as he takes the analysis. Geller, *Sacred Enigmas*, 50.
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In his conclusions regarding Deuteronomy's epistemology, O'Dowd begins with Deuteronomy's 'Ontology and the Created Order'. He says, 'To be epistemologically engaged in ontology is to say that knowledge is acquired and justified on the basis of a preconceived understanding of reality (its origin, purpose, structure, etc.), and not with a move to "disengaged" objectivity.' What we are arguing for here is O'Dowd's 'preconceived understanding of reality' (i.e., the creation story) and how an Israelite would acquire it. In order for Israel to see what YHWH is showing her, she must listen to the 'polyphonic voices' of the creation stories and Moses' instruction to her.

B. Heart to Know, Eyes to See, Ears to Hear

Following up on the structure of knowing by listening and then seeing, Deuteronomy 29 serves to introduce the covenant renewal by explaining the epistemological problem up to this point in the story. Like chapter four, Moses calls Israel to remember what YHWH did 'before your eyes' (29:2 [MT 29:1]) and the signs and wonders 'that your eyes saw' (29:3 [MT 29:2]). Then comes the reason for the 40 years of wandering: 'But to this day YHWH has not given you a heart to know, nor eyes to see, nor ears to listen.'

We cannot address the matter here of divine sovereignty in epistemology, but rather discuss the relationship between knowing, seeing, and hearing as it is ordered in 29:4 [MT 29:3]. Given the relationship between these three elements posited in this thesis, we should be suspect of reading these three as hendiadys. Rather, they may form a reverse order. In other words, Israel has not known because she has not seen what YHWH was showing her because she was not listening to the voice of the prophet. That certainly would be a fair summary of Israel's history to this point however one interprets this particular saying.

As evidence of the proposed reading above, in the text leading up the triplet of heart/eyes/ears (29:2-3 [MT 29:1-2]), there are only references to what Israel has seen. Therefore, one could easily make sense as to why Deuteronomy says they do not have 'eyes to see'. But why does this saying also contain 'a heart to know' and 'ears to listen'? This can be resolved if we consider the diverse use of 'see' as it is employed throughout. Sight is used to mean 'witness' in 29:2-3, but here in 29:4, it means something like 'insight', to interpret appropriately what one has seen. Recognizing that 'eyes to see' functions to mean insight also avoids the incoherence of a flat reading. Otherwise, we would be forced

70 O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 163.
71 O'Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 171.
72 'You have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes … the great trials that your eyes saw … [MT 29:1-2].'
73 Cf. 4:35: יִהְיוּ. 
to render something like, 'You saw X and you saw Y, but YHWH didn't give you eyes to see anything.'

MacDonald perceives 29:1-3 to be a statement concerning a process of discipline which leads to perception—an epistemological process:

The ability to see, therefore, is ascribed to YHWH because it only comes through his program of disciplining Israel, in which she learns her dependence on YHWH and the necessity of obedience to him. Sight can only occur on the far side of the desert. To express this in different terms, moral formation is a requisite for spiritual perception.

We could rephrase MacDonald's observation to say that Israel's sight was restricted by her first and second-order errors—something to be amended by YHWH in the Promised Land. Even so, Nelson takes this verse to mean that Israel can finally obey the command of YHWH:

However, the logic of the argument demands that we interpret these verses to mean ... Now that Moses has promulgated the law and encouraged obedience to it, ... it [Israel] can obey the covenant (v. 9 [MT 8]).

Nelson's understanding does not suffice on the basis that we have shown that Deuteronomy as teaching that Israel must obey in order to see what YHWH is showing her. Listening/obedience is not what Israel sees with her new 'eyes to see'. Listening enables her eyes to see!

This arrangement of knowing, seeing, and hearing will be picked up again most notably by the prophet Isaiah and then again in regular employ for the Synoptic Gospels. Consequently, establishing its significance in the Pentateuch will have implications beyond the Torah and Tanak. To draw this back into the garden error, there too the woman saw the fruit in a way that transcends mere sensory input. She saw wisdom in a piece of fruit as it was interpreted to her by the serpent. Perhaps brute sight of fruit-as-wisdom did not occur, but because she listened to the voice of the serpent she 'saw that it was good … to make one wise.' Here too, Deuteronomy calls Israel to see by listening to the prophet and therefore know what God is showing them.

V. AUTHENTICATION OF POST-MOSAIC PROPHETS

Looking at Deuteronomy's teaching about future prophets provides the nexus for investigating the constituent factors in authenticating the prophetic voice. Further, this crisis about to whom they

74 N.B. By my count, 40% (26/65) of the instances of 'see' (הָיָה) in Deuteronomy connote 'insight' beyond what one is physically seeing.

75 MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 138.


77 Braulik argues that Israel's wisdom is not her law, but her indwelling of the law. Deuteronomy, 9.
should listen propels the Deuteronomic narrative forward. With the death of Moses, Israel must learn to listen to the voice of someone other than Moses. The *loci classici* for discerning prophetic voices beyond Moses are Deuteronomy 13 and 18. The first text (13:1-5) is general and the second (18:15-22) is specific. Both involve special means of authentication and denying authentication. The first passage authenticates the person as a prophet, while the second passage affirms the words of a prophet as legitimate.78

A. Deuteronomy 13: Future Prophets

Considering the argument of Deuteronomy 13 itself, the matter concerns the straying of Israel from 'these words' in the Torah and specifically the ones being commanded 'today'.79 The burden of this teaching on a 'prophet or dreamer' is to address Israel's clinging to YHWH. McConville observes, 'The point here is not to warn against certain types of official [i.e., prophet] as such, but only in so far as they aim to seduce Israel to the worship of other gods.'80 This passage is most concerned with whether or not a) their prophecies/dreams come to pass and then b) the content of their exhortation. The means of authentication (re prophecy coming to pass) are ignored if the content is unorthodox according to the present teaching of Moses.

It appears as if the special means of authentication only act as an entrée to considering the content of the prophecy compared to the current teaching of Moses. So Christensen says, 'Even if the credentials of the prophet in question are impeccable, if the intention is to draw the people away to the service of other gods, that fact alone is sufficient to prove that the person is a false prophet.'81 If this is the case, then the special authentication of Moses qua prophet (Exod 3-34) must necessarily trump any future prophetic authentication, for the basis of judging all future prophets and prophecies is rooted in Moses' authentication. Deuteronomy then establishes the boundaries within which all future prophets and prophecy must operate. Violating those boundaries and/or encouraging others to do the same is a capital crime (13:5).

Even though this is all rather uncontroversial, we observe that authentication of the prophetic voice who speaks on behalf of YHWH will always require special means of authentication. It was

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78 There is another issue of the prophet's own self-confidence in the veracity of their prophetic message. Suzanne Stone also makes astute observations from the Rabbinic literature concerning the confidence of the prophet him/herself in their own words they are speaking. We cannot, unfortunately, rehearse those here. 'Between Truth and Trust', 337–366.
79 See O'Dowd for the significance of 'today' (תֵּלֶּחֶז) in the rhetoric of Deuteronomy. *The Wisdom of Torah*, 32f.
81 Christensen, *Deuteronomy 1-21*: 9, 272.
previously claimed that there are no general and special epistemologies operating here, but only general and special means of authenticating prophetic voices. Where one wants to authenticate a person's authority to fly commercial airplanes, there are general and reliable ways of authenticating such authority (e.g., exams, licenses on file, identification cards, organizational records, etc.). However, there is no such general authentication of YHWH's prophetic voice. The only way to consider whether or not a prophet's words are from YHWH is to wait for their words to manifest in history and compare them to the Law Israel received 'today'. Both of these steps in the process are special means of authentication. From within its own narrative, there is nothing generally authenticating about the Torah in its giving, its reception, or its immediate provenance by Israel. These are all supernaturalistic, for lack of a better term. The Torah itself is a special redemptive-historical series of events retold. These Torah-making events are as entangled in the signs to Pharaoh (Exod 4-12) as they are with the later signs to Israel herself (e.g., the glory of YHWH over the tabernacle; Exod 40:34f.), without which the internal coherence of its own paranesis might be threatened. Consequently, both the words of a future prophet and the text by which those words are compared exhibit special authentication.

In the text itself, we can again mention the presence of common epistemological parlance. The antidote to a first-order error (i.e., listening to false prophet) is stated succinctly: 'keep his commandments', 'listen to his voice', and 'cling to him' (13:4). All three (i.e., keeping, listening, and clinging) can only be understood in light of the prior revelation by means of the authenticated prophet Moses. Conversely with a false prophet, Israel should 'not listen to the words of that prophet' and 'purge the evil [one] from your midst' (13:3, 5). Again, the focus of Deuteronomy 13 appears to be toward returning Israel back to their devotion to YHWH. Any prophets must be tested in light of Israel's prior devotion to YHWH and her listening to his voice through Mosaic prophecy.

B. Deuteronomy 18: Future False Prophecies

The question presented by the above discussion is not whether we can demonstrate the special nature of prophetic authentication in Deuteronomy. Rather it is: Does the coherence of the Pentateuch's scheme of prophetic authentication follow with what we find in the historical narratives? This pursuit of coherence must begin in Deuteronomy 18, because there we find the promise of future prophets who

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Vasholz argues extensively for this point on Mosaic authentication: 'We will continue to develop the position that the rationale for accepting writings as authoritative, i.e., canonical, resides in the observation of contemporary eyewitnesses of some kind of manifestation of God's approval of the authors of scripture.' Robert I. Vasholz, *The Old Testament Canon in the Old Testament Church: The Internal Rationale for Old Testament Canonicity*, vol. 7. Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 20f.
will be authenticated.

As has been emphasized above, the shift from listening to my voice 'today' toward listening to 'these words and commandments' has been a noticeable trend in Deuteronomy. The tone is positive in nature, starting with the promise that YHWH will raise up a prophet and 'to him you shall listen' (18:15). YHWH promises to put his words in the prophet's mouth and warns against anyone who 'will not listen to my words that he shall speak in my name' (18:19). Then the special means of authentication are given in anticipation of the natural question: 'How may we know the word that YHWH has not spoken' (18:21).

Patrick Miller, alongside others, observes that the list of so-called 'abominable practices' that is immediately prior to this episode (18:9-14) enumerates practices that would have been commonly employed to discern the will of the gods. 'The list is long enough to indicate clearly that all the customary ways of discerning the divine will or plan by magic or divination are rejected.' But there is one way to discern the actual words of YHWH in a prophet's mouth: the foretelling of future events. The exact nature of this can only be seen in subsequent episodes. This type of foretelling might not be a punctiliar incident, but rather a pattern of special authentication.

Deuteronomy 18 emphasizes the words of the prophet, not the voice. Even more, this passage gives comfort and warning—comfort that YHWH will not forsake Israel regarding her prophets and warning that not every word from a prophet's mouth must necessarily be heeded just because they proceed prophetically. Recalling the prior discussion surrounding Moses' own authentication in Exodus, it is not a patent or perspicuous affair. Trust must be initially furnished to 'listen to the voice' of a prophet in order to see whether or not they have spoken presumptuously. Apparently, epistemological ventures inherently involve risk, even ventures of divine communication with special authentication.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Because Deuteronomy acts as the keystone for the remainder of the narratives in the Tanak (and possibly the New Testament), we have examined our thesis in light of its major features. We accomplished this by first appreciating the ways in which Deuteronomy shares unique connections to the primeval history of the Genesis narrative. Second, we scrutinized the varied and rhetorical use of 'listen' throughout the book. Third, we examined the points in this text where see, hear and know come

83 Miller, Deuteronomy, 151.
into a particular relationship as they did in Exodus. Fourth, we considered how the authentication of the future prophets is founded in Moses and in prior errors.

Moses is the only prophetic voice who has been authenticated to both the parents of the Israelites and now to the children. Even so, we also see the explicit concern for the future providence of prophets bound to Israel by YHWH, but discerned by Israel to be authentic. This is an embodied experience, because their lives and livelihood are at stake. It has been clarified that there are two opposing epistemological ends to this process. Enacting obedience to Moses brings fruitful expansion to Israel, but disobedience horrifically diminishes her livelihood. As in the garden, the sacrament of obedience is only fulfilled in choosing life and clinging to YHWH with the result of prospering in the land.
CHAPTER FIVE

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS IN MARK’S GOSPEL

I. INTRODUCTION

Having considered the possibility of an epistemological process spanning the Pentateuch, we now turn to Mark's Gospel. Of interest is whether or not this same epistemological purview continues in at least one Gospel narrative. From the outset of Mark, the story's dependence on the Hebrew canon is plain. The introductory words (1:1-3) are a skilled conflation of Exodus, Isaiah, and Malachi. As the narrative turns to the parabolic teaching of Jesus (Mark 4), the epistemological effect of that teaching is justified in terms of Isaiah 6:9-10. The Transfiguration, at the mid-point of the Gospel, resembles both the scene of Moses at Horeb and its retelling in Deuteronomy. Thus Joel Marcus estimates of Mark's Gospel: '[C]itations of and allusions to the Old Testament continually pop up ….'

Which OT texts are representative for Mark's narratival goals? More specifically, do the sections of the Pentateuch that we have previously examined 'pop up' in Mark. And if our texts are present in Mark's narrative, then how does the evangelist use these texts to portray epistemological process? At stake here is whether or not Mark is depicting the same epistemological process that we have observed in the Pentateuch to tell stories regarding knowing and error. Our suggestions will focus upon the two contrasted epistemological objectives set out in Mark 4-9: 1) seeing the mystery of the kingdom of God

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and 2) epistemological blindness which leads to hardness of heart. In the process, we are sensitive to the critique: 'the Old Testament pattern is squeezed into the shape of the gospel story.'

In Genesis, we could not offer a definite epistemological goal other than knowing YHWH in a garden community. But Genesis 3 clarified that avoiding error consists in listening to YHWH through the man's authoritative voice and participating in his guidance. In the exodus, Egypt came to know YHWH external to the covenant and Israel came to know YHWH in covenantal relationship as her God. Israel avoided error by listening to the authenticated voice of Moses and enacting his commandments. In Deuteronomy, the goal was described in Edenic terms of knowing fruitfulness and long life in the land promised to Abraham. Avoiding error became particularly important as Moses would not continue to guide them prophetically into Canaan. The Deuteronomic teaching focused then on the words commanded by Moses and bound future prophets and kings to what had been taught through Moses 'today'. Of interest to this thesis is that the Deuteronomic reflection appears to resemble garden themes and patterns concerning error.

Mark is a complex narrative with several arcs intertwined: messianic, prophetic, Christological, covenantal, Davidic kingdom and more. However, we will consider a narrower focus upon the epistemological goal of Jesus with respect to his disciples. Dewey's comment remains true for the current study, 'A scholar's outline of Mark tells us more about which aspect of the Gospel narrative is his or her focus than it does about Mark's structure.' Our thesis is that Jesus fits the same mode of prophetic authority as Moses and other authorities. It is difficult to consider Jesus as just a prophet. For even though the Transfiguration is an ultimate authentication of Jesus' prophetic voice, an echo of Deuteronomy 18 (i.e. 'Listen to him'), it is not merely authenticating Jesus as prophet. We will argue that Jesus must be established among his disciples as their prophetic voice in order for them to enact his teaching and see Jesus as the Messiah/Christ, the new covenant bearer, the final prophet, the son of David and more.

If this is correct, then we should find a priority placed upon the story of Jesus being authenticated as a prophet, even if Messianic arcs are intertwined in the narrative of prophetic authentication. Once established as prophet, avoiding an error of the first order, then we can evaluate the expected response to Jesus' prophecy that avoids second-order error: participatory indwelling in Jesus' teaching. Of course, 'authenticated prophet' and 'indwelled participation' are not Marcan terms.

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2 Bruce, *This is That*, 14.
4 Dewey, 'Interwoven Tapestry', 235.
but those that we have been using throughout to describe the appropriate response to the prophetic voice. In Mark, participation takes several forms, perhaps most clearly when the disciples are sent out and then they performed healing and exorcisms as they were taught to do (6:7-13).

In order to assess these criteria of Jesus as prophet and the expected response, we will focus on the epistemological process in the lives of Jesus' disciples (Mark 4-9). First, we will examine the general epistemological content of Mark 4-9 where it is continuous and where it is disparate in the patterns noticed thus far. Second, we will focus on the Gospel's use of epistemological description as we observed it in Deuteronomy. We will argue that Mark's citation of Isaiah 6:9-10 alone does not fully explain what is driving this narrative forward. This will require a robust exegetical defense of Deuteronomy as a major source of Marcan epistemology in chapters four to nine. The result of this is that Jesus seems to presume two epistemological ends in this process where the disciples are meant to receive hidden revelations (re Deut 29), but outsiders will be blinded by these same revelations (re Isa 6). We will argue for the authentication of Jesus' prophetic voice as having primacy, so that the disciples might enact his instructions in order to see the 'mysteries of the kingdom of God.' And ultimately, the disciples will need to see the crucifixion and resurrection in light of the kingdom of God motif.6

Third, we will look at how the disciples sometimes avoid error by listening to Jesus and responding to his commands. At other times, they commit errors of the first and second order, not acknowledging the prophet and not enacting his instruction, respectively. This intends to be minimally sufficient evidence to conclude that Mark appears to utilize the same epistemological process as the Pentateuch to demonstrate how error occurs in reference to Jesus' teaching as the prophetic voice of his disciples.

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5 There are those who question whether or not Wrede's analysis of Mark ultimately aids or obscures other narrative strategies that may intertwine with the 'Messianic Secret'. 'We must ask: Has Wrede's exposure of the Messianic Secret motif led to such a sharp focus on Jesus' identity that we have downplayed Jesus' intentional involvement of his disciples in the kingdom's inauguration?' Suzanne Watts Henderson, "Concerning the Loaves" Comprehending Incomprehension in Mark 6.45-52'. Journal for the Study of the New Testament. vol. 83 (2001): 25.

6 Whether one takes the view that the crucifixion is the climax of Mark or the minority view that the resurrection acts as the climax, we argue here that the disciples' ability to cohere these events into the kingdom of God purview is ultimately the end goal. For the crucifixion as climax, e.g. Bird, 'Crucifixion'. For the resurrection as climax, e.g. Hurtado, 'Climax of Mark'. Also, Knight proposes the dual climax of the Transfiguration and Resurrection: 'Metamorphosis'.
II. DISPARITY AND CONTINUITY WITH THE PENTATEUCH

The absence of the שמע קהל motif creates the most noticeable difference between the Pentateuch and the Synoptic Gospels. The closest pairing of 'א_cursor' and '+'&%( (cf. Gen 3:17 'ף_cursorט תף_cursorף') is in the Transfiguration accounts of the Synoptic Gospels where a 'voice' from above commands the disciples to 'listen' to Jesus. Otherwise stated, no א_cursorף %+Cursor motif exists in the Synoptic Gospels that corresponds to the שמע קהל motif in the Pentateuch. In its stead, we find the regular employment of the Deuteronomistic/Isaianic coupling of ears/hear, eyes/see, and heart/know. As was formerly highlighted, Deuteronomy succinctly states a précis of Israel's epistemological error: Israel has not seen (Deut 29:2-3 [MT 1-2]) because YHWH has not given her a heart to know, eyes to see, and ears to hear. In the Gospels, we find that Deuteronomy 29:4 [MT 29:3] and Isaiah's variant (6:9-10) become the prominent mode of talking about error.

Also in the Pentateuch, a robust utilization of seeing indicated forward movement in the epistemological process. Three instances are striking. In reference to the woman in the garden: 'When the woman looks again at the prohibited tree, seeing it with fresh eyes in the light of the serpent's words, all she can see is that everything about it looks desirable …?' Her seeing was indicative of her knowing. In the escape from Egypt, it was because Israel saw the bodies of the Egyptians in the Red Sea that they believed in Moses as their prophet (Exod 14:31). And in Deuteronomy, Moses calls the people to remember what they saw which caused them to listen to Moses only (Deut 4:35). But in Mark, the juxtaposition of seeing and hearing fades slightly. The two terms most often used in the LXX (βλέπω and ὀρῶ) are only employed sparsely in this Gospel. Despite this disparity, we have not gone astray from the thesis as we found it in the Pentateuch.

Continuous to the trend observed in the Pentateuch, the primary feature of epistemological process from Genesis 2 forward emerges over and again: the prophetic voice. Mark's Gospel places emphatic priority on listening to the authenticated prophet and participatory indwelling of his directions

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7 Moberly, Genesis, 80.
8 The other term for 'seeing' (βεβλω) is not used at all in the Septuagint and only a few times in Mark. It could be argued that Mark 3:11 and 5:15 could represent seeing as epistemological insight. However, neither episode is connected with error nor juxtaposed with hearing.
9 It is observed by some that the healing of the blind man at Bethsaida (8:22-26) is an analog to the disciples epistemological journey. But in that instance, 'seeing' does not appear to be directly employed in the same pattern as the Pentateuch. This will be explored further below. Also, Iverson has directed my attention to the possibility that the centurion's confession came only after he 'saw' (15:31). This may fit this construct of ' seeing' representing knowing.

in order to see what is being shown. It must be admitted that while 'seeing' is not as major a contributor to the epistemological process as previously observed in the Pentateuch, it does occur at moments of consequence. As well, the Deuteronomic notion of Edenic expansiveness and fruitfulness consequent to listening to the prophetic voice is discernibly inaugurated in the Parable of the Sower. We will contend that the basic aspects of knowing and error are still in play here in Mark's Gospel, even if the Deuteronomic variations on the Edenic themes are more prominent than direct connections to Genesis 2-3.

Finally, Mark's utilization of the Pentateuch both tends to be employed in matters of authentication and to make sense of Jesus' crucifixion as Messiah. To this, Horsley remarks:

That is, most of the references to the scripture [Tanak] in Mark have Jesus citing it over against the rulers and their scribal representatives who claim it as the authorization of their power and privilege over the people. Only in the passion narrative does Mark appeal to the general or particular authority of the scripture as explaining the events that were difficult to accept and understand, such as the betrayal, arrest, and crucifixion of Jesus and the desertion of the disciples.

The crucifixion is the ultimate aim of Jesus' epistemological goals for his disciples, turning it from difficult to accept and understand to part and parcel of the secrets of the kingdom of God.

III. TWO EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRAJECTORIES IN MARK

Mark's Gospel begins by connecting the ministry of John the Baptist to Isaianic prophecy. As Mark implies John the Baptist to be 'the voice of one crying in the wilderness', so the reader might expect other connections of the same ilk to be identified by the evangelist. Moving quickly from John the Baptist to Jesus' healing ministry in Galilee, a crowd amasses around Jesus as he calls his disciples and commissions the twelve as apostles (3:13-19). The narrative tempo is brisk, with Mark using the term 'immediately' (ἐκδοχαί) more densely than any other NT author. But the focus of the narrative takes a definitive shift when we arrive at Mark 4 and move onward to the Transfiguration. That shift is from Jesus' ministry in Galilee to an intentional concentration on the disciples themselves. At this point in chapter four we consider the two epistemological trajectories that Jesus sets out and the process by which he accomplishes those two trajectories. One path is Isaianic: epistemological deafening and

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11 We cannot contend for it here, but Fishbane argues that prophets of the Tanak regularly employed Deuteronomy as an entrée into the Pentateuch as a whole. Biblical Interpretation, 293-6.
13 'Εβδομάζει occurs 15 times in Mark 1-3 out of 58 occurrences total in Mark.
blinding. The other is Deuteronomic: the hidden becomes revealed.

If we premise our reading of Mark upon an Isaianic path alone, then pessimism concerning the disciples' epistemological progress develops quite naturally. For instance, Tolbert and Kelber take the view of an Isaianic background to both Mark 4:12 and 8:18, reflected in Tolbert's observation: 'the disciples never seem to understand Jesus' miracles …,' and 'the disciples cannot see who Jesus really is, hear what he teaches, or understand the way he must go.'\textsuperscript{14} Evidence of an Isaianic trajectory mounts as the story itself continues to beg the question of the disciples' epistemological progress. Outsiders do exhibit trust in Jesus and they are commended for it (e.g. the Syrophoncean woman, 7:24-30). In tragic contrast, the disciples appear to be lost, or worse, hardhearted, seeming to confirm Tolbert's diagnosis. Collins, in her conclusion to Mark 8, offers that the disciples' incomprehensibility is itself incomprehensible:

Despite their "being with him" (3:14), their "having the mystery of the kingdom" (4:11), their being given private instruction by Jesus (4:10-20; 7:17-23), their authority over unclean spirits (6:7, 13), their proclamation of the need for repentance (6:12), and their ability to heal the sick (6:13), the disciples do not yet understand who Jesus is or the significance of his mighty deeds.\textsuperscript{15}

The problem created by these two epistemological paths leaves the reader agnostic regarding the disciples. The disciples' trajectory is meant to end in knowledge of the secrets of the kingdom of God, but seemingly ends in obduracy. And yet, the outsiders for whom Jesus renders little concern appear to get the gist of his ministry, if not his identity. This causes Kermode to conclude there might be a problem with the provenance of the story itself: 'All this is very odd …. It gives rise to suggestions that Mark did not understand the parable, that its original sense was already lost ….\textsuperscript{16}' The narrative might even appear at cross purposes with itself. Generally, the scholarship has attempted reconciliation of these two trajectories or has viewed them them as evidence of source problems, something ultimately foreign to the theology of Mark's Gospel.\textsuperscript{17} Some believe that Mark 4 intentionally holds both goals in tension, but focusing on a particular people group. For Watts, Mark's use of Isaiah 6 is aimed at the Jewish leadership, not the 'Jewish people en toto.'\textsuperscript{18} Marcus surmises that it is the disciples

\textsuperscript{14} Mary Ann Tolbert, Sowing the Gospel: Mark's World in Literary-Historical Perspective (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1989), 176, 206; Werner H. Kelber, The Kingdom in Mark: A New Place and a New Time (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1974), 62.

\textsuperscript{15} Adela Yarbro Collins, Mark. Hermeneia, ed. Harold W. Attridge (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 2007), 388.


\textsuperscript{17} '(e.g. Schweizer, Weeden, Räisänen)'. Mary Ann Beavis, Mark's Audience: the literary and Social Setting of Mark 4.11-12. Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series 33 (Sheffield, UK: JSOT, 1989), 87.

who are the primary audience of Mark 4. He suggests that 'look' and 'hear' (4:12) form a hendiadys describing frustration where neither looking nor hearing yields understanding to outsiders. But for insiders like the disciples, there is also something like an apprehension that occurs in which brute looking and hearing alone cannot play a role. Looking and hearing must be guided by Jesus' prophetic voice.

Before continuing to build on Marcus' intuition, we suggest some important distinction. Marcus rightly notes the two epistemological trajectories, one revealed by God and the other obfuscated by Jesus' parabolic speech. However, this thesis contends that Mark draws upon two OT sources in order to evince that these two trajectories are not mutually exclusive; one may actually entail the other. Isaiah is the first source to which most interpreters turn due to its direct, although abbreviated, citation in Mark 4:12. But the second source, which has gone largely unexamined, is Deuteronomy 29. These two sources, Isaiah 6 and Deuteronomy 29, have exclusively similar material of which we will presume there are connections without taking a position on the primacy of one text's influence over the other. Moreover, they also differ greatly concerning the context in which they are stated. Deuteronomy 29 is part of the covenant renewal of Israel's youths who are on the cusp of going into Canaan. YHWH has promised a circumcision of Israelite hearts, which will enable a Shema-like life for them: the ability to listen to YHWH and see a life of plenitude (Deut 30:1-6). In contrast, Isaiah 6:9-10 derives from the prophet's call episode, which focuses upon the frustration of speaking prophetically to a blind and deaf audience. Indeed, Isaiah's prophecy itself might be the instrument of blinding and deafening the Israelites who hear him. These two sources have different epistemological goals which mirror the stated epistemological ends of Mark 4: one blinds and deafens while the other reveals. These parallel trajectories that mirror Deuteronomic and Isaianic routes rely upon metalepsis, where a citation/allusion is employed, but with the effect that characters in the story become part of the literature of the allusion. For example, one might implicate their need to get attention by saying, 'I need to be more of a squeaky wheel.' This draws upon the saying 'the squeaky wheel gets the oil (or grease)', but in a way in which the person speaking becomes part of the allusion employed. In Mark 4, the citation is clearly from Isaiah, but we must continue to query if Deuteronomy is being

21 Beale has suggested that Isa 6:9-10 plays a larger role in the motif of idolatry. But even then, the blindness and deafness of idols are ridiculed because they do not have prophetic ability. G.K. Beale, We Become What We Worship: A Biblical Theology of Idolatry (Nottingham, UK: Apollos, 2008), 36-63.
22 Hollander, Figure, 113f. ; Hays, Echoes, 20-34.
simultaneously drawn upon as metalepsis or metonymy?²³

We will argue that the Deuteronomic trajectory means to reveal hope that the disciples will indeed gain insight into the mysteries of the kingdom of God (4:11) by performing Jesus' prophetic instruction. It metaleptically places the disciples in a similar position as the Israelites at the covenant renewal (Deut 29). The Isaianic source then means to assuage hope for the Israelites to immediately see the kingdom of God. Israel as a whole is not excluded forever, but avoiding error is the central concern for the disciples, while it appears a secondhand matter with regard to those outside. In order to convincingly demonstrate the necessity for understanding these two sources in Mark, we must look more closely at the use of Isaiah and Deuteronomy in Mark 4-9.

A. Isaiah 6 in Mark 4

Mark first turns to the disciples most conspicuously in chapter four. Jesus commences his Parable of the Sower in Mark 4:3 with the imperative 'Listen.'²⁴ He closes the parable with 'He who has ears to hear, let him hear' (4:9).²⁵ Then his disciples questioned him about the meaning of the parable and Jesus counters with positive and negative epistemological goals seemingly based on Isaiah 6:

To you has been given the mystery of the kingdom of God, but for those outside everything is in parables, so that "they may indeed see but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not understand, lest they should turn and be forgiven. (4:11-12)

As Watts points out in a footnote on the connections between Isaiah 6:9-10 and Mark 4:12, "The literature here is immense ...."²⁶ One of the reasons for this immensity is that the citation of Isaiah 6:9-10 is a paraphrase of sorts. Isaiah 6:9-10 reads:²⁷

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²³ 'Metonymy' is the substitution of a word for the intended referent. For instance, '10 Downing Street' could metonymically refer to the governance of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
²⁴ Unless otherwise stated the words 'hear' and 'listen' will always reflect some form of the word 'ἐπιτίθημι'.
²⁵ Derrett confronts Debelius' assertion that, "'He who has ears to hear, let him hear', has practically no bibliography.' For Derrett, the bibliography is plainly Deuteronomy 29:4 [3]. J. Duncan M. Derrett, "'He Who Has Ears to Hear, Let Him Hear': (Mark 4:9 and parallels)". *Downside Review* vol. 119, no. 417 (2001): 255-68.
²⁶ He then lists the six major works on this connection alone. Watts, *INE*, 184 n.1.
²⁷ Note the chiastic structure of Isa 6:10a-f.
And He said, 'Go
and say to these people:
"Keep hearing, but do not understand;
Keep seeing, but do not know;"

A Make the heart of this people dull
B and their ears heavy
C and blind their eyes
C' lest they see with their eyes
B' and hear with their ears
A' and understand with their hearts
and turn and be healed.

But Mark 4:12 reads:

so that they may indeed see but not perceive,
and may indeed hear buy not understand,
lest they should turn and be forgiven.

First, we observe that Mark truncates Isaiah 6:9-10 to just three lines and uses them to summarize the whole passage. Mark both excises the chiasm containing epistemological organs (Isa 6:10a-f) and reverses the order of the first two lines (Isa 6:9c-d) in this unbound reproduction. In both Isaiah and now Mark, the context is clearly the same. Some people in Jesus' audience, as in the days of Isaiah, will not be able to see the kingdom of God because they will be blinded to it. Although the outsiders are not necessarily terminally blind and deaf, the text's gaze focuses on the disciples.

Second, the fact that the disciples 'have been given the mystery of the kingdom of God' is placed alongside the fact that others will be blind to this mystery. This means that a positive
epistemological goal inheres to Jesus' words which is 'the most vital truth of all'. But is this revealing contingent on their prior ability to hear Jesus as a prophet? Immediately after Jesus' explanation of the parable he continues with the 'lamp under a basket' illustration. The substance of the metaphor is that things hidden (κρυπτῇ) would some day be revealed (φανερῶ, 4:22). Closing out this section, Jesus repeats, 'If anyone has ears to hear, let him hear' (4:23). This is proceeded by the stern admonition, 'Pay attention (βλέπω) to what you hear (ἀκούω)' (4:24). The passage taken as a whole leads Gerhardsson to conclude, 'It could not be more powerfully asserted that the material [4:1-24] is concerned with hearing and hearing in the right way.' We will take up the reason as to why Mark 4 is more concerned with hearing than seeing below.

There is also a negative response to Jesus which typifies the Isaianic prophecy. Jesus' rejection at Nazareth implies that some Nazarenes listened to him in amazement, but others rejected him, but only after hearing him (6:1-6). As well, his instruction to the apostles as he sent them out with authority presumes that there may be people who will not listen to them (6:7-12). Despite these negative reactions, Mark generally supports a positive reception of Jesus primarily because people listened to him. Jesus calls his disciples 'to listen' (4:23; 7:14; 8:18). And God himself commands the disciples 'to listen', not 'to see' in the Transfiguration account. Kee remarks of the call to listen at the Transfiguration:

From it ['listen to him', 9:7] one can only conclude that Mark wants to present Jesus as the eschatological prophet whose coming Moses had announced. If Jesus is a second Moses for Mark, it is not as giver of the New Law but as fulfiller of the promise of the Prophet.

Jesus' concern to be heard, in and of itself, creates tension with the view that Isaiah 6:9-10 is the exclusive source of Marcan epistemology. Isaiah 6:9-10 leaves us with no immediate hope that the epistemological process will lead to knowledge of the kingdom of God (4:11; 9:1). In Mark 4-9, Jesus expectantly calls the Jewish people to listen to him and listen to his disciples (6:11). If Jesus' teaching

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32 Marcus, 'Marcan Epistemology', 558.
34 We will not argue how the prophetic message either blinds or deafens, only that this call of Isaiah is negatively oriented in its epistemology. In favor of reading Isaiah 6 qua habitual sin as the means of blinding: Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, vol. II, 432. In favor of YHWH as the agent of blinding: Gerhard von Rad, The Message of the Prophet. trans. D. M. G. Stalker (London, UK: S.C.M., 1968), 122-6; For a summary of how Isaiah 6 is viewed in light of Isaiah’s formation, see: Rolf Rendtorff, Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology. Overtures to Biblical Theology (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Fortress, 1993), 171-80.
in Mark 4 only refers to Isaiah 6, then no recourse exists to explain accounts of outsiders who are not deaf and blind to the kingdom of God, but listen and therefore see. Even worse, we are left with disciples, the men who are meant to see the mystery of the kingdom of God, who do not enact Jesus' instruction and become hardhearted.

B. Deuteronomy 29 in Mark's Gospel

The scarcity of material exploring the Deuteronomic links to Mark's Gospel is perplexing for three reasons. First, the lexical connections between Deuteronomy and Isaiah warrant an explanation. The only two passages in the entire Tanak that have the heart, eyes, and ears in a tripartite arrangement are Deuteronomy 29:4 (MT 29:3) and Isaiah 6:9-10. This fact alone merits further investigation beyond the Isaianic quotes in the Gospels.

Second, a Deuteronomic source in conjunction with Isaiah more simply explains Mark's use of the Tanak material. We are not contesting Mark's citation of Isaiah 6:9-10 in 4:12. But as we arrive to the climax of the disciples' epistemological process in 8:17-18, the source is often presumed to be a conflation of Isaiah 6 and/or Jeremiah 5:21 and Ezekiel 12:12. These other texts could be the intended allusions, but we will offer reasons to believe that Deuteronomy 29 is a more reasonable primary source, even if the others figure in as secondary allusions.

Third, as we have seen above, the narrative itself begs explanation as Isaiah alone does not explain Marcan epistemology. The Marcan material places a priority on hearing that is not explained in terms of Isaiah 6. 'Blind their eyes' makes the center of the chiasm in Isaiah 6:10, and Mark 4:12 even alters the citation of Isaiah 6:9 to begin with 'see but not perceive'. In a passage of continuous calls to listen (Mark 4-9), Isaiah's focus on seeing/blinding does not explain the totality of Mark's rhetorical focus on listening. Because of this disparity, we are forced to explain the lexical and thematic connections between Deuteronomy 29 and Mark 4-9 in full.

Finally, we must situate the Deuteronomic material as metalepses within Mark. We must briefly observe that these references function beyond allusion and call the reader to situate the disciples

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upon one trajectory and the outsiders upon another path.

1. Covenant Renewal and Deuteronomy 29

Before looking at Mark's use of Deuteronomy, we will briefly revisit the passage in question. Deuteronomy 29 is the beginning of the covenant renewal between YHWH and the children of the Israelites out of Egypt. The section begins with Moses saying to the young Israelites, 'You have seen,' the work of YHWH in your favor (Deut 29:2 [MT 29:1]). The narrator sharpens the focus of Israel's seeing with: 'the great trials that your eyes saw; the signs, and those great wonders' (Deut 29:3 [MT 29:2]). And Moses concludes that Israel has not caught the gist of what was shown to them because YHWH has not given them a 'heart to know or eyes to see or ears to hear' (Deut 29:4 [MT 29:3]).

Chapter 29 then commences a retelling of how the Israelites came from Egypt to their present situation (29:5-28 [MT 29:4-27]), including the judgment of other nations along their way. But the very last phrase is one verging on hope: 'The secret things belong to YHWH our God, but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law' (29:29 [28]). Secrets things inaccessible to humanity remain with their God. We cannot miss the fact that there is also revelation, things not previously known have now been made known. Barth does not want the reader to miss the point: 'The fact that it is expressed and revealed in this first sequence only in a way which is muffled and restrained and provisional is obvious enough. But so, too, is the fact that it is actually expressed and revealed.' Moving into chapter 30, Moses continues to speak of their future. If Israel will 'listen to his voice in all I command you today' (30:2), then good things will come to her. Those good things are described in terms of fruitfulness of the land, fruitfulness of their farming, and fruitfulness of their wombs (30:9). The promise that YHWH will circumcise their hearts (30:6) precedes Israel's ability to 'listen to the voice of YHWH' (30:8, 10).

Deuteronomy 29-30 essentially describes how Israel spent 40 years wandering and how YHWH was going to bring them into the land promised, which required listening to the voice of the prophet Moses. It is fundamentally hopeful in its tone, even while admitting the sober reality of Israel's past and potential errors.

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39 Deut 29:1 in the MT and LXX begins at 29:2 in the English versions.
40 Barth, CD, IV/2, 137.
2. Deuteronomy in Mark 4

We have already mentioned the evidence of contact between Deuteronomy 29:4 [3] and Isaiah 6:9-10. We cannot argue the nature of that contact other than to note its uniqueness. But in addition to this association, three connections couple Deuteronomy 29 directly to Mark 4:

1) the unique use of 'hidden' (κρυπτός) and 'revealed' (φανερός) in both texts;
2) the result of fruitfulness is linked to listening to the prophet; and
3) the use of the phrase 'ears to hear' (ἀυτὰ ἀκούειν).

First, the turning point in Deuteronomy 29 is that last sentence which contains an aphorism about what is hidden (κρυπτός) and what is revealed (φανερός). These two terms, κρυπτός and φανερός, are a unique coupling in both the Tanak and the NT. They only appear together on one occasion in the Tanak: Deuteronomy 29:29 [MT 29:28]. In the Gospels, they only appear once each in Mark, Luke and John where Mark 4:22 and Luke 8:17 are parallels. If this is an allusion, it does not appear that Mark could have been referring to any other texts in the Tanak besides Deuteronomy 29:29 [MT 29:28] by juxtaposing κρυπτός and φανερός. This unique contrast in Mark finds its only counterpart in its Lucan parallel and in Deuteronomy 29.

Second, the themes of listening with the consequence of fruitfulness in Mark 4 are Deuteronomic as well. In between the citation of Isaiah 6:9-10 (4:12) and the unique allusion to Deuteronomy 29:29 [28] (4:22), Jesus' explanation of the Parable of the Sower demonstrates those who genuinely understand the kingdom of God through 'listening'. They are likened to good soil and fruitfulness signals of their ability to hear (Mark 4:1-10, 13-20). We argued for this

41 'These three terms do not form a perfect triplet as in Deuteronomy 29:4 or Isaiah 6:9-10, but they do provide a near parallel.' Grisanti, 'Was Israel Unable', 176-196; See also J. Ross Wagner, Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul in Concert in the Letter to the Romans (Leiden, UK: Brill, 2003), 243-45.
42 The nearest approximation is found in Daniel 2:47 where εἴκασεν and κρυπτα are in a similar relationship which could be suggestive lexically of Wright's proposal concerning the relationship between 'the vision' of Daniel 2 and 'the kingdom' of Mark 4. Wright, JVOG, 230-232. Although, there is some word play going on in this verse where the king 'answers' (εἴκασεν) that God is a ' revealer' (εἴκασεν) of mysteries. The only occurrences of εἴκ + φαίνω (3 in total) are in Daniel. And other than Daniel 2:47, κρυπτα and φανερο do not occur within 20 verses of each other in the LXX.
43 All instances in noun or verb form: Mark 4:22; Luke 8:17; John 7:4; Rom 2:29; 1 Cor. 4:5; 14:25; Col 3:3.
44 It is unfortunate that both unique links cited here between Mark 4 and Deut 29 go unnoticed in Schneck's examination. Isaiah, 128-30.
45 For comprehensiveness we should report that μυστήριον and φανερός are never contrasted in either the Gospels or LXX. Paul employs a conceptual paring of μυστήριον and φανερός in his epistles: Rom 16:25; Col 1:26 and 4:3.
46 While Evans himself approvingly cites the arguments of Cave and Gerhardsson who are seeing Deuteronomic trends in the Parable of the Sower (Mark 4:1-9), he does not make the connection and only sees Isa 6 as the background for the parable. Ironically, he cites as evidence a key theme of Deuteronomy that we have already highlighted: 'to bear fruit in abundance'. Craig A. Evans, 'On the Isaianic Background of the Sower Parable.' Catholic Biblical Quarterly vol. 47 (1985): 464-8.
same conceptual strategy in the rhetoric of the first and last sections of Deuteronomy, chapters 1-11 and 28-30 respectively. Those who listened diligently to Moses' commands and performed them would see the land in its fruitfulness (Deut 4, 11, 29-30). So Gerhardsson claims this parable as parsimonious support for the Deuteronomic relationship to Mark 4 between listening which leads to fruitfulness. Although Marcus connects this parable to both fruitfulness and its opposite in the post-Fall garden narrative (Genesis 3:17-18), he has not always noticed that it is also a Deuteronomic trend as well.

Third, there is another unique phrase in Mark 4 that traces to Deuteronomy: 'ears to hear' (ὑτα ἀκούειν). After the explanation of the parable (4:13-20), Jesus goes on to give an illustration concerning the revelation the disciples will receive. In this illustration, he uses a noticeably unique formulation from Deuteronomy. Here are the two lines from Deuteronomy 29 that correspond to Mark 4:22-23:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deuteronomy 29:29, 4 [28, 3; LXX]</th>
<th>Mark 4:22-23</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 τὰ κρυπτὰ κυρίων τὸ θεὸν ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ φανερὰ ἡμῖν</td>
<td>22 οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν κρυπτὸν ἔαν μὴ ἴνα φανερωθῇ, () οὔυδε ἐγένετο ἀπόκρυφον ἀλλ' ἴνα ἔλθῃ εἰς φανερόν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ... ὑτα ἀκούειν ...</td>
<td>23 εἴ τις ἔχει ὑτα ἀκούειν ἀκούσετο.</td>
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In the span of two sentences (4:22-23), Mark employs two distinct phrases found only in Deuteronomy 29: the juxtaposition of κρυπτὸς/φανερός and ὑτα ἀκούειν. The phrase ὑτα ἀκούειν may seem too insignificant to identify this as Deuteronomic, but there are broader reasons for its strength as evidence. Paul uses this phrase, ὑτα ἀκούειν, from Deuteronomy 29 and there is evidence that Paul and

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47 Cf. κρυπτὸς in the LXX of Deut 7:12-13 and 11:17 for instances of 'fruitfulness' as a positive consequence of listening in the former and the negative outcome of not listening in the latter. Also, Deut 11:9-11 makes the analogy of the 'seed of Egypt' being the hard soil, while sowing seed in Promised Land would be easy. And, Deut 28:38 captures Israel's folly in agricultural metaphor saying that they sowed much seed, but reap little specifically because they did not listen to Moses. Heil observes that fruitfulness of seed goes further, 'Both G. Lohfink … and L. Ramaroson …, independently of one another, have pointed out the importance and the scriptural background of the metaphor of the "seed" as representative of the "people" destined for the eschatological kingdom of God.' John Paul Heil, 'Reader-Response and the Narrative Context of the Parables about Growing Seed in Mark 4:1-34'. Catholic Biblical Quarterly vol. 54, no. 2 (1992): 271-286.


49 Joel Marcus, Mark 1-8. The Anchor Yale Bible (London, UK: Yale University, 2009), 295.

50 The only other place in the Tanak where ὑτα ἀκούειν is found is Isaiah 32:3 and Ezekiel 12:12. Neither is identical in form to Deut 29:3 and Mark 4:23. This does not exclude them as being allusions, but we are arguing that Deuteronomy is the more parsimonious source of Mark here.
Mark may share similar sources. But even if a connection between Paul and Mark is tenuous, scholarship generally regards Paul's use of ὀτα ἄκοψειν as a principle reason to affirm Romans 11:8 as a citation of Deuteronomy 29. Also noting the Pauline use in Romans 11:8, Derrett argues that the ὀτα ἄκοψειν phrase in Mark 4:23 has only one parallel, found in Deuteronomy 29:3 [4]. If this phrase creates a reasonable tie from Romans 11:8 to Deuteronomy 29, then it can serve in the same capacity with regards to Mark 4:23.

The above three linkages create reasons to infer Deuteronomy 29 as another unique source of Mark 4-9 in conjunction with Isaiah 6. But more generally than these three, others have seen Deuteronomy as a background to Mark 4 for the thematic reasons given above. Gerhardsson believes that the Sower parable and its explanation (4:1-9; 13-20) rely upon the rhetoric of Deuteronomy's call to hear in the Shema (Deut 6:4). Marcus narrows Gerhardsson's thesis into his own, evincing a specifically Deuteronomic context for Mark 4:23:

Gerhardsson is right about the relevance of the Shema for understanding Mark 4; Mark's audience could not have heard the repeated references to hearing in that passage without being reminded of the Shema. … Rather, at least in Mark's understanding, the parable is addressed only to 'him who has ears to hear,—let him hear.'

Unfortunately, Marcus leaves off other possible Deuteronomic connections that would explain the very phrase he cites as Mark's narrower use of the Shema, such as ὀτα ἄκοψειν.

In short, the truncated version of Isaiah 6:9-10 in Mark 4:12 first appears as a simple citation. But the explanation of the Parable of the Sower that follows it employs unique citations of Deuteronomy 29 as well. This suggests to the reader that there may be something besides Isaiah in the background of this discourse.

We are not seeking to prove definitively that Mark's epistemological process derives exclusively from Deuteronomy. Rather, we have attempted to demonstrate that Mark 4 has both distinct lexical and conceptual ties that are irresistibly Deuteronomic. Further, these connections actually fill in the enigmatic void of the disciple narratives that ensue the discourse of Mark 4. The use of Isaiah 6:9-10

53 'We are grateful since we can be confident that this verse [Deut 29:3] is the root of our saying [Mark 4:23].' Derrett 'He Who Has Ears', 260.
55 Marcus later corrects this omission in his Anchor Bible Commentary. Marcus, Mark 1-8, 513.
alone does not explain either the the hope for the disciples to see or Jesus' frustration with their incomprehensibility. The juxtaposition of Deuteronomy 29 and Isaiah 6 as two epistemological goals does make sense of the narrative. For the disciples, the evangelist hopes for seeing sooner rather than later with the objective that they see the kingdom of God in its fruitfulness. For everyone else, the hope defers to some indefinite time in the future.

If Deuteronomy looms anywhere in the background of this section in Mark and the disciples are expected to see what Jesus shows them by participating in his teaching, then at the very least, the narrative is begging clarification regarding the disciples' epistemological process. Further, we must consider the implications that Isaiah 6:9-10 may not be the dominant paradigm for understanding the epistemological process of Mark 4-9. If these Deuteronomic connections are intended, then covenant renewal and the hope of knowing through listening to the authenticated prophet is paradigmatic for the disciples.

If the above is correct, then we should expect the disciples to struggle at two points with Jesus' epistemological process: 1) believing him to be the prophetic voice to which the disciples must listen and 2) enacting Jesus' teaching in order to see that which is being shown to them. Indeed, we encounter these twin struggles as we progress toward the Transfiguration.

3. Deuteronomy in Mark 8

Toward the end of this section in Mark 4-9, we find the other passage of Deuteronomic significance. Mark 8:17-18 is a climax of sorts where Jesus appears to feel thwarted by the disciples' inability to see what he is showing them. They do not grasp the feeding of the thousands, they do not comprehend his parables, even though they were the very people who were specifically meant to understand. Now he confronts his disciples with their concern over lost bread and the need for food (8:17-18):

And Jesus, aware of this, said to them, "Why are you discussing the fact that you have no bread? Do you not yet perceive or understand? Are your hearts hardened? Having eyes do you not see, and having ears do you not hear? And do you not remember?"

Mary Ann Beavis argues strongly against the 'majority opinion' that 8:17-18 is a 'redactional composition' of Ezekiel 12:12 and Jeremiah 5:21. She favors a single source of Isaiah 6:9-10

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56 Gerhardsson, 'The Parable', 188.
57 Contra Thompson who reads Mark as a fundamentally negative ground where Jesus is the positive figure. Mary R. Thompson, The Role of Disbelief in Mark: A New Approach to the Second Gospel (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1989), 33-59.
instead. She concludes:

Mk 8:18 should thus be regarded not merely as 'OT language' used by Jesus to rebuke the disciples, but as a deliberate Marcan allusion to Isa. 6:10a, in accordance with the larger Marcan theme of the fulfillment of the prophecies of Isaiah ….

We do not disagree with the sentiment of Beavis’ expression, that Isaiah 6:9-10 has some resonance to Mark 8:18, but its lack of inter-textual depth yields room to argue for a Deuteronomic source here as well. The fact that she, like others, makes no mention of the connection between Deuteronomy 29:4 [MT 29:3] and Isaiah 6:9-10 creates a difficulty in asserting Isaiah as the definitive source here in Mark 8 without excluding other reasonable sources. If we can allow Beavis’ comments to act as representative for other treatments of Mark 8:17-18 that are silent about Deuteronomy 29, then we can show why Deuteronomy is the preferred background, not Isaiah, Jeremiah, or Ezekiel.

We will discuss the narrative below, but now we want to make the case that Mark's epistemological process for the disciples stems from Deuteronomy. The primary reasons for claiming this source regarding Mark 8:17-18 are:

1) the order of the elements cited are unique to Deuteronomy, not Isaiah;
2) the appearance of the helping verb 'have' (ἔχω) more closely resembles the form of Deuteronomy 29, not Isaiah 6;
3) Mark 8:17 pairs συνήσσω and νοεώ, not συνήσσω and εἶδος; and
4) the final line of 8:18 draws upon a Deuteronomic theme of 'remembering'.

Let us consider the order of the epistemological organs of Mark 8:17-18 in light of Deuteronomy 29:4 [3]:

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<tr>
<td>καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκεν κύριος ὁ θεὸς ύμῖν καρδίαν εἰδέναι καὶ ὁφθαλμοὺς βλέπειν καὶ ὃτα ἀκούειν ἔως τῆς ἕμερας ταύτης.</td>
<td>καὶ γνοὺς λέγει αὐτοῖς· τί διαλογίζεσθε ὃτι ἄρτος οὐκ ἔχετε; οὔπω νοεῖτε οὐδὲ συνίετε; πεπωρωμένην ἔχετε τὴν καρδίαν ύμῶν; ὁφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες οὐ βλέπετε καὶ ὃτα ἔχοντες οὐκ ἀκούετε; καὶ οὐ μνημονεύετε,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heart/hardened eyes/see ears/hear</td>
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59 Beavis, *Mark’s Audience*, 110.
First, the order of heart, eyes/see, ears/hear does not match Isaiah 6:9-10, even when the order is rearranged by Mark (i.e. 4:12). There are only two passages in the entirety of the Tanak and the NT where this particular order of heart, eyes, and ears occurs: Deuteronomy 29:4 [MT 29:3] and Mark 8:17-18. More than the order, the English translations often obscure the flow of verbs because of verse division. Richard Schneck provides the most critical opposition of a Deuteronomic source for Mark 8:17-18. Schneck's agreement with Suhl and against Myers that 'Verse 18 is really an unnecessary (eigentlich unnötige) addition to the previous verse,' displays part of the problem with Schneck's assessment. The verse division itself is unnecessary and the passage should be viewed as continuous unless reasons are sufficient to split it apart.

Second and consequent to the verse division, we might consider the King James translation as one that enables reading of the Greek form (8:17-18):

| 17 a | καὶ γνώσει ἀντίς- | And when Jesus knew it, he saith unto them, |
| 17 b | τι διασέχεσθε ὅτι ἄρτους οὐκ ἔχετε; | Why reason ye, because ye have no bread? |
| 17 c | οὕτω νοεῖτε οὐδὲ συνίετε; | perceive ye not yet, neither understand? |
| 17 d | πεπωρωμένην ἔχετε τὴν καρδίαν ύμῶν; | Have ye your heart yet hardened? |
| 17 e | ὅφθαλμοις ἔχοντες οὐ βλέπετε | Having eyes, see ye not? and |
| 18 a | καὶ ὅτα ἔχοντες οὐκ ἀκούετε; | having ears, hear ye not? |
| 18 b | καὶ οὐ μηνιμνεύετε, | and do ye not remember? |

When we remove the verse divisions and merely observe the form, the three elements (heart, eyes, ears) are punctuated by the verb 'to have' (ἔχω). Jesus' comments can then be divided in two: questions about the disciples' reasoning (17a-c) and questions about their anthropology (17d-18c).

Third, it is also striking that 'perceive' (νοεῖτε) and 'understand' (συνίετε) are paired in 8:17c, as this resembles Isaiah's pairing of 'perceive' and 'understand' (Isaiah 6:9). But this is not Isaianic either, as Isaiah 6:9 pairs συνίημι and εἶδος to parallel hearing and seeing respectively, not συνίημι and νοέω. This unique arrangement of heart, eyes, and ears only parallels Deuteronomy 29:4 [MT 29:3] and bears no necessary connection to Isaiah 6:9-10. At the heart of these interpretations, perhaps the tendency to see Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel derives from the same fount: picturing the disciples as the obtuse

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61 Neither survey of the use of Deuteronomy or Isaiah in NT citations observes a Deuteronomic or Isaianic source for Mark 8:17-18, even though both texts share the same editors. This silence leaves us to believe that they prefer the Jer 5:21/Ezek 12:12 conflation. Hooker, 'Isaiah in Mark's Gospel'; Steve Moyise, 'Deuteronomy in Mark's Gospel'.

62 Schneck, Isaiah, 217.

referents of the Isaiah 6 citation from Mark 4:12. If a Deuteronomic trajectory functions in Mark 4-9 as well, then no inherent lexical or theological reason exists as to why Deuteronomy could not function as the OT source for Jesus' chastisement of his disciples. Because Jesus' goal aims at the disciples seeing the mysteries of the kingdom of God and an implicit hope for them to see arises out of the Deuteronomic trajectory, Jesus can expect his disciples to see, even if their epistemological organs are not yet attuned to the task.

Fourth, not only does Jesus' upbraid mirror Deuteronomic anthropology (i.e. heart, eyes, ears), but Jesus' admonition ends with, 'do you not remember (8:18c)?' The root word 'remember' ( Mnemon ) is used only once here in all of Mark's Gospel and once in its parallel in Matthew 16:9.64 Ched Myers believes this last appeal to remember clinches the argument for, 'an unmistakable allusion to Moses' interrogation of his people in Deuteronomy 29:2-4.' He continues, 'Significantly, the Deuteronomic theme of "remembrance" … also appears here in 8:19 [sic], "Do you not remember …?"65 This call to remember strongly connotes the things YHWH has done for Israel where 12 out of 14 of its occurrences in Deuteronomy are to remember YHWH's faithfulness and the remaining two are meant to remember how Israel provoked God in the wilderness.66

Finally, Jesus closes his chastisement of the disciples with 'Do you not understand?' This gives the impression that the disciples fall into the Isaianic epistemological path of outsiders who 'may hear but not understand' (Mark 4:12, 13). Again, 'understanding' is parallel to 'hearing' in Isaiah 6:9. So asking this might be equivalent to asking 'Are you not listening to me,' or 'Are you an outsider?' No problem is created by asserting the use of the Isaianic trajectory to provoke the reader's understanding of the disciples. But this scene raises a serious question as to why Jesus appears to lack full authentication amongst his disciples. Are they not listening to his voice as their prophetic guide? This disjunct between the disciples' understanding and whether they are acknowledging Jesus' authentication is problematic. But, positing Jesus' apparent lack of authentication among his disciples helps to explain the next several episodes that deal specifically with his identity as a Messianic prophet where his role is confessed, rebuked, and then ultimately substantiated in the Transfiguration.

There is one notable objection we must face before proceeding. Schneck has argued against Myers' claim that Deuteronomy is the source of 8:17-8 for three reasons: 1) the literary genre of the two

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64 It is also used only once in Luke in Jesus' eschatological discourse, 'Remember Lot's wife' (17:32).
passages does not correspond, 2) the context does not correspond, and 3) the language does not correspond. The first two objections are specific to Myers' reading and do not affect our position. We are only claiming that Jesus' words in Mark 8:17d-18 correspond to the epistemological process as it is described throughout Deuteronomy and especially where the covenant renewal condenses the concepts and language of knowing and error (Deut 29-30).

However, Schneck's third objection concerning the problem of language similarity is at odds with our argument. Although Schneck deems this objection to be 'the most serious', it is actually the weakest of his three objections. Basically, he argues that Deuteronomy 29:4 [MT 29:3] excuses Israel from her prior blindness. Israel was blind, per Schneck, because they had not been given the requisite faculties of a heart, eyes, and ears. The disciples on the other hand, already 'have' a heart, eyes, and ears. Without explanation, Schneck prefers to interpret נֶחְזָק (Deut 29:4 [MT 29:3]) as a pluperfect ('had not given') instead of a perfect ('gave'). He believes this translation offers contrasting evidence to the disciples who already 'have the internal and external organs for sensing'. Nevertheless, the previous Deuteronomistic allusions in Mark 4 go unnoticed by Schneck.

While his strongest argument intends to be lexical, in fact, it turns on a supposition that the disciples already possessed the capacity to see what Jesus was showing them. This is a presumption we do not necessarily share with Schneck. The text of Mark yields no explicit clues to help us determine whether or not Schneck's argument holds up regarding the disciples' 'epistemological organs' in Mark 8. But even if they have the requisite 'eyes to see', there is a developing view that their reticence to enact Jesus' teaching may go deeper than dullness. The disciples' obduracy might equally have roots in their resistance to a Gentile Mission which obfuscates their view of the 'secret of the kingdom of God'. Further, Schneck's objection concerning the Deuteronomistic context strengthens our argument as Deuteronomy 29 shows Israel on the cusp of a circumcised heart by which YHWH means to remedy

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67 Schneck, Isaiah, 223-7.
68 First, Myers argues that Moses and Jesus are interrogating Israel and Schneck views Deuteronomy 29 as 'historical prologue', not interrogation. Second, Myers argues that both Moses and Jesus are 'exasperated' by their followers. Schneck finds this hard to defend in the case of Deuteronomy. But we are not arguing either of these points.
69 Ironically, he notes the form which is structured with 'have' (אָנוּ), the structure that enables us to read the three terms (heart, eyes, ears) in uniquely Deuteronomistic terms. Schneck, Isaiah, 226.
70 Schneck, Isaiah, 226.
their deafness and blindness. Similarly in Mark, the covenant renewal and the Deuteronomic thrust concerning the disciples' incomprehension 'suggests the possibility of new beginning.'

It could be argued that this is precisely what we find in 8:17-18. This would be more convincing if we considered the two-stage healing at Bethsaida as a paradigm for the inauguration of the disciples' understanding (8:22-26). The disciples are on the cusp of seeing, even if not perfectly:

The two-stage healing of the blind man (8.22-26) symbolizes the possibility for the restoration of the disciples' vision. They are no longer blind as Peter's confession makes clear but neither do they have full sight. … The two-stage healing of the blind man suggests that the movement from blindness to sight, from misunderstanding to understanding, is possible, but the disciples must await a second restorative touch that brings clarity of vision.

This blindness/sight trope (8:22 – 10:52) adjourns with another healing of blindness (10:46-52). This second healing of the blind is precipitated by a sign of obtuseness in the request from James and John (10:35-45). Focusing on the disciples' ability to see, we observe the two stage healing at Bethsaida (8:22-26) followed by the hollow confession of Peter (8:27-30). Following the Transfiguration, we observe a blind request for power ensuing Jesus' question to James and John, 'What do you want me to do for you (10:36)?' Then Jesus responds to Blind Bartimaeus with the identical question: 'What do you want me to do for you (10:51)?'

In short, sight qua understanding is a faculty being developed in the disciples despite their resistance. But it is their responsibility to acknowledge Jesus as their prophet by enacting his instruction in order to see what he is showing them. Their incomprehensibility is mitigated by either their failure to listen or their failure to participate. Interestingly, the Transfiguration hones in on the former. For the above reasons, we do not find Schneck's critique persuasive.

Returning to Mark 8, Jesus' final question itself is pessimistic regarding the disciples' epistemological quest: 'Do you not yet understand?' But, we have suggested that the disciples' epistemological trajectory is Deuteronomic, and if so, then this question must be read as hopeful. In his commentary, Marcus is one of the few to recognize the significance of a Deuteronomic background in Mark 8 for the epistemological process described in the narrative. Since he is making a broad argument about which we have argued specifically here, we quote him at length:

This typology suggests an ultimately encouraging view of the disciples. As Myers (Binding,

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72 MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 138.
74 Iverson, Gentiles, 121.
75 Thanks to Kelly Iverson for pointing out this parallel to me.
225) points out, Jesus' queries in 8:17-18 echo not only the passages from Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel referred to above, but also Moses' words to Israel in Deut 29:2-4 LXX, which connect with the previous Markan passage as well. If Mark is making a deliberate allusion to these passages in Deuteronomy—and the prominence of the Pentateuchal Passover/exodus/wilderness traditions in this section of the Gospel makes such an allusion more likely—then the prospect for the disciples is more hopeful than exegetes such as Kelber and Tolbert allow: "to this day" they have not been granted perceptive hearts, eyes, and ears, but they will in the end receive them (cf. Deut 30:1-8). Jesus' concluding words to the disciples in our passage, "Do you not yet understand?," which repeat the question of 8:17, suggest a similarly hopeful message.\textsuperscript{76}

What we have offered here goes slightly beyond what Marcus argues above. We are contending that an allusion to Deuteronomy is metaleptic and therefore 'entails the recovery of the transumed material.'\textsuperscript{77} Beyond dual epistemological ends in Mark 4, disciples versus outsiders, the epistemological process for the disciples draws upon covenant renewal (Deut 29), the 'transumed material' of the metalepsis. Earlier, we argued that these descriptions of error in Deuteronomy were ultimately retelling Israel's story in garden language. For insiders of Mark's Gospel, this process ends in knowing the mystery of the kingdom of God that is pictured as Edenic and Deuteronomic, as soil abounding in fruitfulness.\textsuperscript{78} But for outsiders, the obdurate epistemological process is drawn from Isaiah 6, from their exile and frustration.

\textbf{IV. THE DISCIPLES' STRUGGLE TO SEE THE PASSION}

In this final section we want to demonstrate that, before anything else, Jesus must be authenticated to the disciples as their authoritative and fiducially-bound prophetic voice, a revealer of the hidden 'secret of the kingdom of God'. In this role as authenticated prophet Jesus can expect the disciples to perform his commands in order to see the 'mystery of the kingdom of God' being shown to them. We have chosen this section of Mark because it is a closed pericope with a story line concerning the disciples' epistemological process. A specific goal of the process is stated up front (4:11), even if we can only offer a vague notion here: knowing something about the mysteries of the kingdom of God. But room for error exists as well, of which the disciples take advantage on more than one occasion.

In surveying Mark 4-9, several people and groups in the narrative commit the first-order of error in failing to recognize the authentication of Jesus as prophet. The second order of error is commissioned when his own disciples recognize Jesus' authority, but fail to enact his instructions and cannot therefore see what Jesus is showing them. In the end, we will argue that the Transfiguration

\textsuperscript{76} Marcus, \textit{Mark 1-8}, 513.

\textsuperscript{77} Hollander, \textit{Echo}, 115.

\textsuperscript{78} For the Deuteronomic significance of the Sower parable, see Gerhardsson, 'The Parable'.
rounds out the epistemological process at this stage of the narrative and serves as the definitive moment of authentication in Pentateuchal pictures and language. This prepares them for the ultimate goal of seeing the crucifixion, namely making sense of the death of Jesus.

Put simply, Mark's Gospel portrays avoiding error as listening to Jesus and participating in his instructions. Error is depicted as failing to participate with the consequence of a hardened heart. Now we must look at exactly how Mark's Gospel develops an epistemological process that will guide the disciples around error.

A. Disciples Must 'Listen' to Jesus Qua Prophet

The question is clearly not, "Does this man fit the model of our expectations?" Nor is it, "Is prophecy alive again in this man?" Rather, the question is, "Since this fellow [Jesus] is obviously a prophet, what sort of prophet or which one is he?"  

Despite the plain Christological and covenantal tropes that persist in these narratives, Jesus' role as a prophet has priority in establishing his other roles. In short, Jesus needs the cultural-political capital as prophet to guide his disciples to see him as Messiah. Although obduracy also persists to the prophetic teaching of Jesus, the disciples are called to listen first, so that they can see the kingdom of God. The larger question as to whether or not Jesus should even be viewed as a prophet resolves by surveying how Jesus portrays himself. Jesus saw himself as a dejected prophet (6:4); justifies his authority on the basis of John the Baptist's status as prophet (11:27-33); considers his own teaching as final (13:5, 22); and calls Israel to listen (7:14-23). Whatever else we can say about Jesus' ministry, he identifies himself as a true prophet of Israel and he justifies his call to listen upon his prophetic authority.

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80 This is exactly what N.T. Wright has convincingly demonstrated in Part II of JVOG: ‘the best initial model for understanding this praxis is that of a prophet; more specifically, that of a prophet bearing an urgent eschatological and indeed apocalyptic, message for Israel.' And, 'All the evidence so far displayed suggests that he was perceived as a prophet.' 150, 196.
82 'It is true that from the historian's point of view the working concept which guided Jesus in the task of his ministry was that of "prophet".' Hill, New Testament Prophecy, 48-68.; 'On balance the Jesus of Mark's Gospel appears as one who in his teaching supersedes and transcends Scripture more than as one who makes the Scripture point to himself as its fulfillment.' Hugh Anderson, Anderson, Hugh. 'The Old Testament in Mark's Gospel' in The Use of the Old Testament in the New and Other Essays: Studies in Honor of William Franklin Stinespring, ed. James M. Efird (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, 1972), 304.; Re Jesus' lack of scripture citation, 'This may well have contributed to the impression of authority which distinguished his preaching from that of the scribes ….'
This continued use of ἀκούω in calling people to listen to Jesus as the prophetic voice does not stop in Mark 4. He continues on in this discourse about what the kingdom of God is like and the writer comments that Jesus spoke 'as they were able to hear it' (4:33). In the very next passage, Jesus calms the storm and the perplexed disciples inquire about this man's identity, 'that even wind and sea listen to (ὑπακούω) him' (4:41).

In chapter six, Mark directly links Jesus' rejection in Nazareth to his self-ascribed role as a prophet. The Nazarenes reject Jesus after they hear (ἀκούω) his teaching (6:2). Listening to Jesus is equated with listening to a prophet. And immediate to this instance, when he sends out the apostles, his instructions specifically hone in on whether or not the recipients of their ministry 'listen' (ἀκούω) to them (6:11). In the excursus about Herod and John the Baptist, the Gospel writer plays off the fact that Herod 'heard' (ἀκούω) about Jesus (6:14, 16, 29) and feared because it might be John the Baptist reincarnate. Herod's fear of John particularizes in Mark's note that Herod used to 'listen' (ἀκούω) to John the Baptist gladly (6:20).

When confronted by the Pharisees about the practices of his own disciples, Jesus calls for a public audience: 'Hear (ἀκούω) me, all of you, and understand' (7:14). As noted before, in Jesus' final chastisement of his disciples for failing to follow the epistemological process, he pleads, 'Having ears do you not hear (8:18)!' But the zenith of this hearing motif is in the Transfiguration itself. Where one generally imagines the Transfiguration experience to be visual, it is markedly targeted at hearing, not seeing. A voice which they could not see commands them: 'This is my beloved Son; listen (ἀκούω) to him.' In all, Mark uses the verb ἀκούω 40 times and over half of those instances are found here in 4:1-9:17. Several instances come across as mere report, but still fit the epistemological process offered here. In the cases of the hemorrhaging woman (5:27), the haranguing crowds (6:55), and the Syrophonecian woman (7:25), their positive response to Jesus is precipitated by their prior 'hearing' (ἀκούω) regarding his ministry.

As was the case in the Pentateuch, the epistemological goal is not always clearly defined, nor is the content of knowledge clearly articulated. But, avoiding error is defined by whether or not one acknowledges Jesus as prophet and performs according to his direction. Again, we have described these two layers in epistemological process as errors of the first and second order, respectively.

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83 We should point out that Jesus begins with 'Hear me … and understand' (7:14), but continues on to say that they cannot 'understand' by questioning, 'Do you not see …' (7:18). Once again, the priority is placed upon hearing in order to see.
In the following section, we will look at the narrative where the disciples emerge from Jesus' teaching on the Sower (Mark 4) and follow their progress as they respond to Jesus in listening to him as prophet and enacting his guidance. Throughout we will suggest that the epistemological goal of the disciples is to see the totality of Jesus' actions as commensurate with the 'mystery of the kingdom of God' promised to them (4:11), including his crucifixion. The disciples vacillate between the first-order and second-order errors, but in the end, they will see the kingdom of God, even if in diminished form.

B. Orders of Error in Mark 4-9

Because the question of Jesus' authentication as a prophet lingers for the disciples in the episodes ensuing the Parable of the Sower, let us briefly survey the narratives that lead up to the Transfiguration. As the disciples cross the violent sea, Jesus commands creation back to peace and then chides his disciples, 'Have you not yet belief (οὐ πιστεύετε, 4:40)?' They inquire of each other about the identity of Jesus, someone to whom 'the sea listens' (4:41). In the following scene, the demoniac's cry implicates Jesus' authority, 'What have you to do with me, Jesus, Son of the Most High God? I adjure you by God, do not torment me' (5:7). The disciples are not mentioned outside of merely being present with Jesus in the Decapolis region (5:1). After this, a Jewish leader named Jairus tacitly acknowledges Jesus' authority when he entreats Jesus for a healing (5:21-23). As Jesus went with Jairus, a woman who 'heard' about Jesus came to touch him in the hopes of healing (5:27-28). Mark portrays the disciples as helpless witnesses to the event.

Jesus proceeds to Nazareth, where his hometown was both astonished by his authority, yet offended at his audacity (6:2-3). He withdraws from Nazareth identifying the problem as the failure of the Nazarenes to recognize him as prophet (6:4). At this point in the narrative, we cannot easily discern where the disciples are located in the epistemological process. Do they need to be convinced of Jesus' authentication? Are they themselves enacting Jesus' commands?

After departing, Jesus sends out his disciples in pairs. Notably, he gives them 'authority over the unclean spirits' (6:7) and specific instruction which they must perform. They inherit some role as prophetic guides where they are told to leave a place if 'they will not listen to you' (6:11). This is a simple case of avoiding error. The apostles listened to Jesus, enacted his instructions and were successful (6:12-13, 30). We presume that something about the 'mystery of the kingdom of God' are revealed to them in this episode.

The next sequences are less clear as to whether or not the disciples continue to acknowledge
Jesus as prophet. In the feeding of the 5,000 (6:30-44), several features stand out. First, Jesus takes up the role of Moses in the time of transition to Joshua. At the sight of the people, Mark tells us that Jesus' compassion was like that of YHWH when he appoints Joshua to succeed Moses as Israel's prophet. Without the succession of Joshua, Israel would be like 'sheep that have no shepherd' (Num 27:17). This theme of transitional authority fits Jesus' sending out the apostles with some of his own authority. They are being prepared to take over. The disciples occupy a position analogous to Joshua, recently invested with some of Jesus' authority in order to be 'listened to'.

1. The Hard Heart in Epistemological Process

If Jesus' prophetic authority has been presumed to this point by the disciples, his commands to them at the feeding of the 5,000 tests the disciples' trust in Jesus qua prophet: 'You give them something to eat' (6:37). Jesus means for the disciples to enact his teaching. But the disciples rationalized about the logistics and Jesus took command of the miraculous feeding. Two questions present themselves here: 1) Are the disciples in error and if so, 2) is their error of the first or second order? It is impossible to determine the first-order error in this narrative, except to say that they are clearly guilty of not performing Jesus' imperative, 'You give them something to eat.' Henderson agrees, 'Mk 6.52 both hints at the nature of the disciples' misunderstanding and refuses to pinpoint precisely what they failed to grasp.' Their enduring stupefaction about the loaves (6:52) indicates that this might have been an error of the second order, if not the first order as well.

Leaving that scene, the disciples cross the sea again with some duress. Jesus comes to them walking on the sea. Although the disciples believe Jesus to be a ghost, he quickly allays their fears. Mark bewilders the reader with his note of their reaction, 'And they were utterly astounded, for they did not understand about the loaves, but their hearts were hardened' (6:51-2). Jesus had already sent his disciples out who participated in his authority over demons and diseases. But when the disciples are confronted by the masses needing food, Jesus challenges them, 'You give them something to eat' (6:37). The disciples' reaction perplexes the reader. These men who just went out without food or shelter and performed wonders at the instruction of Jesus now shy away from the simple instruction that they were...

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84 Compare the Num 27:20, καὶ δόσεις τῆς δόξης σου ἐπ’ αὐτὸν, ὡς ἐν εἰσαχώρωσιν αὐτοῦ' with καὶ ἐδίδω ἄνω τις ἔξωσίαν ... (Mark 6:7)' and ὑμᾶς μηδὲ ἀκούσωσιν ὑμῶν ... (Mark 6:11).
85 Henderson, 'Concerning the Loaves', 5.
86 Evans cites this as a 'misplaced gar clause'. However, the evangelist's comment startled the reader as an epistemological insight no matter where it was placed in the text. Craig A. Evans, 'How Mark Writes' in The Written Gospel, eds. Markus N. A. Bockmuehl and Donald Alfred Hagner (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2005), 135-8.
meant to enact: feeding the 5,000. The effect of their dissonance to Jesus' feeding plan lingers significantly because the evangelist bluntly associates it with the hardening of their hearts.\textsuperscript{87} We have no more clues as to what effect this hardening will have until the next feeding miracle.

In chapter eight, Jesus once again has compassion on the amassing crowds. He expresses the dilemma to his disciples (8:2-3) who answered him again with the logistical impossibility of feeding such a crowd (8:4). Immediate to this, Pharisees came 'demanding a sign from heaven' and Jesus reveals his frustration with 'this generation' (8:11-13).\textsuperscript{88} But it is the disciples' epistemological struggle that comes to its apogee at this point in the story.

The disciples are, once again, discussing the problem of bread—their own lack of it (8:14-16). Jesus then confronts them with wording that parallels Deuteronomy 29:4 \textsuperscript{[3]}, calling them to remember both miracles of feeding (8:19-20) in which they sacramentally participated. He ends with, 'Do you not yet understand (8:21)?' We receive no answer to this question, but the narrative's silence yields no hope. Morna Hooker perceptively notes that the relevant question at hand in this passage is how do we separate the epistemological process of the Pharisees from the disciples:

\begin{quote}
[F]or what the Pharisees and the disciples share in common in Mark's view, to greater or lesser degree, is obtuseness, a lack of understanding which renders them incapable of comprehending the evidence which is placed before them. … I suggest that he [Jesus] understood 'leaven' as that rigid attitude which affects the whole personality, making men self-righteous, uncomprehending and hard-hearted, so that they are unable to see the evidence that is placed before them, or to accept the truth when it is presented to them.\textsuperscript{89}
\end{quote}

How do the Pharisees and disciples differ? Our answer from the Deuteronomic trajectory claims that the disciples may be blind, but they are on-the-way to seeing. Because they are fiducially-bound to the prophetic voice of Jesus, for the most part, they will eventually be able to see what is before them. The Deuteronomic path directs our attention forward to the disciples' eventual understanding of how these particularities fit into the whole. For the Pharisees, no such hope is portrayed in Mark's Gospel. They are on the Isaianic path.

After the two-stage healing of the the blind man at Bethsaida, we have a dialogue that reveals the current state of the disciples in the epistemological process. Jesus asked them about the perception of him on the street. They answer with various prophets: Elijah, John the Baptist, or one of the other prophets (8:27-28). When Jesus presses them about their own perception, Peter replies, 'You are the Christ' (8:29).

\textsuperscript{87} Exodus uses \textit{σκληρύνω} to describe Pharaoh's heart where Mark uses \textit{'παράφω} to describe 'hardening', a word which does not appear in the Septuagint.

\textsuperscript{88} Hooker, \textit{The Message of Mark}, 48.

\textsuperscript{89} Hooker, \textit{The Message of Mark}, 49.
Matera, in surveying the scholarship on the motif of a hardened heart, believes that he has reconciled its function in the Mark narrative precisely here at Peter's confession. Essentially, a hard heart is when divine revelation simply cannot be understood apart from 'divine assistance'. While we might superficially agree with his conclusions, Matera seems to treat 'divine assistance' as if it were a switch that can be flipped or objective knowledge that must be internalized. We want to resist this portion of Matera's conjecture because we believe the narrative actually directs the reader to assess what process is entailed with epistemic 'grasping' in Mark.

Matera concludes, 'If they had grasped the significance of the feeding miracles, they would have realized that Jesus could multiply their single loaf if necessary.' And, 'the feeding of the five thousand should have revealed to the disciples that Jesus is the Shepherd Messiah.' For Matera, the realization is theoretical before it is actual, mental before physically acted upon. Notwithstanding, we must challenge Matera and others on this exact assertion. How could the miracle events thus far reveal Jesus as the Shepherd Messiah? Against Matera, we have claimed that a mental logic was not being demanded of the disciples, but they were prophetically called to act out the teaching of Jesus in the feeding of the 5,000. This thesis will continue to argue that because the disciples failed to perform Jesus' imperatives they subsequently failed to grasp what Jesus was showing them. Both listening and then enacting equals seeing.

We will maintain that the divine revelation to which they are privy only comes by enacting the actions required. Thus, hardened hearts are a result of failure to perform Jesus' prophetic directives, not a failure to grasp the significance of logically connected constructs. When the disciples act upon Jesus' teaching, the logical connections are made, the patterns cohere. The evidence is this: the two points where hardened hearts are disclosed in Mark are also the two points where the disciples specifically failed to enact Jesus' requests to feed the crowds (6:30-44; 8:1-10).

The disciples' hardened hearts raise two problems per Matera: 1) How is it that Peter can recognize Jesus as the Christ without any 'narrative logic' that reveals the softening of his heart? And 2), how do we reconcile the Matthean account of divine revelation to Peter where Mark leads the reader into Peter's confession with unresolved hardhearted disciples? To the first problem, Matera simply employs the healing of the blind man at Bethsaida as paradigmatic for the disciples' epistemological process. As Jesus heals the man's blindness into blurriness and then clarity, so it was for the disciples...

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90 Matera's assumptions about what is involved with epistemic 'grasping' is representative of most all the treatments of this section on Mark. 'The Incomprehension', 158-9.
91 Matera, 'The Incomprehension', 162.
92 Matera, 'The Incomprehension', 164.
coming into Peter's confession. This is an uncontroversial reading of the healing as a rhetorical device in Mark. But the exact rhetoric needs to be explored further.

To the second problem of Matthew's divine revelation to Peter (Matthew 16:13-20), Matera argues from silence that 'something has happened' causing Peter's hard heart to be softened. He does not say what happened, but that something extra-narratival has occurred. He derives this from a conceptual parallel between the blind man's healing and Peter's faulty vision. We have already noted the dominance of hearing over seeing as the analogy of priority in Mark's Gospel. As well, the Transfiguration lacks this visual analog to Peter's confession. Notably absent in the Transfiguration is God commanding, 'Look at what he will show you.' So we do not find Matera's parallel of Peter and the blind man particularly persuasive to resolve the problems as he has stated them. Even if it were persuasive, this just leaves us in a further predicament.

More problematic for Matera, Peter is not relieved of his 'faulty vision' in either Matthew's or Mark's account. To point out the obvious, Peter's confession is correct insofar as it coheres to Jesus' further teaching about the necessity of his followers to live out a cross-bearing ministry to the end (8:34-38). But Peter's confession did not entail this sacrificial messianic expectation. Whatever his confession meant, Peter does not see clearly like the man at Bethsaida, his faulty vision is not yet relieved. The error of Peter's confession is that it is flat, free of fiducial binding to the prophetic voice, embodiment, participation in prescribed acts and hence, free of the revelation that Jesus intends his disciples to know. We can still assert in Matthew's affirmation that something has been revealed to Peter, if only an unformed concept of the Messiah. Following Jesus up to this point counts as some degree of listening to the prophetic voice and living out his guidance, which could even reveal basic constructs like 'the Christ'. But Jesus' rebuke of Peter with his ensuing depiction of a true disciple demands that Peter's concept of Christ is not yet the indwelled participation that Jesus requires.

For these reasons, we cannot agree with Matera that Peter's hardness of heart has been softened in narratival silence during the healing episode prior to his confession. It might be the case that the healing story means to act as a metaphor for the long term epistemological trajectory of the disciples.

94 So Marcus: 'The scene in which Jesus' disciples are rebuked for their lack of spiritual vision ("Having eyes, do you not see?" 8:18) is immediately followed by a symbolic tale in which a man is cured of his blindness after first passing through an intermediate state of indistinct vision. The impression that this juxtaposition is deliberate is reinforced by the succeeding narrative, in which Peter also displays genuine but faulty perception: he recognizes Jesus' messianic identity (8:29), but fails to attain a clear insight into what that identity betokens (8:32-33).' Mark 8-16, 597.
95 'The disciples now see clearly everythong which has happened thus far in the narrative [re 8:30]; they see that Jesus is the Shepherd Messiah.' Matera, 'Incomprehension', 170.
(i.e. Peter is still blurry-eyed but on-his-way to seeing). But, if a hard heart correlates to the degree of one's submission to the prophetic voice and living out prophetic counsel, then we have yet to see Peter or the disciples move from their hardheartedness in Mark. The questions for our thesis then become: 1) What exactly does Peter know at the confession? And, 2) What role does the Transfiguration play in remediating the hard hearts of the disciples?

2. What Does Peter Know?

We cannot attempt to describe the content of Peter's knowledge about Jesus qua Christ. Rather, we want to assess why what seems to be knowledge in one instant (8:29) is quickly eschewed as error in the next instant (8:33)? In other words, is Peter committing a first-order or second-order error? The text indicates that Peter believed himself to have a better understanding of what was entailed in the construct 'Christ' than Jesus himself. Further, Peter leans into his own understanding of the Christ in order to pull Jesus aside and 'rebuke him' (8:32). Even more, the evangelist notes Peter's negative response only after Jesus taught about his impending death and resurrection 'plainly' (παραστατικα), a hapaxlegomenon in Mark's Gospel. We might infer that once Peter heard what was bundled into the role of Christ in plain language, his own interpretation then seems to trump Jesus' understanding.

The fact that we see Peter rebuking Jesus intimates that Peter felt he had the authority to speak on a matter where Jesus was in error. If the narrative had portrayed Peter as a perplexed man who desired more explanation, then we might be able to argue that Peter is still submitted to Jesus' prophetic authority. But here, Peter, as the authoritative voice, rebukes Jesus which means that he is committing an error of the first order. This view gains strength when we consider what remediates Peter's error in the next story of the Transfiguration: God instructing Peter to 'listen to him' (9:7).

Jesus pushes the disciples even further after rebuking Peter by insisting that his own prophetic instruction requires them to participate in a particularly difficult process in order to 'see the kingdom of God' (8:34-9:1). These directions include taking up his cross, losing his life, and forsaking shame of the good news. Jesus not only defies Peter's attempt to step in as the prophetic voice, but also goes on to say that the disciples must live out his own brutal path in order to know what he is showing them. The rebuke of Peter and the substitution of Peter's concept of Christ with Jesus' harsh teaching about the reality of his followers leads us to diagnose Peter's error only as one of the first order: failing to acknowledge Jesus' authority in this matter. The Transfiguration in the next scene strikes us as a radical reorientation, which does not authenticate Jesus as the Christ amongst his disciples, but as an
authoritative voice to dictate what is and is not entangled in the role called Christ.

3. The Transfiguration

The disciples' question at the calming of the sea can now be reversed on themselves: If even the wind and sea listen to him, will you? Coming out of Peter's rebuke of Jesus and Jesus' teaching about the true nature of the kingdom of God, Jesus takes Peter, James and John with him to a mountain. On the mountain, the disciples see Jesus changed (μεταμορφομαι) before them and Elijah and Moses appeared to them with Jesus (ὄραω).96

Peter singularly addresses Jesus on the mountain, but his suggestions seem to be dismissed out of hand. Then a voice came from a cloud, 'This is my beloved son, listen to him' (9:7). There are similarities here to the baptism of Jesus (1:9-11), but the Deuteronomic retelling of YHWH's presence at Horeb bears a more striking resemblance (Deut 4:36-37).97 Both the Transfiguration and Deuteronomy 4 contain an account of a voice coming from above (ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή). Both are focused upon listening to an authority (αὐτὸς ἀκούω). And both scenes are motivated by God's distinctly filial love (ἀγαπάω/ἀγαπητός).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deuteronomy 4:36-37</th>
<th>Mark 9:7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36 ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀκουστῇ ἐγένετο ἡ φωνὴ ... καὶ τὰ ῥέματα αὐτοῦ ἴκουσας ἐκ μέσου τοῦ πυρὸς.</td>
<td>7 ... καὶ ἐγένετο φωνὴ ἐκ τῆς νεφέλης. ὁ τότε ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς μου ὁ ἀγαπητός, ἀκούετε ἀυτὸν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 διὰ τὸ ἀγαπῆσαι αὐτὸν τοὺς πατέρας σου ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As well, the instruction 'listen to him' (αὐτὸς ἀκούσεσθε) in Mark 9:7 is regarded as a 'virtual citation' from Deuteronomy 18:15 concerning the future prophets of Israel.98 So Marcus sums up:

On the one hand, this divine acclamation implies Jesus' continuity with Moses and Elijah, since "listen to him" echoes Moses' own words about the arising of a prophet like himself (Deut.

96 The fact that they could recognize Elijah and Moses implicates some sort of enabled vision. As a parishioner once asked me, 'How did they know it was Moses and Elijah?'
97 Stegner argues persuasively for the Transfiguration in Mark as a combination of Exod 34 and Deut 18. This can be maintained without conflict to our proposal that Deut 4:36-7 is a parallel of the Exodus text. William Richard Stegner, 'The Use of Scripture in Two Narratives of Early Jewish Christianity (Matthew 4.1-11; Mark 9.2-8)' in Early Christian interpretation of The Scriptures of Israel, eds. Craig A. Evans and James A. Sanders (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield, 1997), 98-120; See also Foster R.McCurley Jr., "'And After Six Days" (Mark 9:2): A Semitic Literary Device'. Journal of Biblical Literature vol. 93, no. 1 (1974): 67-81. Marcus (and D.F. Strauss no less) cite this as an allusion to Exod 34 only. The Way of the Lord, 82-4.
99 Menken and Moyise, Deuteronomy, 37-8.
18:15, 18), an oracle that by the first century was being read eschatologically .... On the other hand, however, the voice designates only one of the three personages, Jesus, as God's Son, and this is a title that hints at an identity greater than that of Moses or Elijah ....

Here in the Transfiguration, we have a heightened authentication of Jesus to three of his disciples. Moses, who established the instructions about future prophets, stands by while the voice of God authenticates Jesus by those same instructions. This authentication both exemplifies Mark's Deuteronomic reflection on YHWH's authentication of Moses at Horeb (Deut 4:36-7) and brings the Deuteronomic trajectory from Mark 4-9 to a climax. These disciples cannot be the intended referent of the Isaiah paraphrase (4:12), but we now understand them to be metaleptic participants in Deuteronomy 29: hidden things that are now being revealed (4:22). Again, we want to reiterate that the priority of this epistemological process relies upon the disciples listening to Jesus. In Humphrey's examination of vision reports in the NT, she concludes, 'the veil is pulled back for the disciples so they can see the significance of this one to whom they must listen.' We are surprised to see that the authentication of Jesus to these three disciples provides the main thrust of the Transfiguration. As the reader, we would expect that the disciples would have already acknowledged Jesus' authentication and to some extent they must have (e.g. 5:7-13).

It is as though the authentication of Jesus as prophet is not a once-for-all fact, but something that has to be continually proved as Jesus gets closer to Jerusalem and to the crucifixion. Jesus' teaching immediately prior to the Transfiguration concerns itself precisely with his crucifixion. He focuses not on the title 'Christ', which can be erroneously understood (i.e. Peter's confession). Instead, Jesus centers his teaching upon his own participation that is required to bear the 'Christ' title. Further, it is the same life the disciples must also enact (8:34-38) in order to 'see the kingdom of God in power' (9:1).

Thus the Transfiguration authenticates the authority of Jesus so that the disciples can enact the difficult cross-bearing life that will enable them to see the 'mystery of kingdom of God' promised to them in 4:11. What is the epistemic goal here? The best understanding of the epistemological goal is

100 Marcus, Mark 8-16, 640; Calvin takes this view as well: Matthew, Mark, and Luke, vol. 2, 191.
101 Seeming to make the same Deuteronomic connection, Calvin only references to Deut 4 in reflecting on the Transfiguration: 'It deserves our attention, that the voice of God was heard from the cloud, but that neither a body nor a face was seen. Let us therefore remember the warning which Moses gives us, that God has no visible shape, lest we should deceive ourselves by imagining that He resembled a man, (Deuteronomy 4:15.). Matthew, Mark, and Luke, vol. 2, 193-4.
the crucifixion itself. 'The cross marks the climax of the themes of revelation and incomprehension in the Gospel.'

The crucifixion contains many puzzling particularities that can only cohere into a clear picture if one listens to the prophetic voice of Jesus and lives out his guidance.

This will not end the disciples confusion about Jesus' Messianic obligations or their own participation with his instructions (e.g. 9:33-37; 10:35-45). No final straw in Mark's Gospel will assuage the reader that all things will work out with regards to the disciples' folly. Mark's ending begs for something like the Acts of the Apostles to settle what was so epistemologically turbulent in the Gospel. In some sense, after the Transfiguration, more of the same will be seen of the disciples. Requests of the disciples that reveal ignorance (10:35-45), betrayal (14:43-50), and rejection (14:66-72). All of these indicate a persistent skepticism about the disciples' epistemological journey.

We conclude our analysis here. Because at the center of Mark, we find Jesus' first explicit teaching about his own identity as the Messiah and what his epistemological goals for the disciples will necessarily entail (8:34-38). What begins in 4:11 is now partially revealed to the extent that the disciples are understanding the implications of discipleship and even reacting negatively, which may signal the depths of their understanding (8: 31-3).

The promise regarding the revelation of the kingdom of God comes again just before the Transfiguration (9:1). And finally this momentous fracture of space-time relationship bears upon their epistemological process right at the center of Mark's Gospel:

Structurally, its place is precisely at mid-point of the gospel. Topologically, its locale is the only "high mountain" in the gospel. Eschatologically, it stands at the turning of time toward the apocalyptic manifestation of the Kingdom. Christologically, it comes at the peak of a titulary progression: Peter's false Christos is corrected by Jesus' suffering, rising Son of Man, to be capped by the Son of God in his parousia glory. Theologically, it marks God's only intervention outside of baptism. Dramatically, it stages God's attestation of his Son in opposition to Peter's vainglorious Christos.

As we have argued previously, an epistemological process that seeks to avoid error must be first concerned with authenticating the authority of the prophet. But second, the process must evince a

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103 Marcus, 'Marcan Epistemology', 570.
105 Tyson comments on just one of the disciples' ongoing misconceptions: 'That reason seems to be Mark's feeling that the disciples understood Jesus in terms of a royal Messiahship, and that this is simply a misunderstanding. The question of rank can only come up among the disciples if the disciples accept Jesus as a royal Messiah.' Joseph B. Tyson, 'The Blindness of the Disciples in Mark,' Journal of Biblical Literature vol. 80, no. 3 (1961): 261-8.
106 Humphrey, See the Voice, 139.
107 Kelber, The Kingdom, 85.
responsive life toward his prophetic instruction. We have seen the pattern of listening and performing in this sequence with the disciples from Mark 4-9. Listening to Jesus as prophet can only be followed by living out the guidance he models before them, even to the cross. Because of this authentication, the disciples can hear Jesus' teaching again about what must happen in Jerusalem and 'see' how it coheres into the grander interpretation of the 'kingdom of God'.

The final assessment we must make about the Transfiguration scene is why it was needed at all. Were not the numerous healings and miracles enough to authenticate Jesus as Israel's prophet? In the last chapter on Deuteronomy, we reviewed the laws concerning future prophets and observed two crucial aspects in discerning who spoke for YHWH: 1) speaking in accordance with Mosaic law and 2) special signs of authentication. We also noted that the signs of authentication are to be ignored if the prophetic message diverts Israel from the Mosaic Law.

First, Jesus roots his ministry in the Tanak, and if we are correct, a Deuteronomic understanding of the Tanak in Mark. Jesus often argues exegetically from the scriptures, using one passage to interpret another. A question among Jewish leaders persists as to whether Jesus is an appropriate interpreter of the Torah, but not that he has neglected it.

Second, special signs abound in Mark that would authenticate Jesus as prophet. Jesus' signs and wonders were later regarded as equivalent to the authenticating signs of Moses in the early church. Hence, why do the disciples need the Transfiguration to authenticate Jesus if everything up to that point has not superfluously authenticated Jesus as prophet? Both Moses and Jesus suffer similar cycles. We remember that various signs and wonders attended the words of Moses. And yet the Israelite murmuring and errors persisted throughout decades of repeated signs. Authentication was not a once-for-all event with Moses and neither is it for Jesus. The Transfiguration then serves as a supreme instance of authentication, an objectively public event aimed at confirming Jesus' private authority, among other things, to his disciples—an event to which they would have to refer back and explain its meaning.

The final slight upturn of hope in Mark comes from an outsider who sees what God is doing through Jesus (15:39). The centurion's confession at the cross appears to add emphasis to the disciples'
hopelessness. We can read the centurion's confession as one that demonstrates Mark's anticipation of the *kerygma* which the apostles would also confess and enact if we consider:

1) Jesus intends for his disciples to see the secrets of the kingdom of God through a unique epistemological process (4:11; 9:1);
2) the three predictions of his death to his disciples (8:31-38; 9:30-31; 10:32-34);
3) Jesus' unique and ultimate authentication to his disciples in the Transfiguration (9:2-13); and
4) the blind healings that metaphorically illustrate the disciples' progress in the epistemological process (8:22-26; 10:46-52).

Otherwise, we are left to infer Mark's hopelessness for the disciples. Either way, no absolute path exists toward either implication from the text alone. But, we suggest that the thrust of Jesus' demand to be heard as prophet in order to show the 'mystery of the kingdom of God' implicates the former, not the latter.

V. CONCLUSIONS

We recall the six facets of epistemological process as we discovered them in Genesis 2-3: 1) social, 2) prophetic, 3) differentiated, 4) embodied, 5) participatory/revelatory, and 6) sacramentally commissioned. First, in Mark's gospel, knowing is *social* as Jesus is the one who must guide his disciples to see. It is not something that they are left to figure out for themselves, but they must rely deeply on Jesus' authority alone in order to know what Jesus is showing them. Second, Jesus is the only *prophetic voice* to whom the disciples ought to listen. He is authenticated to them as their prophetic voice, his authority is established through miracles over creation, and he appears fiducially-bound to the disciples as he singles them out for his private revelations. As well, the fiducial trust of the disciples in Jesus is the way they proceed forward in the epistemological process. Third, Jesus' instruction to his disciples includes *differentiating* what are and what are not the principles of the kingdom of God (e.g. 3:22-30), as well as why they can see things that others cannot (4:11-12).

Fourth, the object of knowledge can only be had through the disciples' *embodied* acts. This can be seen most clearly in the nature of the miracles which act as pointers to the 'kingdom of God'. They are all events that profoundly involve the body. Whatever else we could say at this point, the embodied actions of Jesus, the disciples, and the recipients of miracles are not accidental to the epistemological process. Fifth, the disciples must *enact* what Jesus instructs them in order to know what is being shown to them. Finally, the disciples are being called to act decisively in accordance with what Jesus wants them to know. The disciples are not spectators, but participants in the *sacramental* acts of Jesus. When confronted with the crowds, Jesus replies, 'You [disciples] give them something to eat' (6:37). As
embodied persons they were expected to live out Jesus teaching in particular acts which have sacramental functions. In a reversal of Genesis 3:6, where the woman took, gave and ate the fruit, we observe Jesus 'taking' the bread, 'giving' it to the disciples for the masses 'to eat' (6:41-2).

Our thesis has maintained that of the six facets of epistemological process, avoiding error puts priority on two aspects: prophetic authentication and participatory indwelling of teaching. In Mark, we have argued that the dual epistemological ends are best explained by Mark's well-explored use of Isaiah 6:9-10 and oft-neglected use of Deuteronomy 29. This employment of Deuteronomy means that we can read the disciples present incomprehensibility in the narrative as hopeful, that is men on-their-way to seeing the kingdom of God. The disciples appear to struggle at these two points as well (errors of the first and second order respectively): 1) believing Jesus to be the prophetic voice to which they must listen and 2) performing Jesus' teaching in order to see what he is showing them.

What comes across as absolute incomprehensibility to some interpreters, is actually the struggle to avoid error of the first and/or second order. The disciples are rebuked for errors of the first order, where they fail to acknowledge Jesus as the prophetic voice (8:31-33). They are described as hardhearted for errors of the second order, where they fail to enact Jesus' teaching to the degree required. The epistemological hope is stated at the beginning of the passages we have examined: 'To you has been give the mysteries of the kingdom of God'. As they listen to Jesus and enact his words, they appear to gain truer sight of that kingdom of God in its fruitfulness (4:8, 20, 26-32).

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112 This mirrors Gen 3:6, but also the institution of the Lord's Supper in Mark 14:22. Compare the parallel language between this feeding of the 5,000 (6:41) and Jesus at the Passover (14:22): λαβὼν ἄρτον, εὐλογήσας ἐκλατεν, and ἐδωκεν αὐτοῖς.
CHAPTER SIX

CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has argued that the epistemological process found in the Pentateuch and Mark's Gospel are commensurable with each other. Of the six aspects proffered, the matter of prophetic authentication and enacting the prophetic instructions arose repeatedly as determinative for knowing and avoiding error.\(^1\) In order to know what God is showing his people, God must authenticate an authority to them, and they must both acknowledge that authority and participate in the process specified. We have seen that rejection of the authenticated prophet and failure to enact the prophetic injunctions ended in errors of the first and second orders respectively.

Of particular interest is the fact that errors were often accompanied by propositional statements affirmed by the characters of scripture. These statements were often vacuous or ill-conceived when contrasted with how those assertions were manifested in their actions. For instance, the propositional affirmation of the serpent that humans would 'be like God' was plainly ill-conceived by the woman when she took the fruit. Regarding Israel's belief that Moses was her prophet authenticated by YHWH (Exod 4:31), Calvin argues against Israel's confession as conclusive evidence of her knowledge. For Calvin, actions must accompany the belief as an embodied participation in the prophet's instruction. He

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\(^1\) In the case of Genesis, it was not a 'prophetic guide', but an authoritative guide in the garden. However, the epistemological process appears commensurate between Genesis and the Pentateuch/Mark whether it's an authority or formal prophet in that role of guide.
relates Exodus 4 to the parable of the sower (Mark 4):

But we shall presently see how fickle and infirm was their belief [Exod 4:31]. It is plain, from its levity and inconstancy, that it was without any living root. But it is not unusual that the word belief should be improperly applied to a mere assent and disposition to believe, which speedily passes away.\(^2\)

Likewise, Peter's confession in the Gospels follows the same current, an affirmation that reveals something about what Peter understands (Mark 8:29). But the proposition 'Jesus is the Christ' is clearly not the final epistemological goal to which Jesus was guiding the disciples. Peter's confession is not knowledge of the kind or quality that Jesus means to induce, nor does it reveal final insight. The proposition 'Jesus is the Christ' is not wedded to the embodied participation required to understand what 'Christ' means, which is exactly what Jesus intends to demonstrate among his disciples (Mark 8:31-8). In short, believing a proposition akin to 'Jesus is the Christ' does not help Peter to fathom the crucifixion as the route to the epistemological goal of 'seeing the secrets of the kingdom of God'. We want to suggest that perhaps the proposition is formally true, but materially vacuous. However, the disciples are not called by Jesus in order to believe correct formal propositions; rather to live a particular kind of life. By enacting this life (re Mark 8:31-8), the disciples will see what is being shown to them.

With these emphases in view, we are now in a position to assess current epistemological theories for their commensurability with the epistemological process discovered thus far in the biblical texts. Below, we begin by proffering a scientific epistemology that is consistent with the epistemological descriptions in the biblical narratives. After we have established parallel impulses in scientific epistemology, we will examine several trends in analytic epistemology to discern the best fit with what is chronicled in the Pentateuch and Mark. The criteria will be the two centralizing features established above: authenticating the guide and participation in that guidance. Finally, we will briefly consider the implications for theology. But in all of this, we seek to answer the question: *What kind of epistemology best serves a theological enterprise concerned to reflect these biblical texts?* Our answer comes in a form akin to Polanyi's scientific epistemology.

**II. THE PROBLEM OF BROAD REALITY**

This is a timely warning against the danger, to which analytic theology is not immune, of lapsing into scholasticism in the pejorative sense of the term, allowing metaphysics to become separated from spirituality (love of God) and ethics (love of neighbor).\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Calvin, *Four Last Books of Moses*, vol. 1, 68.

\(^3\) Merold Westphal, 'Hermeneutics and Holiness' in *Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology*, eds. Oliver D Crisp and Michael C. Rea (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University, 2009), 279.
Westphal's 'warning' to theologians tempted by the analytic tradition in philosophy homes in on the concerns we have with the majority of epistemological conversation. The analytic tradition narrows its focus on propositional forms and individuals in isolated instances of knowledge. The value system that esteems individual agents, logical inference, and investigatory prowess reveals the bent of this field writ large. Those in the tradition are aware of this liability. Goldman glibly describes his own field of Anglo-American epistemology: '[E]pistemic agents are often examined who have unlimited logical competence and no significant limits on their investigational resources.' But what typically surprises the outsider to these conversations is how narrow analytic epistemologies tend to be in contrast to the broadness of human experience. Most in the tradition will admit that non-propositional knowledge exists, but they do not attempt to account for it within their epistemological frameworks. Even more troublesome, attempts are rarely made to clarify the explicit relationship between propositional and non-propositional knowledge. For instance, an oft unanswered yet fundamental problem in epistemology would be: Is non-propositional knowledge founded in or funded by propositional knowledge, or vice versa?

'Epistemology' as a term is generally taken to describe something like: a theory of knowledge that explains the circumstances under which we can affirm that, 'Subject knows Proposition'. This immediately conjures concerns about rationality, justification, confidence, beliefs, and the ability to use knowledge. These concerns are addressed *ad nauseam* in the standard epistemological treatments. But equally important: *Why do we not also focus on social relationships, trust, reliability, authority, and more as essential to knowing anything at all?*

We have argued that the biblical texts are centrally concerned with epistemological process and specifically, the prophetically guided aspects of knowledge. These two facets, process and prophetic guidance, are rarely addressed or only peripherally acknowledged in current analytic epistemology. There appears to be a vital disparity between current theories and what Peter Hicks calls the 'broadness' of reality. In critiquing the narrowness of evangelical notions of truth, Hicks says:

> Despite this trend to reduce truth to something very narrow indeed, as human beings we do in fact find ourselves operating with a broad concept of truth. Each one of us regularly encounters and copes with many different types of truth: mathematical ('2 + 2 = 4'); logical ('If A then not non-A'); truth about the world around us ('There is a tree in the garden'); historical truth ('There

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4 Although Rea has made the case that analytic modes are not necessarily wedded to propositions, he then goes on to argue as if 'analytic theology' will be methodologically propositional. Oliver D Crisp and Michael C. Rea, *Analytic Theology* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University, 2009), 1-25, especially 6f.


6 See footnote 80 of this chapter for recent attempts at working out issues of trust and authority in analytic epistemology.
used to be a tree in the garden, but we cut it down last year); future truth ('This tree won't last
forever'); truth about values ('Every person should be free to exercise his or her human rights');
moral truth ('Destroying the planet through pollution is wrong'); relational truth ('My wife
loves me'); religious truth ('The universe was created by God'); and so on. If our epistemology,
then, is going to be adequate for human experience in the real world, it will need to be broad in
its interests and application, covering as fully as possible the whole range of the

While we could quibble with the use of 'truth' in the above quote, the point remains that reality
(i.e., Hicks' 'truth') and our apprehension of it is broad. Epistemologies are meant to explain how we
know this broad reality. The extent to which an epistemology captures this broadness strikes us as the
measure of the most satisfactory theory. Conversely, the extent to which an epistemology narrows in
upon only one aspect of reality, especially if it does not explicitly relate that narrowness to the broad
reality within which it finds itself, appears to be the mark of an unsatisfactory theory. Or, one must
overtly concede that one has sacrificed the ability to explain broadly for the precision of a particular
epistemological explanation. This is commonly done in the sciences. However, that narrow explanation
has no guarantee of better explanatory power in the narrow sense unless it can be substantively related
to knowing in broader terms. As an analogy, studying cellular biology of skin tissue in order to explain
family systems behavior guarantees no explanatory power in either domain, cellular biology or family
systems, unless one can relate the two in a substantive way. So narrowing the field of study to
propositions does not justify its explanatory power \textit{prima facie}.

The study of epistemology in a narrow sense appears to suffer from Nietzsche's voracious
critique of \textit{philosophical mummification} if there is no method to justify a narrow approach. Nietzsche
acerbically details how in the attempt to study a complex reality of \textit{becoming}, philosophers have
instead killed and mummified the object of study for the sake of conceptual precision. Ironically for
Nietzsche, while their object of study is actually \textit{in mortem}, they falsely believe that they are studying
the general and complex reality \textit{in se}:

\begin{quote}
You ask me what is idiosyncratic about philosophers? … There is, for instance their lack of a
sense of history, their hatred for the very notion of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think
they are honoring a thing if they de-historicize it, see it sub specie aeterni—if they make a
mummy out of it. Everything that philosophers have handled, for thousands of years now, has
been a conceptual mummy; nothing real escaped their hands alive. They kill and stuff whatever
they worship, these gentlemen who idolize concepts; they endanger the life of whatever they
\end{quote}
The matter of theoretical narrowness and broadness is a meta-epistemological matter concerning how we conceive of our examination. The explanatory power of an epistemological purview is analogous to the relationship between sample size and generalization in the sciences. The explanatory power of an experiment's results is constrained by how well the sample represents the population about which it hopes to draw inductive conclusions. For instance, the broad reality of British children with head lice will not be explained by a narrow study of two tribal elders in Indonesia. To have strong explanatory power, a study must take as broad a sample as is feasible to be its object of study. In order to generalize, these must also bear as much similitude to the target population as possible. The broad reality of British children with head lice might be better explained by the narrow study of 2,000 British children from different socio-economic backgrounds and in disparate schooling systems.

So too, the broadness of epistemological reality, biblical or otherwise, cannot be explained by a narrow study of propositions in predicate relationships as if they represent and can generalize to the entanglement of broad realities cited by Hicks. For the reasons cited above, reductions of 'knowing how' to 'knowing that', like the one proffered by Stanley and Williamson, will not sufficiently cover the realities being described. The question remains as to whether traditional, naturalized, virtue, or Reformed epistemologies will be able to account for this broadness. What is needed is an epistemological theory that takes into account both the broadness of reality and reconciles the multifarious epistemic relationships that constitute 'knowing'. The epistemic sensibilities that we have encountered in the Pentateuch and Mark were broad indeed.

As an extended example of broadness in seemingly narrow instances, we can notice the epistemological process that lays behind a simple fact such as 'The sky is blue'. Yet even presuming that there are 'simple facts' might have already looked beyond the breadth of the reality. For we must ask whether or not we mean to discuss the proposition 'The sky is blue' or the epistemological claim: 'I assert that "The sky is blue"'. Polanyi picks up Frege's point that affirmation is inherent in all such propositions as there are no such things as bare sentences. So we cannot speak about a 'brute fact' but only its affirmation. For the question is immediately begged, 'From where did we arrive at such a proposition, "The sky is blue"'? The answer can only propose the parts that make the whole and put

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9 Neither is it the case that head lice in Indonesian elders has nothing to do with head lice in British children.


11 These will all be examined below.
them in proper relations. So 'The sky is blue' iff we look at the referent 'sky' and see something like 'blueness', allowing for variations on the hue of blue. Again, the question comes as to how we know the referents: 'sky' and 'blue'. For that, we can refer to our childhood where some caregiver showed us the genus and differentia (what is and is not) of 'the sky' and the color 'blue'.

So the terms and their referents (i.e., 'sky' and 'blue') are social conventions that are only attained through an embodied experience with an external reality of both the actual 'sky' and actual 'blueness' as taught to us by an authoritative guide. Notice that we did not say that we had 'a sensory experience'. The Empiricist's reduction to senses also takes a very narrow approach to epistemology. Nevertheless, a person must be situated in time and space, history and location, in order to refer to the sky which is a place in reference to spacial location on earth. There must also be a guide, pointing out what is and is not the sky. It is not merely a sensory experience, as Empiricists may have once claimed (and some neuro-scientists currently claim), but a historically and socially-situated experience: a participatory process.

This whole undertaking of coming to know 'what is sky' and 'what is blue' happens within the context of a more experienced knower who differentiates those external realities of sky and blueness to a less experienced knower. The assertion cannot be a so-called 'fact', a brute statement about the world external to us. For there are more obvious problems, such that at any given time or place the sky is not blue. For instance, the sky is not blue when it is gray with clouds or in the middle of the night. Many inhabitants of Scotland are left to wonder whether or not the sky is really blue at all. So when we say 'The sky is blue', we really mean to say something like: 'I assert that "The sky is blue" in certain places, times, and conditions mutatis mutandis.'

Narrow epistemologies that are propositionally reductionistic often believe that the sentence expresses the proposition. Because the proposition 'The sky is blue' is a true and known fact, then the sentence is said to gain meaning upon that fact of the matter (literally, the material blueness of the

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12 Polanyi argues that this confusion between information and testimony can be described in the belief that there are bare propositions (e.g., p = 'mammals have hair'), where in reality, all propositions find their legitimacy in who is asserting them. He suggests, along with Frege's symbology, that all propositions have $\vdash$ implicitly proceeding them where the signpost indicates 'I assert that' (i.e., $\vdash p$). Polanyi, PK, 27-8; Gottlob Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. eds. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Oxford, 1960), vol. 1, §5.

13 'Iff' here means: 'If and only if ….'


Regardless, we are arguing here that 'The sky is blue' can only have meaning if it is couched in terms of personal affirmation ('I assert that …') and further couched in the understanding that the 'sky' and its 'blueness' are constructs derived non-propositionally through interaction with an external reality and trust in an authoritative knower who guides us to know the referents and their relations in the statement. Or to state it chronologically, because I have an embodied (i.e., non-propositional) participatory encounter with the visible light frequency of 475 nanometers, which is then interpreted to me by an authoritative knower as 'blue' ('blue' being the English-speaking social convention for that particular light frequency), of whom I also trust, I can then begin to associate other things external to me that exhibit the feature of 'blueness'. When that association is agreed upon in some way, we often call it knowledge. If several English-speaking persons were observing the sky and believed it to be some hue of blue, then we would say that they have confirmed the statement 'The sky is blue' *mutatis mutandis*.17

We should notice that the statement 'The sky is blue' comes at the end of the epistemological process and only has significance in a social structure of knowers who have previously come to know the referents 'sky' and 'blue' through their prior submission to an authority, presumably their parents who taught them. But, there is nothing bare, brute, nor individual about the affirmation 'The sky is blue'. It is thoroughly enmeshed in an embodied experience with reality external to the knower and interpreted through a hierarchical social structure that imbues experience with linguistic convention. There is nothing simple about this 'fact'. If what we have suggested is true of 'The sky is blue', it holds for any facts that require linguistic convention associated to its referents by an authoritative knower (e.g., 'The earth's atmosphere contains nitrogen').

The problem with propositionally dependent epistemologies, which we will explore below, is that they have trouble accounting for knowledge outside of individual epistemic feats wedded to statements which correspond to propositions. This bumps up against the conspicuous and persistent problem of the broadness of reality described above. Knowing does not only occur at the individual level. In fact, scientific knowledge *cannot* occur individualistically by definition. Even more crippling, the presumption that propositions are somehow the focal point of epistemology immediately runs flat in the investigation into any affirmation of a proposition, scientific or otherwise.

Against Logical Positivism, a propositional epistemology *de jure* not yet defeated in his day,

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16 Or at least, this is one way of dealing with the problem per the correspondence theory of truth.

Polanyi argues that knowledge is inarticulable because fundamentally, knowledge is not propositional. But this does not mean that we cannot speak about our knowledge. It only argues against the notion that articulation can exhaust our knowledge; that articulation bears a direct relationship to our knowledge in the sense that sentences bear a direct relationship to the propositions they represent. 'To assert that I have knowledge which is ineffable is not to deny that I can speak of it, but only that I can speak of it adequately ….' T.F. Torrance, following Polanyi, challenges biblical scholars and theologians with the claim that language itself, propositional or otherwise, cannot be equated with knowledge. Words and statements are tools, instrumental means to guide others to knowledge of the referent to which they point:

Hence if words or signs are to do their job properly, they must have some measure of detachment or incompleteness or even discrepancy to allow them to point away from themselves to the realities intended, in the light of which their truth or falsity will be judged.19

An illustration from the scriptures might aid in connecting the significance to theological reading of the biblical texts. The sixth commandment states 'You shall not murder' (Exod 20:13). But the narratival context of that command within the Pentateuch bewilders any attempt to read the command flatly for the following reasons. The command to 'not kill' comes through the hands of a murderer (Exod 2:11-15), from a god who just murdered thousands of Egyptians combatants (and non-combatants), and from a god who would soon order the extermination of entire villages. So the propositional content of 'Israelites were commanded by their god not to murder' demands that we ask, 'Murder with respect to what?' Regardless of how we might want to qualify the proposition, we must admit that the referents and meaningful content appear to suffer from significant problems of vagueness.

We can add many more qualifying propositions to underwrite the general sentence meant to capture the principle behind the articulation: 'You shall not murder'. But we still have a problem of the informational content of any of these propositions. For on what grounds could Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount possibly argue that an Israelite's current understanding of this command, while fitting within the supposed proposition expressed, does not actually reflect the ineffable and transcendent principle of the command as it was intended? In other words, a first century Israelite would seem to be correct if she understood 'You shall not kill' to mean something approximate to: 'In general, we are to avoid killing people except in warranted circumstances or by divine commandments'.

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18 Polanyi, PK, 91.
19 T. F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology: The Realism of Christian Revelation (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1999), 65.
The command to 'not kill', per Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount, is meant to be a pointer to a reality beyond mortality and toward interior dispositions regarding humanity (Mat 5:21-26). It appears to move murder from an act to the heart, a disposition towards humanity and its Creator. This leads Strecker to aver: 'The sharpening of the Torah leads us to the edge of our existence as human existence. Through the message of Jesus [i.e., Sermon on the Mount], the annihilating power of the law is experienced.' Once Jesus makes this rhetorical move, from parochial meaning of a statement to transcendent meaning, he has taken the propositional affirmation and nestled it within its appropriately enculturated context to then use as a lens (an instrument) with which to view the larger reality of human/divine communications and relations. Stated otherwise, the proposition becomes transparent to the epistemic act, a tool to point to the grander reality to which it was always meant to refer, per Jesus.

Jesus, as he is portrayed in the Gospels, regularly employs this type of hermeneutical reorientation using the same propositions from Israel's prophets and re-nestling them in order to point beyond their superficial meaning toward a grander reality. But Jesus' disposition is important because he is chiding and rebuking as he reorients the gaze of those who follow him beyond the propositional particularities of the Torah. More clearly, Jesus appears to act as if the Jewish authorities have blundered because they looked at the propositions of the prophets as the actual objects of knowledge. Jesus appears saddened by this propositional reading of the prophets that fails to use these articulations as tools to see beyond the surface of the law (e.g., Luke 18, Mark 10). This failure generally regards propositions as the content of God's knowledge to man. But with Jesus, the propositions become transparent to the task of revealing what was hidden (Mark 4:22-23). Westphal cautions Christian philosophers against the temptation to propositionalize Christian belief without practice, 'Our own God talk should not primarily consist in asserting true "propositions" about God but in speaking to God in prayer, in praise, in confession, in gratitude, and so forth.'

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21 See Jesus' frustration with his disciples who are stuck on the superficial particularities of Jesus' actions rather than the 'kingdom of god' reality they are meant to reveal (Mark 4-9). Similarly, the 'young ruler' narratives: Matt. 19:16-22; Mark 10:17-22; Luke 18:18-23.

22 This parallels Westphal's concern of the theological danger regarding the domesticating of God's truth when 'we claim to be in possession of true propositions.' 'Taking Plantinga Seriously', 177.

23 (Emphasis his) Westphal, Taking Plantinga Seriously, 178.
Conclusions

The above discussion intends to suggest that the epistemological process we have examined in the Pentateuch and Mark might share sensibilities with a broad scientific epistemology. Polanyi, Kuhn, Grene, Taylor, Westphal, Torrance, et al., have developed a quasi-Continental view of epistemological process that forces analytic approaches to consider the social interaction of knowers, novices, and external reality as the centralizing features of scientific knowledge. Science is not a dispassionate data-generating machine, but a sociological fabric that pursues the breadth of reality using language among its tools of confirmation.

III. ERROR AND CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY

Our immediate goal is simple: To develop an understanding of the current landscape of epistemologies and assess them for their fit with the epistemological process found in our examination. To pursue this task, we will first consider a case of scientific error. Then we will summarize recent movements in analytic epistemology in order to evaluate them upon one criterion alone: their ability to explain the broadness of reality and error. Our critique sharpens when considering propositionally-reductionistic epistemologies because of their explanatory narrowness. We will finish our discussion of current epistemologies by considering the nature of error in light of the above discussion.

A. Error in the Scientific Epistemological Process

If we are going to focus on knowing in light of error, then we cannot focus on propositions, the tool we use to confirm interpretations of experience. Rather, we must focus on the process meant to engender proper knowing. The importance of the process enables us to discern flat errors that are uninteresting (e.g., miscalculations, typos, grammatical mistakes, etc.) from errors in the process. We might even deign many of these flat errors to be 'unpreventable', due to simple human failures. But of interest to this thesis is when one makes a mistake because one erred in some aspect of the epistemological process. As a particularly notorious example, it is not interesting that Galileo could not calculate celestial orbits because he did not account for them being elliptical, a simple conceptual

24 Polanyi, PK.
26 Grene, The Knower and the Known.
27 Taylor, 'Overcoming Epistemology'.
28 Westphal, 'Overcoming Onto-Theology'; 'Taking Plantinga Seriously'; 'Holiness and Hermeneutics'.
29 T.F. Torrance, Theological Science.
30 I owe this pithy language to Esther Meek.
mistake. What is interesting is why Galileo held onto the construct of circular orbits even though the observable celestial reality should have resisted that belief. The error, as we assess it through the scope of history, was most likely due to a latent neo-Platonic metaphysic: the cosmos reflects the Platonic heavenly ideals. Either way, it was not an unpreventable miscalculation, but a methodological error. Kepler had presented Galileo with his theory and proofs for elliptical orbits, but Galileo maintained his conviction in circular orbits despite the evidence. Although he [Galileo] preached open-mindedness, he never lent an ear to Kepler’s arguments about elliptical paths. This is an error of interest for we have one person appealing to another through instrumental means to view the same reality differently. Kepler is an authoritative voice in this instance, though not necessarily authenticated to Galileo. He wants Galileo to use his calculations like an instrument, like a pair of spectacles, with which Galileo could then put the celestial reality into proper order (or at least, better order).

In this missed opportunity, an authoritative guide (it just so happens that Kepler was correct) attempts to bring Galileo to see the cosmos with higher fidelity than Galileo's own heuristic instruments. Kepler acted as a prophetic voice, he had a more accurate pair of spectacles (i.e., his calculations) with which to view the heavens. Galileo does not err because his calculations failed to explain, but because he never acknowledged either Kepler's calculations or the celestial observations that controverted his own calculations. It was not that Galileo was without knowledge of the heavenlies, but that what he knew was truncated and/or out of sorts because he was unwilling to listen to the authoritative voice of Kepler.

Kepler also displayed his own error where he took Platonic ideals to be the prophetic voice to which he continued to listen. Polanyi surmises:

[Kepler] thought that the solar distances of the six planets known to him corresponded to the sizes of the successive Platonic bodies, as measured by the radii of inscribed and circumscribed spheres. … But though his view of reality lead Kepler astray in this case, it was close enough to the truth to guide him aright to the discovery of his three laws of planetary motion.

Polanyi observes that the 'passion' of the scientist can correctly guide her, but can also create an unwillingness to submit to an authority or external reality. This unwillingness guides her into two types of errors: scientific and unscientific guesses.

These astronomical explorers, for reasons we cannot explore here, were captivated with

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Platonic metaphysics. Galileo would not listen to Kepler's authority in the matter of orbits, but rather held onto a particular ideal of circular orbits: an unscientific guess grasping onto Platonic metaphysics. Similarly, Kepler was listening to that same Platonic metaphysical authority as grounds for assessing particular observations of elliptical orbits. Both were confronted with the realities of observation, one which contradicted his calculus and the other which happened to match his belief about metaphysical relations 'close enough', like a broken clock that renders the correct time twice a day. Both were in error. The happenstance of Kepler's observations coinciding with Platonic ideals would eventually run out of empirical support in the history of astronomy.

How would we instruct these two astronomers if we were to guide them? Presumably, we would advise them to ditch their captivation with Platonism. In this instance, Platonic ideals act as an authoritative guide and astronomers were happy to use versions of Platonic notions, not to render a strictly scientific account,34 but to give a metaphysical account of relations. Why is it that perfectly circular orbits or radii-to-orbit relationships are preferred by Galileo and Kepler respectively? It is because they reflect a theological reality. For them, metaphysical relations ultimately are funded in the divine nature as revealed in natural order. Unfortunately, the prophetic voice to whom they listened on matters of divinity and metaphysical relationships was Plato. Because they listened to the ancient Greek metaphysic, they committed a first-order error. This did not nullify their knowledge, but led them to know the cosmos in a way they did not actually intend to know it.

B. Contemporary Epistemological Approaches

By beginning with a clear case of scientific error, we now hope to show why narrow approaches to epistemology will not only struggle to explain what we have found in the biblical narratives, but scientific instances of knowing and error as well. As we have maintained, the epistemological process found in the Pentateuch and Mark is not a special religious epistemology, but is consistent with all human knowing.

Below, we will look at four major movements in analytic epistemology that have found their way into theological prolegomena, both formally and informally in the past few decades.35 This is not meant to be a comprehensive review, but to identify the main characteristics that drive each initiative. These summaries are meant to act as types in their respective sub-fields of epistemology. If the type can

34 We are using the term 'scientific' very loosely to mean an account that is strictly traceable to the scientific process.
35 For a recent attempt at wedding analytic philosophy with theology, see: Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, eds. Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University, 2009).
stand in here for variations of the same kinds, then we can make judgments about their general commensurability with what we have found in the biblical texts. But we want to be clear in our critique that we are evaluating these epistemologies only upon their ability to describe a broad reality of knowing. We are not necessarily critiquing their efficacy, coherency, or structure other than to look at their scopes of explanation and the sufficiency of each to correspond with the epistemological process found in the biblical texts. That said, the basic claims of Reformed Epistemology will be scrutinized further because of its employment of Christian scripture and theology.

1. Traditional Analysis of Knowledge

The *Traditional Analysis of Knowledge* (TAK) generally argues that propositions can be justified as to their veridicality (true or false) and also believed by individual subjects. This is commonly phrased: Knowledge is *justified true belief*. These beliefs are propositions, constructs that are true or false and can be expressed in a propositional sentence (e.g., 'The world is round'). Further, this analysis of knowledge focuses on propositions as the means of justification. In fact, Feldman begins his primer on epistemology by distinguishing the different types of knowledge and accounts for his exclusive focus on propositional epistemology:

> The most reasonable conclusion seems to be that there are (at least) three basic kinds of knowledge: (1) propositional knowledge, (2) acquaintance knowledge or familiarity, and (3) ability knowledge (or procedural knowledge). … Furthermore, many of the most intriguing questions about knowledge turn out to be questions about propositional knowledge.36

Different versions of the TAK turn on their varying dependence upon principles of justification, theories of truth, and/or the grounds for believing a particular proposition.37 But they all take for granted the basic construct of knowledge as justified true belief. Reliabilism, coherentism, truth-tracking, modified foundationalism, and different flavors of each type will rise and fall upon justification for 'S's belief in P' where S is the believing subject and P is the corresponding proposition. This epistemological framework has weathered severe critiques. But our only critique is to controvert the claim that a propositional view of epistemology is the only one in which 'the most intriguing questions about knowledge turn.'


37 Some analytic philosophers are trying to bridge the gap between these perceived 'types' of knowing. One attempt by a non-epistemologist is Eleonore Stump's text *Wandering in the Darkness*. She develops the idea that there are two modes of epistemology operative, Franciscan and Dominican which are narrative based and propositionally analytic respectively. *Wandering in the Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2010), especially chapters 3-4.
This view of knowledge as 'justified true belief' has suffered most devastatingly from two main critiques: the Gettier problem and the 'myth of the the given'. First, the Gettier problem eloquently posed a scenario where someone holds a 'justified true belief' that is an error in point of fact. The problem is specifically that the proposition believed does not correspond to the actual circumstance.\(^{38}\) Without recreating the entire argument, it essentially proposes that:

1. One can generate many situations where one believes a proposition,
2. one has good evidence to believe it,
3. the proposition is true, \(but\)
4. the proposition does not correspond to the state of affairs in the way construed by the subject.\(^{39}\)

This calls into question the idea of a proposition's truth value corresponding to one's belief. But more importantly for this thesis, error appears to lay outside of the TAK's ability to account for it. However, this critique does not necessarily derail the modified versions of the TAK.

Second, and more broadly damaging to the variations of the TAK, Sellars argues that the TAK has an unstated presumption that one can have 'unconceptualized' access to sensory input, that one's beliefs do not require prevenient concepts. Stated otherwise, the TAK presumes that we have epistemic access to a state of affairs as an uninterpreted 'given' (e.g., I can just have uncategorized beliefs about the number of coins in my pocket). Sellars argues that what we take to be 'given' actually has conceptual girth to it and therefore each individual aspect of 'belief' regarding 'justified true beliefs' must be justified as well.\(^{40}\) The TAK and its kindred epistemological variants assume that beliefs can be 'given', basically accessible without conceptualization or interpretation, and therefore do not need justification. So for one to believe that 'The red ball broke the window', that belief must be premised upon the 'given' belief that 'The ball is red', 'balls can break windows', windows are made of breakable glass', etc. But according to Sellars, the concepts of 'ball' and 'red' (assumed to be 'given' by the TAK) also need to be justified. In short: the TAK suffers the death of a thousand justifications if individual beliefs are not 'given' to the knower in the way the TAK presumes them to be 'given'.

The TAK and its various forms attempt to adjust and accommodate for Gettier's and Sellars' defeaters. Those adapted forms of the TAK do not alleviate our hesitancy with this analysis of knowledge. The TAK vests itself in the notion that knowledge is fundamentally analyzable through

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\(^{38}\) This is a précis of the scenario offered by Gettier: Smith and Jones applied for the same job in their company. Smith saw Jones count ten coins and put them in his pocket. Smith overheard his boss mistakenly report that Jones would get the job. Smith does not know that he also has ten coins in his own pocket. Smith forms the justified true belief that 'The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job'. Gettier then poses the question: Is Smith's belief real knowledge? Edmund L. Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' *Analysis* vol. 23, no. 6 (June 1963): 121-3.

\(^{39}\) Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?'.

propositional examination. Because of that vesting in propositional analysis, the TAK has little flexibility to engage the broadness of reality that can be known. This problem of propositional narrowness will become more pointed as we progress through the other epistemological offerings.

2. Naturalized Epistemology

On the other side of recent epistemologies, W.V.O. Quine, et al., naturalizes epistemology by reducing it to psychology. Knowing becomes ultimately pragmatic, knowing is what works. In the post-Logical Positivist despair, Quine wants to reduce epistemology to scientific pursuits precisely because the 'doctrinal' search for justifying our knowledge (e.g., TAK) is forever plagued by the 'Humean predicament'. Hume's predicament centers around the logical problem that most knowledge is actually some form of inductive hope that past instances will resemble future instances or local observations will generalize to distant events. Science can probabilistically rely on inductive inferences, after all, inductions are the wheelhouse of the scientific enterprise. However, induction has no internal rationality, per Hume, and hence leaves human knowledge largely afloat in the 'Humean predicament'. Therefore, knowledge cannot be funded by inductive inferences, but neither can it take root in deductive inferences, even those with mathematical certainty. Moreover, deductive-mathematic systems cannot be internally complete, they must be justified by premises external to the system itself. Employing Gödel's theorem of incompleteness, Quine argues that justification of knowledge cannot solely rest upon deductions because deductive inferences have no guarantor either.

Quine's Naturalized Epistemology (NE) posits that in light of the problems of induction and deduction we can only justify our knowledge via scientific pay off. It is not the case that we can justify what we know by our knowledge being founded in reality, rationality, or even the scientific process itself. This is precisely because those justifications would involve making logically tenuous claims based on induction. If science is our best case scenario of epistemology, as Quine argues, then epistemology should be focused on assessing how well our science works. We can clarify instances of knowledge when science is successful, when theories explain and calculations are predictive.

To some extent, we can endorse Quine's argument as refreshingly honest about the problematic

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41 Quine might hold the most extreme form of Naturalized Epistemology, ultimately usurping epistemology with psychology. But other offerings to naturalize epistemology suffer similarly from our critique here: Kornblith, 'What is Naturalized Epistemology?'; Kim, "Naturalized Epistemology'; Kitcher, 'The Naturalists Return'; Dretske, 'Précis of Knowledge'; Goldman, 'What is Justified Belief?'.

42 Hume, A Treatise, 1.3.6.7.

43 Gödel, 'On Formally Undecided Propositions', 592-616.

44 'Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science.' Italics mine. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized", 15-31.
ground floor of deduction, induction, and the eschatological hope that we could confirm any 'truth' on
the basis of either of these alone. Quine's case, built upon the deep problems of rationality raised by
Hume, Gödel, Hempel, and Goodman, needs to be weighed with considerable attention. Due to
these problems, Quine ends up in despair about justification and opts for bare pragmatism. Yet, his turn
to science as a best-case-scenario of knowing is not necessarily unfortunate as this thesis is also
employing the analog of scientific epistemology. The question for us is whether or not Quine and
others have correctly captured the epistemology of science itself? In other words, is pragmatic pay-off
the center hub of scientific epistemology? Naturalized Epistemology must hear Marjorie Grene's
warning: 'Fruitfulness [i.e., pragmatic payoff] is a test of truth; positivists make it not a test, but the
essential nature, not of truth only, but of meaning as well.' We cannot follow Quine in his despaired
reliance upon pragmatism, even if we can appreciate his critique of the TAK.

Between the poles of justifying true beliefs (i.e., TAK) and abandoning justification for
scientific pragmatism (i.e., NE) there is a range of epistemologies that find their justification in tracking
truth, proving the reliability of propositional beliefs, showing the coherency of belief systems, and flat
skepticism that we can know an external reality at all. All of these take for granted the basic construct
of knowledge being related to the ability to cohere or justify a propositional belief to an external reality.
Also for these, knowledge is concerned primarily with reconciling our rationality by propositional
analysis, and so we find them fundamentally wanting.

3. Virtue Epistemology

A recent return to the ancient Greek concept of 'virtue' has engendered a discussion concerning
its noticeable absence in current epistemological treatments. Ernest Sosa's essay 'The Raft and the
Pyramid' is taken to be the first significant move towards 'virtue' in English speaking analytic

45 Thus Reno's perceptive observation that Quine was a realist. R.R. Reno, 'Theology's Continental Captivity'. First Things
46 Hume, Treatise, I.3.6.7.
47 Kurt Gödel, 'On Formally Undecided Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems' in Jean Van
Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1977), 592-616; Charles Parsons, 'Platonism
50 W.V.O. Quine, 'Natural Kinds' in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University,
51 Grene, The Knower and the Known, 220.
epistemology. In it, Sosa rejects foundationalism (the pyramid) on the grounds for what he proposes to be a 'fatal dilemma', but sketches a promising new path in reliabilism (the raft):

The important move for our purpose is the stratification of justification. … Here primary justification would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions for belief acquisition, through their greater contribution toward getting us to the truth.53

Building upon this move to virtue, Linda Zagzebski has provided a critique of propositional epistemology and offers epistemological virtue as the answer to problems of justifying knowledge:54

The thrust of most contemporary epistemology is to make us like the fox. If the object of knowledge is a proposition, the person who is greatest in knowledge is the one who has amassed in his mind the highest number of true propositions that pass whatever test for warrant the theory has proposed.55

Citing Kvanvig's singularity critique, Zagzebski sees 'atomism' as the problem of analytic epistemology,56 where some type of holism is preferred. Her answer is to reject belief-based epistemologies because they focus too narrowly on singular insoluble instances of discrete propositions. She prefers an ethical view of epistemology, but one that does not flatten epistemology to morality. Zagzebski proposes knowledge as coming from a non-nascent virtue that is honed toward excellence, thus requiring her to reject act-based and rule-based ethical theories as a foundation for epistemology as well.57 The problem with contemporary epistemologies is their 'neglect of understanding and wisdom', which can only be arrived at through virtuous epistemic acts. 'Virtue' is defined as an uncontroversial concept with some degree of univocity with its philosophically historical roots in the ancient Greek concept of ἀρετή:

Virtue is an excellence; virtue is a deep trait of a person; those qualities that have appeared on the greatest number of lists of the virtues in different places and at different times in history are, in fact, virtues. These qualities would probably include such traits as wisdom, courage, benevolence, justice, honesty, loyalty, integrity, and generosity. Some virtues are intellectual,

53 Sosa, 'The Raft and the Pyramid', 23.
Zagzebski wants to separate 'moral' from 'virtuous' acts as two parts that bear no necessary relationship. This way, virtue is free to strive toward excellence without being determinative of the particular morality of an act. On this account, Zagzebski then defines what knowledge is: 'Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue.'

It requires the knower to have an intellectually virtuous motivation in the disposition to desire truth, and this disposition must give rise to conscious and voluntary acts in the process leading up to the acquisition of true belief (or cognitive contact with reality), and the knower must successfully reach the truth through the operation of this motivation and those acts.

Zagzebski’s proposal of *Virtue Epistemology* (VE) is the most promising yet in connection to what we see described in the Pentateuch and Mark. It recognizes that there is a paucity of consideration about essential features in coming 'to know'. Virtue Epistemology focuses on knowing as a process rather than a static event. Knowing is habituated, historical, and skilled beyond natural talents. However, Zagzebski does not pursue three avenues that would bring her proposal more in line with what we have encountered in scripture.

First, while she acknowledges a social aspect to the development of intellectual virtue, she leaves it unexplored. Individualistic virtue appears to be the goal of her discussion. Second, this epistemology of virtue has little or no somatic features to it. There is no discussion of how this is a distinctively human and embodied epistemology. Third, while she critiques the tendency of analytic epistemology to focus singularly on individuals and propositions, she appears to land in the same mode of analysis. In the end, she is still exploring intellectual virtue as an individually acquired and maintained feature of knowing, comparing her version of epistemic success over and against classical cases of individualistic epistemology (e.g., Gettier-type cases).

4. Reformed Epistemology

In *Reformed Epistemology* (RE), we now have recourse to compare the findings of this thesis for commensurability with a theologically minded and analytic epistemology. Alvin Plantinga's RE is the most robust and well-defended of several extant forms and therefore requires a closer inspection in this brief treatment. Unlike most epistemologies, Plantinga puts *unjustifiable* beliefs at the center of

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58 Zagzebski, *Virtues*, 89.
60 Zagzebski, *Virtues*, 273.
knowing. His notion of *properly basic beliefs* contains within it beliefs that we *cannot* justify but which we must hold in order to navigate the world epistemically. Because our most fundamental beliefs (i.e., *properly basic beliefs*) cannot be justified, we must decide if our beliefs are warranted.62 Plantinga, et al.,63 are also describing something uniquely different from current epistemologies in that his theory of knowing includes belief about God and requires a theological conviction about sin.

In *Warranted Christian Belief (WCB)*, Plantinga goes further to posit that his *properly basic beliefs* can correspond to theologically necessary concepts. Sin and sinfulness have now been incorporated by Plantinga as modes that corrupt proper epistemic faculties.64 As well, Plantinga takes Calvin's 'sense of the divine' (*sensus divinitatis*) as a theological tenet of RE. This *sense* has been implanted in all humans and is offered by Plantinga as a *properly basic belief* from which other beliefs about the world must be funded. Beyond sin, Plantinga also provides a provisional case for error in epistemology. Most basically, if our cognitive processes functioned properly, then error can largely be avoided.65 This forms an eloquent panacea to the problem of error: if our epistemic faculties functioned correctly (e.g., before the Fall of humanity), then we would not err.

But Plantinga's analysis of error and knowing appears too narrow to comport fully with what we have discovered in the biblical texts. Even within analytic epistemology, Plantinga's work may be too narrow. Jonathan Kvanvig, a virtue epistemologist, critiques Plantinga and others of the analytic tradition exactly because of their myopic 'focus on a single belief of a single person at a single time and also to the fact that the object of a belief is presumed to be a discrete proposition.'66 Or as Alvin Goldman puts it, ‘[Epistemology] typically consider[s] the prospects for knowledge acquisition in "ideal" situations.’67 For Kvanvig, propositionally-reduced epistemologies reverse the actual epistemic order: '[E]xperience conveys information only en masse, and the individuation into propositional form often imposes structure rather than conforming to it.'68 Kvanvig does not want to argue that propositions have no use in epistemology, rather that they may atomize epistemic content that is actually meant to be

62 For example, is it justifiable to believe in other minds external to ourselves? Plantinga would say, 'No, but it is warranted.'
63 See also: Alston, *Perceiving God*; Wolterstorff, *Reason within the Bounds of Religion*.
65 Plantinga, *WCB*, 146.
66 This pithy quote from Zagzebski is a summary of Kvanvig's position. *Virtues of the Mind*, 44; Kvanvig, *The Intellectual Virtues*, 181-2.
67 For this and other reasons, Goldman actually believes that testimony 'departs from traditional epistemology and philosophy of science.' *Pathways*, 139.
68 We do not adhere to the totality of Kvanvig's argument for information as 'chunks'. This quote is Zagzebski's summary of Kvanvig's critique. Kvanvig, *Virtues*, 182.
understood as a whole and is only interpretable as a whole because that is the way our minds are structured.\textsuperscript{69}

This critique digs most incisively where Plantinga poses the problems of mistaking one twin brother for another or the happenstance of a broken clock being correct once a day. These examples of error exemplify Kvanvig's singularity critique.\textsuperscript{70} They are all problems due to ignorance of a wider context and historical setting.\textsuperscript{71} These Gettier-type errors are uninteresting examples because they turn on synchronic happenstance: 'a single belief of a single person at a single time.' How would one ever be able to figure out that Peter (Paul's twin) was mistaken for Paul without appealing to the broader context of the situation?\textsuperscript{72} Errors of interest occur diachronically in a process, not synchronically at one instance. The errors we have examined are remedied by social interaction, not singular reasoning upon singular propositional beliefs within a singular knower at a single moment in time.

Having given a terse description and critique of RE, three questions emerge: What is 'Reformed' about Reformed Epistemology? How does RE account for the social epistemic role of authority? Is RE commensurable to what we have found in scripture?

First, to the question of how 'Reformed' is Reformed Epistemology, the answer will revolve around RE's view of sin in epistemology. If we take Calvin's understanding of sin as one that is broadly representative of Reformed thought, then what are we to make of Plantinga's employment of Calvin? Cornelius van der Kooi critiques Plantinga's project upon its ability to satisfy Calvin's legacy. The problem with RE begins with Plantinga's misappropriation of Calvin's sensus divinitatis. Van der Kooi points out that the sensus divinitatis had a 'primarily negative function' in Calvin. It was a concept upon which Calvin referred to God's just condemnation of the unrepentant. Because all have a sense of God, they can therefore be held accountable for their rejection of that same God. Plantinga has conversely developed his properly basic belief with Calvin's sensus divinitatis as an essentially positive role in epistemology. This move in itself does not vie against the legitimacy of Plantinga's argument, but it does raise the question of whether or not RE follows in the tracks of Reformed thinking in more profound ways.\textsuperscript{73}

Second, to the matter of authority, problems persist most acutely where Plantinga neglects the

\textsuperscript{69} Kvanvig, Virtues, 183.

\textsuperscript{70} Plantinga, WCB, 157-58.

\textsuperscript{71} See 'Contextualism and Communitarianism' in Martin Kusch, Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 2002), 131-68.

communal nature of epistemology as a core function of all knowing. In his section titled 'How Does Faith Work?', Plantinga sidelines testimony or authentication of testimony as a sub-par and non-normative route to knowledge. Van der Kooi comments:

Plantinga too characterizes testimony as a de iure [sic] second-class citizen in the republic of epistemology. ... We must keep well in mind that there is a difference between uncertainty with regard to a specific item of testimony, and a skepticism which in principle finds little to go on in the witness of others in general. ... He does certainly suggest that knowledge which is obtained through one's own perception is superior to knowledge which people have based on the testimony of others.

Van der Kooi then goes on to qualify that knowledge is fundamentally social:

We know within a community, within the expanse of history, together with other people. That is true of public, academic knowledge, and true also, mutatis mutandis, of a community of faith.

This egregious suspicion of testimony prompts Helm to criticize Plantinga regarding his 'quick' move from scripture (i.e., testimony) to inferred belief:

What decides what inferences are elementary or obvious or quick? To illustrate, Plantinga says that "what I know in faith, is the main lines of specifically Christian teaching—together, we might say with its universal instantiation with respect to me. Christ died for my sins" (pp. 248-9). But the proposition that Christ died for my sins is certainly a momentous inference from the Scriptures, not a good candidate for an inference which is quick and easy and obvious.

In other words, Plantinga seems to elevate the testimony of scripture but yet simultaneously devalue testimony today. In Helm's mind, this move seems too rash.

Third, to the epistemological role of hamartia, Plantinga's account of sin and sinfulness have been found wanting as well. This aspect of his work is important for our analysis because of the central significance of the first error in Genesis 2-3 (more below). Merold Westphal finds fault with Plantinga for lacking adequate treatments of sin in his earlier work, especially for an epistemology claiming the 'Reformed' banner.

Sin as an epistemological category cannot be, as Fichte and Plantinga, Marx and Freud seem to want it to be, merely a device for discrediting one’s opponents. To take Paul [the apostle] seriously is to take seriously the universality of sin. ... Isn’t this in fact Calvin’s own conclusion, his critique of natural theology being but a subordinate moment in a larger argument denying that we can have any trustworthy knowledge of God, direct or inferential, apart from the divine gift of the Word and the Spirit?

73 Or perhaps this simply raises the question as to whether Plantinga is appropriating the Neo-Calvinian Protestant scholasticism rather than Calvin himself.
74 Plantinga, WCB, 249-52.
77 The lacuna regarding 'sin' is something which Plantinga remedies in WCB, although doubtfully to the satisfaction of his critics.
We cannot actually settle the matter here of the 'Reformed' value of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology other than to say it is not entirely clear that Plantinga is using Calvin in a way that expresses Calvin's Humanistic tendencies toward the biblical texts. The *Institutes* are exclusively cited in Plantinga without much reflection upon the biblical texts to which those sections reflect. But Plantinga has not necessarily attempted to be faithful to historical theology and biblical scholarship as his central task. And we also have acknowledged in our introductory chapter that there can be theological accounts that comport with biblical epistemology, yet do not make specifically exegetical arguments (e.g., Kierkegaard's epistemology). So without making a decisive judgment, we must turn to the matter as to whether RE represents the best epistemological model for theology.

Despite the synchronic epistemologies of Plantinga et al., there looms an even deeper lacuna in their scholarship that may hinder theological work: the nature of trust and the prophetic voice. We have suggested that the epistemological process demonstrated in scripture centers upon two facets: 1) knowing whom to trust based on external authentication and 2) participating in a process prescribed by the prophetic voice in order to know what is being shown. To the former, Plantinga's discussion of sin is most revealing of his view of the significance of trust. Sin, per Plantinga, not only makes one imperceptive, dull or stupid, but also keeps one from loving her neighbor as herself (i.e., participating in the prophetic injunctions of scripture). But absent from his discussion is why one would ever assent to the belief that they ought to love their neighbor. Because Plantinga sets aside the authentication of the prophetic authority of scripture, the question begged is: Why should one trust the witness of

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79 See chapter one of this thesis.

80 Although we have not explored it here, there is an emerging subsection of epistemology concerned with the problem of trust and social epistemology. While these wrestle with some of the pertinent questions raised in the biblical texts, they do so within the narrower analytic modes. Trust is a 'problem' for these analyses because they mostly view trust as if it is beyond deductive inferences, as something ultimately foreign to normative epistemology. Trust as a topic 'departs from traditional epistemology'. Goldman, *Pathways*, 139. See major works: Hardin, *Trust*, especially ch. 5; Gibbard, *Wise Choices*, especially 233-52; Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 213-21; Lackey, *Learning from Words*; Foley, *Intellectual Trust*, especially ch. 4; 'Egoism in Epistemology'; Coady, *Testimony*; Goldman, *Pathways*, especially Part III. Also significant and helpful are: Anscombe, 'Believe Someone'; McMyler, 'Second Hand'. Kusch has an interesting attempt at bringing together a communitarian 'play' of language (think early Wittgenstein) with a contextually determinate and relativist notion of truth. *Knowledge by Agreement*.

81 Plantinga has inexplicably chosen to pick up Calvin's argument for the *sensus divinitatis* in Book I chapter 3 of the *Institutes*, while largely ignoring Calvin's foundation for proper epistemology in I, 2. In this move, Plantinga appears to shift Calvin's epistemology from fundamentally social to semi-autonomous. Calvin begins with the knower in a subjected relationship to his Creator who cannot think of such a being without realizing his own utter dependence upon and service due to that Creator (I, 2).

scripture at all? Further, sin keeps us from trusting God, per Plantinga, which he roots in the primeval story of Adam and Eve. At this point, Plantinga is writing in the midst of the two key aspects we have observed in scripture: why should we trust the prophetic voice of scripture and how sin keeps us from enacting the prophetic directives. These two could be reconciled in a discussion of Genesis 2-3 (as has been attempted in this thesis), but Plantinga chooses another route.

To the latter issue of the authoritative voice, Plantinga comes very close to exploring the serpent's voice as it relates to the error in the garden. But he ends his discussion of the Fall by simply concluding that the error lay in man's self-deception because he believed he could be both autonomous and like God. In other words, Plantinga believes the error to be autonomy, achieved solely through the epistemic faculty of the man without any necessarily socio-epistemic roots. The source of that deception and the social mechanism that enabled it are left to lie. The failure to enact God's commands ensues as a consequence of man's rebellion. For Plantinga's version of error, the man is 'self-deceived' and 'contemptuous of truth'. And so, on the cusp of addressing the role of the serpent's prophetic voice he instead identifies the mystery of free will and the man's envy as the ultimate error in the Fall:

Of course the final mystery remains: where does this sneaking desire to be equal with God come from in the first place? How could the very idea so much as enter Adam's soul? … I can take pleasure in my [the man's] condition, which is wonderfully good, or I can give in to envy.

Plantinga has provided what no other contemporary philosopher has done: a comprehensive analytic epistemology that attempts to represent the Christian tradition with a major Protestant theologian. Notwithstanding, what is our assessment of his work with the critique of propositionally reductionistic epistemologies before us?

The focus of Plantinga's RE appears to be disjunctive with the aims of theology because of its synchronic and singular analysis. Despite whether or not it is truly 'Reformed', RE's precision makes it too narrow, seemingly unsuitable for addressing the epistemological process found in the biblical texts explored here. Plantinga et al., do not seek to clarify the social-prophetic role in epistemology because it does not factor into RE's emphases. His choice to make the error a matter of self-deception shelves the problem as diagnosed by YHWH himself: 'Because you listened to the voice of your wife …' (Gen 3:17a). While a 'scriptural epistemology' need not be properly 'Reformed', it must correctly diagnose the error that it takes to be the type of error ubiquitous to humanity. While we might want to affirm the broad contours of Plantinga's RE (i.e., broken epistemic faculties, proper function, properly basic

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83 Plantinga, WCB, 212.
84 Plantinga, WCB, 212.
85 Van der Kooi, 'Assurance of Faith', 100.
beliefs, etc.), due to the deficiencies noted above, Plantinga's RE can only function as a theological tool with great difficulty.

C. Conclusions

Quine and other epistemologists have looked to science as the best-case-scenario of knowing and we would agree in part. Polanyi's scientific epistemology reflects much of human knowing at its best. Good knowing, according to the scriptures we have investigated, seeks authenticated guides and submits to them, enacting the process meant to engender knowing as a skill that transcends individual epistemic feats. It is doubtful that any of the contemporary epistemologists surveyed above would deny these aspects of science. But for whatever reasons, it is not their interest to pursue this diachronic view of epistemology. They have narrowed their focus largely upon synchronic instances of knowing that are *supposedly* propositional in nature and can be argued for in deductively logical relationships. This propositional narrowness for the sake of precision runs the risk of being a study of knowing *in mortem*. But even if propositional epistemologies can escape Nietzsche's death-trap critique, they still do not reflect the intense interest of scripture in depicting epistemology as a process. Further, this process places priority upon authenticated and authoritative voices and enacting the injunctions of those authorities.

It should be pointed out that we can still affirm aspects of each epistemology. First, there is no way around the matter of justification in an epistemological framework. We must be able to defend our account of how we know reality, but not necessarily articulate it in predicate logic. However, in asking the question 'How do you know X to be the case?', we must not presume that the answer either originates or terminates in a proposition. For instance, how does we know the proper mixture of cement, sand, and rock in a batch of concrete? We can fail to provide a formula or proposition, yet we know it when we stir it. So here, one's knowledge is inarticulable but real nonetheless and articulation may actually interfere with what we know. Plainly, our justification of any knowledge, scientific or common, bears no *necessary* relationship to propositions. Epistemologies that require knowledge to be propositional can only coincide with the epistemological process we have examined.

Ultimately, it seems that Reformed Epistemology, along with all the epistemologies surveyed here, asks fundamentally different questions than those which theology seeks to answer. Their synchronic and narrow scopes appear to be outside of our observations from the Christian scriptures.

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86 Attempts in analytic philosophy at reducing 'know how' to 'know that' remain unpersuasive given the nature of knowledge in these texts as explored here. See Stanley and Williamson, 'Knowing How'.

Therefore, our critique of them is limited to comparison. In short, they are doing something distinctly different from what we see in the Pentateuch and Mark. We cannot offer here that they wrongly approach epistemology, only that they narrowly approach epistemology. The question then becomes whether or not Reformed Epistemology (or another analytic method) represents the best approach to what we find in the scriptures and how we practice theology. We have answered that question negatively, preferring Polanyi's scientific epistemology as one that is commensurable with the Pentateuch and Mark.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEOLOGICAL PROLEGOMENA

For those familiar with the work of T.F. Torrance, it will be obvious that we are not arguing for anything markedly different from Torrance's theological utilization of Polanyi's scientific epistemology. Torrance sought to show that 'the task and problems of a scientific theology are not very different from' a properly understood scientific epistemology. Taking on board the contemporary critiques of physically reductionistic views of science, Torrance seeks to expound the affinity that theology and science share in their epistemological processes. This thesis is only unique in that we have sought to demonstrate that the biblical texts themselves share affinity with what Torrance and others have argued for regarding Polanyi's epistemology.

If the general argument of this thesis befits an intentional pattern of epistemological process in the Pentateuch and Mark, then what are the necessary implications for theological prolegomena? We will suggest three critical ramifications that correspond to the centralizing aspects of epistemological process as we have discovered them: 1) determining the authenticated voices, 2) participating in prophetic direction, and 3) guiding others to see.

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87 Regarding some of Torrance's prolific writing on theology and science, see: Theological Science; Belief; Reality and Evangelical Theology; God and Rationality; Christian Theology and Scientific Culture; Transformation and Convergence; Theology and Science.


89 Of course, this is not a claim we can defend in full here. But we are also not alone in seeing these affinities. E.g., Gunton, 'The Truth of Christology'; 'Knowledge and Culture'; Hart, Faith Thinking. Although Polkinghorne regularly appeals to Polanyi, he only does so regarding the more individualistic and responsible rationalizing aspects of PK, Theology in the Context of Science.
A. Genuflection: Determining the Authenticated Prophetic Voice

Knowing requires submission to prophetic voices, those who guide us. Whether we are young children learning our colors or adults trying to grasp quantum mechanics, we must acknowledge guiding authorities to some degree in order to gain the skill of knowing that we seek. Hart draws this same conclusion where he says of theological epistemology:

The pertinent question, the decision which we have to make, is not whether we will submit to such voices, but rather which voices we will submit to, and at what points and under what conditions shall we feel able or obliged to challenge what they are saying to us.\textsuperscript{90}

There is no neutral position, autonomous humanity making choices, and so we must be aware of the prophetic influence operative over us and that we want to be operative in our epistemological process.\textsuperscript{91}

If the prophetic voice inherently governs one's theological formation, then recognizing who stands in that position of prophetic voice becomes a chief concern. Even more, recognizing who ought to stand in the position of prophetic guide is of ultimate consequence. For Christian theology, the relationship between theologian and scripture must be meted out upon this boundary. For many, the scriptures are the prophetic voice, quite literally the assemblage of the prophets' voices, the ultimate position as prophet over the theologian, and the voice that trumps all other voices. This does not mean that we can simply assert that the scriptures now guide us flatly in all circumstances. None have escaped the Post-Modern critique, rather, we now acknowledge the epistemological baggage that we bring to our reading of the scriptures. As Westphal reminds us, 'We are all Gadamerians now.'\textsuperscript{92}

The theologian's genuflection\textsuperscript{93} toward the scriptures and other theologically influential voices must be sorted out in order to assess her epistemological ends. The Protestant Christian canon makes claims like those we found in Exodus: These texts can prophetically guide one to know both about God and to know God himself as a person—just as Moses guided the Israelites to know YHWH as their god and guided Egypt to know about Israel's god. If we put scripture in position as our prophetic guide, then that scripture determines who and what we can know. The texts we excise from our canon are equally determinative.

Likewise, the theological voices to which one listens determine what kind of god one sees in the sacred texts. Marcionite lenses guide us to different epistemological ends than would Luther's theological voice. But even if we grant the priority of scripture qua prophetic voice, how does one

\textsuperscript{90} Hart, \textit{Faith Thinking}, 177.

\textsuperscript{91} Torrance, 'The Social Coefficient of Knowledge' in \textit{Theology and Scientific Culture}.

\textsuperscript{92} Westphal, 'Taking Plantinga Seriously', 175.

\textsuperscript{93} Genuflection here means: 'To show deference or servility.'
adjudicate between theological lenses with which we look into scripture? Even more, we have argued that if the content of the canon has any authoritative sway, then the scriptures also look into us.

For Roman Catholicism, the historic prophetic voice of the unbroken the Magisterium is the authoritative guide of one's epistemological process, despite lingering concerns of authentication. Claiming the Magisterium as one's prophetic voice makes for a rather tidy epistemological process, but it does not actually help one to adjudicate between prophetic voices. Rather, it calls for basic genuflection to the voice of the Magisterium.

In the same vein, the Protestant Reformation's cry 'ad fontes' was meant to place scripture back in position as the ultimate prophetic voice. That Protestant 'return' was not a bare call for individualistic readings of the texts, but rather a call to hear different prophetic voices, perhaps in contrast to the singular voice of the Roman Catholic Magisterium. That is to say, it is not sufficient for theologians to assert that only scripture or only The Magisterium act as their authority in the epistemological process. The pattern evinced in scripture demands that theology justifies their prophetic voice in terms of authentication. Genuflection towards a prophetically influential voice without authentication of that voice creates first-order errors, knowledge about God and creation that is out of sorts with God's epistemological goals. What constitutes authentication is a matter for another thesis, but at minimum, it is a repetitive process where trust is furnished, guidance is enacted, and reasons for future trust can be justified based on prior trust (e.g., the multiple acts of YHWH through Moses before the Israelites, Jesus' continual miracle ministry, etc.).

The question of prophetic voice is really a question of epistemological goal: What is it that we seek to know by means of this epistemological process? If one seeks to come to particular beliefs logically arranged, then one can 'data-mine' the scriptures or religions in order to sort out those beliefs. This data-mining approach offers both the pretense of submission to the scriptures as prophetic guidance and rational agency in arriving at logical truths.

The problem with this approach is that it posits a different epistemological goal than what is espoused in scripture: to know God and his kingdom (re Exod 6:7; Mark 4:11; 9:1). Knowing God is clearly differentiated from knowing about God, because knowing God is depicted as having personal encounters with God himself. For theology, if the goal is to know God himself and be able to see his kingdom, then personal encounter with that god appears to be a prerequisite for the practice of

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94 We have argued here that the scriptures 'look into us' as well.
95 Compare Exodus' accounts of Israel's personal encounters with YHWH as her god versus Egypt's encounters with YHWH as Israel's god. As well, compare the disciples who knew Jesus (Mark 8-9) with Pilate who knew about Jesus (Mark 15:1-5).
theology. Genuflection toward the scriptures then reflects the texts' authenticity and authority to construct a way of understanding reality that shapes the theologian's understanding. Text alone is incapable of rendering knowledge of a person. However, the text can act as an objective referent to the subjective encounter with the god of those texts.

In short: if the theological enterprise sets the god referenced in scripture as the epistemological goal of its quest, then both the texts of scripture and personal encounter with that god must act as the primary prophetic voice that guides theologians in the process of knowing. In similitude with scientific knowing, theologians have recourse to convergence of observation just as the sciences have confirmation. God, together with his intentionality,\textsuperscript{96} who is the object of theological study can be known and differentiated among competing theologies and gods (e.g., 1 Kings 18). Better and worse understandings of this god can only be justified by theologians who both submit to the prophetic voice of scripture and the personally encountered god of that scripture. Theological enquiry that either resides solely in the interpretation of the scripture or personal encounter with God has no way to gain its bearings and discern authentication as it proceeds.

**B. Participation: Enacting the Prophetic Direction**

If we can generalize this pattern observed in the Pentateuch and Mark, then participation under the guidance of scripture is fundamental to theological knowledge as well. We cannot see what is being shown to us by those texts unless we enact what they require. Participation is essential to the epistemological process. Theological understanding will either come up vacant or go awry if theologians do not perform the process fixed in scripture.

This could mean a host of manifestations depending on the inquirer, but it requires something from everyone who pursues Christian theological understanding. It means that dissecting the OT, NT, or church doctrine will only yield fruitful results to the extent that ones lives the injunctions of the canon. Analysis of 'Loving your neighbor as yourself' (Lev 19:18) will yield some kind of knowledge about YHWH and his intentions only if someone actually practices the injunction.

The implications of this requirement are manifest. Biblical scholars can analyze varying aspects of the texts in their hands (\textit{in mortem} per Nietzsche), but they might never arrive at possible meanings intended by the author when they pursue axiomatization of those texts. In other words, there is no process that will render the meaning of these texts outside of submitting to them and participating in

\textsuperscript{96} 'Intentionality' is most commonly expressed in terms of the Kingdom of God in Mark.
As an illustration, one can learn something about the rules, the effort, and the skills required to play tennis, simply by observing a match. However, the mere observer and the tennis professional are seeing two different games when they sit next to each other at Wimbledon. There is an existential understanding of what-it-is-like-to-play-tennis that is absent in the mere observer's view. Because of that absence, we cannot say that both the observer and tennis player 'saw' the same thing when they watched the match. Just as a doctor and layperson do not see the same thing when they look at the same X-ray. Knowing requires participation and theological knowledge requires enacting the life of a servant of YHWH or disciple of Jesus. Clinical distance neither improves knowledge through objectivity nor renders knowledge that is meant to be known only in contractum.

Fishbane questions whether or not the OT scholar has a unique text before her in the sense of literature, ontology, or both. If both, then the duties of the hermeneut change accordingly:

Hebrew Scripture is an ontologically unique literature: not because of its aesthetic style or topics of concern which are judged weak in comparison with contemporary medieval romances and epics but precisely because such externalities are merely the first of several garment-like layers concealing deeper and less-refracted aspects of divine truth whose core, the root of all roots, is God himself. The true hermeneut who is a seeker after God and not simply a purveyor of aesthetic tropes or normative rules will be drawn to this garmented bride (as the Torah is called in another text in this corpus) and will strip away the garments of Torah until he and the beloved one (God as discovered in the depths of Scripture) are one.

Developing an epistemology of New Testament theology, Rosalind Selby concludes that the participatory element is crucial in order to accurately understand the texts themselves:

If we make a Polanyi-like commitment, in faith, to an epistemology and interpretation which maintains the centrality of God—his priority as the subject who founds us, and the givenness of his self-revelation through a text—logically we must pursue an ethics of reading which is true to that centrality. This is the ethics of reading appropriate to an iconic text [the NT] which is a window onto the kingdom; we attend from the text to the ‘object’ which is always subject as he reaches out to speak to us. We can never grasp this ‘object’ and pin it down, rather we can

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gaze, read, study and be self-critical in obedient response.\textsuperscript{100}

Similarly, Lesslie Newbigin summarizes his theological epistemology: 'We need to learn to know God as he is. There is no way by which we come to know a person except by dwelling in his or her story and, in the measure that may be possible, becoming part of it.'\textsuperscript{101}

Against positions such as Stendahl's and Barr's descriptivist mode of biblical theology,\textsuperscript{102} we side with Bornemann's proposal that the task is not merely knowing the religious questions and the texts of interests, but we must 'participate in the quest' where: 'the starting point is our relationship to God, to understand its nature, how it is established and how it is maintained.'\textsuperscript{103} This requirement then weighs most heavily on the Christian theologian for it requires her to appraise her knowledge in light of her participation as a disciple of Jesus.

More than merely an ethical requirement of the theologian, participation by means of indwelling the life required by the scriptures is how she understands the contentful meaning of theological discourse.\textsuperscript{104} Stendahl's prescriptivism does not guarantee scholarly integrity, but it can obscure knowledge that cannot be had apart from participation, just as a novice scientist is obscured from knowing some features of cellular tonicity if she refused to look down the microscope and listen to her authoritative guide (i.e., her lab professor).

C. Prophetic Guidance: Helping Others to See

We have been arguing for a privileged position of theology as the task that seeks to know God and the secrets of his kingdom.\textsuperscript{105} The reason we have elevated the criteria for assessing theological knowledge is precisely because theology both submits to the prophetic voice of scripture and to God

\textsuperscript{100} Selby, \textit{Comical Doctrine}, 248.
while acting as a prophetic voice for others. If we believe that some theology has broader explanatory power, then that theological insight must be submitted to scriptural authority and derived by lived-participation as a disciple of Jesus.

Because theological writing claims to have insight, it must be judged by the constituent factors of proper epistemological process as evinced from scripture. Theological claims will always act as prophetic guidance to others and so ought to be measured with the highest scrutiny. It is patent from the Pentateuch and Mark alone, that those who act as a prophetic voice in God's community are held to higher account owing to the fact that they can *guide* others as easily as *misguide*.106

Thus, the epistemological goal is not individual, but is social as well. We do not strive to know what is being shown to us just so that we can know as an individual. We come to know God and his kingdom so that we can better point others to that same God and kingdom. Because all theological knowledge that is communicated becomes prophetic for others, the task demands accountability. The theologian must genuflect to an authenticated authority and participate in the life of a community of disciples. As theological knowledge grows, who God is (person) and what he is doing (kingdom) becomes the prophetic voice to others inside and outside of that community. This is the *prophetic society* anticipated in the New Covenant passage of Jeremiah:

> And no longer shall each one teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, declares the Lord. For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.107

In short: Epistemological process is fundamentally social and therefore, theological knowledge requires fiducial binding to a peculiar society: the church. Due to the accountability of the prophetic voice in that peculiar society, theologians guide others to pursue this epistemological process in submission to the same prophetic voice to whom they themselves have submitted. If correct, then no theologian can claim to be experimenting harmlessly with theological ideas apart from the task of the church.

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106 See: Exod 32; Num 12; Deut 13:1-5; 18:15-22; Mark 8:11-21; et al.

107 Jer 31:34.
### General Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BHS</td>
<td>Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>K. Barth, Church Dogmatics</td>
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<td>INE</td>
<td>R. Watts, Isaiah's New Exodus</td>
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<td>JVOG</td>
<td>N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God</td>
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<td>NA²⁷</td>
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<td>New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis</td>
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