SUGAR, SPICE AND EVERYTHING NICE? AN INCLUSIVE FEMINIST RELATIONAL ONTOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF GENDERED MORAL AGENCY WITHIN STORIES OF EVIL

Rebecca Adele Wilson

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



2019

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

at the University of St Andrews

February 2019

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General Acknowledgements

I would like to thank numerous people for their help in making this thesis possible. I would firstly like to thank my parents: Diane and Kevin Wilson for their continued support throughout my education, especially their perpetual belief in my ability, even when I doubted myself. I would also like to thank them for teaching me to prioritise caring, which was most likely the starting point of this thesis. I would like to thank all my family, especially my sister Bernadette, for their patience and encouragement. My deepest thanks must go to my new husband, Robert Price, who has helped me throughout this journey from proofreading the draft of my PhD application to formatting this final version for submission. I am unsure if I would been able to complete this thesis without your continued support, laughter and love, and I am so grateful for all your help. This gratitude is extended to my mother and father-in-law: Suzy and Nick Price for their support.

I wish to thank all of my friends who have supported me over the past few years. To Katarina, Amanda, Brita and Maria, for all of the good times, and to Mya, Flaminia and Lina for making A10 such a lovely office to work in. I would like to thank my friends from Aston University, especially Dan, for their support and kindness. I would also like to thank my fantastic colleagues at CAPOD for their encouragement in finishing.

Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to the Department of International Relations, especially to those who taught me on my IPT Masters. I would also like to thank Dr Amanda Beattie for encouraging me to pursue IPT and apply to St Andrews. A special thanks goes to Professor Patrick Hayden for his support, particularly his invaluable comments on draft thesis and, finally, I am so grateful for the amazing support provided by my supervisor Professor Caron Gentry. Thank you for all of your inspiration, knowledge and encouragement; it has been a fantastic opportunity to work with you.

Funding

I would like to thank my funding providers: The AD Links Foundation Postgraduate Scholarship and The Sir Richard Stapley Educational Trust Grant, in addition, to the Department of International Relations for providing financial support for the attendance of conferences and proof reading**.**

Abstract

This thesis challenges the dominant narratives of evil, highlighting how the masculine approach to telling stories of evil has silenced moral agency. It does so through an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, born from a study of care ethics. The thesis argues the need for an ontological relational feminist approach over a general feminist approach. Here, it engages with the work of Joan Tronto, Fiona Robinson, Margaret Urban Walker and Kimberly Hutchings to highlight the many merits of a feminist relational ontology. However, it also responds to the shortcomings of a feminist relational ontology approach, by engaging with critical (poststructural, queer, postcolonial and black) feminist literature to create an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework.

Furthermore, this methodological framework is used to facilitate a discussion of evil in western thought, examining key points in the literature, and how this has led to the dominant narrative of evil within (Feminist) International Relations. It not only highlights the historical contextualization of evil and women, but how the study of evil, within moral theory, is itself gendered. Here, it is argued that the masculine approach to evil is rooted in abstraction and ambiguity, with the rational autonomous man as the primary agent. Therefore, through an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, it shows how this masculine approach to narrating evil has silenced moral agency.

Additionally, this thesis evidences how stories of evil silence moral agency, by scrutinising two case studies. The first explores a very different story of evil; rape culture in the west. Employment of an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework shows how cultural, patriarchal and racist norms have shaped societies, with a focus on the UK, leading to a single *real* rape narrative. Despite this, most attacks of sexual violence are incompatible with this narrative, meaning that the moral agency of both victims and perpetrators of rape is dissipated. The second case study explores the narratives around Ugandan rebel leader Alice Auma/Lakwena. It highlights, through the use of an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, that postcolonial legacies and gendered norms

have constructed moral boundaries around Alice's complicated story. This hinders readers from seeing her as a moral agent in her decision making during her leadership of the Holy Spirit Movement and quest to banish evil from the world.

Finally, a discussion of how this investigation questions our understanding of evil highlights power hierarchies within stories of evil and explores how many stories are externalized. Overall, this thesis calls for an opening of stories, even of evil, to allow for moral agency to be seen.

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Introduction

What are little boys made of?
What are little boys made of?
Snips and snails
And puppy-dogs' tails
That's what little boys are made of

What are little girls made of?
What are little girls made of?
Sugar and spice
And everything nice
That's what little girls are made of

'Sugar and spice, and everything nice' summarises the gendered expectations and moral norms that are often unquestionably imposed in society, through stories containing colonial undertones of exotic treasures of 'sugar and spice.' This famous poem, "*What are little boys made of?",* supposedly written by Robert Southey in the 18th century, is sung to children, appears on apparel and gifts and is recurrent in popular culture throughout the western hemisphere. This, therefore, provides the starting point of my thesis; to continue to challenge this gendered behaviour and narration of these norms, especially examining those who have already broken expected gender norms in society.

In 1983, Gulu, Uganda, Alice Auma/Lakwena claimed to be on a mission to free the world from evil. Leading the Holy Spiritual Movement (HSM) army, she intended to remove sin from Uganda and, subsequently, territories beyond its borders. Many people were killed in the HSM uprising, which also challenged the Ugandan government, and the movement led to the rise of the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Thousands of children were forced to become soldiers

for the LRA and thousands of East Africans were killed in the uprising. It would be easy to argue that Alice's intention to remove evil actually created more evil, although this is a regular pattern in conflict and politics. Particularly interesting to Alice's story is how the discourse surrounding her actions frames her behaviour as highly gendered and extremely stereotypical. For example, the argument that her decisions were based on failed marriages, inability to conceive children, rumoured prostitution and witchery.

The narratives that surround women who break the gendered expectations are not new and, particularly, there stands a long history of women being seen as morally incapable or inadequate in comparison to their 'male' counterparts. Therefore, this thesis intends to continue the conversation, especially the examination of the relationship between assigned gendered behaviour and evil. However, it will also progress to examine our view of actors, in addition to consideration of the often-unasked question: "what is evil itself?", whilst examining the relationship between gender, morality and evil that often frames this question. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to question how stories of evil are constructed and how this impacts the moral agency of those in the study of evil. It will look at how feminist ethics can provide new reflections on questions of agency and evil.

In order to answer these questions, this thesis will build upon two different areas of knowledge. Firstly, it will take on the daunting task of challenging traditional moral theory, simultaneously identifying how this legacy is gendered. This task will involve asking how and why moral theory is constructed and who is constructing it. As the study of moral theory spans millennia, it is essential to reevaluate current literature and examine how it is being studied to highlight the power in doing so. This thesis will also engage with the study of gender, particularly gender and violence, which has emerged predominantly in the past 50 years. By bringing these two areas together, supported to a lesser extent by other areas of study, I feel that a new and necessary conversation can emerge.

The aim of this study is to investigate how moral agency is constructed within stories of evil through a gendered lens. Although this thesis could have focused on multiple other factors to examine the relationship between gender, evil and agency, I chose to limit my research to western and, primarily, Anglo-American cultures. Arrival at this decision was difficult, due to the existing western dominance within the study of International Relations, however, I believe that an internal reflection is needed when examining gender, evil and agency within morality. One of the fundamental arguments in this thesis is that evil is presented as external. I argue that evil is seen as a foreign concept, external to our constructed notions of humanity and human behaviour. Thus, I wish to examine the tension created when this often external, ostracised subject is internalised. Therefore, I will examine how we perceive evil in our own cultures and communities. The foundation for my study was a framework based upon western thought, with the awareness that these are shaped by a shared history of colonialism. I have also included stories from beyond the west: the primary example of this being my Critical Discourse Analysis of Alice Auma/Lakwena. I feel that these stories are important as they show the tension of how evil is told externally. This examination, therefore, adds to the current literature on agency and feminism within International Relations.

This thesis challenges the dominant narratives of evil, highlighting how the masculine approach to telling stories of evil has silenced moral agency. It does so by using feminist ethics and particularly feminist relational ontologies to provide new understanding of questions of agency and evil. Here, the focus is not on how responsibility is prescribed in these questions, but how gendered agency is narrated in stories of evil and the power behind this narration.

Chapter one critically questions the existing narratives of gendered expectations of behaviour and morality, highlighting how these expectations are engrained in gendered stories of evil. This chapter questions how moral agency is gendered looking briefly how agency is understood in International Relations generally and then specifically focusing on feminist International Relations approaches to (moral) agency.

Building upon this, chapter two considers how to study the problem of moral agency and evil and construct a methodological framework using feminist ethics. It begins by arguing the need for an ontological relational feminist approach over a general feminist approach. This chapter engages with the work of Joan Tronto, Fiona Robinson, Margaret Urban Walker and Kimberly Hutchings to highlight the many merits of a feminist relational ontology. It then moves to look at some of the shortcomings of a strict feminist relational ontological approach, especially when studying morality and stories of evil. Therefore, the chapter responds to critical (poststructural, queer, postcolonial and black) feminist literature to outline an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework.

Chapter three employs this framework to further investigate stories of evil. I argue the central nature of the role of humanity, monstrosity and intentionality, to evil in western thought, facilitating a discussion of this evil which examines key patterns in the literature and highlights how stories of evil are ambiguous. The chapter not only highlights the historical contextualization of evil and women but how the study of evil, within moral theory, is itself gendered. Here, it argues that the masculine approach to evil is rooted in abstraction, with the rational autonomous man as the primary agent. The chapter concludes by showing, through an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, how this masculine approach to narrating evil has silenced moral agency.

Chapters four and five further evidence how stories of evil silence moral agency, through use of two case studies. The first case study explores a different story of evil from the prominent rhetoric of rape culture in the west. Through an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, it shows how cultural, patriarchal and racist norms have shaped societies, with a focus on the UK, leading to a single *real* rape narrative. I explore the metanarrative of rape, framed within Feminist International Relations approaches and challenge the assumption that rapes are only legitimate if they are committed by an unknown monster in an unsafe location. Although, most attacks of sexual violence are incompatible with this narrative, meaning that both victims and perpetrators of rape within moral

agency are silenced. Therefore, this chapter outlines the power hierarchies and boundaries that form to reinforce this narrative.

The second case study explores the narratives around Ugandan rebel leader Alice Auma/Lakwena, offering a Critical Discourse Analysis of Alice's story. It highlights, through an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, that postcolonial legacies and gendered norms have constructed moral boundaries around Alice's complicated story. As a result, this 'blinds' readers from seeing her as a moral agent in her decision making during her leadership of the Holy Spirit Movement and quest to banish evil from the world.

The thesis concludes by discussing how this investigation questions our understanding of evil. It highlights power hierarchies established, within stories of evil, and explores how many stories are externalized. It also reflects on the use of an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework. Overall, this conclusion calls for an opening of stories, even of evil, to allow for moral agency to be seen.

Chapter 1: Gendering Behaviour and Moral Agency

1.1 Introduction

> The words flow almost too easily in our psychoanalytic age: we are dealing with an existential terror of women, of the "mouth of the womb", stemming from a primal anxiety about male potency, tied to a desire for self (phallic) control; men have deep-rooted castration fears which are expressed as a horror of the womb (Dworkin 1974 p.134).

This chapter will question the relationship between gender and morality, in the context of the stories of gender and evil. For millennia there has been a long-standing debate on if and how the sex categories of female, male, and those in between have an impact on social characteristics. The relationship between sexual organs and chromosomes and the expected behaviour of individuals has impacted societies on multiple levels including in the formation of governments, social norms and religious rules. Within western cultures, these expected behaviours have seen the female considered as lesser compared to male. This limits the lived and seen experiences of women, and diminishes the 'feminine' traits associated with being female. It has directly impacted the ontological and epistemological constructions of behaviour. This is the starting point for this chapter. I take a feminist poststructural view of sex and gender to trace how expected behaviours impact society's narration of women. I argue behavioural norms have led to a gendered construction of moral agency that sees the female as morally deficient.

I explore the wider literature of moral agency in International Relations before examining specific postcolonial and poststructural feminist approaches to questions of agency. These approaches highlight how women's agency is seen differently to that of men, but also that agency should not be limited to been seen as a synonym of resistance. I use this exploration of agency in (feminist) International Relations as a platform to highlight how feminist ethics can bring new understandings to stories of evil.

1.2 Gendering Behaviour

My premise for this chapter, is to outline the gendered construction of expected behaviour and its relationship with morality, while acknowledging how this is located within my larger focus on stories of evil. Feminine qualities associated with women have led to a narrative of the female as being incapable of making informed decisions and thus an inadequate moral agent. Throughout this section, by examining constructed gendered behavioural norms, I will unpack how key traits have led to the questioning of women's agency. I will do so by providing an analytical review of key feminist thought.

There is a great legacy of society prescribing different gendered social norms, as Almond outlines (1989 p.42):

> There is a view that is as old probably as the human race, and certainly as old as Homer and the ancient Greeks, that there is structure that represents right for men: a composite of manly virtues such as courage, endurance, physical stamina, willingness and political judgment, and a corresponding but complementary conception of what is right for women, womanly virtues being seen a mixture of timidity, tenderness, compliance, docility, softness, innocence and domestic competence.

Born from these ethical virtues, contemporary norms have created a dichotomy where women are seen both as dangerous and irrational but also pure and in need of protection (Steans 2012 p.9), notably from their male superior counterparts. This is intrinsically linked to the binary of seeing men as beings of reason, and women as not (Sjoberg 2011 p.228). These harmful and incorrect norms reflect a society and knowledge body that favours the so called masculine characteristics of rationality, endurance and reasoning (Tickner 1992 p.3), despite individuals of all genders having all or none of these traits. This binary of seeing women and men as distinct has allowed for a hierarchy to emerge, and thus the subjection of women. This is a starting point for seeing women as inadequate moral agents. Therefore, there is a need to unpack the gendered

understanding of behaviour and norms and reflect on the theories behind these constructions.

The root of gendered behavioural understanding is biological determinism, which falsely argues that both gender and sex are interlinking binaries. The male, with sperm-producing sexual organs and Y chromosomes is placed directly opposite to the female, who produces non-mobile ova and has the facilities to bear children, with two X chromosomes (Braendle and Felix 2006). The first difficulty from this constructed binary is that sex is not simply binary, but a fluid multidimensional spectrum. As an individual has both male and female prescribed sexual organs, or neither, Judith Butler argues it is discursive to fix gender to sex parts (2007 p.9):

> The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and *woman* and *feminine* a male body as easily as a female one.

Placing the male and the female in opposition excludes the varied and vast number of intersex individuals. Furthermore, those who may possess certain 'biological' features but are unable to meet the requirements bound in the definition of their sex may be seen as inadequate. The most prominent example of this, are females who are unable to bear children and thus are seen as incomplete women (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007 p.34, Åhäll 2012 p.292).

This permeates to the second difficulty of a sex binary, the construction of an interlinking binary of gender. In simpler terms, 'the male' will carry certain characteristics and behavioural norms that are masculine, and females, similarly, will have feminine qualities. For example, a prominent myth is that women have feminine qualities of being emotional and irrational in comparison to men who

have masculine sensible and rational qualities (Butler 2012 p.9). Expanding on this, females may be seen as caring and nurturing due to their role as (potential) mothers. In contrast, men are narrated as courageous and strong due to their position as providers for the family. Subsequently this myth is linked to sexuality, where heteronormative narratives have coupled the male and female as a natural occurrence (Steans 2012 p.28). This emerges from gender essentialism, which can be understood as the perceived notion that sexes/genders have set essential behaviours and qualities which are biological and thus universal (Steans 2012 p.10).

These gender essentialist behavioural norms that are formed from this binary, are incorrect on the most primitive level. For example, a female may be nurturing, rational and sexually attractive to other females. Therefore, there is a need to see that norms are based on spectra which are not interlinked to sexual organs. Judith Butler highlights this through a genealogical deconstruction. Her conception of performativity outlines that norms are unstable as they are often unable to be exhibited, repeated or reappropriated, as “no social formation can endure without becoming reinstated, and that every reinstatement puts the 'structure' in question at risk suggests the possibility of its undoing is at once the condition of possibility of the structure itself" (Butler 1997 p.14).

Biological determinism prescribing gendered behaviour and values is ingrained in most societies, and is prominent in the west (Okin 1989). These constructed norms are limiting to all genders, but most interesting to this thesis is that these prescriptions often lead to the subordination of women. In separating the female and the male as polar opposites a distinct difference emerges between the sexes and/or genders and thus there becomes the possibility for one to become less than the other. This separation is essential in the subordination of women, as Frye explains (1983 p.35):

> For efficient subordination, what’s wanted is that the structure not appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human decisions or customs, but that it appear natural - that it appears to be a quite direct

> consequence of facts about the beast which are beyond the scope of human manipulation or revisions. It must seem *natural* that individuals of the one category are dominated by individuals of the other and that as groups, the one dominates the other. To make this seem natural, it will help if it seems to all concerned that members of the two groups seem *very* different from each other, and this appearance is enhanced if it can be made to appear that within each group, the members are very like one another.

Therefore, it is possible to see how these constructed norms, which incorrectly mirror sex, can create the illusion that there is a set of values and behaviours universal to all women, such as being emotional or irrational. As these 'natural' occurrences are inevitable, women are in need of help from the male, who is reasoned and rational (Steans 2012 p.9). Yet, as I will continue to explore, women are portrayed as inherently dangerous to their male counterparts, largely due to their inability to control themselves, and thus seen as the lesser sex (Frye 1983). Furthermore, when women transgress their expected behavioural norms they are not only seen as incapable of making 'rational' decisions but also as not knowing the consequences of these decisions.

This binary is further problematic in the basis of a patriarchal society, which has been formed to value masculine qualities. For example, although a male may not be naturally assertive or aggressive, he is often rewarded in the workplace for being so, however a female is often punished for the same qualities as she is seen to be deviating from her expected behaviour (Frye 1983, Elshtain 1981, Elshtain 1995). Women, who are supposed to have feminine qualities, have been relegated to the home or private sphere, to utilise these values. Thus, women's identities are constructed through stories of the "nonheroics of taking-care-of" Elshtain 1995 p.165). Within these stories are the patriarchal values that oppress women, understood as "a system of interrelated barriers and forces which reduce, immobilize and mold people who belong to a certain group, and effect their subordination to another group" (Frye 1983, p.33).

As there is an increased number of women in the workforce, one could argue these values are no longer true. Yet, although societies have shifted away from less gendered conditions, these beliefs are still exercised in multiple ways. This is evidenced by the unfair pay gap between genders, which is deepened further by race (Hegewisch and Williams-Baron 2018). In addition, these gender essentialist behavioural norms hinder greatly the lives of trans individuals.

Despite the vast majority of current feminist literature within Feminist International Relations arguing against essentialism, it is important to see the legacy of biological determinism within the subfield itself, as influential feminists still argue there is a fundamental gender difference (Gilligan 1982, Bloom 2011, Almond 1989). But more so, it must be seen how these constructed norms feed into wider ideas in International Relations and moral theory.

The gendering of morality has longevity within the discourse on moral thought, with notable thinkers such as Hegel, Rousseau and Freud arguing that females are inadequate moral decision makers (Pateman 1980 p.24). The moral deficit of women is recurrent in political and social theory. Carol Pateman explores the portrayal of women as lacking a sense of justice due to their sexual disorder. Philosophers such as Rousseau and Freud have argued that biologically, women are a disruptive influence on civil life (Pateman 1980 p.22), and claim a scientific male superiority over women (Pateman 1980 p.25):

> The source of the disorder of women lies in their boundless sexual passion. Women, he (Rousseau) claims, foreshadowing Freud, are unable to subdue and sublimate their sexual desires in the same manner, or to the same extent as men. Men are the active and aggressive sex and are 'controlled by nature'; passive and defensive women only have control of modesty.

This disruptive influence is further entrenched as the values of love and family, seen to be core values for women, were thought to conflict directly with justice (Pateman 1980 p.24). This disorder is frightening to a patriarchal order as it can

cause chaos, this is mirrored in both the nature of women and the impact on society (Pateman 1980 p.21):

> "Disorder" can be used in either of two basic senses: first, there is the sociopolitical sense of "civil disorder" as in a rowdy demonstration, a tumultuous assembly, a riot, a breakdown of law and order. Second, "disorder" is also used to refer to an internal malfunction of an individual, as when we speak of a disordered imagination or a disorder of the stomach or intestines. The term thus has application to the constitution of both the individual and the state.

Thus, women are disordered through their being or nature and so a further disruption is exerted in the social and political sphere (Pateman 1980 p.22). Therefore, there is a shared narrative between gender, sexual activity, immorality and irrationality, which leads to the questions of illegitimacy of action. This narrative, which will be core to my entire thesis, not only shows the legacy of gender behaviour but also how this impacts the way in which women are seen as moral agents. In turn this limits the expected behaviour of women, as Elshtain famously quoted, we "know women can be brave but doubt they can be ruthless" (Elshtain 1995 p.173). Consequently, the biological determinist categorisation of women as natural, constructed as universally posing a set of values, boxes them into certain behavioural norms, which I will continue to explore.

The relationship between gender, violence and war is an excellent example of gendered behaviour and morality, as it both creates and reinforces gendered identities. Furthermore, the relationship between gender and violence is fundamental to my exploration of the narration of evil, with violence being central to an understanding of evil. Essentialist biological determinist norms, discussed within this chapter, have constructed another binary: men as the legitimate actors of violence, in contrast to the illegitimate female fighter (Elshtain 1995, Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). This has largely been formed as traditionally women have been narrated as peaceful, underpinned by their supposed maternal nature (Ruddick 1980). In addition, the female actor of

violence is viewed as either passive or irrational and possessing excessive emotionality (Enloe 2004, Sjoberg *et al*. 2011, Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). These often conflicting views mean that women are placed outside of the sphere of violence.

Jean Bethke Elshtain (1995 [1987]) outlines these gendered narratives of violence in her fundamental book *Women and War*. She provides an excellent exploration of the traditional myths and epistemological problems of gender binaries and conflict. The outcome of Elshtain's exploration is to highlight two key narratives: the construction of men as 'Just Warriors' and women as passive 'Beautiful Souls'. The feminine Beautiful Soul, is formed from Hegelian thought, and this identity is built on the idea of purity and pacifism (Elshtain 1995 p.4). Women in conflict are narrated as representations of Christian mothers and the Madonna (Elshtain 1995 p.127). Due to their role in the reproductive process as life-givers they are seen non-combatants (Elshtain 1995 p.183). Therefore, the Beautiful Soul is seen as the supportive mother of not only of the male soldier, but also the nation. This is in contrast to the masculine Just Warrior, who is a reluctant fighter, using violence only to defend and protect the innocent and to prevent 'wrong' (Elshtain 1995 p.127). This narrative uses powerful images of sacrifice to form the male identity of life-takers (Elshtain 1995 p.209).

The Just Warrior and Beautiful Soul identities are formed from a cultural legacy, as Elshtain outlines (1995 p.4):

> We in the west are heirs of a tradition that assumes an affinity between women and peace and between men and war, a tradition that consists of culturally constructed and transmitted myths and memories.

This historical trajectory creates stories that women, seen as peaceful, are outside of the sphere of war and the public realm, while men are embedded in the public as soldiers/warriors who, through rational choice, defend the state. As Elshtain continues (1995 p.165):

> Viewing themselves through the lens of this construction, men see edifying tales of courage, duty, honour, glory as they engage in acts of protection and defence and daring: heroic deed doing. Women see edifying stories of nobility, sacrifice, duty, quiet immortality as they engage in defensive acts of protection, the non-heroics of taking-care of.

These narratives are a powerful tool in exploring how gender impacts the way individuals are judged on their actions, and thus morality. It's particularly important for highlighting how women are constructed outside of the sphere of violence, which is something I shall continue to explore. This reinforces the biological determinism construction of women as emotional and irrational, seen as ideal mothers rather than fighters. This is outside of the constructed masculine values of perceived soldiers and legitimate actors of war.

It is important to identify that these gendered understandings of violence and women further engrain and separate the binary of women and men: women are seen within the framework of conflict as the 'collective other', either the militant mother or pacifist protestor (Elshtain 1995 p.3-4). By rejecting these prescribed cultural norms, it may appear that women who fight or inflict violence are asserting agency, however Ahall (2012 p.287) instead argues that they are seen as cultural exceptions who actually do not challenge traditional gender boundaries. The rare breaking of cultural norms is shown in having to identify a 'female' soldier or terrorist, rather than the presumed male (Alison 2004 p.460). Gender roles are very important to any culture, and in breaking their maternal 'Beautiful Soul' identity women who commit acts of violence challenge the masculine binary (Alison 2004 p.460). Further interlinked into the gendered behaviour of women who commit acts of violence is their motivation, which has great impact on their morality, as women are said to transgress their life-giving to a life-taking role in order to avenge or defend their spouse or children or if they are manipulated to do so by a man (Bourke, 1999 p.318, Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007). In either situation the woman is held under male control and thus her ability to act within moral conventions is decided through gendered notions. This

is also replicated in the narratives of women who kill do so as they are 'super feminine', building on an understanding of women as both rational and crazy. Thus, female killers are often feared, seen to be willing to act in ways men will not. Built within these motherhood narratives, "maternal passions, biological urges, transform women into fearsome killers" (Åhäll 2012 p.292). Thus, "the subject performs femininity through a naturalized life-giving identity, female subjects are also represented as agents of political violence through masculinity and a lack of motherhood" (Åhäll 2012 p.292).

Building on this exploration of gendered behaviour and violence, it is important to consider how these constructed norms are dependent upon women's role in society. Through the Beautiful Soul narrative women are external to war and therefore outside civic society (Elshtain 1995 p.121) Historically, citizenship has been foregrounded in conflict: the legacy of the warrior citizen means that ideas of citizenship are born from a militarised and thus masculinised understanding (Elshtain 1995 p. 48). Elshtain highlights how women are unable to gain this civic virtue and therefore cannot become full citizens. Iris Young explores the state as the protector. Using gender as a tool for interpretation she argues (2003 p.2):

> An exposition of the gendered logic of the masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home. In this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience.

Hence, the state becomes a form of protection but also control, embedded within the constructed norms of women (and children) as vulnerable as thus in need of protection from the heroic male (Elshtain 1995). This enables the masculine state to assert power through the notion of protection. But this power is a pastoral one in which the state exploits its citizens for its own gain (Young 2003 p .6).

This is internally linked to the prefixed identity of women as life-givers and men as life-takers (Elshtain 1995 p. 165). The legacy of disabling women's ability to gain citizenship enforced the gendered division of the male public and female private sphere (Elshtain 1995 p.93). The female as the mother is a prominent motif in the construction of gendered behaviour, particularly when looking at violence. This is intrinsically formed from the notion of life-giver, as the bearer of a child, and legitimises women as peace-keepers through this maternal, passive role (Segal, 2008 p.23). This focus on women's behaviour due to their (potential) motherhood is essentialised and restricts a woman's identity to her body through her womb. This limits how a woman can be constructed as a multidimensional moral being. When focusing on gendered behaviour, the narration of women's motivation through the narrow lens of maternity distorts the discussion on women who commit acts of violence. Caron Gentry's notion of 'twisted maternalism' outlines this, exploring how female Palestinian suicide bombers are removed from agency due to their maternal or child status, objectifying the women (Gentry, 2009 p.242). The role of the mother is a principle metanarrative of the female. These metanarratives, which I will explore throughout this thesis, reduce the individual to a prescribed singular story. If the individual disrupts the expected norms within this story their behaviour is seen as illegitimate. This forms the foundation for women constructed as inadequate moral actors.

A recurrent theme in this thesis will be how women have been constructed as external to morality. In a gendered structure, women strive for passivity in order to appear 'good' (Dworkin 1974 p.48). This is in contrast to a historical trajectory that has linked women and femininity with the devil and carnality (Dworkin 1974 p.48). Andrea Dworkin outlines how this dichotomy of women as passive and evil is constructed in western society, one of the most prominent ways being through fairy tales (1974 p.48):

> There are two different types of woman. There is the good woman. She is the victim. There is the bad woman. She must be destroyed. The good women must be possessed. The bad women must be killed or punished. Both must be nullified.

The 'good' woman or victim, classically a beautiful princess who receives a happy ending in the fairy tale, leads women to think passivity is good. For instance, the good woman receives the happy ending by being passive, victimised or asleep and "the happy ending is when we are ended, when we live without our lives or not at all" (Dworkin 1974 p.49). This is in contrast to the bad woman, the evil step mother or witch, who is ugly[1] in her evil and cruelty; as a protagonist she must be destroyed in order for the male saviour to "fully flower" (Dworkin 1974 p.48).

In both narratives, women act without morality, and are saved by the men who process the women, either rescuing them or destroying them. The narration of women acting without agency directly impacts their ability to have agency: without a moral compass a women cannot make ethical decisions and be autonomous in society. This gives women less credibility to act as they are being acted for. Although these characters appear only in stories, the constant and repeated rhetoric of these stories of passive women having a happy ending has a serious impact on how women are viewed beyond fairy tales. As Dworkin explains (1974 p.53):

> It is the collective scenario of male/female. It is the collective scenario of master/slave. It contains cultural truth: men and women, grown now out of the fairy-tale landscape into the castles of erotic desire, woman, her carnality adult and explicit, her role as victim adult and explicit, her guilt adult and explicit, her punishment lived out on her flesh, her end annihilation-death or complete submission.

Thus, Dworkin highlights how an understanding of agency must be aware of gendered structures. I have highlighted how gendered norms prescribe behavioural standards to women. Here dichotomous stories are interweaved in society, the passive 'good women/ victim' is interweaved with the 'beautiful soul' narrative. In both, women are supportive of the male protagonist; in both, women are selfless and supportive. The beautiful soul has more agency, in supporting the

[1] "The link between awareness of beauty and recognition of the moral good was a fundamental aspect of Plato's ethical theory" (Almond p. 1989.p.48).

soldier, than the 'good women' who is saved by him. This is opposite to the disordered women, or the evil women who disrupts the protagonist male's journey.

These stereotypes of women as either passive victims or violent bodies of evil both reinforce binaries of gendered behaviour and support patriarchal values by dehumanising women and showing them as needing to be controlled/saved by men (Menon 2006 p.11). Women's relationship with evil is explored in my third chapter.

1.3 Moral Agency

On the most fundamental level agency is an actor's ability to perform acts and repeat these acts in a new way, thus "agency is then to be located within the possibility of variation of that repetition" (Butler 2003 p.198). Within western modern culture, moral agency places the autonomous individual actor as the authorised central agent who has the ability to freely choose his actions (Sondermann *et al.* 2018 p.3). Agency is regarded as a property of the actor (Sondermann *et al.* 2018 p.2), therefore agency relates to events which have been enacted by an individual and that would not have happened otherwise. Agency is then associated with an individual being able to formulate preferences and to develop strategies for their realisation, referring to an internal conversation.

In this thesis I will focus on a moral agency. The definition of moral agency is disputed, by largely, "moral agency entails capacities for deliberating over possible courses of action and their consequences and acting on the basis of deliberation" (Erskine 2003 p.6). Here, it is important to distinguish between moral and political agency; as I have explored, moral agency is the ability of an agent to "formulate strategies either in conformity with a set of rules or in pursuit of some good" (Lang 2008 p.100). In comparison, political agency is an agent's ability to engage in a community. This may be prescribed from an authority within this community, such as official notions of citizenship, or it may be self-stated from a person's own activity working for or against a political cause (Lang 2008 p.102).

Yet, not all agents are considered a moral agent, certain social requirements, such as age, intelligent or gender are often a prerequisite to functioning as a moral agent and having the capacity to make ethical decisions. These competencies are fundamental to being seen as a moral agent as Erskine outlines (2008 p.700);

> Moral agents have capacities for deliberating over possible courses of action and their consequences and acting on the basis of this deliberation. Such capacities render moral agents vulnerable to the assignment of

> duties and the apportioning of moral praise and blame in relation to specific actions and in the context of enabling conditions.

Thus, morality does not occur in a vacuum but is created and reinforced by community.

Calhoun begins to outline how morality and agency functions as a social decision (2016 p.1):

> One of the central moral tasks of agents is to "get it right"- to latch on to the correct normative principles and apply them correctly, to grasp what traits are really virtuous or vicious and not merely thought so, to figure out what they are made to feel ashamed or guilty for.

For the agent to 'get it right' an evolving decision-making process must take place, where the agent has knowledge of social norms, morally right behaviour and the ability to decide the correct action in different situations (Sondermann *et al*. 2018 p.3). To achieve this knowledge the agent must have the ability to reflect critically on moral rules. This takes place in a *"hypothetical social world* populated by hypothetical agents who are capable of accessing the reasons there are for everyone's endorsing just this set of rules, where the rules differ in kind from social norms" (Calhoun 2016 p.6).

This hypothetical social world is often the starting point in moral theory, particularly in an analytical approach. This leads to questions around the normativity of moral theory and particularly how much choice the moral agent has. Consequently, this internal conversation must be an authentic one, rather than just processes of "simulacra of morality" (Macintyre 2013 p.3). This becomes further difficult as these moral explorations are shaped by our own moral responses (Taylor 1989 p.8). Therefore, a loop emerges to establish who decides the realms of morality and who acts within these.

Different perspectives can be taken of moral agency. The three most common are: firstly, an individualist approach, rooted greatly in a hypothetical world, where the autonomous agent is responsible for their own decisions. Secondly, a

collective approach which sees multiple individuals responsible for their own autonomous actions; this approach is especially important when reviewing agency at an international level. Finally, there is a social approach which highlights how external actors and structures may impact an agent's ability to make moral decisions (Sondermann *et al*. 2018 p.6).

A further approach is that of Constructivist, which highlights that agency is not simply a result of free choice but conditioned by social practices and expressions of habit (Sondermann *et al*. 2018 p.2). Further breaking down these approaches, the individualist and often collective approach is rooted in a focus on rationality. This traditional approach to studying ethical problems is highly masculine, as it values the previously discussed norms of reason and unemotional logic. This focus on masculine values when studying moral agency will be fundamental to this thesis, and I will discuss it in greater detail in a later chapter. However, for the purpose of gaining a starting point to explore moral agency, this is a key factor when reflecting on this rational approach to agency. This approach excludes any role norms and social institutions in meaning-making (Sondermann *et al*. 2018 p2). Thus, the agent is understood as a "self-determined chooser able to follow objective moral principles" (Hoover 2012 p.237). This rational approach is often born from a Kantian liberal conception of morality and agency, thereby the individual is exercising their own will rather than human influence in the pursuit of a virtuous moral life (Muhanna 2015 p.13).

A social approach to moral agency is more convincing than one premised on the autonomous agent. Using a context method, that includes a focus on unequal power distribution, enables the social approach to look beyond moral obligations and instead highlights how power inequalities are formed from social structures (Hoover 2012 p.234). Therefore, within this social approach an individual is not seen as an isolated actor but rather as a "socially, environmentally, and materially embedded subject" (Chandler 2018 p.183). Both the rational and social approach are important in facilitating a gendered interpretation of agency which I will soon undertake, most notably because they enable a starting point to see how gender,

and other intersections, fit within current attitudes to how moral agents make ethical decisions.

Refining this exploration to a moral understanding of agency, it can be broadly defined as "people's understanding and experience of themselves (and others) as agents whose morally relevant actions are based in goals and beliefs" (Pasupathi and Wainryb 2010 p.55). Yet, there are a number of questions that emerge from the definition. Firstly, who is considered a person? As I will explore throughout this thesis, there are shifting definitions of who is considered to be in the realm of the moral and political sphere. Secondly, what is considered as an 'understanding' or 'experience'? This question is important when the majority of ethical scholarly research has been undertaken with a masculine approach to morality, which values reason and rationality, as I will review later. Finally, ambiguity in this definition is furthered by the phrase 'morally relevant' as one can question who gets to decide what is morally relevant and what is not.

A final factor when exploring moral agency is to consider how this is implicated in an international setting. This is particularly important when thinking how we hold moral agents accountable for their actions, as traditionally primary agents in the international spheres have been states embedded in a logic of sovereignty (Sondermann *et al*. 2018 p.4). An expansion of this is to examine whether formal institutions and international organisations can be moral agents (Erskine 2003). However, increasingly "responsibility is assigned to autonomous agents who have an obligation to respect universal human rights" (Hoover 2012 p.238). This is especially so, as moral concern is not restricted to state borders and "sovereignty does not provide immunity from judgement" (Hoover 2012 p.234). A central concern of this thesis will be how moral agency and norms can translate internationally.

1.4 Moral Agency in International Relations

Within International Relations, little attention is paid to identifying agents, (Erskine 2003 p.2), despite questions of moral agency being fundamental to studying world politics (Erskine 2003 p.699). Overall, there is a lack of consensus on who is considered to be a (moral) agent within International Relations. Consequently, two patterns of thought can be identified within this disagreement. The first pattern, central to traditional International Relations theory, is the state as the primary agent of concern. This argument can be extended further to consider whether other international bodies, such as institutions, can or should be considered as agents. The second school of thought, emerging from a liberal cosmopolitanism approach, focuses on rational individuals as the agents of concern.

A dominant focus within International Relations is that the state is the primary, and sometimes only, agent of concern. This can even form the definition of the field, as Wight argues: "without the notion of the 'state-as-agent', IR appears to be little other than a macro-sociological exercise in political theory or history" (Wight 2006 p.177). This focus is shared by the three main approaches to the study of International Relations: Realist, Liberalist and Constructivist approaches. As states are the dominant agent in International Relations, and thus are central to questions on moral agency, Brown highlights that (2003 p.51):

> There is no generally agreed understanding as to what the term means, but it is clear that the international community is presumed to possess agency, the ability to act in the world. Moreover, this agency is explicitly moral, in so far as a characteristic usage is to suggest that the international community has a duty to do such-and-such- come to the aid of famine victims, protect the human rights of East Timorese, or whatever.

Although moral agency is not explicitly spoken about in International Relations, it is implicitly explored. The debate surrounding states as primary agents is extended to question whether institutions should be agents. Here, agencies such

as intergovernmental bodies can be questioned to see if they hold the same moral responsibility in the international sphere as states (Erskine 2003).

The other approach within International Relations, is a focus on the rational individual, emerging from a cosmopolitanism and liberal approach. As Ainley outlines, (2008 p.39):

> Liberalism, which developed in the European Enlightenment alongside a resurgent cosmopolitanism provides the dominant mainstream interpretation of the individual in contemporary IPT, seeing her as volitional, rational, and autonomous, and it is these characteristics that are seen to justify both protecting the individual through a system of human rights and holding her responsible for the evil we observe in the contemporary world.

The individual of focus is seen to act with rationality and intentionality, using internal capacities (Ainley 2008 p.39).

This focus on the individual is often constructed in abstraction, rather than focusing on lived experiences of agents. Instead writings (especially about evil) are formed by impersonal generalizations (Kellsion 2019 p.1). Within International Relations this is highly problematic as the concept of an international individual agent "ignores the enormous influence of social and environmental factors upon human actors" (Ainley 2008 p.38). Thus, although there is a focus on the individual with International Relations and stories of evil, this does not allow for the lived experience of multifaceted individuals living in social relationships.

In thesis I will challenge the state level and rationalist dominant approach to agency within International Relations, by reflecting on the topic through a feminist and poststructural lens. Within poststructural feminism, there is no single understanding of agency (Shepherd 2012 p.6):

A poststructural account of agency is not located within the pre-existing subject, nor is wholly determined by the structural hierarchies and institutional

arrangements of power s/he inhabits. The agent subject is an effect of power as well as (rather than) its possessor or its dispossessed.

This focus on power is a useful tool when exploring agency, as it highlights a multilateral understanding of the numerous external effects and internal motivations an agent may hold.

Furthermore, this focus on power has led poststructural feminist approaches to question the subject of agency, as feminist research will often focus on the external experiences of women. Therefore, there is a need to construct a view of agency that allows for both a possessor and dispossessor of behaviour and norms. This has an impact on understanding moral agency, most notably the use of creativity to understand agency, as "agency as creative conformity moves away from an idea of empowerment that demands on an autonomous place of perfect freedom" (Bucar 2010 p.682). This focus on the productive aspects of agency is important as moral decisions are not formed in a vacuum; instead individuals are faced with complexity and each individual may respond to situations in "unanticipated and innovative ways which may hinder, reinforce or catalyse social change" (McNay 2000 p.5).

Expanding on this analysis we can see the female agent is formed in opposition to the male (McNay 2000 p.8):

> This is most evident in the description of the phallocentric construction of feminine identity, which is constructed in such univocally negative terms – women as double lack – that it is difficult to see how it connects to the concrete practices and achievements of women as social agents.

Thus, the female agent is predetermined as incompetent and so this collective narrative is formed in an abstraction that does not allow for multidimensional, dichotomous and lived stories to be told. Instead a narrative is repeated and prescribed which is formed as universal regardless of achievements (McNay 2000 p.8):

This uni-directional account of subject formation as the introjection of the repressive law of the symbolic results in a monolithic account of the phallocentric order which remains essentially unaltered by social and historical variations.

Therefore, constructed in a singular narrative and formed through patriarchal norms the 'female', seen as a universal unit, must overcome the prescribed story before she is assigned agency. A dominant response to forming female agency, when women have been formed as lesser than men, is to couple agency and autonomy. Consequently, the female actor finds that agency is freedom from oppressive structures.

Beyond recognising the singular constriction of the female agent, feminist International relations also allows us to look beyond 'rational' actors individual as well as focusing on the 'everyday'. Here we can redraw who or what is considered an agent of international relations, which I will explore throughout this thesis.

There is a wealth of literature which examines gender and agency through a feminist lens (Åhäll and Shepard 2012, Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, Sjoberg and Gentry 2015, Bloom 2011, Sjoberg 2011). However, this feminist focus on agency within International Relations is predominantly centres on political over moral agency.

Many of the underpinnings of this debate emerge from Jean Elshtain's famous book *Women and War*, in which she outlines two contrasting narratives: the Beautiful Soul, who is a passive woman outside the realm of war, yet supportive of the male soldier, and the Just Warrior; the chivalrous male soldier who fights war to protect his state, and the women and children (Elshtain 1995 p.165). This binary of women outside and men inside the realm of conflict has powerful implications for the narration of female actors of violence and politics. Feminism must address the "dichotomy between the allegedly 'mindless victim' and the allegedly 'empowered actor'" (Enloe 2014 p.8). This is further entrenched by the gendered construction of considering men to be rational, and thus the legitimate actors of violence, in contrast to women, who are portrayed as irrational and

overly emotional (Hutchison and Bleiker 2012 p.155). This aligns with my overarching arguments on gendered agency within evil.

Within the literature of gendered agency an important contribution to the field is the argument that women are not seen as legitimate actors in political violence. Sjoberg and Gentry's (2007) book: *Mothers, Monsters, Whores*, highlights how women who commit acts of political violence are not seen as sincere actors and instead their reasons are narrated using gendered stereotypes. They argue that denying this agency comes from a discomfort with acceptance that women would choose to inflict violence (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007 p.17), as "women's violence falls outside of these ideal-typical understandings of what it means to be a woman. These women fall into the historical categorisation of bad women" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007 p.2). Sjoberg and Gentry claim that although decisions are made within patriarchal structures, women actively choose to commit acts of violence for numerous reasons (*Ibid*). Furthermore, they argue that "narratives which 'other' violent women both represent the continuation of subordinating images of women in global politics and are complicit in that continued subordination" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007 p.56). Thus, the existing discourse on agency, gender and political violence compliments my own argument. In viewing the discomfort surrounding women who commit acts of violence and the further discomfort of stories of evil, women become even more external to these stories, as there is a resistance to discuss them. I will use this as an initial platform to address how female actors of political violence, particularly Alice, have been narrated as morally inadequate in stories of evil.

Sjoberg and Gentry's research has been extended within Feminist International Relations, largely focusing on war and political violence. Here, women "have demonstrated agency in relation to war in many ways, both in myth and reality" (Moore 2012 p.144). A main takeaway from this is the enforced hierarchy that the agency of men is seen as legitimate and that women's is not. This hierarchy is informed by men being seen as active and autonomous (Park-Kang 2012 p.122). Here, female agency is "negotiated through and limited to boundaries imposed by

ideas about what is considered appropriate behaviour for female bodies" (Åhäll 2012b p.183), which is formed through western norms (Narozhna 2012 p.94).

1.5 Using Poststructural and Postcolonial Feminism to Understand Agency

Poststructural feminism highlights the need to question the definition of morality away from a generic form to allow each agent authenticity. This means looking beyond mimicked impressions of agency, or there is a danger of repeating Bucar's mistake when researching. In reflective work, Bucar states that: "I had slid into a sort of academic ventriloquism, 'throwing my voice' to the women I study" (Bucar 2010 p.665). In order to do so, there is a need to question a common frame around morality that is invoked by stock concepts which create homogeneity in moral narratives (Calhoun 2016 p.213). Therefore, predetermined expectations are used to invoke these stock concepts or cogntive shortcuts, where presumed outcomes are already decided. For example, women who wear religious dress do so through lack of agency.

The need for authenticity means there is a focus on how autonomy, particularly a universal account of autonomy, is not useful. Butler finds challenging any notion of autonomy that establishes the individual as alone, free of social conditions, without dependence on social conditions, without dependence on social instruments of various kinds (Butler 2004 p.77). Thus, there is a need to find a method of using autonomy, whilst allowing a socially conditioned way of moral decision-making (Bucar 2010 p.679).

Subsequently, embedding a focus on agency that does not rely on an individual account of morality highlights the "necessity of contextualizing agency within power relations in order to understand how acts deemed as resistant may transcend their immediate sphere in order to transform collective behaviour and norms" (McNay 2000 p.4)

This is largely formed from a Foucaultian understanding of ethics, which argues that agency is formed from concrete structures of discourse and thus rejects the

universal agent of autonomy (Bucar 2010 p.669). This is achieved by viewing agency as embodiment, with a focus on lived experience. Through embodiment, an agent is not marginalised; instead they are seen in external constraining norms. This means that no individual is autonomous; instead they exist in social conditions that they must perform their agency within. This includes multiple intersections of race, sexuality and class. Therefore, there is a need to question limited interpretations of gendered agency, as Hollywood outlines (2004 p.524):

If part of the project of women's history is to hear the other—in all of her alterity—we cannot unquestioningly presume that our own explanatory and descriptive categories are valid and those of our subject are invalid.

There is a need to not only question how gender has impacted the sphere of concern for ethics and moral agents but how other intersections such as race and religion are included.

Yet, a definition of agency based largely on autonomy is problematic. Instead a gendered understanding of agency must challenge the imbedded notions of false consciousness and victimisation that feminists are often trapped within (Hemmings and Kabesh 2013 p.30). The female agent should be known not only as resistance to inequality and constraint. Therefore, "agency can easily be cited as a direct counter to coercion or oppression, rather than something that allows individuals or groups to negotiate the conditions they operate within" (Hemmings and Kabesh 2013 p.29). Thus, there is a need for agency to not simply become a resistance but facilitate multilateral and often contradictory ways of being.

I am not ignoring the importance of autonomy or presenting it as a singular understanding. However, there is a need to examine the reliance on autonomy, especially as feminist concepts of "autonomy are driven by nostalgia for a feminist revolutionary subject" (Hutchings 2013 p.14). In seeing agency as a value, an action or in-between there is a danger is trapping a definition of agency in a limited perspective as self-determination. This is underpinned by the agency/ coercion binary (Hutchings 2013 p.18):

> Feminist worries about abandoning autonomy as a value are tied up with the ways in which this is seen to undermine the possibility of telling the difference between agency (self-determination/autonomy) and coercion (otherdetermination/heteronomy).

Therefore, an aspect of examining agency must be to examine autonomy, however it cannot be limited to this.

I will now further unpack how to explore gendered agency and consider how this impacts moral agency. Muhanna highlights three theories of feminist moral agency (2015 p.15):

> Liberal, which considers individual autonomy as the determinant of women' agency; nonliberal, which views women's self-realization and autonomy as an outcome of their subordination by patriarchal cultural and religion and does not confine it to resistance against patriarchy; or poststructural, which views gender as contextually and historically constructed, as well as resisted and de-essentializing women's agency as a universal singular model.

As highlighted here, a liberal and nonliberal model is focused on an autonomous view of agency. One of the most prominent of the liberal thinkers was Susan Moller Okin, who viewed women's agency as fighting against constraining conditions (Okin 1989). Okin has been highly influential in prescribing this notion of gendered agency within the academic community (Bucar 2010 p.667).

This reliance on gender opposition is dominant in liberal accounts of feminism, but draws a tight circle around what is considered agency. Therefore, agency is often "analysed in terms of resistance to the subordinating function of power" (Mahmood 2005 p.154). The resistance and autonomy approach may seem useful on the surface but is restrictive around who is and what actions are of interest. Thus, prescribed moral hierarchies are reinforced in the realm of interest to liberal and nonliberal models of autonomy ones which focus on resistance from perceived aggressor. For example religions being seen as repressive. This often

'white' feminist approach does not allow for multiple ways of being, instead we must think of agency in multiple ways, as Mahmood, (2005 p.157) argues:

If we think of "agency" not simply as a synonym for resistance to social norms but as a modality of action, then this conversation raises some interesting questions about the kind of relationship established between the subject and the norm, between performative behaviour and inward disposition.

The decoupling of agency from the trope of resistance has great analytical return, most notably the articulation of the body inside numerous interpretations of the subject (Mahmood 2005 p.188). In other words, there is no present agenda for what agency can or should be. This is particularly empowering, when thinking how feminist attempts to reclaim agency from a masculine perspective can themselves be limiting, and only accommodate a section of women. Thus, it is important to question multiple forms of agency.

Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, I excluded liberal and nonliberal approaches to agency which simply rely on an autonomous approach that privileges certain women. A definition of agency as autonomy or the ability to act freely, does not amplify the multilateral decisions any agent must make while functioning within societal structures. Instead I will now turn to poststructural and postcolonial feminist approaches to agency to provide an analytical starting point for my understanding of moral agency.

A postcolonial perspective offers an applied approach to analysis where often poststructural accounts simply disrupt. This means a postcolonial perspective offers a more concrete way to view women's agency, particularly of those often excluded in the sphere of concern within moral theory. This postcolonial perspective is constructed by continuing to question the meaning of agency, similarly to that of poststructural approaches and then providing a concrete response to this, by suggesting how multiple forms of agency should be constructed.

Focusing on the fundamental work of Mahmood, often the starting point for other accounts of agency within postcolonial and gender perspectives, I will highlight the critical reflection she provides, when thinking about the meaning of agency. Mahmood highlights that human agency is constructed in an eschatological and social structure and is defined in terms of individual responsibility (Mahmood 2005 p.173). Building upon my previous discussion, Mahmood starts this questioning of agency by reflecting on the feminist focus on resistance (2005 p.153):

> Feminist scholarship emphasizes this politically subversive form of agency, it has ignored other modalities of agency whose meaning and effect are not captured within the logic of subversion and resignification of hegemonic terms of discourse.

Thus, a postcolonial perspective away from resistance, that highlights other forms of agency is crucial in any feminist analysis of moral behaviour.

Mahmood argues a feminist poststructural approach to agency is inadequate because it is too constrictive, as "the body's relationship to discourse is variable" and "it seldom simply follows either of the paths laid out" by feminist perspectives (Mahmood 2005 p.159). Mahmood highlights the need to see multiple paths of women, explored in their own ethical terms. These paths should not be seen, she suggests, as a Kantian universal rule of what is moral but instead a Foucaultian perspective of ethics. By focusing on a different side of ethical behaviour and questioning how moral agency is often constructed Mahmood provides a powerful argument in questioning how gendered agency is seen.

Therefore, in facilitating the perception of individual paths there is a need to see multiple forms of agency, as Muhanna outlines (2015 p.20):

> If we assume that change in women's agency is not merely contextually specific but also self-reflective, self-creative, and based on each individual's capacities and experiences, then it makes no sense to consider change based on singular models, including moral ones.

This is in line with Mahmood's definition of agency, which does not limit itself to definition rooted in autonomy as "agency in this form of analysis, is understood as the capacity to realize one's own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will, or other obstacles" (Mahmood 2005 p.8).

Therefore, this perspective provides a practical sense of how to practice analysis of a gendered moral agency, with a focus on often contradictory models of agency that are specific to the individual. This is formed from personal behaviours, characteristics, desires and cognition (Muhanna 2015 p.19). Therefore, by acknowledging the perceived notion of expected behaviour drawn from a biological determinist interpretation of gendered behaviour the multiple dichotomous narratives are seen, which limit the expected morality and intertwined agency of an individual. In seeing how this is constructed a questioning of the accepted behavioural norms produced from moral agency can take place.

In forming a moral agency with space for all genders, religion is often ostracised, seen as forming patriarchal culture, yet it should be included in the multiple perspectives on how agency is shaped. Religion is one of the intersections that create an interdependent actor's identity; within a moral identity this is intensified as traditionally the judgement of a deity has formed the basis for ethical behaviour. Religion can be used as an equaliser, as agents can resignify and redefine their "gender in relation to God but not in relation to men, emphasizing that God is the super power that both women and men have to submit to equally" (Muhanna 2015 p.16).

Furthermore, within a postcolonial perspective contradictory forms of agency are influenced by objective and subjective factors. This is outlined by Muhanna who argues that (2015 p.20):

> The multiple discourses a woman experiences in her lifetime and how she negotiates them in her day-to-day practice; the diverse individual history and personality of the agent; and the individual capacity and skills

> attained through the negotiation of religious knowledge and beliefs with material, professional, and social life.

This is important as it allows analysis to be contextual and specific, allowing individual paths to be seen.

This overview of moral agency through a postcolonial perspective has led to scholars such as Mahmood arguing against a single definition of agency (2005 p.188):

> I have insisted that it is best not to propose a theory of agency but to analyze agency in terms of the different modalities it takes and the grammar of concepts in which its particular affect, meaning, and form resides. Insomuch as this kind of analysis suggests that different modalities of agency require different kinds of bodily capacities, it forces us to ask whether acts of resistance (to systems of gender hierarchy) also devolve upon the ability of the body to behave in particular ways.

This means there is a need to consider different specificities in enacting, performing and transgressing moral behaviour (Mahmood 2005 p.188). This means moving away from a liberal perspective of the good, which is often limiting to women, especially those who sit on different intersections of race, religion and sexuality. A feminist relational approach to ethics offers a response to what is understood as the 'good' and provides a viable alternative. Care ethics highlights the interdependent vulnerability of all humans and shifts the primary actors to these relationships.

1.6 Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has provided a starting point for my analysis. In this varied literature review I have achieved two aims: firstly, to outline what the existing behavioural norms are that are prominent in western and in particular Anglo-American societies. The second was to unpack what moral agency is, and how it can be gendered.

The first aim of this chapter was to outline the historical and social norms that led to a biological deterministic understanding of sex and consequently gender. Here, the social construction of women formed as different to that of men. Particularly interesting for this thesis is how women are constructed as different moral agents to men, born from the view that women are lesser than men, and excluded from the public sphere. This impacts the relationship between gender and evil, where women are constructed as having a contradictory relationship with evil, being both pure and angelic, a beautiful soul and disorderly. This exploration is picked up further in my third chapter. This dichotomy is born from the need to seek to control women. Within the control of men women are pure and passive, but when they disrupt the expected gender norms they are dangerous.

In order to unpack how women are narrated as inadequate moral agents, I outlined the understanding of moral agency. I started by looking at the defitnion of agency and outlining how it is perceived within International Relations. I then highlighted how moral agency is largely ignored in International Relations theory widely and within Feminist International Relations perspectives which laergely focus on political rather than moral agency. Within this I argued the need to see a social understanding of agency that includes an awareness of how cultural norms impact behaviour. This argument impacted my reading of feminist approaches to moral agency. I excluded liberal and nonliberal approaches to agency which simply rely on an autonomous approach that privileges certain women. I explored the literature of poststructural and postcolonial feminism in relation to agency, which moves away from simply an idea of resistance,

especially of the patriarchy as the definition of agency. These two approaches critique a homogeneous and universal account of autonomy to highlight multiple ways of recognising moral behaviour within a societal structure that imposes norms. Building on this I outline a definition of agency that is not simply a focus on resistance or autonomy. Instead, I push for a multilateral argument that acknowledges the hierarchies present in moral decision-making.

Chapter 2: Constructing an Inclusive Feminist Relational Ontology Framework

2.1 Introduction

My previous chapter outlined how gendered understandings of ethics and behaviour has led to patterns of women being narrated as inadequate agents of morality. In this chapter I will build upon this to question how I will study these patterns, specifically with a focus on stories of evil. I will argue the need for a definite feminist approach in challenging these narratives in order prevent reproduction of the power hierarchies that enforced them. Thus, I will explore feminist approaches to construct a lens which can be used to reflect on problems of agency and evil. I will argue that a feminist relational ontological approach combined with postcolonial feminist theory is needed in order to provide an analytical and more inclusive framework for moral judgement, using the platform that previous care ethicists have provided, especially those who have engaged the theory critically such as Joan Tronto, Fiona Robinson and Kimberly Hutchings. Therefore, in this chapter I will establish feminist framework, for the use in the rest of my thesis.

I begin this chapter by outlining the importance of narratives and highlighting my choice to focus on these. I then outline how I will explore/challenge these narratives in my thesis by constructing a framework. I then outline the development of Care Ethics and subsequently, I hope to address underlying concerns of essentialism and parochialism. Consequently, I wish to engage with wider understandings of feminism – especially those that often fail to be included in mainstream versions of feminist ethics, such as postcolonial feminism, black feminism, queer theory and poststructural feminism, which are essential for understanding notions of relationships, power and authority – whilst being careful not to compact all these theories into a single stream of thought, or pick and choose from them. Furthermore, by outlining a framework based on a feminist relational ontology, I can address issues that emerge from a purely care ethics approach by engaging in a larger feminist conversation on a relational ontology. I ask why a specific feminist ontology is required, rather than an overarching one. I explore how a general feminist ontology is too vague to be the

basis for a moral framework, specifically looking at the blurring of feminist epistemology and ontology and how this vagueness can reinforce gendered notions of 'women's experience'. By highlighting the ambiguity of a general feminist ontology, in my thesis I call for a more specific ontology in order to explore moral issues and reinstate the strength of a feminist relational ontology. This is especially important in ambiguous stories of evil, which I will unpack in my following chapter.

Subsequently, I explore why my feminist framework needs to be intersectional. I then question the foundations of feminism in a feminist relational ontology and push for this to go beyond a western understanding to one which is more inclusive and highlights the power of relationships. I do so by engaging with the work of postcolonial, black and poststructural feminisms as well as queer theory, to show how a reflexive, intersectional and plural ontological foundation is needed. The final question asks what this new inclusive feminist relational ontology will look like and examine six core factors in how I will make this ontology into a framework to explore moral issues: outlining interdependent relationships, concrete situations, gendered structures, care as both a theory and practice, intersectionality and reflexivity.

2.2 Narratives

Narratives can be understood as the accounts of people or events. They are essential to the study of global ethics and politics as narratives "are a primary way by which we make sense of the world around us, produce meaning, articulate intentions, and legitimize actions" (Wibben 2011 p.2). As narratives have a metaphysical significance, as cognitive frameworks are (re) produced through ideas and ideals in stories that we tell (Shepherd 2012 p.3). Shepherd argues (2012 p.3):

> Our stories - those that we consume, those that we circulate and those that we hold close for fear of being judged - constitute our ontopolitical claims: where we began; where we might end; what we might do in our in-between days; who we are.

Stories are relational to contextual construction, they are a product of society and reflect the teller's beliefs and norms. Yet the beliefs of the teller are also produced through narratives, as stories construct the ontology of the tellers' and societies' identities. Thus, by exploring ideas of logocentrism, which are reproduced in social activities (Suganami 2008 p.356), I am able to view the relationships between individuals, all of whom are tellers and listeners of stories. Viewing language as "relationally structured and ontologically productive is coupled to a discursive epistemology" (Hansen 2006 p.15). This establishes the importance of stories, as they shape our understanding of the world.

The construction of narratives has great significance in the international sphere: stories form imperial hermeneutics, which police meaning in global politics as they attempt to regulate the boundaries of interpretation (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007 p.56). This mirrors the development of moral boundaries which dictate who or what is included in a story. Here, the privilege of who is telling a story and where it is being told has a powerful impact that should be noted. Within moral boundaries hermeneutics the analysis of tropes is essential, as narratives are "constitu[tive] of that world's reality" (Shepard 2012 p.9). Yet, stories also produce counter-narratives which create alternative meanings and

interpretations to challenge the 'master' or 'metanarratives.' A metanarrative is an overarching narrative, engrained in society, that shapes thoughts and accepted behaviour. Often a metanarrative is the accepted story mirroring cultural norms. Challenging this metanarrative leads to the illegitimacy of a new or counter narrative.

Therefore, we can see the need to analyse and discover stories as political activity within International Relations, as Wibben explains (2011 p.2):

> Narratives, as such, are sites of the exercise of power; through narratives, we not only investigate but also invent an order for the world. They police our imagination by taming aspirations and adjusting desires to social reality.

This power again reflects back to our moral boundaries as there is a need in this power to see if there is privilege from one perspective over another. Within this analytical focus the actor of interest is vital, as a narrative framework not only "reconceptualises the notion of interests, but it also puts the modern subject - both the individual and the state - on a more acceptable ontological footing" (Ringmar 1996 p.66).

Therefore, I am choosing to use narratives as a site of exploration for the lived realities of interdependent individuals who live in concrete locations, and as a way to see the relationships between these individuals. The rejection of a rationalistic approach to study as the only entry point is particularly useful in the focus on narratives.

Thus, I can use narratives to deconstruct gendered moral agency in stories of evil. This is especially important when considering the gendered foundations to the construction of morality. María Pía Lara provides a powerful analysis of this when examining the power of language and evil, showing how it can lead us to question moral thinking. Focusing on the problems of human cruelty belonging to the paradigm of evil, Lara explores how reflective judgements alter the narratives of evil. These judgements look at construction of human values and the way

"language can be *disclosive* by shocking us with new meaning and stimulate us to *reorient* our moral thinking" (Lara 2007 p.10). Thus, Lara evidences the magnitude of narratives in shaping moral thought within stories of evil. This is a platform I can use when studying the often indescribable subject of evil, as "disclosive language makes it possible to enter into a realm that we could not have imagined had a description not disclosed those dimensions that we could not see before" (Lara 2007 p.77).

As well as a broad analysis on narratives in this thesis, I use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This is an exploratory technique that examines texts and other social mediums to disclose patterns produced by power structures. CDA highlights how "social power, abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context" (Van Dijk 2003 p.353). Therefore, CDA goes beyond simply highlighting discourse structures, to looking at how they relate to social interactions and structures (ibid). This is produced as "beyond giving a language for speaking about (analyzing, classifying) phenomena, discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting toward, the world, and of operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth' while excluding other possible modes of identity and action" (Milliken 1999 p.229).

By focusing on the use of language I can examine how meaning is created through identity and difference. Particular focus is on feminist CDA, which aims to "show up the complex, subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, ways in which frequently taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic power relations are discursively produced, sustained, negotiated, and challenged in different contexts and communities" (Lazar 2007 P.142).

2.3 Why is a Specific Feminist Ontology Needed?

Thus far, I have established how narratives are important in viewing the way in which we reflect on moral agency and evil. I will now build upon this to highlight how and why I will be using a specific feminist approach to reflect upon these narratives. Feminist philosophers share knowledge and standards generated by feminist communities; communities whose political goals led, among other things, to the rethinking of the categories and assumptions of the academic disciplines (including philosophy and sciences), and to the development of categories and ontologies, theories, and methodologies. This has enabled feminists to uncover women's experiences and to reconstruct and re-evaluate the experiences of men and women (Hankinson 1993 p.149). General, often liberal feminist approaches to agency and narratives are abundant (Dworkin 1974, Frye 1983, Lara 1998, Enloe 2004). Recently, there has been an engagement of postcolonial and post structural feminist deconstruction of agency and narratives (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, Åhäll 2012, Åhäll and Shepard 2012). This is embedded as agency is central to feminist aims (Hutchings 2013). Yet I wish to focus specifically on moral agency, within stories of evil. I feel that when approaching this topic, a specific feminist ontology framework is required.

A feminist ontology is required as it challenges dominant production of knowledge and ontological questions are central as they concentrate on the nature of being (Furlong and Marsh 2010 p.185). Here, we reflect on fundamental questions of human existence and the realities that individuals and communities exist within. An ontology is a starting point to these questions and can be defined as "the researcher's view of reality (as opposed to epistemology, which is the researcher's view of the ways in which that reality is knowable)" (Maruska 2017 p.5). Whereas, a feminist ontology is critical and intersubjective; it highlights the constructed and reconstructed nature of world subject to interpretation. Central to a feminist ontology is that all genders matter, therefore rejecting traditional masculine approaches to studying International Relations.

Even if not recognised, ontology and epistemology underpin and shape any theory and method (Furlong and Marsh 2010 p.184). As a feminist scholar, it is very important to acknowledge these foundations which influence my research. Writing from a post-positivist or anti-foundationalist approach I believe there can be little objectivity when writing, as authors are not independent of knowledge but create it. This feminist ontology and epistemology is important as it challenges the traditional assumptions of knowledge and being (Steans 2012, Hankinson Nelson 1993).

A feminist ontology explores not only knowledge but how this knowledge has formed; it questions pure objectivity, which is to argue against the belief that there can be 'true' or 'pure' knowledge (Hirschman 1992 p.167). This is embedded in a rational approach that values logic and reason. This masculine knowledge becomes socially accepted and understood as the *human* experience (Hirschman 1992). A primary example of how a feminist ontology is useful in International Relations is the rejection of classical theory which portrays a masculinist knowing of the world, that draws upon "male-identified roles as the basis for political identity" (Steans 2012 p.53). This is embedded within traditional notions of the pursuit of instrumental interests and the importance of the 'sovereign man' as both an actor and knowing subject (ibid). In exposing these gendered roots to traditional theory a feminist ontology has great strength in challenging previous questions and findings in international relations.

Yet, a general feminist ontology is limited, as there are two fundamental issues that make defining this ontology difficult. The first of these problems is that there is no singular understanding of a feminist ontology, just as there is not a singular understanding of feminism, which will be addressed below. This leads to a blurring between an ontology and epistemology within feminism. The second problem is that this vagueness can lead to an essentialist understanding of gender that subconsciously enforces rather than rejects gendered behaviour.

The first, more substantial issue when exploring a feminist ontology is that there is no common understanding of what this ontology should be, as there is no

shared agreement between the different strands of feminism on the definition of knowing or being (Porter 1991 p.11). As Kimberly Hutchings highlights, feminist theory must be understood as encompassing a range of perspectives, which are influenced by different approaches that are not all mutually compatible (Hutchings 1999 p.82). Because a feminist ontology emerges from the knowledge of multiple and dichotomous lives, its origins must encompass many different women's lives; therefore, there is no typical or essential woman as a starting point (Harding 1993 p.65).

The multiple strands of feminism value different ontological underpinnings of gender itself. For example, "Enlightenment liberal feminists share a belief that women's and men's souls and rational faculties are the same; in other words, that women and men are ontologically similar" (Donovan 1996 p.8). However, this ontology is not shared. Essentialists' feminism sees women constructed in a different gendered ontological position to men because their starting point is biological determinism. In contrast, post-structural feminists reject the binary construction of gender, and instead often concentrate on discourse as an ontological focus (Steans 2012). Although a general feminist ontology can still provide a framework to question traditional approaches to theory it should be recognised as a collection of ontologies rather than a singular notion of being. Therefore, it is easy to say what a feminist ontology does rather than what it is. This vagueness is not a helpful starting point; while throughout this thesis I call for the need for wider multi-dimension approaches, here I pronounce the outline of my feminist ontology while acknowledging the parallel ontologies that exist. This pronounced understanding is needed in order to facilitate a framework that can provide a concrete starting point to challenge ambiguous and abstract masculine stories of evil.

Fuelling this ambiguity is the blurring which occurs between feminist ontology and epistemology. Although not initially problematic, this blending of ontology and epistemology adds to the vagueness of a feminist ontology. This is especially important for my framework, as it seeks to use an ontological base to pose epistemological questions and therefore there needs to be a separation between

the two concepts. When feminist scholars use epistemological questions they are often recasting them to allow for an ontological understanding, and often combining ontology and epistemology (Hirschmann 1992 p.166). Nancy Hirschmann argues that "the assertion that epistemology and ontology are entirely separate is granted the status of objective truth and epistemology comes to be defined as excluding ontology considerations" (Hirschmann 1992 p.166).

This connection between a feminist ontology and epistemology is also fundamental to Staley and Wise, whose theory of 'fractured foundationalism' argues that "ontological relativism marches hand-in-hand with everyday foundationalist claims and practices" (Staley and Wise 2002 p.12). Therefore it is helpful to have a clear distinction between ontology and epistemology in order to encapsulate an everyday theory which can reject the 'grand version' narratives of previous feminist or other social science writings (ibid). Therefore, any explorations of a feminist ontology should both acknowledge its epistemological underpinnings and be aware of projecting a grand narrative.

The second problem with using a general feminist ontology is embedded in feminism's essentialist origins. Even though political and International Relations theory has the potential to translate women's experience and stories into political meaning and significance (Hirschman 1992 p.167), this translation can be problematic in enforcing gendered behaviour as an ontology. For example, Porter explains (1991 p.41):

> Female experience is treated as a new definition of 'the ontological good' from which to derive an all-encompassing women-centred epistemology. Supposedly liberated from patriarchal thought categories, and freed into new modes of being, this more extreme gynocentric version has a strong influence on feminist theory.

In translating these 'women's experiences' into an already masculine discipline there is a danger of enforcing binaries that limit an individual's story to a stereotypical binary of male or female. This is especially problematic when trying

to break moral boundaries that these stereotypes are built upon, in addition to only reinforcing the marginalised experience of women.

Thus an overarching feminist ontology is problematic. By narrowing feminist ontology to a specific feminist relational ontology, the ambiguity of multiple strains of feminism is reduced, and by removing this vagueness about what the ontology is and its links to epistemology, a more workable definition of an ontology is created. Therefore, I will now outline the core features of a feminist relational ontology, born from care ethics. I will also highlight the limitations of the theory, especially when using it to construct a framework for my analysis of stories of evil.

2.4 What is a Feminist Relational Ontology/Care Ethics?

Care ethics can be understood not only as a theory, but also as a practice, with a focus on the relationships between individuals. At the core of care ethics is its feminist relational ontology, which emphasises the recognition of the responsibility for others with a focus on persons as "interdependent rather than independent individuals" (Robinson 1999 p.11). Therefore, the actors and interests of care ethics are fundamentally different from mainstream theories, particularly those based on justice. Instead of the autonomous, rational individual as the primary actor, care is interested in the mutual reliance of individuals, placing importance on caring, empathy and relationships. This shift in primary actors is particularly poignant when examining the use of care in the international sphere, and is a stark contrast to the state-based approach of traditional theories of International Relations, affecting the understating of agency I outlined in my previous chapter.

I have now established the need for a specific feminist ontology to explore problems of evil and agency within International Relations. Care Ethics provides an excellent starting to focus on these moral problems through a feminist lens. Care ethics has evolved from the notion of gendered morality: the assumption that women have a different moral understanding to men, which is highly irrational and focuses more on kindness. This originates from Carol Gilligan's 'different principle', which psychologically explores the different gendered moral reasonings of men and women. Gilligan asserts that there is an inherent gendered, feminine way of approaching moral problems and relating to others, which surpasses questions of rights and utilities. She claims that relationships are experienced differently between genders, especially issues of dependency (Gilligan 1982 p.8), and argues that (Gilligan 1982 p.22):

> The psychology of women that has consistently been described as distinctive in its greater orientation toward relationships and interdependence implies a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding. Given the differences in women's

> conceptions of self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of different priorities.

This gendered starting point is inherent to many care ethics theories, which use Gilligan's different or female voice as the basis for seeing an ethic of care.

In addition to the view of Gilligan, a further development of care stems greatly from maternal thought and the notion that the instincts and love of parents can turn into moral obligations in wider society. This is opposed to traditional approaches to studying morality, which presume individuals are rational and solitary. Through the practice of mothering, certain values are created, as mothering creates a "pattern of practical reasoning that foregrounds the protection of life, the creation of social structures that permit and enhance practices of care and a concern for the wellbeing of vulnerable others" (Groenhout 2003 p.11). Thus, these virtues establish care's focus on concrete, interdependent relationships. Sarah Ruddick claims, in her controversial argument, that (1980 p.347):

> I speak about a mother's thought - the intellectual capacities she develops, the judgments she makes, the metaphysical attitudes she assumes, the values she affirms.

These metaphysical attitudes are pivotal to the maternal theory and emerge out of gender notions as Ruddick explains, (1980 p.352).

> Women are said to value open over closed structure to eschew the clear–cut and unambiguous, to refuse a sharp division between inner and outer or self and other.

Therefore, we see Ruddick's work move away from the 'masculinist' theories of communitarian or individualist traditions to care ethics' focus on human relations. This allows us to see the private sphere upgraded to both the domestic and global context. Ruddick also highlights the shift towards a theory that values

love, as "maternal reason is fuelled by and extends itself through particular passions; it emerges from and requires of itself the actions of love" (Ruddick 1989 p.255). The maternal care ethic theory created by Ruddick disrupts international narratives as it shifts focus from the state or individuals to concentrate on relationships of recognition and responsibility that transcend national boundaries. This moves the primary focus of concern.

Ruddick attempts to open the theory to those of all genders, arguing that 'mothering' is the protection and nurturing of children, and anyone who partakes in this as the primary activity of their work life can be defined as a mother (Ruddick 1989 p.241). However, her maternal values are located within women (Ruddick 1989 p.242):

> Females give birth; giving birth is resonant with deep symbolic meaning as well as with practical consequences that shape women's and men's work in culturally specific ways.

This limits how both care ethics and maternal ethics are viewed, as I will now explore.

Gilligan's gendered morality and maternalism have caused a continuing stumbling block for the use of care ethics due to their essentialist nature. This problem primarily emerges from the gender binary notion presented: that women and men are opposite and prescribe to specific characteristics. This, in itself, is extremely challenging as it is highly exclusionary, and incorrect, as I explored in my previous chapter. Gilligan's gendered morality facilitates an understanding of women as thoughtful and kind, which engrains a narrative that there are certain gender characteristics which support seeing women as 'mindless victim[s]'[2]. The most recent wave of feminist theory has moved away from these notions of male and female, highlighting the patriarchal nature of this understanding. Implicit in poststructuralism is the movement away from fixed

[2] Enloe highlights that feminism must address the "dichotomy between the allegedly 'mindless victim' and the allegedly 'empowered actor'" (Enloe 2014 p.8).

notions of gender and sex altogether, and even most contemporary standpoint feminists are still unlikely to commit to the highly gendered notions that are present in the early work of care ethics. Although Gilligan defended her work, arguing that the voice she built her work upon was not necessarily female, but simply a 'different' voice (Gilligan 1993), we still do not know who's this voice is and how to move forward with it.

Similarly, maternalism prescribes certain behavioural norms to women, especially mothers. The foremost problems with maternalism are the proclamation that motherhood instills certain values and the association of motherhood with peace. On the most practical level this is incorrect, as there is a large spectrum of peace and violence that has little correlation with gender and parental status. Furthermore, the association of women and maternalism further entrenches the relegation of women to the private sphere (as wives and mothers). These brief arguments against the origins of care ethics do not outline the precise positives and negatives of the theories, especially the positive contributions which maternalism scholars such as Ruddick have contributed to the field. However, there is an extensive amount of existing literature on this.[3] What is essential for this chapter is to highlight that there are overt issues which have developed from these gendered expectations of behaviours.

Having highlighted how care ethics and moral theory are interlinked, I will outline its strength in reflecting on narratives of agency and evil within International Relations. I will begin by outlying the particulars of care ethics. My interest lies in the way political theorists have engaged with care ethics, using a gendered understanding of morality to facilitate a discussion of relationships, and epistemologically understand care and morality whilst embracing emotions, in order to create a specific and concrete theory that challenges other traditional moral orientations. Within political theory, care ethics has begun to 'unpick'

[3] For example – see special issue of Journal of International Political Theory; Feb 2014, Vol. 10 Issue 1

moral issues such as the discrimination of women, the interstate system, and issues of global poverty.

One of the foremost stumbling blocks care must face is its definition, which at best can be seen as blurry and at worst as simply a collective group of concepts, with no essential trait in common. This ambiguity is dangerous to care ethics as the lack of understanding of the definition of care often leads to a focus on what it is not, which is traditional or mainstream. This does not allow for the potential strength of care ethics to be shown, as it is simply known in comparison to how it is different to justice or cosmopolitanism. In addition, when a definition of care ethics is put forward, it is often rooted in a gendered definition of morality. Again, this does not allow for the potential of the theory to be realised as it is caught within essentialist qualities. Thus, my first step in highlighting the need for a feminist relational ontology is to find a workable and useful definition of care ethics, in order to make care valuable in understanding specific moral circumstances.

In order to undertake this task, I will consider three possible definitions, eventually eliminating definitions that developed from an essentialist standpoint. The first definition of care considered is from Virginia Held (Held 2006 p.304):

> The ethics of care especially values caring relations between persons, obviously at the personal level within families and among friends, and less obviously at the most general level of relations between all human beings. It understands the value and necessity of caring labour and the values of empathy, sensitivity, trust, and responding to need. It cultivates practices such as the building of trust and practices of responding to actual needs.

Held offers a clear understanding of what the ethics of care includes, however I feel that the definition is limited because it does not explain the implicit theoretical qualities of care ethics and how it can be used to explore moral issues. Thus, Held suggests a practical-based definition rather than a virtue-based

definition of care ethics. One of care's defining features is that it is both a theory and practice, enabling a new distinct standpoint, as I shall explore later. There is a distinction between practical-based and virtue-based definitions of care, with the former being more popular with established care ethicists than the latter, as it identifies actions and goals (Engster 2009). However, within these definitions of care as a practice, such as Held's, a different understanding of how to use care ethics as a theory may be derived. Thus, I believe that a simple, practical-based definition is inadequate in providing a comprehensive understanding of what care is and thus Held provides an inadequate definition of care ethics.

Stephanie Collins aims to provide a "plausible, precise, unified version of care ethics" (Collins 2015 p.87). She suggests a slogan for care to be: "dependency relationships generate responsibilities" (Collins 2015). This short definition is powerful in offering a contemporary understanding of care that facilitates a focus on the relational ontology of the theory. Collins develops the definition by introducing the dependency principle into care ethics (Collins 2015 p.97). Collins' suggestion is useful as she offers a workable definition of care ethics that certainly diverges from essentialist qualities. Particularly useful is her 'slogan' that enables a quick insight into a theory of care, but of course is too brief to give a full understanding of the theory. I choose not to use Collins' definition, though, due to its limitation in understanding the distinct ontological qualities of care ethics. Although her definition is useful in understanding an ethic of care as an ethical decision compass, with particular use in moral philosophy, the grounding of the definition in the roots of dependency means that care ethics is limited to this moral standpoint (Wilson 2016). This is because it does not allow for an understanding of care ethics beyond this, especially considering care ethics' relational ontology. Therefore, this definition has limited use when trying to explore agency and narratives, which are central to my research, and thus Collins does not provide a feasible definition.

The final definition I will reflect upon, and the one I feel is most suitable to understanding care ethics, is offered by Hutchings, who outlines a slightly practical but largely virtue-based definition (Hutchings 2000 p.120):

> Care ethics involves a rethinking of what might be termed 'ethical substance' (in terms of moral ontology of relations of recognition and responsibility) along with bringing a new perspective on ethics (the feminist standpoint), from which certain things can be 'seen' and on the basis of which ethical judgements can be made.

The definition is comprehensive as it enables both an ontological understanding of care to be facilitated, as well as an ethical account to be taken, showing the dual strength of care ethics. It includes what constitutes care ethics as Hutchings explores the use of feminist ethics, particularly care ethics in an international context, and so Hutchings provides a definition that is applicable in the international sphere. Furthermore, she understands the difficulty of using a feminist standpoint as the origin for care ethics and uses a philosophical account of meta-ethics, in particular that of Margaret Urban Walker, to address care ethics without returning to this essentialist standpoint (Hutchings 2000). These three factors allow Hutchings to facilitate a complete and highly useful definition of care ethics. This definition will be the starting point to argue the need for a specific feminist relational ontology as a framework for moral inquiry for reflecting on stories of evil and agency International Relations.

I believe that the focus of an ethic of care should be on the ontological strengths of the theory, with a firm grounding beyond the hypothetical, often the primary approach in International Relations. This is why I focus on a refined feminist relational ontology rather than the wider ethics of care. This relational ontology can address power dynamics in moral problems, while being acutely aware of social and historical circumstances. In the next section I will argue the need for this feminist relational ontology, firstly by highlighting the overall strengths of the approach. I will then look specifically at how this ontology can highlight and deconstruct power hierarchies by working in the concrete (in contrast to the abstract/hypothetical) with an awareness of the contextual input of decisions. Finally, this will lead me to question the universal applications of my feminist framework and how this approach will be helpful in analysing stories of gendered agency and evil in International Relations.

2.5 The Need for a Feminist Relational Ontology

A feminist relational ontology approach is valuable as it challenges gendered moral decisions, that underpin the current narratives of agency and evil within International Relations. Using feminist ethics within the international sphere is useful as a relational ontology will show the "always already normatively inflected nature of the world we inhabit" (Hutchings 2000 p.123). Ethical theory from a feminist perspective does not put forward an ethic of women (Hutchings 2000 p.122), instead "it necessarily brings politics back into the heart of moral judgment and prescription" (Hutchings 2000 p.113). Within a feminist understanding of ethics, judgements are embedded in moral forms of life, impacting on the authority carried by these judgments (Hutchings 2000 p.122). Here ethical decisions are facilitated through masculine norms that exist buried in patriarchal cultures. Here, power hierarchies create an understanding of acceptable moral behaviour, which is challenged by a feminist approach to ethics. Therefore, this feminist approach shifts the norms of what is considered significant (Hutchings 2000 p.91):

> Feminist ethics is committed to re-drawing the line between ethical and unethical in ways that are not anchored in gendered relations of power. In order to do this, feminists need to interrogate and reflect upon the role of the politics of gender in how the line between ethical and unethical is drawn in practice as well as principle.

As women have traditionally been excluded from moral theory and International Relations their voices and perspectives have been lost. This is not arguing that there is a collective unified voice of women, but acknowledging that the 'masculine' approach of focusing on the autonomous rational agent as the starting point of ethical and moral theory is central. The loss of women's voices is dangerous as it only allows a limited perspective of moral theory and lived experience.

The masculine approach is evidenced by how relationships are often seen in economic terms (Held 1987 p.116):

> The marketplace, as a model for relationships, has become so firmly entrenched in our normative theories that it is rarely questioned as a proper foundation for recommendations extending beyond the marketplace. Consequently, much more thinking is built on the concept of rational economic man. Relationships between human beings are seen as arising, and as justified, when they serve the interests of individual rational contractors.

This is in opposition to a feminist relational ontology approach, which is powerful as "it locates a set of epistemological problems of moral and moral-theoretical importance by paying attention to how gender and other determinants of social authority, power and recognition affect the moral life about which some of us make ethical theories as well as the theories we make" (Walker 2007 p.viii). This is important for both reflexivity and in understanding the constructed nature of morality. Therefore, a specific feminist relational ontology approach is able not only to highlight the power in moral decision-making but begin to identify solutions to this through its concrete approach and focus on vulnerability.

I highlighted how feminist ethics and particularly a feminist relational ontology are important in providing a critique to traditional moral theory. Moral decisions do not occur within a vacuum, and therefore there is a need to examine how values influence thought (Hutchings 2000 p.129). Hutchings is useful in acknowledging the power dynamics that occur in the foundational ideas of ethics (Hutchings 2000 p.130):

> Ethics is always about the world we inhabit and the world we want to construct. But that 'we' in any given instance does not emerge outside of the highly complex structures, institutions and practices which make a 'we', its viability and potential for inclusiveness, possible.

This impacts feminist theory itself as the position of a feminist theorist will determine their judgment. Thus, western and post-colonial feminists may understand the same moral ontology through different outcomes (Hutchings

2000 p.123). I will further explore this later in this chapter, but for now I am interested in what constitutes 'we'.

Walker recognises that often only a privileged few have had a voice in traditional moral theory, referring to the traditional account of a theoretical-juridical model of morality and moral theory. She highlights that when we decide and divide responsibilities we must acknowledge the historical legacy and agreements that went into making these decisions. Within western culture, the focus of her work, the 'autonomous man', is the protagonist of modern moral philosophy (Walker 2007 p.137). Fundamental to Walker's critique of the theoretical-juridical model of morality is the notion that morality is constructed, therefore we must see the "role of epistemic and discursive manipulation in understanding how flawed, even vicious, moral orders are reproduced" (Walker 2007 p.240). The focus on the sovereign man and the construction of morality within Walker's theoretical-juridical model are important to make unpacking of gendered and inadequate moral agency narratives. Here the focus on the autonomous man reinforces the masculine approach to moral epistemology. As women have been relegated to the private sphere external to moral theory, their voices have been lost in stories of morality such as evil. Walker acknowledges this silencing, and argues that there is a danger of replicating these masculine driven narratives. This leads to Walker's argument that morality is constructed. Here, social norms that create expected behaviour are constructed and thus not natural occurrences, they create and reinforce power hierarchies. As traditionally, men have been the protagonists and thus the authors of these stories, women's voices have been further excluded.

In response to this, Walker presents her expressive collaborative model of morality, which is "a guiding picture of how we could look at morality in order to better serve two goals of moral inquiry that I assume many moral philosophers share: giving adequate description and illuminating analysis of what morality is and serves to do." (Walker 2007 p.259) Therefore this understanding considers morality not as a set of rules that constitute correct behaviour but as a guiding narrative that is seen as "very coarse grids over the complexity of lives" (Walker

2007 p.126). The expressive collaborative model of morality focuses on producers and relations of authority and makes possible self-expression and mutual acknowledgement, with the aim "to situate a certain normative conception of a moral agent in the places in which it makes sense and in the view points from which it seems obvious or compelling" (Walker 2007 p.139).

This is highly useful as it provides me with a starting point to examine the authority and credibility of representative claims and "challenges epistemic and moral authority that is politically engineered and self-reinforcing" (Walker 2007 p.23). Furthermore, it highlights the strength in feminist ethics questioning the notions of power and representation in both moral life and moral theorising. By acknowledging this method, that challenges moral authority, I am able to start questioning stories, including those of evil, that are told within these authorities.

This focus on power hierarchies is imperative for my research. In establishing a framework to explore gendered stories of evil and agency, I draw greatly on the work of Joan Tronto, who is a well-established feminist political theorist. I will mainly focus on her 2009 book *Moral Boundaries.* The book uses an ethic of care to explore moral boundaries and argues that women are excluded from the creation of these boundaries on a meta-theoretical level and concrete political level (Tronto 2009 p20). Tronto argues this by highlighting that the "current boundaries of moral and political life are drawn such that the concerns and activities of the relatively powerless are omitted from the central concerns of society" (Tronto 2009 p.20). Therefore, there is a need to shift the understanding of morality (Tronto 2009 p.20):

> We need to see the world differently, so that activities that legitimate the accretion of power to the existing powerful are less valued, and the activities that might legitimate a sharing power with outsiders are increased in value. An initial step in this process is to recognize that the concerns and activities of the relatively powerless are omitted from the central concerns of society.

This is an excellent starting point from which to examine ethical questions, as it redraws traditional lines in moral theory.

The discourse of moral boundaries is useful in facilitating an understanding of the power dynamics that emerge within morality and thus moral agency. Tronto highlights that these boundaries are not natural but are human constructions (Tronto 2009 p.11). Tronto presents three boundaries: the first, the boundary between morality and politics, argues that the relationship between the two factors is often seen as separate with questions of whether morality predates politics or politics predates morality (Tronto 2009 p.8). The second boundary is of moral point of view, which states that a moral judgment must extend beyond emotion towards a rational thought, originating from a standpoint of disinterested and disengaged moral actors (Tronto 2009 p.9). The third boundary is between the public and the private, with women's morality left in the private (Tronto 2009 p.10). Tronto argues that these boundaries limit the effectiveness of women's morality argument, thus if we wish to institute change using notions of women's morality we must consider these boundaries (Tronto 2009 p.10).

Tronto highlights that society must understand moral arguments within a political context (2009 p.6):

> Widely accepted social values constitute the context within which we interpret all moral arguments. Some ideas function as boundaries to exclude some ideas of morality from consideration.

In addition, morality is confined to specific social and historical circumstances (Tronto 2009 p.57). Once these contexts, and the boundaries that emerge within morality, are identified there is the possibility to question the strategic role of these boundaries by asking who is excluded from these moral boundaries, and the consequences of them (Tronto 2009 p.11). Thus, in order to see moral boundaries differently we must begin to break down the barrier between politics and morality, as this barrier blocks us from seeing that moral theory conveys

power and privilege. In addition, Tronto outlines that we can do this from care's starting point (Tronto 1995 p.109):

> Caring challenges the view that morality starts where rational and autonomous individuals confront each other to work out the rules of moral life. Instead, caring allows us to see autonomy as a problem that people must deal with all the time, in their relations with both equals and those who either help them or depend upon them.

This relational approach is imperative in readdressing structures that already exist. By taking a non-traditional approach to moral issues, these structures become visible.

The aim of my framework, originating in Tronto's work (2009), is to break down the barrier between politics and morality. By breaking the gendered barrier between morality and politics a relational feminist ontology can approach ethical issues in a new way and ask new questions. It is important to see how politics and morality are relational in order to understand that margins of what is and is not considered ethical are formed from places of power. Here those given authority to produce cultural norms are able to enforce power hierarchies through expected behaviour as explored in the previous chapter. My feminist relational ontology framework asks how moral authority arises as only a privileged few have had a voice in moral theory. This emerges from strength in moral epistemology, and seeing the power that exists in making moral decisions from relational ontology. This power, born from traditional accounts of morality, leads to a binary, usually Good versus Bad or Right versus Wrong, particularly within emotive and ambiguous stories of evil, which often take place in abstraction as I shall subsequently explore. A feminist relational ontology framework pushes for a multifaceted understanding of morality and agency; highlighting how these are formed in power hierarchies.

It is important to understand that morality has many layers and must be understood in the specific context of concrete circumstances.

A feminist relational ontology's strength in moral epistemology enables it to unpick how moral boundaries are formed and highlight their exclusionary tendencies to inflict a notion of the good from a gendered western perspective, as I explored in the previous chapter. I think this can be extended further though, so that moral epistemology born from a relational ontology understanding of ethics can not only challenge moral power, but also look at how that power is legitimised through a focus on moral authority. This is important, as there should not only be questions about how and why moral decisions are being made but why they are accepted in their context, who is accepting them and whose voice is being ignored.

One of the strengths of a feminist relational ontology in unpicking traditional moral theory is its focus on a contextual and concrete understanding of morality which is born from care as a practice. Moral judgments are subjective to the context in which they exist, therefore judgment of a moral situation can become impaired when a context is not shared (Hutchings 2000 p.122). A persuasive moral argument relies on certain circumstances for it to be understood as rational, as there is a need to seek shared meaning for it to be understood (Hutchings 2000 p.122). A feminist ethic that focuses on context, shows the weakness of traditional moral theory and shifts attention from traditional moral theory, as "moral values and practices are inseparable from the broader social and political context within which they operate, and ethics is never entirely divorced from power" (Hutchings 2000 p.121-122). By engaging in actual real experiences, it is possible to begin to listen to each other across the division of race and class (Held 1995 p.164).

The constructed nature of morality is located in culture, and therefore, morality is interchangeable in different places. Furthermore, morality can be defined as "socially sustained practices of responsibility that are taught and defended as 'how to live'" (Walker 2007 p.235). This cultural and social understanding of the construction of morality means Walker is able to see that a variety of understandings of morality exist (Walker 2007 p.56). This understanding of morality is similar to that of Tronto and leads to a view of morality that is

compatible with intersectionalilty. Another important and useful part of Walker's definition is the distinction between theories of morality and the actual human social phenomenon of morality (Walker 2007 p.15). She highlights that we must see morality and moral theory as separate in order to acknowledge the power in moral epistemology (Walker 2007 p.19).

The ethics of care approach to morality can be seen as both a practice and a theory. Tronto uses care to reveal the problem of moral boundaries but begins to offer a solution to moral problems, arguing that "care offers us a powerful way to reconceive the shift in paradigms, to undo current moral boundaries, and to allow us to move towards a more just and caring humane society" (Tronto 2009 p.21). This is largely facilitated through care being both a practice and a theory. In other words, we can use care ethics' theoretical qualities to think categorically about needs and values and how we can meet these. In addition, seeing care as a practice leads to a detailed and tangible thought process about particular situations that factor in all actors' circumstances and capabilities (Tronto 2009 p.136). A particular benefit of the 'concrete' quality of care is that it allows a clear analysis of inequalities as it reveals who cares for whom (Tronto 2009 p.175).

Therefore, Tronto argues that an ethic of care will need to question and broaden what caring means. This would require examining the social and institutional barriers that would need to be restructured in order to make caring for others central in society (Tronto 1995 p.112). This fundamentally questions the traditional 'rational' approach to moral theory, as in order to adapt an alternative approach to morality, it can no longer stem from our own self-interest, forcing us again to focus on concrete connections rather than abstract thought (Tronto 1995 p.113). This is important, as the location of care is one of the stumbling blocks in moving care from a theory of the private to the international sphere. Although Tronto does not offer a fully rounded answer on how to solve this problem, by outlining that the problem is socially constructed, she provides a platform for others to address this issue in different ways.

Continuing this investigation of power hierarchies, Fiona Robinson also argues against the hypothetical notion of the individual and highlights that in order to establish relationships a concrete approach must be undertaken. She argues against the traditional justice/rights-based approach, that sees individuals as independent, but for a method that assesses all individuals, that is tangible and that is unique. This approach transcends the domestic level, as relationships which are beyond 'the veil of ignorance' or hypothetical can be concrete, despite distances (Robinson 1999 p.46). By grounding a moral understanding in the concrete, moral decisions must emerge from specific and actual circumstances rather than abstract notions. This does not mean that care ethics is unable to question theoretical notions or use the moral imagination, but the start and end point of these debates should reflect the specific nature of lives, that each have an individual story.

A feminist relational ontology is grounded in seeing all individuals as interdependent. By seeing humans in this way, the individualist approach that is present in traditional/mainstream/masculine or male-stream accounts of ethics, is challenged. These two factors mean that a feminist relational ontology framework is highly useful in understanding moral epistemology. It can trace where the power goes into making moral decisions by offering a different critical understanding of ethics. This enables me to ask important questions of power, and more importantly the power that goes into making moral decisions and narrating moral agency.

These questions of strength of a feminist relational ontology in this concrete contextualisation of morality leads to questions about the applicability of care ethics on an international level. Tronto addresses the location of care, arguing that we should not simply care for those in our immediate circle, as by doing so we ignore how this narrow circle is constructed and the social institutions and structures that determine who is inside the circle (Tronto 1995 p.111):

> Questions about the proximity of people to us are shaped by our collective social decisions. If we decide to isolate ourselves from

> others, we may reduce our moral burden of caring. Yet if moral life is only understood narrowly in the context of the exhibition of caring, then we can be absolved from these broader responsibilities.

Logistically, though, this is difficult without imposing a western imperial understanding of what care involves and who should be cared for. Therefore, a contextual understanding is needed when addressing moral stories, such as those of evil, in order to prevent introduction of an additional power hierarchy of western moral superiority.

Robinson's critical care approach aims to alleviate this problem, by focusing on an international care ethics. Robinson developed her version of care ethics, both as a practice and a theory, through the argument that care ethics must be situated within the concrete context beyond the hypothetical to allow relationships to be formed between individuals who can be seen as unique and tangible (Robinson 1999 p.46). Her work brings two important features to the ethics of care. Firstly, it raises the idea of a critical ethic of care and, secondly, it begins to establish how this critical ethic of care can be used in the international system. Robinson begins to challenge the essentialist starting point presented in earlier care work, especially that of Ruddick and Gilligan. This is through the desire to move beyond a simple gendered feminist morality to a critical care approach that can facilitate a universal understanding of care and morality by viewing all individuals as interdependent (Robinson 1999 p.21). Robinson asserts that the potential transformative nature of care must distance itself from an orthodox view, which can highlight the role of women in an international context, rather than a local one, and maintain feminist origins, whilst removing its gendered association with women. Therefore, we may still view critical care ethics in alignment with a standpoint feminist value without assuming the same epistemic privilege.

Robinson highlights that "care transcends the moral idea of community", foregrounding her critical care ethics approach with international reach which allows for actual voices to be heard and listened to (Robinson 1999 p.46). Thus, the value-based method, which focuses on concrete individuals, attempts to have

a cosmopolitan quality which surpasses national borders leading to a universal concern of feminism. However, one of the main critiques that care must consider is parochialism. Robinson highlights the need to address whether care can explore moral relations among distant strangers (Robinson 1999 p.12). She acknowledges the concern that care must not be too parochial, as this will limit it to the private realm. In order for care to situate itself in the international it must break the boundary between public and private (Robinson 1999 p.27). Robinson challenges this problem and enables care to be incorporated into a moral vocabulary by moving beyond personal relations and establishing care which transcends the local; this is facilitated by acknowledging that care is a conscious decision (Robinson 1999 p.31). Therefore, we can see how critical, in comparison to orthodox, care ethics is widening its sphere of concern through relational ontology in the global domain; making it more applicable in International Relations.

Robinson argues that in order to establish care for others in the international sphere we must be aware of constructed relations (Robinson 1999 p.3). This is most prominent when Robinson highlights the structural decisions that exclude marginalised groups from society (Robinson 1999 p.46). This is developed from Joan Tronto's theory of moral boundaries, which highlights the exclusion of sections, especially women, when constructing values in society (Tronto 2009 p.9). However, by establishing these moral boundaries, essentialism must be addressed and the question must be asked: can there be "a morality of and for women" (Robinson 1999 p.12)? Robinson approaches this problem through her critical care ethics, and highlights the importance of the transformative potential of care, which must maintain its feminist origins and orientation, but present a view of ethics which must not rely on its association with women (Robinson 1999 p.23). Furthermore, when exploring the role of women it must do this in a global context far from the orthodox care ethics view of the public sphere (ibid). Therefore, a critical care ethics approach engages with the problem of gender constructions in the international sphere.

In Stephanie Collins' *The Core of Care Ethics*, Collins aims to make care ethics useful in contemporary philosophy whilst removing its essentialist qualities. This aim is one very similar to mine, however Collins has a very different approach and, therefore, a different outcome when using and refining care ethics.

By focusing away from care ethics' feminist origins, Collins hopes to make the theory apply to all moral agents, from a moral philosophy perspective. Therefore she does not wish to compile an all-inclusive and 'bulletproof' defence of care but show it as a compelling theory (Collins 2015 p.8). *The Core of Care Ethics* is divided into two different sections, with the first offering a thought-provoking approach to reviewing the literature on care ethics. The second half of the book is far more interesting to me, where Collins outlines and develops her theory of care ethics using the 'dependency principle' (Collins 2015 p.8). This principle is interesting as it establishes an original way to develop care ethics, that moves beyond the association of care and gender.

This principle can be understood as asserting that a moral agent, A, has a responsibility when three conditions are met: (1) moral person B has an important interest that is unfulfilled; (2) A is sufficiently capable of fulfilling that interest; and (3) A's most efficacious measure for fulfilling the interest will not be too costly. A incurs an even more weighty responsibility if (1) to (3) are true and (4) is also true: (4) A's most efficacious measure for fulfilling the interest will be the least costly of anyone's most efficacious measure for fulfilling B's interest.

Collins wishes to expand the application of care beyond the often-limited use in social policy, and instead establish the theory as one that applies to everyone (Collins 2015 p.8):

> By describing care ethics as a universal moral theory – a moral theory which generates responsibilities for all – my hope is that those who are the usual 'caregivers' are seen as doing what we all already should be doing, rather than as doing what *only they* should be doing.

This notion offers a unified perspective of care ethics, which leads to a "plausible" and "explanatory ground" for understanding care, through a set of highly specific moral principles of dependence (Collins 2015 p.87). However by providing this highly specific, technical and unified approach, many of care ethics' defining elements are lost. Furthermore it is difficult to understand care as a singular theory as, with much of feminism, its various normative starting points lead to disagreement and divergence. This is why I choose to instead focus on working on a singular, but fundamental element of care ethics relational ontology, which I hope to build stronger by removing its essentialist standpoint, whilst not disregarding the multitude of opinions within care ethics. This focus on relational ontology offers an excellent approach to studying stories of evil as it challenges the traditional patterns that emerge in prescribed gendered narratives.

Here there is a need to distinguish between a universal application of a feminist relational ontology such as Collins suggests and a feminist relational ontology that is multidimensional and useful to examine international moral issues and International Relations. This is important as there is no universal feminist theory. Instead feminist theory must be understood as encompassing a range of perspectives, which are influenced by different approaches but there is a uniting theme of paying attention to how social reality is 'gendered' and thus there is a powerful normative agenda inherent in any perspective labelled as 'feminist' (Hutchings 2000 p.111). In trying to contrast a universal approach of feminism, there is a danger of imposing the same moral boundaries that a feminist relational ontology is trying to reject, as

> claims to theorize women's experience or to represent what women's voices say have foundered on the same epistemological challenge feminists direct at non-feminist views. Not all women recognize the voice or experience theorized as theirs (Walker 2007 p.63).

A singular understanding would lead to oppression again, confined within a patriarchal society (Butler 2007 p.5).

Although a critical care ethics theory offers an understanding of how to approach a feminist relational ontology in the international sphere, I see this more as a platform to build upon rather than a completed framework for use. I believe there are two fundamental problems with this base: firstly, care ethics' essentialist roots affect the gendered nature of morality; and secondly, the problem of using a feminist relational ontology framework built only from a care ethics approach is limited to a western implementation of norms. This can lead to questions of parochialism and imperialism, and the remit of who cares for whom. I am more concerned with the way in which people care for other people, especially those who do not enter into our immediate area, both who physically live outside the particular locale and those drawn external to moral boundaries. By broadening this often parochial viewpoint to consider the external, those who are 'othered' are now considered within the remit of care. This is powerful when analyzing discourses of evil as these stories are built through a masculine logic of morality and externality is central to defining the protagonists of evil, as I will explore later in this thesis. These stories can, therefore, be retold from a care perspective by addressing the moral boundaries that are established in these stories.

2.6 Problems: Ambiguity and Essentialism

I previously highlighted how care ethics and specifcally a focus on feminist relataional onotlogy have great strength in facililitating an analysis of gender and agency in stroies of evil. Before moving forward with this analysis I wish to outline some of the problems with using the theory. To do so, I question how I can challenge gendered norms whilst using a theory built upon a gendered binary notion of morality, as explored in my previous chapter. Without challenging these gendered beliefs rooted in an essentialist understanding of sex, I risk my framework not exploring gendered stories of evil, but replicating the power heirachies that enforce them. This essentialism in care ethics can be distilled to three core problems: 1) The association of the female body and mother and thus carer. 2) A gendered production of morality based on this association, 3) an epistemological imperialist reproduction of a singular understanding of feminism. I will now unpack these before moving on to to how to overcome these problems.

The first of the core problems, is the association of the female body with motherhood. Evidenced by Held's work which originates from a purely maternal understanding of ethics, there is an entrenchment of gendered ideas, and that feminist ethics come from a highly gendered starting point. Held focuses on a gender binary that men and women have different moral attitudes (Held 1987 p.125). Through a focus on the physical act of the birth of a child, Held cements the notion of birthing with the female. Originating in maternal theory, Held's very practical understanding of care ethics, leads to even more problems than I expressed earlier, regarding maternal theory. To summarise, Held focuses on birthing, highlighting that women/mothers have a greater understanding of relationships and care as they have undergone the birthing process (Held 1987 p.121). In particular, mothers have a vested interest in the child, because through the physical act of birthing the mother has "accomplished far more than has the father" (Held 1987 p.124). In addition Held argues that women who choose not to have children, do so for the potential child's benefit, as they value their needs and may not provide the best childhood (Held 1987 p.121). At a primary level,

this has some alarming concerns, especially viewed through a post-structural feminist lens. The focus on the female as the mother is unhelpful in providing a moral theory, as this confines women to the provision of a womb, and ostracises other parental roles. In addition this alienates a large proportion of the population, most obviously men, but also those who do not align with either gender, and women who are not mothers, or identify as more than a mother. These overwhelming problems divert attention from the strength of care ethics' relational ontology, which many feel they are unable to access due to its essentialist origins. This has similarities with other care ethics work.

The second problem is the gendered production of morality: Tronto argues that her starting point is simply care rather than women's morality (Tronto 2009 p.3). However, she continues to facilitate an essentialist discussion where the morality is rooted in gendered norms. As Tronto's starting point is still women, post-structuralism's focus on the construction of language seriously undermines this care ethics starting point. Butler shows the power dynamic that emerges from the gendered notion within care ethics; she directly challenges the underlining epistemology of care ethics, highlighting that the subject should not be the foundation of feminist politics (Butler 2007 p.8).[4] Starting with her deconstruction of gender norms, she illustrates the exclusionary nature of construction of the subject (Butler 2007 p.8). This is evident in care ethics; at a primary level, care's gendered underpinnings of male and female morality are exclusionary if a person's moral capability does not align with these constructed gender norms. Furthermore, those who do not align with either gender are further excluded, as there is no room for non-binary notions within the current version of care ethics.

The final problem within care ethics is a danger of reproducing a singular unit of feminism. Evidenced by Robinson's application of the critical care theory; the nature of the theory means that while it can address some issues very well, there

[4] Instead Butler argues the need for an ontological construction of identity against the universal construct brought forward by care ethics (Butler 2007 p.8).

are difficulties with translating it from a theoretical understanding into a practice within the international system. Additionally, while Robinson says that we must see a critical care ethic or a care ethic removed from its gendered starting point, she does not offer us a way of doing so. Robinson still engages with a subject that is centre-focused, which is problematic when trying to facilitate the use of care ethics on an international level. Using the work of Judith Butler, who highlights the epistemological imperialism of a singular unit of feminism, which she argues cannot be universal as there is no singular understanding of women[5] (Butler 2007 p.5), Robinson projects a singular notion of what a woman is, through the idea of women's morality, despite trying to move away from this.

A feminist relational ontology cannot simply ignore its origins in these essentialist notions, especially when considering fundamental questions such as how women are defined, although in recent care ethics work, theorists have begun to move past this. The most successful example of this is Tronto's work which addresses the definition of women in the 'difference dilemma', briefly engaging with prominent critiques of feminist theory. Tronto proposed that in order to solve this dilemma, the foundational terms that allowed the dilemma to emerge must be rejected, and therefore: "Once we recognise how the boundaries and structures of current institutions have created problems such as the difference dilemma, we are then in a position to challenge them" (Tronto 2009 p.18). Here I want to use Tronto's difference dilemma as a platform to expand the challenge of the definition of women, which will be fundamental to my framework. This will be the starting point to see the multiple, often dichotomous, stories of women through actual lived experience.

Those theorists who move away from a strict understanding of care ethics are also problematic. It is clear that Walker offers an interesting and useful insight into feminism and morality, however there are still areas that are challenging. Firstly, Walker offers a distinction between an ethic of care and a feminist ethic;

[5] Butler argues that a singular understanding would lead to oppression again, confined within a patriarchal society (Butler 2007 p.5).

in this Walker is highly critical of care ethics, and I agree with much of her argument. However, Walker offers a very limited understanding of care ethics, one that is focused on traditional accounts of care, in contrast to more contemporary critical care ethics, which I have explored. As Walker does not reflect on this newer literature in care, she cannot clearly show the difference between care and feminist ethics. The most prominent example of this is when Walker arguably uses a feminist relational ontology in her account of feminist ethics. This relational ontology is fundamental to care ethics but is not noted. The second key challenge to Walker's work is that of ambiguity: in creating an account of morality that is socially and culturally situated and changing in each situation, there is little tangibility in Walker's account. This is further evident as factors that are key to this theory, such as moral cultures, are extremely hard to define and so limit our understanding of Walker's definition of morality.

Here I will look further into what is a cultural context understanding of feminism and knowledge production using critical feminist theory. By doing so I hope to show how other feminist works can reinforce my framework to be used more easily to address international ethical problems.[6] I want to not only ask questions about moral power, but also about moral authority because I want to understand not only how moral decisions are made, but how they are enforced. By questioning the legitimacy that gives those with moral authority the right to enforce their decisions, even if this is not overtly obvious, it is possible to unpick ethical problems and begin to see them in a new light.

[6] Here I am not advocating for a universal understanding of morality or feminism, but one that is highly aware of its western roots and privilege, in order to be a starting point to address problems and unpick problems that emerge in the international sphere.

2.7 Beyond a Feminist Relational Ontology – Including a Critical Inclusive Lens

Here I wish to draw from postcolonial and other critical feminist theories within International Relations to strength the inclusivity of my relational ontology lens, especially addressing the essentialist origins of care ethics. I am particularly interested in what is understood as 'context' or 'concrete' within this approach. To address these problems I will engage with the work of feminist theorists to look at what is considered contextual by asking larger questions of feminist ethics. In doing so I hope to expand my feminist relational ontology to an inclusive feminist relational ontological lens.

Critical feminist theory is useful in highlighting that a feminist ontology must be inclusive. Postcolonial and Black feminists have argued for many years that feminism with roots in white middle-class culture excludes large amounts of women (hooks 1984, 2015, Mohanty 1991, Salo and Mama 2001). This starting point is dangerous as the 'context' that is considered may be limited as (Mohanty 1991 p.7):

> Feminist movements have been challenged on the grounds of cultural imperialism, and of short sightedness in defining the meaning of gender in terms of middle-class white experiences, and in terms of internal racism, classism and homophobia. All of these factors, as well as the falsely homogenous representation of the movement in the media, have led to a very real suspicion of "feminism" as a productive ground for struggle.

Therefore, there is a need to consider what this concrete and contextual approach is, which itself is not exclusive to a feminist relational ontology but also reflected in other cultures, such as the Afrocentric tradition (Hill Collins 1990).

The primary outcome of making my feminist relational ontology framework inclusive is the need for it to be intersectional, which is vital in any feminist analysis, in order to not reinforce power hierarchies that silence groups of women. Intersectionality can be understood as "the relationships among multiple

dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations - as itself a central category of analysis" (McCall 2005 p.1771). Pioneered by the Combahee River Collective, and first published academically by Kimberly Crenshaw, intersectionality highlights the multiple strands of prejudice faced by individuals. It looks at the multifaceted factors that make up identities, which cut across gender, national identity, class, sexuality and race and the privilege in certain identities (Peterson 2010). Therefore, intersectionality becomes a valuable tool in analysis, that challenges hegemonic approaches, showing that "categorical attributes are often used for the construction of inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries that differentiate between self and other, determining what is 'normal' and what is not, who is entitled to certain resources and who is not" (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199).

This means not simply seeing context as a singular experience but considering the multiple contexts that co-exist often in contradiction to each other. I will unpack this further by looking at how women, as a social category, do not share a common definition or experience of oppression. I will explore how I can overcome this possibly limited interpretation of morality by looking at critical feminist interpretations of knowledge production.

In finding a contextual and concrete understanding of morality especially when exploring gendered agency, it is essential to see 'women' as a lived experience performed in multiple ways. Thus, it is important not to homogenise certain groups as 'western women' or 'third world women' or other groups who do not have coherent interests or unity (Mohanty 1991 p.6-7). Recurrent in postcolonial and Black feminist theory are questions around what constitutes a "woman" which varies greatly on the lines of race, class, nationality and sexuality (Davis, Russo 1991 p.299). Butler continues this argument; acknowledging what could be considered a postcolonial argument she argues that all women's oppression cannot be united as the same. Butler explores how including other cultures into a localised definition risks "repletion of the self-aggrandizing gesture of phallogocentrism colonizing under the sign of the same those differences that might otherwise call that totalizing concept into question" (Butler 2007 p.18).

Thus, an inclusive feminist analysis must acknowledge the realities of all women, especially those who have previously been hindered from entering the conversation of feminism (Salo and Mama 2001). Respecting the different identities of women within an open and inclusive approach will make feminism more effective (Wong 1991 p.303), as exclusionary practices greatly hinder the theory developing in new and varied ways, due to the limited perspective of what a woman is. This is particularly so when considering women's oppression is not universal.

Postcolonial and Black feminist theory enforces the need to acknowledge the underlying issues with the definition of feminism, with many rejecting feminism's focus on common oppression, and instead push for an understanding based on tangible historical, cultural and political analysis (Mohanty 1991 p.56). Butler questions whether ignoring specific cultural oppression can be seen as an epistemological imperialism, "one which is not ameliorated by the simple elaboration of cultural differences as examples of the self-same phallogocentrism" (Butler 2007 p.18). This means an acute awareness is needed to question if western values are being enforced as universal norms.

Mama argues that western radical feminist thought relegates women to abuse of male power, trapping them in a homogeneous group devoid of class and racial inequalities (Salo and Mama 2001). hooks builds on this, arguing that "white women who dominate feminist discourse today rarely question whether or not their perspective on women's reality is true to the lived experiences of women as a collective group" (hooks 1984 p.3).

Butler's main critique of a universal and cohesive category of a singular notion of women is that it limits the "multiplicity of cultural, social and political intersections in which the concrete array of 'women' are constructed" (Butler 2007 p.19). Furthermore, she questions whether unity sets up "an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identity that rules out the possibility of a set of actions which disrupt the very border of identity concepts, or which seek to accomplish precisely that disruption as an explicit political aim" (Butler 2007

p.20). Therefore in order to have an inclusive approach there is a need to engage in a reflexive analysis to challenge any universal notion of 'women' or their common oppression. This is especially important when considering care ethics' essentialist origins. Although it does not undertake the same epistemic privilege as a biological determinist approach to gender, there needs to be flexibility in what is considered a gender category, especially at a global level, within International Relations.

In discovering how to define what is the concrete or contextual, without imposing a western imperialism, there is a need to hear all voices. Guyatari Spivak examines how the colonised subject, especially the female, is silenced as the subaltern history is removed within colonial production (Spivak 1999). This leads to a power imbalance, as the "poor woman in the south is well suited to a victimology narrative that rationalizes the planned management and liberation of the women in the South by Westernized professional hierarchical distinction between the Western and non-Western" (Saunders 2000 p.14). This refers back to the idea that there are multiple ways of being within local cultural and historical contexts, especially when exploring ideals and specifically roles of women, such as notions of family, mother, wife and the division of labour, reproductive rights and other overtly gendered areas (Mohanty 1991 p.67).

My framework must continue to show how moral power and authority have been created in different circumstances on macro and micro levels. Without doing so will replicate existing power hierarchies, thus limiting the framework's ability to challenge the moral boundaries such as the construction of deficient moral agents in stories of evil. It must acknowledge through its moral epistemology how decisions have been ingrained with a shared history of colonialism, leading to a certain understanding of world power that any analysis of culture, ideology, and socioeconomic conditions must also be aware of (Mohanty 1991 p.54). Beyond even events, theories must be understood in this shadow of colonialism. Spivak rejects any totalising ideologies as she views them as 'deeply marked' by colonialism and its influences (Spivak 1990 p.15). Within this undertaking there

is a need to further question how knowledge is constructed, especially when considering what is the context or concrete.

I have previously highlighted that feminist theory and especially a feminist relational ontology has great strength in revealing power hierarchies and moral authority in decision making. Yet there is a need to question where this understanding of morality emerges from.

Returning to the focus of the subaltern and morality enables us to address subjugated agency, subjectivity and modes of sociality by colonial and imperialist institutions (Ivison 1997 p.156). Within this I am particularly interested in the metanarratives that stem from Eurocentric assumptions. A dominant effect of this, prevalent in narratives of morality, is the creation of 'outsiders'. Here narratives of the other are formed as markers of subaltern status by explicit adjectival techniques such as the use of 'Native' (Gordon 2008 p.121). This is particularly important when exploring my case studies, which are constructed in existing power hierarchies, particularly for my second case study which focuses on the narratives of Alice Lakwena/Auma told within a colonial legacy. This is embedded in the argument of Mohanty, who explains (1991 p.3):

> How we conceive of definitions and contexts, on what basis we foreground certain contexts over others and how we understand the on-going shifts in our conceptual cartographies - these are all questions of great importance in this particular cartography of third world feminism.

Here the contextual constructions of stories lead to multiple and dichotomous knowledges. This is mirrored in queer theory.

Queer theory helps to critically question knowledge production and moral epistemology by focusing on pluralist regulation of monolithic knowledge. Weber examines the power in crafting sovereign and sexualised figures, within the existing notion of modern statecraft as modern mancraft (Weber 2016 p.4). This leads to a figure of a singular subjective man, Weber argues, as the fulcrum of

western knowledge production, and thus "scholars have 'tried to build the figure of man in this way', so he may function as a singular, sexualised 'sovereign man' who grounds a political community on the one hand, and a community of scholarly knowledge producers who typically render him as if he were sexualized or sovereign on the other" (Weber 2016 p.192). The use of statecraft as mancraft legitimises the notion of the 'sovereign man' as it is presented as singular, pre-existing and ahistorical. Therefore, queer theory is very useful in deconstructing the sovereign man. The protagonist of the sovereign man is crucial to the production of masculine epistemologies. Queer theory undermines this starting point and offers an alternative platform to view the masculine production of knowledge.

This platform is formed as queer theory is excellent at further deconstructing the binaries, Queer theory biases, rather than exceeds, the binary logics of the 'either/or' (Weber 2016 p.3), therefore, there is great value in using queer logics to examine moral epistemology. Weber explains that, (2016 p.196):

> Reconsidered through the lens of queer logics as statecraft - a lens that contests those exclusively binary expressions of 'difference' that demand that all subjectivities can be and can be known as singularly signifying subjectivities across every potential plural register they occupy or engage - the persistence of 'modern man' as sovereign man is put into doubt.

The rejection of the monolithic within queer logic means that this plurality is central in creating a more inclusive and applicable theory in international relations. This further deconstruction of binaries and emphasis on the importance of pluralism must be present in any solid ontology that can provide moral analysis, in order to not simply replicate traditional moral theory.

Here, moral epistemology is formed through viewing how knowledge is regulated, exploring epistemic violence or authoritarian knowing; thus a deconstruction of knowledge is essential is understanding how moral boundaries

are formed, especially locked in an international understanding. This global approach rejects the western model as the only unit of feminism and looks beyond 'white' feminism. Therefore, a critical approach challenges the homogenisation of cultural difference and pushes us to see alternative modes of life, essential in questioning moral boundaries. This approach coupled with care ethics strength in moral epistemology provides a powerful analytical lens to examine gender and agency within International Relations and how this affects our narration of evil.

2.8 What will this New Inclusive Feminist Relational Ontology Include?

Using this critique, especially the focus on the concrete and the context, I propose a lens that goes beyond a simple focus of the traditional interpretation of a feminist relational ontology in care ethics, but one that incorporates elements of critical feminist theory. Therefore, I will use inclusive feminist relational ontology framework as the starting point of my analysis. This approaches gendered narratives by focusing on relationships as the primary area of concern, therefore highlighting how all people are interdependent and vulnerable. An inclusive feminist relational ontology framework works in the concrete, viewing all individuals as tangible with a unique story, set within their own context. Therefore, this framework shifts how traditional moral issues are studied and offers a powerful critique of them. By moving away from traditional moral theory and starting with relationships, an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework is able to question not only moral power and boundaries as explored in the previous chapter, but also to question moral authority by looking at how ethical decisions are legitimised. This framework does so through a highly reflexive and intersectional approach.

Postcolonial and Black feminism question the starting points of privileged thinking. This further develops feminist ethics' understanding of moral privilege, but it is especially important to open up a conversation of moral authority within a feminist understanding of ethics to ensure that a privileged voice does not emerge within it. By challenging the traditional accounts of ethical theory, and specifically the binaries born from them such as right and wrong, it is possible to begin to understand ethical problems in a new way. Therefore, by using an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework I can question how and why moral decisions are being made and, more importantly, why they are accepted in their context, who is accepting them and whose voice is being ignored, within International Relations. Building upon my conversation exploring a feminist relational ontology, I will now outline the six key factors that establish my framework and reflect on how I will use them.

A. Interdependent Relationships

Fundamental to my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework is the notion that all individuals are interdependent and interconnected. The ontology which focuses on these relationships is powerful in altering how the world is viewed and challenges the traditional notions of morality and International Relations. By focusing on relationships and not autonomous agents it shifts the understanding of what is important and the values that underlie morality. Furthermore, by seeing all agents as interdependent it is possible to begin to break down hierarchies that emerge, as although not everyone is automatically seen as equal, everyone is seen as vulnerable and therefore we make vulnerability normal and acceptable. This acceptance is imperative to moving away from the autonomous man as the primary agent. Within this movement, there is a need to explore what permits the autonomous man, who is often constructed in abstraction.

B. Concrete Situations

A relational ontology enforces the need to see morality in concrete situations over the typical hypothetical world of ethics, especially justice and rights debates. Therefore, the framework takes note of actual lives and stories. Viewing all individuals as concrete allows actual voices to be heard, rather than impressions of those voices in hypothetical situations. By allowing for actual voices to be heard rather than impressions, it is possible to give more power to those interdependent individuals and challenge moral authority as voices can be heard rather than spoken for. This contextualisation must be intersectional.

By exploring International Relations and especially moral problems through this framework, I can reject a number of issues concretely: firstly, the idea of binaries. When working in the concrete and the actual world it is extremely difficult to produce “either/or” options. Instead the mess in between is left, and it is that which can be explored. Challenging binaries in feminism in not new, with many different feminists highlighting this problem. The strength of this framework will lie in providing a different method to see and, more importantly, discuss these

binaries. Such an approach is different, for example, from Butler's successful use of language. Instead, this binary is explored through asking questions of morality, and the structures that permit them to exist.

C. Gendered Structure

An important feature of an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework is highlighting that these issues emerge in a gendered structure. Here my framework must acknowledge further power that underlies moral decision but is not as overt as simply questioning moral power and authority. It must be conscious of the way decisions have previously been made gendered and entrap new moral circumstances in existing norms, from 'private' and 'personal' decisions to relations between states. By acknowledging that these power-gendered structures are present, it is possible to begin to question moral issues and moral agents' ideas of norms. By again working in the concrete, I can understand how these gendered issues are tied to specific cultural circumstances, that go beyond western norms. It is wrong to simply reject these gendered structures or assume that they are always patriarchal, as doing so does not help us understand how these structures impact decisions. Instead, it is important to find how and more importantly why they have been created, as in doing so it is possible to see how they influence decisions within International Relations.

D. Care as both Theory and Practice

One of the most interesting aspects of a feminist relational ontology framework originating in care ethics is how it can be seen as both a theory and as a practice. As explored in the previous chapter, care ethics is not simply an academic undertaking but a physical activity of caring and taking care of others. This has then evolved into a framework born from care ethics. This ethical framework can not only help to understand moral relationships in theory but also in practice. Although not the primary aim of this thesis, I should note that it is possible to move beyond the theoretical underpinnings of moral issues to how they impact actual people's lives. This is especially important as it mirrors the ideals of care ethics to concentrate on actual and concrete experiences. Furthermore, when

pursuing academic feminism, it is important to continue to see and help challenge power hierarchies.[7] By seeing an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework as not only a theoretical exploration but an outline to question real life experiences, it is possible to narrate agency of the lived experiences.

E Intersectionality

Although care ethics highlights the need to understand all individuals as tangible and is highly sensitive to cultural circumstances, a feminist relational ontology must go further than this and learn from postcolonial and Black feminist theory to be intersectional and thus inclusive. By doing so, this framework should ask not only how gender affects morality but how other interlinking factors such as race, sexuality, nationality and class have an important impact on how ethical circumstances are both created and perceived. Only by drawing on this inclusive understanding of the variety of identities and the varieties of feminism can my framework be truly feminist.

F. Reflexivity

Reflexivity is fundamental to moral epistemology in feminist ethics and I must explore how my own stance reflects my interpretation of morality. Therefore, I must acknowledge the privilege in writing. Postcolonial and Black feminist theory reinforce the need to be reflexive in exploring moral problems; they do so by broadening the questions and asking where own privileges emerge from. Critical care ethics offers a way of using a feminist relational ontology framework in the international sphere, but it provides no protection of how care is provided. The use of a feminist relational ontology framework to explore issues, especially west vs east, north vs south, could be used to reinforce a power of dominance that is already recurrent in this literature. This hierarchal relationship would not automatically mimic those already existing, especially the dominant neoliberal agenda, because of its feminist roots, but an inclusive feminist relational ontology

[7] "We resist hegemonic dominance of feminist thought by insisting that it is a theory in the making, that we must necessarily criticize, question, re-examine, and explore new possibilities" (hooks 1984 p.10).

is still in danger of 'over-caring'. By this I mean prescribing a field of pity on those in different circumstances to the author, for example those in different economic conditions. By pitying someone their agency is removed and furthermore they are silenced as they are seen as incapable of changing their situation. At the same time, pitying others removes/obfuscates their original story and imposes a sense of arrogance of towards their situation. Therefore, pitying someone changes how they are seen as moral agents. My framework must be highly reflexive, especially in order to caution any power relations emerging from myself exploring external moral situations.

2.9 Conclusion

Therefore, I understand my feminist relational ontology methodological framework is born from a moral epistemological understanding of feminist ethics as outlined above. My feminist relational ontology framework argues for a multifaceted understanding of morality, which cannot simply result in a binary of right or wrong, highlighting that morality has many layers and must be understood in context-specific circumstances. Furthermore, it must be understood in a culture-specific way that has an intersectional understanding of identity and how moral understandings are not universal, yet is applicable within International Relations. The framework must also accommodate for a range of ideals and understand that 'caring' takes places in an already ingrained system. It must provide a template for constructing "Othering" and hierarchies when viewing moral decisions. The framework ought to be able to see the diverse ways people are affected by moral problems, whilst not applying its own power hierarchy relationship, ensuring a greater amount of reflexivity is undertaken. It is important to note that this framework does not work in the hypothetical, but must be grounded by looking at a specific concrete issue. Over the following few chapters I will engage my feminist relational ontology framework to explore the gendered stories of agency and evil. My inclusive framework will be a guide to unpick moral problems through a feminist lens, without reinforcing existing gendered power norms that exist. To begin, I will use this framework to explore how we tell stories of evil.

Chapter 3: How Gendered Agency is Narrated within Stories of Evil

3.1 Introduction

"The problem of evil is the guiding force of modern thought" (Neiman 2002 p.3), yet the telling of evil relies upon the established gendered moral boundaries. Evil is an ambiguous and confusing subject that is morally normative and, thus, difficult to discuss. Therefore, within these often-upsetting stories, it is uncomfortable to challenge existing narratives. Consequently, stories of evil become a Manichaean fallacy of evil versus good. Engrained within these constructed binaries, of wrong and right, is the lack of room for multifaceted agents with interdependent stories. Instead, these stories promote stereotypes that fit easily within tropes.

This chapter will explore how gendered stories of evil impede the narration of adequate moral agents, over the course of four sections. The first section will begin by grounding my arguments in Claudia Card's work on gender and evil. It will then question how stories of evil are understood, initially, by looking at the ambiguity within the definition of evil. It will then look at patterns that exist in stories of evil, examining how evil is viewed as both an act against humanity and absent from humanity. Here, the actor of evil is viewed as monstrous and actions are narrated as intentional. Through this exploration, I conclude that evil is constructed as external. My second section will focus on how women are narrated in relation to evil, focusing on the body of women in two ways: firstly, how women are seen to have a lack of ability to resist evil and, secondly, how they are narrated as hypersexual.

The third section examines how dominant stories of evil are masculinised. I begin this section by outlining what masculinity is and how it is dominates moral thought, building on my first two chapters. I will subsequently outline how two values of masculinity, the autonomous rational male (as the primary agent) and functioning in abstraction, are key features in stories of evil, providing evidence of when these features take place and their limits.

My final section examines these points through an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework. It explores, how an inclusive feminist relational ontology offers a powerful critique of the dominant stories of evil, focusing on how stories of evil are constructed within norms of externality, and a shallow definition of humanity. Finally, I examine what an inclusive feminist relational ontological exploration of evil would include, concluding that there is a requirement for a multifaceted narration of evil, as without this it does not allow us to see moral agency and gender from a feminist perspective within International Relations.

3.2 Stories of Evil

To begin my investigation, I will outline work particularly important to this thesis by focusing of the literature of Claudia Card. I will then use this as a platform to look at the patterns that arise in stories of evil.

By asking how feminist ethics can help us to understand agency and evil better, one of the foremost starting points is Claudia Card, who uses her feminist background to examine notions of evil. Card is very interested in "what distinguishes evil from lesser wrongs" (2010 p.4) and uses a secular moral point of view to study evil. Card labels her approach to evil 'The Atrocity Paradigm' and it is highlighted in two books - *The Atrocity Paradigm* (2005) and *Confronting Evil* (2010). In this, she argues that evil has two basic components: intolerable harm and culpable wrongdoing (2005 p.4). In many ways, Card's feminist approach to evil should be celebrated, especially her widening of the concept of evil to include highly gendered problems such as domestic violence (2005) and rape (2005 and 2010). The strength of the Atrocity Paradigm is that it does not rely on gendered interpretations of motivations as "atrocities are recognizable without our knowing the perpetrators' states of mind." Therefore, the "atrocity paradigm reveals a concept of evil that is not defined by motive, although it implies culpability" (Card 2005 p.9) Instead, it focuses on suffering.

Card highlights that her atrocity-based theory of evil is underpinned by the need to make judgements of right and wrong as (2005 p.5):

> Harm is not evil unless aggravated, supported, or produced by culpable wrongdoing. The atrocity theory is meant to be compatible with many understandings of the distinction between right and wrong, as long as they neither define "wrong" as "harmful" nor equate "wrong" with "evil".

The aim of the Atrocity Paradigm is not to offer a new theory of right and wrong, but Atrocity Theory is compatible with Rawls' Principles of Justice, Ross or Prichard's Intuitionalism or Kant's Categorical Imperative (Card 2005 p.5). All offer a binary, hypothetical and masculine understanding of wrong and right

which are fundamentally flawed. Here Card uses judgment to explore binaries, "A widely shared common-sense view is that good and evil, unlike right and wrong, are not contradictories (Card 2010 p.36). Furthermore, Card argues that, "evils are foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoings" (Card 2005 p.3). Here, the focus on culpability places evil again on the individual actor through a focus on the guilty. Card argues that we: "need to be able to make judgements of right and wrong in order to apply the atrocity theory of evil, as harm is not evil unless aggravated, supported, or produced by culpable wrongdoing" (Card 2002 p.5).

Central to understating what is considered a story of evil, Card argues that natural events, such as fires and earthquakes that are external to moral agency so not caused or preventable are not evil (Card 2002 p.5). I would question this though, through my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, as often moral agents are linked to others through environmental impacts. Although some natural events such as earthquakes may well be argued to be external to human manipulation, multiple other events that are outside the realm of moral evil, such as famine, forest fires and floods are increased by the behaviour of humankind. Those at risk from these events are often the most vulnerable in the world and so it is easy to forget the relational responsibility we have.

When considering the narration of agency and evil, it is important to note that Card argues that not all humans are capable of inflicting evil. She claims that (Card 2002 p.22):

> We are not all potentially evil simply because we are human beings, although many of us might acquire that potentially evil and more than the mere capacity to experience the attraction of evil incentives or even to form evil intention.

Instead, those who commit acts of evil are the exception (Card 2002 p.22):

> It is to have something real (a persistent desire, baits of gross inattention) in one's character, in virtue of which one's evildoing would be no accident. To be human is not necessarily to have such desires or habits.

This is fundamental because it outlines who is seen as a legitimate agent of evil and highlights that cultural norms are drawn to show how evil is externalised and the perpetrator of evil seen as monstrous.

Using her feminist starting point, Card argues that to "demythologize evil we must also acknowledge that "perpetrator" and "victim" are abstractions. Real people are often both." (Card 2010 p.15). She continues, "atrocities are perpetrated by agents who have epistemological limitations and emotional attachments. They are ambivalent, deluded, changeable, fickle" (Card 2010 p.16). This begins to move away from the rational actor as the starting point of the study of evil, which I will explore in this chapter but does not acknowledge the interdependent nature of the individual. Therefore, Card's study on epistemological limitations and emotional attachments could be pushed even further to look at how other aspects of evil are multifaceted. However, her work offers an excellent platform from which the narration of gendered agency within stories of evil can be questioned and examined.

Finally, Card's work is useful in highlighting how evil is seen as difficult to use because of its externality (Card 2005 p.23):

> For much of the twentieth century, evil has been an unpopular concept among intellectuals in Europe and North America. The reasons appear to be that thinking in terms of evil tends to demonize others instead of understanding them and that demonizing is counterproductive, that it stirs up destructive hatred.

Building upon this I will look at how stories of evil are told using a feminist International Relations perspective and reflect on what this tell us about moral agency. The first step in exploring how gendered stories of evil impede the narration of adequate moral agents is to unpack the definition of a story of evil.

To do so, I will explore four key elements that appear as patterns within these stories. The aim of this section is not to provide a detailed analysis of the literature of evil or theorists who engage with the topic, but instead to sign post the key patterns that appear within stories of evil and to understand how this impacts the narration of agency and gender. This will provide a platform for further analysis within these stories.

The Understanding of Evil as Ambiguous

Within stories of evil, there is little consensus about what evil is or how it can be defined. With the absence of a consistent understanding of evil, stories focus on the characteristics of evil (Jeffery 2008 p.3). Additionally, attention is paid to consequences of evil acts or a history of the term rather than what it means to be an evil actor or what an evil act is (Bernstein 2002). For example, Susan Neiman argues there is no intrinsic property of evil that can be defined and, instead, traces the impact of evil historically (Neiman 2002 p.9). Richard Bernstein is highly sceptical towards any theory of evil, however, he proposes an open-ended hermeneutical circle when considering the theory (Bernstein 2002 p.6-7). These approaches do not provide new alternatives but engrain the ambiguity of the term. Although there may be a focus on particular evil actors or acts, there is no repeatable acceptance to what a definition of evil is.

This is especially problematic as the academic literature on evil has been "sparse and inadequate" (Bernstein 2002 p.1). Although multiple writings explore the surface of evil, they are often reflecting on classical approaches to the study (Jeffery 2008, Bernstein 2002, Connolly 2002, Card 2002), or providing analysis of the political language of evil and the implications this has on current global politics (Hayden 2009, Lara 2007, Fallwell and Williams 2017). Although both of these endeavours are interesting, they limit the scope of our understanding of evil and contribute to the ambiguity of what evil means in our current world(s). Here, the definition of evil, or how we tell stories of evil, is simply reproduced and there is little challenge to how the sexist and racist power structures that exist

have altered the construction of it. This too is problematic (Fallwell and Williams 2017, p. 2):

> if we take a very basic social definition of evil to be that which violates contemporary norms and morals in a given society, then women, who have been circumscribed within narrow social roles, are in danger of being defined as evil any time they cannot meet, unwittingly chafe against, or deliberately defy the oppressive rules of gender

Therefore, the definitions of evil themselves are problematic when thinking of how agency works within its narratives.

Within the sparsely populated literature on this topic, evil is divided along multiple lines and subdivisions. Stories are categorised into natural or moral evil. Natural evil, is seen as beyond human intention or activity, This evil takes its forms in natural disasters such as earthquakes. In contrast to this moral evil includes, "all instances of suffering—mental and physical—which are caused by the intentional and willful actions of human agents (for which human agents can be held morally blameworthy)" (Reichenbach 1976 p.179). These can be further divided to examine metaphysical or ethical approaches to the study of evil. Yet, these multiple divisions are not mutually accepted, as the terms are fluid and normative, depending on the narrator of the story.

This diverse and ambiguous exploration of evil means that there are inconsistencies in both the media and academia on how we tell stories. For example, in the media, a headline which labels a story as evil ranges from the murderer of a cat (Burman 2016, Lakeman 1999), to paedophiles (Wilkes 2006 and Patterson 2010), mothers who kill (Thornton 2014 and Hodge 2018) and terrorist attacks (Epstein 2017 and Verkaik 2005). The recurrences and wide use of the term 'evil' reduces the impact of the term. For example, if everything is evil, then nothing is evil. The construction of the external enemy as evil is repeated within history and still takes place today (Kochi 2010). Yet the constant changing

of who or where evil is, with no set of criteria, means that it provides no clarity on the meaning.

Within this ambiguity moral boundaries are hidden and power structures are reinforced. Within the discomfort and confusion of what and who evil is, existing intersectional hierarchies and stereotypes are reinforced. Therefore, within this ambiguity, there is no room to challenge these hierarchies and stereotypes; allowing the narration of moral agency to be overlooked. I will explore this further in the final section of this chapter and throughout my case studies. Within the ambiguity of what constitutes a story of evil, patterns emerge within the stories, which I will now further unpack.

Humanity

Humanity is a core pattern in stories of evil. This is fundamental to who is narrated as a victim of evil and who can be an actor of evil. This occurs, as the classification of an act as evil where the suffering is so awful that it is not limited only to the victim(s) of the act, but it extends to the community in which the act took place (Neiman 2002 p.8). An example would be that child abuse may have directly impacted a handful of victims, but it harms the entire community in which this takes place. This formula is often seen in terrorist attacks: the experience of the evil of the September 11th attacks, that took place in New York and Washington DC, are narrated in such a way that it does not just affect those directly involved in the plane crashes, but the US community and even those in the 'free world' (Neumayer and Plumper 2009).

This understanding of evil is evidenced by stories of genocide, arguably one of the most agreed upon acts of evil. In the narration of genocide, the actions and actors of evil, are so great that it is beyond wrong. Adorno famously quoted that there can be no poetry after Auschwitz (Adorno 2000). Here, the evil of the Holocaust had not only hurt humanity but shaped our understanding of it.

Yet, the definition of what is considered as humanity is fundamental to the understanding of evil. Here, it is important to note the two characterisations of

humanity which are used interchangeably. The first is simply the collective sum of the human population, sometimes synonymous with humankind. The second is the quality of being human, interlinked with compassion. Both of these iterations have subsequent impact on how evil is defined.

Within my focus on western stories of evil, Christianity has lad a large impact on the understanding of humanity. Here, humanity is seen as God's children, and so an unspecific and a collective understanding of man is taken as a given[8]. This collective understanding of man privileges a specific group of the collective human race however, most notably the focus on 'man' compared to all genders, and often this definition of humanity is focused on race or class. I will explore this further toward the end of this chapter. At this stage, it is important to highlight the power in relaying on a definition of humanity to understand evil, which reinforces existing moral boundaries.

Finally, within stories of evil, the concept of humanity becomes further important, as the act/actor of evil is considered to involve an absence of humanity. Within the western tradition, this can be traced to St Augustine's understanding of evil as *privatio boni* or the absence of good (St Augustine 2002). Here, the act of evil is, once again, seen as so enormous that it is beyond the normal. The notion of evil defines the existing behavioural norms or religious beliefs, and so the deed is not only wrong but transcends this to become evil. This is embedded in a subsequent pattern of evil, the notion of a monster, which I will now further explore.

Monster

This absence of humanity leads to another pattern which is coherent in stories of evil: that the evil actor is inhumane or a monster. This is highlighted in Card's work who argues those who commit acts of evil are seen as they is outside of humanity (2010 p.16):

[8] Here human nature is seen as theistic rather than anti-theistic

> Evil personified as a demon or reified as a force is not something to be reasoned with or understood. We need only destroy it if possible, or defeat it, however temporarily. Demons are monolithic, malevolent through and through, never ambivalent or changeable. They are literally inhuman. Evil on the atrocity paradigm wears a human face. Atrocities are perpetrated by agents who have epistemological limitations and emotional attachments. They are ambivalent, deluded, changeable, fickle.

The behaviour of an actor of evil is seen as so awful that the actor is no longer human. The actor transcends into a monster and, external from their community or the humanity of moral actors, they become their actions. This is embedded in a legacy of Christian association of the devil with evil. Here, the devil is the personification of evil. The monster narrative is constructed in post-original sin thought. Instead there is a focus on a man's choice to commit a sin. Thus, when a man chooses to commit acts of evil, against humanity, they are monstrous.

This post-original sin focus on free will is rooted in a Kantian understanding of character: Kant subscribes to the binaries of good and evil, particularly when considering a man's character. So, for Kant, a man's action may be only slightly good, but his Maxim[9] cannot; this must be either entirely good or evil (Kant 2011). This is due to his ability to either follow the moral law or not and, due to his free will, man has control of his underlying Maxim (Fackenheim 1954 p.349). This is seen more loosely by his definition of moral freedom, which Kant argues to be the strict choice between good and evil (Fackenheim 1954 p.340). Thus, if an individual chooses to commit acts of evil, he must not have the capacity to choose; he is beyond the rational human.

The narrative of the actor of evil as a monster, functions through externality, i.e. those who exist outside of humanity, as Lara outlines (2007 p.146):

> Key to this loss of the human world is the cultural construction of 'the other' as an evil being. The procedure for locating the enmity of others

[9] Here a maxmium can be understood as an intention

> is accomplished through a fictitious conspiracy. It is under these conditions that ideologies are transformed into real weapons.

Thus, within the narrative of the monster, the stories of evil are not limited to a written discourse, and so impact the lived experience of the interpretations of evil. This is itself circular, as the processes of the monstrous other or 'enemy' "are always culturally built according to their negative characteristics" (Lara 2007 p.148). This is mirrored in the definition of humanity where the power hierarchies determine who or what is evil. These hierarchies are formed from masculine epistemologies, that I will explore further later in this chapter.

An epistemological construction of the monster/ enemy is explored by Foucault, who highlights three elements that form the group of abnormals in society. The human monster, the individual to be corrected and the onanist. The first of these elements, is noteworthy when thinking of the evil actor constructed as the monster. The human monster is described as (Foucault 1997 p.51):

> An Ancient notion whose frame of reference is law. A juridical notion, then, but in the broad sense, as it referred not only to social laws but to natural laws as well; the monster's field of appearance is a juridico-biological domain. The figures of the half-human, half-animal being.

Here, the dehumanization of monster is mirrored in stories of evil, where the actors functions beyond social and natural laws. This is reinforced as "the human monster combines the impossible and forbidden" (Foucault 1997 p.51). Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai uses Foucault's interpretation of the monster to analyse the queering of the terrorist in the discourse of the War on Terror. They argue "the monster is not merely an other; it is one category through which a multiform power operates"(Puar and Rai 2002 p.119). This evidences the power in constructing 'the other', which is prevalent in stories of evil. I will use Foucault's and Puar and Rai's analysis in shaping how I explore my case studies of evil, particularly noting the intersections of power that shape the monster narrative.

This 'monster' narrative is inherently gendered, as it relies upon the belief that women are produced differently than those of other genders. Reflecting on wider violence, beyond simply evil, women who commit acts of violence are narrated as having a biological flaw, which disrupts their femininity. This means that they are narrated as lacking responsibility, as their actions are not conscious decisions, but inherent to their failing womanhood (Gentry and Sjoberg 2015 p.93). Therefore, the female monster narrative is further entrenched, firstly, by opposing the rational actor, who willingly commits acts of evil and secondly as her status as a failed women. This pathological deviance, narrated as a gendered defect, in turn impacts the narration of intentionality of the evil actor, which I will soon explore.

Although the construction of the evildoer as monstrous is not unanimously adopted, Arendt affirms the pattern of evil-doer as the monster, but challenges this in her famous accounts of Eichmann, where she states: however "monstrous the deeds were, the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic" (Arendt 1977). This challenge shapes the construction of evildoer as external to humanity, which has powerful implications for the narration of the agent of evil. I will return to this theme in the final section of this chapter.

Intentionality

The final pattern in the narration of evil is the intentionality of acts. Evil acts are deliberate acts done by an agent with the capacity to choose to do otherwise. Rather than evil being an event or occurrence that is inflicted upon humanity by an external power, these accounts emphasize the agential nature of evil. Rousseau argues that (moral) evil is defined as suffering instigated by acts of intentional and willful humans (Cladis 1995). This intentionality is traditionally embedded in the theological concern of whether man, or God, was responsible for the presence of evil on earth.

Numerous arguments have emerged from this tension of whether man is responsible for deliberately inflicting evil. Traditionally, the concept of original

sin is popular, as it is a theodical solution to the logical problem of evil, absolving God from this problem. Instead, man is inherently condemned, embedded in a supposed defect of human nature. Original sin is the fall of man that ensued when Eve took fruit from the forbidden tree in the Garden of Eden, leading to man's ejection from the Garden and bringing evil into the world.

St Augustine's works are fundamental to the study of evil and original sin; he argues that the act of Adam eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden brought evil into the world and humans take responsibility for this through free will (Rengger and Jeffery 2005 p.12). Therefore, due to our character, humans are capable of evil (Augustine 2003 p.462). When reading Augustine, it is vital to acknowledge that he recognises both an allegorical dimension to the myth and the historical actuality of the story. Consequently, exploring evil and original sin through the Augustinian account is fundamentally anti-pluralist. This is further engrained by Augustine's notion of *Libido Dominandi*, which refers to the original sin that all humans are born with, that is inherited through the sin of sex. According to Augustine, all sex, even consensual, marital sex, was sinful as it passed original sin to the next generation (Augustine 2002).

Here, the problem of evil was moved from the internal sin of man, to the external world. As a result, the individual did not claim automatic responsibility. This complicates the internationality of the actor of evil. If man is born inherently evil, then: The Kantian tradition is highly influential in studying stories of evil (Card 2002 p.27). Kant offers a more substantive account on the internationality of man and evil. This is born out of Kant's focus on his categorical imperative, here man must follow moral law as maxim or aim, as moral behaviour is beyond simply following duty, but following duty for the correct reason (Kant 2011). Here the focus on rationality is underpinned by Kant's need to always have free will. As Caswell explains (2006b p.643):

> we are rational agents precisely in so far as we act rationally. Indeed, the rationality of our actions is a necessary condition of their status as products of a free will: a will determined by principles of practical reason.

> In order for an evil agent's acts to count as evil in the genuinely ethicalsense, they must be fully attributable to his or her free, rational agency.

This is mirrored in contemporary accounts of evil. Card, who follows a Kantian logic, argues that "harm is not evil unless aggravated, supported, or produced by culpable wrongdoing" (Card 2002 p.5). This focus on culpability and intentionality means not only that evil has been deliberately instigated, but that responsibility can be attributed to the actor. Jeffery follows this account and she questions the distinction between evil acts and evil intentions that alter responsibility, questioning whether agents are responsible for unintended acts of evil, especially if they are foreseeable (Jeffery 2008 p.99).

This reinforces the notion of the monster as the perpetrator of evil. A dichotomy is produced as the evil doer or monster who chooses knowingly to commit acts of evil, is external to the rational moral agent who chooses to obey the moral constructions of humanity. Yet the 'monster' may also encompass those who have unintentionally failed as moral agents, as they lack the ability to make moral decisions. Thus, this intentionality pattern is not consistent with stories of evil. Some evildoers are seen as incapable of being able to choose whether to commit acts of evil. This may be due to their limited understanding of morality, such as children or women, or in cases where the ideal candidate of evil has committed an act of evil. For example, a rape committed by an educated white male. In this case, evil has acted through him, and the action is justified by claiming that the white male had too much libido. I will return to these narratives throughout the remainder of this thesis.

These four patterns, identified within stories of evil, are central to the ability to understand it: acts of evil are against humanity, and the actors of evil are monsters external to humanity. In the construction of these patterns, there is a great focus on those who are in humanity and those who are external to it. This externality is vital in understanding how stories of evil have been created and repeated and this will be explored in more detail at the end of this chapter. Evil

is rarely recognised to originate within the self defined community, but the vulnerability to evil occurs from outside; from the 'other'. This, in itself, is dangerous as those seen as the 'other' are more likely to be labelled as evil, whilst those classified as internal have greater flexibility. However, this is even more dangerous as evil is highly ambiguous, meaning it is easy to reproduce moral boundaries within stories.

3.3 Gender and Evil

In my first two chapters, I outlined the gendered values born from societal norms that relegate women to a lesser status than men. This is embedded in cultural patriarchal norms that produce moral boundaries and reinforce power hierarchies. As previously explained, women are seen as inadequate moral agents; weak in comparison their male counterparts. As a result of subordinating moral boundaries, a relationship has been constructed between women's bodies and the presence of evil. Here, women embody evil; they are seen as dirty and abject. Menstruation is seen as unclean blood, compared to the bleeding of men which is narrated as a sacrifice. This construction of the evil body of women is thus seen as lesser than men. In this subordination, women have been constructed, in western culture, as vehicles for evil. This is formed through the construction of women as both meek and dirty, thus they are seen as weak to the forces of evil, narrated as gateway between the devil and earth and thus swaying the innocent man. Women are constructed as instruments of Satan; due to their lack of intelligence, and so they are unable to understand the moral dilemma of good and evil. This relationship is further engrained as the female is narrated as having an inclination toward superstition, in comparison to men, meaning they are more susceptible to the Devil's work, in addition to their sinful nature, i.e. being deceitful, excessive, vane and lustful (Ehrenreich and English 2010).

Within the narrative of women as inadequate moral agents, they are viewed as defective when making ethical decisions (Patemean 1980). This leads to a contradiction of women being both pure and sinful, by design. This has a historical legacy, for example, Kant argues that women have many "sympathetic sensations" and are "good-hearted", therefore they "will avoid the wicked, not because it is unright, but because it is ugly; and virtuous actions mean to them such as are morally beautiful" (Kant 2011 p.77). Thus, Kant is claiming that women's moral deficiency is part of their nature (Mikkola 2011 p.90). But, this legacy of women as 'good' is not because of their ability to choose to be so, but because they are destined to be so. So, the resultant dichotomy produced, implies that this body of evil is accompanied by angelic and virtuous behaviour. Here,

women are the saviours of women, such as the Virgin Mary, or are vulnerable and in need of protection from evil (Noddings 1989 p.59)[10]. In both circumstances, women have little agency in their story of evil; they are viewed as a carrier of good or evil rather than as a moral decision maker. Therefore, it this unstable contradiction can be continually reinforced as, in both circumstances, the female is seen as lesser than the virtuous rational male who is a moral decision maker. Therefore, the polarised view of women, as both angelic and demonic, means that they have been narrated as receptive to voices of salvation and evil (Noddings 1989 p.45).

Here, two themes are carried forward: women's lack of ability/intelligence to resist the devil and their hypersexuality, which encourages evil. The incapacity to reject evil is fundamental to the narration of women as inadequate moral agents and, thus, females have been labelled the "devil's gateway" (Church 1975 p.83), in comparison to their male counterparts, who may commit acts of evil, but do so as a failing in ethical decision making. This 'natural' occurrence is mirrored in the second theme, in women's sexuality, which is narrated as a degenerative disease, born from the relationship between femininity and nature, where corrupt women entice 'innocent' men (Dijkstra 1996 p.4). Thus, women's inadequacy in moral decision making is not only detrimental to their own behaviours, but disruptive to the ethical decision making of men (Pateman 1980).

[10] Nel Noddings, one of the founders of Care Ethics, explores the everyday experience of women and evil. Although the book offers an excellent overview into the history of women and evil, which is important for this study, Noddings' approach is incomplete and very essentialist, making it hard to agree with her conclusions. As Noddings outlines, "When I assume a woman's standpoint, I will take the perspective of one who has had responsibility for caring, maintaining, and nurturing and I will try to work out the logic of a morality from this perspective" (Noddings 1989 p.2). Noddings does not appear to separate women from femininity and men from masculinity. Therefore, her conclusion that pain is the basic form of evil seems unconvincing and so there is a need for further research within care ethics and evil. However, I use some elements of her research in this chapter to highlight the masculine formation of evil.

This has allowed women's hypersexuality and a natural tendency towards evil to legitimise men's actions. Here, women have become scapegoats for male doers of evil, as through their uncontrolled embodiment of evil, they influence and corrupt men to commit sinful acts (Noddings 1989 p.37). The masculine focus on rational and autonomous decision making is narrated as being swayed by the beauty and sexuality of women and, therefore, their ability to make a moral decision is disrupted (Pateman 1980). This has a legacy, from the Fall of Man through Original Sin and Eve, which I will explore subsequently. This legacy is engrained in the narration of women, for example through the labelling of women as witches, which features both here and in my final case study, prominently. Here, the men become cursed and are forced to perform the wicked witches' acts (Ehrenreich and English 2010). The narrative of women enticing men to evil is recurrent in my first case study, which examines rape culture. In this case, the women are narrated as having a 'secret rape wish', from 'wanting it', to dressing or acting 'inappropriately'.

The relationship between evil and women is constructed through intersections: A woman's race, sexuality and nationality further engrain how she is portrayed within a story of evil. This is especially important, as evil is externalised away from humanity and human actions. Thus, if something is further 'othered' from the white male autonomous protagonist, then the women are doubly sexualised and engrained in sin. This too has a cultural legacy, in the Bible, where the 'foreign' women were narrated as the temptresses of sinful behaviour. For example, the 'wise' King Solomon's only downfall was the disruption by marriages to foreign women or Samson's vulnerability was Philistine females (Yee 2003 p.2).

This is deep-rooted by the idea that women are "by nature carnal, a structural defect rooted in the original creation" (Dworkin 1074 p.122). As with patriarchal values, if this subordination appears as a natural occurrence it becomes difficult to criticise, as it is a viewed predetermined existence rather than a socially constructed moral boundary that can be eroded (Frye 1983). Therefore, this narrative of women and evil is a dehumanising stereotype which shows women

as either passive victims or violent bodies. In either case, they are in need of being controlled/saved by men (Menon 2006 p.11). Furthermore, this engrained relationship, between women and evil, is not an action but a permanent state (Gebara 2002 p.4).

The relationship between evil and women is reinforced through cultural legacies and stories of sin. The most notable of these in western societies is that of evil and original sin. The infamous creation myth of Adam and Eve, the first man and women who lived in the peaceful Garden of Eden, is of great significance, not only to the Christian tradition, but to wider societal norms. In Genesis, we find that Adam and Eve are told, by God, that they may eat all of the fruit in the garden, except for one; the fruit from the 'Tree of Knowledge'. Tricked by a serpent, Eve takes an apple from the forbidden tree and thus brings sin into the world. Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden, and evil and shame are bought into the world (Genesis 2:25). The story of 'The Fall' has been one of the most influential factors in associating women and evil, it has impacted patterns of our culture and contributed to the subordination of women (Noddings 1989 p.52). Although all of humanity is seen as being damned, women, in particular, are viewed as being sinful due to Eve's temptation. Hence, all women are linked to Eve (Glenn 1977 p.184).

The story of Eve produces the two themes that I previously highlighted, which reinforce the relationships between women and evil: firstly, that Eve does not have the capacity to make moral decisions and, secondly, that she is a temptress. When focusing on the interpretations of Eve, she is labelled as 'easily-fooled' (Elshtain 2000). Eve claims, in the Genesis story, that "the serpent tricked me" (Genesis 3:13). Here, women, as inadequate moral agents who are disobedient, are formed. Furthermore, Eve encouraged Adam to sin and, therefore, is portrayed as a temptress.

Therefore, "when we fell, it was a long hard fall indeed. The woman becomes a seducer. The serpent, one of God's creatures, becomes an instrument of evil" (Elshtain 2000 p.19). Consequently, the woman as a sexual temptress is

engrained in human kind's ability to reproduce. The fall of Eve has been interpreted as part of the subordination of women. When damning Eve, God proclaims, "You will long for your husband. And he will rule over you" (Genesis 2006 3:16). This leads to the interpretation that women are subservient to men and produces moral boundaries; "the men writing the Bible used women, particularly those who were socially, culturally and racially Other, as tropes for evil and destruction" (Yee 2003 p.3). There is a need to look at the interpretation of these foundational texts, and a call to see how and why these texts are being used in these ways. The Bible, like many traditional texts formed in a patriarchal culture, can be questioned to readdress the power in telling the stories.

Women's relationship to sin and evil, and their subordination, is reinforced through Eve's castigation. The punishment for Eve's actions was the pain of menstruation and childbirth that God bestowed on all women, portraying all females as sinful (Newton 2016). The damnation of menstruation has a particular cultural legacy; women's blood is filthy and dangerous, in comparison to men's blood, which is a sign of sacrifice (Gebara 2002 p.7).

In western culture and moral theory, large parts of the relationships between gender, women and evil are formed in Judeo Christian tradition. The Bible as a foundational text still has a large impact on social attitudes on gender, race, ethnicity, class, sexual orienation and colonialism (Yee 2003 p.1). This has, therefore, played a major role in shaping the interpretation of evil; beyond the story of Eve, the association of evil and the devil exists even in secular texts. This story of women bringing evil into the world is not only located in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but famously in Greek mythology through Pandora, who is given to earth as a punishment from God and brings sin into the world (Glenn 1977 p.184). Parallel stories can be found in North American indigenous cultures whose myths include that the first female was the cause of evil and it was she who brought death into the world (Yee 2003 p.3). Here the repetition of women, as the source of evil, engrains subordination and the ability to see females as moral actors.

The myth that women are inherently associated with evil has been largely normalised by incorrect biological assumptions. This same science, that was used to reinforced racism, portrayed women as genetically inferior to men, and could be vehicles for evil, for example, that women are 'naturally' hysterical. These 'natural laws' that science created were then reinforced as truth through the media representation of women (Dijkstra 1996 p.5). Hollywood was particularly vital to this normalization, which latched onto a long tradition of using women's bodies, especially those of foreign women "to inscribe the contradictions and conflicts of their times" (Yee 2003 p.160). Thus, when biological assumptions of the different behavioural traits of sex were proven, these assumptions were already embedded in daily discourse as cultural myths.

A second cultural legacy that reinforced the relationship between women and evil is that of witches. In line with the construction of women as deficient moral agents, for millennia, women, especially those who challenged constructed gendered norms, have been labelled as witches. These witches have been constructed as female figures performing acts of evil, external to society. The construction of a witch narrative does not simply originate from a description of sorcery or magic, but from one of power and othering.

The witch narrative transgresses different time periods and locations with the continuous theme of control and ostracisation of 'the other'. These cultural depictions were narrated in Greek and Latin epic poems, seen in the works of Hesiod, Homer and Ovid, such as bird-women harpies, who tore at the bodies of babies in their cradles. They appear multiple times in the Judeo-Christian legacy, which became the inspiration for many traditions. Examples of these myths and narratives, in Britain, are Morganna of the Arthurian legends, the three witches in Shakespeare's *MacBeth*, or Milton's Satanic Figures (Petherbridge 2013 p.13).

Throughout western history, witch hunts have "never lost their essential character: that of ruling class campaigns of terror directed against the female peasant population" (Ehrenreich and English 2010 p.33). This power is further entrenched as 'witches' were normally illiterate, meaning they could not escape

their own narrative, most history is recorded by the educated elite (Ehrenreich and English 2010 p.35). Women who were often called "wise women" were labelled witches or charlatans by authorities (Ehrenreich and English 2010 p.25). Historically, a specific area in which women have been more closely targeted by authorities is the traditional role of healers and those who practised medicine.

Recurrent in the extensive witch narrative is that a witch possesses the power to influence the actions of others (Ehrenreich and English 2010). To be 'bewitched' means an actor loses agency over their own behaviour. This is particularly frightening to a tradition that enforced the idea that the autonomous rational moral actor is the ideal citizen (Tronto 1995). The threat that a mysterious, powerful woman who has limited capacity to control this power is frightening to a patriarchal culture, particularly when women have a relationship with evil.

The repeated, enforced narrative linking women and evil has led to a normalisation and acceptance of the relationship in western society (Noddings 1989 p.45). Here, "evilness embodied in the female form was constructed out of the social, historical and economic conflicts that needed ideological resolution through her symbolization" (Yee 2003 p.160). The ambiguity of both gender and evil engrain this relationship further. There is great difficulty in defining both of these terms, as both gender and evil are "functions on a continuum which is itself shaped by prevailing cultural conditions – both within and between societies. What is considered feminine or masculine shifts over time and place, as does what is perceived as acceptable (good) or unacceptable (bad)" (Fallwell and Williams 2017 p.1). This shift means that no firm understanding of the relationship between gender and evil exists, adding to the discomfort in ambiguity that has been discussed previously. Within this discomfort, it is difficult to challenge constructed narratives, as there is little stability of the definitions of these narratives.

Seen through a feminist lens, the relationship between women and evil must be challenged, as this will continue to see females relegated to being a 'second sex', while this is still engrained (Gebara 2002 p.85) and patriarchal values still

enforced. This is a dangerous relationship as it not only damns women and reinforces their subordination, but prevents readers from seeing women beyond the association of being pure or satanic. Even if this association is not direct, but embedded in expected behaviour of women, this limits women from being seen as moral decision makers. Now I have considered how the physical body of women is associated with evil, I will move on to focus upon how masculine and feminine values change our understanding of stories of evil. In doing so, I hope to highlight how stories of evil limit the telling of agency through the construction of imposed gendered moral boundaries.

3.4. How are Stories of Evil Masculinised?

Moving forward I will highlight how existing stories of evil are produced within masculine structures. I will do so by looking at two defining features of masculine theory: how the autonomous rational agent is the primary actor in these stories and how these stories are written in abstraction. I will evidence how these features take place and highlight why they are harmful. In doing so I will highlight how seeing agency is limited within the construction of these narratives. To begin this investigation, I will first briefly unpack what masculinity is, building on my first two chapters, arguing how masculinity is linked to superiority.

As I previously explored, sex and gender can be understood as social constructs that include a spectrum of behaviours. Within this spectrum, behavioural norms and qualities that have been associated with the male sex are masculine (Steans 2012). The norms include dominance, rationality, endurance, strength and autonomy, in addition to the premise that men are actors of reason and women are not (Sjoberg 2011 p.228). It should be noted that not all men are prescribed the same behavioural norms within masculinity; here the intersections of race, class and sexuality have large implications on how a male is expected to behave (Connell 2005). There are multiple forms of masculinity, such as hegemonic masculinity that imposes the male's place over women, as well as other subordinated and marginalised masculinities, all of which are not monolithic (Connell 2005 p.181).

In western society and, particularly, in global politics, these masculine norms are valued above the feminised qualities of interdependence and cooperation (as explored in my previous chapters) as these qualities, like women, are seen as weak (Enloe 2004 and Tickner 1992). Therefore, in "most fields of knowledge we have become accustomed to equating what is human with what is masculine" (Tickner 1992 p.5). Therefore, what is feminine is external to the masculine construction of the typical human experience.

Structures are in place that ensure these masculine values are still prioritised. Here, these fragile structures are prioritised as those who have the authority to

reinforce these structures legitimise these masculine values. Masculinities and "the boundaries keeping gender in place are ever fragile hence much work goes into securing them" (Zalewski 2015 p.10). Thus, challenges to patriarchal masculine norms are unwelcome in global politics (Manne 2017) Members of privileged groups, such as those in the hegemonic masculine elite of society, use violence to sustain their dominance. This is evidenced through misogyny which Manne argues, can be understood as (2017 p.13):

> Serving to uphold patriarchal order, understood as one strand among various similar systems of domination (including racisms, xenophobia, classism, ageism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, and so on). Misogyny does this by visiting hostile or adverse social consequences on a certain (more or less circumscribed) class of girls or women to enforce and police social norms that are gendered either in theory (i.e., content) or in practice (i.e., norm enforcement mechanisms).

These masculine structures make identifying and challenging masculine norms more difficult.

As these masculine qualities are highly valued, and men were the predominant narrators of international relations and moral theory, the man is becoming the primary agent in stories of global politics (Enloe 2004 and Tickner 1992). Specifically, the autonomous man is the centrepiece of modern western culture and the protagonist of modern moral philosophy (Walker 2007 p.137). Thus, the central actor of evil is seen as antonymous actor with masculine qualities, in comparison to the vulnerable irrational woman and child who is need of protection.

This focus of masculinity is not only limited to individuals or groups, but also applies to structures, theories and bodies of knowledge. Here, the structures value masculine qualities that the individual male is expected to maintain. For

example, the "values and assumptions that drive our international system are intrinsically related to concepts of masculinity" (Tickner 1992 p.17).

The traditional views of evil "are not only male but masculine in the sense that they maintain and even glorify traits and opinions that have been genderized in favour of males" (Noddings 1989 p.2), as these views have been suffused with male interests and conditioned by masculine experience (Noddings 1989 p.1). Therefore, from this starting point, I will focus on three features of masculinity: abstraction, autonomy and rationality. These values are fundamental to the interdependent 'man of reason' and, thus, are echoed in the dominant narratives of evil, which I will now unpack.

Rational Autonomous Agents

Building upon the exploration provided in my first two chapters and my brief unpacking of masculinity, I will further explore the role of the rational autonomous agent, how this agent is presented in stories of evil and why this is problematic. Here, another dichotomy is formed as the agent is both rational but swayed by the duplicitous woman. Rationality is of paramount importance to the function of masculinity and moral theory (Walker 2007). 'Men of reason', make calculated decisions that are logical answers to both their own needs and the rules of morality in which they exist (Walker 2007). This rationality is removed from the emotional, feminised method of decision making. Furthermore, this actor makes decisions independently, as they are narrated as an autonomous agent (Tronto 1995). Particularly when focusing on moral agents, stories have authorized the autonomous individual actor as the central agent who has the ability to freely choose their actions (Sondermann et al. 2018 p.3). My inclusive feminist relational ontology framework directly challenges this, as feminist care ethics concerns the mutual reliance of individuals, placing importance on caring, empathy and relationships.

It is impossible for any agent to be removed from their emotions as all humans are interdependent on/to one another. In the unlikely event that an agent decides

not to cultivate or maintain any relationships, then the agent is still vulnerable to others, for instance, the agent may be a victim of evil. Furthermore, this silences those who are not autonomous rational agents. The stories of those who are not the autonomous, white educated male are lost or delegitimised. As they are not characterised as the primary agent, individuals do not fit within the dominant narratives and their stories fit uncomfortably with existing metanarratives. Within this discomfort, the easiest response is to narrate these stories within existing tropes, assigning reasoning to existing moral boundaries of racist or sexist stereotypes. I will further unpack these tropes throughout the two case studies that succeed this chapter. Within these case studies, stories of the rational autonomous agent focusing on traditional accounts of evil, blocks the reader from being able to see actors of multifaceted agents.

Within dominant accounts of evil, there is a pattern that rational autonomous agents are the primary focus of stories. As "strength, power, autonomy, independence and rationality, are all typically associated with men and masculinity" (Tickner 1992 p.3), as the primary agents of International Relations and the most valued agents as defenders of security (Tickner 1992 p.3). This is mirrored as the authorised agents with stories of evil. This is embedded in larger relationships between evil and rationality. Evil is criticised for skewing rational judgments by obscuring moral complexity and simplifying complex decision-making processes (Jeffery 2008 p.4). This can be unpacked in three ways: focusing on the removal of emotions, free will and the reinforcement of binaries.

Dominant narratives of evil are rooted in notions of rationality, antithetical to emotional responses. Here, the emotional agent is linked to femininity, in opposition to the calculated logical male, who is the protagonist in International Relations. Despite evil being a highly emotive subject, the rational agent, as the primary agent, in stories of evil must act without emotion or risk becoming seen as weak and female, losing their credibility as a legitimate decision maker and, thus, a moral agent. This is a frequently observed pattern in stories of evil, from the brave prince who defeats the dragon in fairy tales (Dijkstra 1996), to soldiers who fight to protect the vulnerable (Elshtain 1995). Those who are seen as

emotional, especially those who are othered (for example, the female or foreign), are seen to be illegitimate actors of evil because they are seen to have the inability to become a moral decision maker. Deeper exploration of this will be provided in chapter four, which focusses on female actors of political violence and Alice/Lakwena.

The second common way the rational autonomous agent is narrated in dominant stories of evil is through a focus on free will: "if evil is understood as irrationality, the evil agent would have to be taken as less free, and therefore less accountable for his or her conduct as the good agent—more fully a free rational actor" (Caswell 2006b p.643). In order to be autonomous, an actor must act of their own accord. The relationship between free will and evil is well established in stories of evil, particularly when considering whether God or man is responsible for evil. St Augustine argues that Adam eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden brought evil into the world and humans take responsibility for this through free will (Augustine 1993 p.462). The pristine form of Adam's free will meant that God would not be blamed for evil within the world or construct limitations which would challenge God's omnipotence (Connolly 2002 p.129).

In recognising the importance of free will in the construction of the rational autonomous agent, there is a need to refer to Kant, whose work on free will and evil influenced many contemporary writers of the topic (Grimm 2002). Free will is fundamental to Kant's theories of radical evil. He argues that we are born with free will and a rational sentiment, from nature, which makes us aware of the decisions we make and, therefore, all radical evil is developed from a "fundamental maxim" that shapes the actions we choose to perform (Kant 2011 p.25). Kant argues that man has a free choice, which is independent from the casual events in the world (Grimm 2002 p.162). Here, rationality is seen through the ability to choose how to act is accepted.

Built upon the agent's free will within discourses of evil, the final way in which the autonomous agent is narrated in stories of evil is through the enforced binaries of right and wrong (Card 2002 p.5). Here, stories rest on a Manichaean

understanding of the world, i.e. good fighting against bad. Within this simplification, the rational autonomous actor, as a moral actor, fights to conquer evil. The generalisation of right versus wrong or good versus evil allows this to take place, as the agent is offered a choice, rather than being vulnerable to actions of evil. An example of this is found in the stories that surround the Responsibility to Protect discourse, where the good saviour protects the vulnerable citizen from the 'evil' state (Elshtain 2004).

As stories of evil are produced within masculine values of rationality and autonomy, this limits how individuals can be seen within these stories. This prevents the reader from seeing that actors have the ability to make moral decisions especially if they are not authorised, rational agents.

Abstraction

Abstraction functions within International Relations as an analytical device that enables scholars to epistemologically engage with the endless options and stories that global politics holds. In order to participate in knowledge practices, a segment of reality must be focused on. Yet, this abstraction holds great power. The strategy of limiting the infinite reality to one that can be processed in an article, book or classroom involves a decision of what and who is considered important (Krishna 2001 p.403). This decision is often a subconscious one, built upon the existing stories known to be of significance. Therefore, abstraction "usually presented as the desire of the discipline to engage in theory-building rather than in descriptive or historical analysis, is a screen that simultaneously rationalizes and elides the details of these encounters" (Krishna 2001 p.401).

One of the fundamental ways in which abstraction is constructed is through the idea that humankind is seen as singular and male. Here 'men' "feature, but only in so much as they are abstract universalised individuals: men as bodies do not enter into the discussion. This is largely due to the conventional understanding of the body as natural rather than social or political" (Shepherd 2015 p.27). This is further engrained in the construction of human nature, understood as a shared

set of characteristics by all humans (Shepherd 2015). Human nature is constructed as masculine, with individuals described as inherently rational and autonomous, repeated in the work of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes (Tickner 1992 p.63). Here, a universal voice is constructed that is limited to masculine values.

Abstraction reinforces the moral boundaries of what is considered in the remit of interest within International Relations. As "abstraction works as a strategy of containment to discipline what is considered legitimately within the purview of 'proper' IR discourse and what ought to be left on the cutting-room floor" (Krishna 2001 p.402). When focusing on a segmented and often hypothetical aspect of a story, a singular perspective and, thus, voice is produced. The choice of this segmented aspect reinforces existing power hierarchies, for example, the focus on the public over the private sphere as the location of interest in International Relations. By creating and reinforcing these perceived spheres, stories are ignored and we have a limited understanding of evil, as I will continue to explore.

The problem of agent-relative thinking further removes the history of relationships; in the hypothetical construct, the primary agent is the autonomous rational individual. Within this, the agent is counted as a single unit and decisions that they make are presumed to be made on a self-maximising basis (Sen 1992). Instead, the desired relationship is constructed through shared moral values. This removes the genuine care that emerges between individuals and does not allow for the multifaceted decision-making process to take place. Abstract reasoning doesn't work due to personal preferences that cannot and should not be detached from humans (Moore 1999 p.6). It would be impossible to develop any attachments to others in the impartial perspective and, thus, it is difficult to develop the capacity to act morally (Moore 1999 p.11).

The use of abstraction is varied and wide; the autonomous (masculine) agent, who is central to these stories, is narrated as naturally free and equal to other individuals (particularly in social contract stories), yet there is no agreement on

what it means to be an autonomous agent. (Pateman 1997 p.41). This further impedes a feminist undertaking of stories of evil.

One of the foremost problems concerning the narrative of evil within International Relations is the abstract nature of the study, which is often removed from the real-life actions and suffering that takes place. Here, a one-size-fits-all, collective understanding is enforced without highlighting the multifaceted nature of evil and actual people. This has severe consequences. For example, the literature on evil in International Relations is removed from the actual and placed into the hypothetical (Bernstein 2002). Despite the 'real world' approach of many scholars, placed through the lens of international politics, the reflection of these events is, in fact, strongly detached from the individuals about which it speaks. This construction has such a direct focus on how to study evil (metaphysical or ethical), the category of evil (political or moral), the classification of evil and who is responsible for it, that much of the study of evil does not consider the fact that evil is a lived experience, with real, vulnerable, interdependent humans acting within it.

This abstraction is further engrained as the discourse has become so specialized, professionalized and removed from the lived experiences of evil (Bernstein p.2 2002). The main issues of the so-called 'problem of evil' do not really concern the characterisation of evil and its varieties, but rather the problem of how to reconcile evil (however it is described) with religious beliefs and convictions.

This general understanding of evil is not useful, as "reflective judgments focus on the particular" (Lara 2007 p.11). There needs to be a multifaceted and messy understanding of evil that allows for dichotomous stories of real people to take place. Furthermore, this abstraction takes place at an individual level, within stories of evil. Here, stories of evil, "are able to reduce a human being into a thing or non-person, to be awakened only when we ourselves or our fellow countrymen are hit by the same kind of calamity or aggression" (Baunman and Donskis 2016 p.13). This detachment is apparent in stories of evil, where individuals are narrated as 'them' and 'others'; as the experiences and doers of

evil. In this abstraction, evil is further externalised, this externality limits the narration of who can be an agent, as I shall now explore.

3.5 Locating (Gendered) Agency within Stories of Evil

The constructed inclusive feminist relational ontology outlined in the previous chapter offers a powerful critique of the masculine discourse of storytelling. It highlights the moral boundaries that exist in the narration of these stories and, thus, shows how these masculine stories silence moral agency. This critique will examine specific areas in the masculine telling of evil externality and humanity.

Evil is portrayed as external: both external to what we consider as the 'Self', the individual, but also in terms of a society. This is constructed from the notions of morality being formed from a traditional approach, i.e. the ideas and experiences of the white, educated male, which has already been unpacked in this chapter, along with the idea that an externality is central to stories of evil.

This externalisation of evil is dangerous, as we are limited by the definition of evil and who can be an agent within stories of evil. This has implications for classifying who is evil: if the starting point of evil is the rational autonomous male (usually white and well educated) then evil automatically implies connotations of race and femininity. Even white male actors are narrated under the cannon of these external races and genders, for example, Adolf Hitler was feminised through rumoured castration, in the mocking song 'Hitler Has Only Got One Ball' (Composed by Lieutenant F. J. Ricketts). Those males who are not feminised/racialised are, instead, seen as the exception to the rule; the monstrous 'others' who have lost their ability to make moral decisions. For example, the male with too much libido commits rape, which I explore in my case study of rape culture.

This externalisation of evil implicates vulnerability. Evil is narrated as the external actor, hence evil is formed outside and, subsequently, forced upon the internal, rather than constructed within society. By being external, evil can be defeated; a saviour or hero can remove the evil, but if evil was considered internal it would mean overcoming part of ourselves, whether that be the individual or society.

Yet, accepting evil as internal, we are forced to examine the multiple degrees of evil. It is easy to argue that we all commit small acts of evil on a daily basis, for example, by buying and using mobile phones, we indirectly support a regime that damages and exploits the environment, through the mining of raw materials, as well as those who must mine them. In addition, this action supports the manufacture of devices in unethical factory conditions and sold through warehouse stores that have dangerous and poor working conditions. It is arguable that these evils are unavoidable, in order to exist in society without contributing to social injustice and environmental degradation.

Therefore, if we take the inclusive feminist relational ontological stance (that we all have the capacity to be actors of evil, as we are all interdependent on each other) there becomes an issue with the degrees and categories of evil. Though, this leads to many questions that are not of paramount important to my exploration of moral agents within stories of evil. Rather than a detailed exploration of this, I wish to argue that evil should not simply be considered as a binary of existent or non-existent, embedded in the narrative of external and internal. Instead, it should be seen as multifaceted, just as those who act within evil should be seen. By accepting these binaries and seeing evil as internal, this allows room for actors' moral agencies to be seen.

One of the most common starting points for most definitions of evil is a focus on acts against humanity (Neiman 2002). Here, deeds are seen as so large and awful, that they break down and attack the very existence of civilisation. Genocide is the primary example of the application of this definition. The bid to exterminate an entire race or subsection of society can easily be viewed as an act against all of humanity (Card 2010). Often, whole communities are impacted, even those not seen explicitly as evildoers may be enablers or viewers of the act. Therefore, people lose faith in humanity.

An inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, however, fundamentally challenges this definition. The term humanity is another example of a moral and political boundary. It is questionable whether all individuals are included in this

definition of humanity, as, previously, many have been excluded due to race, ethnicity, religion, sex and gender. In the present literature, an intersectional analysis outlines that these histories are still present when looking at who is defined in modern notions of humanity, especially in moral theory and International Relations. Using a language that has had a long history of colonialism and sexism, it is near impossible to find words that have not had a history of oppression. However, the exclusivity of humanity is not just a historic problem, but one that still persists when norms and morals are dictated by a small, privileged minority to a universal group. Moving agency, from the rational autonomous individual to relationships, shifts the expected moral requirements that emerge.

This privileged group, the one that is included in the definition of humanity, is not necessarily geographically external to those who are excluded. For example, the September 11th terror attacks have a strong evil rhetoric surrounding them and are seen as one of the most awful crimes against humanity. However, even accepting this normative labelling of the September 11th attacks as evil, at least to the US citizen, there is a privileged account of who is impacted by this evil. Wibben highlights that the minority of women of colour, living on a low income in the US, face greater fear on a day to day basis from their own state than from the external threat on US land of Al-Qaeda and terrorism (Wibben 2011, p. 3). Here, it is possible to question whether evil is an act against humanity or those privileged enough to be able to label it evil.

I call for a new approach to the narration of evil. A feminist relational ontology exposes the shared vulnerability we all endure. Through this shared vulnerability, we have to care for each other and so relationships become the primary agent of focus. Hence, I will create a counter-narrative: an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework must first acknowledge, and begin to address, these power hierarchies that produce unequal vulnerabilities and explore how these are implicitly worsened within social problems such as evil.

A feminist relational ontology calls for a focus away from the problematic notion of the dominant definition of humanity, to one focusing on relationship. Therefore, there is a focus on inclusive relationships that are aware of the need to determine and undermine the various power structures that operate. By shifting the focus from agents to relationships, a definition of evil is no longer premised on the moral expectations placed upon the individual, but, instead, on the shared reliance on all interdependent individuals. This interdependence is not new to moral theory; it has been at the heart of social contract, yet it has been ignored, to facilitate a focus on the masculine autonomous rational man. When shifting to focus on the vulnerability of each other's actions, the concentration is no longer on the rights of humankind, but the rights between humans. The primary focus of interest is not who is legitimate as a (moral) agent and which of these agents are included in society, but the relationship between interdependent actors, including responsibility and vulnerability to each other, rather than in an abstract society, where these relationships are based on a categorical imperative.

Therefore, building upon exiting feminist literature with International Relations and using an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework must first acknowledge and begin to address the power hierarchies that produce unequal vulnerabilities, exploring how these are implicitly worsened in social problems such as evil. Instead, an inclusive feminist relational ontology calls for an acceptance of people, not justifying their actions, but seeing each perpetrator and victim as an actual interdependent, concrete human being. This is moving away from previous studies on evil that have centred on the hypothetical rational and autonomous agent. This shifts the definition of evil, especially focusing on those who commit acts of evil, as we must ask whether we all have the potential to commit acts of evil as well as being victims of them.

There must be an acknowledgement of the multiple ways in which people are vulnerable as, although we are all vulnerable to each other, this vulnerability is not equal. Power hierarchies that exist in societies determine these vulnerabilities, which happen on multiple sites and scales, along an intersectional axis. For example, women are more vulnerable in a patriarchal society, ethnic

minorities are more vulnerable in a racist society, the poor and more vulnerable in a consumerist society and many other axes that intersect in multiple visible and hidden ways.

Therefore, in telling stories of evil that allow a narration of moral agents of all individuals, these moral boundaries must be addressed. An awareness is needed to the control of definitions of limiting terms such as 'humanity' and 'acts of evil' that I have explored. This means that the agent within stories of evil should not be seen as within a Manichaean fallacy of evil versus good. The removal of this harsh binary allows for a multifaceted story that permits multiple ways of being, and the ability of an agent to be a decision maker inside various power structures that influence decision making. Therefore, my inclusive feminist relational ontological telling of stories of evil will do so from an intersectional approach that highlights how agents are seen in different ways.

This storytelling will be aware of limiting gendered structures and, in doing so, will reject the rational autonomous agent as the primary actor in stories. Instead of focusing on relationships as the starting point in these stories, the way in which all individuals are vulnerable to actions of evil, as well as being an actor of evil, should be considered. By moving this starting point, a different conclusion to stories of evil is formed, allowing all voices, even those who commit acts of evil, to be heard.

Often it is unfathomable to think of a moral agent as an actor of evil. Here, the actor is seen as having the inability to make moral decisions, either not having the capacity to do so or not being informed enough to make such a decision. Although the latter, in particular, may be true if the agency is removed from all of those who commit acts of evil, once again, externalising them.

Finally, fundamental to this retelling of stories of evil is the need for my own reflexivity as a storyteller. Here, I have already gained many privileges. For example, in my own established position as a doctoral researcher, I have been given authority as a storyteller and a channel through which my voice may be

heard. Yet, there is still a danger that within this authority, replication of previously highlighted issues may arise whilst generating stories of evil, for example, the danger that I will construct a singular story that imposes a new power hierarchy and that I will tell the story from my own narrow perspective. Instead, I hope to facilitate a telling of stories of and within evil that allows for a multifaceted exploration, enabling the reader to reflect on their story, whilst not limiting the agency of the actor through the construction of imposed moral boundaries.

3.6 Conclusion

Overall, the study of evil is messy and uncomfortable. Evil is highly emotive and invokes a reaction in the writers and readers of the study. The fluidity and emotion of evil is disconcerting. This is amplified by including gender within the story, whilst there is no agreed definition of gender or evil. Within this messiness, authors have relied on predetermined narratives to construct stories of evil, whilst not challenging the moral boundaries that currently exist. In doing so, those who are not seen as the primary character and those who are not masculine, rational, autonomous agents are silenced. Therefore, there is a need to find voices in this discomfort of evil, to allow painful and incomplete stories to be told and to prevent a single narrative from becoming a metanarrative. In the succeeding two chapters, I will examine how this has taken place in two stories of evil: female actors of political violence and rape culture in the west. In starting to retell these stories, I hope to show how moral agency occurs within actors of these stories, but often in dichotomous ways.

This chapter has shown how stories of evil are gendered, which impedes the narration of adequate moral agents within these stories. This is interlinked with the feminisation of evil, both as a theory and the body of women. Here, stories of evil are masculinised and so prioritise the perceived male values and agency, therefore, women's insufficient agency is further engrained.

I have explored this by examining the rational, exclusionary and hypothetical approaches to the study of evil. These masculine legacies, in the study of evil, have led to the use of 'othering' which is external and not personal, leaving evil to be theorised in the hypothetical. By focusing on patterns of evil that occur within stories, the way in which this impacts the narration of gender and agency, rather than providing a theoretical overview of the field, becomes interesting. Fundamental to this masculinisation of evil is the lack of focus on vulnerability, how vulnerability itself is gendered and, thus, the impact of the masculine/feminine vulnerability of evil: In turn, this changes how we view agency in these stories. I will explore these themes further in the succeeding case

studies, which will study the narration of evil and gender in political violence and rape culture.

Chapter 4: The Epidemic of Rape in the West: How do we Tell Stories of Evil and Agency?

4.1 Introduction

In exploring how feminist ethics can bring new thought to our understanding of evil and agency within International Relations, this chapter will challenge one of the most common occurrences of evil: rape, and how we narrate agency within this story of evil. It will examine the construction of rape within narratives of evil. It will especially ask how these stories have silenced the moral agency of both the victims and perpetrators of sexual violence. It will argue that the culture of rape is engrained in a story of evil. Therefore, it will call for an intersectional approach to deconstruct these narratives that have allowed moral boundaries to be formed, which dilute an individual's autonomy over their body. Within these moral boundaries there are multiple layers of power, formed from historic legacies and hierarchies of ownership that castigate certain genders, races and sexualities.

Viewing through Feminist International Relations, in this chapter I aim to further explore the relationship between gender, evil and agency by examining the epidemic of rape and how it is narrated, therefore questioning power and hierarchy, and especially focusing on the construction of permissive structures and misogynistic attitudes. It will show how traditional masculine notions of law and morals impact the daily lives of women and indeed all genders, building on the legacy of moral theory outlined in my previous chapter. The victimisation and rape culture that has been created in the current cultural and political climate is damaging even to those who are not directly assaulted. It shows how marginalised voices can be hidden or twisted to suit power norms. The study of rape, as an invasion of the body, is deeply troubling as until recently it has been largely ignored. Legally, rape is understood as a sexual assault carried out without the consent of the victim. The cultural understandings of what is regarded as consent, or even the definition of a sexual act, are broad in scope.

Sexual violence is at an epidemic level. This is evidenced, statistically, by the fact that 1/3 of women worldwide have been beaten, coerced into sex or experienced abuse in their lifetimes (World Health Organisation 2017). In England and Wales, 1/5 of women have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime (Office for

National Statics 2018). It is suspected that only 10% of rapes that occur annually are reported to the police in the UK (McGregor 2012 p.70). Thus, despite the prevalence of sexual violence, social norms silence victims in reporting attacks; currently there is a culture that not only allows rape to happen but permits it. Furthermore, this culture mutes moral agents on the subject. Because acts of sexual violence are set into stereotypes, boxed into prefixed narratives, there is little room to move beyond them. These narratives are largely incorrect. They do not allow for complex identities and incidences of violence that exist in a system of hierarchies. When victims and perpetrators do not fit these set narratives they are seen as inadequate moral agents.

These narratives, within stories of evil, are formed in abstraction, without considering the real, interdependent individuals they are silencing. This is embedded within the narratives of evil that I outlined in my previous chapter; the most prominent of which is that evil is external from the self and the community. This is mirrored in the metanarrative of rape when rape is seen as being committed outside by a stranger. However, in reality, evil and rape are not external. Rape, for instance, is more often committed by someone who is known to the victim. It is easy to narrate them as such because they are uncomfortable to discuss. Thus, in this case study I will challenge the externality of evil and reflect on the resultant impact of this, specifically focusing on moral agency. This is further engrained by examining how these stories are inherently masculinised, reproducing the rational autonomous man as the protagonist in an abstract story.

My inclusive feminist relational ontology strongly lends itself to challenging these narratives, constructed within stories of evil, by questioning the boundaries of the private/public/ international sphere. One way to break down these boundaries is to query how actors are defined by their relationship to states or NGOs and to then recognize the interdependent relationships. This allows the focus to be on each individual's mutual vulnerability. This helps to deabstract victims and perpetrators of rape.

Therefore, this chapter will examine the construction of rape within the narrative of evil. Using current approaches to studying rape and everyday violence with International Relations, this chapter will question how narratives have silenced moral agency through my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework. It will argue that we should not change the narration of agency and rape depending on the location of violence. It will do so, firstly, by highlighting how rape is narrated within the discourse of evil, using the patterns I identified in my previous chapter. In particular, I will look at the ambiguity of the definition and how acts against humanity are committed by monsters and are intentional. I will highlight how these patterns produce a metanarrative of the ideal rape and when rape is external to this evil construction. I unpack these patterns by outlining how they have been formed through permissive structures and misogynistic attitudes that emerge in society, focusing on western and Anglo-American culture. I then examine the hierarchies that reinforce rape culture, questioning their implication on moral agency. Finally, I ask how the current status quo is problematic and highlight how my framework allows the narrative to be conceived of differently. Overall, in this chapter I will build on my findings from my previous chapters to question how definitions and moral boundaries stem from a position of abstraction rooted in the focus of the rational moral agent within gendered narratives of evil and rape.

4.2 International Relations, Evil and Sexual Violence

In order to further study how stories of evil take shape moral agency, I will outline the current conversations that are taking place within International Relations regarding rape, examining how this feeds into the narrative of evil. In this chapter I will argue that we shouldn't change how agency is narrated within stories of rape and evil depending on the location of the attack. The reframing of rape due to location takes place both in International Relations and cultural narratives and I will consider them both simultaneously here. To begin, I will consider how rape is examined in International Relations and why we should consider rape that takes place beyond conflict zones, and particularly in homes, as areas of concern for International Relations. I will then examine the existing dominant narrative of rape with Feminist International Relations.

Feminist theory within International Relations has long looked beyond the normal dialogue of traditional politics and international issues. The starting point of this for many has been a feminist curiosity (Enloe 2014 p.3):

> Making feminist sense of international politics requires that you exercise genuine curiosity about each of these women's lives - and the lives of women you have yet to think about.

This curiosity is vital even if the perceived behaviour of the woman is disliked. Recognizing agency to any individual, even if they are oppressed, is important as "even a woman who is victimized is not mindless" (Enloe 2014 p.8), or engaging in proscribed behaviours. Building on this it is unsurprising that one of the first major studies into sexual violence in the international sphere was conducted by Cynthia Enloe, who examined the treatment of sexually harassed tourists in comparison to locals in Egypt and India (Enloe 2014 p.58 first edition of the book published in 1990). She also investigated the use of sexual violence to control female workers in the banana industry (Enloe 2014 p.243), and the sexual abuse of female domestic workers working away from their home country (Enloe 2014 p.329). These fundamental observations started the conversation in IR about sexual violence as a political practice. Although Enloe examines the prevalence of

sexual violence outside of conflict, the majority of work within International Relations has focused on wartime rape, as I explore later in this section.

The 'everyday' in general has also become an increasingly important topic within International Relations. The everyday is understood as a shift away from a focus purely on the international and extraordinary experience, to one that considered the personal and private (Innes 2017). It was originally pushed by the need to see beyond the traditional remit of IR within feminism and having 'feminist curiosity' and is now included in other areas such as Critical Terrorist Studies. Feminist IR scholars such as Sarah Brown and Ann J Tickner urged the need to pay attention to the margins of what is considered global politics. This has led to the research agenda of the 'everyday' in global politics (Sjoberg and Gentry 2015 p.1). It has been captured in multiple forms, such as how popular culture, media or informal political economy impacts international politics (Shepherd 2012). Care ethics and feminist ontologies have also contributed to the everyday within International Relations, such as looking at how motherhood or domestic work impacts the international sphere (Cox 2010). This shift away from the international actors and external to one that is in the very personal, is fundamental to care ethics with relationships between actors rather than states or international bodies.

One of the new areas of interest include what is known as everyday/intimate/ patriarchal terrorism, which can be understood as (Johnson 1995 p.284),

> a product of patriarchal traditions of men's right to control 'their' women, is a form of terroristic control of wives by their husbands that involves systematic use of not only violence, but economic subordination, threats, isolations and other control tactics.

This changes the boundaries of what is of concern to International Relations, such as domestic abuse or intimate violence, including sexual violence, and questions if it should be framed as terrorism. This concept is not new, in the preface of Kelly's foundational text on rape, she argues (Kelly 1988 p.ix):

> When the impact of international terrorism is represented as a threat to basic human rights, what words could illuminate the fact that is it domestic terrorism which more directly threatens countless women's lives across the globe.

There is a clear overlap here between the definition of global terrorism and sexual violence. Rachel Pain argues that this relationship is formed as the intimate and structural dynamics of domestic violence are mirrored of that of global terrorism and they both have the shared foundations of fear (Pain 2014 p.533).

The aspects of the political and fear have been picked up by scholars of IR in terms of how patriarchal violence can be considered (see the special issue of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* on Everyday Terrorism by Gentry and Sjoberg (2015). There are two outcomes from this special issue: firstly, it further demonstrates the politicisation of ownership and fear within intimate violence which is embedded in a narrative of patriarchal control, and the victimization of women. Secondly, the issue presents rape as an everyday violence within IR and highlights the need to see it as a permanent and existing feature in western culture (Gentry 2015). This has led to an interesting conversation, upon which I can build. The primary way that I will do this is by using this transportation of political violence, from the external to the home, as a platform to examine how evil, seen as external, can also be seen as an internal and private occurrence. This will be done by readdressing the metanarratives of rape as a story of evil.

Here, it is important to understand how the location of rape affects its legitimacy within International Relations. Despite the call to acknowledge the 'domestic' within global politics, this is largely ignored. Thus, there is a need to recognise that rape, that occurs beyond conflict settings and in the west should be included in the international agenda (Gentry 2018). By ignoring the importance of domestic rape and gendered everyday violence a new moral boundary is created which highlights the gendered processes within International Relations theory and practice. As Innes and Steele argue (2019 p.154):

> A focus on everyday violence is a decentring tool of IR that looks to individuals embedded in circumstances, identities, and relationships that deviate from the white, propertied, hetero-male and examines how violence manifests in the everyday.

Thus, there is a need to not limit our exploration of rape due to the location of violence, as this can further limit our understanding of moral agency, in these stories of evil.

Furthermore, it is important to consider the global implications of rape, with the impact of globalisation shifting sexual norms internationally with "an increase in the sexualisation and commodification of women's bodies, and the rise of the internet has led to increased access to pornography" (Westmarland and Gangoli 2011 p.6). This is deepened further by advancements in technology, which bridge the private/public/international divide where sexual violence is located. This means that not only norms are shared, but the location of violence is extended, as an attack may take place in the home and thus the private. Additionally, the perpetrator may have anonymity through technology and thus be a stranger located anywhere in the world. Thus, digital technologies can be simultaneously global and local, both in the perpetration of sexual harms and in the effects experienced by victims (Powell and Henry 2017 p.11). I will now reflect on the existing dominant narrative of rape with Feminist International Relations in order to facilitate a discussion agency within these narratives.

War Zones

War zones have historically been and continue to be sites of sexual violence. "Rape in conflict settings is seen as an effective tool of humiliation and intimidation of the enemy and a disciplining tactic against those who pose threats to (national) security. Many understand this to be a vital component of rape as a strategy of war (Rittner and Roth 2012) Even highly romanticised wars such as the Second World War were sites of rape, with an estimated 14,000 civilian women in England, France and Germany raped by the allied American GIs in

Europe (D'Cruze 2012 p.41). For this exploration I will focus briefly on the 'rape capital of the world', the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Having been in conflict since 1998, it is now the most deadly war on record since the Second World War (Baaz and Stern 2016 p.120).

Rape can be understood in different ways during war; a common narrative of rape focuses on how when women are seen as mothers, or potential mothers, they are therefore symbolic carriers of ethno-national identity. The focus on their reproductive value, biologically and culturally means that the rape of these 'enemy' women not only hurts the individual victim but also the fabric of society (Cohen 2016). The symbolic notion of women in warzones often defines war rape. Rape can be understood as a strategic weapon of war, working within the notions of masculinity and femininity as a tool to punish, humiliate and torture women and emasculate men as unable to provide security (Baaz and Stern 2016 p.121). Here, this rational decision is seen as strategic and systematic as it "situates the gendered violent subject in a moral world whose contours we recognize" (Baaz and Stern 2016 p p.122).

Rape in conflict is narrated differently in the DRC compared to western conflicts. This is largely due to hierarchical and postcolonial attitudes. Here rape is driven not by rational and systemic decisions, but by the rapist's biological needs. This is embedded in the idea that the African men who commit these crimes are primitive savages, attacking the passive and helpless African women (Baaz and Stern 2016 p p.123). This has a deep colonial legacy as Baaz and Stern explore, (Baaz and Stern 2016 p p.123):

> The familiar distinction between rational subject and barbaric non-human, which emerges through gendered radicalized troops, works to separate the unspeakable violence running rampant 'there' from the realm of the possible 'here' – it helps to distance those in the civilized world observing and helping those who need to be saved.

This constructed a metanarrative, of who is a rapist and where rape takes place.

International Law

One area of International Relations that has focused largely on rape is that of international law. Here international lawyers and IR scholars challenge the international system that neglects rape victims. This largely emerges from a women-as-victim perspective, and centres on strategies to include Violence Against Women (VAW) in international decision-making bodies. This has largely been done in two ways, firstly through sexual discrimination legal discourse and secondly "to creatively interpret existing human rights so that the experiences of women are included" (Edwards 2011 p.97). However, if rape is located within VAW there is a danger to neglect men and those who are non-binary, which may be exacerbated by not recognising women who commit acts of sexual violence.

Enforcing rape law at a global level is even more problematic than at a domestic level. Rape is not defined with International Human Rights Law, yet this is where violence between individuals is of global interest. Adding to this, feminist theories of international law argue, "the UN human rights system privileges the realities of men's lives and ignored or marginalizes the experience of women" (Edwards 2011 p.93). It is also worth noting that the same rape myths which plague the domestic legal system also do so at an international level and inform penal imagination, with victims often facing harsh and invasive questioning (McGlynn and Munro 2011 p.1).

This means the issue of rape often is not even on an international agenda. However, when rape law is considered the implementation of it is difficult due to international law being implemented vertically, meaning that laws filter through countries to reach individuals. In contrast, a horizontal effect enables a direct line between an international court and a citizen of any country. The vertical implementation of rape law further enforces rape into the private and not public sphere, as "although private acts can now be brought within the purview of IHRL, these cases are still on the periphery, considered an exception to the rule, and a close linkage with the states is still required" (Edwards 2011 p.103). By grounding the foundations of international law in the divide between the public

and private it is argued that "rules have developed as a response to the male elite" (Cole 2011 p.48). This means rape is further gendered, as not only is the act often a performance of masculine violence, it is also silenced through existing gendered divide of the public/private.

Furthermore, there are other more problematic reconceptualisations of rape within international law. Herring and Dempsey, for example, argue that sex should be considered wrong unless it has justification, rather than the reverse which is how it is traditionally understood (Herring and Dempsey 2011 p.30). They "believe there is a general reason not to engage in sexual penetration, and that its prima facie wrongfulness is not limited to cases where the penetration is non-consensual" (Herring and Dempsey 2011p.31). Although this offers another example of the different ways of conceptualising sexual violence, which can be a useful task in moving away from rape culture, Herring and Dempsey's conception is highly problematic. It risks the further shaming of sex, which is especially significant considering that sexual liberation has only recently been gained by women. Beyond this, it also causes problems for mixed-race or same sex couples, whose intercourse was previously viewed as illegal (and in many countries still is). If sex has previously been labeled as 'wrong', then there is a danger of recreating this narrative, particularly when these groups are the most vulnerable to being excluded from current rape laws.

There are some success stories from international law we can take away. For example, the Akayesu judgement, the case redefined as "a form of aggression in a mechanical description of objects and body parts" (Sjoberg 2016 p.201). It was the first to conceptually redefine rape, (Munro 2011 p.17):

> The ICTR sought to ensure that the fundamental aggressive nature of the act of rape should not be eclipsed by a mechanical obsession with what needs to be done (e.g. penetration) with body parts. Thus, a 'conceptual' rather than 'cataloguing' approach was adopted, emphasizing that rape represents a violation of personal dignity,

> which can be used to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, discriminate, punish, control or destroy a person.

This definition, which goes beyond the purely physical act of forced penetration, has huge implications for how rape is considered, and some (including Catherine MacKinnon (2006) have argued that there is a need to adopt this revised definition at a domestic level. In the Akayesu case, a mother witnessed her daughters raped in front of her. The mother claimed she wished her daughters were killed rather than raped, further inscribing the idea that sexual violence is worse than death.

International Relations has made great progress in how it considers, conceives and studies rape. The literature of rape and war is fundamental to how we understand conflict, thus it is vital to acknowledge and build upon this when considering rape external to conflict and particularly rape within the west. The study of rape within conflict, highlights the construction of 'the other' as the rapist and questions the function of rationality and rape. Within international law these questions are continued, however, this law approach shows the hierarchy of enforcing rape. The lack of horizontal implementation silences voices as existing power structures enforce existing rape metanarratives. Great strides have been made within the study of everyday/ patriarchal terrorism that considers violence including rape within the household, yet there is a further need to expand this and highlight how moral boundaries within definitions are constructed and how these limits agency.

Rape and Evil

Building on this exploration of how stories of rape are told within the tradition of International Relations, there is a limited discourse that focusses on rape and evil. This discourse is predominantly found within feminist moral philosophy, foregrounded by the work of Claudia Card and her legacy. Due to this small field of literature, much of the work on rape and evil is focused on rape in war, mirroring the focus of rape within International Relations. The outline of war, evil

and rape can be seen broadly in two categories: firstly, women and girls being used to satisfy the male soldiers' sexual needs (such as the Comfort Girls, involving forced prostitution of Korean women by the Japanese in the Second World War) and, secondly, using rape as a targeted weapon of warfare, such as the genocidal rape in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict (Card 2002). Within the limited discourse on evil and rape, the focus has largely been on the latter, especially on the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict.

In this exploration of rape and evil, the focus is on the embodiment of rape. Here, the physical action of rape is evidenced as a "violation of an individual body" (Clark Miller 2009 p.56). This focus on embodiment of rape is mirrored by Schott, who argues, (2009 p.80).

> Her own body (rape victims) seems to have fulfilled the vile projection of the perpetrator, and has become a foreign enemy to her. And her trauma is magnified profoundly if she becomes pregnant.

Yet this goes beyond a physical reaction to rape, as Clark Miller argues that through the experience of rape, the understanding of a victims uniquely human characteristics are threatened (2009 p.57). Here the implications of war rape, and the adjoining shame, alter the reputation and identity of the victims.

This focus on identity and shame is fundamental to how (war) rape is defined as evil: Doubt argues that rape, as a weapon of warfare, is evil as it attacks the foundation of community; it being "an attempt to destroy a community and sever the bonds of interdependency based on care and trust. Such bonds are what hold communities and families together" (Doubt 2006 p.37). Similarly, Schott argues that war rape is a political evil, using an Arendtian interpretation. She argues that the act is evil, as not only is it a fundamentally bad act, but it ruins a victim's reputation, thus "war rape undermines natality- the capacity for new beginnings- which is fundamental to political life" (Schott 2009 p.81).

Card has established the relationship between rape and evil. Card highlights that her atrocity theory of evil is underpinned by the need to make judgements of right

and wrong as "harm is not evil unless aggravated, supported, or produced by culpable wrongdoing" (2005 p.5). Thus, Card argues that to "demythologize evil, we must also acknowledge that 'perpetrator' and 'victim' are abstractions. Real people are often both" (Card 2010 p.15). She continues: "atrocities are perpetrated by agents who have epistemological limitations and emotional attachments. They are ambivalent, deluded, changeable, fickle" (Card 2010 p.16). This begins to move away from the rational actor as the starting point of the study of evil. Furthermore, this allows for a concrete reaction to evil as (Card 2010 p.8):

> A demythologized understanding of evil is useful for thinking about how to respond with as much honour as possible to the worst wrongs of which humanity is capable. It is helpful in setting priorities, constraining responses and encouraging moral imagination. The dismal history of the concept of evil has been about labelling agents, not identifying evil deeds and practices.

Both focusing on the harms and demythologizing evil, Card argues that rape is evil and is a form of both terrorism and torture (2010).

The focus on rape (predominately with warfare) and domestic violence demythologized the understanding of evil. Card argues that (2002 p.140):

> Institutions are evil when it is reasonably foreseeable, by those with power to change or abolish them, that their normal or correct operation will lead to or facilitate intolerably harmful injustices.

Thus, this functions not only an individual embodied account but the foundations that enable these actions to exist. This is an excellent starting point for my own exploration of stories of rape and evil. This is also important when responding to how moral agency is enabled in these stories, as this chapter will do.

Another area that is useful in previous exploration of evil and rape is the focus on relationships. Embedded in a feminist undertaking of philosophy, the concentration on relationships is important and therefore this impacts how evil

is defined. Schott argues that an abstract formulation of evil in ethics is a failure in relationships (Schott 2009 p.78). Similarly, Clark Miller argues that genocidal rape is evil as it is a relational harm. This is argued through three factors; firstly, that suffering is interpreted intersubjectively through interactions with others, secondly, that rape is harmful to the victim's relationships and, finally, that genocidal rape causes relational harming of communities (Clark Miller 2009 p.62).

Yet, in this relational approach to studying stories of evil and rape, there is a reinforcement of the other/enemy. On a primary level, this narrative is imperative to wartime rape, as soldiers are taught that 'enemy' women are disposable, soon to die and deserving of rape (Card 2002 p.123). Building upon this, analysis "of self-other relations are crucial in order to understand the phenomenological, existential, and psychological dimensions of sexual violence" (Schott 2009 p.80). The rapist is constructed as external to the victim, who is in turn externalised from communities due to the shame of war time guilt.

Overall, the limited discourse on evil and rape offers a useful platform from which these stories can be understood and how moral agency is narrated within them. The focus on relationships is particularly interesting to note and how this impacts the telling of evil. Yet, this discourse is inadequate as it is in danger of reproducing existing gendered metanarratives that impede victims of rape. When focusing on the vastness of wartime rape, individual stories can be lost as women are narrated as victims of war through shared experiences of shame and ostracisation. I do not intend to dispute the findings of these authors, but I argue that this has become a simplification of the story of evil and rape that reinforces the existing narratives of women being external to war, i.e. victims in need of saving. In reproducing these narratives, the rape victim's voice is lost. Furthermore, the rapist and victim are produced in antithesis, and often as the enemy. Yet even within wartime rape, this is untrue, as the extensive rape within armed forced is ignored within this literature. Reinforcing that evil is the external other. The remainder of this chapter will challenge this narrative and focus on how this impacts stories of moral agency.

4.3 Rape as a Story of Evil

In my previous chapter, I outlined key patterns that emerge in stories of evil; ambiguity, monstrosity, inhumanity and intentionality. I will now unpack these patterns to evidence how the 'ideal rape' is constructed as a story of evil and consequent implications.

Ambiguous

The first of these patterns is the ambiguous nature of both rape and evil within International Relations and cultural narratives on the subject: The lack of agreement of the definition of rape equates to inconsistency within stories of sexual violence. Thus, there is a need to establish clarity on who is a rapist or what is rape. Here, the narrative of evil reiterates that rape is external, which is fundamental to the accepted parameters of rape. Fundamental to this exploring is seeing the 'ideal rape' as a metanarrative. A metanarrative can be understood as encompassing story or view that gives context to what we think. The 'ideal rape' story is constructed that the rapist is an estranged violent hypersexual masculine other preying on a virtuous fragile female. In contradiction to this, another accepted rape story is prevalent where the temptress women invites sexual violence through her behaviour, such as dress, location or intoxication. These inconsistent narratives work in conjunction, embedded in a gendered understanding of behaviour to produce a metanarrative that removes agency from both the rapist and victim.

Therefore, I intend to begin to challenge a narrative in which the "victim is blamed both for precipitating her own victimisation through her sexual attractiveness and also through her failure to resist when attacked" (Brown and Walklate 2012b p.18). Although most rapes occur where the victim knows the perpetrator, socially this is not the dominant narrative surrounding sexual violence. The dominant social narrative is a physical violent and surprise attack where the female is unable to defend herself from, despite great effort to do so. Thus, the victim of *real* rape is narrated as being committed by an overpowering stranger, often with a weapon (Brown and Walklate 2012b p.18). This narrative both

excuses and protects men, as the rapist can only be the 'other' man. These narratives intimate violence, and date rape and hookup culture and instead constructs a dangerous and exclusionary story. Thus, an ambiguity on the definition of rape is formed.

One of the most prominent ideas that emerges from this narrative, is the consideration of the rapist as the 'other', reinforcing the need for evil as external. The rapist is not seen as a typical member of society, but instead as a monster different from the standard respectable man (D'Cruze 2012 p.33). This manifests in many different forms. One prominent way reinforces the myth of the "black stranger" as the rapist, but previously the rapist may have been seen as the "working class deviant" (D'Cruze 2012 p.33). This is reinforced by the media, who rarely focus on attackers who are known to the victim, although this is most common, and prefer to give disproportionate attention to the 'pathological stranger' (Kitzinger 2009 p.85). The media also reinforces the 'other' as the rapist, by portraying them as distinctively different, as a 'beast', 'animal' or even a separate species (Kitzinger 2009 p.85). This is a clash between the western rational actor and the other irrational actor, often external from the dominant race or religion in a country. A primary example of this is the link between the rise of refugees and rape. The small number of sexual violence attacks that have taken place by refugees have been sensationalized and have received far greater media and social attention in comparison to the persistent and regular attacks that are perorated by those of the dominant race and religion everyday[11]. I return to the problem of rationality rooted in stories of evil. It can be argued that a sexual violence attack, outside of a warzone, is narrated in society as highly irrational. Thus, this is seen as outside of the remit of the upstanding middle-class white male citizen, who is the protector of (white) women, not the attacker.

The limited definition of rape imposes moral boundaries, which have a powerful impact on society, as they control legitimacy and are fundamental to questioning

[11] For example the large amount of attention the Cologne New Years attack received (Eddy 2016 and Rothwell 2016).

moral agency. For instance, the idea that there is 'real' rape versus rape that is somehow invited "reduce[s] sympathy and attention for victims for whom the stereotype does not fit" (Horvath and Brown 2010 p.557). It is of the upmost importance that I not only question how these moral boundaries have come to exist but who has been excluded from them and why.

Within moral boundaries it is important to highlight how rape has been constructed. Here there is messiness in even breaking down what constitutes rape, as Jordan explains, (2012 p.253).

> The crime of rape is both defiantly simple and surprisingly complex. One person, predominantly male, asserts their will over another person, typically female, to sexually violate their body.

Moving from this we can now see the prevalence of rape; what historically has been seen as unusual and rare is now ordinary (Gavey 2005 p.1). Thus, a rape which does not meet the predetermined ideal factors within the constructed metanarrative, is not seen as genuine. Built within cultural paradigms, rape and evil cannot be 'ordinary'. As Ardent explores, once an evil doer becomes banal it challenges societies perceptions on agency (Arendt 2006). Thus, the normality of rape challenges the construction of an evil doer as a monster and adds further ambiguity to what is considered as a story of evil.

This ambiguity means it is hard to distinguish it from the consensual sex sometimes, both at an individual and societal level. The difference is further strained with the heightened definition of what is considered force. This is in conjunction with the trivialisation of rape (Kitzinger 2009 p.85). Therefore, it is no longer surprising that research argues that "rape is an extension of the traditional sexual scripts emerging from gender-role socialization" (Milburn et al 2000 p.646). It is possible to see the normalisation of sex which makes it difficult to allow moral agency for victims and perpetrators as their actions are now morally normal. In seeing the patterns that make these norms, this chapter will

break down how these conversations embedded within the discourse of evil have silenced agency.

In challenging these ambiguous narratives, it is possible to see how voices are being silenced, not just by the traditional view that the rapist stifles their victim's voice, but how society has built institutions and taught individuals to silence victims, either intentionally or unconsciously (Jordan 2012 p.258). This is often uncomfortable, but there is a need to argue that even if society is not a rape-supporting culture then it is likely that through media and socialisation a rape-condoning culture has been developed (Horvath and Brown 2010 p.558) as, although rape is now contested on multiple forms, it is still tolerated (Gavey 2005 p.17).

When considering agency and rape it is important to recognise the relationship between victimisation and autonomy. For example, using birth control such as 'the pill' could be taken as giving consent, especially in previous decades when birth control was new (D'Cruze 2012 p.38). Therefore, there is a need to question how structures and attitudes have formed, which allow narratives such as this to silence moral agency within stories of evil.

When challenging this narrative, my inclusive feminist relational ontology must be intersectional. Angela Yvonne Davis argues that when combating rape, we must not only contest rape, but highlight the multiple layers of oppression especially at a societal level. Therefore, there must also be a fight against racism; including often ignored stories of rape from women of colour as well as questioning the high levels of prosecuted black male perpetrators in comparison to white men (Davis 1981 p.201). Instead there is a need for a new perspective on rape that does not privilege anyone. There is also a need to shift beyond the idea of simply saving or helping the victims of sexual violence to one that helps end sexual violence (Kelly 1988 p.238). By acknowledging the privilege of an actor in these ambiguous stories of rape, there is an opportunity to open the definition of rape to all of humanity.

Inhumane

This leads to me to the second pattern, that stories of evil are against humanity: mirrored by larger stories of evil, there is a limited scope of who is included within the definition of humanity. This forms a moral boundary, i.e. who is permitted in a story of rape. These narratives are formed from historic misogynistic and racist norms of ownership. In western culture, women were seen as property, initially their fathers and then subsequently their husbands. This has been replaced in modern discourse by ideas of shame and honour (McGlynn and Murno 2011 p.1). Rape laws were traditionally conceived as property law, and originally seen as a crime against males, as sexual assault devalued wives and daughters, and threatened their patrilineal inheritance (McGregor 2012 p.73). Although there are poor legal conviction rates now, these were previously worse, with research from The Old Bailey showing only 29 defendants tried for charges relating to sexual assault between 1750s and 1810s (D'Cruze 2012 p.34).

Women who were seen to have more worth, virgins and those of higher social status, were seen as more cause for grief than those of lower classes or social situations. For example, an act of 1487 excluded servants or 'bond women' from the rape law and its protections (D'Cruze 2012 p.26). There is a clear hierarchy of power through the portrayal of the body, for example rapists of women who were 'less respected' would rarely receive a guilty verdict as it was "assumed that they were little harmed by sexual violence since their characters were already lost" (D'Cruze 2012 p.35). By imposing a hierarchy of what is considered a *real* victim affects the judged morality of that victim to call rape. A modern example of this is that assailants of sex workers often receive a reduced sentence, if a conviction does take place, despite no guidelines suggesting this (Temkin 2002 p.44). These narratives of who is less impacted by rape shows how moral agency is removed by abstract narratives which do not allow for the *lived* instead of *perceived* experience of each interdependent individual, whatever their social status.

Violence towards the sexed body takes place at the intersection of power and pain (D'Cruze 2012 p.24). There has been a lack of intersectional analysis from current research on rape (Kelly 2012 p.xx). Here there are two particularly important intersections other than gender which must be paid attention to. The first of these, and largely ignored, is the impact of sexuality on rape, with members of the LGBGTQ+ community being more vulnerable to sexual attack (HRC 2017). The second interrogates the way race is used in power hierarchies and rape. There is a strong interlinking relationship between rape and race, and "racism has always drawn strength from its ability to encourage sexual coercion" (Davis 1981 p.177).

An important hierarchy at play within traditional conceptualizations of humanity is the disproportionate and unjust amount of abuse faced by the LBGTQ+ community. Some of this stems from the fact that the group, as a whole, faces higher rates of poverty, stigma and marginalisation which make them more vulnerable (HRC 2017). A recent survey in the US found rates of sexual violence were higher among gay, lesbian and bisexual men and women compared to heterosexual individuals (NISVS 2017). These figures are alarming, especially the fact that almost half of bisexual men (47%), bisexual females (46%) and four in ten gay men (40%) have been raped (NISVS 2018). What is even more concerning is that these figures are not included in the majority of literature as rape is seen something that happens to white, straight females by hypermasculine males. When comments on the LBGTQI+ are included in the mainstream focus on rape, there is an alarming emphasis on the simple narrative of 'corrective rape' where hypersexual males rape LBGTQI+ individuals. Although there is a need for awareness of this, there is a danger of this becoming the authoritative narrative on LBGTQI+ rape, and not allowing the multifaceted issues of abuse that takes place within the LBGTQI+ community and to it.

A prominent example of the site of rape and hierarchy is that of race, which is often left out of the conversation within the research on rape. Power within rape and rape narratives is prominent when examining recurrent politics in the US; here a pattern is formed where race is used to engrain existing moral boundaries

as the rapist as the 'other' and the rape victim as virtuous. The most noticeable is the historical power hierarchy between the white majority and the black minority in the US, where the slave trade's legacy has manipulated status and relationships. This legacy has formed a norm of ownership and primitively, where narratives are formed that black women have little ownership and thus agency over their body, and it's permissible for a white man to rape a black woman (as was allowed during slavery). In addition, the black man's primitive stance fits ideally with the metanarrative of the violent stranger as the rapist (McGregor 2012 p.76). The absurdity of these damaging narratives is largely ignored in popular culture, as I will unpack further now.

This narrative is mirrored by the idea of black women as chronically promiscuous. Viewed as 'loose women' and whores, when women of colour make claims about rape they are often seen as lacking legitimacy (Davis 1981 p.182). These women are doubly sexualised as both female and black. Here the "pattern of institutionalized sexual abuse of Black women became so powerful that it managed to survive the abolition of slavery" (Davis 1981 p.175). Sexual coercion was inherent within the slave/master relationship (Davis 1981 p.175). A prime example is the police assaults on black women who reported rape during the 1970's (Davis 1981 p.173). Although some of this data is out of date, we need to remember how these narratives have shaped current opinions on rape.

Hall also acknowledges the relationship between lynching and rape, as previously lynching was used as a way to enforce hierarchies among men, arguing that both rape and lynching were methods of racial subordination (Hall 1983 p.332). This was mirrored with rape. "Thus rape reasserted white dominance and control in the private arena as lynching reasserted hierarchical arrangements in the public transaction of men" (Hall 1983 p.333). This had an added benefit, especially with the emergence of the media, as it was effective not only in scaring its victims but all those who heard about it (Hall 1983 p.337).

This hierarchy is mirrored in current narratives around rape, and the story of Carol Stuart is a prime example of this. Her story became a national sensation in

the US when in 1990 she was raped and murdered while pregnant in Boston, US. Her husband claimed that she had been kidnapped from their car, then raped and murdered by a black stranger. A national campaign was rolled out to protect other vulnerable individuals from the same horrors Carol had faced. However, after the conviction of the alleged criminal, Carol's husband killed himself, and it was revealed that he had killed and raped his own wife. This disrupted the metanarrative of the 'other' stranger of rape. Instead the rapist was both the husband of the victim and the father of her child, rather than the black stranger who often becomes a symbol of urban danger (Stanko 1990 p.2). This highlights the fixed narrative that is already constructed in our society of who is an accepted perpetrator and who is not. This is mirrored in the Central Park 5 case, where four young black men and one latino man were wrongfully convicted of the assault of rape of Trisha Meili. By creating these stories, we limit the understanding of rape, with many not considering spousal rape as a legitimate crime and thus, the rapist (and spouse) and victim a moral actor.

In Kelly's notable original text on rape she herself reflected that her work had "little exploration of intersectional issues in women's experiences – especially the ways in which ethnicity inflects with experience and meaning" (Kelly 2012 p.xx). This acknowledgment is still limited in itself though, and Kelly is only limiting the victims of rape to females. The most prominent example of this is Susan Brownmiller's fundamental book on rape, which is often seen as the foundational text on approaching the topic of rape. Yet there are serious racial undertones to this book, "Brownmiller perpetuates the image of the black man as an insatiable sexually obsessed animal venting his black rage on white women" (Williams 1989 p.21). For example, she questions the innocence of Willie McGee, a famous rape case (Williams 1989 p.21). Furthermore, although Brownmiller claims to be arguing for all women, it appears she is only speaking on behalf of white, middle class women (Davis 1981 p.198). Therefore, it has been highly criticised for perpetuating the myth of the black rapist (Davis 1981 p.178).

When reflecting on hierarchies the media must be considered: The multilayers of media, including television, newspapers, films and, increasingly important,

online media tailor how rape is defined and understood, especially who the victims and perpetrators of sexual violence are (Kitzinger 2009 p.74). Here, multiple voices permeate media, but existing narratives are often enforced rather than challenges. The media can be dangerous in perpetuating stereotypes, such as the whore or virgin woman, and contribute to the culture of blame. These stereotypes are formed from societal norms but also internal media dynamics such as institutional racism and sexism and the need for sensationalism (Kitzinger 2009 p.74). The existence of blame culture means that victims are held responsible for their own safety, particularly when the assault is by an acquaintance of the victim (Milburn et al 2000 p.645).

The hierarchy of the importance of race in rape narratives can understood as testimonial injustice, as Fricker explains, "an identity prejudice against a social type's epistemic trustworthiness is likely to be accompanied by a parallel identity against their practical rationality" (Fricker 2009 p.136). Here, the underpinning of rationality, or lack of, is pinnacle for an agent to be considered legitimate in their actions. This is mirrored in wider narratives of hierarchies and rape, as fundamental to these epistemic injustices facilities power in defining who is a moral agent through preexisting social and personal prejudices that construct moral boundaries which silence agency.

This intersectional approach also includes not presuming the victim will always be female. Here there is a need to identify the lived experience of all individuals; although women are the predominate victim and men the predominant aggressor, men can be victims and women can be perpetrators. There is a need to challenge gendered perceptions of violence as often the line between who are men and who are women is unclear, and thus the definition of perpetrator/ victim is oversimplified (Sjoberg 2016 p.4).

Further challenging cultural norms, and particularly when looking at perpetrators, it is important to consider the idea that women also commit acts of violence towards other women, non-binary individuals and men. In doing so it is essential that these acts committed by women are not sensationalised or made

invisible even as they are not as common as male violence (Sjoberg 2016 p.3). This has particular implications for male victims, particularly of partner violence, as they proceed through the criminal process in the UK. A survey found that this group were particularly dissatisfied with the court system, and it has been argued that the police do not take these cases seriously due to underlying assumptions around masculinity that men "can handle themselves" (Felson and Pare 2007 p.215). It should be especially highlighted that much research is undertaken with gendered assumptions and especially focusing on "aggression and physical violence where a large portion of men may have been pressured through verbal coercion" (Gavey 2005 p.12). Male rape was not even recognised until 1994, and a large overhaul of UK law did not take place until 2003 (D'Cruze 2012 p.38).

This legacy of who is included in the definition of humanity and, thus, rape has been treated, historically, as a religious moral issue, as highlighted by D'Cruze, it was "the criminal justice process since the medieval period, the Early Modern church courts which policed sexual matters such as sin rather than violence" (D'Cruze 2012 p.24). This continues to shift agency away from the victim and silences them. As seen as a sin, rape is further entrenched into the private sphere, not seen as a public issue for the justice system to confront. This removes the victims voice.

There is a long history of morality being linked to sexual violence, within cultural patterns that create permissive structures and misogynistic attitudes (D'Cruze 2012 p.38):

> Although the Victorian law on sexual violence had become focused on the harm of moral violence, by the early twentieth century, the identification of sexual violence with deviance and marginality had become authorised by the emergent discourses of criminology, psychiatry and subsequently psychology.

It is important to trace the patterns that emerge within the narratives of sexual violence, in order to challenge them.

This reliance of morality in rape cases has historic legacy; English Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale, argued the danger in falsely accusing a man of rape, claiming this can be more dangerous than rape itself. This has impacted the western imagination of how rape is understood (Gavey 2005 p.17). With this focus on protecting the reputation of the possible rapist it is unsurprising that the crime and justice system is harsh towards victims, as McGregor outlines (2012 p.87):

> As long as men, police, prosecutors, judges and juries continue to believe myths and stereotypes about women – for instance that 'no' means 'yes', that women require some force, that women desire to live out rape fantasies, and so on – then it may be true in many cases, particularly the so-called acquaintance rape cases, that the defendants will lack the *mens rea* for the crime.

Within the justice approach to rape, the internal masculine mechanisms exclude a relational approach to the understanding of law and further enforce the norms of victim blaming and the permitting of rape culture. The hierarchies formed in stories of rape transcend this; those who are not the rational male agent are viewed in relation to him and so appear to be lesser, as I have evidenced previously. This enforces the rational male agent as the protagonist in moral theory; here he would not commit a moral wrong, unless he is provoked or is monstrous.

Monster

The rapist as the external is fundamental to the metanarrative of sexual violence. Here, only monsters and non-rational autonomous individuals commit acts of evil. This causes great disruption when the rapist is internal. These binaries and hierarchies are best seen through prominent cases where the person is not seen as a rapist as they are a notable figure. This is borne from a traditional notion of morality and justice, where the rational male actor would not harm those in his sphere of protection. Instead the rapist is always an 'other', not a loved celebrity, such as a Hollywood star. Zaleski found that within the media and public opinion

"there was more victim blaming and more perpetrator support as when compared to the comment threads centered on non-celebrity people" (Zaleski et al 2016 p.926). This has wide implications in pre-Weinstein scandal Hollywood, where beloved celebrities cannot be seen as sexual abusers, as rapists are the monstrous others, for example the reports of as Kevin Spacey and Casey Affleck. Yet only recently, has there been a challenge in the narrative around celebrities as perpetrators of sexual violence. The most notable change has been the #MeToo movement, which has gained a large amount of publicity. As so many celebrities supported the movement the dominant narrative as the monster other rapist has begun to be removed.

Another highly notable example of this, but outside the world of 'celebrity,' is the Steubenville case, where in 2012 high school football *stars* from Steubenville, Ohio raped a fellow student and filmed it. Their celebrity status was constructed within a local context "of a hero-worshiping culture of a city obsessed with high school football" (Macur, 2012). This is engrained in a legacy of seeing athletes as excused from immoral behaviour within certain American societies. In the Steubenville case, the rape victim was even accused of ruining the football stars' careers and was run out of her hometown (Pennington and Birthisel 2016). This feeds into the meta-narrative as the rape victim as the temptress. The implication that a football star or celebrity cannot be a rapist can be highly dangerous and perpetuates the narrative that there can be a good rape, done by a bad rapist.

The agency of both rapist and victim are disrupted within the framing of celebrity status. This disruption is formed as the beloved or celebrated celebrity, such as a film star or football player, is constructed in opposition to the violent stranger, essential in the metanarrative of the 'ideal' rapist. Instead assaults by celebrities are narrated as having a higher moral standing than those (*types of assault*) committed by strangers. Thus, this feeds into the moral agency of the rape victim; in cases of 'celebrity rape' there is increased victim blaming; is the victim being narrated as responsible for the attack and, therefore, seen as the cause of the rapist's immoral actions.

Intentional

Continuing to challenge the monstrous rapist, I will explore my final pattern that within the evil metanarrative of rape, acts are intentional. In the ideal rape story, the attacker uses unquestionable force to commit acts of sexual violence. This is evidenced as victims are particularly dissatisfied with the police handling of their case when the attacker is someone they know and more so if they are attacked by their spouse (Felson and Pare 2007 p.215). This is enforced by the need to remove the conservative and masculine belief system that are in place despite various reforms (Jordan 2012 p.278).

These biases in the criminal justice systems have been aided, especially in the US, by unrealistic and often malicious standards. These standards argue that women should be able to fight off an attacker even if they are put under considerable physical force or use of weapon. For example, in Brown v State (1973) the assault of a woman held at gunpoint was considered to be consensual sex, as doctors claimed successful penetration meant women were willing to have a sexual partner (McGregor 2012 p.74). Here women are meant to fight to near death. An absurd recent example of this, is that an Italian judge ruled that sex must have been consensual as a woman was wearing jeans, which are difficult to remove (McGregor 2012 p.75).

The criminal justice system treats women with great suspicion and believes that victims often make up complaints (McGregor 2012 p.74). However, research actually supports the exact opposite of this. Pioneering research conducted by Liz Kelly has found that female victims will tend to minimise their complaints of rape, and refrain from labelling men as rapists or abusers (Kelly 1998). This may be as victims themselves are entering into the metanarrative of rape as external and committed by the monstrous other. Yet, the suspicion of women's allegations is recurrent as "views of women's masochism and the inherent untrustworthiness of a woman's allegation of rape have been recycled in public debate against legislative changes, as well as in the courtroom" (Gavey 2005 p.22). This distrust

of women silently reinforces the notion that they have a lesser understanding of morality in comparison to men.

A holistic but premeditated change is needed that is led by the voices of victims. The questioning of illegitimacy that victims face is internalised and offers a power blockage towards moral agency. As the victims themselves may not see the wrong in the action done to them, they are silenced before they even speak. The power of the police and justice system in this silencing is great, and this must be acknowledged in order to reveal the moral boundary.

Clark looks at the historic evolution of power in how rape is conceived, using two models: firstly the 'libertine' model argued that male sexual irregularities were simply an uncontrollable excess of desire for which men could not be held accountable. Thus, they were not moral agents of their own bodies, and especially of circumstances their bodily or phallic functions, which also included homosexual sex. As there was little control of phallic functions, rape was, to this being, seen as unavoidable and there was little justice for victims of these acts. This was succeeded, secondly, by the 'chivalric' model, where responsibility was introduced. This responsibility was not directed towards the males themselves to not commit act of violence but instead towards women themselves to not lose their virtues. The solution put forward was that women should seek the protection of chivalrous men to preserve their chastity (Clark 1978). It is arguable that the legacies of these models are still highly apparent with there being little moral agency for those who commit acts of violence, whilst victims of all sexes are told to be responsible for protecting themselves. A prominent example of this is an advert campaign launched by the National Health Service in the UK which highlighted that drinking excessive alcohol could lead to young women not being able to protect themselves against rape. The blame no longer falls on the actor of violence, but on the victim by distributing cultural norms, and, therefore, welcoming violence.

Building on these cultural patterns, when studying rape and moral agency the focus on masculinities is of the upmost importance. From the beginning of rape

research, it has been understood that sexual violence is part of the structures of patriarchy, with a particular focus on the productions of masculinity and heteronormativity (Kelly 2012 p.xviii). These patterns have developed from the strict understandings of masculinity formed from Victorian norms (Tosh 2007). Therefore, values are embedded in the narrative of linking the rapist with exaggerated masculinity and, thus, deviant in contrast to homosexual males who were seen as having inadequate masculinity (D'Cruze 2012 p.40). Norms are further reinforced in contemporary cultural patterns, especially by the "high chronic accessibility of gender-role stereotypic schemas in the media and culture" (Milburn et al 2000 p.661). An outcome of this is the need to teach individuals the idea of being more fluid in their categorisation of gender (Gavey 2005 p.222).

This further impacts how rape is both studied and narrated, as Gavey argues (2005 p.34):

> Many social scientists and other writers quickly came to agree that rape was simply the endpoint on a continuum of heterosexual interactions where male aggression and female passivity are integral to the socially constructed roles and where forms of coercion are normative.

Biological essentialism is evident in this passage, where male/female are problematically conflated with masculine/feminine. Yet, this essentialism is a starting point for many understandings of rape. This limits our view, as "theories constructed by men, about men assuming masculinity are partial not only because they leave out women as people but also substantive considerations related to femininity" (Sjoberg 2016 p.23). The first stage of this is to reject the idea that biological assumptions that shape our behaviour and cultural imperatives are unmalleable (Gavey 2005 p.3). It is particularly important to challenge the "normalization of male (hetro)sexual aggression" (McGlynn and Munro 2011 p.3)

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the categories of 'man' and 'woman' are neither natural categories, nor separate from one another. Instead there is a need to consider people as "gendered actors, navigating gendered relationships and living in a gendered world" (Sjoberg 2016 p.26). This argument provides a platform to understand these hierarchies and how they form moral boundaries and silence moral actors.

Building on the previous challenges made when exploring cultural norms and my own investigation of narratives, it is important to consider what it means to explore rape, agency and evil from a feminist perspective. This starting place in itself is difficult, as there is still ongoing debate within feminism over rape – whether it is about violence or power (Gavey 2005 p.31). I think that it can be about both; it is more important to process the hierarchies and moral boundaries that allow this power and violence to take place. Here gender as an analytical tool rather than a standpoint perspective of men or women is more important, as Sjoberg explains "that gender analysis is crucial to understanding the occurrence of, meanings of, and representations of (women's) sexual violence, against each other and more generally" (Sjoberg 2016 p.23). I will use this as a platform to explore sexual violence beyond conflict.

4.4 Finding Agency through an Inclusive Feminist Relational Ontology Framework

Building on this outline of how the ideal rape is constructed as a story of evil, I will examine the impact this has on agency, leading to a focus on moral agency and location. I will particularly focus on the agency of women as victims of rape. Violence against women has long been an accepted social but invisible norm, with those who called against it seen as challenging the social status quo and punished. As the criminal justice system in Britain was developed in the eighteenth century, the norms of the time have been engrained into the system and still persist today. One of the most damaging of these, is the idea that there "are 'deserving' and 'undeserving' complaints and thus victims of sexual violence" (D'Cruze 2012 p.35). This is still seen today, as "much criticism of the treatment of rape victims in court has centred on the use of sexual history evidence to blacken their character" (Temkin 2002 p.9). For instance, if rape victims delay in reporting the incident to the police this is seen as an indicator of a false complaint (Jordan 2012 p.256). However, this interpretation "ignores the ways women have been taught to mute their voice and remain silent, and also fails to understand the impact of centuries of suspicion surrounding the words of women" (ibid).

Thus, fundamental to studying agency is to examine the removal of victims' autonomy. This goes beyond a problematic legal process; cultural norms surrounding rape such as shame and stigma are often very silencing (Westmarland and Gangoli 2011 p.6). A legal narrative is constructed that presumes that all women consent to sex except in the most egregious circumstances. Thus, the law is impeding women's autonomy over their own bodies (McGregor 2012 p.76). Therefore, there is a need to continue to question the moral boundaries that have led to these strange power norms that silence victims and strip them of their agency.

In challenging these I can begin to see how voices are being silenced, not just by the traditional view that the rapist stifles the victim's voice but in the way that society has built institutions and taught individuals to silence victims, either

intentionally or unconsciously (Jordan 2012 p.258). This is often found uncomfortable by many, but it is possible to argue that even if society is not a rape-supporting culture then it is likely that through media and socialisation a rape-condoning culture has been developed (Horvath and Brown 2010 p.558). Although rape is now contested on multiple forms it is still tolerated (Gavey 2005 p.17).

This silencing is reflected in the lack of reporting of sexual violence. In all western countries only a small amount of rapes are reported (McGregor 2012 p.70). Kelly (1998) looked at a range of sexual violence from flashing to rape, and found that less than one per cent of the victims she interviewed reported these events to the police, and of those reported a significant amount were either dismissed by the police or withdrawn (Kelly 1988 p.96). This is still prevalent 30 years later (McGregor 2012 p.70). A recent British Crime survey found that only 11% of sexual assaults were reported to the police and a significant number of victims would tell no one about their attack (Brown and Walklate 2012a p.3). Compared to respectable masculinities, femininity's instability and dangerousness is a frequently held assumption, engrained in stories of evil of women, as the temptress and virgin. Therefore, when women speak of sexual violence, they are treated within this narrative, not believed, and often belittled and shamed (D'Cruze 2012 p.44).

Women's agency is questioned via the criticism of their lifestyles. A notable example of this is the discourse around binge drinking, as women who are seen to be drinking are categorised as 'loose' (Meyer 2010 p.23). This is further problematic, as this attitude "trivializes the criminal nature of rape involving alcohol by using nebulous and euphemistic expressions which can refer to any course of action deemed 'inappropriate', thereby perpetuating the myth that rape is not about violence but 'sex gone a bit wrong'" (Meyer 2010 p.24). A 2009 Home Office report in the UK found that a large part of the general public would argue that women were at least partly responsible for their rape if drugs or alcohol were involved (Brown and Walklate 2012a p.5). Similarly, it also feeds into blame

culture which is persistent in making victims responsible for their own rape (Meyer 2010 p.27).

When focusing on evil, agency and rape is the notion that women are "asking for it". As explored previously, women have long been written as sexual temptresses. Therefore, they are at risk of being seen as inadequate moral agents. This works with the belief that women who 'lead men on' provoke their own rape (Meyer 2010 p.23), whilst women who actively seek sex are seen as dangerous and desperate.

When rape victims are seen as hypersexual men cannot be held accountable for their own moral actions because they are under the female's seductive spell. Card outlines the problem, (Card 2010 p.71):

> What may begin as tolerated habits take on the character of norms when they create patterns of expectations, failure to live up to which becomes an occasion for socially sanctioned criticism. People who criticize raped women for having been "alone" (without a male guardian) become complicit in the protection racket.

This is a common narrative in society, summarised by the absurd notion that women have an unconscious 'rape wish' (Gavey 2005 p.19). The mixture of women being seen as both in need of protection and wanting to be raped is problematic. This permeates culture, with one example being rape being seen as 'sexy'. This is often used subtly in advertising but more obvious is the popularity of rape within porn (Gavey 2005 p.32).

Moral boundaries and, thus, agency are questioned when actors perform outside of the constructed binary of the victim/perpetrator. Forming a distinction of these as opposite allows a set narrative of the definite story for a victim; young, female, heterosexual, white, fragile and rapist; other, hypermasculinity, strange. Instead allowing a spectrum of the multiple and dichotomous ways both a victim and perpetrator functions, allows for various and overlapping narratives to be formed which function to allow agency for very individual in their own story.

Sjoberg (2016) explores this in her work on female sex offenders in wartime, for example, in the context of the Rwandan genocide, particularly the aforementioned Akayesu case. In this case the mother asked her daughters to leave, after their attacks. Sjoberg argues, "the mother described here is a both a victim and a perpetrator of sexual violence, and a perpetrator of violence more generally" (Sjoberg 2016 p.205).

I use Sjoberg's work as a platform to understand rape beyond direct conflict zones in the west. It is possible to examine the ways in which many individuals in society are guilty of contributing to the rape culture that perpetuate larger patriarchal values, ones that then lead to the shaming or rejection of rape victims. It is of great importance that these actions are recognised, as this structural violence should not be ignored as it allows silencing of moral agents. Rooted in rationality of who is an allowed agent, the rejection of this helps us to allow open narratives. Furthermore, voicing lived experience provides room to see moral agency and reasoning, as evidenced in Sjoberg's work, rather than a flat, abstract characterization,

These short examples evidence the rhetoric of women as inadequate moral decision makers; Instead women are seen as victims of their own body while being temptresses to noble men. Within this seduction narrative, women lose autonomy over their own body when they become victims of sexual violence. Instead, female bodies are seen as legitimate sites of violences, formed from a criticism of lifestyle and thus a narrative of 'asking for it', here women are seen as hyper sexual beings. Their story is silenced by social norms which discourage victims to report rape or even identify a rape has taken place. Here moral boundaries are yet again formed that reinforce patriarchal values.

4.5 Locating Rape and International Relations in the Home

In this final section I will establish how my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework can challenge the current status quo and allow sexual violence to be conceived differently, evidencing the moral boundaries that limit the teller of moral agency. I will do so by engaging with the understanding of rape and evil through the notion of the everyday. I also want to start thinking about the location of rape within International Relations beyond simply locations of conflict (MacKinnon 2006 p.180-81):

> When no war has been declared, and life goes on in a state of everyday hostilities, women are beaten and raped by men to whom we are close. Wives disappear from supermarket parking lots. Prostitutes float up rivers or turn up under piles of rags in abandoned buildings… In the record of human rights violations (these acts) are overlooked entirely because the victims are women and what was done to them smells of sex.

The idea of the home as a site of danger is of high importance. There is a need to include a threat of violence in both the public and private sphere (Kelly 1988 p.79). Outside of the model rape story, or metanarrative as I previously outlined, most attacks take place in the home by someone known, and thus they should be included within the narrative away from the abstract construction that rape is external. This is mirrored in other stories of evil which narrates evil as the other and foreign. This has particular implications when examining rape from an international perspective, as there is little inclusion of rape in International Human Rights Law (Edwards 2011 p.96), and more so "VAW in the home has been considered to fall outside the state-based system of international law because that system is primarily concerned with inter-state relations, rather than international relations" (Edwards 2011 p.94). This disrupts the place where moral agents and spaces of violence can be legitimately seen.

Within this analysis as the home as a site of evil, it is important to examine the husband as the actor of violence or evil. A common way that the home is excluded

is the removal of the husband from being seen as a perpetrator of rape. It was not until the 1990s that it was acknowledged that husbands could rape their wives under statutory law in the Anglo-American systems (McGregor 2012 p.72). The argument around spousal rape is a highly interesting one, with most western states only recently enforcing the law that allows a husband to be charged with raping his wife. Within UK law, it is important to note that when a defendant or perpetrator of rape is considered to be in a position of responsibility (such as a carer) to the victim the starting sentence is extended from five years to eight years. It could be considered that wives and husbands have a responsibility to each other, yet rather than extending the sentence it is rarely enforced (Temkin 2002 p.41). This again reflects the externality of evil, with dominant narratives of evil labeling the perpetrator as the monstrous other.

The metanarrative of rape is constructed in the recent 'rape clause'. In 2017 the UK-elected Conservative party government introduced a new tax credit policy which limited parents to claim and receive benefits for only two children, with exceptions for extenuating circumstances such as if the child had been adopted or, more controversially, had been "conceived without consent" (HM Revenue & Customs and Department for Work & Pensions 2017a p.1). This new policy sparked outrage particularly because of the insensitive definitions surrounding what came to be known colloquially as the 'rape clause'. This controversial policy shows the often thoughtless and abstract politics of reproductive and sexual rights.

The epistemological strength of my inclusive feminist relational ontology can allow us to further elucidate the power structures that created the "conceived without consent" clause. A fundamental problem within the policy is that rape must be recognised and reported. This is concerning as it is thought that only 10% of rapes that occur annually in Britain are reported to the police (McGregor 2012 p.70). Furthermore, it is believed that a significant percentage of rape survivors will tell no one of their attack (Brown and Walklate 2012a p.3). Even those who choose to report the attack to the police risk not being taken seriously as those who report spousal rape are most likely to be dissatisfied with their

police experience (Felson and Pare 2007 p.215). In particular, rape allegations that are not reported immediately are further neglected (Brown and Walklate 2012b p.16). Although the clause allows rapes to be reported to healthcare professionals or rape charities instead, it would be easy to see how a "rape-condoning culture" would limit a mother from wanting to report or even recognise her own rape, particularly where rape myths enforcing victim blaming function at societal, organisational and individual levels (Horvath and Brown 2010 p.558). The starting point of this policy is therefore highly problematic as it does not acknowledge societal and instructional norms that limit the recognition and reporting of rape. This is a clear infraction of what is just, from a masculine perspective, that further evidences the control over the womb and defines who is included within the definition of rape.

One of the most problematic aspects of the policy is that in order for the child to be considered to be "conceived without consent", the accused rapist and father of the child must no longer be living with the mother. This enters into a long narrative of seeing marriage and spousal rape as legitimate. Reinforcing the narrative of the perpetrator is only legitimate if they are external. Here, the limited understanding of rape, that it must be documented and external to an existing family is powerful. This is drawn from the historical conceptualisation of women as property of their husband, which is still highly problematic in recognising non-consensual sex (McGlynn and Munro 2011 p.1). This problem is highlighted by the fact that only in the 1990s was it made illegal for husbands to rape their wives in the UK (McGregor 2012 p.72), and the problem is still not taken seriously (McGlynn and Munro 2011 p.1), as victims of spousal rape are not believed nor receive empathy. Two fundamental problems occur. Firstly, the mother may not have recognised that she was raped. Societal norms and policies, such as "conceived without consent", which discount spouses as rapists, mean that women often do not acknowledge that sexual coercion took place (Kelly 1988). The second problem occurs when mothers who would identify the conception of their child as rape, choose to stay with the father, which may take place for numerous reasons. There is a necessity to question who has the

authority to draw such a definition, which is exclusionary and entraps all mothers in a collective understanding of the parameters of expected behaviour. Instead society should aim to move beyond this 'one size fits all' account of any event, but especially a traumatic one such as rape. The removal of the binary of the inner/outer within an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework further challenges the idea that the perpetrator of sexual violence must be external to the family and mother.

Another moral boundary, within the policy that my framework can highlight, is the definition of "conceived without consent". Through an inclusive feminist relational ontology deconstruction of masculine norms, we can see the power of constructing a limited definition. Although the classification is marginally successful in widening the definition beyond non-consensual sex to include controlling, coercive behaviour from either the father or an immediate family member ((HM Revenue & Customs and Department for Work & Pensions 2017a p.1), it also requires the professional to evidence controlling or coercive behaviour. In this case, the professional must identify either fear of violence on at least two occasions or "serious alarm or distress" that is measured by having a "substantial adverse effect on the claimant's day to day activities" (HM Revenue & Customs and Department for Work & Pensions 2017b p.2). This focus on fear and distress does not allow for the 'everyday' patriarchal control of a woman's body and womb, or the normalisation of such in society. Therefore, this definition does not include a wider understanding of how a child may be conceived without the mother's desire, such as forced social pressures that are not violent but still encourage the mother beyond her own will; reinforcing evil action as intentional.

Evidence of social pressured, ignored within the guidelines of the policy, is access to birth control being blocked by the spouse. These measures may impact on women's control over conception of a child and must be noted. This is particularly problematic as psychological abuse or coercion is not considered to be part of rape in the UK despite it being included in the definition in other EU states (Kelly 2012). The policy again works in abstraction and does not identify specific patriarchal norms that may limit a mother's control over if, and when, she would

like to conceive a child. By focusing a definition beyond physical force or distress, the policy does not allow for more subdued control over women's bodies; power hierarchies are further enforced, rather than challenged. This reinforces the narrative that rape is external to the home. This policy engrains evil as external and, thus, limits the definition of who can be seen as legitimate in a story of rape; evil and rape are constructed as external to the home. The monster who commits acts of intentionality are not narrated here, these belong to the perfect rape story and thus the moral agency within the story is illegitimated.

A shift that has caused the home and the immediate private sphere an increasing place of sexual violence is the internet. This is due to the easy access that almost all in the west have to the internet, and constantly carrying cameras through their phones, which has created a platform for sexual harassment and abuse (Powell and Henry 2017 p.2). This has led to an influx of 'revenge pornography', images of sexual violence and rape threats. These are far reaching, aimed at ex partners, rape victims and those in the public eye (Powell and Henry 2017 p.2). Furthermore, the attacker becomes anonymous, and more harmful as the victim does not know if the perpetrator is someone they know or a stranger. This also breaks down the wall between the private/public/international sphere, as digital technologies "can thus be simultaneously global and local, both in the perpetration of sexual harms and in the effects experienced by victims" (Powell and Henry 2017 p.11). Thus, there is a need to re-examine how this has become a global problem and how to include local norms to re-examine moral agency. Furthermore, the use of the internet and particularly social media, perpetuates blame culture, as there is great hostility surrounding rape victims and victim blaming is prevalent (Zaleski et al p.926). This is another way rape victims are silenced.

It is useful to continue to ask why rape is conceived of as different to a non-conflict site. Universities are far from being conflict zones, yet there is an epidemic of rape at them in the West. Here incapacitated and forced sexual assault is at epidemic levels within university students (Carey et al 2015 p.678). Attitudes that shape rape culture are permissible and adhere to problematic

ideologies that have been reported in discourse, sexist humour and hegemonic masculinity are accepted as well as outdated lines such as 'boys will be boys' (Giraldi and Monk-Turner 2017 p.121-2).

In the UK, approximately one in seven female students are sexually assaulted each year. Particularly victimised are those who regularly visit nightclubs and pubs (Ladhardt et al 2017 p.13). This is mirrored in the US where it is argued that party culture has increased the rise of rape or sexual assault happening in both public and private places (Ladhardt et al 2017 p.13). This is actually a historic problem, although it has shifted gender, as though traditionally an all-male location, universities were well known for sexual violence and coercion but also ignored (D'Cruze 2012 p.31).

There are motions to end this epidemic violence, with the creative use of the Title IX in the US and consent workshops taking place across Anglo-American universities. Yet these acts which focus on prevention do not attack the vile culture which permits such behaviour. Instead, there must be a way of seeing the rational/barbaric rape that happens in war zones and the innocent 'boy will be boys' rape in universities in a new light. There needs to be a way to open the conversation to invite new victims into legitimacy without shame, whether this be because of their gender, sexuality or lifestyle. There needs to be a focus on questioning the structures that permit this behaviour and not just the behaviours that are not often questioned. By viewing us all as vulnerable we can begin to shift these, seeing that we are all interdependent we can question these moral boundaries which are being formed.

In many ways the sites could not be more different, with universities focusing on the creation of knowledge and seen as a highly social place, usually filled with parties and enjoyment. In comparison, Baaz and Stern's exploration of war zones, are portrayed as places of destruction, with the aim to kill or end society. These two sites share the epidemic of rape, but encompass two very different narrations of evil. There is a need to question how the moral agency of both the perpetrators and victims on these sites are very different. Therefore, there is a need to consider

these narratives, and how moral boundaries are constructed, to see who is granted moral agency as a decisive actor of rape. This consideration must question whether rational rape is considered better than apparent barbaric rape. Furthermore, we must question why these divisions are taking place and not all rape is seen as barbaric or rational.

This final section has confirmed the need for an inclusive feminist relational ontology framework to shift how we narrate stories of evil and rape. By looking at the home as a site of violence I was able to show the power in definitions. Firstly, through the 'rape clause' by asking who has the authority to construct what is 'conceived without consent'. Within this discussion, as well as larger debates fundamental to this chapter, is the question of the identity of the rapist and the idea that certain individuals cannot be seen as a perpetrator, such as husbands or partners who commit spousal rape. This power is further misused in sexual harassment online and violence on university campuses. This distinction between sexual violence in the home, compared to sexual violence taking place in a war zone shows that dichotomous multifaceted stories often do not fit with the prescribed metanarrative, the rapist instead is inside the private sphere and not the other. Here, evil as the other is further replicated. The barbaric rapist in a warzone is seen as the intentional, inhumane, monstrous, external actor. Yet, this discussion of evil is uncomfortable when its internalized. The highly personal and internal location of a husband, at home, or a university student, in shared accommodation, is not accepted as a site of evil. With the rapist as the known friend, disruption is caused. This disruption to the metanarrative causes discomfort, yet, in similarity to my findings in my previous chapter, it is vital to find agency within this discomfort.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted that the narration of agency and rape should not be changed due to the location of violence. My inclusive feminist relational ontology calls for two things to be shaped in moving forward with the discourse of evil within the narratives of rape, the approach must be inclusive and holistic and it must challenge existing narratives. In creating a wider understanding of rape that allows all voices to be heard there is a need to not silence anyone, especially voices that have not been heard, as Davis argues, (Davis 1981 p.201):

> An effective strategy against rape must aim for more than the eradication of rape - or even sexism - alone. The struggle against racism must be an ongoing theme of the anti-rape movement, which must not only defend women of color, but the many victims of the racist manipulation of the rape charge as well.

Here there is a need for a new perspective on rape that allows multiple and contradictory narratives. This should also go beyond not only including racism but also sexuality and class which are also often ignored in the fight and can hide vulnerabilities. In order to do so, there must a be fight against sexual violence on many fronts that is "always attempting to be reflexive about the practical political implications of the strategies we choose" (Gavey 2005 p.219). Only through this holistic approach can society begin to tackle rape, and not only rape but the society that permits it. This must include focusing on the relationship between gender and sexes, looking at factors that promote sexual violence and looking at educating and re-educating society to fight these norms. Only through these procedures can the formed moral boundaries, which are silencing and enforce an agenda of misogyny dating back centuries, begin to move, in order to rebuild cultural norms that allow moral agency of all, even perpetrators of violence, to allow for actors' voices to be heard.

This re-education must start with the challenging of narratives, located within stories of evil, and must facilitate an open conversation that allows a space to be created, which can be used for (Gavey 2005 p.224),

> defusing and resisting all sorts of other (escalating) sexual imperatives to do with desire, intercourse and orgasm, and erections. Of course, many women and men currently do live out these 'transgressive' sexualities, in subtle and daring, as well as comfortable and uncomfortable forms.

The shifting attitude towards sex would mean a more open dialogue could emerge, thus there would be a distinct difference between rape and sexual violence and 'normal' or consenting sex. In challenging narratives to show what is inside and what is outside of the norms of acceptable behaviour, there is space to begin revoice those who have been silenced. This will require us accepting people who have been assaulted and also our own responsibility in contributing to rape culture, and in silencing others. Privilege of those who create the rules of what is accepted of rape must be acknowledged and it is essential to challenge the moral boundaries that have allowed these to be formed.

This chapter set to challenge the fixed narrative that rape happens, in an alleyway, by a dark stranger carrying a knife. Therefore, the chapter has outlined how moral agents are silenced within rape culture and how this fits within the overarching narratives of evil. It has highlighted how an inclusive feminist relational ontology can help to re-examine these problems. Firstly, it can be used to help to identify how rape metanarratives are produced as a story of evil, highlighting the various moral boundaries that have been formed, and questioning how these are enforced. Then the chapter set to identify the hierarchies of power that can be silencing to others, including institutions that construct permissive structures and misogynistic attitudes that allow rape and rape culture to exist. Therefore, there is a need to focus on the patterns of behaviour that allow these to persist. Such as the intersections of race and sexuality, which shape how both victims and perpetrator are judged. The power in these narratives formed over centuries is deafening to moral agents who are seen as illegitimate rape victims. By asking how these narratives are constructed and by going beyond the abstraction often created when speaking about moral issues including rape, silenced voices can be heard.

With this intersectional approach it is also important to discuss how gender impacts the focus and narratives of rape. Bodies should not be seen as sexed items of either male and female and with set behaviours inscribed to them, most notable male as a predator and female as a helpless victim. Without removing the real, lived experiences of many women who face gender-based violence, there is a need to look at the spectrum of sexes and remove this from fixed understandings of behaviour. The constructed notions of masculinity and femininity are integral to shaping the way in which the world is seen, and most notable for this chapter on how rape culture is formed. The hypermasculine male as the predator needs to be examined but this needs to be seen beyond the abstract to understand how this impacts the lives of both rapist and victim. Here, gender must not only be the focus of study but a lens to view the hierarchies that reinforce it, allowing power structures that are formed from it to be seen. By doing so it is possible to move beyond these power structures, and to allow agency.

Narratives of rape must transcend the boundaries of the public/private/international sphere that have been constructed. It can do so by rejecting the traditional approach to moral theory that rape is located within. By focusing on the lived experience of the stories of rape beyond abstraction and ask how meaning and narratives are constructed. This means rejecting the rational autonomous agents as the protagonist in this story of evil.

There are three key points/questions which come reflecting through my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework at sexual violence. Firstly, the need to see and understand rape as a structural problem, not simply as an individual behaviour. The second is to go back and consider our individual responsibilities and vulnerabilities. Therefore, there is a need to ask what happens when all members of a community are potential/actual perpetrators. Here, I do not argue that all members are actual abusers of sexual violence, but that all must question their own actions which lead to rape culture and the embedding of hierarchies within this culture. The third is how and why stories of rape are told within an evil discourse and how this limits an individual's moral agency. These questions

come from the rejection of traditional moral theory that so many of these assumptions are built upon; the starting point of moral theory as the autonomous man is highly dangerous when considering what is considered rape and who is considered a rapist. Instead, by bringing this question of rape internally, both by removing it from the abstract external international sphere to one that is very private and by claiming that we ourselves may be responsible for being part of this rape culture, we fundamentally challenge the autonomous man. This is fundamentally different to the current approach in international Relations as I will now explore.

Throughout this chapter I have shown the need to reframe the narratives of rape. Those who break the limited metanarrative are not considered an agent including an immoral agent, such as a rapist. This is dangerous as it silences voices and those who are guilty are often not convicted. Although progress has been made in the study of rape within International Relations, as I will now consider, this is still limited, yet my inclusive feminist relational ontology provides a new approach to challenging moral boundaries and the metanarrative of rape.

Chapter 5: Evil, Gendered Political Violence and the Witch of Uganda

5.1 Introduction

The story of Alice Auma, also known as Lakwena, offers a thought-provoking gendered account of morality, as her story is shrouded with uncertainty around her motives, behaviour and even gender. I will use this case study to build upon what I have explored in my previous chapters, examining moral agency in a gendered study of evil and how we narrate stories within this. Here, I am interested in questioning and challenging the norms of political violence within stories of evil, asking who is a moral agent within these norms and why we are uncomfortable with others who are traditionally not seen as agents. In undertaking a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the Ugandan rebel leader, I highlight the narratives that emerge from the discourse of her life and argue how these diminish her ability to be seen as a moral agent in stories of evil. I reflect on how Alice's narrative aligns with existing gendered stories of deficient moral actors and colonial histories of othering. In this chapter I will refer to Alice Auma/Lakwena simply as Alice, not to diminish nor feminise her, but in order not to subscribe to any existing narrative of Alice.

In this chapter, I primarily focus on the discourse around Ugandan rebel leader Alice Lakwena in the British media, demonstrating how it both embraces and reproduces existing gendered and racial stereotypes. This is heightened as Alice's story is surrounded by evil, arguably as both an actor of evil and a fighter for the removal of evil. This discourse prevents the reader from seeing Alice as a decision maker and, building on the existing argument in my thesis, an inadequate moral agent. Instead, I call for an intersectional (re)discovering of Alice's story, by asking how the gendered tradition of evil, especially the use of abstraction and its foundations in masculine notions of rationality, limit our ability to tell Alice's story of evil and see her as moral actor. I highlight how the construction of her narrative as a witch, embedded in a tradition of evil, prevents the reader from being able to see her as a moral agent. Ultimately, I argue that politically violent women are often seen as 'others' and, thus, are considered to lie outside of the realms of politics with little or no ability to be moral actors. Using my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework and my CDA, I remove the idea of

outside/inside, by questioning moral boundaries and, giving actors a voice and, therefore, agency, even in a story of evil.

I begin this chapter by providing a brief outline of Alice story before moving on to examine the relationship between gendered political violence, evil and agency. I then move on to look at the theoretical underpinnings of my arguments, using my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework and, in particular, examination of moral boundaries using a postcolonial lens, in order to facilitate a detailed discussion of the use of care ethics when exploring political violence. Subsequently, I present a CDA of the narrative of the Ugandan rebel leader Alice Auma/Lakwena. I will explore how the discourse constructs the narrative of a Witch, which prevents the reader from seeing Alice Auma/Lakwena as a moral actor. My research includes both media and academic literature. I undertake an analysis of British newspapers from the mid-1980s to the present day. In addition, I analyse all dominant literature on Alice within academic sources; this was largely from a western perspective. Within my analysis I engage in an intersectional approach, in order to see how Alice is constructed using many aspects of her identity that interlink, especially how she is seen as 'African', 'poor' and 'female'. The final section reflects on the CDA of Alice Auma/Lakwena through an intersectional feminist relational ontology, in a bid to establish the importance of seeing moral agents in the discourse on women in political violence, highlighting the repeated narrative of gendered moral deviance in stories of evil.

5.2 Alice Auma and Alice Lakwena

Alice was born Alice Auma in 1956, in Bungatria in the Northern regions of Uganda, belonging to the Acholi tribe. Alice's upbringing was very religious; she was the daughter of Severino Lukoya, a Christian Protestant priest, and Iberina Ayaa.

Alice attended and completed primary school and she was married twice, both times ending in divorce. Her first marriage was to a man from neighboring Patiko (his name is unknown) occurred after she finished school. This marriage is rumored to have ended because the couple did not have children. Her second marriage was to Alex Okello, which only last 3 years; rumored again to have ended because no children were produced (Behrend 1999 p.131). After her second divorce, Alice began selling fish and grain and had a short relationship with a man from Lango. During this time, Alice became known as a 'loose women' (Lukermoi 1990). Finally, before her possession, Alice converted to Catholicism (Finnström 2008).

Focusing on her role as the leader of the HSM we can see key stages to the uprising. The first is the spiritual journey of Alice; she undertook a spiritual journey to the national park: Parra, in northern Uganda. Whilst there, Alice consulted with the animals and waterfalls, but once finishing the journey she became mentally unwell, and was unable to speak fora period of time (Behrend 1999 p.132). After this spiritual journey Alice became possessed by many spirits leading to her emergence as a spirit medium who, apparently, unsuccessfully healed the sick and injured. However, she claimed that the spirits encouraged her to start an uprising. She is most notably known by the name of the primary spirit that possessed her: Lakwena, who was an Italian army captain who had drowned in the First World War in the Nile River (Behrend 1999 p.1). Lakwena (Alice), led this uprising, eventually leading the guerrilla uprising of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) in 1986 (Behrend 1999 p.1).

Thus, in November 1986 Alice traveled to Kitgum, a town in Northern Uganda and inspired over 150 soldiers from the Uganda People's Democratic Army (the

National Resistance Army) a resistance group who opposed the government's armed forces. In this second key stage, Alice had small victories and recruited soldiers from across Northern Uganda. The HSM had a dual purpose: to fight for Acholi rights and to remove evil from Uganda and the world. Alice had the intention of using the HSM to institute a new moral order. She developed complex rituals, purified soldiers and instituted prohibitions (Behrend 1999 p.1). This 'purification' of the soldiers took place when they joined the HSM, using holy water and burning of magical charms. A holy 'yard' was also created to perform these rituals (Behrend 1999 p.44). In addition to these rituals, Alice prophesied of battles, predicting when and where battles would be won. In the initial small victories of HSM, these prophecies reaffirmed Alice as a spiritual leader (Behrend 1999 p.80).

January 1987 saw the final stages of the HSM. Until this time, the movement had been limited to the Acholi tribe, yet with the victories of the uprising other ethnicities joined the army. Here, the movement called for equality for all ethnic groups (Behrend 1999 p.83). As the army grew in numbers, factions began to form, as well as competition from other Northern Ugandan rebel groups for soldiers. In addition, the under resourced HSM faced some significant defeats meaning Alice's influence was declining. In October 1987, the HSM forces started to march down to attack the capital of Uganda: Kampala (Behrend 1999 p.94). Reaching the Busoga region in November 1987, the HSM faced many difficulties, most notably that the region was culturally linked to the NRA and were hostile to Alice and the movement (Behrend 1999 p.92). Then on the 6th November, in Jinja approximately 50 miles from Kampala Alice and a small number of remaining soldiers (around 360) were defeated by NRA and Alice fled to Kenya (Behrend 1999 p.93).

The HSM recruited all 'God-fearing' individuals including women and children. The women were incorporated into a women's section, were they would support with cooking and cleaning. The children (anyone under the age of 18), were organised under the 'Kadongo'. This children's office taught the dangers of war and encouraged both the children and their parents to return home, only if the

children were not collected by their parents were they allowed to stay in the movement (Behrend 1999 p.44). Although the children were trained in basic combat and military drills, it appears from the limited research on the subject that they were not given weapons or placed in battle (ibid). The involvement of children in the movement is concerning, but far more problematic, is the evolution of the HSM. After the defeat in Jinja, the resistance re-emerged as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), under the notorious Joseph Kony, who claimed to be the cousin of Alice Lakwena and have received her spiritual possession (Doom and Vlansenroot 1999 p.23). The LRA continued the use of child soldiers, and eventually actively stole children to fight in its army (Doom and Vlansenroot 1999 p.19). It is important to note this link between the HSM and the LRA, especially when considering agency and evil. Here, children, often not considered as moral agents, were forced to undertake evil actions. Although not the remit of my study on Alice, these events may have shaped how she has been subsequently narrated.

Her biography is similar to other sprit mediums; "possession always appears in the form of illness or insanity. Only following the commandments of the spirit brings alleviation and moves the spirit to lend his medium various means of healing the sick" (Behrend 1999 p.132). Alice's gender is important in this story as a spirit medium should not be with a man, so infertile women are chosen as alternative to income and status, making a previous limiting situation advantageous (ibid).

5.3 Gendered Political Violence, Evil and Agency

So far in this thesis, I have explored gendered moral agency in stories of evil. In this final chapter, I am particularly interested in how this narrative is situated within the overlapping issues of political violence and evil.

Before engaging with this feminist unpacking, it is important to note the relationship between political violence and evil. The language of evil is dominant in the discourse of political violence. Veltmand and Norlock even argue that political violence is evil in its core definition, as "atrocities are paradigmatically evil and characteristically exhibit violent manifestations of social discrimination or hatred for political outsiders" (2009 p.6). The relationship between evil and political violence is complex. The use of term evil in defining all or some acts of violence can often suppress conversation, as the act is seen as inconceivable. Thus, there is great power in labeling an act or an actor of political violence as evil.

When considering the themes of terrorism and evil it is worthy to consider Card's feminist interpretation of evil and political violence, as she argues that terrorists "do not always act with a social conscience". Card continues, "terrorism, more generally, is a form of coercion, a calculated or systematic appeal to heightened fear (terror) in others as a means to obtaining something else the terrorist wants (which need not be a selfish goal), something the terrorist fears is unobtainable or too costly if sought by more conventional means" (Card 2002 p.143). Here, there are two key elements to Card's link between evil and terrorism: firstly, that there is power in the definition and, secondly, that terrorism is often labeled this way as it is ineffable. This attitude is also taken by Neiman, particularly when looking at the September 11th attacks on the twin towers. "The difficulties of coping with terrorism are not conceptual difficulties. Those who carried out the mass murder on September 11 embodied a form of evil so old-fashioned that its reappearance is part of our shock… September 11th provided an instance of evil that was old fashioned in structure" (2002 p.283). The September 11th attacks have largely been narrated within the discourse of evil, especially after George W

Bush labelled the attacks and other events in 'the war on terror' as evil. A common phrase he used to describe the state sponsors of terrorism was the 'Axis of Evil'. These narratives were also mirrored by other politicians and the media. This is important as it sets the remit for what is considered 'of interest' within political violence studies.

Returning to my framework, care ethics, historically, has little credibility within the subfield of political violence. It is rarely used, with a few exceptions, such as Laura Sjoberg's application of Fiona Robinson's critical care ethics to expand the Just War theory dialogue (Sjoberg 2009), and it is not used to examine political violence at the micro level. Yet my refined inclusive feminist relational ontology framework can provide an interesting and insightful approach to examining the power relations that underpin morality and narratives. I have highlighted, throughout this thesis, that the framework's strength in addressing moral boundaries is useful in emphasising the narration of women as inadequate moral agents in stories of evil. The stories told within political violence and terrorism are some of the most memorable stories of evil. Thus, using my framework, I argue that there is a need to see women who commit acts of political violence as moral decision-makers even in complex circumstances.

Moving forward, I am interested in allowing/finding/seeing moral agency within this discourse of political violence and evil. There is a need to understand the power in labelling an actor or act of violence as evil, understanding how it is seen as ineffable and shocking, and the power hierarchies entrenched within the definition that I explored in the previous chapter. I also want to shift the focus of what is normally the sphere of concern when looking at political violence by considering the HSM and a female actor of violence.

5.4 Witches

Alice's story of evil enters into an existing narrative of evil, through the construction of Alice as a witch. As I explored in more detail in my first chapter, stories of witches limit the agency of women, labeling them as external from society and often as wicked souls working with the devil to trick innocent souls.

When examining Alice's story, focusing on evil and agency, it is important to briefly highlight the understanding of the witch beyond an internal western understanding. Firstly, there is an important colonial aspect of witchery to note: the theme of control and ostracisation of 'the other' is heightened. This was/is constructed through a focus on African witchcraft and spirituality as "an unmistakable marker of the primitive other" (Moore and Sanders 2001 p.2). Here, contextual understandings of witches and magic were rarely taken into account and, again, the power of othering the female, especially culturally different women, happened internationally. Historically, western researchers saw witchcraft as evidence of 'pre-logical' thinking, through which Europe had progressed (Moore and Sanders 2001 p.2). This has left a legacy of colonial relations using narrations of witchcraft to entrench exclusion by focusing on strangeness (Moore and Sanders 2001 p.3), further enforcing power hierarchies.

It is important to highlight the colonial attitude to witchcraft and the impact of this in Uganda and particularly in Acholi culture. Within Acholi culture, witchcraft is still common; with various forms existing all with their own unique history (Behrend 1999 p.26). Here, there is a complex relationship between spiritual practices that are seen as odd or primitive in the west. While some forms of traditional 'witchcraft' have been incorporated into local Christian practices, others are seen as immoral and are distrusted, meaning healers (*jok*) are as seen helpful and witches are ostracised. This has led to the fusion of beliefs: "if western medicine failed, they would still visit the medium of a *jok* to be healed by him; and the elders continued to offer sacrifices at the shrines of the clan and chiefdom *jogi*. Unlike the missionaries, who sought to establish their teaching with

monopolistic claims, the Acholi accepted the missions as newly arrived cults that could exist alongside the old ones" (Behrend 1999 p.119).

This pluralist acceptance of multiple belief systems further complicates the Acholi understanding of witchcraft. Yet, there is a need to understand the nuanced forms of Acholi culture and highlight that there is not one collective belief. When undertaking interviews in the Acholi region, Finnstrom showed local opinion on Alice and her successor (Finnstrom p.203):

> The old woman argues that even though it is most likely that Joseph Kony and Alice Lakwena were once presented with the Holy Spirit of God, they have both misused it to such an extent that it has now been replaced by, even transformed into, a spirit of darkness (*tipu macol*). Both Kony and Alice are responsible for unlawful killings of innocent people and can only be regarded as evildoers and witches (*lujok*, sing.: *lajok*), she concluded.

There is a need to see how witchcraft was believed and feared but with a highly different interpretation to that of the west. This further complicates Alice's story of evil.

I hope to show the emergent patterns that have uncoupled the relationship between morality and women in paradoxical ways. By narrating women as external to morality and violence, in addition to being illogical and irrational, women are further entrenched into the private sphere. As witches are external from society and morality, they are narrated as being further ostracised, constructed as 'the other'. This is further engrained when these witches/women are not from the west.

5.5 Narratives of Alice

It is essential to explore the story of Alice, through a postcolonial lens. The most overt reason for this is the colonial history present within the story. Uganda was under colonial rule by Britain until 1951 and the legacy of this mind-set is still present today. This mindset is evident in both the construction of Alice's story and in the power dynamics of the British media and its readers. Looking at the narration of Alice's story from a western perspective shows the privilege in story-telling and the authority in deciding the norms of power. Postcolonialism is an epistemological undertaking that explores the capacities and limitations of western thought (Chakrabarty 2000 p.20).

It is important to acknowledge the multiple, interlinking ways in which narratives are formed. Alice is seen not only as a woman, but a Ugandan woman from the Acholi tribe. In this next section I will explore the various facets of the narration of Alice. I am interested in the dichotomy produced within Alice's narrative, as she is seen through both the Beautiful Soul myth, and contradictorily as the naïve savage. Alice's story is further disrupted through her violence. She transcends the prescribed myth that she is in need of protection, yet this is the foundation of the colonial narrative (Spivak 1994 p.94). This is further problematic to the subaltern colonised subject, especially the females who are silenced and constructed with no history or context (Spivak 1994).

My inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, seen through a postcolonial analysis is central to (re)discovering Alice and her story, in and of evil, and in understanding the complex and contextual construction of morals. This framework allows the reader to see the disruption Alice's story causes within its dichotomous narratives, as it challenges the social myths of expected behaviour by looking at the boundaries that have enforced these myths. Moving forward, I will use this framework as a starting point for my CDA and as a guide to reflect on Alice's narratives as a moral agent in a story of evil. Alice's story is difficult to tell due to the limited resources available about her. A sizeable amount of the discourse is from the media, which at a primary level has issues of credibility due

to the often-biased nature of its information. There is little academic material addressing Alice; what exists largely acknowledges the HSM as a precursor to the infamous Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Joseph Kony, which received greater public attention. The crux of the problem was the emergence of what could be considered an epistemic community, or "a network of specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise" (Jackson 2009 p.81). This community was formed around the work of Heinze Behrend: the main author who wrote on Alice, the single book specifically looking at Alice and other numerous articles, which have become the primary discourse for exploring Alice's life. Although there is little reason to doubt Behrend's excellent work, little other fieldwork has been carried out and using her work as the primary resource for all academic work means that we are in danger of constructing only one narrative of Alice, thus causing us to enter the epistemic community. This is especially dubious as the primary research was undertaken when there was still great civil unrest in Uganda, which may have influenced the findings. My research focuses on the British media and academia in order to show the colonial and gendered legacy of Alice's story of evil. It is highly important when addressing the narratives of Alice to understand the existing political and historical circumstances of Uganda at the time of the HSM. To be brief, there are three key points to stress: firstly, the distinct ethnic struggles prevalent in Uganda which were manipulated and worsened during the colonial period (Laruni 2015 p.215). Secondly, within this struggle, the Acholi tribe has had a long history of power and suppression, and rivalries with the southern Bantu tribes and, especially, the Buganda tribe, who had a very different linguistic, cultural, and ethical heritage to the north of the country (Laruni 2015 p.216, Behrend 1999 p.23). Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it should be stressed that there was civil unrest in Uganda at the time. This was caused (among other reasons) by the fall of President Okello, and the rise of the National Resistance Army (NRA) and President Museveni, a Bantu, and the opposing rebel groups (Behrend 1999). Although this brief overview of the political and ethnic divide does not allow for a full understanding, it is clear that unrest was present at the time of the HSM.

From this Feminist CDA I have derived the witch narrative and have broken down the gendered construction of the narrative of 'Woman', which is intrinsic to the Witch narrative. Furthermore, these narratives are not coherent in all of the discourses, and certainly the literature does not present a united narrative of Alice, but my research shows the main narratives that exist within them. The dominant narrative here is that of the Witch, formed from a colonial gendered western perspective.

These narratives are more complicated than simply illegitimating Alice in a story of evil. Alice's gender identity is very complex: although Alice Auma clearly identified with being a woman,[12] the leadership of the HSM and decision-making was undertaken by a male sprit – Lakwena. Yet this is not discussed within the discourse and Alice is always referred to using feminine pronouns. Although Alice claimed to be possessed by many sprits, it is said that as the fighting evolved the female sprits possessing her were often silenced by new male spirits (Finnström 2008 p.77). In addition, the possession gave Alice great power, more than that of a man, as she apparently had control over forces beyond men's comprehension and, thus, transcended the usual status of a woman (Allen 1991 p.396). Hence, difficulty arises in seeing Alice as male or female which, in turn, complicates the gendered lens used to assess her morality, showing the limitations of a binary understanding of gender.

The gendered construction of Alice foremost as a Witch, amongst other female stereotypes, not only detracts focus from her as a political agent and her religious motivations, but it also removes the possibility of seeing Alice as a moral actor. Thus, Alice, like in other gendered stories of evil, is seen as morally deficient. I am not making a moral judgment about Alice's decisions, instead I argue that the discourse prevents the reader from being able to see Alice's judgements as a moral actor. This blindness emerges largely from the gendered binary embedded in a discourse of seeing women outside the realms of both politics and violence,

[12] Evidenced by the fact that, when not possessed, Alice would claim ignorance and argue she was an unknowing female and performing the women's duties such as preparing and distributing food (Behrend 1999 p.143).

and the inability to make moral decisions. It is further embedded in a colonial narrative of the immoral native. This fits into my larger findings on the study of evil: these stories are limited because of a gendered tradition of evil and morality which leads to a use of abstraction and the reliance on a rational masculine starting point.

A Woman

It is essential to acknowledge this narrative through a postcolonial lens to examine how Alice is seen, not only as a woman, but as a Ugandan woman, and therefore, how she is further constructed as an 'other', outside of morality. The 'woman' narrative can be understood as a "cultural and ideological composite Other constructed through diverse representational discourse" (Mohanty 1998 p.334), through a focus on feminine characteristics. This is intrinsic to understanding Alice as a moral being, which is divided along gendered terms.

The discourse on Alice focuses significantly on her gender at a primary level. The fact that she is a woman is constantly noted, particularly in the media and even within academia (Kayunga 2000 p.113). Alice's description, therefore, further perpetuates the notion that women who commit acts of political violence upset established gender norms. Further distilling the discourse, there are three ways in which the troubled woman narrative emerges: Alice is depicted, firstly, as an innocent 'girl', secondly, simultaneously as a successful mother to her troops and a failed, barren woman and, finally, as a prostitute.

B Girl

This focus on Alice as a child or girl produces an idea of her as naïve and victimised, portrayed as not fully understanding her actions and thus removing her political and moral agency. This narrative occurs as Alice is repeatedly referred to as a 'girl' in the media discourse (Brittian V Guardian, 16/02/1990, The Guardian 7/04/1987, Hill, G The Times 31/12/87). Furthermore, the adjective 'young' is used to describe Alice (Brooker, E Mail on Sunday 5/10/1997 p.27, Borzello, A The Guardian 11/10/1997 p.32 Buckoke A The Times

4/4/1998). In addition, and perhaps even more influentially, the Ugandan government originally instated this naïve, girl-like narrative, with President Museveni referring to Alice as the “poor Lakwena girl”, a "poor girl with a psychiatric problem" (Matheson and Johnson, The Times, 30/10/1987), or claiming that she was “manipulated by criminals” (Museveni 2000 p.98) on another occasion. The focus on Alice as a girl removes her agency, as children are often seen without agency (Watson 2006 p.256), but also reinforces her femininity, which works within an existing, prefixed story.

Additionally, the media and academic discourse repeatedly focus on her as illiterate or uneducated (Bond, C The Guardian 28/03/1988, Economist 25/01/2007, Allen 1991 p.371 and The Times 24/01/2007 p.56). The idea of Alice being uninformed emphasises her naivety and childlike nature. This is embedded in a postcolonial narrative, where a western construction shows Alice as vulnerable and in need of pity, through a construction of being young and uneducated. This instates the idea that Alice was not the leader of the movement and the momentum behind the HSM, so Alice is seen as neither a decision-maker nor a sufficient moral agent.

The treatment of Alice in this highly gendered way is not uncommon, with discourses of women who commit violent acts being highly gendered, and it leads to a removal of legitimacy. Thus, when discourses disproportionally focus on gender, they remove political and moral reasoning from women’s judgments, as they are no longer simply an actor of political violence, but a female actor of political violence. This is reliant on the rational autonomous male as the primary agent in moral decision-making; a definition into which Alice does not fit. Within the local context, the divergence of Alice’s gender norms is reinforced by Acholi culture, which saw the role of a man as a warrior. Killing enemies was evidence of manliness and brave warriors were celebrated in their tribes (Behrend 1999 p.40).

C Mother

The second construction in the woman narrative is that of motherhood. Alice's narrative focuses on her motherhood in two ways: as the mother of the rebels and as an infertile woman. This narrative, focusing on the maternal nature of women, is popular within the wider literature of women who commit acts of political violence (Åhäll 2012). It is largely linked to the view of mothers as peaceful and nurturing. A woman who kills, rather than creates lives, is seen as the ultimate failure of motherhood (see Gentry 2009). The mother is a recurrent narrative in the story of evil, most notably in the story of original sin or birthing evil into the world, for example, in the stories of Eve in Judeo-Christian (Yee 2003 p.3), traditions or Pandora in Greek mythology Glenn 1977 p.184), as explored in the previous chapter. In opposition to this, the mother is also narrated as the protector from evil, prominent in the Christian traditions of the Virgin Mary.

The view of Alice as a mother of the rebel movement is most overt through the use of her nickname, 'Mama Alice',the term 'mama' being commonly used in Ugandan colloquial language. It is interesting that when newspapers choose to use the term, it is not to focus on the rebels' loyalty or affection to Alice as a leader, but to undermine her political and moral actions, through a gendered and postcolonial structure. The most prominent example of this was The Times headline – "Mama Alice's magic sweeps Uganda" (Matheson and Johnson, The Times, 30/10/1987). The same short article repeats the term 'Mama Alice myth'. The use of the word myth not only adds to witch discourse, it further undermines Alice's position by aligning her with a falsehood. The phrase 'Mama Alice' is also cited in The Guardian (Bond, C The Guardian 26/10/1987 p.6) and the Washington Post (Washington Post 20/01/2007). By highlighting this nickname, Alice is seen through a pre-existing narrative that links politically violent women's motivation to their supposed ability to have children and, therefore, their maternal qualities (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). This essentialised reduction is recurrent in the narratives of morality and women that I have evidenced throughout this thesis. Alice's infertility is highlighted within the literature, which is linked to her instability and the desire to found the HSM. This is repeated in

academic discourse (Behrend 1999, Allen 1991, Finnström 2008), and noted in the Times (The Times 24/01/2007 p.56) and The Daily Telegraph (20/01/2007 p.29). This failed motherhood is also part of a larger narrative around women and their motivations for political actions, as they are seen as angry or disheartened by their failure to meet expectations of bearing a child (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007).

This is further enforced through a focus within the academic literature on Alice's maternal, feminine qualities, such as healing and peace (Behrend 1998 p.107), which reinstates the notion of Alice as a woman, as opposed to her more masculine, warrior-like qualities. Behrend highlights that "Lakwena was not a warmonger; for her, war was a necessary evil in order to achieve a new better society" (1999 p.57). Despite still seeing the necessity of war, this can be read as rebirth and sacrifice, rather than brutal killing, which adds to the mothering discourse. This is engrained in the ideas of moral codes, and a 'mother knows best' mentality: "Lakwena had told them her magic potions would protect them only if they observed a strict moral code of no sex, no smoking and no drinking" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987). Here, Alice is described as knowing what is moral but in a specific way that is mocked.

Yet this transcends western narratives, as childless women in Acholi culture were often accused of sorcery, especially during political turmoil (Allen 1991 p.381). Therefore, Alice's credibility is shaken as she is seen as a failed woman by her inability to have children. The discourse of Alice as a mother limits her as a political actor, this reinforces her 'Beautiful Soul' narrative. She is seen as being outside the realm of violence and not as a masculine, political decision-maker. In a gendered tradition of evil, it is easier to portray Alice as a fallen victim rather than a moral agent who does not fit in with the prescribed narrative of who can commit acts of evil.

The final stream linked to this mother discourse, is that of women's liberation. Behrend claims that the sprit had chosen Alice, a woman, in order to create greater equality for women and highlight how they were oppressed in Africa (Behrend 1999 p.79). Within the HSM, a Women's Office was set up, which all

females were a part of, however, the role shifted through the period of fighting. Originally, women were heavily involved in combat, quite successfully, however as the conflict evolved women were increasingly excluded from fighting and involved in more domestic duties (Behrend 1999 p.53).

D Prostitute

The final construction is that of Alice as a 'loose woman' or sex worker. She is described using adjectives such as "elusive" (The Times 24/01/2007 p.56), underpinned by a focus on mystery and magic. This is further advanced by a focus on Alice's failed marriages (The Daily Telegraph 20/01/2007 p.29), and her supposed living arrangements, cohabiting with a man who she was not married to. She is thus considered to be a 'loose woman' (Behrend 1999). Alice is ostracised by society's expected gender norms, this is significant to how Alice is presented as a moral agent, as in western and Ugandan cultures, divorced women are stigmatised. This construction is greatly heightened by a focus on the rumour that Alice was a prostitute before starting the HSM

The focus on Alice as a rumoured sex worker is repeatedly seen in the academic literature (Allen 1991 and Finnström 2008 p.76): "Alice was designated as… a former prostitute" (Behrend 1999 p.2). "A lunatic prostitute" (Behrend 1991 p.162) "she lived as a 'loose women" (Behrend 1999 p.132). Although two media explanations highlight that these are just "accounts" (The Times 24/01/2007 p.56) or claims from the army (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987), in three articles, there is literally no other description of Alice apart from the fact that she is a "former prostitute" (The Times 10/10/1987 lead article, Doyle, L The Independent 05/07/2006 p.21, The Times 19/07/2003 p.24). The focus on Alice as a sex worker was also used by the National Resistance Movement (the political party in power), describing Alice as "a lunatic prostitute of Gulu Town turned witch'" (Behrend 1999 p.162). There is little substantive evidence that Alice engaged in sex work and, if true, her previous employment had no impact on her leadership skills. Therefore, it is questionable why it should be so heavily focused on within the texts.

This focus on Alice as a prostitute removes her from being a rational and, more importantly, moral being, due to the incorrect stereotype that sex workers have a different moral compass to others. This idea is rooted in Rousseau's, and later Freud's, argument that women's boundless sexual passion and inability to sublimate this desire leads to them being irrational (Pateman 1980 p.25). This is further emphasised by the focus on Alice's two failed marriages. The concentration on Alice as a prostitute shows the gendered narrative in the discourse, further degrading Alice's motivation and removing attention from her political and religious causes. There is a long heritage of women being depicted as temptresses of evil, that this prostitute narrative is complicit with. As explored in the my second chapter, the immoral woman is said to have tricked the noble man into inflicting evil.

E Witch

The witch narrative is the strongest within the discourse of Alice and is linked to both the spiritual and religious nature of the movement. The construction of Alice as a witch, within western literature, must be seen through a postcolonial framework; evidenced by a power dynamic as Alice is seen as 'foreign' and strange, this leads to a discourse that removes rationality and reasoning from Alice's moral, and cognitive, decision-making. This can be understood by the way in which western discourses exaggerate differences and 'othering' externally, especially those outside of western culture. The strength of the discourse is producing a narrative that can prevent the reader from seeing Alice as a moral actor, rather than simply as a mysterious witch. This is enhanced by Alice's story being embedded in the notions of evil.

It is also important to remember the Acholi cultural contextual understanding of witchcraft; there was a belief that witchcraft was rife in Northern Uganda. Local traditions in the region proclaimed that death was not caused by bullets or disease but by an enemy curse. During the time of civil unrest there was an AIDS epidemic leading to great unease and suspicion in Acholiland (Behrend 1999 p.27). Furthermore, part of Alice's great attraction was that she was able to

provide purification that cleansed, *cen*,[13] in a time of social and religious instability which is one of the reasons the HSM became so popular (Berkley 2013 p.5). Alice wanted not just to pursue an ethnic struggle, but also to enforce a new moral order.

As well as an overall focus on Alice being a witch, the narrative is constructed in four interlinking ways: firstly, through a focus on magic and the mystical qualities of Alice and the HSM; secondly, through Alice's association with nature; thirdly, through how the movement was ill-equipped; and finally, through the way in which Alice was constructed as a savage native. Overall, this witch narrative leads to an othering through a focus on irrationality and abnormality, within a story of evil. One of the many outcomes of this othering is the portrayal of Alice as a deficient moral agent.

Alice is labelled a witch numerous times in texts—"2,000 rebels die for Uganda witch" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987) and "Bewitched, bothered and bewildered" (Watson, C The Observer 10/04/1988 p.21)— and sometimes this is nuanced where she is simply "accused of being a witch" (The Daily Telegraph 20/01/2007 p.29 and The Times 24/01/2007 p.56). Furthermore, there is an emphasis on "witchcraft" inspiring the movement (Bond C The Times 10/10/1987 p.7) because of the "promises of victory based on witchcraft" (Bond, C The Guardian 9/6/1987 p.12). Other times the movement is described as a "the witchcraft cult" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987). Placing the inspiration solely on witchcraft discredits Alice, as it dismisses her leadership. The witchcraft is taken out of context and thus the movement is portrayed as immoral and strange. Furthermore, there is a sense of an all-encompassing notion of witchcraft, for example: the "Tidal wave of witchcraft" (Watson, C The Observer 10/04/1988 p.21) and "Fired by witchcraft" (Brittain, V The Guardian 7/4/1987 p.10). This creates the illusion that the witchcraft is unstoppable and fear is generated by the authors.

[13] Misfortune sent from ancestors after moral wrongs (Finnström 2008).

In addition, the witchcraft originates with Alice. The Observer notes that “Alice practices sorcery herself” (Watson, C. The Observer 8/11/1987 p.16) and The Times notes “her supernatural powers” (The Times 10/10/1987 lead article). Alice is called a “mystic” (Howard, D The Independent 8/11/2008 p.36) and a “sadistic rebel leader with a taste for black magic” (Howard, D The Independent 8/11/2008 p.36). Furthermore, there is a notion of strangeness around Alice and the movement which fuels this witch discourse. The Times describes the HSM as “one of Africa's most bizarre peasant uprisings” (Matheson and Johnson, The Times, 30/10/1987). The word “bizarre” is repeated in other settings: "bizarre exploits" (Washington Post 20/01/2007), "bizarre cult" (Dowden, R The Observer 2/4/2006 p.32), and “bizarre superstition” (Bond, C The Guardian 28/03/1988 p.7). This focus on the bizarre reinforces the ‘abnormal and witch’ narrative of Alice. Furthermore, “Lakwena's magic” is highlighted (Matheson and Johnson, The Times, 30/10/1987 and The Daily Telegraph 20/01/2007 p.29). This further adds to a focus on coercion through witchcraft - “victims of her mad and evil magic” (Watson, C. The Observer 8/11/1987 p.16).

Part of Alice’s witch narrative is her apparent desire to convert others. Alice was apparently highly persuasive, “she must have possessed the persuasive powers of Joan of Arc” (Hill, G The Times 31/12/87). The use of the metaphor aligning her to Joan of Arc makes Alice seem almost heroic, yet there is an overwhelming negative tone to the analogy. Alice is described as being able to “bewitch Ugandan rebels" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987, Fitzgerald, M A The Sunday Times 26/12/1993) and the rebels are as seen as ““victims of her mad and evil magic” (Watson, C. The Observer 8/11/1987 p.16). This is in opposition to the ‘Mama Alice’ narrative, as it focusses on coercion. Here, her immorality is amplified as she is not only seen as committing harm herself, but she is also forcing others to commit acts of violence.

A predominant theme in the witch narrative is a focus on magic and mystery. This discourse in the western media adds to a narrative of the abnormal and irrational and portrays Alice as strange and crazy. These themes, considered illogical to western normative emphasis on rationality, discredit Alice’s motives which

further 'others' her. The theme of magic is repeated in newspapers, and even makes the headline of the Times – "Magic and Museveni" (The Times 10/10/1987 lead article). The focus on mystery and magic is centred on Alice: on three occasions Alice is described as a "mystic" (Macrae, C The Observer 29/02/2004 p.24, Kiley, S The Times, 03/02/1995 and Matheson, A, The Times 12/10/1987). Furthermore, she is also called "mysterious" (The Times 24/01/2007 p.56) and a "mysterious priestess" (The Times 19/09/1987 p.6). The Sunday Times highlights that, "[H]er origin is a mystery" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987). This focus on the unknown reinforces the idea of Alice as foreign and, thus, irrational. The media's focus on magic is a savage discourse, which projects Alice as an uncivilised and illegitimate moral actor. By ostracising Alice as an irrational savage, external to the western world, the reader is again prevented from considering the idea of Alice as a moral actor and, instead, is led to see Alice as an 'other', beyond the realm of western morality.

Despite being motivated by Christianity, there is an unfounded focus on 'voodoo' in the discourse of Alice. The use of voodoo here is simplistic and does not reflect the historical movement of the religion. Instead the use of 'voodoo' is used to project powerful ideas of savagery which are external to western rationality and play into existing narratives around voodoo and Africa. The term is even used in two headlines: "Voodoo rebels kill" (The Times, 27/10/1987 p.10) and "Ugandans rout voodoo rebels" (Bond, C The Guardian, 07/07/1987 p.7). The use of verbs "kill" and "rout" create an aggressive sense around the misused 'voodoo' term, further fueling the idea of savagery. There is a great focus on Alice around the notion of voodoo, as she is referred to five times as a "voodoo priestess" (The Times, 27/10/1987 p.10, Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987, Bond, C The Guardian, 07/07/1987 p.7, The Daily Telegraph, 31/12/2004 p.29 and Sieveking, P The Sunday Telegraph 08/04/2001 p.37). This reaffirms the idea of Alice as a witch and therefore not a moral actor. This is seen to a lesser extent as the HSM is referred to as Alice's "Voodoo group" (Bond, C The Guardian, 15/08/1987 p.5), which diminishes the actual political and religious motivations of the movement.

Labelling the HSM a cult removes its political motivation and further creates a discourse of savagery. It also prevents the reader from seeing Alice as a moral actor as the notion of 'cult' captures ideas of naivety and abnormal behaviour. The focus on cults even makes The Times headline - "Cult battle in Uganda" (The Times 19/09/1987 p.6). Although two articles do highlight the Christian undertones in the description of the movement as"a Christian cult" (Drogin, B, The Guardian 2/04/1996 p.10) and "a millenarian cult" (Curtis. P guardian.co.uk 13/03/2012), however the focus on the cult still estranges it. Similarly, two other articles describe the movement in semi-truthful ways: "cult-like guerrilla group" (The Times 24/01/2007 p.56) and "a spiritual cult" (Brittain, V The Guardian 16/02/1990 p.14). Again, although it would be fair to call the movement both guerrilla-style and spiritual, the use of 'cult' deflects rationality. Furthermore, on other occasions the movement is described as "the witchcraft cult" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987) and "bizarre cult" (Dowden, R The Observer 2/4/2006 p.32). This removes rationality from the movement and adds to the savage discourse.

One of the most powerful ways the discourse projects a savage narrative is the use of imagery. These descriptions rest on persisting stereotypes that portray Alice and the HSM as uncivilised, and therefore outside of morality and rationality. This is largely constructed through a focus on nature and austerity: on two occasions there is a focus on Alice's mud altar inside her hut (Bond, C The Guardian, 07/07/1987 p.7) or "a makeshift altar in a mud hut" (Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987). The emphasis on bare mud and the religious meaning of altar find juxtaposition in this imagery that adds to the savage discourse and the focus on witchcraft. Yet, whilst mud houses were normal in Acholi culture (Finnström 2008), the articles do not mention this. Further adding to this narrative is a description of Alice herself, "[S]itting barefoot on a straw mat among her advisers" (The Times, 26/10/1987 p.8). The focus here on Alice firstly without shoes and on a straw mat is demonstrative of a lack of civilization. This is rooted in a masculine focus on rationality and western civility, as explored in

my previous chapter, which is key to the gendered understanding of stories of evil.

The focus on animals further adds to the savage discourse, with: “bombs made from scorpions, black ants and monkey flesh” (Watson, C. The Observer 8/11/1987 p.16), with Bibles, hymn-books, slaughtered cats, two live chameleons, which the NRA released (Bond, C The Guardian, 07/07/1987 p.7), and “slaughtered cats, live chameleons” (The Daily Telegraph 20/01/2007 p.29 and Bond, C The Sunday Times, 23/08/1987). The focus on animals, especially sacrificed or dead animals, reinforces the savage rhetoric by underpinning stereotypes of abnormality and witches. The savage imagery is seen as being outside of rationality and external to western norms, and therefore the movement is othered.

Overall Alice’s narrative, in line with many other stories of female agents of political violence, silences her. The construction of Alice as ‘Witch’ creates a savage, irrational actor external to western logic, thus her evil is not legitimate. This gendered narrative not only distracts from Alice’s clear political and religious motivations, but it also reinforces the stereotypes of women external to the realm of conflict. Overall, this prevents the reader from seeing Alice as a moral agent in a story of evil. As Alice spoke little about her story, her narrative is largely untold, and this uneasiness (of her moral behaviour and ambiguity) must be accepted. This discomfort is heightened, as when Alice finally did speak out, her multiple spirit possessions gave her own voice multiple narratives. There must be room for Alice to be viewed as an agent in this discomfort, despite her story often being contradictory. Alice must be narrated as an actor inside the realm of violence, even if her actions are disliked, as excluding her further enforces gendered stereotypes.

5.6 Alice Lakwena as a Moral Agent

The four patterns of evil that I outlined in my third chapter, relating to the masculine tradition of evil, are dominant in Alice's story: her narrative is one fueled by ambiguity which allows the reader's imagination to further propel Alice's involvement in evil. This ambiguity primarily emerges from the lack of Alice's own narrative and is reinforced by the multiple roles she undertook (from fish seller to rebel leader) and her multiple possessions. In addition, the various tellers of Alice's story, of her dichotomous characters' own motivations, sustain this ambiguity further. For example, the western media's desire to sell newspapers was propelled by a colonial legacy, whilst Ugandan newspapers supported rival political factions and government officials' stories, in Uganda, tried to remove the political element to the HSM uprising. Finally, academics have limited access to information surrounding Alice.

Within this ambiguity, other patterns of evil emerge. Although there is little use of the word 'humanity' in Alice's story there is a great focus on community and exclusion. Alice's story is engrained in the external; external from the expected behaviour of an Acholi woman, her tribe external to the ruling power and Uganda narrated as external to the constructed norms of western morality. This focus on the 'other' is vital in the masculine telling of evil. Yet Alice's story is so contradictory, it is not clear which community she is or is not included within, thus her moral agency as further confused.

This leads to the third pattern of the masculine telling of evil: of the evil doer as a monster. The primary way in which Alice is narrated as a monster, is through the construction of her as a witch. Within these stories, Alice is presented as inhuman through her sorcery, savagery and trickery. Yet it is important to see this monstrous narrative is built within gendered and colonial moral boundaries. Alice is not simply a monster, but an African, female monster. This intensifies how she is seen as a moral agent, as the stories of colonial and gendered traditional are replicated in her own narrative as I have evidenced throughout this chapter. Within this monstrous narrative, Alice's intentionality can be questioned. Alice's

motivations are repeatedly challenged in narratives, with a focus on her possessions, hence, the extent of Alice's (Auma's) control over her decision making is unclear. This is further undermined by the gendered and colonial expectations in her story. Thus, authors write Alice's history with questionable accountability for her actions, without reflecting on larger structures that impact how Alice's story is viewed. This limits Alice's ability to be seen as a moral agent.

In order to further unpack Alice's story of evil, and how she is seen as morally inadequate within this, I will refer back to the six key factors of my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework I highlighted at the end of my second chapter.

The first of these is the focus on interdependent relations rather than autonomous agents. Through this shift, the 'one-size-fits-all' definition of narratives, such as 'witch', can be challenged as the power structures and moral boundaries that have permitted this narrative to be formed, are uncovered. Thus, I can use my inclusive feminist relational ontology to challenge the over-simplified construction of Alice, accentuating the limited understanding that emerges from stereotypical narratives and highlighting the need for a multi-dimensional discourse, which includes emotions and enables the reader to see the actor as a moral agent. A primary example of this is referring to Alice's gendered narrative, which offers a simplified understanding of Alice, defined by her sex. Although it is constructed in different ways, through the focus on childlike innocence, motherhood and prostitution, the outcome is still the same and portrays Alice as a specific and narrow stereotype: over emotional, which is essential for making moral decisions, and thus does not allow her room to commit acts of evil. My framework does not argue that these constructions are not present within Alice's story, but that her story is more complex than the singular understanding presented.

Building upon this, a focus on concrete situations allows for the ambiguity in Alice's story. My inclusive feminist relational ontology framework offers a new understanding of who is an actor of political violence and evil, particularly when

considering the controversial definition of who is legitimate and rational, who is a citizen, and in our examination of Alice, even who is a woman. Detailing a case-specific definition of who is a rational or legitimate actor would mean taking into account local considerations of morality, and how an understanding of correct moral behaviour has developed. As Tronto argues, we must understand that morality is confined to specific social and historical circumstances (Tronto 2009 p.57). The difficulty that would emerge, of having such a normative understanding of legitimacy, is that no definition would ever be agreed upon, or to reach any decisions would be laborious process. When moving forward with using a feminist ontology it would be essential to facilitate a discussion of the definition of legitimacy that contains aspects of cultural and historical contexts, without including so many that it becomes meaningless. It can highlight the lived experience of each actor and their actions and, in doing so, it challenges the idea of moral inadequacy. The actor is no longer embedded in a hypothetical narrative but within a contextual understanding of morality and the definition of humanity. A focus on concrete situations allows the reader to see the power hierarchies that have formed to prevent actors from seeing moral agency.

One of these power hierarchies includes gendered structures that reinforce moral boundaries, which is the third key facet in my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework. It is important to challenge these dominant narratives in Alice's story that offer an over simplified understanding of Alice, defined through the gendered construction of the witch, and, thus, an inadequate moral decision-maker. The contextual understanding of morality is highlighted in the discourse on Alice, as the media focuses on particular narratives in order to delegitimise and other Alice. Alice is presented as an irrational and illegitimate actor, through her failed 'womanhood', with a concentration on her two failed marriages, her infertility and her alleged prostitution. Therefore, overall, by identifying, in the media, that Alice has failed in her role as a woman, the narratives present her as irrational. This is embedded in a legacy of women being seen as external to morality and violence, especially those who transgress expected behaviours. The

gendered tradition of evil creates stories in abstraction and so does not allow for specific tangible identities.

Here, I am not dismissing the importance of her gender, race or focus on spirituality within her story, but that her story is more complex than the singular understanding presented, and so her ability to make moral decisions is more complex than is presented within these stereotypes. This is most noteworthy in Alice's story with regard to her gender and morality, as Alice claimed to be possessed by many spirits, but mainly a male spirit – Lakwena – who would make decisions during the HSM conflict. However, the majority of the discourse subscribes to the idea that Alice was possessed by referring to her as Lakwena, her morality is still assumed to be that of a female. However, I feel that it is highly difficult to hold Alice to either a female or a male narrative account of morality, as either one would not include the complex and multidimensional aspects of Alice's story. Instead it is important to note how the societal behavioural norms that surround gender are embedded in stories of morality.

When thinking of care ethics as both a theory and practice within the narrative of evil there is a need to hear actors of political violence. Giving a voice to all actors of violence enables agency. Allowing for a real and heard voice is intrinsic to my inclusive feminist relational ontology as, on a primary level, seeing all individuals as tangible allows them to have a voice. This is also powerful on an international level, as this voice must transcend borders, in addition to surpassing different notions of morality. As Spivak outlines (1994 p.91):

> In seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) the historically muted subject of the subaltern women, the postcolonial intellectual systemically 'unlearns' female privilege. This systematic unlearning involves learning to critique the postcolonial discourse with the best tools it can provide and not simply substituting the lost figure of the colonized.

The discourse shows how women who commit acts of political violence are seen as 'others', outside of the boundary of morality and violence, thus these actors are given little moral agency, embedded in stories of evil which further others Alice who seen as external to the humanity of the west. A postcolonial feminist curiosity removes the idea of outside/inside by challenging the moral boundaries that are constructed, thus giving actors a voice and agency. This allows us to see tangible, interdependent individuals as opposed to the abstract rational agents in traditional moral theory and masculine stories of evil.

Within the story telling of tangible interdependent individuals, an intersectional approach is essential. When reflecting on Alice and the wider moral narrative produced, it is essential to facilitate a discourse that allows for an equal dialogue of the agent and the teller, enabling the reader the opportunity to see a moral decision-maker, even if they do not agree with the decisions being made. This would have a large impact on how Alice's narratives are seen. I am not suggesting that we should justify her often horrific actions, but perhaps there would be a shift in understanding if greater allowances were made for voicing reasons. This would mean Alice's discourse would go beyond her mental state, ethnicity and gender, although these should not be ignored as they contribute greatly to Alice's identity. Instead, an intersectional approach should be formed that does not prevent the reader from seeing these factors, allowing for Alice's voice and motives to be heard. This would prevent her from being seen as a deficient moral agent, allowing her to become a moral decision-maker, with the capacity to decide upon ethical judgements.

The final element in my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework is reflexivity. Thus, it has been essential to reflect on my own bias when researching Alice's story. This involved answering questions relating to my own motivations. For example, whether I had any predetermined conclusions on Alice's narratives from previous findings in this thesis and how other stories of gender and violence have impacted my telling of Alice's story. This reflexivity also involves acknowledging how my own beliefs towards witches, spirituality and possession will affect the telling of Alice. In approaching this thesis through a reflexive mind

set there is an aim not to reproduce the power hierarchies that have limited moral agency previously be seen, while acknowledging my own privilege in being able to tell these stories.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has further evidenced how gendered stories of evil challenge moral agency. By seeing actors as tangible moral agents, there is a need to begin to break down the stereotypes that prescribe and limit behaviours and that can shed new light on narratives of violence. Here, I have challenged the legacy of gendered morality and narrating women as deficient moral agents, especially in stories of evil.

Through my inclusive feminist relational ontology and Critical Discourse Analysis, I examined how Alice was narrated as a witch, which prevents the reader from seeing Alice as a moral actor with her story interlinked with evil. I demonstrated that the highly gendered witch narrative is formed through a gendered and paradoxical lens of construction of Alice as an archetypal character of womanhood, as a naïve child, a nurturing mother and a sinful prostitute. This was the platform from which to further contrast and immortalise. Alice's actions as a witch, seen through a focus on magic and mystery and the HSM being both savage and ill-equipped. This narrative showed Alice as illogical, emotional, mysterious and crazy, all of which contribute to the construction of Alice as an illegitimate moral agent, external to western rationality, where the traditional moral agent is viewed. The witch narrative is rooted in a history of ostracising women, which is further enhanced through a colonial legacy. Thus, Alice is othered not only as a powerful woman, but as a powerful Ugandan woman. Through a reflection of this discourse analysis, I critiqued Alice's narratives by exploring the constructed nature of morality, underpinned by a social and historical context. My feminist CDA presented a new way of viewing these narratives, highlighting an intersectional analysis that allows for voicing and listening. Yet, further original research on Alice's story is needed, as with the few primary sources available on her, an epistemic community is reinforced. This means Alice's story is in danger of being replicated through gendered tropes rather than being challenged. Thus, there is a need for further original primary research to be done on Alice and her story.

Using my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, I have argued how Alice's story fits the tropes of evil which are formed in abstraction and bound by a masculine approach that values rationality.

Conclusions

This thesis has examined the relationship between gender, evil and agency and the resultant impacts on our understanding of world politics. This research was born from feminist curiosity, the initial question being: how do we tell stories of evil when considering gender? This question arose from a long legacy in which women have been treated as morally different to men. Here, women are seen as both dangerous and in need of protection. Similarly, this legacy has also tied women to the story of evil from Eve, Pandora and the feminine as temptation. Subsequently, studying gender not only as the subject of evil, but as a lens through which the narration of evil can be examined shows how moral boundaries formed. In this respect, feminst ethics and gender as a form of analysis, is an excellent tool in understanding power and has allowed me to highlight the hierarchies that form when stories of evil are told.

The study of evil is one that is very important, with great influence in world politics: from George Bush's speech on the Axis of Evil, to Kant's radical evil or narratives surrounding genocides. Evil has a substantial impact on how we shape culture and our understanding of evil. Therefore, there is a need to continue to question who is allowed to decide what evil is and which stories of evil are told. Within these stories, it is easy to disregard those we disagree with, particularly the action of an individual who has previously been marginalised. It is easy to characterise their actions as monstrous, without thought. This removes legitimacy from their actions, silencing them and preventing them from being seen as moral agents. If we wish to change the outcome of a situation in the future, then we must hear what an actor said and why they did it. Ignoring a problem or legitimising a person will not stop the repetition of an action. Therefore, it is very important to hear the stories of all to allow agency and voicing.

This interest in evil was paralleled by my interest in care ethics. I felt that this theory had great potential as an exercise in critiquing traditional moral theory, yet within this great potential and ambiguity, there were also essentialist

foundations. Consequently, I was also interested in how this theory, born from the understanding that women had a different moral undertaking than men, could be used to challenge it.

This research, therefore, has multiple spheres of importance in the academic world. Firstly, I hope that it will be of interest to current feminist ethics, as we all try to enhance the field further and create a more inclusive environment. Secondly, I think that this work would be of interest to moral theorists, who may not agree with my work, but can see some weakness in how they have constructed previous arguments and how these arguments may exclude some marginalised voices. Finally, I hope it would be of interest to researchers in Feminist International Relations, who may see the need to include moral agency, in their research.

In my first chapter, I set out the fundamental argument to this thesis; that the gendered construction of moral agency sees women as morally deficient in comparison to men. I showed how women are constructed in opposition to men, which is often through a biological deterministic understanding of sex and, thus, gender. Within this construction, women are narrated as emotional and irrational, viewed outside the realm of reason in the private sphere. In this chapter I unpacked how this argument had been formed, highlighting that sex and gender are not interlinking binaries but socially constructed characteristics that include multiple identities.

This led to an examination of how gendered behaviours are prescribed, with a focus on western, particularly Anglo-American, cultures. Here, genders are constructed to perform certain limiting identities, based on the presumed character attributes of their sex. The irrational woman is seen as the emotional, caring mother who nurtures. If someone of any gender breaks these prescribed narratives, they are seen as disruptive and illegitimate: Mirrored in how women are seen as moral agents, i.e. that they must be seen as pure and good, according to the moral rules created within patriarchal norms. This is evidenced in the relationship between women and evil, where the discourse shows them as both

passive victims and contradictory violent bodies of evil, reinforcing binaries of gendered behaviour. This is linked to women's sexuality, being seen as dirty. Contradictorily, the feminine is seen as pure. The female is presented as an individual in need of protection and, simultaneously, as a possible temptress to persuade men to undertake immoral acts.

My most important finding in this chapter was the definition of agency itself. I challenged how the agent is constructed, in abstraction, and autonomous, which is prominent in much of moral theory and International Relations. Here, I outlined how current literature of agency within feminist International Relations focuses primarily on political agency rather than moral agency. Building upon this, using postcolonial feminist theory, I pushed for a definition of agency that was not limited to resistance and, instead, facilitates multifaceted and contradictory ways of being understood as a person negating their own choices in existing structures. By including culturally prescribed norms in an understanding of agency I was able to obtain a wider understanding of agency, that included often dichotomous ways of living.

My second chapter established an analytical framework, in which I demonstrated the importance of a specific feminist relational ontology, whilst reflecting on how the current use of the ontology is in danger of reproducing current gendered narratives. Therefore, by engaging with critical feminist theories I constructed my own inclusive feminist relational ontology framework.

In this chapter I raised four main points: i) that current moral theory and International Relations is inadequate due to the tradition being gendered, ii) that there is ambiguity within general feminist approaches iii) that a specific feminist relational ontology framework should be employed and iv) an outline for an inclusive feminist relational ontology methodological frameowork was provided. The traditional approach to moral theory is embedded in a gendered legacy: Through a focus on rationality and autonomous agents as the primary actor, a masculine approach to ethics is formed, which is exclusionary to women. This legacy is damaging to feminist approaches too, as there is a danger in translating

the female experience into the masculine tradition in replicating the pre-existing narratives of gendered behaviours.

Building on these problems, my second argument is that there is ambiguity within feminist approaches; a feminist ontology can be difficult to define and is often vague. Furthermore, the blurred used of ontology and epistemology within feminism adds to this ambiguity. This means there is a danger of resorting to an essentialist understanding of gender that subconsciously enforces, rather than rejects, gendered behaviour. A more specific feminist theory, such as care ethics loses the ambiguity of multiple strands of feminism, as it focus on interdependent relationships and mutual vulnerability, rather than gender equality, which offers a concrete starting point for examining moral problems.

However, there is still ambiguity in the definition of care ethics having multiple and practical/virtue-based definitions. Therefore, care ethics can remain rooted in its gendered essentialist definition and so, I choose not to use a specific ontological approach within care ethics.

My third argument highlights the benefit and strength of using a specific feminist relational ontology as a framework. This approach is an excellent analytical tool as it enables the reader to identify power in moral decisions through a focus on shared vulnerability. Therefore, a feminist relational ontology not only pushes for a multifaceted understanding of morality and rejects binaries, it questions how moral power is legitimised, through a focus on moral authority. A feminist relational ontology is able to deconstruct power hierarchies by working with a concrete awareness of the contextual input of decision. However, I feel that there is a need to identify the understanding of a concrete and contextual morality, in order to prevent reproduction of white, colonial heteronormative values when thinking about morality.

Therefore, my final objective of this chapter was to determine what a critical feminist understanding of the concrete and context is. In order to do so, I rejected the idea that a western model is the only unit of feminism and examined how a

feminist relational ontology engages a detailed and tangible thought process about particular situations using specific circumstances and capabilities. I found that current care ethics work can be ambiguous and essentialist, not offering multiple variants of the concrete. As a result, I engaged with critical feminist theories to highlight how my argument must be embedded in a shared history of colonialism, whilst embracing pluralist regulation of monolithic knowledge. By doing so, I was able to establish my inclusive feminist relational ontological methodological framework, which not only questions how and why moral decisions are being made, but why they are being accepted in this context, who is accepting them and whose voice is being ignored.

My third chapter examined how stories of evil are told, and argues that the field of moral theory, and thus the narration of evil, is masculine. I unpicked how the rational and abstract approach to telling stories can construct moral boundaries.

I started this chapter by grounding my argument in the literature of Claudia Card and her feminist approaches to the study of evil. Then the first step in examining how stories of evil are understood was by highlighting the ambiguity in the narration of evil. Within this ambiguity, I focused on the patterns that persist within these stories of evil, examining the central role of humanity, monstrosity and intentionality. These patterns and the gendered undertaking of the dominant stories of evil result in stories featuring the autonomous rational male as the primary and legitimate agent in stories, which function in abstraction. Overall, I saw how this masculine approach, and patterns which take place in stories of evil, externalize the problem.

Fundamental to the relationship between gender and evil, is the narration women. Within western discourses, women are inherently evil, due to the original sin of Eve in the Garden of Eden. This evil permeates the female in numerous ways; their body is seen as a physical evil; as dirty. Building upon this, women themselves are seen as vessels for evil. Within the moral naïvety they are carriers of Satan's work. This leads to the notion of women as temptresses, causing the rational actors (the men) fall from reasoned argument. The repeated

and enforced narrative linking women to evil has led to a normalisation and acceptance of the relationship in western society.

This exploration of the development of storytelling of evil in western cultures has enabled me to highlight the moral boundaries that are formed in this narrative. Here, the 'real world' approach, used by many scholars, is detached from the individual. This rational approach allows power hierarchies to be identified by posing a series of questions. Firstly, for example, by asking who is an act of evil against and, if this is an act against humanity, then who is considered within this wide term? Secondly, who are the perpetrators of evil? I argue that all humans must be seen as having the potential to inflict evil, as we are all interconnected through a web of all relationships.

My fourth chapter explored the narrative of rape and evil, which highlights how gendered agency performs within stories. Stating from literature on 'everday' violence within Feminist International Relations, I called for an intersectional approach to deconstruct narratives that have allowed moral boundaries to be formed, which dilute an individual's sovereignty over their body. These moral boundaries are formed by historic legacies of ownership that castigate certain genders, races and sexualities that form multiple layers of power. I also focused on how agency is undermined when sexual violence does not follow a constructed society metanarrative. This does not allow for the complex identities and incidences of violence, that exist in a system of hierarchies. I found particular interest in cultural structures that persist, which not only allows rape to happen but permits it. Rape is seen as an invasion of the body, but is largely ignored. These structures, seen through an inclusive feminist relational ontology, therefore, result in the silencing of moral agents, i.e. both perpetrators and victims.

Within this chapter, I focused on the disruptions of the metanarrative surrounding sexual violence; both the rapist and rape are seen as the 'other', consistent within a larger narrative of evil. I highlighted the need to not delegitimize agency based on the location of violence. A prominent example of

this disruption is the location of rape. Focusing on rape beyond 'conflict' situations, sexual violence attack outside of a warzone is narrated as highly irrational. To reinforce this, I examined the home as a site of danger. The private sphere is often discounted as a place for sexual violence, despite it sadly being a common occurrence. By focusing on the April 2017 Conservative UK Government's 'Rape Clause' and the narration of the father as the rapist, I was able to show the disruption of having the actor of evil inside rather than external. This disruption is caused by not portraying the rapist as a demonic monster. A similar disruption is caused when focusing on the celebrity as the rapist. The blame often goes to the victim rather than the attacker. An inclusive feminist relational ontology enables us to view the dichotomous narratives embedded in a gendered understanding that removes agency of both the rapist and the victim.

Through this disruption, I was able to show how both victims' and perpetrators' agency is seen as inadequate, if they break the metanarrative. Therefore, women are viewed as vulnerable, whilst being a sexual temptress or even having a 'rape wish'. As agency is questioned when actors perform outside of the constructed binaries, many voices are silenced. Narratives within stories of evil are set in abstraction and do not consider the real, interdependent individuals they are silencing. Therefore, through a Feminist International Relations apporach, I push for multiple and contradictory narratives of rape and sexual violence that acknowledge the power in rape stories, formed over several centuries.

My final chapter was the second of my two case studies, exploring gendered moral agency within the discourse of evil. In this chapter I analysed the discourse of Alice Auma/Lakwena, the Ugandan rebel leader of the Holy Sprit Movement. I used my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework to challenge the over simplified construction of Alice as witch, thus limiting Alice's narration as a moral agent with a story of evil. Acknowledging the current dialogue of gendered agency and political violence, my Critical Discourse Analysis evidenced this limiting narration, unpacking the construction of Alice's story as a girl, mother prostitute and witch. This predominant witch narrative was formed by focusing on magic and mystery, embedded in illogicality external to western rationality.

Through my reflection of Alice's story of evil, which is a history of gendered deficient moral agent, and colonial legacies of othering, I called for a multi-dimensional approach that included emotions. In addition, I used this framework to challenge legitimacy and the moral boundaries that are constructed to hide moral legitimacy and agency. By doing so, I had to determine what is considered to be rational, including a contextual understanding. I concluded by highlighting the constructed nature of morality and argued that all agents must be seen as moral decision makers. This means allowing voice even in complex circumstances. As a result, I showed the strength of feminist relational ontology by making spaces for marginalised voices and removing the idea of the inside and outside.

The relationship between gender, evil and morality is complex and has a long history. Therefore, I feel that it is dangerous to try to separate the three. Instead, there should be an insistence to see evil and morality in a myriad of power and hierarchies looking at how gender, as well as other intersections such as race and class, have carved our understanding of these fluid, yet highly influential, terms. We should ask how these intersections have voiced what is said about evil and morality and perhaps, more importantly, who is saying it.

Future stories of evil need to be inclusive and, to do so, they must move away from a traditional moral theory and International Relations approach. This does not mean that all theories must come from a critical perspective, but that traditional theory must acknowledge this critical school and be self-reflective about how the power and masculinities, that have formed the foundation of its moral theory, may have clouded certain definitions and outcomes. It should register who has previously had a voice in evil and aim to widen this voice to include marginalised voices. This study of evil is an extremely powerful one that extends beyond theory.

When something is defined as evil, a moral boundary is quickly formed. This boundary determines who or what is included in the definition. A notable example of this is the idea of humanity. A very common definition of evil is: an act against humanity. However, historically, this definition of humanity has been corrupted with power, with certain races, sexualities and genders being excluded from this privilege group. Consequently, the definition of evil is no longer is based upon an act against all, but just an elite few. This, in itself, is a crime. Therefore, it is a dangerous starting point from which to tell stories that have such impact. Instead, we can shift this to examine evil as a crime against relationships, or with the aim of breaking these interdependent relationships.

By providing this shift in the starting point of storytelling, we can tell a story of evil that does not marginalise voices and provides a place to voice agency. Within my findings I have identified four key categories, i) moral boundaries and power hierarchies, ii) my inclusive feminist relational ontology, iii) contextual and

concrete approaches and iv) dichotomies. I will now further unpack these categories'.

Throughout this thesis I have exposed power hierarchies that form in structures and create moral boundaries. I am interested in why these boundaries have formed, who has been excluded from them and who has constructed them. Within these boundaries, I am particularly concerned about how marginalised voices can be hidden or twisted to reflect existing power norms. Therefore, building upon critical theory and, especially, queer theory, there is a need for a pluralist regulation of monolithic knowledge in order to understand how moral boundaries are formed. A primary focus for this thesis is how patriarchal structures and misogynistic attitudes have informed knowledge production. Thus, I approach the study of narratives, gender and agency through a concentration on feminist moral epistemology. I have engaged with an intersectional analysis of knowledge production, which must be understood in a shared history of colonialism. In these narratives, power hierarchies and moral boundaries, that impact real lives, allow violence to take place.

An example, fundamental to this thesis, is the narration of evil. The definition and narration of evil, by its nature, is normative and so it can be interpreted in multiple ways. Yet the fields of moral theory and International Relations have traditionally been highly masculinised. The study of evil has also been masculinised. Consequently, a rational approach to the study of evil takes place, which limits both the definition of evil and how agents within stories of evil are seen. Therefore, the moral boundary emerges around stories of evil, making it possible to ask: is evil an act against humanity or those privileged enough to be able to label it as such? I have evidenced this in my case studies, for example, in Alice's story, the discourse prevents the reader from seeing Alice as a moral actor, due to the focus on her gender and race, in a story of evil. This is embedded in an epistemic community around Alice's story.

A prominent moral boundary of concern for this thesis is the construction of women's morality: women have been portrayed as external to morality. As

women have been excluded from moral theory, and a masculine approach to knowledge production has been favoured, there is a focus within moral theory on rationality; the autonomous male playing the central actor of concern. Thus, patterns emerge that have uncoupled the relationship between morality and gender, specifically women in paradoxical ways. A prominent example of this is the repeated rhetoric of women as passive which impacts societal norms and constructs further narratives. Beyond this, these constructed gendered norms feed into wider ideas in moral theory and International Relations.

Therefore, by translating women's experiences into an already masculine discipline, there is a danger of enforcing binaries that limit an individual's story to a stereotypical binary of male or female. This means that even within feminist theory there is a danger of reproducing masculine knowledge. This is evidenced by the fact that, although most recent feminist literature within International Relations argues against the essentialist legacy of biological determinism, feminists still argue a fundamental gender difference between sexes. This means there is a need to readdress how moral knowledge is formed and how this impacts gendered moral agency.

Furthermore, I highlighted how a traditional approach to care ethics can be problematic, as it is both ambiguous and often essentialist. In similarity to a general feminist ontology, these problems stem from a lack of definition within care ethics, with multiple applications of the theory understood as both practical and virtue based. Thus, I focused on a specific aspect of care ethics: its feminist relational ontology. Yet, this is part of a larger problem for my work, as care ethics has evolved from a gendered notion of morality, with the assumption that women have a different moral understanding to men; one which is focused on compassion. Therefore, I continually had to reconsider whether it was possible to use a theory born from gendered assumptions to challenge behavioural norms. These gendered understandings of morality are not only limiting to women, but do not include the multiple dimensions of race, class and sexuality within the understanding of gender. Therefore, I suggested use of an updated version of a feminist relational ontology which is inclusive to the multiple ways of being, or

living, whilst still offering an analytical framework that focuses on mutual dependence and vulnerability.

I successfully constructed my inclusive feminist relational ontology methological framework to deconstruct power hierarchies, whilst working in the concrete and ensuring a diverse contextual awareness. Therefore, my framework was vital in examining moral authority, and asking who is legitimising this power. As a key outcome, my framework pushed for a multifaceted understanding of morality, rejecting the binary of Right vs Wrong.

This inclusive feminist relational ontology framework was fundamental to my analysis throughout this thesis, as it was used to highlight the rational masculine approach to the traditional study of evil, which has moulded current narratives of evil. The primary focus of the framework on interdependent, but diverse relationships (which inherently hold power), rather than sovereign actors, enables me to consider dichotomous and multi-layered narratives of agency within my two case studies.

Central to my argument has been the concrete and contextual nature of my examination. Emerging from my inclusive feminist relational ontology, the ideas of 'context' and 'concrete' are fundamental to care ethics. Yet, within my thesis, I have tried to expand the understanding of what is considered to be contextual from a limited western, middle class perspective, enabling it to provide me with a multifaceted understanding of lived experience. By engaging in the 'concrete' and the 'contextual', this directly opposes most traditional approaches to moral theory and, thus, moral agency. This allows for multiple ideas to coexist together.

These 'concrete' and 'contextual' understandings were important from my starting point. In line with current poststructural account of gender, I opposed a single understanding of both women and feminism. Instead, I took feminism as a collective of ideas existing in multiple ways, that work beyond the hypothetical and allow for multiple understandings of women. This meant that the western model inevitably had to be rejected as the only unit of feminism, in order to

examine the various ways in which we can engage with gender as both a theory and an identity. By engaging in and with multiple forms of feminism, I was able to open conversations, such as how we tell stories of evil, that had previously been limited.

Therefore, moral agency is understood very differently when considering a definition that is both contextual and concrete. Similarly to my focus within feminism, I argued that there is no singular understanding of agency. Instead agency is located in contextual understandings that are concrete to each lived individual. This is opposed to a hypothetical understanding of agency, found in much of moral theory, that works on paper but not in practice. This means giving voice to all actors and, therefore, allowing them agency, as tangible living beings, set in their own circumstances, with their own lived experiences. By seeing all actors as moral agents, there is a divide between the narratives that prescribe and limit behaviours and dichotomous interdependent individuals live. I have evidenced this in multiple ways throughout my thesis, for example, a feminist moral agency must allow space for religion or the multiple external structures experienced by each agent, beyond a hypothetical setting. This is fundamental to a gendered study of moral agency, as in order to negate the agency/cohesion problem, a gendered understanding of agency must challenge the embedded notions of false consciousness and victimisation that feminists are often trapped within. Instead, I called for a dialogue of agent and teller, to afford the reader the opportunity to see a moral agent as a decision maker, even if they do not agree with the decision being made.

The narration of evil shifts greatly, when a 'contextual' and 'concrete' study is facilitated. I argue that all humans must be seen as having the potential to inflict evil and pain on others, as we exist in an interconnected web of relationships, meaning that all humans are vulnerable to other human's actions. However, narratives within stories of evil are set in abstraction and do not give consideration to the real interdependent individuals they are silencing, despite the 'real world' approach many scholars place through the lens of international politics, for example, examining sites of evil, such as the September 11th attacks

or the holocaust. Yet, the reflection of these events is detached from the individual emotional response that takes place in a 'concrete' and 'contextual' site.

This is further mirrored by my final case study, in which acts of sexual violence are set in stereotypes, packaged into prefixed narratives with little room to move beyond them. This does not show the complex identities and incidences of violence that exist in a system of hierarchies in contextual circumstances.

One of the main findings of my thesis was to allow for contradictions and dichotomous ways of being. Through my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework investigation of gendered moral agency within stories of evil, I have found that actors are silenced if they are external to the masculine, rational prescribed narratives that pre-exist. For example, in my previous chapter I highlighted that inconsistent dichotomous narratives work in conjunction with embedded gendered understandings of behaviour, to produce a metanarrative that retains agency of both the rapist and the victim. However, allowing for dichotomies to be established is not only important within focusses on narratives. In my first chapter, I provided a critique of the homogeneous and universal account of autonomy. Therefore, I seek a multidimensional understanding that allows for contradictory voices.

One of the fundamental dichotomies I explored is that of the narrative of women within traditional accounts of moral, but also societal, norms. Contemporary norms and gendered legacies have created a dichotomy: women are both dangerous and irrational, but also pure and in need of protection. These norms are engrained in the understanding of women, for example, their sexuality is seen as nasty, while women are also seen as pure. Therefore, the identity of women is imprisoned within these dichotomous hierarchies that are unattainable. These gendered dichotomies have been highlighted throughout my thesis. In my primary discussion of evil, I evidenced that theorists have claimed that women are the perfect vehicles for evil as they are receptive to both demonic and angelic voices. In my fourth chapter, I showed how Alice/Lakwena was constructed in both the Beautiful Soul narrative, whilst contradictorily being seen as the naïve

savage. These overlapping and opposing descriptions limit how Alice's behaviour can be understood. This is further reflected in the findings of my final chapter, where I determined that women are seen as both in need of protection from the rapist (who is the 'other'), whilst also having a secret rape wish, by using a gendered dichotomous narrative. In these mixed narratives, she is need of protection through patriarchal power norms.

Contradictory and dichotomous narratives cause discomfort as they do not provide a closed and unanimous ending to a story. A story with multiple or no endings is itself contradictory to what society understands as a story. This is positioned within a larger question in International Relations, yet, by highlighting these multiple ways of being and dichotomous narratives, new voices can be found.

My research into gender, agency and evil has several implications for the study of International Relations, and specifically the subfield of Feminist International Relations. The two main implications are: the importance of including moral agency in research and further challenging masculine approaches to knowledge production.

One of the fundamental contributions this thesis has made is in highlighting the importance of acknowledging moral agency within International Relations. With the concept of agency being rarely discussed in International Relations, and moral agency even so less (Erskine 2003), there is a need to recognise the importance of this concept in how we understand world politics. In contrast, one of Feminist International Relations' core facets is to understand how agency is constructed in global politics (Hutchings 2013). Yet, within this extensive literature on agency, there is little discussion on moral agency. By not recognising moral agency, there is a danger of replicating the pre-existing narratives of who or what prescribed agency is within lobal politics. Thus, it is particularly important for Feminist International Relations to engage with moral agency in order to continue to challenge the patriarchal norms that create unequal power structures. When feminists look at a broad understanding of agency or a limited focus on political agency, there is a danger that this does not acknowledge the multifaceted ways individuals engage in their society, with one of the most prominent ways being ethical decisions. Thus, I hope this thesis has highlighted the need to engage with and challenge the telling of stories of moral agency and questions how these shape our understanding of the world.

The investigation into moral agency is further important for feminists, due to the gendered narration of the topic. The most prominent moral boundary I have examined, is how a gendered construction of the moral agent considers the female as morally deficient. I specifically focused on how this was constructed within stories of evil: these masculine stories, written in abstraction, with the rational autonomous agent as the primary actor, obstruct alternative protagonists, such as the feminised emotional interdependent actor. Stereotypes of women frame them as passive victims and violent bodies of evil, reinforcing

binaries of gendered behaviour once again. Furthermore, the repeated narrative linking women and evil has led to a normalisation and acceptance of this relationship in western society.

Here, moral agents are narrated as deficient through the construction of the 'other'. The ostracisation of the 'other' is fundamental in stories of evil. Within a traditional approach to the study of evil, the 'other' is required in order to make evil an external event; one that is not the responsibility of the doer. This is mirrored by the rejection of original sin as the root of evil in contemporary society. The construction of the 'other' is prominent in both of my case studies: Alice is constructed as the 'other' through the narration of her as a foreign witch, whilst the rapist is constructed to be seen as an external monster. Alice's discourse focuses on voodoo, mystery and savage imagery. This is consistent with the legacy of the female immoral witch, where witches have been constructed as female figures performing acts of evil external to society. Thus, they are narrated as the ostracised 'other'. This is, again, mirrored in construction of the rapist. Within the pre-existing metanarrative, the perpetrator is a foreign stranger and the attack takes place outside of the home. When actors do not fit into these set narratives, within stories of evil, they are seen as inadequate moral agents.

Further important to feminist research, and the need to see moral agency is the focus on dichotomies, which fundamental to how moral agency is constructed. The dominant narrative within International Relations is that there is a single understanding of agency. This is also present within feminism, where 'white' 'liberal' feminists have constructed agency simply as resistance. Throughout this thesis, I have shown that contradictory models of agency are needed, that are specific to the individual; agency should not simply be resistance but should facilitate multifaceted ways of being. This is, again, evidenced in my case studies where I outlined how the various understandings and voices of Alice should not dismiss her as an agent. My final chapter parallels this argument, as agency is questioned when actors perform outside of the constructed binaries of victim/perpetrator. For example, the agency of both the rapist and the victim are disrupted within the framing of the attacker as a celebrity. When an individual's

story is contradictory to a dominant narrative or metanarrative, this individual is seen as illegitimate.

Often, it is more important to grant this moral agency to stories we dislike, within International Relations such as terrorism and rape. These stories need to open the window to what and who is considered morally legitimate. By doing so, we can begin to re-narrate the stories that don't continue to marginalise actions. This vicious circle of silencing means that without an awareness of how stories are being constructed, some stories may be suppressed, within International Relations. This not only harms those who are being silenced, but the wider community who are only aware of the more powerful hierarchies instead.

My thesis argued the need to find moral agency even within complex circumstances of evil or difficult stories. I used my inclusive feminist relational ontology methodological framework to show the power and hierarchies that have been produced in traditional accounts of evil. In these accounts of evil, traditional approaches to International Relations has been used as a 'backbone' to underpin theories of what constitutes moral behaviour and who is considered an agent of interest within this investigation. Within these traditional stories of evil, there lies a lot of privilege and, as a result, voices are left out or silenced within these hierarchies. The typical agents of interest are small and formed from a masculine and exclusionary approach to the study of ethics and International Relations. This approach is dangerous as it narrows our understanding of what our world constitutes. In this instance, the use of narratives holds great power, by focusing on the stories told and who these stories are told by, we are able to begin to trace these power hierarchies.

Therefore, my thesis argues the need to find voices and spaces within these stories and to question, challenge or even reject, the outcomes of stories told from a single point of view, within International Relations. This can be very uncomfortable as it entails being highly self-reflective and requires personal involvement in the moral problems. This is even more so uncomfortable when dealing with highly emotive issues such as evil; this issue has been placed in the

external, away from us. The externalisation of evil is part of the masculine approach of International Relations. It is easy to comprehend that the 'nastiness' of evil happens far from home and that we are neither victim to it nor the facilitator of it. This is highly problematic when we eventually enter into the field of the evil. The definition of evil is highly normative, as its description varies from person to person. For example, a vegan may feel that eating meat is evil. The most prominent example of this is the phrase: "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". So, I argue that we all highly susceptible to being part of evil both as a victim and perpetrator. This is particularly so due to my inclusive feminist relational ontology framework, which focuses on shared vulnerability. This means that we are all interdependent on and to each other. I do not argue that we should aim to meet every person's concept of what is right and wrong, but, instead, take these relationships as the starting point from which we can determine how we should narrate evil. By doing so, this shifts the stories of evil, which no longer are dependent on the autonomous moral agent.

Building upon this my second key implication is the contributing to the challenge of masculine knowledge. Confronting gendered epistemology is fundamental to Feminist International Relations (Steans 2012). In this thesis I have highlighted masculine production of knowledge that has constructed moral boundaries through power hierarchies in defining what moral agency is and how we narrate stories of evil, adding to the existing debate within International Relations. This shift away from the masculine approach also has strong implications for seeing marginalities in existing stories of evil, especially those of gender, race and sexuality. Thus, we must listen to stories of these marginalised voices in order to grant them agency. This, however, does not mean that we should accept or like everything they say. For example, this is most clear in the story of Alice Auma; we do not have to agree with Alice's actions to make her a moral agent, but we must simply grant her the ability to make moral decisions. When looking at narration, the reader has a power to grant this moral agency; they have the power to see hierarchies that have previously prevented other readers from granting this.

There are numerous ways my research could lead to further work. I am especially interested in two areas: i) the further study of evil from a gendered perspective and ii) further focus on moral agency with Feminist International Relations literature.

The first area for further research is rooted within the definition of evil. My aim within this thesis has been to highlight the problem with the current storytelling of evil, with a particular focus on agency. Therefore, there is a need to build upon this: the first stage of this research would involve a more in-depth study of the various definitions of evil, in both western contexts and other traditions of morality. A genealogical tracing of how evil has been constructed through a gendered lens would further highlight the power in defining evil. This would facilitate greater research into the understanding of evil and how it is used in world politics.

Finally, additional research into both of my case studies could be carried out. The story of Alice/Lakwena needs to be retold with more primary research having taken place and a wider remit of what should be included. Similarly, deeper investigation into rape policy could be undertaken and discourse analysis on this would be of high interest. Both of these investigations offer a powerful narrative that needs to be further exposed.

Overall this thesis has identified patterns of gendered moral agency within stories of evil. These patterns included the construction of women and inadequate moral agents, in comparison to men, and the externalization of evil through 'othering' both the perpetrator and the location of the act. These constructions have been formed through a masculine approach to the study and storytelling of evil. This masculine approach values rationality and creates norms in a hypothetical construct. By identifying narratives that constrain all genders, we move away from limiting perceptions and behaviours that are damaging. Instead we should make space for voices, in feminist and postcolonial norms, and begin to remove the idea of outside/inside of rationality and morality, by questioning moral boundaries and, thus, by giving actors voice and agency within

stories of evil. Here, women are not simply seen as being made of 'everything nice' and, therefore, we can continue to challenge the construction of gendered stereotypes.

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