“Proven Patriots”: the French Diplomatic Corps, 1789-1799

Linda S. Frey
and Marsha L. Frey

St Andrews Studies in French History and Culture
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by
LINDA S. FREY
and
MARSHA L. FREY

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French History and Culture
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<tr>
<td>A.N.</td>
<td>Archives Nationales de France</td>
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| DBF          | M. Prevost and Roman D’Amat, eds., *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1933-)
| PRO, FO      | Public Record Office, London (National Archives) – Foreign Office papers |
| Winter       | Otto Friedrich Winter, *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder 1764-1815* (Graz, 1965) |
Series Editor’s Note

This volume in our series – St Andrews Studies in French History and Culture – is an English-language version of a longer book published simultaneously in France, entitled “Le Théâtre du monde”: les diplomates français dans la Révolution, 1789-1799, by Presses Universitaires de France. Given the monumental impact on Europe of the French revolutionary wars and the efforts to export revolutionary principles in this decade (against which even the distant, fledgling United States of America was not immune, much to the anxiety of President Washington and Vice-President Adams), the subject of French revolutionary diplomats and diplomacy deserves an audience not confined to the Francophone world.

Guy Rowlands

June 2011
We wish to thank the Earhart Foundation for its gracious and generous assistance, especially Dr. Ingrid Gregg, President, and Dr. Montgomery Brown, Secretary and Director of Programs, for their unending support and encouragement. Without their financial assistance this work would not have been possible. Thanks also are owed to the Newberry Library who provided us with a fellowship over one of the coldest winters on record. Their warm hospitality and unceasing help aided us in mining their French Revolutionary collection for gems. A Batten Fellowship, at Monticello, the International Center for Jefferson Studies, illustrated the warmth of Southern hospitality along with access to an extensive collection. We also received much appreciated financial support from the Chapman Fund, the Institute for Military History and 20th Century Studies, the Boone Fund, the University of Montana, and Kansas State University. Thanks must also go to the United States Military Academy, West Point, for their financial and moral encouragement, especially Colonel Robert Doughty, Kansas State University and the University of Montana for sabbatical leaves, and the staffs of the Mansfield Library, the Hale Library (particularly Tim Watts), the United States Military Academy Library, and the William O. Thompson Library at The Ohio State University, especially the interlibrary loan departments, for their invaluable assistance and herculean efforts on our behalf. We also benefitted from using the collections at the New York State Historical Society and the Special Collections of the University of Virginia, Alderman Library. This study, like all others, would have been impossible without the due diligence of archivists and librarians scattered across the United States: the Newberry Library, the Special Collections Division of the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and the New York Public Library; and Europe: the Archives Nationales, the British Library, the Public Record Office, the Hampshire Record Office, the Centre for Kentish Studies, Merton College library, Oxford, the National Maritime Museum, the National Library of Scotland, and the National Library of Ireland. Other archivists and historians have extended a helping hand across the great pond: Alexander Pyrges, Maroma Camilleri at the
National Library at Malta; Paula Ursulina at the Staatsarchiv, Graubünden; Julian Reid, Merton College, Oxford; and Annekathrin Miegel, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg. Lindsey Aytes, Chelsea Weidner, and Andrew Decock helped on various details and technical gridlock. A particular word of thanks must go to Sarah Hunstad for her technological expertise and tireless efforts. This book could not have been completed without the unflattering and always cheerful support of our secretaries Michelle Reves and Diane Rapp. Our colleagues and friends, James Friguglietti and Barry Rothaus, doggedly read the manuscript and offered perceptive suggestions. This work has been strengthened by the astute comments of our readers. Most of all, we must thank Dr. Guy Rowlands for his Sisyphean patience in expediting the publication. The seminal work of Prof. Lucien Bély, a friend and colleague, has inspired our own. Last, but by no means least, we must thank our sister Debbie and our canine confidantes for their unending love and limited patience.

Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey

May 2011
Notes on the authors

Linda Frey (Professor of History at the University of Montana) and Marsha Frey (Professor of History at Kansas State University) have also taught at the United States Military Academy, West Point and Ohio State University where they graduated B.A. summa cum laude, B. S. summa cum laude, M.A. and Ph.D. They have written *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*, *Frederick I: The Man and his Times*, and have edited *The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession*, among other books as well as numerous articles. Their work has been funded by organisations including: the Earhart Foundation, the Newberry Library, the Monticello Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Department of Education, the Folger Shakespeare Library, and the American Council of Learned Societies. Archives in both Eastern and Western Europe as well as in the United States have encouraged their burrowing in the collections. Throughout their parallel careers they have worked in tandem on early modern diplomacy and the evolution of international law along with their furry support staff of Yorkshires.

Dedication

*To our families and friends whose love and laughter have enriched our lives.*
Foreword

In a brilliant inaugural address delivered to the University of St. Andrews, Scotland on 1 February 1867 John Stuart Mill addressed the issue of individual responsibility. He urged his audience never to deceive themselves about the dangers inherent in inaction: “Let not any one pacify his conscience by the delusion that he can do no harm if he takes no part, and forms no opinion. Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing.”¹ The following study revolves around 152 individuals who were confronted with that very issue during a particularly divisive era, the French Revolution. In particular this study focuses on those individuals in the diplomatic corps who served France abroad in very tumultuous times from 1789 to 1799 and who held the rank of chargé d’affaires and higher.

The question of loyalty surfaced early. For some choice was an illusion. They were damned by their background. Others decided, in the words of Tennyson:

To reverence the King, as if he were
Their conscience, and their conscience as their King

Some went further and not only supported the king, but also sabotaged the Revolution. Still others placed their hopes in the Revolution and put nation (as they defined it) above king. Such decisions became more problematic as the shifting political winds buffeted the careers and lives of these men. The vicious factionalism meant that the definition of loyalty constantly shifted. Some trod the path of expediency. Others retired in an attempt to escape the violence endemic in the Revolution, which tore apart French society and made France, as Matthew Arnold said of another place in another time, the “home of lost causes and forsaken beliefs... and impossible loyalties.” (Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism).

Throughout the Revolution its most ardent supporters often attacked the diplomatic corps, which was particularly vulnerable, for it, like the officer corps of the army, was dominated by aristocrats and incarnated an international system that was widely disparaged. Studying the careers and fate of such men who had often served the king for years shows how individuals grappled with questions of loyalty – more problematic for some than others – and illumines the larger issue of France’s role within the international system. By their action or inaction the diplomats of the Old Regime could – and not a few did – sabotage revolutionary France’s relations with other states and isolate the new government. Although historians have analyzed the fate of other groups in the Revolution no one has yet asked the vital question: what happened to the diplomats of the Old Regime and later those appointed by the revolutionaries.

The attack on diplomats during the Revolution was part of a larger onslaught against the nobility. The privileges of the nobility were abolished on 4 August 1789. For revolutionaries even the word “aristocrat” was repugnant. Baron Erik Magnus de Staël-Holstein, the Swedish representative to France, reported in October 1789 that a man passing in the street was jeered at for being an aristocrat and was subsequently murdered by the crowd. Less than a year later, on 19 June 1790, nobility itself was abolished and on 29 November 1797 nobles were “denied the rights of French citizenship.” This legislation reflects, as

2 For one contemporary’s account of the attack on the nobility see Jules Flammermont, ed., *Les Correspondances des agents diplomatiques étrangers en France avant la Révolution* (Paris, 1896), 269-270.
Patrice Higonnet has claimed, the gradual revolutionary shift in attitude toward the nobles as initially redeemable people to treasonous and immoral.⁴ The policy toward the diplomatic corps throughout the Revolution reflected that mentality as well.

The assault on diplomats was part of the larger assault on diplomacy and the Old Regime, for intrinsic to the French revolutionary vision of establishing a new revolutionary order at home and abroad was the jettisoning of the old order and everything associated with it – whatever, in Alexis de Tocqueville’s words, “even bore, however faintly, [its] imprint.”⁵ The diplomatic system bore that imprint rather heavily. The diplomatic system and the diplomats who served in it, whom Napoleon dubbed derisively “the brilliant butterflies of the panniers age,”⁶ were vulnerable particularly because the diplomatic system was so tainted by its association with privilege and with the Old Regime. Concomitant with a new social and political order was a diplomatic one. The ideological Revolution in France meant the rejection of the norms and practices of classical diplomacy. Genet, one of the French representatives to the United States, insisted that the French had rejected “everything associated with the diplomacy of the past.”⁷ In their fervor they discarded all diplomatic conventions and rejected the system as a whole. To do otherwise would have compromised the Revolution itself. Diplomacy had to be refashioned in the republican image. Not only would the diplomacy of the French republic be simpler, but it would also be “more loyal” and less costly. Ducher argued that the republic must “abjure itself of all politics other than that of courage” and all diplomacy except that of commerce, “the natural bond of peoples.”⁸ Under the “empire of liberty,” France would project a “new character.”⁹ But many revolutionaries, such as Brissot, had argued that the diplomatic system was so flawed that it was difficult, if not

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impossible, for republican France to work within it without compromising its principles. If the French representatives “kept silent” in order to maintain relations with the emperor or various kings, then soon France would find itself bowing “before the turban of the dey of Algiers, and the Liège mitre.”

These revolutionaries would have agreed with Thomas Jefferson’s conclusion that diplomacy was “the pest of the peace of the world... the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are manufactured.” Upon assuming office Jefferson, who ironically had served as the American representative to France, immediately dismissed half of the American foreign representatives and expressed a wish to dispense with the rest. Imbedded in such qualms in France was an innate distrust of diplomats, not only France’s but other powers’ as well. In Robespierre’s speech of 18 November 1793 on the political situation of the republic, he condemned the “cowardly emissaries” of foreign tyrants, the “perfidious emissaries of our enemies.”

Foreign envoys in France were often harassed; they were detained by authorities, they were shot at; they were threatened, their homes often invaded. Much the same mentality was reflected in the speech of Philippe Jacques Rühl delivered on 20 July 1793. A former member of the diplomatic committee, he argued regarding foreign ministers that it was “important to know who the spies are who surround us.”

Brissot had said much the same – but about French diplomats. He went on to talk about the difficulty of choosing agents. “A free people,” he noted, can rarely succeed in such negotiations for “if it employs patriotic agents – it will be deceived. If it employs ministerial agents it will be deceived... A free people can only conduct its affairs well by itself or by

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11 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and his Time, 4: Jefferson the President, First Term, 1801-1805 (Boston, 1970), 386.
12 Maximilien Marie Isidore de Robespierre, Discours et rapports (Paris, 1908), 279, 284.
agents exposed unceasingly to its attention.” Realizing the impossibility of such scrutiny, he concluded that “diplomacy cannot be popular, that is to say, sincere, open, simple....” The republic that professed to base its policy on truth and sincerity could not operate within the international system. But a republic could wage war because “in war it is the nation who negotiates and will not let itself be deceived. In war all is public, where all is mysterious and often fraudulent in the cabinet; it would be better for a free people who wish to guard their independence, to assure it with the success of their arms, than by diplomatic niceties.”15 Brissot was not alone in concluding that war was preferable to “this withering, this languor that exhausts.” France, he underscored, could not be appeased with “diplomatic falsehoods,” “reduced by these artifices.” Should the “politics of a great people descend to these shabby considerations? No, its politics is simple and sincere.” Only justice and force should be consulted. The nation could only reconquer “its dignity, its majesty, its security... at the point of a sword.”16 This distrust of diplomacy was concomitant with a distrust, if not dismissal, of its practitioners. The word diplomat became as opprobrious as the “frightful word” aristocrat with which it was associated.17 The word diplomat was rarely employed during the Revolutionary era, although the word “diplomacy” was often used in the sense of negotiating with foreign powers.18

Predictably the criteria for selecting diplomats during the Revolution differed markedly from those relied upon in the Old Regime because the revolutionaries rejected the old system and its concomitant values. That rejection meant an evisceration of what had been one of the best diplomatic corps in Europe. When Charles, comte de Vergennes left the Foreign Ministry on his death in 1787, it was noted for being one of the most adept and efficient. Two years later at the outbreak of the Revolution France had 11 embassies, 20 legations, and four residences

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16 Brissot, Discours de J.P. Brissot, deputé sur les dispositions des puissances étrangères, 32.
abroad. When revolutionaries looked at this body they saw a corps staffed by members of the Old Regime, who adopted a policy of “false prudence.” The new government could only deplore that, instead of illustrating the force of the idea of liberty, diplomats “flung themselves into excuses”; they negotiated timidly. Such flings and such timidity were to be regretted.

The revolutionaries strove to purge the diplomatic system not only of aristocrats, but also of anyone who was tainted by his experience during the Old Regime or by sympathy with it. Predictably the revolutionaries strove to select as their representatives those committed to the new order, those thoroughly imbued with revolutionary ideology, those most likely to reflect republican aspirations, and those least likely to please their host governments. Charles de Peysonnel, for example, as early as March 1790 urged the National Assembly to purge the diplomatic corps of “those infected with the poison of the Old Regime.” The diplomatic corps was like a serious wound; the “gangrene” had to be cut out in order for healing to take place. France could then follow a foreign policy worthy of the “benefactress of humanity” and the friend of those who struggled against tyranny. Condorcet echoed those concerns. He contended that France had to “return to the nation its dignity among foreign powers.” To do that ambassadors should be “chosen among those celebrated in the annals of liberty.” These envoys should be convinced of the necessity of toppling the Old Regime and should carry “virtue and love

23 October 1791 quoted in Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 114.
of liberty in their hearts.”\textsuperscript{24} The problem that the revolutionaries confronted was how to choose “simple citizens” with “clear judgments and just hearts”\textsuperscript{25} to carry the new ideology abroad. For Saint-Just the revolutionary man was “inflexible, but he is sensible, he is frugal, he is simple without vaunting an excess of false modesty; the irreconcilable enemy of all lies, all indulgence, all affectation.”\textsuperscript{26} Such men were not easily found. Some went even farther and urged that France send no individual of public character to foreign nations – no ambassadors, no ministers, no consuls.\textsuperscript{27} The declaration of peace of May 1790 inevitably led to the conclusion that in the new world order diplomats would no longer be necessary. The mere mention of a profession so associated with the Old Regime as diplomacy tarred an individual with the taint of treason, for its purported virtues – reticence, formality, and deviousness – could only compare unfavorably with the frankness and openness of the ideal revolutionary. The debate in the Executive Provisional Council of 8 June 1793 over the vital question of prisoner exchanges with Great Britain reflected the persistent distrust of the diplomatic office, for the council concluded that the commissioners selected ideally should be adroit, circumspect, and politically knowledgeable. They should not, however, have any acquaintance with diplomacy.\textsuperscript{28} Nor had Brissot been alone when he argued that the people through their representatives, not the king, should name the envoys. He raised the query: “Is there a greater folly than leaving in foreign courts those most valuable instruments of the Old Regime?”\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[A.N. D XIII, carton 2, dossier 34, Society of the Friends of the Constitution at Cherbourg to the diplomatic committee, 6 September 1792.
\item[25] \textit{Moniteur} 4 (1790), 411, Menou, 20 May 1790.
\item[27] A.N. F/7/4402, Expilly, letter of 19 Nov. 1792.
\item[29] Quoted in Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 85-86.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The man who had to confront these issues was Armand-Marc, comte de Montmorin de Saint Herem (1745-1792), who served as foreign minister from February 1787 to 11 July 1789 and again from 16 July 1789 to 20 November 1791. Montmorin could never escape his association with the Old Regime under which he had served the king in many important positions, including ambassador to Spain.\textsuperscript{30} Ironically, one of the first crises focused on the French ambassador sent to that country. The recall of Paul François de Quélen de Stuer de Causade, duc de La Vauguyon (1746-1828), ambassador to Spain from 1785 to 1790, clearly reflected the suspicions that many revolutionaries harbored towards diplomats of the Old Regime. By Old Regime standards La Vauguyon seemed to be ideally suited to his position: he belonged to an old prestigious noble family and had considerable diplomatic experience. He had served as ambassador to the United Provinces from 1776 to 1784 and briefly as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 12 to 16 July 1789. These very qualities made him suspect. The radicals particularly distrusted him because of his hostility to the Revolution. La Vauguyon served in the critical position of ambassador to Spain at a time when the Family Compact was being attacked and the crisis over Nootka Sound erupted. The vigorous debate over the Nootka Sound crisis raised the more fundamental issue of the power of the king to make war and peace, and implicitly undermined the position of ministers and diplomats who were seen as agents of the king rather than the nation. In the assembly La Vauguyon was criticized for his handling of the negotiations, especially for precipitating a rupture with Spain, an accusation that had no basis.\textsuperscript{31} In Madrid La Vauguyon had in fact tried to strengthen the ties between France and Spain. He protested against the calumnies leveled against him in a letter to the National Assembly and subsequently published extracts of his correspondence with the foreign minister Montmorin.\textsuperscript{32} Louis XVI as well publicly supported the

\textsuperscript{30} Eric Thompson, \textit{Popular Sovereignty and the French Constituent Assembly 1789-91} (Manchester, 1952), 136.

\textsuperscript{31} Alfred Mousset, \textit{Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution, le comte de Fernan Nuñez ambassadeur d’Espagne à Paris (1787-1791)} (Paris, 1924), 204-06; \textit{Moniteur} 4 (15 May 1790), 374 and 4 (17 May 1790), 378.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Moniteur} 5 (14 July 1790), 114-15; Paul François de Quélen de Stuer de Causade, duc de La Vauguyon, \textit{Extrait d’une correspondance de l’ambassadeur
ambassador in the Assembly. Throughout this ordeal he also retained the
support of the Spanish king Charles IV, Louis’ cousin, who felt that the
Assembly had treated him unfairly.

Although La Vauguyon was recalled on 1 June 1790, Charles IV
protested and refused to grant him his audience of congé, insisting that
Louis allow the envoy to resign – as he eventually did. Charles then
refused to accept any of the ambassadors suggested to replace him,
(whether it be Louis Marie, marquis de Pons or Emmanuel Marie Louis,
marquis de Noailles), but agreed to receive only a secretary, Auguste
Marquet de Montbreton d’Urtubise (1791-1792, 1793), who had earlier
served as chargé to Portugal from 1788 to 1789, and a chargé, Jean
François, chevalier de Bourgoing (1792-1793), who had earlier served in
Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Bremen, the Lower Saxony Circle, Hamburg,
Lübeck, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1788-1792) and was noted for his
moderation. But even this concession was grudging; the Spanish foreign
minister, for example, refused initially to grant Urtubize an audience. Charles finally granted La Vauguyon an audience of congé in April of
1792, twenty-two months after his recall. Charles’ refusal to accept an
ambassador and his insistence that the French send individuals of much

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33 Moniteur 5 (2 August 1790), 290.
35 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 31-36.
36 Charles IV had little respect for Pons whom he described to Louis as a man who “can be depended upon to serve neither your Majesty’s interest nor my own.” Quoted in Thomas M. Iiams, Peacemaking from Vergennes to Napoleon: French Foreign Relations in the Revolutionary Era, 1774-1814 (Huntington NY, 1979), 114.
38 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 55.
lower rank was a clear sign of the deterioration of relations between the two powers. La Vauguyon’s case is interesting because he retained the support of both Charles IV and Louis XVI and had formally been exonerated by the diplomatic committee of all culpability. Louis, in fact, told Charles of his support for La Vauguyon and of his resolve not to abandon his ambassador, but at the same time he recognized the necessity of replacing him “for the good of affairs” because a majority of the National Assembly as well as the public have the “strongest prejudices” against him. After his resignation La Vauguyon prudently remained in Spain, serving as a critical liaison for the future Louis XVIII. He stubbornly held on to the papers and the cipher of the embassy and only released them after Montmorin repeatedly insisted. The La Vauguyon case illustrates the problems, even early in the Revolution, over the control of the appointment and recall of representatives and underscores the often hostile view of courts abroad to the revolutionaries.

In many instances recalling the representatives of the Old Regime was not a problem, for beginning in 1790 many of France’s representatives and some of their subordinates refused to serve a revolutionary regime and resigned, leaving their posts in the charge of another official. Of those some emigrated and some simply retired to private life. One of the most prominent to resign early in the Revolution was Jean-Baptiste Gédéon de Malescombes de Curières, baron de Castelnau (1734-1798), the French resident at Geneva since 1781. After his official resignation in August 1790, he joined the counter-revolutionaries led by the comte d’Artois, the king’s brother. That same path was chosen by Charles François Just, marquis de Monteil at Genoa. They would be but two of many. Even the

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40 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 34.
41 Ibid., 31.
42 Baillou et al., eds. Les Affaires étrangères, 1:306-07; Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 45.
44 Higonnet, Class, Ideology and the Rights of the Nobles, 63-64.
45 We must thank Orville Murphy for pointing out this excellent article: Louis Bergès, “Le Roi ou la Nation? Un Débat de conscience après Varennes entre diplomats français (juillet 1791),” Revue d’histoire diplomatique 98 (1984), 33. See also DBF, 9:1406; France, Recueil des instructions, 30: Suisse, 2: Genève, Les
consular service was affected. For example, François Antoine Herman (1758-1837), a distinguished consular official, undertook a number of missions for the future Louis XVIII and only returned to France in 1801. Such resignations only reinforced the concerns of many revolutionaries about the loyalty of the diplomats to the new regime.

The problem of ensuring that those who held governmental posts were loyal to the Revolution surfaced early. In October 1790 the Révolutions de Paris urged the dismissal of the ministers who had served the Old Regime. How, the author queried, could such men, chained to abuses by force of habit as well as personal interest which were necessarily contrary to the new order, be expected to cooperate in their own ruin? Brissot as well attacked the foreign minister for not recalling those “students of intrigue,” “trained in the principles of despotism.” The majority not only decry the Revolution, but also, he claimed, favor projects which tend to destroy it. Even when they are replaced, they are replaced not with “citizens of proven patriotism,” but rather with those who share their views. The recall of such men was necessary for the general good. All the bureaus should be “purified by patriotism.” On 17 November 1790 the National Assembly required all members of the diplomatic corps to swear an oath of allegiance to the new regime: “to be faithful to the nation, to the law and to the King, to maintain with all my power the Constitution decreed by the National Assembly, and to protect (in the country of _____) Frenchmen who shall there be found.” Those who refused to take the oath and had not yet resigned, faced immediate dismissal and automatic disqualification from holding any public office. This oath would be but the first of several. The oath and the ritual use of words such as “virtue” and “regeneration” symbolized “adherence to the

46 DBF, 17:1080.
48 Révolutions de Paris vi, no. 67 (16/23 octobre 1790), 61.
49 Thompson, Popular Sovereignty, 149. See also A.N. F/7/4397, April 1791; Moniteur 6, 403; and Jean-Baptiste Duvergier, ed., Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, reglements, avis du conseil d’état (Paris, 1834), 1:485, decree of 26 October 1790.
revolutionary community.” In place of a kingship based on divine right the revolutionaries created a community based on the nation. The taking of oaths not only “evoked a revolutionary tradition of contractual thought,” but also ironically recalled “the juridical-political culture of the Old Regime” that was predicated upon such avowals. Oaths are but one example of the revolutionaries’ reliance on the mechanisms of the Old Regime to construct a new one. Jean-François La Harpe, an early supporter and later opponent of the Revolution, derided such frequent swearings as “an incurable mania for oaths.” For him the revolutionaries had profaned what should be an act of religion and should be sacred.

On 30 December 1790 the foreign minister Montmorin turned over to the Assembly the list of those who had taken the oath. To those with revolutionary sympathies the oath posed no problem. Armand Louis, baron de Mackau, whose mother had been governess of the royal family and whose sister had been a friend of Madame Elisabeth, the king’s sister, was the first to take the oath demanded by the Constituent Assembly. At

50 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution (Los Angeles, 1984), 21.
52 Jean-François La Harpe, Du Fanatisme dans la langue révolutionnaire ou de la persecution suscitée par les barbares du dix-huitième siècle contre la religion chrétienne et ses ministres (Paris, 1797), 71.
54 Moniteur, session of 31 December 1790, 7:8. See also Barry Rothaus, “The Emergence of Legislative Control over Foreign Policy in the Constituent Assembly (1789-1791)” (Ph.D. diss., Wisconsin, 1968), 177; and Thompson, Popular Sovereignty, 149.
that time he was the minister at Stuttgart (1785-1792). In Russia, Genet, who was later notorious for his revolutionary fervor, also took the oath. The reference to the king allowed many, even of royalist persuasion, to take the oath. Some, such as the marquis Marc-Marie de Bombelles (1744-1822), an experienced diplomat who had been appointed ambassador to Portugal in 1785 and Venice in 1789, refused. Bombelles had earlier served Louis XV as a musketeer in the Seven Years’ War. He followed a common career path, joining the diplomatic corps and serving as secretary to Louis-Auguste Le Tonnelier, baron de Breteuil, before being appointed, respectively, councillor to the embassy at The Hague, Naples, and Vienna, minister at Regensburg (1775-86), ambassador to Portugal (1786-88) and ambassador to Venice (1789-1791). Louis XVI had named him ambassador to Constantinople in 1789, but he never left Venice. He continued to work for the king, often clandestinely, negotiating with the courts of St. Petersburg, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. He fulfilled the worst fears of the revolutionaries for he continued to work against the Revolution and for the king. He finally returned to France with Louis XVIII in 1814 after an absence of 25 years.

In some cases clergy lost their positions because they refused to take or qualified an additional oath, that to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. François Joachim de Pierre de Bernis (1715-1794), for example, another distinguished diplomat, was stationed at Rome. He had taken the oath to the Civil Constitution mandated for all clergy by a decree in November 1790, but he had done so only after adding a qualification about his religious obligations. That qualification cost him both the ambassadorship at Rome, which he had held since 1769, as well as the archbishopric of Albi, which he had held since 1764. It also ended a

57 Michaud 4:650-51; France, Recueil des instructions, 18: Diète germanique, 344.
58 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 87, fn.1.
diplomatic career that had begun in 1752 with an embassy to Venice and that had included a stint as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1757 to 1758. An opponent of the Revolution and a defender of divine right, he was proscribed as an émigré and his estates in France looted. He remained in Rome and died there at the age of 79 in 1794. His body was not taken to Nîmes until 1800. The pope in fact refused to receive any ambassador who took the oath to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy or the other oaths mandated by the Assembly, even the moderate Louis-Philippe, comte de Ségur (1753-1832). In turn the French refused to allow the nuncio, Cardinal Antonio Dugnani (1748-1818), archbishop of Rhodes, to remain in Paris. Shortly after the nuncio left in May 1791, the papal auditor, Giulio Cesare Quarantotti, followed him in August.

The actions of Bombelles and Bernis seemed to confirm the suspicions of many that the diplomatic corps was riddled with ultra-royalists. On 28 January 1791 the celebrated orator and Jacobin, Honoré Gabriel Riquetti, comte de Mirabeau (with the approval of Montmorin) called for a purge of the diplomatic personnel. He wanted only men committed to the Revolution, who were not in any way “strangers to the new language of which they should be organs.” Those who harbored “old

60 DBF, 6:124-25; Michaud, 6:123-24; J.W. Merrick, “Bernis,” Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution, edited by Samuel S. Scott and Barry Rothauns (Westport, CT, 1985). 1:91-92; Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:308; France, Recueil des instructions: 20, Rome, 3: 469, 14-15. Alphonse-Timothée Bernard was named chargé after Bernis’ recall but he was never recognized as such by Pius VI (1775-1799) (pp. 501-05) because he had taken the oath to the Civil Constitution and the papacy had refused to admit anyone who had done so. The pope also refused to receive François Cacault (1743-1805), who was named resident at Rome on 19 January 1793 (20: 527-29). See also liams, Peacemaking, 145.

61 Winter, 291. See also Papiers de Barthélémy, ed. Tausserat-Radel, 6: 156, n. 2. Dugnani was one of ten cardinals interned by Napoleon in 1806.

62 Michaud, 38:673-79 and 11:450-51. See also Décret de la commissiion impériale de la diète de Ratisbonne sur les griefs des états de l’empire contre la France du 26 avril 1791 suivi d’une lettre de M. de Montmorin au nonce du Pape sur le refus du Pontife romain de ne pas admettre d’ambassadeurs de France qui aient prête le serment civique; le tout à la séance de l’Assemblée nationale du 5 mai 1791 (Paris: Dubosquet, 1791), 6, 7; A.N. F/7/4397, Letter of Montmorin, 3? May 1791; Armand Marc, comte de Montmorin Saint Herem, Lettre de M. de Montmorin à M. le Nonce: le 3 mai 1791 [Paris]: Imprimerie nationale, [1791?]. See also Papiers de Barthélémy, ed. Tausserat-Radel, 6:156, n 2.
prejudices” or those who had served “a despotism” for a long period would “compromise their duties.” They should be neither agents of a minister nor confidants of the aristocracy, in Mirabeau’s phrase, but representatives of a magnanimous people. The problem for Montmorin was that such representatives were unlikely to be received. He explained to the Swedish ambassador, Baron de Staël Holstein, that even though the office of ambassador to Sweden had been vacant since July 1789 when Louis Marie de Pons, marquis de Saint-Maurice et de Grignol, had left, he had delayed selecting a replacement because the National Assembly wanted “the popular choice” for all vacancies. Montmorin, however, knew that Gustavus III (1771-1792) would “not view with pleasure” a revolutionary at his court. In fact no French ambassador was received until October of 1795. The difficulty of choosing suitable envoys who would satisfy both the sending and receiving governments persisted throughout the Revolution. Mirabeau candidly acknowledged that Montmorin “ruins” himself by his choices, which he regarded as both dubious and unpopular. The comte de la Marck had personally urged Montmorin to adopt a more astute and machiavellian strategy: send individuals whom the Jacobins could not attack to the more insignificant or hostile posts in which case they would fail – and this failure would redound on the Jacobins, and accredit men devoted to the monarchy to the more important ones. But Montmorin found this tightrope impossible to traverse. This conundrum made it impossible, for example, for Louis XVI to appoint someone as talented as François Emmanuel Guignard de Saint-Priest, who had previously served as plenipotentiary to Portugal from 1763 to 1766.

64 For information on Pons see France, Recueil des instructions, 16: Prusse, 508-09. See also Recueil des instructions, 13, Danemark, 224.
65 Staël-Holstein, Correspondance diplomatique, 193, 16 February 1791.
67 Bacourt, ed., Correspondance, 45, letter of 6 February 1791.
ambassador to the Turks from 1768 to 1784 and ambassador to the United Provinces in 1788. The Révolutions de Paris of September 1790 personally attacked this dedicated diplomat for following for so long a “despotic course.” The sympathies harbored by Saint-Priest, a peer of France who had achieved the rank of colonel in the army before going abroad for the king, did not lie with the revolutionaries. He subsequently represented the future Louis XVIII at Vienna from 1795 to 1797.

Still, the new appointments that Montmorin announced on 27 March 1791 included many nobles and many who were experienced diplomats:

Ségur (Rome)
Charles François Hurault, vicomte de Vibraye (1739-1828) (Stockholm)
Louis, comte de Durfort (d.1825) (Venice)
Eustache René, marquis d’Osmond (1751-1838) (St. Petersburg)
Frédéric Séraphin, marquis de La Tour du Pin-de Gouvernet (1759-1837) (The Hague)
Elisabeth-Pierre, comte de Montesquiou-Fesenac (1764-1834) (Dresden)

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68 Révolutions de Paris v, no. 63 (18/25 septembre 1790), 535.
70 Winter, 114, 126, 130, 142.
71 Of a distinguished noble family, he was a moderate royalist. Before the Revolution he had represented France at St. Petersburg. During the Revolution he was sent to Rome and Berlin. After the latter mission he retired and resurfaced under the Consulate, joining the Council of State. Under the Empire he served as Napoleon’s master of ceremonies but the Bourbon restoration ended his career. L. Apt, “Louis Philippe, comte de Ségur” in Historical Dictionary, edited by Scott and Rothaus, 2:889-90.
72 He had entered the diplomatic career in 1775 and served as minister plenipotentiary or ambassador at Stuttgart (1775), Dresden (1784), and Copenhagen (1792). DBF, 18:59-60; Winter, 144.
73 He had served as minister at Parma (1771-1772) and Tuscany (1784-1791). See A.-F. Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique (Paris, 1954), 308; Winter, 129, 144. See also France, Recueil des instructions, 16: Naples et Parme, 121, 223; 19: Florence, Modène, Gênes, 158; and 26: Venise, 309-10.
74 Winter, 134, and Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 721.
Marie Louise Henry, marquis Descorches de Sainte-Croix (1749-1830) (Poland)  
Guillaume Bonne-Carrère (1754-1825) (Liège).

These appointments could not be considered a success; the bishop at Liège refused to receive Bonne-Carrère (1754-1825) (and later Pazzis D’Aubignan) just as the pope refused to receive Ségur, (then Bernard and later Cacault). Within a year Osmond (1791) had resigned and a few months later Gouvernet and Vibraye (1792). Nor were the revolutionaries appeased. When the diplomatic list was read before the National Assembly only one French representative, Bonne-Carrère, the secretary of the Jacobin club, could clearly be identified as a “patriot.” This was somewhat of an exaggeration because both Ségur and Descorches also supported the Revolution. Bonne-Carrère’s acceptance was denounced as “apostasy,” an interesting indictment that revealed the revolutionaries’ persistent aversion to the diplomatic office. The secretary had in some ways betrayed the faith. Danton, for one, argued that he could no longer be regarded as “a friend of liberty.” In undertaking such a mission Bonne-Carrère had given a “painful illustration of his attachment to the Revolution,” but he had betrayed “the holy cause of liberty.”

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75 He served as minister plenipotentiary at Liège (1782) and envoy extraordinary at Constantinople (1793). One of the few nobles who served through the Revolution, he renounced his title at this time. Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 186-88; DBF, 12:1446-47; Michaud, 10:447, and France, Recueil des instructions, 31: Liège, 405, 424.
76 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères 88, 156. Also see PRO, FO 27/36 for a list. See also Rothaus, “The Emergence of Legislative Control,” 179; and Centre for Kentish Studies, Sackville Manuscripts, U269, C 181, Crawford to the Duke of Dorset, Paris, 25 March 1791 & 1 April 1791.
77 See also Florimond Claude, comte de Mercy-Argenteau and Charles Blumendorf, Dépêches inédites, ed. Eugène Hubert (Brussels, 1919), 154 fn.; and France, Recueil des instructions, 31: Liège, 405, 427. After Dumouriez’s successes, he returned to Liège where he planted a tree of liberty because he had a debt to “pay to this small mitered tyrant” (442). For his successor Jean-Baptiste Nicolas, chevalier de Pazzis d’Aubignan, see pages 437-42.
79 Ibid. See also Michaud 5:24-25.
80 Aulard., ed., La Société des Jacobins, 2:221-22. See also PRO, FO 27/36, 1 April 1791.
Montmorin could not satisfy his critics such as Brissot, who accused him of retaining envoys who hated the Revolution or of replacing them with those of like mind. In his view revolutionaries should not trust Montmorin who was nourished on the “poisons” that infected the old diplomacy.\(^{81}\) This attack echoed an earlier diatribe in the *Révolutions de Paris*, in which the author attacked Montmorin for being both inept and hypocritical; he was the “valet” of Brienne (the former minister of finance and a man notorious for his immorality) and others, and a “vile flatterer” of all parties.\(^{82}\) *L’Ami du peuple* followed up a month later with yet another, labelling Montmorin a “tartufe” and traitor. Montmorin was one of many “abhorred ministers” who have served the court well but have betrayed the nation.\(^{83}\) For Brissot the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was screened from the influence of the Revolution because there remained the “same form, the same mystery, the same falsity of language.”\(^{84}\) Brissot went on to accuse the minister of ignoring the National Assembly and deferring only to the king. He condemned Montmorin and his colleagues for “idolatry” and their “antique royalism.”\(^{85}\) When, he asked, will the language of diplomacy “purify itself”?\(^{86}\) He accused Montmorin of being afraid of sending a “Popilius to the court of kings,” alluding to the representative of ancient Rome who had successfully challenged a king who had defied the Roman republic. Instead of such stalwart men, the foreign minister retained those who had been promoted “in the filth of the old diplomacy” and who maintained “the same aristocratic system” in the

\(^{81}\) Brissot, *Discours de J.P. Brissot, député sur les dispositions des puissances étrangères*, 41. See also Alexandre Tuetey, *Repertoire général des sources manuscrites de l’histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française* (Paris, 1892), 4: #434.

\(^{82}\) *Révolutions de Paris*, 6, no. 67 (16/23 octobre 1790), 62.

\(^{83}\) *L’Ami du peuple*, 5, no. 296 (30 novembre 1790), 5-6. See also *L’Ami du peuple* 7, no. 478 (3 juin 1791), 5-6.

\(^{84}\) Brissot, *Discours de J.P. Brissot, député sur les dispositions des puissances étrangères*, 43.


\(^{86}\) Brissot, *Discours de J.P. Brissot, député sur les dispositions des puissances étrangères*, 43.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The people preferred to send abroad partisans of the Revolution rather than its enemies. Brissot had leveled his attack not only against the minister, but also against the commis, the true directors of French diplomacy, the “veterans of the aristocracy.”

Even the subsequent appointment of someone as radical as Charles Louis Huguet de Sémonville, later marquis (1759-1839), to Genoa – a protegé of Mirabeau’s, who flaunted his republican sympathies by placing an escutcheon of France embracing liberty over the embassy door – did not appease Montmorin’s critics. In short, Brissot alleged that the diplomatic corps was “entirely reserved for the privileged and [for] creatures of the ancien régime.” These “valets” still “speak of the king their master and decry the nation.”

Could the nation, Brissot asked, ever trust agents whom it was “easy to circumvent and seduce,” especially when they were “chosen by an executive power whom the nature of things renders perhaps an enemy of liberty”? How could the French people have any confidence in negotiations when diplomacy was in the hands of men who regret the demise of the Old Regime and who only quit their positions to don the white cockade – a reference to the actions of one of the king’s defiant supporters.

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87 Ibid., 47. See also National Library of Scotland, Minto Family Archives, Papers of Hugh Elliot, Ms. 13022, fol. 296, Hugh Elliot to Pitt, Secret, Paris, 22 October 1790, for intrigues against Montmorin; and fol. 298, Hugh Elliot to Pitt, Paris, October 1790.
88 Brissot, *Discours sur la dénonciation contre le comité autrichien et contre M. Montmorin*, 21.
92 Ibid., 8.
93 Ibid., esp. 8, 9, 12, 19.
The suspicions of Mirabeau, Brissot and others convinced the Assembly of the necessity of requiring yet another oath of loyalty in April 1791 to “be faithful to the nation, to the law, to the king, to maintain with all my power the constitution decreed by the assembly and accepted by the king.” In a letter of instruction sent to all the ministers at foreign courts in April 1791, Montmorin tried to reassure the envoys that the king had freely accepted the new government and taken an irrevocable oath to maintain it. The king, he noted, “has adopted without hesitation, a happy constitution, which will at once regenerate his authority, the nation, and the monarchy....” Moreover, the king “remains charged with the power of negotiating with foreign powers....” He dismissed as mere calumnies the suggestions that the king was not free or happy and that his authority was “lessened.” How credulous the public was we do not know but at least one émigré, Antoine-François-Claude, comte Ferrand (1751-1825), disputed Montmorin’s claims, pointing out “the irresistible truth” that the king was not free and condemned Montmorin for “servile cowardice” in serving “an assembly of usurpers.” Ferrand, who wrote many tracts against the Revolution, emigrated in September 1789 and only returned to France when Napoleon came to power. He then concentrated on his literary career. On the return of Louis XVIII he was named Minister of State and Director-General of the Post. He defended the émigrés and argued for restitution of the goods and property that they had lost. He was later made a peer of France and member of the French Academy.

Two months later, Louis XVI confirmed Ferrand’s view in a letter he left behind when he attempted to flee the country. He noted in particular that although the constitution reserved the power of appointing ministers to foreign courts to the king and of conducting negotiations, in fact Louis had little choice because the “revision and confirmation of

94 A.N., F/7/4397, April 1791.
95 The Annual Register, 1791, 194.
97 The Constitution of 3 September 1791 provided in title three, ch. IV, article 2 that the king named ambassadors and other agents and in section III, articles 1 and 3 that only the king maintained political relations abroad and conducted negotiations and signed all treaties and alliances. See the Constitution of 1791 in Léon Duguit and Henri Monnier, eds., Les Constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789 (Paris, 1915), 23, 26.
treaties which is reserved to the National Assembly and the appointment of a diplomatic committee absolutely nullify” this provision. The king went on to ask: how could one entrust the “secret of the frankness one puts into negotiations to an Assembly whose deliberations are of necessity public?” The king could subvert those envoys chosen by the Assembly as Marie Antoinette urged as early as 3 February 1791. At that time the queen had written candidly to Florimond Claude, comte de Mercy-Argenteau, her brother’s envoy, that the revolutionaries had wanted to change all the ministers at foreign courts. Although some, such as Ségur, she considered a good choice, the queen expressed the hope that foreign governments would not receive them. In so doing they would render us “a great service.” Her brother in particular, she hoped, would remember that neither she nor the king were free to choose their own representatives and accordingly should never regard them as such nor receive them. Some had not.

THE FLIGHT OF THE KING

Any hesitation or doubts the host governments harbored were reinforced by the events of the summer of 1791. The capture of the king in Varennes after his abortive flight in June, his later imprisonment in the Temple, and his loss of power intensified the crisis of conscience for both receiving governments and French ministers abroad. The Dutch, for example, worried that if a newly appointed envoy did not come with credentials signed by the king, he could not be received. The Pensionary in fact suggested that European governments give their ambassadors to France a leave of absence until a government was established that they


\footnote{99 Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette et Madame Elisabeth, Lettres et documents inédits, ed. F. Feuillet de Conches (Paris, 1869), 1:471-72.}
recognized. Some countries, such as Spain, withdrew their envoys and urged others to do the same.

Historians, such as Higonnet and Bergès, argue convincingly that the king’s flight to Varennes was more of a turning point for the Revolution and the nobles than the so-called second Revolution of 10 August 1792. The position of the nobles in the diplomatic corps paralleled those in the navy and the army. Before June 1791 only 425 officers had left the army. The flight of the king, however, was the great precipitant. One officer expressed the feeling of many when he refused to take the oath: “My conscience and my duty prohibit me from subscribing to a new oath which is not sanctioned by the king....” By the end of 1791, 1500 army officers had resigned; others emigrated so that 6,000 officers, that is, about 60% of those serving, had left the army. By March 1792 7 of 9 vice-admirals, 15 of 18 rear-admirals, 128 of 170 captains had also left. Just as the loss of experienced officers was reflected in the failure of the French navy to win a single major naval battle during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the loss of experienced officers had an impact on the army, so too the loss of seasoned diplomats harmed France’s diplomatic efforts.

The crisis was particularly acute for the French envoys stationed abroad. Custine at Berlin considered his powers suspended after the arrest of the king. In 1791 seven diplomats resigned: the marquis de Vérac at

101 Alfred Ritter von Vivenot, Die Politik des oesterreichische Staatskanzlers Fürsten Kaunitz-Rietberg unter Kaiser Leopold II (Vienna, 1873), 234.
106 Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:309.
the Swiss diet; O’Kelly at Mainz; von Groschlag at Darmstadt; Osmond at St. Petersburg; Talleyrand at Naples; La Houze at Hamburg and Copenhagen; and Moustier at Berlin. Anne César, chevalier, later marquis de la Luzerne-Beuzeville (1741-1791), did not have to choose as he died at his post in London on 14 September 1791. Still others were replaced in what a contemporary called a “constitutional purge.” In the aftermath of Varennes, 50% of the ambassadors immediately resigned and 31% of the ministers. Within a year all French ambassadors had resigned.

We can see the personal dimensions of that crisis in the case of Olivier de Saint-Georges, marquis de Vérac (1743-1828), the king’s ambassador at Solothurn, the residence of the French ambassador to the Swiss Diet. Vérac had had a distinguished military and diplomatic record: a musketeer, an aide-de-camp, a colonel of a regiment of grenadiers, a mestre de camp and a chevalier de Saint-Louis. He had been badly wounded and lost an arm fighting for France. He served subsequently as minister to Hesse-Kassel from 1772 to 1774, Denmark from 1775 to 1779, Russia from 1780 to 1784, and the United Provinces from 1785 to 1787 before accepting the post at Solothurn. When Montmorin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a formal note to the European chancelleries on the temporary suspension of the royal power, Vérac sent a personal letter of resignation (6 July 1791). The deputy at the foreign office was none other than his son-in-law, Hippolyte Gracieux, marquis de La Coste (1760-1806), who had been elected one of the noble deputies to the Estates General and was initially favorable to the Revolution. La Coste urged Vérac to reconsider. He pointed out that only the Assembly could prevent disorder and that many were convinced that changing the form of government was not only unconstitutional but also criminal. He was convinced that the king’s inviolability would be preserved—an ingenuous remark in retrospect. If his father-in-law did not immediately return to France, he would be regarded as an émigré. He did not need to point out

107 He had served as Louis’s envoy to the United States from 1779 to 1784. France, Recueil des instructions, 25, part 2: Angleterre, 3:1698-1791, 535, 557; Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:308; Winter, 118, 144.
109 Excluding the ambassador in London who was ill and died.
110 Representatives as well as consuls and their families had to return expeditiously to France or face proscription. Those who were unable to do so often because of
the financial difficulties that Vérac would face being in a foreign country. He soon found himself without credit or resources. He had not been paid, a common problem at the time, and had left the ambassadorial residence and was renting another house. Montmorin was willing to defer the announcement of his resignation, La Coste assured him. Vérac still had time to retract his letter.

But Vérac’s resolution did not waver. He told him that he could not retain his position because he no longer acted in the name of the king. He thought it “criminal” to serve a power that had weakened or suspended the king’s authority. Furthermore, many abroad regarded the Assembly as a body which had engaged in “frightful abuses.” The mutiny of the French garrison at Nancy in August 1790 and the “atrocious crimes” there dismayed him. Nor had Vérac forgotten the oaths that he had taken to the constitution and to the king who since his return to Paris had been a virtual prisoner in the Tuileries. Faithful to his sovereign, Vérac would not serve an illegitimate government. By postponing his audience of congé, Vérac had the satisfaction of infuriating Montmorin and paralyzing the embassy for seven months. But Vérac paid dearly; his property was confiscated and sold. Vérac only returned to France in 1801. One wonders if his son-in-law regretted his decision as he emigrated in August 1792, narrowly escaping the September Massacres. La Coste returned to France in 1795 only to be arrested as an émigré. After his acquittal he remained in the capital, divorcing his wife and marrying an actress. He subsequently served as a sub-prefect and later prefect, and died in office.

Others had made the same painful decision as La Coste’s father-in-law, including comte Jean Jacques O’Kelly Farrell, seigneur de Lansac at Trier (1783-1791). O’Kelly, a naturalized citizen (1756), had earlier war-time conditions had to request a special exemption as Raulin, the former consul at Genoa, did for his family. See Pierre Philippeaux, Rapport et projet de décret au nom du comité de législation (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, [1793?]), 1, 2, 30.

112 Michaud, 22:375-76.
113 Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 783. See also National Library of Ireland, MS 8552 (30); MS 8552 (29); P. 159, Papers Relating to the History and Genealogy of Members of the Following Families of Irish Origin in France; P.

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served the king at Zweibrücken from 1778 to 1779 and Cologne in 1784. For him the desperate plight of Louis XVI, whom he greatly respected, made it impossible to fulfill his duties. Although he was troubled by the publicity given to his despatches, the main reason for his resignation on 16 September 1791 was his conscience. Friedrich Karl Willibald, Freiherr von Groschlag zu Dieburg at the circle of the Upper Rhine (1778-1792), residing at Darmstadt, resigned shortly thereafter in October of 1791. Osmond, accredited to St. Petersburg, also resigned that same year (late 1791), as did comte Louis Marie Anne de Talleyrand (1738-1809), ambassador to Naples since 1785, Mathieu de Basquiat, baron de la Houze (1724-1792), at Copenhagen, and marquis Eléonore-François-Elie de Moustier (1751-1817) at Berlin. Moustier, who was personally devoted to Louis XVI, considered his power suspended after the arrest of

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185, Collection of Papers Made in Paris; P. 192, Letters of Vicomte de Sarsfield and of Comte O’Kelly.

114 Winter, 124; France, Recueil des instructions, 28: États allemands, 1, L’Electorat de Mayence, 263-79. He returned to Ireland.

115 Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 430. See also France, Recueil des instructions, 16: Prusse, 553.


117 Of an old and reputable noble family, he began his career in the army and rapidly rose to the rank of captain commandant (1771) and then mestre de camp. In 1788 he accepted a position as ambassador and minister plenipotentiary at The Hague. He was appointed to a post at St. Petersburg but because Russia severed relations with France he never went. He resigned at the end of 1791 and emigrated to Italy. He only returned to France under the Consulate. He served Louis XVIII as ambassador at Turin and later ambassador to London. Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 280; and Michaud, 31:448.

118 Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 1072; Winter, 139.

119 He served as attaché in Spain (1748), chargé d’affaires in Naples (1748), and minister at Rome (1762), Parma (1765), Hamburg (1772-79) and Denmark (1779-92). Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 501. Winter, 112, says he left in February 1792. According to Recueil des instructions, 13: Danemark, his letter of recall was dated 9 May 1792.

120 He began his career in the army and then entered diplomatic service. He served as minister to Trier (1778), minister plenipotentiary to London (1783) and minister to the United States (1787). France, Recueil des instructions, 28: États allemands, 3: L’Electorat de Trèves, 295-96.
the king. Some minor officials resigned as well. On hearing of the flight of the king, the prince of Nassau-Siegen, who acted as councillor to the embassy in Russia, left St. Petersburg on 2 August 1791 and returned in February 1792 as an advocate of the émigrés. Those who did not resign on receiving news of the king’s flight and the adoption of a new constitution that required the taking of yet another oath faced other difficulties, most notably increased scrutiny by the Assembly. Some revolutionaries argued that even taking an oath was insufficient, especially for army officers, because, as one revolutionary phrased it, it would not “cure them of [their] aristocratic gangrene.”

Additionally, diplomats often found their positions in host countries untenable. In Spain, Charles IV, who abhorred the Revolution, instructed his foreign minister José Moñino y Redondo, conde de Floridablanca to inform Urtubise that he could no longer be regarded as France’s representative because Louis XVI was no longer master of his own affairs. He would see him only in a private capacity. Even after Louis XVI accepted the constitution in September 1791, Urtubise’s position did not improve; he was not received by the foreign minister because the Spanish and others believed that the king had little power. Urtubise’s letters to the foreign minister went unanswered. When he demanded an interview, the minister did not reply. The foreign minister often expressed his detestation of the revolutionaries, categorizing them as “wretches” with whom it was impossible to negotiate. Floridablanca confessed frankly his desire to place a “cordon” on the frontier just as one would do for the plague. At a public audience when Urtubise finally confronted the foreign minister, Floridablanca told him that Charles did

123 The Constitution of 3 September 1791 chapter two, section 4, article 3 also provided that all state officials had to take the civic oath. See Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:279-80 and John Hall Stewart, ed., A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 230-62, esp. 245.
124 Quoted in Blaufarb, The French Army, 83.
125 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 47.
not regard his cousin as free.\textsuperscript{127} When Urtubise insisted that Louis was, the Spanish demanded proof. Spain, relying on a typical gambit of the Old Regime, recalled its ambassador in Paris, Fernan Nuñez. Because the French no longer had an ambassador in Madrid, Spain should no longer have one in Paris.\textsuperscript{128} Such difficulties, coupled with the king’s abortive flight to Varennes and its consequences, undermined Montmorin’s position, which had been eroded by Brissotin attacks, ultimately forcing his resignation in October 1791. Although no incriminating evidence was found in his papers, after the Revolution of August 10\textsuperscript{th} 1792 he was denounced, imprisoned, and perished in the September Massacres. By the fall of 1791 the resignation of Montmorin and that of many of the French diplomats abroad, particularly in the higher ranks, eviscerated the Foreign Ministry and depleted the diplomatic corps, creating new challenges for the government. The next foreign minister faced an ever more difficult situation abroad and an increasingly perilous one at home.

128 Ibid., 57. In fact the Spanish ambassador was relieved as he had frequently requested his recall from Paris and that they not leave him a “prisoner of these madmen.” Quoted in Iiams, \textit{Peacemaking}, 114. See also France, Convention nationale, \textit{Décret de la Convention nationale, qui déclare que la république française est en guerre avec l’Espagne, du 7 mars 1793 l’an 2 de la république française} (Moulins: Imprimerie nationale de G. Boutonnet, 1793) esp. 10; Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 2:195.
From the summer of 1791 to January of 1793, French diplomats confronted increasingly hostile governments abroad. The hostility escalated exponentially with each incident: the king’s flight, the Revolution of August 1792 and the establishment of a republic, and the king’s execution. Although Varennes had ignited the first great wave of resignations, the next wave followed in the fall of 1792 after the invasion of the Tuileries and the dethroning of the king, creating ever more difficulties for the new foreign minister, who found himself confronting a growing enmity abroad, even from France’s putative allies.

LESSART

The appointment of a new foreign minister did not improve France’s relations with the rest of Europe nor that between the foreign minister and the Assembly, particularly the Jacobins who remained intransigently hostile. Given the suspicious attitude of the Assembly towards the ministers it is not surprising that Ségur refused the appointment. For many Lessart was un pis aller or “last recourse.” ¹ Jean Marie Claude de Valdec de Lessart, who succeeded Montmorin as foreign minister (November 1791 - March 1792), strove to keep the peace. That attitude brought him into conflict with many, such as the Girondins who espoused war, and ultimately led to allegations by Brissot that he had “betrayed his duties” and that he had showed, especially in his negotiations with the house of Austria, “a cowardice and a weakness unworthy of the grandeur of a free people.” ² Instead of responding to Austrian démarches with the “noble

2 Ibid., 209. See also Arthur Chuquet, Dumouriez (Paris, 1914), 69 and Eloise Ellery, Brissot de Warville: A Study in the French Revolution (Boston, 1915), 245, 249.
brevity of the Spartans,” he had only answered vaguely. In Brissot’s view Lessart was not only duplicitous and inept but also a traitor to the nation. Some also pointed out that relying on the supposed probity of the executive and its agents was a defect of the constitution. In addition Brissot accused him of compromising the “security and constitution of France” by his silence. For Brissot the only way to assess the foreign minister was to ask if he had defended the national interest. In Brissot’s view he had not: Lessart had violated the constitution and compromised the security of the state. Because Lessart had not acted more quickly against the coalition forming against France, the emperor saw France as “impuissant.” In addition, Marat accused “this impudent scoundrel” of insolently intervening in the deliberations of the Assembly. Brissot also pointed out that the foreign minister had retained representatives abroad who opposed the Revolution, such as Vergennes and Montezan. He denounced the “incurable habit” of ministers who confounded the nation with the king. Others demanded that such “enemies of the nation” be recalled. Brissot saw the king surrounded by men “who detest the

5 Révolutions de Paris, 11, no. 142 (24-31 mars 1792), 565.
7 Ibid., 20-21.
10 L’Ami du peuple, 9, no. 616 (3 décembre 1791), 4-5 & 8, no. 594 (9 novembre 1791), 1.
12 L’Ami du peuple, 9, no. 616 (3 décembre 1791), 5.
Revolution” and wish to reverse it. Undoubtedly, Lessart had followed the pattern of his predecessor and appointed friends of the king, such as Marie-Gabriel-Florent-Auguste de Choiseul (1752-1817) (called the comte de Choiseul-Gouffier) to London, Louis-Claude Bigot de Sainte-Croix (1744-1803) to Trier, Moustier to Constantinople, Joseph de Maisonneuve to Wurttemberg, D’Assigny to Bavaria, Ségur to Berlin, and François de Barbé-Marbois, later marquis (1745-1837), to Regensburg. He also appointed those from “la seconde couche de l’ancienne diplomatie,” such as François Barthélémy (1747-1830) to the Swiss cantons and Baron Jean François de Bourgoing (1745-1811) to


14 A distinguished diplomat who had served as chargé d’affaires at Turin, Rome, and St. Petersburg from 1769-1787 and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He courageously stayed with the royal family when a mob invaded the palace on 10 August and accompanied them to the Assembly. He subsequently fled to London where he died. DBF, 6:454; and France, Recueil des instructions, 28: États allemands, 3: L’Électorat de Trèves, 317-18. He replaced the comte de Vergennes who had served as minister plenipotentiary since 1791 but who was suspect because he was the son of the former foreign minister and the brother of another who commanded a company of émigrés (307-15).

15 He never went to Constantinople but fled to Britain. He joined the brothers of the king and finally returned to France in 1814 accompanying Louis XVIII. Michaud, 29:482-83.

16 Maisonneuve, a knight of Malta, accepted this appointment but resigned a few months later on August 10, 1792. He had served as minister of Malta and of Poland in Paris (Winter, 109, 113, 116, 145). He went on to serve Tsar Paul I in a variety of official and unofficial capacities. In particular he was instrumental in fulfilling Paul’s ambition to be Grand Master. We would like to extend gracious thanks to M. Camilleri of the National Library at Malta for providing us information on the elusive Maisonneuve.

17 He too remained in office a short time, leaving September 1792. Winter, 110.

18 Ségur only remained a few months in Berlin. Winter, 131.

19 Barthélémy came from an old bourgeois family. One of 15 children, he entered the diplomatic corps serving as secretary of the embassy in Stockholm (1768), Vienna (1781), and secretary and later chargé d’affaires in London (1784). In December 1791 he became minister plenipotentiary and ambassador to the Swiss.
Spain. Some of those appointed never went to their posts: Choiseul-Gouffier, Moustier, Terrier de Monciel (Mainz) (1757-1831) and Baron Louis-Dominique, called Abbé Louis (1755-1837) (Stockholm).

Lessart did not recall those committed to the Revolution, such as Mackau, but did recall some of the king’s supporters, notably comte Louis Cachet de Montezan (b. 1746), who had served as minister plenipotentiary at Cologne from 1777 to 1779 and as minister plenipotentiary to Bavaria from 1780 until December 1791, and Laurent Bérenger (b.1728), minister plenipotentiary at Regensburg since 1786 and who left in January 1792. Bérenger, who was from the second “couche” of diplomacy, had had a long and illustrious career in the diplomatic service. He had served as chargé at various courts including Russia (1762-65), Vienna (1766-67), Sicily (1769-70, 1771-72, 1774-76), the United Provinces (intermittently from 1778 to 1785), and Parma (1785) before being promoted to minister at Regensburg (1786-January 1792), his last and perhaps most challenging

He also negotiated peace treaties with Prussia and Spain (1795). He was later elected a member of the Directory, was sentenced to deportation to Guiana but escaped and fled to the United States. He returned to France and served as envoy extraordinary to Switzerland (1802). He was given the title marquis in 1817. Henri Stroehlin, La Mission de Barthélémy en Suisse (1792-1797) (Geneva, 1900); DBF, 5:664-65; Michaud 3:182-88; Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 2:245; Raymond Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe: Des Traité de Bâle à la deuxième coalition, 1795-1799 (Paris, 1912), 77. Unlike many revolutionary diplomats, Barthélémy discouraged and condemned revolutionary propaganda. See John P. McLaughlin, “The Annexation Policy of the French Revolution, 1789-1793” (Ph.D. diss., London, 1951), 355.

20 He had earlier served as chargé d’affaires in Spain (1777-1875) and minister at Hamburg (1788) and Bremen (1788-1792). In 1799 Napoleon sent him to Copenhagen and Stockholm. See DBF, 6:1501.

21 From a distinguished family, Monciel was only appointed to the one diplomatic post but he never went. He later succeeded Roland as minister. Subject to frequent attacks, especially because of his condemnation of the mob invasion of the Tuileries on 20 June 1792, he subsequently resigned. Pursued by ill-wishers during the August Revolution, he survived the Revolution by returning to his department. Michaud, 28:604.

22 Abbé Louis (1755-1837), for example, who supported the Revolution in the beginning but was disenchanted by its excesses and fled to Britain shortly after the August Revolution. He did not return to France until after 18 Brumaire. See Michaud, 25:326-30.

23 DBF, 7:781; Winter, 121, 110.
posting. After his recall he refused to serve a revolutionary government.\textsuperscript{24} Others resigned, such as the secretary of the legation at the German diet, Herissant (4 February 1792).\textsuperscript{25}

The turmoil in the diplomatic corps could not but affect France’s relations with other powers. Some in France blamed the diplomatic missteps or “incoherence” on the earlier policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the court. The instructions issued on 1 January 1792 to Barbé-Marbois at the German Diet reflect that mentality. The ministry and the court had wished to employ abroad former envoys and rely on the old diplomacy; they rushed into “excuses and apologies” and thus gave the negotiations a sense of feebleness and timidity. Thus the discordance between “our vigorous constitution” and the “shameful and timid” manner of representing it. This policy of “false prudence” had disparaged France and created enemies. The negotiations had only succeeded in fomenting “scorn” and “hatred” on the part of foreign courts. His instructions intimated that it might be necessary to recall all representatives and cease all negotiations. Relations with Europe had reached a “crisis” that was “almost irremediable.” Whoever drafted these instructions acknowledged some of the difficulties that French envoys, who were often accused of being the “abettors of assassinations,” faced. To combat such accusations the author advocated the adoption of a diplomatic system “analogous to our constitution.” He urged Barbé-Marbois to adopt a mode of conduct that was “courageous,” “prudent,” “open” and “pure.” He went on to order Barbé-Marbois not to negotiate on the basis of positive German law because the French constitution was founded on natural law. Barbé-Marbois might face “delays” and “extraordinary difficulties” in being accepted as the legitimate representative. If he confronted such obstacles, he should ascertain whether these obstructions stemmed only from etiquette. If so, he should adopt the vagaries or “follies” of his predecessors to surmount them. If the difficulties stemmed from a plan to hinder him, he should take steps to eliminate these obstacles.\textsuperscript{26}

Even moderate individuals such as Ségur often faced an impossible task.\textsuperscript{27} Ségur had earlier served France as minister

\textsuperscript{24} France, Recueil des instructions, 18: Diète germanique, 362; Winter, 113, 116, 126, 129, 132 and 139; and Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 92.
\textsuperscript{25} France, Recueil des instructions, 18: Diète germanique, 382.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 377-81.
\textsuperscript{27} Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 2:339.
plenipotentiary to Russia and had won over Catherine II, but was received very coldly at the Prussian court on 12 January 1792 because Berlin had been told that Ségur was instructed to spread propaganda and stir up unrest. This intelligence seemed to be corroborated by a memo sent to the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold II in which the author alleged that France was planning on inundating European courts with “wild emissaries.” Ségur, both charming and talented, faced nothing but insults and rebuffs in Berlin where he remained a little over a month, leaving on 27 February 1792 after an unfortunate incident in his room when he was either attacked or fell on his sword. The obvious futility of his mission fueled rumors throughout the diplomatic corps that he had asked to be recalled and that he had tried to commit suicide. Renaud Philippe de Custine, who served as chargé d’affaires departed a few months later and relations between Prussia and France virtually ceased. Nor was Ségur’s treatment atypical. Baron François de Bourgoing (1748-1811), who arrived in February 1792 in Madrid to replace Urtubise, “still hid under the etiquette of royalty,” but candidly told Lessart that the French do not “enjoy any consideration.” Instructed to avoid a rupture at any cost, Bourgoing suffered numerous humiliations at the court where he remained less than a year.

French representatives abroad often received little thanks from their own government. The clamor grew for the dismissal of all representatives of the Old Regime. For example, marquis Charles Alexis Brûlart de Sillery, also comte de Genlis (1737-1793), a deputy in the National Convention, contended that the function of the ambassador was

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28 Michaud, 38:676; Winter, 133.
30 Winter, 131.
31 Staël-Holstein, Correspondance diplomatique, 252-3 letter of 26 January 1792 and 254, letter of 2 February 1792. He retired to private life until 1801.
32 Winter, 140; Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 77; Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 2:444. Also see Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 1:133, 220, October 1793; and Mousset, Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution, 250-373.
“futile” and that the “reign of the protected spies is over.” If France had to send representatives abroad, they should be “pure and simple.” In the minds of some Lessart also failed that test. His opposition to the war and his membership in the Feuillants increased the hostility of the Girondins and led to his arraignment on charges of treason. He refused to flee, was arrested, and transferred to Paris, where he was attacked. According to at least one witness, he survived his wounds, was saved by his secretary, and survived another eight months.

DUMOURIEZ

In such an atmosphere the triumph of the Brissotins accelerated the push to war. Charles François Dupérier, dit Dumouriez, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (15 March 1792-15 June 1792). His appointment and the subsequent outbreak of war on 20 April 1792 precipitated drastic changes in the diplomatic corps. In his brief tenure of three months Dumouriez instituted a number of changes. As Jean-Pierre Bois has observed, Dumouriez initially appealed to many; he enjoyed the confidence of the king and the support of Brissot. He knew Europe – its courts and its languages – well. Finally, he had mastered revolutionary rhetoric. It will probably never be known whether Dumouriez was

36 Journal des débats de la Société des Amis de la Constitution, #145, 19 February 1792. See also Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 153-54.
38 Bergès, “Le Roi or la Nation?” 41, fn. 33; Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 151-81; and Bourgoing, Histoire diplomatique, 1:474-81.
39 Chuquet, Dumouriez, 70.
complicit in the downfall of his friend and predecessor, Lessart,\(^{41}\) but many suspected him because the evidence used to accuse the minister had been disclosed to Dumouriez in confidence. Undoubtedly, his predecessor had been criticized in particular not only for not changing diplomatic agents but also for adhering to the spirit of the old diplomacy. Such policies were, they argued, influenced by Austria and counter-revolutionary.\(^{42}\) But it is also true that principles rarely guided Dumouriez’s actions. Realizing probably more than anyone else that France was unprepared for war, because of the disorganized and undisciplined state of the army, he still adopted a belligerent attitude toward other powers in an attempt to win popular support. Such a craven desire also dictated his policies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^{43}\) It is also true that it would have been difficult for the most selfless minister to negotiate the political shoals of that time. His failure to win over the king ultimately led to his resignation in June 1792.

In his admittedly self-serving memoirs, Dumouriez recounts his first visit to Louis XVI. He told the king at the outset that although devoted to his service, he was the “man of the nation,” who would always speak the language of liberty. In his view almost all members of the diplomatic corps were counter-revolutionaries,\(^{44}\) “courtisans” more occupied with intrigues than with the concerns of France.\(^{45}\) Although pressed by the diplomatic committee to dismiss all the representatives, he confided to Louis that he did not intend to do so, but only to change them little by little as necessity dictated. Dumouriez wanted to eliminate those he considered overtly counter-revolutionary. He also wanted to reduce the number of ambassadorial positions and replace them with ministers plenipotentiary to save money.\(^{46}\)

Dumouriez’s appearance at the Jacobin club clad in the infamous cap earned him the nickname “le ministre bonnet rouge.” In an address delivered at the club and subsequently published as *Mémoire sur le*

\(^{41}\) For intrigues against Lessart see Mercy-Argenteau and Blumendorf, *Dépêches inédites*, 117-19. Brissot in particular accused the minister of “culpable weakness” in dealing with other powers.


\(^{43}\) Michaud, 11:543-61.

\(^{44}\) Dumouriez, *La Vie et les mémoires*, 2:140.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 2:153.

ministère des affaires étrangères, he outlined his plans for reform. Dumouriez argued that it was necessary to replace all the diplomats stationed abroad. This “regeneration” was essential for the dignity of the nation and the glory of the king. It was a mistaken policy to retain the privileged classes in such positions in order to avoid shocking the “prejudices” of foreign courts because such policies dilute “our constitutional principles.” France needed the most virtuous and the most capable of its citizens. The new political system dictated that reason, good faith and force should replace pride, Machiavellianism and finesse. The new policies that guided France were simple – without mystery or passion. The French were now a free people whose monarchy belonged to them. They did not belong to the monarchy. A free people was naturally allied to all other peoples and should not conclude alliances that bound it to the interests and passions of other states, especially those governed by despots because the politics of such courts were capricious. Frank and simple negotiations would dissipate the prejudices Europe harbored. The past was a history of absurd, barbaric wars that desolated Europe. Henceforth France would abstain from conquests and only undertake just, that is, defensive wars. The French, no longer an ambitious people, had no enemies except those who violated their constitution. In the future, wars would be short and would not involve the cession or annexation of territory.

To implement this policy Dumouriez concluded that a prompt and total change was needed in the diplomatic corps. The ministers stationed at foreign courts have carried the “colors” of aristocracy and disdained the principles of Revolution and liberty. Just as France had changed its political system, so it should change its representatives. He acknowledged that many envoys were capable diplomats – but of the old system. To the argument that such a complete renewal would result in placing inexperienced individuals in foreign courts, he rejoined that France’s new interests were simple: France had rejected the intrigues, the corruption, the vain mysteries and puerilities that had characterized the diplomacy of the Old Regime. The majesty of the nation now provided the basis for and dignity of negotiations.47 Dumouriez attacked what he termed the “vile espionnage” and the corruption of the old diplomacy, and

47 Dumouriez, Mémoire sur le ministère des affaires étrangères. See also Patricia Chastain Howe, “Charles-François Dumouriez and the Revolutionizing of French Foreign Affairs in 1792,” French Historical Studies 14, no. 3 (Spring 1986), 366-90.
urged the adoption of a “simple, noble and frank correspondence.” For him negotiation should not be “the exchange of guile and cunning” but that of “truth and good faith.” The minister who oversaw the implementation of such a policy should be a patriot and, “like Caesar’s wife,” above suspicion.48

Shortly after Dumouriez’s appointment, the king acknowledged (24 March 1792) that in the past he had chosen principled, honest men for his representatives, but now that so many had resigned he had the duty to replace them with men “accredited by their popular opinions.”49 This declaration supported the position of Dumouriez who strove to dismiss the employees of the Old Regime and subordinate the ministry to the committees of the Assembly. Undoubtedly, the ministers at this time were under a great deal of pressure to purge their staffs. In L’Ami du peuple Jean-Paul Marat had publicly urged Joseph Servan de Gerbey, the War Minister, “to purge all the bureaux infected with the most disgusting aristocracy and to replace them with proven patriots.”50 Servan ignored this advice. Dumouriez did not.

The changes were most apparent at the Foreign Ministry in Paris, whose personnel had a reputation for being hostile to the Revolution. Unlike the diplomatic representatives, those who worked in the ministry were predominantly bourgeois, although some had been ennobled because of their service. These men, moreover, had strong family bonds with others in the Foreign Ministry. Both the Parisian commune and the diplomatic committee suspected that the ministry was a sanctuary for counter-revolutionaries.51 The celebrated remark of the Swiss revolutionary Peter Ochs, that he would only go to the ministry “if I wished to give lessons in counter-revolution,”52 epitomized that attitude. Dumouriez’s appointment of Bonne-Carrère53 as director-general indicated the new policy, as did his reorganization of the ministry. As Howe notes, Dumouriez replaced the two former bureaus with six

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49 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 172.
52 Ibid., 181, fn.14.
The appointment of many who had no experience and even less merit prompted some to label Dumouriez a patriot and others a sans-culotte. Bonne-Carrère publicly bragged that he intended to replace the commis “bent under the yoke of despotism” with Jacobins “passionate for equality” and insisted that the department would be “purified in the fire of patriotism.” The “idiom of liberty” would replace the “rampant style of slavery.” Yet Bonne-Carrère himself was also criticized. Brissot, in a public letter to Dumouriez, sarcastically queried if Bonne-Carrère was his first choice, a gambler notorious for his vices, perverse habits, and deplorable reputation who had earlier enjoyed the support of Montmorin. By appointing a man who surrounds himself with the most loathesome corruption, who engages in the politics of wiliness and cowardice, a man execrable in the view of patriots, contemptible in that of moderates, Dumouriez had “dishonored” the revolution.

Dumouriez dismissed most of the current employees of the ministry who in many cases had worked there for more than forty years. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like that of the Interior, had the highest proportion of individuals who had joined before the Revolution (approximately 25%) and were therefore the most vulnerable. Dumouriez fired the old commis, Gerard de Rayneval and Hennin, who were considered suspect and replaced them with Pierre Henri Hélène Marie Lebrun-Tondu who became first commis and François-Joseph Noël (1755-1841). This purge was expanded to include the clerks and

55 Chuquet, *Dumouriez*, 71.
cribes.\textsuperscript{60} He then reorganized the ministry placing the director immediately under the minister and appointed six commis whom he knew personally.\textsuperscript{61} Those commis who remained, although few, were a source of both continuity and competence. The atmosphere was poisonous enough that at least one commis, Bonnet, acted as a Jacobin informer.\textsuperscript{62}

Dumouriez’s policies reflected the deep distrust many revolutionaries harbored toward the civil service. As one revolutionary argued: it was essential that in the ministries there be more “probity than scientific knowledge, more patriotism than the Machiavellianism of tyrants.”\textsuperscript{63} In the great majority of cases those dismissed received no pension or compensation. One distinguished jurist’s eloquent rejoinder to Dumouriez is fortunately preserved. Christian Friedrich Pfeffel’s (1726-1807)\textsuperscript{64} disdain resonates throughout his letter of 8 April 1792. He told the minister that “the rigidity of my principles does not permit me to demand nor to accept a pension from the Assembly. The services which I have rendered to the state during a career of 43 years have received enough recompense by the reputation that my work has acquired, by the esteem of honest men, and by the witness of my conscience that I was always faithful to the king, full of a disinterested zeal for the service of the king, and irreproachable in the exercise of my functions.”\textsuperscript{65}

We can see the effect of Dumouriez’s policies on the diplomatic service abroad in the fate of Mathieu Joseph Gandolphe (1748-1804), who first worked in the finance section. He had been promoted to secretary of the legation at Hamburg (1787) and later chargé d’affaires at Hamburg and Bremen (1790-1792). Gandolphe was neither a member of an old illustrious family, nor a noble. His origins were humble; his father had been a wood seller. But he too was caught up in the hunt for royalist sympathizers. The Gandolphe case shows that not even those from the “second couche” were secure. Gandolphe was one of many who were forced out without any indemnity or pension and shortly thereafter

\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid.
\item Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:283-84.
\item Church, Revolution and Red Tape, 84.
\item He served as chargé d’affaires at Regensburg (1759-1761); he then served for Zweibrücken as minister resident to Bavaria. In 1768 he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a jurisconsult. Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 839.
\item Blaga, L’Évolution de la diplomatie, 445-46. See also Emmanuel de Lévis Mirepoix, Le Ministère des affaires étrangères (Angers, 1954), 37-46.
\end{itemize}
arrested and imprisoned in the Abbaye. Luckily, he survived. It was not until the consulate that he received an appointment as secretary (1800) and later chargé d’affaires at Berne (April to June 1803), chargé d’affaires at Valais (September 1803 to July 1804) and first secretary of the French legation at Rome, where he served from 1803 until his death. Dumouriez’s distrust of those abroad reflected the mentality of many revolutionaries who queried: where were the patriotic envoys? Many questioned the civism of envoys such as Jacques Hardouin, comte de Châlon in Portugal, who presented his credentials in October 1789, and Durfort in Venice, who had been appointed as recently as March 1791. Many contended that diplomacy was controlled by the “creatures of the Old Regime and consequently mortal enemies of the new.” Not only Dumouriez but others as well advocated the appointment of those of proven loyalty such as Sémonville or Ternant (1750-1816).

Dumouriez’s policies would have proved even more disastrous had it not been for the outbreak of war, which greatly reduced the number of envoys abroad. After April 1792, as France found herself at war with more and more of Europe, she had need of fewer representatives. Those few, according to Dumouriez, did not need experience because it was the majesty of the nation that lent importance to negotiations. In his view a constitutional government was by its very nature superior to that of a despotic one. Accordingly, France’s agent should be resolute. His rhetoric did not entirely match reality for he chose some men with diplomatic experience. He appointed Antoine-Bernard Caillard (1737-1807), one of the “second couche.” Caillard had had extensive diplomatic experience as secretary of the legation at Parma (1770-72), Kassel (1773-74), Copenhagen (1775-77), St. Petersburg, (1780-83), and The Hague (1785-87); and chargé d’affaires at Copenhagen (1777-79), St. Petersburg (1783-84), and The Hague (1788-91). He was one of the very few diplomats of the Old Regime to serve the new one successfully and to survive. Although Caillard was appointed as minister plenipotentiary to

67 Moniteur, 12:33, 4 April 1792; Allonville, Mémoires, 1: 269-71.
69 Chuquet, Dumouriez, 71.
70 He later served as minister at Berlin (1795-98). In 1799 on Talleyrand’s recommendation he received an appointment in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. Michaud, 6:348-49; DBF, 7:843; Winter, 112, 116, 126, 131-33, 141.
Regensburg and went in June 1792, he was never received because on 31 July the Holy Roman Empire declared war.\textsuperscript{71} Dumouriez also relied upon and sent the adroit and experienced Maisonneuve to Baden as minister (April-December 1792)\textsuperscript{72} and the inexperienced Pierre Paul Meredieu, baron de Naillac, to Zweibrücken. The latter’s mission to bribe the duke in order to obtain Prussian neutrality failed and lasted little more than a month.\textsuperscript{73}

Overall, Dumouriez made poor decisions. For example, he dispatched Talleyrand as an unaccredited representative to the British, but because he was just that, the British refused to negotiate with him. He also appointed friends and relatives while recalling some of the king’s most experienced envoys, notably Edouard Victurnien Charles René Colbert, comte de Maulevrier, who had refused to take the constitutional oath.\textsuperscript{74} and Bernier de Maligny. Maulevrier, who had served as minister plenipotentiary at Cologne since 1785, was recalled in April 1792 and replaced with Charles de Pont (b. 1767), who only remained a few months.\textsuperscript{75} Maulevrier’s scruples may have cost him his position: he was unwilling to spy on French refugees, who had fled there. He was willing to report on anything that might endanger France, as he candidly had told Montmorin earlier, but anything else derogated from the character that he held. Angrily Montmorin had rejoined that ministers should be “attentive to anything that concerned France” and that he would never demand that he do anything which “compromised” his character.\textsuperscript{76} When Maulevrier left, the first secretary of the legation, Loubrie Laval, resigned.\textsuperscript{77} Bernier de Maligny, the chargé d’affaires at Geneva was also recalled on 25 April 1792 and replaced with Dumouriez’s cousin, Pierre Basile François de

\begin{footnotes}
\item[72] Winter, 109.
\item[73] Sorel, \textit{L’Europe et la Révolution française}, 2:449. Naillac was later sent to Genoa (August 1792-May 1794) as minister plenipotentiary: Winter, 117. See also Winter, 130.
\item[74] Coiffier de Verseux, ed., \textit{Dictionnaire biographique}, 2:517.
\item[77] Ibid., 373.
\end{footnotes}
L’Espine de Châteauneuf, who arrived on 13 May 1792 as resident. His cousin had served briefly in the army before entering the consular service and being posted to Smyrna, the Morea, Tripoli, and Tunis. In addition to his cousin, Dumouriez also appointed his personal friend, the marquis Bernard François de Chauvelin (1766-1832), who was dispatched to London as minister plenipotentiary. Dumouriez sent other diplomatic neophytes: Charles François de Pont as minister plenipotentiary to Cologne (May-July 1792), Emmanuel de Maulde Hosdan as minister plenipotentiary to The Hague (1792-93), Baptiste Dorothée Villars, a well known Jacobin, as minister plenipotentiary to Mainz (May 1792-July 1792), and Nicolas-Félix, later Baron Desportes (1763-1849), to Pfalz-Zweibrücken.

Even the lower ranks were impacted. Dumouriez recalled second secretaries such as the competent Gaudin in Portugal. He appointed in their stead the inexperienced. Pierre Chépy tried to ingratiate himself with Dumouriez by underscoring, not his diplomatic experience as he had none, but his Jacobin credentials. He assured Dumouriez that he would remain a

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79 After his cousin fled, Chateauneuf resigned his post (1793) and went to Holland and then Hamburg where he died in 1800. Michaud, 8:16.
80 Peter Jupp, Lord Grenville, 1759-1834 (Oxford, 1985), 146. For Grenville’s attitude toward him see, for example, PRO, FO 27/39, Grenville to Chauvelin, 25 May 1792.
82 Winter, 126; Georges Six, Dictionnaire biographique des généraux et amiraux français de le Révolution et de l’Empire (1792-1814) (Paris, 934), 2:172.
83 Winter, 124. Villars left Mainz on 14 July 1792 because of the declaration of war by the Holy Roman Empire. The elector had promised to observe “all that conforms to the principle of the droit des gens.” France, Recueil des instructions, 28: États allemands, 1: L’Electorat de Mayence, 281-87. Villars candidly told the foreign minister of his “nullity.” He complained of the “perfidious politesse” of the elector, the “aristocratic gangrene” and their “hatred” of the French constitution (286). Villars would later go to Genoa (1794-1796). Winter, 117.
Jacobin “until his death.” That profession of faith evidently secured him a position but did not, however, deter him from soliciting and later accepting a pension from Louis XVIII. Chépy succeeded in being appointed secretary at Liège, where he remained a mere five days. His first appointment was not a happy nor successful one. He was chased from the cathedral by men armed with swords who were attending a funeral service for Emperor Leopold II. He and his colleagues fled to the French legation which was quickly surrounded. They eventually escaped at four in the morning back to Paris. His second diplomatic foray was no more successful. Appointed second secretary to the embassy at Portugal, the court refused to recognize him. Because his reputation preceded him, the police refused to allow him to disembark for four days. Even after he left the ship the police kept him under tight surveillance. Intemperately trumpeting the August Revolution, Chépy tactlessly succeeded in alienating even further Châlon, the French ambassador, and many at court and was forced yet again to flee after remaining a little over a month.

Dumouriez’s policies also triggered the resignations of envoys at two critically important posts, Vienna and the Imperial Diet, and a more minor one at the Grisons. Emmanuel Marie Louis, marquis de Noailles (1743-1822), the ambassador at Vienna (1783-92), demanded his recall. Although the Assembly passed a decree against him, it was adjourned. He was subsequently called before the Assembly to defend his record, thrown into prison, and only released after Robespierre’s death. The experienced Barbé-Marbois, who represented France at the Imperial Diet, resigned as well in April. He took the oath demanded, but only remained a few months because he refused to represent so revolutionary a government.

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86 Ibid., xi-xiv, lxxii.
87 He had served as ambassador to the United Provinces (1771-1775) and to Great Britain (1776-1778). He had extensive experience under the Old Regime, serving also at Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Lower Saxony, and Vienna. He was incarcerated during the Terror and after Thermidor retired to his château. Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 770-71; Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:307; Winter, 111, 113-15, 118-19, 122, 124-25; and Michaud 30:628.
The king had been particularly fond of this diplomat, who had served him well in the United States and several German states. Beginning in 1768 he had served as secretary of the legation at Regensburg and chargé d’affaires at Dresden and Munich. After 1776 he served as secretary of the legation, chargé d’affaires, and consul general in the United States, and in 1785 intendant general for St. Domingo. The king valued him for his integrity and competence. Barbé-Marbois was sent to Regensburg as minister to resolve the delicate issue of the German princes’ rights in Alsace and Lorraine and later went with Noailles to Vienna. He retired to Metz. A voice of moderation, he was briefly imprisoned and then transported to Guiana in Fructidor. He returned to France in Brumaire. Both Napoleon and Louis XVIII rewarded him with important offices.\textsuperscript{89}

The resignation of Salis in the Grisons was equally unfortunate because it robbed France of an individual who had served faithfully for 24 years.\textsuperscript{90}

Under Dumouriez’s ministry relations also deteriorated at two other courts, both former allies, Sardinia and Prussia. Dumouriez was in large part responsible for the first crisis because he refused to observe the usual courtesy of vetting an individual at the receiving court before his formal appointment. Predictably, the king of Sardinia refused to “abase” himself and allow Charles-Louis Huguet de Sémonville, “a Jacobin,” into his realm.\textsuperscript{91} Sémonville’s sporting of a hat decorated with an enormous tricolor cockade when he reached the border had cemented the duke’s determination.\textsuperscript{92} Although Dumouriez had insisted in the Assembly that Sardinia make a public reparation for the insult, behind the scenes Dumouriez was proposing to replace Sémonville with a more acceptable

\textsuperscript{89} Michaud, 26:424-31; Recueil des instructions, 18: Diète Germanique, 375; Winter, 114, 116, 134.

\textsuperscript{90} Jean Kaulek, ed., Papiers de Barthélémy, ambassadeur de France en Suisse, 1792-1797 (Paris, 1886) 1:117 for resignation of Salis. See also 1:142, 144; and France, Recueil des instructions, 30: Suisse, 2: Genève, Les Grisons, Neuchâtel et Valangin, L’Évêché de Bâle, Le Valais, 763.

\textsuperscript{91} Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 2:450. See also James Harris, earl of Malmesbury, Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury (New York, 1970) 4:409, for refusal of passports and departure of the French chargé, La Lande, without taking leave.

\textsuperscript{92} Allonville, Mémoires, 1:350-55; Dumouriez, La Vie et les mémoires, 2:201, 248-51 and 6:244; and Harris, Diaries and Correspondence, 2:444; Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 221-22; John Harold Clapham, The Causes of the War of 1792 (Cambridge, 1899), 188.
This discrepancy between his public rhetoric and his actions often marked Dumouriez’s tenure. Dumouriez’s second emissary to Sardinia, Audibert-Caille, was no more successful. The duke refused to accept him or to deal with a government that was on the edge of “an abyss.” Given the close ties between the house of Savoy (the rulers of Sardinia) and the Bourbons, the duke’s attitude should not have been surprising. Louis’ brothers, the future Louis XVIII and Charles X, had married princesses of the house of Savoy and Louis’ sister, Clotilde, had married the future Sardinian king Emmanuel IV. Nor would the ministers at Berlin agree to compromise the Prussian king with these “wretches” and receive Pierre-Victor Benoît, a partisan of the Revolution (1758-1835). Renaud Philippe de Custine, whom Lessart had earlier sent as chargé to Prussia, was in effect quarantined. He found himself under close guard until Blumendorf, the Prussian representative in France, and a Prussian courier were allowed to leave Paris. Custine, like his famous father, was condemned to death and executed, on unrelated charges. Those diplomatic failures were harbingers of Dumouriez’s own dismissal. Girondin hostility forced him from office. He rejoined the army and was present at the French victory at Valmy and the French defeat at Neerwinden. He subsequently defected to the Austrians and finished his life as an exile in England. As Sorel noted, for Dumouriez “the French Revolution was not, in his eyes, a regeneration of humanity, it was a career.”

DUMOURIEZ’S SUCCESSORS

Dumouriez’s successors were both men of real courage. Victor Scipion Louis Joseph de la Garde, marquis de Chambonas (d. 1807) (17 June-23 July 1792), and Bigot de Sainte-Croix (August 1-10, 1792) only remained in office a short time and were increasingly frustrated as more and more

93 Chuquet, Dumouriez, 75.
95 Ibid., 2:447.
96 Michaud 3:660. His wife was a student of David and a famous painter. He held minor positions under Napoleon, was employed by Louis XVIII and eventually ennobled, receiving the title comte.
97 Winter, 131; Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française 2:443-44; Michaud, (9:588-89) says he was sent as minister plenipotentiary but Winter disagrees.
98 Scott and Rothaus, eds., Historical Dictionary, 1:331.
power devolved to the Convention. The diplomatic difficulties increased as the tempo of ministerial resignations accelerated. Chambonas resigned after presenting a dire overview of France’s relations with the rest of the world, concluding with the memorable phrase: “We have many enemies, few certain allies, even fewer friends.” Bigot lost his office in the aftermath of August 10th.

The increasingly precarious position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was echoed ironically in the fate of the members of the diplomatic committee who had undermined his authority. Those who served on the diplomatic committee (created on 14 October 1791) were also suspect. Koch, the distinguished jurist, who presided over the committee before the fall of the monarchy, fell foul of the Girondins because of his opposition to the war. He was arrested twice and spent eleven months in different prisons before being released in 1794. Even Koch’s arch-rival on the committee, Rühl, described by one biographer as not only a man of pride and arrogance, but also a partisan of the extreme left and a supporter of Robespierre, was proscribed shortly after Thermidor and killed himself rather than face the guillotine. Others on the diplomatic committee scarcely fared better. Of the total 35 members who served on it – and some served more than once – seven (20%) were executed: Brissot, Jacques-François-Marie Delaunay, François-Claude Fauchet, Gensonné, Marc-David Alba dit Lasource, and Pierre-Paul-Victorin (or Victorien) Vergniaud. Eight (22.8%) were arrested: Jean-Baptiste Collet, Jean-Baptiste Debry, Joseph-Benoît Dalmas, Henri-Maximin Isnard (who escaped), Koch, Pierre Laureau (Laureau de Saint-André), Lindet, and Thomas François Treilh-Pardhailhan. Two committed suicide: Rühl and Jean-Antoine Daverhoult. Two emigrated: Jacourt and Daverhoult (tried but caught and killed himself). Five fled: Lazare-Nicolas-Marguerite Carnot ainé, Pierre-Louis Lacretelle, François-Arnail de Jaucourt, Pierre

99 Blaga, L’Évolution de la diplomatie, 447. See also Jean-Pierre Bois, “Chambonas” and “Bigot de Sainte-Croix” in Bély et al., Dictionnaire des ministres des affaires étrangères, 216-19. See also Tuetey, Répertoire général, 4: #2166 for the decree putting his papers under seal.

100 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 195.

101 Voss, “Christophe Guillaume Koch,” 533. See also Friedrich Buech, Christoph Wilhelm Koch (1737-1813), der letzte Rechtslehrer der alten Strassburger Hochschule (Frankfurt am Main, 1936).

Edouard Lemontey, and Vincent-Marie Viénot de Vaublanc. One was assassinated, Bonnier. The conclusion seems inescapable that service on the diplomatic committee, whether beginning on 25 October 1791, 2 March 1792, or 17 July 1792 was hazardous, but not as dangerous as that of serving as foreign minister.

By July and early August 1792 governments increasingly expelled or refused to accept French envoys and recalled their own. Exemplative of the deterioration of relations between France and Europe was the expulsion of Edmond Charles Édouard Genet (d. 1834) from Russia. Genet, chargé d’affaires in Russia (1789-1792), found himself in an untenable position largely because of his own conduct. His predecessor, Ségur, the French minister plenipotentiary (1785-1789), although committed to the Revolution, had won favor with Catherine, who from the outset had opposed the Revolution. By 6 October 1789 Ségur would write the foreign minister that the empress received him privately but not publicly. Although the tsarina had read his dispatches and knew he sympathized with the popular cause she saw him leave shortly thereafter “with pain.” Genet, noted that Ségur was “generally loved” at court. That was not true of his successor. Genet had begun his service as a captain of dragoons before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an interpreter. He then served at the Berlin and Viennese embassies before being named chief of the bureau of translation at the ministry, replacing his father. When this bureau was suppressed, Montmorin sent him to

103 See appendix for complete listing of members of the diplomatic committee. Also see Rothaus, “The Emergence of Legislative Control,” 169; and Thompson, Popular Sovereignty, 148. See Aulard, ed., La Société des Jacobins, 1:27 for establishment of the diplomatic committee. One revolutionary argued that the committee was crucial at a time when the ministry was stubbornly clinging to its old and perverse path. For the preponderant role of the diplomatic committee see National Library of Scotland, Minto Family Archives, Papers of Hugh Elliot, Ms. 13022, fol. 219.

104 See e.g. B.L. Add. Mss. 48388, fols. 135-138, Pitt to Grenville, 18 August 1792, and 7 September 1792 regarding the recall of British representatives.


106 Ibid., 475.

107 Ibid., 476.

108 Ibid., 477. See also 470-76.
Russia to act as secretary for Ségur who found him intelligent, linguistically gifted but “extremely passionate.”

Genet, who had neither the tact nor the skill of Ségur, found his situation increasingly untenable as Catherine’s contempt for the revolutionaries increased. In a letter of 1 June 1791 she referred to France as a “Sodom and Gomorrha.” Russians who went to France faced the possibility of losing their positions and their lands. The coldness with which Genet was treated changed over time to snubs and then insults. Genet undoubtedly had worsened his position by his overt advocacy of the Revolution. As early as 19 December 1790 Montmorin had cautioned him against acting with more zeal than discretion. But his situation was a difficult one because at St. Petersburg Catherine listened to the personal representatives of the king, the emissaries of Provence and Artois, and agents of the other émigrés. In August 1791 Genet, despite his protests, was told to appear at court no longer. Genet’s associates in Russia were warned against seeing him and the police were ordered to follow him. By October Catherine forbade her officials from accepting any memorials from him. As he candidly told Montmorin, his “difficulties, “vexations,” and “mortifications” multiplied daily. One minister at court referred to him as a rascal and Catherine herself termed him an “enragé.” In part, this hostility stemmed from the court’s knowledge of Genet’s true feelings as they had read all his dispatches – as he well knew. Back in Paris, the foreign minister, Lessart, cautioned Genet as late as 24 January 1792 that he “could not entirely approve” his dispatches and urged him to “moderate, if it is possible this impetuous character...” and also, if possible, avoid “irritating” his Russian hosts. Genet in fact did just the opposite; he deliberately did not encode his letters so that Catherine would know what he had written. By the spring of 1792 not surprisingly Genet found himself more and more isolated. By that time Catherine had recalled her minister plenipotentiary, Ivan Matveevic Simoline (1785-92), and shortly thereafter her chargé d’affaires, Michail Semenovic Novikov,

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109 Ibid., 480. See also 479 and Michaud 16:146-47.
111 Ibid., 509, letter of Bezborodko of September 1791.
112 Ibid., 517, Genet to Montmorin, 14 October 1791.
113 Ibid., 518, 537.
114 Ibid., 522.
115 Ibid., 523, De Lessart to Genet, Paris, 13 February 1792.
from Paris. In July 1792 Genet was ordered to quit the capital within eight days because his presence was not only “superfluous” but “intolerable.” After Louis XVI’s execution Catherine issue an oukase on 8 February 1793 in which she denounced the revolutionaries’ intent to propagate their principles of “impiety, anarchy and immorality” throughout the world. She denounced the “atrocities” that the French had committed and the “universal horror” they inspired. She also announced the expulsion of the French representative and all the French consuls.  

Other governments, even those France expected to be friendly, if not allied, refused to accept those appointed diplomats when vetted beforehand. The United States, for example, regarded the appointment of Bonne-Carrère as the French representative as an insult and refused to accept him. His predecessor, Ternant, had been very popular; he had served in the American army and was a friend of Lafayette. William Short, the American envoy to The Hague, noted somewhat acerbically that the Assembly used diplomatic appointments as an opportunity to provide “a secure retreat for some of the leading demagogues.” But many in the Assembly also found Bonne-Carrère “obnoxious” and later quashed the appointment. Bigot de Sainte-Croix, who refused to accept the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs unless Bonne-Carrère left the ministry, had suggested that he be sent abroad. Bonne-Carrère (1754-1825), a secretary of the Jacobin club, had undertaken secret missions for Vergennes and Montmorin. An ally of Mirabeau and Dumouriez, he had earlier been appointed to represent France at Liège but the bishop had refused to receive him. He had also served under Lessart and Dumouriez at the Foreign Ministry. He was arrested on 2 April 1794 and accused of complicity with Dumouriez. Only 9 Thermidor saved him from certain

116 Winter, 354.  
117 France, Recueil des instructions, 9: Russie 2: 1749-1789, 536, note to Genet of 8/19 July 1792. See also 497 and 499, Montmorin to Genet, 19 December 1790; see also 479, 480, 492-93, 506, 510-12, 515-18, 524-27, 532, 535-41.  
119 Gouverneur Morris, A Diary of the French Revolution (Boston, 1939), 2:494.  
121 Ibid., 24:303, 324. See also PRO, FO, 4/16 Dispatch of Hammond, Philadelphia, 3 October 1792.
death. He was subsequently sent on various secret missions to Great Britain and Denmark. Bonaparte refused to appoint him to any office of importance, as did the restored Bourbons in spite of his disingenuous protestations that he had supported the monarchy.\footnote{Mercy-Argenteau and Blumendorf, \textit{Dépêches inédites}, 154-55 note. See also Michaud, 5:24, 25; and Tuetey, \textit{Répertoire général}, 4: #2166 for the decree putting his papers under seal.}

\section*{REVOLUTION OF 10 AUGUST 1792}

As late as August 1792, the problem of appointments had not been resolved. Petitioners demanded that if France had to have envoys, and they were still not convinced that they were necessary, then these men should not be former nobles.\footnote{Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 206.} Revolutionaries continually reiterated the necessity of replacing enemies of the new order with men dedicated to the new. The difficulty lay in how to determine those loyal to the new order.\footnote{Church, \textit{Revolution and Red Tape}, 48.} Revolutionaries’ suspicions of France’s envoys had not lessened nor had receiving governments’ aversion to them. France found herself more and more isolated. This sense of isolation only increased after the Revolution of August 10, 1792 and the overthrow of the monarchy because more diplomats resigned under the ministry of Pierre Henry Marie Tondu, called Lebrun-Tondu (10 August 1792 to 21 June 1793), a man whom Madame Roland indicted as having “no industry, spirit or character.”\footnote{Jean-Pierre Bois, “Lebrun-Tondu” in Bély et al., \textit{Dictionnaire des ministres des affaires étrangères}, 219. J.T. Murley, “The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1793” (D.Phil. diss., Oxford, 1959), 13-21, sees Lebrun as an individual beset by “the tragedy of weakness” (p. 19), who had no experience of traditional diplomacy and who allowed himself to be dominated by stronger personalities. For more on Lebrun see Howe, \textit{French Foreign Policy}.} Lebrun had no doubt garnered support with his condemnation of the diplomacy of the Old Regime for being only “the art of dissimulation, of perfidy, of imposture, of deceit” and his praise of the new diplomacy for being “frank and little complicated.”\footnote{Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 261.} The so-called “Second Revolution” in effect suspended the missions of the foreign representatives still in Paris who had been accredited to the king and now
had no official status. Nor any longer had the French representatives abroad. Barthélémy, an experienced diplomat of the Old Regime, had no doubt that “la politique des nations n’a pas une autre marche.”

As early as June 1791 when the king’s power was provisionally suspended, most countries had broken off relations or recalled their envoys. Many who had not at that time did so after the Revolution of 10 August 1792. More and more foreign representatives fled Paris. This depressing litany included the representatives of Spain, Venice, the Hanseatic cities, Geneva, Poland, Saxony, Denmark, Sweden, Liège, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Parma. Many of the


129 Bois, “Lebrun-Tondu” in Bély et al., *Dictionnaire des ministres des affaires étrangères*, 219. See also Frey and Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*, ch. 8 for treatment of foreign diplomats in France; and Margherita Marichione, Stanley J. Idzerda, and S. Eugene Scalia, eds., *Philip Mazzei: Selected Writings and Correspondence* (Prato, Italy, 1983) 2:225-26; and Mousset, *Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution*, 135-49 for Fernan Nuñez’s complaints about the difficulties diplomats encountered in Paris in trying to retain their privileges, and about the seizure of dispatches and couriers, and the destruction of insignia and so forth. In his view it was as if “the Saracens have entered Paris” (142). For yet other contemporary views see Anne Louise Germaine Necker Stäel-Holstein, *Considérations sur les principaux événemens de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1818) 2: 64-66, 77; HMC, *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue*, 2:307, 309; and Jean Loup de Virieu, *La Révolution française racontée par un diplomate étranger: correspondance du bailli de Virieu, ministre plénipotentiaire de Parme (1788-1793)* (Paris, 1903), 437-38, 440, 447, 476. In the case of Parma, the representative, Virieu, was arrested and the official papers later seized. A secretary, the chevalier Joseph de Lama, was put in charge of the legation after the plenipotentiary departed but he too left the country in October of 1793. For the problems of representatives of even fellow republics see Marc Peter, *Genève et la Révolution française* (Geneva, 1921), 350; Claude Emmanuel Henri Marie, comte de Pimodan, ed., *Le Comte F.-C. de Mercy Argenteau, ambassadeur impérial à Paris sous Louis XV et sous Louis XVI* (Paris, 1911), 318-20; Tuetey, *Répertoire
representatives would have left earlier had they been able to procure passports.\textsuperscript{130} The positions of these diplomats had become untenable: they found themselves harassed, their homes invaded, their dispatches seized, and often their wives or members of their entourage attacked.\textsuperscript{131}

Some host governments even feared that their own representatives might have been too exposed to what they regarded as the revolutionary contagion. Only the untimely death of the Swedish king saved Baron Erik Magnus de Staël-Holstein, the Swedish ambassador to France, from arrest on his return.\textsuperscript{132} As diplomats accredited to France returned home the pressure increased to expel the French diplomats still resident abroad. After news of the Revolution of 10 August reached Naples and Poland, the French representatives often found themselves in precarious situations. In Naples the court broke off relations and forced Mackau to leave.\textsuperscript{133} In Poland the government ordered the French representative, Marie-Louis-Henri Descorches, marquis de Sainte-Croix, to depart and emphasized that he could not remain under the protection of the droit des gens or retain the prerogatives of a foreign minister. The August Revolution had in effect given the Poles the pretext they needed to demand Descorches’ expulsion for they had earlier in the year requested his recall. They feared that he might spread what they labelled “the French contagion.”\textsuperscript{134} Descorches confided affairs to Jean-Alexandre-Yves Bonneau, who had served France in Poland since 1775. Bonneau was subsequently arrested and imprisoned on orders from Catherine II on 7

\textsuperscript{130} HMC, The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, 2:307.
\textsuperscript{131} Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 3:14.
\textsuperscript{132} National Library of Scotland, Papers of Sir Robert Liston, Ms. 5566, fol. 53, Liston to ?, Stockholm, 26 August 1792. For Liston’s view of Staël-Holstein whom he saw as a “man of slender talents, great self opinion, and tiresome loquacity”, see fol. 52.
\textsuperscript{133} Attilio Simioni, Le origini del risorgimento politico dell’Italia meridionale (Rome, 1925), 1:441-42.
\textsuperscript{134} Pierre Doyon, “La Mission diplomatique de Descorches en Pologne (1791-1792),” Revue d’histoire diplomatique 41 (1925), 185-209; see also Winter, 130;
March 1793 and not released until 13 December 1796, and only then because of Prussian intervention. Even in the Swiss lands, many, such as those at Solothurn, remained sympathetic to the king and hostile to the Revolution in part because of the massacre of the Swiss guard. Barthélemy reported how on arriving at his mission he discovered that many prayed for the king’s safety.

The Revolution of 10 August 1792 triggered more resignations from diplomats abroad than any other revolutionary crisis with the exception of the king’s flight to Varennes. Many diplomats who could in conscience no longer support the revolutionary government tendered their resignations: Maisonneuve at Württemberg, the comte de Choiseul-Gouffier at Constantinople, Charles François Hurault, vicomte de Vibraye, at Copenhagen. Yves Louis Joseph Hirsinger, chargé d’affaires at the Grison League (8-9 August 1792-26 August 1792), and La Tour du Pin-Gouvernet at The Hague. In Portugal Jacques Hardouin, comte de Châlon, did what he could to obstruct the revolutionaries: he refused to leave the embassy and eventually died in Portugal. The French retaliated and confiscated his property and imprisoned the Portuguese chargé, Tommazini, in La Force. The Convention then sent Darbault and Chépy to replace Châlon but the Portuguese refused to recognize either. The case of La Tour du Pin-Gouvernet in the United Provinces shows the human dimension behind the turmoil at Foreign Affairs. The marquis de La Tour du Pin-Gouvernet, who belonged to an illustrious old family, began his career in the army; he served as an aide de camp to Lafayette and then to François-Claude-Amour, marquis de Bouillé, in 1778, fought in the American War of Independence, and rose through the ranks to become colonel. In 1789 he served as an aide de camp to his father, and again under Lafayette in the National Guard in Paris. In 1791 he was sent to The

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136 Iiams, *Peacemaking*, 104.
137 He remained in Copenhagen supporting the king. He was condemned as an émigré. He returned to France at the First Restoration and was named honorary lieutenant general. DBF, 18:59-60.
138 Winter, 131. See also Simão José da Luz Soriano, *Historia da Guerra Civil* (Lisbon, 1866), 501-04 and Jean de Pins, *Sentiment et diplomatie d’après des correspondances franco-portugaises* (Paris, 1984), 8-9. The duo arrived in Portugal on 12 March 1793 and Lisbon on 23 March. They were neither recognized nor received. Chépy quickly returned home. Darbault did not. He was seized and imprisoned by the British on the isle of Guernsey.
Hague as minister plenipotentiary (17 October), where he remained until 10 August 1792 when he resigned. He did not return to France until 1808 but held no diplomatic appointments until Louis XVIII ironically nominated him envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to The Hague (9 July 1814) – his post before the August Revolution – and shortly thereafter minister plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna. He subsequently was given the title marquis and served as ambassador at Turin from 19 July 1820 until August 1830 when he resigned. He refused to take the oath to Louis Philippe and retired to Switzerland.¹³⁹

Other envoys, such as Hirsinger and Vibraye, explained their positions. In a letter from Copenhagen of 7 September 1792 Vibraye contended that “since the King because of his captivity can no longer exercise his royal power, I cannot recognize any other legitimate power in France... I held my power from the king... from the moment when my authority is null, I am null also, and as long as this evil situation lasts, I cannot acknowledge any other orders that you would give me.”¹⁴⁰ In the Grisons that same argument was made by Hirsinger, who publicly announced his resignation in the Gazette de Berne and to the president and heads of the Grison League. He wrote the foreign minister, Lebrun, that he was abandoning “without regret the diplomatic career which I have followed for forty years and in which I have acquired a certain esteem.” He then terminated his correspondence.¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, Lebrun replied. He condemned Hirsinger and agents “like you who put their opinion in the place of the law, betraying insolently their duties and the interests of their country.”¹⁴² In a letter to the president of the National Convention Lebrun noted that many agents, citing the suspension of the king, had “abandoned their functions.” Such “craven desertion,” he fulminated, was “guided by perfidious views” and would “injure the interests of the republic.” Lebrun bitterly denounced these men for having “betrayed their duty and the cause of their country.”¹⁴³

Yet another diplomat who took a principled stand was Choiseul-Gouffier, the ambassador to Constantinople (1784-92). A distinguished

139 Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 234-35.
140 A.N., F/7/4397. See also declaration to Danish Minister dated 24 August 1792.
141 Ibid., Hirsinger to Lebrun, 26 August 1792. See also letter of 10 September 1792 to Lebrun.
142 Ibid., October, an I.
143 Ibid.
intellectual, a member of the Académie des Inscriptions and the Académie des Beaux-Arts and founder of the Société des Amis des Arts, he refused to return to France and considered his mission ended after 10 August. Choiseul-Gouffier did “not neglect any means to weaken the perfidious insinuations of the National Assembly.” He refused to abandon the embassy, which the “enemies of the monarchy could occupy with such advantage,” and vaunted that he did all he could to “multiply the obstacles” confronting his successor. If he could not stop the recognition of his successor, he at least hoped to delay it as long as possible. The government pulled Fonton, the senior member of the staff, out of retirement to be the chargé from 1792 to 1793. At Constantinople Choiseul-Gouffier had raised the prestige of France, impressed the court with his knowledge of ancient Greece, and succeeded in freeing the imprisoned Russian ambassador. The latter was to prove important to him when he fled to St. Petersburg in 1793, where he was warmly received by Empress Catherine. Her successor, Paul, named him councillor to the court and director of the Academy of Arts and the Imperial Library. He only returned to France in 1802. Louis XVIII subsequently named him a member of the Privy Council, minister of state, and peer of France. As a contemporary noted: he died “faithful to his God as well as to his king.”

Choiseul-Gouffier’s reputation at Constantinople was so high that he was able, with the help of other envoys, to persuade the Porte to refuse to accept his successor, Sémonville, whom he regarded as one of the “scoundrels who menace Europe with general subversion.” Four of the representatives – from the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia, Russia, and Naples – sent memoirs to the Turks denouncing Sémonville and urging them not to accept him. The Neapolitan envoy depicted Sémonville as “more of a scoundrel than the Goths and the Huns.” The Austrian and

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144 Édouard de Marcère, Une Ambassade à Constantinople: La Politique orientale de la Révolution française (Paris, 1927), 1:62; Allonville, Mémoires, 6: 239-40.

145 For some of his problems with the French merchants see A.N. F/7/4390/2.


147 DBF, 8:1199 and France, Recueil des instructions, 29: Turquie, 467.

148 Michaud, 8:192.

149 Hérault de Séchelles, Rapport présenté le 30 sept 1792, 6.

150 For their memoirs see Ibid., 6-11.

150 Marcère, Une Ambassade à Constantinople, 1:61-62.
Prussian representatives seconded these remarks and depicted Sémonville as a monster. They pointed out that other courts had refused to receive him. They went on to criticize the “perversity of his principles” and “execrable projects” and concluded that their courts would see his acceptance as an act of hostility.\textsuperscript{151} The Prussian envoy denounced Sémonville as a member of the Jacobins, “a vile sect composed of frightful fanatics dominated by democratic rage.” The Russian \textit{chargé d’affaires} contended that Sémonville, whom several courts had refused to receive as minister, was an advocate of a “false and dangerous system.”\textsuperscript{152}

In addition to discredit his successor Choiseul-Gouffier also turned over the archives of the embassy to the Turks.\textsuperscript{153} Lebrun, who could only condemn the “criminal maneuverings” of Choiseul-Gouffier,\textsuperscript{154} found himself powerless. The Assembly, however, acted and passed a decree of accusation against Choiseul-Gouffier.\textsuperscript{155} Lebrun and the Assembly, however, found it impossible to persuade the Porte to receive Sémonville and at the Porte’s insistence sent another representative, Descorches de Sainte-Croix.\textsuperscript{156}

In addition to the heads of embassies, such as Choiseul-Gouffier, other more minor players resigned. Chalgrin, the first secretary of the embassy at Constantinople, remained loyal to Choiseul-Gouffier and the king and resigned. In a moving letter widely circulated Chalgrin noted that he never considered himself the agent of the Assembly or the Ministry but rather the servant of the king whom he had served “with zeal and honor” for thirty-two years. He had recognized the constitution because the king had ordered him to do so. He went on to say that he did not recognize this “cadaverous constitution and that no oath will bind him in this regard.”

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 1:62.

\textsuperscript{152} A.N. F/7/4390/2, Report in the name of the comité diplomatique et de sûreté générale, 9 August 1792 presented to Hérault, deputy, includes letter to discredit Sémonville to Ottoman Porte by envoys of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Naples. See also Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 267; Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 3:353.

\textsuperscript{153} Marcère, \textit{Une Ambassade à Constantinople}, 1:11.

\textsuperscript{154} Grosjean, \textit{La Mission de Sémonville}, 35.

\textsuperscript{155} For the decree of the National Convention against Choiseul-Gouffier see section on the Porte, Constantinople, 8 December 1792 in A.N. F/7/4398; Sorel, \textit{L’Europe et la Révolution française}, 3:302; Allonville, \textit{Mémoires}, 6:240-48.

\textsuperscript{156} Marcère, \textit{Une Ambassade à Constantinople}, 2: 46; See also Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 2:269.
The actions of rebellious subjects had deprived the king of his rights and the executive power and plunged him into consternation and the most profound grief. He was neither “a revolutionary” nor “a vile intiguer” nor a rebel against his legitimate sovereign given by God. He was rather a good Frenchman, a faithful subject of the king, his unfortunate master, whom he would serve “until the last drop of his blood.” This profession of faith will remain for him “until his last breath.”\textsuperscript{157} The comte de Bray (b. 1765) resigned as well. He was a member of the French legation to the Diet at Regensburg until 10 August 1792. He entered the service of Maximilian I of Bavaria who employed him at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Paris, and Vienna.\textsuperscript{158} In the wake of August 10\textsuperscript{th}, still other diplomats or aspiring ones, such as the radical Bonne-Carrère,\textsuperscript{159} who had hoped to be appointed to a post in the United States, found their appointments suspended and their papers sealed.

In an attempt to ensure the loyalty of the dwindling few who were still abroad, the Assembly passed a decree on 15 August 1792 requiring those who represented France to take yet another oath to “be faithful to the nation and to maintain liberty and equality or to die in defending it.”\textsuperscript{160} This oath was problematic for many because it no longer required allegiance to the “nation, the law, and the king” as the king no longer existed and a republic had been declared.\textsuperscript{161} To the revolutionaries it was a protestation of faith. Lebrun sent the assembly a list of those who complied and took the oath: Chauvelin, minister, and Rheinhard, secretary of the legation, in London; Maulde Hosdan, minister plenipotentiary to the United Provinces; the secretary of the legation in Spain; Raymond Verninac de Sainte-Maure, the minister plenipotentiary to Sweden; François Barthélémy, the ambassador in the Swiss lands; Pierre Basile

\textsuperscript{157} National Library of Scotland, Papers of Sir Robert Liston 5574, fol. 193, Copy of letter of M. Chalgrin to Lebrun, 10 October 1792. See also Marcère, \textit{Une Ambassade à Constantinople}, 1:62.

\textsuperscript{158} F.-G. comte de Bray, \textit{Mémoires du comte de Bray} (Paris, 1911), xii.

\textsuperscript{159} Guillaume de Bonne-Carrère, \textit{Guillaume Bonne carrère à ses concitoyens} (n.pl.: 1792), 1.

\textsuperscript{160} Duvergier, ed., \textit{Collection complète}, 4:305.

\textsuperscript{161} Quoted in Baillou et al., eds., \textit{Les Affaires étrangères}, 1: 281. See also Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 241. See also Letter to Citizen President of National Convention, A.N. F/7/4397. See also A.N. F/7/4395, note of 2 October 1792; and Grandmaison, \textit{L’Ambassade française}, 79.
François de l’Espine de Châteauneuf, the resident in Geneva and the secretaries of the legation; Félix Desportes, the representative to Zweibrücken; Assigny, the envoy extraordinary in Bavaria; Louis Grégoire Le Hoc, minister plenipotentiary at Hamburg; Bechelé, the chargé d’affaires in Saxony; and Alexis Joseph Marie Fourvet de la Flotte, chargé in Tuscany. In December 1792 yet another decree provided that an individual could not vote or hold a position in the state unless he had taken an oath to liberty and equality and renounced privileges and prerogatives in writing.

But even taking such an oath did not completely safeguard envoys, some of whom were recalled because diplomats by the very nature of the office they held were suspect. For example, Colonel Jean Baptiste, chevalier de Ternant, who had served loyally and well as France’s minister plenipotentiary to the United States since August 1791 and had submitted the required oath, was recalled. Ternant had had diplomatic experience; he had served as envoy to the Holy Roman Empire in June 1790 but more important he had served bravely in the American revolutionary wars and was fluent in English. Lebrun also recalled Emmanuel de Maulde Hosdan, the French minister plenipotentiary at The Hague, who was accused of peculation by the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention. A “confirmed liar” and a “mild paranoic” with an oversized ego, Maulde was not the easiest envoy to defend. Lebrun had argued that the envoy had been unfairly recalled and defended both his probity and patriotism.

162 A.N. F/7/4397. See Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 12:381, 4 April 1793 for the subsequent arrest of Flotte.
163 Duvergier, Collection complète, 5:93 for 22-23 December 1792 decree.
164 De Conde, Entangling Alliance, 169; Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797 (New York, 1972), 1:163-64, 170-72; Winter, 144.
165 DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 157,168-69; Winter, 109, 120, 130, 144, 157, 169.
167 A.N. F/7/4390/2, comité diplomatique, attached letter of Lebrun?, copy, no date; Kidner, Jr., “The Girondists and the “Propaganda War” of 1792,” 36-37; Murley, “The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1793,” 239. For Auckland Maulde was “dangerous” even though he was both indiscreet and a ridiculous “wheedler.” HMC, Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, 2:288, Lord Auckland to Grenville, Most Secret, 6 July 1792.
unsuccessfully – Desportes, the representative to Zweibrücken, who was accused of seeking to “strangle liberty.” 168 The local Jacobin club had expelled him and refused to issue him a certificate of civism in part because of his relationship with some local aristocrats, his moderation, and allegations that he had removed the tricolor from his hat. After Danton fell, Desportes was imprisoned along with other Dantonists and only released in Thermidor. 169 The Thermidoreans then sent him to Geneva as resident (17 December 1794-18 October 1795), 170 but he was recalled yet again. Although the secretaries of his mission wrote on his behalf, defending his actions, some alleged that he had used expressions “unworthy of a French Republican,” such as “excellence” and “serenity,” while minister at Zweibrücken. The “elegance” of his figure and his habits convinced many that this “ci-devant” was not committed to the Revolution. 171 Lebrun also recalled François Cacault (1743-1805), a diplomat of the Old Regime who had served as secretary of the embassy and occasionally chargé d’affaires at Naples (1788-89, 1791-92). He was accused of consort ing with émigrés. But Lebrun must have had confidence in him for he sent him again in January of 1793 on another mission, this time to the pope, who did not receive him until 1796. 172

Lebrun also temporarily suspended from his functions Sénonville, recently appointed representative to the Turks, when a letter was found in the Tuileries written to the king in which Sénonville was described as having the “colors of a Jacobin” but a “heart devoted to the king.” 173 Sénonville was eventually cleared, but Lebrun was criticized for delaying the envoy’s departure to his post. 174 Lebrun argued that France could not be exposed to such a public affront as the Turks’ refusal to receive the envoy. Should such an action occur it would cause a public

168 A.N. F/7/4398, letter from Paris, 20 November 1792.
170 Winter, 139.
173 Lebrun letter of 2 April 1793, A.N. F/7/4397; Grosjean, La Mission de Sénonville, 34.
174 Lebrun letter of 2 April 1793, A.N. F/7/4398.
rupture. He also pointed out the undeniable truth that France could not afford to alienate the Ottomans.175

Nor had such precautions lessened the danger of Lebrun’s position. Lebrun found himself and the ministry under increasing scrutiny. In May 1793 L’Ami du peuple depicted Lebrun as an “Austrian dragon” and as a “creature of Dumouriez” – both treasonous indictments at the time – and predicted that the minister would soon be forced out – as he was. In addition the journalist went on to criticize Lebrun’s neglect of friendly powers, such as the Danes, his selection of poor envoys, some of whom were “courtisans” of the king, and his failure to purge the ministry of “creatures of Dumouriez.”176 Attacking men appointed or retained by the foreign minister was a tactic frequently relied upon to undermine the holder of this post. For example, Hugues-Bernard Maret, later duc de Bassano (1763-1839), was criticized for being insignificant, arrogant, and diplomatic inept; Soulavie as a hypocritical knave; and Noël as unpatriotic.177 They also targetted those at the bureaux, criticizing some as intrigues and others as enemies of the Jacobins.178 The bureaux, according to one disaffected individual, were filled with “creatures” or “protégés” of those now suspect. Uneasy with the other commis, this official was ill advised enough to announce that he “intended to accuse his colleagues in the bureau to the Jacobins.” Not surprisingly, his infuriated colleagues threatened him and forced him to leave his division. Resolving “never to set foot there again,” he proceeded with his accusation.179 This incident reveals how the disaffection of one individual could imperil others, especially within a ministry as vulnerable as that of Foreign Affairs. Lebrun also had to worry about a Provisional Executive Council that after 15 August was empowered to make diplomatic appointments and subsequently an increasingly powerful Committee of Public Safety (established on 7 April 1793). Little wonder then that he felt as if he were losing control of events.180

175 Ibid.
176 L’Ami du peuple, 13 May 1793. See also Jean Paul Marat, ed., Le Publiciste de la république française 4, no. 196 (18 May 1793), 2.
178 Ibid., 6.
179 A.N. F/7/4390/2 Comité diplomatique, Papers herein received by prosecutor of Revolutionary tribunal regarding arrest of Lebrun.
By January 1793, Lebrun had few experienced diplomats. Since the outbreak of the Revolution 23 had resigned or refused to take the required oath: La Vauguyon in Madrid, Castelnau in Geneva, Osmond in St. Petersburg, Vibray in Stockholm, La Tour du Pin-Gouvernet at The Hague, Vérap at the Swiss Diet, O’Kelly at Mainz, von Groschlag at Darmstadt, Talleyrand at Naples, Hérissant, the comte de Bray, and Barbé-Marbois at the German Diet, Noailles at Vienna, Moustier at Berlin, La Houze at Hamburg and Copenhagen, Choiseul-Gouffier and Chalgrin at Constantinople, Hirsinger at the Grison League, Bombelles at Venice, Bernis and Hardouin, comte de Châlon at Portugal (1739-1794). 181 Two had died in office: Esteron in Berlin and Anne César, marquis de La Luzerne-Beuzeville in London. 182 Adding to this toll the French recalled others including Montezan in Munich, Bérenger at Ratison, Maulevrier at Cologne, Maligny at Geneva, Desportes at Zweibrücken, Ternant in the United States, and Hosdan at The Hague. In addition, Naples had forced Mackau to leave, Poland ordered Descorches to depart, Russia expelled Genet, and Catherine II imprisoned Bonneau, Descorches’ successor. Some countries had refused to accept or recognize French representatives: Portugal – Darbaut; the Pope – Ségur; Sardinia – Sémonville and Audibert-Caille; Berlin – Benoit; and both Liège and the United States – Bonne-Carrère. The Foreign Ministry, then, was ill prepared to face the diplomatic crisis ignited by the king’s death in January 1793 for they had few experienced diplomats left abroad. By January 1793 Chambonas’ dire appraisal of France’s relations with foreign powers was even truer than it had been in the summer of 1792 when he first voiced it: “We have many enemies, few certain allies, even fewer friends.”183

183 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 195.
By January 1793 France employed few agents of the Old Regime. Of the thirty-nine who had served the Old Regime only six continued to serve the new in the rank of chargé or higher. Those who had survived were from the second tier: Aubert de Bayet, Barthélémy, Cacault, Caillard, Descorches, and Jean-Frédéric Helflinger.¹ Aubert de Bayet had risen from being an agent in the Old Regime to being an ambassador in the new; Barthélémy from chargé and minister plenipotentiary to ambassador; both Cacault and Caillard from secretaries and chargés to ministers plenipotentiary; Descorches from minister plenipotentiary to envoy extraordinary; and Helflinger had remained a resident. Of these only Descorches was from the nobility. Of the six only one, Helflinger, served continuously from 1789 to 1799, the period examined, and then up to 1812. He was the only one able to tack to the ever changing political winds and remain in office through the monarchy, the early republic, the Reign of Terror, the Thermidoreans, the Directory, and later Napoleon. Like the eponymous Vicar of Bray in England, who boasted in the song of that name of the elasticity of his principles that enabled him to remain in his office through various political upheavals:

That whatsoever king may reign,
Still I will be the vicar of Bray, sir....
With this new wind about I steered, and swore to him allegiance.
Old principles I did revoke
Set conscience at a distance....
My principles I changed once more...
For in my faith and loyalty
I never more will falter,

And... my faithful king shall be – until the times do alter.”

Most of the diplomats were not so adept or perhaps not so willing to compromise their principles. The Republic witnessed a continuous turnover of diplomatic personnel that directly impacted relations with other states. Shifting definitions of loyalty coupled with the rise and fall of various factions from the Reign of Terror to the Thermidoreans to the Directory accounted for a number of the dismissals, purges throughout the period for still more, and expulsions by host governments the rest. Unlike the late monarchy, few in the republic resigned (for example, Garat) and even fewer died at their posts (for example, Aubert de Bayet).

For French representatives abroad the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793, to paraphrase George Eliot (Middlemarch), proved to be one of those deeds that “still travel with [them] from afar.” That deed exacerbated the difficulties that diplomats and the foreign minister Lebrun faced because it horrified those in Europe who had refused to accept the legitimacy of the new regime. Personally many regarded Lebrun as anathema because as president of the Conseil exécutif he had signed the order for Louis’ execution. Many states either refused to accept or expelled France’s representatives. Malta and Denmark declined to recognize the French republic. Consequently, Philippe Antoine Grouvelle’s (1757-1806) status in Copenhagen remained equivocal until

3 Bois, “Lebrun-Tondu” in Bély et al., Dictionnaire des ministres des affaires étrangères, 221. See also Rose, William Pitt and the Great War, 59. For British “abhorrence and detestation” of the cruel, unjust and pusillanimous proceedings” against the king see National Library of Scotland, Minto Family Archives, Papers of Hugh Elliot, Ms. 13000, fol. 312, Keith to Elliot, Spring Garden, 21 December 1792; Ms. 13001, fols. 14-16, Keith to Elliott, Privy Garden, 25 January 1793 for the British “unaffected horror and indignation at the Consummation” of this “atrocity.” See also Ms. 13001, fol. 32, Lisle? to Elliott, 7 August 1793. For the view in Stockholm see National Library of Scotland, Papers of Sir Robert Liston, Ms. 5569, fol. 23, Henry Wesley to Liston, 14 February 1793.
5 Eymar, the representative to Malta, was recalled on 26 November 1793.
1796.\(^6\) Portugal and the Ottomans refused to accept France’s representatives.\(^7\) Florence no longer acknowledged Flotte. The French chargé there had the “impudence and barbarity,” in the words of the British minister, Hervey, to announce the death of the king clad in “full gala.”\(^8\) Others, such as the Hanseatic League, Poland, Great Britain, Spain, the United Provinces, and Naples expelled them. In Naples both Mackau, minister plenipotentiary, and Reinhard, recently named first secretary, were expelled.\(^9\) After the Hanseatic League expelled Louis Grégoire Le Hoc (1743-1810)\(^10\) from Hamburg, the French retaliated by placing an embargo on all ships from the Hanseatic League.\(^11\) Far more serious, in reprisal for the execution of the king, Catherine II arrested the chargé to Poland, Jean-Alexandre-Yves Bonneau (1739-1805) on 7 May 1793 and imprisoned him in Schlüsselbourg. Her successor released him only on 13 December 1796.\(^12\)

A substantive problem arose with the French representative to Great Britain, Chauvelin, who had stubbornly remained in London after the August Revolution despite warnings from the British Secretary of State. William Wyndham Grenville, baron Grenville, had bluntly told him in a note of 31 December 1792 that since the Revolution of 10 August

\(^6\) Edvard Holm, *Danmark-Norges Historie fra den store nordiske Krigs Slutning til Rigernes Adskillelse (1720-1814)* (Copenhagen, 1909), 19.
\(^7\) U.S., National Archives, General records of the Department of State RG59, State Department, Diplomatic Dispatches, Portugal (M43), vol. 3, Lisbon, 4 April 1793, from David Humphreys.
\(^8\) See PRO, FO 353/69 letter of Hervey on 22 Jan. 1793 where the British minister complains of the insensitivity of the French envoy there in announcing the death of the king. The French minister did not intend to put on mourning but feared insult. The British representative declared his intent not to appear “in color.” Hervey told the French minister Flotte that he could not enter into any official correspondence with him.
\(^9\) Masson, *Le Département des affaires étrangères*, 294. See also PRO, FO 353/69 for Hervey’s report on 22 January 1793 recounting that riots broke out at Naples and the arms of the French republic were pulled down and Mackau insulted.
\(^10\) He was imprisoned during the Terror and later served under the Directory as minister to Sweden. See Winter, 110-11, 115 and Frangulis, *Dictionnaire diplomatique*, 600.
\(^12\) DBF, 6:992-93.
George III had suspended all official communication with him.\textsuperscript{13} The French had initially argued that the British refusal to recognize Chauvelin in his official capacity was simply a question of form and so were determined to observe “all diplomatic rigor,”\textsuperscript{14} but they had badly miscalculated. In the French view Grenville had engaged in chicanery, equivocation, and bad faith.\textsuperscript{15} Grenville in turn had bluntly informed Chauvelin that the government would not recognize any other character than that of minister of the Christian king and that he had no claim to the title.\textsuperscript{16} Chauvelin had been accredited by a government that no longer existed. Chauvelin has the dubious distinction of bequeathing his name to the ruthless and amoral eponymous villain in the \textit{Scarlet Pimpernel}.

The problems Chauvelin confronted after he had tried to stay in London after the death of the king illustrate the larger issue of the legitimacy of the new revolutionary government and the repercussions of the execution of the king on international relations. The Provisional Executive Council in France had issued Chauvelin new letters of credence and as early as 27 November 1792 had attempted to re-establish “formal and official intercourse” with Britain. By 17 January 1793 they were demanding a “prompt and definitive” response from the British

\textsuperscript{13} The Authentic State Papers which passed between Monsieur Chauvelin, Minister Plenipotentiary from France and the Right Honorable Lord Grenville, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from 12th May 1792 to 24th January 1793 and presented to the House of Commons, January 28th 1793 (London, 1793), esp. 42-51, Grenville to Chauvelin, 31 December 1792. See also Albert Mathiez, \textit{The French Revolution} (New York, 1964), 214-15; Moniteur 23:342; Sorel, \textit{L’Europe et la Révolution française}, 3:230; PRO, FO 95/99, 167-75; Exposé historique des motifs qui ont amené la rupture entre la République française et S.M. britannique ([Paris],[1793]), 6 and ff..

\textsuperscript{14} PRO FO 95/99 France, Lord Grenville Private Letterbook, Letters to him, 167-76, received from Chauvelin, 13 Jan 1793.

\textsuperscript{15} Brissot de Warville, \textit{Brissot député du département d’Eure et Loire à ses commetans} (Paris: P. Provost, 1794), 29.

government on whether it would accept Chauvelin’s new letters.\textsuperscript{17} George III, however, refused and ordered him to leave Britain, with his staff by 1 February 1793.\textsuperscript{18}

Lebrun futilely protested the dismissal and emphasized that this action would mark the beginning of hostilities of a “truly national war,” which would have the “most fatal consequences for humanity and the repose of Europe.”\textsuperscript{19} As late as 23 August 1792 Lebrun had told the Assembly that the difficulties with the British stemmed merely from what

\textsuperscript{17} PRO, FO 27/40, note from Chauvelin of 27 November 1792 and minutes of conference with Chauvelin of 29 November 1792; FO 27/41, letter of Chauvelin, 17 January 1793; FO 95/99, letter from Chauvelin of 18 January 1793.

\textsuperscript{18} PRO, FO 27/41, letter to Chauvelin, 20 & 24 January 1793, order in Council, 24 January 1793; and FO 95/100, pp.71-84. See also FO 27/40, Grenville to Chauvelin, 31 December 1792; FO 95/99, France, Lord Grenville private Letterbook, Letters to him, 71-84 and ff., and 81-84 letters to Chauvelin and conversation after the death of the king; PRO, FO 88/78, 8; FO 27/41, Chauvelin received 2 May 1792 as minister plenipotentiary, ordered to depart 1 February next, order in council issued on 24 January; PRO, FO 27/41, 24 January 1793 to Chauvelin; Letters of Grenville to Chauvelin and Chauvelin to Grenville of 24 January 1793 re: Passports, order of King of England for Chauvelin to leave before 1 February, Chauvelin’s letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs of 24 January 1793; A.N. F/7/4390/2; Letter of Grenville to Chauvelin, 24 January 1793 (Chauvelin had no public character after the death of the king); and Comité diplomatique F7/4398; B. L. Add. Mss. 58857, fol. 80, Grenville to King, 24 January 1793, and fol. 82 King to Grenville, 24 January 1793; Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 271-73; \textit{Authentic State Papers which passed between Monsieur Chauvelin, Minister Plenipotentiary from France and the Right Honorable Lord Grenville}, 88-89, Grenville to Chauvelin, 29 January 1793; Dumouriez, \textit{Mémoires}, 1:89-90. See also \textit{Exposé historique des motifs qui ont amené la rupture entre la République française & S.M. britannique}.

\textsuperscript{19} PRO, FO 27/41 Paris, Lebrun, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Grenville, 1 February 1793. For Lebrun’s views, see Pierre Henri Hélène Marie Lebrun-Tondu, \textit{Lettre du citoyen Lebrun, ministre des affaires étrangères au président de la Convention nationale} (Lyon: Imprimerie d’Aime Vatar-Delaroche, 1793), esp. 1-4, and \textit{Lettre du ministre des affaires étrangères au président de Convention nationale, par laquelle il fait part d’un arrêté pris par la société établie à Rochester pour la propagation des droits de l’homme} (Paris: Imprimerie nationale [1792?]).
he derided as “miserable quarrels of etiquette.”

But the difficulties were far more serious. A series of events had undermined Franco-British relations. On 16 November 1792 the Assembly had decreed the opening of the Scheldt to international navigation. This move, trumpeted on the grounds of natural rather than treaty rights, had the virtue of supporting the Belgian revolutionaries. The British viewed this decree as flaunting international covenants, evidence of French ambitions, and a challenge to British naval power. That challenge was followed by another. On 19 November, the French issued the declaration of fraternity that offered assistance to all who wished to recover their liberty. The British predictably saw it as inciting insurrection. The arraignment of Louis on 11 December, his trial on the 26th, and his execution on 21 January swiftly followed and further embittered relations. George III had been horrified by the account of conditions in France reported by the British representative, George Grenville Leveson Gower, earl of Sunderland. The Revolution, he thought, aimed to destroy “all Religion, law and Subordination.”

By February 1793, the king, appalled by the death of Louis, found the prospect of war against France “highly agreeable” as a means to curb “the insolence of those Despots” and to restore order to that “unprincipled Country,” which aimed to “destroy the foundation of every civilized state.”

French representatives in Britain, both official and unofficial, had not been popular with the government. George III had candidly told Grenville that he was relieved that Talleyrand and his associates had no letters of credence for he feared that they might receive “the contempt their characters entitle them to.” The king’s disdain for the revolutionaries was reflected in advice he extended to Grenville, who, he hoped, would be cautious in conversing with individuals ill suited to negotiating with servants of the Crown. George III, in particular, became increasingly impatient with the number of memorials that Chauvelin sent and his seeming obtuseness. The king had told Grenville bluntly that he wanted

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21 B.L. Add. Mss. 58857, fol. 31, King to Grenville, Weymouth, September 1792.

22 Ibid., fol. 87, King to Grenville, 9 February 1793.


24 B.L. Add. Mss. 58857, fol. 5, 20 June 1792, King to Grenville.
to “escape the blame” of being the first to acknowledge the government established by French Revolution.²⁵ Chauvelin had been unwelcome not only because of his defense of the Revolution but also because of his attempts to incite violence.²⁶ Nor was Maret, who had no official status, any more successful than Chauvelin. After landing at Dover, the British ordered him to re-embark.²⁷ Charles Frédéric Reinhard, secretary of the embassy, remained in Britain until the rupture of relations and received his passport on 27 January 1793. Although Lebrun persisted in trying to reopen relations, George III continued to underscore his opposition to negotiating with “that dangerous and faithless nation.”²⁸ The British made their position clear: in reply to a letter from Lebrun on 2 May 1793 they refused to grant passports for a French envoy to come to London before they were assured that the French had “entirely changed” their principles and conduct toward other nations.²⁹ William Eden, an experienced envoy who represented Britain in Spain and the United Provinces, pointed out to Grenville that there would be neither “wisdom” nor “propriety” in opening a communication with the “desperate and sanguinary” men who dominated the regicide convention.³⁰

The situation in Spain paralleled that of Britain. In Spain both representatives, Urtubise, secretary and later chargé, and Bourgoing, chargé and later minister plenipotentiary, encountered difficulties even before Louis’ execution. In March 1791 when Urtubise reached the frontier his luggage was not exempted from customs, a courtesy typically extended to members of the diplomatic corps. When he arrived in Madrid to present his letters of créance the chief minister, Floridablanca informed him that a foreign ambassador had to present him at court as there was no

²⁵ Ibid., fol. 59, George III to Grenville, 25 November 1792.
²⁶ Murley, “The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1793,” xiii; Michaud, 8:56-59 DBF, 8:905; and National Library of Scotland, Minto Family Archives, Papers of Hugh Elliot, Ms. 13000, Keith to Elliot, Dover Street, 29 November 1792, referred to Chauvelin and other French envoys as the “abominable emissaries of France who are most assiduous in their Efforts to disturb the internal tranquility of this happy Island.”
²⁷ Lebrun to Dumouriez, 30 January 1793 and Maret, 31 January 1793, A.N. F/7/4390/2.
²⁸ B.L. Add. Mss. 58857, fol. 110, 27 April 1793, the King to Grenville. See also fol. 124, King to Grenville, 13 June 1793.
²⁹ Letter from Whitehall to Lebrun, 18 May 1793, PRO, FO 27/42, fol. 107.
³⁰ PRO, FO 27/42, fol. 156, letter from Auckland to Grenville, 10 August 1793.
longer an accredited ambassador from France. Therein lay the difficulty for no one in the diplomatic corps was willing to make the presentation. Urtubise saw the issue as “only a matter of etiquette,” another means to “annoy the French.” Montmorin had advised him earlier to feign incomprehension when confronted with these petty affronts. But these petty affronts reflected the court’s hardening position toward France. In May 1792 the King of Spain finally and officially received Bourgoing who had arrived in February 1792, but the Spanish king continued to refuse to name or accept an individual of ambassadorial rank, an ominous sign of difficulties ahead.

After 10 August 1792 Bourgoing’s position worsened considerably. The king and queen refused to receive him at court and the foreign minister to treat with him because he had no official character after the Revolution of August 1792. These events also marked the official end of the Family Pact. Some days later, Don Domingo de Yriarte, the Spanish chargé in Paris, left. In addition to these difficulties Bourgoing had to deal with spies in his own staff. The French did not trust Bourgoing and sent a Jacobin, Paul-Auguste Taschereau de Fargues (1752-1832), to spy on him. Louis XVI’s execution made any attempt at reconciliation impossible. All attempts to communicate with the government were rebuffed; the new foreign minister, Manuel de Godoy, refused to receive Bourgoing. The nobles went into mourning and Bourgoing was placed, symbolically, at the very back of the diplomatic corps. Bourgoing left shortly thereafter on 23 February 1793, having received his passports for “the former minister of his very Christian Majesty.” Taschereau, who had ambitions to succeed Bourgoing, remained only a short time because of the outbreak of war. The hostile populace pursued him to the embassy.

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31 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 42, 44. See also 40.
32 Ibid., 51, 52.
34 Mousset, Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution, 307-08; PRO, FO 27/38, Gower, 13 January 1792.
36 Mousset, Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution, 306.
37 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 80. See also 77-78 and Mousset, Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution, 322-23.
where he was able to save himself by escaping through a window.\textsuperscript{38} Urtubise followed him not through the window but out of the country on 17 April after burning the embassy’s papers.\textsuperscript{39} Charles IV of Spain, like George III, had wanted to avoid war: “I have had the feebleness to desire frankly to remain at peace with France.” He reluctantly concluded that there “is no means to treat with such a government.”\textsuperscript{40}

The expulsion or refusal to receive French envoys was repeated across Europe. Still Lebrun had persisted.\textsuperscript{41} In the Swiss lands the French representatives found their situations precarious and their reception often hostile, especially after the murder of the king’s Swiss Guard on 10 August and in the September massacres. In addition, the disbanding of all Swiss regiments in French service entailed not only financial losses but also undermined historic ties and abrogated agreements based on honor. The execution of the king prevented the Swiss from accepting either Helflinger’s or François Barthélémy’s credentials.\textsuperscript{42} Although Barthélémy had gone to the Swiss Confederation in early 1792, he was not officially recognized until 28 May 1796. François Noël’s position at The Hague was even more precarious. Noël, who had served as chargé d’affaires for less than a month in 1793, reported that he had secured the papers and the cipher because his staff had been threatened and the embassy menaced. He feared that disagreeable scenes might ensue after the funeral services being held for the king at the various legations. A few days later he

\textsuperscript{38} Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 83, 94. According to Michaud 41:47-48, Taschereau was imprisoned with Robespierre but survived. He subsequently died of cholera.

\textsuperscript{39} Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 80, 94; Mousset, Un Témoin ignoré de la Révolution, 322; France, Recueil des instructions, 12: Espagne, 2, vol. 3 (1722-1793), 393-96.

\textsuperscript{40} Bourgoing to Lebrun, 31 January 1793 in Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 80; France, Convention nationale, Décret de la Convention nationale, qui declare que la république française est en guerre avec l’Espagne, esp. 11-19.

\textsuperscript{41} Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 3:417 for list of Lebrun’s appointments.

\textsuperscript{42} DBF, 5:664; Stroehlin, La Mission de Barthélémy, 56-60; Édouard Chapuisat, La Suisse et la Révolution française (Geneva, 1945), 49-50.
confirmed that the services had indeed kindled, in his view, “royal and religious fanaticism.” He left shortly thereafter.

Lebrun’s appointments, especially after the execution of the king, illustrate the increasing emphasis on employing only those with impeccable revolutionary credentials and not coincidentally, little diplomatic experience: Grouvelle to Copenhagen, Chauvelin to Florence, Noël to Venice, Maret to Naples, and Séémonville to Constantinople. Before the Revolution none of these men had held diplomatic positions. Grouvelle had excellent revolutionary credentials for he served as secretary of the conseil exécutif provisoire. Chauvelin’s friendship with Dumouriez had secured him this diplomatic appointment but it also endangered him. Dumouriez’s negotiations with and subsequent defection to the enemy in the spring of 1793 implicated his friends. Chauvelin was imprisoned in 1793 and not released until Thermidor. Noël was equally inexperienced diplomatically. Before the Revolution he had been a priest and professor. Only during the Revolution did he obtain a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shortly after the August 1792 Revolution he went to London on a brief, and unsuccessful, mission. At the beginning of 1793 he went to The Hague as chargé d’affaires but again very briefly. His next mission was to Venice as minister plenipotentiary in late 1793, where he remained until his recall in September 1794. His mission to Venice was also fraught with difficulties; the Senate refused to accept his letters of credence in the new republican form and in Paris he was denounced as a counter-revolutionary and friend of Danton. His situation deteriorated to the extent that letters from Paris were sent not to him, but to his secretary, prompting his resignation on 26 July 1794. In 1795, he was again sent to The Hague as minister plenipotentiary. Maret also had

43 H.T. Colenhander, Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840, 1: Nederland en de revolutie, 1789-1795 (The Hague, 1905), 277; Winter, 126.
44 DBF, 16:368, Michaud, 17:628-29. In May 1793 he was named minister at Copenhagen; he was recalled in 1794 and sent again in 1796. See Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 197-99.
45 See Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 5:30. Prior to the Revolution he had served as secretary to Chamfort and then Condé.
46 France, Recueil des instructions, 26: Venise, 316-17.
47 In October 1797 he was replaced by Charles Delacroix. Noël spent the remainder of his career writing prolifically and in 1801, holding the position of
had no diplomatic experience before the Revolution, at which time he became active in politics, editing the *Moniteur*, joining the Jacobin club and serving as one of the founders of the Feuillants. He was appointed secretary of the legation at Hamburg and Brussels. After the Revolution of 10 August 1792, he remained at his post. His reward was rapid advancement. Lebrun named him chief of the first division in the ministry and then sent him to London in late 1792 in an attempt to retain British neutrality and to Naples, which he never reached. When Lebrun fell from power, so too did Maret. Maret later became Secretary of State (1799) and Minister of Foreign Relations (1811), and remained devoted to Napoleon. Séronville, first named ambassador extraordinary to Genoa in July 1791, was then appointed under Dumouriez to his second post, Turin, where he was never received and to his third post, Constantinople, which he never reached and where the Porte also had refused to receive him. In 1799 he was appointed minister plenipotentiary and later ambassador to The Hague (1799-1805). The elasticity of his principles enabled him to serve Louis XVI, the Revolution, Napoleon, Louis XVIII, and Louis Philippe.

Some envoys never reached their posts. These were remarkably few, however, given that many foreign governments viewed the representatives of Revolutionary France as operating outside the *droit des gens*. The most famous seizure was that of Séronville, the designated ambassador to Constantinople, and Maret, the designated minister plenipotentiary to Naples. Their staffs and papers were seized by Austrian agents in July 1793 as they passed through the Valtelline on the way to their posts. Technically no international law had been breached because they were not seized by the power to which they were accredited but custom had formerly guaranteed their inviolability. The Austrians defended themselves by pointing out that these men were dangerous agitators posing as diplomats. The two men and their surviving staff were later exchanged for Marie Antoinette’s daughter and arrived back in Paris inspector general (although the title did change) of public education. Masson, *Le Département des affaires étrangères*, 282; Michaud, 30:654-57.

48 Michaud, 26:527-40; see also Jean Tulard, Jean-François Fayard, and Alfred Fierro, *Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française, 1789-1799* (Paris, 1987), 972, especially for Talleyrand’s indictment of him: “there is no individual more of an animal than Maret.”

in 1796, thus escaping the worst excesses of the Terror.\(^{50}\) Nor had the French been able to secure any international support for their demand that the envoys and their staff be released because most countries regarded the French regime as illegitimate and their envoys not entitled to the traditional protections.\(^{51}\) By the spring of 1793 Lebrun praised the few who remained abroad for their “steadfastness” in their posts.\(^{52}\) But their situation was increasingly precarious, especially after Lebrun and some members of the diplomatic committee were arrested on 31 May and 2 June 1793 when the Girondins were swept from power and control of foreign affairs shifted to the Committee of Public Safety.\(^{53}\)

**THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY**

From 13 June 1793 the Committee of Public Safety not only appointed those sent abroad but also assumed the direction of foreign affairs, sending ten secret agents abroad.\(^{54}\) The Committee of Public Safety excluded all *ci-devant* nobles from diplomatic or consular positions and dismissed many, such as the brilliant jurist, Hauterive, who was serving as consul at New York.\(^{55}\) They also ordered the arrest of others, such as the consul in Philadelphia, Dupont, who died before the order of arrest could be

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\(^{52}\) A.N. F/7/4397, Lebrun letter of 19 March 1793.

\(^{53}\) In a moving memoir written while in hiding, Lebrun tried to justify his actions, writing that “if I owe to my Country the sacrifice of my life, I owe to no one the sacrifice of my honor...” Quoted in Howe, *French Foreign Policy*, 184.

\(^{54}\) Baillou et al., eds., *Les Affaires étrangères*, 1:292.

executed.\textsuperscript{56} A \textit{mémoire} of 3 May 1793 reflected the committee’s desire to ensure that diplomats would be chosen “among men already proven” and that merit alone would determine who would be hired. Additionally, it stipulated that ambassadors be replaced by ministers who were less expensive.\textsuperscript{57} In July 1793 Rühl, a former member of the diplomatic committee from the Bas-Rhine, called for an examination of the civism and talents of those employed abroad.\textsuperscript{58} The Committee of Public Safety underlined that point in November when they urged “revolutionary apostles” to serve the country. The first condition of employment was the possession of a republican spirit and pronounced love of country. The committee would eliminate all men who were cold, egotistical, or indifferent to the Revolution.

The form that citizens needed to complete (see next page) requested the usual information such as name, age, place but also work done before and after the Revolution, civic action, moral and physical character, and works written as well as what functions the individual could fill.\textsuperscript{59} Predictably, appointments based purely on political criteria increased. Although the Committee had underscored that both appointment and promotion were based on merit, the opposite proved to be the case. By spring 1793 the bureau had become a refuge for the inept and the lazy. But the Committee did not even have confidence in the recent appointments and considered creating yet another office to watch the employees. The department had mushroomed in size from 41 in 1789 to 73 in April 1793.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, consuls no longer reported to the Minister of the Marine, but to the Foreign Minister.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{56} Turner, \textit{Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States}, 1:269.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Blaga, \textit{L’Évolution de la diplomatie}, 461.
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{Moniteur} 17:185, 20 July 1793.
\item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{Le Comité de salut public de la Convention Nationale a...} (Paris: n.p., 23 Brumaire, Year 2). See also Church, \textit{Revolution and Red Tape}, 99.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Masson, \textit{Le Département des affaires étrangères}, 257 and Blaga, \textit{L’Evolution de la diplomatie}, 449 and 450.
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In November, Robespierre proposed strengthening the ties between France and her fellow republics, the United States and the Swiss.
So doing, he contended, would not violate the tenets of the Revolution.\textsuperscript{61} At that time the French abandoned negotiations with the enemy and diplomatic relations virtually ceased.\textsuperscript{62} By the fall of 1793 France was diplomatically isolated. Excluding the Turks, France had relations only with other republics: the United States and other republics in Italy (Genoa and Venice) and the Swiss lands (Geneva, the Valais, and the Helvetic Corps). But even with other democracies France had problems: as late as September 1793 neither the republic at Valais nor the Helvetic corps had recognized the French republic, neither therefore would accept the letters of credence for Helflinger or Barthélémy.\textsuperscript{63} Furthermore, the Committee of Public Safety decided to reexamine immediately the list of all diplomatic officials abroad with the idea that many would be recalled. Until peace was declared, France would not send ministers plenipotentiary or ambassadors to foreign powers other than the United States and the Swiss confederation. To others, France would send only secret agents, secretaries of legation, and \textit{chargés d’affaires},\textsuperscript{64} for as Genet had argued as early as 25 December 1792, “it is only between the hands of free nations that sincere and fraternal treaties can be formed....”\textsuperscript{65} For many, such as Anacharsis Cloots, a durable peace was impossible between a legitimate power and the ravishers of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{66} By April 1794 Saint-Just had cynically concluded that without exception no states in Europe are “ruled by our principles,” rather they are governed more or less by their “old prejudices.” “The purity of our principles”, he contended, “does not admit any pact with error, nor any sort of pact with tyranny.”\textsuperscript{67} One historian has pointed out that “a regime so pure that it will entertain diplomatic relations


\textsuperscript{63} Kaulek, ed., \textit{Papiers de Barthélémy}, 3:76.

\textsuperscript{64} Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 7:28-29, 24 September 1793.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Le Patriote français}, 26 December 1792.

\textsuperscript{66} Anacharsis Cloots, \textit{La République universelle ou adresse aux tyranicides} (New York, 1973), 150.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Oeuvres complètes de Saint-Just}, 2:336.
only with other free peoples... is a regime condemned to perpetual warfare.”68 And so it proved.

**DEFORGUES**

By spring 1794 Lebrun’s successor, François-Louis-Michel Chemin Deforgues (1759-1840) (21 June 1793 - 2 April 1794), still retained the title of Foreign Minister, but had little authority. Deforgues simply registered the decisions of the Committee of Public Safety and relayed them. His active role in the September prison massacres had burnished his revolutionary credentials as had Danton’s support. When Danton fell, Deforgues lost power as well. Imprisoned in April 1794, Deforgues had the distinction of being the first on the list of conspirators that Robespierre had prepared to denounce on 9 Thermidor.69 Of aristocratic background, he was known for his urbanity. Deforgues, followed Dumouriez’s earlier tactics; he published an address in the *Journal des débats*. His rhetoric as well echoed that of Dumouriez. He promised not to forget the “sacred principles which have served as the base of our constitution.” “Immortal justice” and “eternal reason” ought to be the only arms of our republican ministers. Frankness and loyalty should replace the “obscure intrigues of diplomacy.”70 He trumpeted this change, contending that the republic had “regenerated” the system, even the language. “We are no longer the ministers of despots, we are the agents of a popular government.” The French should rid themselves of “monarchical debris.”71 Although Deforgues professed his attachment to the Revolution and always signed letters to diplomats abroad *salut et fraternité*,72 he proved susceptible to attack as André François Miot de Melito (1762-1841) observed because of

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71 Ibid., 300. See also DBF, 10:530; Adolphe Robert, Edgar Bourloton and Gaston Cougny, *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 1789-1889* (Paris, 1891), 2:293. See also Aulard, ed., *Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public*, 5:35.

72 A.N. F/7/4390/2.
his desire for a “restoration of order, decorum and urbanity.” When Miot de Melito moved from the War Ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he found that “politeness and elegance of manner, the result of a gentlemanly education and the habit of association with foreigners” prevailed. Reassuringly, he also found there traces of the “former customs of the monarchy.” Miot de Melito’s post at the Foreign Ministry was far less perilous than his former one because by then there was little to do as foreign relations were, he noted, “for the present almost at an end.”

Unlike his predecessors, Deforgues made few changes within the ministry itself, maintaining that he wanted a tranquil life. He did, however, have to replace some of the officials within the ministry: Baudry, Mendouze, and Jozeau (all executed in the summer of 1794), Barallier, who was denounced as a federalist, and Rouhière, who had been named vice-consul at Venice. His internal appointments, unlike those of his predecessors, were men of education and integrity and included, for example, the talented Miot de Melito and Charles-Frédéric Reinhard (1761-1837), whom Talleyrand praised as an ideal diplomat. Reinhard had had diplomatic experience in Britain (1792-93) and Naples (1793). Reinhard had been trained as a theologian and had written poetry before he became a diplomat under the sponsorship of the Girondins. He had the right revolutionary credentials and was as well a man of tact, accustomed to the tumult of the world, knowledgeable about history, familiar with treaties, their antecedents and consequences. It is perhaps not surprising that he was arrested during the Terror and eventually freed. Deforgues did not need to make many appointments abroad because by the time he assumed office France was at war with most of Europe. By 1794 France

73 Count André François de Melito, Memoirs of Count Miot de Melito, Ambassador, Councillor of State, ed. General Wilhelm August Fleischmann (New York, 1881), 24.
74 Ibid., 23-24.
75 Ibid., 23.
76 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 289; and Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:290.
77 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 290-92. He was arrested during the Terror and freed after the fall of Robespierre. See Frangulis, Dictionnaire diplomatique, 892.
had only ten agents abroad and only Geneva, Malta, and Denmark had representatives in France.  

SUPPRESSION OF MINISTRIES

During Deforges’ tenure the assembly in its determination to execute or impoverish those suspected of being royalist suspended the payment of pensions for all employees of the Old Regime who did not have a certificate of civism.  

Saint-Just capitalized on this attitude when he condemned officials as “not good enough to merit the title of citizen....” A frontal assault was also being launched against the system of ministries. The attack on ministers was not new. As early as 1790 Brissot had attacked ministers as “actors of pomp.” They, along with the commis and the rest of the staff, were “veterans of the aristocracy.”

A celebrated article in Révolutions de Paris of September 1790 decried the ministerial plots and compared the throes of Laocoon and his two sons being squeezed to death by serpents to France being squeezed to death by tortuous ministers, who were “avid for his blood.”

In February of 1791 L’Ami du peuple urged patriots to stab the ministers if the “traitorous assembly” did not order their execution. In October 1793 Saint-Just argued that it was “impossible for the revolutionary laws to be executed if the government is not constituted in a revolutionary manner.” He went on to point out that the Convention must “tighten all bonds of responsibility and control the power that is often terrible to patriots and indulgent to traitors.” For Saint-Just the government at present “ignored” its “duties toward the people.” The “insolence of the persons in office is unbearable” and government a “perpetual conspiracy.” “Bureaucracy,” he concluded

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78 The replacement for Gouverneur Morris, the United States representative had not yet arrived. Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 287.
79 Ibid., 289-300.
80 Quoted in Church, Revolution and Red Tape, 214.
81 Quoted in Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 85 and Blaga, L’Évolution de la diplomatie, 442-43.
82 Révolutions de Paris, v, no. 63 (18-25 septembre 1790), 533.
83 L’Ami du peuple 6, no. 369 (11 février 1791), 7.
“has replaced monarchism.” The government, bogged down in a “world of paper,” no longer governs.  

Even the post of foreign minister was suspect as can be seen in the fate of those who occupied it from 1789 to 1794. Montmorin (Foreign Minister in 14 February 1787 - 12 July 1789 and then 16 July 1789 - 20 November 1791) was killed in prison; La Vauguyon (12-16 July 1789) served as France’s ambassador to Spain and prudently remained there after his recall; Lessart (November 1791 - March 1792) was a victim of the September Massacres; Dumouriez (15 March - 13 June 1792) fled; Chambonas (16 June - 16 July 1792) sought refuge in London after August 1792; Bigot de Sainte-Croix (1-10 August 1792) also fled to Great Britain; Lebrun (10 August 1792 - 21 June 1793) was executed; Deforgues (21 June 1793 - 2 April 1794) was imprisoned, but released in Thermidor 1794. Some, such as Moustier, Ségur, Choiseul and Narbonne had been prudent enough to decline the office.  

Even those who served par interim as Minister of Foreign Affairs were often targeted. Armand-Martial-Joseph Hermann (1759-1795), for example, a friend of Robespierre, who also served as president of the Revolutionary Tribunal, was condemned with other members of the court and executed in May 1795. Undoubtedly, not because of his service at the ministry but because of his unjust condemnation of many, including Marie Antoinette and Danton.

**COMMISSIONERS**

On 1 April 1794 the ministries were abolished and replaced with twelve commissions, which in turn were abolished on 25 February 1796 under the Directory. Robespierre’s earlier admission when Dumouriez had assumed power that: “I am not one who believes that it is absolutely impossible that a minister can be a patriot...” illustrates that others

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86 Michaud, 19: 278-79; and DBF, 17:1079-80. In an ironic twist of fate, Hermann’s property, confiscated by the courts, was sold and acquired by a man whose father Hermann had condemned to death.
88 *Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre*, 1:298.
assumed that being a minister was tantamount to treason. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the *Commission des Relations Extérieures* and its head took the title not minister, but *commissaire*. Thenceforth, the Committee of Public Safety assumed total control over foreign policy; it even read every diplomatic dispatch. This dominance meant that the commissars had little power, especially during the Reign of Terror. Jean-Marie-Claude-Alexandre Goujon, an ardent supporter of Robespierre and the Mountain, served as interim commissioner (2-9 April 1794). The second, Philibert Buchot (9 April - 21 October 1794), a former schoolteacher, legendary for “his ignorance, bad manners, his stupidity” which, according to Miot de Melito, “surpassed anything that can be imagined,” only lasted a few months and spent most of that time in a local tavern. During his short tenure he appointed many mediocrities and denounced four of his subordinantes as moderates: Otto, Colchen, Reinhard, and Miot de Melito. Only the fall of Robespierre saved them. In an ironic twist of fate Miot de Melito (November 1794 - February 1795), one of the four “moderates” succeeded his accuser, purged the bureau of terrorists, made some minor, but basic organizational changes, and orchestrated the *entrée* of the first ambassador of a monarchical power into the Convention, conte Francesco Saverio Carletti (1740-1803) from Tuscany. Carletti’s tenure in France, however, was not to be long; he remained in Paris less than a year. When he asked to be allowed to pay his respects to “Madame Royale,” the daughter of Louis XVI, the Directory ordered him to leave. But the other more substantive step Miot de Melito took was to lift the seals on the effects of Mercy-Argenteau, the former Habsburg ambassador to Paris, Fernan Nuñez, the former Spanish ambassador, and Souza, the former Portuguese ambassador. The release of these papers and goods signalled a new spirit of accommodation to Europe.


and a new acceptance of le droit commun. The last commissioner, Victor Colchen, only served a few months (February - 10 November 1795). In addition to this major change from ministers to commissars, the Committee of Public Safety made its determination to control all diplomatic appointments explicit. During this chaotic interim French diplomats abroad often complained that they were forgotten and relations with foreign powers often foundered.

PERSONNEL

As Brown has noted about army positions, the Committee of Public Safety “labored in an environment of intense personal and factional lobbying” that undermined any attempt “to place professionalism over politics.” By 1794 the nobles had come to represent not only “anti-Revolutionism,” but also “anti-Jacobinism.” For Patrice Higonnet the noble question had become a “contrapuntal” one, that is, the Old Regime symbolized by the nobles was contrasted with the new “Republic of Virtue” that the Jacobins wanted to establish. The debate both during and after the Reign of Terror about the exclusion of nobles from public office underscores their precarious position. By 2 June 1793 81% of the officers had left the army, and from 3 June 1793 to 20 April 1794 595 officers were suspended or dismissed. The groups most loyal to the king proved to be the infantry and the cavalry. From April 1793 through December 1793 the ministry undertook a purge of the officer corps suspending “an astounding” 214 generals and cashiering 58. This purge had been expedited by a September 1793 directive that mandated all nobles be expelled from the

93 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 347.
95 Church, Revolution and Red Tape, 99.
100 Ibid., 72.
101 Brown, “Politics, Professionalism, and the Fate of Army Generals after Thermidor,” 137.
officer corps.\textsuperscript{102} By the end of Year II, 1793-94, 10,000 army officers had either resigned or emigrated,\textsuperscript{103} and 84 generals had been executed,\textsuperscript{104} paralleling the attrition in the diplomatic corps with the caveat that normal diplomatic relations had virtually ceased while the war had expanded.

Similarly the revolutionaries believed that only certain individuals could be trusted to represent France abroad. Yet the definition of loyalty constantly shifted as factions vied for control. Those once loyal were now suspect. After the Girondins fell from power, their friends or allies were targeted. The two most prominent Girondins who had served abroad were Otto and Genet. Robespierre, for example, complained on 17 November 1793 that by a “bizarre fatality” the republic was still represented in the United States by Genet, the agent of the traitor Brissot.\textsuperscript{105} Although Washington had earlier requested Genet’s recall, the president refused to hand him over to the French for certain execution and allowed him to remain in the United States, where he married the daughter of the governor of New York.\textsuperscript{106} Yet another career diplomat who lost his position when the Girondins fell was Louis-Guillaume Otto, later ennobled by Napoleon as comte de Mosloy (1754-1817). In 1776 he accompanied Anne César, chevalier de La Luzerne (1741-1791) to Bavaria and then in 1779 to the United States as his secretary.\textsuperscript{107} A very able man, he became secretary of the legation and then chargé d’affaires.

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\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{103} Quoted in Blaufarb, \textit{The French Army}, 91.

\textsuperscript{104} Blanning, \textit{The French Revolutionary Wars}, 1787-1802, 199; Wawro, \textit{Warfare and Society in Europe}, 1792-1914, 181.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre}, 3:455. See also Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 7:359, October 1793, resolve to send agents to arrest Genet.

\textsuperscript{106} See PRO, FO 5/4, Downing Street, 11 January 1794; Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Politique (AAE CP), États-Unis, 43, part III, fols. 147-50, Genet to Fauchet, 10 Frimaire, Year 3. See also AAE CP, États-Unis, 47, part I, fols. 7-12, for discussion of Genet and his missions; Winter, 144; Frey and Frey, \textit{The History of Diplomatic Immunity}, 300-01, 313, 350, 498; and Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 7:359-60 and 8:169, 235-36.

\textsuperscript{107} Frangulis, \textit{Dictionnaire diplomatique}, 573. Sieyès later named him secretary of the legation at Berlin. He later served as ambassador at Vienna where he negotiated the marriage of Napoleon with Marie Louise. See Nadine-Josette Chaline, ed., \textit{La Paix d’Amiens} (Amiens, 2005), 300.
\end{flushright}
He returned to France and became chief of the first division of the Foreign Ministry. When the Girondins fell in June 1793, he was imprisoned and was only released during the Thermidorean reaction. François Noël also felt the enmity of the Committee of Public Safety. Saint-Just denounced the minister plenipotentiary at Venice as a friend of Danton and a counter-revolutionary. Because of such charges the Committee of Public Safety stopped corresponding with Noël for the last eight months of his mission, although he was not recalled until 27 September 1794. Reflecting the Committee of Public Safety’s distrust of diplomats, especially those stationed far away, they empowered a commission of four to represent France in the United States. Robespierre chose his friend, Jean Antoine Joseph, later baron Fauchet (1761-1834), a diplomatic neophyte, to head the commission as minister plenipotentiary (21 February 1794 - 26 June 1795). This would be his first and last diplomatic mission. Instructed to act in concert, the commission predictably had difficulties from the outset. Fauchet, a young lawyer of 33 who spoke no English, was instructed to deal with diplomatic issues, La Foret as consul general with matters of commerce and finance, while Le Blanc, as secretary of the legation, had charge of all French consulates, except Philadelphia which was entrusted to Petry. It did not take Fauchet and Le Blanc long to quarrel with and undermine their colleagues and initiate a separate correspondence with their government. Fauchet even sent Le Blanc to Paris to complain of

108 He had a distinguished career under the Directory and Consulate and Empire. In 1798 he accompanied Sieyès to Berlin as secretary and then chargé d’affaires. Napoleon sent him to London (1800) to arrange a prisoner exchange and to Munich (1803) and to Vienna as ambassador (1809) and made him Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1815). Michaud, 31:483-85. See also Turner, Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1:390.

109 France, Recueil des instructions, 26: Venise, 315-17. Noël, who arrived in Venice on 9 June 1793, resigned on 26 July 1794 but did not leave Venice until November 1794.

110 Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 2:606-07; Winter, 144.

111 De Conde, Entangling Alliance, 393-99, 406-07, 411; Turner, Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States 1791-1797, 1:288-89, 1:389-90. See also AAE CP, États-Unis 41, 1794, fols., 328-329 for letter of Rochambeau, Newport, the 15th day, 12th month, Year II, for critique of Fauchet.
his colleagues.\textsuperscript{112} To compound their difficulties representatives in the United States often found themselves isolated and rarely heard from Paris. Ternant received no dispatches in eight months, Genet for nine, and Fauchet for a year.\textsuperscript{113}

Saint-Just, a member of the Committee of Public Safety, also launched an attack on the diplomats who represented France. The “perfidies” and the “stupidities” fatigued him, in particular the “treasons” of our “imbecile” diplomats and their “ruinous expenses.”\textsuperscript{114} He started out by attacking the representatives at Constantinople, Hénin and Descorches, and the quarrels between them. For these two “base knaves,” “ex-nobles,” “Feuillants,” “Brissoins,” only the guillotine could compensate the nation for their services. Barthélemy with the Swiss had also badly used both his talent and French money.\textsuperscript{115} He condemned Tilly at Genoa as “a coward and a knave;”\textsuperscript{116} La Flotte in Tuscany as a “brigand;”\textsuperscript{117} Hénin at Venice, “this insignificant republic,” as nothing but a “clumsy liar.”\textsuperscript{118} When Hénin went to Constantinople, Saint-Just noted that he was replaced with an ex-priest, an adventurer born in Ireland who calls himself citizen Noël.\textsuperscript{119} “True republicans” should be sent to replace these Brissotins.\textsuperscript{120} He concluded by noting that when he looked at the diplomatic picture he saw nothing but “inept ministers,” “scandalous expenses,” “ridiculous negotiations,” and “ruinous follies.”\textsuperscript{121} Fortunately for those employed abroad, Saint-Just shortly thereafter lost both his power and his life.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{113}Ibid., 118.
\bibitem{114}\textit{Oeuvres complètes de Saint-Just}, 2:335. See also Étienne-Félix Hénin de Cuvilliers, \textit{Sommaire de correspondance d’Étienne-Félix Hénin, chargé d’affaires de la République française à Constantinople pendant la 1re, 2e and 3 années de la République} (Paris: Imprimérie du dépôt des lois, an IV).
\bibitem{115}\textit{Oeuvres complètes de Saint-Just}, 2:339-41.
\bibitem{116}Ibid., 2:347.
\bibitem{117}Ibid., 2:349. Aulard, ed., \textit{Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public}, 3:381, 4 April 1794 for arrest of Flotte.
\bibitem{118}\textit{Oeuvres complètes de Saint-Just}, 2:347.
\bibitem{119}Ibid., 2:348.
\bibitem{120}Ibid., 2:349.
\bibitem{121}Ibid.
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THERMIDOREANS (27 July 1794 - 3 November 1795)

By the time the Thermidoreans came to power in July 1794 France had relations with very few states: Barthélémy represented France to the Helvetic League (30 January 1792 - 2 June 1797); Soulavie to the Genevans (5 July 1793-1794); Helflinger to the Valais (1788-98); Descorches (7 June 1793 - 8 April 1795)\(^{122}\) and Hénin to the Turks (23 July 1793 - 2 May 1795); Fauchet to the United States (21 February 1794 - 26 June 1795);\(^{123}\) and Tilly to Genoa (May 1793 - October 1794). Of these seven, five were recalled: Descorches, Hénin, Soulavie, Fauchet, and Tilly.\(^{124}\) After the Reign of Terror, just as the army was purged of its terrorists, so too the diplomatic corps was purged of radicals. The diplomatic corps also paralleled the army in its reinstatements. Just as many of the officers who had lost their positions in the Terror were reinstated so too in the diplomatic corps.\(^{125}\) Noël, recalled by the Committee of Public Safety, received a new posting and Miot de Melito and Reinhard, accused of moderation and only saved by the fall of Robespierre, also received new appointments as did Le Hoc who had been expelled by the Hanseatic League and briefly imprisoned in France during the Terror. Those who governed France after the Terror realized the necessity of hiring able men. As the astute Miot de Melito observed: after the fall of Robespierre the government was attempting to emerge from the “abyss of anarchy” and restore France “to Europe whence she had been in a manner exiled.”\(^{126}\) Many, such as Jean-Jacques Régis de Cambacères,

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\(^{122}\) Marcère, *Une Ambassade à Constantinople*, 1:9-11 for brief biography of Descorches who belonged to an old family of nobles and had served in the army. He served as minister plenipotentiary to Liège for ten years before being sent to Poland as minister plenipotentiary and later to the Ottomans as envoy extraordinary. For his mission see also Sorel, *L’Europe et la Révolution française*, 4:66.

\(^{123}\) See Bernard Nabonne, *La Diplomatie du Directoire et Bonaparte d’après les papiers inédits de Reubell* (Paris, 1951), 73.

\(^{124}\) De Conde, *Entangling Alliance*, 411, note.


\(^{126}\) *Memoirs of Count Miot de Melito*, 32.
were willing to argue that France needed “certain talents” and should not, by definition, exclude ex-nobles or ex-priests.  

The Thermidoreans appointed:

Desportes as resident to Geneva (17 December 1794 - 18 October 1795) but recalled him and replaced him with Louis Pierre Resnier (1 November 1795 - 8 February 1796), a friend of Sieyès and editor of the *Moniteur*;

Dorothée Villars as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Genoa (19 October 1794 - 5 March 1796);

Le Hoc as minister plenipotentiary to Hamburg (29 September 1795 - 3 October 1795) and later as ambassador extraordinary to Sweden (28 October 1795 - March 1796);

Caillard as minister plenipotentiary to Prussia (29 October 1795 - 5 July 1798);

Miot de Melito as minister plenipotentiary to Tuscany (29 May 1795 - 1 December 1796);

Jean Baptiste Lallement as minister plenipotentiary to Venice (13 November 1794 - 7 May 1797);

Noël as minister plenipotentiary to the Netherlands (6 March 1795 - 27 December 1797);

Reinhard minister plenipotentiary to the Hanseatic cities (25 June 1795 - 19 February 1798);

Pierre Auguste Adet (1763-1834) as envoy to Geneva (22 September 1794 - 1 November 1794) and later minister plenipotentiary to the United States (15 June 1795 - 6 May 1797); 

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129 Ibid., 381.
130 See also France, *Recueil des instructions*, 26: *Venise*, 339-40. Lallement’s letter of appointment was dated 17 September 1794.
131 See also *Papiers de Barthélémy*, ed. Tausserat-Radel, 6:151, n. 1; and Turner, *Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States*, 1:810-11: Adet takes oath of loyalty to new regime, 8 January 1796. See also Nabonne, *La Diplomatie du Directoire*, 73; and Coissier de Verseux, ed., *Dictionnaire biographique et historique*, 1:7. For the British view of Soulavie and Adet see Hampshire Record Office, Wickham Papers 38M49/a/115/14, Lord Robert Fitzgerald to William Wickham, confidential, Berne, 24 September 1794.
Verninac de Sainte-Maur as envoy extraordinary to the Turks (12 April 1795 - 22 October 1796);\textsuperscript{132}

Chépy as vice-consul at Rhodes.

Denounced as a terrorist, Chépy faced yet again an arrest warrant which his father was able to get revoked, and Chépy went on to Rhodes. Ironically, he found himself detesting a post he had worked so hard to procure. For him Rhodes was “a lost country,” where he found himself vegetating and suffering from a “mortal ennui.”\textsuperscript{133} In the midst of his mission, Napoleon invaded Egypt and Chépy found himself under arrest in the summer of 1798, transferred to Constantinople in 1801 and only freed finally in September of that year.\textsuperscript{134} After continuous politicking, Chépy secured yet another post – as commissar of commercial relations at Jersey (1802). This mission was no more successful than the last; he was refused formal recognition and eventually expelled in March 1803.\textsuperscript{135}

Of the total nineteen diplomats who served under the Thermidoreans, two envoys, Adet and Le Hoc, both moderates, served in two different posts: Le Hoc at Hamburg and Sweden, and Adet at Geneva and in the United States. Seven had been appointed before the Thermidoreans came to power. Only six had had diplomatic experience under the Old Regime: Barthélémy, Caillard, Descorches, Helflinger, Lallement\textsuperscript{136} and Le Hoc. Nine – that is, Barthélémy, Caillard, Descorches, Helflinger, Le Hoc, Noël, Reinhard, Verninac and Villars – had served previous revolutionary governments. Seven – Adet, Desportes, Fauchet, Miot de Melito, Resnier, Soulavie and Tilly – had no significant experience within the diplomatic service. The very radical – Soulavie, Villars and Noël – were mixed among the group. Accusations of being too radical – leveled, for example, against Soulavie – or too royalist – against Desportes and Descorches – triggered a recall.\textsuperscript{137}

The total number of diplomats who served from the declaration of

\textsuperscript{132} Winter, 117, 120, 126, 131-32, 136-38, 141-42, 144.
\textsuperscript{133} Delachenal, ed., \textit{Correspondance de Pierre Chépy}, lx.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., lx-lxvi.
\textsuperscript{135} Delachenal, ed., \textit{Correspondance de Pierre Chépy}, lxvii-lxix.
\textsuperscript{136} Lallement had served as chancellor of consulate at Ragusa, chancellor at Naples, vice-consul at Messina, consul general at Naples before his appointment. See also France, \textit{Recueil des instructions}, 26: Venise, 339. See also \textit{Papiers de Barthélémy}, ed. Tausserat-Radel, 6:9, fn. 1.
\textsuperscript{137} For accusations against Descorches see, e.g., Hénin de Cuvilliers, \textit{Sommaire de corresponsandce}.
the Republic in September 1792 to the Directory in November 1795 was fairly small because France was at war for all of the period. Those appointments were politically charged and increasingly dangerous. In a 50% sample of the 40 diplomats who served, the average age was 39 and the median 40 at the time of their appointment. The youngest was Chauvelin who assumed his post at the age of 26 and the oldest Bonneau at 53. 50% were in their forties, 30% were in their thirties. Some of those individuals would continue to serve abroad.
4 "Proven patriots": French diplomats, 1795-1799

The Directory’s *politique de bascule* influenced the diplomatic service just as it did the army. Nor was this problem of appointment ever completely solved. The revolutionaries retained their hostility to diplomacy which Barras referred to as “an institution not highly moral in its practice...,” a system impelled by “the privileges of hypocrisy.”¹ What had changed after Thermidor was the diplomatic climate. By 23 April 1795 Merlin de Douai could contend that before 9 Thermidor it was said that “we only ought to exercise diplomacy with the blows of a cannon... Since then we have proclaimed our respect for all the institutions of diplomacy which belong to the *droit des gens*...” He proposed a decree – unthinkable early in the Revolution – regulating the reception ceremony for foreign ambassadors that stressed that a distinction should be made among the different ranks: ambassadors, ministers, residents, and chargés.² This statement harkened back to some of the practices of a more traditional diplomacy. Nonetheless, though Saint-Just had perished, his view that an official was unworthy of the title citizen persisted.³ The Directory re-established the ministries,⁴ appointing *seriatim* Charles Delacroix (1795-97), Talleyrand (1797-99) and Reinhard (July - November 1799) as Ministers of Foreign Affairs in succession.⁵ In addition they passed *arrêt* which forbade representatives from corresponding on diplomatic matters with anyone other than the Minister of Foreign Affairs, thus re-establishing vital control for the ministry.⁶ Delacroix was selected as Minister of Foreign

³ Church, *Revolution and Red Tape*, 214.
⁴ *Moniteur* 25:772 for the law of 30 Fructidor, Year 3.
Affairs, in part because he had no diplomatic experience. An *avocat*, Delacroix had been elected to the Convention, voted for the death of the king, and aligned himself with the Jacobins. He also served as a member of the first Committee of Public Safety and as secretary to the Convention. Madame Reubell had in fact suggested the appointment as she believed the former professor of rhetoric was so bereft of ideas that he would easily follow instructions. As Sorel has so aptly phrased it: “Delacroix wrote and received. Reubell directed.” Delacroix’s appointment may have stemmed from Talleyrand’s influence or may have reflected the Directors’, particularly Reubell’s, desire to control foreign policy, but it also may have mirrored the revolutionaries’ distrust of those who had served the Old Regime and of diplomacy itself. He had little influence in the Directory. His role in foreign policy was, if anything, secondary. But when he did act, he ignored diplomatic forms.

Delacroix had to deal with the recommendations of the Commission des Dix-Sept established in October 1795 to purge the royalists from the civil service. He accepted all the dismissals suggested and half of those in the unproven category, ultimately firing forty in the ministry. On appeal the Directory reinstated four. This was a significant purge of the Foreign Ministry. Concerns, however, continued to be raised, especially from the left-wing press, about those who remained, who were vilified as “careless ones, robbers, royalists, chameleons...” As late as 1799 the mentality, however, still prevailed that a possession of “republican virtues” was the first and foremost criterion. Nothing in the view of the Minister of War, who spoke for many, could make up for this lack. Although an employee should also be well educated, if he were not also hard working and a “friend” of the public good he should be dismissed. An “ardent zeal” compounded distinguished talent. In his view the “genius of liberty” has “created extraordinary men; it has developed

8 Iiams, *Peacemaking*, 93.
talents that despotism had nullified.”

To be appointed and to retain a position required a complete commitment to the prevailing orthodoxy.

The Directors also followed what had become the established practice of previous revolutionary governments; they demanded a list of the diplomats currently employed, their status, and background. Of the twelve only Caillard, Helbling, Le Hoc, and Barthélémy had served in the diplomatic service of the Old Regime and only Barthélémy, Helbling, Reinhard, and Verninac would also serve Napoleon abroad. Only four had diplomatic experience under the Thermidoreans: Adet, Lallement, Miot de Melito, and Resnier. Men interested in diplomatic postings underwent a rigorous interrogation. As with other government appointments, they could be damned by association. General Philippe-François de Latour-Foissac, who was nominated for the position of ambassador to Sweden, lost the appointment when the Directory ruled that as a brother-in-law of an émigré, he could not hold the post.

Cronyism, rather than ideology, served as the barometer of diplomatic appointments. Many of those appointed were friends or associates of the Directors. Expediency also played a role. When governments abroad complained or the powerful at home criticized, the Directory did not hesitate to dismiss those whose patriotism was viewed as too excessive or too moderate. For example, when James Monroe, the United States minister to France, objected to the appointment of Michel-Ange-Bernard Mangourit du Champ-Duguit, former consul to the United States, as chargé, the nomination was withdrawn. Nor did the Directory hesitate to refuse to receive envoys whom they viewed as unacceptable, such as Rehausen, the chargé from Sweden.

They also rejected those they believed ideologically questionable such as the Genevan nominee for ambassador, Delaplanché, whom they suspected of Babouvism. Nor did they hesitate to

12 Church, Revolution and Red Tape, 116.
13 Ibid., 234-35.
14 A.N. AF III, 335. See also Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 76-77.
15 21 nivose, an IV (11 January 1796). A. Debidour, ed., Recueil des actes du Directoire exécutif (procès-verbaux, arrêtés, instructions, lettres et actes divers) (Paris, 1910), 1:404. Latour-Foissac had been imprisoned during the Terror and was only released after the fall of Robespierre.
17 Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 391.
pressure their allies to recall envoys accredited to others. For example, the French pressured the Batavians to recall Johan Valkenaer from Madrid for his alleged Jacobin tendencies. At this time the Directory, however, did not have relations with some of the most important European states, notably Great Britain, Austria, and Naples.

RECALLED

Of the twelve posted abroad when the Directors came into power four were recalled: Le Hoc, Villars, Resnier, and Verninac, who had requested his recall. Eight were retained in office: Reinhard, Noël, Caillard, Helflinger, Miot de Melito, Adet, Lallement, and Barthélémy. The Directors recalled those on both ends of the political spectrum as well as those who could not negotiate successfully with their host governments. For example, the Directors recalled one of the most experienced diplomats who had served both the Old Regime and the new, Louis-Grégoire Le Hoc (1743-1810), who was bourgeois. Le Hoc had been sent by Louis XVI to negotiate a prisoner exchange in 1778. He then went to Constantinople with Choiseul-Gouffier as first secretary of the legation. After the flight to Varennes the assembly entrusted him with guarding the dauphin. Le Hoc was subsequently appointed as minister plenipotentiary to Hamburg, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Bremen, and Lübeck (1792-93). After the king’s execution in January 1793 he was expelled by the Hanseatic League. Upon his return home, he was imprisoned for nine months because of the discovery in the Tuileries of a letter he had written to the king. In 1795 the Thermidoreans named him ambassador extraordinary to the king of Sweden, but his mission lasted less than a year. After Le Hoc’s recall by the Directory, he was not reappointed. Noted for his exquisite manners and his brilliant conversation, his gentility contrasted markedly with republican mores. The Directors, and the foreign minister, Delacroix, in particular, did not trust him perhaps in part because his brother-in-law was

19 Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 84.
20 Michaud, 23: 653-54.
22 Ibid., 78. See also Winter, 110, 111, 115, 120, 122, 136.
an émigré and perhaps in part because he had served under the Old Regime.

The Directory also recalled Villars, an individual with little diplomatic experience and even less political tact. A well known Jacobin and friend of Bonne-Carrère, Villars had served briefly as chargé at Mainz in 1792 before being sent to Genoa in 1794. Because of the frequent complaints from the Genoese Senate about his spreading revolutionary propaganda and the desire of the Directory to give a position abroad to the ex-minister of finance, Faipoult, he was recalled in 1796. They also recalled Louis Pierre Panteleon Resnier (1752-1807), the envoy in Geneva (1 November 1795-8 February 1796). An editor of the Moniteur and friend of Sieyès, he had dallied in the theatre, but had no diplomatic experience. The Genevans’ complaints of him as duplicitous and ill-intentioned prompted his recall. On his return to Paris his revolutionary credentials garnered him an appointment as archivist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Delacroix also recalled some individuals whom he had earlier appointed, such as a secretary to the embassy in Spain. An individual of dubious morals who could not return to his native Brittany, Mangourit exulted in his revolutionary credentials, especially his role in the taking of the Bastille. Predictably, he saw Spain as a country “corrupted by

23 Villars had also served as minister plenipotentiary to Mainz (May-July 1792) before his appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Genoa (October 1794 - March 1796). See Winter, 117, 124; Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 81; France, Recueil des instructions, 28: États allemands, 1, L’Electorat de Mayence, 287. Dorothée Villars was envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Genoa (19 October 1794 to 5 March 1796) and was replaced by Guillaume Charles Faipoult de Maisoncelle who arrived on 5 April 1796. Villars’ predecessor was Tilly, who was accredited as chargé d’affaires from 1 May 1793 to 10 October 1794. In fact the citizens of Genoa complained bitterly of Tilly’s actions and requested his recall. See B.L. Add. Mss. 46825, fol. 224, extracts of committee of 4 October 1793. Villars dreaded his recall and the hatred of Salicetti who was determined to destroy him. Fearing that he was going to be put in irons and sent back to France, he sold his furniture. His secretary was in fact ordered back to Paris to clarify the situation. See B.L. Add. Mss. 46827, fol. 238, Genoa, 9 January 1796; fol. 245, Genoa, 27 February 1798; fol. 248, 5 March 1796; and Add. Mss. 26829, 20 December 1794, fol. 112.

24 Winter, 138; Michaud, 35:457; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 5:122; Barbey, Félix Desportes, 38, 49, 56.
fanaticism.” Mangourit also quarreled with and tried to undermine the French ambassador.

Even French representatives in remote spots such as Algiers, Tunis, and the Ottoman Porte could find themselves targeted. Louis-Alexandre d’Alloïs d’Herculais, sent on a special mission to Algiers in 1796, denounced Devoize, who had served in Tunis as consul general and chargé d’affaires since July 1792. He accused Devoize of befriending royalists, supplying incorrect information about the country, engaging in suspect relations with the British consul, going to mass, and most damning of all, forbidding the singing of patriotic songs and encouraging the rendition of royalist ones. Devoize lost his position, but only temporarily; he was reinstated and returned to Tunis in October 1797. Herculais also denounced and succeeded in getting replaced Vallière, the consul in Algiers, who had given asylum to his brother-in-law, a man who had held a municipal office in Toulon during the brief British occupation. Ironically, Herculais himself was recalled and ordered to return home.

Verninac de Saint-Maur requested his own recall from the Ottoman Porte. He was a zealous partisan of the Revolution who had been first sent to the Comtat Venaissin to re-establish peace but instead bore partial responsibility for some of the bloodshed that ensued and complete responsibility for discrediting his moderate colleagues. He was named chargé d’affaires to Sweden in April 1792 but was recalled the following year when his Swedish counterpart in France was recalled. He was then named envoy extraordinary to the Turks in 1795 replacing Descorches de Sainte-Croix, but was increasingly frustrated because of his inability to convince the Turks to conclude an alliance with France. On his return to France he was stopped and held in Naples for several months. Shortly thereafter, reaching France in May 1797, he married Delacroix’s daughter.

He held no more foreign posts until Napoleon appointed him minister plenipotentiary to the Helvetic Republic (1801-02) then recalled him in

25 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 117. See also Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 82, 550; Winter, 140; Michaud, 32:491-92; Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française en Espagne pendant la Révolution, 115-42.
26 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 122-23.
27 DBF, 17:1049.
29 B.L. Add. Mss. 36811, 1 June 1795 from Robert Liston regarding the reception of Verninac.
disgrace for favoring the independence rather than the annexation of the Valais.\textsuperscript{30} If the Directory did not replace agents, nonetheless they often circumvented them. In writing to Grenville, the British foreign secretary, William Wickham, the British minister in the Swiss lands, observed that at Paris a resolution had been taken to “treat as little as possible through the medium of avowed agents, particularly those who have any of the old principles or habits or manner of the ancient system remaining.”\textsuperscript{31}

REPLACEMENTS

The Directory replaced Le Hoc in Sweden with a chargé d’affaires, Henri Maes de Perrochel (1750-1810), a war hero known by one of the Directors, La Revellière-Lépaux (1796); Villars with Guillaume-Charles Faipoult, chevalier de Maisonnelle (1752-1817), a former Girondin, who had served as Minister of Finance before now being named minister plenipotentiary to Genoa (5 April 1796 - 23 February 1798);\textsuperscript{32} and Resnier with Desportes, a friend of Danton who had been briefly imprisoned and was released in Thermidor. Desportes went back to his old posting at Geneva (9 February 1796).\textsuperscript{33} The Directory replaced Raymond Verninac de Saint-Maur with a military hero and friend of Reubell, General Jean-Baptiste Annibal Aubert de Bayet (1757-1797), who had served with distinction in the Vendée and been briefly imprisoned during the Terror before being appointed Minister of War and then ambassador to the Turks on 8 February 1796. He died at his post after having served a little over a year.\textsuperscript{34} The Directory also reappointed Grouvelle minister plenipotentiary

\textsuperscript{31} Hampshire Record Office, Wickham Papers 38/M49/1/22/63, draft dispatch to Grenville, Berne, 2 July 1796.
\textsuperscript{34} Guyot, \textit{Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe}, 79; Winter, 142; Michaud, 2:576-77; Edna Hindie LeMay, ed., \textit{Dictionnaire des législateurs, 1791-1792} (Paris,
to Denmark – he had first been appointed in 1793, but was recalled in 1794.  

RETAINED IN OFFICE

Of those the Directory retained in office – Reinhard, Noël, Caillard, Helflinger, Miot de Melito, Verninac, Adet, and Lallement – only one was an ardent revolutionary: François Noël, minister plenipotentiary to The Hague (7 September 1795 - 27 December 1797). A zealous advocate of the Revolution, this ex-priest and ex-journalist had enjoyed the support of Danton. Napoleon did not employ him as a diplomat but did appoint him inspector general of public instruction. Five of these individuals had extensive diplomatic experience: Caillard, Lallement, Barthélemy, Helflinger, and Charles Frédéric Reinhard (1761-1837). Dumouriez had appointed Reinhard, a supporter of the Girondins, secretary of the embassy at London (15 April 1792). Later he served as first secretary of the embassy at Naples (February 1793) before becoming chief of the division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (9 January 1794). He was named minister plenipotentiary to the Hanseatic cities (25 June 1795) and later minister plenipotentiary to Florence (13 December 1797). His last mission for the Directory was as minister plenipotentiary to the Helvetic Republic. He was subsequently named Minister of Foreign Affairs (18 July 1799), a position which he lost shortly after the coup of Brumaire when he was again sent abroad by Napoleon, hopscotching from Berne and on to one German city and court after another: Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Westphalia, the dukes of Anhalt, and the princes of Lippe and Waldeck. He even went on to Moldavia. During the Restoration he was again appointed to head the chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the Germanic Confederation. When Louis-

2007), 1:17-20; and Frédéric Clément-Simon, Le premier ambassadeur de la République française à Constantinople (Paris, 1904).

35 Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 197-99; Winter, 112.

36 Michaud, 30:654-57; Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 83; Winter, 126.
Philippe came to power in 1830 he was sent as envoy extraordinary to Dresden.37 Barthélémy, Lallement, Caillard, and Helflinger exemplify diplomats from the “second tier” whose promotion would have been virtually impossible under the Old Regime, but who attained important posts during the Revolution. François Barthélémy, who had been appointed minister plenipotentiary and ambassador to the Swiss in December 1791, would also serve under Napoleon.38 Jean Baptiste Lallement, who served as envoy to the Venetians (13 November 1794 - 26 October 1797)39 was recalled shortly after Napoleon dissolved and partitioned Venice, handing large parts of it over to Austria in the Treaty of Campo Formio (October 1797). As a penniless commoner, Lallement had only served in the consular service under the Old Regime. Under the Revolution he was appointed consul general at Naples then envoy to Venice, a promotion unthinkable under the Old Regime.40 The last of our trio who served both the Old Regime and the new was Antoine-Bernard Caillard (b. 1737), who had initially worked with Turgot, then provincial intendant at Limoges. He went on to serve as secretary of the legation at Parma (1770-72), at Kassel (1773-74), and at Copenhagen (1775), where he also served as chargé d’affaires until 1780. He next served as chargé d’affaires at St. Petersburg (1783), and then in 1785 he was sent to the United Provinces where he became chargé in 1787. Subsequently, he was sent to the Diet at Regensburg but was never officially received. In 1795 he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to Berlin where he remained until 1798. In 1799 Talleyrand recommended him for a position in the foreign affairs archives.41 He survived because he was able to rely on the support of powerful individuals such as Talleyrand but also because he prided himself on being a “republican minister”, was never a member of

38 Stroehlin, La Mission de Barthélémy; DBF, 5:664-65; Michaud, 3:182-88.
39 Winter, 144.
40 Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 83.
the first tier of diplomats and therefore was less vulnerable.\textsuperscript{42} Helflinger who served as \textit{chargé} (August 1788) and later resident (December 1788) to the Valais retained this post throughout the Revolution.

The Directors also temporarily retained the able and moderate Miot de Melito as minister plenipotentiary to Tuscany (May 1795 - December 1796). They sent him as special emissary to the papacy in 1796 and then as ambassador to Sardinia (14 June 1797 - 25 March 1798).\textsuperscript{43} Miot de Melito had ably served in the War Ministry for many years before moving to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They also retained the naturalist Pierre Auguste Adet (1763-1834) as minister plenipotentiary to the United States (15 June 1795 - 6 May 1797). Adet had had some limited diplomatic experience as envoy to another republic, Geneva in 1794,\textsuperscript{44} and felt a deep sense of personal betrayal when he was unable to prevent the ratification of the controversial Jay Treaty. The election of the Federalist John Adams to the presidency further demoralized him. Increasingly frustrated, he thought that the United States had not honored its 1778 alliance with France. As Franco-American relations deteriorated after the ratification of the Jay Treaty the French recalled Adet, whose personal distaste for his mission and dislike of the United States had only exacerbated the difficulties inherent in his position, and replaced him with a \textit{chargé}, Philippe Joseph Letombe (1797-1801).\textsuperscript{45}

\section*{THE COUP OF FRUCTIDOR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES}

The diplomatic corps did not remain immune to the political gales that swept through France. Like the army, the diplomatic service saw presumed royalists ousted and Jacobins reinstated.\textsuperscript{46} The coup of Fructidor

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\textsuperscript{42} Paul Bailleu, ed., \textit{Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807, Diplomatische Correspondenzen} (Osnabrück, 1965), 1:457, report of Caillard from Berlin, 28 March 1797; Winter, 131.
\textsuperscript{43} Winter, 128, 135, 141.
\textsuperscript{45} De Conde, \textit{Entangling Alliance}, 379, 424-28. See also Winter, 144.
\textsuperscript{46} Brown, “Politics, Professionalism, and the Fate of Army Generals after Thermidor,” 151.
\end{flushright}
on 4 September 1797 was directed against those on the right and resulted in the annulment of 49 elections, the removal of 177 deputies and two Directors, Carnot and Barthélémy, the purging – yet again – of the army, the deportation of a number of individuals, some of whom were or had been in the diplomatic corps, including Barthélémy and Barbé-Marbois, and the passage of laws including that of 3 Brumaire, Year IV which declared émigrés ineligible to hold office. But even after many had been fructidorisé, that is removed, some in the left wing press continued to criticize the ministries for employing “the indifferent, thieves, royalists, chameleons.”

Two of the most prominent former diplomats condemned to be deported were the Director Barthélémy and Barbé-Marbois, secretary to and a member of the Council of Ancients. François Barthélémy (1747(?)–1830), who had served his diplomatic apprenticeship under Vergennes, had faithfully served both the Old Regime and the new. From an established bourgeois family, he had worked under Etienne François de Choiseul in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before becoming secretary of the embassy at Stockholm (1768) and Vienna (1775), chargé d’affaires in Spain (1783-85), minister plenipotentiary at Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1788-92) and London (1784), ambassador to the Swiss Confederation in January 1792 and at the Peace of Basel (1795) and then Director in June 1797. After the coup of Fructidor, Barthélémy was-condemned to deportation to Guiana. He escaped, however, and fled to the United States and then Britain, was placed on the list of émigrés and only returned to France in Brumaire 1799. Louis XVIII made him a marquis in 1818. Barthélémy was one of the most adept and astute of the revolutionary diplomats and one, moreover, who was able to inspire great personal devotion. His very moderation put him at great risk. Some of his enemies claimed that he was “du très ancien régime,” a damning indictment. Paul François Jean Nicolas Barras, another of his enemies, criticized him for being “honey-like” and too “humble” – “more than what is required in a republic.” In addition, Barras condemned him for speaking rarely and for

47 Church, Revolution and Red Tape, 510.
48 Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:308.
49 DBF, 5:664-65; Michaud, 3:182-88; Winter, 113, 118, 124, 131, 136-37, 140.
51 Barras, Memoirs, 2:497. See also Nabonne, La Diplomatie du Directoire, 91, note.
being extremely formal. He went on to note that “Diplomats are accustomed to believe that their silences, their reticences, their civilities are marks of genius.”

Reubell, another of his critics, who had opposed his election to the Directory, thought Barthélémy “a cowardly and weak politician.” François Barbé-Marbois was also a moderate, who had served both the Old Regime and the Revolution abroad. A friend of Louis XVI, the king had appointed him to positions at Regensburg, Dresden and Munich as well as the United States. He survived his exile and upon his return to France after 18 Brumaire was honored by Napoleon and later Louis XVIII.

After the coup of Fructidor the Directory sent a circular to its ministers which instructed them to purge the personnel of their bureaux; to dismiss those “who dishonor the republic by their incivism or betray it by their immorality.” In reply, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talleyrand, assured the citizen Directors that “No duty... seems more sacred and accords more with my sentiments. For a long time, I have shared your indignation about this revolting discordance between principles and functions, between morals and places.” After underscoring in unmistakable terms his agreement with the directive, he nonetheless defended the staff of the ministry: “But I owe justice to the employees of my bureaux. In general all carry here the stamp of civism.” Talleyrand reported that he found no disguised aristocrats; no one used the word “Monsieur,” no one displayed in either language or dress “the frivolity bordering on aristocracy.” To prove the latter contention he claimed that “the word citizen, far from being proscribed, is the only one constantly employed and constantly received by them. I have never had a single occasion to recall it to them and certainly I would not have hesitated to do so, if they had abjured the honorable denomination which we have conquered with equality.” Not only did these men employ the word citizen, but their morality was not suspect. “Their habits are simple, decent. Nothing which recalls the exterior of the enemies of the country.” He concluded by a rhetorical question: was there “any employee who has

52 Ibid., 2:498.
53 Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 78, fn. 1. See also Kaulek, ed., Papiers de Barthélémy, 3:76.
55 Ibid. ; Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 549.
abused this confidence who has disguised perfidy under a republican exterior, under a pure language, who has deceived me or my predecessor?” Not surprisingly, he did “not know any.”

As this incident indicates, men in the ministry and diplomats sent aboard found themselves entangled in the symbolic deployment that was so integral to the revolutionary imagination and the revolutionary faith. The ideal government servant was supposed to meet certain revolutionary expectations. As Clive Church found in his study of the bureaucracy: “For the activist it was not enough that the civil servant should have negative virtues, that he was not involved in opposition to the Republic, or was not marked by ‘aristocratic’ vices such as vengeance, crass ignorance, despotism, ambition, and intolerance. He was expected to have more positive characteristics. He had to have a strong love of duty, country, constitution, and Republic; which was to be demonstrated by being a father – hence with a stake in the future, by having served in the army where appropriate, and by having chosen the right side at crises such as those of Prairial and Vendémiaire. As an official he must always put nation above faction, use the republican form of address, be at his post in times of crisis, and be of good moral character: honest, open, firm, and zealous.”

Barras explained the government’s position. He did not believe that one could establish “a republic without republicans.” In order to sustain such a new organization “in the middle of old Europe, we have only one means, that is, to place everywhere, in the exterior as well as the interior, those men who are most devoted to liberty and who have pledged themselves to it.” Such men were difficult to find. Those who served France often found their patriotism questioned or their character impugned.

In spite of Talleyrand’s spirited defense, the Foreign Ministry was purged along with the consulates and embassies abroad. Accusation of “incivism” or immorality broadly defined led to dismissal. The Directory reduced the budget of the ministry by one third and reduced the number of agents to 46 and couriers to 9. Some employees were sent abroad: David was named secretary at Milan. Some, such as Flassan,

57 Church, Revolution and Red Tape, 236.
denounced as an émigré, were imprisoned. Not only were the former diplomats Barthélémy and Barbé-Marbois exiled to the “dry guillotine,” Guiana, but eight diplomats were recalled: Cacault, Canclaux, Clarke, Letourneur, Pérganon, Miot de Melito, Noël, and Faipoult. Friendships with now discredited revolutionaries such as Carnot (Clarke and Letourneur) or accusations of moderation (Cacault, Canclaux, Pérganon, Miot de Melito, Faipoult), relations who were émigrés (Canclaux), aristocratic birth (Faipoult), service in the Old Regime (Cacault, Étienne-François-Louis-Honoré Letourneur, Canclaux, Miot de Melito, Faipoult), general distrust (Noël) or a combination of the above led to these recalls.

In the words of the disenchanted Miot de Melito, the Directory “entirely remodelled” French diplomacy after 18 Fructidor. Thereafter, it selected individuals with a “dogmatic and proselytizing spirit.” Guillemandet was sent to Spain, Garat to Naples, Sotin to Genoa, Ginguene to Turin, and Trouvé to Milan. Many of these succeeded only in making France “implacable enemies” abroad. Some Frenchmen cannily envisaged nothing but war for France. For one deputy one of the “poisonous fruits” of Fructidor was that we would “neither have nor be able to have peace....” In his view the Directory patterned itself after Cromwell in his tyranny and the Committee of Public Safety in its execrable conduct.

Fructidor was the last significant purge of diplomats abroad during the Revolution. One of the most capable to be recalled was François Cacault an experienced diplomat, who was fluent in Italian. Under the Old Regime he had served as a professor of fortifications at the École militaire before being appointed secretary of the embassy and occasionally chargé d’affaires at Naples. He was recalled in August of 1792 because of allegations that he maintained relationships with émigrés. Sent again, this time to the papacy in January of 1793, he was not received by the pope until 31 July 1796. The Directory sent him as minister

60 LeMay, ed., Dictionnaire des législateurs, 1791-1792, 2:504-05.
61 Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 552. According to Guyot Noël lost his position because of his suspect relations with Maret and his role in the negotiations at Lille.
62 Memoirs of Count Miot de Melito, 117.
64 Edward Elton Young Hales, Revolution and Papacy, 1769-1846 (Notre Dame, IN, 1966), 97.
plenipotentiary to Tuscany (1797-98), but recalled him because of allegations that he was too friendly with kings. A supporter of Napoleon in Brumaire, Cacault was sent again to the papacy to conclude the Concordat (1801-03). In exasperation, Napoleon at one time accused him of being more Roman than French. Skillful, tactful, and patient, he was able to conclude the difficult negotiations and win over many of the papal advisers, especially Cardinal Hercule Consalvi (1757-1824), who regretted his departure in 1803. He returned to France and died shortly thereafter in 1805.66 General Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke (1765-1818), who was negotiating a treaty with Austria, also lost his position. Whether the allegation that a fleur de lys was found in his possession was true or not, the real problem for Clarke lay in his relationship with Carnot and earlier with the duc d’Orléans. He was neither imprisoned nor exiled because of Bonaparte’s support. The Directory never employed him again but when Napoleon came to power he sent him as minister plenipotentiary to Tuscany (1801-04), envoy to Lucca (1802-03), and special commissioner to negotiate with the British in 1806.67

Yet another casualty of Fructidor was Charles Louis François Honoré Letourneur (1751-1817), at the time plenipotentiary to the conference at Lille (28 June 1797 - 12 September 1797). A captain in the army before the Revolution, he was elected to the Legislative Assembly where he occupied himself with naval issues, to the National Convention where he was charged with inspecting defenses on the Mediterranean coast, to the Council of Elders and then chosen as a Director. He was recalled from the peace conferences at Lille after 18 Fructidor because of his friendship with Carnot. He was exiled in 1816 and fled to the Netherlands where he died.68 Dominique-Catherine de Pérignon (1754-1818), another soldier, faced a similar fate. Pérignon came from a family which had served France with distinction in the army. A moderate, he

65 Michaud, 9:61-68.
68 Auguste Kuscinski, ed., Dictionnaire des Conventionnels (Yvelines, 1973), 405-06; Winter, 119; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 4:140-41; Michaud, 24:364.
served in the Legislative Assembly and later in the revolutionary army with valor. The Directory sent him as ambassador to Spain in 1796, where he successfully concluded a treaty of alliance with Charles IV. His skill as well as moderation endeared him to the Spanish, but not to the Directory, which recalled him and two members of his staff after Fructidor, allegedly because his staff had mingled with agents of Louis XVIII. His misunderstandings with the consul in Spain and quarrels with Mangourit, the secretary at the embassy who repeatedly denounced him, had also weakened his position. He continued to serve France in the army and later Louis XVIII. Yet another prominent member of the military who lost his position was General Jean-Baptiste Camille de Canclaux (1740-1817), who came from an old family of the robe. He rose rapidly in the army of the Old Regime and the new. He lost his position, but not his life in the Terror. After Thermidor he was reappointed general and subsequently concluded a treaty with the Vendéans. The Directors, especially Reubell, initially wanted to send Canclaux to Spain but he refused the post. The Directory named him ambassador to the court of Naples in 1796, where he remained until his recall in 1797 allegedly because his subordinates, particularly Trouvé, the secretary of the embassy, accused him of failing to insist that the Neapolitans treat the French with enough dignity and receive them with enough grandeur. His dismissal may also have stemmed in part because he was a relative of émigrés. The friendship of Reubell and Merlin was insufficient to save him. He later served France with distinction.

The Directors also targeted those who were seen as too moderate, notably the experienced Miot de Melito – at that time ambassador to Sardinia (14 June 1797 - 25 March 1798) – and Guillaume-Charles Faipoult, chevalier de Maisoncelle (1752-1817), minister plenipotentiary to the republic of Genoa (5 April 1796 - 23 February 1798). Miot de Melito, a Feuillant, had gone into hiding after the August 1792
Revolution. He served in the Foreign Ministry under Deforgues as secretary general before being sent abroad. Miot de Melito, who disapproved of the political agitation orchestrated by the Directory in Sardinia and who had respected the asylum of certain émigrés, was recalled for not following orders. Later, he lost both his son and son-in-law at Waterloo. Faipoult, who came from a noble family in Champagne, had served as a captain in the army. He resigned when he was not given permission to fight with the Americans in their struggle for independence. A Girondin, he served under Roland as secretary general of the Ministry of the Interior. He escaped the proscription of the Girondins and prudently remained out of Paris until after 9 Thermidor. He had served as Minister of Finance before his diplomatic appointment to Genoa.

REPLACEMENTS

The Directors replaced Cacault in Tuscany with Reinhard, an experienced and moderate revolutionary diplomat, and Perignon in Spain with a chargé, Henri Maes de Perrochel (1750-1810), a former canon and captain of the cavalry who had fought in the Vendée, and was known by one of the Directors, La Revellière-Lépeaux (1796), and chosen by Talleyrand. Admiral Laurent Jean François Truguet (1752-1839), the former Minister of the Marine, was later appointed ambassador. Truguet had served in

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74 In Brumaire Napoleon named him prefect of the Scheldt, a position which he held until he was blamed for the disaster in 1809 when the dikes broke and flooded the country. He went to Spain to serve Joseph Bonaparte, not returning to Paris until 1813. Unemployed during the Restoration, he was thrown in jail and then went abroad, only returning to France in 1816. Guyot, *Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe*, 552; Winter, 117; Tulard, Fayard, and Fiero, *Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française*, 1789-1799, 812; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français*, 2:593; Fiero, Palluel-Guillard, and Tulard, *Histoire et dictionnaire du Consulat et de l’Empire*, 767; Michaud 13:470-71.
75 Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français*, 5:111.
the navy under the Old Regime and the new. He had also worked earlier with Choiseul-Gouffier at Constantinople and had negotiated a treaty with the bey of Tunis. Impressed by his abilities, Louis XVI had appointed him *chef d'escadre*. In chaotic times he tried to maintain discipline. He was briefly imprisoned during the Terror. His friendship with Barras helped him secure an appointment as Minister of the Marine. Although he was denounced for his role in the disastrous Irish expedition of 1796, he did not lose his portfolio until two days before 18 Fructidor (1797). Barras again secured him an appointment, this time to Spain. Because of intrigues at the Spanish court and the discontent of some Directors, he was recalled and replaced by a complete diplomatic novice, Ferdinand Guillemandet, a former member of the Convention, a regicide, and a deputy of the Council of Five Hundred. When Truguet did not return immediately to France, he was inscribed on the list of *émigrés*. He returned to France, was briefly imprisoned and then when into exile in the United Provinces, only returning to France after the coup of 18 Brumaire. He later served Napoleon, Louis XVIII, and Louis Philippe. Louis XVIII awarded him the grand cordon of the legion of honor and Louis Philippe raised him to the rank of admiral.

Cancaloux in Naples was replaced for a short time with a *chargé d’affaires*, Charles Joseph Trouvé, until the arrival of comte Dominique-Joseph Garat as ambassador extraordinary (7 May - 28 June 1798). Garat (1749-1833), a member of the Council of Elders, former professor of history and deputy of the Third Estate, and he wrote for the *Mercure français* and the *Journal de Paris*. He had served as Minister of Justice (1792-93) and later of the Interior (1793). His discourse, which attempted to justify the September Massacres, led him to be dubbed thereafter “Garat September.” He was briefly imprisoned after the fall of the Girondins. He was the one who notified the king of his death sentence and later supervised the execution. He was also an unsuccessful candidate for one of the positions in the Directory. The Directory’s appointment of him as ambassador to Naples shows their and his ineptitude and insensitivity to the Bourbon family, who ruled there and who understandably treated the new representative with contempt. His tenure was predictably short (7 May - 28 June 1798). He requested his own recall and never served abroad.

77 Nabonne, *La Diplomatie du Directoire*, 104.
again. During the Hundred Days Napoleon excluded him from power as did the Bourbons during the second Restoration. The Directory replaced Miot de Melito with Pierre-Louis Ginguéné (1748-1816) as minister plenipotentiary (31 March - 12 October 1798) to Sardinia. A man of humble origins as well as a gifted writer of both prose and poetry, Ginguéné had been imprisoned during the Terror. From 1795 to 1797 he served as the director of the Commission of Public Instruction. He was sent to Turin as minister plenipotentiary on his first and only mission abroad. Faipoult’s position at Genoa remained unfilled until Napoleon named Jean François Aimé Dejean envoy extraordinary in 1800. In the interval the Directory relied on the consul and correspondent, Belleville de Redon.

THE COUP OF FLORÉAL

The next political gale to sweep through the diplomatic corps was the coup of 22 Floréal (11 May 1798) directed against those on the left. Floréal resulted not only in the annulment of numerous elections but also the purging of radicals from the diplomatic lists either by dismissal or by relegating them to the political wilderness. Both Pierre Louis Ginguéné, minister plenipotentiary at Turin, and P.-J.-Marie Sotin de la Coindière (1764-1810), consul at Genoa, both of whom had attained their positions after Fructidor, lost them after Floréal. The latter, an avocat before the Revolution, had served as Minister of Police after Thermidor. Devoted to Barras, he was one of the instigators of the Fructidor coup. After Fructidor he was sent as consul to Genoa. Ironically, Floréal, resulted in his being sent into political exile – to Charleston, South Carolina, in the United States.

79 Winter, 139; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 3:105-06; Michaud, 15:526-45.
80 Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 3:174; Winter, 135; Tulard, Fayard, and Fierro, Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française, 1789-1799, 850.
81 Winter, 117; Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 162-64.
82 Martyn Lyons, France under the Directory (Cambridge, 1975), 207.
83 Tulard, Fayard, and Fierro, Histoire et dictionnaire de la Revolution française, 1789-1799, 1100; Robinet, ed., Dictionnaire, 2:760-61.
THE COUP OF 30 PRAIRIAL

The coup of 30 Prairial (18 June 1799), a purge of the right in the legislature, was viewed as fitting retribution by those who had lost positions after Floréal. This Jacobin victory resulted in the annulment of the election of Treilhard and in the forced resignations of two other Directors, Merlin de Douai and La Revellière-Lépeaux, and those who had attained their positions because of their support. The most notable casualty in the diplomatic corps was Henri Maes de Perrochel (1750-1810), minister plenipotentiary to Lucerne (1798-99). During the Revolution he had served as a volunteer in the army before being named captain in 1793. Badly wounded at Martigny, he left the army. One of the Directors, La Revellière-Lépeaux, who knew him, had him appointed first secretary to Truguet at Madrid, where he also served briefly as chargé. After his dismissal from Lucerne, like his protector, he went into political retreat, never serving again.  

APPOINTMENTS MADE DURING THE DIRECTORY

Appointments proved problematic throughout the Directory. In a sample of 61 out of a total of 75 diplomats who served during the Directory, the average age on appointment was 43 and the median 44. The youngest was Napoleon, at 28, with his brother Joseph (29) and Trouvé (also 29) close seconds. The oldest was Caillard at 58. As in the earlier sample from 1792-95, almost 50% (49.18%) were in their forties. In this sample, 25.59% were in their thirties and 21.3% were in their fifties. The Directors were particularly sensitive to the issue of hiring relatives of émigrés or of those politically suspect. Because diplomatic appointment was such a politically charged issue both in France and abroad the Directory tried to choose “safe individuals.”

For the most part the Directors tended to rely on colleagues, friends, relatives, or military heros. Charles Joseph Trouvé (1768-1860) owed his various diplomatic appointments and rapid advancement during the Directory as chargé d’affaires to Sicily (27 December 1797 - 1 May

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84 Michaud, 32:540-41; Winter, 136-37, 140.
1798), ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic (May - October 1798) minister plenipotentiary to Württemberg (31 January/5 February - 16 April 1799) to the support of La Revellièr-Lépeaux. Born to a family of artisans, this ambitious journalist worked on the Moniteur, becoming editor-in-chief. A partisan of Napoleon, who named him to a prefecture, he later served the Bourbons and became a staunch monarchist. Nicolas Félix, baron Desportes (1763-1849) owed his position as resident in Geneva (1796-1798) to Delacroix whom he had served as secretary. The son of a rich merchant, before the Revolution Desportes became an avocat and in 1790 mayor of Montmartre. He had had diplomatic experience: he had served as French representative earlier in the Revolution to Zweibrücken (May 1792). Napoleon later appointed him first secretary to the Spanish embassy (December 1800). When the Bourbons returned, he was arrested, forced to retire to his estates and later banished. Perrochel (at Sweden) owed his appointment to La Revellièr-Lépeaux and Aubert de Bayet (at Constantinople) to Reubell. Conversely the friendship or support of a Director could also lead to dismissal when power shifted, as it had at Fructidor when the support of Carnot or Barthélémy meant the loss of position for Clarke and Letourneur, or at Prairial which promoted the recall of Perrochel. Just as the support of one Director could assure the individual of a post so too the opposition of one Director was often enough to kill an appointment. Reubell, for example, vetoed the idea of sending Bourgoing back to Spain, where he had earlier represented France in 1777-85 and 1792-93. An experienced diplomat, he had served as minister at Hamburg (1788) and Bremen (1788-92) and assisted in the preliminary negotiations for the treaty of Basel in 1795, but he was never employed by the Directory. Napoleon, however, did rely upon him, sending him to Copenhagen and Stockholm.

86 Michaud, 42:213; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 5:453-54; Winter, 111, 139, 145. See also Charles-Joseph Trouvé’s memoir in which he defends his career and accuses his enemies of being “apostles” of Robespierre’s “furious maxims,” who in committing “the most execrable crimes” “in the name of liberty” are rendering it “odious” to other nations. Quelques explications sur la république cisalpine (Paris: Agasse, n.d. [25 thermidor, an VII]), 33.
87 Michaud, 42:213; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 5:453-54; Winter, 111, 139, 145.
88 DBF, 6:1501; Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 82.
Not surprisingly, the appointments under the Directory illustrate the intertwining of political elites. Because the Directors tended to appoint those they knew, many diplomats had served on the Council of Elders (Bonnier, Delacroix, Guiot, Lacombe, Letourneur, and Marragon) or the Council of Five Hundred (Alquier, Joseph Bonaparte, Debray, Guillemardet, Guiot, Lamarque, Rivaud, Roberjot, Sieyès, Treilhard); or as Directors (Letourneur, Neufchâteau and Treilhard). Many diplomats had also served as ministers: Aubert-Dubayet as Minister of War, Delacroix and Francois-Louis-Michael Deforgues (1759-1840) as Foreign

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89 Winter, 114, 121, 128, 145. Hales, Revolution and Papacy, 1769-1846, 112, 114. Joseph served as resident (April 1797) and later minister plenipotentiary (May 1797) to the duke of Parma before serving as French ambassador to Rome (1797). He demanded his passports and left after the killing of Duphot, his sister’s fiancé. He subsequently negotiated a treaty with the United States and represented France at the negotiations at Lunéville (1801) and Amiens (1802). He later became king of Naples and then Spain, reluctantly abdicating in 1813. After his brother lost power, he lived in the United States and briefly in Italy where he died. See also Thierry Lentz, “Joseph Bonaparte, chef de la délégation française au congrès d’Amiens” in La Paix d’Amiens, actes du colloque (Amiens, 24 & 25 mai 2002) (Amien: Encrage, 2005), 109-21, who underscores how Joseph excelled as a diplomat. At Amiens he noted that one danced, one dined, one supped, one visited (118.) These remarks could very well have been given by a diplomat of the Old Regime. For the Duphot killing also see Henry Lapauze, Histoire de l’Academie de France à Rome (Paris, 1924), 1:475 and for Talleyrand’s attitude see Georges Lacour-Gayet, Talleyrand (Paris, 1928), 1:294.

90 François Rivaud du Vignaud, (1754-1836), was a gendarme of the king, lieutenant of the Gendarmerie, member of the Convention, deputy to the Five Hundred and supporter of the Girondins, he was imprisoned for 14 months and later appointed ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic (30 December 1798 - 23 May 1799). Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 5:152-53.

91 Tulard, Fayard, and Fierro, Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française, 1789-1799, 1068-69, for a brief biography of Roberjot who served as a curé before the Revolution. He took the oath to the civil constitution, served as a deputy to the Convention, abandoned his clerical life and married. He then served on the Council of Five Hundred before becoming minister to the Hanseatic Cities, the Batavian Republic, and the Congress of Rastatt, where he was killed. See also Jean Baptiste Magloire Robert, Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale (Paris, 1814), 359-60.
Minister (1793), François de Neufchâteau as Minister of the Interior, Pléville as Minister of the Marine, and Garat as Minister of Justice and of the Interior.

The Directory also increasingly tended to appoint men of military standing. Most prominently, they relied on generals or naval officers, notably Jean-Baptiste-Annibal Aubert-Dubayet (ambassador to the Turks), Bernadotte (ambassador at Vienna), Canclaux (minister plenipotentiary at Naples), Jean François, comte de Carra-Saint-Cyr (chargé to the Turks), Jean-Baptiste Lacombe Saint-Michel (1751 or 1753-1812) (minister plenipotentiary at Naples), Dominique-Catherine de Perignon (ambassador to Spain), and Laurent-Jean-François Truguet (ambassador to Spain). The Directory also tended to send men of military stature to the important peace conferences: for example, they sent Napoleon to Campo Formio and Rastatt, Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke to Campo Formio, and Georges René Pléville Le Pelley (1726-1805) to Lille.

92 The Directory sent him as minister plenipotentiary to the Dutch (17 October 1799 - 18 January 1800). A former lawyer who had served as Danton’s secretary, he was briefly imprisoned but freed in Thermidor only to be rearrested for his role in the September Massacres. Given amnesty, he was sent on diplomatic missions. Napoleon named him consul of France at New Orleans, but he was disgraced in 1810. Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 5:35 and note.

93 He was sent on a special mission to the Holy Roman Empire. A poet and playwright, Neufchâteau had also been a member of the Directory. Dominique Margairaz, François de Neufchâteau, biographie intellectuelle (Paris, 2005), esp. 348-49. See also Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 700-10.

94 Jean François, comte de Carra-Saint-Cyr (b. 1756), was an infantry officer and a friend of Aubert-Dubayet. By 1794 he was a general of brigade. He worked with Aubert at the Ministry of War and accompanied his friend to the Ottomans as first secretary of the embassy and later served as chargé in the Ottoman Empire (1798). See Michaud, 7:41-42; Winter, 142.

95 Robert, Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale, 221; and LeMay, ed., Dictionnaire des législateurs, 1791-1792, 2:437-38.

96 Le Pelley was a corsair and naval officer before the Revolution who had fought in the American Revolutionary wars and had achieved the rank of captain before the Revolution. He worked as chief of the division in the Ministry of the Marine before being appointed minister plenipotentiary to the congress of Lille. During that mission he was named Minister of the Marine. By 1798 he had attained the rank of admiral and shortly thereafter was in charge of the naval forces in the Mediterranean. Michaud, 33:516-18; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 5:5; Six, Dictionnaire biographique, 2:319.
diplomats who had military experience included Ragettli, a colonel, sent as chargé to the Grisons (1798), Bacher, a lieutenant in the army, chargé to the Swiss (1797) and the Diet at Regensburg (1798-1799) and Perrochel, a captain in the army, who had been badly wounded in action, as chargé to Sweden (1796) and Spain (1797-1798), and minister plenipotentiary to the Swiss (1798-1799). Letourneur, a captain in the army before the Revolution, represented France at the conference of Lille as a plenipotentiary.

Unfortunately, many of them, with the exception of Aubert-Dubayet, who had served the Old Regime as an agent in Poland (1788-1791), and Bacher, as a chargé to the Swiss and envoy to Basel, were unschooled in the diplomatic arts, which led, as one historian has noted, to the conquerors being “treated as the conquered.” They may have been inexperienced diplomatically but they were unquestionably loyal to the Revolution, which had made their careers and their rapid ascent possible. Numerically, the number appointed may seem insignificant but many held the rank of ambassador and thus were more prominent. In addition, they were sent to the most important courts in Europe: Austria, Spain, Naples, and the Porte. Some military men, however, were loathe to serve. For example, the Directors chose Pichegru, a war hero and a member of the Council of Five Hundred, to act as representative to Sweden and to the Turks, but he declined both.

The Directory also targeted certain professions for appointments. A large number of diplomats were trained as either judges or avocats:

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98 Théobald-Jacques-Justin Bacher (1748-1813), a lieutenant in the Old Regime, served in 1777 as secretary of the embassy and sporadically as chargé d’affaires to the Swiss until the arrival of Barthélémy in 1792 and yet again when Barthélémy was appointed to the Directory. He oversaw the exchange of prisoners of war and of the daughter of Louis XVI for those handed over by Dumouriez. The Directory put seals on his papers. In 1797 he served as chargé at Regensburg and yet again in 1801. Throughout his career he was also a secret agent. He also served Napoleon. It was he who announced the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire. Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 100-02; Michaud, 2: 365-66; Winter, 109-10, 125, 132, 134-35, 137; Kaulek, ed., Papiers de Barthélémy, 1:9-10.
99 Quoted in Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 21. See also Baillou et al., eds., Les Affaires étrangères, 1:322.
100 Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de l’Europe, 79.
Guiot, Lombard, Alquier, Bertolio, Comeyras, Deforgues, Delacroix, Lachèze, Maret, Helflinger and Treilhard. Three had served as editors of the Moniteur: Maret, Resnier and Trouvé. Three had served as mayors: Desportes (Montmartre), Alquier (La Rochelle) and Marragon (Carcassonne). Professors/scholars and naturalists of some reputation included Adet, Bruguière, Cacault and Olivier. The Directory also appointed one of the most distinguished literary figures and a member of the Académie française: François Nicolas Louis Neufchâteau (1750-1828) as minister plenipotentiary (25 May - 8 July 1798) to the peace conference with Austria. He had worked as a departmental administrator and was elected a member of the Legislative Assembly. He was imprisoned during the Terror and later served as Minister of the Interior and as a member of the Directory. Prolific poet, playwright, and author, he initially supported Napoleon.101

The Directory also confronted a problem that had bedeviled earlier revolutionary governments, that is, host governments often refused to accept French envoys or forcibly escorted them from the country. The elector of Bavaria refused to accept the credentials of Charles Jean Marie, later baron Alquier (1752-1826) in part because of his “insulting remonstrance.”102 Many at the Munich court regarded him with loathing because he was a regicide. Before the Revolution he had been an avocat and mayor of La Rochelle. Elected to the Third Estate, the Convention, and the Council of Five Hundred, he served as consul general at Tangiers (16 May 1798) before his appointment as resident and chargé d’affaires in Bavaria (3 Sept 1798 - 11 March 1799).103 He remained in an unofficial capacity at Munich until he and his entourage were forcibly removed by Austrian troops in March 1799. At that time Théobald-Jacques-Justin Bacher, a chargé d’affaires, was forcibly expelled from Regensburg as well.104 Yet another revolutionary who proved unacceptable to foreign courts was Mangourit who had earlier been recalled from Madrid and

101 Robert, Bourloton and Cougn, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 3:58-59; Michaud, 14:686-88; and Nabonne, La Diplomatie du Directoire, 105.
102 B.L. Add. Mss. 48388, fol. 5, Paget to Grenville, Munich, 4 October 1798.
104 B. L. Add Mss. 48388, fol. 39, Paget to Grenville, Munich, 10 March 1799. See also fols. 21, 24, 36, Paget to Grenville, Munich, 13 and 20 December 1798, 28 February 1799.
from the United States (consul at Charleston, South Carolina 1792-94). He was offered but refused the position of commissar of foreign relations, but did serve as resident in the Valais (1798). His depiction of the massacre of four hundred Swiss: “These fanatics fought like tigers; they died without a sigh, clutching their relics and their rosaries...” reflects too well his character. Monroe blocked his appointment as chargé to the United States in 1796 and the King of Naples refused to receive him as secretary of the legation at Naples (1798). Many in the United States, who were aware of his previous activities as chargé when he ably abetted Genet’s activities, decried the “violence” of Mangourit’s character.105

In part the Directory faced such difficulties because of its appointment of regicides. These appointments often reflected the Directory’s concern that those appointed would not be seduced by an aristocratic milieu.106 Of the negotiators at Lille in 1797 three of the five French representatives, namely Bonnier, Letourneur107 and Treilhard were regicides.108 The same pattern held at Rastatt (1797-1799) when again three of the five were regicides: Bonnier, Debry and Treilhard. Excepting the negotiations at Rastatt and Lille, the Directory had appointed no regicides before 1798. These appointments reflect the general leftward

105 De Conde, Entangling Alliance, 379. See also 201, 238; R. R. Palmer, “A Revolutionary Republican: M. A. B. Mangourit,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 9, no. 4 (October 1952), 483-96, esp. 492; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 4:247; Winter, 139; and Papiers de Barthélemy, ed. Tausserat-Radel, 6: xxi.

106 Dry, Soldats ambassadeurs, 1:64.

107 Charles Louis François Honoré Letourneur (1751-1817) served as plenipotentiary to the conference at Lille (28 June - 12 Sept. 1797). A captain in the army before the Revolution, he was elected to the Legislative Assembly where he occupied himself with naval issues and to the National Convention where he served on the war committee and was charged with inspecting the defenses on the Mediterranean coast. He was an enemy of Robespierre and the Jacobins. He was elected to the Council of Elders and then as a member and president of the Directory before his appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the conference at Lille. However, he was recalled after 18 Fructidor because of his relationship with Carnot. He was exiled in 1816 and fled to the Netherlands where he died. See Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 366-67.

108 See also Papiers de Barthélemy, ed. Tausserat-Radel, 6: 61-62, fn. 1 for information on Jean-Baptiste Treilhard (1742-1810), and Robert, Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale, 406-07. Treilhard also served as consul general at Naples (1797).
swing of the political pendulum after Fructidor. In 1798 and 1799 the Directory increasingly relied on regicides to fill regular posts, appointing ten out of a total of twenty-four: Alquier, Delacroix, Fouché, Garat, Guillemardet,109 Guiot, Lacombe Saint-Michel, Lamarque, Marragon110 and Sieyès. Many of these individuals found themselves diplomatically and socially isolated at their posts and their host governments hostile. The French representative in Munich, Charles Jean Marie Alquier (1752-1826), voiced the very sentiment that many must have felt: “A plague stricken person whom the police have sequestered for the security of all is not more watched and dreaded than I am.”111 He was also treated as a pariah in Naples where Marie Antoinette’s sister resided.112 Those difficulties, however, did not preclude Napoleon from appointing him to a number of positions.113

109 Ferdinand-Pierre-Marie Guillemardet (1765-1809) was a doctor, mayor of Autun, and member of the Convention and the Council of Five Hundred. He had supported the coup of 18 Fructidor. The Directory sent him as ambassador to Spain (8 July 1798 - 3 March 1800) but he was recalled by Napoleon who appointed him prefect of Charente-Inférieure. See Winter, 140; Jean Tulard, ed., Dictionnaire Napoléon (Paris, 1987), 856; Robinet, ed., Dictionnaire, 2: 119-20; Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 317; Michaud, 18:180; and Robert, Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale, 190-91.

110 Jean Baptiste Marragon (1741-1829) served as minister plenipotentiary to the Hanseatic League (1798-99). Before the Revolution he was a commis for the director general of the canal at Languedoc. During the Revolution he had become commandant of a battalion of the National Guard at Carcassonne and then mayor of the city. Elected to the Convention, he became a member of the Committee of Bridges and Causeways where he dedicated himself to improving interior navigation. He was later elected president of the Council of Elders. Exiled as a regicide, he died in Brussels. See Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 438; Winter, 111. 120, 123; Michaud, 27:57; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 2:282-83; and Robert, Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale, 294-95.

111 Quoted in Léonce Pingaud, Jean de Bry (Paris, 1909), 87.


113 Napoleon appointed him: ambassador at Madrid (30 November 1799), Florence (2 May 1801), Naples (1805) and Rome (10 April 1806), envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Sweden (11 March 1810), and envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Denmark (6 November 1811-1813). See Henri-Robert,
Even more indicative of such difficulties was the selection of abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836) as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Prussian court (5 July 1798 - 23 May 1799), despite the Prussian king’s displeasure. Sieyès’ reputation as a foremost revolutionary figure and regicide did not endear him to the Prussians nor did his revolutionary views, readily available to them in a German translation of his writings. On arrival Sieyès found himself virtually isolated, having achieved notoriety abroad as the author of the famous pamphlet *What is the Third Estate?* He did nothing to endear himself to his hosts and his position remained untenable. Although Sieyès was well versed in diplomatic matters, having served on the Committee of Public Safety in 1795 and having enjoyed the tutelage of Louis-Guillaume Otto and Charles Reinhard, his knowledge of German affairs could not overcome his reputation as an extremist. The characterization of the Prussian representative in Paris, Alfons von Sandoz-Rollin, of Sieyès as a misanthrope of extreme views was echoed in Berlin. The king regarded Sieyès as an apostate and regicide. In spite of the Prussian opposition to his appointment Sieyès was sent – with predictable consequences. He made no attempt to win over his hosts. In his audience with the king Sieyès appeared not in the traditional formal dress with sword but rather garbed in a morning coat, shoes with large buckles, a large three pointed hat with a tricolor plume and sash, underscoring his radical views. Sieyès was never able to converse on political matters with the other representatives or with Haugwitz, the foreign minister, who stymied Sieyès through sheer inertia. In frustration Sieyès complained of Haugwitz’s “cunning with Germanic forms” and his ability to “avoid listening” and “avoid responding.” Tellingly, the abbé used a religious

_Dictionnaire_, 91-93; Kuscinski, _Dictionnaire des Conventionnels_, 4-6; and Michaud, 1: 533-35.

114 Allonville, _Mémoires_, 6:118.
117 Ibid., 283.
118 Bailleu, _Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807_, 1:483-84, report of Sieyès to Talleyrand, Berlin, 28 July 1798.
119 Ibid.
analogy and referred to his “excommunication” from the Prussian court.\textsuperscript{120} He remained less than a year in Prussia (July 1798 - May 1799), leaving the capital without observing the usual diplomatic formality of an audience of \textit{congé}, and returned to France to serve as a Director.\textsuperscript{121}

Other regicides found that they no recourse except to resign. Such was the case with Garat who served briefly as ambassador extraordinary to Naples (7 May - 28 June 1798).\textsuperscript{122} In some cases the Directory was forced to recall its regicide envoys, as it did with Joseph Fouché (1759-1820) who was appointed ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic (19 October - 3 December 1798). Fouché had taken minor orders in the Old Regime before obtaining a position as a professor of logic and physics. He had forged an infamous reputation. His riposte to Napoleon who had queried if he had voted for the death of the king was often quoted: “It is the first service I have rendered your majesty.” He was equally famous for organizing the infamous \textit{mitrailldes} in Lyons with Collot d’Herbois and for spearheading a rabid dechristianization campaign. He relied on the friendship of Barras who had sent him as ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic. He did not retain that position for long as he was quickly replaced because of his conduct, which inspired neither confidence nor respect. He fled, taking all of the goods of the embassy with him. After the fall of Merlin and La Revellière-Lépeaux in the coup of 13 Prairial he was named plenipotentiary to the Netherlands (14-24 July 1799) where he remained only a few days before being named Minister of Police.\textsuperscript{123} He

\textsuperscript{120} Brouillet, “Un régicide ambassadeur,” 284.
\textsuperscript{121} Sieyès represented the Third Estate, served as a member of the Convention and the Council of Five Hundred and the Directory. He later took part in the coup of 18 Brumaire, went into exile during the Bourbon Restoration and returned to France after 1830. Kuscinski, \textit{Dictionnaire des Conventionnels}, 565-68; Winter, 132; Robinet, ed., \textit{Dictionnaire}, 2:753-54; Michaud, 39:309-19; and Winter, 132.
\textsuperscript{122} He expressed his devotion to Napoleon both times the general was in power as well as his adherence to the Bourbons. During the Hundred Days Napoleon excluded him from power as did the Bourbons during the Second Restoration. Winter, 139; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, \textit{Dictionnaire des parlementaires français}, 3:105-06; Michaud, 15:426-545.
\textsuperscript{123} Although Fouché knew the Robespierre family, especially Charlotte, he was expelled from the Jacobins and increasingly feared and turned against Robespierre. After 9 Thermidor he was arrested but briefly. He also sporadically served Napoleon. Under the Bourbons he was named minister plenipotentiary to Dresden but soon his lost his post and was exiled. He died a very wealthy man who was noted for his wit and imperturbability. Kuscinski, \textit{Dictionnaire des}
was replaced in the Netherlands by Florent Guiot (1755 or 1756-1834) (minister plenipotentiary, 31 July - 4 November 1799).\textsuperscript{124}

Also exemplative of the Directory’s often poor and politically insensitive choices was the appointment of Jean-Antoine-Joseph Baron Debry (1760-1834) and Ange Elizabeth Louis Antoine Bonnier d’Arco to the peace conference at Rastatt. Debry, an \textit{avocat} before the Revolution, a deputy to the Legislative Assembly, a member of the Convention, and a deputy in the Council of Five Hundred, was best known for his often quoted suggestion after the Revolution of 10 August that the government should create a corps of 1200 tyrannicides to assassinate the kings at war with France.\textsuperscript{125} Predictably, this remark did not endear him to the powers represented at Rastatt. It was not he but another regicide, Ange Elizabeth Louis Antoine Bonnier d’Arco, who was killed after leaving the conferences. Bonnier had also represented France at the conference at Lille (1797) and had served as deputy to the Legislative Assembly, member of the Convention, and deputy to the Council of Elders.\textsuperscript{126}

Indubitably, many European governments viewed the French envoys with contempt, if not hostility. Governments refused to receive

\textit{Conventionnels}, 261-67; Winter, 111, 126, 134, 137; and Robert, \textit{Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale}, 142-44.

\textsuperscript{124} An \textit{avocat}, he was elected to the Estates General and to the Convention where he worked with the Army of the North to improve France’s defenses. An enemy of Robespierre, he sat in the Council of Elders and then the Council of Five Hundred. The Directors had first sent him to the Grisons as resident and \textit{chargé} (3 February - 13 October 1798). In the Napoleonic era he was imprisoned. He was exiled in 1816 and did not return to France until after the Revolution of 1830. Kuscinski, \textit{Dictionnaire des Conventionnels}, 318-19; Winter, 118, 126; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, \textit{Dictionnaire des parlementaires français} 3:288; Michaud 18:217-18; Robert, \textit{Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale}, 195; and LeMay, ed., \textit{Dictionnaire des législateurs}, 1791-1792, 1:195-98.

\textsuperscript{125} During the Second Restoration he was exiled and only returned to France after the fall of the Bourbons. Kuscinski, \textit{Dictionnaire des Conventionnels}, 182-83; Robinet, ed., \textit{Dictionnaire}, 1: 565-66; Winter, 122; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, \textit{Dictionnaire des parlementaires français}, 2:283-84; and Robert, \textit{Vie politique de tous les députés à la Convention nationale}, 93-94.

them as the king of Sweden did when the Directory named François Lamarque (1753-1839) as ambassador there, his first and last diplomatic appointment. In some rare cases, however, the nominations of regicides to diplomatic positions were revoked. Treilhard, for example, was appointed to Naples but the “indecency,” as the British envoy Malmesbury saw it, of sending a regicide to the court where Louis XVI’s sister-in-law was on the throne eventually convinced the government of the necessity of withdrawing the appointment. In the wake of the Fructidor coup, however, the Directory appointed seriatim two other regicides: Garat and Lacombe. In some cases external events rather than their revolutionary pasts precipitated their return to France. The arrival of the British fleet and the outbreak of war quickly ended the first and last mission of Lacombe Saint-Michel, who served very briefly as ambassador to Naples (3 October - 10 December 1798). In that short time he managed to alienate many at court in part because of his republican language. After leaving his post he was captured by corsairs but later released. Excepting chargés, two of

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127 Lamarque served as an avocat before the Revolution. He was later a judge, a member of the Legislative Assembly, commissioner to the army, and member of the Convention. Sent to Dumouriez’s army, he was seized and imprisoned by the Austrians, remaining more than two years in jail until he and his colleagues were exchanged for Louis XVI’s daughter. He was elected to the Council of Five Hundred. He was re-elected but when that election was quashed on 20 May 1798, he was named ambassador to Sweden as compensation. He was later re-elected to the Council of Five Hundred. When the Bourbons returned, he fled abroad to Geneva and then to Austria, returning to his country in 1819 when he retired from public life. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 366-67.

128 PRO, FO 27/50, fol. 283, Malmesbury to ?, Lille, 11 September 1797. Jean Baptiste Treilhard (1742-1810) was an avocat before the Revolution, who relied on the patronage of Turgot. He served as a deputy to the Estates General and the Convention and a member of the Council of Five Hundred. He was later nominated to the Directory but this nomination was annulled in Prairial 1799. He represented France at the conferences at Lille (1797) and Rastatt (1797-98). He later served Napoleon as jurisconsult, but not abroad. See Robert, Bourloton and Cougnuy, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 5:441-42; Michaud, 42:108-10; Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 590-91; and Winter, 119, 121.

129 Before the Revolution he had been a captain in the army. During the Revolution he continued his military career, became a partisan of the Revolution, a deputy to the Legislative Assembly and a member of the military committee and deputy to the Convention. He was sent on frequent missions to the army, later became president of the Council of Elders and was promoted to the rank of general
the Directory’s three appointments to Naples were regicides. In the Netherlands, excepting the chargés, half of those the Directory appointed were regicides: Fouché and Guiot.

Such problematic appointments tarnished the reputation of the diplomatic service and stymied the efforts of the Foreign Ministers Talleyrand (16 July 1797 - 20 July 1799 and 21 November 1799 - 17 June 1807) and later Reinhard (20 July - 29 November 1799), who tried to reestablish the prestige of the ministry – and its representatives. Yet another difficulty that Talleyrand confronted was the visceral detestation of many, such as Reubell, who regarded the minister as the prototype “of treason as well as corruption... a powdered flunkey of the Old Regime... [who] had no more limb than heart.” The first problem they both confronted was ridding the ministry of the bloated and incompetent bureaucracy that had become a refuge for the inept. The bureaucracy of division of the army and commander-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine. See Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 358-59; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 4:496-97; Winter, 139-40; and Six, Dictionnaire biographique, 2:21-22.

The Directory appointed Canclaux as minister plenipotentiary (May - December 1797), then Garat as ambassador extraordinary (May - June 1798) and then Lacombe as minister plenipotentiary (October - December 1798).

A regicide and former minister, Charles Delacroix, called Delacroix de Contaut (1741-1805), was an avocat who worked briefly under Turgot as premier commis of the controller general of finances before being dismissed. He was elected to the National Convention and to the Council of Elders. Although Minister of Foreign Affairs (7 November 1795 - 16 July 1797), he had little influence in the Directory. After Talleyrand replaced him as foreign minister, Delacroix was sent as special emissary to handle peace negotiations and to the Netherlands as minister plenipotentiary (2 January - before 12 June 1798). See Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, 186-87; Robinet, ed., Dictionnaire, 1: 576-77 and Winter, 109, 126; Michaud, 22:405-06. See also Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807, 1:90, 30 September 1796 for complaints about him as foreign minister, especially for making “irreconciliable enemies” for the Republic.

The others appointed were Roberjot, Vincent Lombard de Langres and Desforges. See Winter, 126; and Michaud, 25:51.


Lacour-Gayet, Talleyrand, 1:288.

Masson, Le Département des affaires étrangères, 257.
had mushroomed in size: in 1790 the ministry employed 46 men, in 1793 64, and in 1795-96 106. In 1796-97 France spent almost three times as much on foreign affairs as any other power.\textsuperscript{136} They strove to restore the traditions of and respect accorded the ministry; they reorganized the bureaux and exterior posts and reduced the number of employees. In a candid conversation on 16 June 1798 Talleyrand complained about France’s envoys. He was both dispirited and alarmed when he noted that France only had “fools” abroad. Ginguené at Turin staged ridiculous scenes, Garat at Naples had become the laughing stock of Europe, Sotin at Geneva made ill-advised decisions as did Delacroix at The Hague, and Guillemardet in Spain was too inexperienced. Talleyrand complained that for a long time the Directory had only wanted to employ members of the Convention – some of whom, he could have added, were regicides. The result was that Europeans abhorred the French republic.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid. For the mushrooming of the bureaucracy during the Revolution see Church, \textit{Revolution and Red Tape}.

\textsuperscript{137} Bailleu, \textit{Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807}, 1:211, 16 June 1798.
5 Conclusion

Throughout the Revolution diplomats often confronted difficulties at home and abroad. They faced hostility from foreign governments and their own and were often more in danger from their own government than foreign ones. Those most at risk because of political conditions sometimes chose to stay abroad and not return, as did Choiseul-Gouffier, the French representative to the Turks who fled to Russia; Genet, the French representative to the United States who married the daughter of the governor of New York; Charles-Ulysse de Salis, who served in the Grisons;\(^1\) or La Vauguyon, the ambassador to Spain. Others were not as fortunate. One, Custine, the son of the more famous general, who was sent to but never received by Prussia, was executed, although for reasons unrelated to his mission. The French often imprisoned or deported to the “dry guillotine” others: Aubert de Bayet, Barthélémy, Bonne-Carrère, Chépy, Deforgues, Desportes, Flotte, Fouché, Gandolphe, Garat, Ginguéné, Giraud, Guiot, La Chèze-Murel,\(^2\) Latour-Foissac, Le Hoc, Barbé-Marbois, Neufchâteau, Noailles, Noël, Otto, Reybaz,\(^3\) Rivaud de Vignaud, Soulavie, Taschereau, and Truguet. Still others, such as Bacher or Bonne-Carrère,\(^4\) found their papers under seal or were forcibly escorted back to France, as was the case with Soulavie in Geneva.\(^5\) Some

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\(^1\) After this mission Salis was condemned to death and his goods were confiscated. He died at Vienna in 1800. See Michaud, 37:505-06.

\(^2\) Pierre Joseph de La Chèze-Murel (1744-1835) was an avocat before the Revolution. He was elected to the Estates General and was among the minority who protested against restricting the king’s power. He protected the king on 10 August, was thrown in prison and not released until Thermidor. He served as secretary of the embassy at Naples and later chargé (1798).

\(^3\) Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 11:495, 2 March 1794, Reybaz, released from state of arrest.


\(^5\) Marc Peter, Genève et la Révolution (Geneva, 1950), 2:29. The Swiss in fact had demanded his recall as had Reybaz. Adet, his replacement, sent him back under escort to France. See also Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, 15:475, 16:390, 17:115; and Kaulek, ed., Papiers de Barthélémy, 3:76.
diplomats who did not return to France as quickly as others thought necessary found their goods sequestered and themselves labelled as émigrés. Such was the case with Louis-Marie-Gabriel-César de Choiseul-Esguilly, the ambassador at Turin from 1765 to 1792, who did not arrive back in Paris until 13 May 1792 and was not able to recover his property until 16 January 1795. Some diplomats, although suspended from their functions and recalled, were able to clear their names and return to their old positions as did Desportes in Geneva, Descorches in Constantinople and Grouvelle in Denmark, but these were admittedly few. Some, but very few diplomats were imprisoned by other powers: Bonneau on orders of Catherine II; Ruffin and his entourage by the Turks; Devaux, Marat, and Sémonville by the Austrians; Lacombe Saint-Michel by corsairs; Darbault by the British; and Descorches and Chépy by the Turks. Given the admitted insurrectionary intent of French envoys, this number is surprisingly low and reflects the durability of that tenet of the Old Regime: diplomatic inviolability. On a lesser scale some courts refused to receive certain individuals, such as the court of Naples did Mangourit, the king of Sardinia Sémonville, the bishop of Liège Bonne-Carrère and Pazzis d’Aubignan, and the Porte Sémonville. Still others demanded their

6 DBF, 8:1206.
7 Pierre Jean Marie Ruffin (1742-1824) acted as interpreter in Constantinople and in the office of foreign affairs. In 1784 he became a professor of Turkic and Persian and in 1788 he was charged with negotiating with the ambassadors of Tipu-Sahib. In 1794 he again went to Constantinople as secretary and interpreter. He served as chargé to the Ottomans (1797) after the death of Aubert du Bayet. He was imprisoned when French troops invaded Egypt in 1798 and was not released until 1801. He continued to serve both Napoleon and Louis XVIII in Constantinople. Henri-Robert, Dictionnaire, 313-14.
8 See Philippe Devaux, Lettre de M. Philippe Devaux, Secrétaire de légation près la cour de Liège [sic Liège] à l’Assemblée nationale (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1792), who was appointed secretary of the legation at Liège by the king and imprisoned and questioned for eight days by the Austrians.
9 Pins, Sentiment et diplomatie d’après des corrrespondances franco-portugaises, 8-9. The British had seized Darbault and his papers.
10 He was held six weeks in Bosnia. See Iiams, Peacemaking, 128.
11 Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française, 124.
12 France, Recueil des instructions, 31: Liège, 437-42.
13 PRO, FO 78/15, fols. 379-80, Ainslie from Constantinople, 18 October 1793.
recall as Washington did of Genet or the Genoese did of Tilly among others. Still others were expelled.

By 1799 all but one of the “courtisans of the king” – those who had served the Old Regime – had resigned, been recalled or dismissed, or died. Individuals from what has been called “la seconde couche de l’ancienne diplomatie” that is, those under the Old Regime who had been unable to obtain important posts because they were not nobles, moved up the diplomatic ladder.  

But even they were suspect, often under scrutiny, and were dismissed or resigned. Incompetents (not that they were exclusive to the revolutionary governments), political cronies, relatives, ideologues and increasingly, because of their burgeoning power, army officers held diplomatic positions. Periodically the revolutionaries purged the diplomatic corps, using ideology as their criterion. They attacked the nobles, those who had worked under or sympathized with the Old Regime, and those who had allied with a certain political faction. Political ideology, rather than merit or experience, became the prime consideration for diplomatic appointments. The same pattern of “arbitrary dismissal and uncertain career advancement” that Brown depicts in the administration of the army emerged in the diplomatic corps as well. There, too, “personal connections” and political patronage mattered more than ability and experience.  

Longevity in service proved the exception rather than the rule.

Since its outbreak in 1792 war reduced the number of French diplomatic posts abroad. When Napoleon came to power in 1799 war and revolution had shrunk the number of postings; there were a number of small missions in Spain, Kassel, Regensburg and Dresden and secretaries in Berlin, Copenhagen and The Hague. During his time in power Napoleon developed a well organized and far flung diplomatic service of thirty-nine missions. But by 1814 France’s international position had changed. When Napoleon fell from power there were even fewer missions than when he had come in: a secretary in Switzerland, a minister and secretary in the United States and Denmark, and an ambassador in the Ottoman Empire. This situation prompted a career diplomat, the marquis Just Pons Florimond Fay de la Tour-Maubourg (1781-1837) to complain:

15 Brown, War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State, 275, 279.
16 Whitcomb, Napoleon’s Diplomatic Service, 3.
“I can now regard my presence in foreign countries as useless.” Such was the heritage of the Revolution and Napoleon. Revolution, war, and empire had proven no friend of diplomacy. Their deeds, to paraphrase John Fletcher (*An Honest Man’s Fortune*, epilogue), were “fatal shadows” that walked by them still.

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17 Ibid. See also Henri-Robert, *Dictionnaire*, 188-89. After holding a variety of lesser position such as secretary and *charge d’affaires*, he was named minister plenipotentiary at Stuttgart (1813), minister plenipotentiary at Hanover (1815), minister plenipotentiary at Saxony (1818), ambassador to Sicily (1830) and ambassador at Rome (1832).
Appendices

APPENDIX A

Foreign Ministers 1787-1799
APPENDIX B

Diplomatic Committee, established 14 October 1791

Elected 25 October 1791 (for 3 months)

Baert, Charles-Alexandre-Balthazar-François-de-Paule (Pas-de-Calais)
Briche, Jean-André-François de (Bas-Rhin)
Brissot, Jacques-Pierre, dit B. de Warville (Paris)
Gensonné, Arnaud (Gironde)
Jaucourt, François-Arnail de (Seine-et-Marne)
Koch, Christophe-Guillaume (Bas-Rhin)
Lemontey, Pierre-Edouard (Rhône-et-Loire)
Mailhe, Jean-Baptiste (Haute-Garonne)
Ramond, Louis-François-Elisabeth (Paris)
Rühl, Louis-François-Antoine (Ramond de Carbonnières) (Bas-Rhine)
Schirmer, Jean-Louis (Haut-Rhin)
Treil-Pardailhan, Thomas-François (Paris)

Replacements

Carnot aîné, Lazare-Nicolas-Marguerite (Pas-de-Calais)
Collet, Jean-Baptiste (Collet de Messine) (Indre)
Daverhoult, Jean-Antoine (Ardennes)
Delaunay l’aîné, Joseph (Maine-et-Loire)
Du Bois du Bais, Louis-Thibault (ou Dubois-Dubais) (Calvados)
Fauchet, François-Claude (Calvados)
Téallier, Claude-Etienne (Puy-de-Dôme)

Committee of 2 March 1792

Briche, Jean-André-François de (Bas-Rhin)
Daverhoult, Jean-Antoine (Ardennes)
Jaucourt, François-Arnail de (Seine-et-Marne)
Lemontey, Pierre-Edouard (Rhône-et-Loire)
Rühl, Louis-François-Antoine (Bas-Rhine)
Viénot de Vaublanc, Vincent-Marie (Siene-et-Marne)
Replacements

De Bry, Jean-Antoine-Joseph (Aisne)
Hérault de Séchelles, Jean-Marie (Paris)
Lasource, Marc-David Alba, dit (Tarn)
Pozzo di Borgo, Charles-André (Corse)
Schirmer, Jean-Louis (Haut-Rhin)
Vergniaud, Pierre-Paul-Victorin (ou Victurnien) (Gironde)
And on occasion Isnard, Henri-Maximin (Var)

Committee of 17 July 1792

Bonnier d’Alco, Ange-Elisabeth-Louis-Antoine (Hérault)
Brissot, Jacques-Pierre, dit B. de Warville (Paris)
De Bry, Jean-Antoine-Joseph (Aisne)
Koch, Christophe-Guillaume (Bas-Rhin)
Lindet, Jean-Baptiste-Robert (Eure)
Mailhe, Jean-Baptiste (Haute-Garonne)
Pozzo di Borgo, Charles-André (Corse)
Ramond, Louis-François-Elisabeth (Ramond de Carbonnières) (Paris)
Rühl, Louis-François-Antoine (Bas-Rhine)

Replacements

Arena, Barthélémy (Corse)
Dalmas, Joseph-Benoît (Ardèche)
Delaunay l’aîné, Joseph (Maine-et-Loire)
Fabre, Gabriel-Jaques-François-Maurice (Aude)
François de Nantes, Antoine-François (Français de Nantes) (Loire-Inférieure)
Gensonné, Arnaud (Gironde)
Juéry, Pierre (Oise)
Lacretelle, Pierre-Louis (Paris)
Laureau, Pierre (Laureau de Saint-André) (Yonne)
Bureau of the Diplomatic Committee

28 Dec. 1791. President: Koch, Christophe-Guillaume; Secretary: Ramond, Louis-François-Elisabeth

4 Mar. 1792. President: Koch, Christophe-Guillaume

### French Diplomats and their Service

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**French Diplomats**

- Vergennes, Constantin Gravier, comte de
- Vergennes, Jean Gravier, marquis de Baron de Temare
- Villars, Baptiste Dorchée
- Verrierac de Saint-Maur, Raymond
APPENDIX D

Diplomatic Stations
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