DYNAMICS OF INTERPLAY BETWEEN THIRD-PARTY INTERVENERS AND NATIONAL FACTIONS IN CIVIL WAR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: CASE STUDIES ON CAMBODIA AND EL SALVADOR

Sung Yong Lee

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. Andrews

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Dynamics of Interplay between Third-Party Interveners and National Factions in Civil War Peace Negotiations:
Case Studies on Cambodia and El Salvador

by

Sung Yong Lee

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of International Relations

November 2010
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Abstract

This thesis examines the processes of the peace negotiations in Cambodia (1987-1993) and El Salvador (1989-1993) in order to address the following question: What does the interplay between the national factions and the external interveners in peace negotiations tell us about their chances of achieving their goals? By using the concept of ‘interplay,’ this study reinterprets the negotiation processes as the negotiating actors’ exchanges of strategic moves. In particular, it explores how the negotiating actors’ attitudes towards the core negotiation issues changed in the two cases and how the changes affected their counterparts’ negotiating strategies.

There are two aspects to the findings of this thesis, one descriptive and the other explanatory. First, this study has investigated the characteristics of the negotiating actors’ strategies and the pattern of the interplay between them. As for the interveners’ strategies, this thesis finds that impartial third parties generally employ diplomatic intervention methods, while advocate states enjoy a wider range of options. In addition, national factions’ behaviour is generally affected by three factors: their fundamental goals, the domestic resources under their control, and the incentives or pressure from external interveners. It is also observed that the stronger the intervention becomes, the more that national factions’ provisional strategies are inclined to be receptive towards the intervention. Nevertheless, the national factions rarely fully accepted proposals that they deemed harmful to the achievement of their fundamental goals.
Second, based on the descriptive findings, this thesis highlights the importance of mutual understanding between national factions and external interveners. The case studies of Cambodia and El Salvador show that the effectiveness of a particular intervention depends not so much on the type of method employed but on the context in which it is applied. An intervention is more likely to be effective when it is used in a way that national factions can understand and is supported by the consistently strong attention of external interveners. In addition, it is observed that actors’ ethnocentric perceptions on core concepts of conflict and negotiation as well as their lack of an effective communication capability are some of the common causes of the misunderstandings that arise during negotiation processes.
# Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures ii

Acknowledgements iii

Acronyms v

**Chapter 1**  
Introduction 1

**Chapter 2**  
Peace Negotiations and Third-Party Intervention 12

**Chapter 3**  
Research Framework and Methodology 63

**Chapter 4**  
Case Study Overview 116

**Chapter 5**  
The Interplay between National Factions and Impartial Third Parties 165

**Chapter 6**  
The Interplay between National Factions and Advocate States 216

**Chapter 7**  
Analysis of the Case Studies 265

**Chapter 8**  
Conclusion 297

Appendices 317

Bibliography 339
< Tables >
Table 2.1. Internal Peace Agreements: 1991-2005 44
Table 3.1. The Typology of National Factions’ Choices 80
Table 3.2. Eleven Peace Negotiation Cases in the Post-Cold War Period 83
Table 4.1. Actors in the Cambodian Conflict, 1975-1993 130
Table 4.2. Actors in the Salvadoran Conflict, 1989 150
Table 5.1. Major Perceptual Barriers in the Cambodian Negotiations 193
Table 6.1. Perceptual Limitations That Shaped the PDK’s Strategies 243
Table 7.1. The Typology of National Factions’ Choices 271
Table 7.2. The Patterns of National Factions’ Behaviour and Their Consequences 273
Table III.1. Main organisations of the FMLN 333

< Figures >
Figure 3.1. The Framework of Analysis 66
Figure 3.2. The Level of Analysis 68
Figure 3.3. Variables Determining National Factions’ Strategies 74
Figure 4.1. Map of Cambodia 121
Figure 4.2. CGDK Areas of Control, mid-1980s 129
Figure 4.3. Relations between the Major Actors in the Cambodian Peace Negotiations 136
Figure 4.4. Map of El Salvador 143
Figure 4.5. FMLN Areas of Control and Expansion in 1989 148
Figure 4.6. Relations between the Major Actors in the Salvadoran Peace Negotiation 156
Figure 5.1. Dynamics of the Interplay between the PRK and the UN / the US 192
Figure 5.2. Dynamics of the Interplay between the FMLN and the UN 211
Figure 6.1. Change in the Common Interests of China and the PDK 241
Figure 6.2. Dynamics of the Interplay between the PDK and China 242
Figure 6.3. Dynamics of the Interplay between the US, the Cristiani Government, and the ESAF 260
Figure 7.1. National Factions’ Vulnerability to Internal Rivalry 275
Figure 7.2. The Composition of the Transitional Authorities in Cambodia and El Salvador 279
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Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my family, Gyunyeol Lee, Sunki Park, Jinyong Lee, Jihyun Kim, Suseong Lee, and Eunyoung Cho. I love you.

St Andrews, November 2010

Sung Yong Lee
## Acronyms

### CAMBODIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGKE</td>
<td>The Association of Overseas Cambodian (Association Générale des Khmers à l'Etranger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>The Sihanoukist National Army (Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGDK</td>
<td>The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>The Cambodian People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>The Khmer People's National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUFNS</td>
<td>The Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOULINAKA</td>
<td>The Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADK</td>
<td>The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>The People’s Army of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>The Paris Conference on Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>The Party of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPAs</td>
<td>The Paris Peace Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>The Supreme National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>The State of Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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EL SALVADOR

ARENA Nationalist Republican Alliance (*Alianza Republicana Nacionalista*)

BIRI The Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalion (*Brigada Infantería Reaccionmente Inmediamente*)

CD The Democratic Convergence (*Convergencia Democratica*)

COPAZ The National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (*Comisión Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz*)

DNI Directorate of National Intelligence

ERP The Revolutionary Army of the People (*Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo*)

ESAF The El Salvador Armed Forces

FDR The Democratic Revolutionary Front (*Frente Democratico Revolucionario*)

FMLN Farabundo Marti National Liberation (*Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*)

FPL The Popular Liberation Forces "Farabundo Martí" (*Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo Martí")

ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (*Misión de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador*)

PCS The Communist Party of El Salvador (*Partido Comunista de El Salvador*)

PDC The Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democrata Cristiana*)

PH The Treasury Police (*Policía Hacienda*)

PNC The National Civil Police (*Policia Nacional Civil*)

PRTC The Workers’ Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos*)

RN The National Resistance (*Resistencia Nacional*)
Chapter 1

Introduction

Why are some interveners better than others at inducing the warring national factions in civil conflicts to consent to peace accords? This question has been explored in many academic studies since the end of the Cold War. However, despite the diversity in their specific ideas, these studies have usually paid sole attention to either the external conditions of civil wars (Zartman, 1997; Turner, 2004; Regan, 1996) or the methods of international intervention (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Regan, 2000; Walter, 2002; Kaufmann, 1996; Le Billon & Nicholls, 2007) and have neglected the role of national factions – the counterparts of the international interveners – as central actors in the interplay within peace negotiations (see below for details).

Nevertheless, the dynamics of third-party intervention can be accurately understood only when the behaviour of both sides in the interplay, third-party interveners and national factions, receive balanced attention. Thus, this thesis intends to fill this gap by examining the interplay between national factions and third-party interveners in civil war peace negotiations. In short, through a comparative case study on Cambodia and El Salvador, it contends that mutual understanding between both sides is one critical requirement for successful third-party intervention.

The two topics explored in this thesis, civil war and third-party peace intervention, have been two of the most debated issues in the academic field of international security in the post-Cold War period. First, civil war has attracted scholars’ particular attention for the following reasons. Of the various types of military conflict, civil war has been by far the most common
in the post-Cold War era. Civil wars account for the overwhelming majority of conflict cases: ninety-four per cent of the major military conflicts since the Cold War ended have been civil war cases (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007: 624). While the number of inter-state wars has fallen significantly in this period, the total number of major civil conflicts shows no sign of diminishing. Even though many recent civil conflicts were ended through negotiated settlements, many of these have since relapsed into violence, and new conflicts occur every year.

Another aspect of civil wars that attracts people’s attention is their brutality (Slim, 2008: 37-70). Since civil war is conflict within a state, military operations are highly likely to target or victimise civilians. For example, many civil war leaders employ strategies that directly target ordinary people, such as ethnic cleansing, kidnapping, and recruiting youths as soldiers (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005: 138-9). Furthermore, since the military forces engaged in civil war are often irregulars untrained in conventional warfare, unintended human rights abuses frequently occur.

In addition, since the actors involved in civil war are many and diverse, their characteristics are multifaceted and complicated (Kaldor & Vashee, 1997; Kaldor, 2006: 1-14). Civil wars are not conflicts between sovereign states but between different factions within a state, and the distinctions between the actors are complex. Although identifying group members is relatively straightforward in ethnic or religious wars, group identity is not so clearly defined in most civil war cases. An added complication is that, in many instances, constituencies change their support for factions. Moreover, in the past few years, civil wars have become increasingly ‘internationalised’ (Gleditsch, 2007: 295), with the result that the traditional definition of civil war as something that occurs within the boundaries of a state might have to be re-appraised.
A serious dilemma exists in relation to the previous point: there is a tension between state sovereignty and the principle of human rights. In modern international society, sovereignty is the primary exclusive right of a state, where the state is defined as ‘an aggregate of individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts, treating all members of the political community as legally equal citizens’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005: 87). However, in many civil wars, governments openly discriminate against some sections of their populace and sometimes even undertake military operations against particular groups. In such cases, international actors have to decide whether to protect people’s human rights and become involved in the conflict or to respect the sovereignty of the state and not intervene.

The second topic that this thesis examines is third-party intervention. Indeed, the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution has become one of the most significant issues in international politics. Of the various forms of intervention for achieving peaceful conflict resolution, negotiation is the most widely accepted and most commonly employed method. However, not many conflicts have been brought to an end through negotiation. In fact, ‘for the period 1945-93, there were 14 conflicts that ended via negotiations out of a total of 84, which is 17 per cent’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 125-6). As the scope of international intervention in peace negotiation has increased in the post-Cold War period, the role of international interveners, including states, international organisations, and sub-state actors, in peace negotiations has become an important issue.

However, not all of these efforts have achieved their goals. In fact, as the number of interventions has increased, the number of cases of intervention failure (or partial failure) has also risen. Many international interventions, including the operations in Somalia, Angola (1991), and Liberia, failed to persuade the national leaders in those countries to abide by the
agreed peace accords. Moreover, although some international interventions, such as those in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, succeeded in producing a hiatus in the conflicts, their efforts at building a stable peace did not result in success. Hence, identifying the factors that influence peace processes and their outcomes is considered one of the most pressing issues in the field of international relations.

Thus, vigorous research has been undertaken to discover the factors that determine the success of third-party intervention, focusing on the external conditions of conflicts and negotiation, the strength of interveners, negotiation strategies and the like. Despite the extensive academic discourse, however, conventional studies on the role of intervention in peace processes have a number of common weaknesses (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000, 2003; Hampson, 1996; Stedman, 2003; Walter, 2002).

This research intends to contribute to conflict studies through the analysis of the actors’ interplay in civil war peace negotiation processes. Specifically, this research aim to address the following weaknesses in the conventional academic discourse. First, the conventional studies, particularly ones relying on quantitative analyses, have paid little attention to the negotiating actors’ behaviour and perception. Instead, the majority argue that a strong correlation exists between the specific conditions of the civil conflict or negotiation, such as (1) identity wars, (2) the human costs of the wars (deaths and displacements), (3) the duration of the wars, (4) the number of factions, (5) ethnic heterogeneity, (6) per-capita income and the overall level of economic development, and (7) the UN’s involvement, and the likelihood of successful peacebuilding. In addition, there are a significant number of studies seeking the ‘specific effects of certain intervention methods’ (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Regan, 2000;
However, a surprisingly small number of studies have focused on how the actors in peace processes actually behave and perceive such conditions. Although findings in traditional studies have provided firm grounds for the existence of a correlation between the factors and the processes and outcomes of peace negotiations, the question of ‘how they are related’ remains unexplored. Put another way, the studies have focused on ‘what’, but not ‘why’ or ‘how.’

In response to this failing, this actor-oriented study will reveal some of the concealed factors that promote successful peace negotiation. This research primarily studies the role of the perceptions and strategies of the parties in negotiation. In particular, this study explores when and how the attitude of a certain party towards critical negotiation issues changed, and what motivated them to change. Of course, structural conditions are important in that they provide basic constraining factors. However, since each party understands their negotiation conditions in different ways, this study contends that the circumstances surrounding the negotiation can differ according to the parties’ perceptions.

Second, many previous studies that looked at the actors’ roles, have focused solely on the influence of interveners, neglecting the role of warring factions. Compared to the research on post-conflict recovery and development, which highlights the role of national or local actors (Richmond, 2008; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mac Ginty, 2008; Mac Ginty & Hamieh, 2010), surprisingly few studies on peace negotiation processes have examined the behaviour of national factions. For instance, the academic debates on the determinants of the peace resolutions in Cambodia have commonly treated national factions as passive recipients of the intervention rather than active players whose interactions affected the course of the

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1 For example, after scrutinising various cases, Le Billon and Nicholls conclude that ‘military interventions appear to be a deceptive “quick-fix”’ and that ‘revenue sharing is as successful as military intervention in terms of implementation’ (see Le Billon & Nicholls, 2007: 629).

Part of the reason why few studies have advanced theories on the role of national actors is that, due to their diverse characteristics, national factions do not exhibit generalised behaviour. The national actors in each civil war case have unique cultural backgrounds, motives for taking up arms, material or non-material resources, and leadership styles. Also, since many intervening actors are Western, they have attracted much of the research by Western scholars. Moreover, many studies have tended to neglect close analysis of the national leaderships, regarding them as ‘a factor so obvious’ and categorising the leaders with simple criteria (Gormley-Heenan, 2007: 22, 28-9). In addition, many of the studies that do focus on the national factions’ side, particularly those seeking formal theories, simply assume that national factions will behave in accordance with the rationale shared by the authors, namely, that they will make rational decisions in response to economic and military costs and benefits (see Chapter 2).

However, an analysis of third-party peace intervention that relies solely on investigating the external interveners’ side can reveal only partial aspects of the dynamics of the intervention; accordingly, it necessarily neglects the national and local factors that affect the effectiveness of the intervention. To fill this gap in the conventional academic discourse, this research pays attention to both international interveners and national factions by using the concept of ‘interplay’. For the analysis, the cultural and historical background that has formed the basic perceptual characteristics of the national factions is examined in this research. In particular, three historical factors that strongly affect the negotiators’ perception of conflict and negotiation – indigenous culture, colonialism, and chronic conflicts – are analysed. In addition, this study employs the concept of ‘interplay’ to demonstrate the interactional
dynamics of actors’ strategic moves in negotiations.

In addition to the above, this thesis makes two further contributions to the discourse. First, it deals with the impact of cultural issues on negotiation processes, a factor that receives limited attention in the academic discourse on civil conflicts. As discussed in Chapter 3, this research maintains that ethnocentric culture is a critical factor that affects the dynamics of interplay between the actors in civil conflicts. Traditional debates regarding the impact of culture on civil conflicts have focused on three areas. Firstly, focusing on the causes of conflicts, some commentators have asserted that the artificially imposed European cultures of the colonial periods are the root of civil conflicts and continue to have an influence during peace negotiations (Birmingham, 1992; Blanton, Mason & Athrow, 2001; Young, 2004). Secondly, others stress that in peace negotiations, the interveners promote Western-style negotiation processes and resolutions (Kimmel, 1994; Lieberfeld, 1999; Watkins & Rosegrant, 2002). Thirdly, in regard to peace accord implementation, it is argued that aid and support from external agencies and states imposes Western standards and viewpoints (Avruch & Black, 1991; Paris, 1997; Richmond, 2006). However, while the first and third issues have been extensively studied, the influence of culture on peace negotiation processes has attracted limited attention, despite its importance. In this sense, this thesis aims to fill the gap that exists in the conventional examination of negotiation processes.

Second, and related to the previous point, much of the research on peace processes has neglected contextual factors. In the same way that actors’ perceptions and attitudes contribute to the root causes of a conflict, their attitudes, behaviour and perceptions can have a range of effects on the negotiations, depending on how they combine with other factors. For example, Lieberfeld shows that ‘impending threats’ can encourage leaders to negotiate but can also make them ‘to try to prevail by force’. Moreover, dependence on third parties may lead the
national actors ‘to encourage/impose [a] settlement’ but may also lead them to seek selfish interests based on ‘extraneous issues’. In addition, a ‘leadership change’ can foster either ‘pragmatism’ or ‘increased militancy’ (Lieberfeld, 1999: 11). The lack of attention paid to such contextual issues has hampered the accuracy of the analyses of previous studies.

By implementing in-depth analysis of the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, this thesis intends to reveal various contextual issues surrounding actors’ decision making, such as their historical and cultural backgrounds, the external actors’ perceptions, and accidental events. The case studies demonstrate that the direction that the negotiation takes is determined by a combination of the actors’ intentions and situational factors such as the timing of the negotiations, domestic events in participating countries, and the characteristics of representatives.

As mentioned above, this research aims to identify and verify the most effective methods for achieving successful peace negotiation via an investigation of the patterns of interplay between the actors in civil war peace negotiations. In order to fulfil this goal, it raises the following key question: ‘What does the interplay between the national factions and the external interveners in peace negotiations tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?’

In order to answer this question in a more systematic way, three subordinate questions are posed: (1) What strategies do national and external actors use to achieve their goals? (2) Which intervening methods are more effective? (3) What are the major perceptual barriers to effective third-party intervention?

This study adopts a qualitative research approach, with the intention of investigating the factors that promote successful negotiation. More specifically, a comparative case study that focuses on the interplay between national factions and international interveners is used to reveal the factors that lead the participants in a negotiation to come to respect the peace
process and its outcome. The peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador were selected as the case studies. Although they share similarities in various respects, including the backgrounds to the conflicts, the severity of violence, and the characteristics of the external interventions, their negotiations and peace process outcomes exhibit significant differences. They therefore provide good examples of how procedural issues can produce significantly different negotiation outcomes under conditions that are similar in many ways (see Chapter 3 for details).

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 defines and specifies the core concepts and theories that this thesis employs. After reviewing the definitions of civil war, peace negotiation, third-party intervention, and interplay, it describes how this research modifies these concepts and how they will be utilised in the case studies. It also discusses the strengths and weaknesses of positivist and non-positivist discourses on negotiation and argues that it is necessary to adopt a number of core concepts and principles from both traditions in order to reveal and clarify the dynamics of the interplay between national factions and international interveners. This chapter also considers previous research on the types of intervention methods.

Based on the conceptual and theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents the research frameworks, analytical components, research methodologies, and practical issues related to the field research. Employing game theory, this research views peace processes as a ‘game’ between a national faction and an external intervener. Thus, this chapter clarifies what constitutes an actors’ strategic move and how it should be understood. However, based on non-positivist discourse, this research also includes a number of cultural and perceptual variables that determine the actors’ moves. In addition, the chapter spells out the actor-oriented, qualitative, and comparative nature of the study. By comparison of the peace
negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, this research explores the behaviour of negotiating actors and seeks the core elements of successful peace negotiation. Finally, it describes how the fieldwork, which involved a series of elite interviews in Cambodia, was conducted and discusses the issues of research biases, ethical considerations, and its approach to research subjects.

Chapter 4 provides the background information for the case studies. This chapter consists of two separate sections that discuss Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively. Each section begins with a brief overview of the history of the conflicts and negotiations in each case. This is followed by a description of the major actors in the negotiation processes and an analysis of the relationships between the players. Finally, the long-term and short-term factors that led to the start of the peace negotiations are presented.

Chapters 5 and 6 present the case studies, which reveal the interplay between actors in the peace negotiations. The analytical focuses of the two chapters are dissimilar in terms of the relationship between the actors and the perceptual barriers to successful peace negotiation. Chapter 5 reveals the dynamics of interplay between the national factions and impartial third parties in Cambodia and El Salvador. Chapter 6 focuses on the exchanges in strategic moves between national factions and their advocate states. Moreover, Chapter 5 shows that the interveners’ ethnocentric cultures prevented them from gaining a good understanding of the national factions, whereas Chapter 6 argues that the national factions’ limited communication capabilities prevented them from recognising the changes in the attitudes and intentions of external interveners.

Chapter 7 integrates and confirms the findings of the case studies. The first section of this chapter looks at the general patterns and divergent characteristics of the interplay and highlights the similarities in the cases and the differences that they possess. In addition, these
findings present a number of theoretical implications related to the interplay in the negotiations, such as the two-level game in conflict resolution and the role of ethnocentric culture. In the following sections, two explanatory questions of ‘which intervening methods are more effective?’ and ‘what are the major perceptual barriers to effective third-party intervention?’ are investigated.

Finally, the conclusion summarises and clarifies the findings. It reviews the discussions that appeared in the case studies and provides answers to the above-mentioned core questions. In sum, two points are highlighted. First, in observing both national factions and third-party interveners through the concept of ‘interplay’, a better understanding of the dynamics in peace negotiation processes is obtained. Second, good mutual understanding between the negotiating parties is a key requirement for successful third-party peace intervention. It also presents three practical suggestions for future third-party peace intervention: ensuring good communication between national factions and international interveners, providing a minimum security guarantee, and judging the right timing for intervention withdrawal. This chapter concludes with the presentation of the contributions of this research on the academic discourse as well as the weaknesses to be supplemented in the future.
Chapter 2

Peace Negotiation and Third-Party Intervention

INTRODUCTION

Having clear and accurate ideas on the concepts, theories, and typologies is a prerequisite for academic research, and reviewing previous studies provides a good starting point for this. Therefore, this chapter first explores the conventional academic discourse on the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues that provide the foundation for the analysis of the case studies and for developing the central arguments of this thesis. Based on this literature review, it also presents how this thesis understands the concepts and how it applies the theories and typologies to the research framework.

First, this chapter defines the core terms and concepts used in this thesis and the context in which they are used. Since the purpose of this thesis is to verify the patterns of interplay between mediators and warring factions in civil war peace negotiations, this chapter focuses on the following four concepts: civil war, peace negotiation, interplay, and third-party intervention. If civil war defines the circumstances in which negotiation takes place, peace negotiation provides the stage on which all the efforts and strategies of actors to achieve their goals are orchestrated. Additionally, the term interplay denotes that this research views the movements of actors through the conceptual lens of mutual influence. Finally, third-party intervention is the target of this study and sets the level of analysis. As these concepts have been used in a variety of ways in previous studies and there is no unanimity on their definitions, it is necessary to define them for the purposes of this research.

Second, the theories of peace negotiation (or, more generally, negotiation) that are employed
or examined in this thesis are reviewed. This section reviews a number of major theoretical debates in the two traditional academic discourses on negotiation, the positivist tradition and non-positivist arguments, because this research relies on both schools. In short, while this research adopts the fundamental principles and assumptions of game theory in its analytic framework, it also considers the perceptual issues discussed by non-positivist groups in order to supplement the weakness of game theory.

Positivist negotiation theories, which are primarily based on an assumption of the rationality of actors, provide for the basis for the research framework in this thesis. Drawing on these theories, this research understands negotiation in conceptual terms as a game played between actors. Thus, it is assumed that all actors decide their next strategic move by weighing their options against their fundamental goals. Non-positivist ideas enable this research to escape from positivist theories’ restricted views on actors’ preferences, which tend to focus on economic interests, and positivism’s unrealistic assumption of perfect information. In response to these limitations, this thesis regards the role of actors’ cultural values and imperfect information as important factors affecting the actors’ decisions.

Third, the ways in which previous academic debates have depicted the characteristics and unique features of interveners and their strategies are examined. However, since interveners are not uniform but have very different characteristics, motivations for intervention, and interests in the conflicts in which they are involved, this chapter classifies interveners into the following three groups in order to make the analysis clearer: national states, international organisations, and sub-state actors. Based on this review, this thesis will develop its own typology in Chapter 3.

This chapter also reviews the discussions on the strategies that interveners employ in peace negotiations. Although the types of national factions and their methods of response are not
closely examined in the conventional discourse, its ideas on interveners nevertheless provide a sound conceptual basis for the categorisation of national actors. By employing two criteria used in previous studies to categorise the strategies – strength and forms – this chapter summarises the principal methods of third-party intervention. In addition, this chapter reviews the discourse on the role of third-parties’ impartiality and strength of intervention because they are important considerations in this thesis.

**Definition of the Core Concepts**

This section defines the four core concepts in this thesis: civil war, peace negotiation, interplay, and third-party intervention. For each term, the discussions on these concepts in previous research are first reviewed. After this, these concepts are redefined in terms of the way in which they are as used for the purposes of this research. Where necessary, this chapter also presents a number of the criteria that are used to categorise elements of the concepts.

**Civil War**

Most definitions in conventional studies agree that civil war is a military conflict that takes place within a state’s territory. Although the precise wording differs, the definitions are generally similar to Fearson’s: ‘a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies’ (Fearson, 2007: no pagination). However, under this broad definition, various types of conflicts can be categorised as civil war.²

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² For example, some are simple power struggles among various monarchs in a kingdom or empire (e.g. the Three Kingdoms war period in China (184-280 AD), the English Wars of the Roses (1455-1485 AD)), while others are rebellions against central authorities (e.g. the Russian Civil War (1917-1921), the Salvadoran Civil War (1979-1991)). In addition, whereas some are mobilised and organised by internal actors (the French Revolution (1789-1799), the English Civil War (1642-1651)), others are strongly influenced by external advocates (the Korean Civil War (1950-1953), the Vietnamese Civil War (1954-1975)).
Thus, in order to accomplish accurate analysis, civil wars need to be defined and categorised. In regard to the conditions of civil war, Small and Singer propose two distinctions that set civil wars apart from interstate war: the internality of the war to the territory of a sovereign state and the participation of the government as a combatant (Small & Singer, 1982: 210). Under these criteria, the conflicts among non-governmental factions in a state, such as violent skirmishes between local militias in Afghanistan, are not considered civil war.

The US Army specifies five conditions for conferring civil war status upon a conflict: the contestants of conflicts should control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some foreign recognition, have identifiable regular armed forces, and engage in major military operations. Although these are useful criteria, it is not clear whether all actors have to fulfil these requirements in order for a conflict to be considered a civil war (US Army, 1990: no pagination).

As a way of coding conflicts for statistical databases, Doyle and Sambanis proposed six conditions that define a conflict as a civil war: ‘[it] causes more than 1,000 deaths overall, in at least a single year; [it] challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; [it] occurs within the recognized boundary of that state; [it] involves the state as a principal combatant; [it] includes rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state; and [it] has parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war’ (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 783). These criteria have been employed and developed both by many scholars and by agencies outside academia. For example, Singer and Small (1982) and Licklider (1993) adopted Doyle and Sambanis’s conceptualisations. Regan reduced the number of casualties as a condition and defined it as ‘armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least
This thesis posits a somewhat broader definition of civil war: it is a type of violent conflict conducted mainly in a state territory and initiated by domestic factions. This definition is distinct from the previous research reviewed here in three regards. First, this thesis considers the participation of external actors one of the characteristics of civil war. Since a diverse range of international actors have interests in the countries involved in conflicts, it is not surprising that most civil wars are intervened in by external actors. Second, geographically, this thesis does not strictly assume that civil war needs to be conducted solely within a territory until the end of the conflict. In fact, many civil wars tend to be internationalised because borders tend to be porous. Third, this research does not use the number of casualties as a criterion for distinguishing types of conflicts. In many cases, definitions based on numerical canons cause conceptual problems. Since this thesis mainly applies qualitative methods, it will analyse and categorise the diverse characteristics of civil war under the somewhat broad definition given above rather than excluding conflict cases based on whether there is an external actor in the conflict or whether the number of deaths exceeds a certain number.

**Peace Negotiation**

Peace negotiation is a type of negotiation that aims at terminating military conflicts. Thus, this section first defines the meaning of negotiation in this thesis and then clarifies some of

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3 Furthermore, these criteria were used by the US government as the basis for its denial that the conflicts that occurred in Iraq after the new Iraqi government had been established amounted to a civil war. Gen. Peter Pace, the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that even though there are a few bloody incidents, they are not considered civil war cases because the government is controlling the security (rather than joining as a contestant) and the numbers of victims are too low (MSNBC, 2008: no pagination).

4 For instance, although some people follow Doyle and Sambanis in using ‘1,000 casualties’ as a condition of civil war, it appears to an arbitrary decision to deem conflicts with 1,002 victims ‘wars’, but those causing 998 deaths are merely deemed ‘conflicts’. Moreover, it is also controversial to interpret a death toll of 1,000 in China and the same number of casualties in Haiti as equivalent.
the distinctive characteristics that make peace negotiations unique.

In general, negotiation is defined as ‘an interaction in which people try to meet their needs or accomplish their goals by reaching an agreement with others who are trying to get their own needs met’ (Mayer, 2000: 142). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall also employ a similar definition saying ‘negotiation is the process whereby the parties within the conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 29). Gulliver characterises it as ‘the presentation and exchange of more or less specific proposals for the terms of agreement on particular issues’ (Gulliver, 1979, cited in Lewicki et al, 1992: 219). Focusing on social bargaining, Walton and McKersie describe it more specifically as ‘the deliberate interaction of two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence’ (Walton & McKersie, 1988: 26). Regarding international aspects, Pfetsch defines negotiation as ‘a social process in which two or more parties interact in the search for an acceptable position with regard to their differences and concerning the same issue of conflict’ (Pfetsch, 2007: 9).

Although these definitions highlight different aspects of negotiation, there is a general agreement that negotiation is a process by which compromise is reached. In addition, these definitions assume that negotiations have four core elements: board (set up), players (important actors), stakes (issues and their salience for players), and moves (strategies and tactics) (Starkey et al, 1999: 125-6). In short, no matter what specific forms they have, the actions that actors communicate to build a voluntary agreement can be defined as ‘negotiations’. Considering these discussions, this thesis defines peace negotiation as ‘a strategic compromise between the actors in adversarial relations that takes place to terminate violent conflicts’. It limits the scope of negotiation to ‘the negotiation in violent conflicts’ to focus on the issues of international security.
This thesis applies the concepts of game theory in order to specify the characteristics of peace negotiation; in particular, the concepts of a competitive game and a collaborative game are considered. Although researchers use various terms to describe them, the basic difference between these two types of game is the likelihood of cooperation among the negotiating actors. Theories of competitive games assume that the relationships among negotiators are based on zero-sum interests. Thus, by and large, actors do not trust the commitment and sincerity of their counterparts. Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld described three types of games: positional bargaining, adversarial diplomacy, and coercive diplomacy (Starkey, Boyer, and Wilkenfeld, 1999: 111-3). All three commonly assume that the interests of two or more actors clash and the actors barely move from their original positions. Models for negotiations of this type are well developed. The ‘Chicken game’ and the ‘Prisoners’ dilemma’ are representative of this model.

In collaborative negotiation, actors behave in more cooperative ways. Various theories that ‘find ways, if not to reconcile the conflicting positions, then to meet the underlying interests, values or needs’ have been produced. ‘The nature of the dispute and the goals each side seeks to achieve’ are the determinants of the game (Deutsch, 1973: 20). When goals are tied together in a way that means ‘the chance of one side attaining its goal is increased by the other side’s attaining its goal,’ the possibility of cooperation is increased (Spangler, 2003: no pagination). The following are widely considered to be the elements that establish collaborative games: setting the issues into a wider context or redefining the parties’ interests

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5 Here, game means the situation of interplay that is set participants. Game largely determines the set of all possible utility payoffs. In a game, players make efforts to maximise their utility.

6 Zero-sum game, bargaining approach, and adversarial negotiation are commonly used for describing the competitive negotiation games; whereas, non zero sum game, positive sum game, integrative negotiation are widely adopted as terms indicating the collaborative game.

7 Positional bargaining is undertaken by a negotiator who sees only one desirable outcome of negotiation. In this negotiation, the counterpart has to choose either to accept the deal or to go to war. Aggressive diplomacy occurs when the negotiators’ interests are in sharp contrast but there is little possibility of military conflict. In this case, aggressive methods such as economic sanctions can be used. Finally, coercive diplomacy is also adversarial but with no actual punishments (usually limited to diplomatic threats).
in such a way that they can be made compatible; sharing sovereignty or access to the contested resources; increasing ‘the size of the cake’; offering compensation for concessions or trading concessions in other areas; and managing the contested resources on a functional, rather than a territorial or sovereign, basis (Watkins & Rosegrant, 2002: 31; Spangler, 2003: no pagination).

Negotiation in conflicts can be understood as one of the most competitive types of negotiation in the international arena for several reasons. First, when a war begins, actors believe that their contradicting interests cannot be harmonised through non-violent means. Second, once a war begins and causalities occur on both sides, the level of a faction’s trust toward its counterpart decreases dramatically. Third, even when leaders wish to negotiate, the rank and file are so filled with anger that they tend not to allow it. Under these circumstances, the actors in peace negotiations seek resolutions that can convince the warring factions to agree to end the war through peaceful means (for the strategies employed by actors, see below). In this regard, peace negotiation can be described as the negotiation for transforming a competitive game into a collaborative one.

Interplay

As the main interest of this research is the interplay between the actors in peace processes, a clear definition of what constitutes interplay is essential if the analyses in the following chapters are to be valid. The term ‘interplay’, which means that two or more things affect or react to each other, has been used in a variety of ways. In politics, the concept of interplay has been widely used to indicate inter-relations among various phenomena. In many studies, despite the difference in precise meanings, the terms ‘interplay,’ ‘interaction’ and ‘inter-relation’ are used interchangeably.
Regarding the boundary of the concept, ‘interplay of institutions’ studies provide relevant ideas. Jungcurt defines interplay as actors’ behaviour that is intended to realise ‘desired changes in an institution target variable (outcome and impact level performance), as well as the interests, perceptions and capabilities’ (Jungcurt, 2006: 11-2). Moreover, as to the types of interplay, Schroeder suggests ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ interplay based on whether one organisation involves regimes on the same or on different levels of societal organisation (Schroeder, 2008: 29-70). In summary, although they emphasise different aspects interplay, these definitions explain interplay in terms of a series of ‘interactions’ among ‘intended behaviours’ of actors.

Moreover, the three types of motive for interplay suggested by Strokke are notable: utility, norms and ideology. First, ‘a case where rules or programmes that are undertaken within one regime alter the costs or benefits of behavioural options addressed by another regime would exemplify utilitarian interplay’ (Keohane et al, 1993: 21-2). In utilitarian interplay, the actors consider cost-efficiency, externalities, and competition important. Second, normative interplay may be depicted as how ‘an international regime may confirm or contradict the norms upheld by another institution’ (Keohane et al, 1993: 21-2). In this type of interplay, the motive that controls the relationship is the actors’ concerns about legitimacy, not the costs and benefits. The third type of interplay is ideational interplay and relates to the learning process. ‘Thus, one regime can support the effectiveness of another by drawing political attention – domestically or at the international level – to the problems that are addressed by the recipient regime’ (Keohane et al, 1993: 21-2). The actors in this category can increase societal or bureaucratic concern for the problems addressed by the recipient regime and thus add political energy to further development and implementation of the regime. Furthermore,
they can increase awareness of relevant solutions to problems by stimulating policy
innovation or the transfer of successful responses.

As regards the aspects of interplay to be considered, Oberthur and Gehring define three levels
of institutional interaction: ‘interaction of rules and rule-making processes (output level);
interaction of actor-group behaviour (outcome level) and interaction of target variables
(impact level)’ (Oberthur & Gehring, 2000, cited in Stokke, 2001: 5).

This research defines interplay as ‘the actors’ exchange of intentional moves’ in peace
negotiations (reflecting Jungcurt’s definitions). The interplay in peace negotiations includes
the behaviours of actors during both the negotiation phase and the initial implementation
phase. The types of interplay observed in the case studies in this thesis generally take the
form of vertical interplay between national factions and external third parties with relatively
asymmetric powers. The motives for the interplay in the case studies generally conform to the
patterns of normative interplay and ideational interplay outlined above.

In addition, this thesis emphasises the reciprocity of interplay, paying attention to both the
outcome level and impact level (in Oberthur and Gehring’s terms). Although many recognise
this, studies on peace negotiation in internal wars normally pay less attention to how these
reciprocal dynamics affect conflict situations and instead emphasise the unilateral influence
of international interveners vis-à-vis warring factions. Nevertheless, national actors have a
strong effect on a negotiation process through their diverse actions, which include making
suggestions, accepting or rejecting other parties’ suggestions, modifying suggestions,
conducting direct negotiation, employing indirect lobbying, and the like. Thus, it is necessary
to regard national parties in disputes as active negotiators rather than passive reflectors of
external interveners. In this sense, Richmond points out that a peace process is subject to
‘how a mediator is perceived by disputants’ (Richmond, 1998: 710). Bercovitch also argues
that ‘mediation attempts fail because the parties in conflict make different assumptions about the process and have different expectations regarding its outcome’ (Bercovitch, 1996: 6). Taking these points into account, this thesis stresses the importance of reciprocal influences and the outcomes of the influences on the progress of negotiations.

**Third-Party Intervention**

Under the most basic definition of intervention, the act of intervening in a situation, there are many kinds of intervention, each having different forms, actors and intentions. However, the target of this research – discovering the patterns of interplay between national factions and international interveners in peace processes – means that the concept of intervention needs to be narrowed to the efforts to achieve peaceful conflict resolutions in civil wars in the post-Cold War period.

Many conflict resolution studies define intervention using similar criteria. For example, Regan regards intervention as ‘convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country, targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces’ (Regan, 2000: 10). Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld state that third-party intervention is ‘the introduction of an external party into a negotiation when it is apparent that progress cannot be achieved without some form of outside involvement’ (Starkey, Boyer & Wilkenfeld, 1999: 32). Young has a similar definition: intervention is ‘any action taken by an actor that is

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8 For example, as a regional power, South Africa supported Namibian rebels in order to maintain its national economic and political interests, whereas Cuba, which had no direct interests in Africa, joined the Angolan civil war to support its ideological ally. In addition, the US, which has international hegemony, has intervened in various Latin American civil wars to reflect its global strategies. Although these states had different motives for intervention and applied different methods, their actions can all be classed as interventions.
not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the
problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the
crisis’ (Young, 1967: 34). The former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, also defines
intervention as action ‘to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken
out, or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from
spreading’ (Annan, 1998: no pagination). Crocker, Hampson and Aall insist that the role of
interveners is to create ‘both the plan and the momentum to carry the plan forward’, juggling
‘a number of relationships, including [those between] the direct parties to the conflict, other
influential individuals surrounding the conflict, his or her own host institution, and other third
parties’, and representing ‘both a threat and a promise to all involved in the conflict’ (Crocker,
Hampson & Aall, 1999: 61).

In light of these definitions, this thesis defines ‘intervention’ as the military, economic and
diplomatic efforts of external parties that aim at a pacific accommodation to a violent conflict.
It also assumes that ‘third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the fighting’
(Regan, 1996: 340). This definition is distinct from conventional studies in the following
ways. First, it is somewhat wider than others, especially Regan’s definition, in that it includes
diplomatic measures (methodologically) and efforts to support government sides (targets) as
parts of interventions. Second, this definition limits the meaning of intervention by focusing
on the ‘good will’ of the intervener. By narrowing the definition, it is possible to recognise
the effects of interveners’ strategies that aim at peaceful resolution of conflicts, one of the
core targets of analysis.\(^9\)

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\(^9\) For clarity, this thesis will term an influence that is not intended to achieve a balance of power ‘a meddling’ so as to distinguish it from an intervention. In this thesis, therefore, meddling refers to an attempt to prolong or end the civil war by supporting a certain party’s domination.
**Intervention vs. Mediation**

In many peace negotiation analyses, the distinctions between different terms describing the external effort to contribute to the peaceful termination of violent conflicts become blurred. In particular, intervention and mediation, the most frequently used concepts, are used without clear discrimination.

In pure definitional terms, mediation is regarded as a subcategory of intervention that is non-directive and refrains from using coercive methods. In peace processes in civil wars, one of the most frequently used forms of intervention is mediation. In this sense, Lewicki (1992) draws a distinction between mediation and arbitration. He defines mediation as prioritising control of the processes rather than the results of the negotiation, whereas arbitration is intended to achieve a specific negotiation result.

Kolb (1983) further divides mediatory roles into two categories: deal making and orchestrating. Deal making tries to produce substantive forms of compromise, while orchestrating places greater emphasis on the process. In orchestrating mediation, parties continue negotiations but use a new forum created by the mediator. Moore defines mediation as ‘the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement’ (Moore, 1986: 6). Singer views it as a ‘form of third-party assistance (that) involves an outsider to the dispute, who lacks the power to make decisions for the parties’ (Singer, 1990: 20). Folberg and Taylor define it ‘as an alternative to violence, self-help or litigation that differs from the processes of counselling, negotiation and arbitration’ (Folberg & Taylor, 1984: 7).

Nevertheless, the distinction between mediation and intervention is vague in many academic
studies. Many simply consider mediation to ‘include the idea of a process undertaken by an outside party to bring or maintain peace’ (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999: 7). For instance, Touval identifies mediators as ‘intermediaries who make suggestions pertaining to the substance of the conflict, and seek to influence the parties to make concessions by exerting pressures and offering incentives’ (Touval, 1982: 240). Mitchell states that mediation is ‘intermediary activity […] undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour’ (Mitchell, 1981: 287) and argues that the roles of mediation are becoming wider and more complex (Mitchell, 2003: 82-4).

Moreover, there are many definitions of intervention similar to those given for mediation. Burton and Dukes insist that the primary role of the third party is not to seek compromises but ‘to facilitate analysis so that goals and tactics, interests, values and needs, can be clarified, and later to help deduce possible outcomes on the basis of the analysis made’ (Burton & Dukes, 1990: 198). Blake and Mouton assert that the role of intervention is to ‘investigate and define the problem’ and to ‘approach each group separately with recommendations designed to provide a mutually acceptable solution’ (Blake & Mouton, 1985: 15).

This mingling of definitions did not cause confusion until the end of the Cold War period since most international intervention operations were, or tried to be, neutral and impartial and based on the consent of conflicting parties. In fact, the definitions that have been presented in this chapter so far were produced during this era. However, in the post-Cold War era, more international actors involved in violent conflicts began to use material forces such as economic or military pressure (for details of the development of international peace intervention, see Appendix II). As third-party intervention changed and took more active...
forms, it became important to distinguish mediation from more aggressive or partial intervention.\textsuperscript{10}

This thesis follows Bercovitch’s definition of mediation – a non-coercive, non-violent, ultimately non-binding and voluntary form of intervention (Bercovitch, 2002: 5). Specifically, the term ‘mediation’ is used to indicate a form of ‘non-violent intervention with no clear preference for its result’. It is assumed that intervention includes all types of mediation. In this sense, mediation is equivalent to light intervention in this thesis.

\textbf{Theories Related to Peace Negotiation}

This section summarises the theoretical discussions on peace negotiation in the academic fields (or negotiation in general) that are relevant to this thesis’s analysis. Based on these debates, the methodologies and framework of this research are conceptualised in Chapter 3. In this section, the traditional debate between positivists and non-positivists is discussed in two distinct sections, each of which focuses on one of the two traditions.\textsuperscript{11} Each section first discusses how scholars from that tradition investigate and answer the question, ‘how can cooperation be promoted among conflicting parties?’ In addition, a number of core theories adopted by this research for the purpose of analysis are elaborated.

\textsuperscript{10} Although not expressed explicitly, some research does not make a clear distinction between these uses of the term mediation, using both interchangeably or tending to assume that mediation always employs benign strategies. For example, Burton and Dukes, and Mitchell did not use ‘mediation’ when referring to coercive intervention. Moreover, a new term of ‘mediation with muscle’ was created to identify this new type of intervention (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 30).

\textsuperscript{11} The academic discourse on negotiation is divided into two distinctive traditions: positivist and non-positivist. The positivist tradition points ‘to material (among other) resources, and power’ as the causes of conflicts, while the other group ‘highlights perception and belief’ (Avruch, 1998: 24-5).
Positivist Arguments

Positivist scholars have sought to discover the universal principles or conditions for successful negotiations, and many of these theories, including ‘rational choice’ and ‘game theory’, were ‘developed furthest by economists, who found it a rigorous and thus convincing way to model (and “predict”) individual behaviour’ (Avruch, 1998: 75). A basic assumption of this tradition is that actors are rational players and that perception stems from this rationality.

Conditions for Successful Negotiation

Researchers in this field seek ways of ‘changing the bargain to a non-zero-sum game’ based on the assumption of actors’ rationality. Some propose methods for finding common interest among actors and for manipulating the game so that it becomes ‘interest-based bargaining.’ Fisher and Ury suggest a few effective methods to do this: ‘separate the people from the problem; focus on interests, not positions; invent options for mutual gain; and insist upon using objective criteria to judge the merits of possible solutions’ (Fisher & Ury, 1991, cited in Starkey et al, 1999: 115). Axelrod insists that there are three inter-related features of cooperative negotiation: (1) negotiations need to be sequential games, (2) the gains that actors expect in the forthcoming games should be sufficiently large, and (3) reciprocity should be guaranteed (Axelrod, 1990: 138). In more practical terms, he argues that ‘tit for tat’ might be the best strategy because it ‘can avoid being invaded by such a rule only if the game is likely to last long enough for the retaliation to counteract the temptation to defect’ (Axelrod, 1990: 58). Wallensteen proposes seven mechanisms for achieving success in peace negotiations: changes of priorities, dividing the values in conflict, trade-off deals, power-sharing, leaving control to a minority or third force, the conflict resolution mechanism, and postponing controversial issues (Wallensteen, 2007: 131).
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern first developed a systemic model for it (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), game theory has been one of the most widely used methodologies in the academic community. Although detailed elaboration is not necessary because this theory is so well known amongst the academic community, this section briefly describes some of its fundamental assumptions and some representative criticisms of them.

Most game theories are premised upon four fundamental assumptions: utility, rationality, ordered preference, and perfect information. The theories believe that actors make decisions in pursuit of utility maximisation. When actors are given choices, he/she chooses the one that best reflects his/her ordered preferences, which are regarded as completely rational. These theories assume that actors possess perfect information (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010: no pagination).

Although some of the arguments are relevant to peace negotiations, academic studies have pointed out that some of the core assumptions of game theory cannot be simply applied to all negotiations. For instance, Harsanyi showed that there are many games in which the actors possess incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1995: 293). The issue of imperfect information is particularly significant in civil conflict negotiations. Furthermore, some critics contend that game theory’s assumption of rationality is mistaken (Berenice, 1969: 295-321; Turner, 2004: 88-9). Due to various intervening factors such as social structures, cultural values, and actors’ personalities, it is not possible to make a genuinely rational choice in game theory’s terms (Hechter, 1997: no pagination). It is also evident that many decision makers in military conflicts do not always make rational decisions.
However, as game theory assumes that ‘actors can change dynamics by making particular moves or even breeding some of the rules that the conflict has generated’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 32), the basic concepts of game theory are relevant to this research because it examines the actors’ movements and the outcomes of these movements. It should be noted that this thesis does not use advanced models of game theory; rather, it draws on its fundamental principles.

Nevertheless, as the conditions of peace negotiations are significantly different from many assumptions of game theory, not all its principles are applicable to peace negotiations and must therefore be modified or discarded. Thus, its assumptions of rationality and perfect information are abandoned in this research, and instead, the game theory framework is supplemented with a number of non-positivist ideas (see below and Chapter 3 for details).

*Timing - Ripeness*

One of the most significant practical problems facing intervention is its timing. For instance, although early involvement in violent conflicts can reduce the number of casualties (Regan, 2000: 93), early intervention is always easier said than done for the following reasons. The early stages of conflicts rarely attract the attention of international actors. In addition, early intervention is a risky undertaking because it raises the likelihood of the intervener being accused of violating a country’s national sovereignty. Moreover, early intervention sometimes extends the duration of conflicts by providing new sources of conflict to the warring parties.

William Zartman’s model has dominated the discourse on timing. It presents a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ as a good indicator of the ripeness for intervention to end the conflict. He suggests that there are three conditions that determine this ‘ripeness for resolution’: the high costs of the war, a balance of power, and certain domestic political institutions (Zartman, 2003: 19-20). As to the costs of war, much research, including that of Mason and Fett, insists
that peaceful settlements are more likely to be achieved by lowering the benefits and increasing the costs of war (Mason & Fett, 1996: 546-68). Although there are many reasons for this, three are most commonly proposed: when the costs increase, (1) combatants’ limited resources run out, (2) the expected outcomes of victory become less attractive, and (3) domestic pressure increases.

As regards the balance of power, scholars generally agree that when combatants clearly realise that a balance of power exists, they are more likely to come to the negotiation table. Organski emphasises the importance of this, commenting ‘no one side can achieve a great enough superiority to be sure that aggressive action would be crowned with success’ (Organski, 1968, cited in Walter, 2001: 9).

Finally, when domestic political constraints are combined with the previous conditions, the chances of compromise rise. This is particularly true in democratic societies. The American Civil War, in which Abraham Lincoln signed a peace agreement rather than pursue complete victory, is a traditional example (Walter, 2001: 11).

However, some commentators point out that the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ should not be taken as a self-fulfilling condition. For instance, despite previous efforts to clarify the conditions for ripeness, it should be noted that ripeness is also an issue of perception. As Zartman himself admits, a fundamental condition of ripeness is that the actors need to perceive the ripeness (Zartman, 2003: 20). Furthermore, Lederach contends that ripeness is ‘extremely weak in its predictive capacity from the standpoint of a practitioner’ and requires analysts or practitioners to have a ‘capacity to envision a longer-term process and recognize opportunities for constructive change in the midst of crisis’ (Lederach, 2003: 31-3). In this sense, although ripeness theories are based on the concept of rationality, the validity of these theories is subject to the negotiators’ perceptual limitations.
In addition, Rubin argues that there may be multiple moments of ripeness and interveners need to recognise or create chances to intervene rather than waiting for the mutual hurting stalemate to develop (Rubin, 1991). Moreover, studies show that the conditions are not relevant to cases such as the negotiations for the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine (1993) and the peace negotiation in South Africa in the mid-1980s (Rothstein, 2007: 263).

This thesis follows the basic assumptions of Zartman’s theory in investigating the long-term and short-term factors that brought the national factions in the two cases to the negotiation table (in Chapter 4). Furthermore, the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 show that these theoretical arguments on the ripe moments for negotiation are helpful in understanding the initial timing of a third-party intervention. When the ‘mutual hurting stalemates’ became evident, the external interveners in the two cases saw a good chance to initiate the peace negotiations. However, the cases also demonstrate that this is not necessarily the optimal moment for conflict resolution.

Two-Level Game

A two-level game is a theory that is employed in this thesis. Emphasising the domestic constraints on international negotiations, Robert Putnam proposes the concept of a two-level game. Putnam argues that a negotiator (e.g. national decision maker) bargaining with an external counterpart needs to engage in the negotiations with both the external counterpart (Level I) and its own constituencies (Level II). By using the ‘win-set’ concept, Putnam insists that although in many cases the domestic constituencies limit the variety of proposals that the negotiator can agree to, they sometimes strengthen the negotiator’s bargaining by providing sufficient pressure to convince the external actors to be more receptive to the

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12 The concept of ‘win-set’, which refers to a range of proposals that a negotiator can consider acceptable, was first proposed by Shepsle and Weingast (1987).
domestic negotiators’ position (Putnam, 1988).

Two-level game theory is a useful research framework for analysing multiple-level negotiations and has therefore been widely applied in studies on negotiation since its introduction in the 1980s. However, the majority of these studies in the field of politics have dealt with trade negotiations between states or conflict disputes between organisations in developed countries (Mo, 1994; Paarlberg, 1997; Pahre, 1997; Lehman & McCoy, 1992). Research has rarely focused on two-level games during military conflicts.  

Therefore, this thesis intends to add a relatively new issue to this research tradition by examining and revealing the dynamics of two-level games in peace negotiations, an element that has largely been ignored by previous research. Making use of Putnam’s hypothesis, this thesis presents some of the characteristics of the two-level games that occurred in the Cambodian and Salvadoran peace negotiations.

Non-Positivist Discourse

Although the above rational, realistic approaches to negotiation have prevailed in international relations, the other tradition, which emphasises the importance of cultural factors, should not be overlooked. This perspective regards negotiation as a ‘matter of perception and belief, of cognition and affect’ (Avruch, 1998: 27), and, therefore, ‘correctly assessing the other side’s goals and beliefs’ is very important in decision making (Jervis, 1976: 44).

Non-positivist theorists emphasise the critical role of culture in conflict resolution. They assume that cultural issues play critical roles in civil conflicts as causes, reflectors, amplifiers or inhibitors (Ross, 2007: 42). Firstly, cultural issues can be the causes of conflicts. In ethnic war, for instance, ethnic identity provides the essential motivation for violent resistance to the (perceived) discrimination of rival parties (Ross, 2007: 44). Secondly, cultural symbols and narratives are sometimes the mirror for tensions among groups. A good example is the religious parades in Northern Ireland, which galvanise the anger of opposing sides (Ross, 2007: 43; Volkan, 1997). Thirdly, according to how the cultural expressions are used, they can be either amplifiers or inhibitors of conflicts. For example, although the parades in Northern Ireland are reflections of existing tensions, they may also cause subsequent tensions or violent reactions (Ross, 2007: 44-7). Hence, theorists in this tradition believe that understanding the cultural traits of actors is ‘the first step in a successful intervention’ (Avruch & Black, 1993, cited in Fisher, 2001: 17).

Additionally, they maintain that it is imperative to understand how warring factions perceive conflicts, peace negotiation and related issues in order to promote successful negotiation between parties in conflict. However, since most of the literature on negotiations arises from the West, but many of the conflicts are non-Western, these theorists contend that this understanding is insufficient in most international intervention cases.

Moreover, non-positivists contend that conflict resolution should be distinguished from retreat from (even if voluntary) or suspension of violent conflicts. For them, ‘[r]esolution aims somehow to get to the root causes of a conflict and not merely to treat its episodic or symptomatic manifestation, that is, a particular dispute’ (Avruch, 1998: 26). Galtung refers to such a resolution status as positive peace, setting it against negative peace, where the
resolution does not address the fundamental causes of conflict. Burton called such ‘real efforts’ conflict prevention, while Lederach and Maiiese called it ‘conflict transformation’ (Lederach & Maiiese, 2003: no pagination).

**Bounded Awareness**

Although there are various perceptual factors that affect the effectiveness of negotiation, this thesis pays special attention to the limitations in the mutual understanding of negotiators because of their bounded awareness. Bounded awareness describes a phenomenon where actors ‘do not “see” accessible and perceivable information during the decision-making process, while “seeing” other equally accessible and perceivable information’ (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 2; Simon, 1983: 34). Because of this bounded awareness, actors in negotiation tend to have limited information on ‘their opponents’ skills, preferences, and strategies’ (Thompson, 2006: 28), and frequently, their own goals or influences (Thomson, 2006: 28; Gormley-Heenan, 2007: 101-2). Therefore, they fail to devise and employ the best strategies to achieve their goals. More specifically, Chugh and Bazerman argue that the actors’ bounded awareness mainly caused by the failure of obtaining key information in early stages of negotiation and by the failure of examining and using the information in a right way in later stages (2005: 3-4).

Conventional studies have described various patterns of behaviour that result from the bounded awareness of actors. For instance, Gilbert and Wilson developed the concept of ‘focalism’, which refers to the tendency of actors to pay too much attention to ‘a particular event (the ‘focal event’ )’ and ignore other events (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000, cited in Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 10), to account for actors’ bounded awareness. In addition, based on the title of a television show, vos Savant presented the ‘Monty Hall Game’, which showed that the actor has a tendency to stick to his/her first choice when he/she is given the opportunity to
change their decision (vos Savant, 1990 & 1991). Tor and Bazerman proposed the ‘Acquiring a Company Game’, which demonstrates that the player with the most information will ignore the rules of the game (Tor & Bazerman, 2003, cited in Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 19).

In accordance with these concepts and arguments, the case studies in this thesis show that many of the national factions and international interveners in the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador perceived and interpreted other actors’ behaviour through the lens of their own limited perception and thus obtained very limited and incorrect information. Thus, their negotiation strategies did not comprehend, reflect or address other actors’ fundamental aims and achieved only partial success in promoting stable peace.

The concept of bounded awareness is robust enough to replace game theory’s assumptions of rationality and perfect information for the purposes of this study, having sufficient power to explain the behaviour of most of the warring factions in the two cases studies (Chapters 5 and 6 examine the effects of bounded awareness on the Cambodian and Salvadoran factions’ patterns of behaviour).

*Liberal Peace – Western Society’s Ethnocentric Values*

One of the reasons for employing the concept of bounded awareness is the significant role played by the negotiating actors’ ethnocentric cultures in the negotiations (see Chapter 3). Many previous studies also acknowledge the importance of this factor. Although various studies have revealed the influence of cultural values on negotiation strategies by comparing and contrasting different cultural communities, most studies take the form of ‘contrasting the cultural values of Western society’¹⁴ and those of non-Western communities’ (Adair & Brett, 2003).

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¹⁴ Although ‘Western society’ is a broad concept, the term in this thesis indicates international intervening states and organisations relating to the two study cases, including the United States, the United Nations, France, Australia, and Portugal.
These studies generally agree that Western societies share notions of individualism and egalitarianism, have low-context communication systems, and historical backgrounds that include modernisation and industrialisation and that the combined effects of these factors have a strong influence on people’s perceptions. With regard to the ideas related to peace negotiation, the unique approaches of Western society to the following four perceptions are particularly notable.

First, in relation to the negotiation framework, the interveners’ strategies are based on the distinctive features of Western culture, including individualism, egalitarianism, and low-context communications. Individualist societies tend to have the ‘outcome-oriented’ model, which emphasises the importance of interests and tangible outcomes rather than ‘process oriented’ ones (Ting-Toomey, 1999: 210). Moreover, since Western society values individual control, Western people normally give negotiators ‘a great deal of latitude in reaching acceptable agreements’ (Kimmel, 1994: 181). Egalitarianism considers power to be transitory and situational, whereas in hierarchical cultures, power is long-term and general (Brett, 2001: 17-9). Therefore, in negotiations, decisions are made based on majority voting or authoritative decisions rather than by certain individuals or people in certain social strata. Furthermore, Western society heavily relies on low-context communication, which emphasises directness rather than contextual or symbolic behaviour (Le Baron, 2003: no pagination). In a low-context communication society, negotiations need to be official and scheduled, and communication is ‘direct and verbal’, and ‘written contracts that are exact and impersonally worded are binding’ (Kimmel, 1994: 180-1).

Second, many interveners have certain standardised concepts of peace. In the post-Cold War era, Western-sponsored peacemaking processes have followed a somewhat formulaic path in
many places (Paris, 2004: 41-2; Richmond, 2006). Such processes have generally pursued what some scholars have called ‘liberal peace’ with its constituent elements of ‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development’ (Richmond, 2006: 292). It also advocates Western-style electoral politics and technocratic approaches to ‘good’ governance. In this approach, ‘there is a bias towards using the state, bureaucracy and formal political processes (e.g. elections and parties) as core lenses for the interrogation of a proclivity towards conflict or passivity’ (Paris, 2004: 43-4; Mac Ginty, 2008: 146).

Third, another factor that has affected the interplay between national factions and international interveners has been their different approaches to violence. The experience of absolutist state systems led Western societies (or more specifically, European countries) to promote ‘the centralization of the control of the means of violence’ to combat external threats and ‘non-violent internal order’ (Giddens, 1986, cited in Lизée, 1999: 20-1). The emergence of a bourgeoisie erected the ‘barriers to the exercise of violence’ against human rights. As a result, Western societies have a strong idea of the nation state’s ‘responsibility to protect the individual from violence’ and share the conviction that peace can be achieved by ‘the absence of violence’ and ‘the reduction of conflict to political processes’ (Lизée, 1999: 20-1). Thus, international interveners have assumed that ceasefire is a prerequisite of peace negotiation and an essential element that demonstrates the actors’ willingness to negotiate.

Finally, the assumption of the ‘rationality of humankind’ is another important factor. As May points out, rationalism and individualism are the most basic consideration frameworks in European society and have limited the scope of perception (May, 1991: 288). In many cases, by placing too much emphasis on this assumption, interveners have failed to understand local people’s core motives for conflicts and negotiations. These interveners have consistently tried
to discover the ‘reasons’ behind an actor’s moves and have considered ‘irrational’ action as ‘un-interpretable’ (Brett, 2000: 176). Nevertheless, many people in societies that do not use low-communication systems have considerable difficulty in understanding the rationality assumption (Schirch, 2005: 35; Brett, 2000: 178).

Because of this limited scope, third-party interveners have tended to engage in very limited strategies that often fail to reflect the true interests of the national parties. For example, third parties have often sought to stick to rational *costs and benefits* assumptions based on economic benefits and have used Western-style formal negotiation techniques. Some scholars have suggested that the attainment of stable peace, the fundamental goal of intervention, has been thwarted by these methodologies. This aspect of negotiation is discussed in Chapter 6.

**ISSUES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION**

This section identifies the types of actors involved in third-party intervention and the methods that they employ. After reviewing the various ideas that have appeared in previous studies, it roughly re-categorises them. First, interveners are differentiated using Kenneth Waltz’s levels of analysis. Waltz proposes three levels for analysing international relations: the individual, the state regime, and the international structure. The actors in each level are re-sorted by their intentions and capabilities. Second, the methods employed by interveners are roughly divided into two groups: light methods and heavy methods. Light methods refer to the non-coercive measures that are used to coax the national factions, whereas heavy methods are more direct and coercive. These concepts and typologies are used in developing the research framework in Chapter 3. Finally, the discourse on impartiality and strength, two factors that are believed to affect the effectiveness of third-party interventions, is reviewed.
Interveners

In considering the criteria by which the interveners are categorised, three factors have been highlighted: enthusiasm, neutrality, and centrality of power. In other words, in many previous studies, external interveners were differentiated according to whether the interveners were partial or neutral (whether an actor has an existing interest or not), whether the actor was a unilateral state or a multilateral organisation, and whether the actor had the will and capability to use military force (Bellamy et al, 2004: 35).

National States

Many of the interveners are national states with a centralised power structure. Among the various actors, this section focuses particularly on regional hegemons, former colonial or ideological powers and concerned neighbours. 15

A. Regional Hegemons

Actors in this category intervene in civil wars in neighbouring states ‘in order to press their own claims to territory, economic benefits or access to natural resources, or support the socio-political ambitions of allies’ (Bellamy et al, 2004: 35). Examples include Russia in Georgia and Nigeria in West Africa. Although they exhibit strong enthusiasm and have effective power, these actors are highly likely to be partial to certain factions and may be motivated to pursue narrow national interests. Since the collapse of the global bipolar system in the late 1980s, the role of regional hegemons has been increasing. South Africa’s mediating role in recent internal conflicts in neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe demonstrates the enhanced and complicated roles of regional hegemons in conflict resolutions. In addition, many regional hegemons such as China, India, and the US are also global powers.

15 Although not expressly mentioned in this thesis, many middle-sized countries have recently made strong efforts to contribute to such interventions, such as the Nordic states, Canada, Australia and South Korea.
B. Former Colonial/Ideological Powers

Many Western countries that had previously colonised the states in civil war also intervene. In the Cold War period, a few hegemonic states also participated in civil war peace processes. Since former colonial powers ‘have close economic, political and social ties with their former colonies’ and Cold War hegemons strongly supported developing states, they had relatively strong leverage. Most peace processes in the Cold War era and some in the post-Cold War period (including the UK in the case of Sierra Leone and France in Rwanda) provide examples of these close ties and leverage. More recently, these countries have created a number of value-based groups such as the Community of Democracies and have restructured the role of institutions like the Council of Europe, in which members closely cooperate in peace keeping activities.\(^\text{16}\)

C. Concerned Neighbours

If the countries neighbouring the states in civil war are vulnerable to the impact of the war, they often try to intervene. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall put it, civil wars ‘have external effects on the region through the spread of weaponry, economic dislocation, links with terrorism, disruptive floods of refugees, and spill-over into regional politics when neighbouring states are dragged or the same people straddle several states’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 98-9). As a result, states tend to be deeply concerned about the security issues of their neighbours and try to minimise the external effects of their neighbours’ violent conflicts. However, despite their strong desire to resolve the conflicts, in many cases they lack the ability to intervene effectively and are therefore unable to contribute significantly to the resolution of the conflicts.

\(^{16}\) Since these communities are based on democratic values, Wallensteen refers to them and their underlying ideology as a *Pax Democratica* (Wallensteen, 2007: 254).
International Organisations

International organisations have played the most active roles in peace processes in the post-Cold War era. While international financial organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have played a major role through economic assistance (Paris, 2002; Boyce, 2000; de Soto & del Castillo, 1994), the United Nations has been at the centre of international intervention for conflict resolution, and the importance of regional organisations is growing rapidly.

A. The United Nations

The UN has been the most vigorous actor in peace negotiation processes. As a mediator, it has provided the main momentum and opportunities for talks in peace processes in El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Tajikistan and the Western Sahara (Wallensteen, 2007: 221). The UN’s legitimacy as an impartial external actor helped the organisation to play relatively effective roles in these operations (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 170).

The UN’s organisational structure plays a significant part in guaranteeing and legitimising its impartiality. The UN Security Council and the General Assembly act as consultative organisations in which member states debate. Since the UN can act only with the consensus of the five permanent members of the Security Council, it is a relatively impartial intervener. The UN Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General, resembles and functions as an independent bureaucratic organisation.

However, the UN’s impartiality and autonomy have not always played positive roles in peace processes. Doyle confirms that many smaller non-Western states have doubted the impartiality and neutrality of the organisation (and of the Security Council, in particular)
Moreover, critics have also noted that the UN frequently lacks operational efficiency and that it relies heavily on the financial, military, and human resources of member states (Crocker et al., 1999: 38).

B. Regional Organisations

A number of regional organisations, including NATO in Europe and ECOWAS in Africa, sometimes play key roles in peace negotiations. Increasing numbers of cases are dealt with by regional security organisations. Examples include NATO’s intervention in the war in Kosovo, The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia (consisting mainly of Nigerian military forces), and the intervention by the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT), led by the British army, in Sudan (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 149). While some organisations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe, were intentionally established ‘to bridge the divide in an existing conflict and provide a venue for discussion and dialogue’, others like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS) and ECOMOG were founded on broader shared interests.

In particular, the roles of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) are prominent in the post-Cold War period. As the UN has increased its reliance on regional organisations in conflict resolution\(^\text{17}\), both the EU and AU have been key actors in many regional conflicts. In recent years, the AU has played a ‘stronger and more influential’ role and has moved towards ‘responding earlier to political challenges’ (DFID, 2008: 1), and the EU has expanded its concerns outside Europe to other parts of the world.

\(^\text{17}\) Since 1992, when former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued *An Agenda for Peace*, the UN has repeatedly emphasised the increasing importance of regional organisations in conflict resolution. A number of its reports, including *Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms* in 1999, have sought ways of establishing mutual cooperation with regional organisations.
The member states of these regional organisations have a relatively strong interest in stabilising the conflicts, and some of the organisations possess a relatively wide range of operational methods, including military options. Hence, in many cases, these organisations conduct much more energetic inventions than international organisations. However, because of this, the scope of their operations tends to be limited by the fact that ‘member-states have a primary interest in capturing its flag for their side of the dispute’ (Zartman, 2002: 80).

Sub-state Actors

The role of sub-state actors has been growing since the end of the Cold War. In particular, NGOs’ participation in conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction and development has increased significantly, and individuals have played key roles in many peace processes.

A. Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)

The mediating roles of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in civil wars are attracting more attention than before. In fact, many of them ‘have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of intervention in states and civil society’ (Richmond, 2005: 5). In the post-Cold War period, many NGOs, including the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in the Liberian conflicts, have contributed to peaceful conflict resolutions as mediators. Although they do not provide any military power, they help to support good communication between the parties due to their neutral and reliable reputations. Moreover, they can ‘give assistance to conflicting parties in addressing their interest in a locally workable way’ (Cert, 2004: 5). As a result, the UN is extending its partnership with NGOs in intervention projects.

B. Private Individuals

In international and intrastate conflicts, an individual’s mediation can sometimes play a
critical part in peaceful resolutions. Examples of effective individual mediation include Jimmy Carter (former President of the United States) in the Palestine/Israel disputes, George Mitchell (former Senator of the United States) in the Northern Ireland civil conflict, Kofi Annan (former UN Secretary-General) in a number of African crises, and Johan Jørgen Holst (former Norwegian Foreign Minister) in the Oslo Channel for Palestine/Israel. The Elders, which was formed in 2007 and comprises a group of elder politicians and peace activists including Nelson Mandela, is another good example.

Since they cannot provide material support, they act as ‘the facilitator (who provides secrecy and deniability), the communicator (who supplies information and [carries] messages), the formulator (who finds acceptable formulations) and the psychoanalyst (who confronts self and enemy images)’ (Bercovitch, 2002: 64-9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN (19)</th>
<th>Non-UN Organization (6)</th>
<th>State (18)</th>
<th>Sub-national Actor (8)</th>
<th>No Intervener</th>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2.1 categorises the peace agreements promoted between 1991-2005 (extracted from the cases in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset) according to the types of major interveners based on the criteria presented above. It can be seen that the United Nations and states were the most common interveners and that most mediation by non-UN international organisations occurred from the late-1990s. This is because regional organisations began to expand their scope of action from the early 1990s after the bipolar system collapsed. In addition, it took a long time for regional organisations such as OAU and ASEAN to nurture sufficient power to deal with security issues.

In the case studies in this thesis, the UN and three national states are selected as the intervening actors for analysis. Specifically, the United States, a global power, and the UN are selected as impartial third-parties and China and the US are analysed as the partial advocates of the national factions for Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively.

**Methods of Intervention**

This section discusses the major strategies that many third-parties employ in their peace interventions. Since the impact of these powers and skills varies according to the context in which they are employed, there are various methods of differentiating the strategies of
interveners (Bercovitch, 1996; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 1999: 20; Boulding, 1989; Nye, 2002; Nye, 2004). This thesis adopts two of the criteria commonly used, strength and form, and uses them to understand the types of intervention methods in the following chapters. This section summarises the discussions in previous research on the methods of third-party intervention by using the categories based on these two criteria.18

**Strength: Light Methods and Heavy Methods**

The first analytic lens for observing intervention methods is strength, and two categories are proposed: light intervention and heavy intervention. Light intervention indicates pure mediation, which uses diplomatic methods such as providing good offices, suggesting proposals and establishing negotiation rules. By contrast, heavy intervention employs coercive methods such as diplomatic threats, economic sanctions, military operations and the like. The main intervention methods that make up the two categories are outlined below.

**A. Light Methods**

Light intervention methods chiefly aim to provide better conditions for warring factions to begin dialogue and make compromises. Frequently used methods include stage setting, rule making, suggesting negotiation targets, information transmission, and the provision of diplomatic incentives and pressure.

(1) **Providing Good Offices**

Offering good offices is the most basic light intervention strategy and is usually conducted in the initial phase. Before the start of formal negotiations, interveners provide an environment in which all the factions can get together and talk to each other. As Stevens argues, the

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18 The methods explained in this section point to an ideal-type scenario.
chance of successful negotiation becomes much higher when interveners ‘(1) create a contract zone;’ \(^{19}\) (2) help the parties to save face and to recreate the contract zone, and (3) assist the parties to weigh and to rank existing alternatives and create a truly integrative strategy’ in the stage setting phase (Stevens, 1963 cited in Lewicki, Weiss & Lewin, 1992: 235).

In order to do this, interveners in the initial phase of the negotiation need to make contact and establish connections with the warring factions. Indirect talks (e.g. China’s mediation between the Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia), track II diplomacy (e.g. the Oslo Negotiation between scholars from Israel and Palestine), and direct informal talks (e.g. South Africa, Northern Ireland (Hume-Adams Dialogue)) are common strategies in this phase. Once trust between national factions and external interveners is established, interveners initiate negotiations in which all negotiating parties can exchange their ideas with minimum restrictions.

For mediators who are considered neutral, impartial and not harmful by all warring factions, the facilitation of communication between the warring national factions is not particularly difficult to implement and does not require many resources.

(2) Building the rules of the negotiation

As du Toit explains, rules and procedures are important because they construct ‘the arena within which negotiators cooperate and compete with each other’ (du Toit, 2003: 74). When opposing factions in conflicts express their intention to negotiate, they usually have ‘exploring’ and ‘signalling’ stages. In the exploring phase, actors exchange their basic views on the issues. Subsequently, in the signalling stage, they explain their specific positions on

\(^{19}\) A contract zone means a common area of disputing actors’ interest, which makes all the actors consent to a certain peace proposal.
the issues and express their willingness to enter negotiation.

In these stages, the interveners frequently employ the strategy of ‘rule making.’ Since both factions are extremely suspicious about possible deception by their counterparts and as many factions are not familiar with bilateral or multilateral negotiation, a negotiation in the early stage is extremely fragile. The mediators’ neutral suggestions on negotiation principles and conditions may contribute to its sustainability. For example, they need to agree on basic issues such as the following: the people participating in the negotiation, inviting mediators, the basic principles of the negotiation. ‘The greater their fear and mistrust, the more detailed they will want the contract to be and the more guarantees they will believe they must exact’ (Jervis, 1976: 45).

(3) Suggesting the contents and feasible targets of the negotiations

When players agree with the basic rules of the negotiations, each player presents more detailed and concrete proposals. During this stage, the interveners use compromise strategies to entice factions to remain at the negotiation table. When factions approach each other, the interveners help them to produce explicit resolutions. First, interveners sometimes help the factions make a list of issues of mutual interest to discuss. For warring parties, this is a highly sensitive process. Each faction makes strong efforts to prevent the issue that might most hamper their position from being the topic of negotiation. Many negotiations remain deadlocked in this phase for a long time, and many warring parties have in fact left the negotiation table and have become ‘outside spoilers’ during this phase. However, if interveners are considered impartial and neutral, their suggestions are more likely to be accepted by the factions. The biggest challenge for interveners is making the factions believe that they will not be victimised nor have their positions undermined by the negotiations.
Second, the mediators from time to time present their own suggestions or compromise proposals to the factions. After the issue list is agreed to by the factions, the negotiators begin specific bargaining. It is highly likely that factions will have completely different views on many issues and demand unacceptable things from each other. It is therefore important that the suggested proposals should be seen as beneficial, or at least not harmful, to all factions. Disappointed factions are likely to leave the table or approve proposals with no intention of implementing them (being inside spoilers).

Moreover, the interveners’ capacity for agenda setting and their effective use of process management skills are essential. Scholars have proposed a range of tactics that interveners employ to increase their effectiveness in setting agendas and managing processes. For instance, there may be different kinds of peace accords.\textsuperscript{20} Interveners may advocate ‘comprehensive compromise’, in which all the players strike a deal on the all issues at stake, or they may recommend discussing the issues consecutively (one by one). Wallensteen suggests that there are seven possible means of promoting a successful outcome in this phase: changes of priorities, dividing values in conflicts, a trade-off arrangement, power-sharing, leaving control of minorities to third parties, appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms, and postponing controversial issues (Wallensteen, 2007: 131-2). What is more, he insists that these can be pursued through democratic systems.

(4) Transmission of information

The conveying of information is a prerequisite for successful negotiation in all phases. A major challenge in any negotiation is obtaining precise information. A large number of negotiations break down because of a lack of information. In conflict situations, information

\textsuperscript{20} Mac Ginty explains that accords may take various forms. For example, they might be comprehensive or interim, publicly endorsed agreements or elite-level compacts (see Mac Ginty, 2006: 6).
transmission is crucial, but it is also difficult. After long military conflicts, factions naturally acquire a deep-rooted mistrust of adversarial parties. Although they desperately need to know what the others think, they rarely have the opportunity to obtain direct information. In these cases, information circulation becomes the critical factor in achieving a successful negotiation. Moreover, communication is not only a matter of passing information but also a way of sustaining dialogue between the actors (Curle, 1971: 254). A large number of studies underline the importance of communication (Wallensteen, 2007; Regan, 2000; Avruch, 1998; Curle, 1971; Warner, 2001).

Interveners contribute to the development of good communication channels between the adversarial actors. Most commonly, interveners act as a messenger, conveying the messages of one actor to another (e.g., Norway in Israel-Palestine conflict). Another frequent role is that of a mediator that transmits each party’s will as well as their own suggestions. Recognising this, Avruch affirms the critical role that clear and effective communication plays in the success of international negotiations and stresses the importance of intervention in conflicts. However, he cautions interveners to make efforts not to create misunderstanding among actors, arguing that ‘effective communication, especially across national, cultural, and linguistic boundaries, requires constant attention to make sure that messages are sent clearly and interpreted similarly by both parties’ and ‘an awareness of the individual and group sources of potential misinterpretation so that conscious efforts must be made in negotiations to communicate in spite of these differences’ (Avruch, 1998: 40).

(5) Diplomatic tactics

A variety of skills that utilise the diplomatic power of interveners are considered ‘diplomatic tactics.’ First, negotiation with warring factions is a direct strategy. In many cases, the interveners join the negotiation as players and engage in direct bargaining. Among the many
diplomatic resources that interveners use, one frequently used method is ‘diplomatic recognition.’ In the modern international political system, obtaining national sovereignty for a state is essential. Therefore, when a faction wins a war, obtaining recognition as the legitimate authority from the international community is of paramount importance to the victorious party (e.g. the State of Cambodia (Hun Sen) in the Cambodian civil war).

Second, indirect strategies are also commonly employed. One of the most widely used strategies is ‘alignment.’ In managing a negotiation, a vigorous intervener will call for support from other states or organisations. Particularly when the negotiation has stalled on the most important issues, the consensus of interveners and supporters sometimes helps the factions to find a breakthrough. If warring factions rely on support from advocating states, interveners’ skill in persuading the advocates to exert pressure on their client factions can become a critical factor in the outcome of the negotiation.

Interveners sometimes use a third-party actor whose role is to target another external actor. Especially when a particular faction is heavily reliant on an external advocate state, the advocate is likely to be the target of indirect diplomacy. By persuading the advocate, interveners may have an indirect influence on the factions.

B. Heavy Methods

In cases where light intervention strategies have been employed, but factions still refuse to agree to compromise, interveners may use heavy tools to attract or force them to do so. The heavy methods might include ‘threats of sanctions, promises of trade relations, international law, pressure from neighboring states’ as well as withdrawal of military aid (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999: 53). This thesis identifies the economic and security ‘push-and-pull’
factors used by interveners.

(1) Economic Incentives and Pressure

Among various means of enforcement, economic methods are frequently used by state actors and international or regional organisations. Economic assistance (e.g. agreements on revenue sharing, official development assistance, establishing new trade routes, and long-term loans) may be a major ‘carrot’ used to attract warring factions to the negotiation table. Some people describe this assistance as ‘buying peace’. One of the most common types of ‘carrot’ is revenue sharing. Interveners might give official consent to the use of resources already under the control of the factions. In other cases, interveners may grant access to new resources. For instance, the strategy of revenue sharing was used in Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola (Le Billon & Nicholls, 2007: 618). Moreover, the reconstruction package is another type of economic incentive that is frequently used by international interveners (Baranyi & North, 1996: 15-6; Whitfield, 2001: 37).

However, economic sanctions can be used as a ‘stick.’ Jentleson defined economic sanctions as ‘the actual or threatened denial of economic relations by one or more states (senders) intended to influence the behaviour of another state (target) on noneconomic issues or to limit its military capabilities’ (Jentleson, 2000: 126). Although the UN Security Council had used only two economic sanctions during the Cold War (on Rhodesia and South Africa), the imposition of the UN economic sanctions became much more frequent since 1990 including the sanctions on Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Iran (Wallensteen, 2007: 240; Rhyu & Bae, 2010: no pagination). The economic sanctions imposed on Liberia, Haiti, Eritrea and Ethiopia are considered to have played significant

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21 This thesis regards both the economic sanctions that are actually imposed and an explicit declaration of the threat of sanctions as the strategies in this category.
roles in the persuasion of parties, while the sanctions on Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan have been deemed failures. Although economic sanctions clearly demonstrate the intentions and determination of the international community, they also provide ‘opportunities for evasion by the actors, using go-betweens, family or clan members, and even strengthening the determination of the ruling clique to keep itself in power’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 242). It is very important, therefore, to choose an appropriate timing and procedure when imposing sanctions (Regan & Aydin, 2010).

(2) Military Incentives and Pressure

Military involvement in civil war is another core intervention strategy and performs two significantly different roles. On the one hand, military forces play the role of ‘peace guarantor.’ It is natural for warring factions to consider political survival as their primary concern. In a civil war, it is extremely difficult for warring factions to trust other negotiation partners’ sincerity because of the high probability of deception. One side’s ‘cheating’ may cause irreparable damage to their adversary. Thus, international interveners normally assure the security of all factions. In promising to dispatch peacekeeping troops, interveners ensure that the factions are inclined to implement the resolution under negotiation.

On the other hand, the interveners may threaten to use military force as a ‘pushing method’. From time to time, factions stubbornly refuse to attend the peace negotiation processes. In some extreme cases, the superpowers and neighbouring countries threaten to use their military strength to force such factions to abide by pre-agreed rules. This method is more frequently used after the peace resolution has been issued rather than in the initial phase of the negotiation.

Depending on the negotiation contexts, the effects of military ‘push-and-pull’ may differ
(Regan & Aydin, 2010:738-9). For example, as Crocker, Hampson and Aall contend, ‘mediators could impose a settlement on parties to a conflict when the mediators had access to overwhelming force and were willing to use it, as happened in Bosnia, or when there was a well-organized and generalized external consensus favouring settlement, as happened in Cambodia. In most other cases, however, the mediator enters into a complex dance with the combatants’ (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1997: 52-3). In other words, military intervention is a risky method that needs to be chosen carefully and used cautiously in accordance with the context of the conflicts and negotiations.

**Forms: Process Control, Content Control, and Motivational Control**

The second criterion for categorisation is the forms of intervention. In examining the intervention methods in the case studies, this thesis relies on Sheppard’s three forms of third-party contribution: process control, content control, and motivational control (Sheppard, 1983 & 1984 cited in Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin, 1992: 231).

A. Process Control: Coordinating Procedural Issues

Process control describes the intervening methods that coordinate processes in order to enable the parties to negotiate easily and directly. The intervening methods presented in Chapter 2, including providing good offices, building the rules of negotiation, transmission of information, and some parts of proposal suggestions, fall into this category. In general, non-coercive mediators rely heavily on these types of methods. Two types in particular are most frequently observed in this research: the offer of good offices and the setting of negotiation rules (see above for details).

B. Content Control: Suggesting Peace Proposals

Proposal suggestion is a more direct means of intervention. As negotiation processes are
taking place, actors endeavour to make negotiation proposals that guarantee the realisation of their goals (Burton, 1990: 182). Moreover, when a proposal is presented, the actors examine whether they can achieve their targets under the conditions that the implementation of the proposal would bring about. Thus, in many cases, third parties try to provide impartial proposals so that the direct parties make progress in the negotiations.

This thesis analyses content control by dividing the issues into two categories: issue selection and deal making. First, choosing the issues for negotiation is one of the most problematic parts of a negotiation process (Burton, 1990: 217). The issues that frequently make the negotiation process difficult include power sharing issues, land reform questions, demilitarisation, amnesty, poverty, economic and social justice, economic policies, and human rights issues (Wallensteen, 2007: 131-2). Since national factions are very sensitive to those issues that may affect their critical interests, selecting the issues for discussion is a difficult matter.

Second, the selection of the contents of proposals is crucial to the chances of being able to strike a deal (Young, 1972, cited in Bartunek, Benton, & Keys, 1975: 534). Many negotiations fail because the suggested proposals and the issues selected for discussion do not reflect the core interests of the actors in the negotiations. Cases show that some contents are good for the negotiation process but disastrous for the implementation process. For example, although ambiguity helps a negotiator to avoid sensitive issues, it can cause many problems in the implementation phase.

C. Motivation Control: Setting Response Rules

Motivation control refers to the manner in which a third party employs inductive or coercive methods to persuade disputants to negotiate. Although there might be multiple ways to attain
motivation control\textsuperscript{22}, this thesis regards the response rules set by international interveners as a representative method of this type of control. A response rule (also called a reaction function) indicates that an actor’s move is conditional on another actor’s behaviour (Dixit & Skeath, 1999: 290). In other words, it is a condition used by an actor for ‘deterrence’ or ‘coercion’. There are two types of response rules: incentives and pressure\textsuperscript{23}. In many conventional studies, the role of response rules has been considered critical to the success of the negotiations (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Regan, 2000; Walter, 2002; Kaufmann, 1996).

In line with many previous studies, this thesis concurs that the major response rules employed by third parties are diplomatic, economic and military powers. Diplomatic tactics consist of direct strategies (such as negotiation with domestic factions and diplomatic recognition) and indirect methods (including the alignment of third parties, using advocate states). Economic assistance and sanctions are the most frequently used methods of providing incentives and applying pressure, respectively. As regards the security aspect, while military forces play roles as peacekeepers or peace guarantors, they also frequently become a means of compelling factions to continue their negotiations.

The following chapters will examine the strategies of third-party interveners by using these two categorisations. It is observable that most peace negotiations in the post-Cold War era have applied a mixture of the two types of methods.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, it may be argued that this categorisation might be useful for analytical purposes but is inapplicable to the real world. However, as the following chapters will demonstrate, although many interveners employ a

\textsuperscript{22} Sheppard does not present the types of motivation control methods in detail.

\textsuperscript{23} Pressure and incentives in this thesis are equivalent to Dixit and Skeath’s ‘threat’ and ‘promise’. For them, ‘threat’ takes the following form: ‘unless your action (or inaction, as the case may be) conforms to my stated wish, I will respond in a way that will hurt you’. ‘Promise’ functions in the following way: ‘if your action (or inaction, as the case may be) conforms to my stated wish, I will respond in a way that will reward you.’ (1999: 290)

\textsuperscript{24} To provide a clearer illustration of this trend, Appendix II presents a historical overview of the changing characteristics of international third-party intervention.
mixture of the methods from the different categories in their intervention, there are patterns in their mixture of methods. Moreover, this thesis considers the changing pattern of intervention methods as a sign of changes in their mid-term intervention strategy. Hence, this thesis will use these categories as a tool for analysing the case studies.

**Impartiality and Strength of Intervention**

This thesis focuses particularly on two factors that directly relate to intervention ‘before and during negotiation’: impartiality and strength. These are important factors in helping external interveners (or mediators) attain successful peace intervention (Toubal & Zarman, 1985; Curle, 1986; Mitchell & Webb, 1988; Van der Merwe, 1989; Bercovitch, 1996).

On the one hand, intervention is seen as a process involving the exercise of power. The intervener can have the ‘power to reward, power to punish, and power to induce parties’ to reach the agreement that the intervener wants them to reach. Especially when warring factions are reluctant to abide by the negotiation proposals, the strength of interveners can leave the negotiators little choice but to accept mediation (Smith, 1994: 447). Hence, most studies highlight the role of military operations and economic sanctions as coercive methods of intervention (Rauchhaus, 2010: 3-4).

However, some people disagree with this idea. For instance, Fisher argues that although coercive methods are useful for promoting an ‘initial settlement’, they are counter-productive for developing ‘the values of autonomy and free choice’ among the national actors (Fisher, 2001: 19). Other commentators claim that since most interveners have limits to their ability ‘to police the terms of settlement’ and ‘to observe and control the actions of the disputants’, external intervention is also likely to prolong the conflicts (Watkins & Rosegrants, 2002: 271).
Moreover, in some cases, interveners who have relied too heavily on pressure are likely to bring about a situation that leads to a ‘dangerous win-lose outcome, to rebellion, and to more conflict’ (Peou, 1997: 298).

On the other hand, for mediators, impartiality is an essential element for a successful job. In many cases, warring parties have little trust in the intervention and will not consent to negotiate without proper levels of neutrality on the part of the mediator. In the traditional discourse, the neutrality of third parties has been viewed as a prerequisite for successful intervention. This idea is based on the assumption that warring factions cannot trust mediators if the factions believe that they are ‘involved in some way with the other side’ (Folberg & Taylor, 1984: 7). Thus, it is believed that neutrality and impartiality make it easier for national factions to accept the legitimacy of the intervention and give interveners more opportunities to promote creative suggestions (Moore, 1986: 14; Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2005: 104). In particular, American mediation discourses tend to stress that an ideal mediator is ‘completely impartial and unbiased, ideally unconnected’ to the negotiating parties (Avruch, 1998: 83).

However this assumption faces criticism from a variety of viewpoints. First, there is the question of whether a third party can be purely impartial and unbiased. Some commentators insist that ordinary peacekeeping operations generate opportunities for profit (Bhatia, 2005: 205-24). Even for the actors who do not have direct economic and security interests in the conflicts in which they become involved, the interveners in many cases consider the indirect interests that they might gain from the result of the peace process. In addition, many external actors that have no particular economic or security interests have ideological and cultural biases. The cultural and perceptual limitations of Western interveners described in this chapter are a good example (see above).
In a more practical sense, some scholars claim that neutrality does not necessarily provide the basis for successful intervention. They provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of impartial and non-forcible intervention in war zones and assert the need to consider the alternatives of either letting the conflicts ‘burn themselves out’ or of intervening decisively on one side. Others provide evidence that mediators who are favourable towards one national party can play significantly productive roles (Touval & Zartnam, 1989). Thus, in some extreme cases, people argue that letting the conflicts ‘burn themselves out’ or ‘intervening decisively on one side’ might prove better options than simple impartial mediation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2005: 142).

In light of these ongoing debates, this thesis examines the usefulness of these two factors (strength and impartiality) by tracking the responses of the national factions in Cambodia and El Salvador to the external interveners’ pressure and incentives. It also reveals the different patterns of application of strength and impartiality by the impartial third parties and the advocates of certain national factions (see Chapter 3 for details).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the conceptual and theoretical discussions in the conventional studies on negotiation and intervention, defined the core concepts to be used in this thesis, and has critically applied them to and adopted them in the framework and methodology of this research.

First, this chapter clarified how this thesis defines the following concepts: civil war, peace negotiation, interplay, and third-party intervention. Owing to the internal diversity of the concept, this thesis employs a minimalist definition of civil war: a type of violent conflict
conducted mainly within a state’s territory and initiated by domestic factions. Using the
concepts of game theory, this research restricts the definition of peace negotiation to ‘a
strategic compromise between the actors in adversarial relations, which takes place to
terminate violent conflicts.’ Moreover, this thesis narrows down the meaning of interplay by
focusing only on the exchange of strategic moves that the actors intentionally make. Finally,
this thesis defines third-party intervention as ‘the military, economic and diplomatic efforts of
external parties which aim at a pacific accommodation in a violent conflict’, and
interventions that do not pursue a balance of power between the warring national factions will
be considered a ‘meddling’. These definitions and categorisations will be applied in
formulating the basic analytical framework for this research and in generalising the findings
of the case studies. Specifically, the definitions delineate the boundary of the analytic
framework used in this research.

Second, it has also examined the various theoretical discourses on peace negotiation in terms
of the ongoing debate between two different traditions – positivism and non-positivism – that
emphasise different aspects of human perception: rationality and cultural diversity. With
regard to the rationality assumption inherent to positivism, the discourse on the conditions for
successful negotiation, game theories, timing for conflict resolution, and two-level game were
reviewed. As regards the non-positivist discussions, the perceptual issues in peace negotiation,
such as bounded awareness and the role of ethnocentric culture, were discussed.

In applying these theories to the case studies, this thesis employs a mixture of both traditions.
The theories based on the assumption of rationality provide the fundamental analytical
framework for this research. Thus, this thesis assumes that the negotiating actors decide upon
their next move by weighing their options against their fundamental goals. The principles of
game theory are applied in conceptualising the anticipated dynamics of the interplay between
the external interveners and the national factions, and its assumptions, such as the actors’ rational choice, ripeness, and zero-sum and two-level games, are all employed in the analysis of the case studies.

By adopting non-positivist ideas, this thesis intends to supplement the shortcomings in the positivist theories. Specifically, it acknowledges the importance of the actors’ cultural values and imperfect information. In other words, rather than assuming that the actors are completely rational, it emphasises the cultural aspects of conflict and pays particular attention to the examination of the motives and goals of parties. Although the national factions are rational in their decision making, the issues that are of most concern to them when making their decisions may be strikingly different from what the external actors assume them to be. Moreover, in rejecting the perfect information assumption, this thesis recognises that the parties in military conflicts have a serious information deficit and therefore face significant obstacles to achieving effective communication with other actors or within the party.

Third, the academic discourse on the typologies of third-party interveners and their methods of intervention has been discussed. Traditionally, states, including regional hegemons, former colonial/ideological powers and concerned neighbours, have been the crucial actors in third-party intervention. However, the role of international organisations such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF has become much more prominent in the post-Cold War era. Sub-state actors such as NGOs and individuals also contribute to the success of international intervention.

The methods of intervention have been discussed on the basis of two criteria for categorisation: strength and form. On the one hand, the methods were divided into two groups based on strength: light intervention and heavy intervention. Among them, stage setting, building the negotiation rules, suggesting the contents of negotiation, and
transmission of information, diplomatic tactics are regarded as ‘light intervention’ methods in
that they do not coerce warring factions. By contrast, this thesis regards the methods that
‘push-and-pull’ the opposing factions, before and during the negotiations, as ‘heavy
intervention’ tactics. These heavy intervention tactics have two dimensions: economy and
security.

On the other hand, the intervention methods have been categorised into three types according
to their forms: process control includes the interventions that aim at encouraging warring
factions to negotiate by eliminating procedural barriers for talks; content control refers to the
third-parties’ proposals or suggestions on the topics under negotiation; and motivation control
indicates the intervention methods that convince national factions to talk to each other by
applying incentives or coercion. Finally, the arguments in previous studies on the contribution
of the impartiality and strength of interveners to successful third-party intervention were
summarised.

Based on these definitions, theories, and typologies, Chapter 3 conceptualises the research
framework and methodologies. After a brief overview of the analytical framework, it presents
the key questions and core variables that affect the actors’ decisions. It also presents the main
research methodologies used in this thesis, and in addition to the theoretical background that
this thesis relies upon, it reveals the specific research methods used and practical information
about the fieldwork.
Chapter 3

Research Framework and Methodology

INTRODUCTION

In order to obtain the evidence that enables this research to answer its key questions, establishing the right research design is essential. This chapter describes three components of the research design: the research framework of this thesis, its methodology, and practical issues related to the field research.

First, it sets out the research framework of this thesis. Since the purpose of this thesis is to determine the most effective means for promoting successful peace negotiation by tracking the changes in the interplay between the negotiating actors, both the description and explanation of actors’ behaviour are pursued. Since this research intends to demonstrate the dynamics of interaction between actors, verifying when and how the actors’ strategies changed is therefore a crucial goal. In order to more clearly observe these changes, this thesis proposes the types of strategic moves that the actors may make. When an actor changes his type of strategic move, this thesis regards the actor as having transformed its strategy (rather than every strategic move indicating a transformation in the actor’s strategy).

Demonstrating the reasons behind the changed strategies is also a principal goal, and, therefore, a number of variables that affect the actors’ decisions are proposed. Since this thesis aims to analyse the reasons why actors changed their strategies by looking at the mutual interaction between the actors, the strategic moves of the counterparts are included as an important variable. In addition, this chapter proposes some of the moves that actors can be anticipated to make depending on the combination of the variables.
Second, this chapter introduces and discusses the major methodological components adopted in this thesis. Overall, this research is an actor-oriented, qualitative, and comparative study; by comparing and contrasting the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, this thesis seeks to reveal the patterns and features of the actors’ behaviour. The assumptions and principles of two contradictory theories – game theory and bounded awareness – provide the bedrock for the analysis. While game theory informs the construction of the basic framework for analysing ‘interplay,’ bounded awareness ideas supplement or replace some of the assumptions of game theory that do not reflect the reality of peace negotiation.

Additionally, this qualitative study undertakes field research in order to investigate and confirm the issues related to peace negotiation. Since civil conflicts and peace negotiations, the two topics of this research, are politically sensitive, assuring the validity of the information obtained, protecting the confidentiality of research subjects, and avoiding bias are particularly important. Hence, this chapter also describes a number of practical methods that were used to achieve the research goals.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first section discusses a number of issues related to the research framework of this thesis. This section begins by describing the primary analytical framework. It also discusses the core questions that this research focuses on. After this, the variables affecting the behaviour of external interveners and national factions are discussed. Finally, justification of the case selection, the main issues to be dealt with in the case studies, and the focus of the arguments are presented.

The second section presents the various methodological ideas and practical methods that this research employs. After introducing the methodological grounds on which this thesis is based, this section presents and justifies the research methods and theories used in this research. In addition, it discusses the cases chosen for comparison and contrast, the focus of the
arguments, the topics under consideration, and the means of data collection. Finally, this section also discusses practical issues related to the implementation of the field research.

**RESEARCH FRAMEWORK**

The first section of this chapter sets out the main research framework and a number of analytical components. After providing an overview of the framework and the key research questions, it discusses how this research understands the ‘interaction moves’. In addition, the variables that differentiate the actors’ strategic moves are presented. It also justifies the case selection and explains the focus of the arguments.

**Overview of the Main Analytical Focuses**

The central aim of this research is to examine the following question: ‘what does the interplay between national factions and external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?’ In order to investigate this question in more systematic ways, three subordinate questions are raised: (1) What strategies do national and external actors use to achieve their goals? (2) Which intervening methods are more effective? (3) What are the major perceptual obstacles that prevent effective third-party intervention?

To answer these questions, this thesis adopts the following analytical components. First, regarding the analytical framework of this research, the key word is ‘interplay’. This thesis analyses the interplay between negotiating parties to discover a means for achieving

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25 As explained in Chapter 2, this thesis defines interplay as ‘the actors’ exchange of intentional behaviours’ in peace negotiations.
successful peace negotiation. More specifically, it considers three aspects of interplay: the process of interaction between actors, the background reasons for the changes in actors’ interacting behaviour, and the outcomes of the interplay.

The first analytical focus of this thesis is tracking the negotiation processes. As Figure 3.1 shows, this thesis views a peace negotiation as a process of strategic move exchanges by negotiating actors. In terms of the case studies, it also observes how the negotiating actors’ attitudes towards the core negotiation issues changed in Cambodia and El Salvador and how the changes affected their counterparts’ negotiating strategies. As regards the external
interveners’ moves, this research takes account of their peace proposals and response rules, including diplomatic, economic, and military incentives and threats. As for the national factions’ moves, their responses to the suggested proposals include rejection, transformation of the proposal, counter proposal, and consent (details are discussed below).

Moreover, this thesis investigates the factors that cause the changes in the actors’ behaviour. Once a particular actor modifies its attitudes towards a core negotiation issue, the motives and background factors for the changes will be examined. In order to do this, a number of variables that affect the actors’ moves are proposed below. Finally, it also examines the outcomes of the negotiation and their effects on the negotiating parties. For evaluating the interplay, this research considers both the final peace agreements and the implementation of the peace accords.

Second, although the analysis relies on game theory to describe the interaction between the actors, this study also considers the perceptual issues that affect the actors’ decisions (for details, see the methodology section presented below). In order to conceptualise the interplay on the basis of game theory, this thesis assumes a number of variables determine the strategies of the actors. For instance, it is assumed that their fundamental goals, the domestic resources that they control, and the reaction functions of external interveners are critical factors in determining the behaviour of national factions. In terms of external interveners, this type of negotiation is asymmetric in that the interveners are rarely affected by the threats or promises of national factions. Thus, this thesis regards the external interveners’ main goals as the only variable affecting their behaviour.

Third, in terms of the level of analysis, this research focuses on the interplay between the core

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26 Here, the definition of ‘response rule’ and ‘reaction function’ follows Dixit & Skeath (1999) (see Chapter 2).
leaderships of the national factions and the representatives of the external interveners (Level 4 in Figure 3.2). Although it is in the negotiations between national factions where the most important bargains are struck in a civil war peace process, the role of third-party interveners in peace processes has become very important since the end of the Cold War (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). In some civil war negotiations in this period, including those in Cambodia and El Salvador, external third parties have played key-roles in changing national factions’ attitudes towards the core issues under negotiation (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999: 6-7; Song, 1997: 59-76). Hence, studying the interplay between national factions and external interveners can reveal many important factors that affect the effectiveness of peace negotiations.

Figure 3.2. The Level of Analysis

Fourth, the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador are selected as the research cases. While a diverse range of issues were discussed in the peace negotiations in the two countries,
this thesis focuses on demilitarisation and the establishment of transitional authorities.

Although the two cases share many similarities as regards the characteristics of the conflicts and the methods employed by the actors during the negotiation, the dynamics of the interplay between the national factions and the international interveners exhibit strikingly dissimilar patterns.

Through the use of this analytical framework, it is expected that this research will reveal the negotiating actors’ patterns of behaviour and some of the critical perceptual factors that led to changes in their behaviour, such as their ethnocentric cultural values and lack of communication. As its central argument, this thesis highlights the importance of actors’ mutual understanding of their fundamental goals.

**Interplay Moves**

Observing the interplay, or the actors’ exchanges of strategic moves, is a core part of this research. It is therefore necessary to clarify the moves that this research looks at. As presented in Chapter 2, this thesis defines the interplay in peace negotiation as the actors’ exchange of intentional moves. Based on this definition, this research focuses on the following three aspects. First, it considers the external interveners’ coordination of negotiation procedures, submission of peace proposals, and set of response rules. Second, the national factions’ various responses to the proposals of the external actors are discussed. Finally, this thesis tracks the changes in the actors’ moves and thus reveals the patterns of interplay between the national factions and the international interveners.
The Strategic Moves of External Interveners

In order to understand the various methods employed by the third-party interveners in their intervention moves, this thesis reviewed the conventional discussions on the criteria for categorising methods of intervention in Chapter 2 and proposed two categorisations: form and strength. This thesis adopts these two criteria as the main analytic tools for examining the changes in the third-parties’ intervention strategies in the following chapters.

First, in the case studies, this thesis employs the three forms of third-party contribution proposed by Sheppard: process control, content control, and motivational control (1983 & 1984, cited in Lewicki et al, 1992: 231). To reiterate, process control refers to the intervention methods that reduce the procedural barriers in talks between national factions by providing good offices, transferring information, conveying national factions’ messages to their counterparts, and the like. Content control concerns helping warring factions reach agreements more easily via third parties making proposals on core negotiating issues. Motivational control is the material or non-material incentives and pressure used to convince or compel national factions to become more committed to ending their wars by making compromises with their counterparts (for details of the three forms, see Chapter 2).

Second, although categorising the methods based on the forms of intervention is useful for tracking the change in an external third party’s intervening moves, in order to achieve a clearer analysis, it is also necessary to distinguish the methods according to the strength of the intervention: light intervention and heavy intervention. In fact, although an intervener may use methods that occur within the same form of intervention category, the impact of one method may be significantly different from another. For instance, the influence that diplomatic incentives might have on a national faction would be very different from that of a military threat.
This categorisation is useful in understanding what types of methods the different intervening actors prefer to use. Although third parties tend to mix different types of intervention methods in most peace processes, the case studies show that the different types of interveners tend to have varied but specific preferences in the methods used. More specifically, whereas (relatively) impartial third parties rely mostly on process control, content control, and light methods, the external interveners that advocate particular national factions are likely to use a wider range of methods.

These categories will be used to examine the relationship between the types of intervening methods used and the outcomes of the negotiation. By examining the national factions’ negotiation attitudes after the changes in the external actors’ intervention methods, the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 will investigate which methods are more useful in promoting progress in peace negotiations.

*National Factions*

The negotiation between national and international actors in civil war is an asymmetric interplay. Because external actors are third parties whose interests are not critically affected by national factions, and since they normally have greater resources to use than national factions, in most cases, the response rules of national factions are unlikely to influence external actors unduly. Hence, although national factions use various types of proposals, responses to the suggested proposals, and response rules, this thesis excludes the response rules of national factions from being regarded as an important strategic move.

As explained in Chapter 2, most previous studies on the strategies of warring actors have focused on symmetrical warfare between states founded on realist ideas. Thus, very few ideas on the strategic moves of the national factions in civil wars have been forwarded. Although
there are some exceptions that have investigated the multiple roles of national leaderships
(Gormley-Heenan, 2007), most of the few studies that have addressed national factions’
actions have typically regarded them as limited to simple reactionary moves, such as their
acceptance or refusal of the suggested proposals (Walter, 2002: 32; Regan, 2000: 72-9).

Thus, the conceptualisation of national factions’ responses in this section is based on the case
studies of Cambodia and El Salvador rather than on a review of previous studies. Although
the detailed behaviour of the actors varies, national factions’ responses to external third-
parties’ intervention can be divided into five general categories: (1) rejection (ignorance), (2)
delaying the procedure, (3) devious consent, (4) conditional consent, and (5) full acceptance.

First, rejection (ignorance) of the third-parties’ suggestions is the most extreme expression of
the national factions’ unhappiness or disinterest. Factions usually take this type of action
when they are sufficiently confident that they are in control of or prevailing in the civil
conflict. Second, delaying the procedure and devious consent occur when national actors are
unable to resist the suggestions openly even though they do not wish to consent to them.
Third, full acceptance and conditional consent are cooperative positions taken by national
factions, although the level of cooperation in the two actions is dissimilar.

Based on these attitudes toward negotiation, this thesis posits five types of actors: initiator,
follower, spoiler (inside, outside), and loner. The initiator is the actor who eagerly and
strongly supports the progress of the negotiation. It should be noted, however, that the
initiator does not necessarily have to initiate the first phase of a negotiation. If an actor takes
the lead in a negotiation and brings about a consensus, this thesis will consider this actor an
initiator. The follower is a player who wishes for the success of the negotiation but does not
have sufficient resources to take the lead. When a negotiation takes place, followers normally
choose one of two options: they follow the lead of the initiator and consent to his decisions,
or they form alliances with each other to strengthen their voice. The inside spoiler and the outside spoiler essentially follow Stedman’s definitions, as these actors ‘spoil’ the peace processes and harm neighbours from inside or outside the negotiation table (Stedman, 2003: 105). Finally, the loner is the actor who strongly opposes the direction that the negotiations take but is neglected by other actors because of their lack of resources. In this case, other actors ignore loners’ opinions, and they have only a nominal position in the negotiations.

Change of Moves

Interplay is a chain of actions and reactions, or a chain of moves in game theory terms. Such moves are not unthinking actions but the result of actors’ strategic analyses. Hence, when players change their strategies, it is necessary to understand what factors make them do so. However, judging whether an actor’s strategies have changed is not a simple matter.

In negotiation, actors’ strategic changes are expressed in various ways. Sometimes many moves represent one strategic calculation, and one move may embody multiple intentions. Although not a civil war issue, the frequent changes in North Korea’s position with regard to its nuclear ambitions is a good example. From 1990 to the present, the Kim Jong-il regime has changed its attitude towards the abandonment of nuclear weapons numerous times. Nevertheless, such frequent reverses in position do not reflect a change in its strategy or fundamental attitude but are part of its consistent strategy of ‘retaining nuclear technology.’

Therefore, as a criterion for determining the actors’ change of moves, this thesis views an actor as having changed its moves only when it has added another type of move or has changed its behaviour from one type to another (in the typology presented above). For instance, although the UN issued a series of proposals in 1990 containing different procedural ideas intended to convince the two Salvadoran national factions to negotiate, this thesis
regards the series of proposals as parts of the same behaviour pattern (procedural control). However, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)’s move from its low-profile cooperative stance towards the UN P-5’s Framework Document to postponing acceptance of the document and renegotiating the issue with other Cambodian factions is regarded as an obvious change of strategic move (devious consent → dragging procedure).

**Variables for National Factions’ Actions**

What, then, are the variables that determine the decisions of the actors? The following two sections discuss the factors that lie behind the change in actors’ attitudes towards core negotiation issues. First of all, this section deals with the variables that determine national factions' strategies. Since they have to deal with other national factions, external interveners, and their own constituencies, distinguishing the factors that decisively influence their behaviour towards external interveners is difficult. Nevertheless, conventional studies generally agree that the impact of the following three variables is critical: their fundamental goals, the domestic resources under the control of the national faction, and the response rules of external interveners (Walter, 2002; Regan, 2000; Zartman, 2002) (see Figure 3.3).

![Figure 3.3. Variables Determining National Factions’ Strategies](image)
Goals

One of the biggest factors that affects the behaviour of national factions is their fundamental goals. Unlike many previous studies, which argue that negotiation is about compromising one’s goals, this thesis assumes that actors are unlikely to make concessions on their fundamental goals in peace negotiations. Thus, this thesis argues that verifying the true goals of each national faction and reflecting them in the peace proposal is crucial for negotiators.

Traditional discourses assume that the peace process is an effort to achieve agreements by convincing national actors to sacrifice some of their goals or by creating new common ground. For example, Bercovitch defines mediation as ‘a process of conflict management […] to change […] perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law’ (Bercovitch, 1997:130). Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin have a similar viewpoint, saying ‘[a] bargainer must choose among three basic strategies for moving toward agreement; conceding unilaterally, standing firm and employing pressure tactics (competition) or collaborating with the other party in search of a mutually acceptable solution (coordination)’ (Lewicki, Weiss & Lewin, 1992: 223).

However, in many cases, national leaderships do not negotiate with the intention of achieving peace through compromising their goals but rather with the aim of seeking better opportunities to achieve them. Especially in chronic wars, leaderships do not tend to change their fundamental positions. The goals established in the initial phase of conflicts are re-selected and transformed during the conflicts, but the fundamental goals remain unchanged and prominent, and warring factions stubbornly adhere to them.

A cursory examination of twenty-eight peace accords from 1989 to 2004 confirms the rarity of compromise on fundamental issues. Among these cases, the final peace accords (where
more than one accord was reached) in eleven cases achieved the target of initial implementation. However, in Angola, Nicaragua, Somalia, Djibouti, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa, the accords could only be reached after a change in the core members of the leaderships (i.e. the death of a leader or a change of presidents). In addition, in Cambodia and Haiti, the agreements were implemented not through the cooperation of factional leaders but through excluding certain parties from the processes. Thus, only two (Macedonia and Mozambique) of the twenty-eight cases achieved cooperative implementation of peace accords through national leaders compromising on their fundamental goals. Therefore, this thesis maintains that actors’ fundamental goals are rarely compromised.

In civil war analyses, however, identification of the ‘real’ goals of a particular faction is not an easy task. Obviously, not all claims made by the factions are ‘central’ to their aims. While rhetorical or strategic demands are proclaimed overtly, the fundamental aims that are the foremost reasons for deadlock in the negotiation processes are likely to be hidden. In this sense, Leigh distinguishes ‘aspirations’ from ‘reservations’ (2006: 29). Since the actor who focuses on aspiration achieves more in negotiation than the player focusing on reservation (Galinsky et al., 2002: 1132), many negotiators’ initial proposals contain many aspirations. Moreover, even the parties that have the same fundamental targets are likely to express them in different ways. For example, among actors who wish to have control of their countries, some (particularly opposition parties) demand a share in government, whereas others (such as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional: FMLN) in El Salvador) simply demand a secure opportunity to participate in the

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27 Angola, Haiti, Djibouti, Macedonia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and South Africa.

28 In fact, when a pragmatic faction replaces a leadership, the likeliness of an attitude change increases (Rupesinghe, 1998: 140).

29 One example is the dispute between Egypt and Israel over Sinai. Although both parties claimed the occupation of the region as a fundamental goal, it turned out that ‘Egypt’s main interest [was] in national territorial integrity and Israel’s main interest [was] in security’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 18; Burton, 1990: 44).
political process (Wallensteen, 2997: 136).

In considering reservation, this thesis takes into consideration political survival, which is believed to be a critical goal of national factions. Moreover, two major negotiation issues directly related to reservation will be discussed in the following chapters: the establishment of an interim authority and demilitarisation.

Domestic Resources under the Control of National Factions

‘Domestic resources’ are another crucial variable in national factions’ strategies. After consideration of the peace proposals, national leaderships establish their positions and related strategies based on the resources under their control. In this thesis, domestic resources represent the material and non-material resources that are under the control of national factions and that enable the factions to keep undertaking military operations. Even though material resources such as food sources and military forces are critical, psychological resources such as internal integrity, popularity among constituencies, esteem, and identity are also essential factors (Anderson, 1999: 37-9).

Traditionally, many studies have insisted that conflicts tend to last longer and peace processes tend to be less successful when warring factions have good access to valuable resources (Fearon, 2004: 275-302; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 799-801). Empirical research supporting this argument has shown that warring factions in many chronic conflicts possess stable natural resources. The following are major examples: UNITA in Angola (diamonds), the RUF in Sierra Leone (diamonds), the Liberian government (timber), the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (timber), the Myanmar government (timber), FARC in Colombia (cocaine), the Rwandan government (coltan), the Sudanese government (oil), and the Taliban in Afghanistan (opium). If factions rely heavily on foreign support, however, this means that
they may be vulnerable to the third parties’ demands.

Nevertheless, owing to the complexity of the concept of what constitutes resources and how to measure them, precise quantitative and qualitative assessment of resources is very difficult. In fact, ‘resources come in many shapes and sizes, destroying the ability to aggregate them in a single measure’ (Zartman & Rubin, 2002: 10). Resources are not only material (economic and military factors) but also non-material (psychological and cultural factors). Moreover, the importance of a certain resource can vary according to the type of conflict. In fact, there are various non-material factors that can have a critical effect on the progress of a conflict and negotiations, such as the morality of the factions, individual negotiation skills, networks with external states, domestic frictions, education, and the like. Azar suggests that there are four types of non-material resources in conflicts: communal contents, human needs, governance and the state’s roles, and international linkages (1990: 11).

Considering these issues, this thesis limits the scope of the analysis to a few critical resources. First, as regards non-material resources, popular support from constituencies is included. Popular support is a critical factor that limits the scope of factions’ military operations, and in particular, guerrilla warfare (Mack, 1975: 176-7). There are various factors that influence popularity. For instance, some national factions acquire people’s support by demonstrating their ability to provide for people’s security and well-being. Moreover, there are other factions that enjoy high popularity simply because the leaders are royal family members.

Second, as regards material resources, movable property and natural resources (economically) and the number of soldiers and weapons (militarily) are regarded as the primary resources. As small-scale guerrilla warfare was the common military strategy (rather

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30 For instance, in comparing greed-based conflicts with grievance-based ones, the former is much more dependent on economic and military assets. Moreover, some types of wars, such as guerrilla wars, demand much fewer resources.
than nationwide campaigns) in Cambodia and El Salvador, the number of troops and light weapons was more important in both cases than heavy weapons such as tanks or missiles.

These two resources will be specifically mentioned in the overview of the actors in Chapter 4. However, this thesis does not pay too much attention to the actual number or quantity of resources. In fact, there are many cases in which government factions have possessed much greater military force but have failed to defend the capital city from guerrilla rebels (McClintock, 1998: 201; Mack, 1975). Thus, instead of numerical calculation, this thesis considers whether a faction has sufficient resources to continue the war. It therefore considers ‘sufficient resources’ to continue the war in the following way: if a war is chronic, the resources and powers of each faction are relatively balanced. ‘Balance’ does not mean that all factions’ resources are equal but rather that a certain faction does not have ‘dominant’ resources with which to defeat the other. This assumption is widely accepted in the academic community (Curle, 1971: 5-6).

*Response Rules set by External Interveners*

The response rules of external interveners are regarded as an important variable in influencing domestic actors’ behaviour. In particular, when national factions do not have substantial domestic resources, threats and promises from external interveners are important factors. All the forms of intervening methods presented above are also adopted as response rules in this thesis.

The three factors above – goals, domestic resources, and the response rules of external interveners – are deemed to be the three major variables affecting national factions’ strategic moves. This thesis assumes that the combination of these variables critically influence the national factions’ decisions and changes in their strategic moves.
The table below shows their expected behaviour according to the combined effect of the three variables. An actors’ behaviour is determined by three questions: ‘Is the suggested proposal critically harmful to its fundamental goals?’; ‘Does it have enough resources to continue the war?’; ‘Are the threats and promises from external actors compelling?’ By reflecting on the patterns of the national factions’ moves during the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, Chapter 7 examines the relevance of these assumptions in the two cases.

Table 3.1. The Typology of National Factions’ Choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Pretend Consent (Initiator)</td>
<td>Pretend Consent (Follower)</td>
<td>Consent (Initiator)</td>
<td>Consent (Follower)</td>
<td>Pretend Consent (Initiator)</td>
<td>Pretend Consent (Follower)</td>
<td>Refuse (Inside or Outside Spoiler)</td>
<td>Refuse (Loner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Pretend Consent</td>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>Pretend Consent</td>
<td>Refuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Actors</td>
<td>(Initiator)</td>
<td>(Follower)</td>
<td>(Initiator)</td>
<td>(Follower)</td>
<td>(In Spoiler)</td>
<td>(Outside Spoiler)</td>
<td>(Follower)</td>
<td>(Loner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Highly Probable</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Probable But Slow</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Highly Unlikely</td>
<td>Highly Unlikely</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>No Progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Proposal Contents:  
P – the suggested proposal is favourable or neutral to the faction’s fundamental goals  
N – the proposal is contrary to pursuance of the faction’s fundamental goals

2. Resource:  
P – resources of the faction are relatively abundant  
N – resources of the faction are relatively few

3. Response Rules:  
P – response rules from external interveners are forceful  
N – response rules from external interveners are not forceful

*The Variable for Interveners’ Strategies: Goals*

This section discusses the major variables that affect external interveners’ strategic moves. As mentioned above, the negotiation between national factions and international interveners is an asymmetric interplay. The response rules from national factions are not likely to affect
external actors’ behaviour. Thus, interveners’ strategies are generally determined solely by their goals. This thesis pays more attention to interveners’ moves when the goals of interveners are inconsistent with those of warring factions. This difference in goals prevents negotiators from developing mutual understanding and from reflecting the fundamental interests of their counterparts in their proposals.

When they become involved in a peace negotiation, all actors pursue their own interests. External interveners also make efforts to reflect their interests in the negotiation processes in which they engage. However, it is frequently observed that external interveners’ goals are inconsistent with those of national factions. For instance, the importance of selfish interests is greater for regional interveners since they tend to have more direct and stronger interests in the conflicts. Hence, in many cases, regional interveners are likely to be partial supporters of a certain national faction and to have goals consistent with that faction.

On the international level, global powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union were particularly enthusiastic in expanding or securing their hegemony by manipulating civil war peace negotiations during the Cold War period (Haas, 1991: 72-86, 160-7; Munck, 1993: 77-8). Smaller international interveners such as France, Spain, and Japan, which once colonised the countries in conflict as imperial powers, tried (or have tried since) to maintain their influence over the country or the region in which the negotiations were (or are) taking place (Haas, 1991: 178; Whitfield, 2007: 64-7). Moreover, in many cases, international interveners had (and have) only limited understanding of national factions’ perceptions precisely because of their position as a third party. The way that one actor perceives a certain issue when it is a third party will be very different from the way it sees the issue when it is a direct party.

In sum, this thesis assumes that the only question that external interveners ask when deciding upon and executing their strategic moves is whether their strategies are effective in changing
the attitude of national factions.

Case Selection and Issues to Be Studied

This section justifies the case selection and discusses the issues that will be analysed in the following chapters. First, it explains why Cambodia and El Salvador were selected as the case studies. In short, this is because the two cases demonstrate significantly different outcomes in peace implementation even though they share striking similarities in the characteristics of their civil wars and peace processes. Second, with regard to the topics to be studied, demilitarisation and the establishment of a transitional authority are at the centre of the analysis because both issues were highly contentious and caused serious delays and renegotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Third, this research includes the first phase of implementation as a part of the negotiation process since many negotiators attempted to renegotiate on controversial issues during this period, and the success of the negotiations can be assessed by considering not only the signing of the peace agreements but also their implementation.

Case Selection: Cambodia and El Salvador

Cambodia and El Salvador are chosen as case studies because they demonstrate significantly different peace negotiation processes and outcomes despite similarities in the characteristics of the conflicts and the forms of third-party intervention. Between 1989-2006, twenty-eight civil war cases ended in peace agreements (Wallensteen, 2007: 124). Table 3.2 displays a number of cases that share analogous critical factors related to the characteristics of conflicts and intervention conditions.
Table 3.2. Eleven Peace Negotiation Cases in the Post-Cold War Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th>Duration Of War</th>
<th>Colonial History</th>
<th>Interveners</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua (1990)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (1991)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this table, the components shown at the top are some of the ‘determinants of conflict and negotiation’ commonly suggested by previous studies. As to the characteristics of conflicts, the possibility of successful negotiation is believed to vary according to whether a conflict is related to ethnicity, whether the conflict involves central government (vertical violence), and whether the war is chronic (Carment, Rowlands, & James, 1998; Brown, 1993; Burton, 1987). In addition, colonial history is also frequently cited as a factor that determines the circumstances of a negotiation, particularly national factions’ perceptions of negotiation and the role of external interveners (Cooper & Berdal, 1993; Baumhoegger, 1984). Regarding intervention, the participation of the UN and one or more global powers is also an important variable (Sambanis, 2000; Carment & Schnabel, 2000; Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992; Andemichael, 1972). In comparison to the last two cases, the first nine civil wars share similar characteristics even though they are separated geographically.
Nevertheless, the result of the negotiations in the cases varied, thus failing to meet the expectation of conventional studies. While the negotiations in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Namibia are regarded as successes, those in Angola, Somalia, and Liberia are viewed as failures. The peace processes in Cambodia and Mozambique achieved only partial success. This suggests, therefore, that the factors that are proposed by conventional studies to be determiners of the success or failure of a negotiation process do not provide a universal explanation. It is therefore necessary to identify supplementary factors that contribute to the success or failure of negotiations.

There are a number of new approaches that aim to explain civil war outcomes that appear contradictory to the conventional studies’ arguments, including those approaches aiming to identify omitted factors, analyse the effect of a combination of factors, or refine the criteria for judging the success of implementation (van der Stoel, 1999: 61). This thesis aims to identify the negotiation process itself as one of the hidden factors contributing to the outcome of a negotiation. It selects the Cambodian and Salvadoran peace negotiations as the targets for case study.

As shown in the table above, the two cases share significant similarities in terms of the characteristics of their wars and interventions: neither war was due to ethnic cleavage;

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31 Evaluating the success of the negotiation is complicated by the complexity of the concept but also because different interpretations of what constitutes ‘success’ are dependent on different people’s perceptions. This thesis uses the four issues conceptualised by Simpson (1996) and Pushkina (2002) to evaluate the ‘success’ of a negotiation process: (a) the fighting came to an end, (b) demobilisation of forces was completed, (c) key provisions of the accords provided for a restructuring of the armed forces and police, and (d) the holding of free and fair elections occurred. In addition to the previous studies on the success and failure of peace implementation, the evaluation was supplemented by the information from one conflict database, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (www.kida.re.kr).

Although it might still be deemed controversial to state that the implementation processes in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were completely successful, it is evident that the four cases exhibit more complete implementation of the three projects stated above. In Cambodia and Mozambique, demilitarisation and the implementation of an electoral process were unsuccessful. In the remaining cases, national factions broke their ceasefires in the first phase of the implementation (Hampson, 1996; Peceny & Stanley, 2001; Pasára, 2001; Walter, 1999; Alden & Simpson, 1993).
vertical violence between central governments and resistance groups had dominated the countries for a long time; both countries had experienced a colonial period that transformed their indigenous cultures; and during the negotiation period, external interveners such as the United Nations and the United States played important roles (Solomon, 2000; Whitfield, 2009; Munck & Kumar, 1993: 169).

In addition to the similarities presented above, there are others that the two cases share. First, the two wars were affected by similar international circumstances. The Cambodian civil war ran from 1979 to 1991, and the Salvadoran conflict began in early 1981 and ended in early 1993. The international bipolar system during the Cold War played an important role as an external factor, and the collapse of this structure in the late 1980s had a critical effect on the peace processes in both countries (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 34; Thakur & Thayer, 1992: 203; Montgomery, 1992: 216; Munck & Kumar, 1995: 171). Although regional political contexts meant that the specific effects of the collapse of the Cold War system on the two regions were different, the changed international structure nevertheless prompted a fundamental transformation of the inter-state relationships in both Central America and Southeast Asia as the two global powers withdrew their security umbrellas and new possibilities to resolve military confrontations via peaceful means consequently emerged (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 195).

Second, the United Nations played an active role in the settlement of the two conflicts. With the support of the United States and the cooperation of the USSR, the UN could make a great contribution to the peace processes as a mediator and negotiation facilitator (Hampson, 1996: 136). Although the specific roles and forms of the UN’s intervention in resolving the two conflicts were quite dissimilar, the organisation played an ‘instrumental role in brokering both countries’ respective peace accords’ (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 195).
Nevertheless, the implementation processes in the two cases were very different. Despite some delays and rescheduling, the implementation of the Salvadoran peace process progressed relatively smoothly. The major projects, including demilitarisation, holding an election, and national reconciliation processes, were eventually completed without encountering decisive problems (Hampson, 1996: 142-66). The Cambodian implementation process, however, was much more difficult. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, Khmer Rouge) flatly refused to cooperate with UN supervision of the demilitarisation process and to compete in the general election, while the State of Cambodia (SOC, the successor of the PRK) openly rejected the election result (Ashley, 1998: 24). With this in mind, this thesis will treat the Cambodian peace negotiations as an example of a partially successful peace process, while the El Salvadoran case will be regarded as an example of a relatively successful multilateral peacekeeping operation. A comparison of the two cases will identify the factors that differentiated the processes and outcomes of the peace negotiations in each case.

*Issues to Be Studied: Demilitarisation and the Transitional Authority*

Of the issues that were discussed during the two negotiation processes, which are to be analysed in this research? The formation of the transitional authority and demilitarisation have been selected because they are directly related to a national factions’ fundamental goal – political survival. Since the outcome of negotiations on these issues could change the national factions’ future destiny, disagreement on these topics frequently causes stalemates in peace negotiations (Hampson, 1996).

First, the issue of an interim authority concerns the establishment of a provisional national controlling power that manages and supervises all the processes between a ceasefire and a general election. However, national actors are extremely sensitive to the composition and the
power of the authority for the following reasons. Above all, the composition of the interim authority may determine who will win the forthcoming election. In contrast to Western ideas, which assume that an interim government will take the form of a short-term technical management governing body, many warring factions fear that it may strongly influence the result of their future election(s) (Lee, 2011: 15). Since a transitional authority deals with many important tasks, including electoral processes, reconciliation issues, and refugee repatriation, it may have a significant influence on the election results. Thus, many peace negotiations between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, including Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique, became deadlocked and were delayed because of strong disagreements between the actors on this issue (KIDA, 2007: no pagination). It is also very important in controlling internal solidarity. Since the interim authority frequently is a symbol of the negotiation result (Lee, 2011: 15), factional leaders are keen to ensure that their practical and symbolic interests are reflected in the formation of the interim authority.

In the peace processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, the structures of the transitional authorities were ostensibly similar. In both cases, a UN body as an external supervisor (UNTAC and ONUSAL), a national reconciliation council that allowed most warring factions’ participation (SNC and COPAZ), and the de facto government (the PRK/SOC and the Cristiani government) comprised the core governmental authorities during the post-conflict recovery period (for details of the organisations and national factions, see Chapters 4 and 7). Nevertheless, despite their similar compositions, the ways in which the parties cooperated within the authorities and effectiveness of their cooperation were significantly different. This thesis argues that some of the reasons for the differences are imbedded in the negotiation processes themselves.

Second, demilitarisation issues, including the demilitarisation of soldiers, closing of bases
and other measures, are often the most controversial parts of negotiations because demilitarisation is a process of removing a fundamental part of the means by which actors’ conduct activities (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005: 176; Berdal, 1996: 5). Moreover, the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) is considered one of the most crucial issues in the post-conflict reconstruction period in that the progress of DDR determines the security conditions in the post-conflict society and ultimately affects the success of a peace process (Barakat & Özerdem, 2005: 228-35).

For the factions in a military conflict, demilitarisation removes the most important resources that they use to carry out their campaigns. Once they lose their military capability, they find it difficult to return to violent conflict even if they experience unexpected attacks. Hence, each faction tends to be very reluctant to agree to a specific proposal on demilitarisation unless they are confident about the following two issues: (1) the fairness of demilitarisation targets and processes and (2) clear verification of the implementation (Spear, 2002: 141-82).

In addition to the security dilemma presented above, for the Cambodian factions, demilitarisation was also closely related to their future political power. While the PRK, which wanted to preserve its power, insisted on a proportional reduction in the military forces of all factions, the other resistance groups, which had much smaller armies, argued that all factions should possess the same number of soldiers. As all knew the intentions behind the proposals, neither side was receptive to demilitarisation proposals in the early phase of the negotiations.

For the FMLN in El Salvador, the complete demilitarisation of the Salvadoran government’s army was the fundamental goal of its revolutionary movement. As the army’s brutal human rights abuses were one of the biggest motivations for many Salvadorans to join the rebel movement, the FMLN could not abandon this demand. Nevertheless, purging the army was an extremely difficult issue for President Cristiani because this did not simply involve
reducing the size of the military but rather eliminating the power group that had controlled the country for decades (Palmer, 2006: 9; Negroponte, 2005: 164; Juhn, 1998: 126-7) (see Chapter 4 and 6 for details).

There are other critical issues that are worthy of attention, such as repatriation of refugees, uncovering the truth about war crimes, redistribution of natural resources, human rights issues, and economic and social justice. For instance, while land reform issues were extremely controversial in El Salvador, human rights issues related to the Khmer Rouge’s former administration severely hampered the negotiation process in Cambodia. However, whereas the transitional authority and demilitarisation were critical in both cases, other issues assumed greater importance in one case than the other. Thus, the dynamics of the negotiators’ interplay is better explained by the two issues that assumed critical importance in both cases.

The Time Period under Consideration

With regard to the time frame, the author contends that it is necessary to examine the two peace negotiations from a wider perspective by accepting that a peace negotiation is a part of the overall peace process. There are two justifications for the author’s position. First, in many peace negotiations, the distinction between negotiation and other procedures is not clear. In other words, the peace processes were comprehensive amalgamations of various procedures, including pre-negotiation confidence building, peace initiating, peace negotiation, and peace implementation. Moreover, in many cases, these procedures do not occur in a specific order. Some may occur simultaneously, whereas others sometimes take place repeatedly.

For example, in the Colombian conflict, peace negotiation and post-war reconstruction were taking place while violence continued. In addition, during the Northern Ireland negotiations phase, the British Government undertook symbolic confidence building measures such as
police reform, and during the talks with the political leaders of Northern Ireland, it began the transfer of long-term Republican prisoners in English prisons to Ireland (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000: 75).

Although the Cambodian and Salvadoran cases do not provide such striking examples, the national factions in both cases regarded the implementation period as another phase of negotiation. Therefore, rather than concentrating on fulfilling the expectations of external third parties, they continued to renegotiate the agreements on controversial issues during the implementation phase (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Second, from a more practical viewpoint, it is impossible to evaluate the outcomes of a peace negotiation without considering its implementation process. The production of a peace agreement does not guarantee the success of its implementation (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 180-1). As was shown earlier, although the national factions in Angola and Liberia signed peace agreements, the implementation of these agreements was unsuccessful, and their peace negotiations turned out to be a complete failure.

Hence, although this project focuses on negotiation, both the peace negotiation process and the first phase of the implementation period are included in the scope of this research; or more specifically, the time period between the signing of the peace agreement and the first general election (October 1991 – July 1993 in Cambodia; January 1992 – September 1993 in El Salvador) is the period under analysis.

The Focus of the Arguments

There are four purposes of academic research: exploring, describing, explaining, and
predicting (Blaikie, 2010: 76). Among these, this thesis pays particular attention to the following two aspects: (1) describing two distinctive patterns of interplay between the actors, and (2) explaining these patterns by including the actors’ perceptions as a factor that influences their strategic moves.

First, the two case study chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) aim to show the significantly different interaction between the national factions and different external interveners. An impartial intervener’s attitude towards and influence over national factions is significantly different from those of an advocate state. In terms of neutrality, for instance, whereas an impartial third party does not really care who comes to power in the post-conflict political arena, a national faction’s advocate normally has a strong interest in the shape of the future political landscape. In addition, an advocate state normally has much greater influence on and over the national actor that it supports than an impartial intervener has. Since the advocate has provided material and diplomatic support to the national faction, it possesses many response rules as incentives and pressures. Impartial third parties need to devise new strategies to influence domestic actors because they tend not to have strong pre-existing connections with them. However, the impact of these new response rules are generally weaker than those of advocate states because the incentives and pressures are not critical to the national faction’s survival and are largely ineffective without the cooperation of other advocate states in the regions (Cortright, 1997: 3-11) (for detailed discussions on this, see Chapter 7).

Hence, there are many aspects of the interplay between a domestic actor and an impartial third party that are different from the interaction between a national faction and its advocate. In order to demonstrate this, Chapter 5 describes the national factions’ relationship with the impartial third-party interveners (the PRK-US in Cambodia and the FMLN-UN in El Salvador), whereas Chapter 6 details their interplay with their advocate states (PDK-China in
Cambodia and the Cristiani government-US in El Salvador). Moreover, each chapter highlights some of the similarities in the interplay between the actors in Cambodia and El Salvador that are distinct from the interplay in the other chapter.

Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are few, if not no, purely impartial third parties. From substantial security or economic interests to cultural biases, various factors prevent external interveners from being completely impartial (Carnevale & Arad, 1996: 39-57). Hence, this thesis regards an external actor as an impartial intervener when the actor pursues a negotiated conflict resolution between warring factions with little intention of supporting gains for particular domestic actors. In this sense, ‘impartial’ in this thesis is a relative term.\footnote{The author recognises that representing the US as an impartial intervener is controversial. Until the mid-phase of the civil war, the US behaved more like an advocate of the CGDK rather than an impartial mediator. The country had provided (official) economic and (unofficial) military aid to the KPNLF since the outbreak of the civil war and to FUNCINPEC from the mid-1980s (Son Soubert & Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview). However, when the Cambodian peace negotiation began, the US assumed a relatively impartial mediating role. In this period, the US was implementing its ‘exit from Indochina’ strategy and did not have strong interests in the civil war. The US was trying to seek diplomatic solutions behind the scenes by placing France and Indonesia (in the early phase) and the UN (in the late phase) at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to secure a comprehensive resolution of the Cambodian conflict (Solomon, 2000: 22, 72).}

Second, these chapters analyse the role that perceptions play in influencing actors’ strategic moves. As discussed in Chapter 2, perceptual issues frequently determine the extent of an actor’s understanding of the issues related to the negotiation and strongly influence the effectiveness of the negotiation. Although there are various perceptual factors, this thesis pays most attention to the issue of ‘bounded awareness’, which means a phenomenon that actors are not able to react or make an informed decision about given negotiation issues either
through lack of understanding or inaccurate information (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 2; Simon, 1983: 34).

In particular, this thesis pays attention to the role of actors’ perceptions and suggests two factors that cause such perceptions: negotiating actors’ ethnocentric cultural values and their internal ability to gain and assess information.

First, Chapter 5 discusses the limitations of the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values. Specifically, the chapter argues that the international interveners’ perception, informed by their ethnocentric Western culture, hampered the effectiveness of their strategic moves. However, the impact of the interveners’ Western culture on the negotiation process in Cambodia was significantly different from its impact in El Salvador. Whereas the interveners’ restricted understanding of negotiation, violence, and peace (constrained as it was by their liberal understanding of these concepts) prevented them from developing a thorough understanding of the intentions and strategies of the Cambodian national factions, the UN’s same ethnocentric culture did not adversely affect the peace negotiation with the FMLN in El Salvador (See Chapter 5 for details).

Second, Chapter 6 focuses on the domestic organisations’ limited ability to communicate with external actors and interpret other actors’ moves. The chapter demonstrates how the lack of a systematic structure of communication and discussion prevented the PDK in Cambodia from assessing the negotiation situation properly, whereas the Cristiani government had better communication systems (See Chapter 6 for details). These differences were one of the reasons for the divergent processes and outcomes of the two peace negotiations.
METHODOLOGICAL COMPONENTS

This section explains the main methodologies and research techniques used in this research. Firstly, it describes and justifies the main methodological features of this research – an actor-oriented, qualitative, and comparative study. Secondly, the main theories used in the analysis, game theory and bounded awareness, are presented. Thirdly, on a more practical level, the details of how the author collected the data for this research are described. Finally, potential biases that may be caused by these methodologies and triangulation are discussed.

Research Methodologies: Qualitative Research

With the aim of seeking the ways in which successful peace negotiation is accomplished, this research considers the ‘interplay between external interveners and national factions.’ At the most fundamental level, the analysis in this research is based on the qualitative research paradigm. According to Bryman, the qualitative approach is ‘an approach to the study of the social world which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of those being studied’ (1996: 46). As the strength of qualitative research lies in ‘gaining a rich and complex understanding of a specific social context or phenomenon’ and in investigating the ‘behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals’ (Mack et al, 2005: 2), it is an appropriate approach for this study, which analyses the interplay between negotiators and the reasons behind it. From among the various qualitative methods, this research applies an actor-oriented, comparative, and case study method.
Actor Oriented Research

One of the factors that distinguishes this research from other studies is that it seeks ‘the factors that contribute to successful peace negotiation’ by focusing on ‘human behaviour and perception’ rather than social or international structure or material constraints. However, this research does not neglect the importance of material and structural conditions and factors. Rather, it intends to reveal and examine factors that have not received enough attention from the academic community (see Introduction). This thesis regards people’s perception as one of the critical factors that determines the nature and the outcome of the negotiation process. If one actor strongly believes that a particular issue is harmful to their political survival, it has a strong impact on the negotiation process, regardless of whether it is true or not.

In this sense, as the fundamental basis of the research, this actor-oriented research method is based on constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. As regards an ontological approach to the nature of ‘being’ or ‘existence,’ there are two main positions: objectivism and constructivism. Whereas objectivism claims that ‘social phenomena and their meaning have an existence that is independent or separate from actors’ (Bryman, 2001: 17), constructivism insists that reality ‘arises from the interactive process and its temporal, cultural, and structural contexts’ (Charmaz, 2000: 524). The ontological position that this thesis takes is that the outcome of a peace negotiation is the result of the interplay between actors rather than entirely a result of material or structural forces. In terms of epistemology, which concerns ‘what’ knowledge to learn and ‘how’ to do it, there are two traditions: interpretivism, and positivism. While interpretivists maintain that ‘the human sciences aim to understand human action’, positivists believe that ‘the purpose of any science […] is to offer causal explanations of social, behavioral, and physical phenomena’ (Schwandt, 2000: 191). This thesis assumes that knowledge about peace negotiation can be more effectively obtained when contextual
issues such as the actors’ cultural backgrounds, unexpected or accidental events, and the like are considered.

Comparative Case Study

This research applies a comparative case study to achieve its goal. In fact, comparison and case study are not exclusively qualitative research methods. However, in contrast to the large number of cases that quantitative comparative studies use, this study examines a wide range of dimensions of a small number of cases to explain negotiation processes by highlighting the diverse factors that constitute a broader social context of negotiation.

This thesis focuses on the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Field research was conducted as its findings are used as the core means for clarifying the factors that affect peace negotiation. Fundamentally, field research investigates ‘social settings and grasps multiple perspectives in natural social settings … [getting] inside the meaning system of members and then goes back to an outside or research viewpoint’ (Neuman, 2002: 368). The primary method used for the fieldwork was elite interview (for details, see below).

Case studies are intended to be comparative in that they ‘examine patterns of similarities and differences across cases and try to come to terms with their diversity’ (Ragin, 1994: 107 cited in Neuman, 2006: 437). If case studies are useful for gaining an in-depth understanding of the diverse aspects of social events, comparative study is helpful in distinguishing the common characteristics of a case from its unique traits. The specific type of comparison used here is case study comparative research, which ‘[compares] particular societies or cultural units and [does] not make broad generalizations’ (Kohn, 1987 cited in Neuman, 2006: 438). In other words, after observing the behaviour of the actors and analysing the notable factors that influence such behaviour in the two cases, the common features found in both cases are
considered to be the targets of generalisation.

**Theories**

The research framework of this thesis is based on two contradictory theories: game theory and the concept of bounded awareness. First, in the analysis of the actors’ strategic moves, the concepts of game theory provide the bedrock for the framework. This thesis views the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador as negotiation games between actors who aim to achieve their goals. Second, it is assumed that the actors in negotiation determine their next moves by calculating their benefits and costs. Third, since peace negotiation is considered an extreme form of adversarial negotiation, most of the difficulties encountered in adversarial games are expected to emerge in peace negotiation (see Chapter 2 for the details of adversarial games). Finally, as for the strategy of actors, basic assumptions related to response rules\(^{33}\) and commitments\(^{34}\) are widely accepted in this thesis.

However, although these assumptions and theories are very useful in explaining actors’ behavioural characteristics and the dynamics of interplay between actors, game theory has a number of weaknesses. One weakness is the ‘rationality’ assumption, which is a reflection of Western values. Game theory assumes that all actors are rational and behave according to a rational appraisal of the benefits and costs of the behaviour. However, the extent of the costs and benefits are largely subject to actors’ psychological values. In light of this, while this thesis assumes that warring factions make decisions according to their costs and benefits, it also takes into account the actors’ cultural and psychological estimation of the extent of the  

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\(^{33}\) As explained in Chapter 1, a ‘response rule’ is a promised response (incentive or punishment) from negotiation counterparts when a negotiator makes a move.

\(^{34}\) Commitment is a non-response move that is made by negotiators or mediators to increase the possibility of negotiation success.
costs and benefits. It is the actors’ interpretation, their perception, of the extent of the costs and benefits that may lead to the same intervention strategy having different effects on the behaviour of actors.

In addition, the fundamental assumption of perfect information is contrary to the reality of many peace negotiations. The actors in most peace negotiations suffer from a lack of information on their counterparts’ strategies and their domestic and the international environment. A number of factors prevent them from obtaining good information. First, the warring factions in civil wars normally have very limited means of communication. Thus, they do not transmit information or messages within their internal organisations, with their negotiation counterparts, nor with external actors (Norman, 2009). Second, the national factions’ mutual distrust makes the information that is transmitted between actors less reliable. A national faction tends to be very reluctant to release useful information about itself. Likewise, they tend to doubt the accuracy of the information that their ‘enemies’ divulge (Norman, 2009; Lu Lay Srêng, 2009: Author’s Interview). Thus, most actors in peace negotiations have limited or distorted information, and the perfect information assumption is not applicable to this type of negotiation. In fact, actors tend to base their decisions on what they believe is right or accurate.

Thus, it is useful to include the cultural and perceptual concerns of actors that are critical to the progress of a negotiation. Many recent research projects have paid great attention to the emotional and perceptual aspects of negotiation, foreign policy, and conflict resolution (Long & Brecke, 2003; Womack 2003; Kimmel 1994). In short, as an analytical background, this thesis uses game theory on the bases of diverse human perceptions. More specifically, this thesis rejects the two previously mentioned assumptions of game theory – the rationality of actors and perfection information – and uses the concept of bounded awareness in their place.
As discussed in Chapter 2, since many factors may prevent actors from seeing accessible and perceivable information, they normally have only bounded awareness of the reality during the negotiation (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 2). Moreover, in order to provide evidence to support the rejection of the two assumptions, this thesis pays particular attention to two sources of bounded awareness: the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values and their limited capacity for communication.

First, ethnocentric cultures predetermine actors’ perception and limit the scope of their negotiation strategies. It is widely accepted that the ethnocentric cultures of third-party interveners play significant, if not critical, roles in shaping and determining the outcome of a civil war peace process (Jervis, 1976: 44; Ross, 2007: 42; Bazerman et al., 2000 cited in Thompson, 2006: 9; Brett, 2001: 8; Sama, 2007: 206; Ikeda & Tehranian, 2004). These cultural differences, resulting from divergent historical events, have a strong impact on the negotiation process. In particular, negotiators from differing cultural backgrounds are likely to have dissimilar definitions and accounts of the conflicts and negotiations. Moreover, they also tend to approach the core issues of the negotiation from different perspectives. However, the effects of such cultural differences are normally hidden, and they are not well recognised as a key factor by the actors in the negotiation. Thus, in many cases, the negotiators exchange their own strategies on the basis of a very limited understanding of those of their counterparts.

In particular, since interveners from Western societies share standardised concepts about peace and negotiation, this limits the interveners’ scope for contribution. As regards this attitude towards peace, Western societies have a standardised model – liberal peace – which consists of ‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development’ (Richmond, 2006: 292). In this ‘experiment that involves transplanting western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-
shattered states’ (Paris, 1997: 56), ‘there is a bias towards using the state, bureaucracy and formal political processes (e.g. elections and parties) as core lenses for the interrogation of a proclivity towards conflict or passivity’ (Mac Ginty, 2008: 146). As to perceptions of negotiation, three distinct components of culture are prominent: individualism, egalitarianism, and low context communication (Gellman, 2007: 25-6) (for details, see Chapter 2).

Second, this thesis also looks at the negotiating parties’ internal ability to communicate with other actors and to interpret the resultant information accurately as a factor influencing their bounded awareness. Since negotiating actors’ abilities vary too much to be able to make generalisations, few conventional studies have attempted to provide theoretical perspectives on this factor. However, a number of studies have addressed some issues related to the bounded awareness caused by group behaviour, such as the social validation of information (Stasser and Stewart, 1992), the influence of group familiarity (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, and Neale, 1996), and people’s reluctance to give ‘information contrary to the prevailing group opinion’ (Hartwick, Sheppard, & Davis, 1982, cited in Lightle, Kagle, & Arkes, 2008: 27).

In particular, the Acquiring a Company game and the Attribution game are relevant to the case studies. The Acquiring a Company game demonstrates people’s tendency to ‘focus much more on shared information than on unique or unshared information’ (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 13, Stasser and Stewart, 1992; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, and Neale, 1996). Thus, when Acquiring a Company players have a major influence on a particular group’s decision makers, it is difficult for them to gain the benefits of group discussion and information sharing. In many cases, the negotiators in these circumstances would ignore or simplify the strategic calculation of other actors or the rules of the game (negotiation) (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 20-1). Moreover, how much impact would a certain group will receive by
the Acquiring a Company game when it make a decision, largely depends on the organisation’s internal information gathering structure and decision-making system. The more international structures for information sharing are unorganised, the more difficult free and mutual communication is between internal groups, and the stronger is the influence of this tendency. These aspects of bounded awareness are closely analysed in Chapter 6.

The negotiating actor’s internal ability to obtain accurate information and to assess the negotiating environment is a main topic of Chapter 7. By comparing the PDK of Cambodia and the Cristiani government in El Salvador, the chapter will demonstrate how such internal structures and communication systems are important for successful negotiations.

**Data Collection: Document Analysis and Elite Interview**

The data collection methods used in this study consisted of two phases. First, as a preliminary process, examination of a range of written materials was conducted to discover the ‘facts’ about negotiation processes. It was necessary to study as many available materials as possible in order to gain a good understanding of negotiation. In addition, the materials are excellent points of reference against which to confirm the findings of the interviews.

Details relating to the behaviour and motivation of national factions were investigated by analysing various sources. This research considered secondary sources such as UN reports and academic papers documenting the negotiations; the biographies of related figures including Prince Sihanouk, Pol Pot (the leader of the PDK), and Khieu Samphan (a core leader of the PDK) were included as part of this research. Moreover, an analysis of primary sources such as documents released by local governments and the speeches of the factional leaders was made. The strategies of interveners are relatively well documented in materials
such as news articles, UN reports, research reports from various institutes, and the published memoirs of the individuals who were involved in the negotiations.

However, the materials on the methods of negotiation employed by national factions are still rare. Even where official documents issued by the factions and personal memoirs are available, the information in the materials is not reliable enough for the purposes of this study. Therefore, fieldwork to collect first-hand data needed to be conducted. Hence, the fieldwork in Cambodia was carried out between June and September 2009 in order to discover how the then factional leaders perceived various issues related to the peace process.\(^{35}\) The data collection mainly took the form of elite interviews. The interview is ‘one of the most common and powerful ways’ to obtain data in social science (Fontana & Frey, 2000: 645), and it is a particularly important research method for this research because a core part of this thesis is concerned with identifying the reasons for specific behaviours: for example, ‘how the actors in peace negotiation perceived crucial issues’, and ‘why did they employ certain strategic moves?’

Specifically, the fieldwork primarily involved conducting elite interviews with former factional leaders who had participated in the Cambodian peace negotiations because first-hand accounts of the negotiation process were adjudged most likely to reveal the factors that proved crucial in promoting and inhibiting the progress of the negotiations. By questioning people who were directly involved in the peace negotiations, the interviews were likely to unearth what this research is designed to discover. More specifically, four factional leaders who participated in the Cambodian peace negotiations, four former PDK leaders who conducted military operations, and six people who were involved in the post-conflict

\(^{35}\) More specifically, preliminary research was conducted in South Korea and Japan in June 2009. In this research, a number of interviews with scholars who study the Cambodian case were carried out in both countries. The field research in Cambodia was conducted from July to September 2009.
recovery projects were interviewed (the list of interviewees is at the end of the bibliography).

Semi-structured interviews were selected as the preferred interview format so as to combine the strengths of structured and unstructured interviews. On the one hand, while the structured interview is useful for addressing all the issues with which a piece of research is concerned, it usually provides ‘little room for the interviewer to improvise or exercise independent judgment’ (Fontana & Frey, 2000: 649). On the other, the unstructured interview is highly flexible but tends to be ‘persistently slippery, unstable, and ambiguous from person to person, from situation to situation, from time to time’ (Schurich, 1997: 62 cited in Fontana & Frey, 2000: 654). Although a number of issues were central to this research, and the interviews were structured so that needed these could be addressed by the interview respondents, it was also necessary to be ready to uncover new (or hidden) factors that were relevant to the research. Hence, the semi-structured interview was selected as the method for the fieldwork.

The first half of each interview centred on the following key themes:

- The central methods of communication between the actors.
- The major concerns of the actors in negotiation.
- The key events for negotiators, and the impact of the events on their negotiation strategies.
- The priorities of the national factions.
- The perception of the neutrality and the power of external interveners (for details of the interview questions, see appendix IV).

In order to find and select interviewees, a snowball sampling method was used. This is a common method for identifying and approaching potential targets for interview when the targets are ‘inaccessible or hard to find’ (Trochim, 2006: no pagination). Since the negotiation
processes in civil war cases are still considered sensitive topics in many societies, access to interview subjects is largely restricted. In addition, many of the people who were central to the decision making in the Cambodian peace negotiations are no longer in public life or easily available for interview. With its flexibility, snowball sampling provided the most effective way to overcome these obstacles.

After the data was collected, transcribed, and saved as electronic files, two copies of the electronic data (recordings and typed scripts of the interviews) were produced. To protect the data from potential risk of damage, one copy was kept by the author, while the other was stored at the office of an NGO in Phnom Penh that the author had worked with. The written consents obtained from the interviewees were put into an envelope and sealed.

The interview data was collated and analysed by the author after completing the field research. Any claims made by the interviewees about facts or events were rechecked against secondary published sources and, when necessary, the author consulted with the scholars that he interviewed during the preliminary research.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that although this thesis examines two cases, Cambodia and El Salvador, the field research was conducted only in Cambodia. It is clear that fieldwork in El Salvador is necessary for this research to be a comprehensive and systematic study. However, because of the limited time and funding given to a PhD student, the analysis on the Salvadoran case in this thesis had to rely on published materials. Compared to the Cambodian case, more research on the Salvadoran case has been published in English, and this helped the author to find evidence for the arguments on this thesis without conducting field research. Moreover, e-mail exchanges with some of the scholars who have studied the civil war in El
Salvador supplemented this weakness. This limitation will be revisited in the conclusion of this thesis.

**Ethical Issues**

This section demonstrates how this study avoided potential ethical problems. Although the subject of the study is not a contemporary civil conflict, many contemporary issues in Cambodia are directly and indirectly related to its civil war and peace negotiations. For instance, the former PDK (Khmer Rouge) leaders, who were once accepted as high-ranking government officials, are currently detained and awaiting the sentence of the Special Tribunal for Cambodia. Moreover, mentioning Hun Sen’s collaboration with Vietnam during the civil war is considered taboo among many politicians. Thus, conducting interviews on the Cambodian peace negotiations may raise politically or ethically sensitive issues for many Cambodian people.

Although there are various ethical considerations in social science, the author was most concerned about the following ethical issues: informed consent, no deception, protection of subjects, and accuracy of information.

First, it is essential to obtain the informed consent of the research subjects. Research participants have ‘the right to be informed about the nature and outcomes of experiments in which they are involved’ (Christians, 2000: 138). Therefore, the research participants, including the interview subjects or interpreters, were provided with written information that

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36 Although some of the scholars’ names appear in the acknowledgements, the author once again wishes to express his deep appreciation for their kind and generous comments and advice.

37 This categorisation follows that proposed by Christians (2000: 133-55). After setting a detailed field research plan based on the following ethical considerations, the author sought and gained ethical approval from the University Ethics Committee.
explained the purpose of the research, their rights as a research subject, and details of the interviews (the written information used during the fieldwork is attached to Appendix V). In addition, each research subject received his/her own interview questions in advance. In most cases, they agreed with the research conditions by signing written forms.

Nevertheless, from time to time, the attempts to gain written consent failed. As Norman explains, trust is emotional, and people are frequently sceptical of formal paperwork and explanations about research purposes in high-context societies like Cambodia (Norman, 2009: 73). The occasions on which the author failed to get written consent from national elites were mainly due to this reason. Less prominent leaders or local people often had different reasons. Because of Cambodia’s tragic past, a number of people were afraid that signing documents might cause them future trouble with their current government or their former fellow combatants. For example, some former leaders of the PDK (Khmer Rouge) only agreed verbally to the research conditions.

Second, research subjects were not deceived in any way. Fundamentally, there was no need to deceive them since most of the research questions concerned ‘past’ history and do not directly relate to current Cambodian political issues. Hence, in most cases, research subjects were happy to share their experiences. In addition, since the trust between the researcher and the subjects was crucial to this research, deception would have been a highly risky strategy to adopt.

Third, protecting the identity of the research subjects is important when investigating

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38 For instance, when he received the form of written consent, the Son Soubert’s secretary remarked, ‘Do you really need to get this signed? I don’t recommend you to do so, because His Excellency will feel that he is not trusted by you. He knows why you are here, and he knows what he will say.’ In his interview, Ieng Mouly said, ‘I can see that you are a trustworthy student. That’s it. We Cambodians consider trust important.’

39 Quite a number of local village leaders flatly refused to answer any questions in case I asked them to fill out the written consent form.
politically sensitive issues. The study of peace negotiation processes is defined as a sensitive research topic because it ‘potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/or the researched the collection, holding, and/or dissemination of research data’ (Lee & Renzetti, 1990: 512). Thus, the field research on this topic might expose the people involved to a potential threat (Lee, 1993: 4). Above all, protecting the identity of the research subject is essential in societies experiencing violent conflict or where the issues under investigation might expose the interview subjects to potential risk (Armakolas, 2001: 169; Paluck, 2009: 44). Moreover, assuring the confidentiality of the interviewee is also helpful in guaranteeing a more honest response from the interview subjects (Norman, 2009: 81).

Therefore, the research subjects were asked in advance whether they agreed to exposure of their identity. If they did not consent, their identities were not released, and descriptions that might reveal clues to the identity of interviewees (e.g. where the interview took place, the person who introduced the interviewee) were minimised. Furthermore, even in cases where the subjects agreed to provide their names, they were asked again whether their identities could be exposed when their answers to questions might be considered politically sensitive.

Fourth, accuracy of information is also ethically important since ‘fabrications, fraudulent materials, omissions, and contrivances are both nonscientific and unethical’ (Christians, 2000: 139). Of these, the effect of omissions on the analysis was the most significant issue in this study. Since certain information has had to be omitted from the description and analysis, there is a possibility that this leaves the information open to misinterpretation. However, since this study considers the historical and cultural context of the negotiation important, it

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40 Hence, the names of some of the former PDK (Khmer Rouge) leaders and former PRK soldiers are not given in the interview list (see interview list at the end of bibliography). However, contrary to the author’s expectation, many interviewees agreed to the disclosure of their identity.
attempts to reveal the details of the factors related to actors’ behaviour in the negotiations as much as possible (for these factors, see Chapter 5 and 6).

Research Biases and Triangulation

This section describes potential biases that this thesis might possess and the efforts taken to reduce this risk. Research bias is one of the most important factors impairing the accuracy of studies. Since this research adopts an interview technique that promotes ‘active interactions between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, contextually based results’ (Fontana & Frey, 2000: 646), a range of subjective biases may result. Hence, it is important to recognise the biases that this research is likely to encounter and to try to improve the accuracy of the analysis through triangulation. According to Katzer, Cook & Crouch, there are two kinds of biases: ‘biases due to the researcher’ and biases ‘due to the behaviour of subjects’ (1998: 56).

First, in terms of the biases due to the researcher, the researcher’s expectation is a major problem. When information related to the research is ambiguous, ‘the expected or desired outcome of the study may distort the judgment of the researcher’ (Katzer, Cook, & Crouch, 1998: 57). For example, when the researcher receives an answer from an interviewee that he/she considers vague and then finds clear evidence to the contrary, he/she may be inclined to interpret the interviewee’s answer so that it more closely corresponds to the ‘evidence’ (especially when the evidence is in keeping with his/her expectations). In such instances, the risk of these biases is high.

To prevent this potential problem, the author interviewed at least two people from each

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41 Triangulation is ‘a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation’ (Stake, 2000: 443-4).
national faction with the same set of questions so as to determine the accuracy of their answers. In order to check the accuracy of the analysis, the researcher met with a number of expert scholars in Cambodian issues. By visiting these scholars in the UK, Cambodia, Japan, and Singapore, the author confirmed the relevance of the information obtained during the fieldwork and gained a broader perspective from which to view the peace negotiations (the list of the interviewees is presented at the end of the bibliography).

Second, another important potential bias due to the researcher is bias as a result of cultural difference. Since the author does not have a Cambodian cultural background, there was a high possibility that the responses of the interview subjects would not be interpreted correctly. In particular, when the interview subjects recounted the impact of individuals’ behaviour on the negotiations, this risk was high. Without a thorough understanding of the Cambodian people’s traditions and culture, recognising the hidden connotations of the interviewees’ behaviour and language was impossible.

However, the problems caused by cultural differences were relatively minor during the fieldwork for the following reasons. First, since the factional leaders involved in the negotiation processes had been exposed to Western culture, they normally clearly articulated the meaning of their actions. Moreover, since the author had already been working in Cambodia for approximately eight months, he had developed a reasonably good understanding of how Cambodian people generally behave in negotiations. In cases where the issues related to Cambodian culture, such as the involvement of Buddhist groups in the negotiation process and the emerging importance of the members of the royal family in the Cambodian political arena, the answers given by the interviewees were interpreted after consultation with a number of Cambodian people.

42 Many of them had lived in American or European countries for work or education.
Third, in terms of the biases due to research subjects, an interview frequently reveals only partial aspects of an event because it relies heavily on a person’s subjective opinions, experiences, and memories. Answers based on rumours, invention of stories, denial of facts, evading or avoiding answering questions, and silence are frequently occurring problems. Moreover, people tend to avoid sensitive or threatening topics and instead provide normative responses (Fujii, 2009: 149-60; Ruane, 2005: 155).

In the field research in Cambodia, the problems related to rumours, inventions, and evasions were most frequently encountered. As many former leaders had relied on the reports of their internal informers, they could not confirm whether some controversial events had really occurred. In particular, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army and the human rights abuses of the PDK were the issues on which the factional leaders recounted strikingly different ‘facts.’ Moreover, the interviewees who had worked for the CPP government (the government led by Hun Sen) were very reluctant to answer questions on anything related to the PRK leadership (the military faction led by Hun Sen during the civil war). It was essential, therefore, to screen inaccurate information.

To this end, this thesis confirmed information to be accurate only after the information was corroborated by at least one counterpart who was also involved in the negotiations. In addition, interviews with people from different backgrounds were pursued, and interviewing low-profile negotiating staff as well as policy makers was considered desirable in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the negotiations. When contradictions between the answers were encountered, the answers were re-examined using a third source. In cases where the use of a third source was impossible, the contradictory answers were not used as
In this way, many fabrications and answers founded on rumours were screened. However, if all the interviewees’ answers to a question were different, the author classified the question as unanswered.

Finally, there are problems that are caused by language issues. Since the author is not a fluent local language speaker, it was necessary to use interpreters. However, using interpreters runs the risk of researchers receiving distorted or limited information since interpreters are also a research subject who bring ‘their own assumptions and concerns to the interview and research process’ (Temple & Edwards, 2002: 5). Therefore, it is necessary to perform an ‘exploration of the social location of the interpreter’ in order to guarantee the validity of the research results (Temple & Edwards, 2002: 5).

In most cases, the use of interpreters was not a major issue since most interview subjects were national elites who had participated in international negotiations and could speak fluent English. In these cases, the main role for the interpreters was taking the author to the interview subjects, where the interviews were conducted in English.

However, when interviewing some former PDK (Khmer Rouge) leaders and local survey subjects who could not speak English, the omission or distortion of information due to the interpreter’s own interpretation of answers occurred from time to time. Hence, to minimise this risk, in addition to ensuring that interpreter’s translation was correct, the author recorded all interviews when interviewees agreed to it and double-checked the recorded interviews with other native Cambodians. In these cases, in order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, the first parts of the interviews, which usually dealt with the interviewees’ roles in the civil war and the peace process, were excluded from recording. Moreover, whenever

\[43\] In particular, many answers from the former PDK leaders had these problems.

\[44\] For instance, the complete cessation of Chinese military assistance to the PDK in late 1989 and the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese army could not be confirmed in this research.
issues that the author considered politically sensitive were encountered, he double-checked with the interviewees that they agreed to the recording of the conversation.

Nevertheless, even in the interviews conducted in English, there remained the risk of misinterpretation. Most notably, some terms and words have quite different meanings in the Cambodian society. For instance, ‘conflict resolution (kar dors sray)’ and ‘conflict settlement / negotiation for settlement (chor cha)’ refer to quite different processes for Cambodians. Moreover, although there are various terms that differentiate the classes and roles of Buddhist monks (who served a role as social mediators), it was impossible to translate them into English accurately because there are no equivalent concepts or terms in English. Hence, such confusions were clarified and rechecked by asking other native Cambodians after the interviews had been conducted.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has described the analytical framework and methodological elements utilised within this research. First, with regard to the main analytical design, this chapter has addressed the following topics. It began by articulating the elements of interplay in order to lay the foundation for the key question: What does the interplay between national factions and external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?

In terms of the interaction of strategic moves, international interveners’ use three main types of moves to promote successful peace intervention: process control, content control, and motivation control. In order to reflect the different intervention patterns according to the types of third parties, this chapter further categorised the external actors’ moves as light
intervention and heavy intervention. In addition, this chapter generalised the national factions’ responses towards the third-parties’ efforts into five categories: rejection, dragging out the procedure, devious consent, conditional consent, and full acceptance. It was also indicated that the change of moves in this thesis refers to a transformation in the types of behaviour of actors rather than a simple change of action.

Moreover, in order to verify the reasons why a change in strategic moves occurs, the variables that determine the strategic moves were proposed. In the case of interveners, their goals are assumed to be the sole variable. However, the variables of national factions are more complex, and include goals, domestic resources, and response rules set by external interveners.

The focus of the case studies was also presented in this section. The peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador are selected as the case studies because the outcomes of their negotiations were significantly different despite striking similarities in the characteristics of the conflicts and peacekeeping interventions. With regard to the issues to be analysed, the case studies pay particular attention to the negotiation processes on demilitarisation and the formation of the transitional authority. Additionally, in analysing the cases and the issues, this research has two focuses: the different patterns of interplay (in terms of description) and the role of perception in peace negotiations (in terms of explanation).

The second half of this chapter focused on the methodological grounds of this research. This research is a qualitative study that primarily uses actor-oriented, comparative, and case study methods. Specifically, elite interviews are used for collecting information. In addition to the survey of written materials for the preliminary research, this study investigated how the people involved in peace negotiation perceived various negotiation issues by conducting a series of semi-structured interviews with former leaders of the national warring factions in
the Cambodian civil conflict.

Regarding background theories, this chapter brought the assumptions and ideas of game theory to the centre of the research framework. In particular, game theory’s ideas on the strategic moves of actors are adopted in the analysis. However, this thesis also makes efforts to reflect the importance of perceptual issues such as local values, traditions, and rituals.

This study’s data collection relies on document analysis and elite interview. The author conducted field research in Cambodia in 2009 for the purpose of interviewing Cambodians who were directly or indirectly involved in the Cambodian conflicts and peace processes and some expert scholars who have studied the issues related to the Cambodian peace negotiations. During the field research, the author endeavoured to meet ethical concerns by gaining explicit consent from the research subjects on the purpose and methods of the research and by ensuring that no deceptive measures were used.

Finally, research biases are another concern for this research. To reduce potential biases due to the researcher, efforts were made to consult both with experts on Cambodian issues and native Cambodians. Moreover, as for the biases that may be caused by research subjects, this study regards certain information as a fact only when it can be corroborated by their counterparts or other sources.

The following three chapters examine the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador by applying the research elements that this chapter has set out. Chapter 4 provides background information on the conflicts and peace negotiations in the two countries, the national and external actors who participated in the negotiations, and the international and domestic factors that instigated the peace negotiations. Based on this background to the cases, Chapters 5 and 6 compare and contrast the interplay between the actors. While Chapter 5
looks at the interplay between the national factions and the impartial interveners (the PRK and the US in Cambodia, and the FMLN and the UN in El Salvador), Chapter 6 studies the interaction between the national factions and their advocate states (the PDK and China in Cambodia, and the Cristiani government and the US in El Salvador).
Chapter 4

Case Study Overview

INTRODUCTION

This chapter intends to provide introductory information that is necessary for the core analyses in the following chapters. Specifically, it considers three topics: a brief history of the conflicts and negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, the characteristics of the main negotiating actors, and the chief factors that promoted negotiation between the national factions. This chapter consists of two separate sections that describe the two cases, with each section comprising three subsections that discuss the issues presented above.

First, each section begins with a brief history of the conflict and peace process. For accurate analysis, it is important to review the historical circumstances of both cases before observing the interplay between the actors in the negotiation processes with micro-level frameworks. The causes of the conflict, the development of the war, the major stalemates in the peace negotiation processes, and the efforts of interveners to bring about successful peace talks are briefly discussed in this subsection.

Second, a description of the actors that were involved in the negotiation follows. In particular, this section focuses on some of the elements that affected the actors’ decision making during their negotiations. For instance, the national factions’ main negotiators, their material and non-material resources, and their fundamental aims are described. As discussed in Chapter 4, resources and fundamental aims are critical factors that determine actors’ strategic moves in peace negotiation.

Additionally, this section also outlines the external interveners’ attitudes to the conflicts, their
fundamental goals in the negotiation, and their strategies to achieve them. Discussion on interveners’ fundamental aims is necessary since this thesis regards the aims as a decisive factor in determining their strategic moves. Moreover, the strategies that were applied by these interveners were response rules, another critical constraint of national factions’ behaviour. Although there were a large number of interveners that played direct or indirect roles in the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, this chapter only deals with the regional interveners and international mediators that are at the centre of the analyses in the following chapters.

Finally, this chapter presents the long-term and short-term factors that convinced national factions to negotiate with their opponents. This section deals with the long-term factors and short-term factors separately; in addition, international and domestic factors are described separately. Understanding these factors is important because they contributed to the peace negotiations as either incentives to or pressures on the national factions. However, this chapter has another reason to pay close attention to these factors; these domestic and international factors had a range of effects on the national factions. For instance, the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s provided a mixture of opportunities and threats to the national factions in Cambodia and El Salvador, and the factions had to develop different negotiation strategies in response to these factors.

CAMBODIA

Brief History of the Conflict and Negotiation

The Cambodian civil war was a military conflict between four national leaderships that had governed the country rather than a war mobilised by the citizens. After gaining its
independence from France in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk ruled the Kingdom of Cambodia as a prince (de facto king), prime minister, and head of state until 1970. Then with support from the US, General Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk and established the Khmer Republic. The Republic was overthrown by a socialist military group called the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)\(^{45}\) in 1975. During its four years of rule, the PDK launched radical socialist projects such as a collective agricultural system, depopulation of cities, and prohibition of markets, which caused the deaths of approximately 1.5 million people.\(^{46}\) A group of PDK officers who were opposed to the direction the party had taken escaped to Vietnam and formed an anti-PDK socialist movement called the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS) (Chandler, 1998: 15-8).

When the KUFNS, headed by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen with backing from Vietnam, overthrew the PDK regime and established the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in 1979, the Cambodian civil war began. Against the PRK government, three major military movements led by former national leaders emerged, basing themselves near the Thai border. First, although it had been ousted from power, the PDK’s military strength and support from China remained a grave threat to the PRK (Slocomb, 2004: 54). Second, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) was formed by Prince Sihanouk. Although lacking the PDK’s substantial military and financial resources, the king’s perceived legitimacy and his intimate relationship with China made the party an important actor in the resistance movement (Etcheson, 1987: 197-8). Finally, the

\(^{45}\) The group that established Democratic Kampuchea is commonly known as the Khmer Rouge in the West. The term Khmer Rouge (meaning Red Khmer in French) was originally coined by Prince Sihanouk and is commonly used to refer to the faction. However, this thesis uses the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, the name that was officially used by the organisation itself.

\(^{46}\) Although the number of people killed under the DK regime is still disputed, many sources generally agree with an approximation of between 1.5 million and 2 million. For instance, the Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University suggests that 1.7 million died (The CGP, 2010), while Short argues that the number of victims should be estimated at 1.5 million (2005). Kiernan (1993, 2002) and Heder (1999) also agree with a figure of between 1.5 – 1.7 million deaths.
former prime minister, Son Sann, established the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), which pursued the formation of a republican government from 1979. Chiefly supported by and composed of refugees from near Thai border, the KPLNF normally conducted guerrilla operations and received moderate support from the US and ASEAN. The UN’s refusal to recognise the new government was well received by resistance parties and was seen as a sign of tacit UN support (Jones, 2007: 527; Long, 1989: 155). As these organisations began to resist, the PRK government released evidence of the Khmer Rouge’s mass executions of Cambodians. However, despite their different views, rivalries and targets, the three parties formed a coalition named the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 (Sihanouk, 2005: 198-9).

After fierce external combat and turbulent internal struggles, Hun Sen became the new prime minister of the PRK, and peace talks between the government and the CGDK began in 1987 (Osborne, 1994: 254-5; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 38-49). However, despite several formal and informal meetings in Paris and Jakarta, the parties could not reach agreement on the inclusion of the PDK in the forthcoming government and the contours of new political institutions. Compounding this, the PDK’s stubborn refusal to enter into negotiation was proving to be another obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and ongoing combat continued to take a heavy toll of casualties (Haas, 1991: 203-5; Gottesman, 2004: 223-37; Um, 1990: 100-2).

The collapse of the Cold War system opened a new phase of peace talks. With encouragement from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, the State of Cambodia (SOC, the successor of PRK government) showed signs of changes in its posture, and China in particular applied strong pressure on the Khmer Rouge (Lizée, 1999: 60; Haas, 1991: 156-8; Ross, 1991: 1180). The US also applied pressure on the PDK by announcing the withdrawal
of its support for the PDK’s continued possession of its UN seat. In addition, Australia and the UN Security Council provided peace proposals, including ‘Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal’ (November 1989) and the UN P-5’s ‘Framework Document’ (28 August 1990), while ASEAN, France, and Japan convened talks between the national factions (Solomon, 2000: 34; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 70; Richardson, 2009: 149; Lizée, 1999: 66-71). The four factions finally agreed to the UN Security Council’s proposal, and the four parties, the UN Secretary General, and representatives from 19 countries signed the Paris Peace Agreement on 23 October 1991.

In 1992, implementation of the peace agreements, including the repatriation of some 350,000 refugees and demobilisation of the military factions, began. Under the control of the Supreme National Council (SNC), headed by King Sihanouk, and the supervision of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and although the PDK boycotted it and attempted to coerce people in the regions under its control not to participate, a nationwide election was held in May 1993 (Heder, 1999: 277-8; Richardson, 2009: 163; Solomon, 2000: 90). FUNCINPEC was declared the winner of the election, but Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) rejected the result and military conflict resumed (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 167-8). However, King Sihanouk’s mediation and pressure from the international community led to FUNCINPEC and the CPP establishing a coalition government, with Prince Rannaridh (son of Sihanouk) and Hun Sen becoming the first and second prime ministers, respectively (Ashley, 1998: 24). After three years of peace, however, Hun Sen staged a coup, executing prominent FUNCINPEC ministers, and became the sole prime minister in 1997 (Roberts, 2001: 155).
Figure 4.1. Map of Cambodia

National Factions

People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) / State of Cambodia (SOC)

Brief History - On 2 December 1978, the KNUFNS was formed by former PDK commanders and Hanoi-trained revolutionaries that included Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, and Chea Sim. After the Vietnamese army ousted the PDK from Phnom Penh on 10 January 1979, the KNUFNS staked its claim to authority and became the PRK, appointing Heng Samrin as the head of state. Although Foreign Minister Hun Sen was the youngest of the PRK’s top leaders, his
political leadership and political skills resulted in him becoming prime minister in 1985 (Slocomb, 2004: 195). Initially, the government operated under strong Vietnamese influence. Most bureaucratic issues were managed by people trained in Vietnam, and Vietnamese soldiers controlled the major cities. The PRK’s failure to generate sufficient popular loyalty to and support for the party resulted in the PRK’s 30,000 troops suffering from poor morale. With the lack of capable civil workers and the regime’s low popularity, the PRK achieved only limited success in building an effective state structure, leaving a large proportion of rural areas outside its control until the peace negotiation began in the mid-1980s (Slocomb, 2004: 245-7; Gottesman, 2004: 53).

Primary Negotiator - Although critical diplomatic issues were discussed by the PRK’s central committee under the supervision of Vietnam, international negotiation was managed chiefly by Prime Minister Hun Sen (Slocomb, 2004: 64-5). However, the leaders of the PRK/SOC (especially Chea Sim) periodically challenged Hun Sen’s authority to negotiate on the behalf of the PRK (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview).

Resources - Regarding its military resources, the joint army of the PRK and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had some 180,000 soldiers. 47 Although the number of troops decreased dramatically when the PAVN withdrawal took place, the PRK/SOC always had superior military capacity than the CGDK (Turner, 2004: 56).

Economically, it relied heavily on aid from Vietnam and the USSR. Total Soviet economic assistance to Cambodia is estimated to have reached 284 million roubles (equivalent to $ 71 million) for the period between 1979 and 1990 (Country Data, 2008: no pagination). Initial Vietnamese aid was estimated at around $ 60 million annually but this decreased in the

47 The number of PAVN troops had been maintained between 150,000 and 140,000 until 1986, when Vietnam proclaimed the withdrawal of the army (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 32).
middle and late 1980s. Since China and the West refused to have direct economic relations with the regime, the PRK/SOC’s international trade had to be conducted in indirect ways through Vietnam. Thus, the government was very vulnerable to changes in economic support from its two sponsors (Gottesman, 2004: 149).

As for non-material resources, the PRK/SOC was unable to gain much domestic support. Most Cambodians refused to be enlisted as PRK soldiers, and tens of thousands of people moved to the refugee camps along the border with Thailand (Gottesman, 2004: 227; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 15). At first, people were suspicious about the communist PRK because of their disastrous experience under the rule of the PDK. After that, deep-rooted Cambodian nationalism prevented the regime from commanding people’s loyalty. Externally, the PRK/SOC had not been recognised as a legitimate government by the international community. This diplomatic isolation made it difficult for the regime to receive the economic support necessary for them to build and run an efficient state structure (Long, 1989: 155).

*Fundamental Goals* – When the negotiation in Cambodia began in the mid-1980s, the PRK had two fundamental goals: the removal of the PDK and maintaining its superiority in the post-conflict Cambodian political arena. The former goal was set when the KUFNS was established and had been a core principle of its movement. For instance, when it undertook its first military operation in Cambodia, Heng Samrin proclaimed that the PRK should repel the ‘dictatorial’, ‘neo-slavery’, and ‘reactionary’ ‘Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique’ (the Declaration of the KUFNS on 2 December 1979, cited in Slocomb, 2003: 45). The second goal emerged when it became clear that the PRK could not eliminate its opponents militarily. Hence, if it could not stand as the sole legitimate authority, the PRK needed to continue to be a leading political organisation (Turner, 2004: 163). These two goals are reflected in its initial peace proposals, including the Six Point Peace Plan (January 1985).
The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)

Three anti-Vietnamese military movements established a coalition group, the CGDK, in 1981 and proclaimed that they would ‘avoid any clashes among themselves’ (Joint Statement of the Three Khmer Leaders, 4 September, 1981, cited in Sihanouk, 2005, appendix). However, the organisations rarely demonstrated coordinated actions as a unified entity. Therefore, this thesis considers these three groups as independent actors.

(A) The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)

Brief History – The PDK emerged from the Cambodian communist party, which had been formed in 1951 with the support of the Vietnamese communists. During the 1960s and 1970s under the leadership of Pol Pot, the party developed its own unique political ideas that reflected its anti-colonialist stance. After years of war against what it saw as US interference in Cambodia, the PDK overthrew the pro-American Lon Nol regime in 1975 and established Democratic Kampuchea (Kiernan, 2002: 159). Between 1975 and 1979, the PDK implemented radical programmes that resulted in the deaths of some 1.5 million Cambodians. When the PDK lost Phnom Penh on January 7 1979, it regrouped in a region near the Thai border and began to undertake guerrilla operations (Chandler, 1998: 15-8; Kiernan, 2002: 159-312; Heder, 1999: 74).

Primary Negotiators - The delegations from the PDK at the negotiation were led by Khieu Samphan, the faction’s official chief. However, all major issues were discussed and determined by the central committee of the party (Khieu Samphan, 2004: no pagination). Thus, all major decisions were actually made by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary although their retirement had been officially announced in 1985 (Heder, 1999: 73).

Resources – During the 1980s, the PDK enjoyed a relatively stable supply of resources. Its
armed forces constituted the biggest military threat to the PRK. In 1985, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) possessed an estimated 30,000 - 40,000 troops (See Table 4.1). In terms of its economic resources, it exported diamonds and timber to Thailand. In addition, until the end of the 1980s, it received strong military support from China and Thailand and a large amount of economic aid from the U.S. and ASEAN countries (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 17).

Although the party received little popular domestic support, it achieved the support of the people in Pailin (an area near Thai border that possessed rich gem mines, see Battambang province in Figure 4.1) by providing them with more food and supplies than the PRK did. In addition, having achieved victory in the war against the US backed Lon Nol regime through the use of guerrilla warfare, it was very confident in its ability to conduct a long-term war. Diplomatically, the PDK had retained its UN seat until 1982, when it was replaced by the CGDK. Furthermore, within the CGDK, Khieu Samphan played a significant role as the leader of the only de facto military force fighting against the PAVN.

**Fundamental Goals** – The PDK’s goal was returning to power. The party characterised the Cambodian conflict as a war against an external threat and was willing to cooperate with two non-communist resistance groups. However, the PDK believed that the conflict would be a ‘war against other classes’ after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese imperialists and that the PDK would eventually win the war with the support of the “basic people” (poorer people in society) (Ashley, 1992: 42; Heder, 1999: 43-84).

(B) FUNCINPEC

**Brief History** - Immediately after the collapse of the PDK regime, the followers of Prince Sihanouk organised an armed movement called the Movement for the National Liberation of
Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) near Cambodia’s north-western border in 1979. Founded on this organisation, Prince Sihanouk and his followers officially launched FUNCINPEC and its army, the Sihanoukist National Army (ANS), on 21 March 1981 (Sihanouk, 2005: 235). Although the key administrative and military organisations were led by a group of people who had been exiled in Western countries, including Norodom Ranarridh and Lu Lay Sreng, it was Prince Sihanouk’s legitimacy and material support from Western countries that sustained FUNCINPEC (Osborne, 1994: 248-51; Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview).

*Primary Negotiator* - The primary negotiator was Prince Sihanouk himself. As a former king, prime minister, and party leader, Prince Sihanouk had the most autonomy in decision making. Although his son Ranarridh had served as Sihanouk’s authorised spokesman, most of FUNCINPEC’s decisions were made by Prince Sihanouk (Osborne, 1994: 250-7).

*Resources* - From a military viewpoint, FUNCINPEC was the weakest faction. The ANS possessed approximately 7,000 troops (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 32). Moreover, disagreement among its military leaders lowered their military effectiveness. Despite consistent official and unofficial military assistance from Western countries (the US in particular), the ANS rarely mounted successful attacks on the PRK/SOC. Economically, this group relied entirely on relatively abundant aid from Western and regional countries, mainly the United States and China (Um, 1990: 104).

Considering non-material resources, Cambodian citizens’ considerable respect for Sihanouk made FUNCINPEC a leading player in the peace negotiation process. Although he had been deposed 10 years previously, he still enjoyed a level of popular support that the PRK’s propaganda was unable to challenge (Gottesman, 2004: 140; Peang-Meth, 1991: 448-9.) Internationally, he also received strong support from China and assistance from the international community.
**Fundamental Goals** – Although FUNCINPEC’s fundamental goal was resistance against Vietnamese imperialism, its detailed aims were not clearly set out. However, at the heart of the proposals made by Sihanouk were two main objectives: the withdrawal of the PAVN and the establishment of a democratic country under international supervision (Sihanouk, 2005; Brown & Zasloff, 1998). Although never explicitly pursued as an aim, he also assumed that he would be the head of the post-conflict Cambodia.

(C) The KPNLF

**Brief History** - Before the end of the PDK regime, Son Sann, ex-President of the Cambodian National Bank and Prime Minister (1967-68), exiled in France, ran the Association of Overseas Cambodians (AGKE), which organised an anti-PDK movement and attempted to preserve Cambodian traditional culture (Corfield, 1991: 6-7). In October 1979, Son Sann and a number of former senior officials in the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes formed an armed resistance organisation, the KPNLF. Although internally fractured and beset by infighting, the KPNLF soon became a significant military resistance group. As the largest non-communist group, it controlled approximately 160,000 refugees in the camps in Thailand (Country Studies, 2008: no pagination).

**Primary Negotiators** - Although the KPNLF’s main negotiator was Son Sann, his prominence was limited by internal and external obstacles after joining the coalition. Externally, Sihanouk’s high profile and Khieu Samphan’s rigid attitude left little space for him to promote his own initiatives. Internally, many former ministers and generals openly disagreed with him and refused to comply with his decisions (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s interview; Son Soubert, 2009: Author’s interview).

**Resources** - Stable military and economic aid from China and Western countries bolstered the
KPNLF’s military offensives against the PRK and Vietnam. Since it pursued the establishment of a ‘democratic’ country, the faction gained favourable publicity in the West and received substantial humanitarian support from governments and non-governmental organisations (Ieng Mouly, 2009, Author’s Interview). However, although the organisation controlled approximately 15,000 soldiers, the KPNLF’s actual military campaigns were not particularly successful and did not significantly affect the course of the conflict (Brown & Zasloff, 1998, xiii). Furthermore, it achieved only limited success in attaining domestic popularity. Although refugees in Thai camps were largely sympathetic to the organisation, most people inside Cambodian territory were not interested in its activities.

Fundamental Goals – The core leaders of the KPNLF were defectors from the Khmer Republic, which had been ousted by the PDK. Having lost power, assets, and family due to PDK’s victory, the KPNLF set three main goals in 1980: (1) “the liberation of Cambodia from Vietnamese occupation”, (2) the removal of the Khmer Rouge, and (3) the building of a new “independent, free, and sovereign Cambodia” (Corfield, 1991: 21). If the last goal was a vague rhetoric, the first two were specific and concrete goals that were pursued fairly stubbornly during the negotiation process (Ieng Mouly, 2009, Author’s interview).

(D) After the establishment of the CGDK

The CGDK was a loose gathering of three factions that allowed each group to operate with a certain degree of freedom and to maintain autonomy. Although it held periodic ‘inner cabinet’ sessions inside Cambodia to demonstrate its jurisdiction over the territory under its control, the issues raised and discussed in the sessions did not generally concern the means of governing the country. Both FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF had a deep-seated distrust of the PDK. However, there was also keen rivalry between the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.2, the CGDK controlled a number of refugee camps near the border with Thailand. As the war progressed, the CGDK (particularly the PDK) occasionally expanded its influence over areas deeper inside Cambodia. However, unlike the FMLN in El Salvador, the CGDK failed to become a *de facto* government that could claim to govern a significant portion of Cambodian territory (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 26-7).

After the launch of the CGDK, Western countries began to provide a large amount of aid. In the late 1980s, the U.S. alone generally offered more than $20 million annually in non-lethal
aid and $ 5 million in humanitarian aid to the two non-Communist groups (Erlanger, 1989: no pagination).

Table 4.1. Actors in the Cambodia Conflict, 1975-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governmental Identity</th>
<th>PRK/SOC</th>
<th>PDK</th>
<th>FUNCINPEC</th>
<th>KPNLF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Negotiator</td>
<td>Hun Sen</td>
<td>Khieu Samphan</td>
<td>Prince Sihanouk</td>
<td>Son Sann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Hun Sen (prime minister)</td>
<td>Heng Samrin (president of the PRK)</td>
<td>Pol Pot</td>
<td>Ieng Sary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prince Sihanouk (former head of state)</td>
<td>Prince Ranariddh (Sihanouk’s son)</td>
<td>Son Sann (former prime minister)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Supporters</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligned outside Powers</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Australia, France, Japan, USA, UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Soldiers</td>
<td>30,000 (150,000)*</td>
<td>30,000 ~40,000**</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including Vietnamese PAVN forces fighting in Cambodia.
** There are no agreed figures for the number of troops commanded by the resistance groups. Although many previous studies accept the figures given above, other studies contend that the number of troops under the control of resistance groups differed markedly from the above totals. For instance, Turner insists on the following figures: NADK 25 000, ANS 1500-1200, the KPNLF 7000 (2004: 56).

External Interveners

Regional Actors

This section describes the regional actors’ basic attitudes towards the Cambodian conflict and

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48 This table is partly quoted from Brown & Zasloff (1998: xiii, 32) and updated by the author. The numbers of soldiers are the estimated number in 1985.
main goals in the peace negotiation. During the Cold War period, the Southeast Asian states were divided into two groups: the Indochinese communist countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) and the ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines) (Prasad, 2001: 44-6; Acharya, 1993: 7-8). When the Cambodian war began, the interaction between the regional states generally reflected this cleavage (see Figure 4.3). Specifically, this thesis pays attention to Vietnam, which had a direct influence on the conflict as an advocate of the PRK, and Thailand, which adopted a very aggressive diplomatic posture towards the Vietnamese occupancy of Cambodia.49

(A) Vietnam

The biggest motivations for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia are usually analysed in two aspects. First, following consistent diplomatic confrontation, the PDK’s military operations to occupy parts of Vietnam (claimed by the PDK as Cambodian territory) in 1975 and 1977 were interpreted as a direct threat to Vietnamese security. In fact, the Vietnamese deemed these invasions to be part of a wider Chinese strategy to encircle Vietnam (Karnow, 1991: 58). Second, from the 1930s, Vietnam had pursued the establishment of an Indochina Federation led by itself as one of its long-term goals. This ambition was still being pursued during the 1970s (Morris, 1999: 65-6).

In the initial phase of the conflict, Vietnam insisted that the war in Cambodia was a civil conflict between the “genocidal Pol Pot regime” and a “Cambodian salvation front” in order to stave off intervention from the international community (Acharya, 2001: 82). Moreover, although claiming that the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia was merely an indirect and voluntary support to opposition to the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam nevertheless made

49 However, although the country is not at the centre of this thesis’s analysis, Indonesia’s constructive role in the peace negotiation process as a relatively neutral and autonomous mediator need to be recognised (Prasad, 2001; Lee, 2010).
efforts to ensure that regime change in Cambodia would be irreversible. However, as the Vietnamese government began to prioritise economic issues from the mid-1980s, its attitudes towards the Cambodian conflict gradually changed. The ‘New Thinking’ policy of the Soviet Union effectively led to the reduction in economic aid to Vietnam and its isolation from the international community. Moreover, Vietnam’s domestic economic crisis forced it to adopt a more conciliatory diplomatic approach in its international relations (Vuving, 2006: 811; Prasad, 2004: 75-7). However, despite its relatively progressive attitudes towards the normalisation of its relationship with China and the United States, Vietnam did not demonstrate a dramatic change of position on the settlement of the Cambodian conflict until 1991.

(B) Thailand

The Thai leaders defined the Cambodian conflict not as a civil war but as an invasion by Vietnamese imperial forces. Moreover, they considered that the invasion constituted a direct threat to internal security because of the high possibility of fighting spilling over into Thai territory and the negative political effects of the expansion of Vietnamese power on Thai national interests.

Hence, Thailand made efforts to reverse the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia by employing two strategies. First, the country provided material support to the resistance groups (Chinwanno, 2004: 197) (see Figure 4.3). In addition to facilitating the transfer of economic and military aid from China and other states, Thailand provided a sanctuary for three anti-Vietnamese groups. Furthermore, Thailand also traded with the PDK forces that settled at Pailin, a region near the Thai border that was home to lucrative gem mines (Widyono, 2007: 87). Second, in conjunction with other ASEAN member states, Thailand employed a variety of diplomatic tactics. For instance, coercive diplomacy was applied during the early stage of
ASEAN’s intervention. During this period, Thailand tried to win the support of the international community by raising the Cambodian conflict issue in UN sessions, issuing joint resolutions or statements, and organising international conferences (Alagappa, 1993: no pagination; Long, 1989: 155).

From 1982 onwards, Thailand and the rest of ASEAN began to play more constructive roles in the Cambodian peace process. Specifically, ASEAN held a series of regional and international talks aimed at settling the conflict. Through the meetings, the Cambodian warring factions had their first and most concrete opportunities to sit together and discuss ways to resolve the conflict peacefully. Thailand’s main goals were reflected in the ‘An Appeal for Kampuchean Independence’ proposal that was put forward by ASEAN in September 1983. In this appeal, they called for the following: the withdrawal of all foreign military forces under the supervision of UN peacekeeping forces, the disarmament of all Cambodian factions, and an internationally supervised election (ASEAN Secretariat, 1987: 461).

Global Actors

This section examines the initial aims and strategies of two countries that interacted closely with the national factions during the negotiations: the United States, which played a key role in the coordination of the external actors’ policies, and China, a global power with strong regional interests. Although the role of the United Nations was important, this section does not focus on the UN because it functioned more like a forum for debate rather than a unilateral organisation that had a specific position on the conflict.50

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50 Furthermore, although not examined in this chapter, the conspicuous contributions of Australia, France, Japan, and the USSR should be noted.
(A) The United States

The US viewed the conflict as an invasion by Vietnam and held that its resolution necessitated the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia (Altschiller, 1989: 115). However, there were a number of concerns that had a direct effect on the US’s Cambodian policies in this period. First, since its defeat in the Vietnam War had resulted in huge domestic friction, political leaders in the US wanted to have a clear “exit strategy” from Indochina (Solomon, 2000: xv). Second, from the early-1980s, the crimes against humanity committed by the PDK became a prominent political issue in the United States (Chanda, 1988: 39).

These two factors had mixed effects on the negotiation processes. First, economic and military aid to the resistance groups was one of the main factors that enabled the Cambodian resistance groups to continue fighting the PRK and allowed them to adopt a relatively strong stance during the negotiations. Second, the US’s non-aggressive attitude enabled it to be a neutral mediator among the international interveners (Turner, 2004: 194). Finally, the domestic politics of the US prevented its diplomats from assuming more pragmatic positions in the negotiation processes (Kiernan, 1993: 191-272).

In the early phase of the conflict, the US joined ASEAN’s containment strategy against the PRK and Vietnam (Solomon, 2000: 50) (see Figure 4.3). While the United States used its diplomatic power to prevent the international community from providing economic assistance to Vietnam, it provided aid directly to non-communist resistance factions (Turner, 2004: 35-6). This initial position gradually transformed during the mid-1980s. Whereas the US began to exhibit more flexible attitudes towards the USSR and Vietnam (Raszelenberg & Schier, 1995: 183), it continued to provide steady material aid to the resistance groups.
When the negotiations began in 1987, the Bush government set four main goals: ‘the verified withdrawal of all foreign forces; the creation of a neutral political process culminating in free and fair elections under UN auspices; the preservation of a viable non-communist alternative; and a settlement which guaranteed that the Khmer Rouge would not return to power’ (Turner, 2004: 190).

(B) China

During the 1970s, the tension between China and the USSR exacerbated as the latter launched a so-called “encirclement” of China policy. Although China tried to prevent it, the influence of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia (and in Vietnam in particular) became increasingly evident. In this context, the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam was considered by China as a part of the “Balkanisation” of Indochina. Based on this interpretation, China pursued three major goals: a significant reduction in Soviet influence in the region, Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and the dissolution of the PRK government (Ross, 1991: 1170-1). However, although it was a strong advocate of the PDK (see Figure 4.3), China did not seek to secure outright victory for the party because the four years of Khmer Rouge policies had not been beneficial to Chinese interests (Ross, 1991: 1173).

In the early phase of the conflict, China made military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to thwart the PRK regime. First, China provided economic and military aid to the PDK through Thailand. Moreover, it hosted a series of meetings to encourage the Cambodian resistance groups to forge an alliance (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 22). Diplomatically, in addition to open condemnation of the invasion through its government-controlled mass media, China made efforts to convince the UN not to recognise and deny legitimacy to the PRK regime (Vang, 2008: 221-2).
In the mid-1980s, China revised its regional strategies and improved its relationships with the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which it had hitherto regarded as aggressors. Sino-Vietnamese relations began to show signs of improvement from 1987 (Turner, 2004: 116). More importantly, the USSR and China moved closer to each other after Gorbachev identified the normalisation of ties with China as his diplomatic priority in 1986. During a series of bilateral talks between China and these countries, the Cambodian problem was one of the main issues that were discussed (Turner 2004, 105-6).

Figure 4.3. Relations between the Major Actors in the Cambodian Peace Negotiations

Factors Occasioning the Cambodian Peace Talks

Long-term Factors

This section describes five major long-term factors that convinced the Cambodian national factions to change their attitudes towards negotiation and resolution of the war: the change in
Sino-American relations, the transformation in the USSR’s diplomatic priorities, the military stalemate in the conflict, and the lack of both material and non-material resources. The former two factors are attitudinal changes that occurred at the international level, and the latter three are changes that originated from within the country.

(A) International Factors - Changes in the Relationships between the Power States

As global powers such as the Soviet Union, the USA, and China began to escape from the politics of ideological confrontation in the mid-1980s, the Cambodian national factions and Vietnam were encouraged to reconsider their war strategies. The relationship changes began with Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986 in which he proclaimed *perestroika* (reform) and *glasnost* (opening). As a part of the transformation, the USSR pursued reconciliation with China and ASEAN (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 34). Although the USSR did not reduce its material aid to Vietnam and the PRK dramatically (Thakur & Thayer, 1992: 203), its new approach nullified the system of global ideological hostility that had underpinned the regional strategies of the actors.

Although their change in diplomatic stance was less radical than that of the USSR, the US and China also assumed more moderate postures toward Vietnam and the PRK. Although both countries continued to insist that the Vietnamese army withdraw from Cambodia, they acknowledged that they did not seek the return of the PDK (Ross, 1991: 1172). This change gradually convinced the PRK to seek an opportunity to achieve its goals through diplomatic means (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview).

Furthermore, facing the prospect of economic isolation and suffering chronic economic depression, Vietnam was compelled to improve its relationship with the US and China. To promote economic recovery, Vietnam sought an infusion of foreign funds. However, major
international monetary organisations (e.g. the IMF) and states requested its withdrawal from Cambodia as a condition for assistance (Turner, 2004: 140). Thus, Vietnam had to make some concessions on the Cambodian issue.

All these external changes caused Vietnamese attitudes towards the Cambodian conflict to soften. As a consequence, the PRK also actively began to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Seeing this, the CGDK felt that this new scenario provided a good opportunity to gain concessions from Vietnam through negotiation. In particular, the PDK thought the changes provided opportunities to improve its negative international image by demonstrating its eagerness to engage in peace negotiation (Heder, 1999: 69-70).

(B) Domestic Factor (1) - Stalemate in the War

In the mid-1980s, it became more evident that ending the war through one party’s military victory was impossible. Although the PRK-PAVN alliance dominated the combat in the initial phase of the civil conflict, it failed to control territories effectively. The resistance groups conducted guerrilla warfare, and the PRK was unable to wipe out its opponents. Although the heavily armed PRK-PAVN were able to attack and destroy the PDK’s military bases during its dry season campaigns, the resistance groups were successful in organising counteroffensives that attacked the PRK’s provincial offices during the rainy season. Gradually, both sides began to worry that the war might become a protracted affair.

The PRK-PAVN alliance’s dry season campaign in 1984-85 heightened the concerns of both sides. In fact, the alliance had achieved its greatest conventional victory since 1979. It destroyed most major KPNLF and the PDK bases and forced the majority of the PDK troops to retreat to the border (Bilveer, 1985: 28-36). As a result, all the resistance groups realised that their forces were unlikely to prevail and that an outright military victory was improbable.
Particularly, the PDK and the KPNLF, which had pursued a policy of ‘total victory’ over the PAVN, were shaken by the destruction of most of their bases (Haas, 1991: 141). As Hun Sen recalls, however, the campaign also strained the PRK and caused it to re-evaluate its potential to militarily bring about an end to the war and to consider peace talks as a supplementary (if not an alternative) way of resolving the conflict (SWB, 1985: 3; Haas, 1991: 140-1).

(C) Domestic Factor (2) - Insufficient Resources

As the war dragged on, the lack of resources became a paramount issue to all national factions. However, the issue was particularly important to the PRK. As briefly described above, it lacked popular support during the mid-1980s. This low popularity affected other material resources. For instance, the army failed to recruit and train new soldiers (Bangkok Post, 3 January 1986). Furthermore, the chronic military conflict, the lack of capable human resources following the PDK’s failed socialist projects, and the international economic embargo prevented the PRK from promoting economic stabilisation (Haas, 1991: 139-40). Therefore, it became increasingly difficult for the PRK to continue conducting nationwide military combats.

The resistance groups suffered less from lack of resources. The resistance armies normally conducted sporadic guerrilla operations and needed much fewer military and economic resources than the PRK regime. Moreover, although not sufficient, relatively stable military support (from China) and economic aid (from the US and ASEAN) were provided. Although the legacy of the PDK’s rule could have adversely affected domestic and international opinion, Prince Sihanouk’s leadership of the CGDK afforded it legitimacy and helped to secure a degree of domestic and international support (Heder, 1999: 16-7).

The combination of the factors presented above brought about the Cambodian national
factions’ enthusiasm for peace talks. The PRK was especially keen to enter negotiation and took active steps to engage with the CGDK. After Hun Sen expressed his willingness to meet with Prince Sihanouk, the PRK government began in 1987 to officially promote policies for ‘national reconciliation’ (Osborne, 1994: 254). Moreover, Vietnam announced a plan to withdraw its army by 1990 (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 29). The CGDK, especially Prince Sihanouk, responded favourably to these gestures. Eventually, the first meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen was held in December 1987 in France.

*Short-term Factors – Withdrawal of the Vietnamese Army from Cambodia*

If the long-term factors provided the bedrock for negotiation, there were a number of short-term factors that provided more instant and direct motivation to the Cambodian national factions to enter negotiation. In fact, many factors contributed to bringing the Cambodian factions to the negotiating table, such as external interveners’ intense diplomatic pressure on the factions to negotiate, the proliferation of anti-PDK movements in US domestic politics, and China’s diminishing enthusiasm for Cambodian issues. However, the greatest momentum was provided by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army in 1989.

The withdrawal of the PAVN from Cambodia was an issue that was critical to the resolution of the conflict. The CGDK and many external interveners, including China, Thailand, and Singapore, demanded Vietnamese withdrawal as a prerequisite for negotiation or as a non-negotiable condition. However, after confronting the resistance armies during the dry-season campaign in 1984-85 and recognising their strength, the PRK and Vietnam became increasingly concerned about the outcomes of withdrawal and requested a ‘guarantee that Pol Pot would never return to power’ (Haas, 1999: 150-1; Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s interview). Hence, the withdrawal of the PAVN in September 1989 removed a huge obstacle to the Cambodian negotiation process.
However, Vietnam and the PRK’s concession did not result directly in a stable and productive negotiation. In contrast, believing that the PRK had been weakened, the CGDK conducted vigorous military operations during the rainy season in 1989-90. However, although these operations achieved relative success, the PRK recovered most of its lost territories in the next dry-season campaign (Turner, 2004: 208). All Cambodian provincial capitals and all but two district towns remained under PRK rule (Kiernan, 1992: no pagination). It was obvious that the PRK’s military strength was stronger than the resistance groups had estimated. Finally, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF more actively engaged in negotiation.

In general, after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, all the national factions showed more readiness to negotiate than before. Losing its largest military resource (the PAVN) and seeing that Vietnam had more important national interests than supporting its Cambodian ally, the PRK began more earnestly to work towards the success of the negotiation. For the resistance groups, the withdrawal meant that they achieved their primary goal (the removal of Vietnamese Imperialism). After realising that the Vietnamese ‘puppet’ regime was still strong despite Vietnam’s withdrawal, the CGDK finally acknowledged Hun Sen as a negotiation partner.

El Salvador

Brief History of the Conflict and Negotiation

The historical roots of the civil conflict in El Salvador, in which 100,000 were killed and 38,000 disappeared (Stanley, 1996: 3), lie in its economic system, which has traditionally relied heavily on coffee exports. The cultivation of coffee had led to the widespread displacement of subsistence farmers (mestizos) after The Vagrancy Law (1881) and the
Agrarian Law (1907) expropriated their lands and compelled them to either work on large
estates or seek new land to clear. Their former lands were consolidated into coffee plantations,
resulting in the majority of Salvadorans becoming landless labourers. The disaffection of
Salvadoran peasants and workers with their chronic poverty, government corruption, and the
suppression of human rights intensified. However, the ‘military-oligarchy alliance’ ruthlessly
suppressed any resistance to its rule (Juhn, 1998: 1-2).

During the 1970s, with the support of Christian priests and rural peasants, five major
revolutionary organisations were established, mainly by intellectual ideologues. While the
government responded to popular resistance with violent suppression and assassination, the
five organisations undertook ‘executions, kidnappings, acts of financial “recuperation”,
bombings, and mass action’ (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 217-8). After the establishment in October
1980 of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a coalition of the five
revolutionary groups, the conflict in El Salvador escalated into a full-scale civil war (Karl,

Finally, with the peaceful election of Alfredo Cristiani of the Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista (ARENA) in 1989, the first signs that a negotiated peace settlement might be
reached emerged (Byrne, 1996: 177; Montgomery, 1995: 214). Additional momentum for
negotiation came when the FMLN’s largest military campaign, launched on 11 November
1989, resulted in failure (Pugh, 2009: 88-9). Internationally, many changes related to the end
of the Cold War led the FMLN to transform their military and negotiation strategies

With the mediation of the UN’s Secretary-General, the government and the FMLN held a
series of negotiation sessions (De Soto, 1999: 362). At the meetings in Geneva and Caracas in
April and May 1990, they agreed to establish ‘a two-phased process: negotiations first on
broad-ranging political issues, then on a ceasefire’ (Karl, 1992: no pagination). However, after the Sanjosé Agreement was signed on 26 July 1990, the talks became deadlocked from June 1990 to April 1991 over the issue of reform of the armed forces.

Figure 4.4. Map of El Salvador

![Map of El Salvador](http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/el_salvador_map.htm)

Source. Nations Online Project
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/el_salvador_map.htm

After several months’ stalemate the breakthrough came when the government yielded to demands to rewrite the constitution so as ‘to exclude the armed forces from internal security management and to place the military under civilian control’ (Hampson, 1996: 143). Both sides consented to the Mexico Agreement, which included the six central issues of ‘reforming
the armed forces; the judicial system; human rights; the electoral system; the forming of a Truth Commission which would investigate the most heinous crimes committed by both sides during the civil war; and, in a separate addendum, reforms to the country’s constitution’ (LeVine, 1997: 238). After extensive problems and conflicts among the political actors, the ARENA-dominated National Assembly amended the constitutional articles on 29 April 1991.

Although a number of issues remained unresolved, the government and the FMLN signed the New York Accords on 31 December 1992. In these accords, most remaining critical issues, including the reduction of the armed forces, FMLN’s participation in the civilian police, the establishment of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comision Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz, COPAZ), and the like, were addressed. Simultaneously, a ceasefire between the two parties was also proclaimed.

During the implementation phase, ONUSAL played a key role. In particular, it successfully depoliticised the military groups (Negroponte, 2005: 334-5; Baranyi & North, 1996: 15). Moreover, the FMLN was officially recognised as a political party in April 1991. Finally, a presidential election was held in 1994. Although Rubel Zamora of the FMLN was defeated by Armando Calderón Sol of ARENA and there were many accusations of vote fraud, the FMLN accepted the result (Montgomery, 1995: 155-6).

**National Factions**

This section describes two national factions: the ARENA government, led by President Cristiani, and the FMLN, a coalition of five anti-government resistance groups. In line with the corresponding section for the Cambodian conflict, it focuses on a brief history of each faction, its fundamental goals during the negotiation, and material and non-material resources. This thesis considers the FMLN as a unified organisation because the five organisations that
comprised the FMLN coordinated their moves in the Salvadoran peace negotiation and
demonstrated relatively strong unity (McClintock, 1998: 48).

(A) The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)

From the end of military rule in 1979, the country was mainly governed by the Christian
Democratic Party of El Salvador (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) and ARENA.
However, this section deals only with ARENA since it led the negotiation with the FMLN
during the last phase of the Salvadoran conflict.

ARENA was established in March 1981 by Roberto D’Aubuisson, a major in the National
Guard (Guardia Nacional). D’Aubuisson’s support largely came from the coffee elites (i.e.,
landowners and entrepreneurs), middle class groups (i.e., small businessmen, traders, and
grocers), and military commanders (Paige, 1993: 10-1; Stanley, 1996: 232). As the role of the
business group in the party grew during the 1980s, the party prioritised industrial interests
(Munck, 1993: 79).

After being defeated in the elections in 1984, the party appointed Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, a
leading member of the progressive business group, as the party leader in order to improve its
image. Cristiani’s policies, which pursued economic modernisation, currency liberalisation,
trade tariff reduction, and reinvestment of industrial profits, as well as his personal
commitment to donation to charitable causes, gained strong support from diverse social strata
(Negroponte, 2005: 161-3). After a landslide victory in the local and congressional elections
in 1988 (80 per cent of the votes in local elections and 31 seats in the National Assembly),
Cristiani was elected president in June 1989. In his inauguration ceremony, he proclaimed
peace as one of his main political priorities (LeVine, 1997: 229-30).

Primary Negotiators – Obviously, it was President Cristiani who promoted enhanced
negotiation with the FMLN. However, he did not appear in person at the negotiating table until December 1991. Instead, the president left the details of the negotiation to Colonel Mauricio Ernesto Vargas, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff (Juhn, 1998: 66).

Resources – The government’s military and economic resources were considerable. Owing to its close ties with the US, the Salvadoran government possessed a ‘most formidable military force’ (Prisk, 1991: 109). In 1988, the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) had 55,000 regular soldiers, and the members of paramilitary groups such as the Treasury Police and the National Guard groups totalled approximately 24,600. As a testament to its capacity to wage war, the government could afford to spend approximately $200 million for military purposes in 1990 alone (Harris, 2004: 186). Economically, however, the country relied on US aid because of the problems arising from its chronic civil conflict. Between 1980 and 1989, Salvadoran agricultural production fell by 32 per cent. Moreover, per capita food production also fell by 85 per cent (Byrne, 1996: 141). During the late 1980s, the average annual economic aid from the US was more than $400 million (Dunkerley, 1994: 145).

With regard to non-material resources, President Cristiani was elected with relatively strong support from the people (winning 53.8 per cent of the votes). However, the military groups that Cristiani could not control hampered his internal power (Negroponte, 2005: 141; Munck, 1993: 80). Internationally, the United States, a long-term supporter of the Salvadoran government, shifted from the position that it had held throughout most of the 1980s. Abandoning Reaganite policies, the new Bush administration openly called for a political settlement and encouraged Cristiani to promote negotiation. Moreover, its military aid to the government reduced significantly (from $196.6 million in 1984 to $81.3 million in 1989).

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51 The official negotiating team consisted of six members: two ministers, the SAF Deputy Chief of Staff (including Vargas), and three civilians.
Fundamental Goals – When the negotiation began in El Salvador, the Cristiani government held a comparatively stronger position than the FMLN because it had relatively more abundant material and nonmaterial resources. Thus, the government approached the negotiations from a reasonably practical and conservative viewpoint. In general, the government did not proclaim a specific fundamental goal other than the ‘recovery of economic development by achieving stable ‘no war’ status’ (Byrne, 1996: 175). Nevertheless, its detailed proposals were conservative rather than concessionary. For instance, when the two parties exchanged their initial ideas on specific issues in 1990, the government insisted most issues should be settled ‘according to the government’s own rules’ (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 1990).

(B) The Farabundo Martí National Liberation (Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN)

The FMLN was established in October 1980 as a coalition of the following five different but mutually-interconnected rebel organisations: the Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador: PCS, established in 1930), the Popular Liberation Forces "Farabundo Martí" (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo Martí": FPL, established in 1970), the Revolutionary Army of the People (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: ERP, established in 1972), the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional: RN, established in 1975), and the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos: PRTC, established in 1976) (Grenier, 1991: 51-2). Most group leaders had middle-class backgrounds, were educated at the National University of El Salvador, and they espoused leftist or centre-leftist political ideology and liberal theology. Their main supporters were peasants, students, workers, and lay-followers of churches (Juhn, 1998: 1-2;
Berner, 2008: no pagination) (for details of the five revolutionary groups, see Appendix III).

During most of the 1980s, the FMLN had controlled the northern and eastern areas of Salvadoran territory (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5. FMLN Areas of Control and Expansion in 1989


The FMLN effectively coordinated the actions of its member organisations through its relatively democratic structure. Since the FMLN had no single leader, key decisions were taken by consensus; the five commanders and their close associates gathered frequently, and ‘a great deal of discussion and debate’ took place out when disagreement surfaced (McClintock 1998, 56). After the death of Salvador Cayetano Carpio, the charismatic but stubborn leader of the FPL, in April 1983, Schafik Handal of the PCS attained a ‘first among equals’ position and maintained a relatively strong internal unity (Berner, 2008: no pagination). The FMLN had connections with a number of domestic and international actors.
The Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) was its domestic partner. Although disagreements existed, the two groups cooperated relatively well during the 1980s and 1990s (McClintock, 1998: 52). In addition, Cuba and Nicaragua were close external allies that provided economic, military and diplomatic support.

**Primary Negotiators:** The Diplomatic Commission (Comisión Política y Diplomática), represented by Salvador Samayoa (the FPL’s second in command) and Ana Guadalupe Martinez Menendez (the ERP’s second in command), led the negotiation. This commission acted as both a negotiator and a think tank, and most of the commission members were skilful negotiators (Negroponte, 1996: 100) (for details of the Diplomatic Commission, see Appendix III). However, final decisions were made only after discussion with FMLN commanders (comandantes) (Pugh, 2009: 97).

**Resources** - Although the situation changed according to the quantity of foreign aid that it received, the FMLN’s comparative scarcity of military resources continued until the late 1980s (Montgomery, 1992: 116-7). The organisation possessed approximately 8,000 soldiers (less than 20 per cent of the government army’s strength) (Economist, 25 March 1989: 43; McClintock, 1998: 74) and about 50,000 committed supporters in 1989 (see Table 4.2) (LeMoyne, 1989: 114; Prisk, 1991: 88). However, a more serious problem was a severe shortage of arms; only approximately 15 per cent of the troops were provided with ammunition (McClintock, 1998: 61). Nor were the FMLN’s economic resources sufficient either. Its annual budget was estimated at less than $ 5 million, and the organisation was unable to pay proper salaries to its staff and soldiers (McClintock, 1998: 63).

As for non-material resources, although its level of popular support during the civil war is difficult to calculate precisely, McClintock estimates that about 20-25 per cent of the population supported the FMLN during the 1980s (1998: 76-7). The FMLN made efforts to
develop close contact with the people in rural areas via organising frequent meetings with local people, mobilising grassroots organisations, and establishing local government (Thompson, 2004: 106). Regarding its international network, its strongest allies were the USSR, Cuba, and Nicaragua. They provided ‘weaponry, logistical support and training’, which were crucial for the FMLN (Negroponte, 1996: 34).

**Fundamental Goals** – Founded on Marxist and Leninist principles, the FMLN believed that El Salvador should reject and insulate itself from US influence in order to halt the crimes against humanity committed by the US-backed authoritarian government. Therefore, during the 1980s, its fundamental goal was ‘to ransom sovereignty and national independence’ (Prisk, 1991: 121). However, when it became obvious in late 1989 that a military victory was impossible, the coalition demanded more realistic goals: the total dissolution of infantry battalions in the security corps, Treasury police, National Guard, and other death squads; restructuring of the National Police; dissolution of the National Directorate of Intelligence; and removal of the ESAF officer corps (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 1990; Grenier, 1991: 58).

**Table 4.2. Actors in the Salvadoran Conflict, 1989**

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<th><strong>The Government</strong></th>
<th><strong>The FMLN</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Leaders</strong></td>
<td>Alfredo Cristiani Burkard</td>
<td>Shafik Handal</td>
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<td>Eduardo Sancho</td>
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<td>Salvador Sánchez Cerén</td>
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<td><strong>Core Negotiators</strong></td>
<td>Mauricio Ernesto Vargas</td>
<td>Ana Guadalupe Martínez</td>
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<td>Salvador Samayoa</td>
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<td><strong>Regional Supporters</strong></td>
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<td>(Cost Rica)</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td><strong>Aligned External Powers</strong></td>
<td>The U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Soldiers</strong></td>
<td>55,000 (+24,600 paramilitary groups)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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External Interveners

Regional Actors

This section describes external interveners’ perception of the conflict and the peace negotiation in El Salvador. In the 1980s, Central America was divided into three groups. First, a group of countries that included Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica relied heavily on the support of the United States. Second, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama took an anti-US diplomatic stance. Finally, Cuba and Nicaragua were targeted as enemies by the United States (Furthermore, among the three countries that led regional peace initiatives, that is, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, there were significant differences in their diplomatic priorities (Whitfield, 2007: 62-4).

Regarding their interplay with the national factions, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela demonstrated particularly dynamic interaction. Whereas Cuba played an especially important role during the early phase of the civil war as an advocate of the FMLN, the other two countries collaborated to establish the regional peace initiatives but demonstrated decidedly different viewpoints on the conflict in El Salvador.

(A) Cuba

During the Salvadoran civil war, Cuba became the most important regional advocate of the FMLN (McSherry, 1994: no pagination). When the Nicaraguan revolution ended in success in 1979, the military and logistical support from Cuba to the FMLN increased greatly. For example, it trained thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas and supplied Eastern European-made weapons. Cuba also encouraged the Nicaraguan Sandinista government to support the FMLN (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 3-4; Prisk, 1991: 21-5). From a diplomatic viewpoint, Cuba openly criticised the Salvadoran government and supported a number of important

Although other socialist states gradually changed their attitudes towards the El Salvadoran revolutionary movement in the mid-1980s, Cuba adhered to its original ‘strategic and military asset’ (Negroponte, 1996: 225). Thus, while material aid from the USSR and Eastern Europe decreased significantly in 1989, Cuba continued to support the FMLN. Because of this position, Cuba could not play a key role during the Salvadoran peace negotiation and functioned instead as a communication channel between the FMLN and other actors.

(B) Mexico

Mexico had a long-term strategy of assistance to revolutionary movements in Central America and resistance to US intervention in the region. Thus, Mexico demonstrated its opposition to US involvement in the region by organising Central American peace initiatives such as the Contadora group, condemning American intervention in the region, and by providing material and diplomatic support to the anti-government movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the early 1980s (Purcell, 1987: 164).

Mexico partially supported the FDR-FMLN resistance group until the mid-1980s. For example, Mexico provided the group with an operational base in its territory and withdrew its ambassador from El Salvador in 1979. Moreover, its constant criticism on the human rights violations in El Salvador was a major diplomatic headache for the Salvadoran government. For instance, a 1981 joint statement by Mexico and France acknowledged the FDR and the FMLN as representative political forces and called for the regional conflicts to be resolved by regional efforts (Karl, 1986: 275-80).

However, Mexico changed its anti-US position in the late 1980s. Owing to a number of domestic factors and the transformation in the international structure, the Carlos Salinas de
Gortari government tried to promote reconciliation and normalisation of Mexico’s relationship with the US, placing economic development at the centre of the agenda (Whitfield, 2007: 63).

(C) Venezuela

Although it opposed the interventionist attitude of the United States, the Venezuelan government’s regional policies did not favour the regional left-wing revolutionary movements. Identifying itself not as a revolutionary country but as a democratic state, Venezuela wished to spread democracy in the region. Moreover, Venezuela feared that the spread of such movements might lead to a resumption of the Marxist insurgency that had previously operated in the country (Karl, 1986: 280).

As for the conflict in El Salvador, rather than supporting the FMLN, Venezuela’s peace intervention focused primarily on persuading the Salvadoran government to make more concessions. In fact, Venezuela did not believe that the FMLN would bring democracy to El Salvador. Thus, when Venezuela and Mexico joined the Contadora Group in 1983, which aimed at pursuing a comprehensive political settlement in Central America, their regional strategies differed (Molina Mejia, 1991: 7; Purcell, 1987: 161). For instance, Mexico’s call for negotiated power sharing in El Salvador was opposed by Venezuela’s desire for integration of the FMLN through the electoral process. Moreover, to secure regional stability, Venezuela dispatched its military advisers to El Salvador. It also organised a number of official and non-official meetings between the two Salvadoran parties during the late 1980s.

Global Actors

This section pays attention to two global actors that played critical roles in the Salvadoran peace negotiation process: the US and the USSR. The United States was the most influential
external actor, intervening militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Although the USSR did not prioritise the settlement of the Salvadoran conflict, its dramatic change in attitude towards the country in the mid-1990s became one of the most important factors in forcing the national factions to agree to negotiate.\footnote{The UN is not dealt with in this section. Although the UN contributed greatly to the peace negotiation in El Salvador as a mediator, it did not exhibit any clear standpoints during the negotiation. Rather, it proposed a series of ideas to overcome the difficulties in the negotiation between 1990 and 1991.}

(A) The United States

During the 1970s and 1980s, the US made determined efforts to counter Soviet-backed communism in the region (McClintock, 1998: 201). Hence, the US engaged in direct military intervention to defeat the insurgency until 1989 (see Figure 4.6) (Munck, 1993: 77-8; Hampson, 1996: 135). In addition to the training of Salvadoran military officers in its institutes, the US provided various military equipment, including helicopters and other aircraft. Moreover, the USA increased its financial aid to the Salvadoran government from $9.4 million in 1979 to $897.8 million by 1986 (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 222). Although the Central American countries established a number of regional peace initiatives including the Contadora group’s proposals, the Reagan administration ignored the initiatives until the late 1980s.

However, the US’s policies shifted significantly when President George H. W. Bush took office in 1989. Instead of blindly supporting the Salvadoran government, the Bush administration pressed it to negotiate with the FMLN (Hampson, 1996: 135). In addition, with the government army’s murder of respected Jesuit priests in 1989, the genuine improvement of Salvadoran democracy became an important concern for the US administration. This pressure from the US to negotiate and to improve human rights compelled the Cristiani government to work towards and promote a negotiated
peace (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 170).

(B) The USSR

Although the USSR welcomed the revolutions in Central America, it was somewhat reluctant to overtly support the revolutionary movements so as not to upset the US unduly. Hence, although it demonstrated sympathetic attitudes toward the FMLN, the influence of the USSR on the Salvadoran civil conflict was indirect and unofficial. For instance, when the FMLN leaders visited Moscow in 1980, the USSR did not acknowledge it as a potential government and instead helped the organisation secure military and financial aid from Eastern Europe rather than providing direct aid itself. Moreover, when it began to actively support the movement, all aid was sent via Cuba and Nicaragua (Negroponte, 2005: 219).

As the USSR began its new diplomatic approach in the late 1980s, its regional strategy also changed. The Soviets wanted to stabilise the situation in Nicaragua even though this might involve sacrificing the FMLN (Prisk, 1991: 113). In 1989, Edward Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, warned the FMLN that Soviet economic assistance would be reorganised and encouraged the rebel group to establish and develop contacts in Western Europe in order to obtain financial investment (Negroponte, 2005: 235). In addition, in meetings with the United States, the USSR emphasised that it supported a negotiated settlement to the conflict in El Salvador.
Factors Contributing to the Negotiation between National Factions

This section discusses the international and domestic factors that encouraged the Salvadoran national factions to consider peace negotiation more seriously. First, there were a number of long-term factors that contributed to the success of the peace negotiation in El Salvador: the Soviet Union’s changing attitudes toward the revolutionary movements in Central America, military stalemate, the implementation of regular elections, and decreasing popular support for the war. Second, a number of international and domestic events occurred in 1989 that also played key roles in bringing the national factions to the negotiating table, including the election of the George Bush administration in the US, the collapse of the Nicaraguan government, the murder of six Jesuits, and the failure of the FMLN’s 1989 campaign.
Long-term Factors

(A) International Factors – The Change in the USSR’s Regional Policies

As the Soviet Union began to change its domestic and international policies from 1986, the conditions for the Salvadoran negotiation also changed. The USSR demonstrated diminished interest in the socialist movements in the region and persuaded Cuba and Nicaragua to reconsider their hostility to and confrontation with the US (Montgomery, 1992: 216; Munck & Kumar, 1995: 171). Moreover, aid from the USSR and other socialist states became erratic. In 1989, for instance, the USSR’s Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the Soviet Union would reduce its economic aid and suspend the transfer of heavy armaments. In addition, the supply of ammunition and light arms was to be provided only ‘publicly’; thus, unofficial arms supply would be stopped (Negroponte, 1996: 235-6). As a prominent leader of the FMLN admitted, the announcement was a major blow to the organisation since the assistance was ‘the key factor in sustaining the insurgents’ (Prisk, 1991: 110).

This transformation in Soviet policies changed the regional politics related to the Salvadoran peace negotiation. On the one hand, released from its commitment to challenge the perceived Soviet threat in what the US regarded as its own backyard, the Bush administration became more committed to pressurising the Salvadoran government to seek negotiation with the FMLN and to improve internal democracy. On the other hand, after losing their major donor, Cuba and Nicaragua reduced their aid to the FMLN. The FMLN had to reconsider the direction and ideological premise of their revolutionary campaign (Sullivan, 1994: 85).

(B) Domestic Factor (1) - Military Stalemate

Despite the Salvadoran government’s strenuous efforts to win the war during the mid-1980s, it became clear that the civil war would be a prolonged one. To bring about an end to the war,
the government increased the efficiency of its military campaigns by restructuring the army, providing more arms, and implementing more brutal strategies. However, the FMLN countered the government’s moves with a swift change in its operational style, replacing middle-sized regular combat tactics with small-scale guerrilla warfare (the so-called “Prolonged Popular War”). As a result, although the FMLN lost a few municipalities that it had previously controlled, it continued to wield its exclusive or dual administrative power over most of its original territories (Stein, 1988: 195-6). This failure to critically weaken the FMLN convinced the government that its counterpart was stronger than it had expected (Sullivan, 1994: 84).

By 1988, the FMLN had also realised that military victory was not easily achievable. In this period, the coalition changed its strategy from that of a ‘Prolonged Popular War’ to that of a ‘Strategic Counter-Offensive’, which focused on more vigorous attacks in urban centres (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 13). However, the operations that it conducted throughout 1988 ended in failure, which led the FMLN to change its military strategy again.

(C) Domestic Factor (2) - Signs of Political Democratisation

Periodic elections during the 1980s were another factor that encouraged the FMLN to be more receptive to diplomatic resolutions. The Salvadoran government had implemented regular elections for national office since the end of the military junta regime in 1979. Although electoral fraud was frequently reported or suspected, the Magaña administration and the Duarte government succeeded in reinforcing the democratic process as an essential element of Salvadoran politics (Pugh, 2009: 93).

These regular elections changed the FMLN’s perception of the political arena. Since the organisation had believed that the real cause of Salvadoran problems lay in the US’s
influence over and use of the government’s army to advance its own regional interests, they had refused to join the election so long as the election was ‘controlled by the same genocidal and repressive armed forces’ (Prisk, 1991: 122). However, in 1989, the FMLN agreed to participate in the election and announced a short ceasefire for its duration (Prisk, 1991: 122-3). Although it is unclear whether the coalition had a genuine desire to accept the result of the election, it was an important indicator of the change in the FMLN’s revolutionary strategies.

(D) Domestic Factor (3) - Decreasing Popular Support for the Conflict

In the late 1980s, both factions suffered from a decrease in popular support for the war. As the war dragged on, people became weary of the violence and angered by the increasing terrorism during the mid-1980s. Evident economic deterioration, the constant security threat, and the impossibility of managing daily life made people turn against the FMLN (Stein, 1988: 196; Montgomery, 1992: 215). The loss of support had a direct and negative impact on the FMLN’s military operations. The organisation’s political propaganda failed to persuade the people to support their ongoing military campaign, and recruitment of new forces became more difficult (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 10). As a result, the number of FMLN troops fell from 10,000 in 1985 to 4,000 in 1989 (Prisk, 1991: 110). For the Cristiani government, the people’s desire to end the war became a significant political asset, and a negotiated peace became central to the government’s agenda (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 32-3).

*Short-term Factors*

(A) International Factors – Three Regional and International Events

In 1989, a number of events occurred that provided both national factions with good opportunities to achieve their goals through negotiation. First, together with the change in the USSR’s policies, the political change in Europe was a clear signal of the emergence of an
external crisis. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, many socialist countries in Europe underwent radical ideological changes.

In addition, the Sandinista government also lost in the Nicaraguan election. The FMLN leadership was left reeling by these changes and realised that embarking on a strategy of protracted conflict had become untenable (Negroponte, 1996: 241-2; LeVine, 1997: 231).

Moreover, George H. W. Bush had been elected as the president of the US. In contrast with the Reagan administration that had maintained an ideological hostility against the revolutionary movements in Central America, the Bush administration demonstrated much greater flexibility and pragmatism (Pugh, 2009: 84; Munck, 1993: 79-80). For instance, Bernard Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, planned to reduce the US’s military aid to the Salvadoran government and to apply more pressure on it to enter negotiation with the FMLN. Moreover, the new government in the United States sought to be an ‘insider partial mediator’ (Negroponte, 1996: 54).

(B) Domestic Factor (1) - Failure of 1989 Campaign

Seeing the changes in international politics described above, the principal leaders of the FMLN (especially Shafik Handal) decided to launch a major military offensive against the government on 20 November 1989 in order to demonstrate its abiding resilience and to gain more support from the people (Negroponte, 1996: 238; Pugh, 2009: 88). Although the initial phase of the attack was successful, the FMLN was eventually defeated by the Cristiani government (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 33-5).

The failure provided critical momentum for both national factions to treat the issue of peace talks seriously. On the one hand, the FMLN was forced to abandon its baseless belief that it could prevail over the government once it had concentrated its entire forces. On the other
hand, the government realised that the FMLN’s offensive capability was much stronger than they had anticipated and that they did not have the capacity to prevent all attacks by the resistance group (Pugh, 2009: 88-9; LeVine, 1997: 231).

(C) Domestic Factor (2) - The murder of Six Jesuits

The killing of six Jesuit priests and their two co-workers by the governmental death squad known as the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) on 16 November 1989 galvanised the anger of both the domestic public and the international community. The killing was considered important because the priests were well known and respected figures in Salvadoran society, and the manner of their murder was particularly brutal (Betancur, Planchart, & Buergenthal, 1993: no pagination). Since the US government had professed that its aid to the Salvadoran government would help to develop democracy and human rights in the country, the murder made the USA reconsider its Salvadoran policy (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 34-5; Sullivan, 1994: 84). In May 1990, the House of Representatives decided to halve military aid to El Salvador (Byrne, 1996: 183) Facing these difficulties, the Salvadoran government had to demonstrate its will to improve human rights in the country and to display a greater willingness to enter negotiation with the FMLN.

All these long-term and short-term factors persuaded the Cristiani government and the FMLN to seek more actively a resolution to the Salvadoran conflict by peaceful means. By employing a two-track strategy that used both diplomatic negotiation and military strength, the FMLN demonstrated that it had accepted diplomatic tactics as a means of pursuing its goals. The organisation transformed the Diplomatic Commission, which had been its instrument of public relations, into the body for negotiation with the government (Negroponte, 1996: 61). Moreover, it officially called for the involvement of the UN on 6 December 1989 (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 35). Under strong diplomatic pressure from the US
government and in the absence of serious opposition from its military, the Cristiani
government also more actively sought a negotiated settlement. Finally, both sides accepted
the offer of UN mediation and discussed the detailed procedures of the negotiation in January
1990.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the background information of the two cases examined in this thesis,
focusing on three issues: the historical backgrounds of the two conflicts, a brief description of
the national factions and external interveners, and the long-term and short-term factors that
promoted peace talks. It also briefly illustrated the initial moves taken by the actors to
accommodate the peace negotiations, an issue that will be revisited in later chapters during
the focus on interplay.

Each of the two sections that dealt with the Cambodian and El Salvadoran cases began by
explaining the history of the conflicts and negotiations in each country (this section is also
supplemented by the chronologies in the Appendix I). The roots of the conflicts, the origin of
the warring factions, the development of the conflicts, the negotiation processes, and the role
of external actors were briefly described in the first part of each section.

After this, the characteristics of the negotiating actors were discussed. With regard to the
national factions, the primary negotiators, the material and non-material resources, and the
fundamental goals of each faction were at the centre of the description. In the Cambodian
case, the PRK government, led by Hun Sen, and the three resistance groups, FUNCINPEC,
the PDK, and the KPNLF, were discussed. The internal unity of the coalition of resistance
groups, the CGDK, was seen to be very weak, and the three groups were therefore considered
as separate entities. In the Salvadoran case, the Cristiani government and the FMLN were discussed. Here, however, the resistance coalition’s internal unity was relatively strong, and it was adjudged to be a unified organisation.

This chapter also described the basic attitudes of the external interveners towards the conflicts in Cambodia and El Salvador. These attitudes were based on their fundamental goals in the conflicts and played a key role in determining the strategies and conduct of the national factions. The external actors that had strong interrelations with the national factions, that is, Vietnam, Thailand, China, Cuba, Mexico, the USSR, and the US, were discussed.

Finally, the major long-term and short-term factors that convinced the national factions to come to the negotiating table were demonstrated. As observed above, there were a number of common long-term factors in both cases: the changes in world politics at the end of the Cold War, the domestic military stalemate, and decreasing material and nonmaterial resources. In addition, there were a number of short-term events that demonstrated the need for negotiated resolution of the conflicts. The combination of these factors promoted the initiation and progress of the negotiations in both countries.

Based on this information, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will analyse the processes of interplay between the national factions and external interveners that were used to achieve agreement on the establishment of the coalition resistance group, demobilisation of troops, and the composition of the transitional authority. In particular, the changes in the negotiating actors’ moves during their negotiation and the motivation behind the changes are at the centre of the analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, the issue of the establishment of the coalition resistance group is different from the other two issues in terms of the time period, the purpose of negotiation, and the actors involved. However, it is selected as a study case because it shows the patterns of interaction between national factions and regional advocate countries during
the early period of the conflict. Considering the other two cases, although the negotiations on the two issues were closely interrelated, they are discussed in separate chapters in order to demonstrate two different aspects of the interaction: the interplay between national factions and international mediators whose approach to peace negotiation is based on Western concepts, and the interplay between national factions and global/regional powers that act as a regional actor having global power.
Chapter 5
The Interplay between National Factions and Impartial Third Parties

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the interplay between the national factions and the external interveners in the two case studies, or more specifically, the PRK’s interaction with the US in Cambodia and the FMLN’s interplay with the UN in El Salvador during their peace negotiation processes. At the centre of the analysis are two aims: (1) finding the characteristics of the national factions’ interplay with the impartial third parties that are distinct from their interaction with other external interveners, and (2) identifying and studying the obstacles generated by the ethnocentric cultural values of the third-party interveners in the peace negotiation. To clarify the actors’ strategic movements on these issues, the Cambodian part of this chapter is largely based on the author’s fieldwork conducted in 2009.

First, this chapter reveals the patterns of interplay between the impartial third parties and the warring factions during the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. More specifically, phase by phase, it tracks the changes in the strategies employed by impartial third parties to persuade the national factions to make progress in their peace negotiations and the warring factions’ responses towards the external actors’ efforts.

In general, the patterns in the two case studies show that when the impartial third parties displayed stronger enthusiasm for the peace negotiations, this was more likely to promote

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53 As discussed in Chapter 3, an impartial third party in this thesis refers to third parties that pursue peaceful resolution of conflicts through negotiation between national factions and have little intention of seeking benefits for certain national factions.
serious and flexible attitudes among the national factions. However, it is also observed that while their relatively neutral but less enthusiastic actions provided good conditions for the national factions to promote their own peace initiatives, the impartial third parties did not play decisive roles in changing the fundamental attitudes of the warring factions towards the peace negotiations.

In addition, through the juxtaposition of the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, this chapter also analyses different patterns of this type of interplay. In short, the UN mediators and the FMLN leaders in El Salvador achieved better cooperation than the US and the PRK negotiators in Cambodia.

Second, this chapter suggests that the role played by the negotiating actors’ disparate cultural backgrounds in the formation of their perceptions is an important factor that affects the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Many of the peace processes undertaken by the United Nations and other external states and organisations between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s were based on Western cultural values. Since the conceptions underpinning these projects differed from those of the local culture in which the projects were being carried out, many of the UN peacekeeping operations were only partially successful in gaining people’s support. Hence, the effectiveness of these peace processes tended to be hampered by the prosecution of policies that were based on cultural values alien to the local culture (Richmond, 2006: 300).

In this chapter, the two case studies reveal the role that cultural barriers can play in peace negotiations. The negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador encountered significantly different obstacles arising from the actors’ ethnocentric cultures. In Cambodia, since the international interveners did not consider the Cambodian people’s perceptual differences
important and relied heavily on their Western cultural values\textsuperscript{54} to interpret major negotiation issues, they failed to produce proposals that were persuasive to the Cambodian national factions. By contrast, as a result of its relatively close cultural ties and good communication with the Salvadoran factions, the UN succeeded in avoiding serious mutual misunderstandings when attempting to convince the FMLN to abide by the UN’s coordination and suggestions.

This chapter looks at the negotiation processes with regard to the issues of demilitarisation and the interim authority. As explained in Chapter 3, demilitarisation was a highly controversial issue for most of the warring factions because the process might determine their future survival. The negotiations on this issue clearly reveal the dynamics of the interplay between the national factions, who were reluctant to make concessions, and the impartial third parties, who attempted to convince them to make compromises. In addition, El Salvador and Cambodia’s differing negotiation processes on the formation of a transitional authority and the reasons for these dissimilarities help to explain the contrasting effectiveness of the implementation processes in the cases.

Each section begins with a brief description of the actors’ perceptions of negotiation, peace, and violence in order to contextualise their strategies during the peace negotiations. After this, the ways in which these perceptions affected their goals during the negotiations are discussed. Next, each section examines the phase-by-phase change in the interplay between the impartial third party and the national faction during the negotiation process. Finally, a summary and rough analysis of the patterns is presented.

\textsuperscript{54} As indicated in Chapter 1, Western culture is not monolithic and comprises various sub-cultures with varied characteristics. In this chapter, however, the term ‘Western culture’ denotes some of the common cultural features of the countries that played the most important roles in the Cambodian peace negotiation, including the US and Australia.
CAMBODIA

This case study examines the interplay between the United States and the PRK. The US played a prominent role in the Cambodian peace negotiations as a relatively impartial intervener that had modest economic and military influence over the Cambodian national factions. The USA also made great efforts to coordinate the moves of other international actors, including Indonesia, Japan, China, Vietnam, and the members of UN Security Council (Lizée, 1999: 61, Solomon, 1999: 314). The PRK, as the de facto government (but one that had lost most of its advocates (the USSR and Vietnam) by the end of the 1980s), sought to secure its political prominence in the forthcoming transitional authority.

Differences in the Cultural Values of the Actors

Although a variety of factors contributed to the different perceptions of the actors, many studies agree that three historical factors most strongly affected the Cambodian people’s attitudes to conflict and negotiation: indigenous culture, colonialism, and civil war. Cambodia’s indigenous culture, influenced by Brahmanism, Theravada Buddhism, ‘patron-client communitarianism,’ and Cambodia’s long history of being a unified entity, provided a basis for the Cambodian people’s conceptions of conflict and negotiation, conceptions that are very different from those of Western societies (Peang-Meth, 1991: 445-6; Marlay & Neher, 1995:14; Bit, 1991:: 3-14; Lizée, 1999: 30). Moreover, although the relatively short and indirect period of French colonialism (1863-1953) had a significant impact on the ruling class of the country, it had little effect on local peasant societies (Bit, 1991: 13; Chandler, 1998: no pagination). Finally, the sequence of violent events in recent Cambodian history,

55 For details of Western notion of negotiation and its origins, see chapter 2.
beginning with the Vietnamese war (1959-1975), continuing through the disastrous Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979), and culminating in the fourteen-year long civil war (1979-1993) transformed people’s ideas greatly (Bit, 1991: 77-84; Lizée, 1999: 30).

The different approaches of the actors to the following issues were particularly serious obstacles to the development of mutual understanding between the national factions (the PRK and the CGDK) and the international intervener (the US) during the Cambodian peace negotiation.

**Negotiation**

Three distinct components of Western culture – individualism, egalitarianism, and low context communication – informed the international interveners’ conceptions of negotiation (Gellman, 2007: 25-6). Since individualism emphasises the importance of interests and tangible outcomes (Ting-Toomey, 1999: 210), Western societies prefer to use direct and verbal communication methods to produce concrete contracts (Kimmel, 1994: 180-1) rather than contextual or symbolic behaviour (Le Baron, 2003: no pagination). In addition, they generally believe that agreement can be forged by both sides making concessions and agreeing to compromise some of their interests.

However, Cambodian culture is underpinned and guided by a collectivist ethic. Due to the prominence of hierarchical social structures and high-context communication systems in Cambodian collectivist culture, the Cambodian national factions’ viewpoints were clearly at variance with Western ideas. For them, negotiation was a process towards mutual and interdependent existence and resolution of root causes rather than quick fixes. The influence of Brahmanism, which assumes that ‘the god-king does not negotiate nor placate’, and Buddhism, which regards visible disputes as the expression of long accumulated anger,
prevented Cambodians from subscribing to a belief in conflict resolution through compromise (Bit, 1991: 15-6). Instead, the Cambodian factions considered negotiation ‘a means of circumventing pressures for more painful sacrifices’ (Bit, 1991: 15-6). Moreover, rapid compromises were uncommon in the Cambodian hierarchical social structure, and there are few examples in Cambodian history of leaders compromising with their opponents (Bit, 1991: 33; Turner, 2004: 148; Peou, 2002: 511).

This difference in the actors’ concepts of negotiation led the interveners and the national factions to set very different fundamental goals. Whereas the basic aim of the major interveners was the stabilisation of Indochina, the national factions’ goals were either total victory, removal of counterparts, or at least gaining political supremacy in the forthcoming political arena (Turner, 2004: 163) (details follow below). Although the interveners recognised that the Cambodian factions’ goals were very different from their own, they assumed that they could persuade the national factions to conform to their concepts of negotiation (Solomon, 2000: 34-5, 45-6).

Cultural differences had a further impact on the Cambodian negotiations through the actors’ different assumptions about the duration of negotiation processes. Whereas the Western interveners regarded a written consensus as an expression of the end of negotiation, the Cambodian national factions believed that such contracts merely demonstrated progress in the negotiations and formed only a part of the process. Thus, this misunderstanding contributed to the many problems that occurred during the implementation phase of the Paris Peace Agreements (PPAs) (Heder, 1999: 115; Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview).

**Peace**

In general, Western societies have a standardised concept of liberal peace. This concept
assumes that once good institutions and practices are established and sustained, peace will follow (Lizée, 1999: 83). These peaceful institutions comprise ‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development’ (Richmond, 2006: 292). Incorporating an assumption of universality that justifies intervention, the Western institutional models of social, political, and economic organisation were transplanted wherever Western peace interventions in war-shattered regions occurred (Paris, 1997: 56; Mac Ginty, 2008: 146; Lizée, 1999: 23-4; Ignatieff, 2003: 17).

Although the national leadership in both cases ostensibly consented to the principles of liberal peace, few actors truly intended to establish such institutions. Under the strong influence of Buddhism, which stresses that each individual’s internal tranquillity contributes to the realisation of social peace, and hierarchical fragmented societies that lacked a systemic social model of peace, Cambodians believed that peace equated to ‘factional balance/hegemony’ or ‘restored social harmony’ rather than a certain type of political entity (Peang-Meath 1999: 446-447; Lizée 1999: 36-43). Furthermore, although the Cambodian leaders understood Western notions of democracy and the market economy, the constituencies did not share such ideologies, because of the country’s short and turbulent experience of democracy (Peang-Meath, 1999, 451-2; Gottesman, 2004: 17-24).

Such differences in their conceptions of peace affected the actors’ views on the nature and composition of a transitional authority. Western interveners’ fundamental goal of peace through democracy meant that they believed that the transitional authority would act as a neutral and legitimate power until a new government could be formed. However, the Cambodian factions doubted that a neutral transitional power able to withstand the existing confrontations could be formed (Peang-Meth, 1999: 453).
Violence

Another factor that affected the interplay between the national factions and the international interveners was their different approaches to violence. Western societies have a strong idea of the nation state’s ‘responsibility to protect the individual from violence’ by its monopoly of domestic violence and share the conviction that peace can be achieved by ‘the absence of violence’ and ‘the reduction of conflict to political processes’ (Lizée, 1999: 19-21). Thus, international interveners assumed that ceasefire was a prerequisite for peace negotiations and an essential element that demonstrated the actors’ willingness to negotiate.

However, Cambodia lacked such concepts and systems to protect constituencies, and violence was seen as contextual and as ‘part of the very nature of social aggregation’ (Lizée, 1999: 40). Although the French presence provided a sense of modern statehood to Cambodia, the concept of nation statehood remained ill-defined in Cambodia, and neither a strong bureaucracy to sustain the structure nor an agreed conception of the responsibilities of a state were established (Bit, 1991: 66). Thus, for Cambodians, violence was regarded as a method of negotiation that could be used by the state when necessary.

These contrasting conceptualisations of state responsibility resulted in the different approaches of the international interveners and national factions to the violence that occurred during the negotiation. The international interveners continuously demanded ceasefire as an integral part of the peace negotiation, and they took the national factions’ violation of the ceasefire very seriously (Haas, 1991: 129). However, the Cambodian national factions shared the view that periodic demonstration of their military capability was a realistic way to attain a favourable position in the negotiation56, and, therefore, they remained unconvinced that their

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56 For instance, Lu Lay Sreng, a chief military commander and the first vice-president of FUNCINPEC, said ‘Showing our strength was important. (…) Only after our victory in Datung in 1985, did the US begin to
opponents would continue to observe an agreed ceasefire.

\textit{Aims of Actors}

Based on the different perceptions described above, the international interveners and the Cambodian factions set their own goals with regard to the transitional authority. First, the basic target of the major interveners, including the UN, the US, France, and Australia, was stabilisation of Indochina (Lizée, 1999: 54). Although each country had individual objectives, they generally agreed with the vision of liberal peace. In 1989, the United States set three main goals: Cambodia’s independence from Vietnam and the influence of the USSR, the establishment of democratic government through elections, and prevention of the PDK’s return as Cambodia’s central authority (Solomon, 2000: 35; Haas, 1991: 252).

As a result, the UN proposals assumed that all existing military forces of the four military factions needed to be dissolved and depoliticised before the general election (Lizée, 1999: 77). With regard to the interim authority, the interveners’ main goal was building neutral political infrastructures that would promote a free election in Cambodia. Thus, the US thought that (1) the UN should take the lead in promoting a neutral political environment, imperative for a free and fair election; (2) in order to promote the Cambodian state’s sovereignty, a representative organisation of Cambodian people needed to play a symbolic and nominal role during the interim period; and (3) the PDK should be excluded from the future governance of Cambodia (Lizée, 1999: 62; Haas, 1991: 163).

provide economic and military support. (…) We also had to show how strong our solidarity and military power were to the PRK and the (sly) Khmer Rouge’ (Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview). Moreover, Chhin Kim Thong, a former commander of the PDK, stated, ’It was after the failure of Vietnam’s and Hun Sen’s biggest military campaigns that they became more cooperative.’ (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009, Author’s Interview).
The PRK’s fundamental goal was gaining and maintaining its superiority in the post-conflict Cambodian political arena (see Chapter 4). Hun Sen (as well as other Cambodian factional leaders) did not believe that a future election would be democratic or neutral. It was difficult for him to envisage the PRK’s counterparts being content to limit their interests and adhere to the agreed peace accords. Thus, Hun Sen considered that ensuring his supremacy in the interim authority was vital to securing the survival of his party.

Therefore, the PRK wanted to retain as many military forces as possible until the new general elections. With regard to the transitional authority, its goal was maintaining its bureaucratic structure in the country. Hence, when the negotiations began, Hun Sen requested (1) the exclusion of the PDK from the forthcoming election, (2) minimal involvement by the international supervisory body, and (3) maintenance of the SOC bureaucracy (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 31; Turner, 2004: 147).

Interplay between the Actors in the Negotiation Process

This section tracks the changing dynamics of the strategic interplay between the US and the PRK/SOC to achieve their goals during the Cambodian negotiations. First, the United States tried to mediate the differences between the actors’ goals by providing economic and diplomatic incentives, coordinating other external actors’ moves, and suggesting comprehensive peace proposals. Second, the national factions attempted to nullify the interveners’ efforts that were disadvantageous to their interests and endeavoured to achieve

57 Lu Lay Sreng, a former leader of FUNCINPEC recalls how, “Hun Sen, whose power was highly dependent on Vietnam’s military force, could not simply trust the words spoken in the negotiations because everyone knew the Khmer Rouge was smart, so smart” (Lu Lay Sreng, 2009: Author’s Interview).
58 These requests were in direct opposition to the CGDK’s goals that included (1) a UN-supervised election, (2) the dissolution of SOC organisations, and (3) inclusion of PDK in the negotiation process (Haas, 1991: 195; The CGDK Press Release, 1986: no pagination).
their goals by producing effective responses to the interveners’ pressure and suggestions. The negotiations had the following four distinct phases, and the characteristics of the pattern of interplay changed in each of these phases.

**Phase 1: 1987 – August 1989**

Recognising the long-term factors described in Chapter 4, the Cambodian national factions began to demonstrate a greater willingness to negotiate, and external interveners also began to facilitate the negotiations in this phase. However, because of the US’s lukewarm attitude and their simple focus on confidence building, no significant interplay between the third-party intervener and domestic warring factions was evident. Eventually, the US failed to prompt the national factions to launch stronger initiatives.

The efforts of international interveners in this period were limited to the provision of good offices. With regard to the suggestion of peace proposals, for instance, although the UN Secretary-General Xavier Perez de Cuellar’s four-point plan in June 1987 and the UN Undersecretary-General Rafeeuddin Ahmed’s working paper outlined the UN’s principles on the Cambodian issues, they were far from a comprehensive blueprint for the peace process (Haas, 1991: 129; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 48). Furthermore, external interveners applied no new significant economic or diplomatic pressure on the factions nor provided them with fresh incentives to negotiate. During this period, the United States displayed little interest in the Cambodian issue. Although it favoured Vietnamese withdrawal and the prevention of the PDK’s return to power, the Bush administration simply expressed its support for the PCC initiatives of France and Indonesia (Solomon, 2000: 21).

Despite the good offices, however, the Cambodian national factions failed to reach any agreements. In October 1987, Hun Sen called for a meeting with Sihanouk and tabled the

Furthermore, he proclaimed the party’s abandonment of socialism (the state’s name was subsequently changed to the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989) (Gottesman, 2004: 303). In return, Sihanouk also expressed his willingness to negotiate. The first bilateral meetings between Hun Sen and Sihanouk were held in December 1987 and January 1988 (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 38-49). Thanks to the regional actors’ facilitation, the first round of the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM), which brought together the four Cambodian factions, took place from July 1988 onwards. In addition, the efforts of external interveners to promote the peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict resulted in the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) in August 1989.

However, the resistance groups were not ready to make real concessions under circumstances where the promise of Vietnam’s withdrawal might not actually be implemented. For them, the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia was a non-negotiable prerequisite of the negotiation, and they regarded non-implementation of Vietnamese withdrawal as a grave threat that might enable the SOC to reverse the negotiated peace agreements (Lizée, 1999: 57). As Ieng Mouly, a top leader of the KPNLF stated:

(In the initial period of the war,) we wanted to fight against Vietnam with our army. We wanted to push them out of our country, not negotiate with them. (…) Although we approved of the negotiations with Hun Sen, Vietnam had to be removed. The real aggressor was Vietnam, not Hun Sen.

(Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview).

In a similar vein, a former PDK commander said:

We decided to cooperate with Prince Sihanouk and Mr Son Sann because
fighting against Vietnam was more important than fighting against our former enemies. How could we abandon our demand for PAVN withdrawal? (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview).

However, Vietnamese withdrawal meant that the SOC would lose much of its military strength, and it was desperate to ensure its security in the face of expected PDK aggression (Lizée, 1999: 57). Hence, despite calls by some reformists for a change in policy, hard-line leaders, including Chea Sim, criticised Hun Sen’s attempts to seek a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. Thus, although the talks produced a number of constructive proposals, the national factions nevertheless continued to reiterate their original positions during the talks (Haas, 1991: 203-5).

**Phase 2: September 1989 – late 1990**

In Phase 2, the interaction between the PRK and the US became much more dynamic. The US adopted stronger and more varied strategies, such as promoting the UN peace proposals and providing diplomatic and economic incentives, and the PRK became more flexible towards the demands of the external interveners.

There were two reasons for the intensified involvement of the international actors. First, the series of efforts to provide good offices had resulted in failure. Second, the behaviour of the CGDK after Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodian territory had disappointed the international community. Rather than promoting enhanced peace talks, the resistance groups had undertaken nationwide military operations against a PRK army weakened by Vietnamese withdrawal (Haas, 1991: 213-4). This caused the interveners to believe that the Cambodian negotiations needed to be supported by stronger and more varied measures (Richardson, 59

59 Put in terms of Putnam’s two-level game theory, Hun Sen’s efforts failed to gain domestic ratification.
Thus, while Indonesia, France, Japan, and China contributed to the Cambodian peace negotiations by providing good offices and applying diplomatic pressure on the national factions, Australia and the United States produced comprehensive peace proposals (Lizée, 1999: 60). The USA employed three main methods to bring about a successful peace resolution. First, the country prepared detailed UN-centred peace proposals after the end of the PCC in August 1989 (Solomon, 2000: 34). Based on ideas suggested by Australia, the US’s peace proposals formed the UN Security Council’s peace initiatives, which comprised a ‘Framework Document’ (August 1990) and an ‘Implementation Plan’ (November 1990). Second, the US made various diplomatic efforts to bring the parties to the negotiation table. The US demonstrated its strong support for the non-communist groups by appointing US congressmen to visit their refugee camps. In addition, the US made official calls urging the non-communist resistance groups to pursue negotiation more seriously (Haas, 1991: 254-5) and officially withdrew its support for the PDK (Solomon, 2000: 34; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 70; Richardson, 2009: 149). Third, the US applied economic pressure by restricting its aid to non-military support of the two non-communist resistance factions. In addition, American economic cooperation with Vietnam became more direct and active. For instance, approximately $11 million of US aid went to Vietnam through private organisations in 1990 (Haas, 1991: 256-7).

However, as the interplay between the Cambodian national factions and the international interveners intensified, tension between the two sides exacerbated. The Australian and UN peace proposals, which were based on a liberal peace model, failed to reflect the national factions’ fundamental interests. Both proposals aimed at producing a free and neutral political environment in which the Cambodian people’s will could be expressed. The UN Security
Council’s ‘Framework Document’ in August 1990, which the US supported with recommendations and coordination, is a good example of the interveners’ misreading of the national factions’ aims and interests. The document made four recommendations on the transitional authority issue: (1) UNTAC would control the processes of a national election;\(^60\) (2) a Supreme National Council (SNC) would be established in order to represent Cambodian sovereignty; (3) the composition of the SNC would be decided by the national factions; and (4) although the bureaucratic structure of the SOC would remain, all military forces would be dissolved (UN Security Council, 1990a; Appendix, Section I, Article 1, 2, & 3; Lizée, 1999: 68; Haas, 1991: 287).\(^61\) The document also declared that UNTAC would be the central governing body during the transitional period and that the SNC would play only a nominal role. Although its detailed suggestions differed, ‘Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal’, released in early 1990, and the UN’s follow-up ‘Implementation Plan’ of November 1990 were based on the same liberal peace principle (Lizée, 1999: 64. 69; Haas, 1991: 217; UN Security Council, 1990b, Annex 1, Section I, Article 8 and 10).

These recommendations were inconsistent with the fundamental assumption of the warring factions that the character and composition of the transitional authority would determine their political survival. However, the interveners did not try to reconcile these contradictions, convince the factions that a completely neutral authority could emerge, or formulate a concrete plan to enforce their ideas. Rather, the UN P-5, including the US, paid more attention to avoiding the controversies that the documents were anticipated to arouse within the Western community, such as their pronouncement on the inclusion of the PDK in the

\(^60\) The idea UNTAC’s central role was developed in this period. Until the first Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1989, it was widely accepted that the transitional government should consist of Cambodians. The controversial issue was whether it would be a quadripartite government that would grant the four factions an equal number of seats or a bipartite body that would give 50% of the seats to the PRK and the CGDK.

\(^61\) In fact, many ideas in the UN’s peace proposals for Cambodia were referenced from the peace process in Namibia (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 132; Heininger, 1994: 6).
transitional authority (Solomon, 1999: 307).

In order to bring the SOC on board, the US began to provide economic and diplomatic incentives to Hun Sen. Diplomatically, the US officially withdrew its support for the CGDK’s representation of Cambodia in the UN and accepted direct talks with the Hun Sen government in July 1990 (Solomon, 2000: 45-6). Economically, in addition to the lifting of economic sanctions against the SOC, the US decided to provide approximately $10 million of humanitarian aid to the de facto Cambodian government (Haas, 1991: 237, 286; Richardson, 2009: 149).

Nevertheless, the SOC viewed the Framework Document’s proposals, especially the proposals on the transitional authority, as harmful to its goals. Although the preservation of its organisation was good news for the SOC, UNTAC’s control over electoral processes would remove the privileges that the SOC’s governmental status had afforded. Moreover, since the PDK’s guerrilla forces were more easily able to avoid UNTAC verification of their demobilisation, the dissolution of all military forces was likely to benefit the PDK. These views were reflected in their responses toward the US’s increased pressure.

Despite the SOC’s reservations, the strengthened incentives and pressure from the US, together with the transformation in its advocate state’s diplomatic position, convinced the SOC to adopt more a flexible attitude in the peace negotiations (Solomon, 1999: 311).

Pointing to this, Son Soubert, a core leader of the KPNLF and a son of Son Sann, explains:

> The international community, especially the UN and the US, applied strong pressure on us (the four national factions) to accept their peace proposals.

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62 Vietnam, which had developed a closer relationship with China, withdrew its demands for a minimal role for UNTAC in this period.
However, their goals were different from ours. Nonetheless, for all of us, it was very difficult to escape their pressure. We saw Hun Sen announce that the SOC would accept most of the UN’s proposals, but we did not take the announcement as reflecting his true intention (Son Soubert, 2009: Author’s Interview).

Accepting the SNC as an unavoidable reality, the SOC changed its main strategy from claiming legitimacy as the sole government to maximising its interest in the council. For example, two weeks after the announcement of the UN’s ‘Framework Document,’ the Cambodian national factions agreed to form a twelve-member Supreme National Council (Solomon, 2000: 73) and endorsed the Framework Document (Accord, 1998: 19; Doyle, 1995: 17).

Under pressure from the international community, the negotiations between the Cambodian national factions on the composition of the SNC progressed throughout 1990. The CGDK initially demanded that each faction should hold 25 per cent of the SNC membership, whereas the SOC insisted on a membership formula comprising a 50:50 distribution between the SOC and the CGDK (Haas, 1991: 203-5). The breakthrough came in April 1990, when Prince Sihanouk accepted a 6:6 distribution of seats between the SOC (Haas, 1991: 232). Two weeks later, in exchange of these developments, the SOC accepted the PDK as part of the authority. These proposals were reconfirmed when Sihanouk and Hun Sen met in Japan in June 1990 (Lizée, 1999: 66-67; Haas, 1991: 282). In short, Hun Sen gained a concession from the CGDK on the composition of the SNC’s membership while acquiescing to the inclusion of the PDK (Solomon, 1999: 312).

The SOC continued to exhibit a relatively flexible attitude in the subsequent period. For instance, when the foreign ministers of the UN P-5 and the UN Secretary-General urged the
SOC to accept Sihanouk as the chairman of the SNC in September 1990, the faction revised its adamant adherence to the ‘no leader’ idea and proposed ‘some compromise formulae such as co-chairs and rotation patterns’ (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 77). As the PRK’s attitudes became more receptive, the internal confrontation on Hun Sen’s reformist ideas against traditional socialist stance exacerbated in mid 1990. The hardliners in the PRK/SOC pressed the prime minister to be tougher in the negotiation; nevertheless, Hun Sen continued its policies (Haas, 1991: 235-7). Ultimately, the Cambodian parties proclaimed the first ceasefire in April 1991 (Accord, 1998: 19).

In short, the US and other third-party interveners succeeded in pressurising the PRK to consent to their core demands on demilitarisation and the transitional authority. However, the national factions’ collaboration on ending the conflict, based as it was on diplomatic and economic incentives and pressure from the US and other impartial interveners, would not last long.

**Phase 3: End of 1990 – October 1991**

During Phase 3, the PRK challenged the external intervention, while the international community, including the UN, exhibited much less enthusiasm in promoting the progress of the conflict resolution process in Cambodia. Thus, many of the UN proposals that had gained the agreement of the Cambodian national factions were reversed or significantly modified.

Recognising that the international community had become less enthusiastic about involvement in the Cambodian peace process and acknowledging the increased Chinese support for more independent roles for the national factions (Lizée, 1999: 72)\(^{63}\), the SOC tried to exclude external actors from involvement in the Cambodian factions’ discussions on

\(^{63}\) The details of Chinese policies on the Cambodian issue are discussed in Chapter 4.
the peace processes. The SOC’s first goal in this period was resisting the UNTAC arrangement (Solomon, 2000: 74). Since there was much less pressure being applied by the Western interveners, Hun Sen’s only *de facto* obstacle was the strong resistance of the PDK against any compromise.

In pursuing his goals, Hun Sen used two strategies: developing a good relationship with China and convincing other CGDK leaders to agree to his proposals, with the aim of minimising the negotiating power of the PDK. First, he utilised China’s willingness to support the peace negotiation. For instance, when the PDK refused to accept the proposal on Sihanouk’s role as SNC chairman and the composition of the SNC (7:7), which the other factions had agreed at the meeting in Jakarta in early June 1991, Hun Sen ignored the opposition while securing continued PDK participation in the negotiations by taking advantage of the improving relationship between Vietnam and China to apply pressure on the PDK (Lizée, 1999: 73). As a result, this meeting became ‘the beginning of a major breakthrough’ in the negotiation process (Brown, 1992: 90).

Second, he tried to gain unanimous agreement for his proposals from the other two CGDK groups. For example, when UNTAC’s proposed role was on the table in Pattaya in August 1991, the SOC succeeded in reversing the decisions of the UN’s P-5 on the transitional authority. In the discussions, the SOC claimed that direct control by UNTAC merely amounted to further governance by a foreign power, and little more than a continuation of the one hundred-year long French colonisation, but the strong regional influence of the US was relatively successful in persuading the other factions to agree to UNTAC control.  

Furthermore, it persuaded other Cambodian factions to reverse a number of international

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64 For instance, Lu Lay Sreng, the first vice-president of FUNCINPEC, said, “It was ridiculous that the PRK, the puppet of Vietnam, talked about Cambodians’ rule. However, although I didn’t trust the words much, we couldn’t say it was wrong that Cambodia should be ruled by Cambodians” (Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview).
interveners’ decisions on the transitional authority.

A number of important decisions related to the transitional authority were made in this period and included the following: (1) resolution of all disagreements within the SNC should occur through its internal conflict resolution mechanism rather than by simply complying with the decisions of UNTAC; (2) the SNC should assume greater legitimacy than a nominal representative of Cambodian sovereignty and should play an increased role in the peace process; (3) and each factions’ military capacity should be reduced by 70 per cent rather than undergoing complete dissolution (Final Communiqué of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, 29 August 1991, U.N. document A/46/494 and S/23066, 24 September 1991; PCC Co-Chairs report, A/46/418 and S/23011, 4 September 1991).

These decisions were clearly beneficial to the SOC’s pursuit of its interests and ran contrary to the proposals suggested by the UN. The first two decisions provided the SOC with grounds to intervene and refuse to accept UNTAC’s implementation policies. The last decision enabled the SOC to possess a military capability, which it considered essential in order to defend itself against possible attacks by the PDK. In short, the SOC was able to maintain its superior status in terms of administrative and military organisation during the transitional period.

However, the decisions would make realisation of the UN P-5’s ideas very difficult, if not impossible. First, establishing a neutral political environment for the election by eliminating the existing political powers would be difficult because the UN had consented to the retention of the SOC’s administration in its ‘Framework Document’ of August 1990, and the SOC could exploit its position as the de facto government by drawing on the relatively autonomous power of the SNC. Second, although the SOC’s preservation of 30 per cent of its military forces was crucially important to the pursuit of its interests, this decision made UNTAC’s
verification of the demilitarisation process very difficult. Thus, the Cambodian national factions were able to keep military forces in reserve in order to resist UNTAC’s implementation with force if necessary.

Nevertheless, the US did not pay sufficient attention to the issues that lay behind the Cambodian national factions’ modification of the UN’s proposals. The country in this period displayed an ambivalent posture. In early 1991, American domestic outrage against the PDK, boosted by mass media coverage of its disastrous rule (by ABC in particular), dampened the Bush administration’s enthusiasm for coordinating the Cambodian resistance groups’ behaviour (Solomon, 2000: 66-9). Therefore, the United States distanced itself from the PDK and began to establish a closer relationship with Vietnam and the SOC by enhancing economic cooperation and by opening talks on the return of American MIAs still held in Vietnam (Haas, 1991: 286). However, this strategy did not produce the expected outcomes because the PRK gradually tried to be more independent from Vietnam as the PRK believed Vietnam became more selfish (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview). Moreover, the Bush government became increasingly uncomfortable with the unpredictable and independent attitude of Sihanouk and considered supporting General Sak Sutsakhan as an alternative candidate to head a democratic government in Cambodia (Haas, 1991: 257).

Hence, the US and other international interveners did not play an active role. Rather, they left the decisions on the detailed issues of the proposal to the factions themselves rather than making sustained efforts to develop a blueprint for the transitional authority (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 92). For instance, although the US had chances to raise its concerns about the Pattaya agreements at the P-5 session on the last day of the Pattaya meeting, at a final SNC meeting convened by the P-5 in late September, and at the meeting between President Bush and Sihanouk in September, it failed to do so (Solomon, 2000: 76-7).
As a result, the second PCC in October 1991 produced four agreements. The transitional authorities consisted of three main organisations: UNTAC, a UN body supervising the implementation process; the SNC, a council representing Cambodian sovereignty; and the PRK government. Moreover, with regard to demilitarisation, at least 70 per cent of all existing factions were supposed to be demobilised (Political Settlement Agreement Annex 2 Article V).

The agreements were the hybrid of the UN P-5’s proposal and the national factions’ modifications. However, the hybrids were a simple mixture of the ideas that had been moulded by the actors’ differing perceptions rather than a compromise between them.\(^65\) First, some basic themes of liberal peace, such as free and fair elections and freedom from human rights abuse, were incorporated into the agreements. Furthermore, the agreements generally heeded the P-5’s call for UNTAC’s central role in administrative issues. The governmental sectors, particularly the ones dealing with foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, and information were to be directly controlled by UNTAC (Political Settlement Agreement, Part I, Section II, Article 2).

Second, however, the SNC became a nationalist authority that would not permit a foreign power (UNTAC) to become the dominant force in Cambodia. The Paris agreements accepted that the SNC, a ‘unique legitimate body and source of authority’, ‘offers advice to UNTAC, which will comply with this advice’ (Political Settlement Agreement, Part I, Section III & Annex 1, Section A, Article 2-b). In fact, the power of the SNC expanded beyond the level that the UN had envisioned in its original proposal, which had limited the role of the SNC to

\(^65\) In fact, the conference in Paris was a process to aggregate pre-consented agreements rather than another forum for discussion.
mere ‘consultation’ (Implementation Plan, November 1991, cited in Lizée, 1999: 92). Moreover, the UN P-5’s decision to entrust administration to the SOC structure during the transitional period should have been reconsidered. Since the intention had been for the UN to wield absolute power during the transitional period, preservation of the SOC structure did not appear to be a serious problem. However, once the SNC was allowed to play a relatively independent role, and since the SOC controlled the majority of seats in the SNC, it should have been foreseen that the SOC would attempt to dominate the election process. However, believing that the SOC would ‘tolerate without giving away their pre-election advantage’, international interveners simply accepted the UN’s proposal, a proposal that had been made under completely different assumptions of the role that the UN would take during the transitional period (Brown, 1992: 92; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 102).

In short, the reduced enthusiasm of the US and other external third parties allowed the PRK to renegotiate and modify the pre-agreed provisions in Phase 3. As the interveners simply adopted these changed ideas without considering their outcomes at the PCC, the final peace agreements became a poorly coordinated mixture of Western ideas of peace and the Cambodian national factions’ decision to resist the ideas.

**Phase 4: October 1991 – July 1993**

After the PPAs, the efforts of the Cambodian national factions to challenge the UN’s proposal became more evident. During this period, external actors did not pay much attention to the Cambodian peace processes, assuming that the negotiation process had ended and the remaining issues were solely about ‘implementation’ of the agreed processes. However, this

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66 What is more, the details of how to balance the administrative power of UNTAC and the legitimate power of the SNC remained unaddressed. Inevitably, disputes between the actors on how to interpret the agreements arose.
was another mistaken assumption underpinned by the external actors’ ethnocentric interpretation of negotiation, and the Cambodian national factions (except for the KPNLF) continued to try to renegotiate or redefine the details of the agreement in order to achieve their fundamental goals (Heder, 1999: 115). While the PDK tried to transform the unfavourable political situation by demonstrating its military power, the SOC tried to justify and expand its political dominance via political tactics.

The SOC’s efforts chiefly consisted of the following strategies: alliance with Sihanouk in the SNC, marginalisation of UNTAC in the governing process, renegotiation with international actors, and refusal to accept the election results (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 91-161). First, during the initial phase of the implementation, Hun Sen tried to justify and expand the SOC’s power in the SNC through an alliance with FUNCINPEC. Consulting closely in a power-sharing arrangement, Sihanouk and Hun Sen collaborated to exclude the PDK from playing a part in the implementation of the PPAs. For instance, on the evening of his arrival in Phnom Penh on 7 November 1991, Prince Sihanouk called for an international tribunal on the rule of the Khmer Rouge and its atrocities. In addition, Hun Sen allowed (if not organised) a violent attack by Cambodian mobs on the PDK representatives to take place in the same month (Gottesman, 2004: 345). Soon after, an alliance was forged between FUNCINPEC and the SOC for the forthcoming election (Heder, 1999: 136-8).

Second, after gaining a firm powerbase in the SNC, Hun Sen made efforts to reduce UNTAC’s authority and to secure real administrative power for the SOC government from early 1992 onwards. The SOC’s efforts to hamper the effectiveness of UNTAC activities included ignoring orders from UNTAC, attacks on UNTAC contingents, and refusing to

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67 Although the former negotiators of FUNCINPEC, the SOC, and the KPNLF did not admit that they planned to renegotiate the Paris Peace Agreements, most of them insisted that ‘other factions’, especially the PDK and the SOC, were ready to ‘oppose’ or ‘redefine’ the agreements (Lu Lay Sreng; Son Soubert; three former assistants of factional leaders who do not want to reveal their names, Author’s Interview, 2009).
provide necessary facilities to the authority (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 103, 105-6, 110-1; Mu Sochua, 2009: Author’s Interview). As a result, UNTAC’s control was ‘never more than partial and begrudging’ (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 107; Peou, 2002: 516-7), and the national election processes were frequently disordered by the SOC.

Third, the SOC tried to renegotiate the popular vote principle agreed upon at the PPAs. As the SOC and the PDK-orchestrated political violence became serious enough for international interveners to anticipate a return to civil war, international actors, including China and France, expressed the need to seek an alternative approach to forming a new government. Based on these prominent international actors’ concerns, in January 1993, the SNC decided to ‘reconsider the peace agreement’ and to establish a government of national reconciliation (Lizée, 1999: 111-3). The intention was to form a government that would be headed by Sihanouk and include all the Cambodian factions so that the forthcoming election did not result in another military conflict. Although the SNC’s proposition failed to materialise because of strong opposition from the US, which insisted that any future government should reflect the people’s democratic will, the SOC did not abandon its desire to secure its prominence (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 146-61).

The election result was released in June 1993, with the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, the political party of the SOC) gaining 38 per cent of the votes and FUNCINPEC 45 per cent (Solomon, 2000: 90). Despite all its machinations, the SOC had failed to secure victory, and Hun Sen refused to accept the result and threatened to resume military operations (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 167-8). However, after a period of resistance against the newly elected government, the CPP entered negotiations, and Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh (a son of Sihanouk and the leader of FUNCINPEC) assumed co-premiership (Ashley, 1998: 24). Therefore, although the election was supposed to reflect the democratic will of Cambodians,
the government was actually formed in accordance with the factional leaders’ objective of establishing a government of national reconciliation.

During this period, external interveners, with the exception of the UN, did not play significant roles in the implementation of the Cambodian peace process. The international interveners regarded the PPAs as having concluded the negotiations and wanted to declare peace and withdraw from involvement in the Cambodian issue as soon as possible (Lizée, 1999: 124). Rather than devising and employing additional strategies to persuade or coerce the Cambodian national factions to implement the peace agreements, the interveners paid most attention to technical issues related to the dispatch of UNTAC, which included mobilisation of resources, recruitment of staff and military forces, and logistics (Doyle, 2000: 160-1, 164). Hence, when the national factions ‘violated’ the agreement and changed the conditions related to the election, international actors did nothing more than simply call for ‘keeping the internationally consented agreement’ or accepting the changed situation as a reality (Lizée, 1999: 111-3).

Moreover, the less enthusiastic involvement of external actors in the implementation issues caused the UNTAC implementation plan to be delayed. In fact, it was not until 15 March 1992, six months after the Paris Conference, that UNTAC began to operate in Phnom Penh. Although a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was dispatched as a stopgap, UNAMIC’s limited mandate and resources prevented it from establishing effective control over the country in the transitional period (Doyle, 1997: 159; Lizée 1999: 99). During the period between the PPAs and the dispatch of UNTAC, the Cambodian national factions, especially the SOC, had a relatively long time in which to develop and employ political strategies that would ensure that conditions in the run up to the election favoured their faction (Heder, 1999: 117).
As a result, UNTAC’s mandate, which was ‘the first and largest of its kind in UN history’, achieved only partial success. In terms of supervising the national election and overseeing the transitional period, UNTAC succeeded in enabling 90 per cent of registered voters to exercise their franchise and in encouraging the Cambodian politicians to establish a new assembly and government. However, the UN’s more ambitious vision of establishing and maintaining a neutral political environment for the free and fair election of a new government based on a popular democratic mandate could not be realised (Solomon, 2000: 90; Heininger, 1994: 88-90; Ashley, 1998: 24; Lizée, 1999: 128). In other words, through its incessant efforts to overcome the obstacles posed by the UN’s peace proposal, the PRK finally achieved its goal, gaining a prominent position in the new government.

To summarise, there are two points that this section has intended to make. First, it presented the way in which the pattern of interplay between the two actors changed according to the phase of the negotiation. When the incentives and pressures from external interveners were strong, the PRK/SOC pretended to accept the suggested proposal. However, when it saw a possibility to pursue its objectives in the third phase of the negotiation, the PRK/SOC tried to change the UN proposal by excluding external actors from the national factions’ negotiation processes, by convincing other national leaders, and by using the power of regional states, including China and Vietnam. Furthermore, the international interveners simply accepted the modified proposals rather than considering their possible outcomes. As a result, the PPAs became a confused mix of incompatible ideas based on Western or Cambodian perceptions of violence, peace, and negotiation (Figure 5.1 summarises this pattern).

During the implementation period, the PRK/SOC’s attempts to secure its own interests became more direct and obvious during the implementation phase. Although the interveners considered the negotiations concluded by the PPAs, the Cambodian national factions wanted
to continue their negotiation. Eventually, although UNTAC succeeded in realising a nationwide election, the shape of the Cambodian central power was decided mainly by the national factions’ negotiation.

Second, the ‘bounded awareness’ of actors due to their ethnocentric cultural values generated conceptions that created a number of perceptual barriers that hampered the effectiveness of the Cambodian peace negotiations. Specifically (as shown in Table 5.1), throughout the peace process, the US’s definition of what constituted the transitional period and its long-term vision of peace prevented it from producing more realistic peace proposals that reflected the
Cambodian factions’ fundamental interests. Moreover, especially during Phase 2, different understandings of violence and the withdrawal of the PAVN created significant obstacles to sound communication between the interveners and the PRK. In Phase 4, the differences between the Cambodian factions’ and third-party interveners’ understandings of negotiation played a particularly significant role as a barrier to the successful outcome of the peace process.

Table 5.1. Major Perceptual Barriers in the Cambodian Negotiation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Fundamental Goals</th>
<th>Definition of Transitional Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Understanding of Violence / Withdrawal of PAVN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>Understanding of Negotiation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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EL SALVADOR

This section focuses on the interplay between the United Nations and the FMLN in the Salvadoran peace negotiation. The purpose of the narrative section is to help illustrate the inter-party interaction and how the parties reacted to each other’s moves. As described in Chapter 2, the UN became involved in many civil wars as an impartial mediator between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, including those in Namibia, El Salvador, and Haiti. In particular, the UN Secretariat’s active role was one of the most important factors in promoting the relative success of the Salvadoran peace negotiation. The FMLN, a coalition of five revolutionary military movements, was the counterpart of the Cristiani government in the
Salvadoran peace negotiations. The FMLN’s transformation provides a good example of how an armed rebel group can become a legal political party through peaceful negotiation.

As for the intervening actor, it needs to be noted that while the UN Security Council was at the forefront of the UN’s intervention in Cambodia, the UN Secretary-General and his representatives played the main roles in the Salvadoran mediation. Moreover, while the Security Council tried to exert pressure on the Cambodian national factions to accept its own peace proposals, in El Salvador, the Secretary-General paid most attention to sustaining the negotiations, leaving the conclusions open.

**Cultural Values of Actors**

In contrast to the Cambodian case, the actors’ cultural traits did not seriously hamper the development of a mutual understanding between the FMLN and the UN since the Salvadoran rebel group shared similar ideas about negotiation and peace, and they maintained constant and regular communication.

A number of factors shaped the Salvadoran negotiators’ perceptions of negotiation, peace, and violence. First, direct Spanish colonialism, which lasted for approximately 300 years, had insulated Central American people (in particular, social elites) from their indigenous cultures and formed a new political culture (Prisk, 1991: 118). Secondly, as Christian priests had led anti-authoritarian movements since the 1940s, and the core leaders of the FMLN were highly educated intellectuals, the military insurgents were well aware of Western themes such as human rights, and democracy (Negroponte, 2005: 101-4; McClintock, 1998: 253-6). Thirdly, since the Salvadoran government had conducted a series of regular and (relatively) fair elections during the 1980s, Salvadoran people understood what democracy was about.
Finally, Marxism-Leninism, which formed the FMLN’s ideological background, provided its main framework for viewing the world (Grenier, 1991: 51-55).

Thus, the FMLN’s understanding of some of the core issues related to the peace negotiations was similar to that of the Western interveners. As regards the FMLN’s concept of negotiation, although the FMLN’s approach to negotiation was quite different from the Western (and North American) interveners’ time-honoured problem-solving concept (Prisk, 1991: 118), the faction’s leaders, who had been educated at the National University, managed the ‘give-and-take’ mutual concessions well during the Salvadoran peace process based on their conception of negotiation as a political task whose aim is to convince other actors to agree with their ideas (Juhn, 1998: 93). With regard to liberal peace, through their experience of regular elections and socialist ideas, both the Cristiani government and the FMLN were in agreement with the UN’s ideas on ‘peace through [a] democratic political process’ and the Western idea of ‘the domestic and international legitimacy’ of a political authority (Sullivan, 1994: 84; Juhn, 1998: 46, 55). In terms of their attitudes to violence, the FMLN’s Marxist-Leninist philosophy considered military action an indispensable part of popular revolution and not incompatible with democracy (Grenier, 1991: 62-3). Additionally, the faction assumed that continued demonstration of its military power was essential in order to prevent the government attempting a military solution (Villalobos, 1989, cited in Grenier, 1991: 56-7, 63). Thus, despite strong criticism from many internal and external actors, the FMLN recommenced its military campaign against the government during the negotiation process (Americas Watch Report, 1990). Nevertheless, as it maintained effective communication routes with the UN, the FMLN was able to make assurances that its use of violence aimed to strengthen its position in the negotiations and not to spoil the negotiations themselves (Juhn, 1998: 72).
The Aims of Actors

Until the mid-1980s, the FMLN’s fundamental goal was the ‘triumph of the democratic revolution, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialistic’ through ‘defeat of the counterinsurgency project’, or in short, a military victory (FDR-FMLN, ‘Pacto político’ (March 1987) cited in Grenier, 1991: 53).

By 1989, however, the FMLN had realised that it had lost its chance to achieve its objective, and it therefore set more realistic goals. First, in terms of demilitarisation, it sought total dissolution of the government’s military force, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (Armada de El Salvador, ESAF), and the death squads, including the rapid action battalions (Brigada Infantería Reaccionamente Inmediamente, BIRIs) in the security corps, the Treasury Police, the National Guard and the National Directorate of Intelligence (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia; DNI) (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 1990; Juhn, 1998: 62). Disbanding the army was critically important for the FMLN since the ESAF leadership had been in de facto control of the country for decades (Mouritsen, 2003: 65) and many of its former members had joined the FMLN because of their abhorrence towards the ESAF’s human rights abuses.

Second, in terms of the transitional authority (and in contrast to the Cambodian resistance actors, who denied the legitimacy of the PRK), the FMLN accepted the Cristiani administration as the legitimate government in the late 1980s. Although it had originally demanded a provisional government in which it could share power with the government, the FMLN decided to accept the existing political system and to participate in the forthcoming elections as a legitimate political party (Prisk, 1991: 119; Juhn, 1998: 47; Grenier, 1991:

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68 The death squads are believed to have been responsible for many civilian deaths, which “peaked at about 800 a month in the early 1980s.” In particular, the National Guard and Treasury Police were notorious as the most brutal ones (Mouritsen, 2003: 66-7).
In addition, it also requested the integration of demobilised FMLN soldiers into the ESAF or, alternatively, the formation of a new national army (Karl, 1992: no pagination).

During the negotiations, the FMLN employed the following main strategies to pressure the Cristiani government into accepting its demands. Firstly, due to its strong suspicion about the government’s potential for duplicity and its fear that the government would renege on any agreements, the military group invited and used the UN as an external mediator. Secondly, it frequently conducted military offensives immediately prior to its meetings with the government in order to demonstrate its military power. Thirdly, in the later phase of the negotiations, it used popular demonstrations and the media to influence other domestic actors and external interveners.

Although the UN did not present specific blueprints for the resolution of El Salvador’s conflict, its main goal was ‘to end the armed conflict by political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadorian society’ (Geneva Accord (April, 1990) cited in De Soto, 1999: 362; Munck, 1993: 90). In particular, in keeping with liberal peace ideas, the UN saw the establishment of a democratic political system that respected human rights as one of its primary goals, regarding it as indispensable for guaranteeing a sustainable peace in El Salvador’s (Whitfield, 2001: 36).

Assuming a neutral mediatory role, the UN made concerted efforts to produce compromise peace proposals by using the following strategies. First, the UN consistently demonstrated its neutral position in the negotiations by demonstrating that it considered the FMLN an official negotiation actor and by treating the Cristiani government and the FMLN as equal contenders.

69 The FMLN also called for changes in the socioeconomic structure of society and investigation into and punishment of human rights abuses. However, this thesis excludes these issues from the analysis in order to make this section more focused.
Interplay between the Actors in the Negotiation Process

Phase 1: June 1989 – May 1990

Phase 1 began in June 1989, when Alfredo Cristiani was elected as president, and ended in May 1990 when the two national factions held their first direct meetings. The negotiations in this phase focused on confidence building and technical issues related to the future plans and agenda items to be discussed (De Soto, 1999: 362). Moreover, a constant pattern of interplay between the UN and the FMLN was established in this period: the UN’s neutral but empathetic stance towards the FMLN and the FMLN’s compliance with the UN’s mediation. Since the two mutually suspicious factions had had no previous interaction, the UN’s mediation focused on facilitating meetings. First, the UN began shuttle diplomacy to exchange ideas between the national factions before beginning the actual talks (Negroponte,
Second, the UN produced a number of provisional draft agreements that would provide the foundations for the negotiations. These drafts were particularly important at the Mexico City meeting in March 1990 and the Geneva Accords in April as a starting point for the negotiations (Sullivan, 1994: 83; Juhn, 1998: 54). Third, at the meetings in Geneva (in April) and in Caracas (in May), the UN’s role as a negotiation moderator was prominent. It supervised and contributed to the meeting by presenting proposals, leading separate discussions with the national factions, and revising the proposals (De Soto, 1999: 359-60; Negroponte, 2005: 134).

Throughout its mediation, the UN’s strong commitment to treating the two warring factions as equal negotiators was particularly important in encouraging the FMLN to remain at the negotiating table. Despite continuous requests by the San Salvador government and the US to regard the incumbent administration as El Salvador’s legitimate government and the FMLN as an inferior (or illegal) military group, the UN made it clear that it respected both sides equally (Negroponte, 2005: 283).

The FMLN generally complied with the UN’s mediation in this period. In fact, it was the FMLN that requested the UN’s intervention in December 1989. Since the faction was not happy with the existing regional peace mediators (under the Esquipulas initiative), a more neutral and impartial alternative third-party intervener was necessary (Negroponte, 2005: 287-8). Initially, the faction had suspicions that the UN was unduly influenced by the United States (Negroponte, 2005: 284, 290; Sullivan, 1994: 85). As the UN’s neutral and impartial role in the negotiations became clearer, however, the FMLN made use of the UN’s presence in the negotiations.

Before the bilateral talks, the FMLN relied heavily on the UN envoys’ transmission of information because it had no direct route through which to contact Cristiani (De Soto, 1999: 278; De Soto, 1999: 361).
Moreover, in consultation with the UN, the FMLN demonstrated its willingness to negotiate by tabling a number of unilateral plans for negotiation or suspension of hostilities with conditions favourable to the government (Juhn, 1998: 55, 57).

After the bilateral negotiations began, the FMLN demonstrated its willingness to make concessions on topics under discussion that were critically important to the faction. For instance, when the principles and procedural issues were discussed in Geneva in April, the rebel group abandoned its request for power sharing in exchange for the government consenting to the FMLN’s full integration into civil society (De Soto, 1999: 360). Moreover, it also succeeded in engineering a mutual compromise at the Caracas meeting on the agenda and rough timetable of future negotiations (Sullivan, 1994: 89; De Soto, 1999: 362-3).

To summarise, the UN’s neutral but limited coordination succeeded in encouraging the FMLN to participate more actively in the peace negotiation. The two important agreements in Geneva and Caracas were arrived at without serious difficulty. However, the relatively successful start in Phase 1 was also partly because the negotiations did not deal with contentious issues and the government did not take the talks seriously (De Soto, 1999: 362).

**Phase 2: May 1990 – December 1990**

Phase 2 marks the period between late May and the end of 1990 in which the negotiations experienced a series of deadlocks. Each national faction moulded their demands on the disputed issues into specific proposals, which resulted in serious resistance from their counterparts. Both employed tactical intransigence in the negotiations in order to improve their bargaining positions. In response, the UN intensified its mediating role, but its tactics failed to achieve a breakthrough.

Recognising the deadlock in Phase 2, the UN tried to strengthen its mediation. However, as
tension between the two national factions exacerbated, the UN’s coordination of the negotiations’ procedural and technical issues did not work. For instance, when serious friction between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN on demilitarisation emerged in June at the Oaxtepec meeting in Mexico, the UN tried to drive the negotiations forward by setting the issue aside. As the two sides called for the UN’s help, Alvaro de Soto, a representative of the UN Secretary General, proposed that the focus of the negotiations should be on human rights and that the issue of demilitarisation could be dealt with later (Negroponte, 2005: 135).

Nevertheless, the FMLN ignored the suggestion and revised its demands, submitting more radical ones at the San José meeting in Costa Rica and conducting military attacks against the government in August.

Sensing the prospect of a long-term deadlock, the UN took more direct action: submission of its own peace proposals (Juhn, 1998: 71, 76; De Soto, 1999: 374). In so doing, it abandoned its traditional position as a simple mediator that managed procedural issues and confidence building only. However, the two negotiating sides were not persuaded by these proposals and were unable to reach an agreement.

Nevertheless, the UN Secretariat did not exert strong diplomatic or material pressure on the FMLN, worrying that this may have a negative effect (Juhn, 1998: 72). Instead, Alvaro de Soto continued to have secret meetings with the two factions until the end of the year (Montgomery, 1992: 221).

The FMLN maintained its stubborn attitude towards the UN proposals. Believing that concessions would weaken its negotiating position and might help ARENA achieve victory in the forthcoming election in March 1991 (Juhn, 1998: 74), the military faction relied on the following two strategies.
First, the FMLN continually increased its demands at each new meeting. For example, although it had simply called for the removal of the ESAF from its domestic policing role at the June meeting in Oaxtepec, Mexico (Juhn, 1998: 61), it demanded the complete dissolution of the ESAF and the creation of a new civilian police at subsequent meetings (Sullivan, 1994: 90; Montgomery, 1992: 221).

Second, the FMLN began to conduct military operations and employ them as a negotiation strategy, marking the beginning of a pattern of behaviour by the FMLN: submission of a proposal accompanied by a demonstration of its military power. For instance, a day before the San José meeting in August 1990, the FMLN made an attack on the Presidential Palace in San Salvador. In the belief that such a display of its military muscle would strengthen its position, it did not abandon this strategy until the end of the negotiations, despite strong criticism from external interveners (Juhn, 1998: 70-3).

In short, although the UN changed its role from ‘a passive mediator’ to ‘an active player’ in Phase 2 (Montgomery, 1992: 221), its new type of involvement did not produce the expected responses from the FMLN. Thus, the meetings held in Oaxtepec (June), in San José (July/August), and in Mexico City (October/November) ended without significant progress having been made on demilitarisation and reintegration.

One important agreement, however, was made in June: an agreement to launch the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission (Sullivan, 1994: 89). Although it was relatively easy for the two national factions to agree on a proposal to set up a human rights monitoring authority, it eventually resulted in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador, ONUSAL), a UN body that supervised the implementation of the

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70 The only exception was the FMLN’s agreement to talk about the human rights issue in June. However, this acceptance caused a strong internal dispute as some commandantes condemned this agreement (Negroponte, 1996: 133-5).
peace accords in Phase 4.


Phase 3 occurred from December 1990, when the FMLN began to display a more flexible attitude, to January 1992, when the Chapultepec Accord was signed. All actors, including the UN and the two national factions, were under strong pressure to secure a peace agreement. Throughout the intense but difficult process, the UN applied more proactive mediating methods, while the FMLN became much more responsive to the UN’s supervision.

In this period, the UN faced three notable challenges: continuous US pressure on the UN to make more aggressive moves; the national factions’ lack of enthusiasm for compromise; and other domestic actors’ attempts to participate in the negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 86-98). Given these circumstances, therefore, the UN applied the following strategies in order to effect a more fruitful outcome to the negotiation.

First, the UN’s traditional shuttle diplomacy with its own proposals achieved more success. For instance, the UN’s formula on the National Civil Police (PNC) broke the two-month long stalemate between the two national factions (Juhn, 1998: 107; Sullivan, 1994: 96). To secure both sides’ agreement to this proposal, UN negotiators made numerous visits to the factions between October and December 1991 (Juhn, 1998: 110-1).

Second, the UN Secretariat succeeded in increasing other actors’ pressure on the negotiating parties. Most significantly, it organised the Friends, which consisted of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Spain, in December 1989. Using their cultural and political affinity with the national factions, impartiality as a third party, international influence, and personal connection with the leaders in El Salvador, the group’s negotiators supported the UN’s efforts (Montgomery, 1995: 145; Whitfield, 2007).
In addition, after the failure of its initial efforts, the UN succeeded in persuading the US to support its efforts in August 1991 (De Soto, 1999: 374-5; Montgomery, 1995: 144-5). Moving away from its support of the Cristiani government, the US became more proactive in pressing the government not to obstruct or withdraw from the negotiations and in assuring the FMLN that it would respect the UN’s efforts (Sullivan, 1994: 88; Juhn, 1998: 116).

Third, as more domestic actors began to express their viewpoints on the negotiations, the UN tried to discourage these new actors from hampering the process for their partisan interests. For instance, when the PDC, together with other political parties, presented their own proposals on constitutional reform, the UN did not take them on board, insisting that the negotiator should be the government that was elected by the Salvadoran people (De Soto, 1999: 90-1).

Fourth, the last significant strategy of the UN was demonstrating its determination to implement the agreements. A striking example was the launch of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in July 1990 while military conflict was still ongoing. By conducting balanced verification projects on both sides in the war, ONUSAL succeeded in reducing the level of human rights violations, building confidence in the implementation process, and gaining trust as an impartial actor (Negroponte, 2005: 302-3; Whitfield, 2001: 36).

The increasing internal demands (e.g. constituencies’ increasing criticism of the prolonged conflict) and external pressures (e.g., Nicaragua’s suspension of logistic support) to end hostilities and achieve a successful outcome to the negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 79, 106; Negroponte, 2005: 325; Sullivan, 1994: 86) encouraged the FMLN not to boycott or sabotage the negotiation. Besides, the group had developed a more positive outlook towards the negotiations after the New York Agreement in September (Juhn, 1998: 109). Thus, the FMLN demonstrated its adoption of a strategically more flexible stance by reducing its demands,
actively cooperating with external actors’ mediation, and reducing its military threat. In so doing, it was clear that its dependence on the UN’s role was growing (Juhn, 1998: 103; Montgomery, 1992: 222).

First, after requesting an intensification of the UN’s mediation in December 1990 (Montgomery, 1992: 222), the FMLN began to make concessions, the most striking examples of which began in April 1991. First, the faction dropped its original demand that Constitution Article 248 be changed. Since this article requires that all constitutional changes need to be approved by two consecutive assemblies, all negotiations on the Salvadoran constitutions had to be completed before the new assembly began its term in April. Moreover, in discussions about the reform of the constitution in relation to demilitarisation, it abandoned its long-time demand for the inclusion of demilitarised FMLN soldiers in the ranks of the military, in exchange for absorbing FMLN soldiers into the National Civil Police (PNC) (Pugh, 2009: 97-8).

Second, concerned about the slow pace of the negotiations, the FMLN also proposed changes to their format. Abandoning its original demand for open-ended negotiations, it called for a remodelling of the talks from their two-stage format into a compressed format in which the negotiators would discuss all issues before the proposed ceasefire came into force in June (Sullivan, 1994: 92-5).

Third, after painstaking negotiations in mid-1991, the FMLN also made unilateral concessions on some critical issues. For instance, recognising that mutual dissolution of both sides was unacceptable to the government, the rebel group decided to change its demand from a ‘dissolution’ of the government forces to their ‘profound reform’, including

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71 Immediately after the meetings in September, Handal, a core leader of the FMLN, confirmed this transformation by saying, “We don’t want to lose one more person; we’re all going into politics. We don’t want to make shows of force. Let’s not screw up two months of work” (Juhn, 1998: 109-10).
fundamental changes to the doctrines and training system of the ESAF and the PNC (Juhn, 1998: 102-3).

Fourth, in the final period of the negotiations (October - December), the FMLN began to make efforts to change the circumstances that limited President Cristiani’s negotiating power. For instance, the FMLN undertook a unilateral ceasefire on November 16th in order to weaken the resistance of the ESAF against its dissolution (Juhn, 1998: 109-15). Moreover, when the government organised a popular march that called for a tougher approach against the FMLN in the negotiations, the FMLN also called a mass demonstration against the army and appealed to the media to exert pressure on the government to continue the negotiations in December (Juhn, 1998: 117).

As a result, the Cristiani government and the FMLN produced some important peace agreements, although each of them required intense and painstaking negotiation. The Mexico City Accord of April 1991 was particularly notable because both sides arrived at a principle-level agreement on demilitarisation and the UN Truth Commission (Negroponte, 2005: 313-4; Sullivan, 1994: 91-2). The New York Accord in September made further important progress on the issues of demilitarisation and human rights (Montgomery, 1992: 224; Sullivan, 1994: 94-5). Finally, the Chapultepec Peace Accord, signed on 16 January 1992, ended the decades-long civil war in El Salvador. This accord redefined the role and size of the ESAF, announced the demobilisation of other military groups, extended the role of ONUSAL, and introduced socioeconomic reforms.

Although the FMLN made significant concessions on its demands during the negotiation process, it achieved relative success in defending three of its fundamental goals. Firstly, with regard to the complete disbanding of the government’s military machine, the FMLN gained the government’s agreement on depoliticisation of the ESAF, reduction in the size of the
armed forces, and dissolution of other security forces, including the National Guards, the Treasury Police and the BIRIs (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 1, para 4, 8, 9 & 12).

Secondly, as regards the integration of FMLN soldiers into the national army, the FMLN withdrew its original demands and agreed instead to participation in a new national police force (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 2, para 7). This integration was essential for the FMLN’s successful demilitarisation since it provided demobilised soldiers with a future and curbed any potential aggression against former FMLN members by the security forces.

Thirdly, in regards to its participation in Salvadoran politics, the Mexico City Accord and the New York Accord, via their endorsement of the establishment of ONUSAL and COPAZ, paved the way for equal opportunities for political participation. As a result, the implementation of the peace accords was to be controlled by a triangular authority comprising the Cristiani government, a Salvadoran multiparty organisation, COPAZ, which included the FMLN’s representatives, and ONUSAL of the UN.

**Phase 4: January 1992 – September 1993**

Phase 4 began in January 1992 with the Chapultepec Accord and ended in September 1993 with the completion of ONUSAL’s missions. In this phase, the pattern of interplay between the UN and the FMLN did not change much. While ONUSAL displayed a neutral but empathetic attitude towards the FMLN, the FMLN cooperated with the recommendations and verification of the UN body, although there were some delays and instances of minor resistance.

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72 Although a number of UN agencies, including UNDP, UNHCR, and UNICEF, had contributed to the post-conflict recovery projects in El Salvador, ONUSAL was the most prominent actor and managed to achieve close cooperation with the Secretariat (Montgomery, 1995: 146-7). ONUSAL’s main mandates were (1) demobilisation of the FMLN and the Salvadoran armed forces, (2) establishment of a new national police force, (3) human rights monitoring, (4) election monitoring, and (4) implementing the judicial and socio-economic conditions requested in the accord (Montgomery, 1995: 150; Montgomery, 2000: 144).
In general, the UN’s determination to accomplish the implementation mission and its neutral stance and skilful negotiation skills helped the national factions to complete the agreed tasks. In particular, it used the following strategies to encourage the FMLN to abide by the Chapultepec Accord: renegotiating the target dates for completion and applying pressure on the national factions.

These points are clearly observed in the UN’s responses to the FMLN’s sabotage of the demilitarisation process, which resulted from their concerns about the lack of security guarantees for their leaders and constituencies as well as their paucity of resources for supporting their demobilised soldiers (Negroponte, 2005: 334-5; Baranyi & North, 1996: 15). First, ONUSAL and the UN Secretariat relaxed some of the specific conditions of the implementation process, such as its timetable and the forms of demilitarisation. For instance, the date set for demobilisation of troops (25 June), as the first step of demilitarisation, was rejected by the FMLN as unrealistic, and the UN recommended that the timetable be revised and a more realistic date for demobilisation be set (Baranyi & North, 1996: 15; McCormick, 1997: 286; Montgomery, 1995: 151).

Second, at the same time, the UN assured the FMLN that the implementation of the government forces’ demilitarisation would be completed by taking a tough stance with President Cristiani. When the FMLN delayed its disarmament process because of the government’s objection to the punishment of some core military leaders who had committed human rights abuses in October 1992, the UN envoys had extensive meetings with Cristiani and made him promise to implement the demilitarisation process (Baranyi & North, 1996: 17). During these meetings, the UN, backed by the US, threatened the government that it would call for greater pressure from the international community and would release the names of the military leaders who had committed human rights abuses (Negroponte, 2005: 151).
These two strategies were repeatedly used until the completion of the UN mission.

During the initial phase of the implementation, the FMLN was seriously concerned about the possibility of government attacks on its supporters and its lack of resources to support its demobilised soldiers (Negroponte, 2005: 339). It therefore made very cautious and considered moves. Nevertheless, the FMLN overcame these obstacles to its successful demilitarisation by renegotiating with the government with help from the UN rather than refusing to demilitarise. For instance, when the UN put forward a new proposal in June 1992 that allowed both ESAF members and the FMLN soldiers to join the PNC in order to resolve the confrontation between the Cristiani government and the FMLN, the rebel group accepted this swiftly and completed its concentration project that pursued gathering all military troops at certain places as a process of demobilisation (Negroponte, 2005: 339).

Once mutual demilitarisation was carried out and the FMLN became aware of the extent of the internal resistance within the government to President Cristiani, the FMLN became much more flexible towards and supportive of the president’s peace initiatives. For instance, although the government failed to meet the UN’s recommendations, the FMLN accepted the president’s decision to decrease the pace at which the military was to be disbanded (US Embassy San Salvador cable #00639, cited in Negroponte, 2005: 346).

Although some problems persisted, such as ONUSAL’s inadequate verification process and a breakdown in the FMLN’s internal unity (McCormick, 1997: 297; Baranyi & North, 1996: 18; Whitfield, 2001: 37-8), the implementation of the Chapultepec Accord was relatively successful. By the end of 1992, the FMLN’s forces had been demobilised and the size of the government’s army reduced by half. Other military agencies, including the BIRIs, the Treasury Police, and the PNC, had been completely disbanded or replaced by new organisations (Montgomery, 1995: 158; Call, 2003: 394-5).
As regards the actors’ goals, the FMLN succeeded in achieving its two main objectives: the disbanding of the ESAF and other governmental military agencies and the FMLN’s integration into Salvadoran society. The provisions in the Chapultepec Accord that guaranteed the depoliticisation of the ESAF, the disbanding of other military agencies, the reintegration of FMLN soldiers into civilian life, and the remodelling of the FMLN as a political party (see Phase 3) were eventually carried out, although there were some delays and minor modifications to the provisions (Whitfield, 2001: 34-5). The FMLN was recognised as a legitimate political party and participated in the election in 1994 (Negroponte, 2005: 343). Even though the FMLN failed to gain a majority of the vote and rumours of electoral fraud spread, the FMLN leaders accepted the result.

The UN also achieved relative success in the pursuit of their goals: the establishment of a democratic political system, and in particular, an improvement in Salvadoran social conditions. For instance, ONUSAL improved human rights conditions significantly and managed to oversee a relatively free and fair electoral process. In addition, it also reformed various social institutions, including restructuring the national assembly, launching new human rights organisations within the government, and reforming the army (Montgomery, 1995: 156-7; Whitfield, 2001: 34-5). Noting this, the UN stated that ONUSAL’s activities opened-up ‘political space for democratic participation’ (UN, 1997: no pagination).

In summary, two points need to be discussed. First, the UN constantly maintained a neutral and non-threatening mediation with both national negotiators by using diplomatic coordination and negotiation skills throughout the whole negotiation period. The FMLN cooperated with the UN because it required the UN’s mediation in order to achieve its goals. To demonstrate the dynamics more specifically, figure 5.2 summarises the change in the two
sides’ interplay phase by phase. In Phase 1, the two actors readily established a good relationship because the negotiations were not taken seriously. In Phase 2, however, the FMLN continually refused to countenance the UN’s calls for compromise. As external and internal pressure intensified and the UN intervention became more proactive, the FMLN gradually complied with the UN’s supervision and agreed to the final peace accord in Phase 3. Finally, during the implementation phase, the two actors cooperated more closely.

Second, with regard to the effect of the actors’ cultures on the negotiation, misunderstanding due to ethnocentric culture did not play a prominent role in the Salvadoran negotiation. The FMLN leaders and UN representatives shared similar conceptions of negotiation and peace.
Since the leading mediator from the UN, Alvaro de Soto, was a Peruvian, miscommunication due to differences in culture was minimised. Second, although the FMLN’s understanding of violence was significantly different from that of many external interveners, it successfully avoided misunderstanding of the intention behind its continuous military operation by demonstrating that its use of violence was to gain a better bargaining position in the negotiations. The organisation’s effective use of mass media and political movements meant that the FMLN avoided any serious misunderstandings with the UN as to its intentions.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has studied the interplay between the national factions and the impartial third-party mediators in Cambodia and El Salvador. The preceding analysis shows a number of the features of the interplay. In general, the two cases shared a number of similar characteristics: the interveners’ diplomatic efforts were met with a wide range of responses by national factions. The US, in the Cambodian case, and the UN, in the Salvadoran negotiation, made constant efforts to promote peaceful resolution of the conflicts. Although there were some changes in their level of enthusiasm, their basic stance did not change during the negotiation periods.

Furthermore, both impartial third parties relied heavily on diplomatic incentives and pressure, pressure that usually resulted from their legitimate, moral, diplomatic, and, from time to time, personal influence. Their main methods of intervention were diplomatic, such as presenting peace proposals and controlling procedural issues. As regards the types of interplay, the impartial interveners’ interplay with the national factions in both cases took the form of either

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73 In fact, de Soto recalls that many of the US’s complaints about the UN mediation were made due to its misunderstanding of cultural issues, something that he could avoid (De Soto, 1999: 373).
normative or ideational interplay. Most efforts that the UN made during the Salvadoran peace negotiations, such as its calls for the Salvadoran national factions to display a stronger political will to achieve a peaceful resolution of the war, its frequent criticism of the Salvadoran government’s reluctant cooperation with the UN, and its diplomatic pressure through the Friends of the UN Secretary General are examples of their normative interplay. The international conferences that were organised by third-party actors, including the International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981 and the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia in 1989, are examples of their ideational interplay.

In response to the external interveners’ efforts, the PRK in Cambodia and the FMLN in El Salvador took a wide range of actions, from complete refusal to conditional acceptance. More specifically, their responses included refusing to accept the suggested proposals, presenting alternative proposals, accepting the proposals but with conditions attached, and applying counter-pressure through their advocate states.

More importantly, the patterns of interplay in Cambodia and El Salvador demonstrate that the stronger and more substantial intervention in the later periods of the peace processes promoted more flexible and committed attitudes on the part of the national factions. Just like the US’s heightened pressure in Phase 2 succeeded in forcing the PRK to accept the UN’s peace proposals, the UN managed to persuade the FMLN to abide by its procedural coordination and provisional proposals in Phases 3 and 4. Although further research is needed for generalisation of this finding, it indicates that the external interveners’ enthusiasm was an important factor in changing the national factions’ attitudes towards the peace negotiations in

74 Stokke proposes three types of interplay: utilitarian interplay, normative interplay, and ideational interplay. The actors in utilitarian interplay consider costs and benefits important. Normative interplay is generally determined by the norms that are expected to be commonly respected by the actors in a certain community. Ideational interplay indicates a focus on the institutional learning process, from which an actor can learn how to behave (see Chapter 2 for details).
Cambodia and El Salvador.

However, the case studies also show that the impartial parties did not decisively influence the national factions’ behaviour. In fact, the PRK and the FMLN tried to exploit the mediators’ contribution to achieve their own goals, and they demonstrated little willingness to alter their fundamental attitudes to comply with the mediators’ requests. Although the PRK showed ostensible compliance with the UN proposals when US pressure was strong, it made continuous efforts to nullify the expected negative effects of the proposals on its de facto governing power in the following periods. Moreover, in the absence of other external actors to aid the UN’s diplomatic efforts, the UN’s strong desire for success in the Salvadoran peace negotiations failed to convince the FMLN to compromise during Phase 2.

Additionally, this chapter has illustrated that differences between actors’ ethnocentric cultures might hamper the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Assuming that the Western peace process model was universally applicable, international interveners in Cambodia, including the United States, France, and Australia, pushed the Cambodian warring factions to accept their peace proposals without understanding how the proposals would be perceived by the national actors. As a result, many resolutions were formed by incorporating the contradictory ideas of the international and national actors; as a result, these resolutions failed to facilitate effective post-conflict peace processes. Although the Paris Peace Agreement ostensibly appeared to be a good mixture of Western ideas and Cambodian cultural values, liberal peace principles completely failed to materialise during the implementation phase. By contrast, the FMLN’s good understanding of Western ideas on peace and negotiation and the leading UN negotiators’ cultural closeness with El Salvador helped the national rebel group and the UN to avoid serious mutual misunderstandings.

The significance of these findings will be made clearer by their comparison and contrast with
the interplay between the national factions and their advocate states in the following chapter. Chapter 6 studies the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador by focusing on the relationships between the PDK (Khmer Rouge) and China in the Cambodian case and between the Cristiani government and the US in the Salvadoran negotiation. The studies in Chapter 6 will demonstrate that the methods of external intervention and the national factions’ responses are strikingly different from those displayed this chapter. However, the general patterns of interplay appear to be similar; in other words, the enthusiasm of the advocate states is expected to result in national factions exhibiting more flexible attitudes. In addition, Chapter 6 also points to a number of requirements for successful peace negotiations that the national factions’ interplay with the impartial third parties does not reveal.
Chapter 6

The Interplay between National Factions and Advocate States

INTRODUCTION

Although this chapter also examines the changes in the strategic moves of the national factions and international interveners in Cambodia and El Salvador by focusing on the pattern of interplay and the role of perception, the research focus is different from that in Chapter 5 in two respects. In terms of actors, whereas Chapter 5 considered the interplay between a faction and an impartial external intervener with relatively few strong interests in the conflict, the actors studied in this chapter are national factions and their advocate countries: the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, the official name of the Khmer Rouge) and China in the Cambodian case, and the Cristiani government and the US in the Salvadoran case. Moreover, while the main source of the actors’ interpretations of various issues under negotiation (e.g. the actors’ understanding of the war itself, their main goals, external actors’ intentions and the like) in Chapter 5 was the interveners’ ethnocentric cultural values, this chapter focuses on the national factions’ limited facility and intention to comprehend their circumstances.

First, the dynamics of the national factions’ interaction with their advocate states is at the centre of the analysis. The two case studies show that the general pattern of interplay between factions and advocates was similar to the pattern presented in Chapter 5: the stronger the engagement of the advocate states, the more significant the changes in the national factions’ negotiating attitudes. However, the important difference between the subjects of analysis in this chapter and those in Chapter 5 is their impartiality: the ways in which China and the US behaved differed significantly from the behaviour of international actors who had no serious
political or economic interests in the conflict (i.e. the UN in El Salvador). An advocate’s negotiating position is not impartial since it normally has strong interests in the conflict and desires to lead the war in a direction that favours these interests. By contrast, impartial third-party interveners without strong interests in the conflicts maintain relatively constant relationships with each national faction.

Furthermore, with regard to influence, an advocate state may have a stronger influence on the national faction that it supports. Whereas impartial interveners need to apply new incentives or pressures on the faction, an advocate state possesses an existing military, economic, or diplomatic relationship with the faction that it can use as a source for its response rules. The study below shows that the strong pressure from China and the US succeeded in bringing about a dramatic transformation of the resistant attitudes of the PDK and the Cristiani government, respectively.

In addition, the divergent patterns of the interplay in the later periods of the two negotiation processes and their outcomes show that the constant attention of advocate states and close mutual communication were key to successful intervention. Whereas the abrupt discontinuation of Chinese economic and military aid to the PDK, based on China’s miscalculation of the national faction’s intentions, resulted in the PDK rescinding its consent to the Paris Peace Accords, the US’s incessant use of pressure and incentives on the ESAF enabled President Cristiani to complete the mandate set out in the Chapultepec Accord.

Second, this chapter pays attention to the limitations in the national factions’ communication institutions, which acted as an obstacle hampering the effectiveness of external actors’ intervention. If Chapter 5 demonstrated that the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values hampered their development of mutual understanding, this chapter studies the misunderstandings that arose between national factions and external interveners that understood each others’ cultural
features. When the US transformed its approach towards critical interests, the Cristiani government responded swiftly to the changes, whereas when China did the same in the Cambodian case, the PDK did not perceive the significance of these changes until the end of the negotiation. Furthermore, while China failed to recognise and meet the needs of the PDK during the implementation period, the US successfully managed to supply what President Cristiani lacked in order to complete the peace accords. This chapter demonstrates that one of the most important reasons for this difference was their distinctive internal and external communication systems.

The actors chosen as the study targets for analysis are the PDK in Cambodia and the Cristiani government in El Salvador. Since they were both less enthusiastic about negotiation than the other national factions, they effectively illustrate the role that advocate states can play in changing national factions’ attitudes.

Each case study begins with a short description of the actors’ fundamental and mid-term goals. Then, after dividing the negotiation periods into a number of phases, the changes in the pattern of interplay between the national faction and its external supporter throughout the negotiation phases are described. In the Cambodian case, significant perceptual issues that affected the behaviour of the actors in each phase are also presented. The chapter concludes with some findings and a brief summary.

**CAMBODIA**

This section focuses on the mutual exchanges in the negotiation strategies of China and the PDK. Throughout the entire duration of the Cambodian civil war, China played one of the most critical roles as the advocate state of the CGDK and of the PDK in particular. Although
China partially supported the PDK’s military campaigns by providing diplomatic, economic, and military aid until the mid-1980s, it contributed to the progress of the negotiation as a relatively impartial negotiation facilitator in the later period. The PDK was the most stubborn Cambodian actor in the peace negotiation. As a result of its self-delusions, the faction continuously refused to negotiate with the PRK regime until the last phase of the negotiation.

The PDK’s Self-Perception and its Sources

As explained in Chapter 1, many negotiators had a bounded awareness that prevented them from seeing and evaluating information in accurate ways. The PDK also failed to develop effective negotiation strategies because its decisions were based on many misconceptions during the Cambodian peace negotiation process. There are three reasons for its lack of self-awareness.

First, the PDK lacked a sound communication system that linked the top leadership and the combatants on the frontline. From early 1960, when Pol Pot was elected as the leader of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, the predecessor of PDK), the faction had been led by a small number of French-educated leaders, but the majority of its soldiers were very young and uneducated (Peou, 2000: 102). Moreover, although the CPK had ousted Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic and had established Democratic Kampuchea in 1975, the party leadership had failed to develop an effective administrative structure. Thus, during its four-year rule, Cambodia was run by a poorly functioning military structure (Chandler, 1992: 112). In this period, communication meant ‘orders and education from the Angka (party)’ rather than mutual conversations between ‘the party and the people, between the internal organisations, and between the leadership and normal members’ (Men Sourn, 2009: Author’s Interview).
Although there were many informers, they only reported information to party leaders. In many cases, the information frequently failed to be transmitted beyond the regional division that were operating independently. Externally, although ‘the PDK had representatives and ambassadors in France, Switzerland, and other communist countries,’ the agencies ‘did not play active roles in communicating with’ the figures that were involved in the Cambodian peace negotiation (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). Thus, when the Cambodian civil war occurred, the PDK did not have any system capable of transmitting and receiving good information.

Second, the rivalry and tensions between the small groups within the leadership prevented them from assessing their situation correctly. The PDK leadership consisted of a number of separate groups whose relationships were characterised by serious mutual mistrust, and power struggles between them were common (Quinn, 1982, cited in Peou, 2000: 103; Etcheson, 1984: 164). In particular, the rivalry between the divisions in the Eastern Zone (pro-Chinese) and the groups in the Western zone (pro-Vietnam) was significant (Peou, 2000: 103). Moreover, although meetings of the PDK leaders were held regularly, the leaders rarely shared what they experienced with other groups.75 Thus, internal and external information was not aggregated effectively. What is worse, when certain problems emerged, accurate assessment of the issues related to the problems proved difficult because the leaders tended to blame other groups.

Third, most members of the leadership were strongly reliant either on Vietnamese revolutionary doctrine or Chinese Maoist ideology. Since the origins of the PDK lay in the Indochinese Communist Party, which had been led by Vietnamese communists, many of the

75 Chhin Kim Thong, a former commander of the PDK, says, “I know these issues because I worked for the intelligence service for many years. Normally, commanders do not know what happened with other troops or what other leaders thought” (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview).
PDK’s political goals and strategies were heavily affected by Vietnamese communist ideas (Raszelenberg, 1999: 64-5). Although the PDK broke away from Vietnam in 1960, and its resistance against the country became more vigorous from 1975, the PDK remained heavily reliant on Vietnamese ideology during the Cambodian civil war, especially the ‘people’s war’ doctrine (Heder, 1999: 25-8). In addition, the core leadership of the PDK, including Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, were inspired by Maoist notions such as ‘autonomous revolution, voluntarism, and continuous class struggle’ and copied Chinese slogans, including ‘storming attacks,’ ‘leaps forward’, and ‘independence mastery’ (Chandler, 1992: 3-6). The PDK’s policies tended to be based on these doctrines regardless of whether they reflected reality or not.

These three limitations prevented the PDK from having adequate information about its true situation, and this resulted in two self-delusions that affected the party’s strategies throughout the Cambodian peace negotiations. The first delusion concerned its domestic resources. When the civil war began, the PDK was convinced that it could rely on the people’s strong support (Heder, 1999:70). However, from the time of its establishment in the 1950s, the PDK had never received genuinely strong support (Peou, 2000: 101), and the people’s ostensible backing was largely because of the PDK’s strong enforcement of its rule in areas under its control (Frieson, 1993: 30-50). Although there were many pointers to its obvious unpopularity, such as the highly reluctant cooperation of villages during the civil war (Heder, 1999: 91-3), the PDK did not recognise or accept that it was profoundly unpopular. Instead, the leaders of the PDK repeated the same propaganda and claimed that the people’s support was not visible owing to severe PRK repression (Heder, 1999: 96).

The second misguided perception was the PDK’s blind belief that China would continue to support the party until its victory. However, although China’s goal of limiting the influence of the USSR and Vietnam reflected its regional interests in Southeast Asia, it did not want the
return of the PDK as the principal Cambodian power because this was not beneficial to its national interests (Haas, 1991: 247-8). Although China radically transformed its major policies towards the Cambodian civil war, the PDK appeared not to notice this change. Hence, the distance between the Chinese and the PDK’s positions grew wider. Whereas China engaged more eagerly in the peace negotiations and adopted a more neutral demeanour, the PDK continued to adhere to its initial ideas.

**Actors’ Aims**

China played a critical role in the Cambodian peace negotiations as a supporting actor of the CGDK. The country pursued three fundamental goals: (1) reduction of the Soviet Union’s influence in Southeast Asia, (2) withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces from Cambodia, and (3) removal of the PRK/SOC regime (Ross, 1991: 1170; Hood, 1990). Moreover, when the establishment of a transitional authority and demilitarisation came to top the agenda, China set two aims. First, the size of military forces of all four Cambodian factions needed to be frozen and needed to refrain from politics. Second, the PDK needed to be guaranteed that it would be involved in the future Cambodian political arena (Hood, 1990; Haas, 1991: 249).

China employed five main strategies to achieve its goals: (1) modifying other external interveners’ proposals, (2) coordinating the moves of the three resistance groups, (3) consistently maintaining its economic and military aid to the PDK, (4) negotiating with the supporters of the PRK/SOC (the USSR and Vietnam), and (5) supervising the meetings between the Cambodian national factions. Nevertheless, the strategies’ priorities changed according to the transforming circumstances of the negotiation.

The PDK, the only *de facto* resistance group with sufficiently strong military forces to
challenge the PRK/SOC, consistently pursued one fundamental goal: winning the war. Strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninist traditions and the Vietnamese doctrine of ‘people’s war’, in which political strength derived from peasant support, the PDK believed that it could regain its position as Cambodia’s central power with the support of the rural poor (Heder, 1999: 20-3; Ashley, 1992: 42). In the CGDK’s press releases, the PDK’s fundamental goal was reworded to encompass four aims related to the transitional authority and demilitarisation: (1) a UN-supervised election, (2) the dissolution of SOC organisations, (3) the establishment of a quadripartite government that included the PDK, and (4) demobilisation of all four factions’ armies (Haas, 1991: 195; Turner, 2004: 143-5; Heder, 1999: 73).

However, the PDK had little intention of achieving its goals through negotiation with the PRK/SOC. For the faction, political settlement was merely a tactical means of ‘remedying [its] chronic political weakness’ and of legitimising itself ‘with de facto avoidance of painful sacrifices’ rather than ‘necessitating major sacrifices’ (Turner, 2004: 148, 158). Thus, the PDK’s strategies during the Cambodian peace negotiations were neither consistent nor effective (details follow below).

Interplay between Actors in the Negotiation Process

Phase 1: Mid-1980s – May 1988

The attitudes of both China and the PDK towards the peace negotiations were consistently negative until mid-1988. In this period, China and the PDK shared two critical goals, which were the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the removal of the PRK/SOC regime. Moreover, although the two actors also had some different aims (China – reducing
the influence of the USSR, the PDK – winning the people’s war), their positions and aims were not considered contradictory to each other in this period (Richardson, 2009: 122).

Thus, China enthusiastically supported the PDK’s resistance movement during Phase 1. Specifically, China pursued ‘containment’ and ‘roll-back’ policies against Vietnam and the USSR and protected the PDK by employing military confrontation, applying diplomatic pressure, and providing direct aid to the CGDK (McGregor, 1990: 267-76). After its invasion of Vietnam in 1979 to ‘teach [it] a lesson’, China retained a significant number of forces near the border with Vietnam and maintained economic sanctions against the PRK and Vietnam (Richardson, 2009: 153). Moreover, China’s military and economic aid, transferred through Thailand, enabled the PDK to continue its military operations (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 22).

Diplomatically, China doubted the usefulness of negotiation with Vietnam. Thus, the Cambodian factions’ initiation of peace negotiations in 1987 and 1988 was discouraged by China. When Sihanouk’s first meeting with Hun Sen took place in December 1987, China intervened in the efforts by expressing its objection to the commencement of any negotiation before a PAVN withdrawal from Cambodian territory, applying pressure on Sihanouk, and by conducting a military operation against Vietnam, thus breaking a long-standing peace (Hood, 1991: 981; Haas, 1991: 127). As a result, Sihanouk decided to resign from his presidency of the CGDK to demonstrate his unhappiness with the situation.

China’s diplomatic moves in this period, as the only de facto advocate, were more focused on providing support for the PDK’s demands rather than intervening to alter its plans. Confirming this, Ieng Mouly, a former leader of the KPNLF says,

> For many years, China’s position was simple: approving the decisions of the CGDK. We normally had our own meetings first and met with Chinese
delegates later to explain what we had decided. The Khmer Rouge was strongest in expressing opinions, and China usually accepted the opinions (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview).

The PDK’s reluctance to compromise its goals and its indifference to a negotiated peace arose for two reasons. Most importantly, the PDK’s delusion about its level of popular domestic support led it to believe that it could defeat the PRK-Vietnamese alliance. Its core leadership, including Pol Pot and Ta Mok, insisted that they still possessed (or could rebuild) the support of the Cambodian peasantry necessary to achieve victory in the people’s war. Moreover, the PDK thought that pursuing settlement of the conflict while Vietnam remained on its territory might lead to further Vietnamese deception (Heder, 1999: 33; A former PDK leader who requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview).

Thus, the PDK consistently called for the dissolution of the PRK and the four parties’ participation in a new transitional government with equal status (Turner, 2004: 159). In addition, the faction repeatedly demanded that Sihanouk made no further moves to effect negotiations, which it felt could lead to concessions on the CGDK’s part that would favour the PRK. Although it signed up to some of the CGDK’s peace proposals, such as the 1986 ‘Eight-point Proposal on Resolving the Cambodian Problem’, the purpose behind the participation was to gain enough time to strengthen its resources and international support in order to defeat the PRK militarily or through political manipulation (Turner, 2004: 160).

**Phase 2: May 1988 – August 1990**

Phase 2 indicates the period from May 1988, when Vietnam expressed its willingness to withdraw 50,000 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops from Cambodia (Hood, 1990: 981), to August 1990, when the UN Security Council released its ‘Framework Documents’
for the settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

Tension emerged between China and the PDK in this period as the importance of their common goals decreased and the importance of their different goals increased. Most importantly, the significance of the two common goals, the withdrawal of the PAVN and the dissolution of the PRK, diminished because the USSR and Vietnam began to make significant efforts to normalise their relations with China (Haas, 1991: 156-7). In particular, as Vietnam withdrew PAVN troops from Cambodia in 1989, China’s fear of Soviet and Vietnamese influence in Indochina abated (Ross, 1991: 1180). Moreover, Vietnam’s efforts towards diplomatic normalisation with China also reduced its anxiety about the PRK, a suspected puppet regime of Vietnam.

In addition, China regarded the regional stability of Indochina as increasingly important because it could benefit from increased economic cooperation with Vietnam and an improved relationship with the USSR (Haas, 1991: 158). China’s consideration of a new goal – regional stability – produced new strategies that were contradictory to the PDK’s pursuit of its fundamental goal: complete victory in the people’s war.

A Chinese domestic issue was another factor that convinced China to distance itself from the PDK’s position. After the Tiananmen Incident in April 1989, China needed to demonstrate greater flexibility in its negotiation with Western countries in order to rehabilitate its relationship with them (Richardson, 2009: 146).

Thus, China pursued an early settlement of the Cambodian conflict and began to oppose the PDK’s goal of returning to power. It employed two strategies. First, China gradually transformed its attitudes from exclusive defence of its (and the PDK’s) interests to a somewhat more flexible concessionary posture in its negotiation with other external
interveners. In the early period of Phase 2, China still tried to use negotiation as a means of justifying and securing its goals rather than as an opportunity to engineer mutual concessions (Ross, 1991: 1180). For instance, during the negotiations on the normalisation of its relationship with the USSR and Vietnam, it stubbornly requested the withdrawal of the PAVN from Cambodia as a prerequisite for normalisation (Qian, 2005: 23; Haas, 1991: 205; Richardson, 2009: 142, 143). The same demand was reiterated by Chinese diplomats in subsequent meetings until 1989 (Qian, 2005: 41; McGregor, 1990: 280-1; Acharya, Lizée, & Peou, 1991: 138-9).

However, the Chinese attitude became more flexible during a series of UN P-5 meetings in 1990, where it modified its former hard-line position and began to make concessions. During this period, the composition of the Supreme National Council (SNC) was a highly controversial issue. While China consistently advocated the PDK’s participation in the peace negotiations and the forthcoming transitional authority (Ross, 1991: 1179), it accepted the UN’s stewardship of the transitional period and the inclusion of the PRK/SOC in order to convince the Soviet Union to agree to the final proposal (Richardson, 2009: 148; Haas, 1991: 223). Through this, China succeeded in reflecting its main interests in the UN P-5’s final proposal of August 1990 (Hood, 1991: 988).

Second, in dealing with the Cambodian national factions, China made two main efforts: coordinating the moves of the three resistance groups and applying pressure on the PDK to join the peace negotiations (Hood, 1990: 977). First, China’s efforts focused on the coordination of the CGDK’s movements in the early phase of the negotiation. For instance, when two CGDK members, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, criticised the PDK’s past policies and worked towards preventing the PDK’s return to power at JIM I in July 1988, China tried to reduce the tensions between the factions. On the one hand, China made it clear that
although it did not support the PDK’s return to power, neither did it support the PDK’s exclusion from the forthcoming authority (Hood, 1990: 982-3). It also announced that the PDK would play a minor role in the interim government (Haas, 1991: 144). On the other hand, it persuaded the PDK to express its willingness to reduce the size of its army to match those of the other two factions and to accept the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. However, these efforts did not produce the expected results. The PDK rejected China’s requests and boycotted the following meetings in October and November, and Sihanouk did not desist from his criticism of the PDK (Haas, 1991: 144-5).

When it became evident that its coordination efforts were not working, China applied stronger and more direct pressure and succeeded in persuading Sihanouk to remain part of the CGDK formula. For example, when Sihanouk announced his ‘Five-Point Peace Plan’ in November 1988 without having secured the agreement of the PDK, China applied stronger pressure: it threatened to stop its aid. From the end of 1988, China repeated its readiness to withdraw its aid to both FUNCINPEC and the PDK (Hood, 1990: 985). Although these threats did not materialise at the time, they generated an instant response from FUNCINPEC. From the second JIM in February 1989 onwards, Sihanouk toned down his criticism of the PDK and China and displayed a more flexible attitude towards their demands (Hood, 1990: 985).

However, as described below, China’s continuous efforts during Phase 2 to force the PDK to commit more strongly to negotiation with the PRK/SOC failed. Moreover, China’s enhanced involvement in efforts to secure a negotiated settlement was interrupted by the Tiananmen Incident in May 1989. While the Chinese leadership concentrated on the domestic political crisis, Cambodian issues were disregarded. Thus, the internal negotiation between the three resistance groups was left to Cambodians until the first PCC in July 1989 (Richardson, 2009: 228).
Despite the changed international circumstances and the enhanced pressure from China, the PDK consistently refused to compromise its original position (Richardson, 2009: 142). Lying behind the PDK’s stubborn attitude were three delusions: its domestic popularity, China’s never-ending support, and Vietnamese pretence of PAVN withdrawal. The first two issues provided the PDK with misplaced confidence in its resources. The PDK was convinced of its domestic popularity, blindly believing that it had the unconditional support of Cambodian peasants even though its political projects to establish village-level political organisations had not achieved much success due to people’s reluctance to cooperate (Heder, 1999: 96). In addition, the gradual transformation of China’s regional priorities was not well understood by the PDK. Hence, the PDK believed that it possessed enough domestic and international support to win ‘the people’s war’.  

The third misunderstanding was related to a goal: the withdrawal of Vietnam. The PDK had insisted that any negotiation could not be considered meaningful as long as ‘Vietnamese imperialists’ remained in Cambodia. However, when Vietnam announced the withdrawal of PAVN forces in 1989, the PDK regarded the announcement as a straightforward lie. It insisted that a large number of Vietnamese troops had simply changed their uniforms and had stayed in Cambodia to support the PRK (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 59; Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). 

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76 Although they had chances to see the reality in mid-1990, the reports on ‘the failures of the domestic revolutionary movements’ were ignored or distorted. In particular, some hardliners, including Ta Mok, insisted that such reports were ‘exaggerated’ by their rivals within the party (such as Son Sen) (A former PDK leader who requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview; Heder, 1999: 98).

77 It is not clear whether the PDK did not realise that the PAVN’s withdrawal had actually been implemented or simply refused to accept it. Since the PDK simply assumed that it would defeat the PRK forces with ease once the PAVN withdrew from Cambodia (Haas, 1991: 144-5), the PRK’s strong resistance after the alleged withdrawal was difficult for them to comprehend. For many of them, it was natural to assume that there were still many PAVN soldiers in the PRK military forces.
As a result of these delusions, the PDK ignored China’s diplomatic efforts and continued to conduct a nationwide military campaign and to sabotage the negotiation. First, the PDK had concentrated on local-level military offensives in Phase 2. The focus of the campaigns in this period was on ‘liberating’ villages and sub-districts and building political organisations that could support the PDK’s future political campaigns (Voice of PDK, February 1988, cited in Heder, 1999: 81). Notably, however, after the failure of JIM I in 1988 and Vietnam’s announcement of the PAVN’s withdrawal, the faction conducted one of the biggest military campaigns of the Cambodian civil war in late 1989 and seized a number of regions, including Pailin (Haas, 1991: 214-5). Despite its scale, China was not informed or consulted prior to the launching of this important military operation (Richardson, 2009: 147-8).

Second, in many cases, the PDK frequently refused China’s recommendation to seek a political solution. For example, even after JIM I revealed the unanimous animosity of the other Cambodian factions towards the PDK, Chinese pressure frequently failed to force the PDK leadership to join the follow-up meetings (Hood, 1990: 984). Even when it joined negotiation processes, it never stepped back from its original position. Although it realised the importance of a diplomatic solution from early 1990 (Son Sen, 1990, cited in Heder, 1999: 97), the PDK failed to escape from its old tendency to persist with its propaganda.

Thus, when it found that some resolutions suggested by other international actors might prove beneficial in its pursuit of power, the PDK simply concentrated on and demanded the implementation of proposals that were advantageous to it, with little intention of making concessions. For example, when ‘An Australian Peace Proposal’ was presented in early 1990, the PDK paid most attention to the immediate realisation of the quadripartite interim administration outlined in the proposal while ignoring other factions’ demands (Heder, 1999: 94; Haas, 1991: 231). Moreover, when the UN P-5 presented the idea of UN supervision of
the election process, the PDK, believing that this role for the UN would help nullify the power of the PRK, continuously demanded that the PRK accept the proposal (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 68; Heder, 1999: 100-1).

In short, the attitudes of China and the PDK towards the peace negotiations diverged in Phase 2. China recognised that its interests were best served by a negotiated peace and made efforts to compel the PDK to commit to negotiation with the PRK and Vietnam. Nevertheless, due to its misinformed evaluation of its resources and the reality of other factions’ movements and external support, the PDK ignored most of these efforts and refused to change its posture. As a result, the PDK gradually moved beyond China’s control (Richardson, 2009: 148).

**Phase 3: August 1990 – June 1992**

Phase 3 occurred between August 1990, when the UN P-5 released the Framework Documents, and June 1992, when the PDK discontinued its collaboration with UNTAC over the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreements. In this period, China applied greater pressure on the PDK to remain part of the negotiation; moreover, it gradually assumed a stronger and more neutral role in mediating the negotiated peace in Cambodia. The PDK’s astonishment at China’s withdrawal of military and economic aid and disappointment at the failure of its political projects in Cambodian villages finally led it to begin displaying a more serious attitude towards negotiation with the PRK and Vietnam.

Since China had succeeded in reaching agreements with Vietnam and the USSR on the major issues related to the resolution of the Cambodian conflict (Ross, 1991: 1181; Osborne, 1994: 256; Richardson, 2009: 150), its efforts in this period were concentrated mostly on facilitating the four Cambodian factions’ negotiation.

First, while Western interveners became more ambivalent and less enthusiastic about the
Cambodian negotiations, China played a prominent role as a mediator, accommodating most of the meetings between Cambodian factions from mid-1990 to the second PCC in August 1991. For instance, at the meeting between the Cambodian factions in Pattaya in June 1991, China expressed its recognition of the value of the PRK’s proposals while pressing the PDK not to leave the negotiation table (Ross, 1991: 1182). Moreover, China invited Hun Sen to Beijing for the first time to convene a follow-up SNC meeting in July. At the two meetings, in exchange for the PRK concessions on the PDK’s role in the forthcoming political arena, China recognised the PRK/SOC’s role as the *de facto* ruling party (Ross, 1991: 1183; Richardson, 2009: 152).

Second, China began to apply more substantial pressure on the PDK. The pivotal decision was its cessation of military support to the PDK in late 1990. Although from 1988 China had repeatedly proclaimed that it would discontinue its military aid to the faction, this pledge had not been carried out. This continued assistance was a reason for the PDK’s strong but misguided belief that it had China’s unwavering support. Pointing to this, a former PDK leader who requested anonymity stated:

No. We did not imagine that China would turn away from us. What China said was not important. No matter what they had said, they had never stopped military support. I didn’t experience any lack of arms during the war. We thought China an ally (A former PDK leader who requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview).

Nevertheless, after significant reductions in aid during 1990 (Pear, 1990: no pagination), Chinese military assistance ended in late 1990.\(^78\)

\(^78\) It remains a matter of dispute whether China stopped its military aid completely in 1990. However, it appears
Diplomatically, China began to make open expressions of its unhappiness with the PDK’s policies and its desire for PDK participation in the negotiation. For instance, China made an open request to the PDK to join the Pattaya meeting of June 1991 (FBIS, DR/CHI, June 4, 1991: 9) and called for the PDK to work towards a political solution in front of other Cambodian leaders in July (Richardson, 2009: 149). In addition, China’s recognition of the PRK/SOC as a prominent actor in the Cambodian negotiation served to increase its diplomatic pressure on the PDK (Ross, 1991: 1183-4). A former KPNLF negotiator confirms this change by saying:

Once they lost interest in our war, the Chinese began to push us to end it. Although they grew closer to Vietnam and Hun Sen, Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge could not escape Chinese influence. But we knew that China was changing (Son Soubert, 2009: Author’s Interview).

Even after the Paris Peace Agreements were agreed in August 1991, China kept its distance from the PDK. Formal or informal meetings between China and the PDK were rare, and even when they took place, China simply repeated its commitment to supporting the implementation of the PPAs. China also made it clear that it would not provide material support to the PDK in 1992 (Richardson, 2009: 163). In addition, despite the PDK’s backlash against the implementation, China repeatedly confirmed its commitment to the PPAs (Richardson, 2009: 158-9) and provided unconditional economic assistance (approximately $150 million in 1992) to the post-war reconstruction projects in Cambodia (Richardson, 2009: 157, 160).

China’s obvious withdrawal of its advocacy of the PDK in this period proved telling. Since its

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79 Pointing out this, a former PDK leader who requested anonymity says ‘China changed its face when we agreed with the Paris Agreement’ (2009: Author’s Interview).
fear of losing Chinese support was considerable (Chandler, 1994: no pagination), the PDK began to take international diplomatic pressure seriously and to seek a settlement of the Cambodian conflict through negotiation (Haas, 1991: 220).

Moreover, for the PDK, the UN P-5’s Framework Document presented in Phase 2 seemed to favour its core interests. First, the PDK thought that it would prevent the PRK’s dominance of future Cambodian politics by virtue of the CGDK’s significant proportion of SNC seats. Second, with regard to the transitional authority, the PDK expected UNTAC’s dominant role during the transitional period to limit the PRK/SOC’s advantages as a government and to provide the PDK with greater opportunities to direct its political campaigns. Third, in terms of demilitarisation, the PDK also anticipated that complete dissolution of all factions’ military forces would enable it to use the available extra manpower to rebuild its political units (Heder, 1999: 100-1, 103-5). Thus, Pol Pot thought that the proposals were the PDK’s ‘best bet for regaining power’ and achieving victory (Heder, 1999: 105). However, these expectations were merely more misconceptions founded on its self-centred interpretation of the UN’s proposals (details will be discussed in Phase 4).

Hence, the PDK decided to conduct a diplomatic struggle from late 1990 (Richardson, 2009: 149). Although its intention to negotiate was consistent throughout Phase 3, the PDK’s negotiation strategies were transformed in June 1991. Before June, the two strategies that the PDK used in the negotiation process were still very much in keeping with its old behaviour pattern. First, the PDK persisted with its first demand – full acceptance of the UN Framework Document and Implementation Plan with no modification – rather than adopting a concessionary posture. After proclaiming its ‘full support’ for the proposals in September

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80 The domestic dynamics in the PDK’s two-level game partly caused these misunderstandings. The hardliners in the leadership, such as Ieng Sary, were excluded from major decision making in this period, and the reformists’ ideas dominated the internal discussions. However, just like the hard-liners’ arguments, the new ideas were a result of their ‘bounded awareness’ and were based on very limited information (Heder, 1999: 109-15).
1990, the PDK leadership reaffirmed its position at every meeting until June 1990 (Heder, 1999: 100, 103-4). Second, the PDK continued its military operations against the PRK in order to reinforce its demands. As mentioned in the previous chapter, violence was regarded as a method of negotiation by many Cambodians, including the PDK leadership. Thus, under a new slogan of ‘Cambodia’s sole legitimate body: there is no other state organ apart from the SNC’ (Heder, 1999: 104), the PDK tried to force the PRK/SOC to accept its demands by demonstrating its still robust military capability.

Nevertheless, by June 1991, these two strategies were revealed to have failed to achieve what the PDK had expected. First of all, its demands were ignored by all the other national factions. Since China had assumed a neutral mediating role and no longer directly intervened in Cambodian matters, the other three Cambodian factions did not take the PDK’s stubborn attitude seriously (Haas, 1991: 220, 283-4). In addition, the military situation in Cambodia began to favour the PRK/SOC rather than the PDK. From May 1991, the PRK/SOC succeeded in recovering most of its lost territories and began to pressurise the stronghold of Pailin, the de facto PDK capital (Heder, 1999, 114-5). Furthermore, the military offensive caused the other actors to misunderstand the intentions of the PDK. Since many external actors considered the cessation of violence as an expression of an actor’s will to negotiate, the PDK’s aggressive strategy was interpreted as confirmation of its insincerity (Heder, 1991: 112-5; Haas, 1991: 230-1).

Henceforth, the PDK’s approach underwent a profound transformation in June 1991. Abandoning its previous approach of merely reiterating the same propaganda, the PDK began to accept other factions’ proposals if they were not fundamentally inconsistent with its long-term survival. For instance, at the second Pattaya meeting in August 1991, the PDK consented to the ceasefire, the discontinuation of military aid from external actors, demilitarisation, and
cooperation between the SNC and UNTAC. Many of the points agreed to by the factions in Pattaya were different from the PDK’s initial demands (Brown, 1992: 90; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 82-3). Furthermore, the PDK did not undertake any major military operations until the second PCC in August 1991.

The PDK’s changed attitude was an important contributory factor to the success of the PPAs in August 1991 (Lizée 1999: 95). In fact, the party thought the PPAs provided similar opportunities to regain its power as the UN P-5’s Framework Document. Although the specific contents were significantly different, the PDK thought the PPAs contained similar core proposals to those in the Framework Document, such as a dominant role for UNTAC, the CGDK’s possession of at least half of the SNC’s seats, and the dissolution of a significant proportion of all factions’ military forces.

Hence, the PDK cooperated with the UN’s implementation processes until mid-1992. For instance, when it was requested to provide information about its military forces to the UN as part of the demilitarisation process and establishment of a civil police force in November 1991, the PDK submitted fairly comprehensive information (Heder, 1999: 122). Moreover, during the demilitarisation process, the PDK voluntarily began to disarm its army and forced some resistant commanders to join the process. All its military leaders were compelled to announce their endorsement of the reduction in troop numbers to 30 per cent of their original complement (Heder, 1999: 124-5).

In short, as China abandoned its advocacy of the PDK and applied substantial pressure on the faction, the PDK finally decided to participate in the negotiations with the PRK/SOC. After realising that the negotiation strategies based on its own concepts of negotiation had produced no fruitful results in the early period, the PDK demonstrated much more flexible behaviour in the later period (from June 1990). However, its changed attitude was grounded
in its own distinctive interpretation of the PPAs, which was significantly different from that of international interveners and other Cambodian factions.

**Phase 4: June 1992 – June 1993**

Phase 4 marks the period in which the PDK refused to comply with UNTAC’s supervision of the implementation of the peace process. The PDK’s perception of the function of negotiation, the methods by which to achieve its goals in negotiation, and the lack of Chinese efforts to control the problems caused by this perception hampered the effectiveness of the peace negotiation process.

The PDK decided to transform its strategy for two main reasons: its expectations had failed to materialise and China had increasingly distanced itself from the PDK.\(^{81}\) Firstly, the party realised that its expectation that the PPAs would provide opportunities to gain political power had proved to be unrealistic. Since the PPAs allowed the CGDK (including Sihanouk) to take half of the SNC seats, the PDK anticipated that this provision would prevent the PRK from dominating domestic politics. However, Sihanouk and Son Sann, the leaders of the other two members of the CGDK, were preparing political campaigns against the PDK, thus fracturing the CGDK bloc.\(^{82}\) Moreover, since the PDK leaders were entitled to stay in Phnom Penh as SNC delegates, the PDK planned to organise anti-PRK/SOC movements in the capital (Heder, 1999: 115).

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\(^{81}\) Although it is not directly related with the main research topic of this thesis, this finding provides an explanation of the PDK’s sudden change of its attitudes between August 1991 and 1992. In fact, the question why the PDK that agreed to sign the PPAs abruptly declared not to cooperate with UNTAC after a few months was left as “a puzzle” and “anybody’s guess” (Wang, 1996; Peou, 1997). This case study suggests that it is because the national faction realised that its expectation from the PPAs was a self-delusion. In this sense, this finding supports Heder’s research (Heder, 1999).

\(^{82}\) In November 1991, on the day that he returned to Phnom Penh from exile, Sihanouk condemned the PDK leaders as “Hitlerites” and denounced the PDK’s role in the SNC. In addition, after announcing his support for maintaining the PRK/SOC regime as a “de facto government” (AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991 cited in Heder, 1999: 137), Sihanouk built an FUNCINPEC-CPP (Cambodian People’s Party: a political party of the PRK/SOC) alliance on 25 November.
Furthermore, the PDK had expected that UNTAC’s central role during the interim period would provide a neutral and democratic political environment in which the PDK could build its political organisations. Thus, the PDK thought it could establish political structures that would replace the PRK/SOC’s provincial and local administrations if UNTAC was deployed early enough (Heder, 1999: 115). However, it took more than six months before UNTAC was deployed in March 1992. Moreover, the PDK felt that UNTAC simply demanded the PDK’s full collaboration with the PPAs without serious consideration of the PDK’s security concerns (Peou, 1997: 270-4; Heder, 1999: 263). From the PDK’s point of view, this enabled the PRK/SOC to seize upon this opportunity to attack PDK agents in the villages and nullify the efforts of the PDK from the beginning of the implementation phase (Gottesman, 2004: 345). As a former PDK leader insisted:

The implementation process was not impartial. Although there were four groups – the KPNLF, the SOC, the Khmer Rouge, and FUNCINPEC – UNTAC targeted only us. So, we thought, ‘what about the other groups?’ The military action in Siem Reap occurred when UNTAC requested the disarmament of the Khmer Rouge only. They didn’t listen to our concerns about this unilateral disarmament. If you were a part of the Khmer Rouge, would you accept that? (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview).

In addition, the PDK anticipated that the dissolution of 70 per cent of each faction’s military forces under a permanent ceasefire would enable it to use more human resources for political purposes. As it had struggled with a lack of political cadres, the PDK felt that its demilitarised soldiers might prove to be a significant resource that could propel its political projects more quickly and more effectively (Heder, 1999: 120). However, the PDK’s expectations belied the population’s reluctance to cooperate with it (Heder, 1999: 91-3). Realising that attempting to
rally popular support by invoking the image of Pol Pot or Khieu Samphan would be counterproductive, it instead tried to establish village-level councils in the name of Sihanouk (Heder, 1999: 105-6). However, except in Kamot province, the faction was unable to sustain many councils.

Secondly, China’s lukewarm attitudes towards the PDK led it to abandon hope of reclaiming China’s support, one of the few remaining viable methods by which it could attain a political solution. Bilateral informal communication between the PDK and China stopped, and China tried to send its messages to the PDK through open remarks, including official announcements made by the Chinese government (Richardson, 2009: 161-4). Moreover, China reconfirmed its termination of military aid in early 1992. Combined with other international actors’ antagonistic stance towards the PDK, China’s changed attitudes left the faction feeling completely isolated.

The PDK therefore announced that it would not collaborate with UNTAC and would continue the fight against the remaining Vietnamese and the other national factions in June 1992 (Heder, 1999: 277-8). In fact, the PDK had carried out a series of small military operations when other actors were not amenable to its interests (Heder, 1999: 239; Richardson, 2009: 163) even before this announcement. However, if the intermittent military operations before June represented a PDK strategy to attain a position of strength in the negotiation, the PDK deviated from its previous approach and made its first priority the preservation and expansion of its military power. Since UNTAC endorsed the PRK/SOC’s right to self-defence against the PDK, the hostilities in Cambodia became much more widespread and acute from June 1992.

As the military action intensified, China tried to resume its diplomatic engagement with the PDK over the summer of 1992. For example, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin met Khieu Samphan and asked him to abide by the PPAs in August 1992 (Richardson, 2009: 164).
In September, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, also announced China’s hope that the PDK would return to the peace process and accept UNTAC supervision. Following this, a series of meetings between China and the PDK took place in Beijing, continuing into November.

Externally, it also stressed to other external actors the importance of the inclusion of the PDK in the peace process and in the future political arena to ensure a stable peace in Cambodia. Moreover, China pressed Thailand not to support the PDK economically. According to a Chinese diplomat, it did ‘everything it could to keep the Khmer Rouge involved’ (Richardson, 2009: 164).

However, the PDK completely ignored China’s recommendations. The PDK leaders in Phnom Penh stopped attending most meetings, including the international conference on Cambodia’s rehabilitation and the SNC meetings. Furthermore, after withdrawing their delegates, the PDK officially closed its office in Phnom Penh in early 1993 (Richardson, 2009: 164-5; Heder, 1999: 284). The PDK’s resistance against UNTAC’s demilitarisation project and armed attacks against the PRK/SOC continued until the election in June 1993.

As a result, UNTAC’s goal of ‘establishing a neutral political environment before the electoral period’ could not be achieved (Lizée, 1999: 115). The only options for Akashi in May 1993 were either ‘to proceed with the best possible election under imperfect conditions’ or ‘to declare that the basic acceptable conditions for free and fair elections [did] not exist in Cambodia’ and abandon the election (Lizée, 1999: 118). Ultimately, he resolved to proceed with the election. Although the election took place without serious incident, the PDK eventually refused to join it.

So far, this chapter has presented two aspects of the interplay between China and the PDK during the Cambodian peace negotiations. First, the pattern of the interplay was described.
Since the two actors had common interests in Phase 1, China intervened in the Cambodian civil war as an advocate of the PDK. Both actors consistently refused negotiation with the PRK/SOC and Vietnam. In Phase 2, the two core common interests, the withdrawal of Vietnam and the dissolution of the PRK/SOC regime, became significantly less important for China. In addition, China became more interested in what it could gain from regional stability (See Figure 6.1). Thus, China began to alter its posture and applied moderate pressure on the PDK in an effort to persuade it to be more serious about negotiation with the PRK/SOC. The PDK’s response to this pressure was to flatly ignore it.

![Figure 6.1. Change of Common Interests of China and the PDK](image)

Note: (A) Withdrawal of PAVN from Cambodia  
(B) Dissolution of the Heng Samrin – Hun Sen Regime  
(C) PDK’s Return as Cambodia’s Central Power  
(D) Reduction of USSR’s Influence on Indochina  
(E) Regional Stability

China’s intensified pressure in Phase 3 had a particularly strong influence on the PDK. The withdrawal of China’s diplomatic and material support was a major shock to the PDK leadership and caused its changed attitudes towards negotiation with the PRK/SOC and
Vietnam (see Figure 6.2). However, China’s continued distance from the PDK led the faction to feel that it had been deserted and not to expect further support. Ironically, the former advocate state lost its leverage over the PDK in Phase 4. Although China changed its attitudes and resumed its engagement with the PDK, it had already lost its most valuable means of providing incentives or exerting pressures on the PDK. As a result, the PDK continued its military operations until the election period. In recognition of this, some Chinese leaders regretted that China had not endeavoured further to secure the PDK’s position in the SNC (Richardson, 2009: 165).

Second, this chapter also showed that the PDK’s self-delusion was a crucial barrier in the Cambodian negotiation. As summarised in Table 6.1, the PDK’s blind optimism about its
popularity and China’s advocacy, and its own understanding of negotiation, played a significant role throughout the negotiation process. The PDK’s confidence that it had the Cambodian people’s support was the main reason why the PDK continued to pursue a complete military victory until the last phase of the Cambodian negotiation. Furthermore, the PDK failed to understand the changing negotiation circumstances and blindly believed that China would provide unwavering support. In addition, the PDK also failed to consider that the Vietnamese withdrawal might be genuine and, therefore, failed to respond appropriately. This failure was a major factor in bringing about the PDK’s continuous refusal to deal seriously with the PRK/Vietnam during the negotiations in Phase 2. In Phase 3, the faction also misinterpreted the UN’s peace proposals and conceived its future campaigns without knowing what other actors really planned. In addition, the PDK’s military operations that were conducted as part of its negotiation strategies generated misunderstandings among external actors, who interpreted the violence as an expression of its disinterest or insincerity in negotiation. All these self-delusions prevented the faction from devising and exploiting more effective strategies to achieve gains (See Chapter 7 for details).

Table 6.1. Perceptual Limitations That Shaped the PDK’s Strategies

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<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Perception of the UN’s Proposals</td>
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EL SALVADOR

This section discusses the interaction between the Cristiani government and its advocate state, the United States of America, during the Salvadoran peace negotiations. Since the Salvadoran government had relied heavily on material and diplomatic aid from the US during the civil war period (McClintock, 1998: 221), the change in the USA's attitude towards the Salvadoran negotiations had a critical impact on their progress.

The pattern of the interplay between the two actors in the Salvadoran case was distinct from the interplay of the PDK with China in the following ways. First, as internal resistance from the military leadership was very strong, the Salvadoran government’s negotiation strategies were focused on managing a two-level game involving US pressure and the resistance of the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF). Second, perceptual differences between San Salvador and Washington did not play a significant role, since President Cristiani maintained relatively close communication with its advocate, something that the PDK lacked.

The Aims of Actors

Both the US and the Cristiani government had similar attitudes towards two issues that this thesis focuses on. As regards demilitarisation, both actors considered the realisation of democracy in the country as the most important goal and saw fundamental reform, if not disbanding, of the Salvadoran military forces as an indispensable condition for it (Palmer, 2006: 9; Negroponte, 2005: 164; Juhn, 1998: 126-7). As regards the interim authority, the two allies wholeheartedly advocated the legitimacy of the Cristiani government’s domestic authority, mandated as it was via a democratic election (Negroponte, 2005: 726, 782-3).

83 For a definition of a ‘two-level game’ and further theoretical discussion on the concept, see Chapter 1.
asserting that no other transitional authority needed to be established.

Specifically, the newly elected President Cristiani pursued two fundamental goals: ‘to end the armed confrontation and to demobilize the FMLN’ (De Soto, 1999: 351). Cristiani, a member of the business elite, wanted to promote economic development by stabilising the conflict (Byrne, 1996: 174-5).

Nevertheless, he understood that the FMLN would not accept unilateral demobilisation. He therefore proposed that the government’s armed forces and agencies would also be demobilised, ‘according to the government’s own rules’ (Juhn, 1998: 62). Specifically, with regard to demilitarisation, he suggested the following in June 1990: (1) a significant scaling down of the ESAF and (2) a change in the ministries to which the police were accountable – The Treasury Police would be controlled by the Ministry of the Treasury, absorbing the Customs police; The National Police would come under the control of the Interior Ministry; infantry battalions would be removed from the Security Corps; The National Guard would remain, but it would become the Rural and Border Police (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 1990). In fact, the government’s proposals faced strong objections from both the FMLN, which demanded that the armies and agencies be completely disbanded, and the army’s High Command, which refused to accept measures that would result in a significant reduction in its power.

Nonetheless, the US’s strong pressure supported and forced the Cristiani government to move the negotiations with the FMLN forward. The government therefore had to find a middle way that would placate the two hard-line (internal and external) parties while protecting its own interests. The government used the following strategies to achieve its main goals. First, in order to defend its interests from the strong pressure of the FMLN (and the UN) to make major concessions, the government called for the Bush government’s diplomatic support.
Second, it also tried to maximise the US’s direct pressure on the leadership of the Salvadoran army (details follow below).

In the Cold War environment, the USA pursued a policy of ensuring the Salvadoran government’s non-engagement with the FMLN’s revolutionary movement and did not support a peaceful resolution to the Salvadoran conflict until the end of 1989 (McClintock: 223). Freed from its Cold War rivalry, the Bush administration began to adopt a more pragmatic approach to managing its relationship with El Salvador and began to emphasise the importance of the country’s domestic democracy and peaceful resolution of the civil war (Palmer, 2006: 22-3).

The United States used three main strategies to achieve this goal. First, it applied various material and non-material pressure on the Cristiani government and the ESAF High Command to persuade them to become more flexible. Second, the US initiated direct talks with the FMLN in order to improve the circumstances surrounding the negotiations. Third, the superpower also began to cooperate more closely with the UN and other regional supporting countries (Negroponte, 2005: 275, 297-8, 305-6).

**Interplay between the US and the Cristiani Government**

**Phase 1: June 1989 – the End of 1989**

During Phase 1, despite the change of leaderships in the US and El Salvador, no dramatic transformation of their relationship took place during 1989. Whereas the new Bush administration maintained its partial advocacy of the Salvadoran government, the Cristiani government, constrained by the election in March 1991 and strong resistance from the ESAF,
did not take serious action to encourage a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Byrne, 1996: 177; Montgomery, 1995: 214).

During Phase 1, the Bush administration did not support the UN-supervised Salvadoran peace negotiations and continued in its efforts to protect the legitimacy of the Cristiani government. Despite El Salvador’s changed external and internal circumstances (see Chapter 4), the new US administration continued to follow the policies of the Reagan administration. First, the US government maintained its economic and military aid to the Salvadoran government and military forces (Mouritsen, 2003: 30-9). Second, it continued its diplomatic advocacy of the Cristiani government and its stance against FMLN aggression, declaring that ‘if something were to happen to Cristiani, all the might and weight of the United States would fall on this country’ (Escobar, 1995, cited in Juhn, 1998: 50). Third, the United States did not cooperate with the UN’s peace facilitation efforts in this period. Rather, it criticised the UN’s mediation efforts as insufficient and partial (Negroponte, 2005: 726, 782-3).

In addition, most of the communication between the two governments on controlling and maintaining these strategies was multilayered. The US Embassy in San Salvador had been the main communication agency since the 1930s. Government officials of both countries exchanged frequent messages, and the US administration wielded a strong influence over a wide range of Salvadoran political, economic, and military policies (Mouritsen, 2003: 6-7, 32-9). The presidents of the two countries maintained regular contact with each other. For instance, George Bush made a personal telephone call to then president-elect Cristiani to ensure him that the US’s support for the Salvadoran government would continue unabated (Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater, 1989: no pagination). In addition, the US also maintained connections with the Salvadoran civil societies by supporting the US NGO’s activities in El Salvador (Solís & Martin, 1992: 104-6).
The USA’s ambivalent, if not negative, attitude towards the bilateral talks in El Salvador prevented the Cristiani government from taking proactive action to advance the peace negotiations. In fact, the Cristiani government’s initial diplomatic efforts were markedly more positive than those of the previous government. First, President Cristiani’s proposal of negotiations was unconditional. Considering that previous government leaders had demanded the surrender of the FMLN as a prerequisite for further negotiation, this was taken as evidence that Cristiani was serious about negotiating an end to the conflict (Juñ, 1998: 50). Second, the government appealed for a form of negotiation that could produce substantive agreement. In view of the fact that previous negotiation efforts had merely been occasional events used as opportunities to express the parties’ own demands, President Cristiani instead suggested making the negotiations ‘continuous, uninterrupted, secret, and substantive’ (Juñ, 1998: 50).

The Salvadoran military force did not offer serious resistance to President Cristiani’s new initiative since it did not consider the initiative serious (Juñ, 1998: 47-50). Nevertheless, as the military had formed the government between 1932-1979 and retained a significant influence over Salvadoran politics even after the return to civilian rule (Mouritsen, 2003: 65), it was impossible for Cristiani to make significant progress in the negotiations without the support of the US government.

As a result, despite President Cristiani’s continuous assertion of his desire for talks, the government took no important action and made no substantial progress towards negotiation in Phase 1. In fact, it was the FMLN that made practical progress towards setting up negotiations in this phase (see Chapter 5).
Phase 2: Early 1990 – End of 1990

In this phase, a somewhat different pattern of interplay between the US and the Salvadoran government emerged as the US administration and congress became increasingly critical of the ESAF’s human rights violations, in particular, the killing of six Jesuit priests in 1989. As the US began to adopt a tougher stance towards the Salvadoran military leaders, President Cristiani played a more active role in advancing negotiations with the FMLN.

The Salvadoran governmental death squad’s infamous killing of six respected Jesuit priests in November 1989 marked a turning point in US policy. The Democrat-led Congress reacted strongly to this human rights violation, and the Bush administration was compelled to pressurise the Salvadoran government to investigate the incident and to improve domestic human rights (McClintock, 1998: 154; Byrne, 1996: 179-80; Levine, 1997: 231). In addition, early 1990 saw a change in the USA’s policies on the Salvadoran peace negotiations ‘from a rigid ideological stance toward more pragmatic positions’ (Munck, 1993: 79-80).

Most strikingly, in October 1990, the US Congress voted to cut its assistance to the Salvadoran forces by half from 1991 in order to press for the reform of the ESAF and the transparent investigation of the murder of the Jesuit priests (McClintock, 1998: 154). In addition, Washington continuously expressed its unhappiness with the ESAF. For instance, Bernard Aronson, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and William Walker, then US Ambassador to San Salvador, conveyed direct and indirect messages to the Salvadoran government and military leaders of their desire for a reduction in the size and for reform of the ESAF and other military agencies (De Soto, 1999: 372; Juhn, 1998: 60). Moreover, President Bush invited Cristiani to the US and expressed his desire for the improvement of human rights in El Salvador and the restructuring of the ESAF (LA Times, 30 January, 1990).
Nevertheless, the US government did not make strong efforts to ensure the success of the negotiations because of the following reasons. First, in this period, the first priority of US diplomatic pressure was reform of the Salvadoran military groups. Nor was the US ready to support the peace negotiation processes led by the UN. Thus, although the US diplomats applied strong pressure on El Salvador’s military leaders, the focus was not about the military’s stubborn attitude towards the Salvadoran peace negotiations but about its human rights abuses and its resistance to democratisation (Juhn, 1998, 45; De Soto, 1999: 371; Negroponte, 2005: 258-9). Second, the diplomatic pressure from the US government and Congress resulted in a sudden transformation of the country’s policies towards El Salvador. However, the Bush administration maintained its military aid to and diplomatic support for the Salvadoran government until the end of 1990, and therefore, the changed US position did not significantly alter the Salvadoran government’s attitude towards the negotiations.

For the Salvadoran government, while President Cristiani’s US diplomacy focused on minimising the outcomes of the Jesuit priests’ murders, the High Command took efforts to undermine the negotiations by exaggerating the FMLN’s recent offences. As US pressure gradually increased throughout late 1990, the military leaders began to make it known that there existed the possibility of a coup if the ESAF became isolated from the government’s political decisions (Juhn, 1998: 68, 77; Montgomery, 1992: 222).

The strategy of Cristiani’s negotiation team in this period was simply to repeat the following courses of action. First, the government flatly refused all FMLN demands on the purging or disbanding of military forces, and, therefore, the same confrontations over demilitarisation reoccurred between the two sides in most meetings. This intransigence was compounded by the approach of the legislative election planned for the following March, and the government adopted a tougher line in the negotiations after October 1990 (Juhn, 1998: 71-8).
Second, President Cristiani presented its own proposals to avoid the breakdown of the negotiations and to respond to the increasing pressure from the US. For instance, the Cristiani negotiation team suggested a 33-point proposal at the July 1990 meeting in San José. However, these suggestions failed to attract the FMLN (which also displayed its own stubborn refusal to compromise at this meeting) because they were based on the government’s own perception of the military issues (UN memo, 18 September 1990; Juhn, 1998: 71-2).

Third, the government tried to avoid discussion on a range of controversial issues, demilitarisation in particular. Since the government had accepted the UN’s suggestion to leave aside the issues relating to the armed forces and to prioritise the discussion of human rights in July 1990, the government kept refusing to undertake serious negotiation on the issue of demilitarisation until the end of Phase 2 (Juhn, 1998: 70-1).

As a result, after producing initial agreements in Geneva (in April) and Caracas (in May), which the government viewed as informal talks prior to the beginning of the real negotiations, the bilateral talks remained deadlocked until the end of the year (Sullivan, 1994: 89; De Soto, 1999: 360-2). Demilitarisation remained a particular sticking point, with neither side showing any sign of concession on the issues of purging or restructuring the Salvadoran military forces. Pedro Nikken, then advisor to the UN Secretary-General for the Salvadoran peace process, describes the negotiations in this period as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Juhn, 1998: 70).

However, in terms of the issues surrounding the establishment of a transitional authority, the Cristiani team agreed with the launching of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in June 1990 to verify the army’s human rights abuses (Sullivan, 1994: 89), and the two Salvadoran warring factions agreed to enlarge the role of the UN during and after the civil conflict. Moreover, the formation of ONUSAL, an important part of the transitional authority,
was eventually called for by both sides (Negroponte, 2005: 302).


In Phase 3, both the US and President Cristiani became more eager to reach a final peace agreement. As the US’s efforts to pressurise the Salvadoran government to make significant progress in the negotiations became more direct and forceful, the US and the Salvadoran government cooperated more closely and actively to compel the ESAF to abide by the expected demilitarisation.

The Bush government made a variety of efforts to advocate President Cristiani and to minimise the resistance of the military leaders (US Department of State cable #216340 cited in Negroponte, 2005: 311). In addition to the reduction in its military assistance, the US also made various diplomatic efforts. First, with regard to its pressure on the ESAF, the US government instructed its representatives and envoys to make direct contact with the leadership of the High Command to make it explicitly clear that the US supported the peace negotiations. For example, General George Joulwan, then head of the US Southern Command in Panama, met with the High Command to emphasise the US’s firm support for President Cristiani’s diplomatic efforts (Negroponte, 2005: 312). Moreover, when the government flatly refused most of the FMLN’s demands in April 1991, Colin Powell, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited El Salvador and made a strong statement calling for the end of the war (Juhn, 1998: 90).

Second, the US officials’ direct contact with the FMLN was another important signal to the ESAF that its former advocate no longer supported military conflict. After several months of indirect talks, US officials began to make direct visits to the FMLN in January 1991 (Sullivan, 1994: 87; De Soto, 1999: 376). From August 1991, the US government engaged with the
FMLN more closely by facilitating bilateral talks with the Salvadoran government, explaining Cristiani’s intentions, and presenting mediating proposals (Juhn, 1998: 105; Sullivan, 1994: 87-8).

Third, the Bush administration cooperated with the UN’s diplomatic coordination of the negotiations, assuming an ‘activist, low-key, behind-the-scenes’ role (Sullivan, 1994: 86). At the end of 1990, the US government expressed its conviction that the UN’s involvement was critical to the success of the Salvadoran negotiations, and from then on, the US backed most of the UN initiatives (Sullivan, 1994: 98; Juhn, 1998: 101-4). Nevertheless, it continued to keep its diplomatic efforts low-profile because the Bush administration did not wish to raise concern among other Central American states about too strong an involvement of the US in their regional issues (Negroponte, 2005: 317).

Fourth, in the final phase of the negotiations, the US’s skills at the negotiation table played a particularly important role. In December, when progress towards a final agreement remained deadlocked on the issue of demilitarisation, US officials persuaded President Cristiani to come to New York with the intention of achieving a breakthrough (Sullivan, 1994: 42-6, 96; Montgomery, 1995: 144). Moreover, the US also presented an offer of political and financial aid in exchange for the Cristiani government’s concession on a reduction in military forces (Juht, 1998: 119).

The US’s new pressures, which were stronger, employed a greater diversity of strategic methods, and increased the number of participating individuals, are considered one of the most important pushing-and-pulling factors behind the Cristiani government’s willingness to sign the final peace agreement (LeVine, 1997: 248).

By making use of the stronger US pressure, the Cristiani government achieved significant
success in its two-level negotiation – persuading the FMLN to compromise its demands and
convincing the military leadership to abide by the government’s decisions (Juhn, 1998: 84-5)
– and demonstrated a far more flexible attitude from August 1991, when the US embarked on
a series of much more proactive moves (Juhn, 1998: 99-100).

Under pressure both from external actors (i.e. heightened diplomatic criticism from the UN
and the US) and internal actors (i.e. popular demonstrations against the negotiations
organised by right wing groups, including the High Command), the Cristiani government’s
negotiation behaviour took on a recurring pattern. In each round of negotiation, the
government negotiation team’s initial resistance to any compromises on military issues
gradually weakened under increased pressure from the US (Juhn, 1998: 117; Negroponte,

Responding to the external pressure, President Cristiani made significant concessions on the
demilitarisation issues. For instance, after the US’s intensive diplomatic lobbying in August,
the Cristiani government’s original resistance gave way to its acceptance of the need to
reform the ESAF (UN/PDC notes, 15 August 1991; Juhn, 1998: 102-4), and after a
painstaking New York meeting in September 1991, the Cristiani government agreed to
establish a new National Civil Police (PNC) and to dissolve the Directorate of National
Intelligence (DNI) (Negroponte, 2005: 321). Similar patterns were repeated in the October
and December meetings (Juhn, 1998: 112-4).

He also made a great deal of effort not to upset the military leaders too much. Most
significantly, the government refused to disband the ESAF completely until the end of the
negotiations, as it was concerned about the desperate High Command’s uncontrollable
behaviour. In addition, when it agreed to the New York Accord in September, it demanded
that the agreements on the creation of a PNC were not released, as they might galvanise the
anger of the military leaders (Negroponte, 2005: 321). In many cases, the Cristiani negotiation team simply tried to avoid making decisions on the ESAF issue when possible.

Nevertheless, this pattern of behaviour could not be used in the final round of the negotiations in December 1991. Since all unsettled issues needed to be addressed, President Cristiani himself had to join the meeting in New York. Facing a 31 December 1991 deadline (the end of Pérez de Cuéllar’s term) and with all external mediators’ participating, President Cristiani needed to make final decisions. Finally, he agreed with the FMLN on all the major issues, despite the expected resistance of the High Command, on the day of the deadline (Sullivan, 1994: 96; Montgomery, 1992: 225; Negroponte, 2005: 326-8; Juhn, 1998: 120-1).

As a result, the government had to make great concessions (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 36). With regard to the demilitarisation of the governmental armed forces, although the core leadership of the national army would be granted the opportunity to remain in place, the military and political power of the ESAF would be significantly reduced (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 1, para 1, 4, 9, and 12). In addition, all other major military agencies, including the Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalions (BIRIs), the DNI, and the national police were to be disbanded or completely reformed (ibid, para 7 and 8; Chapter 2, para 1 and 2).

Thus, although President Cristiani, who had a business elite background and had liberal ideas on military power, agreed with the proposals, serious resistance was expected from the army leadership.

Major decisions on the interim authority were made with relative ease. Although there was no systemic definition of the new transitional authority, a tripartite cooperative arrangement was established for its implementation. First, the Cristiani government was retained as the authority externally representing El Salvador’s sovereignty and controlling all administrative power. Second, the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) was
established to deal with the restructuring of major social institutions (including the electoral system). It consisted of representatives from the government, the FMLN, and other political parties. Third, ONUSAL, an external actor representing the UN, was charged with investigating various issues related to the peace process and to present its recommendations to President Cristiani.

**Phase 4: January 1992 – September 1993**

In the implementation phase, the involvement of ONUSAL produced a new form of the two-level game in the Salvadoran peace process. While ONUSAL played an active role as a legitimate authority in planning and verifying the implementation of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement and in pressurising the Cristiani government, the US government supported ONUSAL’s efforts. Facing pressure (or using the pressure) from both ONUSAL and the US government, President Cristiani gradually carried out the demilitarisation.

Because of the national army’s strong resistance to the issue of demilitarisation, its implementation proved to be particularly troublesome, and the US’s diplomatic and material pressure became focused on persuading the top military leaders to abide by the Accord.84 First, the US provided incentives to secure the implementation of demilitarisation, announcing to the Cristiani government that it would provide resources such as funds for demobilisation, facilities for training new military organisations, and other support that Cristiani needed (US Embassy San Salvador cable #10412, October 6, 1992 cited in Negroponte, 2005: 357).

Second, in order to increase its diplomatic pressure, the US also held direct meetings with the

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84 The Clinton administration took office in January 1993 and inherited and strengthened its predecessor’s two principles: support for democratic institutions and for rebuilding market-oriented economies. Based on an approach of ‘pragmatism and partnership’, the new US government gave stronger and more substantial support to the peace implementation in El Salvador (Palmer, 2006: 22-3).
ESAF leadership to persuade them to abide by the peace process. For instance, when the retirement of top ESAF figures was repeatedly delayed, the then Assistant Secretary, Bernard Aronson, met with the ESAF leaders in September 1992 and asserted the US’s determination to complete the work (Negroponte, 2005: 352).

Third, the US’s military and economic support was linked to the progress of the implementation of the peace agreement. For instance, the then Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, warned San Salvador in February 1993 that military assistance and funds for the Department of Justice would be withheld unless the Salvadoran government demonstrated its resolve to implement the agreement (Baranyi & North, 1996: 18).

Fourth, after the decisive peace agreement was reached on 31 December 1991, USA officials met continuously with the FMLN leaders and expressed their strong support for the peace accords. These meetings with the FMLN convinced the ESAF that the US no longer supported it (Sullivan, 1994: 88).

Combined with the activities of ONUSAL, the US’s tougher stance and consistent strategies forced the Salvadoran government to complete the demilitarisation programmes set out in the Chapultepec Agreement. However, the initial response of the government to these pressures was ambivalent, if not reluctant. Because of the ESAF leadership’s strong resistance to demilitarisation, the Cristiani administration could not easily ensure its implementation. For example, during the early stages of demilitarising the National Guard, the BIRIs, and the death squads in February and March 1992, the military leaders sabotaged the process, and fake implementation caused a serious delay in the overall process (US Embassy San Salvador cable #04523, 24 April 1992 cited in Negroponte, 2005: 334). Moreover, the Cristiani government’s political will to overcome the resistance was not taken seriously by the US (Whitfield, 2001: 37).
Nevertheless, the combined effects of ONUSAL’s diplomatic efforts towards the Cristiani government and other external actors as well as the US government’s repeated promise of financial support for the implementation process and continuous assertion of its determination to complete the demilitarisation succeeded in changing President Cristiani’s attitudes (Baranyi & North, 1996: 15-6; Whitfield, 2001: 37).

A good example of this pattern is observed in the retirement of core military officers who had perpetrated human rights abuses against the Salvadoran people. Although the UN Ad Hoc Commission recommended the immediate dismissal of approximately 100 officers in September 1992 (Montgomery, 1995: 151), the Cristiani government was unable to take swift action because the removal of 15 top leaders was a particularly sensitive issue for the EASF. Thus, there was little sign of implementation until February 1993. Nevertheless, as the Clinton government made it clear in February that no more military support would be given until the military leaders accused of human rights abuse were dismissed, the government was able to overrule the ESAF resistance. Between March and April 1993, all the military leaders listed in the Ad Hoc Commission’s report were forced to retire. Moreover, the government announced a revised target date for the completion of the Commission’s recommendations: 30 June 1993 (The New York Times 16 March 16, 1993, cited in Baranyi & North, 1996: 18; Negroponte, 2005: 350).

As a result, although the process extended beyond the originally proposed deadline, all missions of ONUSAL were declared complete in September 1993 (Baranyi & North, 1996: 3). Moreover, as Licenciado Rodriguez, who took the lead in the demilitarisation as the Ad Hoc Commission’s Chairman, stated, only the US had the effective power to enforce the Commission’s recommendations, and its pressure was the most important (and, in reality, the only) factor in compelling the Salvadoran military leaders to cooperate with the
demilitarisation process (Negroponte, 2005: 350).

Throughout the negotiation period, two distinctive characteristics of the interplay between the US and the Cristiani government are observed. First, the two-level game played by President Cristiani is particularly important in understanding the interplay between the Cristiani government and the United States. As Figure 6.3 shows, the actors had no significant difference in goals that could hamper their cooperation in Phase 2. Nevertheless, dealing with the strong pressure from the US to achieve progress in the peace negotiations and the stubborn resistance of the military leadership was a critically important yet difficult task during the peace negotiation processes for both actors. In Phase 1, since the US administration, bound by Cold War rivalry, maintained its partial support of the Salvadoran government (and its military forces), President Cristiani’s new peace initiatives did not produce fruitful results. Although the US changed its attitude towards the Salvadoran peace negotiations in Phase 2, the advocate country’s material and diplomatic pressure did not have an immediate effect. Thus, the Cristiani government refused to make any significant concessions on the demilitarisation issue. From Phase 3 to the end of the implementation phase, the consistently strong enthusiasm of the US government for a peaceful resolution of the Salvadoran conflict, together with other external actors’ pressure, forced the Cristiani government to be tougher with the ESAF.
Second, the relatively close interaction between the governments of the United States and El Salvador was a significant feature of the negotiations (Sullivan, 1994: 87). Since the US government had a good understanding of the influence of the Salvadoran army in Salvadoran politics (Mouritsen, 2003: 65), no significant issues related to bounded awareness were observed. The US’s policies were focused on protecting the Cristiani government from the threat of the ESAF and acquiring greater influence over the Salvadoran military forces in order to support President Cristiani’s initiatives. In order to achieve these ends, and in contrast to China’s relationship with the PDK, it remained in constant contact with the Salvadoran government and the ESAF leaders. Hence, mutual misunderstandings that might affect the decision-making process were minimised, and the effectiveness of US pressure on the Salvadoran military leadership was increased.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has analysed the changing pattern of the interplay between two national factions in the civil wars in Cambodia and El Salvador (the PDK and the Cristiani Government) and their advocate states (China and the US) during their peace negotiation processes. In general, similar to the pattern of interplay studied in Chapter 5, when the external actors showed greater enthusiasm towards the negotiation, the negotiations achieved better progress. When the pressure or incentives from the external interveners became stronger, the national factions tended to demonstrate more cooperative and less belligerent attitudes in their negotiation. A closer analysis reveals the following points.

First, the attitudes of the advocate states in the two cases changed significantly over time. In the initial periods of the civil wars in Cambodia and El Salvador, both China and the US behaved like spoilers rather than mediators in the early phases of the negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively. However, as their core regional interests changed with the end of the Cold War system, both advocates redefined their roles in the negotiations from partial supporter of certain national actors to neutral mediators. Accordingly, their relationship with the national factions that they supported changed significantly during the negotiation processes. Close cooperation between the national factions and the advocates was hampered, and tensions emerged from the mid part of the negotiations as their core goals diverged.

Second, from a short-term viewpoint, the impact of the advocate states on the national factions’ changes in attitudes towards their negotiations is considered more critical than the impact of third-party mediators. In addition to the diplomatic tactics that were used by the impartial third-parties, China and the US applied stronger and more material incentives and pressures. Using the classification of types of interplay suggested by Stokke (see Chapter 2),
the intervention of the two advocates can be categorised as utilitarian interplay, which is
usually determined by costs and benefits. Although they also facilitated the peace
negotiations by engaging in normative and ideational interplay with the national factions, the
diplomatic, economic, and military tactics employed by the US and China were intended to
persuade their clients to engage more actively in the peace negotiations and to treat them
more seriously by increasing the costs of continuing the conflict and the benefits of peace
negotiation.

Moreover, national factions made more sensitive responses towards their advocate states’
changed attitudes. Compared to their responses to the impartial interveners’ recommendations,
the factions tended to be more favourably disposed towards the demands of their advocates.
For instance, the significant decrease in the military and economic support from China and
the US shocked the PDK and the Cristiani government (or, more specifically, the military
leaders), respectively, and succeeded in forcing them to take their negotiations more seriously.

Third, close communication between an advocate state and a national faction might play an
important role in the success of a peace negotiation. Although China was the only *de facto*
military and economic supporter of the PDK, the misunderstandings between the two actors
prevented China from being able to apply effective pressure on the PDK. In fact, being
trapped by its communist ideas and self-affirming internal discussion culture, the PDK
developed many assumptions about the conflict and the negotiations without attempting to
find out the reality of the situation. In not reflecting these assumptions in its policies or
conveying its intentions correctly to the PDK, China’s new policies towards the Cambodian
peace process failed to gain the support of and cooperation from the national faction. By
contrast, through its use of multi-layered communication routes with various Salvadoran
governmental bureaucracies, the US government maintained effective channels for the
transmission of information by both sides. These channels minimised the potential problems of bounded awareness for both the US and the Cristiani government during the negotiation. The US leaders’ good understanding of President Cristiani’s intentions and the circumstances that he faced in the negotiation periods helped the advocate state to use its power in effective ways.

Fourth, the cases studies also demonstrate that the constant attention of the advocate states was important to the success of the negotiations. As seen in the Cambodian negotiations, although China’s cessation of its substantial aid to the PDK succeeded in forcing the faction to participate in the negotiations, the abrupt abandonment of its advocacy both removed China’s leverage over the PDK and engendered a deep feeling of betrayal among the PDK leadership. Therefore, China was unable to influence the PDK’s behaviour during the implementation phase. By contrast, the US government paid consistently close attention to the restructuring of the ESAF, and the combination of incentives and pressure during the implementation phase was one of the biggest push-and-pull factors behind the Cristiani government being able to complete its mandates.

The following chapter will present a number of theoretical and practical implications that can be derived from the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. First, a more systematic analysis of the patterns of interplay between national factions and external interveners will be undertaken. In more closely observing and indentifying the similarities and differences between the four cases of interplay, Chapter 7 will uncover both a number of general patterns common to most cases and each case’s unique features. Second, the chapter will study the theoretical implications of the findings. The features of the cases studied will provide evidence to confirm some existing theoretical discourses related to international negotiation or conflict resolution, such as the dilemma of impartiality and enthusiasm of third-party interveners, the
two-level game of negotiation, and the role of culture in international negotiation. Finally, the following chapter will also present a number of practical implications of the findings for future peace negotiations. In particular, the chapter will propose a number of suggestions that might be useful in answering the questions of how interveners convince warring factions to choose peace negotiation over military solutions and, once a ceasefire is in effect, how the third-parties’ power can be effectively used to convert the temporary ceasefire into a sustained peace.
Chapter 7

Analysis of the Case Studies

INTRODUCTION

The previous two chapters studied the national factions’ changing patterns of interaction with two types of third-party interveners (impartial third parties and advocating states) in the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. In general, it is observed that stronger response rules from international interveners are likely to result in national factions demonstrating greater flexibility towards the peace negotiation in the short-term.

However, the case studies also showed that the national actors eventually refused to cooperate with proposals that they deemed harmful to the chances of achieving their fundamental goals, regardless of the strength of the intervention methods employed.

Moreover, the chapters displayed the distinctive behaviour of the impartial third parties and advocate states during their interventions and the dissimilar responses of the national factions to the external incentives and pressures. They also revealed two factors that prevented the actors from developing good mutual understanding: ethnocentric cultural values and limitations in the organisations’ communication systems.

This chapter attempts to provide a more systematic analysis of these findings by asking what answers the previous case studies provide to the main questions. It examines both the descriptive and explanatory aspects of the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 that are relevant to the question of ‘what does the interplay between national factions and external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?’ In addition, this chapter also discusses some significant implications that these findings have for a number of
the theoretical perspectives employed in conventional studies, such as the role of culture in negotiation, the utility of coercive interaction, two-level games, and bounded awareness.

The first section of this chapter illustrates the descriptive achievements of this thesis by providing answers to the first subordinate question: ‘what strategies do national and external actors use to achieve their goals?’ As regards the interveners’ strategies, it presents the different types of intervention methods used by the impartial third parties and advocate states. With regard to the responses of the national factions to the external intervention, it re-examines the national factions’ changing attitudes during their peace negotiations by applying the case studies’ findings to the typology of national factions’ reactions that was conceptualised in Chapter 3. In general, the decisions of the national actors in the cases studies conform with those in the typology. After this, the two-level games in the national factions’ decision making are examined. It is observed that most military factions in civil conflicts play two-level games when they make decisions, and, moreover, the internal negotiations in their two-level games are normally conducted between the leaders of rival subordinate units.

The final two sections provide answers to the two remaining subordinate questions presented in Chapter 1. In section two, the comparative effectiveness of the methods of intervention is explored. By examining the usefulness of the different types of third-party peace intervention, however, this section concludes that there is no specific type of intervention that is more useful than others. The third section addresses the following question: what are the major perceptual obstacles preventing effective third-party intervention. It discusses the contribution of the third-parties’ ethnocentric cultural values to their perceptual limitations and points to how the national factions’ limited communication capabilities prevented them from making the most of their strategies in the negotiations.
QUESTION I:

What strategies do national and external actors use to achieve their goals?

In order to answer this question on the strategic moves of external third parties and national factions, this section sets out to describe the features of the interplay between the negotiating actors in civil war peace negotiations and to present some theoretical implications of these features. It consists of three parts, which deal with the behaviour of the external third parties, the responses of the national factions, and the consequences of the interplay, respectively.

The Intervention of the Third Parties

This section presents a number of the differences between the intervening behaviour of impartial third parties and that of advocate states. In short, while the impartial third parties paid most attention to process control and content control, the advocate states used a wider range of strategies. It was also observed that although the advocate states’ intervention appeared to have stronger short-term effects, its long-term influence varied by case.

Chapter 3 proposed two categories for interveners’ strategic moves. The first category consists of three forms of intervention: process control, content control, and motivation control. The second category deals with the strength of intervention and distinguishes between light methods and heavy methods. The case studies’ findings in respect to these criteria reveal two notable features.

The advocate states in the case studies used more diverse methods than the impartial interveners. The impartial third parties tended to rely on diplomatic incentives and pressures that were founded on their legitimate moral and diplomatic influence as impartial
international actors. The UN in El Salvador used the most limited range of methods, which were procedural coordination, indirect organisation of other interveners’ pressures, and its own diplomatic pressures on the national factions. In addition to its diplomatic and mediating roles, the United States in the Cambodian case applied more direct diplomatic and economic pressure, including official condemnation of the national factions’ behaviour and linking their economic cooperation to concessionary moves by Vietnam and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)/the State of Cambodia (SOC: successor of the PRK).

By contrast, as the advocate states had provided economic and/or military support to the national factions before the civil wars, they had more varied resources with which to influence their client national factions. In Cambodia, China utilised its personal connections with the CGDK’s leaders, diplomatic advocacy at the international level, and economic and military aid, together with most of the methods that were applied by the impartial interveners. The US in El Salvador used the most diverse intervening strategies of the interveners examined in this thesis, adding the following methods: using its influence over the leaders of Salvadoran social or political groups, promising future incentives, and using El Salvador’s domestic media.

**The Responses of the National Factions**

This section discusses the issues related to the pattern of the factions’ responses towards the interveners’ proposals and pressure. First, after a brief description of the national factions’ behaviour presented in Chapters 5 and 6, it examines the usefulness of the typology of national factions’ decision making suggested in Chapter 3. The national actors in the case studies are observed to have generally conformed with the assumptions presented in that
chapter. Additionally, it discusses the two-level games found in the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador.

As presented in Chapter 3, the strategic moves of national factions can be categorised into the following five actions: (1) rejection of the suggested proposal; (2) dragging out the procedure; (3) devious consent; (4) conditional consent; and (5) full acceptance. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that the primary methods that the national factions used to respond to the third-parties’ intervention changed in each phase of the negotiations.

The Cambodian national actors generally responded negatively to the interveners’ efforts. For instance, the PDK demonstrated its stubborn attitudes in the initial phase of its negotiations by rejecting talks with its enemies. Although it participated in the negotiations from 1989, it was not until late 1990 that the faction displayed a receptive attitude. However, its cooperation with the peace negotiation process ended in its overt refusal to cooperate with UNTAC’s demilitarisation process.

In addition, the PRK/SOC used two less obvious tactics to resist the proposals during the negotiation period: dragging out the process and devious consent. When the third parties were paying serious attention to the Cambodian issues (between late 1989 and the end of 1990), it pretended to agree to the UN’s proposals but made efforts to drag out the negotiation procedures. Moreover, when the international attention on Cambodia waned at the end of 1989, it quickly persuaded other national factions to change the proposals, despite continually confirming its official position of support for the UN’s proposals. The PRK/SOC’s resistance became more explicit during the implementation phase, when it obstructed the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)’s activities and rejected the election results.
Compared to the Cambodian factions, the Salvadoran military factions displayed more positive attitudes towards the external actors’ intervention. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) maintained a relatively good relationship with the UN largely because the international body adopted an impartial attitude towards both negotiating parties. Although the FMLN rejected the UN’s appeals for renewed negotiation between the middle and the end of 1990, the military faction responded relatively positively to the UN’s coordination of the implementation phase by fully accepting or conditionally consenting to the implementation processes.

The Cristiani government’s responses to the external pressure for negotiation were somewhat more reluctant because of the strong internal resistance from the military leaders of the government forces. After its ambivalent and rather negative stance against any real concessions ended in March 1991, the government moved the negotiation forward slowly while seeking a middle path that would appease both the ESAF leaders and the US government. Thus, its normal response to pressure from the US was to drag out the procedure or offer conditional consent.

*Pattern of National Factions’ Responses*

This section argues that the behaviour of the national factions studied in Chapters 5 and 6 generally supports the assumptions and typology that appeared in Chapter 3. Table 7.1, which has already appeared in Chapter 3 (p. 78), summarises the typology. This typology is based on the assumption that an actor’s decisions on its future actions in negotiation are strongly affected by its assessment of the combination of three questions. First, are the proposals critically harmful to the actor’s fundamental goals? Second, are the pressures or incentives from external interveners strong? Third, does the national faction have sufficient domestic resources to resist the pressure from international interveners?
Table 7.1. The Typology of National Factions’ Choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
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<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Rules</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent Of Actors</td>
<td>Consent (Initiator)</td>
<td>Consent (Follower)</td>
<td>Consent (Initiator)</td>
<td>Consent (Follower)</td>
<td>Pretend Consent (In Spoiler) Refuse (Out Spoiler)</td>
<td>Refuse (Inside or Outside Spoiler)</td>
<td>Pretend Consent (Follower) Refuse (Loner)</td>
<td>Refuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Highly Probable</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Probable But Slow</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Highly Unlikely</td>
<td>Highly Unlikely</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>No Progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Proposal Contents: P – proposal is favourable or neutral to the faction’s fundamental goals
   N – proposal is contrary to pursuance of the faction’s fundamental goals
2. Resource: P – resources of the faction are relatively abundant
   N – resources of the faction are relatively few
3. Response Rules: P – response rules from external interveners are forceful
   N – response rules from external interveners are not forceful

The case studies reveal that the national factions’ behaviour was generally consistent with these assumptions. Moreover, their actions changed phase by phase because the conditions of their domestic resources and the response rules from external interveners varied according to the phase. First, in Cambodia, the PRK/SOC’s response to the UN’s peace proposals in Phase 2 was relatively positive when all international interveners applied strong diplomatic and economic pressure and incentives (Type E in the Table 7.1). However, as the international communities’ focus on the peace negotiation waned in Phase 3, the de facto government made efforts to reverse or renegotiate the proposals that it had agreed to in Phase 2 (F, Inside Spoiler). This intention became more explicit during the implementation phase; more seriously, it flatly refused to accept the result of the first Cambodian post-war general election, which was unfavourable to its goals (F, Outside Spoiler) (Ashley, 1998: 24).

Second, the PDK constantly rejected negotiations with the PRK/SOC until Phase 2 because Chinese economic and military aid continued, and the faction was largely unconcerned about
the diplomatic pressure from other external interveners as its legitimacy or military power did not rely on them (F). However, under much stronger pressure from China (discontinuation of its military aid) and sensing in the UN’s proposals a chance to achieve their goals, the faction showed much greater flexibility towards the negotiations. Although it had some natural resources, including diamond mines in Pailin region, the faction feared that the discontinuance of Chinese aid would critically hamper its capabilities (B). In Phase 3, realising that it was unlikely to achieve its goals and finding that China had little interest in supporting it, the PDK returned to hostilities, refusing to collaborate with UNTAC in Phase 4 (F, Outside Spoiler).

Third, as regards the Cristiani government in El Salvador, it could not initially promote peace negotiation vigorously because negotiation was not a US interest, and the government did not have sufficient resources to challenge the ESAF (H). As the US changed its policies from partial advocacy of the ESAF to support for a negotiated peace in El Salvador, the goals of the Cristiani government and the US began to converge. From this time on, the pressure from external interveners, particularly the US, became one of the Cristiani government’s primary resources in overcoming ESAF resistance. Thus, from Phase 2, the behaviour of the government changed from D (Follower) to A (Initiator) (in Phase 3 and 4).

Finally, the FMLN did not identify any particular aspect of the UN’s proposals that might fundamentally prevent it from achieving its goals in Phase 1 (C). However, when the faction adopted a tougher approach towards the Cristiani government in Phase 2, the UN’s relatively neutral but weak intervention could not deter the factions from behaviour that was detrimental to the peace negotiation (F). However, the stronger pressure from the UN and other international actors in Phases 3 and 4 convinced the faction to return to the negotiating table and make significant concessions. Moreover, the FMLN gradually encountered more
opportunities to achieve its goals as both sides made more concessions from the latter period of Phase 3 (E→A, Initiator).

Table 7.2. The Patterns of National Factions’ Behaviour and the Consequences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Change of Behaviour</th>
<th>Final Reaction</th>
<th>Outcomes of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>The PRK/SOC</td>
<td>E→F→F</td>
<td>Internal Resistance</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The PDK</td>
<td>F→B→F</td>
<td>Flat Refuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>The Gov’t</td>
<td>H→D→A</td>
<td>Slow Consent</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The FMLN</td>
<td>C→F→E→A</td>
<td>Slow Consent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As summarised in Table 7.2, the pattern of behaviour of the national factions in Cambodia and El Salvador follows the assumptions presented in Chapter 3. Moreover, it is observed that the final reactions of the national factions to the peace agreements strongly affected the outcomes of the peace implementation. In this sense, as far as the case studies in this thesis are concerned, the typology presented above is useful.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the case studies also demonstrate that the goals of the actors are not always clearly evident. In some cases (e.g. the FMLN and the PRK/SOC), although the actors’ goals were stable, their behaviour towards the interveners’ proposals followed a change in their mid-term or provisional goals. For instance, although the UN proposals were not inconsistent with the FMLN’s fundamental goals (the dissolution of the ESAF and the integration of the FMLN into Salvadoran politics), the military faction’s

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As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis regards a peace process as a success when the process achieves four goals: (a) the fighting comes to an end, (b) demobilisation of forces is complete, (c) key provisions of the accords provide for a restructuring of the armed forces and police, and (d) free and fair elections are held. The cases in which some of these goals are not achieved are regarded as partial successes.
response to them was negative when the FMLN decided to adopt a tough stance towards the government in order to improve its negotiating position.\footnote{In these cases, as the goals were not presented clearly, the usefulness of this typology is reduced.} In these cases, as the goals were not presented clearly, the usefulness of this typology is reduced.

\textit{Two-level Games in Peace Negotiation}

Another noteworthy aspect of the national factions’ behaviour is that the party leaders’ decision making involved playing two-level games. It has been shown that most warring parties are involved in two-level games even during their military phase of operations; moreover, internal negotiation mainly occurs with other leaders within the same party. Since its introduction by Robert Putnam in 1988, two-level game theory has been widely used to analyse negotiations. However, the two-level game played by national warring factions during civil conflicts has attracted much less attention in the academic community (See Chapter 2 for details). The case studies display a number of two-level game characteristics.

First, it is apparent that most of the national factions played two-level games during their military campaigns. Although the power of internal actors’ influence varied, few factional leaders in Cambodia and El Salvador made decisions without facing internal resistance. Even while they were conducting military campaigns against opponents or even when the communications between the scattered units were extremely difficult, the rebel groups, including the People’s Democratic Kampuchea (PDK: the Khmer Rouge), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the FMLN, continued their internal debates (Heder, 1999; Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview; Prisk, 1991). Although they had the outward appearance of a solid faction, the negotiators for each faction had to negotiate with external counterparts while convincing internal hardliners.

\footnote{In addition, although not discussed in detail in the cases studies, the goals of a faction were from time to time not based on unanimous consensus within the organisations. In many cases, the factional leaders faced strong opposition from internal constituencies or other leaders within the groups.}
Second, in contrast to the models in previous research focusing on democratic countries (Putnam, 1988; Smit, 2006), the intra-factional negotiations in the civil war peace negotiations related more to the rifts between internal factions than to their constituencies’ opinions. In fact, except for the Cristiani government, which had a popular mandate and received the results of popularity surveys, most national factions had little opportunity to learn how their constituencies thought and felt. Instead, they paid more attention to carrying out political campaigns to spread their propaganda to the people.

Third, the case studies confirm that the factions with stronger internal rivalries tended to regard the negotiation at the internal level more important (see Figure 7.1). For instance, Prince Sihanouk, who had enjoyed strong normative and popular support as a god-king and the representative of the state, decided upon most important matters without having close internal discussions. In contrast, the Cristiani government, which faced strong opposition to the president’s peace initiatives from its own military leaders, was keen to carry out a successful two-level game. As the High Command of the ESAF had controlled the country for decades, the success of President Cristiani’s peace negotiation largely depended on whether he could persuade the military leaders to abide by the agreed peace proposals (Juhn, 1998: 70).

Figure 7.1. National Factions’ Vulnerability to Internal Rivalry

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87 Although the KPNLF in Cambodia tried to gather the opinions of the people in its refugee camps and reflect them in their policies, as Ieng Mouly recalls, such efforts were ultimately futile (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview).
Moreover, the degree to which other four factions (the PDK, the PRK/SOC, the KPNLF, and the FMLN) relied on two-level games generally depended on the factions’ leadership style. The leaders of the two socialist organisations (the PRK/SOC and the PDK) generally ruled out opposition from other leaders by positioning their closest allies in core posts in the leadership (Heder, 1999; Haas, 1991: 138-41, 232-7). However, the KPNLF and the FMLN, which both had a relatively democratic internal decision-making process, had more two-level games than the former two factions. Shafik Handal of the FMLN and Son Sann of the KPNLF occasionally retreated from their original positions due to internal opposition (Ieng Mouly & Son Soubert, 2009, Author’s Interview; Juhn, 1998: 70).

To summarise, although further research is necessary to allow for generalisation, three theoretical findings related to two-level games are offered based on the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. First, two-level games were found in most national factions’ decision-making processes. Second, the warring factions’ two-level games are mainly related to the rivalry among the internal factions. Third, the factions’ dependency on two-level games was closely associated with the seriousness of the internal rivalry and its leadership style.

Consequences of the Interplay

Although both the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador succeeded in producing final agreements on demilitarisation and transitional authorities, the two cases exhibit contrasting implementation processes. Whereas the implementation process in El Salvador is considered in much research a success, the Cambodian peace process achieved only partial success (Hampson, 1996; Walter, 1999; Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997).

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88 In addition, Putnam argues that domestic constraints might provide better negotiating positions to negotiators in international negotiations as they can use the domestic hard-liners’ opinions to make external counterparts more receptive to their demands (1988: 451-2). However, the case studies did not provide sufficient evidence to decide whether this argument can be applied to peace negotiations.
Demilitarisation

Demilitarisation was one of the most critical issues for all warring factions in both cases since retaining (or losing) their military forces could determine their future survival (see Chapters 3, 5, and 6 for details). Hence, the negotiation process on this issue was the most painstaking in both cases. The two negotiations produced very different agreements, and the implementation outcomes also differed.

In the Cambodian case, the Paris Peace Agreements dictated that 70 per cent of all military forces were to be dissolved before the election was held. This stipulation was a result of the Cambodian national factions’ resistance to the external interveners’ proposals. The UN’s original proposal on demilitarisation in the Framework Document was complete demobilisation of all military forces (Lizée, 1999: 68; Haas, 1991: 287), and the PRK/SOC and the CGDK agreed to this in late 1991. However, the national factions wished to retain some military forces to protect themselves from the possibility of their counterpart’s deception. Thus, after a series of independent meetings between the national factions in 1991, the four factions instead agreed to a 70 per cent reduction in each faction’s military forces.

Nevertheless, this was risky a decision because it was appreciated that verifying proportional reductions in the factions’ military forces, which included various guerrilla fighters and political agencies, would prove difficult. Moreover, due to the factions’ mutual suspicion, fake cooperation with the implementation was also highly likely. However, the interveners, which included the US and France, simply accepted this idea without considering the potential risk of the decision or providing specific procedural supplements to make it work.

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89 Considering the national factions’ original positions, the members of the CGDK including the PDK demanded that each faction reduce its total military manpower and retain a fixed number of soldiers so as to eradicate the gap between the military forces of the PRK/SOC and the CGDK (Haas, 1991: 195). However, concerned about potential deception by the CGDK, the PRK/SOC insisted on proportional reductions instead (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 31; Turner, 2004: 147).
They assumed that the detailed decisions agreed by the national factions had to be respected as long as they did not contradict the basic principles in the UN Framework documents (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 92). In this sense, the failure was partly due to the peace agreement itself.

During the implementation period, UNTAC failed to wield substantial power because the PRK/SOC attempted to prevent the UN body from undermining the PRK/SOC’s supremacy in Cambodia and because the PDK refused to collaborate with it, claiming that UNTAC was partial and treated it unfavourably (Peou, 1997: 270-4; Heder, 1999: 263). Accordingly, the PRK/SOC halted its demilitarisation process in order to defend itself from the PDK’s attack.

By contrast, the outcome of the Salvadoran negotiations on demilitarisation was relatively successful. The FMLN’s demand for the complete demobilisation of all military forces and agencies, including the ESAF, was not accepted by the government for a long time. Under strong pressure from the international community, the FMLN finally abandoned its demands of the disbanding of the ESAF in late 1991. Moreover, the final negotiation in December 1991 took place in close consultation with other external actors such as the UN, the US, Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain (Sullivan, 1994: 96; Montgomery, 1992: 225; Negroponte, 2005: 326-8). Hence, in contrast to Cambodia, both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN tried to produce specific provisions for implementation in order to prevent the other’s deception, rather than preserving their own military forces to prepare for potential problems (Call, 2002: 413).

As a result, the Chapultepec Accords specified the number of soldiers that the ESAF had to demobilise, ordered the complete disbanding of paramilitary groups, including the DNI and BIRIs, and the complete dissolution of the FMLN army. The accords also presented detailed plans for implementation (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 1, para 4, 8, 9 & 12). Although
many procedural problems and the limited ability of ONUSAL were revealed, the
demilitarisation was declared complete in December 1992.

_Transitional Authorities_

The transitional authorities in Cambodia and El Salvador exhibit ostensible similarities in
composition but striking difference in the effectiveness of their functions. The authorities in
both cases consisted of three main bodies that represented the UN (UNTAC and ONUSAL),
the wills of all national factions (the SNC and COPAZ), and the _de facto_ governments (the
PRK/SOC and the Cristiani government). However, the power structures between the bodies
and the effectiveness of each body’s activities in Cambodia and El Salvador were
significantly different (see Figure 7.2). This is partly because the national factions in the two
cases had different ideas about the transitional authority.

Figure 7.2. The Composition of the Transitional Authorities in Cambodia and El Salvador

In Cambodia, UNTAC was the central authority for supervising the implementation of the
Paris Peace Agreements. The SNC, which consisted of representatives of all the Cambodian
factions and thus represented Cambodian sovereignty, was supposed to advise UNTAC. In addition, the PRK/SOC was allowed to retain its administrative structures and to perform limited administrative roles to supplement UNTAC’s implementation.

However, the three authorities did not work as the PPAs had intended. As the international interveners’ focus of attention shifted away from Cambodia, the PRK/SOC strengthened its efforts to take control of the implementation processes because it faced continuous PDK efforts to undermine its administrative structure and feared that UNTAC might ignore its status as the *de facto* government. As a result, UNTAC’s supreme authority could be applied only through the PRK/SOC’s administrative agencies, and the SNC became a nominal consultative council with little actual power.

In El Salvador, the Cristiani government took a leading role, while ONUSAL supplemented the government by issuing reports to President Cristiani containing the results of its investigations on issues related to the implementation and suggestions. Moreover, COPAZ, which consisted of representatives of all the major political parties and the FMLN, dealt with legislative issues.

ONUSAL, with assistance from the external interveners, the US in particular, played a constructive and effective role in helping and coercing both the government and the FMLN to carry out their duties. In particular, the UN’s mediatory role in resolving the stalemates on demilitarisation caused by the factions’ mutual mistrust was considered a great success (Baranyi & North, 1996: 40-1).

In short, in Cambodia, UNTAC was given strong authority to supervise the overall implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, but it failed to overcome the resistance of the Cambodian national factions and to wield its power effectively. However, ONUSAL, which
was granted much more limited and supplementary power, was successful in completing its mandates. In the early phase of the implementation (until December 1992), the UN’s roles included the coordination of the two national factions implementation procedures, which was beyond its designated mandate (Baranyi & North, 1996: 41).

QUESTION II:

Which methods of intervention are more effective?

Of the various strategies that external third parties employed in Cambodia and El Salvador, did some prove more useful than others? This thesis examines this question by using the traditional discourse on the usefulness of impartiality and strength of intervention. By means of a comparative analysis of the case studies, this thesis concludes that the usefulness of a particular method cannot be generalised, because the utility of an intervention is determined by the context in which the intervention is applied. Moreover, it stresses the importance of the actors’ mutual understanding as a factor for improving the effectiveness of intervention.

As shown earlier, the intervention methods that the impartial third parties adopted aimed at removing the barriers to good communication between the warring parties (i.e. process control), presenting more feasible and creative proposals (i.e. content control), and providing legitimate or diplomatic incentives (i.e. light intervention of motivation control). In contrast, the main methods that the advocate states used in their interventions were largely based on their coercive powers. They commonly applied economic pressure, threatened to withdraw military aid, and promised new economic support. However, the outcomes of the peace
interventions were not decided by the types of methods that they employed.\footnote{In this sense, by using Stokke’s terms, most interactions that the impartial interveners had with the warring national factions in both cases can be regarded as either normative interplay or ideational interplay, whereas the interactions of advocate states with their client national factions were generally characterised by utilitarian interplay.}

First, in terms of strength, there was no evidence that heavy intervention was more useful than light intervention. This finding appears to contradict the widely accepted belief that the success of an intervention is dependent upon the intervenor’s ability and willingness to apply sufficiently strong pressure on the warring factions (Touval and Zartman, 1985:14-5; Mitchell and Webb, 1988: 43-7; van der Merwe, 1989). The case studies suggest that it is doubtful whether an intervenor’s strength of intervention is really that useful in persuading national factions to accept their peace proposals.

As for the usefulness of light intervention by impartial third-parties, their use of procedural coordination, message conveyance between the national factions, and consultation are useful in facilitating conditions conducive for negotiation. However, the role that light intervention plays in changing the national factions’ negotiating behaviour is insignificant.

The UN’s mediation process in El Salvador demonstrates this point well. Since it had been invited to act as a neutral external mediator by both the Cristiani government and the FMLN, the UN made considerable efforts to maintain an impartial attitude towards both factions (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 179-80; see the Salvadoran section of Chapter 5). The faith in UN impartiality that the factions gained through these efforts helped the UN in facilitating the bilateral peace talks between the Salvadoran national factions and in coordinating the procedural issues in the negotiations, which involved it conveying messages between the Cambodian factions and suggesting its own proposals.\footnote{Although not often discussed, the UN also received similar trust from the Salvadoran government (de Soto,}
factions decided to adopt tougher approaches to their counterparts, such trust did not contribute to changing their attitudes. Despite the international organisation’s varied efforts (e.g. sorting out the negotiation contents, more frequent meetings with the Salvadoran factional leaders), neither actor listened to the UN.

Moreover, on many occasions, the national factions used the impartial actors’ engagement to justify their demands in the negotiations. For instance, the PRK/SOC used the issues of human rights and democracy, which the US highlighted as two of its main concerns, to justify their call for the exclusion of the PDK from the SNC and their demand that Prince Sihanouk be denied a privileged status in the future government. Furthermore, the FMLN tried to maximise the UN’s presence at the negotiations so as to be able to convey its messages to the government.

With regard to the usefulness of heavy intervention, although the coercive intervention in Cambodia and El Salvador proved to be useful in encouraging the national factions to remain at the negotiating table, it failed to force them to abide by the peace proposals that they considered harmful to their fundamental goals. The reactions of the PRK/SOC to US (and UN) pressure and the PDK’s behaviour in response to China’s pressure are good examples of this.

From a short-term viewpoint, the advocate states’ coercive methods were relatively successful in changing the national factions’ behaviour (Turner, 2004: 201-2). Once these advocate states made it clear that their clients should join the negotiations, the national factions rarely expressed open rejection of negotiation proposals. In both Cambodia and El Salvador, the advocate states decisions to end their military aid to the national factions proved

1999: 376).
decisive in motivating the warring factions to take the negotiations more seriously and to try to reach an agreement. The ESAF’s acquiescence to the Chapultepec Accords, which had set out the terms for the fundamental restructuring of its forces, is a good example of the success of advocate states’ coercive methods. Moreover, the PDK, which had ignored the Chinese messages encouraging its participation in the early phase of the Cambodian peace negotiations, changed its fundamental attitudes and joined the negotiations.

However, although both Cambodian client factions became more receptive to the peace negotiations when the pressure from the external interveners was strong, the PDK refused to abide by the peace agreements, and the PRK/SOC obstructed UNTAC’s implementation of the peace agreements so as to preserve its privileges (Peou, 2002: 516-7; Solomon, 1999: 311; Turner, 2004: 246).

Moreover, the failure of China’s strong coercive pressure on the PDK shows that the use of sudden and powerful pressure without proper consideration of a national faction’s situation may produce an unintended and counterproductive outcome. Although the complete withdrawal of Chinese military support for the PDK succeeded in pressurising the faction to regard the peace negotiations more favourably, China’s continued application of pressure without any attempts to reflect the faction’s interests led to the PDK’s flat refusal to accept the implementation of the peace process (see the Phase 4 of the Cambodian case in Chapter 6). These findings support the argument that coercive methods are useful in facilitating the initial talks between warring factions, but coercion alone will not make a negotiation successful (Peou, 1997: 298; Fisher, 2001: 19) (see Chapter 2 for details).

In short, although the differentiation of light intervention and heavy intervention was useful in ascertaining the differences in the intervening methods used, the usefulness of such methods in the peace processes is revealed to have been limited.
Second, Chapter 3 proposed three forms of intervention: process control, content control, and motivation control. Again, it was observed that no particular form was more useful than others. Rather, the case studies show that these three forms are complementary and the usefulness of each method is maximised when they are effectively coordinated with other methods.

Process control or content control alone is not likely to induce national factions to regard a peace negotiation as an alternative means of achieving their goals. For example, when the UN’s intervention, which relied on process control and content control, faced strong resistance from the Salvadoran national factions in 1990, it was only after international pressure was heightened and the national election (which was important to both national factors) was over that the negotiations produced significant agreements.

Nor can motivation control alone ensure the national factions’ long-term cooperation. For instance, although the interveners’ strong motivation control methods in Cambodia forced the PRK to announce its acceptance of the UN P-5’s Framework Document, the interveners’ failure to reflect the fundamental interests of the PRK in content control and process control resulted in the national factions’ resistance to the implementation of the agreement.

Third, more importantly, the case studies suggest that the effectiveness of third-party intervention is determined more by the context in which the methods are applied than by the types of methods used. In other words, the utility of a particular intervention method can vary depending on the context in which it is employed. Although there might be various factors influencing the context, the impact of ‘mutual understanding’ was highlighted in this thesis. The case studies demonstrate that a third-party intervention is more likely to be successful when it is used in a way that is comprehensible to national factions and receives the consistently strong attention of external interveners.
As regards process control, the UN in El Salvador succeeded in sustaining the negotiation between the two national factions by mitigating the procedural demands of the opposing groups. The negotiation form was changed from a two-stage negotiation (which discusses the conditions for ceasefire first and resolves other issues after the ceasefire comes into effect) into a compressed negotiation (which considers all issues simultaneously) as a result of the UN’s careful consideration of the national factions’ demands. Although not discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, ASEAN also played an important role in sustaining the peace negotiations between the Cambodian parties. When their mutual mistrust was at its peak, Indonesia promoted their continued negotiation by arranging separate bilateral meetings in Jakarta between Prince Sihanouk and other factional leaders in an attempt to overcome the obstacles by using the prince’s legitimate domestic power.

Accurately reflecting national factions’ core interests is critical to producing successful content control methods (Turner, 2004: 221, 247-9). The contrasting performances of the US in Cambodia and the UN in El Salvador presented in Chapter 5 highlights this issue (details will be analysed below). The recognition of national factions’ needs and interests is an important factor in improving the usefulness of motivation control as well. For example, although Western interveners’ constant refusal to recognise it as a legitimate government had been a constant pressure on the PRK, their threat to withdraw diplomatic support for the CGDK in the UN did nothing to transform the PDK’s attitudes in the late phase of the Cambodian negotiation.

In sum, in answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section, this section argues that no one type of intervention method is universally more useful than others. Moreover, the usefulness of a method is largely dependent on the context in which it is applied, and more specifically, the reflection of national factions’ core interests is a key factor in determining the
QUESTION III:

What are the perceptual barriers that prevent effective third-party intervention?

The third (and the second explanatory) question concerns the perceptual barriers to successful peace negotiation. Although choosing the right types of intervention is critically important for achieving successful third-party intervention, making sure that the intervention is correctly understood by national factions is also very important. The case studies show that the interveners in Cambodia achieved much less success than the third parties in El Salvador in this respect and, more importantly, that this contributed to the contrasting outcomes of the peace negotiations in the two countries. In the case studies, it was observed that a number of perceptual obstacles prevented the actors from developing and employing more effective strategies.

This section explores the issue of perceptual barriers by using ‘bounded awareness’ theory (see Chapter 2 for details). First, it demonstrates that the ethnocentric cultural values of Western interveners in Cambodia seriously hampered their ability to analyse the circumstances of the negotiations and limited the scope of their intervening strategies. Second, it also shows that national factions in Cambodia failed to recognise the interveners’ changing attitudes in the last phase of the negotiations and missed the opportunity to pursue their goals because the faction lacked effective communication institutes.
The Role of Ethnocentric Culture (Liberal Peace)

This section argues that the outcomes of the negotiations on demilitarisation and the transitional authorities in the case studies reveal how external interveners’ ethnocentric cultures can hamper the effectiveness of peace interventions. From a theoretical perspective, it deals with the issues related to liberal peace and the role of ethnocentric cultures. By demonstrating that the different outcomes of the negotiations in the case studies were partly caused by the external interveners’ ethnocentric cultural values, it criticises the liberal peace idea that the establishment of a democratic political system is the best way to bring sustained peace to war-torn societies. It argues that the utility of a certain idea or proposal largely depends on how the national actors perceive it.

The final peace agreements in both cases (the Paris Peace Agreements and the Chapultepec Peace Accords) pursued the realisation of liberal peace in the countries. In pursuit of this goal, the agreements set out the core post-conflict recovery projects, which included the establishment of a new politically neutral national army, election of a new government in free and fair elections, creation of democratic state institutions, and respect for human rights. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the implementation processes in the two cases are strikingly different.

In El Salvador, the transition to a democratic society founded on the people’s will was relatively successful. After the demobilisation and restructuring of the armed forces, the transitional authorities succeeded in reducing human rights abuses, running a democratic election, and implementing institutional reforms of the national police and judicial system (Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997: 372-3; Call, 2002: 393-412). As Sullivan asserts, the constant application of the ‘fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law’ was one of the biggest reasons behind the relative success of the Salvadoran peace negotiations.
In Cambodia, however, despite the success of the repatriation of refugees and the implementation of a general election, the UN’s initial goals in attempting to build democratic political systems, such as maintaining the ceasefire, accepting of the election results, and establishing a democratic governmental structure, were not achieved. Moreover, during the transitional period, the UN failed to preserve the democratic political and social systems that had been established because the UN was unable to control the implementation processes (Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997: 370-2; Peou, 2002: 508-10, 516-7).

Many previous studies have attributed these different outcomes to the UN’s implementation strategies. For instance, Lee Kim and Metrikas point out the lack of advanced planning, bureaucratic issues in the UN, and communication problems between New York and Phnom Penh as major reasons for the failure (Lee Kim & Metrikas, 1997:126-9). Although the specific reasons that are given for the failure differ, the previous studies only focus their attention on the procedural problems and therefore tacitly accept the liberal peace ideas embedded in the peace agreements as ideal goals.

However, with a specific analytical focus on the issues of demilitarisation and the transitional authority in Cambodia and El Salvador, it is observed that the different outcomes are partly due to the peace agreements themselves, which largely reflected the interveners’ liberal peace concepts. More specifically, the outcomes were partly dependent on whether the ethnocentric cultural values of the third-party interveners that were reflected in the peace agreements were accepted by (or acceptable to) the national factions.

The case studies on the Cambodian peace processes reveal what might happen when the interveners’ ideas are incompatible with those of the warring factions. For example, the UN’s
proposals on the transitional authority in Cambodia called for the establishment of a new government by conducting a fair and free election under the supervision of international interveners. However, all the Cambodian actors set fundamental goals that relied heavily on their ethnocentric cultural values. Since Cambodia has high-context communication systems, hierarchical social systems, and had experienced long-term civil war, the national factions doubted that compromise and conflict resolution could be achieved through negotiation. Hence, while Western interveners pursued stabilization of the regions via peace negotiations, the national factions pursued ‘total victory’ or ‘political dominance in a future political environment’ (see Chapter 5 for details). Since control of the election process would likely determine the winner, all national factions tried to have as much influence over the implementation process as possible, and the PRK/SOC made great efforts to preserve its supremacy in Cambodian politics during the transitional period.

Thus, although the interveners’ strong pressure forced the PRK/SOC to abide by the peace agreement for a short time, it employed varied tactics to retain its dominant position during the implementation phases (for details, see Chapter 5). In the end, the interveners’ fundamental goals failed to be implemented. UNTAC’s supreme authority was seriously hampered, the election process was affected by the PRK/SOC’s self-serving strategies, and the new government that was formed was a coalition of FUNCINPEC and the PRK/SOC, regardless of the popular will.

By contrast, both Salvadoran national factions agreed that the establishment of (Western) democratic systems was the best way to achieve peace. Although the focuses of their emphasis were significantly different, reflecting the social, political, and economic cleavages in Salvadoran society, both factions pointed to the lack of democracy as the root cause of El Salvador’s problems (FMLN memo, 5 February 1990 cited in Juhn, 1998: 55; Sullivan, 1994:
Moreover, since elections had been held on a regular basis for approximately a decade, the Salvadoran people had a good understanding of what elections entailed. Since the FMLN had achieved and maintained a close relationship with the people in the regions formerly under its control, it had confidence that it could compete strongly in the forthcoming elections (Negroponte, 2005: 105, 114).

Thus, both the Salvadoran national factions and most external interveners already agreed that the next government should come to power through a free and fair election; the controversial issues were about how to make the forthcoming election more politically neutral and democratic. Additionally, although the FMLN criticised issues surrounding the elections, it did not deny the Cristiani government’s legitimacy, and, therefore, there was little disagreement about the Salvadoran government’s leading role in the implementation of the peace agreements (see the Salvadoran part of Chapter 6 for details).

Despite a number of instances of sabotage and fake implementation due to mutual suspicions about the sincerity of counterpart’s actions, the three transitional authority members played constructive roles. Whereas ONUSAL played a very active role in investigating human rights abuses, suggesting plans for implementation, and verifying the government’s implementation processes, COPAZ succeeded in reflecting the interests of various domestic actors by moderating the contents of new legislation (Baranyi & North, 1996: 8; Horst, 2010: 157). Although the government frequently showed its reluctance to take action on controversial issues, it had no intention of revising or reversing the provisions agreed at Chapultepec in January 1992 (Juhn, 1998: 126-9; Baranyi & North, 1996). As a result, all the national factions accepted the outcome of the election in March 1994 and Armando Calderón Sol of ARENA assumed a new presidency.

These examples from the case studies show that although liberal peace ideas (i.e. democratic
elections, transparent governance, and a market economy) might contribute to sustained peace in war-torn societies once they are well embedded, liberal peace ideas in themselves do not promote successful peace negotiations or post-war recovery. Rather, the case studies suggest that the degree of success that is achieved in the initial stages of democratisation in post-war societies depends more on whether the national actors are ready to accept the ideas of liberal peace than on how democratic the planned processes are. In this sense, the findings support the argument that the failure of many peace negotiation (and implementation) processes in the 1990s, such as those in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, is partly due to the interveners’ too hasty attempts to force the national actors to accept liberal peace ideas.  

Lack of Institutions for Communication

Although the author could find few previous theoretical or practical studies on this issue, this thesis has considered the lack of good communication institutions an important factor in causing serious misunderstandings between actors. The different performances of China (in Cambodia) and the US (in El Salvador) in establishing and maintaining communication with their client national factions (the PDK and the Cristiani government, respectively) as well as the markedly contrasting outcomes of their interventions demonstrate the significance of this factor.

As observed in Chapter 6, the PDK’s institutions for exchanging information and establishing internal consensus were very weak. It did not have constant external contact points that could manage close relationships with international third-parties. The information collected by local

92 Thus, greater care should be taken when basing proposal design on democratic competition. The development of democratic ideals and the institutions of democratic competition should be viewed more as part of long-term development. People’s perceptions cannot be ‘democratised’ in a few years.
agencies in domestic areas was frequently transmitted no further than the area level. Moreover, when assessing the information and deciding on the next strategic move, internal discussion within the leadership was dominated by the opinions of a handful of leaders and was led by the party’s ideological convictions. Accordingly, the PDK failed in making an accurate evaluation of its own domestic resources and external circumstances.

This lack of an effective communication system resulted in its critical misinterpretation of China’s changing attitudes towards the Cambodian civil war and the PDK itself. Despite its long and heavy reliance on Chinese economic and military support, the PDK’s communication with China was infrequent and superficial. Thus, although China’s policy priority gradually changed from supporting the PDK’s revolutionary movement to ending the civil war and promoting regional stability, the PDK fervently believed that China would not turn its back on the party and took all the signs of the transformation in Chinese attitudes to be rhetorical gestures.93

By contrast, the relatively constant and multi-layered communication between the Cristiani government and the US, the external advocate of the government, enabled President Cristiani and the ESAF leaders to interpret the transformation in American policies correctly. Due to a long and extensive collaboration with the US, Salvadoran governments had established a variety of routes for communication (formal and informal, direct and indirect, from top leaders to local constituencies). By using these routes, the US clearly conveyed its intentions to President Cristiani and the supreme leaders of the ESAF. For instance, when the Bush administration decided in 1990 to support the peace negotiations, this intention was repeatedly transmitted to both President Cristiani and the military leaders through the US embassy in San Salvador and through visits by US politicians and military leaders. As a result,

93 Chugh and Bazerman called the mistakes in this sort ‘change blindness’(2005: 4)
the Salvadoran national factions avoided seriously misinterpreting the intentions and
behaviour of its advocate state.

Moreover, the performance of the US in the Salvadoran case demonstrates that a faction’s
internal communication may be facilitated by external third-parties. As the mistrust between
the Cristiani administration and the ESAF leaders grew in the latter phases of the peace
negotiation, direct talks between the two sides became rare. The US therefore acted as a route
for transmitting Cristiani’s messages and incentives to the ESAF.

Taking these points into consideration, the conclusive answer to the third question is that the
ethnocentric cultures of negotiating actors and the actors’ underdeveloped institutions for
communication are two important barriers to good communication between actors.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 7 has provided the answers to the central questions of this thesis through systemic
and theoretical examinations of the findings of the case studies. The first section described
the dynamics of the negotiating actors’ moves in their peace negotiation processes and the
outcomes of their interplay. First, with regard to the external actors’ intervention, this chapter
confirmed that the advocate states used partial but stronger intervention in order to change the
national factions’ negotiation attitudes whereas the impartial third-parties applied moderate
diplomatic pressure.

Second, the patterns of the national factions’ responses towards the external intervention were
reconsidered. The strategic moves of the four national factions studied in Chapters 5 and 6
were seen to have generally followed the assumptions and typology presented in Chapter 3.
Furthermore, it was observed that most of the national factions were committed to two-level games, even during the military conflicts, and, moreover, the influence of the two-level games on the national factions’ decision making was largely determined by the severity of their internal rifts.

Third, the outcomes of the negotiations were considered. The provisions of the peace accords and the implementation processes in the two cases were strikingly different. Whereas the Salvadoran transitional authorities managed to achieve and sustain a relatively successful collaboration for the implementation of the provisions of the Chapultepec Accords, the Cambodian interim authorities failed to conduct effective implementation projects.

Based on these descriptions, the second section examined the utilities of intervention methods. After reviewing the usefulness of separating the methods into different categories, this section argued that there no particular type of intervening method is measurably more useful than others. Although the suggested categories based on strength and form of intervention were useful in distinguishing the changes in the interveners’ strategies, it was not possible to generalise the contribution of the methods by the categories that they belong to. It was also argued that the usefulness of a certain method is determined not by its type but by the context in which the method is applied. More specifically, it was stressed that the intervening methods should reflect national factions’ core interests. Regardless of the types of intervening methods that were employed, no national factions collaborated with the interveners’ suggestions that seemed inconsistent with their fundamental goals.

The last section of this chapter discussed the perceptual barriers in peace negotiations that hamper communication between the negotiating parties, focusing on ethnocentric cultures and inadequate institutions for communication. First, it argued that the external interveners’ ethnocentric values prevented them from possessing a good understanding of the national
factions. From a theoretical viewpoint, this chapter also cautioned that the utility of liberal peace ideas in promoting the success of peace processes should not be exaggerated. The case studies showed that the success of a peace process is likely to be determined not by how much democracy the peace plan intends to achieve but by how much the plan can be accepted by the national factions. Second, it also demonstrated that the national factions’ limited institutions for communication proved to be a major obstacle to obtaining and assessing accurate information for some of the national factions and that the ‘imperfect’ information that they did have led to their serious misinterpretation of it.

This chapter is followed by the conclusion of this thesis. In the conclusion, the following two arguments are reconfirmed. First, peace negotiations can be better analysed through the concept of interplay between actors. Second, external interventions without an understanding of the national factions’ approach to the civil war and peace negotiations are not likely to result in successful third-party intervention.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

Since the UN’s engagement in international and civil conflicts has become more extensive in the post-Cold War period, the attention paid by scholars and practitioners to the factors that determine the effectiveness of third-party intervention has also increased. Accordingly, a large number of studies containing suggestions on ways to improve third-party intervention have been produced. Despite the great achievements of these studies, they display a number of weaknesses that have thus far remained unaddressed. First, many conventional studies tend to neglect the dynamics of the interplay between the negotiating actors. Second, the studies that look at the actors’ behaviour in peace negotiations have usually paid most attention to third-party interveners, leaving national warring parties unexplored. Third, while other periods of the civil conflicts, including the pre-war conditions that led to the conflicts and the post-war recovery process, have been extensively investigated, the peace negotiation process itself is a much less studied topic.

This thesis has attempted to remedy these shortcomings by analysing the dynamics of the interplay between the national factions and the external interveners in the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. By paying balanced attention to both national parties and external interveners, it has aimed to track the changing patterns of interplay between the actors. Moreover, based on the examination of this interplay, it has also tried to identify a number of the key features of and requirements for successful third-party peace intervention.

This chapter summarises the degree to which these attempts have succeeded and concludes
this thesis by presenting a number of practical suggestions for improving third-party peace intervention and by acknowledging the remaining issues that need to be explored in future research. First, this chapter reconfirms the findings of this research. After presenting the dynamics of the changing strategies of the third-party interveners and the national military factions during the negotiation processes, it summarises the notable features of the interplay. It also makes clear that the utility of an intervention method is determined not by the type that is used, but by the context in which it is applied. Accordingly, it is argued that a peace negotiation is a process of mutual interaction between actors and that mutual understanding between national factions and external interveners is a key requirement for successful third-party peace intervention. In addition, two barriers to the negotiating parties’ mutual understanding – ethnocentric cultures and insufficient communication institutions – are presented.

Second, this thesis proposes three practical ways to improve the effectiveness of third-party intervention. The first, and most important, recommendation is for external third parties to establish and maintain close communication with national factions. This is one of the most effective and efficient ways to avoid mutual misunderstandings. Second, since building close relationships with national warring groups is not always feasible, it is argued that interveners need to provide a minimum security guarantee in order to reduce national factions’ fear about their future survival. Although many conventional studies have emphasised the importance of providing a security guarantee, this thesis goes further by arguing that the security guarantee should be based on an understanding of the national factions’ minimum goals and that third parties need to build mutual trust with national factions so that there is faith in the guarantee. Finally, this thesis stresses the importance of timing. Supplementing the previous research that focuses on the best timing for the start of intervention, this thesis demonstrates that
figuring out the right timing for the withdrawal of intervention is also crucial to a successful peace intervention.

Third, the contributions that this research makes to the academic discourse in this field and its weaknesses that need to be addressed in future research are presented. The central analytical concept of ‘interplay between actors’ employed in this thesis is useful in unveiling the factors that contribute to a successful peace process but have not been identified in previous studies, which have generally paid most attention either to the external conditions of wars and peace processes or to the role of third-party interveners. Moreover, this research makes theoretical contributions by providing empirical evidence related to the role of culture, warring national factions’ two-level games, and the influence of military factions’ institutional communication systems, factors that have not been systemically debated in previous conflict studies.

Three weaknesses of this research are also noted and addressed. First, because this research lacks field research in El Salvador, the arguments related to the case study had to rely entirely on written materials. Hence, the hidden factors that might be found from fieldwork could not be reflected in this research, although the abundance and quality of previous studies on the Salvadoran civil conflict and peace process partially compensated for this weakness. Second, since the findings of this research are based on only two cases, the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, more cases need to be investigated in order to confirm whether the findings reflect the general characteristics of civil war peace negotiations. Third, although the actors’ preferences were conceived as unchanging, stable, and evident as a core assumption of this research, there were a few cases where this assumption was not applicable. Thus, the dynamics of peace negotiation in cases where the actors’ preferences are uncertain or unknown need to be studied in the future.
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

This thesis has examined the interplay between the actors in civil war peace negotiations in search of answers to the question, “what does the interplay between national factions and external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?” In so doing, it has explored three subordinate questions by using descriptive and explanatory approaches.

The first subordinate question concerned the characteristics of the strategies that national factions and third-party interveners employ to achieve their goals. The cases studies in Chapters 5 and 6 revealed two features. First, the impartial third parties generally used limited intervention methods (chiefly process control and content control), while the advocate states enjoyed a wider range of options. Moreover, of the motivation control methods employed, the impartial third parties generally used more non-coercive and impartial methods, whereas the advocates of certain national factions tended to use stronger and direct means of intervention. Second, it was observed that the types of methods that an intervener preferred to use changed according to the changes in the national factions’ responses. As interveners became more resistant to the external interveners’ strategies, the external interveners increased their pressures.

In considering the responses of the national factions to the interveners’ moves, the case studies demonstrated that national factions’ behaviour tends to be affected by the strength of interveners’ response rules. The stronger and tougher the intervention becomes, the more that national factions’ provisional strategies are inclined to be receptive towards the intervention. Nevertheless, it was observed that the national factions rarely fully accepted proposals that they deemed harmful to the achievement of their fundamental goals.
Second, the descriptive analysis presented above leads to the second question with which this research is concerned: “which strategies are most effective in ensuring that an intervention is successful?” In fact, the case studies do not provide any evidence to confirm which methods are more useful. Although this research has distinguished between heavy intervention and light intervention according to the strength of the methods used, heavy intervention was revealed to be no more useful than light intervention in convincing the national factions to cooperate with the external third-parties’ intervention, at least from a long-term viewpoint. Moreover, it was also observed that the usefulness of the three forms of intervention, that is, process control, content control, and motivation control, cannot be examined separately and that they are more effective when they mutually supplement each other.

Moreover, it was observed that the effectiveness of a particular intervention is dependent on the context in which it is applied. More specifically, an intervention is more likely to be effective when it is used in a way that national factions can understand and when it receives the consistently strong attention of external interveners. For example, although previous studies have pointed to impartiality and strength as important factors in successful peace intervention, neither impartial nor strong strategies helped the interveners to achieve their goals when they were employed without reflecting the national factions’ fundamental goals. Thus, this research’s first conclusion is that there is no one particular type of intervention method that is universally more useful than others; moreover, good mutual understanding between the actors is a crucial element in successful third-party peace intervention.

Third, the previous conclusion leads to this study’s third question: what prevents the actors from having a better understanding of each other? In seeking the factors that affect the actors’ mutual understanding, this thesis has paid particular attention to two perceptual barriers: ethnocentric cultures and limited communication capabilities.
Chapter 5 explored the perceptual limitations and barriers to communication that result from the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values. More specifically, the chapter tracked how Western perceptions of peace, conflict/violence, and negotiation reduced the effectiveness of the international third-parties' efforts to promote successful peace negotiations. First, it was seen that interveners’ ethnocentric cultures may reduce their ability to appreciate the actual conditions of a negotiation when the cultural differences between them and warring countries are significant. The case studies showed that the US and other Western interveners in the Cambodian peace negotiation process were unable to perform an accurate analysis of the national warring factions’ fundamental concerns about the civil war and peace negotiation; by contrast, the UN in El Salvador was more successful in avoiding such problems because of the perceptual similarities between the representatives of the UN Secretariat and the FMLN. Second, when seeking methods to improve the situation, the interveners' cultural traits limited the scope of their strategies. The Western interveners in the Cambodian negotiation set their proposals and response rules according to their own concepts of conflict and negotiation and their own sets of skills: as a result, their strategies were largely unsuccessful. However, although there is no indication that the interveners in El Salvador were more creative in setting strategies, the UN’s intentions and intervention methods were acknowledged and understood by the Salvadoran national factions.

Chapter 6 addressed the national factions’ misunderstandings about the interventions and showed how their limited communication systems and skills may influence the effectiveness of third-party intervention. In Cambodia, the PDK did not have sound systems for acquiring and exchanging information or for appropriate discussion. Thus, it made a number of critical errors in interpreting the intentions of China and the Western interveners. It also had misconceptions about its resources and capabilities. Accordingly, the PDK failed to apply
good/timely strategies that would maximise its chances to achieve its goals during the last phase of the negotiations. By contrast, in the Salvadoran case, the US continuously reassured the Cristiani government of its intentions by utilising the existing multi-layered communication routes between the two sides.

In sum, this thesis concludes that misunderstandings between actors frequently occur in civil war peace negotiations, and such misinterpretations may critically hamper the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Moreover, actors’ ethnocentric perceptions of the core concepts of conflict and negotiation and their underdeveloped communication systems are some of the common causes of the misunderstandings. Based on these findings, the second main conclusion of this thesis is that minimising misunderstandings between external interveners and national military factions is a key requirement for successful third-party peace intervention.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

This section draws on the findings of the case studies to present three practical suggestions for improving the effectiveness of third-party interventions: establishing good mutual communication, providing a security guarantee, and determining appropriate timing. The first two are practical suggestions for avoiding the negative effects of the perceptual misunderstandings between negotiating actors. Whereas good mutual communication is proposed as a fundamental and maximalist solution to the problem of such misunderstanding, provision of a minimal security guarantee is a more realistic and minimalist suggestion for reducing the risk of complete failure. The matter of choosing the right timing for withdrawal is an additional issue that emerged from the case studies. Although the suggestions regard
different aspects of the intervention, they all point to the importance of interveners’ efforts to reflect the national factions’ fundamental goals.

**Good Mutual Communication**

This section argues that maintaining good communication between international interveners and national factions is an important factor in accomplishing an effective intervention because it prevents mutual misunderstandings from emerging and developing. There are a range of obstacles that contribute to poor mutual understandings, including different cultural values and the negotiating parties’ limited communication capabilities. Furthermore, one misunderstanding is likely to lead to further misinterpretation of the actors’ behaviour, leading to a vicious cycle of misunderstandings and further misinterpretations during the negotiation process. Hence, interveners need to make serious efforts to maintain close communication with national factions.

The case studies highlight this point in two respects. First, the case studies reveal that understanding the intention of the national factions’ behaviour and the circumstances surrounding the actors is essential if an external intervener is to establish an effective strategy. For instance, although both the FMLN and the PDK conducted military campaigns during their negotiations, the external interveners’ responses towards the violence were different.

In El Salvador, despite the FMLN’s repeated military attacks on government forces and agencies, the organisation sent clear messages to the Cristiani government and other external interveners from September 1990 that these operations were a political manoeuvre to gain a better bargaining position in the peace negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 72). In particular, the UN had many opportunities to learn the intention behind the military faction’s violence through its numerous visits to the FMLN headquarters and informal personal meetings with the faction’s negotiators.
(de Soto, 1999: 359-65). Thus, despite their calls for the suspension of military action, the international interveners did not apply serious pressure on the FMLN to cease military operations (Sullivan, 1994: 86). In fact, the UN officials considered it unrealistic to demand that the FMLN, a warring party, abandon military pressure (de Soto, 1999: 381, and, therefore, the repeated use of violence by the FMLN did not critically hamper the negotiation processes in Phase 3.

However, the reaction of the international interveners to the PDK’s military action was strikingly different. The UN and the US had very little direct contact with the PDK during the peace negotiation process. Their communications were conveyed either through China or by public statements. Hence, although the purpose of the PDK’s military operations changed from outright victory over the PRK/Vietnam to securing a better negotiating position in Phase 3, the external interveners did not recognise this. Moreover, as Western countries had been shocked by the media reports of the PDK’s systematic killing of approximately 1.5 million people, the PDK’s repeated military campaigns exacerbated its international image as an evil clique and generated an even colder response from the international community (Solomon, 1999: 305-7).

Second, the case studies show that conveying accurate messages to national factions is also a critical factor in the success of an external intervener’s mediation. For example, China’s failure to articulate clearly to the PDK its change in direction on Cambodia from August 1990 was an important reason why the PDK flatly refused to cooperate with the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreements. Although China had formal and informal communication routes with the PDK leadership, its continued economic and military aid, regardless of its revised diplomatic stance, led the Cambodian faction to believe that China would not withdraw its advocacy. Moreover, China failed to clearly express to the PDK the fundamental nature of its policy changes in 1991 (see the Cambodia part of Chapter 6 for details). Hence, when there was finally
a dramatic reduction in Chinese material assistance (if not a complete withdrawal of aid) in 1992, the PDK regarded this change as an unexpected betrayal and felt that it had lost its external ally. This misunderstanding was an important factor in convincing the PDK to return to military action (Peschoux, 1992: 226-32 cited in Heder, 1999: 88).

China’s behaviour contrasts strikingly with the communication between the US and the Cristiani government in El Salvador. The Bush administration made various efforts to maintain its existing communication routes despite the transformation in its policies towards El Salvador from 1989. From the bilateral meetings between the presidents of the two countries, to the interplay between the US’s non-governmental organisations and the Salvadoran political associations, the range and diversity of connections between the two countries enabled the US to maintain multi-level communication with Cristiani (see the Salvadoran part of Chapter 6 for details). Thus, based on the understanding that the ESAF resistance was the biggest obstacle to implementation of the peace agreements, US pressure on El Salvador targeted two actors: President Cristiani, and the High Command of the ESAF. Moreover, in conveying its messages during 1992, the US made repeated personal visits to both actors to confirm its resolve to press ahead with the demilitarisation process and to notify them of the possible incentives and pressures that the country could employ. Hence, despite continuous rumours about the potential for a coup d’état, the ESAF leaders maintained an ambivalent stance towards the process until demilitarisation was completed in December 1992.

To summarise, the avoidance of mutual misunderstanding between external third parties and national factions through good communication is critically important to successful intervention. Interveners need to have a good understanding of national factions’ behaviour and have to transmit their intentions to national factions correctly.
Security Guarantee

In a sense, uncertainty is a part of peace negotiation (Stedman, 2003: 107), and maintaining good communication with warring national factions is very challenging for a third-party intervener. Thus, this thesis argues that although external interveners need to pursue good communication as a maximalist goal, they should also consider providing minimum security guarantees to all meaningful national factions as a minimalist requirement of the peace negotiation process (Walter, 2002; Regan, 2000).

Most national factions in civil war peace negotiations pursue political survival in the forthcoming political arena as their most fundamental goal (Sorpong Peou, 2009: Author’s Interview; Zamora Rivas & Handal, 1987: 484-5). Hence, external interveners who wish to keep national factions at the negotiating table should guarantee that the negotiations will secure the survival of the factional leaders and the grounds for their political activities.

Moreover, this thesis argues that interveners need to demonstrate two things to the national factions: (1) their consistent will and (2) that they have strong enough capabilities to guarantee the minimum security of the national factions. Chapter 6 supports this argument by displaying how the dissimilar attitudes of the US (in El Salvador) and China towards their client national factions resulted in contrasting outcomes to the peace processes.

The US succeeded in providing security assurances to both President Cristiani and the FMLN leaders. In regards to the government, the US continued to guarantee the president’s status. It goes without saying that as the US supported the Salvadoran government during the initial

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94 The term ‘meaningful actor’ indicates those actors who have the power to ‘spoil’ the negotiation process.
95 Defining what constitutes a ‘minimum security guarantee’ is a controversial matter. However, the former Cambodian factional leaders who were interviewed by the author generally agreed with three requirements: (1) a clear indication that factional leaders would not be executed or punished as if they had lost the conflict; (2) a clear message that fair opportunities should exist for the factions’ political activities and that they should not be hampered by the factions’ rivals; and (3) an acknowledgement that the fundamental rationales for the factions’ military movements were to be respected (Chhin Kim Thong, Ieng Mouly, and a former PDK commander who requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview).
phase of the negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 50), it made continuous efforts to protect President Cristiani from potential threats. For instance, when the president encountered strong resistance from the High Command from the end of 1990, the US government repeatedly confirmed that it supported his presidency (Negroponte, 2005: 311-2). This guarantee was repeated in the implementation phase.

Moreover, the US government also tried to relieve the FMLN’s security concerns. The US maintained direct contact with the leaders of the different military factions that made up the FMLN and made public statements about its impartial role in the negotiation process and its trustworthiness. One major issue that the US had to deal with in these direct meetings concerned the provision of security assurances for these leaders (Sullivan, 1994: 88, 98). Moreover, when the FMLN’s demilitarisation was delayed because of the faction’s scepticism about the government’s willingness to abide by the Chapultepec Accords, the US convinced the faction to proceed with the process by reassuring it of its strong desire for demilitarisation of both the FMLN and other military agencies (Sullivan, 1994: 88; Negroponte, 2005: 352; Baranyi & North, 1996: 18).

Although not described explicitly in this thesis, the UN’s (and the US’s) attitudes towards the PDK in Phase 3 (end of 1990 – October 1991) and Phase 4 (October 1991 – July 1993) are in sharp contrast to those adopted in El Salvador. During the negotiation period, the international interveners, including the UN P-5 and the US, did not show willingness to provide the PDK leaders with a minimum safety guarantee. In the latter phase of the peace negotiation (from mid-1990), when the PDK began to display greater receptivity to the peace process, US domestic anger against the Khmer Rouge led to the United States renouncing its former connection with the PDK and condemning the faction’s earlier human rights abuses (Solomon, 1999: 305-7). Moreover, when the PRK/SOC’s demanded an international tribunal
targeting the PDK leaders (including Pol Pot and Ieng Sary), no international interveners (except for China) demonstrated the intention of securing the faction’s leadership. In fact, the interveners’ moral judgement on the PDK’s previous behaviour prevented them from playing a more effective mediating role when the mutual mistrust between the national factions became clearly evident in the last period of the negotiation (Haas, 1991: 206).

Moreover, in the implementation phase, UNTAC showed an inability and a lack of willingness to deter PRK/SOC aggression against the PDK. In fact, UNTAC’s top leaders (including Yasushi Akashi, the head of the UN body) held a similar moral judgement of the PDK as the PRK/SOC (Sorpong Peou, 2009: Author’s Interview). Thus, despite repeated calls from the PDK for more active and strong action by UNTAC to secure the safety of its representatives in Phnom Penh and to nullify the PRK/SOC’s attempts to dominate the implementation process, UNTAC responded to this request by instructing the PDK to adopt a more cooperative demeanour (Peou, 1997: 270-4; Heder, 1999: 263).  

In short, it is important for third-party interveners to demonstrate their constant will and sufficient strength to guarantee the political survival of the national factions in the peace negotiations. First, interveners need to establish the national factions’ absolute trust in their promise to protect them. Second, the interveners should ensure that they possess sufficiently strong resources to respect and act upon the promise. This security guarantee is the first step to convincing the national factions to agree to mutual demilitarisation during the negotiation period and to abide by the implementation of the agreement.

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96 It should be noted that this paragraph does not intend to argue whether the UN officials’ moral judgment was right or wrong. The argument is that the policies that were based on this judgment were not useful in convincing the PDK to remain part of UNTAC’s peace process.
97 This lesson is evident in the UN’s relatively impartial supervision of the implementation processes in Namibia and Nicaragua (Peou, 1997: 295-6).
Timing

As discussed in Chapter 3, many previous studies have argued that the timing for intervention is critically important. Although the detailed arguments vary, most discussions agree that finding a ‘ripe-moment’ is critical to the success of a peace negotiation. The existence of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (in Zartman’s terms) might signal an appropriate time to begin third-party intervention for peace negotiation (Zartman, 2003: 19; Mitchell, 2003: 79-81). However, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that the best timing for the withdrawal of the intervention, which is also critically important for the success of third-party intervention, was not overtly apparent.

During the Cambodian peace negotiations, the international interveners failed to prevent the PRK/SOC’s resistance to the PPAs partly because of their misperception of the ripe moment (Solomon, 1999: 314). The first misjudgement of the ripe moment was made in September 1990. When the PRK/SOC proclaimed that it supported the newly released UN Framework Document, the US and other Western interveners considered that the ripe moment for the peace agreement had come. Thus, in the following negotiation processes, the interveners allowed (if not encouraged) the Cambodian factions to discuss the details of the peace agreements by themselves (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 92).

Nevertheless, the PRK/SOC saw little chance of maintaining its political supremacy within the framework of the UN’s proposals and attempted to reverse some of the framework’s important recommendations, such as the ultimate authority of UNTAC and complete dissolution of all military forces, in meetings that excluded external actors. In fact, the PRK/SOC’s decisions were not so much about the detailed proposals in the UN’s framework as about presenting a silent challenge to the framework itself (details were discussed in Phase 3, the Cambodia Section, Chapter 5). As a result, the final agreement became an awkward
hybrid of the interveners’ ideas and the Cambodian parties’ amendments rather than a coordinated and complex combination of the two.

The second misjudgement came at the Paris Conference in Cambodia in October 1991. When the agreement was signed, the international interveners believed that the negotiations were at an end. For them, the transitional period between the ceasefire and the forthcoming election was simply about implementing the agreed provisions in the PPAs. Thus, they turned their attention away from Cambodia, leaving all the remaining issues to UNTAC.

However, the PRK/SOC and the PDK still tried to renegotiate or change the contents of the PPAs when they found new reasons to do so. Hence, while the PRK/SOC continuously tried to expand its influence over the implementation projects, the PDK threatened that it might resume military operations if UNTAC did not listen to its demands. However, with the international community’s attention elsewhere and UNTAC’s inadequate material and human resources, these actors were in effect allowed to conduct their strategies in pursuit of their goals (see the discussion in Phase 4, the Cambodia part, Chapter 5 & 6).

In summary, Western interveners missed many good opportunities to encourage the PRK/SOC to consent to their peace proposals because they misunderstood the intention of the Cambodian faction. Based on their assumption of the ripe moment for the termination of the conflict, they concluded that the peace negotiations had been successful, and they lost their enthusiasm for intervention when further pressure or attention was necessary. This demonstrates that although a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ is a good opportunity to begin peace negotiations, there remain multiple crucial moments in a peace process when the earnest attention of third-party interveners is necessary. Thus, it is very important for

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98 Although the detailed contexts are different, the interveners’ misjudgement of the ripe moment can also be found in the cases of Northern Ireland and Angola (Stedman, 2003: 105).
interveners to make an accurate judgment about the timing for intervention withdrawal.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This chapter concludes by noting a number of the contributions that this research makes and the weaknesses of this project. Besides the practical suggestions presented above, this research also offers several conceptual and theoretical implications that contribute to future research and supplement the general literature on peace and conflict studies. First of all, this research has demonstrated that ‘interplay between actors’ is a useful concept for analysing the processes and the outcomes of peace negotiations. By paying attention to the dynamics of interplay between national factions and third-party interveners, this thesis has demonstrated a number of aspects of peace negotiation that have not been discussed in depth in previous research.

For instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, many previous studies seeking the factors that bring about successful peace intervention have focused their attention on the external conditions of wars or negotiations (i.e., the duration of the wars, the human costs, and per-capita income); hence, although being useful in describing the correlation between the factors and outcomes of peace negotiations, they have generally not explained how they are related. However, although the external conditions may roughly delineate the scope of actors’ behaviour, it is the negotiators’ wills that determine the success of a peace negotiation. By adopting some of the external conditions as a part of the variables that affect actors’ moves, this research has shown how actors change their attitudes towards core issues in consideration of the variables. In addition, much of the previous research looking at the actors’ roles has tended to pay sole
attention to how to improve the effectiveness of third-party intervention and has neglected the role played by national factions, under the assumption that national factions behave as reactive actors (see Chapter 1 for details). However, by using the concept of ‘interplay’, this thesis has revealed that the procedures and the outcomes of peace negotiations are the result of the mutual influence between the two sides. Moreover, in Cambodia and El Salvador at least, it was the national factions who finally decided the outcomes of the peace negotiations. No external interveners succeeded in compelling the national factions to accept proposals that the domestic actors considered critically harmful to their long-term goals.

The Angolan peace negotiation that led to the Bicesse Accords (1990-91) is an example showing that the ‘interplay’ concept can be useful in other cases. The patterns of interplay between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the UN and between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the US are quite similar to the patterns described in this thesis. Moreover, despite the extensive intervention of the UN and the Troika (the US, the USSR, and Portugal), the external actors failed to convince the national factions to abide by the Bicesse Accords, a settlement that reflected the interveners’ liberal peace ideas. Although both national factions pretended to consent to the accords, UNITA simply refused to accept the outcome of the 1992 election (Lee, 2011).

Second, this research also provides a number of theoretical contributions. For example, this thesis fills a gap in the previous research on the role of culture in conflict studies. As discussed in Chapter 1, whereas the impact of cultural issues during the pre-conflict period (as causes of the conflicts) and during the post-conflict period (focusing on the reconstruction of the war-torn societies) has attracted much academic attention, the effect of cultural issues during the conflicts themselves has received much less attention. This thesis has addressed
this by providing a large number of empirical observations on the role of cultural values in civil war peace negotiations. Specifically, it argued that the third-party interveners’ ethnocentric cultures reduce the effectiveness of their intervention by preventing them from having a good understanding of national factions and by limiting the scope of their strategies.

Moreover, the findings on two-level games in peace negotiation as well as the influence of national factions’ institutional communication systems on peace negotiations may contribute to future research. Although discussion of these issues can be found in previous research related to game theories and bounded awareness, respectively, these discussions have tended to take place at the theoretical level, with little empirical evidence (see Chapter 2). This thesis has shown, however, that some of the features of warring factions’ two-level games in peace negotiations and the national factions’ self-conceptions are caused by a lack of good communication institutions. These observations, therefore, can provide a foundation on which further research is developed.

Nevertheless, it is also important to note the weaknesses of this project and suggest possible directions for future research in order to address them. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, this research lacks field research from El Salvador. As this thesis presents negotiating actors’ perceptions as an important factor that determined the processes and outcomes of the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, interviews with core actors in the Salvadoran peace negotiations to confirm how they perceived various issues related to the negotiation would have been desirable. However, due to limited time and funds, the author had to conduct field research only in Cambodia; moreover, the arguments related to the Salvadoran case had to rely entirely on written materials. Fortunately, as a relatively large number of studies based on interviews with the core negotiators in the Salvadoran peace negotiations have been published (particularly in the US), this weakness, although important, does not
critically affect the findings of this research as the wealth of published material in part addresses this weakness. Nevertheless, in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the Salvadoran peace negotiations, field research in El Salvador is necessary.

Second, further case studies are required in order to generalise the findings of this research. As Chapter 3 stated, a comparative study focusing on a small number of cases has strengths in investigating the dynamics of actors’ interaction and in discerning the unique characteristics of the cases from the common features of peace negotiations. By utilising these strengths, the case studies of Cambodia and El Salvador have indicated some of the various features of civil war peace negotiations. Nevertheless, this in-depth case study has a weakness in that it was not designed to observe the universal patterns of dynamics across many cases at once. In other words, it is necessary to apply the findings to a wider range of cases in order to confirm them as general characteristics of peace negotiations. However, a Large-N study relying on statistical methods is not likely to achieve this goal because the dynamics of interplay between actors cannot be observed through such a methodology. Hence, in-depth analysis of more case studies is recommended.

The third challenge that this thesis faces is related to an assumption embedded in the research framework. The assumption of ‘unchanging, stable, and revealed preference,’ a fundamental assumption of game theory, is employed as the backbone of the research framework. In other words, the research framework was established based on the assumption that all actors have clear goals (preferences), that they are aware of the goals, and that the goals are stable. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the case studies demonstrate that actors sometimes have multiple goals that are frequently contradictory and that the actors may not know which of the goals are their priorities. In addition, it was observed that the goals of external interveners may change in response to changes in the situation surrounding the peace negotiation and the
civil conflicts. In these instances, this research framework was of limited use in examining the actors’ strategic movements. Accordingly, the dynamics of interplay between negotiating actors who have uncertain preferences remains a subject to be explored in the future.
Appendix I

Chronology

CAMBODIA

1975  Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge topples the US-backed Khmer Republic, led by Lon Nol, in the wake of the Vietnam War

1978  Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows the Khmer Rouge regime, and installs a surrogate regime led by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen

1987  December  First meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen

1989  July  First Jakarta informal meeting (JIM) between the CGDK parties and the PRK
August  Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, co-chaired by France and Indonesia
September  Vietnam announces completion of full troop withdrawal
October  The release of the Evans plan by Australia

1990  January – August  UN Security Council Permanent Five consultations produce a framework agreement
August  The UN’s Framework Document released
September  Jakarta Informal Meeting – the formation of the SNC decided
November  The UN’s Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict produced

1990 – 1991  Secret Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on normalising relations

1991  October  Dispatch of UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
October  Paris Peace Agreements reached at reconvened Paris Conference

1992  March  UN implementation force – UNTAC – arrives in Cambodia to oversee transition to elections and administer the government
May  Free and fair elections won by Prince Sihanouk’s party, FUNCINPEC
EL SALVADOR

1981 Final offensive of the FMLN

1984 President Napoleón Duarte proposes peace talks

1986
November UN-OAS joint diplomatic initiative to negotiate peace in El Salvador

1987
August Esquipulas Declaration adopted

1989
June President Cristiani proposes dialogue with the FMLN
September Alvaro de Soto appointed UN Secretary-General’s personal representative for Central American “peace processes”
November The FMLN launches its largest offensive of the war
December Informal and indirect talks begin with representatives of the UN Secretary-General

1990
January Pérez de Cuéllar agrees to assist El Salvador negotiations; de Soto begins shuttle diplomacy.
April Geneva Agreement formulates basic rules and framework for the negotiations
May Caracas Agreement sets general agenda and timetable for the negotiations
July San José Agreement on human rights is reached

1991
January The Preparatory Office for ONUSAL is set up in San Salvador
April Mexico agreements on constitutional reforms, legal matters, and a truth commission reached
May The UN Security Council passes Resolution 693, authorising the establishment of ONUSAL to verify compliance on all agreements reached
July ONUSAL begins verification of the San José Agreement on Human Rights
September New York agreements on a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace and on the Compressed Agenda reached
December New York Act I finalises the substantive peace accords

1992
January New York Act II completes the remaining items and implementation calendar
January Peace agreement signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City

Note. These chronologies are partly cited from Brown & Zasloff (1998, xv-xvi), Crocker, Hampson, & Aall (1999: 276-7, 346), and Baranyi & North (1996: 4-5).
Appendix II

Historical Development of International Intervention

It is necessary to understand the characteristics of intervention in the current era from a broader historical viewpoint. Hence, this appendix presents a brief discussion on the historical development of third-party intervention. The traits of international third-party intervention have changed in accordance with the distinctive characteristics of the era. Likewise, the characteristics of the world in the post-Cold War period are reflected in the interventions in the Cambodian and El Salvadoran cases.

The modern concept of peace support operations by the international community emerged in the 19th century, the era of the ‘balance of power’. Besides signing and entering into treaties of mutual cooperation, European states established common security codification, institutions, trade regimes, discouraged slavery, tackled piracy at sea to control their waterways, and promoted postal and telecommunications services. Moreover, as seen in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the division of Kosovo, some European countries participated in forms of external humanitarian intervention, although their chief aim was the order and stability of the international system (Pugh, 2005: 42). World War I was the first case of major international military intervention. In its aftermath, the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 extended the scope of cooperation in the international community.

After World War II, another significant example of intervention, a diverse range of international interventions began. The establishment of the United Nations, which was authorised to conduct military operations in cases that threatened international peace and security, signalled the opening of a new era. The UN Charter, which was adopted in 1945, sets out the UN’s role in matters of security. For example, Chapter VI states that the UN is entitled to use ‘a set of techniques which it can use in order to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes, including fact-finding, good offices, conciliation, mediation and negotiation’ (Miall et al, 2007: 34), while Chapter VII indicates its power to use coercion and armed force ‘if necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Miall et al, 1999: 34). The Korean War (1950-53), in which armies from 16 nations participated, was a striking example of the UN’s role in collective security. In a further development, the first formal UN peacekeeping mission, UNEF I, was deployed to Sinai to help defuse the Suez Crisis of 1956.
The UN's intervention was not very active or aggressive during the Cold War. Since the Security Council decisions were mainly based on bipolar bloc coalitions, the Security Council rarely achieved consensus on military issues. In this period, however, military intervention in certain security matters became widely adopted by the United Nations (and the superpowers). ‘Although the UN Charter specifies that issues “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of a state should not be of concern to the UN and, thus, not internationalized, they were. The Charter provision was often only barring the UN itself from involvement where a host of other actors were heavily engaged’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 122).

The principal methods used in such military interventions were of three types: peacekeeping-type activities (the Balkans, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent), peace enforcement actions (Korea and Congo), and the management of transition (Congo and Dutch West New Guinea) (Bellamy et al 2004: 71). The intervention of the UN (and other international organisations) could be implemented only with the consent of the conflicting parties.

Moreover, many countries, regarding the UN as an agency of the United States, did not believe it to be a neutral mediator. Because of the limitations on the UN’s role in civil wars, the scope of its intervention in peace negotiations was also limited. Before and during negotiation processes, the UN frequently failed to lead the negotiations, instead employing very limited, ‘neutral and impartial’ methods such as offering good offices. The UN’s lack of intervention in peace negotiations was accompanied by a similar lack of intervention by powerful states under the rigid international bi-polar system.

As to the UN’s conflict mediation, Secretary-Generals such as Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant continued using ‘quiet diplomacy.’ Although it bridged conflicting parties in conflicts such as the Cyprus conflicts (1967 and 1974), the UN’s role as a mediator attracted limited attention from the two global rivals (the US and the USSR) as a means of resolving the conflicts. However, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar promoted the UN as a relatively active mediator. In conflicts such as the war between Iraq and Iran, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and the independence of Namibia, the UN played key roles (Bercovitch, 1995: 82).

In this period, other types of intervention also appeared or were revitalised. The activities of
the Contadora Group\textsuperscript{99} in Central America and the intervention of the Western Contact Group\textsuperscript{100} in the Namibian Civil War are representative examples of the so-called ‘post-Napoleonic’ form. While collective actions under the name of the UN were largely limited because of the tensions between the two global camps, individual states such as the US and the UK played various roles in international conflicts in this period.

In addition, regional organisations began to become involved in regional conflicts. For example, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963, played pivotal roles in various conflicts in Africa in both positive and negative ways. The OAU provided military aid to some rebel groups (e.g. to independence movements against colonialism and anti-apartheid groups in South Africa). In addition, it also actively promoted a number of projects helping refugees of conflicts and natural disasters. Nevertheless, its failure to gain unanimous consent from member states to intervene in warring states hampered its ability to mediate in internal conflicts in the region. This lack of unanimity is evidenced by the fact that although the OAU Charter recommended the establishment of a Commission of Mediation, Reconciliation, and Arbitration, the commission never materialised (Murrey, 2004: 5).

In a number of cases, high-profile individuals contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Some of these figures include Tanzanian President Nyerere in the civil war in Burundi, Jimmy Carter in the conflicts in the Middle East, and the Emperor of Ethiopia in the Sudanese Civil War. Another example is political pressure applied by The Commonwealth Eminent Persons’ Group on the South African government regarding its policy of apartheid.

The collapse of the Cold War system brought enormous changes to the international security arena. The radical changes in the international intervention atmosphere, however, were not due only to the change in the system itself. Crocker, Hampson and Aall have pointed to four new characteristics: the disappearance of bipolar constraints (new system), the emergence of NGOs as players (new actors), renewed interest in mediation (new motive), and international norms recognising the need for international intervention (new norms) (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999: 6-7). Due to these changes, third-party interventions significantly expanded quantitatively, qualitatively, and normatively in the early 1990s.

\textsuperscript{99} The Contadora Group consisted of Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela and played significant intermediary roles in conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in the 1980s.

\textsuperscript{100} The Western Contact Group was launched by Canada, France, Germany (West), the UK, and the US in 1977.
In terms of the number of interventions after the collapse of the Cold War system, the UN conducted more peacekeeping operations during the five years between 1989-1994 than it had in the previous forty years. By the mid-1990s, the number of countries contributing to peacekeeping missions had almost tripled, from twenty-six in the late 1980s. In addition, after Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the Secretary-General, the UN began to play a more active role as a mediator than before. Using assets such as its moral standing as an impartial actor, its position in the international arena as the sole organisation that embraces global entities, and its extensive diplomatic network, the UN made efforts to provide good conditions for negotiation as a direct or indirect mediator in many conflicts, including the Israeli and Egyptian conflict (Bercovitch, 1995: 83).

In the post-Cold War period, the evidence suggests that the number of civil war cases brought to an end through negotiation has increased. The percentage of negotiated resolutions among all war-termination cases post-1945 is believed to be less than 25 per cent. For example, Mason and Fett insist that of the 56 civil wars that ended between 1945-92, 13 cases ended in peace agreements (23 per cent). In a study covering the period 1945-93, Licklider claims that 14 conflicts out of a total of 84 ended via negotiations, a mere 17 per cent. Stedman states that for the period 1900-89, ‘there were solutions through negotiations in 15 per cent of the civil wars in that century’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 125-6). However, according to Wallensteen, 39 percent of armed conflicts have been ended through peace negotiations in the post-Cold War period (Wallensteen 2007: 77); moreover, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicates that 61 per cent of conflicts that ended between 1989-2006 (74 out of 122) have been resolved by peace agreements (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2009: no pagination).

This significant increase is partly due to the increased efforts of international interveners, including the UN, to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The Agenda for Peace, which was announced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, insisted that UN intervention needed to change its direction. After acknowledging ‘the increasing ethnic, religious, social and cultural tensions within state boundaries, the problems of population growth, trade barriers, debt burdens and the disparity between the rich and the poor as potential sources of regional instability’, the report concluded that the UN needed to extend the breadth of its concerns and expand the methods it employed (Rupesinghe, 1998: 17).

In terms of the qualitative aspects of post-Cold War international intervention, the collapse of
the Cold War system widened the scope for cooperation among the major powers. They were able to enjoy greater opportunities for ‘negotiations, talks, dialogue, non-violent change, rewards and promises of economic assistance’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 216). The Gulf War in 1991, in which the UN’s collective security force was utilised, was a notable example of this increased cooperation. In the process of building consent for a military solution to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union supported the US-backed resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq. In addition, under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN played much a bigger role in many civil war peace negotiations in Latin America and Southern Africa.

At the same time, the composition of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations became more diverse and complex: peacekeepers were drawn from a wider variety of sources (military, civilian police, and diplomatic quarters), nations, and cultures (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). The military interventions were supplemented by a range of projects such as humanitarian aid, state-building programmes, local peacemaking, and elements of peace enforcement. In normative terms, the concept of liberal-democratic peace was widely accepted as the standard of the post-Cold War system (Carment & Rowlands, 1998: 573).

In recognition of such changes, the concepts of first, second, and third generation UN Peacekeeping have emerged. First generation peacekeeping is the common form that early intervention takes. The operations in this category are conducted by unarmed or lightly armed UN forces, and their main purposes are monitoring truces and troop withdrawal or creating a buffer zone while political negotiations proceed (Doyle, 1996: 484). Second generation operations are engaged in ‘various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict’ (Doyle, 1996: 484). The peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990s are representative examples. Third generation peacekeeping operations are also called ‘peace enforcing’ because their scope is extended ‘from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of cease-fires and, when necessary, assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states’ (Doyle, 1996: 484). Third generation operations are generally conducted under a Chapter 7 mandate but occasionally are undertaken without the consent of the UN (Doyle, 1996: 484).

With regard to the actors involved in post-Cold War intervention, the number of participants has increased and the characteristics of the actors have become more complex. In recent years,
‘more than a hundred different nations [have contributed] forces to UN peacekeeping missions’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). In addition to powerful states (such as the US, the UK and France) and small, neutral developed countries (including Canada, the Republic of Ireland and the Scandinavian nations), there are many countries in ‘Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India) and Africa (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana) that make the major contribution to current missions’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). In addition, since ideological tensions between the superpowers no longer exist, powerful countries have begun to cooperate in promoting more effective peace processes.

Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU, the successor of OAU), the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have played more prominent roles in conflict intervention in the post-Cold War environment. In Africa, after the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993) failed to achieve its goal, the OAU was disbanded and replaced by the AU. In addition to peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Sudan, the AU has made great efforts to mediate between parties in conflict by sending envoys to countries like the Central African Republic (2003) and Zimbabwe (2005) (Murithi, 2007: no pagination).

The OAS also began to play an active role in conflict mediation. When severe political tensions emerged in 1990 among national leaders in various Latin American countries, the OAS not only applied diplomatic pressure but also imposed economic sanctions in order to encourage a peaceful resolution of the conflict (McDougall, 1999: 389-94). Since then, the OAS has intervened in several civil wars in the region, including those in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Paraguay, as a direct or indirect mediator. Most recently, it made efforts to prevent war through mediation between rival leaders in Bolivia in 2008.

In Europe, while NATO has played significant roles in various military operations, from peacekeeping (e.g. its operations in the former Yugoslavia in 1994) to direct military action (e.g. the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995), the EU’s activities have focused on preventive diplomacy and post-war assistance. In particular, the EU’s civilian operations have mainly focused on post-war recovery: for example, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUPOL Proxima operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia. However, since the establishment of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has
begun to place more emphasis on the mediation role (Väyrynen, 2006: 224).

The role played by small or middle-sized countries in conflict resolution has also gradually increased. The activities of the Nordic countries are good examples. Sweden, Finland, and Norway, which had been known as ‘neutral’ polities, have begun to play larger roles in many domestic conflicts in Europe and other regions of the world. While the efforts of Sweden and Finland are focused on dispatching individual representatives to mediate between warring parties, Norway adopts somewhat more active and diversified roles. For instance, in Palestine-Israel (1990s) and Sri Lanka (2001), the Norwegian government contributed to the negotiations as a good office provider, secret messenger, negotiation facilitator, and new proposal producer (Väyrynen, 2006: 228-33).

As international circumstances have changed since the end of the Cold War period, the timing of intervention has also changed. Until the end of the 1980s, most intervention by international actors began after negotiations between conflicting parties had been set up. During the Cold War era, the main role of intervention was to create a buffer zone in which the peace processes could proceed. However, in the 1990s, ‘missions have been undertaken either in the midst of war or prior to the outbreak of violence’ (Carment & Rowlands, 1998: 573). This is because the changed relations between powerful countries opened greater opportunities for international intervention in civil wars. Hence, intervention to promote dialogue between adversarial parties became more frequent than before, and more interventions emphasised ‘negotiation’.

Despite the enlarged efforts of the international community in civil war pacification, third-party interventions have confronted various obstacles. In particular, the failure of a number of peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s, including those in Rwanda and Somalia, triggered a new momentum to reconsider its effectiveness, efficiency, and morality. Scholars began to seek new approaches that reflected the demands of the changed international security arena and the limit of the will and capabilities of the interveners. For example, in relation to the UN, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan modified the direction of UN intervention and adopted new agendas in the Millennium Report, We The Peoples: The Roles of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century (Ramsbotham, 2005: 147).

Finally, the battle against terrorism is one of the most significant issues in this period. After the terrorist attack on September 11 2001, shared fear ‘brought the EU, NATO and the other
major powers on to the same side’; furthermore, the war on terrorism became a new norm in
the international security arena. Even China and Russia have given very strong support on the
issue (Wallensteen 2007: 218). Nevertheless, subsequent wars have posed new challenges to
intervention: questions about lack of legitimacy and morality are now part of the discussion.
In recent interventions and wars, the US and some European states have conducted military
operations without the consent of the United Nations. Although supporters have claimed that
the operations are related to the ‘responsibility to protect’ and the ‘war against terrorism’, the
lack of procedural legitimacy has been harshly criticised. According to Chandler, ‘while there
is little barrier to the assertion of US power around the world, there is, as yet, no framework
which can legitimize and give moral authority to new, more direct forms of Western
regulation’ (Chandler, 2007: 75).

In addition, as the cultural issues involved in the intervention attract more attention, new
types of interventions are also considered important. Interactive conflict resolution is a
prominent example, which means ‘small group, problem-solving discussions between
unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are
facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners’ (Fisher, 1997: 239). However, these types of negotiations have not been at the centre of international peace
processes.
Appendix III

The Internal Factions of the FMLN

1. The Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador; PCS)

The PCS, which was officially established by Miguel Mármol in 1930, was the birthplace and breeding ground for many other anti-government movements. Although it was the only significant Marxist faction in the country and had close relations with the Soviet Communist Party, the PCS did not follow a traditional revolutionary path. Rather, it opposed armed struggle and attempting to expand its popularity through legal elections and trade unions until 1970 (Berner, 1998: no pagination; Negroponte, 1996: 104).

When Cayetano Carpio, one of its leading figures and an advocate of armed revolutionary struggle, left the party and established the FPL (See below), Schafik Handal sustained the party’s non-militaristic popular movement, focusing primarily on strikes and demonstrations during the 1970s. The PCS allied with the PDC, a mainstream political party, in 1971 and ran for the elections in 1972 and 1977 alongside it (McClintock, 1998: 50; Negroponte, 1996: 105).

2. Popular Liberation Forces "Farabundo Marti" (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo Martí": FPL)

The FPL came into being when Cayetano Carpio, the only working-class member of the then leaders of the FMLN, seceded from the PCS, arguing that the PCS’s strategies were too focused on electoral participation and political engagement. The FPL was committed to armed struggle against the military dictatorship and soon became the largest resistance group. Its operations usually targeted policemen and members of the security forces. Moreover, understanding the importance of building close relationships with local people, it promoted political mobilisation by guaranteeing people’s everyday needs and supporting local communities (Negroponte, 1996: 107). Before long, its system of Local Popular Groups (poder popular local) became one of the most reliable political foundations of the organisation (Lungo Ucles, 1996: 140). When the FPL forged an alliance with the
Revolutionary Popular Bloc (*Bloque Popular Revolucionario*, BPR), ‘a popular organization that included many unionized teachers, students, and peasants among its members’ (McClintock, 1998: 50-1), the military and political influence of the organisation increased further.

3. **The Revolutionary Army of the People** (*Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: ERP*)

The ERP was an organisation that concentrated solely on military operations. It was established in 1972 by disaffected former members of the PDC and the PCS and was led by Joaquín Villalobos. In contrast to the other left-wing factions, which were Marxist-Leninist in nature, the leadership of the organisation did not adopt a clear ideological position (Berner, 1998: no pagination). Its focus on military operations and its opposition to negotiation convinced the government to regard it as the most radical faction. Its intransigent posture (it viewed any non-military engagement with the government as collaborationist) continued under Ana Guadalupe Martinez, its second commander. It did not form any strong alliances other than with the Popular Leagues - 28th of February (Ligas Populares – 28 de Febrero, LP-28) until it joined the FMLN. Its extreme militarism created a split within its ranks that eventually led to the formation of the RN (Negroponte, 1996: 107-8).

4. **The National Resistance** (*Resistencia Nacional: RN*)

When the ERP assassinated Roque Dalton, a popular Salvadoran poet, internal friction about the direction that the movement was taking resulted in a split within the faction. A disaffected group led by Eduardo Sandho Castañeda formed the RN, which focused greater attention on political campaigning. The RN mobilised popular militias and conducted a range of projects targeting local people. For its military operations, the RN formed an armed sub-organisation called the Armed Forces of National Resistance (*Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional*, FARN) to conduct guerrilla warfare, in the belief that guerrilla tactics would cause fewer deaths but have a greater impact on society (Negroponte, 1996: 109).

5. **The Workers’ Revolutionary Party** (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores*)
The PRTC was distinctive in that it pursued regional-level revolution due to its connection with regional trade unions. The PRTC in El Salvador was formed and supported by its parent organisation in Costa Rica. Under the leadership of Francisco Jovel, a number of students at the National University of El Salvador were instrumental in its founding. Later, some of those disaffected with the PCS and the ERP joined it (Berner, 1998: no pagination). The PRTC was characterised by its flexible attitude in its dealings with other rebel groups and played a mediating role among rebel parties. It later dissociated itself from its external advocate in Costa Rica to join the FMLN (McClintock, 1998: 51).

Table III.1. Main Organisations of the FMLN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political-Military Organisation</th>
<th>Popular Organisation*</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPL (1970)</td>
<td>Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario, BPR-1975)</td>
<td>FPL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP (1972)</td>
<td>28th of February Popular Leagues (Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero, LP-28-1978)</td>
<td>ERP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS (1930)</td>
<td>Nationalist Democratic Union (Unión Democrática Nacionalista, UDN-1967)</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación, FAL-1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRTC (1976)</td>
<td>Popular Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Popular, MLP-1979)</td>
<td>PRTC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Years cited are the dates of founding.

*The Popular organisations had ceased to exist by late 1980.
The table is cited in (Montgomery, 1992: 102) and modified by the author.

* The FMLN’s main negotiators - The names of the main participants are as follows: Ana Guadalupe Martínez (senior commander), Salvador Samayoa (senior negotiator), Dagoberto Gutiérrez (senior commander), María Marta Valladares “Nidia Diaz” (senior commander), Roberto Cañas (senior commander), and members of the General Command, including Shafik Handal, Eduardo Sancho, Joaquín Villalobos, Francisco Jovel, and Salvador Sánchez Cerén (Buchanan & Chávez 2008, Annex 2).
Appendix IV

Interview Questionnaires

As the author conducted semi-structured interviews during the field research, the questions varied according to the interviewees’ responses. However, the following questions were commonly asked.

**To interviewees involved with the PDK (Khmer Rouge)**
- Did you respect Prince Sihanouk before, during, and after the Cambodian civil conflict?
- Did you understand what ‘election’ meant when the Paris Peace Agreements were signed? Did you expect to win the election?
- When you conducted the dry season campaign in 1985, how many troops did you have? How did you recruit new soldiers?
- Did you see any significant changes in the military or economic aid from China between 1989 and 1991? If so, did the leadership give any explanation for/about these changes?
- How did you manage/achieve/maintain communication with China? Did you have any constant contact point with the country? Was there any change in terms of the frequency or methods of communication?
- Pol Pot announced that the Khmer Rouge had abandoned the communist ideology in the early 1980s. What happened within the party after the announcement? Do you think it changed the leadership’s attitudes towards the civil war or the negotiations?
- After the Vietnamese army occupied Phnom Penh in 1979, how did you maintain relationships with the Cambodian people?
- In the late 1980s, did you know that peace negotiations with the PRK and Vietnam were taking place? If so, did you expect the negotiations with the two enemies to achieve a productive outcome?
- What were the main institutions for internal communication or discussion? Did you have regular meetings within the leadership?

**To interviewees involved with the PRK/SOC**
- Why did Hun Sen initiate the talks with Prince Sihanouk in 1987? Many people argue that the lack of resources and the desire for international recognition as the legitimate government were the biggest motivation. Do you think these arguments are right?
- For many people (at least your supporters), the civil conflict was ‘a war to liberate people from the human rights abusing Khmer Rouge.’ However, you accepted the PDK as a political entity in the last phase of the negotiations. How did you understand this decision?

- In 1991, or more specifically from the meeting in Japan, the PDK boycotted the peace talks. However, you continued negotiations with the other factions. Did you believe that it would be possible/feasible to arrive at an agreement without the PDK’s participation/consent? If this is the case, why did you think in that way?

- Some sources say that Vietnam supported the peace negotiations from the late 1980s. Is this correct? If so, could you elaborate on some details of this? Did you receive any verbal messages from Vietnam? Was Vietnam involved in coordinating the details of the negotiations?

- When you signed the Paris Peace Agreements, did you expect the PDK to comply with the agreements?

- We you aware of the change in China’s attitudes towards the peace negotiations? If so, when did you perceive the change? Did you have any direct contact with China in this period? How did Mr Hun Sen communicate with the Chinese leaders?

- If you were to nominate a critical event/moment that led to the negotiations, which would it be? Do you think that the failure of the dry season campaign in 1985/1986 provided the momentum for you to reconsider your war strategy? If so, how did you change the direction of your military and diplomatic principles?

- Did you have any direct contact with the UN or the US? If so, in which way did you communicate with them?

- What were the main institutions for internal communication or discussion? Did you have regular meetings within the leadership?

**To interviewees involved with the KPNLF**

- The KPNLF strongly opposed coalition with the Khmer Rouge. However, you changed your initial position later. What convinced you to change it?

- Do you think that Khmer cultural values influenced the direction or outcomes of the peace negotiations a lot? If so, can you give some examples?

- Did you have regular meetings within the leadership? How did you manage the discussions?

- What do you think about Mr Son Sann’s leadership?

- What do you think was the critical event/moment that persuaded the KPNLF to negotiate
with Vietnam (rather than continuing military operations)?
- You set three main goals in the initial phase (liberating the people from the Khmer Rouge, removal of the Vietnamese imperialist, and the establishment of a democratic country). Which do you think was the most important goal?
- What do you think the role of China was? Did you have direct contact with the country?
- How frequently did you meet with the delegates from Western donors/supporters, including France and the US? What did they say in the last phase of the negotiations?
- What was the role of regional actors (ASEAN in particular)?
- Did you believe that you had strong popular support? Did you believe that you would win many seats in the assembly in the first general election?

To interviewees involved with FUNCINPEC
- Many people argue that FUNCINPEC was an organisation that relied heavily on the charismatic leadership of Prince Sihanouk. What do you think about this?
- How did you manage internal discussions? Are you aware of any case where the prince’s decision was reversed due to internal discussions? In particular, when Prince Sihanouk decided to collaborate with the Khmer Rouge, did you have any internal disagreements? If so, how did you manage the disagreements?
- What was the most important goal of FUNCINPEC when it was first established?
- On which issue do you feel that gaining the consent of other members of the CGDK proved the most difficult?
- How was your relationship with China? Did you meet with Chinese delegates? When you had disagreements with the Khmer Rouge, did you ask for Chinese help?
- Why do you think that the PRK wanted to have talks with Prince Sihanouk?
- What was the role of the US in the negotiations? How frequently did the American delegates visit you? Were there any occasions when the US gave specific suggestions about the negotiations?
- Were there significant changes in American economic and military support during the final phase of the negotiations?
Thank you for your participation.

**Purpose of the Research**
This field research intends to discover the effects of non-material factors, such as the perceptions of negotiators, popular support, and cultural practices, on the direction and progress of negotiation. In particular, the interview (and survey) that you have kindly agreed to participate in is to ascertain how Cambodian people perceived the civil conflict and peace negotiation process when the negotiation process was taking place.

**Anonymity, Privacy & Confidentiality**
The researcher will ensure anonymity in the writing up and publication of the final study. When any data directly related to your personal identity is used, your consent will be obtained in advance. The researcher will ensure privacy during each of the data collection sessions. Data collected will be handled only by the researcher and supervisor and will be stored securely. Future use of the data for scholarly purposes through archiving or the destruction of the data will be carried out as agreed in the ‘Volunteer Consent Form’.

**Withdrawal**
Please remember that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. Should you do so, all data relating to you will be destroyed.

**Questions**
If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the researcher to answer them.

**Contact Details**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher(s) Name</th>
<th>Supervisor’s Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sung Yong Lee</td>
<td>Dr Roger Mac Ginty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tel: +44 7923 538 366</td>
<td>Tel: +44 1334 461 923</td>
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<td>E-mail: <a href="mailto:syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk">syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk</a></td>
<td>E-mail: <a href="mailto:hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk">hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix V (Khmer)

បុគ្គលិក / បុគ្គលិកទី២ ស្រុកសំរែសំលាត់

ការសិក្សាដែលកំពុងប្រការ និង ការសិក្សាថែលកំពុងសុខភាពឈ្មោះនៃដំណើរការអនុវត្តន៍ការសិក្សាដែលកំពុងប្រការ ។

ស្វាយដែលជាអ្នកព្រមាណសំនុសសំរែសំលាត់

សិស្សស្រុកសំរែសំលាត់

ខេត្តធ្វើឯកសារការណ៍

ខេត្តមានកិច្ចការធ្វើឯកសារដោយសម្រាប់ការអនុវត្តន៍ការសិក្សាដែលកំពុងប្រការ ។

អត្ថប្រយោជន៍

អត្ថប្រយោជន៍នៃការសិក្សាដែលកំពុងប្រការ ។

ឈ្មោះ អត្ថប្រយោជន៍

Sung Yong Lee រoger Mac Ginty

Tel: +44 7923 538 366  Tel: +44 1334 461 923

E-mail: syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk  E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk
DEBRIEFING FORM

Project Title
Survey of Perceptual and Cultural Factors Affecting the Peace Negotiation Processes in the Cambodian Civil War

Researcher(s) Name
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Supervisor’s Name
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E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk

Thank you for participating in this survey.

This survey intends to discover the effects of non-material factors, such as the perceptions of negotiators, popular support, and cultural practices, on the direction and progress of negotiation. As a part of research data, the contents of your interview will be analysed in the researcher’s thesis to ascertain which negotiation factors proved crucial in promoting and inhibiting the progress of the negotiations.

For your data protection, the following will be respected.
1. Your personal details will not be released in any way without your consent.
2. The data contained in your interview will not be modified or distorted.
3. In cases where your interview needs to be directly quoted, your consent will first be asked.
Appendix VI (Khmer)

School of International Relations
University of St Andrews

អនុគោលនៃអាមេររោត្តម

ការពារជីវិត និងសុខភាព និងការគ្រប់គ្រងការសង្វែះប្រការ និងការអនុវត្តអំណាច ត្រូវបានការពាររបស់អ្នក ស្ថិតការ

អតិថិជ្ជមាត់នៃអាមេររោត្តម

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Roger Mac Ginty
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រាងកាយអតិថិជ្ជមាត់នៃអាមេររោត្តម

១.បញ្ហារាងក្នុងការធ្វើឱ្យមិនមានសេវាបម្រុងបានអនុវត្តន៍ខ្លួនឯង ប្រសិនបើ
   ការធ្វើឱ្យមិនមានសេវាបម្រុង

  ២.បញ្ហារាងក្នុងការធ្វើឱ្យមិនមានសេវាបម្រុងបានអនុវត្តន៍ខ្លួនឯង ប្រសិនបើ
   ការធ្វើឱ្យមិនមានសេវាបម្រុង
PARTICIPANT / VOLUNTEER CONSENT FORM

Project Title
Survey of Perceptual and Cultural Factors Affecting the Peace Negotiation Processes in the Cambodian Civil War

Researcher(s) Name
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Supervisor’s Name
Dr Roger Mac Ginty
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E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk

Consent
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to help you to understand what it entails. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do, and you are free to withdraw at any stage.

- Have you read and understood the Participant / Volunteer Information Sheet?
  - Yes [ ]
  - No [ ]

- Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?
  - Yes [ ]
  - No [ ]

- Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions?
  - Yes [ ]
  - No [ ]

- Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study:
  - At any time
  - Without having to give a reason for withdrawing
  - Yes [ ]
  - No [ ]

- Do you agree to take part in the study?
  - Yes [ ]
  - No [ ]

Name ________________________________________________
Signature ______________________________________________
Date ________________________________________________

337
អំពីអនុសាសន្ត្រី / អំពីអនុសាសន្ត្រី អនុសាសនីសាសន៍

ក្រុមអនុសាសន្ត្រី អនុសាសនីសាសន៍ ដំបូង ក្រុមអនុសាសន្ត្រីយូរជូរមានបញ្ហាមិនបាន ដែលរស់នៅមកសម្រាប់បង្ហាញមកសម្រាប់អំពីអនុសាសន្ត្រី អនុសាសនីសាសន៍

រាមាព្យាបាល

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*Official Reports or Press Release from States or Organisations*


*Other Media*


*Interviews*
1. Negotiators Who Participated in the Peace Negotiation in Cambodia

Ieng Mouly  
Senior Minister, Government of Cambodia, Cambodia  
Former Leader of the KPNLF who became a member of CPP  
August 27th, 2009 at His Office in Phnom Penh

Lu Lay Sreng  
Deputy Prime Minister, Government of Cambodia  
Former Vice-President of FUNCINPEC  
July 25th, 2009 at His Residence outskirt of Phnom Penh

Son Soubert  
Member of the National Assembly of Cambodia  
Former Leader of the KPNLF, Son of H.E. Son Sann  
July 14th, 2009 at His Office in Phnom Penh

A Former Leader of the PDK requested Anonymity  
August 30, 2009 at a village in Otdar Meanchey

2. Former Leaders or Associates of the PDK (Khmer Rouge)

Chhin Kim Thong  
Director of Trapang Prasat District Administrative Office  
Former Officer of Information Department, the PDK  
August 31st, 2009 at Village Council Building, Trapang Prasat

Men Sourn  
Chief of Section, Trapang Prasat District, Otdar Meanchey,  
Former Leader of A PDK Brigade  
August 31st, 2009 at a Village Council Building, Trapang Prasat

A Former Leader of the PDK Brigade requested Anonymity  
August 30th, 2009, at a Village in Otdar Meanchey

3. People Involved in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Projects in Cambodia

Kol Pheng  
Senior Minister, Government of Cambodia  
August 19th, 2009 at His Office in Phnom Penh

Khiev Bun Roeub  
Senior Provincial Program Advisor, UNDP Cambodia  
August 12th, 2009 at a Cafeteria in Battambang  
August 30th, 2009 at Her Office in Otdar Meanchey

Lim Vannak  
Director, SEED Cambodia  
July 26th, 2009 at an Office of COPION, Phnom Penh

Mu Sochua  
Member of Parliament, Sam Rainsy Party, Cambodia  
July 20th, 2009 at Her Office in Phnom Penh
### 4. Researchers Studying Issues or Countries related to the Cambodian Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
<th>Date/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sin Sieth</td>
<td>Provincial Finance Advisor, NCDD Cambodia</td>
<td>August 31&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;, 2009 at His Office in Otdar Meancheay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So Chenda</td>
<td>Program Coordinator, PAK-Cambodia</td>
<td>August 13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2009 at His Office in Ta Keo</td>
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<td>Sorpong Peou</td>
<td>Professor, Sophia University, Japan</td>
<td>June 30&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2009 at His Office in Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johan Saravanamuttu</td>
<td>Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore</td>
<td>July 24&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2009 at His Office in Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ear Chariya</td>
<td>Research Student, University of Tokyo</td>
<td>September 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; at a Cafeteria, Phnom Penh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teemu Naarajärvi</td>
<td>Researcher, University of Helsinki, Finland</td>
<td>July 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2010 at His Temporary Office in St Andrews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>