# REFASHIONING THE CALIPHATE : IMPERIAL VICISSITUDES AND THE DEFORMATION OF ORDER

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Refashioning the Caliphate

Imperial Vicissitudes and the Deformation of Order

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I, Mahdi Ahmad Sidki Al-Dajani, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately one hundred and four thousands words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in October 2007 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in July 2008; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between [2007] and [2015].

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<u>Abstract</u>

Relying on the work of the political philosopher, Eric Voegelin, I argue that in the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics that appeared as of the Umayyad founding caliphs up to Al-Banna, a relation emerged between imperial vicissitudes, the ensuing anxieties and the desire to eliminate recalcitrant realities on one end, and the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate, of grand conceptions of order and of the mystery on the other end. Phases of Caliphal imperial ascent and imperial floating saw a mode of deformation which consisted of mystery-distorting conceptions, hence pointing to a metastatic consciousness which escaped from the metaxy heading towards the *transcendent* pole. Phases of imperial decay saw a mode of deformation which was characterized by a general avoidance of the mystery, and an immersion in profaneness, hence pointing to a metastatic consciousness which escaped form the metaxy heading towards the *immanent* pole. Both modes were outcomes of a superbia-based emotional difficulty preventing the libidinous self from bearing the persisting cognitive anxieties aroused by imperial vicissitudes. I demonstrate that characteristic of the phase of imperial ascent and imperial floating is the accentuation of the individual caliph/imam, and the customization of mystery distorting conceptions to solidify his status in the system of transcendental representation such as constructing him as God's deputy. This accentuation of the caliph is underpinned by the desire to boost his role in the system of existential representation especially his imperial status. Characteristic of the phase of imperial descent and imperial encroachment is the accentuation of the umma and the construction of the caliph as the umma's deputy, and a general avoidance of the mystery. The accentuation of the umma is underpinned by the desire to reinvent the system of existential representation and invoke maximal power which would end the state of imperial decay or encroachment.

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Introduction

At of the dawn of the Umayyad Caliphal reign (661 AD), the attempt at modifying the Caliphal mode of governance in the hope of making it largely monarchical and imperial became visible. Monarchical norms of governance including strict centralization and intense authoritarianism acquired definite shape. Monarchical protocols and practices increased. Rule became largely *superbia*-based, and glory-driven. A strictly "preferential system" (Esposito, 1998, p. 15) which was underpinned by an ethos of multi-tiered particularism was introduced developing later into an economically and ethno-socially non-equitable class system. Conquest became predominantly a means of expansion and of wealth aggregation an vehicle of constructing a rich center and a marginalized dispossessed periphery. Dynastic rule and the principle of hereditary succession to the Caliph's seat were put in motion. The mechanism of consultation in designating the caliph was abandoned. (Hawting, 2000, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14). In Voegelinian terminology, the *compact* attempts at incorporating a governance of superiority-driven monarchism and imperialism *advanced into differentiation* during the Abbasid and Ottoman caliphal reigns. The adoption of monarchical and imperial norms of governance augmented. However, the political and strategic edge of the imperialism differed from one caliphal phase to another, flowering in certain phases and petering out in others. In the mode of imperial ascent and the mode of imperial descent, theories on the caliphate and on caliphate-related governance were formulated and enunciated by different purposive actors. However, each enunciated caliphate-related theory was an integral part of a *total caliphate-related theoretical fabric*. That fabric included the general epistemology which permeated the caliphate theorization, the general ethos espoused to by the concerned purposive actor, and essential enduring caliphate-related conceptual behavior. The relevance of such surrounding elements is underpinned by the notion that "human phenomena are constituted by pre-reflective or conceptual understanding." (Bhargava and Asharya, 2008, p. 25), and is underpinned by the notion that actors

enunciate but part of the theoretical understanding of a given phenomenon. Weaving such elements and surveying them in their entirety would permit unearthing a comprehensive ultimate caliphate-related scenario with a set of precepts that would unfold should the theory be put into practice fully.

Relying on the work of the political philosopher, Eric Voegelin, including his theoretical and conceptual language, I argue that in the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics that were formulated as of the Umayyad founding caliphs up to Al-Banna, a relation emerged between imperial vicissitudes, the ensuing anxieties and the desire to eliminate recalcitrant realities on one end, and the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate, of grand conceptions of order and of the mystery on the other end. Phases of Caliphal imperial ascent and imperial floating bore witness to a mode of deformation which consisted of mystery-distorting conceptions, hence pointing to a metastatic consciousness which escaped from the metaxy heading towards the *transcendent* pole. Phases of Caliphal imperial decay saw a mode of deformation which was characterized by a general avoidance of the mystery, and an immersion in profaneness, hence pointing to a metastatic consciousness which escaped form the metaxy heading towards the *immanent* pole. Both modes of deformation were born out of the womb of a *superbia*-based emotional difficulty preventing the libidinous self from bearing the persisting cognitive anxieties aroused by imperial vicissitudes, and the desire to overcome the ensuing adverse circumstances. Both modes of deformation indicate that *a major* role which was intended to be played by caliphate-related theoretical fabrics and by pertinent understandings of conceptions of order and of the mystery included a customized present empowerment which would entail immediately expunging the adverse circumstances resulting from unpleasant imperial vicissitudes and lead to a betterment of the imperial condition.

The above mentioned imperialism emerged within a context of a deformational wave which called the order established between the heirophanic event of Messenger

Mohammad (610 AD) and the end of the revelation period (632 AD), and which the believers attempted to sustain by having themselves underpinned by a sense of deputyship (caliphate) of the Messenger. Crudely, for Voegelin, order[1] is the harmonized condition which consciousness induces the soul to underpin itself by and live, and the harmonized condition which collective consciousness induces the society to underpin itself by and live in attunement of the harmonized condition of the soul, all being combined with the harmonized conditions resulting from divine ordering of the soul and society. Human ordering is a participation in divine ordering, and is in attunement to the cosmic order. Attempting to achieve the harmonized condition of the society takes place on the epistemic level and the level of structuring and constituting. Put concisely, as Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper indicate in *Faith and political philosophy: the correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964*,

> Voegelin argues that the search for political order is found in human responsiveness to the order of being. (Emberley and Cooper, 2004, p. xvii).

On the epistemic level, the society underpins itself by a set of conceptions that inform its self-understanding, self interpretation and self-illumination as well as its understanding of the world, and of its mission in history. The study shall refer to those conceptions as the "conceptions of existence and order" or simply the "conceptions of order." The most essential conceptions of order include the conception of transcendence, of epistemology, of the human being, of time, of identity, of governance, of war and conquest, and of fulfillment and completion. Those conceptions underpin every individual and societal conscientious and spontaneous self-ordering. That said, the new order sprang from the Message in order to enable living the essence of the Message. As shall be explained below, the order established during the period of revelation was informed by the Quran, by the Messenger and his teachings. Authenticating each other's authority to us the language of Packer and Oden, the Quran, constituting the main textual pillar of the Message, and the Messenger, constituting the human pillar of the Message, formed

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[1] An explanation of Voegelinian conception of order and its formulation shall be furnished in Chapter One.

together the center of the new spiritual outburst, to use a Voegelinian terminology. In view of this, the study shall refer to the new order as the "Message-based order". The authority resulting from the coalescing of the Messenger and the Quran is contrastable, *mutatis mutandis*, with the centrality of Christ and Scripture in so much as the Christian outburst is concerned. As Packer and Oden put it,

> by authenticating each other's authority, Christ and Scripture coalesce into a single fount of authority. (Packer and Oden, 2004, p. 55).

As Voegelin argues, that spiritual outburst became one of the source of meaning in history. (Franz, 2000, p. 50). As Voegelin explains in *The Ecumenic Age*,

> mankind is no concrete society at all. In the pursuit of this question, the analysis had to acknowledge the spiritual outbursts, not as phenomena in a history of mankind, but as the sources of meaning in history and of such knowledge as man has of it. By letting man become conscious of his humanity as existence in tension toward divine reality, the hierophanic events engender the knowledge of man's existence in the divine-human In-Between, in Plato's Metaxy, as well as the language symbols articulating the knowledge. Moreover, they are experienced as meaningful inasmuch as they constitute a Before and After within time that points toward a fulfillment, toward an Eschaton, out of time. History is not a stream of human beings and their actions in time, but the process of man's participation in a flux of divine presence that has eschatological direction. (Franz, 2000, p. 50).

Upon the death of the Messenger, the believers selected a head who bore the title caliph ushering in a new reign. The new reign bore witness to the designation of caliphs whose pursuit was characterized mainly by the attempt to deputize the Messenger.

Mystery has been an essential element of the Message-based order. In the MBO, a mystery means mainly a divinely-made unknowness in relation to the divine, the human being, things, and phenomena. For example, the divinely-made unknownesses in relation to the divine include the divine essence, the divine presence in the mode of the beyond, and the howness of divine manifestation. A mystery in the MBO is not far from the Voegelinian conception of the mystery. In his book *Voegelin on the Idea of Race: An*

Analysis of Modern European Racism, Thomas Heilke explains mystery in Voegelin by saying that,

> the symbol of the 'mystery' is a term essential to understanding both the early and the later Voegelin. The word is Greek, and in antiquity it had the meaning of a 'secret' or 'something unknown' or 'hidden'. The usage that Voegelin employs is especially Pauline. A mystery is a secret belonging to God that He may reveal if He wishes, but that frequently, even when revealed, is not fully comprehensible in the understanding. It cannot be penetrated by the intellect, but must be grasped spirituality or by faith. Voegelin gave the symbol the meaning of the ungraspable ground of being, and differentiated this great mystery into many smaller problems within the processes of being that also remain mysteries in their essential nature. The nature of existence and the dialectic between transcendental consciousness and existence are two we have already encountered. The essences of the phenomenon of life and the nature of man are two more. (Heilke, 1990, p. 29-30).

In fact, mystery has been of significance to the notion of order in many instances throughout history, whether in the revelatory form of existence in history, or in other forms of existence. That is why the subject of mystery was an important line of inquiry that engrossed a good part of the interest of philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973 AD) (Hughes, 1993, p. 2) and Eric Voegelin himself. Also, that is why the relevance of mystery to political philosophy was confirmed by other philosophers such as Leo Strauss. (See Smith 2009. p. 143, and Ranieri 2009. p. 127). In turn, Voegelin's own diagnosis of the role of mystery in the phenomenon of order itself became a subject of whole studies in the discipline of politics. (See Hughes 1993 for one instance).

Methodology

This study explores the following question: What is the relation between sharp imperial transformations, the ensuing anxieties and the desire to purge refractory realities on the one hand, and the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate, of pertinent conceptions of order and the conception of the mystery in caliphate-related theoretical fabrics on the other hand. There is sufficient evidence to hypothesize and surmise that the inclination to "employ" the meaning of the caliphate, of conceptions of

order that permeate and surround the notion of the caliphate and of the mystery, as instruments of power in confronting adverse circumstances resulting from imperial transformation has continued to be a dominant inclination. In broad strokes, caliphate-related theoretical fabrics have been conceived as designs formulated, in large part, to provide what is claimed by the formulator as *the proper interpretation* of the sacred in relation to the caliphate in particular and in relation to caliphate-related governance at large. They were also perceived as designs formulated to provide *an explanation* of the notion of the caliphate and the functions of the caliph in the generic sense. Nonetheless, a critical diagnosis would unearth that caliphate-related theoretical fabrics were concerned, *in the main*, with providing a specific understanding of the caliphate and of relevant conceptions of order and of the mystery which would enable a certain aspired scenario in the present circumstance. That scenario is governed by power considerations before anything else.

Multiple approaches underpin the present study. First and foremost, the study will take a thematic approach. The dissertation shall cut across a spectrum of historical periods witnessing imperial vicissitudes in dissecting the overarching theme of the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate, of other most pertinent conceptions, and of the mystery. Whereas chapter four will analyze the specific theme of the deformation during the mode of imperial ascent and imperial floating, chapter Five will analyze the specific theme of the deformation during the mode of imperial descent. Without prejudice to that, it is worth remembering that the study shall apply the Voegelinian theoretical maxim of the movement of consciousness, and it expressions from the state of compactness into the state of differentiation which will be explained in details in Chapter One. Distinguishing compact expressions and phenomena and differentiated ones necessitates first looking at the root which gained existence in history first, and then at the branch which gained existence in history at a later stage. The analysis of MBO during the period of revelation in Chapter Two and the meaning of the caliphate during the reign of the first four caliphs in together with the further growth of deformation in

Chapter Three should not be taken as contradictory to the thematic approach. Without this account the theoretical and substantive intricacies of the range of the caliphate-related fabrics that shall be analyzed and the relevant deformation would not be intelligible. Additionally, a comparative approach will be employed since the study is dealing with the theoretical propositions of multiple actors. While juxtaposing the various caliphate-related theoretical visions, the primary concern will be with discerning comparable and contrastable elements. The study will seek to demystify the etiology of the variation. On another plane, the study is a textually-focused query. An analytical approach will be employed in deciphering the conceptions embedded in the propositions related to the Caliphate. Theoretical conceptions of the caliphate were articulated in certain official correspondence to which Caliphs were a party, in statements by caliphs and officials, in books, and in pamphlets. Yet, because the prime concern is to demystify the actual total caliphate-related theoretical fabric of the purposive actors and not only their expressed theoretical statements, a holistic approach will be used to engage the entirety of what the study conceives as the most germane conceptual and pragmatic corpus and behavior.

Caveats

A full application of the aforementioned Voegelinian compactness/differentiation and the finding that there is a genealogy which ran in the Umayyad theoretical fabric through the ideologized Shiism to the Umayyad theoretical fabric of ideologized Sunnism mandates a succinct treatment of origin-variation relations between elements within the 'Shiite theory' and the 'Sunni theory'. It is well understood that it may be plausible to devote an individual research on a central topic such as the caliphate to one confessional orientation, namely Sunni or Shiite. Yet, the Voegelinian theoretical maxim of the movement by consciousness and its expressions including theories from compactness into differentiation enabled us to locate multiple common elements. For one, the study argues that the intellectual pedigree of Al-Mawardi's stipulation that the powerful emir

should be established as the authorisee of the caliph should be found, at least partly, in the conception held by the theoretical fabric of the ideologized Shiism that the missionary or the *da'i* as well as every existential ruler should be regarded as the delegate of the imam. The former anticipated the latter and gained a definite shape in the very same intellectual milieu.

The study is confined to examining the waves of deformation as the nature and scope of this study does not permit an extensive analysis of the line of restoration of the meaning of the caliphate and its relation with the mystery. Nonetheless, some of the restoration-related undertakings are discussed as part of the recalcitrant reality which challenged the actors who formulated the deformation conceptions. Other restoration-related undertakings are merely pointed to in utmost brevity and succinctness for the purpose of contextualization.

Due the nature of the study, a very limited theological tenor may appear only in Chapter Two but shall be without prejudice to the character of the study as an inquiry in political theory. Analyzing an order which was anchored in a spiritual outburst renders it mandatory to analyze inextricably linked theological concepts. To this it may be added that the theological dimension and the political are strongly interconnected in political theory and in international relations theory. The case of the works of Reinhold Niebuhr, theologian and political philosopher and one of the founders of 20th century realism is only one case in point. Particularly after the recognition of Voegelin's corpus and Carl Schmitt's works especially his writings on Political Theology, the interest to re-explore the connection between the theological and the political widened in studies in the field of political theory and international relations theory. Such interest is manifested by works such as Nicolas Guilhot's article entitled "American Katechon: When Political Theology Became International Relations Theory" (2010), Jodok Troy's book entitled *Religion and the Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back* (2013), and Vassilios Pipes's article entitled "Overcoming

'Gnosticism'? Realism as Political Theology" (2015). Being based on the unity of the human condition, Voegelin's inquiry in the notion of order employed multiple platonic and Judeo-Christian theological concepts citing the Old Testament and the Bible. Voegelin also cited Quranic verses pointing to the ecumenic orientation of the Message. (Franz, 2000, p. 199). Nonetheless, Voegelin's methodology was mindful about the nature of the its inquiry and its center being an inquiry of order, hence avoided immersion in pure theology. This we shall avoid too.

Review of the Literature

Whereas the subject of the study has not been previously explored, several lines of literature intersect with the dimensions of the present study. Chief amongst those is the line which has its lenses focused on the relation between the meaning of the caliphate and Imperialism. Also, there is the line which is concerned with exploring the relation between Islam, the Caliphate and Modernity or Islam and Modernity. Third, there is the line which is interested specifically in the concept of caliph, its meaning and usages. Forth, there is the line of studies whose concern is with the general landscape of the political thought which is linked to Islam. Finally, there is the line of studies which is particularly piqued by the question of mystery and its relevance to human behavior.

Literature on the relation between the meaning of the caliphate and Imperialism

Regrading the literature on the relation between the meaning of the caliphate and Imperialism, one of the lines of studies which intersects with the present study is the line concerned with "the caliphate in memory". Examples of this line of studies include Recalling the Caliphate: Decolonization and World Order by S. Sayyed, Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts which is edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten and Marat Shterin, and The Caliphate and Islamic Statehood Formation, Fragmentation and Modern Interpretations which is edited and introduced by Carool Kersten. Theoretically, the main lens of these works is focused on the

conceptualization of the caliphate within the context of the politics of memory. Indeed, the question of memory is of significance to political theory at large and to the discipline of international relations in particular. One of the relatively recent relevant trends in the field of politics of memory is the way political actors deal with indelible scars left on collective consciousness and individual consciousness as a result of traumatic moments and events such as wars, genocide and violent revolutions. The book *Memory and Truma in International Relations Theories, cases and debates* edited by Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte is one of the recent works that cover theories related to remembering imagining, and reimagining traumatic political events and their impact on ontological security and identity. (Resende and Budryte, 2013). The impact of events of international relations on ontological security and identity is essentially common amongst constructivist scholars. An example is the works of Richard Ned Lebow including *The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves* (2012)*, Constructing Cause in International Relations* (2014), and *Goodbye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System*, coauthored with Simon Reich (2014). This research area generally interconnects with Voegelin's theorization of the impact of imperially-caused destruction and acute imperial vicissitudes on collective consciousness, and the irrevocable anxieties they originate. The present study will demonstrate the how the mystery distortion conceptions and the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate, and the escape from the mystery, were all power instruments that are hoped to influence a certain imperial equation. The question of shaping and controlling memory and the multiple political utilities of both is another central theme in the politics of memory. As Peter Verovsek explains in his article *The Politics of Memory A Conceptual Approach to the Study of Memory in Politics*, political actors "activate memory as a weapon both against domestic opponents and in international affairs." (Verovsek, 2014, p.1). Verovsek adds that, political actors

seek to gain political advantage by monumentalizing group-specific understandings of the past in order to legitimize their actions in the present to gain an advantage in the future. (Verovsek, 2012, p.1).

Embedded in the politics of memory is a dispute over shaping meaning and over the possession of sources of meaning. Superbia-driven Mobilization, legitimation and misrepresentation are amongst the prime areas in which memory shaping and manipulation serves. *Demystifying the Caliphate* edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten and Marat Shterin attempts at exploring the images of the caliphate in collective memory and imagination. Underpinned by a phenomenologist perspective, the book argues that those images are influenced by attempts of self-assertion on the international arena and mechanisms of self-reassurance by circles within a multi-ethnic umma which was once the prey of encroachment. As the editors explain in the introduction,

> the memory of the caliphate as the bastion of pan Islamic aspiration remains anchored in Utopian visions about power, unity, glory and uniformity." (Al-Rasheed, Kersten and Shterin, 2012, p. 3).

From its end, the present study shall seek to demonstrate how the contemporary "memories of the caliphate" which are underpinned by considerations of power, unity and glory, were anticipated and preceded by "caliphate-related theoretical fabrics" that were also underpinned by power impulses and glory. One of the contributions of *Demestifying the Caliphate* is the attempt to balance the research on the Caliphate in collective memory by giving a wider space to the exploration the intricacies of the conception of the caliphate in zones other than the Arab zone. This attempt is based on the conscious awareness that the balance was tilted in favor of the latter. (Al-Rasheed, Kersten and Shterin, 2013, p. 12). Hence, the book explored caliphate-related conceptions in India, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan. From the civilization theory viewpoint, this is an attempt to unchain the examination of the caliphate from *the unitary conception* of civilization by applying a *pluralist conception* of civilization. According to theorists who espouse to the characterization of a civilization as a pluralist context such

as Peter Katzsenstein the author of *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives* by Peter Katzsenstein. (2009), a reading which is anchored in a unitary conception of civilization is one in which the understanding of a whole complex multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and multi-cultural civilization is distorted as a result of over-emphasizing one dominant ethnicity or culture or any other framework and circle of identity and exaggerating its comparative weight. The over-emphasized ethnicity or culture is awarded an overarching character and is constructed as an all-encompassing or a hegemonic category. (See Katzenstein, 2009). Accordingly, when the complex civilization is studied, the over-emphasized category receives the lion's share of the attention, while other categories are marginalized. From its end, the present study will analyze the sense of Arab particularism and later Arab nationalism that took root and accrued in most of the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics under examination as manifestations of the unitary conception of civilization. The sense of Arab particularism underpinned by a unitary conception of civilization in the theoretical fabric of the Umayyad founders yielded the behavior and conception that Islam is the property of the Arabs. (Hawting, 2000, p.4). Likewise, the sense Arab nationalism underpinned by a unitary conception of civilization in the theoretical fabric of El-Banna yielded the behavior and conception that the Islamic umma declined in history because the wheel of leadership was in the hands of non-Arabs who did not obtain a solid grasp of the essence of Islam because they did not understand Arabic. (Mura, 2012, p. 77). Part of the intellectual pedigree of the methodological bias which the book Demystifying the Caliphate came to confront should be located in this ethno-cultural bias which plagued the theory of the caliphate.

Recalling the Caliphate: Decolonization and World Order by S. Sayyed (2014) is another work in the area of exploring how the caliphate is remembered. It has as its purpose explicating that the notion of the caliphate invoked as of the start of colonization is a symbol that the presence of the faith in the public sphere did not abate and a symbol of a contestation of the colonizer. The book is underpinned by a

perspective which synthesizes post-colonialism, critical theory, Gramsci's theoretical concept of cultural hegemony, and phenomenology. In spite of attempting at confining the faith to the private sphere after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphal seat, it maintained its relevance in the societal sphere. The subsequent contemporary invocation of the caliphate is an expression of self-assertion, autonomy, unity and power in the international arena. From this it follows that both meanings are invalidators of the argument of the universality of the Western experience. The argument that the particular historical Western experience is not universal to other human experiences should not be conceived as without limitations. This anti-cultural hegemony argument should not denote a total dissimilarity between the Western experience and other cultural experiences including the cultures that took root in the sphere living the MBO. The motive of self-assertion should not preempt the approach of juxtaposing the two experiences to locate similarities and differences. Actually, similar essential conceptions and historical vicissitudes of the Western experience are locatable in the zones living the MBO. The study will show some striking similar paradigmatic conceptualization, similar historical vicissitudes and similar resulting imbalances of consciousness.

One of the main motivations of the line of literature which is focused on the "caliphate in memory" is to come to grips with the phenomenon of contemporary expressions of activism, radicalism and terrorism that attempt to link themselves to Islam. Some bodies of activism has as an integral part of their discourse the invocation of the caliphate and the call for its reinstatement. One of the clear pronouncements of this invocation and call is found in the rhetoric of Hizb At-Tahrir. Also, the group led by Abu Bakr El-Baghdadi has made the symbol of the caliphate central to his terrorist project, using it as a tool of recruitment of to-be-terrorists from all the corners of the globe. This phenomenon of contemporary activism and terrorism has captured the interest of a cohort of academics and writers during the past two decades. One of the specific areas that captured specific attention was the globalist nature of the behavior of extreme activists and terrorists attempting to link themselves to Islam, and their position towards

the notion of the modernist state. Examples of this line include *The Failure of Political Islam* (1998) *and Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma* by Olivier Roy and Global Political Islam by Peter Mandaville (2007). All, in all, understanding this phenomenon would provide a short-term and long-term prognosis of the radicalism embedded in it. One of Olivier Rody's main arguments is that contemporary radical and violence-minded activists dissociated themselves from tradition and from past ulama. While we agree with this argument in general, it should be understood that the conceptualization and behavior of contemporary radical and violence-minded activists is largely underpinned by much of the deformation which plagued the caliphate-related theoretical fabric that was generated at times of imperial ascent and at times whereby the zones living the MBO fell prey to foreign imperial dominance.

The relation between Islam and modernity has piqued the interest of numerous scholars. Fazlur Rahman's book *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* may be regarded as one of the founding works in this area of research. The overarching attempt is to reconcile the Islamic teachings with the tenets of modernity. The gist of Rahman's argument is that coping with the inescapable challenges of modernity necessitates that contemporary Muslim intellectuals revolt against the traditional methodology of understanding the Quran. The argument is underpinned by Ibn Taymiyya's attempt at deconstructing the epistemic, theological yield and jurisprudential systems developed throughout preceding centuries. Main amongst the epistemic frameworks which the Taymiyyan consciousness attempted at purging was the science of *usul al-fiqh* or the Fundamental Jurisprudential Methodologies whose core function was to extrapolate from the sacred rules of comprehension of the sacred for the purpose of preempting unwarranted and emotive inferences and interpretations of the sacred. In a not so dissimilar way, in his book *Islams and Modernities*, Aziz El-Azmeh seems to be taking from the idiosyncrasy of every ethno-cultural experience that Islam, having been lived in various historical and social contexts, lacks a common essence, and ought not to be essentialized. That said, the work which specifically treats the caliphate

within the context of the relation between Modernity and Islam is Nurulla Ardic's book *Islam and the Politics of Secularism The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century*. (2012). Its basic gist is that the

> relation between Islam and secularism was one of accommodation rather than conflict and accommodation because Islam was the single most important source of legitimation in the modernization process of the Middle East. (Ardic, 2012, preface).

The modernization in the 'Middle East' is distinguished from the modernity of the West on the basis that it was based on accommodation and not confrontation between religion and secularism because Islam was used in informing and legitimating the process of secularization. Perhaps, the main contribution of Ardic's work is the wealth of cases of references to maxims related to the Islamic teachings in warranting 'secular' notions which demonstrates the strength of the presence of the 'Islamic culture' which derives in part from the Islamic teachings. However, establishing those maxims that are related to Islam or claimed to have emanated from the sacred does not, alone, warrant the dismissal of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and Modernity. Additionally, the argument that in Europe's modernization Christianity was not used in informing and legitimating the process of secularization is an unwarranted argument. The fact of the matter is that some formative modernistic works used Christian maxims in informing secularization. John Locke's *Letter on Toleration* published in 1689 is a case in point. In it, Lock, a modernist empiricist, frequently cites biblical texts in validating his propositions in which he objected to the stipulations embedded in Hobbes's *Leviathan* that unitary and homogenous religious identity was a condition precedent of a stable society. For Hegel, "the birth of Christ was the dividing line, the axis of world history." (Bellah and Joas, 2012, p 10). Notwithstanding the fact that Voeglein argued that much of modernity was a revolt of the order which had earlier emerged in Europe, Voeglein argued that much of modernity was in large part a distorted respiritualization as shall be explained in more details. We find this in Hegel where the nation-state was consecrated. To his theorization,

the state is the divine will. The state replaces the Church as the bearer of salvation wherein a people can realize their freedom and catholicity. If the monarch is the personification of the divine will, it is the nation-state that sublates (*aufheben*) religion because it becomes the vehicle for fulfilling the universal element in the human spirit. (Bretherton, 2014, p.228, 229).

Put concisely, like Islam, Christianity, being a source of meaning, was used in legitimating secularization.

Literature on the meaning of the title "caliph" and the functions of the caliph

Crone and Hinds' *Gods Caliphs Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam* concerned itself with exploring how Umayyad Caliphs negotiated the meaning of the concept of caliph, and what jurisdiction they assumed in practice on the basis of being caliphs. The work examines the Caliph's rhetoric and the system of symbolism including coins in unearthing the self-concept of early Umayyad caliphs. The conclusion was that they established themselves as God's direct deputies, not the deputies of the Messenger. From its end, the present study shall seek to ground the Umayyad caliphal behavior in a sufficient analysis of the notion of the caliphate during the preceding periods namely, the period of revelation and the period of the first four caliphs. We will also attempt to sketch the attempt by the eighth Umayyad Caliph Umar Ibn Abd El-Aziz to pragmatically revoke the aforementioned attempt of Umayyad founding caliphs and restore the characterization of the caliph as the deputy of the Messenger and to locate its pedigree in the reign of the first four caliphs.

Literature on the history of Islam-related political thought the theory of the caliphate

Anthony Black's *History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present* is an example of the line of studies that were concerned with surveying central theoretical concepts linked to Islam. The book provides a thorough mapping of expressions of political thought – including conceptions of the caliphate – as of the period of revelation till contemporary Islamism and fundamentalism. We have stated

earlier that a major shift in the theoretical journey of Voegelin was his decision to abandon the discipline of history of ideas. Now adopting a rigid understanding of Voegelin's departure from the discipline and the assessment that it is inadequate would jump to total dismissal of the discipline. On the other hand, a flexible understanding would arrive at the conclusion that the discipline was inadequate *only* in so much as the discernment of a philosophy of history and consciousness - which Voegelin regarded as his personal calling - is concerned. In his chapter entitled "The Experience of limitation Political Form and Science of Law in the Early Writings of Eric Voegelin", Sandro Shignola explains the core difference between the object of the discipline of history of ideas and the object of a philosophy of history and consciousness

> concentrating on human consciousness as the place of the originary experiences of the order (or the disorder) of reality upon which turn all interpretations of the reality of being—and of which, obviously, political and social order represent a simple articulation—Voegelin finds a way of arriving at a philosophy of history emancipated from a superimposed 'continuity'. Only now, with this transition of focus from the 'idea' to the `experience' of reality, expressed by means of the idea time and time again, does Voegelin become fully aware of the necessity of setting aside the project of a history of ideas for the struggle of dedicating himself to a real `philosophical inquiry' into human history." (Hughes, McKnight and Price, 2001, p. 81)

In our assessment, what should be taken from Voegelin shift is that a liberation from the ways of the field history of ideas is a precursor of building a philosophy of history and consciousness. It is a condition precedent of an adequate discernment of consciousness formation. It is a prerequisite for the discernment of the experiences of consciousness, and the manifold yields of those experiences, the tension of existence, the suffering of anxieties that lead to the movement of consciousness away from the metaxy towards the immanent pole or the transcendent pole, and the pursuit of ordering the soul and society. It is also a precursor for a proper mapping of complex intellectual pedigrees of ideas. The lineage of ideas will not be only traced by way of juxtaposing concerned expressions, but more importantly by way of identifying the experiential and intellectual DNA of consciousness and the experiential and intellectual genetic codes running

through generations, and by way of juxtaposing contrastable and comparable experiences that consciousness underwent.

Literature on the Mystery

Whereas the specific topic of the relation between the meaning of the caliphate and the mystery within the context of imperial vicissitudes was not explored, whether the exploration was underpinned in a Voegelinian perspective or not, there is a considerable paucity of contemporary works that specifically examine the question of the mystery in political philosophy and political theory. Heidegger's philosophy of being is a major 20th century negative position towards the mystery, yet which seems to have reinvented, in dismissal of the mystery, theoretical maxims belonging to propositions recognizing the mystery is assessed by some scholars as having employed theoretical maxims belonging. *Heidegger and The Mystery of Being* by Mario Reddan juxtaposes Heidegger's conception of being and its mystery with the conception of the Godhead and its mystery by Eckhart, one of Heidegger's sources of inspiration according to the author. The similarities of some mystery-related maxims seems to be established to warrant the inference that Heidegger's conception was, in part, an existential reincarnation of *some* of the tenets of the quasi-Neoplatonist ethos of his source of Eckhart, noting that in Heidegger, there is no ultimate ground. (Reddan, 2009, 272-280). Gabriel Marcia's Mystery and Being is an attempt at refuting writings that flatly dismiss mystery including *Being and Nothingness* by Jean-Paul Sartre and *The Myth of Sisyphus* by Albert Camus. Near to the death of Voegelin in 1985 and afterwards, interest in the relation between mystery and political philosophy surged. Eugene Web's book *Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History* (1981) is credited with being one of the earliest works in the uncharted path of exploring the intricacies of the Voegelinian conceptualization and theorization of history and the mystery of history. Edited by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper*, Faith and political philosophy: the correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964* (1993) presents a rare philosophical exchange between the two political

philosophers over a range of mystery-related themes. In some of the letters, Voegelin provides his conception of the effect of the Christian spiritual outburst on the Platonic Aristotelian consciousness. (Emberley and Cooper, 2004, p. 9). Other letters tackle the relation between rational propositions and the mystery the relation between rational propositions and the mystery and revelation. As Lee Trepanier explains in his review of the book, for Straus, rational propositions are the yield of an experience which is at variance with the religious experience. Platonic and Aristotelian knowledge is a journey of reason not of faith. Obtainment of knowledge by the philosopher is strictly different from revelation. For Voegelin, rational propositions are but one form of experiencing the divine or the Beyond, which is the one source of a one universal knowledge which may take different forms. (Trepanier, 2006, p.485). As shall be explicated in Chapter One, rational propositions are the fruition of the noetic differentiation of consciousness manifesting in the philosopher. The noetic differentiation is contrasted with the pneumatic differentiation manifesting in the mystical experience. (Webb, 2005, p. 19). Both are an outcome of a participation in the Mystery. *Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin* by Glen Hughes (1993) is one of the few works that are fully devoted to presenting the main principles of the notion of mystery in Voegelin. Yet, the engagement of a few mystery-related Voegelinian theoretical concepts rendered the compass of the treatment narrow, and made the book only intelligible to a small circle of Voegelin specialists. It seems that a lot of thirst for a context would have been quenched by marking the milestones of the undertaking to do without the mystery prior to and during Modernity in response to which the Voegelinian pursuit of retrieving the centrality of the question of mystery in political philosophy and theory came into being. Although much of the modernist paradigm fought the mystery, the latter did not just retreat and reappeared in Voegelin. A comprehensive and integrated genealogy of Voegelin's conceptualiziation of the mystery remains unpacked. Tracing the lineages of Voegelin's thought of the mystery would have grounded it in a history-based theoretical corpus and would have rendered it a normal fruition of an old seed. Citing Plato and Aristotle is not

enough. Finally, the perspectival limitations of the book did not do justice to its central thesis. A world-based perspective would have unearthed that taking aim in mystery was not a modernist idiosyncrasy as conventionally believed and as the reader would extrapolate from the lines of the introduction. The present dissertation shall demonstrate how in zones other than Europe, an inclination to circumvent the question of the mystery acquired definite shape prior to the birth of modernity and grew in history making itself felt in the caliphate theories.

When we look at the state of contemporary scholarship on the caliphate in its entirety, we find that it is largely preoccupied with examining immanently-related caliphate-related conceptions, hence the usefulness of the present study. This study has as one of its task closing the gap resulting from the insufficient exploration of the intricacies of the relation between transcendentally-related and immanently-gravitated caliphate-related conceptions. Mystery-related conceptions, irrespective of this nature, did not cease to be meshed with order-related conception and constitutional conception and to be an integral part of *the political* in the Schmittian sense of the term. They remain a relevant phenomenon worthy of scrutiny.

Importance of the Study

The importance of the study stems from a number of considerations. As Ardic rightly indicates, the concept of the "caliphate" lies at the center of political philosophy in Islam. (Ardic, 2012, p.6). This centrality made the caliphate a compelling subject in different epochs and even at times when the Caliphal seat became vacant. In spite of the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphal seat, as assert Al-Rasheed, Kersten and Shterin

> the concept and vision of the caliphate has outlived the historical polity and today they generate heated more than any other Islamic concept …. A small but growing fringe contemporary political activists openly call for the return of the caliphate as the ideal Islamic state. (Al-Rasheed, Kersten and Shterin, 2012, p. 1, 2).

The study is the first endeavor to underpin a studying a central concept within the political theory related to Islam, namely the caliphate, in the work of the political

philosopher and theorist Eric Voegelin. In academic terms, this had not been attempted so far. The constitutional scrutiny in the study may significantly contribute to the rising effort of constitutionalism worldwide and to building bridges between constitutional cultures. The study is important because the understanding of the meaning of the caliphate which it proposes is hoped to automatically unveil the inadequacies embedded in the understandings held by agents of terrorism, and in turn contribute to ending their kidnapping of the concept in enabling their project of hegemony and dominance.

Structure

Chapter One presents the Voegelinian theoretical perspective on order and sheds a fresh light on Voegelin's theoretical biography. One of the purposes of this chapter is to demystify the set of Voegelinian theoretical concepts that have been selected to be employed in discerning the Message based order, and the relation between the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate and the mystery and imperialism. Another purpose is obtain a sense of the impact of the intellectual milieu in which the Voegleinian thought and philosophy emerged. This exploration is underpinned by the maxim that although a system of ideas would merit standing as a theory should it enjoy an explanatory power of phenomena beyond its present surrounding spatio-temporal reality, putting the theory in context is an essential precursor of a solid grasp and application. Such contextualization is achievable through outlining the contours of the intellectual characteristics of the epoch in which the theoretician lived, and the intellectual milestone which the theoretician passed through. Chapter Two shall endeavor to provide *a* reading of the Message based order which was set during the period of revelation. This reading lays out the main conceptions of that order and the mystery-related elements in those conceptions, and how its system of existential representation was established. The reading is validated by elements from its sources, namely, the Quran and Sunna, and the conduct of the Messenger. Put another way, it is normal to see other different readings of the said order being built and constructed.

Amongst the deciding factors of the accuracy of any reading is its nature and coherence of the validation. Chapter Three looks extensively at the meaning of the caliphate in the foundational caliphal reign of the first four reign and its relation with the mystery. It also looks at the rising of the forces of disorder and deformation. The latter section of this chapter touches on the growth of the imperial tendency, and explicates the dynamics of the emergence of *de facto* embryonic monarchism that would evolve later into an explicit imperial attempt. Chapter Four attempts at unpacking the first line of deformation of the meaning of the concept of the caliphate, and the distortion of MBO grand conceptions, and the mystery. It will discuss four different moments in each of which the caliphal seat undertakes to impel an idiosyncratic imperial agenda in an idiosyncratic imperial milieu. The context of the four cases is one of imperial ascent or imperial floating. Chapter Five attempts at unpacking the second line of deformation of the meaning of the concept of the caliphate, and the distortion of MBO grand conceptions, and the mystery. It will discuss four different moments in each of which the concerned caliphate-related theoretical fabric undertakes to avert total collapse and disintegration and invigorate and reenergize an imperial awakening. The context is one of imperial descend and of an attempt to avoid dissolution and of explicit decline in which the zones living the MBO fell prey to external imperial destructive invasions. The conclusion will include the main findings of the studies.

Chapter One: An exposition of the Voegelinian theoretical perspective

This chapter carves from Voegelin's vast theoretical yield a constellation of tenets that *represent* his theory of order. Special emphasis will be laid on the main theoretical concepts that interest the present study on the caliphate, and that fit its quintessential coordinates and quantitative limitations. In explaining the tenets of Voegelin's theoretical perspective, the chapter will rely on definitions and clarifications provided in Voegelin's own writings, and in most authoritative secondary sources. However, before delving into the depths of the Voegelinian theoretical concepts, it seems in order to shed a fresh light on the epoch in which Voegelin lived and on the main stations of his intellectual journey.

The formative phase of Eric Voegelin (1899-1985), namely the twenties of the twentieth century, was concomitant to a historical moment at which questions about the ramifications of the underpinnings of the modernist paradigm on consciousness began to engross wider interest. The 14th century bore witness to the birth of a new consciousness embracing a set of new paradigmatic conceptions that were formulated within the context of, as Voegelin argues, an intellectual revolt "against the symbols inherited from the Ecumenic Age." (Keulman, 1990, p. 146). At the core of the paradigmatic conceptions lied a conception of an accentuated human being who is conceived is *the* center within the context of asserting the mundane reality at the detriment of, or the exclusion of, transcendence, and within the context of claims of original human sovereignty, full human self-sufficiency, full human autonomy, and human full self-determination. This conception was manifested in the Cartesian maxim "I think therefore I am" or *cogeto ergo sum* (AD 1596-1650). The worldview comprising those conceptions became known as humanism. The second essential conception amongst those paradigmatic conceptions was a unique multi-dimensional conception of epistemology. Central to this conception was an infatuation with the yields of scientific discoveries. The attention of thinkers speculating on human phenomena was engrossed by the interest of arriving at a level of

certainty which would be equal to the certainty obtained by scientists applying empiricist methods. Hence the attempt to see no borders separating natural phenomena from human phenomena. Whereas empirical research is over-emphasized, "cognitive significance is restricted to verification by means of scientific observation." (Sankey, 2012, p. 20). Also central to this conception is the over-emphasis laid to the human senses and experience in the quest of obtaining knowledge. The understanding of reality should be sought and validated within the natural realm alone. According to Francis Bacon (AD 1561-1626),

> Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature. Beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything. (Sargent, 1999, p. 89).

In other words, "natural Science alone is capable of providing a true account of reality." (Calcaterra, 2011, p. 22). The worldviews comprising those conceptions became known as positivism and scientism. The third essential conception formulated by the modernist consciousness was a conception of time and history which is underpinned by a unilinear idea of history as inexorable progress towards freedom and improvement (Claus and Marriott, 2014, p. 75) which entails conceiving of the epochs preceding the age of modernity as inferior. This conception is so vivid in Marx's determinism, and in Montesquieu's conception of the ancient as inferior within the context of venerating the "present moment" which was captured by Pierre Manent in his book *City of Man*,

> the primary intent of *the Spirit of the Laws* is … to weaken decisively the authority of the Ancient, of the idea of the "best regime", the idea of virtue, in order to replace it with the authority of the "present moment", of the modern experience, summed up in the notions of "commerce" and "liberty". (Manent, 2000, p. vii).

The worldview comprising those conceptions became known as progressivism. On the predominantly structural level, the struggle over sovereignty in what is today Europe gave birth to a new kind of political structure, namely the state which later became known as the "nation-state". The state was the outcome of a complex struggle over sovereignty and jurisdiction between many parties. Emperors began to seek

independence from even the symbolic subordination to the papacy. The assertion emanating from the crowning by Leo III of Charlemagne became an obliging precedent. Princes and kings also sought to assert themselves at the expense of the Papacy and the Roman Emperor. One essential subject matter of the conflict was the pursuit of independence by the followers of Protestantism, Anabaptism and Calvinism. At an early moment, the confrontation between Pope Calixtus II (r 1119-1124 AD) (d 1124 AD) and Henry II (1114-1124 AD), the 4th Holy Roman Emperor of the Ottonian (Saxon) Dynasty, which culminated in the Concordat of Worms (1122) at Worm, yielded incipient conceptions of political independence from the papacy. Confrontations between the Schmalkaldic League which was established by Lutheran Kings in 1531 and Charles V (r 1519-1556 AD) the Holy Roman Emperor, King of Germany, and King of Italy, culminated in the emergence of the solution of recognizing the sovereignty of kings and princes. It also resulted in the recognition of the premise that the denomination of the king is the basis of the membership of the constituency within his dominion. The principle of *cuis region eius religio* or "whose realm whose religion" was approved in the Treaty of Augsburg of 1555. (White, 2007, p. 140). The pressured migration resulting from the application of the principle led to cutting large numbers of families and individuals from their natural and traditional formations which led to widespread individualization and alienation. That being the case, "modernity" became the name used to express an essentialization of the aforementioned paradigmatic conceptions and the structural developments inextricably linked to them. With the passage of centuries, this consciousness gained a grand epochal consciousness, which may be named the modernist consciousness. That being the case, after the passage of roughly six centuries, a sharp uncertainty emerged in relation to some of the essential elements of the modernist paradigm. The sense of uncertainty became pervasive on the structural level as claims for the responsibility of main underpinnings of the modernist nation-state, namely exclusionist nationalism and ideology, for the great frequency of war and debilitating destruction were pronounced especially after WWI. The crisis of identity

resulting from sharp ethnic and national divisions was reflected, *inter alia*, in the literary works of Franz Kafka (1883-1924 AD). As explained by literary scholar Vivian Liska in her book *When Kafka Says We: Uncommon Communities in German-Jewish Literature*. (2009). The sense of uncertainty became pervasive on other essential elements of the modernist paradigm. As Paul Gillen and Devleena Ghosh explain in *Colonialism & Modernity*,

> By the mid nineteenth century, belief in progress became ubiquitous in the Western world. It remained so until the early to mid 20th century when it began to be displaced by "growing doubts and anxieties about modernity. (Gillen and Gosh, 2007, p. 33).

Subsequent to the decline of the progressivist worldview was the rise of a new wave of re-exploring history and its relation with the notion of political structuring and public association. This wave appeared in the writings of Karl Jaspers (1883-1969 AD) the author of many books including *The Origin and Goal of History*, and in the writings of Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975 AD), and the propositions of Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) the author of many books including *A study of History*, and in the writings of Leo Strauss (1899-1973 AD) the author of many books including *Natural Right and History.* On a another plane, norms of philosophizing that were informed by certain essential elements of the modernist paradigm, and that attempted, at the same time, not to center themselves on other essential elements of the modernist paradigm emerged. This includes existentialism wherein the centrality of the human being stayed as an essential element. Yet, while the centrality of raising epistemological questions was replaced in existentialism by the centrality of temporality and experience (Malpas, 2008, p. 96), the inherent modernist "epistemological doubt", as explains Douwe Fokkema, literary scholar, in *International Postmodernism: Theory and Literary Practice*

> broadens into moral doubts and ontological anxiety. In existentialism, the point of no return is reached. Suicide is a much discussed and sometimes practiced option. (Bertens, Bertens, and Fokkema, 1997, p. 21).

Put differently, certain inherent features of some of modernity's core fields of inquiry reinvented themselves in the new norms of philosophizing and paradigms continuing to generate ontological discomposure. In another track, Edmund Husserl (AD 1859-1938) laid emphasis on taking things and phenomena as objects of consciousness (subject) "regardless of the region or category of being to which it belongs". (Kockelmans, 1994, p. 124). According to Husserl, that things and phenomena are objects of consciousness was the indubitable apodictic certainty one may arrive at in the Cartesian subject-object schema. (Hermberg, 2006, 45-46). This orientation became a discipline or a practice known as phenomenology. Wanting to avoid the influence of "misconstructions and impositions", phenomenology hoped

> to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experiencer. (Moran, 2002, p. 4).

Accordingly, it would be normal for a historical moment like the one at which Voegelin's formative thought cropped up, and for the surrounding intellectual and political milieu, to be expecting new attempts at theorizing in areas on which he would eventually focus. It was normal to expect new theories in relation to the nature and structure of consciousness, epistemology, history, and ordering. It was normal to expect a reassessment of the epochal consciousness which was entering into a phase of decay. In addition to the scholars mentioned above, this specific trait of the historical moment and the surrounding milieu seems to have been recognized by other multiple thinkers including Hanna Arendt, Leo Straus, and Eric Voegelin. As Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper indicate in *Faith and political philosophy: the correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964*,

> Both thinkers shared the conviction that the internal unraveling of modern philosophy had made possible a renewal of the experience of thinking and a direct encounter with reality, unmediated by centuries of preoccupation with formular manifestations of a genuine philosophic quest. (Emberley and Cooper, 2004, p. xvii).

It also seems that the idiosyncratic nature of the German epochal modernist consciousness, and the extremely high political and constitutional volatility which it has experienced, has contributed to making the areas of the Voegelinian inquiry pique the interest of a number of German scholars. Protestantism was founded in Germany by Martin Luther (1483-1546). The Westphalian mode of political ordering and structuring was first experienced by the German consciousness. Some of the most pivotal philosophical propositions and literary works of modernity during all its sub-epochs were formulated by German writers. The very long list include Emanuele Kant (1724-1804 AD), Johann Wolfgang (von) Goethe (1749-1832 AD), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860 AD), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1870-1831 AD), Karl Marx (1818-1883 AD), Fredric Nietzsche (1844-1900 AD), Edmund Husserl (AD 1859-1938 AD) and Max Weber (1864-1920 AD). Structurally, between the 14th century and the post WWII period, the German consciousness experienced different politico-constitutional systems with different public orders, the experience being inclusive of tremendously sharp swings and intense frequent fluctuations in terms of stability, mission in history, ideology and geopolitical reality. Many transitions from one system to another were the furthest thing from smooth. Following an exceptional imperial rise to prominence regionally and globally, both the post Versailles and the post WWII transitions, particularly, entailed exceptionally painful measures imposed by crushing imperial interventions. So, it was normal for a political milieu hosting such an epochal consciousness to expect attempts at theorizing, philosophizing and metaphilosophizing in general, and attempts at formulating new insights on political philosophy, political theory, sociological theory, ordering, constitutionalism, and systems of governance in particular. It was normal for it to expect assessments of the experienced historical structures including the nation-state, and assessments of political phenomena related to it including totalitarian political partism and exclusionist nationalism. It is in this light that we may further nuance our understanding of the phenomenon of the emergence of a large number of sophisticated German philosophers theoreticians who filled thousands of pages with ideas on such

topics in a relatively short period of time. The very long list includes Martin Heidegger (1989-1976 AD), Carl Jaspers (1983-1969 AD), Erich Unger (1887-1950 AD), Heinrich Blucher (1899-1970 AD), Carl Schmitt (1888-1985 AD), Leo Straus (1899-1973 AD), Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969 AD), Hanna Arendt (1906-1975 AD), and Eric Voegelin (1899-1985 AD).

Voegelin's theory of order is an outcome of a long journey of writing which culminated in bouquet of sophisticated books. In 1922, Voegelin received his doctorate in law under the supervision of Hans Kelsen, a positivist legal theorist. A Rockefeller grant allowed him to study in the United States from 1924 to 1927. There, he became interested in exploring the idiosyncrasies of the American idea of law and philosophy, having been introduced to the philosophy of William James and George Santayana. He grouped his findings in his first book, *On the Form of the American Spirit* (1929). He also attended some of the lectures of John Dewey and Alfred Whitehead. After returning to Vienna, Voegelin served as an instructor at the University of Vienna. There he taught literary works such as James Joyce's Ulysses, and was interested in the writings of Paul Valéry. Between 1936 and 1938, he served as secretary of the Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, set up under the League of Nations (1936-1938). In 1936, Voegelin published his books, *Race and State and The Idea of Race in the History of Ideas*. The interplay between race and the state was a major subject especially during the thirties and especially in Germany and Austria given the adoption by Hitler and the third Reich of a racist ideology. In 1936, Voegelin published his book, *The Authoritarian State an Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State*. The book contains a theoretical politico/constitutional dimension wherein it explores the meaning of the concepts of the "total state" and the "authoritarian". It contains an applied constitutional dimension where in it analyzes the Austrian constitution. Voegelin's writings on authoritarianism and totalitarianism enraged the Nazi regime. Accordingly, like some other German scholars including Erich Unger, Heinrich Blucher, Hanna Arendt, and Leo Straus, Voegelin had to escape from the Nazis. So, in 1938 he fled to Switzerland. There, he embarked on

writing *The Political Religion*. Settling in the United States, he taught at Harvard, and later
at Louisiana State University where he taught for sixteen years. During this period,
Voegelin began to write a series on the history of ideas. Upon starting, he found out that
tracing ideas in history beyond a context of scrutinizing existing order was inadequate.
That what stirred his project *Order and History*. During the following years, Voegelin
would issue three volumes, namely *The Israelites and Revelation*, *The World of the Polis*,
and *Plato and Aristotle*. Voegelin obtained American citizenship in 1944. In 1952,
Voegelin published six of the lectures that he delivered in the University of Chicago in
critiquing modernity under the title *The New Science of Politics*. In 1958, Voegelin
returned to Germany to serve as the director of the Institute of Political Science at the
University of Munich. In 1966, he published *Anamnesis*. In their article *The Challenges of
Voegelin* Glenn Hughes and Frederick Lawrence describe the special significance of
Anamnesis in Voegelin's journey:

> inclusive of series of technically exacting essays developing a nuanced ontology of
> consciousness, employing a set of carefully chosen explanatory terms upon which
> Voegelin relied in all of his later writings. (Hughes and Lawrence, 1995, p.408).

Upon the passage of nearly 17 years as of the publication of the first three volumes of
Order and History, Voegelin published the forth volume of the series which is *The
Ecumenic Age*. In it, he provided new major insights of his theory of order and revised
and corrected some components of his theory of order in history. Voegelin declined from
implementing his intention to produce "*The Protestant Centuries*, but instead he
published *In Search of Order*. According to Hughes and Lawrence, this book:

> refines both the theoretical formulation of Voegelin's theory of consciousness
> and the interpretive principles of his philosophy of history, while its second half
> carries these refinements into a series of complex and provocative reflections on
> historical themes-German Idealism and Hegel, Hesiod's Theogōny, Plato's
> Timaeus-that advance Voegelin's efforts to determine what types of symbols
> adequately represent consciousness and reality. (Hughes and Lawrence, 1995, p.
> 409).

Finding the mission of healing the German consciousness from the scars left on it by the horrors of Nazism, Voegelin designed and delivered a series of lectures in Munich in 1964 on the subject of the rise of Hitler and the Nazi which he viewed as "the central German experiential problem" (Clemens, and Purcell, 1999 p. 51, 52) and its ramifications and the way towards consciousness restoration. The lectures were later published as *Hitler and the Germans* offers. In the lecture entitled "The Greatness of Max Weber", we see Voegelin using the intellectual position of Max Weber as an eloquent testimony of how a restored recognition of transcendence immunized his consciousness from falling prey to the tenets of the unhealthy culture in which the rise of Hitler was possible. Somewhat this diagnosis by Voegelin of Max Weber counterbalanced his critique of Max Weber which was the subject of his earlier lectures that were published as *The New Science of Politics*. Finally, Voegelin's own intellectual journey was the subject of a series of interviews conducted with him entitled Conversations with Eric Voegelin. Parts of those interviews were later published as *Autobiographical Reflections*. Voegelin died in 1985.

Looking at the works of Voegelin under the light of context of his own life and under the light of the intellectual context which surrounded him would further nuance our appreciation of their significance. A few observations should suffice. First, in the editor's introduction to *Modernity Without Restraint*, Manfred Henningsen attracts the attention of the reader to significance of not overlooking the impact of "the experiential background that motivated his theoretical analysis". (Henningsen, 2000, p. 4). In so doing, Henningsen observes how much of Voegelin's writings that comprised The New Science of Politics and his "theoretical" critique of modernity was heavily informed by his German experience, and how many of the cases discussed were related to the German experience. We fully agree with Henningsen. Nonetheless, we think that the heavy "German ambiance" (Henningsen, 2000, p. 4) is also attributable to the idiosyncrasy of the epochal German political and the exceptional political and constitutional volatility to which we alluded earlier. That said, many of Voegelin's works intersected with the works and propositions of the aforementioned scholars of his age. Some included analysis of

the same subject and phenomenon. Accordingly, his analysis and their analysis on the same subject would constitute an essential component of a newly emerging literature on the subject in question. For example, as we shall see later, like Hanna Arendt, one of the areas which piqued Voegelin's interest was diagnosing modernist totalitarian parties especially the Nazi experience, though each tackled the subject in an idiosyncratic manner. Like Leo, Straus, one of the areas which piqued Voegelin's interest was interpreting Plato and Aristotle and reengaging their philosophy. Voegelin's criticism of modernity intersected with criticism voiced by scholars who offered a deconstruction of essential modernist tenets yet reinvigorated others. As Henningsen explains, this applies to the criticism by founders of the Frankfurt School Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno appearing in their book *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1947). (Henningsen, 2000, p. 4). Voeglein's diagnosis of "the spiritual disorder of our time, the civilizational crisis of which everyone so readily speaks" (Henningsen, 2000, p. 261) represented an automatic refutation of Heidegger's existentialism, and of mid 20th century existential nihilism. Many aspects of Voegelin's own philosophy of the metaxy-living consciousness reflected phenomenological protocols. It should be noted that in his correspondence with Leo Straus, Voegelin confirmed his exceptional appreciation of Husserl's essay on philosophy regarding it as "a grandiose piece of work". (Emberely and Cooper, 2004, p. 19). Yet, he recorded his objection to the assumption that "the problem of epistemology (is) the cardinal problem of philosophy. What he found missing in the article "was a foundation of his (Husserl) phenomenology in the larger context of a metaphysical system". (Emberely and Cooper, 2004, p. 19).

For Voegelin, the *metaxy*-living human consciousness which is in continual experiencing of the tension of existence is the unique reality which indulges into participating in the mystery, constitute the core of human ordering on the individual level and the collective level. For Voegelin,

> Consciousness is reality, but it is not one of the realities that the cosmic primary experience discerned in the encompassing reality. Consciousness is the

experience of participation, participation of man in his ground of being. In the optimum luminosity of the noetic experience it is, then, knowledge of a relation between the things of the primary experience; and in its full meaning, it is a knowledge of order concerning reality. The noetic knowledge of relationship, however, is not the type of knowledge of the natural sciences, observing things "from without," but the experience of a relation "from within." The relationship is experienced through the reality of living within it. Since "things," in this case man, do not cease to be what they are as they experience life within the relationship, life within the relationship belongs also to the objective reality of the thing. More yet: Since the relationship is participation in the ground of being, the ground of being, insofar as it can be experienced, extends into the reality of man. As we move in the relationship in meditation, and linguistically express our movements, we speak also of the realities that participate in each other and express insights into them. Knowledge of participation be-comes knowledge of man and of his ground. (Voegelin, 1990, p. 175).

So, consciousness is a unique reality which mediates in relating the human being to all reality. As Michael Morrissey puts it in explaining Voegelin, "it is by our consciousness that we are able to participate in and know reality". (Morrissey, 1994, p. 247). It is to this function that the fundamentality of consciousness in indebted, and it is this function which renders consciousness "the foundational starting point". (Morrissey, 1994, p. 247). It is the mediation in relating the human being to all reality which Michael Morrissey meant when he continued to explain Voegelin's understanding by saying that "consciousness is the in-between reality of participatory experience." (Morrissey, 1994, p. 247). This is so because, as Eugene Web explains, the human being is constantly magnetized by an immanent pole and a transcendent pole. This magnetization renders the human experience of existence a "Between" (translating the Greek *metaxy*), "that is, between the two poles." (Webb, 2005, p. 18). The human condition experiences this bi-polarization "as a tension, especially of longing for what is *Beyond* or being pulled by it." (Webb, 2005, p. 18). The "ground" here connotes divine reality. Webb explains the term "ground" in Voegelin by saying it is

that upon which something is founded. In the sense of the `divine ground,' Voegelin uses it to refer to the supreme, undefinable, transcendent reality which may be considered either as the source or origin (arche) of both the world and

the metaxy or as `the Beyond' that forms existence by drawing it into participation. (Webb, 1981, p. 282).

The tension of existence to which the human being is continuously subjected is the outcome of the bi-polar magnetization. According to Webb, the tension of existence is

the fundamental experience of longing for transcendental fulfillment, the Beyond, the *summum bonum*. (Webb, 1981, p. 288).

In explaining what they referred to as "Voegelin's theory of consciousness" in their article entitled *The Challenge of Eric Voegelin*, Glenn Hughes and Frederick Lawrence, provide us with the following definition of consciousness" which is telling how congenital and pivotal the tension of existence to consciousness in Voegelin is:

Consciousness is not an entity in the manner of physical objects, but rather a "tension" of awareness, questioning and understanding-a tension ultimately oriented by its desire for deepening participation in the very "ground" that is the cause of its existence. (Hughes and Lawrence, 1995, p. 405-406).

In his book *Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin*, Glenn Hughes elaborates further on this nature of consciousness cautioning from taking Voegelin's consciousness to mean a coalition or a coadunation between things divine and things human. He argues that

consciousness is not exclusively human. Or rather, what is human about consciousness is precisely that it transcends its mere humanity through conscious participation in the ultimate formative origin of its own existence, its own divine ground. Following a formulation of Plato's consciousness is something like a divine-human *metaxy*, or in-between. It is an intermediate area of reality, in-between the temporal and the timeless, constituted as a questioning and knowing awareness in-between ignorance and knowledge. It is not a *merging* of the human and divine, but the place of their interplay, where a derived, created being suffers a degree of participatory creativity insofar as it is one with the origin out of which it realizes it has emerged. 'The In-Between of existence is ... the meeting-ground of the human and the divine in a consciousness of their distinction and interpenetration.' [Voegelin, 'On Hegel: a study in sorcery"] It must not be thought that Voegelin is attempting to divinize humanity outright. On the contrary, his emphasis is always upon the limitations of human knowledge and power. (Hughes, 1993, p. 28-29). (See Rhodes, 2003).

As far as the mystery is concerned, Voegelin's definition of it was explained in the introduction. Let us add Hughes's general definition of mystery which seems to be inspired from Voegelin's conception of mystery.

> while mystery is emphatically an existential notion, it remains also a cognitional notion. It refers to something human knowing is aware of, but cannot comprehend; a known unknown. (Hughes, 1993, p. 3).

The tension of existence and the mystery renders the *metaxy*-living consciousness in a state of openness and propels it towards a pursuit of participation. According to Webb, openness is

> the mode of existence in which consciousness is consistently and unreservedly oriented toward truth and toward the transcendental pole of tension of existence. (Webb, 1981, p. 285).

Web explains his understanding of Voegelin's usage of the platonic concept of participation by saying that it

> refers to sharing the qualities of a supreme exemplar, in which they are present in their perfection. In 'participation in being' being is an analogical term with varying degrees of applicability; it describes existence in the metaxy as a condition between higher and lower degrees of reality. (Webb, 1981, p. 285).

In his forward to his book *Anamnesis* Voeglein established the

> The problems of human order in society and history originate in the order of consciousness. The philosophy of consciousness is therefore the core of a philosophy of politics. (Sandoz, 1982, p. 105). [1]

This metaxy-living consciousness experiences a two-track ordering. The first ordering is divine ordering. The *metaxy*-living consciousness finds itself a subject of ordering by truth being an orienting force while simultaneously pursuing, from its end, a process of ordering. The second is human ordering. Consciousness finds itself the subject

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[1] Whereas the quotation appears in many secondary sources that cite *Anamnesis*, it does not appear in the English translation of Anamnesis (Edition 1987) which is used in this study. Most probably, it appears in the original work written in German.

of ordering by truth, the latter being understood as *summum bonum*. In

Autobiographical Reflections, Voegelin says

> The revelation of truth to man in history occurs in two fundamental modes of
> experience: in the mode of the Beginning with its experience of divine creativity
> in the cosmos; and in the mode of the Beyond with its experience of the divine
> ordering presence in the soul. (Sandoz, 2006, p. 225).

This Voegelinian conception finds its origin in the Socratic-Platonic conception of truth

which Voegelin had earlier pointed to in Volume III of *Order and History* entitled *Plato*

and Aristotle:

> Truth is not a body of propositions about a world-immanent object; it is the
> world-transcendent *summum bonum* experienced as an orienting force in the
> soul, about which we can speak only in analogical symbols. (Franz, 2000, p. 418).

As an outcome of the tension, and an expression of the participation, the *metaxy*-living

consciousness pursues a process of ordering by way of "attuning" to a conceived greater

order. As Voegelin illustrates in *Autobiographical Reflections*,

> by *order* is meant the structure of reality as experienced as well as the
> attunement of man to an order that is not of his making--i.e., the cosmic order.
> (Sandoz, 2006, p. 171).

Ordering is an outcome of conceiving the qualities of the *summum bunum* as of an order,

and an outcome of the desire to share the "order" of the qualities of the *summum*

bunum given that participation is "sharing the qualities of a supreme exemplar", and that

ordering is motivated by participation. One of the applications of this pursuit is that

consciousness perceives itself as representative of transcendental truth.[2] In summation,

the emergence of the order of the soul and the order of the society is a phenomenon

which is born out of the womb of

> the tension of God seeking man, and man seeking God—the mutuality of seeking
> and finding one another—the meeting between man and the Beyond of his heart.
> Since God is present even in the confusion of the heart, preceding and motivating

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[2] A detailed explanation of the meaning of transcendental representation shall be furnished
below.

the search itself, the divine Beyond is at the same time a divine Within. (Franz, 2000, p. 398).

Voegelin's theorization of the concept of the metaxy-living consciousness, the inherent mystery, and its participation in the mystery through ordering, and the relevant sub-concepts is a crucial in enabling multiple axial understandings. First and foremost, it will be crucial to identifying the elements of mystery in the conceptions of order which will in turn enable building what we call the system of mystery. It will be crucial to discerning the inner ordering and the collective ordering which the Message induced. It will be crucial to identifying forms of distortion of mystery and distinguishing them from forms of participation. Likewise, it will be crucial to identifying forms of avoidance from the mystery. It will help in diagnosing how both constitute a movement away from the metaxy.

Ordering as a form of participation by the metaxy-living consciousness is guided by the recognition of a system of transcendental representation. Voegelin distinguished the type of representation by the entirety of society of an amalgam of supreme conceptions of the grand truths of the society, which a society seeks to represent, to live, and to sustain and which inform the constituting of the society. He termed this type "transcendental representation". In *The New Science of Politics*, Voegelin explains that the order of early empires was constructed on the assumption that the empires were representatives of a transcendental order. He says:

> All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as Far Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a transcendent order, of the order of the cosmos, and some of them even understood this order as a "truth." Whether one turns to the earliest Chinese sources in the Shu King or to the inscriptions of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, or Persia, one uniformly finds the order of the empire interpreted as a representation of the cosmic order in the medium of human society. The empire is a cosmic analogue, a little world reflecting the order of the great, comprehensive world. Rulership becomes the task of securing the order of society in harmony with cosmic order, the territory of the empire is an analogical representation of the world with its four quarters, the great ceremonies of the empire represent the rhythm of the cosmos, festival and sacrifices are a cosmic

liturgy, a symbolic participation of the cosmion in the cosmos, and the ruler himself represents the society, because on Earth, he represents the transcendent power that maintains cosmic order. The term "cosmion", thus, gains a new component of meaning as the representative of the cosmos. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 130-131).

Voegelin clarifies how order is challenged by opposite forces. He says:

Inevitably, such an enterprise of representative order is exposed to resistance from enemies within and without, and the ruler is no more than a human being and may fail through circumstances or mismanagement, with the result of internal revolutions and external defeats. The experience of resistance, of possible or actual defeat now, is the occasion on which the meaning of truth comes into clear view. In so far as the order of society does not exist automatically but must be founded, preserved, and defended, those who are on the side of order represent the truth, while their enemies represent disorder. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 131).

"The enemy is discovered to be the representative of the Lie." (Henningsen, 2000, p. 137).

Ordering as a form of participation by the metaxy-living consciousness is guided by the recognition of existential truth or *aletheia*. In *participating*, consciousness recognizes an existential truth or *aletheia*. Webb defines *aletheia* as a

truth, that which is `unhidden' or `uncovered.' In Voegelin, especially `lived' truth, existential truth, the experienced manifestness of 'existential consciousness`.' Equivalent to episteme. (Webb, 1981, p. 227).

Finally, in *participating*, the collective consciousness recognizes an *idea directrice*. It is an animating idea which summarizes the conception of the collective consciousness of its spatial and temporal coordinates and of its mission in history.

As Voegelin clarifies

The nucleus of such an institution will be the idea, the *idea directrice*, of realizing and expanding it and of increasing its power, and the specific function of the ruler is the conception of this idea and its realization in history. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 126).

The institution is successfully perfected when the ruler has become subordinate to the idea and when at the same time the *consentement coutumier* of the

members is achieved. To be representative means to guide, in ruling position, the work of realizing the idea through institutional embodiment, and the power of a ruler has authority in so far as he is able to make his factual power representative of the idea. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 126).

In ordering, inextricably linked to the recognition of the system of transcendental representation is the establishment of a system of existential representation. Existential representation is the type of representation which relates to representing the society as political society which is ready for action in history. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 50-64). An existential representative is a person who is able to commit the society by her/his/its actions taken on behalf of the collective human body. Ideally, existential representation is properly fulfilled when the authority abides by, and realizes, the guiding idea, or what Maurice Hauriou called the *idea directrice*, which informs the life and action of the body politque. That said, the existential representatives of the collective human body and the members of the collective human body indulge in articulation or the process of constituting and structuring into a body politic. Voegelin specifically defines articulation as "the process in which human beings form themselves into a society for action." (Henningsen, 2000, p. 117). Articulation is achieved, *inter alia*, as a result of the initiatives of the ruling power who sees the first step of its quest the unification of the polity:

> The first task of a ruling power is the creation of a politically unified nation by transforming the pre-existent, unorganized manifold into a body organized for action. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 126).

Upon the basic articulation of the society, the notion of elemental representation gains definite shape. Elemental representation is the third type of representation which Voegelin distinguished and which relates to "outward forms by virtue of which all societies develop institutions which represent the various strata of society" (Hoye, 2003, No pagination) and which attempt to provide for basic defense and, in various ways, for the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of government as Timothy Hoye clarifies in his article entitled "Elemental and

Existential Representation in the Constituting of Modern Japan". This level of representation does not raise a problematic pertaining to the self-interpretation of the society. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 114). Timothy Hoye continues to explain by saying that,

> scholars who study electoral processes, redistricting procedures, institutional checks and balances, voting behavior, party competition, and the like are examining the particular dynamics involved in elemental representation, in Voegelin's distinction. (Hoye, 2003, No Pagination).

To state the obvious, elemental representation does not exhaust the problem of representation. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 115). The election of a representative does not, alone, ensures the realization of the quintessence of the notion of representation. A representative or the representing institution such as political parties may fulfil such essence or dissipate it. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 116). In summation, consciousness drives the members of the society to articulate "for the sake of representation of truth" (Rhodes, 1992, p. 647), and for the sake of living an existential truth and realizing an *idea directrice*.

That said, the theoretical concepts expressing the three types of representation are crucial to the present study in many ways. First, they will crystalize the different representation-related capacities and powers invested in the caliphs, the imam or the existentially powerful emir. They will crystalize how conceptions related to the system of transcendental representation, including conceptions related to the system of mystery, were manipulated by caliphs and theoreticians in order to solidify the existential status of the caliph and his existential representation. The theoretical concept of transcendental representation will be crucial for discerning the essential conceptions of order that the Message stipulated that the believers would be representing. Also, the Voegelinian distinction between elemental representation and existential representation shall be crucial for distinguishing aspects of representation within distinguishable frameworks of representation that seem, prima fascia of similar nature.

The double-track ordering of the *metaxy*-based consciousness yields on two levels. The first level is the level of human internality where an "order of the soul" is established. The second level is the level of human externality where an "order of society", taking inspiration from the order of the soul" is established. As Morrissey summarizes in explaining Voeglein's conception of ordering, "the order of human existence in history and society originates in the order of human consciousness." (Morrissey, 1994, p. 247).

The articulated collective of bearers of a *metaxy*-based consciousness upholding a system of representation recognizes a constellation of symbols through which the society lives the truths that it represents, and deciphers and grasps the meaning of its existence. Voegelin defines symbol as a mysterious expression also born within the context of the participation out of the womb of the *metaxy* character of consciousness. In *Autobiographical Reflections*, Voegelin says:

> the language phenomena engendered by the process of participatory experience. The language symbols expressing an experience are not inventions of an immanentist human consciousness; rather, they are engendered in the process of participation itself. Language, therefore, participates in the *mataxy* character of consciousness. A symbol is neither a human conventional sign signifying a reality outside consciousness nor, as in certain theological constructions, a word of God conveniently transmitted in the language the recipient can understand. It is engendered by the divine-human encounter and participates, therefore, as much in divine as in human reality. (Sandoz, 2006, p. 74).

The society, Voegelin explains,

> is illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 109).

It is the system of symbolism which shall serve as the vehicle which shall allow the society to fathom that meaning, to translate its understanding of the world around it, and of itself. Additionally, it is the vehicle which allows the theorist to understand the society. According to Voegelin,

The society is illuminated through an elaborate symbolism, in various degrees of compactness and differentiation-from rite, through myth, to theory-and the symbolism illuminates it with meaning in so far as the symbols make the internal structure of such a cosmion, the relations between its members and groups of members, as well as its existence as a whole, transparent for the mystery of human existence. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 109).

Voegelin regards the system of symbols as an essential part of social reality. In other words, although symbols represent a unique framework of expression, one that is different from common language, they are not to be perceived as a sheer mythological output, or as non-germane to actual life or human essence. Voegelin explains by saying:

The self-illumination of society through symbol is an integral part of social reality, and one may even say its essential part, for through such symbolization the members of the society experience it as a more than an accident or a convenience, they experience it as of their human essence. And inversely the symbols reflect the experience that man is fully man by virtue of his participation in a whole that transcends his particular existence, by virtue of his participation in the xynon, the common, as Heraclitus called it, the first Western thinker who differentiated this concept. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 109-110).

As a consequence every human society has an understanding of itself through a bouquet of symbols, sometimes highly differentiated language symbols, independent of political science and such self-understanding precedes historically by millenniums the emergence of political science, of episteme politikie in the Aristotelian sense. Hence, when political science begins, it does not begin with a tabula rasa on which it can inscribe its concepts. It will inevitably start from the rich body of self-interpretation of a society, and proceed preexisting critical clarification symbols socially. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 109-110).

The "system of symbolism" embraced by the society serves as a vehicle of understanding of the society's externality and internality, and serves as a coded expression of its conception of order. Hence, a true theory of politics, according to Voegelin, must be primarily concerned with exploring the role of symbols within the system of representation. It must explore what symbols are at work and how they make themselves felt while the process of self-interpretation is being carried out. Studying the system of symbolism permits "an exploration of the symbols by which political societies

interpret themselves as representatives of transcendent truth". (Henningsen, 2000, p.88).

Consciousness, and all its yields and expressions are born in history in a state of compactness from which they advance in time to differentiation. Consciousness, conceptions, symbols, intellectual propositions, and societal phenomena emerge as intense formations ready for action in history. They immediately begin to manifest in history in variations. Voegelin confirms the occurrence in history of

> epochal, differentiating events, the "leaps in being," which engendered the consciousness of a Before and After and, in their respective societies, motivated the symbolism of a historical "course" that was meaningfully structured by the event of the leap. The experiences of a new insight into the truth of existence, accompanied by the consciousness of the event as constituting an epoch in history, were real enough. There was really an advance in time from compact to differentiated experiences of reality and, correspondingly, an advance from compact to differentiated symbolizations of the order of being. (Franz, 2000, p. 46).

The human consciousness undergoes noetic and pneumatic differentiations in response to the uncertainties resulting and mysteries resulting from that bi-gravitation, and in striving for an equilibrium. The noetic differentiation which is the rational or intellectual differentiation manifests in the Philosopher who "experiences questioning as a seeking and being drawn by potentially knowable truth." (Web, 2005, p. 19). On the other hand, the pneumatic differentiation which is the spiritual differentiation manifests in the mystic "experiences the soul's longing as a seeking and being drawn by the divine." (Web, 2005, p. 19). As Voegelin explains in the Ecumenic Age, "…the structure of a theophanic experience reaches from a pneumatic center to a noetic periphery." (Franz, 2000, p. 309). Eugene Webb elaborates by saying that,

> In both differentiations it is the same Beyond, the same pole of the tension of seeking and being drawn. The difference is only in the way the philosopher or the mystic relates to it. One relates to it through questioning, the other through prayer. (Webb, 2005, p. 19).

Voegelin's theoretical concept of the differentiation of consciousness and the advancement of consciousness and its expressions from the state of compactness into the state of differentiation is crucial for understanding the unfolding and continuation of many of the Caliphate-related theoretical concepts and phenomena. Put differently, it allows the study to identify if there are lineage relations between concepts and practices across successive caliphal epochs, and to pinpoint which concept was a foundational concept and which was a variation, and, possibly, which was a second variation. This will enable identifying the complex theoretical pedigree of certain caliphate-related concepts and conceptual practices. As an advancement on Voegelin, should the essence shared by the differentiation and the compact origin, or by the differentiation and the preceding differentiation be in a state of flowering, the study will call that differentiation an "ascending differentiation". Should the essence shared by the differentiation and the compact origin, or by the differentiation and the preceding differentiation be in a state of petering out, the study will call that differentiation a "descending differentiation". Voegelin's concept, and the study's advancement of it, will enable the identification of the point at which a consciousness and the concepts and practices it generated were born, the point at which they began to ascend, and the point at which their ascension reached its acme, and the point at which their decent reached its nadir.

While responding to the magnetization by the immanent pole and the transcendental pole and the tension of existence, the *metaxy*-based consciousness finds itself facing the challenge of maintaining balance. Hughes provide us with a definition of balance of consciousness:

> It consists in not letting the discovery, or the suspicion of the existence, of transcendent being disorient and frighten one in such a way that it lead one to devalue or reject either the immanent or the transcendent pole of being. In other words, one does not let the world as it is be degraded into 'an untruth to be overcome by the truth of transfigured reality'. (Hughes, 1993, p. 102).

Hughes weighs the balance of consciousness as the "primary virtue of differentiated consciousness." (Hughes, 1993, p. 102).

The *metaxy-living* consciousness and the mystery of *metaxy* led man in history to pursue the "participation" in that mystery through recognizing the "quaternarian structure" of God and man, world and society as a primal "community of being". In Volume II of *Order and History* entitled *Israel and Revelation*, Voegelin argues that

> God and man, world and society form a primordial community of being. The community with its quaternarian structure is, and is not, a datum of human experience. It is a datum of experience insofar as it is known to man by virtue of his participation in the mystery of its being. It is not a datum of experience insofar as it is not given in the manner of an object of the external world but is knowable only from the perspective of participation in it. The perspective of participation must be understood in the fullness of its disturbing quality. It does not mean that man, more or less comfortably located in the landscape of being, can look around and take stock of what he sees as far as he can see it. Such a metaphor, or comparable variations on the theme of the limitations of human knowledge, would destroy the paradoxical character of the situation. It would suggest a self-contained spectator, in possession of and with knowledge of his faculties, at the center of a horizon of being, even though the horizon were restricted. But man is not a self-contained spectator. He is an actor, playing a part in the drama of being and, through the brute fact of his existence, committed to play it without knowing what it is. It is disconcerting even when a man accidentally finds himself in the situation of feeling not quite sure what the game is and how he should conduct himself in order not to spoil it; but with luck and skill he will extricate himself from the embarrassment and return to the less bewildering routine of his life. Participation in being, however, is not a partial involvement of man; he is engaged with the whole of his existence, for participation is existence itself. There is no vantage point outside existence from which its meaning can be viewed and a course of action charted according to a plan, nor is there a blessed island to which man can withdraw in order to recapture his self. The role of existence must be played in uncertainty of its meaning, as an adventure of decision on the edge of freedom and necessity. (Hogan, 2001, p. 39-40).

Sandoz explains how the recognition of the quaternarian structure is a form of participation, drawing the distinguishing participation from the subject-object categories of cognition and ontology. Sandoz:

> The principle of participation is the existential basis of man's self-understanding insofar as from earliest times onward men are aware of participating in a structured reality of which they are but a part, one ontologically articulated by the symbolisms man, God, world, and society--the primordial quaternarian

structure of being reflected in the earliest cosmological myths. Participation forms, therefore, as both the essence of the knower and the knowable and the inevitable perspective of the inquiry into reality. There is no Archimedean point outside of reality-as-participation available to men. Accordingly, it supplants the subject-object categories of cognition and ontology. (Sandoz, 1981, p. 204).

For Voegelin, history has a meaning because consciousness has a history (Douglass, 1977, p.10), and thus the order of history emerges from the history of order. Obtaining an understanding of order in history necessitates a scrutiny of the relation and the tension between spiritual history and political/pragmatic history by way of examining the interrelation between "the order of the soul" and "the order of society". In his article entitled *On Eric Voegelin His collected Works and Significance in the Review of Politics*, James M. Rhodes explains how history is the amalgam of events of consciousness by saying that

> for Voegelin, the order in history was not different from the order in the individual soul; he once stated flatly that: 'There is no history other than the history constituted in the Metaxy of differentiating consciousness.' As he repeatedly made clear ever since the 1950s, the only events that even counted as 'history' for him were those 'experiences in which man gains the understanding of his humanity and together with it the understanding of its limits.' This makes it logical to ask why Voegelin then did not restrict himself simply to the analysis of order in consciousness. Why did he bother with 'history'? The answer is that he saw, or thought he saw, that experiences in the *metaxy* through which people become aware of the grounds of their order have 'historical' dimensions, in three senses: They produce consciousness of a *before* and an *after* of their occurrences. They seem to constitute a *process*. They become involved in external time when societies *articulate* themselves for the sake of representation *of truth*. (Rhodes, 1992, p. 621-647).

All the volumes of series of *Order and History* hoped to demonstrate "that Order of history emerges from the history of order." (Douglass, 1977, p.2). According to Voegelin, Order and History is "a philosophical inquiry concerning the order of human existence in society and history." (Hogan, 2001, p. 24). In his article "The Break in Voegelin's Agenda", Bruce Douglass argues that *Order and History* is designed to

elaborate the history of the symbolization of order running all the way from the empires of the ancient Near East, with their cosmological myths, to the modern nation-state, with its gnostic symbolism. (Douglass, 1977, p. 1).

History is a stage of orders with symbolisms, but not a course of succession of orders with corresponding symbols, because though consciousness differentiates, it does not differentiates in a linear mode. Voegelin embarked on studying successive historical epochs with the intention of scrutinizing the distinctive orders that emerged in them and exploring the order of history, if any. As Voegelin clarifies in the introduction of Volume I of *Order and History* entitled *Israel and Revelation*, the types of order which *Order and History* was set in the beginning to explore include

> the imperial organizations of the Ancient Near East and their existence in the form of the cosmological myth; 2) The revelatory form of existence in history, developed by Moses and the prophets of the Chosen People; 3) The polis and the Hellenic myth, and the development of philosophy as the symbolism of order; 4) The multicivilizational empires since Alexander, and the emergence of Christianity; 5) The modern national state, and the emergence of modern Gnosticism as the symbolic form of order. (Hogan, 2001, p. 20).

Volume IV of *Order and History* entitled *The Ecumenic Age* includes special re-theorization regarding the relation between history and order. Voegelin devotes the introduction to illustrating the nature of the retheorization, and devoted the body of the work to applying his new theory as well as other elements of his theoretical perspective which remained unaltered. Voegelin *now* conceives of history as a stage on which different orders emerge, noting that in certain cases a specific symbolization of order is present across historical periods, hence precluding the notion that there is a succession of types of order with corresponding symbolism composing a historical "course."[3] One symbolization of order ("historiogenesis) was actually "a historical constant that vitiates by its very constancy any notion of "succession". (Franz, 2000, p. 9). History is not "a

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[3] This was Voegelin's early assumption in the first three volumes of Order and History which was pronounced in the Introduction of *The New Science of Politics* as follows: "the manifold of such symbols, finally, will not form a flat catalogue but prove amenable of theorization as an intelligible succession of phases in a historical process.

process of increasingly differentiated insight into the order of being." (Franz, 2000, p. 9).

In *Autobiographical Reflections*, Voegelin confesses that he had discovered that the

aforementioned five types of order cannot exhaust all past types of order.

> There has arisen the new problem of disengaging the general problem of
> cosmological symbolism from its specific, imperial variation; the cosmological
> symbolisms on the tribal level, back to the Stone Age, must bean analyzed; and
> then the differentia specifica, introduced by the foundation of empires, as for
> instance in Egypt, must be distinguished. I have collected the materials for this
> purpose; and I hope to publish my findings sometime in the future. (Sandoz,
> 2006, p. 108).

Glenn Hughes and Frederick Lawrence explain:

> the patterns of meaning revealed in the history of Western self-understanding are
> not properly explained when presented as a linear, one-way development.
> Rather, the patterns of meaning by which humans have oriented themselves in
> society and world must be approached from the recognition that there are
> synchronic "lines of meaning" in history as well as diachronic ones, and that
> furthermore a "timeless" dimension of meaning must be taken seriously as the
> background of reality against which, and only against which, the historical
> plurality of societies can be intelligibly understood as constituting a single "human
> history." A proper analysis of meaning in history must therefore, as Voegelin put
> it in the Introduction to *The Ecumenic Age*, be able to move "backward and
> forward and sideways, in order to follow empirically the patterns of meaning as
> they [have] revealed themselves in the self-interpretation of persons and
> societies in history. (Hughes and Lawrence, 1995, p. 407-408).

In its original form, historiogenesis is a speculation which emerges in cosmological

societies and which constructs history in a way which entails weaving events in pragmatic

history with mythical events producing a non-real origin of society and a non-real

beginning of history. Yet, Voegelin uses the term to characterize and enterprise in other

societies including modern societies:

> historiogenesis is any mythical construct that attempts to account for the origin
> and cause of society and its order. (Morrissey, 1994, p. 94).

Morrissey clarifies that historiogenesis is propelled by the trepidation and alarm filling

the socio-political sphere as a result of the permutation of imperial order namely the

dismantling of empire. As Morrisse puts it,

in its origin, historiogenesis is motivated by the anxiety aroused by the vicissitudes of imperial order, the breakdown of empire, and existential alienation. Under the impact of such anxiety the fabrication and manipulation of historical material is easily accounted for. In the age of imperial conquests the historiogenetic symbolists legitimize the new rule by letting it descend from the mythical beginning in an unbroken line. At the price of violating historical reality the new order is sublimated to 'the emergence of order in the cosmos, so that the events would have a meaning that made them worthy of transmission to posterity.' (Morrissey, 1994, p. 94).

A "deformation" of consciousness, and in turn of order, usually follows the emergence of a given order in history. In the first three volumes of *Order and History*, Voegelin concludes that the order of society as an expression of political history and the order of the soul as an expression of spiritual history became remote from one another. (Douglass, 1977, p. 6). This separation takes place because

cultural thought has a tendency to fall back to moving exclusively within compact intramundane symbolism ("the myth of the cosmos") and to forget the hard-won spiritual and philosophical insights into the transcendent (i.e., the achievements of "pneumatic and noetic differentiation" with regard to theoretical speculation about gods, humans, the world, and society). (Morrissey, 2012, p.5).

This separation creates a state of antipathy and aversion of the established order leading to the creation of schemes of divergence through changing and distorting the quintessential tenets of the established order. Palpably, the concept of deformation means that the attempt to forsake the established order is not about creating a totally novel order. Rather it is about disfiguring the established order.

Deformation is comprised of multiple elements. Foremost amongst those is metastasis. In Voegelin, metastasis

is a term used extensively to refer to all unrealistically expected transformations of man, society, the structure of existence, and so on. The fundamental form of such utopian expectation is that escape from the tension of existence will be possible through movement out of the metaxy toward identity or union with one of its poles. (Webb, 1981, p. 248).

So, the metastatic consciousness is one which disacknowledges the magnetization by one of the two poles. The direct result of metastasis is the emergence of imbalanced consciousness. Webb explains this condition by saying that the balance of consciousness is

> easily lost when the experience of being drawn toward the transcendental pole becomes sufficiently vivid to tempt one to expect escape from the *metaxy* and from the existential tension that characterizes it. (Webb, 1981, p. 278).

In other words, a metastatic consciousness is by definition an imbalance consciousness. The movement out of the *metaxy* or the escape from it leads the metastatic imbalanced consciousness to *migrate from openness/open existence to closed existence*. Webb explains the term "closed existence" by saying that it is

> Voegelin's term for the mode of existence in which there are internal impediments to a free flow of truth into consciousness and to the pull of the transcendental. Contrasts with 'open existence'. (Webb 1981, p. 278).

Upon dwelling in closed existence, the metastatic imbalanced consciousness replaces the pursuit of living, maintaining and nurturing culture, with the pursuit of deculturation.[4] *In Voegelin, Deculturation is*

> the loss of culture, or the loss of the process in which soul and character are formed through experiences of transcendence and the virtues (such as faith, love, hope, reason) inherent in open existence. (Webb, 1981, p. 279).

In closed existence, the metastatic imbalanced consciousness falls captive to *superbia. Superbia is a Latin concept which means detestable pride and inclination towards superiority and dominance. It appears in Thomas More's Utopia: Adeo execrabilis belua est superbia et praecellendi cupiditas. (Such a cursed savage beast is pride and the urge to dominate) (Baker-Smith, 2012, p. 138). As Voegelin puts it, superbia "could be discerned as the permanently present danger of the fall from true nature." (Henningsen, 2000, p. 234). Also,* in closed existence, the metastatic imbalanced consciousness falls

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[4] Webb sees deculturation as an equivalent of deformation, but it appears to us as one of its main elements.

captive *to libido dominandi or the "Pleasure in dominating, especially intellectual domination." (Webb, 1981, p. 28).* In closed existence, the metastatic imbalanced deculturated consciousness replaces the quest for truth, which is the core of order, with the employment of Doxa, which is an agent of disorder. In his works, Voegelin uses Doxa mainly through blending its meaning *in Parmenides and in Aristotle. As an outcome, Doxa is the application of inadequate starting points that yield an output which ultimately qualifies only as mere opinion and not as adequately structured sophisticated theoretical construct.* I*n his book Consciousness and Transcendence: The Theology of Eric Voegelin',* *Michael P. Morrissey's explains by saying* that

> *Doxai* in Parmenides must not be interpreted as false propositions or untruths, but rather as the ever-inadequate starting point and periodic resting point, for the search for truth that can never end in true propositions. Within the confines of limited knowing in this world the many Doxa*i* are true, but compared to the one transcendent truth of being they appear as delusion. In Socrates' speech *Doxa* is often reduced to appearance or mere opinion that is fervently denounced. (Morrissey, 1994, p 271).

Doxa grows within consciousness enjoying a growing appeal to the extent of becoming the object of the love of man. Voegelin used Plato's term Philodoxy to connote this peculiar love. Webb explains philodoxy by saying that it is

> Voegelin's term (based on Plato's *philodoxos*) for `love of opinion.' Contrasts with philosophy' or `love of wisdom' in that it conceives of truth in immanentistic rather than transcendental terms and tends to claim a perfect correspondence between ultimate reality and the ideas or interpretive models used to represent it. Another point of contrast is that whereas philosophy is inherently oriented toward further inquiry through openness to the Question, philodoxy is the expression of a desire to put an end to questioning and thereby to escape from the tension of existence. In this respect, philodoxy is a principal manifestation of 'closed existence'. (Webb, 1981, p. 286).

The employment of Doxa leads to the effacement and/or defacement of truth and alethia which is the sustenance of consciousness. Accordingly, Michael Federici illustrates that the outcome of the pursuit of the restoration of order is a function of the outcome

of the collision between the aletheia represented in the soul and the deformation spreading in the society represented in Doxai. He says.

> The recovery of order in the disordered society depends on the confrontation between the truth (*aletheia*) represented in the soul of its carrier and the disorder of society represented in the untruths or illusions (*Doxai*) of the day. (Federeci, 2002, p.93).

At least in part, doxa is an outcome, inter alia, of deculturation. Parties in dichotomous relations exchanging doxic attacks having been induced by philodoxy are, in Voegelin's terms, in dogmatomachy. (Web, 1981, p. 280). In closed existence, the metastatic imbalanced deculturated doxic consciousness replaces truth with second reality. Keulman interprets second reality as follows:

> consciousness will inevitably form images and representations of reality as of something other than itself, but can and occasionally will form images that miss reality and sometimes even substitute an ersatz-reality, or, as Musil has called it, a 'Second Reality'. (Kuelman, 1990, p. 61).

Webb stresses how second reality is a part of what may be referred to as a grand disguise of reality. He explains it as "Voegelin's term, drawn from Robert Musil, for a fictitious world imagined as true by a person using it to mask and thereby eclipse genuine reality" (Webb, 1981, p. 288), noting that Voegelin regarded the nature of reality as "the fundamental philosophical problem is the nature of reality" according to Keulman. (Keulman, 1990, p. 82). *In closed existence, one of the ways in which the metastatic imbalanced deculturated doxic consciousness creates second reality is* hypostatization. Heilke helps us understand hypostatization by saying that this concept which is borrowed from Plato "signifies the process of reifying analytical concepts that are, by the act of reification, considered to have independent existence." (Heilke, 1990, p. 52). *Simply put, hypostatization is conceiving of the abstract as concrete. In closed existence, another way in which the metastatic imbalanced deculturated doxic consciousness creates second reality is historiogenesis. The meaning of historiogenesis was explained above.*

The prime embodiment of the metastatic imbalanced deculturated consciousness is the Gnostic consciousness. Webb summarizes Voegelin's diagnosis of the main symptomatic constituent elements of that consciousness-related distortion which Voegelin lists in *Politics, and Gnosticism* as follows:

> 1) dissatisfaction with one's situation; 2) belief that the reason the situation is unsatisfactory is that the world is intrinsically poorly organized; 3) salvation from the evil of the world is possible, 4) if the order of being is changed, 5) and this is possible in history, 6) if one knows how. (Webb, 2005, p.15).

In his book, *Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History*, Eugene Webb defines Gnosticism as:

> A type of thinking that claims absolute cognitive mastery of reality. Relying as it does on a claim to gnosis, gnosticism considers its knowledge not subject to criticism. As a religious or quasi-religious movement, gnosticism may take transcendentalizing (as in the case of the Gnostic movement of late antiquity) or immanentizing forms (as in the case of Marxism). (Webb, 1981, p. 282).

With all the above in mind, it should remain clear that the establishment of order does not mean total absence of disorder, and the prevalence of deformation and disorder does not mean total absence of order. This is because "the tension between openness toward reality and contraction of the self is a human problem *at all times.*" (Franz, 2000, p. 404). The gained balance of consciousness is subject to loss, and the lost balance of consciousness is regainable. (Franz, 2000, p. 74, and p. 339).

Voegelin's theoretical concept of deformation and the constituent elements of that deformation will be crucial for locating the elements of distortion of the meaning of the caliphate and the grand conceptions of order and the mystery, and in adequately characterizing the various forms of that distortion. For example, in light of the concept of metastasis we will identify cases of escaping from the metaxy and explore whether the escape headed towards the transcendental pole or the immanent pole and how each escape affected the conception of the mystery. The concept of doxa will help assess as sheer biased opinions such concepts expressed in relation to the caliphate theories that are in disharmony with the foundational grand conceptions of order and that are pronounced within the context of an ideological battle. In light of the concept of

Gnosticism, we will identify gnostic actors whose Gnosticism influenced their caliphate-related theorization, and qualify why they merit this characterization, and distinguish between the Gnosticism which takes the transcendentalizing form, and the Gnosticism which takes the immanentizing form.

For Voegelin, the period between the emergence of the Persian Empire and the fall of the Roman Empire - roughly 600 B.C. to 600 A.D – was a special period in the history of mankind in that it saw an intensive sequence of "spiritual outbursts" hence giving birth to a unique human consciousness and in turn a unique sense of order. Voegelin devoted Volume VI of *Order and History* to exploring the relation between spiritual history and political history, or between the order of the soul and the order of society, in societies living a unique age dominated by new powers, and hence developing a unique consciousness. (Douglass, 1977, p. 6). In his article *The Break in Voegelin's Agenda*, Bruce Douglas argues that

> as a philosophical work Volume IV has two principal themes - history and the unity of mankind. Both are presented as central to the progress of events and consciousness in *The Ecumenic Age*. (Douglass, 1977, p. 9).

Voegelin noted that the period saw the emergence of the ecumenic empires whose pursuit resulted in widespread severe destruction but entailed at the same time the removal of many of the material and artificial barriers between small human polities. This was followed by the emergence of universal teachings. This made the consciousness of the members of the different nations more open to the unit of identity of humanity which would be receptive of the ecumenic religions. He notes that the different experiences were largely disconnected. It saw rise of the Pharonic civilization, of the Prophets amongst the Israelites, of Zoroasterianism, of Confucius and Loa Tzu, of the Buddha, of Plato and Aristotle, of Jesus and Mohammad. Epiphanies of Moses, Christ, Mani and Mohammed are regarded as "the sources of meaning in history and of such knowledge as man has of it." (Franz, 2000, p. 50). As Glenn Hughes and Frederick Lawrence explain,

> while it (The Ecumenic Age) addresses developments that fall chronologically during the centuries that saw the rise of "ecumenic empires, it examines them synoptically and guided by a focus on the recurrent constants in the symbolization of order, even as these undergo during this period radical re-articulation as a result of both spiritual discoveries and new forms of political organization and upheaval. (Hughes and Lawrence, 1995, p. 408).

In responding to Karl Jaspers theorization and Albert Toynbee's historical description of this period, Voegelin explains by saying that,

> in order to elevate the period from 800 to 200 b.c., in which the parallel outbursts occur, to the rank of the great epoch in history, Jaspers had to deny to the earlier and later spiritual outbursts the epochal character which in their own consciousness they certainly had. In particular, he had to throw out Moses and Christ. The construction did not seem to make sense. If spiritual outbursts were to be recognized as the constituents of meaning in history, the epiphanies of Moses and Christ, or of Mani and Mohammed, could hardly be excluded from the list; and if they were included, the axis time expanded into an open field of spiritual eruptions extending over millennia. The objections appeared to have disposed of the axis time for good. On closer examination, however, the argument proved less conclusive than it had seemed at first. For Jaspers had supported the exclusiveness of his period with the argument that the earlier and later outbursts had only regional importance, while a universal consciousness of humanity, pervading all the major civilizations from Rome to China, had indeed been created by the outbursts of the axis time. Moreover, when all the pointing to earlier and later outbursts had been done, the phenomenon of the parallel outbursts was still there, waiting to be dealt with.

> The problem became manageable only when I realized that both Jaspers and Toynbee treated hierophanic events on the level of phenomena in time, not letting their argument reach into the structure of experiencing consciousness. The construction of an axis time dissolved when I applied the principle of the study more carefully to the types of order and symbolization actually to be found in the period in question. The analysis of the order concretely experienced in the spiritual outbursts had the negative result: There was no "axis time" in the first millennium b.c., because the Western and Far Eastern thinkers did not know of each others' existence and, consequently, had no consciousness of thinking on any axis of history. The "axis time," I had to conclude, was the symbolism by which a modern thinker tried to cope with the disturbing problem of meaningful structures in history, such as the field of parallel spiritual movements, of which the actors in the field were quite unaware. The conclusion then led on to the questions concerning the validity of the modern symbolism: Could one really

interpret the pluralistic field of outbursts, though it had no consciousness of itself, as a meaningful structure in the history of mankind? or did the field not rather suggest the existence of a plurality of mankinds, each having a history of its own? (Franz, 2000, p. 49, 50).

Voegelin explains the special effect by the spiritual outbursts on the sense of humanity

by saying that

> ... for reasons unknown (which might be said to be the mystery behind the configuration of history), not all men are endowed equally with spirituality; and even when they are endowed with spiritual sensitivity, insights into order develop only gradually in the course of time. Every new insight begins with a single person, who receives it, one might say, as a representative of the whole of humanity. As a matter of fact, the very idea that there *is* a humanity, that there *is* a mankind, and that one can generalize about man, appears only when certain revelatory insights occur. These are spiritual outbursts. We now recognize that man is that being who is capable of insight into true order, the order of true existence and of God, which can only be understood through the orders actually existent in history. That would be the definition of man from which all ideas of a general conception of man must begin. Before such spiritual outbursts, no general conception of man is possible... Only when spiritual insights are attained does man become defined as that being who receives his order through existence from God. There is therefore a tremendous importance attaching to these spiritual outbursts and insights. The recipients of such insights act as representatives of humanity, with the obligation to communicate their insights to all mankind. Every prophet, every philosopher, every enlightened person ... comes as an element of disorder in his society, because he has received an insight into the true order, which is different from the established order. Thus, every new insight into order is the beginning of a revolution of more or less considerable dimensions. (Sandoz, 1990, p. 111-112).

For Voegelin, modernity is a deformation of that order which prevailed in Europe

and which resulted from the interaction between Christianity and Classical philosophy,

both being a part of the spiritual outburst of the Ecumenic Age. Studying the order-

related changes which gave birth to the radical shift which yielded the emergence of the

modernist epochal consciousness, Voegelin inferred that

> much of the history of the modern period consists of a revolt against the symbols inherited from the Ecumenic Age. The meaning of these symbols was deformed through theological and metaphysical dogmatism. By adding more doctrine, however, the modern revolt only succeeded in compounding the

problem, so that contemporary errors were stacked on top of medieval ones. The net result is a great block of accumulated symbols that serve only to eclipse reality. (Keulman, 1990, p. 146).

In this connection, it is imperative to caution that Voegelin conceives of Modernity not an origin, but rather as a differentiation of ancient Gnosticism, Morrissey contends that it is Voegelin's thesis is that

> modern thought, in its tendency to fall back from humanity's hard-won spiritual and philosophical achievements, is a variation on ancient Gnosticism (Franz, 2005, p. 28–47, esp. 42–43). If we avoid a "monolithic and monochromatic use of the term" (McKnight, 2005, p. 25), and regard "Gnosticism" as an analogical term that is valid insofar as it stimulates further inquiry, and not use it univocally as a species (or even a genus) (Rossbach, 2005, p. 86), then we would stay true to Voegelin's cautionary use of the term. (Morrissey, 2012, p. 5).

The Modernist deformation is comprised of multiple elements. We have discussed in the outset of this chapter the main three pivotal elements of modernity namely secular humanism, positivism and scientism, and progressivism. In his book From Enlightenment to Revolution, Voegelin criticized positivism arguing that it

> rests on the assumption that the theological and metaphysical phases of the mind are transitory and not necessary. (Hallowell, 1982, p. 139).

In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin described value free judgment as doxa. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 95). Web explains Voegelin's conception of scientism by alluding to its nature and by stressing how the Baconian notion of knowledge is power constitutes its substance in the Voegelinian sense of the term:

> The reductionist theory that all reality should be knowable by the methods of the natural sciences (especially mathematical, quantitative method). Tends to involve the expectation of control of man through scientific knowledge and technique. (Webb, 1981, p. 287).

That being the case, we suffice here with mentioning a few other elements of the deformation given rise by modernity. First, Modernity has at its heart a gnostic consciousness-related distortion. Though he had some second thoughts about the suitability of the concept of Gnosticism later, Voegelin did not forsake the

characterization of the quintessence of the consciousness-related distortion. As Webb indicates,

> Voegelin's own use of the term, though richly meaningful when one goes into it in depth and sets aside all the side issues it tends to arouse, covers so many distinct problems that its very richness makes it seem overly general and imprecise—a problem Voegelin seems to have recognized himself when he said in 1978, as I mentioned earlier, that besides what was then usually called by that name, the ideas he was interested in using it to address included many other strands, such as apocalypticism, alchemy, magic, theurgy, and scientism. (Webb, 2005, p. 28).

For Voegelin, Modernist Gnosticism is not merely an orientation, for

> the rise of *gnosticism* at this critical juncture now appears in a new light as the incipient formation of a Western *civil theology.* (Henningsen, 2000, p. 111).

In the latter part of his life, Voegelin made some revisions concerning that name. As Webb clarifies in his article "Voegelin's "Gnosticism" Reconsidered",

> at a conference on "Gnosticism and Modernity" at Vanderbilt University in 1978, he said he would probably not use that term if he were starting over again because, besides what then went by that name, the ideas he was interested in using it to address included many other strands, such as apocalypticism, alchemy, magic, theurgy, and scientism. (Webb, 2005, p.2).

The second element of the deformation given rise by Modernity is the tripartite periodization of a progressive history ending with a utopianized "perfect realm" inspired by an "immanentization of the eschaton". This element is a derivative of modernist progressivism. Let us here Voegelin's own explanation of the notion of immanentization in Anamnesis

> When consciousness of the cosmic bond of being as the background of all philosophy declines, there arise the well-known dangers of the dedivinized world and the unworldly God the unworldly world as nothing but a nexus of relations between immanent things, and the dedivinized God reduced to mere existence. (Voegelin, 1990, p. 79).

Simply put, the immanent sphere, for Voegelin, is "the limited mundane reality." (Webb, 1981, p. 283). Immanentization is forcing the transcendent in the mundane reality or profane world, or transferring the transcendent to the worldly. We have alluded earlier

to the conception of conception of time and history which is underpinned by a unilinear idea of history as inexorable progress towards freedom. Immanentizing the eschaton is deludingly forcing transcendental fulfilment and sense of completion into the immanent world or the closed earthly sphere. The utopian state of affair ceased to be an axiological *model* for inspiration in the way Thomas More conceived it in the *Utopia* (1991), but rather achievable in the concrete situation presently and in the future. In *The New Science of Politics*, Voegelin demonstrates how history was re-periodized into three periods which are linked by a relation of progress leading to ultimate perfection. According to Voegelin, such progressivist, fulfillment-driven re-periodization was first speculated during the 13th century by Joachim of Fiore (AD 1202-1230). It reappeared in various differentiations. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 178). Amongst the variations of the Joachimian symbol of the periodized history ending with the perfect realm stands the humanistic periodization of history in which history is divided into three periods: the Ancient period, the Middle Ages and Modern period. There is also August Comte's periodization which includes the theological period, the metaphysical period and the scientific period. Glenn Hughes affirms that at the core of this manipulation of time and history lies an escape from the mystery of history:

> Condorcet, Comte, Proudhon, Marx: each presents a "philosophy of history" that de-scribes a single line of civilizational advance bringing history to a culmination in the foreseeable future of his own society, promoting it thereby "to the rank of a goal toward which all mankind had been moving from the beginning." The device of historiogenetic speculation, as always, wards off troubling questions about the mystery of history by narrowing it to a unilinear sequence that reaches a specific worldly conclusion. (Hughes, 2003, p. 100).

Lack of awareness, better yet recognition, of the mystery is a forth element of the deformation given rise by Modernity, as Hughes clarifies in *Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin*:

> Voegelin perceived modern culture in the West to be sadly and dangerously lacking in consistently balanced awareness of the mysterious dimension of

conscious existence, the basic mystery having, as he might put it, slipped

below the level of public consciousness. (Hughes, 1993, p. 3).

The emergence of brotherhoods, coupled with the symbols of the "prophet of the new era" and the "leader", claiming command of knowledge away from institutional authority, is another quintessential element of the deformation given rise by Modernity. The presence of the Church, for the members of modernist brotherhoods, will be meaningless on the basis that personal charismatic gifts that are required to live an ideal life shall be attainable without the need of the sacraments. The intermediation of the spirit shall not be required for people to join the new perfect realm. Voegelin holds that the idea was developed to suggest the possibility of the rise of the society of spiritually complete individuals who are able to live with one another without an institutional authority and bred numerous variations. Amongst the religious variations was the Puritan movement. In the secular domain, it inspired the foundations of contemporary democratic laws and the Marxist movement and its conception of the ultimate realm and the decline of the state. Intertwined with the Brotherhood was the symbol of the neo prophet, the prophet of the new era. The creation of this symbol, Voegelin deduces, is inspired by the desire to suppose that the substance of history – as an understandable and meaningful entirety – is capturable and comprehendible to all whether through direct revelation or Gnostic speculation. Intertwined with the Brotherhood was the symbol of the leader. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 152). The symbol of the "leader" was seen in the Paracletic person, the *hominess spirituals* and the *hominess novi* of the Middle ages. It is also seen in Machiavelli's book *The Prince*. During the period of secularization, it is seen in the supermen created by Condorcet, Comte and Marx. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 152). Voegelin argues that in later stages of secularization – the symbol of the leader will be materialized in the person of the Gnostic intellectual. Finally, the emergence of totalitarian mass movements and totalitarian parties is another quintessential element of the deformation given rise by Modernity. One main deformational symptom of the totalitarian movements is that they manipulate the element of "representative

humanity" without having "received an insight into the true order". (Sandoz, 1990, p. 112). Voegelin explains by saying that

> this element of representative humanity is a real factor, not only in these outbursts of ancient times ..., but also in the present day... It is the element of representativeness that gives momentum to all of the modern ideological movements. The representatives or leaders of such movements feel themselves to be the representatives of mankind, and they feel that everyone must be converted to the representative type of truth. The category of representative humanity thus runs from antiquity down to the modern era, to the contemporary political mass movements, conducted by sectarians like Comte and his positivist movement, the progressivists, and so on. (Sandoz, 1990, p. 111-112).

In the Lecture entitled *The End of Modernity*, Voegelin concludes that

> the totalitarianism of our time must be understood as a journey's end of the gnostic search for a civil theology. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 221).

In sum, it is worth noting that modernity acquired the status of a generator of a Before and After, and the status of the prime source of meaning. Voegelin's conception of the spiritual outbursts which was mentioned earlier, taken together with the conception of modernity as a deformation constituted an impulse for consciousness to move in the direction of re-recognizing the spiritual outbursts as generators of a Before and the movement in the re-recognition of them as the sources of meaning in history. It constituted a resistance to the movement by consciousness in the direction of conceiving modernity as the prime generators of a Before and After, and a resistance to the movement by consciousness in the direction of re-recognizing it as the main source of meaning in history. Accordingly, not only is the status of "the Origin" and the status of "the source of meaning" invested in modernity is contested by Voegelin, but modernity is awarded a status of an aberration-driven variation" of the very origins which it came to displace.

When all is said and done, perhaps the best way to synthesize Voegelin's theoretical arguments is to stress that in their entirety they form a theory of a unique consciousness, a metaxy-living consciousness seeking participation in the mystery. The

beating heart of the theory of order is the metaxy-living consciousness which is influenced by the mystery. It is around these two pivots that the tenets of the theory revolve and coalesce into a theoretical body. The entirety of the theory is indebted to the condition of gravitation by the transcendent pole and the immanent pole and the resulting tension of existence. It is also indebted to the influence of the ordering truth and the mysterious stirring up of consciousness by it to enter into a mutual relationship by being receptive of its ordering, by participating in it and responding through pursuing a mission of ordering. Being in a state of openness vis-à-vis the mystery and that ordering truth, the metaxy-living consciousness pursues the architecture of an order in its closest domain, the soul, and synchronously pursues a corresponding ordering in the second closest domain, the society. The bedrock of the pursuit of ordering by the metaxy-living consciousness is to represent that truth, to take inspiration from it, and to take inspiration from an external order which was created by it. The metaxy-living consciousness is in continuous search for an equilibrium.

It is the idiosyncratic nature of the metaxy-living consciousness which mandated the cross-disciplinary approach which Voegelin took to his studies. The *metaxy*-living consciousness moves vertically and horizontally. That is why Voegelin's theory of order theoretical perspective had to delve in the disciplines of theology and in the disciplines of politics, and semiotics. The *metaxy*-living consciousness also moves backward and forward. That is why Voegelin's theory of order had to delve in the discipline of history and in the disciplines of futurology and eschatology. The *metaxy*-living consciousness also moves inwards and outwards. That is why Voegelin's theory of order had to delve in discipline spirituality and in the in the discipline of psychology.

Accordingly, it may be important to caution from a limited characterization of Voegelin's theory. Put differently, it is a misrepresentation to speak of Voegelin's theory of consciousness without stressing the idiosyncratic nature of the consciousness which the theory has in mind, namely that it is a metaxy living consciousness. It is also a

misrepresentation to speak of Voegelin's theory of consciousness without stressing its central pursuit of participating in the mystery. Speaking of Voegelin's theoretical fabric without pointing to these two essences does not do full justice to the Voegelinian theory nor does justice to the reader. There are multiple writings by Modernist and non-modernist thinkers that are replete with analysis of consciousness which merits their yield the status of a theory of consciousness. It is Voegelin's unique conception of consciousness as a metaxy-living consciousness and as a participant in the mystery which illuminates the distinction.

Voegelin's theory of the metaxy-living consciousness which seeks participation in the mystery, or his theory of order, had as one of its ultimate greater missions the restoration of the science of politics as he understands it. Intertwined with the objective of gaining an understanding of reality, of political reality, of exploring the notion of order, and the notion of mystery, and the diagnosis of deformation paradigms, Voegelin's theoretical pursuit was propelled by the desire to contribute to the restoration of the science of politics. It is within this context that the recuperation of an understanding of mystery constitutes one major step in the journey of curing philosophy and the science of politics from the injury inflicted on them due to the deterioration of the awareness of mystery. A theory of the metaxy living consciousness illuminating the participation by consciousness in mystery had as one of its missions the convalescence of the awareness of mystery. As noted be Glen Hughes,

> If an awareness of mystery and the need for it have gradually been lost in the modern period, recovering this awareness maybe crucial for recovering from the ills of modernity. Such a convalescence seem to require the development of a theory of consciousness whereby the meaning and function of mystery can be redeemed. (Heilke, 1999, p. 22).

In this chapter we undertook a presentation of Voegelin's main theoretical concepts. We began by observing that the formative years of Voegelin's consciousness were years that saw an epochal consciousness suffering an ontological anxiety, namely the modernist consciousness. We discerned how this reality provoked an assessment and

an endeavor to chart a new course. Voegelin's intellectual biography told us that he thought that his calling was to carrying out both missions. We identified the intellectual milieu in which Voegelin's thought emerged and how his propositions intersected with the propositions of a wide range of scholars. The nature of Voegelin's ensemble of theoretical concepts indicate that he was not influenced by scholars of his age. Rather, the main perspective that by which his thought was informed is the Platonic perspective. On a secondary level, the Aristotelian perspective. Nonetheless, Voegelin's theorization took a special note of certain philosophical and theoretical insights by a few modernist philosophers especially Kant, Husserl and Weber. We then moved to explicating Voegelin's theory of the metaxy-living consciousness. We observed the centrality of mystery and the centrality of the maxim of participation in his theory. Having done that, the time is ripe to employ Voegelin's theoretical perspective and his theoretical concepts in analyzing the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate and pertinent conceptions of order and the mystery within the context of imperial vicissitudes. As said earlier, we need to start with providing a general picture of the Message based order. This we will do in the following chapter.

Chapter Two: The emergence of a spiritual outburst and the birth of a quaternarianism-inspired metaxy-minded consciousness and order

Equipped with the Voegelinian perspective, we will analyze in this chapter the composition of the Message based-order during the period of revelation laying special emphasis on the main conceptions of the MBO. We will identify the main elements of mystery in those conception. We will initially locate the conception of the caliphate in it and establish its basic meaning. This will be coupled with identifying the conception of disorder and deformation. Let us first sketch the milieu in which the MBO was built.

General Background

During the decades which preceded the first revelation in the year 610 CE, Arabia was surrounded by Empires whose Imperial influence cast its shadow on it. To the North, there was the Byzantine Empire whose influence spread in the Western part of the Peninsula and galvanized the loyalty of certain Arab tribes, and in the Mediterranean. Towards the East there was the Sassanian Empire whose influence spread in central Asia, in Mesopotamia, and in eastern Arabia where it forged alliances with vassal tribes. The two great powers, Sassanian Persia and Byzantium, entered into frequent wars. Southward, there was Yemen which "had experienced a long history of independent kingdoms that attained a high level of civilization" (Hallaq, 2005, p.9) and separated Mecca from the Christian Abyssinian Kingdom.

Mecca and Medina, the two places in which the MBO was built, lived different orders. Mecca was a small valley-town "with very little agricultural potential". (Donner, 2010, p. 35). Located along the Western border of the Arabian Peninsula, Mecca was located in the middle of the trade route linking Syria and Yemen. Several generations prior to the revelatiuon,

> Quraysh, the tribal confederation at Mecca, under the leadership of a certain enterprising Qusay, managed to construct an active network of regional trade

that connected the Peninsula with a larger international system. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 14).

Quraysh identified itself with the venerated House, on account of its service of the House and its visitors and pilgrims who belonged to different denominations. (Donner, 2010, 40), and on account of tracing its lineage to Abraham. The presence of Abrahamic monotheism continued to be felt though within small circles. The monotheistic Abrahmic teachings were known as Haneefies. Polytheism was widespread in Mecca. The economy of Mecca mainly relied on the pilgrimage and organizing caravans throughout the year heading north to Syria and south to yamen (Donner, 2010, p. 40). Mecca was run by a number of prominent figures amongst whom usually one would nearly enjoy the prestige of a *primes inter pares*. Yathrib, later known as Medina, was a typical large date-palm oasis. (Donner, 2010, p. 35). Yathrib was home to three Jewish clans, and to two polytheist clans originating from the tribe of Qayla, namely Al-Aws and Al-Khazraj. The latter two clans engaged in a prolonged conflict to which the Jewish clans may have been a party. (Donner, 2010, p. 42).

The MBO

The Message was revealed throughout 23 years in Mecca and Medina. The 23 year period is usually divided into two phases: The first is the Mecca phase and it lasted for 13 years starting with the day of revelation and ending with *Hijra* or migration of the Messenger to Yathrib. It is the phase in which the Messenger and some of the Muslims stayed in Mecca. The second phase, the Medina phase, lasted for 10 years. It is the phase in which the Messenger and the majority of his followership stayed in Medina. It lasted for ten years starting with the *Hijra* and ending with death of the Messenger.

During the Meccan phase, a process of building the order of the soul and the system of transcendental representation was underway, and grounded in it was an ensuing process of the order of society, of composing the system of existential representation and of articulation. The Message invited the recognition of the centrality of human consciousness within the human sphere. Similar to Voegelin's description, the

believer is invited to recognize that consciousness is the subject of constant pulling by the transcendental pole and the immanent pole, and that the bi-pulling renders his experience of existence a *metaxy*, and that the metaxy generates a tension of existence. The human being has a longing to both poles. The human being is invited to seek to recognize that the human soul is in a state of openness towards mystery and truth. The human being is invited to recognize that the human soul is subjected to ordering by the divine. The human being is subjected to divine ordering by way of installing in the human being attributes and powers that are mysteriously vested in the human being. In the ordering, the human being is provided with an innate sense of the divine archetypal bearing of the attributes and archetypal disposition of the divine powers, and is provided with models to take inspiration, namely prophets and messengers. This provision is complemented with the "revelation of truth in the mode of the Beyond with its experience of the divine ordering presence in the soul" to use Sandos's words in explaining Voegelin. (Sandoz, 2000, p. 225). Parallel to that, the divine ordering of the soul is done through designing the order of the cosmos so that the human being may take inspiration, such inspiration being complemented with "the revelation of truth in the mode of the Beginning with its experience of divine creativity in the cosmos". (Sandoz, 2000, p. 225). This ordering is partly carried out by installing a constellation of *grand conceptions* that consist of a repertoire of mysteries that the believers is invited to recognize/remember, live and represent. Main amongst the grand conceptions was the conception of the divine, of the human being, of the Messenger, of the Quran, of epistemology, of identity, of public trusteeship, and of fulfillment and completion. The Messenger preached those conceptions in Mecca, in a plain and unadorned nature. Through time, they only underwent elaboration. Few MBO conceptions were identified during the period of Medina. The following pages will analyze the main grand conceptions and the elements of mystery of which some of them consist.

Conception of the Divine

The Message introduced the divine as the one creator whose essence is a mystery, and who acts in a mysterious way, and who, at the same time, unveiled some of his attributes to be vehicles for participation in the Voegelinian sense of the term. On the one hand, the divine essence or the metacosmos-related reality of the divine is only spoken of in a negative way or ("the *via negativa*"). Only what should *not* be attributed to the divine is emphasized including divine aseity, immutability, impassibility, incorporeality and inscrutability. The essence of the divine is presented as being beyond capturing by sight[1] and or penetrable by human intellect. The divine reality cannot be brought into experiential grasp. This conception is very similar to the Platonic conception which Voegelin brings to the fore in *Order and History, Volume III, Plato and Aristotle*:

> transcendental reality cannot be an object of cognition in the manner of a world-immanent datum because it does not share with man the finiteness and temporality of immanent existence. It is eternal, out-of-time; it is not co-temporal with the experiencing soul. (Germino, p. 418).

The constellation of the divine names and attributes are vehicles of divine self-disclosure and action. They are partly cognizable, perceptible to the mind and sensible if unveiled by the divine. This conception is not dissimilar to the Voegelinian conception of the divine established in *Order and History*. The following lines by David Walsh explain.

> On Voegelin's view there would be no knowledge of divine Being unless God had revealed himself to man; there would not even be a search for the divine ground if the ground itself were not already present in the soul as the source of its movement. (Emberley, 1993, p. 357).

According to this conception, the divine would command created things through manifesting in various combinations of divine names. Because the divine names are carriers of divine action in relation to beings and creatures they are perceived as *the deputies or Caliphs* of the divine essence in relation to things created. Yet, the nature and howness of the manifestation itself is conceived as a mystery which may be referred to

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[1] 6: 103.

as "the mystery of divine action". Accordingly, the divine names are agents of divine disclosure and agents of divine mystery at once. The presence of the divine essence and the presence of divine manifestation renders divine action, such as creation, a state of between, in the Platonic Voegelinian sense of the term, in that it is a pointer to and a witness of the essence, and at the same time it is a pointer to and a witness of the manifestation. Not only is the howness of divine action a mystery, but the content of multiple divine actions such as divine concrete judgment in the hereafter is a mystery. In the sacred, created things are evidence of divine attributes and action, not essence and existence. Divine existence would be a matter of faith, not reason. The centrality of the divine name *Ilah* or the loved/worshiped deity denotes that *amor dei*[2] to use the terminology of St. Augustine in *Civitas Die* is *the central* state which the human being is expected to live in relation with the divine. Contrastable with this conception is the Platonic notion that "the enthusiastic experience of Eros open the soul towards transcendental reality." (Germino, 2000, p. 418).

Conception of the Human Being

The sacred profiled the human being as a being with a partially mysterious essence and a *metaxy*-living consciousness. The human essence is introduced as consisting of a mysterious spirit, and a mysterious soul which originates from one greater mysterious soul. With the Quranic concept of the One Soul from which every individual soul is created one may contrast the Greek concept of *anima mondi* or the World Soul. See Plato (1999) *Timaeus*. The soul is home to mysterious and miraculous divine signs

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[2] For more on the concepts of *amor die* and *amor sui* and their relation with the question of order and the political theorization of man's self-concept in so much as representation of transcendent truth is concerned and political behavior, see Eric Voegelin's analysis of St Agustin's usage of the terms in his *Civitas Dei* in
Eric Voegelin, E. (1999) *Modernity Without Restraint: The Political Religions, The New Science of Politics, and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* (Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 5). United States: University of Missouri Press. (Ed. Henningsen). p. 151. Also, it is worth juxtaposing with this conception Voegelin's maxim that "Philosophy is the love of being through love of the divine being as the source of its order". (Hogan, 2001, p. 24).

that are gradually revealed by the divine.[3] As said above, the human experience is presented as being the subject of constant pulling by the transcendental pole and the immanent pole. The human being is invited to manage the tension through the search of balance. The Quran speaks of a two-track ordering of the human being. We have already illustrated the divine track of ordering. From the end of the human being, there is a voluntary pursuit of participation, in the Voegelinian sense of the term, by way of positioning the soul in a state of openness. On the basis of that positioning, balanced deriving from the divine attributes and disposition of the powers invested in the human being should be pursued. Such balanced deriving and disposition would be pursued by way of further invocation of divine presence through dhikr which roughly means anamnesis. *Dhikr* means mentioning, invocation, recollection and remembrance of the divine. To borrow Morris's words in explaning Platonic anamnesis which is essentially similar, dhikr is stimulating recollection in the soul through psychegogia, or leading and moving the soul. (Morris, *Plato's Gorgias*, n.d). Balanced deriving and disposition would be pursued by way of employing the function of restraining or *aql* in encasing the powers and attributes, and by way of practicing rites, and by way of living relevant sacred symbolism.[4] Yet here stands a mystery concerning the exact structure of the synergy between human free will and divine pre-destination. Based on all the above, there is a relation of deputyship between the human being (deputy), and the divine manifesting through the divine names (ultimate principal).

Actually, the Quran explicitly establishes that the main creation-related capacity of humanity is that it is a deputy/caliph on earth but without clarifying the referential element of the term deputy.[5] In the pertinent verses, the term deputy/caliph is used in the singular sense to characterize humanity in its entirety. Henceforth, the study will refer to this deputyship as "the creation-related caliphate/deputyship". The mission, and

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[3] 41: 53.
[4] This deputyship and representation is manifested, *inter alia*, in the phrase "In/With the name of God".
[5] 2: 30.

test, of the deputy is to establish *umran* on earth (Ibn Khaldun, 1967, p. 35) in the name of the divine, by way of employing the powers vested by the divine in the human being through manifesting in the divine names. Ibn Khaldun speaks of umran as a nexus of the order of the soul and the order of society. The language used in relation to the characterization of humanity as deputy/caliph creates a mystery. It is evident from the verses of the Quran that the divine is the *ultimate* deputized party. However, the usage of the word caliph/deputy in the indefinite form necessitates the existence of an in-between reality whom humanity deputizes within the context of deputizing the divine. This intermediary is a mystery.

Conception of the Messenger

The Message introduced Mohammed as the last Messenger with an ahistorical mysterious presence. The Messenger is presented as a person who before the revelation indulged in his retreats in a journey of Eros which propelled a pursuit of ascension towards God. The Quran characterized the Messenger as a mercy to all creations, as the sovereign or the master of humanity, As-Sayyed, such sovereignty being based on the deputyship/representation of original divine sovereignty, as the *waley* or trustee of the believers[6], as the last and seal of Messengers and Prophets (See Franz, 2000, p. 199), and as an interceder and Intercessor. Further, the Messenger is presented as the source of guidance. He is the one in whom lies a beautiful *uswa*,[7] which means the very essential basis and essential sustaining pillar of a thing and its highest potentiality. The phrasing of the *uswa* verse, namely the usage of the wording "in the Messenger", necessitates that taking a beautiful *uswa* in the Messenger means that the scope of the possibility is to live *part* of the qualities of the Messenger. The usage of the phrase "in the Messenger" means that a believer cannot, and should not endeavor, in Voegelinian Platonic terminology, to "create the same state of the soul" (Henningsen, 2000, p. 146) or,

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[6] 33: 6.
[7] 33: 21.

crudely stated, to replay the Messenger or his mission. The Messenger used the word *Sunna* to describe his way, in the general sense of the word. The verb *sanna* means to set something such as a path or legislation. The term was taken to mean a direction to be observed with various degrees of strictness. The Quran instructs the believers to observe the directions of the Messenger.[8] The believers used the term Hadith to denote the verbal statements of the Messenger. Further, the Messenger, in more than one incident including the incident of the negotiations preceding the settlement of Hudaybiyya in the year (Ad 628 / H 6), behaved as a piety-driven monarch - as distinguished from a superiority-driven monarch. The Messenger's capacity of a piety-driven monarch was eclipsed by his capacity as s*ervus Dei* or servant of God which the Quran dealt with as his prime capacity. Further, a precondition for faith is that the love of the Messenger or *amor prophita* be greater than *amor sui.* That said, the Messenger is presented as having a mysterious multi-dimensional ahistorical presence which transcends his historical presence. The Quran and hadith indicates that the Messenger's pivotalness, centrality and trusteeship would remain after his death. Not infrequently, the ahistorical presence and the special status of the Messenger is mentioned in the Quran. All the above is underpinned by an assertion of the humanhood of the Messenger, and at the same time, a reference to the notion of experiencing hierophanic encounters. In "Sira and The Question of Tradition", which is one of the chapters of Motzki's book *The Biography of Mohamad The Issue of Sources*, Adrien Leites points that Tor Andrae in his book *Mohammad The Man and His Faith* has reached the conclusion that there are two main conceptions of Mohammad in the early sources.

> According to the first conception, Mohammed is a mere man invested with the function of prophethood at a certain point of his life. According to the second conception, Mohammad is a superhuman being invested with the attribute of prophethood through an election preceding his terrestrial existence. The first conception which was indeed mentioned in the Quran, was favored by Sunni

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[8] 59: 7.

Scholars. The second was originally the product of Shiite and Sufi speculations, but permeated, Sunni traditions. (Leites, 2000, p.55).

Leites refers to the two conceptions as the functional prophet vs the Ontological prophet. (Leites, 2000, p.55, 56). With that said, there seems to be some exaggeration in the term "superhuman", and some generalization in the claim that all Sufi orientations conceive of the Messenger as a superhuman. The choice of the names of the dichotomous categories of conceptions seems reductionist. It obscures the above mentioned conception appearing in the sacred in which the humanhood of the Messenger is reasserted, and at the same time established as experiencing hierophanic encounters.

Conception of the Quran

The Quran is introduced as the divine last word which bears multiple mysteries, and as a prime revealer and regulator of the metaxy. The Quran is conceived as "the literal, authentic and unadulterated word of God." (Abou El Fadl, 2005, p. 114). To this relates the mystery of the characterization of the divine speech in relation to the divine. The Quran is in a part a revelation through which divine self-disclosure is transmitted. At the same time, it consists of mysterious depths through which divine self-veiling is made. So, the Quran, too, is an agent of disclosure and at the same time an agent of mystery. The Quran is described as mysteriously supreme to the human being, such supremacy being reflected in the wording *brought down*.[9] In his article entitle, *Law in Islam and in the West Some Comparative Observations*, Bernard Weiss speaks about the mystery of divine speech and its effect on the supremacy of the Quran:

> In including the divine speech among the seven attributes of God, Islamic orthodoxy made speech, and thus law, a part of the eternal Reality which was God. The relationship between each divine attribute and the divine essence was shrouded in mystery. Not wishing to compromise the divine unity by making the divine attributes components of the divine essence, orthodoxy settled upon a formula which was, like many formulae of Christian dogma, intended more to

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[9] 4: 43.

preserve a proper balance than to explain away a mystery: the divine attributes were said to be neither identical with nor "other than" the divine essence. The point which is relevant to the present discussion is that in raising the divine speech above the level of created things orthodoxy was in effect raising the law above created things. (Adams, Hallaq, and Little, 1991, p. 243-244).

The Quran is comprised of verses pointing to the perfection and fullness of the divine, cosmogonic and eschatological explanations, anecdotes of previous nations and Messengers, and provisions including permissions and prohibitions. The supremacy of the Quran over the human being makes itself felt again in stipulating that seeking divine assistance is the vehicle of fathoming its content and that it cannot be received by human reason alone. The Quranic verses are introduced as consisting of a hierarchy of meanings. Some verses of the Quran deliver a basic meaning and a supplementary meaning or a mystical meaning at once. While using metaphor in speaking of the divine, the Quran abstracts the divine from all creations, and dismisses personification, in a way which mandates not taking the metaphor literally. In so much as the provisions are concerned, the Quran is presented as a book which contains a system of provisions which may be within the reach of individuals who have gained special ability and competence that are based on dedication and divine enlightenment. The Quran is described as the last revelation in the spiritual history of humanity. What is implied here is that embedded in the Quran elements of the mystery that correspond to elements of the mystery embedded in other books. In her book entitled *The Names of God in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: A Basis for Interfaith Dialogue*, Máire Byrne brings to light the contrast established by earliest scholars between an aspect of the mystery of the Quran and an aspect of the mystery of Jesus. Whereas Jesus is the divine eternal word made flesh, the Quran is the divine eternal word made text or made book. (Máire Byrne, 2011, p. 91). On another plane, the Quran is presented as a prime regulator of the tension stirred by the metaxy in that it is established as the vehicle of balance of consciousness. In short, the Quran is presented as a co-source of the *metaxy*, and at the same time a regulator of the tension emanating from the *metaxy*.

Conception of other Messages

The message bears, using in Voegelinian terminology, a "conception of spiritual history and its finality" in which the Message constitutes the last milestone of preceding Messages and revelations. (Franz, 2000, p. 199). So, the epiphany of Mohammad is conceived as an extension of the epiphany of Christ and Moses. (Donner, 2010, p. 69). According to Voegelin, "to the succession of messengers corresponds the succession of the messages". (Franz, 2000, p. 199). Put differently, the MBO was born out of the womb of one of the hierophanic events that comprised the spiritual outbursts of the ecumenic age, and hence falls within the Voegelinian order-related category of "the revelatory form of existence in history". (Franz, 2000, p. 45). In stipulating the epiphany-related unity of the three epiphanies, the Quran particularly stressed the capacity of Islam, Judaism and Christianity as being Abrahamic faiths that reveal one truth. (Abou El Fadl, 2005, p. 121). While avouching the resemblance and similarity of the essence of the shared truth sought, the Quran celebrated the diversity of the forms of the sacraments, rites and rituals lived and practiced in the pursuit to approach the truth. Under the title *Ecumenism* Fred Donner noted that in many occasions, the category of "believers" whom the Quran addressed intensively meant believers from across the three monotheistic religions:

> It seems that Jews or Christians who were sufficiently pious could if they wished have participated in it, because they recognized God's oneness already. Or, to put it the other way around, some of the early believers were Christian or Jews – although surely not all were. The reason for this "confessionally open" or ecumenical quality was simply that the basic ideas of the believers and their insistence on observance of strict piety were in no way antithetical to the beliefs and practices of some Christians and Jews. (Donner, 2010, p. 69).

In a nutshell, the pursuit of the Messenger was inclusive of integrating believers from amongst followers of other monotheistic faiths in spreading a unified monotheistic campaign. The unity of the messages was reflected in the fact that the Message stipulated that believing in previous messages and books is an integral part of the belief in the Message. Implied in the unity of the messages, the unity of the mystery, and the

correspondence between the elements of mystery in the Message, and the elements of mystery in other Messages.

Conception of Al Al-Bayt

The Quran and *Sunna* awarded Al Al-Bayt, or the House of the Messenger, collectively and individually, a special status. The Quran refers to the members of the house of the Messenger as *al-Qurba* which means roughly the close relatives. The Quran positions the *love of Al Al-Byat* as a branch of *amor prophita*, such love being a branch prerequisite for having a proper belief or *iman*. (Kazemi, 2007, p. 17). Invoking the transmission of divine peace and prayer to Al Al-Bayt is a part and parcel of the canonical prayer. (Kazemi, 2007, p. 17). As Al-Qadi Al-Numan clarifies in his book *Disagreements of the Jurists*, the Messenger is reported, as recorded in 'Sunni' and 'Shiite' books, prior to his death, to have established the

> the Book – the Quran – and *ahl al-bayt* "members of the Prophet's family" as twin objects to which the believers must cleave after the demise of the Prophet. (Al-Numan, 2015, p. xvii, xviii). (Kazemi, 2007, p. 17).

The close relatives of the Messenger received a special share in war booty known as the share of Al Al-Bayt. Individually, the Messenger spoke of Fatima as one of the few women in spiritual history who achieved human perfection, and established her as the mother of her father.

Conception of Identity

The revelation established a complex system of identity. The system is comprised of multiple concentric circles of identity. Main amongst those is "the faith circle of identity", "the racial circle of identity", "the family circle of identity", "the tribal circle identity", the "tongue circle of identity", "the local national or *watani* circle of identity", "the trans-territorial national circle of identity", and "the human circle of identity". The revelation positioned itself as the identifier of the conception which ought to be held of each circle of identity, and coordinator. The Message re-acknowledged the Familial and

tribal units of identity as natural divinely-made units of identity. However, customary predispositions and biases were condemned. The Messenger continued to employ the tribal bond and to ensure that some of his actions are considerate to the tribal reality, yet in such a way that the tribal framework is governed by the faith unit of identity.

Conception of Epistemology

The sacred established a metaxy-based conception of epistemology which consists of an element of mystery. The sacred established the foundational conception that *understanding is a function of belief*. St. Anselm's maxim: "I believe that I may understand" or *Credo ut intelligam* (Marias, 2012, p. 144) is not dissimilar of this conception. As mentioned earlier, *the love of the Messenger or amor prophita* is a pre-requisite for a true belief or *iman*. Hence, obtaining episteme starts with *amor prophita* which leads to belief or *Credo* which in turn leads to understanding or *intelligam.* Generally speaking, knowledge comes from the divine to the human being including that knowledge which the human being exerted effort in acquiring. The human being can only identify the truth as a truth only if enabled to do so by the divine. In principle, man's immaterial agents such as the heart are the prime sensorium of truth whereas the senses are, in principle, secondary agents of knowledge. The senses may fail one in obtaining episteme should they operate on the grounds of disbelief. The sacred speaks of knowledge through the senses (sensual knowledge), knowledge through experience (experiential knowledge), knowledge through presence (presential knowledge) or intuitive knowledge. Whereas the element of mystery is present in all the forms of knowledge, it is more evident in presential knowledge. Quintessentially, all forms of knowledge constitute *a participation* in the Voegelinian sense of the word though in varying degrees. Additionally, the human being gains cognition through remembrance/recognition or *ma'rifa* which is perceived as an awareness of something which was forgotten due to the emergence of a veil, and through learning or *ilm* which is conceived as a knowledge of something which the human being did not know of. The human being is born having no knowledge at all - a *tabula rasa* - of the things which the

human being is prone to obtain *ilm* of. On the other hand, the human being is born having *ma'rifa* of the presence of the divine which is prone to growth in time through anamnesis. As for divine names and attributes, the human being is acquainted to them primarily through learning. The human being is expected to obtain *ma'rifa* and *ilm* on the grounds of anamnesis *or dhikr* through contemplation or *tafaqqur* and reason-facilitated examination – or *nathar* both being grounded in anamnesis.[10] Without prejudice to that, reason remains inferior to revelation. The supremacy of revelation over reason finds its roots in the very encounter or the theophany, which is well explained by the following lines from Sandoz's book *The Voegelinian Revolution: a Biographical Introduction:*

> The mystic's quest for *the divine* Ground takes him *into the divine* presence and *into* the ineffable Tremendum of apophatic contemplation and mystical theology. *His quest achieves encounter* with reality at a depth that appears to transcend reason itself; and it is not subject even to analogical communication in either rational discourse or mythopoeic representation, but finds utterance only *through the irrational rationale of paradox* and in the ultimate silence of the contemplative who beholds the ineffable and unfathomable mystery of being. (Sandoz, 1981, p. 166).

Conception of Time

The Sacred formulated a conception of time in which elements of mystery are rooted. The sacred provided a general summarized cosmogonic narrative keeping certain cosmogonic happenings a mystery. Telling certain specific stories about previous epiphanies, spiritual outbursts and nations, the Quran explicitly characterized much of the historical happenings of the past as a mystery that the divine word unveiled. Central to the conception of time and history is the theme of the twelfth hour. However, the Quran maintained the occurrence of the twelfth hour a mystery which is not decryptable:

> The Quran provides considerable detail on the last day: how it will come on us suddenly and without warning. (Donner, 2010, p. 59).

Though, as Voegelin remarked, "the spiritual outbursts are widely scattered in time and space". (Franz, 2000, p. 12), the Message positioned itself as part of the spiritual

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[10] 3: 189, 190.

outbursts of history stressing that the epiphanies of Moses, Christ, and Mohammed are the sources of meaning in history and of such knowledge as man has of it,". (Franz, 2000, p. 50). At one with the Voegelinian's diagnosis that the spiritual outbursts generated "engendered the consciousness of a Before and After" (Franz, 2000, p 46), the Message engendered its own consciousness of a Before and After establishing itself as a source of meaning in history. It also spoke about the age of Abrahamic monotheism as an integrated autonomous historical category, engendering a grand consciousness of a Before and After establishing the diverse faiths as sources of meaning in history. As Voegelin reminds us in *The Ecumenic Age*,

> by letting man become conscious of his humanity as existence in tension toward divine reality, the hierophanic events engender the knowledge of man's existence in the divine-human In-Between, in Plato's Metaxy, as well as the language symbols articulating the knowledge. (Franz, 2000, p. 50).

The very occurrence of the final three epiphanies of Moses, Jesus and Mohammad are established as eschatological signs of its absolute nearness. Put differently, the ecumenic age itself is an eschatological category. Additionally, a sense of a non-linear history lies at the core of the conception of history. This conception is resembled by Voegelin's aforementioned conception of history which is underpinned by the understanding that though consciousness differentiates, it does not differentiates in a linear mode. Inextricably linked to this non-linear conception of history is the conception that "dominion is circulated amongst humanity" across history. Dominion does not stay with one nation or people.[11] Embedded in the relevant verse is the meaning that a dominion is bound to undergo infancy, youth-hood, and elderhood and death. Implicit in the conception of "the circulation of the days" amongst the nations of the world an admission of the presence of "a mystery of history". As one analyzes the maxim of the circulation of dominion amongst the nations and the ensuing maxim of the inevitability of the growth and decay of nations, one is reminded with Voegelin's refutation of the

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[11] 3: 140.

gnostic eschatological interpretation of history and its denial of the maxim of inevitability of the growth and decay of nations. In *The New Science of politics*, Voegelin argues that

> The eschatological interpretation of history results in a false picture of reality; and errors with regard to the structure of reality have practical consequences when the false conception is made the basis of political action. Specially, the gnostic fallacy destroys the oldest wisdom of mankind concerning the rhythm of growth and decay that is the fate of all things under the son. The Kohelet says: To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven: A time to be born and a time to die. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 223, 224).

Conception of Fulfillment and Completion

In the main, the sacred formulated the conception that the sense of complete fulfillment and completion is not attainable in this world. The default mode of the present world is one of non-fulfillment. There is no sense of complete fulfillment and completion in sheer longevity of a rulership or a dynasty.

The formulation of a Confessional Community (a religion-based *umma*)

Building the order of the soul yielded the formulation of a religion-based *umma*, sharing a bond of common faith. Put differently, it generated a defined human collective body sharing one identity. It is the identity of embracing a religion. It generated one transcendentally-based trusteeship grounded in friendship or *wilaya.* That faith-based trusteeship/wilaya is grounded in, and is inspired by, the trusteeship/wilaya of the divine over all creations which is reflected in the divine name Al-Waley (roughly the Trustee/Friend). On another level, as mentioned earlier, the Messenger is presented as the trustee of the believers. Conversely, the believers are the trustees of the all that that are invested in them by the divine. Finally, the believers are trustees of one another. The concept of trusteeship/*wilaya* may be clearer when contrasted with the Aristotilean concepts of *philia politike* and *homonia*. Voegelin explains the nature of the Aristotelian's *philia politike* and *homonia* as follows:

> The Aristotelian conception of philia politike, of political friendship. Such friendship is for Aristotle the substance of political society, it consists in *homonia*, in spiritual agreement between men, and it is possible between men only in so far as these men live in agreement with the nous, that is, the divinest part in themselves. All men participate in the nous, though in varying degrees of intenseness, and, hence, the love of men for their own noetic self will make the nous the common bond between them. Only in so far as men are equal through the love of their noetic self is friendship possible; the social bond between unequals will be weak. On this occasion, now, Aristotle formulated his thesis that friendship was impossible between God and man because of their radical inequality. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 150).

That said, whereas mutual friendship between the divine and the human being is possible in the MBO, it is not possible in the Aristotelian theory. Going back to the formulated *umma*, it included the believers who stayed in Mecca, individual believers who came from other parts of the region, individual believers from other parts of the region who embraced the faith and stayed in their homeland, individual believers from Medina, as well as a group of believers which the Messenger instructed to migrate to Abyssinia. The wording of the Messenger's instructions indicates that the main reason for the migration is to allow the believers to merely live their faith under the rule of a king who is conceived as a just ruler (Bacon and Morris, 2011, p. n.p). During this phase, there is a strict prohibition to engage in any armed confrontation with the polytheists of Mecca. During the Meccan period, the Messenger paid comparatively very limited attention to articulation-related conceptions, and the Quranic revelations did not include ample provisions focused on regulating the public sphere. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 195). Without prejudice to the bond of faith, the bond with the homeland was recognized.

The establishment of the confessional community was harmonized with the recognition of the bond of a homeland. For example, for Meccan believer, Mecca was a homeland in the full sense of the word. This reality is reflected in the words of the Messenger and the expressions of the believers upon migration.

During the Meccan thirteen years, a new system of existential representation was being gradually formulated though with a much slower pace than the formulation of a

system of transcendental representation. The believers of Mecca, forming a religion-based *umma* or a confessional community, took the Messenger as their *de facto* existential leader. He negotiated the leaders of Quraysh on behalf of his emerging community. They met "his acts of command" with habitual obedience. This includes his order of abstaining from responding to the persecution with retaliatory measures, and his orders to abstain from responding with reciprocal measures to the three-year socio-economic boycott that the Masters of Quraysh imposed on the believers. The transcendentally-based trusteeship/ wilaya which the believers shared had an existential aspect in that the believers would be expected to provide one another with protection. A second main step in the formulation of existential representation was the pledge or oath of allegiance given to the Messenger in the Twelfth year as of the revelation (H 621), and the pledge given to him in the thirteenth year of revelation by believers from Mecca and Medina. The main covenant stipulated was that the covenantors would provide the Messenger with protection. (Humphreys, 2006, p. 39).[12] A third step which contributed to the formulation of existential representation was the conciliation of the existential chronic conflict between the two clans of Medina which established him as a mediator and a potential unifier.

The Formulation of a Multi-Confessional Society (a watan-based and a faith-based *umma*)

Upon migration, further steps were taken in building a system of existential representation. In the year AD 622, the Messenger himself migrated. In Medina, the Messenger maintained his capacity in the system of transcendental representation as the head of the religion-based *umma* which had grown. Besides, the Messenger enjoyed a new capacity in the new system of existential representation which pertained to the new

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[12] The article "Did the Quraysh Conclude a Treaty with the Ansar prior to the *hijra*" by Michael Lecker in Harald Motzki's *The Biography of Mohammad The Issue of the Sources* is one of the few historiographical examinations of early reports on an event which falls within the field of "external relations" yet which took place *prior* to the *hijra* and the formal formation of the polity in Medina. That is why it is significant for the discipline of international relations.

polity which was in the making in Medina. He became the prime trustee of a multi-confessional society (a large multi-faith based-*umma*). This society was comprised of the majority of the confessional community of the believers (a religion-based *umma*), and the confessional community of other believers namely the three Jewish clans of Medina (religion/clan-based *umma*s). As far as the political weight of the constituents of the new society are concerned, the largest share in the foundation effort of the new administration was that of the collectivity which migrated from Mecca, now known as the Immigrants, and the collectivity of the converts of Medina, now known as the Helpers. Together, they formed the strongest power in Medina. That is why they had the largest say in governance. Each of the Jewish clans joined as a unionist element, but enjoyed wide autonomy in a *quasi*-federal system. The Messenger also enjoyed the status of the unifier of the two clans of Aws and Khazraj. Additionally, the Messenger re-recognized the geographical spots that are marked as the boundaries of the territory of Medina. In practice, the Messenger consulted with the Jewish clans on matters of collective security prior to battles taking place on the borders of Medina. Further, a mosque was constructed to serve as the main venue of consultation, decision-making and public announcements, in addition to its predominantly transcendental function of hosting prayers. The Messenger carried out what is known as the Brotherization of the Immigrants and the Helpers asking a member from the Helpers to host a member of the Immigrants. The step seems to be serving the objective of solidifying the bond tying the members of the religion-based *umma*. At the same time, the step seems to be serving the objective of reducing the anxiety resulting from leaving home, and the ensuing economic gap. Finally, the step seems to be serving the objective of undoing or reducing the *wilaya* gap and the citizenship gap resulting from becoming part of a new people living in a new homeland. The expeditiousness of the Brotherization seems to mean that there was a desire to prevent taking further foundational steps prior to remedying the above gaps. It seems that said desire was grounded on the understanding that formative characteristics of a body *politique* gain a special capacity and special legitimacy, and grow

in history. Amongst the elements of the *idea directrice* mission which the component of the Immigrants and the Helpers hoped to achieve from becoming part of the larger Home *umma*, and from establishing the dominion of Medina, was the element of living their faith in safety, living their lives in safety, and using the polity as a base for transmitting the teachings of the new faith and the MBO.

The Messenger is reported to have issued a security-driven constitutional document known as *as-sahifa* in which he defined certain elements of the new polity. The parties concerned were the majority of the confessional community of the believers including the Immigrants and the Helpers, and the confessional community of other believers namely the three Jewish clans of Medina. The *Sahifa*, defined those parties together as one *umma* distinguished *within* humanity. To highlight the feature that the *Sahifa* perceived those constituents as one people, and that its provisions moved in the direction of "binding them all together as belonging to a single community" (Donner, 2010, p. 44), Donner named it "the *umma* document." (Donner, 2010, p. 44). So, it was a *watan*-based *umma* or "a society" whose members shared one identity, namely being an inhabitant of Medina. At the same time, it was a multi- confessional *umma* sharing one identity, namely being agents of faith or *iman* in the general sense of the word as illustrated by Donner. The document defined certain provisions related to "the payment of blood money and ransoming of prisoners, (Donner, 2010, p. 44), and related to common defense and common security. Central in the *Sahifa* is the principle of respecting and co-defending private and forbidden areas and off limits of the autonomous constituents that were referred to as *hurumat (plural of hurma)*. The *Sahifa*, together with the military behavior of the Messenger indicate that whereas the Messenger expected the other constituents of the new polity in Medina to partake in defending the common home, he did not expect them to participate in offensive wars of *fath* related to the religion. Characterizing and defining the members of the polity as one "*umma*/nation distinguished within humanity" nuances an important conception in so much as the relation between the MBO and humanity is concerned. The polity

established to live the MBO would not have a global claim to dominate the world. Without prejudice to that, being a distinguished body "of/from humanity", it would have a general human responsibility.

In the Medinian period, a set of other conceptions of the MBO acquired final shape. In the following pages, we will analyze the ones that are most relevant to the study.

Conception of the Trustees or *Ulu al-amr*, the conception of the *Ra'iyya* and the Conception of the Caliphate

The Message established a *sui generis* system of trusteeship and guardianship of *Public affairs*. The system finds its essence in the central verse stipulating obeying the divine, the Messenger and the trustees. The wording of the verse, when taken with other relevant verses such as the verse of the trusteeship of the Messenger, gives the meaning that the supremacy of the trusteeship of the Messenger extends, though in a different way, after his death. In principle, all the members of the *umma* are general trustees and guardians of *the public*, and are stakeholders in res publica, and share a common guardianship. Habitual obedience should be awarded to the divine orders and the Messenger's orders during the Messenger's life and after his death. During and after the death of the Messenger, *the public* sphere and public powers, and functions, will be held by a multiplicity of trustees or *ulu al-amr* and not by one sole Trustee standing between the Messenger and the *umma,* whether a natural person or an artificial person.[13] Simply put, the multiple trustees are entrusted to serve as guardians of the *ra'iyya* (roughly the constituency) on behalf of the Messenger *directly*. Habitual obedience to the trustees is conditioned with the trustee's obedience of the Messenger. The trustees include trustees who are elemental and existential representatives, and trustees that are authorized by an elemental and/or existential representative. The trustees also include self-proclaimed

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[13] 4: 59.

trustees. The collectivity of the people, other than the trustees, is generally referred to as *ra'iyya* which means those who are subject to trusteeship or those who are looked after.

The Caliphate/Deputyship of the Messenger being the nature of the trusteeship

During the life of the Messenger, the notion that the caliphate/deputyship was the nature of the believers' trusteeship was partly revealed. Reports inform that when the Messenger travelled outside of Medina, he assigned a deputy as a senior trustee of Medina. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 31). The assignment was expressed by the verb *istakhlafa* which means to assign a deputy. Also during his life, the Messenger also assigned deputies to carry out adjudication. The later sources used the term *istakhlafa* to point to the Messenger's designating one of the companions to serve as judge during the Messenger's life. In both cases, the deputy was authorized to practice the power vested in him in the name of the Messenger within the context of continuing to recognize the Messenger as supreme trustee, and within the context of continuing to recognize his presence. The deputyship was "of the Messenger". Because this deputyship relates mainly to the framework of the society and its public sphere and to the continuation of the society as an association, the study shall refer to it as "the association-related caliphate". That being the case, it is of cardinal importance to appreciate the differences between "the association-related caliphate/deputyship" and the aforementioned creation-related caliphate/deputyship". Due to the nature of the notion of the caliphate, its application flowered and gained sophistication *after* his death. Thus, part of the meaning of the concept of the caliphate will be furnished here, and part in the following chapter Three.

Conceptions of Jihad and Fath or Conquest

The sacred provided a conception of the concepts of *jihad* (roughly exertion of effort) and *fath* (roughly faith-driven conquest) that consist of elements that are inextricably linked to the order of the soul and the order of society. The Quran used the term *jihad* to denote struggling with the inner self, by fighting one's own *superbia*, ego,

libido dominandi, desires, inner temptations and attachment to earthly things for the purpose of achieving realization and nearness of the divine. Ona second level, the Quran used the term *jihad* to denote exerting effort in the pursuit of truth *by word* alone. It also used it to denote exerting effort in the pursuit of truth by the sword. The Quran used the term *fath* to denote the descent of illumination from the divine unto one's consciousness. Additionally, the Quran used the term *fath* to mean the peaceful entry of the word of the Message into a new territory for the first time. The study refers to this type of conquest as word-based *fath*. The Quran used the term *fath* to denote the entrance of the Message being backed by sword-based piety-driven jihad. The study refers to this type of conquest as sword-based *fath*. In many parts of the revelation, ontological jihad and conquest in the realm of the soul was given priority and primacy over public jihad and conquest in the inter-societal realm. The latter was introduced as a function of the former. Without prejudice to that, and grounded in this relationship, the revelation spoke of a relation of reflexivity between both. The stipulations of jihad and conquest during the period of revelation were surrounded by denunciation of behaviors that emerged as of the establishment of the polity in Medina amongst the believers that point to the inclination to be preoccupied by benefiting from jihad and conquest in affluence accumulation and achieving supremacy, the very components of imperialism. Put differently, the sacred spoke of the presence of a metastatic consciousness drawn towards the immanent pole of existence.

Conception of Ddisorder and Ddeformation *(fitna* and *tagyeer*)

Actually, the imperialist tendency was only one of the ingredients of deformation and disorder that emerged as of the commencement of the effort to establish the MBO, and in relation to which a conception was established by the sacred which was also inclusive of elements that pertained to the order of the soul and the order of society. The conception of *fitna* lies at the core of the notion of deformation. On one level, *fitna* meant the state of disorder of the soul which results in conceptual and behavioral perplexity due to, *inter alia*, temptation in the widest sense of the word. In the public

realm as Asma Afsaruddin points out in her article entitled *Maslaha as a Political Concept*, the Arabic word *fitna* is generally and particularly in the political realm understood to connote "disorder" and "chaos." (Boroujerdi, 2013, p. 30). During the second century, the theme of *fitna* addressed primarily the intra-communal question of political and religious leadership" (Donner, 1998, p. 187) and the disunity and decline of order resulting from differences and confrontations over that question that emerged particularly as of the eruption of the first revolution and the subsequent *khurujs* or rebellions in (655-61 Ad/30-40 H). That said, the notion of *taghyeer* or deformational change represents the second main ingredient of the conception of disorder and deformation. The Quran used the term *taghyeer* to denote causing certain aspects of the inherent fundamental built-in perfection of the essence of something to deteriorate and to be defaced based on a hurtful innovation, or an innovation running counter to the MBO. It does not mean that there is a complete *alteration* of the essence. A close concept to the Quranic concept of deformational change is Plato's concept of the unmeasured innovation as articulated in *The Laws*. (Plato, 1892, p. 226). The Quran used the term *islah* to denote restoration. The Quran makes it clear that the initiation of causing a deformational change is attributed to the human being. The Quran states that the divine shall not permit the fall in *taghyeer* unless the human being has, with full free will, opted to move towards *taghyeer* and has actually taken concrete measures in pursuing that. Within the context of providing the human being an edge in the pursuit of salvation the Quran stipulates that the will of the divine would not induce or allow the deterioration unless they had firmly directed their own will in the direction of causing a deteriorational change.[14] A particular emphasis is laid on the existence of a strong potentiality of *fitna* or disorder and *taghyeer* or deformation in relation to conquest. Not infrequently does the Quran engage the mystery as a means of confronting and diluting the disordering effect of *fitna* and *taghyeer*, including *fitna* resulting from conquest and the augmentation of the imperial tendency. Clear in the sacred is the maxim that the

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[14] 13: 11.

effort of building the order of the soul and the order of the society is constantly challenged by forces of deformation and disordering. So, absence of deformation and disorder is impossible. By the same token, total absence of the order of the soul is impossible even when the wave of deformation and disorder of the soul has heightened due to the presence of an unchangeable or non-deformable essence in every human soul.

The MBO as the Quaternarian Structure

In establishing the relatively autonomous community in Mecca, and the polity in Medina, the Messenger and the believers' lived, and set models of living, the quaternarian structure of God world man society. When consciousness has become luminous through the hierophanic events, it begins to draw on its conception of the divine creation of the world by building the society. So, the creation of the society in history is man's word which is spoken in response to, and in participation in, the divine word spoken in the soul, namely divine ordering, and the divine word spoken in transcendence, namely the order of the divine names, and the divine word spoken in the cosmos, namely the order of the cosmos. Put differently, the divine ordering in the soul and the moving of man in history has evoked a human response. When man has become conscious of divine reality as moving his humanity (Franz, 2000, p. 62), man responded by speaking society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we attempted at providing an account of the conceptions of the MBO. We began with the set of conceptions that lie at the heart of the system of transcendental representation and the element of mystery in them. We then explained the emergence of the system of existential representation. Amongst the conceptions is the very conception of disorder which is expressed by the concepts of *fitna* and *taghyeer*. By the end of the revelation period, an order with a system of transcendental representation and a system of existential representation was formed. The MBO was

diagnosed as a quaternarian structure in the Voegelinian sense. The minute the MBO was established, forces of disorder were also at work. Analyzing the systems of transcendental representation and existential representation led us to contemplate the relation between the order of society and the order of the soul. We found out that the order of the soul had a general primacy over the order of the society. Without prejudice to that, once ordering is in motion, the two enter into a reflexive relationship. We also noted that the concept of the caliphate of the Messenger emerged during the revelation period. We called it "the association-related caliphate" for purposes of distinguishing it from the creation-related caliphate. Given the nature of the caliphate, neither the term nor the deformation of its meaning nor the relevant deformation of the mystery in the range of caliphate-related theoretical fabrics will be comprehensible if we did not explore it in the foundational caliphal reign of the first four caliphs. This we will now attempt.

Chapter Three: Deputizing the Messenger, mounting deformation and invigoration of the mystery

In this chapter, we will explore what the caliphate meant during the foundational reign of the first caliphs and the development of the position towards the MBO conceptions and towards the mystery. Special attention will be given to discerning forms of mounting deformation in general and particularly to the deformation which pertains to the external sphere and to imperial tendencies. We will begin by focusing on aspects relating the system of existential representation. In so doing, we will analyze the process of designating the first caliph mining for caliphate-related constitutional meaning. This will be followed by examining telling elements of the system of symbolism that are hoped to unearth the self-concept of the caliphs, as well as dominant trends of self-concept amongst the *ra'iyya*. Then we will analyze behaviors concerning some essential MBO conceptions in relation to which concerns about distortion augmented or which were prey to actual distortion. Finally, we will analyze significant thorough attempts at restoring MBO conceptions in relation to which special care was given to the attempt at invigorating the elements of mystery in those MBO conceptions, and how such attempts were related to ramifications of complications pertaining to the external sphere and to imperial tendencies.

Deputizing the Messenger

In 632, immediately upon the death of the Messenger, the public stage in Medina bore witness to a set of behaviors and practices and rhetoric that are reflective of the understanding that the main inherent condition of the believers, manifested by the caliphate, was the deputization of the Messenger in the widest sense of the term. Such a behavior is discernable on the level of the societal heads, the caliphs and the members of the *ra'iyya*. The following pages explain this behavior on those three levels.

In materialization of the MBO conception of the public trustees or *ulu al-amr*, societal heads from amongst the believers rushed to hold what maybe referred to in

today's parlance as constitutional consultations in order to designate a caliph within the context of deputizing the Messenger by way of maintaining the polity which he led the foundation of. Leading companions from amongst the immigrants and the Helpers convened in the public lounge or *saqifa* of the clan of Sa'ida to conduct urgent constitutional consultations to designate a caliph (Kennedy, 2004, p. 51). They spontaneously split according to their capacities which was at work on the eve of the foundation of the polity a decade or so earlier, namely Immigrants and Helpers. In today's constitutional parlance, they returned to their "foundational constitutional capacities". The Helpers made the case that the caliph should be one of them, while the Immigrants argued that he should come from them. An existential argument ended the fierce consultations: The appointment of a caliph from Quraysh, to whom most of the Immigrants belonged, was a guarantor of the *survival* and stability of the *polit*y given the assessment that the surrounding tribes of Arabia have grown accustomed to recognizing a head who came from the imminent Quraysh. The majority of the attendees accepted the designation of Abu Bakr based on the above criterion in the hope that this will ensure the continuation of the union upon which the Messenger led the foundation of the polity. As Hodgson puts it,

> Umar promised his loyalty to Abu-Bakr, and the Ansar soon followed suit, as did the Quraysh. With the two towns thus determined to maintain Muhammad's polity. (Hodgson, 1974, p. 198).

The constitutional consultation hoped to maintain the MBO after the Messenger's death *mutatis mutandis*. Capitalizing on their authorities as trustees or *uli amr* of their circles, the societal heads assumed the power of loosening and binding which entails the designation of the caliph, within the context of deputizing the Messenger in maintaining the polity which he led the foundation of. The power of *loosening* is the power of delegitimizing and revoking the appointment of an incumbent. The power of binding is the power of recognizing the legitimacy on the incumbent. In Voegleinian terms, the power of loosing and binding is mainly an existential power as it is underpinned by the assumption of the ability of orders of the binder/looser to commit his followers.

Twelve years later, in 644 AD, another consultation to designate a caliph would be held upon the instructions of the Second caliph, revealing an ingredient of the deputization of the Messenger, namely commitment to precedence set by him. On his death bed, the second caliph Umar ordered the formation of a committee of six figures from amongst the companions to decide on the designation of the third caliph from amongst themselves. Unlike the constitutional moment succeeding the death of the Messenger at which the societal heads split as Immigrants and Helpers, the six companions were all from the Immigrants. At the last stage of the consultation, the consultation coordinator requested from each of the final two candidates, Uthman and Ali, their unequivocal commitment to the conduct and precedent of the Messenger, and to the conduct and precedent of the previous two caliphs. Ali answered by saying that he would commit to the conduct of the Messenger. However, in relation to the precedent of the previous two caliphs, he would exert his effort to arrive at the right decision independently in the same way the first and second caliphs did. Uthman approved and accordingly, the coordinator named him the Caliph. So, committing to the Messenger's precedent, alone, was mandatory and undisputed. Committing to the precedent of the first two caliphs was optional. Ali's above answer revealed the unique rank of the power of the precedent of the Messenger and its supremacy. It represents an admission of the infallibility of the Messenger and a confirmation of the fallibility of the Caliphs. It is important to note that given the weight of Ali, had he pledged commitment to the precedent of the previous two caliphs, his pledge would have been taken to mean that the power of the precedent set by the two Caliphs is equivalent to the power of the precedent of the Messenger. That said, Ali's answer should not be construed as underpinned by an undervaluing of the precedent of the first two caliphs. His answer speaks for the conviction that there would be more than one archetypal model in deputizing the Messenger in so much as matters in relation to which there was no precedent by the Messenger. Ali's answer was order-conscious. It speaks for the recognition of what we call "the order of the power of precedent".

Looking at the two constitutional consultations of 632 and 644 with the Voegelin's lines on the theoretical concept of existential representation in mind, one is piqued to compare the underlying existential representation-related assumptions that underpinned the two consultations. In the first constitutional consultation, the attendees split into Immigrants and Helpers. The main constitutional questions discussed was: What existential representation-related considerations should determine the designation of the caliph? It pertained to the relation between such present considerations that are hoped to contribute to sustaining the polity at the present moment, and the considerations that contributed to sustaining the polity of the Messenger. This constitutional moment may qualify as "an irregular constitutional moment". In the second constitutional consultation, the consulters were all immigrants. The main constitutional question discussed was: What is the nature of the code of governance to which the to-be-caliph should govern. It pertained to the relation between the commitment by the to-be-caliph to the precedent of the previous two caliphs, and his commitment to the precedent of the previous two caliphs. This constitutional moment may qualify as "a regular constitutional moment".

Generally speaking, the governance of caliphs was underpinned by the attempt at deputizing the Messenger by way of keeping effective decisions taken by the Messenger, as well as pledges made to him. We are able to observe the attempt at keeping his decisions effective in the refusal by the first caliph to submit to the pressure of certain companions to replace a young army commander appointed by the Messenger. (Kennedy, 2004, p. 53). We are able to observe the attempt at keeping pledges made to him effective in the insistence of the first caliph to wage war against the rebelling tribes of Arabia that refrained from effecting the alms which they effected to the Messenger to the Caliphal seat. The insistence of the first caliph should be understood within the context that acquiescing meant the breakdown of the polity. According to Coeli Fitzpatrick and Adam Hani Walker,

the battles that ensued are commonly termed the Apostate Wars (Ridda Wars). This is a poor choice of terminology, as the prevailing issues had little to do with suppressing people because of their apostasy and instead had much to do with the fact that various quarters were trying to avoid their existing financial obligations, trying to break away pans of the Islamic lands unilaterally, or, in some cases, planning attacks against Medina. (Fitzpatrick and Walker 2014, p. 4)

The caliphs created a system of symbolism correlating to the nexus of the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation which was underpinned by the understanding that deputizing the Messenger was the essence of the caliphate. We have established in the previous chapter that the mosque was an essential institution in the systems of transcendental and existential representation. After the Messenger's death, the pulpit served as one of the vehicles of recognizing the ahistorical presence of the Messenger. Every pulpit in every mosque would be named "the pulpit of the Messenger". The name and architecture of the pulpit denoted three things. The first is that the Messenger is the point at which the intersection of the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation is most visible. The second is the ahistorical presence of the Messenger. The third is the centrality and supremacy of that presence. The caliphs demonstrated their capacity as deputies who are of a subordinate level while delivering sermons. The following lines by Vincent Cornell from his book *Voices of Islam: Voices of art, beauty, and science* are demonstrative how the first two caliphs were keen to symbolically illuminate and manifest the subordination of the position of caliph to the Messenger:

> The prototype of the minbar is a sort of stepped stool which the Prophet used in his mosque at Medina to talk to the assembled faithful. According to certain traditional authorities, this stool had three levels. The Prophet sat on the third level and rested his feet on the second. After him, Abu Bakr, the first caliph, sat on the second level and rested his feet on the first. `Umar, the second caliph, took his seat on the first level and placed his feet on the ground. The hierarchical sense of the levels is clear. (Cornell, 2007, p. 53).

That said, the caliphs actually enunciated the understanding that deputizing the Messenger was the essence of the caliphate. The first caliph is reported to have been addressed as "Caliph of Allah" during his early days in office, and to have immediately

corrected the speaker by saying: "I am not the Caliph of Allah, but the Caliph of the Messenger of Allah." The incident warrants certain important inferences in relation to the distinction between the human creation-related caliphate and the association-related caliphate. The resolute rejection to be addressed as "Caliph of Allah" confirms the existence of a mystery in relation to the human-creation related caliphate. It indicates that the concrete deputy of the Messenger shall not be referred independently as Caliph of God. In turn, this denotes that the "scope" of the human creation-related caliphate is predominantly distinct from the scope of the association-related caliphate, and that both scopes should not be overlapped. Finally, it indicates that none of the concrete members of the human race shall be referred to *independently* as Caliph of God. With that said, the event is demonstrative that as early as the dawn of the first caliphate, a deformational conception confusing the association-related caliphate with the creation-related caliphate.

The caliph's attempt to deputize the Messenger, and to live the MBO, was rooted in an *assertion of the fallibility of the caliph* whether in relation to acts pertaining to the system of transcendental representation or pertaining to the system of existential representation. The Caliphs were keen to assert their fallibility upon their inauguration, and in other occasions. This practice was initiated by the first caliph in his inauguration where he said:

> I have been made your trustee, and I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong set me right.[15]

The repetitive assertion of fallibility may be characterized as a step of resocialization. It was a means of inculcating the *ra'iyya* with the idea that the system of transcendental and existential representation has undergone some modification by the death of the Messenger.

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[15] Translated by the dissertation writer.

It is the above-mentioned differences between the nature of the status and authority of the Messenger and the status and authority of the caliphs, *inter alia*, that oblige us not to agree with Hallaq's assessment which saw that caliphal authority ran parallel to the authority of the Messenger. According to Hallaq:

> but by the time of his death, when his mission had already met with great success, he was the most important living figure the Arabs knew. Nonetheless, these Arabs also knew of the central role that Umar I, Abu Bakr and a number of others had played in helping the Prophet, even in contributing to the success, if not survival, of the new religion. Like him, they were charismatic men who commanded the respect of the faithful (and in the case of Umar I, the ability to instill fear in his adversaries). Inasmuch as Muhammad's authority derived from the fact that he upheld the Quranic Truth and never swerved from it, these men – some of whom later became caliphs – derived their own authority as privileged Companions and caliphs from the same fact – namely, upholding the Quranic Truth. This is not to say that caliphal authority was necessarily or entirely derivative of that of the Prophet; in fact, it ran parallel to it. Muhammad was the messenger through whom the Quranic Truth was revealed – the caliphs were the defenders of this Truth and the ones who were to implement its decrees (Hallaq, 2005, p. 43).

As we have seen earlier, the behavior and rhetoric of the Caliphs was not founded on the conception that their general authority as agents of guidance was a peer of the general authority of the Messenger as a source of guidance. Obviously, they did not regard their legal authority as a match for the legal authority of the Messenger as a legislator.

On the level of the *ra'iyya*, the reign also bore witness to behaviors within the *ra'iyya* that are reflective of the understanding that the main inherent condition of the believers was the deputization of the Messenger which was manifested by referring to the public sphere as the caliphate. As caliphs embarked on performing their governance-related duties, ordinary members of the *ra'iyya* took various initiatives and assumed the power of monitoring and the power of holding caliphs and their delegates accountable. Public interrogation of caliphs and governors and officials by members of the *ra'iyya* using the conduct of the Messenger as measurement became ubiquitous. The interrogator would question the caliph's financial conduct even in cases where the

caliph's personality is feared as the case with the second caliph Umar. Members of the public would demand from caliphs immediate public financial disclosure, and would report to caliphs the unlawful financial practices by governors demanding expeditious correction and penalty. Expressions by the different segments of the *ra'iyya*, including women, of their opinion concerning public policy, concerning public spending, and concerning external relations including opposing views, became more visible. In Voegelinian terms, the *ra'iyya* understood that it bears part of the weight of representation. From the other end, the Caliphs' behavior and rhetoric speaks for a general recognition of the *ra'iyya*'s above mentioned practices of monitoring which in turn points to a conception of the *ra'iyya* as stakeholders of the caliphate and as co-trustees.

The pursuit of the *ra'iyya* to live as a stakeholder in the caliphship of the Messenger and as a co-trustee of public sphere was also rooted in the understanding that the *ra'iyya* was fallible in relation to the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation. One of the first things which the fourth Caliph did was to inspect the mosques in order to listen to the narrators and to assess the authenticity and soundness of the narration and the compliance of their public statements with the major tenants of the MBO. The forth Caliphs removed many narrators on the basis of lack of sufficient competence. In explaining his instruction to his governor Al-Ashtar to be merciful towards the people under his trusteeship, the forth Caliph Ali reminds his governor that "mistakes slip from them, defects emerge from them, deliberately or accidently" (Kazemi, 2007, p. 220). In it, he also says, "people do have faults" (Kazemi, 2007, p. 221). Yet he cautions his governor that the correction of the shortcomings of the *ra'iyya* should be carried out with mercy. Ali's words to Al-Ashtar:

> Let those of your subjects who most keenly seek out the faults of others be the ones furthest away from you and the most despicable in your eyes. For people do have faults which behoves the governor – above all others – to conceal. So do not disclose those faults which remain hidden from you. Your duty is but to purify

that which has become apparent and obvious to you; God will judge concerning those things which remain hidden from you. So, try and veil deficiencies as much as you can, so that God may veil from your subjects that in yourself which you wish to be veiled. (Kazemi, 2007, p. 221).

That being the case, the understanding that the deputization of the Messenger was the main inherent condition of the believers is reflected by the spontaneity and immediacy of using the title of caliph, and the absence of a competing title, upon the death of the Messenger. The head of the polity was referred to as Caliph and the public sphere as caliphate. Whereas the companions fiercely debated who should be the incumbent of the position, they did not debate the title "caliph", nor the use of the term caliphate in reference to the common public affair. In nuancing the usage of the term, using the title in reference to the head of the polity and to the public sphere was underpinned by the assumption that in both cases it was grounded by and informed by a process of building the MBO in the soul. All that and the previous meanings of the grand conceptions of the MBO render it plausible to propose the definition that in essence, "caliph" is the name of the inherent condition of deputizing the Messenger in maintaining and restoring the MBO in the soul and in the external sphere, individually and collectively, in proportion to existing limitations. It is a name of the inherent human condition of deputizing the Messenger in maintaining and restoring the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation.

The reign bore witness to the emergence of other titles that were secondary tot he title caliph, and that were underpinned by its essence namely the deputization of the Messenger such as "*amir al-mu'mineen*" or the "commander of the faithful". This understanding is corroborated by the following insightful order-related psycho/military and sociopolitical explanation of the adoption of the title *Amir Al-Mu'minin* by Hodgson:

> The only binding authority the Arabs had recognized was that of the military commander on the march to new pastures or at war. Though the Qur'an enforced the idea of a community, in which individual pious action was completed by joint action in the cause of God, it provided directly for no government other than that of the Prophet himself. The only position, therefore, that could be felt to be

legitimate was still that of military commander, with authority correspondingly limited. 'Umar saw this as his position. But war was the business of the community for the present and such a position opened a wide scope of responsibility. The Muslims accepted him as commander of the community in any matter wherein each man could not act for himself. This position of command rested on personal prestige; and in this case, on a religious prestige. Since any group action beyond tribal interests was a matter for religion, we may say that it was precisely in religious matters that he was successor, 'caliph', to the Prophet; certainly his decisions were to be consistent with what Muhammad had shown of God's will. Of course, since he received no revelations from God, he had no independent religious authority; it was only current political questions that he was to decide on this religious basis. In any case, his authority depended on his personal closeness to the precepts and example of Muhammad and on his being personally recognized at Medina- and on that account also by the bulk of the Muslims at large - as in fact representing Muhammad's way. (Hodgson, 1974, p. 207).

These lines reiterate how the overarching governance was that of the Messenger, and that the legitimacy of the title of commander of the faithful was measured in light of the ability of the incumbent to represent the way of the principal. To this we may add that the title commander of the faithful also expressed the lines that ought to be drawn between the deputy and the principal. Put differently, the title draws those lines between the incumbent and the Messenger that help identify the incumbent's acts of command as his acts, not the acts of the Messenger, and that it is the incumbent who is accountable for such acts. The title "Commander of the faithful" helped in indicating that the framework of deputyship should not result in an overlap between the person of the caliph and the person of the Messenger. The Caliph's behavior, decisions and actions shall not be perceived as automatically intended by the Messenger. Finally, it plausible to argue that a vast cohort of studies focus on the significance of the first component of the title, namely "commander", to the detriment of the second component, namely "the faithful". We mentioned in the previous Chapter's Fred Donner's discerning interpretation of the connotations of the term "faithful" and how it sometimes was meant to denote a multi-confessional society which shares the bond of faith, and which takes as its mission in history living faith in the widest sense of the term, and advancing

the cause of faith ecumenically. So, it is plausible to construe that the title Commander of the faithful was meant, at least in part, to express this characteristic.

The literature on the caliphate has seen an enduring debate whether the term caliph meant deputy or successor. This debate was analyzed by Oliver-Dee in his book *The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic Governance.* As Oliver-Dee points out, on the one hand, Watt takes the term "caliph" to mean "deputy" based on examination of material belonging to pre-Islamic culture. Crone and Hinds and Watt takes the term "caliph" to mean "deputy" citing pre-Islamic Arab inscriptions. Crone and Hinds argue that the title was "Deputy of God" right from the outset". They cite the Quranic verses that speak of the creation-related caliphate which we mentioned in the previous chapter, and by evidencing that the title caliph of God was used during the Umayyad reign. (Oliver-Dea, 2009. p. 18). It should be added that in substantiating this argument, Crone and Hinds argued that the third caliph is reported to have described himself as the "Khalifatu Allah" and as the "deputy of God", and that one of the poets used the title "Khalifatu Allah". (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 6). On a second front, Goldziher and Para, "both claim that successor". They also base their argument on the Quranic verses that speak of the creation-related caliphate. On a third front, Bernard Lewis takes a different position defining "khalifa as deputy, replacement and successor from the verbal root "to pass on." (Oliver-Dea, 2009. p. 18). He cites the same Arab inscription cited by Crone and Hinds.

We have demonstrated above a set of behaviors, practices and rhetoric that are reflective of the understanding that the main inherent condition of the believers, manifested by the caliphate, was the deputization of the Messenger. In the event in which the first Caliph dismissed the title "Caliph of God", should the concept of caliph have meant "successor", the addressor would have not referred the term "caliph" to "God", and the first caliph would not have sufficed with the above correction. Our findings are at one with the first part of the assessment of Crone and Hinds, namely that the term caliph meant "deputy. Yet, we cannot agree with the second part that the title

was Caliph of God from the outset. The claim that the third caliph described himself as caliph of God is not substantiated by the absolute majority of the sources on the caliphate. In all likelihood, it was made up later by founding Umayyad caliphs who used the title "caliph of God" to assert the existence of a precedent. There are no reports that the second caliph or the fourth caliph were ever addressed by the title "caliph of God". Hence, one cannot take from such reports that as of the third caliph which includes the period from Uthman to Ali - the concept of Caliph meant caliph of God. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 19). We based our treatment on the behavior and rhetoric and symbolism of the reign of the first four caliphs. We did not base it on the meaning of the term caliph in pre-revelation times. We don't object to the remark that certain verses of the Quran used the term caliphs to mean a succeeding generation. The literal meaning "to succeed" or "to come after" is only one of the meanings of the verb "*khalafa*" next to other meanings including the meaning "to serve as deputy". But this usage does not prejudice the use of the Quran of the term caliph to mean "deputy" as furnished in chapter Two.

Settling the debate whether the concept of Caliph means "deputy" or "successor" has serious order-related implications. Presuming that the concept of Caliph means "successor" permits the conceptualization that the Messenger as an actor of the past and a historical actor, a sheer "predecessor". It permits the conceptualization that the successor is independent of the predecessor and is free to pursue an independent *idea directrice*, and permits the conceptualization that the successor is equal to the Messenger or even that the successor is supreme. On the other hand, understanding the term Caliph to mean "deputy" runs parallel to tenants of the Message-based order in that it is in keeping with the concept of the continuation of the presence of the Messenger, and is based on the ahistorical nature of the Messenger and his teaching. As Oliver-Dee remarks

> the extended discussion upon the exact meaning of the original Arabic word might he deemed obscure. However, a conclusive answer to the intended meaning of the word also speaks into the wider issue of legitimization. For if the title deputy was indeed the common designation of the Caliphs rather than

"successor", then the source of legitimization becomes different: the Caliph as "deputy" is responsible to whomever he is deputizing for, rather than the "successor" who simply follows on from his predecessor. Further within the title "deputy" is the tension implied by "Deputy of God" against "Deputy of the Prophet of God," which also suggests a lessening of Mohammad himself as a source of legitimacy: The deputy of God is very different from the deputy of the Prophet of God. (Oliver-Dee, 2009. p. 18-19).

Mounting deformation

The attempt to live the deputization of the Messenger took place within the greater pursuit of living the grand conceptions of the MBO and confronting the mounting deformation. Particularly, the greater part of the attention was given to stiffening particular MBO conceptions that would enable a smooth transition of consciousness, and that would contribute significantly to preventing the growth of elements of deformation leading to an imbalance of consciousness.

The dawn of the Caliphal reign bore witness to an attempt at preempting a deformation of the MBO conception of the Messenger in the system of transcendental representation by way of accentuating him. Upon the spread of the news of the death of the Messenger, a number of companions showed signs of shock and denial. Upon noticing the signs of panic and shock, Abu Bakr said loudly:

> Let him then know, whoever worshiepth Mahomet. Mahomet is dead. But whose worshipeth God, let him know that the Lord liveth and doth not die. (Muir, 2010, p. 284).

It seems that the statement was motivated by the assumption that the state of shock in which some companions were was a potential introduction of an accentuation of the Messenger in the system of transcendental representation which would be at variance with the MBO conception of the Messenger. This accentuation would lead to a state of loss of balance of consciousness. Implicit in the statement is an attempt at bringing about a transition of consciousness by virtue of which the collective consciousness would recognize the end of the mode of the presence of the Messenger which the believers

were used to, and the commencement of another mode of presence, namely the postmortem ahistorical presence.

Specific attention was given to the consolidation of the MBO conception of the Quran as the prime pillar of the system of meaning, and as the chief regulator of the metaxy. A first step in this attempt was the compilation and production of a standard text. As Hallaq notes, "the importance of the Quran as the principal guide of Muslim life required the fixing of a vulgate". (Hallaq 2005, p. 33). The task engrossed the attention in spite of the rise of serious existential threats. The first Caliph took the initiative of compiling the Quran at a time in which the polity was in sharp transition. In addition, it was facing an existentially threatening internal mutiny. Even more importantly, it was facing an increasingly serious external military threat from the world's strongest power, Byzantium. Later, the third caliph Uthman designed and launched an effort to prepare the authentic version of the standard text, and to send it to the provinces to be used in place of other copies containing variations. The mission was also carried out in a critical moment. The rapid conquest and expansion was creating increasing complications. Furthermore, new forms of internal unrest continued to unfold. That being the case, the compilation and issuance of the standard text speak for a recognition that there was what we may call "a meaning gap" between the center and the peripheries and a hope to minimize that gap. On the other hand, the opposition by segments of the people especially in the provinces against the decrees to burn the unauthentic versions speaks for the existence of another meaning gap which the rulership in the center was not conscious of. A second step was the installation of the Quranic provisions into the legislative system. As Hallaq remarks,

> at this early period, the Quran's injunctions, combined with the public policies of the new order, represented the sole modification to the customary laws prevailing among the Peninsular Arabs, laws that contained indigenous tribal elements and, to a considerable extent, legal provisions that had been applied in the urban cultures of the Near East – including the cities of the Hejaz – for over a millennium. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 32).

Hallaq explains how certain old customary laws persisted:

> While Abu Bakr and Umar I's enforcement of Quranic laws points to the centrality of the Quran in the emerging state and society, it is also clear that the new order had to navigate an uncharted path for which the Quran provided little guidance. A large portion of pre-Islamic Arabian laws and customs remained applicable, and indeed survived into the legal culture that was being constructed. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 33).

A third step in the task of consolidating the MBO conception of the Quran was inculcating the growing dispersed *ra'iyya* with the Quranic teachings through dispatching Quranic teachers, and firming the MBO-based legal system and the Quran-based adjudication through dispatching judges or *qadis*. According to Hallaq,

> The new leadership of the Islamic state realized the importance of the policy of religious indoctrination, which they viewed as essential to achieving unity among the unruly tribal Arabs engaged in the conquests. Booty alone could not appease them for long, and the need was felt – especially during the caliphate of Umar I – for implanting a religious (Islamic) ethic. To this end, the early caliphs built mosques in each garrison town, and deployed Quranic teachers who enhanced the military commanders' religious program already in place. Private and public preachers whose function overlapped with that of the story-tellers and the commanders, were as much part of this religious deployment as the qadis were dispatched. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 55).

Also, specific attention was given to stiffening the MBO conception of conquest and the reliance of external conquest on inner conquest. The instructions by Caliphs to commanders in the frontiers consisted of the reminding of the destructive ramifications of failing to maintain inner spiritual health, and assertions that impiety is a direct cause of military failure. For example, in the mandate he issued to the new commander to be in charge of the armies conquering Syria, the second caliph warned against attachment to worldly things:

> Therefore shut off your sight from this world and divert your heart from it. Do not at all let it destroy you as it destroyed those before you whose death you have seen. (At-Tabari, 1993, p. 159).

Also, in his letter to the commander of the armies that were conquering Egypt and that failed to promptly conquer Alexandria, the Second Caliph attributed the delay in

conquering Alexandria in the year 640 to finding fulfilment and completion in worldly things. (Wright, 2006, p. 167). The forth caliph made the restoration of inner order an instrument of sound governance. (Kazemi, 2007, p. 222-232).

As vehicles of stiffening the MBO conception of conquest, the caliphs undertook a transformation of the main cities into "centers of radiation of order" and "centers of radiation of meaning" which actually helped in spreading the meaning of other MBO conceptions and elements of the system of meaning. During the reign of the first three caliphs, Madina was the main center of radiation of order" and "center of radiation of meaning. From Medina, the greater part of judges or *qadis* and teachers were dispatched. To Medina, new converts flocked to learn the Quran and the sciences of religion. During the reign of the forth caliph, Kufa, to which he moved, became one of the places in which his epistemic line specifically flowered. Soon, Mecca and Basra followed suit. The caliphs themselves were main explicators of order and conveyers of meaning. The pursuit to radiate order and the elements of the system of meaning targeted the inculcation and socialization of segments of the *ra'iyya* as well as members of the governing apparatus who left Madina. Here it is possible to point to two main grand themes in which the caliphs attempt at radiating order and radiating the system of meaning. The first is the theme of just war, and the second is the theme good governance. The First and Second Caliphs formulated commandments to their military commanders reminding them of the necessity to adhere to just war provisions, and giving details of what qualifies as a just war conduct. For example, Yahya ibn Sa'ad reported that Abu Bakr instructed Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan, who was the commander of one of the battalions.

> You will find a people who claim to have totally given themselves to Allah, so leave them with what they have claimed. You will also find a people who have shaved the middle of their heads (as a sign of rebellion), so strike what they have shaved with the sword. I advise you with ten: do not kill women, children or the elderly; do not cut down fruit-bearing trees; do not destroy an inhabited place; do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food; do not burn bees nor scatter them; do not steal from the spoils; and do not be cowardly. (Anas, 2013, p. 174).

In his governance-focused commandment to his governor, Ali reminds him of the necessity to observe already existing traditions and to seek to maintain them. Ali warns against the tendency to cause a sudden change unto them. Such traditions would even include policies of men of wisdom from outside the circle of the followers of the faith:

> Don't rapture any beneficial tradition established by the leaders of this community, as a result of which unity has been harmoniously established, and from which the subjects have prospered. Don't set up some new practice which is detrimental to the already established traditions. (Kazemi, 2007, p. 222, 232).

Stiffening the MBO conception of the Quran and the MBO conception of conquest was hoped to lift or at least confront the waves of *superbia* that continued to mount and hit from the dawn of the reign to its end. On one level, a multi-dimensional *superbia*-based anxiety made itself felt on multiple fronts. The relations between the elite of the polity in Medina suffered a *superbia*-based anxiety. The relation between the tribes in the near periphery and the center suffered a *superbia*-based anxiety. The people of the broken empires suffered the anxiety of the break-up of empire. Generally speaking, the rise of superbia was surrounded by the growth of a metastatic consciousness which suffers attraction to the immanent pole of reality.

Stiffening the MBO conception of conquest was hoped to lift or at least confront the anxieties of the process of conquest. The notion of conquest, even that which is predominantly faith-driven, was not devoid of anxieties. There were the anxieties resulting from the unruliness of the Arabs which the above quote of Hallaq alluded to and before him was described by Ibn Khaldun. (Ibn Khaldun, 1967, p. 120). The rebellion by some tribes at the morning of the reign was a rejection by the tribal unit of identity to be dominated by a wider unit of identity even if some of its autonomy is protected, and a desire to return to the state of full independence which preceded the establishment of Mohammad's polity. There were also the unprecedented mounting pressure and anxiety resulting from the speed of the conquest with its administrative, demographic, socio-economic and political challenges and costs. The strength of the pressure is felt in the desire which the second caliph voiced upon defeating the Sassanians and the break-up of

the empire to have a military pause in order to properly administer the huge land annexed and the huge populations that became part of the *ra'iyya*. There was the anxiety resulting from the difficult challenge of striking a balance between, and properly drawing the lines between the predominantly transcendentally-driven pursuit of transmitting the essence of the MBO ecumenically, and the predominantly existentially-driven pursuit of expanding the polity in an Imperial environment and an unruly tribal environment while maintaining domestic stability in a stubborn internal milieu. Though the track of transmitting the essence of the MBO ecumenically, and the track of expanding the polity existentially were interconnected, each had its own autonomous personality. There was the anxiety resulting from the difficult challenge of maintaining the character of the external pursuit as a faith-driven conquest noting that the predominantly-faith driven wave of conquest wave was not devoid of imperial ambitions and imperial practices.

Stiffening the above MBO conceptions was hoped to lift or at least confront the anxieties of the "imperial factor", and the "imperial tendency" which seems to have acquired definite shape in the midst of the reign. By the term "imperial factor", we mean the existing imperial realities. By the term "imperial tendency", we mean the imperial appetite and disposition within the believers themselves. In relation to the external front, there were anxieties resulting from the fact that the region was one which had long seen the emergence of empires and monarchies, and to imperial systems of governance. There were anxieties resulting from the fact that the region was controlled by the mightiest empires in the *ecumene* and that both had an opposite agenda. There were anxieties resulting from the challenge which was posed by older centers of radiation of order and meaning, namely Constantinople and Ctesiphon, on the centers of radiation of order, namely Medina and later Kufa and Mecca. In the internal front, the problems that emerged between governors and the *ra'iyya*, between the caliphs and governors, speak for the persistent ascent of imperial dispositions and practices within the circle of the elite especially upon the conquest of Syria and Iraq, and the termination of the Sasanian rule. In the collective consciousness, those problems and the aforementioned pursuit of

reminding of the MBO conception of conquest and the centrality of the conquest of the soul was surrounded by memories of multiple sayings by the Messenger to the effect that the times in which deformational waves of losing the balance of consciousness gain momentum. They are times in which the metastatic consciousness in which attraction is to the immanent pole of reality, and the fall into closed existence, grows. They are times in which the appetite for the creation of the second reality that fulfillment and completion is to be pursued in worldly things becomes greater.

One of the frameworks in which the monarchical imperial appetite and practices acquired definite shape at second half of the reign was the monarchical imperial pursuit by some members of the Umayyads. During the second half of the reign of the third caliph in which he grew quite old, much of the administrative and financial policies of the old Caliph were influenced by some members of his clan, the Umayyad clan, who began to systematize nepotism amongst themselves, stirring waves of irritation in the center and the peripheries. (Hodgson, 1974, p. 213). (Humphreys, 2005, p. 48). There pursuit was widely interpreted as a movement in the direction of "building the influence and power which they had before Islam." (Hawting, 2000, p. 27).

The behavior and rhetoric of the third Caliph Uthman about his kin during the revolt of the provinces was underpinned by a certain understanding of the role of lineage in governance which is anchored to a special comprehension of the conception of Al Al-Bayt within the system of transcendental representation and existential representation. Uthman justified the appointments of his kin by drawing upon the Messenger who sought the help and actually appointed many of his kin and members of Al Al-Bayt. Uthman's justification was not considerate of the order-related special treatment of Al Al-Bayt, namely that they were part the system of transcendental representation, and that they bore a unique status and responsibility in the system of existential representation.

Blocks of rioters or *thuwwar* marched to Medina in rage and besieged the Caliph's house. (Hawting, 2000, p.26). Clear was the evidence that the rioters were determined to assassinate the third Caliph irrespective of the conclusion of any argument. Surprisingly, the third caliph was abandoned by the members of his kin. Mu'awiya, the relative of the caliph and governor of Greater Syria and the one able to march with sufficient troops to rescue the Caliph refrained from doing so. According to At-Tabari,

> when Uthman saw what happened to him and how many of people had been sent against him, he wrote Mu'awiya bin Abi Sufyan in Syria: "In name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. To proceed: The Medinese (i.e. Uthman referring to People of Madina and not of Egypt) have become unbelievers, they have abandoned obedience and renounced their oath of allegiance. Therefore send to me the Syrian soldiers who are at your disposal, on every camel you have, whether docile or stubborn". When Mu'awiya got the letter, he delayed action on it, for he did not wish to differ openly with the Companions of Messenger of God, since he knew that they concurred [on this matter]. When Uthman became aware of the delay, he wrote to seek aid from Yazid bin Asad bin Kurz and the Syrians, he stressed his rightful claims upon them, and mentioned Almighty God's commandment to obey the Caliphs. (Humphreys, 1990, p. 185).

Upon the killing of the Caliph, Ali was appointed Caliph by the heads of the Immigrants and the Helpers and attempted at re-uniting the *umma* but faced a mutiny by two of the companions, Talha and Az-Zubayr. Ali quelled the revolt of Talha and Az-Zubayr in the Battle of Al-Jamal. (Hawting, 2000, p. 27). Subsequently, Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria, revolted. Daftari points to Mu'awiya's main instrument of mobilization as follows:

> `Ali's caliphal authority was challenged by Mu`awiya, the powerful governor of Syria and leader of a pro-Uthman party. As a member of the influential Banu Umayya and a relative of `Uthman, Mu'awiya found the call for avenging the slain caliph a suitable pretext for establishing Umayyad rule. (Daftari, 2005, p. 9).

Ali defeated Mu'awiya in the battle of Seffin. But, Mu'awiya's man, Amr Ibn Al-A's, ordered his followers to raise the *mushafs* or the Scribed Quran on the head of the spears requesting arbitration. Ali's followership insisted on accepting the arbitration. A group of believers sharply objected Ali's acceptance of arbitration, and declined to

recognize both arbitrating parties. They became to be known by the name of the Kharijites.

Mu'awiya's revolt unearthed a pursuit to build an informal superiority-driven monarchism in a milieu which was aspiring for a king, namely Syria. As a governor of Syria for a long period, Mu'awiya excelled in carving out a *de facto monarchical* spheres of influence leveraging his image as a leader belonging to a prestigious clan. In locating the factors that factors of the rise of Mu'awiya's strength Hawting, in his book, *The First Dynasty of Islam – The Umayyad Caliphate 661-750*, rightly pointed to

> the long and continuous association with Mu'awiya before he became caliph, and the fact that he was able to call on the support of one strong tribal group in Syria, Quda'a, in contrast to the multiplicity of tribal fragments elsewhere. (Hawting, 2000, 38).

As R. Stephen Humphreys explains in his book *Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan From Arabia to Empire*, Mu'awiya's governance and power rested upon alliances forged through, *inter alia*, marriages, with the chief Syrian tribesmen that Hawting mentioned, who "formed the core of Mu'awiya's army in the struggle 656 and 661." (Humphreys, 2006, p. 61). Humphreys proceeds to argue that,

> It is reasonable to surmise that these marriages reflected an Umayyad decision to seek political and military support outside the elite inner circle of Muhammad's to whom they would always be *personae non gratae*. (Humphreys, 2006, p. 62).

From its end, Syria, it is plausible to surmise, was ready for a king. Prior to the recent conquest by the armies of the caliphate, Syria was one of the centers of the Roman Empire and later the Byzantine Empire. The people of Syria lived monarchism and monarchical traditions to the fullest at the heart of the empire for more than half a millennia. So, it was natural for many segments of the people of Syria, having been subjected to a relatively short interruption as of the Islamic conquest, to resume living the monarchical life and traditions and the imperial ambition when their governor began to re-monarchize the governorate. In nutshell, the native people of Syria and some of the new-coming Arabs were ready for a king hoping that a monarch would boost the status

of their relatively newly articulated society. It is possible, to an extent, to draw similarities between the Syrians and the case of the Israelites during migration, and between them and the Lombards, in so much as the desire to have a king is concerned? As Voegelin notes,

> in the case of the Israelites, when in the course of the migration the loose tribal federation proved too week, a king was elected for the purpose of a more effective military and administrative conduct of affairs, and this king was selected from a family "which was considered among them particularly noble. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 124).

> In the account of Paul, the active history of Lombards begins when, after the death of two dukes, the people decided that they no longer wanted to live in small defeated groups under dukes and set themselves a king like the other nations. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 124).

To the above analysis we should add that the planned ascent of Mu'awiya and some other members of the Umayyad clan was surrounded by memories of the sharp *superbia*-based Umayyad opposition of the Message and superiority-driven imagined conception of the nature of the Messenger's dominion. It was surrounded by memories of the fierce confrontation between men of the Umayyad clan and men of the Hashim clan (See Hawting 2000, p. 22) in the first battle between the believers and the polytheists which resulted in the killing of three leaders of the Umayyad House. It was also surrounded by memories of the loss of the Umayyad rule of Quraysh at the hand of the believers on the day of the conquest of Mecca which extended for six years. Upon the killing of the leaders of the polytheists in the battle of Badr, Abu Sufyan, the most imminent figure of the Umayyad clan became the undisputed Master of Quraysh, and his son, Mu'awiya was his heir apparent. It was also surrounded by the imagined conception held by Abu Sufyan at least till the date of the conquest of Mecca that Mohammad's dominion was a superiority driven-monarchism. This imagined conception was verbalized by Abu Sufyan, the Umayyad master of Quraysh, on the eve of the conquest of Mecca in 630 AD alluded to in the previous chapter. That statement was taken by some researchers as an unveiling of the nature of dominion which Abu Sufyan himself aspired to.

Invigoration of the mystery

Whereas a good part of attention during the reign of the first three caliphs was engrossed by military and political and administrative challenges, the concept of the mystery and its centrality were significantly invigorated during the eleventh hour of the reign. We have pointed earlier how the first caliph refused to elaborate on the human creation-related mystery when he was addressed as the Caliph of God. During the reigns of the first three caliphs, sermons would generally touch on elements of the system of mystery, for example, within the context of treating the conception of the oneness of the divine ground. On the other hand, the intellectual produce of the forth caliph speaks for a full-fledged pursuit to invigorate the mystery and retrieve its centrality. His sermons and statements dug deeper in the ocean of the mystery. His articulations expanded the horizons of negative theology demonstrating what may be referred to as inexhaustibility of the negation itself. Reza Kazemi explains the contribution of Ali's negation theology in reasserting the mystery by pointing that his theology hoped to confirm

> the incommensurability between the reality in itself and the human conceptions that are made of it is effectively evoked by this creative use of paradox. In modern parlance, each human conception of reality needs to be `deconstructed'; but then, unlike modern deconstructionism which is so radically destructive that it has nothing left to 'reconstruct, the Imam's apophasis feeds directly into modes of spiritual intuition, contemplation and realization of that which reason, on its own account, is incapable of attaining. It is this intuition and contemplation which 're-members'—or 'reconstructs, if one likes—the spiritual realities that transcend the categories of reason. The value of the paradoxes, antinomies, apophasis and negation is entirely predicated on the eminently positive realities which the intellect can plumb, and thus become aware of its own hidden depths. The resulting consciousness does not negate reason so much as situate it and thereby reveal the limits of the sphere of operation proper to reason; it reveals that reason alone cannot 'comprehend' the higher realities, nor express them fully, however indispensable it may be in initiating the cognitive movement towards those realities. (Kazemi, 2007, p. 30).

His articulations redeemed the mystery of the final hour and the significance of the eschatological conceptions as a pillar of any restoration of the MBO. Also, his articulations recouped the presence of the mysteries of the Quran, and its depths, as well

the presence of the cosmognic mysteries. In relation to restoring spiritual health and building the order of the soul, his explications focused on the mysteries of the soul, and the vastness of the inner world. The articulations of the first caliph also focused on the best practices to navigate in the inner orbits, and the best practices to live the pursuit of having a healthy *metaxy* and of avoiding the fall in metastasis and closed existence. (Kazemi, 2007). Ali's pursuit to invigorate the presence of the mystery was carried out within the context of an integrated epistemological process of completing the laying down of the infrastructure of all the fields of knowledge that constitute the system of meaning of the MBO. (See Kazemi, 2007, p. 24 and subsequent pages). This includes principles that served as foundations of virtually all the disciplines or sciences of religion including interpretation or tafsir of the Quran, fiqh, rhetoric, judicial sciences, arbitration, politics and governology, theology, cosmogony, philosophy, Sufism, warology including internal conflicts known as *baghy* (literally aggression). (Tabassum, 2011, p. 2). The centrality of Ali in the fields of warology and internal conflict is clear in Hallaq's following words:

> There are two main sources cited for the law of rebellion the Quran and Ali Ibn Abi Talib. (Hallaq, 2006, p. 34).

Ali's pursuit to live, anchor to, and invigorate the mystery was one of the main factors that lied at the root of the formulation of the discipline of spirituality and spiritual health which would be one of the essential vehicles for building the order of the soul and which would later be given various names including Sufism. It was one of the main factors that caused the absolute majority of Sufi orders would trace their spiritual lineage to Ali. As Colin Turner indicates, "most of these chains have Ali as the link which connects them with the Prophet." (Turner, 2013, p. 146). "That Ali is a crucial component in the spiritual make up of Shiism and Sufism is undeniable." (Turner, 2013, p. 146).

By the end of the reign, new sub-identities had taken root. The sub-unit of identity of the Shiites of Ali emerged in Kufa defining itself against the framework of the Umayyad and the followership of Mu'awiya. It took upon itself the mission of sustaining

Ali's and Al Al-Bayt's narrative of Mu'awiya's revolt in public memory, and vitiating Mu'awiya's "historicizing legitimation" which shall be described in the following chapter. "Historicizing legitimation" is a theoretical concept coined by Fred Donner in his book *Narratives of Islamic Origin - The Beginnings of Islamic Writings*, to connote "legitimation by means of narratives of the past." (Donner, 1998, p. 112). It is the last of four "styles of legitimation" theorized by Donner that will help us demystify the legitimating behavior of caliphs throughout the study. The first is "pietistic legitimation" according to which the entitlement to the position of caliph derives from outstanding personal piety. The second is "genealogical legitimation" according to which the entitlement to a superior position would be justified by descending from an esteemed lineage. Finally, there is "theological legitimation" according to which one occupies a superior position because God wants it that way". Human free will is excluded. (Donner, 1998, 98-111). That said, another group which developed an independent identity was the intransigent Kharijites who developing an idiosyncratic revolutionary violent theology and political view.

The Kharijites planned the assassination of Ali and Mu'awiya in addition to Mu'awiya's advisor Amr. Only Ali's assassination was successful. Upon Ali's assassination, his son Al-Hasan was designated as Caliph. However, lacking existential representation, he soon abdicated to Mu'awiya.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we were able to observe what the caliphate meant for the caliphs and a weighty segment within the *ra'iyya* during the foundational Caliphal reign of the first four caliphs, and the struggle between the forces of preserving the MBO and the forces of disorder and deformation, and the impact on the question of the mystery. We observed that at dawn of the reign, there was an effort to preserve the conception of the Messenger in the system of transcendental representation upon a moment of anxiety which revealed a degree of metastatis causing an imbalance of consciousness resulting from movement towards the immanent pole. The preservation attempt was carried out

by way of reaffirming divine-related transcendent mystery which was hoped to cause a balancing movement towards the transcendental pole. This effort was immediately followed by the existential effort to preserve the polity within the context of partially modifying the systems of existential representation and transcendental representation to consolidate a *postmortem* deputization of the Messenger, such deputization being the essence of the caliphate. The designation of the first caliph demonstrated the basal nature and capacity of the function of those who loose and bound in relation to the caliphate in the system of existential representation. Elements of the system of symbolism demonstrated how the caliphs conceived such deputization to be their prime capacity and function. The compass of deputization included members of the *ra'iyya* as well. The relevant debate in the literature on whether the word caliph meant successor or caliph was examined. That the caliphate denoted deputization was validated by more than one evidence including order-related measures. Inextricably linked to the above modification was the alignment made in relation to the caliphal position in the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation, namely the assertion that the caliph was fallible and accordingly he would not existentially commit the people through a claim of theological legitimacy. The external factor including regional political geopolitics and considerations related to the global imperial balance of power constituted a determinant factor in the designation of the caliph. The decisive and crucial factor in designating the caliph was the survivability of the polity within an unamenable geopolitical proximity. Likewise, the external factor including conquest and the complications of governance of newly conquered provinces was one of the areas in relation to which early waves of deformation emerged, the imperial tendencies and their disordering effects being amongst the main forms of such deformation. Conquest-related and the deformation related to the imperial tendency was behind the attempt at stiffening of the MBO conceptions of the Quran together with its mysteries and of the MBO conception of conquest. The stiffening attempt was hoped to contribute significantly to diluting the multiple intellectual, cultural and socio-economic gaps

between the different segments of the expanding body politic. We discerned the dynamics of the emergence of *de facto* embryonic monarchism that would evolve later into an explicit imperial attempt. We also observed that the external factor including the growth of the deformational imperial tendency and its disordering effect constituted a determinant factor in the invigoration of the recognition of the mystery at the last years of the reign within the context of an attempt at sorting the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation. The specific attempt by the forth caliph to invigorate the recognition of the mystery took place upon the revolt related battles which represented a critical moment of anxiety causing collective consciousness to suffer arduous anxieties and to be shaken to its core. The attempt at invigorating the mystery also took place after a moment at which the notion of superiority-driven monarchism had gained a definite shape in Syria. The factors motivating the rise of monarchism were explicated using relevant Voegelinian analysis. The attempt at invigorating the mystery also took place some two decades after the conquest which resulted into breaking up the Sassanian empire, and conquering strategic cities in the Byzantine empire. It took place approximately a quarter of a century after the beginning of the Caliphal reign. During this period, considerations relating to the system of existential representation and the order of the society engrossed the greater part of attention. Considerations relating to the system of transcendental representation and the order of the soul received attention but largely subsequently. During this sensitive period, the gap of the recognition of the mystery between the enlarging body politic, which we call the mystery-related gap, continued to widen. The timing of the attempt at invigorating the recognition of the mystery by the forth caliph speaks for the conviction that whereas the deformation was more visible in relation to the system of existential representation and the order of the society, its roots pertained to conceptions relating to the system of transcendental representation and the order of the soul. In light of its timing, the attempt at retrieving the recognition of the mystery may be construed as an attempt to prevent much of the disordering effect of the elements of mounting

deformation. It may be construed as an attempt to dilute the mystery gap and the relevant deformation, the other aforementioned socio-economic gaps, and to participate in lifting the multiple anxieties resulting from conquest and from the external factor. Above all, it should be construed as an effort to realign the participation in the mystery. The system of mystery was invigorated to regain the lost balance of consciousness resulting from the growth of the polity in history from a small polity into a regional polity, and ultimately into a world power. But how did the forces of deformation with their disordering effects develop? How did they affect the meaning of the caliphate and the mystery after the end of the reign of the first four caliphs? It is these question that we will now address.

Chapter Four: A transcendentally-gravitated metastatic consciousness and the distortion of mystery

This chapter undertakes an analysis of the deformation of the meaning of the concept of the caliphate, and the distortion of MBO grand conceptions, and the mystery, during several distinguished moments that saw the mode of the ascent of caliphal imperialism. We will analyze the deformation in the theoretical fabric of founding Umayyad caliphs and founding Abbasid caliphs. We will analyze the deformation in the theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism which was produced when it sought to establish its own dominion and pursue its own imperialism. We will analyze the deformation in the theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi which was produced at a moment when the imperializing caliph lost most of his existential representation but maintained some presence in the system of transcendental representation, when emerging autonomous imperializing Sultans enjoyed the lion's share of existential representation, and when there were attempts by some caliphs to restore some of the existential representation of the imperializing caliph.

The Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

An autocratic ruler, a God's deputy and a constituent of a majestic framework of mystery

Taking over of the seat of the caliph by the Umayyad founders was coupled with inauguration an attempt to create a largely monarchical and imperialistic rule. As said earlier, Umayyad rule steadily abandoned much of the culture of governance which arose with the establishment of the polity Medina, and some essential elements of the archetypal foundational system of governance which grew during the reign of the four caliphs. The seeds of the hereditary system were sowed in breach of his covenant with Al-Hassan Ibn Ali. A new style of governance and a new symbolism conveying the new monarchical nature of their rule was designed. Luxurious palaces were constructed. The Fifth Umayyad Caliph Abd El-Malik Ibn Marwan caliph was engraved on the dinar. In his

book *Introduction to Islamic theology and Law*, Goldziher explained the nature of the

Umayyad monarchization by saying that

> Kingdom – mulk - this expression characterizes the trend of Umayyad rule. it was
> entirely secular showing little concern with religious law …. And laying no stress
> on the fact that it wielded a power which it derived from the prophet. (Goldziher,
> 1973, p. 40-41).

The idiosyncratic Umayyad emphasis on monarchism was the outcome of synergizing a

transformed triabalism with what Anthony Black refers to in his book *The History of*

Islamic Political Thought as neo-tribalism (or communalism) as patrimonial bureaucracy.

According to Black,

> Under the Umayyads and early Abbasids, two forces – Islamic neo-tribalism (or
> communalism) and patrimonial bureaucracy – contended for ascendancy in
> political culture … By patrimonialism we mean a system of government in which
> the ruler is permitted to regard the state as his and his family's benefice (from on
> high), and the people are regarded as clients under his protective and distributive
> patronage. (Black, 2011, p. 18).

The Umayyad process of monarchization was coupled with a process of imperialism.

Foreign policy became a policy of a world imperial power. The following lines by

Goldziher are illustrative of the second change:

> No doubt the Umayyads' rise to power inaugurated a new system. Their idea of
> Islam, honestly held, was political: "Islam had united the Arabs and led them to
> rule a world empire." The satisfaction that religion afforded them was in no small
> measure due to the fact that Islam "had brought glory and high rank, and had
> taken possession of the heritage of nations." (Goldziher, 1981, p. 71).

In spite of taking over the seat of the caliph, the reality in which the Umayyad

Imperial Caliphal project was launched was a recalcitrant one especially throughout the

foundational phase. Firstly, as of the dawn of the Umayyad rule, the main centers of

radiation of order or centers of meaning, namely Mecca, Madina, Kufa and Basra were

generally disapproving of the Umayyad rule. Kufa was the become the center of Shiite

opposition to the Umayyads and the scen of a number of anti-Umayyad movements.

(Hawting, 2000, p. 41). Politics of co-option managed to generate formal acceptance to

pay homage, but failed to ensure real approval and habitual obedience. Generally speaking, many of the MBO conceptions including the MBO theological conceptions and the conception of the Messenger and his presence which the Umayyad system of meaning was at variance with as shall be explained shortly were widely lived in those centers. Those centers of meaning began to emit waves of rebellion, going out of the Umayyad control for lengthy periods. Hence, a serious anxiety was inflicted on the Umayyad founders. They suffered alienation, lack of popularity in the heart of the polity, and distress due to failure to enjoy full control. Secondly, the body of the *ra'iyya* and the geography continued to undergo exponential growth while the ruling apparatus continued to lack proportionate expertise being mainly comprised of the relatively limited population of favored Syrian Arabs including Muslims and Christians.

Thirdly, as of its dawn, the Umayyad rule was checked by Al Al-Bayt's attempt to restore the systems of transcendental and existential representation by asserting themselves as public trustees and deputies of the Messenger in carrying out the constitutional mission of preserving the conception of the Messenger in the system of meaning. In a compact way, the members of Al Al-Bayt, living in the centers of meaning, Medina and Mecca and Kufa, asserted themselves as a scholarly authority especially in relation to teaching the Sunnaic practices, and in relation to what would later be known as the prophetic sciences. We have noted in the previous chapter how Ali contributed significantly to the development of such sciences. (Ja'afari, 1967, p. 112). That pursuit was joined by a pursuit by members of Al Al-Bayt of restoring existential and transcendental representation through rebellion. In the year h 61, Al-Husayn Ibn Ali, accompanied by members of his family, rebelled against the Second Umayyad Caliph Yazid (AD 680-683) (h 60-64). Amongst the corollaries of Al-Husayn's rebellion and the posthumous decapitation of Al-Husayn and the attempt to humiliate his family was a strong decline in the role of the Umayyad caliphs in the system of *transcendental* representation. The disapproval of the Umayyad as rulers of a polity of believers

elevated. Another indirect corollary was the decline of the Umayyad *existential* representation. As Esposito points out,

> The slaughter and "martyrdom" of the Alid forces gave rise to a movement of political protest centered on the martyred family of the Prophet, Ali and Husayn. (Esposito, 1998, p. 13).

Al-Husayn's rebellion was a one of the indirect causes of the abdication of the third Umayyad Caliph which in turn resulted in the internal rivalry between the Sufyanid line and the Marwanid line of the Umayyad House, and the subsequent end of the rule of the Sufyanid line. Al-Husayn's rebellion inaugurated a series of rebellions that contributed to weakening the Umayyad fist. It paved the way for the rebellion of Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubair (AD 624 – 692) (H 2-73) which erupted three years later and which employed the killing of Al-Husayn in delegitimizing the Umayyad rule. The rebellion by Az-Zubair resulted in further significant contraction of Umayyad existential representation. Claiming the title of caliph, Az-Zubair seized a sizable territories that included Mecca, parts of greater Syria, Kufa, Yemen and Egypt. (Hawting, 2000, 48). The Umayyad imperial caliphs could not control the logistics of Hajj which significantly detracted from their existential representation as well as of the transcendental representation. His rule persisted for nine years.

The final main obstacle which the founding Umayyad imperializing caliphs faced was that they inherited a polity in rivalry with a world power, namely Byzantium, (Humphreys, 2005, p. 50-60). The rivalry entered into a new phase on the foundation of the Umayyad caliphate. (Humphreys, 2005, p. 105-108). The polity which they inherited face to face with the Byzantine Empire whose cultural influence even remained in the very capital of the rising Umayyads. The Greek language continued to prevail in Syria and the Greek coin continued to be the main medium of trade throughout the greater part of the foundational phase.

Within the context of overcoming the above-mentioned recalcitrant reality, a mystery-distorting theoretical fabric was produced by the Umayyad founders; such

fabric, as shall be exhibited below, being the working of a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole. This fabric was a combination of theoretical stipulations, conceptual practices, statements, and a system of symbolism. It acquired definite shape throughout the foundational phase which extended from the reign of the founder, Mu'awiya, to the reign of the 6th Umayyad caliph, Al-Walid, (r- 705-715 AD).

The Umayyad theoretical-fabric pertained to an enlarging body politic which the Umayyad sought to manage through the employment of *superbia*-based multi-tier particularism-driven preferential system. On the level of Arab Arab relations, in an infringement of the MBO conception of units of identity, the Umayyad embarked on constructing what Esposito referred to as a "preferential system" which used the Syrian Arab segment of the ra'iyya as a privileged imperial base, and hence rendered it an advantaged aristocracy. (Esposito, 1998, p. 15) (Hawting, 2000, p.32). (See Lapidus, 1988, p. 60). On the level of relation between Arabs and members of other ethnicities embracing other confessions,

> the Umayyads and the Arab tribesmen who first conquered the Middle East regarded their religion as largely exclusive of the conquered people. There was no sustained attempt to force or even persuade the conquered peoples to accept Islam, and it was assumed that they would remain in their own communities paying taxes to support the conquerors. (Hawting, 2000, p.4, p.34).

The Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical-fabric was underpinned by the principle of the separation between Arabs and non-Arabs, and "there were from time to time, measures designed to prevent such changes of status" (conversion). (Hawting, 2000, p.4). within the context of keeping them as an inferior class. As Hrbek explains in his book *Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century*, as follows:

> Aiming to preserve their privileges and their revenues, the Umayyad caliphs were never willing to grant the newly converted their rights as members of the Islamic community (umma) or to regard them as equal to the Arabs. (Hrbek, 1992, p. 129).

This policy left its impress in the form of cultural egotism and cultural jealousy. The Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical-fabric was also built on a sense of Arabist particularism. Imperialism-related anxieties, particularistic prejudices and egoistic self-assertion against the Byzantine culture and against non-Arab Muslims lied at the core of Umayyad process of Arabization and the issuance of the new Arab dinar to replace the Byzantine currency were carried out within the context of self-assertion. That said, to all that we should add that the Umayyad Arabization, and its replacement of Greek, was a step within an establishment of an "imperial civilization" by redefining the civilizational component of "language". In the new design, the imperial civilization will be underpinned by a unitary conception of civilization which would be hoped to replace a plural conception of civilization. All in all, the special doxic dogma of Arabist supremacy moved in the direction of obstructing the transformation of the socio-economic system into a universal ecumincally-driven system.

The body politic would be ruled by an Umayyad caliph who would be the existential representative conceived in terms of the transcendence-related mystery-distorting conception of "the accentuated *quasi* ruler under God"[1] reflected by the title of "God's caliph", which would entail a theological and pietistic legitimation, and which would be based on an attempt at dropping the Caliph's deputyship of the Messenger and diluting his presence. As a deformation of the MBO theological conceptions and of the Messenger, the Umayyad founders used the title "God's caliph" to denote that the caliph was God's direct delegatee and authorizee instead of the title of "the Messenger's caliph" which denoted that he was the Messenger's deputy. As Crone and Hinds note, Mu'awiya was depicted as concretely the direct deputy of God "within the formula: the earth belongs to God and I am his deputy". (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 25). Further, they note that the Messenger is absent in the system of symbolism including inscriptions, stones, and papyri and rhetoric. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 24). The words of Goldziher

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1 See Eric Voegelin's treatment of "the ruler under God" in *What is History? and other Late Unpublished Writings*, Volume 28. University of Missouri Press, 1990.

bear repeating, the Umayyad monarchism laid "no stress on the fact that it wielded a power which it derived from the prophet. (Goldziher, 1973, p. 30, p. 41). Put concisely, as Crone and Hinds suggest, the self-concept of the first Umayyad founder was rooted in the separation from the Messenger, and the non-relevance of recognizing the Messenger's presence (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 24) in opposition to the MBO conception of the Messenger. The Umayyad founders disseminated the conception that whereas the Caliph is the direct legatee or deputy of God and is of the present, the Messenger is a deliverer of God's message and is of the past. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 24-25). To depict the caliph as God's direct deputy is to hint that his role is divinely ordained which renders the title itself a means of "theocratic legitimation". According to Hawting,

> the title implies that the Umayyad regarded themselves as God's representatives at the head of the community and saw no need to share their religious power with or delegate it to, the emergent class of religious scholars. (Hawting, 2000, p. 12).

To depict the caliph as God's direct deputy is to hint that the first assumption would be that the caliph lives the orders of the Principal whom he is deputizing which renders the title a means of subtle and light "pietistic legitimation". Yet it is a special pietistic legitimation considering how the Umayyad rule was

> entirely secular showing little concern with religious law …. and laying no stress on the fact that it wielded a power which it derived from the prophet. (Goldziher, 1973, p. 40-41).

That said, the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric of the Umayyad founder advanced into differentiation during the remaining period of the Sufyanid line or the branch of the Umayyad house named after Abu Sufyan. The second Umayyad caliph Yazid referred to himself as "the Imam of the believers and the Deputy of the Lord of the Creations". (*Imam Al-Muslimin wa Khalifat Rab Al-Alamin*). (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 7). Linguistically, the term Imam means the leading one or the Principal and does not connote subordination to another party *ipso facto*. None of the four caliphs took the title

"imam". The concept of "imam" was mainly a vehicle of "pietistic legitimation". It is good to remember that in the period of revelation the title "imam" was mainly awarded to the leader of the prayer. Prayer is a rite which is strictly linked to piety. Accordingly, when the title "imam" is held by the governor, the latter would be conceived as of being a person of piety and religious primacy *ipso facto*. At any rate, the Mu'awiya-Yazid's line of deformation advanced into differentiation during the reign of the Marawnids. During this phase too, the Umayyad 'deputy of God' outranked the Messenger. Al-Hajjaj, the highly influential governor of Iraq (r 1692-715/40-95 AD) under the fifth Umayyad Caliph, Abd El-Malik, "deems the khalifah as superior to the *rasul*." (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 28). As Crone and Hinds note, it was the sixth Umayyad Caliph, Al-Walid Ibn Abd El-Malik (r 705-715 AD/86-96 H), who formulated the most elaborative Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical-fabric. The essence of Al-Walid's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric was enunciated in the letter sent by him to his son Yazid III (r AD 744). According to Crone and Hinds, in the letter, Al-Walid

> sketches out a salvation history divided into two eras', an era of prophets and an era of caliphs. "The first began in aboriginal times in which God sent Messengers to deliver the Message of Islam which God considered the religion of mankind. The letter implies that generally speaking the Messengers effort was not met by success. The letter further implies that Mohammad succeeded, but only in preaching what his ancestors preached. Then, the era of prophets came to an end, and the era of caliphs began, the mission of caliphs being seeing to it that the teachings of God are implemented and Islam is maintained. Obedience to God's caliphs is the way to salvation. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 27).

According to Crone and Hinds, in the letter,

> The caliphs are in no way subordinated to prophets, both are God's agents, and both dutifully carry out the task assigned to them, the former by delivering messages and the latter into putting them into effects. The caliphs are legatees of prophets in the sense that they administer something that is established by them, but they do not owe their authority to them. Their authority comes directly from God. Mohammad stood at the end of an era not at the beginning of one messenger belong to the past. The present have been made over to caliphs. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 27).

It is critical to observe that in so much as the nature of the deputyship of God which is claimed in the Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical-fabric, it is the *public association-related* caliphate which is meant in the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric. The theoretical fabric focused on the Caliph's public authority in relation to governance. The theoretical fabric was not speaking of the *human creation-related* caliphate. The caliphate-related theoretical-fabric was not an establishment of an inherent creational human function (deputyship of God) in relation to other created beings. Without prejudice to the above, the Umayyad title "deputy of God" bears connotations that take inspiration from the essence and idiosyncrasies of the concept of the *human creation-related* caliphate. Hence, the process of manufacturing the title "God's caliph/deputy" consisted of inserting the name of the divine as a direct reference to the creation-related caliphate in opposition to the usage of the Quran explained in Chapter Three. It also consisted of transferring the connotations related to the human creation-related caliphate to the *public association-related* caliphate. Finally, it consisted of referring to the concrete Caliph as a "the Caliph of God". Thus, it was formulated in breach of the mystery related to the human creation-related caliphate.

Should the Marwanid caliphate-related theoretical-fabric be, in Voegleinian terminology, a differentiation of the Sufyanid caliphate-related theoretical-fabric as argued above, how can one interpret the appearance of the Messenger in some symbolic media during the Marwanid phase? Crone and Hinds took from the appearance of the Messenger in the Umayyad symbolism, including coins, that the Marwanid caliphate-related theoretical-fabric is different and independent of the Sufyanid caliphate-related theoretical-fabric on the basis that the Messenger "played no legitimatory role in Sufyanid political theory". (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 25). From a Voegelinian perspective, the consonance between the two expressions especially in relation to the essence of the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric, namely the notion of the superior God's deputyship, and the relation between the Sufyanid line and the Marwanid line, mandate conceiving the Sufyanid as the compact expression of the caliphate-related

theoretical-fabric and conceiving the Marwanid as the differentiated expression. The employment of the Messenger's presence was a utilitarian adaptation to imperial anxieties related to new external challenges that Crone and Hinds themselves noted in addition to domestic challenges within the Umayyad empire. It did not constitute an alteration of the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric. It was a means of the *superbia*-driven pursuit of establishing the superiority of the faith over other faiths within the context of the rivalry with the Byzantine Emperor. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 26). Domestically, concomitant to the Marwanids' rise was the rebellion by Abdullah Ibn Al-Zubayr which resulted in the takeover of sizable territories including Mecca and Medina and the declaration of a rival caliphate as shall be explained later. Hence, it is likely that the Marwanids found it mandatory to stress some adherence to the Messenger's heritage in their constructed image given the shaky ground in which their existential and transcendental representation was.

The rule of the Umayyad caliph would rely on another mystery-distorting theological legitimation. In infringement of the MBO theological conceptions, and in a distortion of the mystery of divine action and the soteriological mystery, the Umayyad caliphs employed the idea of divine compulsion or *jabr* which was articulated within theological circles according to which God had entrusted the Umayyads with the caliphate. The divine ordainment rested on an emphasis of predestination and, hence, of irreversibility (Ess, 2006, p. 135) to the exclusion of free will. Put differently, it would be impossible and a contestation of the divine will to attempt at reversing that entrustment. Palpably, claiming that the caliph was divinely ordained was another type of "theocratic legitimation". (Donner, 1998, 98-111). In contradiction with the soteriological mystery, obedience to God's deputy/caliphs was the way to salvation. (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 27). In this regard, it is important to note that different readings have emerged in nuancing the understanding of the nature of this specific Umayyad delving in the theological mystery. On the one hand, in his book *The Flowing of Muslim Theology* Van Ess seems to be simply arguing that in establishing their right to rule, the Umayyad made use of the

theology of compulsion (*jabr*) which was articulated by *jabr* theologians whereas their opponents propounded a theology of fatalism. (Ess, 2006, p.135). On the other hand, in his article entitled *Jabr and Qadar in Early Islam, a Reappraisal of their Political and Religious Implications*, Hassan Qasim Murad joins issue with Van Ess by arguing that

> politics of the right to rule and to rebel had its own logic or religious basis. These "rights" were not essentially or primarily made dependent or consequent upon the principles of Jabrism or Qadarism. These principles, or rather the political attitudes presumably inculcated by them, might have helped in certain situations, times and places. But they never formed the general rationale or universal justification for these rights. When the Umayyads claimed their right to rule on the grounds that they were God's caliphs, that the caliphate was entrusted to them by God,' they were not simply applying the doctrine of jabr through extension; they were perhaps breaking a new and independent ground for some kind of divine right to rule and to be obeyed. (Murad, 1991, p. 118).

The plausibility of the argument of Murad derives from the first sentence of the paragraph just cited. It is reasonable to argue that the politics of the right to rule has an idiosyncratic logic or religious basis. It is also reasonable to argue that there is a difference between the perception of ideological output by the people of the sword such as the Umayyad rulers and the perception of ideological output by the people of the word such as the compulsion theologians. Accordingly, it seems safe to infer that there is an inherent imparity between the prevailing doxic dogma as articulated by theologians and the actual final formula of the ideological conceptions held by the ruler. Be that as it may, the theological conception of the right to rule which was propagated by the Umayyad founders moved in the direction of diluting the MBO conception of special divine action. That said, perhaps what is of equal significance is to notice the subtle accord between the predestination embedded in the Umayyad theology of the right to rule recanting special divine action on one end, and the influence of the *human creation-related* caliphate on the *public association-related* caliphate on the other end. Generally, the conceived scope of the element of free will which is perceived to be interlaced with the element of predestination in the *human creation-related* caliphate is *greater* than the conceived scope of the element of free will which is perceived to be interlaced with the element of predestination in the *public*

association-related caliphate. Perhaps, this idiosyncratic subtle harmony substantiates the Murad's argument in that it is more plausible to venture to surmise that the presence of this subtle harmony was greater in the minds of the Umayyad than in the minds of theologians. In the minds of the Umayyad, the notion of the divine right to rule and the element of compulsion and predestination related to it has an omphalic aggrandized presence whereas the other elements of the theology of compulsion had an auxiliary presence. On the other hand, it seems that in the minds of the theologians, the divine right to rule and the element of compulsion and predestination related to it may not enjoy the same centrality.

Additionally, the rule of the Umayyad caliph would be based on a genealogical legitimation. The Umayyad founders over-emphasized their clan root in order to portray the foundation of the new dynasty as a dignified enterprise. Such purpose is usually sought by new dynasties. Voegelin pointed to the myth of the foundation of Western kingdoms by a band of Trojans under the leadership of a son or grandson of Aeneas in the early Western centuries. He noted that

> it served the purpose of arrogating to the new establishments a dignity of foundation, of the same rank as the Romans. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 124).

The ra'iyya would not be a stakeholder in the systems of transcendental and existential representations. In breach of the MBO conception of ra'iyya, the aforementioned "preferential system" was complemented by "the progressive centralization and militarization of the state" which "resulted in an increasingly autocratic and absolutist government". (Esposito, 1998, p. 15). Additionally, in breach of the MBO conception of conquest, conquest would be used to maximize the dispossession of the wealth of the periphery and the enrichment of the imperializing Caliph in the center, and keep the majority of the disapproving *ra'iyya* away from rebelling.

The rule of the Umayyad caliph would be based on the policy of depicting Al Al-Bayt as "the enemy of the official dogma". In breach of the MBO conception of Al Al-

Bayt, the foundation phase bore witness to a practice of *damnatio memoriae*[2] according to which Ali, the forth caliph, and other members of Al Al-Bayt, were publicly and methodically cursed including being cursed in sermons delivered by prayer leaders standing on the pulpit. The practice entailed distorting the symbolic structure of the Friday prayer by way of *inserting* the cursing of Ali in the Friday's sermon and invocation. In her book entitled *Fathers and Sons: The Rise and Fall of Political Dynasty in the Middle East*, M. E. McMillan notes the width and breadth of the practice in the pursuit of self-legitimation and demonization of conceived competition by saying that

> cursing of `Ali became such a cornerstone of Umayyad policy that governors from one end of the Islamic empire to the other were ordered to curse him at Friday prayers. (McMillan, 2013, p. 146).

The practice moved in the direction of distorting the mystery related to the workings of the transcendentally engendered effect of the canonically prescribed love of Al Al-Bayt. It moved in the direction of replacing such love with enmity, the animosity being depicted as transcendentally mandated. On the pragmatic level, the members of Al Al-Bayt were specifically excluded from consultation and from filling public offices and persecuted.

A historiogenetic teleological conception of the relation between prophethood and the caliphate would be the main element of the caliphate related *doxic ethos* to be lived. In breach of the MBO conception of time and history and their mysteries. It consisted of the constructed teleological conception that history found its fulfilment in the emergence of the Umayyad caliphate. According to this historiogenetic conception, as of an early point in history, prophethood emerged for the purpose of paving the way for *the Caliphate*. The Caliphate here was construed as being the concrete Umayyad caliphate. This historiogenetic conception entails of an implicit distortion of the mystery of history and

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[2] For a flavor of the notion of the practice of *damnatio memoriae* in world history, See Catherine Lyon Crawford's Collecting, Defacing, and Re-inscribing (and otherwise performing) Memory in the Ancient World. (p. 10-42) in Patricia A. McAnany and Norman Yoffee's *Negotiating the Past in the Past: Identity, Memory, and Landscape in Archaeological Research* especially p. 27.

the mystery resulting from the conception of the circulation of the days amongst the nations and peoples of the world.

That being the case, ultimately, the accentuated Umayyad ruler held three capacities in addition to being depicted as an integral part of an accentuated genealogical base. He was depicted as God's Deputy/Caliph. He was "the imam". He was "the Successor" of the Messenger. Additionally, as explained earlier, the ruler was depicted as a part and parcel of the accentuated Umayyad clan.

Being birthed from a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole, the Umayyad theoretical fabric and the distortion of mysteries, and of pertinent MBO conceptions, were power instruments enabling an imperial take off and structuring in which the Umayyad caliph would have *a special* mystery-anchored image, and enabling purging imperialism-caused anxieties. The caliph would be depicted as a "constituent of a majestic framework of mystery" - would *monopolize* the systems of transcendental and existential representation. The mystery distortion and the ensuing multi-dimensional legitimation, including the legitimation yielded by the employment of the mystery-distorting title "God's caliph" and the title of "imam" moved in the direction of elevating the Umayyad caliph to the dignity of "an ingredient of the majestic structure of mystery in which he is the undisputed direct representative of the divine. This would allow the Umayyad caliph to imperially reign supreme, transcending multiple MBO authorities, and unchallenged by a higher authority, having a status which would be superior to the status of the Messenger, and a presence which would shroud his presence. The mystery distortion and the ensuing multi-dimensional legitimation, and the policy of *damnatio memoriae* and the historicizing legitimation and the depiction of the members of Al Al-Bayt as the enemies of the people moved in the direction of eliminating the canonically prescribed role of Al Al-Bayt in the systems of transcendental and existential representation, hence vitiating their authority. In addition to moving in the direction of self-empowerment, the Umayyad genealogical legitimation and the historicizing legitimation moved in the

direction of vitiating the genealogical legitimacy of Al Al-Bayt and the historicizing legitimacy of the Shiite of Ali in relation to the revolt, the war, and later in relation to Al-Husayn's rebellion. Besides, the theocratic and pietistic legitimations yielded by the employment of the title of "God's caliph" and "imam" and by the employment of the mystery-distorting theology of compulsion and ordainment moved in the direction of enabling the Umayyad caliph to consume the system of transcendental and existential representation at the exclusion of the *ra'iyya*. Both styles of legitimation were designed to disenfranchise the *ra'iyya* which has been politically active for more than for decades. They were designed to deny the *ra'iyya* its share in the caliphate and to change the members of the *ra'iyya* into a subdued imperial subjects in breach of the MBO conception of the *ra'iyya*. The conclusion of the premise that the Caliph was divinely ordained was that the *ra'iyya* was not a stakeholder of the caliphate. Accordingly, true political consultation in the selection of the Caliph, free payment of homage, and the accountability of caliphs would be impaired. Finally, within the context of enabling the imperialization predominantly in the *external* arena, the mystery-distorting conception of "God's caliph" and the divine right moved in the direction of rendering the imperial status of the Umayyad Caliph's status greater than, or at least equipollent to, the imperial status of neighboring emperors and monarchs. On another plane, there are mainly two consequences of the Umayyad histortiogenetic teleological conception. Intimating that prophethood emerged to pave the way for the caliphate, namely the Umayyad caliphate, means that the Umayyad Caliphate was the *raison d'etre* of prophethood and the ultimate purpose of history. Put differently, the Umayyad caliph would be a superior successor of the Messenger. To intimate that the Umayyad caliphate was the purpose of history means that the Umayyad imperial caliphate was immune from extinction and would continue to be unchallenged by the mystery of time and of history. Extinction and the mystery of history have been always feared by empires. As Hughes clarifies,

the device of historiogenetic speculation, as always, wards off troubling questions about the mystery of history by narrowing it to a unilinear sequence that reaches a specific worldly conclusion. (Hughes, 2003, p. 100).

Interim developments: The relative waning of the title: God's caliph, and the wave of ideologizing the Shiite orientation

Before we move to the theoretical fabric produced by the Abbasid founders, it is imperative to briefly explain the prospect of the notion of the "accentuated quasi ruler under God" and the title of "God's caliph/deputy", together with pertinent MBO conceptions, after the foundation phase, especially in light of the restorative undertaking by the 8th Umayyad caliph Umar II. In effect, the notion of the "accentuated quasi ruler under God" and the title of "God's caliph/deputy" somewhat waned as of the end of his reign. That waning is attributed, in part, to the pursuit which included re-characterizing the caliphate as a deputyship of the Messenger within the context of restoring existential and transcendental representation. The governance of Umar II (r 717–720 AD) (r 99-101 AH) moved in the direction of invigorating the governance-related Sunnaic practices but on the basis of living the law according to which the order of the soul takes precedence over the order of the society. Leveraging a journey of soul ordering, Umar II's policy consisted of a self-imposed accountability code, of leading an ascetic life as a ruler and of terminating Caliphal privileges. His asceticism moved in the direction of undoing the disordering effects of the deformation of superiority-driven monarchization. Umar re-identified the political pedigree of his reign and the tracing of the political lineage of his reign to the reign of the first four caliphs citing governance precedents and practices by the four Caliphs' and defining them as standard caliphal practices. Symbolically, the honorific title "the fifth of the Rightly Guided Caliphs" which was given to him by historians, is emblematic of the recognition of his pursuit to reestablish the recognition of the archetypalness of the reign of the first four caliphs. This re-identification of moved in the direction of undoing the disordering effects of the Umayyad abandonment of the Archetypalness of the reign of the first four caliphs.

The above pillars of Umar II's policy were joined by an attempt at restoring the MBO conception of the Messenger in the system of meaning through the constitutional step of inserting hadith in the articulation of the polity, and through the general attempt at restoring other pertinent MBO conceptions. Umar ordered the collection of the Messenger's *hadith* within the context of positioning it in the ethical and legal systems. In his book *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, Wa'el Hallaq explains as follows:

> Umar II is credited with one of the earliest attempts to collect Prophetic *hadith*. As part of this effort, he commissioned a number of scholars and probably governors to 'look for what there is of the *hadith* of the Apostle and of his *Sunna*.'' The caliph, a highly learned man, reportedly worked on the project, also collecting *hadith*. But the larger task of coordinating this material was assigned to Zuhri. Upon completion, copies of the compilation were made and sent to each province or city for the benefit of judges and administrators. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 71).

Simultaneously, Umar's measures headed in the direction of curbing the disordering effects of the Umayyad deformation of the MBO conception of the ra'iyya and the termination of the disenfranchisement of the *ra'iyya*, and the reestablishment of the *ra'iyya* as a stakeholder in the *umma*'s caliphate of the Messenger. Such measures included the returning of real estates and properties confiscated by preceding Umayyad caliphs which entailed a re-empowerment of the *ra'iyya*. Further, they included the application of a strict policy of distribution of alm (*zaka*) and taxation which entailed an equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, and which entailed

> major revision of the rules and principles of taxation for the sake of greater uniformity and equity. (Lapidus, 1988, p. 60).

Lapidus continues:

> While converts claimed exemption from land and poll taxes as a form of equality with Arabs, Umar ruled the taxes were not a function of the status of the individuals. Converts were expected to pay full taxes on land, and Arab landlords would also henceforth have to pay taxes at full rather than privileged rates. (Lapidus, 1988, p. 64).

The policy of equalization of taxes angered privileged Arabs. (Lapidus, 1988, p. 64).

Thirdly, the measures moved in the direction of restoring the MBO conception of the

identity. The measures induced the centrality of the faith unit of identity and the employment of it in reconciling Arabs with the non-Arabs. (Kennedy, 2004, p. 106). As Lapidus notices,

> Umar II changed the standing policy of the Caliphate and sought to put the empire on a Muslim rather than a strictly Arab basis. He accepted the fundamental equality of all Muslims. (Lapidus, 1988, p. 52).

In lifting the discriminatory policies against non-Arab citizens (*the mawali*), Umar carried out a swift integration of non-Arab citizens in the administrative system of the polity. Lapidus:

> Umar proposed to satisfy the complains of the *malawi* fighting alongside the Arab forces by fully accepting their claim that all active Muslim soldiers, Arabs or not, were entitled to be enrolled in the diwans. In Khurasan, Umar ordered the enrollment of 200000 mawali. (Lapidus, 1988, p. 64).

Finally, Umar's measures headed in the direction of partly undoing the disordering effects of the Umayyad deformation of removing Al Al-Bayt from the system of representation. They included the prohibition of the cursing of Ali, and the replacement of the cursing with a Quranic verse stressing justice and beautification. They included returning to members of Al Al-Bayt much of their illicitly confiscated property. Umar's measure of returning properties went was so far as to include returning the land of *fadak* to the descendants of the Messenger's daughter, Fatima, which the first Caliph Abu Bakr judged was not to be submitted to Fatima.

Whereas the restorative undertakings by Al Al-Bayt and Umar II moved in the direction of curbing the disordering effects of the Umayyad deformation of the meaning of the caliphate and of the mystery, both undertakings did not consist of an explicit refutation of the specific distortion of the mystery. Neither undertaking consisted of a verbalized disavowal of the conception of God's deputyship or a refutation of the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric of the divine right to rule or an attempt to provide a decryption of the mystery related to the creation-related caliphate. The undertaking by Al Al-Bayt consisted of an explicit pragmatic assertion that the caliphate was *not* what

the Umayyads theorized and lived. The undertaking by Umar II sufficed with asserting what the caliphate was in relation to the Messenger and with living that meaning. Both undertakings sufficed with general verbal clarifications and with a pragmatic behavior moving opposite to the direction in which the theology of compulsion and the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric of the divine right to rule moved.

A final development which ought to be observed prior to delving into the deformation in the theoretical fabric produced by the Abbasid founders, is the wave of converting the Shiite orientation and sentiment to an ideology and the ensuing change in the connotations of the title "imam". As a response to the Umayyad policies, the circle of support of Al Al-Bayt transformed into the equivalence of a sub-unit of identity especially as a result of the Karbala' massacre (680 AD) (61 H) in what was referred to as the Shiite of Al Al-Bayt. Naturally, part of the descendants of the Shiite of Ali became Shiite of Al Al-Bayt at large. At this stage, the term "Shiite" *mainly* connoted dichotomy with the Umayyad. The post Karbala' period bore witness to a gradually rising conversion of the Shiite orientation into a dichotomy-minded ideology or an otherization-driven doxic ethos. Within the Shiite communities, the general preference that Ali should have been designated as the first caliph petered while a full-fledged rejection of the first three augmented giving rise to the doxic ethos of rejectionism. The title imam began to be used in referring to a leader of a rebellion movement seeking to take over the seat of the caliph. Later, it began to be used to refer to a figure from Al Al-Bayt or circles of kin close to Al Al-Bayt who would be accentuated by a specific followership, and viewed as the legitimate leader who should sit on the seat of the Caliph. In some cases, the ideological construct would be underpinned by an eschatological messianic perspective which, in Voegelinian terminology, immanentizes the eschaton, and which depicts the imam as the awaited Al-Mahdi who would fill the earth with justice. (Kennedy, 2004, p. 95). In another variation, the death of the imam would be changed into an occultation which would be followed by a promised *parousia* in person or through reincarnation. One of the common outcomes of that ideological usage of the term "imam" was that the main

instant connotation of the term would be the primacy, autonomy and premiership of its holder. Another outcome was attaching a compounded pietistic aura to the holder. It worth noting that this reading of the term imam differs from one conventional reading which stops at noting that the two terms, Imamate and caliphate, were interchangeably used. (Kazimi, 2008, p. 4).

The Abbasid caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

A dominant ruler, a God's deputy and a constituent of an expanded majestic framework, and an arbiter of mystery

The Abbasids, too, pursued an ascendingly differentiated version of the Umayyad *superbia*-driven monarchization and imperialization of the Caliphal system. The symbolic system of Monarchical protocols and politesse became more sophisticated. The majority of such formalities took inspiration from the Monarchical and Imperial protocols observed in neighboring entities. The sophistication of the system of monarchical caliphal formalities is reflected by the emergence of an entire discipline which became to be known by the name *The Protocols of the Caliphate* (*rusum al-khilafah*). Esposito comments on this Abbasid development as follows:

> The ruler's exalted status was further reinforced by his magnificent palace, retinue of court attendants, and the introduction of court etiquette appropriate for a monarch or emperor. For the religiously minded, the court at Baghdad was a far cry from the Medinan ideal. (Esposito, 1998, p.18).

Like the case of the Umayyad, the main centers of meaning and of radiation of order were not sympathetic of the Abbasid rule especially after persecuting the sons of Ali. The sons of Ali enjoyed a strong legitimacy and acceptance in in Mecca and Madina. So, the Abbasid founders, too, felt a sense of alienation as a result of the lack of approval in those radiating centers. That is why,

> the Abbasids even sought distance from the earlier centers of Islam (Mecca, Medina, and Damascus) and moved closer to the ancient centers of learning like Ctesiphon. In fact, they displaced the city of Ctesiphon by building the city of Baghdad (762) in its vicinity. Within a short time, the Bayt al-Hikmah in Baghdad became one of the most important centers of learning in the Islamic world of the time. (Bashiri, 2005, p.9).

Another main obstacle was the vastness of the empire and the difficulty of the center to enjoy absolute command over the peripheries, which tempted governors and commanders of provinces to pursue independence and autonomy. As Rippin puts it,

The Abbasid caliphate enjoyed considerable economic growth, but maintaining centralized authority over such a vast empire eventually overwhelmed it. (Rippin, 2013, p. 14).

The inability to directly administer the stretched empire manifested itself from the first days of the Abbasid reign through the emergence of figures who claimed complete independence of the Abbasid Caliph. AbderRahman Ibn Muwaiyah, the grandson of the 10th Umayyad Caliph, established his dominion (r. 756-788 AD) in Andalusia upon escaping from the Abbasid, and called himself Emir. Idris Ibn Abd Allah Al-Kamel, the great grandson of the Messenger, escaped to Walili and then Fes in Western North Africa where he established the Idrisi polity (788-944 AD) upon surviving the genocide in which the Abbasids exterminated the sons of Ali in Mecca in 786 AD. Also, the early Abbasid phase saw the phenomenon of Abbasid commanders becoming autonomous rulers yet continuing to recognize the Caliph in Baghdad. Ibrahim Ibn Al-Aghlab, a commander of the fifth Caliph Harun Ar-Rashid (r 786-809 AD), established the Aghalebah dominion (800-909 AD) in north Africa and took Al-Qayrwan in Tunisia as its capital and extended its rule to eastern Algiers, southern Italy, Cecily, Malta, Corsica, and Sardinia.

The third difficulty which faced the Abbasid founders was that their pursuit was checked by the Sunna ulama who asserted themselves as public trustees (*ulu amr*) and deputies of the Messenger within the context of restoring the systems of transcendental and existential representation through the constitutional step of further inserting the Sunna in the legal system. Abu Hanifa (699-767 AD) (80-148 H). *Malek* Ibn Anas (711-795 AD) (93-179 H) assumed the function of *ifta'* in Medina. *Malek* also assumed the function of the supreme instructor of *jurisprudenc*e in Medina. Ash-Shafi' (767-820 AD) (150-204 H) emerged in Iraq and later in Egypt where he established himself as the *de facto* grand mufti and the main instructor of hadith and jurisprudential methodologies. Several decades later, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855 AD) (164-241 H) emerged in Iraq mainly as a Hadith expert and secondarily as a jurist. The ulama independently controlled the authorities of *ifta'a* and jurisprudential education. Generally speaking, the ulama's initiative to hold those authorities was met with a general consent and approval by the

*ra'iyy*a. The ulama completed the construction of regimented systems of teaching and of qualification. One of the frameworks of this system is the framework of tutelage or *mulazama*. The ulama gave the successful students *ijaza* or certification and directed them to specific areas of specialization. (Hourani, 1993, p. 164). The ulama's decisions and words were able to existentially commit and bind the behavior of the public. Subsequently, the institutional efforts of the *ulama* led to the emergence of full-grown schools of jurisprudence and law that took rise as during the second *Hijri* century and that were referred to as *madhabs*. As Hallaq remarks,

> *madhhab* meant not only the doctrine of the reputed founding imam but also the cumulative positive doctrine propounded by his predecessors and, no less so, by his successors. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 163).[3]

Hallaq locates the relation between the system of mulazama pointed to earlier and the *madhabs* saying:

> These schools originally emerged out of the scholarly circles of legal specialists, going through a middle stage dominated by what I have termed ''personal schools.'' (Hallaq, 2005, p. 5-6).

The ulama controlled the aforementioned authorities within the context of the constitutional step of further inserting the Sunna in the legal system. "Completing the construction of an MBO-based legal epistemology" maybe the proper overarching characterization of the ulama's pursuit. This task included completing the formulation of methodologies that ought to be used in utilizing an available provision in the Quran and Sunna in religiously and legally locating a solution for a matter in relation to which there is no clear provision in the Quran and the Sunna. The formulation of such methodology necessitated designating and ranking of the sources of legislation namely the Quran, the Sunna, consensus, and the practice of the people of Medina, and anterior *shari'a*, as well as the methodological sources of legislation including analogy. It also necessitated

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[3] For a flavor on the transformation from personal school into doctrinal group school see Wa'el Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*. p. 154.

further designation of the Sunnaic practices and determination of their religious and legal bearing. This multidimensional pursuit gave birth to the completion of the formulation of the science of jurisprudential methodology. Now in order-related terms, the ulama assumed the authorities of *ifta'a* and jurisprudential education in a materialization of the MBO conceptions of the public trustees (*ulu al-amr*) who were direct deputies of the Messenger and who were stakeholders of defining the system of meaning and the system of representation and articulating. They positioned themselves as shareholders of the constitutional framing of the polity. According to Hallaq:

> their very profession as Guardians of Religion, experts in religious law and exemplars of virtuous Muslim lifestyle made them not only the most genuine representatives of the masses but also the true ''heirs of the Prophet,'' as a Prophetic *hadith* came to attest. (Hallaq, 2005, p. 183).

The *ulama*'s claim and control of those authorities, and the ensuing public consent, were *not* underpinned by the conception that they were delegatees of the incumbent caliph. They were *not* underpinned by the conception that they were recognized as holders of such authorities only because the caliph was short of jurisprudential competence and there was a necessity for a substitute as one infers from the following lines by Maher Jarrar in his Article entitled "The Martyrdom of the Passionate Lovers: Holy War as a Sacred Wedding",

> Yet with the tendency of the state to centralization and institutionalization, and the desire of the caliph to control and monopolize the religious as well as the military functions, …., a feeling of bitterness and discontent spread among wide factions of the ulama who regulated local communal and religious life by serving as judges and administrators teachers and religious advisors to Muslims – as well as of ascetics and other groups that were struggling with the state over the control of many offices and institutions. (Jarrar, 2004, p. 321).

Jarrar proceeds to explain that the ulama's juridical authority sometimes interfered with matters relating to the very core of the caliph's role in the system of existential representation including matters pertaining to the army as happened with Malik in his early stage as *mufti*:

the celebrated Madinan Jurisconsultant Malik Ibn Anas had forbidden that one should fight under the banner of the state army." (Jarrar, 2004, p. 322).

As a result of the fact that the ulama were fully focused on the constitutional step of further inserting the Sunna in the legal system, the term "Sunni" took root denoting an orientation. The distinguishing factor of this "orientation" is preoccupation with Sunna-related jurisprudence, with Sunnaic practices, and with hadith. In a word, centering on the Messenger's Sunna.

The above undertaking was intertwined with an attempt at preserving and restoring other pertinent MBO conceptions but to a limited degree, and was coupled with the pattern of explicitly dismissing distortions of the mystery pertaining to other MBO conceptions but in utmost brevity, and without an attempt at decrypting the mystery. The ulama generally sanctioned rebellion, and were expressive of their sympathy towards Al Al-Bayt. However, their support of Al Al-Bayt was limited. The following lines by John Strawson, legal historian, about the political engagement of Abu Hanifa are expressive of the idea. They establish how the emergence of Islamic law and the role of the ulama represented an impediment of the totalitarian and hegemonic pursuit of the Abbasid founding Caliphs.

> Unlike the implicit portrayal by Hamilton he (Abu Hanifa) was not a passive intellectual who was remote from politics." He supported Zayd ibn Ali in his revolt against the Umayyad dynasty in 740 CE" and towards the end of his life also supported the revolts of the brothers Mohammed and Ibrahim Dhu l'Nafs al Zakiyyah against the Abbasids. He was not a participant in the rebellions but articulated support for them and gave financial aid." This active involvement in political revolt rather symbolized the way in which Islamic law emerged in conflict with power. When offered the post of a judge, the jurist refused and he was imprisoned and it has been alleged that the caliph in the end had him poisoned." Thus Abu Hanifa is a far more challenging figure than Hamilton suggests. His legal scholarship was moreover produced in turbulent times. (Dorsett and McLaren, 2014, p. 162).

The pattern of explicitly dismissing the distorted mystery pertaining to other MBO conceptions but in utmost succinctness, and without an attempt to provide a decryption of the mystery is visible in the way the Sunna ulama dealt with the Mu'tazilites doctrine.

They firmly rejected the doctrine. Yet, they gave the greater part of their attention to asserting their own methodological and substantive outlooks, and only the smallest part of the attention to voicing their objection to the tenets of the doctrine. The pattern is also visible in the way Malik responded to the theological question on the meaning of the notion of divine settling/establishment upon the throne. Malik sufficed with articulating a strictly succinct theological statement which seems to have been driven by the *via negativa* and desire to sustain the *via negativa*. He

> affirmed that the "settling" [Upon the throne] is known but "how" it occurred is unknown, that faith in it is incumbent, but the asking about it is innovation (*Bid'a*). (Sells, 1996, p. 317).

He did not only refrain from providing an elaborate answer, he condemned the questioning of the nature of divine settling/establishment. The pattern is visible in the way Ahamd Ibn Hanbal responded to the claim of the createdness of the Quran by the Seventh Abbasid Caliph Al-Ma'mun. He sufficed with reiterating the MBO characterization of the Quran as divine speech. He did not produce an elaborative refutation.

In facing the above-mentioned obstinate reality, a caliphate-related mystery-distorting theoretical fabric was produced by the founding Abbasid caliphs, such fabric being the working of a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole, the fabric and the consciousness being a differentiation of the Umayyad theoretical fabric and consciousness. This fabric comprised of theoretical pronouncement, conceptual practices and a system of symbolism. It was produced over the foundational phase which extended from the declaration of the Abbasid Caliphate in 750 AD to the reign of the 7th Abbasid caliph, Al-Ma'mun (r 809-813 AD).

The Abbasid conception of the caliphate related to a body politic in which non-Arabs would be employed as the mainstay of the Abbasid might, and in which, at the same time, the Abbasid imperializing caliph would leverage his Arab lineage in distinguishing and elevating himself. The first element of the non-Arab partners was the

powerful Khurasanian, Persian and Turkik commanders and families who partook in establishing the Abbasid Caliphate. The second element was the non-Arab armies that fought for the Abbasids. The Abbasid founders employed the non-Arab element as a power base in foundation and maintenance, including Khurasanians and Persians and even made use of the Umayyad discrimination against non-Arabs. The following lines from *The Middle East Remembered: Forged Identities, Competing Narratives, Contested Spaces* by Jacob Lassner signify how the non-Arab partners asserted themselves as cosmopolitan elements living in a cosmopolitan milieu whereas the founding Abbasid caliphs undertook a *superbia*-based self-exaltation through taking a strong pride in being of an Arab race:

> A string of victories brought the Khurasan army to Iraq, and eventually they were settled in the military cantonments of the newly created Abbasid capital,29 Baghdad. Transplanted from the east into an alien environment, the mixed forces that made up the Abbasid standing army strove for a new identity that would engender pride and create a sense of unity that transcended the narrowly defined affiliations of the past. They found this identity by recalling events and places associated with the Abbasid era. Thus the first generation of Khurasanis born in Iraq referred to themselves as the "sons [labna'] of the dawlah" and/or the "sons of the (revolutionary) calling laklalvahj." With evident pride, they pointed to Khurasan as the root (asl) of their lineage, that is, the region from which the Abbasid revolution burst forth to bring about a new age. However, if Khurasan was the root, then Baghdad, the so-called Khurasan of Iraq, was the branch. The Abna' considered themselves more firmly rooted in the dawlah than were their fathers and more a part of it than were their grandfathers. The expression "more rooted" (A'raqu) appears to be a play on words to indicate more Iraqi, that is, Baghdadi, for it is the tie with the Abbasid capital and hence the caliphs themselves that allowed the Abna' to claim their distinction."' In this case, the heavy—indeed almost exclusive—emphasis on a newly acquired geographical affiliation is a clear sign of muted tribal sensibilities. There is in fact not a single topographical description of Baghdad that shows firm evidence of military cantonments organized along Arab tribal lines. The sources suggest that the full transformation from tribal to regional and then imperial army was accomplished within a single generation—an exemplary sign of the revolutionary changes brought about by the Abbasid dawlah.31 Such as it was, the loyalty of the Abbasid army was governed by highly personalized ties that generally transcended ideological concems.32 This is not to say that the ruling family did not attempt to

indoctrinate the armed forces with official views or that the latter were totally unreceptive to any such program. The legitimacy of the Abbasids was certainly defended on ideological grounds, but these arguments were always rooted in an Arab and Islamic past. (Lassner, 2000, p. 73, 74).

The caliph would be the existential representative who would be conceived in terms of an ascending differentiation version of the mystery-distorting conception of "the accentuated quasi ruler under God", which would be based on an attempt at dropping the Caliph's deputyship of the Messenger and diluting his presence. The Abbasid founders resurrected the concept of "God's caliph/deputy" who enjoys the sovereignty of "the accentuated and ordained ruler under God" in spite of the fact that it had eroded significantly during the three decades that followed the end of the reign of Omar II (r 717-720 AD) as mentioned above. The Abbasid version, too, was grounded in the deformational theological legitimating notion of divine ordainment of the caliph. In his book *Islam and Politics*, John Esposito clarifies as follows:

> The Abbasids adopted and refined Umayyad practice by borrowing heavily from the Persian tradition with its divinely ordained system of government. The caliph's claim to rule by divine mandate was symbolized by the altering of his title from "successor," or "deputy," of God's Prophet to "Deputy of God" and the appropriating of the Persian-inspired title "Shadow of God on Earth." (Esposito, 1998, p.18).

The second Abbasid Caliph Al-Mansour (r 754-775 AD) is reported to have said: "I am the Sultan (power) of God in his earth." (Crone and Hinds, 1986, p. 84). Anthony Black argues that the Abbasid caliph saw himself as "the link with cosmic order", and argues that this self-concept was an outcome of "imbuing Irano-Sassanian concepts with Quranic meanings." (Black, 2011, p. 21).[4]

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[4] This constructed mystery shall grow in history up till the days of the attempt by the Mongol Hulaku "to end the dynasty by executing the caliph al-Mustaisim" (r 1242-1258 AD), when

> he was initially dissuaded from doing so, for it was said that an act of such magnitude might tamper with the cosmic order of the universe; the sun might be veiled, the rains might cease to fall, and the earth might fail to give rise to vegetation. (Lassner, 2000, p. 85).

The rule of the Abbasid caliph would be based on an idiosyncratic genealogical legitimation. The Abbasid founding caliphs stressed the supremacy of that line of lineage which related connected them with Messenger through his uncle Al-Abbas. In so doing, they constructed the image of "the true and closest hairs of the Messenger". (Ess, 2002, 141). In view of this, also the scheme of legitimation of the Abbasid founders comprised of "theological legitimation" which was synergized with "genealogical legitimation".

In a differentiation of the Umayyad case, in the final analysis, the accentuated Abbasid ruler held three capacities in addition to being depicted as an integral part of an accentuated genealogical base. He was depicted as God's Deputy/Caliph. He was "the imam". He was "the Successor" of the Messenger. He was not the deputy of the Messenger. On top of that, the ruler was depicted as a part and parcel of the accentuated Abbasid clan.

The rule of the Abbasid caliph would be underpinned by the understanding that the caliph would impose dogma-related conceptions, such dogma being underpinned by an overemphasis of reason and an attempt to *rationalize* the MBO. The Abbasid founding caliphs attempted at establishing the Mu'tazilite dogma as the official dogma. From the view of the MBO, it qualifies as a doxic ethos being centered on an attempt at overemphasizing reason and rationalizing the faith. In his article *The Ideological background of Rationality in Islam,* Malik M. Tariq indicated how the Mu'tazilite doxic ethos, in a divergence from the MBO conception of epistemology, claimed "parity for reason with revelation." (Tariq, 2008, p. 38). It is reason which is the arbiter in knowing what is good and what is wrong. Tariq transmits Fazlur Rahman's attempt to nuance the understanding of the nature of the Mu'tazilah's epistemology and ratiocination as follows:

> Fazlur Rahman says, that the *Mu'tazila* were not 'free-thinkers' as they have been sometimes called. They were not pure rationalist' (despite their claim that reason is an equal source with revelation, of moral truth), although the impulse to a systematic thinking out of dogma, unlike traditional Islam, was certainly an activity which made them pursue their ratiocination further and further as the

time went on.23 He says that *Mu'tazila* carried their rationalism so far as to claim parity for reason with revelation in the discovery of religious truth. They were not content only with a declaration of the superiority of reason over revelation, but put it with equal footing the Word of God as a religious guide. (Tariq, 2008, p. 37, 38).

An attempt at rationalizing the nature of the Quran led the Mu'tazilite *doxic* ethos to arrive at the conception that the Quran was created hence subtly distorting the mystery of the nature of the divine speech. Additionally, an undertaking to rationalize divine judgment led to the determination that "those who commit grave sins (*Kaba'ir*) and do not repent are destined for hell" (Tariq, 2008, p.37) because in this regard "God has no choice" (Bashiri,2005, p. 11), and to the inference that the human being decides his/her destiny. Both conclusions seemed distortive of the soteriological mystery and the principle that "he (the divine) decides the fate of the individual as He pleases". (Bashiri, 2005, p. 11). Tariq explains by saying that

> by insisting on human freedom and responsibility, the Mu'tazilites made a person's ultimate destiny depend on him. The basic thought was that God in revelation showed the believers what they ought to do attain Paradise, and then left it to each of them to do it or not to it. This gave a tidy rational scheme with paradise as the reward for obedience and Hell as the punishment for disobedience. (Tariq, 2008, p. 37).

The strong emphasis on human freedom and the ensuing dilution of divine special action and predestination constituted, in part, a distortion of the mystery of the structure of the synergy between human free will and divine pre-destination. That said, the Abbasid founders endeavored to make the doctrine of the Mu'tazaites the official dominant doctrine. (Tariq, 2008, p. 35). They privileged Mu'tazilite jurists and judges at the exclusion of jurists and judges coming from other schools who, as demonstrated earlier, have asserted themselves as trustees in the realms of ifta'a, jurisprudence and education, who have established their scholastic merit and legitimacy and who were recognized by the people. The policy of dogma imposition reached its acme under the 7th Caliph Al-Ma'amun who used coercive means to impose central conceptions of the doxic ethos, namely the conception of the createdness of the Quran. (Tariq, 2008, p. 35). Al-Ma'mun

ordered that "officials publicly profess that the Qur'ān was the created word" (Tariq, 2008, p. 35), and instituted the inquisitional tribunals for the trial of the non-Mu'tazila". (Tariq, 2008, p. 36). The imposition of dogma by the imam/caliph and the exclusion of the ulama who asserted themselves as public trustees, constituted a movement in the direction of rendering the caliph *the sole* trustee or *waly al-amr*, and not in the direction of rendering him as one of the public trustees or *uli al-amr*. In Anthony Blacks analysis, the caliph's hegemony in the scholarly realm was seen as normal amongst some circles of Persian politicians who were highly influenced by their Sassanian heritage. Blacks' assessment of the Treaties by the Caliph's advisor Ibn Al-Muqafa'a are illustrative:

> Ibn Muqaffa' clearly saw the religious authority of the Deputy, at least in the legal sphere, as essential to his political power. The reason why Ibn Muqaffa' challenged head-on the ulama's prevailing perception of their role in Law (and so society at large) was that he thought that it led to incompetent decisions and general confusion. The paradox was that the view he put forward, and so clearly spelled out, was bound to offend the very ulama whose support the Abbasid government knew it needed. In fact, Ibn Muqaffa' saw the claims currently voiced by the learned as incompatible with stable political authority or even coherent social organization. It was a distinctly Iranian perception. He came down firmly on the side of God's Deputy. (Black, 2011, p. 23).

Plausibly, the understanding that caliph would impose dogma is an outcome of leveraging the overemphasis which the Mu'tazilite doctrine put on the role of the imam (caliph) in maintaining the order of the society, and the puritan overemphasis they put on the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil and enforcing penalties. For the Mu'tazilites, the umma needs the imam *primarily* to coercively enjoin good and forbid evil and enforce penalties. (Tariq, 2008, p. 35) (Ess, 2002, p. 132). Should the imam be absent, chaos would prevail. This is the relevance of imams in the first place. The puritanism of the Mu'tazilites may be discerned as an emotional reaction to the anxieties resulting from the practices of most of Umayyad imperial caliphs and the state of disorder which prevailed during the latter part of the Umayyad reign. Accordingly, the Caliph's main capacity would be the capacity of "the law enforcer". What this means is that societal order comes first, and that the order of the soul, if relevant at all, is fully

dependent on the order of society. Accordingly, making the enjoinment of good and the forbidden of evil and the enforcement of religious penalties *the* axial concern and function of the ruler and the umma of the believers constituted the exact reversal of the Voegelinian principle which found its materialization in the period of revelation, namely the primacy of the order of the soul over the order of the society. The *axial* function of the caliph would not be to deputize the Messenger, to stimulate recognition of his presence. It seems that this rational was *one* of the factors that were leveraged in establishing the caliph as a successor and not as the deputy of the Messenger. The mystery distortion and the ensuing multi-dimensional legitimation, including the legitimation yielded by the employment of the mystery-distorting title "God's caliph" and the title of "imam" moved in the direction of elevating the Umayyad caliph to the dignity of

Being the product of a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole, the Abbasid theoretical fabric, and the distortion of the mystery and of pertinent MBO conceptions, should be largely diagnosed as instruments of power enabling a new imperial ascent in which the Abbasid caliph would have an *expanded* special mystery-anchored image, and enabling lifting imperial anxieties. The caliph would be established as the "constituent of a *widened* majestic framework of mystery", and "the Arbiter of meaning". The caliph would dominate the systems of transcendental and existential representation. The mystery distortion and the ensuing multi-dimensional legitimation generated by title "God's caliph" and the title of "imam" moved in the direction of elevating the Umayyad caliph to the dignity of the main element of an expanded majestic mystery and the fixer of the meaning of the MBO conception, and the fixer of the meaning of the Mystery. The "Abbasid element" of the genealogical legitimation was hoped to contribute to outdoing the Arab competitors in the battle of legitimation, namely the sons of Ali (Hawting, 2000, p. 111). The Qurayshi element of the geneaological legitimation and the Arabist chauvinism were hoped to elevate the status of the Abbasids over the status of the non-Arab partners and denying

them their share in power. On a second plane, the Abbasid founders did not suffice with reviving the mystery-distorting concept of the "accentuated quasi ruler under God" upon its waning. They expanded it by blending it with a component imported from the new environment which was overwhelmed by the Sassanian heritage. By doing so, the Caliph made himself the main element of an expanded majestic mystery which was harmonious with the new milieu, hence cementing his position in the new milieu internally vis-à-vis the expanding *ra'iyya* and externally vis-a-vis monarchs and emperors. That being the case, what about the adoption and imposition of the Mu'tazilites mystery-distorting conceptions including the conception of the createdness of the Quran? Christopher Melchert, the author of *Religious Policies of the Caliphs from Al-Mutawakkil to Al-Muqtadir A H 232-295/A D 847-908* argues that the inquisition of Al-Ma'mun was a serious attempt to establish the caliph as arbiter of Islamic orthodoxy. (Melchert, 1996, p. 316). It is possible to propose the interpretation that by tilting the balance in favor of the mystery-distorting conceptions of the Mu'tazilites doxic ethos and attempting at imposing it, the Abbasid Caliph positioned himself the dominating fixer of the meaning of the MBO conception and fixer of the meaning of the Mystery. Making the Abbasid caliph the main element of an expanded majestic mystery and the fixer of the meaning of the MBO conception, and the fixer of the meaning of the Mystery, moved in the direction of subordinating the *ra'iyya* and the non-coopted ulama. All of that moved in the direction of dismissing that they were stakeholders of the Caliphate, and of coercing them to follow Caliph's dogma. It was hoped that this positioning would send ripples on the level of the system of existential representation. This positioning was complemented by other methods of dominating the system of meaning including the attempt to transform Baghdad into a new center of meaning but in which the intellectual movement would be personally directed by the caliph, said attempt being visible in the establishment of *Bayt Al-Hikmah* by Al-Ma'mun.

So far, we have covered the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate and the Mystery in the theoretical fabric of founding caliphs of two successive dynasties. Those

stations of deformation were followed by a deformation in the theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism and ideologized Sunnism represented by Al-Mawardi. Let us examine the deformation in ideologized Shiism.

The caliphate-related theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism:

A revelation-anchored ruler, a God's deputy, a constituent of an ultra-majestic framework of mystery, and a demystifier of mystery

As a reaction to the accruing suffering and frustration resulting from Umayyad persecution and the suffering resulting from Abbasid persecution, waves of further converting the Shiite orientation into an ideology or a neo doxic ethos began to emerge within circles embracing the Shiite orientation and ideologized Shiism that were coupled with revolutionary *superbia*-driven attempts at establishing an independent dominion which would swiftly grow into an Imperil rule. Upon the Abbasid's persecution of the great grandsons of Ali and forcing some of them to migrate to North Africa, the level of socio-economic autonomy of the communities living the Shiite orientation soared. The two sects, the Isma'ilis and the Ja'afaris or the Twelvers, gained exceptional prominence through the third / ninth century. The Isma'ilis saw that the line of Imamate passed from Ja'afar As-Sadiq through his son Ismail. The Ja'afaris or the Twelvers saw that the line of Imamate passed from Ja'afar As-Sadiq through his son Musa Ibn Ja'afar ending with the Twelfth imam Mohammad Ibn Al-Hassan who was the great grandson of Musa. The Isma'ili doctrine gained full existence before the Twelvers doctrine did. The Isma'ilis produced a doxic conceptual framework the center of which was an attempt at philosophizing. On the other hand, the Ja'afaris or Twelvers "did not become a coherent party until the time of the third safir (spokes-man for the Hidden Imam), Ibn Rawh al-Nawbakhti (d 326/938)". (Melchert, p. 1996, 318). The names of the earliest formulators of the intellectual substance of the Isma'ili doctrine are not known, mostly due to Abbasid persecution. Amongst the known *da'is* or missionaries stand Shi'rani, Ghiyath, and al-Amir Husayn b. Ali al-Marwazi. It was *da'i* An-Nasafi who managed around (AD

937-9) (H 326) to spread Isma'ilism in Central Asia especially after converting senior figures in the Samanid Dynasty. Later, the intellectual substance of the doctrine was widened by *Da'i* As-Sijistani (d ca AD 971) (H 360), and later the thinker and missionary Nâsir-e Khosrow (AD 1004-1074). Unlike the Isma'ilis, the Twelvers embarked on building a doxic conceptual framework the center of which was some jurisprudential provisions which was hoped, one may ventures to surmise, to make up for the forced disappearance of Al Al-Bayt and their lines in the *hadith* and *fiqh*, and to achieve what we call jurisprudential independence. Al-Nawbakhti was one of the main formulators of the imami creed together with Ali Ibn Babaweh Al-Qummi (d AD 939) (H 381), who authored numerous works sharpening the conception of Imamate and *wasiyya* or the determination of the imam's heir apparent such as *l'tiqadatul Imamateyah* or *The Imami beliefs*, and later Al-Mufid (AD 948-1022) (H 338-413). To be sure, the two confessional systems of the Isma'ilis and the Twelvers differed in some respects, and some of their variations even developed idiosyncratic conceptions. Nonetheless, both share a common *infrastructure* of doxic thinking as we shall see. Henceforth, it is in order to essentialize them and speak of an overarching *ideologized Shiism* and an overarching imamate/caliphate-related theoretical fabric. Circles within the communities living "the Shiite orientation" discharged a pursuit headed towards establishing own system of representation. One of the methods of accomplishing this mission was convincing an imperializing ruler to embrace the dogma. The conversion of one of the dynasties would immediately enable the pursuit of transforming the disenfranchised and disempowered Shiite circles into a constituency of an imperializing power.

One of the things that impeded the imperial pursuit of idoelogized Shiism was the strength which the legitimacy of the Abbasid Caliphs acquired. Even when the existential representation of the Abbasid Caliphs began to decline, their *legitimacy* of the Abbasid Caliphs did not lose all its splendor whether in the center or the periphery. It seems that this was one of the reasons why the Shiites continued to fail to take over the seat of the caliph. Accordingly, although a Persian dynasty embracing the Twelver doctrine entered

Bagdad at the request of the caliph by the midst of the Tenth century AD to fasten his rule upon the waning of his existential representation and its share in power augmented decade after decade, it could not claim the seat of the Caliph. The following lines by Norman O'Brown in his book *The Challenge of Islam: The Prophetic Tradition* summarize the idea:

> Disappointed at the outcome of the Abbasid Caliphate beginning about 810 AD- the outbreak of Shiite revolts. 945-1055 is called the Shiite century. Local Shiite powers, but failure to establish any unified caliphate. (O'Brown, 2009, p. 82).

Another impediment obstructing the imperial ambition of idoelogized Shiism was the *libido-dominandi*-minded sectarian supremacy and exclusion by the rising ideologized Sunnism. Roughly by the end of the period of the foundations of the jurisprudential madhabs, namely the second quarter of the ninth century, circles within the followership of the Sunna orientation, pioneered by the late Hanbalites, embarked on depicting themselves as *the* human category which possessed an uncorrupted understanding of the Sunna, which spoke in its name, and which constituted the unified body of true believers. They formulated the name *the people of the Sunna - the body of the true unified believers* or *ahl as-Sunna wa al-jama'a.* As Fred Donner points out in his book *Narratives of Islamic Origins*, the term *jama'a* did not appear in the Quran and was not of a strong presence in the period of revelation. The concept of *jama'a* became visible after the tumultuous storm resulting from the war erupting as result of Mu'awiya's against the forth Caliph Ali has lost much of its fury. The year following the war was named "the year of the unified collectivity" or *a'm al-jama'a*. The term *jama'a* continued to take root under Umayyad founders who stressed the importance of unity under their rule. For Donner, the above considerations justify, at least partly, the reading that the hadiths that used the word jama'a in stressing unity and warning against disunity were manufactured during the Umayyad period to serve the purpose of commanding obedience and combating dissent. (Donner, 1998, p. 55, 56, 57). This name, to use the characterization by Aziz Al-Azmeh of the phenomenon of "naming" in this age, was "intended to set limits, establish boundaries and interdict communication and access" (Al-Azmeh, 1986, p. 212)

through excluding from that human category embracers of dogmas that were at variance to their own. According to Al-Azmeh,

> Naming is full of institutional, and hence political, significance for a name is also a token which is negotiable in the arena of cultural politics. *We must therefore be wary of classifying schools — legal, theological and other — on the basis of the classifications available in medieval Arabic doxographies. These works are invaluable for the minute historical reconstruction of various opinions and the wider connections of such opinions. But their criteria for classification are not truly historical.* (Al-Azmeh, 1986, p. 212).

The term *jama'a* was mainly sourced from an unauthentic hadith which was used by ideologized Sunnism as a vehicle of exclusion. In it, the umma of the believers was purportedly envisaged to break into 73 factions or sects, and that 72 groups of them are destined to hellfire whereas only one "group" would be the saved group. This one group constituted the *jama'a* or the body of the true and unified believers. The hadith was judged by many scholars including Ibn Hazm as unauthentic. Drawing on Max Weber, in this self-concept, "original salvation universalism" of the MBO "is reversed by" ideologized Sunnism characterized by the Anti-universalism or particularism of Grace monopolized by ideologized Sunnism, "the self-proclaimed aristocracy of salvation or heavenly oligarchy." (Milan Zafirovski, Daniel G. Rodeheaver, 2013, p. 72, 73). Inextricably linked with the self-proclaimed salvation was the accentuation generated by the self-proclamation of infallibility. The infallibility claim was justified by a cohort of unauthentic hadiths that purportedly stipulate that the *umma* of believers would not unanimously sanction an evil conduct. The authenticity of those hadiths were dismissed by Al-Juwayni, one of the main later exponents of the doxic ethos of ideologized Sunnism himself. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 34, 35). In ideologized Sunnism, the self-proclaimed salvation reflected by the term *jama'a*, and the self-proclaimed infallibility, were glued to the historiogenetic concept of *as-salaf*. In it, the human category of the "companions" or *"as-sahaba"* and the following generation known as "the followers" or *"at-tabe'en"* is constructed as one human category sharing one consciousness. However, a closer examination reveals that the constructed human category of As-Salaf, in Voegelinian

terms, "had no consciousness of itself as a meaningful unified structure in the history of mankind. (Franz, 2000, p. 50). The consciousness of the three generations was not conceived throughout the past centuries as being of a distinguished unified cohesive epochal character. As explained in Chapter two, the MBO was clear about distinguishing the period of revelation from latter periods. Even within the period of revelation itself, the MBO was clear about distinguishing the consciousness of those who accepted the faith prior to the conquest of Mecca and those who accepted it afterwards. The attempt by the caliphs to fasten the recognition and awareness of the MBO and the grand attempt by the forth caliph to invigorate the conceptions of the MBO and the system of mystery mentioned in Chapter Three are demonstrative of the shifts and fluctuations that the expanding collective consciousness experienced. All the more, it constituted a stark and arresting defiance of the Voegelinian law that "societies don't exist as cosmic fixtures from eternity but grow in history". (Henningsen, 2000, p. 117). The constructed human category of as-salaf was accentuated and utopianized in the companions and the followers were, *de facto*, conceived as infallible. The human category of *as-salaf* was positioned as *the Origin* of the umma of the believers, to use the terminology of Fred Donner. It was depicted as the ultimate reference for the *umma* the believers across history. The authority of the constructed category companions is depicted as higher than the rank of Al Al-Bayt. The canonically established category of Al Al-Bayt and its canonically established primacy, and the precedence of the members of Al Al-Bayt are shrouded. The treatment of the entirety of the three generations as one all-encompassing human category and historical unit of a common epochal consciousness, and the embedded implicit infallibility of the members of the *salaf*, moved in the direction of obscuring and defacing the difference between the authority of the Messenger and the authority of the figures of the three centuries constituting the constructed human category of the salaf. Within the constructed human category of as-Salaf, there is no hierarchy. Any precedence of a member of the late followers may be cited prior to the precedents of the Messenger or his closest companions. In ideologized

Sunnism of the human category of As-Salaf, and in the unauthentic hadiths of the self-proclaimed salvation, the authority of the constructed category companions is *de facto* equipollent to the authority of the Messenger. Further, the order-necessitated distinction between the period of the first four Caliphs and the subsequent periods is defaced, and archetypalness of the period of the first four caliphs in so much as living the caliphate or deputyship of the Messenger is defaced. By the name *"ahl al-Sunna wa al-jama'a"*, ideologized Sunnism attempted at excluding multiple sectarian frameworks including ideologized Shiism, mainly rejectionism. The accentuation of the companions of the Messenger was in large part meant to counterpoise the accentuation of Al Al-Bayt by ideologized Shiism. Ideologized Sunnism constructed the members of Al Al-Bayt as symbols of a counter hostile doxic ethos, hence the general position towards them was one of disregard. Ideologized Sunnism adopted the greater part of the Umayyad narratives in relation to assessing the confrontation with - and later the persecution of - Al Al-Bayt. The doxic ethos created by the late Hanbalites was one of the main constituents of ideologized Sunnism. A theological element of that doxic ethos was an unprecedented extreme anthropomorphic conception which was underpinned by the stipulation that verses speaking of the divine should be taken literally. The exclusion of the Shiite orientation and ideologized Shiism by the doxic ethos of the late Hanbalites' and of ideologized Sunnism at large, was an integral part of a larger phenomenon of cross-madhab and cross-sectarian exclusion. The Hanafi and the Shafi'e *madhabs* were also excluded by the late Hanbalites. The late Hanbalites went so far as to accuse highly esteemed *ulama* of the Shafi'e *madhab* and even Abu Hanifa of being apostates. They prevented the followers of the Shafi'e *madhab* – sometimes by force - from praying in the way their doctrine stipulated. They carried out an inquisition in which they launched raids on the homes of ordinary people in search of alcohol, searched ordinary couples walking in the street for proof of legitimate relations and applied instant punitive measures, including lashing. They adopted an exclusionist position towards Christians and the Jews, prohibiting sharing food with them. The prominent 10th century historian,

Ibn Al-Atheer used the title *Fitnat Al-Hanabela* or *The sedition of the Hanablites* as a title of the section in which he covered the Hanbalites doxic behavior. A narrower wave of particularization of grace emerged mainly within late Hanbalites and late Shafi'es who relied heavily on hadith at the expense of other sources. The self concept that it is *ahl Al-hadith* (the people of Hadith) who inherited the infallibility of the Messenger gained currency. (Konakata, 1994, p. 132).

Within the framework of undoing the above refractory reality, a caliphate-related mystery-distorting theoretical fabric was produced by ideologized Shiism, such fabric being the working of a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole. This fabric was mainly a combination of theoretical stipulations, Gnostic philodoxic writings and conceptual practices, statements, and a system of symbolism. It acquired definite shape throughout the late second/ninth century and the third/tenth century.

The body politic to which the theoretical-fabric of ideologized Shiism pertained would be underpinned by a premise of exclusionist *sectarian* particularism which was grounded in sectarian supremacy, in an ideologization of the Sunni orientation, and in a reflexive relation of otherization and ideologization with ideologized sunnism. Ideologized Shiism provided its share in the battle of creating a dichotomous doxic ethos in that it too converted the Sunni orientation into a hostile ideology. Ideologized Shiism counterpoised the accentuation of ideologized Sunnism of the companions by way of excommunicating them. The rejection of the three first caliphs who preceded Ali was widened. The characterization that they were usurpers was cemented. A *damnatio memori* practice based on which particularly the first two caliphs as well as their daughters were systematically cursed became an integral part of the system of symbolism. The Umayyad founders were constructed as symbols of all the followers of the Sunna orientation based on generalizing their centrality for the majority of Hanbalites in spite of the fact that the Sunna orientation, as the case of the Shiite orientation, "developed", as Hawting asserts, "in opposition to the Umayyads". (Hawting,

2000, p. 3). The jurisprudential output of the *Sunna ulama* was not to be adopted and their sources were banned.

That body politic would be *imamed* by an imam/God's caliph who would be a transcendental representative, and who *should*, but not necessarily *would*, be the elemental and existential representative, and who would be conceived in terms of *an ascending differentiation* of, surprisingly, the Umayyad notion of "the accentuated quasi ruler under God", synergized with an ascending differentiation of the Umayyad, and non-Umayyad, messianic eschatological notion of "the awaited chosen one". The theoretical-fabric rested on the conception that in every epoch after the Messenger, there shall be a person from Al Al-Bayt who would be "the absolute leader" and "the first and perfect one" and who would be "God's direct vicegerent". That is why he is referred to in the theoretical-fabric as "imam", and as "God's caliph" denoting a concrete direct deputyship of God. The stronger emphasis is laid on the title "imam". He is the imam and God's deputy whether he sat on the Caliphal seat, such as Ali Ibn Abi Taleb, or did not sit on it such as the case of the following imams. In Voegelinian theoretical terminology, he is imam and God's deputy whether he was a full-fledged existential representative or not. Not sitting on the caliphal seat does not contract his imamate or deputyship of God in the system of transcendental representation, and to a limited extent in the system of existential representation. His sheer presence renders him the one from whom spiritual guidance is sourced, and the one to be followed on the transcendental level. He is the one to be obeyed on the existential level even if his existential representation is limited. The justification of the existence of the "imam" who is "God's Caliph" is that in every epoch, humanity needs a living perfect model. After the death of the Messenger, there must be living imams to be the ultimate example in his time in the same way the Messenger was the ultimate example of his time. God would not leave humanity without guidance after the death of the Messenger. Thus, the conception moved in the direction of contracting the ahistorical presence of the Messenger. In a materialization of the Voegelinian theme of the immanentization of the eschaton, and in breach of the MBO

conceptions of history and of the MBO conception of the Messenger especially his ahistoric presence, the last imam who was conceived as having gone into occultation and would stay alive till the final hour, shall reappear to fill the entire earth with justice within the context of an idea of "an end of history in the sense of an intelligible worldly state of perfection" to use Voegelin's words in describing a similar case. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 184). In the conception lies the implicit notion that the scope of justice realized by the last imam would be greater than the scope of justice realized during the foundation stage or during the ages of all prophets. It seems this messianic notion was a variation of the multiple messianic conceptions that emerged during the preceding century. Such conceptions were inaugurated by the followership of Al Al-Bayt who rebelled against the Umayyads. Yet, they were equally reproduced by no other than the followership of the Umayyads themselves. As Hawting explains,

> during the first century or so of the Abbasid rule a number of political and religious movements developed in Syria which had a strong messianic character and looked for the coming of a figure who would overthrow the Abbasids and reestablish Syrian glory. The figure was known as the Sufyani and was supposed to be descended from the line which had produced the great Mu'awiya. It is as if the Sufyanid period of Umayyad history had come to be regarded as of a special significance and something like a golden age for Syria. (Hawting, 2000, p. 34).

Thus, the conception of the imam is underpinned by an automatic dropping the Caliph's deputyship of the Messenger, and a spontaneous dilution of the recognition of his presence.

The imamate of the imam/God's caliph would be based on theological legitimation, on genealogical legitimation, on a pietistic legitimation, the first two mechanisms of legitimation being a differentiation of, surprisingly, Umayyad legitimation. Firstly, similar to the Umayyad case, divine ordainment of the imam is highly stressed at the exclusion of consultation (*shura*) in designating the imam. In the variation of ideologized Shiism, divine ordainment was materialized in the ways of designating the imam/God's caliph, namely designation through canonical stipulation (*nass*) *such as a hadith*, designation through appointment by the earlier imam (*wasiyya*). Partly similar to

the Umayyad soteriology, the divine right to rule was complemented by the soteriological notion that obeying the imam and caliph of God was the cause of salvation. As Daftari remarks,

> the Isma'ili *da'wa* would, thus, guarantee deliverance in this world and salvation in the hereafter. (Daftary, 2007, p. 133).

In the variation of Twelver Shiism, not believing in the twelfth imam is viewed as full-fledged apostasy. (Abdul Rauf, 2013, p. 3). Hence, believing in the imam was one of the quintessential fundamentals of the religion. Secondly, as an idiosyncratic differentiation of the Umayyad employment of the accentuated constructed genealogy in legitimation as explained earlier, ideologized Shiism constructed an accentuated version of the framework of Al Al-Bayt stipulating that "membership of the Prophet's family was a sine qua non for the imam". (Hawting, 2000, p. 3). In Donner commented on the genealogical legitimation underscoring the *gnostic* legitimation inextricably linked to it as follows:

> the Shiite claim is essentially genealogical (and gnostic) in principle, but they developed historical justification for their continued aspiration to power, despite sustained failure to gain it. (Donner, 1998, p. 188).

Thirdly, ideologized Shiism stipulated that not only was the imam the most pious living human being, but he was as infallible as the Messenger. The imam must be infallible. His infallibility is underpinned by the contention that he is the ultimate example of his age whose model shall be followed in the same way the Messenger was.

As Donner stated, the imamate of the imam/God's caliph would be based on gnostic legitimation, the mystery-distorting gnostic conception of the all-knowingness of imam/God's caliph being a corner stone conception in relation to the faculties of the imam. At variance from the MBO conception of epistemology, the intellect is not a function or an act of restraining the abilities supplied by the divine, but a thing which is installed in man and there is no way to increase it. Man should only seek to realize its potentialities by way of receiving the initiatory knowledge of the imams. According to Moezzi,

aql (the intellect) is not just an acquired quality, but a gift from God. He who works to achieve a good education can succeed, while he who works to attain 'aql only increases his ignorance."14 'aql cannot be acquired by human effort; man has no control over its presence … All man can do is to develop, to actualize coal, this divine gift in the potential state; it is actualized with the aid of 'ilm, the initiatory knowledge taught by the imams in different fashions. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 9).

The imam is the exterior intellect and the intellect is the interior imam or the aql of the faithful believer. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 9). Moezzi explains:

Aql was defined as the axis of the religion of the imams, like an indispensable key for opening the mysteries of their teachings and for opening oneself to these teachings. The spiritual vision attained by virtue of this hiero-intelligence allowed one to distinguish the true from the false, light from darkness, Knowledge from Ignorance, in short, the doctrine of the imams from other doctrines. This doctrine, as will be seen in the present study, essentially consists of cosmogonic, mystic, esoteric, even magical and occult elements, that is, non-rational elements. It is through a kind of phenomenon of "resonance," of mystic synergy, that "the interior imam" or the 'aql of the faithful believer, recognized and believed in the truth of the words, acts, and gestures, regardless of how incredible and nonrational they were, of the exterior 'aql that the historical imams were. Through the "light" of hiero-intelligence, the religious consciousness of the faithful Imamite not only perceived cosmogonic data, inspired Knowledge, or the miraculous powers of the imams and other esoteric and occult elements that made up the essentials of basic Imamite doctrine as credible, but this light elevated these elements to the level of articles of faith. It happened this way because hiero-intelligence made all these elements look like so many Signs and gifts from God. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 12).

Regarding the Quran and Sunna, the ethos espoused a special conception that the imam is the final arbiter and interpreter of the Quran being qualified to understand all the esoteric meanings of the Quran. He is the speaking Quran (*Al-Qur'an An-Natiq*). Likewise, the Messenger's hadith can only be understood in light of the imams' traditions. As Moeazzei remarks,

The true axis around which Imamite doctrinal tradition revolves is that Imamology without the knowledge of which no other great chapter, as is the case with theology or prophetology, could be adequately studied. The Imam being in this case the center of everything, it is in relation to him that the nature and the authority of hadith can be considered. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 23).

Hence, the imam enjoys a subtle *de facto* supremacy over the Quran and hadith. Daftari holds that early Imamism adopted Cabalist methods of interpretation attaching a great significance to "mystical properties and symbolism of letters and numbers". (Daftary, p. 2007, p. 130). The truths (haqaiq) in effect formed a *gnostic* system, representing an esoteric world of hidden spiritual reality." (Daftary, 2007, p. 129). The Imam possesses supernatural knowledge. Mankind is divided into two categories, the elite (*al-Khawas*) and the commoners (*al-awam*). Religious laws were announced by the prophets, it was the function of their successors, the legatees (*awsiya'*) and imams, to interpret their true meaning to those who were properly initiated and received proper teaching. (Daftary, 2007, p. 131). Esoteric truths are only accessible by the divinely guided imam and the teachers after the Prophet and Ali. (Daftary, 2007, p. 131). Truths are accessible only to those who

> recognize the teaching authority of Prophet Mohammad and his *wasi* Ali and the legitimate imams of the era," and who make an oath to keep the esoteric knowledge they attain secret, and may use *taqiyya* to do so, are initiated by the imam in a step which is known as *balagh*, and receive gradual teaching. (Daftary, 2007, p. 129).

As Moezzi explains, the limitless epistemological capacity of the imams is conceived as inextricably linked with their supernatural powers. Their knowledge includes

> 1) knowledge of the Invisible World; 2) knowledge of the past, the present, and the future; 3) knowledge of the hermeneutic science (*ta'wil*) of all previous sacred books; 4) knowledge of all languages, the language of the animals and the birds, of inanimate objects, and of the "metamorphosed" (*al-musukh*); 5) the column of light (`*amud min Nur*) that the imam can visualize at will to see the answers to all his questions; 6) "the marking of the heart" (*al-nakt fi al-qalb*) and "the piercing of the eardrum" (*al-naqr fi al-udhn*), as occult means of the "transmission" of Knowledge. 73 (Moezzi, 1994, p. 18).

The supernatural powers of the imams include

> possession of the supernatural power of the Supreme Name of God and of sacred objects that belonged to the prophets; 2) the power to bring the dead back to life, to communicate with the dead, to heal the sick; 3) the powers of clairvoyance, of

"clairaudience," of physiognomy; 4) instantaneous deplacement in space and walking on clouds. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 18).

It follows that in a differentiation of the Umayyad and Abbasid cases, the accentuated imam held three capacities in addition to being depicted as an integral part of an accentuated genealogical base. He was "the imam". He was depicted as God's Deputy/Caliph. He was "the Successor" of the Messenger, not his deputy. On top of that, the ruler was depicted as a constituent of the accentuated Al Al-Bayt.

A historiogenetic conception of the relation between prophethood and the caliphate would be the main element of the formulated caliphate related *doxic ethos*, qualifying as *an ascendingly differentiated version* of the mystery distorting Umayyad historiogenetic conception. First of all, central in the theoretical-fabric is the teleological conception that the appearance of the Imams the ultimate *telos* of history. Messengers and the Prophets are created to lead to the appearance of the Imams. We have shown how this historiogenetic notion was first manufactured by the Umayyad founding caliphs. As Daftari explains, in the variation of ideologized Shiism, history is divided into phases that are defined in the light of emergence of Prophets and imams *or wasies* (legatees), hence human history is divided into six epochs of Prophets who are vocals accompanied by six silent legatees. In an implicit differentiation of the Umayyad argument that Caliphs came to fulfil the task which prophets did not complete, in the Ismaili and Ja'fari theoretical outlook, the Imam *complements* the Messenger in relation to revealing the meanings of the Quran. In the Isma'ili variation, whereas Prophets and Messenger's interpret the external meaning of the Quran (*tanzil*), the imams interpret the inner meanings of the Quran (*ta'wil*). (Kazemi, 2007, p. 19).

The above historiogenetic conception would be complemented by another imam-centered cosmogonic historiogenetic conception. As Daftari remarks, early Ismaili thought developed a variation of neo-platonic theology and neo-platonic cosmogonic conception according to which creation is conceived as a happening of divine emanation. (Daftari, 2007, p. 113). The intellect (*aql*) proceeded from the divine becoming "the first

matter" and the manifestation from which "all else emanates". (Bashiri, 2005, p. 18). The emanated intellect (*aql*) is perceived within the context of joining with the forces of good and light including the imams, in confronting ignorance (*jahl*) which is joined by the forces of evil and darkness who are the enemies of the imams. In his book, *The Divine Guide in Early Shi'ism: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam*, Moezzi remarks that

> Imamite doctrine constantly had recourse to paralleling, if not identifying, 'aql, its Armies, and the Imam and his faithful, on one hand, and Ignorance, its Armies, and the enemies of the Imams on the other." The cosmogonic dimension given to aql and its Armies seems to be the result of a doctrinal development that breaks the mold of Qur'anic definitions and turns it into a kind of cosmic Morality, a metaphysical prototype of human morality, at war with cosmic Immorality. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 8).

Another element of the cosmogonic anecdote is the concomitance of the primacy of the divine emanation of Ali, who is the first of the line of imamate, with the divine emanation of the Messenger, in "the world before the world" as Moezzi calls it, and the unity of the light from which both proceeded. According to Moezzi,

> from his own light, God made a luminous ray spring forth, and from this ray he made a second ray proceed; the first was the light of Muhammad, that of Prophecy (nubuwwa), that of the exoteric (dahir); the second, of identical nature but subordinate to the first, was the light of 'All, that of the Imamate or of walaya, of the esoteric (batin). "Two thousand years before creation, Muhammad and 'Ali were one light before God ... , light formed from one main trunk from which sprang a shining ray.... And God said: "Here is a light [drawn] from my Light; its trunk is prophecy and its branch is the Imamate; prophecy belongs to Muhammad, my servant and messenger, and the Imamate belongs to 'All, my Proof and my Friend. Without them I would have created none of my creation.... " This is why 'All always said "I proceed from Muhammad [or from Ahmad] as one clarity proceeds from another. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 8).

In the writings of Saffar Al-Qummi (d. 290/903), the Cosmogonic stations mentioned in the Quran and other constructed ones are all read in light of the centrality of the imams in each of them. (Moezzi, 1994, p. 16).

Being the working of a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole, the caliphate theoretical fabric of ideologized

Shiism, the distortion of the mystery and of pertinent MBO conceptions ought to be construed as power instruments enabling the establishment of an independent imperial dominion with an extremely inflated mystery-justified image of the imam *and his legatees*, and enabling lifting imperially-related anxieties. The dominion would be 'imamed' by an imam who would be "the main constituent of an ultra majestic complex of mystery" and "the demystifier of mysteries". The dominion would be actually co-led by an imam's delegatee who would be "an assistive constituent of the framework of mystery" and "a co-demystifier of mysteries". As an ascending differentiation of the Umayyad and Abbasid, the mystery distortion and the relevant multi-dimensional legitimation, including the legitimation yielded by the employment of the mystery-distorting title "imam" and "God's caliph" moved in the direction of elevating the imam to the dignity of "an integral part of an exorbitantly majestic structure of mystery". Exorbitantly expanding the position and the role of the imam in the system of transcendental representation positioned the imam above the essential authorities of the MBO namely the authority of the Quran and the authority of the Messenger, and, more importantly, above the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. On the level of existential representation, it served as a compensator for the failure to seize the caliphal seat, and as a lifter of the ensuing anxieties, and served in making the step of embracing the dogma in the eyes of existential monarchs an appealing step. In addition to moving in the direction of self-empowerment, the genealogical legitimation and the historicizing legitimation moved in the direction of reciprocating and curbing the Umayyad's genealogical and historicizing legitimation. The exorbitant accentuation of the imam and his delegate(s) also moved in the direction of enticing the followership to continue to follow and obey the delegates of the imam, and empowering the status of the actual leadership pursuing the mission of building an imperial dominion and speaking in the name of the imam, namely the missionary or the *da'i*.

With that said, the deformation of the meaning of the caliphate in the theoretical-fabric of ideologized Shiism was followed by an idiosyncratic deformation in

the theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi which, in part, belongs to ideologized Sunnism as we shall see shortly. I now turn to examine that station of deformation which is the last one in so much as the first line of deformation is concerned.

Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

A dependent ruler, a God's deputy and a constituent of a lesser-majestic framework of mystery

The caliphate-related theoretical-fabric of Al-Mawardi (972-1058 AD) (364-450 H) was formulated at a historical phase in which Abbasid Caliphal Imperialism had lost much of its existential power and his spiritual status has been discredited, and which bore witness to an attempt by Al-Mawardi's caliph, Al-Qa'im, to reassert his Caliphal Imperial presence in the systems of transcendental and existential representation. As of the second half of the ninth century, the Abbasid faced a series of revolts in the center and in peripheral spots. Between 869, 883 hundreds of thousands of slaves brought to Iraq throughout the preceding century revolted in the south near Basra causing a huge destruction and forcing the attention of the Imperializing Caliph to be engrossed by the unrest in the center to the detriment of attending to the politics of the provinces. Consequently, Governors of important provinces began to widen the scope of their autonomy. Ibn Tulun of Egypt expanded his autonomy and had his name engraved on coins next the name of the Abbasid caliphs and began to play the caliph against his rival brother. In the periphery, with the end of the first decade of the 10thcentury AD, the Isma'ili leader Ubayd Allah established his dominion in Central North Africa proclaiming himself as Imam/Caliph (r 909-934 AD) of an independent Caliphate (909-1177 AD) (296-572 H). Ubaid Allah claimed a Messenger's lineage and used the persona of Fatima Az-Zahra'a, the daughter of the Messenger, as the eponym of the Dynasty which he called Fatimid. He propagated that the Imamate continues after the seventh imam, and claimed himself the imam of the time and the awaited Al-Mahdi. In 969 AD, the Fatimids conquered Egypt and established Cairo as the new Capital, and later controlled the main

parts of Hejaz, including Mecca and Medina and established themselves through the new legitimacy ground of the Custodianship of the Two Holly Shrines. The Qarmatians who originally emerged in Salamiyyah in Iraq living an idiosyncratic variation of Isma'ilism and who had established a dominion in Bahrain in 889 AD, and who rejected the "Fatimid" claim of Mahdism, expanded their rule and to take over geopolitically sensitive parts of the Arab region. They controlled Oman, and parts of the Hijaz. They assaulted Mecca and Madina in 930 AD and stole the sacred black stone which they returned only against a ransom by the caliph. They forced the caliph and the Fatimid caliph to pay tribute. In Persia, in the middle of the second quarter of the 10th century AD, the Buwayhids emerged in Ray as a monarchical Imperializing dynasty embracing the doctrine of Twelver Shiism. In 945 AD, the Buwayhids entered Baghdad at the request of the powerless seventeenth Abbasid Caliph, Al-Mustakfi (r 944–946 AD), to put an end to the growing influence of the Turkik commanders in Baghdad. The entrance ushered in an unprecedented formula of role sharing in the systems of existential and transcendental representation. For the first time, the capital of the Caliphate is subservient to another capital. For a whole century, up till 1055 AD/447 H, the Buwayhids continued their relentless pursuit of expanding their power to the detriment of the Abbasid caliph's role in the systems of existential and transcendental representation. The second quarter of the 11th century saw the rise of the Seljuk dynasty who controlled Khurasan in 1040 AD, and proceeded to control Transoxiana and Persia having ousted the Buwayhids there. Concomitant with the rule of the 26th Abbasid Caliph Al-Qa'im (r 1031-1075 AD) was the completion of the transformation of the Seljuk's rule from a regional power to an ascending monarchical imperializing rule under Tugrul (r 1037-1063 AD). As of 1051 AD, the Seljuk took Isfahan as their capital instead of Rey. From their end, the 25th Abbasid Caliph Al-Qadir (r. 991–1031 AD) and subsequently Caliph Al-Qa'im (r. 1031–75 AD) embarked on resurrecting the Caliphal Imperial power politically and spiritually. They resumed the policy of the Abbasid founders of imposing their own creed. The only difference is that Al-Qadir and Al-Qa'im harbored the ideologized Sunni doctrine which

became the doctrine of the Caliph as of the reign of the 10th Abbasid caliph Al-Mutawakkil (847-861 AD) (205-247 H) replacing the Mu'tazilite doctrine. (Al-Azmeh, 1986, p. 122). They positioned themselves as the heads of ideologized Sunnism depicting themselves as the saviors of the doctrine, and launched campaigns against the ethos of ideologized Shiism. The following lines by Black clarify:

> A more aggressive Sunni-restoration policy was undertaken under the combined leadership of the urban Scholars and two forceful Deputies, al-Qadir (lit. 'the one who decrees') (r.991–1031) and his son al-Qa'im (lit. 'the deliverer') (r.1031–75). Al-Qadir prohibited discussion of Shiite or Mu'tazilite teachings, and even banned theological disputation (*kalam*) itself from the madrasas (Religious Colleges). Mu'tazilites were deprived of positions of influence; pro-Mu'tazilite members of the Hanafi School were made to retract their views publicly. His political programme was to liberate the Deputyship from Shiite rule; and the chosen instrument were the Saljuk-led Turkish tribes to the East, with whom al-Qadir 'formed what amounted to an alliance. (Black, 2011, p. 82).

Bridges of communication between the Seljuk imperializing Sultans and the Imperializing caliph were built and bonds of cooperation were created. The daughter of the Seljuk ruler Shagri was married to the 26th Abbasid caliph Al-Qa'im.

However, on the level of the surrounding reality, the rule of the Abbasid caliph was facing critical times. During Al-Qa'im's reign, two Imperial dynasties had strings of influence that they could pull in the capital hosting the seat of the Caliphate. The power map was somewhat complicated. On one level, the Abbasid caliph had an incomplete military power and existential representation. "His acts of command were not met with habitual obedience" in Voegelinian terminology (Henningsen, 2000. p. 117) due to the lack of means of enforcement. However, he retained some existential power and representation. He was still able to mobilize existentially powerful autonomous dynasties especially ascending ones who were in need of the Caliph's legitimation and investiture. On the other hand, the powerful Emirs, whether Buwayhid or Seljuk, had a strong military power and existential representation. Their acts of command were met with habitual obedience. Each emir was generally able to bind and commit a militarized followership and a ra'iyya. Thus, the Emirs had the lion's share in existential

representation whereas the Abbasid caliph had the smaller share. On another level, the Abbasid Caliph's legitimacy was strong and hence had a central place in the system of transcendental representation. The Abbasid's strongest legitimation at work was the genealogical legitimation. Amongst the indicators of the strength of the Caliph's legitimacy was that the Twelver Buwayhids could not seize the seat of the caliph though they were the veritable military rulers of Baghdad for nearly a century. Even the Seljuks could not do so later. On the other hand, the Emirs too enjoyed a part of the symbolic power. Thus, the caliph had the lion's share in the system of transcendental representation, whereas the Emirs had the smaller share. The relative longevity of the Buwayhid presence in the Capital led the Buwayhid Emirs' aspirations to surge, and made the struggle on political power and the symbolic power become fiercer. As of the Buwayhid Emir Adud Al-Dawla of Iraq (r. 949 – 983 AD), the Buwayhids resurrected the Sassanid title ShahenShah or King of kings. (Clawson and Rubin, 2005, p. 19). The title was seen as repugnant to the spirit of the MBO and the MBO theological conceptions in that it should not be claimed on the human level. It was provocative to the caliph and the public

From his end, Al-Mawardi (972-1058 AD) (364-450 H) was very clear about his loyalties. In spite of the presence of three masters or clients in the capital, Al-Mawardi's undivided loyalty was pledged to one client or sovereign to whom "he strictly maintained his obedience" as he established in the outset of the book, namely the Abbasid Caliph. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 1). Al-Mawardi's loyalty was pledged to the then existing Abbasid Caliph and to the Abbasid Dynasty in general. Further, his loyalty to the Abbasid Dynasty was seen in stressing, in his book, the genealogical criterion of the Quraysh lineage, and in using the practices of Abbasid founders as best practices that should be universalized and from which provisions may be extrapolated together with the practices of the Messenger and the first four caliphs. (Al-Mawardi, 1989 p. 20, 30, 107, 108, 109, 113, 120, 121).

The capital of the Imperialized caliphate which was inhabited by a large Arab population, and which was also of a cosmopolitan character, was under the hegemony of a Turko-Persian dynasties who embraced a distinguished, but not necessarily different, mode of Imperial monarchism. Effectively, the center had become a *de facto* satellite/periphery, and a satellite/peripheral city has become *the facto* center, namely Rey and later Isfahan. Multiple *superbia*-based socio-ethnic tensions on all fronts seem to have unfolded. Foremost among those was a sectarian tension. The sectarian tension streamed between ideologized Shiism and ideologized Sunnism. As indicated earlier, the Caliph's father, the Caliph Al-Qader, had personally led the camp of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism in the stern ideological battle. (Black, 2011, p. 82).

Within the context of overcoming the above-mentioned recalcitrant reality, a less mystery-distorting caliphate-related theoretical fabric was produced Al-Mawardi, such fabric being the working of a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole. This fabric was expressed in books on the caliphate and on prophethood and other related topics, on jurisprudence. It was also expressed in his jurisprudential identity and affiliation, in the genre which he focused on, and in his political and strategic stances and behavior.

The body politic conceived in the Al-Mawardi's theoretical fabric would encompass the entirety of the Muslims peoples, and would be perceived in terms of light religious and sectarian particularism according to which the *doxic* ethos of ideologized Sunnism would be lightly expanded, and the difference between the monotheistic faiths and non-monotheistic faiths would be diluted. On the sectarian level, Al-Mawardi embarked on further incorporation of the Sunna in the legal system within the context of completing the restoration of the MBO conception of the Messenger, and at the same time on advancing the construction of the ethos of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism. As a judge, Al-Mawardi was at the heart of the juridical process. Hence, the theme of juridical practices was a main theme of his writings. As a jurist, he had a firsthand knowledge of matters that were of legal significance to the public and pertain to their

daily life. Hence, he was focused on applied jurisprudence. His monumental work Al-Hawi included a jurisprudential and legal treatment of a large number of subjects such as buying, selling, leasing, mortgage, guarantees, corporations, bankruptcy, divorce, alimony, murdering. It also included a chapter on the best practices of judges. Thus, it is possible to infer that Al-Mawardi was after providing a practical reference or a manual for muftis and judges. He was after removing jurisprudential and legal vacuums resulting from the continuous springing up of novel incidents as a result of the increasing complication of life in a colossal geography. He was also after advancing the systematization of the juridical process. At the same time, Al-Mawardi's jurisprudential corpus demonstrates an undertaking at rearranging certain aspects of the output by jurists belonging to the four madhabs. As Anthony Black remarks,

> he compiled manuals on the doctrines of all four Legal Schools. His output was (like that of all major Religious Scholars) voluminous: 4,000 pages on the *Shari'a* system alone. (Black, 2011, p. 86).

The focus on the four madhabs was, in part, a development of jurisprudential category of "the four madhabs" which was ideologized and taken by some circles within the advocates of the Sunna orientation as the framework which informed their ideological path, namely ideologized Sunnism, and which distinguished them from the advocates of ideologized Shiism. Though not being one of his largest books, Al-Mawardi's book *The Flags of Prophethood* seems to be an axial work within Al-Mawardi's corpus. Al-Mawardi's *The Flags of Prophethood* seems to have an attempt to put together a formulated abridged creed which would summarize the MBO conceptions. The book used the theme of prophethood as a platform on which he based his pursuit to restore multiple MBO conceptions reconfirming many of their mysteries. On the level of the inter-religious relations, in *The Flags of Prophethood*, Al-Mawardi provides a very reductionist and simplistic treatment of Christian theology immediately following another a reductionist treatment of Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism (Al-Mawardi, n.d, p.10, 11). This is followed by another treatment of Zoroastrianism and Trinitarian Christianity together (Al-Mawardi, n.d, p.28) hence implicitly moving in the direction of transferring

Christianity proper from the category of monotheistic religions. Nonetheless, this *light* exclusion of Christianity is counterpoised by sanctioning in *The Ordinances of Governance* that the executive viziers of the imam be from amongst the category of dhimmis or the followers of the other two monotheistic religions. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p.36).

Contrary to the conventional understanding in the literature, Al-Mawardi's caliph would be conceived as having a strong role in the system of transcendental representation being conceived in terms of a *descending* differentiation of the transcendence-related mystery-distorting notion of the "accentuated *quasi* ruler under God".

God has *delegated* to the Umma a leader whom …. (whom he) made the wall which shields religion, and delegated to him *siyasa*)[5]. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 3).

Speaking of a direct divine delegation constituted *an actual* subscription to the characterization of the caliph as God's deputy. In the imam and "successor" was vested a divine authorization to act on behalf of God in managing the affairs of the umma. It is worth noting that the Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric exhibited its awareness of the debate among the ulama in relation to the mystery-distorting concept of "God's caliph". This is reflected by Al-Mawardi's discussion of the difference which emerged among the ulama on sanctioning the title "God's caliph". In doing so, Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric remarked that some *ulama* have sanctioned the usage of the title on the basis that the Caliph secures God's rights in the world, and on the basis of the Quranic verse related to the creation-related caliphate whereas the *majority* of the ulama did not sanction the title "God's caliph". The caliphate-related theoretical-fabric cited the refusal by the first Caliph after the Messenger, Abu Bakr, to be called "God's caliph". In explaining Al-Mawardi's adoption of the concept of "God's caliph", it is crucial to note that the longevity of the idea of a God's caliph or God's direct deputy who would be conceived as "the quasi ruler under God",

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[5] Translated by the writer of the dissertation.

and the cross-sectarian or cross-confessional adoption of it, rendered the concept compelling. By the days of Al-Mawardi, the concept of "God's caliph" had been at work for more than three centuries. What is indeed striking is that in validating the claim that there could be only one imam, Al-Mawardi's theory uses the Quranic verse which dismisses the possibility of the existence of multiple Gods by pointing that a multiplicity of Gods would lead to disorder (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p.37). For Al-Mawardi, there can only be one imam. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p.37). He is the guardian of faith and the chief administer of worldly affairs. Using the terms imam and caliph interchangeably, the imam is *the* overarching head who presides over the entirety of the Umma. He is not a *primus inter pares*. With regard to eligibility, Al-Mawardi argued that all imams must be from Quraysh based on a *Hadith* related to the Messenger, and is considered to have been used during the consultations that led to the designation of the first Caliph after the death of the Messenger. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p.5).

The rule of the imam would rest on a theological and genealogical legitimation and a pietistic legitimation. We have established earlier that the notion of God's direct caliph entailed a theological legitimation and a pietistic legitimation. The opening of the book The *Ordinances of Governance or Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyya* consists of a subtle expression of veneration of the Abbasid dynasty. Yet, this genealogical legitimation differs from the genealogical legitimation of the early Abbasid founders. It does not run within the framework of the rivalry with the sons of Ali. No mention of the notion that the Abbasids' lineage is traced to the Messenger. Put differently, implied in this genealogical legitimation is the idea that the Abbasid dynasty derives its worthiness entirely from its own self.

Though being an elemental representative with an incomplete existential representation, the caliph would be the source of authorities. The essential thread of the Al-Mawardi's book *The Ordinances of Governance* or *Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyya* is to stipulate that the caliph is in charge of all functions and that he is entitled to delegate them since there is no way that he may carry them out in person. Such functions include

the governance of provinces and of new provinces taken over by independent emirs who would later obtain the recognition of the imam, there is also the function of military commandership, commandership of caravans of pilgrims, the settlement of disputes, the judiciary. Al-Mawardi's lines are illustrative that the caliph was a league of his own. In relation to each function, the book outlined the method of the delegation, the scope of delegation, the qualifications of the delegate, and the job description of the delegatee and the best practices which may inform the administration of such public functions. All through, the caliph is not a *primus inter pares* within the category of the trustees (*ulu al-amr*), but rather a league of his own.

Central to the capacities of the caliph would be the characterization of the existentially powerful Emir who took over a certain territory as the Caliph's representative and authorize based on recognition by the caliph and investiture. As Emon explains in his article entitle "Case Studies on Sovereignties in Islamic Legal History",

> For al-Mawardi, all local rulers were deemed the caliph's governors, whether by appointment or usurpation. But, even in the latter case, their legitimacy was built upon a post-hoc caliphal delegation of authority to them. (2012, p. 288).

The theoretical-fabric outlined the *shari'a* basis for recognizing the take-over emir as a deputy of the Caliph, and the basis for recognizing his powers as *de jure* powers, and defined his main duties. Conventional literature holds that Al-Mawardi was the first to articulate this idea of considering every ruler the delegate of the caliphate. Historiographically speaking, Al-Mawardi's characterization of the existentially powerful Sultan as the delegatee and representative of the Caliph was *anticipated* by the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism which dealt with every existential leader as the delegate of the imam including the Missionary (*da'i*), the ambassador (*safir*), and every ruler who would convert to the dogma. For purposes of historiographical exactness, the notion of the delegate of the imam was already made out by the 70s of the tenth century, the decade in which Al-Mawardi was born. Among

other verbalizations of said characterization was the verbalization of the Ismaili author and missionary An-Nassafi Sigistani who was active during that decade in the region. That being said, it is possible to propose the new reading that Al-Mawardi's theoretical attempt to legalize the status of the autonomous powerful emir through making him the authorizee of the Caliph was a "differentiation" of the notion voiced by Ideologized Shiism that every existential leader was the delegatee and representative of the hidden imam.

A main bedrock of the doxic ethos which would be lived would also be a subtle historiogenetic teleological conception of the relation between prophethood and the caliphate. The caliphate would be perceived as a mode of rule which would be nearly equipollent to the prophethood. This conception is a differentiation finding its state of compactness in the Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical-fabric and in the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism. Yet, it is a descending differentiation because here the caliphate is not conceived as widely superior to prophethood as the case was in the Umayyad theoretical fabric. It is not conceived as narrowly superior to prophethood as the case was in the ideologized Shiism. First, the conception of succession of the two analogous modes of trusteeship, the caliphate and prophethood, is seen in the same part of the opening just quoted above:

> God has *delegated* to the Umma a leader whom he made a *successor* of prophethood. (Al-(Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 3).

Second, the conception is expressed again in the definition of the caliphate which is furnished in the outset of the book:

> The Imamate *is originated* to succeed prophethood in guarding the faith and managing worldly affairs. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 3).

Put differently, both analogous modes of trusteeship are made to perform one function. Implicit in this definition is the absence of the idiosyncratic characterization of the period of revelation as a phase of *foundation* in so much as the religion is concerned. Also, implicit in this definition is the absence of the idiosyncratic characterization the period of

first four caliphs as an archetypal phase in so much as the caliphate is concerned. That said, the conception of succession, thirdly, is seen in Mawardi's explanation of the title as follows:

> And he (the incumbent) is named Caliph because he has *succeeded* the Messenger in (trusteeing) his Umma, hence it is permissible to refer to him as: "The Successor of the Messenger", and it is permissible to refer to him generally as "Successor". (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 22).

Forth, the conception that the imamate/caliphate is a mode of trusteeship which is *comparable* to the mode of trusteeship of prophethood, and which is destined to *succeed* it is seen in taking the conception of the Public Trustees (*ulu al-amr*) to mean those trustees who will *come after* the Messenger in being in charge of the umma. Fifth, the conception is seen in rendering the imamate/caliphate, in its own right, "an essential fundamental (pillar) upon which the bases of religion has rested." (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 2). Sixth, the conception is seen in the absence of the Messenger in the book especially the first foundational chapter, which is reflected, *inter alia*, in not mentioning any of the Messenger's precedent and practices throughout the first part of the book. The only hadith cited in this foundational part is a very weak hadith in which the notion of succession is a central notion. When one precedent of the Messenger is mentioned in page 20, it is discussed as a precedent which ought not to be applied.[6] Seventh, in theorizing the notion of succession, the book uses the practices of early Abbasid Caliphs, such as Al-Mansur, as a reference whose rank is no different than the rank of the practices of the first four caliphs. Eighth, the conception that the caliphate is a mode of trusteeship which is comparable to the mode of trusteeship of prophethood, and which is destined to succeed it is seen in constructing the Caliph as a league of his own as shown earlier, and as the source of authorities as will be clarified below.

It is possible to propose a new explanation for the fact that Al-Mawardi's usage of the term "caliphate" in his theoretical-fabric was taken by a vast cohort of academics to

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[6] It is also reflected in not adhering to the tradition of mentioning the Messenger in the opening, and in sufficing with mentioning "prophethood" in general.

denote "deputyship of the Messenger". In analyzing the three previous caliphate-related theoretical-fabrics, we have seen how the caliph was perceived as caliph of God in the sense of God's deputy, and he was actually perceived as a successor of the Messenger in spite of holding no title relating him to the Messenger. Without prejudice to the above, in so much as the relation between the caliph and the Messenger, A homonymous relation emerged between the concept of "successor" and "deputy" because Arabic word "caliph" etymologically meant a successor and a deputy. A good example of the interpretation that Al-Mawardi used caliphate to denote deputyship is found in Nurrulla Ardic's book *The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century*. (Ardic, 2012. p. 7). Plausibly, Al-Mawardi usage of the word caliphate was taken to denote deputyship was due to the strength of the radiation of Al-Mawardi's pursuit to advance the incorporation in the legal system. In Al-Mawardi's general corpus, the presence of the Messenger is stressed. In the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric, it is diluted. Al-Mawardi's corpus was taken as a homogenous corpus which was devoid of discordance and which did not have a syncretistic intellectual pedigree. At the same time, it was due to the effect of the ideological need to retroactively widen the scope of Al-Mawardi's ideological stance as an exponent of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism which required radical distinguishing between his caliphate-related theoretical-fabric and the imamate/caliphate-related theoretical-fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism. The latter saw the caliph as a sheer successor of the Messenger and not as his deputy. That is why Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric is pictured in conventional literature as the Sunni caliphate-related theoretical-fabric. The second possible reason is the paucity, or maybe absence, of the treatment of Al-Mawardi within the context of the Voegelinian theoretical law of compactness and differentiation. It is this theoretical law which enabled a nuanced discernment of the subtle common theoretical infrastructure which Al-Mawardi's understanding of the term caliph as "God's deputy", as "successor" and as "imam", and the understanding of previous caliphate-related theoretical-fabric shared. One of the main utilities of the Voegelinian law of compactness and

differentiation is enticing the researcher to resist the general paucity of appreciation of nuanced theoretical syncretism, and to resist the temptation of the ease of conceiving a corpus of a theorist as a homogenous body.

Thus, in another differentiation of the Umayyad and Abbasid cases, and the case of the theoretical-fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism, the imam in Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric held three capacities in addition to being depicted as an integral part of an accentuated genealogical base. He was "the imam". He was God's Deputy/Caliph. He was "the Successor" of the Messenger, not his deputy. On top of that, the ruler was depicted as a constituent of the exceptionally venerated Abbasid clan.

Without prejudice to the aforementioned, the distortion of mystery in Al Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric was *a descending differentiation* of the distortion of mystery in Umayyad and other previously treated notions. It suffices to note that Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric eschewed delving in mystery-related issues pertaining to the divine deputization and theological legitimation which found its state of compactness in the Umayyad caliphate-related theoretical fabric and which found its vivid differentiation in the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism. Al-Mawardi's historiogensis did not consist of the mystery-distorting cosmogonic conception and the aggrandized mystery-distorting teleological conceptions that were present in the Imamate/caliphate-related theoretical-fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism. Al-Mawardi's historiogensis does not include an eschatological messianic conception underpinned by an immanentization of the eschaton or a sense of a last hour earthly fulfillment and perfection.

Al-Mawardi's version of the doxic ethos of the people of the Sunna and the unified body of the believers or *ahl As-Sunna wa al-jama'a* to which the umma and the caliph would be *chiefly* underpinned by an idiosyncratic philodoxic overemphasis of reason and an attempt to *rationalize* the MBO. This characteristic is clearly discernable in Al-Mawardi's book *The Flags of Prophethood*. In the main, Al-Mawardi hoped that his

book would accomplish the strategic task of vitiating the disordering effect of the writings of the mystery-distorting philodoxic speculations voiced by writers such as Ar-Razi (865-923 AD) (250-311 H). Ar-Razi's speculations were part of a larger wave of philodoxic writings that disrecognized the traditional conception of prophethood and that conceived of philos or *hikma* as beyond the scope of prophethood, and that prophethood is inferior to the sciences related to philos. As Iraj Bashiri remarks, at the base of Abu Bakr Al-Razi's views was the notion that creation was the result of combining the five co-eternals, namely space, time, soul, and creator. (Bashiri, 2005, p. 21, 22). While harboring reason as superior to all vehicles of *epistme*, Abu Bakr Ar-Razi,

> rejected the fact that Allah has created the world out of nothing, that the Qur'an was revealed, that there is a need for prophecy, that the prophets are mediators between God and man, that they are privy to special or divine knowledge, and that there will be a Resurrection Day. But these refutations he shares with other philosophers before him. He is singular, therefore, only in his advocacy of reincarnation in Islam. (Bashiri, 2005, p. 22).

Those speculations were widely perceived as diametrically opposite to the essence of the MBO and its conceptions, and as specifically repugnant to the MBO conceptions of the divine, of the Messenger and of other religions. The speculations caused the collective consciousness to experience an acute anxiety which led to a socio-epistemic imbalance. This magnitude of the imbalance is noticeable in the fact that for nearly half a millennium successive generations of writers would take it as their grand mission to reestablish recognition of the divine, of prophethood, and of resurrection. We see this in the table of contents of the main works of those writers. The attempt at refuting the 'philosophers' would be carried out by Al-Mawardi (972-1058 AD), himself and seen in his book The Flags of Prophethood. Later. Later, it would be carried out by Al-Juwayni (1028-1085 AD), and seen in his work The Nizami Creed. Later, it would be carried out by Al-Ghazali (1058-1111 AD), and seen in his book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. Finally, it would be carried out by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 Ad) and seen in his Introduction or *Muqaddema*. As the case in the absolute majority of those works, the axial concern, in Al-Mawardi's book *The Flags of Prophethood*, is not with reintroducing the MBO conceptions in the

traditional way which gives primacy of *credo* over understanding, and which recognizes where the two separates and were they conjoin, and which entails confirming the mystery in relation to the various conceptions of the MBO. Rather, the concern is using non-mysterious created things as evidence proving the existence of the divine, and the authenticity of prophethood and revelation. Choosing epistemology to be the subject of the inaugurating chapter, the main objective of the chapter is to establish reason as *the* undisputed source of knowing, including knowing prophethood, to the detriment of *credo.* Presential knowledge or mystical knowledge is dismissed as a source of knowing prophethood without an explanation of the relation between presential knowledge and *credo*. (Al-Mawardi, n.d, p.6). This dismissal and exclusion may also be attributable to the desire to vitiate the Sufi and the Neoplatonism-minded Ismaili epistemology. Then, the book moved to tackling theological conceptions. The sequence of theological epistemology suggests that the creator is known in light of the created through ratiocination. By the same token, no centrality is attached to the MBO theological epistemology according to which knowledge of the divine primarily would originate from the divine through revelation. In a reductionist manner, the book asserted the MBO conception of oneness stressing divine permanence against the contingent nature of created things. (Al-Mawardi, n.d., p.9-14). Then, the book polemically refuted, also in a reductionist manner, the non-recognition of prophethood focusing on what it characterized as the implicit non-recognition by some 'philosophers'.

Al-Mawardi's idiosyncratic over-emphasized reason generated a historiogenetic conception distortive of cosmogonic mystery and the mystery of history. The book then moved to treat cosmogonic and historical conceptions within the context of discussing the prophets that were reveled to as of the beginning of creation. In this regard, the book put forward a number of conceptions relying on unauthentic hadiths such as the hadith that the number of nations as of the beginning of creation was seventy. (Al-Mawardi, n.d., p.36-49). This also included distortions about the mystery of the age of the created world. More importantly, as the book moved to providing proofs of the Messenger's

prophethood, it focused on "miracles" as the cardinal proof, subscribed to the view that the nature of each miracle is strictly relevant to the nature of the society of the prophet. When discussing the miraculous nature of the Quran, the book focused on the "historical" feature of the Quran being an exceptional book which outdid the output of gifted orators and speechmakers while disregarding its ahistorical miraculous nature (Al-Mawardi, n.d., p.53-70) not appreciating that such a conception is a particularization of a religion whose very essence is its universalism.

Being the working of a metastatic consciousness which escaped from the metaxy to move towards the transcendental pole, Al-Mawardi's *less* mystery-distorting theoretical fabric, the distortion of the mystery and of relevant MBO conceptions were instruments of power that were hoped to enable bracing up the loose imperial existential representation of the Abbasid caliph who would have a less mystery-anchored image, and enabling lifting imperialism-caused anxieties. In light of the radical imperial power vicissitudes, and at the same time in proportion with the Caliph's feeble existential representation, the caliph would be depicted as "an element of a *less* majestic framework of mystery". Al-Mawardi's insistence on the criterion of having a Quraysh lineage and the rejection of more than one imam seem to have coalesced to delegitimate the rival Fatimid caliph posing a serious imperial threat on the level of the system of existential representation and on the level of the system of transcendental representation. It is observable that in the battle over legitimacy, the Abbasid caliphs chose the weapon of proving that the lineage claimed by the Fatimids was invalid, pointing that only their lineage was valid. Al-Mawardi's rejection of more than one imam was assessed by An Lambton as a subtle delegitimation of the Fatimids. According to Emon,

> Ann Lambton, in her study of Islamic political theory, recognizes that jurists were averse to acknowledging the possibility of two imams. Commenting on al-Mawardi's seminal treatise on governance, she speculated that one of al-Mawardi's motives for rejecting the possibility of two imams "was, no doubt, implicitly to refuse recognition of the claims of the Fatimids. That he also

incidentally excluded the claims of the Umayyad in Andalusia was of little importance since they did not pose, as did the Fatimids, a political threat to the [Baghdad-based] 'Abbasids.'" (Emon, 2012, p. 289).

Al-Mawardi's light theocratic legitimation and the theorization of the solution of the authorization of the powerful emir primarily moved in the direction of empowering the caliph's political status and religious status in the face of powerful sultans and emirs. The empowerment argument was made by John Esposito. (Esposito, 2004, p. 197). Also, for Anthony Black,

> Al-Mawardi's restatement of the Caliph–Sultan relationship allowed him to introduce a new way of getting rid of a bad ruler. If a usurper acts contrary to religion and to justice, the Caliph himself may 'call to his aid those who will restrain the usurper's hand and put an end to his domination' (in Gibb 1962: 160). This might have been a way of legitimising the Saljuk conquest. This made the position of the Caliph similar to that of the pope in the West; according to some, the pope could in emergency replace a wicked ruler. (Black, 2011, p. 89).

Second, it served as a *religious* basis for the power of issuing investitures. Black adds that

> Al-Mawardi showed how the religious Code and the accepted Sunni theory of the Deputyship could be reinterpreted and developed so as to take account of existing power relationships. His theory made rulers technically dependent upon the Caliph's approval for their legitimacy. (Black, 2011, p. 89).

Antony Black adds that Al-Mawardi:

> sought to overcome the radical disjuncture between religious leadership and coercive power by reconnecting the de facto rulers – Sultans and Amirs – with the Abbasid Caliphate. He sought to define their relationship in terms of Religious Law, so reabsorbing them into the religious system. (Black, 2011, p. 85).

In addition to empowering the caliph for reasons relating to the caliph and the Abbasid house whom Al-Mawardi viewed as *the* legitimate rulers, the caliph's empowerment in Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric, as Patricia Crone rightly inferred, constituted a cushion against the collapse of legal order which is clear in the lines of Al-Mawardi himself. (Al-Mawardi, 1989, p. 45). According to Crone,

> in al-Mawardi's opinion the legalization of usurpers, far from bringing down the edifice of the law, helped to preserve its provisions ... partly by keeping the caliphate going and the Muslims united and partly by ensuring that public

authority remained valid in the provinces in question, so that the decisions and judgments (of governors and qadis) retained their legality, the canonical taxes could be collected, and the penalties known as hudud could be imposed. (Crone, 2005, p. 233) (Emon, 2012, p. 288).

This accentuation of the caliph was formulated within the context of a *subtle* sublimation or an escape mechanism which was hoped to hide the hard political reality that the body politic living the MBO was declining and falling prey to division and that the body politic itself was responsible for that disintegration and was accountable for it. Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric boosted the argument that *religion* was at a critical jeopardy and needed protection. In Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric, the caliph is no less than the "the wall securing the millet" and the "guardian of faith". This escape mechanism moved in the direction of *channeling* the sense of decay suffered by the body politic living the MBO to religion. It was a mechanism to acquit the office of the caliphate and the caliph from the charge of being shareholders in the decay. There is an implicit sense of utopianism embedded in the inflated conception of the caliph as the source of authorities and the ensuing unrealistic expectations embedded in the transformation which Al-Mawardi hoped to cause. The office of the imperializing Caliph would be empowered, and in turn that power will be channeled through multiple veins to the various organs of the public body politic, and thus the splendor of the Caliphate will be retrieved. But why did the caliphate-related theoretical-fabric opt for a less delving in the mystery? First, this may be attributed to the fact that Al-Mawardi's thought in general was underpinned by a somewhat inflated conception of reason as explained above. Second, it seems that Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric found it mandatory to down tone this utopian idealism by synergizing it with some realism through the depiction of the caliph as an element of *a less* majestic framework of mystery because the caliph's actual weak position did not warrant depicting him as an element of a majestic framework of mystery. Doing so would discredit Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical-fabric and show it as quixotic. In a word, the level of mystery was proportionate to, and considerate of, the level of the power of the role of

the caliph in the system of transcendental representation and more importantly in the system of existential representation.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the first line of deformation of the Caliphate, and of MBO grand conceptions and the mystery in phases of imperial ascent and phases of imperial floating. The analyses has involved a juxtaposition of the theoretical fabric of different purposive actors. The analysis engaged the caliphate-related theoretical fabric generated by the founding caliphs of two successive imperial dynasties, by missionaries representing ideologized Shiism, and jurists representing the platform of ideologized Sunnism. In every case, the analysis included an outlining of the geopolitical milieu in which each caliphate-related theoretical fabric was formulated. The analysis identified the idiosyncratic scope of the specific imperial aspiration of the concerned party. We also identified the recalcitrant reality which challenged such aspirations. Employing the Voegelinian theoretical perspective, we were able to see how all analysed caliphate-related theoretical fabrics were formulated within the context of an empowerment which is perceived as of utility in overcoming the relevant recalcitrant realty. Common in the four theoretical fabrics is the centrality of mystery distorting conceptions that point to a metastatic consciousness escaping from the metaxy and moving towards the transcendental pole. The four theoretical fabrics had as their purpose particularly the utilization of the mystery in solidifying the status of the caliph or imam. Specifically, central to that utilization was the usage of the mystery-distorting notion of "God's direct deputy" expressed as "God's caliph" within a context of theological legitimation. Its presence petered out by the end of the Umayyad reign yet soon regained strength in the theoretical fabric of the Abbasid founding caliphs, and reached its acme in the theory produced by the formulators of ideologized Shiism. In certain cases, solidifying the status of the caliph was motivated by the incumbent caliphs to secure their own Caliphal imperial seat. In other cases, such as the case of the theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi, the solidification the status of the caliph is telling of an imagined conception of the person of

the caliph as being the key to every stability and rise. How would this conception of the caliph develop upon the transition in which the zones living the MBO began to suffer serious mounting existential threats especially internally, and upon later transitions in which they suffered gruesome difficulties due to falling prey to imperial aggression and encroachment? What is the nature of the deformation that would unfold then, and how the question of mystery would be approached? These are the questions that the following chapter shall seek to tackle.

Chapter Five: An Immanently-gravitated metastatic consciousness and the avoidance of mystery

This chapter undertakes an analysis of the deformation of the meaning of the concept of the caliphate and the avoidance of mystery during several distinguished moments within the mode of the descent of caliphal imperialization. We will explore the ideas of four theorists, who embody different ways in which the caliphate was deformed. First, we will analyze the deformation in the caliphate-related theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni which was articulated at a moment when the imperializing caliph lost most of his existential representation, and much of his presence in the system of transcendental representation. The Abbasid dynasty was susceptible to total collapse and loss of the caliphal seat. The idea that an autonomous Sultan or powerful vizier would be designated as caliph began to take root. The state of the zones living the MBO was primarily a state of pushing back against disintegration of the order of the society. Second, we will analyze the deformation in the theoretical fabric of Ibn Taymiyya which was articulated at a moment when the in which the imperializing caliphal rule was ripped to shreds by an invading destructive imperial force. Third, we will analyze the deformation in the theoretical fabric of Rashid Rida which was articulated at a moment when the imperializing caliphal rule was ripped to shreds by an invading destructive imperial force who undertook an imposition of new paradigm. Finally, we will analyze the deformation in the caliphate-related theoretical fabric of Hassan Al-Banna which was articulated at a moment when the seat of the imperializing caliph was terminated within the context of finally terminating the caliphate as a title of rule and as an idea. As said in the introduction, the concern of the study will be with identifying the caliphate related deformation within the context of the scenario which the nature of the caliphate-related theoretical fabric would yield.

Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

An infallible umma - an accentuated sect - a Sultanic deputy of the umma –

accentuated ulama - light mysterylessness

Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric (1028-1085 AD) (419-478 AH) was formulated at a moment which saw an exacerbation of the decline of the Abbasid Caliphal Imperialism, further fracturing of the body politic, attacks by imperial Byzantium, and an attempt by Seljuk imperializing kings, and their vizier, Nizam Al-Mulk, to respond to both challenges. The scenario which Al-Mawardi seems to have hoped for did not play out, namely that the caliph's existential representation would be enhanced upon the production of a caliphate-related theoretical fabric which empowered the caliph. Though the Abbasid caliph was able to mobilize the Seljuk to end the rule of the Buwayhids in Baghdad, the caliph continued to lose existential power. According to Khaduri and Liebesny,

> The rise of the Seljuk sultanate had destroyed the hopes on which al-Mawardi's exposition was built. Caliphate and sultanate were now and henceforth two separate institutions, and the only chance of salvaging something from the wreckage lay in an alliance between them … by which the caliphate retained its responsibility for, and supervision of, the Community's religious activities, and the sultanate conducted the temporal affairs of government. Hence the term sultan, signifying "temporal power," …. now became an official title conferred by the caliph on sovereign princes in the temporal sphere.'5 Satisfactory though the theory of a concordat or alliance might is the parallel case of the decline of the temporal power of the Fitimid (Shin) caliphs at Cairo, a different solution was found. There the supreme military commander was officially appointed vizier to the Caliph, with the formal style of "the sultan". (Khadduri and Liebesny, 2008, p. 20).

The decay of the *idea* of caliphal imperial process resulting from the serious structural waning of the Caliph's existential representation was deepened by the emergence of *a Sultanate theory* to which the relevance of the caliphal imperialization was not significant. In the words of Khadduri and Liebesny,

The resulting duality of powers and functions was still more sharply emphasized by the emergence of a distinctive political theory of the sultanate, based, in Ibn Khaldun's classification, on "rational statecraft and its principles," and in particular on the old Persian tradition. Its standard exposition was given in the "Book of Government" *(Siyaset-namah)* of the Nizam ul-Mulk, vizier of the Seljuk sultans Alp Arslan and Malikshah (d. 485/ logs). Apart from a brief selection of old juristic traditions, this work (which was destined to become the textbook of all later generations of Persian and Turkish rulers) owes nothing to Islamic theory; its arguments are based on expediency, and its proofs are drawn from history and experience. The caliphate is scarcely mentioned, and the whole exposition is centered on the "monarch" (padishah) "whom God selects and adorns with kingly qualities, and to whom He entrusts the well-being and peace of His servants." Even in his injunctions to maintain the orthodox faith and respect the doctors of religion, the Nizam does not rise above the level of political advantage: The best thing which a padishah must possess is true religion, for sovereignty and religion are as two brothers. (Khadduri and Liebesny, 2008, p. 21).

Nonetheless, a nuanced understanding of the sultanate-related line of theorization necessitates recognizing that the Sultanate-related theorization in *siyasat namah* by Nizam Al-Mulk was one of the postliminary expressions of that genre. Nizam Al-Mulk authored siyasat nama at the request of the Seljuk King Malik Shah to serve as a constitutional reference, in the wide sense of the word, for kings containing best governance-related practices, precedence, advice, protocols, and theorization about the role of the king in the polity. (Nizam Al-Mulk, 2012). It is in other works of Al-Mawardi himself, the classical caliphate theorist, that the sultanate-related line of theorization acquired its first definite shape. According to Aziz Al-Azmeh,

It has been noted that the Ulama', some of whom were particularly illustrious, like Ghazali and Mawardi, often wrote works of advice for kings. In some instances these works are indistinct from those written by courtiers — for example, the Tashil an-nazar of Mawardi. The Tashil of Mawardi commences quite explicitly with Aristotelian ethics and material of Greek origin takes precedence over material of Arabic and Muslim provenance. This makes the opening section of the book closer in structure and spirit to philosophico-moral works on politics, such as the writings of Miskawayh (who is not quoted by Mawardi, but who quoted directly from Arabic translations of Greek works). The Tashil then moves on to a detailed, though topically and discursively conventional, discussion of kingship and its functions and prerogatives. (Al-Azmeh, 2001, p. 98, 99).

Within the societies falling under the jurisdiction of the caliph, forms of disorder multiplied. Ideologized partisanship, polarization and exclusionism amongst Intra-confessional bodies became fiercer. Militias and exclusionist brotherhoods proliferated. The Fatimid Empire continued to pose a strategic threat. In summarizing the rise of disorder in the *Salvage of Nations during times of* Perplexity, Al-Juwayni tells us that injustice prevailed on all levels of public trusteeship, confusion plagued the domain of the ulama, piety disappeared amongst the elite and the masses, the flags of Islam itself have been torn apart, and its days have nearly become numbered. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 12, 13). Internationally, though Byzantium was in decline, it too continued to be a source of worry. As for the Seljuk founders, they were doubtlessly existentially powerful, including Tughril (r 1037–1063 AD), his nephew Alp Arslan (r 1063 – 1072 AD), and his son Malik Shah I (r 1072 – 1092 AD). Without prejudice to that, the rise of the Seljuk dynasty was vehemently indebted to the services, valor, good administration and intellectual insights of the vizier, Abu Ali Hasan ibn Ali Tusi who became known by his title Nizam al-Mulk (1064-1092 AD) (408-485 H). Nizam al-Mulk was a man of sword and on a secondary basis a man of word. Al-Juwayni described him in his book as "the employer of the sword and the pin". (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 8). Symbolically, the meaning of the very title he held, Nizam al-Mulk or "the order of the dominion/monarchy", is indicative of the constitutional nature of his role. In the eyes of many embracers of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism, Nizam Al-Mulk was no less than the rescuer of the 'Sunni' doctrine. Nizam al-Mulk contributed significantly to the restoration of the centrality of the doctrine at a time of stern and unyielding ideological polarization and exclusionism. Nizam al-Mulk was the eponymous founder of a number of cognate institutions or *madrasas* which taught a curriculum the Sunna orientation and the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism. The rise of the cognate institutions or madrasas

constituted a station which followed the rise of madhabs within the history of academia.[1] He patronized a number of distinguished jurists and assigned some of them to administer the schools and teach. It is within this context that Nizam al-Mulk patronized Al-Juwayni himself and assigned him to head one of the schools upon reinstating him in the jurisprudential arena. Al-Juwayni was suspended by the earlier visir Ḥanafī al-Kundūrī who denied *ulama* subscribing to the Ash'ari theology permission to ascend the pulpit. In more than one occasion, the political dispute between Nizam al-Mulk and Malik Shah I became simmering and the tension reached the boiling point. As of the assassination of Alp Arslan in 1072 AD, the spheres of influence that Nizam al-Mulk had carved for himself enlarged and he became the wielder of power. The idea that Nizam al-Mulk would become the sole monarch began to take root. For Al-Juwayni, his loyalty was undividedly awarded to Nizam Al-Mulk whom he considered and declared to be his master, and the one eligible to prevent the total imperial disintegration of the body politic living the MBO.

In responding to the above reality, a caliphate-related theoretical fabric distancing itself from the mystery was produced by Al-Juwayni, such fabric being, as shall be explicated, the product of a metastatic consciousness departing from the *metaxy* and heading towards the immanent pole. This fabric was expressed in Al-Juwayni's corpus, his conceptual behavior, and his stances. His main book from which part of that fabric is to be discerned is *The Salvage of Nations in times of Perplexity* or *Giyath Al-Umam fi iltiyath al-Zulam.* His main book from which part of his theology and epistemology is inferred is *The Nizami Creed* or *Al-Aqida An-Nizamiyya*.

Ideally, the body politic conceived in the Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric would encompass the entirety of the Muslims peoples, and would be perceived in terms of religious and sectarian particularism according to which the umma of the believers would

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[1] For a diver's view on the history of academic institutions, see George Makdisi. *The Rise of Colleges*. Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.

be vested with sovereignty which is most visible in its subsumer, ideologized Sunnism whose *doxic* ethos especially as expressed by Al-Juwayni, would be the dominant creed. As Emon infers,

> the term imam, in this context, implied, for al-Juwayni, leadership of the Muslim community of believers, and not just over a geographic unit where Muslims resided (*khitta*). In other words, the subjects under an imam's authority are not confined to territorial units, but, rather, extend beyond any such boundaries. (Emon, 2012, p. 290).

On the level of the conceived umma of the believers, we have established earlier, that Al-Juwayni dismissed in his central book, *The Salvage of the Nations*, the authenticity of the set of hadiths stipulating ijma'a which were inclusive of a claim of the infallibility of the umma. Nonetheless, he still extrapolated that the umma of the believers enjoyed a general immunity from going astray. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 34, 35). Put differently, a sovereignty is vested in the umma of the believers. The segment in which this sovereignty was most realized was the segment embracing ideologized Sunnism and which Al-Juwayni was leading and was trying to bring to the fore after a century of relative decline, namely the segment referring to itself as *ahl As-Sunna wa al-jama'a*. On the inter-religious level, in a differentiation of the behavior of Al-Mawardi's theoretical fabric, Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric speaks of the doctrinal behavior of Christians and "other infidels" as one thing, which is also a movement in the direction of evicting Christianity from the category of monotheistic religions. (Al-Juwayni, 1979. p. 37). The exclusion embedded in such statements is complemented by theological "subtle arguments against Christians and other non-Muslims". (Watt, 2013, p. 65). On the sectarian level, a significant recurring theme in the book *The Salvage* is a polemical purgative vitiation of essential caliphate theoretical maxims voiced by ideologized Shiism. No line is drawn between the original Shiite orientation and ideologized Shiism. The constructed category of the companions is universally idealized (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 33), while the members of Al Al-Bayt are shrouded. Hence, it is in the sectarian exclusion of

early waves of ideologized Sunnism that the sectarian exclusion in Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric finds its state of compactness.

Without prejudice to the "monist" nature of the Al-Juwayni's theory, as Emon referred to it, and having established that a dual imamate would be rejected in principle, to this rule there is an exception. Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric entertained the possibility that the umma of the body comprising of the believers be dispersed in different polities. Should there be Muslims living in places which the imam had no way to observe and control, necessity would mandate the existence of another imam. (Emon, 2012, p. 289-290). Should the *umma* of the believers become divided and the imam be absent, necessity would mandate that each body would recognize the authority and leadership of a governor or an emir. (Emon, 2012, p. 292) who does not necessarily have to be a caliph or an imam. The study shall refer to this scenario as Al-Juwayni's exception scenario.

The caliph of the trans-territorial *umma* would be designated by the people who loose and bound who represent the sovereign infallible umma. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 34). Central to Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric was the attempt at elevating ijma'a or consensus which earlier Sunna ulama considered as one of the sources of legislation after the Quran, the Sunna. One of the means to do so was to cite the consultations that took place on the day of the death of the Messenger and the ensuing agreement as a model for consensus. Thus, in the main, the caliph appears in the theoretical fabric as the deputy of the sovereign *umma*. He is not the deputy of the Messenger. Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric disregarded the long-lived criterion of the Quraysh lineage which the Abbasids relied upon in legitimation. As Crone illustrates, 'the imam was first and foremost a political and military leader whose descent had no bearing on his competence'. (Black, 2011, p. 97).

The presence of the caliph is canonically prescribed (based on *shar'a*), not based on reason (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 20). Preserving the oath of allegiance is canonically

required. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 16). The necessity of the Imamate stems from consensus which is one of the sources of legislation or *shar'a*. For Al-Juwayni, the *shar'a* does not include an explicit direct provision stipulating that the appointment of the imam would be mandatory. Although the imamate is necessitated by the enunciated sacred or *shar'a*, it remains beyond the scope of the basal issues of theology, and beyond theological conceptualization or *i'tiqad*. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 47). Simply put, imamate is not a matter of theology.

The rationale behind the need for the imam is a subtle differentiation of the rational behind the need for the imam in the Mu'tazilite doxic ethos. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 16). The very existence of the *umma* depends on the existence of an imam with a uniting vision. The absence of the imam and that vision would lead to a state of war of all against all. According to Emon,

> what preserves the continuity of the regime is that regional princes and rulers are governed by a single, uniting vision that rests with the imam. Otherwise, "if they do not have a rope to follow, [and] a particular aim to which to adhere, they will compete, become insolent, struggle with each other, vie against each other, and indulge the desires for conquest and regal authority. They will jockey with each other without paying any heed to the ruin of the multitudes and masses. (Emon, 2012, p. 291).

Accordingly, the primacy of the order of the society over the order of the soul is explicit in the first quote and implicit in the second.

Sourcing from the sovereignty of the umma of the believers which is represented in the sovereignty of *those who loose and bound*, the caliph would be, formally, the source of all powers having the strongest role in the system of transcendental representation, and the lion's share, formally, in the system of existential representation. According to Al-Juwayni,

> Imamate is a full headship or presidency and a universal leadership over the elite and the masses, in relation to the significant affairs of matter of religion and matters of the world …. It is essence is preserving own territory and looking after the ra'iyya, and spreading the call to Islam by argument and by the sword, and

curbing injustice and discrimination …. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 15) (See Emon, 2012, p. 291).

In rereading the selection of the first caliph after the death of the Messenger, Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric described the prospected caliph as to whom the *entirety* of *res publica* was delegated. Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric described the state of the companions within the consultations of the Lounge upon the death of the Messenger as follows:

> They were searching for someone who would be a haven and a harbor, someone who would provide the final word when the public matter is at ease and when it is at hardship, someone to whom the *entirety* of the public matter is delegated. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 27).

This imam or caliph is in charge of all affairs.

> For al-Juwayni, the monist theory of the imamate is fundamentally tied to an aspiration of unity across the Muslim community, or *umma*. (Emon, 2012, p. 291). The dignity of the office is associated with its leadership of a community organized around commitments to a vision of the good that concerns both worldly and otherworldly matters.

In this sense, Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric is one of the many theoretical fabrics that conceived of a framework of authority

> in which all political authority was centered in the caliph-imam, and no authority was valid unless exercised by delegation from him, directly or indirectly. (Emon, 2012, p. 289-290; Gibb, 1955, p. 17).

Also sourcing from the sovereignty of the umma of the believers, the ulama would have a role in the caliph in the system of transcendental representation which would be, *at minimum*, equal caliph's, and would have a wide share in existential representation which is justified, formally speaking, by necessity and the inability of the individual caliph to carry out all functions. Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric was clear in stipulating that the performance of main functions by actors other than the caliphs would be sanctioned on the basis of considering that the caliph had no way to perform such functions. As Hallaq explains,

the *ulama*, Juwayni contends, are in charge of affairs, especially when the Imam has no way to ijtihad, and their opinion is final and must be accepted even though it may contradict an opinion of a school's eponym. (Hallaq, 1984, p. 14).

Al-Juwayni likens the alliance between the caliph and the ulama with the alliance between Prophets and Kings.

Ideally, the nation would be ruled by an alliance between a nizam al-Mulk, who would be an existential representative and not only an elemental representative, and a Juwayni. The introduction of the book *The Salvage of The Nations during the times of Perplexity* in which he articulated his theoretical fabric of the caliphate argues that *Islam* has lost its presence and that piety has disappeared and that Nizam Al-Mulk was the rescuer of Islam proper. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 12). After a lengthy and theologically sophisticated praising of the divine ground in the introduction which is followed by a one-line-praise of the Messenger, Al-Juwayni's introduction jumps to an exceptionally lengthy and deep praise of Nizam Al-Mulk. It stressed the services of Nizam Al-Mulk to the systems of transcendental and existential representation describing him as "the Master of humanity", and "the refuge of the religion and the world". (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 8). Once again, in the heart of the theoretical fabric, Al-Juwayni suddenly interrupted his presentation of his theoretical maxims with yet another praise of the qualities of Nitham Al-Mulk. This was followed by describing him as "the Master of time", and "the preeminence of the age", "whom God has chosen to be in charge of the affairs of the worlds". (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 243). The exceptional centrality of the role of Nizam Al-Mulk *in protecting religion* could not be better symbolized than by giving the name " the Nizami Creed" to the very theological ethos which Al-Juwayni formulated and published with the hope the entire body living the MBO would subscribe to it and profess it. Meshing all of the above is meshed Al-Juwayni's pragmatic conceptual behavior, especially his attempt to elevate the creed of *ahl As-Sunna wa al-jama'a* especially as articulated by himself, to the dignity of the dominant creed through, inter alia, forging an alliance with Nizam Al-Mulk, warrants the inference of some scholars such as Nigel (Peacock, 2013, p. 107) that Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric included the implicit

stipulation that Nizam Al-Mulk should be caliph. To this inference we add that it also included that such stipulation was qualified by the implicit stipulation that Al-Juwayni himself, as the leader of *ahl As-Sunna wa al-jama'a*, would be Nizam's Al-Mulk subordinate partner in the system of transcendental representation and in the system of existential representation as well.

The body politic would be living a rationalism-centered-epistemology detaching itself from the mystery. Unlike Al-Mawardi, the bedrock of his corpus is his theological output. Al-Juwayni exhibited his theology in more than one book including his central book *The Nizami Creed.* The name of the book and its opening indicate that Al-Juwayni conceived of Nizam Al-Mulk as a symbol of unifying and possible softly enforcing the theological creed of the *umma* of the believers. As in the case of Al-Mawardi's *Flags of Prophethood*, general epistemology is the subject of the first chapter of the book. As in the case of Al-Mawardi's book, reason, rationalism and ratiocination are emphasized to the detriment of mystical knowledge and revelation. For Al-Juwayni, as the case with Al-Mawardi, the divine ground and the divine permanence are knowable in light of rationally fathoming the created worlds and their contingent nature. (Al-Juwayni, 1993, n. p.). Knowledge of the divine resting on divine self-definition or on divine testimony is not established, and the mystery embedded in it is disregarded. In the book, Al-Juwayni stressed divine occasional intervention and divine special action, and strictly dismissed anthropomorphism. The Nizami Creed also established the proofs of prophethood within the context of refuting and invalidating the claims of the sects that don't recognize prophethood. (Al-Juwayni, 1993, n. p.). For Al-Juwayni, like Al-Mawardi, the proof of the authenticity and truthfulness of the Messenger's prophethood is the miraculousness of the Quran and the *material* supernatural things that happened to the Messenger. A validation of the authenticity of prophethood which is anchored to divine testimony is not established. Accordingly, it is plausible to infer that Al-Mawardi's theology was largely of a less transcendental nature. Al-Juwayni widened the religious polemics of Al-

Mawardi focusing on conceptions held by the followers of the three religions. (Al-Juwayni, 1993, n. p.).

A conception of historiogenetic Salafism would be integral to living the creed of *the people of the Sunna and the unified body of the believers* which is hoped to be the dominant creed, especially as articulated by Juwayni. Al-Juwayni's central theological book *The Nizami Cre*ed incudes a differentiation of the historiogenetic concept of the *Salaf* which was formulated by early waves of ideologized Sunnism. In Al-Juwayni's variation, the accentuated constructed human category consisting of the "companions" and the "followers" is reincarnated. (Al-Juwayni, 1993, n. p.). This is complemented, as established earlier, by the universal idealization of the companions, to the detriment of Al Al-Bayt in *The Salvage of The Nations*. The companions' application of *the* Sunna is presented as *the* origin of the umma and as the binding example. (Al-Juwayni, 1978, p. 16).

Characteristic of Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric is the presentation of a caliph unconnected to the mystery within a context of profaneness causing a radical shift in the line of caliphate theorization. Separating the caliphate from the mystery is mainly grounded in, and expressed by, the maxim that the caliphate is not an issue of theology and theological conceptualization or *i'tiqad*. The caliph is neither a constituent of a majestic system of mystery, nor an arbiter of the mystery, nor a creator of the mystery, nor a demystifier of the mystery. Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric avoided treating the mystery-distorting historiognetic and cosmogonic conceptions in the theoretical fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism. Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric avoided refuting the mystery-distorting conception of theological legitimation in the Umayyad and the Abbasid theoretical fabrics. It should be clear that Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric included an implicit refutation of some of the elements of Al-Mawardi's theoretical fabric. Yet, it avoided treating or commenting on Al-Mawardi's discussion of the permissibility or prohibition of the usage of the title of "God's Caliph". Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric escaped from the mystery within the context of being infatuated by subjects and issues

of the profane world. Foremost amongst those was the role of the caliphate in restoring a *superbia*-based glory, the question of political unity, the emphasis on the *umma* of the believers being the source of powers, and the emphasis on the capacity of the caliph as an imam or leader whose main function is to realize unity. Disconnecting the caliph from the mystery is also seen in Al-Juwayni's conception of Nizam Al-Mulk. In nuancing our understanding of Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric of the status of Nizam Al-Mulk, or the imam, it is critical to note that Nizam Al-Mulk, or the hoped for imam, was conceived as someone springing up from amongst the people to lead the people. He was not above the *umma* of the believers. Al-Juwayni's exceptional veneration of Nizam Al-Mulk and the insertion of his persona in the midst of his caliphate-related theoretical fabric should not be taken to mean that Al-Juwayni was a theorist who only accentuated great men and heroes to the detriment of the people. This nuanced understanding that the *umma* of the believers outweighed the caliph in Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric is substantiated by the realism-minded accommodation of the possibility of the absence of the imam. For Al-Juwayni, the shar'a has clarified that there were times in which there were no prophets. Hence, it is normal to recognize that there would be times in which there would be no caliphs. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 20). What is surprising is that Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric distanced itself from the mystery of the human-creation-related caliphate in spite of the fact that by his days, many jurists had treated that mystery, especially jurists with a knowledge of Sufism, Al-Juwayni being one of them. Early spiritualists had spoken of the concept of the Muhammadian truth or *al-hiqaqah al-Muhammadiyya* to express the conception that the Messenger's metaphysical reality was the first thing to be existentiated, and that it was the Caliph of the divine, and that the ordinary human being was the caliph of that Mohammadian metaphysical Truth.

Being the working of a *largely* metastatic consciousness which escaped from the metaxy to move towards the immanent pole, Al-Juwayni's theoretical design and the avoidance of mystery were instruments of power that were hoped to enable an accentuated particularism-based umma of believers to regain imperial composure. This

was hoped to be done through motivating the conceived umma of the believers to take its destiny in its hands in the pursuit of regaining imperial composure, and to seat on the Caliphal seat an existentially able imperializing caliph who is aided by the ulama, both being subscribers to the particularistic dogma of *ahl As-Sunna wa al-jama'a*, which would be the official and dominant dogma. Stipulating the infallibility of the umma of the believers was a reassurance of the umma of the believers and an invitation for it to act considering its action as *the* main key to halting the rising dissolution and demoralization. Through expanding Al-Mawardi's sublimation and escape mechanism by way of heavily punctuating the notion that it was 'Islam' which was primarily declining, the caliphate-related theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni shrouded the imperial decay and the decay of the order of the soul which Al-Juwayni himself confirmed, and the anxiety resulting from it was reflected in his own words. The specific stress that the caliph should be designated by *those who loose and bound* particularly moved in the direction of making possible the termination of the imperially decedent Abbasid caliphate and in the direction of paving the way for a new dynasty. Opting for a monist theory of one imam in principle constituted an establishment of a unified command, and an invocation of the unity of the aggregate trans-territorial body of the believers so as to generate the utmost power possible in regaining imperial composure. The alliance between the caliph and the ulama would lead to a strong command, which is empowered in the system of transcendental representation and in the system of existential representation. The polemical exclusion of ideologized Shiism together with the Salafism of Al-Juwayni's discourse, moved in the direction of consolidating the sectarian position of the rising ideologized Sunnism and sustaining the preferred internal sectarian balance of power formula. The effect of the Imperial factor on the caliphate-related theoretical fabric will become clearer when we compare the position of Al-Juwayni and Al-Mawardi towards ideologized Shiism. As established earlier, Al-Mawardi's loyalty was unequivocally awarded to the Abbasid caliphs, and although a part of his discourse contributed to the formulation of ideologized Sunnism. Nonetheless, his caliphate-related theoretical fabric was devoid of

a sharp and direct exclusion of ideologized Shiism. Then, the sectarian balance of power was different in that the imperializing kings of Twelver Buwayhids controlled the region including the very capital of the Abbasid caliphate. It is between them and the Abbasid caliph that Al-Mawardi mediated. In Al-Juwayni's days, the imperial scene witnessed remarkable transformation with the decline of the Buwayhids, and the rise of the Seljuqs and their control of Baghdad. Although the Seljuqs and Nizam Al-Mulk built relations with scholars across the sectarian and madhab map, the scholars of ideoligized Sunnism were the closest to them. Ideologized Sunnism was on the rise trying to position itself as the dominant proper interpretation of the MBO. In the short term, the polemical condemnation of ideologized Shiism was pronounced within the context of Al-Juwayni's pursuit to complete the construction of the ethos of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism, and to position himself as the formulator and exponent of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism. Al-Juwayni dedicated a whole book to presenting the creed or the *profession de foi,* to use Azmeh's terminology, *(*Al-Azmeh, 1986, p. 212) which would be lived by that ideologized body. By the same token, the sharpened exclusion of Christians and the subtle theological polemics in the theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni may be understood as reflective of the anxieties emanating from seeing the decline of the order of the soul within an umma of believers whose societal order is crumbling within a critical imperial plateau. The heart of the Seljuq empire shared borders with the Byzantine Empire with whom relations fluctuated, whereas Western Europe was seeing new attempts of imperial rise. To this we should add that the internal scene was already replete with Muslim Christian polemics that acquired definite shape some two centuries earlier. (Watt, 2013, p. 64, 65). The implicit stipulation of having Nizam al-Mulk as caliph within the context of an alliance forged with Al-Juwayni himself in his capacity as the main exponent of ideologized Sunnism was hoped to serve as an immediate solution. The specific stress that the caliph is designated by *those who loose and bound* particularly moved in the direction of making possible the termination of the imperially decedent Abbasid caliph and the designation of Nizam Al-Mulk. This invocation represented a

departure from the emphasis by Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical fabric on lineage and on the mechanism of succession. Nizam Al-Mulk had relations with many jurists including jurists representing the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism, the Sunna orientation, the Mu'tazilte doxic ethos, and the Asha'rite school of theology. Many of such jurists qualify as members of *those who loose and bound*. Simply put, it would not be impossible to obtain the approval of the majority of those jurists. By the same token, Nizam Al-Mulk did not have a lineage connecting him with the Messenger or Quraysh. Both the accentuation of the *umma* of the believers and the stipulation of the constitutional mechanism of having the caliph designated by *those who loose and bound* would return the matter to the *umma* of the believers and have the People who Bound and Loose designate Nizam Al-Mulk. Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric conceived of Nizam Al-Mulk mainly as "a defender" and "a rescuer from total collapse". The exceptional praise of Nizam Al-Mulk at the heart of the caliphate-related theoretical fabric follows the warning from the waning of religion and follows the listing of the worldly and religious hazards entailed in such a case. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 242). The multi-dimensional accomplishments of Nizam Al-Mulk convinced Al-Juwayni that he, or a leader in his caliber, would be the right winch and halter of decline.

Meshing the accentuation of the umma of the believers with the overemphasis on reason within the context of a rationalist epistemology, and the avoidance of the mystery is a movement in the direction of convincing the umma of the believers that the tasks of avoiding a free fall, of reunification, and of the designation of the new caliph, were *rational* processes that were within cognitive and pragmatic reach. The avoidance of the mystery may have seemed as a facilitator of the challenging task of convincing the ulama and societal and tribal heads that they had a strong say in toppling an incumbent caliph and in designating a new one. The task was also challenging due to the longevity of the application of the succession mechanism and the Abbasid lineage criterion and the marginalization of the ulama and societal and tribal heads in the designation of the caliph. More importantly, the task was challenging because the caliph had been

portrayed for more than three centuries by caliphs belonging to different dynasties and by ulama belonging to different ideologizal camps as the direct deputy of God and the recipient of a divine covenant. It is probable that the caliphate-related theoretical fabric found it *generally distracting*, and hence disempowering, to touch on conceptions of mystery at a time when the state of the conceived umma was at the verge of total collapse. Particularly, Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric may have found that reminding common consciousness that the Caliph was earlier conceived as a constituent of majestic framework of mystery would discourage the hoped for task of returning the matter to the people and ousting the caliph and designating a new caliph. Al-Juwayni's fabric may have assumed that a faith-anchored collective consciousness would hesitate to pursue and overthrow of a caliph who was claimed by different actors to be "God's deputy" for a long time. It is probable that Al-Juwayni's theoretical fabric reasoned that it would be wiser to suffice with informing common consciousness that Islam was at jeopardy, and with "hinting" to the steps that ought to be taken to avert a free fall and a total loss of caliphal imperial composure.

Ibn Taymiyya's caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

An infallible globally supreme umma - a subsuming Gnostic *jama'a* - a severity-anchored deputy of the umma - accentuated activists - expanded mysterylessness

Ibn Taymiyya's consciousness ripened during the period of the aftershocks generated by the debilitating impact of the Mongol imperial outburst which shook the zones living the MBO to their core, a period which saw the loss of further elements of the already waning Caliph's existential representation, such loss being conceived as compromising of the system of transcendental representation. The hope by Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric to resuscitate the caliphate was not fulfilled. The power of the caliph continued its nosedive. Ultimately, the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 AD. In effect, Ibn Taymiyya was born two years after that invasion. Baghdad, which once enjoyed the capacity of *caput mundi*, was totally sacked. The caliph was killed and his body was thrown in the river. The massacres claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands. The loss of balance of collective consciousness is somewhat comparable to the loss of balance resulting from the sack of Rome, "the Eternal City" in 401 AD. In 1260, the Mongols proceeded to Syria and seized Damascus and Ibn Taymiyya became "a refugee at the age of six". (Black, 2011, p. 158). The fall of Damascus entailed ending the Ayubid dominion. The fall of Damascus after Baghdad, rendered two important centers of power, and at the same time, centers of meaning, under imperial occupation. The Mamluks of Egypt filled part of the vacuum assuming control of Egypt and parts of the Levant, and defeated the Mongols in 1260 AD preventing the fall of another center, namely Cairo. Nonetheless, another existential threat was posed on the Northern Eastern front by the European crusaders who resumed their pursuit to recapture Jerusalem. The Caliphate-related symbolism was again shattered upon the killing of another shadow caliph installed by the Mamluk Sultan Baibars (r 1260-1277 AD).

In responding to the above reality, a caliphate-related theoretical fabric distancing itself from the mystery was produced by Ibn Taymiyya, such fabric being, as

shall be demonstrated, born out of the womb of a metastatic consciousness departing from the *metaxy* and heading towards the immanent pole. This fabric was expressed in Ibn Taymiyya's sizable corpus. At the top of his works from which part of that fabric would be extrapolated was his pamphlet *The Shari'a-based Governance* in *Reforming the Trustee and the Ra'iyya* or *As-Siyasa Ash-Shari'yya fi Islah ar-Rai wa Ar-Raiyya*, which may be judged as a public jurisprudence *pamphlet*, perhaps one of the earliest in the history of the zones living the MBO. Next stands his book *The Way of the Sunnah* or *Minhaj As-Sunna.*

The body politic conceived in the Ibn Taymiyya's theoretical fabric would be perceived in terms of an ultra religious and sectarian particularism, according to which the umma of the believers would be vested with an expanded sovereignty which would be most visible in its subsumer, *Ibn Taymiyya's Gnostic jama'a*, whose *doxic* ethos would be the dominant creed. The Taymiyyan theoretical fabric did not include an explicit stipulation to the effect of the size or geopolitical indicators of the umma of the believers which it spoke about. Nonetheless, it stipulated an all-out permanent Muslim-non Muslim dichotomous relation. The umma of the believers would be in a continuous pursuit of fighting followers of other confessions and a non-stop pursuit of conversion including compulsory conversion. *Jihad*, by which the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric means fighting, would be an element of the penal system being a "punishment for the neglect of religious duties, or for forbidden acts". (Black, 2011, p. 162). Put in a legal parlance, Muslims would have a legal jurisdiction over all followers of other confessions. In this respect, the Taymiyyan *doxic* discourse validates the centrality of fighting by citing an unauthentic hadith which does not appear in the six books of hadith: "I am the one who laughs much, I am the one who kills much"[2]. (Ibn Taymiyya, n.d., p. 23). For the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric, fighting non-Muslims was mandatory. (Ibn Taymiyya, n.d., p. 153). The Taymiyyan polemics stressed the *superbia*-driven superiority of the faith and

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[2] Translated by the dissertation writer.

its followership, as perceived by Ibn Taymiyya, over the other two monotheistic faiths and their followership. Followers of other faiths proclaim religion without striving to achieve "the conditions necessary for its existence: power, Holy War, material resources". (Black, 2011, p. 159). As Muhammad Umar Memon takes from Ibn Taymiyya's lines in his book entitled *On the Necessity of the Straight Path*, the true beginning of Muslim life was the point at which, "a perfect dissimilarity with the non-Muslims has been achieved". (Ibn Taymiyya, 1976, p. 78). The investment of the aforementioned unlimited power in all Muslims over the rest worldwide, and the ostracism of *the rest*, add more supremacy to the conceived umma, and more exclusion and downgrading of *the rest*. In a differentiation of the *"anti*-universalism or particularism of Grace monopolized" by Ideologized Sunnism, (Milan Zafirovski, Daniel G. Rodeheaver, 2013, p. 72, 73*)* and as a sharp ascending differentiation of the inter-religious exclusion of the theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric excommunicated the followers of the two other monotheistic religions. Central to the Taymiyyan discourse is a differentiation of Al-Juwayni's claim of the sovereignty of the umma of the believers which is based on its claimed immunity against going astray. The segment in which this sovereignty was most realized was Ibn Taymiyya's own *jama'a being grounded in ahl al-hadith* or *ahl As-Sunna wa al-jama'a*, and it is that *jama'a* who discharged a multi-front dogmatomacy, a coercive spreading of its dogma, and orchestrated a libido dominandi - based doxic exclusion of advocates of other sectarian and madhab-related dogmas. The Taymiyyan Gnostic *jama'a* would be the dominant body and shaper of consciousness, in varying degrees in the body politic. The behavior of Ibn Taymiyya and the Gnostic *jama'a* which he established indicate that it was an element of a hoped for ultimate integrated scenario and not a sheer ad hoc body. The *jama'a* equating itself with authentic religion, embarking on coercively spreading its dogma, and launching *libido dominandi* - based doxic condemnations of advocates of different dogmas within the context of multi-front dogmatomacy. In her article *Ibn Taymiyya and his jama'a* or *jama'atuhu, Authority Conflict and Consensus in Ibn*

Taymiyya's Circle, Caterina Bori took issue with the reading of Henri Laoust's which conceives Ibn Taymiyya merely as a Hanbalite. She argued that in addition to being a Hanbalite he was in his own right a head of an ideological *jama'a* which was comprised of members from across the spectrum of jurisprudential schools.[3] The *jama'a* was referred to him personally. (Bori, 2010, p. 24). Emblematic of Ibn Taymiyya's *jama'a* was a sense of exclusivism and a sense of a worldwide mission of being the embodiment of authentic religion proper. Caterina Bori cited the following statements by the members of the *jama'a* to demonstrate its self-concept.

> Verily you have distinguished yourselves from the whole of the people on earth by the authentic religion. (Bori, 2010, p. 29).

> He has made you, among all the people of this time, like the white mark on the black animal. (Bori, 2010, p. 28).

Caterina Bori also explained the categories of members of Ibn Taymiyya's *jama'a* as follows:

> This collective term (jama') refers both to intellectual association with Ibn Taymiyya and to those individuals who *accompanied the Shaykh in public and shared his penchant for activism, especially on his excursions against popular religion.* (Bori, 2010, p. 25).

Such excursions included launching raids against shops selling spirits to prevent them from continuing the practice. That being the case, what should be added to Bori's insightful diagnosis is that the behavior, discourse, rhetoric and self-concept of the Taymiyyan *jama'a* and its leader justify the interpretation that they used the word *jama'a* in reference to Ibn Taymiyya's group not to denote the literal meaning of the word, namely "group". Rather, in a breach of the soteriological mystery, it was used to denote that Ibn Taymiyya's group concretely constituted the unified body of true believers who were promised salvation. We have explained in the previous chapter how the concept of the saved *jama'a* which appeared in an unauthentic hadith was one of the

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[3] For a deeper scrutiny of the question, see Abdoul Hakim I Al-Matroudi's book *The Hanbali School of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah: Conflict or Conciliation*. Routledge 2006.

tools of the ideologization of the Sunna orientation and the construction of the doctrine of ideologized Sunnism. Ibn Taymiyya used the hadith extensively in his fatwas judging it as authentic. The conceptual behavior of pragmatic coercion of Ibn Taymiyya and his *jama'a* substantiates the finding that the self-concept of the *jama'a* was that it constituted the body of true believers. According to Bori, this collectivity was established within an intellectual milieu which

> was characterized by competition over knowledge and the social, religious, and political authority engendered by monopoly over it. (Bori, 2010, p. 24).

Presiding over his coercive *jama'a*, the Taymiyyan discourse excommunicational polemics and searing critique took aim in Asha'rite theology, the Shiite orientation, the Hanafi and Shafi'e schools of jurisprudence. Generally speaking, the Taymiyyan polemics were not "oriented toward further inquiry through openness to the Question" to use Eugene Web's terminology in distinguishing gnostic and ideological articulations. (Web, 1981, p. 286). Rather, they were philodoxic statements which were verbalized within the context of a battle of dogmatomacy with the hope of being received by the public as the final truth closing the gate of questioning. Put differently, the Taymiyyan polemics pointed to a consciousness which claimed absolute command of truth and authenticity, and which perceived its knowledge not subject to reproval. The Taymiyyan polemics were verbalized to globalize the closed existence of which they were a manifestation of. Sometimes the attempt to globalize the Taymiyyan closed existence resorted to coercion. As Caterina Bori points out,

> the polemics would occasionally turn into violent civil disturbances (*fitan*) as exemplified by several incidents in Ibn Taymiyya's biography. (Bori, 2010, p. 24).

In addition to all the above, the Taymiyyan consciousness was engrossed by socio-political ambitions and by *personal love of supremacy*. (Bori, 2010, p. 37). He was the subject to a complaint raised by his adversaries of pursuing political ascendency. In view of all this, it is clear that the Taymiyyan doxic discourse and gnostic *jama'a* were hoped to be globalized on an ever-widening scale within the conceived umma in relation to

which the Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric was expressed. This is not to say that Ibn Taymiyya came close to realizing his dream of political ascent during his lifetime. In view of all the above and what to follow shortly, from a Voegelinian perspective, the doxic discourse and behavior of Ibn Taymiyya and his *jama'a* speak for a Gnosticism of an immanetizing form.

Deriving from the sovereignty of the umma of the believers which is most installed in the Taymiyyan *jama'a*, the ruler would be an "imam", not a caliph, who should be the main existential representative, who should have the greatest role in the system of transcendental representation, and whose *prime* capacity would be to coercively enforce a puritan legalistic severity-minded code conceived to be the *shari'a*, and who should be aided by activists and crafty commanders. In what seems as a distorted differentiation of "Al-Juwayni's exception scenario" of the absence of the caliphate, the Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric spoke of one sole governor (*waly al-amr*) not a caliph. Whereas Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric conceived of the absence of the caliphate and the emergence of the emir as an exception, in Ibn Taymiyya's governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric, the presence of the emir within the context of the irrelevance of the caliphate appeared as the state of normalness or as the state of permanence. The notion of deputyship of the Messenger is absent. The Caliphate would be remembered as a past historical mode of governance. Hence, the imam would be a sheer *successor* of all governors up to the Messenger. In as much as the conception of the period of the first four caliphs, the reign of the forth caliph Ali, According to the Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric, was not an integral part of the category of the reign of the four caliphs. This exclusion was anchored to the premise that Ali fought only for the purpose of being obeyed and to be in control of public fund, and because his years saw internal strife and divide. The reign of the first four Caliphs is not *the* archetypal model of rulership *after* the Messenger. The Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric used the practices of the Umayyad caliphs, namely Mu'awiya, as a reference that was of a power

and rank that were equal to the power and rank of the practices of the Messenger. Plausibly, this *order* of the power of previous practices and precedent is a differentiation of the *order* of the power of previous practices and precedent in Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical fabric. As explained earlier, the caliphate-related theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi and Al-Juwayni used the practices and precedent of *the Abbasid* and Umayyad caliphs as a reference that was of a power and rank that were equal to the power and rank of the practices of the Messenger and the first four caliphs. The Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric did not speak of method of designation of *waly al-amr*. The spinal cord of the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric is that the rationale behind the existence of the ruler is that in case of is absence, the duty of commanding good and forbidding evil,

> as well as all other duties which God has decreed namely Holy War, justice, pilgrimage, communal prayer … assisting the oppressed, Legal Penalties and so on" will not be performed. (Black, 2011, p. 159).

The governor's very existence is justified by his ability to ensure the injunction of good and the forbidding of evil to the fullest through optimal *coercion*. The *ra'iyya* is obliged to award *waley al-amr* habitual obedience on the basis of his ability to coerce and impose his public will. (Konakata, 1994, p. 92). The theoretical fabric equates obedience of the governor with obedience of God. The intermediation of the governor's obedience of the Messenger is not established. The means of ensuring the injunction of good and the forbidding of evil, and of coercion and control is the strict application of the *shari'a*. The *shari'a* is conceived as the sacred text taken literally and centered on the verses and hadith related to the regulatory, organizational, legal and penal system. The *siyasa* or governance by the governor becomes *wholly* an integral part of the *shari'a.* (Black, 2011, p. 159, 160). The *shari'a*, being understood in the way already mentioned, constitutes the second center in the Taymiyyan scheme next to the governor. Not only is the governor expected to take the application of the provisions of the penal system of the *Shari'a* as his first and foremost mission, but he should apply the penal system with severity. (Ibn Taymiyya, n.d., p. 125) (Black, 2011, p. 161). Punishment must be executed

to the fullest even should the guilty person repented prior to being convicted in all situations. (Black, 2011, p. 162). The Taymiyyan theoretical fabric goes to the extent of harboring "the individual ruler discretion over penalties not prescribed by the law". (Black, 2011, p. 161). As established earlier, rendering the enjoinment of good and the forbidden of evil and the enforcement of religious penalties *the* axial concern and function of the ruler and the umma of the believers constituted the exact reversal of the Voegelinian principle which found its materialization in the period of revelation of the primacy of the order of the soul over the order of the society. Plausibly, the aggrandizement and centralization of the principle of the injunction of evil and commanding of good may qualify as an *ascending* differentiation of the Mu'tazilite's puritanism and strictness and their aggrandizement of that principle. On another plain, Ibn Taymiyya's pamphlet of the Shari'a-based governance argued that in selecting between the criterion of craftiness and the criterion of morality, the governor should choose the immoral crafty commander not the moral uncrafty commander. In another differentiation of the contention voiced by the Mu'tazilites and Al-Juwayni that the order of the society had primacy over the order of the soul Ibn Taymiyya's stipulation is justified by the argument that the ramifications of the commander's immorality would affect only the commander, whereas the ramifications of the commander's non-craftiness would affect the entirety of the followership. (Ibn Taymiyya, n.d. p. 19). The Taymiyyan theoretical fabric used Khaled Ibn Al-Walid, the commander and companion of the Messenger, as an example of the immoral crafty commander. (Ibn Taymiyya, n.d. p. 19). So, meshing this stipulation with the Taymiyyan pragmatic behavior regarding his *jama'a* would lead to a scene in which the ruler is surrounded, not by ulama, but by the activists of the *jama'a* and the crafty commanders.

The conceived body politic would be living the historiogenetic Taymiyyan Salafism which constituted an ascending differentiation of Al-Juwayni's salafism, and which was also characterized by an avoidance of the mystery. The caliphate-related theoretical Ibn Taymiyya, consists of a differentiation of the historiogenetic concept of the *Salaf*

(Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p. 4) formulated by early ideologized Sunnism and by Al-Juwayni. The Taymiyyan Salafism expanded Al-Juwayni's Salafism in stressing that the contemporary generation ought to live *in the same way* the salaf lived. In so doing, Ibn Taymiyya harbored the method of relating reports on figures who lived in that conceived era (Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p. 10) without applying a certain order of reference. The Taymiyyan differentiation of the concept of as-salaf entailed the magnification that the traditional epistemic heritage and paradigm which accrued over the centuries that followed the constructed phase of the salaf ought to be abandoned. This includes abandoning the epistemic heritage of all ulama, inter alia, the methodological and substantive yield of the Sunna *ulama*, of the second generation scholars of the madhabs, and of the ulama of theology. According to the Taymiyyan historiogenetic conception of the salaf, relying on traditional jurisprudential method and content is at variance with the way of the members of the *salaf* who received the revealed teachings without an intermediation. Instead of engaging the epistemic heritage, the Taymiyyan consciousness prescribed a full-fledged "direct engagement with the revealed sources" (Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p. 203). The end result would be that this specific historical past which separated the Taymiyyan days from the days of the constructed human category of the salaf would be treated not as a living thing in which each sub-phase would have an epochal consciousness. In Voegelinian parlance, "the past is dead". (Voegelin, V 28. 1990, p. 111).

The conceived body politic would be living an epistemology which accentuates reason, and which would be characterized by a generally negative position towards the mystery. *Prima facie*, Ibn Taymiyya's treatment of the relation between reason and revelation seems oxymoronic. In his book *Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism*, John Hoover argues that the theme of the non-contradiction between reason and revelation has stirred a debate because "it is not immediately obvious what Ibn Taymiyya means by this". (Hoover, 2007, p. 29). Hoover demonstrates how "two studies by Binyamin Abrahamov" constitute an eloquent testimony of the vagueness of the

theme. (Hoover, 2007, p. 29). What Hoover was alluding to was that in his 1992 article,

Abrahamov has reached the conclusion that

> Ibn Taymiyya's view appears to come very close to that of the philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) in which revelation and reason are both true and do not contradict. Abrahamov concludes, however, that Ibn Taymiyya differs fundamentally from Ibn Rushd by confining himself to the terms and rational proofs found in the Qur'an and the Sunna. Reason does not disagree with revelation because it has no status apart from revelation. (Hoover, 2007, p. 30).

However, later, Abrahamov explicitly revoked this assessment. In his book Islamic

Theology Traditionalism and Rationalism 1998, he contended that

> for Ibn Taymiyya there are rational arguments arising from the human intellect independently of revelation, which are valid so long as they do not contradict revelation. Reason is thus an independent source for knowledge of God. (Hoover, 2007, p. 30).

In application, the dominance of reason, better yet the Taymiyyan reason, over

revelation is clear in a number of Taymiyyan conceptions. Foremost amongst those was

Ibn Taymiyya's attempt at rationalizing the divine ground by taking rationally, which for

him meant literally, metaphoric Quranic verses mentioning the divine ground which led

to reiterating anthropomorphist conceptions voiced by the late Hanbalites, hence

infringing the mystery of the divine self and the mystery of revelation itself. From a

Voegelinian perspective, this supremacy of reason and ratiocination is an escape by the

Taymiyyan metastatic consciousness from the revelation-reason metaxy and tension

towards union with the immanent pole. To explain in Voegelinian parlance, the

ratiocination-caused internal impediments that obstructed the free flow of mysterious

truth into the consciousness, and obstructed the pull of the transcendental pole. In

closed existence, the Taymiyyan metastatic consciousness abandoned the *via negativa* or

apophatic theology and the MBO principle of the inscrutability of the divine ground, and

generated a new theology which is in stark contradiction with the MBO theology.

Additionally, the dominance of reason, better yet the Taymiyyan reason, over revelation

is clear in attempting at rationalizing, beyond the principle of *amor propheta*, canonically

prescribed symbolic rites relating to the Messenger including visiting the Messenger's tomb. In an infringement of the mystery of the Messenger's ahistorical presence, that rationalization led him to warn against the canonically prescribed visit of the Messenger's tomb. For him, the visit should not be motivated by something other than reminding one's self of the reality of the hereafter, and are not compliant with the *shari'a* should they be motivated by a desire to seek benediction, (Al-Matroudi, 2006, p. 97). That said, the blowing of reason out of proportion moved in the direction of the vitiation of the centrality of *amor propheta* within the MBO epistemology, and in the direction of the total displacement of the epistemological conception of *amor propheta*. In turn, this led to a defacement of the MBO epistemological conception that *credo* is attainable if preceded by *the amor prophita, the latter being* greater than *amor sui*. It also led to a defacement of the conception that *credo* is a prerequisite for episteme.

With that said, it is possible to discern that, as a differentiation of Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric, the Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric was detached from the mystery. The imam or *waly al-amr* is neither a constituent of a majestic system of mystery, nor an arbiter of the mystery, nor a creator of the mystery, nor a demystifier of the mystery. The Taymiyyan citation of Umayyad practices and his polemics with articulators of the doctrine of ideologized Shiism indicate that he was aware of the fact that the conception of God's deputy and the different forms of theological legitimation aroused a controversy. However, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric avoided treating the concept and the notion of theological legitimation in previous theoretical fabrics. Even the implied theological legitimation in the Taymiyyan governance/caliphate-related theoretical fabric itself was not served by an elaborate explanation touching on mystery-related maxims. Whereas *governance* is a matter of religion, it is so but within the context of being a matter of the profane world, and as a matter which is so distanced from transcendence. This circumvention of the mystery may well qualify as *an ascending differentiation* of the escape from the mystery found in Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric. The Taymiyyan historiogenesis carried the

same narrowness of the compact conception of salafsim which comprised Al-Juwayni's doxic ethos. In addition to being devoid of cosmogonic mystery-distorting conceptions, scope of the Taymiyyan differentiated Salafism was "as of" the revelation.

Being the working of a *largely* metastatic consciousness which escaped from the metaxy to move towards the immanent pole, the Taymiyyan theoretical design and the circumvention of mystery should be decoded as power instruments that were intended to enable pursuing a revolutionarily reversal of unamenable reality resulting from imperial destruction, and the removal of imperialism-caused anxieties. They were also hoped to enable a *superbia*-based worldwide imperial dominance. That reversal ought to be pursued by an accentuated *umma* of trans-territorial believers living the Taymiayyan doxic ethos and subsumed under the gnostic Taymiyyan *jama'a* and anchored to an exclusionist sectarian and religious particularism and self-determinism.

The first element in achieving the above ends was the dilution of existing MBO authorities and branch authorities to the favor of empowering Ibn Taymiyya, his doxic ethos, and the body of his his followers, and making him the supreme reference. Firstly, the Taymiyyan epistemology with its inflation of reason, with its claim of the absence of variance between revelation and reason, and with its lack of a coherent methodology moved in the direction of diluting the autonomy of the Quran and the establishment of reason, better yet the Taymiyyan reason, as arbiter of the Quran. Likewise, the Taymiyyan historiogenetic conception of Salafism moved in the direction of diluting the authority of the Quran. Abandoning the epistemic methodological and substantive heritage especially the science of the Fundamental Jurisprudential Methodologies or *usul al-fiqh* and traditional interpretations would disable the autonomy of the Quran and subordinating the Quran to human will, and would inaugurate the conduct of citing verses without contextualization. Such conduct is frequently seen in Ibn Taymiyya's book *The Shari'a-based Governance* or *As-Siyasa Ash-Shari'ya* especially in so much as his arguments on jihad and fighting. In turn, the Quran would cease being conceived as a miraculous book with a hierarchy of meanings. In turn, the human being would be

conceived as capable of capturing all the meanings of the Quran, hence positioning the human being above the word of God. Secondly, the unique Taymiyyan anthropomorphic notion of the personal God resulting from the Taymiyyan peculiar rationalism was also a movement in the direction of the construction of a conception of the divine in which the divine is in *a fixed state* which would in turn subtly connote a contracted special divine action and an occasional divine intervention. Thirdly, the aforementioned contraction of *amor propheta* resulting from the Taymiyyan epistemology was a movement in the direction of diluting the Messenger's authority and contracting the recognition of his presence. By the same token, the Taymiyyan historiogenetic conception of Salafism moved in the direction of contracting the Messenger's authority, and expanding the authority of the user of the conception of Salafism. As said earlier, the treatment of the entirety of the three generations as one all-encompassing human category, and as one historical unit with one epochal consciousness, and the embedded implicit infallibility of the members of the salaf, obscured the difference between the authority of the Messenger and the authority of the figures of the three centuries. Further, the order-necessitated distinction between the period of the Rashidi Caliph and the subsequent periods is defaced, and archetypalness of the period of the first four caliphs in so much as living the caliphate or deputyship of the Messenger is defaced. They also moved in the direction of vesting the authority of the final arbiter and the ultimate reference in this constructed human category, better yet in the user of the category and the party who would be able to use its precedents selectively. This is because selectivism is amongst the direct ramifications of Salafims and the abandonment of the epistemic heritage. As Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmad argue,

> it is evident that Ibn Taymiyya interprets the traditions from the salaf in ways that would fit his own brand of philosophical traditionalism. (Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p. 12).

They also moved in the direction of obstructing the comprehension of the period of revelation as a compact period, and as a period of application and foundational legislation, and obstructing the comprehension of the later periods as periods of

differentiation and periods of application. Fourthly, meshing the call to relive the way of as-Salaf, with the removal of the epistemic methodological and substantive heritage which was conceived as a necessary means for living the MBO in a period of differentiation of consciousness, with the removal of the history separating the Taymiyyan days from the revelation, opened the door for a serious unconscious psychosocial disorder. It opened the door for changing of the central duty of taking beautiful uswa in the Messenger into a pursuit to *impersonation and* arbitrary pastiche. The term "pastiche" is used in the political theory and in international political theory by constructivists, such as Ned Lebow, to denote identity construction through imitation by the individual and, analogously, by the state. (Ned Lebow: "National Identities and International Relations, 2015). Actually, this impersonation found its first materialization in the replacement of the centrality of the Messenger and the Quran with the centrality of the Taymiyyan persona and the Taymiyyan puritan severity-anchored code which was taken to be the shari'a. As Yussef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed indicate, In Ibn Taymiyya's mind there was a complete identity between the views of the salaf and his own. (Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p.11). The impersonation found its second materialization in the establishment of the Taymiyyan gnostic *jama'a* and having it hold the self-concept of being the equivalence of authentic Islam. It is crucial to remember that the Taymiyyan days was the first period in which entire zones living the MBO, centers of meaning, and millions of Muslims living in them, became the prey of a destructive imperial outburst by a foreign force anchored to a different order. Accordingly, the Taymiyyan consciousness did not find a precedence to anchor itself to. To this we should add that plausibly multiple factors coalesced in implanting in public consciousness the assumption that dominance of peoples living the MBO has become a state of permanence. Chief amongst those factors was the canonical declaration of the eminence of the twelfth hour. Another factor would be the longevity of the imperializing pursuit as of the beginning of the Umayyad caliphate. A third factor would be taking the jurisprudential rule that Quranic verses speaking of the sword option have superseded

those speaking of the word option in the latter phase of the Messenger's life to mean that Muslims shall, and should, be on the offensive all the time and everywhere. Yet, another factor would be taking the verse speaking of the completion of religion after the conquest or *fath* of Mecca and the public nature of part of the faith to mean that religiosity would be incomplete should forces living a different MBO be in control. All the above made it so challenging to even consider that subordination to a non-Muslim rule could be a state of exception. As a result, the Taymiyyan consciousness suffered a sense of rejection of self, of place, of time, of the history which led to this calamity and the ensuing anxiety, and above all a rejection of the consciousness living them. Hence, the impersonation itself was an empowerment of the Taymiyyan persona and its doxic ethos and its first vehicle namely the Taymiyyan *jama'a*. Fifthly, the Taymiyyan historiogenetic conception of the Salaf moved in the direction of deadening the authority of the traditional epistemic heritage and paradigm and traditional *ulama* and contemporary traditional *ulama* while positioning the Taymiyyan persona as the ultimate reference. For Yussef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, Ibn Taymiyya's usage of the term Salaf

> has an instrumental quality directly related to Ibn Taymiyya's challenge to the dominant doctrines of the theological and legal schools. It is in the face of charges of contempt towards the established authorities that Ibn Taymiyya often appeals to the authority of the Salaf … Ibn Taymiyya's Salafism was iconoclastic – as much as it was about revering the members of the early Islamic community, it was about undermining the binding authority of later interpretations. (Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p.11) …. Salafism on its own simply cannot express the distinctiveness of the Taymiyyan method. Rather, the invocation of the salaf often occurred only at a secondary stage, as a way of legitimating and justifying a methodology that encountered opposition from the majority of his contemporaries. (Rapoport and Ahmad, 2010, p. 10-13).

Finally, the Taymiyyan historiogenetic Salafism moved in the direction of deadening the authority of the ra'iyya through the deculturation and *scotosis* that it generated. Perhaps, the deculturation and the resulting darkening and voluntary ignorance, to use Web's terminology, (Web, 1981, p. 287) that were geared towards eclipsing reality in this epistemological option are too obvious to need elaboration. It suffices to recollect the

fields of knowledge that are disposed of and the consequences of such disposal. What Taymiyan Salafism prescribed abandoning included the jurisprudential methodologies discovered and formulated by the *ulama* throughout the past four centuries including the science of the Fundamental Jurisprudential Methodologies or *usul al-fiqh*. It also included the avalanche of jurisprudential rulings of the *ulama*, the apophatic theology of the *Ash'arites* and the Maturidis, the customs and symbols that have been embraced living the spirit of the *shari'a*. A corollary of the abandonment of the traditional epistemic heritage and paradigm was the removal of the epistemic methodological and substantive heritage which was conceived as a necessary means for living the MBO in a period of differentiation of consciousness. It meant the loss of the tools that the *ulama* and their societies found indispensable in approaching the revealed texts after the death of the Messenger. Another corollary was the loss of an ethnographic understanding of those centuries across the geographies of zones living the MBO, and consequently, the loss of the understanding and appreciation of the correspondence between the differentiation of episteme and the differentiation of consciousness. Books classifying the *ulama* of every centuries demonstrated a firm conviction of the indispensability of studying the life accounts of the *ulama*, of obtaining a sense of the characteristics of the epistemic consciousness of every period, and of understanding the socio-economic and political milieu of every period and geographical spot. In short, the abandonment of the *ulama*'s epistemic heritage also moved in the direction of making history loses its comprehensibility. All the above speaks for a self-determining consciousness which hoped to pursue a free intellectual navigation beyond any constraints. Plausibly, this free "intellectual navigation" was the conceived as the condition president of free political navigation in the pursuit to reverse adverse imperial conditions.

The second element in achieving the aforementioned grand end is the utmost empowerment of the body living the Taymiyyan ideological and theoretical fabric in the face of the prospected enemy. As an ascending differentiation of Al-Juwayni's discourse, the Taymiyyan ideological discourse invoked the unity of the aggregate trans-territorial

body of the believers so as to generate the utmost steam and power possible in reversing the victimization resulting from Imperial Mongol invasion and occupation, in eliminating the existential threat paused by imperial Byzantium, and in pursuing own imperialism. Nonetheless, in nuancing our understanding of that invocation, it is possible to discern three levels of audience that the Taymiyyan discourse addressed. The first level of the audience included the Taymiyyan *jama'a.* The second level included the Taymiyyan version of the people of the Sunna and the body of true believers which was referred to as *the people of hadith* or *ahl al-hadith* who generally "inherited the infallibility of the Messenger" (Konakata, 1994, p. 132) and who were hoped to ultimately join the Taymiyyan *jama'a*. The third level of the audience included the global body of Muslims which Ibn Taymiyya hoped would embrace the Taymiyyan doxic ethos and on a secondary basis to join the *jama'a*. That being said, in order to satisfy the unspoken of objective of reversing the adverse circumstances resulting from imperial caliphal destruction, the theoretical fabric, firstly, fused the collective and the governor through making them pursue one cardinal mission which was the coercive injunction of good and the forbidding of evil under which jihad falls. Effectively, it is in the pursuit of accomplishing this mission that the collective and the governor find the original sovereignty and sense of infallibility which the theoretical fabric invested in them. Secondly, the theoretical fabric demonized the rest and made them the subject of the action of the collective and the leader. The theoretical fabric characterized all the followers of other confessional frameworks as deviant, destined to hill in the afterlife, and as ones who must be physically eliminated. The two options available were converting *the rest* to the Tamiyyan version of Islam, or annihilating them.

The theoretical fabric changed the meaning of jihad, and changed the nature of the penal system and the MBO conception of other messages by making jihad an integral part of the penal system and by making the followers of other religions infidels. Then, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric positioned the hoped for governor and collective in a state of permanent offensive against *the rest*. To make possible putting them on the offensive

and equip them, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric empowered the governor and the collective to the hilt. It invested in both of them the authority to guide, judge, and penalize the *rest* so as to realize the utopian notion of having all the living world accepting its doxic ethos which was conceived as authentic 'Islam'. To further vindicate the license to eliminate the rest, the Taymiyyan fabric constructed, through the usage of a false hadith, the image that the Messenger was a habitual killer who took pride in being so. The construction of this image was a means to maximize the appetite to eliminate the rest, and to re-socialize the collective psyche to mutate and to center itself on cruelty. The ultimate result was the investment in the governor and in the collective an unlimited authority the scope of which was no less than the world proper. All the world now falls under the direct jurisdiction of the collective and its governor. The Taymiyyan theoretical fabric unchained the governor and the collective from any conceived traditional constraints including any commitment to a deputyship/caliphate of the Messenger. It granted the governor a *carte blanch* to use crafty commanders who would increase the odds of military triumph. It did so after undoing the ethical criterion of selecting commanders through portraying that the state of normalness was to have to choose between a crafty commander and an immoral commander. The imperial factor and the effect of its anxieties are highly visible here. The disturbance from adverse imperial circumstances and the desire to swiftly end them led the Taymiayyan consciousness to lay emphasis on the theme of surrounding the ruler with crafty commanders who would be conceived as able to accomplish that task, and not be preoccupied with structuring the formula governing the relation between the ruler and the ulama in the system of transcendental representation and the system of existential representation. Then, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric changed the foundation upon which the juridical and penal system was founded from one of mercy into one of severity, and allowed the governor a wide discretion in defining penalties, and allowed him to disregard repentance, so that he would enjoy maximal coercive power.

The third element was an extremely subtle empowerment against the Mongol imperialism, the empowerment being a counter claim of utopianism. When carefully dissected, the Taymiyyan Salafism included a dual utopianism. First, there is the aforementioned utopianization of the constructed human category of the Salaf. Second, there is the utopianism of reliving the life of the Salaf. To those two utopian states we should add the utopianism of the ultimate state of affairs following the imperial dominance of 'Muslims'. It is possible to argue that in effect, this Taymiyyan utopianism was, to use the terminology of Andrea Mura in an analogous inspiring remark, an attempt to "dislocate" Mongol "monopoly over the discourse of" utopianism, "pursuing a counter-hegemonic articulation and valourization of utopian signifiers." (Mura, 2012, p. 70). It is not a stretch to say that every imperialism is by definition a utopian enterprise. A juxtaposition of the various forms of imperial utopianism lies outside the scope and limits of the present study. Specifically, the Mongol's discourse of utopianism is implied, *inter alia*, in the letter sent Kuyuk Khan to Innocent the 4th (1243-1254 AD) in response to a letter by the latter. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 132-134).

That being said, why did the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric generally avoid treating the question of mystery? Why did it avoid to even discuss or refute the mystery distorting conceptions of previous theoretical fabrics including, for example, the notion of elevating the caliph to the dignity of being a constituent of a majestic framework of mystery? As hinted above, the Taymiyyan ideological discourse and the consciousness formulating the theoretical fabric was largely engrossed by the conviction that the best way to reverse imperial victimization was to conjure the masses and revolutionize them. Let us first remember that the Taymiyyan focus on the consciousness of common circles and lay people was greater than the focus of any preceding theoretical fabric. The outburst of the destructive Mongol imperial invasion and the failure to maintain even a shadow caliph to set on the imperializing caliphal seat which previous theoretical fabrics celebrated have rocked the composure of public consciousness. The Taymiyyan theoretical fabric wanted to remove all vestiges of uncertainty in public consciousness

and establish that reversing imperial victimization was nothing but a process and that that process and its destination was within cognitive and pragmatic reach. Finally, it was largely engrossed by the desire to have the people act swiftly. Possibly, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric found it *generally distracting*, and hence disempowering, to touch on conceptions of mystery whence the state of the conceived umma is at the verge of total collapse. Particularly, the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric may have found that reminding the public that the Caliph was conceived as a constituent of majestic framework of mystery would discourage the process of invoking and mobilizaing the masses who should not be centered on the caliph. In s*umma*tion, the impulse to protect, to control, and to ascend moved the Taymiyyan consciousness towards the immanent pole leading it to superimpose on the MBO system of meaning a deformational deputyship-less theoretical fabric. Why? Because that theoretical fabric, in Voegelinian terminology, provide "a sense of superiority over the reality that does not conform". (Franz, 2000, p. 74).

Interim development: The invigoration of the title: God's caliph by Ottoman founders

For about half a millennium after Ibn Taymiyya's theory, the wheel of theorization did not yield a theory which contained significant deformational conceptions. During this lengthy period, the Ottoman dynasty emerged in Anatolia and after an arduous ascent, the Ottomans founders established themselves as the mightiest power within the Muslim sphere living the MBO. The Ottoman founders designed a sui-generis Sultanate-based governance architecture. Unlike the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs, the Ottoman Sultans claimed the title Caliph as a secondary title which was to a large extent an honorific title. The Ottoman Founders hoped to establish the image of the quasi ruler under God on a worldwide scale. This first element of this image was the image of the "world Sultan". As Arnold indicates: Isfandiyar Beg, An Amir of Asia Minor of Qastamunl, in 1374, addresses Murad as

> "Your Highness ... Sultan of the Sultans of Islam, and Khaqan of the Khaqans of mankind". Later, "a letter from the governor of Erzerum describes him as the lord of the world". (Arnold, 1924, p. 131).

The second element was adopting the version of "God's Caliph on earth" asserting the image of God's deputy on an earth-wide scale. (Arnold 1924, p. 154-161). The Ottoman founders were keen to cite the verses of the Quran speaking about the human creation-related caliphate. (Arnold, 1924, p. 154-161). The title was also used in addressing the Sultans by different parties. (Arnold, 1924, p. 155-161). When Murad I had "conquered Adrianople, Philippopolis and other cities about 1362 AD, the Amir of Karamania in Asia Minor wrote to congratulate him on his victories and described him as the "chosen Khalifah of the Creator ' and the shadow of God upon earth". (Ozcan, 1997. P. 130, 132). As of the second quarter of the sixteenth century, the Mughals established their dominion in the Indian subcontinent (1525-1857 AD). Upon the entrance by the Ninth Ottoman Sultan Selim of Mecca and Medina, Selim embraced the title "Servant of the two Honorable *Harams*/Shrines". The title remained with subsequent Ottoman Sultans. The title further reinforced the self-concept as a deputy of the Messenger. Not only did

the Ottoman founders use the title "Servant of the two Honorable *Harams*/Shrines", they used it as bedrock of their caliphal legitimacy having recognized that the dynasty was not of Qurashite lineage, which had served as the main legitimacy source during the Abbasid reign. Selim claimed a title which combines the Sultanic symbol and the caliphal symbol: *Malik ul-Barreyn, wa Khakan ul-Bahrayn, wa Kasir ul-Jayshayn, wa Khadim al-Haramayn* (King of the Two Lands (continents Europe and Asia), Khagan of the Two Seas (Mediterranean and Indian Seas), Conqueror of the Two Armies (European and Safavid armies) and (Servant of the two Honorable Harams/Shrines). While informing Shrvan Shah of Persia, Selim I demanded that as he controlled the holly cities, he is the only one who had authority to grant the right to khutba or sermon and coinage (Ozcan, 1997, p. 10). Shah Waliullah (AD 1703-1762), the prominent thinker of India in his *Tafhimat-I Illahiyah* wrote:

> From the time of Sultan Selim Khan most of the countries of Arabia, Egypt, and Syria have been under the control of the Ottoman Sultans (Salatin-i Rum) on whom has devolved the wardenship of the two sacred harems, chieftainship … of and the arrangement of mahmul and caravans. For this reason every one of them is remembered as the Amirul-Muminein on the pulpits of Arabia and Syria in general and on those of the two sacred harams in particular. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 10).

Shah Waliullah himself seems to have been against recognizing the Ottoman sultans as caliphs on the basis that they do not meet the first criterion stressed by earlier Muslim jurists, namely the Qurashite lineage. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 10). Most probably, it is such disapproval which made Shah Waliullah shrewdly suffices with using the second title which the Ottoman Caliphs held, which is the title of *Amir ul- Mu'minin*. Arnold contends that a number of jurists avoided using the title Khalifah and *Amir ul-Mu'minin* and Imam in their official descriptions of the Ottoman Sultan in their writings because they adopted the Hanafi *Madhab* which prohibits a claim to the caliphate which lacks the lineage criterion. (Arnold, 1924, p. 163).[4] The usage of the concept of caliph of God by the

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[4] Actually, Shah Waliullah (1703-1762 AD) formulated a theory of the Caliphate which attempted, inter alia, at restoring the caliphate as a deputyship of the Messenger, and restoring the special capacity of the reign of the first four caliphs as a special Caliphal reign.

Ottoman and the dilution of the Messenger's presence resulting therefrom is different from the usage of the concept of God's caliph/deputy by the Umayyad, the Abbasids and the Doctrine of ideologized Shiism and the dilution of the Messenger's presence resulting therefrom. First, as mentioned above, the Ottoman only held the title Caliph as secondary to the title Sultan which was their essential title. Whereas early founding Sultans used the title of caliph aft-times, it seems that only as of the reign of the Ninth Ottoman Sultan Selim the concept caliph began to be *consistently* used. The new habitual usage of the title Caliph resulted in originating symbolic alterations, yet only originated *minor* genuine governance-related and foreign policy-related modifications. According to Ozcan, holding the title Caliph gave the Ottoman Sultan status and responsibility. Ozcan notes that Indians sought Suleiman's help against Portuguese attacks on routes of Hajj. He faced them in Deu in 1531 and that won him popularity Padishah of Islam. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 13). However, one cannot agree that such an action was purely motivated by the sense of responsibility emanating from holding the title Caliph. Nothing swayed the Ottomans from continuing to act mainly as Sultans. Even Ozcan noted at the end of his analysis that Suleiman wanted to annex India under Ottoman sovereignty. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 13). So, unlike the case during the Abbasid reign, the legitimacy of the Ottoman's status as Sultan is *fully* independent of the Calipshate. In the Ottoman case, the measure of making investiture to other rulers was so rare and as a bono fide measure unlike the Abbasid Caliphs who considered the investiture as one of the powers/functions of the Caliph and took it seriously. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 13). In certain occasions, the pre-occupation by Ottoman Sultans with the title Sultan and its power-related symbolism eclipsed their preoccupation with the title caliph with its honorary symbolism. Arnold noted that the secretary of the Ottoman Sultan Murad III (r 1574-95 AD) Ahmad Firidun Bey did not mention the title caliph while listing the many titles of the Sultan-Caliph pointing out that such a behavior cannot be excepted unless the Secretary knew that the Sultan attached little importance to the title caliph. (Arnold, 1924, p. 164). Whereas prima fascia the title Caliph of God *only* denotes a status of a theocratic ruler with Earthwide aspirations which

is mainly or solely vertically conceived, in reality the title is meant to mainly convey the image of a ruler ho asserts his status as one world Sultan who is able to impose and sustain a Pax Ottomana. This meaning is reflected by the description of the Ninth Ottoman Sultan Selim as the "Protector of the world". (Arnold, 1924, p. 154). What corroborates this important theoretical finding is that the Ottoman Founders accepted the existing practice by Mughal princes and Emperors of using the title caliph hoping that they recognize the Ottoman's Caliphate as Khalafat-I Ulya which means the supreme caliphate. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 8). As of the reign of Akbar, the rulers were called caliphs and their capital *the abode of Caliphate.* This practice by the Mughal rulers was coupled by striking coins in their names and capacity as caliphs. Ozcan argues that this practice is

> possibly due to the desire to establish the legitimacy of their rule through the well respected caliphal institution and thus to further their reputation as just rulers creating solidarity among the various Muslim elements of their empire. (Ozcan, 1997, p. 8).

Over and above, the Ottoman's usage of the concept of Caliph of God was not backed by a theological theory which justifies it as the case was with the Umayyad. Accordingly, the Ottoman Sultans did not conceive themselves as caliphs of God and as universal caliphs *sensu strictu*. Perhaps, the above analysis obliges our diagnosis to conclude that a sense of schizophrenia is embedded in the usage of the concept of the caliphate contrary to the diagnosis by some Caliphate analysts such as Arnold which only eyes the grounding by the Ottoman founders of the authority on divine appointment.

Interim development: The emergence of the modernism paradigm, and modernist imperialism, and the permeation of nation-statism in the zones living the MBO, and the emergence of indigenous waves of ethno-particularism

After nearly six centuries after the Taymiyyan theoretical fabric, the theoretical fabrics of Rida and El-Banna, being comprised of idiosyncratic deformation, emerged but only after the deformational paradigm of modernity and its tenet of Nation-statism had permeated the zones living the MBO, and only after they had permeated the doxic fabrics of Rida and El-Banna as shall be explained later. The paradigm of modernity and its tenet of Nation-statism had permeated the zones living the MBO as a result of the voluntary adoption of it by indigenous actors. That permeation was a result of the imposition of the Modernist paradigm and its tenet of state-nationism by Modernist Imperial consciousness within the context of its attempt to globalize and impose the Modernist paradigm earthwide. To that consciousness, that globalizing required dismantling the Message-based order, and the Ottoman Sultanate-caliphate as shall be clarified shortly.

Nuancing our understanding of the idiosyncratic nature of Rida's and Al-Banna's caliphate-related theoretical fabrics requires nuancing our understanding of the foundational theoretical contours of Nation-statism. In Chapter One, we outlined the foundational pragmatic developments that yielded nation-statism. On the theoretical level, in response to the fight over sovereignty, but within a milieu of a spreading secularization, Hobbes's theory (1588-1679 AD) proposed the solution of the Leviathan which seems to have been inspired by the principle upon which the Treaty of Augsburg was built, namely that the King would be the basis of the polity. Hobbes's theory was formulated at a moment when rivers of blood were sweeping the continent due to the Eighty Years War between the Netherland and Spain (1568-1648 AD), and the Thirty years War (1618-1648 AD) between Protestant states and allies and Catholic states and allies. He also produced it at a time whereby modernist humanism and scientism were on the rise. Plausibly, Hobbes theory modified the Augsburg's principle in two ways. First,

the theory secularized it investing in the sovereign ruler an original sovereignty. Second, it attached the possibility that the sovereign ruler be an artificial person next to the standing reality according to which the sovereign is a natural person. The principle of the absolute ruler was also voiced by Bodin's theory (1530-1596 AD) expressed in *Les Six livres de la République*. The theory stipulated the absolute in unison with the accentuation of the total body politic, namely the nation. The accentuation of the nation is a part and parcel of the humanism-based accentuation of the human being and the investment of original sovereignty in it. The line of theorization investing an original sovereignty in the absolute ruler would be counterpoised by a line of theorization investing an original sovereignty in the populace, that line being inaugurated by John Lock (1632-1707 AD) and later Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778 AD). It seems that there were three main impulses of this dichotomous claim. The first is the absence of a logical ground forbidding the constituency from claiming the original sovereignty which the natural person sovereign claimed. The second is the modernity's foundational disposition of strict secular egalitarianism which made itself felt, inter alia, in the revolt against monarchism. The third impulse seems to be the outcome of Oliver Cromwell's (r AD 1653-1658) experience which to some extent appears as a quasi materialization of Hobbes's Leviathan. Hence, as of the final quarter of the eighteenth century, a neo dichotomous relation between the two ingredients of the nation-state namely ruler and the ruled/constituency would unearth itself, each attempting to monopolize the claim to original sovereignty. One may venture to surmise that amongst the drivers of the struggle to monopolize the claim to original sovereignty is the pursuit of worldly glory and honor which Hobbes considered as "the choice criterion" of the individual. (Manfredi and Slomp, 1994, p. 161). As Manfredi and Slomp explain in their article *Leviathan: Revenue-maximizer or glory-seeker,*

> the objective pursued by Hobbesian people is to obtain the pleasure of superiority over fellow men. (Manfredi and Slomp, 1994, p. 161)*.*

That said, in addition to being the homeland, national territory would constitute a main framework signifying the collective national self and excluding the otherized other. In his study *A genealogical inquiry into early Islamism: the discourse of Hasan Al-Banna,* Andrea Mura explains as follows

> A new cognition of space, in the form of the national *territory*, was also devised, which substantially adopted the same binary mechanism of exclusion. The national *territory* constitutes another central signifier of the discourse of the nation, one that marks the very origin of its etymological root (from Latin *nasci,* the term *nation* coveys the idea 'to be born' into a certain land). The consolidation of the modern state, especially in the form of the nation-state, in fact, required first and foremost the creation of clear-cut frontiers. (Mura, 2012, p. 68).

> So obtained, national identity was then taken to constitute an undividable *sacred* Self, which was thought of in radical *antagonism* with its outside, the realm of exclusion, what remained external to it (that is, competing nations). (Mura, 2012, p. 67).

As a result of that, and as a result of being perceived as the host of the accentuated nation, national territory would be accentuated. In unison, the most powerful segment of the nation would pursue a conformity-driven elevation of its tongue to the dignity of "the national tongue". (Merriman, *Nationalism*, 2008). Subsequently, that tongue would derive some accentuation from the accentuation of the nation.

So, when examined, the nation-statism derives from Christian theology, and entails an embedded respirtualization of the despirtualized society. As Carl Schmitt argued,

> all significant concepts of the modem theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development-in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver-but also because of their systematic structure ... Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last centuries. (Schmitt, 1985, p. 36).

From his end, Mura argued that

in modern juridical doctrines, sovereignty had been conceptualized as the supreme 'power' (*summa potestas*) giving 'force' and 'authority' to a political order by way of its 'absolute and perpetual' (Bodin), 'exclusive and indivisible' (Hobbes) essence. The supreme power of a political order was thought of, therefore, as the original, unrestricted and unique source of legitimacy of state control, which does not recognize any superior principle of power *outside* itself. (Mura, 2012, p. 67).

Voegelin explains that immanent nature of the Hobbesian conception of order which Mura is alluding to within the context of arguing that Hobbes's theorization within the framework of confronting the absence of a civil theology and the desire by Gnostic movements to impose as a civic theology their conceptions which destroyed the truth of the soul, especially those conceptions which were based on an immanentization of the Christian *eschaton*, and their disregard of the problems of existence. Hobbes attempted to confront the threat of the destruction of the society by creating a civic theology which made the order of the society the truth which the society represented while disregarding other truths. The idea was based on stressing existence which the Gnostics disregarded. In facing the Gnostics who insisted that the society may only exist if it represented a specific truth, he contended that any order would do if it secured the existence of the society. He had to create his new idea of man. Human nature may find fulfillment in existence itself. Any end beyond such existence must be dismissed. In other words, Hobbes reversed the Gnostic immanentization of *eschaton* with a radical immanentization of existence which dismissed *eschaton*. Hobbes denied the notion that societies are driven by a pursuit of truth, and interpreted their struggle as an expression of their desire for war. Whatever religious justification is nothing but a mask of the existential desire for war. By doing so, he lifted the mask concealing the instinct to dominate or *libido dominandi*. Contrary to Plaotnic and Aristotilian conception of the emotion which is oriented towards *summum bonum*, he denied the existence of *summum bonum* and the existence of the Aristotilian *homonia* and the participation in the nous or the logos, and denied the existence of a society as he stressed that the members of the *politea* are sheer individuals who are driven by their individual emotions.

Man is driven by the desire to accumulate power over time and to build glory. Happiness

is attained when one is in the lead. The main emotion which drives the behavior of the

individual is pride or *superbia*. Order will be driven by fear of death which will be

perceived as the *summum malum* and which will replace *summum bonum* in serving as a

driver and a deterrent. It is this fear which will generate the readiness to submit or

surrender to the government through contract. They vest their power and authority on

one person or a group of persons and who will represent their will. They merge the

impulses of authority in them in one new person, the commonwealth who will be the

sovereign. Creating this one person is more than sanctioning and approving. The

individuals merge in the one person resented by the sovereign. He is able to frighten and

thereupon form their will to have domestic peace and to defend against foreign attack.

Mura concurs with our previous remark that there was a difference on the actor or thing

in which sovereignty would be invested. According to Mura,

> modern sovereignty entailed the passage of this exclusive and absolute power
> from the transcendent dimension of God to the immanent authority of the state,
> though differences among theorists regarded the locus of sovereignty: the king,
> the people, the law, etc. (Mura, 2012, p. 78).

In Hegel, the nation-state was consecrated. To his theorization,

> the state is the divine will. The state replaces the Church as the bearer of
> salvation wherein a people can realize their freedom and catholicity. If the
> monarch is the personification of the divine will, it is the nation-state that
> sublates (*aufheben*) religion because it becomes the vehicle for fulfilling the
> universal element in the human spirit. (Bretherton, 2014, p.228, 229).

Schmitt establishes how in occasions, the sovereignty was invested in the princes, and

how in others it was invested in the 'people'. According to Schmitt,

> The politicization of theological concepts, especially with respect to the concept
> of sovereignty, is so striking that it has not escaped any true expert on his
> writings. Said Emile Boutmy,"Rousseau applies to the sovereign the idea that the
> philosophers hold of God: He may do anything that he wills but he may not will
> evil In the theory of the state of the seventeenth century, the monarch is
> identified with God and has in the state a position exactly analogous to that
> attributed to God in the Cartesian system of the world. (Schmitt, 1985, p. 46).

The general will of Rousseau became identical with the will of the sovereign; but simultaneously the concept of the general also contained a quantitative determination with regard to its subject, which means that the people became the sovereign. The decisionistic and personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was thus lost. The will of the people is always good … "The people are always virtuous." Said Emmanuel Sieyks, In whatever manner a nation expresses its wishes, it is enough that it wishes; all forms are good but its will is always the supreme law. (Schmitt, 1985, p. 48).

The prince develops all the inherent characteristics of the state by a sort of continual creation. The prince is the Cartesian god transposed to the political world. (Schmitt, 1985, p. 46-47).

One of the cases that demonstrate the simultaneous and reflexivity-based adoption and imposition of the Modernist paradigm and its tenet of state-nationism is the case of adoption and imposition of the maxim of nation-statism in the Ottoman heartland. After the end of the phase of the founding Ottoman Sultans, the Ottoman scene saw the emergence of a new type of Sultan-caliphs who were strongly fascinated by the modernist culture and life style which they began to impersonate and spread at home. At the same time, the influence of major European powers especially Franc and Britain began to penetrate the Ottoman heartland on the official and non-official levels. However, this did not mean the end of political and military struggle. The relationship of struggle and influence became visible as of the reign of the 28th Ottoman Sultan Abulhamid I (r 1725-1789 AD). From their end, Imperialist powers capitalized on the ramifications and the contraction resulting from the military losses which the Ottoman military suffered as of the first round of the Russo-Ottoman Wars (1768-1774 AD), including a rising debt. Bulen Ozdemir, the author of *Ottoman Reform and Social Life* endorses the argument made by Wallerstein, the author of *The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World Economy: Some Questions for Research* that the capitalistic forces of the capitalist world economy pressured the Ottoman economy to transform in order to subordinate the Ottoman socio-economic structure. According to Bulen Ozdemir:

The world-system perspective, formulated by Wallerstein, developed a theoretical framework for Ottoman history. This approach argues the necessity of considering the Ottoman economy as part of a worldwide economic system.

Therefore, the Ottoman transformation took place in the context of
"peripherelization" of the Ottoman socio-economic structure, after it came in
contact with world economic forces. Determining factors of the change in the
Ottoman social structure are taken into consideration from a perspective in which
forces of the capitalist world economy prevail. (Ozdemir, 2003, p. 30).

It was the 28th Ottoman Sultan, Selim III, (AD 1789-1807) who inaugurated the program

of *nicam cedid* or the new order which consisted of an expeditious replacement of the

Janissary with a modern army. Afterwards, the pressure of modernist Imperialism moved

in the direction of uprooting natural and traditional formations, institutions and

intermediary structures within the context of transferring the state-individual

relationship. This meant that the individual would be dependent only on the state, and

would lose the protection provided by the intermediary structures against potential state

hegemony. Direct Modernist pressure led to uprooting the entire long-lived inherited

Millet system, and to installing the Modernistic version of citizenship which is grounded

on modernist exclusivist chauvinistic nationalism which became to be known as

Ottomanism. The uprooting of the Millet system was part of the wide framework of the

tanzimat or measures of re-organization which were new sets of large scale regulations

designed to complete the re-articulation of the Ottoman polity into a modernist nation-

state, and which were carried out specifically in the names of Sultan Abd El-Mecid (r AD

1839-1861) and Abd El-Aziz (r AD 1861-1876). The dismantling of the Millet system was

in reality a dismantling of an entire administrative system of essential services and

functions including educational, hospitalization, relief, nourishment and orphanage care

services. It is the Ottoman state in the making now who would render such services but

at the huge costs including national uniformity and impersonalism. As Quartet explains,

the separate religious communities had financed and operated schools, hospices
and other poor relief facilities. Muslim, Christian, and Jewish groups – usually via
their *imam*s, priests, and rabbis – had collected monies, built schools, or soup
kitchens, or orphanages and paid the teachers and personnel to care for the
students, the poor, and the orphans. But, during the second half of the
nineteenth century, the official class took on these and many other functions,
creating separate and parallel state educational and charitable institutions.
During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II, for example, the state built as many as

10,000 schools for its subjects, using these to provide a modern education based on Ottoman values. (Quartaert, 2005, p. 63).

The dismantling of the Millet system was coupled with weakening and dismantling the guilds and the tribe or the clan in the Ottoman heartland and throughout the provinces. Anthony Black noted how in the latter Ottoman Empire the concept of subject began to be used in constitutional documents in a different way to refer to inhabitants of the empire – as distinct from categories based on religion or occupation that had been current up to now (Muslim, peasant and so on), and then commented by saying that

the conceptual implications of these moves were considerable. 'Subject' implied a civil agent with rights and duties as a member of the state. It implied a closer and more direct relationship between the Sultan and his subjects; it implicitly strengthened the Sultan's position by ignoring intermediaries between ruler and subject. Such a relationship had been one of the bases of modern statehood in Europe, going back to the later Middle Ages. (Black, 2011, p. 284).

In addition to weakening and gradually fading out intermediary structures, the reforms entailed weakening and gradually fading out the *ulama*. Black proceeds by saying:

It was, as Deringil points out, an Enlightenment agenda. Indeed, some religious thinkers argued against the reforms on the constitutionalist grounds that they would lead to tyranny by reducing the traditional role of the ulema and the Sharia. This had formerly limited the sultan's power, and protected the security and prosperity of individuals. (Black, 2011, p. 285).

The second case which demonstrates the reflexivity-based adoption and imposition of the Modernist paradigm and its tenet of state-nationism is the case of adoption and imposition of the maxim of modernist nationalism, especially *religious nationalism*, known as Pan-Islamism. From its end, the strategy of British Imperialism saw a vested geopolitical interest in boosting Pan Islamism and in asserting the capacity of the Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of all Muslims in that it will help achieving two objectives. The first objective is employing the weight of the Ottomans as a barrier in front of the

the increasing Russian covetousness for Central Asian lands and other southern territories, including those in the Ottoman sphere. (Khan, 2007, p. 5).

The second objective, which is intimately intertwined with the first, is to interlace the inflated image of the caliph with the image that the British Empire is the friend of this Caliph of all Muslims in boosting its occupation of the subcontinent which is home to the largest Muslim population in the world by minimizing rejection and maximizing approval as much as possible. Sa'ad Khan explains:

> Britain's historic concern for maintaining the European balance of power made a strategic alliance with the Ottomans inevitable. The British consciously bolstered the sultan's role as caliph to gain external support for their colonial interests (5) … because at the time of the Crimean War (1853-56 AD), Russia was seen as enough of a threat to justify a long-standing British-Ottoman alliance. (Khan, 2007, p. 5).

It is based on this consideration that British Imperialism prevented the forces of Ali Pasha of Egypt from marching to Istanbul to oust the Ottoman Caliph. Correspondingly, as far as the Muslims of India are concerned, Pan-Islamic politics in India took form after the AD 1857 Indian Mutiny and the subsequent dismantling of formal Mughal rule. Why? Because The loss of the last Indo-Muslim empire and the reality of foreign domination in the Subcontinent, where they were already a minority, encouraged the Muslim elite's desire to branch out of India in search of some universal sense of Islamic solidarity.

> "The Ottoman caliph provided the perfect figurehead, for he was the leader of a "free" Muslim empire considered to be on a par with the European powers in stature". (Khan, 2007, p. 11).

Sa'ad Khan adds that

> The Russo-Turkish war (1877-78 AD) and the growth of Sultan Abdul-Hamid's aggrandizing of his position as caliph, Britain was helping to create a nascent pan-Islamic movement originally intended to further its own geostrategic interests. (Khan, 2007 p. 5, 6).

From their end, in trying to dispel the winds of total collapse, the latter Ottoman Caliphs began to *consistently* invoke the title "Caliph" stressing the version "of the Muslims" (Black, 2011, p. 296) and its variations, contrary to the version rehearsed by the Ottoman founders of "caliph of God on earth". Arnold notes that by the latter part of the 18th century, the usage of the symbol of Caliph began to suffer significant fluctuation in that

the title was not fully used when the caliph did not feel the need for it. Yet, Caliphs invoked the title when they felt that the such invocation would serve as a tool in preserving the Sultanate. (Arnold, 1925, p. 164). In 1774 AD, the modernizing Sultan Abdul Hamid I (1774-1789 AD) invoked the title "caliph" in relation to the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji with Empress Catherine II of Russia. In the treaty, the Sultan had to recognize the complete independence of the Tartars of the Crimea and of Kuban, wherein the Turkish version describes the Sultan as: "The Imam of the believers, and the Khalifah of those professing the Unity of God". (Arnold, 1925, p. 165). In what started during the 17th and 18th century as intermittent behavior, invoking the title caliph turned into an importunate behavior by the end of the 19th century. Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r 1876-1909 AD) launched an integrated policy of reversing the de-ottomization which entailed stressing the capacity of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph, the title mainly being used in the version caliph of the Muslims and its variations. He also took a set of decisions and measures that seem to have been driven by his capacity as Caliph in their greater parts and by his capacity as Sultan in their lesser part. Constitutionally speaking, during the promulgation of the constitution of 1876 AD, Sultan Abdul Hamid II insisted that the constitution of 1876 AD should explicitly stipulate that the Caliphate is a position to be held by the Sultan. Article Three of the constitution reads:

> The Sublime Ottoman Sultanate, which possesses the Supreme Islamic Caliphate, will appertain to the eldest of the descendants of the house. (Arnold, 1925, p. 173).

Abd El-Hamid's invocation of Islamic unity made the modernistic European powers and the rising indigenous modernistic nationalists regard him as a barrier to de-Ottomization. It is important to note that while the Ottoman Sultan held the title Successor of the Prophet of the Universe and was perceived and addressed predominantly as caliph of Messenger by some circles in the *umma* of the believers especially in India, he behaved and wanted to appear mainly as caliph of the Muslims. Even upon curbing Abd El-Hamid's pursuit to reverse the de-Ottomization and after the declaration of the autonomy of some of the countries from Ottoman rule, the Sultan Caliph continued to

invoke the status of the caliph of the Muslims through maintaining the authority of the
Sultan Caliph as the overseer of the *Ifta'* authority in some of the countries which gained
independence as the case in the treaty of Lausanne (1912 AD) which declared the
sovereignty of the King of Italy over Libya (Arnold, 1925, p. 177) and The Treaty of
Constantinople (1913 AD) concerning the independence of Bulgaria. (Arnold, 1925, p.
178). Put differently, what is essentially being invoked is the function of the caliphate as
an instrument of unity, and hence of empowerment within the context of the
international balance of power. The following lines from Peter Mandaville's book *Global
Political Islam* s*umma*rize the development of the three cases of adoption of nationalism:

> The debate over nationalism took on various forms in different parts of the
> Muslim world, reflecting the diverse political conditions, histories, and power
> arrangements under which Muslim communities were living at the time. In the
> Turkish Republic, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, Mustapha Kemal
> Ataturk instituted a veritable cultural revolution, seeking as much as possible to
> distance the new republic from its Ottoman heritage through an emphasis on
> rapid modernization and intensely secular norms. In the Arab Middle East,
> however, this shift played out initially as an exchange between advocates of
> political futures based on Islam, and those advocating the primacy of nationalist
> arrangements. As nation-states consolidated in the Arab world, this evolved into a
> debate between political forces seeking to establish an Islamic version of the
> nation-state, and those—mainly social and political elites—who grounded their
> legitimacy in discourses of Arab nationalism. In the Indian subcontinent, which at
> the time was the most populous Muslim country in the world—initial concerns
> about the un-Islamic character of nationalism gave way to more pressing worries
> about the community's future in a Hindu-dominated India. This resulted in calls
> for the establishment of a separate homeland for Muslims, with Islam itself
> transformed into a form of nationalism. (Mandaville, 2010, p. 51).

The third case which demonstrates the reflexivity-based adoption and imposition
of the Modernist paradigm and its tenet of state-nationism is the case of adoption and
imposition of the maxim of Arab nationalism. As far as imposition is concerned, having
exhausted the benefits of the form of *religious nationalism*, namely Pan-Islamism, British
Imperialism moved to employing *racial nationalism*, namely Arabism vs Turkish
nationalism. Prior to and during World War I, British and French Imperialism employed
the instrument of nourishing Arab / Turkish chauvinistic nationalist rivalry coupled with a

policy of luring. In order to weaken the Ottoman caliph in World War I, Imperialist Britain lured the Sharif of Mecca to revolt militarily against the Ottoman garrisons and against the Sultan caliph in Sinai, the Hejaz, and the Levant in consideration of a promise of recognizing an Arab kingdom and caliphate headed by him. Kitchner, then British High Commissioner for Egypt, expressed the British promise to recognize an Arab caliphate headed by Sharif Hussein more than once. In a letter dated 31 October 1914, specifically saying that ...

> it may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring. (Khan, 2007, p. 14).

Regarding voluntary adoption of Arab nationalism by indigenous actors, Arabism specialists differed on the characterization of the intellectual pedigree of Arab nationalism birthing an enduring debate. In her book *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology,* Sylvia Kedouri insists that Arab Nationalism as an ideology was a recent phenomenon only emerged during the 20th century. Kedouri mentioned how George Antonious in his book *The Arab Awakening* found roots of Arab Nationalism in the Wahhabi movement and in the imperialist pursuit of Mohammad Ali and dismissed his findings. Her dismissal was only underpinned by the contention that the Wahhabis were but a purist movement. (Kedouri, 1962, p.3). Other writers traced the lineage of Arab nationalism to the Umayyad supremacist Arabism. With that said, let us admit that the variety of opinions testifies to the complexity of the question and the non-soundness of providing a simple answer. Yet, the facts seem to warrant the following findings. First, an exclusionist chauvinist sentiment existed as of the beginning of the Arab bond as in the case of any other bond. This sentiment was visible prior to the revelation. This sentiment acquired another shape during the Umayyad imperial take off and the Abbasid consolidation of power as explained earlier. This sentiment was an idiosyncratic form of nationalism. As Madawi Al-Rasheed explains in her chapter entitled" The Wahhabis and The Ottoman Caliphate: The Memory of Historical Antagonism" in *Demystifying the Caliphate Historical Memory and Contemporary Context*, the Wahhabi movement did leverage that

sentiment an Arab supremacist sentiment in the battle of delegitimation with the Ottoman sultanate. (Al-Rasheed, p. 131; Abou El Fadl, 2005, p. 49-51). Modernist nationalism, as the case with The Wahhabi movement, was built on the precept of the sovereignty of the nation. Whereas the sovereignty claimed in the case of modern nationalism was explicit and within the context of an explicit secularization, the sovereignty claimed in the case of modern nationalism was implicit and within the context of an implicit secularization. The idiosyncratic differences between modern nationalism and the Wahhabi movement on the one hand, and pre-modern supremacist Arabism seem to warrant using the term "Nationalism" when speaking of the first, and the term "particularism" when speaking of the second.

It is crucial to observe that prior to, and concomitant with, the permeation of the essential modernist tenets including the tenet of Nation-statism, the zones living the MBO were witnessing the growth of significantly contrastable *indigenous* conceptual tenets, and were even witnessing the composition of polities who had much to share with, surprisingly, the pragmatic foundational experience of Modernist European nation-statism. We have already seen how Salafism anchored in an inflated and somewhat arbitrary conception of reason and an accentuation of the collective consciousness centered around a claim of infallibility, all leading to a de facto idiosyncratic sense of sovereignty. In contrast to the modernist reason-based sovereignty which explicitly separates itself from transcendence or dismisses it within the framework of a claim of secular world view, the Salafist reason-based sovereignty *partially* separates from transcendence within the course of a de facto partial secular world view. Pragmatically, the course of foundation of the Saudi Wahhabi polity in the Najd region in AD 1744 and the formulation of the polity itself being a pragmatic differentiation of the Taymiyyan counter-traditional caliphate-less doxic ethos, bore indigenous qualities that, in our assessment, strongly corresponded to the course of foundation of modernist nation-state and its formulation. First, the Westphalian polity was incorporated within the context of liberating from the overarching authority of the Pope claiming a supreme

spiritual authority and the Emperor claiming supreme temporal authority. Correspondingly, the Saudi-Wahhabi polity was incorporated within the framework of liberating from the overarching authority of the Ottoman Sultan-caliph whose rule was underpinned by an idiosyncratic claim of possessing the highest spiritual authority and a claim of possessing the temporal authority. In both cases, the liberation or separation was premised on a protest against the spiritual authority coupled with a contention of lack of spiritual legitimacy. In contrast with the cardinal principle of Cuius region, *eius religio* of the Peace of Augsburg 1555 AD, the Saudi Wahhabi polity lived the principle that the ra'iyya must follow the ethos of the imam. The followers of madhbas and sects such as Shiites were persecuted. In contrast with the original sovereignty which the unaccountable sovereign of the Westphalian state and later the state enjoyed, the ruler of the Saudi who was a de facto unaccountable sovereign monarch who was perceived as deriving his authority from God. Second, in contrast with logic of nationalism of the Westphalian state, a defining factor of the Saudi-Wahhabi polity was the superbia-driven ethnocentric exclusivist chauvinistic racial Arabist particularism. Ottomans and other non-Arabs were sharply otherized, alienized and regarded as of subordinate to the Arab race. Another defining factor of the polity was the superbia-driven ethnocentric exclusivist chauvinistic religious nationalism. Christians were conceived of as infidels. In contrast with the Hobbesian conception of the law as the source of right and wrong, and as the means of coercing the constituency, central to the Saudi Wahhabi political system was the Taymiyyan deformational conception of the puritanized Shari'a which is reduced to the penal system which ought to be applied with severity. Finally, in contrast with the principle of popular sovereignty which became an element of the European Nation-state as explained above, the Saudi Wahhabi political system lived the conception of the sovereignty of the umma. That being said, central to the British option of empowering the Saudi was the understanding that the code of transcendental and existential representation observed by the Saudi Wahhabi alliance is devoid of the notion of the caliphate and is closer to the nation-state paradigm.

Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

An infallible, self-determining, popular sovereignty-anchored nation – an ultra-trans-territorial nationalism-based nation - an indoctrinating Gnostic ideological school of thought - a symbolic deputy of the umma - an accentuated modernized intelligentsia - an ultra mysterylessness.

Rida's consciousness ripened at a phase in which implanting influence by modernist European Imperial powers into zones living the MBO advanced into large-scale encroachment which took place within the context of the *superbia*-driven attempt to dismantle the Ottoman systems of existential and existential representation, and to replace the MBO with the modernist paradigm, and which was faced by a pursuit of liberation. European imperialism widened its policy of occupation employing the civilizing pretext or "the *mission civilisatrice* or the civilizing mission". (Zabus, 2014, p. 238). The underpinnings of the pretext was that European powers were vested with the capacity of a mandate over Arab countries which were within the Ottoman orbit in order to civilize such Arab countries through installing modernistic values, systems and institutions of governance and state building. By the end of the second decade latter quarter of the 19th century, the majority of the zones living the MBO became under the occupation of Imperialist powers. The Treaty of Sevres of August 1920 declared Hejaz an independent state, and hence the Ottoman Sultan lost the legitimacy ground of the Custodian of the two Shrines which it has employed for nearly four hundred years. Modernist Imperialist influence and the Young Turks joined hands in ousting Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r 1876-1909 AD) and replaced him with a weak Sultan-Caliph. The wave of occupation was faced by waves of liberation. The majority of the zones living the MBO saw the rise of demands of liberation from imperial encroachment but within the context of an indigenous call to live the modernist paradigm. The calls for independence were anchored to an accentuation of the human category of the "people", denoting the ruled, which emerged within a context of nationalism-driven identitarian politics and self-assertion. The "people" were conceived as the primary agent of liberation. In the Indian sub-continent,

the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885. The Congress voiced a discourse of nationalism-based independence. In the Levant, a pursuit to discharge Arab renaissance which took considerable inspiration from European renaissance gained currency. It was complemented by calls for independence and a demand for the establishment of sovereign Arab states. Abd El-Rahman Al-Kawakibi (1855-1902 AD) rose to prominence as one of the early articulators of this current. In part, the accentuation of the people took inspiration from the theoretical accentuation of the constituency within the context of the struggle over sovereignty between the sovereign ruler and the sovereign ruled which modernity produced upon installing sovereignty in the body politic upon disregarding divine sovereignty. Secondly, the accentuation of the people in the zones living the MBO took inspiration from the waves of revolutions against monarchs that appeared in modernizing European countries which was driven by the aforementioned theoretical accentuation of the constituency and which culminated in the replacement of flat monarchism with republicanism or with constitutional monarchism. So, in part, the pursuit of the colonized peoples to employ the vehicle of revolution against the colonizer to end occupation and dispossession but within the context of staying in the modernist paradigm, took inspiration from the pursuit of the constituency in modernizing European countries to employ the vehicle of revolution against privileged monarchs to end domestic dispossession but within the context of staying in the modernist paradigm. That is why many military confrontations against imperialist powers were labelled "revolutions" not "wars".

However, it important to contextulize this latter wave by recalling that it followed a different attempt to fill the power gap caused by the decline of the Ottoman center, to confront imperial penetration, and to restore the MBO, which was discharged by two Sufi leaders who asserted themselves as public trustees deputizing the Messenger. As-Sanusi introduced himself to the tribes of Barqa and they took him as a de facto leader and gradually as a senior trustee. The model which the polity lived rested on the alliance of the tribal unit of identity and the Sufi order unit of identity. As-Sanusi established a

constellation of lodges. The lodge was the main basal institution. It was multi-functional. It was used for educational and socialization purposes, socio-economic purposes and military purposes. The rationale behind the choice of the Capital and the location of the lodges was the ability to withstand attacks by Imperialist powers. As-Sanusi established a postal system and made Al-Bayda'a and Jaghbub centers of meaning. In Wahran, the tribal leaders assumed the authority of *The People who Loose and Bound* taking the constitutional step of inviting Abd El Qader Al-Jaza'eri (AD 1808-1883) ("Qader") to serve as Amir of the prospected *dawla* by virtue of a written covenant dated (AD 1833) (H 1248). Upon accepting, Qader became the official existential trustee of the newly established polity. He issued a new coin, and structured the army. Similar to the case of the polity of As-Sanusi, the constitutional model which the polity lived rested on the alliance of the tribal unit of identity and the Sufi order unit of identity. The constitutional covenant stipulated that one of the prime purposes of establishing the polity is carrying out jihad against the enemies to prevent further encroachment, to resurrect living the "Mohammadian millet", and to prevent the effects of the wave of disorder which has prevailed as a result of the demise of the Algerian government. Both leaders introduced themselves and were recognized as deputies of the Messenger. Qader held the titles Sayyed and Emir and rejected the title Sultan. As-Sanusi seems to have only held the title Sayyed. In effect, the common model which the polity lived was a materialization of Ibn Khaldun's theory that unruliness of the Arabs finds its exception in the submission to sainthood which deputizes the Messenger.

Central to the undertakings by the two Sufi Masters was the pursuit of restoring essential MBO conceptions and their mysteries, the pursuit being anchored to the maxim that the order of society was a function of the order of the soul. Both leaders were leaders in Sufi orders and were conceived by their followership as Saints. The framework of the Sufi order was vestibule channeling in the society the notion that ongoing restoration of spiritual health was a condition precedent for public trusteeship and for representation. The collective consciousness of the two bodies was engrossed by themes

of mystery including divine mysteries, Quranic mysteries, and mysteries related to the Messenger including the ahistorical presence of the Messenger, as well as mystical epistemology. Contrary to the Taymiyyan governance-caliphate related theoretical fabric, the assumption that the ruler would have to choose between the pious commander and the immoral crafty commander was not on the table in the first place.

In reacting to the above reality, a caliphate-related theoretical fabric distancing itself from the mystery was produced by Rida, such fabric emanating from a metastatic consciousness departing from the *metaxy* and heading towards the immanent pole. This fabric was expressed by Rida's corpus, his conceptual pragmatic experience, and the positions he took. His main book from which part of that fabric is to be discerned is *The Caliphate or Al-Khilafa.* The book was published in 1923, one year prior to the ousting of the last Ottoman caliph and the termination of the Ottoman caliphal seat. Rida's general thought and epistemology was communicated through the journal which he published *Al-Manar*.

The body politic to which Rida's theoretical fabric related would encompass the entirety of the Muslims peoples, who would be perceived in terms of religious and sectarian particularism according to which the umma of the believers would be vested with *a dual* sovereignty which is most visible in its subsumer, Al-Afghani-Abdu-Rida Gnostic school whose *doxic* ethos, would be the dominant ethos. Rida's theoretical fabric addressed the entirety of trans-territorial Muslims invoking their unity whether under colonial rule or not. Rida's theoretical fabric reasserted the infallibility-anchored sovereignty of the umma of the believers. (Rida, 1988, p. 21). Rida's argument was focused on underpinning the umma's infallibility by the unauthentic hadith that the umma would not unanimously agree to a deviation from which Al-Juwayni extracted the umma's immunity in spite of dismissing its authenticity. As we shall see in more details shortly, Rida's fabric vested the umma of the believers with the modernist popular sovereignty which finds its roots in modernist humanist self-determinism. That said, the body of trans-territorial believers would be living Al-Afghani's doxic ethos in which Islam

is changed into an ideology of nationalism and solidarity unifying the 'Muslim peoples' in confronting Modernist imperialism. In her book, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl Ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"* Nikki Keddie inferred that because Afghani's desire for self-strengthening outweighed his desires for reform, he

> initiated the partial transformation of Islam from a generally held religious faith into an ideology of political use in uniting Muslims against the West.

Kiddie cites Sylvia Haim in clarifying how this step positioned Islam as a peer of the then struggling ideologies, and how it entailed spreading a secularist conception of politics. According to Haim,

> What al-Afghani did was to make Islam into the mainspring of solidarity, and thus he placed it on the same footing as other solidarity-producing beliefs. His political activity and teaching combined to spread among the intellectual and official classes of Middle Eastern Islam a secularist, meliorist, and activist attitude toward politics, an attitude the presence of which was essential, before ideologies such as Arab nationalism could be accepted in any degree. It is this which makes al-Afghani so important a figure in modern Islamic politics." It is to an analysis of Afghani's use of Islam as ideology and his original contributions built up from an Islamic philosophical base that attention is now turned. (Keddie, 1983, p.35).

This solidarity moved in the direction of stripping the MBO from its universal dimension which is based on the conception that the Message was of an ecumenic nature, and of rendering it a tool of self-assertion in identitarian and particularistic politics within the context of the *superbia*-driven and *libido dominandi*-driven confrontation against European imperial powers. As Paul Salem notes,

> Islam was to be considered first and foremost a communal identity—a basis for solidarity that distinguished the conquered from the conqueror and gave the conquered the cohesion and confidence necessary for rebellion and triumph. In this pan-Islamic nationalism of his, the loyalty and energies of the people should be directed to the Ottoman state because it was the strongest and most central Islamic institution and, hence, the most able to lead the Islamic world against the West. (Salem, 1994, p. 92).

By uniting, and taking matter in their own hands, the 'Muslim peoples' would be able to end their subordination to the European imperialist powers and retrieve their lost glory. Paul Salem:

> In his public utterances, he spoke in ringing phrases of Islamic history and Islamic tradition and exhorted his fellow Muslims to rise against foreign domination and work for the unification and rejuvenation of the entire Islamic *umma*. He addressed Muslims as members of an Islamic nation and endeavored to instill in them the enthusiasm and dedication to be found in European nationalism. He warned his coreligionists that the Muslim world had fallen behind and that Muslims had to take matters into their own hands to regain the initiative and prominence they once enjoyed among the civilizations of the world. "Verily," he quoted from the Qur'an, "God does not change the condition of a people until they change their own condition" (cited in Smith 1957, SO). In his early exposure to the Indian nationalist opposition, he grew impressed with the force of nationalist sentiment. (Salem, 1994, p. 92).

The body of trans-territorial Muslims would be indoctrinated with the doxic thought of the gnostic activist philodoxic school which Rida inherited from Al-Afghani and Abdu, and which would be serving as a vehicle pulling a revolutionary emancipation from imperial encroachment, and which would be a party to a multi-dimensional dogmatomacy. The gnostic roots of the school are located in the persona of its founder, who was highly influenced by a new age like esoterism, and who relied heavily on secret work. The pens and output of the three founders of the school reflect the self-concept of *the* highest authority who spoke the final word on matters of the faith and of confronting imperialism. Employing his rhetoric and craftiness in pamphleteering in shaping "public opinion", Al-Afghani targeted the recruitment of rulers and the control of lay people. In a differentiation of the strategy of the missionaries of the doctrine of ideologized Shiism. Rida attached more importance to directing public opinion. Abandoning traditional media of transmission of knowledge, the policy of Al-Afghani and Rida relied on media that would permit controlling public opinion including pamphlets, journals, and scorching speeches. Al-Afghani's pamphlet *Treaties on Divine Decreeing and Predestination* attempted a refutation of the rejection of predestination. To his mind, an eloquent testimony to the soundness of the notion of predestination was that great leaders who

have made significant achievements such as Napoleon Bonaparte were believers in predestination. Plausibly, this statement was propelled by the desire to hint that it was to that belief in predestination that their glorious victories were indebted. Al-Afghani and Abdu transferred the modernist technique of pamphleteering employing it in revolutionizing the masses against Imperial domination. From his end, Rida advanced Al-Afghani by Issuing *Al-Manar Journal* as a main vehicle of intellectual activism to use the characterization of Paul Salem. (Salem, 1994, p. 92). It is in Al-Manar that the aforementioned supremacist conjectural discourse and criticism of Christianity was voiced within the context of the dogmatomachy exchange with some missionary circles. In large part, the dogmatomachy was plausibly underpinned by the desire to protect the collective consciousness and soul from penetration. On the inter-religious level, while the superiority of the believers is stressed, populist polemicist conjectural simplistic criticism would be central. Rida's pen and rhetoric took acute and critical theological questions from the realm of sophisticated specialization to the realm of simplistic popularization. Abstaining from delving in an analysis of the complex worldviews of the Modernist paradigm, Rida's explanation of the adoption of the modernist paradigm and the ensuing displacement of Christianity moved in the direction of diluting the status of Christianity as a framework of faith, and as one of the monotheistic faiths. As Umar Ryad explains in his study *Islamic reformism and Christianity : a critical reading of the works of Muhammad Rashid Rida and his associates (1898-1935)*, Rida's polemics provided an apologetic justification of modernity which is not regarded *chiefly* as a deformation, and coupling that apology with an inflated veneration of its technological accomplishments. In Rida's understanding,

> because Western people (especially scholars and philosophers) became skeptical about Christianity, some governments (such as in France) started to declare that their states had no official religion. (Ryad, 2009, 189).

Rida's exponentiated the contraction of the conception of Christianity as a spiritual outburst by arguing that the intellectual pedigree of the creed of trinity should be located in tritnitarian paganism. (Ryad, 2009, 189). Plausibly, Christianity is libeled within

the context of the doxic motif that the West is but in need of Islam, such motif being a differentiation of the Taymiyyan conception of the necessity to see all "the rest" converting to Islam. The polemics moved in the direction of, de facto, diluting the conception of Islam and Christianity as, to use Voeglein's terminology, "spiritual outbursts" and agents of faith, transcendence, spirituality, and mystery, that are equally attacked by the deformational Modernity. They moved in the direction of establishing Christianity as the rival of Islam, and establishing Modernity as the complementary partner of Islam. (See Ryad, 2009, p. 31).

The polities of the zones living the MBO would be articulated in accordance with the setting of modernist nation-states and would be pulled by one existentially powerful nation-state, ideally Turkey. In his 1923 book *The Caliphate* which contained his caliphate-related theoretical fabric, Rida appealed to the Turkish people to assume the status of the leading nation or the locomotive and restore the caliphate and pursue a unification of the nation. He stressed that they were the most qualified to play that role. Upon abolishing the office of the Ottoman Caliph, Rida maintained his aspiration that the caliph would be designated by existing states especially upon rearticulating politically in accordance with modernist political articulation. He advised the would-be congregants at Cairo to first identify those who loose and bound in every Islamic nation and to incorporate them into a functioning body using "known modern methods for initiating parties, associations and unions". (Kazimi, 2008, p. 9). The explicit stipulation that the existentially powerful Turkish people would qualify as the promising leading nation seems a differentiation of Al-Juwayni's implicit stipulation that the existentially powerful Nizam Al-Mulk qualifies as the promising ruler and caliph leading person.

Deriving from the sovereignty of the umma of the believers formulated by ideologized Sunnism, and from modernist secular sovereignty, parliamentarian representatives and the ulama would be conceived as enjoying the capacity of those who loose and bound, and would serve as *the* existential representative whose powers include the power of designating and ousting the caliph. The modernist concept of

popular sovereignty was transferred to the zones living the MBO by way of equalizing the indigenous concept of *the people who bound and loose* with the modernist concept of the "people" (the *umma* of the believers). According to Anthony Black,

> Rida took the view that 'all that the [European] laws possess that is good and just has long since been laid down by our sharia'. (This enabled him to decide on grounds of traditional Muslim criteria just how far he wanted to go towards popular sovereignty in the Western sense. In Kerr's words, shura (consultation) became 'the hallmark of [Rida's] political theory … in the Fields of election, constitutional interpretation, administration, and legislation. Now, as it turned out, Rida assigned all of these functions to 'the people who bind and loose. These notables or prominent citizens are not elected, just recognized. Rida equated them with 'the people (*umma*) in the sense that their choices and decisions constitute the choices and decisions of the people. It was, once again, partly by such an equivalence between a self-selected representative body and the whole community that representative constitutionalism had started in Europe. But here Rida was obviously watering down the theory of popular sovereignty as stated by Islamic modernists, presumably because of the secularising tendencies of the Turkish National Assembly. (Black, 2011, p. 326).

What should be added to Black's discerning diagnosis is that the equation between the *umma* of the believers and the representatives was only made upon the grounds of asserting the original absolute righteousness of the *umma* of the believers and hence rendering it *the* source of authorities and functions. This assertion is made through adoption of the indigenous conception of the sovereignty of the umma which is anchored to its infallibility. In any case, upon equalizing *The People who bind and loose* with the people or *umma*, *The People who bind and loose are equalized with* the *people's representatives* in the modernist nation-state. In his book *The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century*, Nurullah Ardic points to the sameness of the two categories in Rida's eyes as follows:

> Other modernists, too, constantly emphasized the limits of the caliph's authority on the grounds that he only represented "the people" as the head of the executive branch of the government, a principle that had been formalized in the constitution. The modernist response also entailed a strategic intervention into Islamic theology and law as part of what I have called "theological engineering". Redefining the key concepts of the Islamic legal and theological traditions on the

basis of the emerging exigencies of the modern historical context and using the literature in these traditions to promote their own political agenda. The way two leading modernists, Seyyid Bey and Rashid Rida, defined the Caliphate offers a good example of this intervention. While their overall argument on reviving the Caliphate was quite "Islamic," Seyyid Bey and Rashid Rida manipulated the theory of the Caliphate by positing a contractual basis for it and by inserting into it the notion of "popular sovereignty" in their discussion of the caliph's legitimacy. Seyyid Bey dismissed what I have called the traditionalist and secularist views of the Caliphate as extremist and maintained that it was no more than an executive office of the government, deriving its legitimacy from the "nation," to which it was, thus, accountable (1917: 443, 445). Similarly, Rashid Rida argued that the Caliph's legitimacy was derived from the "community," or the Muslim *umma* (1923a: 50).7 An extension of this modernist argument was that the caliph needed to be elected and — if necessary — could be deposed by the representatives of "the people," i.e., parliament members. Accordingly, virtually all modernists identified the parliament (first the Ottoman Meclis-i Mebusan, and later the Turkish Grand National Assembly) with the *Ahl al-hal wa al-'aqd* (the committee that is in charge of the election of the Caliph) in classical theory, thereby finding an Islamic equivalent to a political institution that was imported from the West. Furthermore, some modernists (e.g., Rashid Rida 1923a: 69, 141) insisted that, since its members were direct representatives of the people, the parliament, as the *Ahl al-hal wa al-'aqd*, was more important than the Caliphate itself, and that the existing parliament, as the authorized committee, had the right not only to elect or appoint the caliph, but also to depose him (pp. 21-23). Rida thus argued that the caliph was "merely a primus inter pares who must seek the advice of the representatives of the community and respect their *ijma'a*. (Soage 2008: 10). (Ardic, 2012, p. 158).

Perhaps, the Voegelinian distinction between elemental representation and existential representation allows us to see the difference between the authority of the modernist constitutional representatives, and the authority of those who loose and bound, which Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric did not appreciate. On the one hand, modernist constitutional representatives are surely elemental representatives. Regarding basis of authority, the representative derives his/her authority from the individual will of every voter, the weight of that individual will being significant. Regarding existential representativeness, with regard to the scope, the input of the member of parliament is designed to commit the state as an artificial person. Though elected by a small circle of voters, the member shall become the representative of the

nation in its entirety. The legislation which the member co-voted for obliges the state as an artificial person. With regard to efficacy, the input may only commit if certain procedural conditions were met. If the proposed legislation is outvoted, it will not pass. Politically speaking, though being a member of parliament, the ability to commit may be absent in certain situations. Hence, being elected as a parliamentary representative does not mean *ipso facto* that the member is an existential representative who is able to commit the constituency. On the other hand, the weight of the will of each member of the followership is not that significant. Being one of *those who loose and bound* means *ipso facto* that the person is able to commit a certain followership.[5] With that said, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric consisted of a differentiated version of Al-Juwayni's and Ibn Taymiyya's concepts of the sovereign *umma of the believers*, a differentiated version of the modernist concept of popular sovereignty, and a differentiated version of Al-Juwayni's stress on the power of *the people who bound and loose* as the makers of the Caliph. It is worth mentioning that the concept of popular sovereignty was first transferred by Khayruddin At-Tunisi's pursuit to make the case for parliamentary government. (Masud, Salvatore, and van Bruinessen, 2009, p. 246). Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric used this cluster in vesting sovereignty in *the people* and in establishing them as the source of the caliph's authority. That being said, although Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric vested original sovereignty in the "people", it stayed away from adopting a theology to merit that vestment as, for example, the Umayyad adopted the theology of compulsion to merit the theological legitimation of the caliph.

The caliph would be an elemental representative (symbol of unity) being installable prior to decolonization and liberation from imperial domination and prior to unification. Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric conceived of the caliph as an honorary head manifesting the unity of the trans-territorial nation. According to Black:

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[5] For further differences, see the characteristics of the people who bound and loose in Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric. (Al-Juwayni, 1979, p. 48).

in true Sunni fashion, he insisted that the Caliph is specifically not a religious leader in the sense that he cannot decide questions of Religious Law. He is a worldwide leader, but in the modern world he would not supplant existing states. He is to preside over Muslim states and Muslims living under 'foreign rule' in a kind of confederation or 'commonwealth'. So, the Caliph's political powers are also practically non-existent. (Black, 2011, p. 325).

Not only would the caliph be disentitled to take a part in legislation should he be religiously incompetent, but also should he be competent. At any rate, it remains puzzling that Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric conceives of the caliph as someone who would be lacking sufficient existential representation, and at the same time defines the caliphate as a headship of the Islamic government which was supposed *to protect* the interest of the *umma* of the believers in the worldly realm and the religious realm. There is no deputyship of the Messenger in the definition and in the pragmatic application. Successorship is implied. Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric refers to the caliphate as the greatest imamate and the commandership of the believers.

The school's epistemology which rests on a nexus of Mu'tazilite-Taymiyyan inflated neo-Salafist reason and modernist inflated rationalism and scientism would be the main element of the doxic ethos to be lived by the solidarity-oriented body of trans-territorial Muslims. In his book, *Canonical Texts. Bearers of Absolute Authority. Bible, Koran, Veda, Tipitaka: A Phenomenological Study (Currents of Encounter),* Rein Fernhout draws the contours of Rida's pursuit to read modern scientistic 'findings' in the sacred text as follows:

Rashid Rida laboured to make the miracles recorded in the Koran itself acceptable by referring to natural causes or by arguing that it was not irrational to presuppose causes of which nothing yet was known. One of the issues, still debated today, with which Rashid Rida was confronted was the phenomenon of the "scientific exegesis (al-tafsir al- ilmi) of the Koran." This exegesis was intended to show that all contemporary scientific discoveries were already implicitly predicted in the Koran. Rashid Rida opposed this 'scientific exegesis',"' but nonetheless approximated it here and there. At the least, over against the accusations of atheists and Christian missionaries, he fervently defended the idea that there could be no contradiction between the Koran and the established results of modern science. He went further than this, however, in holding that

things such as an original nebula and a round earth were already indicated in the Koran.' (Fernhout, 1994, p. 221).

It should be remembered that Rida's attempt to locate the answers of modernist scientism in the sacred text took direct inspiration from Al-Afghani who

while travelling the Islamic realm calling for reform to defend against and drive away the West, was simultaneously an admirer of Western rationalism, technology and scientific advances … . (Turner, 2014, p. 114).

For Al-Afghani, "Islam and Western rationalism were not incompatible." (Turner, 2014, p. 114). Also, Rida's attempt to locate the answers of modernist scientism in the sacred text find their roots in Abdu's rationalism and fascination for modernist scientism. Abdu's book *Islam the Religion of Science and Civility* attempted to subtly depict the modernistic centrality of reason and scientism as quintessential tenets of the MBO. The Book does not offer an intellectual discussion of the epistemological worldviews of modernity including Cartesian dualism or Baconian positivism or Kantian rationalism. Science in the modernistic sense of the term is an arbiter of truth. Scientism and modernist sciences became the perfect benchmark, and the Quran became in need of being justified in light of scientism and the finding of modernity's sciences.

The body of trans-territorial Muslims would be applying an idiosyncratic historiogenetic Salafism which a differentiation of the Taymiyyan historigenetic Salafism which, like Ridas' epistemology, would be primarily employed to serve the purpose of reading the "values of modernism into the original sources of Islam". (Abou El Fadl, 2005, p. 77). The school employed the Taymiyyan constructed human category of the first three generations as the unified origin of the *umma* of the believers, and the Taymiyyan utopianization of that human category and the call to replay it, and the disregard of subsequent historical epochs that are not seen as a part of living history. Whereas the Taymiyyan Salafism-based ijtihad was actually geared to permit overstepping the yield of traditional *ulama* within the context of issuing irregular rulings and fatwas, the *ijtihad* of Rida's school was a vehicle for overstepping the yield of traditional *ulama*, but within the

context of filling MBO themes with modernist content. For Al-Afghani, as Turner indicates,

> Ijtihad is necessary, he argues, to deal with the contemporary crisis of the decline in prosperity and power of the Islamic civilization. (Turner, 2014, p. 114).

Turner explains the specific utility of that ijtihad as follows:

> It was possible to selectively incorporate Western concepts," while seeking to reform the *umma* by looking through the Salafist lens back to the time of the Prophet for guidance and employing ijtihad to adapt these teachings to modern times. Al-Afghani's effort was to bridge the gap between the outright secular modernist and the traditionalist, to save the Islamic world from its relegated position as a civilization which was no longer influential in the way it had previously been78. (Turner, 2014, p. 114).

That being said, the above should have clarified how Rida's theoretical fabric was underpinned by *ultra mysterylessness*, hence constituting an ascending differentiation of the theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni's and Ibn Taymiyya. It is underpinned by indigenous mysterylessness emanating from the accentuation of the umma and the ensuing dilution of the recognition of transcendence and of divine intervention. It also took inspiration from modernist mysterylessness. Hence, although the umma is accentuated it is accentuated within a context of profanes. The ascension of the umma would be a rational process. The caliph, like the umma, is distanced from transcendence. Avoided was the discussion of the concept of God's caliph, the notion of theological legitimation in previous caliphate-related theoretical fabric, and the mystery of the creation-related caliphate of humanity. For Rida, politics would be a matter of the profane world and a matter distanced from transcendence, hence a normal extension of politics in the eyes of the founder of the school, Al-Afghani, whose

> political activity and teaching combined to spread among the intellectual and official classes of Middle Eastern Islam a secularist, meliorist, and activist attitude toward politics. (Kiddie, 1983, p. 53).

The surrounding theology is limited to the favor of an overemphasis of reason. Mystery is obscured by the veneration of the material explanations of naturalist modernist science and scientific achievements.

When carefully examined, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric and its avoidance of the mystery were tools of self-empowerment enabling an independence from imperial colonialism. Yet, that pursuit of independence should be sought in parallel with widening the pursuit to live Modernism. This independence ought to be pursued by a unified accentuated largely self-determining trans-territorial *umma* of believers living the Afghani-Abdu-Rida's Gnostic neo-Salafist modernist doxic ethos and its version of nationalism, according to which Islam is changed into a unifying ideology of solidarity employed in undoing imperial encroachment. In pursuing this mission, that *umma* of the believers ought to be led by an existentially powerful *nation/people* articulated in a modernist state such as the Turkish people.

In a differentiation of the Taymiyyan deformation, a main element of Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric was the dilution of the authorities of other actors to the favor of self-empowerment and establishing the neo-Salafist doxic ethos as the supreme reference. As the case with previous theoretical fabrics that were underpinned by the primacy of reason over revelation, Rida's conception of the supremacy of reason moved in the direction of contracting the authority of the Quran and of the Messenger. As the case with the Taymiyyan ideological and theoretical fabric, Rida's Salafism headed in the direction of turning around the authority of traditional *ulama*. In his book *Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order*, John Turner clarified how Al-Afghani's historiogenetic Salafist ijtihad of which Rida's was a differentiation headed in the direction of turning around the authority of traditional *ulama*,

> Al-Afghani's call for ijtihad was a dynamic departure from the teachings of the traditional religious elite, and represented a direct challenge to their ecumenical authority. (Turner, 2014, p. 114).

As established in In *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates*, the neo Salafi

movement led by Rida

> sought to reform and modernise existing Muslim institutions and practices in the
> light of what they saw as the unadulterated teachings of the Islamic foundational
> texts ….

which

> meant, inter alia, denying the authority of the medieval schools of law and
> resorting to tinned not only to address new legal problems but also to reopen
> those the earlier jurists had supposedly settled. (Masud Salvatore and van
> Bruinessen, 2009, p. 232).

Besides, Rida's historiogenetic Salafism and the ensuing deculturation and scotosis, and

the ideological indoctrination, headed in the direction of disempowering the ra'iyya. The

disempowerment of the ra'iyya was also caused by the modernist element which Al-

Afghani's and Rida's synergized with their differentiated Salafism, and which stirred

people to "overcome" what he perceived as "the lethargy of traditional Islamic moeurs".

(Black, 2011, p. 295). Finally, the stipulation that the caliph's representation would be

mainly elemental not mainly existential headed in the direction of minimizing the

authority of the prospected caliph.

Rida's doxic discourse on Christianity was mainly a product of the anxiety

resulting from imperialism-related assault of Islam, and moved in the direction of

disempowering imperialism and empowering "the Muslim umma". "Driven by this spirit

of despair" (Ryad, 2009, p. 309),

> Characteristic of his style was his bemoaning of the sad state of Muslims which
> made it possible for the opponents of Islam to deprecate it in its own home.
> Muslims had become powerless, so that Europeans lorded over them
> everywhere.7 Riḍā's anti-Christian polemics involved his critique of their attempts
> to win over Muslim' souls' as well. (Ryad, 2009, p. 310).

Rida's pen was provoked by Christian missionary writings on Islam that "tried to ridicule

Islam and relate the socio-political failure among Muslims to the tenets of Islam." (Ryad,

2009, p. 309). Henceforth, Rida's anti-Christian polemics were designed to brace up an

umma which has fallen prey to imperialism by making it believe that it, together with its faith, are inherently superior to the faith of the victimizer, the two faiths being conceived as rivals. On the flip side, it was designed to rid imperialism of the tool which it employed, according to Rida, "in subduing Islam." As Ryad rightly notes,

> Arslān's contributions in Riḍā's journal on the Christian theological developments in Europe expressed an integral part of their com-mon belief in pan-Islamism and their broad efforts of anti-imperialism. (Ryad, 2009, p. 309).

The second corner stone of Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric was the empowerment of the trans-territorial body of believers which was hoped to be living the neo-Salafist modernist doxic ethos from which Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric emanated. Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric invoked the unity of the entirety of trans-territorial body of the believers so as to generate the utmost steam and power possible in combating European imperial colonialism and pursuing own imperialism. Further, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric continued Afghani's pursuit of changing faith into an ideology which was in itself an empowerment mechanism. One of the conditions in which "ideology becomes important" is "when other means of securing control, such as coercive force, ties of family or sect and distribution of wealth, are weakened". (Black, 2011, p. 306). The end of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century were periods in which imperial invasion and vicissitudes and indigenous modernization resulted in the decline of natural and traditional socio-economic formations and the ensuing alienation of individuals. As mentioned earlier, the imperial influence particularly worked on dismantling traditional socio-economic formations. Then, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric subtly accentuated the aggregate trans-territorial body of the believers by way of synergizing the enshrinment of its infallibility through citing the aforementioned hadith, with awarding it a modern sovereignty by way of installing signifiers of the Modernist nation-state to use Andrea Mura's terminology. To enable the trans-territorial *umma* of believers to live its sovereignty and unite, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric specifically selected the method of naming the caliph which was based on the decision by the by *those who loose*

and bound who would manifested the aggregate will. Given the imperial dominance which European imperialist nation-states achieved as of being articulated as a nation-state, the nation-state model was sought as a power vehicle which was hoped to eliminate the structural weakness which have accrued over a long period. The stipulation that the caliph's representation would be mainly elemental not mainly existential, and that the caliph would not interfere in legislation were two step in the pursuit to model after the modernist nation-state through a subtle, yet partial, installation of the principle of the separation between 'state' and "religion" in a way which would placate those who would not concur. Now, given the fact that the Turkish people was one of the peoples who completed the process of creating a nation-state, and was militarily one of the strongest powers in the zones living the MBO, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric appealed to it to assume leadership. This subtle partial secularization in the political sphere is analogous to the aforementioned subtle partial secularization in the theological realm by which Al-Afghani's and Abdu's outlook was marked.

As a differentiation of the Taymiyyan case, the third corner stone of Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric was an extremely subtle empowerment of the self, the self here being the victim of imperialism, against the Modernist European imperialism, the element of empowerment being a counter claim of utopianism. The utopianization of the Salaf may also be construed as an attempt to undo the Modernist ownership of the discourse of utopianism, and pursue a counter-hegemonic pronouncement of civilizational utopianism. It is crucial to note that Rida's caliphate caliphate-related theoretical fabric and discourse acquired definite shape at the same moment which saw the utopian discourse of Modern European Imperialism reaching its acme. By the end of the second decade and the beginning of the third decade of the 20th century, the European powers intensified their employment of the civilizing pretext which originated from a utopianization of the Modernist civilization. After using "the *mission civilisatrice* or the civilizing mission" (Zabus, 2014, p. 238) as a tool of ethical legitimation throughout the 19th century, they began to use it as a tool of international

legislation. As frameworks regulating imperial occupation, the mandates of the League of Nations stipulated that the driver of the mandate was to allow civilized countries to civilize the uncivilized occupied countries.

That being said, why did Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric generally avoid treating the question of mystery? Why did it avoid to even discuss or refute the mystery distorting conceptions of previous theoretical fabrics including, for example, the notion of elevating the caliph to the dignity of being a constituent of a majestic framework of mystery? As hinted above, the consciousness of the caliphate-related theoretical fabric formulator was overwhelmed by the conviction that the best way to reverse imperial encroachment and pursue own imperialization would be to conjure the power of the masses of the total nation which was hoped to be living the modernist neo-Salafist doxic ethos, and in which each nation would be articulated as a nation-state. The consciousness of the caliphate-related theoretical fabric formulator was anxious to achieve an efficient mobilization of the masses which it addressed. It was anxious to resuscitate the common consciousness's self-confidence, to install in it a sense of superiority, and install in it the conviction that reversing imperial encroachment was an intelligible and achievable process. It was anxious to see the masses expeditiously acting and implementing. A state of uncertainty amongst many circles was one of the corollaries of the outburst of modernist European imperial encroachment and the dazzling modernist material achievements. Possibly, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric found it generally distracting and confusing, and hence disempowering, to touch on conceptions of mystery at a time when the state of the conceived umma is at the verge of total collapse. Particularly, Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric may have found that reminding the common consciousness that the Caliph was conceived as a constituent of majestic framework of mystery may backfire on the attempt of Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric to install the conception that the caliph should be a figurehead with very limited authorities. It would be challenging to digest that a caliph who was claimed by different actors to be "God's deputy" for a long time should be

treated as a ceremonial symbolic figurehead. To this we should add that reminding that the caliph enjoyed was conceived as a constituent of majestic framework of mystery would annoy the accentuation of the nation and its feeling of the superiority which Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric wanted to implant in it.

Al-Banna's caliphate-related theoretical fabric:

An infallible, self-determining, popular sovereignty-anchored nation - a light trans-territorial nationalism-based nation - a subsuming Gnostic totalitarian political religionist *jama'a*/brotherhood - a totalitarian deputy of the umma - accentuated modern activists - an ultra mysterylessness

Al-Banna's consciousness developed during the years that followed the completion of the dismantling by imperial powers and voluntarily modernizing indigenous forces of the Ottoman Sultanate and Ottoman caliphate. This period bore witness to attempt at reinstituting the caliphal seat, and the imperial strategy of preempting the restitution of the caliphal seat. It bore witness to the continuation of the pursuit of replacing the MBO with the Modernist paradigm and to the heightening of pursuits of political independence. The Treaty of Sevres of August 1920 declared Hejaz an independent state, and hence the Ottoman Sultan became no longer able to use the Custodianship of the two Shrines as an instrument of legitimation having used it for nearly four hundred years. In October 1923, Turkey became a republic upon a declaration by the National Assembly. A constitutional theoretical 'study' with a jurisprudential flavor was prepared under Seyyid Bey (d. AD 1925) under the title *Hilafet ve Hakimiyet i Milliye (The Caliphate and National Sovereignty)*. The study argued that the Caliphate is essentially a legal, not a canonically prescribed religious system of governance which those who loose and bound instituted and that would not suit today's world. On March 3rd 1924 the Turkish Parliament deposed the Caliphate after holding a long session in which it entertained the speech by a member in which he established the theoretical grounds of 'terminating the caliphate'. Different attempts at restituting the caliphal seat shortly began to take root, some of them being anchored in the conviction that the main criterion of the selection of the new caliph would be a strong nation enjoying strong systems of transcendental representation and existential representation. Some of the opinions voiced in the General Caliphate Congress which was held in 1925 AD in Cairo to look into the matter of designating a caliph testify to the end of the

mindset which conceived the incumbent of the Caliph position would be a figurehead of a dynasty. They testify to the emergence of the mindset which conceived the caliph as a leader or a representative of a nation articulating as a modern nation-state. As Kramer illustrates,

> Shaykh Muhammad Faraj al-Minyawi, the principal signatory of the solicitation, was the journal's editor, and his editorial line exactly reflected that of his letter. A caliphate established in Mecca, among the barren rocks and amassed sands of the desert, would be an unstable caliphate parting at the seams. The Bedouin would plunder its strength and undermine its foundations. Egypt at present is more independent than others, better fortified against the raids of Beduin (*al-a'rab*), and freer than any Muslim land in the East. (Kramer, 1986, p. 88-89).

Shaykh Dijwi argued that whereas Egypt enjoys the advantages of location and progress, the fact that its legal order was infected by the tenets of the Modernism preclude designating it as the seat of the Caliphate. Kramer cited Dijwi saying that

> Egypt as a geographic and cultural entity was certainly the Muslim land most worthy of the caliphate, wrote Shaykh Dijwi and his associates in a manifesto, but the "legal order in our country is invalid." The Afghans, who maintained the holy law of Islam, were "the single community to preserve the principles of their religion," and had succeeded the Turks to Muslim primacy. (Kramer, 1986, p. 90).

> If Afghanistan had what Egypt has, in geographic location and situation at the meeting point of east and west, and scientific and economic centrality, the Muslims from one corner of the world to another would be stirred to recognize its amir as caliph. (Kramer, 1986, p. 90).

The British Imperial decision curbed the claim by Sharif Al-Husayn Ibn Ali, the Sharif and Emir of Mecca (AD 1908–1924), King of Hejaz (AD 1916-1924), and Sultan of the Arabs (AD 1916-1918) to the position of caliph in March 1924 AD which he maintained till December 19th 1925. Rather, it induced the Sultan of Najd, Abd El-Aziz to seize the Hejaz recognizing him as King of Najd and Hejaz (AD 1926-1932) and later as King of Saudi Arabia (AD 1932-53).

> Ibn Saud publicly condemned Hussein's "greedy assumption of the Khalifate" and openly sided with Egyptian and Indian Musalmans that the Khalifate question should be decided by a Congress thoroughly representative of Islam. (Khan, 2007, p. 9).

It is not known whether his public siding with the Indian pan-Islamists was purely cynical or due to genuine religious indignation. Paris argues that Ibn Saud's Wahhabi ideology had no room for a caliph of any stripe and that such alliances with Indian Khilafatists were nothing more than a disingenuous ploy for external support. (Khan, 2007, p. 9).

Likewise, the British Imperial decision curbed the attempts of King Fouad I of Egypt (r AD 1917-1936) to induce the *ulama* of Al-Azhar to designate him Caliph.

On his part, Al-Banna had aspirations of glory-driven nationalism-based imperialism. Those aspirations are visible in his foundational Letter Towards the Light, where he lays his definition, of the homeland or watan of the Muslim being inclusive of

The immediate country.

Other Muslim countries.

the first Islamic empire that the ancestors founded with their precious blood and raised on it the banner of God, and in which their remnants still utter the distinction and glory they enjoyed.

Then, the homeland of the Muslim extends to include the entire world. Have you not heard God's words: and fight them so that there would not be fitna, and so that all submission/religion to God. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 71).

Al-Banna's *libido-dominandi*-based and glory-driven imperial aspirations is seen in the emphasis on the opportunity for nations to rise and gain power, and the ensuing emphasis on experiences of nations in history which rose under the leadership of great men, of which the Muslim nation is one example. In his Letter entitled The Brother's stance toward European Countries

Time will yield numerous extremely important events, and there will be opportunities for great actions, and the world is awaiting your da'wa, the da'wa of righteousness and winning and peace to rid it from its pain, and it is your turn to lead the naitons and to have sovereignty over peoples.[6] (Banna, 2002, p.204).

In reacting to the above reality, a caliphate-related theoretical fabric distancing itself from the mystery was produced by Al-Banna, such fabric being, as shall be explicated, emanating from a metastatic consciousness departing from the *metaxy* and

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[6] Translated by the dissertation writer.

heading towards the immanent pole. This fabric was expressed by Al-Banna's corpus, his conceptual pragmatic experience, and the positions he took. The main source from which an essential part of that fabric is to be discerned is Al-Banna's Letters. The Letters were composed as of 1924 till the year 1949.

The body politic to which Al-Banna's theoretical fabric related would encompass the entirety of the Muslims peoples, who would be perceived in terms of an exclusionist religious nationalism according to which the umma of the believers would be vested with *a dual* sovereignty which is most visible in its subsumer, the *jama'a*/brotherhood whose political religion, deriving from Al-Afghani's doxic ethos, would be the dominant ethos, and would be perceived in terms of an exclusionist ethno-nationalism. As a differentiation of Rida's theoretical fabric, Al-Banna's theoretical fabric addressed the entirety of trans-territorial Muslims invoking their unity whether under colonial rule or not. Al-Banna's theoretical fabric vested the umma of the believers with more than one sovereignty. As a differentiation of Rida, it vested it with the modernist popular sovereignty which finds its roots in modernist humanist self-determinism. It also vested it with the modernist autonomy-underpinned humanist sovereignty which is also grounded in modernist self-determinism. We find this sovereignty embedded in altering the MBO conception of reform by arguing that it is the umma, like other nations, who would be able to *autonomously* lift itself from a state of decay and enter into a "renaissance". (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 126). In Al-Banna's theoretical fabric, the infallibility-based sovereignty which Rida's fabric vested the umma of the believers with advanced into an ascending differentiation. The theoretical fabric of Al-Banna underpinned the infallibility of the umma of the believers by the unauthentic hadiths stipulating that whoever parted from the *jama'a* of the believers had be killed. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 231). That being the case, the body of trans-territorial believers would be living Al-Afghani's doxic ethos. On the inter-religious level, Al-Banna's discourse constructed an anecdote resting on an imaginary congenital existential dichotomization and enmity between the faith and the other two monotheistic faiths. In that narrative, after the "Quranic principles" had

"knocked down the hallucinating religion of polytheism having expelled it from the Arabian peninsula and Persia, it chased sneaky Judaism Knocking out its religious and political dominion, and later wrestled with Christianity. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 142. In the narrative, "*The Islamic State*" was the dominant state which was capable to globalize the Arabic language, culture and habits. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 142, 143). It is crucial to see how grouping the other two monotheistic faiths with polytheism constitutes a glaring differentiation particularly of the discourse of Al-Mawardi, Al-Juwaini, Ibn Taymiyya, and how the construction of the relation of enmity between the faith and the two monotheistic faiths constitutes a blatant differentiation particularly of the discourse of Al-Juwaini and Ibn Taymiyya. On a second level, within the context of a multi-front dogmatomacy, and coercive spreading of its dogma, and orchestrating a libido dominandi - based doxic exclusion of advocates of different dogmas, Al-Banna's Gnostic ingurgitating *jama'a* would be the dominant body and shaper of consciousness, in varying degrees, in the conceived local nation, the trans-territorial nation and the body politic. The *jama'a* lived a syncretic multifactorial Gnosticism whose etiology was influenced by indigenous and external strains of Gnosticism. Al-Banna named his Brotherhood *jama'at al-Ikhwan al-muslimeen*, the term *jama'a* being pragmatically used to denote the body of true believers. Al-Banna characterized the *jama'a* as a totalitarian and an all-encompassing body which actually *is* there to be all public bodies and to perform all public functions at once. Al-Banna identified the Brotherhood as a "Total Thing" performing all the functions of living and sustaining the faith.

> Banna defined for the members the scope of the movement of which they were a part: 'The idea of the Muslim Brothers includes in it all categories of reform'; in specific terms he defined the movement as 'a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea'. (Michel, 1993, p.14).

In the founder's and the followership's self-concept, the *jama'a* was equated with authentic religion and was perfect. In a differentiation of ideologized Shiism and at the same time the Taymiyyan *jama'a*, Al-Banna's *jama'a* was anchored to the constructed

image of the perfect guide topping the group of the elects or the body of true believers. (Al-Banna, 2002, 311-313). The founder was also awarded the title "imam" and after his death. He was constructed as infallible. His Treaties and Memoirs, together with the writings of major leaders of the *jama'a*, would become an

> authentic formulation of truth that would make recourse to previous literature unnecessary. (Henningsen, 2000, p. 201).

Multiple sources connected the policy of assassination to the policy of the Qarmats. That being the case, in Al-Banna, in his thought and in his *jama'a*, the notion of Gnosticism reached its ultimate fruition. Accordingly, the *jama'a* was a differentiation of the Gnosticism of Al-Afghani and his school, of Ibn Taymiyya and his *jama'a*, of ideologized Shiism, of modernist puritan brotherhoods, and of twentieth century modernist totalitarian parties. Al-Banna's syncretic *superbia*-based political religion would be the primary ethos to be lived by the *jama'a*, and on a secondary degree by the local nation, the trans-territorial nation and the entire body politic. Rooted in a dichotomization of "us and them", Al-Banna's political religion constructed the Messenger's persona as "our leader", and the Quran as "our constitution", both slogans being raised within the context of the confrontation with colonialism. The bond of the brotherhood in the *jama'a* reigned supreme over all other bonds including the bond of the brotherhood in faith. It was given the name "brotherhood in God". The smallest unit of the Brotherhood was named "family" or *usra*. (See Michel, 1993, p. 32). In formulating the system of symbolism of the *jama'a*, Al-Banna took significant inspiration from modernist totalitarian parties, which is discernable in the rituals of taking the oath of membership and the dress code. In part, the founder positioned the *jama'a* within the arena of political parties struggling with Al-Wafd, Young Egypt and the communist party. It is good to remember that the decades of the thirties and the forties were par *excellence* the decades of ideological modernist totalitarian parties. During those two decades, multiple modernist totalitarian parties managed to seize power and control the state in the East (Maoism) and the West (Nazism and Fascism). A prime ultimate mission of Al-Banna's

political religion was the realization of a *libido-dominandi*-based "Mastership of the world" or *ustathiyyat al-alam*. In the main, Al-Banna's political religion was an advancement into differentiation of the largely political usage by Al-Afghani of the faith, and of modernist totalitarian parties. Voegelin conceived of the 20th century totalitarianism as "a journey's end of the Gnostic search for a civil theology". (Henningsen, 2000, p. 221). On a third level, the unity and rise of the trans-territorial nation and the local nation would also be paralleled by a general less stressed unification of the Arab countries and within the context of the supremacy of Muslim Arabs over other Muslims. Al-Banna's discourse stressed that Arab unity was integral "to the restitution of Islam and the establishment of its 'state' and strengthening its dominion". (Al-Banna). "Should the Arab become humiliated, Islam would be humiliated, and Islam would not rise without the unity of the word of the Arab nations and its renaissance." (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 123). Al-Banna's ideological discourse assessed that the Arab tongue allowed Arabs alone to taste the essence of the religion. Should Arabism be sought to revive *jahili* costumes that vanished and to use its national claim to dissolve the bond of Islam, it is objectionable. According to Al-Banna, the crisis of Islam is

> the transfer of authority to non-Arabs: Persians at one time, the Mamluks, Turks, and others at another time who had never had a taste of genuine Islam, and whose hearts had never been illuminated with the light of the Qur'an because of the difficulty they encountered in trying to grasp its concepts, even though they read the Words of Allah. (Mura, 2012, p. 77).

Making the case for an Arab original superiority seems to be a differentiation of the exclusionist *racial* Arabist nationalism of the Umayyads. As seen above, integral to Al-Banna's discourse was an exceptional fascination for the Umayyad reign as the first imperial reign. Besides, the unity and rise of the trans-territorial nation and the local nation would be paralleled by a general less stressed rise of the 'East'/'Orient' against Modernist Europeanism of the 'Occident'. Al-Banna's ideological discourse consisted of a discourse of Occidentalism which was but an advancement into differentiation of the exclusionist *civilizational* nationalism of modernity. The discourse reduced European

countries to some of what the Orientalist discourse has reduced the East to, namely lust and leisureliness. According to that Occidentalism discourse, "the East would rise up and compete with the nations which have stolen its rights and oppressed its people." (Mura, 2012, p. 81).

The liberation and installation of the Islamic order or an-nizam al-islami in the trans-territorial nation would be inaugurated by the local nation (Egypt) which would be expected to act as a locomotive. (Mura, 2012, p. 75-77). In a differentiation of the superbia-based local nationalist nationalism of Modernism, Al-Banna's discourse applied modernist signifiers in speaking of the Egyptian nation. It called for

> reforming the government so that it may become a truly Islamic government, performing as a servant to the nation in the interest of the people. (Mura, 2012, p. 78).

In Mura's assessment, the notion of serving the interest of the people finds part of its intellectual pedigree in the principle of maslaha or "common good" which emerged in indigenous jurisprudence. In broad strokes, jurists used the general principle that whatever leads to the achievement of a permissible common good is permissible. Jurists used this principle to establish the compliance with the *shari'a* of novel happenings in relation to which there was no clear canonical stipulation. According to Mura, Abdu heavily employed the principle in establishing the permissibility of modernistic concepts. The other part of the intellectual pedigree was the liberal concept of 'public interest' or general welfare. Mura:

> Al-Banna's focus on 'the interest of the people' came to sanction these ongoing cultural transformations, bringing the Islamic notion of 'common good'—which had to maintain some moral and theological
> characterization as expression of the will of God-close to the liberal concept of 'public interest' or general welfare, to use Robert Mitchell's translation of this term. (Mura, 2012, p. 78).

Mura inferred from Al-Banna's usage of that employment of the concept of the people being a signifier of the modern nation-state that

It is not God or *shari'a*h that defines the ultimate 'interest' of which the Islamic government is an expression, but 'the people', here incarnating the locus of sovereignty and the space of public interest. (Mura, 2012, 78).

Al-Banna's discourse assigned the greatest priority to liberating and establishing the 'Islamic political order or 'An-Nizam Islami' in Egypt. Giving primacy to local nationalism over trans-territorial nationalism constituted a technical diversion from Rida's caliphate-related theoretical fabric. Nonetheless, Al-Banna's local nationalism was distinguishable from the local nationalism of other wings in Egyptian politics that called for centering on the Pharaonic identity. Be that as it may, giving the option of Islamism in Egypt first priority, Islamism being conceived as an ideology or a doxic ethos, and giving Islamism in the rest of the countries in which the trans-territorial umma of the believers lives, is analogous to the concomitant strategy by Stalin of embracing the option of socialism in one country.[7]

Al-Banna's modernist neo-Salafist doxic ethos would be the main ethos of the local nation, the trans-territorial (Pan-Islamic) nation, and the entire body politic. Al-Banna's treaties applied the Salafist principles of dealing with the Quran especially the abandonment of mandatory thematic and order-related contextualization required from the view of the science of the Fundamental Jurisprudential Methodologies or *usul al-fiqh* and the citation of individual verses such as the case of the verse of fighting. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 71). The treaties also applied the Salafist historiogenetic conduct of stressing utopian conjectures regarding the constructed human category of the salaf, as well as conjectures regarding the contemporary *umma* of the believers to the detriment of the middle period of thirteen centuries which is nearly dead to use Voegelin's terminology. In his book, *Many faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, Mohammad Ayoob contends that

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[7] For more on the strategy of Socialism in one country, see E. H. Carr's book *A History of Soviet Russia: Socialism in One Country, 1924-26* Pt.3 (Pelican). Penguin Books Ltd. 1970.

> Hasan contrasted the ulama of early Islam—who, according to al-Banna, challenged their caliphs, rulers, and governors without fear—to the weakened ulama of his time, who were preoccupied with ingratiating themselves with government authorities. (Ayoob, 2009, p. 29).

Within the context of demonstrating some of the losses that Muslims suffered as of the termination of the Ottoman caliphate, the Treaties included the conjecture and generalization that the caliph in the past played the role of the arbiter and settler of disputes. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 29). Al-Banna's ideological discourse took the Salafist historiogenetic stance of abandoning traditional epistemic heritage, abandoning traditional regimented frameworks of jurisprudential qualification, and issuing an all-out condemnation of madhabs. Such a sweeping condemnation was glued with a condemnation of imitation or *taqlid* in jurisprudence, with a stress on the need for *ijtihad*, and was glued with an advancement of the indoctrinational pamphletism of Ibn Taymiyya's and Al-Afghani. Al-Banna's Salafism constituted a differentiation of Ibn Taymiyya's multiple utopianization. That multiple utopianization included the utopianization of the constructed 'first generation'. It included the utopianization of the current generation living in the same way of the utopianized 'first generation. Finally, it included the utopianization of the prospected eventual state following the establishment of the international prominence (Mura, 2012, p. 78), dominance, and mastery of the world. To those utopian conceptions we should add the utopianization of the first empire which is alluded to in this quotations which the prospected mastery of the world should be a reproduction of. With that said, in addition to this thorough application of the Taymiyyan Salafism, Al-Banna's foundational treaties stressed that the *jama'a* was essentially a Salafist *dawa*.

The local body politic, and every body politic in which the components of the trans-territorial nation exist, would be articulated as a modernist state. The aforementioned modernist signifier of "the people" was complemented by the modernist signifiers of "constitutionalism", and of "separation of authorities". In a differentiation of the pursuit by the Afghani-Abdu-Rida school to read the "values of modernism into the

original sources of Islam" (Abou El Fadl, 2005, p. 77) Al-Banna held that Modernistic constitutionalism fulfils the essence of the Islamic conception of governance, as he did in his foundational Letter of the Fifth Conference held in 1939. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 232). Also, Al-Banna complemented his stress on the signifier of "the people" with stressing other signifiers of the modernist nation-state such as 'national greatness', 'militarism', 'public health', 'science', 'economics', etc… . (Mura, 2012, p. 75). The hoped for 'Islamic state' is conceived in utopian terms. This conception seems as a differentiation of the conception by the imamate/caliphate-related theoretical fabric produced by Ideologized Shiism and the immanantization of the eschaton in relation to the return of the imam.

The local body politic, and every body politic in which the components of the trans-territorial nation exist would be governed by the *Shari'a* conceived in accordance with the Banna-Taymiyyan Salafist legalistic puritanism. According to Al-Banna,

> Every nation has a set of laws in which the people partake their ruling. These sets of laws must be derived from the proscriptions of the Islamic Sharee'ah (drawn from the Noble Qur'an, and in accordance with the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence). The Islamic Sharee'ah and the decisions of the Islamic jurists are completely sufficient, supply every need, and cover every contingency, and they produce the most excellent results and the most blessed fruits.48

In the view of Andrea Mura, the preaching of the rule of the *Shari'a* in Al-Banna's discourse is anchored to, in Voegelinian terms, an escape from the metaxy and movement towards union with the immanent pole. Mura:

> while acknowledging the transcendent power of God in principle, al-Banna's transcendent advocacy was shadowed on a practical level by the emphasis he put on the immanent ability of jurists' 'decisions' to 'cover every contingency'. (Mura, 2012, p. 71).

In a differentiation of the Mu'tazilites and Ibn Taymiyya's discourse, the *prime* rationale behind the existence of rulership is the need for the enforcement of the laws and penalties. What makes the government truly Islamic in Al-Banna's caliphate-related theoretical fabric is the enforcement of the rules and teachings of Islam. According to Al-Banna

> By Islamic government I mean a government whose officers are Muslims who perform the obligatory duties of Islam, who do not make public their disobedience, and who enforce the rules and teachings of Islam. (Mura, 2012, p. 78).

The emphasis on the condition that the governing officers must be Muslims came within a context in which the appointment of Christians in successive Egyptian governments became a common practice. This emphasis appears as a differentiation of Al-Juwayni's exclusionist religious particularism. It should be clear that in essence, what is meant by enforcement of the rules and teachings of Islam is the enforcement of the interpretation of Al-Banna's *jama'a*/brotherhood of the rules and teachings of Islam. As Oliver Roy notes,

> certainly, too, the MB has also always believed state power to be the best tool for "re-Islamizing" society and thus has been striving to arrive at the helm of the state. (Diamond and Plattner, 2014, p. 39).

As established earlier, rendering the enjoinment of good and the forbidden of evil and the enforcement of religious penalties *the* axial concern and function of the government constituted the exact reversal of the Voegelinian principle of the primacy of the order of the soul over the order of the society which, as indicated earlier, found its materialization in the period of revelation. Plausibly, the aggrandizement and centralization of the principle of the injunction of evil and commanding of good which constitutes the main thread to which all the elements of the theoretical fabrics are tied may qualify as an *ascending* differentiation of the Taymiyyan and the Mu'tazilites' puritanism and strictness and their aggrandizement of that principle. The caliphate would be a symbol of unity and world prominence, and installable after liberation and unification. Al-Banna made his objective

> rebuilding the international prominence of the Islamic *Umma* by liberating its lands […] until once again the long awaited unity and the lost *Khilafah* is returned. (Mura, 2012, p. 78).

Thus, the caliphate did not mean an original permanent condition of deputyship of the Messenger. Rather,

> The caliphate is the sign of Islamic unity, and the manifestation of the connection between the Islamic peoples, and an Islamic symbol. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 194).

A set of measures must precede the reinstatement of the caliphal seat. Main amongst those is

> establishing a full cultural and social and economic cooperation between all Islamic peoples, followed by the formation of alliances and treaties, and by holding congregations and conferences that should be attended by representatives of those countries … Then comes the step of the formation of the Islamic League of Nations, so that when all the above is fulfilled, it would yield agreeing on the imam who would be the bedrock and the shadow of God on earth. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 194, 195).

In this quote we find Al-Banna reiterating the greater part of the conceptualization of the caliphate by Rashid Rida published in 1922, and which was essentially echoed a few years later by Abdel Razzaq As-Sanhuri in his book *The Fiqh of the Caliphate and its development to become an Oriental League of Nations,* which was based on his doctoral thesis (2008). The main difference is the accentuation of the imam which should be understood in light of the following paragraph, not as an expression of a transcendentally-gravitated metastatic consciousness as it would seem *prima fascia*.

The ruler of the body politic would derive from the sovereignty of the umma of the believers and from modernist secular sovereignty, and would be a "guiding imam", and subsequently a caliph, who would attempt at seizing the lion's share of the sovereignty of the umma of the believers in the systems of transcendental and existential representation. The two types of sovereignty are most vested with himself, being the founder of the subsuming political religionist *jama'a*/brotherhood, and in the *jama'a*/brotherhood itself. In Al-Banna's theoretical fabric, three actors were vested with sovereignty. The first actor would be the Guiding imam, a natural person, who would be vested with a sovereignty which derives from the infallibility-anchored sovereignty of the umma of the believers. At the same time, he would be vested with a sovereignty which derives from the Hobbesian sovereignty of the natural person which would emanate from modernist human sovereignty. The second actor would be the *jama'a*/brotherhood,

an artificial person, who would be conceived as constituting authentic Islam and the human embodiment of it in a differentiation of the Taymiyyan *jama'a*. As a *jama'a*, it would derive from the infallibility-anchored sovereignty of the umma of the believers. As a brotherhood, it would derive from the sovereignty claimed by modern Brotherhoods which emanates from modernist human sovereignty. The third actor would be the state which would derive from the sovereignty of the modernist nation-statism being Hobbes's artificial person. The three actors would be definers of right and wrong. In running the nation-state, the members of the parliament who would have a secondary share. They would include main members of the brotherhood and other activist not ulama. The ruler would elevate himself to the dignity of God's shadow in the immanently gravitated form not the transcendentally gravitated form. Inter alia, the ruler would leverage his charisma. Simply put, the struggle over sovereignty between the founder, the *jama'a*/brotherhood, and the state would be akin to the struggle over sovereignty between the charismatic leaders/founders of totalitarian parties of the interbellum in the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy, the totalitarian parties, and the states they founded, better yet the influential bureaucracy of the states or the deep state. It is worth reminding that it is from such totalitarian parties that Al-Banna's *jama'a*/brotherhood took what we call "foundational inspiration". To state the obvious, with regard to the ruler's governance, the notion of deputyship of the Messenger would be absent. The Caliphate would be remembered as a past historical mode of governance. Hence, the imam would be a sheer *successor* of all governors up to the Messenger.

With that said, it is palpable that Al-Banna's theoretical fabric was informed by, and reflected, *an amplified mysterylessness*, hence constituting a differentiation of the theoretical fabric of Rida's. Absent is a mystery-related theological explanation of the accentuation of the umma which should not be abandoned due to always being righteous. The umma's pursuit of renaissance, too, is remote from mystery and from transcendental being subject to the initiative of the umma itself. As a differentiation of Rida's, Al-Banna's fabric finds part of its intellectual pedigree in modernist

mysterylessness. The caliph, like the umma, is effectively distanced from transcendence. While discussing historical Umayyad caliphs within the context of invoking their imperial achievements that generated glory to the 'umma', there is no discussion of the the title they used, namely "God's caliph" and the related mystery-related conceptions. Politics would be a matter of the profane world upon changing much of the MBO tenets into a civil theology. The relevance of a theological question and its worthiness of contemplation is measured, inter alia, against its effect on practical matters and things that qualify as "work". Much of traditional theology ought to be abandoned on the basis that it would be a source of conflict, and on the basis that it would be conceived as directly generative of practical matters of life. (Al-Banna, 2002, 402).

Being the working of a *largely* metastatic consciousness which escaped from the metaxy to move towards the immanent pole, El-Banna's theoretical design and the circumvention of mystery should be interpreted as power instruments. Such power instruments were hoped to enable achieving the mission of independence from imperial colonialization. Nonetheless, the mission of independence should be synergized with the mission of living the Modernist doxic ethos. The mission of decolonization ought to be followed by a mission of a *superbia*-based worldwide imperial dominance. Both missions must be pursued by a unified accentuated largely self-determining trans-territorial *umma* of believers living Al-Banna's Gnostic neo-Salafist modernist doxic ethos and its version of nationalism and subsumed under El-Banna's gnostic *jama'a*. In pursuing this mission, that *umma* of the believers ought to be pulled by an existentially powerful *nation/people* articulated in a modernist state such as Egypt. El-Banna's theoretical fabric moved in the direction of diluting existing authorities to the favor of self-empowerment and the establishment of Al-Banna's doxic ethos as the supreme references. Only empowerment-premised explanations may demystify the discursive and discordant position taken by Al-Banna's discourse towards Arab nationalism. On the one hand, Al-Banna's discourse *lightly* invoked Arab nationalism with reservation that it ought to be rejected if premised on supremacy-based Arab nationalism. At the same time, it stressed the superiority of

Arabs in living the faith and equalized their state with the state of the faith in another letter. As one concludes from Mura, the prime shaper of this position was that Al-Banna's discourse was keen to appropriate Arab nationalism to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time to prevent it from seriously competing and contracting the central circle of nationalism in Al-Banna's discourse, namely Islamism or Pan Islamism. The Salafism of Al-Banna's discourse moved in the direction of contracting the authority of the divine ground, the Quran, the Messenger. It also moved in the direction of diluting the authority of contemporary ulama. Also, the historiogensis of Al-Banna's Salafism moved in the direction of deadening the authority of the *ra'iyya* through the deculturation and *scotosis* that it generated which is a differentiation of the Taymiyyan deculturation and scotosis discussed earlier. Further, the institutionalization of urbanization resulting from the establishment of the brotherhood-based *jama'a* moved in the direction of disempowering the ra'iyya in that it served as a substitute of natural and traditional social formations including the family, the extended family, the tribe, and the guilds. This substitution muscled the dichotomization of the relation between the members and their original natural formations, and exponentiated the disconnection from such traditional formations and the alienation and anomie. The reliance of the members on the *jama'a* and its leadership increased. Drawing on Mura, the utopianism of Al-Banna's discourse moved in the direction of undoing the Modernist ownership of the discourse of utopianism, and pursuing a counter-hegemonic pronouncement of civilizational utopianism. On another plane, the invocation by Al-Banna's theoretical fabric of the aggregate trans-territorial nation moved in the direction of generating utmost quantitative power which seemed to be needed to fuel the placement of maximal pressure on Modernist imperial European powers necessary to enable decolonization. The adoption of the framework of the modernist local 'nation' (Egypt) was motivated by the desire to make use of the power of that framework which only Modernist European powers employed. In Mura's words,

> Al-Banna's elaboration of what could be called a 'territorial' trajectory of Islamism …. denoted, in discursive terms, the attempt to dislocate western monopoly over the discourse of the nation, pursuing a counter-hegemonic articulation and valourization of national signifiers. (Mura, 2012, p. 70).

It also moved in the direction of outdoing domestic competition, namely Al-Wafd, which grounded itself in local nationalism. The weight which Al-Banna's discourse gave to local or territorial nationalism was almost equal if not greater than the weight it gave to trans-territorial nationalism because by the thirties and forties the power generated in the applications of local or territorial nationalism worldwide was greater than the power generated in the applications of trans-territorial nationalism. Additionally, the stipulation that Egypt should be the locomotive moved in the direction of privileging the headquarters of the *jama'a*, namely Al-Banna's leadership and its offshoots. Put differently, Al-Banna's local nationalism was largely a utilitarian local nationalism. The adoption of the framework of the 'state' moved in the direction of utilizing the power of that structure, in the direction of counterpoising the hegemony of the Modernist imperial powers. As Mura explains,

> The nationalization of al-Banna's discourse, however, signalled that the target was not the restoration of a traditional Islamic government but rather a sort of counter-hegemonic appropriation and Islamization of the nation-state structure, with shari'ah maintained as an ethical source for state legislation. (Mura, 2012, p. 82).

On a secondary level, the invocation of the Eastern circle moved in the direction of generating yet more force and power in counterpoising Modernist imperialism and Euro-centrism. Al-Banna's discourse was quite clear about the motive of the invocation of the Eastern circles of identity. It was not an invocation of an original identity. It was driven by a temporary meaning which only gained presence as a reaction of the holding deer by the West of its civilization and its accentuation of its civility, and the distancing by the West of itself from those nations that it named Eastern nations, and its division of the world into an Eastern world and a Western one. When the West return to fairness and

abandons aggression and injustice, this interim favoritism would cease to exist and worldwide universalism would prevail. (Al-Banna, 2002, p. 124).

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the second line of deformation of the Caliphate, and of MBO grand conceptions and the mystery in phases of imperial descend and falling prey to imperial invasion. The analyses has involved a juxtaposition of the theoretical fabric of four figures. We began by tracing the fulfilment of the imperial transition which took place in the system of existential representation and which constituted the occasion for the formulation by Al-Mawardi of his theoretical fabric. Put differently, the rise of powerful emirs and sultans who controlled the lion's share in the system of existential representation at the expense of the caliph persisted. In parallel, the new line of theorizing the Sultanate, not the caliphate, which began by Al-Mawardi himself, grew especially under Nizam Al-Mulk reflecting a transition in consciousness. Yet, the rise of powerful emirs and sultans did not mean that the state of the zones living the MBO especially in the region hosting the caliphate was promising. Then we moved to the theoretical fabric of Ibn Taymiyya which was formulated at a historical moment in which further but gruesome deterioration made itself felt when the greater part of the zones living the MBO fell prey to Mongol crushing invasion. Then we moved to the theoretical fabric of Rida which emerged upon the invasion of almost all the zones living the MBO by European Modernist imperialism. Because the notion of nation-statism has permeated conceptually and pragmatically, we had to explore how it came into being. Finally, we moved to the caliphate theoretical framework of El-Banna. Of particular significance was how the Voegelinian theoretical perspective had been crucial to the exploration of the genealogy of the deformational historiogenetic Salafism which ran from the theoretical framework of Al-Juwaini in a compact state through Ibn Taymiyya in a state of differentiation to Rida and El-Banna. Of equal significance was how it helped us how to discern the subtle distinctions between the nature and scope of the representation of those who loose and bound and the nature and scope of the representation of those

democratic members of parliament, that Rida's theoretical framework seems to have not been conscious of. We were able to observe how a sense of avoidance of the mystery grew in history as of the theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni. The four theoretical fabrics with their deformational conceptions were chiefly intended for an empowerment which would contribute to lifting the state of victimization and the ensuing anxieties. The empowerment and enablement of the people was the key to achieve these goals.

Conclusion

The study unearthed two chains of deformation of the meaning of the concept of the Caliphate and pertinent MBO conceptions. Two distinctive positions towards the mystery in two imperial modes. Two types of underpinning consciousness were discerned. Let us recapitulate the most important findings in relation to each chain of deformation.

On the one hand, the study unveiled *a chain* of deformation of the meaning of the concept of the Caliphate and pertinent MBO conceptions during the mode of Caliphal imperial ascent and Caliphal imperial floating which consisted of mystery-distorting conceptions that point to *a transcendentally-gravitated metastatic* consciousness. The four cases consisted of the accentuating characterization of the Caliph as "God's deputy", in the sense of God's *direct* representative, which entailed a distortion of the mystery of the human creation-related caliphate. The employment of the mystery-distorting accentuating characterization of the Caliph as "God's deputy" started at a fairly high point in the Umayyad theoretical fabric. It reached a higher point in theoretical fabric of the Abbasid founders especially upon being blended by accentuation deriving from the Sassanian culture. It reached its acme in theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism in the idea of the miraculous imam. It reached its nadir in the theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi. The four cases included a theological legitimation which entailed a distortion of the mystery of divine action. That theological legitimation started at a high point in the Umayyad theoretical fabric, went to a lower point in theoretical fabric of the Abbasid founders, reached its acme in theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism, and descended to its nadir in the theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi. The four cases consisted of historiogenetic conceptions entailing a distortion of the MBO conception of time and history and their mysteries. The employment of mystery-distorting historiogenetic conceptions was at a low point in the Umayyad theoretical fabric, went to a lower point in theoretical fabric of the Abbasid founders, reached its acme in the theoretical fabric

produced by ideologized Shiism and reached its nadir in Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical fabric. The four cases consisted of distortions of mysteries related to other pertinent MBO grand conceptions. This includes distortions of mysteries related to the MBO conception of the divine ground, the MBO conception of the Quran and of the human being. The specific main effect on the caliph and on the imperial pursuit that the mystery-distorting scheme was designed to yield differed from one case to the other. The Umayyad mystery-distorting caliphate-related theoretical fabric wanted to construct the Umayyad imperial caliph as "a constituent of a majestic mystery". The Abbasid mystery-distorting caliphate-related theoretical fabric wanted to construct the Abbasid imperial caliph as "the Arbiter of mystery", and a "constituent of a *widened* majestic framework of mystery". The theoretical fabric produced by the embracers of ideologized Shiism wanted to construct the imam and God's deputy as "the main constituent of an ultra majestic complex of mystery", "the demystifier of mysteries", and wanted to construct the imperializing delegate of the imam as "an assistive constituent of the framework of mystery" and as "a co-demystifier of mysteries". Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical fabric wanted to construct the Abbasid imperial caliph as "an element of a less majestic framework of mystery". The dosage of mystery distortion was underpinned by the amount of the actual power of the concerned Caliph or imam and at the same time by the amount of empowerment which was hoped to be awarded to the concerned caliph or imam. The four cases moved in the direction of establishing the caliph as above the umma of the believers in the system of existential representation. The theoretical fabric of the Umayyad founders attempted at awarding the caliph full competencies within the context of their attempt at excluding Al Al-Bayt and ensuing rebelling parties. The theoretical fabric of the Abbasid founders attempted at positioning the caliph above existing other trustees or *uli amr* especially the ulama. The theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism attempted at awarding the caliph exaggerated competencies in the system of transcendental representation to compensate the inability of establishing own system of existential representation. Although the imam is essentially in

occultation in theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism, existential habitual obedience is awarded to his legatees based on them speaking in his name. Although the caliph has incomplete powers in the system of existential representation in Al-Mawardi's theoretical fabric, it constructed him as the source of authorities. The four cases consisted of stipulations that moved in the direction of constructing the caliph as infallible and sovereign. The Umayyad theoretical fabric consisted of an implicit claim of the infallibility. In addition to attempting at constructing him as God's deputy, the theoretical fabric attempted to render him unaccountable to the ra'iyya. The Abbasid caliphate theoretical fabric consisted of an implicit claim of the infallibility. In addition to attempting at constructing him as God's deputy and shadow, and the arbiter of meaning and the arbiter of the mystery, the theoretical fabric attempted to render him unaccountable to the ra'iyya. The theoretical fabric of ideologized Shiism consisted of the strongest claim of infallibility. The theoretical fabric of Al-Mawardi consisted of a humble *de facto* claim of infallibility constructing the caliph as God's deputy and the origin of all function, and avoiding to include stipulations of caliphal accountability. The four cases consisted of an explicit genealogical legitimation. The Umayyad theoretical fabric employed a special genealogical legitimation in which the Umayyad caliph is constructed as a part of the special Umayyad house. It was formulated mainly to elevate the status of the Umayyads above the House of Hashem. The Abbasid genealogical legitimation constructed the Abbasid house as the closest relation to the Messenger, although the Abbasid founders constructed themselves as God's deputies and not the deputies of the Messenger. The Abbasid genealogical legitimation was employed to within the legitimation battle against the Alids, and at the same time as a legitimacy instrument to elevate their standard above non-Arab ethnicities. In the four cases, the characterization of the caliph was based on a dilution of the recognition of the presence of the Messenger. That dilution started at a very high point in the Umayyad theoretical fabric, went to a lower point in theoretical fabric of the Abbasid founders, went to further lower

point in the theoretical fabric produced by ideologized Shiism and reached its nadir in Al-Mawardi's caliphate-related theoretical fabric.

On the other hand, the study unveiled another chain of deformation of the meaning of the Caliphate and pertinent MBO conceptions during the phases of imperial decay and encroachment which were anchored to a general avoidance of the mystery, and which were underpinned by *an immanently-gravitated metastatic consciousness.* The four cases consisted of the characterization of the umma of the believers as sovereign and infallible and sovereign, and moved in the direction of establishing the umma of the believers as above the caliph. In Al-Juwayni, the caliph would be the deputy of an umma vested with mystery-less-related sovereignty. In Ibn Taymiyya, the imam would be the deputy of a hegemonic umma vested with mystery-less-related sovereignty. In Rida, the Caliph would be a symbol of an umma vested with mystery-less-related sovereignty and mystery-disrelated sovereignty. In Al-Bana, the Caliph would be a totalitarian head of an umma vested with mystery-less-related sovereignty and mystery-disrelated sovereignty. The four theoretical fabrics came void of any accentuating genealogical legitimation, yet consisted of an accentuation of the framework which the caliph was supposed to belong to. The theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni consisted of an accentuation of the framework of *ahl as-sunna wa al-jama'a* which he was one of its exponents. The theoretical fabric of Ibn Taymiyya, consisted of an accentuation of the framework of his own *jama'a*, and on a secondary level, the people of Hadith or *ahl Al-hadith*. The theoretical fabric of Ibn Taymiyya, consisted of an accentuation of the framework of the Afghani school of neo-salafism. The theoretical fabric of Ibn Taymiyya, consisted of an accentuation of the Brotherhood. The Umayyad theoretical fabric employed a special genealogical legitimation in which the Umayyad caliph is constructed as a part of the special Umayyad house. It was formulated mainly to elevate the status of the Umayyads above the House of Hashem. The Abbasid genealogical legitimation constructed the Abbasid house as the closest relation to the Messenger, although the Abbasid founders constructed themselves as God's deputies and not the deputies of the

Messenger. The Abbasid genealogical legitimation was employed to within the legitimation battle against the Alids, and at the same time as a legitimacy instrument to elevate their standard above non-Arab ethnicities. Those frameworks played the role which previously the Caliph's genealogical base or kin house played, namely the provision of *asabiyya* to use Ibn Khaldun's terminology, and legitimation. The four caliphate-related theoretical fabrics consisted of the historiogenetic conception of Salafism which entailed a distortion of the MBO conception of time and history, and which infected the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics themselves. The historical scope of historiogenesis in that Salafism was narrower than the historical scope of historiogenesis in caliphate-related theoretical fabrics formulated in the mode of imperial ascent and imperial floating. The four cases consisted of a generally negative position towards the mystery in other pertinent MBO grand conceptions, such position being underpinned by an ideology which strongly accentuated reason and rationalism. The four caliphate-related theoretical fabrics came void of a conception of the caliph as a constituent of a majestic framework of mystery. Further, though the first set of theoretical fabrics that were formulated in the mode of imperial ascent and floating, and their mystery-related conceptions were known to the formulators of the second chain of theoretical fabrics, they also came void of any discussion or refutation of the mystery such previous distorting conceptions. In the four cases, the characterization of the caliph was based on a dilution of the recognition of the presence of the Messenger. That dilution started at a low point in the theoretical fabric of Al-Juwayni, descended to a high point in theoretical fabric of the Ibn Taymiyya, descended to further higher point in the theoretical fabric of Rida and reached its acme in the caliphate-related theoretical fabric of El-Banna.

That being said, it is crucial to recognize the subtle effect of the *first* caliphate-related theoretical fabric in each line of theorization, namely the Umayyad's and Al-Juwayni's caliphate-related theoretical fabric and how each left its impress, in varying degrees, upon later generations of Caliphate-related theoretical fabrics. Each caliphate-related theoretical fabric emerged in the beginning of an idiosyncratic caliphal

imperializing mode charting a unique theoretical trajectory, and inaugurated a mode of caliphate theorization. Many of the genes of *each first inaugurating* caliphate-related theoretical fabric passed on to the following caliphate-related theoretical fabrics. Not only did the theoretical genes pass to a succeeding generation of caliphate-related theoretical fabrics that were produced by actors who were generally at one with the actor who produced the first inaugurating caliphate-related theoretical fabric, but to actors who were categorized historically as staunch enemies. The study has uncloaked how the theoretical genes of the caliphate-related theoretical fabric engendered by the Umayyad founders passed to the caliphatecaliphate-related theoretical fabric produced by the Abbasid founders and even to the caliphate-related theoretical fabric generated by the embracers of ideologized Shiism. The passing of theoretical genes to a successive caliphate-related theoretical fabrics maybe attributed to what may be referred to as "the force of the inaugurating consciousness". Each first inaugurating consciousness which matures at the outset of a certain epoch charts a course and a context and grows in history transforming into an epochal consciousness. The passing of theoretical genes to a successive caliphate-related theoretical fabric generated by an oppressed enemy may, over and above, be explained by the Khaldunian law of the tendency of the defeated to imitate the victor.

The claim of infallibility may be most cogently explained by attributing it to the inability by a certain part of the collective consciousness to make what this study calls "the psychological anchoring shift" upon the death of the Messenger. During the period of the revelation, normally, the historical presence of the Messenger would obscure his ahistorical presence. Also, normally, the knowness of the historical presence of the Messenger would eclipse the mystery of the Messenger and of his ahistorical presence. During this period, the collective consciousness got used to psychologically anchoring to the presence of the Messenger with its historical mode outsizing its ahistorical mode. The anxiety which was analyzed in the outset of Chapter Three following the news of the death of the Messenger is indicative that part of the collective consciousness was too

gravitated by the status quo and was not fully ready for a transformation. It was an indicator of a certain tendency suffering some shortage of the ability to switch to psychologically anchoring to the presence of the Messenger with its ahistorical mode outsizing its historical mode. Because foundational compact phenomena grow in history as one infers from Voegelin's theoretical fabric, getting used to anchoring to a historical living infallible source of guidance grew in history. This compact phenomena found its differentiation in the various caliphate-related theoretical fabrics that replaced the psychologically anchoring to the Messenger with anchoring on another living actor which was worn infallibility. In the analyzed caliphate-related theoretical fabrics that were produced in the mode of imperial ascend and imperial floating, it was the caliph who was hoped to be the center of the process of leading the imperial ascent or maintaining the imperial ship floating. Hence, it was the imam/caliph of God who was worn infallibility. In the analyzed caliphate-related theoretical fabrics that were produced in the mode of imperial decay and encroachment, it was the body of the believers that was hoped to be the center of the process of leading the emancipation from imperial decay and imperial encroachment. Hence, it was the body of believers who was worn infallibility.

The deformation embedded in the discussed caliphate-related theoretical fabrics would not have been discerned if the study did not arrive at a more sophisticated *foundational meaning* of the concept of the caliphate and the concept of *ulu al-amr*. The caliphate is a handling of an authority or a wilayat amr within the context of a deputyship of the Messenger. All the actors within the body of the believers are stakeholders of the caliphate/deputyship of the Messenger. Authority is diffused in the body of the believers. On a first tier, the deputyship is an original unchangeable capacity. On a second tier, it is optional. The head of the body of the believers bears the title of caliph to manifest the deputyship. The study extracted the meaning of the caliphate from the nature of the MBO, from the behavior, symbolism and rhetoric of the first caliphs who acted as foundational caliphs and were later perceived as archetypal caliphal models. One significance of this finding is that it provided the grounds of the limitations of the power

of the individual caliph. It showed the invalidity of the reading that in the Islamic tradition, the caliph could do anything without any limitations by bother actors. Additionally, the study has revealed the fallacy that despotic caliphs had a free hand in behaving and in dictating their will. According to Nadirsyah Hosen,

> the caliphs could do anything they wanted without the fear of facing an opposition party or even impeachment procedures, and that Implementing the Shari`ah would lead to an undemocratic state, for the caliph's power would be unlimited. (Hosen, 2004, p. 5).

This is because, as Bassam Tibi holds, "none of them was a legal ruler in the modern constitutional sense," and that one of the reasons for this situation was that no institutional authority was able to enforce the caliph's compliance with the Shari`ah". (Hosen, 2004, p. 5). The study has revealed that from the first day of the emergence of the position of caliph, his authority was not entire, and caliphs were *always* challenged verbally and militarily, and the *ulama* and the Saints assumed pertinent authorities of *ulu al-amr* and denied the caliphs who desired and attempted to dominate all public functions in a totalitarian manner the opportunity to enforce their desire.

The study has brought to light the dynamics of the growth of superiority-driven monarchism and imperialism. Tendencies towards both superiority-driven monarchism and imperialism existed as of the beginning of the establishment of the Message-based order. Such tendencies constituted an integral part of the forces of disordering which right from the beginning entered into a dialectical relation the forces of ordering. The seeds of monarchism and imperialism emerged, and were warned from, during the period of revelation and took root during the reign of the first four caliph. The de facto embryonic monarchism which grew in Syria also during that reign was one of its many manifestations. They were largely responsible for the struggles and disputes that emerged during that reign. The attempt to consolidate a largely monarchical imperial system as of the Umayyad reign was largely a fruition of the earlier seeds. Then, and to small extent, the colouring, not the essence, of that monarchism and imperialism may have been partially influenced by external imperialism and imperialist cultures including

those of the Sassanians and the Byzantine. Accordingly, this clarification corrects the argument that the Umayyad and Abbasid imperialism emerged as a result of the interaction with the surrounding imperialist cultures. It also corrects the assumption that that imperialism was an outcome of the inclination *to imitate* imperial actors on the international arena. This argument may be very much voiced if one concedes to the constructivist argument that polities define their identity and roles on the international level on the basis of pastich and imitation of other polities in the same way individuals define their identity and roles on the basis of pastiche and imitation. As pointed earlier, this argument is voiced by certain constuctivists such as Ned Lebow. Let us remember that the superbia tendency and the tendency towards glory are so deeply rooted in the domain of the soul and are responsible for much of the forces of preventing building the order of the soul for generating disordering effects. As an outcome of that, and within the context of a reflexivity-based relationship, the tendency towards superiority-driven monarchism and imperialism are deeply rooted in the domain of the society and are responsible for much of the forces of preventing building the order of the society and for generating disordering effects. Indeed, the argument that the Umayyad and in turn Abbasid imperialism originated within the context of the interaction with neighbouring imperial cultures was a sort of "externalization of blame" and an instrument of politics of memory which is used in constructing an idealized past.

Whereas post 1924 conceptualization which conceived of the caliphate as a sheer historical institution, such as those of Abd El-Raziq, were at variance with much of the essence of the diagnosed caliphate-related fabrics, our diagnosis seems to warrant the inference that some of Abd El-Raziq's stipulations would be contrastable with, and sometimes close to, tenets in the discussed theoretical fabrics. After the termination of the last Ottoman caliph by the Turkish Parliament in March 1924, Abdel Raziq published his book *Islam and the Foundations of governance* arguing against the caliphate. The main thesis of Abdel Raziq's essay was very similar to the thesis of Seyyid Bey's study. It stressed that the caliphate was not canonically prescribed neither in the Quran nor in the

Sunna. Discordantly, the essay explained that the caliphate essentially meant deputyship of the Messenger, and at the same time conceptualized the caliph as a substitute of the Messenger which effectively meant conceiving the caliph as a successor not a deputy. Abdel Raziq's essay stressed that need for the application of the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The essay stressed the need to separate 'state' and religion. When carefully examined, we find that the mystery-disrelated sovereignty of the people in Abdel Raziq is contrastable with the mystery-less sovereignty of the umma of the believers in the four theoretical fabrics by Al-Juwayni, Ibn Taymiyya, Rida, and Al-Banna. Further, Ibn Taymiyya's theoretical fabric speaks about an imam, not a caliph, relegating the caliphate to the status of a historical mode of governance. The actual conception by Abdel Raziq's essay of the caliph as the substitute of the Messenger was embraced by all the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics analyzed in the present study conceived the caliph as a substitute of the Messenger. That said, what about the call by Abdel Raziq's essay for the separation between 'state' and religion? Indeed, the question merits a nuanced answer. Rida's stipulation that the caliph should not to be involved in *ijtihad* and legislation, moved in the direction of providing an equivalence of the maxim stipulated by Lockean-inspired modernist popular sovereignty that the role of the 'state' in serving religion should be limited.

The examined deformation of the meaning of the caliphate, and MBO grand conceptions, and the mystery, in all the examined caliphate-related theoretical fabrics, was *largely* inspired by power consideration in responding to *specific historical* imperial challenges. The deformations were primarily *customized* to enable an imperial take off, to boost a renewal of imperial ascent, to muscle the position of an imperially declining caliph, to enable the designation of a new imperially able vizier, and to discharge an emancipation from victimization by imperial domination. Examining the theoretical fabrics against the lives and the ethos of the actors who produced them unearthed how they heavily inspired the content and contours of the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics, and how they were largely customized to influence the present imperial reality,

and how they were fashioned to achieve immediate results. Both modes of deformation were enthused by the desire to enjoy a greater existential representation-related power, to overcome a recalcitrant reality, and to lift ensuing anxieties of consciousness during acute imperial vicissitudes. All of that mandates appreciating the greatness of the weight of historical limitations in nuancing the understanding of each caliphate-related theoretical fabric, and blandly rebukes the myopic usage of caliphate-related theories which is underpinned by the assumption that they are fully or even largely fit for different epochs and different epochal consciousness.

Should that be the case, does there not impose itself the question: Did this power-centered caliphate-related theorization have a role in the etiology of the contemporary caliphate-related discourse of the 'Islamists'? It is deemed not within the scope of this study to juxtapose, contrast and compare the caliphate-related theoretical fabric of bodies like Hizbuttahrir, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, and ISIL and the caliphate-related theoretical fabrics analyzed in this study. It suffices to note that a cohort of academics have discerned, as did *Demystifying the Caliphate*, that

> the call to restitute the caliphate has become an element of a discourse of empowerment and ideological tool for activist mobilization. (Al-Rasheed, Kersten, and Shterin, 2013, p. 3).

In broad strokes, the aforementioned contemporary bodies voicing this discourse heavily drew on the caliphate-related and governance-related theoretical fabrics analyzed in this study, and enunciated that they traced their intellectual lineage to them. Similar to the caliphate-related and governance-related theoretical fabrics analyzed earlier, the contemporary caliphate-related and governance-related theoretical fabrics were an integral part of a discourse expressing reflecting an anxiety resulting from special imperial vicissitudes in colonial and post-colonial epochs. Their theoretical infrastructure as well as their circumvention of mystery generally hints that they are a normal continuation of the caliphate-related and theoretical fabrics that were formulated by a metastatic consciousness escaping the metaxy and heading towards the immanent pole.

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