Wolves in the Airport: Jesus’ Critique of Purity as a Challenge to 21st Century Surveillance.

1.0 Introduction

‘Wolves in sheep’s clothing’ is a metaphor whose power lies in our lack of certainty that we can readily detect an impostor. Someone seeking us harm may be amongst us, having gained entry to our community by posing as other than who they are. That this vivid phrase appears to originate with Jesus tells us something about the fears of the Matthean community; threatened, or at least feeling threatened, by false teachers (Matt. 7:15). But, if any sheep might be a wolf, then all sheep might be dangerous. Importing the logic of 21st century surveillance cultures would mean we need to know as much as we can about each sheep, their movements, their associates, their politics, lest we fail to spot one of the wolves. Perhaps there are early indicators, slippages of the pelt, that we can learn to recognise. If certain breeds of sheep are a little more lupine in body-shape or mannerism then they must be viewed with more suspicion.

However, no community can function in a healthy fashion when the possibility of any one of them being a threat mutates into fear that all pose a danger, unless proved benign. Of course, all rarely means all; reasons for fearing particular categories of ‘all’ are constructed so that the rest can maintain some degree of cohesion.

This paper aims to offer a theological response to disproportionate and unjust surveillance in 21st century contexts where people are assigned to categories designating them, to different extents, as being risky, to be treated with suspicion. I take the airport as a focal point because it is a theatre, where surveillance is deliberately seen to be performed, managing flows of people. I turn by analogy to the control of space and movement of people in the Jewish Temple envisioned by Ezekiel. The framing of holiness in terms of ritual purity, and thereby categorisation of clean/unclean, offers a functional parallel with 21st century systems of surveillance. Jesus’ reorienting of holiness, as compassion reaching over boundaries, suggests a theological challenge to today’s predilection for controlling a chaotic (and threatening) world by means of digital sorting of personal information (offered, surrendered, and scraped unknowingly) from 21st century citizens.

2.0 Bias in Surveillance

In a world of travel bans against all refugees and people from selected Muslim-majority countries who are without bona fide close relationships with US residents, and in contexts of energetic Islamophobia in various European countries, public practical theological reflection is vital as a political critique - of surveillance and of churches.

Everyone who uses a mobile phone or connects to the internet leaves digital traces of their activities. Edward Snowden’s revelations of projects such as PRISM (Greenwald and MacAskill 2003) threw a public spotlight on the extent to which the US government’s NSA and a number of key allied countries, including the UK, were involved in monitoring generally unimaginable amounts of personal data, following in and out of their own, and other, countries. Even this, however, is not surveillance of everything everyone does all of the time (Lyon 2015: 44) but it is ‘suspicionless’ in the sense that it is aimed at whole populations (Greenwald 2014: 94). Whilst it is ‘bulk’ interception, some argue that it is
neither ‘blanket’ nor ‘indiscriminate’ because choices are made about which data carriers to access (ISC 2015). Critics see this as ‘throwing more needleless hay’ on the stack within which the search for a needle (terrorist) is already difficult (Corrigan 2015).

At the level of bulk interception it seems that the likelihood of being under surveillance is generally evenly distributed. Any particular characteristics of mobile phone or internet users are invisible to systems collecting and storing such data. It is not until inspected that interest is shown in your activities and/or associations. As François Ewald observes, although ‘population’ actually refers to a sub-group, ‘The moment a population is identified as a risk, everything with it tends to become - necessarily becomes - “just that”’ (Ewald 1993: 221).

2.1 Behaviour Detection at the Airport

Whereas earlier dangers arose from mid-flight destruction (Pan Am Flight 2013 over Lockerbie on 21st December 1988) or hi-jacking to gain hostages or effect escape from a regime, post-9/11 fears are extended to the use of commercial aircraft as weapons. Airports are therefore sites of intense surveillance in which needs for security compete with travellers’ convenience. Behaviour detection was developed by Paul Eckman from his work in the 1960s in which he claimed to prove that physiological responses to stress (such as lying to officials) are involuntary and, with proper training, these otherwise hidden cues betray someone as worthy of closer investigation (Ekman 2003, 2006). This is the principle of the polygraph test, but extended to additional cues observable by trained operatives, without invasive procedures. Because flying can be stressful, attempts to lower the ambient anxiety-inducing features of airports can be introduced. More ‘relaxing’ departure areas will supposedly reduce general levels of anxiety thus making it easier for operatives to spot those with abnormal anxiety.

Rachel Hall has discussed the widespread use of Ekman’s theories in airport security and the failure to acknowledge quite how contested these are (Hall 2015: 132-40). Timothy Levine and colleagues at Michigan State University have cast considerable doubt over Ekman’s claims (Levine et al. n.d.) which leads Hall, to conclude that the Ekman model is subject to ethnic bias in a number of ways. (The ACLU reports that documents in the TSA’s own files discredit the behaviour detection programm (ACLU 2017).) The wider public discourse around surveillance and suspicion directed at particular ethnic (e.g. Arab) and religious (e.g. Muslim) travellers may well increase some people’s involuntary cues; a result of the ‘terror of suspicion’ (Hall 2015: 144). In other words, the experiences of a ‘white Christian’ and a ‘brown Muslim’ moving through an airport are not related only to their immediate surroundings, but to the prevailing socio-political climate.

Ramirez and colleagues offer a more precise definition: ‘racial profiling is the inappropriate use of race, ethnicity, or national origin, rather than behavior or individualized suspicion, to focus on an individual for additional investigation’ (Ramirez et al. 2003: 1205). William Press argues from a statistical analysis, ethnic profiling may simply be ineffective in its aims: ‘Screening by strong racial profiling is no more effective than uniform sampling – and may actually be less effective’ (Press 2010).

It may be that profiling reinforces racism (Kleiner 2010) and alienates minorities whose cooperation in preventing crime (including terrorism) is potentially invaluable (Ramirez et al.
We should also be deeply suspicious of any feedback loop whereby representation of ‘suspects’ influences eye-witness reports. In her discussion of the ‘browning’ of bodies as deviant, Tina Patel draws our attention to the ways in which Charles De Menezes (the Brazilian man shot by police at a London tube station on 22nd July 2005) was mis-identified as ‘Asian’, he was not wearing the ‘heavy-coat’ that witnesses ‘saw’ but a light denim jacket and no wires were visible from beneath his clothing (Patel 2013). De Menezes was ‘visually resignified’ (Pugliese 2006) in the terms of wider public discourse about ethnicity and ‘terrorist appearance’.

Once we place profiling in its wider social context then Zygmunt Bauman’s warning is far from theoretical: ‘Security sacrificed in the name of freedom tends to be other people’s security; and freedom sacrificed in the name of security tends to be other people’s freedom’ (Bauman 2001: 20). In purportedly democratic states wrapped in the ‘fabric of fear’ (Walklate and Mythen 2008: 219) (Soyinka 2004), the putative ‘wolves’ are ‘Islamist terrorists’ or ‘jihadists’. With leaps of paranoia, passengers take exception to a fellow-traveller speaking Arabic whilst queuing to board a plane (Araiza 2015). ‘Flying while brown’ (Chandrasekhar 2003) parallels the injustices encountered by African-Americans ‘guilty’ of ‘driving while black’ (Harris 1997). Surveillance systems, with their supposed technological objectivity, distribute the assigning of risk in ways that have material disadvantages for people whose religion or ethnicity are ‘deviant’. Media mis-representation of swathes of the population feeds, and is fed by, vortices of politics, religion, fear, and corporate interest.

Furthermore, the model of behaviour detection assumes that although authorities might use techniques (such as lay-out and lighting) to lower stress levels in particular parts of the airport, the capacity to control, or at least amend, one’s own involuntary cues is beyond someone. This is an assumption that fails to recognise religious practices of non-Western traditions such as Buddhist meditation of Hindu yoga. The distinction between performance and reality that is integral to behavioural detection models is not universal (Hall 2015: 152-53). To put this another way, some spiritual disciplines may cast doubt upon the ‘involuntariness’ of cues. This could mean either that a prospective terrorist might be able to mask his cues or that an innocent brown person, perhaps a Sufi, who ‘looks Muslim’ might be treated with greater suspicion because of the absence of behaviour cues for which the behavioural detection officer has been trained to expect. It is also important to recognise that passengers may have ‘abnormal’ affective performance because of mental, emotional or cognitive illnesses or disabilities (Hall 2015: 156).

With the limitations (much more so than readily admitted by the authorities) of behavioural detection models, any veneer of objectivity is quite thin. The scope for officials’ prejudices to influence their practice is therefore more occluded - because the very possibility is bracketed out of the model. Lest we too-quickly put faith in systems with less human intervention, it is significant that facial recognition technologies (used for identification rather than behaviour detection) can also have racial/ethnic biases (Introna and Wood 2004), and Sa’di observes, the history of modern surveillance systems is often interwoven with colonialism (Sa’di 2012). This need not coalesce only around race/ethnicity as potential international travellers holding insufficient economic capital in their home countries may be denied visas by embassies tasked with filtering out undesired migrants.
3.0 Theologies of Surveillance

There is, as yet, only a small literature on the theology of surveillance although some discussions of privacy do intersect, e.g., (Fortner 1989) (Muers 2004). In a remarkably prescient report in 1973 the United Presbyterian Church in the USA addressed the emergence of digital data-gathering (in terms of credit scoring), emphasising that ‘we belong to a social system of informational exchange; but we belong to it also, or seek to, as persons’ (United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. 1974: 5). It has not been until 2017 that another church report has tackled surveillance in any significant theological depth (Church and Society Council 2017). Sociologist David Lyon in Canada has, over more than 20 years, contended for human flourishing (informed by humanist and religious tradition, but particularly for him, the Christian faith) to be central to critique and practice of surveillance (Lyon 1995, 2014). Susanne Wigorts Yngvesson in Sweden has engaged in a theological exploration of the phenomenology of visibility, especially under the ubiquitous digital gaze of 21st century systems (Wigorts Yngvesson 2013).

My own work adds to field with the first full-length treatment of a theology of surveillance (Stoddart 2011). There I consider Jesus as one who himself was under political and religious surveillance (by the Romans and Pharisees) concluding that he is in solidarity with all those who experience unjust surveillance. In the phrase ‘surveillance from the Cross’ I attempt to turn an imperial, domineering paradigm of ‘God is watching’ through 90 degrees. It is in self-surrender, compassion and solidarity that the nature of Divine ‘seeing’ needs to be framed. This means considering surveillance as potentially an act of care, but also ensuring that we talk about the qualities of those undertaking surveillance (not simply the efficacy or morality of the technologies that are deployed). Focusing more narrowly on surveillance as categorisation, I offer a theological critique of the ideology of ‘normativity’ in digital systems of social sorting and deploy John Swinton’s notion of the resurrection of the person (from non-personhood in the form of social invisibility) (Stoddart 2014). To destabilise the category of ‘the risky person’ I there use Jürgen Moltmann’s eschatology in order to challenge the way in which ‘naming’ people from a projected future cuts across the possibilities open to them both now and in years to follow.

My focus in this paper is again on the sorting of people but more specifically for their movement through securitised space. I want to use the analogy of sacred to securitised space (the former in the Temple, the latter in the airport) as a way of generating theological critique, based on Jesus’ radical realignment of holiness – away from purity to compassion; from defilement seen as a danger that fends off, to love as a transforming power that reaches out.

3.1 Ezekiel’s Temple: sorting access to sterile space

In the temple of Ezekiel 40-48 we are presented with an ideational social map of cultic space (Smith 1987: 48-9). (Figure 1 shows a simplified, composite diagrammatic representation.) Through a language of ‘gates’ and ‘entering’, Ezekiel offers a conceptual, imaginary, construction of the proper flows and sectors for different categories of worshippers; some to be excluded altogether. Following Smith’s analysis we can see in Ezekiel a series of maps that delineate different hierarchies. Map one is a hierarchy of power based around the dichotomy of sacred/profane (40:1-44:3), whilst map two proffers
a dichotomy of pure/impure and this time a hierarchy of status (44:4-31). The third map (45:1-8 and 47:13-48:35) presents a civic and territorial scheme and the fourth (46) is orientational (Smith 1987: 56). We need to think not of a flat plane but of three-dimensions. There are terraces of rising sacredness as well as areas (in plan-view) of distinctly differentiated spaces. At the same time, the entrance ways narrow so that as one approaches the site of greatest power access is made more difficult and the visual focus is narrowed (Smith 1987: 57).

Categories of people are admitted to areas associated with their relative sacral and power positions. For example, Zadokite priests are in charge of the altar, other priests are responsible for the temple - but without privileges of access to this most holy space. Further out still, in relation to the holiest space, is the sphere of the people. There are gates on the south and north sides through which the people pass but the gatehouse (of a shut gate) on the east is reserved to the prince. There is no gate on the western side because this is closest to the holy place.

When the paradigm is that of pure/impure, as in the second map, foreigners ‘defile’ the temple (44:7,9) and in an ‘innovation’ (Smith 1987: 62) are to be excluded, although they had previously been employed as servants within this pure place. Ezekiel’s social map offers a hierarchy in terms of purity: the people, Levites, and Zadokites (to whom detailed instructions about theirs, the highest level of purity, is to be maintained (44:15-31) (Smith 1987: 63). In the fourth map the focus is on proper movement within the sacred space. The people can move, on a north-south axis through only the outer court whilst the king has some privileged access to the threshold of the inner gate. All are subject to strict etiquette (46:1-3, 8-10) and their business in this space is to provide offerings for sacrifice. It is not a public forum.

It is important to re-iterate that Ezekiel’s is an ideational social mapping and is not to be conflated with the layout of the Herodian reconstruction of the 1st century BCE; the temple of the New Testament narratives. Nevertheless, restrictions of access depending on religion, gender, and lineage applied to the respective Courts of the Gentiles, Women, Israelites, and Priests. Gates, whilst also defensive, manage the flows of people into and through sacred spaces.

### 3.2 Temple and Airport Analogy

I need to clear the ground by first saying what I am not attempting to argue by drawing analogies between airport and temple. I am not suggesting that the airport bears religious significance. Neither do I wish to draw parallels between the functions of particular ‘courts’ in each arena. My argument is simply that processes of surveillance involving not only watching but sorting of categories operates in both temple and airport. If I can demonstrate sufficient parallelism in this respect then the way is open to consider the extent to which Jesus’ critique of social sorting in the temple of his time might cast some critical light upon the vexed issue of discriminatory surveillance in the 21st century airport.

Airport regulations use the language of cleansing to talk of secured areas being ‘sterile’ (CFR 2017). People need to be in their proper place with progressively tighter restrictions applying not only from landslide to airside, but also once airside. Bona fide travellers are not permitted to wander at will through airside service areas or out to the tarmac.
The management of flows of movement, through liminal space into sterile areas, depends on sorting people (on different criteria in temple and airport). Whilst such processes are common, with respect to roles in, for example, a stately home, a business, or in a theatre, the paradigm of clean/impure that drives the temple sorting is what interests me. Anthropologist Mary Douglas argued that purification should be seen as ‘a positive effort to organise the environment’ (Douglas 1966: 2). In countering that which ‘offends against order’ a community is ‘reordering [its] environment, making it conform to an idea’ (Douglas 1966: 2). The idea of the holy is one of wholeness and completeness (Douglas 1966: 51). In an observation that has strong resonances with our interest in social sorting and categorisation Douglas proposes the further idea of holiness as completeness: ‘holiness requires that individuals shall conform to the class to which they belong. And holiness requires that different classes of things shall not be confused’ (Douglas 1966: 53).

4.0 Bi-directional Theological Critique

What, then, is Jesus’ theological critique of the clean/unclean framework? He radically reorients the prevailing holiness as purity paradigm by rejecting the notion of defilement as pollution from external materials (Mark 7:15). It is words and actions emanating from the heart that are impure. Jesus’ choice of ‘sinners’ as his eating companions (Luke 15:2) vividly demonstrates this profound and shocking reconfiguration of what is disgusting in the kingdom of God. Jesus restructures what it means to be a community who imitate God. The narrowness of purity is replaced by the expansiveness of compassion as the manner in which God’s approach to the world is to be mirrored by Israel. The Holiness Code of Leviticus 19 is echoed and modified in the turning the other cheek, loving of enemies, and generally reflecting God’s disposition of giving the gifts of sun and rain to both the just and unjust (Borg 1998: 139-40). To love one’s neighbour is extended from an injunction regarding fellow members of the covenanted community to include all – and that this is righteousness surprises even those who practice kindness (Matt 25: 31-46).

Marcus Borg highlights the political importance of this alternative paradigm, in a context where Jewish renewal movements are engaged in resistance against Roman control: ‘contrary to the “holiness code” which undergirded resistance, the “compassion code” strikes a new but complementary note…the material points specifically to the consequences of the shift of paradigms for Israel’s relationship to Rome’ (Borg 1998: 145). In a parallel re-framing, Jesus understands holiness as ‘transforming power’ that brings wholeness, in contradistinction to the positively defiling power of uncleanness (Borg 1998: 147). So, holiness (in the sense of compassion) does not require protecting from contagion through systems of separation, rather compassion-holiness (akin to the work of a physician) is ‘an active dynamic power that overcame uncleanness’ (Borg 1998: 148).

The nascent Christian communities practice this reorienting, however, in tension with boundary maintenance. The Jesus movement did not abandon the temple, reflecting surely their understanding that Jesus’ was not abolishing but re-interpreting Torah (Matt 5:17-18). Borg recognises the two-fold dynamic: of maintaining distinctive community identity and having an expansive paradigm of compassion-as-holiness; there are boundaries of the community but, he argues, these are ‘broad and very indistinct’ (Borg 1998: 151). Despite his appraisal of the threat and warning sayings attributed to Jesus, Borg’s argument gives
insufficient weight to the dichotomous categories deployed by Jesus. Jesus’ dire evaluation of Korazin and Bethsaida (Luke 10:13) is uncomfortably close in structure to 21st century notions of categorical suspicion – wherein a whole community is negatively framed. As Stephen Pattison correctly observes, there is shaming of recalcitrant hearers of God’s word in play across the gospels (Pattison 2000: 2401-1).

The ideational temple maps of Ezekiel offer us a way of reading the surveillance systems airports for sorting into, and flow-management of, categories of travellers. The technologies and processes are, in effect, operating something akin to a clean/unclean paradigm; a framework for holiness that Jesus radically re-interpreted. The question now is to articulate what Jesus’ ‘compassion code’ might offer as a critique of airport surveillance, and in the other direction, what 21st century theological models might hear as echoes from critiques of surveillance as sorting.

4.1 Critique of the Airport

How does the temple analogy helps us think more critically about the airport? First of all, we are reminded how perennially difficult it is for people to live in a chaotic world. Our ancestors sought to control, or at least cope with, their chaotic and dangerous world by means of classification into systems of purity/impurity and consequent taboos. For all the appearance of order in an airport (at least in the operation under normal circumstances) the lanes, queues, signage, liminal areas for ‘security checks’, and clearly defined boundaries between sterile and non-sterile areas, the wider social context is one of managed-chaos and a ‘fabric of fear’. The temple, although special and sacred, did not function apart from broader religious, social, and political concerns. Its topography might be used to express conflict (between the royal and priestly houses) and perhaps to instantiate a compromise in actual, rather than only ideational, mapping. To extend the horizon further, the temple was but one of many in the known world, each allied to one or other religion. Rituals of supplication or appeasement across an array of beliefs and to a diverse pantheon expressed human aspirations to view themselves as not powerless against natural disasters, military conflict, or other events. A felt need to categorise is an ancient one from which technological sophistication has not delivered us, but which it seems may have captured us.

When we think in cultic terms we become more aware of those figures who have the authority to name categories. Priests, prophets, perhaps kings are relatively easy to identify in the temple system. In the 21st century we might conclude that designation of categories of people as ‘risky’ or ‘trusted’ are partly political and effected by public pronouncement. That these declarations are made claiming ‘scientific’ or ‘statistical’ ‘objectivity may not be wholly untrue, but will not be wholly shorn of prejudice. Occult, hidden, knowledge held by a priestly caste seems to be mirrored in the secret, black-boxed, knowledge held today by the intelligence services or, in the case of analytical algorithms, by proprietary software companies. It is no less important nowadays to know who makes categorising decisions - and in whose interests; even, or in fact especially so, when the public cannot be given access to intelligence data.

The mental mapping of pure/impure categorisation was widely dispersed into everyday life. Domestic cooking, clothing, births, deaths, and even building regulations all fell, to varying extents, and to different intensities, under the sorting system of clean/unclean.
Attitudes of categorisation were dispersed into everyday life - such as, for example, those that drive the plot of the parable about the good Samaritan. This process suggests that today we become alert to how surveillance sorting and the consequent securitisation of identity is not confined to airports but contributes to our broader social imagination. The ideational map of the airport is shaped by wider public and political discourse but that map shapes what goes on in our heads, worked out then in our social attitudes to those deemed to be ‘risky persons’.

Theories of social identity tells us that categorisation is integral to how we structure our encounter with those outside our own group - it is not a process arising recently from cultures of surveillance by sorting (Tajfel 1981). Whilst a psychological process, categorisation has its political and material consequences (Jenkins 2000). My point here is that the construction of categories is never innocent nor is it objective. The analogy of temple-sorting serves as a salutary reminder of the power of those who can name categories into which people might be, correctly or incorrectly, placed. Although there exist legal routes for redress should a traveller believe she is being repeatedly and erroneously subject to additional screening the imbalance of power remains daunting. Furthermore, with our creation of gated communities and securitised educational premises (with controlled, surveilled access, sometimes with scanners to identify concealed weapons) the ‘airport’ as a paradigm of sorting is in our minds, far beyond the transportation hub.

4.2 Critique of the (Living) Temple

How, in the other direction, does the airport help us think more critically about our theological frameworks? What happens in an airport has to make us consider those theological perspectives that reinforce unjust, prejudicial categorisation. This is both a human and civil rights issue of justice - but it is also a profoundly theological challenge to Christians. The infamous ‘curse of Ham’ in Genesis has been used to legitimate the othering of black people in South Africa and the USA; despite it being uttered by a drunk Noah and never authorised by YHWH (Sadler jr. 2006). In the contemporary context, Christian contributions to the vilification of Muslims, or even ‘only’ casting aspersions against people of the Islamic faith are forced into the limelight when we consider airport surveillance. This is way beyond pietistic responses of Christians who ask God’s forgiveness for looking their Muslim fellow-passenger up and down as they stand together in the queue for security checks at the airport. We are confronted by the much more fundamental question of how Christian theologians, but particularly preachers, frame Muslims (Cook 2004-2005). At the moment, there are prominent Christians stoking irrational fear of Muslims; preachers with wide media profiles such as Pat Robertson (Majority Report 2015), Franklin Graham (Graham 2016) who gave a prayer at Donald’s Trump Presidential inauguration ceremony, and the senior minister of First Baptist Church in Dallas Texas, Robert Jeffress (Jeffress 2015) who preached at the pre-inauguration private service. Such narratives serve to legitimate disproportionate surveillance and, of course, are themselves fed by the very surveillance measures that people see in everyday, especially airport, life.
4.3 The Compassion Rather Than Purity Paradigm

What happens when we bring Jesus’ critique of holiness into the frame and draw on his alternative paradigm of compassion reaching over boundaries? To make one thing clear, it cannot mean a simplistic rejection of security screening, whether at airports or any other vulnerable locations. There are people of ill-intent and compassion demands that harm be prevented. However, the alternative paradigm of compassion places vestiges of clean/unclean frameworks in the spotlight because compassion pushes attention beyond the protection of tight, exclusive boundaried community. The ‘them and us’ mental mapping of purity paradigms, with its concomitant fear of pollution, reinforces prejudicial categorisation that perceives ‘them’ as ‘wholly bad’ and ‘us’ as ‘beyond reproach. Bauman’s warning is apposite here: it is too easy to sacrifice ‘their’ freedom, for ‘my’ security. Purity thinking encourages this othering that distances by defining others as strangers and therefore as threats. To have an effect, such viewpoints do not need to be expressed in active support of ethnic or religious categorisation and sorting. Attitudes may encourage silence towards prejudicial surveillance and, more worryingly still, render the privileged majority blind to how surveillance is being practiced. A purity paradigm looks inward, with a fundamental fear of contamination from the dangerous (perhaps chaotic) outside world.

5.0 Conclusion

The argument of this article is important because it confronts injustice, including elements of Christians’ complicity. It raises questions as to the extent to which Christians have been able to follow Jesus in breaking from a holiness as purity paradigm. Holiness understood instead as compassion need not be naive but looks outward and is suspicious of boundaries that demarcate and thus exclude. Compassion is attuned to what is happening to the ‘other’ with the intention of reaching over boundaries. Compassion wants to find out what the effects of its practices are upon those who are different. Peace-making - not driving an opponent into surrender - seeks to dismantle barriers to reconciliation. Even if there are enemies, Jesus’ injunction is to love. It seems bizarre to be re-iterating a fundamental teaching of the Gospels but that includes ‘terrorists’. A significant difficulty lies in the prevalent use of a category: terrorists. This offers media sound-bites for politicians but compassion reminds us that this, as any category, might have vividly described boundaries but those boundaries are mobile constructions, malleable to public opinion and political expediency.

Compassion is evident in resistance to ethnic or religious profiling on grounds that it is ineffective because it alienates valuable community-sources of intelligence. Whilst this may be a utilitarian argument in some cases there is a more humane dimension. ‘Them and us’ terminology is eschewed in favour of inclusive language that appreciates that, for example, Muslims are victims of ‘Muslim terrorists’ - as are Christians, humanists, and people of any faith for that matter. This sort of thinking is counter-cultural precisely of the power of the purity paradigm in public discourse at the moment.

When we step back from the airport to place it in its wider social context, racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice and hate-speech pervade prominent sectors of the media, political rhetoric, and in some cases political action. There is fear of cultural pollution and perhaps
even of religious pollution. This may be interwoven with patriotism or exclusive models of nationalism and exceptionalism.

Watching out, practising surveillance towards, wolves in sheep’s clothing would seem to chime readily with a purity paradigm, defensive of boundaries. It could be construed as an admission that the paradigm of holiness as compassion is a lovely idea but practically negligent. But what if the wolves are those inciting prejudice, who are intent on dragging the Jesus movement back into a holiness, defensive, categorising framework? Such wolves know that they need to insinuate themselves into the flock who would otherwise be alarmed at their retrograde teachings. Perhaps the wolves are systems of surveillance that purport to be objective, just, and immune to prejudice because they are ‘scientific’. Under the cover of faux-objectivity they conceal discriminatory assumptions, coded into algorithms and obscured by reliance on behaviour detection training. It is very difficult for minorities under categorical suspicion to challenge surveillance systems. There is a significant role for allies from within the majority community.

Interfaith organisations have been one avenue by which some Christian leaders have sought to exert their influence in criticism of alt-right ‘othering’ of racial/ethnic and religious minorities (Religions for Peace USA 2017). The National Council of Churches is in dialogue with the US Council of Muslim Organizations in a National Muslim-Christian Initiative. This group jointly called on President Trump to renounce his anti-Muslim tweets of December 2017 (National Council of Churches 2017). The Christian social justice movement, *Sojourners*, has been a prominent voice since the early 1970s and appreciate the complexities of offering solidarity as allies across racial/ethnic boundaries (Ariel 2017). This paper would suggest that confronting an abiding holiness-as-purity paradigm, re-configuring it towards holiness primarily framed as compassion is a vital, albeit difficult, dimension of resisting latent, and not so latent, Islamophobia amongst Christians.

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Figure 1